


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*Department  
of State*  
**bulletin**

Official Monthly Record of United States Foreign Policy / Volume 80 / Number 2034

January 1980



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**UNITED STATES**

# Department of State *bulletin*

Volume 80 / Number 2034 / January 1980

**Cover Photo:**

U.S. Ambassador to the United Nations Donald F. McHenry in the Security Council just before he addressed the Council on December 1, 1979. Seated behind him, from left to right first row, are Senator Frank Church and Congressman Clement J. Zablocki; in the second row are Congressman William S. Broomfield and Ambassador William vanden Heuvel, Deputy U.S. Representative to the United Nations.

(United Nations photo by M. Grant)

The Department of State Bulletin, published by the Office of Public Communication in the Bureau of Public Affairs, is the official record of U.S. foreign policy. Its purpose is to provide the public, the Congress, and government agencies with information on developments in U.S. foreign relations and the work of the Department of State and the Foreign Service.

The BULLETIN'S contents include major addresses and news conferences of the President and the Secretary of State; statements made before congressional committees by the Secretary and other senior State Department officials; special features and articles on international affairs; selected press releases issued by the White House, the Department, and the U.S. Mission to the United Nations; and treaties and other agreements to which the United States is or may become a party.

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Ambassador McHenry confers with Ambassador Kaiser of Bangladesh before the U.N. Security Council meeting on November



## News Conference of November 28

For the last 24 days, our nation's concern has been focused on our fellow Americans being held hostage in Iran. I have welcomed some of them home with their families and their friends. But I will not rest nor deviate from our efforts until all have been freed from their imprisonment and their abuse. We are confident that the Government of Iran fully responsible for the well-being and the return of every single person.

I want the American people to understand the situation as much as possible, but there may be some questions which I cannot answer fully because of my concern for the well-being of the hostages.

First of all, I would like to say that I am proud of this great nation, and I want to thank all Americans for their courage, their persistence, their strong support and patience. During these past days, our national will, our courage, and our security have all been severely tested. History will show that the people of the United States have met every test. In the days to come our determination may be even more sorely tried, but we will continue to defend the security, honor, and the freedom of America everywhere. This nation will never be sold to blackmail.

For all Americans our constant concern is the well-being and the safety of our fellow citizens who are being held unjustly and irresponsibly hostage in Iran. The actions of Iran have shocked and civilized world.

For a government to applaud mob violence and terrorism, for a government actually to support and, in effect, participate in the taking and the holding of hostages is unprecedented in American history. This violates not only the most fundamental precepts of international law but the common ethical and religious heritage of humanity. There is no recognized religious faith on Earth which condones kidnapping.

There is no recognized religious faith on Earth which condones blackmail. There are certainly no religious faith on Earth which condones the sustained abuse of innocent people.

We are deeply concerned about the dehuman and degrading conditions imposed on the hostages. From every corner of the world, nations and people have voiced their strong revulsion and condemnation of Iran and have joined in calling for the release of the hostages.

Last night a statement of support was released and was issued by the President of the U.N. General Assembly, the Security Council, on behalf of all of its members. We expect a further Security Council meeting on Saturday night, at which more firm and official action may be taken to help in obtaining the release of the American hostages.

Any claims raised by government officials of Iran will ring hollow while they keep innocent people bound and abused and threatened. We hope that this exercise of diplomacy and international law will bring a peaceful solution, because a peaceful solution is preferable to the other remedies available to the United States.

At the same time, we pursue such a solution with grim determination. The Government of Iran must recognize the gravity of the situation which it has itself created and the grave consequences which will result if harm comes to any of the hostages.

I want the American people to know, and I want the world to know, that we will persist in our efforts, through every means available, until every single American has been freed. We must also recognize now, as we never have before, that it is our entire nation which is vulnerable because of our overwhelming and excessive dependence on oil from foreign countries. We have got to accept the fact that this dependence is a direct, physical threat to our national security. And we must join together to fight for our nation's energy freedom.

We know the ways to win this war: more American energy and the more efficient use of what we have. The U.S. Congress is now struggling with this extremely important decision. The way to victory is long and difficult, but we have the will and we have the human and the natural resources of our great nation. However hard it might be to see into the future, one thing tonight is clear: We stand together.

We stand as a nation unified, a people determined to protect the life and the honor of every American. And we are determined to make America an energy secure nation once again. It is unthinkable that we will allow ourselves to be dominated by any form of overdependence at home or any brand

of terrorism abroad. We are determined that the freest nation on Earth shall protect and enhance its freedom.

**Q. The Ayatollah Khomeini said the other day—and I'm using his words—he doesn't believe you have the guts to use military force. He puts no credibility in our military deterrent. I'm wondering how do we get out of this mess in Iran and still retain credibility with our allies and with our adversaries overseas?**

A. We have the full support of our allies, and in this particular instance we have no adversaries overseas. There is no civilized country on Earth which has not condemned the seizure and the holding of the hostages by Iran. It would not be advisable for me to explore publicly all of the options open to our country. As I said earlier, I'm determined to do the best I can through diplomatic means and through peaceful means to insure the safety of our hostages and their release. Other actions which I might decide to take would come in the future after those peaceful means have been exhausted.

But I believe that the growing condemnation of the world community on Iran will have a beneficial effect.

**Q. Why did you reverse your policy and permit the Shah to come into this country when, one, medical treatment was available elsewhere; two, you had been warned by our Charge that the Americans might be endangered in Tehran; and three, the Bazargan government was so shaky that it was questionable whether he could deliver on the promise to protect our Embassy; and last of all, in view of the consequences do you regret the decision?**

A. No, the decision that I made personally and without pressure from anyone to carry out the principles of our country, to provide for the means of giving the Shah necessary medical assistance to save his life, was proper. At the same time we notified the Government of Iran. We were assured by the Prime Minister and the Foreign Minister that our Embassy would be protected, and it was protected for several days, in spite of threats from outside.

Then peremptorily, after Khomeini made an aggravating speech to the crowds in the street and withdrew protection from the Embassy, it was attacked successfully. The Embassy was

protected by our people for the length of time possible without help from the host government. No embassy on Earth is a fortress that can withstand constant attacks by a mob unless a host government comes to the rescue of the people within the embassy.

But I took the right decision. I have no regrets about it nor apologies to make because it did help to save a man's life, and it was compatible with the principles of our country.

**Q. We appear to be in a rather dangerous period of international tension and volatility, especially in the Islamic world, and it comes at a time when we're about to embark on our quadrennial election campaign, with all that that will bring. Have you given any thought to whether, following examples of other national emergencies, it may be wise to try to mute the political fallout of this by trying to bring opponents in and outside of your party into some kind of emergency coalition for this purpose?**

A. We have attempted to keep the political leaders in our nation informed, both publicly and through other channels. We have given frequent briefings, for instance, on the Hill, both to the Members of the Senate and to the House. We have encouraged all of those who have become announced candidates for president to restrain their comments which might be misconstrued overseas and to have a maximum degree of harmony among those who might be spokesmen for our country. I, myself, in order to stay close to the scene here where constantly changing events could be handled by me as President, have eliminated the major portion of political oriented activities.

I don't think the identity of the Islamic world is a factor. We have the deepest respect and reverence for Islam and for all those who share the Moslem faith. I might say that so far as I know, all the Islamic nations have joined us in condemning the activities and the actions of the Government of Iran. So I don't think religious divisions are a factor here at all.

But I will have to continue to restrict my own political activities and call on those who might be opposing me in the future for president to support my position as President and to provide unity for our country and for our nation in the eyes of those who might be looking for some sign of weakness or division in order to perpetuate their abuse of our hostages.

**Q. What can the United States do now; what can it do to prevent future**

**incidents of the nature of Iran? How can you satisfy the public demand to end such embarrassment?**

A. This is an unprecedented and unique occurrence. Down through history, we have had times when some of our people were captured by terrorists or who were abused, and they have obviously been instances of international kidnapping which occurred for the discomfort of a people or a government. So far as I know, this is the first time that such an activity has been encouraged by and supported by the government itself. And, I don't anticipate this kind of thing recurring.

We have taken steps already, in view of the disturbances in the Middle East and the Persian Gulf region, to guard our people more closely, to provide them with a higher degree of security, and to make arrangements with the host government to provide assistance if it's needed in the fastest possible way.

Many other nations have reduced severely the number of persons overseas. I think one of the points that should be made is that a year ago, we had 70,000 Americans in Iran—70,000. There were literally thousands of people who were killed in the Iranian revolution, from all nations.

We were able to extract Americans from Iran safely. It was a superb demonstration of cooperation and good conduct on the part of the State Department and other American officials. There will be disturbances in the future, but I think we are well protected as we possibly can be without withdrawing into a shell from protecting American interests in nations overseas.

My own experience, so far, has been that the leaders of nations have recommitted themselves to provide security for embassies of all countries. I think we've learned a lesson from this instance. But, because it is so unique, in the high degree of irresponsibility of the Iranian Government leaders, I don't believe that we'll see another reoccurrence of it any time soon.

**Q. Former Secretary of State Kissinger has criticized your Administration's handling of the situation in Iran. He has suggested that it came about because, partly because of the procedure—a weakness in American foreign policy and that it has further damaged America's image as a result. How do you respond?**

A. I would rather not respond. There's no reason for me to get into a

public debate at this time with former Secretary Kissinger about who is or who is not responsible for the events that took place in Iran. Obviously, what has occurred could not have been predicted. And for 30 years, our country has had a relationship with a fairly stable government there. The changes took place very rapidly. So far as I know, no one on Earth predicted the And, I think it's not becoming at this moment, and not conducive to better American understanding, to get involved in answering allegations that or someone else may have been culpable and may have caused a further aggravation of a very difficult situation.

**Q. What role did the former Secretary play in your decision to permit the Shah into the country?**

A. None. I did not hear at all from the Secretary—former Secretary Kissinger nor did he contact Secretary Vance at any time during the days when we were deciding that the Shah should come into the United States for medical care to save his life. In previous weeks and months, since the Shah was deposed, Secretary Kissinger and many others let it be known that they thought that we should provide a hospital for the Shah. But Secretary Kissinger played no role in my decision to permit the Shah to come in for medical treatment.

**Q. Speaking of the Shah, if he were well enough to travel, would you permit him to leave the country?**

A. That's a decision to be made by the Shah and by his medical adviser. When he decided to come to our country, with my permission, I was informed then, and I have been informed since, that as soon as his medical treatment was successfully completed that his intention was to leave. And have not encouraged him to leave; he was free to come here for medical treatment, and he will leave on his own volition.

**Q. The consequences of the crisis in Iran is drifting the United States to almost a cold war with the Islamic countries. Watching TV news for 3 days, Americans soon will believe the whole Moslem world is hating them. Moreover, they are not told that the Shiites are a very minor minority among the population of the Islamic world, because the most majority is Sunni. Don't you think you get an help from any Islamic country, an what will your policy be toward the Islamic countries under these circumstances?**



A. The premise of your question is completely wrong. We are not attacking any sort of cold war with the muck countries. So far as I know, any Islamic country has condemned us for its capture of our hostages and been very supportive.

This includes Moslem nations which, in the past, have not been close friends of ours—Iraq, Libya, and others. So I don't see this as a confrontation at all between our nation and the Islamic world. It's certainly not part of Islamic faith to condone, as I said earlier, blackmail or the persecution or imprisonment of innocent people or kidnapping or terrorism.

So I think that we have a very good relationship with the people and the governments of the Islamic world, and I don't think it's deteriorated in this incident. In some ways we've been drawn closer to these people, because they see that there has occurred in Iran as something of a disgrace for their own religious beliefs, and they don't see this as typical of what Moslems believe.

I might add also that this is not peculiar to the Shiite faith either. It's the unaided actions of a few people in Iran who are burning with hatred and a desire for revenge, completely contrary to the teachings of the Moslem faith.

**Q. There's a feeling of hostility throughout the country toward Iran because of the hostages. Senator [Name] said that the taking of our Embassy in Iran, in his words, is an act of war. There are rumors, since December, that our Navy has been called up for service. I ask you, as our Commander in Chief, is war possible? Is it thinkable?**

A. It would be a mistake for the people of our country to have aroused in them hatred toward anyone; not just the people of Iran and certainly not against Iranians who may be in our country as our guests. We certainly do not want to be guilty of the same violation of human decency and basic human principles that have proven so embarrassing to many of the Iranian citizens themselves.

We obviously prefer to see our hostages protected and released completely through peaceful means. And that is my deepest commitment, and that will be my goal. The United States has other options available to it which should be considered, depending upon the circumstances. But I think it would not be well-advised for me to speak of those options tonight.

**Q. We have had 55,000 Iranian students in this country. We've been very good to them, very hospitable. Even the new Finance Minister of Saudi Arabia was a student who once demonstrated in Washington against law and order. Shouldn't we be very careful in letting any of these students come in here? Shouldn't we screen them in the future and make them agree that they will not demonstrate?**

A. It's very difficult for an Iranian citizen or a student to get a visa at the American Embassy in Iran at this time. [Laughter] And I think the influx of Iranians to our country now would be minimal.

I'm determined to enforce the law about Iranian students. Some of them have violated the law; they are now being screened, they are being assessed in their commitment and the legality of their presence here. We have already finished this procedure with more than 22,000. About 17,000 have proven to be here completely legally and are, indeed, full-time students. Among the other 5,000, about several hundred have already departed. Others are now having to prove that, contrary to the earliest evidence, they do, indeed, have a right to be in our country. If they are here illegally, they will be expelled.

There is one exception to that rule. If a citizen of Iran can prove that if he or she returned to Iran that they would be executed or abused because of their political beliefs, they can seek asylum here. And if that asylum, in our judgment, is justified, we will provide it for them. But this procedure is going forward in accordance with American law, in accordance with American fairness, in accordance with the full principles of the U.S. Constitution.

**Q. Can this crisis go on indefinitely or ought the Ayatollah Khomeini understand that at some point the American people may demand and other nations may expect that you move forward to resolve it by whatever means you find necessary?**

A. It would not be possible or even advisable for me to set a deadline about when or if I would take certain action in the future. This is an ever-present consideration on my mind. I'm carrying out all of the duties that normally fall on a President's shoulders, which are adequate, but I never forget one moment that I'm awake about the hostages whose lives and whose safety depend on me, and I am pursuing every possible avenue to have the hostages released.

Any excessive threats or any excessive belief among the Iranians that they will be severely damaged by military action as long as these negotiations are proceeding and as long as legalities can be followed might cause the death of the hostages, which we are committed to avoid. So that's one of the questions that I cannot answer, to set down a certain deadline beyond which we would take extra action that might result in the harm or the death of the hostages.

We are proceeding, I guarantee you, in every possible way, every possible moment, to get the hostages freed and at the same time protect the honor and the integrity and the basic principles of our country. That's all I can do. But I'm doing it to the best of my ability, and I believe we will be successful.

**Q. Many Americans view the Iranian situation as one in a succession of events that proves that this country's power is declining. How can you assure Americans tonight that our power is not declining abroad, and how are you reassessing priorities for the 1980s in terms of foreign policy?**

A. The United States has neither the ability nor the will to dominate the world, to interfere in the internal affairs of other nations, to impose our will on other people whom we desire to be free, to make their own decisions. This is not part of the commitment of the United States.

Our country is the strongest on Earth. We're the strongest militarily, politically, economically, and I think we're the strongest morally and ethically. Our country has made great strides even since I've been in office. I've tried to correct some of the defects that did exist. We have strengthened the military alliances of our country, for instance. NATO now has a new spirit, a new confidence, a new cohesion, improving its military capabilities, much more able to withstand any threat from the East—from the Soviet Union or the Warsaw Pact—than it was before.

We've espoused again the principles that unite Americans and make us admired throughout the world, raising the banner of human rights. We're going to keep it high. We have opened up avenues of communication, understanding, trade with people that formerly were our enemies or excluded us—several nations in Africa, the vast people and the vast country of the People's Republic of China.

## Report on the Transport of Air Pollutants

In doing so we've not alienated any of our previous friends. I think our country is strong within itself. There is not an embarrassment now about our government which did exist in a few instances in years gone by. So I don't see at all that our country has become weak. We are strong and we are getting stronger, not weaker.

But if anybody thinks that we can dominate other people with our strength—military or political strength or economic strength—they are wrong. That's not the purpose of our country.

Our inner strength, our confidence in ourselves, I think, is completely adequate. And I believe the unity that the American people have shown in this instance, their patience, is not at all a sign of weakness. It is a sign of sure strength.

**Q. Serious charges have been placed against the Shah concerning the repression of his own people and the misappropriation of his nation's funds. Is there an appropriate vehicle to investigate those charges, and do you foresee a time when you would direct your Administration to assist in that investigation?**

A. I don't know of any international forum within which charges have ever been brought against a deposed leader who has left his country. There have been instances of changing governments down through the centuries in history, and I don't know of any instance where such a leader who left his country after his government fell has been tried in an international court or in an international forum. This is a matter that can be pursued. It should be pursued under international law, and if there is a claim against the Shah's financial holdings, there is nothing to prevent other parties from going into the courts in accordance with the law of a nation or internationally and seeking a redress of grievances which they claim.

But as I said earlier, I don't think there's any forum that will listen to the Iranians make any sort of claim, justified or not, as long as they hold against their will and abuse the hostages in complete contravention to every international law and every precept or every commitment or principle of humankind. ■

Text from Weekly Compilation of Presidential Documents of Dec. 3, 1979.

*For other documentation pertaining to the situation in Iran, see p. 37. For Ambassador McHenry's statements and the text of the Security Council resolution, see p. 49.*

The Department of State on October 15, 1979, announced the release of the first annual report of the U.S.-Canada Research Consultation Group on the long-range transport of air pollutants.<sup>1</sup> The release was simultaneously announced in Ottawa by the Canadian Department of External Affairs.

In recognition of its increasing significance, the two governments requested the group to provide them with a clear and concise statement of the nature of the pollutants problem, as well as of its impact on the environment of eastern North America. Such a report was to provide a synthesis of existing scientific information which would make it accessible and understandable to the nonspecialist community of interested persons. It was also recognized that such a report would be of assistance in the ongoing discussions on transboundary air quality.

Research programs in both countries are at an early stage and have benefitted from the coordinating efforts of the group. The data in the report and the conclusions which it advances are of a preliminary nature. The governments are providing this information to the public to encourage discussion of this important bilateral environmental issue. Further reports from the Research Consultation Group are expected in the future.

The bilateral Research Consultation Group was formed in October 1978 through an exchange of letters between the Embassy of Canada and the U.S. Department of State. The group is to consult on ongoing research efforts in Canada and the United States and to facilitate a full exchange of technical information on the long-range transport of air pollutants. Among the responsibilities of the group are:

1. Analysis of currently instituted programs and those under development to determine where gaps may exist in the information base relating to the occurrence and effects of long-range transport of air pollutants;

2. Promotion of measures necessary to insure the intercomparability of data generated by programs in both countries;

3. Promotion of the dissemination of appropriate data and research information;

4. Tendering advice and recommendations to the appropriate agencies in the two governments with respect to

modification of existing research programs and/or development of new research programs; and

5. Preparation of a yearly status report to both governments and other reports as deemed necessary.

The group is cochaired by a representative of Environment Canada and of the U.S. Environmental Protection Agency and is comprised of representatives of a number of Canadian and U.S. agencies with research interests related to pollutants. The group has had two plenary meetings since its formation, well as frequent contact between researchers in particular specialties. ■

Press release 264.

<sup>1</sup> Copies of the report may be obtained from Mr. Conrad Kleveno, Environment Protection Agency, Washington, D.C. 20460.

## rs. Carter Visits Thailand

*At the request of the President, Rosalynn Carter visited Thailand October 7-10, 1979, to observe first the plight of refugees there, particularly the conditions of Kampuchean refugees. Following are remarks made by the President, Reverend Theodore Hesburgh, Chairman of the Select Commission on Immigration and Refugee Policy, and Mrs. Carter at a White House meeting on relief efforts Mrs. Carter's trip.<sup>1</sup>*

### PRESIDENT CARTER

I'm very grateful that all of you come to the White House to talk about one of the most important issues facing humanity and will face it in lifetime. It's a rare occasion in an memory when there has been a ability of holocaust, threatening to roy an entire race of people. It ended, perhaps, in the time of the emians, earlier in this century, and, of course, among Jews and others e time of Hitler, and now among e people of Cambodia, or Kampuchea, 's presently known.

There also is a rare occasion when e life of a great nation, its govern- t and its people can react in an un- sh, dynamic, and effective way to iate extraordinary human suffer- such as the case, again, with the ees and the starving people of the odian region.

I was very pleased that the three tors, then my wife and Dr. mond [Julius B. Richmond, Assist- Secretary for Health and Surgeon eral, Public Health Service], Mrs. ng [Jean Young, Chairperson, U.S. mission on the International Year e Child] and her group, and now a p of Congresswomen and others e been to that region to dramatize eed for action, and also to bring tangible recommendations on how suffering might be alleviated more- tively.

It's a difficult issue to resolve. e are major obstacles to overcome: acles of war, over which we have no rd in that long-troubled part of the d; the issue of diplomatic bridges e very hard to cross; and also, of se, the very serious problems in inistration, in dealing with the aocratic needs, to derive help from e eager to give and actually to de- t effectively to those who are t in need.

Rosalynn and Senators Danforth, Baucus, and Sasser, Dr. Richmond, and others have brought back very specific recommendations on what might be done.<sup>2</sup> I'm not going to try to preempt their reports to you. They can make their reports much better than can I. I'm one of those who is listening, and, like you, I am eager to act in accord- ance with the best interests of those who are crying out for assistance.

There are three basic areas of re- sponse: One is the U.S. Government itself—and the Congress has reacted very well in approving almost \$70 million worth of aid. And I will go to the Congress for additional aid if it's neces- sary.

Second is an appeal to private or- ganizations, volunteer organizations of all kinds, represented by many of you here. That's a resource of assistance which is eager to be tapped and which has already done yeoman's work, even before governmental help could be effective.

And the third recommendation is concerning international relationships. And I would like to caution you about that: This is a judgment and a decision that we can't make in this room.

One of the vivid reports that Rosalynn brought back to me was that quite often a U.S. initiative is counter- productive in the eventual carrying out of a recommendation. If the initiative comes from one of the less developed nations of the world or comes directly from the United Nations or, perhaps, comes from other countries than we, it's much more effective.

So, I would like to urge you to re- strain your own inclinations to give public condemnation or public advice on what the Vietnamese ought to do, what the warring parties in Kampuchea ought to do, what the United Nations ought to do. Let that be handled through diplomatic channels. I can as- sure you that I will not permit these efforts to be abandoned or ignored. But I think that the public calling for action might be the very thing that would prevent that action being carried out. That's my only caution to you.

I have a second one—I forgot. I think the more all of us forgo credit for action to be taken, the more effective the effort will be. There is a great yearning, I know, within the U.S. Government, within the Red Cross, within UNICEF, within Catholic Charities, within the Protestant churches, within benevolent groups, to want to give aid and then have that assistance be pub-

licly acknowledged and recognized. That is a human trait, but the more we can subjugate those natural, human de- sires for quiet giving and close coopera- tion with others, with a minimum of jealousy and a minimum of grasping for recognition, the more effective we'll all be.

I'm sure that's a cautionary word that you don't need, because there's an overwhelming unselfishness and be- nevolent attitude among this group. And you've taken the initiative, and there's been no evidence of a grasping for recognition. But in the future, this is going to be a long, slow, tedious process, and that needs to be recog- nized and avoided.

The last point I'd like to make is this: The Thai people and the Thai Gov- ernment both deserve every possible recognition, expression of gratitude, and thanks. They are a poor country. Many of the Thai people suffer terribly from poverty, disease, and hunger. It's not a popular political thing to bring in enormous numbers of refugees from an alien and antagonistic country, who's been historical enemies on occasion, and still not arouse the condemnation of the Thais, who themselves suffer.

This has been a very great demon- stration of both kindness and also cour- age, political courage. I know that this is something that you'll want to help with. The Thais are not able to accept literally hundreds of thousands of refu- gees into their country and feed those refugees on their own. We've got to be especially generous to the Thais in our thanks and in our direct help and the recognition of what they are contribut- ing.

I look forward with great eager- ness to the summary of your recom- mendations. I will be getting it through the National Security Council, and through my wife, who always has easy access to me. And I think that her in- volvement is one that can be of help to you as well. She'll be working with the wives of Senators and other Members of Congress, and female Members of Congress. She will also be working with any of you who want her to help, in providing an avenue to the public and also an avenue directly to me.

But I'm very grateful to all of you for being willing to come. I think this will be one of the most important meetings ever taking place in the White House. And I'm grateful that I am President of people like you.



## REVEREND HESBURGH

Just short of 3 weeks ago, on October 24, this same group of leaders from our various religious faiths and from the various private voluntary organizations met in Washington to discuss what we might do together and in concert to meet the tragedy in Cambodia. The purpose was to consult how the American people, how the American Government, and how the United Nations might best respond to avoid what appeared to be a growing holocaust, already half accomplished, if you will.

We called on the voluntary agencies, first of all, to increase their efforts and to work together to help the Cambodians. We urged Americans to provide them all with financial support, and in a special letter to the President we urged greater U.S. Government efforts in order to assist, as quickly and as effectively as possible, this people in great need.

We met that same day at the White House with the President, and never was a letter answered more quickly.<sup>3</sup> Hardly before the letter was in his hands, he granted us all of the various requests we had for increased aid and said he was willing to do whatever else might be necessary to do to avert this holocaust.

I think today, in the light of the appeal made by United Nations Children's Fund—UNICEF—the International Committee of the Red Cross, the appeals by all of our various voluntary agencies for more than \$300 million for Cambodian relief, and after the generous and immediate response of the President of the United States voiced by our Secretary of State, Mr. Vance, at the pledging conference of the United States on Monday, November 5, when many of you were present, and I too, it seemed to us that the time was now appropriate to update our October 24 meeting in an effort to relieve the growing misery of the Cambodians.

It was again against this same background as our last meeting that I, as chairman of the Overseas Development Council, and cochaired by the Reverend Paul McLeary, who is chairman of the American Council on Voluntary Agencies, that we invited this group again, on very short notice, to this second consultation to exchange information on the situation in Thailand and Cambodia after other relief is taking place there.

In this second consultation we have four things we would like to do: first, to find out what the various agencies are now doing; second, what they are plan-

ning to do for the near term future; third, what fundraising efforts have been undertaken to date; and fourth, what are the various bottlenecks and needs that we have to move forward quickly and efficiently. There is, of course, a fifth topic which I'm sure will emerge from our discussion with Mrs. Carter, and that is how can we improve and institutionalize exchange of information among ourselves and coordination of the various activities—governmental and nongovernmental and intergovernmental—here and overseas.

It seems to me that the vigor of the pluralistic American response to this Cambodian tragedy is most welcome, but it does raise for all of us a great challenge to work together and, as the President just said, to work together without seeking praise in so doing.

I would like to say that the visit to Cambodia and Thailand in October by Senators Danforth, Sasser, and Baucus, who are here with us this morning, on my left, your right, and also the various Governors and the Congresswomen and, most particularly, of our First Lady, Mrs. Carter—all of this has heightened and increased the consciousness of Americans for the need of all of the generous action we might put forward to alleviate this growing tragedy.

May I say, Mrs. Carter, in introducing you, that we are looking forward to hearing the report from you and your colleagues on the situation with respect to Cambodian refugees in Thailand, and any other recommendations or questions you may have of this group, which represents, I think, the cream of the private voluntary effort. After your comments we will be hearing from all of these various agencies active in Cambodia on the questions posed earlier, and we are looking forward later in the day to discussing our conclusions further with you.

Mrs. Carter, it's with real pride and great satisfaction that I'd like to present you.

## MRS. CARTER

Thank you very much. I'm very pleased to have you all here today. I welcome you.

I did go to Cambodia, and I'm very happy to have this opportunity to report to you about my trip, and also to thank you for what you have done already and for what you continue to do,

and to work with you on ways that we can better help those who are suffering in this area of the world.

As the President has said, I went to Thailand on his behalf to express to profound concern of the people of our country for the tragedy that is unfolding in Indochina. My visit was very brief, but I think I can say positively that it was one of the most significant events of my life. I came away filled with admiration for the representativity of your organizations who are there struggling with this massive problem relief for thousands and thousands of human beings who are starving and homeless and ill and bereaved. And came away also, as Jimmy said, filled with gratitude for the efforts of the people of Thailand and for the Government of Thailand.

And I'm sure that every person this room knows what faces us in the coming weeks. The problem is one that is not going away any time soon. We will be faced with it for a long time. While our international efforts have brought vast improvements—and I see in the refugee camp at Sakeo some beginnings of hope for those few who have been brought back from the very edge of death. The camp, since the time that the Senators were there, has really made progress; in fact, some people told us that a miracle had happened the last few weeks. The camp is only about 3 weeks old, but people are being fed and are being taken care of in the camp now. You will have a further report on that from some of those who went with me.

But the picture in the near future looks very bleak, because a wave of new refugees is expected to come across the border into Thailand from Kampuchea—a number estimated at where from 100,000 to 250,000, maybe 300,000—that are now right at the border, that are expected to come now that the dry season is here and the fighting has begun again. They will be pushed over into Thailand.

And for those of us who have seen with our own eyes the dimension of the problem and the terrible suffering at starvation, the thought of so many more people in the same situation will be coming into Thailand is almost more than you can bear, when you are there and look at it.

I'd like to tell you briefly about my trip. I was accompanied by some of those here that are here at that head table, who will be reporting to you about. Some of us worked together; some of us dispersed so that we could gather more information, because we were only there for a few hours, a day, 2 days.

We went to the refugee camps in inland, Kampeuchea, that I have already talked about, Sakeo. We witnessed the disease, the dislocation of sons, suffering, starvation. We saw young, young and old. We saw children rated from their parents, afflicted malaria and malnutrition.

In the camp at Ubon, for refugees in Laos, conditions were substantially better. There are approximately 100 persons there. That camp is 4 or 5 years old. They eat well, but they get out of the camp. They have stayed there, some for 3 or 4 years, waiting to be resettled abroad. And although the living conditions are somewhat better than Sakeo, they are still anything that you would call good. It is sad to see them with no purpose. They at first thought they might get back into Laos. Now they know they don't, or don't want to. And they're waiting to be resettled, some of them thinking that they've been forgotten by the world, because the focus has been on the Kampucheans, the focus has been on the boat people. And these people really feel forgotten. I was touched by them. And one of the girls who worked with me said that one of the main problems they have with these people is mental depression, just waiting day to day for 4 or 5 years, waiting to see what happens to them. At the transit center, the refugee processing center in Bangkok, we saw crowded and humiliating conditions for refugees awaiting final processing or immigration must endure. These are things that I don't think I'll ever forget. These were people who have already been chosen to go to other countries and have to wait in an unbelievable place, some for a month and a half months. We try to process ours, ones that are coming to the United States, much earlier, but still the conditions are unbearable.

While we were there in Bangkok, we had candid discussions with representatives of the international volunteer organizations to discuss their needs, their frustrations, and the need for better coordination. We did have a very good meeting, and everybody, I think, vented their frustrations, and everybody decided that there was a real need for coordination.

We met with the King and Queen of Thailand to discuss the whole spectrum of the refugee problem and the need for better sites, because we must have better sites for this 200,000-300,000 people expected to come into Thailand

from Cambodia—and they're expected to come in in the next 3 or 4 weeks. The situation is urgent.

We had a long discussion with Prime Minister Kriangsak, a fruitful discussion, about the political and foreign policy risks that are facing the Thai Government because of their policies. It is important that the international community provide visible and demonstrable political, economic, and security support to the Thais.

As we flew back to Washington, we got together on the airplane and worked on our report for the President, which stresses the urgency of the situation, and we did lay out some specific recommendations. We will give you that report this morning. In fact, you have in your brochure a folder with our recommendations in it.

We need your careful consideration of our recommendations. We need your creative ideas for how to implement them, your support, and your consensus. I do not know when I have ever felt a sense of urgency more about cutting redtape and unblocking logjams and moving ahead.

I think I can say with some assurance that the American people are ready to help. They are already mobilizing help as you here indicate, and as I have seen and heard through my mail and telephone calls and with people in the whole country concerned about this problem. But they need to know how to help, and they need to know now. They need to know where to turn; they need to know that now. They need to know what is needed, and it's our responsibility to give the people of our country specific information about ways they can reach out to their fellow man. We cannot lose time. Time is—the situation is urgent.

I understand that most of you who are here have prepared briefing papers about your programs and your problems. I know that you will be addressing yourselves to this issue throughout the day, and I look forward to being with you again at the end of the afternoon so that I can have a report for the things that you talk about during the day.

But now I want to call on the members of my traveling party, who've brought back new information which might be helpful to you. Then I would like to share—after we get through with the reports we will look at the rec-

ommendations, and I can tell you then some of the steps that we are already taking to implement some of these recommendations. ■

<sup>1</sup> Text from Weekly Compilation of Presidential Documents of Nov. 19, 1979.

<sup>2</sup> For text of the Senators' report, see BULLETIN of Dec. 1979, p. 4.

<sup>3</sup> For text of the President's announcement on Oct. 24, see BULLETIN of Dec. 1979, p. 7.

## Pacific Basin

by David D. Newsom

*Excerpts from an address before the Pacific Basin Economic Council in Los Angeles on May 15, 1979. Ambassador Newsom is Under Secretary for Political Affairs. The full text of this address may be obtained from the Public Information Service, Bureau of Public Affairs, Department of State, Washington, D.C. 20520.<sup>1</sup>*

" . . . the Pacific Basin [is] a part of the world where, for the United States, at least, the positive elements outnumber the negative. In this area, ancient protagonists appear prepared to talk to each other—with mediators. Clearly, regional cooperation is more than a slogan. The problem in many countries of the region is not how to stimulate growth but how to control it and direct it.

"[Normalization of relations with the People's Republic of China] is of major significance not only for our two countries but for the longer term peace and stability of Asia. Already we are well into a large agenda of trade, legal, and cultural discussions with the Chinese. Of equal importance, we are moving into a better understanding of others' points of view on global issues.

"In the satisfaction of our renewed communication with China, we should not forget that we continue to be two nations quite different in character and with often different perceptions of events in Asia and around the world. We should not be surprised if occasional problems and disappointments arise.

"We have rough spots in our relations with Japan but almost exclusively in the economic field. . . . We are both mindful that the United States and Japan are now the world's two largest non-Communist economies. . . . Considering the breadth of economic contacts and some basic differences in the way the two economies work, it is not

unnatural that we should have problems."

"The Soviet Union, after the collapse of its major effort in Indonesia in the 1960s, had relatively little impact on Southeast Asia. The active Soviet support for the Vietnamese invasion of Kampuchea threatens to change that. Soviet naval vessels have called at Vietnamese ports. A Soviet airlift has brought extensive supplies to Vietnam. The possibility of greater use by Soviet air and naval forces of facilities in Vietnam would be disturbing, not only to us but to the Japanese and other nations in the area concerned both about the security of sealanes and about preventing major power confrontation in Asia."<sup>1</sup>

<sup>1</sup> Press release 132.

## World Efforts To Aid Kampucheans

**International Appeal**—launched Nov. 5, 1979, at U.N. pledging conference

**International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC)-UNICEF**

Relief for 2.5 million Khmer in Kampuchea for 1 year

\$251,000,000

**U.N. High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR)**

Relief for Khmer fleeing to Thailand for 8 months

\$60,000,000

\$311,000,000

\$210,000,000

### Estimated Pledges

#### ICRC-UNICEF

From mid-October to November 22, ICRC-UNICEF operated a daily airlift from Bangkok to Phnom Penh and received additional flights which brought in 886 metric tons (MT) of relief supplies. By November 18, ICRC-UNICEF, working through the World Food Program (WFP), landed food supplies at Kompong Som port, which, combined with Oxfam shipments, totaled 10,030 MT. Phnom Penh authorities agreed November 4 to open the Mekong River to relief supplies. An Oxfam barge and a French barge, *Ile de Lamone*, were able to land 2,510 MT at Phnom Penh via the Mekong route. ICRC-UNICEF projects it will reach a monthly goal of 34,500 MT of food supplies during January 1980. Relief efforts are particularly impeded by political restrictions on the radius of distribution and quantity of relief agency personnel. Further, ICRC-UNICEF advises that despite pledges made at the U.N. conference, a critical need for cash funding for the relief effort now exists.

#### U.N. Response

Currently estimated U.S. contribution

|    |            |                               |
|----|------------|-------------------------------|
| \$ | 925,000    | (FY 1979 funds)               |
|    | 25,000,000 | (PL 480 food commodities)     |
|    | 5,000,000  | (cash grant to ICRC-UNICEF)   |
|    | 15,000,000 | (UNHCR for Khmer in Thailand) |
|    | 30,000,000 | (new funds) <sup>1</sup>      |
|    | 30,000,000 | (reprogramming authority)     |

Total **\$105,925,000**

As of late November, the U.S. Government had expended \$20,257,830 and had either shipped or is in the process of preparing \$25,000,000 worth of PL 480 commodities in response to WFP requests. Detailed breakdown follows:

|                      | Amount  | To/For  |    |
|----------------------|---|---|----|
| <b>Kampuchea</b>     | \$5,000,000                                     | ICRC-UNICEF for start-up costs  | 1  |
|                      | 2,000,000                                       | UNICEF for rice purchases   | 1  |
|                      | 25,000,000                                      | WFP request for PL 480 commodities. Activity to date:   |    |
|                      |   | <b>Kampuchea</b> —U.S. Department of Agriculture purchases 10,000 MT rice; 2,500 MT en route, remainder arrives late December; 3,781 MT nonfat dry milk (NFDM) to arrive December; 1,000 MT vegetable oil to arrive December. |    |
|                      |   | <b>Thailand</b> —45 MT instant corn-soya-milk (ICSM) arrived Bangkok 11/12; 2,000 MT corn-soya-milk to arrive December; 1,000 MT vegetable oil; 1,000 MT NFDM—2 shipments arriving November/December.                         |    |
| <b>Thailand</b>      | \$ 300,000 <sup>2</sup>                         | ICRC grant for border feeding   |    |
|                      | 625,000 <sup>2</sup>                            | Catholic Relief Services, border feeding  |    |
|                      | 9,000,000                                       | UNHCR for care and maintenance of Khmer   | 1  |
|                      | 100,000   | Thai Red Cross, donation by Mrs. Carter   | 1  |
|                      | 450,000   | UNHCR for 800 tents   | 10 |
|                      | 290,000   | WFP grant for leasing trucks  | 1  |
|                      | 2,500   | WFP grant to pay for engineer   | 1  |
|                      | 500,000   | Catholic Relief Services, border feeding  | 10 |
|                      | 407,830 <sup>3</sup>                            | Special airlift medical/relief supplies per President's 11/13 decision; arrived Bangkok 11/20   |    |
|                      | 168,000   | Air transport cost for 11/12 airlift of ICSM to Bangkok   |    |
|                      | 27,000  | ICRC for two field labs   | 1  |
|                      | 250,000   | U.S. Embassy Bangkok for emergency funds for Khmer relief   | 1  |
|                      | 95,000  | UNHCR for communications equipment  | 1  |
|                      | 512,500   | WFP for food processing   | 1  |
| 20,000               | Medical survey team for Khmer camps in Thailand | 1   |    |
| 600,000 <sup>3</sup> | Airlift cost for cranes—UNICEF                  | 1   |    |
| <b>Total</b>         | <b>\$45,317,830</b>                             |   |    |

Press release 312, Nov. 30, 1979. <sup>1</sup> Not yet appropriated. <sup>2</sup> FY 1979 funds. <sup>3</sup> Estimated cost.



# U.S.-China Trade Agreement

Warren Christopher

*Statement before the Subcommittee on International Trade of the Senate Finance Committee on November 15, 1979. Mr. Christopher is Deputy Secretary of State.<sup>1</sup>*

I am pleased to have this opportunity to testify on behalf of the Agreement on Trade Relations that we signed with the People's Republic of China in July 1979 and which the President transmitted to the Congress for approval October 23.<sup>2</sup>

The establishment of diplomatic relations January 1 opened a new era in U.S.-China relations, based on equality, mutual interest, and respect. Diplomatic recognition alone, however, does not automatically insure the development of a normal and mutually beneficial relationship. Thus our task is to build a new relationship in a credible and practical ways.

Barriers to trade pose one hindrance to a fruitful relationship with the P.R.C. The trade agreement you are before you, by reducing these barriers and creating incentives to trade, will go a long way toward cementing bonds between China and the United States. Nondiscriminatory treatment, credits, insurance, a favorable investment climate, and business litigation are the lifeblood of trade. Without them, trade with China will falter. With them, we can forge the solid and constructive ties with China that we seek and that will guide us into the 1980's and beyond.

Our new ties with China are of fundamental importance to the United States and to the prospects for a peaceful and prosperous world. We want to encourage China to play a constructive and stabilizing role in Asia. We want to see a prosperous China, a China that can feed and fuel itself.

Every long-term global problem—economic development, population, environmental, natural resources, or the environment, to cite just a few examples—benefit from positive contributions from both China and the United States. The trade agreement not only symbolizes our mutuality of interest in promoting closer ties but also our support for a modern China, secure and out-looking, which will be part of the solution to such problems.

Failure to approve this agreement would, unfortunately, be viewed as a sign that the United States is not interested in moving toward such a constructive, mutually beneficial relationship with the Chinese. It is in our interest for China's next generation of leaders to look back in 1990 upon the relationship we are now building with a sense of satisfaction and to view the United States as a reliable partner in development.

## The First Year

Beginning with the January visit here by Vice Premier Deng Xiaoping, we began building the framework of our new relationship. We signed agreements in science and technology, cultural, and consular affairs.

In March former [Treasury] Secretary Blumenthal initiated a claims-assets agreement which removed a significant obstacle to the development of economic and commercial relations between the United States and China. We also established a joint economic committee with China to help coordinate the development of our economic activities. This committee will hold its first meeting early next year under Treasury Secretary G. William Miller.

In May Secretary of Commerce Juanita Kreps signed the claims-assets agreement and initiated the trade agreement. During this same period, high-ranking Chinese officials visited this country at the invitations of the Departments of Energy and Commerce in cooperation with private industry. And a number of U.S. oil companies signed contracts to assist China's offshore oil development.

In August Vice President Mondale capped this extraordinary period by signing a hydropower and water conservation agreement, by opening the first U.S. Consulate General on the Chinese mainland in 30 years, and by stating our readiness to extend Exim-bank credits and Overseas Private Investment Corporation guarantees to China, as well as giving a boost to bilateral civil aviation and maritime discussions.

Clearly, we have come far in the past year in developing our ties with China. Until this agreement is approved, however, we will remain the only major trading partner that does not have some form of trade agreement with China and that suffers from the competitive disadvantage that lack of nondiscriminatory treatment of commerce entails.

## Benefits of Trade

Although small in world terms, our trade with China is expanding rapidly again this year after more than tripling in 1978 to \$1.1 billion. Our trade balance with China continues to weigh heavily in our favor.

Trade with the West is critical to China's modernization. Its imports of capital equipment and industrial materials are expected to continue increasing faster than its export earnings. For China the trade equation is simple: It must sell more in order to buy more. Extending most-favored-nation (MFN) trading status to China is fundamental to this equation.

Of course, this agreement will benefit the United States as well as China. The foreign exchange that China earns from sales to the United States will allow it to purchase more goods from us, thereby benefiting U.S.

exporters, helping our balance of payments, and reducing, through competition, inflationary pressures. Without this agreement, the United States penalizes its exporters, who will have to face their European and Japanese competitors supported by governments that have already extended lines of credit and MFN to China. In a market with limited foreign exchange, this represents an appreciable advantage for our competition and a disadvantage to us.

I would now like to focus the remainder of my remarks on the political perspective with which this agreement should be viewed.

## Political Perspectives

I know that questions have been raised about the implications that submission of this agreement may have for our policy toward the Soviet Union. I want to be clear on this matter. We want to improve economic relations with both countries. But we do not feel that we should make every move with one country dependent on making the same move at precisely the same time with the other. Such a rigid policy would fail to recognize relevant differences in the factual situation with respect to the two nations as well as relevant matters of timing.

We signed a trade agreement with the Soviet Union in 1972. We have not yet submitted it to Congress. When we do—which I hope will be soon—it will be because it is warranted by the factual situation, because it is consistent with our policy toward the Soviet Union, and because the timing is

right—and not because of our policy toward China or some other third country.

In the last 3 years China's economic, political, and cultural policies have undergone substantial change. There is greater diversity in almost all aspects of Chinese life. Economic decentralization, interaction with the West, and experimentation with new ideas and concepts have been matched by an increased openness and a willingness to admit problems. The Chinese leadership publicly has committed itself to raising the living standards of the people.

These new developments should be kept in perspective. We cannot ignore China's long authoritarian tradition, but neither should we turn our back on what is beginning to happen. It should be a source of satisfaction to us that the Chinese Government is determined to develop a legal system that would prevent the unchecked exercise of official authority.

China's emigration policies, which have undergone substantial change in the last 3 years, are of particular importance to this subcommittee. Under the provisions of the Jackson-Vanik amendment, MFN treatment of Communist nations that restrict emigration is prohibited. That prohibition, however, may be waived if the President concludes and reports to Congress that the amendment's requirements pertaining to a country's emigration practices have been satisfied. The Trade Act vests in the President the responsibility to determine whether these requirements have been met. In his report to the Congress the President set forth his conclusion that in the case of the P.R.C., these requirements have, indeed, been met.

The President's conclusion was based upon an analysis and weighing of three factors. These include China's current emigration performance, public statements by Chinese officials, and our confidential diplomatic discussions with Chinese officials.

On the first element, emigration from China has increased dramatically over the past 2 years. In 1978, 71,000 persons emigrated from Hong Kong, the major exit point from the P.R.C. This figure is three times the number who emigrated in 1977. This trend continued in 1979 with 28,000 emigrants entering Hong Kong in the first 3 months alone. The number has slowed somewhat since April due primarily to protests by the Hong Kong Government. Nevertheless, 4,000-5,000 emigrants continue to enter Hong Kong each month.

The U.S. Consulate General in Hong Kong received over 10,000 applications from P.R.C. emigrants between November 1978 and April 1979. Chinese emigrants and visa applicants now far exceed the available immigrant visa numbers chargeable to China. Therefore, several thousand have been obliged to wait in China and in Hong Kong until visa numbers become available.

That the P.R.C. has liberalized its emigration policy is confirmed by public statements of Chinese officials. Mr. Liao, the Director of the Office of Overseas Chinese Affairs, stated on January 4, 1978: "We should provide . . . for foreign nationals of Chinese descent to visit their relatives in China or make a tour of the country as well as for Chinese citizens to go abroad for reunion with their kinfolk of foreign nationality, simplify the procedure for getting permission to enter or leave China, give warm reception to those entering China, and improve our service." China has followed this theme consistently since this instruction was issued.

Mr. Liao elaborated on this policy in December 1978 when he stated that Chinese who had received visas from other countries should be granted exit permits "immediately." During his visit to the United States in January 1979, Vice Premier Deng Xiaoping reiterated this policy publicly before the U.S.-China People's Friendship Association. Adding weight to the Vice Premier's remarks, the consular agreement concluded during his visit contains a commitment by China ". . . to facilitate the reunion of families and [to] process all applications as quickly as possible. . . ."

On the final element, U.S. and Chinese officials conducted confidential conversations in which the Trade Act's emigration requirements and Chinese emigration policy came to be mutually understood. The conversations indicate that the P.R.C. is liberalizing its emigration rules and intends to continue this policy.

We have examined China's emigration record, we have studied the public statements made by their officials, and we have had discussions with the Chinese on their emigration policy. Based upon all of these factors, we are confident, as the President has reported, that the requirements of Section 402 of the Trade Act have been satisfied.

In closing, I seek your support and urge that you give this agreement speedy approval. We are now building the structure of our relationship with China for the 1980's. This relationship is and will continue to be very important to us. Your approval of this agreement is a critical step in the process. I am confident of your support.

<sup>1</sup>The complete transcript of the hearings will be published by the committee. It will be available from the Superintendent of Documents, U.S. Government Printing Office, Washington, D.C. 20402.

<sup>2</sup>For texts of the agreement and the President's message to the Congress, see BULLETIN of Dec. 1979, p. 33.

## Agreements With Taiwan

by Warren Christopher

*Statement before the Subcommittee for East Asian and Pacific Affairs of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee on November 16, 1979. Mr. Christopher is Deputy Secretary of State.*<sup>1</sup>

I am pleased to appear today before the committee to review our experience with the unofficial arrangements we have established with Taiwan.

For years the United States, along with the other major nations of the world, refused to accord recognition to the People's Republic of China (P.R.C.) This anomaly hindered our diplomacies, Asia and thwarted the development of economic relations with a country that is the home of one-fourth of the world population.

Following 6 months of intense discussions both here and in Beijing, President Carter announced almost a year ago that the United States would henceforth recognize the P.R.C. as its sole legitimate Government of China. At the same time the President announced our intention to sever official relations with Taiwan.

The development of our relationship with the P.R.C. over the past year stands as testimony to the wisdom of the President's decision. As this committee is aware, the Administration recently submitted to the Congress Agreement on Trade Relations that would extend most-favored-nation and non-discriminatory trade status to the P.R.C.<sup>2</sup>

While our improved relations with China have been gratifying, I am



ly pleased by the fact that the ring of our diplomatic relations with Taiwan has not adversely affected the welfare of the people nor has it weakened the practical ties that exist between Taiwan and the United States. Taiwan's economy today is even more vigorous than it was before we normalized relations with the P.R.C. Taiwan's GNP is growing robustly, and industrial production is increasing at a rapid rate each year. Projected U.S.-Taiwan trade for 1979 is \$10 billion compared with \$7.5 billion in 1978. This represents an increase of 33%. U.S. private investment in Taiwan, a very good indicator of confidence in the island's future, was \$68.7 million in the first half of this year compared with \$27.1 million in the same period in 1978—a 150% increase.

### and CCNAA

I do not mean to suggest that the situation from official to unofficial relations has been problem free. But the Taiwan Relations Act, the basis for our relations, has afforded us the flexibility to deal with problems creatively and imaginatively. In particular, the unofficial instrumentalities in our new relationship—the American Institute in Taiwan (AIT) and the U.S. Liaison Council for North American Affairs (CCNAA)—have proved their effectiveness during the transi-

tion. In accordance with the Taiwan Relations Act, the President issued an executive order that, among other things, delegates to the Secretary of State the authority to extend functional privileges and immunities on a reciprocal basis to the CCNAA.

AIT provided CCNAA a copy of a draft agreement on privileges and immunities on September 20, 1979, to which CCNAA has responded. Differences are minimal, and agreement between the parties should soon result. In meantime, the two sides have extended functional privileges to allow for effective operations of the two organizations. To conduct its affairs, the CCNAA has opened nine offices in our country—a number that is appropriate for our new relationship with Taiwan.

Although our unofficial relations with Taiwan are coordinated through AIT, we have recognized that issues could arise which are beyond the official competence of the AIT. We have made it clear that, to the extent necessary and appropriate, we would engage for technical contacts with

U.S. Government employees through AIT. Such instances have, in fact, arisen, and the appropriate contacts have been arranged.

I would now like to address for the record some of the issues regarding agreements in an attempt to clarify the Administration's intentions and, I hope, to dispel any misunderstandings.

### Existing Agreements

When we normalized our relations with the P.R.C., we made crystal clear our intention to maintain, on an unofficial basis, trade, cultural, and other relations with Taiwan. We believed it essential that our existing agreements with Taiwan would continue to have legal validity, despite the withdrawal of recognition. The President, therefore, issued a presidential memorandum on December 30, 1978, which stated that: "Existing international agreements and arrangements in force between the United States and Taiwan shall continue in force . . ." The Administration welcomed the addition of Section 4(c) of the Taiwan Relations Act, which approved the continuation in force of such agreements ". . . unless and until terminated in accordance with law . . ." because that provision further removed any doubt about their continuing validity. This treatment of existing agreements by the Administration and Congress stands in contrast to that of most other nations which abrogated their agreements with Taiwan upon recognizing the P.R.C.

Our relationship with Taiwan is not static. It has not been frozen in the status quo that existed at the moment we recognized the P.R.C. Some of our agreements with Taiwan will expire, perhaps calling for replacement with new agreements; some will require changes or updating; and others, having completed their purposes, will become obsolete. However, I want to emphasize that we do not have a policy to convert or terminate all of the treaties and agreements we maintain with Taiwan. Each agreement, as the circumstances require, will be considered on its own merits, on a case-by-case basis.

In that context, we have undertaken a review of these agreements with Taiwan and I will share with you our preliminary views on them. There are five agreements that require current attention.

**Scientific Cooperation.** First, our agreement on scientific cooperation, which both sides have found beneficial, expires in January 1980. Negotiations for a new agreement will soon begin be-

tween the AIT and CCNAA. Under the Taiwan Relations Act, agreements concluded by these unofficial instrumentalities have full force and effect under U.S. law.

**Air Transport.** Second, the air transport agreement, concluded in Nanjing [Nanking] in 1946, has become a hindrance to development of aviation relations with the P.R.C. It was only after Vice President Mondale, during his trip to China in August, informed Beijing that we planned to replace the Nanjing agreement with a new agreement between the AIT and the CCNAA that the Chinese Government agreed to begin negotiations for a U.S.-P.R.C. civil aviation agreement. In any event, a new basis for air links with Taiwan would be useful in improving U.S.-Taiwan air services. Negotiations currently are underway between AIT and CCNAA on a civil air agreement. Good progress is being made in the talks and we would hope to have a new agreement soon.

**Textiles.** Third, our textile agreement with Taiwan requires some implementing modification. These are being handled by AIT-CCNAA letters of understanding.

**Nuclear Cooperation.** Fourth, pursuant to the Nuclear Nonproliferation Act of 1978, we are reviewing the nuclear cooperation agreement.

**Trade.** Fifth, on October 24, CCNAA and AIT exchanged letters implementing multilateral trade negotiations-related reductions in tariff and nontariff barriers.

Having mentioned these five categories that require action, no other agreements appear to require current attention.

### Active Programs

A second group of 29 agreements concerns active programs or contains provisions of continuing relevance. For example, this group contains agreements on active programs in the fields of education, fisheries, investment, postal affairs, and the Treaty of Friendship, Commerce, and Navigation.

Two agricultural sales agreements, on the other hand, contain provisions of continuing relevance. They relate to commodities which have previously been furnished but for which payment is still being received by the United States. We see no reason at this time to take any action with respect to these agreements.

A third category includes the mutual defense treaty and six agreements in the military field. The Presi-

dent has given notice that the mutual defense treaty will terminate on January 1, 1980, and we are committed to taking the steps necessary so that the termination will occur as scheduled. Accordingly, all related military agreements will also terminate with the mutual defense treaty at the end of the year.

In addition, two nonmilitary agreements have been rendered moot by normalization. One agreement calls for entry-free privileges for consular officers, and the other concerns the status of the American Embassy language school. We no longer have consular officers on Taiwan and the American Embassy school in Taiwan ceased to function on February 28. We plan to delete these agreements from the January 1980 *Treaties in Force*.

It is appropriate here to dispel a notion that arises from time to time. There is no substance to the rumor that we are planning an additional 1-year moratorium on new arms sales to Taiwan. When the mutual defense treaty terminates at the end of this year, we shall continue to provide Taiwan access to selected defensive weapons.

The final group concerns 14 agreements that appear to be either fully executed or inactive. These include five agricultural commodities agreements, a fully executed agreement for provision of nuclear research and training equipment, and two agreements relating to our economic aid program to Taiwan. We wish to take more time to review these agreements. AIT will discuss them with CCNAA to assure that they contain no active provisions before deciding on their disposition.

After further review and as changing circumstances warrant, we may want to take further action with respect to certain of our agreements. I want to assure you that we intend to maintain close contact with Congress on this subject. We will, of course, notify Congress of any agreements concluded between the AIT and CCNAA as provided in the Taiwan Relations Act.

Although our new relationship with Taiwan has required creativity and flexibility on the part of officials on both sides, the experience of the past year has demonstrated the viability of that new relationship. Recognition of the P.R.C. has not resulted, as some feared, in the interruption of our relations with Taiwan. Avoiding a dogmatic approach, we have sought to promote those ties with Taiwan that are consistent with diplomatic relations with the P.R.C.

I believe that the evidence demonstrates the success of the transition. At the same time that U.S. trade and investment in Taiwan have increased dramatically, we have successfully preserved the terms upon which we normalized relations with the P.R.C. ■

<sup>1</sup>The complete transcript of the hearings will be published by the committee and will be available from the Superintendent of Documents, U.S. Government Printing Office, Washington, D.C. 20402.

<sup>2</sup>For text of agreement, see BULLETIN of Dec. 1979, p. 33.

<sup>3</sup>For full text, see BULLETIN of Feb. 1979, p. 24.

## Accounting for MIAs

by Richard Holbrooke

*Excerpts from a statement before the Subcommittee on East Asian and Pacific Affairs of the House Foreign Affairs Committee on October 17, 1979. Mr. Holbrooke is Assistant Secretary for East Asian and Pacific Affairs.*<sup>1</sup>

I'm pleased to have this opportunity to appear before the subcommittee today to discuss with you the efforts this Administration has made through the Department of State to obtain an accounting of Americans lost in Southeast Asia. You will recall Deputy Assistant Secretary [for East Asian and Pacific Affairs Robert B.] Oakley's appearance before your subcommittee this past May, in which he reviewed the results of our efforts up to that time.<sup>2</sup> I would like to . . . bring you up to date on developments since then.

Vietnam's attitude toward the question of an aid commitment and toward normalization with the United States evolved over the summer of 1978 and officials of the Socialist Republic of Vietnam (S.R.V.) hinted broadly to other governments that they were on the verge of dropping the precondition. We met with the Vietnamese in New York for direct discussions on issues of mutual concern during the fall of 1978. The Vietnamese indicated officially and clearly they were no longer demanding U.S. aid as a *quid pro quo* for normalization. Discussion on missing-in-action

(MIAs) was also positive, and we expected an agreement on normalization might emerge before the end of the year. However, progress was halted due to the emergence in October and November of new Vietnamese policies toward the region, especially on refugees and Kampuchea.

Although progress toward normalization has been suspended, we have continued our efforts to obtain a full accounting.

In February Secretary Vance sent a personal message stressing our continuing strong interest in obtaining Vietnamese cooperation on the POW/MIA issue.

During May our Embassy in Paris reiterated to the Vietnamese Embassy there our government's continuing concern over the fate of those still missing in action. The Vietnamese Embassy said that Hanoi was aware of humanitarian need to make every effort in this regard.

During the refugee meeting in Indonesia, Deputy Assistant Secretary Oakley made the same point in strong terms directly to Vu Hoang, the S.F. official with responsibility for POW/MIA matters.

In response to a suggestion by our Embassy in Moscow approached Soviet Government in May to request that it impress upon the Vietnamese the importance the United States attaches to the MIA issue and urge them to provide us the fullest possible accounting of our missing men. Our Embassy noted that we had contacted Vietnamese directly on this matter numerous occasions and that our approach to the Soviets reflected our desire to explore every possible avenue to resolve the MIA issue. A Department of State officer also made a similar approach to a Soviet Embassy officer in Washington. The Soviet Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Southeast Asia Department chief, agreed to pass on our request to his superiors but indicated the "surer" route remained direct contact with the Vietnamese.

In June our Joint Casualty Reporting Center (JCRC) liaison officer in Bangkok again met with his counterpart in the Vietnamese Embassy to provide further specific information which we believed might assist the Vietnamese in resolving certain individual cases. In addition, he drew attention to the continuing, strong American public interest in arriving an MIA accounting and in this connection cited the National League of Families of American Prisoners of War and Missing in Southeast Asia.

Mr. Oakley reiterated in his meeting with the Vietnamese in New York and July the intense interest of the Administration, the Congress, and the American people remain in the MIA issue and in obtaining the best possible accounting of our missing men. He noted that the cooperation of the Vietnamese had provided a major impetus in helping to provide such an accounting and had had a direct bearing on the evolution of our relationship and that it was extremely important for the Administration to continue to provide information on this issue. He also urged that your congressional delegation be given the fullest possible cooperation on this matter in its visit to Hanoi.

The major recent event on the MIA issue was the visit of your congressional delegation to Hanoi August 10-12. As you know, Mr. Vu Quang, Chief of Consular Affairs of the U.S. State Department, reviewed the work of his committee but stated that the Administration had reduced manpower, funds, and material devoted to recovering missing Americans. He indicated that "routine" visits by JCRC representatives, Lt. Col. Paul Mather might be possible, and also agreed to discuss with the Vietnamese Minister Thach possible ways of approaching the Lao People's Democratic Republic to arrange talks on this issue.

We followed up Vu Hoang's indication to you of flexibility on visits by Lt. Col. Mather by sending a message in August via the S.R.V. liaison office in Bangkok asking for Vietnamese views on the timing and scope of such visits and expressing the U.S. desire to have them as rapidly as possible. Receiving no reply to this message, Embassy Bangkok raised the issue again on September 5, and we sent a follow-up message September 10 reiterating our desire to begin such visits at an early date and stressing the interest and importance that the Administration, the Congress, and the American people have in making demonstrable progress in accounting for missing Americans.

On October 3, an officer of the U.S. Embassy in Bangkok delivered a verbal response to our earlier message on the proposed visit by JCRC personnel. He stated that a visit by Lt. Col. Mather had initially been discussed during the August visit of the U.S. congressional delegation. Although the Administration was under conditions of war and threat of invasion, he said, Hanoi maintained the MIA office and con-

tinued to devote scarce resources to resolve MIA cases. Hanoi, he claimed, had always shown goodwill in this matter and has thus far returned the remains of more than 70 MIAs. With regard to the visit of Lt. Col. Mather, he stated that Hanoi will inform the United States later when the time is convenient.

During the discussion which followed, the S.R.V. officer assured us that such visits could take place but at some unspecified future date. He made no attempt to back away from the agreement in principle for such visits.

In response, the U.S. Embassy officer stressed:

- The importance of the MIA issue to the United States and to our bilateral contacts;
- The disappointment that the Congress, particularly the members of your delegation, would feel over the delay;
- Our interest in keeping the MIA issue separated from other issues on which progress is currently not possible;
- Our appreciation of Hanoi's past cooperation, and our desire to accelerate these efforts; and
- Our belief that resolution of the MIA issue is in the interest of the S.R.V. as well as the United States.

The conditions of war and threat of invasion that Hanoi cited are real, but they are conditions that the S.R.V. has brought upon itself by its invasion of Kampuchea. And this should not be used as an excuse to stall on exchanging information on MIAs. We hope that progress can resume shortly; we note that the Vietnamese position does not rule this out.

We raised the subject of Lt. Col. Mather's visit also at the United Nations with the Vietnamese mission there, stressing the importance of the issue and our hope for a resumption of progress.

Also at the United Nations, as requested by this committee, we formally transmitted the text of House Concurrent Resolution 10 and Senate Concurrent Resolution 17 to Secretary General Waldheim. We are consulting with other delegations there to see if there is any sentiment for general action. We have contacted the International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC) in New York, and they have agreed to consult with their headquarters in Geneva to determine how they can support this resolution. We will also continue to work with the U.N. High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) and with the ICRC and other governments which

have representatives in Vietnam in support of our efforts to gain an accounting.

Since your previous hearings on this subject, we have also again expressed directly to the Lao Government—via a letter to the embassy here and approaches by our embassy in Vientiane—the continued interest of the U.S. Government in MIA matters and the importance of making progress on accounting for MIAs. We noted our approaches to the S.R.V. in this regard, recounted Vietnamese statements of willingness to be forthcoming, and asked if Laos could also actively do more to resolve this issue. We repeated the standing invitation for a Lao delegation to visit the JCRC in Hawaii and requested that they consider a visit to Laos by Lt. Col. Paul Mather, or any other group which would be mutually satisfactory, in order to advance the accounting process and increase the exchange of information. Subsequently, as you know, the Lao charge met informally September 26 with a small group of congressmen, including many of you, and passed information related to the four sets of remains the Lao provided last year, giving crash site, approximate date, and plane type associated with each set.

On October 4, I met with the acting Lao Foreign Minister Khamphai Boupma in New York. I expressed our appreciation for the information that the charge had provided Congress and our hope that this would be the first in a series of such actions by the Lao Government. I emphasized the importance of this issue to the American people, the Congress, and the Administration. Our new charge in Laos, Leo J. Moser, is talking with Lao officials about this matter during his initial calls in Vientiane and will continue to do so throughout his assignment there.

As you can see from my remarks, we have consistently addressed the MIA accounting issue in our contacts with the Vietnamese and Lao authorities. There is no doubt that they understand its importance to us. We will continue to work toward eliciting from the Vietnamese and Lao forthcoming and satisfactory cooperation in accounting for our missing personnel. ■

<sup>1</sup> The complete transcript of the hearings will be published by the committee and will be available from the Superintendent of Documents, U.S. Government Printing Office, Washington, D.C. 20402.

<sup>2</sup> For text, see BULLETIN of Oct. 1979, p. 39.



## Flexible Exchange Rates After 6 Years' Experience

by Richard N. Cooper

Address before the World Affairs Council of Philadelphia and the University of Pennsylvania on October 31, 1979. Mr. Cooper is the Under Secretary for Economic Affairs.

The title of this conference, "Achieving Stability in the International Monetary System," suggests that our hosts may feel that the present international monetary system, with flexible exchange rates at its center, is not stable. There are also those who feel that the flexible exchange rate system has caused a marked deterioration in the overall performance of the world economy, that exchange rate movements have been excessive, and that flexible rates have not made a major contribution to the external adjustment process.

In contrast to this widely held view, I want to take this opportunity today to indicate my judgment that the system of flexible exchange rates works reasonably well, that is to say, it has made a significant contribution to the external adjustment process and, indeed, that it has worked just about as one would expect, given the disturbances the world economy has endured the past 3 years.

### Macroeconomic Performance—1973-79

In making this judgement, I have tried to abstract from the week-to-week exchange market turbulences which we have seen at times during the past 6 years. Let us adopt the perspective of looking back on this period from, say, 1982. Equally important, I have tried to avoid confusing the effects of flexible rates themselves with our overall economic performance during the period of flexible rates. By almost any comparative measure, our macroeconomic performance during the period 1973-1979 was worse than our performance during the last several years of the adjustable peg system. For example, if we compare some of the most important measures of economic performance of the major industrial countries during 1973-79 to the previous period, we see a significant difference: Real economic growth was only 60% as fast; unemployment rates were 50% higher; and inflation rates were more than double.

These developments, however, cannot be attributed to the flexible rate

system. *Post hoc* does not imply *propter hoc*. To appreciate this, we only need to remind ourselves of two other factors which affected economic performance during the period of flexible rates: the quadrupling of world oil prices in 1973-74 and the further doubling of those prices since then, and the tremendous expansion of international liquidity in 1970-73 associated with the breakdown of the fixed exchange rate system. These factors have forced us to deal simultaneously with high unemployment and high inflation, a task to which our tools of economic management are not well suited.

### Movements in Exchange Rates

When we look at the entire 6 years of flexible exchange rates, we find that the broad movement of exchange rates has not been surprising; nor has it been as great as the newspapers have led us to believe. From the viewpoint of balance-of-payments adjustment, what is important is the movement of each country's currency against some average of the currencies of its trading partners, not its movement against another single currency. When the currencies of all industrial countries are weighted by their importance in U.S. trade (which implies, for example, that the Canadian dollar is given a weight of about one-fifth), the U.S. dollar is virtually unchanged today from March 1973, when major currencies were allowed to float against one another.

Moreover, the year-to-year movements during those 6½ years have been relatively modest and have followed a pattern which textbook theory would lead us to expect: The dollar appreciated when U.S. economic activity increased less rapidly than elsewhere (or declined), and the dollar depreciated when U.S. economic activity was more vigorous than that elsewhere. The actual percentage changes in the U.S.-trade weighted value of the dollar relative to other OECD (Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development) currencies were as follows:

March 20, 1973 to Dec. 31, 1973, +1.5 percent; 1974, -1.4 percent; 1975, +4.9; 1976, +0.7; 1977, -3.5; 1978, -5.4; 1979 through Oct. 26, +3.1; or, for the total period March 1973 to October 1979, +0.4).

Neither have the movements in exchange rates been surprising if we adopt a perspective across countries. If we had forecast accurately in December

1976, for example, the current account imbalances which in fact emerged, we would also have forecast quite accurately the changes in exchange rates which have taken place. At least we would have forecast accurately the ranking of exchange rate changes; we might have been off on the exact magnitude, which is a more complicated question.

The Swiss franc is at one extreme. It appreciated 34% against the U.S. dollar between December 1976 and December 1978. But we must also observe that by mid-1978 Switzerland had a current account surplus equal to 6% of its GNP. By any standard, this is an enormous surplus, and it is not at all surprising under a system of flexible exchange rates that the Swiss franc appreciated sharply relative to other currencies.

Japan's surplus in 1978 was much larger in absolute terms, but was smaller relative to its economy. As with the Swiss franc, it is not surprising that the yen increased in value during the period. The yen is followed by the German mark and the other European currencies that are linked to it. Again, there is a clear relationship between the value of the mark and Germany's current account surplus.

Even the appreciation of the British pound can be readily explained in these terms. Recall that in 1976 the pound was under severe external pressure, and Britain ran a large current account deficit. By 1978 Britain's financial situation and the current account had improved substantially and the pound appreciated. Comparable developments took place in Italy.

In contrast, the United States moved from current account surplus in 1976 to a very large deficit in 1978, and Canada also showed a deterioration. Under these circumstances, is it surprising that the U.S. dollar depreciated relative to European currencies and the yen and that the Canadian dollar depreciated relative to the U.S. dollar? The rank order of movement in exchange rates relative to movements in current account positions is almost perfect. France is an exception. The French franc was especially depressed in late 1976 by the prospect of a Socialist-Communist victory in the French elections of March 1977. The election results differed from those expected, the French franc recovered accordingly.

This pattern of observations is likely what we would expect of exchange rates if they are to function as an element in the external adjustment process. Deficits lead to depreciation, surpluses lead to appreciation. I would also note, however, that it is not actual current account balances which cause changes in exchange rates. In a country's economic policies are needed to be inadequate to correct external current account imbalances, an indication about future exchange rates is created. As often happens in the financial market, these expectations about future prices have an effect on present prices as well. Long-term capital flows must also be entered into calculation.

If my judgment that the pattern of exchange rate changes is what we should expect if they are to function as an element in the adjustment process is at variance with the popular opinion of an unstable exchange rate system, the difference is due to the fact that the financial press exaggerates the economic importance of changes in exchange rates by typically reporting the most movements in bilateral rates. It is relevant from the point of view of the adjustment process is a trade-weighted average movement in exchange rates for each country's currency.

As I noted above, these movements have been very much less than pressures would lead us to believe. For example, Germany is Switzerland's best trading partner, so movements in the Swiss franc-U.S. dollar rate do not exaggerate the effective movement of the Swiss franc. Similarly, Canada is the largest trading partner of the United States, so movements between the dollar and the German mark do not capture adequately the effective movement of the U.S. dollar.

### Trade and Service Flows

Of course, if movements in exchange rates are to be a key element in the adjustment process, trade and service flows must respond to these movements in exchange rates. I have noted that exchange rates moved in response to imbalances in goods and services. But will trade and services in turn respond to movements in exchange rates? I think the answer is affirmative, provided it is clear that we are talking about real, rather than nominal, exchange rates changes and that we are talking about the long-run effect rather than the short-run effect.

Those who take the view that flexible exchange rates do not work have mistakenly focused on nominal exchange rate changes or have, against all evidence, expected a quick response in current account positions.

The changes in exchange rates that we have observed between major currencies have been influenced by differential rates of inflation between countries. A country's competitive price position is, of course, not affected to the extent that movements in nominal exchange rates only compensate for differential movements in price levels. The movements in exchange rates we have seen in the last 6 years can be only partially explained by differential rates of inflation among the industrial countries. They are, therefore, largely "real" and may be presumed to account for some part of the shifts in current accounts we are now seeing.

### Long-Run vs. Short-Run Effects

In judging the efficacy of the flexible exchange rate system, it is also important that we look at the long-run effect rather than the short-run effect. Formal studies generally show that price elasticities of demand in virtually all industrial countries are statistically significant and reasonably large over the long run, defined as 2 years or more, but are much smaller in the short run. If one looks only at the short-run effects of exchange rate changes, it would be possible to conclude that the adjustment process does not work. In the short run, import prices (in domestic currency) increase more rapidly than import volume decreases, resulting in a worsening of a country's trade balance. In the long run, however, this trend is reversed, producing the J-curve effect, and the trade balance improves. Changes in real income also have an important impact, and macroeconomic policy must be used to reinforce changes in exchange rates.

When we adopt a long-run perspective, we find that trade flows seem to be responding to the changes in real exchange rates which have taken place. The Japanese and German surpluses are declining and the American deficit is also declining. We now expect that the U.S. current account deficit in 1979 will be under \$4 billion, compared with about \$14 billion in both 1977 and 1978. Furthermore, we expect a surplus next year of over \$5 billion. This is strong, if still incomplete, evidence that flexible exchange rates have worked well. But we need patience for the relevant factors to work themselves out. If we are not patient, we may well find that we

cannot function with a system of flexible exchange rates, not because it does not work in economic terms, but because in a world of instant gratification, we find the delays psychologically intolerable.

### Effects of Domestic Economic Policies

A complete analysis of the flexible exchange rate system must also ask how the large current account imbalances arose in the first place. An analysis of domestic economic policies may seem inappropriate for a conference focused on the international monetary system, but it is an essential part of the picture. What we find is that current account imbalances were closely related to domestic economic policies. Again, take the case of Switzerland.

Switzerland adopted a medium-run policy, historically the only case of which I am aware, of negative growth. From 1974 to 1977, Switzerland's labor force fell by about 9%, through the reduction of foreign workers by 25%. Since industrial capacity did not shrink correspondingly, but domestic demand fell, it is not surprising that the export surplus grew to enormous (relative) proportions.

In the United States, we had experienced a long recession which put great strain on the world economy and on the international financial system, especially in terms of its effects on developing countries. By late 1976, the world economy was in a very precarious situation. Unemployment was high in the United States; it was high and rising in Europe. Many countries, including some of the large industrialized countries as well as many developing countries, found themselves with a very large burden of external indebtedness. Those countries had to engage in economic and financial retrenchment. Yet that alone would have aggravated and prolonged the world recession, making corrective actions in all countries more difficult. Under these circumstances, for both domestic and foreign policy reasons, the United States undertook a program of economic expansion to end the recession.

### Balanced Expansion

It would have been desirable for the world economic recovery to have been led by a balanced expansion in the leading industrial economies and most notably in the United States, Japan, and Germany. These countries all had



excess capacity and relatively strong external positions. The London economic summit in May 1977 represented an effort to achieve such a coordinated expansion by the leading countries, but it failed in that respect. The United States went ahead anyway.

Largely as a consequence, the U.S. payments position deteriorated relative to that of other major countries. It was recognized at the time that vigorous economic expansion in the United States without concomitant expansion in other countries would worsen the U.S. trade position, and it could have been expected that the emerging imbalance in turn would lead to the depreciation of the dollar relative to some other currencies. A balanced expansion among the leading countries would have avoided this.

Balanced expansion would certainly have been preferable to the actual development, but it was apparently unattainable at the time. Under these circumstances, I believe it was desirable for the United States to go ahead alone, even though that would predictably lead to some depreciation of the dollar. Not to have done so, in my judgment, would have courted far graver dangers for the world economy—extreme financial difficulties for a number of countries and increasing protectionist actions in most of the industrialized countries. Indeed, the highly successful international economic system which was so painstakingly established in the preceding 25 years was in jeopardy. The U.S. external deficit relieved the financial pressures on many countries, and it also reduced protectionist pressures abroad. Still, it would have been preferable to have had in 1977 the kind of concerted action and coordinated expansion which was finally achieved in 1978. Through it, we could have avoided the emergence of such great imbalances in payments and at least some of the consequent turbulence in foreign exchange markets.

## Expected Account Imbalances

I mentioned earlier that changes in exchange rates are caused not only by emerging current account imbalances but also by expected imbalances. I want to return briefly to the role of expectations before concluding this discussion of our experience with flexible exchange rates, because the fragility of exchange rate expectations is one of the most disturbing features of our experience during the last 6 years. As I have indicated, the broad direction and magnitude of exchange rate changes are fully explicable by underlying move-

ments of payments positions. Yet there were clearly several occasions—briefly in the fall of 1977 and more notably in October 1978—when exchange rates moved too far, too rapidly. It is difficult to explain the developments in October 1978 in terms of the underlying economic developments I have been emphasizing. Contrary to what was asserted at the time differential inflation rates—actual or reasonably expected—can only go a small distance toward explaining the exchange rate movements during this period. I think, therefore, that we have a problem with highly fragile, easily moved expectations in exchange markets. As a result, governments must be prepared to intervene heavily as stabilizing speculators even in a system of floating exchange rates.

Ten years ago, Federal Reserve Governor Henry Wallich divided mankind—or at least international financial specialists—into four categories: those who advocate fixed exchange rates; those who advocate freely floating exchange rates; those who prefer fixed rates but are nervous about it; and those who prefer floating rates but are nervous about it. I am a nervous floater. We have a floating—or flexible—exchange rate system which works reasonably well. The experience of the last 6 years indicates that exchange rates will change in response to external imbalances, that changes in relative prices caused by changes in real exchange rates have a strong influence on the volume of both exports and imports, and that, therefore, flexible exchange rates can make a significant contribution to the external adjustment process. We must remember, however, in judging the flexible exchange rate system that the short-run impact is not the same as the long-run impact, that exchange rates are not the only determinant of a country's external balance, and that exchange rate changes themselves can be caused by expectations as well as by actual economic developments.

For these reasons, we have to be patient for the equilibrating results of exchange rate changes. From time to time, monetary authorities will have to intervene heavily in exchange markets in order to break bandwagon movements which develop because of the fragility of expectations and the ease with which they are moved around.

## The U.S. Dollar

Now let me turn from the recent past to the more distant future. I believe that the U.S. dollar will be the world's leading currency for a long time to come. Very likely, the Japanese yen and German mark, and perhaps other currencies, will grow in relative importance; and diversification out of the dollar into other currencies by both private and official holders will take place. Moreover, the diversification probably not take place smoothly but fits and starts that create periodic turbulence in exchange markets. Despite these developments, the U.S. dollar will remain the most important currency used internationally.

I can imagine, however, that by first or second decade of the next century, the international role now played by the dollar could be assumed to a great extent by a different asset. Gradually over the next 30 years; the economic dominance of the United States will continue to decline, as it did during the past 30 years. The U.S. share both of world production and of world trade have fallen, (e.g., from 16% of world exports in 1960 to 10% in 1978), and they will continue to fall not because the United States is doing badly, but because other countries of the world are doing well.

Incomes in many other countries will rise relative to incomes in the United States. Over time, this will reduce the relative attractiveness of the dollar as an international currency. Another national currency will offer a clearly preferable substitute. We should, therefore, begin to explore the possibility of developing an effective alternative.

## Feasible Alternatives

These discussions are presently centered on the creation of a substitution account, whereby dollars and other official reserves would be deposited in new account managed by the International Monetary Fund (IMF) in exchange for assets denominated by special drawing rights. The substitution account has two basic purposes. The first is to inhibit exchange market disorders which can be associated with periodic switches in assets from one currency to another, especially diversification from dollars to other major currencies, and to channel this diversification outside of exchange markets. The second purpose is to enhance the role of the special drawing rights and provide an alternative international financial vehicle to those denominated national currencies.

## Identifying U.S. Security Interests in U.S.-Soviet Relations

by Marshall D. Shulman

*Address before the International Studies Association at the University of Pittsburgh on October 4, 1979. Ambassador Shulman is Special Adviser to the Secretary on Soviet Affairs.*

Those of you who work in the field of U.S.-Soviet relations know that in describing the interrelationship of these two countries, one needs to deal not only with their foreign policies and the domestic determinants of foreign policy but with a third element that sometimes is of paramount importance. That third element in the relationship is the terrain of international politics on which the countries meet and to which each of them is reacting. There are many aspects of the international political scene that are relevant, but I would like to speak of two in particular that seem to me to put the stamp on this period and to have a determining influence on the character of U.S.-Soviet relations.

The first and obvious one is the revolutionary development of military technology in our times, which has obviously changed the relationship between war and politics and has also created the major imperative in foreign policy of trying to work our way through the minefield of problems and conflicts with which we are confronted, without its leading to a general nuclear war.

The second aspect of the current international political scene is the extraordinary turbulence and upheaval that characterize every part of the world. We have come in only two generations from the prolonged stability of international politics that characterized the scene at the opening of World War I. We have seen the rapid collapse of political institutions, the weakening of the European states that had driven and dominated international politics, and the emergence on the international scene of the United States as a major world actor together with the Soviet Union and China. Also in the recent past we have seen the consequences of some three decades of rapid, chaotic, turbulent decolonization and the transforming effect this has had and is having on international politics. We have also witnessed the effect of upheavals within industrial societies, including our own, which have resulted in weakening the fabric of these societies,

weakening the traditional sources of authority of the state, the family, and the church—or perhaps I will have to amend that as a result of the visit of the Pope.

But nevertheless, it has clearly created a time of disorientation within societies. An age of irascibility tends to influence the domestic climate for foreign policy. In the developing world, you see the desperate effort of new nations to create necessities for the people and to face the manifold sources of conflict arising out of tribal, religious, and ethnic border disputes. And most recently you have seen the added spurt that has been given to this turbulence in Africa as a result of the precipitous collapse of the Portuguese position.

As these elements enter on the scene and these various sources of conflict throw up perturbations to which the United States and Soviet Union, among other nations, find themselves responding—oftentimes without any planning or anticipation—these become perturbations in the Soviet-American relationship. Since we must expect this will continue for a long time, it is quite likely, in my judgment, that we shall not, in the foreseeable future, see any substantial easing of the Soviet-American relationship. We shall not see recreated, I think, in the near term what was by many people called détente as it was thought to exist in 1972.

Against this background, I turn now more directly to the topic of identifying U.S. security interest in U.S.-Soviet relations. First of all, it is evident that what we are talking about is predominantly a competitive relationship between the two countries that emerged on the scene to a leading position among nations by reason of their resources and by virtue of the fact that they are each embarked upon a period in which they have had a surge of national development.

### A Competitive Relationship

In seeking to respond to this situation, we need to ask ourselves not *whether* to respond but *how* to respond effectively. The first element here is to face the fact that a military equilibrium is a prerequisite in the relationship. There can be no serious questioning of this necessity, but there is a question about what kind of military equilibrium, and I will return to that point in a moment.

clusion

Let me close by making four observations about the substitution account—the longer run evolution of the international monetary system.

First, it is not a short-run dollar port operation. That point can perhaps be most effectively emphasized considering a realistic timeframe for substitution account to emerge. It must first be an extended period of discussion—several differing concepts of substitution accounts must be followed by a period of negotiation followed by a period of ratification. An optimistic scenario would not a substitution account in place by 1982.

Second, consideration of the substitution account in the near future will be a late further official discussion of broader aims and character of the international monetary system, some of which has not taken place for some time since 1974. This will be a useful contribution even if the substitution account itself fails to materialize.

Third, success in making the sprawling rights an international treaty medium would enable the United States and other reserve currency countries to divorce, or at least to attenuate, the responsibility of holding reserve currencies from the responsibilities of sensible national economic policy.

Fourth, to accomplish this ambitious result would require, in my judgment, that special drawing rights-denominated assets be traded extensively in private markets. And this in turn surely has implications for how a substitution account aimed at this ultimate result must be set up.

In the long meantime, between a new and a reformed monetary system, we must live with what we have; which I suggested earlier is not that bad when weighed with the feasible alternatives.

But living with the present systems requires looking beyond today's headlines and next week's money market figures. ■

The second primary necessity is to deal effectively with the kinds of issues I have mentioned as thrown up by international political developments. We need to respond to them in their local terms, i.e., with an awareness of their local significance, local politics, local cultures, and not purely in the game theory projection of the East-West encounter.

One of the vulnerabilities we have, I think, in our recent experience is that we have not done so in these terms. We have been inclined to see these manifold problems primarily in their East-West context without a sufficient appreciation of the local factors. Partly I think this is the result of our own insularity or lack of knowledge, lack of sensitivity and familiarity with the cultures, the languages, and histories of the peoples who have been only names in an atlas one day and then front-page preoccupations the next day.

In putting those two elements together, it seems to me they point to our interest in finding ways of regulating the competitive aspects of this relationship and of conducting it effectively. The United States has an interest in regulating the competition and moderating it so that it does not operate at the higher end of the tension scale. It seems evident to me—and I should think it is beyond dispute—that every problem in which we are concerned would be more difficult and more dangerous if the United States and the U.S.S.R. were locked into a high confrontation relationship instead of one of moderated tension.

I would add another general point and that is the necessity of recognizing that though this is—and we should not disguise the fact—primarily a competitive relationship, it is not without significant elements of overlapping interest between the two countries. Such an interest exists, especially in regard to the effort to pass through this period of international politics without having it lead to a general nuclear war which clearly neither the Soviet Union nor the United States can rationally desire.

Finally, a fourth general point—it is necessary not only to conduct this relationship with an eye toward the crisis of the month, the day-to-day problems, but also with some sense of where we would like to see it go over 5 years or 10 years, within our capacity to influence this. What are our interests in the longer term relationship with the Soviets? How would we like to see the Soviet Union evolve, to the extent that we can exercise some influ-

ence over the process of evolution, both in its domestic characteristics and in its role in the world?

This question ought not to be lost sight of at a time when the Soviet Union clearly is on the threshold of a wholesale generational turnover of its entire upper structure of leadership. This may bring the Soviet Union into a period of grave uncertainties—a period that is very difficult for us to extrapolate from the past, a period when elements among the secondary and tertiary levels of leadership may become ascendant.

There are many questions that we cannot answer about that process. We do know something about the ascendant generation. We know that, by and large, it is better educated than the present leadership. We know that it is more familiar with the outside world, but beyond that it is clearly not homogeneous in its view of the world. We are not in a position to influence choices that will be made, but we are, I think, in a position to influence the way in which the successor leadership views us, whether there is a series of transitions or something more incisive. We can affect the way in which that leadership examines its options and makes its determinations as to how it sees Soviet self-interest in the world. We have to conduct ourselves now in such a way that if there should be, among the successor leadership, some behind-the-scene appreciation for the Soviet self-interest in responsibility and restraint in the world, they will not feel that option is closed to them by the actions we are taking.

It is necessary for us, I think, to hold out what might be called a twin option policy to them at all times—that is to say, a policy which at the same time makes it clear to them what our response would be if they conduct themselves with restraint and responsibility and also makes them aware of the measures that we would feel it necessary to take if they do not, or if actions on their part have the effect of exacerbating the many sources of conflict. This is related, I think, to a problem that should be dear to your hearts—that of our own self-interest in this strengthening of the international system.

Therefore, one of our objectives has to be to try to do what we can to bring the Soviet Union to the point where it sees self-interest in a cooperative and constructive role in dealing

with local issues that confront us all as well as in participating in the international system in a way it does not at the present time. To some extent the cooperative programs that we have developed—thirty or so bilateral areas of cooperation in agriculture, transportation, space, health, in the problems of industrial societies, etc.—are tokens of the future intent. They do not go to the centrality of our relationship now. They are not likely to influence the conduct of the Soviet Union in present problems, but they are there as a signal of our intent over the long term.

And now what follows from this? Any effort to move in this direction, there are clearly impediments on both sides to working toward some sensibly regulated relationship against the background of a frank recognition of our differences.

*In the Soviet view there is no inconsistency between support for what the Soviet Union calls "national liberation movements" and "peaceful coexistence," or detente.*

#### Impediments on the Soviet Side

On the Soviet side, it is evident that a major impediment in moving this direction is the Soviet view of coexistence means, what it includes. The Soviet view there is no inconsistency between support for what the Soviet Union calls "national liberation movements" and "peaceful coexistence," or detente. There is no inconsistency, in their view, in the exploitation of local conflict situations in order to advance Soviet interests and the development of better relations with the United States. There is no inconsistency, in their view, between their arming and transporting of Cuban soldiers to participate in combat in African conflicts and their relations with us.

But to us there is an inconsistency and we have not yet reached the point where we are able to work out with the Soviet Union anything like a Marquis de Queensbury understanding about the terms within which we will conduct competition—what the limits will be on the flow of weapons into trouble areas or on the exacerbation of local conflict.



To some extent there have been understandings that have deepened. There were such understandings, for example, at the time when the Cuban conflict was at its height. There were communications between the two governments in which our respective concerns were expressed, and there were responses that were helpful in going against the widening of that conflict. The question is whether we can carry that a step further—whether it is possible to have a clearer understanding between us on the boundaries in which we will act in the prosecution of our respective interests in these conflict situations.

A second obvious impediment to improvement of relations in the way suggested has been the Soviet military buildup in the recent period, both the development of strategic weapons systems and in the development of its military capabilities that are evident on the European theater. In both respects these have been of concern to us and to our allies. They seem to us to have gone beyond a reasonable, prudent concern with legitimate Soviet defense requirements.

From the Soviet perspective, not only do they see themselves as still trying to catch up with the United States, but they seem to come out from under the shadow of the strategic inferiority for which they labored for so many years. And it may be that one of the problems here is that they and we are assessing differently the different attributes of the central strategic balance and are tending to give different weight to the fields in which the other side has an advantage. There may be, therefore, that a reporter recently called the "domino" effect of the difference in our respective perspectives on what the actual state of the central strategic balance may be. Nevertheless, this question of the strategic balance has been a matter of particular sensitivity to us as a result of the sequelae to our experience in the Vietnam war and the apprehensions that, as a result of that experience, we may have become or may be perceived as becoming weaker or less resolute.

Finally, among the impediments on the Soviet side there is the Soviet system itself and the repressive aspects of that system which are repugnant to those of us who cherish the values of individual freedom and dignity. This has been, of course, an abrasive factor in the recent past as a result of the emergence of the human rights issue as a significant element in U.S. foreign policy, and it is quite likely that it will

continue to be an element of disruption in the relationship.

The issue here, I think, is not whether we should seek to express in our foreign policy the basic values of our own society; the issue rather is to learn how to do that in a way that can have productive results. This, I think, we have been learning to do, somewhat imperfectly, as a result of our recent experience. But we have to recognize that there are limits of feasibility within which we can expect to see significant change in the Soviet Union and in the Soviet system. These limits arise from the enormous strength of the political police bureaucracy and the party bureaucracy. The party is determined not to let power slip from its hands, which might be the consequence of a further diffusion of political power within the society.

### Impediments on the U.S. Side

From the U.S. side there are also impediments to the development of what one might call a sensibly regulated relationship. First of all, there has been a lack of clarity in perceiving our own interests in this relationship and of even describing to ourselves where we want to go with it, what we would like it to be. This is perhaps in part a result of our own recent political experience—the result of changes in our society which have widely separated the experience of one generation from the next. These changes have occurred at a very rapid rate and have involved us in traumatic experiences in the world, the consequence of which has been to heighten the disorientation and anxieties which characterize this period.

Some of these anxieties, whether appropriately or not, have clearly focused upon the Soviet Union as the symbol of our hostilities and made it more difficult to follow a measured course in this relationship. Sometimes in reading the papers one has the impression that the determination of our policy toward the Soviet Union is like ordering an egg at breakfast. It should be either hard or soft. But in truth neither hard nor soft is really very good advice for us in this relationship. Neither extreme is very sensible or is truly in our interest. Either appeasement on one side or bellicosity on the other quite evidently would be likely to encourage a more militant policy on the part of the Soviet Union.

What makes better sense, although it makes less convenient headlines, is a policy of firmness, clarity, and civility in the relationship. We would seek in

pursuing such a policy to conduct the relationship in a way that protects and advances our interests but strives at the same time to moderate the level of tension and pays due attention to those areas in which there is an overlapping of interest between the two countries. Civility, I stress, and perhaps I surprised you with the word because there is in our society an evident difference of judgment about how to encourage the Soviet Union to move in the directions we would like to see it move. There are some who feel that the only language the Soviet Union understands is that of a two-by-four across the forehead. It is quite evident from our recent experience that the net effect of an approach to the Soviet Union in these terms is about the same as a similar approach would be to us—causing us to stiffen in our determination to resist movements toward their position.

Rather it seems to me that the model to be followed is that which was followed by President Kennedy in the Cuban missile crisis, i.e., while paying attention to the elements of power required in the situation, nevertheless to leave a way open for the Soviet Union to move without a sense of humiliation. The ultimate folly in the conduct of this relationship would be to take on the Soviet style in determining our response to the Soviet Union, instead of speaking in terms that truly reflect our own values, our own civility in our society.

Secondly, the issue has come to the fore in recent days, as Dean Funnari said, about linkage of SALT to other issues—in this case to the issue of the Soviet brigade in Cuba. It seems to me that those who would make the ratification of SALT dependent on the Soviet brigade in Cuba, or any other actions of the Soviet Union in the world rather than on the security of the United States, suffer from a terminal case of myopia. It would not advance our interests to do so; it would have the effect of weakening U.S. security; and we would lose an opportunity to operate in an international environment in which it was possible to regulate the strategic military confrontation. Instead, we would face the unknown of an unregulated strategic military confrontation. We would, in effect, be making a choice about which way lies U.S. security—whether our security is best advanced through the effort to stabilize strategic military competition or whether it is better advanced by the effort to attain a superiority which, in fact, it is not possible to attain and which can only

have the effect of plunging the world into development of more weapons, more widely dispersed, more complex, more difficult to regulate, and all the uncertainty that goes with that.

This is not in any way to diminish the importance of those measures which have been proposed for strengthening the U.S. defense program where it is now not adequate, but it is important to bear in mind that the measures required to deal with those deficiencies would have to be substantially larger in the event there were no effective SALT agreement. In this connection I think it is important to say that the effect of postponing SALT—and we should not deceive ourselves on this—would be to kill the treaty; if we were to seek, 1 year from now, 2 years, 3 years from now to pick up the pieces and try to bring the treaty to realization at that time, we would not be able to start where we left off. The military environment will not stand still; we and the Soviet Union will be moving into systems that will be more difficult of regulation, and we shall have to begin again. No one can foresee the terms that such an effort at regulation might require under those circumstances.

The effect of postponement or of nonratification would be more immediately felt, I think, on Soviet programs than on our own, because most of the programs now being proposed and discussed for rectifying our strategic posture are not prohibited to us under the treaty, whereas many of the measures before the Soviet Union would be. The Soviet Union's practice in recent months of taking out of circulation submarines to offset newer systems as they come into service would no longer be required if the Interim Agreement were not regarded as being in force. Without the SALT II Treaty, there would be no limits on the number of warheads on strategic missiles, which is a matter of great concern to us. The ban on interfering with national technical means of verification would also not be in force. Encryption of Soviet telemetry would then not be barred, in the absence of a treaty. Moreover, I think it is important that we not lose sight of concerns our allies have unanimously expressed about the situation in which they would find themselves should the treaty fall.

Behind many of these concerns is the need for greater rationality in our defense policy. It is evident to all of us that there is a certain accidental quality in the determination of our defense capabilities. It is a resultant of the interplay of pressures and interests having to do with particular systems,

rather than the result of an overarching plan which takes account of our needs and at the same time integrates into our defense planning the undoubted security interest we have in trying to stabilize the military competition wherever we can. And it must be, I think, an objective for those of us who work in this field to try to move toward that greater rationality.

In conclusion, we have to bear in mind that the Soviet Union is obviously not our only problem, and except for this one aspect—the danger of nuclear war—it is not the main problem in our foreign policy. In many of the problems we deal with, the Soviet Union is a complicating factor rather than a prime cause of our troubles. It is essential for the effectiveness of our response to the competitive aspects that we should address the real needs of the Third World—the nations of Africa and Asia and elsewhere—so that we are seen as having interests that are not in conflict with theirs and that we help to bring them too into the framework of the international system which is important to us.

It is clear that if we are not successful in doing this, the situation may roll on in its own unguided way toward a disintegrative development of the international system, leading to anarchy and chaos in which the values to which our own society is dedicated shall not flourish and may not survive. ■

## Continuity and Commitment

by Matthew Nimetz

*Address before the leadership conference of the National Interreligious Task Force on Soviet Jewry in New York City on October 30, 1979. Mr. Nimetz is Counselor for the Department of State.*

My purpose today is to speak to you about one of the most important ways in which we are trying to improve the situation for human rights in the East-West context. I speak of the Helsinki process, the dialogue which was formalized in 1975 by the leaders of the 35 nations who signed the Helsinki Final Act. I would like particularly to address my remarks to the thinking of the U.S. Government about where we are and where we ought to go with re-

spect to this process and also to give you the flavor of our thoughts on how to improve the dialogue in the future.

This audience certainly understands the fundamental difference between the Western system of democratic society and the competing Soviet system. The Helsinki process seeks to address our basic foreign policy dilemma: How can these two competing and largely antagonistic systems coexist in a manner that protects our security and at the same time create opportunities to increase areas of cooperation?

The Final Act goes beyond dealing with interests of diplomats for it also seeks to address the universal desire all peoples for basic human rights and freedoms. For this reason, we do not conceive of the Helsinki process as a bloc-to-bloc confrontation, although we have no illusions that the problem of the East is at present our central consideration. By taking account of the various wishes and hopes of the signatory nations, the Helsinki process helps to keep open channels of communication on many sensitive issues in a way which shows great promise for the improvements we seek. This process, however, can only be kept alive through our commitment to make it work and to use its potential continuously to attain our objectives.

### Background of the Final Act

Before I continue with my main theme, let me briefly review the genesis of the Final Act in order to place in perspective my later remarks about the continuity of its application.

We are all familiar with the postwar situation as it developed in Europe following the victory of the allies over Nazi Germany. The nature of the postwar division of territory, people, and value systems is still more than a generation later, at the heart of the current political strains in Europe.

In the period after the Soviet Union consolidated its control over Eastern Europe, Moscow devoted its efforts to legitimize its postwar sphere of domination. To achieve this end, and to exclude the United States from Europe, the U.S.S.R. sought a conference solely of European states to finalize the frontier arrangements which had existed *de facto* since the end of World War II. The West stood firm against these Soviet desires since we had no interest in unilaterally granting legal recognition to the U.S.S.R.'s territorial gains. The United States and our allies, in addition, saw that such a Soviet-sponsored

conference would be used by  
to weaken the relationship among  
United States, Canada, and West-  
European nations, as in-  
tionalized in the NATO alliance.

In the late 1960s, as a part of the  
ral relaxation of tensions, a Euro-  
conference became of greater  
rest throughout the West. The  
O alliance expressed cautious  
rest in such a conference, provided  
United States and Canada took  
l. Simultaneously during this  
od, the Federal Republic of Ger-  
y introduced its *Ostpolitik* in part  
neliorate various intra-German  
lems, and the United States was  
ng directly with the Soviet Union  
number of specific questions such  
mprovements in the Berlin situa-  
SALT I, nonproliferation, and  
ous other issues.

The policy of Western nations in  
early 1970s was to work toward a  
kation of political tension and a re-  
ion of the all too real risks of nu-  
war. This effort, of course, is now  
n by the short-hand term—  
nte. Someone has said that there  
be something wrong with a con-  
that cannot be described in Eng-  
Nevertheless, one of the concrete  
continuing results of detente was  
Conference on Security and Coop-  
ion in Europe, which we commonly  
re to as CSCE. Preparatory talks  
led in Helsinki in late 1972, and  
tations continued there and in  
eva to work out the outlines of the  
l Act.

Since security concerns such as  
T, the mutual and balanced force  
ction negotiations, and other such  
ific topics were being handled  
rately in their own restricted  
ms, the concept of security which  
Final Act of Helsinki embodied was  
rstood to be a much broader one.  
Helsinki negotiators sought to  
e the sense of security among all  
participating nations by expanding  
eration among them, especially be-  
en Eastern and Western nations, in  
e range of areas including eco-  
ic, humanitarian, educational, and  
aral.

The practical expression of this or-  
zational concept resulted in the di-  
on of the Final Act into three basic  
sets which have commonly been called  
sets. Basket 1 contained a declara-  
of principles of interstate behavior,  
as sovereign equality and restraint  
n the use of force, principles which  
e consistent with the U.N. Charter  
other declarations of international

Basket 1 also contained a very im-  
portant affirmation of human rights and  
fundamental freedoms, including reli-  
gious practice, as one of the 10 prin-  
ciples governing the relations among the  
participating states. The inclusion of  
this principle was a difficult achieve-  
ment and was accomplished by careful  
drafting which produced wording sim-  
ilar to, and consistent with, earlier  
statements in such documents as the  
U.N. Charter, the Universal Declara-  
tion of Human Rights, and the U.N.  
conventions on human rights. In re-  
stating this principle, the Helsinki sig-  
natories not only affirmed their com-  
mitment to such freedoms, they also  
specifically reaffirmed the earlier and  
more basic documents. More impor-  
tantly, perhaps, the signatories im-  
plicitly affirmed the principle that true  
detente—and true security—rested in  
the final analysis upon respect for  
human rights.

Also included in basket 1 is an in-  
novative and important security com-  
ponent, called confidence-building  
measures.

Realizing that the building of trust  
is an important component of security,  
the Final Act provides for the prior  
notification of certain troop maneuvers  
and movements and the exchange of ob-  
servers among the signatories at mili-  
tary maneuvers.

Baskets 2 and 3, you will recall,  
deal with economics, science, and tech-  
nology, and with cooperation in cul-  
tural, humanitarian, and other fields.  
In these baskets, specific areas of coop-  
eration were outlined which nations  
could pursue to strengthen interchange  
and provide for the betterment of the  
conditions of life in specific ways for  
their populations.

A great deal more could be said  
about the elements included in the  
Final Act, but I suspect you are all  
quite familiar with them. Among the  
many who talk readily about the Final  
Act, few have actually read it and, I  
further suspect, a significant proportion  
of that exclusive group is present in  
this room. For that reason, you are all  
aware that the Helsinki act is not ac-  
tually a treaty. It is instead a solemn  
agreement among the signatories to  
seek the political objectives outlined in  
the act. Inherent in the Final Act's  
provisions was the desire to reduce the  
level of confrontation between East and  
West and to contribute to the spirit of  
detente. Also implicit in the provisions  
was a commitment to increase the  
dialogue among the parties, especially  
between Eastern and Western nations.

The negotiators created a delic-  
ately balanced document; it contained  
items of importance to each participant.  
All of the participants were, quite ob-  
viously, interested in a strengthened  
sense of security in Europe. For the  
Soviet Union, CSCE implied a certain  
degree of acceptance of the post-World  
War II territorial frontiers in Europe,  
since the signatories agreed to seek no  
change in frontiers except by peaceful  
means. For many of the East European  
states, it established a framework that  
permitted greater interaction with  
Western countries than was previously  
possible.

For the neutral and nonaligned  
states, CSCE provided a forum in  
which to pursue European-wide in-  
terests. Thus Switzerland, which is not a  
member of the United Nations, plays a  
creative political role in Europe; the  
Vatican pursues its important moral  
and institutional goals; while Malta ex-  
presses its interests in Mediterranean  
issues.

For the West, the Final Act gave  
us a means to promote the exchange of  
people and ideas and to seek peaceful  
evolution in the systems that govern  
the populations of the U.S.S.R. and the  
countries of Eastern Europe and pro-  
vided as well a concrete affirmation of  
the right of states to raise humanitarian  
concerns in a diplomatic context. In our  
view, the Final Act achieved an enor-  
mous success of making quite explicit  
the notion that improved human rights  
would be a permanent factor in the de-  
tente equation. This may have been an  
unexpected turn of events for the  
Soviet Union, but it quickly became  
plain that the inclusion of the human  
rights concept was to be essential to the  
CSCE process.

Perhaps the most important aspect  
of Helsinki is that it is more than a  
document; it is a document that was  
converted into a vital process. It  
created a process for continuous  
dialogue between the East and West, a  
platform from which the signatory na-  
tions legitimately could talk about sen-  
sitive concerns with their neighbors,  
concerns that previously were difficult  
to voice in a diplomatic context. This  
was accomplished through the estab-  
lishment of a unique system of follow-on  
meetings which allow—or more accu-  
rately, requires—the signatory nations  
to review with each other on a con-  
tinuing basis the progress being made  
toward the implementation of the Final  
Act's provisions. By placing in the text  
of the act itself the requirement to re-  
view the implementation of the political  
objectives to which they had agreed,  
the Helsinki signatories initiated a



process that is as important as the text of the Final Act itself.

## U.S. Policy Toward the CSCE

At this point let me try to give you an idea of how the U.S. Government views the current status of the Helsinki CSCE process.

First of all, we think the process is reasonably healthy given the nature of the Soviet system and the state of East-West relations today. The Belgrade meeting of 1977 showed our serious commitment to implementation and to the process itself. Under the distinguished leadership of Ambassador Arthur Goldberg, the U.S. delegation made a strong effort to enhance implementation of the Final Act by all signatories. Although some may have preferred a more anodyne approach to the meeting, we believed that it was important, at the first Helsinki follow-up meeting, to articulate our determination that the commitments made at Helsinki be taken seriously. Our determination has not diminished.

Since the Belgrade meeting, there have been numerous bilateral and multilateral talks among the signatories as called for in the Final Act. In 1978 and 1979, our government held CSCE consultations with nearly all the members of the Warsaw Pact, with all of our NATO allies, and with most of the neutral or nonaligned signatories such as Austria, Sweden, Switzerland, and Yugoslavia. We have also met on several occasions with the Spanish, given their important role as hosts for the next review conference in Madrid. Our experience in the bilateral discussions with Eastern countries has been moderately encouraging. Like all diplomatic interchange, they were confidential, but I can assure you they were frank, extensive, and specific.

We intend to continue the process in the next 12 months with the hope that progress can be made in the period before the Madrid meeting. These regular and extensive bilateral meetings are an important development since Belgrade, and the existence of these intensive talks has caused the Helsinki process to take on greater vitality.

Another productive Helsinki activity was the work of the expert groups established by the Belgrade meeting to discuss concrete ways to enhance specific CSCE implementation. A scientific forum under CSCE auspices will take place in Hamburg in February, with Dr. Philip Handler, President of the National Academy of Sciences, as head of the U.S. delegation.

Moreover, the Helsinki Final Act has permeated the day-to-day interchange between nations and within states as well. We find, for example, that CSCE topics now tend to become key agenda items during state visits, and we note increasing references in speeches by the leaders of the signatory nations to the value of the CSCE process and to the need to make a deeper commitment to it, and even an effect on domestic legislation such as that involving our visa laws.

As a result of all this activity, efforts by the signatory nations to create the necessary atmosphere for improved compliance with the Final Act's provisions have been enhanced. I would not tell you that all is well, however. The harsh sentences recently imposed on Charter '77 members<sup>1</sup> by Czechoslovak authorities shocked the world and made a mockery of that country's commitments to its obligations under the Final Act, not to mention its obligation to fundamental concepts of human rights.

American policy toward CSCE remains unchanged. We are committed to the continuity of the Helsinki process and we seek to deepen the commitment of others to this process as well. We are committed to fulfill our obligations under the Final Act, and in this regard, we have been seeking to improve our domestic implementation of the Final Act's provisions. I might mention at this point that the CSCE Commission, under the able and effective leadership of Representative Dante Fascell, is in the process of finalizing a report on this subject which will be released shortly to the public.

Naturally we also continue to review and seek improved implementation of the Final Act's provisions by all parties since it is indisputable that the Helsinki process can be viable only when all signatories honor their commitments. As an adjunct to this desire, the United States continues to search for new ways to build cooperation within the CSCE context and will be working with other governments on ways to enhance implementation through specific proposals for the 1980 CSCE review conference in Madrid, some of which I will talk about shortly.

Lastly, the United States continues to maintain its unflagging interest in the human rights provisions of the Final Act. It is here most of all that we seek the evolutionary change in the East which will result in a true reduction in the political tensions dividing us and which will, in the long run, allow our relations with the East to take on a more normal character and contribute to the betterment of life not only in those countries but throughout the CSCE area.

## Current Status of Implementation

Now let me address our view of the current status of implementation. I mentioned earlier that the Helsinki process was causing the signatory nations to make efforts to enhance implementation of the Final Act's provisions. Although this has, indeed, happened, and although the Helsinki process may to some extent be responsible for this happening, it is obvious that not all aspects of the Final Act are being implemented satisfactorily.

In this regard, the United States remains quite unsatisfied with the level of CSCE implementation by the East, the human rights area. The Final Act has provided a yardstick to measure the implementation of human rights in the East and, by all measures, implementation is insufficient to meet the standards expected when the Final Act was signed. We are continuing by all feasible means, and especially in the bilateral and multilateral talks which I mentioned earlier, to make our views known on human rights implementation and the ways we think it can improve.

The U.S. Government has been in the forefront of this effort on human rights; yet at the same time, we recognize there are limitations to what we can accomplish. Being a government engaged in an intense security competition with the Soviet Union, we will always be open to the charge that our human rights concerns are politically and ideologically motivated. For this reason, the U.S. Government continues to believe that private citizens and their organizations in all CSCE countries necessarily play a very important role to encourage CSCE implementation. The very nature of private groups, such as those you represent, puts beyond dispute the humanitarian concerns to which they—and you—are devoted. You are not required to balance competing interests as governments must do. Your concerns are direct and specifically focused. You have an enormous advantage in many respects in bringing to public attention, in a believable and effective way, the areas in which human rights implementation can and must be improved.

For this reason, the U.S. Government, from President Carter on down, is very pleased with the interest and involvement in the Helsinki process which private citizens and their organizations have shown. We feel, furthermore, that your efforts very fully complement the government's and that the overall result has been to deepen this nation's commitment to the continuity of the Helsinki process.

The Final Act, we believe, specifically encourages relevant private activity by providing that individuals shall own, and have a right to act upon, their rights and duties. For this reason, the establishment of CSCE monitoring posts in Eastern countries was a welcome sign, and it is difficult to see how the United States will be able to speak positively about the Eastern performance so long as CSCE monitors continue to languish in detention and are otherwise harassed.

### Future Directions

Let me turn to another aspect of the Helsinki process and inform you of our government's current thinking about the future directions it believes the process should take. First of all, as I have already said, the United States is committed to deepening the involvement of all Helsinki signatories in the CSCE process.

It is quite clear to us that a balanced implementation of all aspects and provisions of the Helsinki Final Act is a crucial factor in the deepening commitment to the CSCE process. We know this is so because various signatories often have specific interests in different aspects of the Final Act. I mentioned before that the genius of the Final Act is that it contained something of importance for each participant.

In the implementation process, we must apply this genius practically by promoting implementation across a broad spectrum. Some nations, such as the United States, tend to place priority on the humanitarian provisions as we seek balanced progress in all CSCE areas. Others, while interested in these provisions, give greater priority to security and economic aspects of the Final Act. Geographic, historical, or other reasons. A successful process, and a successful meeting at Madrid, will see progress in a broad range of areas, in which the humanitarian and the security fields must be included.

We have also come to understand that an uneven manner of implementation can damage the entire Helsinki process. Nations whose interests are neglected or whose values are given short shrift will lose interest in the process. There are already Americans who have suggested that we abandon CSCE because progress has been slow in humanitarian fields. There have been Europeans who have shown irritation over the failure of rapid progress in other fields—for example, the extension of more advantageous trading terms, increased attention to security measures, or extensive Mediterranean discussions.

Based on our experience to date, we must recognize that balanced implementation of the Helsinki Final Act has not been achieved. The United States and its friends among the Helsinki signatories have been emphasizing implementation of the humanitarian provisions of the Final Act. Given the nature of the Eastern response so far, we have been, at best, exploring the fringes of the Eastern nations' receptivity to progress in these areas. We know, however, that the East is not monolithic and that their internal regimes and societies differ. Their relations among themselves and with us are distinct, and their record of implementation in the human rights area reflects these differences.

In our discussions, we have achieved some progress in connection with family reunification, a major priority for us. In several countries religious freedom and intellectual diversity are somewhat greater now than before. Advances have been made in greater cultural interchange with a few countries. But the free flow of people and ideas—which CSCE envisions—is certainly far off.

The economic provisions of the Final Act have not been pursued as vigorously as they might have—although it should be noted that other forums exist for this purpose. U.S. legislation links the trade status of the Soviet Union and most nonmarket countries to the emigration question, and this has placed limits on economic relations with several of them. Fulfillment by many Communist countries of Helsinki commitments to provide business information and adequate working conditions for our businessmen has not been satisfactory. Because the commerce of Communist countries is conducted by the state, political considerations often affect economic activity. Despite these difficulties, however, trade with the Soviet Union and Eastern Europe has grown over the last few years and has produced a large and rising trade surplus.

At present, many of the Helsinki signatories look to the security provisions of the Final Act as an area that is ripe for improved effort at implementation.

The confidence-building measures presently in the Final Act have worked rather well and thus have proved to be worthy precedents for possible further expansion. There have been several proposals for security enhancement, and the U.S. Government has been

closely examining them. Among the most important and creative of these proposals was forwarded by the French a year or so ago for a conference on disarmament in Europe. The proposal was intended to widen the area for conventional arms control by establishing a conference, the first stage of which would develop confidence-building measures to enhance the sense of security among nations.

Another proposal was put forth by the Warsaw Pact states. In their Budapest proposal made earlier this year, they called for a European conference on military detente which would discuss confidence-building measures as well as other Eastern ideas.

These initiatives are currently under active consideration and discussion. The United States and its allies have a deep interest in enhanced security for all states in Europe, and there are aspects of these and similar proposals that may be of interest to us. But three things should be clear.

**First**, neither we nor our allies will have any interest in arms control exercises that are motivated by a desire to achieve propaganda victories and one-sided advantages or to delay our NATO modernization programs without properly addressing the underlying realities.

**Second**, we do not want to establish new forums or procedures that might interfere with or endanger the goals we seek through currently established channels of arms control negotiations.

**Third**, we will not permit the CSCE process to become distorted and its balance lost through excessive weighting in one area at the expense of others.

Thus, we return to our theme of balance since this notion seems to us to provide the best chance of making long-term progress in basic areas. We will not lessen our emphasis on humanitarian concerns, and we expect that other Western nations will stand firmly beside us in demanding better implementation. And, at the same time, we should find a way to deal in a positive fashion with the desire of European states for enhanced security within the CSCE context. Therefore, we are rededicating ourselves to the pursuit of a positive, as opposed to a negative, balance in CSCE—that is, a balance based on greater movement toward implementation in all CSCE areas.

There are several ways in which we can enhance balance in the implementation process. First, perhaps, we should



explore more systematically the relations between trade and economy and security and human rights so that we can see the interdependent factors in each of these areas. Second, when we consult bilaterally and multilaterally with the Helsinki signatories, we can widen the scope and expertise available on all areas of the Final Act. Third, we can suggest that, in the interim between regular CSCE review conferences, there could be more experts or high-level meetings on specific and concrete CSCE subjects, such as we have seen in a limited way after the Belgrade meeting. There would be fruitful areas for intensive work in the coming years, for example in the areas of security, family reunification, freer travel, and emigration.

All of these suggestions offer ways to implement the Final Act in an evenhanded manner and to give us the tools we need to seek greater commitment to the implementation of those concerns in which we have a specific interest.

## Preparations for the Review Conference

Now that I have given you an idea of our current thinking about the CSCE process, I would like to say a few words about our preparations for the followup review conference in Madrid and the period beyond.

Our policy is to have the Madrid meeting be a constructive one which will review compliance, seek to enhance implementation in the future, and explore concrete ideas for improving cooperation. In the area of human rights, there is absolutely no doubt that we will continue vigorously to seek full implementation, particularly of principles seven and basket 3. I have mentioned earlier the high level of interest in this area, and given your own continuous involvement in these concerns, I am sure our commitment to effective human rights implementations will deepen.

In this regard, among the many areas which we will be examining at Madrid, we will do our utmost to encourage Eastern countries to accord respectful and humane treatment to the courageous individuals who have established citizens' committees to monitor and stimulate compliance with the Helsinki Final Act. Related to this will be efforts to alleviate the suffering and obtain freedom for those who have been imprisoned because of their political and religious beliefs and for espousing compliance with the Final Act.

Of specific concern to this leadership conference will be our continuing interest in a more humane approach to emigration and improved emigration procedures, with special emphasis on and continuing sympathy for the plight of Soviet Jews and other religious adherents who wish to emigrate, as well as for the elimination of harassment of those who have been refused exit visas. We remain concerned about implementation of the provisions involving the freedom of journalists to pursue their work without interference.

We see no reason why there could not be substantial progress in these areas in the period before Madrid; positive developments here would be a powerful stimulus to making the Madrid meeting the type of success we all wish it to be.

For the sake of balance, and to enhance our ability to obtain compliance with all aspects of the Final Act, we will be working with other signatories to improve implementation of the security provisions of the Helsinki agreement by looking at ways to heighten the effect of the confidence-building measures written into the Final Act. Since the Final Act also encourages the parties to make further efforts which could lead to developing and enlarging measures aimed at strengthening confidence, we will be willing to explore ways to implement these provisions in a manner that accommodates some aspects of the French proposal and Warsaw Pact proposal within the CSCE context in the period after the Madrid meeting.

In the economic fields, we will also look for ways to facilitate trade and other forms of economic cooperation.

The scientific forum, which will be held in Hamburg this coming winter, will allow distinguished private scientific figures, as well as the CSCE signatories, to see where further efforts can be made in this important field. In Geneva in November we will sign the Convention of Transboundary Air Pollution worked out in the CSCE context under the auspices of the U.N. Economic Commission for Europe. We will also try to see where other environmental problems of common interest can be cooperatively examined. We intend to further cooperation and exchanges in the fields of science and culture as well. These questions will be taken up bilaterally and multilaterally as we prepare for the Madrid review conference.

What I have attempted to do in these remarks is to describe for you the U.S. Government's continuing interest in the well-being of the Helsinki process and our deepening commitment to the implementation of all Final Act provisions agreed to by the signatories. Of all the methods we have for dealing with the East, of all the concrete means established to work out the parameters of detente, and of all the forums that have been constructed to improve what is, at best, a tense relationship with a strong and determined adversary, the Helsinki process is by far the broadest and most politically workable.

For the long-term, however, the Helsinki process can lead us beyond the bloc-to-bloc relationship and disseminate understanding for the concepts of openness, pluralism, and humanity in the world. For this reason, the United States remains deeply committed to the Helsinki process and to the effort being made by all 35 signatories to improve their relationships by means of this unique diplomatic and public process.<sup>1</sup>

<sup>1</sup>A private group in Czechoslovakia established to monitor compliance with the Helsinki Final Act.

## CSCE Semiannual Report and 1980 Madrid Meeting

DEPARTMENT STATEMENT,  
DEC. 5, 1979<sup>1</sup>

On behalf of President Carter, Secretary Vance on December 4, 1979, retransmitted the seventh semiannual report on implementation of the Helsinki Final Act to Chairman Dante Fascell of the Commission on Security and Cooperation in Europe. These reports are submitted to assist the commission in its function of monitoring implementation of the Helsinki accords. The present report covers the period June 1 - November 30, 1979.<sup>2</sup>

The next followup meeting of the Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe (CSCE) will start in Madrid on November 11, 1980. A major feature of that meeting will be a review by the signatories of implementation of the Final Act. The United States intends to speak frankly and honestly about successes and failures in im-

mentation. Our comments will reflect the record of progress at that time.

Thus far, the record has been unimpressive. Advances in some areas have been coupled with serious failures with respect to other aspects of the Final Act.

For example, during the period covered by the report, there have been encouraging developments in the reunification of divided families and the general area of human contacts but continued repression of individuals seeking exercise rights which their governments have pledged to respect.

The Final Act recognizes respect for human rights as an integral part of the basis for the development of security and cooperation among the 35 participating states. It is in the area of human rights that certain states have made the most difficulty in meeting the commitments which they voluntarily assumed at Helsinki. The United States, beginning the coming year and at the March meeting, intends to continue to engage all signatories to implement the Final Act in its entirety. ■

Read to news correspondents by Defense spokesman Hodding Carter III. Copies of the report may be obtained from the Public Information Service, Bureau of Public Affairs, Department of Defense, Washington, D.C. 20520.

## Helsinki Agreement Human Rights

PRESIDENT'S STATEMENT,  
July 30, 1979<sup>1</sup>

My Administration is deeply committed to the cause of human rights here and abroad. As a means to promote respect for fundamental freedoms and the development of a more peaceful, stable world, the United States attaches great significance to the Final Act of the Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe (CSCE). The document, signed in 1975 at Helsinki by the leaders of 33 European nations, Canada, and the United States, urges its signers to work toward lowering barriers and improving cooperation between East and West. Each nation made solemn promises to take steps to improve the lives of its citizens. These obligations required some investments in the foreign and domestic policies of all 35 nations.

I am extremely pleased that the U.S. Commission on Security and Cooperation in Europe has taken the lead in assessing U.S. implementation and identifying areas where American performance can be improved. The commission's report, "Fulfilling Our Promises: The United States and the Helsinki Final Act"—released on November 8—is the first comprehensive review by any CSCE signatory which takes into account criticism from other Helsinki states as well as domestic observers.

CSCE signatory states which suppress human rights cannot, in good conscience, justify their record of compliance. But I believe our record of implementation has been second to none, even among the other democracies among the 35 participating states. American political history is testimony to the firm foundation of civil liberties enshrined in our own Constitution with its Bill of Rights, long before Helsinki.

As this report points out, our work is never complete. Our own traditions, reinforced by the Helsinki Final Act, pledge us to strive constantly for improvement in both domestic, civil, and economic rights and in the expanded cooperation with other participating states. This report should go far to persuade other CSCE governments that the United States is serious about its obligations under the Helsinki accords.

I also hope that it will stimulate other Helsinki countries to undertake similar public assessments of their performance. Implementation of the Final Act is critical to peace and security in Europe and for our own nation. We cannot permit the Helsinki agreement to become meaningless words on parchment. We must bring it to life, and I believe the CSCE Commission has made a major contribution to that end. ■

<sup>1</sup>Text from Weekly Compilation of Presidential Documents of Dec. 3, 1979.

## Visit of Irish Prime Minister Lynch

*Prime Minister Jack Lynch of Ireland made an official visit to the United States November 7-15, 1979. While in Washington (November 8-10), he met with President Carter and other government officials. Following is the press statement issued at the conclu-*

*sion of his meeting with the President on November 8.<sup>1</sup>*

The President met today with Prime Minister Jack Lynch of Ireland. Prime Minister Lynch, in addition to being the Head of Government of Ireland, is for the last half of 1979 also the President of the European Council of Heads of State or of Government of the nine countries of the European Community.

The President and the Prime Minister reviewed the close relations between their two countries and discussed a number of key world issues which are of particular concern to the European Community, with which the United States enjoys close cooperation, based on common interests and values.

The President and the Prime Minister also discussed at length the tragic communal problems in Northern Ireland. They condemned support for organizations engaged directly or indirectly in campaigns of violence which only delays the day when peace and reconciliation can come to Northern Ireland. They noted with interest the proposal of the British Government to convene a conference of the principal political parties in Northern Ireland and shared the hope that progress could be made toward a form of administration acceptable to both parts of the community there. The President reaffirmed his statement of August 1977 looking to support for American investment in Northern Ireland when the violence is ended.

The official visit of Prime Minister and Mrs. Lynch to Washington and to several other American cities demonstrates the great friendship between the two nations and also the great respect of the American Government and people for a country which in recent years has enjoyed rapid economic growth and taken its place among the industrialized nations of the world. The Prime Minister spoke of the contribution of American investment to this growth and reiterated his government's continuing support for such investment.

The Prime Minister invited the President to visit Ireland at a mutually agreeable date and the President accepted the invitation with pleasure. ■

<sup>1</sup>Text from Weekly Compilation of Presidential Documents of Nov. 12, 1979, which also carries the texts of President Carter's and Prime Minister Lynch's remarks made at the welcoming ceremony on Nov. 8, their remarks to reporters following a meeting on Nov. 8, and their dinner toasts that evening.

## Four Treaties Pertaining to Human Rights Domestic Interests

Following are statements before the Senate Foreign Relations Committee on November 14, 1979, by Deputy Secretary of State Warren Christopher, Legal Adviser of the Department of State Roberts B. Owen, and Assistant Secretary for Human Rights and Humanitarian Affairs Patricia M. Derian.<sup>1</sup>

### DEPUTY SECRETARY CHRISTOPHER

I am grateful for this opportunity to appear before the committee in support of the four multilateral treaties on human rights transmitted to the Senate by President Carter in 1978: the International Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Racial Discrimination; the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights; the International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights; and the American Convention on Human Rights.<sup>2</sup>

A fifth human rights treaty, the genocide convention, has already undergone extensive hearings before this committee and is, therefore, not before you today. I want to emphasize, however, that ratification of that convention remains one of the most important goals of this Administration's human rights policy. As President Carter said in a message to the Senate [May 23, 1977], the genocide convention "... protects the most fundamental of all human rights—the right to live. . . ." And as this committee well knows, its ratification is very long overdue.

In addressing the United Nations about the treaties [March 17, 1977] before you today, President Carter noted that: "The basic thrust of human affairs points toward a more universal demand for fundamental human rights." The treaties—all of which have been signed by large numbers of countries and have already entered into force—are a reflection of that "basic thrust." Our history, and our vital national interests, require that we be a full and active part of it.

In my remarks this morning, I will concentrate on the compelling interests—both foreign and domestic—that call for U.S. adherence to the treaties. Later today Bob Owen, the Legal Adviser of the Department of State, and our colleagues from the Department of Justice will discuss in detail the legal dimensions of the treaties, as well as the reservations to them that we rec-

ommend. Patt Derian, the Assistant Secretary for Human Rights and Humanitarian Affairs, will address the relationship between the treaties and other aspects of our human rights policy.

At the outset, however, I would like to describe very briefly the contents of the four treaties.

### Contents of the Treaties

The racial discrimination convention was signed by the United States in 1966. Its purpose is to define racial discrimination, to condemn and prohibit the practice of racial discrimination by governments, and to encourage the removal of institutional obstacles to the ending of racial discrimination.

The International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, signed by the United States in 1977, is a more comprehensive document. It commits participating states to respect many of the rights enshrined in our own Constitution: freedom of speech, religion, association, and movement; the right to vote in secret elections; the right to stand equal before the law; the right to self-determination and to nondiscrimination; the presumption of innocence for those accused of a crime; the right against self-incrimination; and the protections of due process of law.

Unlike the other U.N. treaties, the International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, which was signed by the United States in 1977, looks to the future. It commits states to take steps toward the future realization of certain economic, social, and cultural goals for the individual. These goals are ones to which the United States has long been committed, including the right to work, to social security, to physical and mental health, to education, and to freedom from hunger.

The one non-U.N. treaty being considered here—the American Convention on Human Rights—was adopted by the Organization of American States in 1969 and signed by the United States in 1977. It seeks to guarantee for the peoples of this hemisphere rights similar to those guaranteed by the civil and political covenant.

All four of the treaties before you today also contain reporting procedures and provide for review by independent experts of progress in achieving the treaties' goals.

As I suggested earlier, the Administration urges Senate approval of these treaties because adherence to them is so clearly in our national interest. Concern for human rights is one of the foundations of our greatness as a nation. Our observance of human rights contributes profoundly to our leadership in the international community. But to preserve and enhance that leadership role, we must demonstrate our willingness to make human rights a matter of international commitment at policy and not solely a matter of domestic law.

As President Carter noted in his letter to the Senate transmitting the treaties [February 23, 1978], the United States is one of the few important nations in the world that has not yet become a party to the U.N.

*Unless the United States is a party to the four human rights treaties we will be unable to contribute fully to the evolving international law of human rights.*

treaties. In the eyes of the world, our failure to do so reflects adversely upon our own impressive accomplishments the human rights field. Even more importantly, our nonadherence to the treaties prejudices U.S. participation in the development of the international law of human rights.

This is not only unfortunate, it is also unnecessary. In essence, the treaties create an international commitment to the same basic human rights that are already guaranteed to citizens of the United States by our own law and Constitution. U.S. ratification would not endanger any rights that currently enjoy. On the contrary, ratification would encourage the extension of rights already enjoyed by our citizens to the citizens of other nations and it would allow the United States to participate in this process.

The fundamental rights enjoyed in this country are a product not only of our Founding Fathers' drafting but of two centuries of practice and interpretation. Similarly, the rights enunciated in these treaties will be molded by the actions of the states party to them in future years. Unless the United States is a party to the treaties, we will be unable to contribute fully to this evolving international law of human rights.



## International Interests

Moreover, ratification of the treaties will remove a troubling complication from our diplomacy. Governments with which we raise human rights concerns will no longer be able to sit at the force of our approaches or question the seriousness of our comment by pointing to our failure to ratify. I have personally observed that person-to-person diplomacy provides the primary and, in many instances, the best means to obtain improvements in human rights. But I have also observed personally that our effectiveness can be compromised by our own failure to ratify these treaties.

Ratification also gives the United States an additional international forum through which to pursue the advancement of human rights and to challenge other nations to meet the high standards set for this nation. We should not deny ourselves this opportunity to help shape and develop international standards for human rights and to encourage the attention to others of the rights we so long enjoyed.

While the treaties are not subject to legally binding sanctions, they do impose the political costs attached to violations of human rights. The committees established to review compliance with the treaties provide a mechanism through which human rights practices throughout the world can be evaluated, compared, and publicized. These committees will develop a sort of human rights caselaw—a body of precedent that can give shape and substance to basic standards enunciated in the treaties.

It is toward this goal—the operation of the rule of law in the international human rights field—that we would strive. Ratification of these four treaties would be an important step toward that end.

U.S. adherence to these treaties would unquestionably promote the international recognition of fundamental human rights. But it would also unquestionably advance the national interests of the United States. As President Carter suggested on the 30th anniversary of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, the two are inextricably linked. As he said on that occasion:

Human rights are not peripheral to the foreign policy of the United States . . . . The pursuit of human rights is part of a grand effort to use our great power and our tremendous influence in the service of creating a better world—a world in which all human beings can live in peace, in freedom, with their basic needs adequately met.

For these reasons, I respectfully urge that advice and consent be given to the ratification of these human rights treaties.

## MR. OWEN

I feel pleased and privileged to appear before this distinguished committee in order to testify in support of the four treaties on human rights now before you. Deputy Secretary Christopher has already presented the compelling case, in terms of U.S. foreign policy and our domestic system of values, for ratification of these treaties. I shall only reiterate that considerations of the effectiveness of our moral and economic leadership in the world community today, and a deep commitment to the just treatment of men and women everywhere, underlie this Administration's vigorous espousal of ratification.

Everyone here today agrees that every person should have the benefit of freedom from arbitrary and inhumane treatment at the hands of his or her government. Such freedom takes the form of legal rights within the constitutional system of the United States. We cherish these rights and have made great progress in promoting their advancement.

I am here today to support ratification of these treaties as a means for the United States to participate in the furtherance of similar rights in the international sphere. They were drafted under the close scrutiny of representatives of our government at the United Nations and the Organization of American States. We have had them under careful review for a good many years and are satisfied that any problems they still present can be satisfactorily resolved through a reasonable number of reservations, understandings, and declarations. I wish to assure this committee that these treaties will insure a more widely accepted legal framework in which the United States can pursue internationally the values of human freedom and justice under law that we all share.

Since these treaties are extensive, I propose to review their provisions only briefly and then to discuss at some length certain aspects of the treaties and of this Administration's approach to them that some perceive as obstacles to ratification.

## Provisions of the Treaties

The racial discrimination convention defines "racial discrimination" to include distinctions and preferences based not only on race, but also on "colour, descent, or national or ethnic origin" whose purpose or effect is to impair the enjoyment of human rights on an equal footing. The substantive provisions of the convention require states parties to undertake to pursue a policy of eliminating such discrimination by refraining from discriminatory practices, by guaranteeing equality before the law with respect to a variety of substantive rights, and by providing for remedies against discriminatory treatment. These undertakings are in keeping with the legislative and judicial strides taken in this country in the last 100 years through the adoption of the 14th amendment and the Civil Rights Acts of the 1960s.

The other three treaties under consideration today range far more widely over the spectrum of rights which an individual may enjoy.

Under the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights and the American Convention on Human Rights, states parties undertake to respect and insure a series of rights of individuals that largely coincide with fundamental rights built into our democratic tradition and guaranteed by our Bill of Rights. These treaty rights include the right to vote, to free expression, to freedom of religion, to freedom of association and assembly; rights of the family and of children and a right to nationality; rights to freedom of movement and of residence; and a whole series of procedural rights of the accused to a fair trial, to representation by counsel, and other procedural rights. Each treaty requires that the states parties respect the enumerated rights without discrimination as to race, sex, national origin, or other status.

Special importance attaches to article 4 of the covenant which addresses the need to distinguish, in accordance with internationally agreed standards, between emergencies that warrant reasonable derogations from the covenant's requirements and unwarranted claims of emergency, and between those rights from which reasonable derogation is permissible and those from which no derogation is allowed. In the latter category are such fundamental rights as freedom from torture, from slavery, and from retroactive application of statutes defining criminal offenses.

# Human Rights

Unlike its partner covenant, the International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights looks not to the recognition of present rights but to the future. It commits states to take steps toward the future realization of certain economic, social, and cultural goals for the individual, much as many of our domestic enactments and policy statements look toward aspirational goals of full employment, universal health care, and the like. Article 2 requires that ratifying states undertake "to take steps . . . with a view to achieving progressively the full realization of the rights recognized in the present Covenant . . ."

These rights include the right to work and to enjoy just and fair conditions of work; the right to social security, to the enjoyment of a high standard of health, and to an adequate standard of living; the right to the protection of the family and of children; and the right to primary education.

The desirability of realizing these rights is clear and in keeping with policies fostered in the United States for some 50 years at least. It is worth reiterating that no ratifying party thereby commits itself to the present implementation of these rights. Nor does any party commit itself to distribute the benefits foreseen by the covenant to individuals directly. Rather, the covenant obliges governments to work toward the eventual achievement of the minimum standards it sets out. To emphasize that this constitutes an obligation to promote rather than an immediate legal commitment to perform, the Administration has suggested appending a declaration to this effect.

## Implementation Procedures

All four of these treaties contain provisions for their enforcement. There are four essential ways by which implementation of these treaty rights may be overseen.

First, common to the racial discrimination convention, the economic and social rights covenant, and the civil and political rights covenant is a reporting procedure requiring states parties to submit reports on the measures they have adopted to give effect to the rights recognized in the treaties. These three treaties call for such reports within 1 year of their entries into force and periodically thereafter.

The reports required by the economic and social rights covenant are to be submitted to the Economic and Social Council of the United Nations through the Secretary General; those required by the racial discrimination

convention and the civil and political rights covenant are to be submitted, again through the Secretary General, to independent committees established by the treaties. The Committee on the Elimination of Racial Discrimination and the Human Rights Committee each contain 18 members who are persons of "high moral standing" and "character" and competence, elected by secret ballot from nominees by states parties and who act in an individual capacity.

The American convention reconstitutes a similarly independent seven-member commission called the Inter-American Commission on Human Rights. The respective bodies reviewing the reports are authorized by the treaties to make general comments based upon examinations of the reports.

The second route of implementation consists of an interstate complaint and conciliation procedure.

Under the racial discrimination convention each state party subjects itself to the interstate procedure, but under the civil and political rights covenant and the American convention, a state party does not so subject itself unless it makes a declaration to that effect. Such a declaration would state that the state party recognizes the competence of the appropriate independent committee to receive and examine allegations from other states parties that it is not fulfilling its obligations under the treaty. The appropriate committee or commission is authorized to examine the complaint and to issue reports with nonbinding recommendations.

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*The rationale behind the reservations is . . . that we take our international legal obligations seriously and . . . commit ourselves to do by treaty only that which is constitutionally and legally permissible within our domestic law.*

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The economic and social rights covenant has no comparable provision for interstate complaints and conciliation procedures.

The third type of implementation procedure allows individuals and groups to lodge complaints with the appropriate commission or committee against states parties to the treaties.

Under the racial discrimination convention, a state party subjects itself to such complaints only if it makes a declaration to that effect; under the civil and political rights covenant, a state would be so subject only if it ratifies an optional protocol.

The American convention provides that any individual, group, or organization may lodge complaints of violation by states parties; submission to this procedure is not optional for a ratifying state.

The economic and social rights covenant contains no comparable provision.

The fourth and last means of implementation is set forth only in the American convention: that is, judicial proceedings before the Inter-American Court of Human Rights. This court, composed of seven judges elected in an individual capacity, has jurisdiction to hear cases submitted by states parties and the commission only if the interstate complaint procedures described above have already been completed and only if the states party involved have declared themselves subject to the court's jurisdiction. The court provides the only enforcement mechanism that would produce decisions legally binding the states parties concerned.

As is evident from a summary of the substantive provisions of these four treaties, they do not concern themselves solely with the behavior of one state toward another. One of their principal objects and purposes is to subject the behavior of a government toward its people to international legal scrutiny, not generally, but only where that behavior does not meet certain minimum standards of justice and humanity as reflected in the treaties.

As Deputy Secretary Christophers has pointed out, the United States has always striven to conform its treatment of those under its jurisdiction to our constitutional standards and the processes of law; on the whole, we do for our own citizens what the drafters of these treaties contemplated as necessary for the citizens of all countries.

## Criticisms of Opponents

But because these treaties do concern themselves with the relations between governments and individuals rather than solely with those between states, objections have been raised to them. It is feared by some that these treaties could be used to distort the constitutional legislative standards to shape our Federal and our State governments' treatment of individuals.

in the United States. These critics deserve response.

Such objections tend to fall into three categories.

First, it is said that the human rights treaties could serve to change the laws as they are, allowing individuals in courts of law to invoke the treaties where inconsistent with domestic law or even with the Constitution.

The second type of objection is that the treaties could be used to alter the jurisdictional balance between our Federal and State institutions. Since these two objections will be addressed during these hearings by the Department of Justice, I will go into them only briefly.

The third type of objection is that the relationship between a government and its citizens is not a proper subject for the treaty-making powers at all but should be left entirely to domestic legislative processes. This last point I will address in somewhat more detail.

### Inconsistencies With Domestic Law

As others have noted, the treaties do diverge from our domestic law in a relatively few instances. Criticize that this divergence will cause changes in that domestic law outside the normal legislative process, or that it will subject the relations between government and the individual to conflicting legal standards.

This fear is not well founded, in our view, for two reasons. First, the President has recommended that to one of the four treaties there be appended a declaration that the treaties' substantive provisions are not self-executing. A treaty is self-executing, thus automatically the law of the land upon entry into force, or non-self-executing, requiring implementing legislation before it becomes a rule for courts, depending upon its terms and the intention of the parties adhering to it.

It is the Administration's view that the treaties are, on their face and according to their terms, not self-executing and, thus, are not enforced directly by the courts. A Senate ratification would simply clarify the intention of the United States in this regard. This does not mean that vast new implementing legislation is required, as a great majority of the treaty provisions are already implemented in our domestic law. It does mean that further changes in our laws will be brought about only through the normal legislative process. This understanding as to the non-self-executing nature of the substantive provisions of the treaties would not derogate from or diminish in

any way our international obligations under the treaties; it touches only upon the role the treaty provisions will play in our domestic law.

A second reason why we need not fear a confusion of standards due to possible conflicts between the treaty provisions and domestic law rests in this Administration's recommended reservations and understandings. In the few instances where it was felt that a provision of the treaties could reasonably be interpreted to diverge from the requirements of our Constitution or from Federal or State law presently in force, the Administration has suggested that a reservation or understanding be made to that provision.

In our view, these reservations do not detract from the object and the purpose of the treaties—that is, to see to it that minimum standards of human rights are observed throughout the world—and they permit us to accept the treaties in a form consonant with our domestic legal requirements.

### Jurisdictional Balance Between Federal and State Institutions

As I have previously noted, a second objection raised by critics to the ratification of these human rights treaties is that they might upset the existing allocation of jurisdiction between our Federal and State institutions. Some of these critics feel that certain matters addressed in the treaties lie exclusively within the jurisdiction of the several States within our Federal system and that subjecting these matters to regulation by treaty or by congressional legislation will infringe upon that State jurisdiction.

Although most of the matters dealt with in the treaties are governed by Federal law at this juncture in our history, the Administration is sensitive to this concern. We have, therefore, recommended a reservation to the racial discrimination convention and the two covenants, stating that the United States shall implement the treaty provisions over whose subject matter the Federal Government exercises jurisdiction and shall encourage State authorities to take appropriate measures with regard to the provisions over whose subject matter the States exercise jurisdiction.

The content of this reservation is already built into article 28 of the American convention. There need be no apprehension that the ratification of the human rights treaties will invade the field of those matters which are properly left to states jurisdiction.

**Relationship Between Government and Its Citizens.** The third objection that has been raised is that the subject matter of these treaties lies beyond the scope of the treaty-making power. The text of the Constitution, of course, gives no guidance as to what may or may not be the subject of a treaty. The Supreme Court has said a number of times that "[t]he treaty-making power of the United States is not limited by any express provision of the Constitution, and, though it does not extend 'so far as to authorize what the Constitution forbids,' it does extend to all proper subjects of negotiation between our government and other nations." (*Asakawa v. Seattle*, 265 U.S. 341 (1923); *Geofroy v. Riggs*, 133 U.S. 258, 266 (1889); *Ware v. Hylton*, 3 Dall. 199 (1796)) Although the Court has not elaborated upon what a "proper subject of negotiation" might or might not be, it has come to be commonly accepted that the treaty power extends to any "matter of international concern." (See *Restatement of Foreign Relations Law*, §40, comment b at 117 (1965))

Although there have in the past been differences of opinion as to what is and is not a matter of "international concern," it seems clear today that no matter how widely or narrowly the boundaries of "international concern" be drawn, a treaty concerning human rights falls squarely within them. States have entered into such treaties since the 17th century.

For example, in 1648 the treaty of Westphalia established the principle of equality of rights for those of the Catholic and Protestant religions. The Congress of Vienna in 1815 and the Congress of Berlin in 1878 both provided for the free exercise of religion by individuals. Numerous treaties in the 19th century had as their goal the suppression of the slave trade; the United States became party to one of them in 1862. The peace treaties in central Europe following the First and Second World Wars assured protection of life and liberty to all inhabitants without regard to birth, nationality, language, race, or religion and included provisions for the protection of minorities.

In the 20th century, the United States has become party to a number of treaties that address the rights of the individual as against his government, including international labor conventions, the constitution of the International Labor Organization, the 1926 slavery convention, the 1945 peace treaties, the U.N. Charter, and, more recently, the Supplementary Convention on Slavery in 1967 and the Conven-



tion on the Political Rights of Women in 1976.

The United States is party to the Charter of the Organization of American States, which addresses the economic and social rights of the individual, and we are, of course, party to the U.N. Charter, under which members are pledged to take action to promote "... universal respect for, and observance of, human rights and fundamental freedoms for all without distinction as to race, sex, language, or religion." The growth of the U.N. system of reporting, review, and treaty-making arising from this provision—touching on matters from terrorism to the status of refugees—reflects a universal judgment that human rights are properly a matter of international concern and foreign policy interest.

A reporter's note to the Second *Restatement of Foreign Relations Law* states in part as follows.

Proposed treaties dealing with human rights have raised questions in the U.S. and, indeed, in other countries as to whether or not they deal with matters that are appropriate for settlement by agreement between nations. . . . Although such conventions generally specify standards already observed in the U.S., it has an interest in seeing that they are observed by as many states as possible, not merely to protect its own standards, but to promote conditions abroad that will foster economic development and democratic institutions that are conducive to prosperity in the U.S. and achievement of its foreign policy objectives. It cannot effectively urge other states to adhere to such conventions without doing so itself. (*Restatement (Second) of Foreign Relations Law*, §118, Reporter's note at 375).

In sum, it seems now beyond dispute that human rights are properly a matter of international concern.

## Criticisms of Supporters

Thus far I have discussed criticisms heard from opponents of ratification of these treaties on human rights. Let me turn now to criticisms heard from supporters of ratification. Some of these supporters—including some of the treaties' most distinguished proponents—are critical of what they perceive as the Administration's efforts to insulate our own domestic system from the impact of the human rights treaties' terms by means of reservations.

It is asserted that the essential object or purpose of these human rights treaties is to change the domestic law of the ratifying states in order to conform

with the precise dictates of the treaties' terms. That being the case, it is said, the Administration's recommended reservations violate the purposes of the treaties, because the reservations are designed to harmonize the treaties' requirements with our existing domestic law.

We think it appropriate to suggest, however, that these critics have not fully appreciated the purpose of these human rights treaties. The primary objective is the fostering of international commitments to erect and observe a minimum standard of rights for the individual as set forth by the treaties. This standard is met by our domestic system in practice, although not always in precisely the same way that the treaties envision. By ratification, we would commit ourselves to maintain the level of respect we already pay to the human rights of our people; we would commit ourselves not to backslide; and we would be subjecting this commitment and our human rights performance as a whole to international scrutiny.

Our main goal in suggesting the reservations that I have described is, thus, not to evade the minimum standards imposed by the treaties whenever they touch our system. The rationale behind the reservations is, rather, that we take our international legal obligations seriously and, therefore, will commit ourselves to do by treaty only that which is constitutionally and legally permissible within our domestic law.

In this respect, it should be noted, we are in good company. This has been the approach taken by other countries which share with us the democratic traditions from which these treaties derive their content. Specifically, a number of Western European countries have appended extensive substantive reservations to these treaties. I might add that the European Convention for the Protection of Human Rights, which is similar to the civil and political covenant in content, explicitly provides for the making of reservations to allow participating countries to make their international commitments by treaty consistent with their domestic legal systems. At least five nations have availed themselves of this opportunity.

Another reason why the Administration has proposed a number of reservations, understandings, and declarations is pragmatic. We believe these treaties to be important and necessary, and we are anxious to secure the advice and consent of the Senate to their ratification. It is our judgment that the prospects for securing that ratification

would be significantly, and perhaps decisively, advanced if it were to be clear that, by adopting these treaties, the United States would not automatically be bringing about changes in its internal law without the legislative concurrence of the Federal or State governments.

## How Enforcement Has Proceeded

Let me turn to a brief examination of how enforcement of the treaties has proceeded in practice up to this time, for that will give some indication as to whether ratification would unduly expose the United States to unwarranted or unfair attack pursuant to the treaties.

The reporting procedures for the racial discrimination convention and the civil and political rights covenant have thus far, been the principal enforcement mechanisms. The Committee on the Elimination of Racial Discrimination has been meeting to consider reports submitted by states parties since 1970; the Committee on Human Rights since 1977. Each has begun to build its own set of practices and procedures at that time.

The Racial Discrimination Committee requires the states parties to submit an itemized account of the "legislative, judicial, administrative or other measures" adopted with regard to each of the substantive obligations of the convention. The committee has no independent factfinding authority, but practice committee members have also gathered outside information in their capacity as "experts." The utilization of such additional information has given the committee the opportunity to raise meaningful questions as to a state's claims of compliance.

The Racial Discrimination Committee has never issued a formal determination of noncompliance with the convention in response to a state's report. On the other hand, it has invited each state party to send a representative reply to questions of the committee; it considers the state's report, and the practice has given the committee the opportunity to convey to that state its opinion that compliance with the convention's obligations is unsatisfactory, albeit without issuing a formal ruling that effect.

The attendance of a state representative affords the state a forum in which its practices in the area of discrimination can be directly defended against deserved or undeserved attack.

here is no provision for cross-examination of the answers to committee questions given by these representatives.)

The system I have just described generally worked fairly toward those whose compliance has been questioned. On a few occasions, however, particular states have attempted to use the committee to further other political ends. For example, in two cases a reporting state has used its report on its own compliance with the convention as a way of charging another country, not party to the convention, with human rights violations; in one of those cases the United States was the wrongly charged party. Not being a party to the convention, however, the United States had no opportunity to refute the charges before the committee through a state representative of its own choosing to question the competence of the committee to address what was in substance an interstate complaint through the reporting procedure.

The Committee on Human Rights, charged with implementing the civil and political rights covenant, also avoids formal rulings against states and makes use of state representatives' appearances, just as does the Racial Discrimination Committee. In its shorter reports the Human Rights Committee has managed to steer clear of political confrontation, and the questioning of all state representatives—whether from the developing world, Eastern Europe, or Western Europe—has been uniformly tough and searching. British treatment of prisoners in Northern Ireland has come in for severe criticism; have Soviet restrictions on freedom of movement.

The committee members are taking seriously their position as impartial, independent jurists. Although its record still quite brief, the committee appears to have great potential for shaping attitudes toward, and the language of, human rights standards as they develop over time; participating countries, through their reports, their responses to questioning, and through the individuals they nominate to serve as members will have the opportunity to have a hand in such future developments.

The conclusions we draw from the early practice of the implementing committees are twofold.

First, to the extent that they remain impartial mechanisms for the monitoring of states' compliance with human rights treaties, as they largely have been so far, the United States would do well to participate and,

thus, have a role in the development of an international jurisprudence of human rights.

Second, to the rare extent that the committees do lapse into political confrontation, the United States cannot afford not to be represented so accurately to set forth its human rights record.

The United States has historically maintained a strong tradition of commitment to the cause of the rights of the individual at home and abroad. The ratification of these four treaties before this committee today would provide a mechanism for upholding this fine tradition internationally. President Carter has described these treaties as a beacon—a guide to a future of personal security, political freedom, and social justice. In order to enhance our contribution to the achievement of such a future, I urge this committee to report favorably on these treaties.

#### ASSISTANT SECRETARY DERIAN

I want to thank the committee for this opportunity to speak about the four human rights treaties: the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights; the International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights; the International Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Racial Discrimination; and the American Convention on Human Rights.

My message today is very simple. It concerns the connection between these treaties and the human rights policy of the United States. Our failure so far to ratify them has had a significant negative impact on the conduct of that policy. Ratifying them in the near future will substantially improve our ability to pursue human rights objectives in foreign affairs.

By adhering to these treaties, we strengthen the international legal basis for the protection of basic human rights; we can participate fully in the machinery established by the treaties for their implementation; and we increase the credibility and effectiveness of our own human rights efforts.

#### Strengthening International Law on Human Rights

These treaties embody the fundamental tenet that international law creates obligations which all governments owe to their citizens. Together with the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, they create an international legal structure for the protection of human rights. They set standards for the world community which reflect the

same vision that inspired our own Bill of Rights.

Ratification by the United States will significantly enhance the legitimacy and acceptance of these standards. It will encourage other countries to join those which have already accepted the treaties. And in countries where human rights are generally not respected, it will aid citizens to raise human rights issues.

*Our failure to ratify so far has become confusing to our friends and may be exploited by our adversaries.*

I would like to elaborate for a moment on this last point. In countries where citizens have few domestic remedies for human rights abuses, they can point to these international standards. Today, dissidents throughout the world are monitoring their own governments' compliance with this body of international law for the protection of human rights. It is cited by wall posters in China, on manifestos of Soviet dissidents, and by families of the disappeared in Latin America. Ratification of the treaties will support their efforts.

#### Participation in Implementation

The four treaties establish international machinery for monitoring their implementation. The United States has taken a strong position in favor of such machinery. This is because, over the long run, greater respect for human rights depends on the creation of international institutions. Yet because it has not ratified these treaties, the United States cannot participate in the work of these implementing bodies. The United States does not review the reports submitted by states parties on their compliance with the treaties, and it does not have a voice in their interpretation—interpretations which may affect the course of the law of human rights for decades to come.

I would like to describe some of the activities of the monitoring bodies for you. Ratification will enable us to participate in them.

• A U.N. committee on compliance with the covenant on civil and political rights is reviewing reports on Czechoslovakia, the U.S.S.R., Chile, and Uruguay. By ratifying the covenant, we can participate in this review process.

• In the Western Hemisphere, an Inter-American Human Rights Court has been established to hear disputes, and an Inter-American Human Rights Commission has been established to conduct investigations of abuses. By ratifying the American Human Rights Convention, we will be eligible to nominate and vote for their members.

• The racial discrimination convention applies not only to discrimination on account of race but also on account of ethnic origin. Ratification would enable us to participate in the implementation committee's monitoring of such discrimination around the world.

## Credibility and Effectiveness of the U.S. Human Rights Policy

Our human rights policy has raised significantly the priority of human rights in U.S. foreign policy. It has contributed to an increasing level of international consciousness about human rights and to a climate in which improvements have taken place in a number of countries. We can be proud of these achievements. But it is also essential for our nation to ratify the instruments establishing the international legal framework for their observance. Ratification will enhance our ability to remain in the forefront of those who are struggling for the full enjoyment of human rights.

Our failure to ratify so far has become confusing to our friends and may be exploited by our adversaries. In his latest report to the Congress on the Helsinki accords, President Carter noted the criticism directed against this country for not yet ratifying the international human rights agreements.

Ratification of the human rights treaties is also important for U.S. participation in the reviewing process under the Helsinki Final Act. The Helsinki accords, themselves, call on participating states to fulfill their obligations under international human rights declarations and agreements, including the international covenants.

The United Nations last summer established a working group to examine the "circumstances" preventing governments from ratifying the treaties. In my own work, I am asked constantly by representatives of foreign governments why the United States has failed to ratify these agreements, given our fine human rights record, our human rights policy, and our previously active role in drafting these agreements. I have not yet found an acceptable response.

The United States has a long tradition of seeking to fully implement the human rights enshrined in our Con-

stitution and Bill of Rights. Our history has been one of struggle for universal suffrage, for the abolition of slavery, for women's rights, for racial equality, for trade union rights. That struggle continues. To date, the United States has ratified international human rights treaties on slavery, women's rights, and refugees. Ratification of these additional human rights agreements would emphasize our determination to work for a world in which the rights enjoyed by our own citizens are universally respected.

The treaties before the Senate express values in which the people of the United States have believed for a long time. They give expression to human rights that coincide with our own laws and practices.

I join the Deputy Secretary and other witnesses in urging that the advice and consent of the Senate be given to the four human rights treaties. ■

<sup>1</sup>The complete transcript of the hearings will be published by the committee and will be available from the Superintendent of Documents, U.S. Government Printing Office, Washington, D.C. 20402.

<sup>2</sup>For texts of the two international covenants, see BULLETIN of Jan. 16, 1967, pp. 107 and 111; for text of the American convention, see BULLETIN of July 4, 1977, p. 28; the convention on racial discrimination was not printed in the BULLETIN.

## President Carter Receives Human Rights Award

*Following are excerpts from remarks President Carter made on October 24, 1979, upon accepting an international human rights award from the Synagogue Council of America.<sup>1</sup>*

Human rights takes on a broad range of meanings. And we've had some notable successes in the last 2½ to 3 years: Prison doors have opened to release literally tens of thousands of those who've been incarcerated for years, even decades. We've seen a massive shift in countries around the world and particularly, I think, in this hemisphere toward giving people the basic human right of shaping their own future, of choosing their own leaders, of modifying and establishing the policies of their own government.

It has not always been easy, even in this country, to maintain a strong commitment to human rights. As Patt Derian [Assistant Secretary for Human Rights and Humanitarian Affairs], sitting in the front row, responsible for this position in the State Department, so well knows, there are always delegations who come to me or to her or to Secretary Vance and say: "This particular dictator has been a valuable ally of ours, and when the United States makes a critical remark about political prisoners who are being restrained or in jail or punished or executed, it tends to shake our relationship with that country." We've had to withstand those kinds of pressures, and I believe that in many instances we've been successful in that effort. ■

<sup>1</sup>For full text, see Weekly Compilation of Presidential Documents of Oct. 29, 1979, p. 2009.

## Implementing the Human Rights Policy

by Warren Christopher

*Statement before the Subcommittee on International Organizations of the House Foreign Affairs Committee on May 2, 1979. Mr. Christopher is Deputy Secretary of State.<sup>1</sup>*

May I begin by congratulating you on your new position as head of the House Subcommittee on International Organizations [Don Bonker of Washington]. I hope and expect that we will continue the close and productive working relationship that has existed between the subcommittee and this Administration.

As you know, this Administration has placed renewed emphasis on human rights objectives in the conduct of our foreign affairs. In this endeavor, we have had the benefit of this subcommittee's extensive interest and involvement in human rights issues. It has played a vital role, particularly through building a solid legislative foundation for the pursuit of human rights objectives in foreign affairs. Perhaps most significant was a 1976 amendment to the Foreign Assistance Act—an amendment that originated in this subcommittee. It states: "A principal goal of the foreign policy of the United States shall be to promote the observance of internationally recognized human rights."



Today I would like to describe the steps that have been taken in the past 2 years and 4 months to implement that objective. In particular, I would like to discuss three areas in which human rights considerations have become an integral, everyday part of the foreign policy process: first, reporting and evaluating information on human rights conditions; second, incorporating human rights into our diplomacy, both bilateral and multilateral; and third, giving human rights considerations top priority on our foreign assistance programs.

### Reporting and Evaluating Information

A necessary first step in implementing an effective human rights policy is the systematic collection and evaluation of basic data on human rights conditions throughout the world. About balanced, objective, and detailed assessments of the human rights situation in a country, we cannot hope to have productive discussions with that country about possible improvements in the situation.

In order to develop such assessments, we have sought information from many sources. Of course, a primary source of information is our embassies abroad. All U.S. Ambassadors have been asked to report on human rights conditions in their host countries in regular and detailed basis.

We also rely on the published reports of nongovernmental human rights organizations, on reports of international organizations, on findings of congressional committees, on discussions with private U.S. citizens, and on other information in the public domain.

Some of this information is inevitably controversial. Reports of serious human rights abuses often elicit official denials. Official claims of significant progress may be challenged by private human rights groups. We are careful to check and recheck the accuracy of critical information and the reliability of its source.

The information we collect is used primarily for internal decisionmaking and for preparing the annual reports required by the Congress on human rights practices in countries receiving development or security assistance. I believe that if you compare the reports submitted for the 3 years Congress has required them, you will see a consistent improvement in their coverage and quality. This year's reports cover over 650 pages and 115 countries. They include for the first time an overall assessment of the human rights situation

worldwide. Also included is an appendix reporting on the compliance by East European countries with the human rights provisions of the Helsinki Final Act.

We recognize, of course, that the assessment of human rights conditions is not an exact science. There are inevitably some questions of judgment on which reasonable people will differ. There are inevitably some elements of subjectivity which the most conscientious process of reporting and evaluation cannot eliminate. And there are inevitably differences in the quantity and quality of data available on human rights practices around the world, depending for example, on the degree of contact of a particular country with the United States and other Western countries or on the extent of foreign press coverage.

Nevertheless, I believe we can have confidence in our overall appraisals and in our identification of trends. And that is an essential predicate for an effective human rights policy.

### Diplomacy

Let me turn to the diplomacy of human rights. The primary ingredient in this human rights diplomacy has a seeming simplicity: We frankly discuss human rights in our consultations with foreign diplomats and leaders. This may seem an obvious technique. But it is a dramatic change from past diplomatic practice.

In the past, our diplomats tended to shy away from high-level dialogue on sensitive human rights issues, such as the fate of political prisoners. Now those issues are raised in face-to-face conversation. They are brought to the center of the diplomatic interchange, where they must be addressed rather than being conveniently ignored.

In the case of governments which seriously restrict the rights of their citizens, we have expressed concern over specific abuses. Where countries have good records, we have encouraged such practices and invited support for our efforts. In all cases, we discuss the international legal foundation for recognizing basic obligations owed by all governments to their citizens. We emphasize, in addition, the high priority which the Congress and the American people attach to human rights concerns.

We underline these discussions with actions, such as meeting with opposition political figures or with exiled victims of human rights abuses. For

example, when President Carter visited Brazil last year, he met with a Brazilian human rights leader, as well as with officials of the military government.

In some circumstances, a public statement of concern or praise may be appropriate. We generally do not prefer to use public criticism, but we will not shrink from it where it can be effective.

This bilateral diplomacy has been complemented by our multilateral efforts. We are participating actively in the consultations and conferences in which the 35 nations which signed the Helsinki Final Act are reviewing what has been done—and what has not been done. It is clear that the Soviet Union and the East European countries, in varying degrees, have not lived up to their human rights commitments. We have not hesitated to say so publicly. And we are persisting in our efforts to seek fuller compliance. The role of the congressional Commission on Security and Cooperation in Europe, under the wise and able leadership of Congressman Dante Fascell, has been indispensable in this work.

At the United Nations, we have pressed for more even-handed treatment of human rights issues. We remain deeply disturbed by the unfair politicization of these issues in that body. But we believe that progress is being made toward establishing fair procedures that can lead to broader and more objective consideration of human rights issues by the United Nations.

In the Western Hemisphere, we are working to strengthen the intergovernmental machinery for protecting human rights. The authority and staff of the Inter-American Human Rights Commission have been increased. Last year the Commission reported on violations in Chile, Nicaragua, Paraguay, and Uruguay; and the Commission has accepted an invitation to visit Argentina this year.

### Foreign Assistance Programs

These and other efforts at quiet diplomacy are in many ways our most effective tools in promoting human rights. But we are also prepared to support our words with actions—to take tangible steps to recognize good human rights performance or to manifest our concern over human rights violations. I would like to discuss one such area—namely, the way we are bringing human rights considerations to bear on our foreign assistance programs.

Our foreign assistance programs are an essential tool in promoting a broad category of internationally rec-

ognized human rights—rights to fulfillment of such vital needs as food, shelter, health care, and education. In the face of severe budget pressures, the President proposed significant increases in development assistance for 1979 and 1980. At the same time, we are attempting to channel a growing share of our economic aid to countries that respect the human rights of their people. The President reaffirmed this policy a few months ago when he said:

In distributing the scarce resources of our foreign assistance programs, we will demonstrate that our deepest affinities are with nations which commit themselves to a democratic path to development.

Congress has played an active role in this area by mandating that human rights considerations be taken into account in decisions to provide aid to some countries and deny it to others. It has enacted a broad range of statutes which restrict the flow of economic and military assistance to countries with serious human rights problems. Restrictions of varying kinds apply, for example, to our economic assistance, our military assistance and sales, our PL-480 food aid, and our votes on loans in the World Bank and other international development banks.

Congress passed many of these provisions before the Carter Administration came into office and others more recently. For example, in the last session of Congress, new legislation was passed requiring the Overseas Private Investment Corporation to take into account human rights considerations in the conduct of its programs abroad. In that same session, Congress also strengthened the restriction on providing security assistance to serious human rights violators.

We are committed to carrying out the letter and the spirit of these laws. To assist in these efforts, the Interagency Group on Human Rights and Foreign Assistance was established in the early months of the Administration to provide a broad and open forum for discussion within the executive branch of human rights issues relating to foreign assistance programs. The membership includes representatives from the Departments of State, Defense, Labor, Treasury, Commerce, and Agriculture, from the National Security Council and the Agency for International Development, and from other agencies that have a potential interest in the deliberations of the group.

In applying the relevant statute to a particular loan, grant, or program, this interagency group generally con-

siders a wide range of factors, including the following:

- The present human rights situation in the recipient country and any positive or negative trend;
- The political, economic, and cultural background of the country and the level of human rights performance that can reasonably be expected of the country in light of that background;
- The other fundamental U.S. interests with respect to that country;
- The extent to which a loan will directly benefit the needy; and
- The effectiveness of a decision to defer or oppose a loan in comparison or in combination with any of the available diplomatic tools for indicating our concern about human rights violations.

The interagency group is by no means the only forum in which issues relating to human rights and foreign assistance are discussed. For example, human rights aspects of arms transfers are generally considered by the Arms Export Control Board, which is responsible for formulating our security assistance programs.

Over the past 2 years, the agencies participating in these and other groups have gained valuable experience in carrying out the new function of systematically bringing human rights considerations to bear on foreign assistance decisions. Working groups have been established which, in an increasing number of cases, are able to develop consensus recommendations that eliminate the need for higher level review.

Perhaps most useful in promoting the smooth functioning of this interagency process has been the emergence of a number of general principles which have come to guide our decisionmaking. We have not tried to formalize these principles because we wished to proceed cautiously and deliberately in implementing a new and controversial policy and because we wished to respond flexibly to the widely varying circumstances presented by particular countries and particular programs.

## U.S. Guidelines

However, I think it is now appropriate to mention a few of these guidelines that have developed over the more than 2 years that we have been addressing these problems.

- We attach fundamental importance to all three basic categories of internationally recognized human rights—that is, personal, economic,

and political rights. We are prepared to react to flagrant denials of any of these rights, but we have found in practice that we are most often called to respond to flagrant violations of personal rights such as widespread systematic torture or arbitrary executions.

- The most effective strategy for obtaining human rights improvements is one that combines the full range of diplomatic approaches with a willingness to adjust our foreign assistance programs as required. No element in the overall strategy can be as effective alone as in combination with others. In addition, the use of these various elements must be calibrated and sequential, conveying our concerns in a steady, even way while avoiding sudden escalations.

- Bilateral or multilateral economic assistance that directly benefits the needy is rarely disapproved, even to governments with poor human rights records. Disapproval could penalize the poor because of their government's misdeeds.

- Only compelling considerations of national security can justify providing security assistance to countries with very serious human rights problems. Even where these considerations require us to go forward with military sales to such a country, we still restrict sales to the police or others involved in human rights abuses. And we take particular care to convey our human rights concerns through other diplomatic instruments.

- Decisions to extend or withhold assistance are often taken on the basis of trends in human rights conditions, as well as the overall level of performance.

It should be apparent from these five principles that we do not rigidly adopt the same approach to foreign assistance decisions just because two countries have a similar human rights situation. Our decisions are influenced by other factors—factors such as the presence of other important U.S. interests, conditions, and traditions unique to a particular foreign country and considerations of effectiveness and tactics. What does remain constant in our approach to human rights problems around the world is our determination to bring these concerns to bear on foreign assistance programs in a conscientious process that fully reflects the will of Congress.

I have discussed the implementation of the human rights policy in three areas—reporting, diplomacy, and foreign assistance. Let me turn now and address briefly what I believe we have accomplished with this policy.

# Soviet Invasion of Afghanistan

*Following are President Carter's address to the nation on January 4, 1980, U.S. Ambassador to the U.N. Donald F. McHenry's statement in the Security Council on January 6, and the text of the draft Security Council resolution cosponsored by Bangladesh, Jamaica, Niger, the Philippines, and Zambia. When the Council voted on the draft resolution on January 7, it was vetoed by the Soviet Union and not adopted (a veto by a permanent member of the Council prevents adoption of a resolution). Members of the Council which voted in favor of the draft resolution were Bangladesh, China, France, Jamaica, Mexico, Niger, Norway, Philippines, Portugal, Tunisia, the United Kingdom, the United States, and Zambia. The Soviet Union and the German Democratic Republic voted against the resolution.*

## PRESIDENT'S ADDRESS, N. J. 1980<sup>1</sup>

me to you this evening to discuss the extremely important and rapidly changing circumstances in Southwest Asia.

I continue to share with you the sense of outrage and impatience because of the kidnapping of innocent American hostages and the holding of them by fanatical terrorists with the support and approval of Iranian officials.

Our purposes continue to be the promotion of the long-range interests of our country and the safety of the American hostages.

We are attempting to secure the release of the Americans through the International Court of Justice, through the United Nations, and through public and private diplomatic efforts. We are determined to achieve this goal. We hope to do so without bloodshed and without further danger to the lives of our 50 fellow Americans. In these efforts we continue to receive the strong support of the world community. The unity and the common sense of the American people under such trying circumstances are essential to the success of our efforts.

Recently there has been another very serious development which threatens the maintenance of the peace in Southwest Asia. Massive Soviet military forces have invaded the small non-aligned sovereign nation of Afghanistan, which heretofore has not been an occupied satellite of the Soviet Union.

Fifty thousand heavily armed Soviet troops have crossed the border, and are now dispersed throughout Afghanistan, attempting to conquer the fiercely independent Muslim people of that country.

The Soviets claim falsely that they have invited into Afghanistan to help

protect that country from some unnamed outside threat. But the President, who had been the leader of Afghanistan before the Soviet invasion, was assassinated—along with several members of his family—after the Soviets gained control of the capital city of Kabul.

Only several days later was the new puppet leader even brought into Afghanistan by the Soviets.

This invasion is an extremely serious threat to peace—because of the threat of further Soviet expansion into neighboring countries in Southwest Asia, and also because such an aggressive military policy is unsettling to other peoples, throughout the world.

This is a callous violation of international law and the United Nations Charter.

It is a deliberate effort of a powerful atheistic government to subjugate an independent Islamic people.

We must recognize the strategic importance of Afghanistan to stability and peace.

A Soviet-occupied Afghanistan threatens both Iran and Pakistan and is a stepping stone to possible control over much of the world's oil supplies.

The United States wants all nations in the region to be free and to be independent. If the Soviets are encouraged in this invasion by eventual success, and if they maintain their dominance over Afghanistan and then extend their control to adjacent countries—the stable, strategic and peaceful balance of the entire world will be changed. This would threaten the security of all nations including, of course, the United States, our allies and our friends.

Therefore, the world simply cannot stand by and permit the Soviet Union to commit this act with impunity.

Fifty nations have petitioned the United Nations Security Council to condemn the Soviet Union and to demand the immediate withdrawal of all Soviet troops from Afghanistan.

We realize that under the United Nations Charter the Soviet Union and other permanent members may veto action of the Security Council.

If the will of the Security Council should be thwarted in this manner, then immediate action would be appropriate in the General Assembly of the United Nations where no Soviet veto exists.

In the meantime, neither the United States nor any other nation which is committed to world peace and stability can continue to do business as usual with the Soviet Union.

I have already recalled the United States Ambassador from Moscow to Washington. He is working with me and my other senior advisors in an immediate and comprehensive evaluation of the whole range of our relations with the Soviet Union.

The successful negotiation of the SALT II Treaty has been a major goal and a major achievement of this Administration—and we Americans, the people of the Soviet Union, and indeed the entire world will benefit from the successful control of strategic nuclear weapons through the implementation of this carefully negotiated Treaty.

However, because of the Soviet aggression, I have asked the United States Senate to defer further consideration of the SALT II Treaty so that the Congress and I can assess Soviet actions and intentions and devote our primary attention to the legislative and other measures required to respond to this crisis.

As circumstances change in the future we will, of course, keep the ratification of SALT II under active review in



consultation with the leaders of the Senate.

The Soviets must understand our deep concern.

We will delay opening of any new American or Soviet Consular facilities, and most of the cultural and economic exchanges currently under consideration will be deferred. Trade with the Soviet Union will be severely restricted.

I have decided to halt or reduce exports to the Soviet Union in three areas that are particularly important to them. These new policies are being and will be coordinated with those of our allies.

I have directed that no sales of high technology or other strategic items will be licensed for sale to the Soviet Union until further notice, while we revise our licensing policy.

Fishing privileges for the Soviet Union in United States waters will be severely curtailed.

The 17 million tons of grain ordered by the Soviet Union in excess of that amount which we are committed to sell will not be delivered. This grain was not intended for human consumption but was to be used for building up Soviet livestock herds.

I am determined to minimize any adverse impact on the American farmer from this action. The undelivered grain will be removed from the market through storage and price support programs and through purchases at market prices. We will also increase amounts of grain devoted to the alleviation of hunger in poor countries and we will have a massive increase of the use of grain for gasohol production here at home.

After consultation with other principal grain exporting nations, I am confident that they will not replace these quantities of grain by additional shipments on their part to the Soviet Union.

These actions will require some sacrifice on the part of all Americans, but there is absolutely no doubt that these actions are in the interest of world peace and in the interest of the security of our own nation and they are also compatible with actions being taken by our own major trading partners and others who share our deep concern about this new Soviet threat to world stability.

Although the United States would prefer not to withdraw from the Olympic games scheduled in Moscow this summer, the Soviet Union must realize that its continued aggressive actions will endanger both the participation of athletes and the travel to Moscow by spectators who would normally wish to attend the Olympic games.

Along with other countries we will provide military equipment, food, and other assistance to help Pakistan defend its independence and its national security against the seriously increased threat it now faces from the North. The United States also stands ready to help other nations in the region in similar ways.

Neither our allies nor our potential adversaries should have the slightest doubt about our willingness, our determination, and our capacity to take the measures I have outlined tonight.

I have consulted with leaders of the Congress and I am confident they will support legislation that may be required to carry out these measures.

History teaches perhaps very few clear lessons. But surely one such lesson learned by the world at great cost is that aggression unopposed becomes a contagious disease.

The response of the international community to the Soviet attempt to crush Afghanistan must match the gravity of the Soviet action.

With the support of the American people and working with other nations, we will deter aggression, we will protect our nation's security, and we will preserve the peace.

The United States will meet its responsibilities.

**AMBASSADOR McHENRY,  
JAN. 6, 1980<sup>2</sup>**

The Security Council meets today, at the request of more than 50 members of the United Nations from all parts of the world and of all political persuasions. We meet to consider a matter of fundamental importance to world peace and to the principles on which the United Nations was founded.

A member state of this world organization has been invaded by massive contingents of troops from another state. Its government has been overthrown. Its leaders have been killed. Its people have been silenced. Its territory has been occupied.

The United States has joined in the call for an urgent meeting of the Security Council to consider the Soviet Union's blatant act of aggression against the territory and people of Afghanistan. We have done so because the action of the Soviet Union not only breaches the peace and violates international law, but also

threatens the viability of the fundamental principles that underlie the U.N. Charter.

## Sequence of Events

The representative of the Soviet Union has offered us a wide and confusing range of rationales for the so-called "limited" but surely deadly assistance foisted on the people of Afghanistan. Let us look at the chilling sequence of events connected with the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan.

- During the first weeks of December, the Soviet Union secured Bagram airfield, north of the Afghan capital of Kabul, by sending the equivalent of an airborne regiment there. It also landed troops and equipment at the Kabul airport and, at the same time, mobilized enormous forces in areas bordering Afghanistan.

- On December 25 and 26, a massive Soviet airlift into Kabul took place. In over 200 flights, roughly 10,000 Soviet troops were transported into Afghanistan.

- On the evening of December 27, a special Soviet assault unit surrounded the presidential palace in Kabul. Afghan soldiers defending the palace were attacked and overcome, and President Amin was summarily executed. Simultaneously, Soviet troops attacked Afghan forces guarding radio Afghanistan and other key government installations and took them under control.

- The first announcement of the Soviet-engineered coup d'etat, and the replacement of President Amin by Babrak Karmal, who had been in exile in Eastern Europe, was made using frequencies purporting to be Radio Kabul. In fact, the transmitters from which these announcements were made were located in the Soviet Union. We know this because the real Radio Kabul continued normal transmissions for at least 1½ hours after these announcements were first heard. Nothing in these broadcasts from Kabul confirmed the content of the Soviet broadcast disseminated in Afghanistan's name.

- Subsequently, Soviet troops captured all key civilian and military installations in the Kabul area and established a defense perimeter around Kabul. Afghan military forces have been disarmed.

- Immediately after the coup, two Soviet motorized rifle divisions entered Afghanistan by land, one at Kushka and the other at Termez. Elements of the western division arrived at Herat, where fighting between Soviet and Afghan forces was reported. Much of the Termez division proceeded to the Kabul area.

• The Soviet Union now has up to 100,000 troops in Afghanistan. There are indications that other Soviet divisions are moving into the Soviet-Afghan border. Soviet jet forces have moved out to secure border key towns.

The Soviet Union has claimed that the leadership of Afghanistan requested Soviet military assistance. Which leader? It is beyond doubt that President Amin was still in office when the Soviet jets attacked the presidential palace when he was executed. Are we to believe that President Amin invited Soviet jets to come into Afghanistan in order to oversee his own downfall and his own execution? Or was it the leadership of Brigadier General Babrak Karmal, President Amin's self-appointed successor, a man who was not even in Afghanistan at the time the Soviet intervention but was, nevertheless, in the Soviet Union?

### U.N. Principles

The armed intervention of the Soviet Union in Afghanistan and the presence of an uninvited occupation force in that country is a gross and blatant violation of the most important principles of international law and of the U.N. Charter. What are those principles?

- That one state must not use force against the territorial integrity and political independence of another state;
- That a state must not intervene by force in the internal affairs of another state;
- That all states must respect the principle of equal rights and self-determination of peoples;
- That fundamental principles of human rights must be respected by all governments; and

### Article 51 of U.N. Charter

*Nothing in the present Charter shall impair the inherent right of individual or collective self-defense if an armed attack occurs against a Member of the United Nations, until the Security Council has taken the measures necessary to maintain international peace and security. Measures taken by Members in the exercise of this right of self-defense shall be immediately reported to the Security Council and shall not in any way affect the authority and competence of the Security Council under the present Charter to take at any time such action as it deems necessary in order to maintain or restore international peace and security.*

The Afghan people and Afghan army have resisted this Soviet aggression, despite the overwhelming military superiority of the invader. Fighting continues in several areas of the country.

The facts of the situation are clear. For a period of months, the Soviet Union carefully planned and prepared to invade Afghanistan, because it was dissatisfied with the degree of subservience the Amin government and undoubtedly its performance against Moslem insurgents in Afghanistan who long have been struggling for their rights. The Soviet Union then carried out its military operation—quickly and brutally. They did not recourse whatsoever to the authorities then in power in Afghanistan. The Soviet Union overthrew the Amin government, which it had previously supported, and replaced it with a puppet regime.

- That states must settle international disputes by peaceful means.

The Soviet claim that it was acting in furtherance of collective self-defense under Article 51 of the Charter is a perversion of the Charter—an insult to the intelligence of the members of this Council. Article 51 can be invoked only "if an armed attack occurs against a Member of the United Nations." From whence came the armed attack on Afghanistan? The only armed attack on Afghanistan was the one launched by the Soviet Union. No one can believe the claim that the Soviet Union was requested by the Afghan Government to intervene in Afghanistan in the fashion in which it did, unless one also believes that President Amin invited the Soviet Union in to overthrow him. Article 51 of the Charter requires that measures taken by members in exercise of their right of self-defense "shall be immediately reported to the Security Council

and shall not in any way affect the authority and responsibility of the Security Council under the . . . Charter to take at any time such action as it deems necessary in order to maintain or restore international peace and security." That neither the Soviet Union, nor the puppet regime it has installed in power in Kabul, has given the required notice to the Security Council under article 51 is itself evidence of the hollowness of the Soviet Union's refuge behind the Charter.

Nor can one believe that the Soviet Union was requested by the Afghan Government to intervene in Afghanistan pursuant to the terms of the so-called Treaty of Friendship and Cooperation it entered into with that country in 1978. For the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan violates the Soviet Union's obligation, under the terms of the treaty, to respect Afghanistan's national sovereignty and to refrain from interfering in its internal affairs.

The U.N. Charter does not give the Soviet Union or any nation, the right to take military action in another country or to replace its government because it disagrees with the policies or performance of the existing government. The fact is that the Soviet Union has flouted international law and has violated regional and international peace and stability. That the Soviet Union has done so with cold calculation and advance planning, in an area of the world which is now experiencing particular instability and tension, makes its act even more egregious and irresponsible. That the Soviet Union is taking military action against a deeply religious and fiercely independent people, who are struggling for human and religious rights, underscores the brutality and illegality of its action.

### The Need for U.N. Action

Accordingly, it remains for this Council to take action under the Charter to restore international peace and security.

A terrible miscalculation has been made by Soviet authorities. The ramifications of the Soviet intervention in Afghanistan are enormous. For no state will be safe against a larger and more powerful neighbor if the international community appears to condone the Soviet Union's armed intervention. This must be of particular concern to states whose territories lie near the Soviet borders.

It is, therefore, incumbent upon this Council and upon every nation that believes in the rule of law and opposes the use of force in international affairs to denounce this dangerous breach of peace and security. It is incumbent upon this

Council to make the weight of world opinion felt.

We note that the Soviet Union has stated that it intends to withdraw its troops from Afghanistan at some point. We urge the Soviet Union to do so immediately and to allow the people of Afghanistan to conduct their own affairs, to choose their own system of government, to choose their own national leaders without outside pressure and interference. Only in this way can the grave threat to international peace and security created by the Soviet Union be diminished and this most serious challenge to the basic principles of the United Nations be removed.

No state, not even a great power, can be allowed to ignore with impunity the responsibilities, obligations, and commitments it assumed when it became a member of the United Nations. The United States therefore calls on all members of the Council to act vigorously in discharge of their Charter obligations.

## DRAFT RESOLUTION, JAN. 7, 1980

### *The Security Council,*

*Having considered* the letter dated 3 January 1980 addressed to the President of the Security Council (S/13724 and Add.1 and 2),

*Gravely concerned* over recent developments in Afghanistan and their implications for international peace and security.

*Reaffirming* the right of all peoples to determine their own future free from outside interference, including their right to choose their own form of government,

*Mindful* of the obligations of Member States to refrain in their international relations from the threat or use of force against the territorial integrity or political independence of any State, or in any other manner inconsistent with the purposes of the United Nations,

1. *Reaffirms* anew its conviction that the preservation of sovereignty, territorial integrity and political independence of every State is a fundamental principle of the Charter of the United Nations, any violation of which on any pretext whatsoever is contrary to its aims and purposes;

2. *Deeply deplores* the recent armed intervention in Afghanistan, which is inconsistent with that principle;

3. *Affirms* that the sovereignty, territorial integrity, political independence and non-aligned status of Afghanistan must be fully respected;

4. *Calls* for the immediate and unconditional withdrawal of all foreign troops from Afghanistan in order to enable its people to determine their own form of government and choose their economic, political and social systems free from outside intervention, coercion or constraint of any kind whatsoever;

5. *Requests* the Secretary-General to submit a report on progress towards the implementation of this resolution within two weeks;

6. *Decides* to remain seized of this question.

*[Documentation concerning taking the question of the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan to the General Assembly will be published in the February 1980 Bulletin.] ■*

<sup>1</sup> Broadcast live on television and radio from the Oval Office (text from White House press release).

<sup>2</sup> USUN press release 1.



## World Opinion on the Holding of U.S. Hostages in Iran

*Following is a partial list of public actions taken by governments, international organizations (both governmental and nongovernmental), and prominent persons supporting efforts to assure the safety and release of the U.S. hostages in Iran.*

### November 4

**West European Embassies** (Nov. 5) inform U.S. of developments in Tehran and offer to assist in efforts for release of hostages

### November 6

**U.N. Security Council.** Issues statement on behalf of Secretary General Waldheim expressing extreme concern about the situation in Iran and offering his assistance.

**Canada.** House of Commons approves resolution to protest to the Iranian Government against an "act of criminal aggression."

### November 7

**Turkish Ambassador** attempts to visit hostages.

### November 8

**Liberia.** President Tolbert appeals to the Ayatollah Khomeini for release of hostages on humanitarian grounds.

**Canadians** visit Charge d'Affaires Bruce Laingen, the senior U.S. diplomatic official held hostage in Tehran.

**U.K.** Prime Minister Thatcher announces that the United Kingdom will continue to do everything possible to assist the United States.

### November 9

**U.N. General Assembly.** President alim Ahmed Salim issues a statement expressing his concern for the safety and security of hostages and announces he is sending a personal message to Khomeini appealing for their release.

**U.N. Security Council.** President Palacios de Vizzio reads a statement expressing the Council's profound concern over prolonged detention of hostages and states that the taking of hostages is in violation of internationally accepted norms.

**European Community Ambassadors** join in demarche to Iran's Foreign Ministry, urging access to the U.S. Charge and hostages.

### November 10

**Cape Verde.** *Voz de Povo*, a Cape Verde newspaper which speaks for the government party, comments that "invasion of the American Embassy in Tehran runs counter to all the principles of conduct of relations and coexistence among nations."

**Algerian, French, Swedish, and Syrian Ambassadors** visit hostages.

**EC-9 Ambassadors** call at the Iranian Foreign Ministry to express their governments' concern over violations of diplomatic immunity.

**Swiss Ambassador** appeals to Iranian Foreign Ministry to release women hostages as a humanitarian gesture.

### November 11-12

**Pakistan.** In response to Secretary General Waldheim's request, major newspapers report that President Zia Ul-Haq sent a special message to Khomeini appealing for release of hostages.

### November 12

**EC-9 Ambassadors** again visit the Iranian Foreign Ministry.

### November 13

**Prince Sihanouk**, in a message to Khomeini, asks that he grant mercy to the hostages "who are in no way responsible for the actions of their government."

**Norway.** Undersecretary Holst states that the Norwegian Government views the use of hostages as an intolerable mechanism and points out that it is equally intolerable that Iranian authorities condone the violation of diplomatic immunity.

### November 14

**Brazil.** In columns and editorials, newspapers criticize Khomeini government, and several applaud U.S. restraint.

**Netherlands.** Foreign Minister van der Klaauw expresses deep concern and states that the principle of inviolability of diplomatic missions and personnel must be upheld.

In Paris, the **International Human Rights Federation**, which denounced the Shah's rule some time ago, states that Iran's demand to return a "sick man" is unjustified and urges unconditional release of hostages.

### November 15

**Netherlands.** Economic Minister Lambsdorff states that the F.R.G. will take no action to undermine the U.S. oil embargo.

**Kenya.** A statement by President Moi, broadcast on the "Voice of Kenya," states in part that "whatever crimes might have been committed by the Shah during his reign," the taking of hostages to coerce the U.S. Government to return him for trial "constitutes a serious breach of diplomatic intercourse and must be viewed with disapproval by the entire international community."

**India.** The *Times* carries a letter by a prominent Indian Moslem, Badruddin Tyabji, expressing his hope that Khomeini will remind the students of the distinguished Islamic traditions of chivalry, hospitality, and generosity.

**Paraguay.** Senate, in a unanimous vote, issues a strong statement renouncing the action of Iranian authorities.

**New Zealand.** Government expresses its profound concern about the Iranian situation and associates itself with the statement made by Security Council President Palacios on November 9 urging immediate release of hostages.

**Malaysia.** Press refers to U.S. action as "commendably restrained" and

most state that the United States cannot be expected to bow to pressure by meeting the Iranian Government's demands.

**London Times** states that if the United States were to yield to Iranian Government pressure, such action would invite lawless governments or unscrupulous armed groups worldwide to seize U.S. diplomats as hostages and hold them for ransom.

Resolution is adopted by the **European Parliament** condemning detention of U.S. diplomatic personnel in Tehran and expressing solidarity with all those who oppose the seizure of hostages.

**Bangladesh.** Daily newspaper, *Ittefaq*, calls the Iranian occupation of the U.S. Embassy and the taking of hostages a disgrace for the entire nation. In the *Sangbad*, often anti-U.S., a columnist says that action by Iranian students violates all practiced diplomatic norms and cannot be supported.

#### November 17

**Paraguay.** Press editorial expresses outrage at Iranian action.

**Norway.** Press is uniformly supportive of President Carter and strongly condemns Iranian authorities for their breaches of diplomatic immunity.

**West Germany.** Chancellor Schmidt announces West Germany's "full solidarity with the American nation and the American leadership" in the Iranian crisis.

#### November 18

**Swiss Ambassador** in Tehran assists in coordinating evacuation of hostages scheduled for release.

#### November 19

**Papua New Guinea.** Government states that it regards the seizure of hostages under any pretext as indefensible, and the taking of diplomatic personnel as hostages, in violation of international law and the canons of civilized behavior, as especially reprehensible.

**Cyprus.** Union of Members of the Foreign Service delivers a message to the U.S. Embassy in Nicosia, expressing to the families of the hostages their sympathy and their support.

**Liberia.** President Tolbert again writes Khomeini appealing for release of hostages on religious, moral, humanitarian, and international legal grounds.

**Dominican Republic.** Both houses of Parliament pass resolutions denouncing the taking of hostages and the invasion of the Embassy.

**Turkish Ambassador** visits Laingen.

#### November 20

**Swedish Ambassador** visits Laingen.

**Finland.** Foreign Minister Vayrynen says Finland considers the Vienna convention on diplomatic relations a central part of international law, and it should be respected by every government.

**Netherlands.** Parliament passes a resolution condemning the hostage taking and expressing support for Secretary General Waldheim's efforts to reach a peaceful solution.

**Portugal.** Government issues a statement calling the Embassy takeover a "grave act which collides frontally with the basic norms of international law and coexistence."

**EC-9 Foreign Ministers Council** condemns "any attempt to exert pressure on governments by the taking of hostages."

**Guyana.** Foreign Ministry condemns the holding of U.S. hostages.

**Australia.** Foreign Minister Peacock declares that the holding of hostages conflicts with Iran's obligations under international law and cannot be justified in any circumstances. He adds he would "strongly deplore" any so-called trial of hostages.

**Venezuela.** President of the Chamber of Deputies, Carlos Canache Mata, writes that Khomeini is a "medieval fanatic" who has "edited God out of the Koran."

**Togo.** President Eyadema calls for release of hostages.

**EC-9 Foreign Minister's Council** issues a statement denouncing the holding of hostages and the threat to put them on trial as a breach of international law, concluding that the Iranian Government failed to fulfill its obligations under international law to protect diplomats and embassy premises.

**West Germany.** Chancellor Schmidt informs President Carter of West Germany's wholehearted support in the U.S.-Iranian crisis and pledges to assist in securing release of hostages.

**Secretary General Waldheim,** through the U.N. press spokesman, expresses deep concern over the continued detention of hostages. He

stresses that the hostage-taking contravenes diplomatic conventions and a U.N. resolution to which Iran was a party.

**U.N. General Assembly.** President Salim Ahmed Salim issues a statement expressing his personal gratification and appreciation at the release of 13 hostages and recalls the appeal he addressed to Khomeini on November 9.

#### November 21

**Australia.** Foreign Minister Peacock states he deplores the taking of hostages.

**Honduras.** General Paz sends a message to Khomeini appealing for release of hostages.

**Sweden.** Foreign Minister states that the takeover of the Embassy is of the utmost gravity because a government is behind the violation of international law.

**Jamaica.** Government issues an appeal to Iranian authorities to insure the release of hostages and cessation of the occupation of the Embassy.

**Mexico.** Government expresses sympathy with the United States and a desire to be helpful. It publicly declares that the Shah is welcome to return to Mexico.

**Tanzania.** President Nyerere sends a strong personal message to Khomeini urging the prompt release of hostages.

**Zambia.** President Kaunda writes Khomeini as a fellow revolutionary.

**Zaire.** President Mobutu and Foreign Minister Nguza send messages to Khomeini and acting Foreign Minister Bani-Sadr, respectively.

**Senegal.** On orders from President Senghor, the Prime Minister makes an official protest against the taking of hostages to the Iranian Charge.

**Cameroon.** President Ahidjo promises a government communique on the situation and views that as the only effective avenue available to Cameroon.

**Botswana.** In Parliament, Foreign Minister Mogwe makes what the local radio terms "a strong statement" on the Iranian situation.

**Sierra Leone.** Government issues a statement which is carried on the local media and sent to Iran.

**Mauritius.** Minister of External Affairs sends a message to Tehran urging release of hostages.

**Mozambique.** Permanent Representative to U.N. informs the Iranian Charge that Iran's action is unacceptable and is criticized by almost all governments.

**Rwanda.** Government sends U.S. Embassy a diplomatic note expressing support.

**Mauritania.** Prime Minister declines public support for U.S. efforts or to intervene with Iranian authorities. The government also turns down an Iranian request for support.

**Tanzania.** Student organization of the political party at Dar es Salaam University passes a resolution and issues a statement calling the holding of hostages inhumane and indefensible and appeals for their unconditional and immediate release.

**Guyana.** Foreign Minister tells the press he is especially disturbed over the events in Iran. The Foreign Minister announces that he has written to Cuban Premier Castro proposing that the nonaligned movement help resolve the conflict.

**Panama.** Permanent Mission to U.N. expresses dismay and concern that a large number of Embassy personnel are still held captive and remain a prey to terror and uncertainty. Under the Vienna convention, they call for release of hostages.

**France.** Government says all must obey rules that govern diplomatic immunity and which conform with universal law.

**Canada.** Former Prime Minister Trudeau, in Parliament, calls for Canada to do all possible to support the United States in its present situation and to take the lead in mobilizing international support.

**Greece.** Government, through its Charge d'Affaires in Tehran, participates in a joint action by ambassadors requesting release of hostages.

## November 22

**Committee of Ministers of the Council of Europe** notes that Iranian action "constitutes a flagrant violation of the most elementary rules of international law . . . [and] appeals to the Iranian authorities to see that the hostages are released immediately."

**Austria.** Foreign Minister Wilibald Pahr calls the taking of hostages an outrageous violation of international law and the Vienna convention.

**Nepal.** Student association issues a statement praising Iranian students for their role in bringing down the Shah, but calls their conditions for release of hostages "fanatic" and "bizarre."

**Mauritius.** National Moslem Council sends a message to Khomeini urging

release of hostages to mark the occasion of Muharram.

**South Africa.** Moslem Judicial Council of Cape Province cables Khomeini seeking release of hostages and stating that holding them for the crime of another is not in accordance with Islamic teachings. The *Cape Times* carries the cable as well.

**Singapore.** Government appeals to the Iranian Government to release hostages, stating that diplomatic immunity has been the cardinal principle of international relations, and any breach would render it impossible for peaceful exchanges and contacts between nations.

**Libya.** Radio reports that Libya does not support any action against diplomatic missions and their staff members, and in principle, it is against any action directed against missions and the holding of staff members as hostages.

## November 23

**Turkey.** Prime Minister Demirel states that his government disapproves of events occurring in Iran.

**Poland.** Primate Stefan Wyszynski appeals publicly to Iran to release hostages.

**Spain.** Council of Ministers urges release of hostages and stresses acceptance of international relations.

**Spain.** Leading weekly, *Cambio IG*, carries an editorial by publisher Juan Tomas de Salas, who calls Iranian actions "a current of irrationalism—which threatens to lead humanity into new and frightening holocaust."

**Italy.** President Pertini urges Khomeini to release hostages; Liberal Party condemns holding hostages; and the foreign affairs spokesman of the Italian Communist Party, Gian Carlo Jajetta, states that Iranian actions "completely violate international law," put Iran in "a difficult position before every other country and international organization, and certainly do not help the government of Tehran in this difficult moment."

**East Germany.** Publishes a call for the release of hostages.

**Swiss Ambassador** visits Laingen. **EC-9 Ambassadors** visit the Iranian Foreign Minister and stress their anxiety about hostages' well-being.

**U.S.S.R.** Foreign Minister Gromyko advocates fulfillment of international convention of respect for diplomatic immunity.

**Niger.** President Kountche sends message to Khomeini.

Twelfth World Congress of the **International Confederation of Free Trade Unions (ICFTU)** is shocked that Iran blatantly disregards principle of inviolability of embassies in that it condones holding hostages as a means of attaining objectives.

**Colombia.** National Confederation of Liberal Youth, National Federation of Liberal Youth, and Social Action Brigades of the Conservative Party urge Iranian students to respect the hostages' lives and to release them to show that the Islamic republic respects human rights.

**Zaire.** In a message to Khomeini, President Mobutu publicly appeals for release of hostages.

## November 24

**Suriname.** Prime Minister calls for release of hostages and condemns Iran's violations of international law.

**Nicaragua.** Junta members, Ortega and Bobelo, strongly condemn holding of hostages as an act of terrorism. Nicaraguan delegation to the Organization of American States will support OAS consensus resolution on hostages.

**Colombia.** Youth groups deliver telephone message to Iranian students asking "respect for the lives and personal integrity" of hostages and for their liberation.

**Tunisia.** Tunis press reports that the government expresses disappointment over the hostage situation to a delegation from the Iranian Revolutionary Council. Iran is asked to consider the consequence of escalation and to conform to the rules of international law.

**Senegal.** Government issues communique on November 22 meeting between Prime Minister Abdou Diouf and the Iranian Charge in which the former "vigorously requested the prompt liberation of the hostages" and expressed his government's "ardent wish to see the tension created by the occupation" of the Embassy "dissipate rapidly."

**Mauritius.** Prime Minister Ramgoolam appeals to "the head of the Revolutionary Council of Iran" for release of hostages.

**Canada.** Ivan Head, an international lawyer who is now President of Canada's International Development Center, states that the hostage actions



by Iranians violate the law of treaties and the law of diplomatic immunity.

**November 25**

**Guinea.** President Sekou Toure strongly condemns the taking of hostages and refers to international law, the Koran, and the Bible.

**November 26**

**Italy.** President Pertini outlines his previous record of support for human rights and urges Khomeini to free hostages.

**Turkey.** Prime Minister Demirel expresses disapproval of the taking of hostages.

**Bolivia.** Foreign Minister Julio Garret instructs U.N. Security Council President Palacios to do everything possible to help secure release of hostages.

**Brazil.** Foreign Minister Guerreiro is cited in the press as defending the concept of immunity for diplomats and the inviolability of diplomatic property.

**China.** Ministry of Foreign Affairs issues a statement saying "principles guiding international relations and accepted diplomatic immunities should be universally respected."

**Ghana.** Government issues a statement calling for the release of hostages.

**Burundi.** Issues of the government-controlled newspaper condemns the taking of hostages and cites President Bagaza as stating Burundi's commitment to international conventions on diplomatic immunity.

**Canada.** Roman Catholic Archbishop of Plourde of Ottawa and Dr. W. Gunther Plaut, President of Canadian Jewish Congress, respond to U.S. Ambassador Ender's telegram communicating President Carter's statement asking for special prayers for hostages.

Swedish branch of **Amnesty International** calls for release of hostages.

**Morocco.** Maroc Sair calls hostage situation a "condemnable act."

**Guinea.** President Toure condemns the hostage situation as "absolutely contrary" to international law, as well as to the Koran.

**Canada.** Maxwell Cohen, former Law Dean at McGill University and former Canadian Chairman of the International Joint Commission, calls for respect for the principle of protection of diplomats.

**OAS.** Approves resolution in special session which condemns holding of hostages in Tehran.

**November 27**

**Cameroon.** Government-owned *Tribune* carries text of a message from President Ahidjo to Khomeini.

**Austria.** Foreign Minister Pahr states that hostage-taking is "an outrageous violation of international law and the Vienna diplomatic convention."

**Chile.** Human rights exponent, Raul Cardinal Silva, Archbishop of Santiago, says in reference to the Iranian situation that "men who say they love God seemingly do not want to respect their brothers; to respect the innocent . . ."

"**Suriname** unconditionally condemns the seizure" and supports "international action to undo the occupation of the Embassy."

**Iceland.** Prime Minister and Foreign Minister announce they have protested to the Iranian Government's takeover of the U.S. Embassy.

A statement is issued by the **Commonwealth High Commissioners** appealing to the Iranian Government to procure the release of all hostages and expressing the hope that the parties will resolve their differences by peaceful means.

**Uruguay.** Dr. Eduardo Jimenez de Arechaga, former judge and President of the International Court of Justice 1970-79, states: "The conduct of Iranian authorities . . . constitutes the most flagrant violation of the norms of international law . . . Diplomatic and juridical annals will register the actions of those authorities or the most complete list of infractions against universally recognized norms of international law in matters relating to diplomatic immunity and privileges . . ."

**Senegal.** President Senghor denounces taking of hostages, burning of buildings, and murders as means for the solution of conflicts ". . . beyond international law."

**Commonwealth Secretary General** Ramphal says holding diplomatic personnel hostage violates international law and jeopardizes fabric of international relations.

**November 28**

Tehran-based Embassies of **Finland**, other **Nordic** countries, **Australia**, **Austria**, **Canada**, **Greece**, **New**

**Zealand**, **Spain**, **Portugal**, and **Switzerland** submit appeal to Iranian Foreign Minister Bani-Sadr for release of Embassy personnel.

**France.** President Valery Giscard d'Estaing calls the taking of hostages "totally unacceptable."

**Non-EC-9 Western Ambassadors** meet with Iranian Foreign Minister; **EC-9 Ambassadors** hold similar meeting with Foreign Minister.

**Canada.** A unanimous resolution adopted by the House of Commons "unequivocally condemns the Government of Iran" for breaching the rule of international law "by allowing and encouraging the taking of American diplomatic staff as hostages within that country."

**No Date**

**Malaysia.** Tunku Abdul Rahman, the father of Malaysian independence, strongly denounces the holding of diplomatic hostages and calls for their release.

**Amnesty International** issues two statements calling for release of hostages.

**Belize.** Premier Price appeals on grounds of international law and humanity for release of hostages.

The **Dalai Lama** appeals to Khomeini to protect hostages.

**Hungary.** Television states that the taking of diplomats as hostages should not be condoned.

**South Korea.** Supports the United States in its public positions.

**German Democratic Republic.** Calls for adherence to and respect for principle of protection of diplomatic missions extended under international law and in accordance with the Vienna convention, as essential part of the function of normal government-to-government relations. ■

## Accomplishments

One of the major achievements is the dramatic increase in world awareness of human rights issues. To quote from the 1978 annual report of a leading private human rights organization, the International League for Human Rights.

Within the past year, human rights for the first time become a subject of national policy debate in many countries. Human rights concerns have been the focus of greater discussion in international organizations and of greater attention in world media. A most significant factor in this has been President Carter and the U.S. human rights policy.

This new consciousness helps to curb existing abuses and to deter new violations. Moreover, there are many examples of tangible human rights progress. We do not claim credit for particular improvements. But we believe that we have contributed to an atmosphere that makes progress more likely to occur.

In the past year, significant steps toward the transfer of power from the arbitrary to civilian democratic institutions were taken in the Dominican Republic, Ghana, Nigeria, Peru, Brazil, and Thailand. In Bangladesh, Sudan, Indonesia, Nepal, and Paraguay, substantial numbers of political prisoners were released, and other prisoner releases occurred in Cuba, Guinea, and the Republic of Korea. In Bangladesh, Brazil, and Thailand more freedom was extended to the press, to labor organizations, and to political parties. Just a few days ago, successful elections were held in Ecuador which help pave the way for civilian rule.

In Eastern Europe and the Soviet Union, human rights conditions remain a source of serious concern. But even there, we have seen some positive signs: prisoner releases in Poland and Yugoslavia; greater tolerance for dissent in Hungary and Poland; and significant increases in emigration from the Soviet Union. We are particularly gratified that Aleksandr Ginzburg and his fellow dissidents have been released from prison and are now in the United States.

In my view, then, our policy clearly has been effective in improving human rights around the world. Moreover, I believe our policy is also making an important contribution to our security in a changing and often turbulent world. In this regard, our idealism and self-interest coincide.

Our human rights policy responds to the aspirations of more and more people in the Third World for a fuller participation in their government and economy. As Secretary Vance said last night in Chicago, these growing demands for fulfillment of fundamental rights are generally in our national interest, because they are producing new or strengthened democratic institutions in many countries around the world. By helping Third World nations meet popular aspirations in an orderly and peaceful way, we can improve our relations and strengthen our own security, not on a temporary basis of accommodation to a repressive regime but on an enduring basis of a shared commitment to democratic values.

As I have said, I believe our efforts in implementing the human rights policy have been effective. But the distance covered is dwarfed by the distance that still must be traveled. Let me say a few concluding words about this task that remains.

Despite the many improvements I have mentioned and others like them, egregious violations of human rights persist around the globe. Through our words and our actions, we will persevere in our efforts to improve these situations. As progress is achieved, we will set new goals for further attainment.

In these efforts, we seek your support to carry out the common objective of Congress and the President to rekindle the beacon of human rights in American foreign policy. ■

<sup>1</sup>The complete transcript of the hearings will be published by the committee and will be available from the Superintendent of Documents, U.S. Government Printing Office, Washington, D.C. 20402.

## Political Asylum

by Warren Christopher

*Address before the Los Angeles County Bar Association on November 6, 1979. Mr. Christopher is Deputy Secretary of State.*

Late last summer, I found myself confronted with one drama of political asylum. As you will recall, the Soviet Dancer Alexandr Godunov had left the Bolshoi Ballet while on tour here and was granted asylum. The circumstances led the State Department to request an interview with his wife, the Bolshoi ballerina Lyudmila Vlasova, so that we could ascertain her wishes. Despite Soviet assurances to Department officials that such an interview would be arranged, Ms. Vlasova suddenly appeared at Kennedy Airport in New York, accompanied by a group of husky Soviet escorts who rushed her aboard an Aeroflot flight for Moscow.

This issue reached my desk on a Friday afternoon at about the same time Ms. Vlasova arrived at the airport. Our laws authorize the Immigration and Naturalization Service (INS) to prevent an alien's departure from the United States when such a departure would be contrary to the national interest. Acting under that statute, I asked the Department of Justice to delay Ms. Vlasova's departure so that we could determine whether her leaving was truly voluntary.

Ms. Vlasova had been taken aboard the aircraft before this order could be carried out—and thus ensued a 3-day standoff at the airport. The "prevention of departure" order issued by INS kept the plane on the ground, while we discussed with the Soviets our insistence that Ms. Vlasova be interviewed in a noncoercive atmosphere. As the weekend wore on, it became clear that the issue was being considered at the highest levels of the Soviet Government.

On day three of this incident, the Soviets finally acquiesced to a suggestion we had made on day one, and the interview was conducted in a mobile lounge at the airport. Our team of experts on the scene was led by Ambassador Don McHenry [then U.S. Deputy Representative to the U.N. Security Council and now U.S. Ambassador to the United Nations] and included both a doctor and Mr. Godunov's attorney. They were convinced that Ms. Vlasova's expressed desire to leave was, in fact, voluntary, and she was, therefore,

permitted to depart without further delay.

While we were able, in this case, to uphold the principle of no forced repatriation, the procedures employed were not ideal. As I shall discuss a little later, we are now working with the Justice Department to improve them.

Since then, a number of spectacular defections and asylum cases has been in the news. In September two more Bolshoi dancers sought and received asylum here in Los Angeles. A pair of Soviet Olympic skating champions sought asylum in Switzerland. A Soviet journalist appeared at our Embassy in Tokyo to ask for asylum, and he, too, is now in the United States. An East German family fled to West Germany in a homemade hot-air balloon. And recently, reports appeared in the press suggesting that a champion Soviet canoeist, who had received asylum in West Germany, has disappeared under mysterious circumstances, perhaps in a case of forced repatriation.

Such dramatic cases are, in many ways, a tribute to the West and its free institutions. Certainly we in the United States can take pride in the fact that citizens from other countries are willing to risk their lives in order to breathe the free political and cultural air of America.

But we should not let pride blind us to the complexities that surround the subject of asylum. While asylum is an essentially humanitarian issue, it can have far-reaching international ramifications. In controversial cases, when charges and countercharges are traded back and forth—involving undiplomatic words like “persecution,” “kidnapping,” and “espionage”—tensions inevitably increase, and the whole range of relations between countries can be affected.

For a nation like ours, the decision to grant or deny asylum in a particular case cannot turn on a cool calculation of the international pros and cons. Because of our historical role as a country of refuge for the oppressed, because of our firm national commitment to human rights, we must insure that our actions in such cases comport not only with the law but also with the dictates of conscience.

So let us explore the theory and practice of asylum—in the belief that the United States can handle these sensitive matters with intelligence and compassion and with more efficiency as well.

## Theory of Asylum

The concept of asylum appears to be almost as ancient as the idea of human mercy. And the law of asylum, like so much of our law, has its roots in primitive magic and taboo: Ancient tribes and societies had their sacred places—temples or the houses of chiefs—where bloodshed and revenge were prohibited. The Incas had fortified places to which women and children repaired for safety in time of hostilities. Some of the Greek city-states even sought to formalize a basic law of asylum.

In modern times—to leapfrog over a great stretch of history—the right of asylum is enshrined in both national and international law.

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*Asylum is granted to persons who are already in the United States and want to stay. Refugee status is granted to those who are somewhere else, but who want to come to the United States.*

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Before discussing the legal principles, I should note that when I speak of asylum, I am actually referring to what is properly called territorial asylum, which involves refuge sought by foreign persons within U.S. territory. The related concept of diplomatic asylum, involving refuge in diplomatic missions abroad, is widely recognized in some parts of the world. But it is strictly limited by U.S. law. It is longstanding U.S. policy to grant temporary refuge in our diplomatic posts abroad only to persons in immediate physical danger. Of course, Cardinal Mindszenty's 15-year stay in our Embassy in Budapest demonstrates that the rule is not totally inflexible, but that example also demonstrates the kind of practical problems that can arise when diplomatic missions become places of refuge.

We should also differentiate between asylum and the related issue of refugees. While the legal distinction is not clear cut, it is useful to think of the difference this way: Asylum is granted to persons who are already in the United States and want to stay. Refugee status is granted to those who are somewhere else, but who want to come to the United States.

## Legal Principles

The starting point in discussing the law of asylum is the U.N. Universal Declaration of Human Rights, which declares that: “Everyone has the right to seek and to enjoy in other countries asylum from persecution.” Similarly, the Declaration on Territorial Asylum, passed by the U.N. General Assembly in 1967, provides that no person seeking territorial asylum “. . . shall be subjected to measures such as rejection at the frontier . . . or compulsory return to any state where he may be subjected to persecution.”

While these declarations are aspirational in nature, the U.N. Protocol Relating to the Status of Refugees has the force of a treaty and, therefore, the force of law. This protocol provides that no signing state shall return a seeker of asylum who would face a threat to his life or freedom “. . . on account of his race, religion, nationality, membership in a particular social group or political opinion.”

Our own domestic legislation adopts a similar standard. Under the Immigration and Nationality Act, the Attorney General is authorized to “withhold deportation” of an alien seeking asylum who would be subject to persecution on account of race, religion or political opinion.

This statutory standard sounds fairly straightforward, but there are some significant ambiguities. For example, what constitutes “persecution” under the act? Is “persecution” necessarily political in nature—or is the concept of “persecution on account of . . . political opinion” broad enough to encompass restrictions on the ability of a painter or sculptor to express herself fully? Or on a dancer's right to the full est artistic expression? Or the highest pay? Can extreme economic deprivation amount to “persecution”? Hundreds of would-be immigrants from Haiti claim that it does and are currently pressing their claims in a U.S. District Court in Florida.

Many asylum cases involve no complications and are handled each year by our immigration authorities without fanfare and with only routine advice from the State Department. But in politically sensitive cases—where the safety of the seeker of asylum may be in doubt, where there is the danger of forcible repatriation, or where sensitive relations between nations could be affected—the State Department may be involved from the outset.



It is in such cases, involving not only high diplomatic stakes but the problems of coordination among various government agencies, that the dangers are greatest that missteps and mistakes will occur. Our laws and regulations governing the granting of asylum are, in my judgment, generally fair and accurate. It is in trying to execute them with compassion and dispatch that problems may arise. And it is here that we are working to improve our performance.

### Potential Problems

One problem arises from the fact that a request for asylum may occur almost anywhere, at any time. A request may be encountered, in spite of our best efforts, by people who simply do not know what to do.

In 1970, for example, a Lithuanian seaman leapt from his Soviet ship onto the deck of the U.S. Coast Guard cutter *Vigilant*. A sad scenario was played out in which the proper authorities were not notified; the standard procedures for handling asylum requests were not followed; and judgments were made on the spot to return the seaman to his ship, where he was beaten unconscious.

The story of the seaman, Simas Kirka, has a happy ending. As it turned out, he was an American citizen by birth and was later granted entry to the United States. But the incident on board the *Vigilant* should have been handled very differently.

Another potential problem we are likely to encounter in the future, as well as with Ms. Vlasova, concerns the question of whether a foreign citizen is departing the United States voluntarily or under duress.

More specifically, when are we justified in delaying someone's departure from the United States, in the face of that person's express desire to leave, in order to determine whether he or she is leaving under duress? As I suggested earlier, there was a reasonable basis for our concern about the circumstances surrounding Ms. Vlasova's hasty departure. Our request for an interview in a cooperative environment was amply satisfied by both U.S. and international law. I am convinced, however, that we need to strengthen our regulations at this point and to clarify the procedures to be followed when such incidents occur.

### Improving Procedures

To deal with all these and with other problems, we are taking several

steps, in cooperation with the Justice Department.

**First**, we are updating and clarifying the State Department's official guidelines for dealing with asylum cases. These guidelines will be issued to other government agencies, to local officials, and to police agencies across the nation so that those who may become involved in asylum cases will be aware of the specific steps to be taken.

**Second**, we are amending the regulations governing the departure of aliens from the United States to deal more explicitly with the problem of possible involuntary departure. This involves two steps. We will make clear in the proposed new regulation that where doubt exists whether an alien is departing voluntarily, such departure would be prejudicial to the interest of the United States and may, therefore, be temporarily delayed while an inquiry is conducted. And we will propose that immigration officers be granted the power to subpoena persons who in our judgment should be interviewed. This will make clear their authority to conduct an investigation into the question of whether an impending departure is voluntary or forced.

**Third**, we are studying how best to handle the problem of protecting a person who may be in danger of forced repatriation. As lawyers, you will readily understand the complexity of affording such protection without violating the constitutional rights of the person involved.

In a very real and often dramatic way, the issue of political asylum is a barometer of humanity's yearning for freedom. Asylum was traditionally granted to political figures who needed protection from their own governments in the wake of wars or revolutions. Today, increasingly, we see not only political figures but writers, dancers, musicians, and others seeking asylum as a means of free expression—artistic or even athletic expression. And we see ordinary people seeking asylum for reasons of religion or personal belief.

For us in the United States, these requests for refuge may create temporary abrasions and difficulties. But they are a tribute to our way of life—and to the values we represent in the world. They are also a recurring challenge to our support for human rights.

The steps I have outlined today represent our continuing effort to do not only what the law requires but what conscience compels, so that in the future we can respond to that challenge with imagination, skill, and the generosity that are the hallmarks of our people. ■

## U.S. Takes Case Against Iran to the International Court of Justice

DEPARTMENT ANNOUNCEMENT,  
NOV. 29, 1979<sup>1</sup>

The United States on November 29, 1979, took its case against Iran to the International Court of Justice. In an action filed with the Court in The Hague, the United States charges that the Government of Iran has violated fundamental principles of international law in not protecting the U.S. Embassy in Tehran, in supporting the actions of those holding the American hostages, and in threatening to subject the hostages to trial.

In particular, the United States charges Iran has violated the 1961 Vienna Convention on Diplomatic Relations, the 1963 Vienna Convention on Consular Relations, the 1973 Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of Crimes Against Internationally Protected Persons, including Diplomatic Agents, the 1955 U.S.-Iran Treaty of Amity, and the Charter of the United Nations.

The United States will seek an urgent hearing before the Court and has requested the Court to issue forthwith a preliminary order directing Iran to secure the release of the hostages and to insure their safety.

Following are the texts of the U.S. Application to the Court, its Request for Interim Measures of Protection, and a letter from Secretary of State Vance to the President of the Court. The papers were filed by the Legal Adviser of the Department of State, Mr. Roberts B. Owen, who will represent the United States in the action.

### LETTER TO ICJ

Dear Sir Humphrey:

The Government of the United States is today filing with the Court an Application and a Request for Interim Measures of Protection in a case against the Government of Iran for the seizure, and holding as hostages, of members of the United States Embassy in Tehran. As you are aware, at least fifty United States nationals are being subjected to prolonged and inhumane detention. They have already been held

hostage for more than three weeks, and threats have been made that they may be placed on trial.

In view of the extraordinary urgency of this case, which is unlike any before submitted to the Court, I respectfully suggest that you, as President of the Court, urge the Government of Iran to act immediately to appoint its Agent in the case. I further urge that the Court in any event hold any hearing on the request for Interim Measures as soon as it has a quorum. My Government earnestly hopes that the Court will issue an Order indicating appropriate interim measures within days. As the Secretary-General of the United Nations has informed the Security Council, the present crisis constitutes a serious threat to international peace and security.

May I further respectfully suggest that you, as President of the Court, immediately request the Government of Iran to ensure that no steps are taken to inflame opinion against the hostages, to heighten the danger to which they are exposed, or to place them on trial.

I have designated the Legal Adviser of the United States Department of State, the Honorable Roberts B. Owen, as Agent of the United States in this case.

Sincerely

CYRUS VANCE

Sir Humphrey Waldock,  
President,  
International Court of Justice,  
The Hague.

## APPLICATION TO THE COURT

Sir,  
I have the honor to refer to the following:

(1) the Vienna Convention on Diplomatic Relations of 1961, and Article I of the Optional Protocol Concerning the Compulsory Settlement of Disputes of that Convention;

(2) the Vienna Convention on Consular Relations of 1963, and Article I of the Optional Protocol Concerning the Compulsory Settlement of Disputes of that Convention;

(3) Article XXI(2) of the Treaty of Amity, Economic Relations, and Consular Rights between the United States of America and Iran of 1955, and

(4) Article 13(1) of the Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of Crimes Against Internationally Protected Persons, Including Diplomatic Agents, of 1973.

Under the jurisdiction thereby conferred upon the Court, I hereby submit, in accordance with Article 40(1) of the Statute and Article 38 of the Rules of Court, this application instituting proceedings in the name of the Government of the United States of America against the Government of Iran in the following case:

## I. Statement of Facts

At about 10:30 a.m., Tehran time, on November 4, 1979, during the course of a demonstration of approximately 3,000 persons, the United States Embassy compound in Tehran was overrun by several hundred of the demonstrators. The Iranian Government's security personnel on duty at the Embassy compound apparently made no effort to deter or discourage the demonstrators from the takeover. Access to the compound and Chancery building was gained by cutting chains and removing bars from a Chancery basement window, and control of the first floor of the Chancery was rapidly seized. In the process the invaders took hostage the Embassy security officer, who had come out of the Chancery to negotiate with them, and four of the Embassy's Marine guards. A large group of Embassy personnel, including consular and non-American staff and visitors, took refuge on an upper floor of the Chancery.

About two hours after the beginning of the attack, and after the invaders had attempted to set fire to the Chancery building and to cut through the upstairs steel doors with a torch, the demonstrators gained entry to the upper floor and seized the remaining personnel.

During the two hours of attack on the Embassy, no Iranian security forces were sent to relieve the situation, despite repeated calls for help from the Embassy to the Iranian Foreign Ministry, and despite the efforts of the United States Charge d'Affaires, who made contact with the Prime Minister's office and Foreign Ministry officials at the time the attack occurred. No attempt was made by the Government of Iran to clear the Embassy premises, to rescue the personnel held hostage, or to persuade the invaders and demonstrators to terminate their action. Nor did the Government of Iran take any action when, shortly after the Embassy seizure, the U.S. consulates in Tabriz and Shiraz were also seized.

Since the time of the takeover, the Embassy personnel have been held hostage in the compound under threatening and inhumane conditions. Some hostages have been paraded in sight of the crowd outside, blindfolded and hands bound, in full hearing of menacing, chanting crowds. Inside the buildings the hostages have been kept bound, often by hand and foot, forced to remain silent, subjected to other forms of coercion, and denied communication with their families and U.S. officials. Embassy records have been confiscated.

During the entire time and with the support and assistance of the Iranian authorities, demonstrations have been occurring outside the compound, often quite vociferous. A crowd of hundreds of thousands of demonstrators converged on the Embassy on November 22.

Those holding the hostages have refused to release them and have conditioned their release on various unacceptable demands. They have threatened on several occasions that, in certain circumstances, the hostages would be put to death. While 13 hostages were released on November 18 and 20, at

least 50 Americans remain in captivity, virtually all of whom are diplomatic agents of the United States or members of the administrative and technical staff of the Embassy. The group holding the Embassy has asserted that the remaining hostages are guilty of espionage and will be tried for their "crimes" if their demands are not met. Non-Iranian outside observers have been permitted only limited access to the hostages. It is not certain that all persons held have been seen, and the conditions during these few visits did not permit free communication with the hostages.

During this continuing ordeal, the Government of Iran is failing and refusing to make any effort to secure the release of the hostages and the return of the Embassy and consular premises to the United States' control. The Government has refused any direct substantive contact with United States Government officials in Tehran or at the United Nations. It refused to admit the special emissaries sent to Iran by the Government of the United States. The United States Charge d'Affaires, who was at the Foreign Ministry at the time the attack began, has been confined to the Foreign Ministry and denied free access both to his diplomatic colleagues from other Embassies and to senior Iranian officials.

Moreover, the Government of Iran, from an early stage of the crisis, has given direct support and encouragement to the group holding the Embassy. Members of that group have been permitted to come and go freely from the compound. The Government of Iran has refused or ignored the repeated requests of the Government of the United States to free the hostages and to restore the Embassy compound to the possession of the United States. The Government of Iran has supported the demands of those holding the hostages, has endorsed the charges of espionage leveled against Embassy personnel, and has threatened to place the personnel on trial for espionage.

## II. The Jurisdiction of the Court

Under Paragraph 1 of Article 36 of the Statute of the Court, the jurisdiction of the Court encompasses "all matters specially provided for . . . in treaties and convention in force." The United States and Iran are, members of the United Nations, parties to the Statute, and are also parties to three international conventions, each of which independently establishes the Court's jurisdiction over the present dispute.

First, the United States and Iran are parties to the Vienna Convention on Diplomatic Relations (done at Vienna, April 18 1961) and to its Optional Protocol Concerning the Compulsory Settlement of Disputes. As set forth separately in this application the actions of Iran bearing on this dispute constitute multiple and profound violation of that Convention. Article I of the Protocol provides:

"Disputes arising out of the interpretation or application of the Convention shall within the compulsory jurisdiction of the International Court of Justice and may accordingly be brought before the Court by



application made by any party to the dispute to a Party to the present Protocol."

Second, the United States and Iran are parties to the Vienna Convention on Consular Relations (done at Vienna, April 24, 1963) and to its Optional Protocol Concerning the Compulsory Settlement of Disputes. Article 1 of that Protocol is identical in its terms to Article 1 of the Protocol to the Convention on Diplomatic Relations.

\* The present dispute involves numerous violations of the Consular Convention.

Finally, the United States and Iran are parties to the Treaty of Amity, Economic Relations, and Consular Rights between the United States and Iran, signed in Tehran on August 15, 1955 (284 U.N.T.S. 93). As set out below, numerous and serious violations of this treaty are also involved in the present dispute. Article XXI, Paragraph 2 of the Treaty provides:

"Any dispute between the High Contracting Parties as to the interpretation or application of the present Treaty, not satisfactorily adjusted by diplomacy, shall be submitted to the International Court of Justice unless the High Contracting Parties agree to settlement by some other pacific means."

There is a dispute exists between the United States and Iran is clear. The present dispute has not been satisfactorily adjusted by diplomacy, Iran is continuing in its violations, and Iran has refused to discuss pacific settlement of the dispute.

In addition to the foregoing, the United States and Iran are parties to the Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of Crimes Against Internationally Protected Persons, Including Diplomatic Agents (done at New York, December 14, 1973). Serious violations of this Convention are also involved in the present dispute. Article 13, Paragraph 1 of the Convention provides:

"Any dispute between two or more Contracting Parties concerning the interpretation or application of this Convention which is unsettled by negotiations shall, at the request of one of them, be submitted to arbitration. If within six months from the date of the request for arbitration the parties are unable to agree on the organization of the arbitration, any one of them may refer the dispute to the International Court of Justice by request in conformity with the Statute of the Court."

In light of the urgency of rectifying the present violations of the Convention and Iran's refusal to meet with United States representatives on the subject, which renders any prior resort to arbitration, it is submitted that the Court is competent to hear the United States' claims under this Convention in connection with its other claims.

### The Claims of the United States

The Government of the United States, submitting the dispute to the Court, claims as follows:

(a) Pursuant to Article 29 of the Vienna Convention on Diplomatic Relations, the Government of Iran is under an international legal obligation to the United States to ensure that the persons of United States diplomatic agents be kept inviolate from "any form of arrest or detention" and that every such diplomatic agent shall be treated "with due respect" and protected from "any attack on his person, freedom, or dignity." The Government of Iran has violated and is currently violating the foregoing obligations.

(b) Pursuant to Article 37 of the same Convention, the Government of Iran is under an international legal obligation to the United States to ensure that members of the administrative and technical staff of the United States Embassy in Tehran, and members of the families of United States diplomatic agents and of administrative and technical staff, enjoy the relevant privileges and immunities specified in Article 29 of the Convention. The Government of Iran has violated and is currently violating the foregoing obligations.

(c) Pursuant to Article 31 of the same Convention, the Government of Iran is under an international legal obligation to the United States to ensure that its diplomatic agents shall be absolutely immune "from the criminal jurisdiction" of Iran and that, under Articles 31 and 37 of the Convention, such immunity is accorded to members of the administrative and technical staff of the United States Embassy as well as to the families of diplomatic agents and of administrative and technical staff. By its threats of prosecution, the Government of Iran has violated and is currently violating the foregoing obligations.

(d) Pursuant to Article 22 of the same Convention, the Government of Iran is under an international legal obligation to the United States to ensure that United States diplomatic premises in Iran "shall be inviolable." The Government of Iran has violated and is currently violating this obligation.

(e) Pursuant to Articles 24, 25, 27, and 47 of the same Convention, the Government of Iran is under an international legal obligation to the United States to ensure the inviolability of the archives and documents of the United States Embassy in Tehran, to accord full facilities for the performance of the functions of the Embassy, to permit and assist Embassy personnel to depart from Iran, and to preclude discrimination between States in the application of the Convention. The Government of Iran has violated and is currently violating the foregoing obligations.

(f) Pursuant to Articles 28, 31, 33, 34, 36, and 40 of the Vienna Convention on Consular Relations, the Government of Iran is under an international legal obligation to the United States to ensure that the United States enjoys full facilities for the performance of consular functions; that United States consular premises, documents, and archives are kept inviolate; that the consular personnel of the United States shall enjoy freedom of movement and travel in Iran; that such personnel shall

enjoy the right to communicate and contact other United States nationals; that the consular personnel of the United States be treated with respect and protected from attack on their persons, freedom, and dignity; and that United States consular officers be free from arrest or detention. The Government of Iran has violated and is currently violating the foregoing obligations.

(g) Pursuant to Article 4 of the Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of Crimes Against Internationally Protected Persons, Including Diplomatic Agents, the Government of Iran is under an international legal obligation to the United States to cooperate in the prevention of crimes against the official premises and the staff of the United States Embassy in Tehran, including an obligation to take all practicable measures to prevent preparations in its territory for the commission of such crimes. The Government of Iran has violated and is currently violating the foregoing obligations.

(h) Pursuant to Article 7 of the Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of Crimes Against Internationally Protected Persons, Including Diplomatic Agents, the Government of Iran is under an international legal obligation to the United States to submit to competent Iranian authorities for the purpose of prosecution all those persons who, since November 4, 1979, have been engaged in committing crimes against the official premises and the staff of the United States Embassy in Tehran. The Government of Iran has violated and is currently violating the foregoing obligation.

(i) Pursuant to Articles 11(4) and XIX of the Treaty of Amity, Economic Relations, and Consular Rights between the United States and Iran, the Government of Iran is under international legal obligation to the United States to ensure that nationals of the United States shall receive "the most constant protection and security" within the territory of Iran; that such nationals shall, if placed in custody, receive reasonable and humane treatment; that the United States shall have the full opportunity to safeguard the interests of such detained nationals; and that such nationals shall, while in custody, have full access to United States consular officials and services. The Government of Iran has violated and is currently violating the foregoing obligations.

(j) Pursuant to Articles XIII and XVIII of the foregoing Treaty of Amity, Economic Relations, and Consular Rights, the Government of Iran is under an international legal obligation to the United States to accord to United States consular officers and employees the privileges and immunities accorded to officers and employees of their rank and status by general international usage and, in particular, immunity from local jurisdiction for acts done in their official capacities and within the scope of their authority; to accord to such consular officers and employees the opportunity to exercise all functions which are in accordance with general international



usage; and to ensure that consular offices are not entered by the police or other local authorities except in case of fire or other disaster. The Government of Iran has violated and is currently violating the foregoing obligations.

(k) The Government of Iran, or persons acting with its support and approval, are holding United States citizens as hostages and are threatening the lives of these hostages in order to coerce the United States into taking actions which the United States has no international legal obligation to take. This exercise of coercion is in violation of Iran's obligations under the Charter of the United Nations, particularly Article 2, paragraphs 3 and 4, and Article 33.

(l) The Government of Iran is under an international legal obligation to the United States to respect and observe, and ensure respect for and observance of, the obligations of Iran under customary international law to ensure the immunities of the diplomats and staff of the United States Embassy in Tehran, the inviolability of its Embassy, and the protection of its nationals. The Government of Iran has violated and is currently violating the foregoing obligations.

#### IV. Judgment Requested

Accordingly, the United States requests the Court to adjudge and declare as follows:

(a) That the Government of Iran, in tolerating, encouraging, and failing to prevent and punish the conduct described in the preceding Statement of Facts, violated its international legal obligations to the United States as provided by

- Articles 22, 24, 25, 27, 29, 31, 37 and 47 of the Vienna Convention on Diplomatic Relations,
- Articles 28, 31, 33, 34, 36, and 40 of the Vienna Convention on Consular Relations,
- Articles 4 and 7 of the Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of Crimes Against Internationally Protected Persons, Including Diplomatic Agents, and
- Articles II(4), XIII, XVII, and XIX of the Treaty of Amity, Economic Relations and Consular Rights Between the United States and Iran, and
- Articles 2(3), 2(4), and 33 of the Charter of the United Nations;

(b) That pursuant to the foregoing international legal obligations, the Government of Iran is under a particular obligation immediately to secure the release of all United States nationals currently being detained within the premises of the United States Embassy in Tehran and to assure that all such persons and all other United States nationals in Tehran are allowed to leave Iran safely;

(c) That the Government of Iran shall pay to the United States, in its own right and in the exercise of its right of diplomatic protection of its nationals, reparation for the foregoing violations of Iran's international legal obligations to the United

States, in a sum to be determined by the Court; and

(d) That the Government of Iran submit to its competent authorities for the purpose of prosecution those persons responsible for the crimes committed against the premises and staff of the United States Embassy and against the premises of its Consulates.

The Government of the United States further requests the Court to indicate interim measures of protection as set forth in a separate request filed concurrently with this Application.

The Government of the United States has designated the undersigned as its Agent for the purposes of these proceedings. All communications relating to this case should be sent to the Embassy of the United States, The Hague, Lange Voorhout 102.

Respectfully submitted,

ROBERTS B. OWEN  
The Legal Adviser

The Registrar,  
International Court of Justice,  
The Hague.

#### APPENDED STATEMENT

I, David D. Newsom, certify and declare the following:

1. I am Under Secretary for Political Affairs of the United States Department of State. I have been vested by the Secretary of State with overall responsibility within the Department for matters relating to the crisis in Iran.

2. In this capacity, I have closely monitored events since the attack on the United States Embassy in Tehran began. The facts stated in the Application of the United States to the Court are, to the best of my knowledge, true.

DAVID N. NEWSOM

#### REQUEST FOR INTERIM MEASURES OF PROTECTION

The Registrar  
International Court of Justice  
Sir,

1. I have the honor to refer to the Application submitted to the Court this day instituting proceedings in the name of the Government of the United States of America against the Government of Iran and to submit, in accordance with Article 41 of the Statute of the Court and Articles 73, 74 and 75 of the Rules of Court, an urgent request that the Court indicate provisional measures which ought to be taken promptly to preserve the rights of the Government of the United States.

2. The compelling reasons for this request are set out in the Statement of Facts of the Application of the United States to the Court. The facts set forth therein have been verified in the appended statement of David D. Newsom, Under Secretary for Political Affairs of the United States Department of State. The premises of the Embassy and Consulate of the United States in Tehran have been invaded by large numbers of persons acting with the support and under the apparent authority of the Government of Iran, and remain occupied without the authorization of the United States. At least fifty United States citizens, virtually all of whom are diplomatic agents or administrative and technical staff of the Embassy, are being held hostage. The conditions of their detention are harsh, demeaning, dangerous and in flagrant violation of international law. The Iranian authorities have stated that the hostages will be kept until the United States complies with various demands. The Government of Iran has also threatened to submit the hostages to criminal trial and punishment, despite their entitlement to diplomatic and other immunities. The Secretary-General of the United Nations has invoked the United Nations Security Council because of this "grave situation". In exercise of his exceptional powers under Article 99 of the United Nations Charter, he has informed the Security Council that "the present crisis poses a serious threat to international peace and security".

3. The Government of the United States submits that the interim measures of protection requested are urgently needed to preserve the rights of the United States. The United States in its Application primarily requests the Court to adjudge and declare that Iran shall release immediately and permit to depart from Iran immediately all hostages and other members of the Embassy of the United States who are not of Iranian nationality, shall restore to the United States its embassy premises, shall be held in violation of multiple international legal obligations, shall pay to the United States reparation for numerous grave violations of the international legal rights of the United States. Interim measures of protection are required to preserve the following rights of the United States: the rights of its nationals to life, liberty, protection and security the rights of inviolability, immunity and protection for its diplomatic and consular officials; and the rights of inviolability a protection for its diplomatic and consular premises. The Court can grant and Iran can execute a decision providing effective and meaningful redress only if the lives and physical and emotional well-being of the hostages are preserved. In the volatile circumstances existing in Tehran, the hostages are, to an anguishing degree, in continuing jeopardy; their situation could sharply deteriorate at any moment. In the absence of effective measures of protection, a tragedy of an irreparable kind could result. It is these possible consequences that the Court's not indicating provisional measures that so urgently impel the United States to request them.

4. Moreover, the Government of the United States submits that the urgent need for interim measures of protection is reinforced by the dangers to the fabric of diplomatic relations and international law which are posed by the continued detention of United States diplomatic personnel. On this day that this condition continues to cause irreparable damage to principles of international law and the fundamentals of diplomatic relations. Indeed, recent events in other countries demonstrate that continuation of this situation in Tehran presents a clear and present danger to the safety of the diplomatic community at large. Moreover, should the Government of Iran proceed to implement a possible course of action which it has threatened, namely, to place diplomats on trial for alleged criminal acts of espionage, the principles of international law and the fundamentals of diplomatic relations will have been irreparably damaged. No judgment of the Court will be able to undo the taking of lawless and extraordinary a step.

5. In view of the considerations referred to in the foregoing paragraphs and the Application of the United States, I respectfully request, on behalf of the Government of the United States of America, that the pending final judgment in this suit, the Court indicate forthwith the following:

(a) That the Government of Iran immediately release all hostages of United States nationality and facilitate the prompt and safe departure from Iran of these persons and all other United States officials in dignified and humane circumstances.

(b) That the Government of Iran immediately clear the premises of the United States Embassy, Chancery and Consulate of all persons whose presence is not authorized by the United States Charge d'Affaires in Iran, and restore the premises to United States control.

(c) That the Government of Iran ensure that all persons attached to the United States Embassy and Consulate should be accorded, and protected in, full freedom within the Embassy and Chancery premises, and the freedom of movement within Iran necessary to carry out their diplomatic and consular functions.

(d) That the Government of Iran not place on trial any person attached to the Embassy and Consulate of the United States and refrain from any action to implement any such trial.

(e) That the Government of Iran ensure that no action is taken which might prejudice the rights of the United States in respect of the carrying out of any decision which the Court may render on the merits, and in particular neither take nor permit action that would threaten the lives, safety, or well-being of the hostages.

6. In view of the gravity of the current situation caused by the actions taken and threatened by the Government of Iran and by persons acting under its authority or with its support, the Government of the United States urges that this request be treated as a matter of extreme urgency. In this connection, the attention of the Court

is invited to the letter from the Secretary of State of the United States to the President of the Court, a copy of which is attached, which is submitted in conformity with Article 74, paragraph 4, of the rules of the Court. In view of the extreme urgency of the case, the United States further respectfully requests that the Court set a hearing on this request at the earliest possible date.

7. The undersigned is authorized by the Government of the United States of America to appear before the Court in any proceedings or hearings relating to this request which the Court may convene in accordance with the terms of Article 74, paragraph 3 of the Rules of the Court.

ROBERTS B. OWEN  
Agent for the Government of the  
United States of America

### RESPONSE FROM THE ICJ, NOV. 30, 1979<sup>2</sup>

The Registrar of the International Court of Justice has sent on November 30, 1979, the following communication to Roberts B. Owen, the Legal Adviser of the State Department, who is representing the United States in the case the United States has brought against Iran before the Court:

I have the honor to refer to the Application of the United States of America, instituting proceedings against Iran on 29 November and to simultaneous request filed by the United States for indication of provisional measures. The President directs me to express his hope that the two governments concerned will take into account the fact that the matter is now *sub judice* before the International Court. This being so the President, in conformity with Article 74, paragraph 4, of the Rules of Court, draws the attention of both parties to the need to act in such a way as will enable any order the Court may make on the request for provisional measures to have its appropriate effects. A similar communication addressed today to Government of Iran. Court will hold public hearings at an early date to afford parties the opportunity of presenting their observations on request for interim measures. Projected date and time for such hearings is Monday, 10 December, at 3 p.m.

The provisional measures which the United States has requested and to which the Registrar referred were as follows:

(a) That the Government of Iran immediately release all hostages of United States nationality and facilitate the prompt and safe departure from Iran of these persons and all other United States officials in dignified and humane circumstances.

(b) That the Government of Iran immediately clear the premises of the United States Embassy, Chancery and Consulate of all persons whose presence is not authorized by the United States Charge d'Affaires in Iran, and restore the premises to United States control.

(c) That the Government of Iran ensure that all persons attached to the United States Embassy and Consulate should be accorded, and protected in, full freedom within the Embassy and Chancery premises, and the freedom of movement within Iran necessary to carry out their diplomatic and consular functions.

(d) That the Government of Iran not place on trial any person attached to the Embassy and Consulate of the United States and refrain from any action to implement any such trial.

(e) That the Government of Iran ensure that no action is taken which might prejudice the rights of the United States in respect of the carrying out of any decision which the Court may render on the merits, and in particular neither take nor permit action that would threaten the lives, safety, or well-being of the hostages.

The United States welcomes the action of the President of the International Court of Justice and urges that the hearing take place at the earliest feasible time. ■

<sup>1</sup>Press release 311.

<sup>2</sup>Articles II and III of the Protocols to the Vienna Conventions on Diplomatic and Consular Relations both provide that the parties may agree on alternate procedures—arbitration or conciliation—in lieu of proceeding directly to this Court. No such agreements have been made. Indeed, the Iranian authorities have refused to discuss the dispute—still less modes of settlement of it—with United States emissaries. The terms of the preambles to both Protocols demonstrate the intent of the protocols to make recourse to the Court unconditional and not dependent upon joint pursuit by the parties of the options of arbitration or conciliation. They provide that: "*expressing their wish to resort in all matters concerning them in respect of any dispute arising out of the interpretation or application of the Convention to the compulsory jurisdiction of the International Court of Justice, unless some other form of settlement has been agreed upon by the parties within a reasonable period . . .*" (Emphasis supplied.) [Text in Original.]

<sup>2</sup>Press release 313.

## U.S. Embassy Marine Security Guards

Marine security guards have a long and proud tradition of providing security guard coverage at U.S. Embassies and Consulates abroad.

Shortly after World War II, the Department of State recognized a need for a guard force of young, alert, well-trained, and highly disciplined American military personnel to man its Embassies and Consulates. The evolution of the present-day Marine Security Guard Battalion, based at Quantico, Va., began in 1947. In that year, a proposal was made that the Department of War furnish Marine Corps personnel for Foreign Service guard duty under the provisions of the Foreign Service Act of 1946. Two years later, on Jan. 28, 1949, the first Marines departed Washington, D.C., for their assignments.

A normal tour for Marine security guards is 30 months, broken into two 15-month tours at different posts. Usually, a new Marine security guard will be assigned to a hardship post where there are restricted recreation and social activities. Examples are Moscow and Brazzaville (Congo), which are 12-month tours. Tour length in Iran has been 6 months.

The largest detachment is in Paris, with 35 Marines. Other large posts are London (19) and Tokyo (20). The smallest posts have six Marines, such as the one at Bridgetown, Barbados.

While on post, Marine security guards are under direct operational control of the Chief of Diplomatic Mission. The primary mission of Marine security guards is to provide protection of classified and administratively controlled material and other assigned U.S. Government property and personnel.

In the event of large-scale riots and demonstrations directed against U.S. diplomatic installations, the role of the Marine security guards is twofold: (1) to delay entry of a hostile group into the installation long enough to allow for the destruction of classified material and (2) to aid in safeguarding the lives of American and locally hired personnel.

Their duties, therefore, are defensive in nature, entailing both the protection of classified information and the provision of an "in-house" deterrent to counter small-scale acts of violence di-

rected against U.S. personnel and facilities.

Overall protection of U.S. Embassies and assigned personnel is the responsibility of the host governments. This is generally provided by national police or other paramilitary organizations. The host government is bound by the "Vienna convention" to protect the lives and property of assigned diplomats. Contingency plans concerning use of Marine security guards in a "delaying action" presuppose that the host government will honor its obligations. Marine security guards are not intended to be a fighting force ready and able to engage a hostile population in pitched battle.

There are presently about 1,100 Marine security guards on duty. They man 118 posts in 105 countries around the world. There are 15 women serving with the Marine security guards, who are part of a pilot program. No more women will be admitted to the program until it has been evaluated. They are serving at Kingston, Jamaica; Seoul, Korea; Belgrade, Yugoslavia; Amman, Jordan; Quito, Ecuador; and Karachi, Pakistan. ■

## International Court of Justice

The International Court of Justice (ICJ) is the principal judicial organ of the United Nations. It was created by the U.N. Charter in 1945 as the successor to the Permanent Court of International Justice. The Statute of the ICJ forms an integral part of the U.N. Charter. The Court's principal functions are to decide such cases as are submitted to it by states and to give advisory opinions on legal questions at the request of intergovernmental bodies authorized pursuant to the Statute of the Court and the U.N. Charter.

The Court is composed of 15 judges, no two of whom may be nationals of the same state, elected by the U.N. General Assembly and the Security Council, voting independently. The electors are mandated to bear in mind the qualifications of the individual candidates and the need for the Court as a whole to represent the main forms of civilization and the principal legal systems of the world. Members of the Court are elected for 9 years, one third of the total number of judges being elected every 3 years.

The membership of the International Court of Justice at the present time is as follows: President, Sir Humphrey Waldock (United Kingdom); Vice President, Taslim Olawale Elias (Nigeria); and Judges Manfred Lachs (Poland), Isaac Forster (Senegal), Andre Gros (France), Richard R. Baxter (United States of America), P. D. Morozov (Union of Soviet Socialist Republics), Jose Sette Camara (Brazil), Jose Maria Ruda (Argentina), Nagendra Singh (India), Abdullah Ali El-Erian (Egypt), Hermann Mosler (Federal Republic of Germany), Shigeru Oda (Japan), Salah El Dine Tarazi (Syrian Arab Republic), and Robert Ago (Italy). ■

## Situation in Iran

### WHITE HOUSE ANNOUNCEMENT, NOV. 14, 1979<sup>1</sup>

The President has today acted to block all official Iranian assets in the United States, including deposits in U.S. banks and their foreign branches and subsidiaries. This order is in response to reports that the Government of Iran is about to withdraw its funds. The purpose of this order is to insure that claims on Iran by the United States and its citizens are provided for in an orderly manner.

The order does not affect accounts of persons other than the Government of Iran, the Central Bank of Iran, and other controlled entities. The precise amounts involved cannot be ascertained at this time, but there is no reason for disturbance in the foreign exchange or other markets.

The President is taking this action pursuant to the International Emergency Economic Powers Act, which grants the President authority "to deal with any unusual and extraordinary threat to the national security, foreign policy, or economy of the United States."

### MESSAGE TO THE CONGRESS, NOV. 14, 1979<sup>1</sup>

Pursuant to Section 204(b) of the International Emergency Economic Powers Act, 50 U.S.C.A. § 1708, I hereby report to the Congress that I have today exercised the authority granted by this Act to block certain property or interests in property of the Government of Iran, its instrumen-



ties and controlled entities and the Central Bank of Iran.

1. The circumstances necessitating the exercise of this authority are the recent events in Iran and the recent actions of the Government of Iran.

2. These events and actions put at grave risk the personal safety of United States citizens and the lawful claims of United States citizens and entities against the Government of Iran and constitute an extraordinary threat to the national security and foreign policy of the United States.

3. Consequently, I have ordered blocked all property and interests in property of the Government of Iran, its instrumentalities and controlled entities and the Central Bank of Iran which are or become subject to the jurisdiction of the United States or which are or come within the possession of persons subject to the jurisdiction of the United States. I have authorized the Secretary of the Treasury to employ all powers granted to me by the International Emergency Economic Powers Act to carry out the blocking.

4. Blocking property and property interests of the Government of Iran, its instrumentalities and controlled entities and the Central Bank of Iran will enable the United States to assure that these resources will be available to satisfy lawful claims of citizens and entities of the United States against the Government of Iran.

5. This action is taken with respect to Iran for the reasons described in this report.

JIMMY CARTER

#### WHITE HOUSE STATEMENT, NOV. 17, 1979<sup>2</sup>

We welcome this announcement that some of the Americans held in the Embassy of Tehran will be released. We are thankful the ordeal may be over for them and that they may be soon reunited with their families.

We strongly urge that the authorities in Iran now move to secure the safe release of all those still being held. Their ordeal is not over. The U.S. Government will continue to work in every channel open to it to achieve that goal.

#### PRESIDENT'S STATEMENT, NOV. 17, 1979<sup>2</sup>

As we approach our traditional day of national Thanksgiving, the hearts of Americans are heavy with concern for the safety of those held hostage in Iran.

We join with people of all faiths throughout the world who adhere to fundamental principles of human rights and international law. We are united

with them in seeking an end to acts of terrorism against innocent people.

On Thanksgiving Day and during the holiday weekend, I ask all Americans to make a special prayer at churches and synagogues and places of public meeting.

Let us seek God's guidance in our search for peace and human brotherhood and pray for the safe return of those whose lives are threatened. May we come with gratitude for our abundant blessings and humility before the heavy burden of world responsibility that our blessings and power have brought.

#### WHITE HOUSE STATEMENT, NOV. 19, 1979<sup>2</sup>

Three of our hostages in Tehran have been released and have left Iran. After a brief period of rest and care, they will be reunited with their families here in the United States.

The remaining hostages must also be released. Their detention is without justification. The Government of Iran is responsible for achieving their immediate and safe release, and the United States has the right to expect that Iran will do so.

The specter has been raised of other American diplomatic hostages being placed on trial. Such a step would be a further flagrant violation of elementary human rights, religious precepts, and international law and practice. Worldwide outrage at the detention of the hostages would be greatly heightened by any attempt to put these diplomatic personnel on trial.

#### WHITE HOUSE STATEMENT, NOV. 20, 1979<sup>2</sup>

There are reports that the American citizens being illegally held as hostages in Tehran with the support of the Iranian Government might soon be put through some sort of "trial." This would be a flagrant violation of international law and basic religious principles, and the Government of Iran would bear full responsibility for any ensuing consequences. The United States is seeking a peaceful solution to this problem through the United Nations and every other available channel. This is far preferable to the other remedies available to the United States. Such remedies are explicitly recognized in the Charter of the United Nations. The Government of Iran must recognize the gravity of the situation it has created.

#### PRESIDENT'S REMARKS, NOV. 28, 1979<sup>3</sup>

This morning I have received the credentials of the Ambassadors of several nations. This is a very important and a very solemn occasion for me whenever I have this opportunity. There is a vivid reminder in this ceremony of the importance of diplomatic relationships. In looking down this row of representatives, who are quite distinguished in their own right, the differences among us are apparent. We represent countries with different backgrounds, different political systems, different customs, heritage, commitments, goals, opportunities, different levels of income, different alliances with widely varying countries.

The only way to bridge the inherent gaps between countries and to maintain peace and proper relationships is through the honoring of the integrity of diplomatic immunity. It's extremely important that mob violence be controlled and that international terrorism not be permitted to reign. All countries are afflicted at times with mob violence and terrorism.

The tragedy of the occurrences in Iran is that in a departure from accepted custom and tradition down through the centuries, in this instance, the Government itself has both condoned and encouraged the seizure of an American Embassy and our personnel through mob violence and through terrorism.

The inviolability of embassies is absolutely indispensable in easing tensions and resolving problems that exist among nations and in searching for a common ground of peace and communication among people. This is vital to every country. It's particularly vital to those countries which are small and which are weak and which do not have military power or economic power to exert in defending one's own institutions and one's own rights.

In this principle, the attitude of our own country, our efforts to have our hostages released and to restore the integrity of our diplomatic institutions, is an effort not only for the rights and benefits of the United States but for the rights and benefits of all nations. Some of the countries represented here, almost all of them, have strongly supported the condemnation of the Iranian Government's actions in seizing our Embassy and holding our hostages captive. We need the help of all countries. The rule of law is only as strong as the efforts of those who are committed to defend it. We are very grateful for the help of those nations

which have joined us in this effort.

The harming of innocent people is condemned by every law of mankind and by every law of God, no matter what religious principles or economic or political principles prevail in a country. We are determined to work as peacefully as possible to achieve the release of our hostages as early as we possibly can and, of course, commensurate with that, to defend and to protect the unchanging principles on which our nation and other nations are founded.

My hope is that all countries represented here and those others who have representatives in our Capital City will join with us in bringing a quick and peaceful resolution to the problem which afflicts not only the United States but all countries. ■

<sup>1</sup>Text from Weekly Compilation of Presidential Documents of Nov. 19, 1979.

<sup>2</sup>Text from Weekly Compilation of Nov. 26, 1979.

<sup>3</sup>Made in the Oval Office when he received diplomatic credentials from the newly appointed Ambassadors from Nicaragua, Algeria, Australia, Honduras, Yugoslavia, and West Germany (text from Weekly Compilation of Dec. 3, 1979).

## Chronology of Events in Iran, November 1979

- Nov. 4 Iranian students seize U.S. Embassy in Iran and hold 100 hostages (65% American) protesting that the deposed Shah of Iran, Mohammed Reza Pahlavi, be returned to Iran to stand trial. Promised host government help never arrives.
- Nov. 5 Iran announces cancellation of 20-year-old defense agreement with U.S. and scraps portions of a 1921 treaty with Russia.
- U.S. rejects students' demands to return the Shah to Iran and expects Prime Minister Mehdi Bazargan's government to live up to its assurances for protection of American diplomatic staff and premises.
- Nov. 6 Prime Minister Bazargan's provisional revolutionary government dissolves, yielding power to the Islamic authority of Ayatollah Ruhollah Khomeini and his secret Revolutionary Council.

- Nov. 7 Iranian students publicly threaten to kill American hostages if U.S. attempts rescue.
- PLO announces that it is sending representatives to Iran to seek release of hostages.
- At President Carter's request, former Attorney General Ramsey Clark and Mr. William Miller, U.S. Senate committee senior staff official, leave Washington for Tehran carrying a message from the President to Iranian authorities seeking the release of American hostages and to discuss U.S. relations with Iran.
- Iranian authorities agree to receive emissaries.
- Khomeini rejects talks with President Carter's special envoys Clark and Miller stating that if the U.S. gives up the Shah and stops espionage, negotiations may be possible.
- PLO officials announce that a two-member delegation, headed by a leader of Al Fatah (the main guerrilla group), arrives in Tehran in efforts to protect the lives of the hostages.
- Deposed Shah offers to leave U.S but is dissuaded by doctors.
- Secretary Vance declares that the U.S. holds Iranian authorities responsible for safety of hostages.
- Iranian students reject negotiations with PLO.
- Iranian students protest in Washington, and American students stage counter-demonstration.
- President Carter announces postponement of Canada visit until 1980.
- Iran cuts supplies to some oil concerns by 10% for rest of 1979.
- Nov. 9 U.N. Security Council President urges Iran to free hostages.
- U.S. announces suspension of deliveries of about \$30 million in military equipment and spare parts to Iran.
- Egyptian President Sadat invites Shah to Egypt for further medical treatment and political asylum and attacks Khomeini as a "lunatic who misrepresents Islam."
- Pope John Paul II sends a message to Khomeini asking him to insure the safety of the hostages.
- Nov. 10 President Carter directs Attorney General Civiletti to deport any Iranian student who is in the U.S. illegally.
- Officials of the PLO fail in their efforts to free hostages.
- Abolhassan Bani-Sadr becomes Iran's acting Foreign Minister and reaffirms demands that the U.S. return the Shah.
- Khomeini receives Papal Nuncio but rejects Pope's appeal.
- Nov. 12 President Carter orders suspension of purchases of Iranian oil to U.S. Shortly after, Iran announces that it is cutting petroleum shipments to the U.S.
- Bani-Sadr asks the Security Council to hear charges against the U.S., accusing America of being a "threat to peace."
- Mexico announces it is closing its embassy in Iran.
- Nov. 13 American and British naval vessels start maneuvers in the Arabian Sea. Iran, charging the U.S. with war threats, calls for a meeting of the Security Council.
- Nov. 14 Iran's Foreign Minister announces that Iran will withdraw its funds from American banks.
- President Carter acts to block all official Iranian assets in the U.S. including deposits in U.S. banks, their foreign branches, and subsidiaries.
- With Secretary of State Vance's support, the Security Council declines to debate Iran's charges against the U.S. until hostages are freed.
- Nov. 15 Iranian officials hint that women and blacks among the hostages are to be freed. Students holding them strongly reject the possibility.
- Iran announces it will no longer sell oil to American companies.
- Defense Department discloses that it may end training in the U.S. for Iranian military men.
- Khomeini cancels all appointments until Dec. 5 because of fatigue and illness.
- President Carter accuses Iranian Government of encouraging embassy takeover and warns Tehran that U.S. "will not yield to international terrorism or blackmail."
- Nov. 16 Iranian students warn that hostages will pay if Shah is allowed to go anywhere but to Iran.

- 150 Iranians are ordered by U.S. Government to leave U.S. voluntarily in 30 days or face deportation.
- President Carter discourages public recriminations against all Iranians living in U.S.
- Federal Judge orders President Carter to lift ban on demonstrations by Iranians and Americans on Federal property calling the ban "a substantial infringement on their First Amendment rights."
- 17 Khomeini orders students to release all women and blacks among hostages.
- 18 Khomeini declares U.S. hostages face being tried as spies.
- Iranian students announce that three hostages will be released—a woman and two black men.
- 19 U.S. demands all remaining hostages in American Embassy in Tehran be released and says that if any are tried on espionage charges, it would be "a further flagrant violation" of "human rights, religious precepts, and international law."
- Iranian officials announce they will stop using dollars to pay for imports and asks OPEC not to accept dollars for their oil exports.
- 20 A second group of 10 hostages are released and arrive at a U.S. air base near Frankfurt, West Germany.
- U.S. suggests to Iran that it might resort to military force if the remaining 49 hostages are not freed.
- Khomeini repeats threat to try the 49 remaining hostages.
- President Carter orders a second naval task force, including the aircraft carrier *Kitty Hawk*, into the Indian Ocean to join the carrier *Midway* and four other ships in the Arabian Sea.
- 21 Students warn that all hostages will die if U.S. attacks and the embassy will be blown up.
- Security Council offers Iran two forums in which to state its case in return for the release of hostages.
- First stage of the deposed Shah's medical treatment ends.
- 22 Thirteen hostages freed from U.S. Embassy in Tehran arrive in Washington; they are met by Secretary Vance and other senior State Department officials.
- Khomeini urges all Moslems to rise up against the West to fight "blasphemy."
- U.S. pledges to maintain presence in Islamic world.
- President Carter instructs U.S. Embassies around the world to undertake greater security precautions and for host governments to do all they can to protect embassies.
- U.S. again warns Iran that it will be held "strictly accountable" for the safety of the hostages.
- Nov. 23 Bani-Sadr declares that all Iranian foreign debts are repudiated.
- PLO officials say Yasir Arafat never tried to mediate the release of hostages because "we are allies of the Iranian revolution."
- Israel announces in a broadcast that it has a plan for rescuing hostages.
- Nov. 24 Khomeini accuses U.S. and Israel of attempting to seize two of the most sacred Moslem mosques in the holy cities of Mecca and Medina.
- Nov. 25 A U.N. Security Council session is called by Secretary General Waldheim because Iran fails to respond to an appeal to release U.S. hostages. It is only the second time in 19 years that a Secretary General has requested such a meeting.
- U.S. Congressman George Hansen (Idaho), on a self-appointed peace mission to Tehran, visits some of the U.S. hostages.
- Nov. 26 State Department orders embassies in 11 Moslem countries to evacuate "voluntarily" dependents, nonessential diplomats, and private businessmen to minimize risks in the aftermath of events in Iran, Pakistan, Saudi Arabia, and other countries.
- The U.N., in a new appeal for immediate release of hostages, moves to bring U.S. diplomats together with a responsible figure in the Iranian regime.
- Nov. 29 Foreign Minister Bani-Sadr, who had planned to fly to the U.N. headquarters in New York, is overruled by Iran's ruling Revolutionary Council which decides that no leader can leave Iran until Ashura, the holiest period of the Shiite Moslem calendar, ends.
- Bani-Sadr plans to come to the U.N. on Dec. 1 when talks could begin.
- Italian President Pertini urges Khomeini to free the hostages on humanitarian grounds.
- Nov. 27 State Department recommends that only essential travel by U.S. citizens be undertaken to United Arab Emirates, Iraq, Lebanon, Syria, Qatar, Kuwait, Oman, Libya, Bahrain, the Yemen Arab Republic, and Bangladesh.
- Officials at New York Hospital-Cornell Medical Center announce that the deposed Shah of Iran is able to leave the hospital and return to Mexico within a week.
- Khomeini attacks plans for a session of the Security Council claiming the outcome had been dictated by the U.S.
- Security Council receives written promise that Iran's acting Foreign Minister will arrive for the Dec. 1 session.
- A statement issued by the Commonwealth High Commissioners appeals to the Iranian Government to procure the release of all hostages and expresses the hope that the parties will resolve their differences by peaceful means.
- Nov. 28 Bani-Sadr is dismissed as Iran's acting Foreign Minister. Sadegh Ghotbzadeh, Director of Iranian television, is named to the post.
- Deposed Shah's health is improved and a plane is reported standing by at Kennedy International Airport to return him to exile in Mexico.
- President Carter denounces the "inhuman and degrading conditions" imposed upon the hostages and again warns Iran that it would suffer "grave consequences" if hostages are harmed.
- Iranian Government files suit in New York against the deposed Shah and his wife asking \$56.5 billion in damages.
- Nov. 29 U.S. initiates actions against Iran in the International Court of Justice.
- Mexico announces it will not renew visa for deposed Shah.
- Nov. 30 U.S. expects Shah to leave country despite Mexico's refusal to renew his visa.
- The Shah announces he intends to leave U.S. in hopes that his departure would "end the tragic situation in Iran."
- President Carter cancels six-state political tour because of Iranian crisis.
- Foreign Minister Ghotbzadeh announces Iran will not at-



tend the meeting of the Security Council stating that "there is no basis for negotiations over the hostages except the return of the deposed Shah for trial in this country." He also announces that Laingen and two other embassy officials are not hostages and "are free to leave at any time" although he could not guarantee their safety to the airport.

Registrar of the ICJ issues call to parties of hostage case stating that the "Court will hold public hearings at an early date to afford parties the opportunity of presenting their observations on request for interim measures. Projected date and time for such hearings is Monday, 10 December, at 3 p.m." ■

## The Challenge of Peacemaking

by Harold H. Saunders

*Address before the Conference on U.S. Vital Interests in the Middle East in St. Louis on November 6, 1979. Mr. Saunders is Assistant Secretary for Near Eastern and South Asian Affairs.*

I am delighted to be here in St. Louis to speak about the challenge of war and peace in the Middle East, and we appreciate the interest all of you have shown in coming to share this day with us. Conferences such as these give us in your Department of State a valuable opportunity to exchange perceptions with informed and interested citizens about what is at stake for all of us in this key area of the world—an area which Americans in many walks of life increasingly recognize can affect their lives and interests.

At the root of our exchange of views are some basic questions.

- Why is the United States so deeply involved in the search for peace in the Middle East?
- Does that involvement serve our national interests or threaten them?
- What are those national interests, and just how should we pursue them in this unstable region where change is taking place with unprecedented rapidity?

The answers to these questions begin to define the elements of a truly national policy toward this troubled region. For years, Middle East policy was the preserve of a few specialists. Today it is the concern of all Americans.

The purpose of this conference has been to stimulate thought and to contribute to a greater understanding of the ingredients of our policy. For, without a national consensus about what the United States is trying to do in such a critical area and why, no policy—no matter how designed and executed from Washington—can succeed.

At the outset let me make three central points about the Middle East, and then develop them in relation to the peacemaking process.

- More important and yet different American interests converge in the Middle East today than in any other area of the developing world. The United States no longer has the choice of distancing itself from what happens there.
- Fundamental changes are taking place in the Middle East at breathtaking speed. Some of the richest and fastest modernizing nations in the world live side-by-side with some of the poorest and most traditional nations, and all are coping with the impact of rapid change. Instability of some kind is inevitable. The issue is not whether we can avoid instability but how we deal with it.
- Within this environment of high stakes and diverse interests, the only sensible policy for us is one which permits us to pursue all of our interests at the same time in conditions of orderly change. We must avoid being forced to make choices among our various interests because none is so unimportant that it can be sacrificed. This is in our interest. It is in the interest of our friends in the Middle East.

### Important U.S. Interests

Any discussion of American interests in the Middle East today must begin with some thought about how American perceptions of the Middle East and our interests there have changed in recent years. Only after such reflection do we see what is at stake.

For years, the Middle East was thought of mainly in schoolbook geography terms as a "strategic crossroads," as a "land bridge" joining Asia, Africa, and Europe and forming the "life line" of the British Empire. In the 1950s and 1960s, the area took on new geopolitical importance because of the

oil it provided to our NATO allies and Japan and because of the importance of Turkey and Iran in containing Soviet expansion to the south toward that oil. Even during those years, however, the Middle East still did not seem to have direct overriding importance to the United States itself. We could still make the choice of standing a step back from direct involvement in its problem.

That situation has changed markedly in the 1970s. If we can just look for a moment at the five areas of primary interest which the United States has today in the Middle East we will see the extent of the change.

The first relates to the Soviet Union. While we have long recognized the importance of denying to the Soviet Union a predominant influence in the Middle East, we have also learned in the heat of two crises that we have a particular concern to avoid confrontation with the Soviets there in this nuclear age. The Soviet Union, for reasons of power, oil, geographic proximity, and ethnic and cultural ties between elements of its population and peoples of the Middle East also considers that it has interests in the area.

Our interest is to help the nations of the area preserve their independence against any foreign domination. But unlike Europe, where the lines between the Soviets and us are drawn both geographically and by precedent, the line are not clearly drawn in the Middle East. Either by accident or by escalation, the two superpowers could end up in confrontation. Messages exchanged between Moscow and Washington in the heat of crisis in both the 1967 and the 1973 wars made that specter all too clear.

So today we are more acutely aware than ever before of the challenge of avoiding confrontation, while making certain that nations of the area preserve their independence.

Our second major interest is the security and well-being of Israel. Even American President since the establishment of Israel in 1948 has declared the unwavering American commitment to that end. Our two peoples have deep cultural and emotional ties which make relations between our two countries both unique and indestructible. We have stood by Israel through its wars and given generously to its development and defense. As President Carter has put it: "For 30 years we have stood at the side of the proud and independent nation of Israel. I can say without reservation, as President of the United States of America, that we will continue to do so not just for another 30

ers, but forever. The United States can never support any agreement or action that places Israel's security in jeopardy.

Today this traditional interest in Israel has new dimensions.

During the early days of the 1970's, Israel reverses shook Israel's faith in its military prowess and led to a number military buildup. But those reverses also raised questions about whether, over time, Israel could depend solely on its military strength to survive.

Now the peace treaty with Egypt signed last March finally provides a political complement. Today, for the first time, Israel has a realistic hope of securing its future not just by arms but—though these will always be necessary—but by developing peaceful relationships with its neighbors as an accepted member of the Middle East community of nations. In helping Israel realize this dream of peace with its closest neighbor, President Carter has given a new dimension to our commitment to Israel. We now have the historical challenge and opportunity to help determine what is necessary to provide Israel with security in peace as well as in war.

Our third interest is in the supply of Middle Eastern oil. We have long known that this oil must be available "at reasonable prices" to our allies who are so dependent on it. In this decade we see that oil in a different light. That dependence has hit closer to home. We need only remember the impact of the oil embargo of 1973-74, or again more recently the gas lines of early summer, to note that the United States itself is not so deeply affected by imported oil as much of it from the Middle East. Because the greatest reserves are there, these nations also have the capacity to affect price as well as supply.

The fourth American interest, closely tied to the third, is maintenance of close and friendly ties with key moderate Arab nations. The reasons are both political and economic. Politically, moderate leaders of the Middle East will set the character of that area for the remainder of the century. They control the forces which will be the first line of defense against any foreign domination. Economically, the Middle East is among the fastest growing markets in the world. We have an obvious interest in developing trade which will not offset the cost of oil. We also have a larger foreign policy interest in the growing network of relationships that tie the people of this area to the people of the United States in common purposes.

Furthermore, the oil-producing nations of the Middle East, with their large supplies of capital, also have the capacity to influence world economic stability and to provide help to the developing nations with everything from expensive development projects to aid in meeting high energy costs.

Our fifth and no means last interest in the Middle East is a humanitarian one. We remain a nation concerned about the people of the area. For years we have provided assistance to refugees, whether from the Holocaust in Europe or from Arab villages in Palestine. We are now trying to help end the cycle of violence in southern Lebanon which has caused so much suffering to innocent civilians and caused 200,000 refugees to flee north from their homes. We have contributed to economic development of the poorer nations and have provided necessary technology to those nations which have oil money.

*Until the Palestinian refugees can find dignity and hope in a future . . . there can be no final peace in the Middle East.*

Today exciting new opportunities exist. With the conclusion of the Egyptian-Israeli Peace Treaty as the first step toward a comprehensive peace settlement, we have realistic hope of progress in resolving the Palestinian problem in all its aspects. We can look to the day when the refugees will no longer define their future in the hopelessness of the camps. This is a complex problem but also a vital human one. Until the Palestinian refugees can find dignity and hope in a future—until they can have a voice in the determination of that future and feel that peace in the Middle East has something in it for them—there can be no final peace in the Middle East. In facing this tragic human problem, we are deeply conscious that, as President Carter has said, it sometimes takes more courage to wage peace than to wage war.

#### Forces of Change

In considering these diverse and important interests—and our sharpened national perception of them—we must consider the forces of change which define the environment in which those interests are pursued.

With rapid change comes instability. In the past year, we have witnessed a revolution in Iran, a coup d'etat in Afghanistan and spreading insurrection there, continued internal strife in Lebanon, and the escalating dispute over the western Sahara in North Africa. All reflect unending turmoil which outsiders are powerless to control. The issue for the United States, therefore, is not whether change will occur but how we deal with it.

Our tendency too often has been to consider change as threatening. That need not be so. After all, our country has been and remains one of the fastest changing in the world. Our heritage is revolutionary. Our society has thrived on change. The spirit of innovation has produced human and technological achievements which cause other developing societies to look to us for leadership. These achievements are the hallmarks of our capacity to advance the human condition through harnessing change.

Dangers do exist in the Middle East. We cannot ignore them. At the same time, I propose that we look at the changes occurring there as an opportunity to build, not solely as a danger to destroy. As Secretary Vance said in Chicago last May, the United States must be seen as a power that uses its tremendous resources—diplomatic, military, economic—to promote healthy change and not as the power employing its military might to repress change.

Our task is to work with the moderate governments of the area, to try to help them direct change into constructive channels. It is they who have to cope with the consequences of an economic revolution, where in some, fast increases in oil revenues have produced new power of global dimensions at a time that their societies are experiencing the painful stresses and strains of rapid modernization. Nor are any governments there immune from the pressures of new-found nationalism, of the Islamic revival, of the traditional rivalries within the region, which, together with the economic revolution, feed change and instability.

For our part, we have great assets in helping these nations meet the challenge. While some are just beginning to enjoy the independence and power which their resources provide them, they are also finding that interdependence is equally a force in the modern world. Whether it be in food production and imports, acquiring industrial and consumer goods, importing skilled and unskilled labor, no nation—no matter

how rich—can prosper on its own.

With few exceptions, the peoples of North Africa, the Middle East, and Southwestern Asia want a good working relationship with us. They value our know-how, our practicality and inventiveness, our technology, our educational system, and share many of our values. They know we respect their right to solve their own problems and to preserve their own freedom. They know that we do not ask them to be like us but only to work with us in a shared desire for an orderly and peaceful world. Our acceptance of a pluralistic world enables us to contribute rather than to dominate. While they recognize we have our own interests in the area, they also recognize that we will pursue them with respect for their integrity.

### Strategy for Peace

This brings me to the third point I mentioned in opening—that the only sensible policy for us in the Middle East is one designed overall to permit us to pursue all our interests simultaneously in conditions of orderly change.

Our problem is that interests as diverse as ours sometimes come into conflict with one another. The most obvious example is the difficulty over the years of pursuing steadfast support for Israel while preserving and developing the relationships we need in the Arab world; nor can we totally thwart Soviet designs on the region or pursue humanitarian aspirations to end the plight of refugees and release valuable resources for economic development so long as the Arab-Israeli conflict is allowed to fester and periodically explode.

We have discovered over the past 36 years that a strategy centered on finding an Arab-Israeli peace best meets our interests. It allows us to work closely with all of the key nations in the Middle East in pursuing a common, if difficult, objective. We have been helped by the common perception in the area that we are the one outside nation able to help obtain settlement by diplomatic means rather than the military means which have proved so fruitless.

We do not delude ourselves that this is an easy task. It is extremely difficult. Nevertheless, this active search for peace not only enables us to pursue the full range of our national interests in the Middle East, it also can claim full support of the American people, harmonizing as it does the strategic, economic, political, moral, and humane interests of this nation. In the Middle East we need not be torn between current perceptions of strategic interests

and our humane and moral interests as we were during the decade of Vietnam.

### Egyptian-Israeli Peace

The progress of the past year in moving toward an Arab-Israeli peace has been historic. Today after three decades of recurrent war without hope, the prospect for peace in the Middle East is real. For the first time negotiations are directed toward lasting peace—not just temporary armistice. They are built on real achievement by brave and dedicated leaders who have had the courage to put aside fatalistic assumptions about the insolubility of the conflict between them—President Sadat, Prime Minister Begin, and President Carter. The Treaty of Peace between Egypt and Israel signed on the White House lawn last March 26 opened the door to negotiated peace between Israel and all its neighbors.

The first gigantic step came in September of last year, when the leaders of Egypt and Israel agreed at Camp David on two "framework" documents for peace in the Middle East. The first set forth the principles for a comprehensive peace and established the basis for proceeding with negotiations on the West Bank and Gaza, where Palestinians would participate in determining their own future. The second document established the basic terms governing an Egyptian-Israeli peace treaty. When those terms were actually translated into a contractual peace agreement last March 26, President Sadat and Prime Minister Begin signed a joint letter addressed to President Carter setting forth a time frame for the West Bank-Gaza negotiations.

Americans can take pride in the role their country played in this historic event. Both leaders have paid tribute to the key role of President Carter. I can say as a professional that without the courage, vision, and persistence of our President, this first practical step in 30 years toward peace in the Middle East would not have been taken.

The Egyptian-Israeli treaty is now being scrupulously implemented. It was reached through mutual concessions—Egypt, by breaking the pattern of confrontation and giving full recognition to Israel; Israel by agreeing to withdraw completely from the Sinai. The treaty opens new avenues for trade and communications; for economic, scientific, and social betterment; and for the enhancement of learning and cultural exchange. Its achievement against heavy odds is a demonstration of men and

women everywhere that human reason, common sense, goodwill, hard work, and faith can prevail. Its careful implementation is demonstrating that even those who have been adversaries for generations can overcome enmity and make peace.

### Status of the Peace Process

As important as the Egypt-Israel Peace Treaty is, it is not an end in itself. It is still only the first step on the long and difficult road to a comprehensive peace. Peace has come to Egypt and Israel; it has not come to the other peoples involved. Until it does, the peoples of Egypt and Israel cannot realize fully the benefits of their peace and there can be no end to the tension and hostility which have plagued the Middle East. All the governments at Camp David have committed themselves to a comprehensive peace. The process outlined in September 1978, President Sadat, Prime Minister Begin and President Carter at Camp David continues.

The principal unfinished item on the Middle East agenda is the relationship between Israel and its other neighbors, particularly between Israel and the Palestinian Arab people. What we seek, as full partner in continuing negotiations, is a permanent basis for assuring the full security of Israel at the same time, satisfaction of the legitimate rights of the Palestinians.

To that end, Egypt, Israel, and the United States have entered the next phase of negotiations set out in the Camp David framework. For the first time in 30 years, we have begun a negotiation which concentrates on issues of concern to the Palestinians: as well as protection of Israel's security. We have embarked on negotiating a series of practical steps laid out at Camp David by which more than 1 million Palestinians living on the West Bank and Gaza—and eventually those displaced by war now living elsewhere—can participate in determining their future.

These negotiations have been underway since late May with Ambassador Robert Strauss heading the American negotiating team. It is important to understand their objective. They are a first stage in dealing with the issues of the West Bank and Gaza. What we are attempting to do is build political structure—a self-governing authority—on the West Bank and Gaza that takes into account the legitimate interests of both Israelis and Palestinians. This step is designed to pave way, over a succeeding 5-year tran-



...al period, for working out the final  
...s of these territories. This first  
... is to give them full autonomy to  
... their lives through their own self-  
...rning body and to participate in  
...ciations on the final status of these  
...itories.

This is complicated. No one before  
...e defined "full autonomy" in such cir-  
...stances. The three parties to the  
...ent talks are developing a transi-  
...l arrangement, not deciding the  
... status of the territories. Yet that  
...governing authority must be  
...eningful and credible so that Pales-  
...tians will be willing to vote and par-  
...ticipate in picking leaders who will rep-  
...sent them in the next round of  
...ciations during the 5-year transi-  
...l period. Obviously, many deep  
...ferences exist at this early stage.  
...ve the past 5 months, the negotiating  
...ans and their two working groups  
...e been laying the technical basis for  
...ding just what will be the content of  
...onomy.

Progress has been slow, painstaking  
...and not highly visible. But it is  
...e in the steady achievements of the  
...king groups. The achievements,  
...ugh modest, are building blocks for  
...ing autonomy into a reality. As you  
...w, we have a May 1980 target date  
...ompleting these first negotiations.  
...e essential to insure that genuine, if  
...r, progress is being made, that sub-  
...tial progress is there by next year,  
...we are on the way to resolving the  
...aining difficult issues in order to  
...re the credibility of the peace  
...ness.

This credibility is essential if we  
...to encourage Palestinians and other  
...b nations and leaders to join in the  
...ciations. They must see that these  
...ciations are a genuine beginning. It  
...o secret that a sizable body of opin-  
...in the Arab world remains uncon-  
...ed that our course is the right one.  
...her than a step toward a com-  
...prehensive peace, they see the Egypt-  
...al treaty as a separate peace de-  
...ctive of Arab unity. We hope that  
...tudes will become more positive as  
... world sees that these negotiations  
... produce concrete results.

One of the positive elements in the  
...ent situation is that parties on all  
...es are taking a fresh look at their  
...erests in the present fluid situation.  
...ns exist that the Palestinians and  
...er Arabs are watching the negotia-  
...ns closely, that they are carefully  
...sidering their next steps, and that a  
...tain sense of realism is emerging in  
...ts of their relationship.

In Israel, too, awareness is grow-  
...ing of the need for creativity and  
...agination in dealing with the Pales-  
...tinian problem. As for the United  
...States, we see evidence all around us  
...that more and more Americans under-  
...stand the need to resolve the Pales-  
...tinian dimension of the Arab-Israeli  
...conflict.

Success will not come overnight.  
...Violence continues to poison the en-  
...vironment. Years of hatred and suspicion  
...are not easily overcome. At Camp  
...David we all recognized this truth.  
...Since the gap between Israeli and Pal-  
...estinian and other Arab perceptions of  
...each other's motives cannot be bridged  
...in one stroke, the Camp David  
...framework sets up a process for evol-  
...ving a negotiated solution over time.  
...Each success and the trust which comes  
...with genuine accommodation form the  
...basis for tackling still harder issues in  
...later stages and a context for testing  
...the results of negotiations. What re-  
...mains for us all is to persevere in the  
...course we have set. This we intend to  
...do—for our own interests in the Middle  
...East, as well as for those of the peoples  
...living there. ■

## Security Council Meets on Iranian Situation

*Following are statements made by  
U.S. Ambassador to the United Nations  
Donald F. McHenry to the press  
following a Security Council meeting  
on November 27, 1979, in Security  
Council sessions on December 1 and 4,  
and the resolution unanimously  
adopted by the Council on December 4.*

**AMBASSADOR McHENRY,  
NOV. 27, 1979<sup>1</sup>**

I can say on a preliminary basis  
that what you have seen the Council do  
this afternoon has been to respond to  
the call of the Secretary General for an  
immediate meeting and to reject the  
idea that a situation can be so urgent as  
to require action under article 99 and  
then wait until one party finds it con-  
venient to appear.

What we sought to do was to, in a  
sense, bend over backward to insure  
that there was no excuse for the con-  
sideration of the Council on the issue  
before it, and that issue, stripped of all

of the rhetoric which may be present, is  
the question of the illegal detention of  
the American diplomatic personnel and  
the occupation of the American diplo-  
matic premises in Iran in violation of  
every principle of international law.

There has been a great deal of dis-  
cussion within the Council in the con-  
sultations over the last several days  
with regard to the procedure which was  
to be followed. And some of the discus-  
sions went on at interminable length.

Basically what the Council has  
done has been to publicly and formally  
not only restate the important principle  
involved here, which is the inviolability  
of diplomatic personnel, but to both re-  
state and reiterate that principle and  
the call for release despite the excuses  
which have been offered for the action  
which has been taken. Our effort here  
was to insure that that was done even  
while trying to accommodate and to in-  
sure that there was no excuse, no im-  
pediment to the work of the Council.

I think it is clear from the reitera-  
tion of the statement by the President  
of the Council, on the behalf of all of its  
members, that the position of the  
Council with regard to the holding of  
hostages is one which is unanimously  
held. In my own experience here in the  
last 3 weeks since this unbelievable  
event occurred, I have not come upon  
any single delegate, whether they are  
in agreement with the United States on  
other issues or in disagreement with  
the United States on other issues, I  
have yet to find one delegate who has  
defended the action which has been  
taken by the authorities in Iran.

I think that one thing is clear, one  
additional thing is clear, and it is that  
the unanimity which is present in the  
Security Council and in the General As-  
sembly as a whole is one which is also  
present with regard to the American  
public. Despite efforts to try and take  
advantage of differences which may  
exist within our own society, Ameri-  
cans are at one, whether they are  
women or men, white or black; they are  
at one in the insistence that American  
diplomatic personnel held in Iran be  
released and be released safely and  
promptly. I think in view of the gravity  
of the situation, the restraint which has  
been shown by the American public is a  
restraint which is both admirable, and I  
would suggest to you one which must  
not be misunderstood. It would be a  
mistake to interpret the restraint which  
exists as one which in any way ac-  
quiesces with the action which has been  
taken in Iran.



(United Nations photo by M. Grant)

General view of the Security Council on December 4, 1979, when the 15 members (U.S., Norway, Portugal, U.K., Gabon, France, Bolivia, Bangladesh, U.S.S.R., Zambia, Nigeria, Czechoslovakia, China, Jamaica, and Kuwait) unanimously adopted a resolution calling on Iran to immediately release the U.S. personnel being held in Tehran.

Our expectation is that the Council will meet on Saturday. We specifically insisted that it not only have a day given but that the Council would have to set a time, and we insisted that the Iranians had to submit a letter to the President of the Security Council this morning, prior to any agreement on this afternoon's activities, indicating that they would be present and indicating the individual who would be present.

Our hope is that the efforts of the Secretary General over the last 3 weeks will be facilitated by the process which has been set in train.

There is one final point which I wish to make. I have read some of your statements in terms of dissension within the Council and I think that in some instances individuals, members of the Council, are done a disservice by the interpretations, snippets here and there, because I think as was indicated by the unanimous statement which the President read, the Council is at one on the question of the release of the hostages and maintains that position despite the effort to put this in a broader context.

**AMBASSADOR McHENRY,  
DEC. 1, 1979**

Twenty-seven days ago, 63 Americans, as well as personnel of other nationalities, were seized when an armed, disciplined group of demonstrators invaded the U.S. Embassy in Tehran. Eighteen of those captured have been released. At least 50 Americans remain captive.

As with diplomats everywhere, the individuals who were taken hostage are entitled to the protection of the Government of Iran by the most solemn commitment nations can give—the sovereign pledge of governments by treaty and international obligation.

Governments retain the right to require that foreign diplomatic personnel leave their soil. But every standard of international behavior, whether established by practice, by ethics, by treaty, or by common humanity, supports the principle that the personnel of a diplomatic mission and diplomatic property are inviolate. Even in the darkest moments of relationships between countries, the security and well-being of diplomatic personnel have been respected.

Iran asks that its grievances be heard and acted upon. Yet Iran, and the authorities who speak for it, are violating the most basic obligation of nations. They hold hostage the very people who facilitate those communications that can resolve differences and lead to understanding and agreement among nations.

None of us, whatever our differences on other issues, can ignore the implications for all of us of this event. Nor can the world ignore that these diplomatic representatives are being held under degrading conditions. They are threatened, kept bound, isolated, not allowed to speak, denied mail. Even their whereabouts are uncertain. All of us at this table are also diplomatic representatives of our countries, charged with the same duties and protected by the same laws and rules of conduct as those now held captive in Tehran. It is for all of us to speak up to demand their

release and to insist upon basic conditions of humanity for their care pending that release, including daily visitation by impartial observers.

Many members of the United Nations, including some members of this Council, have had ambassadors murdered, diplomatic personnel injured, embassy facilities destroyed. On each occasion the delicate framework of our international community has been harmed, but efforts were made to repair the wounds. The situation in Tehran has a feature unlike other assaults on the diplomatic ties that bind our world. In Iran, the government itself defends the violence which holds diplomats hostage. Such a position is intolerable.

The United States insists that its diplomatic personnel be released and its diplomatic premises restored. These are not negotiable matters. The United States will hold the authorities in Iran fully responsible for the safety of the Americans held captive.

I speak today for hostages who are endangered by the frenzy and uncertainty of events, by the inhumane conditions under which they are held, and by the threat of the authorities in Iran to compound unjust acts through trials.

Around the world, nations of East and West, North and South, in individual and collective statements, have expressed their opposition to this violation of international law and called for the immediate release of the hostages. We express our appreciation for this overwhelming expression of international concern and support in behalf of principles that lie at the heart of civilized international behavior.

In this spirit, the President of the Security Council, speaking for the members of this body, has twice urgently appealed for the release of the hostages. The President of the General Assembly has twice spoken eloquently in support of this plea. The Secretary General of the United Nations has worked unceasingly to resolve this crisis.

There has not been a satisfactory response, and the hostages are still not free. We gather here to determine what more can be done.

None of us is deaf to the passionate voices that speak of injustice, that cry out against past wrongs, and that ask for understanding. There is not a single grievance alleged or spoken in this situation that could not be heard in an appropriate forum.

In addition, as we have said from the beginning, the United States remains ready, upon the release of the

pages, to discuss with the Iranian authorities the differences which exist between us and to seek their resolution.

But no country can call for justice at the same time denying it to the senseless. No country can breach the fundamental rules of the community of nations and at the same time expect that community to be helpful in the problems which it perceives for itself.

In the simplest terms, no country can break and ignore the law while seeking its benefits.

What is it that the world can agree on if not the protection and respect for those whom we appoint to represent sovereignty and resolve our differences?

*The United States insists that its diplomatic personnel be released and its diplomatic premises restored. These are non-negotiable matters.*

How tragic for Iran, how tragic for the world that threatens to peace are being driven to a new crescendo. The powerful voices in Iran are encouraging violence in neighboring countries and condoning bloodshed rather than condemning it. In addition, totally unfounded charges which can only inflame the situation are being made against the United States with respect to the current crisis.

The United States, in all the years of its history, has had as a fundamental principle the freedom of all people to choose as they choose. Out of this history and long association, we honor and respect the leaders and the nations of Iran.

The principle of noninterference in internal affairs of other nations is one of the tenets of the United Nations and the foreign policy of the United States, and that includes, of course, respect for the territorial integrity, political independence, and sovereignty of Iran. We respect the right of the people of Iran to determine their own future through institutions of their own choosing. All of us must accept their decisions.

The President of the United States, speaking for a unified and determined nation, has made it clear that we are seeking a peaceful resolution to the conflict so that the wounds of the past can be healed. In this spirit, the United States has turned to the Security Council and the Secretary General

in the search for a peaceful solution. In this spirit, the United States has begun proceedings in the International Court of Justice.

There is in the United States a unity of purpose, a disciplined sensitivity to the needs of peace, a determination to search out all peaceful means to bring this dispute to a just conclusion, and also a determination to do what must be done to protect our fellow citizens and the rule of law. That unity of purpose is shared by all Americans. But make no mistake. Beneath that discipline is a seething anger which Americans properly feel as they witness on daily television new threats and outrages against their fellow citizens. The hostages must be freed.

**AMBASSADOR McHENRY,  
DEC. 4, 1979<sup>a</sup>**

The 15 members of the Security Council in their action today have given unanimous expression once more to their urgent call on the Government of Iran for the immediate and unconditional release of the hostages of our Embassy being held in Tehran. They have called on the Government of Iran to provide the hostages protection and to allow them to leave the country.

It is clear from this vote and from the debate of the last 4 days, in which representatives from all parts of the world have participated, that the family of nations speaks with one voice in calling for the immediate release of the hostages. We are deeply appreciative.

We hope that this call of the Security Council will be heeded and carried out by the Government of Iran in a matter of hours. Whatever the time required, we urge the Secretary General, in the exercise of his good offices, to provide all humanitarian support possible to those being detained against their will. We remain deeply concerned for their safety, their well-being, and their health on this, their 30th day of suffering and isolation.

The United States wishes to place on the record that the adoption of this resolution by the Security Council clearly is not intended to displace peaceful efforts in other organs of the United Nations. Neither the United States nor any other member intends that the adoption of this resolution should have any prejudicial impact whatever on the request of the United States for the indication of provisional measures of protection by the International Court of Justice.

With the hostages released, the resolution calls on the Governments of Iran and the United States to take urgent steps to resolve peacefully the remaining issues between them in accordance with the purposes and principles of the Charter of the United Nations. The United States is fully prepared to cooperate with this call.

Many speakers in this debate have also referred to the grievances of the people of Iran. I myself did so when I remarked that: "None of us is deaf to the passionate voices that speak of injustice, that cry out against past wrongs, and that ask for understanding. There is not a single grievance alleged or spoken in this situation that could not be heard in an appropriate forum." The Security Council has now also noted those grievances in its acknowledgment of the Iranian letter of November 13, 1979.

Neither the United States nor the other members of the community of nations has a desire to isolate Iran. We are all members of the United Nations. Let us then, all of us, be true to the purposes and principles of the charter which we have pledged ourselves to honor.

**SECURITY COUNCIL  
RESOLUTION 457<sup>d</sup>**

*The Security Council,  
Having considered the letter dated 25 November 1979 from the Secretary-General (S/13646),*

*Deeply concerned at the dangerous level of tension between Iran and the United States of America, which could have grave consequences for international peace and security,*

*Recalling the appeal made by the President of the Security Council on 9 November 1979 (S/13616), which was reiterated on 27 November 1979 (S/13652),*

*Taking note of the letter dated 13 November 1979 from the Foreign Minister of Iran (S/13626) relative to the grievances of Iran,*

*Mindful of the obligation of States to settle their international disputes by peaceful means in such a manner that international peace and security, and justice, are not endangered,*

*Conscious of the responsibility of States to refrain in their international relations from the threat or use of force against the territorial integrity or political independence of any State, or in any other manner inconsistent with the purposes of the United Nations,*

*Reaffirming the solemn obligation of all States Parties to both the Vienna Convention on Diplomatic Relations of 1961 and the Vienna Convention on Consular Relations of 1962 to respect the inviolability of diplomatic personnel and the premises of their missions,*



1. *Urgently calls* on the Government of Iran to release immediately the personnel of the Embassy of the United States of America being held in Teheran, to provide them protection and allow them to leave the country;

2. *Further calls* on the Governments of Iran and of the United States to take steps to resolve peacefully the remaining issues between them to their mutual satisfaction in accordance with the purposes and principles of the United Nations;

3. *Urges* the Governments of Iran and of the United States to exercise the utmost restraint in the prevailing situation;

4. *Requests* the Secretary-General to lend his good offices for the immediate implementation of this resolution and to take all appropriate measures to this end;

5. *Decides* that the Council will remain actively seized of the matter and requests the Secretary-General to report urgently to it on developments regarding his efforts. ■

<sup>1</sup>USUN press release 129.

<sup>2</sup>USUN press release 134.

<sup>3</sup>USUN press release 138.

<sup>4</sup>Adopted unanimously on Dec. 4, 1979.

## Agenda of Global Economic Issues

by Howard T. Rosen

*Statement in Committee II (Economic and Financial) of the U.N. General Assembly on October 12, 1979. Mr. Rosen is a U.S. delegate to the U.N. General Assembly.*<sup>1</sup>

We meet in the 34th General Assembly of the United Nations at a critical time in international economic relations. The global economy faces serious challenges:

- The traditional fuel supply of our planet is shrinking while its population is burgeoning.

- Economic growth is slowing while the aspirations of the world's citizens are soaring.

- The shocks of high oil prices are undermining economic stability.

- Joblessness is increasing and inflation eroding the real value of income.

- Exchange markets are moving erratically and gold prices are rising irrationally.

- Protectionist pressures are mounting even as international trade is becoming increasingly important to the health and prosperity of all nations and their people.

- The interdependence of our destinies is becoming clearer, yet the call for protectionism is growing louder.

These challenges must be met and they must be met urgently. All of our futures, and those of our children, will depend on the outcome of our endeavors. We will succeed in restoring balance to the world economy and promoting national and international growth and prosperity if we demonstrate the will to take strong actions domestically and globally. We will fail if we procrastinate or seek to avoid hard decisions by casting all the blame for the current malaise elsewhere. New initiatives will be required, but older programs and institutions, whose effectiveness has been tested, must continue to be utilized and strengthened.

A cooperative international approach is imperative for the orderly and mutually beneficial management of the world economy. Such an approach requires that all nations set their domestic houses in order as well as seek international solutions to issues of global significance.

On the national level the industrialized countries must curb inflation while maintaining employment, stimulate growth, seek to insure that their economic actions do not adversely affect others, and undertake effective measures to produce more energy and moderate their consumption.

The developing countries must increase domestic savings and investment, utilize scarce economic resources more effectively, and make difficult trade-offs between growth rates and indebtedness.

The oil-exporting nations must accept, in their pricing and production policies, the responsibilities for global economic health and stability thrust on them by their position as suppliers of the world's chief source of energy.

And the countries with centrally planned economies must follow internal programs and policies which both reflect the reality of their increasing participation in the global economic system and enable them to assume their responsibilities vis-a-vis the developing countries.

### U.S. Domestic Actions

Let me briefly note several recent actions taken by President Carter to strengthen the U.S. economy and contribute to international economic prosperity and stability.

Determined to maintain a reasonable balance in our external accounts and to insure that the dollar is sound

and stable, my government has implemented policies to strengthen underlying economic conditions and to counter market disruptions with forceful exchange market operations. In 1980 we expect a strong current account surplus. We are confident that budgetary stringency measures and policies announced last week to raise interest rates, slow monetary growth, and increase reserve requirements will moderate significantly our inflation rate, sharply reduce inflationary expectations, and strengthen the dollar. These efforts will be reinforced by the new national accord with labor that provides, among other things, for an effective voluntary program of wage and price restraints. We will overcome our energy difficulties; the President is committed to hold down oil imports, to raise domestic oil prices to market levels, and to assist the development of domestic alternate energy supplies, including new and renewable sources of energy.

These unilateral actions by the United States, and equally appropriate ones by other nations—developed and developing, producer and consumer—are necessary for internal and global prosperity. But by themselves they are not sufficient. We face many common problems—global problems—where complementary national actions are essential, or we all suffer. And most of these problems cannot accurately be characterized as North-South issues that demand action by one group of countries for the primary benefit of another. Instead they are global concerns that require action by all and entail gains to all.

### Energy

The subject of energy is the most obvious. The farmer buying diesel fuel in Iowa and the farmer buying kerosene near Khartoum must both cope with rising world petroleum prices. Governments in the richest countries and those in the poorest must deal with the impact of higher energy costs and rising energy demand on their national economies.

Those who suffer most as we enter the era of energy scarcity are to be found in the countries emerging from centuries of deprivation. In the developing nations, 3 billion people need energy at prices they can afford if the era is to rise from lives of bare subsistence. The oil-importing developing countries will face an oil bill in 1979 of more than \$35 billion, an increase of \$1 billion over only a year earlier.

The distinguished Minister of External Affairs of India spoke last week on a special problem that energy poses to many developing economies: energy is marked by limited substitution possibilities for priority uses such as transport, by the high capital intensity of alternative energy sources, and by the difficulty of reducing further a level of consumption already at bare and essential minimums.

Even the oil-exporting countries themselves cannot regard the effects of energy price and supply policies on the world economy with complacency, for the effects adversely impact on them. There are poor countries, despite their production. All have ambitious development plans that can be undermined by global inflation and recession, and these are related in part to rising oil prices.

Much needs to be done. Secretary General are indicated in the General Assembly. A key question today is whether the exporting nations are prepared to stabilize prices and, to the extent it is in their control, to insure adequate supply. All nations must use energy more efficiently. They must also intensify efforts to develop their domestic sources of energy. National and international efforts should aim at the research, exploration, and development of petroleum and its alternatives as part of an overall strategy for increasing world supply.

No single subject is in such need of an agreement, and action by this body as energy. Yet in an interdependent world, there are other vital issues that must be addressed if we are to have a healthy world economy.

Food and nutrition are also economic problems of global dimensions. Despite the "green revolution" and the increase in food production worldwide, demand generated by burgeoning population and improved eating habits is rapidly outdistancing supply. There are alarming predictions of widespread famine in several parts of the world in the 1980's. The situation is much more dire than most believe. As with energy, a major international effort is required.

Our world cannot tolerate that one out of every five of its citizens is sick or disabled or hungry because he or she does not have enough to eat. We must act together to increase food production, improve its distribution, and promote better nutrition, particularly with regard to the world's poorest.

The United States is contributing in a major way to dealing effectively with the international problem. Our bilateral assistance alone in the agricultural area, including concessionary food assistance, will surpass \$2 billion this year. In various international fora, we are pressing for progress on world food security, including rapid completion of a new food aid convention and for increased international funding for agricultural research. We are also stressing the importance of adoption by governments of food sector strategies which can help increase domestic food production and improved nutritional levels.

### Trade

The experiences of the past 30 years have demonstrated the value to all nations of an increasingly open international trading system. The recently concluded trade negotiations—the most recent of several major liberalizations since World War II—resulted in major tariff cuts, significant reductions in nontariff barriers, and an intensified framework agreement that permits special and differentiated treatment for developing countries. Though less than many of us would have desired, the multilateral trade negotiations did produce benefits for all. It is in the interests of developing countries to sign the various codes at an early date and participate actively in their implementation to insure that their respective interests are advanced.

### Other Issues

Other global issues require continuing attention by the international community—managing the growing deficits of a number of countries; providing better health care worldwide; spreading the benefits of science and technology around the world; increasing employment opportunities and improving living conditions of the poor in whichever country they are found; and protecting the political, economic, and social rights of all human beings.

Most economic questions of major consequence to the world economy are under discussion in international fora. The exception is energy. This General Assembly could make a significant contribution to global economic health and stability by agreeing to a program for getting discussion of the world energy situation underway.

We have an extremely full international calendar before us, in Committee II and elsewhere. In addition to our own work, the negotiations on the

common fund and commodities under the U.N. Conference on Trade and Development are in progress; in Belgrade the Development Committee recently agreed to recommend that the World Bank and the International Monetary Fund study several important financial issues; and the implementation of new codes negotiated in the multilateral trade negotiations will soon begin in the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade. In addition, if approved by the General Assembly, the Committee of the Whole will begin consultations in January on the most effective way of conducting a new round of global negotiations. The special session next year will consider the international development strategy and decide on the new round of global negotiations. In 1981, the United Nations will hold the important Conference on New and Renewable Energy.

Our full calendar is a positive sign that the international community recognizes the urgency of dealing with the global issues.

The following story, told to me by a South American diplomat, makes a point we should ponder in our work. He said a college professor established a model farm in a remote rural area of his country. The local farmers were astounded by the excellent crops that resulted from his new, innovative agricultural methods. One day the professor announced that he was going to train his horse, a fine stallion, to survive without food or water. Even though they were astounded by the plan, in view of his previous record, the farmers thought it might be possible for the professor to succeed. After a week had passed, one of the farmers asked the professor about the progress of his stallion. He replied that the stallion had been learning very rapidly and was on the verge of a breakthrough until— for no apparent reason—it had unexpectedly expired.

Clearly, if we do not act vigorously and with urgency, the international community may fail in meeting the challenges of the global economic issues, to the detriment of all nations.

With the conclusion of our general debate, let us then turn to our work with a spirit of dedication and a determination to make our session productive and meaningful. Let us approach our task in a manner that will insure that our efforts here contribute to concrete progress in dealing with the economic issues of concern to all nations. Unfortunately, we have little time to accomplish all that is before us. For that reason, I will not deal specifically

in these remarks with all of the key items on our agenda; I will put forward the U.S. positions as we come to the individual subjects. My delegation will contribute constructively to our common Herculean task of completing our work in this committee. ■

<sup>1</sup>USUN press release 89.

## Arms Control

by *George M. Seignious II*

*Statement in Committee I (Political and Security) of the U.N. General Assembly on October 18, 1979. Mr. Seignious is Director of the U.S. Arms Control and Disarmament Agency.*<sup>1</sup>

I am pleased to have this opportunity to address the First Committee of the United Nations General Assembly. This is my first visit to the United Nations as Director of the United States Arms Control and Disarmament Agency. I am honored to be here.

The fact that some \$450 billion is spent the world over every year for arms, the fact that 1,000 missile warheads could kill more than 100 million people, the fact that conflict anywhere could result in destruction everywhere—these facts make the pursuit of peace a necessity for all humanity.

The fact that this committee now deals only with disarmament and security, the fact that more nations than ever before are actively participating in the consideration of disarmament issues, the fact that there are some nine international arms control conventions in effect which have been adhered to by most of the nations of the world—these facts testify to a simple conclusion: arms control and disarmament are the province of all nations.

We have an immense task ahead of us. It is difficult enough psychologically for any nation or people to share responsibility for their security with other nations. How much more of a revolution in thinking is required for nations to see security as a function of reducing the very arms that often have been the only means that they have had to insure their security. Arms control, in short, does not come naturally, and

any progress—although it may fall short of our hopes—should be welcomed as a step toward security through restraint of arms and as a step away from the tradition of security only through arms.

Because so many challenges remain, progress should not mean complacency. We cannot be satisfied with the security of the world as it is. The weapons we have within our collective hands are too numerous and too awesome to entrust our common destiny to good fortune and chance. We must actively seek a safer world and never falter in that search.

My government has negotiated and supported two SALT treaties, because we believe that strategic arms limitations that are equitable can enhance the security of all nations. No agreement constructed on unilateral gain or fiat can long endure, even if it were possible to achieve in the first place. Consensus on SALT between two nations, or on any other arms control issues among many nations, is a difficult but unyielding prerequisite for success, for we are dealing with fundamental issues of security and survival.

The process of SALT confirms that serious negotiations, seriously conducted, can move forward provided they do not bear impossible burdens. No arms control talks will succeed if they must right every age-old wrong. And no arms control talks can make progress if political advantage, rather than the enhancement of mutual security, is the principal purpose. My government is firmly committed to arms control agreements based on principles of equity and improved security—for all.

Today, I want to discuss five arms control subjects that I know are of interest to this committee. All of them demonstrate that our task ahead is not without challenge as it is also not without hope.

### SALT II Treaty

I want to begin with the new agreement—SALT II—to limit strategic offensive nuclear arms. I have said over and over to my fellow citizens that SALT II is not the millennium, nor will it stop competition, nor will it guarantee permanent stability. But it is still a remarkable accomplishment.

- The United States and the Soviet Union have established, for the first time, equal ceilings on strategic nuclear forces.

- We have negotiated equal sub-ceilings on strategic systems carrying

multiple independently targetable warheads.

- We have begun the much-desired process of reductions.

- We have taken major steps to control the technological arms race, such as limiting the numbers of warheads allowed on each missile.

- We have broken new ground in verification procedures.

- We have renewed our commitment to the long-term process of strategic arms limitation. In crafting a framework of equality between two different strategic forces, SALT II is an essential bridge to deeper reduction and further qualitative restraints in SALT III.

I want to reaffirm before you the commitment of the United States and President Carter—as expressed in the SALT II agreement itself—to begin negotiations to achieve further limitations and deeper reductions in nuclear arms promptly upon entry into force of SALT II. We take this obligation with the utmost seriousness. It is an obligation between two nations, ar it is an obligation of two nations to all nations.

In this regard, let me state in this forum what President Carter makes clear every day in Washington. The Administration is making strenuous efforts to insure early ratification and entry into force of SALT II.

### Comprehensive Test Ban

I would like to turn now to the subject of the comprehensive nuclear test ban, for no arms control measure has been consistently assigned a high priority in this chamber over many years. Indeed, the very fact that negotiations are underway on such a treaty can be attributed in part to the dedicated efforts by many nations and individuals to build strong international support for such a ban.

That support is well founded. A comprehensive test ban will place an important qualitative constraint on the nuclear arms competition, and it will be an important contribution to the international community's efforts to prevent the spread of nuclear weapons.

The trilateral negotiations are proceeding actively in Geneva. Agreement has already been reached on many of the features of the treaty, including some issues that just a few years ago seemed insurmountable obstacles. Verification of a comprehensive test ban is extremely important. Innovative cooperative measures will be



desired—as both sides have recognized. Work is now continuing on these other aspects. A number of these problems have been less susceptible to prompt solutions than we had hoped. My government continues to place great importance on the conclusion of these negotiations. Success will require hard work. But success, I believe, would be a statement of hope no nation could ignore.

### Chemical Weapons

As with the negotiations for a comprehensive test ban, progress in the talks between the United States and the Soviet Union on chemical weapons cannot be rapid, but it has been substantial. Two-and-a-half months ago, the two nations provided a detailed report on these negotiations to the Committee on Disarmament.

A treaty providing for the elimination of chemical weapons would be a major and far-reaching accomplishment.

- For the first time, an entire class of weapons that has been used in a major conflict would be banned and eliminated.
- The international community would be establishing, and participating in, cooperative measures of verification of great breadth and complexity.
- A technology capable of inflicting widespread and horrible destruction of human life would be safeguarded for peaceful uses.

These are some of the reasons why my government attaches high importance to the chemical weapons negotiations. We fully recognize that many other countries have a direct interest in chemical weapons prohibition. Many nations could produce them on short notice. And all nations that adhere would be affected by the verification procedures that are a necessity if such an agreement is to promote stability and confidence. In this connection, I would like to note that my government is grateful for the important work on verification which is being pursued by a number of countries.

The Committee on Disarmament has a vital role to play in the process of achieving a chemical weapons convention. The United States fully appreciates the importance of that committee's role, and we are giving serious thought to how we can contribute to making the committee's work in this area most effective in advancing the objective we all seek.

The complete prohibition and elimination of chemical weapons has

been an important goal of the international community for many decades, ever since, in the first great world war of this century, these weapons were used on a massive scale. Even though that war is receding in time, I can still remember, as a boy, the vision of men returned home, but gasping for breath forever. That is a vision we should eradicate entirely from the memory of man.

### Radiological Weapons

We could be haunted by another class of weapons never used but with a similarly dreadful potential—radiological weapons. The number of facilities producing radioactive by-products has multiplied manifold in recent years and the accumulation of materials is accelerating.

I am pleased to note that significant progress was achieved this year to deal with such weapons. My nation and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics have presented a joint initiative to the Committee on Disarmament to ban all radiological weapons. The United States hopes that the General Assembly will encourage the Committee on Disarmament to build on this achievement and to elaborate an international convention.

### Nonproliferation Treaty

The August 1980 will mark the date of the second review conference of the Nonproliferation Treaty. The SALT II agreement, with its commitment to continuing the process in SALT III, reflects the determination of the United States and the Soviet Union to fulfill their obligation under Article VI of the Nonproliferation Treaty. My government is deeply conscious of its obligations to the nations party to this treaty which have forsworn nuclear weapons. Their continued restraint, and that of other non-nuclear-weapons states, is essential to preventing a dangerous multiplication of the risk that conflict or miscalculation could lead to nuclear war.

In this regard, the United States welcomes the recent adherence of the nations of Sri Lanka, Indonesia, and Bangladesh.

We can further buttress nonproliferation and nuclear stability by the establishment of nuclear-weapon-free zones. The full realization of a nuclear-weapon-free zone in Latin America is drawing closer. We continue to hope that the necessary steps to bring the treaty of Tlatelolco into force

for all concerned states within the region will be taken in the near future.

Additionally, the United States strongly supports efforts to establish nuclear-weapon-free zones in other regions of the world—in accordance with the criteria which we believe can permit the successful establishment of zones that promote the security of the participants.

The development of effective international arrangements for assuring that nations that forswear nuclear weapons will not be threatened by nuclear attack is an effort which deserves our serious consideration. Such arrangements would help create a climate of confidence and would reduce incentives for additional countries to develop nuclear weapons. The United States would like to reiterate its proposal made last July in the Committee on Disarmament that there be a General Assembly resolution setting forth the various undertakings made by the five nuclear powers to give assurance to non-nuclear-weapons states against the use of nuclear weapons.

In concluding this brief review of the important questions with which this committee is concerned, I am also happy to refer to the progress which has been made on a number of significant and potentially useful studies currently underway, such as the pilot test of a standard format for reporting military budgets, the study on the relationship between disarmament and development, and the study of regional arms control. The United States, for its part, will continue to give these studies wholehearted support. They are investments in the future.

My life has been dedicated to the security of the United States. Yet, I see no greater security for my nation than peace among all nations. We share a common goal—peace with security. For we share, in this nuclear age, a common bond for survival and a common search for the ability of us all to live in a secure world.

We are all involved in an undertaking to shape our destiny. As President Carter said in Vienna: "If we cannot control the power to destroy, we can neither guide our own fate nor preserve our own future." ■

<sup>1</sup>USUN press release 95.

## International Year of the Child

by Jean Young

*Statement to the U.N. General Assembly on October 17, 1979. Mrs. Young is Chairperson of the U.S. National Commission on the International Year of the Child.<sup>1</sup>*

The International Year of the Child (IYC) has been a celebration of the inestimable value of the child in all the countries of the world. Activities associated with the IYC have done much to concentrate the attention of the world's people not only on the importance of children but also on the international obligation to meet perhaps the most pressing and heart-rending need of the day—to improve the lot of suffering children in so many parts of the world and most especially in the developing world. It is thus fully appropriate that this meeting focus on the follow-up to the International Year of the Child and that the follow-up concentrate on methods to improve the situation of children of the world, especially in developing countries.

In his report on the work of the organization, the Secretary General states: "In the International Year of the Child we have been reminded very forcefully of the stark deprivations suffered by children in many parts of the world and we have seen that all too often children are also victims of violations of human rights. It is absolutely intolerable that children should be made to suffer in this manner in our day and age."

It is absolutely intolerable that children should suffer so in our day and age. But they are suffering in varying degrees in all parts of the world.

We in the United States have prided ourselves in caring not only adequately but very well for our children. We provide free education. We have good child labor laws. We have extensive safety regulations to protect them. Good hospitals and clinics exist in all our States. Food is plentiful, and we have a high standard of living as compared with the rest of the world.

Yet, even as a nation of such immense resources, we recognize that there are, indeed, children suffering. There are children in the mountains of Appalachia, in rural areas, in the urban ghettos, on Indian reservations, in Hispanic barrios, and in migrant camps who lack the basic necessities of life. There are other children who do not receive an equal opportunity in this great

nation because of language, race, economic status, or mental or physical handicaps. There are still other children who suffer neglect, abuse, or indifference.

Nevertheless, we recognize that in comparison with the world statistical averages that our children fare very well. But we recognize also that if a single child suffers anywhere in the world, we must be concerned. This is why, in addition to appealing to Americans to understand and resolve the problems of their own children, we have also committed ourselves to reaching out to help the most desperate of the world's children. The National Commission initiated this goal with the theme: "The World's Children—A Joy to Share. A Responsibility to Care."

Through more than 350 non-governmental organizations and 52 States and territories, the commission shared information on the status of refugee children, abandoned children, and children in need in developing nations. This effort has been followed up with fund-raising plans to culminate at Thanksgiving. We will give thanks by giving to children without. In addition to giving funds, we are urging Americans to give programmatic and legislative support to meeting the needs of the world's children.

### Plight of Children

It has been estimated that 55 million children in the world under the age of 15 must work. Millions of children in our world know virtually no childhood at all. They must take on the role of adults in many cases even before they are old enough to begin school. Poverty is the reason for much of this but so also is greed, and it is a problem of the developed countries as well as the developing. Children are employed in hazardous jobs, at hard labor. Many must beg, and many barely into puberty are forced to become prostitutes. In some places, because child labor is cheap, children work at adult jobs while adults are unemployed.

In recent history there have been particularly distressing conditions that have highlighted rather dramatically the deprivation of children. We witnessed the tragedy of children in southern Africa. We saw the heart-rending plight of "boat people" children. We have seen the 9- and 10-year-old children of Northern Ireland and the Middle East brandishing weapons.

Millions of children in our world suffer from malnutrition which hampers their physical and mental development. Many receive little or no education.

Many are homeless and many are without parents.

In some areas where the plight of children is so appallingly bad at the best of times, it has become immeasurably worse as children become the innocent victims of warfare. The world community for years has tried to cope with the suffering of refugee children. Especially in Africa and Asia, extensive efforts have been taken to alleviate the suffering of refugee children, as well as, of course, that of adults. Our own government, as well as the international community, has responded massively to this need and much has been done, although so much more remains to be done. This problem will be before us for the foreseeable future and demands our continuous attention.

### Children of Kampuchea

Even sadder than the tragic plight of refugee children—though a greater sadness than that seems inconceivable—is that of the child victims of war who have yet to be reached by the relief efforts of the international community. The most recent case involves the children of Kampuchea, who represent 45% of that country's population.

Professional relief experts have reported that in that unhappy land, very few children under the age of 5 have survived the famine and associated diseases that have resulted from prolonged warfare; the validity of these observations is supported by the virtual absence of young children among Khmer refugees. The few who do survive the famine and fighting in Kampuchea will undoubtedly bear permanent mental and physical scars as a result of severe malnutrition.

Scientific research has proven conclusively that malnutrition in early childhood is closely related to later developmental disabilities. One recent survey of a Khmer refugee group along the Thai-Khmer border indicated that 96% of the surviving children in that group were suffering from malnutrition. A generation of Khmer may already have been lost, and thousands of older children are likely to perish unless urgent actions are undertaken by the international community.

An international effort to provide relief to Kampuchean civilians is underway. UNICEF has been designated by the Secretary General as the lead agency for the U.N. system in this effort. Together with the International Committee of the Red Cross, UNICEF deserves our particular appreciation for its initiative and perseverance in attempting, under the most difficult con-

ons, to alleviate the suffering of  
 Kapuchean children and mothers as  
 as others in need.

It is the fervent hope of my gov-  
 ernment that as a fitting contribution to  
 the International Year of the Child, all  
 member nations will join in support of  
 this effort to save the children of Kam-  
 puchea and also join in urging all in-  
 volved parties, particularly the parties  
 in the area, to support and cooperate in  
 relief efforts. We trust that this session  
 of the General Assembly will receive a  
 comprehensive report on the status of  
 children in Kampuchea and on the prog-  
 res of efforts to assist them.

Confronted with the appalling situa-  
 tion of so many of the children of the  
 world, we must reject despair and at-  
 tack the problems with resolution. Gov-  
 ernments must do more for the welfare  
 and protection of the children in their  
 jurisdiction and to the extent that they  
 are able to help other governments  
 cope with their problems. UNICEF and  
 other agencies of the U.N. system must  
 continue and expand the work they  
 have been doing. My government  
 urges, for instance, that the Interna-  
 tional Labor Organization will continue  
 to study to seek ways to resolve the  
 complex problem of child labor and that  
 other U.N. agencies and governments  
 cooperate in this vital effort.

The International Year of the Child  
 has done great service in increasing our  
 awareness of the problems of children,  
 and there have been many small suc-  
 cesses in meeting those needs. All those  
 associated with its conception and im-  
 plementation deserve our gratitude.  
 But this increased awareness also has  
 brought increased determination to  
 deal with the demands of the situation  
 demonstrated by the Secretary Gen-  
 eral's commendable compilation of spe-  
 cial messages on the IYC by heads of  
 State or government. It is well to re-  
 member in the face of intolerable  
 tragedy that improvement is possible  
 and that the determination to improve  
 must prevail.

Special credit to the success of the  
 IYC must go to UNICEF and the IYC  
 Secretariat for their excellent work in  
 involving all the countries of the world  
 in the year. My special admiration goes  
 to Dr. Estefania Aldaba-Lim, the Sec-  
 retary General's special representative  
 for the IYC, for her skill in stirring the  
 imagination and participation of so  
 many countries.

The Government and the people of  
 the United States were among those  
 who responded enthusiastically to these  
 efforts. In his message to the Secretary  
 General, President Carter said:  
 "Working through UNICEF and other

United Nations agencies and through  
 the leaders of other nations, I think we  
 can enhance the opportunity for better  
 clothing, housing, food, medical care,  
 education and the protection against  
 suffering on the part of children of all  
 nations. So I am very eager to be a part  
 of it. It is a sobering prospect to know  
 that perhaps once in a lifetime we have  
 an opportunity to focus attention on  
 such a neglected group in the world's  
 population."

### U.S. National Commission Activities

The President appointed a National  
 Commission for the International Year  
 of the Child and did me the honor of  
 asking me to be its Chairperson. Throughout this year, the commission  
 has initiated and conducted a dialogue  
 for the purpose of increasing public  
 awareness of the special needs of chil-  
 dren in such areas as health, nutrition,  
 education, justice, recreation, and the  
 arts. In addition, we dealt with equal  
 opportunity, the impact of media on  
 children, and the needs of children  
 around the world.

Because of this effort many people  
 learned for the first time that many  
 among the one-third of our population  
 who are children are inadequately  
 provided for in these areas. Many were  
 shocked to learn that 17 million children  
 in the United States do not have an  
 adequate standard of living. Many of  
 them receive inadequate nutrition,  
 medical care, and educational opportu-  
 nity. Many, and not necessarily the  
 poor, are denied the warmth and secu-  
 rity of a loving home. In some of our  
 large cities, juvenile crime and juvenile  
 exploitation are serious problems.

The response to the commission's  
 activities from the public, from gov-  
 ernments at the municipal and State  
 levels, from the interagency committee  
 at the Federal level, and from non-  
 government organizations of many  
 kinds was enthusiastic. Activities were  
 far too numerous to list in this speech,  
 let alone describe. However, a detailed  
 description is contained in the commis-  
 sion's report to the General Assembly.  
 I will say just a few words about how  
 the National Commission approached  
 its work.

The commission set itself the fol-  
 lowing goals:

- To stimulate a national dialogue  
 on issues facing children, both at home  
 and abroad and thus create a broad-  
 based support group concerned and  
 knowledgeable about children and their  
 problems;

- To form lasting coalitions of con-  
 cerned citizens at the local, State, and  
 national levels to serve as continuing  
 advocates for children's needs, both at  
 home and abroad long after 1979;

- To motivate people from all walks  
 of life—private as well as public organi-  
 zations, parents as well as children, in-  
 dividuals as well as groups, government  
 agencies as well as charitable institu-  
 tions, organized labor as well as  
 corporations—and at all levels from the  
 local to the national to evaluate the  
 needs of children in their communities  
 and take concrete steps toward meeting  
 these needs;

- To provide a celebratory oppor-  
 tunity for children, families, and com-  
 munities to come together in a joyful  
 event;

- To persuade legislative bodies to  
 take legislative actions and governmen-  
 tal agencies to review and refine regu-  
 lations and policies that affect the  
 well-being of children and their  
 families;

- To discover the concerns, feel-  
 ings, and aspirations for children from  
 all across our country, including those  
 of children themselves; and

- To reach out beyond our own  
 country for information exchange and  
 cooperation in confronting common  
 problems.

In each of these goals we have re-  
 ceived a very positive response from  
 the American people. We have begun to  
 see progress in all areas. We look for  
 this momentum to be sustained through  
 existing organizations and governmen-  
 tal channels. In light of this we are  
 presenting to our President not a final  
 report but a "challenge report"—a  
 challenge to our country to continue the  
 work begun on behalf of children here  
 and around the world.

The International Year of the Child  
 will soon be behind us and the matter at  
 hand is the follow-up to the year. The  
 U.S. Government supports a vigorous  
 follow-up to the accomplishments of  
 this year. We hope that the General  
 Assembly will make a strong statement  
 on the continuing need to focus on chil-  
 dren's welfare as a major element of  
 government policies in all countries.  
 We believe the IYC has demonstrated  
 that its focus on children can serve as  
 an organizing principle to mobilize gov-  
 ernment actions as well as community  
 support and participation for develop-  
 ment activities benefiting the country  
 as a whole. We hope that UNICEF at  
 its next executive board session will  
 recommend steps to be taken to con-  
 tinue the momentum that has been  
 created. We agree with the recommen-



## Central America at the Crossroads

by Viron P. Vaky

*Statement before the Subcommittee on Inter-American Affairs of the House Foreign Affairs Committee on September 11, 1979. Mr. Vaky is Assistant Secretary for Inter-American Affairs.<sup>1</sup>*

I welcome the opportunity to meet with you today to discuss the situation in Central America. I would like to consider first the overall Central American scene, then the various national contexts and regional aspects, and conclude by reviewing our policy response.

### OVERVIEW

Much of Central America—particularly the northern tier—is gripped by a polarizing dynamic of pressure for change, terrorism, and potential radicalization. These wrenching instabilities are rooted in basic underlying structural problems and vulnerabilities. The impact of recent events in Nicaragua is assuredly a factor in the internal politics of all countries in Central America. But even without Nicaragua the situation would be volatile.

The nations of the region face a number of common, interrelated social and economic problems, most of which produce direct pressures for political and systemic change.

- With the exception of Costa Rica, and to some extent Panama, societies in the region are characterized by deep class and, in some cases, ethnic divisions, endemic violence, political atomization, and distrust. Inequalities of opportunity mark the social, political, and class structures in varying degrees. The demands of new middle class entrepreneurs and professionals—an educated, informed, articulate, and generally ambitious group—for a greater national role and share of political power have frequently not been accommodated. The minimal needs of workers and peasants, whose ranks have been swollen by the population explosion, have also remained unmet in varying degree. Growing social tensions and defeated aspirations have, therefore, become natural breeding grounds for alienation, opposition, and violence.

- With the possible exception of Costa Rica and Panama, virtually all of these countries are characterized by unequal and inequitable economic growth, national poverty, and maldis-

tribution of income. While statistically many of these nations show respectable growth, the benefits of progress have, in most cases, accrued to traditional elites; the masses of the people find their situation little changed. Malnutrition and illiteracy rates remain high among the poor majority. Unemployment and underemployment are high and growing.

- Again with the exception of Costa Rica, and to some degree Panama—although the system there is not yet fully open—political institutions have, in the past, tended to be authoritarian and resistant to change. As pressures build up, governments have tended to rely on repression of dissent. Movements expressing pressures for modernization or more basic demands for equity have too often been frustrated by electoral manipulation and violence, censorship of the media, outlawing of political parties, and suspension of constitutional guarantees. Where legitimate channels of redress are choked off, the political situation tends to polarize to the extremes and the likelihood of peaceful evolution and change is reduced.

## Political Parties and Groups in Central America

### EL SALVADOR

#### Political Parties and Groups

- National Conciliation Party (*Partido de Conciliación Nacional*—PCN). The official party; backs pro-government candidate but has few other functions.

- Nationalist Democratic Organization (ORDEN). A rural, military-sanctioned civilian force with an estimated strength of about 30,000. It is ostensibly dedicated to civic education and law enforcement but is occasionally used in political activity. Owing to its record of alleged human rights violations, ORDEN has become a major target of the government's critics at home and abroad.

- United National Opposition (*Unión Nacional Opositora*—UNO). Now shaky opposition coalition which includes:

- Christian Democratic Party (*Partido Demócrata Cristiano*—PDC). The largest opposition party; left-of-center.

- National Revolutionary Movement (*Movimiento Nacional*)

dation of UNICEF that we should continue to place emphasis on providing basic services to the poorest children in the low income countries.

UNICEF has performed admirably as the lead agency for the International Year of the Child. My government looks forward to continued cooperation with UNICEF in the lead agency role as we move into the follow-up phase. At the same time, we urge other U.N. agencies to maintain an awareness of the needs of children in all of their programming.

Let me reiterate our concern about the intolerable situation for many of the children of the world and particularly about the desperate need to save the children of Kampuchea. The governments of the world, together with international organizations, have the ability to vastly improve this situation. My government has supported and will support efforts toward this end. We urge other governments to continue to support and cooperate with these efforts so that children everywhere can have the love and care that they need and which the world requires to advance the common humanity of us all. ■

<sup>1</sup>USUN press release 93.

Institutions of all kinds—from order and social services to press and political parties—are being undermined by socioeconomic strains, human rights violations, and terrorism. These dynamics in turn produce obsession with survival and a temptation to blame external causes for the region's difficulties.

Economic stress in the form of inflation, fluctuating commodity prices, and recession have decreased incomes and lessened the ability of governments to meet popular needs. Petroleum costs have quadrupled, with increasingly severe cumulative effects.

New political lines and new economic challenges have been drawn in the region. Sandinista Nicaragua, Costa Rica, and Panama will not cooperate easily with the passionately nationalist governments of the northern tier (yet if communication is imperfect, mutual tensions will grow, and the cooperation necessary to sustain a regional economy and Central American common market will be limited). Fortunately, indications are that these potential costs are recognized, and tentative but significant efforts at "bridge-building" are in train among national actors.

In sum, deep grievances; legitimate needs for reform, growth, and modernization; and basic demands for equity are all coursing through the region. These give rise to equally deep pressures for political and systemic change. As in other parts of the world, those aspirations and demands are so fundamental that change cannot be avoided. Defense of the status quo cannot prevent it or cap instability for long; it can only radicalize the dynamics at work.

A complicating factor is that Castroist/Marxist and extreme insurgent groups have seized upon these legitimate aspirations and unstable situations to advance their own objectives. Thereby, they may exacerbate the tensions and the violence, but they do not cause them. The upsurge of terrorism and subversion unfortunately often confuses perception of the realities and strengthens tendencies by those benefiting from the status quo to misidentify the issues and focus on insurgency rather than on the underlying core problems.

If there is any one central motif that characterizes Central America today, it is this intense—and essentially inevitable—pressure for change which has swept into the region. The central

issue, in turn, is not whether change is to occur but whether that change is to be violent and radical—or peaceful and evolutionary and preserving individual rights and democratic values.

## THE NATIONAL CONTEXTS

The trends, problems, and vulnerabilities described above come together in different, even idiosyncratic, ways in individual countries.

Let me first deal with Nicaragua, whose revolution cannot help but affect its neighbors' political future. Then the "south"—Panama and Costa Rica, each different but representing progressive and moderate forces for change in Central America. Finally, the "northern tier"—Honduras, El Salvador, and Guatemala, now led by conservative establishments where the winds of change are blowing the hardest.

### Impact of Nicaragua

For both Latin America and the United States, Nicaragua now presents a critical challenge and a major opportunity. The course of events will influence prospects for democracy else-

*Revolucionario*—MNR). Small, left-of-center party associated with Social Democratic circles.  
National Democratic Union (*Union Democrata Nacional*—UDN). Communist influenced party often considered a legal front.  
Salvadoran Popular Party (*Partido Popular Salvadoreño*—PPS). Small, right-wing party.

### Legal Groups

Popular Revolutionary Bloc (*Bloque Popular Revolucionario*—BPR). A coalition of worker, student, and peasant groups having a membership of 60,000–80,000, largely directed or controlled by the FPL (see below); beneficiary of the political transition.  
The United Popular Action Front (*Frente de Accion Popular Unido*—FAPU). A mass front group controlled by the FPL; estimated 8,000–15,000 members.  
Farabundo Marti Popular Liberation Front (*Fuerzas Populares de Liberacion*—FPL). The strongest guerrilla group professing a revolutionary Marxist ideology; probably numbers about 800.  
Armed Forces of National Resistance (*Fuerzas Armadas de Resistencia Nacional*—FARN). Second most important guerrilla group; about 600 strong.  
Popular Revolutionary Army (*Ejercito Revolucionario del Pueblo*—ERP). A major terrorist group.

## GUATEMALA

### Political Parties and Groups

- National Liberation Movement (*Movimiento de Liberacion Nacional*—MLN). Ultraconservative, linked to rightest terrorist groups; now in opposition, controls more congressional seats than any other party.
- National Action and Reconstruction Party (*Partido de Accion y Reconstruccion Nacional*—PARN). Small, conservative party of former Chief of State Peralta Azurdia.
- Institutional Democratic Party (*Partido Institucional Democratico*—PID). Small, conservative party.
- Revolutionary Party (*Partido Revolucionario*—PR). The most powerful party in the government. Originally embracing all elements of the left, it is now centrist, liberal, and mildly nationalist.
- United Revolutionary Front (*Frente Unido de la Revolucion*—FUR). Leftwing. Founded by Vice President Villagrán Kramer. Formerly led by Manuel Colom Argueta.
- Christian Democratic Party (*Partido Democratica Cristiano*—PDC). Liberal, reformist.

### Illegal Groups

- Guatemalan Labor Party (*Partido Guatemalteco de los Trabajadores*—PGT). Communist-led, small; has engaged in some guerrilla actions.
- Rebel Armed Forces (*Fuerzas Armadas Rebeldes*—FAR). Left terrorist group.
- Guerrilla Army of the Poor (*Ejercito Guerrillero de los Pobres*—EGP). Most potent insurgent force, formed in 1974; about 300 members.
- Guatemalan Workers Militia (*Milicias Obreras Guatemaltecas*—MOG). Rightwing counterterrorist group.
- Secret Anti-Communist Army (*Ejercito Secreto Anticomunista*—EST). Rightwing counterterrorist group.

## HONDURAS

- Nationalist Party (*Partido Nacionalista de Honduras*—PNH). Traditional, conservative party; founded in 1911 but with roots in the old liberal-conservative division that characterized Central American political life in the last century.
- Liberal Party (*Partido Liberal de Honduras*—PLH). Traditional liberal party, founded in 1870; now moderately reformist.
- Innovation and Unity Party (*Partido de Inovacion y Unidad*—PINU). Small, centrist; lacks historical base of two major parties.

## Western Hemisphere

where and have an important impact on U.S.-Latin American relations.

The new Government of National Reconstruction (GNR) took office July 20 in a country left without functioning political, economic, or security institutions. Almost half of Nicaragua's population was displaced, and the country is now struggling with massive problems of hunger and unemployment. The loss of life and physical destruction were staggering. The United Nations has reported that 45,000 persons were killed, 160,000 wounded, and 40,000 orphaned, while Agency for International Development (AID) figures indicate some 1 million in need of food and 250,000 in need of shelter. Economic losses approach \$2 billion. The Nicaraguan economy is completely disrupted.

Initially formed in exile, the new Nicaraguan Government is a coalition comprised of former guerrilla and civic leaders. It consists of a five-member junta as the executive authority, a 19-member Cabinet, and a 33-member National Council still in the process of formation. The Sandinista National Directorate, made up of guerrilla leaders, some with close ties to Cuba, wields major influence.

Since the GNR formally took office July 20, the following have become clear.

- Christian Democrat Party (*Partido Cristiano Democrático*—PCD). Organized in 1962 but not yet accorded legal recognition by the government. Associated with a Christian Democratic trade union confederation (CGT) and a Christian Democratic peasant association (UNC).

- Communist Party of Honduras (*Partido Comunista de Honduras*—PCH). Soft-line Communist Party; outlawed since 1963. Funded largely by the Soviets. Negligible electoral strength; has pro-Soviet and pro-Chinese factions.

### COSTA RICA

- Unity Party (*Partido Unidad*—PN). Government coalition; constituent groups are:

Democratic Renovation Party (*Partido de Renovación Democrática*). President Carazo's party.

Calderonista Republican Party (*Partido Republicano Calderonista*). Traditional conservative party originally founded by Ramon Calderon; now led by Foreign Minister.

Christian Democratic Party (*Partido Democrático Cristiano*).

Popular Union (*Unión Popular*). Small, rightwing group.

- National Liberation Party (*Partido de Liberación Nacional*—PLN). Founded by

- Nicaragua's humanitarian and reconstruction needs are immediate and too great to be met by Nicaraguans alone.

- Administrative confusion and improvisation remain widespread, but the change of government is popularly accepted, and there is definite movement toward restoration of public order.

- The GNR has shown generally moderate, pluralistic tendencies in its initial policies. It is not distinguishably Marxist or Cuban in orientation, although Marxist figures are present in key positions. It has restrained reprisals, promulgated a decree guaranteeing individual rights, and permitted an independent press and radio. It has promised free elections. In foreign affairs the GNR has indicated a desire for friendly relations with all countries including their northern neighbors. Nicaraguan leaders have denied any intention of "exporting revolution."

- Nevertheless, the political situation remains very fluid, with heterogeneity, confusion, and flux in the power dynamics. The country's political and economic future thus remain unclear, and many outcomes or scenarios are still possible within the framework of the Sandinista revolution.

Jose Figueres. Reformist, non-Marxist.

- United People (*Pueblo Unido*). Coalition of leftwing groups. Components are:

Popular Vanguard Party. Orthodox Communist.

*Partido de Accion Socialista*. Communist splinter group.

*Partido Obrero*. Small radical group linked to Sandinista movement.

*Frente Popular*. Small, leftist group.

### PANAMA

Parties are officially suspended. The suspension was relaxed prior to the 1978 elections, but no candidates were permitted to run on party tickets. Main parties are:

- *Partido Panamenista*. One of two major pre-1969 parties (the other being the PLN). Led by the charismatic former President Arnulfo Arias.

- *Partido Liberal Nacional*. Stems from the Colombian Liberal Party. Led by David Samudio.

- *Partido Revolucionario Democrático*. Left-of-center Torrijista party. Organized in 1978.

Other opposition parties are:

- *Partido Democrata Cristiano*

- *Movimiento Independiente Democrático*

- *Partido del Pueblo de Panama*. The Communist Party. ■

The central issue in the Nicaragua situation, therefore—whether in terms of its internal system, its relations to Cuba, its attitude toward its neighbors—is the extent to which a moderate, pluralistic, and equitable democratic order can emerge in a country with few democratic traditions and whose new and inexperienced leaders could resort to authoritarianism to cope with the enormous tasks facing them.

The course of the Nicaraguan revolution will thus depend in part on how the United States perceived it and relates to it. Indeed, Nicaragua's future internal policies and relationships with the outside world will, in fact, be determined by those Nicaraguans who best define and meet the country's needs during the reconstruction period. The individual leaders who do so will necessarily have outside contacts. But who they will be and the terms on which they relate to each other and to outsiders will not be predetermined by the past guerrilla war against Somoza. It will depend on the reconstruction of Nicaragua from that war.

### The "South"

Costa Rica has long had an excellent functioning democracy, and Panama has been moving toward a more open political system. Economic and social problems exist but the process of change and accommodation functions sufficiently well to keep the internal situation fairly stable.

Both countries have established close and cooperative relationships with the Nicaraguan Government. Having supported the Sandinista cause, they are not disposed to see the Nicaragua revolution turn out "radical." The leaders of these countries will continue to use their influence to urge moderation. Both countries have, relative to their resources and capacities, extended significant amounts of technical and material assistance to Nicaragua.

**Panama.** U.S. interests in Panama, though more extensive than the presence of the Panama Canal, revolve primarily around the canal. The Panama Canal treaties of 1977 enter into force on October 1. With that date approaching very fast, we are trying to insure the continued smooth and orderly functioning of the canal under the new treaty relationships with Panama. For this reason, I hope that the Senate and the House will proceed promptly to enact the implementing legislation necessary to exercise our responsibilities under the treaty.



Panama has been relatively stable since the 1968 coup that deposed President Arnulfo Arias. We have expressed concern about human rights conditions in the past. Constitutional reforms and other measures taken since 1977 have provided for movement toward a more free and democratic political system and more engagement of the people in reform measures and in developmental projects. Although opposition parties are pushing for more and faster political reforms, we do not see at this time a real threat to the civilian government of President Royo.

Panama's current economic situations are difficult. Problems stem largely from the same factors that are affecting the United States—inflation and energy imports. Economic pressures and issues have caused disaffection with the government and will continue to do so until the situation eases through new investment, improved official economic management, and a possible increase in confidence when the treaties enter into force.

Some 10 opposition parties have formed a National Opposition Front for the purpose of seeking prompt reforms, particularly the holding of early elections for a new government. The two major participants in the front—the Communists, headed by Arnulfo Arias, and the Liberals—have no foreign links and are themselves often divided over tactics. The smaller Christian Democratic Party is linked to the Christian Democratic movement in Latin America and Western Europe.

**Costa Rica.** Costa Rica continues to enjoy a stable democratic political system. Strong democratic traditions have served to give the country an outstanding human rights record. Freedom to participate in the political process is provided for in the constitution and reflected in practice. Elections are free, fair, and highly competitive.

Normally one of the best managed economies in the region, Costa Rica is experiencing internal stresses stimulated by oil price increases, internal economic difficulties, and the spillover of oil from neighboring Nicaragua. The security situation is stable. Our bilateral relations with Costa Rica are close and cordial. Problems are dealt with in a friendly, straightforward, and pragmatic manner.

#### "Northern Tier"

The Governments of El Salvador, Guatemala, and Honduras tend to see the world through a different lens than is used in the "south." They are app-

rehensive over the Nicaraguan revolution and what its impact will be. Anxiety over their future pervades these governments, which expect to have to contend with a new rash of insurgency.

Although circumstances vary among them, all three societies are relatively closed. Political systems and processes are relatively restricted. Economic development is at varying levels, but a small elite is the main beneficiary in each country, and opportunities for upward mobility remain limited. The incidents of violence, repression, and human rights violations are high in Guatemala and El Salvador.

With limited channels of redress or free political flow, dissent tends to back up into pressure and instability. Political and social tensions, instabilities, and polarization are considerably higher here than in the rest of the region, although domestic circumstances vary. El Salvador is the most volatile, given conflict between activated and polarized political and social groups, while Honduras is the most tranquil with optimistic prospects for social and political modernization.

**El Salvador.** El Salvador—the smallest and most densely populated country in Central America—presents a classic setting for social and political unrest. Its population density—at 565 persons per square mile—is the highest of any country in the Western Hemisphere. Population growth of 3.2% and agricultural land pressures have pushed the unemployment-underemployment rate above 30%. New jobs in industry absorb less than one-sixth of labor force entrants, and agriculture provides jobs for only one-half of new job seekers. Many Salvadorans, faced with poverty and lack of opportunity, have chosen to emigrate.

The export-oriented economy is characterized by a highly skewed distribution of income, wealth, and land. In agriculture, for example, 2% of the population owns almost 60% of the land. A small oligarchy controls much of industry and agriculture and has great influence on the quasimilitary government. The class structure is one of the most rigid in Latin America. Human rights violations have been serious, as noted in the Department's report on the human rights situation submitted to the Congress last January.

Under a constitutional system in place since 1962, military candidates have been regularly elected to the presidency under the banner of the official *Partido de Conciliación Nacional*.

The political system has not accommodated dissent and demands for change well.

Political, economic, and social rigidities under successive regimes have not allowed a sufficient outlet for rising frustration and dissatisfaction. This atmosphere has spawned a dramatic increase in leftist terrorism, and terrorist movements have flourished, their actions accelerating a drift toward revolutionary violence.

The country has thus been caught in a chronic national crisis; antigovernment activity is rampant, often begetting violence, and trust is lacking on all sides. In these circumstances polarization is far advanced, and the prospects for avoiding insurrectional violence are rapidly dimming.

Fortunately, however, there are signs that President Romero, the moderate opposition, and the private sector are crucially aware of this spiraling polarization and some evidence of a desire to find some reconciliation. In mid-August President Romero announced a series of significant electoral measures, which if they can be effectively implemented, hopefully would go far to end the spiraling violence, frustration, and polarization. Halting human rights abuses against the integrity of the person will also be crucial to allowing an atmosphere to develop which will permit these reforms a realistic chance of success.

President Romero's commitment to free municipal and legislative elections in March 1980 and to measures to reform and open up the electoral system is particularly encouraging. He also invited all political exiles to return, has asked the Organization of American States (OAS) for observers and advisors to assist in electoral reform, and has invited the International Red Cross to visit the prisons to judge conditions there.

**Guatemala.** Guatemala is the most populous and the most economically significant country in Central America. The nation's population is divided into two distinct ethnic groups, each with its own languages and culture. The Indians, embracing 20 distinct indigenous tongues, make up 40% of the total population and remain both physically and culturally separate from the larger Spanish-speaking group. The urban population growth rate of 4.4% is among the region's fastest. Even so, rural areas still account for over 60% of the population.

The economy is largely agrarian, with agriculture employing 55% of the labor force and contributing a little

more than one-fourth of GDP. Alongside the agricultural base is a developed manufacturing sector—the largest in the region. Although manufactured exports account for less than one-third of foreign sales, it is the most dynamic sector in terms of employment and growth.

Benefits of Guatemala's generally solid economic performance have been unevenly distributed. For three-fourths of the population, annual per capita income is still less than one-half of the national average. Neither the rural poor nor labor have proportionately benefited from growth in the agricultural and manufacturing sectors. Widespread poverty and a major need for land reform are probably among the major factors contributing to instability and political violence.

Politically, Guatemalan society is polarized and has been for many years. Violence is widespread and virtually institutionalized. Subversive groups of the extreme left are capable of terrorist operations; the extreme right is similarly organized with their own terrorist organizations. Reciprocal acts of terrorism have cycled through Guatemalan society for many years. The list of assassinated political reformists is long, as is the list of government officials who have been assassinated by leftwing terrorists.

While presidential succession takes place with regularity every 4 years, the political process is relatively closed. The political opposition is divided. New parties of the right and center left have been intimidated by the assassination of their most prominent leaders. The labor movement is relatively weak. Human rights violations have been described in the Department's report to the Congress.

While enjoying something of a resurgence since being decimated in the early 1970's, leftist guerrilla groups are relatively weak. They are isolated from the large but unassimilated Indian population in rural areas and out-gunned in the cities. Moreover, they lack broad-based front groups like El Salvador's Popular Revolutionary Bloc to organize and direct popular dissent.

Guatemala thus suffers similar socioeconomic imbalances and political polarization as its neighbors, but the conflicts have not yet reached the same degree of intensity as in El Salvador.

**Honduras.** Honduras is the poorest of the Central American countries, but at the same time it suffers from far less internal polarization and enjoys greater domestic calm than other countries in the region. Class differences are far

less marked and rigid, and wealth is considerably more evenly distributed than in its northern tier neighbors. Although Honduras has a high population growth, it remains comparatively underpopulated with fewer people and five times the land area of neighboring El Salvador. Land is relatively abundant and fairly evenly distributed.

The current military government has experienced a general continuity since December 1972 when a Superior Defense Council took power from the elected Nationalist Party president. Admittedly de facto, the government is committed to a return to constitutional rule beginning with elections for a constituent assembly in April 1980.

The government, while ruling as a de facto regime, is generally not repressive. Human rights performance and civil liberties are reasonably good. The government, and the military institutions are much more sensitive to popular aspirations and pressures than in the other countries, and the government is committed to development programs aimed at bettering the lot of the ordinary citizen, especially in the rural areas.

Honduras has no current guerrilla problem, and it faces the least serious threat to stability from internally generated insurgent action, at least in the short term. Several factors have helped insulate Honduras from an insurgent threat—relatively benign military rule, a favorable land-labor ratio, and an economic distribution pattern that has avoided the sharp economic polarization and deep gaps between rich and poor that exist, for example, in El Salvador.

### EXTERNAL FACTORS

#### Cuba

The most important single factor governing possible Cuban involvement in subversive activities in the northern tier will be its perception of opportunities.

Profiting from its experience in the 1960's, Cuba has generally followed a policy of cultivating and maintaining contact with leftist rebel movements; in some cases providing subsistence-level support, safehaven as needed, and various types of training; urging disparate opposition forces to unite; counseling recipients of their aid to expand grassroots support; and waiting for the development of objective conditions propitious for additional support.

Given events in Nicaragua, Cuba is certain to increase its attention to Central America. Cuba, however, may now seek a period of assessment and digestion of the results of Nicaragua. Thus, we should not be surprised if the Castro regime carefully weighs pros and cons of each situation as it arises and, rather than trying to force events to happen, should decide to react to events as they occur. In assessing opportunities Castro is very likely to consider such factors as the internal dynamism in each country, the U.S. reaction, the impact on members of the nonaligned movement, the degree of support or tolerance from other Latin American countries, the complexities of logistical problems, the extent of Cuban influence with the insurgent groups, and, ultimately, the chances of success.

The major question in the minds of interested neighbors is what kind of ultimate relationship with Cuba Nicaragua will develop. While Havana certainly has the gratitude of the Sandinista leadership for the assistance it provided, and considerable ties with key figures in the revolution, it is not automatic that—whatever Havana's intentions—the interests of the Sandinistas as the Government of Nicaragua will become identical with those of Cuba. There is, indeed, every reason to suppose that Nicaraguans would prefer independent development.

Certainly there are significant forces at work to produce something better than a worst-case model in Nicaragua. Practical considerations may work to constrain radical impulses within the Sandinista movement: a period of relative calm needed to rehabilitate the country; the diplomatic shelter that a broad-based policy affords in contrast to a provocatively Communist tilt; the potential for growing power and authority of moderate elements in the government and the society; and the support and cooperation of non-Communist countries and international financial institutions in and outside of Latin America.

#### Other Latin American Countries

Moderate governments of Latin America, especially the Andean group, have shown a keen interest in Central America. Venezuela, particularly, has chosen to play an active role of assistance and contact with these governments, and an official Venezuelan mission recently visited the northern tier countries. Mexico, too, has a major interest in developments in this geographically close region.

These governments have indicated a goal of fostering peaceful change in the region generally and supporting pluralism in Nicaraguan domestic and foreign policies. It can be expected that these nations will play an increasingly significant and constructive role.

## POLICY RESPONSES

Central America's geographic proximity creates special U.S. interests in Central American peace, prosperity, and cooperation, enhanced by the sympathy from deep past involvement. Interests embrace:

The existence of reasonably stable and friendly governments free from domination by outside powers;

Security against use of the region for purposes hostile to us;

Human rights, including the development of viable democratic institutions and

Economic and social development through domestic reform and increased regional cooperation and integration.

Given the volatile circumstances and vulnerabilities described, the instability of change, and the dangers of securitization and radicalization, we do hope to see those vulnerabilities

reduced by peaceful change consistent with individual liberties and democratic values and more open, pluralistic, and equitable societies.

To help assure peaceful and evolutionary change, we want to work with the nations of Central America and with other hemisphere countries to achieve:

- An evolution toward more open, pluralistic political systems, maintaining contact with all elements in Central America, including labor and youth organizations, the media, private sector groups, and public officials;

- Social and economic development through bilateral and multilateral assistance programs;

- Positive relationships with the region's governments on a basis of nonintervention, equality, and respect for human rights; and

- Regional cooperation in dealing with common economic problems.

Let me now summarize our major policy lines toward Nicaragua and the countries of the northern tier.

## Economic Cooperation, Migration

In spite of very real progress in the early years the integration movement is in considerable disarray. Currently new large-scale opportunities for import substitution are limited. Political problems abound, especially over future progress for economic integration is rare. The obstacles to major progress include:

- The current situation in Nicaragua is a major political and economic impact, changes from interrupted transportation between Costa Rica and the rest of Central America to problems due to instability and border closings;

- The deteriorating security situation in El Salvador and Guatemala;

- The longstanding dispute between El Salvador and Honduras that has yet to be resolved;

- The failure to obtain any agreement to restructure a substitute for the Common Market treaty which expires in 1982.

The Honduras position that it has not found equivalent benefits from the Common Market and the unwillingness to date of other countries to agree to structural

changes to insure that Central America's only less developed country receives relatively favorable treatment.

Nevertheless there is still enough interest in the Common Market either because of its perceived benefits or because of belief in a regional commitment to keep its institutions and arrangements functioning even when ad hoc arrangements are required.

The strength of the historical, social, and psychological basis for continued regional cooperation in the area does not rest solely on the progress of economic integration. The realization that Central America was one country before 1823; similar legal codes; similar climate; production of coffee, sugar, and cotton; good transportation and communications; intermarriage among families; easy movement of people within the region; similar cultures; same language; and country sizes (small) all lead to a sense of community within the region which permitted the Central American Common Market experiment and holds together a cooperative structure today.

After over a decade of relatively rapid economic growth, per capita incomes for the countries of the region have risen substantially. There is a considerable variance in per capita incomes, however, ranging from the low in Honduras of \$400 to the middle income levels of \$1,100+ in Panama and Costa Rica.

## Nicaragua

We seek to develop positive relationships with the Government of National Reconstruction on the basis of nonintervention, equality, and mutual respect. I am confident that our new relationships will reflect efforts to foster respect for human rights and democracy.

We support a humane and pluralistic evolution, based on Nicaragua's own needs, without outside intervention from anyone. We plan to maintain contact with all elements in Nicaragua, including the church, the media, and the private sector, as well as public officials.

We will encourage Nicaragua and its neighbors to build bridges, to dampen tensions, to remove the possibility of involvement in each other's domestic political affairs, and to promote regional cooperation and security.

We are already helping alleviate human suffering and hope to assist concretely in the massive reconstruction task facing that nation, thus insuring the best possible climate for the establishment of a normal democratic order with respect for human rights.

We plan to cooperate with other nations and public and private institutions in assisting Nicaragua's economic recovery and progress.

While still agriculturally based, the economies of the Central American countries have become more diversified and a recent study by the Regional Office for Central America and Panama and the Secretariat for Central American Integration attributes the creation of over 150,000 jobs in the modern sector to the effects of the economic integration movement. Even in the face of great difficulty, intraregional trade has grown to about \$1 billion annually.

Nontraditional exports are increasing due at least in part to the period of protection provided under the Common Market arrangements. Whether the Common Market can be rejuvenated depends largely on whether it can become a means for cooperation in producing exports from the Common Market to other parts of the world, particularly Europe and Japan in addition to the United States. Since the easy opportunities for import substitution have been seized, growth within the market is expected to be only that induced by the growth of the constituent countries. Reform of industrialization and export incentives in the region may be easier to bring about on a group basis than by the individual countries acting alone.

## Regional Institutions

Some regional institutions are technically strong although financial support from the countries in the area is often disap-



## El Salvador

We are encouraging the government and other democratic elements in the very delicate political transition process now underway in El Salvador. This is of critical importance to the future of El Salvador. Putting an end to human rights violations of the integrity of the person is crucial to the overall atmosphere in the country.

We believe the establishment of a real and credible electoral process, leading to free municipal/legislative elections in March 1980, is crucial to El Salvador's peaceful evolution and to arresting the critical polarization and frustration that can lead almost certainly to violent confrontation between right and left.

President Romero's August 1979 proposals offer a constructive and hopeful beginning. They represent significant promises that now must be given life by both government and opposition in restoring trust and agreeing to program specifics. The concrete steps already taken are encouraging, but the overall assessment of the situation is uncertain.

We will support real and serious reform with appropriate cooperation and assistance.

pointing. The Common Market Secretariat (SIECA) has suffered from insufficient backing for its proposals by the Ministers of Economy. The impact of the new Secretary General remains to be seen. The Central American Bank for Economic Integration (CABEI) is now an established lending institution which has had real success in financing regional infrastructure projects, particularly highways and telecommunications.

There are several institutions, such as the Center for Tropical Agricultural Research (CATIE), the Nutrition Institute for Central America and Panama (INCAP), and the Central America Institute of Research and Industrial Technology (ICAITI), which have substantial technical staffs which can address common development problems in the area, such as agricultural research, nutrition, energy, technology, and the environment.

## International Inputs

The World Bank, the Inter-American Development Bank, the Agency for International Development (AID), and other international and bilateral assistance programs are active in Central America. There is a clear willingness on the part of the World Bank to finance additional bilateral projects as they materialize. This is demonstrated by its current plan to establish, along with the

## Honduras

We have been impressed by the Honduran Government's demonstration of social awareness and its commitment to return that country to constitutional rule next year.

It is also clear that geography gives Honduras a central role in the prevention of regional conflict, incursions, and potential infiltrations both ways between revolutionary Nicaragua and its conservative northern neighbors.

Honduras is thus central to the "bridge-building" process we hope will emerge in Central America. We will encourage Honduras to play such a role and will encourage both El Salvador and Honduras to reach an early settlement on their border dispute.

We will provide cooperation and assistance to the government to help it achieve its goals.

## Guatemala

We see no crisis in the months immediately ahead, but we recognize the country faces severe and fundamental longer term socioeconomic and political questions.

We would encourage the Government of Guatemala to work toward a

more open electoral process, to take effective action to halt spiraling political violence, and to play a constructive role in regional cooperation.

## Conclusion

This brings me full circle to my opening comments. Central America is a region in which deep demands for change exist, in which serious inequities and structural problems create political pressures, in which legitimate grievances result in basic demands for equity and redress. In the northern tier these instabilities have run up against relatively closed or rigid processes that permit their accommodation or venting with great difficulty. The consequent tensions result in polarization that unless relieved will invite radicalization and the capture and perversion of legitimate causes by extreme elements.

There is in all this a difficult and agonizing dilemma—the legitimacy of grievances and inequities and the inevitability and drive for systemic change and reform, on the one hand, and the effort by Castroist/Marxist elements, on the other, to exploit these currents for their own use in order to disguise and legitimize their ulterior objectives. Clearly, helping resolve the

U.N. Development Program, a project design team in Central America. The Inter-American Development Bank is currently lending even larger amounts than the World Bank. AID programs are relatively much smaller but still have a major impact as trailblazers.

All three institutions have provided substantial support to projects designed to have a direct impact on the rural poor, although the banks continue to finance major infrastructure projects as well.

## Commerce and Trade

Well over half of current exports from Central America are to the United States (excluding trade with other countries in the region). However, the Central American countries have not taken maximum advantage of general system of preferences (GSP) under current U.S. legislation. Commercial opportunities have not, therefore, been exploited to the extent they can be.

Realistically, however, any major increase in exports to the U.S. in such areas as textiles or shoes or even fruits and vegetables, can run into major political opposition in the United States. As a result there are very real limitations on export expansion to the United States in any area where these exports are in direct competition with U.S. products.

Similarly, the European Common Market presents limited opportunities in many products, with the additional problem that many primary products benefit from preference arrangements with former colonies in Africa and the Caribbean. Nevertheless, possibilities for major export expansion do exist in many areas and products, especially nontraditional exports and processed agricultural products. Beef and beef products are examples. Japan could become a major market as it already is for cotton. Assembly operations in fields such as electronics for reexport offer other possibilities.

An important conclusion about the Central American countries is that given the relative importance of the external sector in these economies and their relative openness, U.S. trade policy may be an important element in determining the parameters of further growth in the region. ■

former in a peaceful, democratic, moderate way is the best defense against the latter. Communism's greatest ally is a rigid, indiscriminate defense of the status quo and intolerance of change and dissent. As I noted, defense of the status quo will not avoid change; it will only radicalize it. Instability cannot be capped, nor repression maintained, indefinitely without sowing the seeds of a violent and radical denouement. Failure on our part to identify with the legitimate aspirations of the people in these countries—and with those democratic elements who seek peaceful constructive change—respect for human rights, and basic equity will put us on the wrong side of history.

Our task, therefore, is how to work with our friends to guide and influence change, how to use our influence to promote justice, freedom, and equity to mutual benefit—and thereby avoid insurgency and communism. Nowhere will this task be more crucial than in Nicaragua. As Dr. Hans Morgenthau once wrote: "The real issue facing American foreign policy . . . is not how to preserve stability in the face of revolution, but how to create stability out of revolution." ■

<sup>1</sup> The complete transcript of the hearings will be published by the committee and will be available from the Superintendent of Documents, U.S. Government Printing Office, Washington, D.C. 20402.

## Inter-American Institute for Cooperation on Agriculture

MESSAGE TO THE SENATE,  
NOV. 14, 1979<sup>1</sup>

I transmit herewith, for Senate advice and consent to ratification, the Convention on the Inter-American Institute for Cooperation on Agriculture (the Convention) which was signed at Washington on March 6, 1979. For the information of the Senate, I also transmit the report of the Department of State with respect to the Convention.

The Convention is a revision of the 1944 Convention on the Inter-American Institute of Agricultural Sciences. It clarifies the 1944 Convention and strengthens and broadens the mandate of the Inter-American Institute of Agricultural Sciences (the Institute).

Membership in the Institute under the Convention is open to states which are members of the OAS [Organization of American States] and the existing Institute, or other American states whose admission is accepted by the Inter-American Board of Agriculture.

Under the Convention, the Institute will consist of three principal organs—the Inter-American Board of Agriculture, the Executive Committee, and the General Directorate. The Inter-American Board of Agriculture will be the highest organ of the Institute and will consist of one representative from each Member State. The new Convention stipulates that such representatives should preferably be persons connected with agriculture or rural development. This Board will be responsible for setting policy and budgetary priorities of the Institute.

To reflect the changed responsibilities of the Institute, its name has been changed to the Inter-American Institute for Cooperation on Agriculture.

The Convention will enter into force when two-thirds of the states parties to the 1944 Convention have deposited instruments of ratification. Correspondingly, the 1944 Convention will cease to be in force for those states for which the new Convention is in force.

I recommend that the Senate give early and favorable consideration to the Convention and advice and consent to ratification.

JIMMY CARTER ■

<sup>1</sup> Text from Weekly Compilation of Presidential Documents of Nov. 19, 1979.

## Chile

DEPARTMENT STATEMENT,  
NOV. 30, 1979<sup>1</sup>

The Government of the United States has been reviewing our relations with the Government of Chile, in light of Chile's actions with respect to the assassination of Orlando Letelier, a former Ambassador of Chile to the United States, and Ronni Moffitt.

Mr. Letelier and Mrs. Moffitt were killed in Washington in September 1976 by a bomb attached to their car. On August 1, 1978, a Federal grand jury handed down a number of indictments in the case. Three officers of the Chilean intelligence service (Messrs. Contreras, Espinoza, and Fernandez) were indicted for having planned and directed the killings. Michael Townley, a member of the Chilean intelligence service, pleaded guilty and was sentenced for his role in the crime, and two of his Cuban accomplices were subsequently tried and convicted in the U.S. District Court in Washington. The United States sought the extradition from Chile of the three Chilean officials, but on October 1 that request was denied by the Chilean Supreme Court. The court also chose not to call for a Chilean investigation of the murder charges.

The Government of Chile bears a twofold responsibility in this matter. First, the three men indicted for having planned and directed the killings were officials of that government and included the former head of Chile's intelligence service. The overwhelming body of evidence amassed by the Department of Justice makes it likely that the charges against these officials would be upheld if a fair trial could be held. Second, for over 20 months the Government of Chile has made no serious effort to investigate or prosecute these crimes on its own.

The Government of Chile has thus, in effect, condoned this act of international terrorism. It now seems likely that the men who planned and directed this crime, committed on the streets of our nation's capital, will go unpunished. We believe it is essential that we make clear, both to the Government of Chile and to others throughout the world, that such acts of terrorism cannot be tolerated.

Accordingly, the President has concluded that the following measures should be taken.

- We shall reduce the size of our mission in Chile.

## Current Actions

### MULTILATERAL

#### Agriculture

Convention on the Inter-American Institute for Cooperation on Agriculture. Done at Washington Mar. 6, 1979.<sup>1</sup>

Ratifications deposited: Barbados, Oct. 24, 1979; Canada, July 11, 1979.

#### Arbitration

Convention on the recognition and enforcement of foreign arbitral awards. Done at New York June 10, 1958. Entered into force June 7, 1959; for the U.S. Dec. 29, 1970. Ratification deposited: Jordan, Nov. 15, 1979.

#### Aviation

Convention for the unification of certain rules relating to international transportation by air and additional protocol. Concluded at Warsaw Oct. 12, 1929. Entered into force Feb. 13, 1933; for the U.S. Oct. 29, 1934. 49 Stat. 3000.

Accessions deposited: Chile, Mar. 2, 1979;<sup>2</sup> Uruguay, July 4, 1979.

Notification of succession: Bangladesh, Feb. 13, 1979.

Additional protocol No. 3 to amend the convention for the unification of certain rules relating to international carriage by air signed at Warsaw on Oct. 12, 1929 (49 Stat. 3000) as amended by the protocols done at The Hague on Sept. 28, 1955 and at Guatemala City on Mar. 8, 1971. Done at Montreal Sept. 25, 1975.<sup>1</sup>

Ratification deposited: Brazil, Aug. 16, 1979.<sup>2</sup>

Montreal protocol No. 4 to amend the convention for the unification of certain rules relating to international carriage by air signed at Warsaw on Oct. 12, 1929 (49 Stat. 3000) as amended by the protocol done at The Hague on Sept. 28, 1955. Done at Montreal Sept. 25, 1975.<sup>1</sup>

Ratification deposited: Brazil, Aug. 16, 1979.<sup>2</sup>

Convention for the suppression of unlawful acts against the safety of civil aviation. Done at Montreal Sept. 23, 1971. Entered into force Jan. 26, 1973. TIAS 7570.

Accession deposited: Kuwait, Nov. 27, 1979.

#### Biological Weapons

Convention on the prohibition of the development, production and stockpiling of bacteriological (biological) and toxin weapons and on their destruction. Done at Washington, London, and Moscow Apr. 10, 1972. Entered into force Mar. 26, 1975. TIAS 8062.

Ratification deposited: Argentina, Nov. 27, 1979.

#### Customs

Convention establishing a Customs Cooperation Council, with annex. Done at Brussels Dec. 15, 1950. Entered into force Nov. 4, 1952; for the U.S. Nov. 5, 1970. TIAS 7063.

Accession deposited: Mauritania, Oct. 2, 1979.

#### Environmental Modification

Convention on the prohibition of military or any other hostile use of environmental modification techniques, with annex. Done at Geneva May 18, 1977. Entered into force Oct. 5, 1978.<sup>3</sup>

Senate advice and consent to ratification: Nov. 28, 1979.

#### Finance

Articles of agreement of the International Monetary Fund formulated at Bretton Woods Conference July 1-22, 1944. Opened for signature at Washington Dec. 27, 1945. Entered into force Dec. 27, 1945. TIAS 1501.

Signature and acceptance: St. Lucia, Nov. 15, 1979.

#### Human Rights

American convention on human rights. Done at San Jose Nov. 22, 1969. Entered into force July 18, 1978.<sup>3</sup>

Ratification deposited: Nicaragua, Sept. 25, 1979.

#### Judicial Procedure

Convention abolishing the requirement of legalization for foreign public documents with annex. Done at The Hague Oct. 5, 1961. Entered into force Jan. 24, 1965.<sup>3</sup>

Senate advice and consent to accession: Nov. 28, 1979.

#### Maritime Matters

Amendments to the convention of Mar. 6, 1948, as amended (TIAS 4044, 6285, 6490), on the Intergovernmental Maritime Consultative Organization. Adopted at London Oct. 17, 1974. Entered into force Apr. 1, 1978. TIAS 8606.

Acceptance deposited: Argentina, Oct. 8, 1979.

Amendments to the convention of Mar. 6, 1948, as amended (TIAS 4044, 6285, 6490, 8606), on the Intergovernmental Maritime Consultative Organization. Adopted at London Nov. 14, 1975.<sup>1</sup>

Acceptance deposited: Liberia, Nov. 19, 1979.

Amendments to the convention of Mar. 6, 1948, as amended (TIAS 4044, 6285, 6490, 8606), on the Intergovernmental Maritime Consultative Organization. Adopted at London Nov. 17, 1977.<sup>1</sup>

Acceptances deposited: Canada, Finland, Nov. 19, 1979.

#### Red Cross

Protocol additional to the Geneva conventions of 12 August 1949, and relating to the

• By January 1, 1980, we will terminate the foreign military sales (FMS) "pipeline" to Chile and will thereby terminate all deliveries of military equipment to the Government of Chile by the U.S. Government.

• The military group now stationed in our Embassy in Santiago will be phased down as the FMS pipeline is reduced; at the end of this year, we will assess whether the military group should be completely eliminated.

• Pursuant to the Export-Import Bank Act and to authority delegated by the President, Secretary Vance has determined that suspension of Exim financing in Chile would "clearly and importantly advance U.S. policy" in combating international terrorism. Exim is, therefore, immediately suspending all such financing.

• The Overseas Private Investment Corp. will not approve any further guaranties or undertake any new activities in Chile.

Chile's deplorable conduct in this affair, and in particular its refusal to conduct a full and fair investigation of this crime, demand the actions we are taking today, which constitute a strong reaffirmation of our determination to resist international terrorism. ■

<sup>1</sup> Read to news correspondents by Department spokesman Hodding Carter III.



protection of victims of international armed conflicts (Protocol I), with annexes. Adopted at Geneva June 8, 1977. Entered into force Dec. 7, 1978.<sup>3</sup>  
Ratifications deposited: Sweden, Aug. 31, 1979;<sup>4</sup> Tunisia, Aug. 9, 1979.

Protocol additional to the Geneva conventions of 12 August 1949, and relating to the protection of victims of noninternational armed conflicts (Protocol II). Adopted at Geneva June 8, 1977. Entered into force Dec. 7, 1978.<sup>3</sup>  
Ratification deposited: Sweden, Aug. 31, 1979; Tunisia, Aug. 9, 1979.

### Sugar

International sugar agreement, 1977, with annexes. Done at Geneva Oct. 7, 1977. Entered into force provisionally Jan. 1, 1978. Senate advice and consent to ratification: Nov. 30, 1979.

### Trade

Protocol extending the arrangement regarding international trade in textiles of Dec. 20, 1973 (TIAS 7840). Done at Geneva Dec. 14, 1977. Entered into force Jan. 1, 1978. TIAS 8939.  
Ratification deposited: Guatemala, Oct. 29, 1979.

### Whaling

Amendments to the schedule to the international convention for the regulation of whaling, 1946 (TIAS 1849). Adopted at the 1st meeting of the International Whaling Commission, London July 9-13, 1979. Entered into force: Oct. 24, 1979 except for the provision concerning the catch limit of 43 fin whales for the Spain-Portugal-British Isles stock of the North Atlantic, which shall enter into force Jan. 22, 1980.

### Wheat

Protocol modifying and further extending the wheat trade convention (part of the international wheat agreement), 1971 (TIAS 144). Done at Washington Apr. 25, 1979. Entered into force June 23, 1979, with respect to certain provisions, July 1, 1979, with respect to other provisions.  
Accessions deposited: Belgium, Nov. 29, 1979; Ireland, Dec. 3, 1979.  
Ratification deposited: Cuba, Dec. 3, 1979.

Protocol modifying and further extending the food aid convention (part of the international wheat agreement), 1971 (TIAS 7144). Done at Washington Apr. 25, 1979. Entered into force June 23, 1979, with respect to certain provisions, July 1, 1979, with respect to other provisions.  
Accessions deposited: Belgium, Nov. 29, 1979; Ireland, Dec. 3, 1979.

### Bilateral

#### Argentina

Agreement concerning hide exports and other trade matters. Signed at Washington Aug. 10, 1979. Entered into force Sept. 19, 1979.

#### Colombia

Agreement amending the agreement of Aug. 3, 1978, as amended (TIAS 9515), relating to trade in cotton, wool, and man-made fiber textiles and textile products. Effected by exchange of letters at Bogota Aug. 30 and Sept. 7, 1979. Entered into force Sept. 7, 1979.

Agreement amending the agreement of Aug. 3, 1978, as amended (TIAS 9515), relating to trade in cotton, wool, and man-made fiber textiles and textile products. Effected by exchange of letters at Bogota Sept. 6 and 7, 1979. Entered into force Sept. 7, 1979.

#### Egypt

Agreement concerning U.S. Government and other claims, with exchange of notes. Signed at Cairo May 19, 1979. Entered into force: Nov. 5, 1979.

#### Finland

Extradition treaty. Signed at Helsinki June 11, 1976.<sup>1</sup>  
Senate advice and consent to ratification: Nov. 29, 1979.

#### France

Arrangement for the exchange of technical information and cooperation in the regulation of nuclear safety. Signed at Paris Oct. 25, 1979. Entered into force Oct. 25, 1979.

#### Germany, Federal Republic of

Treaty concerning extradition, with protocol. Signed at Bonn June 20, 1978.<sup>1</sup>  
Senate advice and consent to ratification: Nov. 29, 1979.

#### Greece

Agreement concerning the grant of defense articles and services under the military assistance program. Effected by exchange of notes at Athens Aug. 30, 1979. Entered into force Aug. 30, 1979.

#### Hungary

Convention for the avoidance of double taxation and the prevention of fiscal evasion with respect to taxes on income, with exchange of notes. Signed at Washington Feb. 12, 1979. Entered into force Sept. 18, 1979. Proclaimed by the President: Nov. 28, 1979.

Agreement amending the agreement of July 7, 1972, as amended and extended (TIAS 8640), on scientific cooperation. Signed at Washington and Budapest Oct. 24, 1979. Entered into force Oct. 24, 1979.

Program of cooperation and exchanges in culture, education, science and technology for 1980 and 1981, with annex. Signed at Washington Oct. 25, 1979. Enters into force Jan. 1, 1980.

#### India

Agreement amending the agreement of Dec. 30, 1977, as amended (TIAS 9036, 9232), relating to trade in cotton, wool, and man-made fiber textiles and textile products. Effected by exchange of notes at Washington Nov. 6, 1979. Entered into force Nov. 6, 1979.

#### Israel

Memorandum of understanding for technical cooperation in mineral technology. Signed at Washington and Jerusalem Aug. 14 and Sept. 19, 1979. Entered into force Sept. 19, 1979.

Agreement relating to cash assistance to Israel during fiscal year 1980 to support the economic and political stability of Israel. Signed at Washington Nov. 15, 1979. Entered into force Nov. 15, 1979.

#### Japan

Treaty on extradition, with exchange of notes. Signed at Tokyo Mar. 3, 1978.<sup>1</sup>  
Senate advice and consent to ratification: Nov. 30, 1979.

#### Kiribati

Treaty of friendship, with agreed minute. Signed at Tarawa Sept. 20, 1979. Enters into force on the date of the exchange of instruments of ratification.

#### Malaysia

Agreement amending the agreement of May 17 and June 8, 1978, as amended (TIAS 9180), relating to trade in cotton, wool and man-made fiber textiles and textile products. Effected by exchange of letters at Washington and New York Oct. 4 and 12, 1979. Entered into force Oct. 12, 1979.

#### Mexico

Treaty on extradition, with appendix. Signed at Mexico City May 4, 1978.<sup>1</sup>  
Senate advice and consent to ratification: Nov. 30, 1979.

#### Morocco

Agreement regarding interpretation of Articles 21(2) and 25(1) of the convention of Aug. 1, 1977 for the avoidance of double taxation and the prevention of fiscal evasion with respect to taxes on income. Effected by exchange of letters at Washington and Rabat Oct. 25, 1979. Enters into force upon entry into force of the convention of Aug. 1, 1977.

#### Norway

Extradition treaty. Signed at Oslo June 9, 1977.<sup>1</sup>  
Senate advice and consent to ratification: Nov. 30, 1979.

#### Panama

Treaty on the execution of penal sentences. Signed at Panama Jan. 11, 1979.<sup>1</sup>  
Senate advice and consent to ratification: Nov. 30, 1979.

Agreement relating to the library and museum in the Civil Affairs Building. Effected by exchange of notes at Panama Sept. 24, 1979. Entered into force Sept. 24, 1979. Interim agreement relating to continued use of lands and installations for purposes of air traffic control and related services, with related note. Effected by exchange of notes at Panama Oct. 1, 1979. Entered into force Oct. 1, 1979.

# CHRONOLOGY

Agreement relating to the Port Meteorological Office. Effected by exchange of notes at Panama Oct. 1, 1979. Entered into force Oct. 1, 1979.

Agreement relating to Article II of the agreement in implementation of Article III of the Panama Canal Treaty concerning establishment of a Coordinating Committee. Effected by exchange of notes at Panama Oct. 1, 1979. Entered into force Oct. 1, 1979.

Agreement relating to Article III of the Panama Canal Treaty concerning the establishment of a Consultative Committee. Effected by exchange of notes at Panama Oct. 1, 1979. Entered into force Oct. 1, 1979.

Agreement relating to Article III of the agreement in implementation of Article IV of the Panama Canal Treaty concerning establishment of a Joint Committee. Effected by exchange of notes at Panama Oct. 1, 1979. Entered into force Oct. 1, 1979.

Agreement relating to the agreements in implementation of Articles III and IV of the Panama Canal Treaty with respect to tax on movable property. Effected by exchange of notes at Panama Oct. 1, 1979. Entered into force Oct. 1, 1979.

Agreement relating to Article IV of the Panama Canal Treaty concerning establishment of a Combined Board. Effected by exchange of notes at Panama Oct. 1, 1979. Entered into force Oct. 1, 1979.

Agreement relating to Article VI of the Panama Canal Treaty concerning establishment of a Joint Commission on the Environment. Effected by exchange of notes at Panama Oct. 1, 1979. Entered into force Oct. 1, 1979.

Agreement relating to electric power. Effected by exchange of notes at Panama Oct. 1, 1979. Entered into force Oct. 1, 1979.

Agreement relating to tropic testing in accordance with the provisions of the agreement on certain activities of the U.S. in Panama. Effected by exchange of notes at Panama Oct. 1, 1979. Entered into force Oct. 1, 1979.

## Sweden

Arrangement for the exchange of technical information and cooperation in nuclear safety matters, with patent addendum. Signed at Washington Oct. 30, 1979. Entered into force Oct. 30, 1979.

## Tunisia

Agreement concerning cultural cooperation. Signed at Tunis Sept. 28, 1979. Entered into force Sept. 28, 1979.

## Turkey

Treaty on extradition and mutual assistance in criminal matters. Signed at Ankara June 7, 1979.<sup>1</sup>

Senate advice and consent to ratification:  
Nov. 28, 1979.

Treaty on the enforcement of penal judgments. Signed at Ankara June 7, 1979.<sup>1</sup>  
Senate advice and consent to ratification:  
Nov. 30, 1979. ■

<sup>1</sup> Not in force.

<sup>2</sup> With reservation.

<sup>3</sup> Not in force for the U.S.

<sup>4</sup> With declaration and reservation.

## November 1979

Events pertaining to Iran can be found on page. 44.

- |        |   |         |  |
|--------|---|---------|--|
| Nov. 1 | Secretary Vance departs for Seoul to attend President Park Chung Hee's funeral.   | Nov. 13 | Israeli Ambassador to Portugal is wounded and his bodyguard killed in an attack on the Israel Embassy in Lisbon.   |
|        | U.S. announces normalization of diplomatic relations with Equatorial Guinea.  | Nov. 14 | Palestinian mayors in Israeli-occupied territory resign in protest against the imprisonment and threatened deportation of Nablus Mayor Bossam al-Shakua. U.N. Security Council issues unanimous statement expressing its concern.  |
| Nov. 2 | A military junta headed by Bolivian Col. Alberto Natusch Busch overthrows the government of President Walter Guevara Arze.  | Nov. 16 | Bolivian Congress, for the first time, selects a woman, Lydia Gueiler, as interim President.   |
| Nov. 4 | Bolivia's new military government declares martial law.   | Nov. 18 | Thailand opens its borders to 560,000 Kampuchean camped along its frontier.  |
| Nov. 5 | U.N. General Assembly holds Pledging Conference for Emergency Humanitarian Relief to the people of Kampuchea; \$210 million in aid is pledged by representatives of 51 nations. | Nov. 19 | Soviet Foreign Minister Gromyko arrives in Spain for a 3-day official visit. While there, he expresses Soviet opposition to Spain's joining NATO.  |
| Nov. 6 | U.S. pledges \$69 million to help check starvation among Kampucheans.   | Nov. 20 | Semiannual U.S.-Economic Community high-level consultations held Nov. 19-20 at State Department.   |
|        | UNESCO meeting on Communication Development Activities held Nov. 6-9 at State Department.   | Nov. 21 | Armed fundamentalist Moslems, believed to be from Iran, seize Grand Mosque in Mecca.   |
| Nov. 7 | UNHCR sends \$60 million to aid Kampuchean refugees in Thailand.  | Nov. 25 | U.S. Embassy in Pakistan is stormed and partially burned. A U.S. Marine guard is killed and 100 persons are trapped for 5 hours in the security vault before being led to safety by Pakistani Armed Forces.  |
|        | Mrs. Carter leaves on fact-finding tour of Kampuchean refugee camps in Thailand to focus international attention on the problem, Nov. 7-10.                                     |         | Former Canadian Prime Minister Trudeau resigns as leader of the Liberal Party.   |
|        | Irish Prime Minister Jack Lynch visits U.S., Nov. 7-15.   |         | Minority government of Turkish Prime Minister Demirel wins a vote of confidence in Parliament with the support of the Fundamentalist Nationalist Salvation Party, the National Movement Party, and several Independents. The vote in the 450 seat assembly was 229 to 208, with 13 members abstaining. |
| Nov. 8 | Col. Natusch of Bolivia suspends martial law and press censorship, but remains silent on military-civilian junta.   |         | Israel gives up Alma oilfields in the Gulf of Suez to Egypt.   |
|        | Shelling incident occurs during Mrs. Carter's visit to the Thai-Kampuchean border resulting in significant number of deaths and injuries to innocent civilians.                 |         |  |

Kenya's parliamentary elections are held with both President Moi and Vice President Kabiki returned to office. As in previous elections, a large number of Cabinet Ministers and over half the Parliament were defeated in their bids for reelection.

Turkish Prime Minister Demirel announces formation of a government consisting of 28 Ministers in the new Cabinet.

U.S. and Chinese officials hold first round of talks in Beijing aimed at conclusion of a bilateral consular convention. The talks provide an opportunity for a general review of the positions of the two parties.

Israeli Ambassador to Portugal is wounded and his bodyguard killed in an attack on the Israel Embassy in Lisbon.

Palestinian mayors in Israeli-occupied territory resign in protest against the imprisonment and threatened deportation of Nablus Mayor Bossam al-Shakua. U.N. Security Council issues unanimous statement expressing its concern.

Bolivian Congress, for the first time, selects a woman, Lydia Gueiler, as interim President. People's National Party of Ghana wins 8 of 10 parliamentary seat contested in last round of byelections.

Thailand opens its borders to 560,000 Kampuchean camped along its frontier.

Soviet Foreign Minister Gromyko arrives in Spain for a 3-day official visit. While there, he expresses Soviet opposition to Spain's joining NATO.

Semiannual U.S.-Economic Community high-level consultations held Nov. 19-20 at State Department.

Armed fundamentalist Moslems, believed to be from Iran, seize Grand Mosque in Mecca.

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Israel gives up Alma oilfields in the Gulf of Suez to Egypt.

Department of State

November 19-30

Press releases may be obtained from the Office of Press Relations, Department of State, Washington, D.C. 20520.

Nov. 26 Newly appointed ambassadors to the U.S. presented their credentials to President Carter—Rafael Solis Cerda (Nicaragua), Redha Malek (Algeria), Nicholas F. Parkinson (Australia), Ricardo Midence Soto (Honduras), Budimir Loncar (Yugoslavia), and Dr. Peter Hermes (Federal Republic of Germany).

Nov. 27 Soviet leadership promotes Nicolai A. Tikhonov to full membership in the Communist Party ruling Politburo.

Nov. 28 South Africa's Ambassador to El Salvador Archibald G. Dunn, is kidnapped by a group calling itself the Popular Liberation Force.

Nov. 30 State Department announces sanctions against Chile affecting diplomatic, military, and financial relations in response to Chilean failure to carry out a diligent and prompt investigation of murder charges against three former secret police officers accused of the assassination of Orlando Letelier, a Chilean exile, and Ronnie Moffitt, an American citizen, in Washington 1976.

Several thousand people demonstrate near the U.S. Embassy in Kuwait. Kuwaiti security personnel, using tear gas, disperse crowd.

Several explosive devices go off simultaneously on the grounds of the U.S. Embassy in Bangkok. ■

| No.  | Date  | Subject   |
|------|-------|---|
| *300 | 11/19 | Harry Roberts Malone sworn in as Ambassador to Rwanda (biographic data).  |
| *301 | 11/19 | U.S., Malaysia amend textile agreement, Oct. 4 and 12.  |
| *302 | 11/19 | U.S. Organization for the International Radio Consultative Committee (CCIR), study group 1, Dec. 13.                    |
| *303 | 11/20 | Robert B. Oakley sworn in as Ambassador to the Republic of Zaire (biographic data).                                     |
| *304 | 11/21 | U.S. Organization for the International Telegraph and Telephone Consultative Committee (CCITT), study group A, Dec. 19. |
| *305 | 11/21 | Asian-American Foreign Policy Conference, Dec. 1.   |
| *306 | 11/23 | Joint statement following U.S.-Andean Pact meeting.   |
| *307 | 11/27 | Anne Forrester Holloway sworn in as Ambassador to the Republic of Mali (biographic data).                               |
| *308 | 11/27 | U.S., Pakistan amend textile agreement, Nov. 13 and 16.   |
| *309 | 11/28 | U.S., India amend textile agreement, Oct. 26 and Nov. 6.  |
| *310 | 11/28 | U.S., Singapore amend textile agreement Sept. 12 and Oct. 16.   |
| 311  | 11/29 | U.S. initiates action against Iran in International Court of Justice.   |
| 312  | 11/30 | International and U.S. efforts to aid Kampuchean famine.  |
| 313  | 11/30 | President of ICJ issues call to parties in hostage case. ■  |

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Press releases may be obtained from the Public Affairs Office, U.S. Mission to the United Nations, 799 United Nations Plaza, New York, N.Y. 10017.

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| *71 | 8/24 | Young: Palestinian question, Security Council. |
| 72  | 8/29 | Young: Lebanon, Security Council.              |

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|-----|-------|---|
| *73 | 8/31  | Announcement of U.S. contribution of \$102.9 million as 1979 partial payment toward the U.N. regular assessed budget. |
| *74 | 9/4   | Cardwell: apartheid and women, preparatory committee for the World Conference of the Decade for Women.                |
| *75 | 9/4   | Ambassador to lead trade mission to Africa.   |
| *76 | 9/11  | McHenry: death of Angolan President Neto.   |
| 77  | 9/12  | Hormats: world economy, Committee of the Whole, Sept. 12.   |
| *78 | 9/12  | Petree: admission of Saint Lucia, Security Council.   |
| *79 | 9/18  | McHenry: admission of Saint Lucia, General Assembly.  |
| 80  | 9/18  | U.S. representatives and alternate representatives to the 34th U.N. General Assembly (biographic data).               |
| 81  | 9/21  | Petree: Kampuchean credentials, General Assembly.   |
| 82  | 9/21  | Reis: Venda, Security Council.  |
| 83  | 9/24  | Vance: opening session of the General Assembly.   |
| *84 | 9/27  | Busnell: Nicaraguan relief and reconstruction assistance, ECLA Committee of the Whole.                                |
| *85 | 10/1  | Saddler: financial reports and accounts, Committee V.   |
| *86 | 10/8  | Graham: foreign economic interests, Committee IV.   |
| *87 | 10/11 | Graham: foreign economic interests, Committee IV.   |
| *88 | 10/11 | Dunfey: foreign economic interests, Committee IV.   |
| 89  | 10/12 | Rosen: energy, Committee II.  |
| *90 | 10/16 | Rosenthal: atomic radiation, Special Political Committee.   |
| *91 | 10/16 | Brecher: assistance to Nicaragua, Committee II.   |
| *92 | 10/16 | Saddler: program budget, Committee V.   |
| 93  | 10/17 | Young: IYC, General Assembly.   |
| *94 | 10/18 | Coopersmith: racial discrimination, Committee III.  |
| 95  | 10/18 | Seignious: arms control, Committee I.   |
| *96 | 10/18 | Jill Schuker named Counselor for Public Affairs (biographic data).  |
| *97 | 10/19 | Rosenthal: UNRWA, Special Political Committee.  |
| *98 | 10/19 | McHenry: Special Committee Against Apartheid's Day of Solidarity With South African Political Prisoners.              |
| 99  | 10/22 | McHenry: economic dialogue, General Assembly.   |



- 100 10/24 McHenry: address before the Appeal of Conscience Foundation awards dinner, New York, Oct. 23.
- \*101 10/24 Vanden Heuvel: human rights, Committee III.
- \*102 10/25 Morgenthau: food, Committee II.
- \*103 10/26 Vanden Heuvel: Czechoslovak dissidents, Committee III.
- \*104 10/31 Dunfey: TTP1, Committee IV.
- \*105 10/31 Coopersmith: torture, Committee III.
- \*106 11/1 Dunfey: U.S. Virgin Islands and American Samoa, Committee IV.
- \*107 11/1 Petree: outer space, Special Political Committee.
- \*108 11/2 Rosen: environment, Committee II.
- \*109 11/5 Dunfey: U.N. visiting mission to Guam, Committee of 24.
- \*110 11/2 Petree: Angolan complaint, Security Council.
- \*111 11/5 Winn: IAEA report, General Assembly, Nov. 2.
- 112 11/5 Vance: pledging conference for Kampuchean refugees, General Assembly.
- \*113 11/6 Coopersmith: religious intolerance, Committee III.
- \*114 11/6 Fisher: arms control, Committee I.
- 115 11/8 Dunfey: apartheid, General Assembly.
- \*116 11/9 Rosen: operational activities for development, Committee II.
- \*117 11/12 Rosen: U.N.-OAU cooperation, plenary, Nov. 9.
- \*118 11/13 Vanden Heuvel: situation in Kampuchea, plenary.
- \*119 11/13 Rosenthal: information, Special Political Committee. ■

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**Department  
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# Department of State *bulletin*

Volume 80 / Number 2035 / February 1980

Cover:

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The DEPARTMENT OF STATE BULLETIN, published by the Office of Public Communication in the Bureau of Public Affairs, is the official record of U.S. foreign policy. Its purpose is to provide the public, the Congress, and government agencies with information on developments in U.S. foreign relations and the work of the Department of State and the Foreign Service.

The BULLETIN's contents include major addresses and news conferences of the President and the Secretary of State; statements made before congressional committees by the Secretary and other senior State Department officials; special features and articles on international affairs; selected press releases issued by the White House, the Department, and the U.S. Mission to the United Nations; and treaties and other agreements to which the United States is or may become a party.

The Secretary of State has determined that the publication of this periodical is necessary in the transaction of the public business required by law of this Department. Use of funds for printing this periodical has been approved by the Director of the Office of Management and Budget through January 31, 1981.

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## Profile

### People

**Population:** 15.5 million (1979 est.).  
**Density:** 50 per sq. mi.  
**Religion:** Sunni Moslem.  
**Literacy:** 10%.  
**Life Expectancy:** 40 years.

### Geography

**Area:** 260,000 sq. mi. (673,397 sq. km.),  
 compares with the size of Texas.  
**Capital:** Kabul (pop. 603,969).

### Economy

**Agriculture:** *Products*—wheat, cotton, fruit and nuts, karakul pelts, wool, mutton.  
**Industry:** *Products*—textiles, soap, furniture, shoes, carpets, fertilizer, cement.  
**Natural Resources:** Natural gas, oil, coal, copper, talc, barites, sulphur, lead, zinc, iron, salt, precious and semiprecious stones.

**Trade:** *Exports*—\$340 million (1978): natural gas, fruit and nuts, karakul pelts, raw cotton, carpets, wool. *Partners*—U.S.S.R. (45%), U.S., U.K., India, Pakistan, Iran. *Imports*—\$450 million (1978): capital goods, petroleum products, textiles, foodstuffs. *Partners*—U.S.S.R. (45%), U.S., Japan, India, U.K., F.R.G.

**Economic Aid Received:** Foreign aid was in the range of \$200 million per year just before the April 1978 coup. This was two to three times the level of earlier in the decade. The leading donor has been the Soviet Union. Substantial aid has also been received traditionally from the U.S., the F.R.G., and multilateral agencies. During the Daoud period, large commitments were also received from Middle East oil states and China. More recently, much of the foreign aid has been suspended except for that received from the U.S.S.R.

*(For more details on Afghanistan's geography, people, history, government, and economy, see p. 65.)*

# Security of the Western Alliance

*Address before the Berlin Press Association in Berlin on December 10, 1979 (delivered by George S. Vest, Assistant Secretary for European Affairs).<sup>1</sup>*

I want to begin by expressing Secretary Vance's keen regret that the pressure of events makes it impossible for him to be here tonight. The continuing situation in Iran has required that he make some urgent changes in his travel plans—a fact which he regrets and which he and I hope you will understand. He has asked, therefore, that I convey to you his greetings and that I stress to you this point: that every word I speak tonight should be accepted as his—and attributed to him.

An invitation to address the Berlin Press Association is itself an honor. Some lines of Goethe go this way: "He only earns his freedom and existence who daily conquers them anew."

Each day, the press corps of this city expresses anew the truth of those lines—by upholding the principles of a free and open press. You help us understand the profound changes taking place about us, and you help defend the right of citizens to participate in decisions which affect their lives and well-being.

This gathering affords an opportunity also to express, once again, the admiration that millions of Americans feel for Berlin and its people—and the abiding commitment of our nation to this city. President Carter, who remembers with great warmth his visit to Berlin last year, has asked that his personal greetings be conveyed to you, along with his assurance that the United States is steadfast in this commitment.

For 35 years, Berlin has been a symbol for free people everywhere. In the postwar period of tension and confrontation, Berlin became a stirring example of human determination to be free—to live under democratic institutions. It is this unyielding determination which helped create the balance upon which Berlin's current stability is based. The clear demonstration that Berlin would not yield, that Berliners wished to remain part of the Western world, made possible the Quadripartite Agreement.

And in the years since the Quadripartite Agreement, Berlin has been an impressive symbol of the tangible fruits detente can yield.

For the United States, the freedom of Berlin—and protection of the benefits made possible by the Quadripartite Agreement—are central foreign policy objectives. We will use every means at our disposal to guarantee the safety and the freedom of this city.

Moreover, we are committed to further easing tensions in Berlin through the opportunities provided by the Quadripartite Agreement. Full realization of these opportunities will benefit both East and West. Strict observance and full implementation of all aspects of the Quadripartite Agreement will make such progress possible.

It is essential to maintain the delicate balance of interests which has developed in and around the city. There should be no temptation to use Berlin as a point of pressure in reaction to developments in other areas of East-West relations.

There should be no questioning the important ties between the Federal Republic of Germany and the Western sectors of Berlin, to which the United States attaches particular importance.

Perhaps most importantly, there should be no questioning of Four Power rights and responsibilities for Berlin as a whole. These remain the basis for the stable situation which has developed in this city. The United States is determined to maintain Four Power rights and responsibilities for Berlin as a whole. We expect the agreement, and the practices and procedures which have arisen from it, to be strictly honored.

There is yet another reason to welcome this forum, for it affords us the opportunity to discuss an issue of vital concern to the people of Berlin and to us all—the security of our Western alliance.

Berliners know, better than most, that true security—what John F. Kennedy called "the survival and success of liberty"—cannot be bought with arms alone. The security of the West depends ultimately upon the vitality and the appeal of free political systems, upon the health of our economies, upon the ability of the Western democracies to cooperate with one another. Our goal is not only to defend ourselves, it is to build and maintain a way of life worth defending.

Nonetheless—as Berliners also know—it would be folly to neglect the military aspects of security. Indeed, one of the stern lessons of the past three decades is that we make detente possible through strength, not weakness. In a perfect world this would not be true; in the real world it is inescapable.

So let us focus tonight on the issue of military security—in both its defense and arms control aspects.

The subject is especially timely now, for the NATO allies are reaching, at this moment, a number of decisions—decisions which will shape the security of Europe in the 1980s and deeply influence relations between East and West. Such decisions, as you know, will be the chief concern of the NATO ministers when they meet in Brussels later this week.

One of these decisions involves a fundamental question which confronts NATO members and, indeed, all of the West. How should the alliance respond to the Soviet Union's unprecedented buildup of long-range theater nuclear forces targeted against Western Europe?

## Deterrence and Arms Control

We will be answering that question in Brussels this week in a way which emphasizes two essential points.

- First, we stand ready to adjust force levels through concrete arms control negotiations. Our hope is that such negotiations will limit force levels on both sides. The Soviet Union and the Warsaw Pact nations should understand that we have a genuine commitment to seek mutual arms limitations in strategic, theater nuclear, and conventional arms.

- NATO is determined, however—and this is the second essential point—to maintain secure deterrent forces across the entire nuclear and conventional spectrum. This the Soviets must also understand.

This dual policy—a policy of maintaining deterrence and of pursuing arms control—will be at the heart of NATO's strategy in the 1980s, for it is self-evident to us that adequate defenses and arms control must go hand-in-hand. Arms control agreements hold out the hope of affording greater security than arms competition with its high costs and built-in dangers. But

only a strong defense, including prudent measures to modernize our forces, can remove any doubts about our resolve—doubts which themselves would make genuine arms limitations less likely.

Let me explain how this dual policy will manifest itself in our decisions in the coming decade—decisions concerning strategic, theater nuclear, and conventional forces.

## The Balance of Strategic Forces

Strategic nuclear parity between the United States and the Soviet Union is, and will remain, a central fact of international security. Efforts by either side to resist this central fact, or to evade it, will inevitably threaten the world's stability and security—for neither side will allow the other to attain superiority.

Over the past decade, the Soviet Union has steadily increased its strategic capabilities. Without new investments on our part in our strategic forces, this Soviet momentum could jeopardize a stable balance at the strategic level. So we are making those investments in each leg of our strategic triad.

- We are developing advanced cruise missiles for our B-52 bombers.
- We are now deploying the new Trident I missile in some existing submarines, and by 1981 we will be deploying the new Trident submarine.
- And we are moving forward with the MX missile program to assure the survivability of our land-based strategic missiles.

These improvements represent the most vigorous American strategic weapons program in more than a decade.

Our purpose in these efforts is not only to maintain essential equivalence in strategic forces, it is also to maintain flexibility in our strategic nuclear options. For, while we accept the idea that mutual vulnerability is a deterrent to war, we do not accept the notion that our options should be limited to mutual assured destruction. We must have in our strategic quiver more than the single arrow of Armageddon.

It is both our policy and our practice, therefore, to maintain a variety of strategic forces, capable of absorbing the heaviest blows possible and still retaining the power to retaliate against the entire spectrum of military and economic targets. We refuse to lock ourselves into either of two doctrines:

the doctrine of reliance on massive retaliation alone or a doctrine which emphasizes so-called limited nuclear exchanges directed by each side against the other's strategic forces.

There must be a deliberate uncertainty about precisely what our response to attack might be—for that very uncertainty strengthens deterrence. Our doctrine of flexible response, and our wide range of strategic forces, preserve that uncertainty.

We will maintain a secure strategic balance and a credible deterrent, at whatever level of effort is required. But we know that there can be no ultimate security in relentless escalations of strategic power. Both we and the Soviet Union have a compelling national interest in stabilizing the strategic competition and achieving balanced reductions through negotiation.

The SALT process demonstrably serves these ends. And SALT provides a striking illustration of the dual approach I have described—the mutual reinforcement of arms control and force modernization. For it is clear that authentic arms control progress would not be possible without our determination to maintain the balance in any environment—whether with arms control or without it. But it is clear, as well, that in a nuclear age, true security will elude us unless we are equally determined in our diplomacy—in the search for dependable and balanced controls on nuclear arms.

The SALT II Treaty is now before the U.S. Senate. It is my hope and belief that it will be ratified in the near future. Once that step is taken, the agreed goal of SALT III will be to achieve substantial reductions in nuclear arsenals.

Throughout this process we have benefited from consultations with our European allies. We have worked to assure that European security interests and options are fully protected. In the next phase, SALT III, those consultations will be even more intense; the role of the allies in shaping our approach will be even more direct, as the talks take up issues of long-range theater, as well as strategic, forces.

But the same central principles will guide us: a commitment to have whatever arms we need to maintain the balance while we press for progressively more stringent mutual limits through negotiations.

## Theater Nuclear Forces

Maintaining stability and deterrence is important not only in the field of intercontinental strategic weapons but at the theater nuclear level as well.

Indeed, the emergence of parity in these strategic systems focuses attention on NATO's long-range theater nuclear forces as a stone in the arch of deterrence.

For many years, NATO's European allies have had the assurance that the threat posed to Western Europe by Soviet and Warsaw Pact forces is ultimately deterred by the intercontinental nuclear striking power of the United States.

That assurance is undiminished. Our strategic nuclear forces would be used if necessary for Europe's defense. The vital interests of the United States are so engaged in Europe, our commitments so deep, and our ties so strong that it could not be otherwise.

But NATO's chief aim is to prevent aggression. We must, therefore, be sure that no problem arises with regard to Soviet perceptions, for it is on those perceptions that deterrence rests.

It is crucial that the Soviets not be tempted to believe—however wrongly—that strategic parity between the superpowers means that Europe's defense could be separated from that of the United States or that the Soviet Union itself could remain immune from a military conflict in Europe. Thus deterrence requires that NATO have a full range of capabilities to respond to any level of military challenge. It requires that there be no gap in this continuum of forces; that every stone in the arch of deterrence be sound.

Such a gap could emerge if we should fail to modernize NATO's long-range theater nuclear forces. For the Soviet Union, having achieved strategic parity, appears now to be driving toward nuclear preponderance in the European theater.

We can see the evidence in the Soviet Union's vigorous program to modernize and expand its long-range theater nuclear forces.

The most dramatic development in this regard—and the matter of greatest concern to us—is the rapid, ongoing Soviet deployment of the SS-20 mobile missile.

Let us make no mistake: The SS-20 is not an upgrading of an old system. It is an entirely new system—the first mobile, land-based, long-range missile system in the European theater. Each SS-20 launcher can reload and refire.



Each missile can deliver not one but three nuclear warheads. The SS-20 can reach everywhere in Europe from bases deep within Soviet territory.

Add to the SS-20 system the growing numbers of Bockfire bombers employed in the European theater and the conclusion is inescapable: This Soviet buildup goes beyond what is necessary to upgrade their armaments to meet developments in NATO's forces.

Yet Soviet spokesmen tell us that any moves by NATO to redress this situation could undermine detente and launch a new period of East-West tensions in Europe. They have insisted that we accept, in the name of detente, a trend toward manifest inequality.

The West cannot be passive in this situation. From a political standpoint, to do so would constitute a curious approach to detente. It would say to the world that Western security decisions are the business of both East and West and that those of the East are for Moscow to make alone. For the West to acquiesce in such a notion could tempt Moscow to risk other kinds of pressure on other issues. I need not remind this audience how gravely this would undermine the only sensible basis for cooperation between East and West—a principle of mutual security.

So it is essential for the United States and the NATO allies to maintain deterrence across the whole military spectrum.

This week in Brussels, therefore, the NATO Defense and Foreign Ministers will decide upon a set of proposals providing for theater nuclear modernization and arms control.

In this connection, let me say that the staunchness of the German Government and Chancellor Schmidt and a resolution passed here in Berlin last week by the Social Democratic Party Congress are far-sighted contributions which will add to the unity and determination of the alliance as we meet in Brussels.

The pending modernization proposal for deployment by NATO in Western Europe of long-range theater nuclear weapons—a mix of land-based and ballistic missiles.

By replacing aging long-range theater nuclear systems with highly survivable and more capable systems, the deployments will reduce the chance that the Soviet Union might perceive, however incorrectly, a gap in NATO's spectrum of deterrence. And by improving NATO's deterrent posture, they will raise the most significant threshold—that between peace and

This deployment will permit NATO to reduce its overall nuclear stockpile in Europe as part of the rationalization of its theater nuclear forces. And it will signal to the Soviet Union that its buildup promises no real military or political advantages—because NATO will respond to the challenge.

At the same time, we firmly believe that our security can be enhanced through genuine arms control; through concrete agreements to regulate force levels. Such agreements hold the promise of preventing unrestrained competition and providing greater stability in the theater nuclear field.

But arms limitation cannot be unilateral; it must be achieved through a process that is truly mutual.

Because we are committed to seeking genuine arms control, our modernization decisions will be coupled with an important arms limitation offer—an offer aimed at limiting long-range theater nuclear forces on both sides. NATO's proposal will call for verifiable limits that are significant and based upon the principle of equality.

This arms control initiative will test the sincerity of the Soviets on limiting these systems. Since the first NATO systems will not be fielded until 1983, there will be ample time to pursue serious arms control negotiations.

There are those, I know, who argue that NATO should delay its deployment decision until such talks can be held. We must not delay, for two important reasons.

**First**, we cannot know in advance that such talks will succeed. It would make little sense for the allies to fall farther and farther behind in the mere hope that the talks might succeed. And given the present momentum of Soviet efforts, any delay in NATO modernization increases an already troubling disparity.

**Second**, the West must demonstrate its seriousness about modernization or the Soviets will have no visible incentive to negotiate reductions in forces.

So our position is clear: The United States and the NATO allies will strive to reduce forces through negotiations. But we will do all that is necessary to maintain a credible deterrent across the entire spectrum of nuclear and conventional forces.

We cannot, however, accept unilateral restraint by NATO as a prerequisite to negotiations, and we will not. The restraint must come from both sides.

## The Balance of Conventional Forces

The policy I have described—a policy of maintaining deterrence by force improvements where necessary and by arms control where possible—is also our strategy in the field of conventional forces.

Because improvements in Soviet conventional forces continue and because conventional forces are central to the alliance's deterrent, it is essential that the allies hold to their comprehensive modernization program. NATO's Long-Term Defense Program will assure us a modern, better integrated, and more effective conventional force for the 1980s. The NATO goal of 3% real annual increases in member defense spending will provide the resources essential to finance these improvements in conventional forces, which consume the largest share of defense budgets.

But here again, we are determined both to maintain deterrence and to neglect no opportunity for progress in arms limitation.

One significant opportunity for progress lies in the mutual and balanced force reduction (MBFR) talks in Vienna. Here our hope is to give practical meaning to the concept of balance in the conventional field—just as the SALT process has sought to do in the strategic field.

The goal of the MBFR talks—a goal now accepted by both sides—is to negotiate common collective ceilings at lower levels for NATO and Warsaw Pact forces in central Europe. But progress toward that goal has been hobbled by Eastern unwillingness to resolve the data issue. There is still a very large discrepancy between the figures provided by East and West regarding the level of Eastern forces in the area.

Let me reaffirm today that the Western side is eager to make progress toward agreement—progress which can come only if such basic issues as the data problem and verification methods can be resolved.

The announcement by Chairman Brezhnev of a Soviet withdrawal of up to 20,000 troops, 1,000 tanks, and some other equipment is a positive step. However, the basic issues of the MBFR negotiations must still be resolved.

Progress toward greater stability and mutual confidence in Europe can also come through the effort to implement the Final Act of the Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe (CSCE), signed in 1975 by 35 nations at Helsinki.

The Final Act is an historic document, for it transcends normal state-to-state relations to deal with concrete problems that have divided East and West. Compliance with its obligations would enrich the lives of people and ease the tensions between East and West.

The Final Act offers a potential framework for reducing military tensions in Europe and building greater confidence with respect to military activities.

There have been a number of suggestions that this objective could be advanced through a meeting of the CSCE states to deal with security issues. The Government of France has put forward a useful proposal in this regard.

Clearly such a meeting would only make sense, however, as part of a balanced and healthy CSCE process. Thus it is important, first, to conclude successfully the review in Madrid. As we approach that meeting, the United States will keep in mind, above all, the importance of implementing all the provisions of the Final Act, not just the security provisions. We are particularly concerned about the provisions dealing with humanitarian issues that directly affect the daily lives of our citizens and those elsewhere in Europe.

We will work to insure that the discussions in Madrid take place in a constructive atmosphere, free of polemics. But we will not avoid providing an honest assessment of problems simply to project a positive image.

### Conclusion

The realities of military security I have discussed, and the opportunities for progress in arms limitation, argue for a special attitude on the part of the allies as we face the 1980s—an attitude I would describe as sober optimism.

We must be sobered by the prospect that deep and fundamental differences will persist between East and West—differences rooted in geography, in history, and in the assumptions underlying our political systems. Neither our differences nor our weapons systems will be dismantled overnight. So we would do well to keep ourselves free of illusions based solely on hope.

But we should never abandon hope. For in spite of our historic differences, East and West have come a long way in their relations. The range of contacts among the countries of Eastern and Western Europe has broadened; their

relations have taken on an increasing air of normality.

Clearly, the future of East-West relations will be marked by deep differences. But we should at the same time seek to broaden the areas of cooperation between us.

Neither prospect should unsettle us in the West, for we bring to the future an impressive record of achievements and an equally impressive array of strengths.

- For 31 years, the deterrent shield of the NATO alliance has worked successfully.

- The economies of the Western alliance are more than three times as productive as those of the Warsaw Pact.

- Our societies are free and open, hospitable to innovation and creativity, unafraid of change.

- Though we cannot dominate events in our world, our power is immense to influence those events and to shape them in ways that improve the prospects for humanity.

If we preserve these strengths and build upon them, if in the future we find within ourselves the same qualities of statesmanship we have always found, we need not fear the 1980s or the decades beyond. We will be strong—strong enough to protect ourselves and strong enough, if our adversaries are also willing, to cooperate in pursuit of peace.

Indeed, just as we will do whatever necessary to maintain stability and deterrence in Europe, so are we deeply committed to a relaxation of tensions between East and West. We stand ready to propose and consider new ideas, to follow unconventional paths, to respond to every sign of good faith from the other side, for we want to build a future in which the peace of Europe—East and West—is never again disturbed. ■

<sup>1</sup> Press release 321.

## Interview on the "Today" Show

*Secretary Vance was interviewed in Washington, D.C., on the "Today" Show on January 11, 1980, by Richard Valeriani, NBC News diplomatic correspondent and Tom Brokaw, host of the "Today" Show.<sup>1</sup>*

### Q. What other measures is the Administration planning to take in reaction to the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan?

A. We are not planning, at this point, to take any other measures. The invasion of Afghanistan by the Soviet Union crossed a new threshold and it required a very strong and a very resolute response. That response was given by President Carter in the speech which he made.

We have two purposes in the actions which we have taken. First, to make it very clear to the Soviet Union that they will continue to pay a heavy price as long as their troops remain in Afghanistan. And secondly, to make sure that they understand that aggression will be faced up to whenever it occurs. It's too early to say at this point what the long-range effect is going to be on the U.S.-Soviet relationship. That depends upon Moscow and actions which will be taken in Moscow.

I do want to make a point, which I think is a very important point to make. And that is that the invasion of Afghanistan underscores the importance of pursuing the policies which we have been embarked upon. What are those policies? Let me outline them for you very briefly.

- Continuing to strengthen America—we have been in the process of doing that during the past 3 years through a wide variety of steps in the strategic fields and the field of theater nuclear weapons and in the field of conventional weapons as well. That will continue.

- Secondly, we will continue to play an active diplomatic role throughout the world, taking the kind of actions such as we have taken in the past to help preserve the peace in the Middle East and in southern Africa.

- We will also continue to play an active role in the Third World, dealing with Third World problems on Third World basis, and not trying to impose solutions from the outside, from external forces.

- In addition to that, we will continue to pursue an active policy in terms of democratization and the support and

tection of human rights throughout the world, and will continue to pursue our policy of seeking mutual and balanced relations to control progress wherever necessary.

**Q. Getting back to Afghanistan, would the United States consider helping the Afghan insurgents?**

**A.** The question of what happens internally is a question I'd prefer not to get into.

**Q. As you know, the Administration has drawn considerable criticism for some of the measures it's taken: withholding of the sale of grain and advanced technology to the Soviet Union. And the question is, why should an American farmer, why should the American businessman pay the price that you're talking about?**

**A.** I think it's very important, as I indicated earlier, that we take firm, clear, and resolute action. And this required us across the board. We took not only action in the field of cutting back on the grain shipments in a very substantial way but also steps in denying to the Soviet Union high technology. And another major area was cutting back on the fish allocations so that it would be no longer fish allocations to the Soviet Union in the future.

These kinds of strong steps were necessary. And all of us are going to have to share in the sacrifices that are necessary to make this demonstrated stand to reflect the view which we hold about the importance of the principles which are involved here.

**Q. How long will these measures remain in effect? And I ask that in light of what happened with the Soviet invasion of Hungary in 1956, Czechoslovakia in 1968. Six months, a year or, were we back doing business as usual.**

**A.** They will remain in effect as long as necessary. And I believe it will be a protracted period. That may not be the case. That would be fortunate if that were the case. But I do not believe that is the case. We must assume it will be for a protracted period.

You're absolutely right. When you look back at what took place at the time of the Hungarian invasion, that was forgotten in a period of weeks. The same thing was true in the case of Czechoslovakia. The Soviets must understand that this will not be a passing thing, that aggression will not be rewarded.

**Q. What about the economic reprisals that we've taken thus far? Aren't they largely symbolic? There's a wide body of opinion that they really will have no effect on the Russian quality of life or certainly on the presence of Soviet troops in Afghanistan, that they were done primarily to make us feel better and to send up some kind of a signal; but it's really no more than a signal.**

**A.** No, I would respectfully disagree very strongly with you. The steps taken insofar as grain are concerned are going to have, in our judgment, a major impact on the livestock program in the Soviet Union. The denial of grain to them is going to require a sharp cutback in livestock production. This is a very important program to the Soviets, and it's had the strong backing of Mr. Brezhnev. The denial of high technology is something which is also of great importance and has been for many years. Therefore, I think that that will have a substantial impact. The cutting back in the fish allocations is of lesser importance but, again, an important step.

**Q. What about the Olympic games? Vice President Mondale is now suggesting that they be moved to Canada. Is that the official Administration policy?**

**A.** The official policy was stated by the President at the time that he made his speech. At that time he said that we prefer the games would go forward, but that we would have to watch and see what happens, and he would make his decision in the future, after seeing how the situation develops in terms of what the Soviets would now do.

**Q. —take the Olympic Games out of Moscow is something that would probably really hurt the Russians. Is there much sympathy for that among our allies, other Western countries, Third World countries?**

**A.** It's mixed.

**Q. Is that something you're going to push?**

**A.** We are going to watch and see what happens. It remains a possibility which may be exercised.

**Q. Let me ask you about Iran now. Do you expect the Soviet Union to veto the Security Council resolution against sanctions?**

**A.** I don't know. It remains a real possibility. As you know, we'll probably vote on the sanctions issue either tonight

at the United Nations or tomorrow morning. I believe that the vote will be a positive vote, but the Soviet Union may veto.

**Q. What will you do if there's a veto?**

**A.** We will go ahead and take action as if the sanctions had indeed been put into effect.

**Q. Would you consider a naval blockade to back it up?**

**A.** I do not rule it out.

**Q. What if the Soviets begin to move out of Afghanistan and toward the warm-water ports of the Persian Gulf, as a lot of people are speculating that they may. Does that mean that we have to begin to move troops to that area?**

**A.** I do not want to speculate on events which are not facing us at this time. We'll deal with them when we have to cross that bridge. ■

<sup>1</sup>Press release 10 of Jan. 15, 1980.



## Deputy Secretary Christopher Interviewed on "Face the Nation"

*Deputy Secretary of State Warren Christopher was interviewed on CBS's "Face the Nation" on January 6, 1980, by George Herman, CBS News (moderator); Marvin Kalb, CBS News; and Henry Trewhitt, Baltimore Sun.*

**Q.** I think the question that almost every American is asking himself or herself today, reading the headlines about Soviet denunciations of President Carter and American sanctions, if you like, against the Soviet Union, is are we now embarking on a second cold war?

**A.** I don't think it is very helpful to use terms like that. We are in a period of making a strong response to what we regard as an extraordinary event. You have to consider the degree of the aggression of the Soviet Union into Afghanistan. They go in with 50,000 troops, they are involved in wiping out the head of the country, they install a puppet regime, they are bearing down on the Moslem minority. This is the kind of an event that calls for the strong response that President Carter has made.

We will have to see in the future how U.S.-Soviet relations work out. I don't think it is time to pronounce the death of detente, but I think we need to deal with an important and serious reality for America.

**Q.** In your first answer, you said we will have to wait and see in the future what our relations with the Soviet Union are going to be. That sort of brings to mind the idea that you feel it is a temporary situation—this crisis over Afghanistan. If we have this embargo on grain and all these other things afoot, what will it take on the Soviet Union's part to end it? What is the minimum Soviet action which will stop this threat of a second cold war?

**A.** Let me respond to that by telling you what our goals are. We are determined to show the Soviet Union that their aggression into Afghanistan is not without considerable cost to them. We are also determined to make it clear to them that any subsequent event of the same kind will be subject to very severe penalties.

Now, if we can make those points, then the Soviet response will, I think, determine what our relationship will be with them in the future.

**Q.** Isn't there some danger, however, that if you simply withdraw these

sanctions after the Soviet Union has consolidated its position in Afghanistan, that you will be seen in something of the ambivalent position you have in the past as with the combat brigade in Cuba, that sort of thing?

**A.** We don't intend to set any time for withdrawing the sanctions. I think one of the lessons coming out of the Czechoslovakia crisis is that the response needs to be determined and of considerable duration. When I was in Europe last week, I was struck by the number of officials there who had gone through the Czech crisis and who regretted the fact that their response was of such short duration. I think we need to be determined and persistent here.

**Q.** Could you—pointing out this West European possible allied response—could you point out for us what you expect, what you have worked out with the European allies?

**A.** We are in the early stages of that. But there are a number of things we do expect. First, we expect our allies will not move in to supply the grain that we are denying to the Soviet Union.

**Q.** That is Canada, Australia, Argentina.

**A.** That is Canada, Australia, and any of the other European countries which may have some grain stocks which could be substituted for ours.

Second, I think we expect them to terminate their aid programs for Afghanistan. It is one thing to aid a nonaligned country; it is quite another thing to aid a puppet regime of the Soviet Union.

We expect them to take some action with respect to their diplomatic representation. We also expect them to take actions which are somewhat parallel to ours in the economic field. Every country will have to do what it can do best. For example, I would expect some of the countries there to deny export credits that they have been giving in the past.

Now we are in the early stages of working through this kind of a response. The United States took a long step when President Carter announced his program on last Friday; the NATO group will be meeting this week to consider what actions they will take in response. In my meetings with our NATO allies, I am sure that they are as concerned about this action of the Soviet Union as we are, and I

expect their response to be determined and firm.

**Q.** What about the French? There have been reports that the French really don't see it quite the same way that the United States does.

**A.** I will have to see it as that develops. In the comparable situation in Iran France has been very supportive of the United States, and I didn't see any difference in talking with my French colleague as to his analysis of the gravity of the Soviet step. Everyone recognizes that it is a new departure in Soviet policy.

**Q.** The American position regarding the Olympic games is unclear to me. Now I see the Saudis have withdrawn from the games next summer. What is the United States really recommending in that regard? Are you considering withdrawing support of the games, recommending voluntary non-participation by Americans? What is the American position?

**A.** First let me comment on the Saudi reaction which I think is very interesting here. We have a leading Moslem country feeling so strongly about the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan that they are pulling out of the Olympic games.

Our position is the one stated by President Carter on Friday night. We would much prefer to be able to go to the Olympic games, but the aggressive behavior of the Soviet Union puts at some risk both the athletes and the fact that individuals will be going to the Soviet Union. So we have not reached a decision on that subject. It is under review and will continue to be.

**Q.** On the question of SALT, which is of interest to a lot of people, the Administration tried so hard to complete the process of negotiating SALT. You went to the Congress, held up in the Senate Afghanistan, and suddenly you are pulling back and shelving it for the time being. At the same time, it is made very clear that we are going to abide by the terms of the treaty as it was negotiated and it seems why the ratification process, in a sense? But why stick with the terms?

**A.** Under international law, a country is obligated to stick to the terms of a treaty that has been negotiated and which is in the process of ratification. I intend to do that for our part. But we also intend to keep our eye on the Soviet Union, and if we find some deviation from the terms of SALT II on their part then, of course, we will be in quite a different position ourselves.

**Q.** Listening to your answers earlier to what our intentions were on this Soviet-Afghanistan incursion or invasion, you said we wanted to show that such an action was not without cost to them, that it would incur very severe penalties.

**A.** Sounds—now correct me if I am not getting the diplomatic language exactly right—it sounds as though what his means is you do not expect our actions to roll back the Soviet action, you just are trying to say that any future actions of this kind will be expensive.

**A.** No. We hope both.

**Q.** Realistically?

**A.** We hope both. We hope that they will roll back their actions in Afghanistan, and we hope to make the point that any onerous actions of that same kind will incur very heavy penalties.

**Q.** You also said—I just am trying to clear up a few loose ends on this very pending point, I asked about the cold war. You said it is too early to call it hot, yet you quoted various diplomats who regretted our response to the Soviet invasion of Czechoslovakia was a brief, and it sounds to me a little bit sly though you are hinting that our reaction at this time, or displeasure, could be longer.

**A.** I would not think our reaction will be a brief one this time. I don't expect to go back to business as usual with the Soviet Union for some time to come. We have taken severe actions in this country. It will result in a loss to the Soviet Union of 17 million tons of grain this year, 360,000 tons of fish, a good deal of high technology. Those are strong actions. We intend to carry them out for long enough so that the Soviet Union incurs some cost for this really quite unprecedented action that they have taken moving into Afghanistan.

**Q.** I wonder if I could get into this area. Did you have intelligence before the Russians moved in that they would do such a thing?

**A.** We knew that there was a buildup across the border of Soviet troops. And we have been warning, backgrounding, talking about this prospect for some time. But until they flew in the 250 planes in a 24-hour period, of course, we didn't know what they were going to do that. Indeed, there had been some signs that they were going to shore up the Amin regime, but when they flew in the 250 planes, when they went across the border with two divisions, then, of course, we had an entirely new situation on our hands.

**Q.** What I am trying to get at really—that suggests surprise by the dimension of the Soviet action, the boldness of it. What about our intelligence? There has been a problem with that in the past, expressed by the President himself concerning Iran, and I am wondering if the same problem is not manifest here. In talking to your colleagues, I find that they were taken quite by surprise by the boldness of this Soviet action. Isn't that in itself worse?

**A.** I think we ought to recognize that this is the first time since World War II that the Soviet Union has used its troops outside the Warsaw bloc. Now the very audacity of that move is one that caused us to be taken aback. We didn't think the Soviet Union would take such a great risk, and, having taken it, I think we are determined to respond in a way that is commensurate with the risk.

**Q.** That leads directly to the question of why they were willing to take that risk. Do you think they felt that the United States had become, in order to borrow a phrase from the past, "a pitiful, helpless giant" and simply would not react in a substantive way?

**A.** It is very hard to speculate about Soviet intentions. I do not think we are a weak or pitiful giant in any respect. As a matter of fact, I think our country's military posture is a good deal stronger than it was when we came into office 3 years ago with the strengthening of NATO, with the cruise missile, and the other defense steps that we have taken.

There are a number of reasons why the Soviet Union might have done what they did. They might be in Afghanistan for a specific reason, or there might be reasons that extend beyond.

**Q.** Which is it?

**A.** I don't think anybody knows at the present time, but I think the United States has to be ready for either one of the alternatives.

**Q.** —put it the other day in terms of the steppingstone. He said the Afghan action was a steppingstone toward some broader strategic aim.

**A.** I think we believe it could be a steppingstone to some broader aim, perhaps to their historic interest in a warm water port, perhaps to their interest in oil.

**Q.** Do you see this as an effort by perhaps a new group within the Kremlin, a new hard faction? There are some of your intelligence people who talk

about the rise once again of Mikhail Suslov to greater prominence in the Politburo. Is this possible to explain what the Russians have done?

**A.** I wouldn't want to get into factions. This was an action taken by the Soviet Government. They have the responsibility for it. I wouldn't want to get into a good-guys, bad-guys situation within the Soviet Government. They are responsible as a government.

**Q.** That leads in turn again to the question about their objectives in Pakistan, which is a neighbor that clearly feels threatened. How far is the United States prepared to go in setting aside its concern over the development of nuclear weapons in Pakistan in order to help the Pakistanis rearm?

**A.** We retain our concern over the development of nuclear weapons there. Our nuclear nonproliferation policy is one of our important policies. On the other hand, it is only one of the tenets of our foreign policy. This is an exceptional situation and we will be prepared to help the [Pakistanis] in this exceptional situation if they do desire.

**Q.** Do they so desire? Are you in communication with them on this?

**A.** We are in communication with them and I think the next week or two will give us an opportunity to indicate how we and to what extent we will be helpful to the [Pakistanis].

**Q.** Would you have to balance aid to Pakistan with some kind of aid to India, or some help, something to keep from tilting as the previous Administration once said?

**A.** We are determined to maintain relations with India, but India ought to see the action of the Soviet Union as a threat to India as well as the other countries in the region. After all, India—

**Q.** Do you see signs that they do?

**A.** I see signs that some elements of the government do. They are in the process of an election campaign. I think we will have a fuller response for them after the campaign.

**Q.** I would like to ask you about China and Defense Secretary Brown's visit there. There has been speculation that the United States, while not in any sense choosing at this point to establish a military relationship with the People's Republic of China, is not beyond considering with Peking the possibility of stationing radar facilities in

**China to replace, for example, some of those lost in Iran. Is there that kind of halfway-house military relationship possible with the Chinese?**

A. Let me say in general terms that we don't intend to let the misconduct of the Soviet Union keep us from developing a normal relationship with the People's Republic of China.

On the other hand, we have said, and we continue to maintain, that we do not intend to furnish arms or weapons to the People's Republic of China. Now Secretary Brown is there. He will be having conversations with respect to many subjects, including the new Afghan invasion by the Soviet Union, and I think that out of that will come an important indication to us as to how we can cooperate in that area. But as I say, we will not be in a military relationship of supplying arms or weapons to the People's Republic.

**Q. But short of the supply of American weapons to China, will the United States try to explore with the Chinese the possibility of using Chinese territory for the basing of radar-type facilities?**

A. On that subject I really wouldn't have any comment except to say that we will be discussing with them, for example, their possible aid to other countries in the region which might be threatened by the Soviet behavior.

**Q. In Pakistan, for example?**

A. If Pakistan desired, we would be talking to a number of countries around the world about aiding Pakistan. So I would put Pakistan in that group.

**Q. Let me direct your attention to Afghanistan's other boundary. The impact of the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan has been sort of peculiar in Iran. On the one hand you have the Moslems from Afghanistan invading the Soviet Embassy in Tehran; on the other hand you have the militants who hold the 50 Americans demanding three more Americans. Do you have any kind of evaluation as to what the adventure in Afghanistan is going to do to the holding of American hostages in Tehran?**

A. If the people in Iran are thinking clearly about the matter, I would think that it would cause them to want to end their controversy with the United States and the obscene holding of our hostages and direct their attention to the greater threat which comes from Soviet domination of Afghanistan.

**Q. But what have you seen or sensed?**

A. I have some reason to think that a number of the leaders of that country sense the importance of ending the problem with the United States. How high that goes in that government is, of course, a puzzle.

**Q. But there is no guarantee at all that reasonable thought has dominated the people who hold the hostages in the Embassy. Do you see any evidence whatever that the transition in the government, if that is what is happening, appreciation of strategic reality or whatever, is having an influence on the willingness of the people who are in that Embassy to release the hostages?**

A. We haven't seen it yet but I have to believe that the people of that country are concerned about their own welfare, concerned about their own future, and that the combination of actions that the United States is taking—the seeking of sanctions, the condemnation of the world community, and now the threat from Afghanistan—that combination of events may bring the people of Iran, including the terrorists who hold our hostages, bring them to their senses.

**Q. Is it your sense that if the Ayatollah Khomeini should give a direct order through whatever gradual process for the people in the Embassy to release those hostages, that they would do it?**

A. It is my judgment that the Ayatollah could give such an order and have it carried out.

**Q. You seemed to be suggesting a moment ago when you said there might be some members of the government who would like to end all of this and get on with better relationships with the United States, that these were lower ranking members. What about Khomeini who seems to have the power? Is there anything from all of your diplomatic activities and ventures over the last 9 or 10 weeks to suggest that he has changed his basic approach to this crisis?**

A. No, I don't have any indication of a change in his mind. I hope one will be forthcoming.

**Q. What help, what support can the American people realistically hope for from the United Nations in bringing pressure to bear on the Soviet Union over Afghanistan?**

A. Well I think the fact that 50 countries have gone to the United Nations from all over the world seeking a resolution in the Security Council of condemnation against the Soviet Union is an impor-

tant fact in itself. This is outcry of international opinion against this invasion that has its own importance. Beyond that, I think you can look forward perhaps to a debate in other organs of the United Nations which once again could focus world opinion, add to the costs that the Soviet Union is paying for their actions.

**Q. During this and other Administrations, I think specifically of some of the statements by Ambassador Moynihan as he was then, there was a strong feeling in this country that the independent nations, the Third World, tended more to support the Soviet Union than the United States. Does this sudden end of, at least temporary end, of detente begin to push the balance in the United Nations a little more in our favor?**

A. Well there have been a number of interesting indications along those lines. You know it is important to remember that on Iran, the vote in the Security Council was 15 to nothing. The vote at the International Court of Justice in favor of the United States was 15 to nothing. The Third World countries on these two issues—both Iran and Afghanistan—are lining up behind the United States policy, and I think that is a very important change.

**Q. What about the question of America being able to use not bases but military facilities in the Persian Gulf region? We have read stories about the possibility of Oman providing facilities Kenya, Somalia. Could you tell us something about that?**

A. Let me back up just a minute on that and say President Carter's speech on Friday night was primarily directed to bilateral steps that might be taken between the United States and the Soviet Union. Now in addition to that, the United States is in the process of important steps to improve its military posture in the Middle East. A carrier task force, to be operating in the Indian Ocean, building up our facilities at Diego Garcia and in that connection we will be seeking additional facilities in those three countries to service the fleet and to give us a greater capacity, additional facilities, but ports and airfields.

**Q. Could I pursue that, because perhaps even more sensitive than the three countries Mr. Kalb mentioned would be the possibilities of facilities in Egypt and Israel, both of which would be receptive to that kind of arrangement. What is the U.S. attitude on that?**



## Negotiations on Southern Rhodesia

by Richard M. Moose

*Statements before the Senate Foreign Relations Committee on November 27, 1979, and the Subcommittees on Africa and International Organization Affairs of the House Foreign Affairs Committee on December 5.<sup>1</sup>*

NOV. 27, 1979

I appreciate the opportunity to meet with you today. I want to discuss the President's determination on sanctions and the relationship of that decision to the negotiations on Zimbabwe-Rhodesia now underway at Lancaster House in London.

As you are aware, the President informed the Congress on November 14 of his determination that it is in the national interest to continue sanctions against Zimbabwe-Rhodesia at this time. In the justification which accompanied his determination, he noted that the negotiations presently being conducted by the United Kingdom have not yet concluded.

If the United States lifts sanctions now, it could jeopardize the chance for a successful conclusion to those negotiations. A termination of sanctions at this stage could lead all the parties to harden their positions on the remaining issues.

The President made it clear that we are prepared to lift sanctions when a British Governor assumes authority in Salisbury and a process leading to impartial elections has begun. With this objective in mind, he instructed the Secretary of State to report to him immediately upon the conclusion of the conference and to recommend action by the United States with respect to the termination of sanctions.

The London conference started with a sober appreciation that this could be the last chance to achieve a peaceful settlement for Rhodesia. Important obstacles subsequently have been overcome. It is remarkable that so much has been accomplished in bridging the differences between the parties to the conflict.

Agreement has been reached on two of the fundamental goals we have pursued for so long—a democratic con-

stitution providing for majority rule and protection of minority rights and an impartial transition government which would manage elections open to all parties.

The constitution to which the parties have now agreed corrects the inadequacies of the previous constitution. While the white minority will not be able to exert disproportionate influence, the rights of every individual—white as well as black—would be protected. This would include property rights. And the minority would be guaranteed a special 20% representation in Parliament for the first 7 years of independence.

The parties have also agreed to transition arrangements. They provide for a British Governor who will assume all legislative and executive authority and manage the election. The Governor would be assisted by senior British civil servants and police, who would thoroughly supervise the day-to-day operations of government, the elections process, and the maintenance of law and order by the existing civil police. Commonwealth observers would be invited to observe every aspect of the elections. All parties would be represented on an Election Council, which would be concerned with the fair conduct of elections. Political prisoners would be released, bans against political parties lifted, and all parties allowed to campaign freely.

These are enormous achievements. It has been possible because of the statesmanship shown by the parties and the skill with which [British Foreign Secretary] Lord Carrington has conducted the negotiations. And it has been possible, as well, because we—the United States as well as the United Kingdom—did not choose sides in a tragic conflict. By maintaining our own impartiality among the parties, we have been able effectively to assist Britain in pressing for agreement to arrangements which are both workable and fair.

The conference is now addressing the cease-fire issues, which form the third and last phase of the negotiations. The British tabled their elaborated cease-fire proposals on November 22. We believe the prospects are good that the British will be able to obtain agreement on a cease-fire very soon. For us to change our policy at this delicate moment would be unnecessary and unwise.

A. They are under consideration as well, along with the others.

Q. There is a movement in this country now to end that old traditional thing—bipartisan foreign policy. Will the beginning of Republican and other Democratic attacks on this Administration have any impact on our ability to conduct our foreign policy and to make it stick?

A. I think the people of the United States are unified. Some of the politicians may not be at the moment. I thought it was rather strange and ironic last night that those who call out most loudly for a stronger U.S. position against the Soviet Union were criticizing the single strongest step we took—the grain embargo.

I might say in this connection that the Administration will be announcing tomorrow a major new gasohol program, one that will use the equivalent of 5 million tons of corn during the next year. This will lead, during 1980, to the production of over 500 million gallons of gasohol. Indeed, by the end of 1980 over 10% of a particular kind of gasoline will have alcohol added to it.

[Later in the week, the Administration announced a gasohol program which will seek to create, during 1981, the capacity to use 5 million tons of biomass products, most of which will be corn, in the production of more than 500 million gallons of ethanol. This would replace about 10% of the anticipated U.S. demand or unleaded gasoline.]

This is the kind of thing that we can do to compensate for the grain and corn that is not being sold to the Soviet Union. I think it is an important development. I think our farmers would rather be growing grain to solve our energy problems than they would for the Soviet Union's needs.

Q. So you don't think that the end of bipartisanship hurts your ability to conduct foreign policy?

A. I don't think there is an end to bipartisanship among the people. There may be among some of the political leaders. ■

The British should have a chance to resolve the Zimbabwe-Rhodesian problem. It is not in our national interest to move before they do. Our most effective role is to reinforce the British effort to bring the talks to a successful conclusion. We have been doing precisely that, and we shall continue to do so.

While the negotiations continue, the British are maintaining most of their sanctions. They have stated these sanctions will remain in force until the British Governor arrives in Salisbury. No other country has terminated sanctions against Zimbabwe-Rhodesia. Under these circumstances, there is no reason why the United States should stand alone in the international community.

As we look to the future, we should bear in mind that a peaceful settlement will benefit not only the people of Zimbabwe-Rhodesia but neighboring countries as well. Because of the hostilities, Zambia and Mozambique have suffered, and important lines of transportation and communication have been disrupted. The surrounding countries have also had to cope with a steady influx of refugees which has strained their economies and their societies. The process leading to an independent and internationally recognized government in Zimbabwe will allow the recovery process to begin throughout the region.

The Lancaster House conference is in its concluding moments. The goal we share is within sight. We urge the Congress not to take precipitous action by lifting sanctions now.

DEC. 5, 1979

Since the announcement of the President's determination, there have been important developments at the Lancaster House conference. On November 15, the Patriotic Front delegation agreed to the transition arrangements, which were the focus of the second stage of the conference. These arrangements provide for a British Governor who will assume all legislative and executive authority and manage the elections. In the same sense that the earlier agreement on constitutional proposals provided for majority rule, the transition proposals provide an impartial framework for the holding of elections. These are extremely important and significant accomplishments. They are entirely consistent with our previous objectives when we sought to obtain a negotiated settlement to the Rhodesian problem.

Subsequently and during the past 2½ weeks, the conference has addressed the cease-fire issues. This constitutes the last phase of the negotiations. The Salisbury delegation has agreed to the cease-fire proposals which were tabled by the British on November 16 and were amplified on November 22. Lord Carrington provided a more detailed description of these proposals to the Patriotic Front on November 28 and asked for a positive response to them so that technical discussions could be conducted to work out the final details for the implementation of a cease-fire.

As of the time of the preparation of this statement, the Patriotic Front has not replied favorably to Lord Carrington's request. The Patriotic Front has advanced counterproposals on cease-fire arrangements, and discussions are continuing.

Under these circumstances, the Administration continues to believe that this is not the moment to lift sanctions. The negotiations have not been concluded; the British are retaining most of their sanctions at this point; and the British Governor has not arrived in Salisbury and assumed authority. No other country has ended sanctions against Zimbabwe-Rhodesia. If we were to lift sanctions now, we would stand alone and isolated in the international community.

On December 3, the Secretary of State informed the Senate Foreign Relations Committee that when the British Governor arrives in Salisbury to implement an agreed Lancaster House settlement and the electoral process begins, the President will take prompt action to lift sanctions. The Secretary said that this will be done no later than 1 month after the Governor's arrival.

The Secretary also took the position that if an agreed settlement is not reached at the conference, we will consult with the respective committees of the Senate and the House regarding the course of action which best serves the national interest.

I would emphasize, however, that in view of the agreements which have been reached at Lancaster House, the prospects for a successful conclusion to the negotiations remain very good. We believe that the talks can be concluded quickly and the terms of the agreements can soon thereafter be implemented. If this is achieved, the Administration will move to terminate sanctions for there would be no reason to maintain sanctions under these conditions.

Our principal objective in the immediate days ahead should be to lend full support to the British effort to bring the conference to a successful conclusion promptly. This has been our overriding purpose ever since the conference began, and I believe that we have been helpful to the negotiating process. We must never lose sight that the United Kingdom has primary responsibility for Rhodesia and that they should have the opportunity to resolve this problem. After 15 years of failed negotiations, I do not believe this is too much to ask.

The parties are now close to an agreement. When the record of the last 3 months is reviewed, it is remarkable that so much has been accomplished. We must give great credit for this result to the skill that Prime Minister Thatcher and Foreign Secretary Carrington have shown during the negotiations. Until we know the final outcome at Lancaster House, however, we should not risk jeopardizing that process by lifting sanctions now. ■

<sup>1</sup>The complete transcript of the hearings will be published by the committees and will be available from the Superintendent of Documents, U.S. Government Printing Office, Washington, D.C. 20402.

## Sanctions Against Southern Rhodesia

MEMORANDUM FOR THE SECRETARY OF STATE,  
NOV. 14, 1979<sup>1</sup>

*Subject:* Maintenance of Sanctions Against Zimbabwe-Rhodesia Under Section 408(b) of the Department of State Authorization Act, Fiscal Years 1980 and 1981.

Pursuant to Section 408(b) of the Department of State Authorization Act, Fiscal Years 1980 and 1981 (93 Stat. 405), hereby determine that it is in the national interest of the United States to continue sanctions against Zimbabwe-Rhodesia at this time.

You are requested, on my behalf, to report this determination promptly to Speaker of the House of Representatives and the Chairman of the Committee on Foreign Relations of the Senate.

You are further requested to report me immediately upon the conclusion of the present Constitutional Conference on Zimbabwe-Rhodesia being held in London describing the conclusions of that conf

## Southern Rhodesia Settlement

nce and your recommendations for action by the United States with respect to the termination of sanctions.

This determination shall be published in the FEDERAL REGISTER.

JIMMY CARTER

**Justification for Presidential Determination Under Section 408(b) of the Department of State Authorization Act, Fiscal Years 1980 and 1981 Concerning Sanctions Against Zimbabwe-Rhodesia**

### Problem

Section 408(b) of the Department of State Authorization Act, Fiscal Years 1980 and 1981, requires that sanctions against Zimbabwe-Rhodesia be terminated by November 15, 1979, unless the President determines that it would not be in the national interest of the United States and so reports to the Congress.

### Justification

Encouraging progress has been made in recent months toward a peaceful resolution of the conflict in Zimbabwe-Rhodesia; however, the negotiations presently being conducted by the United Kingdom with the parties have not yet been concluded, and differences still remain. A termination of negotiations at this stage could lead all the parties to harden their positions and would jeopardize the chances for a successful settlement for Zimbabwe-Rhodesia.

The British Government has not yet included negotiations that would end the rebellion in Rhodesia. They have stated that this will occur when the British Governor arrives in Salisbury and assumes authority. At the present time, the great bulk of British sanctions remain in force and one of our major allies has taken action to terminate sanctions.

The negotiations are now at a critical stage. We hope they will be rapidly and successfully concluded. While the talks continue, it would be premature for the United States to alter its position on sanctions. We would, however, be prepared to lift sanctions when a British Governor assumes authority in Salisbury and a process leading to impartial elections has begun. Our policy will continue to be that no party should have a veto over fair settlement proposals.

This issue will be kept under continuous review and the President will promptly notify the Congress when conditions warrant the lifting of sanctions. ■

### DEPARTMENT STATEMENT, DEC. 6, 1979<sup>1</sup>

The U.S. Government welcomes the news of an agreement on cease-fire arrangements for Zimbabwe-Rhodesia. The historic accomplishments of the Lancaster House negotiations reflect great credit on all of the participants who have displayed a seriousness of purpose and a willingness to compromise in the interest of ending the bloodshed.

Although a few issues remain to be dealt with in detail, the United States is confident that a settlement is near and urges all the parties to conclude the historic task in which they are engaged. In doing so, the British Government and the parties have the full support of the American Government.

### DEPARTMENT STATEMENT, DEC. 12, 1979<sup>2</sup>

The United States welcomes and urges prompt acceptance of the now complete British proposals for a settlement in Zimbabwe-Rhodesia. Those parts of the proposals already agreed to by the parties provide for a democratic constitution with protection of individual rights and elections for an independent government in which all parties can participate freely.

The final proposals for implementation of the cease-fire certainly would appear to assure that voters could choose their government in peace, free from intimidation by any faction.

We strongly urge the Patriotic Front to accept the cease-fire implementation proposals and join in the settlement. It would be tragic if this remarkable chance for peace were lost in last-minute efforts to gain military advantage.

As the President has said, our policy will continue to be that no party should have a veto over fair settlement proposals.

### DEPARTMENT STATEMENT, DEC. 15, 1979<sup>3</sup>

With the arrival of the British Governor in Salisbury on December 12, the United Kingdom has assumed legal and constitutional authority in Rhodesia, and a process leading to impartial elections and independence has begun. The

British Government has taken this action on the basis of proposals developed by the parties at the Lancaster House conference.

On the Governor's arrival, ordinances have come into effect which establish the powers of the Election Commissioner and make provision for the Election Council. All parties which agree to campaign peacefully will be able to do so freely. All parties which wish to participate in the elections have been invited to register. The British Government is taking the legislative action necessary to bring into force those parts of the independence constitution required for elections to be held.

It has been heartening that the two delegations led by Bishop Muzorewa and Messrs. Nkomo and Mugabe have accepted the basic principles of all the proposals elaborated by the British delegation in the Lancaster House negotiations. The remaining issues relate to some aspects of the implementation of the cease-fire. On December 11, British Foreign Secretary Lord Carrington presented detailed cease-fire proposals which we believe provide the assurances necessary for the Patriotic Front to have confidence in the conditions under which the elections will take place.

Having studied all the British proposals presented at Lancaster House for the constitution, the transitional arrangements, and the cease-fire, it is our judgment that they are fair and make possible an impartial election leading to a just settlement of the Rhodesian conflict.

In these circumstances, it seems clear that the aims and objectives of the U.N. sanctions as set forth in the relevant resolutions of the Security Council, have, in fact, been achieved.

President Carter, in explaining his November 14 decision to maintain sanctions against Rhodesia, stated that he would be prepared to lift sanctions when a British Governor assumes authority in Salisbury and a process leading to impartial elections has begun. These conditions have now been met, and the President has ordered, effective midnight the 16th of December, that U.S. sanctions against Rhodesia be lifted.

<sup>1</sup> Text from Weekly Compilation of Presidential Documents of Nov. 19, 1979.



## WHITE HOUSE STATEMENT, DEC. 17, 1979<sup>1</sup>

Today, final agreement was reached at Lancaster House on a Rhodesian settlement. The world can celebrate a triumph of reason and an extraordinary diplomatic success. A long, destructive, and tragic conflict is ending.

This settlement is a tribute to the parties concerned, who rose above bitterness and suspicion to agree upon a formula for peace. It is a tribute to the United Kingdom, whose leaders took the issue directly in hand and applied a remarkable combination of wisdom, courage, persistence, and skill. The concerned African states played a vital role.

Active American involvement in the search for a Rhodesian settlement began in the last Administration. In cooperation with the British we intensified that effort and, since last summer, have given our full support to the British negotiations.

The settlement which has been attained can lead to an enduring peace in Zimbabwe and promote tranquility in the region. It is founded upon majority rule with protection of minority rights and reflects the interest of all of the parties.

As the process leading to an independent Zimbabwe unfolds, it will be incumbent upon the international community, and especially the surrounding states, to support and respect the electoral process and its outcome.

For its part, the United States looks forward to the day when an independent Zimbabwe can be welcomed to the family of nations. ■

<sup>1</sup> Read to news correspondents by Department spokesman Hodding Carter III.

<sup>2</sup> Read to news correspondents by acting Department spokesman Tom Reston.

<sup>3</sup> Made available to news correspondents by acting Department spokesman Tom Reston.

<sup>4</sup> Text from Weekly Compilation of Presidential Documents of Dec. 24, 1979.

## Group Formed for Development

For the purpose of strengthening their economic assistance effort in sub-Saharan Africa, representatives of Belgium, Canada, the Federal Republic of Germany, France, the United Kingdom, and the United States have met in Paris, on the French Government's ini-

tiative, in order to work toward coordination of resources for joint projects within the framework of a concerted action for development in Africa. They are prepared to consider widening the circle of donor countries to other members of the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development.

The six countries, aware of the fact that Africa has a great need for substantial assistance from the international community, are resolved to take this necessity into account. They have more particularly in mind projects of a regional character related, for example, to the opening-up of land-locked regions, the development of agricultural resources, or the effects of problems such as drought or tropical diseases, since these action areas require efforts which are still only partially covered by the national or international programs.

They deem it indispensable that this new action should be elaborated in close collaboration with the Africans concerned on the continental, regional, or national levels in such a way that projects which are selected for joint action conform to priorities set by the Africans themselves. This means that the concerted action should harmonize with the existing international and national programs.

The projects shall be identified and carried out according to appropriate procedures which will be worked out during periodic meetings of representatives of donor countries. A permanent liaison will be insured by means of a group of officials in Paris beginning January 1, 1980. ■

Unnumbered press release of Dec. 28, 1979.

## Delay Requested for SALT II Treaty

### WHITE HOUSE STATEMENT, JAN. 3, 1980<sup>1</sup>

After consultation with the Senate leadership, the President has asked Senate Majority Leader Robert Byrd to delay consideration of the SALT II Treaty on the Senate floor.

While the President continues to believe that ratification of SALT II is in the national security interest of the United States, he has concluded that the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan, in defiance of the U.N. Charter, has made consideration of the SALT II Treaty inappropriate at this time.

The President has asked that the delay continue while he and the Congress assess Soviet actions and intentions and devote their attention to legislative and other measures required to respond to the crisis created by the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan.

### LETTER TO SENATOR BYRD, JAN. 3, 1980<sup>2</sup>

In light of the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan, I request that you delay consideration of the SALT II Treaty on the Senate floor.

The purpose of this request is not to withdraw the Treaty from consideration, but to defer the debate so that the Congress and I as President can assess Soviet action and intentions, and devote our primary attention to the legislative and other measures required to respond to this crisis.

As you know, I continue to share your view that the SALT II Treaty is in the national security interest of the United States and the entire world, and that it should be taken up by the Senate as soon as these more urgent issues have been addressed.

Sincerely,

JIMMY CARTER

<sup>1</sup> Read to news correspondents by White House press secretary Jody Powell (text from Weekly Compilation of Presidential Documents of Jan. 7, 1980).

<sup>2</sup> Text from Weekly Compilation of Jan. 7.

# Wildlife Protection

William A. Hayne

*Statement before the Subcommittee on Resource Protection of the Senate Committee on Environment and Public Works on November 7, 1979. Mr. Hayne is Deputy Assistant Secretary, Oceans and International Environmental and Scientific Affairs.*<sup>1</sup>

These hearings are timely. They coincide with an upsurge of activities involving international conservation issues and efforts by the Department of the Interior to increase international wildlife protection, drawing on the considerable expertise of U.S. Government agencies, especially the Department of Interior. They are also helped by other Federal agencies such as the Council on Environmental Quality and the Smithsonian Institution, the private sector, and international organizations to define specific needs and develop domestic and international activities to implement them. The Department of State is firmly committed to development of environmentally sound strategies and programs.

Until recently many nations, particularly the less developed ones, regarded environmental protection as a luxury of the rich. Now we see growing recognition that unless the natural resource base is protected, future economic development is impossible. This has led into increased willingness to protect soil resources and tropical forests. While there is yet in our view a long distance to go in recognizing the value of wildlife—apart from the obvious tourist attractions—the forests that help preserve needed habitat. But in the whole, increasing populations and the need for land in a never-ending quest for food, and raw materials. These pressures on the Earth's grasslands, forests, and croplands are unending.

The only visible means of supporting these new millions are the Earth's lands and a more intensive use of areas already dominated by man's activities. Unknown numbers of species slated for extinction unless countering together can devise new strategies for protecting wildlife and habitat until population growth is contained. Wildlife is our canary in the coal mine. Its decline signals our

## Framework for Protection

Today's hearings focus on channels available to the United States for the protection of international wildlife. The most important is the Convention on International Trade in Endangered Species of Wild Fauna and Flora, negotiated in 1973 and ratified by the U.S. Senate in 1975. The convention established an international system for controlling trade in endangered and threatened species and created a cooperative network of scientific and management authorities in signatory countries to administer the trade controls and advise the 54 member governments on the status of species covered by the convention.

Other international conventions and agreements collectively provide an institutional and programmatic framework within which nations are now making significant progress toward improved protection of wildlife species.

Before I move on to habitat degradation, the most important factor in wildlife decline internationally, I would like to note a couple difficult issues that reoccur in wildlife protection negotiations. Your committee may wish to review these issues and consider legislating clearer guidelines. At any rate, airing them as problems will serve notice that we don't like the situation any better than do some of our constituent groups.

One of the first difficult issues is that of Federal-State relationships. During the negotiation of a Convention on the Conservation of Migratory Species of Wild Animals in Bonn, and again recently in our preparations for negotiating with the Canadians a treaty on migratory caribou, the concern of State groups that the Federal government would use international agreements to encroach upon traditional State rights to manage wildlife has caused confusion. Lack of a clear understanding of the State and Federal roles brought widespread opposition from State fish and wildlife groups to the migratory species convention; it may happen as well to the caribou treaty. This ambiguity should be resolved.

Another issue is that of habitat protection in international agreements. We, as well as most other nations, resist any outside suggestions—especially those of a compulsory nature—affecting the use to which we will put our land. We are not always certain what economic activities are compatible with maintaining wildlife populations. Furthermore, we and other nations are faced with possible difficult choices.

To illustrate this problem, I invite the committee's attention to the proposed treaty with Canada on migratory caribou. Complete habitat protection is in possible conflict with petroleum exploration. Access highways on both sides of the border expose herds to sports hunters. What is the relative importance of these uses to the traditional needs of local people who use caribou for essential food needs?

Other issues that arose in connection with the negotiation in Bonn of a treaty to protect migratory species involved possible conflicts with U.S. Law of the Sea positions. We were also restricted by possible overlapping jurisdictions with existing treaties applicable to marine mammals and particularly by possible application to all marine species, including commercial fish species.

As the committee may be aware, the United States and a number of other major countries were unable to sign this convention at Bonn.

## Habitat Degradation

There is growing recognition that the major issue is the loss of critical habitat in many regions. Accordingly, our wildlife conservation efforts now center on the advancement of habitat protection strategies. This is most difficult to do effectively; the United States has supported and assisted a number of recent international efforts that support this goal including the world conservation strategy (in preparation by the International Union for Conservation of Nature and National Resources), UNESCO's Man and the Biosphere Program, and the Global Plan of Action to Combat Desertification.

Chief among our efforts, however, has been development of a series of recommendations for the President on U.S. goals, strategies, and programs to help protect and conserve world forests.

**Forests.** One of our highest priorities is tropical deforestation. Forest cover in most of the world's tropical countries is disappearing at an accelerating rate to meet an increasing demand for cropland, rangeland, firewood, and commercial wood and wood products. One of the most alarming aspects is that mankind stands to lose critical habitat for hundreds of thousands of plants and animal species. This committee has heard from other witnesses about the importance of maintaining genetic diversity and about the potential benefits of many indi-

vidual tropical species threatened with extinction which have, to date, never even been examined for their social and economic values.

In June 1978, the Department of State and the Agency for International Development (AID) cosponsored a "U.S. Strategy Conference on Tropical Deforestation" to obtain a better assessment of the nature of the problem, to clarify U.S. interests in addressing it, and to obtain views on an appropriate U.S. response. One result was the establishment by the State Department of an interagency task force on tropical forests to provide a government-wide focal point for policy and program planning and coordination. The conference also recommended that a comprehensive "U.S. policy strategy and program" on tropical forests be developed to shape and guide future U.S. efforts in this area; we anticipate transmitting recommendations on this to the President next month.

I believe that we must mobilize an expanded U.S. effort on tropical forest management which will catalyze and support a much larger effort by the international community as a whole. In pursuit of this, the United States raised the deforestation issue at the U.N. General Assembly earlier this week and over the past year in other major U.N. forums. Last May, the Governing Council of the U.N. Environment Program overwhelmingly approved a U.S.-sponsored resolution calling for an international meeting of experts to develop proposals for a coordinated action program, and a division of labor, to insure better management of tropical forests. That meeting is now scheduled for February 1980 in Gabon.

Given the fact that the U.S. possesses less than 1% of the world's tropical forests, it is clear that international cooperation is the key to any success we wish to achieve in this area.

**Acid Rain.** Moving closer to habitat in our own forests and lakes, we see a problem, particularly in the Northeast, of acid rain. This is a widely recognized problem as was illustrated earlier this month when 800 people gathered in Toronto for a "action seminar on acid precipitation" under the sponsorship of the National Clean Air Coalition and a number of environmental groups. We anticipate that President Carter and Canadian Prime Minister Clark will discuss this topic when they next meet. Next week Douglas M. Costle, Administrator of the Environmental Protection Agency, will sign for the United States, in Geneva, a Convention on Long-Range Transboundary Air Pollution.

Acid rain has been linked to sharp declines in the number of fish in many lakes and streams. Some freshwater lakes in Canada, the United States, and Scandinavia are totally unable to support fish life. We are less certain of our facts with respect to the effect on vegetation, but there is evidence to show that tree growth is slowed and agricultural crops are affected adversely.

Negotiations have been begun with Canada with a view to conclude a treaty concerning the transboundary acid rain problem.

Meanwhile, we and the Canadians are engaged in a number of joint programs to attack this problem pending the negotiation of a treaty. By their signature to the Economic Commission for Europe treaty in Geneva, both Canada and the United States will accept the broad and rather general obligations specified in that convention concerning transboundary air pollutants. Efforts are now underway to implement the extensive programs to combat acid rain set out in President Carter's environmental message of August 2. These measures have a direct bearing on our transboundary acid rain problem and on wildlife habitat in the United States and Canada.

Tropical deforestation and acid rain are two very different types of habitat disruption for the many species of wildlife that call the forests, both tropical and temperate, home. On both fronts the Department of State is looking for solutions before the situation deteriorates further.

## Trade in Elephant Products

Earlier in the year Chairman John Murphy of the House Merchant Marine and Fisheries Committee introduced H.R. 4685, a bill to provide for the control of the importing into, and the exporting from, the United States of elephants and elephant products. The bill authorizes the Secretary of the Interior to permit importation of elephant products only from nations actively managing and conserving elephant populations.

The Administration, while in sympathy with the intent of the bill, opposed H.R. 4685, largely because it was not certain that an elephant product import ban would actually help save elephants.

In response to Chairman Murphy's request that the State Department canvas its sources for African elephant range state views on the legislation and on the elephant conservation situation in general, we found division among countries on the question of whether

H.R. 4685 would help conserve African elephants.

We found consensus on a couple other points. First, while range states appreciate our good intentions in seeking ways to assist them in controlling illegal trade in elephant products and generally regard the convention on trade in endangered species as useful, they do not have the financial wherewithal to build the wildlife management infrastructure sufficient to bring them into compliance with either the convention or what H.R. 4685 would do if enacted.

Secondly, approximately two-thirds of responding states were interested in various types of technical assistance, ranging from wildlife training programs and equipment supply to help with creating and managing national parks and wildlife reserves. One range state spokesman commented that developed countries do not seem to understand fully the expensive demands on developing countries' limited resources entailed by compliance with the convention. He urged priority attention by developed countries to increasing funds available to elephant range states for enforcement of their conservation and antipoaching laws and for training of the necessary wardens and other staff.

We cannot set standards for issuance of permits to countries if there is no visible means to achieve those standards. If we are going to continue to press poor countries to join the convention on trade in endangered species, we must find a way to marshal existing monies and personnel into projects that offer multiple benefits. A pooling of agency resources through an inter-agency coordinating mechanism might aid the Department of State and other Federal agencies in this difficult task.

Many of the African elephant range states are AID or Peace Corps countries. AID is developing a number of natural resource protection projects which will also aid the elephant and provide environmental training for host country personnel. The Peace Corps has environmental projects in over 30 countries. Approximately 200 volunteers are involved in forestry, soil conservation, and watershed protection. Approximately 20 Peace Corps volunteers are involved in wildlife management and another 200 in fisheries management. Perhaps 200 more are involved in various water supply and agricultural projects which are beneficial to wildlife habitat.

The African elephant is not the only African species threatened with extinction. As populations grow and



# NATO Ministers Meet

*Secretary Vance departed Washington, D.C., December 9, 1979, to meet with officials in London (December 10), Paris (December 10-11), Rome (December 11), and Bonn (December 11-12). He then headed the U.S. delegation at a special meeting of Foreign and Defense Ministers of NATO members (December 11-12) and at the regular semiannual session of the North Atlantic Council (December 13-14) in Brussels before returning to Washington on December 14.*

*Following are the Secretary's statement in the special meeting, the communique, a statement issued by Secretary Vance, and the text of a joint news conference by Secretary Vance and Secretary of Defense Harold Brown on December 12 and Secretary Vance's statement in the North Atlantic Council on December 13 and the communique and Secretary Vance's news conference of December 14.*

## SECRETARY VANCE, SPECIAL MEETING, DEC. 12, 1979

The Foreign and Defense Ministers of NATO have just concluded a successful meeting of extraordinary importance. We have decided to proceed with a plan to deploy 108 Pershing II ballistic missiles and 464 ground-launched cruise missiles in Europe. At the same time, we have decided to pursue vigorously with the Soviets a meaningful and equitable arms control agreement on long-range theater nuclear forces.

The far-reaching decisions we have made here attest to the determination and common purpose of NATO's member states. The 2 years of intensive consultations which led up to these decisions give evidence of the mutual trust that prevails in the alliance.

Before Secretary Brown discusses the details of the steps taken here to strengthen NATO's defense posture, I would like to sketch for you the political context of these decisions.

The Atlantic alliance is committed to a reduction of tensions between East and West. But our pursuit of detente, including balanced arms control agreements, must rest on a firm foundation of military security. Relaxation of tensions is possible only when each side has confidence in its own strength. Serious negotiations

can only proceed when neither side doubts the will and capacities of the other. Steps to consolidate and strengthen NATO's collective defense thus are central not only to a secure deterrence of military threats; they also provide a basis for broader efforts to find a relaxation of tensions.

In a political as well as military sense, defense modernization and the pursuit of detente are twin paths along the road of security. In recent years, the Soviet Union has improved significantly its nuclear forces in Europe. The Soviet deployment of modern MIRVed SS-20s, and the Backfire bomber, threatens to provide the Soviets with nuclear preponderance in the European theater. In response, the alliance has developed parallel programs of modernization and arms control.

In deciding to deploy new long-range nuclear forces in Europe and to support the United States in its pursuit of a serious arms control agreement involving theater nuclear forces, the alliance is giving new meaning and force to its policy of deterrence, defense, and detente. Our deployment decision gives evidence of the continued vitality and cohesiveness of the alliance. This decision has strengthened our spirit as well as our forces, and it has conveyed the clear message that we define detente as a search for mutual and balanced, rather than unilateral, advantage.

In this context, we are prepared to enter into serious negotiations on long-range theater nuclear forces, within the framework of SALT III. Any agreement reached must—like SALT II—be balanced and adequately verifiable. We will not entertain any notion of a freeze which would confirm a Soviet preponderance in long-range nuclear forces in this theater. But we are prepared to negotiate an equitable agreement on U.S. and Soviet deployments of these systems at reduced levels. This would mean a reduction of the Soviet threat and a reduction in NATO's deployment program.

The modernization decision that we have made here also makes it possible for us to withdraw 1,000 nuclear warheads from Europe. In addition to this reduction, for each of these weapons we deploy, we will withdraw one existing weapon from Europe. Thus, far from increasing NATO's reliance on nuclear weapons, our

development increases, many more will disappear. The most feasible course would seem for the Federal Government, conservationists, and the Congress to turn away from single species approaches and work toward training wildlife and natural resource managers in regional centers such as the College of African Wildlife Management in Mweka, Tanzania, and the Wildlife School at Garoua, Cameroon. We must redouble efforts within the international organizations such as the U.N. Food and Agriculture Organization, the U.N. Development Program, the U.N. Environment Program, and the U.N. Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization which are engaged in wildlife management and ecosystem protection efforts.

## Future Needs

As mentioned above, the greatest present need is the protection of wildlife habitat. As this frequently puts wildlife needs in competition with people for agricultural land or resource development, solutions are not easy.

Depending upon the priority we in the United States are prepared to give to the protection of international wildlife, we should be able to extend additional help. It might be possible to coordinate better international activities of U.S. Government agencies with a view to protecting wildlife.

Greater use might possibly be made of Federal personnel assigned to temporary duty in countries which request training assistance. Sometimes agencies can spare someone for a 1 or 2 month assignment, when an entire year wouldn't be possible. Short training courses would double or triple the wildlife management expertise in many countries and help countries achieve the standards we might wish for them, in the process saving their resident wildlife from extirpation.

The Department of State does not have suggestions at this time for statutory changes that might facilitate our work. If we develop any suggestions, we will be glad to submit them for the record. ■

<sup>1</sup>The complete transcript of the hearings will be published by the committee and will be available from the Superintendent of Documents, U.S. Government Printing Office, Washington, D.C. 20402.

decisions will result in a significant reduction in the size of NATO's overall nuclear stockpile in Europe.

Our willingness to enter into negotiations on theater nuclear forces in the SALT framework is but one of a comprehensive set of arms control initiatives which the alliance is now developing. Mutual and balanced force reductions and the Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe are other negotiations which the alliance members are pursuing with equal vigor.

The political effects of the decisions taken here today are considerable. Faced with a real challenge to the security of Western Europe, the alliance has reacted decisively, prudently, and in a way that invites the pursuit of arms control initiatives. I believe that our governments can be proud of this memorable achievement, and that the free peoples of the alliance will show overwhelming support for the decisions made here today.

## COMMUNIQUE, SPECIAL MEETING, DEC. 12, 1979<sup>1</sup>

1. At a Special Meeting of Foreign and Defense Ministers in Brussels on 12 December 1979:

2. Ministers recalled the May 1978 Summit where governments expressed the political resolve to meet the challenges to their security posed by the continuing momentum of the Warsaw Pact military build-up.

3. The Warsaw Pact has over the years developed a large and growing capability in nuclear systems that directly threaten Western Europe and have a strategic significance for the Alliance in Europe. This situation has been especially aggravated over the last few years by Soviet decisions to implement programs modernizing and expanding their long-range nuclear capability substantially. In particular, they have deployed the SS-20 missile, which offers significant improvements over previous systems in providing greater accuracy, more mobility, and greater range, as well as having multiple warheads, and the Backfire bomber, which has a much better performance than other Soviet aircraft deployed hitherto in a theater role. During this period, while the Soviet Union has been reinforcing its superiority in LRTNF [long-range theater nuclear forces] both quantitatively and qualitatively, Western capabilities have remained static. Indeed these forces are increasing in age and vulnerability and do not include land-based, long-range theater nuclear missile systems.

4. At the same time, the Soviets have also undertaken a modernization and expansion of their shorter-range TNF [theater nuclear forces] and greatly improved the overall quality of their conventional forces. These developments took place against the background

of increasing Soviet inter-continental capabilities and achievement of parity in inter-continental capability with the United States.

5. These trends have prompted serious concern within the Alliance, because, if they were to continue, Soviet superiority in theater nuclear systems could undermine the stability achieved in inter-continental systems and cast doubt on the credibility of the Alliance's deterrent strategy by highlighting the gap in the spectrum of NATO's available nuclear response to aggression.

6. Ministers noted that these recent developments require concrete actions on the part of the Alliance if NATO's strategy of flexible response is to remain credible. After intensive considerations, including the merits of alternative approaches, and after taking note of the positions of certain members, Ministers concluded that the overall interest of the Alliance would best be served by pursuing two parallel and complementary approaches of TNF modernization and arms control.

7. Accordingly Ministers have decided to modernize NATO's LRTNF by the deployment in Europe of US ground-launched systems comprising 108 Pershing II launchers, which would replace existing US Pershing I-A, and 464 GLCM [ground-launched cruise missiles], all with single warheads. All the nations currently participating in the integrated defense structure will participate in the program: the missiles will be stationed in selected countries, and certain support costs will be met through NATO's existing common funding arrangements. The program will not increase NATO's reliance upon nuclear weapons. In this connection, Ministers agreed that as an integral part of TNF modernization, 1,000 US nuclear warheads will be withdrawn from Europe as soon as feasible. Further, Ministers decided that the 572 LRTNF warheads should be accommodated within that reduced level, which necessarily implies a numerical shift of emphasis away from warheads for delivery systems of other types and shorter ranges. In addition they noted with satisfaction that the Nuclear Planning Group [NPG] is undertaking an examination of the precise nature, scope, and basis of the adjustments resulting from the LRTNF deployment and their possible implications for the balance of roles and systems in NATO's nuclear armor as a whole. This examination will form the basis of a substantive report to NPG Ministers in the Autumn of 1980.

8. Ministers attach great importance to the role of arms control in contributing to a more stable military relationship between East and West and in advancing the process of detente. This is reflected in a broad set of initiatives being examined within the Alliance to further the course of arms control and detente in the 1980's. They regard arms control as an integral part of the Alliance's efforts to assure the undiminished security of its member states and to make the strategic situation between East and West more stable, more predictable, and more manageable at lower levels of armaments on both sides. In this regard they welcome the contribution which the SALT II treaty makes towards achieving these objectives.

9. Ministers consider that, building on this accomplishment and taking account of the expansion of Soviet LRTNF capabilities of concern to NATO, arms control efforts to achieve a more stable overall nuclear balance at lower levels of nuclear weapons on both sides should therefore now include certain US and Soviet long-range theater nuclear systems. This would reflect previous Western suggestions to include such Soviet and US systems in arms control negotiations and more recent expressions by Soviet President Brezhnev of willingness to do so. Ministers fully support the decision taken by the United States following consultations within the Alliance to negotiate arms limitations on LRTNF and to propose to the USSR to begin negotiations as soon as possible along the following lines which have been elaborated in intensive consultations within the Alliance:

A. Any future limitations on US systems principally designed for theater missions should be accompanied by appropriate limitations on Soviet theater systems.

B. Limitations on US and Soviet long-range theater nuclear systems should be negotiated bilaterally in the SALT III framework in a step-by-step approach.

C. The immediate objective of these negotiations should be the establishment of agreed limitations on US and Soviet land-based long-range theater nuclear missile systems.

D. Any agreed limitations on these systems must be consistent with the principle of equality between the sides. Therefore, the limitations should take the form of *de jure* equality both in ceilings and in rights.

E. Any agreed limitations must be adequately verifiable.

10. Given the special importance of these negotiations for the overall security of the Alliance, a special consultative body at a high level will be constituted within the Alliance to support the US negotiating effort. This body will follow the negotiations on a continuous basis and report to the Foreign and Defense Ministers who will examine developments in these negotiations at their semi-annual meetings.

11. The Ministers have decided to pursue these two parallel and complementary approaches in order to avert an arms race in Europe caused by the Soviet TNF build-up, yet preserve the viability of NATO's strategy of deterrence and defense and thus maintain the security of its member states. A modernization decision, including a commitment to deployments, is necessary to meet NATO's deterrence and defense needs, to provide a credible response to unilateral Soviet TNF deployments, and to provide the foundation for the pursuit of serious negotiations on TNF. Success of arms control in constraining the Soviet build-up can enhance Alliance security, modify the scale of NATO's TNF modernization requirements, and promote stability and detente in Europe in consonance with NATO's basic policy of deterrence, defense and detente as enunciated in the Harmel Report. NATO's TNF requirements will be examined in the light of concrete results reached through negotiations.



## SECRETARY'S STATEMENT, DEC. 12, 1979<sup>2</sup>

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The far-reaching decisions we have made here attest to the determination and common purpose of NATO's member states. The 2 years of intensive consultations which led up to these decisions give evidence of the mutual trust that prevails in the alliance.

Before Secretary Brown discusses the details of the steps taken here to strengthen NATO's defense posture, I would like to sketch for you the political context of these decisions.

The Atlantic alliance is committed to a reduction of tensions between East and West. But our pursuit of detente, including balanced arms control agreements, must rest on a firm foundation of military security.

Relaxation of tensions is possible only when each side has confidence in its own strength. Serious negotiations can only proceed when neither side doubts the will and capacities of the other. Steps to consolidate and strengthen NATO's collective defense are central not only to a secure deterrence of military threats; they also provide a basis for broader efforts to find a relaxation of tensions. In a political as well as military sense, defense modernization and the pursuit of detente are twin paths along the road of security.

In recent years, the Soviet Union has improved significantly its nuclear forces in Europe. The Soviet deployment of modern MIRVed SS-20s, and the Backfire bomber, threatens to probe the Soviets with nuclear preponderance in the European theater. In response, the alliance has developed parallel programs of modernization and arms control.

In deciding to deploy new long-range nuclear forces in Europe and to support the United States in its pursuit of a serious arms control agreement involving theater nuclear forces, the alliance is giving new meaning and force to its policy of deterrence, defense, and detente. Our deployment decision gives evidence of the continued vitality and responsiveness of the alliance.

This decision has strengthened our spirit as well as our forces, and it has conveyed the clear message that we define detente as a search for mutual and balanced, rather than unilateral, advantage.

In this context, we are prepared to enter into serious negotiations on long-range theater nuclear forces, within the framework of SALT III. Any agreement reached must—like SALT II—be balanced and adequately verifiable.

We will not entertain any notion of a freeze which would confirm a Soviet preponderance in long-range nuclear forces in this theater. But we are prepared to negotiate an equitable agreement on U.S. and Soviet deployments of these systems at reduced levels. This would mean a reduction of the Soviet threat and a reduction in NATO's deployment program.

The modernization decision that we have made here also makes it possible for us to withdraw 1,000 nuclear warheads from Europe. In addition to this reduction, for each of these weapons we deploy, we will withdraw one existing weapon from Europe. Thus, far from increasing NATO's reliance on nuclear weapons, our decisions will result in a significant reduction in the size of NATO's overall nuclear stockpile in Europe.

Our willingness to enter into negotiations on theater nuclear forces in the SALT framework is but one of a comprehensive set of arms control initiatives which the alliance is now developing. Mutual and balanced force reductions (MBFR) in Europe and the Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe (CSCE) are other negotiations which the alliance members are pursuing with equal vigor.

The political effects of the decisions taken here today are considerable. Faced with a real challenge to the security of Western Europe, the alliance has reacted decisively, prudently, and in a way that invites the pursuit of arms control initiatives. I believe that our governments can be proud of this memorable achievement and that the free peoples of the alliance will show overwhelming support for the decisions made here today.

## SECRETARIES VANCE AND BROWN, NEWS CONFERENCE, DEC. 12, 1979

**Secretary Vance:** I think you've all got a copy—and if you haven't got it, you'll get it shortly—of a short press statement which I have issued. I'd like to

say a few words of introduction and then Harold and I would be glad to answer any of your questions.

As you know from your meeting with the Secretary General, the Foreign and Defense Ministers have just concluded a successful meeting of extraordinary importance. We decided at that meeting that we would go forward with the program to modernize our long-range nuclear theater forces. And at the same time we decided to pursue vigorously our program for arms control agreement in the long-range nuclear theater forces area with the Soviet Union. As you know, the subject has been under study for approximately 2 years now, and the recommendations of the two study groups made their presentations to the group today and the final decision was taken. The decision, I think it is important to note, was a unanimous decision on the part of the alliance to go forward with the program.

**Q. Did you bring up the subject of the Iran crisis at any point in the proceedings? What did you ask of the alliance and what response did you get?**

**Secretary Brown:** It didn't come up today in the joint meeting between Defense and Foreign Ministers. I did raise it this morning with the Defense Ministers, and it was along the same line that Secretary Vance has been speaking to, and I'll let him answer it.

**Secretary Vance:** It will be coming up again tomorrow morning in the meeting which we are going to be having, and I will be reporting to the Council on the situation in Iran. It will be taken up in restricted session, and we will have a discussion of the Iran issue, and in my judgment we will probably issue a statement of the 15 nations, as 15 nations—not as NATO but as 15 nations.

**Q. Could you comment on the restrictions made by the Dutch and the Belgian Governments on the installation and the difficulties for the decision to go on with the production of the new arms?**

**Secretary Brown:** First, I would say that the decision was a very successful one in deciding to respond to Soviet modernization and increased deployments of its theater nuclear forces; that the agreement provides a solid basis for the United States to proceed with production of the missiles. The agreement did call for that, and you will recall that President Carter has insisted that if the United States is to



produce the missiles, there must be a previous decision on the part of NATO to deploy them. The Belgian Government, along with the United Kingdom, the Federal Republic of Germany, and Italy, has decided to deploy the missiles. It has also decided that it will examine the question of implementing that decision in about 6 months on the basis, among other things, of the success reached during that time in arms control of theater nuclear forces.

The Dutch position is that they will make a decision on whether to accept deployments within 2 years. But it should be noted that of the total number being contemplated for deployment, only about 15% or 20% are to be deployed in those two countries.

**Q.** We have three countries that have agreed to station these systems. The Germans have said that they will not be the only country that would take them on the continent. If Italy were, during the next 2 years, to decide for one reason or another to pull out, couldn't this decision quickly unravel?

**Secretary Brown:** The Germans consider their conditions to have been met. As I noted, Belgium, as well as Italy, has made a decision to deploy.

**Q.** Are you optimistic over a positive response by Russia on the offer of negotiating on the long-range theater nuclear weapons? And can you figure out how long it will take to start off—months or years?

**Secretary Vance:** I am optimistic that negotiations will get underway between ourselves and the Soviet Union on the question of arms control, in the field of long-range nuclear theater forces. As to when the discussions can get underway, I am merely speculating.

Let me say that the first step will be to assemble the consultative group which is to be established pursuant to the plan which has been developed. That is a consultative group including ourselves and our allies. We will be working to put together the final touches on what we will be sending forward to the Soviet Union, and following that there will be discussions with the Soviet Union. I do not rule out some preliminary discussions, but they would be only of a preliminary nature sometime in the next month or two. At what pace those negotiations will proceed is a different question, because it is the decision that these negotiations can best be carried out in SALT III. And we, therefore, have the factor of

when we can get to SALT III in order to get the starting date for actual negotiations.

**Q.** Given the Belgian and Dutch reservations, are you confident that Congress will provide them \$5 billion to finance this program, and moreover, what kind of signal of this lack of unity within the alliance do you think NATO is sending the Soviet Union?

**Secretary Vance:** Let me say first that I think that it is wrong to characterize this as a lack of unity. The decision taken across the board was that the program was accepted and that we would go forward with the program.

**Secretary Brown:** Indeed, this was a unanimous decision to proceed with the program, and these countries will all participate in the infrastructure funding, which is a part of the operations funding of these systems. The Congress, as you know, has been very interested and very concerned about the imbalance of theater nuclear forces between the Warsaw Pact and NATO, and as a consequence of this decision, I would expect that Congress will, indeed, support the program. They have been supporting the research and development; they have been saying, tell us when you have a place to put most of these, and we now have that.

**Secretary Vance:** Let me just add from somebody who sees it from a slightly different perspective, because I deal with different committees than Harold does in the Congress. I find the same interest and importance attached to the modernization of our theater nuclear forces, and I would expect that we would find support in the Congress.

**Q.** What was your reaction to the Danish proposal?

**Secretary Vance:** Insofar as the Danish proposal was concerned—which called for a deferral for 6 months or a postponement of making any decision—I have felt all along that we could not and should not postpone this decision. The time had come, after 2 years of study, when all the work was done; we've got to get on with the process of modernizing our forces. We've also got to get on with the companion program of discussions in the arms control area so that the sooner the better, and, therefore, I was against any postponement.

**Secretary Brown:** Moreover, the proposal found no support from any other country, partly because I think was realized that during that 6 months the Soviet deployment of SS-20s, which continues at the same or perhaps even an accelerated rate as part of the theater nuclear force increase and modernization, would have deployed about 200 additional nuclear warheads against the countries of Western Europe.

**Q. [Inaudible] by the Defense Minister includes a specific reference of assumption that SALT II will have been ratified by the end of this 2-year period. Before this meeting, there have been, over some period, indications that the ratification of SALT would have an important influence on European positions. Do you feel that if SALT had been ratified by now, all the alliance members would have been able to stay on the same line?**

**Secretary Vance:** I don't know the answer to that. But let me say—because I don't know enough about the internal politics of a number of the various countries—that I think all of you are familiar with the reasons that the hearings on SALT have fallen behind schedule in the Congress. It not only came about as a result of the need to get through vital energy legislation that is before the Congress right now but of course, we have been seized with the Iranian crisis which has not only taken most of the waking hours of the day in the executive branch but also has consumed a great amount of the attention and time of the congressional leadership and the Members of the Congress. As a result of these factors Senator Byrd decided that he would delay, until about the fourth week in January, the bringing forward of the SALT debate to the floor. I believe that it will come forward at that time, and is still my strong belief that we will, those hearings, come out with a successful conclusion.

**Q.** Don't you have any fears that the Soviet Union might consider the restrictions which have been put forward by Belgium, the Netherlands and Denmark as a sign of weakness as a breach in NATO solidarity and that they will seek political profit from it?

**Secretary Vance:** No, I don't think so. I think that there are obviously very difficult problems, political problems, in various countries. However the decision was taken in Belgium, a Harold Brown has previously indicated

you, to make a positive decision with respect to the problem and to the issue of deployment with the caveat that they wanted to take a look at the situation in the months to see whether there had been enough progress in the arms control field to change their mind. Otherwise, the decision is made; they are going forward.

**Q. Could you just tell us whether the United States is going to ask any other country, besides the five, on deploying the missiles in the coming 2 years?**

**Secretary Brown:** The program is made up by a military-civilian group, a so-called high-level group, and these were the candidate countries. I don't rule out further studies, but the program we are proceeding with is the program that the high-level group came up with.

**Secretary Vance:** Let me add one thing to that. We decided how many additional warheads were required in the modernization program. Having made that determination, the next step is to determine how it might be best to allocate the deployment, and the most sensible course of action developed by the group which was studied was the five countries which were referred to. And, that's how we arrived at the group that is included in the deployment sites for the new missiles.

**Q. If I understood well, it will take at least 2 or 3 years before these modern weapons are going to be installed here. What about if the Soviet Union, in the meantime, produces or acquires a more modern weapon? What happens?**

**Secretary Vance:** This is the very problem that Harold was talking about because as the months go by, more and more weapons are being deployed, and this is obviously a matter of great concern to us. This is the reason that we have both the modernization program and the arms control program. So that is necessary not only that we take the steps to move forward to produce and deploy these new weapons but also to proceed vigorously with the arms control aspect of this bilateral program.

**Q. Given your answer on possible timing of any negotiations, what do you think the Belgians will have in 6 months time to change their minds?**

**Secretary Vance:** Quite honestly, I would say that there probably will be not a great deal. I think negotiations will have been started by that time, but as anybody knows who has been involved in negotiations in the strategic nuclear field, these are very complicated matters. They proceed extremely slowly. We also took 6½ years to negotiate the SALT II agreement, and I would expect that this is going to be even a more complex negotiation than the ones which we've had so far in SALT I.

**Secretary Brown:** Again, I'm not sure that we've gotten across to the public the very substantial existing imbalance in theater forces. The Soviets have far more warheads, far more missiles, of intermediate range than the NATO alliance, and they are adding SS-20 warheads at the rate of about one a day.

**Q. To what extent does the Dutch and Belgian decision represent a message that they are sending to the American Congress on SALT? To what extent did you find the agreement that you reached here in effect depends upon ratification of the SALT Treaty?**

**Secretary Vance:** I think that as I said earlier, they continue to attach great importance to ratification of SALT. But, at the same time, they attach great importance to dealing with the theater nuclear problem. So, I think that it sends forward two messages to the Congress: number one, they stand just as strongly as they did before in urging and hoping that we can get on to ratification of SALT, and at the same time they want to get us moving in the theater nuclear field not only on the development, production, and deployment side but also on the arms control side.

**Q. Secretary General Luns said that the infrastructure financing would be done by NATO as a whole, which would seem to imply that all the systems are single systems and that the level of financing is rather lower than what Secretary Brown mentioned in The Hague what the United States might hope for. Or are you satisfied with what—**

**Secretary Brown:** The United States is going to pay for the development and production of the missiles. That is likely to run into several billions of dollars. The operation and maintenance costs including the guard force, security force, etc., construction of some base equipment, will be arranged

through infrastructure and that cost will be shared. The United States unquestionably will carry the great bulk of the cost.

**Q. Can you move ahead with negotiations on theater nuclear weapons if you don't get a ratification of SALT II?**

**Secretary Vance:** I think the answer is yes we can. But it will be much more difficult to do. Therefore, I think it's incumbent on us to get SALT II ratified and get moving on both aspects of the problem, negotiating SALT III insofar as central systems are concerned and also insofar as theater systems are concerned.

#### SECRETARY'S STATEMENT, NORTH ATLANTIC COUNCIL, DEC. 13, 1979

Before leaving Washington for this session of the North Atlantic Council, I reviewed our forthcoming meeting with President Carter. He has a deep interest in our work here this week and asked me to extend to all of you his greetings. I would also like to extend a special welcome to the Ministers joining the Council for the first time.

In the history of the alliance, this meeting will be remembered as a moment of special significance. Issues central to NATO are always important. But on this occasion, the issues before us are so important. Our decisions are of such deep meaning for the continued security of the alliance and for the strengthening of peace in Europe that our deliberations merit well the word "historic."

We meet at the opening of a new decade. None of us believes that the times ahead will be easy. But turbulent times can call forth the best that is in us. Such challenges can rally our societies to greater achievements. Our peoples have shown such strength throughout the history of our alliance. They will do so again.

We of this alliance, which has been so successful in the past, should look with confidence to the future. Our systems are strong and flexible. Our economies are resilient and innovative. Our peoples are steadfast. With continuing hard work and cooperation, we will maintain the healthy and strong societies on which our security ultimately depends.

It was the quest for security that brought us together in this alliance. Today, no less than 30 years ago, we

have the strength and the will to be able to decide for ourselves, through sober assessment, the requirements of our defense. This unique group of free nations, valuing our sovereign independence and collective values, will never permit others to dictate the terms of our security.

With the understanding and support of our peoples, we are now taking action to preserve the peace. We are acting to strengthen our strategic forces in the United States—to modernize our theater nuclear forces in Europe and to improve our conventional posture.

I am convinced that the alliance is on the right track. Our Long-Term Defense Program, our commitment to 3% real increases in annual defense spending, and our decisions to modernize theater nuclear forces promise to take us into the 1980s with a sense of real security. It has been clear to all that we will maintain the fortitude and determination necessary to carry these decisions forward.

The strength of our alliance remains the essential underpinning of our efforts to strengthen the framework for more productive relations with the East. It is clear to all that we will pursue security for Europe through negotiations as well as through military preparedness. Here also we need to move forward on a broad front.

- In SALT and theater nuclear force negotiations, we look forward to a more intensive alliance consultative mechanism. We must insure that the promise this mechanism holds for closer coordination within the alliance is matched by our determination to make progress in the negotiations themselves.

- In MBFR, our persistent and patient negotiations will continue to explore vigorously all promising avenues for achievement of an agreement.

- In CSCE, we will couple creative new proposals for building military confidence with a determination to preserve the integrity of the Final Act; to maintain progress across the board on CSCE issues, including those that most directly affect people's lives.

- In East-West relations, we understand that security in the broadest sense is not achieved by weapons alone. The members of the alliance will continue to show willingness to increase official, individual, and commercial exchanges. These exchanges can grow as a mutual commitment to better rela-

tions between East and West grows. As better understanding between East and West is pursued, all our people benefit from the lessening of tensions.

This alliance draws strength from our determination to achieve both mutual security and a lessening of tensions. This very important meeting provides an opportunity to match the challenges that we face with the decisions of wisdom—decisions that will reinforce our preparedness, strengthen the confidence of our peoples in our readiness, and enhance the prospects for greater security through the agreed control of arms.

Whenever we assemble, and especially at such moments of great decision as today, I believe that each of us is touched by the past, by recollections of the wisdom of the founders of this alliance. They knew that people who live in freedom are people at their strongest. They knew that collective decisions, made in freedom, are the strongest decisions. And they knew that free nations, acting together, draw strength from each other as they work for peace.

## COMMUNIQUE, NORTH ATLANTIC COUNCIL, DEC. 14, 1979

1. The North Atlantic Council met in Ministerial session in Brussels on 13th and 14th December 1979.

Ministers accepted with pleasure the invitation of the Turkish Government to hold the next Ministerial session of the North Atlantic Council in Ankara in the spring of 1980.

2. Ministers renewed their faith in the North Atlantic Treaty which guarantees the freedom, security and well-being of their peoples and the preservation of peace and international stability. Because their governments are based on the consent of their peoples, on democratic institutions and on the principle of equality and the rule of law, the members of the Alliance have the strength, enhanced by the will to assist each other, to face the challenges which lie ahead. Looking forward to the 1980's, Ministers expressed their confidence that, by maintaining the strength and cohesion of their Alliance and pursuing the complementary goals of arms control, disarmament and the improvement of relations between East and West in general, their governments would continue to make a major contribution to peace and stability in Europe and the world.

3. Reviewing developments in East-West relations since they last met, Ministers noted that the conclusions of the study undertaken in 1978 remain valid. They recalled their commitment to detente and stressed

the defensive nature of the Alliance. Even since their previous meeting showed the continuing influence of forces not conducive to the consolidation of international stability and security. They expressed concern over the direct or indirect actions of the Soviet Union and some of its Allies in a number of troubled areas concurrently with a very considerable build-up, both qualitative and quantitative, in Warsaw Pact military strength, and particularly with growing Soviet theatre nuclear and conventional capabilities. Ministers noted that these developments were a cause for legitimate concern and were not compatible either with assurances by the Warsaw Pact countries that they do not seek military superiority or with their publicly-declared intention to promote detente, particularly in the military sphere. Ministers reiterated their view that detente must be worldwide and indivisible character.

4. Ministers confirmed that their governments were resolved to take steps to reduce the growing imbalance of forces by improving their military capabilities and thus maintain an adequate level of deterrence and defence across the full spectrum. They recalled the determination of their governments to achieve, as a key element in conventional force modernization, more effective use of available resources through co-operative equipment programmes and increased standardization and interoperability of weapons systems. They noted with satisfaction the initial progress that has been achieved in these respects, they repeated that through the transatlantic dialogue they would continue to work towards more balanced relations among the European and North American members of the Alliance in the field of armaments development and production in order to enhance the availability and quality of new defence equipment. They noted the contribution which is being made by the Conference of National Armaments Directors in this respect, and the need to bear in mind the interests of the less industrialized members of the Alliance.

5. Ministers believed that efforts to achieve agreement in fields of arms control, disarmament and confidence building should go hand in hand with defence efforts of the Allies. They noted that recent proposals put forward by the Eastern countries echoed part the Western proposals and they saw them a hopeful indication of the evolution these countries towards a more positive attitude in the search for common ground. Ministers considered ways of advancing a propiate discussions and negotiations.

6. Ministers recalled that the Strategic Arms Limitation Treaty (SALT II) signed by the United States and the Soviet Union on 18th June reflected their desire for genuine arms control measures which should contribute to the stability of East-West relations. Ministers observed that the Treaty makes it possible to maintain a strong US strategic nuclear deterrent, which remains vital to the defence of the Alliance. Thus this Treaty, which will have the effect of



curbing the build-up of strategic nuclear weapons in the world, improves the prospects for detente without jeopardizing the security interests of the members of the Alliance. Ministers expressed the hope that the Treaty would soon come into force. They looked forward to the early continuation of the SALT process, on the basis of further close consultations within the Alliance, leading to additional United States and Soviet reductions and qualitative limitations in the nuclear field. They also expressed the belief that ratification of the Treaty would contribute to other possibilities of progress in the field of arms control.

7. Ministers believed that the process initiated by the Conference on Security and Co-operation in Europe made a most valuable contribution to the strengthening of detente, and offered further opportunities to develop existing and new areas of dialogue in the search for agreement. They expressed the hope that the CSCE follow-up meeting to be held at Madrid in 1980 will be a major step forward in that process. Tangible progress in the meantime in implementing the principles and provisions of the Final Act and adequate preparation are of great importance for the success of the Madrid meeting and could provide a basis for participation at the political level. Although here have been certain welcome measures of relief, in particular the granting of amnesty, and some improvement in other fields, Ministers noted with concern that in certain countries the situation remained unsatisfactory or had even deteriorated as regards respect for human rights and fundamental freedoms, including cases where citizens continue to be subject to harassment and imprisonment for no reason other than their efforts to bring about the full implementation of the Final Act. Ministers also noted that process in the field of human contacts was uneven and expressed their concern that the level of implementation of the provisions dealing with a freer flow of information and working conditions for journalists had remained low and, in some cases, had deteriorated. They noted with satisfaction, however, that the Final Act increasingly has become the standard by which the actions of signatory states are judged.

8. Ministers expressed their intention to devote increasing efforts to preparations for the Madrid meeting during the period ahead, emphasizing the importance of consultations among Allies as well as with the other participating states and of maintaining balance among all sections of the Final Act. They confirmed that they intended to approach and conduct the Madrid meeting in a constructive frame of mind and in a manner which would permit a thorough, frank and measured review of the implementation of all provisions of the Final Act. In this spirit, they will be ready to put forward new proposals and to discuss proposals from other participants calculated to bring concrete and balanced progress in all fields covered by the Final Act and thereby contribute to the vitality of the CSCE process. Ministers rec-

ognized the importance for the Alliance of developing the confidence building measures and the other provisions of the Final Act relating to certain aspects of security and disarmament, and hoped for concrete results in this regard at the Madrid meeting.

They reviewed with interest the proposals made in these fields by different CSCE participants, whether Western, neutral and non-aligned or Warsaw Pact countries, including those made by the latter in May and December 1979. They considered that the proposal for a Conference on Disarmament in Europe put forward by France is a useful concept providing a basis upon which to continue developing their approach in this field to bring about such a conference.

They agreed to work towards the adoption during the Madrid meeting, as part of a balanced outcome, of a mandate for further negotiations under the aegis of the CSCE on military significant and verifiable confidence building measures, applicable to the entire continent of Europe. These, if agreed, would help create conditions conducive to limitation and reduction of arms in the same geographical area. This process should take account of both the varied aspects of the existing security situation and of the current negotiations on other aspects of arms control and disarmament concerning the European continent.

9. The Ministers of countries participating in the negotiations on Mutual and Balanced Force Reductions reemphasized their determination to work for a successful outcome which would enhance stability, peace and security in Europe. They noted, however, their concern that despite representations made at the highest level by Western leaders to the Eastern participants, the East has made no effort to resolve the data question. These Ministers noted that agreement on the starting size of forces to be reduced is not only an essential prerequisite to any reductions, but can also serve to build confidence that a reduction agreement is being observed and that mutual security is being enhanced.

In order to advance the negotiations toward an early result, these Ministers approved a proposal for an interim Phase I agreement consistent with the objectives of their governments in the negotiations, in particular the establishment of parity in the form of a common collective ceiling on ground force manpower and agreement on a combined common collective ceiling on air and ground force manpower of each side in the area of reductions. Their new initiative aims at simplifying existing proposals for a Phase I agreement by focussing on US and Soviet manpower withdrawals and limitations, based on agreed US-Soviet data, and on associated measures applied on a multilateral basis. This interim Phase I agreement would open the way for a subsequent Phase II agreement, based on agreed overall data, providing for a common collective ceiling on ground force manpower

for each side at approximately 700,000 and for agreement on a combined common collective ceiling on air and ground force manpower for each side at approximately 900,000.

These Ministers called attention to the package of associated measures which forms an integral part of their proposal for an interim Phase I agreement. This package of measures is designed to promote military stability and confidence, to ensure adequate verification of an MBFR agreement and to help safeguard undiminished security for flank countries.

These Ministers urged Eastern participants to give prompt and serious consideration to their initiative, which takes account of negotiating proposals of both sides and which is in accordance with the agreed aim of the negotiations to contribute to the creation of a more stable relationship and to the strengthening of peace and security in Europe. They view this new Western initiative as an integral part of the arms control initiatives agreed upon during this Ministerial meeting.

10. Turning to the question of negotiations on disarmament and arms limitation in other fora, Ministers reaffirmed the importance which they attached to the adoption of effective, balanced and verifiable measures. They welcomed as positive elements the discussions during the first session of the Committee on Disarmament in Geneva and the deliberations of the Disarmament Commission in New York. They attached importance to the frequent and active consultative on these questions within the permanent machinery of the Alliance.

11. Ministers discussed developments with regard to Berlin and Germany as a whole. They noted that since their last meeting the climate in and around Berlin had continued to remain relatively calm. Ministers reaffirmed their conviction that an undisturbed situation in Berlin and on the access routes is an essential element of detente, security and cooperation in Europe, and noted the continuing relevance of the London declaration of 9 May 1977 and the Tokyo declaration of 29 June 1979. Ministers noted with satisfaction the improved climate in the relations between the two German states after a period of reserve and welcomed the conclusion of new agreements and the continuation of negotiations. Ministers consider this as a positive element in the process of detente in Europe, having at the same time beneficial effects for Berlin.

12. Ministers noted the report on the situation in the Mediterranean prepared on their instructions and underlined again the necessity of maintaining the balance of forces in the whole area. They requested the Council in permanent session to continue to consult on the question and submit a further report at their next meeting.

13. Ministers welcomed the continuation of the dialogue between Greece and Turkey in search of a peaceful solution to the differences between the two countries and they expressed the hope that in this manner positive results could be attained in the near future.

14. Ministers considered a report by the Secretary General on the particular problems faced by economically less advanced member countries which constitutes a sound basis for action. While noting with satisfaction the special efforts that had been made over recent months, they stressed the need to give further momentum to the efforts to provide, in the spirit of Article 2 of the North Atlantic Treaty, assistance to those countries, so as to reach concrete and timely results. They reaffirmed their continuing political support for this process which will, indeed, constitute an essential element for the fulfillment of the contributions by those countries to collective defence.

15. With respect to the Middle East, the Ministers affirmed the importance of elaborating and implementing a just, lasting and comprehensive settlement of the Arab-Israeli conflict on the basis of Resolutions 242 and 338 and with the participation of all the parties concerned, including representatives of the Palestinian people. Ministers noted with satisfaction the progress achieved by Egypt and Israel in the implementation of Resolution 242 insofar as their mutual relations are concerned. They reaffirmed that a lasting peace requires the solution of the Palestinian problem in all its aspects and the achievement of the legitimate rights of the Palestinian people in the context of a negotiated settlement that ensures the security of all states in the region including Israel.

16. Ministers warmly welcomed the agreement reached in the constitutional conference on Rhodesia. They expressed the hope that the cease-fire proposals agreed at that conference would quickly become fully effective, and that peace would return to Rhodesia and the neighboring countries. Ministers looked forward to the day when the independent Republic of Zimbabwe would take its place as a full member of the international community.

17. Ministers, recalling that the Committee on the Challenges of Modern Society (CCMS) had been set up in 1969, took note of the Committee's achievements during its first ten years. They commended its innovative and flexible approach to many problems of the human environment in fields such as energy conservation, alternative energy sources and pollution. Ministers noted the studies launched in 1979, including those of the restoration and conservation of monuments, and on man's impact on the stratosphere, as well as projected studies on the management of technology.

18. The Ministers who participated in the special meeting of Foreign and Defence Ministers on 12th December, 1979 noted with satisfaction that the decisions taken today by the North Atlantic Council in their opinion complemented those adopted at that meeting. Taken together, along with continuing activities flowing from decisions reached at the London and Washington meetings, they constitute a comprehensive programme of action. This programme comprises measures to reduce the military imbalance through concrete improvement and modernization of long-range theatre nuclear and conventional forces, and the following

wide range of initiatives particularly in the fields of confidence building and arms control designed to improve mutual security and co-operation in Europe:

- An offer to negotiate for substantial reductions in the level of long-range theatre nuclear forces as well as intercontinental strategic forces within the framework of SALT III;
- Unilateral withdrawal of one thousand US nuclear warheads from Europe as part of the 12th December decision;
- A proposal for an interim Phase I agreement for mutual and balanced force reductions, designed to give fresh impetus to the MBFR negotiations;
- A proposal for a package of associated measures in MBFR designed to ensure compliance with the agreement and to make military activities more transparent, thereby improving mutual confidence;
- In furtherance of the CSCE process, readiness to examine proposals concerning confidence building measures and a conference on disarmament in Europe.

These Ministers are determined that the 1980's should see a fundamental change for the better in the situation between East and West and will make every effort to bring this about. The programme of action which they envisage offers the best opportunity for creating more constructive relations between East and West for which their citizens have hoped for so long.

These Ministers considered that this programme represents a major new opportunity for the countries of the Warsaw Pact to translate into action the interest they have signalled in improving the situation in Europe. They call on the Warsaw Pact Governments to respond to this offer by making a determined effort, in all available negotiating fora, to achieve substantial results which will enhance security and mutual trust.

## SECRETARY'S NEWS CONFERENCE, DEC. 14, 1979

Let me say at the outset that I believe that this has been one of the most productive ministerial meetings of NATO in many years. The achievements were solid, and a sense of common purpose was impressively high. After this meeting and the NATO summit meetings in 1977 and in 1978, I think we can say that we have set the alliance on a sound course for the next decade.

Let me review for you briefly, before we get into the questions, what has taken place.

On Wednesday [December 12], as you all know, the Ministers reached agreement on an important program to modernize the theater nuclear forces and to start negotiations on limiting

theater nuclear forces in the SALT III framework. Yesterday, the alliance issued a declaration on the situation in Iran, and we had a very useful discussion of this subject, and I was heartened by the support shown us by all of those around the table.

Today the alliance has issued a communique which I think you have probably now seen which presents, in my judgment, a challenge to the Warsaw Pact to translate into action the interest that they have signalled in improving the situation in Europe.

The Ministers have agreed on a comprehensive program of action in the field of arms control which is designed to improve security and cooperation in Europe, and I'll sketch very briefly for you the principal items of this comprehensive program.

The first is an offer for substantial reductions in the level of long-range theater nuclear forces as well as intercontinental strategic forces to be discussed within the framework of SALT III.

Next, a withdrawal of 1,000 U.S. nuclear warheads from Europe as part of the theater nuclear decisions which were taken on Wednesday.

Third, a proposal for an interim phase-one agreement for mutual and balanced force reductions designed to give fresh impetus to the MBFR negotiations.

Next, a proposal for a package of associated measures in MBFR designed to insure compliance with the agreement and to make military activities more transparent and, as a result, producing and improving mutual confidence.

And finally, in furtherance of the CSCE process, readiness to examine proposals concerning confidence measures and a conference on disarmament in Europe.

The United States will be shortly transmitting to the Soviet Union the communique of the December 12 meeting which contains the decision taken by the United States following consultations within the alliance to negotiate arms limitations on long-range theater nuclear forces, and to propose to the Soviet Union to begin negotiations as soon as possible along the lines contained in the December 12 communique.

We also promptly moved within the alliance to implement the December 12 decision by constituting a special high-level consultative body to support the U.S. negotiating effort on theater nuclear weapons in SALT III. I think it is a comprehensive and a very impor-



tant program which was unanimously supported today.

**Q. The American proposal for deploying missiles in Western Europe was put forward on the theory that it would stimulate arms negotiations with the Soviet Union. And yet the reaction of the Soviet Union and their allies has been a negative one. Do you take that reaction as being just an instant reaction, or does it suggest something about their unwillingness to see the proposal the way you do and to negotiate?**

**A.** I take it as an initial reaction. It is my judgment that when they see and study the proposal that has been put forward that they will treat it as a serious proposal, and I believe that it does form the basis for negotiations between the Soviet Union and the United States acting in consultation with its allies.

**Q. What effect do you think events in Iran will have on the autonomy negotiations for the West Bank and Gaza, because the U.S. chief negotiator is a pessimist regarding the May 25 target date?**

**A.** I do not think that the situation in Iran will affect the negotiations on the West Bank and Gaza. As to whether or not the May target date can be met, I think it's too early yet to see. We've always said that that was going to be a very difficult set of negotiations. There are very tough issues to be resolved in those negotiations. Some progress has been made. There's a long way to go on that road. People are going to do their best to meet that target date. I can't say for sure whether it can be met or not.

**Q. Did you say that the negotiations about the reduction of the long-range theater nuclear forces will take place in the framework of SALT III? Does that mean that nothing can be started until SALT II is ratified by the U.S. Senate?**

**A.** What it means is that we will start consultations with our allies in January in the consultative group which I referred to earlier, and there will be constant consultations with them on a regular and periodic basis. I would say that they would occur at least at a quarterly basis and my guess is more frequently.

In addition to that, I intend to communicate to the Soviet Union in a few days—probably next Monday—the proposal which resulted from our deliberations here. I think it is possible to have preliminary discussions, but in-

sofar as actual negotiations are concerned they would await the start of the SALT III negotiations.

**Q. Does the United States now contemplate, either in SALT or in these theater nuclear force negotiations, adding our forward base systems to the mix in exchange perhaps for the Backfire?**

**A.** Insofar as the Backfire is concerned, as I indicated yesterday, Backfire is one of the issues which must be taken care of in the SALT III negotiations, and it is a key and important issue. On the question of forward base systems, they were excluded from the prior negotiations. We will have to wait and see what the Soviet position is in the SALT III negotiations.

**Q. Some U.S. officials in recent weeks have characterized the NATO arms control package as the most comprehensive arms control proposal ever made concerning Europe. Would you agree with that characterization?**

**A.** That what we arrived at today is the most comprehensive? Yes, I think it is because it's a comprehensive proposal that cuts across the entire spectrum. And when you see that, also coupled with the fact that insofar as central systems are concerned—we will be discussing central systems as well—it is indeed the most comprehensive that's ever been put forward.

**Q. Could you repeat the concrete proposals you are going with to Moscow which were very vague in the communique? Could you be more concrete on that?**

**A.** I think it's quite concrete. I've just been through an outline; what all they covered just a moment ago.

**Q. If we now add yet another echelon in the disarmament field of a conference—the 35 nation conference—how are you going to keep the kind of lines of what each is doing clear? What's the point of adding yet another conference to this process?**

**A.** The negotiations with respect to theater nuclear forces do add a complexity to the discussions in SALT III. There's no question about that. And it will be a much more complex set of negotiations than were the negotiations in SALT II, because they include not only central systems but theater systems as well. Insofar as the question of a conference on disarmament is concerned, that I think is a constructive

idea which has been put forward by France, and it's a useful concept which may provide a basis for putting forward—on which to continue developing their approach in this field to bring about a conference where one could discuss confidence-building measures.

**Q. Would you please outline for us what you think the accomplishments have been this week in terms of your efforts to get the hostages in Iran free and what future steps are contemplated?**

**A.** I have had a series of very useful meetings with a number of the heads of government of several of the European nations. In this I have been able to explore with them the current state of the discussions and activities which are going on in the diplomatic field and various actions which are underway and various actions which are contemplated. This has been very useful to us in helping to chart our own course of action, and I have been very pleased by the solidarity that I have found in the discussions with the various heads of government.

In addition to that I have had a chance here to meet with the Foreign Ministers of the 14 nations and to discuss with them also, in a very full but less detailed sense, the same matters which I discussed with the heads of state. I think I have outlined to them not only what the situation is but what the immediate prospects are for the days immediately ahead of us, and, again, I feel encouraged by the very obvious and clear solidarity that was shown by all of our allies.

**Q. You are speaking of solidarity. What I want to know is really whether you have asked, and whether you got some support by the European governments, in joining the United States of America, if eventually you will decide to apply sanctions against Iran.**

**A.** I have discussed with our colleagues the possibility of having to go to the Security Council for chapter 7 sanctions if action is not forthcoming in the release of the hostages. And I have discussed that at quite some length with not only the Foreign Ministers but with the heads of government, and I have been much encouraged by the response I've gotten. ■

<sup>1</sup> Press release 326 of Dec. 19, 1979.

<sup>2</sup> Issued at the conclusion of the joint meeting of NATO Foreign and Defense Ministers.



## Visit of British Prime Minister Thatcher

*Prime Minister Margaret Thatcher of the United Kingdom made an official visit to the United States December 16-18, 1979. While in Washington, D.C. (Dec. 16-17), she met with President Carter and other government officials. Following is the text of the White House statement issued on December 18.<sup>1</sup>*

The President met December 17 with Prime Minister Margaret Thatcher of the United Kingdom. Prime Minister Thatcher is making an official visit to the United States, her first to this country as Prime Minister.

The President and the Prime Minister reviewed the exceptionally close relations between their two countries and discussed a number of key world issues which are of particular concern to both. These included the Iran crisis, the Rhodesia settlement, Middle East, Northern Ireland, theater nuclear force modernization and arms control, strategic cooperation, SALT, the comprehensive test ban talks, international economic issues and energy, common approaches to the Caribbean and aid to developing countries, trans-Atlantic defense trade, and bilateral economic and commercial issues.

The President expressed his appreciation and that of the entire American people for the United Kingdom's assistance and support in connection with the international effort to secure release of American hostages held by Iran in defiance of universally accepted standards of decency and law. The President and the Prime Minister agreed that the principle of civilized behavior and the rule of law, vital to the whole world community, is at stake in the present crisis. The Prime Minister made it clear that Britain shared the anguish of America and would do its utmost to convince the Iranian authorities to release all the hostages unharmed.

The President congratulated the Prime Minister on her government's vigorous role in the Lancaster House negotiations and the potential these have for contributing to peace and stability in southern Africa. The Prime Minister expressed warm appreciation for the full support of the United States for an all-party solution to outstanding

issues and its readiness to promote further progress in Rhodesia toward a fully democratic, independent state, within the framework of the arrangements agreed upon by the parties directly concerned.

The Prime Minister explained the British Government's recent political initiative in proposing a conference of the principal political parties in Northern Ireland with the aim of finding an acceptable way of giving the people of Northern Ireland more responsibility for their own affairs. Both leaders condemned support for organizations and individuals engaged directly or indirectly in campaigns of violence and agreed that such campaigns only delay the day when peace and reconciliation can come to Northern Ireland. The President reaffirmed U.S. policy concerning the tragic problem of Northern Ireland as set forth in this statement of August 1977.

In security matters directly affecting their two countries, the President and the Prime Minister: (1) applauded the decision taken last week by NATO governments to proceed with effective modernization and deployment of theater nuclear forces and with arms control proposals designed to reduce, on a basis of equality, nuclear weapons of both NATO and the Warsaw Pact; (2) agreed that the earliest possible ratification of the SALT II treaty would significantly contribute to a safer and more stable international security environment.

The President and Prime Minister agreed on the importance of maintaining a credible British strategic deterrent force and U.S.-U.K. strategic cooperation. The leaders agreed that

their governments should continue their discussions of the most appropriate means of achieving these objectives for the future. In this connection the President and Prime Minister discussed the importance of increased efforts to strengthen NATO's defenses, both nuclear and conventional. The President reviewed the new U.S. 5-year defense plan, noting that in order to carry out that plan the United States will be increasing defense spending, in real terms, steadily over the next 5 years.

The President and Prime Minister reaffirmed their strong support for the NATO Long-Term Defense Program and for the NATO aim of 3% real growth in annual defense spending. The Prime Minister noted plans for further significant increases in the U.K. defense budget to improve the effectiveness of United Kingdom conventional forces, including provision of modernized equipment and reserves. The Prime Minister agreed that it was essential for America's European allies to share equitably in any collective defense buildup to meet the needs of the common defense.

During her visit to the United States, the Prime Minister is also meeting with Secretary of Defense Brown, Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, General Jones, and other senior defense officials; Members of Congress; Chairman Volcker of the Federal Reserve Board; U.N. Secretary General Waldheim, and the President of the U.N. General Assembly.

Prime Minister Thatcher invited the President to visit the United Kingdom at a mutually agreeable date, and the President accepted the invitation with pleasure. ■

### Prime Minister Thatcher and President Carter.



(White House photo by Bill Fitz-Patrick)

<sup>1</sup> Text from Weekly Compilation of Presidential Documents of Dec. 24, 1979, which also contains President Carter's and Prime Minister Thatcher's exchange of remarks at the arrival ceremony and following a meeting on Dec. 17 and their toasts at the state dinner that evening.

# U.S.-U.K. Atomic Energy Agreement

MESSAGE TO THE CONGRESS,  
NOV. 28, 1979<sup>1</sup>

I am pleased to transmit to the Congress, pursuant to Section 123d of the Atomic Energy Act of 1954, as amended (42 U.S.C. 2153), the text of an amendment to the Agreement Between the Government of the United States of America and the Government of the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland for Cooperation on the Uses of Atomic Energy for Mutual Defense Purposes of July 3, 1958, as amended, and my written approval, authorization and determination concerning the agreement. The joint classified and unclassified memoranda submitted to me by the Secretaries of Energy and Defense which provide a summary analysis of the amendment are also enclosed.

The amendment extends for five years until December 31, 1984) those provisions which permit the transfer of nonnuclear parts, source, by-product special nuclear material and other material for nuclear weapons and special nuclear material for fueling military propulsion reactors.

In my judgement, the proposed amendment meets all statutory requirements. The United Kingdom intends to continue to maintain viable nuclear forces. In light of our previous close cooperation and the fact that the United Kingdom has committed its nuclear forces to NATO, I have concluded that it is in our security interest to continue to assist them in maintaining a credible nuclear force.

I have approved the amendment and authorized its execution and urge the Congress give it favorable consideration.

JIMMY CARTER

## MEMORANDUMS FOR THE SECRETARIES OF DEFENSE AND ENERGY, NOV. 28, 1979<sup>1</sup>

Subject: Proposed Amendment to the US-UK Agreement for Cooperation on the Uses of Atomic Energy for Mutual Defense Purposes

I have reviewed your joint letter to me of November 2, 1979, recommending approval of a proposed Amendment to the Agreement Between the Government of the United States of America and the Government of the United Kingdom for Cooperation on the Uses of Atomic Energy for Mutual Defense Purposes. I note from your joint recommendation that the United Kingdom is participating with the United States

pursuant to an international agreement by substantial and material contributions to the mutual defense and security. The proposed Amendment will permit cooperation which will further improve our mutual defense posture and be in support of NATO.

I hereby:

- Approve the program outlined in the proposed Amendment to the 1958 Agreement;
- Determine that cooperation under the proposed Amendment will promote and will not constitute an unreasonable risk to the common defense and security; and
- Authorize the execution of the proposed Amendment for the Government of the United States in a manner specified by the Secretary of State.

JIMMY CARTER ■

<sup>1</sup> Text from Weekly Compilation of Presidential Documents of Dec. 3, 1979.

## 16th Report on Cyprus

MESSAGE TO THE CONGRESS,  
NOV. 28, 1979<sup>1</sup>

In accordance with the provisions of Public Law 95-384, I am submitting the following report on progress made during the past 60 days towards the conclusion of a negotiated solution of the Cyprus problem.

In my last Cyprus report to the Congress, dated September 25, I noted that the recess in the intercommunal talks continues despite persistent and intensive efforts by UN Secretary General Waldheim and his staff to bring the two parties back to the conference table. I regret to report that in the intervening 60 days these efforts have still not borne fruit.

The United States shares the view that only sustained intercommunal talks can lead to a just and lasting settlement of the Cyprus problem. We believe that the continuing good-offices efforts of the Secretary General are the most promising way to achieve a serious negotiation. I am pleased that our November 1978 proposals provided impetus for the current UN initiative. We have strongly supported that initiative since it began, and we shall continue to do so. In part due to our support, the Secretary General and his staff are making progress toward finding a formula on the basis of which the talks might resume.

The current session of the UN General Assembly is creating opportunities to explore avenues of progress on the Cyprus question. Secretary Vance had meetings with President Kyprianou in New York on September 26 and October 4. Other U.S. officials are in contact with principals in the Cyprus dispute, and with interested third parties, to prepare for the General Assembly debate on Cyprus. We hope that after

the General Assembly completes its discussion of Cyprus, both sides will find it possible to resume the intercommunal negotiations. It is essential that they not allow the quest for short-term advantage to erode their mutual objective of finding a settlement which meets the basic needs of all people on the island.

The long and tortuous history of the Cyprus problem demonstrates that peaceful progress has never been easy. The obstacles, while formidable, are not insurmountable. We continue to believe that progress is achievable, and we are vigorously seeking it. Toward that end, we remain in close touch with all parties to the Cyprus dispute, the United Nations, our European allies, and other states which have a legitimate role to play and which desire to contribute to the achievement of our common goal. Sincerely,

JIMMY CARTER ■

<sup>1</sup> Identical letters addressed to Thomas P. O'Neill, Jr., Speaker of the House of Representatives, and Frank Church, Chairman of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee (text from Weekly Compilation of Presidential Documents of Dec. 3, 1979).

### CORRECTION

In the November 1979 issue of the BULLETIN, page 35, the Secretary's statement on "U.S. Commitment to Western Europe," in the first paragraph, the last sentence should read: "The substantial forces we have deployed to Europe are one concrete evidence of that commitment." Through a typographical error, the word "one" was printed as "not."

# National Security and U.S.-Soviet Relations

by *Matthew Nimetz*

*Address at Duke University in Durham, North Carolina, on November 19, 1979. Mr. Nimetz is Counselor for the Department of State.*

Forty years ago, Winston Churchill—in a now famous piece of rhetoric—described the Soviet Union as “a riddle wrapped in a mystery inside an enigma.” He spoke, of course, before the creation of a wartime alliance between the Soviet Union and Great Britain and the United States, before the detonation of the first nuclear device, before the onset of the cold war and the division of much of the world between East and West, before the Cuban missile crisis, before the era of detente, and before the SALT process.

Our relations with the Soviet Union have undergone much change in the intervening years, punctuated with major developments and occasional crises, but the aura of mystery and unpredictability still remains. Both sides have yet to arrive at a common understanding of each other, much less a common approach to participating in the wider international environment.

That this should be so is not a reflection upon the wisdom or skills of the officials who have managed our bilateral relations in the past decades. There has been no lack of desire to carve out a peaceful and productive relationship with the Soviet Union, but we remain, however, two nations with fundamentally different points of view. Our moral values, social beliefs, and economic systems are very different. Our approach to international problem areas is often widely divergent. Our perceptions of the strategic military balance are probably quite dissimilar. Our approach to the Third World, to development issues, to the creation of a harmonious approach to North-South questions is not the same and often intensely competitive. Our methods of formulating foreign policy—including the assimilation of domestic viewpoints—are notably different. And our relationship often is influenced by developments in the international environment which neither country can control.

In large part the differences between our two countries are inescapable, and we must recognize that our

bilateral relationship must reflect the fact that we are dealing with a nation and a set of leaders whose background and principles and sense of national interests are very different from our own. The frustration and disappointment that sometimes accompany the periodic setbacks in our dealings with the Soviet Union are understandable; but we should not despair that overall progress cannot be made. We should continue to seek out those areas of accommodation that are possible while accepting the fact that the Soviet leadership will measure progress in our relations by a yardstick of their own construction.

It has historically been true that the United States and the Soviet Union have had only very few areas of contact. Our genesis as a nation was primarily in Western Europe, and our ties to that continent have traditionally been close and fruitful. Russia, on the other hand, on the periphery of Europe, retained a powerful tie to native Slavic and Central Asian traditions and culture that were untouched by the Renaissance and only superficially affected by 17th and 18th century humanism. The physical breadth and wealth of our two nations insured a degree of insularity to our two societies. We are both continental nations; the United States being surrounded by two oceans, and Russia being separated from major Western European centers by vast distances with uncertain communication.

Consequently, trade between our two countries has historically been very slight. Prior to 1917, our interests in terms of global developments centered on different portions of the world. Cultural developments and industrialization took place in each country largely independent of developments in the other. Perhaps most importantly, we developed a system of government that drew upon principles of individual liberty, representative government, and the subservience of the state to its citizens—all markedly different from the historical and cultural determinants that shaped the character of czarist rule and the Government of the Soviet Union.

## National Security

Thus, the historical background alone should caution us against being too sanguine about the degree to which the interests and attitudes of our two nations can be closely reconciled. We shall continue to remain fundamentally opposed on a variety of important issues. What has changed in the last four decades is not the degree to which the world views of the United States and the Soviet Union have converged but the number of areas in which our direct interests have intersected and occasionally clashed.

Nowhere is this more apparent than in the field of national security. We have entered a world since 1945 in which the growing arsenals of both countries and the revolutionary change brought about by the development of nuclear weapons has made it impossible for us to ignore the potential challenges of Soviet military power. Dealing with this new factor in the U.S.-Soviet equation is perhaps the central foreign policy problem we face today. How we respond to the fact that the Soviet Union has at last emerged as a global military force, with all the political and diplomatic consequences that stem from that development, will influence the course of our international policies for some time to come and profoundly affect the character, the stability, and even the continuation of the entire international order.

Until recently, the military forces of the Soviet Union were largely oriented toward territorial defense and control of the Eastern European members of the Warsaw Pact. The U.S.S.R. has always maintained a large standing army, but these combat forces were trained and equipped primarily to fight in defense of the homeland or on the periphery of the Soviet Union. Similarly, until the present decade, the Soviet Navy lacked a significant ocean-going capability, concentrating instead upon the deployment of smaller craft designed for coastal purposes. The Soviet Air Force, although impressive in many areas, was largely made up of tactical interceptors, and the U.S.S.R. has never emphasized the development of a significant intercontinental bomber force.

Beginning in the 1960s, the leadership of the Soviet Union began a major, sustained campaign to improve Soviet military capabilities across the board. Real increases were made in the Soviet defense budget on the order of 3% every year. Significant resources



were funneled into an extensive program of military research and development. New weapons were acquired and eventually assigned to combat units.

As a result, major changes have taken place in the power and sophistication of the Soviet military establishment. New generations of ICBMs [intercontinental ballistic missiles], equipped with multiple warheads, have gradually been introduced into the Soviet rocket forces. The Soviet Air Force has greatly expanded its ability to strike deep within an adversary's territory and carry out naval strike and interdiction roles. The Soviet Navy has now become a truly "blue water" force, capable of operating in all oceans of the planet and confronting us for the first time with a significant danger of interference with vital western sea lines of communication.

Why the Soviet leadership has chosen to emphasize military strength at a time when the Soviet economy is having great difficulty in meeting even the most basic domestic needs is unknown to us. Given the bitter differences in views among Marxist states and parties—among the Soviet bloc, China, Yugoslavia, Albania, and the Euro-Communists—it is hard to believe that the leaders of the Kremlin still pursue the dream of Lenin and Trotsky to subjugate the world under the unified rule of a Russian-based Communist dictatorship. To rational men those goals must long have perished as the ideological appeal of the Soviet Union has steadily diminished throughout the world. Whatever the motive, it seems obvious to us that the extent and degree of this Soviet military buildup is far in excess of what is reasonably required to protect the basic security interests of the Soviet people.

We should bear in mind that our definition of national security is not necessarily shared by Soviet defense planners. The Soviets obviously are concerned not only about the United States and our allies but about an unfriendly China on their border. Recent history plays a major role as well. Our country has not, after all, been subjected to an actual military invasion in this century. The U.S.S.R. has—twice—and with devastating results. The national calamity of World War II, with some 20 million casualties in the Soviet Union, is an experience that is deeply etched in the minds and psyches of every member of the Soviet Politburo. It has been pointed out that such

a trauma contributes to a policy that errs generously on the side of overpreparedness.

But we, as careful trustees of our nation's destiny, must base our planning on what we see and assume that current Soviet military planning springs from pragmatic and calculated geopolitical considerations. As dedicated as our nation may be to the peaceful resolution of international disputes, it is an indisputable fact that military power counts in the modern world. It counts not only in the direct application of force to the settlement of conflicts, or in the threat of its use, but also in the effects that the knowledge of superiority of military power inevitably has upon the actions that nations may choose to take or to forego when faced with a stronger and better armed adversary. There is no doubt that military strength is a powerful aspect of diplomatic relations, even if it is never actually used and never actually threatened.

### U.S. Policy

Our policy in the United States has been to meet the challenge of the Soviet military buildup in two ways.

First, we are determined that our overall military capabilities remain essentially equivalent to those of the Soviet Union and that they are sufficient to deter any aggression against the United States, our allies, or our military forces overseas.

Second, when we can reach agreement with the U.S.S.R. on the basis of enlightened self-interest, we are committed to pursuing those arms control initiatives which will reduce the likelihood of armed conflict, enhance our own national security, and contribute to international stability.

These twin goals are interrelated and mutually reinforcing. Together, they will help us in managing the U.S.-Soviet military balance in the years to come.

To insure parity between the defense forces of the two sides is not to insist upon a strict numerical equilibrium based upon the accountant's ledger or the unyielding comparison of any given set of static indicators. Simply counting up the number of tanks, ships, and other weapons deployed on each side would reveal a military balance that is inherently misleading in terms of what it indicates about the relative effectiveness of the two military forces. We do not need a defense struc-

ture that is a mirror image of the Soviet Union's. Perfect symmetry will not in itself guarantee the fulfillment of our true defense needs. Our geography is different; our relations with our neighbors are different; our economies are different; and our allies are different.

What we do need is a defense effort that is adequate to guarantee our national security, the security of our allies, and our worldwide interests. We are spending enough now to meet that goal, but the trends in Soviet military expenditures mean that we shall have to do more in the years to come. The Soviet military is currently outspending us, although it is worth remembering that the U.S.S.R. defense effort must draw upon a civilian economy that is much less efficient than our own. They also began their current buildup from a position of clear inferiority, so that we have had a marginal advantage for many years that has made it relatively less important that our defense expenditures match those of the Soviets.

Indeed, for most of the years in the past decade, our own military spending has actually declined when measured in constant dollars or as a percentage of gross national product. In 1960, for example, national defense expenditures amounted to \$115 billion (in 1978 dollars) and constituted slightly more than 9% of our gross national product. Those figures rose during the latter half of the decade due to our involvement in Southeast Asia, but they then began to decline. By 1977, we were actually spending \$12 billion less on defense in real terms than we were in 1960, and the percentage of our GNP allotted to the military had fallen to 5.3%.

Meanwhile, the Soviet military buildup continued unabated. (You should know that the Soviets devote about 13% of their GNP to defense.) As Secretary of Defense Harold Brown has noted, the U.S.S.R.'s commitment to rising defense budgets has been unaffected by the decisions we have made with regard to defense spending: "As our defense budgets have risen, the Soviets have increased their defense budget. As our defense budgets have gone down, their defense budgets have increased again."

Given these facts, we have arrested the downward spiral in U.S. military spending. Last year, the Administration was successful in obtaining a real increase in the defense budget of 3%, and the President has made clear his commitment to an increase in the next budget of at least 3%. We have

certainly not been standing still during the past 10 years, but it is equally clear that further efforts are required if we are to be successful in maintaining the military balance for the future.

We have, as I say, made some impressive strides in modernizing and expanding our capacity to respond to military conflicts throughout the world. In the field of strategic nuclear weapons, the President has decided to improve the survivability of our land-based intercontinental ballistic missile (ICBM) force through the development and deployment of the new, mobile MX missile system. We have just put the first of the new Trident submarines to sea, and we are currently in the process of deploying the improved Trident I submarine-launched ballistic missile. In 1981, we shall begin fitting many of our B-52 strategic bombers with long-range, air-launched cruise missiles that will serve to extend the useful life of the B-52 force well into the 1980s.

We have also sought to upgrade our capabilities in the field of conventional weapons. Together with our NATO allies, we have agreed upon a long-term defense program for Western Europe that will vastly improve the alliance's ability to respond to any military threat or incursion from the Warsaw Pact. We have accelerated our programs for the acquisition of sophisticated antitank weapons and other precision-guided munitions. We have generally upgraded the overall effectiveness of our conventional forces, and we are exploring new ways of organizing military units—such as the proposed rapid deployment force—that will enable us to meet military situations in a flexible and effective manner. A major watershed in the deployment of theater nuclear weapons will occur next month when the NATO governments meet to decide upon the emplacement of a new generation of medium-range nuclear weapons in Western Europe.

## SALT

Military competition can be managed, however, in ways other than mutual buildup of forces. For this reason we pursue arms control initiatives, perhaps the most important of which is SALT. SALT—the Strategic Arms Limitation Talks—is certainly not a panacea that will solve all our problems, and it is also not a substitute for the increased effort we are making in terms of defense outlays. For one thing, SALT deals only with a limited category of weapons—those that are nuclear capable and that are deliverable from the territory of the

United States to the Soviet Union, or vice versa. The talks have not dealt with conventional weapons or with shorter range, theater nuclear devices. These systems continue to be unconstrained by the arms control process.

Secondly, the SALT II agreement that is currently before the Senate of the United States does not go as far as we would like in limiting and restraining the strategic nuclear delivery vehicles that are included in the agreement. Both the United States and the Soviet Union will be able to modernize their strategic arsenals to some degree even with the SALT II agreement in force. We do plan, however, to make further progress in obtaining greater controls on strategic weapons in the context of the SALT III negotiations.

SALT II is an important step for the United States, however, because we will slow the momentum of Soviet strategic deployments in several crucial areas. The agreement will last until 1985, and we could well be facing a more dangerous strategic environment in that year without the controls that SALT II will provide.

- We know, for example, that the Soviet Union currently has four and possibly five new types of ICBMs either on the drawing boards or in the early stages of development. Without SALT II, the U.S.S.R. could deploy all five new types. With SALT II, they will be limited to one totally new missile system.

- Without SALT II, the Soviet Union could deploy as many as 3,000 strategic missile launchers and heavy bombers by 1985. With SALT II, they will be limited to no more than 2,250.

- Without SALT II, the Soviet Union could have in place by 1985 as many as 1,200 ICBMs equipped with multiple warheads. With SALT II, they will be limited to a maximum of 820.

- Without SALT II, the Soviet Union could deploy 30 or 35 individual warheads on each of their largest land-based missiles. With SALT II, they will be limited to no more than 10.

- Without SALT II, it is questionable whether the Soviet Union would choose voluntarily to make real reductions in its nuclear arsenal. With SALT II, the U.S.S.R. will be forced to dismantle some 250 strategic nuclear delivery vehicles that are now targeted on the United States.

The SALT II agreement, therefore, will enhance our ability to meet the challenge of rising Soviet defense expenditures. It will do so without constraining any significant military pro-

grams that we plan to inaugurate during the term of the agreement. It will be a useful complement to our regular defense programs, and it will aid us in predicting the future course of Soviet defense decisionmaking.

## Other U.S. Strengths

We should also remember that national security is made up of a number of important factors, of which military strength is only one. By most other indicators, the United States is clearly the most powerful nation in the world. In terms of our economic strength, the vitality of our basic science and technology, the appeal of our democratic lifestyle to other nations, and the political and social vitality of our society, the Soviet Union does not rank as even a distant second. Our allies and friends—Canada, Western Europe, Japan, Australia, and New Zealand—add overwhelmingly to Western influence and strength, particularly when compared to the demoralized and often reluctant supporters of the Soviet Union.

Let me mention the sphere of ideas—the competition for the minds of people—as another arena of competition where I believe we have a decisive advantage, albeit one we have not used as adeptly as we might. The Soviets, trained in the Marxist-Leninist tradition, place heavy emphasis on propaganda and on ideology, while we tend to feel less comfortable with heavy-handed verbal posturing.

But we should make no mistake about the importance of articulating our values strongly, continuously, and persuasively. Western ideals of individualism, personal dignity, and representative government strike responsive cords everywhere. The results can clearly be seen in the movement of people. The Soviet Union and other Marxist states expend great effort, including the crude use of walls and barbed wire, to keep their people from leaving. Our problem, as we review our immigration and refugee policy, is to decide how many of the millions who want to participate in our society we can reasonably accept.

It is only in the area of military strength that the U.S.S.R. has approached equivalence with us. We should not undervalue the enormous potential and capacity of the United States in nondefense matters. But we must also be realistic about preserving our ability to defend our interests, should that become necessary. For this reason, we see a new realism pervading

## Approaching Common Issues With Developing Countries

by Thomas Ehrlich

*Address before the Council of Presidents of the National Association of State Universities and Land-Grant Colleges in Washington, D.C., on November 27, 1979. Mr. Ehrlich is Director of the International Development Cooperation Agency.*

It is a pleasure to be here today. I am honored to speak before the representatives of institutions that have played a vital role in the development of this country and many other nations as well. My hope today is to underscore my commitment to a partnership in international economic development between the Federal Government and State universities and land-grant colleges and to suggest some of the ways in which that partnership can be strengthened, using the energy field as an example.

Your institutions have been a major force in increasing American and global agricultural production since the last part of the 19th century. They deserve much of the credit for our country's ability not only to feed its own citizens but also to serve as the granary of the world. Your universities have made powerful contributions, not only in educating students but also in sponsoring innovative research and, through unique extension services, in applying its benefits to communities throughout the world.

Our system of State universities and land-grant colleges is a particularly important asset to the developing nations of the world, where more than 75% of the world's people—over 3 billion human beings—live. Far too many people in these countries exist in conditions of abject poverty—more than 1 billion are continually hungry and malnourished, more than 700 million persons in developing countries are illiterate, and 2½ billion do not have adequate health care.

We should all be proud of the 30-year history of cooperation between your universities and the Agency for International Development (AID) and its predecessors. Research, extension services, and training facilities planned and implemented by your universities—in collaboration with your colleagues abroad—have helped develop vital technology and services for poor families in the Third World. Many of

the leaders in every walk of life in the Third World were educated in universities represented here today. The U.S. Government relies heavily on you for the expertise and training to manage many of our assistance efforts.

In 1975 Congress reaffirmed the vital role of U.S. universities in alleviating world hunger by passing title XII of the Foreign Assistance Act. The title mandates AID to utilize the skills and experience of American universities. It goes on to provide means for strengthening the capacities of agricultural universities to assist developing countries in increasing their food production.

As a former university dean, I understand the importance of government support in planning, building, and maintaining specialized capabilities. Concerns are increasingly expressed in some quarters, however, that foreign aid funds may merely subsidize American universities and not go significantly to meet the pressing development needs of poor countries. These concerns arise when there is a perception that development assistance funds are not being used directly to address the basic human needs of people in developing countries.

Our efforts should be and will be carefully scrutinized, especially in times of fiscal restraint. The ultimate success of those efforts rests on our ability to deal with the challenges represented in these questions. Your universities, the U.S. Government, the American people, and, especially, poor people throughout the world have an enormous stake in insuring that our cooperative arrangements are implemented in the most effective manner possible and that they are carefully and fully explained to the American people and their representatives in Congress.

### Purposes of Foreign Aid

U.S. interests are at stake in a wide range of problems that foreign economic assistance addresses. Our own prosperity and security, to a large extent, will depend on how effectively we assist developing countries in advancing their economic growth and meeting the basic needs of their citizens.

Our foreign aid serves both the development aspirations of the Third World and U.S. interests in three fundamental ways.

the American polity—a realism about the world that is neither defeatist nor cocky. The next decade will require strengthened defense programs, tough negotiations, and a firmness and constancy of principle. I have no doubt that we will meet that challenge. I have no doubt that the fundamental advantages, now and for the future, lie with the West, not the East. ■

## Publications

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**First**, our historical values and beliefs provide a humanitarian basis for our efforts to help alleviate world poverty. As a free people with one of the highest standards of living in the world, we must respond to the staggering picture of world hunger, poverty, illiteracy, unemployment, and disease and the misery that these words represent in human terms.

**Second**, we have vital global interests that require collaboration with developing countries. These include the need to control world population growth and the need to manage better the world's deteriorating natural resource base. The promotion of international human rights and democratic values vitally depends on our cooperation with Third World countries. Developing countries cannot adequately respond to these challenges without our assistance.

**Third**, foreign aid serves our economic and political interests. Third World development means more trade and more jobs for Americans.

- The developing countries are a major—and the fastest growing—market for U.S. goods. They already buy over one-third of our exports—the same share as for Europe and the Communist countries combined. One out of every three acres of American farmland produces food for export, much of it to the Third World, and 1.2 million American manufacturing jobs now depend on exports to the developing countries.

- The United States is increasingly dependent on Third World countries for essential raw materials vital to our economy and security. We import from developing nations 85% of the bauxite required for aluminum products. We obtain 93% of our tin from developing countries. The importance of oil imports from the Third World has been repeatedly, almost bitterly, brought home to us. I will focus on energy a bit later in my remarks.

- Our country earned more than \$16 billion from our direct investments in the developing world in 1978. Last year U.S. firms invested nearly \$6 billion in the developing world.

- Our economy also benefits substantially from aid dollars spent here to buy commodities and services. For every dollar we have paid into the multilateral development banks, U.S. GNP increased roughly \$3 as a direct result of bank lending activities.

A developing country's commitment to its equitable growth is the most

important factor in determining its own economic development. Basic policies concerning trade, investment, commodities, and technology transfer have an enormous impact on the development process. But external aid also plays a vital role, and this will continue for the foreseeable future.

Earlier this month I visited Bangladesh, Thailand, and Indonesia and saw how important the programs of AID, the multilateral banks, and the international organizations are to the development goals of these countries. The problems are enormous. I found the pressures of overpopulation in Dacca frightening, for example. Every aid program, of course, can be strengthened. But they are making a major contribution.

World peace and security interests are served by foreign aid because developing countries are key participants in the quest for peaceful resolution of disputes, regional stability, arms restraint, nonproliferation, and other basic foreign policy objectives. Good relations with developing nations are essential in a wide range of areas that affect our security.

Human economic and social progress, promoted by effective development, mitigates against conflict resulting from poverty, inequitable distribution of resources, and denigration of basic human rights. The words of Pope John XXIII come to mind: "In a world of constant want there is no peace. . . ."

The United States has committed substantial amounts of foreign aid over the past years—acting bilaterally and through multilateral development banks and international institutions. But since 1975, our contributions to development assistance as a share of U.S. gross national product have been only about ¼ of 1%. This year the figure is less than that—22%, which ranks the United States 13th out of 17 major donor countries. All foreign economic aid amounts to only about 1% of our national budget: \$7.3 billion for FY 1979. Given the importance of U.S. interests at stake, a major priority of all our efforts must be to seek support throughout this country for stronger development assistance efforts in the future.

## Role of IDCA

An important step in that direction came earlier this fall when the new International Development Cooperation Agency (IDCA) was established. The IDCA, which came into being on Oc-

tober 1, 1979, plays the central role in U.S. development assistance efforts. It is primarily responsible for formulating U.S. international development policies for the President and for serving as his principal spokesman on those matters.

As the principal adviser to the President on international development, IDCA must insure that our varied bilateral and multilateral development efforts are coordinated, efficient, and effective. The agency just prepared the first comprehensive foreign assistance budget and will present it next year to the Congress and the American people.

The component parts of IDCA include AID, the Overseas Private Investment Corporation, and—if approved by Congress—a new Institute for Scientific and Technological Cooperation. IDCA's concern and responsibility is economic development, and from this perspective it shares with the State Department responsibility for U.S. involvement in the U.N. system; with the Treasury Department, responsibility for U.S. participation in the multilateral development banks; and with the Department of Agriculture, the direction of the U.S. Food for Peace Program.

Finally, the new agency has been mandated by the President and Congress to insure that our economic relations with developing nations are taken into account in the full range of U.S. international policies, including trade, commodity arrangements, and financial matters.

In short, IDCA has a broad range of responsibilities that extend beyond U.S. bilateral assistance. The agency should lead the way in analyzing and understanding the full complexity of U.S. economic relations with developing nations and provide advice on the development aspects of these relationships. In that role, we need your help—we need the partnership of your institutions in many areas, just as it exists in agriculture. Let me use energy as an example.

## Challenge of Energy Development

Among development problems, none is more challenging than energy. Many universities—and many of you, their leaders—have already become involved in the complex issues that the dynamics of energy have thrust on us. Energy concerns are plainly global. Domestic solutions alone cannot adequately deal with our own energy problems. The enormity of the task of the transition to a postpetroleum era requires our best

minds and efforts in cooperation with their counterparts in the Third World.

As events of the past weeks have made increasingly clear, the totality of our relations with the developing countries is interwoven with energy economics.

- More than one half of world oil production is in developing countries.
- Nine out of every 10 barrels entering the international market come from developing countries.
- Developing countries currently use about one-sixth of the world's oil, a figure likely to approach one-fourth within a decade.

The oil-importing developing countries have been hit very hard by petroleum price rises. Expensive imported fuel is exacerbating balance-of-trade problems. Many countries are postponing needed investment projects, holding down the growth of essential social services, and going more heavily into debt. Stagflation and the dangers of protectionism in industrialized countries, as well as the overall slower growth in the countries belonging to the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development, have seriously affected most developing countries.

Developing countries' demand for commercial energy is likely to double by 1990. Many of these economies are entering energy-intensive phases of growth, much as we did during the last century.

What is too often not understood, or overlooked, is that most of the people in developing countries rely on so-called traditional fuels for their direct energy needs. In the rural areas of the Third World, between 80% and 90% of nonanimate energy is provided by wood, charcoal, and crop and animal wastes, as well as simple forms of solar, water, and wind energy. Growing populations are straining these supplies. Firewood shortages are especially serious. The ever-demanding search for firewood diverts villagers from agricultural tasks and denudes the landscape causing widespread soil erosion. The shortages of wood leaves people without fuel to cook and boil water for health needs. Here are a few examples of how serious is the firewood crisis.

- At current rates of depletion, the world's tropical forests, which are mostly in developing countries, will disappear in only 60 years.
- At least 12 countries, with a combined population of about 150 million people, are currently using fuelwood in excess of sustainable yields.

- The pace at which the firewood crisis is expanding, and the economic and environmental damage it portends, present a clear and present danger to future generations throughout the planet.

Policymakers and planners in the Third World are now paying much more attention to energy problems than in the past, just as we are. Virtually all developing countries have begun to take concrete steps to manage their energy sectors more efficiently. These steps include more rational energy prices, expanding investment in domestic energy resources, organizing energy ministries, and funding research on locally suitable energy techniques.

It is also becoming increasingly clear, however, that foreign assistance is needed to expedite this process. Rapid development of their energy sectors is limited by lack of:

- Basic knowledge of their own resources;
- Appropriate technology;
- Financial resources; and
- Adequately trained personnel.

Moreover, most developing countries are just beginning systematic energy planning. Much of what must be done will be new, experimental, and innovative. As a new and growing area of major concern, IDCA is making energy a priority area of focus. Today, I want to share with you some of the actions that are underway.

### Energy Assistance Programs

At both the Bonn and Tokyo summits, the United States and other Western countries agreed to increase aid for energy conservation and supply. President Carter has emphasized the U.S. commitment to increased energy assistance. I reiterate that pledge to you. The United States will continue to support vigorously bilateral and multilateral programs for balanced energy development.

- With strong U.S. backing, the World Bank recently approved a major new lending program for petroleum, natural gas, and coal projects. We anticipate that lending will rise to an annual level of \$1.5 billion by 1983.
- We are further urging the World Bank to take a more active role in coordinating the energy assistance programs of bilateral and multilateral agencies, especially in the areas of renewable energy.
- We will continue to encourage all multilateral development banks to con-

sider expanding their energy programs. This process has begun at the Asian and Inter-American Development Banks, and we are encouraged that the World Bank is now preparing a policy statement on renewable energy.

- The U.S. strongly supports the planned 1981 U.N. Conference on New and Renewable Energy. Preparations are underway for active U.S. participation at all levels, including helping less developed countries with their own conference preparations.
- The United States is currently funding, on a bilateral basis, a substantial range of assistance projects in the energy field.
- The Department of Energy and AID have undertaken energy sector assessments in Egypt, Peru, Indonesia, Portugal, and Argentina. These efforts undertaken in collaboration with those governments, establish an essential data base for planning.

- A Peace Corps energy program has been established to strengthen energy-related volunteer training, identify rural energy needs, and develop village-level energy projects. I anticipate that such volunteer efforts will become an increasingly important part of our energy assistance.
- AID's funding for pilot energy projects in rural areas has more than doubled in the past 2 years.
- We are taking steps to insure that energy concerns and needs are integrated as a matter of standard procedure into all rural development assistance projects that the United States supports.

The lack of properly trained technical manpower is a serious constraint to accelerated and diversified energy production in the Third World. AID is already funding several training programs related to energy. Two are at your member institutions—a course in energy sector management at the Stonybrook Campus of the State University of New York and a course on alternate energy technology at the University of Florida. I am convinced that much more can, and should be, done.

Recognizing that the U.S. higher education system is the most significant asset we have for transferring technical skills, I am pleased to announce to you that we are preparing a new program to provide support for long-term training in science and engineering fields related to energy. The program will offer fellowships for training ranging from internships to doctoral-level studies, with heavy emphasis on existing master's degree programs. I hope that by September 1981, the first students will

## The Nonaligned Movement After the Havana Conference

by Charles William Maynes

*Keynote address before the National Conference on the Third World at the University of Nebraska in Omaha on October 25, 1979. Mr. Maynes is Assistant Secretary for International Organization Affairs.*

Once in a while an act can symbolize an age: This summer Garry Davis asked to come home.

Who is Garry Davis? A highly patriotic bombardier in World War II, Davis renounced the United States for a citizenship of the world to dramatize his view that nationhood was incompatible with peace. Over the years he drew tens of thousands of Europeans to world government rallies and upset immigration officials by appearing at their borders with a 42-page "World Citizens Passport." Now he wants to come home.

But Garry Davis' return poses a problem for those of us interested in American foreign policy, particularly those of us interested in U.S. policy toward the Third World. Many of us undoubtedly thought Garry Davis' quest for world government foolish. Yet in an extreme way, he represented an underlying and coherent current in the postwar American approach to the world. In the wake of the devastation of World War II—with the evidence of the monumental inhumanity which the traditional game of international politics can bring—we thought we knew what we wanted. We also thought we knew what the rest of the world wanted. Even if few believed in world government, many believed we were in the process of creating a tightening web of international institutions and laws which would make the world a better place to live. The process of change in the Third World seemed almost reassuring. With these new nations, the world could begin afresh.

At first things seemed to work out. Self-determination, a word American Presidents minted for international coinage, swept the world. New states took their place on the international stage, most verbally supporting our values, most visibly copying our institutions. They joined the United Na-

tions. They asked for our help. We seemed to have new friends and new interests.

Then it seemed to go sour. In country after country, democratic structures crumbled under military or mob assault. Or the very men and women who controlled the new democratic institutions appeared intent on subverting them. When even India, dear to American internationalists, temporarily moved out of the democratic camp, the whole postwar vision of the way the world would develop seemed bankrupt, and many wanted to withdraw from the area of the world we never understood very well in the first place—the developing world, the Third World, the nonaligned world.

So many Americans in recent years came home like Garry Davis. Yet once home, they soon faced a paradox. They no sooner retired from the developing world—declared it was outside the "core of U.S. interests"—than everyone began hinting it was important after all. Angola, Ethiopia, Rhodesia, and Namibia suggested that not only [former U.S. Ambassador to the U.N.] Andy Young considered Africa important. Many had downgraded the importance of Indochina until the Vietnamese occupied Cambodia and threatened Thailand. Commentators considered the Caribbean of secondary importance until revolutions began to sweep the area. South Asia was not even on the back pages until the coup in Afghanistan, the revolution in Iran, and the nuclear moves in Pakistan. Suddenly and surprisingly, everyone agreed the Third World was important.

Suddenly everyone agreed we came home too soon. So I would like to spend the rest of my time discussing the following questions. Who is in the Third World? Why do we have trouble talking to them? What should our policy be?

### Organization of the Nonaligned Movement

Let's begin with the so-called nonaligned movement. What does it represent? What are its priorities?

The current membership is 95. Burma having just detached itself in protest to Cuban intimidation tactics in Havana, the nonaligned movement now consists of 91 nations and four liberation movements, nearly two-thirds of

have enrolled, many of them at your institutions. This could eventually become one of the largest single economic development training programs ever undertaken by the U.S. Government for people from developing nations.

Against this background, I underscore the important role that you and your institutions can play in the energy area and in other development sectors as well. Training programs relevant to the Third World need to be expanded. There will be a need to absorb more students. There is a need for new curricula, especially in emerging fields such as energy sector management and renewable energy technologies. Similarly research on new energy technologies will have to take into account developing country circumstances.

A strong partnership between development agencies and universities is essential given the task before us. Development is a taxing and often discouraging process. It will be even more difficult in the future. Our commitment to Third World development will require even more sacrifice and dedication. But no effort is more worthwhile in terms of the world's future and the future well-being of our children.

Just 2 years ago, Senator Hubert Humphrey, who first proposed the International Development Cooperation Agency, spoke at the Famine Prevention Symposium. It was his final public speech. His words apply today as they did 2 years ago.

So, as I said, it is appropriate for these institutions which are in title XII—that have such a responsibility—begin to play a vital and integral role in the agricultural development of countries around this planet. But, may I say to my friends of the diplomatic corps that are here today, it won't work if we just have to come knocking at your door. We have to join hands. You may have to knock at our door or we at yours, but more importantly we have to understand we can help each other. . . . ■



the U.N. membership. The nonaligned movement has no charter, no executive, no secretariat. It is usually the host country for each summit meeting which assumes the presidency for periods of 3 years.

The summit remains the authoritative organ. It reviews events since the previous summit, debates and takes positions on the issues, and then adopts action programs for a 3-year period. Each summit initiates a new 3-year cycle of nonaligned movement meetings. In the first year, there is a meeting of the 36 Non-Aligned Coordinating Bureau at the Foreign Minister level and there is a plenary meeting of Foreign Ministers. In the final year, a new round of plenary meetings of Foreign Ministers is followed immediately by the summit of heads of state and government.

Membership criteria in the nonaligned movement are vague, largely determined by members' attitudes toward a particular applicant. So, one has major actors of international politics in the group such as India or Nigeria, important ones such as Yugoslavia or Cuba, harried ones such as Kampuchea, and insignificant ones such as some of the smaller island states. It has Communist members such as North Korea, anti-Communists such as Argentina and Indonesia, Communists who fight each other such as Vietnam and Cambodia, rich ones such as OPEC [Organization of Petroleum Exporting Countries], and poor ones who are most of the rest.

How could, one might ask, such a group hold together? Their cohesiveness is explained perhaps best by not what they are but what they are not. They are not white, though Yugoslavia was a founding member; they are not rich, though that has changed as far as the OPEC countries are concerned; they are not members of the big power blocs, though that must be taken with a grain of salt when one thinks of North Korea, Cuba, and Vietnam; they are not countries with democratic governments, though its largest members such as India and Nigeria are, and the trend is somewhat more promising than a few years ago.

### Evolution of Causes

The nonaligned movement was founded by Tito, Nehru, Sukarno, and Nasser, but its genealogy includes the Bandung conference; Zhou Enlai; and an assortment of attempts to seek third roads, third camps, and third worlds. While each of its founders had a pet big power

to be wary of, this movement, as most movements do, emerged as a reaction to, rather than as an initiative for, something.

Thus, the nonaligned were countries situated in what used to be called "grey areas" of conflict in the cold war, from which they wanted to stay out. Trying to avoid overdependence on the superpowers and trying to enhance their own influence internationally through expressions of solidarity on major issues, the nonaligned movement began, with its first summit in Belgrade in 1961, as a concerted effort to mediate in the cold war. But it quickly emerged that this common denominator did not provide a sufficient impulse to unity. Over the next few years, therefore, nonaligned emphasis shifted to a campaign to speed up the decolonization process. This was the overriding nonaligned issue at the Cairo summit in 1964.

The economic issues—always a concern—gained nonaligned attention on par with the cold war and decolonization only at the Lusaka summit in 1970. At Lusaka, a separate summit declaration on economic issues—the first such—emphasized self-reliance, mutual assistance, and cooperation. This thrust achieved new momentum at the Algiers summit in 1973 with the adoption of a comprehensive nonaligned economic program calling for fundamental revision of the world economic order, the forerunner of the controversial new international economic order. Nearly one-half of the recent Havana summit's final declaration is devoted to aspects of these same economic issues, as was a major portion of the October 12 U.N. General Assembly speech of Fidel Castro, the current chairman of the nonaligned movement.

Is the evolution of causes of the nonaligned movement a theater in search of a play? The nonaligned movement, as most movements, does not define itself by strict rules of adherence to a core ideology. Nor is it an alliance based on contract with fine print. Faithfulness to the original spirit that spawned the movement is its best characteristic, and this is where the sharpest battles are fought—not unlike most denominational movements. The integrity of original principles is where Tito put most of his efforts at the recent Havana summit. It is to his credit that the section on principles and on philosophy of the movement in the final declaration was largely satisfactory to those members who attach special importance to the independence of the

movement. The Yugoslavs and others succeeded at Havana in rebuffing the Cuban drive toward a nonaligned movement-Soviet "natural alliance" and in gaining confirmation of the movement's traditional posture as an independent nonbloc force.

Yet this should not be viewed as a defeat of the Soviets, much less a victory for the West, nor should it be dismissed as an inconsequential victory of principles over expediency. It was a battle fought for reasons hardly flattering to any major military power.

The *raison d'être* of the nonaligned movement, at least in the minds of its founders, was to raise as high as possible the psychological barriers to the use of force in international relations since Third World countries were the most probable victims of the use of force. The reason the Yugoslavs and others resisted the Cuban drive to support Vietnam in its campaign to occupy Cambodia is precisely because they fear Vietnam's success will lower the barriers for many even more powerful countries to intervene in Third World affairs.

### Anticolonialism

One will notice I referred to intervention in Third World affairs. Nonaligned movement members have concentrated their criticism and joint opposition to the historic ability of the colonial countries to intervene in Third World internal affairs. They have denounced the least threatening action of former colonial countries in their region while remaining silent on more threatening developments in other parts of the world—for example, Soviet actions in Eastern Europe. The global reach of the Soviet Union, using Cuban and Vietnamese proxies, has increasingly called into question this double standard which has understandably troubled us.

The nonaligned movement concentration on principles does not obviate the continuing search of the movement for animating causes. The movement's earlier emphasis on anticolonialism and traditional stand against the cold war no longer serve effectively to insure solidarity of the nonaligned countries. There are reasons for this.

- The decolonization process is nearly concluded; indeed, we are working with our allies and with the front-line African states to bring about internationally acceptable solutions in

southern Africa, the final bastion of colonialism.

• We have tried where we could to lower the level of East-West confrontation, but we have been prepared to respond vigorously to protect our interests.

While neither colonialism nor the cold war provides a single unifying *raison d'être*, nonaligned movement members now discuss nearly every important international issue. At the recent Havana summit, for example, the nonaligned movement:

• Strongly supported liberation groups in Rhodesia and Namibia while pointing to the importance of efforts toward negotiated settlements;

• Was on record in favor of a political settlement of the Kampuchea problem, consistent with the principles of noninterference and withdrawal of foreign forces and also came down for humanitarian efforts to deal with the refugee and famine issues in Indochina;

• Was critical of U.S. policy in Latin America while rebuffing Castro's efforts to condemn the Rio pact and the Inter-American system;

• Condemned the Camp David agreements, thanks largely to Cuban intimidation and manipulation tactics at the summit. I might add that this decision was not sustained in a meeting of nonaligned Foreign Ministers a couple of weeks later in New York.

But while the nonaligned movement at Havana considered a broad range of international political questions, summit discussions of them have demonstrated a significant lack of consensus. In the post-Havana period, this lack of consensus has been even more notable; for example, the Havana declaration's position on the representation of Kampuchea was promptly revised by the U.N. General Assembly.

The key point I am trying to make is that none of these many issues has provided the movement with an effective replacement for colonialism or for the cold war as unifying themes.

## The New International Economic Order

That leaves the movement with the economic issues—the new international economic order—as the cause which can again bring unity and results. But there are differences between decolonization and development as issues for confronting the industrialized world.

Anticolonialism involved a clearly identifiable opponent who accepted part of the nonaligned critique. The same is not true with respect to the new international economic order. Admittedly, it can be said—and it is being said—that so-called neocolonialism is the main evil. After all, the former colonialists who once controlled foreign territory continue to control much of the capital, resources, technology, and information which flow in international channels. The difficulties reside in the differences. In the case of colonialism, Western nations admitted to behavior in conflict with Western values. This ethical disjunction engendered a feeling of guilt; and in fact, Western nations could neither legitimize nor hold on to their colonial empire—which in time, and in any event, they considered a burden, not an asset.

Over the issues where the battle is now joined, however, most in the West do not see any fundamental conflict between Western behavior and Western value systems. They, therefore, feel no sense of guilt. Moreover, unlike the case with colonialism, they believe that this time around the West is being asked to shed policies bringing it not weakness but ultimately strength. Consequently, while the West does not seek victory in the battle, it does not want to come out a loser. It, therefore, offers formulas for compromise and stresses mutual advantages. In this respect, although some portions of Fidel Castro's speech did stress mutual advantage, his recent U.N. call on the North to aid the South as an act of retribution for past sins represents for the North-South dialogue a dead end and a disservice. The call cannot be received because the language is not understood. Castro is trying to apply a strategy which brilliantly succeeded on one issue—colonialism—but which will inevitably fail on another—North-South relations.

## Cumulative Impact of LDCs on Western Countries

Yet if all this is true, it is also incontestable that the Third World is much more important to U.S. security and welfare than it has ever been. In the past, less developed countries (LDCs) commanded superpower attention because they were weak and breeding grounds for East-West conflict. That concern remains and in some regions of the world even grows. But in addition, they now command attention because, collectively, they have on some issues

more strength than before and are raising questions relevant to the West's own future economic welfare. Thus, many LDCs have acquired the capacity to affect international events in significant ways. Some of them, like Brazil, India, and Nigeria, have potentially preponderant regional influence because of location, population, and military power. Others, such as Saudi Arabia and Venezuela, have substantial oil power. Particularly, the countries in East Asia play major roles in international trade. There are, in short, new loci of political and military power in the Third World, and the cumulative impact of unified action in many areas is, at least on paper, considerable.

Yet, like us, the members of the nonaligned movement confront many contradictions in the foreign policy goals they pursue. Together with the need for unity, they share the importance of maintaining direct and responsive relationships with industrialized states for reasons that are economic, military, and political or a combination of all these. For example, some oil states have an indisputable ability to shake the foundations of the international financial system and wield considerable political influence in the Mideast and Persian Gulf regions. Yet they remain vulnerable to military attack from their neighbors, and their wealth depends on Western stability. They cannot act alone. For them, as for us, close bilateral and multilateral relationships are crucial to their security and economic viability.

These considerations underscore the compelling argument for some sort of world order vision which can replace the one we have lost. If neither the traditional powers nor the newly emerging centers of influence can impose their will on the others, nor survive without each other, then we need to strive for some common framework, some neutral understanding.

Yet it is not enough to underscore the mutuality of interests between the developing countries and the industrialized world. Nor is it enough to appeal to fear, since apocalyptic warnings, unless real and immediate, remain unconvincing. Rather we must patiently strive for common ground.

## "Moderation"—Key Objective to World Order Politics

The objective of world order politics, to use Stanley Hoffman's phrase, must be "moderation plus"—neither Utopia nor resignation. Notwithstanding the disci-

pline it requires, we must begin with moderation. Rhetorical fulminations against the Third World are no more effective with them than their rhetorical excesses are with us. This is not to say that we should not expose rhetorical posturing when it takes place and adjust our bilateral relationship accordingly. Nor does it mean that the United States should not respond vigorously to countries that unfairly abuse or challenge our legitimate interests. If for no other reason than self-respect, that will be necessary. But we should not expect more from confrontation than it can yield. Even when we are forced to act vigorously, we should make clear that the U.S. bias is to return to moderation and dialogue.

If we can maintain moderation and provided that others maintain it too, then the "plus" we need can be introduced into the new global politics. That "plus" requires that we go beyond thinking of the current dilemma as an essentially North-South dichotomy or as a question of economics.

In a way, we have to go back to the drawing board and negotiate not about who gets what and who yields what but whether the rules which all in the end accept can be applied more equitably to all the players.

Several examples come to mind which suggest that, in fact, we are—with the Third World—haltingly doing precisely that already. In recent months and even days, the United States has joined, and is participating in, international conferences and negotiations which specifically deal with the equitable application of the rules of access to global wealth, resources, and power.

The Law of the Sea negotiations, the Vienna Conference on Science and Technology for Development convened by the United Nations, and the World Administrative Radio Conference, now in process in Geneva, each deal with his issue. In each of these fora, delegations and negotiating teams are confronting extremely difficult challenges in devising international regimes which regulate access and utilization of global resources.

In all of the debates on equity of access and utilization of the global commons, sides have been drawn along pluralistic lines. Across the board, the problem has been whittled down to one basic point—after the consensus is reached on objectives, are the rules of the game being fairly applied?

### System of Rules

This has been in almost every instance the crux of the negotiating process. In every case, we have supported a strict policy of rule-adherence, where they already existed, and rulemaking, when they did not, as the basis for negotiation. We have defended or sought fair and impartial rules.

In all these questions of equitable access and sharing, we, for our part, have maintained that it is inherently unfair for the developing countries to share in the proceeds without sharing in the effort according to their abilities. The developing countries in turn have maintained that they cannot accept a

system under which they may share in the benefits but do not share in the operation and management.

So for all practical purposes, "charity" is out, but common interest is in, as it should be where one is negotiating over "rules" which must rest on common interest and not "relief" which must develop from shared compassion.

In the Law of the Sea negotiations, we see the operative example of how this new system of rules may work, where developed and developing nations have exhausted debate and have gotten down to compromise. The product is a relatively strong model of co-

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### 95 MEMBERS OF THE NONALIGNED MOVEMENT

|                          |               |   |
|--------------------------|---------------|---|
| Afghanistan              | Iraq          | Sao Tome and Principe                   |
| Algeria                  | Ivory Coast   | Saudi Arabia                            |
| Angola                   | Jamaica       | Senegal                                 |
| Argentina                | Jordan        | Seychelles                              |
| Bahrain                  | Kampuchea     | Sierra Leone                            |
| Bangladesh               | Kenya         | Singapore                               |
| Benin                    | Korea (North) | Somalia                                 |
| Bhutan                   | Kuwait        | Sri Lanka                               |
| Bolivia                  | Laos          | Sudan                                   |
| Botswana                 | Lebanon       | Suriname                                |
| Burundi                  | Lesotho       | Swaziland                               |
| Cameroon                 | Liberia       | Syria                                   |
| Cape Verde               | Libya         | Tanzania                                |
| Central African Republic | Madagascar    | Togo                                    |
| Chad                     | Malawi        | Trinidad and Tobago                     |
| Comoros                  | Malaysia      | Tunisia                                 |
| Congo                    | Maldives      | Uganda                                  |
| Cuba                     | Mali          | United Arab Emirates                    |
| Cyprus                   | Malta         | Upper Volta                             |
| Djibouti                 | Mauritania    | Vietnam                                 |
| Egypt                    | Mauritius     | Yemen (Aden)                            |
| Equatorial Guinea        | Morocco       | Yemen (Sana)                            |
| Ethiopia                 | Mozambique    | Yugoslavia                              |
| Gabon                    | Nepal         | Zaire                                   |
| Gambia                   | Nicaragua     | Zambia                                  |
| Ghana                    | Niger         |   |
| Grenada                  | Nigeria       | African National Congress               |
| Guinea                   | Oman          | Palestine Liberation Organization       |
| Guinea-Bissau            | Pakistan      | Patriotic Front of Zimbabwe             |
| Guyana                   | Panama        | South West Africa People's Organization |
| India                    | Peru          |   |
| Indonesia                | Qatar         |   |
| Iran                     | Rwanda        |   |

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operative, joint venture—of fairness, if you will.

The basis of this treaty dealing with the mining of seabeds calls for the creation of parallel regimes. A private firm winning a concession must help the international community mine a parallel track.

I was particularly intrigued by the analysis of one of the major architects of this tentative agreement—Ambassador M.C.W. Pinton from Sri Lanka. In describing the rationale for this international regime, he stated: "... the 'common heritage' of these resources is not '*res nullius*' to be had for the taking; is not '*res communis*' simply for enjoyment or use in common; it is more akin to property held in trust—held in trust for 'mankind as a whole,' for the public. It is, therefore, closest to '*res publicae*,' the property of the people to be administered by the people and for the people."

His prescription is a rejection of social Darwinism in global politics yet does not make the opposing error of Utopian regimes. In an age of diminishing resources, growing scarcities but also growing threats, I am reminded of Jefferson's words that such '*res publicae*' is the only form of government which is not eternally at open or secret war with the rights of mankind."

In the continuing dialogue on the rules for a new international order, as in a republic, even the rules must be debated according to the rules. Neither the demands of the Third World nor our interests can be satisfied in conditions of global anarchy.

But within the rules we have interests to protect and principles to uphold. We cannot agree to rules that unfairly tax our interests just as we cannot expect the developing world to abide by rules which unfairly violate theirs.

We are conscious of the unfair treatment history has given some countries or groups within countries, including our own. But both at home and abroad the sins of the past cannot be the foundation of the future. We must lay aside charges of guilt and focus on the duty of common obligations.

There is no other way to forge the global coalition necessary for achieving the reforms we need to make the world safer and more prosperous. As Fidel Castro, speaking as the chairman of the nonaligned, acknowledged in his report to the General Assembly on the Havana conference, worldwide economic crisis will harm everyone—from Socialist state to capitalist investor.

Consequently, everyone according to his abilities must participate in the solution. In today's integrated world economy, we can no longer allow the choice of opting out of one's responsibilities.

Common obligations in a new world order imply a division of labor but not a division of the world into competing blocs plus one more bloc to remain on the sidelines. If the Third World has obligations and interests, if the West has obligations and interests, so do the Soviets and their allies. If they are affected by the cycles of economic recession, so must they share in offering concrete remedies to avoid them.

This is not to say that we will always be able to communicate with the nonaligned as a movement. Just as NATO members speak with one voice multilaterally yet often differ bilaterally, so do the nonaligned. Precisely for this reason, the Administration has not sought relations with the nonaligned as a movement but with countries in the movement which have power to influence problems we believe must be resolved.

We have, therefore, established close relations with some members of the nonaligned and maintain strained relations with others. We will continue to act accordingly. We will judge the nonaligned movement as a movement. We regard the movement's record as very mixed, with commendable balance displayed on some issues and high irresponsibility in evidence on others. Nevertheless, we will judge its members as individual countries and will find we can work with some and must resist others. To do otherwise—either to reject the nonaligned countries in their entirety or to embrace them in their collectivity—would only damage U.S. interests.

## Conclusion

Where then does this leave us in terms of U.S. policy toward the Third World? I would like to suggest a policy based on three components: responsibility, resources, and realism.

**Responsibility** in the sense that the Third World must show it as well as expect it. Colonialism was a historic mistake which had to be eradicated. So long as it existed, the primary responsibility was on the shoulders of the powers which were called on to decolonialize. But we are approaching the end of that era.

With the new issues there are—there must be—reciprocal obligations for all parties. These obligations may take into account different circumstances, but reciprocity is critical to final agreement.

**Resources** in the sense that the Third World needs help and we must play a larger role in providing that help. The way that we have allowed our aid program to deteriorate is a national disgrace. It is time we stated the issue starkly. There is no way that the United States can compete for influence in the world, as the critics of the Administration are urging, without the resource commitment which those same critics are denying.

**Realism** in the sense that we look at the Third World as it really is—as an area in flux, of concern, and with importance. In flux, because the popular stereotypes of a region headed for authoritarian darkness are wrong. Some of the most heartening developments of the Third World have been the liberalizing trends in the powerhouses of the Third World—in India, in Nigeria, in Brazil, and even in China. Indeed, were it not for the tragedy in Kampuchea, the past year would be seen as a banner year for human rights in the Third World as four of the most vicious tyrants since Hitler and Stalin have been overthrown—Idi Amin, Pol Pot, Bokassa, and Macias.

Of concern because the thesis that American security need only be concerned with the industrial heartlands of Western Europe and Japan was wrong when it was formulated and clearly is wrong today.

With importance because issues such as oil, nonproliferation, strategic location, and trade document the vital nature of the Third World to our security and well-being.

A policy built on responsibility, resources, and realism can succeed. It will not give us the world government Garry Davis sought, but it can make the world safer and the United States more secure. And that, in the end, is what a sound foreign policy is all about. ■

# Missing and Disappeared Persons

by Patricia M. Derian

*Statement before the Subcommittee on International Organizations of the House Foreign Affairs Committee on October 18, 1979. Ms. Derian is Assistant Secretary for Human Rights and Humanitarian Affairs.<sup>1</sup>*

I welcome this opportunity to appear before you and your colleagues and commend the committee for its initiative in conducting these hearings on missing or disappeared persons. We consider this problem to be one of the most serious human rights issues confronting the world today, necessitating attention and action not only by the United States but by all members of the international community. This was the view expressed by the U.S. Representative to the Human Rights Commission to Committee III of the United Nations last December and reiterated by him at the U.N. Human Rights Commission earlier this year. It remains our view today.

In your previous hearings, distinguished witnesses from a variety of nongovernmental human rights organizations have provided considerable detail on the disappearance phenomenon. We believe their accounts were carefully researched and accurate. I do not intend to rehearse those details at any great length. Previous testimony has made them painfully familiar to all of us.

What I should like to do today, in accordance with your letter to Secretary Vance requesting my appearance, is to:

- Provide you the Administration's views and response to this relatively new violation of human rights;
- Discuss some of the remedies being proposed both on the bilateral and multilateral levels; and
- Examine the role of our embassies and human rights officers in those countries where disappearances are reliably reported.

Finally, I shall give you a status report on our efforts to give effect to U.N. Resolution 33/173 on disappeared persons adopted by the General Assembly on December 20, 1978.

## Views on and Response to Disappearances

As I stated at the outset, the United States views the use of officially sanctioned political kidnappings as one of the most serious problems confronting the international community. Disappearances have become one of the more tragic and insidious instances of human rights abuse occurring in today's world. Coupled with the failure of governments to account for those missing, this disturbing development has been causing intense anguish and suffering for countless individuals and families in many parts of the world. As you know, the word "disappeared" itself has become a euphemism for what often appears to or does amount to political murder, preceded by intensive interrogation and torture of those not charged with any crime.

## Forms of Disappearances

I would like to review very briefly the forms that disappearances take. In one, governmental policy directs the security forces, military, and/or police to round up all persons suspected of subversion to get them out of circulation, to obtain information, to halt specific acts, and to demoralize the "opposition." There are no constraints of any kind placed on those charged with the roundup.

In another, security or police forces operate "unofficially," generally in civilian clothes, with the tacit approval or acquiescence and under the umbrella of protection from the state.

In a third, groups of "civilians," often with official urging or approval, operate their own terrorist forces. (When "unauthorized" groups bring too much embarrassment to the government or when the government wishes to end their actions, it often finds that it has set in motion a force which eludes its control. They are then faced with the problem of trying to contain a group which is nominally its own.)

In all forms, people are abducted from their homes, offices, or while moving about in public. Sometimes operations are strictly clandestine—no one sees the pickup, no phone calls or messages are delivered; people simply vanish. On other occasions, a street or an area is blocked off by unmarked cars, a force of armed men—nearly al-

ways in civilian clothes—storms a building or house and emerges with the person or persons who are taken away. Or a group of armed men stops their car in traffic, leaps onto the street with drawn guns, and wrestles the victim into a car and speeds away.

The victims are taken to secret places of detention, often military installations, and tortured for periods ranging from hours to months. Sometimes they die as a consequence of torture, sometimes they are killed in detention, and sometimes they are set up for death in a flamboyant and public way. They may be loaded into a car or van, told to drive away after being given arms without ammunition, followed, and killed in a "shootout." A few endure and eventually find themselves in a regular place of detention. These people may be held indefinitely without trial or charges or they may be charged, tried, and sentenced to official jail terms by military or civilian courts. A minuscule number are released at some stage of the process.

At no point do any parts of the system of justice or the rule of law or due process operate on behalf of the disappeared. They disappear not only literally but also as legal entities.

They do not disappear from the thoughts of their families, however. And what becomes of them? Sometimes they are too frightened to take any action or tell anyone what has happened; this is often the case in the first period of disappearances.

Sooner or later, though, an inquiry is made to some official unit. They are told that there is no record of an arrest; there is no information. Occasionally, the family will receive an anonymous phone call which might say that the disappeared person will be released soon, is all right, or if an infant or child has been taken, might request some item for the child or tell where the child can be picked up if the child is not to be held. But the search is fruitless unless a body is found or the person finally surfaces in prison. Otherwise, the family members wait in tense anguish for months or years. For some there will probably never be an answer.

Responsibility for remedying the tragic phenomenon of disappearances rests with the government which shuts its eyes to or colludes in or engineers disappearances. Whether these disappearances are the result of authorized actions, unauthorized excesses by law enforcement and security agencies,

paramilitary or private groups, governments are responsible for bringing them under control, even in times of emergency. In confronting domestic violence or terrorism, there is no justification under domestic or international law for such violations.

Governments furthermore cannot argue that they do not know. Governments are custodians of the law. When they engage in their own campaign of terror, they jeopardize the rule of law and their right to govern. They are no different at those times than the worst of their opponents.

International law, as set forth in the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (article 4), the European Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms (article 15), and the American Convention on Human Rights (article 27) prohibits states, even in times of public emergency, from abandoning certain fundamental guarantees afforded the individual.

Under no circumstances can a state arbitrarily deprive its citizens of their lives or subject them to torture or cruel, inhuman, or degrading punishment. Death sentences can be imposed only in accordance with due process of law. Governments are responsible for the safety and protection of those detained. They are also responsible for rendering an accounting of the whereabouts and fate of those apprehended.

There is now available a well-developed body of human rights standards and precedents. It is up to individual countries to realize them. The United States tries to influence other nations to live up to common international obligations. In the final analysis, the decision to comply with international law—and to do what is right—rests with the individual country. While our ability to influence other nations' human rights performance varies from country to country, I can assure you we are assiduous in our efforts to persuade governments to halt disappearances and accompanying excesses and to insure that those guilty of such practices must be punished in accordance with law.

We urge all governments in whose countries there are disappeared persons to release prisoners arbitrarily detained, to provide the guarantee of fair trial, to publish lists of those missing, and to provide death certificates for those known to be killed. We also urge that they return remains to relatives

and establish governmental mechanisms, together with the courts, to trace missing people and clarify their status for their relatives.

In my discussions with the families of the disappeared—both here in Washington and abroad—they emphasize that it would be easier for them to suffer the knowledge of the death of their relatives than to suffer continuous uncertainty about their fates. In most countries, this would represent an act of strength and courage on the part of the government and indicate a desire for national reconciliation, peace, and return to the rule of law.

In our discussions with a variety of governments, we have pointed out that ample precedents exist in international law for dealing with the problem of accounting for those taken prisoner as a result of domestic and international conflicts. During periods of armed conflict and occupation, the 1949 Geneva Convention Relative to the Treatment of Prisoners of War and the 1949 Geneva Convention Relative to the Protection of Civilian Persons in Time of War require parties to implement a variety of reporting and other mechanisms to account for prisoners of war and "protected persons."

More recently in July 1977, additional protocols to the Geneva conventions set forth, in the context of armed conflict, even more detailed provisions for tracing the missing and the dead and for protecting the human rights of those held in captivity.

Protocol I asserts "the right of families to know the fate of their relatives," requires governments to gather and transmit all relevant information concerning persons reported missing by an adverse party, and imposes several obligations concerning the remains of all persons who have died for reasons related to hostilities. These legal requirements make available to countries standards and procedures for dealing with prisoners of war and other detained or interned persons and for handling the problem of missing persons in a humane manner.

Let me digress for a moment and explain a dilemma with which we are sometimes faced. In certain countries there have been efforts by some authorities to eliminate the disappearance phenomenon. The numbers of disappeared may decline dramatically. The question then arises of how the United States should respond. Quite clearly, even one person disappearing is one too many. But if we elect not to recognize this "progress," we may perhaps run the risk of strengthening the hands of individuals in or outside a repressive

government who may argue that the U.S. human rights appetite is insatiable. If, on the other hand, we choose to recognize the "progress" that has been made, certain governments may incorrectly conclude that we are reconciled to some irreducible minimum of disappearances or other human rights violations. These are not easy questions to resolve. Difficult judgments and hard choices are required. We confront such problems every day, and in almost every case there are honest differences of opinion on how we can best resolve them.

It is also appropriate to note here that this, like other forms of official human rights violations, is not endemic to any country and is not an inevitable concomitant of political unrest or instability. Some of today's worst offenders have long previous histories of high respect for individual rights, even in times of crisis, which gives us hope that they can return to their best traditions. And in recent times, some whose practices have been most deplored have, indeed, done so and thereby not only regained the respect of the world community but also set an example for others.

## Role of Embassies and Human Rights Officers

Permit me now to speak about the role of our embassies and the human rights officers in embassies in countries where disappearances take place.

Each embassy has a human rights officer usually in the Political Section whose responsibility is to report on human rights conditions and to present the U.S. Government's views to the host government. Our Ambassadors are charged with human rights responsibilities as personal representatives of the President. They are deeply conscious of the priority he has assigned to human rights in our foreign policy. As the President noted in his remarks to the Hispanic Caucus on September 13th: "From the day that I took office, I have sought to place at the top of my agenda and to awaken the conscience of the world and to bring that conscience about human rights to bear on the world's leaders."

An important part of a human rights officer's responsibilities is to maintain contact with individuals and groups most aware of human rights conditions in the country in which he/she works. He or she must be active and energetic in seeking out these contacts. These include private human rights groups; representatives of the religious community, the legal profession, political opposition, and dissident groups;



# State of the Union Address

*Following is the text of President Carter's address before a joint session of the Congress on January 23, 1980.<sup>1</sup>*

These last few months have not been an easy time for any of us. As we meet tonight, it has never been more clear that the state of our union depends on the state of the world. And tonight, as throughout our own generation, freedom and peace in the world depend on the state of our union.

The 1980s have been born in turmoil, strife, and change. This is a time of challenge to our interests and our values, and it's a time that tests our wisdom and our skills. At this time in Iran 50 Americans are still held captive, innocent victims of terrorism and anarchy. Also at this moment, massive Soviet troops are attempting to subjugate the fiercely independent and deeply religious people of Afghanistan. These two acts—one of international terrorism and one of military aggression—present a serious challenge to the United States of America and indeed to all the nations of the world. Together, we will meet these threats to peace.

I am determined that the United States will remain the strongest of all nations, but our power will never be used to initiate a threat to the security of any nation or to the rights of any human being. We seek to be and to remain secure—a nation at peace in a stable world. But to be secure we must face the world as it is. Three basic developments have helped to shape our challenges:

- The steady growth and increased rejection of Soviet military power beyond its own borders;
- The overwhelming dependence of the Western democracies on oil supplies from the Middle East; and
- The press of social and religious and economic and political change in the many nations of the developing world—exemplified by the revolution in Iran.

Each of these factors is important in its own right. Each interacts with the others. All must be faced together—squarely and courageously.

We will face these challenges. And we will meet them with the best that is in us. And we will not fail.

In response to the abhorrent act in Iran, our nation has never been aroused and unified so greatly in peacetime. Our position is clear. The United States will

not yield to blackmail. We continue to pursue these specific goals:

- First, to protect the present and long-range interests of the United States;
- Secondly, to preserve the lives of the American hostages and to secure as quickly as possible their safe release;
- If possible, to avoid bloodshed which might further endanger the lives of our fellow citizens;
- To enlist the help of other nations in condemning this act of violence which is shocking and violates the moral and the legal standards of a civilized world;
- To convince and to persuade the Iranian leaders that the real danger to their nation lies in the north in the Soviet Union and from the Soviet troops now in Afghanistan and that the unwarranted Iranian quarrel with the United States hampers their response to this far greater danger to them.

If the American hostages are harmed, a severe price will be paid. We will never rest until every one of the American hostages is released. But now we face a broader and more fundamental challenge in this region because of the recent military action of the Soviet Union. Now, as during the last three and one-half decades, the relationship between our country—the United States of America—and the Soviet Union is the most critical factor in determining whether the world will live in peace or be engulfed in global conflict.

Since the end of the Second World War, America has led other nations in meeting the challenge of mounting Soviet power. This has not been a simple or a static relationship. Between us there has been cooperation, there has been competition, and at times there has been confrontation.

- In the 1940s, we took the lead in creating the Atlantic alliance in response to the Soviet Union's suppression and then consolidation of its East European empire and the resulting threat of the Warsaw Pact to Western Europe.
- In the 1950s, we helped to contain further Soviet challenges in Korea and in the Middle East, and we re-armed, to assure the continuation of that containment.
- In the 1960s, we met the Soviet challenges in Berlin and we faced the Cuban missile crises, and we sought to

engage the Soviet Union in the important task of moving beyond the cold war and away from confrontation.

- And in the 1970s, three American Presidents negotiated with the Soviet leaders in attempts to halt this growth of the nuclear arms race. We sought to establish rules of behavior that would reduce the risks of conflict, and we searched for areas of cooperation that could make our relations reciprocal and productive—not only for the sake of our two nations, but for the security and peace of the entire world.

In all these actions, we have maintained two commitments: to be ready to meet any challenge by Soviet military power and to develop ways to resolve disputes and to keep the peace.

Preventing nuclear war is the foremost responsibility of the two superpowers. That is why we've negotiated the strategic arms limitation talks—treaties SALT I and SALT II. Especially now in a time of great tension, observing the mutual constraints imposed by the terms of these treaties will be in the best interest of both countries and will help to preserve world peace. I will consult very closely with the Congress on this matter as we strive to control nuclear weapons. That effort—to control nuclear weapons—will not be abandoned.

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*The 1980s have been born in turmoil and change. This is a time of challenge to our interests and our values, a time that tests our wisdom and our will.*

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We superpowers will also have the responsibility to exercise restraint in the use of our great military force. The integrity and the independence of weaker nations must not be threatened. They must know that in our presence they are secure. But now the Soviet Union has taken a radical and an aggressive new step. It's using its great military power against a relatively defenseless nation. The implications of the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan could pose the most serious threat to the peace since the Second World War.

The vast majority of nations on Earth have condemned this latest Soviet

attempt to extend its colonial domination of others and have demanded the immediate withdrawal of Soviet troops. The Moslem world is especially and justifiably outraged by this aggression against an Islamic people. No action of a world power has ever been so quickly and so overwhelmingly condemned.

But verbal condemnation is not enough. The Soviet Union must pay a concrete price for their aggression. While this invasion continues, we and the other nations of the world cannot conduct business as usual with the Soviet Union.

That's why the United States has imposed stiff economic sanctions on the Soviet Union.

I will not issue any permits for Soviet ships to fish in the coastal waters of the United States.

I've cut Soviet access to high-technology equipment and to agricultural products.

I've limited other commerce with the Soviet Union, and I've asked our allies and friends to join with us in restraining their own trade with the Soviets and not to replace our own embargoed items.

And I have notified the Olympic Committee that with Soviet invading forces in Afghanistan, neither the American people nor I will support sending an Olympic team to Moscow.

The Soviet Union is going to have to answer some basic questions: Will it help promote a more stable international environment in which its own legitimate, peaceful concerns can be pursued? Or will it continue to expand its military power far beyond its genuine security needs, and use that power for colonial conquest?

The Soviet Union must realize that its decision to use military force in Afghanistan will be costly to every political and economic relationship it values.

The region which is now threatened by Soviet troops in Afghanistan is of great strategic importance. It contains more than two-thirds of the world's exportable oil. The Soviet effort to dominate Afghanistan has brought Soviet military forces to within 300 miles of the Indian Ocean and close to the Straits of Hormuz—a waterway through which most of the world's oil must flow. The Soviet Union is now attempting to consolidate a strategic position, therefore, that poses a grave threat to the free movement of Middle East oil.

This situation demands careful thought, steady nerves, and resolute action, not only for this year but for many years to come. It demands collective efforts to meet this new threat to security in the Persian Gulf and in southwest Asia. It demands the participation of all

those who rely on oil from the Middle East and who are concerned with global peace and stability. And it demands consultation and close cooperation with countries in the area which might be threatened.

Meeting this challenge will take national will, diplomatic and political wisdom, economic sacrifice, and, of course, military capability. We must call on the best that is in us to preserve the security of this crucial region.

Let our position be absolutely clear: An attempt by any outside force to gain control of the Persian Gulf region will be regarded as an assault on the vital interests of the United States of America, and such an assault will be repelled by any means necessary, including military force.

During the past 3 years you have joined with me to improve our own security and the prospects for peace, not only in the vital oil producing area of the Persian Gulf region but around the world.

• We've increased annually our real commitment for defense, and we will sustain this increase of effort throughout the 5-year defense program. It's imperative that the Congress approve this strong defense budget for 1981 encompassing a 5%

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*... I have notified the Olympic Committee that with Soviet invading forces in Afghanistan, neither the American people nor I will support sending an Olympic team to Moscow.*

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real growth in authorizations without any reduction.

• We are also improving our capability to deploy U.S. military forces rapidly to distant areas.

• We have helped to strengthen NATO and our other alliances. And recently we and other NATO members have decided to develop and to deploy modernized intermediate-range nuclear forces to meet an unwarranted and increased threat from the nuclear weapons of the Soviet Union.

• We are working with our allies to prevent conflict in the Middle East. The Peace Treaty between Egypt and Israel is a notable achievement which represents a strategic asset for America and which also enhances prospects for regional and world peace. We are now engaged in further negotiations to provide full autonomy for the people of the West Bank and Gaza, to resolve the Palestinian issue in all its aspects, and to preserve the peace and security of Israel. Let no

one doubt our commitment to the security of Israel. In a few days we will observe an historic event when Israel makes another major withdrawal from the Sinai and when ambassadors will be exchanged between Israel and Egypt.

• We've also expanded our own sphere of friendship. Our deep commitment to human rights and to meeting human needs has improved our relationship with much of the Third World. Our decision to normalize relations with the People's Republic of China will help to preserve peace and stability in Asia and in the western Pacific.

• We've increased and strengthened our naval presence in the Indian Ocean, and we are now making arrangements for key naval and air facilities to be used by our forces in the region of northeast Africa and the Persian Gulf.

• We've reconfirmed our 1959 agreement to help Pakistan preserve its independence and its integrity. The United States will take action—consistent with our own laws—to assist Pakistan in resisting any outside aggression. And I'm asking the Congress specifically to reaffirm this agreement. I'm also working, along with the leaders of other nations, to provide additional military and economic aid for Pakistan. That request will come to you in just a few days.

• In the weeks ahead, we will further strengthen political and military ties with other nations in the region.

• We believe that there are no irreconcilable differences between us and any Islamic nation. We respect the faith of Islam, and we are ready to cooperate with all Moslem countries.

• Finally, we are prepared to work with other countries in the region to share a cooperative security framework that respects differing values and political beliefs, yet which enhances the independence, security, and prosperity of all.

All these efforts combined emphasize our dedication to defend and preserve the vital interests of the region and of the nation, which we represent, and those of our allies in Europe and the Pacific and also in the parts of the world which have such great strategic importance to us, stretching especially through the Middle East and southwest Asia. With your help, I will pursue these efforts with vigor and with determination. You and I will act as necessary to protect and to preserve our nation's security.

The men and women of America's Armed Forces are on duty tonight in many parts of the world. I'm proud of the job they're doing, and I know you share that pride. I believe that our volunteer



forces are adequate for current defense needs. And I hope that it will not become necessary to impose the draft. However, we must be prepared for that possibility. For this reason, I have determined that the selective service system must now be revitalized. I will send legislation and budget proposals to the Congress next month so that we can begin registration and then meet future mobilization needs rapidly if they arise.

We also need clear and quick passage of a new charter to define the legal authority and accountability of our intelligence agencies. We will guarantee that abuses do not recur, but we must tighten our controls on sensitive intelligence information. And we need to remove unwarranted restraints on America's ability to collect intelligence.

The decade ahead will be a time of rapid change, as nations everywhere seek to deal with new problems and age-old tensions. But America need have no fear—we can thrive in a world of change if we remain true to our values and actively engage in promoting world peace.

We will continue to work as we have for peace in the Middle East and southern Africa. We will continue to build our ties with developing nations, respecting and helping to strengthen their national independence, which they have struggled so hard to achieve. And we will continue to support the growth of democracy and the rejection of human rights.

In repressive regimes, popular frustrations often have no outlet except through violence. But when peoples and their governments can approach their problems together—through open, democratic methods—the basis for stability and peace is far more solid and far more enduring. That is why our support for human rights in other countries is in our own national interest as well as part of our own national character.

Peace—a peace that preserves freedom—remains America's first goal. In the coming years as a mighty nation, we will continue to pursue peace. But to be strong abroad we must be strong at home. And in order to be strong, we must continue to face up to the difficult issues that confront us as a nation today.

The crises in Iran and Afghanistan have dramatized a very important lesson: our excessive dependence on foreign oil is a clear and present danger to our nation's security. The need has never been more urgent. At long last, we must have a clear, comprehensive energy policy for the United States.

As you well know, I have been working with the Congress in a concentrated and persistent way over the past 3 years to meet this need. We have made prog-

ress together. But Congress must act promptly now to complete final action on this vital energy legislation. Our nation will then have a major conservation effort, important initiatives to develop solar power, realistic pricing based on the true value of oil, strong incentives for the production of coal and other fossil fuels in the United States, and our nation's most massive peacetime investment in the development of synthetic fuels.

The American people are making progress in energy conservation. Last year we reduced overall petroleum consumption by 8% and gasoline consumption by 5% below what it was the year before.

Now we must do more. After consultation with the governors, we will set

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*The Soviet Union is going to have to answer some basic questions: Will it help promote a more stable international environment in which its own legitimate, peaceful concerns can be pursued? Or will it continue to expand its military power far beyond its genuine security needs, and use that power for colonial conquest?*

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gasoline conservation goals for each of the 50 States, and I will make them mandatory if these goals are not met. I've established an import ceiling for 1980 of 8.2 million barrels a day—well below the level of foreign oil purchases in 1977. I expect our imports to be much lower than this, but the ceiling will be enforced by an oil import fee if necessary. I'm prepared to lower our imports still further if the other oil consuming countries will join us in a fair and mutual reduction. If we have a serious shortage, I will not hesitate to impose mandatory gasoline rationing immediately.

The single biggest factor in the inflation rate last year—the increase in the inflation rate last year—was from one cause: the skyrocketing prices of OPEC oil. We must take whatever actions are necessary to reduce our dependence on foreign oil and at the same time, to reduce inflation.

As individuals and as families, few of us can produce energy by ourselves. But all of us can conserve energy—every one of us, every day of our lives. Tonight I call on you—in fact all the people of America—to help our nation. Conserve energy. Eliminate waste. Make 1980 indeed a year of energy conservation.

Of course, we must take other actions to strengthen our nation's economy.

First, we will continue to reduce the deficit and then to balance the federal budget.

Second, as we continue to work with business to hold down prices, we will build also on the historic national accord with organized labor to restrain pay increases in a fair fight against inflation.

Third, we will continue our successful efforts to cut paperwork and to dismantle unnecessary government regulation.

Fourth, we will continue our progress in providing jobs for America, concentrating on a major new program to provide training and work for our young people, especially minority youth. It has been said that "a mind is a terrible thing to waste." We will give our young people new hope for jobs and a better life in the 1980s.

And fifth, we must use the decade of

the 1980s to attack the basic structural weaknesses and problems in our economy, through measures to increase productivity, savings, and investment.

With these energy and economic policies, we will make America even stronger at home in this decade—just as our foreign and defense policies will make us stronger and safer throughout the world.

We will never abandon our struggle for a just and a decent society here at home. That's the heart of America, and it's the source of our ability to inspire other people to defend their own rights abroad. Our material resources, great as they are, are limited. Our problems are too complex for simple slogans or for quick solutions. We cannot solve them without effort and sacrifice. Walter Lippmann once reminded us:

You took the good things for granted. Now you must earn them again. For every right that you cherish, you have a duty which you must fulfill. For every good which you wish to preserve, you will have to sacrifice your comfort and your ease. There is nothing for nothing any longer."

Our challenges are formidable. But there's a new spirit of unity and resolve in our country. We move into the 1980s with confidence and hope and a bright vision of the America we want:

- An America strong and free;
- An America at peace;



## State of the Union Message

- An America with equal rights for all citizens and for women guaranteed in the United States Constitution;

- An America with jobs and good health and good education for every citizen;

- An America with a clean and bountiful life in our cities and on our farms;

- An America that helps to feed the world;

- An America secure in filling its own energy needs;

- An America of justice, tolerance, and compassion.

For this vision to come true, we must sacrifice, but this national commitment will be an exciting enterprise that will unify our people. Together as one people let us work to build our strength at home. And together as one indivisible union, let us seek peace and security throughout the world. Together let us make of this time of challenge and danger a decade of national resolve and of brave achievement. ■

<sup>1</sup>Text from Weekly Compilation of Presidential Documents of Jan. 28, 1980.

*Following are excerpts relating to foreign policy from President Carter's message to the Congress of January 21, 1980.<sup>1</sup>*

My State of the Union Address will be devoted to a discussion of the most important challenges facing our country as we enter the 1980s.

Over the coming year, those challenges will receive my highest priority and greatest efforts. However, there will also be many other significant areas which will receive my personal commitment, as well as that of my Administration, during the 2nd Session of the 96th Congress.

It is important that Congress, along with the public, be aware of these other vital areas of concern as they listen to my State of the Union Address. In that way, the context of the Address, and my Administration's full message for 1980, can best be understood.

For that reason, I am sending this State of the Union Message to the Congress today, several days before my State of the Union Address.

- the decline in defense spending has been reversed; defense spending has increased at a real rate of over 3% in 1979, and I am proposing a real increase in the defense spending level of more than 20% over the next 5 years;

- the NATO Alliance has been revitalized and strengthened through substantially increased resources, new deterrent weapons, and improved coordination; increased emphasis has also been given to conventional force capabilities to meet crises in other areas of the world;

- Egypt and Israel have ended more than 30 years of war through a Peace Treaty that also established a framework for comprehensive peace in the Middle East;

- the commitment of our Nation to pursue human rights throughout the world, in nations which are friendly and those which are not, has been made clear to all;

- our resolve to oppose aggression, such as the illegal invasion of the Soviet Union into Afghanistan, has been supported by tough actions.

### RECORD OF PROGRESS

When I took office in 1977, our Nation faced a number of serious domestic and international problems:

- no national energy policy existed, and our dependence on foreign oil was rapidly increasing;

- our defense posture was declining as a result of a continuously shrinking defense budget;

- the strength of the NATO Alliance was at a post-World War II low;

- tensions between Israel and Egypt threatened another Middle East war; and

- America's resolve to oppose international aggression and human rights violations was under serious question.

Over the past 36 months, clear progress has been made in solving the challenges we found in January of 1977:

### LEGISLATIVE PRIORITIES

In the coming legislative session, the last in this Presidential term, I am deeply committed to finishing the agenda that I have placed before the Congress. That agenda has been comprehensive and demanding, but it has also been absolutely essential for our Nation's well-being.

I do not plan to add significantly to the agenda this year. Because of the importance of enacting the proposals already before the Congress, and the relatively short Congressional session facing us, I will be limiting my major *new* proposals to a critical few:

- Initiatives implementing my response to the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan.

I am convinced that these new initiatives, along with the major proposals I previously made to the Congress, can be enacted this year, if we have a dedicated all-out effort on the part of the Administration and the Congress. I pledge such an effort on my part, and that of my Administration.

As in the previous three years, I will be working with you toward the basic goals of:

- Building America's military strength;
- Working to resolve international disputes through peaceful means;
- Striving to resolve pressing international economic problems;
- Continuing to support the building of democratic institutions and protecting human rights; and
- Preventing the spread and further development of nuclear weapons.

My highest legislative priorities in each of these areas this year will be:

### Building America's Military Strength

• *Defense Department Authorizations and Appropriations*—I will be proposing a defense budget containing a 3.3% real growth in outlays. It is essential that the Congress support an increase of that amount if we are to strengthen our defense capabilities.

### Working to Resolve International Disputes

• *Refugee Legislation and Funding*—This legislation is necessary to improve our refugee program and to provide needed domestic assistance to refugees. Prompt House action would assure that we have a sound framework within which to accommodate the increasing flow of refugees.

### Striving to Resolve International Economic Problems

• *Bilateral and Multilateral Foreign Assistance*—I will be proposing foreign assistance legislation which provides the authority needed to carry forward a cooperative relationship with a large number of developing nations. Prompt Congressional action is essential.

• *China Trade Agreement*—I will be seeking early approval by the Congress of the Trade Agreement reached with China; the Agreement represents a major step forward in the process toward improved economic relations with China.

### Continuing to Support the Building of Democratic Institutions and Protecting Human Rights

• *Special International Security Assistance for Pakistan*—I am sending

to Congress a military and economic assistance program to enable Pakistan to strengthen its defenses. Prompt enactment will be one of my highest legislative priorities.

• *Human Rights Conventions*—I will continue to press the Senate to ratify five key human rights treaties—the American Convention on Human Rights, the Convention on Racial Discrimination, the UN Covenants on Civil and Political Rights, and on Economic and Social and Cultural Rights, and the Genocide Convention.

### Preventing the Spread and Further Development of Nuclear Weapons

• *SALT II*—I firmly believe that SALT II is in our Nation's security interest and that it will add significantly to the control of nuclear weapons. But because of the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan, I do not believe it is advisable to have the Senate consider the Treaty now.

## I. ENSURING ECONOMIC STRENGTH

### Trade

This past year was one of unmatched and historic achievement for a vital component of the U.S. economy—exports and trade. In 1979, nearly 3 million jobs in our manufacturing industries, or one out of every seven jobs in manufacturing, depended upon our export performance in overseas markets. Our exports were a key contributor to the growth of the U.S. economy in 1979.

Exports of agricultural and industrial goods grew by an unparalleled \$35 billion, reaching a level of \$180 billion. This represented an increase of 25% over exports in 1978. This record increase in exports, coupled with a slower rate of growth of imports, resulted in substantial improvements of \$5 billion in our balance of trade. Furthermore, a rapid growth of service exports in 1979 led to a \$13 billion improvement in the current account, bringing that account from a deficit in 1978 to near balance in 1979.

I expect that in 1980 our exports will continue to strengthen and that, if we can continue to further conserve and limit imports of oil, we will further im-

prove our trade balance position and that of the dollar. The future for American exports is bright, and will remain so, despite the necessity of suspending certain exports to the Soviet Union.

This Administration has accomplished several goals in the last year in assuring that there will continue to be greater exports and, therefore, job possibilities for U.S. workers and farmers.

To improve the condition of access of U.S. exports to foreign markets, I signed into force in July of last year a new trade act which reflected two years of hard bargaining in the recently concluded round of multilateral trade negotiations. These negotiations, which included all major developed and lesser developed countries, resulted in agreements to strengthen the rules of conduct of international trade and open new markets to U.S. exports. These negotiations were of historic importance in their scope and accomplishment, and their success is attributable to close cooperation that existed during and after the negotiations between the Congress, the private sector and the Administration.

Our negotiating success now challenges us to take advantage of the opportunity for improving further our ex-

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*... I am proposing a real increase in the defense spending level of more than 20% over the next 5 years.*

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port performance. To meet this challenge, I proposed in 1979 a major reorganization of the government's trade policy and export promotion activities. That reorganization will strengthen government coordination in the trade field and provide an improved basis for protecting American interest in the recently negotiated trade agreements. I put this reorganization into effect, with Congressional approval, earlier this month. With the changes initiated in my trade reorganization, we will ensure that trade between the United States and its trading partners will be conducted fairly and openly.

Consistent with my decisions on suspending certain types of trade with the Soviet Union, my Administration will be seeking this year to find additional ways to foster U.S. export ex-

pansion. We are studying the possibility of further agreements on expanded trade with both traditional and newer trade partners, including China. I look forward to working with the Congress on ways we can continue to improve our trading position which, in turn, will help maintain a prosperous American economy.

## II. CREATING ENERGY SECURITY

Since I took office, my highest legislative priorities have involved the development of our Nation's first comprehensive energy policy. The struggle to achieve that policy has been difficult for all of us, but the accomplishments of the past three years leave no doubt that our country is finally serious about the problems caused by our over-dependence on foreign oil. The accomplishments can be lost, however, and the progress stopped, if we fail to move forward even further this year. There is no single panacea that will solve our energy crisis. We must rely on and encourage multiple forms of production—coal, crude oil, natural gas, solar, nuclear, synthetics—and conservation.

It is therefore essential that Congress enact the major energy bills I proposed last year; and their enactment will be my most immediate and highest legislative priority this year.

## III. ENHANCING BASIC HUMAN AND SOCIAL NEEDS

### Refugees

In 1979 my Administration made significant progress in resolving a number of problems arising from the increase in refugees. Last March, I proposed comprehensive refugee legislation, and I regard its passage as a high priority this year. The legislation—which is the first comprehensive reform of our refugee immigration and domestic resettlement policies in twenty-eight years—will bring common sense and cohesion to an unnecessarily fragmented approach to international and domestic refugee needs. Under vigorous new leadership, the Office of the U.S. Coordinator for Refugee Affairs, which I created last year, will aggressively address the needs of refugees at home and abroad. We will also encourage greater cooperation with the pri-

vate sector and other actions to ensure successful refugee resettlement.

## VI. PROTECTING AND DEVELOPING OUR NATURAL RESOURCES

### AGRICULTURE

#### Agricultural Progress

While much work remains to be done, America's agriculture is by far the best in the world. Efforts made by my Administration, in cooperation with Congress, to secure economic stability for the farmer, have produced results.

In 1979, we experienced another record year for farm production. Net farm income jumped to \$32 billion in 1979, a \$4 billion increase over 1978. Agricultural exports also reached new highs, rising 18% in 1979 to \$32 billion. Despite the suspension of exports to the Soviet Union, we can expect a continued healthy export picture for our Nation's farmers.

Last year the Secretary of Agriculture travelled around the country and conducted an extraordinarily detailed and creative dialogue with the Nation's farmers. He obtained invaluable suggestions on economic and social issues concerning farm life; as we prepare our farm program for this year and beyond, the advice of our Nation's farmers will clearly be reflected in the policies we develop with the Congress.

#### Soviet Grain Suspension

In response to the Soviet armed invasion of Afghanistan on Christmas Eve, I took several actions to demonstrate our Nation's resolve to resist such hostile acts of aggression against a sovereign, independent nation. One of the most important of these actions was the suspension of grain sales to the Soviet Union beyond the 8 million tons provided under our 1975 grains agreement. The Soviet Union had intended to purchase an estimated 25 million tons of U.S. wheat and feed grains. Thus, the suspension of sales above the 8 million ton agreement level is expected to result in the freeing of about 17 million tons.

My decision to suspend these sales was a difficult one, but a necessary one. We could not continue to do business as usual with the Soviet Union while it is invading an independent, sovereign nation in an area of the world of strategic

importance to the United States. I am fully committed to a policy of promoting international trade, and particularly the expanded export of U.S. agricultural products. I am proud of my Administration's record in this regard. Because of the aggressive efforts of American farmers and businessmen, working in cooperation with Federal representatives, and the provision of new authorities by Congress, we have set new trade export records in each of the past 3 years. Even with the Soviet suspension, we intend to set still another record in the coming year. In making my decisions on the suspension, I believed it would be unfair to ask the American farmer to bear a greater share of the burden and sacrifice than their fellow Americans were asked to bear. Farmers should not be penalized simply because they are part of an agricultural machine that is of growing strategic importance in the world.

To protect American farmers from the price depressing effects of the grain suspension, I directed the Secretary of Agriculture to take several actions:

- The Commodity Credit Corporation will assume the contractual obligations for grain previously committed for shipment to the Soviet Union.

- The Department of Agriculture, acting through the Commodity Credit Corporation, will purchase wheat contracted for export to the Soviet Union for the purpose of forming an emergency international wheat reserve. In this connection, I will propose legislation authorizing release of this wheat for international aid purposes.

- To encourage farmers to place additional grain in the farmer-held grain reserve, the Secretary of Agriculture has made several modifications in that important program.

- The Commodity Credit Corporation will purchase corn at the local level to alleviate the congestion within the transportation system caused by the refusal of the International Longshoremen's Association to load grain up to the 8 million metric ton level.

In combination, these actions are expected to isolate from the market an amount of grain equivalent to that not shipped to the Soviet Union, thereby avoiding a decline in grain prices. I am pleased to report that these actions are having the desired results and that American farmers are being protected from the effects of the suspension.



If further actions are necessary to insure that American agriculture does not bear a disproportionately large share of the burden associated with this action, I will not hesitate to take them.

### International Emergency Wheat Reserve

The Congress has not yet acted on the proposal I made in the last Session to create an International Emergency Wheat Reserve. This reserve of up to 4 million tons of wheat would be used to assure recipient nations that we will meet our international food aid commitments. The suspension of further grain sales to the Soviet Union provides an appropriate opportunity to provide this authority, and thereby establish guidelines for the release of wheat now being acquired by the Commodity Credit Corporation.

### FOREIGN POLICY

From the time I assumed office three years ago this month, I have stressed the need for this country to assert a leading role in a world undergoing the most extensive and intensive change in human history.

My policies have been directed in particular at three areas of change:

- the steady growth and increased projection abroad of Soviet military power—power that has grown faster than our own over the past two decades.
- the overwhelming dependence of Western nations, which now increasingly includes the United States, on vital oil supplies from the Middle East.
- the pressures of change in many nations of the developing world, including the year old revolution in Iran and uncertainty about the future in many other countries.

As a result of those fundamental facts, we face some of the most serious challenges in the history of this Nation. The Soviet invasion of Afghanistan is a threat to global peace, to East-West relations, and to regional stability and to the flow of oil. As the unprecedented and overwhelming vote in the General Assembly demonstrated, countries across the world—and particularly the non-aligned—regard the Soviet invasion as a threat to their independence and security. Turmoil within the region adjacent to the Persian Gulf poses risks to the security and prosperity of every Western nation and thus for the entire global economy. The continuing holding of American hostages in Iran is both an

affront to civilized people everywhere, and a serious impediment to meeting the self-evident threat to widely-shared common interests—including those of Iran.

But as we focus our most urgent efforts on pressing problems, we will continue to pursue the benefits that only change can bring. For it always has been the essence of America that we want to move on—we understand that prosperity, progress and most of all peace cannot be had by standing

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still. A world of nations striving to preserve their independence, and of peoples aspiring for economic development and political freedom, is not a world hostile to the ideals and interests of the United States. We face powerful adversaries, but we have strong friends and dependable allies. We have common interests with the vast majority of the world's nations and peoples.

There have been encouraging developments in recent years, as well as matters requiring continued vigilance and concern:

- Our alliances with the world's most advanced and democratic states from Western Europe through Japan are stronger than ever.
- We have helped to bring about a dramatic improvement in relations between Egypt and Israel and an historic step towards a comprehensive Arab-Israeli settlement.
- Our relations with China are growing closer, providing a major new dimension in our policy in Asia and the world.
- And across southern Africa from Rhodesia to Namibia we are helping with the peaceful transition to majority rule in a context of respect for minority as well as majority rights.

The central challenge for us today is to our steadfastness of purpose. We are no longer tempted by isolationism. But we must also learn to deal effectively with the concentration of the world—the need to cooperate with potential adversaries without euphoria, without undermining our determination to compete with such adversaries and if necessary confront the threats they may pose to our security.

We face a broad range of threats and opportunities. We have and should continue to pursue a broad range of defense, diplomatic and economic capabilities and objectives.

I see five basic goals for America in the world over the 1980s:

- First, we will continue, as we have over the past three years, to build America's military strength and that of our allies and friends. Neither the Soviet Union nor any other nation will

have reason to question our will to sustain the strongest and most flexible defense forces.

- Second, we will pursue an active diplomacy in the world, working—together with our friends and allies—to resolve disputes through peaceful means and to make any aggressor pay a heavy price.

• Third, we will strive to resolve pressing international economic problems—particularly energy and inflation—and continue to pursue our still larger objective of global economic growth through expanded trade and development assistance.

- Fourth, we will continue vigorously to support the process of building democratic institutions and improving human rights protection around the world. We are deeply convinced that the future lies not with dictatorship but democracy.

• Fifth, we remain deeply committed to the process of mutual and verifiable arms control, particularly to the effort to prevent the spread and further development of nuclear weapons. Our decision to defer, but not abandon our efforts to secure ratification of the SALT II Treaty reflects our firm conviction that the United States has a profound national security interest in the constraints on Soviet nuclear forces which only that treaty can provide.

Continuing close cooperation between the Congress and the Executive Branch will be required to achieve these goals. My most immediate legislative priorities include:

- (1) Defense Department Authorization and Appropriation Bills
- (2) Special International Security Assistance, for Pakistan and other countries
- (3) Bilateral and Multilateral Foreign Assistance Bills, including Central America supplemental
- (4) The China Trade Agreement
- (5) Intelligence Charters
- (6) Refugee Legislation and Funding
- (7) Human Rights Conventions
- (8) And, when appropriate, the SALT II Treaty.

One very immediate and pressing objective that is uppermost on our minds and those of the American people is the release of our hostages in Iran.

We have no basic quarrel with the nation, the revolution or the people of Iran. The threat to them comes not from American policy but from Soviet actions in the region. We are prepared to work with the government of Iran to develop a new and mutually beneficial relationship.

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*As the unprecedented and overwhelming vote in the General Assembly demonstrated, countries across the world—and particularly the non-aligned—regard the Soviet invasion as a threat to their independence and security.*

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But that will not be possible so long as Iran continues to hold Americans hostage, in defiance of the world community and civilized behavior. They must be released unharmed. We have thus far pursued a measured program of peaceful diplomatic and economic steps in an attempt to resolve this issue without resorting to other remedies available to us under international law. This reflects the deep respect of our Nation for the rule of law and for the safety of our people being held, and our belief that a great power bears a responsibility to use its strength in a measured and judicious manner. But our patience is not unlimited and our concern for the well-being of our fellow citizens grows each day.

## ENHANCING NATIONAL SECURITY—AMERICAN MILITARY STRENGTH

The maintenance of national security is my first concern, as it has been for every President before me.

As I stated one year ago in Atlanta: "This is still a world of danger, a world

in which democracy and freedom are still challenged, a world in which peace must be re-won every day."

We must have both the military power and the political will to deter our adversaries and to support our friends and allies.

We must pay whatever price is required to remain the strongest nation in the world. That price has increased as the military power of our major adversary has grown and its readiness to use that power been made all too evident in Afghanistan.

## The U.S.-Soviet Relationship

We are demonstrating to the Soviet Union across a broad front that it will pay a heavy price for its aggression in terms of our relationship. Throughout the last decades U.S.-Soviet relations have been a mixture of cooperation and competition. The Soviet attack on Afghanistan and the ruthless extermination of its government have highlighted in the starkest terms the darker side of

measures that might be taken to register our disapproval and bolster security in Southwest Asia. I have been heartened by the support expressed for our position, and by the fact that such support has been tangible, as well as moral.

The destruction of the independence of Afghanistan government and the occupation by the Soviet Union has altered the strategic situation in that part of the world in a very ominous fashion. It has brought the Soviet Union within striking distance of the Indian Ocean and even the Persian Gulf.

It has eliminated a buffer between the Soviet Union and Pakistan and presented a new threat to Iran. These two countries are now far more vulnerable to Soviet political intimidation. If that intimidation were to prove effective, the Soviet Union might well control an area of vital strategic and economic significance to the survival of Western Europe, the Far East, and ultimately the United States.

It is clear that the entire subcontinent of Asia and specifically Pakistan is threatened. Therefore, I am asking Congress, as the first order of business, to pass an economic and military aid package designed to assist Pakistan defend itself.

## Defense Budget

For many years the Soviets have steadily increased their real defense spending, expanded their strategic forces, strengthened their forces in Europe and Asia, and enhanced their capability for projecting military force around the world directly or through the use of proxies. Afghanistan dramatizes the vastly increased military power of the Soviet Union.

The Soviet Union has built a war machine far beyond any reasonable requirements for their own defense and security. In contrast, our own defense spending declined in real terms every year from 1968 through 1976.

We have reversed this decline in our own effort. Every year since 1976 there has been a real increase in our defense spending—and our lead has encouraged increases by our allies. With the support of the Congress, we must and will make an even greater effort in the years ahead.

The Fiscal Year 1981 budget would increase funding authority for defense to more than \$158 billion, a real growth of more than 5% over my request for Fiscal Year 1980. Therefore, requested outlays for defense during Fiscal Year

their policies—going well beyond competition and the legitimate pursuit of national interest, and violating all norms of international law and practice.

This attempt to subjugate an independent, non-aligned Islamic people is a callous violation of international law and the United Nations Charter, two fundamentals of international order. Hence, it is also a dangerous threat to world peace. For the first time since World War II, the Soviets have sent combat forces into an area that was not previously under their control, into a non-aligned and sovereign state.

On January 4 I therefore announced a number of measures, including the reduction of grain sales and the curtailment of trade and technology transfer, designed to demonstrate our firm opposition to Soviet actions in Afghanistan and to underscore our belief that in the face of this blatant transgression of international law, it was impossible to conduct business as usual. I have also been in consultation with our allies and with countries in the region regarding additional multilateral

1981 will grow by more than 3% in real terms over the preceding year.

The trends we mean to correct cannot be remedied overnight; we must be willing to see this program through. To ensure that we do so I am setting a growth rate for defense that we can sustain over the long haul.

The defense program I have proposed for the next five years will require some sacrifice—but sacrifice we can well afford.

The defense program emphasizes four areas:

(a) It ensures that our strategic nuclear forces will be equivalent to those of the Soviet Union and that deterrence against nuclear war will be maintained;

(b) It upgrades our forces so that the military balance between NATO and the Warsaw Pact will continue to deter the outbreak of war—conventional or nuclear—in Europe;

(c) It provides us the ability to come quickly to the aid of friends and allies around the globe;

(d) And it ensures that our Navy will continue to be the most powerful on the seas.

### Strategic Forces

We are strengthening each of the three legs of our strategic forces. The cruise missile production which will begin next year will modernize our strategic air deterrent. B-52 capabilities will also be improved. These steps will maintain and enhance the B-52 fleet by improving its ability to deliver weapons against increasingly heavily defended targets.

We are also modernizing our strategic submarine missile force. The first new Trident submarine has already been launched and will begin sea trials this year. The second Trident will be launched in the spring of 1980. The first of our new Trident missiles, with a range of more than 4,000 miles, have already begun operational patrols in Poseidon submarines.

The new MX missile will enhance the survivability of our land-based intercontinental ballistic missile force. That is why I decided last spring to produce this missile and selected the basing mode best suited to enhance its capability. Further the MX will strengthen our capability to attack a wide variety of Soviet targets.

Our new systems will enable U.S. strategic forces to maintain equivalence in the face of the mounting Soviet challenge. We would however need an even greater investment in strategic systems

to meet the likely Soviet buildup without SALT.

### Forces for NATO

We are greatly accelerating our ability to reinforce Western Europe with massive ground and air forces in a crisis. We are undertaking a major modernization program for the Army's weapons and equipment, adding armor, firepower, and tactical mobility.

We are repositioning more heavy equipment in Europe to help us cope with attacks with little warning, and greatly strengthening our airlift and sealift capabilities.

We are also improving our tactical air forces—buying about 1700 new fighter and attack aircraft over the next five years—and increasing the number of Air Force fighter wings by over 10%.

We are accelerating the rate at which we can move combat aircraft to Europe to cope with any surprise attack, and adding to the number of shelters at European airbases to prevent our aircraft from being destroyed on the ground.

### Rapid Deployment Forces

We are systematically enhancing our ability to respond rapidly to non-NATO contingencies wherever required by our commitments or when our vital interests are threatened.

The rapid deployment forces we are assembling will be extraordinarily flexible: They could range in size from a few ships or air squadrons to formations as large as 100,000 men, together with their support. Our forces will be prepared for rapid deployment to any region of strategic significance.

Among the specific initiatives we are taking to help us respond to crises outside of Europe are:

- the development and production of a new fleet of large cargo aircraft with intercontinental range;
- the design and procurement of a force of Maritime Prepositioning Ships that will carry heavy equipment and supplies for three Marine Corps brigades.

In addition, responding to the Soviet military presence in Cuba and the proxy role of Cuba on behalf of the USSR, we have taken or are taking the following actions in support of the rapid deployment force:

- (1) We are substantially increasing our ability to monitor Cuban and Soviet/Cuban activities;

(2) We have established a Caribbean Joint Task Force Headquarters which improves our ability to respond to events in the region;

(3) We are increasing regional military exercises; and,

(4) We are intensifying assistance to countries in the region that are threatened by Soviet or Cuban intervention.

### Naval Forces

Seapower is indispensable to our global position—in peace and also in war. Our shipbuilding program will sustain a 550-ship Navy in the 1990s and we will continue to build the most capable ships afloat.

The program I have proposed will assure the ability of our Navy to operate in high threat areas, to maintain control of the seas and protect vital lines of communication—both military and economic—and to provide the strong maritime component of our rapid deployment forces. This is essential for operations in remote areas of the world, where we cannot predict far in advance the precise location of trouble, or preposition equipment on land.

### Military Personnel

No matter how capable or advanced our weapons systems, our military security depends on the abilities, the training and the dedication of the people who serve in our armed forces. I am determined to recruit and to retain under any foreseeable circumstances an ample level of such skilled and experienced military personnel.

We have enhanced our readiness and combat endurance by improving the Reserve Components. All reservists are assigned to units structured to complement and provide needed depth to our active forces. Some reserve personnel have also now been equipped with new equipment.

### Mobilization Planning

I have also launched a major effort to establish a coherent and practical basis for all government mobilization planning. Begun last May, this is the first such effort conducted at Presidential level since World War II. It involves virtually every Federal agency, with the aim of improved efficiency and readiness.



**Our Intelligence Posture**

Our national interests are critically dependent on a strong and effective intelligence capability. We will not shortchange the intelligence capabilities needed to assure our national security. Maintenance of and continued improvements in our multifaceted intelligence effort are essential if we are to cope successfully with the turbulence and uncertainties of today's world.

The intelligence budget I have submitted to the Congress responds to our needs in a responsible way, providing for significant growth over the Fiscal Year 1980 budget. This growth will enable us to develop new technical means of intelligence collection while also assuring that the more traditional methods of intelligence work are also given proper stress. We must continue to integrate both modes of collection in our analyses.

It is imperative that we now move forward promptly within the context of effective Congressional oversight to provide America's intelligence community with Charters which can permit it to operate more effectively and within a national concern codified by law.

**REGIONAL POLICIES**

Every President for over three decades has recognized that America's interests are global and that we must pursue a global foreign policy.

Two world wars have made clear our stake in Western Europe and the North Atlantic area. We are also inextricably linked with the Far East—politically, economically, and militarily. In both of these, the United States has a permanent presence and security commitments which would be automatically triggered. We have become increasingly conscious of our growing interests in a third area—the Middle East and the Persian Gulf area.

We have vital stakes in other major regions of the world as well. We have long recognized that in an era of interdependence, our own security and prosperity depend upon a larger common effort with friends and allies throughout the world.

**The Atlantic Alliance**

At the outset of this Administration I emphasized the primacy of our Atlantic relationship in this country's national security agenda. We have made impor-

tant progress toward making the Atlantic Alliance still more effective in a changing security environment.

We are meeting the Soviet challenge in a number of important ways:

First, there is a recognition among our allies that mutual security is a responsibility to be shared by all. We are each committed to increase national defense expenditures by 3% per year. There remains much work to be done in strengthening NATO's conventional defense; the work proceeding under the Alliance's Long Term Defense Program will help achieve this objective.

Last month, we and our NATO allies took an historic step in Alliance security policies with the decision to improve substantially our theater nuclear capabilities. The theater nuclear force modernization (TNF) program, which includes the deployment of improved Pershing ballistic missiles and of ground-launched cruise missiles in Europe, received the unanimous support of our allies. The accelerated deployment of Soviet SS-20 MIRVed missiles made this modernization step essential. TNF deployments will give the Alliance an important retaliatory option that will make clear to the Soviets that they cannot wage a nuclear war in Europe and expect that Soviet territory will remain unscathed.

While we move forward with our necessary defense efforts in Europe, we are also proceeding with our efforts to improve European security through arms control.

As an integral part of the NATO TNF decisions, the Alliance has made it clear that it is prepared to negotiate limitations on long-range theater nuclear missiles.

On our part, our TNF modernization efforts will make possible a streamlining of our nuclear weapons stockpile in Europe, allowing us to withdraw 1,000 nuclear warheads over the next year.

In the Mutual and Balanced Force Reduction talks, we and our allies have recently put forward new proposals that are designed to simplify the negotiations and improve the prospect for early progress in limiting conventional military forces in Europe.

In a very real sense the accomplishments of the past year answered a critical question concerning NATO's future: can the Western Alliance, which has provided the foundation for one of the longest periods of peace and prosperity that Europe has ever enjoyed, still summon the essential cohesion, relevance, and resolve to deal with fun-

damental security issues likely to affect its member nations well into the next century? NATO's consensus in favor of modernizing and negotiating about its nuclear arsenal while continuing to improve conventional forces, dramatized Allied capacity to respond effectively to both the military and political threats posed by the Soviet Union.

Relations with our allies and friends in Europe are taking on ever broader dimensions. Our security agenda remains central; we are addressing new concerns as well.

I met with an unprecedented number of European statesmen in Washington during the year just past, including the leaders of Great Britain, West Germany, Austria, Norway, Finland, the Netherlands, Ireland, Sweden, and the European Community; in all of these meetings a common theme was the changing realities of political and economic interdependence and, as we enter a new decade, the need to promote more equitable conditions of peaceful growth and stability throughout the world.

This approach has achieved tangible form in a number of ways. For example, every West European government supports us as we have continued by every peaceful means to seek the release of American hostages held in Tehran in defiance of universal standards of international law and decency. We are consulting and cooperating closely in our responses to the Soviet Union's invasion and occupation of Afghanistan.

In the NATO area itself, we moved together vigorously to meet the serious economic problems faced by Turkey and thereby strengthen a vital part of NATO's southern flank and we have signed a new base agreement with Turkey. This action, though indispensable in its own right, also supported our continuing efforts to promote a solution to the Cyprus problem and to bring about the reintegration of Greece within the military framework of the Atlantic Alliance, objectives which retain high priority this year.

**Asia**

The United States is a Pacific nation, as much as it is an Atlantic nation. Our interests in Asia are as important to us as our interests in Europe. Our trade with Asia is even greater than our trade with Europe. We have pursued and maintained these interests on the basis of a stable balance of power in the region. Our partnership and alliance

with Japan is central to our Asian policy. We are strengthening our new relationship with China. We have expanded our ties with the Association of South East Asian Nations (ASEAN) and its member governments.

My trip to the Far East helped forge closer working relationships with Japan and Korea.

### Asian Security

The balance of power is fundamental to Asian security. We have maintained that balance through a strong United States military posture in the region, as well as close ties with our allies, Japan, Australia, New Zealand and Korea. Over the past year I have worked to stabilize the United States military presence in Asia by concluding an amended base agreement with the Philippines that will last until 1991. We have fostered the closest degree of security cooperation with Japan in the history of our two nations—exemplified by joint planning for the defense of Japan, increased Japanese contributions to United States base costs in Japan, and large-scale Japanese purchases of United States defense equipment. After examining in detail new intelligence estimates of North Korean military strength, I decided to maintain our troop strength in the Republic of Korea at its present level until at least 1981. The reaffirmation of our commitment to Korean security has been of great importance to the Koreans as they make necessary political adjustments in the wake of President Park's assassination.

Response by nations in East Asia to the Soviet aggression in Afghanistan has been gratifying. Australia in particular deserves recognition for the forthright stand it has taken. Japan and the ASEAN nations have also been strongly supportive.

### China

Over the last year we have expanded our new relationship with the People's Republic of China to ensure that where our interests coincide, our separate actions will be mutually reinforcing. To this end we have enhanced our consultative relationship. We have also sought to develop an enduring institutional framework in the economic, cultural, scientific, and trade areas.

This process has been facilitated by the successful visits of Vice Premier Deng to the United States and Vice President Mondale to China; through the signing of over 15 commercial, sci-

entific, and cultural agreements; through numerous Cabinet-level visits; and through a significant expansion of trade and the flow of people between our two countries.

During Secretary of Defense Brown's recent trip to the People's Republic of China, wide-ranging talks were held on global and regional issues, arms control, technology transfer, and ways to sustain bilateral contacts. Although we may differ with the Chinese on some issues, our views coincide on many important issues, particularly with respect to the implications for the region of the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan.

In 1980 I look forward to passage by Congress early in the year of the China Trade Agreement and of authorization of OPIC operations in China; we plan to conclude civil aviation, maritime, and textile agreements; and continue to expand our commercial, cultural, and scientific relations, particularly, through ExImBank credits to the People's Republic of China.

### Southeast Asia

The countries comprising ASEAN are central to United States interests in Southeast Asia.

Throughout the past year, our relations with ASEAN have continued to expand as our consultative arrangements were strengthened.

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*We are demonstrating to the Soviet Union across a broad front that it will pay a heavy price for its aggression in terms of our relationship.*

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The stability and prosperity of Southeast Asia have been severely challenged by Soviet-supported Vietnamese aggression in Cambodia. During this year we will continue to encourage a political settlement in Cambodia which will permit that nation to be governed by leaders of its own choice. We have taken all prudent steps possible to deter Vietnamese attacks on Thai territory by increasing our support to the Thais, and by direct warnings to Vietnam and the U.S.S.R. The other members of ASEAN have stood firmly behind Thailand, and this in great measure has helped to contain the conflict. We have been gratified by Thailand's courageous and humane acceptance of the Cambodian refugees.

### Middle East—Persian Gulf—South Asia

Events in Iran and Afghanistan have dramatized for us the critical importance for American security and prosperity of the area running from the Middle East through the Persian Gulf to South Asia. This region provides two-thirds of the world's oil exports, supplying most of the energy needs of our allies in Europe and Japan. It has been a scene of almost constant conflict between nations, and of serious internal instability within many countries. And now one of its nations has been invaded by the Soviet Union.

We are dealing with these multiple challenges in a number of ways.

**Middle East.** First, it has been a key goal of my Administration since 1977 to promote an enduring resolution of the Arab-Israeli conflict—which is so essential to bringing stability and peace to the entire region. Following the Camp David Summit of August 1978, in March 1979, I helped bring about the signing of a peace treaty between Egypt and Israel—the first time in 30 years of Middle East conflict that peace had shined with such a bright and promising flame. At the historic signing ceremony at the White House, Prime Minister Begin and President Sadat repeated their Camp David pledge to work for full autonomy for the West Bank and Gaza.

Since then Egypt and Israel have been working to complete this part of the Camp David framework for the Palestinian people to participate in determining their future. I strongly support these efforts, and have pledged that we will be a full partner in the autonomy negotiations. We will continue to work vigorously for a comprehensive peace in the Middle East, building on the unprecedented achievements at Camp David.

At the same time, I have reinforced America's commitment to Israel's security, and to the right of all nations in the area to live at peace with their neighbors, within secure and recognized frontiers.

**Persian Gulf.** In recent years as our own fuel imports have soared, the Persian Gulf has become vital to the United States as it has been to many of our friends and allies. Over the longer term, the world's dependence on Persian Gulf oil is likely to increase. The denial of these oil supplies—to us or to others—would threaten our security

and provoke an economic crisis greater than that of the Great Depression 50 years ago, with a fundamental change in the way we live.

Twin threats to the flow of oil—from regional instability and now potentially from the Soviet Union—require that we firmly defend our vital interests when threatened.

In the past year, we have begun to increase our capacity to project military power into the Persian Gulf region, and are engaged in explorations of increased use of military facilities in the area. We have increased our naval presence in the Indian Ocean. We have been working with countries in the region on shared security concerns. Our rapid deployment forces, as described earlier, could be used in support of friendly governments in the Gulf and Southwest Asian region, as well as in other areas.

**South Asia.** The overwhelming challenge in this region will be dealing with the new situation posed by Soviet aggression in Afghanistan. We must help the regional states develop a capability to withstand Soviet pressures in a strengthened framework for cooperation in the region. We want to cooperate with all the states of the region in this regard—with India and Pakistan, with Sri Lanka, Bangladesh and Nepal.

In this new situation, we are proposing to the Congress a military and economic assistance program to enable Pakistan to buttress its defenses. This is a matter of the most urgent concern, and I strongly urge the earliest possible approval by the House and Senate. We are also working closely with other friends of Pakistan to increase the resources available for Pakistan's development and security.

We are also pursuing the possibility of gaining access to military facilities in the region in time of trouble. We are prepared to work closely with our friends in the region, on a cooperative basis, to do whatever is required to ensure that aggressors would bear heavy costs so that further aggression is deterred.

A high priority for us in the region is to manage our nuclear concerns with India and Pakistan in ways that are compatible with our global and regional priorities. The changed security situation in South Asia arising from the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan calls for legislative action to allow renewed assistance to Pakistan. But this in no way diminishes our commitment to work to prevent nuclear weapons proliferation, in Pakistan or elsewhere.

Steady growth of our economic assistance is also essential if the countries of South Asia are to achieve growth and true stability.

### **Africa**

A peaceful transition to majority rule in Southern Africa continues to be a major goal of the United States. We gave our fullest support to the successful British drive to reach an agreement among all parties in Rhodesia. The process of implementation will not be easy, but the path is now open to a peaceful outcome. With our European allies, Canada and the African states directly concerned we also are making progress toward independence and majority rule for Namibia. The momentum resulting from successful resolution of the Rhodesian conflict should aid in these initiatives.

Congressional support for the Executive Branch decision to maintain sanctions on Rhodesia until the parties reached agreement on a ceasefire and an impartial elections process had begun was instrumental in creating the conditions necessary for agreement. Now that the United States, European trading partners and the surrounding African states have lifted sanctions, the process of economic reconstruction in Rhodesia—soon to be Zimbabwe—can begin.

With the creation of an independent Zimbabwe after many years of fighting, we will be prepared to cooperate in a coherent multi-donor development plan for the poor nations in the Southern Africa region.

Our active support for self-determination and racial equality in Southern Africa has enabled the United States to develop a continuing and effective dialogue with governments throughout the continent. As Africa grows more important to us for economic, political and strategic reasons, we will be strengthening our ties of mutual interest with Africans. We will continue to participate in their first priority—economic development—and to help Africans resolve their political problems and maintain stability in their continent.

Whether in the Horn or in other areas of the continent, we will also provide to friendly nations security assistance when needed for defense of their borders.

### **North Africa**

In 1979 the United States moved to help a long-standing friend by

strengthening our arms supply relationship with Morocco. In assisting Morocco to deal with attacks inside its internationally recognized frontiers, we seek conditions of greater security and confidence in which a political settlement of the Western Sahara conflict can be effectively pursued. Though not itself a mediator, the United States in the months ahead will encourage the countries in the area to resolve their differences peacefully in order that the vast economic potential of North Africa can be exploited for the well-being of the people living there.

### **Latin America**

Since my inauguration, I have worked hard to forge a new, collaborative relationship with the nations of Latin America and the Caribbean—one resting on a firm commitment to human rights, democratization, economic development and non-intervention. The events of 1979—even the turbulence in Central America and the Caribbean—presented us with opportunities to move toward these goals.

There was encouraging progress in the area of human rights and democratization in the Western Hemisphere this past year. The inauguration of a new democracy in Ecuador, and the strong effort by the Andean countries to preserve democracy in Bolivia were positive steps.

During 1979, I met with the President of Mexico twice to discuss the opportunities and difficult issues before our two countries. We have taken worthwhile steps, including an agreement on natural gas and on trade.

On October 1, Vice President Mondale and many leaders from Latin America traveled to Panama to celebrate the coming into force of the Panama Canal Treaties. The transition to a new relationship and a new structure to manage the Canal was smooth and effective because of the contributions and the mutual respect between Panamanians and Americans.

The Vice President also traveled to Brazil and Venezuela. The Secretary of State met with leaders in Quito at the inauguration of the new democratic President of Ecuador and in La Paz at the OAS General Assembly. These meetings have helped us to develop further the close consultative ties which are so important to a free and balanced community of nations in the hemisphere.

Also, in 1979, the United States moved to a much closer economic and



political relationship with the increasingly significant Andean Pact countries. A memorandum of understanding on economic relations was signed in Washington in November.

Central America and the Caribbean region are undergoing a period of rapid social and political change. There is a threat that intervention by Cuba may thwart the desire of the people of the region for progress within a democratic framework and we have been working closely with the governments in the region to try to aid in the developmental process of the region and are prepared to assist those threatened by outside intervention.

The Caribbean Group, which is coordinated by the World Bank and which we helped establish, has now become an important factor for development in the region, adding \$260 million in concessionary resources to the region. We have increased our aid to the Caribbean, reprogrammed loans, and are seeking prompt Congressional action on a supplemental of \$80 million for Nicaragua and Central America.

My Science Advisor, Dr. Frank Press, led a large delegation of scientists and educators to Barbados, Peru, Venezuela and Brazil to forge new and fruitful ties between our countries in important areas of science and technology.

## THE INTERNATIONAL ECONOMY

A growing defense effort and a vigorous foreign policy rest upon a strong economy here in the United States. And the strength of our own economy depends upon our ability to lead and compete in the international marketplace.

### Energy

An essential lesson to be drawn from Iran is that there are compelling foreign policy as well as domestic economic reasons for lessening our dependence on foreign oil.

In response to a series of United States proposals, the industrial countries adopted in 1979 a cooperative energy strategy for the 1980s. Its main elements are collective restraint on oil imports; intensified efforts to conserve oil and boost production of conventional substitutes for oil; and collaborative research, development and commercialization of new fuel technologies.

At the Tokyo Economic Summit in June, the heads of government of the seven major industrial democracies agreed that they must take responsi-

bility for curbing oil demand. By the end of the year, 20 industrialized nations, members of the International Energy Association, had agreed not only to enforce equitably allocated ceilings on their oil imports, but to create a system for quickly adjusting the ceilings to changes in world oil supply. Completion of the detailed agreements to execute the global oil demand-allocation process is at the head of the international energy agenda for 1980.

At the 1980 Economic Summit in Venice, I intend to propose further joint action to smooth the transition from oil to more abundant fuels and to slow the growth in oil prices.

In support of the international oil strategy, the Administration and the United States coal industry are launching joint marketing efforts to

improve. Of course the outcome depends in part also upon responsible pricing behavior by OPEC and other oil producers.

We support the efforts under way to strengthen the international monetary system. I urge the Congress to enact promptly legislation permitting the United States to increase its quota in the International Monetary Fund (IMF) as part of the general expansion of Fund resources. We welcome the measures being taken by the IMF to improve its ability to promote sound economic and exchange rate policies in all member countries. We also welcome the study of the possible establishment of a "substitution account" to strengthen the international monetary system by promoting the role of the Special Drawing Right as the principal reserve asset in the system.

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*We have long recognized that in an era of interdependence, our own security and prosperity depend upon a larger common effort with friends and allies throughout the world.*

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make this country a major exporter of steam coal. With assurance of reliable United States coal supply at competitive prices, many of the electric power plants to be built in the 1980s and 1990s can be coal-fired rather than oil-burning. Coal exports will help us pay for our declining but costly oil imports.

A new source of natural gas supply for the United States—Mexico—was opened through the conclusion of government-to-government negotiations. Through close cooperation with our northern neighbor, Canada, the Administration cleared the way for expanding the flow of Canadian natural gas to the United States and for private development of the Alaskan gas pipeline across Canada to the lower 48 states.

We continue to believe that nuclear power will play an essential role in meeting the energy needs of many nations, but with effective safeguards against the proliferation of nuclear weapons.

### International Monetary Policy

We are moving forcefully to establish the fundamental economic conditions for a strong dollar. In 1979 the balance of payments was in approximate balance for the first time in three years, despite substantially higher oil import costs. Our anti-inflationary economic policies and strong energy program should provide a basis for further im-

### Trade

Under the direction of my Special Trade Representative, we brought to a successful conclusion the multilateral trade negotiations, the most ambitious set of negotiations to reduce barriers to international trade in a decade. The resulting "MTN" agreements, covering a broad spectrum of trade issues, were concluded and ratified by overwhelming majorities of the United States Congress. These binding commitments, signed by all the major trading nations, provide the framework for a new era in international trading relations with them and with the developing nations. This makes clear my resolve and that of the American people to resist the dangers of protectionism.

The reorganization of the Federal government trade agencies which I directed will assure more effective and prompt governmental action to exploit the export opportunities afforded by the MTN. The plan, approved by Congress this fall, establishes a strong, authoritative voice in the Executive Office of the President to provide coherence and leadership to United States trade policy, negotiations, and the implementation of the MTN trade codes. The reorganization establishes the Office of the U.S. Trade Representative and strengthens the Commerce Department.

## Sugar

In 1979, Congress ratified the International Sugar Agreement, thus fulfilling a major commitment of this Administration. The agreement is an important element in our international commodity policy with far-reaching implications for our relations with developing countries, particularly sugar producers in Latin America. This agreement and other measures my Administration has taken already have helped to stabilize sugar prices and bring high domestic prices into line with those prevailing in the world marketplace. Producers and consumers alike will benefit from a more stable market for this essential commodity. We need prompt enactment of implementing legislation for this agreement.

## Tin

At year's end, Congress approved stockpile disposal legislation which will permit the General Services Administration to sell 30,000 metric tons of tin from our strategic stockpile and contribute up to 5,000 metric tons to the International Tin Organization's (ITO) buffer stock. This fulfills a United States pledge made during the Conference on International Economic Cooperation and represents a major step forward in our relations with producing countries in the developing world. We will consult with other members of the ITO to ensure that our tin disposals do not disrupt markets and take into account the needs of both producers and consumers.

## Common Fund

The United States joined members of the United Nations Conference on Trade and Development, both developed and developing nations, in negotiating an agreement on the framework of a Common Fund to help international commodity agreements stabilize the prices of raw materials. Negotiations are now underway on the final articles of agreement of the Fund.

The United States also participated in successful negotiations of an international rubber agreement.

## Economic Cooperation With Developing Nations

Our relations with the developing nations are of central importance to the United States. The fabric of our relations with these countries has both political and economic dimensions, as we witnessed in recent weeks when na-

tions of the Third World took the lead in condemning the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan. Our ability to work together with developing nations toward goals we have in common—their political independence, the resolution of regional tensions, and our growing ties of trade for example—require us to maintain the policy of active engagement with the developing world that we have pursued over the past three years.

The foreign assistance legislation which I will be submitting to you for FY 81 provides the authority and the funds to carry on a cooperative relationship with a large number of developing nations. Prompt Congressional action on this legislation is essential in order to meet our treaty and base rights agreements, continue our peace efforts in the Middle East, provide economic and development support to countries in need, promote progress on North-South issues, protect Western interests, and counter Soviet influence.

We will also be asking Congress to enable us to honor our international agreements for multilateral assistance by authorizing and appropriating funds for the International Financial Institutions.

Finally, the Administration and the Congress agreed in 1979 on fundamental changes in the way the United States government is organized to conduct economic and technical relations with the developing nations. I submitted and the Congress approved a plan to consolidate in a small policy-coordination body, the International Development Cooperation Agency (IDCA), responsibility for direct United States development assistance, for guidance to United States representatives in multilateral development agencies, and for presenting our long-term development interests in Federal government policy bodies dealing with trade and other economic relations with developing nations. I also submitted, and the House approved in the 1979 session of Congress, a plan to establish the Institute for Scientific and Technological Cooperation (ISTC), a constituent element of the IDCA group of agencies. Once approved, the ISTC will carry out research as well as support research by foreign scientists on technological means of reducing poverty in developing nations.

## Food—The War on Hunger

One of the main economic problems facing developing countries is lagging food production. We must help these countries meet this problem—not only so that their peoples will be free from

the threat of continuing hunger, but also so that their societies will be strong enough to resist external pressure. I have directed that United States bilateral and multilateral aid be geared increasingly to this goal, as recommended by our Hunger Commission, chaired by Sol Linowitz; we are urging other donor countries to join in more effective efforts to this end.

Good progress has been made since the Tokyo Economic Summit called for increased effort on this front. The World Bank is giving this problem top priority, as are some other donor countries. The resources of the consultative Group on International Agricultural Research will be doubled over a five-year period. The work of our own Institute of Scientific and Technological Cooperation will further strengthen the search for relevant new agricultural technologies.

The goal of freeing the world from hunger by the year 2000 should command the full support of all countries.

## THE HUMAN DIMENSION OF FOREIGN POLICY

### Human Rights

The ultimate aim of our foreign policy must be to preserve freedom for ourselves and to expand freedom for others. This is a matter both of national principle and of national interest. For we believe that free and open societies are not only better able to meet the rising expectations of their people; they are also better able to accommodate often conflicting internal pressures before popular frustrations explode in violent and radical directions.

We do not seek to impose our system or institutions on others. Rather, we seek to support, in practical and concrete ways, the efforts of other nations to build their own institutions in ways that will meet the irrepressible human drive for freedom and justice.

Human rights policy commands the strong support of our citizens, and of the Congress. The world climate increasingly favors human rights progress.

Despite new turbulence and conflict, the past year featured some encouraging positive developments. We cannot and should not claim credit for them. But it is clear that we are part of a growing movement. During 1979, we saw:

- The further strengthening of democratic practices in Spain and Portugal, with free elections in both countries;

- The disappearance of several of the world's most repressive regimes;
- The freeing of political prisoners in Asia, Africa, and Latin America;
- A return to democratic rule in several Latin American countries and widespread progress in reducing human rights violations in the region;
- The growing strength of international human rights institutions. The Inter-American Court of Human Rights held its first meeting. Preparations began for another conference to review compliance with the Helsinki accords, to be held in Madrid this November. The OAU took long strides toward establishing a human rights commission for Africa. UN bodies became increasingly active in their human rights efforts.

The United States is still not a party to the key human rights treaties that establish world standards and implementing machinery. In early 1978, I sent for Senate approval four such treaties, the American Convention on Human Rights, the Convention on Racial Discrimination, and the UN Covenants on Civil and Political Rights and on Economic and Social and Cultural Rights. Hearings were held in 1979. No single action by this country would do more to advance the cause of human rights than Senate approval of these instruments and a fifth human rights treaty sent to Congress previously, the Genocide Convention. I urge the earliest possible Senate action.

### Humanitarian Aid

The mass exodus of refugees from Vietnam reached a crescendo in summer 1979 with over 65,000 people a month fleeing repression and economic privation. Most fled by boat, and many were lost at sea. In July, at a special UN meeting on refugees, Vice President Mondale presented a major United States program to rescue and help support and resettle the new refugee population. I doubled to 14,000 a month the number of Indo-Chinese refugees the United States, in accord with our finest traditions, would absorb over the year ahead.

The Vietnamese invasion of Kampuchea in late 1978 gravely jeopardized the supply of food for the already decimated and brutalized Khmer people. In October, I announced that the United States would pay one-third of the costs of the international relief program mounted jointly by UNICEF and the International Committee of the Red

Cross. Leaders of thirty-five church and voluntary agencies, with White House encouragement, are engaged in their own large fund-raising program for refugees.

In early November, Mrs. Carter visited refugees on the Thai-Cambodian border and reported back to me, the United States voluntary agencies, and the American people. In response, our efforts to avert a mass famine were accelerated.

The obstacles remain daunting—continued warfare and aggression by Vietnam, non-distribution by the Phnom Penh authorities of much of the UNICEF-ICRC aid, movement of up to 900,000 hungry Khmer to and across the Thai border where they can be fed and helped.

But Americans will continue their efforts both public and private to avert the famine that looms. New help for our efforts will come from the National Committee formed in early 1980 by leading citizens to help in mobilizing and supporting the sustained effort essential to achieve this humanitarian goal.

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*An essential lesson to be drawn from Iran is that there are compelling foreign policy as well as domestic economic reasons for lessening our dependence on foreign oil.*

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As the year began, we are also considering new means of helping, through our contribution to the UN High Commissioner for Refugees and in other ways, the mounting Afghan refugee population in Pakistan and other desperate refugee situations such as Somalia.

It cannot be ignored that the destructive and aggressive policies of the Soviet Union have added immeasurably to the suffering in these three tragic situations.

I have asked the heads of the appropriate departments of the Executive Branch to play an active role in the Select Commission on Immigration and Refugee Policy to formulate a new approach to deal with sensitivity with the difficult subject of people arriving on our shores from Latin America.

My meeting with Pope John Paul II during his historic and unprecedented visit to the United States helped raise the world's consciousness in connection with pressing problems of famine, homelessness, and human rights. Our talks spurred positive action in many of these areas, notably Indochina, and set the stage for further action in 1980.

### THE CONTROL OF NUCLEAR WEAPONS

Together with our friends and allies, we are striving to build a world in which peoples with diverse interests can live freely and prosper. But all that mankind has achieved to date, all that we are seeking to accomplish, and human existence itself can be undone in an instant—in the catastrophe of a nuclear war.

Thus one of the central objectives of my Administration has been to control the proliferation of nuclear weapons to those nations which do not have them, and their further development by the existing nuclear powers—notably the Soviet Union and the United States.

### Non-Proliferation

I entered office committed to assert American leadership in stemming the proliferation of nuclear weapons—which could create fundamental new instabilities in critical regions of the world, and threaten the security of the

United States. This should not and cannot be done unilaterally. The cooperation of other suppliers of nuclear technology and materials is needed. This issue must not become a North-South confrontation.

We have been proceeding on a number of fronts:

- We have been seeking to encourage nations to accede to the Non-Proliferation Treaty, or to accept full-scope international safeguards. The Nuclear Non-Proliferation Act calls for such safeguards in connection with United States nuclear exports.

- The International Nuclear Fuel Cycle Evaluation (INFCE) has demonstrated that suppliers and recipients can work together. Its results will be published in a month. While differences remain, it will provide a broader international basis for national decisions which must balance energy needs with non-proliferation concerns.

- Finally, we are working to encourage regional cooperation and restraint. Protocol I of the Treaty of Tlatelolco which will contribute to the lessening of nuclear dangers for our



Latin American neighbors has not yet been ratified by the United States Senate.

Working together with Congress, I remain committed to vigorous pursuit of our non-proliferation objectives.

## Limitations on Strategic Arms

The most prominent of our nuclear arms control efforts is, of course, SALT II.

The signing of the Treaty brought to an end painstaking negotiations carried out under three administrations of both parties.

- SALT II is in our mutual interest; it is neither an American favor to the Soviet Union nor a Soviet favor to the United States.

- Ratification of the SALT II Treaty would represent a major step forward in restraining the continued growth of Soviet strategic forces.

Because SALT II reduces superpower competition in its most dangerous manifestation, this Treaty is the single most important bilateral accord of the decade:

- SALT II will permit us better to maintain strategic equivalence in nu-

clear weapons and devote our defense increases more heavily to our highest priority needs for conventional force improvements;

- Without it, the Soviets can add more power to their forces and better conceal from us what they are doing;

- Without SALT II, and the beginning of SALT III, deeper cuts would take many more years to achieve;

- Without SALT II, our efforts to control the proliferation of nuclear weapons will be more difficult.

I believe that the Senate will ratify SALT II because the Treaty is, in its simplest terms, in the interest of our Nation's security.

But I do not believe it advisable at this time to bring up the Treaty for consideration on the Senate floor. The Congress and the Executive Branch must first deal with the pressing matters arising from the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan.

## CONCLUSION

As we enter the decade of the 1980s, we face challenges both at home and abroad which will test our qualities as a

people—our toughness and willingness to sacrifice for larger goals, our courage and our vision.

For this Nation to remain secure, for this country to prosper, we must rise above narrow interests. The dangers of disunity are self-evident in a world of major power confrontation. The rewards of a new national consensus and sense of purpose are equally clear.

We have new support in the world for our purposes of national independence and individual human dignity. We have a new will at home to do what is required to keep us the strongest nation on earth.

We must move together into this decade with the strength which comes from realization of the dangers before us and from the confidence that together we can overcome them.

JIMMY CARTER ■

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<sup>1</sup>Text from Weekly Compilation of Presidential Documents of Jan. 28, 1980.

and the families and friends of victims of human rights abuses including the disappeared. Often as important, but sometimes more difficult to manage, are contacts with government agencies responsible for the judicial system, the management of detention centers, and the general administration of justice.

In countries where disappearances have been commonplace, we have registered our disapproval of this phenomenon in the strongest possible terms, emphasizing as well the damage it does to our bilateral relationship and the negative effects it may have on all aspects of our relationship including the assistance we provide.

We talk on two levels; one on the principles concerned the problem itself, clearly and specifically, and we make formal and informal representations about the disappeared on our own initiative and at the behest of the families and friends of the disappeared, Members of the Congress, private citizens, and human rights organizations. We present representation lists containing the names of the disappeared.

The sad reality is that even when a repressive government reaches a stage of willingness to look for certain of the disappeared, or when an individual official is disposed to be helpful in such a search, it is often unable to determine the whereabouts of an individual who may have been picked up by security agencies operating without the knowledge of other agencies or operatives acting independently without the knowledge of their superiors.

In some instances, during the early stages, our representations are disparaged. We are told that the disappearances, while unfortunate, are the unavoidable byproduct of the "war" against subversion or terrorism. We are asked why we are interested at all since the disappeared are not U.S. citizens but terrorists and criminals. It is suggested to us, and not obliquely, that we have no business meddling in another nation's internal affairs. As we enter the third year of this policy, however, these efforts to escape discussion of the issue have by and large been abandoned.

Needless to say, we reject categorically such self-serving and fundamentally erroneous distortions of the international human rights obligations of all countries. We are prepared to demonstrate, and indeed have demonstrated, our concern on this issue in a tangible way using the variety of

foreign policy instruments provided by law and policy to the conduct of our foreign affairs.

#### U.S. Support for U.N. Resolution 33/173

There is much the United States can and does do bilaterally in our efforts to attenuate and eventually eliminate this problem. Our efforts are enhanced when other states join in our representations and express concerns similar to our own.

At times world public opinion may seem ephemeral, but no country—no matter how unenlightened or repressive its regime—enjoys being the target of international scorn and obloquy. In nations where disappearances occur, we have joined with like-minded friends and allies to urge an end to this dreadful human rights violation. We work closely with other free nations to foster our international human rights objectives. There still is no more appropriate forum for such cooperation than the United Nations.

On December 20, 1978, the U.N. General Assembly adopted Resolution 33/173, on disappeared persons. Its genesis can be found in a growing awareness that in various parts of the world, enforced or involuntary disappearances of persons, as a result of excesses by law enforcement or security authorities, unhappily had become a common phenomenon. The resolution called upon governments to search for missing persons, hold law enforcement and security authorities fully accountable for disappearances, and to cooperate with other governments in locating or accounting for persons who disappear. The resolution also requested the U.N. Human Rights Commission to consider the question of the disappeared. It urged the U.N. Secretary General to use his good offices in disappearance cases and to draw the concerns expressed in the resolution to the attention of governments with a view toward disinterested humanitarian action.

The United States strongly supported this resolution, and is working to insure that it is implemented in the spirit which animated its adoption. In late August of 1979 in Geneva, the Subcommittee on the Prevention of Discrimination and Protection of Minorities discussed the human rights of detained persons with special emphasis on the disappeared. The outcome of this discussion was a resolution adopted by the subcommittee on September 5.

The subcommittee considers that the resolution in question places not merely a legal but also a moral obligation, based on the principles of elementary humanity which inspire the international community on all those participating in U.N. activities. Nations are asked to take account at every appropriate opportunity of disappearances brought to their knowledge and to combine their efforts to try to locate the missing and disappeared persons.

The subcommittee also proposes for Human Rights Commission approval the creation of a group of experts who would be given all the information available for locating disappeared and missing persons in various regions of the world and who would make necessary contacts with government and families concerned.

The subcommittee also submitted to the U.N. Secretary General several lists of missing persons with a view toward his exercising the good offices role urged in the General Assembly resolution of last December.

Finally, the subcommittee suggests that if the disappearance phenomenon continues, its extreme gravity would justify some form of emergency remedy based on the notion of *habeas corpus* designed to induce governments to search for the disappeared.

What is striking about the subcommittee's actions is that we are witnessing the beginning of the forging of machinery and procedures within the U.N. system to handle the disappearance phenomenon. The U.N. Human Rights Commission will consider the subcommittee's recommendations at its meeting in Geneva in early 1980. I promise you the United States will do all it can to insure constructive action on the subcommittee's proposals.

Let me conclude by reiterating my appreciation for the opportunity to appear before your committee, my admiration for the tremendous international public service this forum provides, and my assurances that this Administration remains totally committed to finding ways to mitigate and eliminate the egregious violation of human rights that "disappearances" represent. ■

<sup>1</sup>The complete transcript of the hearings will be published by the committee and will be available from the Superintendent of Documents, U.S. Government Printing Office, Washington, D.C. 20402.

# World Court Rules on American Hostages

*Following are introductory remarks by the President of the International Court of Justice, Sir Humphrey Waldock, and the oral argument to the Court by the United States, on December 10, 1979, and the order of interim measures of protection issued by the Court on December 15, 1979, in the case United States Diplomatic and Consular Staff in Tehran.*

*The oral argument was presented to the Court at The Hague by U.S. Attorney General Benjamin R. Civiletti and the Legal Adviser of the Department of State, Roberts B. Owen. The U.S. Government was represented by Roberts B. Owen, as Agent; Benjamin R. Civiletti and Stephen M. Schuebel, Deputy Legal Adviser of the State Department, as Counsel; and David H. Small, Assistant Legal Adviser for Near Eastern and South Asian Affairs of the State Department, as Adviser. Mr. Civiletti was assisted by Jack Goldklang, Attorney-Adviser, Office of the Legal Counsel of the Justice Department, and by Robert Smith, Special Assistant to the Attorney General.*

*Texts of the U.S. application to the Court instituting proceedings against Iran, its request for interim measures of protection, and a letter from Secretary of State Vance to the President of the Court were printed in the Department of State Bulletin of January 1980, p. 37.*

## PRESIDENT WALDOCK

The Court meets to consider the request for the indication of provisional measures, under Article 41 of the Statute of the Court, and Articles 73 and 74 of the Rules of Court, made by the Government of the United States of America, in the case concerning *United States Diplomatic and Consular Staff in Tehran* brought by the United States of America against Iran.

The case was brought before the Court by an application filed in the Registry of the Court on 29 November 1979. In that application the U.S. Government claims to found the jurisdiction of the Court on the Vienna Convention on Diplomatic Relations of 1961 and Article I of the Optional Protocol thereto concerning the compulsory settlement of disputes; the Vienna Convention on Consular Relations of 1963 and Article I of the Optional Protocol thereto concerning the compulsory settlement of disputes; Article XXI, paragraph 2, of a Treaty of Amity, Eco-

omic Relations, and Consular Rights of 1955 between the United States of America and Iran; and Article 13, paragraph 1, of the Convention of 1973 on the Prevention and Punishment of Crimes against Internationally Protected Persons, Including Diplomatic Agents.

The United States then alleges a sequence of events beginning on 4 November 1979 in and around the U.S. Embassy in Tehran, involving invasion of the Embassy premises and the seizure and detention of U.S. diplomatic and consular staff. On the basis of these allegations, it formulates a number of legal claims and asks the Court to adjudicate and declare that the Government of Iran, in tolerating, encouraging, and failing to prevent and punish the conduct described in the application, violated its international legal obligations to the United States under the provisions of a number of international treaties and conventions; that the Government of Iran is under a particular obligation immediately to secure the release of all U.S. nationals currently being detained and to assure that they are allowed to leave Iran safely; that the Government of Iran should pay reparation for the alleged violations of Iran's international legal obligations; and that the Government of Iran should submit to its competent authorities for the purpose of prosecution the persons responsible for the crimes committed against the premises and staff of the U.S. Embassy and Consulates.

On 29 November 1979, the day on which the application itself was filed, the United States of America submitted the present request for the indication of provisional measures. I now ask the Registrar to read from that request the statement of the measures which the United States asks the Court to indicate.

## THE REGISTRAR

The Government of the United States of America requests that pending final judgment in this suit the Court indicate forthwith the following:

(i) that the Government of Iran immediately release all hostages of United States nationality and facilitate the prompt and safe departure from Iran of these persons and all other United States officials in dignified and humane circumstances;

(ii) that the Government of Iran immediately clear the premises of the United States Embassy, Chancery and Consulate of all persons whose presence is not authorized by the

United States Chargé d'Affaires in Iran, and restore the premises to United States control;

(iii) that the Government of Iran ensure that all persons attached to the United States Embassy and Consulate should be accorded, and protected in, full freedom within the Embassy and Chancery premises, and the freedom of movement within Iran necessary to carry out their diplomatic and consular functions;

(iv) that the Government of Iran not place on trial any person attached to the Embassy and Consulate of the United States and refrain from any action to implement any such trial;

(v) that the Government of Iran ensure that no action is taken which might prejudice the rights of the United States in respect of the carrying out of any decision which the Court may render on the merits, and in particular neither take nor permit action that would threaten the lives, safety, or well-being of the hostages.

. . . .

## PRESIDENT WALDOCK

The Government of Iran has not appointed an Agent. On the other hand, by a letter telegraphed to the President and received in the Registry in the late evening of yesterday, 9 December 1979, the Government of Iran has informed the Court of its view that on various grounds the Court cannot and should not take cognizance of the case submitted to it by the U.S. Government, or indicate the provisional measures formulated in the Request. A copy of that letter was communicated immediately to the Agent of the United States of America. I shall therefore ask the Registrar now to read the text of that letter.

## THE REGISTRAR

*[Translation from French]*

I have the honour to acknowledge receipt of the telegrams concerning the meeting of the International Court of Justice on 10 December 1979, at the request of the Government of the United States of America, and to submit to you below the position of the Government of the Islamic Republic of Iran in this respect.

1. First of all, the Government of the Islamic Republic of Iran wishes to express its respect for the International Court of Justice, and for its distinguished members, for what they have achieved in the quest for just and equitable solutions to legal conflicts between States. However, the Government of the Islamic Republic of Iran considers that the Court cannot and should not take cognizance of the



case which the Government of the United States of America has submitted to it, and in a most significant fashion, a case confined to what is called the question of the "hostages of the American Embassy in Tehran".

2. For this question only represents a marginal and secondary aspect of an overall problem, one such that it cannot be studied separately, and which involves, *inter alia*, more than 25 years of continual interference by the United States in the internal affairs of Iran, the shameless exploitation of our country, and numerous crimes perpetrated against the Iranian people, contrary to and in conflict with all international and humanitarian norms.

3. The problem involved in the conflict between Iran and the United States is thus not one of the interpretation and the application of the treaties upon which the American Application is based, but results from an overall situation containing much more fundamental and more complex elements. Consequently, the Court cannot examine the American

Application divorced from its proper context, namely the whole political dossier of the relations between Iran and the United States over the last 25 years. This dossier includes, *inter alia*, all the crimes perpetrated in Iran by the American Government, in particular the *coup d'état* of 1953 stirred up and carried out by the CIA, the overthrow of the lawful national government of Dr. Mossadegh, the restoration of the Shah and of his regime which was under the control of American interests, and all the social, economic, cultural, and political consequences of the direct interventions in our internal affairs, as well as grave, flagrant and continuous violations of all international norms, committed by the United States in Iran.

4. With regard to the request for provisional measures, as formulated by the United States, it in fact implies that the Court should have passed judgment on the actual substance of the case submitted to it, which the Court cannot do without breach of the norms governing its jurisdiction. Furthermore, since provisional measures are by definition intended to protect the interests of the parties, they cannot be unilateral, as they are in the request submitted by the American Government.

In conclusion, the Government of the Islamic Republic of Iran respectfully draws the attention of the Court to the deep-rootedness and the essential character of the Islamic revolution of Iran, a revolution of a whole oppressed nation against its oppressors and their masters; any examination of the numerous repercussions thereof is essentially and directly a matter within the national sovereignty of Iran.

I have the honour, etc.

Tehran, 9 December 1979

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## MR. OWEN

I have the honor to appear before the Court today as Agent of the United States of America in support of the request of the United States for provisional measures of protection against the Government of Iran. Mr. President, in view of the extraordinary nature of the matter which is to be argued before the Court this afternoon, the President of the United States has requested the Attorney General of the United States to appear before the Court as Counsel in support of our request for provisional measures. With the Court's permission, therefore, I would like at this time to introduce to the Court the Attorney General, Mr. Benjamin R. Civiletti, who will commence the presentation on behalf of the United States.

## MR. CIVILETTI

I appear today as Attorney General of the United States and advocate in support of its request for provisional measures of protection from illegal acts of the Government of Iran. I feel privileged to appear on behalf of my government. I should also say that the United States is grateful to the Court for providing a hearing at this time.

If I may be permitted a personal introduction. I have spent my working life as a trial lawyer in the United States. I have been an advocate both for the government and for those who oppose the government, in both civil and criminal suits. Anyone who has been a trial advocate in any country would approach this Court with respect and awe. In a real sense this Court represents the highest legal aspiration of civilized man.

Yet I find myself addressing this Court with awe but with restrained anger. More than 50 of my countrymen are held prisoners, in peril of their lives and suffering even as I speak. This imprisonment and this suffering are illegal and inhuman. It takes no advocate to bring this cause to you. The facts are known worldwide, and every citizen of the world—trained in the law or not—knows the conduct to be criminal.

I come to this Court, my government comes to this Court, not so that yet another body will reiterate the fact that what we are witnessing in Iran is illegal. The United States comes here so that this tribunal may demonstrate that international law may not be tossed aside, that the international fabric of civility may not be rent with impunity.

My government asks this Court to take the most vigorous and most speedy

action it can not to settle a minor boundary dispute with regard to a small boundary, not to give to one national treasury from another, but to save lives and set human beings free. This is what people everywhere—not just monarchs and presidents, not just lawyers and jurists—expect of what a judge in my nation called the "omnipresence" that we know to be the law.

If I come to you with anger, I also come to you with urgency. We who speak the sober language of jurisprudence say the United States is seeking the "indication of provisional measures." What we are asking this Court for is the quickest possible action to end a barbaric captivity and to save human lives.

For the first time in modern diplomatic history, a state has not only acquiesced in, but participated in and is seeking political advantage from the illegal seizure and imprisonment of the diplomatic personnel of another state. It even threatens to put these diplomatic personnel on trial. If our international institutions, including this Court, should even appear to condone or tolerate the flagrant violations of customary international law, state practice, and explicit treaty commitments that are involved here, the result will be a serious blow not only to the safety of the American diplomatic persons now in captivity in Tehran, but to the rule of law within the international community.

To allow the illegal detention and trial of U.S. diplomatic personnel and other citizens to go forward during the pendency of this case would be to encourage other governments and individuals to believe that they may, with impunity, seize any Embassy and any diplomatic agent, or indeed any other hostage, anywhere in the world. Such conduct cannot be tolerated; every civilized government recognizes that. We therefore submit that every Court has a clear obligation to take every action to bring this conduct to an immediate end.

We shall this afternoon discuss the simple, clear issues presented in the following order. I shall review the applicable basic principles of international law which bind both Iran and the United States, not only under customary international law but also under four treaties to which both states are parties. These treaties are directly in point. Mr. Owen will then briefly summarize the facts to demonstrate to the Court that the Government of Iran has committed, is committing—and is proposing to commit—clear, flagrant violations of these principles of international law.

We will next demonstrate that the Court has jurisdiction over this dispute and the authority to indicate the provisional measures requested by the United States. Finally, we shall explain why, on the basis of article 41 of the Court's Statute, an indication of interim measures is urgently needed and amply justified.

The international legal standards here are of ancient origin. They have evolved over centuries of state practice, and in recent years have been codified in a series of international agreements. It is on four of those agreements that the Government of the United States relies here.

### Vienna Convention on Diplomatic Relations

Since the subject of this proceeding is focused largely on the status and immunities of diplomatic agents, I shall refer at the outset to the 1961 Vienna Convention on Diplomatic Relations. The purpose of that convention, to which both the United States and Iran are parties, was to codify a fundamental, firmly established rule of international law—that the immunity and inviolability of Embassies and diplomats must be absolutely respected and that in no circumstances may a state engage in the type of conduct that is involved here in this matter before this Court.

The first relevant provision of the Vienna Convention on Diplomatic Relations is article 22, relating to the physical premises of an Embassy or mission. The words of article 22 are clear:

"1. The premises of the mission shall be inviolable. The agents of the receiving State may not enter them, except with the consent of the head of the mission.

2. The receiving State is under a special duty to take all appropriate steps to protect the premises of the mission against any intrusion or damage and to prevent any disturbance of the peace of the mission or impairment of its dignity.

3. The premises of the mission, their furnishings and other property thereon and the means of transport of the mission shall be immune from search, requisition, attachment or execution."

As to the personnel of such a diplomatic mission, article 29 of the convention goes on to provide that every diplomatic agent "shall be inviolable" and that he shall be free from "any form of arrest and detention." The language is unqualified: It prohibits any form of arrest or detention, regardless of any grievance which the host state may suppose that it has against a particular diplomat. There

is a remedy available against a diplomat who a state believes has engaged in improper conduct—to require him to leave the country. But the Vienna convention excludes any form of physical arrest or detention for the purpose of prosecution or for any other reason.

The convention reemphasizes the principle of diplomatic inviolability in several different ways. Article 29 requires the receiving state to prevent any attack upon the person, freedom, or dignity of a diplomatic agent. Article 31 requires that each such agent enjoy unqualified "immunity from the criminal jurisdiction of the receiving State." There is no exception; no matter what the cause, the receiving state is precluded from allowing the criminal prosecution of a diplomatic agent. In the last few days, as we will explain later in our argument, this absolute immunity from criminal prosecution has taken on an overwhelming importance.

Article 37 of the convention extends the same absolute inviolability and absolute immunity from assault and from criminal trial to the administrative and technical staff of an Embassy. All but two of the more than 50 Americans currently being held hostage in Tehran are either diplomatic agents or Embassy administrative and technical staff, some of whom also perform consular functions.

Other immunities and privileges pertinent to this case are found in Articles 24, 25, 26, 27, 44, 45, and 47 of the Vienna Convention on Diplomatic Relations. Among these are the inviolability of the archives and documents of the mission, the right of diplomatic agents and staff to communicate freely for official purposes, and the right to depart from the receiving state at any time they wish.

Over the hundreds of years that these principles have been recognized and honored throughout the international community, there have been occasions when a particular state has felt dissatisfied or aggrieved by the conduct of a diplomatic agent of another state or his government; and Iran is claiming some such grievances now. For hundreds of years, however, states have uniformly recognized that the only lawful course open to them is to declare the diplomatic agent *persona non grata*. When a state declares a diplomatic agent *persona non grata*, his government must withdraw him or suffer the eventual termination of his diplomatic status.

These uniformly recognized principles have been codified in article 9 of the Vienna convention. Under that treaty, a receiving state can in effect expel an objectionable diplomat—but under no circumstances may a state imprison an emissary or put him on trial. In diplo-

matic history and practice there is no precedent or justification for the seizure of a diplomat, let alone an entire diplomatic mission. There is also no precedent or justification of the imprisonment and trial of such persons in an attempt to coerce capitulation to certain demands. It is difficult to think of a more obvious, more flagrant violation of international law.

### Vienna Convention on Consular Relations

Both Iran and the United States are also parties to the second international convention on which the United States relies in this proceeding—the 1963 Vienna Convention on Consular Relations. This convention reflects many of the same principles I have just described. Under the consular convention every state party, including Iran, has an international legal obligation to protect the consular facilities and members of the consular posts of every other state party.

Of course, when personnel of a diplomatic mission are providing consular services, they are entitled to the full protection afforded by the Vienna Convention on Diplomatic Relations. The Convention on Consular relations also requires the receiving state to permit another state party's consular officers to communicate with and have access to their nationals. This right is manifestly violated when the consular officers are themselves held incommunicado by force.

### New York Convention

Apart from these two Vienna Conventions, the United States and Iran also are parties to the New York Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of Crimes Against Internationally Protected Persons, Including Diplomatic Agents. One of the essential premises of the New York convention is stated in its preamble. It is that crimes against such internationally protected persons, including diplomatic agents, are "a serious threat to the maintenance of normal international relations" and "a matter of grave concern to the international community."

The convention defines a number of types of conduct as constituting crimes within its scope. Under article 2 it is a criminal act to participate as an accomplice in an attack on the person or liberty of an internationally protected person or in a violent attack on official premises. Under article 4 of the convention, every state party, including Iran, is required to prevent such crimes. Under article 7, every state party must take steps to see that those responsible for such crimes are prosecuted. The Government of Iran has



violated every one of these provisions in the plainest way.

All three of the treaties I have discussed were drafted by the U.N. International Law Commission. They were adopted by conferences of plenipotentiaries or by the U.N. General Assembly—and thus by the vast majority of the states of the world. They have been so widely ratified as to demonstrate that they reflect universally recognized rules of international law.

### Bilateral Treaty of Amity

Finally, the United States relies in this case upon a bilateral treaty—the 1955 Treaty of Amity, Economic Relations, and Consular Rights between the United States and Iran. This treaty is in a sense even broader than the three multilateral conventions to which I have previously referred. Under article II, paragraph 4, of the treaty of amity, each party has a legal obligation to insure that within its territory the nationals of the other party shall receive “the most constant protection and security.”

In addition, article II provides that, if any U.S. national is in custody in Iran, Iran must in every respect accord him “reasonable and humane treatment.” Under articles II and XIX any such national is entitled to communicate with his own government and avail himself of the services of his consular officials. Article XIII requires that the consular officers and employees themselves be accorded the privileges and immunities accorded by general international usage and that they be treated in a fashion no less favorable than similar officer and employees of any third country.

That completes my brief summary of the principles of international law that underlie the application of the United States. I could go on to discuss the provisions of Article 2, Paragraphs 3 and 4, of the Charter of the United Nations, under which Iran and all other U.N. members are obligated to settle their disputes by peaceful means and to refrain in their international relations from the threat or use of force. But the United States believes that the three multilateral conventions and the 1955 bilateral treaty provide as clear a legal predicate as can be rationally required for its request for an indication of provisional measures.

### MR. OWEN

The Attorney General has summarized the treaty provisions which form the legal predicate for the United States' pending

request for an indication of provisional measures—and I would like to open my portion of the argument by making one brief comment about those treaty provisions.

In my judgment, the most striking feature of the legal principles involved in this case is their clarity and simplicity. All of the substantive principles involved are well known and familiar, and they are clear and unambiguous. This is not a case involving complicated legal considerations or difficult questions of interpretation; the only question here is one of the application of the four treaties—and I suggest that the application of the treaties will become very clear indeed from a brief review of the facts—to which I now turn.

Like the legal principles involved, the facts are simple—and tragically so. I submit that a mere recitation of the events will demonstrate beyond any doubt whatever that the Government of Iran is today engaged, on a continuing basis, in gross and obvious violations of the international legal obligations which it owes to the United States and to the international community at large.

The immediate factual story began on November 4 of this year. On that day, in the course of a demonstration of several thousand people immediately outside the U.S. Embassy compound in Tehran, several hundred demonstrators broke away and commenced a physical assault on the Embassy. I will not burden you with the details of the 2-hour attack on the Embassy or the manner in which the attackers physically cut their way into the Embassy. But I should emphasize that throughout the attack, U.S. officials were in contact with the office of the Prime Minister of Iran and the Iranian Foreign Ministry—vigorously calling for security assistance—and yet the Government of Iran made absolutely no effort to prevent the seizure of the Embassy and its personnel.

Indeed, in the days and weeks that have followed the initial attack and the seizure of more than 50 American hostages, the chief of the Iranian Government and the members of his council have repeatedly praised and approved the conduct of the captors. Instead of honoring its legal obligations and seeking to prevent or remedy the violations of the rights of the United States, the Government of Iran has actually ratified those violations and made them its own.

Since this last point is important in fixing the responsibility of the Government of Iran, let me pause to emphasize that government's complicity in the conduct involved. In response to a question from the President of the Court, we have submitted to the Court a collection of public statements made by Iranian offi-

cial in the last few weeks, and I would like to refer to two or three of those statements. On November 4, the very day of the Embassy seizure by the so-called Iranian students, the Ayatollah Khomeini, then the *de facto* Chief of State, approved the students' action, and the next day, November 5, a number of Iranian officials did exactly the same.

On that day, November 5, the Ayatollah Khomeini publicly refused to call upon the students to withdraw; the commander of the Revolutionary Guard congratulated the students and pledged the Guard's full support for the action; the public prosecutor and the judiciary announced their support; and then the Foreign Minister of Iran declared: “The action of the students enjoys the endorsement and support of the Government.” On November 18 the Ayatollah Khomeini declared “what our nation has done is to arrest a bunch of spies, who, according to the norms, should be investigated, tried, and treated in accordance with our own laws.” He made clear at the same time that the hostages would be released only if the United States first met certain specified demands of the Iranian Government.

I ask the Court to bear in mind that these statements emanated from a government which is under a solemn and continuing legal duty to provide the most constant protection and security to U.S. personnel. Indeed, as documented in the materials we have submitted to the Court, two senior members of the Iranian Government have publicly acknowledged this legal duty, while at the same time approving its violation.

Continuing the story of the hostages, the fact is that since the time of their capture they have been subjected to a harrowing ordeal. Bound hand and foot and frequently blindfolded, they have been subjected to severe discomfort, complete isolation and threats, including repeated threats both by their captors and by the Iranian Government to the effect that, in certain circumstances, they, the hostages, would be put on trial and even put to death. They have been paraded blindfolded before hostile crowds, denied mail and visitors, and essentially held incommunicado. Some time ago, it is true, 5 non-American captives and 13 American hostages were released, but more than 50 U.S. citizens continue to be held in these inhumane and dangerous circumstances. Moreover, recent reports suggest that some of the hostages may have been transferred from the Embassy compound to other places of confinement. We have no way of knowing the details of the conditions of their confinement or their treatment at any such new locations.



When these facts are held up against the standards of international law to which the Attorney General earlier referred, including the principles that every diplomatic agent must be kept inviolate from any form of arrest or detention and from any attack upon his person, freedom, or dignity, I suggest that it is not really possible to imagine any clearer violations of the four applicable treaties than the violations presented in this case. On this score, I might also add, there is true unanimity among international legal scholars. Since early November there has been an outpouring of pronouncements from leading international legal scholars throughout the world, and all have unanimously condemned the Iranian treatment of the American nationals in Tehran.

In addition, the same view has received the public support of numerous well-known organizations of jurists, including various societies of international law, the International Law Association, and the International Commission of Jurists. Without exception, the scholars and learned societies have condemned the Iranian hostage-taking as the purest kind of violation of international law. To cite just a single example, the retired President of this Court stated in a recent interview as follows:

... the conduct of the Iranian authorities in this matter constitutes the most flagrant violation of the norms of international law honoring the privileges and immunity of diplomatic missions and their officials.

He went on to say that history will record Iran's actions as "the most complete list of infractions" against these universally recognized norms of international law.

I know of no dissent. Moreover, we are not speaking in the past tense. The violations are going forward and continuing as I stand here this afternoon. With each passing day—indeed with each passing hour—the rights of the United States and the rights of its citizens in Tehran are being assaulted in a manner which is totally inconsistent with the rule of law. That ongoing and continuing violation of plainly established rights is the essence of the problem before the Court this afternoon.

### Jurisdiction of the Court

Having reviewed the substantive elements, legal and factual, of the dispute with Iran which the United States has brought before this Court, I would like now to turn to the question of the Court's jurisdiction over the dispute. As I understand the teachings of the prior decisions of the Court with respect to the indication of provisional measures, it is not

necessary for a state requesting such measures to establish conclusively that the Court has jurisdiction. The urgency of the situations which call for provisional measures is such that an effort to reach final and conclusive determinations with respect to jurisdiction could well defeat the purpose of Article 41 of the Court's statute. For these reasons, as I understand it, the Court follows the principle that if the Party requesting interim protective measures makes a *prima facie* showing that the Court has jurisdiction over the dispute, that showing provides a sufficient jurisdictional predicate for the Court to act affirmatively on the request.

In this case, I respectfully submit, the United States can make more than a *prima facie* showing. Indeed, I think I can demonstrate that the Court has jurisdiction over the present dispute beyond any doubt at all.

In this connection let me refer to the jurisdictional provisions of the Optional Protocol to the Vienna Convention on Diplomatic Relations. Article I of the Protocol provides unequivocally:

Disputes arising out of the interpretation or application of the Convention shall lie within the compulsory jurisdiction of the International Court of Justice and may accordingly be brought before the Court by an application made by any party to the dispute being a Party to the present Protocol.

Needless to say, the United States is a party to a dispute with Iran. It has repeatedly called upon the Government of Iran to release the hostages pursuant to its international legal obligations, and Iran has repeatedly refused. Since both states are parties to the protocol, and since one of them (the United States) has presented an application to the Court, article I confers mandatory jurisdiction upon the Court.

It is true that articles II and III of the protocol go on to provide that the parties to the dispute may agree on other methods of settling the dispute, namely by arbitration or conciliation. That is to say, the compulsory jurisdiction of this Court under article I is unqualified, but under articles II and III the parties may mutually agree on arbitration or conciliation instead. I want to emphasize, however, that the settlement procedures contemplated by articles II and III are purely optional. In the English version of the protocol this is indicated not only by the permissive word "may" as it appears in articles II and III, but also by the preamble to the protocol, which indicates explicitly the intention that the Court shall have jurisdiction "unless" arbitration or conciliation have been agreed upon by the parties. Moreover, I am in-

formed that the same conclusion flows from the equally authoritative texts of the protocol in French, Spanish, Russian, and Chinese.

And, finally, the same conclusion—the conclusion that the Court has jurisdiction if no such optional agreement on arbitration or conciliation has been reached—is confirmed by two articles by well-known scholars, both of which appear in a volume whose English title is *A Collection of Studies on International Law, In Honor of Paul Guggenheim*, published in 1968. May I refer the Court respectfully to pages 634 and 695 of that volume, at which Herbert Briggs and Paul Ruegger emphasize that under treaty provisions of this kind the Court's jurisdiction is obligatory where the parties have not in fact resorted to other means of settlement.

The Court will not be surprised to hear from me that no agreement on other means of settlement has been reached in this case. In response to questions propounded by the President, the U.S. Under Secretary of State for Political Affairs, Mr. Newsom, has provided the Court with a factual account of the efforts made by the United States to open negotiations with the Iranian authorities, and the total rejection of all such overtures by the Government of Iran. Specifically, in early November, after the seizure of the hostages, when the U.S. Government dispatched a distinguished emissary, a former U.S. Attorney General (Ramsey Clark), to visit Iran to discuss the hostage-taking with the Government of Iran, that government refused even to let him enter the country. He stayed in Istanbul for several days attempting assiduously to open discussions, but eventually he returned home without having been able to meet any representative of the Government of Iran.

Moreover, as Mr. Newsom has stated, subsequent efforts by the United States to negotiate have been equally unsuccessful. In fact, every one of the United States' repeated efforts to open direct communications between the two parties has been rebuffed by Iran which, incidentally, has even refused to attend the relevant meetings of the U.N. Security Council. Under such circumstances the United States respectfully submits that, even if articles II and III of the protocol required a prior attempt to arbitrate or conciliate as a condition on this Court's jurisdiction—and we do not believe that they do—that requirement would have been obviated by this Iranian conduct. I should add that exactly the same is true with respect to the Vienna Convention on Consular Relations whose jurisdictional provisions are identical to

those of the Vienna Convention on Diplomatic Relations.

Turning to the elements of the dispute which arise under the Treaty of Amity, Economic Relations, and Consular Rights between the United States of America and Iran, the jurisdiction of the Court is again, I submit, crystal clear. Article XXI, paragraph 2, of the treaty provides in its entirety as follows, and I quote:

Any dispute between the High Contracting Parties as to the interpretation or application of the present Treaty, not satisfactorily adjusted by diplomacy, shall be submitted to the International Court of Justice, unless the High Contracting Parties agree to settlement by some other pacific means.

Again, in view of the fact that the repeated efforts of the United States to deal with the dispute by diplomacy have been consistently rebuffed by the Government of Iran, it seems indisputable that under the treaty of amity, this case is properly before this Court.

A final jurisdictional issue arises under the Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of Crimes against Internationally Protected Persons, Including Diplomatic Agents. With respect to that convention, the jurisdictional showing that we can make is admittedly less compelling than the showing we have made with respect to the other three treaties. In contrast with the Vienna Conventions on Diplomatic and on Consular Relations, article 13 of the convention on internationally protected persons might be read as requiring a 6-months' effort by the parties to arbitrate the dispute as a prerequisite to the Court's jurisdiction.

It is the position of my government, however, that where, as in this case, one of the parties has closed down the Embassy of the other and has flatly refused even to open communications, either through the other's special emissary or in any other fashion, the arbitration requirement is rendered inoperable. It is our position, therefore, that we have made out a *prima facie* showing of jurisdiction, even under the internationally protected persons convention. Moreover, even if no such showing had been made, all of the major claims presented in the Application of the United States are solidly based, I submit, upon the other three treaties—as to which, in our view, the Court's jurisdiction appears not merely *prima facie*, but beyond dispute.

At this point, in response to a question raised by the President of the Court, I should make one final comment on the Court's jurisdiction. As the Court is aware, the Security Council of the United Nations has addressed the present dis-

pute, and in Resolution No. 457, adopted 6 days ago, the Council called upon the Government of Iran to bring about the immediate release of the hostages. In such circumstances it might conceivably be suggested that this Court should not exercise jurisdiction over the same dispute.

I respectfully submit that any such suggestion would be untenable. It is, of course, an impressive fact that the 15 countries represented in the Security Council—15 countries of very diverse views and philosophies—have voted unanimously, 15 to nothing, in favor of the resolution to which I have referred. The fact remains, however, that the Security Council is a political organ which has responsibility for seeking solutions to international problems through political means. By contrast, this Court is a judicial body with the responsibility to employ judicial methods in order to resolve those problems which lie within its jurisdiction. There is absolutely nothing in the U.N. Charter or in this Court's Statute to suggest that action by the Security Council excludes action by the Court, even if the two actions might in some respects be parallel.

By contrast, Article 12 of the U.N. Charter provides that, while the Security Council is exercising its functions respecting a dispute, the General Assembly shall not make any recommendation on that dispute; but the charter places no corresponding restriction on the Court. As Rosenne has observed at page 87 of his treatise, *The Law and Practice of the International Court of Justice*, the fact that one of the political organs of the United Nations is dealing with a particular dispute does not militate against the Court's taking action on those aspects of the same dispute which fall within its jurisdiction.

To sum up on this point, the United States has brought to the Court a dispute which plainly falls within the Court's compulsory jurisdiction, and I respectfully submit that, if we can satisfy the Court that an indication of provisional measures is justified and needed in a manner consistent with Article 41 of the Court's Statute, the Court will have a duty to indicate such measures, quite without regard to any parallel action which may have been taken by the Security Council of the United Nations. As to whether the actions of the Security Council affect the need for provisional measures, I will have more to say a little later in my argument, but first I would like to explain the specific reasons which underlie our request for such an indication of such measures.

## Nature of Interim Measures

On this subject I start from the premise that an essential purpose of such provisional measures is to preserve the rights of the parties pending the final decision of the Court. Putting the matter in other terms, it is familiar jurisprudence that the Court may look to see whether any injury which may be done to one party or the other during the pendency of the case will be, on the one hand, an injury which can be remedied through the Court's final decision or, on the other hand, whether during the pendency of the case one party will be subject to an injury which is actually irreparable.

An injury of the former kind may or may not justify an indication of provisional measures, but where an irreparable injury threatens or is actually being inflicted during the pendency of the case, there is clear justification—and indeed an urgent need—for interim protective measures. As the Court observed in the *Fisheries Jurisdiction* cases, the *Nuclear Test* cases, and the *Aegean Sea* cases, Article 41 of the Court's Statute, and I quote, "presupposes that irreparable prejudice should not be caused to rights which are the subject of dispute in judicial proceedings".

Applying this standard of irreparable injury to the present case, I submit that the United States is clearly entitled to interim measures of protection. The simple fact is that the United States' rights of the highest dignity and importance are being currently and irreparably violated by the Government of Iran. Specifically, the international agreements upon which we base our claim have conferred upon the United States the right to maintain a working and effective embassy in Tehran, the right to have its diplomatic and consular personnel protected in their lives and persons from every form of interference and abuse, and the right to have its nationals protected and secure.

As I indicated earlier, with each passing hour those rights are being destroyed, and the injury, once incurred, is plainly and completely irreparable. The trauma of being held hostage day after day in conditions of danger cannot be erased; the weeks of interruption of diplomatic functions cannot be repaired. If the hostages are physically harmed, this Court's decision on the merits cannot possibly heal them. Given the nature of the rights involved, an ultimate award of monetary damages simply could not make good the injuries currently being sustained as this case awaits the Court's judgment.



That being so, I would direct the Court's attention to an early and similar case decided by the Permanent Court of International Justice. In that case, entitled *The Case Concerning the Denunciation of the Treaty of November 2, 1865, Between China and Belgium*, interim measures were requested in order to provide for the protection and security of nationals and property, the performance of consular functions and freedom from arrest and criminal penalties except in accordance with law. In indicating the requested protective measures, the President of the Court emphasized that the injury expected to occur during the pendency of the case "could not be made good by the payment of an indemnity or by compensation or restitution in some other material form." In that case, given the threat of irreparable injury, interim measures were indicated, and we seek the same relief here.

Moreover, I should emphasize that the threat of future irreparable injury is growing. The situation in Tehran is volatile in the extreme, and the danger for the hostages can sharply increase at any moment. The current chief of the Iranian state himself has spoken of the possible destruction of the hostages—the ultimate in irreparable injury. In this connection it should be recalled that in recent months over 600 Iranian nationals have actually been executed after peremptory trials by revolutionary councils. The defendants in those trials were denied the right to counsel, the right to present defensive evidence, the right to appeal—indeed, the right to any legal process at all—and the penalty was death.

Against that background, the often repeated threats to put the American hostages on trial for alleged crimes creates an ominous and an unacceptable threat not only for the hostages and for the United States but for the entire international community. In the words of the Secretary General of the United Nations, "The present crisis poses a serious threat to international peace and security," a threat which may well be alleviated if this Court promptly indicates the interim measures requested by the United States.

I would like now to turn to an alternative standard under which the United States in our submission is now entitled to the requested relief. As the Court is aware, in many legal systems it is recognized that interim relief of the kind requested here is appropriate in order to preserve the status quo *pendente lite*—and it is the position of the United States that this principle also cries out for immediate judicial action in this case.

On this point, however, I do not wish to be misunderstood. Obviously I am not asking the Court to maintain the status quo as created by the Government of Iran over the past days and weeks. Obviously the status quo which we seek to preserve—or, more correctly, to which we seek to return—is the status quo *ante*, the situation immediately prior to the Iranian seizure of the Embassy and the hostages.

There is, I submit, clear authority for such relief, as noted in Dumbauld's treatise, *Interim Measures in International Controversies*. Referring to the general principle of enforcing or sanctioning the status quo through indications of interim measures—and citing cases and authorities—Judge Dumbauld states as follows (and I quote from page 187 of his treatise):

It should be noted that the status quo thus sanctioned is not that at the time of the judgment, or at the date suit is brought, but the last uncontested status prior to the controversy.

The controversy which we have brought before the Court arose with the seizure of the Embassy and the hostages in Tehran on November 4, 1979, and I submit that the situation cries out for interim measures calling upon Iran to release the hostages and the Embassy and thus return to the status quo as of November 3, 1979.

In order to test the validity of this conclusion, I should like to pose for the Court a simple hypothetical case. Let us assume that on November 4, 1979, instead of allowing the Embassy and the hostages to be seized, the Revolutionary Council of Iran had announced that, unless certain demands were met by the United States by—let us say—December 10, 1979, the U.S. Embassy in Tehran would then be attacked and its personnel taken hostage.

If in that situation the Government of the United States had brought its case to this Court and requested an indication of provisional measures calling upon Iran to desist from its threat, I suggest that the Court would have acted affirmatively on that request. In that situation, I submit, the Court would have called upon Iran to leave the American diplomatic staff in Tehran free and inviolable and immune from prosecution—and I want to emphasize that that, in essence, is exactly the basic provisional measure we are requesting from the Court now.

In other words, we would have been entitled, in our view, to such a provisional measure if Iran had not yet violated its international legal obligations to the United States, and, in our view, that

necessarily means that we are entitled to the same protective measures now—now that Iran has actually embarked upon a profound and continuing violation of our rights. To hold otherwise at this time—to withhold such protective measures—would be to allow Iran to benefit from actually using force instead of merely threatening to do so.

For the foregoing reasons, we believe that we are clearly entitled, as a matter of law and logic, to the protective measures which we are seeking, and we submit that humanitarian considerations require no less.

### Possible Obstacles to the U.S. Request

At this point I would like to turn to the question of whether there are any possible legal obstacles to our request. We have considered that question with care, and we, at least, have concluded that there are none.

On this subject I would refer at the outset to the telegraphic message which has just been received by the Court from the Government of Iran and reference to which was made by the President at the opening of the hearing. Since that message constitutes Iran's only response to the United States' request for provisional measures, I should like to reply thereto on behalf of my government.

I think it is significant that the opening paragraph of the Iranian statement expresses great respect for this Court and its achievements in resolving legal conflicts between states. It is our hope and expectation that this respect will lead the Government of Iran to honor in full whatever action the Court may take in response to the pending U.S. request.

The main theme of the telegraphic statement of the Government of Iran is that the question of the American hostages in Tehran is only one of several problems or disputes that now exist as between the two governments. It is alleged in general terms that in various ways the Government of the United States has behaved improperly toward Iran in past years and that in this larger context the problem of the American hostages in Tehran is only a marginal and secondary problem.

There are, I suggest, two short answers to this proposition. First of all, Iran's view of its treatment of the American hostages as a *secondary* problem is not shared by the Secretary General of the United Nations or the Security Council of the United Nations. They have unanimously characterized the hostages' captivity as a major threat to international peace. Secondly, to the extent that



there are *other* disputes between Iran and the United States. Iran has made absolutely no effort to bring any such matters before the Court. The fact that the *only* dispute which has been brought before the Court is the dispute relating to the taking of the American hostages, and, we submit, with the greatest respect, that that is the only dispute with which the Court can now deal. The Government of Iran asserts that the Court should not take cognizance of the dispute relating to the hostages, but for the reasons I have previously indicated, that is simply incorrect as a matter of law. The hostage question clearly lies within the Court's jurisdiction and, we submit, is properly presented for your decision now.

Paragraph 4 of Iran's statement of yesterday goes on to suggest—albeit somewhat indirectly—that the United States is now improperly seeking part or all of the relief which it seeks on the merits. In fact, if the Court compares our request for interim measures with the form of judgment that we are seeking, it will find that the two pleadings request different forms of relief—except in one respect. The only respect in which our request and our application overlap is that both pleadings ask in effect for an order calling for the immediate release of the hostages and their safe departure from Iran.

I submit, however, that this convergence of the two requests results merely from an excess of caution on the part of the United States. Frankly, we are hopeful that this Court will indicate measures calling for immediate release of the hostages and that Iran, consistent with its asserted respect for this Court, will comply long before it becomes necessary for the Court to write its final judgment. It is our hope and expectation, therefore, that the request for a judgment requiring release of the hostages will have become moot long before the Court acts on our application for such a judgment.

In a very real sense, therefore, our request for release of the hostages, being one of the very greatest urgency, should have appeared only in our pending request for an indication of provisional measures—and should not have been included in our application for judgment. Nevertheless, not wishing to presume as to how the Court will rule as a result of today's hearing, we took the conservative course of including a similar request in our application. I earnestly submit, however, that such conservatism on our part does not in any way militate against our request for an indication of interim measures; the need for such relief is urgent in the extreme.

This brings me to the final point made in yesterday's statement by the Government of Iran. It is there suggested that if provisional measures are indicated by the Court, they cannot properly be made unilateral—the implication being that the Court could not properly call for the release of the hostages by Iran without calling for some equivalent action by the United States.

That suggestion is simply, I submit, incorrect. Article 41 of the Court's Statute authorizes the Court, where circumstances so require, to indicate "any provisional measures which ought to be taken to preserve the respective rights of *either* party." I submit that clearly contemplates that where one of two parties is unilaterally causing irreparable injury to the other, a unilateral provisional measure is entirely appropriate. As I shall indicate in a moment, the United States would have no objection if the Court were to include, in an indication of provisional measures, the conventional provisions calling upon both parties to avoid aggravation of the dispute and preserve their rights—but we nevertheless assert an urgent need for unilateral action by Iran to release the hostages.

Having provided that response to the recent statement of the Government of Iran, I should now like to return to the question of whether there are any legal obstacles which might militate against our pending request. In this respect we have considered with care the possibility that the Court's 1976 decision in the *Aegean Sea Continental Shelf* case might be viewed as contrary authority against our request, having in mind the recent action of the U.N. Security Council. I respectfully submit, however, that the facts and law of the *Aegean Sea* case are so distinguishable that, far from militating against an indication of provisional measures in this case, they actually support the present position of the United States.

In the Aegean Sea dispute between Greece and Turkey, both parties participated in the Security Council debates on the dispute. Both parties agreed in the Security Council that a solution to the dispute could be achieved only through direct negotiations between the parties. After the Council called upon both parties to negotiate, both parties expressly agreed that they would do so. Moreover, in the *Aegean Sea* case the question whether violations of international law were occurring was open to legal question, and the jurisdiction of the Court was also in doubt.

In that situation, when Greece requested that this Court indicate pro-

visional measures calling upon Turkey to refrain from certain exploratory activities on the disputed Continental Shelf, the Court assumed that both states would honor their undertakings to negotiate and that aggravation of the dispute would thereby be avoided. Most importantly, the Court was not persuaded that the activities of which Greece complained were actually threatening irreparable injury. For those reasons, as we read that case, the Court concluded that an indication of provisional measures was unnecessary.

The contrast with the present case, I submit, is very clear indeed. In the present case the Court plainly has jurisdiction; the authorities of Iran have refused to send a representative to take part in the proceedings of the Security Council; they have rejected the Council's resolution as "an American plot"; they have refused to communicate with the U.S. Government in any way at all; their violations of international law are clear; by threatening trials, they are continuing to aggravate the dispute; and truly irreparable injury is proceeding day by day. In the present case the need for protective measures, I submit, could not be more imperative.

If there were any doubt about the distinctions between the *Aegean Sea* case and the present one, I think it is laid to rest by the terms of the resolution of the Security Council in this case and the debate which attended its adoption. Resolution 457, to which the President of the Court has earlier referred, in its first operative paragraph, "Urgently calls on the Government of Iran to release immediately the personnel of the Embassy of the United States of America being held in Tehran, to provide them protection and to allow them to leave the country." The second operative paragraph "Further calls on the Governments of Iran and of the United States of America to take steps to resolve peacefully the remaining issues between them to their mutual satisfaction in accordance with the purposes and principles of the United Nations." That is to say, the resolution calls upon the parties to take steps directed not to the release of these hostages, but to "the remaining issues" between the two states. Those remaining issues, however, are not before this Court, and the Court can take no responsibility for them. Under its Statute the Court's function "is to decide in accordance with international law such disputes as are submitted to it . . ." and that is a judicial function which has not been, and, of course, could not be, undertaken by the Security Council.

In short, there is a clear division of responsibilities here and that division was clearly recognized during the proceedings in the Security Council. At that time U.S. Ambassador [to the United Nations] Donald McHenry stated as follows:

The United States wishes to place on the record that the adoption of this resolution by the Security Council clearly is not intended to displace peaceful efforts in other organs of the United Nations. Neither the United States nor any other member intends that the adoption of this resolution should have any prejudicial impact whatever on the request of the United States for the indication of provisional measures of protection by the International Court of Justice.

Before making that statement Ambassador McHenry and his colleagues informed Council members that the United States would speak in this vein during the debates about this pending case before the Court, and all of the members so consulted were in agreement with the statement. Moreover, after the statement was made, no member of the Council disagreed with the stated intention to the effect that the Council's action should not impede the United States' pending request before this Court. Thus all 15 members of the Security Council evidently agree that the Court is free to act affirmatively on the pending request of the United States if it is inclined to do so.

## Requested Measures

Let me conclude my argument in favor of interim protective measures by reciting exactly what measures are being requested. The Government of the United States respectfully requests that the Court, pending final judgment in this case, indicate forthwith the following:

**First**, that the Government of Iran immediately release all hostages of U.S. nationality and facilitate the prompt and safe departure from Iran of these persons and all other U.S. officials in dignified and humane circumstances.

**Second**, that the Government of Iran immediately clear the premises of the U.S. Embassy, Chancery, and Consulate in Tehran of all persons whose presence is not authorized by the U.S. Government and restore the premises to U.S. control.

**Third**, that the Government of Iran insure that all persons attached to the U.S. Embassy and Consulate should be accorded, and protected in, full freedom of movement necessary to carry out their diplomatic and consular functions. That is to say, to the extent that the United States should choose, and Iran should

agree, to the continued presence of U.S. diplomatic personnel in Tehran, they must be permitted to carry out their functions in accordance with their privileges and immunities.

**Fourth**, that the Government of Iran not place on trial any person attached to the Embassy and Consulate of the United States—and refrain from any action to implement any such trial.

Now, in connection with this fourth request, I should like to draw the Court's attention to recent reports that Iran may intend to continue the captivity of these hostages so that they may appear before some sort of international commission. Whatever the purpose of the continued detention, of course, it remains totally unlawful. Accordingly, in light of these recent reports, with the Court's permission, the United States wishes now to amend its fourth request for interim measures to add: that the Government of Iran must not detain or permit the detention of these persons in connection with any proceedings, whether of an "international commission" or otherwise, and that they not be forced to participate in any such proceeding.

**Finally**, the fifth request of the United States is that the Government of Iran insure that no action is taken which might prejudice the rights of the United States in respect of the carrying out of any decision which the Court may render on the merits, and in particular neither take, nor permit, action that would threaten the lives, safety, or well-being of the hostages.

This recitation of the provisional measures requested by the United States makes clear, we believe, that we are seeking an indication which is relatively specific as to the measures to be taken. We recognize that in some cases it may be appropriate simply to indicate, in general terms, that each party should take no action to aggravate the dispute or prejudice the rights of the other party in respect of the carrying out of the Court's decision on the merits. As I indicated earlier, the United States has no objection to the inclusion of such general provisions, subject, of course, to the usual specification that such measures will apply on the basis of reciprocal observance. I earnestly submit, however, that, in the circumstances of this particular case, any provisional measures indicated by the Court should be specific as to the release of the hostages, the clearing of the Embassy, and the inadmissibility of putting the hostages on trial, or bringing them before any international commission. Every effort should be made to insure that the Court's message will be clearly under-

stood in Iran, thus maximizing the chance that it will be effective.

There is ample precedent, I submit, for the specificity of our request. In the *Anglo-Iranian Oil Co.* case, the Court, in indicating provisional measures, included not only the usual language about avoiding prejudice to the rights of the parties and aggravation of the dispute; it also included particularized measures as to the method by which the Anglo-Iranian Oil Company should be managed during the pendency of the litigation. Similarly, as another example, in the *Fisheries Jurisdiction* case, the Court indicated very specific provisional measures as to the enforcement of fisheries regulations and even permissible annual catches of fish. I respectfully submit that, if such specific measures were appropriate in the context of these commercial cases, they are the more appropriate in a case which involves the lives and liberties of some 50 human beings and in which, because of divergences in culture and language, misunderstandings as to meaning may arise unless any provisional measures indicated by the Court are as specific and hence as clear as possible. The specific measures indicated in the case between Belgium and China which I have earlier discussed are illustrative of what is required; the measures there indicated are not unlike those sought here.

## Conclusion

In concluding my argument this afternoon, I would respectfully—most respectfully—urge that the Court rule on the request of the United States with the maximum possible expedition. We have taken the liberty of reviewing the timing of the Court's actions on requests for provisional measures in years past, and we have found that in one case, the Court indicated provisional measures 13 days after the request was filed; in another case the Court ruled on the request in 9 days; and in a third case, the Court acted in only 6 days. Today is the 11th day since the pending U.S. request was filed, and we recognize, of course, that the Court will need some amount of additional time to deliberate and to act.

Nevertheless, we respectfully request that the Court act with the maximum possible speed—because we are dealing here, again, not with commercial interests, but with the lives and liberties of persons who have now been under close confinement and imminent peril for more than 5 weeks. The danger for these 50 or more lives increases as each day goes by. It is critically important to my government to achieve the immediate re-



lease of these individuals, and I suggest that it is no less important to the world community and to the rule of law.

Mr. President, distinguished and learned Members of the Court, we believe that this case presents the Court with the most dramatic opportunity it has ever had to affirm the rule of law among nations and thus to fulfill the world community's expectation that the Court will act vigorously in the interests of international law and international peace. The current situation in Tehran demands an immediate, forceful, and explicit declaration by the Court, calling upon Iran to conform to the basic rules of international intercourse and human rights. Only in that manner, I respectfully suggest, can the Court discharge its high responsibilities under the Charter of the United Nations.

On behalf of the Government of the United States of America, I respectfully request that the Court indicate provisional measures calling upon the Government of Iran to bring about the immediate release of the U.S. nationals now held captive in Iran and the transfer of control of the American Embassy in Tehran to the Government of the United States.

## TEXT OF COURT ORDER

### INTERNATIONAL COURT OF JUSTICE

YEAR 1979

15 DECEMBER 1979

### CASE CONCERNING UNITED STATES DIPLOMATIC AND CONSULAR STAFF IN TEHRAN

(*United States of America v. Iran*)

### REQUEST FOR THE INDICATION OF PROVISIONAL MEASURES

#### ORDER

*Present: President Sir Humphrey WALDOCK; Vice-President ELIAS; Judges FORSTER, GROS, LACHS, MOROZOV, NAGENDRA SINGH, RUDA, MOSLER, TARAZI, ODA, AGO, EL-ERIAN, SETTE-CAMARA, BAXTER; Registrar AQUARONE.*

The International Court of Justice,

Composed as above,

After deliberation,

Having regard to Articles 41 and 48 of the Statute of the Court,

Having regard to Articles 73 and 74 of the Rules of Court,

Having regard to the Application by the United States of America filed in the Registry of the Court on 29 November 1979, instituting proceedings against the Islamic Republic of Iran in respect of a dispute concerning the situation in the United States Embassy in Tehran and the seizure and holding as hostages of members of the United States diplomatic and consular staff in Iran;

#### *Makes the following Order:*

1. Whereas in the above-mentioned Application the United States Government invokes jurisdictional provisions in certain treaties as bases for the Court's jurisdiction in the present case; whereas it further recounts a sequence of events, beginning on 4 November 1979 in and around the United States Embassy in Tehran and involving the invasion of the Embassy premises, the seizure of United States diplomatic and consular staff and their continued detention; and whereas, on the basis of the facts there alleged, it requests the Court to adjudge and declare:

"(a) That the Government of Iran, in tolerating, encouraging, and failing to prevent and punish the conduct described in the preceding Statement of Facts [in the Application], violated its international legal obligations to the United States as provided by

• Articles 22, 24, 25, 27, 29, 31, 37 and 47 of the Vienna Convention on Diplomatic Relations,

• Articles 28, 31, 33, 34, 36 and 40 of the Vienna Convention on Consular Relations,

• Articles 4 and 7 of the Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of Crimes against Internationally Protected Persons, including Diplomatic Agents, and

• Articles II(4), XIII, XVIII and XIX of the Treaty of Amity, Economic Relations, and Consular Rights between the United States and Iran, and

• Articles 2(3), 2(4) and 33 of the Charter of the United Nations;

(b) That pursuant to the foregoing international legal obligations, the Government of Iran is under a particular obligation immediately to secure the release of all United States nationals currently being detained within the premises of the United States Embassy in Tehran and to assure that all such persons and all other United States nationals in Tehran are allowed to leave Iran safely;

(c) That the Government of Iran shall pay to the United States, in its own right and in the exercise of its right of diplomatic protection of its nationals, reparation for the foregoing violations of Iran's international legal obligations to the United States, in a sum to be determined by the Court; and

(d) That the Government of Iran submit to its competent authorities for the purpose of prosecution those persons responsible for the crimes committed against the premises and staff of the United States Embassy and against the premises of its Consulates";

2. Having regard to the request dated 29 November 1979 and filed in the Registry the same day, whereby the Government of the United States of America, relying on Article 41 of the Statute and Articles 73, 74 and 75 of the Rules of Court, asks the Court urgently to indicate, pending the final decision in the case brought before it by the above-mentioned Application of the same date, the following provisional measures:

"(a) That the Government of Iran immediately release all hostages of United States nationality and facilitate the prompt and safe

departure from Iran of these persons and all other United States officials in dignified and humane circumstances.

(b) That the Government of Iran immediately clear the premises of the United States Embassy, Chancery and Consulate of all persons whose presence is not authorized by the United States Chargé d'Affaires in Iran, and restore the premises to United States control.

(c) That the Government of Iran ensure that all persons attached to the United States Embassy and Consulate should be accorded, and protected in, full freedom within the Embassy and Chancery premises, and the freedom of movement within Iran necessary to carry out their diplomatic and consular functions.

(d) That the Government of Iran not place on trial any person attached to the Embassy and Consulate of the United States and refrain from any action to implement any such trial.

(e) That the Government of Iran ensure that no action is taken which might prejudice the rights of the United States in respect of the carrying out of any decision which the Court may render on the merits, and in particular neither take nor permit action that would threaten the lives, safety, or well-being of the hostages";

3. Whereas, on the day on which the Application and request for indication of provisional measures were received in the Registry, the Government of Iran was notified by telegram of the filing of the Application and request, and of the particular measures requested, and copies of both documents were transmitted by express airmail to the Minister for Foreign Affairs of Iran;

4. Whereas, pursuant to Article 40, paragraph 3, of the Statute and Article 42 of the Rules of Court, copies of the Application were transmitted to Members of the United Nations and to other States entitled to appear before the Court;

5. Whereas on 6 December 1979 the Registrar addressed the notification provided for in Article 63 of the Statute of the Court to the States, other than the parties to the case, which were listed in the relevant documents of the United Nations Secretariat as parties to the following conventions, invoked in the Application:

(i) the Vienna Convention on Diplomatic Relations of 1961, and the accompanying Optional Protocol Concerning the Compulsory Settlement of Disputes;

(ii) the Vienna Convention on Consular Relations of 1963, and the accompanying Optional Protocol Concerning the Compulsory Settlement of Disputes;

(iii) the Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of Crimes against Internationally Protected Persons, including Diplomatic Agents, of 1973;

6. Whereas on 30 November 1979, pending the meeting of the Court, the President, in exercise of the power conferred on him by Article 74, paragraph 4, of the Rules of Court, addressed a telegram to each of the two governments concerned calling attention to the fact that the matter was now *sub judice* before the Court and to the need to act in such a way as would enable any Order the Court might make in the present proceedings to have its



appropriate effects; and whereas by those telegrams the two governments were, in addition, informed that the Court would hold public hearings at an early date at which they might present their observations on the request for provisional measures, and that the projected date for such hearings was 10 December 1979, this date being later confirmed by further telegrams of 3 December 1979;

7. Whereas, in preparation for the hearings, the President put certain preliminary questions to the Agent of the United States Government by a telegram of 4 December 1979, a copy of which was communicated on the same date to the Government of Iran; whereas, in response to those questions the United States Agent on 7 December 1979 submitted to the Court a declaration by Mr. David D. Newsom, Under-Secretary of State for Political Affairs, together with certain documents appended thereto; and whereas copies of that letter and the declaration and documents accompanying it were immediately transmitted to the Government of Iran;

8. Whereas on 9 December 1979 a letter, dated the same day and transmitted by telegram, was received from the Minister for Foreign Affairs of Iran, which reads as follows: [Translation from French]

I have the honour to acknowledge receipt of the telegrams concerning the meeting of the International Court of Justice on 10 December 1979, at the request of the Government of the United States of America, and to submit to you below the position of the Government of the Islamic Republic of Iran in this respect.

1. First of all, the Government of the Islamic Republic of Iran wishes to express its respect for the International Court of Justice, and for its distinguished members, for what they have achieved in the quest for just and equitable solutions to legal conflicts between States. However, the Government of the Islamic Republic of Iran considers that the Court cannot and should not take cognizance of the case which the Government of the United States of America has submitted to it, and in a most significant fashion, a case confined to what is called the question of the "hostages of the American Embassy in Tehran".

2. For this question only represents a marginal and secondary aspect of an overall problem, one such that it cannot be studied separately, and which involves, *inter alia*, more than 25 years of continual interference by the United States in the internal affairs of Iran, the shameless exploitation of our country, and numerous crimes perpetrated against the Iranian people, contrary to and in conflict with all international and humanitarian norms.

3. The problem involved in the conflict between Iran and the United States is thus not one of the interpretation and the application of the treaties upon which the American Application is based, but results from an overall situation containing much more fundamental and more complex elements. Consequently, the Court cannot examine the American Application divorced from its proper context, namely the whole political dossier of the relations between Iran and the United States over the last 25 years. This dossier includes, *inter alia*, all the crimes perpetrated in Iran by the Ameri-

can Government, in particular the *coup d'état* of 1953 stirred up and carried out by the CIA, the overthrow of the lawful national government of Dr. Mossadegh, the restoration of the Shah and of his régime which was under the control of American interests, and all the social, economic, cultural, and political consequences of the direct interventions in our internal affairs, as well as grave, flagrant and continuous violations of all international norms, committed by the United States in Iran.

4. With regard to the request for provisional measures, as formulated by the United States, it in fact implies that the Court should have passed judgment on the actual substance of the case submitted to it, which the Court cannot do without breach of the norms governing its jurisdiction. Furthermore, since provisional measures are by definition intended to protect the interests of the parties, they cannot be unilateral, as they are in the request submitted by the American Government.

In conclusion, the Government of the Islamic Republic of Iran respectfully draws the attention of the Court to the deep-rootedness and the essential character of the Islamic revolution of Iran, a revolution of a whole oppressed nation against its oppressors and their masters; any examination of the numerous repercussions thereof is a matter essentially and directly within the national sovereignty of Iran.

9. Whereas both the Government of the United States of America and the Government of Iran have been afforded an opportunity of presenting their observations on the request for the indication of provisional measures;

10. Whereas at the public hearing held on 10 December 1979 there were present in Court the Agent, counsel and adviser of the United States of America;

11. Having heard the oral observations on the request for provisional measures on behalf of the United States of America presented by the Honorable Roberts B. Owen, Agent, and the Honorable Benjamin R. Civiletti, Attorney-General of the United States, as counsel, and taking note of the replies given on behalf of that Government to further questions put at the conclusion of the hearing by the President of the Court and by two Members of the Court;

12. Having taken note that the final submissions of the United States of America filed in the Registry on 12 December 1979, following the hearing of 10 December 1979, were to the effect that the Government of the United States requests that the Court, pending final judgment in this case, indicate forthwith the following measures:

"First, that the Government of Iran immediately release all hostages of United States nationality and facilitate the prompt and safe departure from Iran of these persons and all other United States officials in dignified and humane circumstances.

Second, that the Government of Iran immediately clear the premises of the United States Embassy, Chancery and Consulate in Tehran of all persons whose presence is not authorized by the United States Chargé d'Aff-

aires in Iran, and restore the premises to United States control.

Third, that the Government of Iran ensure that, to the extent that the United States should choose, and Iran should agree, to the continued presence of United States diplomatic and consular personnel in Iran, all persons attached to the United States Embassy and Consulates should be accorded, and protected in, full freedom of movement, as well as the privileges and immunities to which they are entitled, necessary to carry out their diplomatic and consular functions.

Fourth, that the Government of Iran not place on trial any person attached to the Embassy and Consulates of the United States and refrain from any action to implement any such trial; and that the Government of Iran not detain or permit the detention of any such person in connection with any proceedings, whether of an 'international commission' or otherwise, and that any such person not be required to participate in any such proceeding.

Fifth, that the Government of Iran ensure that no action is taken which might prejudice the rights of the United States in respect of carrying out of any decision which the Court may render on the merits, and, in particular, neither take, nor permit, action that would threaten the lives, safety, or well-being of the hostages";

13. Noting that the Government of Iran was not represented at the hearing; and whereas the non-appearance of one of the States concerned cannot by itself constitute an obstacle to the indication of provisional measures;

14. Whereas the treaty provisions on which, in its Application and oral observations, the United States Government claims to found the jurisdiction of the Court to entertain the present case are the following:

(i) the Vienna Convention on Diplomatic Relations of 1961, and Article 1 of its accompanying Optional Protocol concerning the Compulsory Settlement of Disputes;

(ii) the Vienna Convention on Consular Relations of 1963, and Article 1 of its accompanying Optional Protocol concerning the Compulsory Settlement of Disputes;

(iii) Article XXI, paragraph 2, of the Treaty of Amity, Economic Relations, and Consular Rights of 1955 between the United States of America and Iran; and

(iv) Article 13, paragraph 1, of the Convention of 1973 on the Prevention and Punishment of Crimes against Internationally Protected Persons, including Diplomatic Agents;

15. Whereas on the request for provisional measures in the present case the Court ought to indicate such measures only if the provisions invoked by the Applicant appear, *prima facie*, to afford a basis on which the jurisdiction of the Court might be founded;

16. Whereas, so far as concerns the rights claimed by the United States of America with regard to the personnel and premises of its Embassy and Consulates in Iran, Article I of each of the two Protocols which accompany the Vienna Conventions of 1961 and 1963 on, respectively, Diplomatic and Consular Relations provides expressly that:

"Disputes arising out of the interpretation or application of the Convention shall lie within the compulsory jurisdiction of the International Court of Justice and may accordingly be brought before the Court by an application made by any party to the dispute being a Party to the present Protocol";

whereas the United Nations publication *Multilateral Treaties in Respect of which the Secretary-General Performs Depositary Functions* lists both Iran and the United States as parties to each of the two Conventions, as also to each of their Protocols concerning the compulsory settlement of disputes, and in all cases without any reservation to the instrument in question;

17. Whereas, while it is true that Articles II and III of the above-mentioned Protocols provide for the possibility for the parties to agree, under certain conditions, to resort not to the International Court of Justice but to an arbitral tribunal or to a conciliation procedure, no such agreement was reached by the parties; and whereas the terms of Article I of the Optional Protocols provide in the clearest manner for the compulsory jurisdiction of the International Court of Justice in respect of any dispute arising out of the interpretation or application of the above-mentioned Vienna Conventions;

18. Whereas, accordingly, it is manifest from the information before the Court and from the terms of Article I of each of the two Protocols that the provisions of these Articles furnish a basis on which the jurisdiction of the Court might be founded with regard to the claims of the United States under the Vienna Conventions of 1961 and 1963;

19. Whereas, so far as concerns the rights claimed by the United States with regard to two of its nationals who, according to the declaration by Mr. David D. Newsom referred to in paragraph 7 above, are not personnel either of its diplomatic or of its consular mission, it appears from the statements of the United States Government that these two private individuals were seized and are detained as hostages within the premises of the United States Embassy or Consulate in Tehran; whereas it follows that the seizure and detention of these individuals also fall within the scope of the applicable provisions of the Vienna Conventions of 1961 and 1963 relating to the inviolability of the premises of Embassies and Consulates; whereas, furthermore, the seizure and detention of these individuals in the circumstances alleged by the United States clearly fall also within the scope of the provisions of Article 5 of the Vienna Convention of 1963 expressly providing that consular functions include the functions of protecting, assisting and safeguarding the interests of nationals; and whereas the purpose of these functions is precisely to enable the sending State, through its consulates, to ensure that its nationals are accorded the treatment due to them under the general rules of international law as aliens within the territory of the foreign State;

20. Whereas, accordingly, it is likewise manifest that Article I of the Protocols concerning the compulsory settlement of disputes which accompany the Vienna Conventions of 1961 and 1963 furnishes a basis on which the jurisdiction

of the Court might be founded with regard to the claims of the United States in respect of the two private individuals in question;

21. Whereas, therefore, the Court does not find it necessary for present purposes to enter into the question whether a basis for the exercise of its powers under Article 41 of the Statute might also be found under Article XXI, paragraph 2, of the Treaty of Amity, Economic Relations, and Consular Rights of 1955, and Article 13, paragraph 1, of the Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of Crimes against Internationally Protected Persons, including Diplomatic Agents, of 1973.

22. Whereas, on the other hand, in the above-mentioned letter of 9 December 1979 the Government of Iran maintains that the Court cannot and should not take cognizance of the present case, for the reason that the question of the hostages forms only "a marginal and secondary aspect of an overall problem" involving the activities of the United States in Iran over a period of more than 25 years; and whereas it further maintains that any examination of the numerous repercussions of the Islamic revolution of Iran is essentially and directly a matter within the national sovereignty of Iran;

23. Whereas, however important, and however connected with the present case, the inequities attributed to the United States Government by the Government of Iran in that letter may appear to be to the latter Government, the seizure of the United States Embassy and Consulates and the detention of internationally protected persons as hostages cannot, in the view of the Court, be regarded as something "secondary" or "marginal", having regard to the importance of the legal principles involved; whereas the Court notes in this regard that the Secretary-General of the United Nations has indeed referred to these occurrences as "a grave situation" posing "a serious threat to international peace and security" and that the Security Council in resolution 457 (1979) expressed itself as deeply concerned at the dangerous level of tension between the two States, which could have grave consequences for international peace and security;

24. Whereas, moreover, if the Iranian Government considers the alleged activities of the United States in Iran legally to have a close connection with the subject-matter of the United States Application, it remains open to that Government under the Court's Statute and Rules to present its own arguments to the Court regarding those activities either by way of defence in a Counter-Memorial or by way of a counter-claim filed under Article 80 of the Rules of Court; whereas, therefore, by not appearing in the present proceedings, the Government of Iran, by its own choice, deprives itself of the opportunity of developing its own arguments before the Court and of itself filing a request for the indication of provisional measures; and whereas no provision of the Statute or Rules contemplates that the Court should decline to take cognizance of one aspect of a dispute merely because that dispute has other aspects, however important;

25. Whereas it is no doubt true that the Islamic revolution of Iran is a matter "essentially and directly within the national sovereignty of Iran"; whereas however a dispute which con-

cerns diplomatic and consular premises and the detention of internationally protected persons, and involves the interpretation or application of multilateral conventions codifying the international law governing diplomatic and consular relations, is one which by its very nature falls within international jurisdiction;

26. Whereas accordingly the two considerations advanced by the Government of Iran in its letter of 9 December 1979 cannot, in the view of the Court, be accepted as constituting any obstacle to the Court's taking cognizance of the case brought before it by the United States Application of 29 November 1979.

27. Whereas in that same letter of 9 December 1979 the Government of Iran also puts forward two considerations on the basis of which it contends that the Court ought not, in any event, to accede to the United States request for provisional measures in the present case;

28. Whereas, in the first place, it maintains that the request for provisional measures, as formulated by the United States, "in fact implies that the Court should have passed judgment on the actual substance of the case submitted to it"; whereas it is true that in the *Factory at Chorzów* case the Permanent Court of International Justice declined to indicate interim measures of protection on the ground that the request in that case was "designed to obtain an interim judgment in favour of a part of the claim" (*Order of 21 November 1927, P.C.I.J., Series A, No. 12*, at p. 10); whereas, however, the circumstances of that case were entirely different from those of the present one, and the request there sought to obtain from the Court a final judgment on part of a claim for a sum of money; whereas, moreover, a request for provisional measures must by its very nature relate to the substance of the case since, as Article 41 expressly states, their object is to preserve the respective rights of either party; and whereas in the present case the purpose of the United States request appears to be not to obtain a judgment, interim or final, on the merits of its claims but to preserve the substance of the rights which it claims *pendente lite*;

29. Whereas, in the second place, the Government of Iran takes the position that "since provisional measures are by definition intended to protect the interests of the parties they cannot be unilateral"; whereas, however, the hypothesis on which this proposition is based does not accord with the terms of Article 41 of the Statute which refer explicitly to "any provisional measures which ought to be taken to preserve the respective rights of either party"; whereas the whole concept of an indication of provisional measures, as Article 73 of the Rules recognizes, implies a request from one of the parties for measures to preserve its own rights against action by the other party calculated to prejudice those rights *pendente lite*; whereas it follows that a request for provisional measures is by its nature unilateral; and whereas the Government of Iran has not appeared before the Court in order to request the indication of provisional measures; whereas, however, the Court, as it has recognized in Article 75 of its Rules, must at all times be alert to protect the rights of



both the parties in proceedings before it and, in indicating provisional measures, has not infrequently done so with reference to both the parties; and whereas this does not, and cannot, mean that the Court is precluded from entertaining a request from a party merely by reason of the fact that measures which it requests are unilateral;

30. Whereas, accordingly, neither of the considerations put forward in the Iranian Government's letter of 9 December 1979 can be regarded as constituting grounds which should lead the Court to decline to entertain the United States request in the present case;

31. Whereas it follows that the Court has not found in the Iranian Government's letter of 9 December 1979 legal grounds which should lead it to conclude that it ought not to entertain the United States request;

32. Whereas the Court will accordingly now proceed to examine the request of the United States Government for the indication of provisional measures in the present case;

33. Whereas by the terms of Article 41 of the Statute the Court may indicate such measures only when it considers that circumstances so require in order to preserve the rights of either party;

34. Whereas the circumstances alleged by the United States Government which, in the submission of that Government, require the indication of provisional measures in the present case may be summarized as follows:

(i) On 4 November 1979, in the course of a demonstration outside the United States Embassy compound in Tehran, demonstrators attacked the Embassy premises; no Iranian security forces intervened or were sent to relieve the situation, despite repeated calls for help from the Embassy to the Iranian authorities. Ultimately the whole of the Embassy premises was invaded. The Embassy personnel, including consular and non-American staff, and visitors who were present in the Embassy at the time were seized. Shortly afterwards, according to the United States Government, its consulates in Tabriz and Shiraz, which had been attacked earlier in 1979, were also seized, without any action being taken to prevent it;

(ii) Since that time, the premises of the United States Embassy in Tehran, and of the consulates in Tabriz and Shiraz, have remained in the hands of the persons who seized them. These persons have ransacked the archives and documents both of the diplomatic mission and of its consular section. The Embassy personnel and other persons seized at the time of the attack have been held hostage with the exception of 13 persons released on 18 and 20 November 1979. Those holding the hostages have refused to release them, save on condition of the fulfilment by the United States of various demands regarded by it as unacceptable. The hostages are stated to have frequently been bound, blindfolded, and subjected to severe discomfort, complete isolation and threats that they would be put on trial or even put to death. The United States Government affirms that it has reason to believe that some of them may have been transferred to other places of confinement;

(iii) The Government of the United States considers that not merely has the Iranian Gov-

ernment failed to prevent the events described above, but also that there is clear evidence of its complicity in, and approval of, those events;

(iv) The persons held hostage in the premises of the United States Embassy in Tehran include, according to the information furnished to the Court by the Agent of the United States, at least 28 persons having the status, duly recognized by the Government of Iran, of "member of the diplomatic staff" within the meaning of the Vienna Convention on Diplomatic Relations of 1961; at least 20 persons having the status, similarly recognized, of "members of the administrative and technical staff" within the meaning of that Convention; and two other persons of United States nationality not possessing either diplomatic or consular status. Of the persons with the status of member of the diplomatic staff, four are members of the Consular Section of the Embassy;

(v) In addition to the persons held hostage in the premises of the Tehran Embassy, the United States Charge d'Affaires in Iran and two other United States diplomatic agents are detained in the premises of the Iranian Ministry for Foreign Affairs, in circumstances which the Government of the United States has not been able to make entirely clear, but which apparently involve restriction of their freedom of movement, and a threat to their inviolability as diplomats;

35. Whereas on the basis of the above circumstances alleged by the United States Government it claims in the Application that the Government of Iran has violated and is violating a number of the legal obligations imposed upon it by the Vienna Convention on Diplomatic Relations of 1961, the Vienna Convention on Consular Relations of 1963, the Treaty of Amity, Economic Relations, and Consular Rights between Iran and the United States of 1955, the Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of Crimes against Internationally Protected Persons, including Diplomatic Agents, of 1973, the Charter of the United Nations, and customary international law;

36. Whereas the power of the court to indicate provisional measures under Article 41 of the Statute of the Court has as its object to preserve the respective rights of the parties pending the decision of the Court, and presupposes that irreparable prejudice should not be caused to rights which are the subject of dispute in judicial proceedings;

37. Whereas the rights which the United States of America submits as entitled to protection by the indication of provisional measures were specified in the request of 29 November 1979 as:

"the rights of its nationals to life, liberty, protection and security; the rights of inviolability, immunity and protection for its diplomatic and consular officials; and the rights of inviolability and protection for its diplomatic and consular premises";

and at the hearing of 10 December 1979 as:

"the right [of the United States] to maintain a working and effective embassy in Tehran, the right to have its diplomatic and consular personnel protected in their lives and persons from every form of interference and

abuse, and the right to have its nationals protected and secure";

and whereas the measures requested by the United States for the protection of these rights are as set out in paragraphs 2 and 12 above;

38. Whereas there is no more fundamental prerequisite for the conduct of relations between States than the inviolability of diplomatic envoys and embassies, so that throughout history nations of all creeds and cultures have observed reciprocal obligations for that purpose; and whereas the obligations thus assumed notably those for assuring the personal safety of diplomats and their freedom from prosecution, are essential, unqualified, and inherent in their representative character and their diplomatic function;

39. Whereas the institution of diplomacy, with its concomitant privileges and immunities, has withstood the test of centuries and proved to be an instrument essential for effective co-operation in the international community, and for enabling States, irrespective of their differing constitutional and social systems, to achieve mutual understanding and to resolve their differences by peaceful means;

40. Whereas the unimpeded conduct of consular relations, which have also been established between peoples since ancient times, is no less important in the context of present-day international law, in promoting the development of friendly relations among nations, and ensuring protection and assistance for aliens resident in the territories of other States; and whereas therefore the privileges and immunities of consular officers and consular employees, and the inviolability of consular premises and archives, are similarly principles deep-rooted in international law;

41. Whereas, while no State is under any obligation to maintain diplomatic or consular relations with another, yet it cannot fail to recognize the imperative obligations inherent therein, now codified in the Vienna Conventions of 1961 and 1963, to which both Iran and the United States are parties;

42. Whereas continuance of the situation the subject of the present request exposes the human beings concerned to privation, hardship, anguish and even danger to life and health and thus to a serious possibility of irreparable harm;

43. Whereas in connection with the present request the Court cannot fail to take note of the provisions of the Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of Crimes against Internationally Protected Persons, including Diplomatic Agents, of 1973, to which both Iran and the United States are parties;

44. Whereas in the light of the several considerations set out above, the Court finds that the circumstances require it to indicate provisional measures, as provided by Article 41 of the Statute of the Court, in order to preserve the rights claimed;

45. Whereas the decision given in the present proceedings in no way prejudices the question of the jurisdiction of the Court to deal with the merits of the case or any questions relating to the merits themselves, and leaves unaffected the right of the Government of Iran to submit arguments against such jurisdiction or in respect of such merits;



46. Whereas the Court will therefore now proceed to indicate the measures which it considers are required in the present case;

47. Accordingly,

THE COURT,  
unanimously,

1. *Indicates*, pending its final decision in the proceedings instituted on 29 November 1979 by the United States of America against the Islamic Republic of Iran, the following provisional measures:

A. (i) The Government of the Islamic Republic of Iran should immediately ensure that the premises of the United States Embassy, Chancery and Consulates be restored to the possession of the United States authorities under their exclusive control, and should ensure their inviolability and effective protection as provided for by the treaties in force between the two States, and by general international law;

(ii) The Government of the Islamic Republic of Iran should ensure the immediate release, without any exception, of all persons of United States nationality who are or have been held in the Embassy of the United States of America or in the Ministry of Foreign Affairs in Tehran, or have been held as hostages elsewhere, and afford full protection to all such persons, in accordance with the treaties in force between the two States, and with general international law;

(iii) The Government of the Islamic Republic of Iran should, as from that moment, afford to all the diplomatic and consular personnel of the United States the full protection, privileges and immunities to which they are entitled under the treaties in force between the two States, and under general international law, including immunity from any form of criminal jurisdiction and freedom and facilities to leave the territory of Iran;

B. The Government of the United States of America and the Government of the Islamic Republic of Iran should not take any action and should ensure that no action is taken which may aggravate the tension between the two countries or render the existing dispute more difficult of solution;

2. *Decides* that, until the Court delivers its final judgment in the present case, it will keep the matters covered by this Order continuously under review.

Done in English and in French, the English text being authoritative, at the Peace Palace, The Hague, this fifteenth day of December, one thousand nine hundred and seventy-nine, in four copies, of which one will be placed in the archives at the Court, and the others transmitted respectively to the Government of the Islamic Republic of Iran, to the Government of the United States of America, and to the Secretary-General of the United Nations for transmission to the Security Council.

(Signed) Humphrey WALDOCK  
President

(Signed) S. AQUARONE,  
Registrar. ■

## U.S. Seeks Sanctions Against Iran

PRESIDENT CARTER,  
DEC. 21, 1979<sup>1</sup>

From the first day the American Embassy was invaded and our diplomatic staff was seized as hostages by Iran, we have pursued every legal channel available to us to secure their safe and prompt release. On at least four separate occasions the world community, through the U.N. Security Council and through the International Court of Justice, has expressed itself clearly and firmly in calling upon the Iranian Government to release the American hostages.

Yet Iran today still stands in arrogant defiance of the world community. It has shown contempt not only for international law but for the entire international structure for securing the peaceful resolution of differences among nations.

In an irresponsible attempt at blackmail, to which the United States will never yield, kidnapers and terrorists, supported by Iranian officials, continue to hold our people under inhumane conditions. With each day that passes, our concern grows for the health and for the well-being of the hostages. We have made clear from the very beginning that the United States prefers a peaceful solution, in preference to the other remedies which are available to us under international law. For a peaceful resolution to be achieved, it is now clear that concrete action must be taken by the international community.

Accordingly, I have decided to ask for an early meeting of the U.N. Security Council to impose international economic sanctions upon Iran, under title VII of the U.N. Charter. The Government of Iran must realize that it cannot flaunt with impunity the expressed will and law of the world community. The Security Council must act to enforce its demand that Iran release the hostages. The world community must support the legal machinery it has established so that the United Nations and the International Court of Justice will continue to be relevant in settling serious disputes which threaten peace among nations.

I can think of no more clear and compelling challenge to the international community than the one we face today. The lives of over 50 innocent

people are at stake; the foundation of civilized diplomacy is at stake; the integrity of international law is at stake; the credibility of the United Nations is at stake. And at stake, ultimately, is the maintenance of peace in the region. As we call on the Security Council to act, on behalf of international law and on behalf of peace, we again call on the Government of Iran to end this crisis by releasing the hostages without delay.

And now, because our holy days approach—a time to think of peace—I would like to add a few special words for the American people, indeed the people of good will in all countries, including Iran, who share concern for 50 innocent human beings who hope, themselves, for peace and for the salvation of their lives.

Henry Longfellow wrote a Christmas carol in a time of crisis, the War Between the States, in 1864. Two verses of that carol particularly express my thoughts and prayers and, I'm sure, those of our nation in this time of challenge and of concern and of crisis. And I would like to quote from that poem:

And in despair I bowed my head,  
'There is no peace on earth,' I said,  
'For hate is strong and mocks the song  
Of peace on earth, good will to men.'  
Then pealed the bells, more loud and deep,  
'God is not dead, nor does He sleep,  
The wrong shall fail, the right prevail,  
With peace on earth, good will to men.' ■

<sup>1</sup> Made to reporters assembled in the White House Briefing Room (text from Weekly Compilation of Presidential Documents of Dec. 24, 1979).

## NATO Issues Declaration on Iran

Declaration on Iran Issued by Ministers and Other Representatives Attending the NATO, Brussels, December 14, 1979:

The Foreign Ministers and representatives of Belgium, Canada, Denmark, France, the Federal Republic of Germany, Greece, Iceland, Italy, Luxembourg, the Netherlands, Norway, Portugal, Turkey, the United Kingdom and the United States of America, meeting in Brussels on 13th December 1979, reviewed the grave situation created by the occupation of the Embassy of the United States of America in Tehran and

the holding of members of its staff as hostages in flagrant violation of international law and human rights.

They reaffirmed that their countries fully respect the independence of other states and recognise the right of all peoples to chart their own political, economic and social course. They have no desire to intervene in Iran's internal affairs.

They emphasised that any taking of hostages, for any motive whatsoever, is totally unacceptable and must be firmly opposed by the international community as a whole.

The Governments of the above-mentioned countries urgently call upon the Iranian authorities immediately to release unharmed all the United States Embassy staff members in Tehran and to allow them to return to their country. ■

## Iranian Diplomatic Personnel in U.S.

### DEPARTMENT STATEMENT, DEC. 12, 1979<sup>1</sup>

The Department of State has informed the Charge of the Iranian Embassy that the staffing level of the Embassy should be reduced to 15 persons. The Charge was also informed that the Iranian Consulates General in New York, San Francisco, Chicago, and Houston are expected to reduce their personnel to five at each post.

These steps have been taken in view of the continued illegal detention of American personnel and holding of the American Embassy compound in Tehran, as well as U.S. Government property in Tabriz and Shiraz.

### DEPARTMENT STATEMENT, DEC. 29, 1979<sup>2</sup>

I want to clarify the situation with respect to the staffs of the Iranian Embassy and four Consulates.

On December 12, the Iranians were asked to reduce their staff with diplomatic status to 35 and to give us a list of those remaining within 5 days. Our list on December 12 showed a total of 218 individuals in that category at those Iranian posts. We noted at the time that we believed our list might not be up-to-date as the Iranian Embassy had not been reporting regularly on the departure of its personnel.

We have since learned that of the total of 218, 152 have been removed from the rolls of the Iranian Embassy and Consulates. Many of these were old

regime personnel who have either departed or been given permission to remain. That leaves a total of 66 persons to be accounted for.

Thirty-five of those persons are eligible to remain in the United States under the maximum levels we established on December 12. The Iranian Embassy is revising the list of those eligible to remain that they originally provided us, and we expect that list Monday. The remaining 31 persons of the 66, plus an additional 17 military officers (who have been reported to us by the Department of Defense as liaison personnel), are required to depart or regularize their status with Immigration and Naturalization Service (INS). The Iranian Embassy has been directed that these persons not immediately departing should be in touch with INS at once.

INS is getting in touch directly with each Iranian removed from the list—the 152 persons associated with the previous regime who were removed from the Embassy rolls plus the 31 terminated diplomatic personnel and the 17 terminated military personnel. These persons will be instructed to make arrangements for their departure or to regularize their status in the United States.

We have requested INS to provide continuing reports on the status on Iranian Embassy and Consulate employees including departure information. ■

<sup>1</sup> Made available to news correspondents by acting Department spokesman Tom Reston.

<sup>2</sup> Made available to news correspondents by Department spokesman Hodding Carter III.

## FMS Credits for Israel

### WHITE HOUSE STATEMENT, DEC. 31, 1979<sup>1</sup>

The President met with Israeli Minister of Defense Ezer Weizman on December 28, 1979. Subsequently, the President has decided to request the Congress to increase by \$200 million the foreign military sales (FMS) credits previously authorized for Israel in the special legislation in support of the peace treaty.

The decision was based on consideration of such factors as inflation and

Israel's balance-of-payments deficit and takes into account the fact that the Israeli Government has instituted since November extremely tough austerity measures designed to overcome these economic problems.

The decision, taken at a time when the President is determined to hold down Federal expenditures, reflects our sympathy and concern for Israel's security and well-being.

Presently, U.S. FMS credits for Israel total \$2.2 billion, in addition to a grant of \$800 million, to be disbursed over a period of approximately 3 years. ■

<sup>1</sup> Text from Weekly Compilation of Presidential Documents of Dec. 31, 1979.

## Publications

*Publications may be ordered by catalog or stock number from the Superintendent of Documents, U.S. Government Printing Office, Washington, D.C. 20402. A 25% discount is made on orders for 100 or more copies of any one publication mailed to the same address. Remittances, payable to the Superintendent of Documents, must accompany orders. Prices shown below, which include domestic postage, are subject to change.*

**Agricultural Commodities.** Agreement with Egypt. TIAS 9230. 13 pp. \$1. (Cat. No. S9.10:9230.)

**Exhibition of Art Treasures.** Agreement with Egypt, modifying the agreement of October 28, 1975. TIAS 9236. 4 pp. 75¢. (Cat. No. S9.10:9236.)

**Economic Cooperation.** Agreed minutes with Iran. TIAS 9238. 27 pp. \$1.50. (Cat. No. S9.10:9238.)

**Technical Cooperation in Audit Administration and Training.** Agreement with Saudi Arabia. TIAS 9246. 10 pp. \$1. (Cat. No. S9.10:9246.)

**Pedagogique Nationale d'Education Technique.** Agreement with Lebanon. TIAS 9280. 9 pp. \$1. (Cat. No. S9.10:9280.)

**Technical Cooperation in Supply Management Development.** Agreement with Saudi Arabia. TIAS 9281. 10 pp. \$1. (Cat. No. S9.10:9281.)

**Collecting and Conserving Water Supplies from Surface Runoff.** Agreement with the United Arab Emirates, amending and extending the agreement of July 10, 1976. TIAS 9288. 9 pp. \$1. (Cat. No. S9.10:9288.)

## American Hostages in Iran

VICE PRESIDENT MONDALE,  
DEC. 5, 1979<sup>1</sup>

Over the past several weeks, we have been hearing a drumfire of propaganda out of Tehran, some of it from people calling themselves students, some of it from the government-controlled radio and television in Iran, and some of it from various officials or people in authority. The message is very clear. It says over and over that the world and the American people should ignore the hostages, forget about the innocent people bound hand and foot, overlook the continued outrage to law and standards of human behavior. We are told to forget all that and focus on the hatred of one man. We are not going to forget, and the American people are not going to get their priorities confused.

How are our hostages being treated? The facts are there for all to see, and the simple fact is that 50 human beings are being held under inhuman conditions, contrary to all civilized standards, in order to prove a political point. They are not permitted regular visitors. They are isolated and not allowed to speak, except to their captors. As far as we know, the hostages have not been allowed to receive mail or messages. There has never been a systematic accounting of the numbers and welfare of the hostages.

The so-called students have not permitted any outside observers even to see these people for 10 days. They are refusing to let international organizations, such as the Red Cross, into the compound. They refuse visits by religious organizations. They refuse representatives of neutral states. Even prisoners of war are guaranteed certain standards of human treatment. But these standards are being dragged in the dirt every day by a group of kidnapers, with the acquiescence of the government.

We are hearing daily propaganda about the alleged crimes of our people in Tehran, most of whom volunteered to serve their country at a difficult and dangerous time. We are not and will not respond to that propaganda.

I would note that one of those being held as a so-called spy in Tehran is, in fact, a private American citizen who simply happened to be visiting the Embassy on business at the time of the attack on November 4. It was many

days before we even learned, indirectly, that he was being held. That man, like the rest, has now been held for 31 days—tied up, denied contact with his family, denied exercise, denied access even to the comfort of religion.

We hear a great deal about the crimes of the Shah, but that is not the issue. The issue which disturbs the American people is that 50 of our fellow citizens are being abused, in violation of international law. These are our brothers and sisters.

Yesterday, the U.N. Security Council passed a resolution which called—as the first most important priority, as it should—for the release of the American hostages. That is the issue. It is the only issue, and we are not going to forget they must be set free.

PRESIDENT CARTER,  
DEC. 7, 1979<sup>2</sup>

[Inaudible] in the last 30 days has been not only the support and understanding and patience of the American people and the strength of the hostages' families, but also the superb work of the State Department and all of you, who I know have put in many extra hours, prayers, and extra commitments to help protect the lives and the safety of our hostages.

The most important single message that I can give to you is this: As far as I am concerned, as far as the State Department is concerned, as far as our nation is concerned, there is one issue and that is the early and the safe release of the American hostages from their captors in Tehran. And it's important for us to realize that from the very first hour of the captivity of our hostages by a mob—who is indistinguishable from the government itself—that has been our purpose. And we have tried to restrain every other nation and the United Nations and the people in our own country from confusing the issues.

At this time, I am not interested in trying to resolve whether or not the Shah was a good or bad leader or the history of—[applause]—or the history of Iran. I'm not trying to interfere in the Government of Iran or the inclination of the people there, and we do not want to confuse the issue by injecting these extraneous questions or debates into the present situation. When that does happen, in my opinion, it delays the day when we will see the American hostages come home.

I am not going to take any military action that would cause bloodshed or arouse the unstable captors of our hostages to attack them or to punish them. We're going to be very moderate, very cautious, guided and supported and advised by Secretary Vance. Our purpose is to get the hostages home and get them safe. That's my total commitment, and I know you join with me as full partners in this effort.

Just one other comment. I'm not trying to be presumptuous in speaking for them, but there's no doubt in my mind that every hostage and every person who loves those hostages, not just the families, but 220 million American people, thank you—working with Secretary Vance and all those in this Department—for the superb work that you have done in insuring, so far, the safety in which I am confident and which I pray every moment of my life will be successful in getting our hostages home where they belong.

WHITE HOUSE STATEMENT,  
DEC. 13, 1979<sup>3</sup>

We have read reports from Iran today that international observers will be allowed to see our people who are being held hostage.

I want to emphasize that for any such visit to the hostages to accomplish a humanitarian objective and to be responsive to international opinion and to acceptable standards of behavior, it is important that those who see the hostages be allowed to see all of them, to talk with them, and to report to the families of the hostages and to the world on the condition of each hostage. Any observers allowed on the Embassy compound should be qualified, internationally recognized, impartial, neutral observers and should include a qualified medical doctor. Visits by these observers should occur regularly and frequently until the hostages are released. If this occurs, we would consider it a step forward.

WHITE HOUSE STATEMENT,  
DEC. 18, 1979<sup>4</sup>

There continue to be confusing and sometimes conflicting reports that American citizens being illegally held as hostages might be placed before some type of public trial or tribunal. As we made clear on November 20, such an action would be a further provocation to the United States and to the world



community. The gravity of the situation created by the illegal and irresponsible holding of the hostages would be compounded by any such public exploitation of American citizens. The authorities in Iran would bear full responsibility for any ensuing consequences.

As also stated on November 20, the United States is seeking a peaceful solution through every available channel. This is far preferable to the other remedies available to the United States.

## DEPARTMENT STATEMENT, DEC. 25, 1979<sup>5</sup>

The State Department believes there are 50 U.S. hostages being held in the American Embassy in Tehran. We have, on previous occasions, requested a list from the Iranian authorities of all the persons being held in the Embassy. We have not yet received such a list. This discrepancy illustrates the importance of our getting such a list and receiving confirmation from the Iranian authorities that all the hostages are safe. We are continuing to seek such a list from the Iranian authorities through the channels available to us.

## PRESIDENT CARTER, DEC. 28, 1979<sup>6</sup>

Secretary of State Vance will proceed to the United Nations tomorrow to press the world's case against Iran, in order to obtain the speediest possible release of American hostages, in accordance with the demands which have already been made earlier by the U.N. Security Council and the International Court of Justice.

The United States reserves the right to protect our citizens and our vital interests in whatever way we consider appropriate in keeping with principles of international law and the Charter of the United Nations. But our clear preference is now, and has been from the beginning of this crisis, for a quick and a peaceful solution of this problem through concerted international action.

We must never lose sight of our basic goals in this crisis—the safety of our fellow citizens and the protection of the long-term interests of the United States. A thoughtful and determined policy, which makes clear that Iran will continue to pay an increasingly higher price for the illegal detention of our people, is the best policy to achieve those goals, and it is the policy that I will continue to pursue.

Another serious development, which has caused increased concern about peace and stability in the same region of the world, is the recent Soviet military intervention in Afghanistan, which has now resulted in the overthrow of the established government and the execution of the President of that country. Such gross interference in the internal affairs of Afghanistan is in blatant violation of accepted international rules of behavior.

This is the third occasion since World War II that the Soviet Union has moved militarily to assert control over one of its neighbors, and this is the first such venture into a Moslem country by the Soviet Union since the Soviet occupation of Iranian Azerbaijan in the 1940s.

The Soviet action is a major matter of concern to the entire international community. Soviet efforts to justify this action on the basis of the U.N. Charter are a perversion of the United Nations that should be rejected immediately by all its members.

I have discussed this serious matter personally today with several other heads of government, all of whom agree that the Soviet action is a grave threat to peace. I will be sending the Deputy Secretary of State [Warren Christopher] to Europe this weekend to meet with representatives of several other nations to discuss how the world community might respond to this unwarranted Soviet behavior. Soviet military action beyond its own borders gives rise to the most fundamental questions pertaining to international stability, and such close and extensive consultation between ourselves and with our allies are urgently needed.

**Q. Do we have the votes in the U.N. Security Council, and do we have the Russians' promise they won't veto our resolution?**

A. I expect we will see adequate support in the U.N. Security Council for our position.

**Q. Have you gotten in touch with Brezhnev?**

A. I have sent him a message. ■

<sup>1</sup> Remarks made to reporters assembled in the White House Briefing Room (text from Weekly Compilation of Presidential Documents of Dec. 10, 1979).

<sup>2</sup> Remarks made to State Department employees in the lobby at the State Department (text from Weekly Compilation of Dec. 10). Prior to the remarks, the President and Secretary Vance met with the families of the hostages.

<sup>3</sup> Made by White House press secretary Jody Powell (text from Weekly Compilation of Dec. 17).

<sup>4</sup> Made by White House press secretary Jody Powell (text from Weekly Compilation of Dec. 24).

<sup>5</sup> Made available to news correspondents by Department spokesman Hodding Carter III in reply to questions about the discrepancy between the numbers of hostages believed to be in the Embassy in Tehran and the number of hostages reported to have been seen by visiting American clergymen.

<sup>6</sup> Remarks made to reporters in the White House Briefing Room (text from Weekly Compilation of Presidential Documents of Dec. 31).

## Iran Chronology, December 1979

### December 1

Iranian students announce they have identified CIA agents among the hostages.

### December 2

President Carter gives deposed Shah temporary sanctuary at Lackland Air Force Base hospital in San Antonio, Texas.

Egypt renews asylum offer for deposed Shah.

### December 3

United States reports no success in finding a permanent haven abroad for deposed Shah.

U.N. Security Council drafts third appeal to Iran to release hostages.

### December 4

Security Council unanimously adopts resolution "urgently" demanding the immediate release of hostages.

In an investigation of the deposed Shah's finances, Iranian officials allegedly uncover \$1 billion in identifiable funds misappropriated by the Shah.

Foreign Minister Ghotbzadeh says hostages will be tried as spies and judged by the students holding them captive.

### December 5

Deposed Shah rules out Egypt, Panama, South Africa, and the Bahamas as possible places of refuge.

### December 8

Nephew of deposed Shah is slain in Paris.

### December 9

Foreign Minister Ghotbzadeh announces that Iran intends to proceed with an investigation into alleged U.S. wrongdoings in Iranian affairs.

Ghotbzadeh assures Secretary General Waldheim of hostages' safety and states that they can be visited by a neutral observer.

Soviet Union warns United States that any military action in Iran could have "grave consequences."

#### December 10

In The Hague, Attorney General Civiletti appeals to the International Court of Justice to take "the quickest possible action" to insure release of hostages.

Carter Administration charges Japan with undercutting U.S. efforts to use economic pressure against Iran.

#### December 11

A Federal district judge rules the order issued by Attorney General Civiletti on November 13 unconstitutional.

In a private session, the International Court of Justice begins consideration of U.S. suit against Iran.

#### December 12

United States orders expulsion of Iranian diplomats in retaliation for continued detention of hostages.

Carter Administration asks appeals court to allow continued deportation of Iranian students, arguing that the program was a key foreign policy measure in efforts to secure release of hostages.

#### December 13

Khomeini approves Foreign Minister Ghotbzadeh's plan for an "international investigative team" to look into "aggressor policies" of the United States in Iran. He also approves Ghotbzadeh's suggestion that an international team visit the hostages.

New Iranian delegate to the United Nations, Mansour Farhang, is scheduled to arrive in New York.

Central Bank in Iran accuses the Shah and his associates of forging documents, diverting nationalized land into private holdings, and illegally taking over a company as part of a plot to embezzle hundreds of millions of dollars.

United States welcomes Iran's decision to allow outside observers to check on condition of hostages.

Three hostages are permitted to make telephone calls to their families.

Central Bank in Iran estimates that Iran's economy shrunk by 12% in 1979.

Foreign Ministers and other representatives attending the NATO ministerial meeting in Brussels issue a declaration condemning the holding of U.S. hostages in Tehran. They reaffirm that while they have no desire to intervene in Iran's internal affairs and "... fully respect the independence of other states, recognizing the right of all peoples to chart their own political, economic, and social course, any taking of hostages, for any motive whatsoever, is totally unacceptable and must be firmly opposed by the international community as a whole." They urgently call upon Iranian authorities to release unharmed all hostages and allow them to return to their country.

#### December 15

International Court of Justice orders Iran to immediately release all hostages and

tells Iran to return the Embassy in Tehran and consulates in Tabriz and Shiraz to U.S. control.

Deposed Shah leaves United States for residence in Panama.

After learning of the Shah's departure for Panama, Iranian militants holding the U.S. Embassy announce that trial for the 50 hostages would "definitely begin."

Foreign Minister Ghotbzadeh says that hostages will be visited by delegation of Christian clergy before Christmas to see that "none have been harmed." He also states, while appearing on ABC-TV's "Issues and Answers" that "no trial will go on."

#### December 16

In a proclamation, President Carter designates December 18 as National Unity Day and, to demonstrate support for the hostages, calls upon all citizens and organizations to observe that day by prominently displaying the American flag.

#### December 17

Khomeini says that the militants occupying the U.S. Embassy are expressing the people's will and not setting a separate foreign policy.

#### December 18

Carter Administration reports it is seriously considering "nonviolent" military action if hostages are put on trial.

#### December 19

United States agrees to a request by Secretary General Waldheim to delay moves to seek economic sanctions against Iran.

#### December 21

President Carter decides to ask Security Council to impose economic sanctions against Iran.

Khomeini orders arrangements to be made for clergymen to visit U.S. Embassy in Tehran to hold Christmas services for hostages.

#### December 22

United States warns Soviet Union that any attempt by Soviets to block the Security Council from imposing economic sanctions against Iran would be regarded as unfriendly action.

Iran ignores Carter Administration call for economic sanctions by United Nations. Iranian Economic Minister, Bani-Sadr, states they were already prepared for such action and have taken precautionary measures.

#### December 23

Secretary Vance revokes passport of former CIA employee, Philip Agee, who proposed resolving the Iranian situation by exchanging CIA files on Iran for release of hostages.

#### December 24

Three American clergymen hold Christmas services in U.S. Embassy compound for hostages.

Soviet Government indicates disapproval of U.S. efforts to have Security Council impose economic sanctions against Iran.

United States announces its intent to seek wide-ranging rather than limited sanctions against Iran.

Japan rebuffs a plea by Iranian ambassador to remain neutral in international effort to obtain release of hostages.

#### December 25

Four clergymen meet 43 hostages in Iran creating a discrepancy in the total number of hostages held.

Soviet Union rebuffs appeal by Ambassador Thomas J. Watson, Jr., that it promise not to veto a move for Security Council sanctions against Iran.

U.S. Congressman George Hansen embarks on a second trip to Iran.

#### December 26

United States asks Iran for explanation on the discrepancy in the number of hostages being held.

#### December 27

Federal appeals court rules that the Carter Administration had the right to conduct special immigration checks of Iranian students in the United States and to begin deportation proceedings against any who were here illegally or who did not report to officials as ordered.

Three clergymen return from visit with hostages.

Foreign Minister Ghotbzadeh abandons attempts to find a way out of the impasse over the hostages through an international tribunal and calls for their trial on charges of spying.

#### December 29

Secretary Vance visits the United Nations to press world's case against Iran in order to obtain release of hostages in accordance with demands already made by the Security Council and the International Court of Justice.

#### December 31

Secretary General Waldheim leaves for Iran in an effort to negotiate the release of hostages.

Security Council votes 11 to 0 to give Iran one week to release hostages. ■

# U.S. Defense Policy

by President Carter

*Remarks to members of the Business Council in the East Room of the White House on December 12, 1979.*<sup>1</sup>

It's indeed a pleasure for me to be with you again. This afternoon I would like to make a very important statement to you, following which the Chairman and I will walk down the hall, and I'd like to greet each one of you individually, as has been my custom in the past when we've been together. And then we'll have a chance for a few questions that you might want to put to me concerning energy or inflation or legislation before the Congress or Iran or other matters of interest to you.

But my first concern, and the first concern of every President who has ever lived in this house, is and must be the security of our nation. This security rests on many kinds of strength—on arms and also on arms control, on military power and on economic vitality and the quality of life of our own people, on modern weapons, and also on reliable energy supplies. The well-being of our friends and our allies is also of great importance to us. Our security is tied to human rights and to social justice which prevails among the people who live on Earth and to the institutions of international force and peace and order, which we ourselves have helped to build.

We all hope and work and pray that we will see a world in which the weapons of war are no longer necessary, but now we must deal with the hard facts, with the world as it is. In the dangerous and uncertain world of today, the keystone of our national security is still military strength—strength that is clearly recognized by Americans, by our allies, and by any potential adversary.

Twice in this century, each time in the aftermath of a global war, we were tempted in this country by isolationism. The first time, we succumbed to that temptation, withdrawing from our global responsibilities, and you know what the result was. A generation later the world was again engulfed by war. But after the Second World War, we

built a national consensus, based on our own moral and political values, around the concept of an active role for America in preserving peace and security for ourselves and for others.

Despite all the changes that have swept across this world in the last 30 years, that basic consensus has endured. We've learned the mistake of military intervention in the internal affairs of another country when our own American security was not directly involved. But we must understand that not every instance of the firm application of the power of the United States is a potential Vietnam. The consensus for national strength and international involvement, already shaken and threatened, survived that divisive and tragic war.

Recent events in Iran have been a vivid reminder of the need for a strong and united America, a nation which is supported by its allies and which need not bluff or posture in the quiet exercise of our strength and in our continued commitment to international law and the preservation of peace. Today, regardless of other disagreements among ourselves, we are united in the belief that we must have a strong defense and that military weakness would inevitably make war more likely.

So, the issue we face is not whether we should be strong; the issue is how we will be strong. What will be our defense responsibilities for the 1980s and beyond? What challenges must we confront in meeting those responsibilities? What defense programs do we need, and how much will be spent to meet them? How can we correlate most successfully our military readiness and our arms control efforts? To begin with, our defense program must be tailored to match our responsibilities.

## European and Pacific Alliances

In Europe our military forces have provided the foundation for one of the longest periods of peace and prosperity that continent has ever enjoyed. Our strength, both conventional and nuclear, helps to maintain peace while our allies work together and build together through the European Community and

also nurture their historical ties to the countries of Eastern Europe. Our mutual commitments within the Atlantic alliance are vital to us all, and those commitments are permanent and unshakable.

American military strength provides the framework within which our mature friendships with Japan, Korea, Australia, New Zealand, the Philippines, and Thailand all contribute to stability in the Pacific basin and throughout the world.

The prospects for peace in the Middle East have been enhanced by a strong America and by confidence in us among our friends in Egypt and in Israel. We are determined to continue the progress which has been made in the Middle East.

We must and we will continue to meet these and our other responsibilities. But there are reasons for concern about our ability to sustain our beneficial and our peaceful influence throughout the world—real reasons for concern.

## Defense Spending

For nearly 20 years now, the Soviet Union has been increasing its real defense spending by 3% or 4% each year, 3% or 4% compounded annually. In contrast, our own defense spending has declined in real terms every year from 1968 through 1976. This is creating a real challenge to American leadership and to our influence in the world.

We will almost certainly face other challenges, less direct, though no less serious. The 1980s are very likely to bring continued turbulence and upheaval, as we've experienced in the 1970s. Problems of energy price and energy supply will continue to strain the economy of the developed world and will put even more severe pressures on the developing nations. Political instability, which is already serious enough, may even intensify as the newer nations struggle to cope with these problems, which are serious enough for us.

As in the past, when the winds of change threaten to arouse storms of conflict, we must be prepared to join our friends and our allies in resisting threats to stability and to peace.



The steady buildup by the Soviets and their growing inclination to rely on military power to exploit turbulent situations call for calm, deliberate, and sustained American response.

Through the mid-1970s, the United States relied on the defense strategy and also on force structures devised during the early 1960s, a time when we enjoyed strategic nuclear superiority and a tactical nuclear monopoly, when Soviet seapower was limited and the Soviet military presence outside Eastern Europe almost nonexistent. All that had changed by the time I took office as President.

Beginning in 1976 and continuing in my own Administration, we've set out to counterbalance the growth in Soviet military power by launching new efforts that draw on our own considerable strengths. During each of the last 4 years, there has been a moderate increase in real defense spending. In Europe we've taken steps, as you know, to reverse a decade of relative decline in the military strength of the Atlantic alliance.

When I first began to meet with Atlantic alliance leaders almost 3 years ago, I found them very troubled by the state of our military strength in the Atlantic alliance. I promised to raise our own level of defense spending, in real terms, by some 3% per year, and our NATO allies responded by making the same pledge. With American leadership, NATO also took the crucial step of adopting a bold, Long-Term Defense Program, which will extend over 15 years. That program is helping us to increase our capacity to deter or to defeat any surprise attack that may be launched against our European allies and, therefore, against ourselves.

## Theater Nuclear Forces

We are also taking steps to redress the balance in other theater nuclear forces. This action, as you know, we've been pursuing in the last few days.

In the early 1960s, the United States removed its medium-range missiles from Europe. We could do this then because there was overwhelming U.S. strategic superiority. But the Soviet Union did not show similar restraint. The accelerating development

of their relatively long-range, mobile, multiwarhead SS-20 missile is a major escalation in theater nuclear armaments. With the advent of rough strategic parity, this new missile creates a potentially dangerous weakness in NATO's ability to deter aggression. In the SALT II negotiations, we carefully protected our freedom to correct this weakness.

Just a few hours ago, I was informed that the NATO alliance resolved to strengthen its theater nuclear weapons to offset actual Soviet deployments. The agreement reached this afternoon in Europe was a unanimous agreement very encouraging to all of us. Now, on the basis of strength, we can negotiate with the Warsaw Pact to reduce nuclear weapons and also to reduce, we hope, conventional weapons throughout the European theater.

## Strategic Forces

In the area of intercontinental or strategic forces, we also face adverse trends that must be corrected. Improved Soviet air defenses now threaten to make our strategic bombers vulnerable. The cruise missile will be our solution to that problem. Production of the first generation of air-launched cruise missiles will begin next year.

In addition, our land-based Minuteman intercontinental ballistic missiles (ICBM) are becoming increasingly vulnerable because of the improved accuracy of the Soviet Union's multiwarhead missiles. That's why we decided last spring to produce the MX missile. The relatively small number of MX missiles to be deployed will have mobility and a large number of shelters and will be far less vulnerable than our present fixed-shelter Minutemen.

Further, in response to any first strike against us, the MX will have the capability to attack a wide variety of Soviet military targets. The MX missile, deployed as I've just described, will not undermine stability, but it will deter attack and encourage negotiations on further nuclear arms limits. In addition, by increasing the difficulty of any contemplated Soviet strike, it will contribute to the survivability of our own strategic bombers and submarines. Even with SALT II, America needs the MX to maintain the strategic nuclear balance.

We are also modernizing our strategic submarine force. The first new Trident submarine has already been launched, and the first of our new Trident missiles, with a range of more than 4,000 miles, have already been put to sea.

Thus, each leg of our strategic triad is being modernized—cruise missiles for our bombers, the MX for our intercontinental missiles, and Trident for our undersea deterrent. Nor will we neglect our conventional forces, though here we must rely heavily on the parallel efforts of our allies, in Asia as well as in Europe. They must bear their proportional share of the increased costs of a common defense.

## Conventional Forces

I'm determined to keep our naval forces more powerful than those of any other nation on Earth. Our shipbuilding program will sustain a 550-ship Navy in the 1990s, and we will continue to build the most capable ships afloat. Seapower is indispensable to our global strategy, in peace and also in war.

And finally, we are moving rapidly to counterbalance the growing ability of the Soviet Union, directly or through surrogates, to use its military power in Third World regions, and we must be prepared to deal with hostile actions against our own citizens or our vital interests from others as well. For this purpose, we need not only stronger forces but better means for rapid deployment of the forces that we already have.

Our 1981 defense budget and our 5-year defense program will meet this need in two different ways. The first will be a new fleet of maritime prepositioning ships that will carry the heavy equipment and the supplies for three Marine brigades that can be stationed in forward areas where U.S. forces may be needed. With their supplies already near the scene of action, the troops themselves can then be moved in by air very rapidly. The second innovation will be a new fleet of large cargo aircraft to carry Army tanks and other equipment over intercontinental distances. Having rapid deployment forces does not necessarily mean that we will use them. We intend for their existence to deter the very developments that would otherwise invoke their use.

We must always remember that no matter how capable or advanced our weapons systems, our military security

depends on the abilities, the training, and the dedication of the people who serve in our Armed Forces. I'm determined to recruit and to retain, under any foreseeable circumstances, an ample level of such skilled and experienced military personnel.

To sum up, the United States is taking strong action: first, to improve all aspects of our strategic forces, thus assuring our deterrent to nuclear war; second, to upgrade our forces in NATO and in the Pacific, as part of a common effort with our allies; third, to modernize our naval forces and keep them the best in the world; fourth, to strengthen our rapid deployment capabilities to meet our responsibilities outside NATO; and fifth, to maintain an effective force of highly trained military personnel.

### Defense Budget

We must sustain these commitments in order to maintain peace and security in the 1980s. To insure that we press forward vigorously, I will submit for fiscal year 1981 a budget to increase funding authority for defense to more than \$157 billion, a real growth of more than 5% over my request for fiscal year 1980. Just as in 1979 and in 1980, requested outlays for defense during fiscal year 1981 will grow by more than 3% in real terms, over the preceding year. We will sustain this effort.

My 5-year defense program provides a real funding increase that will average more than 4½% each year. I intend to carry out this program. With careful and efficient management, we should be able to do so within the budget increases I propose. If inflation increases or exceeds the projected rates that we now expect, I intend to adjust the defense budget as needed, just as has been done in 1980 fiscal year.

Much of this program which I've outlined to you will take 5 years or more to reach fruition. The imbalances it will correct have been caused by more than a decade of disparity. This cannot be remedied overnight, so we must be willing to see this program through. To insure that we do so, I'm setting a growth rate for defense that will be tolerable for our country over the long haul.

The most wasteful and self-defeating thing that we could do would be to start this necessary program, then alter it or cut it back after a year or two when such an action might become politically attractive. The defense program that I'm proposing for the next 5 years will require some sacrifice—but sacrifice that we can well afford. It will not increase at all the percentage of our gross national product devoted to defense, which will remain steady at almost exactly 5% per year.

We must have a long-range, balanced approach to the allocation of Federal expenditures. We will continue to meet such crucial needs, of course, as jobs and housing and education and health, but we must realize that a prerequisite to the enjoyment of such progress is to assure peace for our nation. So in asking congressional support for our defense efforts, I'm asking for consistent support, steadfast support—not just for 1980 or 1981 but until these commitments have been fulfilled.

Sustained American strength is the only possible basis for the wider, truly reciprocal detente which we seek with the Soviet Union. Only through strength can we create global political conditions hospitable to worldwide economic and political progress and to controlling both conventional and nuclear weapons.

### SALT

As the strongest, most advanced country on Earth, we have a special obligation to seek security through arms control as well as through military power. So, I welcome the debate by the Senate in its consideration of the SALT II Treaty. It will enable us to build a clearer understanding that these efforts in both arms control and in defense are vital to our security and they are mutually compatible, one with another.

There are several reasons why SALT II will strengthen the military aspect of our national security.

**First**, we can better maintain strategic equivalence in nuclear weapons with SALT II. Without it, the Soviet Union can add more to the power of their own forces, widen any advantage that they may achieve in the early 1980s, and conceal from us what they are doing. For us, maintaining parity with these uncontrollable Soviet activities would add to our costs in time, money, and also uncertainty about our own safety.

**Second**, we can better maintain the combat efficiency and readiness of our non-nuclear forces with SALT II than we can without it. Whatever the level of the defense budget, more of it will have to go into strategic weapons, atomic weapons, if SALT II is not ratified.

**Third**, we can better strengthen the unity, resolve, and capability of the NATO alliance with SALT II than we can without it. That's why the heads of other NATO countries have urged strongly its ratification.

**Fourth**, we can better continue the SALT process, which has now been going on for more than 30 years—the process of negotiating further reductions in the world's nuclear arsenals, with SALT II than without it. Without SALT II and all its limits, its rules, and definitions in place, any agreement in SALT III would, at the very best, take many more years to achieve.

**And finally**, we can better control the proliferation of nuclear weapons among currently non-nuclear nations with SALT II than without it. This could be one of the most important factors involved in our pending decision on the SALT Treaty.

All of these issues are extremely important and they are intimately interrelated. A strong defense is a matter of simple common sense; so is SALT II.

I will do my utmost as President to keep America strong and to keep our nation secure, but this cannot be done without sustained effort and without some sacrifice, which our nation can certainly afford.

The best investment in defense is in weapons that will never have to be used and in soldiers who will never have to die. But the peace we enjoy is the fruit of our strength and our will to use this strength if we need to. As a great nation devoted to peace, we must and we will continue to build that American strength. ■

<sup>1</sup> Text from Weekly Compilation of Presidential Documents of Dec. 17, 1979.

## Review of U.S. Policy in the 1980s

by Howard B. Schaffer

*Address before the Foreign Policy Conference for Asian-Americans at Hunter College in New York City on December 1, 1979. Mr. Schaffer is Country Director for India, Nepal, and Sri Lanka Affairs in the Bureau of Near Eastern and South Asian Affairs.*

During its now 203-year history, the United States has had a relationship with the countries of South Asia that differs in many ways from our involvement with the rest of Asia. China clipppers and Yankee traders did not plough the waters of the Indian Ocean as they did those of the Pacific. We never involved ourselves directly in the political affairs of South Asia—there was no "Open Door" policy, no forced opening to the west, no colonial relationships. We fought no wars in the region. Until recently, South Asia was not a source of immigrant skills for our own economic development. Even our missionaries did not find South Asia as fruitful a ground as other regions.

Of course, we all remember that the beginning of our own history goes back to South Asia—Columbus was looking for a new route to India and found a new world instead. But the subcontinent was exactly half a world away from us. Throughout most of our history, this region of the world was dominated by one colonial power, hereby closing off the possibility for the development of closer ties between the United States and the nations of South Asia.

It was not until 1947 and the dawn of independence in South Asia that the United States began to search for its role in the region, to seek to define a relationship where none really had existed before.

But in the postwar world, America was a very different kind of country with global responsibilities. The way we looked at South Asia reflected in many ways the way we looked at the world as a whole. And just as our perception of the world has changed during the past three decades, so has the nature of our relationship with the countries of South Asia.

In the 1950s we tended to look at the nations of the region, as we did countries elsewhere, through the prism of the cold war, looking at gain for our adversaries as a loss for us

In the 1960s our emphasis was on economic development. We were determined to do everything we could to promote the human development of the region and to enable it to serve as an alternative to the developmental models offered by the Communist world.

In the 1970s a number of developments in the region caused us to reassess our interests there. Many of our critics borrowed a phrase coined by one of our former American ambassadors to India and said that we were pursuing a policy of benign neglect. I do not believe this is true. But nevertheless, in the wake of Vietnam and our own re-examination of American interests and involvement around the world, it was inevitable that we should ask ourselves what kind of a relationship we should have with the nations of the subcontinent.

### Principles of U.S. Policy

Today, as we face the beginning of the decade of the 1980s, I think we have a clear idea of what our policy should be. I would like to review with you some of the major principles that will govern our policy toward South Asia during the coming decade.

- The United States seeks equally good relations with all the nations of South Asia. We recognize as a fact of life that no matter what measuring stick one uses—GNP, population, military strength, political and economic influence—India is the most important power in the region. But our desire to pursue equally good relations with all of the countries in the region means that there will be no "tilt" in U.S. policy toward any country.

- We respect the nonalignment of the South Asian nations and expect others to do the same. Today, for the first time, all of the nations of the area are members of the nonaligned movement. Nonalignment in the true sense of the word is acceptable to us. We want to see a South Asia that is free of great power involvement and competition, a South Asia that is able to work out its own problems without fear of external manipulation or exploitation. For our part, we do not wish to dominate the region or any part of it, and we do not wish to see an external power play such a role. In this connection, we cannot help but look with great concern

at the increased Soviet role in Afghanistan and the specter of external involvement in the region that this portends.

- We want to see a South Asia that continues along the path of economic development, that increasingly meets its own food needs, that betters the conditions for human development, and that seeks to alleviate chronic unemployment and underemployment.

- We want to see South Asian nations develop strong internal institutions, where the strength of the governments derive from the consent of the governed, and where the relationships between the governments and the people lead to internal stability and not instability.

- We want to see a South Asia where the nations of the region continue to improve their relations with each other, where they begin to look to the future and not to the past, and where they seek areas of cooperation based on their common heritage and interests.

- We want to see a South Asia that remains free of the peril of nuclear proliferation, not only because of our general desire for a halt to the spread of nuclear weapons but for the very real and specific dangers this would present to the stability and security of the region.

In pursuing these goals, we will help where we can, bearing in mind the wishes of the people of the region. But we must recognize that in the final analysis, it is the people of the region themselves—and especially their governments—who bear the responsibility for creating in reality what the people of South Asia have sought for generations—a just society, free from want and free from fear.

With this outline of our policy interests in South Asia as a backdrop, I would now like to describe a number of developments in the individual countries of the region, and relate them to those overall policy interests.

### India

I believe we can take some satisfaction with the present state of affairs in South Asia, with the exception of the tragic situation in Afghanistan. Relations among most of the countries of the



region have rarely been better. Indian policy has been key to this, and any description of South Asia must start with its largest member—India.

In the last years of Mrs. Gandhi's government, relations were restored between India and Pakistan and Ambassadors were again exchanged between India and China. Mrs. Gandhi made additional efforts to improve relations with India's smaller neighbors. Following up this welcome progress, the Janata government, which took office in 1977, made the good-neighbor policy a cornerstone of its foreign policy. Further improvements were made in Indo-Pakistan relations, and Indian and Pakistani leaders have met with each other on a number of occasions. This is not to say, however, that deep-seated suspicions do not remain. A relationship born in the turmoil of India's partition—and one which has led to three armed conflicts—cannot be changed overnight. But progress has been made, and we sincerely hope that further progress will come.

Similarly, India has improved its relations with Nepal and Bangladesh. It agreed to Nepalese requests for separate trade and transit agreements. India also agreed to a short-term division of Ganges Rivers waters with Bangladesh. India's actions created a greater sense of confidence on the part of its neighbors, who are often uneasy about the over-awing strength and size of the giant across the border.

Aside from being well-received by the smaller South Asian countries, India's good-neighbor policy has been good politics in India itself. This would seem to augur well for a continuation of the policy by any government which takes office in New Delhi after the January election. We would certainly hope so and will be doing what we can from the sidelines to cheer on the cause of stable and friendly relations.

## Afghanistan

There is, of course, one major exception to the general improvement of relations among the states of South Asia. This is the uneasy relationship between Pakistan and the Democratic Republic of Afghanistan. The situation in Afghanistan is a profoundly troubling one for the United States. I would like to review it for you.

Afghanistan is today the scene of continuing human suffering and what amounts to civil war. In April 1978 the People's Democratic Party came to power in Kabul in a violent coup. Since then the prospects for reform under the new government have been overshadowed by internal strife. The government is confronted by continuing rebel operations and occasional troop mutinies. Nonetheless, the new President, Hafizullah Amin, continues to demonstrate that he retains the loyalty of key military units and that he is determined to employ these well-armed forces to defend his regime.

There are in Afghanistan large numbers of Soviet military personnel, primarily engaged in technical and advisory roles with the Afghan Armed Forces. They appear to be taking an increased role in military decisions and operations. The prospect is for a prolonged period of continued fighting.

Important U.S. interests are affected by developments in Afghanistan. Our effort to encourage peace and stability in the region is clearly made more difficult by Afghanistan's internal unrest and the exodus of refugees from Afghanistan. These already number over 300,000, most of whom have fled to Pakistan. The reorientation in Afghanistan's foreign policy away from its traditional genuine nonalignment to an approach virtually indistinguishable from that of Cuba or the Soviet Union is one we regret.

Our interest in the welfare and economic development of the people of Afghanistan—one of the world's poorest nations—has been amply demonstrated by the fact that we have provided over \$5 billion of assistance in the past 30 years. In the present situation, economic development has largely come to a standstill, and our own aid program is being phased out in accordance with legislative requirements.

We are especially disturbed by the growing involvement of the Soviet Union in Afghan affairs. Afghanistan and the Soviet Union, as neighbors, have always had close relations. Never before in recent times, however, have the Soviet military—and, apparently, the political—roles been as extensive. Direct interference in Afghanistan by any country, including the Soviet Union, would threaten the integrity of that nation and peace in the area and would be a matter of deep concern to the United States. We have repeatedly

impressed on the Soviet Government the dangers of more direct involvement in the fighting in Afghanistan. We are continuing to monitor developments closely.

For its part, the U.S. Government seeks no special position in Afghanistan. We look for a relationship based on mutual respect and shared interests in regional stability, the independence and territorial integrity of all states in the area, and noninterference. These are goals which I have already spelled out as among the guiding principles of our policy throughout South Asia. We have important differences with the Afghan Government, including our deep concern about the human rights situation in Afghanistan. Security concerns and the decline in our programs have required us to reduce our Embassy staff in Kabul and to withdraw dependents of U.S. Government personnel. Nevertheless, we have continued to express to the Government of Afghanistan our desire for normal and friendly relations. We consider that the initiative for such relations lies with them.

## Pakistan

Pakistan's understandable uneasiness about developments in Afghanistan is heightened by its internal difficulties. The country continues under martial law, imposed in July 1977. Elections that were promised for November of this year were indefinitely postponed, and martial law has been indefinitely extended. We regret this decision and continue to hope that Pakistan will reform to elected civilian government as soon as possible.

Pakistan's political problems are heightened by its economic difficulties. Years of heavy budget deficits, mounting imports and inadequate exports have brought Pakistan to the brink of crisis in its external finances. Moreover, to feed itself, Pakistan will require a sustained and substantial increase in agricultural productivity. To turn this situation around will require difficult economic policy decisions.

The United States traditionally has had a close relationship with Pakistan. Pakistan was a member of both South-East Asia Treaty Organization (SEATO) and the Central Treaty Organization (CENTO). Our two countries continue to be linked together by a 1955 agreement which pledges the two sides to consult in accordance with constitutional processes in the event of aggression from Communist powers. Although SEATO and CENTO no longer exist

and Pakistan has joined the nonaligned movement, we continue to value our ties with this country and remain pledged to support Pakistan's independence and territorial integrity. Pakistan's security is an important concern for us.

Our ability to provide Pakistan with the support we would wish to give it has been restricted by Pakistan's nuclear activities. Our legislation mandates a cutoff of most development and military assistance to countries which import certain sensitive nuclear equipment material and technology, including equipment used for uranium enrichment. The fact that Pakistan has been developing a uranium enrichment program which is inconsistent with its power generation or research needs has caused us deep concern. We have cut off further economic development assistance, valued at about \$40 million annually, as well as terminated our modest military training program. This action, as I have said, was required under U.S. law.

We have expressed our concern to the Pakistanis about their nuclear activities and have urged them not to move forward to develop a nuclear explosives capability. We believe that the development of such a capability could aggravate rather than relieve their security concerns and could be a major source of instability in the South Asian region.

As you all know, our Embassy in Islamabad was overrun by a mob and destroyed by fire 10 days ago. Four members of our staff died tragically in that fire—two American servicemen and two Pakistani employees. There are legitimate questions about the time it took for the Pakistanis to clear the compound. The Pakistani Government has established a commission of inquiry to look into this. But in contrast to the Iranian regime, the Government of Pakistan acknowledged its responsibility for the protection of our diplomatic mission. President Zia has expressed regret to us about the incident and as offered to rebuild our chancery in Islamabad.

### Relations With India

Differences over nuclear issues have also influenced U.S. relations with India, whose 1974 nuclear explosion was a key element in generating renewed concern in this country and elsewhere about the danger of the spread of nuclear technology which

could be used for military purposes. U.S. concern about nuclear proliferation eventually resulted in the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Act of 1978.

This act has had an important bearing on our relations with India. It provides that after March 1980, nuclear supplies may not be exported by the United States to any country which has not accepted International Atomic Energy Agency safeguards over all its peaceful nuclear facilities. India has refused to accept such safeguards.

The provisions of the act affect the continued supply of enriched uranium fuel to the twin reactors at Tarapur, north of Bombay. These reactors, which supply some 15% of the power requirement of western India, were built in the 1960s with American economic assistance. A bilateral agreement calls for U.S. supply of enriched uranium for the lifetime of the reactors. India, in exchange, is obligated to purchase all Tarapur fuel from the United States and to accept certain safeguards and other controls over the fuel and the waste material produced from it.

This knotty problem has received considerable attention in India. It has at times tended to obscure the fact that relations between the United States and India are otherwise good and probably better than they have been since the early 1960s.

The improvement in our relations with India dates back to the last years of Mrs. Gandhi's government. You will recall that a few years before that, in 1971, our relations had sunk to a low with the famous, so-called American tilt toward Pakistan in the Bangladesh war and the dispatch of the aircraft carrier *Enterprise* to the Indian Ocean. By the mid-1970s, both governments had come to recognize that a more mature relationship was called for. The Desai government moved further in this direction. It made "genuine nonalignment" a watchword. While it maintained good relations with the Soviet Union, it also sought better ties with the United States.

The United States and India often stress our shared commitment to human rights and the democratic process. But our relationship with India goes far beyond the realm of political philosophy. Perhaps nothing better symbolizes the diversity of ties between the two countries and the concrete ways in which that cooperation is manifested than the Indo-U.S. Joint Commission and the work carried on

through its four subcommissions—economics and commerce, agriculture, science and technology, and education and culture.

We hope that through the work of these commissions, through our expanding trade (now approaching \$2 billion annually), through the establishment of a modest economic assistance program, through exchanges of scholars and students, and, perhaps most important, by a willingness on the part of the two countries to engage as equals in a wide range of candid consultations on bilateral and multilateral issues, the ups and downs which have so frequently characterized Indo-U.S. relations in the past will be avoided. We recognize that we have much in common. We also recognize that there are issues where we disagree. Our aim has been to expand the former and to isolate and discuss the latter. We think we have made considerable progress.

We hope that this will continue.

India now faces general elections, scheduled for January, taking place in an established institutional framework. We are confident that whatever government comes to power, our good relations with India will continue. We can also hope, as I have said earlier, that India will continue to strengthen and improve relations with its neighbors. In the final analysis, it is this aspect of Indian foreign relations that may be the most important from our own point of view.

Let me turn now to four smaller countries of the area.

### Sri Lanka

Sri Lanka (or as it was formerly known, Ceylon), like most of the countries of South Asia, has faced two major problems since it won independence in 1948: the creation of an economy sufficient to raise the standards of living and meet the aspirations of its people and the nurturing of a sense of nationality and unity among peoples of diverse ethnic, religious, and linguistic communities.

Sri Lanka has tried to meet these challenges within a democratic system and remains one of the few functioning multiparty democracies in the Third World.

Since the government headed by J.R. Jayewardene came to office in the last national elections in mid-1977, Sri Lanka has dramatically changed its former economic policies. While not abandoning the general Socialist orientation that has characterized Sri Lanka

for decades, the government has encouraged the domestic private sector, welcomed foreign investment, and accelerated a major economic development program designed to bring irrigation to hundreds of thousands of presently unproductive acres. Sri Lanka has been very successful in enlisting foreign support for this development effort, including the United States, and the response of the economy to the new economic policies has been impressive. From a GNP growth of under 3% for most of the 1970s, Sri Lanka achieved a real growth rate of over 8% in 1978.

Despite this economic success, there remain unresolved tensions between the majority ethnic group, the Sinhalese who are Buddhist, and the minority Tamils who are Hindu and Christian. Underlying the tension is a small group of Tamil terrorists bent on achieving a separate nation for Tamils through violence. While Sri Lanka has a population of only 15 million, the course of events over the next few years may have a significance beyond the shores of the island nation. What is at stake is whether a nation can maintain its commitment to democracy and human rights and meet the economic expectations of its people, while at the same time resolving the competing and conflicting claims of its majority and minority peoples. While the problems are centuries old, Sri Lanka's traditions and the moderation and accommodating spirit of its government augur well for the future.

### Bangladesh

Bangladesh, in the eastern part of the region, is one of the world's most impoverished and overpopulated countries. Following its creation, Bangladesh faced a number of major economic, political, and administrative problems. In recent years there has been a modest but broad-based improvement in the quality of public administration, the economy, and public order. Ziaur Rahman, who took power in 1975, was elected president in June 1978. This February parliament elections gave his Bangladesh Nationalist Party a majority.

During the past year, there has been continued progress in fulfilling commitments to restore political freedom and to promote economic development. The number of political prisoners has been further reduced. The February 1979 parliamentary election was a step forward in Bangladesh's political

evolution. Martial law was withdrawn, restrictions on press freedom were relaxed, and some long-banned newspapers resumed publication. On Wednesday of this week, Ziaur completed the dismantlement of the emergency/martial law regime which had been in place nearly 4 years, ending the state of emergency and announcing the release of 730 political prisoners. Ziaur's actions are worthy of commendation.

Bangladesh states that its foreign policy is one of "friendship toward all" and genuine nonalignment. Relations with the United States are excellent and probably as good as they have ever been since that nation's birth. Our interests in Bangladesh reflect our desire for stability and a humanitarian interest in improving the lot of Bangladesh's desperately poor majority. We welcome Bangladesh's position as a moderate in multilateral forums such as the United Nations and the nonaligned movement.

### Nepal

The Himalayan Kingdom of Nepal is also being buffeted by the winds of change. Disturbances which broke out this spring led the King to call for a referendum to determine whether the country should continue with and slightly modify its present system of no political parties and indirectly chosen representatives—or whether it should move to a multiparty system. The King's decision was widely hailed in Nepal and abroad as a bold and imaginative step which paves the way to genuine popular participation in a continuing monarchical system. It has been followed by a burst of political activity, facilitated by lifting of restrictions on politicians and the press. The referendum is expected to be held in the spring.

Nepal's primary relations are with its two giant neighbors—India and China. Our relations with it are good. We are grateful for Nepal's consistently moderate stance on international political and economic issues in the nonaligned movement, the United Nations, and other international forums.

Our humanitarian interest in Nepal as one of the poorest of the world's countries has prompted a substantial American economic assistance program there. This has contributed to the strength of our bilateral relationship.

### Maldives

I would like to mention one other country with which until recently we had very little contact—the Republic of Maldives. Maldives is a new country—it gained its independence only in 1965—and it is comprised of nearly 2,000 islands stretching over 600 miles through the Indian Ocean. During the last 2 years we have sought to develop and strengthen our ties with this nation.

Like the rest of the South Asian nations, Maldives is nonaligned. Its first national priority is economic development. To date, we have not been able to provide any direct economic assistance, but international development institutions to which we are a contributor, such as the U.N. Development Program, the Asian Development Bank, and the World Bank, are involved in promoting human development in this fascinating country. We value our relationship with Maldives and hope we will be able to develop it further in the years ahead.

### Conclusion

In much of this talk I have spoken of South Asia as if it were a discrete part of the world, somehow isolated from events to its east and west, and protected by the Himalayas in the north and the Indian Ocean to the south. Of course it is not. The links between South Asia and other areas of the greater region of which it is a part are important and becoming ever stronger.

You will recall that very early in my remarks, I said that the way the United States historically has looked South Asia reflects in many ways the way we have looked at the world as a whole. As a global power, with global responsibilities, we cannot make South Asia policy in a vacuum. We cannot do with all developments there as if they were somehow isolated from events elsewhere. Furthermore, because of the growing links between the South Asian nations and the countries to the east and west, the countries of the subcontinent themselves recognize their security and well-being increasingly are affected by events occurring outside their own region. And we also seek to make them aware that many of their actions carry great implications for our global interests and, indeed, for the world as a whole. ■



## Soviet Invasion of Afghanistan

DEPARTMENT STATEMENT,  
DEC. 26, 1979<sup>1</sup>

On December 25-26 there was a large-scale Soviet airlift into Kabul International Airport, perhaps involving over 150 flights. The aircraft include both large transports (AN-22s) and smaller transports (AN-12s). Several hundred Soviet troops have been seen at the Kabul airport and various kinds of field equipment have been flown in. I cannot give you an estimate of numbers.

The Soviet military buildup north of the Afghan border is continuing, and we now have indications that there are five equivalent of five divisions in Soviet areas adjacent to Afghanistan. It appears that the Soviets are crossing a few thousand in their military deployments into Afghanistan. We believe that members of the international community should condemn such blatant military interference into the internal affairs of an independent sovereign state. We are making our views known directly to the Soviets. ■

<sup>1</sup> Read to news correspondents by Department spokesman Hodding Carter III.

## Background on Afghanistan

### Geography

Afghanistan is a landlocked country whose strategic location has had a major influence on its history. It borders on the U.S.S.R., Iran, Pakistan, and the People's Republic of China.

From southwest to northeast the country is divided by the towering—up to 25,000 feet (7,620 m.) above sea level—Hindu Kush and Pamir mountain ranges. Mountains and arid desert country are interspersed by small valleys made fertile by irrigation from snow-fed mountain streams.

Afghanistan's climate is typical of the higher regions of central Asia—cold in the winter and hot and dry in the summer. Another characteristic of the climate is the range of temperature change within short periods, from season to season, and from place to place. For example, in summer at Kabul

(6,000 ft.; 1,829 m.), the temperature may be 60°F (16°C) at sunrise and by noon reach 100°F (38°C). Kabul's mean temperature in January is 32°F (0°C). In the plains of Jalalabad (1,800 ft.; 549 m.), summer temperatures can reach 115°F (46°C).

Precipitation is scanty—rarely exceeding 15 inches (38 cm.) annually, most of which occurs from October to April.

### People

Afghanistan's ethnically and linguistically mixed population reflects its location astride trade and invasion routes that lead from central Asia into the Middle East and the Indian subcontinent. Pushtun (Pathan), Tajik, Uzbek, Turkoman, and Hazara groups constitute the bulk of the Afghan population, with small groups of other peoples represented. The dominant ethnic group—the Pushtun—comprises about half of the total population. Afghan Persian (Dari) and Pushtu are the principal languages spoken, although Turki is also used in the north.

The principal cities of Afghanistan are the capital, Kabul, in the east; Kandahar, southwest of Kabul; Herat, near the Iranian border in the northwest; and Mazar-e-Sharif, near the Soviet border in the north. Other cities with industrial bases are growing.

Afghanistan is a Moslem country, which is now governed by a Marxist regime. Religion has traditionally pervaded all aspects of life, and it is now a prime factor underlying the countrywide revolt against the government, which is perceived as Communist and atheist. Except for a rather small urban population in the principal cities, people are divided into clan and tribal groups and follow centuries-old customs and religious practices in the conduct of their affairs.

### History

Afghanistan, often called the crossroads of central Asia, has had a turbulent history and has suffered many invasions. In 328 B.C., Alexander the Great entered present-day Afghanistan and, after crossing the Helmand River and the Hindu Kush, captured ancient Bactria (present-day Balkh). His rule was followed by domination by Scythians, White Huns, and Turks. In 652 A.D., Afghanistan fell to conquering Arabs, who brought with them a new religion, Islam.

Arab rule gave way to Persian rule, which continued until 998, when Mahmud of Ghazni (of Turkish extraction) assumed control. Mahmud established Ghazni as a great capital and cultural center, from which he repeatedly invaded India to spread the Moslem faith. Mahmud's dynasty was short-lived, however, and Afghanistan was ruled by various princes until the invasion of Ghengis Kahn in the early 13th century, which resulted in the destruction of Herat, Ghazni, and Balkh.

Late in the 14th century, Afghanistan was again devastated—this time by the invasion of Tamerlane, who made it part of his huge Asian empire. In the early 16th century, Afghanistan came under the rule of Babar, who founded the Moghul dynasty in India and who is buried at Kabul, his favorite city.

Afghanistan was founded as an independent kingdom by Ahmad Shah Durrani in 1747. Ahmad Shah consolidated various chieftainships, petty principalities, and provinces into one country. From then until 1973, when the monarchy was overthrown and a republic was established, the monarchs were members of the Durrani tribe, although after 1818 they were members of a different clan.

**European Influence.** During the 19th century, as British power in India expanded and Russia moved into central Asia in its push to the east, the history of Afghanistan was significantly influenced for the first time by European countries. British efforts to secure a stronger position in order to counter Russian influence in Persia (Iran) and central Asia led to the first Anglo-Afghan war, from 1838 to 1842.

British anxiety over Russian advances in central Asia and Afghan dealings with Russia led to the second Anglo-Afghan war (1878-80), which brought the Amir Abdur Rahman to the throne. This ruler agreed to British control of Afghan foreign affairs.

**World War I.** During World War I, Afghanistan remained neutral despite German intrigue to have the Afghans foment trouble along the borders of India. Meanwhile, nationalism was developing in the area. Amanullah, who succeeded to the throne in 1919 following the assassination of his father, sought to terminate British control of Afghanistan's foreign affairs. This resulted in the third Anglo-Afghan war, which lasted only a few months. Some initial Afghan successes persuaded the

war-weary British to give Afghanistan the freedom to conduct its external affairs. This event, celebrated on May 27, is considered to be its independence day, even though Afghanistan was never actually colonized by the British.

**Reform and Reaction.** After the third Anglo-Afghan war, King Amanullah set about making changes in his country. Moving from its traditional isolation, Afghanistan entered into diplomatic relations with the principal nations of the world. In 1927 the King made an extensive tour of Europe, an experience which fired him with a desire to modernize Afghanistan. His modernization efforts, which included abolishing the traditional Moslem veil for women, alienated many tribal and religious leaders. This development, together with the depletion of the national treasury and the deterioration of his army, made him easy prey for Bacha-i-Saqao, a brigand who captured Kabul and declared himself King early in 1929. Nadir Khan defeated Bacha-i-Saqao on October 10, 1929, with Pushtun tribal support and was declared King, returning the crown to the Durrani tribe.

His son, Mohammad Zahir Shah, succeeded to the throne on November 8, 1933, after the assassination of Nadir Shah by a fanatical follower of the previous dynasty. Nadir Shah's brothers were Prime Ministers through 1952, and Zahir Shah's cousins, Sardar Mohammad Daoud and Sardar Mohammad Naim, were Prime Minister and Deputy Prime Minister/Foreign Minister from 1953 until March 1963.

With the 1964 Constitution as the vehicle, Zahir introduced a program of social and political reforms under a more liberal parliamentary rule. In practice, the so-called experiment in democracy produced few lasting reforms, and frequent executive-legislative deadlocks delayed or blocked vital legislation. Under this more relaxed rule, which allowed political expression but which did not provide for a legalized political party system, the country's moderate reformers were increasingly overshadowed by extremists of both the left and right. A 2-year drought in 1971-72 worsened economic conditions. Amid charges of corruption and malfeasance, the monarchy was removed from power by a virtually bloodless military coup d'etat, led by former Prime Minister Mohammad Daoud, on July 17, 1973. The 1964 Con-

stitution was abrogated, and Afghanistan was declared a republic with Daoud as its first President and Prime Minister.

**Recent Events.** Five years after coming to power, President Daoud was, in turn, overthrown by a Marxist coup in April 1978. Daoud and many members of his family were killed at this time. The coup was carried out by the leadership of the People's Democratic Party of Afghanistan, a coalition of the Marxist Khalq and Parcham parties. It succeeded because of previous effective recruitment of a large number of young military officers.

Opposition to the Marxist government developed almost immediately and subsequently grew into a coun-



trywide insurgency. Differences between the leaders also surfaced very early and resulted in the exile of the Parcham group and numerous purges and imprisonments. Approximately 1½ years after coming to power, the in-party factionalism erupted in a showdown between the two top leaders—Mohammad Taraki and Hafizullah Amin—resulting in the death of Taraki and the assumption of power by Amin in September 1979. Three months later, Amin was overthrown in a bloody coup engineered by the Soviets and was replaced by Abarak Karmal, leader of the Parcham group which had been exiled in the summer of 1978.

After the April 1978 coup had brought a Marxist government to power in Afghanistan, the Soviets moved quickly to take advantage of the new situation and to consolidate their ties with the Taraki government. In December 1978, they signed a new Treaty of Friendship and Cooperation

with Afghanistan. Soviet military assistance to Afghanistan grew significantly and, as the insurgency against the government developed, Soviet military equipment and advisers became critical to the survival of the regime. Beginning in the spring of 1979, Soviet military involvement in Afghanistan began to escalate dramatically until it culminated in December 1979 with the current Soviet invasion which installed the new government.

## Government

Since April 1978 Afghanistan has been ruled by a Marxist regime. The government calls itself a republic. The highest body is the Revolutionary Council headed by a President. There a Council of Ministers headed by a Prime Minister. Basic power is vested in the Politburo of the ruling party, the People's Democratic Party of Afghanistan headed by a Secretary General. The new leader, Babrak Karmal, holds all three leadership positions—President, Prime Minister, and Secretary General of the party—as did his predecessor, Hafizullah Amin.

## Economy

The turmoil which has engulfed Afghanistan during the past year owing an insurgency, which escalated steadily throughout the year until it had spread throughout the entire country, has totally disrupted the basic economic system. Therefore, it is impossible to provide any reliable current economic statistics. The last statistics available are for 1978 when the gross national product was in the range of \$3-4 billion and the per capita income was about \$250. ■

## J.S. Asks Security Council To Impose Sanctions Against Iran

SECRETARY VANCE,  
DEC. 29, 1979<sup>1</sup>

We meet tonight at a moment when the principles upon which this great international body rests are being sharply challenged in Iran.

More than 8 weeks have passed since our Embassy was seized and our people and those from other nations were taken hostage in Tehran. On three separate occasions, this Council has unanimously expressed the will of the international community that the hostages be released immediately.

From the outset, the Secretary General, with the full cooperation of the United States, has labored unceasingly for a peaceful solution. The President of the General Assembly has twice urged us to release the hostages. The International Court of Justice has spoken, clearly and unanimously. Governments and world leaders, of varying political and religious faiths, have appealed for the release of our people. And the U.S. Government has, with determination, persistence, and patience, pursued every peaceful channel available to us.

The response of those who perpetuate this crisis—the terrorists who have invaded our Embassy and the Government of Iran which supports them—has been defiance and contempt. They have placed themselves beyond the world's law and beyond the moral imperatives that are common to the world's cultures and religions.

At the heart of this matter are 50 men and women—still captive, still lamed, still subjected to the most severe strains. The World Court, in its unanimous decision, expressed concern that continuation of these conditions of imprisonment "... exposes the human beings concerned to privation, hardship, anguish and even danger to life and health and thus to a serious possibility of irreparable harm. . . ." It demands that the hostages are well ringed in law, for the international community has been denied either consistent or apprehensive access to them.

But let us be clear: It is not only 50 American men and women who are held captive in Iran, it is the international

This is far more than a conflict between the United States and Iran. Iran has placed itself in conflict with the structure of law and with the machinery of peace all of us have painstakingly built.

The time has come for the world community to act, firmly and collectively, to uphold international law and preserve international peace. We must give practical meaning to the principles and purposes of our charter.

As long as Iran remains indifferent to the voices of reason and mercy that have been raised from every corner of the world, as long as it refuses to recognize the common rules of international behavior, it must accept the consequences of its deliberate actions.

On November 25 the Secretary General, acting under article 99 of the charter, took the extraordinary step of requesting an urgent meeting of the Council to deal with this crisis, stating that "the present crisis poses a serious threat to international peace and security." The Council's resolution of December 4, adopted unanimously, expressed the Council's deep concern at the dangerous level of tension and spoke of possible grave consequences for international peace and security.

These statements, along with the many statements of concern by member states, make clear the judgment of the international community that Iran's act of taking and holding hostages represents a violation of the law of nations and threatens international peace and security. If Iran continues to hold the hostages, after the Council and the world community have unanimously called for their release, action against Iran under chapter VII of the charter is not only justified but required to promote a peaceful solution to this crisis.

It is, therefore, incumbent upon all of us as members of this Council to take the steps necessary to insure that the Council's earlier unanimous decision is implemented. My government, therefore, seeks a resolution which would condemn Iran's failure to comply with earlier actions of the Security Council and of the International Court calling for the immediate release of all the hostages. The resolution would further

provide for two additional steps: first, request the Secretary General to intensify his good offices' efforts, noting his readiness to go personally to Tehran and to report back to the Council by a specified date; second, decide that, if the hostages have not been released when the Council meets again at the early specified date, the Council will at that time adopt specific sanctions under article 41 of the charter.

We believe that the continued solidarity of the international community will serve to demonstrate that an early resolution of the problem is to the benefit of all, including the people and leaders of Iran. The prolongation of this crisis is in no one's interest.

We are not unmindful of the grievances of the Iranian people. We respect Iran's sovereignty and independence and the right of the Iranian people to decide their own form of government. As we have repeatedly emphasized, once the hostages are released unharmed, we are prepared, in accordance with the U.N. Charter, to seek a resolution of the issues between us. With the hostages' release, the way will be clear for Iran to present its grievances in any appropriate forum.

The United States, however, cannot respond to claims of injustice while our citizens are held in unjust captivity, in violation of the resolutions and orders of the world's primary peacekeeping institutions. As a great American President, Abraham Lincoln—a man of deep compassion and understanding—once declared: "There is no grievance that is a fit object of redress by mob law."

Our patience and forbearance have been severely tested in these past weeks. They are not unlimited. We have made clear from the beginning that we prefer a peaceful solution to the other remedies that are available to us under international law. It is in the interest of such a peaceful solution that today we call upon this body to act.

Let us act now to preserve the web of mutual obligation which binds us together and shields us from chaos and from disorder. For there can be no evasion of this central point: If the international community fails to act when its law is flouted and its authority defied, we not only diminish the possibility for peace in this crisis, we belittle this institution of peace, itself.

Effective action by the Security Council can breathe new life into the provisions of the charter and the deci-



sions of this Council. It can remind all of us, now and in the future, of our solemn obligation to heed the judgments of this body and to preserve its central place in the maintenance of international peace and security.

Let us move together, in a manner that is clear and convincing, to demonstrate that the rule of law has meaning and that our machinery of peace has practical relevance. Let us protect, as we must, the basic process that permits nations to maintain civilized relations with one another.

Through the decision we urge on this Council, we together can hasten the day when this ordeal is resolved. And through our demonstrated commitment to the purposes of our charter, we will strengthen both the principles and the institutions that serve world peace and protect us all.

## SECURITY COUNCIL RESOLUTION 461, DEC. 31, 1979

*The Security Council,*

*Recalling its Resolution 457 (1979) of 4 December 1979,*

*Recalling also the appeal made by the President of the Security Council on 9 November 1979 (S/13616), which was reiterated on 27 November 1979 (S/13652),*

*Gravely concerned over the increasing tension between the Islamic Republic of Iran and the United States of America caused by the seizure and prolonged detention of persons of United States nationality who are being held as hostages in Iran in violation of international law, and which could have grave consequences for international peace and security,*

*Taking note of the letters from the Minister for Foreign Affairs of the Islamic Republic of Iran dated 13 November 1979 (S/13626) and 1 December 1979 (S/13671) relating to the grievances and statements of his Government on the situation,*

*Recalling also the letter dated 25 November 1979 from the Secretary-General (S/13646) stating that, in his opinion, the present crisis between the Islamic Republic of Iran and the United States of America poses a serious threat to international peace and security,*

*Taking into account the order of the International Court of Justice of 15 December 1979 calling on the Government of the Islamic Republic of Iran to ensure the immediate release, without any exception, of all persons of United States nationality, who are being held as hostages in Iran (S/13697) and also calling on the Government of the United States of America and*

*the Government of the Islamic Republic of Iran to ensure that no action is taken by them which will aggravate the tension between the two countries,*

*Further taking into account the report of the Secretary-General of 22 December 1979 on developments of the situation (S/13704),*

*Mindful of the obligation of States to settle their international disputes by peaceful means in such a manner that international peace and security, and justice, are not endangered,*

*Conscious of the responsibility of States to refrain in their international relations from the threat or use of force against the territorial integrity or political independence of any State, or in any other manner inconsistent with the purposes of the United Nations,*

1. Reaffirms its Resolution 457 (1979) in all its aspects;

2. Deplores the continued detention of the hostages contrary to Security Council Resolution 457 (1979) and the order of the International Court of Justice of 15 December 1979 (S/13697);

3. Urgently calls, once again, on the Government of the Islamic Republic of Iran to release immediately all persons of United States nationality being held as hostages in Iran, to provide them protection and to allow them to leave the country;

4. Reiterates its request to the Secretary-General to lend his good offices and to intensify his efforts with a view to assisting the Council to achieve the objectives called for in this resolution, and in this connexion takes note of his readiness to go personally to Iran;

5. Requests the Secretary-General to report to the Council on his good offices efforts before the Council meets again;

6. Decides to meet on 7 January 1980 in order to review the situation and in the event of non-compliance with this Resolution, to adopt effective measures under Articles 39 and 41 of the Charter of the United Nations.

## VOTE ON RESOLUTION 461, DEC. 31, 1979

**For (11)**

Bolivia, China, France, Gabon, Jamaica, Nigeria, Norway, Portugal, U.K., U.S., Zambia.

**Abstain (4)**

Bangladesh, Czechoslovakia, Kuwait, U.S.S.R.

**AMBASSADOR McHENRY,  
JAN. 13, 1980<sup>2</sup>**

For the third time in the last 6 weeks, this Council meets to consider a dangerous violation of the principle of diplomatic inviolability—one that, in the words of the Secretary General, poses a serious threat to international peace and security.

After 70 days, the 50 personnel at the American Embassy, who were taken hostage by a lawless mob in Tehran, are still prisoners. We have yet to have a statement of opposition to their imprisonment from the Iranian authorities.

Those few outsiders who have seen the hostages briefly, during carefully orchestrated visits, report that the hostages are isolated, psychologically abused, and afforded an inadequate diet, despite assurances to the contrary. Some have suffered the humiliation of forced participation in propaganda broadcasts. Neutral observers are not permitted to visit them regularly to assess their condition or to minister to their needs. Even the Secretary General of the United Nations, the emissary of the world community, was barred from seeing the hostages.

The past 2 months have been marked by repeated calls for the release of the hostages from nearly every member of the international community. The Secretary General and many members of this Organization have devoted tireless efforts to promote a peaceful resolution of the present crisis. The broad international support we have received in our efforts to secure the release of the hostages has given encouragement to the American people in this difficult and trying period. On their behalf, I thank all who have worked so hard.

It might be useful to recall the measured steps which have brought us to the current situation.

On two separate occasions during November, the President of the Security Council, expressing the will of the members of the Council, appealed to Iran to release the hostages. But the hostages were not freed.

On December 4 of last year, this Council, by unanimous vote, urgently called on the Government of Iran to release immediately the personnel of the American Embassy who were being

held in Tehran, to provide them with protection, and to allow them to leave Iran. Still the hostages were not freed.

On December 15, the International Court of Justice gave the authority of the world's highest tribunal on international legal matters to the position set forth in the Council's resolution. The Court noted that "... there is no more fundamental prerequisite for the conduct of relations between States than the inviolability of diplomatic envoys and embassies. . . ." The Court ordered the Government of Iran to release the hostages immediately and to restore possession of the U.S. Embassy in Tehran to American authorities. Still the hostages were not freed.

On December 31, this Council, without dissent, adopted resolution 461, in which it deplored the continued detention of the hostages as contrary to the order of the International Court and its own prior resolution and urgently called once again on the Government of Iran to release immediately all U.S. nationals being held as hostages. In that resolution, the Council decided that it would adopt effective measures under Articles 39 and 41 of the U.N. Charter in the event that Iran did not comply with its mandate. And still the hostages have not been freed.

Five times the world community, acting through the duly constituted organs of the United Nations, has pleaded with the Government and people of Iran to conform to the precepts of international law and release the hostages. Five times our collective plea has fallen on deaf ears.

The International Court and the court of world opinion have demanded that Iran release the hostages in accordance with both the accepted norms of international behavior and its treaty obligations. Yet Iran continues to imprison diplomatic personnel as part of a campaign of terrorism and political blackmail by elements in Iran who have the support of Iranian authorities.

Resolution 461 is a decision of the Security Council adopted under chapter VII of the charter. The operative language of that resolution, including the Council's decision to adopt effective measures under articles 39 and 41 of the charter in the event of non-compliance with the resolution, continues in full force. Under article 25 and article 2, paragraph 2, of the charter, all members of the United Nations are obliged to accept that decision and to carry out its mandate.

Clearly Iran has not complied with the resolution and freed the hostages. The time has, therefore, come for the Security Council to adopt the effective measures against Iran under Articles 39 and 41 of the U.N. Charter that are required by paragraph 7 of resolution 461.

The members of the Council have before them the measures that my government proposes. Admittedly, they should not be taken lightly. But after 2 months of restraint by the American people and the world community, during which we have explored every possible avenue for a solution, we have failed to secure the release of the hostages and to restore the rule of international law.

Our deliberations this weekend exemplify the patience and good faith with which we have sought to resolve this crisis. The Council was originally scheduled to vote on these measures last Friday, January 11. In the hours before the meeting, various suggestions and reports from voices purporting to speak for Iran led some to believe progress toward release of the hostages was possible. They believed further clarification of Iran's position was necessary before proceeding to vote on sanctions.

Reluctantly the United States agreed to delay the vote—not because we saw any evidence of movement toward a solution but because we were, and are, prepared to explore every proposal that holds any realistic prospect of securing the release of the hostages. The Secretary General then sent an urgent message to Tehran, seeking

clarification of the unwritten proposal which some thought they had heard Friday afternoon.

Last night the Secretary General received a letter, but the letter did not respond to the Secretary General's message. The letter does not mention the existence of the hostages or acknowledge the world's concern and responsibility for them. Even the most dexterous among us have had difficulty finding a clue in the letter that could encourage responsible governments to delay the vote on sanctions any longer.

The most that can be said for the letter is that, for the first time since last November, when Mr. Bani-Sadr resigned as Foreign Minister, Iran has sent a written message to the United Nations. Even so, Iran has now explicitly refused to abide by any pronouncements from the United Nations with which it does not agree—including, obviously, the demand for the immediate release of the hostages contained in resolution 461.

We delayed Friday's vote in order to explore any possible hope represented by Friday's suggestions and by this letter. To have gone ahead without doing so would have been irresponsible. But our efforts at clarification have come to a frustrating end. It would be even more irresponsible for us to delay any longer in discharging our obligations under Resolution 461 and the charter. Clearly the time to take effective measures has come.

When Secretary of State Vance addressed this Council on December 29, he said that: "As long as Iran remains indifferent to the voices of reason and mercy that have been raised from every corner of the world, as long as it refuses to recognize the common rules of international behavior, it must accept the consequences of its deliberate actions." The sanctions we propose will serve to demonstrate that Iran's continued defiance of international law will result in its increased isolation from the world community.

While the proposed sanctions constitute a meaningful and significant expression of the world's condemnation, they are yet a temperate response to Iranian intemperance. To adopt measures less stringent than those proposed in the resolution before the Council would be tantamount to adopting no measures at all. And to adopt no measures at all would both violate the binding mandate of paragraph 6 of resolution 461 and constitute an abdication of our obligation to search for peaceful

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#### Article 39 of the U.N. Charter

The Security Council shall determine the existence of any threat to the peace, breach of the peace, or act of aggression and shall make recommendations, or decide what measures shall be taken in accordance with Articles 41 and 42, to maintain or restore international peace and security.

#### Article 41 of the U.N. Charter

The Security Council may decide what measures not involving the use of armed force are to be employed to give effect to its decisions, and it may call upon the Members of the United Nations to apply such measures. These may include complete or partial interruption of economic relations and of rail, sea, air, postal, telegraphic, radio, and other means of communication, and the severance of diplomatic relations.

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resolutions to international disputes and uphold the fundamental principles of international law.

Some have urged that we not pursue sanctions because they may not result in the immediate release of the hostages, and may even harden Iranian intransigence.

We hope that sanctions will strengthen the voices of those in Iran who argue that the holding of diplomatic hostages is wrong and will result in Iran's increased isolation from the international community.

Failure to impose sanctions will confirm the belief of those in Iran who feel that they can act with impunity. The effect of our failure will, thus, be measured in a lessening of this Council's ability to deal effectively with international crises.

Others have urged that the Council set aside the question of sanctions in order to focus the world's attention on Soviet aggression in Afghanistan.

But Soviet aggression in Afghanistan does not reduce our concern over the situation in Iran. On the contrary, it should heighten Iran's concern for its future as an independent nation. It should bring Iranians to a realization that they must rebuild their country quickly and prepare to defend their borders. It should make Iran aware of the danger posed by its isolation from the rest of the world community.

Once sanctions have been imposed, the key to ending this crisis and restoring its status as a fully participating member of the international community will lie with Iran. It has only to free the hostages and provide them with safe conduct until they can leave for home, and the sanctions will automatically expire. Iran can even avoid imposition of the sanctions altogether by releasing the hostages before the members of the United Nations complete the process of taking the necessary steps under their constitutions and laws to implement sanctions. Nothing will prejudice Iran's right to seek redress of its grievances, whether against the United States or its former rulers, in an appropriate international forum.

I remind the Council that this is not a bilateral quarrel but a confrontation between Iran and the entire international community. The continued viability of cherished and heretofore universally observed principles of international law is at stake. As the distinguished delegate from Nigeria, who served so ably on this Council during prior debates, said last month, diplomatic immunities and inviolability are so

much a part of international law and custom that all nations that rely on and respect law have an obligation to defend them.

The members of this Council must now do what we can do, in the words of Secretary Vance, "... demonstrate that the rule of law has meaning and that our machinery of peace has practical relevance."

We must do what we can under the charter to defuse this most serious threat to peace and world order. That is the object and purpose of the collective security system. We must show Iran that the world is determined to see the hostages freed.

## DRAFT RESOLUTION, JAN. 13, 1980

*The Security Council,*

*Recalling its Resolutions 457 (1979) of 4 December 1979, and 461 (1979) of 31 December 1979.*

*Recalling also the appeal made by the President of the Security Council on 9 November 1979 (S/13616) which was reiterated on 27 November 1979 (S/13652),*

*Having taken note of the letters dated 13 November 1979 and 1 December 1979 concerning the grievances and views of Iran (S/13626 and S/13671, respectively),*

*Having taken into account the order of the International Court of Justice of 15 December 1979 calling on the Government of the Islamic Republic of Iran to ensure the immediate release, without any exception, of all persons of United States nationality, who are being held as hostages in Iran (S/13697) and also calling on the Government of the United States of America and the Government of the Islamic Republic of Iran to ensure that no action is taken by them which will aggravate the tension between the two countries,*

*Further recalling the letter dated 25 November 1979 from the Secretary-General (S/13646) stating that, in his opinion, the present crisis between the Islamic Republic of Iran and the United States of America poses a serious threat to international peace and security,*

*Bearing in mind that adoption by the General Assembly by consensus on 17 December 1979 of a convention against the taking of hostages,*

*Mindful of the obligation of States to settle their international disputes by peaceful means in such a manner that international peace and security, and justice, are not endangered and, to that end, to respect the decision of the Security Council,*

*Conscious of the responsibility of States to refrain in their international relations from the threat of use of force against*

the territorial integrity or political independence of any State, or in any other manner inconsistent with the purposes of the United Nations,

*Affirming that the safe release and departure from Iran of all those being held hostage is an essential first step in resolving peacefully the issues between Iran and the United States and the other States Members of the international community,*

*Reiterating that once the hostages have been safely released, the Government of Iran and the United States of America should take steps to resolve peacefully the remaining issues between them to their mutual satisfaction in accordance with the purposes and principles of the United Nations,*

*Further taking into account the report of the Secretary-General of 6 January 1980 (S/13730) made pursuant to Resolutions 457 (1979) of 4 December 1979 and 461 (1979) of 31 December 1979,*

*Bearing in mind that the continued detention of the hostages constitutes a continuing threat to international peace and security,*

*Acting in accordance with Articles 39 and 41 of the Charter of the United Nations,*

1. Urgently calls, once again, on the Government of the Islamic Republic of Iran to release immediately all persons of United States nationality being held as hostages in Iran, to provide them protection and to allow them to leave the country;

2. Decides that, until such time as the hostages are released and have safely departed from Iran, all States Members of the United Nations:

(a) Shall prevent the sale or supply, to their nationals or from their territories, whether or not originating in their territories, to or destined for Iranian governmental entities in Iran or any other person or body in Iran, or to or destined for any other person or body for the purpose of any enterprise carried on in Iran, of a items, commodities, or products, except food, medicine, and supplies intended strictly for medical purposes;

(b) Shall prevent the shipment by vessel, aircraft, railway, or other land transport of their registration or owned by or under charter to their nationals, or the carriage whether or not in bond by land transport facilities across their territories of a of the items, commodities, and products covered by subparagraph (a) which are consigned to or destined for Iranian governmental entities or any person or body in Iran, or to any enterprise carried on in Iran;

(c) Shall not make available to the Iranian authorities or to any person in Iran to any enterprise controlled by any Iranian governmental entity any new credits or



loans; shall not, with respect to such persons or enterprises, make available any new deposit facilities or allow substantial increases in existing non-dollar deposits or allow more favourable terms of payment than customarily used in international commercial transactions; and shall act in a businesslike manner in exercising any rights when payments due on existing credits or loans are not made on time and shall require any persons or entities within their jurisdiction to do likewise;

(d) Shall prevent the shipment from their territories on vessels or aircraft registered in Iran of products and commodities covered by subparagraph (a) above;

(e) Shall reduce to a minimum the personnel of Iranian diplomatic missions accredited to them;

(f) Shall prevent their nationals, or firms located in their territories, from engaging in new service contracts in support of industrial projects in Iran, other than those concerned with medical care;

(g) Shall prevent their nationals or any person or body in their territories from engaging in any activity which evades or has the purpose of evading any of the decisions set out in this resolution;

3. Decides that all States Members of the United Nations shall give effect forthwith to the decisions set out in operative paragraph 2 of this resolution notwithstanding any contract entered into or licence granted before the date of this resolution;

4. Calls upon all States Members of the United Nations to carry out these decisions of the Security Council in accordance with Article 25 of the Charter;

5. Urges, having regard to the principles stated in Article 2 of the Charter, States not members of the United Nations to act in accordance with the provisions of the present resolution;

6. Calls upon all other United Nations bodies and the Specialized Agencies of the United Nations and their Members to conform their relations with Iran to the terms of this resolution;

7. Calls upon all States Members of the United Nations, and in particular those with primary responsibility under the Charter for the maintenance of international peace and security, to assist effectively in the implementation of the measures called for by the present resolution;

8. Calls upon all States Members of the United Nations or of the Specialized Agencies to report to the Secretary-General by February 1980 on measures taken to implement the present resolution;

9. Requests the Secretary-General to report to the Council on the progress of the implementation of the present resolution, in his first report to be submitted not later than 1 March 1980.

## VOTE ON DRAFT RESOLUTION, JAN. 13, 1980

### For (10)

France, Jamaica, Niger, Norway, Philippines, Portugal, Tunisia, U.K., U.S., Zambia.

### Against (2)

German Democratic Republic, U.S.S.R.

### Abstain (2)

Bangladesh, Mexico.

### Not Participating (1)

China.

## AMBASSADOR McHENRY, JAN. 13, 1980<sup>3</sup>

The Security Council has now completed its effort to discharge the legally binding obligation imposed on it by the passage of resolution 461/79 and to adopt effective measures against Iran under Articles 39 and 41 of the U.N. Charter. It has been prevented from doing so by the negative vote of the Soviet Union. Written by Lewis Carroll as pages out of Alice in Wonderland, the light becomes darkness. The victim becomes the criminal. Commitment to international law becomes a defense of anarchy. How extraordinary to hear from a nation that has just sent its armies and gauleiters into Afghanistan to describe our efforts to seek the freedom of 50 of our citizens held hostage by armed terrorists as interference in "the internal affairs" of Iran.

The Soviet vote is a cynical and irresponsible exercise of its veto power. The motive behind it is transparent. The Soviets hope that, by blocking sanctions, they can divert attention from their subjugation of Afghanistan and curry favor with the Government and people of Iran, who are among those most directly affected by the Afghan invasion.

But the Soviets hope in vain. The nations of the world, viewing this veto in tandem with the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan, cannot fail to note that Soviet tributes to the primacy of international law are purely rhetorical and that Soviet policy only conforms to international norms on a selective and self-serving basis.

And in Iran, even though chaos seems to reign, it should be apparent that the Soviet veto is an act of political expediency designed to buy Iranian silence on Afghanistan and Soviet advantage in the region.

By resolution 461, the Council undertook a binding obligation to adopt effective measures under article 25 of the charter; all member states are obliged to respect the provisions of resolution 461. A Soviet veto now attempts to block the membership from fulfilling that obligation.

The question then arises: what a member, bound by resolution 461, and acting in good faith, pursuant to its obligations under article 2, paragraph 2 of the charter, should do to implement it.

Most obviously, Iran remains bound immediately to release the hostages pursuant to resolution 461. But in addition to that paramount obligation, the membership of the United Nations at large remains obliged to review the situation and the event of Iran's noncompliance with it—an event which has come to pass—to take effective measures consistent with the charter to carry out that resolution.

My government has already instituted measures designed to exert economic pressure on Iran, as envisaged in the vetoed resolution. These measures will be applied firmly and vigorously until the hostages have been released. We urge all other members of the United Nations to join with us in the application of meaningful measures against the continued holding of the hostages in defiance of international law. Only thus will we demonstrate to Iran that their lawless actions are viewed with disfavor by all nations. The United States will, of course, welcome and cooperate with the continued good offices of the Secretary General and all members of the world community in seeking a solution to the present crisis. We sincerely hope that, despite the Soviet veto, our efforts will lead to the return of the hostages and the return to the rule of law in international affairs. ■

<sup>1</sup> USUN press release 155.

<sup>2</sup> USUN press release 6.

<sup>3</sup> USUN press release 7.

## General Assembly Acts on Soviet Invasion of Afghanistan

*Following are texts of Security Council Resolution 462 adopted by consensus on January 9, 1980, U.S. Ambassador to the United Nations Donald F. McHenry's statement in the General Assembly on January 12, and the General Assembly resolution adopted January 14.*

### SECURITY COUNCIL RESOLUTION 462, JAN. 9, 1980

*The Security Council,*

*Having considered the item on the agenda of its 2185th meeting, as contained in documents S/Agenda 2185,*

*Taking into account that the lack of unanimity of its Permanent Members at the 2190th meeting of the Security Council has prevented it from exercising its primary responsibility for the maintenance of international peace and security,*

*Decides to call an emergency Special Session of the General Assembly to examine the question contained in Document S/Agenda/2185.*

### AMBASSADOR McHENRY, JAN. 12, 1980<sup>1</sup>

This emergency session marks only the sixth time that the General Assembly has been specifically convoked under the "uniting for peace" procedure to discharge the peacekeeping functions of the United Nations when the Security Council was prevented from doing so. On each of those occasions, the precarious peace guarded by this Organization was undermined by a crisis that challenged principles underlying the U.N. Charter. The infrequency with which the Security Council has used this extraordinary procedure attests to the world's collective judgment that it be invoked sparingly and only in grave circumstances.

Today we are faced with a challenge to the principles of the charter as grave as any that necessitated our meeting during previous crises. We need no long oration, no extensive remarks to remind us why we are gathered here.

Afghanistan, a member of the United Nations, has been invaded by the Soviet Union, another member. It was invaded in violation of the Soviet Union's obligation not to use force

against the territorial integrity and political independence of another state—an obligation imposed on the Soviets by both the U.N. Charter and a bilateral treaty between the Soviet Union and Afghanistan.

Afghanistan, a nonaligned sovereign state, has been occupied by Soviet troops in violation of the international legal principle that no state may intervene by force in the internal affairs of another. Afghanistan has had its government toppled and replaced by a regime chosen by the Soviet Union, in violation of every nation's right to self-determination by its people.

When I addressed the Security Council during its debate on this matter, I chronicled the brutal series of events in Afghanistan. Every member here knows how the Soviet Union airlifted tens of thousands of troops into the territory of its neighbor and took over the Afghan capital of Kabul. Every member knows that after Soviet troops surrounded the presidential palace in Kabul, the President of Afghanistan was summarily executed, and a puppet leader from abroad was installed in his place. Every member knows that the Soviet Union then undertook widespread military operations to subjugate Afghanistan and its people. Every member of the United Nations also knows that the invasion of Afghanistan poses a serious threat to other countries, both in southwest Asia, where the current level of tension and instability is already high, but also elsewhere in the world. It poses a particular danger to Afghanistan's neighbors.

The Soviet Union and its allies, including the Foreign Minister representing the Soviet-installed regime now in power in Kabul, have asserted, both here and in the Security Council, that the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan was prompted by armed intervention into that country by other foreign powers—including, as they tell it, the United States. They have asserted that all the world is well aware that Afghanistan has been the target of so-called imperialist aggression aimed at overthrowing the "popular democratic regime" that governs there.

But all the world knows no such thing. These allegations are an obvious attempt to divert attention from the central issues. The Soviet allegations are nothing more than a transgressor's attempt to mask its misdeeds. No one can or should believe them.

We are particularly insulted by the transparent falsity of the Soviet claim that its troops entered Afghanistan at the repeated invitation of its "popular democratic regime." As so many of my fellow delegates have pointed out during this debate, no reasonable man could possibly believe that the Government of President Amin issued such a deadly invitation. Amin's Soviet-appointed successor was not even in office at the time Soviet troops first entered Afghanistan.

The truth of the matter is that the Soviet Union invaded Afghanistan to quell determined opposition by the Afghan people to their own government. The Soviet Union replaced one leader in Afghanistan with another to its own liking. It is sheer hypocrisy for the Soviets to claim that their presence was necessary to prevent the overthrow of "popular democratic regime" by so-called imperialist forces.

Neither the U.N. Charter nor any bilateral treaty affords the Soviet Union, or any country, the right to take military action in another country because it disagrees with the policies or performance of the existing government. The Soviet invasion of Afghanistan flouts international law, breaches world peace, and threatens regional and global security.

The universal outcry against the subjugation of a nonaligned state by a great power neighbor proves that the world will not condone military intervention without legal or moral justification by one state into another. The strong responses to this act of aggression by many countries, including my own, demonstrate to the Soviet Union that it cannot ignore international law without suffering serious consequences. The United States and other nations are considering other unilateral and multilateral measures to further demonstrate to the Soviet Union of the magnitude of its error, including withdrawal from cultural exchanges, trade missions, and even the 1980 Summer Olympic Games.

But unilateral action on the part of individual states is most effective when it is taken in concert with collective action that expresses the will of the world community.

The Security Council considered the threat to the peace raised by the question of the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan at length. The vast majority of its members voted to call for the withdrawal of the invasion force in Afghanistan. But the Soviet Union vetoed the resolution and stymied the Council's attempt to discharge its peacekeeping function under the Charter.

Therefore, the nations of the world have turned to the General Assembly to announce this dangerous breach of the peace and security.

It is imperative that we, the member states of the United Nations, express in clear and forceful terms that we will never condone lawless interference with the right of a sovereign people and the lawless invasion of its territory.

It is imperative that we demand the withdrawal of Soviet forces from Afghanistan, so that the people of that country can be free to set their own course in the world and to choose their own leaders.

It is imperative that we demonstrate we cannot be duped into ignoring our responsibility to defend the principles of the Charter by tortured explanations that insult our intelligence.

And, above all, it is imperative that we view this incident for what it really is. The Soviet Union insists that this General Assembly debate has been hijacked by American and Chinese tit-for-tatting; that it is being used as an excuse to renew the cold war; and that the announcement of its invasion by the members of the General Assembly will amount to an abandonment of the principles of nonalignment embraced by many nations represented here.

But the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan is no cold war squabble. It is an act that the rest of the world cannot afford to ignore. It demonstrates that the Soviet Union has no real commitment to the principles of territorial integrity, to self-determination, to nonalignment, when those principles conflict with its perception of its interests.

For this body to remain silent in the face of open aggression would be for the members of the United Nations to condone a violation of the only principles that small nations can invoke to protect themselves from self-aggravation by larger and more powerful states. It is not the United States whose freedom is most threatened by

Soviet indifference to the Charter; the small and nonaligned countries, like Afghanistan, are most imperiled.

So we cannot remain mute. We must speak out. We must stand united in support of the principles of freedom, in support of independence, and in support of the principles of self-determination.

## GENERAL ASSEMBLY RESOLUTION A/RES/ES-6/2, JAN. 14, 1980

### *The General Assembly,*

*Taking note of Security Council Resolution 462 (1980) of 9 January 1980, calling for an emergency Special Session of the General Assembly to examine the question contained in document S/Agenda/2185,*

*Gravely concerned at the recent developments in Afghanistan and their implications for international peace and security,*

*Reaffirming the inalienable right of all peoples to determine their own future and to choose their own form of government free from outside interference,*

*Mindful of the obligations of all States to refrain in their international relations from the threat or use of force against the sovereignty, territorial integrity and political independence of any State, or in any other manner inconsistent with the purposes and principles of the Charter of the United Nations,*

*Recognizing the urgent need for immediate termination of foreign armed intervention in Afghanistan so as to enable its people to determine their own destiny without outside interference or coercion,*

*Noting with profound concern the large outflow of refugees from Afghanistan,*

*Recalling its resolutions on the strengthening of international security, on the inadmissibility of intervention in the domestic affairs of States and the protection of their independence and sovereignty and on the principles of international law concerning friendly relations and co-operation among States in accordance with the Charter of the United Nations,*

*Expressing its deep concern at the dangerous escalation of tension, intensification of rivalry and increased recourse to military intervention and interference in the internal affairs of States, which are detrimental to the interests of all nations, particularly the non-aligned countries,*

*Mindful of the purposes and principles of the Charter and of the responsibility of the General Assembly under the relevant provisions of the Charter and of Assembly Resolution 377A(V) of 3 November 1950,*

1. Reaffirms that respect for the sovereignty, territorial integrity and political independence of every State is a fundamental principle of the Charter of the United Nations, any violation of which on any pretext whatsoever is contrary to its aims and purposes;

2. Strongly deplores the recent armed intervention in Afghanistan, which is inconsistent with that principle;

3. Appeals to all States to respect the sovereignty, territorial integrity, political independence and non-aligned character of Afghanistan and to refrain from any interference in the internal affairs of that country;

4. Calls for the immediate, unconditional and total withdrawal of the foreign troops from Afghanistan in order to enable its people to determine their own form of government and choose their economic, political and social systems free from outside intervention, subversion or coercion or constraint of any kind whatsoever;

5. Urges all Parties concerned to assist in bringing about, speedily and in accordance with the purposes and principles of the Charter, conditions necessary for the voluntary return of the Afghan refugees to their homes;

6. Appeals to all States and national and international organizations to extend humanitarian relief assistance with a view to alleviating the hardship of the Afghan refugees in coordination with the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees;

7. Requests the Secretary-General to keep Member States and the Security Council promptly and concurrently informed on the progress towards the implementation of the present resolution;

8. Calls upon the Security Council to consider ways and means which could assist in the implementation of this resolution.

## VOTE ON RESOLUTION, JAN. 14, 1980

Of the 152 members of the United Nations, 140 participated in the special session vote on General Assembly Resolution A/RES/ES-6/2 on January 14 as follows:

### For (104)

Albania, Argentina, Australia, Austria, Bahamas, Bahrain, Bangladesh, Barbados, Belgium, Bolivia, Botswana, Brazil, Burma, Cameroon, Canada, Chile, China, Colombia, Costa Rica, Denmark, Djibouti, Dominican Republic, Ecuador, Egypt, El Salvador, Fiji, France, Gabon, Gambia, Federal Republic of Germany, Ghana, Greece, Guatemala, Guyana, Haiti, Honduras, Iceland, Indonesia, Iran, Iraq, Ireland, Israel, Italy, Ivory Coast, Jamaica, Japan, Jordan, Kampuchea, Kenya, Kuwait, Lebanon, Lesotho, Liberia, Luxembourg, Malawi, Malaysia, Maldives, Malta, Mauritania, Mauritius, Mexico, Morocco, Nepal, Netherlands, New Zealand, Niger, Nigeria, Norway, Oman, Pakistan, Panama, Papua New Guinea, Paraguay, Peru, Philippines, Portugal, Qatar, Rwanda, Saint Lucia, Samoa, Saudi Arabia, Senegal, Sierra Leone, Singapore, Somalia, Spain, Sri



Lanka, Suriname, Swaziland, Sweden, Tanzania, Thailand, Togo, Trinidad and Tobago, Tunisia, Turkey, United Arab Emirates, United Kingdom, United States, Upper Volta, Uruguay, Venezuela, Yugoslavia, and Zaire.

## Against (18)

Afghanistan, Angola, Bulgaria, Byelorussian S.S.R., Cuba, Czechoslovakia, Ethiopia, German Democratic Republic, Grenada, Hungary, Laos, Mongolia, Mozambique, Poland, Ukrainian S.S.R., U.S.S.R., Vietnam, and Yemen (Aden).

## Abstain (18)

Algeria, Benin, Burundi, Congo, Cyprus, Equatorial Guinea, Finland, Guinea, Guinea-Bissau, India, Madagascar, Mali, Nicaragua, Sao Tome and Principe, Syria, Uganda, Yemen (Sana), and Zambia.

## Absent (12)

Bhutan, Cape Verde, Central African Republic, Chad, Comoros, Dominica, Libya, Rumania, Seychelles, Solomon Islands, South Africa, and Sudan. ■

<sup>1</sup>USUN press release 5.

# Current Actions

## MULTILATERAL

### Atomic Energy

Agreement for the transfer of enriched uranium for a research reactor in Indonesia, with annex and exchange of notes. Signed at New Delhi Dec. 7, 1979. Entered into force Dec. 7, 1979. Signatures: Indonesia, IAEA, and U.S., Dec. 7, 1979.

### Aviation

Convention on international civil aviation. Done at Chicago Dec. 7, 1944. Entered into force Apr. 4, 1947. TIAS 1591. Adherence deposited: St. Lucia, Nov. 20, 1979.

### Biological Weapons

Convention on the prohibition of the development, production, and stockpiling of bacteriological (biological) and toxin weapons and on their destruction. Done at Washington, London, and Moscow Apr. 10, 1972. Entered into force Mar. 26, 1975. TIAS 8062.

Accession deposited: Sao Tome and Principe, Aug. 24, 1979.

### Conservation

Convention on international trade in endangered species of wild fauna and flora, with appendices. Done at Washington Mar. 3, 1973. Entered into force July 1, 1975. TIAS 8249.

Ratifications deposited: Italy, Oct. 2, 1979;<sup>1</sup> Guatemala, Nov. 7, 1979; Tanzania, Nov. 29, 1979. Accession deposited: Liechtenstein, Nov. 30, 1979.

### Copyright

Universal copyright convention, as revised, with two protocols annexed thereto. Done at Paris July 24, 1971. Entered into force July 10, 1974. TIAS 7868. Ratification deposited: Italy, Oct. 25, 1979.<sup>2</sup>

### Cotton

Articles of agreement of International Cotton Institute. Done at Washington Jan. 17, 1966. Entered into force Feb. 23, 1966. TIAS 5964.

Notification of withdrawal deposited: Iran, Nov. 23, 1979; effective Dec. 31, 1979.

### Cultural Property

Convention on the means of prohibiting and preventing the illicit import, export, and transfer of ownership of cultural property. Adopted at Paris Nov. 14, 1970, at the 16th session of the UNESCO General Conference. Entered into force Apr. 24, 1972.<sup>3</sup> Ratification deposited: Cyprus, Oct. 19, 1979.

### Environmental Modification

Convention on the prohibition of military or any other hostile use of environmental modification techniques, with annex. Done at Geneva May 18, 1977. Entered into force Oct. 5, 1978.<sup>3</sup> Instrument of ratification signed by the President: Dec. 13, 1979.

### Fisheries

Convention on future multilateral cooperation in the northwest Atlantic fisheries. Done at Ottawa Oct. 24, 1978. Entered into force Jan. 1, 1979.<sup>3</sup> Ratification deposited: Portugal, May 25, 1979.

### Human Rights

International covenant on civil and political rights. Done at New York Dec. 16, 1966. Entered into force Mar. 23, 1976.<sup>3</sup> Ratification deposited: El Salvador, Nov. 30, 1979.

International covenant on economic, social, and cultural rights. Done at New York Dec. 16, 1966. Entered into force Jan. 3, 1976.<sup>3</sup> Ratification deposited: El Salvador, Nov. 30, 1979.

### Judicial Procedure

Convention abolishing the requirement of legalisation for foreign public documents, with annex. Done at The Hague Oct. 5, 1961. Entered into force Jan. 24, 1965.<sup>3</sup> Instrument of accession signed by the President: Dec. 27, 1979.

### Maritime Matters

Amendments to the convention of Mar. 6, 1948, as amended, on the Intergovernmental Maritime Consultative Organization (TIAS 4044, 6285, 6490, 8606). Adopted at London Nov. 14, 1975.<sup>4</sup> Acceptance deposited: United Kingdom, Dec. 5, 1979.

Amendments to the convention of Mar. 6, 1948, as amended, on the Intergovernmental Maritime Consultative Organization (TIAS 4044, 6285, 6490, 8606). Adopted at London Nov. 17, 1977.<sup>4</sup> Acceptance deposited: Kuwait, Nov. 27, 1979; United Kingdom, Dec. 5, 1979.

International convention on standards of training, certification, and watchkeeping for seafarers, 1978. Done at London July 1978. Enters into force 12 months after the date on which not less than 25 states, the combined merchant fleets of which constitute not less than 50% of the gross tonnage of the world's merchant shipping of ships of 100 gross register tons or more, have either signed it without reservation as to ratification, acceptance, or approval or deposited the requisite instruments. Signatures: Belgium, Dec. 7, 1978;<sup>5</sup> China, June 13, 1979;<sup>5</sup> Denmark, June 4, 1979;<sup>5</sup> Federal Republic of Germany, Mar. 26, 1979; Liberia, Mar. 21, 1979;<sup>5</sup> Poland, Dec. 1, 1978;<sup>5</sup> U.K., Dec. 1, 1978;<sup>5</sup> U.S., Jan. 25, 1979;<sup>5</sup> U.S.S.R., Oct. 9, 1979; Yugoslavia, Mar. 23, 1979.<sup>5</sup>

International convention on maritime search and rescue, 1979, with annex. Done at Hamburg Apr. 27, 1979. Enters into force 12 months after the date on which states have either signed without reservation as to ratification, acceptance, or approval or deposited the requisite instruments.

Signatures: Federal Republic of Germany, U.S.,<sup>6</sup> Nov. 6, 1979; Switzerland, Nov. 1979.<sup>6</sup>

### Nuclear Test Ban

Treaty banning nuclear weapon tests in the atmosphere, in outer space, and under water. Done at Moscow Aug. 5, 1963. Entered into force Oct. 10, 1963. TIAS 5433. Accession deposited: Cape Verde, Oct. 2, 1979.

### Nuclear Weapons—Nonproliferation

Treaty on the non-proliferation of nuclear weapons. Done at Washington, London, and Moscow July 1, 1968. Entered into force Mar. 5, 1970. TIAS 6839. Accession deposited: Cape Verde, Oct. 2, 1979.

### Patents—Microorganisms

Budapest treaty on the international recognition of the deposit of microorganism for the purposes of patent procedure, with regulations. Done at Budapest Apr. 28, 1977.<sup>4</sup> Ratification deposited: U.S., Sept. 24, 1979.

**Plants—Plant Varieties**

International convention for the protection of new varieties of plants of Dec. 2, 1961, as revised. Done at Geneva Oct. 23, 1978.<sup>4</sup> Signatures: Canada, Oct. 31, 1979; Ireland, Sept. 27, 1979; Japan, Oct. 17, 1979; Mexico, New Zealand, July 25, 1979; Sweden, Dec. 6, 1978.

**Postal**

Constitution of the Universal Postal Union, with Final Protocol. Done at Vienna, July 30, 1964. Entered into force Jan. 1, 1966. TIAS 5881. Ratification deposited: Lebanon, Oct. 5, 1979.

Additional protocol to the Constitution of the Universal Postal Union with Final Protocol signed at Vienna July 10, 1964. Done at Tokyo Nov. 14, 1969. Entered into force July 1, 1971, except for Article V of the Additional Protocol which entered into force Jan. 1, 1971. TIAS 7150. Ratification deposited: Lebanon, Oct. 5, 1979.

Ratification deposited: Albania, Sept. 28, 1979.

Second additional protocol to the constitution of the Universal Postal Union of July 30, 1964, general regulations with final protocol and annex, and the universal postal convention with final protocol and tailored regulations. Done at Lausanne July 5, 1974. Entered into force Jan. 1, 1976. TIAS 8231.

Ratifications deposited: Colombia, July 26, 1979; Lebanon, Oct. 5, 1979; San Marino, Oct. 26, 1979.

Ratification deposited: Albania, Sept. 28, 1979.

Passport orders and postal travelers' checks agreement, with detailed regulations. Done at Lausanne July 5, 1974. Entered into force Jan. 1, 1976. TIAS 8232. Ratifications deposited: Colombia, July 26, 1979; Lebanon, Oct. 5, 1979; San Marino, Oct. 26, 1979.

**Racial Discrimination**

International convention on the elimination of all forms of racial discrimination. Done at New York, Dec. 21, 1965. Entered into force Jan. 4, 1969.<sup>3</sup> Ratification deposited: El Salvador, Nov. 30, 1979.

**Maritime Communications System**

Cooperating agreement on the international maritime satellite organization (INMARSAT), with annex. Done at London Sept. 3, 1976. Entered into force July 16, 1979. Ratification deposited: Argentina, Oct. 2, 1979.

Convention on the international maritime satellite organization (INMARSAT), with annex. Done at London Sept. 3, 1976. Entered into force July 16, 1979.

Ratifications deposited: Algeria,<sup>7</sup> July 15, 1979; China,<sup>7</sup> Portugal,<sup>7</sup> July 13, 1979.

Ratifications deposited: Belgium, July 14, 1979; Brazil, Italy,<sup>8</sup> July 10, 1979; Finland,

July 12, 1979; Greece, July 13, 1979; Poland, July 3, 1979.

Accession deposited: Argentina, Oct. 2, 1979.

**Seabed Disarmament**

Treaty on the prohibition of the emplacement of nuclear weapons and other weapons of mass destruction on the seabed and the ocean floor and in the subsoil thereof. Done at Washington, London, and Moscow Feb. 11, 1971. Entered into force May 18, 1972. TIAS 7337.

Accessions deposited: Cape Verde, Oct. 24, 1979; Sao Tome and Principe, Aug. 24, 1979.

**Space**

Convention on international liability for damage caused by space objects. Done at Washington, London, and Moscow Mar. 29, 1972. Entered into force Sept. 1, 1972; for the U.S., Oct. 9, 1973. TIAS 7762.

Accession deposited: Liechtenstein, Dec. 26, 1979.

**Sugar**

International sugar agreement, 1977, with annexes. Done at Geneva Oct. 7, 1977. Entered into force provisionally Jan. 1, 1978. Instrument of ratification signed by the President: Dec. 13, 1979.

Ratification deposited: U.S., Jan. 2, 1980.

**Telecommunications**

International telecommunication convention with annexes and protocol. Done at Malaga-Torremolinos Oct. 25, 1978. Entered into force Jan. 1, 1975; for the U.S., Apr. 7, 1976. TIAS 8572.

Ratifications deposited: Costa Rica, Sept. 10, 1979; Ivory Coast, People's Democratic Republic of Yemen, Sept. 25, 1979.

Final Acts of the World Administrative Radio Conference for the planning of the broadcasting-satellite service in frequency bands 11.7–12.2 GHz (in regions 2 and 3) and 11.7–12.5 GHz (in region 1), with annexes. Done at Geneva Feb. 13, 1977. Entered into force Jan. 1, 1979.<sup>3</sup>

Approval deposited: Argentina, Oct. 1, 1979.

Partial revision of the radio regulations (Geneva, 1959), as revised, relating to the aeronautical mobile (R) service, with annexes and final protocol. Done at Geneva Mar. 5, 1978. Entered into force Sept. 1, 1979, except for the frequency allotment plan for the aeronautical mobile (R) service which shall come into force on Feb. 1, 1983.<sup>3</sup>

Approval deposited: U.S.S.R., Sept. 24, 1979.

**Terrorism**

Convention on the prevention and punishment of crimes against internationally protected persons, including diplomatic

agents. Done at New York Dec. 14, 1973. Entered into force Feb. 20, 1977. TIAS 8532.

Accession deposited: Barbados, Oct. 26, 1979.

International convention against the taking of hostages. Adopted by the U.N. General Assembly Dec. 19, 1979. Enters into force on the 30th day following the date of deposit of the 22d instrument of ratification or accession.

**Trade**

Fourth certification of changes to schedules to the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade. Done at Geneva Apr. 20, 1979. Entered into force Apr. 20, 1979.

Protocol of provisional application of the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade. Done at Geneva Oct. 30, 1947. Entered into force Jan. 1, 1948. TIAS 1700.

De facto application: St. Vincent and the Grenadines, Oct. 27, 1979.

**Whaling**

Protocol to the international convention for the regulation of whaling (TIAS 1849).

Done at Washington Nov. 19, 1956. Entered into force May 4, 1959. TIAS 4228.

Adherence deposited: Peru, Dec. 28, 1979.

**BILATERAL****Association of South-East Asian Nations**

Agreement concerning cooperation in economic development, education, culture, and narcotics. Signed at Denpasar and Kuala Lumpur July 2 and Oct. 24, 1979. Entered into force Oct. 24, 1979.

**Commission of the Cartagena Agreement (Andean Group)**

Memorandum of understanding on science and technology cooperation. Signed at Washington Nov. 21, 1979. Entered into force Nov. 21, 1979.

Memorandum of understanding concerning trade, financing, science and technology, development of industry, agriculture, and infrastructure. Signed at Washington Nov. 21, 1979. Entered into force Nov. 21, 1979.

**Cuba**

Agreement extending the provisional application of the maritime boundary agreement of Dec. 16, 1977. Effected by exchange of notes at Washington Dec. 27 and 28, 1979. Entered into force Dec. 28, 1979.

**Finland**

Extradition treaty. Signed at Helsinki June 11, 1976.<sup>4</sup>

Instrument of ratification signed by the President: Dec. 13, 1979.

## France

Protocol relating to the isotopic enrichment of uranium by chemical exchange. Signed at Washington Sept. 4, 1979. Entered into force Oct. 31, 1979.

## Federal Republic of Germany

Treaty concerning extradition, with protocol. Signed at Bonn June 20, 1978.<sup>4</sup> Instrument of ratification signed by the President: Dec. 20, 1979.

## Guyana

General agreement for economic, technical, and related assistance. Signed at Georgetown Nov. 8, 1979. Entered into force Nov. 8, 1979.

## India

Agreement amending the agreement of Dec. 30, 1977, as amended (TIAS 9036, 9578), relating to trade in cotton, wool, and manmade fiber textiles and textile products. Effected by exchange of notes at Washington Oct. 26 and Nov. 6, 1979. Entered into force Nov. 6, 1979.

## Indonesia

Memorandum of understanding on the multilateral trade negotiations. Signed at Jakarta Nov. 29, 1979. Entered into force Nov. 29, 1979.

## Italy

Memorandum of understanding concerning energy cooperation, with annexes. Signed at Rome Oct. 17, 1979. Entered into force Oct. 17, 1979.

## Japan

Treaty on extradition, with exchange of notes. Signed at Tokyo Mar. 3, 1978.<sup>4</sup> Instrument of ratification signed by the President: Dec. 13, 1979.

## Macao

Agreement amending the agreement of Mar. 3, 1975, as amended and extended (TIAS 8027, 9472), relating to trade in cotton, wool, and manmade fiber textiles and textile products. Effected by exchange of letters at Washington Oct. 17, 1979. Entered into force Oct. 17, 1979.

## Mexico

Treaty on extradition, with appendix. Signed at Mexico City May 4, 1978.<sup>4</sup> Instrument of ratification signed by the President: Dec. 13, 1979.

## Nigeria

Agreement extending the agreement of Apr. 20, 1976 (TIAS 8243), concerning procedures for mutual assistance in the administration of justice in connection with the Lockheed Aircraft Corporation to the International Telephone and Telegraph Corporation and its subsidiaries and affiliates. Effected by exchange of notes at Washington Mar. 8 and 26, 1979. Entered into force Mar. 26, 1979.

## Norway

Extradition treaty. Signed at Oslo June 9, 1977.<sup>4</sup> Instrument of ratification signed by the President: Dec. 13, 1979.

## Pakistan

Agreement amending the agreement of Jan. 4 and 9, 1978, as amended (TIAS 9050, 9551), relating to trade in cotton textiles. Effected by exchange of letters at Washington Nov. 13 and 16, 1979. Entered into force Nov. 16, 1979.

## Panama

Treaty on the execution of penal sentences. Signed at Panama Jan. 11, 1979.<sup>4</sup> Instrument of ratification signed by the President: Dec. 17, 1979.

## Saudi Arabia

Project agreement for technical cooperation in educational programs for meteorology, hydrology, arid land studies, and environmental protection, with annexes. Signed at Riyadh Nov. 25, 1979. Enters into force after deposit by the Government of Saudi Arabia of the sum described in article IX.

Agreement amending and extending the technical cooperation agreement of Feb. 13, 1975. Signed at Riyadh Nov. 25, 1979. Entered into force Nov. 25, 1979.

## Singapore

Agreement amending the agreement of Sept. 21 and 22, 1978, as amended (TIAS 9214), relating to trade in cotton, wool, and manmade fiber textiles and textile products. Effected by exchange of notes at Washington Sept. 12 and Oct. 16, 1979. Entered into force Oct. 16, 1979.

## Spain

Agreement regarding claims arising from CRISEX. Signed at Madrid Nov. 13, 1979. Entered into force Nov. 13, 1979.

## Switzerland

Agreement on research participation and technical exchange in the U.S. heavy section steel technology program and the Swiss research program in fracture mechanics, with appendices. Signed at Washington and Wurenlingen June 15 and July 9, 1979. Entered into force July 9, 1979.

Agreement on research participation and technical exchange in the U.S. loss of fluid test program and the Swiss emergency cooling systems-reflood program, with appendices. Signed at Washington and Wurenlingen June 15 and July 9, 1979. Entered into force July 9, 1979.

## Thailand

Agreement relating to air transport services, and annex. Signed at Bangkok Feb. 26, 1947. Entered into force Feb. 26, 1947. TIAS 1607. Terminated: Dec. 7, 1979.

Agreement amending the air transport agreement of Feb. 26, 1947 (TIAS 1607). Effected by exchange of notes at Bangkok Mar. 3, 1970. Entered into force Mar. 3, 1970. TIAS 6837.

Terminated: Dec. 7, 1979.

Air transport agreement, with annexes. Signed at Bangkok Dec. 7, 1979. Entered into force Dec. 7, 1979.

## Turkey

Treaty on extradition and mutual assistance in criminal matters. Signed at Ankara June 7, 1979.<sup>4</sup>

Instrument of ratification signed by the President: Dec. 13, 1979.

Treaty on the enforcement of penal judgments. Signed at Ankara June 7, 1979.<sup>4</sup> Instrument of ratification signed by the President: Dec. 13, 1979.

Agreement concerning the grant of deferrals and services under the military assistance program. Effected by exchange of notes at Ankara Aug. 15 and 31, 1979. Entered into force Aug. 31, 1979.

Agreement relating to a loan and grant support and promote the financial stability and economic recovery of Turkey. Signed at Ankara Nov. 1, 1979. Entered into force Nov. 1, 1979.

## United Kingdom

Convention for the avoidance of double taxation and the prevention of fiscal evasion with respect to taxes on estates of deceased persons and on gifts. Signed at London Oct. 19, 1978. Entered into force Nov. 11, 1979.

Proclaimed by the President: Dec. 6, 1979.

Agreement amending the agreement of July 3, 1958, as amended (TIAS 4078, 46659, 6861, 8014), for cooperation on the uses of atomic energy for mutual defense purposes. Signed at Washington Dec. 5, 1979. Enters into force on the date on which each government shall have received from the other government written notification that it has complied with all statutory and constitutional requirements for entry into force.

Agreement concerning the turnover of airfield at Grand Turk Auxiliary Air Base to the Government of the Turks and Caicos Islands and its use by the U.S. Government. Effected by exchange of notes at



Washington Dec. 12, 1979. Entered into force Dec. 12, 1979.

Agreement concerning United States defense areas in the Turks and Caicos Islands, with annex, memorandum of understanding and aide memoire. Signed at Washington Dec. 12, 1979. Entered into force Dec. 12, 1979; effective Jan. 1, 1979.

**Yugoslavia**

Agreement on the establishment of a U.S. information center in Titograd in accordance with the terms of the memorandum of understanding of June 14, 1961. Signed at Belgrade June 25, 1979. Enters into force upon its acceptance by authorized parties of both countries in accordance with their national laws.

**Taiwan**

Mutual defense treaty. Signed at Washington Dec. 2, 1954. Entered into force Mar. 3, 1955. TIAS 3178.

Terminated: Jan. 1, 1980. ■

**December 7**

U.N. Cuban mission is bombed.

**December 8**

Britain appoints Lord Soames as British Governor to Rhodesia.

**December 9**

Secretary Vance departs for Europe for meeting with the NATO Council and leaders of U.S. major allies, December 9-14.

**December 10**

Shin Hyon Hwack is named Prime Minister of South Korea.

**December 11**

Zimbabwe-Rhodesia Parliament renounces rebellion against Britain clearing the way for the British to resume control. The territory resumes use of its colonial name, Southern Rhodesia.

In a vote of 82 to 62, Irish Parliament elects Charles Haughey as new Prime Minister of Ireland.

Special meeting of NATO Foreign and Defense Ministers is held in Brussels, Dec. 11-12.

**December 12**

Rhodesia returns to legality under British Crown. British economic sanctions are lifted.

**December 13**

Semiannual ministerial session of the North Atlantic is held in Brussels, Dec. 13-14.

**December 15**

Britain declares formal end to Rhodesia conference without cease-fire agreement.

**December 16**

British Prime Minister Thatcher arrives in the U.S. for official visit December 16-18.

**December 17**

Leaders of Patriotic Front guerrilla alliance, Joshua Nkomo and Robert Mugabe, agree to a British cease-fire plan aimed at ending the 7-year Rhodesian civil war.

**December 21**

Parties to the 7-year Rhodesian civil war, Robert Mugabe, Joshua Nkomo, and Bishop Abel T. Muzorewa, sign Lancaster House agreement.

U.N. Security Council votes to lift 13-year economic embargo against Rhodesia.

Choi Kyu Hah takes office as South Korea's fourth President.

**December 22**

Prime Minister Pol Pot, leader of the Cambodian forces, is replaced by Khieu Samphan. Pot is Secretary General of the Communist Party and Commander in Chief of Democratic Kampuchean Armed Forces.

**December 24-25**

Over 150 flights, part of a large-scale Soviet airlift, land at Kabul Airport in Afghanistan.

**December 26**

United States announces reductions in Embassy staff and other official missions in El Salvador because of concern for the safety and welfare of U.S. Government employees and their dependents.

**December 27**

Afghan President Hafizullah Amin is ousted from power and killed, along with members of his family, in a coup supported by Soviet troops. He is replaced by Babrak Karmal, a former Deputy Prime Minister who had been living in exile in Eastern Europe.

Maria de Lourdes Pintasilgo, Portugal's first female Prime Minister, resigns.

**December 29**

Gabon President Bongo is re-elected to a second 7-year term.

**December 31**

Togo President Eyadema is re-elected to a new 7-year term. ■

**Department of State**

*November 30-December 28*

Press releases may be obtained from the Office of Press Relations, Department of State, Washington, D.C. 20520.

| No.  | Date  | Subject   |
|------|-------|---|
| *314 | 12/3  | Habib: address at the Miami Conference on the Caribbean, Nov. 28.                         |
| *315 | 11/30 | Richard Cavins Matheron sworn in as Ambassador to Swaziland (biographic data).            |
| *316 | 12/3  | Advisory Committee on International Investment, Technology, and Development, Jan. 4.      |
| *317 | 12/5  | Victor H. Palmieri appointed U.S. Coordinator for Refugee Affairs (biographic data).      |
| *318 | 12/4  | Conference on U.S. foreign policy in Africa, Detroit, Dec. 13.                            |
| *319 | 12/7  | Fine Arts Committee meeting, Jan. 18.   |
| *320 | 12/7  | Oceans and International Environmental and Scientific Affairs Advisory Committee, Jan. 8. |

<sup>1</sup>With reservation.

<sup>2</sup>With a statement.

<sup>3</sup>Not in force for the U.S.

<sup>4</sup>Not in force.

<sup>5</sup>Subject to ratification, approval, acceptance.

<sup>6</sup>Subject to ratification.

<sup>7</sup>Not subject to ratification.

<sup>8</sup>With declaration.

**December 1979**

Events pertaining to Iran can be found in page 56.

**December 2**

American Embassy in Tripoli, Libya, is attacked by demonstrators.

In Portugal's parliamentary election, the Democratic Alliance wins 128 seats in the 250 seat Parliament. Francisco Sa Carneiro is named Prime Minister.

**December 4**

Secretary Vance transmits the seventh semiannual report on implementation of Helsinki Final Act covering the period June 1 through November 30, 1979, to Congressman Dante Fascell, Chairman of the Commission on Security and Cooperation in Europe.

**December 5**

United States temporarily suspends normal operations of Tripoli Embassy.

**December 6**

Ambassador Sol Linowitz departs on his first official visit to Egypt and Israel, as the President's special representative, to review work of the negotiations to date, December 6-13.

- 321 12/10 Vance: address at the Berlin Press Association (delivered by Assistant Secretary George Vest).
- \*322 12/12 Gerald B. Helman sworn in as Ambassador to the U.S. Mission to the European Office of the U.N. (biographic data).
- \*323 12/12 Itinerary of British Prime Minister Thatcher's visit to the U.S. Dec. 16-18.
- \*324 12/12 International and U.S. efforts to aid Kampuchean famine.
- \*325 12/13 U.S. Organization for the International Radio Consultative Committee (CCIR), study group 1, Jan. 10.
- 326 12/19 Communique of Special Meeting of NATO Foreign and Defense Ministers, Dec. 12.
- \*327 12/19 CCIR study group 2, Jan. 23.
- \*328 12/19 CCIR study group 4, Jan. 16.
- \*329 12/20 Nancy Rawls sworn in as Ambassador to the Ivory Coast (biographic data).
- \*330 12/26 Oceans and International Environmental and Scientific Affairs Advisory Committee.
- \*331 12/21 Vance: statement on the release of Peace Corps Volunteer Deborah Laff.
- \*332 12/28 Secretary's Advisory Committee on Private International Law, study group on International Child Abduction, Jan. 19.
- \*333 12/28 U.S. Organization for the International Telegraph and Telephone Consultative Committee (CCITT), study group A, Jan. 23 and 24. ■

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# Department of State *bulletin*

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Mangbetu woman, Zaire  
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## SPECIAL (See Center Section)

President Carter's address before the American Legion Convention, February 19, 1980

President Carter's News Conference, February 13, 1980



# Sub-Saharan Africa and the United States—Part 1

*Once called the "dark Continent," Africa, in recent years, has become a vital part of this nation's foreign policy. The following discussion paper, compiled by former Ambassador G. Edward Clark, deals with the sub-Saharan nations and their relations with the United States.*

*The paper is presented as a two-part series with Part 1 focusing on geography, history, the people and their culture, and economic and political conditions. Part 2, to be published in the April BULLETIN, will examine the role the United States has played in postcolonial African development.*

## INTRODUCTION

Sub-Saharan Africa is not only the direct ancestral home of millions of Americans but, according to some anthropologists, perhaps the cradle of mankind—the birthplace of Homo sapiens. Long enshrouded in primeval mist, it has revealed its grandeur and its myriad cultures slowly to the rest of the world. Ancient Egypt and Carthage, followed later by Islamic traders, missionaries, and European colonial powers, ultimately sensed, discovered, and began to exploit the latent potential of the continent's human and natural resources.

Only within the past three decades, however, has the majority of Africa resumed independence through the creation of nation-states and undertaken significant roles in the community of nations. Now African states are in themselves, singly and as a bloc, powers to be reckoned with. It behooves Americans to know this continent—its potential, its strength, its problems—because the future of the United States is inextricably linked to the destiny of Africa.

Sub-Saharan Africa is indeed a majestic mosaic, stretching from the

Although the broad generic term "Africa" is frequently used throughout this publication and some data pertain to the entire continent, attention actually is focused on sub-Saharan Africa and the off-shore island states, which in fact contain the majority of countries and most of the continent's population. Within the Department of State, responsibility for the conduct of relations with this area is delegated to the Bureau of African Affairs. The Department of State conducts relations with North Africa through its Bureau of Near Eastern and South Asian Affairs.

sands of the Sahara to the Cape of Good Hope, lifting from rain forests of the Congo to the snows of Mt. Kilimanjaro. It is a melange of some 1,000 ethnic groups, hundreds of religious sects, and 47 separate countries, 45 of which are fully independent. Africa is an ever-emerging drama of changing leaders, changing names, and changing alliances. But it is far more. For the United States it represents:

- Individual and collective political power;
- A source of essential natural resources;
- An area involving important human rights concerns;
- A potential site for great power confrontation;
- Significant strategic locations; and
- Ever-present hunger for humanitarian and developmental assistance.

For those who already know, understand, and admire Africa and its people, this document is designed to provide some updating of information, views, and data. For those who are not familiar with the continent, it is intended to serve as a basis for understanding the significance and importance of our relations with this vital region of the world.



bove: Tyji Wara (antelope) headress, Mali  
o by John Klekas)



## GEOGRAPHY

The continent of Africa covers 11,635,000 square miles—nearly one-fifth of the world's total land surface—an area which could contain all of the United States, Western Europe, and India. It is the second largest landmass in the world. Some of its countries, such as Sudan, Zaire, and Mali, approach one-third the size of the continental United States. The African Continent stretches 5,000 miles from north to south and 4,600 miles from east to west. Its 18,900-mile coastline looks out upon the Atlantic and Indian Oceans, the Mediterranean and Red Seas. Of this vast continent, the region known as sub-Saharan Africa, of course, does not touch the Mediterranean and contains 2,322,625 fewer square miles than the rest of the continental landmass. Despite close ties between countries of north Africa and those of the Near East, there are some historic, economic, and cultural reasons to consider the continent more than a geographical entity.

In addition to the continent itself, a number of islands are also included under the rubric "Africa." With the exception of the Canary Islands and Reunion, all others are identified with sub-Saharan Africa. These include Madagascar, Cape Verde, Comoros, Seychelles, Equatorial Guinea, Sao Tome and Principe, and Mauritius. The islands of Zanzibar and Pemba are now part of the United Republic of Tanzania.

### Topography

Approximately four-fifths of the African Continent lie in the tropical latitudes. Its vast surface consists of a series of level or slightly undulating plateaus which fall away from a central area of high, cliff-like formations to low-lying coastal zones which average only 20 miles in width. The plateaus are 1,000 feet or higher, rising to 2,000 or 3,000 feet in southern and eastern Africa and to 5,000 feet in some areas.

Massive geologic changes in the plateaus have produced corrugations which are among the most conspicuous features of the African landscape: the Great Rift Valley of east Africa, one of the deepest fractures in the Earth's crust; Mt. Kilimanjaro, 19,565 feet and Mt. Kenya 17,058 feet above sea level

in east Africa; and the volcanic peak of Mt. Cameroon in west Africa, 13,353 feet above sea level. These changes also produced Lake Chad in central Africa; the lakes of East Africa, including Africa's largest, Lake Victoria; and the continent's four major rivers: the Nile (4,000 miles long), the Zaire (3,000), the Niger (2,600), and the Zambezi (1,650). These rivers are, for the most part, broad and sluggish and have occasional rough cataracts and spectacular falls, such as Victoria.

In addition to its peaks and mountain ranges—the Atlas Mountains of the northwest, the highland belt of Ethiopia and eastern Africa, and the Drakensberg of South Africa—the continent contains the Sahara and Kalahari deserts, regions of heavy rainfall and lush forest vegetation, and between desert and rain forest, grasslands (known as savannas), and savanna woodlands. Desert makes up nearly one-half of Africa's total area, while 40% contains the partly forested grasslands and 10% dense forests and thickets.

### Climate

Since it lies astride the Equator, most of Africa has either a tropical or subtropical climate. Temperate climates are found, however, in the north close to the Mediterranean, along the southern and southwestern areas of the Cape of Good Hope, and on the higher parts of the inland plateaus. Air temperatures vary from hot in most parts of the continent to cold in the deserts (at night), on the plateaus, and in the mountains, where some peaks are permanently snowcapped.

Africa is divided into distinct climatic belts, allowing for the exceptions already noted. In one belt, which is bounded by the 5° line on each side of the Equator, there is a year-long hot and rainy climate, with some areas receiving as much as 100 inches of rain annually. From 5° to 15° on each side of the Equator the climate is warm, with heavy rainfall during the season when the sun is high. Deserts prevail in areas 15° to 30° from the Equator, areas where temperatures vary from very hot to very cold. Accumulated rainfall in these areas is less than 10 inches annu-

## African Highlights

- Total area:** 11,635,000 square miles (of which sub-Saharan Africa is 9,312,375 square miles)
- Valleys:** Great Rift Valley of East Africa—one of the deepest fractures in the Earth's crust
- Mountains:** Mt. Kilimanjaro, 19,565 feet, and Mt. Kenya, 17,058 feet, above sea level
- Lakes:** Lake Victoria—Africa's largest lake with 26,828 square miles (compare with Lake Superior, North America's largest lake, 31,700 square miles)
- Rivers:** the Nile (4,000 miles long), Zaire (3,000 miles), Niger (2,600 miles), and Zambezi (1,650 miles)
- Deserts:** the Sahara and Kalahan—all deserts comprise about 50% of the continent's total area
- Partly forested grasslands:** 40% of Africa's total area
- Dense forests and thickets:** 10% of total area
- Climate:** mainly tropical or subtropical
- Population:** estimated at more than 400 million
- Population growth rate:** 2.9%
- Independence:** since 1945, 45 nations gained independence

ally, and sometimes no measurable rainfall occurs for years. More than 50% from the Equator there are mild, rainy winters and warm, dry summers.

Africa's varied climate has not only affected vegetation, river conditions, and the incidence of disease, it has also helped determine patterns of settlement. Africans gravitated toward fertile lands, water, and areas suitable for grazing. Europeans, when they arrived, tended to settle near the coast on the cool eastern and southern plateaus and the temperate regions of northern and southern Africa. Modern cities, having mostly evolved out of bastions of colonial administration and trade, dot the landscape of the continent.

HISTORY


reference to the theory of man's African origin has been provided by the research and diggings of renowned anthropologists in eastern, southern, and western Africa. Remains of a forerunner of modern man—Australopithecus—and other creatures with simian characteristics, such as Homo erectus and Homo habilis, have been unearthed in various parts of the continent. Some are thought to be over 2½ million years old.

Further evidence of the evolution of primitive people throughout the Pleistocene (unpolished Stone Age—1 million-16,000 years B.C.) has been discovered, including remains of Neanderthal man dating back to around 40,000 B.C. Traces of his continued development down through the Mesolithic, Neolithic (polished Stone Age), Bronze, and Iron Ages have been found in several regions of Africa.

Some scholars believe that primitive African people expanded to neighboring continents midway through the Paleolithic Age. Meanwhile, in Africa they were dividing into three main races—Negroid, Bushmanoid, and Hamitic. Near the end of the Pleistocene period Caucasoid people from the Mediterranean region moved to northeast Africa. Somewhat later, a fifth racial group, the Mongoloid, reached the coast and islands of east Africa.

Of the indigenous Africans, the Hamitic became dominant, learning first to hunt and forage, later to domesticate animals, and finally to develop agricultural communities. In a millennium before and a millennium after Christ, descendants (known by linguistic classification as Niger-Congo or Nigritic) expanded to control much of the southern half of Africa. A major subgroup, speaking the Bantu language, spearheaded migration to the east and south, overrunning and nearly exterminating the Pygmoid and Bushmanoid peoples in the process.

Meanwhile, additional Caucasoid groups, during several centuries B.C. and A.D., were moving into north and northeast Africa, in some instances replacing earlier Caucasoids or in other cases pushing back Niger-Congo




Kingdoms and Empires  
1450 B.C. - A.D. 1800

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(Nigritic) groups. During the 7th to 10th centuries, Bedouins spread Islamic influence across north Africa, while from the 10th to the 18th century other Moslems continued to settle in east Africa from the Horn southward to Zimbabwe.

As groups spread and then consolidated, sophisticated societies developed. Artifacts, dating to the 10th century, attest to the organization of their civilizations. Starting with Kush (Ethiopian plateau—1st to 3rd centuries), "Sudanic" kingdoms developed for over 1,000 years—ancient Ghana, Kamen, Mali, Songhai, the Hausa states. The kingdoms of the Congo—Kongo, Lunda, and



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Dogon cliff dwellings (Museum of African Art, Eliot Elisofon Archives)

Bushong—somewhat similar in government and organization to the “Sudanic” states, appear to have been founded in the 14th century. The city-states of the Guinea Coast—Ife, Benin, Yoruba—date at least to the 15th century. These states were highly organized and engaged in long-distance trade in salt, gold, cattle, horses, and ivory.

Early in the 15th century Portuguese navigators undertook voyages of exploration that initiated a gradual buildup of African trade relations with Europe and the Americas, leading eventually to Christian missionary contact with Africa. During the 16th and 17th centuries the Dutch, British, French, Spanish, and Arabs increased their trade with Africa. Slaves became an important commodity, although this trade had existed for centuries before with various Arab countries. No reliable figures exist as to the extent of the slave trade, but estimates range from 10 to 30 million people sold into slavery. At that time, a fringe of trading posts and maritime stations was established on the Atlantic and Indian Ocean coasts, but the interior of the continent remained unknown to most non-Africans.

### Colonial Period

The 18th and early 19th centuries saw extensive European exploration, religious proselytizing, and ultimate colonialization of much of Africa. Missionaries, traders, and adventurers penetrated into the heart of the continent. These were the years of Mungo Park, Savorgnan de Brazza, Rene Caille, H.M. Stanley, Sir Richard Burton, and David Livingstone. They were followed later, especially after 1880, by government officials extending inland their colonial domains.

Once the main dimensions of Africa's inner geography and resources were revealed, a scramble for colonial territory took place. Although until 1879 only a small part of the African Continent was under foreign rule, by 1900 all but two of the present 47 countries (45 independent states) of sub-Saharan Africa were subject to European control. These exceptions were Liberia, settled by freed American slaves in the 1820s, and the ancient Empire of Ethiopia. The remainder of Africa had been claimed and placed under one form of control or another by France, Great Britain, Portugal, Belgium, Spain, Germany, and Italy. For the next half-century, Europeans them-

selves settled in various areas of the continent, traded, extracted minerals, and established governments reflecting the different policies and institutions of the colonial metropolises.

### Independence

Many factors helped to create a climate in which most of the European-ruled colonies in Africa eventually became independent: the growth of African nationalist movements; the participation of Africans in World Wars I and II; the Atlantic Charter of 1941 proclaiming the right of all peoples to choose their form of government under which they would live; and changing interests and ideas in Europe regarding the efficacy of empire, including its economic implications.

With the exception of South Africa, which had become an independent unit with dominion status within the British Commonwealth in 1910, and the Sudan (separated from Egypt in 1956), the wave of actual independence did not begin until 1957. Led by Nkrumah of the Gold Coast, Kenyatta of Kenya, and Sekou Toure of Guinea, a host of sub-Saharan countries in rapid succession broke ties with their colonial rulers. Thus, since 1957, 41 nations have joined the four already independent (Ethiopia, Liberia, Sudan, South Africa) with two more (Zimbabwe and Namibia) poised on the threshold of independence.

Africa's political evolution during the past two decades has been tumultuous, with nearly two-thirds of the countries undergoing nonconstitutional changes in leadership and forms of government. Dozens of coups have toppled not only early leaders and rulers but sometimes series of their successors.

While more than half of the nation have come under the control of military leaders or committees, some—Nigeria, Upper Volta, and Ghana—have now completed the cycle and returned to civilian-constitutional rule. Some leaders who assumed dictatorial powers—Idi Amin of Uganda, Bokassa of the Central African Empire, and Macias in Equatorial Guinea—have been ousted



y more moderate forces. Despite political trauma in many areas, there have been islands of relative tranquility with stable leadership elsewhere on the continent—Tanzania (Nyerere), Zambia (Kaunda), The Gambia (Jawara), Botswana (Seretse Khama), Ivory Coast (Houphouet-Boigny), Senegal (Thioron), and Kenya, where Moi succeeded Kenyatta in an orderly constitutional process.

Secession attempts have rekindled national entities. Eritrea has been trying to break free from Ethiopia since shortly after formal absorption into Ethiopia in 1962. Katanga (now Shaba) tried unsuccessfully to secede from Zaire (then the Democratic Republic of the Congo) in 1960 and Biafra from Nigeria in 1967.

Not only have there been internal disturbances in many African countries but disputes and sometimes open warfare have broken out between states. For example, Somalia and Ethiopia have been fighting intermittently over possession of the Ogaden region for years. Shabans, operating out of Angola, have made incursions into Zaire in 1977 and 1978. Until recently, Mauritania first sided with, but then opposed, Morocco in its dispute with the Polisario over the fate of the Western Sahara (former Spanish Sahara). Chad asserts that Libya has annexed a portion of its northern territory.

African nations, acting through the Organization of African Unity (OAU) and various ad hoc groups, have endeavored to mediate some of these international disputes. While they have had moderate success in a few instances, the continental unity advocated by Nkrumah of Ghana in the independence years has failed to provide a degree of cohesion envisioned by many Africans.

Another source of turmoil is found in the "wars of liberation" being waged in southern Africa. Although in various stages of resolution or escalation, they primarily involve the future of Zimbabwe, Namibia, and ultimately South Africa.



PEOPLE

The population of Africa is presently estimated at more than 400 million persons, with 85% living in sub-Saharan Africa. However, because of the vastness of the continent, density is less than half that of the United States, running at about 30 persons per square mile. This figure is steadily increasing nonetheless, with an estimated annual increase of 2.9%. Should current trends continue, the continent's population might conceivably reach as high as 80 million by the year 2000, a subject of growing concern to the governments some of the highly populated countries.

People are dispersed unevenly throughout the continent. Vast stretches of deserts and mountains are virtually uninhabited. As indicated earlier, good climate, fertile land, navigable rivers, safe ports, and historical demographic movements have created several areas with population density running as high as 500 persons per square mile. South of the Sahara, the most populated areas are:

- The lands bordering the Gulf of Guinea in west Africa, particularly Nigeria and the southern parts of Ghana, Benin, and Togo;
- The Nile Valley in northern Sudan;
- The east Africa highlands, particularly the plateaus of Ethiopia and eastern Zaire, Rwanda, Burundi, and Tanzania; and
- The eastern and southern coast and interior High Veld of South Africa.

Ninety percent of the African people have dwelt for decades as small groups in rural areas but many have been moving in recent years to urban centers. Increased employment opportunities, drought in some regions, and the universal lure of the "big city" are creating burgeoning metropolises which begin to rank with some of the world's largest and busiest. Among those with more than a million inhabitants are: Kinshasa (Zaire), Lagos and Ibadan (Nigeria), Johannesburg and Cape Town (South Africa), Abidjan (Ivory Coast), Addis Ababa (Ethiopia), and Accra (Ghana).



Children in Sudan (AID photo by Kay Chernush)


# African Language Groups



beans and batiks (Museum of African Art, Eliot Elisofon archives)

Tremendous diversity exists among the people of sub-Saharan Africa. This diversity stems from a variety of causes—the infusion of elements from outside the African Continent, the melding of a portion of these people with original African stock, migration to new areas in search of better livelihood, rivalries which produced factions and subdivisions, tendencies to organize into small, close-knit groups for protection and mutual support. This process, which has continued for many millennia, has produced more than 800 ethnic divisions.

Scholars have attempted to classify the people of Africa in a variety of ways. Anthropologists identify by racial strain. Some scholars use linguistic categories, and others work with listings of ethnic or "tribal" groups. From names alone, it is often difficult to determine the interrelationship among race, language, and group or tribe. Therefore, in the outline of African history, references were made to the five anthropological strains of the continent. A section follows on linguistic classification, which endeavors to link origin with major linguistic groups. Finally, a third section carries the progression on to more familiar ethnic, ethnolinguistic, or tribal names.



The approximate distribution of the main native language groups of Africa is shown on the map. Although the number of different languages is very high (perhaps more than 800), all native languages derive from four basic stocks. These stocks are represented by the shaded and unshaded portions of the map. Key letters indicate divisions of the main stocks and are placed in localities where interrelated languages are spoken. European and European colonial languages, which often serve as a common language between language groups, are not included in this presentation. The dotted line at E shows the area where Ancient Egyptian was spoken, but the present language is Arabic. Certain other distributions, too minute to be shown on the map, include complex variations in the Sudanic languages; pockets of Fulani in the Atlantic subgroup of Niger - Congo (L) found as far east as Lake Chad; and Bantu (R) encroachments on the territory of the Click - speakers.

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## Languages

The complexity of African society is graphically demonstrated by the number of languages found on the continent. Of more than 1,000 languages and dialects, fewer than 10 are spoken by over a million persons. Most are used by groups numbering less than 100,000 people.

Of the numerous linguistic authorities, the classifications of Prof.

Joseph Greenberg represent something of a contemporary consensus. His listing of categories and a map showing the general geographic location of groups is reproduced here. In the brief textual amplification which follows, references are also made to alternate names used by another eminent scholar, Prof. George Murdock.

The largest language family is the Niger-Congo and Kordofian (Nigritic-





Traditional dances reveal much of African lore and legend, philosophy, and belief. They may celebrate glories and triumphs of the past, mark contemporary events and rites of passage, or make supplication for a good harvest or the security of the community. Folk dances vary markedly throughout the continent, from those of the Zulu warriors to the Dogon masked societies. However, most involve group, rather than individual, effort with participants massed in circles or lines.

Drums are most often identified with African music. However, Africans for thousands of years have played wind, string, as well as other percussion instruments, obtaining subtle and complex expressions from relatively simple devices. While much of the music has served as accompaniment for dancing, soloists and ensembles perform for many other occasions. The rhythmic patterns of African music are reflected outside the continent, notably in American jazz.

Until the 18th century, most African literature was in the oral tradition, being handed on from generation to generation by word of mouth. Experts estimate that in sub-Saharan Africa one can find over 250,000 myths, legends, and folk tales. Written literature appeared first in areas which reflect Arabic influence, Hausa in west Africa and Swahili in the east. In the past 80 years published works have burgeoned, including such landmarks as Leopold Senghor's "Negritude" poetry, H. I. E. Dhlomo's *Valley of the Thousand Hills*, Chinua Achebe's *Things Fall Apart*, and Thomas Mofolo's *Chaka*.

## AFRICAN GROUPS

In the tribes of traditional Africa every person—man or woman—had a role assigned to him by the society. He learned the ways of the society and the tasks expected of him. If the particular tribe had a relatively complex structure, he might belong to groups other than family groups within the society, such as age-sets, military wings, secret societies, artisans' guilds, etc. But he would be assigned to these groups just as surely as he would be a member of a given family. Almost no choice would be open to him. He could never openly organize to change the society because the justification of all authority was based on doing things the way they had always been done. This does not mean there was no change, but change was not planned. It came about because of natural disaster or invasion. Men did not organize in groups to bring about change. Rather the groups that existed were there to perform certain traditional functions in ritualistic ways.

As tribesmen migrated to the urban centers under the colonial regime, they often moved away from the direct control of their traditional rulers—because the distance was great, because sometimes the European administration encouraged this, and because they found new rewards and new values in the new urban ways. In general, this decline in allegiance to the traditional rulers was regarded by the African urban migrant as a liberation from the restrictions that had been imposed upon him by ancient custom.

This change in attitude, however, had important consequences for him. The tribal structure had offered him two kinds of security: social and psychological. In the tribe he was always assured of enough to eat, insofar as the whole tribe had enough to eat.

He had assured work. When he grew old, the tribe would provide for him. This was his social security. Furthermore, he learned a single set of rules of behavior. He knew what was expected of him and what he could expect of others. He knew that when he was married or his children were born or a member of his family died, the tribe would participate in an appropriate ceremony to mark the occasion. This was his psychological security.

In the towns he tended to lose this kind of security. Often far from home, sometimes separated from his immediate family, he could not count on always having food or employment. In moments of crisis or ceremony—death, birth, marriage, coming-of-age—he might have neither money nor companions with which to mark the occasion. Furthermore, the ways of the city were bewildering. He was not sure what was expected of him or what he might reasonably ask others to do. He was torn between traditional ways and some of the new ideas he learned in the city. He looked around for ways and means to replace the sense of social and psychological security he had lost by leaving his rural, tribal area. To the extent that the government could not provide this security, because of lack of money or personnel or popular acceptance, the migrant to the towns began to create new groups, voluntary associations, which might help to meet these needs. The very idea of a voluntary association was a new one, for it implied that individuals would group together in their own interests for limited purposes to change the social situation in some way. These were more the instruments of change than the instruments of tradition.

Text from *Colliers Encyclopedia*, Vol. I, 1974, p. 22 (© Macmillan Educational Corporation, 1974).



*"Despite the impact of modernization in urban areas, traditional loyalties remain strong . . ."*

**Left:** Africa Hall in Addis Ababa, Ethiopia, meetingplace of the Organization of African Unity and U.N. Economic Commission for Africa

**Above:** Mushenge village chief, Zaire (Museum African Art, Eliot Elisofon Archives)

## POLITICAL PROCESSES

Political institutions and processes vary greatly in sub-Saharan Africa. There are highly centralized forms of governments, constitutional monarchies, military oligarchies and autocracies, as well as parliamentary systems. The latter, in turn, include numerous variations—presidential and collective executives, unicameral and bicameral houses, fully elected and partly appointed legislatures. Universal suffrage is found in most countries, although in some of southern Africa voting rights are racially restricted.

Some of these differences are due in part to the administrative and political institutions imposed upon the Africans during the European colonial period. The various forms of government also reflect different historical and social backgrounds. Ethiopia's former constitutional monarchy, for example, was deeply rooted in the country's centuries-old royal history. Nigeria's newly inaugurated American-style federalism on the other hand, represents an attempt to maintain unity in one of Africa's largest states by accommodating the social, cultural, and historical differences which exist among

the country's several ethnic groups.

Africa's Niger-Congo (Nigritic) groupings are characterized by strongly developed traditional structures, which in some cases cut across political boundaries superimposed on areas by colonial powers with little or no regard for linguistic or cultural distribution. Despite the impact of modernization in urban areas, traditional loyalties remain strong and, therefore, the development of national consciousness in Africa is an exceptionally complicated task.

Most independent African nations have endeavored in a variety of ways and with varying degrees of success to make government both effective and responsive to the will of the people, to provide some means for citizen participation in government, and to establish country-wide arenas in which potentially divisive forces—such as ethnic and regional interests—can contest peacefully.

Supplementing and at times superseding the role of government institutions in working toward these goals in many African countries is a ruling political party. Usually the outgrowth of the country's earlier nationalist movement, these parties have continued after independence their efforts to achieve national mobilization and the resolution of differences within the

populace. Consequently, much of the political activity which normally occur within government institutions in most Western nations occurs "outside the government"—within the ruling party—in many African countries. Thus political confrontation, bargaining, and decisionmaking frequently take place more often within the party organization than within the formal structure government.

Although many of these political parties before independence could boast unified bodies of support, they now experience pressures toward fragmentation. Opposition has frequently been based on ethnic-linguistic and regional rather than national loyalties. This strains national political unity, leading in some cases to the breakaway movements or strong centralized governments cited earlier. The postindependence era has also seen the rise of new competing factions based on age, economic, and other interests.

It is probable that the African states will continue to experience change in government form and process as they experiment in an effort to find the best political mechanism for their particular needs.



## ECONOMIC ISSUES

sharp contrasts are found in the economies of the 45 independent, and 2 early independent, countries of sub-Saharan Africa. Some, like Gabon, Guinea, Liberia, Mauritania, Nigeria, Zimbabwe, Zambia, and South Africa have large reserves of minerals. Today, from its known reserves, Africa produces 5% of the world's diamonds, 87% of its cobalt, 65% of its gold, 54% of its uranium, and a steadily increasing proportion of its petroleum. A few, like Ivory Coast and Kenya, have successfully developed agricultural exports. On the other hand, others, such as Chad, Mali, and Upper Volta in the Sahel, are grossly disadvantaged by poor resources and landlocked locations which create high transport costs. These contrasting circumstances are further accentuated by varied colonial and cultural heritages and postcolonial philosophies of economic development.

Generally speaking, however, most of Africa suffers from poverty and extreme underdevelopment. The continent, in fact, contains two-thirds of the world's least economically developed countries. Economic growth rates of 1% and other indicators are discouraging, portending further economic and human crises, as well as possible resultant political unrest.

The major sectors of concern affecting African development involve agriculture, transport, health, desertification and deforestation, energy, industrial employment, trade, education, and population growth.

## Agriculture


Agricultural prospects are discouraging. Per capita food production is now declining by 1.4% annually, compared with Asia's 3.4% increase each year. A deficit of 23 million tons of food grains in Africa is forecast by 1990 unless production can be significantly increased. This deficit would be 14 times greater than 1975 shortages. Average daily per capita nutritional intake for Africa is 1,950 calories and 55 protein grams, the lowest in the developing world and declining. Wholly inadequate transportation systems prevent agricultural and



Getting water in Malawi (USICA photo by Richard Sanders)



## Hydro-electric Resources



Most countries are endeavoring to expand their vocational and technical schools. They are also attempting to provide better teacher training facilities to staff secondary schools which still often depend on non-African teachers. In these efforts, they face a dilemma—knowing that better educated citizens will facilitate nation-building but at the same time finding that national economies are often unable to fully absorb secondary school and college graduates.

African universities and secondary schools have their share of student unrest. Part of the unrest is directed toward student grievances, such as housing and student desire for more participation in school administration and choice of curriculum. Another part reflects grievances concerned with national, political, and economic problems.

### Population Growth

Population and urbanization growth rates are the highest in the world—2.9% and 11% respectively. Furthermore, growth rates appear to be accelerating. Efforts to control population increases, which impact adversely on already poor societies, are inhibited by religious resistance and traditional African belief in the importance of the large extended family.

### Development

In attempting to arrest its economic decline and counter such adverse indicators as stagnant food production, growing populations, and declining per capita income, Africa must have foreign assistance. Even in countries such as Nigeria, which has benefited from higher oil prices and large oil exports, there are extensive pockets of poverty. Many developed countries have responded through both bilateral and multilateral programs to African needs, although seldom at levels which satisfy the impoverished or produce dramatic improvements in national economies.

While total official development assistance to sub-Saharan Africa has increased modestly each year, in effect the amounts have barely kept even with inflation, particularly in some countries

developing world and 71 years in the United States. Infant and child mortality remains particularly high. The ratio of medical personnel to population in Africa is very low; water supply and sanitation facilities remain widely inadequate.

### Education

Africa is also wrestling with monumental problems in education. Illiteracy is estimated at an average 80% across the continent. Costs are staggering—some countries devote more than one-third of their budgets to education in an effort to increase instruction at all levels and to meet increases in population. There is also the desire to modify the European educational models inherited from the colonial period by adding courses which reflect African traditions, culture, and history.

alth is a serious problem. Although Africa's primary need in this field is preventive medicine, many of the medical facilities provided during the colonial period—hospitals and urban dispensaries—were designed for curative purposes. Africa, nevertheless, has long been an important center for the study of tropical medicine, including parasitic diseases. The great epidemics which once took such a toll of African people are being controlled and in some cases eliminated.

Much, however, needs to be done. Life expectancy averages 43 years, compared with 53 years in the entire




with extremely high rates. Currently 52% of aid is provided bilaterally, 34% multilaterally, and 14% from the Organization of Petroleum Exporting Countries (OPEC)—where statistics combine bilateral and multilateral aid. It should also be recognized that large bilateral donors, such as France, the United States, and West Germany, are also major contributors to international development organizations.

International donors have endeavored to focus their assistance on the major problem areas cited earlier. The World Bank, the United States, and other developed countries have concentrated on the improvement of rural agriculture extension services, building road networks, increasing fertilizer production, and adapting modern technology to Africa's needs. The World Health Organization (WHO) is coordinating numerous medical and health projects, including major immunization programs in which the United States takes a leading role. A plan is being developed for a U.N. Decade on Drinking Water and Sanitation plus Transport and Communications. Many countries, with the United States as a leader, have mounted Sahelian recovery and relief programs, with the aggregate total approximately \$1 billion per year. A U.N. Desertification Conference was held in Nairobi in 1977 as an initial step in organizing efforts to deal with the long-range problems of arid land. Periodic follow-up meetings have been held subsequently.

In regard to Africa's energy needs, the heads of major industrialized countries at the 1978 Bonn economic summit agreed to intensify efforts to deal with energy problems in the developing world by devoting more bilateral aid to them and encouraging the World Bank, which already does much in this area, to provide still more to ameliorate shortages in the developing world. Since employment in industry depends on highly volatile commodity prices, major consumers and producers have negotiated three important international commodity agreements involving cocoa, coffee, and sugar.

Despite the foregoing efforts, international organizations and donor countries must concentrate even more effort on helping Africans deal with the two factors which most seriously im-



### Sub-Saharan Africa: Selected Development Indicators (median values)

|  | Low Income Developing Countries |       | Middle Income Developing Countries |       |
|--|---------------------------------|-------|------------------------------------|-------|
|  | Africa                          | Other | Africa                             | Other |
| Income per person, 1976 (\$U.S.)                                 | 145                             | 155   | 390                                | 990   |
| Share of agriculture in GDP, 1976 (%)                            | 41                              | 47    | 28                                 | 18    |
| Share of population in urban areas, 1975 (%)                     | 11                              | 18    | 24                                 | 47    |
| Share of manufactures in exports, 1975 (%)                       | 5                               | 14    | 5                                  | 24    |
| Life expectancy at birth, 1975                                   | 41                              | 45    | 44                                 | 61    |
| Total fertility rate, 1975                                       | 6.3                             | 6.2   | 6.5                                | 5.8   |
| Percentage of primary school-age children attending school, 1975 | 53                              | 51    | 79                                 | 103   |
| Adult literacy rate, 1974  | 23                              | 22    | 15                                 | 72    |

SOURCE: World Bank—Development Indicators, World Bank Development Report, 1978

**Total Official Development Assistance to Sub-Saharan Africa<sup>1</sup>**  
(Commitments in \$ millions)

| DONOR GROUPS  | 1974         |             | 1975             |             | 1976                   |             | 1977                        |             | 1978<br>Estimate   |             |
|---|--------------|-------------|------------------|-------------|------------------------|-------------|-----------------------------|-------------|--------------------|-------------|
| <b>TOTAL</b>  | <b>4,612</b> | <b>100%</b> | <b>4,585</b>     | <b>100%</b> | <b>5,054</b>           | <b>100%</b> | <b>6,275</b>                | <b>100%</b> | <b>6,695</b>       | <b>100%</b> |
| <b>BILATERAL (FREE WORLD AND COMMUNIST)</b>                   | <b>2,529</b> | <b>55</b>   | <b>3,731</b>     | <b>60</b>   | <b>2,575</b>           | <b>51</b>   | <b>3,277</b>                | <b>52</b>   | <b>3,485</b>       | <b>52</b>   |
| <b>MULTILATERAL</b>   | <b>1,179</b> | <b>25</b>   | <b>1,383</b>     | <b>30</b>   | <b>1,656</b>           | <b>33</b>   | <b>1,998</b>                | <b>32</b>   | <b>2,260</b>       | <b>34</b>   |
| European Communities (EDF) <sup>2</sup>                       | 305          | 7           | 176              | 4           | 515                    | 10          | 772                         | 12          | 850                | 13          |
| International Organizations                                   | 874          | 19          | 1,207            | 26          | 1,141                  | 23          | 1,226                       | 20          | 1,410 <sup>3</sup> | 21          |
| <b>BILATERAL AND MULTILATERAL<sup>4</sup></b>                 | <b>904</b>   | <b>20</b>   | <b>471</b>       | <b>10</b>   | <b>823</b>             | <b>16</b>   | <b>1,000<sup>est.</sup></b> | <b>16</b>   | <b>950</b>         | <b>14</b>   |
| <b>United States<sup>5</sup></b>                              | <b>270</b>   | <b>6</b>    | <b>294</b>       | <b>6</b>    | <b>353<sup>6</sup></b> | <b>7</b>    | <b>371</b>                  | <b>6</b>    | <b>470</b>         | <b>7</b>    |
| AID   | 131          | 3           | 160              | 4           | 203 <sup>6</sup>       | 4           | 219                         | 4           | 330                | 5           |
| P.L. 480  | 117          | 3           | 108              | 2           | 117 <sup>6</sup>       | 2           | 124                         | 2           | 119 <sup>3</sup>   | 2           |
| Peace Corps   | 22           | neg.        | 26               | neg.        | 33 <sup>6</sup>        | 1           | 28                          | neg.        | 21                 | neg.        |
| Exim Bank (nonadditive)                                       | (84)         | (2)         | (125)            | (121)       | (98) <sup>6</sup>      | (2)         | (49)                        | (—)         | (—)                | (—)         |
| <b>Other Free World</b>                                       | <b>4,008</b> | <b>87</b>   | <b>4,058</b>     | <b>89</b>   | <b>4,572</b>           | <b>90</b>   | <b>5,785</b>                | <b>92</b>   | <b>6,105</b>       | <b>91</b>   |
| <b>Europe (17 countries)</b>                                  | <b>2,027</b> | <b>44</b>   | <b>2,188</b>     | <b>48</b>   | <b>2,413</b>           | <b>48</b>   | <b>3,157</b>                | <b>50</b>   | <b>3,320</b>       | <b>50</b>   |
| France  | 562          | 12          | 715 <sup>7</sup> | 16          | 617                    | 12          | 597                         | 10          | 620                | 9           |
| United Kingdom  | 170          | 4           | 198              | 4           | 233                    | 5           | 154                         | 2           | 155                | 2           |
| West Germany  | 344          | 7           | 393              | 9           | 313                    | 6           | 398                         | 6           | 415                | 6           |
| Other (12 countries)  | 646          | 14          | 706              | 15          | 735                    | 15          | 1,236                       | 20          | 1,280              | 20          |
| European Communities  | 305          | 7           | 176              | 4           | 515                    | 10          | 772                         | 12          | 850                | 13          |
| <b>Non-Europe</b>   | <b>1,107</b> | <b>24</b>   | <b>663</b>       | <b>15</b>   | <b>1,018</b>           | <b>20</b>   | <b>1,402</b>                | <b>22</b>   | <b>1,375</b>       | <b>20</b>   |
| Canada  | 203          | 4           | 192              | 4           | 195                    | 4           | 402                         | 6           | 425                | 6           |
| Oil Producers (9 OPEC countries)                              | 904          | 20          | 471              | 11          | 823                    | 16          | 1,000                       | 16          | 950                | 14          |
| <b>International Organizations</b>                            | <b>874</b>   | <b>19</b>   | <b>1,207</b>     | <b>26</b>   | <b>1,141</b>           | <b>22</b>   | <b>1,226</b>                | <b>20</b>   | <b>1,410</b>       | <b>21</b>   |
| International Bank for Reconstruction and Development (loans) | 394          | 9           | 594              | 13          | 494                    | 10          | 505                         | 8           | 584 <sup>3</sup>   | 9           |
| International Development Association (loans)                 | 364          | 8           | 373              | 8           | 419                    | 9           | 373                         | 6           | 429 <sup>3</sup>   | 6           |
| International Financial Corporation (loans)                   | 3            | neg.        | 2                | neg.        | 27                     | 1           | 26                          | neg.        | 32 <sup>3</sup>    | neg.        |
| U.N. programs (grants) <sup>8</sup>                           | 73           | 1           | 83               | 2           | 70                     | 1           | 88                          | 2           | 193 <sup>3</sup>   | 3           |
| African Development Bank                                      | 40           | 1           | 155              | 3           | 131                    | 1           | 234                         | 4           | 172                | 3           |
| <b>Communist (8 donors)</b>                                   | <b>334</b>   | <b>7</b>    | <b>233</b>       | <b>5</b>    | <b>129</b>             | <b>3</b>    | <b>119</b>                  | <b>2</b>    | <b>120</b>         | <b>2</b>    |
| U.S.S.R.  | 17           | neg.        | 73               | 2           | 26                     | 1           | 21                          | neg.        | —                  | —           |
| China   | 237          | 5           | 150              | 3           | 57                     | 1           | 10                          | neg.        | —                  | —           |
| East Europe   | 80           | 2           | 10               | neg.        | 46                     | 1           | 88                          | 2           | —                  | —           |

<sup>1</sup>Official development assistance is defined as gross commitments of grants and concessional loans for development purposes and excludes other official flows consisting mainly of export credits.

Exceptions made in this table are the inclusion of nonconcessional loans from the International Bank for Reconstruction and Development (IBRD), International Financial Corporation (IFC), and African Development Bank (ADB). An unknown portion of U.S.S.R. and Eastern European aid to Africa is also nonconcessional.

Table comprises all independent sub-Saharan African countries including former and current recipients of assistance from the Agency for International Development (AID).

Data are by calendar year. Exceptions are IBRD, International Development Association, IFC, and ADB loans and U.S. assistance which are by U.S. fiscal year for the reason explained under footnote 5.

<sup>2</sup>European Communities' assistance consists of the European Development Fund (EDF) grants and soft loans and part of the Communities' budget (food aid, emergency relief, and some technical assistance), both of which are financed by the nine members (Belgium, Denmark, Federal Republic of Germany, France, Italy, Ireland, Luxembourg, Netherlands, and the United Kingdom).

<sup>3</sup>Actual figure.

<sup>4</sup>Of which bilateral assistance amounted to \$443 million in 1974 and \$438 million in 1975. Only combined data available for 1976. Oil

producers of the Organization of Petroleum Exporting Countries (OPEC) comprise Algeria, Iran, Iraq, Libya, Kuwait, Nigeria, Qatar, Saudi Arabia, and United Arab Emirates. Multilateral organizations are Arab Fund for Economic and Social Development, Special Arab Fund of Africa, Technical Assistance Fund for Africa, and Arab Bank for Economic Development in Africa.

<sup>5</sup>Although calendar-year data are reported and used by the donor community, U.S. fiscal-year data are used here for assistance from international organizations and from the United States to avoid confusion regarding the figures prepared for congressional committees which are provided on a fiscal-year basis. They are published for the Congress in AID's *U.S. Overseas Loans and Grants and Assistance from International Organizations*.

<sup>6</sup>15 months, i.e., FY 1976 plus transitional quarter.

<sup>7</sup>Recent changes in donor aid levels partly reflect fluctuations in exchange rates.

<sup>8</sup>U.N. data are not available on a commitments or expenditures basis. Nor are they comparable since definitions change frequently. (For explanation see notes in *U.S. Overseas Loans and Grants and Assistance from International Organizations*.) Data for the U.N. specialized agencies have not been available since FY 1969.

SOURCE: Agency for International Development, revised 1978



Public health instructor, Sudan (AID photo by Kay Chernush)

pede African development—a lack of infrastructure and a shortage of skilled and semiskilled workers.

It should not be inferred that all African developing countries are dependent on foreign aid in all, or even selected, areas of their economies. Some have been particularly successful in certain sectors (Guinea in bauxite export and Nigeria in petroleum production). Others, which initially devoted large portions of their resources to increasing manufacturing (Kenya and Ivory Coast) are now able to devote greater support again to agricultural production. As indicated earlier, many countries are investing heavily in education and the training of Africans to replace the expensive, imported European manpower which still provides technicians and management for some sectors of African business and government.

## MULTILATERAL ORGANIZATIONS

### United Nations

Sub-Saharan African nations, individually and collectively, play important roles in the international and regional organizations of which they are members. They regard the United Nations as a major forum for asserting their views and as a convenient arena for advancing foreign policy objectives. Each country, large or small, has one vote in the General Assembly and all 45 independent sub-Saharan states are U.N. members. Therefore, they have nearly one-third of the Assembly's 152 votes, and their often coordinated position on many issues is significant and often crucial. The African members have been particularly concerned about issues involving colonial powers, subjugated peoples, and human rights issues. They have been prime movers in General Assembly and Security Council resolutions dealing with southern African problems. They have been, however, more reluctant to take controversial positions involving other independent black regimes.

Just as African nations participate actively in the United Nations, affiliated organizations and other international bodies have been deeply involved in the development of Africa. Among these are the U.N. Conference on Trade and Development (UNCTAD); the International Bank for Reconstruction and Development (IBRD), its International Development Association (IDA), and its International Finance Corporation (IFC); the International Monetary Fund (IMF); the U.N.'s World Health Organization (WHO), the International Labor Organization (ILO), the Children's Fund (UNICEF), Food and Agriculture Organization (FAO), High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR), and the Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization (UNESCO). Many of these bodies participate in the U.N. Development Program (UNDP), which has given or plans to give \$789,175,000, or one-fourth of its world total of allotments (approximately \$3.5 billion), to sub-Saharan Africa in the period 1977-81.

### Economic Commission for Africa

The Economic Commission for Africa (ECA) is a U.N. regional body in which all independent African states, except

South Africa, are represented. It was established in 1958 for the promotion and planning of African economic and social development through cooperative and regional action. The ECA carries on extensive research and has acted as a catalyst in the creation of the Africa Development Institute and the Africa Development Bank. It maintains and endeavors to strengthen economic ties with other countries of the world. The headquarters of the ECA's Secretariat is located at Addis Ababa, Ethiopia.

### Organization of African Unity

The Organization of African Unity (OAU) is the most prestigious and encompassing organization on the Africa Continent. Founded in May 1963, it includes all independent African states except the white-ruled Republic of South Africa. Headquartered in Addis Ababa, it has both political and economic responsibilities. With no coercive powers over its members, OAU resolutions are advisory rather than binding although individual OAU states typically have been extremely reluctant to depart from OAU positions adopted by resolution. A primary OAU function is to obtain an African consensus on questions of interest at the United Nations where the OAU maintains a permanent office.

The preamble of the OAU Charter reaffirms the principles of the United Nations and its Universal Declaration of Human Rights. It also pledges to support the legitimate aspirations of the African peoples and to foster African political and economic development. The signatories agree to coordinate and harmonize their general policies in order to promote African progress and unity, to defend sovereignty and territorial integrity, to eradicate colonialism from Africa, and to promote international cooperation. Signatories adhere to the principle of noninterference in one another's affairs, the peaceful settlement of disputes, the condemnation of political assassination or subversive activity against neighboring states, the liberation of remaining dependent areas, and the nonalignment of national blocs.

The work of the OAU is carried out through four "principal institutions"—the Assembly of Heads of State and Government; the Council of (Foreign



## Basic Data on Sub-Saharan Africa

Data presented in the following tables have been assembled by the Bureau of African Affairs, Department of State, to illustrate the diversity and complexity of sub-Saharan Africa. Profiles include selected information on the governments, people, geography, and economy of 47 political entities south of the Sahara. Not listed are the countries of North Africa, which do not come under the purview of the African Bureau. Data vary in accuracy and recency, depending on method of collection, as well as economic and political considerations. Culled from a variety of sources, the data should not be regarded as definitive or finite and should not be used for accurate country comparisons. They are intended to provide a few basic facts for each country and an order of magnitude by which to gauge demographic changes and economic development.

countries in an experimental attempt known as the STABEX program.

### ACP Group

The African, Caribbean and Pacific (ACP) group was originally convened to negotiate the Lome Convention with the EEC. Founded as a permanent group in July 1975, the ACP group endeavors to insure that the ACP/EEC Convention is properly implemented. It also tries to develop closer trade, economic, and cultural relations among the ACP states and to promote effective regional and interregional cooperation between its members. ACP headquarters is in Brussels.

### Economic Community of West African States

The Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS) has 16 members, including nearly all the Francophone, Anglophone, and Lusophone countries of the West African region reaching from Mauritania to Nigeria. Its objective is to create a common market in which internal trade barriers will be eliminated. The community also promotes free movement of people, services and capital, harmonization of agricultural policies, joint development of economic and industrial policies, and elimination of disparities in levels of development. Community headquarters is in Lagos, Nigeria.

### Inter-African Coffee Organization

The Inter-African Coffee Organization (IACO), which has 15 members, was formed in 1960. Its objective is to adopt and adhere to a united policy on the marketing of coffee. The organization facilitates contracts among member countries, international organizations, and coffee buyers. Its headquarters is at Abidjan, Ivory Coast.

### West African Rice Development Association

The West African Rice Development Association (WARDA) has 14 members. Its purpose is to work cooperatively in the research, growing, and marketing of rice. It lobbies for increased quotas on the world market. WARDA's headquarters is in Monrovia, Liberia.

*Table on Multilateral Organizations can be found on page 28.*

Ministers; the General Secretariat; and the Commission of Mediation, Conciliation, and Arbitration. A number of specialized and ad hoc commissions deal with a wide variety of activities of common interest and attempt to instill a spirit of cooperation among member states.

Annual OAU "summits" endeavor to deal with current crises, often involving African interstate relations. Debates are sometimes acrimonious and avoid facing up to the tough issues and differences which divide nations. The OAU, however, over the years has endeavored to assist in such issues as the early mercenary problems in Zaïre, the Biafran rebellion, disputes between Ethiopia and Somalia, the transition to independence in Angola, the status of the Western Sahara, liberation issues of southern Africa, and, recently, human rights in other areas of Africa.

### African Development Bank

The purpose of the African Development Bank, which was established in 1964 and now has a membership of 48 independent African nations (including those of North Africa), is to contribute to the economic and social development of its members, both individually and collectively. The Bank finances investment projects and development programs, placing special emphasis on multinational projects. The Bank has an authorized capitalization of \$1 billion, of which approximately 35% has now been deposited by subscribers. It is expected that the United States and others will soon become members, helping to increase the Bank's capital to \$6.3 billion by 1984. The United States will be the largest single donor, with 17% of nonregional members' capital contributions.

### Lome Convention

The Lome Convention, establishing overall cooperation between the European Economic Community (EEC) and the African, Caribbean and Pacific (ACP) group, was signed in Lome, Togo, in February 1975. The Lome II Convention, signed in November 1979, succeeds it. The new 5-year accord provides ACP countries with trade preferences, economic assistance, and industrial cooperation. In addition, the Lome Convention has financed efforts to maintain stable export earnings for certain commodities of less developed

**SUB-SAHARAN AFRICA<sup>1</sup>**

| COUNTRY   |             | LAND             |                          |                | PEOPLE                |                                |                                   |   |  |  |                      |   |              |   |  |
|---|-------------|------------------|--------------------------|----------------|-----------------------|--------------------------------|-----------------------------------|---|--|--|----------------------|---|--------------|---|--|
| Familiar Name<br>Official Name<br>(Earlier Name) <sup>2</sup>   | Capital     | Total<br>Sq. Mi. | % in<br>Agricul-<br>ture | Population     |                       |                                |                                   | Culture   |  |  |                      | Education   |              | Labor Force                                     |  |
|   |             |                  |                          | Total<br>(mil) | Growth<br>Rate<br>(%) | Den-<br>sity<br>per<br>Sq. Mi. | Life<br>Expect-<br>ancy<br>(yrs.) | Ethnic<br>Groups (%)                            | Religion<br>(%)  | Language                                   | Liter-<br>acy<br>(%) | Primary<br>Students<br>(% of<br>age<br>group <sup>3</sup> ) | % in<br>Agr. | % in<br>Industry<br>Service,<br>& Com-<br>merce |  |
| <b>Angola</b><br>Peoples' Republic<br>of Angola<br>(Angola)   | Luanda      | 481,351          | 22                       | 6.35           | 2.0                   | 17                             | 38                                | Ovimbundu 38.0<br>Kimbundu 23.0<br>Bakongo 13.0 | animist 84.0<br>Catholic 12.0                                  | Portu-<br>guese<br>Local                   | 20                   | 79.0  | 75.0         | Ind. Serv. 1                                    |  |
| <b>Benin</b><br>The People's<br>Republic of<br>Benin<br>(Dahomey)   | Porto Novo  | 43,483           | 18                       | 3.4            | 2.8                   | 78                             | 40                                | Fons<br>Adjas<br>Baribas<br>Yoruba              | animist 65.0<br>Christian 15.0<br>Moslem 13.0                  | French<br>Local                            | 20                   | 43.0  | 60.0         | Ind. Serv. & Com. 3                             |  |
| <b>Botswana</b><br>Republic of<br>Botswana<br>(Bechuanaland)  | Gaborone    | 220,000          | 5                        | .72            | 3.0                   | 3                              | 55                                | Batswana and<br>others 99.0<br>White 1.0        | animist 85.0<br>Christian 15.0                                 | English<br>Setswana                        | 30                   | na <sup>4</sup>   | 75.0         | 2   |  |
| <b>Burundi</b><br>Republic of<br>Burundi  | Bujumbura   | 10,747           | na                       | 3.9            | 2.2                   | 362                            | 41                                | Hutu 85.0<br>Tutsi 14.0<br>Twa 1.0              | Christian<br>animist<br>Moslem                                 | 60.0<br>Kirundi<br>French                  | 10                   | 23.0  | 92.0         | Ind 50  |  |
| <b>Cameroon</b><br>United Republic<br>of Cameroon<br>(French and British<br>Cameroons)                              | Yaounde     | 183,568          | 35                       | 8.16           | 2.0                   | 42                             | 41                                | 200 Groups                                      | Moslem<br>Christian<br>animist                                 | English<br>French<br>Local                 | 65                   | 111.0   | 80.0         | Ind 260   |  |
| <b>Cape Verde</b><br>Republic of<br>Cape Verde<br>(Cape Verde Islands)  | Praia       | 1,557            | na                       | .33            | 2.8                   | 211                            | 50                                | Creole 71.0<br>African 28.0<br>European 1.0     | Catholic<br>animist  | 65.0<br>35.0<br>Portu-<br>guese<br>Crioulo | 26                   | na  | na           | na 07   |  |
| <b>Central African<br/>Republic</b><br>Central African<br>Republic<br>(Central African<br>Empire; Ubangi-<br>Shari) | Bangui      | 247,000          | 10                       | 2.2            | 2.3                   | 7                              | 41                                | Baya-<br>Mandjia<br>Banda<br>M'Baka             | Protestant 40.0<br>Catholic 28.0<br>animist 24.0<br>Moslem 8.0 | French<br>Sangho                           | 18                   | 79.0  | 87.0         | na 39   |  |
| <b>Chad</b><br>Republic of Chad   | N'Djamena   | 496,000          | 50                       | 4.2            | 2.1                   | 8                              | 39                                | Sudanic<br>Nilotic<br>Arabic<br>Saharan         | Moslem<br>Christian<br>animist                                 | French<br>Chadian<br>Arabic                | 7                    | 37.0  | 90.0         | Ind 39  |  |
| <b>Comoros</b><br>Comoros Federal<br>Islamic Republic<br>(Comoro Islands)   | Moroni      | 863              | na                       | .37            | 3.7                   | 117                            | 49                                | Antalote<br>Cafre<br>Makao<br>Other             | Shirazi-<br>Moslem 86.0<br>Catholic 14.0                       | Shaafi-<br>Islam<br>Malagasy<br>French     | 15                   | 50.0  | 87.0         | Govt. 05  |  |
| <b>Congo</b><br>People's Republic<br>of the Congo<br>(French Congo)   | Brazzaville | 132,000          | 1                        | 1.78           | 2.4                   | 9                              | 44                                | Bakongo<br>Bateke<br>M'Bochi<br>Sangha          | animist 48.0<br>Christian 47.0<br>Moslem 5.0                   | French<br>Lingala<br>Kikongo               | 90                   | 90.0  | 70.0         | na 30   |  |
| <b>Djibouti</b><br>The Republic<br>of Djibouti<br>(French Territory<br>of Afars<br>and Issas)                       | Djibouti    | 9,000            | na                       | .25            | na                    | 27                             | na                                | Somalis<br>(Issas)<br>Afars                     | Moslem   | French<br>Somali<br>Afar<br>Arabic         | 10                   | na  | na           | na 06   |  |

See footnotes at end of table.

| ECONOMY                |                 |                   |                     |             |              |                |                    |                |                  |  | GOVERNMENT                             |                                   |                                     | COUNTRY <sup>5</sup>    |                          |
|------------------------|-----------------|-------------------|---------------------|-------------|--------------|----------------|--------------------|----------------|------------------|--|--|-----------------------------------|-------------------------------------|-------------------------|--------------------------|
| Gross Domestic Product |                 |                   | Distribution of GDP |             |              | Trade          |                    |                |                  |  | U.S. Econ. Assistance FY 1979 (\$ mil) | Date Independence                 | Chief of State and/or Head of Govt. |                         |                          |
|                        |                 |                   |                     |             |              | Imports        |                    | Exports        |                  |  |  |                                   |                                     |                         |                          |
| Annual (\$ bil.)       | Growth Rate (%) | Per Capita (\$US) | % From Agr.         | % From Ind. | % From Serv. | Total (\$ mil) | From U.S. (\$ mil) | Total (\$ mil) | To U.S. (\$ mil) | Leading Exports                        | Type                                   |                                   |                                     |                         |                          |
| 1.83                   | 6.5             | 492               | 29                  | 27          | 44           | 541            | na                 | 672            | na               | Oil<br>Coffee<br>Diamonds<br>Iron      | 1.1                                    | People's Republic                 | 11/11/75                            | Pres—José E. Dos Santos | Angola                   |
| .54                    | 3.0             | 170               | 39                  | 20          | 41           | 226            | 13                 | 144            | na               | Palm Products<br>Cotton<br>Peanuts     | 1.0                                    | Military (Revolutionary Republic) | 8/1/60                              | Pres—Col. M. Kérékou    | Benin                    |
| .23                    | 35.0            | 480               | na                  | na          | na           | 207            | na                 | 170            | na               | Diamonds<br>Copper<br>Nickel<br>Beef   | 16.0                                   | Republic<br>Parl.<br>Dem.         | 9/30/66                             | Pres—Sir S. Khama       | Botswana                 |
| .50                    | 2.7             | 128               | 64                  | 15          | 21           | 61.40          | na                 | 97.50          | na               | Coffee<br>Tea                          | 2.0                                    | Republic                          | 7/1/62                              | Pres—Col. J. B. Bagaza  | Burundi                  |
| 2.60                   | 14.20           | 328               | 33                  | 20          | 47           | 608            | 48                 | 530            | 14               | Cocoa<br>Coffee<br>Timber<br>Aluminum  | 10.6                                   | Independent Republic              | 1/1/60                              | Pres—A. Ahidjo          | Cameroon                 |
| .07                    | 0               | 179               | na                  | na          | na           | 32.3           | 1.8                | na             | na               | Fish<br>Bananas<br>Salt                | 5.7                                    | Republic                          | 7/5/75                              | Pres—A. Pereira         | Cape Verde               |
| .39                    | 4.0             | 177               | 37                  | 23          | 40           | 78.8           | na                 | 80.10          | na               | Diamonds<br>Cotton<br>Timber<br>Coffee | 0.2                                    | Republic                          | 8/13/60                             | Pres—David Dacko        | Central African Republic |
| .29                    | 2.0             | 120               | 52                  | 14          | 34           | 126            | 3                  | 98             | 0                | Cotton<br>Livestock                    | 7.0                                    | National Union Transitional Govt. | 8/11/60                             | Pres—Oueddei Goukouni   | Chad                     |
| .05                    | 1.0             | 153               | na                  | na          | na           | 13             | na                 | 9              | 1.35             | Perfume<br>Oils<br>Copra               | 0                                      | Republic                          | 7/6/75                              | Pres—Ahmed Abdallah     | Comoros                  |
| .89                    | 2.6             | 500               | 15.0                | 43          | 42.0         | 238.9          | na                 | 235.4          | na               | Wood<br>Sugar<br>Tobacco               | 0.9                                    | People's Republic                 | 8/15/60                             | Pres—D. Sassou-Nguesso  | Congo                    |
| .06                    | na              | 360               | na                  | na          | na           | 74             | na                 | na             | 20               | Hides<br>Cattle<br>Coffee              | 1.4                                    | Republic                          | 6/27/77                             | Pres—H.G. Aptidon       | Djibouti                 |



| COUNTRY   |                | LAND             |                          | PEOPLE         |                       |                                |                                   |   |                              |   |                             |   |                      |   |              |  |    |
|---|----------------|------------------|--------------------------|----------------|-----------------------|--------------------------------|-----------------------------------|---|------------------------------|---|-----------------------------|---|----------------------|---|--------------|--|----|
| Familiar Name<br>Official Name<br>(Earlier Name)?   | Capital        | Total<br>Sq. Mi. | % in<br>Agricul-<br>ture | Population     |                       |                                |                                   | Culture   |                              |   |                             | Education                                 |                      | Labor Force   |              |  |    |
|   |                |                  |                          | Total<br>(mil) | Growth<br>Rate<br>(%) | Dens-<br>ity<br>per<br>Sq. Mi. | Life<br>Expect-<br>ancy<br>(yrs.) | Ethnic<br>Groups (%)                                    |                              | Religion<br>(%)   |                             | Language                                  | Liter-<br>acy<br>(%) | Primary<br>Students<br>(% of<br>age<br>group <sup>1</sup> ) | % in<br>Agr. | % in<br>Industry,<br>Service,<br>& Com-<br>merce |    |
| <b>Equatorial Guinea</b><br>Republic of<br>Equatorial Guinea<br>( <i>Equatorial Guinea<br/>and Spanish<br/>Guinea</i> ) | Malabo         | 10,820           | 85-90                    | .31            | 1.7                   | 29                             | na                                | Fang<br>Benges<br>Combes<br>Other                       | 75.0<br>25.0                 | Catholic<br>Protestant<br>animist                       | 60.0                        | Spanish                                   | 20                   | na  | 95.0         | Ind  | 2  |
| <b>Ethiopia</b><br>Ethiopia<br>( <i>Empire of Ethiopia</i> )  | Addis<br>Ababa | 455,000          | 53                       | 30.0           | 2.5                   | 62                             | 38                                | Amhara<br>Galla<br>Tigre<br>Other                       | 25.0<br>40.0<br>12.0<br>23.0 | Ethiopian<br>Orthodox<br>Christian<br>Moslem<br>animist | 45.0<br>40.0<br>15.0        | Amharic<br>Tigrinya<br>Gallinya<br>Arabic | 7                    | 23.0  | 86.0         | Ind  | 10 |
| <b>Gabon</b><br>Gabonese Republic<br>( <i>Gabon</i> )   | Libreville     | 102,317          | 1<br>Forest-<br>75       | .58            | 1.7                   | 5.4                            | na                                | Fang<br>Eshira<br>Bapounou<br>Bateke                    |                              | Christian<br>Moslem<br>animist                          | 46.0                        | French                                    | 20.0                 | na  | 70.0         | Ind.   | 30 |
| <b>Gambia (The)</b><br>Republic of<br>the Gambia<br>( <i>Gambia</i> )   | Banjul         | 4,003            | 55                       | .56            | 2.08                  | 139                            | na                                | Mandingo<br>Fula<br>Wolof<br>Other                      | 40.0<br>13.0<br>12.0<br>35.0 | Moslem<br>animist<br>Christian                          | 85.0                        | English<br>Mandinka<br>Wolof              | 10.0                 | na  | 85.0         | na   |    |
| <b>Ghana</b><br>Republic of Ghana<br>( <i>Gold Coast</i> )  | Accra          | 92,100           | 70                       | 10.6           | 3.2                   | 115                            | 48                                | Akan<br>Ewe<br>Ga                                       |                              | animist<br>Christian<br>Moslem                          | 45.0<br>43.0<br>12.0        | English<br>Akan,<br>Ewe, Ga               | 30.0                 | 60.0  | 60.0         | Ind  | 10 |
| <b>Guinea</b><br>People's Revolu-<br>tionary Republic<br>of Guinea<br>( <i>French Guinea</i> )                          | Conakry        | 246,048          | na                       | 4.5            | 2.5                   | 18                             | 41                                | Foulah<br>Malinke<br>Soussous                           |                              | Moslem<br>animist<br>Christian                          | 75.0<br>24.0<br>1.0         | French<br>Local                           | 10.0                 | 17.0  | 84.0         | Ind &<br>Com                                     |    |
| <b>Guinea-Bissau</b><br>Republic of<br>Guinea-Bissau<br>( <i>Portuguese Guinea</i> )                                    | Bissau         | 14,000           | na                       | .92            | 3.0                   | 65                             | 35                                | Balanta<br>Fulani<br>Manjaca                            |                              | animist<br>Moslem<br>Christian                          |                             | Portu-<br>guese<br>Crioulo                | 12.0                 | na  | 90.0         | 5  |    |
| <b>Ivory Coast</b><br>Republic of<br>The Ivory Coast<br>( <i>Ivory Coast</i> )  | Abidjan        | 124,500          | na                       | 7.3            | 4.2                   | 58                             | 44                                | 60 Groups   |                              | animist<br>Moslem<br>Christian                          | 63.0<br>25.0<br>12.0        | French<br>Local                           | 20.0                 | 62.0  | 75.0         | 25   |    |
| <b>Kenya</b><br>Republic of Kenya<br>( <i>Kenya</i> )   | Nairobi        | 224,900          | 10-<br>15.0              | 15.8           | 4.0                   | 70                             | 53                                | Kikuyu<br>Luo<br>Luhya<br>Other                         | 20.0<br>14.0<br>14.0<br>52.0 | animist<br>Protestant<br>Catholic<br>Moslem             | 38.0<br>37.0<br>22.0<br>3.0 | English<br>Swahili<br>Local               | 25.0                 | 109.0   | 21.0         | Ind  | 23 |
| <b>Lesotho</b><br>Kingdom of Lesotho<br>( <i>Basutoland</i> )   | Maseru         | 11,716           | na                       | 1.2            | 2.1                   | 102                            | 46                                | Sotho<br>Nguni<br>White                                 | 85.0<br>14.0<br>1.0          | Christian<br>animist                                    | 70.0<br>30.0                | English<br>Sesotho<br>Xhosa<br>Zulu       | 59.0                 | 65.0  | 90.0         | Ind  | 2  |
| <b>Liberia</b><br>Republic of Liberia<br>( <i>Liberia</i> )   | Monrovia       | 43,000           | na                       | 1.73           | 3.3                   | 40                             | 46                                | American<br>Descendents<br>20 Niger-<br>Congo<br>Groups |                              | Tribal<br>Moslem<br>Christian                           | 75.0<br>15.0<br>10.0        | English,<br>Local                         | 24.0                 | 40.0  | 76.0         | 9  |    |

| ECONOMY                |                 |                   |                     |             |              |                |                    |                |                  |   | GOVERNMENT                             |                         |                                     | COUNTRY <sup>5</sup>                 |                   |
|------------------------|-----------------|-------------------|---------------------|-------------|--------------|----------------|--------------------|----------------|------------------|---|--|-------------------------|-------------------------------------|--------------------------------------|-------------------|
| Gross Domestic Product |                 |                   | Distribution of GDP |             |              | Trade          |                    |                |                  |   | U.S. Econ. Assistance FY 1979 (\$ mil) | Date Independence       | Chief of State and/or Head of Govt. |                                      |                   |
|                        |                 |                   |                     |             |              | Imports        |                    | Exports        |                  |   |  |                         |                                     |                                      |                   |
| Per Capita (\$)        | Growth Rate (%) | Per Capita (\$US) | % From Agr.         | % From Ind. | % From Serv. | Total (\$ mil) | From U.S. (\$ mil) | Total (\$ mil) | To U.S. (\$ mil) | Leading Exports                           | Type                                   |                         |                                     |                                      |                   |
|                        | 2.20            | 240               | na                  | na          | na           | 20             | na                 | 2.2            | na               | Cocoa<br>Coffee<br>Wood<br>Bananas        | 0                                      | Republic                | 10/12/68                            | Pres—Lt. Col. Obiang Nguema Mbazogo  | Equatorial Guinea |
|                        | 4.0             | 103               | 50.0                | 15          | 35.0         | 520            | 27                 | 306            | 95               | Coffee<br>Pulses<br>Hides<br>Meat         | 9.0                                    | Provisional Military    | Since Ancient Times                 | Chief of State—Mengistu Haile-Mariam | Ethiopia          |
|                        | 10.0            | 4,012             | na                  | na          | na           | 800            | 25.9               | 1,449          | 187              | Petroleum<br>Wood<br>Manganese<br>Uranium | 0                                      | Republic                | 8/17/60                             | Pres—El Hadj Omar Bongo              | Gabon             |
|                        | 4.5             | 280               | na                  | na          | na           | 84.2           | 1.44               | 42             | .8               | Peanuts<br>Palm<br>Fish<br>Hides          | 4.9                                    | Republic                | 2/18/65                             | Pres—Sir A. D. Jawara                | Gambia            |
|                        | 2.9             | 380               | 49.0                | 25          | 26.0         | 842            | 134                | 804            | 153              | Cocoa<br>Minerals<br>Wood                 | 22.3                                   | Republic                | 3/6/57                              | Pres—Hilla Limann                    | Ghana             |
|                        | 3.0             | 140               | 43.0                | 33          | 24           | 206            | na                 | 272            | na               | Bauxite<br>Alumina<br>Fruit<br>Coffee     | 8.5                                    | Republic                | 10/2/58                             | Pres—Sekou Touré                     | Guinea            |
|                        | na              | 120               | na                  | na          | na           | 35             | na                 | 12             | 0                | Peanuts<br>Palm Products<br>Fish          | 2.3                                    | Republic                | 9/24/73                             | Pres—Luis Cabral                     | Guinea-Bissau     |
|                        | 9.10            | 821               | 25.0                | 20.0        | 55.0         | 1,300          | 97                 | 1,600          | 171              | Coffee<br>Cocoa                           | 0                                      | Republic                | 8/7/60                              | Pres—F. Houphouët-Boigny             | Ivory Coast       |
|                        | 5.7             | 337               | 30.0                | 23.0        | 47.0         | 1,800          | na                 | 1,100          | na               | Coffee<br>Tea<br>Meat<br>Cement           | 28.0                                   | Republic                | 12/12/63                            | Pres—D. T. arap Moi                  | Kenya             |
|                        | 4.0             | 120               | 38.0                | 8.0         | 54.0         | 206            | na                 | 16.80          | na               | Wool<br>Mohair<br>Cattle<br>Diamonds      | 12.2                                   | Constitutional Monarchy | 10/4/66                             | King—Moshoeshe II PM—Dr. L. Jonathan | Lesotho           |
|                        | 4.0             | 450               | 29.0                | 37.0        | 34.0         | 463.5          | na                 | 447.4          | na               | Iron<br>Rubber<br>Timber<br>Diamonds      | 9.8                                    | Republic                | 1847                                | Pres—W. R. Tolbert, Jr.              | Liberia           |

| COUNTRY   |              | LAND             |                          | PEOPLE         |                       |                                |                                   |   |   |          |  |   |              |  |   |
|---|--------------|------------------|--------------------------|----------------|-----------------------|--------------------------------|-----------------------------------|---|---|----------|--|---|--------------|--|---|
| Familiar Name<br>Official Name<br>(Earlier Name) <sup>2</sup>                             | Capital      | Total<br>Sq. Mi. | % in<br>Agricul-<br>ture | Population     |                       |                                |                                   | Culture   |   |          | Education                                  |   | Labor Force  |  |   |
|   |              |                  |                          | Total<br>(mil) | Growth<br>Rate<br>(%) | Den-<br>sity<br>per<br>Sq. Mi. | Life<br>Expect-<br>ancy<br>(yrs.) | Ethnic<br>Groups (%)  | Religion<br>(%)   | Language | Liter-<br>acy<br>(%)                       | Primary<br>Students<br>(% of<br>age<br>group <sup>3</sup> ) | % in<br>Agr. | Indus-<br>trial<br>Servi-<br>& Com-<br>merce |   |
| <b>Madagascar</b><br>Democratic Republic<br>of Madagascar<br>( <i>Malagasy Republic</i> ) | Antananarivo | 228,000          | na                       | 9.1            | 2.6                   | 37                             | 44                                |   |   |          |  |   |              |  | 18 Malagasy<br>Groups<br>Comoran<br>French<br>Orientals |
| <b>Malawi</b><br>Republic of Malawi<br>( <i>Nyasaland<br/>Protectorate</i> )              | Lilongwe     | 45,747           | 30.0                     | 5.9            | 2.9                   | 129                            | 42                                | Chewas<br>Njanja<br>Lomwe<br>Yao  | Traditional<br>Christian<br>Moslem                          |          | Chichewa<br>English                        | 25.0  | 61.0         | 90.0   | Ind   |
| <b>Mali</b><br>Republic of Mali<br>( <i>French Soudan</i> )                               | Bamako       | 464,873          | na                       | 6.5            | 2.7                   | 5.1                            | 38                                | Mandé 50.0<br>Peul 17.0<br>Voltaic 12.0<br>Other 21.0   | Moslem 90.0<br>Traditional 9.0<br>Christian 1.0             |          | French<br>Bambara                          | 5.0   | 15.0         | 80.0   | Ind<br>S: v1  |
| <b>Mauritania</b><br>Islamic Republic<br>of Mauritania<br>( <i>Mauritania</i> )           | Nouakchott   | 419,229          | na                       | 1.42           | 2.1                   | 3                              | 39                                | Arab-Berber<br>Arab-Berber<br>Negroid 33.0<br>Negroid 33.0                                    | Moslem  |          | Hasanya-<br>Arabic<br>French<br>Toucouleur | 12.0  | 16.0         | 88.0   | na  |
| <b>Mauritius</b><br>Mauritius   | Port Louis   | 720              | 60.0                     | .9             | 1.3                   | 1,238                          | 66                                | Indo-<br>Mauritian 67.0<br>Creoles 28.0<br>Sino-<br>Mauritian 3.0<br>Franco-<br>Mauritian 2.0 | Hindu<br>Moslem<br>Catholic<br>Protestant                   |          | English<br>French<br>Creole<br>Hindi       | 61.0  | na           | 28.9   |   |
| <b>Mozambique</b><br>People's Republic<br>of Mozambique<br>( <i>Mozambique</i> )          | Maputo       | 303,769          | 30.0                     | 9.6-<br>10.4   | 2.2                   | 29                             | 44                                | Makua<br>Tsonga<br>Other Bantu<br>Europeans   | animist 65.0<br>Christian 22.0<br>Moslem 11.0<br>Other 20.0 |          | Portu-<br>guese,<br>Local<br>English       | 20.0  | 52.0         | 80.0   | Ind   |
| <b>Namibia</b><br>( <i>South West Africa<br/>—former name</i> )                           | Windhoek     | 318,261          | 30.0                     | .92            | 4.1                   | 2.9                            | na                                | Africans 88.0<br>Mixed-<br>European 12.0  | Christian<br>animist  | 50.0     | Afrikaans<br>English<br>German<br>Local    | Wh*<br>80.0<br>NWh<br>28.0                                  |              | 60.0   | Ind   |
| <b>Niger</b><br>Republic of Niger<br>( <i>Niger</i> )                                     | Niamey       | 490,000          | na                       | 5-6            | 2.8                   | 8.1                            | 39                                | Hausa 50.0<br>Djerma 23.0<br>Fulani 15.0<br>Tareg 12.0  | Moslem<br>animist<br>Christian                              |          | French<br>Hausa<br>Djerma                  | 6.0   | 17.0         | 90.0   | na  |
| <b>Nigeria</b><br>Federal Republic<br>of Nigeria<br>( <i>Nigeria</i> )                    | Lagos        | 357,000          | 40.0                     | 79.8           | 2.5                   | 224                            | 41                                | Hausa-<br>Fulani<br>Ibo<br>Yoruba   | Moslem 47.0<br>Christian 34.0<br>animist 19.0               |          | English<br>Hausa<br>Ibo<br>Yoruba          | 25.0  | 49.0         | 75.0   |   |
| <b>Rwanda</b><br>Republic of Rwanda   | Kigali       | 10,169           | 39.0                     | 4.2            | 2.17                  | 400                            | 44                                | Hutu 89.0<br>Tutsi 10.0<br>Twa 1.0  | animist<br>Christian<br>Moslem                              |          | French<br>Kinyar-<br>Wanda                 | 25.0  | 37.0         | 95.0   | Ind   |

\* Wh = white; NWh = nonwhite



| ECONOMY                |                 |                      |                     |             |              |                |                    |                |                  |   | GOVERNMENT                             |                                 |                   | COUNTRY <sup>5</sup>                                |            |
|------------------------|-----------------|----------------------|---------------------|-------------|--------------|----------------|--------------------|----------------|------------------|---|--|---------------------------------|-------------------|---|------------|
| Gross Domestic Product |                 |                      | Distribution of GDP |             |              | Trade          |                    |                |                  |   | U.S. Econ. Assistance FY 1979 (\$ mil) | Type                            | Date Independence | Chief of State and/or Head of Govt.                 |            |
|                        |                 |                      |                     |             |              | Imports        |                    | Exports        |                  |   |  |                                 |                   |   |            |
| Annual (\$ bil.)       | Growth Rate (%) | Per Capita (\$US)    | % From Agr.         | % From Ind. | % From Serv. | Total (\$ mil) | From U.S. (\$ mil) | Total (\$ mil) | To U.S. (\$ mil) | Leading Exports                           |  |                                 |                   |   |            |
| 74                     | 1.0             | 208                  | 29.0                | 20.0        | 51.0         | 282            | 6                  | 278            | 59               | Coffee<br>Cloves<br>Vanilla               | 2.1                                    | Republic                        | 6/29/60           | Pres—Cdr. D. Ratsiraka                              | Madagascar |
| 08                     | 6.4             | 183                  | 45.0                | 22.0        | 33.0         | 344.3          | 4.3                | 183            | 10.7             | Tobacco<br>Tea<br>Ground Nuts<br>Sugar    | 3.5                                    | Republic                        | 7/6/64            | Pres—Dr. H. K. Banda                                | Malawi     |
| 94                     | 5.0             | 140                  | 38.0                | 17.0        | 45.0         | 211            | 3.5                | 84             | na               | Meat<br>Cotton<br>Fish<br>Peanuts         | 17.4                                   | Republic                        | 9/22/60           | Pres—B. Gen. M. Traore                              | Mali       |
| 52                     | -6.0            | 376                  | 35.0                | 37.0        | 28.0         | 283            | na                 | 161            | na               | Iron<br>Gypsum<br>Fish                    | 7.1                                    | Military Republic               | 11/28/60          | Pres.— Lt. Col. Ould Haïdala                        | Mauritania |
| 45                     | 10.0            | 680                  | na                  | na          | na           | 306            | 15.40              | 310            | 15.60            | Sugar<br>Tea<br>Tobacco                   | 3.3                                    | Parl. Dem. Under Const. Monarch | 3/12/68           | Chief of State— Queen Elizabeth PM—Sir S. Ramgoolam | Mauritius  |
| 6                      | 0.0             | 170                  | 45.0                | 15          | 40.0         | 635            | 20                 | 150            | 39               | Cashew<br>Cotton<br>Veg. Oil<br>Tea       | 13.7                                   | People's Republic               | 6/25/75           | Pres—S. M. Machel                                   | Mozambique |
| 2.4                    | 0.0             | Wh* 6,800<br>NWh 816 | na                  | na          |              | 265            | 10                 | 530            | 5                | Copper<br>Uranium<br>Diamonds<br>Cattle   | 0                                      | International Territory         | Pending           | South Africa— Illegal Administrator                 | Namibia    |
| 71                     | 8.0             | 142                  | 47.0                | 24          | 29.0         | 317.9          | na                 | 307.7          | na               | Uranium<br>Livestock<br>Cowpeas           | 9.6                                    | Republic                        | 8/3/60            | Pres—Col. Seyni Kountché                            | Niger      |
| 2.7                    | 2.9             | 522.6                | 23.0                | 50          | 27.0         | 12,452         | 985                | 10,347         | 3,981            | Petroleum<br>Cocoa<br>Tin<br>Coal         | 0                                      | Federal Republic                | 10/1/60           | Pres— Alhaji Shehu Shagari                          | Nigeria    |
| 62                     | 5-6.0           | 106                  | 52.0                | 22          | 26.0         | 105.4          | na                 | 106            | na               | Coffee<br>Cassiterite<br>Tea<br>Pyrethrum | 0                                      | Republic                        | 7/1/62            | Pres—Maj. Gen. J. Habyarimana                       | Rwanda     |

Wh= white, NWh= nonwhite

| COUNTRY   |                  | LAND             |                          | PEOPLE         |                       |                           |                                   |   |  |                                |                                       |   |              |                                  |              |                  |
|---|------------------|------------------|--------------------------|----------------|-----------------------|---------------------------|-----------------------------------|---|--|--------------------------------|---------------------------------------|---|--------------|----------------------------------|--------------|------------------|
| Familiar Name<br>Official Name<br>(Earlier Name) <sup>2</sup>                                     | Capital          | Total<br>Sq. Mi. | % in<br>Agricul-<br>ture | Population     |                       |                           |                                   | Culture                                 |  |                                | Education                             |   | Labor Force  |                                  |              |                  |
|   |                  |                  |                          | Total<br>(mil) | Growth<br>Rate<br>(%) | Density<br>per<br>Sq. Mi. | Life<br>Expect-<br>ancy<br>(yrs.) | Ethnic<br>Groups (%)                    | Religion<br>(%)                              | Language                       | Liter-<br>acy<br>(%)                  | Primary<br>Students<br>(% of<br>age<br>group <sup>3</sup> ) | % in<br>Agr. | %<br>Indu-<br>Serv<br>& C<br>mes |              |                  |
| <b>São Tome and Príncipe</b><br>Democratic Republic<br>of São Tomé and Príncipe                   | São Tomé         | 372              | na                       | .08            | 2.0                   | 215                       | na                                | Mixed-<br>Portuguese-<br>African        | Christian<br>Other                           | 80.0<br>20.0                   | Portu-<br>guese                       | 5-<br>10.0  | na           | 62.0                             | Ind<br>Other |                  |
| <b>Senegal</b><br>Republic of Senegal<br>(Senegal)  | Dakar            | 76,000           | na                       | 5.38           | 2.6                   | 71                        | 44                                | Wolof<br>Fulani<br>Sere<br>Other        | 36.0<br>17.5<br>16.5<br>30.0                 | Moslem<br>Christian<br>animist | 75.0<br>5.0<br>20.0                   | French<br>Wolof<br>Pulaar<br>Local                          | 5-10         | 53                               | 70           | Ind<br>Gov<br>Se |
| <b>Seychelles</b><br>Republic of<br>Seychelles<br>(Seychelles Colony)                             | Victoria         | 171              | na                       | .06            | 2.6                   | 360                       | 60                                | Seychellois<br>Creole                   | Catholic<br>Other                            | 91.0<br>9.0                    | English<br>French                     | 60  | na           | 17                               | Ind          |                  |
| <b>Sierra Leone</b><br>Republic of<br>Sierra Leone<br>(Sierra Leone)                              | Freetown         | 27,925           | 30                       | 3.22           | 2.4                   | 115                       | 44                                | Temne<br>Mende                          | animist<br>Moslem<br>Christian               | 70.0<br>25.0<br>5.0            | English<br>Krio                       | 10  | 35           | 75                               | Ind          |                  |
| <b>Somalia</b><br>Somali Democratic<br>Republic<br>(British Somaliland<br>and Italian<br>Somalia) | Mogadishu        | 246,155          | 13                       | 3.2            | 2.3                   | 13                        | 41                                | Somali<br>Arab<br>Asian                 | 98.8<br>1.2                                  | Moslem                         | 99.0                                  | Somali<br>Arabic<br>English<br>Italian                      | 20           | 58                               | 60           | Ind              |
| <b>South Africa</b><br>Republic of<br>South Africa<br>(Union of<br>South Africa)                  | Pretoria         | 472,359          | na                       | 27.39          | 2.5                   | 53                        | 61                                | African<br>White<br>Colored<br>Asian    | 69.0<br>20.0<br>10.7<br>.03                  | Traditional<br>Christian       | English<br>Afrikaans<br>Zulu<br>Xhosa | Wh*<br>100<br>NWh<br>35                                     | 89           | 31                               | n            |                  |
| <b>Sudan</b><br>Democratic Republic<br>of the Sudan<br>(Anglo-Egyptian<br>Sudan)                  | Khartoum         | 967,500          | 20                       | 16.8           | 2.5                   | 17                        | 50                                | Arab-<br>African<br>Nilotic-<br>African | Moslem<br>Indigenous<br>beliefs<br>Christian | 70.0<br>25.0<br>5.0            | Arabic<br>English<br>Local            | 28  | 33           | 86                               | Ind          |                  |
| <b>Swaziland</b><br>Kingdom of<br>Swaziland<br>(Swaziland)  | Mbabane          | 6,704            | 8                        | .49            | 3.0                   | 74                        | 43                                | Swazi<br>Zulu<br>White                  | 3.0  | Christian<br>animist           | English<br>SiSwati<br>Zulu            | 36  | na           | 85                               | Ind          |                  |
| <b>Tanzania</b><br>United Republic<br>of Tanzania<br>(Tanganyika and<br>Zanzibar)                 | Dar Es<br>Salaam | 365,608          | na                       | 17.4           | 2.7                   | 48                        | 45                                | Over 130<br>Groups                      | Christian<br>Moslem<br>animist               | 35.0<br>35.0<br>30.0           | Swahili<br>English                    | 63  | 57           | 90                               | Ind<br>Com   |                  |

\* Wh= white; NWh= nonwhite

| ECONOMY                |                 |                                    |                     |           |            |                |                    |                |                  |   | GOVERNMENT                             |                      |                                    | COUNTRY <sup>5</sup>                  |                       |
|------------------------|-----------------|------------------------------------|---------------------|-----------|------------|----------------|--------------------|----------------|------------------|---|--|----------------------|------------------------------------|---------------------------------------|-----------------------|
| Gross Domestic Product |                 |                                    | Distribution of GDP |           |            | Trade          |                    |                |                  |   | U.S. Econ. Assistance FY 1979 (\$ mil) |                      | Date Independence                  | Chief of State and/or Head of Govt.   |                       |
|                        |                 |                                    |                     |           |            | Imports        |                    | Exports        |                  |   |  |                      |                                    |                                       |                       |
| Annual \$ bil.         | Growth Rate (%) | Per Capita (\$US)                  | From Agr.           | From Ind. | From Serv. | Total (\$ mil) | From U.S. (\$ mil) | Total (\$ mil) | To U.S. (\$ mil) | Leading Exports                                     | Type                                   |                      |                                    |                                       |                       |
| 0.19                   |                 | 160                                | na                  | na        | na         | 6.9            | na                 | 6.5            | na               | Cocoa<br>Copra<br>Palm                              | 0.1                                    | Republic             | 7/12/75                            | Pres—M. Pinto Da Costa                | São Tomé and Príncipe |
| 1.80                   | 2.30            | 333                                | 28                  | 24        | 48         | 713            | na                 | 426            | na               | Peanuts<br>Phosphate<br>Fish                        | 18.1                                   | Republic             | 4/4/60                             | Pres—L. S. Senghor                    | Senegal               |
| .63                    | 6.5             | 1,146                              | na                  | na        | na         | 53             | na                 | 13             | na               | Copra<br>Cinnamon                                   | 0.5                                    | Republic             | 6/29/76                            | Pres—F. R. Rene                       | Seychelles            |
| .55                    | 2.40            | 176                                | 32                  | 23        | 45         | 173            | na                 | 151.10         | 60.40            | Minerals<br>Agricultural                            | 5.9                                    | Republic             | 4/27/61                            | Pres—S. P. Stevens                    | Sierra Leone          |
| .22                    | na              | 70                                 | 31                  | 8         | 61         | 175            | na                 | 55             | na               | Livestock<br>Fruit<br>Hides                         | 26.2                                   | Independent Republic | 7/1/60                             | Pres—M. Gen. Siad Barre               | Somalia               |
| 45.71                  | 14.3            | 9,136**<br>3,836<br>2,857<br>2,056 | 9                   | 23        | 68         | 9,279          | 1,079              | 8,549          | 2,259            | Gold<br>Ore<br>Uranium<br>Diamonds<br>Wool<br>Sugar | 0                                      | Republic             | 5/31/10                            | Pres—M. Viljoen<br>PM—M. P.W. Botha   | South Africa          |
| 7.5                    | 3.0             | 386                                | 41                  | 16        | 43         | 1,075          | 100                | 525            | 22               | Cotton<br>Gum Arabic<br>Peanuts                     | 42.8                                   | Republic             | 1/1/56                             | Pres—Gen. G. M. Numayri               | Sudan                 |
| .22                    | 9.80            | 440                                | na                  | na        | na         | 151            | na                 | 152            | na               | Sugar<br>Wood<br>Iron<br>Asbestos                   | 6.2                                    | Monarchy             | 9/6/68                             | King—Sobhuza II<br>PM—M. Gen. Dlamini | Swaziland             |
| 3                      | 5.90            | 180                                | 45                  | 16        | 39         | 784            | na                 | 574            | na               | Coffee<br>Cotton<br>Sisal<br>Spices                 | 22.9                                   | Republic             | Tan 1961<br>Zan 1963<br>Union 1964 | Pres—J. Nyerere                       | Tanzania              |

\*\*9,136 (White), 3,836 (Asian), 2,857 (Colored), 2,056 (African)



| COUNTRY   |  | LAND             |                  | PEOPLE                   |                |                       |                                |                                   |                             |                                 |                                   |                               |   |                          |                                    |       |     |
|---|--|------------------|------------------|--------------------------|----------------|-----------------------|--------------------------------|-----------------------------------|-----------------------------|---------------------------------|-----------------------------------|-------------------------------|---|--------------------------|------------------------------------|-------|-----|
| Familiar Name<br>Official Name<br>(Earlier Name) <sup>2</sup>                                       |  | Capital          | Total<br>Sq. Mi. | % in<br>Agricul-<br>ture | Population     |                       |                                |                                   | Culture                     |                                 |                                   | Education                     |   | Labor Force              |                                    |       |     |
|   |  |                  |                  |                          | Total<br>(mil) | Growth<br>Rate<br>(%) | Den-<br>sity<br>per<br>Sq. Mi. | Life<br>Expect-<br>ancy<br>(yrs.) | Ethnic<br>Groups (%)        | Religion<br>(%)                 | Language                          | Liter-<br>acy<br>(%)          | Primary<br>Students<br>(% of<br>age<br>group <sup>3</sup> ) | % in<br>Agr.             | % in<br>Industr<br>& Corr<br>merce |       |     |
| Togo<br>Republic of Togo<br>(French Togoland)   |  | Lome             | 21,853           | 96                       | 2.3            | 2.7                   | 93                             | 40                                | Ewe<br>Mina<br>Kabyé        | animist<br>Christian<br>Moslem  | 60.0<br>20.0<br>20.0              | French<br>Local               | 10  | 50                       | 78.0                               | 22    |     |
| Uganda<br>Republic of Uganda<br>(Uganda)  |  | Kampala          | 91,076           | 30                       | 13.2           | 3.5                   | 145                            | 50                                | Bantu<br>Nilotic<br>Sudanic | Christian<br>Moslem<br>animist  | 50.0<br>10.0<br>40.0              | English<br>Swahili<br>Luganda | 25  | 53                       | 90.0                               | Ind 4 |     |
| Upper Volta<br>Republic of<br>Upper Volta<br>(Upper Volta)  |  | Ouaga-<br>dougou | 106,000          | na                       | 6.5            | 2.2                   | 125                            | 38                                | Voltaic<br>Mande<br>Fulani  | animist<br>Moslem<br>Christian  |                                   | French<br>Local               | 5-10  | 14                       | 95.0                               | 5     |     |
| Zaire<br>Republic of Zaire<br>(Belgian Congo)   |  | Kinshasa         | 905,063          | 2                        | 27             | 3                     | 30                             | 44                                | Bantu<br>80 other<br>groups | Christian<br>Syncretic<br>sects | 50.0<br>50.0                      | French<br>Lingala<br>Other    | 20  | 90                       | 79.0                               | na    |     |
| Zambia<br>Republic of Zambia<br>(Northern Rhodesia)<br>(Federation of<br>Rhodesia and<br>Nyasaland) |  | Lusaka           | 290,724          | na                       | 5.4            | 3.2                   | 11                             | 47                                | Bantu<br>groups             | animist<br>Christian            |                                   | English<br>70 local           | 20  | 96                       | 57.0                               | 4     |     |
| Zimbabwe<br>(Zimbabwe Rhodesia)<br>(Southern Rhodesia)  |  | Salisbury        | 150,333          | 40.0                     | 7.2            | 3.5                   | 45                             | 52                                | African<br>White<br>Other   | 96.0<br>3.0<br>1.0              | Syncretic<br>Christian<br>animist | 52.0<br>24.0<br>24.0          | English<br>Shona<br>Ndebele                                 | Wh*<br>100<br>NWWh<br>30 | 99                                 | 64.0  | Ind |

\* Wh= white; NWWh= nonwhite

<sup>1</sup> Statistics are drawn from the latest, most reliable data available from a variety of sources, particularly Department of State *Background Notes* which are periodically updated. Therefore, except where indicated, no specific year can be designated for each category of statistics. Furthermore, current figures do not exist in many cases and some data are based on U.S. Government estimates.

<sup>2</sup> The earlier name listing is included to identify for readers unfamiliar with Africa earlier names by which some of the countries have been known. In some cases these names date to pre-independence and in other instances relate to previous post-independence regimes. No political significance should be attached to

| ECONOMY                |                 |                      |                     |             |              |                |                    |                |                  |   | GOVERNMENT                             |                                       |                   | COUNTRY <sup>5</sup>                |             |
|------------------------|-----------------|----------------------|---------------------|-------------|--------------|----------------|--------------------|----------------|------------------|---|--|---------------------------------------|-------------------|-------------------------------------|-------------|
| Gross Domestic Product |                 |                      | Distribution of GDP |             |              | Trade          |                    |                |                  |   | U.S. Econ. Assistance FY 1979 (\$ mil) | Type                                  | Date Independence | Chief of State and/or Head of Govt. |             |
|                        |                 |                      |                     |             |              | Imports        |                    | Exports        |                  |   |  |                                       |                   |                                     |             |
| Annual (bil.)          | Growth Rate (%) | Per Capita (\$US)    | % From Agr.         | % From Ind. | % From Serv. | Total (\$ mil) | From U.S. (\$ mil) | Total (\$ mil) | To U.S. (\$ mil) | Leading Exports                               |  |                                       |                   |                                     |             |
| 525                    | 5-8.0           | 233                  | 25                  | 21          | 54           | 162            | na                 | 127.5          | na               | Phosphates<br>Cocoa<br>Coffee                 | 3.1                                    | Republic                              | 4/27/60           | Pres—Gen. G. Eyadema                | Togo        |
| 180                    | 0               | 240                  | 55                  | 8           | 37           | 364            | 3.4                | 334            | 77               | Coffee<br>Tea<br>Cotton<br>Copper             | 5.1                                    | Republic                              | 10/9/62           | Pres—G. Binaisa                     | Uganda      |
| 70                     | 3.1             | 103                  | 34                  | 19          | 47           | 237            | na                 | 89             | na               | Livestock<br>Peanuts<br>Shea Butter<br>Cotton | 17.0                                   | Republic                              | 8/5/60            | Pres—A. S. Lamizana                 | Upper Volta |
| 10                     | -1.0            | 150                  | 16                  | 30.0        | 54           | 623            | 114 + Canada       | 1,576          | 197.7 + Canada   | Copper<br>Cobalt<br>Diamonds<br>Coffee        | 40.3                                   | Republic, with strong pres. authority | 6/30/60           | Pres—Lt. Gen. Mobutu Sese Seko      | Zaire       |
| 25                     | .50             | 228                  | 14                  | 41          | 45           | 680            | 44.4               | 811            | 115.7            | Copper<br>Cobalt<br>Emeralds<br>Zinc          | 31.7                                   | Republic                              | 10/24/64          | Pres—Dr. K. Kaunda                  | Zambia      |
| 3.3                    | -4.0            | Wh* 8,800<br>NWh 816 | 16.0                | 40          | 44           | na             | na                 | na             | na               | Tobacco<br>Chrome<br>Textiles<br>Grain        | 0                                      | Future under negotiation              | Pending           |                                     | Zimbabwe    |

\*Wh = white; NWh = nonwhite

estimations, which are based largely on historical perceptions.

<sup>1</sup>The resulting percentages, or "Gross Primary Enrollment Ratio," for countries with universal primary education may exceed 100% since some pupils may be above or below the accepted primary school age—6 to 12 years.

<sup>2</sup>na= not available

<sup>5</sup>The Bureau of African Affairs has a peripheral interest in the following geographical entities: Western Sahara, British Indian Ocean Territory

## Selected African Multilateral Organizations

|   | No. of<br>African Countries <sup>1</sup>                    | Headquarters                   |
|---|---|--------------------------------|
| <b>Economic Communities and Other<br/>Multisectoral Organizations</b>   |   |                                |
| African, Caribbean and Pacific Group (ACP)<br>(Lome Convention between EC<br>and ACP)                                   | 35  | Brussels, Belgium              |
| Central African Customs and Economic<br>Union (UDEAC)   | 4   | Bangui, CAR                    |
| Council of the Entente States   | 5   | Abidjan, Ivory Coast           |
| Customs Union Between Swaziland, Bots-<br>wana, Lesotho and South Africa  | 4   | None                           |
| Economic Community of West African<br>States (ECOWAS)   | 16  | Lagos, Nigeria                 |
| Great Lakes States Economic Community<br>(CEPGL)  | 4   | Rotates                        |
| Lake Chad Basin Commission (CBLT)   | 4   | N'Djamena, Chad                |
| Organization for the Development<br>of the Senegal River (OMVS)   | 3   | Dakar, Senegal                 |
| Organization of African Unity (OAU)   | All independent<br>African states<br>except South<br>Africa | Addis Ababa, Ethiopia          |
| River Niger Commission (CFN)  | 9   | Niamey, Niger                  |
| United Nations Economic Commission<br>for Africa (UNECA)  | All   | Addis Ababa, Ethiopia          |
| West African Economic Community (CEAO)  | 7   | Ouagadougou, Upper<br>Volta    |
| <b>Specific Purpose Organizations</b>   |   |                                |
| African Civil Aviation Commission (AFCAC)   | 33  | Dakar, Senegal                 |
| Cocoa Producers Alliance  | 7   | Lagos, Nigeria                 |
| Desert Locust Control Organization for<br>East Africa (DLCOEA)  | 7   | Addis Ababa, Ethiopia          |
| Inter-African Coffee Organization (IACO)  | 15  | Not designated                 |
| Organization of Petroleum Exporting<br>Countries (OPEC)   | 4   | Vienna, Austria                |
| Permanent Inter-State Committee on Drought<br>Control in the Sahel (CILSS)  | 8   | Ouagadougou, Upper<br>Volta    |
| West African Rice Development Association<br>(WARDA)  | 14  | Monrovia, Liberia              |
| <b>Banking, Finance</b>   |   |                                |
| African Development Bank (ADB)  | 37  | Abidjan, Ivory Coast           |
| Arab Bank for Economic Development<br>in Africa (ABEDA)   | 7   | Khartoum, Sudan                |
| Bank of Central African States (BEAC)   | 5   | Yaounde, Cameroon              |
| West African Monetary Union (UMOA)  | 6   | No permanent head-<br>quarters |
| West African Development Bank (BOAD)  | 6   | Lome, Togo                     |
| <b>Education and Research</b>   |   |                                |
| African Training and Research Center<br>in Administration and Development<br>(CAFRAD)                                   | 20  | Tangier, Morocco               |
| Association of African Universities (AAU)   | 32  | Accra, Ghana                   |
| Pan-African Institute for Development (PAID)  | 32  | Geneva, Switzerland            |
| Organization of Coordination and Cooperation<br>for the Fight Against the Major Endemic<br>Diseases—West Africa (OCCGE) | 8   | Bobo-Dioulasso, Upper<br>Volta |

<sup>1</sup>Numbers are not always limited to sub-Saharan countries, for example, ACP and OPEC include North African and other countries.

*Copies of the complete discussion paper, Sub-Saharan Africa and the United States, may be purchased for \$2.50 from the Superintendent of Documents, U.S. Government Printing Office, Washington, D.C. 20402 (a 25% discount is allowed when ordering 100 or more discussion papers mailed to the same address).*



# "Meet the Press" Interview

*President Carter was interviewed on NBC's "Meet the Press" on January 10, 1980, by David Broder, The Washington Post; Carl T. Rowan, Chicago Sun-Times; and Judy Woodruff and Bill Monroe of NBC News.<sup>1</sup>*

**Q. Assuming the Soviets do not pull out of Afghanistan any time soon, do you favor the United States participating in the Moscow Olympics? And if not, what are the alternatives?**

A. No. Neither I nor the American people would support the sending of an American team to Moscow with Soviet invasion troops in Afghanistan. I've sent a message today to the U.S. Olympic Committee spelling out my own position, that unless the Soviets withdraw their troops within a month from Afghanistan and the Olympic games be moved from Moscow to an alternate site, or multiple sites or postponed or cancelled. If the Soviets do not withdraw their troops immediately from Afghanistan within a month, I would not support the sending of an American team to the Olympics.

It's very important for the world to realize how serious a threat the Soviets' invasion of Afghanistan is. I do not want to inject politics into the Olympics, and I would personally favor the establishment of a permanent Olympic site for both the summer and the winter games. In my opinion, the most appropriate permanent site for the summer games would be Greece. This will be my own position, and I have asked the U.S. Olympic Committee to take this position to the International Olympic Committee, and I would hope that as many nations as possible would support this basic position. One hundred and four nations voted against the Soviet invasion and called for their immediate withdrawal from Afghanistan in the United Nations, and I would hope as many of those as possible would support the position I've just outlined to you.

**Q. If a substantial number of nations does not support the U.S. position, would not that just put the United States in an isolated position, without doing much damage to the Soviet Union?**

A. Regardless of what other nations might do, I would not favor the sending of an American Olympic team to Moscow while the Soviet invasion troops are in Afghanistan.

**Q. You spoke earlier of a serious threat to peace. Just how serious is this situation? Are we potentially on the verge of conflict with the Soviet Union?**

A. As I said earlier, this in my opinion is the most serious threat to world peace since the Second World War. It's an unprecedented act on the part of the Soviet Union. It's the first time they have attacked, themselves, a nation that was not already under their domination, that is, a part of the Warsaw Pact neighborhood. They have used surrogate forces, the Cubans, to participate in other countries, like Angola or Ethiopia.

This is a threat to a vital area of the world. It's a threat to an area of the world where the interests of our country and those interests of our allies are deeply embedded. More than two-thirds of the total exportable oil that supplies the rest of the world comes from the Persian Gulf region in southwest Asia.

My own assessment is that there have been times in the years gone by that we have had intense competition with the Soviet Union and also an effort for accommodation with the Soviet Union, for consulting with them and working with them toward peace. This is an action initiated by the Soviets, and I am still committed to peace, but peace through strength and through letting the Soviets know in a clear and certain way, by action of our own country and other nations, that they cannot invade an innocent country with impunity; they must suffer the consequences.

**Q. In that connection, your critics say that the Soviets are moving because they've seen weakness on your part. They don't believe you or the American people will fight. If they move into Pakistan or into Iran, will you use military force?**

A. We've not been weak. We've been firm and resolved and consistent and clear in our policy since I've been in the White House. We've had a steady increase in our commitment to the strength of our national defense, as measured by budget levels and also measured by the tone and actions that I have taken and the Congress has taken. We've strength-

ened our alliances with NATO, both in the buildup of fighting capability and also lately in the theater nuclear force response to the Soviet threat with atomic weapons.

We've also let it be clear that we favor the resolution of intense differences that have destabilized the Middle East and the Persian Gulf region. The most notable advance has been the peace treaty signed between Israel and Egypt and we have reconfirmed our commitment to Pakistan of 1959. We are committed to consult with Pakistan and to take whatever action is necessary, under the constitutional guidelines that I have to follow as President of our country, to protect the security of Pakistan, involving military force if necessary.

In addition to that, we're increasing and will maintain an increased level of naval forces in the northern Indian Ocean and the Persian Gulf region and we are now exploring with some intensity the establishment of facilities for the servicing of our air and naval forces in the northern Indian Ocean, Persian Gulf region. These actions have been initiated ever since I've been in office. They are consistent and clear and we are concentrating on them now with an increased level of commitment because of the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan.

**Q. The timing of this appearance the day before the Iowa caucuses suggests a political motive. Why did you accept this appearance when you have refused to appear anywhere where your challengers could confront you directly?**

A. In a time of crisis for our country I believe it's very important for the President not to assume in a public way the role of a partisan campaigner in a political contest. Our country is in a state of crisis, and this has been a consistent policy that I have maintained since the Iranians captured and held hostage Americans in Tehran. I do not consider this to be a campaign forum, "Meet the Press," and I'm not here as a partisan candidate.

As you well know, we have been presenting my views very clearly to the American people in multiple ways, my own appearances before the press, my briefing of groups in the White House, the sending of surrogates for me to Iowa.

I think my positions and the actions that I've taken have been very clear, and my appearance on this show is an opportunity to give you, for instance, a chance to ask me questions about issues that are important to the American people.

**Q. A colleague of mine printed this question 3 weeks ago, at the time that you cancelled out of the Iowa debate, as an example of what you might have been asked, and I'd like to ask it.**

A. Fine.

**Q. With all due respect, we still have 5.8% unemployment. Inflation has risen from 1.8% to 13%. We still don't have a viable energy policy. Russian troops are in Cuba and Afghanistan. The dollar is falling. Gold is rising. And the hostages, after 78 days, are still in Tehran. Just what have you done, sir, to deserve renomination?**

A. Well, since I've been in the White House, I've done everything possible to strengthen our own nation, not only militarily but economically and politically, and I think morally and ethically as well. We have strengthened our alliances with our allies, which has been pointed out already on this program. We have dealt not only with peace for our country but peace for others, working with the British and Rhodesia, working with the Egyptians and Israelis in the Middle East.

We've tried to expand American friendships among other nations on Earth, notably being successful in retaining our friendship with the people of Taiwan, opening up a new and friendly relationship with the recognition [sic] of a fourth of the world's total population in China. We've had, I think, a great improvement in our own nation's relationships with countries as expressed by recent U.N. votes.

Domestically, I've dealt with the nation's crises and problems as best I could, working with a Congress that sometimes acts too slowly. Since the first day I've been in office, we've been addressing the most serious threat to our nation domestically and that is inflation, tied very closely with energy.

Energy is the single most important factor in the increase in the inflation rate since I've been in office. Just in the last 12 months OPEC [Organization of Petroleum Exporting Countries] has increased energy prices by 80%. As a matter of fact, all the increase, for practical purposes, of the inflation rate since I've been in office has been directly attributable to increase in OPEC oil prices.

When I was elected the prime threat to our country was extremely high unemployment. We've added a net increase of 9 million jobs, and we've cut the unemployment rate down by 25%. This has been a very good move toward the strengthening of our nation's economy. We've cut down our balance of trade deficit. We have seen a very clear increase in net income for Americans above inflation, above taxes paid of about 7½%. Corporate profits have gone up about 50%. And I think our nation is much more unified and I believe in addition to that, there's a greater respect for the integrity and the truthfulness of the government of our country. So we've made some progress.

I might say that I don't claim to know all the answers. They are not easy questions to address. They are not easy problems to solve. But our country is united. We are struggling with these very difficult and complicated questions. And I think that they need to be pursued further, hopefully in a second term for myself.

**Q. You said in an interview recently that the invasion of Afghanistan had changed your opinions of the Russians more drastically than anything else since you had been in office. Why did it take almost 3 years for you to discover the true intentions of the Soviet leadership?**

A. I've never doubted the long-range policy or the long-range ambitions of the Soviet Union. The fact that we have consistently strengthened our own nation's defense after 15 years of a decrease in commitment to our nation's defense vis-a-vis the Soviets is one indication of that. All of the actions that I described earlier, the strengthening of NATO, the movement into the northern Indian Ocean, the search for peace in the Mideast, and so forth were directly because of the ultimate threat by the Soviet Union to world peace.

But it is obvious that the Soviets' actual invasion of a previously nonaligned country, an independent, freedom-loving country, a deeply religious country with their own massive troops is a radical departure from the policy or actions that the Soviets have pursued since the Second World War. It is a direct threat because Afghanistan, formerly a buffer state between the Soviet Union and Iran and the world's oil supplies and the Hormuz Straits and the Persian Gulf, has now become kind of an arrow aiming at those crucial strategic regions of the world. So this is a major departure by the

Soviet Union from their previous actions. Their long-range policies have been well understood by me then and still are.

**Q. And yet your Administration didn't take any steps to offset the huge increases in the number of Cuban troops in Africa in recent years. Soviet combat troops are still in Cuba today, despite your statement last fall that their presence was not acceptable. In light of this failure to counter Soviet aggression earlier, do you accept any responsibility at all for the Soviet calculation that they could move into Afghanistan with impunity?**

A. The Soviets have seriously misjudged our own nation's strength and resolve and unity and determination and the condemnation that has accrued to them by the world community because of their invasion of Afghanistan. As you know, Cuban troops went into Angola long before I became President, and the Soviet brigade, about 2,000 to 2,500 troops, has been in Cuba since the early 1960s. There has obviously been a buildup in the Soviet adventurism in the horn of Africa, in Ethiopia. These moves were a great concern to us.

But the point that I would like to make clear is that we have always had a very complicated relationship with the Soviet Union based on cooperation when we could together move toward a peaceful resolution of the world's problems like the negotiation of the SALT Treaty and competition with the Soviet Union when our interests were at cross purposes in any region of the world. I think our strength has been clearly demonstrated. The resolve of our nation has been clearly demonstrated. The support of our allies has been clearly demonstrated, and, indeed, the support of the world in the condemnation of the Soviets' recent invasion has also been clearly demonstrated.

Times change and circumstances change. Our country has been one that does commit itself to the preservation of peace, but peace through strength, not weakness. That has been our policy. That will still be our policy.

**Q. Is there any specific new hope for ending the hostage crisis with Iran?**

A. I can't predict the early end of that situation. The concern that I feel about the hostages today is just as great as it was a month ago or 2 months ago. Our policy on the Iranian capturing of our hostages has been clear and consistent. It's an abhorrent violation of every moral and ethical standard and international

aw. It's a criminal act, a group of terrorists, kidnapers seizing innocent victims and holding them for attempted blackmail in an unprecedented way, supported and encouraged by government officials themselves.

Our response has been clear, to protect, first of all, the short term and long-range interests of our country; secondly, to protect the safety and the lives of the hostages themselves; third, to pursue every possible avenue of the early and safe release of our hostages; fourth, to avoid bloodshed if possible because I have felt from the very beginning that the initiation of a military action or the causing of bloodshed would undoubtedly result in the death of the hostages; and fifth, and perhaps most difficult of all, is to arouse and to sustain the strong support by the vast majority of nations on Earth for our position as an aggrieved nation and the condemnation of the world for Iran for his direct violation of international law. It's an abhorrent act.

I don't know when the hostages will be released, but we will maintain our intense interests in it. We will maintain our commitment to every possible avenue to carry out the policies I've just described to you, and we will maintain as best we can the full support of the rest of the world and that concerted pressure from many sources, including the recent sanctions that we have initiated against Iran, I believe and I hope and I pray will result in the safe release of our hostages. I can't predict exactly when.

**Q. How do you answer criticism that your Administration bungled the admission of the Shah to this country chiefly by not providing guaranteed protection to the American Embassy in Iran after American diplomats had warned that there might be this kind of trouble, and there had been, in fact, a seizure of the Embassy a few months previously?**

**A.** I don't have any apology at all for letting the Shah come here as an extremely sick person—

**Q. What about protection of the Embassy?**

**A.** —for treatment. The Embassy had been attacked in the past. Embassies around the world are often subjected to attacks. In every instance the Iranian officials had joined with our own people to protect the Embassy of the United States. Following the seizure of the Embassy earlier in the year we had carried

out a substantial program for the strengthening of the Embassy's defenses.

After the Shah came here to the United States for treatment and we notified the Iranian officials of that fact, we were again assured by the Iranian Prime Minister and the Iranian Foreign Minister that the Embassy would be protected. It was, indeed, protected for about 10 days, following which the Ayatollah Khomeini made a very aggressive and abusive speech and when it was attacked by militant terrorists, the Iranians, the Iranian Government, withdrew their protection for the Embassy.

It was an unpredictable kind of thing. This has never been done, so far as I know, in modern history, to have a government support a terrorist act of this kind, the kidnapping of hostages and the holding of them for attempted blackmail. But there was no stone unturned in our attempt to maintain relations with Iran, which is in our interest, and at the same time to protect our people.

**Q. Some of our allies are now saying that Iran already is in chaos and that if the United States puts the economic screws on, that country could fall apart and make it easy for the Soviet Union to pick up the pieces. Are you listening to this or are you still going to put the screws on Iran?**

**A.** That's been a constant concern of mine. What we want is a unified Iran, not fragmented. We want a stable and independent Iran, and we want a secure Iran. But we cannot accept the abhorrent act, supported by the Iranian officials, of the terrorists holding Americans hostage. We have decided to take action against Iran, with the presence of our naval forces, to prevent injury to our hostages; and secondly, to impose, with an increasing degree of severity, sanctions against Iran that would encourage them to release the hostages.

There has been obviously a new element introduced into the Iranian hostage crisis in recent weeks with the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan. My belief is that many of the responsible officials in Iran now see that this major threat to Iran's security, and the peace of Iran, is becoming paramount, and that there will be an additional effort on their part to secure the release of the hostages and remove the isolation of Iran from the rest of the civilized world.

But I think our actions have been well considered. We have taken every element of caution about the possibility which you describe. And in my judgment,

the best thing for Iran to do now is to release the hostages, to seek redress of their alleged grievances in the international fora and the courts of the individual nations, and to begin to strengthen themselves against the possible threat by the Soviets now addressed toward them in Afghanistan.

**Q. In view of what you just said, are you prepared to accept a delay or postponement of the imposition of the economic sanctions against Iran?**

**A.** No. Those sanctions will be pursued by ourselves, unilaterally, and joined in by as many of our allies as will agree. We have had very acceptable support by our allies in this imposition of sanctions against Iran, and we've had overwhelming support in the International Court of Justice and in the United Nations from many nations who've observed this situation. So I will not postpone the imposition of sanctions.

**Q. In 1976 you castigated the Republicans for what you described as a "misery index" of some 13%. That misery index is now up to 19%. What do you think about it now?**

**A.** Obviously, when a nation is in a state of crisis—a deep obsession and concern with the holding of innocent Americans and an acknowledged threat to world peace by a Soviet invasion of Afghanistan; with high inflation brought about by, in my opinion, unwarranted increases in the price of oil—this preys on the minds of Americans. We are taking action, as I've described, on this program and previously to alleviate these concerns, and I believe that the unity of America has been paramount. I believe the future will hold a better prospect for the alleviation of those tensions. ■

<sup>1</sup>Text from Weekly Compilation of Presidential Documents of Jan. 28, 1980.



## Interview for NBC News

*Following is an interview President Carter held in the Oval Office with John Chancellor of NBC News on January 7, 1980, portions of which were broadcast during the week.<sup>1</sup>*

**Q. I was wondering about aid—military aid—to Pakistan.**

A. Yes. This is a commitment that I am ready to make. We have already assured President Zia, who's the leader of Pakistan, directly with a telephone communication from me the day—very shortly after the invasion, and since then through emissaries, that we're willing to join other nations in giving necessary protection to Pakistan and meet their legitimate defensive military needs. This is not a threat to India, an adjacent country, but it's an ability for Pakistan to repel invasion if it should occur and particularly to let Pakistan be known as a strong nation able to protect itself, so that a possible invasion will be prevented.

**Q. Have there been any specific communications within the last 48 hours on this between yourself and General Zia or the two governments involved?**

A. Through diplomatic emissaries, yes; not directly between me and Zia.

**Q. Are you able to expand on that, about the amount of aid or how it would be delivered or what it would be?**

A. No. There are three factors that have to be considered. One is the degree to which other nations will join in with us in providing economic and military aid; secondly, the amount of aid and the specific form of it that the Pakistanis would like to have; and thirdly, of course, I'll have to go to the Congress to get authorization to provide the American portion of the aid that's decided to be given to Pakistan.

**Q. Can you tell us what other countries might also be supplying aid to Pakistan?**

A. I think it would be better to let them speak for themselves.

**Q. Would they be Western, industrialized countries?**

A. Yes, mostly, and also some of

the Mideast countries perhaps, which have the wealth and the ability to help to finance part of the aid.

**Q. So you're really putting together a package of aid for Pakistan.**

A. Yes. Some people call it a consortium. I don't want to predict at this point what other nations might do, because the evolution of this so-called consortium is still in the embryonic stage, but we want to accommodate Pakistan's needs. And obviously, with our complete absence, some of the regional countries are obviously consulting with one another and will help themselves individually.

**Q. Somalia, Oman, and Kenya have offered us the use of naval and air facilities. Will the United States accept any of those offers?**

A. Yes, we're considering the use of some of those facilities. We don't have any definite agreement yet, but that's the kind of thing that I think is important to our Nation to prepare for the long-range meeting of any threat to the peace in the Mideast-Persian Gulf-northern Indian Ocean area.

**Q. As a journalist it sometimes seems to me as though the Soviet Union, which will become a net importer of petroleum during the 1980s, is really going for the Persian Gulf. They're trying to control that part of the world. Is that your view?**

A. I think that's one of the factors that we believe is extant. No one can know what the Soviets' plans might be, but I think we've got to be prepared for that eventuality, and the best way to prepare for it is to prevent its occurrence. The arousing of world opinion to recognize the threat that the Soviets project to that area of the world is an important first step, particularly the marshaling of common condemnation of the Soviets for what they've already done. The strengthening of countries in the area that might be threatened, so that they can repel any potential invasion, is another very important element. And I think the third thing is to make sure that our own country realizes that we've got a long-range commitment to be made and that the responsibility and the sacrifice economically to prepare for it must be shared by all of us.

One of the important elements involved in the question you asked is the Soviets' need to produce more of their oil and gas. High technology is an element of that. And the punitive aspects

of a partial trade embargo against the Soviet Union for those very valuable items is a cautionary message to the Soviet Union that I think they are perfectly able to read and must read.

**Q. Could I ask you about Iran, and where we stand now in terms of the hostages?**

A. We've always had a few basic principles to guide me since I've been involved in meeting this absolutely illegal and abhorrent act. One is to protect the long-range interests of our country; secondly, to protect the lives and the well-being of the hostages; third, to seek their release; fourth, to avoid bloodshed if possible, but still to protect our interests if necessary; and lastly, to make sure that a strong majority of the nations of the world understand that Iran is a criminal actor in this process and that we are the aggrieved party, and to keep world support for our position.

We've had four votes in the U.N. Security Council. We've not had a negative vote yet; we've only had four abstentions. When we took our case to the International Court of Justice, the vote was 15 to nothing in favor of our position.

And I think that Iran must realize—there are some responsible people in Iran—and the world must realize that Iran is at this moment involved in a criminal act, a terrorist act. And it's not a matter of negotiating on a diplomatic basis between two nations. This is a matter of condemning Iran for international terrorism and for kidnaping. And I think those purposes that I've described are and will be our basic principles until those hostages are home safe.

**Q. If some Americans are put on trial in "show trials," what would your reaction be to that?**

A. I would rather not give specifics, but we are prepared to take action that would be quite serious in its consequences for Iran.

**Q. And I can't draw any further details on that out of you today?**

A. No, I don't think it would be good to go into details. ■

<sup>1</sup>Text from Weekly Compilation of Presidential Documents of Jan. 14, 1980.

## Hostages in Iran, Invasion of Afghanistan

*Following are remarks by the President made at a White House briefing for Members of Congress on January 8, 1980.<sup>1</sup>*

Tonight I'd like to take a few minutes to explain to you two basic and serious problems that we've now been addressing—one of them since the 4th of November, the other one, just Christmas Eve.

### Hostages in Iran

I don't recall in history a time, at least in modern history, when our nation was at peace that it was so deeply concerned as it has been the last 2 months since American hostages were kidnaped in our own Embassy in Tehran on November 4. I need not go into the details on that incident, because you're thoroughly familiar with them. But I will outline very quickly the basic principles that have guided me the last 2 months, and then at the end of my brief comments, I'll be glad to have questions from any of you.

This has not been a good 2 months. It's been a time of strain and trial. It's been a time of intimate negotiations with many foreign leaders, trying to accomplish the basic goals that we have followed since the beginning of this confrontation with the terrorists or kidnappers in Tehran.

Our first commitment has been to protect the interests of our Nation, the long-run, long-range interests; secondly, to do what we can to insure the lives and the safety of the American hostages—our 50 fellow countrymen; third, to secure through diplomatic means, using every possible channel, their release—unharmful, if God be willing; fourth, to avoid bloodshed, which would very likely lead to the death of our hostages; and fifth and most difficult, to maintain support for the American position by the vast majority of nations on Earth.

This has not been an easy last task, because historically in the United Nations and other international fora, our country has not been a favorite, because we are powerful and a superpower and because there is a jealousy and animosity at times and distrust toward us.

We've now had four votes in the Security Council, as you know. We've not yet experienced a negative vote. On the last vote to set a deadline for the imposition of sanctions and to call for the Secretary General's trip to Iran, there were four abstentions—the Soviet Union and their puppet, Czechoslovakia, and two small Moslem nations, Bangladesh and Kuwait. The other 11 nations voted to send the Secretary General to Iran for a last effort to negotiate the release of the hostages, at the end of which time the Security Council would come back and take action on possible economic sanctions.

In the International Court of Justice, the vote was 15 to 0—a unanimous vote.

So far then, we have accomplished all the goals that we set for ourselves except the release of the hostages, and we are still exploring every possible avenue for that release.

The most difficult part of the Iranian question is that there's no government entity with whom we can communicate or negotiate or register a complaint or a request. When the Secretary General went over to Iran, he came back and reported the same thing that we had already known, and that is that the most powerful single political entity in Iran consists of the international terrorists or the kidnapers who are holding our hostages. Whenever there has been a showdown concerning the hostages between Khomeini or the Revolutionary Council versus the terrorists, the terrorists have always prevailed.

We don't know what will happen in the future, but I think you possibly recognize that this small group of people—who may originally have comprised some students, but who are not students and should not be referred to as students—have achieved, with the holding of American hostages, a great and significant political influence in Iran. They don't necessarily have as one of their prime interests the integrity of Iran as a nation or the well-being of the Iranian people or even the security of the country within which they live. And so there is no legitimate political bargaining leverage that can be exerted on them, and there is no entity there with whom one can negotiate.

They know that the consequences to Iran will be quite severe if our hostages are injured or killed, and I think only the presence of a very strong military force in the Arabian Sea has deterred them so far from taking action that would have been even more abhorrent to the rest of the world. That problem persists. It's an ever-present consideration of mine and yours. And I'm determined that this country will not forget for a moment those hostages. And the last hostage there is just as important to me as the first one.

Our country is remarkably unified. I've had strong support, which I deeply appreciate, and the American people have been surprisingly patient, which, as you know, is not a characteristic of Americans. But I think most people who've studied the situation, who've looked at the map, who've seen where the Embassy is located within Tehran, can see that a strike force or a military action that might be oriented toward the release of the hostages would almost certainly end in failure and almost certainly end in the death of the hostages.

They are being held in small groups—two or perhaps three in a group—with heavily armed militants constantly guarding them and the hostages constantly being tied, with their hands bound at all times.

We'll continue to persist. Our next step will be in the United Nations to have sanctions imposed against Iran. I cannot predict to you that the imposition of those sanctions—if we get the nine requisite votes—will cause an early release of the hostages. We pray that something will happen and that eventually Iran will recognize that the threat to them is not from the United States but even more vividly from the Soviet Union, which has, on Christmas Eve, invaded Afghanistan.

### Invasion of Afghanistan

In my own opinion, shared by many of the world's leaders with whom I have discussed this matter, the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan is the greatest threat to peace since the Second World War. It's a sharp escalation in the aggressive history of the Soviet Union.

Obviously, we all were shocked and deplored publicly and officially the Soviet action in Hungary and then later, in 1968, in Czechoslovakia. Those were two countries which, since the Second World War, were basically subservient to the Soviet Union; they were

not independent nations in control of their own affairs. There was an uprising, as you know, and the Soviets brutally stamped the uprising out within those two countries.

This, however, was a sovereign nation, a nonaligned nation, a deeply religious nation, and the Soviets invaded it brutally.

We were informed, other leaders throughout the world were informed, by Soviet Ambassadors and direct messages from Moscow, that the Soviets went into the nation to protect it from some third force that might be threatening Afghanistan. When questioned about where was the third threatening force from, the Soviets have never been able to give a reasonable answer. They claim that they were invited in by the government to protect Afghanistan. As you know, the leader of Afghanistan, President Amin, who was supposed to have invited them in, was immediately assassinated as soon as the Soviets obtained control over Kabul, the capital city, and several of the members of the President's family were also killed.

We are the other superpower on Earth, and it became my responsibility, representing our great nation, to take action that would prevent the Soviets from this invasion with impunity. The Soviets had to suffer the consequences. In my judgment our own Nation's security was directly threatened. There is no doubt that the Soviets' move into Afghanistan, if done without adverse consequences, would have resulted in the temptation to move again and again until they reached warm water ports or until they acquired control over a major portion of the world's oil supplies.

I talked to the President of Pakistan immediately after this Afghanistan invasion and also talked to many other of the world's leaders and sent them direct messages. The action that we could take was confined to three opportunities. One is to take military action, which I did not consider appropriate. Our country has no desire, nor could we have effectively implemented military action, to drive the Soviet forces from Afghanistan—which left me with two other options, which I chose to exercise. One is political action, and the other one is economic action.

Politically, we joined with 50 other nations to take to the Security Council two propositions: one, to condemn the Soviet Union for the invasion and, therefore, the threat to world peace;

and secondly, to call upon the Soviets to withdraw their troops. The vote was cast after the debates were concluded. The only nations voting against these two propositions were East Germany—again, a Soviet puppet nation—and the Soviets themselves. The permanent members, as you know, have a veto right. And now a move is underway, which I think will be realized, to take this case to the General Assembly for further condemnation of the Soviet Union.

It's difficult to understand why the Soviets took this action. I think they probably underestimated the adverse reaction from around the world. I've talked to many other leaders, our allies and those representing nations that might be further threatened, and they all believe that we took the right action. It was not done for political reasons; it was not done to implement some foreign policy. It was done in the interest of our national security.

We did take economic action, which I think was properly balanced. It was carefully considered. We will try to impose this action on the Soviet Union in a way that will have a minimal adverse effect on our own country, where the sacrifices will be shared as equitably as you and I together can possibly devise and at the same time let the Soviets realize the consequences of their invasion.

We will not permit the Soviets to fish in American waters within 200 miles of our land area. They have a very large fishing fleet, involving hundreds of thousands of tons of fish harvested. They will not have those permits renewed.

We will not send high technology equipment to the Soviet Union or any equipment that might have a security benefit to the Soviet Union. This will include drilling equipment, for instance, used for the exploration and production of oil and natural gas.

We will restrict severely normal commerce with the Soviet Union, which is highly advantageous to them. And of course, I have interrupted the delivery of grain, which the Soviets had ordered, above and beyond the 8 million tons which our Nation is bound by a 5-year agreement to have delivered to the Soviet Union.

We have taken steps to make sure that the farmers are protected from the adverse consequences of this interruption of grain shipments to a maximum degree possible. It will be a costly proposition. I understood this when I took

the action. And my estimate is, based on a fairly thorough but somewhat rapid analysis, that this year the extra cost to purchase this grain and to change the price levels of corn and wheat and to pay the extra storage charges will amount to about \$2 billion. That's in fiscal year 1980. In fiscal year 1981 there will be an additional cost of about \$800 million.

It may be that as the season progresses and we have more experience in substituting for the Soviet Union as the purchaser of this grain, that there will be an additional \$200-300 million spent in 1980. If this should take place, then that would reduce by the same amount, roughly, expenditures in 1981 fiscal year. So, the total cost will be in the neighborhood of \$2.8 billion. This cost will not fall on the farmers except to the extent that they are taxpayers like every other American. This will be shared by all those in this country who pay taxes to the Federal Government.

This grain will not be permitted to go back on the market in such a way as to depress agricultural prices. And in a few minutes I'll let one of the representatives here of the Agriculture Department, Jim Williams, outline to you the details. And I have a sheet prepared, for handing out to all of you—the exact loan prices for wheat and corn and the other prices for the redemption of corn and wheat from storage.

The last point I want to make is this: It's very important that we understand that our allies are working very closely with us. I talked to several of them before we took this action. All of them agreed that it should be taken. We've got the maximum practical assurance from them that they will not substitute their sale of goods, including grain, for our own. There are three major nations that ordinarily have grain to export—Argentina, Canada, and Australia. Argentina does not have adequate grain to make any significant difference.

I talked to President Giscard d'Estaing today, who represents West Europe. They do have substantial quantities of grain ordinarily on hand, particularly barley. They will not substitute their grain for ours that's being withheld from the Soviet Union.

We anticipate that this withholding of grain to the Soviet Union will not force them to withdraw their troops from Afghanistan. We understood this from the beginning. We don't think that economic pressure or even condemna-



## Meeting the Challenge in Southwest Asia

*Statement before the Senate Appropriations Committee on February 1, 1980.<sup>1</sup>*

We meet at a time when new challenges abroad underscore the importance of active American leadership in the world—a leadership based both on strength and on diplomatic skill. For these are times which test both our wisdom and our will.

Our requirements are underscored by the particular challenges we face in the southwest Asian and Persian Gulf region, where Iranian militants hold American diplomats prisoner—and where Soviet troops seek to suppress the people of a sovereign nation.

Let me begin my testimony by taking a few moments to describe the elements of our strategy in this troubled area. Obviously, one region does not define our total agenda. It does, however, provide a compelling demonstration of the imposing diplomatic tasks that lie ahead.

### Resisting Soviet Aggression

In its invasion of Afghanistan, the Soviet Union, for the first time since World War II, has used its own armed forces beyond the Warsaw Pact sphere to impose its authority directly over a Third World country. The Soviets' precise motives in attacking Afghanistan may remain unclear. But there is no lack of clarity about the fact of their aggression.

The Soviet action requires an American response that is firm, sustained, and effective. Our object is to impose a cost on Soviet actions in Afghanistan and, more broadly, to make it clear that such aggression anywhere will encounter firm resistance. We seek also to strengthen our position in the region in ways that protect our interests, reassure our friends, and recognize local realities.

The President acted promptly after the invasion to limit the transfer of high technology, grain sales, and other commercial contracts; to restrict Soviet access to our fisheries; and to suspend various U.S.-Soviet exchanges. It is also our firm view that we should not

make the same mistake that we made in 1936, when we participated in an Olympics which were used to glorify a host whose policies were threatening the peace.

We are working with our allies, and with other nations, as they develop their own measures in opposition to aggression.

The Soviet Union stands condemned by the entire world community. The U.N. General Assembly vote of condemnation, 104 nations to 18, was a telling rebuke to the Soviet Union and especially to their notion, pressed last summer in Havana, that developing countries and the Soviet Union have a "natural alliance."

The President is also taking action to deter further aggression in the area. We have assured Pakistan of our support. And the Soviet Union is on notice that any attempt to control the vital Persian Gulf region will be repelled by any means necessary, including military force.

To strengthen our ability to respond swiftly and effectively to military needs in the region should they arise, we have increased our force presence in the Indian Ocean. We have held positive initial discussions with a number of nations in the area concerning U.S. access to air and port facilities. And we are accelerating our plans for the rapid deployment force. These steps to enhance the mobility of our military forces are an essential part of the overall defense modernization program in which we are engaged.

### Strengthening Regional Security

Enhancing the security of that region must also be a cooperative undertaking. As the President said in the State of the Union: "... we are prepared to work with other countries in the region to share a cooperative security framework that respects differing values and political beliefs, yet which enhances the independence, security, and prosperity of all."

This effort to build a more secure community of independent nations in the region will require a sustained, long-term commitment. Let me briefly

ion by the United Nations of the Soviet Union will cause them to withdraw their troops. But we hope that we have laid down a marker and let them know that they will indeed suffer, now and in the future, from this unwarranted invasion of a formerly independent, nonaligned country.

I need the support of the American people. I believe that it's a matter of patriotism, and I believe that it's a matter of protecting our nation's security. I anticipate that we'll get good response from the Congress in the minimal legislation that might be required to carry out these programs. Almost all of it can be done by administrative action under the rights given by the Congress, through legislation, to the Secretary of Agriculture and to me.

There are just a couple of other things that perhaps should be mentioned, but I think I'll wait on them till a little later.

We want to pursue a long-range analysis and a schedule of actions to strengthen American interests and presence and influence in this troubled area of the world, in southwest Asia. You know about some of these from news reports that have already been issued.

And we will take action, with the Congress' help, to strengthen Pakistan. Our desire is to do this through a consortium of nations; that's also the desire of Pakistan. I talked since luncheon with President Zia of that country. I've talked to him before about this matter.

And other nations in the region which might be threatened by the Soviets, from Afghanistan, will also know that we and many other nations on Earth are committed to their adequate defense capability, so that the Soviets will be discouraged from further expansionism in the area.

Because of the Iranian question, we have greatly built up our naval forces in the northern China Sea or in the Arabian Sea. Those will be maintained at a higher level than they have been in the past. And as you know, there has been a marshaling of worldwide public opinion, not only in the condemnation of the Iranian terrorists who hold our hostages but also against the Soviet Union for their unprecedented invasion of Afghanistan in this recent few weeks. ■

<sup>1</sup>Opening and closing paragraphs omitted; text from Weekly Compilation of Presidential Documents of Jan. 14, 1980.

discuss five critical elements of this effort.

**First**, we are working to improve local capabilities for self-defense and enhance the political and economic stability of the area.

This objective is advanced through our economic and security assistance program, including those in Israel and Egypt. And to address the immediate danger to Pakistan, we will be requesting an exception to existing legislative restrictions so that we can join with others in responding swiftly to Pakistan's security needs. This does not signal a lessening of our commitment to nonproliferation, and we have so indicated to the Pakistanis. It does signal our determination to help a country that faces the threat of Soviet combat forces and combat operations on its border.

**Second**, the goal of regional security will be served if local disputes can be resolved. Resolution of such disputes can strengthen the security of the states in the region, bring a greater measure of stability to the area, and lessen the chances for conflict which the Soviets could exploit.

Recent events have underlined our interest and that of all parties in the region in an Arab-Israeli peace. It is in Israel's and Egypt's strategic interest, as well as in ours, to carry forward the Camp David accords. A secure peace between Israel and its neighbors would enhance the security of Israel and permit the Arab states to concentrate more fully on domestic needs and the Soviet threat.

For similar reasons, we must be diligent in our support for efforts to resolve the differences between India and Pakistan and to avoid a nuclear rivalry on the subcontinent. We are also encouraging cooperation among the nations of the Persian Gulf and Arabian Peninsula.

In a highly significant show of cohesion this week, the Foreign Ministers of 35 Islamic countries united in a forceful denunciation of the Soviet aggression against Afghanistan and called for the use of "all possible means" to bring about a withdrawal.

**Third**, it is important that we seek improved relations with nations throughout the area, wherever there is a basis of shared interests.

As we seek to help Pakistan meet its legitimate defense requirements, we retain a strong interest in cooperation

with India. Clark Clifford's [President Carter's personal emissary to India] mission is a measure of the high priority we attach to U.S.-Indian relations.

With respect to Iran, as the President said: "We cannot and will not relax our concern for the hostages." To do so would be to fail our responsibilities to fellow citizens and to countenance a flagrant disregard for international law and for elemental standards of decency. Therefore, this matter will remain uppermost in our relations with Iran and at the top of our foreign policy agenda. We will pursue every channel to achieve the safe return of our people.

But the Soviet action should give Iran added reason to be responsive. As the Soviet threat has increased, the leaders of Iran have added reason to bring about the prompt and unconditional release of the hostages, as mandated by both the International Court of Justice and the U.N. General Assembly.

**Fourth**, we are coordinating our efforts with others outside the region who share our interests there.

We have already made clear that our assistance to Pakistan will be an integral part of a broad international effort. We have been engaged in active consultations with our European allies, Japan, Australia, Saudi Arabia, and others to this end. The Soviet invasion of Afghanistan presents a threat not only to American interests in the region; it is a threat to the interests of our allies as well. We are asking our allies not that they support an American response; we are asking that they follow our lead in a coordinated response to serve our common interests.

**Fifth**, we need to demonstrate American and Western understanding of Islam. Our difference with Iran, for example, is in no sense a confrontation with the Islamic faith or Islamic traditions. On the other hand, the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan represents an attempt to crush an Islamic resistance and to impose external rule over all of an Islamic nation.

We must pursue such policies on a sustained basis. They will require not only our strength and our resources but also diplomatic skill. And, to a considerable degree, their impact will depend upon our actions in other areas as well.

It is all the more critical now that we reduce our reliance on foreign oil. The strength of our international position is grounded in the strength of our

economy and thus upon our ability to construct a secure energy future. We must invest our efforts here with still greater urgency—to substitute our own conservation for a greater share of imported oil and to build a greater capacity to fulfill our own energy needs.

And we must persist in foreign policy directions that have been charted and which remain fundamentally sound. As we build our strength to meet the challenges of the times, we must not lose sight of the strengths we gain through steadiness in our diplomacy.

The Soviet assault against Afghanistan requires the new steps we are taking in our foreign policies. Our relations with the Soviet Union must convey the clear message that the response to aggression will be firm and sustained. For our hopes for better relations and for peace will depend on the choices they make in coming years.

But let us also be clear that the longer term goals we are pursuing are essential if we are to continue building America's military, economic, and political strength in the coming decade.

- We will continue to build America's military strength and to strengthen our alliances. The reinstatement of registration for the draft will further demonstrate our resolve.
- We will continue, out of hard-headed self-interest, to support effective, verifiable limits on the accumulation and spread of nuclear weapons. The SALT II Treaty remains strongly in our security interest. Without it, by 1985 the Soviets could have several thousand more warheads and several hundred more systems to deliver them than is possible under the treaty. Without it, our ability to observe Soviet strategic forces—and thus evaluate Soviet capabilities—would be impaired. Our predictions of future Soviet strategic forces will be less certain and thus our defense planning more difficult. And the opportunity for further limits in the future will be clouded. For these reasons, we remain committed to ratification of the treaty.
- We will continue the process of normalization of relations with China.
- We will continue to pursue an active diplomacy, as in the Middle East and southern Africa, to seek peaceful solutions to regional disputes. A just peace is always its own justification.

# National Security Goals

by President Carter

*Excerpts from an address before the annual convention of the American Legion in Washington, D.C., on February 19, 1980.*<sup>1</sup>

. . . .

We remain the world's most powerful force, and the American people and the Congress are now united with me in keeping the United States second to none in military strength. I have to tell you that this degree of common commitment has not always existed. During the last 12 years, for instance, the Congress has cut the Presidents' defense budget by more than \$50 billion—an average reduction below what the Presidents have proposed of more than \$4 billion per year.

Recently this pattern has changed, and we now have obvious and growing support throughout this country for a strong national defense. This new unity in this new determination must be sustained; not just for a few months, but so long as the serious challenges confront the United States of America, we must be united and determined to have a strong country. I'm very thankful that most Americans agree with you and me that in order to insure an America at peace, we must and we will have that strong America.

## Promoting Peace

We are determined also to see the blessings of peace shared with other people around the world. At Camp David and during my personal mission to the Mideast, we promoted peace between Egypt and Israel. In just a few days, a milestone will be passed in history when full diplomatic recognition is consummated with the exchange of Ambassadors between those two countries that have been at war four times in the last 30 years. Now work must continue toward that comprehensive peace that is so vital to the security of the United States and to stability in the Middle East.

After 4 years of negotiation also, we concluded the historic Panama Canal treaties, which will protect American interests, which will stabilize a potentially volatile situation, which will assure continued responsible operation of the canal, which will enable us to protect the canal—now and in the far distant future, during the 21st century—and strengthen

our influence in a strategic area of the world and of this hemisphere.

We have also negotiated a sound strategic arms limitation treaty, SALT II, which has great advantages for our country. It will enhance world stability and peace.

SALT II will continue the process of arms control which was begun by President Eisenhower and which has been continued by every President since his time. It will help to prevent the proliferation of nuclear weapons among the other nations on Earth. It will force substantial reduction in the present numbers of Soviet missile launchers and provides no similar requirement that missile launchers of the United States be reduced. It will enhance the ability that we have to monitor the Soviet nuclear forces. It will prevent an expensive and a dangerous nuclear arms race, an arms race that would be counterproductive both for ourselves and for the Soviet Union, and would require funding, very high levels of funding which are needed to improve the American conventional forces.

SALT II is not a panacea. It is a supplement and not a substitute for a strong defense. SALT II is not based on trust. It can be verified by our own national technical means. I will consult very closely with the Congress when the time comes again to move toward ratification of the treaty.

During these past 3 years we've joined with our Atlantic allies to strengthen NATO, both its spirit and also its military capability. There's a new sense of cooperation and resolve and a greater confidence that we together can deter aggression.

Another successful foreign policy initiative has great strategic significance. We have normalized relations with China while retaining our trade and friendship with the people of Taiwan. We now have a great opportunity to expand this new relationship to bring mutual advantages to both countries and to improve the prospects for a stable and a peaceful Asia. This is the first time I recall in history when our nation has been friends with both Japan and China at the same time.

And, as you well know, our nation's commitment to democracy, to human rights, to self-determination, and to economic stability and development has greatly improved our relations with the countries of the Third World.

## New Challenges

These achievements have all been gratifying to you and to me, yet today we face new and serious challenges. At this very moment, 53 Americans are being held hostage in Iran. The long and continuous efforts to insure the safe release of our people have now reached a particularly sensitive and intense stage. My task is to protect the interests and the principles of our nation while we negotiate for the release of the Americans who are being held as innocent prisoners.

I deeply appreciate the firmness, patience, the unity, and the will shown by almost all Americans during these days of crisis. I cannot and I will not rest until every single American is home, safe, and free.

Also at this very moment, some 100,000 Soviet troops, heavily armed, seek to subjugate a proud and a once independent nation, a nation that presented no challenge to Soviet security and wanted only to retain their freedom. This Soviet invasion of Afghanistan poses a threat to the independence of countries throughout southwest Asia and to the economic lifeblood of many nations, oil. It has altered the careful balance of forces in a vital and a volatile area of the world.

That's why I did not hesitate to answer Soviet aggression with strong economic sanctions, including restrictions on grain shipments and sales of high technology to the Soviet Union. That's why we joined with more than 100 other nations in the United Nations to condemn this aggression and to demand withdrawal of the Soviet invasion forces from Afghanistan. And that is why I have given notice that the United States will not attend the Moscow Olympics, unless the Soviet invasion forces are withdrawn from Afghanistan before February 20. That deadline is tomorrow, and it will not be changed.

And finally, I have served notice in my State of the Union address, and I would like to quote the words: "An attempt by any outside force to gain control of the Persian Gulf region will be regarded as an assault on the vital interests of the United States of America, and such an assault will be repelled by any means necessary, including military force."

And as I also stated clearly to the Congress: While protecting the constitutional rights of Americans and avoiding the abuses of the past, we must remove all impediments to an effective intelligence capability for our nation.

At this time, I am strengthening our own military presence in the Persian Gulf region, and we are encouraging other na-



tions to form a cooperative security framework, which can enhance their independence and help to preserve regional peace.

To underscore our resolve and our readiness, I've stepped up our overall defense effort and proposed registration for draft-age Americans. I have made it clear that there is no need at this time to reimpose the draft, but registration is a necessary precaution which will expedite mobilization if it should be required in the future.

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It is important that everyone understands that every action that I have taken is peaceful and is designed to preserve peace. Because we seek peace, we have pursued and will pursue every opportunity to ease tensions. Because we seek peace, we have been cautious and restrained. Because we seek peace, we must leave no room for doubt among our allies and no room for miscalculation among our potential adversaries.

It is obvious that the Soviet leaders did miscalculate in Afghanistan. They underestimated the courage and the tenacity of freedom fighters in that country, and they did not anticipate the world's quick and forceful response to their aggression. They are now paying a high price in the number of casualties in Afghanistan, in our own actions, in the actions of our allies, and in the condemnation of virtually the entire Muslim and Third World community in the United Nations and in the individual and collective statements and actions.

There is no way for you or me to know the future plans of the Soviet leaders. We cannot be certain if or when they will withdraw their forces, if they seek colonial domination only in Afghanistan or if they seek other conquests as well. No President of the United States can afford to gamble our peace and security upon wishful thinking about the present or the future intentions of the Soviet Union. But we do know that our intentions must be crystal clear. We will stand firm against aggression, and we will not accept business as usual with the Soviet Union while the invasion continues.

Our firmness is not a prelude to combat nor is it a return to the cold war. It is simply prudence—to reduce the chances for a misjudgment that could be fatal to peace. It's a reaffirmation of a longstanding commitment and a sustained response to a strategic challenge.

Our measured reaction to this aggression, fortunately, comes at a time when our military strength is unequalled

and growing, in keeping with the commitment that I made to you in 1976.

A dangerous decline in defense spending has been reversed. From 1969 to 1976, real defense outlays—that is, constant dollars spent—declined every year. In constant dollars, defense spending dropped by one-third in those 8 years before I became President. President Ford began to reverse this pattern, but only since 1977 have outlays for defense been increased every year. Our 5-year defense program through 1985 will continue this trend.

I would like to reemphasize that from the very start, my Administration, in cooperation with the Congress, has been engaged in a substantial and carefully planned strengthening of our military forces. In December of last year—well before the Soviet invasion—the Secretary of Defense presented to the Congress the broad outlines of my plans for defense spending not only in 1981 but for the next 5 years. And last month I submitted officially the strong budget proposal itself.

The Soviet invasion of Afghanistan has made everyone more aware of the importance of a strong defense capability. But since the process of strengthening our military forces has been underway for several years, the recent developments in southwest Asia do not now require any major redesign of next year's defense budget. Of course we will continue to review our requirements and make any necessary adjustments to meet changing circumstances.

I consider the increase in the defense budget for fiscal year 1981 to be necessary to assure our national security. It's a carefully measured amount, and it in no way signals a new or transient "boom" in defense spending. It is estimated quite accurately that the Soviet Union spends 13% of their gross national income or gross national product on defense. The percentage of our own gross national product represented by defense expenditures for 1981 is about 5%. And that share will hardly vary at all if the present projections of our defense expenditures are carried out in 1982, 1983, 1984, and 1985—about 5% of our GNP. The impact of the additional expenditure on the inflation rate will be negligible.

These expenditures for defense are clearly within the capability of our American economy. And moreover, we are spending our money well.

- We are strengthening our strategic "triad" that deters the Soviet nuclear threat.

- I accelerated development of cruise missiles, which begin production this year. Because of their small size and the large numbers, cruise missiles will be far more effective than the B-1 bomber for penetrating Soviet air defenses now or those they can project in the future.

- We have initiated a new MX missile system and finally resolved schedule and contract problems that had stalled the Trident submarine program for so long. The first Trident was launched last year, and six more are under construction.

Because we have emphasized a stronger NATO, which had languished, as you know, during the Vietnam war, we now have commitments from our NATO partners for an annual 3% real growth in their own defense budgets. We have begun joint developments of new weapons, we have enhanced our ability for a rapid deployment of ground and air forces in Europe in a crisis, and have spurred modernization of NATO theater nuclear weapons to meet a threatening buildup of formidable Soviet nuclear missiles in that region of the world.

Our NATO allies keep about 3 million troops on active duty. Added to our 2 million, we can and we will maintain a powerful and effective force for the defense of Western Europe. You can depend on that because it is vital to our own nation's defense.

I have also emphasized since I have been in office the general modernizing of the conventional forces of our country, to respond to military threats not only in Europe but in other vital areas of the world.

- We are re-equipping our ground forces. We have already expanded the number of tanks and infantry battalions. We are modernizing our Navy with an additional aircraft carrier, new guided-missile ships, Harpoon cruise missiles, and new and more modern and effective attack submarines. We have now underway the first full-scale modernization of tactical air forces since the 1960s.

- We are capable today of responding to a threat of peace—to a threat to peace in almost any part of the world. Our naval task force now in the Persian Gulf region testifies to our mobility and our strength, and we are building a rapid deployment force which can carry stronger defense forces—much stronger defense forces—to any vital area.

- To achieve that goal, we have already begun development of a new fleet of large transport planes and a force of maritime prepositioning ships with

enough supplies and heavy equipment for three Marine brigades.

The sum of all these defense efforts is a clear message: We have not abdicated—and we will not abdicate—the responsibility of the United States to help maintain a peaceful world.

### Commitment to Peace

Our commitment to world peace is twofold: We and our allies must be able to meet any military challenge, and we must be strong and principled as we seek to resolve disputes and to reduce tensions.

Preventing nuclear war is a preeminent task, to repeat what I said earlier. That is why the last three U.S. Presidents have negotiated the strategic arms limitation treaties—and I will not abandon this effort to control nuclear weapons. In fact, the immediate crisis underscores the importance of mutual constraints on nuclear weapons. Because it serves our security interests, I remain committed to the ratification of the SALT II Treaty.

Last month I said in my State of the Union address that we must face the world as it is. We must be honest with ourselves, and we must be honest with others. That is why 3 years ago I determined to reverse the declining effectiveness of our military forces. And that is why I have worked so hard to fight inflation as we develop a national energy policy. We are dangerously dependent on imported oil, and there is no cheap way out.

Let me quote from the American Legion's own energy policy statement: "Our national security, as well as our economic security, cannot exist without energy independence. . . ."

I thank you again for your hard work and your effective efforts to face facts and to help build a secure future for our country. We cannot spend or regulate our way out of every national problem. Nor can we abolish inflation by decree. That is the truth. Above all, whether it is registration of young people, increased military strength for ourselves and our allies, or increased energy conservation and production, we cannot have peace and security without a willingness to sacrifice. That is the most important truth of all.

With your help and with the support of the American people, I propose to carry on the struggle for a strong nation, for a just society, and for a peaceful world.

## President Carter's News Conference, February 13 (Excerpts)

Since the day our Embassy was seized in Tehran, we have had two goals: one, the safety and release of the Americans being held hostage, and the other is the protection of our national interest in this critical area of the world. Since that first day, we have pursued every possibility to achieve these goals. No stone has been left unturned in the search for a solution.

Over the past several weeks, our efforts and our activities have become particularly delicate and intense. Recently there have been some positive signs, although experience has taught us to guard against excessive optimism.

Since mid-November, we and the Iranian officials have been discussing with Secretary General Waldheim of the United Nations his proposal to send a commission of inquiry to Tehran. We would support steps by the United Nations that would lead to the release of the hostages if the steps are consistent with our goals and our essential international principles. An appropriate commission with a carefully defined purpose would be a step toward resolution of this crisis.

I know that you and the American people will understand that I cannot afford at this delicate time to discuss or to comment further upon any specific efforts that may be underway or any proposals that may be useful in ending this crisis.

**Q. Do you think it was proper for the United States to restore the Shah to the throne in 1953 against the popular will within Iran?**

A. That's ancient history, and I don't think it's appropriate or helpful for me to go into the propriety of something that happened 30 years ago.

**Q. If the crisis in Afghanistan is real and as serious as you have said it is—if it is, does the United States have the military capacity to cope with it, short of using a nuclear weapon?**

A. The crisis is a great one, precipitated by the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan, for several reasons. First of all, this is a crucial area of the world—to us, to our allies, and to other nations. Two-thirds of all the oil ex-

ported in the entire world come from the Persian Gulf region. Secondly, it's a highly volatile, rapidly changing, unstable part of the world. Third, the Soviets have been indulging in a steady military buildup over a number of years, which has caused us concern and to which we have reacted since I've been in this office. Fourth, the Soviets—a major departure from anything they've done since the Second World War—have now exhibited a willingness to use their military forces beyond their own borders, in a massive invasion of Afghanistan.

The reaction that I have taken to these steps are appropriate and, I believe and hope, adequate. We must convince the Soviet Union, through peaceful means, *peaceful* means, that they cannot invade an innocent country with impunity, and they must suffer the consequences of their action.

Everything we've done has been to contribute to stability, moderation, consistency, persistence, and peace. We have taken actions on our own, and we have asked our allies and others to join in with us in the condemnation of the Soviet Union and the demand that the Soviets withdraw from Afghanistan and to convince them that any further adventurism on their part would cause grave consequences to the Soviet Union.

In my judgment our forces are adequate. We cannot afford to let the Soviets choose either the terrain or the tactics to be used by any other country—a nation that might be invaded, their neighbors, our allies, or ourselves—if they should persist in their aggressive action. Those judgments would have to be made at the time. But I believe they're adequate.

**Q. In Afghanistan again, what kind of regime would be acceptable to you? The Russians have said that if they withdraw, they would leave—I think have left the indication that they would leave a puppet regime. Would you insist on a neutralist regime, or what ideas have you on it?**

A. What we would like to have, first of all, is a Soviet withdrawal and a commitment, that might be verified and carried out, that the Soviets would not invade another country or use their military forces beyond their borders again to destabilize the peace. We would like to have a neutral country. If there had to be a transition phase during which a neutral and responsible government might be established ac-

<sup>1</sup>Text from White House press release of Feb. 19, 1980.

ceptable to the Afghanistan people, then perhaps some peacekeeping force espoused by the United Nations, maybe comprised of Muslim military troops or otherwise, could be used during that transition phase.

But the prime consideration that I have is to make sure that the Soviets know that their invasion is not acceptable, to marshal as much support from other nations of the world as possible, and to prevent any further threat to the peace and the cause of war. I think through strength we can maintain peace. But we've got to be resolute, we've got to be consistent, and our actions have got to be in a tone of long-range, predictable action clearly understood by the Soviet Union.

**Q. You call for an increase of about 5% in military defense spending. Some Members of Congress have suggested that that might be too small, given the invasion of Afghanistan by the Soviet Union. Would you support a plan by Congress to go as far as doubling the current 5% increase in military spending?**

**A.** Ever since the first year I've been President, we've had a substantial and steady increase in spending for defense, because I recognized that we had some defects in our defense capability when I became President. I might add, in complete accuracy, that President Ford had initiated this buildup shortly before he went out of office. It's one I've continued.

In my opinion, the military budget that we have presented to the Congress in recent weeks is the appropriate level of expenditures. It's very carefully matched to how rapidly we can purchase and develop weapons and accurately matched to the ultimate goals of deployment of our troops, the mobility of our troops, and the interrelationship with our allies.

I'm not saying that there would be no fine tuning or some modification to the budget that wouldn't be acceptable to me, but I would resist very strongly any effort—as has been proposed just recently—to cut the defense budget below what I proposed.

**Q. You have said that the Soviets have to be made to pay a price for invading Afghanistan, and your counsel has said that our boycott of the Olympics is not intended to be punitive. How do you explain the seeming difference between these two positions?**

**A.** We have no desire to use the Olympics to punish, except the Soviets attach a major degree of importance to the holding of the Olympics in the Soviet Union. In their own propaganda material, they claim that the willingness of the International Olympic Committee to let the games be held in Moscow is an endorsement of the foreign policy and the peace-loving nature of the Soviet Union.

To me it's unconscionable for any nation to send athletes to the capital of a nation under the aegis of the Olympics when that nation—that host nation—is actively involved in the invasion of and the subjugation of innocent people. And so, for that reason, I don't believe that we are at all obligated to send our athletes to Moscow.

And I would like to repeat, if the Soviet Union does not withdraw its troops from Afghanistan by the 20th of this month, then neither I nor the American people nor the Congress will support the sending of an Olympic team to Moscow this summer.

**Q. If the Soviets, by any chance, should remove their troops from Afghanistan between February 20 and May 21, when the Olympic committees have to give their decisions, is there any possibility you might change your mind and then support sending the American team to Moscow?**

**A.** I don't see any possibility of that.

**Q. As you know, the French have not agreed to go to a foreign ministers conference in Rome later this month. The West Germans have not agreed to the Olympic boycott, and there's been some dissatisfaction, I understand, with your Administration's reaction to the Japanese. Have you been entirely satisfied with the Japanese, the French, and the West German reactions to your call for punishment and sanctions against the Soviet Union?**

**A.** In general, I have been well pleased, yes. There's a remarkable degree of unanimity among all our major allies about the seriousness of the Soviet threat into Afghanistan and the actions that must be taken to counter that threat and prevent further aggression by the Soviet Union.

There are nuances of difference.

The countries are different; they have different perspectives; they have different forms of government. Some are coalition governments where the prime minister has a different party represented in his foreign ministry and so forth. We do have times when we get aggravated and displeased, for instance, with the French. There are times when the French get aggravated and displeased by us.

The recent disagreement on exactly the time and the composition and the secrecy to be maintained by the foreign ministers meeting was unfortunate. My understanding of it was derived from a telephone conversation with [West German] Chancellor Schmidt after he met several days with [French] President Giscard d'Estaing. My understanding was that the date and the place had been arranged by them and that I was conforming to their request. That was not the same understanding that the French had. We did not communicate adequately. But that's just a minor difference compared to the major agreements on which we base present and future policy among us allies.

**Q. You once said that you weren't sure whether American troops should ever be used to defend Yugoslavia. Marshal Tito is sick. In light of Afghanistan, do you still feel that way?**

**A.** We have had close discussions with the Yugoslavian leaders, including Marshal Tito when he was here not too long ago. The overall message that they give to us, which I accept as accurate, is that Yugoslavia is a strong, fiercely independent, courageous, well-equipped nation that can defend itself. If we are called upon to give any kind of aid to the Yugoslavian people in the future, we would seriously consider it and do what, in our opinion, would be best for them and for us.

I've had frequent conversations recently with other major European leaders about the need to strengthen our ties with Yugoslavia and to protect them as a nonaligned country, without being dominated or threatened successfully by the Soviet Union. We'll take whatever action is necessary to carry out those goals, but commensurate with actual need and commensurate with specific requests from Yugoslavia itself. ■

<sup>1</sup>Text from Weekly Compilation of Presidential Documents of Feb. 18, 1980.



But now these efforts have an even greater worth.

- We will maintain a policy of positive engagement with the developing world, to assist their development and help them defend their independence. This is deeply in our interest as well as theirs.

- And we will continue to press the process of democratization and human rights. For as President Carter noted in his State of the Union address:

In repressive regimes, popular frustrations often have no outlet except through violence. But when peoples and their governments can approach their problems together—through open, democratic methods—the basis for stability and peace is far more solid and enduring. That is why our support for human rights in other countries is in our own national interest as well as part of our own national character.

### Supporting the Foreign Service

Against this policy background, let me comment briefly on the safety and well-being of the people on whom we depend to conduct the foreign affairs of this Nation.

Since the days of Benjamin Franklin and the Committee of Correspondence, our diplomats have risked their lives in the service of our country. At no time since World War II has such service been more dangerous and difficult than at present. Recent events have illustrated the point all too clearly. Foreign Service has often become hazardous, frontline duty as evidenced by actions against our people in Tehran, Islamabad, Kabul, Tripoli, Managua, and San Salvador.

At many other posts, persons serving abroad have to work and live under conditions of physical danger and stress. More and more employees endure long periods of separation from their families because of deteriorating conditions of overseas service and, more recently, because of widespread evacuations of their dependents.

Despite these most trying circumstances the Foreign Service has performed with singular dedication and high competence.

During times such as these, the members of the Foreign Service deserve the best conditions of service and support we can reasonably provide. To this end, the budget submissions before you have been formulated, and certain

revisions may be needed, to provide enhanced support for our people in several respects.

- Our foreign buildings operations, which have always had the strong backing of this committee and the Congress, have been modified to provide greater emphasis than before on better staff housing and safer working space in dangerous, disagreeable, and high-cost locations.

- Our FY 1981 request presently contains \$25 million for post security against potential terrorist attacks and better safeguards against fire. In light of the increased danger of hostile mob actions, we are seeking authorization to submit in the near future an FY 1980 supplemental request designed to provide better protection in such circumstances.

- The Administration will soon reach a final decision on a new single Foreign Service pay plan. The Administration will then be requesting additional FY 1981 sums, as covered in the allowances for contingencies section of the Federal budget, to provide Foreign Service employees pay comparable to their Civil Service counterparts. This was recommended by a congressionally mandated expert pay study completed last June and is required by the Pay Comparability Act of 1971.

- Our evacuation costs reached a record high last year and may do so again this year. Thus there is an unavoidable deficit in the FY 1979 emergencies account, along with an anticipated shortfall this year, for which we are seeking supplemental funds.

- For the worst hardship posts we are also including funds in our FY 1981 request to permit annual rest and recuperation trips to the United States for the first time, as authorized by Congress.

- We are requesting funds and positions in the FY 1981 submission to strengthen our basic reporting and analytical capabilities at key posts and related critical hard-language training skills.

- And finally, we are seeking final congressional support this year for a new Foreign Service Act to replace the present obsolete 1946 charter. The authorizing committees are now marking up the bill. This measure will provide a modern, simplified, and supportive personnel structure. The understanding

and subsequent support of the Appropriations Committee will be essential.

In concluding, let me emphasize one point: If we are to meet the requirements of leadership in a troubled world, we have to back our policies with our resources.

That basic truth is widely recognized in connection with our defenses. We must be prepared to invest considerably greater sums in the years ahead.

The same rule applies in connection with our foreign economic and military assistance. Minimal commitments will not overcome massive requirements.

The rule holds just as firmly when it comes to supporting the people we depend upon to design and conduct the foreign policy of the United States.

I am confident that they will continue to justify your backing and support in the critical times ahead. ■

<sup>1</sup>Press release 30 of Feb. 4, 1980. The complete transcript of the hearings will be published by the committee and will be available from the Superintendent of Documents, U.S. Government Printing Office, Washington, D.C. 20402.

## “New York Times” Interview

*Following are excerpts from Secretary Vance's interview with Bernard Gwertzman on January 15, 1980, and published in The New York Times on January 16.*

**Q.** About a year ago, you were saying that if we got a strategic arms agreement, this might lead to better relations with the Soviet Union, and I wondered if you might reflect on what went wrong.

**A.** I had hoped that if we were able to get SALT II negotiated and signed and ratified that this would provide a basis for a more stable relationship, without the peaks and valleys that we have experienced in the more than 3 years we have been here.

However, the situation which we have just seen take place in Afghanistan has obviously had a very major negative impact on our relations. The Soviet Union clearly crossed a threshold in its action.

## **Q. What prompted the Soviet action?**

A. There are all kinds of theories. They run from the Soviets' attempting to place themselves in a position where they can exert increasing influence in Central and South Asia—where they are closer to the Indian Ocean and could have as a long-range objective pushing through to the Indian Ocean—to the thesis that they found the situation deteriorating in Afghanistan and they decided to move in, to a concern about what an independent and nationalistic Afghanistan with a strong religious base would mean for the Moslems in the Soviet Union.

But I don't think it does any good to try, at this point, to psychoanalyze which of these was the reason—or what combination of them. The plain fact is that the Soviet Union committed aggression in the naked way by moving their forces in vast numbers into a neighboring country; in short, it invaded that country. The consequence of that is that there must be a sharp and firm response.

The Soviets must recognize that they are going to have to pay a cost as long as their troops stay in Afghanistan. In addition, they are going to have to realize that this kind of action is going to be met by a firm and protracted response so that such adventures will not happen in the future.

## **Q. Do you think the United States contributed to the Soviet action by not being decisive enough in its own signals to Moscow?**

A. The United States has expressed its convictions on important issues to the Soviet Union in strong terms and I don't buy the proposition that the Soviet Union didn't understand our views on key issues. I think they took a conscious, calculated decision in invading Afghanistan, and they are going to have to pay the price for it.

## **Q. Do you feel personally misled by the Russians?**

A. No. I have always believed that there are both competitive and complementary interests involved in our relationship. I have felt that even though there were competitive aspects in the relationship, we should try to see whether we could find a convergence of interests in areas such as arms control, which hopefully could lead to an easing of tensions.

Obviously, the action which was taken in Afghanistan by them has dealt a blow to our bilateral relations. That is too bad, but we live in the real world, and we have to respond to it in a clear and firm way, and we have done so.

## **Q. Can you discuss the speech or doctrine that the President is preparing to deal with the situation?**

A. In light of what happened in Afghanistan, we are reviewing the situation and consideration is being given to a speech which would state our foreign policy in broad terms and also specifically, as it relates to southwest Asia. We are considering the possibility of a statement on building a strengthened framework for regional cooperation in the area.

## **Q. Would this be similar to the Eisenhower doctrine, which offered American protection for countries in the Middle East threatened by communism?**

A. I don't want to comment on specifics which may develop from the current review, but there are certain elements in our strategy that are already obvious.

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*The Soviets must recognize that they are going to have to pay a cost as long as their troops stay in Afghanistan.*

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There is the fact of the increased presence of American forces in the Indian Ocean area. There is the fact that we have always stated that we would increase assistance to nations which are threatened. And there is the fact that we will press in negotiations for regional peace, such as the Arab-Israeli negotiations. These are some of the points that are involved in considering the framework for regional cooperation.

## **Q. An American team recently went to Kenya, Somalia, and Oman to discuss further use of military facilities there. What has been the reaction from those countries?**

A. Reactions arising from our preliminary discussions have been positive. By the way, we are not talking of huge U.S. bases but the use of facilities that exist in various countries which would be available to the United States in connection with the increased presence which the United States has there and would intend to keep there for the foreseeable future.

## **Q. Like more port calls and logistics?**

A. Yes.

## **Q. Rather than stationing combat troops?**

A. Yes.

## **Q. As someone who has been interested in sports your whole life, do you have any personal feelings about American participation in the Moscow summer Olympics?**

A. Yes. I look back to the 1936 games, when I was in college, and I think in hindsight that it was a mistake for us to attend the 1936 Olympics. Obviously, that affects my thinking about the current situation.

## **Q. In other words, you oppose American participation if the current situation prevails in Afghanistan?**

A. That is my view.

## **Q. At what point do you have to make a decision? Obviously, you can't wait until July 18.**

A. It would have to be made in the fairly near future.

## **Q. By the end of this month?**

A. I would say by mid-February.

## **Q. Can the government compel Americans not to take part?**

A. If the government expressed its views, I believe that our citizens would follow that view.

## **Q. Does the President feel the same way as you do on the Olympics?**

A. My guess is he does.

## **Q. The other day, Mr. Brezhnev again said that the Soviet troops would be withdrawn after their mission was completed. Do you think they will?**

A. If they did, that would be a good thing. I don't believe that is going to happen in the near future, but I would like to be proven wrong.

## **Q. You don't think the United States has overreacted in its actions and rhetoric?**

A. No, I don't.

## **Q. Is there any disagreement within the Administration on what to do?**

A. There is no disagreement.

**Q. On the question of further arms control talks, there has been some confusion. What are your instructions?**

A. Our policy, insofar as arms control issues are concerned, is that we should continue to pursue those under discussion with one or two exceptions. This is because the pursuit of these negotiations is in our national interest and, indeed, becomes even more important at a time of high tension or crisis than in more normal times. It is in the interest of the United States and of regional stability and peace as well.

So we will be pursuing various arms control initiatives which are going forward. One exception is that of the Indian Ocean, where the action in Afghanistan cut the legs from under the basis for such negotiations. In other areas such as nonproliferation of nuclear weapons, our objectives remain the same, and we should also continue to pursue limits on conventional arms transfers with the understanding that when our friends are placed in jeopardy by actions or threats that are directed against them, we will help them and provide them with military assistance. We will continue to pursue that policy.

**Q. On Iran, how frustrating has it been for you as a negotiator?**

A. It is a very frustrating problem because there is no interlocutor with whom one can talk who has the authority to pursue a discussion.

For example, you begin to talk to somebody. It appears that maybe some progress is being made. Then the interlocutor is removed from the scene, and somebody else is put in his place. We may begin to make progress again in the discussions. Then either that interlocutor is removed from the scene or he is overruled, so that there is no one that you can really talk to and have any confidence that something is going to come out of the discussion.

Obviously, this is a terribly frustrating experience, especially when the safety of 50 Americans is involved, and concern about their well-being is something that one carries every hour of the day and night.

I often wake up at night and wonder if there is some avenue we are not pursuing that we ought to be pursuing. I get up and try to think out the issues, think a new suggestion through. This is something that all of us do because this is uppermost in our minds.

**Q. How many secret channels have you tried?**

A. Let's say more than 10.

**Q. Were there some secret trips you took?**

A. Yes. Early in the crisis, when we were first involved in negotiations in the hope that we could find a rapid solution for the problem, I made three secret trips to New York. We thought they held some promise and that is why they were handled in such a sensitive way. It was being handled through the United Nations.

**Q. Is that when the package proposal first surfaced—the idea of, in return for freeing the hostages, the Iranians could have their grievances aired at the United Nations?**

A. Yes.

**Q. What will happen next? Are we in for a protracted siege?**

A. I can't say that I see at this point any encouraging prospect for a quick solution. I wish I could say otherwise. But I would be misleading you if I indicated that I did see a quick solution.

**Q. Is the United States pushing itself as a result of Afghanistan into a relationship with China that might hold risks for the future?**

A. I think that the Chinese will follow what they believe to be the correct course of action from their standpoint. We will follow what we believe to be correct. There may be a degree of parallelism on steps that should be taken in connection with Afghanistan. But that does not mean that there is any military alliance or such relationship between the United States and China.

**Q. Might not the Chinese draw the impression we would support them in another war on Vietnam or somewhere else?**

A. There is certainly no basis for that. They are going to follow what they believe to be in their national interests. We will do the same. There will be differences of views, as in the Security Council the other night when they did not participate in the sanctions vote against Iran.

**Q. How important is a solution of the Palestinian issue to the kind of regional cooperation you have talked about?**

A. It is clear that the solution of the Arab-Israeli dispute is a key issue that is necessary for the achievement of peace

and stability in the region. Therefore, one of the most important matters that we and others have to devote our attention to is an effort to try and bring about a satisfactory resolution of the Palestinian problem. We must continue to pursue the autonomy talks and try to make progress in them by the target date, which the parties set for themselves, at the end of May.

**Q. Summing up, do you think we're in another cold war?**

A. Obviously, the bilateral relationship has received a severe blow as a result of what happened in Afghanistan, but I think it is too early at this point to say what the long-range outcome is going to be.

This will depend upon the actions which Moscow now takes and what their actions will be in respect to the withdrawal of forces from Afghanistan. Therefore, it is premature to predict the long-term future.

What is not premature is to make sure that the steps that we take and that others take are clear and firm and strong so that the Soviets understand clearly the action which they took is going to require them to pay a continuing price as long as their troops remain in Afghanistan and that aggression will be resisted.

**Q. Are you still planning to leave office at the end of this term?**

A. I haven't changed my mind. ■



## FY 1981 Foreign Assistance Programs

*Statement before the House Foreign Affairs Committee on February 5, 1980.<sup>1</sup>*

When I appeared before you a year ago on behalf of our foreign assistance programs, I said that the United States cannot have a foreign policy of active leadership in the world if we are unwilling to put out resources behind our words. Today, in the face of new challenges in southwest Asia and other regions of the world, that fact is all the more evident.

The President, with the clear support of the Congress and the American people, has responded firmly and thoughtfully to the challenges posed by terrorism in Iran and aggression against Afghanistan. In both cases, we are showing that acts which violate international law, threaten our interests, or abuse our citizens will meet a determined response from a strong and unified America.

Afghanistan and Iran are immediate challenges which require immediate responses. But they also are manifestations of more profound and sustained challenges which we must meet through sustained and determined policies of our own. And buttressing those policies must be strong foreign assistance programs of the kind we are proposing.

### Diplomacy and Foreign Aid

In Third World countries throughout Latin America, Africa, and Asia, more and more people are insisting not only that their nations preserve their independence from foreign domination but also that they themselves have a greater say in the economic and political decisions of their governments. When these demands are long denied, popular frustrations can explode in violent and radical directions. By helping poorer nations and people in need to build a better future, we are both strengthening the world economy and enhancing the political stability which comes with economic, social, and political justice.

Beyond the challenge of constructively addressing change within developing nations, we must respond as well to threats they may face from be-

yond their borders. A policy which failed to provide for the legitimate security needs of our friends would be more than short-sighted. It would be dangerous. For it would increase the danger of conflicts—and international confrontations—that can be avoided if local security balances are preserved.

We can expect that the Soviet Union will continue to take advantage of conflict—both within developing nations and between them. As we pursue policies that help developing nations preserve their independence and meet the real needs of their people, we are addressing today the conditions of poverty and tension that will produce, if left unattended, the crises of tomorrow.

In short, a policy which addresses in their own terms the genuine needs and priorities of Third World nations is a policy which also has the effect of helping us compete effectively with the Soviets in the Third World. Through sustained support for economic and institutional development in the Third World, we also strengthen the global basis for resistance to outside domination.

In an immediate context, we are also well served by the vivid contrast between our approach to the developing world and that of the Soviet Union.

- We are seeking to address human needs.
- We are prepared to work within a world of diversity, with nations of varying economic and political systems, as long as they are prepared to work with us toward goals we share.
- Our efforts are structured to support the independence and self-sufficiency of developing nations.

The Afghanistan invasion is a vivid demonstration for all the world to see that the Soviet Union disregards such principles and practices. This fact—and this contrast—has not been lost on the nations of the world.

I began my testimony with this brief discussion of the importance of our foreign assistance to our diplomacy, since together we must make certain that our diplomacy is strong and equal to the challenges of our times. And again, I emphasize that we cannot lead in the world without adequate resources.

We all must also recognize the full range of compelling reasons for effective foreign assistance programs.

The human dimension of the issue is clear. We cannot rest well when we know that hunger is the bitter companion of hundreds of millions of human beings; when we know that many millions more lack such essentials as shelter, health, and training. The continuation of that suffering is an affront to the conscience of men and women everywhere.

And our humanitarian commitment is reinforced by the recognition of other ways in which our aid serves our interests as well as the interests of developing nations.

The countries of the Third World are increasingly involved in our daily lives. They supply the major proportion of such critical raw materials as rubber, manganese, and tin. And they are the fastest growing markets for our exports.

The cooperation of developing countries is also essential to the solution of global problems that affect us all. No nation, acting alone, can halt the spread of nuclear weapons or cure the pollution of air and water or overcome the tension between spiraling global population growth and finite resources. There can only be international answers—or there will be no real answer—to these and other pressing global challenges.

For these reasons, the proposition is inescapable that peace and prosperity for ourselves, now and for the future, are directly related to the strength of our relations with the developing nations and the political and economic paths they choose to pursue. That is not to say that our interests and those of developing nations inevitably are the same. They often are not. But we can negotiate most effectively and constructively on specific and practical issues between us in an atmosphere of mutual respect and shared concerns.

I believe we have demonstrated over the past several years that our clear commitment to work toward justice and economic progress abroad does strengthen our ties in the developing world. Despite setbacks and heightened causes of tension in some areas, our

relationships with the nations of Africa, Latin America, and Asia are, in general, better today than they have been in some time. And the practical results have served our interests.

- We have made concrete progress with developing nations on international economic issues—on the common fund, on trade and investment relations, and on strengthening international economic institutions such as the World Bank and the International Monetary Fund.

- Progress toward peace, justice, and independence in Rhodesia has been due not only to the skill of British diplomacy and the wisdom of the parties to the conflict; it would not have been possible without the constructive role played by the African governments in the region and our ability to work with them.

- Resolving our dispute with Panama on the future of the canal has strengthened the security of the canal and strengthened the basis for constructive relations throughout the hemisphere.

- And, with regard to the situations in Iran and Afghanistan, our ability to pursue our diplomatic goals at the United Nations and elsewhere has been enhanced by our improved relations with the nations of the Third World.

The foreign assistance legislation before you is, quite simply, a request for the resources and the flexibility necessary to sustain this active and practical approach to the developing world.

The requests before you are austere in view of the challenges with which we must deal. They have been prepared with careful regard for their budgetary impact. As is always the case, we will keep these levels and their allocation under continuing review to assure that the resources we are requesting are adequate to the task. For we cannot serve our nation's interests without the resources necessary for sustained and effective American leadership in the world.

### Major Programs

Before turning to some of our specific programs, let me address some of the broader aspects of our fiscal year 1981 request.

The first point is the importance of the overall levels we are proposing.

For FY 1981, we are requesting

\$2.96 billion in budgetary authority to fund security assistance programs totaling \$4.9 billion, including both military assistance and economic support funds. When the Soviets are expanding their capability to intervene militarily around the world, it is clear that we cannot reduce our own determination to help others defend themselves and strengthen their economies.

We have proposed a modest increase from \$1.7 billion to almost \$2 billion in bilateral development assistance. There is ample programmatic justification for this increase.

We are also proposing \$1.9 billion for the international financial institutions and such U.N. bodies as UNICEF and the U.N. Development Program. These multilateral efforts increasingly reflect priorities similar to ours. In many cases, they also complement our bilateral assistance efforts by supporting large-scale infrastructure projects, such as irrigation and transportation and other sectors where U.S. bilateral assistance is limited. The size and multinational character of these organizations enables them to take the lead in coordinating donor activity and in encouraging recipient governments to implement policy measures needed to foster equitable economic development. It should be noted that this year we have reduced the size of our request by not seeking budget authority for callable capital subscriptions to the multilateral development banks. None of these funds have ever been spent. We do not believe it necessary or desirable to seek appropriations of funds for this purpose.

In connection with the FY 1981 requests I have just mentioned, although it is not within the direct purview of this committee, let me note that the FY 1980 foreign assistance appropriations bill has yet to be reported out of the Senate-House conference committee. In the meantime, we are operating under a continuing resolution which provides for drastically reduced spending levels for several important programs. This situation, if it continues, will severely impair the effectiveness of our assistance efforts, both economic and military, bilateral and multilateral. It is urgent that a FY 1980 appropriations bill be agreed upon by the conference committee and speedily enacted by the Congress.

Our proposed PL 480 Food for Peace program for FY 1981 will help

meet critical food needs in over 60 countries. For FY 1981 we are requesting a \$1.6 billion Food for Peace program. These funds will provide an estimated 6 million metric tons of agricultural commodities. In addition, we will request through a budget amendment an addition of \$100 million to make use of some of the grain which would have been available to the Soviet Union. In the distribution of our Food for Peace, priority is directed to feeding hungry people, particularly refugees in Kampuchea, southern Africa, and Somalia, and to helping reduce balance-of-payments problems in Egypt, Bangladesh, Pakistan, Nicaragua, the Sudan, and other countries experiencing economic difficulties.

Let me emphasize that the sum of the parts of these economic assistance programs has an independent worth of its own. It conveys the vital message that while our emphasis on security measures is necessarily growing, our commitment to help meet economic and human needs remains just as strong.

Second, let me emphasize that the Soviet action in Afghanistan warrants particular attention to our programs for the Middle East and southwest Asian region. We must demonstrate to those who rely upon us—and to the Soviets as well—that our commitment to the economic progress and military security of the states in the region is strong and dependable.

We have agreed to continue our discussion with Pakistani officials about Pakistan's military and economic requirements. We have made it clear that we do not intend to go beyond the level of assistance we have already discussed for FY 1980 and FY 1981. We will also continue our consultations with other governments on their plans for assistance to Pakistan. Pending these further discussions, we will defer our request to the Congress for assistance to Pakistan at this time.

Third, the President is requesting a sum of \$50 million in unprogrammed economic support funds. This proposal will help us to meet emergency situations where relatively small amounts of aid, readily available, can promote immediate and pressing foreign policy interests.

The requirement for a fund of this nature has been clear for some time. In the past year we have had to come to the Congress with a number of requests for supplementals or budget amendments to deal with urgent and un-

foreseeable aid requirements ranging from Southeast Asia to Central America. Obviously I cannot promise that this amount of unprogramed funds will eliminate the need for future supplementals. But it can give us a greater degree of flexibility and can help us to respond promptly where crisis conditions threaten our interests. It will be used only after providing Congress written notification of our intended use of the fund, in accordance with standard reprogramming procedures.

**Fourth,** our national interest in the international system, including the United Nations and the affiliated institutions, has become ever more clear in the recent past. In turn, our own support for these agencies is especially important now.

The United Nations has been an important forum for the pursuit of our goals in both the Iran and Afghanistan crises. The recent votes in the Security Council and the General Assembly attest to the widespread support for our objectives on these two issues. Beyond that, the U.N. Development Program and other technical assistance agencies, together with the international financial institutions, serve most of the same long-term goals as our own bilateral aid programs—the goals of sustained human progress and a stable world order. And the multilateral development banks are a particularly effective and efficient way of achieving these aims: The combined effect of contributions from other donors and the use of callable capital to support borrowing in private markets mean that U.S. expenditures on the World Bank, for example, are multiplied many times over in actual Bank lending.

For these reasons I hope the Congress will resist any effort to treat our contributions to these agencies as vehicles for punishing or rewarding recipient countries.

I have emphasized that our economic assistance programs have political, as well as economic and humanitarian, importance. In times of challenge to our interests, our incentive to support global development is redoubled. But we should never forget that economic development is not an abstraction; it is a process through which many millions of human beings find first the hope and then the reality of adequate food, decent health care, and the new opportunities which educa-

tion and training can bring. Economic development is one of the great moral challenges of our times.

## Security Assistance

Let me add a few words about our security assistance programs.

These programs are essential instruments for promoting both our own security and that of our friends and allies. In addition they are a vital part of our policies toward the Third World. In recent years they have proved their worth in many ways.

They have strengthened our relations with Israel and Egypt, and strengthened those nations, as they have negotiated toward peace. They have afforded material support to friendly nations in Southeast Asia whose security has been threatened by Vietnamese actions. They have helped us strengthen NATO's southern flank, maintain peace and stability in Korea, and assist Latin American and African nations as they meet their security needs.

As in the past, our FY 1981 security assistance request includes five programs.

- Recent events have clearly demonstrated the importance of our foreign military sales (FMS) financing program. FMS provides credits and loan guarantees which assist foreign governments in purchasing needed defense articles, services, and training. This approach has made possible our gradual transition away from grant military aid. For FY 1981 we are requesting a total program of \$2.6 billion, requiring budget authority of only \$714 million. Some 59% is allocated for Israel and Egypt and will make a critical contribution to our effort to achieve a comprehensive Middle East peace.

- Under the military assistance program (MAP), we are requesting funding for only Portugal, Spain, and the Philippines. In each of those countries we have important military bases serving mutual security interests. The \$105 million requested for FY 1981 will fund those three programs, management expenses, and delivery of previously funded MAP material.

- The economic support fund, for which we are requesting \$2.1 billion, provides needed economic aid to countries of particular political and security interest to the United States. Again,

Israel and Egypt are the primary recipients. In addition, the economic support fund will be used to help improve the prospects for reconstruction and peaceful growth in Central America, southern Africa, and other troubled areas. Let me stress in this context the great urgency we attach to the pending FY 1980 supplemental request for Nicaragua, in addition to the proposed \$25 million in economic support funds for 1981.

- The peacekeeping operations program provides funds for the Sinai Field Support Mission, as well as for U.S. contributions to multilateral peacekeeping efforts in Cyprus. This program for 1981 will cost \$25 million and will help reduce the risk of war in these troubled parts of the world.

- Finally, the international military education and training program (IMET) is a cost-effective element of our security assistance. For FY 1981 we are proposing IMET programs of \$32.5 million to train personnel from 61 countries. We consider this program of major importance, despite the relatively small sums involved. In addition to strengthening local defense capabilities, IMET improves the basis for U.S. security cooperation with developing countries, particularly in the case of small nations where we have no other military ties. In the process, IMET directly supports our efforts to advance the cause of human rights, as it exposes military officers in other countries to the role of our own armed forces in a democratic nation. I believe it has been a factor in the heartening moves toward democracy of a number of Latin American nations in recent years. I hope IMET will have your special attention.

In conclusion let me emphasize a central point. Far from suggesting a change in direction, events in Iran and Afghanistan have underscored the absolute necessity of a sustained American commitment in the developing world. In both cases, important challenges are being answered with resolve. I believe the American people are united in this resolve.

This unity and this resolve must not be applied only to our immediate response to these particular challenges. We are also dealing with long-term,



broader issues which require our holding to long-term strategies—in both defense and development—that are fundamentally sound.

To build and protect the kind of world in which freedom is nurtured, our persistence over time—measured largely by the resources we apply—will be decisive.

That is why I believe that the FY 1981 foreign assistance legislation before you is of particular importance to our nation. ■

<sup>1</sup>Press release 32. The complete transcript of the hearings will be published by the committee and will be available from the Superintendent of Documents, U.S. Government Printing Office, Washington, D.C. 20402.

## Poison Gas Use in Indochina

by Evelyn Colbert

*Statement before the Subcommittee on Asian and Pacific Affairs of the House Foreign Affairs Committee on December 12, 1979. Ms. Colbert is Deputy Assistant Secretary for East Asian and Pacific Affairs.*<sup>1</sup>

Many members of the Hmong (Meo) hilltribes minority arriving in Thailand as refugees from Laos have reported chemical attacks by Lao-Vietnamese forces in Laos. In some cases, they have stated that they were the actual victims of such attacks. These attacks, directed against both civilian and military targets, are reported to have occurred from 1974 to as recently as May 1979. As we have already heard, we do not have absolute proof of these charges; however, the result of U.S. Government investigations support the conclusion that some chemical agent or agents were being used in Laos during the period in question, as part of the Lao Government's effort to bring the Hmong under its control.

### Hmong Resistance

The years of enmity between the Hmong and the lowland Lao and Vietnamese have left bitterness on both sides. During the Indochina wars, one faction of the Hmong worked with the Lao and Vietnamese Communists. However, the majority of the Hmong supported French and later American efforts to forestall a Vietnamese Communist victory in Laos. With their unmatched skills as guerrilla fighters, the Hmong played an important military role for both the United States and France.

When the Communists came to power in Vientiane in 1975, a few Hmong settled under Lao-Vietnamese control semivoluntarily. However, many of the Hmong who had been allied with the French and the United States continued their guerrilla resistance in remote upland areas, threatening land communications and attacking isolated Lao and Vietnamese units. Other Hmong retreated deeper into the mountains of northern Laos or fled to Thailand.

Those who continued their resistance did so without any U.S. assistance, then or now, drawing instead

largely upon cached weapons and ammunition and inspired by their perennial fears of control by the dominant lowland Lao and the Vietnamese. Most Hmong have seen their actions as defensive and that of the Vietnamese and Lao Government forces as an attempt to eradicate Hmong tribes, at least those who are former followers of General Vang Pao and their families in Phu Bia and Phu Ma Thao.

### Lao-Vietnamese Resettlement Campaign

The Lao Government, with strong Vietnamese assistance, is waging a military campaign against the 300,000 Hmong. This campaign is aimed ultimately at resettling them, primarily in the lowlands and plains where they can be more easily controlled. The government contends that such resettlement is essential to its security. It fears foreign support of the Hmong insurgency if the Hmong are left in remote areas. It is also the Lao Government's policy to put an end to the Hmong traditional practice of slash and burn agriculture which results each year in the destruction of valuable timber—one of Laos' few natural resources.

The practical effect of this campaign has been to create great hardship for many Hmong, resulting in the flight to Thailand of approximately one-fifth of the Laos Hmong population. Beginning in 1974, and gradually increasing in frequency in 1976 and 1977, there were reports of use of poison gas by Lao and Vietnamese troops against insurgent Hmong tribes. All of the reports on this subject referred to air delivery of a chemical agent—or agents—causing illness or death. Descriptions given by refugees of color and other characteristics of the agents and the symptoms of the illnesses caused vary widely. Several reports told of repeated chemical attacks on Hmong villages under control of the Lao Government.

I should emphasize that as we have heard, it has been very difficult to obtain physical evidence of poison gas. Some of the symptoms described could possibly result from materials other than lethal poison gas, e.g., defoliants, riot control agents, phosphorous shells, etc. The physical evidence of most toxic agents normally dissipates very

rapidly. In addition, persons severely affected by toxic agents would be unable to survive the long journey to Thai refugee camps and this, in effect, has ruled out the possibility of physical examination.

Nevertheless, as we can see in the materials released today, we believe that the reports are numerous enough to warrant our attention and concern. In 1977 we had begun a dialogue with U.S. agencies and other governments as well as with Lao officials in which we sought to focus concern on the welfare of Hmong caught up in Lao-Vietnamese resettlement schemes. The chairman has already mentioned our diplomatic efforts in this regard. In early October 1978, we specifically raised our concern about the reports of gas use in Laos with the Lao charge d'affaires in Washington. Later in October Assistant Secretary [for East Asian and Pacific Affairs] Richard Holbrooke, in Vientiane, reiterated to the Lao leaders our concern over Hmong human rights and other issues relating to them.

Still later in 1978, the State Department directed U.S. diplomatic missions in the area to seek further information on the possible use of poison gas against the Hmong.

In January 1979, the Department again informed the Lao Embassy of its concern about reports of poison gas use in Laos, coupling this with a similar demarche in Vientiane. The Lao denied the reports. At the same time we also notified the International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC) of our concern.

In March the U.S. Representative to the 35th session of the U.N. Human Rights Commission [Jerome J. Shes-tack] expressed U.S. concern about the plight of the Hmong, specifically raising the issue of reported use of poison gas in Laos against this tribal minority.

In May a State Department representative went to refugee camps in Thailand to interview Hmong claiming to be eyewitnesses and/or victims of poison gas attacks in Laos. The State Department representative also visited Vientiane where he discussed the problem with various diplomatic missions and the senior U.N. representative in Laos. He raised the problem directly with the Lao Foreign Ministry, noting that he had been assigned to seek evidence of gas use from among Hmong refugees in Thailand. Working with another officer from the American Consulate in Udorn, Thailand, he completed a report in June based on over 20 interviews with Hmong who claimed to

be eyewitnesses and/or victims. The report concluded that based on these interviews, there was reason to believe that some chemical agent was being employed in Laos.

Also, during this mission, the two State Department representatives received from Hmong refugees two samples of material that the Hmong claimed to be poison gas residue collected at the sites of two attacks in Laos. We have already heard from the medical people about the difficulties here.

We have provided these reports and our conclusions from these investigations to the Lao Government to substantiate and underscore our concern. We have also made demarches to the Vietnamese and the Soviets and provided them with these June interview reports, urging that the Soviets use their influence with both Hanoi and Vientiane to raise the matter with their allies. The Vietnamese and the Lao have categorically rejected reports of the use of such gas. The Soviets have stood behind these assertions. We have also provided information developed in these reports to other governments, asking each to share with us any available information they may have. Thus far, none have come forward with additional evidence.

In late September of this year, an Army medical team was dispatched to Thailand to interview Hmong who claimed to have knowledge of gas attacks in Laos. The team interviewed over 40 eyewitnesses and produced a report which reinforced the findings of the June investigation and elaborated in greater detail the symptomology of the alleged victims. Dr. [Charles W.] Lewis has discussed his findings in detail. I can assure you that we will very strongly raise Dr. Lewis' findings with various governments in a manner similar to our demarches based on the June report.

As recently as October 4, Assistant Secretary Holbrooke met with Lao Acting Foreign Minister Khamphay Boupna in New York and expressed deep U.S. concern about reports that poison gas was being used in Laos. The Lao, as in the past, rejected the allegations.

As Chairman [Lester] Wolff has noted, we have received no reports of the use of poison gas in Laos later than May 1979, providing some hope that whatever may have been taking place before that time has since ceased. However, there have been a few re-

ports recently from Khmer refugees and from Khmer resistance groups that Vietnamese forces seeking to consolidate control in Kampuchea are using lethal chemical agents.

In late 1978, we had noted isolated allegations by the Pol Pot government, at that time still in control of the country, that Vietnamese troops were using poison gas delivered by artillery fire in eastern Kampuchea. Following the Vietnamese invasion and occupation of Kampuchea, these allegations began to multiply as did refugee reports of apparent gas attacks that were in some instances lethal. While we obviously cannot accept Pol Pot allegations at face value, we are concerned by and investigating refugee reports.

We do not have the volume of reporting from Kampuchea at this time that we have seen from Laos. We are, however, monitoring developments related to reports of gas use in Kampuchea very closely. We note that in Kampuchea, Vietnamese forces and their allies face a guerrilla resistance, often based in rugged and relatively inaccessible terrain, much as they do in Laos. In our demarches to the Vietnamese and Soviets, we made it clear that our concern about these reports related to all of Indochina.

In sum, on the basis of very sketchy reports of gas use in Laos, over a year ago, we acted to expand our knowledge on the question. Operating on the basis that the mounting numbers of reports give them collective weight, and on our conviction that given their subject matter warranted our deep concern, we have also, for over a year, used diplomatic channels to draw them to the attention of those with influence in Hanoi and Vientiane. In the case of Laos, we expressed our concern well in advance of the availability of significant evidence. We note the absence of any gas reports by refugees from Laos in over 6 months. We will, of course, continue to monitor the situation very closely.

In Kampuchea, while we do not have the weight of refugee testimony that we have had in the case of Laos, the similarity of the terrain and the nature of the fighting suggests that Vietnamese might possibly choose to rely on lethal chemical agents, if they have not already begun to do so, as some reports indicate.

We will continue to scrutinize developments in Kampuchea and are prepared to use diplomatic and public pressure on the Vietnamese should we

## Suspension of Agricultural Exports to the U.S.S.R.

*Following are the texts of President Carter's memorandums for the Secretaries of Commerce and Agriculture of January 7, 1980; the President's letter to Speaker of the House of Representatives Thomas P. O'Neill, Jr., and President of the Senate Walter F. Mondale and his report on restrictions on agricultural commodity exports to the U.S.S.R. pursuant to the Export Administration Act of 1979 of January 21; and a statement by Under Secretary for Economic Affairs Richard N. Cooper before the Subcommittee on International Finance of the Senate Committee on Banking, Housing, and Urban Affairs on January 22.*

### MEMORANDUM FOR THE SECRETARY OF COMMERCE, JAN. 7, 1980<sup>1</sup>

I hereby direct that you, in consultation with the Secretary of Agriculture and other appropriate officials, take immediate action under the Export Administration Act to terminate shipments of agricultural commodities and products, including wheat and corn, to the Soviet Union. Export licenses should be granted, however, to the extent necessary to permit shipments to continue up to the 8,000,000 metric tons of wheat and corn per year covered by Article I of the 1975 Agreement between the United States and the Soviet Union on the Supply of Grain. I am taking this action in the national security and foreign policy interests of the United States. I have determined in accordance with the Export Administration Act that the absence of controls would be detrimental to those interests and that alternative courses of action would not comparably advance them.

JIMMY CARTER

### MEMORANDUM FOR THE SECRETARY OF AGRICULTURE, JAN. 7, 1980<sup>1</sup>

I have today directed the Secretary of Commerce, in consultation with you and other appropriate officials, to take immediate action under the Export Administration Act to terminate shipments of agricultural commodities and products, including wheat and corn, to the Soviet Union. The Secretary of Commerce shall, however, grant export licenses to the extent necessary to permit shipments to con-

tinue up to the 8,000,000 metric tons of wheat and corn per year covered by Article I of the 1975 Agreement between the United States and the Soviet Union on the Supply of Grain. I am taking this action in the national security and foreign policy interests of the United States.

I hereby direct that you take the necessary actions, through commodity purchases, and through the price support and grain reserve programs, to protect America's farmers from the impact of this unanticipated action. These steps are designed to remove supplies from the market in order to assure that price levels will not be unduly affected.

JIMMY CARTER

### PRESIDENT'S LETTER, JAN. 21, 1980<sup>2</sup>

The Soviet invasion of Afghanistan and the installation of a puppet government is an extremely serious threat to peace. It threatens vital U.S. security and foreign policy interests:

- It places the Soviets within aircraft striking range of the vital oil resources of the Persian Gulf;
- It threatens a strategically located country, Pakistan;
- It poses the prospect of increased Soviet pressure on Iran and on other nations in the Middle East;
- Above all, it shows that the Soviets will use force to take over a neighboring country.

The Soviet invasion requires a firm and vigorous response by the United States. We must make clear to the Soviet Union that it cannot trample on the independence of other states and at the same time carry on business as usual with the rest of the world.

I have therefore taken several measures. I have directed the Secretary of Commerce to restrict exports and re-exports of identified agricultural commodities from the United States to the U.S.S.R., except for exports of wheat and corn authorized under Article I of the Agreement on the Supply of Grain of October 20, 1975. These restrictions became effective January 7, 1980 under regulations issued by the Department of Commerce. The restrictions were initially made applicable to a broadly described group of agricultural commodities and products as a means of quickly achieving the objective of stopping exports of any items which are significant in terms of the grounds on which I acted. The Department of Commerce is

develop additional information pointing to possible gas use in Kampuchea. ■

<sup>1</sup> The complete transcript of the hearings will be published by the committee and will be available from the Superintendent of Documents, U.S. Government Printing Office, Washington, D.C. 20402.

## J.S.-China Discuss Sale of Military Technology

### DEFENSE DEPARTMENT STATEMENT, JAN. 21, 1980

Technology transfer was one of the major topics of discussion during Secretary [of Defense Harold] Brown's recent visit to the People's Republic of China (P.R.C.). During his discussion there, he indicated that the United States is prepared to sell to the Chinese civilian technology which we would not approve for sale to the Soviet Union. His position grew out of the visit of Vice President Mondale to China last August. While the discussions with the P.R.C. during Secretary Brown's visit focused primarily on the sale of civilian technology designed to assist China in its industrial and economic modernization, it was recognized that some of the technology could also be used for military purposes.

During his visit, Secretary Brown also indicated that the United States is prepared to consider, on a case-by-case basis, the sale of certain carefully selected items of support equipment also suitable for military use, e.g., trucks, communications gear, certain types of early-warning radar. At the same time, he made clear that the United States has not changed its position that it has no plans to sell arms or weapons systems to China.

No decision has been made as to what specific equipment might be sold to China, nor have the Chinese made specific requests. We are studying this issue carefully now, have informed Congress of our intent, and have held preliminary meetings with the Chinese during Secretary Brown's visit. ■



revising the list to eliminate items for which controls are not warranted.

I have acted in the national security and foreign policy interests of the United States under the authority of the Export Administration Act of 1979. I transmit herewith my report pursuant to Sections 6(e) and 7(g)(3) of the Act.

I have recognized that other countries are major exporters of agricultural commodities. At my direction, United States officials promptly began consultations with other major agricultural exporters to seek their cooperation in restricting exports in harmony with our actions. These consultations and negotiations have been fruitful and will continue. We have also consulted with U.S. farm organizations and trading companies, and these consultations have contributed valuable information concerning the domestic impact of these export restrictions, their adverse impact on the Soviet Union, and the availability of identified items from foreign sources. I have considered the possibility that some of the agricultural commodities involved might be obtained by the Soviet Union from other countries. I have also assessed the threat to our national security and foreign policy posed by the Soviet aggression and the consequences of a failure to take prompt and decisive action. I have determined pursuant to Section 4(e) of the Act that the absence of such controls would prove detrimental to the foreign policy and national security interests of the United States.

Pursuant to Section 6(d) of the Act, I have determined that although reasonable efforts have been made to achieve the purposes of these controls through alternative means, available alternatives would not comparably advance the foreign policy and national security interests of the United States.

I have also directed that the Secretary of Commerce, in consultation with the Secretary of Defense and other appropriate officials, review and revise our policy with respect to the export of high technology and other strategic items to the Soviet Union. This review is to proceed with the utmost urgency. Effective January 11, 1980 the Department of Commerce suspended all outstanding licenses and authorizations for exports to the Soviet Union and announced that it has suspended the issuance of new licenses and authorizations. The review I have directed will also consider what our policy should be on future applications for licenses, whether existing special licenses should be amended or revoked, and whether validated licenses should be required for any other exports currently permitted to the Soviet Union under general license. The Secretary of Commerce announced on January 11, 1980 his denial on national security grounds of eight license applications for export of high technology items to the Soviet Union.

When the review and revision of our policy on high technology and other strategic items is completed, I will submit a further report to the Congress concerning any additional controls that may be imposed.

Sincerely,

JIMMY CARTER

**Restrictions on Agricultural Commodity Exports to the USSR: Report to the Congress Pursuant to the Export Administration Act of 1979**

Acting pursuant to a Presidential directive issued on January 7, 1980 under the authority of the Export Administration Act of 1979, the Department of Commerce has issued rules effective p.m. January 7, 1980, restricting the export of identified agricultural commodities and products to the Soviet Union. (45 Fed. Reg. 1883, Jan. 9, 1980). This is the Report required by Sections 6(e) and 7(g)(3) of the Act with respect to the imposition of these export controls.

*These Restrictions Further Significantly U.S. National Security and Foreign Policy Interests*

The Soviet invasion of Afghanistan and the installation of a puppet government is an extraordinary and grave act of aggression which threatens vital U.S. security and foreign policy interests. This invasion is an extremely serious threat to peace.

- It places the Soviets within aircraft striking range of the vital oil resources of the Persian Gulf;
- It threatens a strategically located country, Pakistan;
- It poses the prospect of increased Soviet pressure on Iran and on other nations of the Middle East;
- Above all, it is the first Soviet invasion of a previously independent and unoccupied nation since World War II.

These extraordinary circumstances demand prompt and forceful response by the United States. We must show the Soviet Union that it cannot expect to continue to do business as usual with the United States while it is invading and occupying an independent nation. Accordingly restrictions have been placed on agricultural exports to the USSR. These exports make a substantial contribution to Soviet strength. U.S. security interests are affected when that strength is devoted to the military invasion of previously independent nations. Curtailment of these exports is a critical element in our efforts to demonstrate to the USSR in tangible ways that it cannot engage in armed aggression with impunity and without cost to itself.

As President and Commander-in-Chief of the Armed Forces of the United States, I find that the exports being curtailed by

this action make a significant contribution to the military potential of the Soviet Union that is detrimental to the national security of the United States.

*Probability of Success.* The restrictions can reasonably be expected to bring home to the Soviet leaders that they cannot act as they have in Afghanistan without paying a significant price. The controls are expected to have a significant impact on the Soviet economy. They will impress upon the Soviet people the consequences of their government's actions. Absent substitutes from other sources, the restrictions will mean the loss of up to half of projected grain imports for FY 1980. Combined with the 48 million ton short-fall from planned 1979 production, the effect will be a major reduction in the availability of livestock feed, the slaughter of livestock that cannot be fed, and in due course a significant reduction in USSR meat production below planned levels. Moreover, contacts with the governments of other major grain supplier countries indicate that there will be substantial cooperation in limiting the Soviet Union's ability to replace the curtailed U.S. shipments with imports from other sources.

*Compatibility with Foreign Policy.* The controls are essential to achieve U.S. national security and foreign policy objectives and are compatible with overall U.S. policy toward the USSR, for the reasons given above.

*Foreign Reaction.* Many countries have expressed support for these actions by the United States, and United States officials are urgently consulting with other suppliers to seek complementary actions.

*Economic Impact of Controls.* The most significant effect of the control on U.S. exports relates to the 17 million tons of grain previously authorized for the Soviet Union, valued at about \$2.3 billion. In FY 1978 U.S. exports of all agriculture commodities to the USSR were \$1.9 billion and in FY 1979 \$2.2 billion. These exports constituted 6.8% of total U.S. agricultural exports in FY 1978 and 6.9% in FY 1979. Grain exports accounted for about 80% of the value of U.S. agricultural exports to the USSR in FY 1979. Soybeans accounted for another 15%. The U.S. provided 65.1% of Soviet grain imports in FY 1978 and 77.8% in FY 1979.

Total Soviet grain utilization is estimated at 231 million metric tons from July, 1978 to June, 1979, and—before imposition of these restrictions—was projected to be 228 million tons for July, 1979 to June, 1980. U.S. grain exports (11.1 million tons) accounted for 4.8% of the 1978/1979 Soviet use. Before these restrictions, U.S. exports were projected to provide 11.2% (25.5 million tons) of the Soviets' projected 1979/1980 utilization (228 million tons).

The United States is the world's largest exporter of wheat and corn and will maintain so even after the suspension of most agricultural commodity exports to the Soviet Union. The United States has been undertaking consultations with other governments to reduce the possibility that their suppliers would take advantage of U.S. action to build up their own competitive position at U.S. expense. Because the export restriction has been imposed on agricultural commodities destined to the USSR in response to a Soviet act of aggression and on the basis of fundamental U.S. national security and foreign policy interests, it is unlikely that such action will diminish the overall reputation of the United States as a reliable supplier.

With respect to foreign availability of wheat and corn, the United States is the major supplier of these commodities in world trade. At this time, it appears that additional supplies available in the world market are limited. With respect to soybeans and soybean products, there is substantially greater foreign availability. The availability of these commodities to the Soviet Union will depend therefore, in part, upon the cooperation of foreign suppliers.

In the absence of offsetting domestic policies the restriction on agricultural exports to the USSR would have an economic impact primarily on grain farmers, on firms and employees in the grain sector, on cereal and barge lines, and on communities in grain producing areas.

Absent offsetting action, it is estimated that the restrictions on the export of agricultural commodities to the Soviet Union would reduce 1980 farm income by approximately \$3.0 billion.

The Secretary of Agriculture has been directed to take a number of actions, using authorities already available under current law, to ensure that the suspension of exports to the USSR will not fall unfairly on farmers and on grain marketing systems. To assure that it does not, he has taken the following actions:

*To prevent immediate market congestion*  
The Department of Agriculture:

- has requested that future trading in wheat and corn be suspended for the market days, January 7 and January 8;
- has announced that it will purchase up to 4 million tons (150 million bushels) of wheat, including the assumption of the contractual obligations on up to 3.7 million tons (135 million bushels) that will not be shipped to the Soviet Union;
- is preparing to assume the contractual obligation on up to 10.0 million tons (395 million bushels) of corn.

None of these grain purchases will be resold on the domestic market until it can be done without adversely affecting market prices. All contractual assumptions will be made at prices that will protect against losses, but will not guarantee profits.

*To fully offset the intermediate term impacts of the suspension of sales to the USSR*

The Department of Agriculture has taken action to:

- increase the wheat loan price to \$2.50 a bushel;
- increase the corn loan price to \$2.10 a bushel, with comparable increases in loan prices for the other feed grains;
- increase the reserve release price to \$3.75 a bushel for wheat—representing 150 percent of the new loan price;
- increase the reserve call price to \$4.63 a bushel for wheat—representing 185 percent of the new loan price;
- increase the reserve release price to \$2.63 a bushel for corn—representing 125 percent of the new loan price;
- increase the reserve call price to \$3.05 a bushel for corn—representing 145 percent of the new loan;
- make comparable increases in reserve release and call prices for the other feed grains;
- waive first-year interest costs for the next 13 million tons of corn (corn only) entering the reserve;
- increase reserve storage payments from 25 to 26½ cents a bushel for all reserve commodities except oats, which is increased from 19 to 20 cents a bushel.

*To facilitate long-term supply and demand adjustments*

The Department of Agriculture is not evaluating:

- increased commercial grain exports, and increased food donations under P.L. 480 where appropriate;
- increased production of fuel alcohols from grain and other agricultural commodities;
- acreage diversion programs.

These steps are intended to offset the reduction in farm income and, assuming a suspension through 1980, will limit the reduction in value of agricultural exports to approximately \$2.0 to \$2.25 billion (instead of \$3 billion). It is anticipated that these actions will result in increased budgetary costs of \$2.5 to \$3.0 billion during FY 1980 and 1981. Most of the increase in budget outlays will be associated with removal of wheat and corn from the market and, therefore, the budget impact will be lessened when these commodities move back into the market and loans are repaid or sales proceeds are obtained.

#### Enforcement

No unusual problem is anticipated in enforcing the control on United States direct sales of agricultural products. With respect to reexports from third countries to the USSR, the fungible nature of the com-

modities makes it somewhat difficult to control their ultimate destination. The Department of Commerce and other agencies will watch this situation closely and will take enforcement action in case of violations.

#### Foreign Policy Consequences of Not Imposing Controls

If this and other measures which have immediate and practical effect had not been imposed, United States reactions to Soviet aggression would have been limited largely to words. Vigorous and far-reaching action was required to confirm to the Soviets that they cannot with impunity engage in acts of aggression that threaten the foreign policy and national security interests of the United States.

#### UNDER SECRETARY COOPER, JAN. 22, 1980<sup>3</sup>

I am pleased to have this opportunity to testify before your committee at oversight hearings on the President's suspension of shipments of agricultural products and high technology items to the Soviet Union. I would like to start with a brief description of the events in Afghanistan which led us to take these economic measures. I will comment on their role in U.S. relations with the U.S.S.R., our allies, and other countries, and, in that context, respond to the questions in your letter of invitation.

#### Events in Afghanistan

Massive Soviet military forces have invaded the small, nonaligned, sovereign nation of Afghanistan. Fifty thousand heavily armed Soviet troops originally crossed the border and are now dispersed throughout Afghanistan. More Soviet troops are arriving in Afghanistan daily, with some 80,000 there now. They, and the Afghan troops under their control, are attacking Afghan tribesmen.

This invasion violates the rules of international conduct and jeopardizes peace beyond the borders of Afghanistan. It heightens the threat of further Soviet expansion into neighboring countries in southwest Asia. A Soviet-occupied Afghanistan threatens both Iran and Pakistan. Such an aggressive military policy, if it goes unanswered, threatens other countries on the periphery of the Soviet Union, including Europe and the Persian Gulf. It en-

dangers the security of all nations, including, of course, the United States and our allies and friends.

There has been overwhelming opposition in the United Nations to the Soviet invasion. Our allies and most of the Third World have called for Soviet withdrawal, in the Security Council and General Assembly. But expressions of concern, even vast U.N. General Assembly majorities, would not alone convey to the Soviets our resolve to resist their aggression, especially if we treated our economic relations with the U.S.S.R. as untouchable. Unambiguous action by the United States was necessary.

## U.S. Response

On January 4th, the President announced a series of measures in response to the Soviet invasion. We have asked the Senate to defer consideration of SALT II. We have sharply curtailed U.S. grain exports and Soviet fishing privileges. We will delay new consular facilities and defer most cultural and scientific exchanges. Since the President's speech, we have reduced Aeroflot landings in the United States. We have suspended shipments of goods under validated export licenses and all new licensing pending a review of our policy. Other major aspects of our bilateral relationship with the Soviet Union are also under intensive review, and additional measures may be announced.

We plan to increase direct and indirect support for threatened countries in southwest Asia. We have announced that we will maintain an increased level of forces in the Indian Ocean. We are taking other steps to permit us to project military power more effectively in the region.

All of these actions are designed to demonstrate to the U.S.S.R. in a tangible way that it cannot engage in aggression with impunity. The restrictions on grain exports—our largest commodity exports to the Soviet Union—most clearly illustrate our resolve to the Soviets and to other countries.

The costs to the Soviet Union will be heavy. The U.S.S.R. is dependent upon grain imports for growth in its standard of living. After an initial reduction in livestock herds, an embargo will mean reduced per capita meat con-

sumption in a country that normally does not provide adequate supplies. If we and other countries find it necessary to continue to restrict Soviet agricultural imports, the U.S.S.R. will have to revise its hopes for improving basic living standards. We will pay a price ourselves for imposing these restrictions.

Foreign trade is always mutually beneficial, and we cannot penalize the Soviet Union in this area without to some extent hurting ourselves. But we have the mechanisms in place to insure that the price is kept to a minimum and is borne equitably.

## Multilateral Support

The grain export controls have received multilateral support. On January 12, we convened a meeting of representatives of the major grain exporting countries, including Argentina, Australia, Canada, and the European Community (EC). This group generally agreed that its governments would not replace directly or indirectly the grains denied by U.S. measures.

Those countries with destination controls will impose them. Canada will refrain from grain sales in excess of normal traditional levels. Australia will not replace wheat taken off the market by U.S. action. The EC has taken administrative measures to reduce sharply grain and poultry exports to the U.S.S.R. Argentina will not use government measures to take commercial advantage of U.S. action but has indicated it will not seek to alter normal market demand. All, including Argentina, agreed to set up a group to monitor grain flows on a continuing basis to achieve "our common purposes." We are following up with the Argentine Government to increase their cooperation.

We are also seeking parallel and supportive action for our other measures. A few days ago Deputy Secretary Christopher and I returned from intensive exploratory consultations with our European allies—including discussion in NATO; with the member countries of the European Economic Community; and additional talks in Bonn, London, Rome, and Paris. Philip Habib [Special Adviser to the Secretary of State] has just concluded similar consultations in Tokyo.

Our allies share our view that the Soviet invasion is a sharp and threatening deviation from Soviet policy in recent years. They agree that we must demonstrate to the Soviets that their conduct will involve heavy costs for the U.S.S.R. Their capabilities for responding to the Soviet threat differ, but I am encouraged by their desire to maintain a strong, united front under the current circumstances.

## Controls on Agricultural Exports

We are particularly mindful of the provisions of the new Export Administration Act of 1979 and of this subcommittee's major contribution to that legislation over the past year. You have or will soon have before you the President's report of his decision to impose controls on agricultural exports to the Soviet Union. I would simply like to mention some of the major themes of the 1979 act which are reflected in two of the questions in your invitation and in the President's actions.

- A wide range of political and economic measures has been under consideration from the beginning of the Afghan crisis, not just export controls.
- We raised the issue of Soviet intervention in Afghanistan with increasing urgency as the Soviet military buildup proceeded, culminating with a Presidential message to President Brezhnev. No satisfactory reply was received.
- The Administration consulted congressional leaders promptly, as soon as it became clear that controls on grain exports and other actions would be necessary.
- We have given, and continue to give, high priority to obtaining the cooperation of other governments and to limiting the availability of substitutes from foreign sources.
- The grain controls have been—and any new controls we may need to add for technology exports will be—measured against the specific criteria contained in the 1979 act.

Except for agricultural products, we have not added new controls or increased the number of export items for which validated licenses are required. The suspension of shipments of licensed goods is a temporary measure, expected to last 4-6 weeks, while we review our licensing policy and adopt any changes that seem appropriate under the new circumstances. We look for-



ward to receiving your views and the views of your committee concerning appropriate revisions in our licensing policy.

In conducting our review in the light of the Soviet invasion, we must bear in mind that the concepts of foreign policy and national security—a central objective of our foreign policy—are inextricably intertwined. We must reevaluate which exports actually make a significant contribution to Soviet military potential which would be detrimental to our security. We will also consider other items which should be controlled in order to help deter Soviet aggression.

Let me conclude by affirming that we continue to hope that the Soviets will see the need for restraint in their policies. We have called for them to withdraw their troops from Afghanistan in accordance with the U.N. resolutions. We must deter them from further threats to Pakistan, Iran, the Persian Gulf, and elsewhere. Neither we nor the rest of the world can tolerate a policy of Soviet expansionism. The more quickly we can bring this message to the attention of the Kremlin through firm measures, the better our chances that it will be heeded before greater damage is done.

The 1980s have begun with little optimism for U.S.-Soviet relations. Not only rarely in the past 25 years have we seen such worldwide condemnation of Soviet aggression as we now see. Only rarely have we seen NATO as ready as it now is to strengthen its defenses and to act in concert. If we had taken strong actions, if we had maintained a posture of business-as-usual beyond our diplomatic protests, I have little doubt that the condemnation by other countries and their willingness to work together to deter aggression elsewhere would dissipate in a cloud of uncertainty surrounding U.S. leadership and U.S. determination to resist Soviet aggression. ■

<sup>1</sup>Text from Weekly Compilation of Presidential Documents of Jan. 14, 1980.

<sup>2</sup>Text from Weekly Compilation of Jan. 28.

<sup>3</sup>The complete transcript of the hearings will be published by the committee and will be available from the Superintendent of Documents, U.S. Government Printing Office, Washington, D.C. 20402.

## Customs Valuation Agreement

LETTER TO HOUSE  
SPEAKER O'NEILL AND  
SENATE PRESIDENT MONDALE,  
JAN. 16, 1980<sup>1</sup>

During 1979 we achieved a remarkable series of improvements in the international rules for the conduct of trade, domestic legislation governing trade policy, and the organization of the Executive branch trade policy agencies. These successes were the result of a cooperative effort between the Congress and the Executive which must be continued if we are going to conduct successfully our international economic policy.

At the end of the Tokyo Round of the Multilateral Trade Negotiations last year, we had not yet completed negotiations with a significant number of developing countries on the Customs Valuation Agreement. Despite this fact, we decided to submit the Customs Valuation Agreement to the Congress together with the other nontariff barrier codes for approval. Negotiations with developing countries have continued, however, and have reached a point such that I can now notify the Congress of my intention to enter into a supplementary agreement on customs valuation.

The new agreement would make a minor amendment to the Customs Valuation Agreement already approved by the Congress. This amendment would eliminate one of the four tests under the Agreement by which related parties can establish a transaction value for customs purposes, i.e., the use of the transaction value from unrelated parties' sales of identical goods from third countries (Article 1.2(b)(iv)). This amendment will have little impact on the Customs Valuation Agreement but will greatly facilitate acceptance of that Agreement by a significant number of developing countries. All the developed country signatories to the Agreement support the amendment.

In accordance with the Trade Act of 1974 procedures for approval and implementation of trade agreements, the United States Trade Representative and other appropriate agencies will consult with Congressional committees about the agreement for the next 90 calendar days. After the agreement has been signed it will be submitted for Congressional approval together with proposed implementing legislation and a statement of administrative action necessary or appropriate to implement the agreement in the United States. The agreement will not take effect with respect to the United States, and will not have domestic legal force, unless the Congress approves it and enacts the appropriate implementing legislation.

Congressional approval of the amendment to the Customs Valuation Agreement will help us obtain broader support for the Tokyo Round agreements by developing countries. This result will advance our national interest and enhance the prosperity

of our people. I look forward to working together in this continuing effort.

Sincerely,

JIMMY CARTER ■

<sup>1</sup>Text of identical letters addressed to Thomas P. O'Neill, Jr., Speaker of the House of Representatives, and Walter F. Mondale, President of the Senate (text from Weekly Compilation of Presidential Documents of Jan. 21, 1980).

## Allies Support U.S. Embargo

DEPARTMENT STATEMENT,  
JAN. 10, 1980<sup>1</sup>

The United States is pleased by the positive reaction on the part of our European allies to the President's decision cancelling the sale of 17 million metric tons of grain to the Soviet Union in the wake of their invasion of Afghanistan. The President has received assurances from the leaders of major West European nations that their governments support this important measure. They will take appropriate steps to assure that the Soviet shortfall resulting from the cancellation of U.S. sales will not be made up through exports of their own grain supplies.

At the same time, we are in urgent consultation with the other major grain exporting nations. Both Australia and Canada have already confirmed that they, too, will support the U.S. action and not make up the Soviet grain deficit. As a result of these consultations, which are continuing, the Soviet Union will be unable to purchase sufficient grain from other countries to meet the major shortfall caused by the President's decision.

The United States feels that the strong allied backing in this area demonstrates Western solidarity in the face of a direct Soviet threat to international security and will make clear to the Soviets that they cannot undertake aggression with impunity. The President believes that we have laid down a marker and let the Soviet Union know that they will, indeed, suffer now and in the future from their unwarranted invasion of a formerly independent nonaligned country. ■

<sup>1</sup>Read to news correspondents by Department spokesman Holding Carter III.

## U.S. Favors Transfer of Summer Olympics

by Secretary Vance

*Remarks before the 82d session of the opening of the International Olympic Committee (IOC) in Lake Placid, New York, on February 9, 1980.<sup>1</sup>*

On behalf of President Carter, and as an honorary Vice President of the U.S. Olympic Committee, it is an honor to welcome this distinguished committee to the United States and to Lake Placid and to welcome athletes from around the world to the 1980 Winter Olympics.

As we meet here tonight, the world faces a serious threat to peace which raises an issue of fundamental importance to the Olympic movement.

From their beginnings in ancient Greece, the Olympics have symbolized some of humanity's noblest principles. Foremost among these is peace. The modern games reflect this principle in the opening ceremonies, when doves are released to symbolize peace.

The ancient games were held in the city-state of Elis. They marked a "truce of the gods." During this truce, open warfare against or by the host city-state was forbidden.

In the view of my government, it would be a violation of this fundamental Olympic principle to conduct or attend Olympic Games in a nation which is currently engaging in an aggressive war and has refused to comply with the world community's demand to halt its aggression and withdraw its forces.

Let us be clear about the fundamental issue we face. This is not a question of whether a national team should be barred from competing on political grounds. We welcome every team this committee has invited to these winter games.

The question we now confront is entirely different. It is whether the games should be held in a country which is itself committing a serious breach of international peace. It is our conviction that to do so would be wholly inconsistent with the meaning of the Olympics.

It is impossible to separate this decision from its political consequences. To hold the Olympics in any nation that

is warring on another is to lend the Olympic mantle to that nation's actions.

We already see the nation selected as host of the summer games describing its selection as recognition of "the correctness of [its] foreign political course" and its "enormous services . . . in the struggle for peace."

The inescapable fact is that the struggles of nations and peoples to preserve their independence—to preserve peace now and for the future—will be contradicted and diminished if the Olympics are held in a nation whose continuing aggression has been condemned by an overwhelming majority of the U.N. General Assembly.

Responsibility for this matter should not be shifted to the athletes. That would only force them to carry a burden which properly belongs to the leaders of the Olympic movement. None of us wants our athletes to suffer. But neither should we let them be exploited.

Beyond the effects of this decision on efforts for international peace, we should be concerned about its consequences for the Olympic movement.

The United States deeply values the Olympic Games and the principles on which they rest. We are immensely proud of our own athletes and those of other nations who have trained long and hard. We do not want to see the Olympic movement damaged.

But if the basic principles of the Olympics are ignored, the future of the games themselves will be placed in jeopardy.

Throughout the world, there is broad and growing opposition, among governments and people, to going forward with the games as planned, as if nothing has happened. To do so would imperil the broad popular interest and support upon which this and future Olympics depend.

The preferable course would be to transfer the games from Moscow to another site or multiple sites this summer. Clearly there are practical difficulties, but they could be overcome. There is also precedent for cancelling

the games. Or it would be possible, with a simple change of rules, to postpone the games for a year or more.

Let me make my government's position clear: We will oppose the participation of an American team in any Olympic Games in the capital of an invading nation. This position is firm. It reflects the deep convictions of the U.S. Congress and the American people.

To avoid such problems in the future, we support the establishment of permanent homes for the Summer and Winter Olympics.

I know that this distinguished body will carefully weigh the issues now before you. By upholding the principles of the Olympics when they are under challenge, we will preserve the meaning of the Olympics for years to come. ■

<sup>1</sup>Press release 36.

## Summer Olympics in Moscow

*Following are President Carter's letter of January 20, 1980, to Robert Kane, President of the U.S. Olympic Committee, and Deputy Secretary Warren Christopher's statement before the Senate Committee on Foreign Relations on January 28.*

### PRESIDENT'S LETTER JAN. 20, 1980<sup>1</sup>

As President of this nation and as Honorary President of the United States Olympic Committee (USOC), I write to advise you of my views concerning the Games of the XXII Olympiad scheduled to be held in Moscow this Summer.

I regard the Soviet invasion and the attempted suppression of Afghanistan as a serious violation of international law and an extremely serious threat to world peace. This invasion also endangers neighboring independent countries and access to a major part of the world's oil supplies. It therefore threatens our own national security, as well as the security of the region and the entire world.

We must make clear to the Soviet Union that it cannot trample upon an independent nation and at the same time do business as usual with the rest of the world. We must make clear that it will pay a heavy economic and political cost for such aggressions. That is why I have taken the severe economic measures announced on January 4, and why other free nations are supporting these measures. That is why the United Nations General Assembly, by an overwhelming vote of 104 to 18, con-

lemmed the invasion and urged the prompt withdrawal of Soviet troops.

I want to reaffirm my own personal commitment to the principles and purposes of the Olympic movement. I believe in the desirability of keeping Government policy out of the Olympics, but deeper issues are at stake.

In the Soviet Union international sports competition is itself an aspect of Soviet government policy, as is the decision to invade Afghanistan. The head of the Moscow Olympic Organizing Committee is a high Soviet Government official.

The Soviet Government attaches enormous political importance to the holding of the 1980 Olympic Games in Moscow, and if the Olympics are not held in Moscow because of Soviet military aggression in Afghanistan, this powerful signal of world outrage cannot be hidden from the Soviet people, and will reverberate around the globe. Perhaps it will deter future aggression.

I therefore urge the USOC, in cooperation with other National Olympic Committees, to advise the International Olympic Committee (IOC) that if Soviet troops do not fully withdraw from Afghanistan within the next month, Moscow will become an unsuitable site for a festival meant to celebrate peace and good will. Should the Soviet Union fail to withdraw its troops within the time prescribed above, I urge the USOC to propose that the Games either be transferred to another site such as Montreal or to multiple sites, or be cancelled for this year. If the International Olympic Committee rejects such a USOC proposal, I urge the USOC and the Olympic Committees of other like-minded nations not to participate in the Moscow Games. In his event, if suitable arrangements can be made, I urge that such nations conduct alternative games of their own this summer at some other appropriate site or sites. The United States Government is prepared to end its full support to any and all such efforts.

I know from your letter to me and your meeting with Secretary Vance and Lloyd Cutler of your deep concern for the men and women throughout the world who have trained tirelessly in the hopes of participating in the 1980 Olympic Games. I share your concern. I would support the participation of athletes from the entire world at Summer Olympic Games or other games this summer outside the Soviet Union, just as I welcome athletes from the entire world to Lake Placid, for the Winter Olympic Games.

I have the deepest admiration and respect for Olympic athletes and their pursuit of excellence. No one understands better than they the meaning of sacrifice to achieve worthy goals. There is no goal of greater importance than the goal at stake here—the security of our nation and the peace of the world.

I also urge that the IOC take a further step to eliminate future political competition among nations to serve as hosts for the

Olympic Games. I call upon all nations to join in supporting a permanent site for the Summer Olympics in Greece, and to seek an appropriate permanent site for the Winter Olympics.

The course I am urging is necessary to help secure the peace of the world at this critical time. The most important task of world leaders, public and private, is to deter aggression and prevent war. Aggression destroys the international amity and goodwill that the Olympic movement attempts to foster. If our response to aggression is to continue with international sports as usual in the capital of the aggressor, our other steps to deter aggression are undermined.

The spirit and the very future of the Games depend upon courageous and resolute action at this time. I call for your support and your help in rallying the support of the other Olympic Committees throughout the world.

Sincerely,

JIMMY CARTER

**DEPUTY SECRETARY  
CHRISTOPHER**

**JAN. 28, 1980<sup>2</sup>**

I appreciate this opportunity to meet with you to discuss the Administration's views on U.S. participation in the Summer Olympic Games in Moscow.

In his State of the Union address, President Carter emphasized that "... with Soviet invading forces in Afghanistan, neither the American people nor I will support sending an Olympic team to Moscow."

This weekend in Colorado the U.S. Olympic Committee agreed to ask the International Olympic Committee, when it meets in Lake Placid in early February, to transfer, postpone, or cancel the Summer Games. We are encouraged by this decision and by the support and understanding shown by the U.S. Olympic Committee.

We have carefully examined the two resolutions introduced on January 22 by Senators Muskie and Pryor (S.R. 333 and 334) and are in general agreement with them. Our preference at this time, however, would be Senate adoption of a third resolution—the one passed overwhelmingly by the House last week (H. Con. Res. 249).

This morning I would like to review with you, briefly, some of the factors which led the Administration to take such a strong stand on the Olympics and the reasons we would welcome the committee's early passage of a concurrent resolution.

In late December the Soviets launched a massive invasion of Afghanistan. They played an instrumental role in the execution of that country's head of state. More than 80,000 Soviet troops are now occupying Afghanistan, seeking to crush the resistance offered by Afghan nationalists fighting for their freedom.

In our considered judgment, this invasion presents a serious threat to world peace and, in particular, to the security of the nations in the region surrounding Afghanistan.

In his State of the Union address, the President outlined a full range of responses to this threat. I would like to confine myself chiefly to the question of the Olympics.

The essence of the President's decision is clear and simple: Unless all Soviet troops are withdrawn from Afghanistan within the next month, the U.S. Government will not support participation by U.S. athletes in the Summer Olympics in Moscow.

Our consultations with other governments prove that many strongly share our concerns. We are much encouraged by the decision this weekend of the West German Olympic Committee to support transfer, postponement, or cancellation of the Summer Games. Other governments around the world have also adopted a position paralleling that of President Carter, and we expect many more governments to join in this effort in the days ahead.

We are still exploring a number of alternative ways of dealing with the games: transferring them to another site—or sites—or cancelling them entirely—as was done in 1916, 1940, and 1944. In this latter case, the international community could decide to hold some other form of international competition, this year or next.

The President has also suggested that, in the future, a permanent home for the Summer Olympics might be established in Greece. A suitable site for the Winter Games could be sought as well.

We expect that the U.S. Olympic Committee will discuss all these possibilities with the International Olympic Committee at their February 9 meeting. A firm and united expression from the U.S. Congress before that meeting would help to convey the strength and depth of U.S. sentiment on this crucial question.

I would like to stress that we are deeply conscious of the long, hard, even painful years of practice our athletes



have undergone to prepare for the Summer Olympics. That is why we are actively exploring with other governments possible alternatives to holding the games in Moscow.

But, at the same time, we cannot forget that more profound issues are at stake here. We must convince the Soviets that we are willing and able to respond to their aggression, whether in Afghanistan or elsewhere. If we permit sports to go forward as usual, after we have said there will be no business as usual, we will be sending out a contradictory signal, and one which could call into question the firmness of our resolve.

The Soviets clearly attach tremendous political importance to the games. Their propaganda, the way in which they have gone about Olympic preparations, their transparent hope of using the games as a showcase of the alleged successes of a totalitarian system, leave no doubt that they see in these Olympics a political device. We cannot give our support or blessing to a cynical effort by the U.S.S.R. to masquerade as a peace-loving country while at the same time Soviet troops are occupying and oppressing Afghanistan.

Our view of this matter is reinforced by the recent arrest and exile of Andrei Sakharov, world famous physicist, human rights advocate, and Nobel laureate. Who, in the face of this outrageous act, can believe the Soviets intend to host the Olympics as a celebration of the human spirit?

Facing such bleak realities, we cannot afford to remain passive. Our stand on the Olympic Games is one step which may help convince Moscow that it cannot invade its neighbors and oppress its own citizens with impunity.

We look forward to working closely with the committee to develop policies which will uphold our own principles and will deter the Soviets from aggressive, repressive actions in the future. ■

<sup>1</sup>Text from Weekly Compilation of Presidential Documents of Jan. 28, 1980.

<sup>2</sup>The complete transcript of the hearings will be published by the committee and will be available from the Superintendent of Documents, U.S. Government Printing Office, Washington, D.C. 20402.

## Technology Transfers to the U.S.S.R.

### MEMORANDUM FOR THE SECRETARY OF COMMERCE, JAN. 8, 1980<sup>1</sup>

*Subject:* Policy on Technology Transfers to the USSR

I direct that you, in consultation with the Secretary of Defense and other appropriate officials, review and revise our policy with respect to the export of high technology and other strategic items to the Soviet Union. Pending review, no validated export licenses for shipment of goods or technical data to the Soviet Union are to be approved. This review is to reassess what exports will make a significant contribution to the military potential of the Soviet Union and therefore prove detrimental to the security of the United States in light of the Soviet intervention in Afghanistan.

In addition, I direct that you immediately review those transactions for which validated licenses have already been issued but export has not occurred to determine whether any such licenses should be suspended or revoked in light of the changed national security circumstances.

Finally, I direct that you, in consultation with the Secretary of State and other appropriate officials, determine whether certain transactions now under general license requirements should be subject to validated license requirements.

JIMMY CARTER

### MEMORANDUM FOR THE SECRETARIES OF STATE AND DEFENSE, JAN. 8, 1980<sup>1</sup>

*Subject:* Policy on Technology Transfers to the USSR

I have directed the Secretary of Commerce to review and revise our policy with respect to the export of high technology and other strategic items to the Soviet Union. This review is to reassess what exports will make a significant contribution to the military potential of the Soviet Union and therefore prove detrimental to the security of the United States in light of the Soviet intervention in Afghanistan.

Our COCOM (Coordinating Committee for East-West Trade Policy) partners should be consulted on this review, which will reexamine precedents established in the past for COCOM exceptions, in order to secure their cooperation. These consulta-

tions should make clear that the basis for review and revision is the Soviet intervention in Afghanistan which has changed the nature of the potential danger to our common military security.

JIMMY CARTER ■

<sup>1</sup>Text from Weekly Compilation of Presidential Documents of Jan. 14, 1980.

## Hermitage Exhibit Canceled

### DEPARTMENT STATEMENT, JAN. 22, 1980<sup>1</sup>

The U.S. Government has decided that in the wake of the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan, it cannot recommend that an exhibition in this country of art objects from the Hermitage Museum, in Leningrad, would be in our national interest. This decision has been conveyed to the sponsors of the exhibition.

What this means is that the government will not grant the objects immunity from judicial seizure under Public Law 89-259. This law provides that objects imported for temporary cultural display cannot be seized as part of a legal proceeding, that is, the waiver would. Without a finding that exhibition is in the national interest, this immunity cannot be granted.

In the past, the Soviet Union has chosen not to permit objects into the United States for cultural purposes without the granting of this immunity. The exhibition was originally scheduled for Washington, Minneapolis, San Francisco, and Detroit, sponsored by Control Data Corporation. I would note that a lot of countries do send exhibits here without a waiver. ■

<sup>1</sup>Read to news correspondents by Department spokesman Hodding Carter III.

# FY 1981 Development Assistance Programs

Thomas Ehrlich

Statement before the House Committee on Foreign Affairs on February 19, 1980. Mr. Ehrlich is Director of the U.S. International Development Cooperation Agency.<sup>1</sup>

I am pleased to present the first testimony of the International Development Cooperation Agency (IDCA) before this committee. IDCA owes much to the House Foreign Affairs Committee for its existence. My objective today is to present an overview of all the development assistance programs proposed by the President for the coming year. To evaluate the individual programs, they should be viewed in the context of our entire development assistance effort.

The testimony is in two parts. The first describes our overall development assistance plans, indicates the range of our development assistance goals, and describes activities in some of the priority areas within that range. The second briefly explains the budget request for each of the separate programs and indicates how they relate to one another.

Many now recognize the importance of developing countries to the United States and that assisting development is in the U.S. interest for humanitarian, economic, political, and strategic reasons. But it is also essential to step back and to see these objectives as part of a coherent effort to achieve an overriding goal—a world at peace in which we can overcome poverty.

President Carter, in his State of the Union address, stated that: "Peace—a peace that preserves freedom—remains America's first goal." A world at peace in which nations respect each other's national independence, in which each nation extends the participation of its people in its political process, in which each nation respects the human rights of its citizens, in which each nation strives to meet the economic aspirations of its people equitably—that is a world in which our own people and institutions can flourish.

We have learned that dictatorships which consistently fail to meet the economic and political aspirations of their people raise the risk of internal strife. Frustrated and enraged people, mired in poverty and oppressed by a few, breed terror, revolution, and chaos. They do not produce nations that can resist subversion. Nor can such nations strengthen their national independence. They are prey to destabilizing influences from within and without. They raise the temptations of intervention for their neighbors and more distant major powers. Often those temptations threaten the peace we seek.

A world of nations striving to meet the aspirations of their people through the use of representative institutions and caring about the human rights of their citizens does not guarantee peace and freedom but certainly is a necessary precondition.

Those who fight for peace are also required to struggle against poverty.

American interests in Africa, Asia, and Latin America—dramatized by the threat to our security that currently confronts us—are diverse and significant. How we resolve the many challenges brought to us by the developing world in the 1980s will have a tremendous impact on the course of our own nation's development during the rest of this century.

The central feature of the developing world is *change*—social, economic, and political change that results from an up-swelling of nationalistic or religious feeling, from a desire to bring their nations to parity with developed countries, or from the economic injustice that is far too pervasive within the developing world.

In the midst of an interdependent world economy marked by much prosperity, hundreds of millions of people remain without adequate food, shelter, and health care. We must forge an American response to the twin problems of growing interdependence and world poverty. If America meets this challenge, our own economy and society will be strengthened by the growth and adaptation that our response will require.

Each of the facets of our interdependent relationship with the Third World involves important domestic interests. There are those in this and other industrial countries who would take a protective stance in reaction to the growth in economic contacts between the developed and developing worlds. But our country can profit and grow as a result of, not in spite of, the political and economic development of the Third World. We need the courage and sense of purpose to do so.

In that context, I emphasize that our FY 1981 development assistance budget is an important statement in relation to the current world turmoil. At a time when the world is watching all our actions, and reactions, the President's request says that the United States seeks to strengthen our relations with the nations of the Third World. Those relations will be strengthened in other ways as well: in international organizations, the United Nations, the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT), the World Bank, and the International Monetary Fund (IMF). The United States will continue to cooperate and negotiate on issues of significance to both developed and developing nations. As IDCA responds to its mandate in the field of development assistance, it will also play its part with other agencies in setting policies toward the overall U.S. relations with the developing nations and toward international negotiations with them.

I have just returned from a 2-week visit to Africa. Throughout that trip I heard time after time—directly and indirectly—two quite different concerns that have arisen in the wake of the recent events in Iran and Afghanistan.

On the one hand, some Africans suggested the United States might simply turn inward and minimize its relations with developing countries. Those who expressed this fear were concerned that isolation from the Third World might be the apparent lesson of Iran to the United States—we could expect only grief, not gratitude, from our efforts to help the nations of the Third World, and we would be best off

to minimize our contacts in the hope of minimizing our losses. This possibility is of real concern to many in Moslem as well as non-Moslem nations.

The second possible shift in U.S. attitudes, equally feared by those in Africa with whom I spoke, would be in reaction to events in Afghanistan and our subsequent efforts to help Pakistan. Unless the Russians are coming, it is said by some, the United States will not provide significant help to developing nations.

It would be a grave error for the United States to follow either of these courses, or even to leave uncorrected a suspicion of our adherence to them. Our long-term political and economic well-being is far too enmeshed with the developing world to allow cynicism of that nature to be seen as the basis of our relations with them. On the contrary, Iran and Afghanistan present a prime opportunity to affirm U.S. support for developing countries. Failure to meet the challenge, however, would be more than just an opportunity missed; it could lead to serious trouble over time by creating unnecessary tension in our relations with the Third World.

President Carter underscored the significance of this opportunity in his State of the Union address 2 weeks ago. He declared that:

We will continue to build our ties with developing nations, respecting and helping to strengthen their national independence, which they have struggled so hard to achieve. And we will continue to support the growth of democracy and the protection of human rights.

He continued by pointing out that:

In repressive regimes, popular frustrations often have no outlet except through violence. But when peoples and their governments can approach their problems together—through open, democratic methods—the basis for stability and peace is far more solid and far more enduring.

Our development assistance plans constitute a national statement that we want to work as partners with developing nations throughout the world. The creation of IDCA—and the cohesion it will provide to the presentation of our development assistance programs—could not have come at a more important time. This year the Administration has prepared a development assistance budget that makes clear we will not abandon those who look to the United States to help them bring an end to starvation and

who seek to meet the basic human needs of their people.

During our preparation of the FY 1981 budget, we paid particular attention to the relative advantages of different instruments for achieving different development goals. We compared the advantages of various bilateral programs and examined closely the ways in which U.S. bilateral aid can complement the activities of the multilateral programs to which we contribute.

This budget focuses on the priorities that Congress and the President have stressed as most important. In the bilateral requests, we are emphasizing several key sectors of development. These include agriculture, energy, health, and population. Our bilateral requests also give emphasis to countries that have demonstrated strong support for human rights and equitable economic development. Furthermore, we have strengthened our support for private voluntary organizations.

### DEVELOPMENT THEMES

In shaping our development assistance program, we must be realistic in our expectations of what can be achieved.

We cannot expect foreign assistance to instantly buy us friendship among the developing nations.

Similarly, we cannot expect immediate, dramatic change. We alone cannot wipe out poverty or hunger. Yet change is occurring and will continue. The economic, political, and social forces that set development in motion are vast. Our task is to demonstrate a willingness to be involved, to help channel and accelerate the change to make it as productive and equitable as possible.

We must continue to aid the nations of the developing world. Unless we are willing to do so, and at the same time demonstrate sensitivity toward their national and cultural aspirations, we cannot expect them to respect our system and our values. The concrete accomplishments at each increment of our effort may seem small, but the results are cumulative and lasting.

In order to make sure our developmental goals are cast within a realistic framework and to be certain that our limited development resources are being used most efficiently, IDCA defined a set of priorities for our de-

velopment activities in the immediate future. The range of these priorities shows that assistance is only one of the activities that affect developmental concerns. Just as important to development are our policies in areas such as trade, raw materials, and international finance, which do much to shape the nature of growth and development in the Third World.

In defining the full range of policy areas for our attention, we examined both intensity of need and IDCA's ability to make a constructive contribution to U.S. policy. The result was an agenda for U.S. development efforts that is realistic in scope and that addresses immediate, pressing problems.

In brief, this development policy agenda deals with particular areas within five broad categories of concern where we will be directing our attention.

- We will be guiding an accelerated attack on global poverty—addressing the needs for food security, population control, and health and emphasizing programs that recognize the role of women in development.

- We will stress areas in which the United States and developing nations have the greatest mutual economic interests—particularly energy development, debt management, trade, raw materials, and investment.

- We will focus on regions and countries of particular importance—especially the Caribbean basin, sub-Saharan Africa, and countries demonstrating strong concern for human rights and equitable development.

- We will be involved with designing a development strategy for the coming decade through participation in the U.N. Third Development Decade and through the negotiations at the global level in the United Nations and in other international agencies. We will also be addressing the needs of the future by fostering scientific research and development applicable to development needs and by adjusting the allocation of U.S. development resources as needs change.

- We will manage increased bilateral assistance with reduced staff size by use of the most effective techniques of assistance at different stages of development. We will also increase our development impact by improving coordination among bilateral and mul-



lateral programs and coordination with nonassistance programs.

Within this range of policy themes, we have begun to give particular attention to several of the most pressing sectors in which we can also make the most impact. Three of these sectors are food security and agriculture, energy development, and population and health. Because of their importance, and because they provide sound examples of what the different bilateral and multilateral programs can achieve, it may be helpful to describe briefly some of the activities in those sectors.

### Food Security and Agriculture

Helping to meet the crisis of world hunger is the President's most important development priority. Kampuchea's man-made human starvation is a current focal point of the public attention. But Kampuchea represents only the most visible example of the horror that hundreds of millions of people around the world face every day.

Chronic starvation is rampant and growing. As stressed by the President's Commission on World Hunger, there is no more important way for us to demonstrate concern for the needs of people in the Third World than to work toward the eradication of hunger. And there are no clearer areas than food and agriculture in which development must occur if we are to be able to work effectively and productively with the developing nations.

Obviously the United States cannot expect to feed the world. Instead, we will have to marshal our efforts on a more realistic level.

- Food production must be expanded in developing countries.
- The earnings of poor people must be increased so they can buy the food they need.
- The United States must continue to transfer food to areas where it is needed.

We are pursuing these goals through both bilateral and multilateral institutions. The bilateral Agency for International Development (AID) program for agriculture, nutrition, and rural development has increased in emphasis considerably in recent years. The level of funding has grown from \$174 million in 1977 to \$729 million requested in FY 1981, over half AID's

functional account budget. AID funds will continue to concentrate on institution-building; on the introduction of high-yielding and innovative technologies; and on services, commodities, and generally smaller scale infrastructure aimed specifically at the needs of small farmers and the rural poor.

A second major bilateral tool in this effort is the PL 480 Food for Peace program, which provides both food for needy people and generates resources to support development activities.

From 1977 to 1979 the World Bank group devoted more than \$8 billion to projects in agriculture and rural development. About one-third of the Bank's concessional resources were used for these purposes in FY 1979.

Within the sector, there has also been a greater emphasis by all the multilateral development banks on lending that assists small farmers, as distinct from larger infrastructure projects.

We are encouraging those banks and the relevant U.N. agencies—the Food and Agriculture Organization (the U.N.'s leading organization in this sector), the World Food Program, and the International Fund for Agriculture Development (IFAD)—to expand even further their agricultural development programs. IFAD is unique in that it is charged with the task of dealing specifically with the problems of the rural poor and also because a major share of its funds come from members of the Organization of Petroleum Exporting Countries (OPEC). We are monitoring IFAD's performance carefully with other members of that institution.

### Energy

Energy is a sector in which our interests and those of developing countries are obviously linked. While we are struggling with the energy crisis, they are facing huge energy problems of their own, ranging from depletion of firewood and other traditional fuels to staggering—and growing—debt burdens brought about by their oil imports.

Clearly, we help ourselves by helping them develop energy resources of their own. Not only are we not competing for the same energy supplies, but their growing financial burdens are straining the international financial system.

In developing the FY 1981 budget, IDCA has placed high priority on

energy. The budget addresses the most pressing energy needs of the developing countries: assessments of energy requirements and potential energy sources in particular countries, full development of conventional energy supplies, development and implementation of new and renewable energy sources, and expansion of traditional fuel supplies to reverse or contain worsening environmental degradation.

As in agriculture, a description of the various donor programs for energy shows the relative advantages of the different institutions. IDCA is working to insure that these energy assistance programs complement one another.

The multilateral development banks have the comparative advantage of being able to provide substantial amounts of capital for large projects. With strong U.S. support, the World Bank has now taken the lead in assisting developing countries to develop their own fossil fuel resources. The United States has also encouraged the development banks to become more involved in forestry and renewable energy. The World Bank is now beginning to include fuelwood as an integral part of rural development.

In our bilateral program, AID will undertake a wide range of energy projects in FY 1981, with particular focus on renewable energy and on institution-building for improved management of all energy resources. The emphasis in our bilateral program on renewable energy reflects a concern for the needs of the poor who increasingly will be unable to meet the rising cost of conventional fuels. In this regard, AID is working at the frontiers of the use of alternative technologies to provide energy from indigenous resources. The Peace Corps has been active in helping to carry out these efforts. In a joint project with AID, the Peace Corps has begun to survey rural energy use in more than 30 countries and has helped disseminate basic energy information at the village level.

Current bilateral activities also include an Overseas Private Investment Corporation (OPIC) program to encourage and assist private U.S. energy companies to explore and produce petroleum, natural gas, and other energy resources in energy-deficient developing countries. This began as a special program in 1977 and has increased in activity since then. In a major achievement this past year, one of the first

OPIC-sponsored petroleum projects reached commercial production in Ghana.

In addition, the Institute for Scientific and Technological Cooperation (ISTC) will play a major part in our bilateral energy program. It will have principal responsibility for long-term research and development, for evaluating the applicability to developing countries of different energy technologies, and for fostering the ability of the developing countries to do research and development in energy-related areas.

## Population and Health

Progress in all major fields—agriculture, energy, industry, and health—is threatened by rapid population growth. If present trends continue, the world's population would only stabilize in 2090—at 10 billion compared with today's 4.3 billion. The implications not only for development but also for peace and security throughout the world are obvious.

Moreover, high fertility strains the health of both mothers and children, through the effects of close birth-spacing and through septic abortion, particularly in countries lacking family planning services.

The United States can and should do more to encourage family planning. The proposed FY 1981 budget reflects this need, particularly through increased support for private voluntary organizations working in the field. As emphasized at the U.N. World Population Conference and the U.N. International Women's Year Conference, all couples should have not only the right to plan their families but also the safe, effective, and affordable means to do so, as couples in developed countries have had for years. Family planning assistance is being requested by the governments of most people in the Third World, from countries of many faiths and cultures. IDCA is, therefore, directing a study of assistance needs in this area and of the strengths of other donors, notably the World Bank and the United Nations, as well as the opportunities for increased U.S. efforts.

Equally important, we will develop policies and programs that help make small families a more attractive option, particularly by improving opportunities for women so that they are less dependent socially and economically on large families.

Poor health also hampers development, particularly through its effects on productivity and on learning ability. The principal threats to health in the Third World are malnutrition, common infections, and, of course, high birth rates. IDCA is working to improve health by supporting primary care, safer water and better sanitation, disease control (especially for malaria), and health planning. In conjunction with the U.N. system and the World Bank, we are expanding through AID—and, through ISTC, will be expanding even further—recent efforts to bring U.S. scientific skill to bear on health problems of the Third World, focusing particularly on primary care.

## COMPREHENSIVE DEVELOPMENT BUDGET

The most important initial task of IDCA has been to work with the President in establishing a coordinated, comprehensive budget for the total U.S. development assistance effort.

The President's budget request for the full range of development assistance and development-related programs in FY 1981 is \$8.3 billion. This includes \$6.4 billion for bilateral programs, \$1.7 billion for multilateral development banks, and \$244 million for contributions to the United Nations and the Organization of American States (OAS).

I am convinced that this comprehensive budget is well balanced and makes maximum use of the unique advantages of the various donor mechanisms. IDCA conducted an intense review of the program budgets as they were developed to assure consistency and to assure appropriate emphasis.

The budget reflects the priorities I have already mentioned. It also provides positive incentives for countries with good records in human rights and equitable economic growth and seeks greater use of private voluntary organizations.

Two other features of the FY 1981 budget are worthy of note.

First, we are proposing a change in the budgetary treatment of callable capital subscriptions to the multilateral development banks. Although these banks are not within the jurisdiction of this committee, the callable capital point is important in terms of the full impact of the development assistance

budget. This year we are not seeking budget authority for this type of capital. As a result there is a substantial lowering in the amount of our request. Callable capital accounts for about 90% of our total subscriptions to bank capital. It is not paid in to the banks; it serves only as a guarantee for bank borrowings from private capital markets and could only be called to meet obligations on those borrowings. It is highly unlikely that it will ever be called. More than \$11 billion is already available in case of a call, \$5.7 billion in appropriated funds and another \$5.7 billion through authority for public debt transactions.

None of these funds has ever been spent, and we do not think it is necessary or desirable to seek further appropriations of funds for this particular purpose. In recognition of these factors, the Administration proposes enactment of program limitations, rather than budget authority, for control of callable capital. For 1981, the budget authority for the multilateral development banks is, therefore, \$1.1 billion less than the previous system would have shown.

Second, the Administration is requesting a separate \$50 million emergency special requirement fund for the economic support fund. This will allow rapid and flexible responses to changing international situations without disrupting planned programs elsewhere and without relying on supplemental requests. Allocations from the emergency fund would be done with congressional consultation.

At this point, let me summarize the major program accounts.

## Bilateral Programs

**AID—Development Assistance.** The AID development assistance request of \$1.882 billion will allow AID to provide substantial increases for a number of countries that have performed well in human rights and economic development and also to undertake almost \$80 million in energy programs (compared with about \$30 million in FY 1980).

The emphasis in AID development assistance programs is on meeting basic human needs in poor countries. In carrying out this emphasis, AID specializes in areas where U.S. experience, technology, and carefully programmed resources can multiply the effectiveness of others and make use of our comparative advantages. It has a strong tradi-

of leadership in innovative approaches to development, many of which are now supported by large investments from the banks. Country programs are at the heart of AID's efforts—programs that emphasize not only AID's programmatic strengths but also respond to this nation's concern for support of institutions that encourage popular participation and equitable development.

**Food for Peace.** The request for the 1980 program levels totals slightly over \$1.6 billion; in addition a budget amendment will be submitted shortly to increase this amount by \$100 million to make use of some of the grain diverted from sales to the Soviet Union. Based on December estimates of 1981 seasonal average prices, this should allow for a program of about 6.4 million tons.

Food aid is provided primarily for humanitarian and development purposes to poor countries. Concessional loans under titles I and III, which are basically resource transfer mechanisms, are some of the attributes of both the bilateral aid and the AID programs encouraging sound economic policies. For example, where appropriate, title I programs are used in support of programs recommended by the IMF and the multilateral development banks. Title III multilateral year programs receive developing countries to undertake additional development efforts, particularly in the field of agriculture and rural development. Food donated under title II is used by U.S. voluntary agencies and the multilateral World Food Program in various ways to benefit the needy, including increasingly large amounts for refugee feeding.

The food program has become more development-oriented in recent years under both congressional and administrative direction. IDCA is working to ensure that trend and to insure that it complements our other developmental efforts.

We urge speedy enactment of the food security reserve legislation now pending before the Congress. It provides for a reserve of up to 4 million tons of wheat, a large part of which would consist of wheat that had been destined for the Soviet Union. The wheat reserve would be used in times of emergency to provide for emergency food needs in developing countries even when our food production is relatively low, and without disrupting the U.S. market.

**Overseas Private Investment Corporation.** No budget authority is requested for OPIC because, as a self-sustaining U.S. Government corporation, it does not require annual appropriations to fund its programs.

OPIC offers political risk insurance for private U.S. investments in developing countries, guarantees loans by U.S. business in these countries, and, in some cases, invests its own funds. OPIC has carried out its mandate well. OPIC's basic authorities expire in FY 1982. As we approach the time for reauthorization, IDCA and OPIC will need to consider whether OPIC's programs can be made more effective in achieving U.S. development and export objectives.

**Economic Support Fund.** For FY 1981, the President is requesting \$2.1 billion for the economic support fund, including peacekeeping operations. This also includes the proposed \$50 million emergency special requirement fund. Such a fund is important for avoiding disruptive emergency reprogramming at times when changing situations require unanticipated use of economic support funds.

The economic support fund provides economic assistance to countries where U.S. foreign policy interests can be served by bolstering economies that have been affected by political or economic crises. It can finance balance-of-payment assistance through cash transfers or commodity import programs and large infrastructure projects, as well as programs of more immediate benefit to the poor.

The Secretary of State allocates economic support funds among countries based on foreign policy considerations. AID manages the economic support fund projects, taking into account economic development criteria.

**Institute for Scientific and Technological Cooperation.** The President is requesting budget authority of \$95 million for the proposed ISTC in FY 1981. Of this amount, \$57 million is for the continuation of projects to be transferred from AID.

ISTC was authorized by Congress as a component of IDCA in the International Development Cooperation Act of 1979. Since funds for ISTC have not yet been appropriated, ISTC has not begun operations.

Currently, a very small fraction of the world's research and development

is focused on the problems of the poor countries. Through ISTC, we will be able to channel much more research effort into the same areas upon which we are placing priority emphasis throughout our developmental efforts. Furthermore, the program will be structured to emphasize research in the developing countries themselves, thus fostering their self-help capabilities.

To help in the fight against hunger, ISTC will lead a sustained research effort in the developing countries on the crops, the soils, the actual farming conditions of poor farmers who do not have access to irrigation or the money to buy commercial fertilizers used in the high-yielding rice and wheat varieties.

In the energy sector, ISTC will support centers in selected developing countries which improve and adapt technologies that are not yet ready for practice, doing the work under actual conditions. These centers will serve as central points of information, problem-solving, and training.

Health is a third area in which ISTC will play a leading role. A tiny percentage of the world's health research effort is spent on diseases that ravage the poor of the world. As a result, we labor in our assistance efforts with inadequate vaccines, health equipment unsuited for the conditions of developing countries, and, most of all, lack of knowledge on the causes (and thereby on potential low-cost prevention) of these diseases. ISTC will manage a program that links U.S. health science to training and experimentation by researchers in their own countries to help address these problems.

Other donor nations have recognized the importance of this type of help and have restructured their foreign assistance programs to give special focus to science and technology. Canada's International Development Research Centre, separately organized from the Canadian bilateral program, has been exceptionally successful in strengthening the local problem-solving capability of Third World scientists and practitioners. Sweden, West Germany, the Netherlands, Australia, and Austria have all set up similar institutions. ISTC will be able to work closely with these organizations, as well as with the new U.N. Fund for Science and Technology for Development.

The principal things that distinguish the ISTC from any other activities supported by the United States



in the development field (including the U.N. fund, which is described elsewhere in my statement) are:

- Its program will be built around key subject areas in which scientific and technological investigation can produce results that are broadly applicable throughout the developing world;
- It will work extensively with the scientific and technological institutions and skilled individuals in developing countries, linked along lines of common interests with counterparts in the United States, to enhance capability within the selected key areas; and
- It will monitor the results of scientific and technical research in the United States for new applications to the problems of developing countries.

**Peace Corps.** For FY 1981, \$118.8 million is requested for the Peace Corps. This unique organization continues to be extremely successful. By working directly at the village level, the Peace Corps volunteers often enhance the development prospects of the countries where they serve. The Peace Corps also provides support to the domestic development service programs of Third World nations and to multilateral volunteer programs.

**Inter-American Foundation.** In FY 1981, the Administration is requesting \$17 million. The foundation is an independent government corporation that has focused on small-scale development in Latin America and the Caribbean. It has successfully worked with local private organizations that normally would not have direct access to U.S. development assistance programs.

### Multilateral Development Banks

The President is requesting a total of \$1.7 billion for the World Bank group and the regional development banks. As discussed previously, this incorporates a proposed change in the budgetary treatment of callable capital subscriptions.

The largest request is for budget authority of \$1.1 billion for the first of three installments for our share in the sixth replenishment for the International Development Association (IDA). IDA is the "soft loan window" of the World Bank, making only concessional loans and only to the poorest countries. It is the major source of this

type of assistance. The Administration thus places a very high priority on providing our full share of resources for the replenishment of IDA.

I also want to highlight the request for \$18 million for the first portion of our subscription to the capital of African Development Bank (ADB). This will be the first U.S. subscription to the ADB. It constitutes an important sign of our commitment to growth and development in the African continent.

The multilateral development banks are the largest source of financial development assistance. They receive subscriptions and contributions from many donor countries in addition to the United States, and they mobilize substantial amounts of private capital in markets throughout the world. As a result, they can support large-scale infrastructure projects in critical sectors, and they can help in instances where U.S. bilateral assistance is small or entirely absent. They also provide assistance to middle income countries with whom the United States does not have a bilateral assistance program.

These countries continue to need substantial amounts of external financing for development purposes and many of them are important to the United States for foreign policy and national security reasons. The banks, as a consequence of their size and multilateral character, are also an important force in coordinating donor activity and in encouraging recipient governments to implement appropriate policy measures for fostering equitable growth.

In recent years the banks have moved increasingly toward our policies of supporting development in rural areas in poor countries. IDCA is actively working on furthering those policies within the banks and on establishing specific mechanisms to assure that banks' projects and U.S. bilateral projects are coordinated for maximum effectiveness.

### International Organizations and Programs

The President is requesting \$244 million for U.S. voluntary contributions to U.N. programs and to the OAS. The largest of these requests is for \$140 million for the U.N. Development Program (UNDP), which plays a key role in coordinating multilateral and bilateral assistance at the country level. Also included are requests for \$40 mil-

lion for UNICEF, \$17.5 million for technical cooperation programs of the OAS, and \$15 million for the new U.N. Interim Fund for Science and Technology for Development.

The new science and technology fund, which will be managed by the UNDP, is an initiative growing out of the U.N. Conference on Science and Technology for Development which took place last summer in Vienna. The fund's multilateral character will permit it to take an active role in areas where bilateral efforts are necessarily limited.

In contrast to the problem-oriented approach of the ISTC, the fund, as a U.N. program, will devote the major part of its resources to meeting the specific requests from member countries and regional groups. The fund will primarily undertake institution-building activities which would complement the basic needs focus of AID and the problem-oriented research approach of ISTC. The fund will, for example, help developing countries through technical assistance, training, and policy advice to build up basic scientific competence. Increased scientific capabilities will in turn enable these countries to participate in and benefit from the programs of ISTC and other agencies.

The fund is planned to be in existence for a 2-year period, with a target for total resources of \$250 million. A second U.S. contribution in FY 1982 will be considered as the program becomes more detailed and the intentions of other Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD) and OPIC donors become clearer.

### CONCLUSION

The President's reorganization of the foreign assistance programs will assure a well-coordinated, government-wide approach to U.S. development assistance goals. Three bilateral assistance organizations—AID, OPIC, and the proposed ISTC—are components of IDCA. U.S. participation in the developmentally oriented U.N. voluntary programs falls under the new agency's direction, and responsibility for U.S. participation in the multilateral development banks is shared by the IDCA and the Department of Treasury. Thus, IDCA is in a unique overview position to both observe and influence overall U.S. programs.

## Nobel Laureate Sakharov Exiled

WHITE HOUSE STATEMENT,  
JAN. 23, 1980<sup>1</sup>

The decision by Soviet authorities to deprive Nobel laureate Andrei Sakharov of his honors and to send him into exile arouses worldwide indignation. This denial of basic freedoms is a direct violation of the Helsinki accords and a blow to the aspirations of all mankind to establish respect for human rights. The American people join with free men and women everywhere in condemning this act.

We must, at the same time, ask why the Soviet Union has chosen this moment to persecute this great man. What has he done in the past few months that is in any way different from what he was doing for the past 20 years? Why the need to silence him now? Is it because of the invasion and occupation of Afghanistan?

Just as we have welcomed Solzhenitsyn, Brodsky, Rostropovich, and thousands of others who have fled Soviet oppression, so we would welcome Dr. Sakharov. It is part of our proud and sacred heritage.

The arrest of Dr. Sakharov is a scar on their system that the Soviet leaders cannot erase by hurling abuse at him and seeking to mask the truth. His voice may be silenced in exile, but the truths he has spoken serve as a monument to his courage and an inspiration to man's enduring quest for dignity and freedom. ■

<sup>1</sup>Text from Weekly Compilation of Presidential Documents of Jan. 28, 1980.

## Human Rights Reports

On February 4, 1980, the Senate Foreign Relations Committee and the House Foreign Affairs Committee released *Country Reports on Human Rights Practices for 1979*. This report on human rights conditions in 1,954 countries was submitted to the Congress by the Department of State in compliance with Sections 116(d)(1) and

502B(b) of the Foreign Assistance Act of 1961, as amended.

The 1979 report includes 39 countries that were not covered in previous reports. The expanded coverage is the result of a 1979 amendment to the Foreign Assistance Act which directs that the reports include, in addition to recipients of U.S. economic or security assistance, all foreign countries which are U.N. members. In addition to those countries which fall into the statutory categories, three additional countries, which may be of interest to Members of the Congress, are included (North Korea, Southern Rhodesia, and Taiwan).

The report draws on information furnished by U.S. missions abroad, congressional studies, nongovernmental organizations, and human rights bodies of international organizations. For most countries reported on, conditions are described up to the end of 1979. In the case of a few countries, significant developments occurring during the first month of 1980 are also included.

The organization of this report follows three basic categories. After an introduction, the description of conditions in each country is divided into three sections which correspond to three categories of human rights. A fourth section describes the government's attitude toward outside investigations of internal human rights conditions. In addition, statistical tables are provided, where relevant, listing the amounts of U.S. bilateral assistance and multilateral development assistance for fiscal years 1977, 1978, and 1979.

Copies of this 854-page report may be purchased from the Superintendent of Documents, U.S. Government Printing Office, Washington, D.C. 20402, for \$8.00 each. Remittance, payable to the Superintendent of Documents, must accompany order. ■

The comprehensive foreign assistance program I have outlined is, I believe, well-reasoned and well-balanced, reflects our nation's compassion for the millions of our fellow human beings who face staggering burdens in simply attaining the most basic of human needs. It also reflects the need to make the most efficient use of our development assistance dollars.

More than ever, it is essential that we efficiently marshal our foreign assistance so that we are identified in the international community with a strong commitment to economic progress and human decency. The Administration's program for FY 1981 meets that objective. ■

<sup>1</sup>The complete transcript of the hearings will be published by the Committee and will be available from the Superintendent of Documents, U.S. Government Printing Office, Washington, D.C. 20402.

## Soviets Veto Sanctions Against Iran

WHITE HOUSE STATEMENT,  
JAN. 14, 1980<sup>1</sup>

Like the presence of Soviet tanks in the streets of Kabul, the Soviet veto of the U.N. Security Council resolution on Iran exposes, for all the people of the world to see, the Soviet Union's disregard for international law and the world's machinery of peace.

Their veto is an act of political cynicism. It offends the conscience of all who honor freedom and who seek to strengthen the grip of law over lawlessness, of peace over strife—in this crisis and for the future.

The facts are clear. On December 31, the Security Council adopted a binding resolution on Iran.<sup>2</sup> That resolution, as had a prior resolution which the Soviet Union approved, called on Iran to release the hostages. It requested that Secretary General Waldheim continue to use his good offices to secure their release. It committed the Security Council to review the situation again on January 7 and, if the Iranians had not yet complied, to adopt effective measures under Articles 39 and 41 of the U.N. Charter. These are the articles of the U.N. Charter that provide for mandatory sanctions.

The Secretary General then went to Tehran. He reported to the Council on January 7 that the progress he sought had not been made; that the Iranians refused to release the hostages. It, therefore, became incumbent on the Security Council to act.

Twice the United States, despite extreme skepticism, agreed to a delay of this action so that any indication of a good-faith effort to resolve this crisis could be explored. As has so often been the case in the past, those explorations proved fruitless.

The necessary majority of the members of the U.N. Security Council voted to impose specific sanctions on Iran in accordance with the provisions of the charter and the previous decision of the Council. The Soviet Union has thwarted that effort with their veto.

Let us be clear about what the Soviet Union is saying to the world by its two vetoes in the past week and by its other actions: The Soviet Union has opposed this effort of the international community, including the United States, to resolve the crisis in Iran through peaceful means. Meanwhile, it

is seeking to crush the independence of Afghanistan through military force.

The Soviet Union can veto the Security Council's resolution on Afghanistan—but they cannot veto the imprint their aggression has left on world opinion.

The Soviet Union can keep the Security Council from acting now on Iran—but they cannot block the determination of members of the international community that terrorism and lawlessness must be dealt with firmly.

Over the next several days, we will be working with other nations which uphold the principles of the United Nations and which seek a peaceful end to the crisis in Iran, to carry out our obligations under the Security Council resolution of December 31 and to implement the sanctions. At the President's direction, Deputy Secretary of State Warren Christopher is now in Europe to discuss our actions with our European allies. We will also be in immediate contact with other nations.

The terrorists holding the American hostages cannot take comfort from this veto, because in reality it is aimed at advancing Soviet designs in Iran. The veto does nothing to lessen the world community's condemnation of their acts, nor does it lessen Iran's isolation from the world. In spite of the veto, we are confident that nations will act to maintain the rule of law. ■

<sup>1</sup>Text from Weekly Compilation of Presidential Documents of Jan. 21, 1980.  
<sup>2</sup>For text of Resolution 461, see BULLETIN of Feb. 1980, p. 68.

## U.S. Files Brief With ICJ in Iran Hostage Case

On January 15, 1980, the United States filed its Memorial on the merits with the International Court of Justice (ICJ) in the *Case Concerning the United States Diplomatic and Consular Staff in Tehran*. The Memorial was filed in accordance with the Court's order of December 24, 1979, which gives Iran until February 18, 1980, to file its Counter-Memorial.

In the Memorial, the United States requests the Court to declare that Iran has violated its international obligations to the United States and to order Iran to conform to its legal obligations. The United States also requests the Court to hold that the United States is entitled to reparations for Iran's violations of international law, in a sum to be determined after the full extent of injury suffered by the United States and its nationals is known.

In particular, the United States alleges that Iran has violated:

- Articles 22, 24, 25, 26, 27, 29, 31, 37, 44, and 47 of the Vienna Convention on Diplomatic Relations;
- Articles 5, 27, 28, 31, 33, 34, 35, 36, 40, and 72 of the Vienna Convention on Consular Relations;
- Article II(4), XIII, XVIII, and XIX of the Treaty of Amity, Economic Relations, and Consular Rights between the United States of America and Iran; and
- Articles 2, 4, and 7 of the Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of Crimes against Internationally Protected Persons, Including Diplomatic Agents.

The specific measures the Court is asked to order are:

- That Iran immediately restore the U.S. Embassy, Chancery, and Consulates to the exclusive control of the United States and insure protection and inviolability of those properties according to treaties between the United States and Iran and general international law;
- That Iran immediately release all U.S. hostages and grant them full protection, privileges, and immunities to which they are entitled under treaties in force and general international law,



cluding immunity from criminal jurisdiction and freedom and facilities to leave Iran;

- That none of the hostages be forced to appear at any "trial," "grand jury," or "international commission;"
- That those responsible for crimes against the personnel and premises of the United States be prosecuted or extradited to the United States; and
- That the United States is entitled to reparation in its own right and in the exercise of its right of diplomatic protection of its nationals held hostage.

Many of these measures were already specified by the Court in its order of December 15, 1979, directing Iran to release the hostages. The December 15 order was an interim order entered to preserve the rights of the United States while the case is pending. In the Memorial filed January 15, the United States requests that a final judgment be entered in favor of the United States on all issues in the case. ■

Press release 11 of Jan. 15, 1980.

## Iran Chronology, January 1980

### January 1

U.N. Secretary General Kurt Waldheim arrives in Tehran to seek negotiations for release of the hostages.

### January 2

A spokesman for the Iranian militants asserts that Secretary General Waldheim could not be allowed access to the hostages.

### January 3

Secretary General Waldheim meets with Iran's policymaking Revolutionary Council but fails to meet with Khomeini.

U.S. begins search for 9,000 Iranian students who failed to report to the Immigration and Naturalization Service.

### January 4

Militants order Iranian Foreign Ministry to hand over U.S. Charge L. Bruce Laughlin, to be interrogated about documents that were found in the Embassy files.

### January 8

U.S. wins approval from other major industrial countries on new financial

sanctions against Iran and plans to include the measure in a forthcoming U.N. resolution.

### January 11

U.S. submits draft resolution calling for economic sanctions against Iran to the U.N. Security Council.

### January 12

Security Council delays debate on U.S. bid for sanctions against Iran because of a last minute message from Iranian authorities to Secretary General Waldheim proposing to release the hostages in return for the formation of an international tribunal that would hear Iran's grievances.

Iran formally asks Panama to arrest the deposed Shah for extradition to Iran.

### January 13

Security Council votes 13 to 2 (Soviet Union and East Germany) on a draft resolution calling for economic sanctions against Iran.

### January 14

Iran's ruling Revolutionary Council announces that all journalists working for U.S. news organizations would be expelled from Iran.

Iranian Government warns U.N. members that the economic boycott envisioned by the U.S. would jeopardize their relations with Iran. The Iranian Foreign Ministry also informs U.N. authorities that any Security Council decision that was contrary to Iran's interests would be considered invalid.

### January 15

Abolhassan Bani-Sadr, Iran's Economic and Finance Minister, leads in the Iranian Presidential campaign.

U.S. files its Memorial with the World Court on the merits of the U.S.-Iran hostage case. The Memorial was filed in accordance with the Court's order of December 24, 1979, which gives Iran until February 18, 1980, to file its Counter-Memorial.

### January 19

Alleged plotters of a coup against Iran's Revolutionary Government are arrested in Tabriz.

### January 22

Because of the Afghanistan crisis, the Carter Administration makes a policy decision to offer future economic and military cooperation to Iran if the hostages are released unharmed.

### January 23

Khomeini is hospitalized in Tehran for treatment of a heart ailment.

### January 25

Bani-Sadr wins in Iran's first Presidential election. Of the 4 million votes counted,

he receives 75.7%. However, the Revolutionary Council remains supreme until Bani-Sadr's government can be approved by a General Assembly to be elected about the end of February.

### January 27

Bani-Sadr states that the major responsibility for ending the crisis over the hostages lays with the U.S. He states that "when America decides to put aside its policy of expansionism and violating the sovereignty of other countries, then it will be adopting correct policies for the solution of the crisis."

### January 28

Canada announces it is temporarily closing its Embassy in Iran.

A Federal judge orders the Carter Administration to return the passport of Philip Agee, the former CIA official who, in December, proposed resolving the Iranian situation by exchanging CIA files on Iran for release of the hostages.

Secretary General Waldheim plans a series of new moves aimed at speeding the release of hostages among which includes a tentatively selected five-member commission to inquire into Iran's grievances against the U.S. and the deposed Shah.

### January 29

With the help of the CIA and the Canadian Embassy, six U.S. Embassy employees, who had been secretly hiding in the Canadian Embassy in Tehran, escape from Iran posing as Canadian diplomats and carrying Canadian passports with forged Iranian visas.

### January 30

Foreign Minister Ghotbzadeh states that the escape of the Americans aided by the Canadians could worsen conditions for the 50 hostages. He also condemns the act as a violation of "international law."

### January 31

Iranian militants announce that they would refuse to obey any order by President-elect Bani-Sadr to hand over their hostages to a third party. ■

## IAEA Conference Held in India

by Gerard C. Smith

*Statement at the 23d general conference of the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) in New Delhi on December 4, 1979. Ambassador Smith is Special Representative of the President for Nonproliferation Matters.*

It is indeed an honor to appear here today. I would first like to congratulate you, Dr. Sethna [Homi N. Sethna, Chairman of the Atomic Energy Commission of India], on your election as President. You have long been one of the most admired and respected individuals associated with the work of the agency. Your election augurs well for the success of this conference.

I would also like to express our gratitude to the Government of India for all its efforts in hosting this conference.

The President of the United States has asked me to convey the following message:

On behalf of the American people, I would like to send my best wishes to the participants in the IAEA's 23d general conference.

Nuclear power can be critical in the urgent efforts we must make—individually and jointly—to reduce our dependence on dwindling and sometimes insecure fossil fuel supplies. Our extensive cooperative and supply relationships with other countries are major elements in expanding the utilization of nuclear power.

Our ability to derive its full benefits will depend upon greater public confidence that this important energy source is being developed and managed in a safe and effective manner. Misuse of the technology will gravely affect the security of all nations, and it is vital that we intensify our joint efforts to halt the spread of nuclear explosives.

Difficult challenges often provide great opportunities. By working together I believe we can fulfill the promise of the atom for a better and more peaceful world.

The United States recognizes the central role that the IAEA is playing in these endeavors. We intend to continue providing strong support for the programs of the agency.

It is my hope and the hope of the American people that as we enter the 1980s we can renew our efforts to pursue nuclear development in a harmonious and rewarding fashion.

Nuclear power is needed by many countries, including my own. The

United States recognizes this need; we will meet our commitment to peaceful nuclear cooperation. At the same time, we must do a far better job in meeting the challenges facing the nuclear power industry, including public concern about safety, waste disposal, proliferation, and supply assurance.

### Challenges Facing the Nuclear Industry

We are committed to improving reactor safety. Reactor operators must be more highly trained; regulatory agencies, properly organized; we need more effective and timely response capabilities in emergencies. Three-Mile Island demonstrated shortcomings; it did not negate nuclear energy as a safe, reliable, and economic source of energy. It should make us better able to assure the safe operation of nuclear facilities. The United States will continue to share with the IAEA and its member states the results of its investigation of Three-Mile Island.

Radioactive waste disposal is as much a social and institutional question as a technological one. We should intensify our joint efforts to demonstrate and convince our citizens of the feasibility of waste disposal in different geographic media.

We need to deal more effectively with the disposition of spent fuel. INFCE and other examinations should give us greater confidence in this respect. There is more than one option from which to choose. Protracted retrievable storage of spent fuel produced by most current type reactors is safe and economically competitive with reprocessing. There is growing agreement that reprocessing is not essential for waste management.

There is growing apprehension that additional nations may acquire nuclear explosives. We must insure that this does not occur, since it could have a seriously prejudicial impact on international nuclear commerce, as well as on international security and stability.

The United States recognizes the urgent need to maintain confidence in nuclear supply arrangements with nations meeting nonproliferation conditions. We realize that there should be greater certainty in the issuing of export licenses and predictability in the

exercise of national controls. To these ends we are prepared to work closely with others and intend to implement our law in ways that provide for such certainty. Consumer states also bear responsibility; their use or misuse of technology can have an important effect on the actions of suppliers.

There is need for adequate uranium mining, production, and enrichment to sustain reactor needs. The United States is prepared to help others to identify and develop their natural uranium resources. With necessary exploration and investment, we believe that the uranium industry should not experience excessive difficulty in meeting needs at least until the end of the century. It appears that one conclusion of the International Nuclear Fuel Cycle Evaluation (INFCE) is that the world will be sufficient enrichment capacity meet probable demands, at least through the 1990s. This is encouraging.

The long-term growth of nuclear power will also eventually require more advanced reactor systems. Since fuel utilization improvements can be achieved in thermal reactors, nuclear power could proceed in a once-through mode for a considerable time. Plutonium recycle appears to us as unnecessary, marginally economic at best and imprudent at this time from a nonproliferation standpoint.

Although some nations are proceeding with breeder research and development (which requires reprocessing), we believe there are compelling economic and nonproliferation reasons for limiting the number of reprocessing plants to a few large-scale facilities at gearing reprocessing capacity to near-term plutonium demand for research and development on advanced reactor.

As such reprocessing takes place, will become highly important to assure that the resultant plutonium is subject to rigorous international controls.

If the breeder proves to be economic as it is developed and demonstrated, it is likely to be so only in those countries having advanced infrastructures and suitable grid sizes. This does not mean that breeders should be limited to some countries and denied to others. And, there will be time before selecting a particular advanced technology to look at various options and to modernize international nonproliferation arrangements.

### S. Support for IAEA

The IAEA has long served as a focal point for nuclear cooperation. We believe it will prove important in meeting the challenges I have described.

We strongly support the Director General's proposal to intensify the IAEA's efforts on nuclear safety.

We will continue to support the IAEA's vital safeguards program which is so critical to nonproliferation efforts. This year the United States has contributed \$5.1 million to this program; we call upon others to augment their support for it. We believe that nations could also design nuclear facilities for effective application of safeguards.

Additional nations are adhering to the Nonproliferation Treaty (NPT), and we hope that full-scope safeguards will become a norm for international nuclear trade.

We congratulate the IAEA for its role in the conclusion of the Convention on Physical Protection. The convention could help discourage diversion by terrorists or other subnational groups.

The agency's technical assistance activities help developing nations to take advantage of the peaceful uses of atomic energy. Subject to appropriations by Congress, we will increase our annual 1980 contribution over the 1979 level. We also plan to implement a special program of technical assistance outlined at the recent U.N. session on disarmament. We believe our record of cooperation in accordance with Article IV of the NPT has been consistently good. We continue to look for new ways to be even more responsive to the needs of the developing countries. We endorse the agency's study on spent fuel and are actively working in its examination of whether an international plutonium regime can reinforce existing nonproliferation assurances.

We appreciate the Secretariat's contribution to insure the usefulness of INFCE. We expect the IAEA to have an important role in INFCE follow-on. Since INFCE apparently will not overshadow major technical fixes, we could press for institutional measures that provide both greater supply and nonproliferation assurance. Indeed such evolution is contemplated by U.S. law and policy.

To sum up, the United States expects to preserve and increase the essential role of nuclear power, but this

will require greater public, governmental, and commercial confidence, as well as international cooperation.

With INFCE's conclusion, we need to resolve remaining differences and, building on past achievements, move toward a more assured nonproliferation framework.

Misuse of technology and equipment could severely damage prospects for nuclear power. This would be tragic, especially given the need of many countries to draw on this great source of power to enhance their energy security.

I began by underscoring our dependence on the development of nuclear energy. I would end on a note of optimism—that by dint of cooperation and discipline this great source of energy can be ours. ■

## Munitions Sales to Saudi Arabia

by Lucy Wilson Benson

*Statement before the Subcommittees on Europe and the Middle East and International Security and Scientific Affairs of the House Foreign Affairs Committee on December 12, 1979. Mrs. Benson is Under Secretary for Security Assistance, Science, and Technology.*<sup>1</sup>

It is a pleasure to be here today to meet with the members of the subcommittees of the House Foreign Affairs Committee. I have a brief statement to make concerning the proposed sale of \$120 million of F-5 munitions to Saudi Arabia.

In brief, this proposed sale includes Sidewinder missiles, Maverick missiles, laser guided bombs, and cluster bomb units. All of these munitions are already in the Saudi inventory. The proposed sale would, thus, complement an earlier sale made pursuant to congressional notification.

The Saudi F-5 fleet is an integral part of Saudi Arabia's overall defense posture, a posture designed to provide defensive coverage of a very large, resource-rich land area with limited manpower. The F-5 version we have supplied to Saudi Arabia is a workhorse aircraft which must fulfill a variety of defensive missions. Its major weapons

systems are the Sidewinder, Maverick, laser-guided bombs, and cluster bomb units. Obviously the usefulness of these systems, and thus of a significant portion of the Saudi Air Force, is tied to the availability of munitions such as those proposed in the sale we are discussing today.

Saudi Arabia initially requested these munitions in 1976, to phase with deliveries of the aircraft and the associated training programs. After discussions with the Congress at that time, the United States agreed to provide some, though not all, of the quantities requested. We also told the Saudis then that we would undertake to supply additional munitions at a later date. When we gave that assurance, we clearly conveyed to the Saudis that any further sales would also be subject to our congressional notification procedures. Nonetheless the assurance was given, both because we felt that additional quantities would be justified and because the original sale of the weapons system themselves only made sense if it included—as it did—a corresponding willingness to supply the necessary munitions.

The Saudis have expressed to us on numerous occasions over the past 3 years their concern that we follow through on this earlier commitment and provide adequate numbers of those munitions for both reserve stocks and for training purposes. Their growing concern must, I think, be viewed in light of the major importance to U.S. national interests of the quality of our overall relations with Saudi Arabia.

I know that members of the committee are aware of Saudi Arabia's key role in both regional and world affairs and of the importance of the U.S.-Saudi bilateral relationship.

Saudi Arabia remains the world's largest exporter of crude oil. It currently provides 21% of American oil imports. Saudi decisions on oil production and price have enormous impact on the world economy, and our own. For example, the Saudi decision last June to increase daily production temporarily from 8.5 to 9.5 million barrels greatly eased pressures of supply and price. Saudi Arabia agreed to continue this higher level of production through the final quarter of this year in response to continued supply and price pressure.

Saudi Arabia has become an important factor in international finance, in support for the U.S. dollar, and in world development lending.



Saudi Arabia has been and continues to be a key working partner in our efforts to resolve a number of conflicts in the Middle East and Africa and has become a major contributor to the quest for stability in the region. As we proceed with our efforts to reach a comprehensive peace in the Middle East, we will need to broaden the base of Arab support for the negotiating process, and Saudi cooperation in this endeavor will be of significant importance.

For its part Saudi Arabia places great reliance on its security relationship with the United States. In a general sense it recognizes the inherent vulnerability of a large territorial area with a relatively sparse population. Add to that combination natural resources worth over \$5 trillion at today's prices and you have what the Saudis recognize as a tempting target. The Saudis also recognize that there is little in history to suggest that resources such as theirs will go both unprotected and unmolested for very long.

In specific terms the Saudis view with great concern events in neighboring countries which symbolize to them, to a greater or lesser degree, an aggressive Soviet policy whose objective is expansion of Soviet influence over the long term. In recent years they have seen manifestations of this policy in South Yemen and Ethiopia to the south, in Iraq to the north, and in Afghanistan in the not too distant northeast. In Saudi defense planning, Iraq and South Yemen have been seen as the most direct threats. They each have sufficient resources available in either military hardware terms or in the capacity to organize subversion to justify Saudi concerns.

To counter these perceived threats, Saudi Arabia embarked some years ago on a phased, and we think coherent, program to expand its armed forces and to modernize its military equipment. This program takes full account of the country's size and of its inherent manpower limitations. It involves neither projection forces nor the capability for large-scale, modern offensive operations, nor in most cases the most advanced weaponry. "Defensive" is occasionally used as a term of art; in this case it is a precise description of the force structure and armament on which Saudi military expenditure is based. The large proportion of Saudi military

expenditure devoted to construction of cantonments, ports, roads, and other facilities is consistent with the defensive mission of Saudi forces. The relatively heavy investment in air defense and the associated command and control systems is equally consistent with that mission, as are the limited armored forces, the coastal Navy, and the upgrading of the National Guard. And the F-5 program itself is also primarily defensive; its primary roles are to counter armored or mechanized attack, suppress relatively unsophisticated air cover for such operations, and attack support and staging areas.

Much of the requisite new equipment for the Saudi modernization program has been purchased from the United States, and Saudi Arabia sees American willingness to provide support, spare parts, and munitions as an integral element of our concern for their security needs.

It is worth noting that each of these factors bearing on our relationship with Saudi Arabia has evolved since we sold the initial quantity of F-5 munitions more than 3 years ago. Saudi policy with respect to oil production and pricing, investments, and support of the dollar is, if anything, more important today.

In the meantime, too, the situation in the Middle East has stabilized in one sense as a result of the Camp David accords, focusing even more attention on next steps in the peace process. At the same time, the situation in the gulf has become increasingly unstable, and the Saudis perceive a more immediate threat from Soviet-inspired and assisted regimes in the general area. Thus events in the period since we first assured the Saudis that we would provide additional quantities of F-5 munitions argue in favor of this sale.

The F-5 munitions proposal should be seen in this context. The Saudis believe that these munitions are needed if they are to adequately maintain the defense capabilities of the F-5 aircraft they have acquired from the United States. The Department of Defense has carefully examined this munitions sale and has concluded that the quantities we are proposing to sell Saudi Arabia are militarily justified and will be an important contribution to Saudi Arabia's defensive needs. The Department of State concurs in that view.

More important, we believe there are urgent and overriding policy reasons for approving the sale. The threat is real, and the munitions to be supplied would not have a significant impact on the balance of forces in the region. Saudi Arabia's past and potential contributions to our purposes in the Middle East and to our major national interests in the energy, financial, and security fields support our view that the sale should be made. ■

<sup>1</sup> The complete transcript of the hearings will be published by the committee and will be available from the Superintendent Documents, U.S. Government Printing Office, Washington, D.C. 20402.

## Export of Fighter Aircraft

### DEPARTMENT STATEMENT, JAN. 4, 1980<sup>1</sup>

The President has decided that in certain cases the sale to foreign countries of intermediate fighter aircraft developed or modified for export (FX) would be in the national interest and would be consistent with the objective of the U.S. arms transfer policy. An intermediate fighter is defined as one whose cost and performance characteristics would generally lie between our current export fighter, the F-5E and fighter aircraft now in production for U.S. forces, such as the F-16.

The availability of FX aircraft will contribute to our national security objectives by permitting the United States to respond positively to the security needs of our friends and allies when the F-5E is inadequate, and it will contribute to arms transfer restraint objectives by discouraging purchases of more sophisticated first-line aircraft from the United States and other suppliers. An interagency study of the FX concept found that, without an intermediate alternative, an increasing number of countries may turn to first-line aircraft to fill their fighter needs. The FX, with its capabilities tailored largely toward a defensive role, is thus consistent with the overriding arms control purpose of the President's arms transfer policy—to

provide countries with the weapons best suited to their legitimate self-defense purposes.

The U.S. Government will not provide funding for development of the aircraft, and aircraft companies will assume all financial and market risks. Interested companies can proceed, however, with the assurance that the U.S. Government will not disapprove the sale of an intermediate fighter on the grounds that it was developed or modified solely for export. We will continue, of course, to apply all other arms transfer policy criteria to any proposed sales on a case-by-case basis to insure consistency with our foreign policy, national security, and arms control interests. In addition, any FX sales to countries covered by the President's arms transfer ceiling will be accommodated within the annual ceiling. ■

<sup>1</sup> Made available to news correspondents by Department spokesman Hodgson Carter III.

## **Security Relations With Pakistan**

*Following are the joint U.S.-Pakistan statement issued on February 3, 1980, at the conclusion of the visit to Islamabad by Zbigniew Brzezinski, President Carter's National Security Adviser, and Warren Christopher, Deputy Secretary of State, and a statement by Mr. Christopher before the Senate Foreign Relations Committee on February 7.*

### **JOINT STATEMENT, FEB. 3, 1980**

President Zia-ul-Haq, Foreign Affairs Adviser Agha Shahi, and other Pakistani Government officials held talks with Dr. Brzezinski, Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs, and Mr. Warren Christopher, Deputy Secretary, and their advisers on February 2 and 3.

There was a full exchange of views on global and strategic matters, on the situation in the region, and on the

broad range of issues in the bilateral relations between the two nations.

The two nations agreed that the Soviet armed intervention in Afghanistan and the aggression against the Moslem people of that country is a flagrant violation of international covenants and norms and a serious threat to the peace and security of Pakistan, the region, and the world.

The United States reiterated that its commitment to Pakistan's independence and security pursuant to the 1959 agreement is firm and enduring. The Government of Pakistan reiterated its resolve, as stated in the 1959 agreement, that it is determined to resist aggression.

President Zia-ul-Haq expressed appreciation for the visit of Dr. Brzezinski and Mr. Christopher. The American side expressed warm appreciation for the generous hospitality extended to it by the Government of Pakistan.

Appropriate consultations between the two governments will continue.

### **DEPUTY SECRETARY CHRISTOPHER, FEB. 7, 1980<sup>1</sup>**

In the period since the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan, we have had the strong support of the Pakistan Government in shaping an effective political response both internationally and regionally.

Much of what has been done in the United Nations and the Islamic conference to bring pressure to bear on the Soviet Union has depended heavily on Pakistani leadership along with our strong support. Quite clearly we share with Pakistan a common assessment of the Soviet threat both globally and in the region and are united in our determination to meet the Soviet challenge.

The 2 days of intensive discussions in Islamabad over last weekend built on our earlier talks with Pakistani Foreign Affairs Adviser Agha Shahi in Washington. They produced a large measure of agreement of the nature of the security relationship we seek to build between our two nations. The personal participation of President Zia throughout these discussions indicates, in our view, the importance which he attaches to the regional threat and to U.S.-Pakistani cooperation in meeting that threat.

Much of the discussion in Islamabad focused on the U.S. commitment to the security and territorial in-

tegrity of Pakistan as embodied in the 1959 agreement of cooperation. We again strongly reaffirmed our commitment to the 1959 agreement with Pakistan. The President's forthright statement of vital U.S. interests in the region in his State of the Union address seemed to have had a salutary effect in helping to remove doubts about the strength and durability of this commitment. We stated our willingness to ask the Congress to affirm this commitment explicitly when we seek legislation to permit resumption of assistance. The Pakistanis expressed satisfaction with this outcome.

We described our intention to propose to the Congress a legislative package which would affirm the 1959 agreement and authorize economic assistance and military credits notwithstanding other legislative provisions such as the Symington and Glenn amendments. We described our efforts to encourage other traditional donors to increase their levels of assistance substantially and indicated that we viewed our contribution to be part of a broad multilateral effort.

The Pakistanis asked that we defer presenting any legislation which would specify amounts of aid until we had a better assessment of Pakistan's overall economic and military needs and until we had a fuller appreciation of the global totals of increased assistance which might be forthcoming to meet these needs. We agreed to this request, while making clear that our offer of assistance continued to stand.

In the immediate period ahead, both we and the Pakistanis intend to continue discussions with those governments to which we are looking to provide additional assistance. Our discussions in Riyadh with Saudi officials were a very important first step in this regard, and we received assurances of strong, continued Saudi support. We will stay in close touch with the Pakistan Government as the multilateral consultations proceed. We have stressed to them the importance of not losing momentum and moving forward with our own projected assistance as soon as possible.

In the meantime, our military team has continued detailed discussions in Pakistan in an effort to determine the scope of Pakistan's existing military deficiencies and to identify specific types of equipment which the United

States might provide to strengthen Pakistan's defensive capabilities along its border with Afghanistan. Following an assessment of these talks, we intend to have further detailed discussions with other potential equipment suppliers and sources of financing in an effort to coordinate an overall effective response.

During the Islamabad discussions, we reiterated our deep concerns about Pakistan's nuclear activities. We have made clear to the Pakistanis our view that a nuclear explosion in the present unsettled international environment in South Asia would be especially dangerous and even more unwise than before. We have stated what we consider to be a fact—that a Pakistani nuclear test would drastically alter our relationship and put at serious risk our further cooperation.

Throughout these discussions we stressed our view that the Soviet occupation of Afghanistan posed a challenge to the entire region and that we hoped an appropriate regional response would be forthcoming. Since the visit of the President's special emissary Clark Clifford to New Delhi nearly coincided with our own, we were able to underline in both capitals our support for continued good relations between India and Pakistan. ■

<sup>1</sup>The complete transcript of the hearings will be published by the committee and will be available from the Superintendent of Documents, U.S. Government Printing Office, Washington, D.C. 20402.

## Assistance to the Caribbean, Central America

*Following are President Carter's message to the Congress of November 9, 1979, and a statement by Deputy Secretary of State Warren Christopher before the Senate Foreign Relations Committee on December 7.*

### MESSAGE TO THE CONGRESS, NOV. 9, 1979<sup>1</sup>

Many of our neighbors in Central America and the Caribbean are in crisis—crisis marked by economic problems, terrorism, and popular frustration. The resolution of these problems in ways that will preserve the independence and security of these countries, while expanding democracy and supporting human rights, is very much in the national interest of the United States.

Prompt and effective U.S. assistance is vital.

- Nicaragua's economy has been crushed by bitter and prolonged strife. We have been asked to help, and we are doing so. But more is needed to restore public confidence, private initiatives, and popular well-being.

- The Governments in El Salvador and Honduras have pledged democracy and moderation. These and other Central American countries are embarked on accelerated development efforts of direct benefit to the poor. Assistance in these efforts is essential in creating the conditions under which democratic institutions can grow and thrive.

- The countries of the Eastern Caribbean are young and struggling democracies. They need help now for nation-building and for economic development.

I am therefore today proposing action to expand our support for development and security in Central America and the Caribbean. This will augment our existing development and security assistance programs in these regions, which in turn complement the contributions of several other governments and international agencies.

I have directed that, subject to normal congressional notification procedures, funds be reprogrammed for use in Central America and the Caribbean. These include:

- \$5 million from the fiscal year 1980 Economic Support Funds for development projects in Central American countries other than Nicaragua.

- \$10 million from fiscal year 1979 and fiscal year 1980 development assistance funds for public works and high employment impact projects in the Caribbean. These projects are an important part of our fiscal year 1979-80 contributions of \$66.9 million

budgeted for the Caribbean Development Group, chaired by the World Bank.

We are also reprogramming Food for Peace funds to increase food assistance in the area, especially in Nicaragua. We will also likely be reprogramming \$5 to \$10 million in Foreign Military Sales credits and International Military Education and Training funds for the Caribbean, and similar amounts for such programs in Central America. We are still working out the final details of these proposed reprogrammings and will fully inform the appropriate congressional committees of our proposed actions.

Reprogramming, however, is not enough. The enclosed bill would provide \$3 million in flexible Economic Support funding, \$75 million to assist in the reconstruction of the Nicaraguan economy and \$5 million for early-impact development projects in other Central American countries.

I strongly urge rapid congressional action on this bill.

Such action will demonstrate that the United States can be relied upon to support democratic aspirations, the rebuilding of broken economies, and the security of our friends in this nearby region. Our additional funds for Central American development should substantially augment existing programs. Furthermore, we hope that other nations and international institutions will increase their efforts to accelerate the social and economic development of Central America.

With your help we can make clear where we stand.


JIMMY CARTER

### DEPUTY SECRETARY CHRISTOPHER, DEC. 7, 1979<sup>2</sup>

The President's proposals to help strengthen democracy and support development in Central America and the Caribbean will address growing problems in a part of the world that is of major importance to the United States. We believe these programs are essential to an effective and credible U.S. response to changes in the region.

Most of the new appropriations we have proposed would assist Nicaragua reconstruction. But these constitute only part of a major effort in the region. I would, therefore, like to begin by considering the broader issues and their implications for our national interests





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## Interests, Policy, and Challenges

With few exceptions, our neighbors in Central America and the Caribbean face grave endemic problems that are aggravated by adverse international economic conditions. In recent months there have been violence and coups in both Central America and in the English-speaking Caribbean. Unemployment, poverty, and population growth are placing severe strains on local institutions. The global energy crisis and worldwide inflation compound the difficulty of planning and financing long-range development efforts.

As President Carter said in transmitting this supplemental request, helping our neighbors deal with these severe problems in ways that will preserve their independence and security is very much in the national interest of the United States.

We desire for our neighbors in Central America and the Caribbean what we desire for our own people: strong, independent democracies that respect human rights; equitable economic development; and security against hostile outside forces.

To promote these goals, we have supported the gradual development of open, pluralistic political systems that respect human rights. Our motives reflect practical as well as idealistic considerations, for the flexibility, responsiveness, and resilience of democracy are the surest guarantees against radicalism and disruption.

We have promoted regional cooperation to deal with common economic problems. In the Caribbean we have supported a successful multilateral effort under the World Bank to increase both the effectiveness and the level of foreign assistance. In Central America, we are examining ways to revivify the Common Market and its institutions.

In light, however, of the traumatic events of the past year, we must do more to support moderate solutions to the region's pressing needs.

After a bitter, prolonged, and destructive struggle, the people of Nicaragua today face a massive rebuilding on a scale that is unprecedented in this hemisphere. Because the ultimate character of Nicaragua's new government will heavily influence prospects in other nations of the region, we must, for our own sake, participate in Nicaragua's reconstruction.

Honduras is in the midst of a promising development process that includes elections. But its strategic loca-

tion and poverty make it vulnerable to radical influence.

El Salvador has a new government pledged to open the political system, to pursue urgently needed economic reforms, and to respect human rights. But it faces bitter opposition from both the radical left and the reactionary right.

While Guatemala is stronger, particularly economically, it too has development problems, as well as human rights problems.

Recent events have underscored the fragility of the newly independent democracies of the tiny eastern Caribbean island states. Their leaders, many of a younger generation educated in the United States, the United Kingdom, and Canada are impatient to build societies responsive to the needs of their peoples. But some of them appear to be willing to discard the regional heritage of parliamentary democracy. The coup d'etat in Grenada last March exemplifies this disturbing trend.

Finally, Cuba stands ready to exploit regional tensions, straining still further the often fragile political balance that exists in its smaller neighbors in both the Caribbean and Central America.

These conditions are accelerating change in the region and provoking widespread instability and uncertainty. The fundamental problem we share with our neighbors is not that of defending stability in the face of revolution; it is to build a more stable, equitable, and pluralistic order. That is the challenge of Nicaragua, and it is the challenge throughout the region.

## Our Overall Response

The challenges facing the countries of Central America and the Caribbean are too complex and deep-rooted to be resolved quickly, even with large-scale outside assistance.

By supporting the reconstruction of Nicaragua, however, we can demonstrate our genuine concern for the future of that country, and we can help to revitalize the country's private sector, whose contributions are so important both to development and to democracy. By increasing our support for sound development throughout Central America and the Caribbean, we can help provide hope and direction even in the face of turmoil. And by responding

to legitimate security concerns, we can help free attention and resources to deal with economic development in an atmosphere of peace. The President's proposals will enable us to do this by increasing direct U.S. assistance.

In Central America, our development assistance and PL 480 food aid totals have averaged \$80-90 million over the past several years, providing a stimulus to regional integration as well as an important contribution to individual countries.

In the Caribbean, development assistance and PL 480 programs have nearly doubled since FY 1976, to over \$130 million in FY 1979. This increase will have a growing impact in coming months as actual disbursements begin to catch up with obligations. It has already contributed to the regional impetus of the World Bank-led Caribbean Group for Cooperation in Economic Development, which includes 30 recipient and donors, including Venezuela, Brazil, and Japan, as well as European countries.

The serious situation now facing Central America and the Caribbean has led us to consider additional resource through reprogramming of funds in the proposed FY 1980 budget. These reprogrammings would include:

- \$5 million in economic support for El Salvador. These funds would be used for high-impact programs to improve the barrios surrounding San Salvador and five other major cities and to provide jobs for the people who live there. We are also considering the possibility of diverting funds for similar projects in Guatemala if conditions there improve soon;

- \$10 million in development assistance for the eastern Caribbean; \$7 million of this already has been reprogrammed from FY 1979 funds. These funds are to finance labor-intensive construction and repair of schools, roads, water and sanitation systems, and markets;

- Substantially increased development assistance funds for Honduras and El Salvador;

- \$15-20 million in PL 480 for FY 1980—\$10 million in title I and \$4-5 million in title II—to meet essential needs for Nicaragua; and

- \$10-20 million in foreign military sales (FMS) funds and international military education and training (IME) for the Caribbean and Central America. The funds will be used for a number of purposes including the replacement of the Dominican Republic of equipment

st during the 1979 hurricanes; training in Panama and the United States; sale of basic equipment and Coast Guard training to eastern Caribbean nations; and, in Central America—especially in Honduras and El Salvador—transportation, communication, medical, and other equipment, plus training for professional development.

### Supplemental Request

Although these reprogramings will address many urgent needs, some of the most pressing requirements can be met only through economic support funding. However, as you know, substantial reprogramming of economic support funds is not possible. We are, therefore, seeking new authorizations totaling \$80 million; \$75 million in economic support funding will be used to assist in the reconstruction of the Nicaraguan economy, especially its private sector.

Our supplemental request for Nicaragua includes:

- A \$70 million loan to provide foreign exchange resources that Nicaragua needs to maintain supplies of critical imports—60% of these imports would go to the private sector—which will include agricultural, industrial, medical, and transportation items that the U.S. has traditionally sold to Nicaragua, thus helping to reconfirm or historically close trading ties; and
- \$5 million in grants for technical assistance to help support agricultural institutions, expand activities by private and voluntary organizations, and strengthen educational exchange programs.

These activities are carefully designed to provide direct support for the private sector, through credit for small- and medium-size businessmen and farmers and home repair and reconstruction. All together, we estimate that these funds will generate the equivalent of more than 30,000 year-round jobs.

Nicaragua's economy has been crushed by the long and destructive civil war that finally ended in July. The speed and nature of its recovery will be a key factor in determining Nicaragua's future.

There has been a substantial global response to Nicaragua's needs. Roughly 270 million in bilateral credits and grants have been pledged by other countries to aid in reconstruction.

International financial institutions have made extraordinary efforts. The Inter-American Development Bank, for example, has moved rapidly to provide \$95.5 million in recovery assistance and to reformulate another \$86 million of its existing portfolio.

The new government has efficiently used the resources that have been provided. Even so, critical needs remain. They include restoring private sector productive capacity in both agriculture and industry; reconstructing public transportation, housing, schools, health facilities, and infrastructure; and providing employment opportunities.

In the absence of U.S. assistance, our mission in Nicaragua has projected that the unfinanced balance-of-payments deficit over the 2-year rehabilitation period would be \$400 million. Approximately \$100 million may be covered by new projects under consideration by other donors, leaving an unfinanced gap of \$300 million.

The political situation remains in flux. The Nicaraguan Government today operates collegially and pragmatically. Many views are represented. Some of the Sandinista leadership wants to lead Nicaragua toward a Marxist model. Others want to restructure their country in an independent, pluralist fashion. The Catholic Church, private entrepreneurs, and other key groups in Nicaragua are all actively participating in reconstruction.

We are pleased by the reestablishment of an open press and the respect being shown for legal processes in general. We are concerned, however, by the large numbers of former National Guard members still held prisoner and by the delays in bringing them to trial. We hope the Nicaraguan Government's invitation to the Inter-American Human Rights Commission is an indication that this situation will soon be resolved.

Our own policy is to support the development of an independent and pluralist Nicaragua working with its neighbors in a framework of regional cooperation. We understand and support what has emerged as the driving consensus among Nicaraguans today—to build a new Nicaragua that, through popular participation, is capable of meeting basic human needs.

Through mutual cooperation, mutual respect, and nonintervention, we are strengthening our contacts with the government and with the many groups on which a healthy pluralist society depends—the church, labor, the

media, and the private sector. We are encouraging Nicaragua and its neighbors to ease the tensions that have existed and to promote a new era of regional cooperation and economic integration.

The United States has helped Nicaragua generously with emergency relief. These new programs would enable us to continue to play a role in meeting the far greater challenge of Nicaragua's reconstruction.

Nicaragua's relations with other nations will be shaped by the responsiveness of those nations to Nicaragua's immediate problems. Cuba has provided teachers, doctors, technicians, and military advisers. Other countries—Mexico, Germany, the Andean Pact, Spain—have contributed people and money. We can do no less.

In addition to the \$75 million in supplemental funds for Nicaragua, we are seeking \$5 million in economic support funding for high impact urban and rural development projects in Honduras and possibly Guatemala.

Honduras has made an impressive commitment to social development and democracy. Its common frontier with Nicaragua and a longstanding boundary dispute with El Salvador make it central to the peace of the region.

The additional funds requested for this strategically located country would be used to support high-impact development projects in small towns and rural areas, including roads, water and sanitation systems, and local slaughterhouses. This assistance will demonstrate our willingness to support a Central American government with a good human rights record and a proven commitment to equitable development.

In closing, I want to reiterate our judgment that these requests are vital to U.S. interests in Central America and the Caribbean. By helping to meet new, urgent requirements, we will make our presence felt on the side of both development and democracy. ■

<sup>1</sup>Text from Weekly Compilation of Presidential Documents of Nov. 12, 1979.

<sup>2</sup>The complete transcript of the hearings will be published by the committee and will be available from the Superintendent of Documents, U.S. Government Printing Office, Washington, D.C. 20402.



## Current Actions

## MULTILATERAL

## Antarctica

The Antarctic Treaty. Signed at Washington Dec. 1, 1959. Entered into force June 23, 1961. TIAS 4780. Accession deposited: Uruguay, Jan. 11, 1980.<sup>1</sup>

## Atomic Energy

Fourth supply agreement for the transfer of enriched uranium for a research reactor in Yugoslavia, with annex and exchange of notes. Signed at Vienna Jan. 16, 1980. Enters into force on the date upon which the amendment to the project agreement of Oct. 4, 1961 between the International Atomic Energy Agency and Yugoslavia enters into force.

## Aviation

Convention on international civil aviation. Done at Chicago Dec. 7, 1944. Entered into force Apr. 4, 1947. TIAS 1591. Adherence deposited: Monaco, Jan. 4, 1980.

## Containers

International convention for safe containers (CSC), with annexes. Done at Geneva Dec. 2, 1972. Entered into force Sept. 6, 1977; for the U.S. Jan. 3, 1979. TIAS 9037. Accession deposited: Argentina, Sept. 11, 1979.

## Cultural Relations

Protocol revising the convention of Nov. 22, 1928 (TIAS 6548) relating to international exhibitions, with appendix and annex. Done at Paris, Nov. 30, 1972.<sup>2</sup> Ratification deposited: Italy, Nov. 20, 1979.

## Customs

Customs convention on the international transport of goods under cover of TIR carnets, with annexes. Done at Geneva Nov. 14, 1975. Entered into force Mar. 20, 1978.<sup>3</sup> Accession deposited: Norway, Jan. 11, 1980.

## Education

Convention on the recognition of studies, diplomas, and degrees concerning higher education in the states belonging to the Europe region. Done at Paris Dec. 21, 1979. Enters into force 1 month after the fifth instrument of ratification has been deposited. Signature: U.S. Dec. 21, 1979.

## Finance

Agreement establishing the International Fund for Agricultural Development. Done at Rome June 13, 1976. Entered into force

Nov. 30, 1977. TIAS 8765.

Accessions deposited: China, Maldives, Jan. 15, 1980.

## Genocide

Convention on the prevention and punishment of the crime of genocide. Adopted at Paris Dec. 9, 1948. Entered into force Jan. 12, 1951.<sup>4</sup>

Accession deposited: Barbados, Jan. 14, 1980.

## Maritime Matters

Amendments to the convention of Mar. 6, 1948, as amended (TIAS 4044, 6285, 6490, 8606), on the Intergovernmental Maritime Consultative Organization. Done at London Nov. 14, 1975.<sup>2</sup>

Acceptances deposited: Argentina, Dec. 31, 1979;

Cuba, Dec. 27, 1979; Dominica, Dec. 18, 1979; Israel, Dec. 31, 1979; Peru, Jan. 21, 1980.

Amendments to the convention of Mar. 6, 1948, as amended (TIAS 4044, 6285, 6490, 8606), on the Intergovernmental Maritime Consultative Organization. Done at London Nov. 17, 1977.<sup>2</sup>

Acceptances deposited: Dominica, Dec. 18, 1979; Israel, Dec. 31, 1979; Peru, Jan. 21, 1980; Poland, Jan. 2, 1980; Sri Lanka, Jan. 16, 1980.

Amendments to the convention of Mar. 6, 1948, as amended (TIAS 4044, 6285, 6490, 8606), on the Intergovernmental Maritime Consultative Organization. Adopted at London Nov. 15, 1979. Enters into force 12 months after acceptance by two-thirds of the members of the Organization, other than associate members, except for those which, before the amendments come into force, make a declaration that they do not accept them.

Acceptance deposited: Finland, Jan. 14, 1980.

## Patents

Patent cooperation treaty, with regulations. Done at Washington June 19, 1970. Entered into force Jan. 24, 1978; except for chapter II. Chapter II entered into force Mar. 29, 1978.<sup>4</sup> TIAS 8733. Accession deposited: Australia, Dec. 31, 1979.

## Telecommunications

International telecommunication convention, with annexes and protocols. Done at Malaga-Torremolinos Oct. 25, 1973. Entered into force Jan. 1, 1975; for the U.S. Apr. 7, 1976. TIAS 8572. Accession deposited: Honduras, Oct. 11, 1979.

## Trade

Agreement on technical barriers to trade. Done at Geneva Apr. 12, 1979. Entered into force Jan. 1, 1980.

Acceptances deposited: Chile,<sup>5</sup> Oct. 25, 1979; Argentina,<sup>6</sup> Austria,<sup>6</sup> Belgium,<sup>6</sup> Canada, European Economic Community, Finland,<sup>6</sup> France, Federal Republic of Germany,<sup>7</sup> Ireland, Italy, Japan,<sup>8</sup> Luxembourg, Netherlands,<sup>9,10</sup> New Zealand, Switzerland, U.K.,<sup>9,11</sup> U.S., Dec. 17, 1979; Sweden, Dec. 20, 1979; Denmark, Dec. 2, 1979;<sup>12</sup> Brazil, Norway, Dec. 28, 1979.

International dairy arrangement. Done at Geneva Apr. 12, 1979. Entered into force Jan. 1, 1980.

Acceptances deposited: Argentina,<sup>6</sup> Austria,<sup>6</sup> European Economic Community,<sup>1</sup> Finland,<sup>6</sup> Hungary, Japan, New Zealand, Switzerland, U.S., Dec. 17, 1979; South Africa, Dec. 18, 1979; Sweden, Dec. 20, 1979; Bulgaria, Dec. 26, 1979; Norway, Dec. 28, 1979.

Arrangement regarding bovine meat. Done at Geneva Apr. 12, 1979. Entered into force Jan. 1, 1980.

Acceptances deposited: Argentina,<sup>6</sup> Austria,<sup>6</sup> Canada, European Economic Community, Finland,<sup>6</sup> Hungary, Japan, New Zealand, Switzerland, U.K.,<sup>13</sup> U.S., Dec. 17, 1979; South Africa, Dec. 18, 1979; Sweden, Dec. 20, 1979; Bulgaria, Dec. 26, 1979; Brazil, Norway, Dec. 28, 1979.

Agreement on trade in civil aircraft. Done at Geneva Apr. 12, 1979. Entered into force Jan. 1, 1980.

Acceptances deposited: Belgium,<sup>6</sup> European Economic Community, France, Federal Republic of Germany,<sup>7</sup> Ireland, Italy, Japan,<sup>8</sup> Luxembourg, Netherlands,<sup>9,10</sup> Switzerland,<sup>8</sup> U.K.,<sup>9,14</sup> Dec. 17, 1979; Canada,<sup>15</sup> Sweden, U.S., Dec. 20, 1979; Denmark,<sup>12</sup> Dec. 21, 1979; Norway, Dec. 28, 1979.

Agreement on implementation of article VII of the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (TIAS 1700). (Customs valuation) Done at Geneva Apr. 12, 1979. Enters into force Jan. 1, 1981, for the government which have accepted or acceded to it by that date.

Agreement on government procurement. Done at Geneva Apr. 12, 1979. Enters into force Jan. 1, 1981 for those governments which have accepted or acceded to it by that date.

Agreement on import licensing procedure. Done at Geneva Apr. 12, 1979. Entered into force Jan. 1, 1980 for the governments which have accepted or acceded to it by that date.

Agreement on implementation of article V of the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (antidumping code). Done at Geneva Apr. 12, 1979. Entered into force Jan. 1, 1980, for those governments which have accepted or acceded to it by that date.

Agreement on interpretation and application of articles VI, XVI, and XXIII of the

General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (subsidies and countervailing duties). Done at Geneva Apr. 12, 1979. Entered into force Oct. 1, 1980 for those governments which have accepted or acceded to it by that date.

Geneva (1979) protocol to the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade. Done at Geneva June 30, 1979. Entered into force Oct. 1, 1980.

## U.N. Industrial Development Organization

Constitution of the U.N. Industrial Development Organization, with annexes. Adopted at Vienna Apr. 8, 1979. Enters into force when at least 80 states that have deposited instruments of ratification, acceptance, or approval notify the depositary that they have agreed, after consultation among themselves, that the constitution shall enter into force.

Signatures: Algeria, Argentina, Brazil, Chile, Colombia, Ecuador, Egypt, El Salvador, Ghana, Lebanon, Libya, Nigeria, Peru, Romania, Senegal, Thailand, Tunisia, Turkey, Uganda, Yemen (Aden), Yugoslavia, Apr. 8, 1979; Austria, Oct. 3, 1979; Bangladesh, Jan. 2, 1980; Belgium, Denmark, France, Federal Republic of Germany, Greece, Ireland, Italy, Luxembourg, Netherlands, U.K., Venezuela, Zambia, Oct. 5, 1979; Benin, Dec. 4, 1979; China, Sept. 6, 1979; Congo, Dec. 18, 1979; Cuba, Oct. 2, 1979; Finland, Sept. 28, 1979; Gabon, Jan. 8, 1980; Guinea, Nov. 29, 1979; Haiti, Nov. 16, 1979; Indonesia, Jan. 28, 1979; Japan, Jan. 18, 1980; Madagascar, Oct. 13, 1979; Mexico, Nov. 12, 1979; Paraguay, Jan. 16, 1980; Niger, Apr. 9, 1979; Norway, Sept. 28, 1979; Pakistan, Oct. 22, 1979; Panama, Aug. 17, 1979; Philippines, Oct. 12, 1979; Portugal, Sept. 1, 1979; Rwanda, Aug. 28, 1979; Sierra Leone, Aug. 29, 1979; Spain, Jan. 21, 1980; Sri Lanka, Oct. 31, 1979; Sudan, June 27, 1979; Swaziland, Jan. 14, 1980; Sweden, Sept. 28, 1979; Switzerland, Sept. 19, 1979; U.S., Jan. 17, 1980; Upper Volta, Nov. 16, 1979; Yemen (Sana), July 19, 1979; Zaire, n. 21, 1980.

Notifications deposited: India, Mexico, Jan. 1, 1980; Madagascar, Jan. 18, 1980; Pakistan, Oct. 29, 1979.

## Wheat

Protocol modifying and further extending the food aid convention (part of the international wheat agreement) 1971 (TIAS 44). Done at Washington Apr. 25, 1979. Entered into force June 23, 1979, with respect to certain provisions, July 1, 1979, with respect to other provisions.

Notification deposited: Norway, Jan. 28, 1980.

Protocol modifying and further extending the wheat trade convention (part of the international wheat agreement) 1971 (TIAS 44). Done at Washington Apr. 25, 1979.

Entered into force June 23, 1979, with respect to certain provisions, July 1, 1979, with respect to other provisions.

Ratification deposited: Spain, Jan. 9, 1980.

## BILATERAL

### Bolivia

Agreement amending the agreement for sales of agricultural commodities of May 31, 1978 (TIAS 9581). Effected by exchange of notes at La Paz Dec. 6, 1979. Entered into force Dec. 6, 1979.

### Bulgaria

Joint statement on the development of cooperation in agriculture, with annex. Signed at Washington Nov. 26, 1979. Entered into force Nov. 26, 1979.

### Canada

Agreement for a cooperative vessel traffic management system for the Juan de Fuca region, with annex. Effected by exchange of notes at Ottawa Dec. 19, 1979. Entered into force Dec. 19, 1979.

### Denmark and the Faroe Islands

Agreement concerning fisheries off the coasts of the U.S., with annexes and agreed minute. Signed at Washington Sept. 5, 1979.

Entered into force: Jan. 18, 1980.

### Egypt

Project grant agreement relating to technical assistance for the improvement of the Egyptian telecommunications system, with annex. Signed at Cairo Dec. 30, 1979. Entered into force Dec. 30, 1979.

### European Atomic Energy Community (EURATOM)

Arrangement in the field of nuclear safety research, with addenda. Signed at Washington Mar. 19, 1979. Entered into force Mar. 19, 1979.

### Hungary

Agreement on tariff matters, with annexes and exchange of letters. Signed at Budapest Nov. 18, 1978.

Entered into force: Jan. 1, 1980.

### Indonesia

Agreement for cooperation in scientific research and technological development, with exchange of letters. Signed at Washington Dec. 11, 1978.

Entered into force: Oct. 5, 1979.

### International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA)

Agreement amending the agreement of May 11, 1959, as amended and extended (TIAS 4291, 7852), for cooperation in the

civil uses of atomic energy, with annex. Signed at Vienna Jan. 14, 1980. Enters into force on the date on which the Agency receives from the U.S. written notification that it has complied with all requirements for such entry into force.

### Israel

First amendment to the agreement of Nov. 15, 1979 relating to cash assistance to Israel during FY 1980 to support the economic and political stability of Israel. Signed Dec. 12, 1979. Entered into force Dec. 12, 1979.

Agreement for cooperation in the field of health. Signed at Washington Jan. 29, 1980. Entered into force Jan. 29, 1980.

### Japan

Agreement on educational exchange programs. Signed at Tokyo Feb. 15, 1979.

Entered into force: Dec. 24, 1979.

Agreement for financing an educational exchange program, with memorandum. Effected by exchange of notes at Tokyo Jan. 11, 1958, as amended Dec. 2, 1960, and Aug. 23, 1963. Entered into force Jan. 11, 1958. (TIAS 3982, 4635, 5422)

Terminated: Dec. 24, 1979.

### Republic of Korea

International express mail agreement, with detailed regulations. Signed at Seoul and Washington Dec. 27, 1979, and Jan. 14, 1980. Enters into force on the date mutually agreed upon by the Administrations.

### Macao

Agreement relating to trade in cotton, wool, and manmade fiber textiles and textile products, with annexes. Effected by exchange of letters at Hong Kong and Macao Nov. 29 and Dec. 18, 1979. Entered into force Dec. 18, 1979; effective Jan. 1, 1980.

### Mexico

Treaty on extradition, with appendix. Signed at Mexico City May 4, 1978.

Instruments of ratification exchanged: Jan. 25, 1980.

Entered into force: Jan. 25, 1980.

Agreement relating to salary supplements to personnel dedicated to opium poppy eradication and narcotics interdiction. Effected by exchange of letters at Mexico Dec. 3, 1979. Entered into force Dec. 3, 1979.

Agreement amending the agreement of June 2, 1977, as amended (TIAS 8952, 9251), relating to additional cooperative arrangements to curb the illegal traffic in narcotics. Effected by exchange of letters at Mexico Dec. 5, 1979. Entered into force Dec. 5, 1979.

Agreement amending the agreement of May 22, 1978, (TIAS 9248) concerning an illicit crop detection system to be used in curbing the illegal traffic in narcotics. Effected by exchange of letters at Mexico Dec. 6, 1979. Entered into force Dec. 6, 1979.

#### Poland

Agreement amending the agreement of Nov. 8, 1976, (TIAS 8407) relating to the acceptance of airworthiness certifications. Effected by exchange of notes at Washington Jan. 28, 1980. Entered into force Jan. 28, 1980.

#### Saudi Arabia

Project agreement for technical cooperation in educational programs for meteorology, hydrology, arid land studies, and environmental protection, with annexes. Signed at Riyadh Nov. 25, 1979. Entered into force: Jan. 23, 1980.

#### Spain

Arrangement for the exchange of technical information and cooperation in nuclear safety matters, with patent addendum. Signed at Madrid Nov. 5, 1979. Entered into force Nov. 5, 1979.

Agreement relating to the reciprocal granting of authorizations to permit licensed amateur radio operators of either country to operate their stations in the other country. Effected by exchange of notes at Madrid Dec. 11 and 20, 1979. Entered into force Dec. 20, 1979.

#### Sudan

Agreement for sales of agricultural commodities, with annexes and agreed minutes. Signed at Khartoum Dec. 22, 1979. Entered into force Dec. 22, 1979.

Grant agreement for commodity imports. Signed at Khartoum Dec. 31, 1979. Entered into force Dec. 31, 1979.

#### Switzerland

Administrative agreement for the implementation of the agreement on social security of July 18, 1979. Signed at Bern Dec. 20, 1979. Enters into force on the date of entry into force of the July 18, 1979 agreement.

#### Turkey

Agreement regarding the consolidation and rescheduling of certain debts owed to, guaranteed, or insured by the U.S. Government and its agencies, with annexes. Signed at Ankara Dec. 11, 1979. Enters into force upon receipt by Turkey of written notice that domestic U.S. laws and regulations covering debt rescheduling concerning this agreement have been complied with.

#### United Kingdom

Memorandum of understanding on cooperation in earth sciences and environmental studies. Signed at Reston and London Sept. 21 and 26, 1979. Entered into force Sept. 26, 1979.

#### Venezuela

Agreement for scientific and technological cooperation. Signed at Caracas Jan. 11, 1980. Enters into force on the date on which the parties notify each other that they have complied with the constitutional and statutory requirements necessary for its entry into force.

#### Yugoslavia

Agreement on the establishment of a U.S. information center in Titograd in accordance with the terms of the memorandum of understanding of June 14, 1961. Signed at Belgrade June 25, 1979. Entered into force: Dec. 6, 1979.

#### Zambia

Agreement for sales of agricultural commodities, relating to the agreement of Aug. 4, 1978, with minutes of negotiation. Signed at Lusaka Dec. 21, 1979. Entered into force Dec. 21, 1979. ■

<sup>1</sup> With declaration.

<sup>2</sup> Not in force.

<sup>3</sup> Not in force for the U.S.

<sup>4</sup> Chapter II not in force for the U.S.

<sup>5</sup> Ad referendum.

<sup>6</sup> Subject to ratification.

<sup>7</sup> Applicable to Berlin (West).

<sup>8</sup> Subject to completion of constitutional procedures.

<sup>9</sup> Subject to approval.

<sup>10</sup> Provisionally applicable to the Kingdom in Europe.

<sup>11</sup> In respect of its metropolitan territory and the territories for which it has international responsibility except for Antigua, Bermuda, Brunei, Cayman Islands, Montserrat, St. Kitts-Nevis, Sovereign Base Areas (Cyprus), Virgin Islands.

<sup>12</sup> Not applicable to the Faroe Islands.

<sup>13</sup> In respect of Belize.

<sup>14</sup> In respect of its metropolitan territory and the territories for which it has international responsibility except for Antigua, Belize, Bermuda, Brunei, Cayman Islands, Hong Kong, Montserrat, St. Kitts-Nevis, Sovereign Base Areas (Cyprus), Virgin Islands.

<sup>15</sup> With reservation.

## January 1980

Events pertaining to Iran can be found on page 61.

### January 2

U.S. Coordinator for Refugee Affairs Ambassador Victor Palmieri, leaves on a 2-week trip to Southeast Asia for a firsthand look at Kampuchean relief efforts and refugee assistance programs throughout the region. He will visit Hong Kong, Thailand, Malaysia, Singapore, Indonesia, the Philippines, and Japan.

### January 3

India's seventh national parliamentary elections are held.

Fifty-two nations call for an urgent meeting of the Security Council "to consider the situation in Afghanistan and its implications for international peace and security."

### January 4

President Carter cuts off sale of high technology equipment and grain and limit fishing privileges in U.S. waters to the Soviet Union in response to its aggression in Afghanistan.

U.N. Security Council meets to consider the Soviet military intervention in Afghanistan.

### January 5

Mauritanian President Mohammed Mahmoud Ould Louly is dismissed by the ruling military committee. Prime Minister Mohammed Khouna Ould Haidalla takes over his post and will also serve as head of the ruling military committee.

Secretary of Defense Brown arrives in Beijing for an 8-day visit, the first to China by a senior Pentagon official since the Communists came to power in 1949.

### January 7

U.N. Security Council votes on a draft resolution calling for the "immediate and unconditional withdrawal of all foreign troops from Afghanistan."

### January 9

Security Council adopts Resolution 46 by consensus to call an emergency Special Session of the General Assembly to deal with the Afghanistan situation. The vote was 12 to 2 (U.S.S.R. and East Germany) with one abstention (Zambia).



**January 10**  
U.S.-Turkey announce successfully completed negotiations on an agreement for cooperation on defense and economy and supplementary agreements detailing cooperation in the areas of defense support, defense industry, and installations.

**January 13**  
U.S. offers Pakistan a tentative 2-year economic and military aid package worth \$400 million to help meet the threat posed by Soviet military intervention in Afghanistan.  
Soviet Union Aeroflot office in New York is bombed.

**January 14**  
U.N. General Assembly adopts resolution condemning "armed intervention" in Afghanistan and calling for the "immediate, unconditional, and total withdrawal of the foreign troops from Afghanistan." The vote was 104 to 18, with 18 abstentions and 12 absentees.  
Spanish Prime Minister Adolfo Suarez meets with President Carter.  
Deputy Secretary Christopher visits Western Europe Jan. 14-16.

**January 15**  
Egyptian Vice President Hosni Mubarak visits U.S. Jan. 15-19.

**January 17**  
U.S. journalists, accused of biased reporting and interfering in Afghanistan's internal affairs, are ordered out of the country.

**January 19**  
Afghanistan Government expels journalists with U.S. passports after having them under house arrest for 2 days.

**January 21**  
West German Foreign Minister Genscher visits the U.S. Jan. 21-22.

**January 22**  
Roy Jenkins, President of the European Commission, arrives in Washington for a 3-day visit Jan. 22-24.  
U.S. decides that in the wake of Soviet invasion of Afghanistan, the exhibition of objects from the Hermitage Museum in Leningrad would not be in U.S. national interests.  
Dr. Andrei D. Sakharov, Soviet dissident leader and Nobel Peace Prize laureate, is arrested by the Soviet Government and exiled to the city of Gorky, 400 miles east of Moscow.

**January 23**  
President Carter delivers his "State of the Union" address.  
Prime Minister Cossiga of Italy arrives in U.S. on an official visit Jan. 23-26.

**January 24**

House votes 386 to 12 to support President Carter's request that the U.S. press for the transfer, cancellation, or boycott of the Moscow Summer Olympic Games.

In a House vote of 294 to 88 and a Senate vote of 74 to 8, China is approved most-favored-nation trade status.

U.S. announces it is willing to sell military equipment to China, excluding weapons.

Ambassador Linowitz, U.S. special envoy to the Middle East, visits Europe and the Middle East Jan. 24-Feb. 4. He meets in London with King Hussein of Jordan and British officials Jan. 25-26.

**January 26**

Under Secretary for Political Affairs Newsom visits Romania Jan. 26-28.

**January 28**

Senate Foreign Relations Committee unanimously approves a resolution calling for the relocation, postponement, or cancellation of the 1980 Moscow Summer Olympic Games.

European Parliament President Simone Veil visits the U.S. Jan. 28-31.

**January 29**

At a conference in Pakistan, Islamic Foreign Ministers from 35 Moslem countries adopt a resolution condemning the Soviet military intervention in Afghanistan as a "flagrant violation" of international law.

Senate adopts a resolution 88 to 4 calling for the U.S. to boycott the Moscow Summer Olympics unless the games are postponed, canceled, or moved, regardless of whether Soviet troops withdraw from Afghanistan.

**January 30**

Australian Prime Minister Malcolm Fraser visits the U.S. Jan. 30-Feb. 1.

**January 31**

Newly appointed Ambassadors to the U.S. Simon Sabimbona (Burundi) and Herbert Richard Wright Brewer (Liberia) present their credentials to President Carter.

**Department of State**

**January 1-29**

Press releases may be obtained from the Office of Press Relations, Department of State, Washington, D.C. 20520.

| No. | Date | Subject   |
|-----|------|---|
| *1  | 1/4  | Status of U.S. contribution to international efforts for Khmer relief.  |
| *2  | 1/9  | William G. Bowdler sworn in as Assistant Secretary for Inter-American Affairs (biographic data).                                      |
| *3  | 1/9  | Shipping Coordinating Committee (SCC), Subcommittee on Safety of Life at Sea (SOLAS), working group on radio communications, Jan. 17. |
| *4  | 1/9  | U.S. Organization for the International Telegraph and Telephone Consultative Committee (CCITT), study group D, Jan. 31.               |
| *5  | 1/9  | Secretary of State's Advisory Committee on Private International Law, bankruptcy study group, Feb. 1.                                 |
| *6  | 1/9  | SCC, SOLAS, working group on standards of training and watchkeeping, Jan. 23.   |
| *7  | 1/9  | SCC, SOLAS, working group on safety of fishing vessels, Jan. 23.  |
| *8  | 1/9  | SCC, SOLAS, working group on subdivision and stability, Jan. 23.  |
| *9  | 1/15 | U.S. Secretariat for the World Conference of the U.N. Decade for Women, 1980.   |
| 10  | 1/15 | Vance: interview on "Today" show, New York, Jan. 11.  |
| 11  | 1/15 | U.S. files brief with World Court in Tehran hostage case.   |
| *12 | 1/16 | U.S., Indonesia establish textile visa system, Oct. 1 and 15, 1979.   |
| *13 | 1/16 | U.S., Macau sign textile agreement, Nov. 29 and Dec. 18.  |
| *14 | 1/17 | SCC, SOLAS, working group on safety of navigation, Feb. 20.   |
| *15 | 1/17 | Advisory Committee on the Law of the Sea, Feb. 7 (closed), Feb. 8 (open and closed).  |
| *16 | 1/22 | Lyle Franklin Lane sworn  |

- in as Ambassador to Uruguay (biographic data).
- \*17 1/23 Itinerary of Italian Prime Minister Cossiga's visit to the U.S., Jan. 23-26.
- \*18 1/23 U.S. aid to refugees in Somalia.
- \*19 1/24 Advisory Committee on International Investment, Technology, and Development, Feb. 22.
- \*20 1/25 U.S., Netherlands Antilles sign air transport agreement, Jan. 22.
- \*21 1/25 Vance: statement before the New York State Bar Association, New York.
- \*22 1/28 Status of U.S. contribution to international efforts for Khmer relief.
- \*23 1/29 Advisory Committee on International Investment, Technology, and Development, Feb. 26.
- \*24 1/29 SCC, SOLAS working group on the handling of dangerous goods in ports, Mar. 4.
- \*25 1/29 William G. Bowdler sworn in as Assistant Secretary for Inter-American Affairs (revised biographic data). ■

\*Not printed in the BULLETIN.  
†To be printed in a later issue.

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