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
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
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Department  
of State  
***bulletin***

Official Monthly Record of United States Foreign Policy / Volume 88 / Number 2130

January 1988



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# **Department of State bulletin**

Volume 88 / Number 2130 / January 1988

THE DEPARTMENT OF STATE BULLETIN, published by the Office of Public Communication in the Bureau of Public Affairs, is the official record of U.S. foreign policy. Its purpose is to provide the public, the Congress, and government agencies with information on developments in U.S. foreign relations and the work of the Department of State and the Foreign Service. The BULLETIN's contents include major addresses and news conferences of the President and the Secretary of State; statements made before congressional committees by the Secretary and other senior State Department officials; selected press releases issued by the White House, the Department, and the U.S. Mission to the United Nations; and treaties and other agreements to which the United States is or may become a party. Special features, articles, and other supportive material (such as maps, charts, photographs, and graphs) are published frequently to provide additional information on current issues but should not necessarily be interpreted as official U.S. policy statements.

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The Secretary of State has determined that the publication of this periodical is necessary in the transaction of the public business required by law of this Department. Use of funds for printing this periodical has been approved by the Director of the Office of Management and Budget through September 30, 1988.

DEPARTMENT OF STATE BULLETIN (ISSN 0041-7610) is published monthly (plus an index) by the Department of State, 2201 Street, NW, Washington, D.C. 20520. Second class postage paid at Washington, D.C., and additional mailing offices. POSTMASTER: Send address changes to Superintendent Documents, U.S. Government Printing Office, Washington, D.C. 20402.

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For sale by the Superintendent of Documents, U.S. Government Printing Office, Washington, D.C. 20402.

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## The Philippines and Nicaragua

*President Reagan's radio address  
in connection with the inauguration of November 7, 1987.*

Week news from the Philippines told us all of both the friendship of the Filipino people and their struggle. The gesture of friendship came from Philippine President Corazon Aquino who paid a visit to Clark Air Base south of Manila to attend a memorial service for American airmen slain by the communists. I have told President Aquino that we all Americans appreciate her courage and selflessness. These murders bring us all to all of us the troubles and challenges that the new Philippine democracies face.

Twenty months ago, we applauded President Corazon Aquino's peaceful election as the first woman president of the Philippines to lead the country toward popular rule. Since then, President Aquino has been more successful than many believed was possible. Within this last year-and-a-half, she has led a successful campaign to elect a new, more democratic, constitution and she has overseen the first free national elections in 15 years—elections in which an overwhelming majority of the people participated. Now, working with the newly elected Congress to solve that nation's serious economic problems.

President Aquino believes, as I do, that free enterprise is the most powerful engine of economic progress known to humanity. She has inaugurated an ambitious reform program that has led to a sharp recession and boosted real economic growth to 5%. She has begun to reform the tax system, dismantle monopolies, privatize or eliminate inefficient government-owned industries, and reduce barriers to international trade and investment. These are all reasons for optimism, but there are also reasons for concern as well.

The single most serious threat to the survival of democratic government in the Philippines remains the communist insurgency. As a result of the restoration of democracy, that insurgency has lost political momentum; still it continues, becoming more violent as it becomes more desperate.

But even as she confronts the threat of communist guerrillas, President Aquino must also rebuild the Philippine Armed Forces. She has had to assert the principle of civilian su-

premacy over the military, while at the same time resolve honest differences over how best to defeat the communist insurgency. Not everyone in the military has been happy about the new civilian role. President Aquino has faced five attempted coups since taking office.

I've made it clear to all concerned that Filipino democracy and President Aquino have America's full support. We hope all elements in the Philippine Government, both civilian and military, will work together to find common ground. Division between government and its armed forces can only help the communist insurgents, who are bent on destruction of freedom and democracy in the Philippines.

Few countries are as strategically important to the United States as the Philippines, and we have a moral obligation to help all democracies succeed. That's why I have recently underscored to American business leaders that the United States is committed to Philippine economic recovery. I told them that we believe there are great opportunities for American investors in the Philippines, and I reminded them that, while building the economy, our men and women of enterprise will also be helping to build a stable and democratic future for that nation.

I've also asked Congress to help. I've requested substantial economic and military assistance for the Philippines. While we'd like to do more, budgetary constraints may limit what we can do, but this is one area where we can't afford to cut corners. The people of the Philippines are counting on us. One way Congress could do a lot is to reform our sugar program, as I proposed earlier this year. We will work with President Aquino to build a safer home for democracy in the Philippines. Most of the responsibility belongs to the people of the Philippines, but we can and will lend a hand.

Let me turn for a moment to another area of the world where brave men and women are working for democracy. I mean Central America. This week the Guatemala peace accord went into effect. The world is waiting to see if the Sandinistas in Nicaragua keep the promises they made to the other Central American governments when they signed that agreement. Will they fulfill both the letter and spirit of the agreement? In particular will they institute the steps necessary for the democratization of Nicaragua? Will they allow freedom to prosper as the agreements demand? Will they begin the process of national reconciliation? And will they take full steps, not partial steps? The United States will be watching to see if the Sandinistas were sincere when they signed the Guatemala accord or if their signature was just one more propaganda ploy.

Text from Weekly Compilation of  
Presidential Documents of Nov. 16, 1987. ■

## News Conference of October 22 (Excerpts)

*President Reagan held a news conference on October 22, 1987.*

. . . .

**Q. Your Persian Gulf policies have caused widespread confusion and fear that reprisals on both sides will lead to wider hostilities, more terrorism. Did you miscalculate? And is there any limit to these policies?**

**A. I don't think that we miscalculated anything at all. We're not there to start a war. And we're there to protect**

neutral nations' shipping in international waters that under international law are supposed to be open to all traffic.

They, on the other hand—the irrationality of the Iranians—they have taken to attacking, as they did with this most recent incident—that was Kuwait and an oil loading platform offshore, which they fired, evidently, a Silkworm missile at and caused damage to it. We've said that if attacked, why, we're going to defend ourselves. And

we're certainly going to continue this task. We've now been joined by a number of other nations in keeping the sealanes open. But I don't see it as leading to a war or anything else. And I don't think there's anything to panic about. I think we've done very well.

**Q. You've said you don't think the War Powers Act is constitutional. But do you think that you have the right to obey the laws that you pick and choose?**

A. Other Presidents have thought so too. As a matter of fact, we are complying with a part of that act, although we do not call it that, but we have been consulting with the Congress, reporting to them, and telling them what we're doing—and in advance, as we did with this latest strike. But they have other things in there that we think would interfere so much with our rights and our strategy and so forth.

Let me point out that since 1798, there have been a few more than 200 military actions by the United States in foreign countries. We have only been in five declared wars in our entire history. About 62 of these more than 200, there was action by the Congress, either through appropriating funds for those acts or passing resolutions or Senate ratifying a treaty or something. But the bulk of them—some where around 140 of them—were by American Presidents that, on their own, put American forces in action because they believed it was necessary to our national security and our welfare.

• • • •

**Q. What kind of cooperation are you getting from the Soviets in restoring some stability in the gulf and in ending the Iran-Iraq war?**

A. The Soviet Union joined us in 598; that was, as you know, the UN resolution—the Security Council. They joined us in that and supporting that. Iran is the only one of the two that has refused to accept it as yet. We're still pushing on that before we move on to the followup, which was what do we do if they won't accept it. We're still holding back on that because the Secretary General of the United Nations is still seeing if he cannot persuade Iran to cooperate. If they don't, then we will have to face, in the Security Council, the adoption of the second proviso, which is the arms embargo on Iran.

But they have been cooperative, and they did go along on the resolution.

**Q. And what are the prospects for a peace conference under joint U.S.-Soviet sponsorship?**

A. We had thought, in going along for a long time with the others that believed that the Arab nations were still technically in a state of war with Israel, that they and Israel could get together and should get together. Some of them have, such as the great efforts that King Hussein of Jordan has—how far he has gone to try and bring this about. But it just hasn't worked. And more and more, the word has been uttered that we should form an international group to help them come together and bring peace. We finally have gone over to explore that. That's what the Secretary General has been doing in the Middle East. And so far, Israel prefers not to go that route. They—

**Q. Meaning Mr. Shultz.**  
A. Yes.

**Q. Earlier this week, the United States attacked an Iranian oil platform in the gulf. But despite that, today Iran fired another Silkworm missile on Kuwait. Do you really think you can stop the Ayatollah?**

A. The Ayatollah is in a war, and if he's going to go on with provocative acts against us or anyone else, then he's running a great risk, because we're going to respond. We're not going to sit there. And we have to feel that, on the basis of everything he's said and everything he's done, that if we did not retaliate as we did recently, he still would have done again what he did the first time. We're going to try to point out to him that it's a little too expensive if he's to keep that up.

**Q. When this whole operation started, the United States had five ships in the gulf. Now you have more than 30 in the area. Can you set any limits on the U.S. involvement in the Persian Gulf and tell us how long this escort operation is going to continue?**

A. No, I can't tell you how long that will, but I can tell you that I believe we're just the same as—we have a fleet in the Mediterranean, and we have one in the Caribbean, other places of that kind. We've had naval forces there since 1949. And we have to have them as long as it is necessary to take action to keep international waters open to commerce and trade. No nation has a right to close those, particularly when it's not involved with their enemy that they're at war with, but when it's neutral nations.

• • • •

**Q. Many economists think that one quick, sure-fire way to give the economy a big boost would be to create, in effect, a common market for North America. You initiated these talks with [Canadian] Prime Minister Mulroney, and [Treasury Secretary Baker recently completed the negotiations. But the Canada-U.S. trade pact is being vigorously opposed, especially in Canada and some parts of the United States. I there any way that your office can put behind this to give it the need push?**

A. You bet that I'm behind it. The problem is right now there's a Parliament in Canada also that has to pass it. And I understand they're somewhat reluctant about a few points. I think the trade agreement that we reached with them is one of the foremost that has happened in this area in history. Here we are these two great powers—and we're the greatest trading partners in volume in the world, between us. And this would just be a mendous step forward for all of us.

**Q. Would you be willing to go back to Canada and try and get some of those Canadian legislators together and talk to them, as you just have here?**

A. I'm not sure that I could do better with foreign legislators than doing with our own. [Laughter]

**Q. Now that an INF [intermediate-range nuclear forces] deal is about wrapped up, the next step would be strategic weapons. The Soviets have said that they are willing to you the big cuts in those missiles you've always wanted if you would agree to some limits on strategic defense testing. A lot of experts have said that that would not require sling down the program for the foreseeable future. Why have you told your negotiators that they cannot even discuss this issue with the Soviets?**

A. Because if you put it on the table as a bargaining chip, then it becomes a bargaining chip. And we have said that this, a real defense against nuclear weapons, can be the biggest factor in hopefully one day making those weapons obsolete, because I heard my own words come back to me the other day from [Soviet Foreign Minister] Mr. Shevardnadze, when I said to me what I've said a dozen times in some of the parliaments and legislatures of the world: A nuclear war can



## National Success and International Stability in a Time of Change

*Secretary Shultz's address before the World Affairs Council of Washington on December 4, 1987.<sup>1</sup>*

As I thought about what I wanted to say—as you can see, it may not be 30 minutes, I felt, in order to say these things—just an effort to look ahead a little bit on my part—I had to have an audience that cared enough to sit and listen and try to follow the argument. It's not a stemwinder. So that's what led me to this organization, because I know you're thoughtful people and maybe you would stay with me through this paper.

Americans, and people just about everywhere, now know that big changes are underway in the world—changes in virtually every subject from science to superpower relations. So understanding and managing change is crucial. The United States has been trying to do that in recent years. And we've had some success in doing so, because our society thrives on change. We are open to it, and we are ready for it.

The summit which starts next week is one mark of our success. Arms control gets the most attention, but this summit will reflect hard work on human rights, in coping with conflicts around the world, and in trying for a more stable relation between the two superpowers.

We have been doing pretty well. But we cannot be satisfied to rest on our accomplishments. This is a time to try to deepen our understanding of the changes taking place, to look ahead, and to assess what needs to be done if we are to keep control of our own future.

### The World Ahead

Now, at this point in a speech about the world ahead, an audience can expect to be inundated with a tide of vague generalities—words like “interdependence,” exhortations like “the challenge of the global change,” and recitations of the “gee whiz” variety about artificial intelligence, genetic engineering, and robotics.

Maybe it's impossible, but we have to try to talk about the world ahead without getting bogged down in this stultifying vocabulary. In ancient China, when familiar words and ways of thinking no longer accurately described the

realities of the day, philosophers spoke of the need to “rectify names” so that concepts would correspond to the new order of things.

This is one of those times. Developments in science and social organization are altering the world profoundly—too profoundly for conventional habits of thinking to grasp. History suggests that mankind rarely understands revolutionary change at the time it is coming about. When concepts eventually catch up with the pace of change, new definitions and descriptions are applied: the Agricultural Age, the Bronze Age, the Industrial Revolution were named long after the fact.

So if we are in such a time of transformation, what kind of age is it that we are entering? What do we need to know and do about it?

I am not here to offer a definitive analysis of the global trends now underway but to try to survey the present scene—in Emerson's words—from “an original relation to the universe.” In this time of profound change, one of the hardest adjustments to make is intellectual adjustment. We must discard outdated habits of thinking and make room for new possibilities.

First of all, just how different is this era we have entered? From one point of view, it was the 19th century's radical intellectual, ideological, spiritual, moral, and social revolutions that shattered the “eternal verities.” In a way, we have not fully adjusted yet to those epic events.

Today's—and tomorrow's—revolutionary changes are of a different nature. They are characterized by greater size and speed; they are both centrifugal and centripetal in their impact, dispersing yet concentrating activities, influences, and decisions.

First, the very *material substances* that surround us in everyday life are being transformed. Physically, synthetic materials make objects lighter, stronger, and more durable. But they are changing societies and economies, too, because their emergence affects supply and demand for natural raw materials. One new material substance—ceramics—has led researchers around the world to superconductivity at new temperatures which in turn may profoundly alter one foundation stone of all human activity: energy. Another such foundation—food—no longer limits by

be won and must never be  
The best way to ever bring that  
is to perfect this plan, which we  
can be perfected and then be able  
to the world, here is a defense  
of nuclear missiles. And we'll  
be available to the world in return  
the world giving up nuclear  
arms.

With the likelihood, then, at  
of a summit here in the United  
to sign the treaty on the me-  
range missiles, what kind of  
nit do you envision with Mikhail  
Gorbachev? What would you like him  
to do in this country, and where  
do you like to take him? And how  
do you think that would affect super-  
power relations?

We don't have a word yet or a  
word as to whether he's coming. We  
have a belief that this is going to take  
place and I want it to take place very  
soon. But also I hope that when it  
comes—he's never been to this country  
before—that he would have time to see  
a real deal of America. I think it  
would be good for him to see this and  
to see things that he couldn't accuse us  
of doing them for him. Let him see it.  
Yes, I've thought about—knowing  
something about the quarters that they  
live in for beach homes in the summer  
and go forth—I've thought it would be  
nice to invite him up to our  
10-foot adobe shack that was built in  
1977 and let him see how a capitalist  
celebrates his holidays.

• • • • •

Text from Weekly Compilation of  
Presidential Documents of Oct. 26, 1987. ■

its production the possibility of world population growth. Biotechnology in agriculture has stood Malthus on his head.

The same scientific progress that has altered the nature of these basic substances has also accelerated the speed of human transactions. *Time and space* are calculated in ever-smaller units. Success in every field depends increasingly upon how quickly ideas can be transformed into reality. The speed at which information flows has already created a global financial market. Markets are no longer places, but electronic networks.

Along with these alterations in substance and speed have come changes in *magnitude*. Scientific, economic, and political matters are global in dimension and enormous in extent. They are outstripping the traditional means by which governments dealt with them. The amount of money that changes hands in the global financial market in 1 day exceeds \$1 trillion—more than the entire budget of the U.S. Government for a year. Such flows transcend national boundaries and can overwhelm rigid economic policies. Manufacturing processes similarly are becoming global in scale. I recently saw a snapshot of a shipping label for some integrated circuits produced by an American firm. It said, "Made in one or more of the following countries: Korea, Hong Kong, Malaysia, Singapore, Taiwan, Mauritius, Thailand, Indonesia, Mexico, Philippines. The exact country of origin is unknown." That label says a lot about where current trends are taking us.

The thread that runs through all these things is *knowledge*: its discovery, its rapid transmission as information, and the education needed to use it. Access to ideas, no matter where they are developed, becomes the key to scientific and economic progress. For example, the growth sector for employment is the so-called service sector, particularly in finance, data processing, software, engineering, and management consultation. "Services" is a misleading designation. These activities are centered on ideas but have all the characteristics of the production of what we traditionally call "goods." So it is time, as the ancient Chinese would have recognized, for "a reification of names."

Changes in materials, magnitudes, knowledge, and the speed of its dissemination—the opportunities offered by these changes are immense—and America and other open societies are beautifully situated to make the most of this era ahead. But there are troubling

implications of change to consider as well. Emerson would put it down to his principle of "compensation"—no aspect of progress comes free of some drawback.

For many nations, the emerging era means new problems. Countries which cannot or will not compete in the global marketplace and interact with ideas from other societies will find themselves falling behind the advanced innovators and producers. Some of those countries may be able to absorb what the innovators develop and may register moderate growth. But the quality and technological content of that growth will remain limited by the inability of such countries to adjust to rapid change.

Other nations—single commodity countries and agricultural and industrial subsistence economies—are in danger of becoming marginal participants in, let's call it the "Information Age" economy, living as in eras past. Some lack the human and physical infrastructure to create and exploit economic opportunities. Others are held back by the inflexible nature of their political and social systems.

Yet even those who fall further behind economically can partake of some of the fruits of the new age—fruits that unfortunately are not sufficiently forbidden. Wars in the Third World are being fought with increasing sophistication and firepower. The spread of modern technical skill coincides with the modern resurgence of age-old ethnic, religious, and communal conflict. Beyond the Iran-Iraq war, we see fighting in Sri Lanka, ethnic conflict in Fiji, the devastation of Lebanon, Sino-Indian border tensions, the New Caledonia and Cyprus disputes, and the continuing Arab-Israeli conflict.

Such tensions have always been part of human history. What is new is the heightened possibility that they will become wider and more deadly conflagrations through the misuse of relatively sophisticated weaponry. In the Iran-Iraq war, we see how readily available on the world arms market are missiles such as the Exocet, the SCUD, and the Silkworm. And many developing countries are becoming not just purchasers and users but adept manufacturers of military hardware considered highly advanced only a few years ago.

We have long feared the danger of nuclear proliferation. Now we face worldwide diffusion and use of chemical weapons—thus breaching the international moral consensus of more than half a century. But this growing capacity to acquire or produce and employ such weapons unfortunately is not the whole story. Violence itself is undergoing a qualitative change, as terrorist and narcotics traffickers spread new forms of destruction around the world. We now recognize the long, tough battle we are fighting with these modern day barbarians, equipped with effective weaponry and uninhibited by traditional norms of civilized conduct.

In centuries past, advances in science and technology and warfare often far outstripped the abilities of statesmen and politicians. Today political, economic, and social arrangements must be more closely harmonized with change. Drawing from the example of science, we must create a more just and decent social order from the elements of our understanding. Human society has no unique or preordained social pattern. Our God-given goal is fulfill ourselves through the social and cultural institutions that we ourselves create and to leave this world a better place than when we entered.

### Guidelines for Dealing With Today's Events

As we face this phalanx of changing conditions, what principles stand out for us? I see three clear guidelines for dealing with the size, speed, and complexity of events today.

**First**, a society must be open to this new age of knowledge and information; to resist it deadens hope of progress. Today's transformations are products of our own system of openness and creativity. What we face are not vast impersonal "forces" or "trends" that sway us against our will; they challenge created by our own past achievements. They offer opportunity for a better future, but only if they are exploited.

A subsidiary point: the 18th century idea of democracy, with its qualities of openness, freedom, individual initiative, and innovation, remains the best way to deal with the stress and the opportunities of change.

**Second**, for decisionmakers, the margins for error are diminishing as the consequences of error increase in

and gravity. Overcentralized and decisions increasingly will be made. Thus the free operation of the marketplace—for goods and ideas—is a more efficient arbiter of decisions.

And so entrepreneurial initiative in a market environment is the engine of development and change. Global economic problems will keep coming at us in waves; we must remain open as we meet them or be swept away.

Third, the global nature of changes in science, in economics, in communication—must be matched by political developments, particularly the strengthening of a closer association of like-minded nations. To a greater degree than in previous eras of the past, there is a synergistic interaction between scientific and technological advances and political, economic, and social developments, with each enhancing and accelerating the effect of change on the other.

So, today, regional associations of nations are fast becoming an important and effective new milieu for political and economic interaction in the world.

### Drive Toward Democracy

Do things stand in applying these principles? Not bad. The most stirring political response to the new temper of our time has been the resurgence of democracy and the demand for political openness and participation.

Not so many years ago, democratic nations were thought to be a dwindling embattled minority; today the idea of democracy is among the most important political forces of our time. Elites in the East and West recognize that advanced economic power comes from a high level of education, an openness to the world, a rational distribution of decision-making power, emphasis on individual initiative, decentralization of authority, greater freedom of information and association, and the right of people to have a say in their own lives and destiny.

Around the globe we see a powerful impulse toward democratic institutions and values. This recent phenomenon was first evident in Spain and Portugal a decade ago. Now, in Latin America, this drive has changed the complexion of the entire continent, from Argentina to El Salvador. In the Philippines, despite serious challenges, we see how tenaciously people are working to effect a transition to a new democratic way. In South Korea, there

is a dramatic struggle to create new political institutions and achieve the peaceful transition of national leadership through open elections. And the Haitian people will not abide a return to the tyranny they so recently rejected.

Elsewhere the struggle continues, as in South Africa where the structure of apartheid is under increasing siege, and in Afghanistan, Angola, Nicaragua, and Cambodia, where communist oppression has spawned resistance movements fighting for the rights denied them.

For the United States, these trends must be seen not only as an affirmation of the values we hold so firmly but also as a test. The transition to democracy is a difficult and fragile process. And it can be reversed.

Confronted by daunting internal and external challenges, new democracies will look to us for ideas, assistance, and understanding. In response, we cannot shut our eyes or close our doors. If we do, the lamp of democracy will go out in many lands.

### Freedom—Turning to the Market

With the new surge of democratic feeling, others have come to recognize what we have known all along—that democracy and free markets go together. As our free political system looks out for basic justice and opportunity and provides a safety net in case of adversity, our free markets ensure that our economy will function effectively.

Free markets cannot function in an environment of stifling political regulation or interference. Measures that would isolate an economy from the world or disengage it from the global community do enormous harm. The disintegration of the trade and financial structures during the 1930s provides ample evidence on this score.

All nations share a common responsibility, and must work together, to promote market forces and to ensure the maintenance of an open international economic system. The objective of cooperation is not to achieve a fixed, predetermined result but to ensure that the free market is allowed to function.

Now there is real progress on all fronts here. The nations of Southeast and Northeast Asia were in the vanguard, but now with every passing year we see formerly socialist or command economies, in Africa, Latin America, and Asia, shucking off those rigid and limiting policies and relying more and more on open market practices and individual incentives.

There is progress as well in overcoming the lingering sentiment that governments can get together and somehow dictate economic results. In today's world that simply cannot be done. Markets, not governments, determine economic results, and there is no way to overrule the market more than momentarily—especially given the vast quantities of goods, services, capital, information, and technology flowing across national boundaries today and everyday.

However, governments can work together to promote procedures which allow markets to work more freely and efficiently—that's what we are doing, for example, in the GATT [General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade] trade talks in Geneva, in the annual economic summits, in the structural adjustment program of the OECD [Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development], and through the International Monetary Fund (IMF), the World Bank, and other international financial institutions.

The record of economic growth over the past four decades is one of amazing success. But at the same time, there are plenty of problems and challenges facing the world's free enterprise, market economies—just to name a few:

- The size of government—whether measured by spending, or taxation, or regulatory influence, or income redistribution, or price distortions—has become a real burden to the efficient functioning of the market. There are many stories to be told, from the unconscionably expensive and distorting farm programs to the detailed regulation of opening and closing hours of retail stores. But our own recent experience in trying to trim the budget deficit may bring it home most clearly to this audience. Once established, government programs are virtually impossible to eliminate—they spawn their own interest groups and become entrenched. Unless government is to grow without limits, we must find a way to make it shrink.

- The trading imbalances in the global economy represent another problem and are most likely a symptom of more fundamental imbalances that need to be corrected. I suspect that we, in the United States, are farther along in facing up to our trade deficit than are many other countries whose economic growth has become all too dependent on an export surplus generally related to our deficit. Somehow, people need to realize that it's not possible for

every country in the world to have an export surplus at the same time. Our deficit has sort of the residual claimant of everybody else's surplus, and everybody says it must change. And I agree, and it will, and it is, and it could happen relatively fast. And my question is, when it does, are the countries that have been dining out to lunch on it ready?

Our challenge is to adopt policies at home that engender confidence in the strength of the U.S. economy and promote policies overseas that will strengthen the economies of our major trading partners. If we fail, the process of correction is likely to be acute and painful.

- Another problem: the extraordinary cycle of inflation and disinflation over the past two decades has left a legacy of inflated debt, depressed commodity prices, and stagnation in much of the developing world, especially in several countries close to home. The unpalatable mix of seeming political necessities and economic realities has made a debt workout hard slogging. Progress toward efficient, market-oriented solutions to the debt problem has been demonstrated in some key developing countries. But the problem remains a serious one, calling for unusual political resolve in debtor countries and genuine ingenuity in the international community.

Each country must pursue market-oriented policies and get its own house in order if the international economic system is to thrive. This is especially true for the United States as we are the largest player by far. The fact is that our size relative to that of other economies makes getting our house in order far more important for them than their housekeeping is for us. But we are not the only important player, and so others—Japan, Germany, the other OECD countries, the newly industrialized countries, indeed, all trading nations—must contribute to a stronger international system by strengthening their own economies.

## New Political Groupings

A third emerging reality on the world scene is that political, technological, and economic power and influence have been dispersing horizontally. Ours is no longer a bipolar world—the U.S. and Soviet share of world economic output is decreasing as the growth rates of other countries have been more rapid.

In the future, more nations will have the economic and human resources to contend for political, technological, and commercial influence. Already Brazil, Korea, China, India, Israel, and the countries of ASEAN [Association of South East Asian Nations], for example, have become movers and shakers in one or more commercial or technological areas. The increasing number of students from developing countries in advanced training programs—India alone has about 10% of the world's total enrollment in higher educational institutions—will put these countries in a position to create and take advantage of technological change.

In this new environment, the importance of regional country and functional groupings has been heightened. Regional, political, and religious blocs of nations—such as the Organization of American States, the Organization of African Unity, South Asian Association of Regional Cooperation, the Non-aligned Movement, and the Islamic Conference—now provide platforms for a number of countries to exercise influence in global affairs. Not always the way we want, but, anyway, it's a vehicle.

Other regional organizations are taking on growing economic and political importance—from the eastern Caribbean to southern Africa, from the Americas to South Asia, from the Persian Gulf to the South Pacific. For example, the Pacific Basin, a region of phenomenal economic growth, is developing a web of cooperative realities. ASEAN is showing the way to regional cooperation and is taking on more and more of a political dimension beyond its initial focus on economic affairs.

Just as with the new trends toward democratization and open economies, these developments in political cooperation are outgrowths of our efforts and aspirations for a better world. The United States led the way after World War II in advocating the importance of the regional approach to the recovery of a devastated Europe.

Today the institutions that resulted are thriving: regional organizations such as the NATO alliance, the OECD, the European Economic Community, and the Western European Union; and functional organizations such as GATT, IMF, the World Bank, and regional development banks, and the effective functional organizations of the United Nations, such as those dealing with nuclear energy, health, and civil aviation.

This cooperation, which began in large measure by focusing on post-World War II reconstruction needs in Western Europe, is an inspiration a model for regional and functional approaches to challenges around the world. It is vital to recall that these groupings originated in efforts to reduce barriers. New associations must stay true to that purpose rather than evolve with protectionist enclaves that would spark devastating economic warfare.

Based on the clear success of the regional approach in advancing Western security and economic well-being we are intensifying our efforts to strengthen regional cooperative efforts everywhere in meeting the common challenges we will face in the Information Age.

## The East-West Dimension

What I have sketched out here is a picture of immense dynamism: of the creative energies of free peoples generating challenges which they—and increasing numbers of those who would emulate them—are meeting with considerable success. The West has no monopoly on clever people, and the world centers of scientific creativity and economic power are proliferating.

Where in this picture do we find the nations of the communist world? The Soviet Union will remain our central security concern for the foreseeable future. U.S. military strength, our framework of alliances, and our other security ties remain central to peace the world. But there is also emerging new dynamism in the East-West relationship.

In this respect, the current ferment in the communist world is a remarkable political development. Perhaps nowhere is this more evident than in China, which can be seen to be undergoing a new era of "rectifying names." The opening of a long-closed society to market forces, trade, technology, and ideas is bringing significant benefits for the Chinese people.

Certainly, China and Western democracies are still divided over critical ideological issues. However, China has realized that the future belongs to those who open themselves up to global trends in the dissemination of knowledge, in the international economy, and in popular political participation.

Similar rethinking of old concepts and ways of doing things seems now

terway in the Soviet Union and in Europe. While the ultimate dimensions of this process remain to be seen, its potential importance is great. The constraints of a rigidly centralized society and economy, the Union is a leading scientific force, for example, in space science, in various fields of medical research, and in other technical disciplines. Its massive scientific capability, for all its inefficiency, generates a per capita GNP [gross national product] of about \$8,000.

But now Soviet leaders are telling the people that that is not enough—the system they inherited essentially unchanged from Stalin must be reformed. As General Secretary Gorbachev stated in his June Party Central speech, “command forms of organizing society put a brake on our development.” Whatever *perestrojka* may ultimately come to mean, the terms in which it has been defined thus far suggest that Mr. Gorbachev and his colleagues understand that a closed

system is a dead-end for advanced development. And implicit in the parallel concept of *glasnost* may be a recognition that the free flow of ideas and information which will fuel growth in the future requires greater intellectual and political freedom.

One of the most telling indicators will be the Soviet human rights situation. The U.S. is looking for results that bear the weight of rhetoric—not only for the sake of individuals and families involved because human rights as practiced here ultimately are related to international security. For a government that does not respect the rights it has guaranteed to its own people will not respect its international obligations and the general norms of the world community.

There is nothing in the “new political thinking” to date which suggests the end of the adversarial struggle in hand. What will “new thinking” mean for the people of Eastern Europe, who continue to strive for greater autonomy in dealing with their daunting economic agenda? And what about the Middle East? Will Soviet leaders withdraw their troops and allow the Afghans to decide by political means the kind of government, economy, and political system they desire? Will the United Nations play a constructive role in the Middle East, Korea, southern Africa, and the Persian Gulf?

The winds of change blowing from Moscow may prove as revolutionary as

Mr. Gorbachev has declared. But in determining their ultimate impact, historians will look to the answers to questions such as those I've just raised.

But as for us today, the continuing reality before us means that American political resolve must remain constant, our defense posture, robust. With those parameters, the challenge to us is to be sensitive to any opportunities which the changes now underway in the Soviet Union and other communist countries may hold.

### Conclusion

In this time of global challenge and change, nations of the world look intensely and searchingly at the relationship between the United States and the U.S.S.R. That relationship today is meaty and substantial. A major reason for this is that we Americans stand up for our principles and our interests while remaining ready to test and to deal with changing realities in international life. This approach gets results, and we're going to stick with it.

In a world of blurring national boundaries, dispersed power, and new players vying for influence in international affairs, there will be a continuing need for U.S. engagement and leadership.

Our alliances and our friends, and the growing number of regional associations around the world, provide a foundation for problemsolving on the scale demanded by the world ahead.

We must not falter on the economic front. We can take great satisfaction knowing that the message of economic freedom is at last being heard and acted upon in country after country around the world. If we ourselves yield to the temptation to return to isolation, protection, and structural rigidities, we betray this movement—and general prosperity in the era ahead will be a lost cause.

Economic progress and freedom go hand in hand. New democracies will require continuous support and encouragement. The United States has an immense stake in seeing that the democratic idea works. And those who resist totalitarian governments must be able to know without doubt that they will be able to look to America to back their legitimate pursuit of liberty and justice.

And finally, in this period of profound historical change, both the United States and the Soviet Union

must make the most of opportunities to transform the adversarial character of the U.S.-Soviet relationship to one that is better for both our peoples and for the world at large.

We will leave it to the future historians to give our age a name. Our task is to try to throw off outmoded concepts of the past as well as cloudy generalities about the future. What we need to see is the dynamism in the size, speed, and scope of global change. And most of all we need to see that this change is of our doing. We can manage it better than anyone. We have to have the courage to stand fast to our own principles: democracy, free enterprise, the cooperative association of responsible nations.

With this as our vision and guide, we face a bright future, indeed.

Press release 231 of Dec. 7, 1987, which includes a question-and-answer session. ■

## Secretary's Interview on "Face the Nation"

*Secretary Shultz was interviewed on CBS-TV's "Face the Nation" by Lesley Stahl on November 29, 1987.*

**Q.** There is late word that in Haiti there has been so much violence over the election that was planned for today that they have called off the election. Have the officials in Haiti been in touch with our government, with you? Have they asked for any help?

**A.** We've just heard about this development and, of course, it's a shame that the democratic process wasn't permitted to go on. So far as we know, this is violence caused by the supporters of the deposed dictator, Duvalier. People want to vote, people want to express themselves, people want freedom, and we'll continue to work for it.

**Q.** But isn't it true that the people who had been affiliated with Mr. Duvalier had been denied a place on the ballot, and is that not part of the cause of this violence?

**A.** No, there are quite a number of people who are running—I think 24—so this was a balloting that would basically bring it down probably to three or four people and then there would be a subsequent ballot. That was the way it was conceived of.

**Q.** But you don't know of the supporters of Duvalier being denied by the government a place on the ballot? That's apparently in some of these late reports coming over the wires.

**A.** Some think that. There have also been some who have been murdered by the Duvalierists, probably. So it is a violent-type situation. Nevertheless, people, as in El Salvador, have gone to the polls and voted, despite the communist efforts, in that case, to disrupt them and succeeded. I think in Haiti we'll see these desires for freedom and democracy wind up getting themselves expressed.

**Q.** Do you know whether the situation is under control, and do you know when the election will be resumed?

**A.** I don't know. I've just barely heard about the postponement of the election as I walked into this studio, so I've told you what I know about it.

**Q.** Let's turn to the summit and to the new INF [intermediate-range nuclear forces] treaty. You've just heard [Senator] Steven Symms. You know that Jesse Helms and other conservatives plan to oppose this treaty. What are you going to tell them to turn them around? They just don't trust the Soviets. They don't think we should be making agreements with "bandits," as Senator Symms called them.

**A.** Of course, we have to look at what's taking place. And what we see here is a President who has had a strategy in place from the beginning of his Administration.

In 1981 he called for a treaty that would have a zero result in these intermediate-range missiles. He has been working at it ever since. We deployed the missiles in conjunction with our allies beginning in 1983 as part of a negotiating process. We stood up to that, and our allies stood up to it. We worked it through. It has been a tough negotiation for everybody, and finally the President has succeeded in what he set out to get. And I think it's pretty good.

**Q.** But is it true that you're still writing the details of this treaty and that you are working—continuing to work—under enormous deadline pressures, particularly on the verification system?

**A.** No, that's not really accurate. When decisions are made, you have to reduce it to precise treaty language, and that's going on in a good way, and

there isn't any particular problem about that that I know of.

**Q.** So you don't anticipate any last-minute hitches? It seems almost every time you get together with the Soviets, they throw monkey wrenches into the meetings. You had to leave Moscow without the summit agreement. Is there any chance that that could happen again if you still are writing the language for this treaty?

**A.** No. I think there is no chance. It is all agreed and everybody wants to see it go forward, and there really is not a problem. It's just a question of doing things—continuing to do things—carefully and patiently; and that's what we're doing.

**Q.** Let me ask you about the verification problems that the conservatives have. Is it true that if you suspect a violation at a site that is not designated in the treaty, you turn over the complaint to a commission like the ABM Commission that your Administration and so many have complained have not really gone after the Soviets when they have cheated in the past?

**A.** What you have in verification is successive sets of layers of being able to keep track of possible places where violations might take place. It begins right now as both sides exchange data on what they have in these missiles. The data that we have from the Soviet Union are credible in the sense that they are very much in line with our own intelligence estimates.

The next thing that happens is, when the treaty goes into effect each side examines that so-called baseline—that is, we go to the places where the missiles are deployed, where they are produced, where they are stored, where they are tested, and we observe that what they said was there is there.

Then comes a 3-year process of destroying those missiles; and as they are destroyed, we literally see that process. When it's over, we go back to the places that we inspected when there was a baseline, and we inspect to see, in a close-out sense, that there are no missiles there.

In the meantime, there are 20 per year short-notice inspections that go in that first 3-year destruction cycle. Then after that, we have the right to go back to all of these places 15 times a year for the first 5 years and 10 times a year for the next 5 years. Beyond that—

**Q.** It is endless.

**A.** Yes. We observe the places where these missiles were produced,

and we can verify what is coming out. Beyond that, if any weapon system to be truly operative, you have to test it and train with it and work with the SS-20, contrary to what was said does have a distinctive signature. You can observe that, and we can see if they are doing any testing.

Beyond that, we do have our national technical means in effect all the time as we are photographing and what's happening in their country. Of course, they're doing the same thing here.

**Q.** After all of that, though, can still cheat; right?

**A.** It's possible, but I think if it occurs, it would be in very small portions. The incentives to cheat on all these circumstances are small. Nevertheless, it's possible.

**Q.** I must ask you this because I think a lot of people are real concerned about where the President stands. Here he was, this major anti-Soviet force in our country who was building up our nuclear arsenals, and then—denly—it seems overnight—he's become the major world champion of denuclearization in the whole world. We've obviously changed our policy here somehow, someway. He's changed.

I feel that you're going to deny that he's changed, but obviously he has made a huge shift. When, had this happen?

**A.** Do you define "sudden" as something that happens over a period of 6 or 7 years?

**Q.** The revelation is sudden; is that what you say?

**A.** No. The President set out in early 1980s, early in his term, what was after. And as related to the INF treaty, it was precisely the outcome we're now getting.

As related to strategic arms, it to get a 50% cut, and that's what we going to be working and have been working on. What's happening is that the President has had a strategy, at the fruits of that strategy are beginning to come in.

**Q.** Do you and the President want to get rid of all nuclear weapons? And, if you do, is that realistic? A we going to do that? Is that possible?

**A.** That's an entirely different subject, and the President has—

**Q.** It seems to be where we're headed now.

**A.** Wait a minute. The President has said it is a desirable goal. It's out

in the future, maybe. In the same time, what we need to do—really, need to do this—we need to get control over these nuclear weapons. And by eliminating this class of weapons, which the Soviets shouldn't deploy in the first place, and by, you know, cutting strategic arms down to a point where there will be 6,000 warheads—which is a lot on each side, but nevertheless a lot less than now—we begin to get this thing under control. And I think that's very desirable.

**Q. To do that, there are hints that you are prepared to make a compromise on SDI [Strategic Defense Initiative] or on the ABM [Antiballistic Missile] Treaty.**

**A.** We never compromise our ability to learn how to defend ourselves against ballistic missiles, if we possibly can and have the capability of deploying that system if we can find it.

**Q. Can you see, though, abiding by the strict language in the ABM Treaty for 10 years? We've apparently agreed to do it for 7. The Soviets want to do it for 10. Isn't there any give in that 3-year period if arriving at the 50% cut is so important to us?**

**A.** One method of providing the flexibility and stability that both sides want—not just them, but us—is to have a period in which we agree not to withdraw from the ABM Treaty or to exercise our right of a 6-month notice or to deploy. That's just as important for us as it is for them, because probably right at the moment our ability to field what we think of as an inferior form of strategic defense is better than ours. So we don't want to reduce our offensive system unless we see some notions of stability, just as they don't.

**Q. Why do so many U.S. officials, though, talk about a START [strategic arms reduction talks] agreement in this spring, or an outline of one by this spring? There must be some give on your side for so many. We have Max Kampelman [head of the U.S. delegation to the nuclear and space arms negotiations and U.S. negotiator at the defense and space talks] coming out and talking about the spring; our ambassador in the Soviet Union [Jack Matlock] talks about the springtime. There must have some outline that we know is moving, and it must involve some kind of a softening on our situation.**

**A.** We do. Undoubtedly the most productive summit meeting ever held

was the President's meeting with the General Secretary in Reykjavik, and basically—

**Q. Everyone doesn't agree with that.**

**A.** Basically, the fundamental elements and difficulties in the INF treaty were worked out in Reykjavik.

**Q. But not SDI.**

**A.** That has nothing to do with the INF treaty.

**Q. Oh, INF. What about a START treaty?**

**A.** As far as the START treaty is concerned, the necessary fundamental numbers involved were achieved in Reykjavik, and we've been working off the President's achievements and adding to them and developing them; and that will happen again.

**Q. Is he going to negotiate again on the terms of the START treaty here?**

**A.** Of course. We have only—

**Q. But they say that's not a good thing for summiteers to do.**

**A.** There are different kinds of decisions involved, and there are broad, big, in a sense political decisions. The decision to come down to 6,000 warheads on each side is the kind of decision that the President and the General Secretary make. Decisions on the intricate details of these treaties are the sorts of things that negotiators work at.

**Q. Any give on SDI at all, in terms of going up to the 10 years to agree by the strict interpretation of the ABM Treaty?**

**A.** Our position is clear. And, as I've said earlier, we will never compromise our ability to learn how to defend you against ballistic missiles if we can and to deploy those defenses if we can find them.

**Q. Perhaps there's compromise in there.**

**We are coming to the end of our interview. But I would like to ask you about your interview today on the "NFL Today." Have you given them any secrets about your negotiating position? What have you told the "NFL Today" that you're not telling us on "Face the Nation?"**

**A.** They asked me if I played football, and I did when I was in college. They asked me if I thought I was glad I did, and I said, "Yes, I think it's a good thing. You learn to compete. A little rock-and-sock never hurts anybody."

**Q. What was your position?**

**A.** A nonexistent position now called "blocking back." I was the poor guy who had to go and take those big tackles out of the way so the stars could run through the holes.

**Q. Let's hope your experience helps you with the coming summit next week. Thank you for being our guest, Mr. Secretary.**

Press release 227. ■

## Secretary Meets With Soviet Foreign Minister and NATO Officials

*Secretary Shultz was in Geneva November 22-25, 1987, to meet with Soviet Foreign Minister Eduard Shevardnadze and at NATO headquarters in Brussels on November 25 to meet with the NATO foreign ministers. Following are news conferences the Secretary had in those two cities.*

**NEWS CONFERENCE,  
GENEVA,  
NOV. 24, 1987**

We have just completed 2 days of very productive work—completed the INF [intermediate-range nuclear forces] treaty, worked out all of the basic ar-

rangements for the summit meeting, and, of course, reviewed the full range of issues that we always discuss: the human rights issues, the regional issues, and our own bilateral problems.

Let me turn first to the INF treaty. This treaty, which is now basically complete, will for the first time, by agreement, result in major reductions of nuclear arms.

It is an important first step. The Soviet side will eliminate about 1,500 deployed INF warheads. The U.S. side will eliminate about 350. The numbers of warheads is asymmetrical because the deployments have been asymmetrical. I think that is an important principle, right there, where you have

asymmetrical deployments and you have a program of reductions, reduced to equal levels through an asymmetrical process.

Let me address the question of how we will feel comfortable that what is agreed in this treaty will actually be carried out. First, each side has tabled data on its forces covered by the agreement. The United States has provided all of its data. The Soviet Union has provided most of its and will provide all of it by the end of the week. These data are broadly consistent with the estimates that we have made of what the Soviet side possesses, and we, of course, will take further read-outs on that as we get the complete detail. But basically this has come in in a reassuring way.

Second, we will follow these declared missiles during the course of the 3-year period during which they will be destroyed, and we will inspect the destruction of the missiles, the launchers, and certain support facilities during the 3-year period of their destruction. So we will know by personal observation that the declared weapons have been eliminated.

Third, in order to assure ourselves that new ones aren't produced, we will monitor, through agreed procedures, the plant where the SS-20 missiles were assembled. This is a plant where the Soviet Union also produces the SS-25 strategic missile, and they intend to continue producing that missile there. We will observe what comes out of the plant, and we have agreed on an inspection system that will allow us to assure ourselves that none of the missiles coming out are the missiles prohibited by this treaty.

Fourth, should there, by some circumstance, be any SS-20s remaining and not accounted for, we will know, of course, if those missiles are tested, because they have a unique signature. We know that if a weapons system of this kind is to be operative over any period of time, it must be tested and trained with and worked with. The lack of any testing will once again be a form of reassurance.

Fifth, in addition to monitoring the final assembly period, this treaty gives each side the right to inspect the sites where these missiles have been stored or deployed. We have on-site rights of inspection, as they do. Of course, that includes bases which will have been bases where the SS-20 was deployed and have been converted to bases where the SS-25, the strategic system, is deployed.

There are other bases where the SS-25 is deployed, and we have agreed on a system to be in effect for 3 years following the coming into effect of the treaty for monitoring those bases as well by enhanced national technical means.

To sum up, this agreement provides for a continuous monitoring of the plant that once produced the SS-20. It brings forth, and has brought forth already, a detailed exchange of data on the missiles covered by the treaty; it provides for baseline inspections of that data; it provides for inspections as we close out the presence of the missiles at a particular base or facility and that gets eliminated; and it provides for short-notice inspections where INF missiles are or were, at a rate of 20 per year in the first 3 years—that is, the period during which the missile systems will be destroyed—15 per year for the next 5 years and 10 per year for the final 5 years of the 10-year period, there being 13 years in all in which this unprecedented inspection period will take place.

What this adds up to is a treaty of genuine significance. It is not the end of this process by a long shot, but it is a beginning—a good beginning. We see a significant reduction on an asymmetrical basis of nuclear armaments. We see this treaty accompanied by a system of verification which, of course, can't be 100% but which, I think, gives us a very comfortable feeling that in the end the provisions of the treaty can be verified and will be carried out.

I believe it is fair to say that this treaty—the coming into effect of it—is, first of all, a triumph for President Reagan, who put forward his concept of getting to zero in this class of weapons back in 1981, and he has kept at it. It was originally greeted with skepticism and cynicism, but he kept at it and kept at it and kept at it, and the President has succeeded.

Second, I think it is a tribute to the solidarity and the willpower of the NATO alliance, which took together the dual-track decision in 1979, worked at that on the negotiating track, stood up to the need for deployment, deployed these missiles, continued on in the negotiating track jointly with us, and now we have succeeded in achieving the objective that NATO set out to achieve.

And third, I think it is fair to say it is also a tribute to a genuine effort to negotiate in this area on the part of the Soviet Union and ourselves, and in particular on the part of General Secretary Gorbachev and President Reagan.

Let me now say a few words about the summit meeting. It will take place as you know, from December 8 to 10, Washington, and the purpose of the summit meeting is work—work on the agenda that President Reagan and General Secretary Gorbachev have set on for themselves in the areas of human rights, of arms reductions, of regional issues, and the gradual evolution of bilateral relations.

The summit agenda is dominated by a work program between the two leaders. There will be five substantive working meetings. The first one will be Tuesday morning [December 8], right after the official arrival ceremony; there will be another on Tuesday afternoon. There will be one on Wednesday, mid-morning [December 9]; there will be another on Wednesday afternoon. Then there'll be a final meeting beginning in the morning on Thursday [December 10], going through a working lunch until the official end ceremony at the White House. You can see that the meeting is planned as one in which it will be all hard at work.

In addition to the arrival ceremony there are a number of other official events that are scheduled. There will be a state dinner at the White House. There will be a return dinner, hosted by General Secretary Gorbachev, at the Soviet Embassy. There will be a luncheon at which I'll have the privilege of being the host for the General Secretary and Mrs. Gorbachev. The General Secretary will host a breakfast for the Vice President. There'll be a ceremony at the conclusion of the summit, and there'll be a signing ceremony of the INF treaty and some statements following that by the President and by the General Secretary.

The General Secretary also wants to have a method of being in contact with Members of the Congress. That will be done, but precisely how that will work has not yet been worked out but I am sure it will take place. In addition, the Soviet side is arranging a program of meetings with individual American academic and scientific communities. They are doing that themselves. They are also arranging a meeting of American business leaders and again they are working that out themselves.

This is an outline of the summit events, and additional details will be available as we go along.



beyond these matters, we did discuss the subject of human rights, which is of prime importance to us; we never put that at the top of our list of areas of concern. And, of course, the situation in that area, insofar as our ability to discuss effectively and constructively that subject, is much improved now from what it was, although I believe that there is a huge amount of work to be done in this area.

We also discussed regional issues. In particular we talked about the Iran-Pakistan, about Afghanistan, and a little about southern Africa, as well as about other areas.

That's a rundown on the last 2 days' work and I'll be glad to take your questions.

**Q. When you say verification is being 100%, do you mean there is nothing that is 100% perfect in this world, or has something been left out that you would have preferred be included?**

**A.** What I mean is that nothing is 100% perfect. You can't have something as without any conceivable problem but I tried to outline the way in which the problem is bounded, so to speak, by the provisions there. By the way you identify, as we see it, reasonably fully the missiles that now exist, to verify by being there and watching the process of their destruction. You see yourself that additional ones aren't being produced. You watch to see if anything is tested, knowing that anything is tested, obviously you know there is a violation. But if it is not tested, if there are no tests, before the system becomes obsolete. And I think that you have an extensive system of onsite inspection of sites where weapons systems were once deployed or stored, and in this case some of these sites for a while, where weapons are deployed that have somewhat similar characteristics insofar as certain aspects of how they work are concerned.

I think it is far beyond anything that has ever been attempted before. I think in the end we will feel quite comfortable that what is being agreed will be carried out.

**Q. I am unclear about the rate of destruction that you mentioned. Are you saying that it will take place over a 3-year period?**

**A.** No. The destruction takes place over a 3-year period. After the treaty is ratified and put into effect, then there is a 3-year period. During that period,

all of the weapons systems involved will be destroyed, and we have agreed basically on the schedule through which that will happen. Then there is a 10-year period beyond that in which the various inspection rights that I mentioned are in effect. And, of course, we constantly have our national technical means, and that goes on indefinitely.

But by the time 10 years has gone by, if you have a weapons system that hasn't been seen, you know that it is gone, and it will be obsolete anyway. I think it is quite an adequate regime.

**Q. The numbers you mentioned earlier don't add up. You said 20 per year—20 in the first year?**

**A.** No, 20 per year in the first—there's a 13-year period here. The first 3 years is the period of destruction of the weapons. During that period, having had them declared and identified as to where they are, we then, so to speak, keep track of them. And as they are destroyed, we are there onsite, watching that process. So during this first 3 years we have—there's more to look at, so we have more inspections. Now, during the first 5 years after the destruction has been completed, you naturally have more concern than you do as time goes on, because the system basically atrophies—becomes obsolete with time. We have a larger number of inspections in the first 5 years than in the second 5 years, but a goodly number in each case.

**Q. In the event of the SS-20 and cruise missiles being destroyed or gotten rid of, if the Soviets then demand of you that they wish to inspect one of your bases, say, in Britain, where once the cruise missiles were deployed, have you told them that you will give them permission to visit those bases?**

**A.** They, of course, have the right to visit bases where our missiles were deployed, just as we have the right to visit bases where their missiles have been deployed. And we have worked very carefully with each of the countries where our missiles have been based to work out carefully just how that will work—an exchange of notes that will ensure that, as any inspection takes place, the basic sovereignty and laws of the country involved will be fully respected, and this will go on in a proper way. All that has been done in a very cooperative spirit involving ourselves and the basing countries.

**Q. Does that mean they will be in full agreement?**

**A.** There will be an exchange of notes with each country, in which they will be assured that their laws will be fully respected. In other words, it recognizes the sovereignty of those countries in agreeing to that, since these bases are not in the United States; they are in other countries. We have to involve them to that extent, and that has been done, and done in a good, cooperative way.

**Q. As I heard you, you didn't refer to two verification concepts that American officials had spoken of previously. One is the concept of Soviet inspectors maintaining a presence outside American facilities. Is that part of the agreement, and if so, where would that be?**

**A.** Yes, there is an agreement for Soviet inspectors at an American facility that once produced one of our weapons systems, and there is an agreement for periodic onsite inspections involving another. So there is a reciprocal arrangement here, and we will be prepared to give the names of those sites very shortly, but we want to do certain things before we do that. But by tomorrow we will be ready to tell you the names.

**Q. The second part of my question is, there was a concept which Administration officials had talked of previously where there would be short-notice inspections of undeclared facilities, SS-25 bases where SS-20 missiles have never been, which is part of our challenge inspection regime. I gather that's no longer part of this agreement, and something has been substituted in its place.**

**A.** No, that is part of this agreement, and again, the way that has been handled is that sites are identified, and it is agreed that there will be a system for the use of enhanced technical means to perform that inspection. And it has been agreed that during the first 3 years after the treaty comes in force, these enhanced national technical means will be operative and there will be, I think it is six such inspections each year. So that is, I think, a very meaningful provision.

**Q. What does that mean in plain English? What are national technical means?**

**A.** National technical means involve the photography of the places that you point your camera at. And, of course, the person being photographed can do

whatever he wants. If you have a special agreement to enhance those means, what that does is—you agree that when challenged, so to speak, then certain procedures will be taken to display what's there, and you will, of course, issue your challenge when you are prepared to take your pictures. So that is, so to speak, short-notice inspection by an effective means. Do I have that right—all you experts?

**Q. Can you say how many non-deployed missiles on both sides and warheads on both sides will also be eliminated?**

A. We have the data on deployed and nondeployed missiles. We know that. The nondeployed, obviously, as well as the deployed, will be eliminated, and the data that we have, as I said, is more or less in the ballpark of what we thought. I don't have the numbers right in my head.

**Q. But can you say whether the ratio is the six-to-one that has been discussed in terms of warheads?**

A. In deployed missiles, I gave the numbers I think there are. We estimate about 1,500 of theirs and about 350 of ours. Then there are in addition to that a substantial number of nondeployed missiles, and I don't happen to have that number in my head.

**Q. One subject you did not mention was the strategic arms agreement, which is more or less expected to be the centerpiece of the Washington meeting as far as work is concerned. Were you able to make any progress on that score during your meetings here, and what is your outlook for some progress on strategic arms at the Washington summit?**

A. We made some progress, particularly this afternoon after we had concluded the INF work. But it has been the case that, of course, the key people involved are preoccupied and spending their time on finishing the INF treaty, so they don't have the time to work on the strategic arms treaty. But we did spend 2 or 3 hours, I think, altogether, between myself and Mr. Shevardnadze and the working group chaired by Marshal Akhrameyov on their side and Ambassador Nitze [Paul H. Nitze, special adviser to the President and the Secretary of State on arms control matters] on ours, with all our experts, discussing this. And I think it is fair to say, yes, we made some progress—no question about it. But we have a long way to go before we are able to lay out the parameters of that treaty.

Of course, the verification problems are going to be undoubtedly far more difficult in the case of strategic arms than they are in this treaty, where the most important verification fact is that you have eliminated these weapons entirely. You know that if you see one, there's a violation, and you can have measures such as the observation of testing that assures you that if they are simply dormant, they gradually become obsolete. It'll be much more difficult—we know that. But we have gotten a good start on the work, and we have made a plan for working on it at the Washington summit—perhaps even starting before the summit starts. And, we are in the process of evolving a work plan, a more intensive and systematic work plan for what will take place after the Washington summit on this subject.

**Q. Did you obtain any progress on space weapons?**

A. Not beyond really stating perhaps a little more fully our respective views, but that is a subject that must be addressed, obviously.

**Q. What happens to challenge inspections of suspect sites after the first 3 years?**

A. They continue. Yes. And as I said, in the first 3 years, when there are the most things to observe because there are still missiles deployed, the inspections are permitted at the rate of 20 per year. In the next 5 years, they are permitted at the rate of 15 per year, and in the last 5 years, at the rate of 10 per year—as is, we think, appropriate.

**Q. That is of declared sites, not of suspect sites?**

A. A site where a missile used to be but is not anymore because they have been destroyed is potentially a suspect site. So you declare your interest in seeing it. And a very explicit procedure has been worked out, designed to minimize the amount of time—that is literally hours—between when you announce your desire to see that site and when you are actually physically there.

**Q. Is there a time parameter or limit on the inspection process itself? Can an inspector stay completely through a process?**

A. The inspector is free to look and can't be constrained and can stay as long as it is necessary for him to do what he needs to do.

**Q. One of the areas you haven't touched on yet is the ratification issue back home. Some critics are already saying that you had to do the negotiation under a deadline and that you must have given something away in order to achieve a result in time for the summit. Can you defend yourself?**

A. I don't have to defend myself. The critics have to defend themselves. The point is that this is a very significant step in a good direction. We want to get into process some reductions nuclear armaments, which have grown and grown and grown. And under previous agreements, those agreements simply limited the rate of increase in nuclear weapons. So it seemed to be endless. Now for the first time, that process is being turned around, and they are being reduced. That's a good thing, and the critics have to stand up and say why they think we should have more nuclear weapons, as distinct from less.

And then, in terms of whether or not we know that the provisions of a treaty are actually being carried out have set forth here the basic means which we get at that. I don't want to claim perfection—there's nothing perfect—but I think the arrangements made here bound the problem, and time goes on, we will feel very comfortable that these weapons systems will have been eliminated.

**Q. Can you tell us how far you talks with the Soviets went in discussing Afghanistan?**

A. We had a brief discussion of Afghanistan, and I don't have anything new to report to you as a result of that discussion.

**Q. Another regional issue is the Persian Gulf. Any talk there of the Soviets backing the arms embargo that's necessary?**

A. We did discuss that subject rather extensively. It's up to them to speak for themselves; I won't try to speak for them. But I will say from standpoint of the United States, we think it's time to move on to the next resolution calling for mandatory sanctions. So far as we can see, Iran is playing a game of bluff against the U.S. Security Council. They are saying they are coming to meetings, and then no showing up. And so I think it's time to call that bluff. We feel that it is now necessary, if the Secretary General is to have any real chance of getting someplace in his negotiations, to give

attle more clout to work with. in favor of that and very clear inds about that necessity. It's that the Soviets are not ready to us on that at this point, but on't stop us from expressing our nd working for it in the United os.

I have a note here that says that I fulsome enough about the in- n regime. In the first 3 years, in tin to the 20 suspect-site inspec- s that I mentioned, there will also o called baseline inspections—that o look and see if the missiles that e declared to be in certain places in a numbers are there, and then, at el when they have been destroyed ey are presumably not there any- e you go to that base and you ver- wh your eyes that they aren't e. We call that a close-out ection.

There is a very extensive set of in- tions—anybody want a job? ll be a lot of new jobs created. nter]

## NEWS CONFERENCE.

T, W 25, 1987

le Pierre Harmel, former Prime der and Foreign Minister of um, is receiving NATO's Atlantic ral on the 20th anniversary of the el report—a report which has dd the alliance's approach to East- s relations since 1967. In that re- t Pierre Harmel urged that the ce of frank and timely consulta- between allies be deepened and oved.

It was in this report that the allies articulated their commitment to an ach grounded on strong defense on that basis, continued efforts to ove relations with the East. I per- ly find it very appropriate, there- at Mr. Harmel should receive a prestigious award at a moment n the alliance's commitment to a ng defense and negotiations has ght about a historic INF eement.

This is an agreement which, I t, has proceeded very much from adition, philosophy, and concept e Harmel report and which, from standpoint of the alliance—as every try represented said—is the kind reement that we have wanted. It gs us the result we sought, and it

has in it a number of elements of ver- ifications that perhaps even Mr. Harmel wouldn't have thought possible 20 years ago, or even in 1979.

I think it's a very well-timed mo- ment to make this award to him. I'd be glad to take your questions.

**Q. In reporting to the NATO offi- cials on the agreement with the Soviets, did you encounter any qualms, any concern among them, about having Soviet monitors on their territory?**

A. No.

**Q. Is it correct that [West Ger- man Foreign Minister] Mr. Genscher, and perhaps some other of your col- leagues, indicated that they would no longer deploy any of the outstanding cruise missiles after the agreement is signed? And are you satisfied with that position?**

A. We have said, and publicly, that we have felt it was important—and all of our allies agreed—that until the treaty is signed, we continue on with our schedule. Once the treaty is signed, it is our thought that at that point the deployments and activities associated with it would stop. There would be a period of time between the signing and the ratification when you would, so to speak, hold things constant. Once the treaty is ratified and put into effect, you start the process of taking the mis- siles out. That's a 3-year process, and it has been agreed to in some detail pre- cisely how it will work. That is the pro- cess we envisage, and I think that everybody agrees on and welcomes that process.

**Q. Are you convinced that the people of Europe will sleep more peacefully in their beds as a result of this agreement despite the vast superiority of the Soviet conventional forces? And have you given them an assurance of continued American presence in Europe?**

A. Of course, this treaty is impor- tant and significant for many reasons: first, because it has major reductions in nuclear arms for the first time; second, because the reductions are asym- metrical. Many more—four times as many or more—Soviet warheads come out than do U.S. warheads. That makes our situation better: There are impor- tant verification measures connected with it. All of these things have taken place, and they are important.

Nevertheless, it is certainly the case that our security concerns, our need for deterrence, our need for strength, are of continuing importance.

We need to keep working to develop our own strength, on the one hand, and to be ready for a continuation of the Harmel report advice, and to do that in the field of conventional weapons and in other fields like chemical weapons. Of course, from our standpoint, we will be working very hard on strategic arms. We continue basically in the same spirit.

The real message here is that the alliance has had a philosophy, and it was challenged. It put that philosophy into operational terms in 1979, and then it carried through and was steadfast and cohesive. Now we have the result we sought. I think that's what should give people a sense of some satisfac- tion. Whether they sleep better or not I don't know. There are a lot of other factors that go into how well you sleep. At any rate, I think it's a good result, both as to its outcome and to the way in which it was conducted.

**Q. There has been some debate in the United Kingdom about the possi- bility that, notwithstanding the INF agreement, it might be possible to increase the deployment of sea and, indeed, airborne cruise missiles in the not-too-distant future. Would you think, in principle, that was com- patible with the spirit of INF or not? Secondly, how do you see the priority for battlefield nuclear weapons elimi- nation in the order of the different issues that are now facing you? I ask it in the context of West German con- cerns that this priority is maintained.**

A. I think, on the latter part of your question, that was handled very well in the language that the alliance developed in reporting our meeting in Reykjavik last June. I see no reason why, or any pressures from any quarter, to alter that structure.

As to the balance of forces in Eu- rope, this agreement that we have to- day deals with intermediate-range missiles that are identified clearly. We don't intend to make any agreement or do anything with respect to those, to any undertaking, that would violate this agreement. The agreement doesn't have anything to do with our aircraft. It doesn't have anything to do with the other weapons systems that you men- tioned. But, of course, we have to look at these in the overall context.

**Q. In the verification part of the treaty, what is agreed about the base facilities—on the bases where it has been deployed and on the bases where it has not been deployed? Is it correct that there will be a sort of frozen sit- uation for 3 years at those bases?**

A. What I described was, first, the process of deployment as ongoing according to the schedule that has been established for a long time. When the treaty is finally signed—that will take place on the 8th of December—at that point what we would expect is that whatever exists at that stage stays in place, but there are no further deployments. And that stays constant, so to speak, until ratification takes place and the treaty goes into force. At that moment in time, a well-worked out plan for how the missiles are taken out and destroyed takes over. How that affects the various bases varies, but it goes according to that agreed schedule. At the end of 3 years, everything will have been taken out and destroyed, and we will, among other things, then have an inspection to verify that that's so.

Q. Did you seek the endorsement of NATO for the treaty, as it was completed, and their help in the ratification process? And, if you did, did you get their support?

A. All of the ministers or the permanent representatives, of all the countries, of course, were represented and are delighted with this treaty. They said so in our meeting today, and they have said so on other occasions. I think they feel, just as has been indicated here, that this isn't a U.S. treaty; this is their treaty. This is an alliance treaty. In a sense, the whole process came out of an alliance decision. All of the alliance, particularly basing countries, are involved. This is something we have done together. I think there is an absolutely uniform and full sense of support. Anyone who says that Europe doesn't like this treaty just doesn't have a clue about European attitudes.

Q. Did the alliance work out any contingency for a situation in which the treaty might not be ratified when the remaining cruise missiles have not been deployed?

And secondly, could you indicate just what precise number of missiles we are now talking about that will not be deployed—the deployment the alliance will forego?

A. I think everyone expects the treaty will be ratified, so we are not talking about contingencies. We will proceed on that basis because it is a good treaty. I think that as the Senators examine it—and obviously they haven't had a chance to examine it, so they are not going to commit themselves to something that they haven't had a chance to look at; that's only natural—but as they examine it and think

about it, I believe that they will come to the same conclusion that I have. It is a good thing—good for the United States, good for the alliance. So it will be ratified. As far as the nondeployed are concerned—that is really your question, what is the number of warheads that have been produced in our hands but are not deployed?

Q. Even approximately.

A. Approximately. I think I have got that somewhere here.

Q. While you are looking for that, does the Soviet Union agree to suspend deployment as well as the United States?

A. The Soviet Union, of course, will be bound by the treaty when it goes into effect. They are not bound until it goes into effect. So whatever they do—there are no constraints on that until the treaty actually takes effect. What I announced was what our view is and what our understanding is with our friends in the alliance as to what will take place between the signing and the ratification.

I might just say, as a side matter, that in this day and age of budget stringency, everything you do costs money. And once the treaty has been signed, with a presumption that it will go into effect—I have come to view everything I do in the State Department these days, and in the government, to see whether or not there is a dime here or a quarter there or a dollar that can be saved. So that is something to ponder.

It is perhaps worth mentioning that the costs of implementing the 1979 decision are considerable—that is, we took that decision as an alliance, and various countries had to do different things. Basing countries had to accept those bases and deploy the missiles and stand up politically, and as an alliance we had to work together. The United States had to develop, produce, and deploy these missiles.

Then we will go through the process of removing them. Probably on the whole, that process will cost us, as I understand it, somewhere between \$7,000 million to \$9,000 million. It is a fairly substantial number.

And then this verification regime—I don't know whether you have had a chance to examine the various ways in which inspections will be carried out and so on, but it will cost us some money to do that. That is all right; you

make a hard decision, you work with you bring it into effect, and you have to be willing to put your resources behind it. We have been willing to put our resources behind it, and we are glad to see it succeed.

Q. Is that \$7,000 million to \$9,000 million for the costs to the basing countries, the costs of development the costs of removing it—it is a globe figure, or does it apply to just one part?

A. It is a ballpark number, and I couldn't tell you exactly. But it represents the fact that you have got some missiles that have to be developed, produced, and deployed and then taken out of deployment. Aside from the cost to the basing countries themselves, just ourselves there is a fairly substantial investment in bringing about this result. I think it is a good investment. But I just brought it up in response somebody asking about that sort of thing.

Q. Can you give us a feel for how often Soviet inspectors are likely to be coming into the five NATO countries and what their rights will be they inspect facilities in these NATO countries?

A. We have agreed on an inspection program that gives each side certain rights. The numbers of inspections is 20 per year in the first 3 years. That the period during which missiles will still be deployed, but they will be in process of being taken out of deployment. That is the period of time when there are more things to see. Then in the next 5 years, each side will be permitted 15 inspections per year; and in the second 5 years, 10 inspections per year.

Applying that to all the different things that the Soviet side might want to look at in the United States or in alliance, the agreement is that no more than 50% of the inspections in any one year will take place in any one country. They can't just concentrate everything in one country. And second, there has been worked out—and we and our friends have insisted upon this—that there be an exchange of notes with the basing countries that fully recognize their sovereignty and the fact that these inspections will take place in those countries and the people doing them will be fully respectful of the laws of the countries where they go.

## The OAS, Democracy, and Nicaragua

*Secretary Shultz's address before the Organization of American States (OAS) General Assembly on November 10, 1987.*

The Charter of this Organization of American States declares that "the historic mission of America is to offer man a land of liberty."

The democratic transformation now underway in the hemisphere is giving new life to our common mission. President Sarney of Brazil calls it the "most stunning and moving political fact of recent years." President Reagan speaks of it as "one of the proudest chapters in human history." Clearly, this democratic transformation should also be a moment of triumph for our regional organization.

It should be, but it is not—at least not yet. More of our member countries are more democratic than ever. But some remain undemocratic, a few systematically so. And throughout the hemisphere, we must still grapple with the human problems caused by low rates of economic growth and unevenly distributed development.

Both sets of problems—the political and the economic—are serious. Both contribute to tensions that affect hemispheric security. I would like to address both in my remarks today.

### Encouraging Economic Growth and Social Development

I have great confidence in an improving economic future for Latin America. The efforts we have made together since 1982 have strengthened my confidence. This is the fifth General Assembly that I have attended as Secretary of State. Over the years since the crisis days of 1982, the economic figures have consistently improved.

We have continued to make strong efforts under the Program for Sustained Growth launched at Seoul in 1985. For the third year in a row, overall growth has exceeded 3%—in 1986, it was almost 4%. The Inter-American Development Bank reports that 1986 was a better year than 1985 for about two-thirds of this organization's member countries. Other indices are also good: export earnings continue to rise, imports are recovering, commodity prices are improving, per capita real income has risen, there are signs of im-

provement in the capital flight picture, and inflation rates are down.

New lending and support to the region from international financial and development institutions totaled over \$9 billion in 1986. More than \$9 billion in outstanding commercial debt has been rescheduled in the past 2 years. The U.S. trade deficit with Latin America and the Caribbean has continued to run at about \$15 billion annually. This, too, has made a major contribution to growth prospects for Latin America as a whole.

Responding to the special problems of the Caribbean Basin, the United States has provided more than \$7 billion in bilateral economic assistance since 1981. This is five times the \$1.4-billion worth of military assistance we have extended to meet vital security needs. Even in these cases where we have concentrated available official aid, our commitment is to lasting development; this, we realize, can only be based on a strong private sector, not on long-term dependence on foreign aid. We have, accordingly, sought to stimulate investment by freeing trade under the Caribbean Basin Initiative (CBI). The gratifying result has been a growth of more than 30% in U.S. imports of nontraditional products from CBI countries during the 3 years through 1986.

Throughout the hemisphere, however, per capita incomes are still typically below levels reached before financial flows became a problem in 1982. In addition, some current developments cloud the economic picture. We must do everything we can to correct them. Strong downward trends in interest rates had reduced Latin America's service charges by some \$5 billion annually, but interest rates have edged up again. We in the United States are making a concerted effort to bring our budget deficit under control, as I know only too well. Under President Reagan's leadership, we have vigorously resisted protectionist measures; but strong pressures for protectionism remain. We are determined to maintain an open trading system. We will continue to resist, and need your help.

We believe the international financial institutions of the World Bank and the International Monetary Fund must play a key role in fostering growth. We have, therefore, agreed to participate in the negotiation for an increase in the

Following on that, will there be some sort of protocol apart from the exchange of letters, protocols between the United States and deployed countries?

I don't think that there is any particular need for that.

This refers to, in response to the question, is assurance to each of the receiving countries that, as they perform these inspections to take place, they will be done fully in accord with sovereignty and in accord with the laws.

What are the figures you need to give us?

There are about 1,500 deployed warheads on the Soviet side and about 350 deployed INF missiles on our side. That is what is deployed and will be taken out. So you see that is a little better than the four-to-one ratio. Then there are additional warheads on each side that are spares or are inventory. In any case, we are getting ready to bring up to the number we had agreed and programmed. I believe there was 572 all together. You can subtract 350 from 572. I don't know what the answer to that is; you can work it out. However, we have an agreement.

That is where we are. We are in the process of verifying and collecting the numbers on their side. I guess I'd better not just toss out a number because it might not be right.

Press release 223 of Nov. 25, 1987.  
Press release 225 of Nov. 27. ■

capital of the World Bank. In addition, we have proposed a new external contingency facility for the International Monetary Fund to deal with unforeseen developments such as weaker commodity prices, lower export volumes, and higher interest rates.

A strong world economy will require continued economic reform. As you know, we have been seeking stronger action from the major surplus countries. The markets suggest that the United States has, for too long, been the locomotive of global growth and may, in fact, have been trying a little too hard. Here, too, your active participation is needed. You can help by seeking to persuade our trading partners of the importance of reducing their trade surpluses. You can also help by strengthening your own resolve to carry through the economic reforms needed for future growth. All of us in this hemisphere must work to increase our savings rates, levels of investment and, most importantly, our commitment to work together to create the necessary conditions for sustaining, into the 1990s and beyond, the democratic growth which has been the hallmark of Latin America in the 1980s.

### The Guatemala Agreement

I would like to turn now to the initiative taken by five of our members to bring peace through democracy in Central America. My government believes emphatically that the Guatemala agreement could lead to decisive progress. This organization should spare no effort to help the efforts of its Central American members to achieve peace.

The twin requirements of the Guatemala agreement—democracy and national reconciliation—add up to the only course that can end the bloodshed, promote full political participation, and remove East-West conflicts from the region.

The award of this year's Nobel Prize for Peace to the president of one of our member states reflects this reality. We congratulate President Arias [of Costa Rica]; his award recognizes both his own continuing efforts to complete the region's democratic transformation and the years of struggle by Central America's peoples and democratic leaders.

The implementation of the Guatemala agreement is proving rather complex, but its basic vision is really quite simple. It is a vision of regional peace based on freedom and democracy.

Democratization is to include *complete* freedom of the press, *full* political pluralism and free elections, and the lifting of *all* states of emergency. As President Reagan put it before the OAS Permanent Council, "democracy is the bottom line" of the Guatemala agreement.

Parallel to this process of democratization is a process of national reconciliation. Each government must undertake all steps necessary to achieve an effective, negotiated ceasefire with armed opposition groups and to engage in a meaningful dialogue with its political opponents. To further promote national reconciliation, each government must also issue an amnesty law to—the words of the agreement—"guarantee the inviolability of life [and] freedom in all its forms."

At the time the governments comply with these commitments to democratization and national reconciliation, the signatories commit themselves to deny the use of their national territories for military support to forces destabilizing other governments. As well, they will call upon third parties to cease assistance to irregular forces, except for that needed for the resettlement of combatants and the voluntary repatriation of refugees.

Finally, and very importantly, the Guatemala agreement is not a set of isolated unilateral commitments: it is, as the agreement says, "a harmonious and indivisible whole." It is a whole that depends absolutely on the simultaneous implementation of mutual obligations. For the agreement to work, all sides have to live up to their obligations. Success will require serious time-tables for progress and an awareness of the costs of failure.

### Security Concerns

The Guatemala agreement does not explicitly deal with strategic security concerns. Soviet and Cuban military ties to Nicaragua—military facilities, advisers, types of assistance, sophistication of weaponry—are issues of vital and direct interest to all of us. Peace requires that they be dealt with. A reasonable balance among armed forces in Central America is important to an enduring peace.

These basic security objectives in Central America have strong bipartisan support in the United States. Our major parties both seek a democratic Nicaragua that is neither a military threat

to its neighbors nor a platform for Soviet and Cuban activities hostile to hemispheric security.

Political democracy in Nicaragua would, for the most part, deal with these security concerns, for no truly democratic government would attack neighbors or allow its territory to be used militarily by the Soviet Union.

So we are back to the basic question, which is explicitly addressed in the Guatemala agreement: how can democracy be achieved in Nicaragua?

### Broken Promises

The struggle for democracy in Nicaragua is not new. In 1979, this Organization of American States voted overwhelmingly—right here in this room—to seek the replacement of the Somoza dictatorship, calling for "respect for human rights of all Nicaraguans without exception" and "the holding of free elections as soon as possible." Those are the words we used.

That call was part of a lengthy negotiation between the governments of the hemisphere and the political coalition fighting the Somoza regime. In meetings, documents, and even in statements before this organization, the coalition junta in exile and its representatives affirmed a commitment to pluralist democracy, a mixed economy, and a nonaligned foreign policy.

Some of the leaders of today's government in Nicaragua helped negotiate that political understanding. Yet those same leaders now affirm their absolute right to create a Leninist party state that dominates the economy and is aligned with the Soviet bloc.

Before the fall of the Somoza regime, the Sandinistas repeatedly assured Nicaraguans that they would protect the basic rights and liberties of all Nicaraguans. The most important of these assurances are contained in a document called the "Statute on the Rights and Guarantees of Nicaraguans," which was to be the "bill of rights" of the new Government of Nicaragua. Distributed first while Somoza was still in power, then enacted into law as Decree 52 on August 21, 1979, the statute constituted a comprehensive and solemn promise by the FSLN [Sandinista National Liberation Front] to the Nicaraguan people.

Article 1 of the statute guaranteed to the people of Nicaragua the "right to free and full self-determination to establish their political condition." Article 4 stated that: "Foreigners shall not be

... to intervene in the country's political affairs." As it turned out, the political system that exists today has been determined by the small minority that belongs to the Sandinista partyanguard and is run with the help of thousands of Cubans and other East-European foreigners.

Articles 22, 23, and 25 of the statute of particular relevance to prospects for compliance with the Guatemala agreement. They guaranteed the rights of peaceful assembly and freedom of association; to organize and form political parties; to participate in public activities; to petition for redress of grievances; and to vote and run for office. As it turned out, the Sandinistas did not allow an election for 5 years until Somoza was ousted, and then only under conditions contrived to bring about a preordained result.

This record is a major source of the skepticism about whether the Government of Nicaragua intends to live up to its obligations under the peace accords. It means that the performance of the Government of Nicaragua in meeting its commitment to freedom cannot be measured just by what happens to a few individuals, no matter how prominent. Far-reaching and lasting reforms must be undertaken to ensure that, this progress to democracy is genuine and irreversible.

### National Reconciliation

In his lead editorial the day it was permitted to resume publication, which on October 1, *La Prensa* called for national amnesty, reconciliation through dialogue with the armed rebels, and a truce, without any restrictions, the exercise of emergency that has ruled the country since 1982."

These three measures—a negotiated cease-fire, a full amnesty, and the lifting of the state of emergency—are essential if today's armed enemies are to settle their differences as political rivals. These steps would probably convince most Nicaraguans—refugees and political exiles, young men fighting in resistance and young men drafted into the Sandinista army—that they should indeed, go home and join in their country's democratic politics.

Implemented fully and fairly, these measures could alleviate some of the skepticism about whether President Ortega will, in fact, engage the resistance and the opposition parties in a process leading to reconciliation and an irreversible democratic opening. This is the

basic test. The November 5 announcement by President Ortega that he will accept indirect talks with the resistance is welcome progress. We welcome any move by the Government of Nicaragua, no matter how tentative, to end the fighting and the grievances that have caused it. The more direct the negotiations, the greater is likely to be the progress.

President Duarte and President Cerezo have already undertaken direct negotiations with leaders of the insurgents in their respective countries. The mid-October discussions in Spain were the first official contacts between the Guatemalan Government and the guerrillas in a generation or more. In El Salvador, dialogue has been more frequent, if still intermittent, and the government has formed two mixed commissions with the guerrillas. One is to negotiate a cease-fire, the other to discuss amnesty and national reconciliation.

The results thus far suggest that the Marxist-Leninist forces may not yet be ready to make peace. At the opening meeting of the Salvadoran cease-fire commission, the guerrilla leaders refused to discuss conditions for a cease-fire. They later refused to participate in reconciliation talks that had been scheduled for October 30 in Mexico City. Similarly, the Guatemalan insurgents rejected the Cerezo government's invitation to join in the political process.

To implement the Guatemala agreement with deeds as well as with words, President Ortega and the resistance will have to negotiate in a way that deals directly with these issues. An effective cease-fire cannot simply be declared by one side; those fighting on both sides must agree on what is to happen. This, in turn, would enable leaders to develop the confidence-building measures to pave the way to full and peaceful political reintegration of all Nicaraguans into a free Nicaragua.

A full amnesty is essential to any such process. In September, the National Conference of Roman Catholic Bishops of Nicaragua defined amnesty as a measure to help, in their words, "both sides . . . forget past offenses committed by brother against brother." Any such amnesty must apply to political prisoners, to active members of the resistance, and to those who have simply fled their homeland rather than live under a totalitarian regime. The November 5 announcement by President Ortega that the Sandinistas are willing to grant pardons to approxi-

mately 1,000 political prisoners, while thousands more remain behind bars, is barely a beginning.

The leaders of Nicaragua's democratic resistance have welcomed the Guatemala agreement and taken steps to comply. They have proclaimed their willingness to negotiate a cease-fire, and they have welcomed the latest proposals from Managua as a useful starting point. We must all hope that President Ortega's latest offer will prove to be genuine and that it will lead to the logical next step, direct negotiations of precisely the sort that President Cerezo and President Duarte have conducted.

### U.S. Support for Peace

The Government of the United States is convinced that the military and political successes of the Nicaraguan resistance have helped to create the opportunity for peace. We are convinced that, without this pressure, the Sandinistas would not have taken the steps announced on November 5. We also understand that peace is a process. So when we were asked not to seek new aid for the resistance until November 5—to "give peace a chance"—we continued our active diplomatic efforts, but we heeded those requests.

Today, I can tell you that we will seek no further military assistance for the resistance until next year. This does not mean we will sit idly on the sidelines if the Sandinistas try to strike for a military victory. We will not abandon the resistance fighters to face advanced Soviet weaponry and Cuban advisers with their resources exhausted. We will not permit the peace process to become a shield for the physical elimination of the Nicaraguan resistance. It does mean that we will give peace every chance.

As President Reagan informed the Permanent Council, U.S. assistance "will continue until the Sandinistas, negotiating with the freedom fighters, conclude an agreement for a cease-fire, and full democracy is established in Nicaragua." The specific forms our aid will take will depend on what happens in the implementation of the Guatemala agreement. If it works as we all hope, it will be directed to the peaceful reintegration of the resistance into a free Nicaragua; if it does not, it will be used to enable the struggle for freedom to continue until it does succeed.

In the weeks and months ahead, the United States will back the

Guatemala agreement in other ways as well. President Reagan informed the heads of delegation to this assembly yesterday that when serious negotiations between the Sandinistas and the freedom fighters are underway under the mediation of Cardinal Obando, I will be ready to meet jointly with the foreign ministers of all five Central American nations, including the Sandinistas' representative.

Before such a meeting and throughout this period, we will, of course, continue to consult closely with the Central American democracies and the Nicaraguan resistance on how such multinational negotiations can best contribute to national reconciliation in Nicaragua.

## The Role of the OAS

The OAS and its members have a special responsibility with regard to Nicaragua.

This time, unlike 1979, we must ensure that commitments to democracy are kept. Central Americans must continue to play the lead role. The Guatemala agreement is their creation. They are closer to the problem, more directly involved. But this organization, which has years of special expertise in the region, should be a major source of support.

Keeping the peace requires regional involvement and expertise. This principle of regional primacy is stated explicitly in Article 23 of the OAS Charter, which calls on member states to use regional procedures before referring disputes to the United Nations. It is also recognized in Article 52 of the Charter of the United Nations, which calls on all UN members to make every possible effort to resolve their disputes through regional organizations before submitting them to the attention of the Security Council.

The Secretary General of this organization is a member of the verification and followup commission established by the Guatemala agreement. Much effort and serious commitment from all the members of this organization as well as the Secretary General and his staff will be needed if that commission is to engage in a fair and structured process for analyzing progress under the agreement.

I am aware that some observers have wondered whether multilateral organizations are capable of playing a key

role on the highest priority issues in the hemisphere. We believe that the OAS proves that they are. The OAS has an outstanding record on monitoring human rights, most notably through the activities and impressive public reports of the Inter-American Human Rights Commission. It has undertaken major support for democratic processes through the observation of elections and other technical assistance. It has been trying to assist countries that want to improve their judicial systems. It has undertaken new obligations in the fight against drug abuse and illegal narcotics trafficking in this hemisphere, most notably the action program against drugs agreed upon at Rio de Janeiro just last year. And, of course, the OAS has a long record of successful peacekeeping activity, much of it in Central America.

It is true that the financial health of the OAS has not been good. This is partly a reflection of broader economic and financial difficulties facing the member states. We discussed this issue when we met at Cartagena in 1985. After that meeting, I recommended to President Reagan that we obtain congressional approval for paying our full quota to the organization, which the United States had not done for several years. The President agreed. Then the Congress agreed, but did not find the money in a very restricted budget to do so. I pledge to you, we shall keep trying.

The Department of State has had its budget severely cut for the past 3 years. Last year we had to make difficult adjustments that could well prove minor in comparison to what is before us now. In the coming year, we must make major ones. This drastic reduction in financial support for foreign affairs forced us, among other things, to withdraw our offer to host this General Assembly. What I said to the Secretary General then, I repeat now. That decision does not change our firm commitment to the Organization of American States. As I said at Cartagena, we want this organization to be a vital force. In fact, I think it may very well be that canceling out on the planned San Francisco meeting and holding it here has provided something of a jolt in the Congress, and they're realizing that the financial situation is truly serious.

## The New Solidarity

The growth of democracy in this hemisphere has created a new phenomenon: a new solidarity among democratic countries and among groups and individuals who believe in democracy.

The increase in the number of democratically elected leaders in South America, Central America, and the Caribbean has also increased communication and cooperation among them. When democracy is challenged in one country, democratic leaders throughout the hemisphere are now quick to rally behind their democratic colleagues.

This new democratic solidarity is also evident among ordinary citizens. Political party members, trade unionists, civic activists, and others are joining across boundaries to share experiences and support each other in their quest for democratic government. We have a solemn obligation to them to provide the political and economic framework—responsible government accountable to the people and economic opportunity for all—that they demand.

In addition, the history of the last quarter century has made clear that our security, and the security of all the free countries of the Americas, is enhanced by the consolidation of governments that have a democratic mandate that recognize the responsibilities and hard choices that free and sovereign nations must face, and that are free to pursue their own interests. As fellow democracies, our interests usually coincide; when they do not, we believe we can find the maturity and the political will and sophistication to resolve our differences satisfactorily.

We value greatly the promise of a hemisphere linked by common democratic beliefs and practices, and we work tirelessly to realize it. We are encouraged by what we see. More and more, the prime ministers of the Caribbean and the presidents of Latin America speak the same language, with each other and with us in North America. It is the language of democracy. We are all watching closely the elections in Haiti and Suriname later this month to see that they truly reflect the will of the people. And we will continue to watch efforts in Chile, Panama, and Paraguay to reconstruct a democratic order.

Today Central America is at a particularly critical juncture. A regional framework for democracy has been developed and agreed to by Central



## Visit of Zambia's President

merica's own leaders. They do not believe the people of Nicaragua are content to live under a totalitarian government. We agree. They see no reason for the people of the Central American democracies to accept a future of permanent insecurity. We agree. We see no reason for Central America to accept a future of large armies that waste scarce resources; of permanent violence along international boundaries; of permanent fear, surveillance, and doubt. We agree.

In the struggle that today divides Nicaraguans who believe in democracy from those who believe in totalitarianism or dictatorship—not just in Nicaragua but as an ideal for this hemisphere—we must stand with the democrats. The security of Central America—and, ultimately, the security of all democracies—depends on it.

We in the Organization of American States have a very special responsibility. After what happened in 1979, it would be doubly irresponsible for us to reopen the door of democratization in Nicaragua only to allow it to be slammed shut again. We must put our collective power behind the diplomacy of democracy in Nicaragua, for our security interests, our moral values, and our political objectives all meet in that outcome.

As we approach the half millennium of the Old World's discovery of the New, we have a historic opportunity to make a statement about the future of this hemisphere, to issue a warning to dictators that they are unwelcome in this hemisphere and that they will be lonely, indeed.

Only then will we be able to say that we have met our obligation as members of this great organization to offer man a land of liberty: liberty in our lands for *all* our people.

Press release 218 of Nov. 12, 1987. ■



White House photo by Bill Fitz-Peterson

*President Kenneth D. Kaunda of the Republic of Zambia made an official working visit to Washington, D.C., October 7-11, 1987, to meet with President Reagan and other government officials.*

*Following are remarks made by the two Presidents after their meeting on October 8.*

### President Reagan

It has been a real pleasure to welcome you once again to the White House and to the United States. President Kaunda is a senior and highly respected statesman of Africa and the world. As chairman of the front-line states, his counsel is especially valuable as we work together for peace and economic development in southern Africa. President Kaunda's recent election for a second term as chairman of the Organization of African Unity (OAU) attests to the high esteem in which he is held throughout that vast continent.

Our talks today covered the full range of international issues. We reaffirmed our shared determination to work for the earliest possible end of apartheid in South Africa and its replacement by a truly democratic government. The United States will continue to do everything in its power to bring about a negotiated settlement

involving the independence of Namibia and the departure of all foreign forces from Angola. I told President Kaunda of my meetings this week with President Chissano [of Mozambique] and of our support for his efforts to work for peace in Mozambique. I expressed our appreciation for President Kaunda's efforts on behalf of peace in the Persian Gulf and North Africa and his support for efforts to achieve real arms reduction agreements between the United States and the Soviet Union.

Today also we reaffirmed the long tradition of warm and productive relations between the United States and Zambia and the other states of southern Africa in their efforts to expand trade, pursue economic reform, and develop their transportation networks. The United States has a stake in African economic progress. We have set a goal of ending the hunger that now plagues sub-Saharan Africa and to do this by the year 2000. Accomplishing this will require growth-oriented reform in Africa and assistance from the United States. We Americans are ready and willing to do our part, but setting things right will also require a commitment for tangible reform from African governments.

We welcome the opportunity to join with you, President Kaunda, in helping

to build a future of peace, prosperity, and freedom for Africa and for Zambia. It was a pleasure to have you as our guest, and we wish you a pleasant time in our country for the rest of your stay.

## President Kaunda

May I once again thank you, your government, and the people for receiving my delegation and myself so well. I have found our discussions particularly useful. I am taking back to Africa a message of hope and promise. I am taking back to Africa a message of cooperation and not confrontation. I am taking back to Africa a message of love based on truth, social justice, and fair play from this country.

We have our differences of approach but not differences of principle. This is important in itself.

I can assure you that when I report back to the summit of the OAU November 30 and December 1, God willing, of this year, it will be a message which will lend more to cooperation and not confrontation.

Once again, thank you for the exchange of views, which have been very, very fruitful, indeed, and have helped me a lot to appreciate the stand taken by your country on many international issues. I can only end by saying I wish you God's blessings as you come to the end of the term of your very onerous job. I must once again emphasize our gratitude to you and General Secretary

Gorbachev on the recently agreed new approach to the problems of nuclear weapons on this earth.

<sup>1</sup>Made at the South Portico of the White House (text from Weekly Compilation of Presidential Documents of Oct. 12, 1987). ■

## South Africa Releases Political Prisoners

### DEPARTMENT STATEMENT, NOV. 5, 1987<sup>1</sup>

We welcome the news that the South African Government has released Govan Mbeki and four other black political prisoners. We are especially pleased that their release was apparently unconditional. We know this must be a joyous day for their families.

This action is limited to five people, and many others—including Nelson Mandela, Walter Sisulu, and Zeph Mothopeng—remain in detention. Nevertheless, this is a positive move on the part of the South African Government, and we hope it will be seen in that light by all South Africans.

We urge all parties to use this opportunity to create a climate for dialogue leading to a peaceful resolution of South Africa's political problems.

<sup>1</sup>Read to news correspondents by Department spokesman Charles Redman. ■

efforts to redress the conventional imbalance. And substantial reductions in strategic offensive arms remain our highest priority.

### Heightened Focus on Conventional Imbalance

The conventional imbalance remains an important underlying source of military instability between East and West. In Central Europe, the Soviets have deployed in forward areas 30 divisions, heavy with tanks, artillery, and armored vehicles, configured for offensive operations. The conventional imbalance in Europe derives not only from large Soviet and Warsaw Pact quantitative advantages in key areas of combat capability but also from geographic asymmetries; the Warsaw Pact forces can easily be reinforced by forces from the Soviet Union.

There is no military or political reason that can justify the massive buildup of Soviet and Warsaw Pact forces which threaten Western Europe. The Soviets claim that there is a stable East-West conventional balance. However, in specific locations and weapon systems, the Warsaw Pact enjoys as much as a 3-to-1 superiority over Western conventional forces.

No Soviet action would do more to convince a skeptical world of a change in Soviet strategic objectives than substantial reductions of these massive forces and a serious effort by the Soviets to address our concerns on conventional stability.

In an effort to press for constructive negotiations on conventional force NATO has recently called for establishing two distinct conventional security negotiations to take place within the framework of the Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe (CSCE). One negotiation, among all 3 CSCE participating states, would continue the work of the Stockholm conference on confidence- and security-building measures. The other, limited to the 23 members of NATO and the Warsaw Pact, would seek to create a more stable conventional balance between the two alliances. It would seek to end destabilizing military disparities and to reduce the capability for surprise attack and large-scale offensive operations.

NATO's response to the challenge of Soviet and Warsaw Pact conventional might must be to invigorate and improve its conventional defensive capabilities. To this end, the alliance has

## Hard Work Ahead in Arms Control

by Edward L. Rowny

*Address before the National War College Alumni Association in Colorado Springs on October 16, 1987. Ambassador Rowny is special adviser to the President and the Secretary of State on arms control matters.*

As we approach next week's meetings in Moscow between Secretary Shultz and Foreign Minister Shevardnadze, it is a good time to take stock of where we are and what remains ahead in arms control. In my view, we've cleared the deck for a lot of hard work.

American resolve, aided by allied solidarity, has put us within reach of an agreement on intermediate-range nuclear forces (INF), which for the first time would not simply limit but would, in fact, eliminate an entire class of nuclear weapons. When completed, this agreement will be a significant political and diplomatic accomplishment if we approach the end-game using the same realistic guiding principles that brought us to this point.

Approaching the completion of an INF agreement allows us to concentrate on both ends of the arms control spectrum. Even as we work on an INF agreement, we must redouble our

rtaken a Conventional Defense Im-  
ment (CDI) initiative. If it is pur-  
vigorously, the CDI, like the U.S.  
egic Defense Initiative (SDI),  
result in substantial improve-  
s in defense capabilities through  
chological developments.

The West has an unmatched advan-  
e in its free exchange of ideas and  
nability of capital and skilled labor.  
ordinated, highly effective research  
development effort could revolu-  
ize the effectiveness of NATO's con-  
ventional forces. Without having to add  
ificant manpower—the most expen-  
sive component of Western armed  
forces—such an effort could help us  
eeds the current conventional  
balance.

### Importance of START Agreement

ne strategic arms reduction talks  
(START), there is now an opportunity  
o go deeply into offensive, strategic  
nuclear arsenals. When they met last  
month, Secretary Shultz and Foreign  
Minister Shevardnadze once again re-  
affirmed their commitment to 50% cuts  
in strategic weapons. This issue is  
President Reagan's highest priority and  
is one that General Secretary Gorba-  
chev has termed the "root problem"  
of arms control.

If this reaffirmation is to be trans-  
lated into an effective START agree-  
ment, the Soviets must be forthcoming  
at two critical points.

First is the issue of sublimits. An  
agreement on deep reductions of strate-  
gic offensive arms to 50%—that is,  
1,000 delivery systems and 6,000 war-  
heads—will not alone guarantee a stable  
strategic relationship. Accordingly,  
the draft START treaty we have tabled  
in Geneva includes three sublimits in  
addition to the overall count of 6,000  
warheads. These measures would limit  
the total number of ballistic missile  
warheads to 4,800; ICBM [interconti-  
nental ballistic missile] warheads to  
300; and 1,650 warheads on permitted  
ICBMs except those on silo-based light  
and medium ICBMs with six or fewer  
warheads.

These sublimits would reduce the  
Soviets' current significant advantage  
in ballistic missile forces, especially  
that of the large, MIRVed [multiple in-  
dependently-targetable reentry vehicle]  
ICBMs which can be used effectively in  
a first strike. The sublimits would en-  
sure equality in force capabilities after

reductions. Moreover, they would pre-  
vent future adverse changes in force  
structures.

Most important, sublimits are  
needed to ensure that strategic arms  
cuts are stabilizing, to prevent future  
arsenals from being concentrated in  
ballistic missiles. In response to our  
plan for sublimits, the Soviets have pro-  
posed to limit any one leg of the triad  
to 60% of the total. But without an  
additional cap on ballistic missile war-  
heads, this approach is highly inade-  
quate. It would permit the Soviets to  
retain a strategic force composed en-  
tirely of ballistic missiles following  
overall 50% START reductions. It  
would, moreover, permit the Soviet  
Union to retain a high concentration  
of ICBM warheads on highly MIRVed  
ICBMs. A treaty permitting such a  
composition of forces after reductions  
would not strengthen strategic sta-  
bility. Only sublimits along lines the  
United States has proposed will pro-  
mote such stability.

### Why SDI Must Not Be Traded Away

A second area of Soviet intransigence  
against effective strategic arms reduc-  
tions is the Soviet insistence on link-  
age. They continue to insist on holding  
a prospective START accord hostage to  
U.S. agreement to constrain our re-  
search into how to defend against bal-  
listic missile attack. This linkage is  
unwarranted. It makes abandonment,  
or at least severe curtailment, of the  
U.S. Strategic Defense Initiative a pre-  
condition for START limitations. How-  
ever, there is great benefit in a 50%  
START reductions agreement, properly  
formulated, for the Soviets as well as  
for us. Under 50% reductions, we  
would cut back on strategic nuclear  
forces of concern to the Soviets. They  
would be required to reduce their  
ICBM force, which is of particular con-  
cern to us. Since both sides would gain,  
there is no reason to hold a START  
agreement hostage to limits on our SDI  
program.

At the September meeting, For-  
eign Minister Shevardnadze, purporting  
to show "flexibility," gave us a choice of  
two alternatives. We could, for 10  
years, either "strictly adhere" to the  
ABM Treaty, as "signed and ratified in  
1972," or agree to a list of devices  
which would not be put into space if  
they exceeded certain "performance pa-  
rameters." We are concerned that the  
Soviets may have only poured old wine

into new bottles. Although we don't yet  
have a clear view of the Soviet pro-  
posal, we cannot accept an alternative  
that would restrict us to an SDI pro-  
gram on Soviet terms. Nor can we sub-  
ject our research to highly restrictive  
and unverifiable limitations more string-  
ent than the ABM Treaty—a treaty  
which does not limit, or even mention,  
"research."

On the issues of strategic offensive  
arms and ballistic missile defenses,  
President Reagan's policies are clear.  
We must continue to impress on the  
Soviets that deep cuts in strategic of-  
fensive weapons, especially those that  
are the most destabilizing, are benefi-  
cial in their own right. The Soviet  
Union would like to negotiate certain  
limits on SDI research in trade for a  
START agreement. Embarking on such  
an exercise with the Soviets runs the  
risk of crippling SDI. SDI is and must  
remain a purposeful program investi-  
gating the problem of ballistic missile  
defenses which could provide the basis  
for a cooperative transition to a more  
stable strategic relationship. We must  
disabuse the Soviets from believing  
they can achieve this aim.

Let us not forget that, along with  
NATO firmness on INF, it was SDI  
that brought the Soviets back to the  
nuclear arms negotiating table in Janu-  
ary 1985, after their December 1983  
walkout. Let us be clear that SDI is  
not a bargaining chip but is a program  
we are firmly committed to pursue. As  
such, it provides the Soviets a strong  
incentive to agree to deep reductions  
in strategic arms. Even if the 50%  
cuts now on the table in START are  
achieved, SDI will remain essential as  
an incentive for the Soviets to under-  
take further reductions. Moreover, SDI  
would underwrite the integrity of new  
arms agreements by diminishing the  
Soviet incentive to cheat.

Let us bear in mind, too, SDI's  
function as a hedge against the Soviets'  
own heavy involvement in strategic de-  
fense. Leaving them with a monopoly  
in defenses would threaten peace and  
Western freedom by undermining the  
credibility of our deterrent. Contrary  
to Soviet propaganda, it must be un-  
derstood that the choice is not between a  
world with strategic defenses or one  
without such systems. The free world  
must decide whether the Soviets will  
be allowed to be the only power with  
ballistic missile defenses.

## Assuring Strict Verification for INF Elimination

The Soviets are masters at 11th-hour negotiating. During the next several weeks, they may exert enormous pressures trying to get us to dispense quickly with the remaining details of an INF treaty, particularly the important verification provisions. They will try to get us to compromise our standards in order to keep the "process" moving forward.

This is an expectation we will not let them realize. One of the most consistent tenets of President Reagan's foreign policy is that any arms control agreement must be effectively verifiable if it is to improve stability and to make a lasting contribution to peace and security. The President has made it clear he will not settle for anything less.

The United States has three basic verification objectives for an INF arms reduction agreement:

**First**, to ensure confidence in the agreement;

**Second**, to deter Soviet violations of the treaty by increasing the likelihood that such violations would be detected; and

**Third**, to permit quick and unambiguous detection of any Soviet violations, thereby providing timely warning of a potential or actual threat to U.S. and allied security.

On September 14, we tabled in Geneva an inspection protocol detailing the procedures we consider necessary to verify compliance effectively for an INF treaty, an accord which provides for the elimination of all U.S. and Soviet INF missiles—the "global double zero" formula. Our verification proposal would bring about the most stringent regime to protect against cheating in arms control history.

The Soviets have said they accept the broad outline of our verification plan, including unprecedented onsite inspection. But "the devil is in the details." As negotiations continue, we will insist that the Soviets commit themselves to effective verification measures in detail and in writing.

Even with an agreement for full global elimination of INF missiles, ensuring against cheating requires a demanding set of verification measures. Let me outline for you the key elements of the plan we have presented in Geneva:

- Requirement that all INF missiles and launchers would be fixed geographically in agreed-upon areas or in announced transit between such areas during the reductions period;

- Detailed exchange of data, updated as necessary, on the location of missile support facilities and missile operating bases and the number of missiles and launchers at those facilities and bases;

- Notification of movement of missiles and launchers between declared facilities;

- A baseline onsite inspection to verify the number of missiles and launchers at declared missile support facilities and missile operating bases;

- Onsite inspection to verify the destruction of missiles and launchers;

- Follow-on, short-notice inspection of declared facilities during the reductions period to verify residual levels until all missiles are eliminated;

- Short-notice, mandatory challenge inspection of certain facilities in the United States and the Soviet Union at which illegal missile activity could be carried out; and

- Requirement for a separate "close-out" inspection to ensure that when a site is deactivated and removed

from the list of declared facilities, it has indeed ended activities associated with INF missiles.

Once the Soviets recognize that American people stand firm for effective verification, I believe we will see halt to any 11th-hour delaying tactic the Soviets. Verification is the final as to whether the Soviets are truly committed to a worthwhile INF agreement.

## Conclusion

We approach the next critical episode in our relationship with the Soviet Union with a clear grasp of our fundamental objectives. We have gained an experienced understanding of Soviet negotiating practices and realize that we need to weigh carefully both risks and opportunities. We may, indeed, be able to reach agreements leading to a more stable, less dangerous world. But even if we meet with such success, our people must understand that this will not be cause for euphoria. We cannot rely on our oars with an almost-complete INF agreement. We are only at the beginning of the task of reducing the Soviet military threat—we have a lot of work in front of us. ■

## Soviets Tour Chemical Munitions Destruction Facility

### DEPARTMENT STATEMENT, NOV. 17, 1987<sup>1</sup>

Today we welcome to Washington a Soviet delegation led by Ambassador Yuri Nazarkin, the Soviet representative to the Conference on Disarmament. The Soviet delegation will leave tomorrow to visit the U.S. Army's chemical munitions destruction facility at Tooele, Utah, on November 19 and 20.

At the Tooele facility, we will brief the Soviets in detail on our state-of-the-art pilot plant for the destruction of chemical munitions and demonstrate its operation. We will also offer the Soviet delegation an opportunity to examine a display of current U.S. Army chemical munitions. Ambassador Max Friedersdorf, the U.S. representative to the Conference on Disarmament, will accompany the Soviet delegation.

As you know, there are now under way intensive multilateral and bilateral negotiations aimed at achieving an effective, verifiable, and comprehensive ban on chemical weapons. Openness is the part of all chemical weapons status is essential to achieving such a convention.

For the United States, this will be the second international visit to our chemical weapons destruction facility. In 1983 the United States hosted a group of representatives from the Conference on Disarmament. There were many participants, but the Soviets, who were invited, did not choose to attend at that time back in 1983.

<sup>1</sup>Read to news correspondents by Department spokesman Charles Redman. ■

## U.S., Soviet Union Begin Nuclear Testing Talks

PRESIDENT'S STATEMENT,  
NOV. 19, 1987<sup>1</sup>

in Geneva, the United States and the Soviet Union will begin formal, step-by-step negotiations on nuclear testing. I have long advocated a logical approach to nuclear testing limitations that preserves our national security interests while achieving verifiable agreements with the Soviet Union. I am gratified that we have now agreed to this step-by-step approach.

This is a first step, the United States and the Soviet Union will negotiate improved verification measures for two ongoing but unratified nuclear testing agreements—the Threshold Test Ban Treaty (TTBT) and the Peaceful Nuclear Explosions Treaty (PNET). Once verification concerns have been satisfied and the treaties ratified, we will expect that the United States and the Soviet Union immediately enter into negotiations on ways to implement a step-by-step program—in association with a program to reduce and ultimately eliminate all nuclear weapons—ultimately and ultimately ending nuclear testing.

It is important to recall at this time that our nuclear deterrent has for the last 40 years kept the peace. As successful as this policy has been, I believe we cannot be content for the indefinite future with a deterrence relationship based exclusively on the threat of offensive retaliation. We must continue our efforts, through our Strategic Defense Initiative (SDI), for a means of deter-

ring aggression through increased reliance on defenses that threaten no one.

For as long as we must continue to rely on nuclear weapons for our security, however, we must ensure that those weapons are safe, secure, reliable, effective, and survivable; in other words, that our nuclear deterrent remains credible. This requires nuclear testing, as permitted by existing treaties. It is only within the context of decreasing reliance on nuclear weapons that we can look forward to a time when our needs for nuclear testing would also decrease. That is my objective and one the United States is prepared to work energetically toward.

U.S. STATEMENT,  
NOV. 20, 1987

Today the United States and the Soviet Union ended the first round of their stage-by-stage negotiations on nuclear testing. The U.S. delegation is headed by Ambassador Robert B. Barker; the Soviet delegation is headed by Mr. Igor N. Palenykh. We have completed 2 weeks of intense and businesslike negotiations. Our discussions have produced important progress.

Our most significant accomplishment has been agreement that the delegations will visit each other's nuclear test sites in January 1988 for the purpose of familiarizing themselves with conditions and operations at those test sites. It should be remembered that President Reagan first proposed in Sep-

tember 1984 that the sides exchange visits to each other's test sites for the purpose of starting the process of improving verification of the Threshold Test Ban Treaty and Peaceful Nuclear Explosions Treaty. These visits will enhance prospects for designing and subsequently conducting a mutually acceptable and agreed joint verification experiment that Soviet Foreign Minister Shevardnadze proposed in April of this year. Following these visits, the delegations will resume their negotiations in Geneva.

A key question at the outset of these negotiations was whether a joint verification experiment would be needed in order to make progress toward the priority goal; that of reaching agreement on effective verification measures which will make it possible to ratify the TTBT and PNET. That question has been settled; a joint verification experiment will be necessary for the sides to make progress on our priority goal—effective verification of the TTBT and PNET. A part of that question was whether the Soviets could reach a decision on acceptability of the U.S.-proposed CORTEX [continuous reflectometry for radius vs. time experiment] technique before its use had been demonstrated at the Soviet test site. It has been decided that a demonstration of the practicability and unobtrusiveness of the CORTEX technique must take place at the Soviet test site before they will decide whether or not the CORTEX technique can be accepted and, if so, how it will be made a part of the verification mechanism of the TTBT and PNET.

<sup>1</sup>Text from Weekly Compilation of Presidential Documents of Nov. 16, 1987. ■

## U.S. Arms Control Initiatives: Status Report

*In conjunction with the ongoing nuclear and space talks in Geneva between the United States and the Soviet Union, the Department of State released on November 19, 1987, the following summary of U.S. initiatives on various arms control issues and a methodology of U.S.-Soviet arms control negotiations and expert-level meetings (6-87).*

Arms reduction negotiations are a key element in the Administration's strategy to build a safer peace and ensure the security of the United States and its allies. Through arms reductions, we seek to enhance strategic stability at lower levels of military forces, thus reducing the risk of conflict. The United States seeks such reductions at the nuclear and space talks (START, INF, and defense and space) in Geneva as well as

at other negotiating forums where the United States has taken the initiative to reduce the risk of war.

### Strategic Offensive Forces

The United States places highest priority on its efforts to reach an equitable and effectively verifiable agreement with the Soviet Union for deep reductions in strategic nuclear arms. As a

concrete step toward this end, the United States presented a draft treaty at the strategic arms reduction talks (START) in Geneva on May 8, 1987. The draft U.S. treaty reflects the basic areas of agreement on strategic arms reductions reached by President Reagan and General Secretary Gorbachev at Reykjavik in October 1986. The U.S. draft provides for 50% reductions in U.S. and Soviet strategic nuclear arms to a maximum for each party of 1,600 deployed ballistic missiles and heavy bombers with no more than 6,000 warheads, with appropriate sublimits, over a period of 7 years after treaty entry into force.

The U.S. draft treaty, in addition to the overall limits, provides for specific restrictions on the most destabilizing and dangerous nuclear systems—fast-flying ballistic missiles, particularly heavy intercontinental ballistic missiles (ICBMs). To this end, we have proposed limits and sublimits on certain types of ballistic missile warheads: 4,800 ballistic missile warheads; 3,300 ICBM warheads; and 1,650 warheads on permitted ICBMs except those on silo-based light and medium ICBMs with six or fewer warheads. In addition, we have proposed a limit on ballistic missile throw-weight. Our proposal also includes detailed rules designed to eliminate any ambiguity as to what is agreed and extensive verification provisions—including onsite inspection—designed to ensure that each side can be confident that the other is complying fully with the agreement.

On July 31, the Soviets presented a draft treaty which is similar in structure to the U.S. draft text and contains some common language. This Soviet draft, however, offered no movement on the major outstanding issues, including sublimits on the most dangerous missile systems. It also continued to hold strategic offensive arms reductions hostage to restrictions on strategic defense beyond the existing limitations of the 1972 Anti-Ballistic Missile (ABM) Treaty; such restrictions are unacceptable to the United States.

During their September meetings in Washington, Secretary Shultz and Foreign Minister Shevardnadze agreed to intensify efforts at the Geneva talks to achieve agreement on 50% reductions in strategic offensive arms. During the ministerial—and since, at the Geneva negotiations—some progress has been made on outstanding issues. For example, the Soviets have proposed a limit of 1,540 warheads on heavy ICBMs, al-

though this approach fails to constrain development of new, more threatening heavy ICBMs.

During their October meetings (October 22-23 in Moscow and October 30 in Washington), Secretary Shultz and Foreign Minister Shevardnadze held intensive discussions on START. The Soviets proposed new sublimits as follows: 3,000-3,300 warheads on intercontinental ballistic missiles; 1,800-2,000 warheads on sea-launched ballistic missiles (SLBMs); and 800-900 warheads on air-launched cruise missiles (ALCMs). This proposal is unacceptable because it does not provide the necessary freedom to mix toward more stabilizing systems and would require the United States to reduce its SLBMs and ALCMs by far more than 50% and build up its ICBMs. If, however, the numbers in the Soviet proposal indicate the structure the Soviets want for their own forces, they should be able to accept the sublimits proposed by the United States.

At the Washington meeting, the two sides agreed that General Secretary Gorbachev would visit the United States in December to sign an INF [intermediate-range nuclear forces] agreement and that President Reagan would go to the Soviet Union in the first half of 1988 with the intention, among other things, of signing a START agreement. The two sides agreed to work intensively to achieve such a treaty. START will figure prominently among the issues to be addressed during General Secretary Gorbachev's visit to the United States in December.

Nevertheless, fundamental differences remain, including sublimits on certain types of ballistic missile warheads, a codified throw-weight limit, and a ban on mobile ICBMs. Also at issue is the continuing Soviet insistence that START reductions be linked to further limits on ballistic missile defenses. In this regard, the United States will not accept any measures which would cripple or kill the U.S. Strategic Defense Initiative (SDI). Due to the prospect it holds for a safer means of deterring aggression through defenses which threaten no one, SDI is vital to the future security of the United States and its allies.

The United States believes that its draft START treaty provides a solid basis for the creation of a fair and durable agreement to bring about—for the first time in history—deep reductions

in the strategic nuclear arsenals of United States and the U.S.S.R. The United States believes that a STA treaty could be completed in short order, if the Soviets are now willing to apply themselves with equal seriousness.

### Intermediate-Range Nuclear Forces

During the October 30 meeting in Washington, the United States and Soviet Union agreed that General Secretary Gorbachev would visit Washington beginning December 7, 1987, sign a treaty which will eliminate the entire class of U.S. and Soviet INF missiles (with a range of 500-5,500 kilometers).

The success of these negotiations has been made possible by Western termination to adhere to NATO's 1987 "dual track" decision in response to Soviet deployment of SS-20s. This decision called for NATO to redress the INF imbalance through deployment of U.S. longer range INF missiles, while seeking to negotiate with the Soviet Union to reach an INF balance at the lowest possible level. NATO's resolve is not paying off.

The prospective INF agreement is consistent with the longheld U.S. position in key areas of the negotiation. This success is a direct consequence of the President's steadfast commitment to real arms reductions and allied solidarity in support of these objectives.

**Longer range INF missiles (LRINF).** Since the formal talks with the Soviet Union began in November 1981, the United States has sought to eliminate all U.S. and Soviet LRINF missile systems. This was the President's original "zero option" proposal first made in 1981. In July 1987, the Soviets finally agreed to eliminate these systems.

**Shorter range INF missiles (SRINF).** Since the negotiations began, the United States has insisted that any INF agreement must constrain shorter range INF missiles to prevent circumvention of an accord on LRINF missiles by a Soviet buildup of the shorter range systems. The agreement to eliminate all U.S. and Soviet SRINF missiles as an integral part of an INF accord satisfies this U.S. requirement.

## Chronology: January 1, 1986-November 19, 1987

### U.S.-SOVIET ARMS CONTROL NEGOTIATIONS

#### Nuclear and Space Talks

Round IV: January 16-March 4, 1986  
 Round V: May 8-June 26, 1986  
 Round VI: September 18-November 13, 1986  
 Round VII: January 15-March 6, 1987 (INF continued to March 26)  
 Round VIII: Began on April 23 (INF) and May 5, 1987 (START and defense and space talks)

#### Conference on Confidence- and Security-Building Measures and Disarmament in Europe (Multilateral)

Round IX: January 28-March 15, 1986  
 Round X: April 15-May 23, 1986  
 Round XI: June 10-July 18, 1986  
 Round XII: August 19-September 19, 1986—agreement concluded

#### Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe

First Round of Followup Conference: November 4-December 20, 1986  
 Second Round of Followup Conference: January 27-April 11, 1987  
 Third Round of Followup Conference: May 4-July 31, 1987  
 Fourth Round of Followup Conference: September 22-November 21, 1987 (proposed ending date)

#### Conference on Disarmament (Multilateral)

Chemical Weapons Committee Rump Session: January 13-31, 1986  
 Working Session: February 4-April 25, 1986  
 Summer Session: June 10-August 29, 1986  
 Chemical Weapons Committee Chairman's Consultations: November 24-December 17, 1986  
 Chemical Weapons Committee Rump Session: January 6-30, 1987  
 Working Session: February 2-April 30, 1987

Summer Session: June 8-August 26, 1987

#### Mutual and Balanced Force Reductions (Multilateral)

Round 38: January 30-March 20, 1986  
 Round 39: May 15-July 3, 1986  
 Round 40: September 25-December 4, 1986  
 Round 41: January 29-March 19, 1987  
 Round 42: May 14-July 2, 1987  
 Round 43: September 24-December 3, 1987 (proposed ending date)

#### Nuclear Risk Reduction Centers

Round I: January 13, 1987  
 Round II: May 3-4, 1987—agreement concluded, *ad referendum*; agreement signed in Washington on September 15, 1987

#### Nuclear Testing

Round I: November 9-20, 1987 (proposed ending date)

### U.S.-SOVIET ARMS CONTROL EXPERT-LEVEL MEETINGS

#### Nuclear and Space Talks

August 11-12, 1986, in Moscow  
 September 5-6, 1986, in Washington  
 December 2-5, 1986, in Geneva at the negotiator level

#### Mutual and Balanced Force Reductions Talks

August 6-7, 1986, in Moscow  
 September 10-11, 1986, in Washington

#### Conference on Confidence- and Security-Building Measures and Disarmament in Europe

August 14-15, 1986, in Stockholm

#### Chemical Weapons Treaty Talks

January 28-February 3, 1986, in Geneva  
 April 15-25, 1986, in Geneva  
 July 1-18, 1986, in Geneva

October 28-November 18, 1986, in New York City  
 February 16-March 5, 1987, in Geneva  
 July 20-August 7, 1987, in Geneva

#### Biological and Toxic Weapons Convention

Experts Meeting: March 31-April 15, 1987, in Geneva

#### Chemical Weapons Nonproliferation Discussions

March 5-6, 1986, in Bern  
 September 4-5, 1986, in Bern  
 October 7-8, 1987, in Bern

#### Nuclear Testing

First Session: July 25-August 1, 1986, in Geneva  
 Second Session: September 4-18, 1986, in Geneva  
 Third Session: November 13-25, 1986, in Geneva  
 Fourth Session: January 22, 1987, recessed on February 9, resumed on March 16, concluded on March 20 in Geneva  
 Fifth Session: May 18-29, 1987, in Geneva  
 Sixth Session: July 13-20, 1987, in Geneva

#### Nuclear Risk Reduction Centers

May 5-6, 1986, in Geneva  
 August 25, 1986, in Geneva

#### Nuclear Nonproliferation Talks

December 15-18, 1986, in Washington  
 July 28-30, 1987, in Moscow ■

**Reductions on a global basis.** The United States has long insisted that any limitations on INF missiles must be global to prevent the transfer of the threat from one region to another. The Soviets have accepted this in the context of global elimination of both categories of U.S. and Soviet INF missiles, known as "global double zero."

In reaching these and other agreements in principle with the Soviets, the United States made clear that bilateral agreements between the United States and the U.S.S.R. cannot constrain third-country forces or affect existing programs of cooperation with our allies.

Although the United States and the Soviet Union have agreed to conclude an INF agreement, some important issues remain to be resolved—above all, some important details of verification procedures. Effective verification is essential to ensure that an INF agreement makes a lasting contribution to peace and stability. Accordingly, we have proposed the most stringent verification regime of any arms control agreement in history. We will not settle for anything less. The Geneva delegations of both sides are working hard to resolve remaining issues.

### Defense and Space Issues

During their September and October 1987 meetings in Washington and Moscow, Secretary Shultz and Soviet Foreign Minister Shevardnadze elaborated their respective positions on defense and space issues. There was no narrowing of differences. There was a change in the tone of the discussions, with the Soviets beginning to address the issue in terms of the impact of defenses on "strategic stability." The United States has long sought a discussion of the offense-defense relationship with the Soviets, who have an extensive strategic defense program of their own. If this is an indication of Soviet willingness to engage in a serious discussion of this offense-defense relationship, we welcome it.

While the Soviets have presented what they call "new proposals," they have slowed the pace of the Geneva talks and refuse to clarify their views or give details on these so-called new proposals. Past Soviet efforts have been aimed at crippling the SDI program; it is clear that this remains their principal objective.

During Secretary Shultz's April 1987 meetings in Moscow and subsequently at the nuclear and space talks in Geneva, the United States made a new proposal on defense and space issues. This new proposal incorporates the following elements.

- The United States and Soviet Union would make a mutual commitment, through 1994, not to withdraw from the Anti-Ballistic Missile Treaty for the purpose of deploying strategic defenses.

- During this period, the United States and U.S.S.R. would observe strictly all ABM Treaty provisions while continuing research, development, and testing, which are permitted by the ABM Treaty.

- This commitment would be contingent on implementation of 50% reductions to equal levels in strategic offensive arms over 7 years from entry into force of a START agreement.

- The right is reserved to withdraw from the proposed treaty for reasons of supreme interests or material breach of this treaty, START, or the ABM Treaty.

- Either side would have the right to deploy advanced strategic defenses after 1994, if it so chose, unless the parties agreed otherwise.

In response to expressed Soviet concerns, the United States has also offered proposals to enhance confidence and predictability regarding each side's exploration of advanced strategic defense technologies. The United States has proposed that the United States and the Soviet Union annually exchange data on their planned strategic defense activities. In addition, we seek to have the United States and the U.S.S.R. carry out reciprocal briefings on their respective strategic defense efforts and visits to associated research facilities, as we have proposed in our open laboratories initiative. Finally, we have proposed establishing mutually agreed procedures for reciprocal observation of strategic defense testing.

### Nuclear Testing

During the Washington ministerial in September 1987, the United States and the Soviet Union agreed to begin full-scale, stage-by-stage negotiations on nuclear testing. These negotiations began November 9, 1987, in Geneva. As the first step in these talks, the sides seek agreement on effective verification

measures which would make it possible to ratify the Threshold Test Ban Treaty and the Peaceful Nuclear Explosions Treaty. Once these verification concerns have been satisfied and the treaties ratified, the United States would immediately propose negotiations on ways to implement a step-by-step parallel program—in association with a program to reduce and ultimately eliminate all nuclear weapons—of limiting and ultimately ending nuclear testing.

### Nuclear Risk Reduction Centers

On September 15, 1987, Secretary Shultz and Soviet Foreign Minister Shevardnadze signed an agreement to establish Nuclear Risk Reduction Centers in their respective capitals. This agreement, which is the direct result of a U.S. initiative, is a practical measure that will strengthen international security by reducing the risk of conflict between the United States and the Soviet Union that might result from accident, misinterpretation, or miscalculation. The centers will play a role in exchanging information and notifications required under existing and possible future arms control and confidence-building measures agreements.

### Nuclear Nonproliferation

On July 28–30, 1987, the United States and the Soviet Union held the ninth round in an ongoing series of consultations, which began in December 1982, on nuclear nonproliferation. These consultations have covered a wide range of issues, including prospects for strengthening the international nonproliferation regime, support for the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty, and the mutual desire of the United States and the U.S.S.R. to strengthen the International Atomic Energy Agency. These consultations are not negotiations but, rather, discussions to review various issues of common concern. The United States and the Soviet Union share a strong interest in preventing the dangerous spread of nuclear weapons and have agreed to use these consultations as a forum for discussion and exchange of views. The next round of discussions is tentatively scheduled for January 1988 in Washington.



**Chemical Weapons (CW)**

April 1984, the United States presided at the 40-nation Conference on Disarmament (CD) in Geneva a comprehensive draft treaty banning development, production, use, transfer, and stockpiling of chemical weapons, to be achieved by various means, including advance notice, mandatory onsite challenge inspection. At the November 1985 Geneva summit, President Reagan and General Secretary Gorbachev agreed to intensify bilateral discussions on all aspects of a comprehensive, global chemical weapons ban, including verification. Then, we have held six rounds of bilateral talks on a chemical weapons treaty. A seventh round is scheduled for December 1987.

Bilateral treaty discussions have allowed differences in a number of areas, including early data exchange and challenge inspection. Until March 1987, the Soviets, who possess by far the world's largest CW stockpile, had admitted that they even possess chemical weapons. In April, they announced that they had stopped producing them, had no chemical weapons stockpiled outside their borders, and were building a facility to destroy existing stocks. They also hosted a visit by the Conference on Disarmament representatives to the Soviet CW facility at Chirchik in October and have accepted the longstanding U.S. invitation to observe the U.S. CW destruction facility in Dugway, Utah. We see these moves as successful steps toward building confidence which will facilitate negotiation of an effectively verifiable ban on chemical weapons.

Nonetheless, differences remain on a number of important issues, including increasing participation of all states which could pose a chemical weapons threat; strengthening verification in light of new technologies; the continuing proliferation of CW, and the expansion of chemical industries capable of both military and civilian production; maintaining security during the CW destruction phase under a convention; and defining how to protect sensitive non-chemical weapons-related information during inspections. During the October ministerial in Moscow, the two countries held substantive discussion on the full range of CW issues. They agreed on the need to place special focus on these issues as priority agenda items for bilateral talks.

In addition to treaty discussions, we are working with allies and other friendly countries as well as with the

Soviets on preventing the proliferation of chemical weapons. Primarily in response to the continuing use of chemical weapons in the Iran-Iraq war, the United States and 18 other Western industrialized countries have been consulting since 1985 to harmonize export controls on CW-related commodities and to develop other mechanisms to curb the illegal use of chemical weapons and their dangerous spread to other countries. Also, in bilateral discussions with the Soviets on CW nonproliferation, we have reviewed export controls and political steps to limit the spread and use of chemical weapons.

**Conference on Confidence- and Security-Building Measures and Disarmament in Europe (CDE)**

Last September, after almost 3 years of negotiations, the 35-nation Stockholm Conference on Disarmament in Europe adopted a set of concrete measures designed to increase openness and predictability of military activities in Europe. These measures, which are built around NATO proposals, provide for prior notification of certain military activities above a threshold of 13,000 troops or 300 tanks, observation of certain military activities above a threshold of 17,000 troops, and annual forecasts of upcoming notifiable military activities. The accord also contains provisions for onsite air and ground inspections for verification. Although modest in scope, these provisions are the first time the Soviet Union has agreed to inspection on its own territory for verification of an international security accord. The United States is encouraged by the record of implementation to date, which generally reflects both the letter and the spirit of the Stockholm document.

On August 30, 1987, the United States—under the terms of the Stockholm document—successfully completed the first-ever onsite inspection of a Soviet military exercise. The United States considers the successful conclusion of this inspection a step in the process of improving openness and building confidence and security in Europe. In September, the United Kingdom inspected an exercise involving Soviet and East German forces in the German Democratic Republic; in October, the Soviets conducted similar inspections of NATO exercises in Turkey and the Federal Republic of Germany (F.R.G.) involving U.S. forces; and in November, the German Democratic Republic inspected an F.R.G. military activity.

**Mutual and Balanced Force Reductions (MBFR)**

On December 5, 1985, NATO presented at the MBFR negotiations a major initiative designed to meet Eastern concerns. The proposal deferred the Western demand for data agreement on current forces prior to treaty signature. The Soviets had claimed that this Western demand was the primary roadblock to agreement. The proposal also called for a time-limited, first-phase withdrawal from Central Europe of 5,000 U.S. and 11,500 Soviet troops, followed by a 3-year, no-increase commitment by all parties with forces in this zone. During this time, residual force levels would be verified through national technical means, agreed entry/exit points, data exchange, and 30 annual onsite inspections. Thus far, the Soviets have not responded constructively to the Western initiative.

**NATO High-Level Task Force on Conventional Arms Control**

This task force presented its report on the direction of NATO's conventional arms control policy to the North Atlantic Council on December 11, 1986. At that meeting, NATO ministers issued the "Brussels declaration," which states NATO's readiness to enter into new negotiations with the Warsaw Pact aimed at establishing a "verifiable, comprehensive and stable balance of conventional forces at lower levels" in the whole of Europe from the Atlantic to the Urals. NATO began discussions with the Warsaw Pact in February 1987 to develop a mandate for new negotiations. In July, representatives of NATO presented a draft mandate for negotiations that would directly involve the 23 nations of NATO and the Warsaw Pact and would cover their conventional forces on land from the Atlantic to the Urals. These negotiations would take place within the framework of the CSCE [Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe] process but would be autonomous regarding subject matter, participation, and procedures. ■

## U.S.-Lao POW/MIA Technical Meeting Concludes

JOINT STATEMENT,  
NOV. 20, 1987

In following up the joint press release of August 12, 1987, adopted on the occasion of the visit to Vientiane by a U.S. delegation headed by Richard Childress, Director of Asian Affairs, National Security Council, and following the visit to Washington by His Excellency Mr. Soubanh Srithirath, Vice Minister of Foreign Affairs of the Lao People's Democratic Republic (LPDR) in October 1987, the first Lao-U.S. technical meeting was held in Vientiane on November 11-13, 1987.

The Lao delegation was headed by Mr. Sombat Choulamany, Director of Department Two of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Lao People's Democratic Republic, and included representatives of the Ministries of Defense and Health. The U.S. delegation was headed by Charge d'Affaires Harriet W. Isom of the American Embassy in Vientiane and included representatives of the Joint Casualty Resolution Center and the Central Identification Laboratory in Hawaii.

Both sides reaffirmed their respect for the principles of independence, sov-

ereignty, territorial integrity, and non-interference in each other's internal affairs. The U.S. side underlined its opposition to private, irresponsible efforts that interfere with government-to-government cooperation.

The Lao side is considering a unilateral excavation of a crash site of an American airplane in Savannakhet Province, is continuing its researches into three particular discrepancy cases, and confirmed its intention to provide the results as soon as possible.

The U.S. side acknowledged the legitimate humanitarian problems of Laos, as expressed in the August meeting and in this technical meeting. It confirmed its intention to respond to them within the limits of its capabilities. In this regard, an American nongovernmental organization is considering plans to erect a prefabricated clinic in the vicinity of the Lao Government's next excavation and to stock it with appropriate medicines.

The talks have proceeded in a cordial and frank atmosphere. The Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Lao People's Democratic Republic and the Embassy of the United States of America will continue their discussion of these important issues. ■

force. They are being processed by the Department of Energy in accordance with the applicable provisions of the Atomic Energy Act of 1954, as amended.

The proposed agreement with Japan, including the implementing agreement, has been negotiated in accordance with the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Act of 1978 (NNPA). In my judgment it meets all statutory requirements. It will supersede our 1968 agreement with Japan and, given the magnitude of our long-standing cooperation with Japan in the peaceful uses of nuclear energy, will represent the most significant achievement to date in our program initiated pursuant to section 401(a) of the NNPA to update all existing agreements for peaceful nuclear cooperation to include the more stringent standards established by that Act.

I believe that the new agreement will strengthen the basis for continued close cooperation between the United States and Japan in the peaceful nuclear area and that it will further the non-proliferation and other foreign policy interests of the United States. The implementing agreement provides Japan advance, long-term consent for reprocessing, transfers, alteration and storage of nuclear material subject to the agreement, provided that the reprocessing and subsequent use of the recovered plutonium meet and continue to meet the criteria set out in U.S. law, including criteria relating to safeguards and physical protection. These arrangements should enable Japan to plan for its long-term energy needs on a more assured, predictable basis, while at the same time embodying the most advanced concepts of physical security and safeguards of any agreement. This step forward in our cooperative relations with Japan will be consistent with the NNPA's injunction to take such actions as are required to confirm the reliability of the United States as a nuclear supplier consistent with non-proliferation goals.

Japan is not only a close ally of the United States but is also a party to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons and has long been one of the strongest supporters of the international non-proliferation regime. Moreover, the United States and Japan have a substantive identity of views and intentions with regard to preventing nuclear proliferation and are prepared to work together on measures that will contribute to the prevention of proliferation consistent with the peaceful uses of nuclear energy. An exchange of letters between the United States and Japan, the text of which is included in the agreement package, sets forth in detail our shared views on non-proliferation.

I have considered the views and recommendations of the interested agencies in reviewing the proposed agreement and have determined that its performance will promote, and will not constitute an unreasonable risk to, the common defense and security. Accordingly, I have approved the

## U.S.-Japan Nuclear Cooperation Agreement

MESSAGE TO THE CONGRESS,  
NOV. 9, 1987

I am pleased to transmit to the Congress, pursuant to sections 123 b, and 123 d, of the Atomic Energy Act of 1954, as amended (42 U.S.C. 2153 (b), (d)), the text of a proposed Agreement for Cooperation Between the Government of the United States of America and the Government of Japan Concerning Peaceful Uses of Nuclear Energy, including an implementing agreement pursuant to Article II of the proposed agreement. I am also pleased to transmit my written approval, authorization and determination concerning the agreement, and the Nuclear Proliferation Assessment Statement by the Director of the United States Arms Control and Disarmament Agency concerning the agreement. The joint memorandum submitted to me by the Departments of State and Energy,

which includes a summary of the provisions of the agreement, the views of the Director of the United States Arms Control and Disarmament Agency and an analysis of the approvals and consents contained in the agreement, including the implementing agreement, and associated subsequent arrangements are also enclosed.

I also enclose for your information the texts of a proposed subsequent arrangement under the United States-Norway Revised Agreement for Cooperation Concerning Peaceful Uses of Nuclear Energy and a proposed subsequent arrangement under the United States-EURATOM [European Atomic Energy Community] Additional Agreement for Cooperation Concerning Peaceful Uses of Atomic Energy. These subsequent arrangements are designed to give effect to certain provisions of the United States-Japan implementing agreement and will enter into force only after the agreement enters into

agreement and authorized its execution. I urge that the Congress give it favorable consideration.

I have also found that this agreement meets all applicable requirements of the Atomic Energy Act, as amended, for agreements for peaceful nuclear cooperation and, therefore, I am transmitting it to the Congress without exempting it from the requirement contained in section 123 a. of that Act. This transmission shall constitute a submittal for purposes of both sections 123 b. and 123 d. of the Atomic Energy Act. The Administration is prepared to begin immediately the consultation with the Senate Foreign Relations and House Foreign Affairs Committees as provided in section 123 b. Upon completion of the 30-day continuous session period provided in section 123 b., the 60-day continuous session period provided for in section 123 d. shall commence.

RONALD REAGAN

Text From Weekly Compilation of Presidential Documents of Nov. 16, 1987. ■

## Semiconductor Trade With Japan

PRESIDENT'S STATEMENT,  
NOV. 4, 1987<sup>1</sup>

In response to improved Japanese compliance with the 1986 U.S.-Japan semiconductor agreement, I am today announcing my intention to suspend a portion of the sanctions I placed on Japanese products last April when we determined that Japan was not fully implementing the agreement.

I imposed these sanctions to demonstrate that we are serious about fair trade and to make clear that we insist on the full implementation of all our agreements. I also made clear, however, that we would remove the sanctions as soon as we had firm and continuing evidence that the dumping of Japanese semiconductors in third-country markets had stopped and that access to the Japanese market had improved. Japan is an important trading partner and a close ally, and we want to make every effort to resolve our differences as soon as possible.

This case serves as a reminder that judicious and proper use of Section 301 can bring results. Retaliation ought to be used only as a last resort and only when it is likely to lead to a positive result. In this case, we used the threat of retaliation to achieve a sound

agreement on fair trade in semiconductors. When that agreement was not complied with, retaliation was used to bring about compliance. I hope Congress will remember that Section 301 has been used effectively before making any changes in the law that would attempt to force the President to retaliate at times when it would be counterproductive.

Last June, when a review of the data showed that Japanese third-country dumping was declining on one semiconductor product, I ordered a proportional response and lifted sanctions on \$51 million of the full \$300 million in sanctions. Because the most recent review of the data shows that third-country dumping has ceased for both DRAMs and EPROMs—the two semiconductor products covered under this portion of the agreement—I am directing an additional suspension of sanctions amounting to \$84 million. The remaining \$165 million in sanctions will remain in effect because of the lack of sufficient progress to date on access to the Japanese market for foreign-based semiconductor makers.

U.S. semiconductor producers and users were closely consulted during our discussions with the Japanese Government. Based on these discussions, they recommended the action I am taking today.

The Japanese Government has given me assurances that this positive pattern with respect to third-country dumping will continue. If these assurances prove not to be the case, I will not hesitate to reimpose the partial sanctions that have been suspended. I have also been assured by the Government of Japan that no quantitative or other kinds of restrictions exist on the production, supply, or shipment of semiconductors and that it is not engaged in allocation schemes that might disadvantage foreign purchasers of semiconductors from Japanese producers. In addition, the Japanese Government has reaffirmed its commitment to monitor company-by-company costs and export prices for certain semiconductors to prevent dumping.

<sup>1</sup>Text from Weekly Compilation of Presidential Documents of Nov. 9, 1987. ■

## Protectionism and Trade Barriers

by W. Allen Wallis

*Address before the 9th German-American Roundtable on NATO Issues on October 29, 1987. Mr. Wallis is Under Secretary for Economic Affairs and Agriculture.*

I am particularly pleased to be able to talk to you today on "Protectionism and Trade Barriers." Trade issues present a critical challenge to our economic prosperity, to our political cohesion, and, therefore, to the strength of our alliance. After talking briefly about trade issues from a broad perspective, with special attention to the problem of agriculture, I propose to narrow my focus to talk about the way in which economic principles should be applied in our mutual defense.

### Preserving and Strengthening the International Trading System

These days all our attention seems to be on the gyrations of financial markets and the possible implications of these

gyrations for our prosperity. Headlines are focusing on one policy issue—our efforts to make greater progress in reducing the U.S. budget deficit. I do not want to minimize the importance of dealing adequately with that deficit. But we must not lose sight of other policy issues of great importance to our future prosperity. Chief among these, in my opinion, is the necessity to preserve and strengthen the international trading system. Let us not forget the key role that rising trade protectionism—in particular, the infamous Smoot-Hawley tariff in this country—played in dragging the world economy down into the Great Depression of the 1930s.

Here in the United States, we are engaged in a struggle against the forces of protectionism. Protectionist pressures normally arise because adjustment to shifting patterns of international specialization is a painful process, however beneficial to the economic welfare of the society as a whole. Until now we have been able to contain these pressures fairly well. The U.S. market is still remarkably open. Merchandise imports as a percentage of

gross national product (GNP) are running about a quarter larger than a decade ago. Our openness to the exports of the developing world is particularly noteworthy: with less than 40% of industrial country GNP, we account for over 60% of industrial country imports of manufactured goods from the developing countries. (The European Community, by comparison, with about one-third of industrial country GNP, accounts for less than a quarter of these imports.)

But in the United States at present, two additional factors are making protectionist pressures extremely difficult to contain.

First is the persistent large trade deficit.

Second, and even more important, is the widespread perception that this deficit results from unfair practices abroad—markets more closed than our own or unfair aid to foreign exporters.

While informed people in the United States understand that such practices are not a main cause of our trade deficit, the need to fight protectionism means that we must be seen to be making progress toward a fairer, more truly open international trading system. A more liberal trading system is well worth striving for in its own right, but the current threat of protectionist legislation in the U.S. Congress makes our efforts to improve the international trade system even more urgent.

The United States, as I am sure you know, has also been urging its industrial country trading partners to take action to increase their growth—which would assist the process of adjustment in our trade balances. Germany has been a chief target of this effort, both because of its importance as the bellwether of the European economy and also because its recent and prospective growth is particularly disappointing. We are not talking about promoting growth through inflationary policies; stronger growth can and should be sought through sound means. In particular, European nations, as well as Japan and the United States, need to make a break with past policies that have produced rigidities thwarting structural adjustment to changing technologies and trade advantages. Such policies can simultaneously help keep inflation in check and promote stronger investment and economic growth. Rigidities in labor markets have been pointed out (for example, in a recent OECD [Organization for Economic

Cooperation and Development] study) as a particularly important barrier to adjustment and employment growth in Europe.

Let me return to international trade policy. About a year ago, we launched a new round of multilateral trade negotiations—the Uruguay Round. The successful launch of the round reflects the recognition that the economic health of all nations depends on the preservation of an open, liberalized trading system in which trade based on comparative advantage will help us achieve our economic potentials.

These negotiations—which will be far more comprehensive than those of any previous trade round—seek to strengthen the world trading system and adapt it to the realities of the late 20th and early 21st centuries. In these negotiations, we will seek to establish effective trade rules for sectors outside the current reach of international discipline, such as services, intellectual property, investment, and agriculture.

## The Need for Agricultural Trade Policy Reform

Let me focus for a moment on agriculture, because it is here that one can now see the most egregious example of policies that are producing enormous waste. Indeed, the current situation is scandalous. Present agricultural subsidies and import barriers are costing OECD countries over \$150 billion annually. The costs to the vast majority of the people far, far exceed the benefits to farmers and those who provide goods and services to farmers. Not only do such policies waste resources that could be usefully devoted to other needs—including defense; they strain relations between allies. Each side tries to sustain, at the expense of others, policies that are intrinsically unsustainable. We are hurting ourselves, each other, and, in addition, the growth prospects of developing countries.

The United States has proposed to phase out, over 10 years, all agricultural subsidies and import barriers; to reduce protective barriers by harmonizing health and sanitary regulations; to continue bona fide food aid programs; and to provide needy farmers income support rather than subsidize them to produce surplus crops.

The Commission of the European Communities has also put forward a proposal. We welcome the proposal as a means of starting the necessary negotiations. It includes a number of positive elements, including a multilateral

reduction of incentives to production and separation of farm income support from production, but it would not lead to fundamental adjustment and a more efficient use of resources. Essentially, an extension of the Community's high managed agricultural system, it includes maintenance of extensive export subsidies and restrictive trade practices and even appears to increase the role of governments in setting prices, controlling production, and providing export subsidies. We surely can do better than this.

Reducing agricultural capacity will be difficult and painful in some cases. This is precisely why we place such emphasis on internationally coordinated reform to spread the burden of adjustment across all countries which now provide farm support. Such a process of global adjustment in agriculture would result in a situation where patterns of production and trade would be based on efficiency and productivity.

We recognize that it is not likely that most countries will want to abandon farm programs altogether. Many countries wish to keep small farms for various reasons. All that we propose that such programs not lead to wasteful overproduction and do not distort trade at the expense of others. This is an achievable goal, and the time for action is now.

## Innovation and Technology in Defense Industries

In the defense area, just as in agriculture, we need to deal with the conflict between desires to protect domestic industry and the goal of economic efficiency. But in this area our concern is not just with our prosperity but with our very national security.

Before examining the troublesome contradictions, it is worth taking a moment to consider the role of innovation and technology in defense industries.

Innovation based on advancing technology has become the engine of progress in today's world. We have come to depend on technological innovation for the economic strength that is essential to the welfare of the alliance. Without that progress, our societies would stagnate. On both sides of the Atlantic, we must constantly adapt to technological evolution.

The high-technology revolution exemplifies some of the fundamental values of the West. It is the product of centuries of free scientific inquiry and free interchange of scientific ideas across the Atlantic. The basic economic

of life in the high-technology era. High research costs and short productives. In this environment, business is closely linked with open market. An expanding international marketplace is vital to our high-technology industries.

Of course, it is not only our economic and social well-being that has been affected by the high-technology revolution. Technological leaders such as Germany and the United States, and other commercial competitors worldwide, are joined together in a military alliance. This juxtaposition of commercial rivalry and strategic partnership is the basis of many of the specific issues that crop up in our relationship.

For NATO cannot expect the same from the Warsaw Pact to remain only quantitative. Over the last 10 years, NATO's substantial technological edge in such areas as sophisticated and highly maneuverable aircraft, tank armor, submarine design, and electronic countermeasures has eroded. Moreover, the Warsaw Pact has often been swifter in employing new technology in its weapons systems. Too often, NATO's technological edge over the Warsaw Pact has been in the laboratory, not with its troops in the field.

Modern technology is indispensable to the security of the West. Our superior technology endows us with important advantages over our potential adversaries. However, increasingly sophisticated technologies often come with high price tags. Our defense acquisition costs tend to grow, while quantities procured tend to shrink. NATO countries find themselves forced to make do with ever-smaller increments to their forces, even as they enter an era of rapid technological progress. The smaller NATO countries often worry that technological progress may be beyond their means.

Exploitation of emerging technologies has always been central to NATO's approach to maintaining deterrence. We have regarded our technological advantage as an important offset to the quantitative superiority of the Warsaw Pact. NATO nations will continue to push back the boundaries of high technology in the years ahead. However, that is no reason for us to rest easy.

Despite the apparent superiority of Warsaw Pact conventional forces, experience shows that it would be optimistic to assume that NATO countries will make substantial increases soon in the resources they devote to defense. It follows that the alliance must use its cur-

rent resources more efficiently. One traditional obstacle to efficiency has been our mercantilistic approach to procuring arms and other defense-related goods.

### Economic Principles and Defense Policy

The principles of economics apply as much to defense policy as they do to civilian policy. The drive to innovate and the advantages conferred upon the innovator over his rivals can be found equally in defense and in business. Indeed, the fundamental determinants are identical in both cases. However, there is one characteristic of defense economic policy that, fortunately, does not apply in most of the rest of the economy: for defense equipment, governments are the only customers. This obvious difference sometimes blinds us to the fact that the same economic principles operate in both spheres.

Our thinking about transatlantic arms procurement decisions has traditionally been encapsulated in the term "two-way street." Fortunately, that concept of reciprocal arms purchases does not necessarily interfere with efficiency. One dramatic example of this was the recent U.S. decision to purchase from France a \$4.5-billion mobile field communications system (the "RITA" system) because it was the most cost-effective system available. Yet it is unrealistic to expect that the "two-way street" would naturally result in precisely balanced arms trade between the United States and each of the other 15 NATO members. Nor should it, considering that defense is one industry where the United States has made steady and substantial investment and thus continues to enjoy a competitive advantage.

What we should be striving for, instead, is a freer market for defense equipment within the alliance. There are some encouraging trends. The United States has signed memoranda of understanding with several NATO countries, including the Federal Republic of Germany, providing for reciprocal access to national defense markets. These agreements permit foreign firms to compete for U.S. Department of Defense procurement and for contracts often free of "Buy American" restrictions and even tariffs. In this connection, I remind you that the Department of Defense accounts for some 80% of total U.S. Government procurement.

However, we cannot rest on our laurels. In these days of stubbornly high trade deficits, my government has begun to notice that American defense manufacturers are often denied reciprocal access to foreign defense markets. This is a situation that can easily lead to transatlantic disagreements, so it must not be ignored.

### Noneconomic Practices in Arms Procurement Procedures

Potential causes for concern are various noneconomic, or perhaps I should say antieconomic, practices that have crept into our transatlantic arms procurement procedures. In recent years, for example, offset requirements have proliferated in defense procurement. (Offsets include such industrial and commercial compensation practices as coproduction, subcontractor production, licensed production, overseas investment, directed transfer of technology, and countertrade, imposed as conditions for purchase.) Offsets arose in the 1950s in response to the legitimate need to rebuild the industrial base for defense in Western Europe and Japan. At that time, offset agreements may have been justifiable on grounds of reducing the impact of military equipment purchases on the budgets and trade accounts of those countries. Offsets also contributed to standardizing and modernizing the arms of the alliance and to strengthening transatlantic ties in defense.

Times and circumstances have changed. But offsets remain. America's allies have continued to raise their offset requirements, despite dramatic improvements in their economies. Indeed, the variety and magnitude of the offsets demanded has increased significantly in recent years. Between 1980 and 1984, U.S. exports of defense equipment totaled some \$48 billion. Nearly half of that amount involved offset requirements. Moreover, 75% of these offset obligations were to our industrialized allies: Canada, Japan, and our European NATO allies.

This is an area that cries out for reform. The increase in costs caused by such uneconomic practices is obvious to any economically literate person. Such offset requirements undermine our collective security by weakening the competitive position of industries vital to our common defense. I believe the time has come to seek to develop multilateral understandings within the alliance to limit the use of offsets.

The United States has been working to improve transatlantic collaboration in defense procurement and to open American markets more widely to European defense equipment. We detect a movement in Europe itself toward technological cooperation—though sometimes to the exclusion of American firms and technologies. In European terms, this trend might well be perfectly understandable. Europeans consider intra-European cooperation in the defense sphere without the United States to be both natural and necessary. Europeans sometimes contend that cooperation of this nature is not anti-American but, rather, is in the long-term interest of the alliance. Supporters of the European option in the Westland affair explained their position in exactly these terms.

For its part, the United States has long urged that Europeans work together more closely. We have, for example, applauded the more prominent role the Independent European Program Group has begun to play in fostering greater intra-European arms cooperation. We recognize that as such cooperation begins to bear fruit, the United States may find itself outside some important cooperative defense projects. In such cases, however, it should be demonstrable that this result does not reduce the cost-effectiveness of the system which emerges from the project.

European cooperation is moving forward. Perhaps the most visible example is the effort by Britain, Germany, Italy, and Spain to develop a European fighter aircraft. Some commentators predict that the European fighter aircraft will be a bust. If it is successful, however, and there is every reason to believe the participants will do their utmost to make it so, a European fighter replacing the F-16 could provide strong competition for the next-generation U.S. fighter. And the European fighter aircraft is only one of 30 projects being launched or studied by European nations and European companies.

Such efforts are laudable, to the extent that they promote free competition, more open international arms markets, and exploit economies of scale. However, arms cooperation projects marked by a *a priori* inclusion or exclusion of individual companies based on nationality will undercut these potential advantages. And we must bear in mind that such cooperative efforts have their risks—political as well as technological.

Our partners on the other side of the Atlantic must recognize today's political and economic realities in Washington. In an atmosphere soured by persistent trade deficits and by what are perceived to be European protectionist measures in other areas, reactions in some American circles—including some in Congress—to greater, exclusive intra-European armament cooperation may be quite sharp and harmful both to trade and Western security. We will all be the losers if we, the leaders of the alliance, allow matters to deteriorate to that point.

European policymakers seek to achieve such important goals as safeguarding Europe's technological competence, in defense-related technologies and elsewhere, while simultaneously buying effective armaments at the best possible price. Obviously, the first of these goals will sometimes be in conflict with the second. Superficially, advancing European technology may appear to be attainable by sacrificing price considerations. In many cases, however, the reality is that buying military systems off the shelf from the United States is the most cost-effective use of European resources.

European efforts to develop high-technology weapons, even those involving multinational cooperation, are likely to be both more expensive and less effective than they would be if there were some U.S. involvement. When such weapons are undertaken, European policymakers probably will find themselves driven politically to keep impractical projects alive at great cost. They will feel enormous pressure to "protect their national technological base," even though a more effective, low-cost option is available. In such

cases, the defense capabilities of the alliance as a whole are the real loser.

NATO countries too often have squandered their technological lead over the Warsaw Pact by needlessly developing competing weapons systems perform the same mission or by perming wide gaps to develop in the relative technological sophistication of the various national contingents within NATO armed forces. Our preoccupation with high-technology, prestigious weapons has caused too little attention to be paid to less glamorous, low-technology but still vital, military needs such as ammunition stocks and logistics infrastructure. It is the resulting shortages that could well prove to be "war stoppers"—in the worst sense—for NATO.

### Conclusion

I'm sure these arguments are familiar to many of you. Often the compulsion to pursue intra-European arms alternatives is felt most acutely by countries with the largest populations, most sophisticated scientific establishments, and greatest gross national products. Ironically, smaller NATO countries which lack the capability to develop weapons are freer to seek out the best combination of technology and price. The more widespread this sensible practice becomes in NATO, the easier it will be for the United States to keep its defense procurement open for all suppliers.

The challenges posed by technological change will remain high on the alliance agenda for years to come. Like the concept of security itself, the challenge will have political and economic, as well as military, dimensions. We must not take leave of our economic senses when we consider the security of the transatlantic world. Our societies have achieved the affluence they currently enjoy precisely because they have been open to free trade in ideas, products, and technologies. We must never abandon the openness that has traditionally characterized transatlantic exchanges in all of these, for therein lies our true security. ■

## U.S. Trade Policy at the Crossroads

John C. Whitehead

Address before the Conference on International Trade in Wilmington, Delaware, on November 2, 1987. Mr. Whitehead is Deputy Secretary of State.

Following the devastation of the Great Depression and World War II, the United States took the lead in establishing an international economic system based squarely on the principle of freer trade benefits all countries. The system we established has spurred a remarkable period of economic growth and innovation, not just for us but also for other nations prepared to seize the opportunity. Nonetheless, a debate is raging—in the halls of Congress and in the farms and factories of America—as to whether free trade is still a relevant guiding principle in today's world.

Free trade is not a spent force. The national debate over trade, and our economic policy, has intensified over the last 2 weeks in the wake of the turmoil in the stock market.

The stock market developments vividly demonstrated the interdependence of the major industrial economies and the importance of sound and coherent economic policies. In his recent press conference, President Reagan reaffirmed our intention to work closely with our allies to coordinate policies and ensure stable growth. We all recognize our responsibility to follow sound policies that will inspire public confidence.

In particular, it is necessary that we avoid protectionist policies that would damage the prospects for economic growth and global prosperity. The world community and financial markets would see an outburst of protectionism here as a sign that the United States no longer has the will to exercise responsible leadership on international economic issues. But if we keep our markets open and maintain sound economic policies, the underlying strength of our economy will carry us through.

Against this backdrop of the national debate on trade policy and the recent financial market developments, Americans should recall some basic lessons about trade.

### Economic and Political Benefits of Free Trade

Free trade enriches our lives. Through free trade we obtain the widest possible range of goods at the lowest possible prices. Free trade raises the standard of living in all countries. Ultimately, it is the consumer who benefits from free trade—and who pays when countries depart from it.

Free trade promotes economic efficiency. It encourages capital, labor, and other resources in every country to flow to their most productive use.

When markets are allowed to work freely, the principle of comparative advantage assures a global division of labor that maximizes output. Today this division of labor has produced an extraordinarily efficient, globally integrated pattern of production. The United States cannot have a comparative advantage in all products, but through free trade, we can specialize in what we do best and avail ourselves of the best products available anywhere.

By fostering efficient patterns of consumption and production, free trade maximizes income and spurs economic growth. International competition prods producers in every country to innovate. Free trade is the springboard for new products and processes that make our lives healthier, fuller, and more comfortable. For example, the development of fiber optics will dramatically enhance global communications networks. Recent discoveries in superconductors pave the way for new and improved products in such areas as computers, electricity transmission, medical equipment, and fusion reactors.

While the international marketplace is incredibly competitive, free trade is not a contest in which the success of one country is a defeat for others. We share in the prosperity of others, because rising incomes abroad provide enhanced markets for us. Europe and Japan obviously have become tougher economic competitors, but their economic advances also have been indispensable to our own growth.

The benefits of free trade are not just theoretical. The experience of the last 40 years bears out their practical significance. Those countries that have embraced open markets have prospered, while those that have followed inward-looking economic policies have

stagnated. This lesson applies to developed and developing countries alike. For example, due in large part to the market-oriented, outward-looking economic policies, the rate of growth in Asian countries such as Korea and Singapore has far outpaced the economic growth in developing countries with statist policies.

The strong economy we now enjoy would be impossible without free trade. We are in our 59th month of economic growth, making the current recovery the longest peacetime recovery in U.S. history. Since the start of this expansion, roughly 240,000 jobs a month have been created for American workers. A higher percentage of Americans are working now than ever before. Our unemployment rate is 5.8%, the lowest level in 8 years. Inflation last year dipped to the low level of 2%. Economic growth this year has proceeded at a healthy 3.5% rate. It is important to remember that, despite the recent volatility in the stock market, the U.S. economy is fundamentally sound and strong.

Our open market approach is not the only cause of our prosperity. A sound monetary policy, vigilant efforts to restrain growth in government spending, and deregulatory policies to spark competition and innovation also have been essential. But it is equally true that prosperity could not have been achieved in a world saddled with trade restrictions.

Despite this prosperity, concerns often are raised about the competitive position of the U.S. economy and about our persistent deficit with the rest of the world. As recently as 1981, we ran a surplus on our current account, the broadest measure of our overall trade in goods and services. In 1986, our current account deficit reached \$141 billion, and it is likely to reach a similar level this year.

Ironically, perhaps, our external deficit is, in large part, a result of the strength of the U.S. economy relative to the economies of our major partners. Economic growth in Europe, Japan, and many major developing countries has been sluggish during the past 6 years. Our economy has performed much better. As a consequence, investors have sought to put their capital in the United States; at the same time, our growth in demand has provided a ready market for the products of our trading partners. The trade deficit tells us nothing about the overall competitive position of the U.S. economy.

We should clearly understand that our deficit was not caused by unfair trade practices abroad. As objectionable as such practices are, they have not increased so dramatically during the last 6 years that they can explain the shift from a small surplus to a large deficit.

We also need to recognize that the benefits of free trade do not cease when we run a trade deficit. Trade restrictions would deprive us of the benefits of trade but would not reduce the deficit unless they were so draconian as to devastate the economy.

The United States has a choice to make. We can continue to embrace and strengthen the free trade system—a system that produces enormous benefits for our economy. Or we can retreat from the world economy and construct barriers to foreign trade an investment—an isolationist approach that damages both our national and the global prosperity.

These alternatives are posed starkly in two important issues currently before Congress: the free trade agreement with Canada and the omnibus trade bill.

## U.S.-Canada Free Trade Agreement

The United States and Canada recently concluded an agreement establishing a bilateral free trade area. This historic agreement creates the world's largest free trade area. It will strengthen the economies of both Canada and the United States and, over time, create thousands of jobs in both countries. Some economists estimate that the agreement eventually will raise the level of economic well-being by as much as 5% in Canada and by a smaller, but still very significant, percentage in the United States.

The centerpiece achievement of the free trade area is the total elimination within 10 years of all tariffs on bilateral trade between the United States and Canada, currently in excess of \$120 billion. Since Canadian tariffs currently average 10% (as opposed to 4% in the United States) and sales to Canada account for one-fourth of our total exports, the elimination of tariffs will create significant new opportunities for U.S. businesses. Canada, for its part, gains duty-free access to the largest national economy in the world.

Another landmark achievement is in the services area. The free trade agreement between Canada and the United States is the first international

understanding to establish binding rules for all new measures affecting a comprehensive set of service sectors. Henceforth, neither country will discriminate against service providers from the other in some 150 service sectors. This element of the agreement, covering a large portion of our \$11-billion bilateral trade in services, will provide secure market access in important service sectors, such as the rapidly growing area of enhanced telecommunications and computer services.

In another important economic area, investment, Canada has agreed to limit its practice of screening, and possible blocking, new U.S. investments in Canada. Under the agreement, Canada will make permanent its recent policy of not screening most new investments and will reduce significantly the screening of direct acquisitions.

The free trade agreement liberalizes rules in many other areas, including agriculture, automotive trade, energy, government procurement, standards, and trade law remedies.

The free trade agreement between Canada and the United States is innovative, far-reaching, and courageous. It is based squarely on the precepts of free trade. As it tears down barriers to trade, investment, and other economic activity, the agreement will raise the standard of living and promote growth in both countries. The agreement will make both the United States and Canada more prosperous.

Furthermore, the success of this bilateral market-opening initiative will lend momentum to multilateral market-opening negotiations. We believe that in many areas the free trade agreement between Canada and the United States can serve as a model for the multilateral Uruguay Trade Round.

## The Trade Bill

In contrast to the Canada free trade agreement, the omnibus trade bills pending before Congress would, if enacted, severely damage the U.S. and global economies. The bills represent a retreat from the postwar free trade system that we built and under which we have prospered. Perhaps more important, they represent a retreat from U.S. leadership.

Both the House and Senate trade bills are comprehensive, all-encompassing measures that affect trade, investment, finance, and foreign policy. While the provisions are detailed and complex, there is a common—and very dis-

turbing—thread throughout each bill. Directly or indirectly, these bills seek to replace consideration of the nation interest with the dictates of special interests.

In the trade area, the bills contain a myriad of "technical" changes in our trade law. All of the changes head in one direction: toward increased barriers to trade and greater limitations on the President's trade policy authority.

The cumulative effect of the proposed changes is "procedural protectionism." The provisions take our current trade statutes and twist them in a way which would make import restrictions a surer bet for industries seeking protection. In many cases, the proposed provisions explicitly prohibit the President or the Cabinet from considering the national interest when deliberating whether to take a trade action to aid a specific industry. The cost to consumers, job losses to other U.S. industries, the risk of retaliatory foreign policy considerations—none of these factors would be given full weight in the trade policy decisionmaking process.

"Quick trigger" protectionist measures would inflict economic damage both directly and indirectly. In and of themselves, trade restrictions hurt unprotected sectors of our economy. Restrictions would divert resources to protected sectors of the economy away from dynamic sectors left unprotected. As a result, the standard living for the country as a whole would drop.

Furthermore, new import restrictions here would incite a dangerous, escalating spiral of retaliation that easily could lead to a trade war. U.S. exporters would lose overseas markets as our trading partners erect their own barriers.

The House and Senate omnibus trade bills represent an effort to subvert international trade rules and replace them with our own. If others followed such an approach, we would be the first to protest.

## Outcome Being Watched Closely

The debate over the course of U.S. trade policy is being watched closely financial markets and in foreign capitals. Our decisions will have serious consequences—ones that may be felt more quickly than many realize and in realms beyond the economic. The recent events in the stock market have demonstrated vividly the interdepen-



level of the major industrial economies and how closely economic developments in the country are watched by other countries.

Foreign investment flows have been attracted to the United States by the prosperity of our economy, and they have contributed significantly to that prosperity. Foreign investors, however, are not interested in keeping their money in a country about to enmesh itself in protectionist trade restrictions. Furthermore, they fear, with good reason, that controls on capital movement would soon follow imposition of major restrictions on trade. Indeed, the pending omnibus trade bills already contain provisions—in the form of screening and registration requirements—for concerning capital inflows. If investors were to lose confidence in U.S. economic policy, there could be a rapid flight of capital, leading, in turn, to turmoil in foreign exchange markets. This would rekindle inflationary pressures in the U.S. economy, drive up interest rates, and put the economy in a slump.

Foreign governments look to the United States for economic, political, and strategic leadership. If Congress passes legislation to implement the free trade legislation, the world community will perceive that the United States continues to have the commitment and courage to uphold our international responsibilities.

On the other hand, if we enact an omnibus trade bill in its current form, foreign governments will conclude that we have surrendered international economic leadership. They will assume that we no longer have the will to compete or lead in the search for responsible solutions to global economic problems. Given the recent turmoil in the financial markets, it is particularly dangerous, at this point in time, for the United States to even consider adopting irresponsible, protectionist economic policies.

## Conclusion

In conclusion, the United States is at a crossroads. Before us are two paths for conducting trade relations. The first path is based on recognition of the benefits of global competition and a willingness to confront its challenges. If we continue along this path, we uphold and strengthen the postwar free trade system that has already produced two generations of unprecedented prosperity for us and others. We also remain true

to a free trade tradition supported by every American President since Franklin Roosevelt. A premier example of this strong, forward-looking policy is the agreement establishing a free trade area with Canada.

The second path entails a withdrawal from global competition and a retreat from global responsibilities. Barriers to trade and other economic interactions are constructed. This path leads to economic stagnation here and abroad and more fractious political rela-

tions. A prime example of this weak, defensive approach is the omnibus trade bills before Congress.

The rest of the world is watching our deliberations in these two areas. The stakes are high. I am confident that once the American people understand clearly the nature of the choices before them, they and their elected representatives will choose the path that will foster U.S. international leadership and global prosperity. ■

## U.S.-Japan Energy Cooperation

by W. Allen Wallis

*Address before the U.S.-Japan Energy Policy Conference sponsored by the Atlantic Council on November 12, 1987. Mr. Wallis is Under Secretary for Economic Affairs and Agriculture.*

It is a special pleasure for me to be here tonight for two reasons.

First, I am pleased that the Atlantic Council recognizes that Japan is an "Atlantic" country. Japan is not literally on the Atlantic, but then, neither is Italy. As Prime Minister Nakasone made clear with eloquent simplicity at each of the five economic summits that he attended, Japan is part of the West, which often is called the "Atlantic community"; its security is of a piece with that of the West, its political system is Western, and its respect for freedom and individual rights is like that of the West. So it is appropriate that the Atlantic Council embrace Japan within its field of interest.

Second, I am pleased to be here tonight because of my long association with energy issues and with Japan. I serve, for example, as chairman of the U.S. delegation for semiannual sub-cabinet economic consultations with Japan. In conjunction with those meetings, I serve also as the U.S. Chairman of the U.S.-Japan Energy Working Group. This gives me an opportunity to meet twice a year with my colleagues in the Japanese Government to discuss the important topic of our bilateral energy relationship.

This is a time of transition in the Japanese Administration. Prime Minister Takeshita took office last week, and we look forward to working with the new Japanese Administration in the

same warm and cooperative fashion that we have enjoyed in the past. Here in the United States, our own presidential election campaign is already underway.

The transition of administrations is a time when we take note of the key issues in the U.S.-Japan economic relationship; issues which transcend administrations or political parties. I will take a moment, therefore, to highlight key facets of those relations between Japan and the United States as a backdrop to our discussions of energy issues.

### U.S.-Japan Economic Relationship

The Reagan Administration devotes more attention to its economic relations with Japan, particularly trade, than to its economic relations with any other country. Japan's high propensity to export can be traced to domestic economic factors which have discouraged domestic investment and consumption in recent years and also to its need to export enough to pay for imports of energy and raw materials. Because of widespread inefficiencies in its domestic economy which discourage investment at home, Japan has proven much better at exporting than at importing. There are many official impediments to imports—for example, quotas on rice, beef, citrus, and other agricultural products. There also are many important unofficial barriers. Among the unofficial barriers are cultural preferences for dealing with other Japanese firms; a certain prejudice against imports; concentration of industry; a layered distribution system; extensive and complicated government regulations

administered by a bureaucracy that is powerful and competent but xenophobic; and a political system in which special interests too often override the national interest.

As part of our overall strategy for reducing trade imbalances and for promoting growth in Japan, the United States, and the rest of the world, we are persistently, consistently, and insistently encouraging Japan to open its markets. There are six main elements of our policy.

**First**, addressing the fundamental issues behind our trade imbalance by encouraging restructuring of the Japanese economy in ways that will make it more efficient and thus more attractive to investors, both foreign and domestic;

**Second**, encouraging further liberalization of Japan's financial and capital markets;

**Third**, requesting the removal of trade barriers to permit trade to be based on comparative advantage;

**Fourth**, seeking liberalization of entire industrial sectors through the so-called MOSS process (MOSS means market-oriented, sector-selective);

**Fifth**, taking action under our trade laws, when necessary, against unfair trade practices; and

**Sixth**, working to strengthen the world trading and monetary systems—in particular, to promote the success of the Uruguay trade round.

I want to take this opportunity to recognize explicitly that in all six of these efforts, we receive strong support from within Japan. In the MOSS negotiations, for example, various groups in Japan are every bit as eager as we are to see markets opened—indeed, the substantial results that have been achieved in the MOSS negotiations bring even greater benefits to Japan than to the United States.

Similarly, in strengthening the world trading system, Japan, in cooperation with us, has been a prime mover in launching the Uruguay Round of trade negotiations, and it has been willing to put all subjects on the negotiating table, even those on which it is extremely sensitive and with which it will have great political problems.

## Energy Security and the Persian Gulf

In energy, relations between Japan and the United States are generally harmonious, since we share global economic interests and have similar needs for importing energy.

In the 1970s, we experienced great economic upheavals caused by the disruption of a portion of the world's oil supplies. We have seen that the economic consequences of disruptions in oil supplies can be devastating for economic growth, employment, world trade, and Third World debt service. As the two largest consumers of energy in the free world, the United States and Japan have a common stake in secure, stable supplies of energy.

Although in recent years we have been spared severe disruptions of oil supply, the present situation in the Persian Gulf is precarious. Japan gets over half of its oil through the Strait of Hormuz, so obviously, it would be seriously affected by an interruption of the flow of oil from the gulf. It is less obvious, but nevertheless true, that the United States, which gets only 5% of its oil through the strait, also would be seriously affected by an interruption: some of the oil we now import from elsewhere would be diverted to replace oil from the gulf, and we would be affected by the resulting price increases just as much as any other country.

The United States is pursuing a two-pronged approach to the danger in the Persian Gulf. To counter the immediate threat to freedom of navigation and the free flow of oil, we have increased significantly our naval presence in the gulf. But the long-term solution is to end hostilities between Iran and Iraq. Toward that goal, the United States, together with other members of the Security Council, including Japan, is making vigorous diplomatic efforts in the United Nations to obtain a ceasefire and to bring Iran and Iraq to the negotiating table.

Japan recently announced that it will make substantial contributions toward peace and stability in the Persian Gulf by helping to install improved navigational aids. Saying that economic development is indispensable for peace in the region, Japan promised to expand its economic and technical cooperation with gulf states. Japan also will contribute financially to the UN Secretary General's mediation efforts as well as continue to play an important role on

the diplomatic front with both Iran and Iraq in support of the Security Council's Resolution 598. We welcome the significant contributions by Japan.

Last month the United States announced an embargo on imports of Iranian goods and new controls on exports which expand the categories of militarily useful items that may not be sold to Iran. Our reasons for embargoing Iranian goods are clear: Iran acts and repeatedly supports terrorism, it has unlawfully attacked ships of non-belligerent nations engaged in peace commerce in international waters. If American people are no longer willing to be a source of revenue for Iran's acts of aggression and terrorism. These trade actions, however, in no way reduce our emphasis on the two-prong approach of ensuring freedom of navigation and furthering the United Nations peace efforts.

We hope that our friends and allies will cooperate with our sanctions. A Secretary Shultz has said, we hope "it will be catching—maybe other countries will decide they don't want to Iranian oil." In any event, we are confident that, at a minimum, Japan and other friends will not countenance an increase in their imports of oil from Iran, since that would undercut our action.

## Long-Term Strategy for Global Energy Security

So far, I have discussed the immediate political situation and its implications for our energy security. But the United States and Japan also cooperate closely on a longer term strategy for global energy security.

The first aspect of this longer-term strategy is emergency preparedness. For both the United States and Japan, the formation of the International Energy Agency (IEA), as the principal international agency for achieving energy security, was an important part of response of the industrialized nations to the 1973 disruption of oil trade. The IEA's provisions for emergency oil stocks and its standby oil-sharing program today provide a safety net for the world oil market. As recently as last May, ministers at the IEA Government Board reaffirmed the vital role of strategic oil stocks.

U.S. and Japanese views are in harmony on the importance of oil stocks, and our two nations would be key contributors to an early draw

... during a crisis. In the United States, our Strategic Petroleum Reserve (SPR) now holds 540 million barrels equivalent to about 100 days of net imports. We are adding 75,000 barrels a day to the SPR, working toward a goal of 750 million barrels.

... also holds a sizable government oil stockpile, to which it is adding every day. There is no more important contribution the United States and Japan can make to our mutual protection against an energy emergency than to have ample reserves and to be prepared to start using them promptly.

... the second aspect of our long-term effort for global energy security is free and open trade in energy. This is a goal we believe worth pursuing with all our trading partners, but this evening, I will focus on our cooperation and trade with Japan.

### Japan Energy Trade

... market forces should govern Japan energy trade. Both countries understand that, U.S. energy exports must be competitively priced in order to penetrate Japan's market. At the same time, there is a security dimension to energy trade that must be taken into account.

... There is an obvious fit between the United States' abundant energy resources and Japan's need for diversified, secure sources of energy. The United States is a stable and reliable supplier of coal, gas, and oil from the United States can help to reduce Japanese dependence on less secure energy sources. Increased energy trade provides the impetus for greater development of resources, thus adding to total available energy supplies. This security aspect requires us to take a long-term view of our energy trade.

... In 1983, the United States and Japan agreed on a basic framework for cooperative energy relations. This policy reflects the commitment of our two governments to expanding trade in energy in ways that are mutually beneficial. It emphasizes long-term

... cooperation, the central role of the private sector, and the balance between considerations of economy and security. This framework has been the basis for our work in the U.S.-Japan Energy Working Group. It also has stimulated consideration of private projects. We believe, however, that there is substantial potential for expanding trade in energy between Japan and the United States.

... On the positive side, Japan is America's major partner in energy research and development. We have long had extensive cooperation in the nuclear field, and we hope to speed the day when we can supply a larger share of our total energy needs from safe and secure nuclear fission and, ultimately, fusion.

... Recently, there was an important development in nuclear energy which deserves special mention. Last week, U.S. Ambassador Mansfield and Japanese Foreign Minister Kuranari signed an agreement for cooperation between our two governments concerning the peaceful uses of nuclear energy. This new agreement, the text of which had been agreed on *ad referendum* last January, took several years to negotiate and will supersede an existing agreement that entered into force in 1968. It establishes a comprehensive framework for peaceful nuclear cooperation between the United States and Japan, based on shared objectives of preventing nuclear proliferation and a shared desire to establish a predictable and reliable basis for mutually beneficial cooperation. The agreement is a significant achievement that should serve to enhance considerably the basis for continued close and substantial nuclear cooperation between us in the years ahead. Before the new agreement can be brought into force, it must be approved by Congress and by the Japanese Diet. We look forward to the day when the agreement enters into force.

... In oil, Japanese companies are undertaking more and more exploration and development joint ventures with U.S. oil firms. These are welcome investments in expanding oil reserves. We in the Administration believe that allowing the export of Alaskan North Slope oil would benefit the United States, Japan, and other oil consumers and would be an incentive to further oil development. There is, however, continuing strong opposition in the Congress to removing legislative restrictions on oil exports, and we must await the opportunity to convince the Congress of the economic and security benefits to be obtained from freeing oil exports.

... Natural gas is an area where we think increased U.S.-Japan cooperation may be possible. The United States is Japan's oldest supplier of liquefied natural gas; it comes from Alaska's Cook Inlet. But we are now supplying only a small portion of Japan's needs. Japanese

... and U.S. companies have this year completed a prefeasibility study of a project to develop Alaskan North Slope gas for export to Japan. Although it appears that the Japanese market alone would not support the project, we hope that the interested parties on both sides will continue to explore ways to bring this gas to market.

... In our bilateral energy discussions, we spend a great deal of time on issues associated with the U.S. coal trade—the largest single item in our bilateral energy trade. Until 1983, coal demand was booming, and we had high hopes that Japan would continue to buy substantial quantities of coal from us. Recognizing the vital need to stay competitive in the world market, American firms have made substantial improvements in productivity and cost control. They have invested in new mines and transportation facilities designed to improve service and lower the costs to the export market. In return, we ask Japan to look on U.S. mines as long-term suppliers, not as the suppliers of last resort. We are confident that American coal can be sold competitively in Japan and make a major contribution to Japan's energy security.

### Conclusion

... Let me summarize by saying that I see a partnership between our governments and private sectors in the effort to achieve global energy security. The U.S. and Japanese Governments should continue to prepare for the possibility of an energy emergency. We should seek to remove barriers to free and open trade in energy. I call on you, as representatives of our private sectors, to pursue greater cooperation and increased trade in the energy resources vital to both our economies. ■

## NATO Nuclear Planning Group Supports INF Treaty

*The Nuclear Planning Group of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) met in Monterey, California, November 3-4, 1987. The United States was represented by Secretary of Defense Caspar W. Weinberger. Following is the final communique issued on November 4.*

The NATO Nuclear Planning Group (NPG) met in ministerial session in Monterey, California, on 3rd and 4th November 1987. Iceland attended as an observer. We discussed a variety of security matters pertaining to NATO's nuclear forces, such as current arms control negotiations, the status of implementation of the December 1979 dual-track and 1983 Montebello decisions, the work of several study groups, and future NPG work.

The fundamental security objectives of the Alliance are to deter aggression and to provide an environment for peaceful and stable relationships between East and West on the basis of balanced forces at the lowest possible level. The maintenance of effective military forces and the pursuit of arms control are complementary elements of this security policy.

We welcome and fully support the agreement in principle between the United States and the Soviet Union for the global elimination of land-based INF [intermediate-range nuclear forces] missiles with a range between 500 and 5,500 kms. This has

been made possible by the determination and solidarity of the Allied Governments over the years. We look forward to the prospect of a verifiable INF treaty being signed and ratified in the near future.

With the prospect of Soviet agreement to long-standing Alliance INF arms control objectives, we now look forward to rapid progress in the START negotiations [strategic arms reductions talks] and reaffirm our support for the 50% reduction in the strategic nuclear arsenals of the United States and the Soviet Union as proposed by the United States. In this connection, we emphasize the importance of a comprehensive, integrated, and coherent approach to all elements of arms control and security, nuclear and non-nuclear.

Our strategy of flexible response will continue to be vital to the security of the Alliance. We remain concerned about the offensive capabilities of the Warsaw Pact arrayed against us. We are, therefore, determined, consistent with the framework of the Montebello decision and with our arms control obligations, to continue to implement those measures required to maintain the effectiveness, responsiveness, and survivability of our nuclear forces. In doing so, it is and will remain Alliance policy to possess only the minimum number of nuclear weapons necessary for a credible deterrent. In accordance with this policy, and in spite of the fact that Soviet nuclear forces have continued to increase during that period, the Alliance has already unilaterally reduced its nuclear stockpile in Europe to the lowest level in over twenty years.

We accepted with pleasure the invitation of the Danish Government to hold our next Nuclear Planning Group ministerial meeting in Denmark in the spring of 1988.

Greece has expressed its views in a statement included in the minutes. ■

## Meat Product Sales to the EC

**WHITE HOUSE STATEMENT,  
NOV. 23, 1987<sup>1</sup>**

The President has taken the first step to ensure continued market access for approximately \$100 million in U.S. meat product sales to the European Community (EC). He has instructed U.S. Trade Representative [Clayton Yeutter] to hold public hearings on products for inclusion in a retaliator action against the EC.

In December 1985, the EC decided to ban the sales or import of meat produced from animals treated with growth hormones, effective January 1988. Recently, however, the EC Council of Agriculture ministers voted to allow meat imports to continue for an additional year.

To ensure that U.S. access to the EC does, in fact, remain unimpeded, the President will raise tariffs on all \$100 million of EC exports to the United States effective soon after January 1, 1988, but will then immediately suspend the tariff increases so long as U.S. meat exports to the European Community continue uninterrupted.

The President is optimistic that the EC will permit dispute settlement to proceed in the interim in order to reach a permanent agreement based on scientific evidence. The EC contends that the ban is motivated by health concerns but the U.S. Food and Drug Administration (FDA) and a prestigious panel of international scientific experts have concluded that use of such hormone poses no health hazards.

The President's action illustrates how his discretionary, flexible authority under Section 301 of our unfair trade laws protects American interests. Congress may wish to review this and other effective uses of Section 301 before considering any changes in the law that would attempt to force the President to retaliate at times when it would be counterproductive.

<sup>1</sup>Text from Weekly Compilation of Presidential Documents of Nov. 30, 1987

## The Promise and the Limits of Glasnost

Richard Schifter

Address before the Leadership Conference of the Washington Group on October 10, 1987. Ambassador Schifter is Assistant Secretary for Human Rights and Humanitarian Affairs.

There is one Russian word that a good many Americans have learned in the past year or so, it is "*glasnost*." It is in connection with *glasnost* that the question is often asked: is it a thaw, or is it for real? To be able to answer that question, we need to ask ourselves what the term really means. It, in fact, is *glasnost*?

Let me tell you at this point with my conclusion I want to leave you. It is that it would be equally wrong to say the Soviet society under Gorbachev remains unchanged or, conversely, to suggest that "*demokratizatsiya*" under Gorbachev really means democratization as we know it. The fact is that a great many changes are occurring in Soviet life, some of which are exhilarating and exciting, but they all are taking place within a highly restrictive context.

## Comparing Glasnost and Khrushchev's "Thaw"

Comparisons between Gorbachev's "*glasnost*" and Khrushchev's "thaw" first come to mind. Some of the comparisons are valid. But there are also significant differences.

Let me suggest one very critical difference. The thaw of the 1950s was the product of the utter revulsion of a significant number of Stalin's heirs against the sadism and mindless brutality of Stalin's rule. Their concern was, indeed, a deeply felt longing for at least some semblance of respect for human rights. They had themselves received the knock on the door in the middle of the night, the possibility of ending their lives in the basement of Lubyanka Prison. But none of them had any doubts about the validity of their economic precepts, about the brighter tomorrow that the collectivist, centrally planned system would bring about.

When Nikita Khrushchev told us that the Soviets would bury us, and it is explained that he used this phrase to predict the Soviet Union's economic triumph over capitalism, there was no question that he truly believed what he

said. Today, close to 30 years later, we can fairly say that there are not many such believers left in the Soviet Union—not among the general population, which continues to suffer shortages, or, and that is critically significant, among the leaders. It was in the late 1970s that it became increasingly clear that the Soviet economy had run aground and that no quick fix was available to get it to float again.

This was the setting in which Mikhail Gorbachev attained power. There is no indication that he was concerned, as Nikita Khrushchev had been, about the men and women suffering in the Gulag or that he was deeply interested in allowing freedom of expression for its own sake. What he seemed to see, above all, was an economy which was operating, year after year, ever more sluggishly and a society which, with apologies to President Carter, was suffering from a very serious malaise. He saw the problem and, as distinct from his immediate predecessor, was eager to do something about it. At first, he, too, tried a quick fix: a campaign against drinking.

It was not long before Gorbachev realized that temperance alone was not going to cure the ills that beset the Soviet economy or Soviet society generally. Though convinced that the basic theories on which the system rested were correct, Gorbachev and his colleagues agreed that the system was facing serious operational difficulties which had to be identified and dealt with. That is how *glasnost* was born.

## The Development of Glasnost

What Mikhail Gorbachev and his colleagues fully understood and recognized was that not even the vaunted KGB could be expected to unearth all the ineptitude, inefficiency, and corruption that so clearly plagued both public administration and the economy in the Soviet Union. They reached the logical conclusion that the only effective way in which these serious deficiencies could be dealt with was to have them fully exposed. That, in turn, meant that members of the public would not only have to be *allowed* to denounce the wrongs they observed but would have to be *encouraged* to do so.

And so, the word went out all across the country: speak up. Tell us what's wrong. Let's all get together so that we can root out the bribe-takers, the alcoholics, the incompetents. And

let's try thereby to improve the operations of our economy and of the various public institutions that are in direct contact with the people.

It is important to note that *glasnost* is, therefore, not derived from the precepts of the philosophers of the 18th-century Enlightenment that freedom of speech is a goal in itself, an essential element of a free society. That, we must understand, is not the way the new Soviet leadership seems to see it. Freedom of speech, in their view, is useful when it is exercised for a specific utilitarian purpose—namely, to expose, as I noted before, inefficiency, ineptitude, and corruption in the lowest layers of the Soviet bureaucracy where the leadership might otherwise not be able to identify existing problems. What the leadership itself does, whether Soviet troops stay in or withdraw from Afghanistan, what weapons systems are built, who should be elected to the Politburo—none of these questions are appropriate subjects for public discussion. *Glasnost*, as you can see, has its limits.

Just as certain wrongs of the present can now be exposed, so can wrongs of the past be subjected to public scrutiny and criticism. In that case, it is even permissible to criticize personalities at the highest level of government if they were also guilty of inefficiency, ineptitude, or corruption, such as Brezhnev's crew. Beyond that, going back to the Stalin era, one can expose irrationality, the punishment of loyal followers of the communist system who had been falsely denounced for disloyalty. There is nothing wrong, in the view of the present leaders, with the use of the force of the state to have suppressed dissent that might challenge the system, as Lenin did. But it is certainly wrong and utterly irrational to have punished supporters of the system, as Stalin did.

And then, more recently, the new Soviet leadership took another step in its emphasis on rationality: sanctions imposed by the state should be proportionate to the nature of the threat. Dissenters who constitute danger must, indeed, be severely punished. But those who express dissenting views in a way which merely makes them a nuisance can be tolerated. The distribution of a few hundred copies of a *samizdat* publication such as the magazine called *Glasnost* need not land the authors in jail. Harassing the writers and other-

wise interfering with their work will do. Besides, tens of millions of readers of Western publications are informed of the new phenomenon of the publication and distribution of a new magazine of dissent and, as a result, think more kindly of the Soviet Union. The small number of copies produced and the difficulties encountered by the persons who publish them are overlooked. *Glasnost* thus produces significant benefits, not only within the country but beyond its borders as well.

And so, we get *glasnost* in literature, in the theater, and even in the movies. Heretofore forbidden topics, forbidden thoughts, may now be freely expressed in print, on the stage, and on the screen. It is all new and exciting and enlists many members of the intelligentsia in support of the regime.

## The Limits of *Glasnost* and *Demokratizatsiya*

That there are limits to this new openness is, at the same time, clear. These limits are of concern to some intellectuals in the Soviet Union. But a great many others are quite understandably excited about the difference between what was and what there is now. For them, the malaise is gone. They are fascinated by what they are now allowed to read, to hear, and to say. They are not, at this time, paying attention to what it is that they still may not read, hear, or say.

But there are some members of Soviet society who are more aware of the limits of *glasnost* than are many others. None are as aware of these limits as are those who consider the maintenance of a minority language or culture as central to their life. And these are the dissenters about whom the Soviet leaders prove to be most neurotic, a neurogia so clearly reflected in the extraordinarily severe prison sentences imposed on them: 7 years at hard labor followed by 5 years of internal exile. Let us keep in mind that there are persons in the Soviet Union who are now serving sentences of that length for writing poetry (in Ukrainian), for having translated and distributed George Orwell's *1984* (in Latvian), and similar heinous crimes.

Just as *glasnost* does not mean free speech, *demokratizatsiya* is most assuredly not democratization in the Western sense. The Soviet leaders have, again and again, stated emphatically that they are devout Leninists and that their democratization is, as they put it, of the socialist variety rather than the Western bourgeois kind. On this issue there is no reason why we should not believe that they mean what they say.

Lenin, we must keep in mind, would speak disdainfully of bourgeois liberalism but would appropriate the word "democratic" for his own semantic use. Thus, "democratic centralism" became the term used to describe the dictatorship of a small circle of all-powerful leaders. *Demokratizatsiya*, as the term is used today, means allowing citizens some say in the operations of the lowest level of government, but most assuredly not allowing them to influence the policies adopted by the top leadership of the party.

## Making *Glasnost* Irreversible

And how can it all be held together; how can people be made to obey the orders of the leadership? The answer is, of course, clear: by continuing to concentrate control of all the levers of power in the hands of that leadership. It is with that leadership that the ultimate power of appointment of all officials rests. It is that leadership which determines the political line to be reflected in all the country's media on any issue which it chooses. It is that leadership which decides what is taught in the schools and how it is taught. It is that leadership which, through the operations of the secret police, can listen in on any telephone conversation, on many other private conversations, and which can read anyone's mail. And, finally, it is that leadership which can cause persons whom it deems a threat to the system to be carted off to prison.

My point is that the basic system of repression remains in place. The shackles have been loosened, in some respects substantially so. But they remain in place. They can be tightened again at the will of the leadership.

When I was in the Soviet Union last April, I had the opportunity of being present at a meeting between Secretary Shultz and a group of Soviet

intellectuals. They all were telling us that the new openness was "irreversible." They were making the point so frequently and so fervently that it became clear that this was really an incantation. By saying it often enough they hoped they would make it come true.

We, too, should hope that the present changes are not reversible. We should be interested in an end to repression in the Soviet Union, both for the sake of the Soviet citizens directly affected and because an open, democratic Soviet Union would most certainly be less inclined to engage in military adventurism than one which continually makes war on its own people.

While we should be hopeful, we must also be realistic. Thirty years we witnessed, as I noted earlier, that thaw under Khrushchev. Some of us thought then that the genie of freedom was out of the bottle and couldn't be stuffed back into it. But we were wrong. It was.

What would it take to make that process truly irreversible? In the 15 years of the preceding leadership—that of Stalin—was clearly repudiated, the gross inhumanities perpetrated in the name of the state were exposed, and regret was expressed for them. The secret police was removed from the center of power. And yet, after Khrushchev was deposed, a good many features of Stalinism crept back into the Soviet system of government.

It is obvious that if there is to be a chance of making the progress of the last year irreversible, more will have to happen in the way of basic change in the system than happened in Khrushchev's times. What would be required, in the first instance, is a far more significant reduction in the power of the secret police than occurred under Khrushchev. And with the relaxation of police control, there would have to come an acceptance of true pluralism in all aspects of societal interaction: political pluralism, religious pluralism, cultural and ethnic pluralism, the presentation of divergent views in the media and in education, and so on.

Will it come to that? Only time will tell. All that we can say at this time is that only if such basic changes occur will *demokratizatsiya* really be the equivalent of democratization. ■

## Arms Sales to Saudi Arabia

SENATE HOUSE STATEMENT,  
OCT. 8, 1987<sup>1</sup>

The Administration is making advance notifications to the Senate Foreign Relations Committee and the House Foreign Affairs Committee of four separate arms sale cases for Saudi Arabia. The sales are 12 F-15C/D aircraft to be delivered on a one-for-one basis to replace losses of aircraft sold under previous agreements, 93 artillery ammunition canisters, and upgrade and modernization packages to keep Saudi Arabian Abrams and M-60 tanks at an adequate level of operating effectiveness compatible with U.S. equipment of the same model.

Today's advance notifications inform Congress that these sales are under consideration and initiate a 20-day period of additional consultations and discussions. At the conclusion of this 20-day period, the Administration will formally notify Congress of the systems it plans to offer for sale to Saudi Arabia.

Having taken the situation into account and after extensive consultations with Congress, the President, at this time has decided to withhold notification of a proposed sale of Maverick air-to-ground missiles. The Administration will keep the issue of Saudi need for Maverick missiles under very close review in the light of threats to Saudi security and will maintain close contact with Congress. The Presi-

dent has personally assured the Saudi Government that in the event of an emergency, the United States would provide Mavericks from American stocks with appropriate notifications to the Congress.

These sales are an essential part of the U.S. strategy of protecting U.S. interests, as well as those of our friends in the gulf region, through security cooperation. The sales support Saudi Arabia's legitimate defense needs at a time of heightened threats to Saudi and U.S. military and economic interests in the gulf. They follow other sales to Saudi Arabia approved earlier this year of armed helicopters, electronic countermeasures systems, and Bradley fighting vehicles. They do not upset the basic military balance in the Middle East. However, they come at a time when there is greater demand placed upon Saudi Arabian Armed Forces and at a point of unprecedented U.S.-Saudi security cooperation. If we fail to meet these legitimate needs, our willingness to support friends—who are in need and who are helping us in the face of very real threats—will come under serious question in the gulf and elsewhere around the world.

The Administration has made a detailed case for these sales during extensive consultations with the Congress over a period of 5 weeks prior to the advance notifications. The Administration will continue to consult on the overall situation in the gulf and on the arms sales.

<sup>1</sup>Text from Weekly Compilation of Presidential Documents of Oct. 12, 1987. ■

## Visit of India's Prime Minister

*Prime Minister Rajiv Gandhi of the Republic of India made an official working visit to Washington, D.C., October 19-20, 1987, to meet with President Reagan and other government officials.*

*Following are remarks made by President Reagan and Prime Minister Gandhi after their meeting on October 20.<sup>1</sup>*

### President Reagan

I am delighted to welcome once again Prime Minister Gandhi to the White House. The Prime Minister and I have had useful discussions on the status of U.S.-Indian relations. We noted that in the years since our meeting in 1985 substantial progress has been made. Bilateral trade has expanded. Collaboration between our private sectors has intensified. We've enjoyed cooperation in defense production, notably the Indian light combat aircraft. The memorandum of understanding on technology transfer has been implemented. The United States is working with India to launch its satellites. The U.S.-India Fund for Cultural, Educational, and Scientific Cooperation has been inaugurated. And we're working together to combat terrorism.

Beyond such concrete achievements, there are powerful political, economic, and cultural currents that are drawing our two societies into closer collaboration. Our shared dedication to democracy is paramount among these currents.

We're also building on a strong foundation of cooperation in the fields of science, technology, and space, which permits us with confidence to set ambitious new goals.

In this connection, the Prime Minister and I have agreed to the following: to renew the Ronald Reagan-Indira Gandhi Science and Technology Initiative for an additional 3 years beyond 1988; we agreed to take steps to substantially expand two-way trade and recognize the need to reduce barriers to free trade; to consult regularly to ensure that U.S. supercomputer exports to India reflect the rapid pace of scientific advances while at the same

time safeguarding U.S. technology; to work even more closely together to stem drug trafficking and abuse; to expand defense cooperation in technology and other military areas; to undertake joint research projects to explore the enhancement of arid zone agriculture, water management, and evolution of ground water resources; to increase the educational resources about our countries, as appropriate, using the U.S.-India Fund for Cultural, Educational, and Scientific Cooperation; to establish a program in research institutions in both countries for short-term exchange fellowships in development-related subjects.

Expanding on our leadership exchanges, the Speaker of our House of Representatives will visit India this year, and his Indian counterpart will visit the United States next year.

Today the Prime Minister and I also discussed East-West relations and the prospects for a historic treaty eliminating an entire class of intermediate-range nuclear missiles of the United States and the Soviet Union. And the Prime Minister emphasized India's longstanding encouragement of such efforts to reduce and eliminate nuclear weapons. In this context, I urged that India and Pakistan intensify their dialogue to build greater mutual confidence, to resolve outstanding issues, and to deal with the threat of nuclear proliferation in the region.

We also discussed the tragic situation in Afghanistan and strongly endorsed movement toward a political settlement—a settlement that would remove all foreign troops from that country and permit its people to live in peace, as citizens of a neutral country and free from outside intervention.

On the subject of U.S. security assistance to Pakistan, I assured Mr. Gandhi that our objective is stability and reduced tensions in South Asia and that our assistance is not directed at India.

And finally, let me acknowledge the statesmanship and courage demonstrated by Prime Minister Gandhi and the President of Sri Lanka in their efforts to end the ethnic strife in that troubled island nation. I have pledged to both leaders our full support.

It has been a pleasure to have had this opportunity to discuss these issues with Prime Minister Gandhi and to renew a very real friendship.

### Prime Minister Gandhi

It's always a pleasure to be at the White House. Thank you, Mr. President, for your invitation and for your warm words. May I, at the outset, wish Mrs. Reagan the speediest recovery. We know what a source of strength she is to you, Mr. President, in your work for your country and the world.

I also take this opportunity to congratulate the people of the United States on the 200th anniversary of the Constitution. It is one of history's momentous documents that has made the United States grow to greatness. Your Constitution has been an inspiration to us in our struggle for freedom and liberty.

As the President informed you, we have had good and most useful meetings. We spoke of world peace and our concern for the well-being of humanity, and we spoke of the relations between our countries. We agreed upon further methods of strengthening our mutual friendship. The relations between our two countries have always held much promise. In recent years, we have made notable progress toward realizing that promise. Your personal attention and interest, Mr. President, have contributed greatly to our expanding partnership.

We have agreed to collaborate at the frontiers of technology. We have reaffirmed the tradition of scientific interaction, which has been the hallmark of our relationship. The growth in high technology, trade, and transfers has

been a source of considerable satisfaction. I hope that the United States would recognize India not just as a market but as a partner in technological progress.

In the field of bilateral trade and investment, we have agreed that much can be done to expand the present level of activity. We will encourage increased interaction between our trading entities. Having successfully launched cooperation for the light combat aircraft project, we have now agreed to explore other avenues in the field of defense. This is yet another step forward.

I am confident that after our talk today we will be able to place our relationship on a more enduring basis. We share not only aspirations and values; we sometimes face common threats. We have each recognized the dangers to our societies posed by terrorism and narcotics. I mentioned to you today determination to fight these problems. I'm aware of your personal concern about narcotics, the price they exact in the form of blighted youth and wasted resources. I would like to reiterate once again our commitment to cooperate with you to this end.

Turning to international issues, should first like to applaud the statemanship demonstrated by you, Mr. President, and by General Secretary Gorbachev in pursuing the vexing a complex issues of nuclear disarmament. Your endeavors have given a glimmer of hope to a world threatened by imminent nuclear holocaust. An INF [intermediate-range nuclear forces] agreement will be a historic step. For the first time, an operational nuclear weapon system will be withdrawn and dismantled. We hope that this will be the beginning of the elimination of nuclear weapons altogether, an objective to which you are dedicated. I sincerely wish you, Mr. President, and General Secretary Gorbachev, every success these endeavors. All humankind is



our deliberations today also cover the situation in Afghanistan. We need on the need for an early political settlement there and support the efforts of the UN Secretary General. I believe that a just solution must ensure a foreign, independent, and non-aligned Afghanistan. Foreign intervention and interference must cease. The Afghan refugees must be allowed to return to their homes in honor, dignity, and security. We would welcome any first efforts in this direction.

We had a frank discussion on the dangers of nuclear proliferation, both horizontal and vertical. My country has consistently recognized that a secure world order cannot be built on nuclear weapons. Our actions have spoken louder than any words in expressing our commitment. We do not have nuclear weapons. We do not want nuclear weapons. And we certainly do not want our neighbors to have nuclear weapons in our neighborhood.

We have watched with concern developments in our immediate vicinity. Nuclear stockpiles have multiplied. Yet another country now seems on the verge of fulfilling a long-time goal of acquiring nuclear weapons. On our part, let me assure you, Mr. President, that we do not intend to produce nuclear weapons unless constrained to do so. I have discussed these matters and expressed our mutual concerns. This is not on our side. We are faced with critical decisions on issues which need to be addressed urgently.

We appreciate your support to the efforts to end the ethnic conflict in Sri Lanka, Mr. President, in particular to the July 29th agreement, which I agreed with President Jayewardene. We determined to ensure the full implementation of its provisions as it represents the best hope for peace in the region.

Thank you once again for your hospitality. Our discussions have been most productive, and I leave Washington confident and optimistic about the future of our relationship.

Wade at the South Portico of the White House (text from Weekly Compilation of Presidential Documents of Oct. 26, 1987).

## President Meets With Afghan Resistance Leaders



White House photo by Pete Souza

### PRESIDENT'S STATEMENT, NOV. 12, 1987

We have just held a very useful—and, I might say, brief but also, I'll add, a very moving—discussion with Chairman Yunis Khalis of the Islamic Union of Mujahidin of Afghanistan and other members of his distinguished delegation. I expressed our nation's continued strong support for the resistance and our satisfaction with the large step the Afghan resistance took toward unity in choosing a chairman for the first time. This new political milestone demonstrates that the people of Afghanistan speak with one voice in their opposition to the Soviet invasion and occupation of their homeland.

This increasing unity has already made itself felt on the battlefield. During the past 18 months, the *mujahidin* fighting inside the country have improved their weapons, tactics, and coordination. The result has been a string of serious defeats for the Soviet elite units, as well as many divisions from the Kabul army.

Chairman Khalis and his delegation are visiting Washington following the November 10 UN General Assembly

vote which, with a record vote, once again called overwhelmingly for the withdrawal of all foreign troops from Afghanistan. This is the eighth time since the December 1979 invasion that the General Assembly has decisively called upon the Soviet Union to pull its forces out of Afghanistan. And let there be no mistake about it; the withdrawal of Soviet forces is the key to resolving the Afghan crisis. Other issues that have been raised to divert attention from this fact only extend the combat and prolong the suffering of the Afghan people.

General Secretary Gorbachev has publicly stated a Soviet readiness to withdraw. Both in April and September of 1987, I asked the Soviet Union to set a date this year when that withdrawal would begin. I also stated that when the Soviet Union showed convincingly that it was ready for a genuine political settlement, the United States would be helpful. After all, the Soviet presence in Afghanistan is a major impediment to improved U.S.-Soviet relations, and we would like to remove it. The Soviets should want to do so as well.

Unfortunately the Soviet answer on a date for rapid withdrawal has been silence. Instead we have seen the Kabul regime announce a phantom cease-fire and propose a transitional government, one that would leave this discredited and doomed group in control. These gambits have been rejected by the only voice that really counts, that of the Afghan people, speaking through their resistance representatives. Any proposal unacceptable to the resistance is destined to fail. And as the resistance continues the fight, we and other responsible governments will stand by it. The support that the United States has been providing the resistance will be strengthened, rather than diminished, so that it can continue to fight effectively for freedom. The just struggle against foreign tyranny can count upon worldwide support, both political and material.

The goal of the United States remains a genuinely independent Afghanistan, free from external interference; an Afghanistan whose people choose the type of government they wish; an Afghanistan to which the 4 million refugees from Soviet aggression may return in safety and, yes, in honor.

On behalf of the American people, I salute Chairman Khalis, his delegation, and the people of Afghanistan themselves. You are a nation of heroes.

<sup>1</sup>Text from Weekly Compilation of Presidential Documents of Nov. 16, 1987. ■

## Counterterrorism: U.S. Policy and Proposed Legislation

by L. Paul Bremer, III

*Statement before the Subcommittee on Terrorism, Narcotics, and International Operations of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee on October 15, 1987. Mr. Bremer is Ambassador at Large for Counter-Terrorism.<sup>1</sup>*

It is a pleasure to discuss with this committee a topic which a recent Roper poll showed more American citizens—some 69%—desired government action on than any other foreign policy issue.

I am happy to report to you that the Administration's counterterrorism policy is showing results. The fact is that, although terrorism continues around the world, one is much more likely these days to read news stories about terrorist arrests than about sensational hijackings. And gripping news accounts of terrorist atrocities have quietly given way to brief reports from Western capitals on the successful apprehension, prosecution, and punishment of terrorists.

### Progress Against Terrorism

Over the last 18 months, there has been a measurable drop in international terrorism.

- From 1981 through 1985, international terrorism grew from some 500 incidents per year to about 800 incidents.
- But in 1986, terrorism dropped 6%. So far in 1987, it is down another 10%. The decline would be greater but for Afghan-sponsored terrorism in Pakistan.
- Contrary to the impression many Americans have, terrorism in Europe dropped dramatically last year—over 33%.
- And in 1986, there were only two airline hijackings, the lowest number since we began keeping track over 20 years ago.

While these numbers are encouraging, they do not convey the full sense of what is happening. Terrorism can strain and has strained relations among even the friendliest states, but there is, I believe, a growing consensus about the response to terrorism. This is the key change in our counterterrorism fight.

Ten years ago, the terrorists seemed to have the initiative. They tacked or hijacked seemingly at will. Their grievances were, if not respected often heard sympathetically. The U.S. was on the defensive. A number of countries reached de facto agreement with foreign terrorists, saying, in effect: "Do not attack our interests, not conduct operations on our soil, in return, we will grant you free t and domicile within our borders."

In the mid-1980s, there has been an important shift in emphasis in the West's fight against terrorism. No longer are democracies banding together and cooperating. The dynamics of the situation have shifted, with the initiative now on our side. Over time, it has become clear that terrorists never keep their end of the bargain. Sooner or later, accommodation leads to blood on your own doorstep.

The United States has worked like-minded nations to develop multilateral agreements and declarations about terrorist attacks on civil aviation, internationally protected persons, seafarers, and hostage-taking. These documents reflect an improved degree of agreement in principle. There was none a decade ago. In many contacts at the policy and working levels around the world, I find a new sense of resolve about terrorism. The sense of resolve which is saying: "Let the professionals—the police, the military, the customs and intelligence services—do their jobs."

Networking is a popular word these days. But networking is not something for yuppie stockbrokers. Among the interior ministers in Europe, within Interpol, within military organizations and intelligence agencies, the professionals are meeting each other and sharing tactics, intelligence, and ideas. There is, today, a counterterrorism network, and we are all benefiting from it.

The United States has been at the forefront of the counterterrorism battle.

• On the eve of the Venice summit, Attorney General Meese traveled to Paris for an unprecedented ministerial level meeting on terrorism with representatives of the European Commission and the summit seven.

Bilaterally, we are working to extradite terrorists. We provide extradition treaties. We provide terrorism assistance to some 40 nations which have the will but not the resources to resist terrorism. Our government has made firm diplomatic representations to a number of countries regarding their relations with terrorist organizations, and we have seen results. We also act unilaterally when we do not secure cooperation or when circumstances make it infeasible to coordinate our actions. A Lebanese terrorist, Abd Fawaz Younis, accused of direct hijacking of a Jordanian airliner carrying U.S. nationals aboard, was recently arrested in international waters. The FBI [Federal Bureau of Investigation] He is jailed near here, awaiting trial. This is a direct result of a vigorous, imaginative, unilateral U.S. policy.

### Counterterrorism Policy

The United States follows a three-part strategy for dealing with terrorism.

The first element is a policy of deterrence toward terrorists. Giving in to terrorist demands will only breed further demands, demands which are likely to be greater than those of today. My father, I learned long ago that a terrorist rewarded is behavior encouraged. While the Iran-*contra* affair may have caused some to doubt our steadfastness in resisting terrorist demands, I assure you that there is no sense in the counterterrorism community that would change our policy. No counterterrorism terrorist should believe that anything is to be gained by threatening the United States with terrorist action. We will not make concessions. We will not deal.

The second element of our strategy consists of practical measures to bring terrorists to justice. By practical measures, I mean the identification, apprehension, prosecution, and punishment of terrorists. In the past 18 months, more and more terrorists have been tried and jailed around the world, usually after receiving the kind of stiff sentences which were unheard of only a few years ago. The third element of our policy is to ensure that terrorist-supporting states, and those directly to the committee's current interest, so I would like to address more detail.

### State Support for Terrorism

In the Administration's view, state-supported terrorists are substantially more dangerous than those operating independently. State sponsorship gives clear advantages to the terrorist. For example:

- When a terrorist obtains legitimate travel and identification documents from a patron state, it becomes harder to identify and track him. When Nezar Hindawi went to London to blow up an El Al flight last year, he carried an authentic Syrian service passport.

- A state-supported terrorist has a ready source of weapons and a ready means to transport them. Embassies are exempt from search by international convention, and the baggage handlers at state-owned airlines don't interfere when directed not to examine a particular parcel. Once again, the Hindawi case is instructive. His bomb came into the United Kingdom on Syria's official airline.

- Countries like Libya, Syria, and Iran make a terrorist's work easier by providing a place to train. A terrorist operating alone, especially if a fugitive, has a hard time finding an isolated location to fire automatic weapons or assemble and detonate explosives.

- Similarly, simple refuge supplied by patron states constitutes important support. Being able to live without fear of immediate arrest and punishment is of enormous psychological value to a terrorist.

- Finally, financial support from state sponsors allows terrorists to spend more time on operations because they need not rob banks or traffic in drugs to raise money.

### Benefits to the State Sponsor

The sponsoring state receives benefits as well.

- Terrorism can be an inexpensive form of warfare. A small group of terrorists costs less per year than a company of regular soldiers and can cause far more havoc in an enemy state than could that company of soldiers.

- Using terrorist surrogates makes it easier for the sponsoring state to deny responsibility for actions which, if taken overtly, could lead to war. Shortly after the Abu Nidal Organization (ANO) moved to Syria in 1983, it staged a series of attacks on Jordanian interests. I think it no coincidence that these attacks ceased following a Syrian-Jordanian rapprochement.

- A state can also use terrorists to murder dissidents abroad. Qadhafi, for example, has hired terrorists to kill Libyan opponents in many countries, including the United States. In May, two Libyans tried to kill the former Libyan ambassador in Vienna. After their attempt failed, they fled into the Libyan People's Bureau there. We believe this incident shows why European governments should take particular care to monitor the size and activities of Libyan embassies in their countries.

### U.S. Responses to State-Supported Terrorism

So our policy recognizes the need to deal with state-supported terrorism. Our response should be carefully tailored to each individual case in order to use the leverage that works best with that particular country.

**Libya.** Libya was on the U.S. Government's list of terror-supporting states when it was first published in 1979 and remains on the list today. Over the years, the United States has responded to Libyan actions with a mixture of policy tools.

- We closed our embassy there and later ordered the Libyan Embassy here closed.

- We imposed economic sanctions and exhorted our friends to do the same.

- And, eventually, we used military force.

After that, the Europeans, too, imposed political, diplomatic, and economic measures on Libya.

This policy has worked. While other nations have been slower to respond, today Libya is politically isolated. During the past year, Libyan-supported terrorist operations have declined, although Qadhafi still appears ready to use terrorism as a policy tool.

**Syria.** Syria, too, is a "charter member" of the list of terror-supporting states and, in spite of some encouraging signs, remains on the list. While Syria has long been involved in terrorism, it was particularly active from 1983 to 1986. As I mentioned earlier, Syria began using the Abu Nidal Organization as a surrogate in 1983 in a series of attacks on Jordan. These attacks stopped following a Syrian-Jordanian rapprochement.

While the Jordanian attacks ceased, other ANO attacks—generally planned and trained for in Syria or in Syrian-controlled areas of Lebanon—continued. While based in Syria, the ANO was responsible for many attacks, including the Rome and Vienna airport massacres of December 27, 1985, and the September 6, 1986, murder of 22 worshippers at a synagogue in Istanbul. And Syria continues to play host to a number of other terrorist groups.

Syrian officials have also been directly involved in terrorist activities. Sworn court testimony in London implicated a Deputy Chief of Syrian Air Force Intelligence, Lt. Col. Haithem Said, in the attempt to place a suitcase bomb aboard an El Al flight. Testimony in Berlin led a court there to issue an arrest warrant for Said because of his role in the bombing of the German-Arab Friendship Society on March 29, 1986.

Revelation of Syria's direct role in these terrorist activities led to a series of actions last November by the United Kingdom, the European Community, and the United States to distance themselves from Syria. The United Kingdom broke diplomatic relations. We withdrew our ambassador. Economic sanctions were also imposed, though U.S. bilateral trade with Syria is insignificant and its other trading partners have not imposed major economic sanctions.

However, Syria proved most sensitive to the political and diplomatic isolation. In June, Syria expelled most of the Abu Nidal Organization, and we have not seen evidence recently of Syrian involvement in terrorism. These are encouraging signs. Still, we intend to keep our remaining sanctions in place and to leave Syria on the list of terror-supporting states until we see evidence of a fundamental change in Syrian policy toward terrorism.

**Iran.** Virtually since it came to power, the current Iranian regime has used terrorism. Over the years, it has attacked U.S. targets, European interests, moderate Arabs, and its own dissidents.

The United States has taken an increasingly tough position toward Iran in response to its continuing support for terrorism and its refusal to cease hostilities in the Iran-Iraq war. Following the bombings of the U.S. Embassy buildings and the Marine barracks in Lebanon, we placed Iran on the list of countries supporting international terrorism.

When a country is placed on that list, export controls are imposed on selected "dual use" items. We have specifically banned the export to Iran of a variety of items and equipment which could support terrorist and/or military operations, including helicopters, aircraft, outboard engines, chemical weapon precursors, and several other national-security-controlled items.

We currently are considering other measures which we can take against Iran, including cutting off the import of Iranian oil. This is an extremely complex issue, but let me emphasize here that the Administration is completely supportive of the objectives of the recently proposed legislation on the subject. We want to craft our policy so that these objectives are best met.

Iran has been under little concerted international pressure until recently but is now increasingly isolated. Other countries have been reluctant to sever profitable commercial dealings, particularly in the absence of international cooperation. However, Iran's continued outrageous behavior is beginning to exact a toll with other countries. For example, relations with France have chilled with the onset of the so-called embassies war, which began when a French magistrate demanded the right to question a nondiplomatic employee of the Iranian Embassy in Paris about terrorist activities in France.

### The Lautenberg Bill

As you can see from the foregoing review, we agree with the underlying assumption of Senator Lautenberg's bill: economic pressures can be useful against countries supporting terrorism. However, we oppose the bill in its current form for four reasons.

It is seldom desirable to impose all possible economic sanctions at one time. Seldom is a state which sponsors terrorism solely, or even heavily, dependent on economic relations with the United States. That is why we need to consider most sanctions as having an impact which is as much or more psychological and political than economic. And we must keep in mind that the purpose of sanctions is to bring about a change in behavior on the part of the target state.

We believe it prudent to avoid the automatic linking of economic measures to a political determination. Remembering that it is political effect we seek, we

are more likely to succeed if we have available a range of sanctions which be applied over time than if we are required to impose an entire package at once.

For example, had we used all economic sanctions against Syria we it was put on the terrorist list in 1979 we would have had nothing left to force the political steps taken last November. Of course, there may be times when we would want to impose all the available sanctions at once.

**The bill could force the President to send a contrary signal.** Senator Lautenberg's bill, it might be argued gives the President needed flexibility by permitting him to waive the imposition of certain sanctions. However, amendment would, in effect, force to send a mixed signal by requiring public explanation of why he is not imposing certain sanctions.

By simultaneously declaring a to be a supporter of terrorism and plaining publicly why he is not imposing certain sanctions, the President invites confusion in the target country. Since he must cite "national interest" to avoid imposing the sanction, he would weaken the deterrent effect of the unimposed sanction or sanction. Beyond that, the target country is likely to take the President's refusal to impose a particular sanction as U.S. recognition of some "mitigating circumstance."

There are times when we can avoid sending mixed signals. But we should avoid requiring them in U.S. law.

**The bill's provision for congressional override sets the stage for potentially divisive debate at a time when we should show unity.** Should Congress choose to exercise its option to attempt to override the President's decision to withhold a given sanction, the target state will enjoy the spectacle of watching the Administration and Congress debate just what we should do to it. Such a display would surely undermine the effects accomplished by placing the nation on the list in the first place. Sometimes the executive and legislative branches see things differently that such a debate cannot be avoided. But again, we think it unwise to build the potential for such a conflict into our laws.

**The bill can reduce our chances of operating in concert with other nations.** By tilting the playing field toward early economic sanctions, our ability to act in concert with other

## Counterterrorism: Strategy and Tactics

by L. Paul Bremer, III

*Address before the Committee on Foreign Relations in Tampa on November 4, 1987. Mr. Bremer is Ambassador at Large for Counter-Terrorism.*

It's a pleasure for me to appear before such a distinguished group. You have done much to promote public understanding of the foreign policy issues facing our country, and you are to be commended for your efforts.

A recent Roper poll asked Americans to name topics on which they wished the government to take action. Terrorism was named more often than nuclear arms reductions or Middle East peace. It has become the number one foreign policy issue for many Americans.

Clearly, the people are demanding action. And in the finest American tradition, they want action right now. Today I want to describe how our government is responding to the terrorist threat.

### Dealing With Terrorism Is a Long-Term Problem

In spite of the impression that many of us have, terrorism is not something new. Yes, within the past 20 years we have experienced many different kinds of terrorism, and we have seen terrorism live and in color in our living rooms. But terrorism has been around for centuries.

The group whose name gives us our word for assassin arose in Persia about 900 years ago and later flourished in Syria. The Assassins recognized that a tiny group of men prepared to die during their attack could paralyze a larger foe and that the fear of such attacks could give them power beyond their size.

During the Napoleonic wars, partisan forces pushed carts laden with explosives into the ranks of soldiers, causing significant damage. By the late 19th century, the telegraph, newspapers, and rising literacy led Russian anarchists to recognize the shock value of violence. They referred to their terrorist attacks as "propaganda by the deed."

Given the persistence of terrorism over centuries, it is unreasonable to think we can eliminate it. But we can, and must, take vigorous action to limit terrorism. And the signs are that, after an initial period of uncertainty, the West is finally getting its antiterrorist act together.

### 1970s: On the Defensive

When modern terrorism burst on the scene 20 years ago, the international community, especially in the United Nations, reacted in a befuddled fashion. The West lacked a strategy and was on the defensive against both domestic and international terrorism.

There are a number of reasons for this passivity.

- Many of the world's nations had recently emerged from colonialism; in some cases, they considered terrorists as fellow revolutionaries who would soon join them in the community of nations.

- The Vietnam war increased anti-American sentiment around the world and led to an intellectual environment in which anti-U.S. activism was easier to justify.

- In the late 1960s and early 1970s, the prevailing political and intellectual climate in many Western countries promoted an extraordinary tolerance of violent political action. This allowed terrorists to demand and receive public attention not just for their acts but for their "causes." Terrorist acts—including kidnapping, kneecapping, and murder—acquired an aura of romance and adventure.

- In the Middle East, Israel's stunning success in a preemptive strike in response to threats of war by Egypt, Syria, and Jordan altered the perception of Israel as a microstate struggling against the odds. It also shattered the hopes, nourished by some Palestinians, that the front-line Arab states would destroy Israel and, by military force, create a Palestinian state.

- Finally, the tremendous growth in air travel and television in the 1960s gave terrorists increased mobility, more vulnerable targets, and a readymade worldwide audience for the acts.

is diminished. If the President follows the path of least resistance and rescues all sanctions at once, we could see the chances of sanctions by nations which might be reluctant to be seen as "bowing to U.S. pressure." Also, if we have already imposed sanctions, we will have nothing left over to use to complement the actions of other nations, as we did with Vietnam.

I do not want to suggest that the Administration is uninterested in economic sanctions or even in future legislation in support of sanctions. On the contrary, within the Administration, my office has been instrumental in leading discussion about new measures. Then, after appropriate executive branch review, we may ask for legislative support.

### Conclusion

Most of the recent progress in counterterrorism has been made possible by presidential action. Our Anti-Terrorism Assistance Program depends on authorizations and funding from the Congress. Younis was arrested under statutes passed in 1984 by a Congress eager to assist the Administration in combating terrorism.

The funds and authorities we have received have been used to good effect. It will continue to be the case.

Around the world, there is a cooperative spirit which we have not seen before. After nearly 20 years of disarray in the face of terrorism, the West is beginning to unite to confront terrorists as criminals.

I do not want to leave the impression that our problems are solved, that there are not disagreements among friends, or that we will not suffer reverses in the months ahead. I do believe that the progress we are making is real, substantive, and permanent. We are not going to eliminate terrorism, but we are making the world a more dangerous place for terrorists and safer for the rest of us.

The complete transcript of the hearing will be published by the committee and will be available from the Superintendent of Documents, U.S. Government Printing Office, Washington, D.C. 20402. ■

## The West Develops a Counterterrorist Strategy

By the end of the 1970s, the outrage at terrorist acts slowly began to turn the tide of opinion in the West. Increasingly, people realized that nothing justified what they were seeing.

Perhaps more than anything, the ever-expanding circle of targets for terrorist attack brought about change. People and governments began to realize that terrorists could and would attack anyone, including erstwhile sympathizers. Here in America, the taking of our Tehran embassy catalyzed public opinion and led to demands for effective government action.

As a result of these changes, the West began to develop a clear, overall strategy to deal with terrorism and the

supporting tactics necessary to implement that strategy. Action on two levels was needed: the development of political will to counter terrorism and the allocation of more resources to the fight.

## Political Vision and Political Will

We must avoid the temptation of taking the total elimination of terrorism as our goal. We can no more eradicate terrorism than we can eradicate crime.

The West's strategic objective must be to reduce terrorism to a level at which it no longer dominates world policy. We can achieve this objective with a firm, concerted counterterrorism effort sustained over 5-7 years. How? By making the general political, economic, and psychological climate in which terrorists operate more hostile. The targets of any counterterrorist measure, therefore, are not particular terrorists or groups but the community of nations and the overall political environment.

The key element in developing a counterterrorist strategy is the development of political vision and the political will to carry out the fight. And to nurture the development of political will, the West had to change the whole dynamic of the international discussion of terrorism. We had to get away from the defensive, muddled reaction to terrorist violence of the early 1970s and reassert, clearly and decisively, democracy's willingness to fight terrorism. We had to shift the public debate on terrorism from understanding "root causes" to condemning the crimes terrorists commit.

## Specific Measures

The West has adopted a number of specific measures to pursue our strategic objective. For example, until recently, the international political environment made it relatively easy for terror-supporting states like Libya, Syria, and Iran to operate against the West. A major element of our counterterrorism policy, therefore, is to put pressure on states that support terrorism. If the West can make it clear that supporting terrorists is unacceptable international behavior, then terrorists will be denied important financial, military, and other support from state supporters.

Another important measure we have developed in our overall strategy is applying the rule of law to terrorists.

Terrorists are criminals. They commit criminal actions like murder, kidnapping and arson, and countries have laws to punish criminals. So a major element of our strategy has been to delegitimize terrorists, to get society to see them for what they are—criminals—and to use democracy's most potent tool, the rule of law, against them.

A third measure is expanded international discussion of terrorism. The United States has made terrorism an important issue in our overall bilateral relations, including with the Soviet Union, and in multilateral forums like the United Nations. By repeatedly pressing the issue with non-Western nations, we seek a truly global front against terrorism.

## Counterterrorist Measures Succeeding

These counterterrorist measures are beginning to succeed. In a major shift of collective political will last year, nations of Western Europe took a series of concerted actions to close down Libya's terrorist infrastructure of embassies, "businessmen," and "students." These actions, combined with the U.S. military strike against terrorist facilities in Libya, led to a decline in Libyan-supported terrorism. Indeed, we have detected Libyan involvement in only five terrorist incidents in 1987. Qadhafi no longer openly brags about his use of terrorism. Most important, the political environment was shifted. The Europeans at long last had taken decisive action against a terrorist state. That was a major breakthrough in the development of a Western counterterrorist strategy.

In a similar way, last November we and the European Community imposed sanctions on Syria after Syrian officials were proven to have supported specific terrorist operations. These steps were possible only because the countries of Europe had set the pattern of responding to state terrorism with their earlier measures against Libya. Again, the political environment had shifted. Again, we had success. Syria in June expelled Abu Nidal, a notorious Palestinian terrorist.

As a result of concerted Western pressures, terrorists are finding it harder to get refuge and overt support. The Abu Nidal Organization was expelled from Iraq in 1983 and from Syria in 1987. In Eastern Europe, efforts have been made to disrupt a network of enterprises of the Abu Nidal Organi-

## French Seize Terrorist Weapons

DEPARTMENT STATEMENT,  
NOV. 6, 1987<sup>1</sup>

We congratulate the French Government for its seizure last weekend of a sizable quantity of arms bound for the Irish Republican Army (IRA). This shipment, which originated in Tripoli, involved more than 150 tons of lethal arms and was the largest terrorist arms shipment ever intercepted.

We condemn, in the strongest terms, this latest example of state-supported terrorism by Libya. This shipment was destined to support further terrorist violence by the IRA. We can only deplore again this latest in a long line of examples of Libya's disregard for accepted international values and norms. Libya's behavior should be condemned by all civilized nations. We note that at the same time Libya is engaging in such blatant terrorist activities, the Qadhafi regime seeks to promote a resolution at the United Nations calling for an international conference to define terrorism.

We call on all foes of terrorism to make clear their outrage for this latest example of state-supported terrorism and work to deny Libya the means to pursue its policies.

<sup>1</sup>Read to news correspondents by Department spokesman Charles Redman. ■

Newspaper stories about the terrorist links of a Syrian family named Assad, notorious for arms trafficking. Terrorists, have led to action against them by several European countries in 1987, notably in Spain where they maintained a political headquarters in Marbella.

Moreover, during the past decade, the West has elaborated an international legal structure grounded in bilateral and multilateral agreements to identify and prosecute terrorists for their crimes. The first steps in an international legal framework were taken in the early 1970s with the Hague convention on airline hijacking. Since then, further agreements have been reached in Montreal and at summit meetings of eleven leading industrialized nations in Tokyo, Bonn, and Venice.

In spite of Lenin's insistence that the revolutionary must never abandon terrorism, the Soviet Union now says that it opposes "all terrorism." While the Soviet definition of terrorism can be convoluted from our point of view, we have specifically condemned some acts of terrorism, including the Pan American Flight 073 takeover in Karachi and a grenade attack last year on Israeli soldiers near the Western Wall in Jerusalem. And the Soviets have played a helpful role in drafting new counterterrorist conventions on maritime and airport safety.

Finally, where earlier attempts to cope with terrorism in the United Nations deteriorated into endless apologetic resolutions for terrorists, in 1985 and 1986 the United Nations passed important resolutions condemning terrorism and urging cease-taking.

So we have made a real start this decade in changing the overall environment in which the terrorists must act. Responsible countries have joined a new consensus against terror and have taken concrete steps.

No one of these measures by itself will solve the problem or reduce terrorism to a tolerable level. However, these and other measures, relentlessly pursued over time, will achieve our strategic objective.

#### Development of Tactics:

#### More Resources

As the West had to fortify its collective political will before it could develop a coherent counterterrorist strategy, so it had to dedicate greatly increased resources to antiterrorism

before our tactics could succeed. The strategy demands will; the tactics demand money.

Our tactical objective is to confound and thwart terrorists—to reduce their options and make their operations more complicated and perilous.

For the most part, antiterrorist tactics are measures that better protect the most likely targets from terrorist attacks. How do they work? In much the same way as you protect your home from burglars. Putting heavy dead-bolt locks on your doors, a bar on sliding glass doors, and keeping a dog or installing a burglar alarm will not stop a truly professional thief willing to run substantial risks. But each of them reduces the likelihood of a break-in at your home. Taken together, they can achieve your purpose—protecting your property, lowering your insurance rates, and increasing your peace of mind.

In contrast to counterterrorist measures, antiterrorist steps are largely defensive in nature and can be unilateral or taken in concert with others. The difference, if I may extend my analogy, is between stronger locks and an aggressive policy of pursuing and jailing burglars.

#### More Resources Contribute to Success

One of the most important developments in the 1980s has been the public outrage throughout the world with terrorist violence. This strong public reaction has pressured politicians to make more money available to the antiterrorist fight here and abroad. These new resources form the hard core of our revitalized antiterrorist tactics.

Not surprisingly, the police and intelligence agencies first dedicated these new resources to the fight against domestic terrorists. So not surprisingly, the first successes of antiterrorist measures were seen at home. In Italy, anger at the kidnaping and murder of Aldo Moro led to actions which shattered the old Red Brigades. In Germany, the Baader-Meinhof gang was broken through aggressive intelligence collection and vigorous law enforcement. The same has happened in French efforts to counter *Action Directe* and in Belgium with the Fighting Communist Cells. Just 2 weeks ago, Spanish and French officials, acting together, dealt an important blow to the Spanish terrorist group ETA [Basque Fatherland and Freedom].

As nations developed better tactics for dealing with their homegrown terrorists, they have recently turned their attention to international cooperation. For example, the countries of the European Community have established the so-called Trevi Group made up of ministers of justice and interior. The Trevi Group has considerably expanded police and intelligence cooperation among the 12 EC members. For example, the ministers now regularly produce an agreed assessment of the terrorist threat facing the EC countries. And they have developed a mechanism to exchange specific information on the movements and operating methods of terrorists. INTERPOL [International Criminal Police Organization], which had resisted dealing with terrorism because of its political overtones, finally began coordinating information on terrorism in 1985 at U.S. request. Our FBI [Federal Bureau of Investigation], for instance, can now notify the INTERPOL secretariat of arrest warrants we have out on terrorists. INTERPOL then sends the names by alert to all of its member countries.

Specific antiterrorist measures developed by the West include:

- Near universal screening of all airline passengers for metallic objects, so that terrorists can no longer stroll aboard a flight with a pistol or bomb in their pockets;
- Tighter security at diplomatic installations so that an attack on an embassy is likely to require the attackers to absorb casualties, thereby making an attack less likely;
- "Watch lists" of terrorists for border police to stop terrorists entering countries; and
- Measures to sow dissension within terrorist groups through black and gray covert operations.

#### Tactical Measures Succeeding

As we have had success in developing and implementing a counterterrorist strategy, now our tactical measures are showing signs of working.

Take, for example, the question of air travel. Over the past 15 years, the international community has developed an extensive set of antiterrorist, defensive measures to protect air travelers. Before these steps, there were 18-20

hijackings each year, with substantial casualties and damage. Last year, there were only two hijackings—the fewest since we started recording figures 20 years ago. Similarly, there has been a significant decline in terrorist attacks on our diplomatic establishments.

The "watch lists" we have developed are in the hands of border police in many countries. Border police are becoming much more attentive to suspicious travelers, too. As a result, terrorists run considerable risks crossing international borders. In January, two Lebanese terrorists were arrested on successive days trying to smuggle explosives into Italy and Germany.

Finally, because of increased attention to antiterrorism by Western governments, terrorist groups can no longer be sure they have not been penetrated by Western intelligence agencies.

And as countries dedicate more resources to the fight against terrorism, they are catching and prosecuting increasing numbers of international terrorists.

- In London, Nezar Hindawi received a life sentence for his attempt to blow up an El Al plane.
- In Paris, Georges Ibrahim Abdallah received a life sentence for his role in the murders of a U.S. Army attache and an Israeli diplomat.
- In Germany, a Lebanese terrorist named Hamadei faces air piracy and murder charges for his role in the TWA 847 hijacking.
- In New York City, Mohammed Atta, an Abu Nidal terrorist, awaits extradition to Israel to face murder charges arising from fire bombing and machinegunning of a bus.
- In Washington, D.C., a Lebanese terrorist named Fawaz Younis awaits trial on hostage-taking charges arising from the hijacking of Jordanian Airlines Flight 401 in June 1985.
- Just 2 weeks ago in Madrid, a Palestinian terrorist was sentenced to 47 years in prison for directing the June 1986 bombing attempt against an El Al airliner.

As with the strategic steps mentioned earlier, no single tactical measure, or even group of measures, will solve the problem. But the cumulative effect of the measures helps achieve our strategic purpose.

## Conclusion

Terrorism has by no means disappeared from the world scene. It is an ancient problem that will be with us for the foreseeable future as terrorists constantly revise and adapt their methods of attack.

However, newspaper headlines about spectacular terrorist attacks are gradually being replaced by brief press reports on terrorist trials. This is attributable to the important gains the West has made in recent years. We have developed a coherent strategy to reduce terrorism. With a fortified political will, we are changing the overall political environment, making it less benign to terrorism. We have succeeded in pressuring states that sponsor it, and we have strengthened the legal

framework for punishing terrorists. We have also developed effective tactical measures to supplement our overall strategy, such as tightening security on obvious targets.

Our counterterrorism policy is showing signs of success. If it is pursued over time, I am confident we can usher in an era when international terrorism is no longer a dominant subject on the international agenda.

<sup>1</sup>The complete transcript of the hearings will be published by the committee and will be available from the Superintendent of Documents, U.S. Government Printing Office, Washington, D.C. 204

## Iran's Use of International Terrorism

*The following paper and chronology were prepared by the Office of the Ambassador at Large for Counter-Terrorism and made available October 27, 1987, in connection with the announcement of U.S. sanctions against Iran. The chronology of selected terrorist incidents is not intended to be all-inclusive but is illustrative of Iran's involvement in and support for terrorism and terrorist groups. The groups cited in this chronology have links with Iran.*

Iran is currently one of the world's most active states supporting international terrorism and subversion against other countries. The revolutionaries who came to power in Iran with the Ayatollah Ruhollah Khomeini first attracted public attention to their use of terrorism with the takeover of the U.S. Embassy in Tehran on November 4, 1979. Their activities have continued since then in a variety of forms and places. The Government of Iran regards terrorism as an integral tool of its foreign policy, to be used when the opportunity seems propitious.

An official explanation of the use of terrorism was made as early as May 1979 by Ayatollah Sadeq Khalkhali who supported killing:

... those who enter into a war against God and His prophets and who try to spread corruption on earth. No one who kills any of these persons can be arrested as a terrorist by a foreign government inasmuch as

he will have carried out the orders of Islamic Revolutionary Court of Iran.

Iran has shown exceptional readiness to use terrorism and subversive other governments as a policy tool. Government of Iran or groups over which it has strong influence have tackled civilians, government officials, peacekeeping forces, Iranian dissidents at home and abroad, and the economic assets of neighboring states. Kidnapping, car bombing, suicide attacks, jacking, and assassination have been used in these attacks. While Iranian Government personnel have been directly in terrorist operations, particularly those against Iranian dissidents the Iranian Government prefers to use surrogates such as the Lebanese-based Hizballah group.

The Iranian Government's use of terrorism and subversion of other countries is wide ranging. The major goals of Iranian-backed terrorism and subversion include spreading its Shi'a fundamentalist revolution to other Islamic states, creating a copy of an Iranian Islamic Republic in Lebanon, and using Western influence—especially that of the United States—from the Middle East. Iran also uses terrorism as part of a broader strategy to deter Kuwait, Saudi Arabia, and other Arab states from supporting Iraq in the Gulf War.

Iran recruits disgruntled Shi'a from the Gulf states and elsewhere, gives them paramilitary and terrorist training, and returns them home. Some of the Iranian-backed terrorist activities



gulf are conducted by Iranian-in- and sponsored Shi'a radicals. Iranian-inspired Kuwaiti Shi'a convicted of a number of sabotage attacks at Kuwaiti oil facilities since 1986. Groups in the gulf area promoted by Iran include the Supreme Assembly for the Islamic Revolution in Bahrain, the Islamic Front for the Liberation of Bahrain, the Islamic Dawa Party (which has local branches in Kuwait, Bahrain, and Lebanon), and the Organization for the Islamic Revolution in the Arabian Peninsula.

But Iranian terrorist-related activities reach well beyond the gulf. Negotiation officials announced in July that they apprehended members of what they described as a new Iranian-aided terrorist ring with explosives in their possession. In March 1987, Tunisia broke relations with Iran, charging it was supporting fundamentalist groups trying to undermine the government.

In Lebanon, Hizballah operates under multiple cover names, including "Islamic Jihad," "Right Against Wrong," and "Revolutionary Justice Organization." In Iraq and Kuwait, the Dawa Party has been used. Iran has trained these groups with financial assistance, arms, and training. In Lebanon, Iranian Revolutionary Guards coordinate closely with Hizballah leaders and maintain co-located headquarters. Iran has made clear its ability to manipulate Hizballah's foreign hostages. The pattern of support, combined with evidence of direct Iranian involvement in some Shi'a terrorist operations (e.g., the 1985-86 Paris bombings and the 1991 "Dawa 17" attacks on U.S., British, and Kuwaiti targets in Kuwait), demonstrates Iran's culpability in many, if not all, of its radical Shi'a surrogates' terrorist operations. Hizballah's involvement in hostage-takings, kidnappings, and bombings is well known.

The Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps, formed in the early stages of the Iranian revolution, has served to support Iranian terrorism abroad, especially in Lebanon. A contingent of Revolutionary Guards went to Lebanon's Bekaa Valley in the summer of 1982 and remained there since. One of their principal functions is liaison with and training of Hizballah.

Iran also has shown a disregard for internationally accepted conventions and norms, including those applying to diplomats. On November 4, 1979, the U.S. Embassy in Tehran was seized

and its personnel held hostage for 444 days. More recently, a British diplomat in Tehran was abducted and beaten in May of this year. The French Embassy in Tehran was surrounded as part of the "embassy war" with France when French officials attempted to question a suspected terrorist who took refuge in the Iranian Embassy in Paris.

## Examples of Iranian Terrorism and Subversion

We have good reason to believe that Iran or its surrogates are responsible for the following acts. For more specific information, see the detailed chronology (pp. 52-53).

### Kidnappings in Lebanon

Although the Iranian-supported Hizballah is responsible for almost all of the kidnappings of westerners in Lebanon, Iran exercises strong influence over all hostage-related decisions. For example, we believe Iran ordered the June 1967 kidnapping of journalist Charles Glass, who was held for 2 months before he escaped in August.

### Assassinations of Anti-Khomeini Iranian Dissidents

**October 1987**—Two murdered in London

**August 1987**—One murdered in Istanbul

**August 1987**—One murdered in Geneva

**July 1987**—Failed assassination attempt in London

**July 1987**—Three murdered in Karachi

**January 1987**—One murdered in Hamburg

### Attacks Against Arab and Islamic Interests

**July 1987**—Disruption of the pilgrimages to Mecca, Saudi Arabia; at least 400 killed

**January 1987**—Attempt to disrupt the Organization of Islamic Countries meeting in Kuwait by a series of bombings

**1986**—Bombing of Saudia airline offices in New Delhi, Vienna, and Karachi

**August 1986**—Arrest of 113 Iranian pilgrims trying to smuggle 51 kilos of plastic explosives into Mecca, Saudi Arabia

**June 1986-May 1987**—Bombings at oil installations in Kuwait

**May 1985**—Attempt to assassinate Amir Sabah of Kuwait

**December 1983**—Bombings of Kuwaiti Government buildings along with bombings of U.S. and French Embassies

### Attacks on Peacekeeping Forces

**October 1983**—Suicide bombings of the French and U.S. Marine barracks in Beirut

### Embassy Bombings

**September 1984**—Bombing of U.S. Embassy annex in Lebanon

**December 1983**—Attacks on the U.S. and French Embassies in Kuwait

**April 1983**—U.S. Embassy in Lebanon destroyed by suicide bomber

### Airline Hijackings

**July 1987**—Hijacker of Air Afrique flight from Rome to Paris claimed Hizballah affiliation

**December 1986**—Hijacking of Iraqi airliner en route to Jordan; over 60 killed when the plane crashed in Saudi Arabia

**June 1985**—TWA 847 hijackers had and have strong ties to Iran

**December 1984**—Kuwait Airlines flight 221 hijacked to Tehran; two U.S. Government auditors, Charles Hegna and William Stanford, killed

### Bombings in Europe

**December 1985-September 1986**—Series of bombings in Paris

**August 1986**—Bookstore in London

**July 1985**—Northwest Airlines office in Copenhagen

## Responses to Iranian Terrorism

Several countries have responded to Iranian terrorism.

Tunisia broke diplomatic relations with Iran earlier this year, charging Iran was stirring up fundamentalist unrest. After a Tunisian court in September passed sentences on 90 Tunisian nationals accused of fundamentalist subversive activities, several pro-Iranian groups held demonstrations and threatened retaliation.

The French Government in 1983 closed down the Iranian cultural center in Paris because of concern it was being used by potential terrorists. In July 1987, France broke diplomatic relations with Iran as part of the so-called embassy war, which started when an Iranian translator without diplomatic immunity fled to the Iranian Embassy to avoid questioning about his role in a series of terrorist bombings in France. Subsequently, French officials in Iran were ordered to appear before Iranian courts on trumped-up charges. Each country's embassy continues to be surrounded by the security forces of the other.

The United Kingdom, France, and the United States, exercising their special responsibilities in West Berlin, ordered the expulsion in August 1987 of Iranian consular officials following Iran's renewed threats of terrorist activities.

The United States broke diplomatic relations and imposed a series of trade and financial sanctions against Iran after official government complicity in the seizure of our embassy became clear. After the hostages were released in January 1981, the trade and financial restrictions were lifted. Iran was formally placed on the U.S. Government's list of countries repeatedly supporting acts of international terrorism in January 1984. (Other countries now on the list are Libya, Syria, Cuba, and the People's Democratic Republic of Yemen.) A number of measures, including a ban on Iranian imports, have been taken because of Iran's support for terrorism and its refusal to end the war with Iraq, which has threatened international shipping. Export controls and other economic measures have been taken against Iran in the past and, coupled with these more recent additional steps, are part of a process of trying to contain Iran's support for terrorism and subversion. ■

## Chronology of Selected Terrorist Incidents by Iranian-Supported Groups, 1980-87

The following is an illustrative list of terrorist incidents attributed to Iran or Iranian surrogates.

1987

**October 2: London.** An anti-Khomeini activist and his son were shot and killed in their home. A group called "The Guardians of the Islamic Revolution and Soldiers of Imam Khomeini" claimed responsibility.

**August 10: Geneva.** A former Iranian Air Force pilot who had defected in February was shot by two unknown assailants. Iran is suspected.

**July 24: Geneva.** An Air Afrique airliner was hijacked en route from Rome to Paris and diverted to Geneva. One French passenger was killed. The Lebanese hijacker was subdued, and Swiss police took control of the aircraft. The flight originated in Brazzaville with an intermediate stop in Bangui. The hijacker said he was affiliated with Hizballah.

**June 17: Beirut.** American Charles Glass was kidnapped. Iran reportedly approved the operation, which was carried out by elements of Hizballah. Glass escaped on August 17.

**January 24: Beirut.** Four Beirut University College professors were kidnapped (three American citizens and one Indian U.S. permanent resident). Responsibility claimed by "Islamic Jihad for the Liberation of Palestine."

**January 20: Beirut.** Church of England envoy Terry Waite disappeared. Hizballah is suspected.

**January 19: Kuwait.** Several explosions damaged several oil installations south of Kuwait City. Iranian involvement is suspected.

**January 17: Beirut.** German businessman Rudolph Cordes was kidnapped. Three days later, another German businessman, Alfred Schmidt, was kidnapped. "Organization of the Oppressed on Earth" claimed responsibility. Hizballah is suspected.

1986

**December 25: Saudi Arabia.** An Iraqi airliner en route from Baghdad to Amman crashed in Saudi Arabia following a hijacking attempt; at least 62 of the

107 persons on board were killed, including two of the four hijackers. Several groups claimed responsibility, but Iranian-backed terrorists probably were responsible.

**October 26: Istanbul.** A prominent Iranian dissident was killed. Iran is suspected.

**October 21: Beirut.** Edward Aunтин Tracy was kidnapped. The Revolutionary Justice Organization, a cover name used by Hizballah, claimed responsibility.

**September: Paris.** A series of bombings was claimed by "Committee in Solidarity with Arab Political Prisoners." The French have arrested Hizballah members involved and believe this network was connected to Iran. (See December 1985 entry.)

**September: Beirut.** The French military attache was assassinated in September by a Hizballah member.

**September 12: Beirut.** American citizen Joseph Cicippio was kidnapped. Revolutionary Justice Organization claimed responsibility.

**September 9: Beirut.** American citizen Frank Reed was kidnapped. Hizballah is suspected.

**August 8: Mecca.** 113 Iranian pilgrims were arrested with 51 kilos of plastic explosives.

**August: New Delhi.** Saudia air office was bombed. Other airline offices were bombed in Vienna in April and Karachi in May. Iran is suspected.

**August 19: London.** A video shown by an Iranian dissident was bombed; one person died. Iran is suspected.

**June: Kuwait.** Five explosions cured at Kuwaiti oil installations. 100 backed Kuwaiti Shi'a are suspected.

**April 28: Beirut.** Two Greek Cypriots were kidnapped. The Islamic Liberation Organization, a name used by Hizballah, claimed responsibility.

**April 7: Stockholm.** The Northwest Airlines office was bombed. Hizballah is suspected.

**March 8: Beirut.** A four-man French TV crew was kidnapped, probably by elements of Hizballah.

**February: Beirut.** Seven Iraqi Ba'ath officials were killed. Dawa Party is suspected.

**ber: Paris.** A series of bombings aimed by "Committee in Solidarity with Arab Political Prisoners." The French have arrested Hizballah members involved and believe this network was connected to Iran. (See September 1986 entry.)

**December 25: Istanbul.** A prominent Iranian dissident was assassinated.

**November 24: Frankfurt.** A car exploded in a parking lot adjacent to a U.S. military shopping center. German authorities have issued an arrest warrant for an Iranian identified as having placed the bomb.

**July 12: Copenhagen.**

Simultaneous bombings damaged the Northwest Orient Airlines office and a mosque; one person was killed and injured. Islamic Jihad took responsibility. Hizballah is suspected.

**June 14: Lebanon.** TWA 847 was hijacked by two Lebanese Shi'a gunmen en route to Athens from Rome and forced to land in Beirut after two return trips from Beirut to Algiers. The hijackers demanded the release of Shi'a prisoners. U.S. Navy diver Robert Denton was murdered aboard the aircraft. Hizballah gave support to the hijackers, holding 39 Americans hostage in Beirut for 17 days.

**June 10: Beirut.** American citizen Thomas Sutherland was kidnapped. Islamic Jihad claimed responsibility.

**July 28: Beirut.** American citizen David Jacobsen was kidnapped. Islamic Jihad claimed responsibility. Jacobsen was released November 2, 1986.

**July 25: Kuwait.** Members of the Iran-backed Dawa Party carried out a bombing on the motorcade of the Emir of Kuwait. Six people died in the explosion and ensuing melee, and 12 were injured. The Amir suffered minor injuries. Islamic Jihad claimed responsibility.

**July 22: Beirut.** French citizens Paul Kaufmann and Michel Seurat were kidnapped.

**March 16: Beirut.** Terry Anderson was kidnapped. Islamic Jihad claimed responsibility.

**March 22: Beirut.** Marcel Carton, Michel Fontaine, and Danielle Perez of the French Embassy in Lebanon were kidnapped. Ms. Perez was released 9 days later.

**January 8: Lebanon.** An American priest, Rev. Lawrence Jenco, was kidnapped. Islamic Jihad claimed responsibility. Rev. Jenco was released July 26, 1986.

1984

**December 4: Tehran.** Kuwait Airways Flight 221, carrying 166 people including six Americans, was hijacked to Tehran. The hijackers demanded the release of prisoners held in Kuwait. Two U.S. AID officials were murdered. U.S. and Kuwaiti hostages were set apart and tortured. The Iranian Government assisted the hijackers.

**November: Ladispoli, Italy.** Seven pro-Iranian Shi'a were arrested for planning a car attack against the U.S. Embassy in Rome.

**September 20: Beirut.** The U.S. Embassy annex in East Beirut was severely damaged by a suicide car bomber. Twenty-three persons, including two Americans, were killed and at least 60 injured. Islamic Jihad claimed responsibility.

**July 31: Tehran.** An Air France airliner en route from Frankfurt to Paris was hijacked to Iran by three Lebanese Shi'a.

**July 14: Pakistan.** Police arrested eight Iranians suspected of planning attacks against a Pan Am office and three Saudi Arabian airlines offices. Iran is thought to have been responsible.

**May 8: Beirut.** Rev. Benjamin Weir, an American clergyman, was kidnapped. He was released September 14, 1985.

**March 7: Beirut.** Jeremy Levin, an American journalist, was kidnapped. He escaped February 14, 1985.

**March 16: Beirut.** William Buckley, an American Embassy officer, was kidnapped. Islamic Jihad claimed he was "executed" in October 1985, but other evidence indicates he died from wounds inflicted during beatings while in captivity.

**February 10: Beirut.** Frank Reiger, an American professor at the American University of Beirut, was kidnapped. He was rescued on April 15, 1984.

**January 18: Beirut.** Malcolm Kerr, president of the American University of Beirut, was assassinated. Islamic Jihad claimed responsibility.

1983

**October 23: Beirut.** U.S. Marine barracks were bombed, killing 240 and wounding 70. Islamic Jihad claimed responsibility.

**October 23: Beirut.** Another truck filled with explosives crashed into a French MNF [Multinational Peacekeeping Force] barracks, killing 56 and wounding 15. Islamic Jihad claimed responsibility.

**December 12: Kuwait.** Simultaneous bombings of U.S. and French Embassies.

**April 18: Beirut.** Five U.S. Marines, part of the Multinational Peacekeeping Force, were attacked.

**April 18: Beirut.** A car bomb destroyed the U.S. Embassy, killing 49 and wounding 120.

1982

**March 22: Beirut.** Third Secretary Ali Hajim Sultan of the Iraqi Embassy was assassinated. Iranian involvement is suspected.

1981

**September 4: Beirut.** French Ambassador Louis Delamare was assassinated by four gunmen. Iranian-backed Lebanese Red Brigades claimed responsibility.

1980

**September 26: Beirut.** The U.S. Embassy was struck by three rocket-propelled grenades. Iranian-sponsored "Forces of Mujahedeen" claimed responsibility.

**July 22: Washington, D.C.** Exiled Iranian diplomat Ali Akbar Tabatabai was assassinated in his suburban Bethesda home. The assassin was identified as Daoud Salahuddin of the "Islamic Guerrillas in America."

**July 18: Paris.** Attempted assassination of former Iranian Prime Minister Shahpour Bakhtiar by Anis Naccache, who is serving a life sentence for the crime.

**July 7: Rome.** Explosions occurred at multinational corporation Snia-Techint's office. On August 8, an explosion occurred at Snia-Techint's director's home. No injuries were reported as a result of either blast. "The Guardians of the Islamic Revolution" claimed responsibility. ■

## UN Calls on Soviet Union to Withdraw From Afghanistan

*Following are a statement by Herbert S. Okun, U.S. Deputy Permanent Representative to the United Nations, in a plenary session of the General Assembly on November 10, 1987, and the text of the UN General Assembly resolution adopted that day.*

### AMBASSADOR OKUN'S STATEMENT

Almost 8 years after the Soviet Union invaded Afghanistan, we again must debate the situation in that tragic nation. In spite of the fact that eight General Assemblies have overwhelmingly approved resolutions criticizing the Soviet occupation of Afghanistan, the Soviet Union continues to attempt to subjugate the Afghan people.

Even while this debate is going on, the Soviet Union is waging war against the Afghan people. This policy of military conquest and disregard of the rights of a sovereign people has not succeeded. It has been resisted by the fierce attachment to freedom of the Afghan people. The Soviet leadership should know better than to challenge the sovereignty and independence of a proud people. Their own brave people courageously resisted the Nazi German attempt to subjugate them during the Second World War. This war of conquest in Afghanistan has lasted 4 years and 21 days longer than the Soviet struggle against the Nazis in World War II.

The resolution before us today outlines a fair and comprehensive solution to a problem which has outraged people everywhere. It calls for the complete withdrawal of foreign troops, the right of the Afghan people to choose their own form of government, restoration of Afghanistan's independence and non-aligned status, and the right of the refugees to return in safety and honor.

My government supports these fundamental principles. It supports as well the search for a negotiated political settlement to end the agony the Afghan people have so long endured. The policy of the U.S. Government toward the Afghanistan situation is clear and consistent.

- The United States seeks an early settlement which provides for the prompt withdrawal of the invading forces and for restoration to the Afghan people of freedom to choose their own political course.

- The United States firmly believes that a peaceful settlement is possible.

- The United States strongly supports the efforts of the Secretary General and of his personal representative to find such a solution.

This year the Soviet Union has attempted to persuade the international community that Moscow genuinely wants a negotiated political settlement and that it has decided to withdraw its troops in order to accomplish this. Its campaign has been accompanied by high-sounding initiatives from Kabul calling for "national reconciliation" among the opposing Afghan parties. Let us review the record. Let us compare these assertions of peaceful intentions with what actually has occurred over the past year.

What did they say? In January 1987, the Kabul regime announced a "cease-fire." It subsequently claimed to have extended this "cease-fire" until January 1988. What did they do? They stepped up their military efforts, and in the summer of 1987, the Soviets and the Kabul regime army mounted the largest offensive engagements of the war against the resistance in Qandahar and Paktia Provinces.

The Soviet Union has repeatedly stated that it has "made the decision to withdraw." This is a welcome commitment—if it is sincere. Here again the Soviet Union's deeds do not correspond to its words. The Soviet military continues to construct an elaborate and permanent logistical infrastructure in Afghanistan. Hundreds of Soviet advisers are in Afghanistan to try to prop up an increasingly weakened client regime.

Soviet assertions of peaceful intent are further contradicted by Soviet actions on the ground. For several months earlier this year, the Soviets sought to intimidate Pakistan through repeated air attacks against Pakistani border villages. During the height of these raids in March and April, hundreds of Pakistani civilians were killed.

The Afghan secret police has stepped up a campaign of terrorist bombing side Pakistan, which already has cost hundreds of lives this year. These reckless acts internationalize an already tragic and dangerous conflict.

The Kabul regime tried to appear flexible and willing to compromise. January 1987, it put forward a so-called policy of national reconciliation puring to offer the opposition an opportunity to share power. The reality is quite different. Following the pattern used to prevent the emergence of popularly elected governments in Eastern Europe immediately after the end of World II, the tiny Afghan Communist Party insists on retaining control of the key portfolios of government in order to continue to dominate the political life of Afghanistan. All significant opposition figures in Afghanistan have ignored this offer, and the Afghan resistance has totally rejected it.

Moscow's hand-chosen satrap in Kabul, Najibullah, is a former head of the Afghan secret police and a creation of the Soviet KGB [Committee for State Security]. The tiny and splintered Afghan communist movement, which accounts for less than 1% of the population, is despised by the Afghan people. Lacking popular support, the regime attempts to exert control through terror. The Afghan secret police, known as KHAD, is modeled after the KGB and is the most pervasive and systematic violator of human rights in areas under regime control. Through surveillance, arrest, imprisonment, and torture KHAD has instilled an atmosphere of suspicion and fear. Amnesty International recently reported that torture used systematically by KHAD.

As opposition to the Kabul regime has grown, and as party frictions increase, the Soviet Union has been forced to exercise a more direct role in propping up its clients. Soviet military and civilian advisers sit in almost all ministries and make or approve decisions in the name of the regime. So weak is the Soviet client regime that its tenuous control extends only over a few major cities. The Afghan Army continues to frustrate Soviet and regime efforts to make it an effective military force. Plagued by desertions and low morale, the army remains at half pre-1979 level, despite use of press gangs to conscript youths as young as 15. This summer Afghan troops deserted to the resistance by the hundreds. Meanwhile resistance strength grows.

The Kabul regime claims that tens of thousands of refugees have returned to Afghanistan in response to its call for "national reconciliation." In fact, the devastation and Kabul regime repression have forced an exodus of millions from their homes. Almost 5 million Afghans have fled their country. Millions more are displaced within Afghanistan itself. The net population of the country continues to exceed the number of returnees. As host to the largest refugee population in the world—over 3 million Afghans—Pakistan has earned universal admiration for the truly generous manner in which it has borne this enormous burden.

Enjoying widespread support from the Afghan populace, the heroic *shujadin* for 8 years has held a great way at bay in a tenacious defense of a ancient way of life. The might of the militarily and technologically superior Soviet Army has not been able to defeat this genuinely nationalist resistance movement of the Afghan people. Only three-quarters of the Afghan countryside remains under resistance control. Paradoxically Soviet efforts to subjugate Afghanistan have fostered a sense of Afghan nationhood based on common opposition to the Soviet occupation.

If the Soviet Union genuinely desires to do so, it can easily and rapidly find the means to solve this tragic conflict. Under the leadership of the UN Secretary General and his personal representative for Afghanistan, a framework for a settlement has emerged. There is still no agreement, however, on the crucial element of this framework—what timetable for the withdrawal of Soviet troops. The Soviet Union adamantly refuses to commit itself to a timetable and a date certain to begin the withdrawal of its troops. Without its commitment from the Soviet Union, the war goes on.

I reiterate today my government's repeated assurances to the Soviet Union that the United States is prepared to play a helpful role in bringing about a negotiated settlement. The United States has assured the Secretary General of its willingness to serve as guarantor of an appropriate settlement involving the withdrawal of Soviet troops. My government recognizes the need for a settlement which is just, fair and satisfactory to all the concerned parties, including the Soviet Union.

I recall a statement made by the Soviet Union's Foreign Minister to the League of Nations half a century ago. Maxim Litvinov stated that "peace is indivisible." He asserted that, and I quote, "It has now become clear to the whole world that each war is the creation of a preceding war and the generator of new present or future wars. . . . We must tell ourselves that sooner or later any war will bring misfortune to all countries, whether belligerents or neutrals."

Shortly after his release from internal exile, Andrey Sakharov, reflecting the growing popular Soviet consciousness of the war, termed his country's intervention in Afghanistan "uncommonly cruel and distressing." He called for "the immediate withdrawal of Soviet troops . . . so that the Afghan people can solve their own domestic problems."

In this light, I join with the vast majority of delegates in this hall today in appealing to the Soviet Union to commit itself to the path of peace and to permit the Afghan people to choose their own destiny free of outside interference. We ask the Soviet Union to accept a negotiated formula to end this conflict which would permit it to live in harmony with a small neighbor that would be neutral and nonaligned and which would not constitute a threat to any other nation.

Later today this body will vote overwhelmingly to request the Soviet Union to match its words with deeds. We will know true Soviet intentions when we meet a year from now. If at that time, Soviet troops remain on Afghan soil, the whole world will know that the Soviet Union's goal is not peace but conquest. If, however, the Soviet Union agrees to the elements of a fair and just settlement which are already on the table, the whole world will welcome its contribution to the establishment of a free, neutral, non-aligned, and peaceful Afghanistan.

## GENERAL ASSEMBLY RESOLUTION 42/15<sup>2</sup>

### *The General Assembly,*

*Having considered the item entitled "The situation in Afghanistan and its implications for international peace and security",*

*Recalling its resolutions ES-6/2 of 14 January 1980, 35/37 of 20 November 1980, 36/34 of 18 November 1981, 37/37 of 29 November 1982, 38/29 of 23 November 1983, 39/13 of 15 November 1984, 40/12 of 13 November 1985 and 41/33 of 5 November 1986,*

*Reaffirming the purposes and principles of the Charter of the United Nations and the obligation of all States to refrain in their international relations from the threat or use of force against the sovereignty, territorial integrity and political independence of any State,*

*Reaffirming further the inalienable right of all peoples to determine their own form of government and to choose their own economic, political and social system free from outside intervention, subversion, coercion or constraint of any kind whatsoever,*

*Gravely concerned at the continuing foreign armed intervention in Afghanistan, in contravention of the above principles, and its serious implications for international peace and security,*

*Noting the increasing concern of the international community over the continued and serious sufferings of the Afghan people and over the magnitude of social and economic problems posed to Pakistan and Iran by the presence on their soil of millions of Afghan refugees, and the continuing increase in their numbers,*

*Deeply conscious of the urgent need for a political solution of the grave situation in respect of Afghanistan,*

*Taking note of the report of the Secretary-General [UN Document A/42/600-S/19160], and the status of the diplomatic process initiated by him,*

*Recognizing the importance of the initiatives of the Organization of the Islamic Conference and the efforts of the Movement of Non-Aligned Countries for a political solution of the situation in respect of Afghanistan,*

1. *Reiterates that the preservation of the sovereignty, territorial integrity, political independence and non-aligned character of Afghanistan is essential for a peaceful solution of the problem;*

2. *Reaffirms the right of the Afghan people to determine their own form of government and to choose their economic, political and social system free from outside intervention, subversion, coercion or constraint of any kind whatsoever;*

3. *Calls for the immediate withdrawal of the foreign troops from Afghanistan;*

4. *Calls upon all parties concerned to work for the urgent achievement of a political solution, in accordance with the provisions of the present resolution, and the creation of the necessary conditions which would enable the Afghan refugees to return voluntarily to their homes in safety and honour;*

5. *Renews its appeal* to all States and national and international organizations to continue to extend humanitarian relief assistance with a view to alleviating the hardship of the Afghan refugees, in coordination with the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees;

6. *Expresses its appreciation and support* for the efforts and constructive steps taken by the Secretary-General, especially the diplomatic process initiated by him, in the search for a solution to the problem;

7. *Requests* the Secretary-General to continue those efforts with a view to promoting a political solution, in accordance with the provisions of the present resolution, and the exploration of securing appropriate guarantees for the non-use of force, or threat of force, against the political independence, sovereignty, territorial integrity and security of all neighbouring States, on the basis of mutual guarantees and strict non-interference in each other's internal affairs and with full regard for the principles of the Charter of the United Nations;

8. *Requests* the Secretary-General to keep Member States and the Security Council concurrently informed of progress towards the implementation of the present resolution and to submit to Member States a report on the situation at the earliest appropriate opportunity;

9. *Decides* to include in the provisional agenda of its forty-third session the item entitled "The situation in Afghanistan and its implications for international peace and security".

<sup>1</sup>USUN press release 92.

<sup>2</sup>Adopted by a vote of 123 (U.S.) to 19, with 11 abstentions. ■

## UN Consideration of the AIDS Pandemic

*Following are statements by Dr. C. Everett Koop, a member of the U.S. delegation to the UN General Assembly and Surgeon General of the United States, made in plenary session; the text of General Assembly Resolution 42/8 adopted by consensus; and two Department statements.*

### DR. KOOP'S STATEMENT, OCT. 20, 1987<sup>1</sup>

The United Nations was created with hope and promise following a period of despair and devastation. And, in a way, that is what I want to talk about today—hope amid despair, promise amid devastation. I am referring, of course, to a disease this entire planet faces—the disease known as acquired immune deficiency syndrome (AIDS). This is a disease that most often cuts down those in the prime of their lives. It kills the poor, and it kills the affluent; it is a disease that knows no geographic boundaries. Populations of all countries are vulnerable to attack.

I welcome the General Assembly's decision to discuss this frightening disease, and I welcome the resolution placed before you, commending the World Health Organization (WHO) for its impressive efforts to coordinate the attack on this awesome threat and urging action by governments in all countries to initiate where necessary and improve where possible their individual and collective efforts. My delegation sincerely hopes this resolution is adopted by consensus.

I come to this chamber today not as a diplomat but as a physician. And I come to you with a physician's plea. My plea is for greater compassion and for intensified international cooperation under the WHO. It is a plea for all the nations of the world and all their component parts—in the health community, the educational community, the social services community, industry, non-governmental organizations—to mobilize their energies and their resources and to escalate their common fight against AIDS.

In each of our countries, we must start with an understanding of the disease and an acceptance that it is a risk to the entire society and not just to one or more narrow groups. I recognize that the political and public health leaders in some countries may not have

wanted, at the start, to collect and list data on an epidemic such as this. But we cannot truly understand a disease, much less stop it, if we do not know where it is and how it acts. I believe that the underreporting of AIDS could be retarding our progress in the fight against it, and I am pleased to learn that WHO has made advances in stimulating more openness and honesty about the impact of this problem. I sincerely hope that all delegations here will urge that this growing openness continues.

We also need to recognize that while AIDS is a global problem, it is potentially more destructive to the developing world than it is to the industrialized world.

In developing nations, the people stricken with AIDS are primarily the young, the aged, and the sick. Deaths among these breadwinners cause both family income and nutrition to decline, poverty and disease increase, and AIDS a major threat to family life there is more.

Because AIDS strikes the healthy and usually the young productive in the prime of life, AIDS is also a hindrance to development. Developing nations will be losing workers in a culture, industry, and many other economic areas, not to mention teachers, engineers, physicians, health care workers, government officials, and many other professionals. These are talented people that no country—and especially not a developing country—can afford to lose.

And beyond that, there are the innocent victims—the children, the future of our world—who are and will continue to be afflicted with AIDS. A sad fact is that AIDS can roll back global child survival efforts of both UNICEF [UN Children's Fund] and WHO and undermine all of the hard-won victories in reducing infant mortality.

There are many other unpleasant scenarios. Tourism may suffer due to unreasonable fears about how AIDS is contracted; foreign investment may falter, as well, because AIDS may be leading to reduced local markets and reduced skilled labor, not to mention rising health care costs.

urther the expenses associated with healing with AIDS will inevitably require funds and personnel from other programs in health, education, and other vital sectors and thus jeopardize investments already made in those areas. AIDS can defeat the purposes of foreign assistance that international banks and industrialized countries have provided.

So, it is not fair that those whose material losses are so threatening may be the hardest. But the reality is that AIDS can defeat a developing nation's hopes for the future. Altogether, these are very sad possibilities to consider.

In the industrialized world, the consequences are also very great. We have already seen this in the United States. My country is not the most affected country in per capita terms but, as you all know, has more cases than any other nation. What we have seen is

Forty-three thousand AIDS cases have been reported in the United States, with 25,000 deaths. We estimate that 5 million additional Americans are infected by the AIDS virus and can relate it to others even though they currently show no signs of illness. Recent data indicate that 30%–50% of infected individuals can be expected to develop AIDS within 7 years of first becoming infected.

We now know that the costs are astronomical, even for a country with many resources as the United States. Treatment can cost \$50,000—perhaps more—for a single patient. We estimate that by 1991, the costs of treating AIDS in the United States will have reached between \$8 billion and \$16 billion a year.

At the same time, we are making remarkable strides in research. We have learned more about AIDS in 6 months than we did about polio in 40 years or about whooping cough in several generations. But there are limits to this knowledge. President Reagan has pointed out that "science is clearly capable of breathtaking advances, but is not capable of miracles." He's right; we are if we are able to identify a vaccine because of the long incubation period of AIDS, it will take years to know if that vaccine is effective.

One thing that can be done in the short term, however, that will help prevent tourism, business, and foreign investment is to resolve to make the

world's blood supply safe for transfusion. Could we do this, all of us working together, say by 1991? We have the technology and resources to do it. This is an area where the nations of the world could come together and do something that is for everyone's benefit. Victory over this one small facet of the AIDS pandemic will help bind us together in our struggle to contain the source of AIDS. We call upon WHO to give this high priority.

AIDS is such a devastating disease that the cultural, social, economic, and ethical aftershocks will last longer than the disease itself. My own country is suffering, and, in many cases, my fellow citizens are confused and angry.

With this background in the United States, we have declared AIDS to be our priority public health problem. A massive research effort is underway. We have undertaken education campaigns to inform the public about AIDS and means to prevent it and to try to dispel the myths and fears that can lead to discrimination against the victims of AIDS. Of course, we are also supporting bilateral cooperative efforts in developing nations through our Agency for International Development, and we are cooperating fully with the efforts of the World Health Organization. WHO has developed highly sensible and impressive guidelines for action by individual governments, and I believe it imperative that all countries make their AIDS control programs consistent with the WHO guidelines.

One reason I came here today was to endorse WHO's leadership role in the battle against AIDS. WHO's global AIDS program emphasizes prevention through education, the exchange of information, and the need for national program efforts developed in cooperation with WHO. It is clear to me that no country can fight AIDS on its own and that the international coordinating authority of WHO is absolutely essential. My government has provided money and equipment and manpower to assist the WHO program and will continue to do so.

I have been a surgeon for almost 50 years, and I have never seen such a threat as AIDS. I am proud to be a part of a tradition of care that goes back more than two millennia, a tradition that will not abandon the sick and disabled, whoever they are. But now, in this epidemic, reports are trickling in that some doctors, nurses, and other health care workers, through unfounded fear concerning the transmission of AIDS, are refusing to care for

patients with AIDS or who they think have AIDS. This behavior on the part of a misinformed and fearful minority could destroy the fabric of traditional Hippocratic medicine. We must not let that happen.

We must not abandon those who need our help. Just as important, we must not abandon hope or abandon our countries and their economies to the devastating impact of this pandemic. Certainly there are and will be those we cannot save. But I do believe that our scientific efforts, together with knowledge and education, will eventually stop this terrible disease.

As we speak, progress is being made in the laboratory; progress is being made in education; and, as this discussion illustrates, progress is being made in international cooperation.

Let us continue to move forward with good sense and good science and, together, let us give the world something every bit as precious as a vaccine against AIDS. Let us show the world how compassion and enlightenment can triumph over disease.

#### GENERAL ASSEMBLY RESOLUTION 42/8, OCT. 26, 1987

##### *The General Assembly,*

*Deeply concerned* that acquired immune deficiency syndrome (AIDS), caused by one or more naturally occurring retroviruses of undetermined origin, has assumed pandemic proportions affecting all regions of the world and represents a threat to the attainment of health for all,

*Having considered* World Health Assembly resolution WHA40.26 of 15 May 1987 on the Global Strategy for the prevention and control of AIDS and Economic and Social Council resolution 1987/75 of 8 July 1987 on prevention and control of AIDS,

*Recognizing* the established leadership and the essential global directing and coordinating role of the World Health Organization in AIDS prevention, control and education, and related research and public information and, in this context, the vital importance of the World Health Organization Special Programme on AIDS,

1. *Commends* the World Health Organization for its efforts towards global AIDS prevention and control and, in particular, for its support for national AIDS programmes and regional activities, including the meeting of Ministers of Asian and Pacific Governments at Sydney, and the forthcoming World Summit of Ministers of Health on Programmes for AIDS Prevention to be held in London;

2. *Confirms* that the World Health Organization should continue to direct and coordinate the urgent global battle against AIDS;

3. *Commends* those Governments which have initiated action to establish national programmes for the prevention and control of AIDS in line with the Global Strategy of the World Health Organization, and urges other Governments to take similar action;

4. *Calls upon* all States, in addressing the AIDS problem, to take into account the legitimate concerns of other countries and the interests of inter-State relations;

5. *Invites* the World Health Organization to facilitate the exchange of information on and promotion of national and international research for the prevention and control of AIDS through the further development of Collaborating Centres of the World Health Organization and similar existing mechanisms;

6. *Requests* the Secretary-General, in view of all aspects of the problem, to ensure, in close co-operation with the Director-General of the World Health Organization and through the appropriate existing mechanisms, a co-ordinated response by the United Nations system to the AIDS pandemic, and urges all appropriate organizations of the United Nations system, including the specialized agencies, bilateral and multilateral agencies and non-government and voluntary organizations, in conformity with the Global Strategy, to support the world-wide struggle against AIDS;

7. *Invites* the Director-General of the World Health Organization to report to the General Assembly at its forty-third session, through the Economic and Social Council, on new developments in the global AIDS pandemic, and requests the Economic and Social Council to consider the report in accordance with its mandate.

#### DEPARTMENT STATEMENT, OCT. 28, 1987<sup>2</sup>

On Monday, the 42d UN General Assembly passed a historic resolution which unites all countries in a concerted effort to prevent and control AIDS. Recognizing that AIDS is a global pandemic, the United States, the Soviet Union, and many other countries cosponsored this resolution.

In the resolution, the General Assembly endorses the special program on AIDS of WHO and calls on all nations to initiate strong national efforts within WHO guidelines. Furthermore, it clearly recognizes one or more naturally occurring retroviruses of undetermined origin as the causes of the syndrome.

From our point of view, all elements of the resolution are an important key. It moves beyond disinformation and a lack of coordination toward the achievement of positive

global action. We welcome the action of the UN General Assembly, and we are committed to implementation of this resolution through cooperation with others and firm support of the WHO special program.

#### DEPARTMENT STATEMENT, NOV. 2, 1987<sup>2</sup>

From this podium on October 28, I commended the UN General Assembly resolution which unites all countries in a concerted effort to prevent and control AIDS. The resolution, sponsored *inter alia* by the United States and the Soviet Union, recognizes one or more naturally occurring retroviruses of undetermined origin as the cause of the syndrome.

Today I would like to acknowledge a related development. On October 30, *Izvestia*, the official Soviet Government

newspaper, published a disavowal of AIDS disinformation campaign by authoritative Soviet scientists, Roal Sagdeyev and Vitaliy Goldanskiy. In *Izvestia* article, the scientists public distanced the U.S.S.R. Academy of Sciences from claims that the AIDS virus was artificially cultivated at secret U.S. military bases and stated they had protested the appearances Soviet media of articles which repeated those claims.

The United States welcomes this authoritative Soviet disavowal of the false charges that the United States responsible for creation of the AIDS virus. We note in particular that this disavowal appeared in the official Soviet press.

<sup>1</sup>USUN press release 65.

<sup>2</sup>Read to news correspondents by partment spokesman Charles Redman

## Visit of El Salvadoran President

*President Jose Napoleon Duarte of the Republic of El Salvador made a state visit to the United States October 13-18, 1987, to meet with President Reagan and other government officials.*

*Following are remarks made by the two Presidents at the arrival ceremony on October 14.<sup>1</sup>*

#### President Reagan

It is with great pride and unreserved admiration that I welcome President Duarte to Washington. He comes as the elected representative of a courageous people, people who have struggled long and risked much in order to live in a free and democratic country.

El Salvador, under President Duarte's leadership, has proven wrong the cynics, pessimists, and detractors of democracy. The Salvadoran people have proven that those who love freedom can prevail over great odds—can defeat the forces of tyranny, both left and right—if they have the courage, commitment, and stand together.

It was not that long ago that El Salvador was all but written off by many in this city's circles of power. The communist guerrillas, it was said, were an irresistible force, and the cruel tactics of the right could not be thwarted.

The cause of democracy was doomed they said. Well, the U.S. Congress came within a few votes of making predictions of doom a self-fulfilling prophecy. Our request for military aid to El Salvador was nearly defeated. That would have left you, President Duarte, and others who were struggling for democracy unarmed and defenseless against communist guerrillas who were receiving arms and ammunition through Nicaragua.

Those of us who have stood in support of the democratic peoples of El Salvador are especially proud of what has been achieved in recent years. Under the most trying of circumstances with your steady hand at the helm President Duarte, democratic convictions and ideals have been transferred into institutions, laws, and practice. In a relatively short time, you've brought the military under civilian control and helped turn it into a professional and respected force for both national security and democratic government. You've reformed the police and set about to improve the system of justice. You have created a climate of respect for human rights and the rule of law.

While you were putting in place these fundamental reforms, the communist guerrillas, who would impose a form of dictatorship on El Salvador



...aten back. Your brave military  
...ertainly deserve much credit,  
...th power of democracy itself de-  
...credit, as well. Democracy is a  
...en that offers a peaceful method of  
...in differences. It is a system  
...han incorporate a wide spectrum  
...ies while at the same time protect  
...rights of the individual. Our own  
...cent Lincoln once said: "The ballot  
...rger than the bullet." Well, that  
...neral foundation on which the  
...den-loving people of Central Amer-  
...oe to build a lasting peace.

...Play the prospects for attaining  
...pice, although still far from cer-  
...e better than at any time in this  
...ad. The United States remains  
...mitted to exploring any opportunity  
...ould end the violence that plagues  
...rion and permit the people of  
...nt America to live their lives in  
...ce. Silencing the guns is no easy  
...nd, President Duarte, we both  
...w peace and democracy are inex-  
...ably linked.

...Peace is to prevail, so must de-  
...crv. The people of El Salvador  
...ow is, having been victimized by  
...rgency armed, trained, and  
...debartered in a nearby country.  
...yave firsthand experience that a  
...erment that does not respect the  
...t of its own citizens cannot be ex-  
...te to respect the rights of its  
...ghors. And that is why all of us  
...also closely the reform process set  
...on by the Guatemala peace plan.  
...is process, which ties democra-  
...tity to the end of armed conflict, is  
...sistent with a proposal made by  
...ear Wright [Speaker of the House  
...representative Jim Wright] and my-  
...le want to see the peace process  
...erel. That success is dependent on  
...ue democratic reform, on respect  
...han rights, and on open and free  
...tens. It depends on respect for the  
...oms of speech, religion, and asan-  
...t. It depends on honest dialogue  
...en those who are now engaged in  
...id combat.

...resident Duarte, you have already  
...he extra mile, literally and figur-  
...ve, to bring fundamental change to  
...our country and to end the cycle of  
...ce. Those who are engaged in  
...struggle against your govern-  
...have been invited to join in the  
...ratic process. You have negoti-  
...irectly with the leaders of insur-  
...forces, sincerely trying to find the  
...la that will bring peace and se-  
...reedom in your troubled land.



(White House photo by Pete Souza)

Others in the region can do no less if they expect to end the strife that ravages their countries. The choice is theirs.

As we face the future and determine our next steps, let us recognize that the hope in Central America today has come about because those who believe in democracy have faced reality, made the tough choices, and stood together. In these last 6½ years, through the strength of purpose of brave and farsighted individuals like President Duarte, a crisis has been averted and admirable progress has been made, especially in creating and consolidating democratic institutions.

President Duarte's visit permits us the opportunity to take account of the progress that has been made; to discuss our vision of a free, prosperous, and peaceful hemisphere; and to declare our solidarity with all those who share that vision. President Duarte, again, it is an honor to welcome you.

### President Duarte

This is the first time in many years that a head of state of a Central American nation has been received by the U.S. President on a state visit.

I receive this honor with great modesty, knowing full well that this ceremony is an acknowledgment to the democratic commitment of the great people of El Salvador. Only last week, in your speech to the Organization of American States (OAS), you remembered the heroic behavior of Salvadorans in the voting booths. The same lines of conduct have remained steadfast through all these years and have served to build a strong democracy which, although not yet perfect, is modeled after your own.

Your constant and unswerving support for our undertaking has helped us overcome obstacles which at times seem invincible. Your Congress, too, has worked with us on the difficult roads we have had to travel. For that we thank you. And today peace is a step closer with the signing of the peace agreement in Guatemala early last month.

In your speech at the OAS, you had stated that the Central American plan "contains many of the elements necessary to bring both lasting peace and enduring democracy for the region." You went on to say that there is also a reason for caution; I agree. For this reason, I have insisted that the compliance with our peace plan must be fully verified by the appointed commissions. Here we will hope that the OAS and its member nations, especially those like yours with the technical capacity, will take an active role.

I am convinced that there cannot be peace in Central America without freedom and democracy, which in turn will only be attained through comprehensive dialogue and negotiated ceasefire. I also insist that each Central American president has the responsibility to comply fully within his own country with all the obligations contracted, and that no government be permitted to take only cosmetic or half-measures or to excuse his government's lack of total compliance because of difference with another government not party to the Esquipulas accord [Guatemala peace plan].

We need to continue to work to bring democracy to all [of] Central America. I know that the United States has been engaged in this effort, but we still have a long way to go. I encourage you to do what needs to be done in order to assure that the democratic gains are enduring and that the people of Central America are free from totalitarian oppression. You can count on me and my courageous people to be faithful and effective partners in this historical and noble enterprise.

And now, President Reagan, let me break the protocol. I've seen through my life many times in which people with hate in their heart have put fire to the American flag. This time, permit me to go to your flag and, in the name of my people, to give it a kiss.

<sup>1</sup>Made at the South Portico of the White House where President Duarte was accorded a formal welcome with full military honors (text from Weekly Compilation of Presidential Documents of Oct. 19, 1987. ■

## Trade Sanctions Imposed Against Brazil

PRESIDENT'S STATEMENT,  
NOV. 13, 1987<sup>1</sup>

I am today announcing my intention to raise tariffs on Brazilian exports to the United States and to prohibit imports from Brazil of certain computer products in response to the maintenance by Brazil of unfair trade practices in the area of computer products.

Brazil's national informatics policies, in place since the 1970s, severely restrict foreign participation in Brazil's computer and computer-related market. The United States has unsuccessfully raised its concerns with Brazil in bilateral and multilateral consultations since 1983. In September 1985, I initiated an investigation of these practices under Section 301 of the Trade Act of 1974 and in October 1986 determined that Brazil's informatics policies were unreasonable and a burden and restriction on U.S. commerce. I suspended parts of this investigation after Brazil made commitments to implement its "informatics" law in a more flexible, reasonable, and just manner.

Recent developments in Brazil make it clear that these commitments are not being kept. In particular, the Brazilian Government has rejected efforts by an American software company to license its product in Brazil, asserting that a domestic company makes a product that is "functionally equivalent." This decision establishes a precedent which effectively bans U.S. companies from the Brazilian software market. It is also likely to increase piracy of foreign software since demand for the prohibited product will continue.

In response to these developments, I intend to raise tariffs to offset the lost sales opportunities for U.S. companies, estimated at \$105 million and to prohibit imports of Brazilian informatics products covered under Brazil's "market reserve" policy. Should Brazil reverse its action and live up to its commitments to the United States, I will be prepared to lift these sanctions.

Brazil is a good friend of the United States, and we support the steps it is taking to restore its democratic institutions. But Brazil is also a major beneficiary of the global trading system, the openness of which cannot be maintained if markets are deliberately closed and policies incompatible with a more free and open trading system are established.

WHITE HOUSE FACT SHEET,  
NOV. 13, 1987<sup>2</sup>

### Background

In September 1985, President Reagan instructed the U.S. Trade Representative to initiate an investigation in Brazil's informatics policy under Section 301 of the Trade Act of 1974. The investigation cited Brazil's market reserve policy administrative burdens on import prohibition of foreign investment, lack of copyright protection for computer software as major grounds for the complaint. In October 1986, the President determined that Brazil's informatics policies were unreasonable and a burden and restriction on U.S. commerce.

In December 1986, the President suspended the market reserve and administrative portions of the Section 301 case in response to Brazil's commitment to implement its law in a clearer manner and not to extend market reserve requirements to new areas, nor by 1992, when the market reserve period scheduled to expire. He also instructed U.S. Trade Representative Clayton Yetter to monitor the relevant commitments.

In June 1987, the President suspended the intellectual property part of the Section 301 investigation after Brazil's Chamber of Deputies passed legislation that would provide copyright protection for software, he instructed Ambassador Yetter to monitor the bill's passage through the Brazilian Senate. He also instructed the Trade Representative to continue negotiate the investment parts of the investigation.

In September 1987, Brazil's Secretariat for Informatics (SEI) rejected agreements negotiated between a software company and six Brazilian informatics companies for licensing the world's leading operating system. SEI based the rejection on its determination that a Brazilian-made "functionally equivalent" operating system already exists.

Even though the United States demonstrated that the two operating systems are not similar, the Brazilian Government contends that the Brazilian product is adequate for its domestic market. On this basis, any software program or operating system could be considered "equivalent" to the Brazilian

... SEI's decision specifically vio-  
 understandings reached with the  
 zian Government that SEI's inter-  
 tion of "functional equivalent"  
 would be objective, and the  
 nish establishes a precedent which  
 ctely bans U.S. companies from  
 Brazilian software market. Except  
 nframes, U.S. companies are al-  
 y prohibited from participating in  
 Brazilian hardware market.  
 razil's recent action is also likely  
 ecrease end-user piracy of foreign  
 e since the prohibited product is  
 eally available, and demand for  
 e, state-of-the-art software will  
 e. End-user piracy is perhaps  
 not difficult kind of piracy to mon-  
 e enforce. Brazil's recent decision  
 t copyright protection for com-  
 e software will have little effect un-  
 e these circumstances.

### President's Action

President has decided to impose  
 ctions on certain Brazilian exports  
 h United States. A notice will be  
 ce in the *Federal Register* next  
 e listing possible products upon  
 e sanctions could be imposed.  
 e public hearings are held, the Ad-  
 ministration will select a retaliatory list  
 e products. The size of the retaliation  
 e reflect the average annual lost  
 e opportunities by the U.S. soft-  
 e industry in Brazil, estimated at  
 e \$5 billion. In addition, the Admin-  
 e ration will restrict imports of infor-  
 e products from Brazil which are  
 e and under the Brazilian market re-  
 e wool policy. Although Brazil does not  
 e these products to the United  
 e at this time, this action will pre-  
 e the Brazilian informatics industry  
 e entering the U.S. market as long  
 e it poses a market reserve on com-  
 e software.

These actions will not deprive U.S.  
 e users of the products against  
 e retaliatory action will be taken.  
 e products on the list can be supplied  
 e domestic or other foreign producers.  
 e higher tariffs, which will only be  
 e on imports from Brazil of these  
 e products, will be removed when it has  
 e determined that these unfair prac-  
 e have been eliminated.

...  
 ext from Weekly Compilation of  
 e Official Documents of Nov. 16, 1987.  
 e ext from White House press  
 e. ■

## Current Actions

### MULTILATERAL

#### Arbitration

Convention on the recognition and enforce-  
 ment of foreign arbitral awards. Done at  
 New York June 10, 1958. Entered into  
 force June 7, 1959; for the U.S. Dec. 29,  
 1970. TIAS 6997.  
Accession deposited: Costa Rica, Oct. 26,  
 1987.

#### Aviation

International air services transit agree-  
 ment. Signed at Chicago Dec. 7, 1944. En-  
 tered into force Jan. 20, 1945; for the U.S.  
 Feb. 8, 1945. 59 Stat. 1693.  
Notice of termination: Canada, Nov. 10,  
 1987, effective Nov. 10, 1988<sup>1</sup>

Convention for the suppression of unlawful  
 seizure of aircraft. Done at The Hague  
 Dec. 16, 1970. Entered into force Oct. 14,  
 1971. TIAS 7192.  
Accession deposited: Antigua and Bar-  
 buda, July 22, 1985.  
Ratification deposited: Rwanda, Nov. 3,  
 1987.

Convention for the suppression of unlawful  
 acts against the safety of civil aviation.  
 Done at Montreal Sept. 23, 1971. Entered  
 into force Jan. 26, 1973. TIAS 7570.  
Accession deposited: Antigua and Bar-  
 buda, July 22, 1985.  
Ratification deposited: Rwanda, Nov. 3,  
 1987.

#### Commodities—Common Fund

Agreement establishing the common fund  
 for commodities, with schedules. Done at  
 Geneva June 27, 1980.<sup>2</sup>  
Ratification deposited: Congo, Nov. 4,  
 1987.

#### Consular Relations

Vienna convention on consular relations.  
 Entered into force Mar. 19, 1967; for the  
 U.S. Dec. 24, 1969. TIAS 6920.  
Accession deposited: Western Samoa,  
 Oct. 26, 1987.

#### Diplomatic Relations

Vienna convention on diplomatic relations.  
 Done at Vienna Apr. 18, 1961. Entered into  
 force Apr. 24, 1964; for the U.S. Dec. 13,  
 1972. TIAS 7502  
Accession deposited: Western Samoa,  
 Oct. 26, 1987.

#### Fisheries

Pacific Island regional fisheries treaty,  
 with annexes and agreed statement. Done  
 at Port Moresby Apr. 2, 1987. (Senate)  
 Treaty Doc. 100-5.<sup>2</sup>  
Senate advice and consent to ratification:  
 Nov. 6, 1987.  
Ratifications deposited: Fed. States of Mi-  
 cronesia, Nov. 11, 1978; Solomon Islands,  
 Sept. 9, 1987.

#### Marine Pollution

Protocol of 1978 relating to the interna-  
 tional convention for the prevention of pol-  
 lution from ships, 1973. Done at London  
 Feb. 17, 1978. Entered into force Oct. 2,  
 1983.

Accession deposited: Ivory Coast, Oct. 5,  
 1987.

Ratification deposited: Australia, Oct. 14,  
 1987.<sup>3</sup>

Annex V to the international convention for  
 the prevention of pollution from ships,  
 1973. Done at London Nov. 2, 1973. (Sen-  
 ate) Treaty Doc. 100-3.<sup>2</sup>  
Senate advice and consent to ratification:  
 Nov. 5, 1987.<sup>4</sup>

#### Narcotic Drugs

Protocol amending the single convention  
 on narcotic drugs (TIAS 6298). Done at  
 Geneva Mar. 25, 1972. Entered into force  
 Aug. 8, 1975. TIAS 8118.

Accession deposited: Hungary, Nov. 12,  
 1987.

#### Nuclear Weapons—Nonproliferation

Treaty on the nonproliferation of nuclear  
 weapons. Done at Washington, London,  
 and Moscow July 1, 1968. Entered into  
 force Mar. 5, 1970. TIAS 6839.

Accession deposited: Spain, Nov. 5, 1987.

#### Pollution

Protocol to the convention on long-range  
 transboundary air pollution of Nov. 13,  
 1979 (TIAS 10541) concerning monitoring  
 and evaluation of long-range transmission  
 of air pollutants in Europe (EMEP), with  
 annex. Done at Geneva Sept. 28, 1984.

Accession deposited: Yugoslavia, Oct. 28,  
 1987.

Ratification deposited: France, Oct. 30,  
 1987.

Enters into force: Jan. 28, 1988.

#### Prisoner Transfer

Convention on the transfer of sentenced  
 persons. Done at Strasbourg Mar. 21, 1983.  
 Entered into force July 1, 1985. TIAS  
 10824.

Territorial application: Extended by U.K.  
 to Hong Kong, Nov. 5, 1987.<sup>5</sup>

Ratification deposited: Luxembourg,  
 Oct. 8, 1987.<sup>5</sup>

#### Rubber

International natural rubber agreement,  
 1987, with annexes. Done at Geneva Mar.  
 20, 1987.<sup>2</sup> (Senate) Treaty Doc. 100-9.  
Signature: Netherlands, Nov. 6, 1987.

Ratification deposited: Indonesia, Nov. 2,  
 1987.

#### Terrorism

International convention against the taking  
 of hostages. Adopted at New York Dec. 17,  
 1979. Entered into force June 3, 1983; for  
 the U.S. Jan. 6, 1985.

Accession deposited: Ghana, Nov. 10, 1987.

**UNIDO**

Constitution of the UN Industrial Development Organization (UNIDO), with annexes. Adopted at Vienna Apr. 8, 1979. Entered into force June 21, 1985.

Ratification deposited: Costa Rica, Oct. 26, 1987.

**BILATERAL****Brazil**

Agreement extending the memorandum of understanding of May 8, 1984, concerning the Landsat system. Effected by exchange of notes at Brasilia Oct. 9 and 17, 1987. Entered into force Oct. 17, 1987; effective May 8, 1987.

**Canada**

Agreement amending the agreement of Nov. 22, 1978, as amended, on Great Lakes water quality (TIAS 9257, 10798). Signed at Toledo Nov. 18, 1987. Entered into force Nov. 18, 1987.

Memorandum of understanding for cooperation in the field of magnetic fusion energy. Signed at Washington Nov. 19, 1987. Entered into force Nov. 19, 1987.

**Colombia**

Agreement amending the agreement of Aug. 1, 1961 (TIAS 4916) for relief from double taxation on earnings from operations of ships and aircraft. Effected by exchange of notes at Bogota Oct. 16, 1987. Entered into force Oct. 16, 1987.

**Denmark**

Agreement extending the agreement of Mar. 25, 1985 concerning a Danish-American fund for the exchange of technology.<sup>1</sup> Effected by exchange of notes at Copenhagen Sept. 11 and 25, 1987. Entered into force Sept. 25, 1987; effective Mar. 25, 1987.

**Equatorial Guinea**

Agreement relating to the establishment of a Peace Corps program in Equatorial Guinea. Effected by exchange of notes at Malabo Nov. 18, 1987. Entered into force Nov. 18, 1987.

**France**

Agreement amending the agreement of Feb. 23, 1987, on mutual logistic support. Signed at Casteau Oct. 15, 1987. Entered into force Oct. 15, 1987.

**Federal Republic of Germany**

Memorandum of understanding for an exchange of energy-related information. Signed at Washington Nov. 20, 1987. Entered into force Nov. 20, 1987.

**Grenada**

Agreement relating to employment of dependents of official government employees, with addendum. Effected by exchange of notes at St. George's Sept. 15, 1987. Entered into force Sept. 15, 1987.

Agreement concerning establishment of a radio relay station of the U.S. Information Agency (Voice of America) on the island of Grenada. Signed at St. George's Sept. 29, 1987. Enters into force upon completed conveyance of land to the U.S. Government.

**Honduras**

Agreement governing cooperation in mapping, charting, and geodesy. Signed at Tegucigalpa and Washington Sept. 21 and Oct. 21, 1987. Entered into force Oct. 21, 1987.

**India**

Agreement amending agreement of Feb. 6, 1987, as amended, relating to trade in textiles and textile products. Effected by exchange of notes at Washington Sept. 15, Oct. 2 and 16, 1987. Entered into force Oct. 16, 1987.

**Indonesia**

Project loan agreement for rural roads maintenance systems. Signed at Jakarta Aug. 31, 1987. Entered into force Aug. 31, 1987.

Program grant agreement for agriculture and rural sector support. Signed at Jakarta Aug. 31, 1987. Entered into force Aug. 31, 1987.

**Iraq**

Commercial, economic and technical cooperation agreement. Signed at Washington Aug. 26, 1987. Entered into force Oct. 27, 1987.

**Israel**

Memorandum of understanding concerning the operation of the INTELPOST service, with details of implementation. Signed at Jerusalem and Washington July 20 and Nov. 5, 1987. Entered into force Nov. 5, 1987; effective Sept. 1, 1987.

**Italy**

General administrative agreement relating to participation in the U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission (USNRC) program of severe accident, source term, and containment research. Signed at Rome and Bethesda May 11 and June 5, 1987. Entered into force June 5, 1987.

**Japan**

Agreement for cooperation concerning peaceful uses of nuclear energy, with annexes, agreed minutes, implementing agreement, and exchanges of notes. Signed at Tokyo Nov. 4, 1987. Enters into force on the 30th day after the exchange of diplomatic notes that respective internal legal procedures have been completed.

Agreement amending and extending the agreement of Sept. 10, 1982 (TIAS 10480), concerning fisheries off the coasts of the U.S., with agreed minutes. Signed at Washington Nov. 10, 1987. Enters into

force on the date diplomatic notes are exchanged indicating approval of the two governments.

**Korea**

Record of understanding on intellectual property rights, with related letter. Signed at Washington Aug. 28, 1986. Entered into force Aug. 28, 1986.

Agreement relating to the agreement Aug. 28, 1986, on access of U.S. firms Korea's insurance market. Effected by change of letters at Washington Sept. 1987. Entered into force Sept. 10, 1987; effective Jan. 1, 1988.

**Liberia**

Agreement for the sale of agricultural commodities. Signed at Monrovia June 22, 1987. Entered into force June 22, 1987.

**Mexico**

Agreement in the area of nuclear reactivity research. Signed at Bethesda Mexico May 27 and June 2, 1987. Entered into force June 2, 1987.

Agreement amending agreement of Feb. 26, 1979 (TIAS 9419), as amended, relating to trade in cotton, wool, and manmade fiber textiles and textile products. Effected by exchange of notes at Mexico Washington Sept. 15 and 24, 1987. Entered into force Sept. 24, 1987.

**Netherlands**

Air transport agreement relating to transportation between the U.S. and Aruba, with annexes. Signed at Washington Nov. 7, 1986. Entered into force Aug. 17, 1987.

**Nigeria**

Agreement on procedures for mutual assistance in law enforcement matters. Signed at Washington Nov. 2, 1987. Entered into force Nov. 2, 1987.

**NATO**

Memorandum of understanding concerning the interconnection of the NATO Initial Voice Switched Network (IVSN) and the U.S. Automatic Voice Network (AUTOVON), with annex. Signed at Paris and Brussels Aug. 31 and Sept. 1987. Entered into force Sept. 16, 1987.

**Pakistan**

Agreement for sale of agricultural commodities. Signed at Islamabad June 2, 1987. Entered into force June 25, 1987.

Grant agreement for the project component of the agricultural sector support program (ASSP). Signed at Islamabad Sept. 24, 1987. Entered into force Sept. 24, 1987.

Seventh amendatory agreement to the commodity import grant and loan agreement of Apr. 13, 1982 (TIAS 10378), for agricultural commodities and equipment. Signed at Islamabad Sept. 29, 1987. Entered into force Sept. 29, 1987.

Department of State

Press releases may be obtained from the Office of Press Relations, Department of State, Washington, D.C. 20520.

No.	Date	Subject
*214	11/5	Shultz: statement on departure of Defense Secretary Weinberger.
*215	11/6	Program for the state visit to the United States of Israeli President Herzog, Nov. 9-15.
*216	11/9	Shultz: statement and question-and-answer session, OAS General Assembly.
*217	11/9	Shultz: luncheon remarks, OAS General Assembly.
218	11/12	Shultz: address, OAS General Assembly, Nov. 10.
*219	11/18	David H. Shinn sworn in as Ambassador to Burkina Faso, Nov. 16 (biographic data).
*220	11/18	Department of State and World Affairs Council cosponsor town meeting, Riverside, California, Dec. 9.

*221	11/20	Richard C. Allison appointed as member of Iran-U.S. Claims Tribunal.
*222	11/20	Robert Maxwell Pringle sworn in as Ambassador to Mali, Nov. 18 (biographic data).
223	11/25	Shultz: news conference, Geneva, Nov. 24.
*224	11/25	James B. Moran sworn in as Ambassador to the Seychelles (biographic data).
225	11/27	Shultz: news conference, Brussels, Nov. 25.
226	11/30	<i>Foreign Relations of the United States, 1952-1954, Vol. XII, Part 2, East Asia and the Pacific</i> , released.
227	11/29	Shultz: interview on CBS-TV's "Face the Nation."

\*Not printed in the BULLETIN. ■

USUN

Press releases may be obtained from the Public Affairs Office, U.S. Mission to the United Nations, 799 United Nations Plaza, New York, N.Y. 10017.

No.	Date	Subject
*34	6/10	Rashkow: space, Legal Subcommittee, COPUOS, June 9.
*35	6/24	Walters: statement, ECOSOC, Geneva.
*36	7/2	Bernstein: information, Committee on Information.
37	7/20	Shultz: Iran-Iraq conflict, Security Council.
*38	7/21	Reagan: Iran-Iraq conflict, July 20.
*39	9/10	Byrne: Khmer refugees, Meeting of Donors to the Program of Humanitarian Assistance to the Kampuchean People.
*40	9/14	U.S. response to Libyan letter, Sept. 12.
*41	9/16	Okun: Libya, UN General Assembly.
42	9/21	Reagan: address before 42d session of the UN General Assembly.
*43	9/22	Okun: Iran, UN General Assembly.

*44	10/2	Nygaard: audit report, Committee V.
*45	10/1	Bailey: Zimbabwe, UN General Assembly, Oct. 2.
*46	10/5	Korn: world economy, Committee II.
*47	10/7	Byrne: racial discrimination, Committee III.
*48	10/7	Piedra: Central America, UN General Assembly.
*49	10/8	Walters: statement made upon leaving the UN General Assembly during the speech of Nicaraguan President Daniel Ortega.
*50	10/12	U.S. Delegation to the 42d session of the UN General Assembly.
*51	10/12	Rosenstock: non-use of force, Committee VI.
*52	10/13	Walters: Kampuchea, UN General Assembly.
*53	10/14	Korn: debt crisis, Committee II.
*54	10/14	Treat: self-determination, Committee III.
*55	10/14	Shearouse: pattern of conferences, Committee V.
*56	10/15	Byrne: atomic radiation, Special Political Committee.

mandum of agreement regarding cooperation, study and exchange of archival information and materials on the Nazi occupation of Poland, the Holocaust, and related subjects. Signed at Belzec Aug. 26, 1987. Entered into force Aug. 26, 1987.

**Leone**  
Agreement regarding the consolidation and settling of certain debts owed to, guaranteed by, or insured by the U.S. Government and its agencies, with annexes. Signed at Freetown Aug. 21, 1987. Entered into force Nov. 5, 1987.

Agreement relating to the agreement of Nov. 4, 1973, concerning air transport (AS 725). Effected by exchange of notes at Madrid Mar. 31 and Apr. 7, 1987. Entered into force Apr. 7, 1987.

Agreement amending the agreement of Mar. 1987, for sales of agricultural commodities. Effected by exchange of notes at Freetown June 18, 1987. Entered into force June 18, 1987.

**Maldives**  
Agreement relating to the treaty of May 1983 (TIAS 8302), on mutual assistance in criminal matters. Effected by exchange of notes at Washington Nov. 10, 1987. Entered into force Nov. 10, 1987.

Agreement of understanding on multiple rocket system. Signed at Washington Oct. 2, 1987. Enters into force on date of exchange of letters in accordance with respective legal procedures.

**Kingdom of the Netherlands**  
Agreement amending the agreement of Dec. 1966, as amended (TIAS 6196), concerning the availability of certain Indian Ocean Territory Islands for other purposes. Effected by exchange of notes at Washington Nov. 16, 1987. Entered into force Nov. 16, 1987.

**Uruguay**  
Agreement amending agreement of Dec. 1983, and Jan. 23, 1984, as amended, relating to trade in wool and cotton textiles and textile products. Effected by exchange of notes at Montevideo Sept. 10 and 17, 1987. Entered into force Sept. 30, 1987.

Replaces notification of Nov. 12, 1986, which would have been effective Nov. 12, 1986.

Not in force.  
Does not accept optional annexes III, IV, and V.  
With an understanding.  
With declaration. ■

*57	10/16	Okun: arms control, Committee I.	*85	11/4	Bailey: UNRWA, Special Political Committee.	*107	11/7	Montgomery: information, Special Political Committee.
*58	10/16	Michalski: scale of assessments, Committee V.	*86	11/6	Byrne: human rights, Committee III.	*108	11/20	Shearouse: UN salaries and benefits, Committee V.
*59	10/16	Korn: World Food Day, ECOSOC.	*87	11/6	Friedersdorf: disarmament, Committee I.	*109	11/19	Byrne: contributions, Hoc Committee for Voluntary Contributions to the UNHCR.
*60	10/16	Hoh: management inspections, Committee V.	*88	11/8	Okun: Afghanistan, Afghanistan Relief Committee.	*110	11/20	Byrne: apartheid, UN General Assembly.
*61	10/19	Hill: environment, UN General Assembly.	*89	11/6	Byrne: Namibia, UN General Assembly.	*111	11/23	Walters: human rights, Committee III.
*62	10/20	Okun: atomic energy, UN General Assembly.	*90	11/9	Friedersdorf: chemical weapons, Committee I.	*112	11/24	Thayer: terrorist attacks, Committee I.
*63	10/20	Montgomery: peace-keeping operations, Special Political Committee.	*91	11/10	Coker: development, Committee II.	*113	11/24	Immerman: peace and security, Committee I.
*64	10/20	Cahill: report on ECOSOC, Committee II.	*92	11/10	Okun: Afghanistan, UN General Assembly.	114	11/25	Walters: South Africa aggression against Angola, Security Council.
*65	10/20	Koop: acquired immune deficiency syndrome, UN General Assembly.	*93	11/10	Montgomery: space, Special Political Committee.	*115	11/25	Bernstein: information, Special Political Committee.
*66	10/21	Rosenstock: report on United Nations, Committee VI.	*94	11/10	Siljander: South Atlantic, UN General Assembly.	*116	11/25	Stevenson: human rights in the occupied territories, Special Political Committee.
*67	10/22	Emery: arms control, Committee I.	*95	11/12	Nygaard: personnel, Committee V.	*117	11/27	Immerman: peace and security, Committee I.
*68	10/22	Byrne: social issues, Committee III.	*96	11/12	Walters: Nicaragua, UN General Assembly.	*118	11/27	Okun: peaceful uses of nuclear energy, UN General Assembly.
*69	10/23	Coker: development and economic cooperation, Committee II.	*97	11/12	Cahill: Palestinian people, Committee II, Nov. 9.	*119	11/27	Immerman: world peace, Committee I.
*70	10/23	Byrne: decolonization, Committee IV.	*98	11/12	Korn: trade and development, Committee II.	*120	11/27	Immerman: peace and security, Committee I.
*71	10/26	Stirling: self-determination, Committee III.	*99	11/13	Piedra: Nicaragua, UN General Assembly, Nov. 12.	*121	11/27	Immerman: strengthening security and cooperation, Committee I.
*72	10/26	Crockett: terrorism, Committee VI.	*100	11/12	Piedra: Nicaragua, UN General Assembly.	*122	12/1	Rosenstock: terrorism, Committee VI.
*73	10/27	Korn: economic situation in Africa, UN General Assembly.	*101	11/13	Byrne: refugees, Committee III.	*123	12/2	Boeker: Palestine, UN General Assembly.
*74	10/28	Byrne: Western Sahara, Committee IV.	*102	11/13	Byrne: religion, Committee III.			
*75	10/28	Reagan: women, Committee III.	*103	11/13	Cahill: trade and development, Committee II.			
*76	10/28	Friedersdorf: chemical weapons, Committee I.	*104	11/17	MacArthur: front-line states, Committee II.			
*77	10/28	Byrne: Namibia, Security Council.	*105	11/18	Siljander: law of the sea, UN General Assembly.			
*78	10/29	Amslem: apartheid and mercenaries, Committee III, Oct. 28.	*106	11/18	Saddler: training and research, Committee II.			
*79	10/30	Friedersdorf: disarmament compliance, Committee I.						
*80	10/30	Okun: Namibia, Security Council.						
*81	11/2	Wroblewski: narcotics, Committee III.						
*82	11/2	Bereuter: budget, Committee V.						
*83	11/2	Okun: U.S.-U.S.S.R. ministerial discussions, Committee I.						
*84	11/4	Stevenson: UNRWA [UN Relief and Works Agency], Special Political Committee.						

\*Not printed in the BULLETIN.

## Foreign Relations Volume Released

The Department of State released, on November 30, 1987, *Foreign Relations of the United States, 1952-1954, Volume XII, Part 2*. This volume contains documents on U.S. relations with Burma, Indonesia, the Philippines, and Thailand. Part 1, released in 1984, documents general U.S. policies in East Asia, including the establishment of the Southeast Asia Treaty Organization (SEATO).

These four Southeast Asian countries presented dramatic challenges to American policymakers in a period whose events determined the shape of international relations for decades to come. Each posed for the United States the problem of dealing with the rise of new and sensitive nationalism. Truman and Eisenhower Administrations saw the menace of communism in the framework of the cold war. The

...ing nations perceived entirely different dangers and opportunities that led the way for them toward Third World alignment.

The major irritant in U.S.-Burmes relations was the presence in northern China of Chinese Nationalist troops who had fled China during the revolution. The documentation focuses on the efforts, in part successful, to persuade Chiang Kai-shek to evacuate his troops despite the Burmese Government's unfounded belief that U.S. relations with Generalissimo Chiang were limited. In Indonesia, the United States went to extraordinary lengths to formulate an agreement that would enable the intensely nationalist government to participate in U.S. aid programs. The United States also became reoccupied with the twin problems of dealing with domestic Indonesian communism and Indonesia's desire to absorb West Irian and the islands New Guinea).

With the Philippines and Thailand, relations were close and growing. The United States provided military aid to the Philippines to contain Huk (communist) insurgency, but to expand reform as a more permanent basis. During the 1953 Philippine anti-communist campaign, the United States supported Ramon Magsaysay in private but maintained a neutral stance in public while the Embassy in Manila

## Department of State

Single copies of the following Department of State publications are available from the Correspondence Management Division, Bureau of Public Affairs, Department of State, Washington, D.C. 20520.

### President Reagan

Agenda of U.S.-Soviet Relations, Department of State, Washington, D.C. 20520.

### Secretary Shultz

U.S. Democracy, and Nicaragua, OAS Conference, Nov. 10, 1987 (Current Policy #1024).

Africa: U.S. Policy (GIST, Nov. 1987).

African Development Coordination Conference (GIST, Nov. 1987).

### Arms Control

Work Ahead in Arms Control, Ambassador Rowley, National War College

pushed hard for free elections as the best route to a Magsaysay victory. Mounting communist success in Vietnam stimulated closer relations between the United States and Thailand. Ambassador William J. Donovan, the former head of the Office of Strategic Services (America's World War II intelligence organization), worked successfully for across-the-board increases in U.S. military, economic, and information programs. Thailand became an early supporter of SEATO.

*Foreign Relations, 1952-1954*, Volume XII, Part 2, comprising some 750 pages of previously classified foreign affairs records, was prepared in the Office of the Historian, Bureau of Public Affairs, Department of State. This official record is based upon the files of the White House, the Department of State, and other government agencies.

Copies of Volume XII, Part 2 (Department of State Publication No. 9550, GPO Stock No. 044-000-02193-5) may be purchased for \$23.00 from the Superintendent of Documents, U.S. Government Printing Office, Washington, D.C. 20402. Checks or money orders should be made payable to the Superintendent of Documents.

Press release 226 of Nov. 30, 1987. ■

Alumni Asso., Colorado Springs, Oct. 16, 1987 (Current Policy #1014).

U.S. Arms Control Initiatives: A Status Report, Nov. 1987 (Special Report #171). Nuclear Risk Reduction Centers (GIST, Nov. 1987).

### East Asia

U.S.-Japan Energy Cooperation, Under Secretary Wallis, U.S.-Japan Energy Policy Conference sponsored by the Atlantic Council, Nov. 12, 1987 (Current Policy #1025).

### Economics

U.S. Trade Policy at the Crossroads, Deputy Secretary Whitehead, Conference on International Trade, Wilmington, Nov. 2, 1987 (Current Policy #1022). Third World Debt (GIST, Nov. 1987). International Monetary Fund (GIST, Nov. 1987).

### Environment

State Department Perspectives on Environment, Assistant Secretary Negroponte, International Environment Forum, Sept. 18, 1987 (Current Policy #1008).

### Health

Foreign Policy Implications of AIDS, Deputy Secretary Whitehead, OES Advisory Committee, Oct. 28, 1987 (Current Policy #1026).

### Human Rights

The Promise and the Limits of *Glasnost*, Assistant Secretary Schifter, leadership conference of the Washington Group, Oct. 10, 1987 (Current Policy #1017).

### Nuclear Policy

Nonproliferation As a Fundamental Policy Goal, Ambassador Kennedy, Subcommittees on Arms Control, International Security and Science, on Asian and Pacific Affairs, and on International Economic Policy and Trade, House Foreign Affairs Committee, Oct. 22, 1987 (Current Policy #1020).

### Terrorism

Counterterrorism: U.S. Policy and Proposed Legislation, Ambassador Bremer, Subcommittee on Terrorism, Narcotics, and International Operations, Senate Foreign Relations Committee, Oct. 15, 1987 (Current Policy #1019).

Counterterrorism: Strategy and Tactics, Ambassador Bremer, Committee on Foreign Relations, Tampa, Nov. 4, 1987 (Current Policy #1023).

Iran's Use of International Terrorism, Oct. 1987 (Special Report #170).

### Western Hemisphere

Central America: U.S. Policy (GIST, Nov. 1987). ■

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U.S. Government Printing Office  
Washington, D.C. 20402

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Second Class Mail  
Postage and Fees Paid  
U.S. Government Printing Office  
ISSN 0041-7610

OFFICIAL BUSINESS  
Penalty for Private Use \$300

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58/2131

*Department  
of State*  
**bulletin**

The Official Monthly Record of United States Foreign Policy / Volume 88 / Number 2131

February 1988



The Washington Summit  
and  
the INF Treaty

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# Department of State *bulletin*

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Volume 88 / Number 2131 / February 1988

**Cover:**

**General Secretary Gorbachev and President Reagan at the White House.**

(White House photo by Bill Fitz-Patrick)

The DEPARTMENT OF STATE BULLETIN, published by the Office of Public Communication in the Bureau of Public Affairs, is the official record of U.S. foreign policy. Its purpose is to provide the public, the Congress, and government agencies with information on developments in U.S. foreign relations and the work of the Department of State and the Foreign Service.

The BULLETIN'S contents include major addresses and news conferences of the President and the Secretary of State; statements made before congressional committees by the Secretary and other senior State Department officials; selected press releases issued by the White House, the Department, and the U.S. Mission to the United Nations; and treaties and other agreements to which the United States is or may become a party. Special features, articles, and other supportive material (such as maps, charts, photographs, and graphs) are published frequently to provide additional information on current issues but should not necessarily be interpreted as official U.S. policy statements.

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The Secretary of State has determined that the publication of this periodical is necessary in the transaction of the public business required by law of this Department. Use of funds for printing this periodical has been approved by the Director of the Office of Management and Budget through September 30, 1988.

Department of State Bulletin (ISSN 0041-7610) is published monthly (plus annual index) by the Department of State, 2201 C Street, NW, Washington, D.C. 20520. Second-class postage paid at Washington, D.C., and additional mailing offices. POSTMASTER: Send address changes to Department of State Bulletin Superintendent of Documents, U.S. Government Printing Office, Washington, D.C. 20402.

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For sale by the Superintendent of Documents, U.S. Government Printing Office, Washington, D.C. 20402.

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General secretary Gorbachev arrives at Andrews Air Force Base on December 7.

(Department of State photos by Walt Bowzer)

# Visit of General Secretary Gorbachev of the Soviet Union

*General Secretary Mikhail S. Gorbachev  
of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics  
made an official working visit  
to Washington, D.C., December 7-10, 1987,  
to meet with President Reagan  
and other government officials.*

## Arrival Remarks, Dec. 8, 1987<sup>1</sup>

### President Reagan

I have welcomed a good number of foreign leaders to the White House in these last 7 years, and today marks a visit that is perhaps more momentous than many which have preceded it because it represents a coming together, not of allies, but of adversaries. And yet I think you'll find during your stay that the American people believe that a stranger is a friend they have yet to meet, and that there is still a well-spring of good will here.

Indeed, I know that many of our citizens have written to you and Mrs. Gorbachev and have even sent to you the keys to their homes. That honest gesture certainly reflects the feelings of many Americans toward you and Mrs. Gorbachev and toward your people. I have often felt that our peoples should have been better friends long ago.

But let us have the courage to recognize that there are weighty differences between our governments and systems—differences that will not go away by wishful thinking or expressions of good will, no matter how sincerely delivered. This uncomfortable reality

need not be reason for pessimism, however: It should provide us with a challenge—an opportunity to move from confrontation toward cooperation.

There is a saying in your country that a poor peace is better than a good quarrel. Well, it's up to us with hard work, commitment, and a heavy dose of realism to change the poor peace that has existed between our countries and make it into a good one. Today we will take a giant step in that direction by signing a historic treaty that will rid the world of an entire class of U.S. and Soviet nuclear weapons. Mr. Gorbachev: *mir na nas smatret*—the world is watching and we've got something to show them, and over the next few days, it is my hope that progress will be made toward achieving another agreement which will lead to the cutting in half of our strategic nuclear arsenals.

During the Second World War, Soviet General, later Marshall Chuikov, a front-line commander liked to tell the story of a soldier who said he had captured a bear, and he was asked to bring it along. "I can't," replied the soldier, "the bear won't let me."

General Secretary Gorbachev, like the soldier in Marshall Chuikov's story, our peoples for too long have been both the masters and the captives of a deadly arms race. This situation is not

preordained and not part of some inevitable course of history. We make history. Changing its direction is within our power. However, such change is not easy and can be accomplished only when leaders of both sides have no illusions, talk with candor, and meet differences head on. Such, I hope, will be the spirit of our upcoming meetings.

On the table will be not only arms reduction, but also human rights issues about which the American people and their government are deeply committed. These are fundamental issues of political morality that touch on the most basic of human concerns.

I would hope we will also candidly discuss regional conflicts. The parties to these conflicts should negotiate solutions that restore the peace and advance the rights and freedom of the peoples involved. We cannot afford to view these as far away brush fires. Even small flames risk larger conflagrations and undermine positive developments between our two countries.

Let us also consider ways to expand the contact between our own citizens. The Soviet and American peoples can and should know more about each other. The barriers between them should be taken down, restrictions on travel and communications lifted, personal relations between our young people fostered. Let disagreement between

our governments not get in the way of friendships between our peoples.

Mr. Gorbachev, I hope that during your short time here you will see that we Americans are a dynamic and energetic lot, people of enterprise, and an abiding love of freedom. We believe in God and care about others who are in need. We are proud and independent. Like the peoples of your country, we believe our country should be strong, but we desire peace. Have no doubt about that. The longing for peace runs deep here, second only to our fervency for the preservation of our liberty. Americans believe people should be able to disagree and still respect one another, still live in peace with one another. That is the spirit, the democratic spirit, that I will bring to our meetings.

So on behalf of myself and Mrs. Reagan, and on behalf of all the citizens of the United States, General Secretary Gorbachev, Mrs. Gorbachev, welcome.

### General Secretary Gorbachev <sup>2</sup>

Thank you very much for the cordial welcome and kind words of greeting.

History has charged the governments of our countries and the two of us, Mr. President, with a solemn duty to justify the hopes of Americans and Soviet people, and of people the world over to undo the logic of the arms race by working together in good faith.

In the world's development much will depend upon the choice that we are to make—upon what is to triumph—fears and prejudice inherited from the cold war and leading to confrontation, or commonsense which calls for action to ensure the survival of civilization.

We, in the Soviet Union, have made our choice. We realize that we are divided not only by the oceans, but also by profound historical, ideological, socioeconomic, and cultural differences. But the wisdom of politics today lies in not using those differences as a pretext for confrontation, enmity, and the arms race.

We are beginning our visit 46 years after the days when the United States entered the Second World War, and it

was in those same days in 1941 that the route of Nazi forces began near Moscow—that is symbolic. Those days mark the beginning of our common path to victory over the forces of evil, in a war which we fought as allies.

History is thus reminding us both of our opportunities, and of our responsibility. Indeed, the very fact that we are about to sign a treaty eliminating Soviet and U.S. intermediate and shorter range nuclear missiles, which



President Reagan and General Secretary Gorbachev at arrival ceremony.

(White House photo by Pete Souza)





## Remarks at INF Treaty Signing Ceremony, Dec. 8, 1987<sup>3</sup>

### President Reagan

This ceremony and the treaty we are signing today are both excellent examples of the rewards of patience. It was over 6 years ago, November 18, 1981, that I first proposed what would come to be called the zero option. It was a simple proposal—one might say, disarmingly simple. Unlike treaties in the past, it didn't simply codify the *status quo* or a new arms buildup; it didn't simply talk of controlling an arms race. For the first time in history, the language of arms control was replaced by arms reduction—in this case, the complete elimination of an entire class of U.S. and Soviet nuclear missiles.

Of course, this required a dramatic shift in thinking, and it took conventional wisdom some time to catch up. Reaction, to say the least, was mixed. To some, the zero option was impossibly visionary and unrealistic; to others, merely a propaganda ploy. Well, with patience, determination, and commitment, we've made this impossible vision a reality.

General Secretary Gorbachev, I'm sure you're familiar with Ivan Krylov's famous tale about the swan, the crawfish, and the pike. It seems that once upon a time these three were trying to move a wagonload together. They hitched and harnessed themselves to the wagon. It wasn't very heavy, but no matter how hard they worked the wagon just wouldn't move. You see, the swan was flying upward, the crawfish kept crawling backward, the pike kept making for the water. The end result was that they got nowhere, and the wagon is still there to this day.

Strong and fundamental moral differences continue to exist between our nations, but today, on this vital issue, at least, we've seen what can be accomplished when we pull together.

The numbers alone demonstrate the value of this agreement. On the Soviet side, over 1,500 deployed warheads

will be removed and all ground-launched intermediate-range missiles, including the SS-20s, will be destroyed. On our side, our entire complement of Pershing II and ground-launched cruise missiles, with some 400 deployed warheads, will all be destroyed. Additional backup missiles on both sides will also be destroyed.

But the importance of this treaty transcends numbers. We have listened to the wisdom in an old Russian maxim. And I'm sure you're familiar with it, Mr. General Secretary, though my pronunciation may give you difficulty. The maxim is: *doveryai, no proveryai*—trust, but verify.

**General Secretary Gorbachev.**  
You repeat that at every meeting.  
[Laughter and applause.]

**President Reagan.** I like to.  
[Laughter.]

This agreement contains the most stringent verification regime in history, including provisions for inspection teams actually residing in each other's territory and several other forms of on-site inspection as well. This treaty protects the interests of America's friends and allies. It also embodies another important principle, the need for *glasnost*, a greater openness—in military programs and forces.

We can only hope that this history-making agreement will not be an end in itself, but the beginning of a working relationship that will enable us to tackle the other issues—urgent issues before us—strategic offensive nuclear weapons; the balance of conventional forces in Europe; the destructive and tragic regional conflicts that beset so many parts of our globe; and respect for the human and natural rights God has granted to all men.

To all here who have worked so hard to make this vision a reality, thank you and congratulations, above all to Ambassadors Glitman and Obukhov. To quote another Russian proverb—as you can see, I'm becoming quite an expert—[laughter]—in Russian proverbs—"The harvest comes more from sweat than from the dew."

now going to be scrapped, shows that at crucial phases in history, our nations are capable of shouldering in high responsibility.

This will, of course, be the first step down the road leading to a nuclear-free world whose construction, Mr. President, and I discussed at Gjakvik. Yet it is a great step into the future—the future to which our two peoples and the peoples of all countries are.

I have come to Washington with the intention of advancing the next and most important goal of reaching agreement to reduce, by half, strategic offensive arms in the context of a firm guarantee of strategic stability. We are also looking forward to a most serious and frank dialogue on other issues of Sino-American relations.

Soviet foreign policy today is most intimately linked with *perestroika*—the domestic restructuring of Soviet society. The Soviet people have boldly taken the path of radical reform and development in all spheres—economic, political, and intellectual.

Democratization and *glasnost* are the decisive prerequisites for the success of those reforms. They also provide the guarantee that we shall go in the right way, and that the course we are pursuing is irreversible. Such is the nature of our people.

In charting these ambitious plans, the Soviet people have a vital stake in preserving and strengthening peace everywhere on earth.

May I express the hope that the Soviet Union and the United States, working together with all nations, will make their place in the history of the outgoing 20th century, not only as allies in the battle against Nazism, but also as nations that have paved mankind's way to a safe world, free from the threat of nuclear annihilation.

On behalf of the Soviet people, I declare that we are prepared to go all the way along our part of the road with the sincerity and responsibility that befit a great and peaceful power.



General Secretary Gorbachev and President Reagan sign the INF Treaty.

So I'm going to propose to General Secretary Gorbachev that we issue one last instruction to you—get some well-deserved rest. [Laughter.]

**General Secretary Gorbachev.** We're not going to do that. [Laughter.]

**President Reagan.** Now, Mr. General Secretary, would you like to say a few words before we sign the treaty? [Applause.]

**General Secretary Gorbachev :**

Succeeding generations will hand down their verdict on the importance of the event which we are about to witness. But I will venture to say that what we are going to do—the signing of the first-ever agreement eliminating nuclear weapons, has a universal significance for mankind, both from the standpoint of world politics, and from the standpoint of humanism.

For everyone, and above all, for our two great powers, the treaty whose text is on this table offers a big chance at last to get on to the road leading away from the threat of catastrophe. It

is our duty to take full advantage of that chance, and move together toward a nuclear-free world which holds out for our children and grandchildren, and for their children and grandchildren, the promise of a fulfilling and happy life without fear and without a senseless waste of resources on weapons of destruction.

We can be proud of planting this sapling which may one day grow into a mighty tree of peace. But it is probably still too early to bestow laurels upon each other. As the great American poet and philosopher, Ralph Waldo Emerson, said, "The reward of a thing well done is to have done it."

So let us reward ourselves by getting down to business. We have covered a 7-year-long road replete with intense work and debate. One last step toward this table, and the treaty will be signed.

May December 8, 1987, become a date which will be inscribed in the history books, a date which will make the watershed separating the era of a mounting risk of nuclear war from the era of a demilitarization of human life. [Applause.]

## TV Messages to the American and Soviet People, Dec. 8, 1987<sup>3</sup>

### President Reagan

General Secretary Gorbachev, and distinguished guests, my fellow Americans, and citizens of the Soviet Union: The American philosopher, Ralph Waldo Emerson, once wrote that "there is properly no history; only biography. He meant by this that it is not enough to talk about history as simply forces and factors. History is ultimately a record of human will, human spirit, human aspirations of earth's men and women each with the precious soul and free will that the Lord bestows.

Today, I, for the United States, and the General Secretary, for the Soviet Union, have signed the first agreement ever to eliminate an entire class of U.S. and Soviet nuclear weapons. We have made history. And yet many so-called wise men once predicted that this agreement would be impossible to achieve—too many forces and factors

od against it. Well, still we per-  
ered. We kept at it. And I hope the  
ieral Secretary will forgive me if I  
eal that in some of the bleakest  
es, when it did truly seem that an  
ement would prove impossible, I  
ked myself up with the words of a  
at Russian, Leo Tolstoy, who wrote,  
e strongest of all warriors are these  
—time and patience."

In the next few days we will dis-  
s further arms reductions and other  
es—and again it will take time and  
ience to reach agreements. But as  
egin these talks, let us remember  
t genuine international confidence  
l security are inconceivable without  
n societies with freedom of informa-  
ion, freedom of conscience, the right  
ublish, and the right to travel. So,  
s, we will address human rights and  
ional conflicts, for surely the salva-  
ion of all mankind lies only in making  
rything the concern of all. With  
ne, patience, and willpower I believe  
will resolve these issues. We must if  
ave to achieve a true, secure, and  
during peace.

As different as our systems are,  
ere is a great bond that draws the  
merican and Soviet peoples together.  
is the common dream of peace. More  
an 40 years ago we fought in a great  
ur as allies. On the day that news of  
e enemy's surrender reached Moscow,  
owds gathered in front of the Ameri-  
an Embassy. There they cheered the  
riendship of a nation that had opened a  
cond front and sent food, munitions,  
nd trucks to the Soviet peoples as  
ey displayed awesome courage and  
ill in turning the invader back. A  
ving American diplomat later told of a  
viet soldier in the crowds who  
outed over and over, "Now it is time  
live."

Too often in the decades since then  
e soldier's dream—a time to live—has  
en put off, at least as far as it con-  
rned genuine peace between our two  
untries. Yet we Americans have  
ver stopped praying for peace. In  
ery part of the world we want this to  
a time to live.

Only those who don't know us be-  
ve that America is a materialistic

land. But the true America is not  
supermarkets filled with meats, milk, and  
goods of all descriptions. It is not high-  
ways filled with cars. No, true America  
is a land of faith and family. You can  
find it in our churches, synagogues,  
and mosques—in our homes and  
schools. As one of our great writers put  
it: America is a willingness of the  
heart—the universal, human heart, for  
Americans come from every part of  
earth, including the Soviet Union. We  
want a peace that fulfills the dream of  
all peoples to raise their families in  
freedom and safety. And I believe that  
if both of our countries have courage  
and the patience, we will build such a  
peace.

In the next 2 months, people  
throughout the world will take part in  
two great festivals of faith—Hanukkah  
and Christmas. One is a celebration of  
freedom, the other of peace on earth,  
good will toward men. My great hope is  
that the biographies of our times will  
record that we had the will to make  
this the right season for this summit.

Thank you and God bless you.

#### General Secretary Gorbachev<sup>2</sup>

I am addressing my fellow countrymen,  
the citizens of the Soviet Union; I am  
addressing the American people. Presi-  
dent Reagan and I have just signed a  
treaty which, for the first time in history,  
requires the most stringently ver-  
ified destruction of two whole classes of  
nuclear arms. The treaty on the total  
elimination of Soviet and U.S. interme-  
diate and shorter range missiles will, I  
am sure, become a historic milestone in  
the chronicle of man's eternal quest for  
a world without wars.

On this occasion, may I be allowed  
to refer for a moment to history. Not  
all Americans may know that at the  
height of a world war, the very first  
steps taken by the Soviet republic born  
in Russia in 1917 was to promulgate a  
decree by its author, Vladimir Lenin.  
The founder of our state said, "We are  
willing to consider any proposal leading  
to peace on a just and solid basis." This  
has been the cornerstone of Soviet for-  
eign policy ever since.

We also remember another concept  
of his, disarmament. A world without  
arms or violence, that is our ideal.

Today, regrettably, the risk of a nu-  
clear catastrophe persists. It is still for-  
midable. But we believe in man's ability  
to get rid of the threat of self-annihila-  
tion. We are encouraged by the growing  
awareness in the world of the  
nature of the existent peril which has  
confronted humankind with the ques-  
tion of its very survival. The sacred hu-  
man right to live has now taken on a  
new global dimension, and this is what  
must always be in the minds of, above  
all, political and government leaders in-  
vested with power by the will of their  
peoples.

"The people" is not an abstract no-  
tion. It is made up of individuals, and  
each one of them has the right to life  
and the pursuit of happiness. The  
treaty just signed in Washington is a  
major watershed in international devel-  
opment. Its significance and implica-  
tions go far beyond what has actually  
been agreed upon. Our passage to this  
watershed was typical; it took us  
through lengthy and intense arguments  
and debate, overcoming long-held emo-  
tions and ingrained stereotypes. What  
has been accomplished is only a begin-  
ning. It is only the start of nuclear dis-  
armament, although as we know, even  
the longest journey begins with a first  
step.

Moving ahead from this start will  
require further intensive intellectual  
endeavor and honest effort, the aban-  
donment of some concepts of security  
which seem indisputable today, and of  
all that fuels the arms race. In  
November 1985, President Reagan and  
I said in Geneva that nuclear war could  
never be won and should never be  
fought. We also said that neither the  
Soviet Union nor the United States  
sought nuclear superiority.

This enabled us to take the first  
step up toward a platform of common  
endeavor. Geneva was followed by  
Reykjavik, where a fundamental break-  
through was made in our perception of  
the process of nuclear disarmament.  
That is what made possible both this  
treaty and a substantive consideration

of other issues related to the nuclear confrontation.

We give credit to our American partners. Together, we gained the experience that will help seek solutions to even more challenging problems of equal and universal security. Most important of all is to translate into reality as early as possible agreements on radical cuts in strategic offensive arms subject to preserving the ABM [Anti-ballistic Missile] Treaty, on the elimination of chemical weapons, and on reductions in conventional armaments.

On each of these problems, the Soviet Union has put forward specific proposals. We believe that agreements on them are within reach. We are hopeful that during next year's return visit of the U.S. President to the Soviet Union, we will achieve a treaty eliminating practically one-half of all existing strategic nuclear arms. There is also a possibility of agreeing on substantial cuts in conventional forces and arms in Europe, whose buildup and upgrading caused justified concern.

Once all this is accomplished, we shall be able to say with confidence progress toward a secure world has become irreversible. The abolition of weapons of mass destruction, disarmament for development, that is the principle, and in fact, the sole effective way to resolve other problems that mankind is having to face as the 20th century draws to a close, and—problems—the implications of the new technological revolution—energy, mass poverty, hunger and disease, huge foreign debts, failure to balance the diverse interests and these of scores of peoples and countries. To cope with them, there have to be above all fresh approaches to problems of national and universal security.

I know that with the signing of the treaty on intermediate and shorter range missiles, some politicians and journalists are already speculating as to who has won. I reject this approach. It is a throwback to old thinking. Commonsense has won, reason has won. True enough, it is not yet the greatest victory. But politically and psychologically, it is very important. It meets the aspirations and the interests of hundreds of millions of people throughout

the world. People want to live in a world in which they would not be haunted by the fear of nuclear catastrophe. People want to live in a world in which American and Soviet spacecrafts would come together for dockings and joint voyages, not for Star Wars. People want to live in a world in which they would not have to spend millions of dollars a day on weapons they could only use against themselves.

People want to live in a world in which everyone would enjoy the right to life, freedom, and happiness, and, of course, other human rights which must be guaranteed and practiced for any developed society to exist normally—a world in which the prosperity of a few would not be achieved at the cost of the poverty and suffering of others. People want to have not only military, but also economic security. People want to live in a world which is democratic and free, with equality for all and with every nation enjoying the right to its own social choice without outside interference.

People want to know the truth about each other and to feel at long last the great universal kinship of nations, ethnic groups, languages, and cultures. Can such a world be built? We in the Soviet Union are convinced that it can. Yes, it can. But this requires a most radical restructuring of international relations. To move toward such a world, there has to be creative courage, new thinking, and a correct assessment of—and regard for—the interests of other nations as well as one's own economic capabilities and interests. There has to be political will and a high sense of responsibility.

We in the Soviet Union have initiated a process of reassessing what has been achieved and of developing a new program of action, and we are implementing it. This is what we call *perestroika*. We have undertaken it without hesitation, for we realize that this is what our time demands. We have undertaken it because we want to elevate our society, speed up its development, make it even more democratic and open, and release all of its potential

so as to improve materially and spiritually the life of our people. Our confidence in the future of our country and our conviction that a secure and civilized world can be built are organically interrelated.

On behalf of the Soviet leadership and of our entire people, I declare in international affairs, we are active and will continue to act responsibly and seriously. We know what our interests are, but we seek to accommodate them to the interests of others, and we are ready to meet each other halfway as equals.

The President and I have 3 days intensive and important work ahead of us. Our talks are already underway. For our part, we will try to do all we can achieve results. Substantial results. Thank you.

## Dinner Toasts, Dec. 8, 1987<sup>3</sup>

### President Reagan

In our public statements and in our meetings together, we've always paid each other the compliment of candor. So let us continue to do so.

By now you may have concluded that, while we have fundamental disagreements about how human communities should govern themselves, it's possible, all the same, for us to work together.

As we complete the first full day of this historic meeting, let us look back together at the developments of the past 2 years and the significance of what is taking place. For we find ourselves involved in a dramatic march of events that has captured the attention of our two peoples and the entire world.

Since you and I first met in Geneva in November 1985, our two countries have moved toward a new period in the history of our relations.

The highlight of your visit is the signing of the first U.S.-Soviet arms control agreement in nearly a decade—

## FEATURE The Washington Summit

first ever to mandate actual reductions in our arsenals of nuclear weapons. We're making significant progress in other important areas of arms reduction, and have the opportunity, with mutual commitment and hard work, to achieve much more in the coming months.

But our relationship—the United States and the Soviet Union—is not limited just to arms control, but reaches across a broad spectrum of issues. A relationship that addresses the basic problems of self-determination in areas of regional conflicts and human rights. There are differences here, but ones that require frankness and candor. In bilateral matters, we also need hard and honest debate.

A century-and-a-half ago, the brilliant French observer, De Tocqueville, foresaw that our two countries would be the major countries of the world. History, geography, the blessings of resources, and the hard work of our peoples have made it so. And between us, there has also been a profound competition of political and economic philosophy, making us the protagonists in a drama with the greatest importance for the future of all mankind. Man's most fundamental beliefs about the relationship of the citizen to the state, and man to his Creator, lie at the core of the competition between our two countries. History has indeed endowed our relationship with a profound meaning.

Certainly we will not settle those issues this week. But the tasks before us require a full awareness of those issues, and of a responsibility that is binding on us both. I speak of a responsibility we dare not compromise or shirk. I speak of the responsibility to settle our differences—in peace.

Already, by virtue of hard work and hard bargaining, we've accomplished much and our negotiators deserve great credit. But we cannot afford to rest. There is more work to be done. And time and history are marching on.

So I offer a toast—a commitment on behalf of the American people, of

seriousness, good will, and hope for the future. General Secretary and Mrs. Gorbachev, to your health. *Za raskh zdorovie.*

### General Secretary Gorbachev 2

I take power into my hands now while the President is busy. [Laughter.]

Last summer it took a daring American girl by the name of Lynn Cox a mere 2 hours to swim the distance separating our two countries. On television we saw how sincere and cordial the meeting was between the people—between our people and the Americans when she stepped onto the Soviet shore. By her courage she showed how close to each other our two peoples live.

Without minimizing the great political and ideological distances between us, we want to seek and find avenues of rapprochement in areas where this is of

vital importance for our two countries and for all humankind. That is precisely what we are here for. In my 1986 New Year's Eve address on American television, I spoke of our hopes for a better future. By that time, Mr. President, you and I had already had 2 days of face-to-face talks in Geneva. This enabled me to tell Americans in my New Year's address that the winter of our discontent may one day come to an end. Today, following Reykjavik and the extensive preparatory work that has made our meeting in Washington possible, it can be said that the winter is on the wane.

A boundless world stretches far and wide beyond the walls of this house, and you and I, if you will, are accountable to it and to the peoples of our two countries, to our allies and friends, and to all our contemporaries. The Russian word, *perestroika*, can be applied to the process now underway all



(White House photo by Bill Fitzhugh)

President Reagan and General Secretary Gorbachev meet in the Oval Office Study on December 9. U.S. interpreter Dimitry Zarechnak (left) and Soviet interpreter Pavel Palazhchenko (right) attend the meeting.

over the world of rethinking the realities of a nuclear and space age. It must now be clear to all that the problems of today's world will not be solved through old approaches.

The goal we are setting today is to build a nuclear-free world. The road leading to it is difficult and thorny. But with new thinking it is attainable. As you can see, here, too, changes are necessary. Changes in the minds and changes in actions.

The great age of geographical discoveries amounted to more than one caravel or one newly found continent. Our journey toward a nuclear-free world cannot amount to reaching one or two islands named INF [intermediate-range nuclear forces] and shorter range INF. It is my hope that we shall promptly move further ahead toward the goal of reducing and then eliminating strategic offensive arms which make up the main and decisive portion of the nuclear arsenal.

As the clock of life brings us closer and closer to the 21st century, we are duty-bound to remember that each one of us, within the limits of our capability and ability, personifies the link between the transient and the eternal. As our famous poet, Afanasy Svet, said, "Although man is not eternal, what is human is eternal." It is in the name of eternal humanity that we have today performed our momentous deed. And my first salute is to that event.

It will be cherished by our two peoples. So I address these words of congratulation to the Soviet and American people whose will is embodied in the agreement. I want to emphasize that this is the fruit of the efforts not only of us both, but also of our allies and representatives of all countries and all public movements whose effort and contribution rightfully make them parties to this historic effort.

It would be fair today to pay tribute to the efforts of those who were directly involved in preparing the treaty. May I wish good health to you, Mr. President, and to Mrs. Reagan; happiness and well-being to all those present here tonight; peace and prosperity to the peoples of our two countries.

## Luncheon Toasts, Dec. 9, 1987<sup>4</sup>

### Secretary Shultz

I think all of our friends from the Soviet Union will find a text translated in front of them, which will save us a little time.

Benjamin Franklin, the father of American diplomacy, who exchanged correspondence with Catherine the Great—and for whom this room is named—would be fascinated to be with us today. For this is the first time the leader of the Soviet Union has visited the Department of State. Welcome.

Your visit here, Mr. General Secretary, and the prospect of a visit by President Reagan to Moscow, should cause us to think about guidelines for managing our relations. What should we both be keeping in mind?

**First**, ours is a relationship as important as it is unique. It is important because we each bear an immense burden of leadership in the world. It is unique because the nuclear era demands that we engage each other despite our profound differences. As you said in your book, Mr. General Secretary, "There is no getting away from each other."

**Second**, our relationship will continue to be a difficult one to manage. We have contrasting philosophies, political systems, and national interests. Our basic values, systems and interests will persist, even as the necessity to work together increases.

**Third**, we must be realistic, avoiding extremes, either of hostility or euphoria, through the ups and downs of our relations. The best approach to dealing with one another is one Ben Franklin might have suggested: be down-to-earth, pragmatic, and businesslike in seeking to solve concrete problems.

**Fourth**, we must speak with clarity and candor to one another about our differences. That is why at this summit, we have stressed the fundamental importance we attach to human rights, as set forth in the Universal Declara-

tion and the Helsinki Final Act. As the European Community heads of government stated December 5, "Respect for human rights and freedom is a prerequisite for confidence, understanding and cooperation."

We have spoken with candor about regional issues, as well. You have not hesitated to speak your mind to us. And we have made some progress. As President Reagan has said, we owe each other the tribute of candor, and candor will help us get results.

**Fifth**, we must look to the future without neglecting the lessons of the past. Too often, we face the past and back into the future. In 5 to 10 years our world will be vastly different from the one we know today, and from the postwar world of the past 40 years, which has conditioned so much of our thinking. Franklin—and Lomonosov, his contemporary—were ready and eager for the future. So should we be. The material substances of daily life are being transformed. The speed of human transactions is accelerating. Scientific, economic, and political matters are no longer global in dimension. And through all these changes, runs the thread of knowledge: its discovery, its rapid transmission as information, and the education needed to use it.

This leads to a **sixth** point: the recognition that openness to ideas, information, and contacts is the key to future success. The conceptual breakthroughs embodied in the INF [intermediate-range nuclear forces] Treaty's provisions for verification and on-site inspection are but one example of the powerful pull which openness is already exerting in a key area of our relations.

We must seek steady progress toward a more open, more predictable, more stable, and constructive relationship. In this time of change, a complicated interplay of international relationships complicates the management of our bilateral affairs. But new patterns of interaction also offer new opportunities for cooperation and progress. Let us grasp those opportunities.

Mr. General Secretary, Mrs. Gorbachev, to your health, to the health of the President and Mrs. Reagan, and to the Soviet and American peoples. [Applause.]

### General Secretary Gorbachev 2

I express my gratitude for your invitation to the U.S. Department of State, a highly authoritative body. In international politics, much depends on the people who work here. At any rate, without their participation, what we discussed and took part in yesterday could not have happened.

Yesterday, the President of your country and I signed a treaty eliminating a whole class—to be more precise, two classes—of nuclear arms. As a result, the world will be rid of a total of some 2,000 deadly warheads. The number is not all that big, but the treaty significance goes far beyond its specific content.

We regard it as a start in implementing the program of building a nuclear-free world, which I proposed on behalf of the Soviet leadership and the Soviet people almost 2 years ago, on January 15, 1986. Since then, I have been asked many times whether I continue to believe in the feasibility of that program. My answer is, "Yes, I most certainly do."

The signing of the treaty on intermediate and shorter range missiles demonstrates that the road toward that goal is not at all easy. Yet it also shows that we have chosen the right road, and that the goal can be reached.

Urging us on is the will of hundreds of millions of people, who are beginning to understand that as the 20th century draws to a close, civilization as we know it is approaching a dividing line, not so much between different systems and ideologies, but between common sense and mankind's feelings of self-preservation, on the one hand, and irresponsibility, national selfishness, and prejudice—to put it briefly, old thinking—on the other.

Mankind is beginning to realize that it has had enough of wars, that an end must be put to wars, for good.

The two world wars, and the grueling cold war, along with minor wars which cost and continue to cost millions of lives, are too exorbitant a price to pay for adventurism, ambition, disregard for the interests and rights of others, the unwillingness or inability to reckon with reality, and with the legitimate right of all nations to make their own choice and seek their own place under the Sun.

This implies that the lofty ideals advanced by humanists throughout the ages—the ideals of peace and liberty, awareness of the value of each human life—must underlie practical politics.

Each new step in international life, given a sensible and responsible approach to it, not only gives us a deeper insight into the problems, but also provides additional opportunities for their solution.

What matters now is that we cannot let those opportunities pass, and must use them as fully as possible to build a safer and more democratic world, free from the trappings and the psychology of militarism.

The step we have taken in signing the treaty and preparations for it were, without exaggeration, truly instructive. This has enriched our two countries in world politics, with the recognition of the significance of several difficult, yet simple truths. It is appropriate to mention some of them here.

First of all, while moving closer to each other, we have come to appreciate even more the role and importance of Soviet-American relations in the current development of international affairs, together with our enormous responsibility, not only to our own people, but also to the world community.

Secondly, we have felt how important is our allies' support for our efforts. On top of that, we have felt the substantial potential carried by their ideas and advice, by their concerned and genuine involvement, and by the coordination of our actions with them.

Thirdly, we have seen in practice how important is the understanding of one's intentions, proposals, and plans by the allies of one's partners, and of

course, the sympathy and even solidarity and simply the wishes of success, coming from many nations, big and small, from the developing world, from nonaligned nations.

All of this has confirmed persuasively a simple yet very important truth: peace in the world today cannot be a monopoly of one country or a group of countries, however powerful.

Peace is the concern and preoccupation of many, and increasingly of all of us together. And where many interact, reciprocity and compromise are inevitable.

Peace from a position of strength is inherently unstable, whatever anyone might claim. By its very nature, it is based on confrontation, whether covert or overt. It is based on the permanent risk of flare-ups, on the temptation to try and use force.

For ages, mankind had to put up with such a bad peace. This can no longer be tolerated.

Some believe, that in the process of preparing the treaty, the Soviet side has conceded too much. Others, that it was the United States that made too many concessions. I think neither of you is correct. Each side has conceded as much as was necessary to balance their interests in this particular sphere.

In building an atmosphere of contacts and lively communication, of better knowledge of each other—something without which the treaty would have been difficult to achieve—we and, hopefully, you too have come to feel much more strongly that for us to remain different, to live as each of us wants to, to be able to argue with each other and uphold one's own view, it is imperative above all to preserve peace.

Yesterday, a fundamentally new and important, albeit modest, step was taken toward a more equitable and a more humane order in international relations. We would like to hope that subsequent steps will not be too long in coming. It is, after all, always easier to pursue a good cause based on the experience of what has already been done.

Today, all of us are making the passage from knowledge as dogma to knowledge as thinking. We have begun

to re-establish the peacemaking vocation of politics. It can no longer remain, as it happened in the 20th century after two world wars, a continuation of war by different means.

Also changing with politics is the vocation of diplomacy, which is designed to identify the seeds of accord, even in a sea of discord, and to translate the possible into reality.

Over the past few years, our countries' diplomatic services have done a great deal of work. And while pointing to yesterday's truly historymaking event—the signing of the treaty—one cannot but, particularly here in this building of the State Department, pay tribute to the many who dedicated to it their intellect, energy, patience, perseverance, knowledge, and a sense of duty to their nation and to the international community.

And first of all, I would like to mention Comrade Eduard Shevardnadze and Mr. George Shultz.

I would also like to say a few kind words about the diplomats working outside their own countries. They were not just negotiating with each other. Working in the capitals of their host countries, they were helping us to understand what is attainable and what is not, what is promising and what, as yet, cannot be done.

I like an idea I read in a recent article published in an American newspaper: "Diplomacy is a country's first line of defense, and a front line in the battle for peace."

But foreign policy has ceased to be a domain of professionals alone. The practice of secret collusions and agreements, which deceive nations and doom them to actions and sacrifices that are contrary to their vital interests, is also being consigned to the past. One way or another, any falsehood, any untruth, will be uncovered.

I regard this distinctive feature of our time as a guarantee of a genuine democratization of relations among states. In the powerful gravity field of universal scrutiny, attention and the very high demands placed on people vested with the authority of represent-

ing their country in others, they must permanently be accountable. They must explain and elucidate.

Besides, they stand on the delicate line of contact between cultures. A lot depends on them, in how one nation understands the life of another. And today, this is something badly needed in making policy, too.

The presence in this room of prominent representatives of the United States and of the Soviet Union is not merely a tribute to protocol or etiquette. It is also evidence to the fact that the policy of seeking better mutual understanding between our countries enjoys authoritative support.

Such support has inspired us on the long and arduous road to the agreement that starts real nuclear disarmament. But since we have no intention of stopping in the early stages, that support will also be needed tomorrow, when we continue our joint effort to eliminate the largest, and also the most dangerous, portion of our nuclear arsenals.

In this context, I would like to mention the potential for developing relations between our countries inherent in contacts among our academic and cultural communities. To a substantial degree, it is they who shape a nation's consciousness and its attitudes toward other nations, and precisely for that reason, they find a common language more easily, providing a necessary background for policymaking, too. The role that our two countries' intellectuals are playing in relations between our peoples and countries is big and important.

In the language of simple human communication, both in Russian and in English, what we have achieved here means hope reborn. Force is a variable and unstable category, but truth arrived at through honest efforts is a constant, for it is human.

Today we are closer to the truth than we were yesterday. I congratulate you.

## Remarks, Diplomatic Notes Ceremonies Dec. 9, 1987<sup>5</sup>

### Secretary Shultz

We have three items here and they illustrate that our leaders sign big things like the INF (intermediate-range nuclear forces) agreement, but that there are also other things that represent life between us.

- Here we have signed an amendment to our civil aviation agreement that authorizes more flights and joint use of Pan Am 747s by Pan Am and Aeroflot, and will be mutually beneficial to commerce between us.

- A note extending the world ocean agreement that allows U.S. and Soviet officials and scientists to revive cooperative activity under a longstanding but dormant agreement.

- Then a statement recording our agreement on the nuclear testing joint verification experiment that makes possible improved verification measures for test explosions between 100 and 150 kilotons.

These all represent constructive steps in our joint endeavors and I take pleasure in doing this in company with my friend the Foreign Minister, Mr. [Eduard] Shevardnadze. [Applause.]

### Foreign Minister Shevardnadze<sup>6</sup>

I want to take advantage of this opportunity to once again congratulate you and all those present here on the historic event having to do with signing an INF agreement, which was signed yesterday by President Reagan and by the General Secretary of the Central Committee of our party, Mikhail Sergeyevich Gorbachev.

Today we have signed three more documents, also very important documents. I should say that the two great





(White House photo by Bill Fitz-Patrick)

On December 9, President Reagan and General Secretary Gorbachev meet in the Oval Office with staff members (clockwise): General Secretary Gorbachev, Soviet Foreign Minister Shevardnadze, Secretaries of the CPSU Central Committee Alexander N. Yakovlev and Anatoly F. Dobrynin,

Secretary of Defense Frank Carlucci, Chief of Staff Howard Baker, national security adviser Lt. Gen. Colin Powell, Vice President Bush, Secretary Shultz, U.S. interpreter Dmitry Zarechnak, and President Reagan.

owers cannot possibly sign some insignificant documents. All of them are very significant and this is something we have done with the greatest of pleasure.

#### Secretary Shultz

Thank you, very much. [Applause and exchange of pens.] We will exchange pens the same way the President and the General Secretary did. [Laughter.] We'll follow their example. [Applause.]

Now, we have another tradition. Right after we sign something, we go back to work.

### Joint Statement on Nuclear Testing, Dec. 9, 1987 <sup>7</sup>

In accordance with the joint statement on the problems relating to nuclear testing, adopted in Washington on September 17, 1987, the U.S. and the U.S.S.R. are proceeding to design a joint verification experiment. This experiment would be conducted as soon as possible at the test sites of each other (respectively in Semipaltinsk and Nevada) for the purpose of the elaboration of improved verification measures for the 1974 Threshold Test Ban Treaty and

the 1976 Peaceful Nuclear Explosions Treaty. These verification measures will, to the extent appropriate, be used in further nuclear test limitation agreements which may subsequently be reached.

For the purpose of the joint verification experiment, each side will provide the other side with an opportunity to measure the yield of one or two explosions at each side's test site with yields not less than 100 kilotons and approaching 150 kilotons.

For the purpose of the joint verification experiment, each side will have the opportunity, on the basis of complete reciprocity, to measure the yields

of the explosions for verification purposes, using: teleseismic methods, and, at the other side's test site, hydrodynamic yield measurement methods in a satellite hole. As a yield standard, the experiment will include yield measurement by means of a hydrodynamic method in the emplacement hole.

The joint verification experiment will not be designed to produce statistically significant results, but will be conducted in such a way as to address all other concerns identified by either side regarding methods proposed by the other side for verification of the 1974 Threshold Test Ban Treaty and the 1976 Peaceful Nuclear Explosions Treaty. The sides have also agreed that the experiment will give sufficient information to resolve these concerns by providing an example of the effectiveness of the verification methods used in the joint verification experiment and by demonstrating their practicability and nonintrusiveness. The experiment will thus provide the basis for agreeing on those verification measures which could be used by either side to verify compliance by the other side with the provisions of the 1974 and 1976 treaties. The understanding has been reached that in the future each side will be entitled to apply any or all of these agreed verification measures.

In order to develop and reach agreement on specific technical and organizational parameters of the joint verification experiment, the sides have agreed to establish *ad hoc* working groups at their negotiations.

In order to help prepare themselves to design and conduct the joint verification experiment, the sides have agreed to exchange visits of delegations to the two sides' nuclear test sites. These visits, to the U.S.S.R. Semipalatinsk test site and the U.S. Nevada test site, will take place in January 1988 as the preliminary work of the next negotiating round in Geneva.

## Joint Summit Statement, Dec. 10, 1987<sup>3</sup>

Ronald W. Reagan, President of the United States of America, and Mikhail S. Gorbachev, General Secretary of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union (CPSU), met in Washington on December 7-10, 1987.

Attending the meeting on the U.S. side were Vice President George Bush; Secretary of State George P. Shultz; Secretary of Defense Frank C. Carlucci; Chief of Staff Howard H. Baker, Jr.; acting assistant to the President [for national security] Lt. Gen. Colin L. Powell; Counselor of the Department of State Ambassador Max M. Kampelman; Ambassador at Large and special adviser to the President and Secretary of State on arms control matters Paul H. Nitze; special adviser to the President and Secretary of State on arms control matters Ambassador Edward L. Rowny; Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff Adm. William J. Crowe, Jr.; Ambassador of the U.S. to the U.S.S.R. Jack F. Matlock; and Assistant Secretary of State for European and Canadian Affairs Rozanne L. Ridgway

Attending on the Soviet side were Member of the Politburo of the CPSU Central Committee, Minister of Foreign Affairs of the U.S.S.R. Eduard A. Shevardnadze; Member of the Politburo of the CPSU Central Committee, Secretary of the CPSU Central Committee Alexander N. Yakovlev; Secretary of the CPSU Central Committee Anatoly F. Dobrynin; Deputy Chairman of the U.S.S.R. Council of Ministers Vladimir M. Kamentsev; Chief of the General Staff of the U.S.S.R. Armed Forces and First Deputy Minister of Defense of the U.S.S.R., Marshal of the Soviet Union Sergei F. Akhromeev; Assistant to the General Secretary of the CPSU Central Committee Anatoly S. Chernyaev; Head of the General Department of the CPSU Central Committee Valeriy I. Boldin; Deputy Minister of Foreign Affairs of the U.S.S.R. Alexander A. Bessmertnykh; Ambassador of the U.S.S.R. to the United States of America Yuri V. Dubinin; Member of the

Collegium of the U.S.S.R., Ministry of Foreign Affairs Victor P. Karpov; and Ambassador at Large Aleksey A. Obukhov.

During the course of the official visit, which had been agreed during the two leaders' November 1985 meeting in Geneva, the President and the General Secretary held comprehensive and detailed discussions of the full range of issues between the two countries, including arms reductions, human rights and humanitarian issues, settlement of regional conflicts, and bilateral relations. The talks were candid and constructive, reflecting both the continuing differences between the two sides, and their understanding that these differences are not insurmountable obstacles to progress in areas of mutual interest.

They reaffirmed their strong commitment to a vigorous dialogue encompassing the whole of the relationship.

The leaders reviewed progress to date in fulfilling the broad agenda they agreed at Geneva and advanced at Reykjavik. They took particular satisfaction in the conclusion over the last years of important agreements in some areas of this agenda.

The President and the General Secretary affirmed the fundamental importance of their meetings in Geneva and Reykjavik, which laid the basis for concrete steps in a process intended to improve strategic stability and reduce the risk of conflict. They will continue to be guided by their solemn conviction that a nuclear war cannot be won and must never be fought. They are determined to prevent any war between the United States and the Soviet Union, whether nuclear or conventional. They will not seek to achieve military superiority.

The two leaders recognized the special responsibility of the United States and the Soviet Union to search for realistic ways to prevent confrontation and to promote a more sustainable and stable relationship between their countries. To this end, they agreed to intensify dialogue and to encourage emerging trends toward constructive cooperation in all areas of their relations. They are convinced that in so doing they will also contribute, with



her nations, to the building of a safer world as humanity enters the third millennium.

## ARMS CONTROL

### INF Treaty

The two leaders signed the Treaty Between the United States of America and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics on the Elimination of Their Intermediate-Range and Shorter-Range Missiles. This treaty is historic both for its objective—the complete elimination of an entire class of U.S. and Soviet nuclear arms—and for the innovative character and scope of its verification provisions. This mutual accomplishment makes a vital contribution to greater stability.

### Nuclear and Space Talks

The President and the General Secretary discussed the negotiations on reductions in strategic offensive arms. They noted the considerable progress which has been made toward conclusion of a treaty implementing the principle of 50% reductions. They agreed to instruct their negotiators in Geneva to work toward the completion of the treaty on the Reduction and Limitation of Strategic Offensive Arms and all integral documents at the earliest possible date, preferable in time for signature of the treaty during the next meeting of leaders of state in the first half of 1988. Recognizing that areas of agreement and disagreement are recorded in detail in the joint draft treaty text, they agreed to instruct their negotiators to accelerate resolution of issues within the joint draft treaty text including early agreement on provisions for effective verification.

In so doing, the negotiators should build upon the agreements on 50% reductions achieved at Reykjavik as subsequently developed and now reflected in the agreed portions of the joint draft START [strategic arms reductions talks] treaty text being developed in Geneva, including agreement on ceilings of no more than 1,600 strategic of-

fensive delivery systems, 6,000 warheads, 1,540 warheads on 154 heavy missiles; the agreed rules of account for heavy bombers and their nuclear armament; and an agreement that as a result of the reductions the aggregate throw-weight of the Soviet Union's ICBMs [intercontinental ballistic missiles] and SLBMs [submarine-launched ballistic missiles] will be reduced to a level approximately 50% below the existing level, and this level will not be exceeded by either side. Such an agreement will be recorded in a mutually satisfactory manner.

As priority tasks, they should focus on the following issues:

(a) The additional steps necessary to ensure that the reductions enhance strategic stability. This will include a ceiling of 4,900 on the aggregate number of ICBM plus SLBM warheads within the 6,000 total.

(b) The counting rules governing the number of long-range, nuclear-armed, air-launched cruise missiles (ALCMs) to be attributed to each type of heavy bomber. The delegations shall define concrete rules in this area.

(c) The counting rules with respect to existing ballistic missiles. The sides proceed from the assumption that existing types of ballistic missiles are deployed with the following numbers of warheads. In the United States: Peacekeeper (MX):10, Minuteman III:3, Minuteman II:1, Trident I:8, Trident II:S, Poseidon:10. In the Soviet Union: SS-17:4, SS-19:6, SS-18:10, SS-24:10, SS-25:1, SS-11:1, SS-13:1, SS-N-6:1, SS-N-8:1, SS-N-17:1, SS-N-18:7, SS-N-20:10, and SS-N-23:4. Procedures will be developed that enable verification of the number of warheads on deployed ballistic missiles of each specific type. In the event either side changes the number of warheads declared for a type of deployed ballistic missile, the sides shall notify each other in advance. There shall also be agreement on how to account for warheads on future types of ballistic missiles covered by the Treaty on the Reduction and Limitation of Strategic Offensive Arms.

(d) The sides shall find a mutually acceptable solution to the question of limiting the deployment of long-range, nuclear-armed SLCMs. Such limitations will not involve counting long-range, nuclear-armed SLCMs within the 6,000 warheads and 1,600 strategic offensive delivery systems limits. The sides committed themselves to establish ceilings on such missiles, and to seek mutually acceptable and effective methods of verification of such limitations, which could include the employment of national technical means, cooperative measures, and onsite inspection.

(e) Building upon the provisions of the Treaty on the Elimination of Their Intermediate-Range and Shorter-Range Missiles, the measures by which the provisions of the Treaty on the Reduction and Limitation of Strategic Offensive Arms can be verified will, at a minimum, include:

1. Data exchanges, to include declarations by each side of the number and location of weapon systems limited by the treaty and of facilities at which such systems are located and appropriate notifications. These facilities will include locations and facilities for production and final assembly, storage, testing, and deployment of systems covered by this treaty. Such declarations will be exchanged between the sides before the treaty is signed and updated periodically after entry into force.

2. Baseline inspection to verify the accuracy of these declarations promptly after entry into force of the treaty.

3. Onsite observation of the elimination of strategic systems necessary to achieve the agreed limits.

4. Continuous onsite monitoring of the perimeter and portals of critical production and support facilities to confirm the output of these facilities.

5. Short-notice onsite inspection of:

(i) Declared locations during the process of reducing to agreed limits;

(ii) Locations where systems covered by this treaty remain after achieving the agreed limits; and

(iii) Locations where such systems have been located (formerly declared facilities).

6. The right to implement, in accordance with agreed-upon procedures, short-notice inspections at locations where either side considers covert deployment, production, storage, or repair of strategic offensive arms could be occurring.

7. Provisions prohibiting the use of concealment or other activities which impede verification by national technical means. Such provisions would include a ban on telemetry encryption and would allow for full access to all telemetric information broadcast during missile flight.

8. Measures designed to enhance observation of activities related to reduction and limitation of strategic offensive arms by national technical means. These would include open displays of treaty-limited items at missile bases, bomber bases, and submarine ports at locations and times chosen by the inspecting party.

Taking into account the preparation of the treaty on strategic offensive arms, the leaders of the two countries also instructed their delegations in Geneva to work out an agreement that would commit the sides to observe the ABM [Antiballistic Missile] Treaty, as signed in 1972, while conducting their research, development, and testing as required, which are permitted by the ABM Treaty, and not to withdraw from the ABM Treaty, for a specified period of time. Intensive discussions of strategic stability shall begin not later than 3 years before the end of the specified period, after which, in the event the sides have not agreed otherwise, each side will be free to decide its course of action. Such an agreement must have the same legal status as the treaty on

strategic offensive arms, the ABM Treaty, and other similar, legally binding agreements. This agreement will be recorded in a mutually satisfactory manner. Therefore, they direct their delegations to address these issues on a priority basis.

The sides shall discuss ways to ensure predictability in the development of the U.S.-Soviet strategic relationship, under conditions of strategic stability, to reduce the risk of nuclear war.

#### Other Arms Control Issues

The President and the General Secretary reviewed a broad range of other issues concerning arms limitation and reduction. The sides emphasized the importance of productive negotiations on security matters and advancing in the main areas of arms limitation and reduction through equitable, verifiable agreements that enhance security and stability.

#### Nuclear Testing

The two leaders welcomed the opening on November 9, 1987, of full-scale, step-by-step negotiations, in accordance with the joint statement adopted in Washington on September 17, 1987, by the Secretary of State of the United States and the Minister of Foreign Affairs of the U.S.S.R.:

The U.S. and Soviet sides have agreed to begin before December 1, 1987, full-scale stage-by-stage negotiations which will be conducted in a single forum. In these negotiations the sides as the first step will agree upon effective verification measures which will make it possible to ratify the U.S.-U.S.S.R. Threshold Test Ban Treaty of 1974 and Peaceful Nuclear Explosions Treaty of 1976, and proceed to negotiating further intermediate limitations on nuclear testing leading to the ultimate objective of the complete cessation of nuclear testing as part of an effective disarmament process. This process, among other things, would pursue, as the first priority, the goal of the reduction of nuclear weapons and, ultimately, their elimination. For the purpose of the elaboration of improved verification measures for the

U.S.-U.S.S.R. treaties of 1974 and 1976 the sides intend to design and conduct joint verification experiments at each other's test sites. These verification measures will, to the extent appropriate, be used in further nuclear test limitation agreements which may subsequently be reached.

The leaders also welcomed the prompt agreement by the sides to exchange experts' visits to each other's nuclear testing sites in January 1988 and to design and subsequently to conduct a joint verification experiment at each other's test site. The terms of reference for the experiment are set forth in the statement issued on December 9, 1987, by the foreign ministers of the United States and the Soviet Union. The leaders noted the value of these agreements for developing more effective measures to verify compliance with the provisions of the 1974 Threshold Test Ban Treaty and the 1976 Peaceful Nuclear Explosions Treaty.

#### Nuclear Nonproliferation

The President and the General Secretary reaffirmed the continued commitment of the United States and the Soviet Union to the nonproliferation of nuclear weapons, and in particular to strengthening the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons. The two leaders expressed satisfaction at the adherence since their intent to make, together with other states, additional efforts to achieve universal adherence to the treaty.

The President and the General Secretary expressed support for international cooperation in nuclear safety and for efforts to promote the peaceful uses of nuclear energy, under further strengthened IAEA [International Atomic Energy Agency] safeguards and appropriate export controls for nuclear materials, equipment, and technology. The leaders agreed that bilateral consultations on nonproliferation were constructive and useful, and should continue.



#### **Nuclear Risk Reduction Centers**

The leaders welcomed the signing on September 15, 1987, in Washington of an agreement to establish Nuclear Risk Reduction Centers in their capitals. The agreement will be implemented promptly.

#### **Chemical Weapons**

The leaders expressed their commitment to negotiation of a verifiable, comprehensive, and effective international convention on the prohibition and destruction of chemical weapons. They welcomed progress to date and reaffirmed the need for intensified negotiations toward conclusion of a truly global and verifiable convention encompassing all chemical weapons-capable states. The United States and Soviet Union are in favor of greater openness and intensified confidence building with respect to chemical weapons both on a bilateral and a multilateral basis. They intend to continue periodic discussions with experts on the growing problem of chemical weapons proliferation and use.

#### **Conventional Forces**

The President and General Secretary discussed the importance of the task of reducing the level of military confrontation in Europe in the area of armed forces and conventional armaments. The two leaders spoke in favor of early completion of the work in Vienna on the mandate for negotiations on this issue, that substantive negotiations may be started at the earliest time with a view to elaborating concrete measures. They also noted that the implementation of the provisions of the Stockholm Conference on Confidence- and Security-Building Measures and Disarmament in Europe is an important factor in strengthening mutual understanding and enhancing stability and spoke in favor of continuing and consolidating this process. The President and the General Secretary agreed to instruct their appropriate representatives to intensify efforts to achieve solutions to outstanding issues.

They also discussed the Vienna (Mutual and Balanced Force Reduction) negotiations.

#### **Follow-Up Meeting of the CSCE**

They expressed their determination, together with the other 33 participants in the Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe (CSCE), to bring the Vienna CSCE Follow-Up Conference to a successful conclusion, based on balanced progress in all principal areas of the Helsinki Final Act and Madrid Concluding Document.

#### **II. HUMAN RIGHTS AND HUMANITARIAN CONCERNS**

The leaders held a thorough and candid discussion of human rights and humanitarian questions and their place in the U.S.-Soviet dialogue.

#### **III. REGIONAL ISSUES**

The President and the General Secretary engaged in a wide-ranging, frank, and businesslike discussion of regional questions, including Afghanistan, the Iran-Iraq war, the Middle East, Cambodia, southern Africa, Central America, and other issues. They acknowledged serious differences but agreed on the importance of their regular exchange of views. The two leaders noted the increasing importance of settling regional conflicts to reduce international tensions and to improve East-West relations. They agreed that the goal of the dialogue between the United States and the Soviet Union on these issues should be to help the parties to regional conflicts find peaceful solutions that advance their independence, freedom, and security. Both leaders emphasized the importance of enhancing the capacity of the United Nations and other international institutions to contribute to the resolution of regional conflicts.

#### **IV. BILATERAL AFFAIRS**

The President and the General Secretary reviewed in detail the state of U.S.-Soviet bilateral relations. They recognized the utility of further expanding and strengthening bilateral contacts, exchanges, and cooperation.

#### **Bilateral Negotiations**

Having reviewed the state of ongoing U.S.-Soviet negotiations on a number of specific bilateral issues, the two leaders called for intensified efforts by their representatives, aimed at reaching mutually advantageous agreements on: commercial maritime issues; fishing; marine search and rescue; radio navigational systems; the U.S.-U.S.S.R. maritime boundary; and cooperation in the field of transportation and other areas.

They noted with satisfaction agreement on the expansion, within the framework of the U.S.-Soviet air transport agreement, of direct air passenger service, including joint operation of the New York-Moscow route by Pan American Airways and Aeroflot, and on the renewal of the U.S.-Soviet world ocean agreement.

#### **People-to-People Contacts and Exchanges**

The two leaders took note of progress in implementing the U.S.-Soviet general exchanges agreement in the areas of education, science, culture, and sports, signed at their November 1985 Geneva meeting, and agreed to continue efforts to eliminate obstacles to further progress in these areas. They expressed satisfaction with plans to celebrate jointly the 30th anniversary of the first exchanges agreement in January 1988.

The two leaders reaffirmed the importance of contacts and exchanges in broadening understanding between their peoples. They noted with particular satisfaction the progress made in the development of people-to-people contacts under the initiative they

launched at their 1985 meeting in Geneva—a process which has involved tens of thousands of U.S. and Soviet citizens over the past 2 years. The leaders reaffirmed their strong commitment further to expand such contacts, including among the young.

### Global Climate and Environmental Change Initiative

With reference to their November 1985 agreement in Geneva to cooperate in the preservation of the environment, the two leaders approved a bilateral initiative to pursue joint studies in global climate and environmental change through cooperation in areas of mutual concern, such as protection and conservation of stratospheric ozone, and through increased data exchanges pursuant to the U.S.-Soviet environmental protection agreement and the Agreement Between the United States of America and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics Concerning Cooperation in the Exploration and Use of Outer Space for Peaceful Purposes. In this context, there will be a detailed study on the climate of the future. The two sides will continue to promote broad international and bilateral cooperation in the increasingly important area of global climate and environmental change.

### Cooperative Activities

The President and the General Secretary supported further cooperation among scientists of the United States, the Soviet Union, and other countries in utilizing controlled thermonuclear fusion for peaceful purposes. They affirmed the intention of the U.S. and the U.S.S.R. to cooperate with the European Atomic Energy Community (EURATOM) and Japan, under the auspices of the International Atomic Energy Agency, in the quadripartite conceptual design of a fusion test reactor.

The two leaders noted with satisfaction progress under the bilateral agreement on peaceful uses of atomic

energy toward establishing a permanent working group in the field of nuclear reactor safety, and expressed their readiness to develop further cooperation in this area.

The President and the General Secretary agreed to develop bilateral cooperation in combatting international narcotics trafficking. They agreed that appropriate initial consultations would be held for these purposes in early 1988.

They also agreed to build on recent contacts to develop more effective cooperation in ensuring the security of air and maritime transportation.

The two leaders exchanged views on means of encouraging expanded contacts and cooperation on issues relating to the Arctic. They expressed support for the development of bilateral and regional cooperation among the Arctic countries on these matters, including coordination of scientific research and protection of the region's environment.

The two leaders welcomed the conclusion of negotiations to institutionalize the COSPAS/SARSAT space-based global search and rescue system, operated jointly by the United States, the Soviet Union, France, and Canada.

### Trade

The two sides stated their strong support for the expansion of mutually beneficial trade and economic relations. They instructed their trade ministers to convene the U.S.-U.S.S.R. Joint Commercial Commission in order to develop concrete proposals to achieve that objective, including within the framework of the Long-Term Agreement Between the United States of America and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics to Facilitate Economic, Industrial, and Technical Cooperation. They agreed that commercially viable joint ventures complying with the laws and regulations of both countries could play a role in the further development of commercial relations.

### Diplomatic Missions

Both sides agreed on the importance of adequate, secure facilities for their re-

spective diplomatic and consular establishments, and emphasized the need to approach problems relating to the functioning of embassies and consulates general constructively and on the basis of reciprocity.

### V. FURTHER MEETINGS

The President and the General Secretary agreed that official contacts at all levels should be further expanded and intensified, with the goal of achieving practical and concrete results in all areas of the U.S.-Soviet relationship.

General Secretary Gorbachev renewed the invitation he extended during the Geneva summit for President Reagan to visit the Soviet Union. The President accepted with pleasure. The visit will take place in the first half of 1988.

### Departure Remarks, Dec. 10, 1987<sup>3</sup>

#### President Reagan

These last few days have been exciting indeed, for both of us and for our fellow countrymen who followed the course of our discussions. I am pleased to report that upon the completion of our business that this summit has been a clear success. [Applause.] Like the star on the top of the national Christmas tree which was lit the evening you arrived, Mr. General Secretary, this summit has lit the sky with hope for all people of good will. And as we leave, it is up to both sides to ensure that the luster does not wear off and to follow through on our commitments as we move forward to the next steps in improving the relations between our countries and peoples.

I believe both the General Secretary and I can walk away from our meetings with a sense of accomplishment. We have proven that adversarial differences, can talk candidly and respectfully with one another and, with perseverance, find common ground. We

did not hide from the weighty differences that separate us; many of them, of course, remain. One of my predecessors, President Franklin Roosevelt, once said, "History cannot be rewritten or wishful thinking." Our discussions, in that spirit, were straightforward and designed to open a thoughtful communication between our governments on the critical issues that confront us.

Our exchange on the subject of human rights underscored the priority we in the Western democracies place on respect for fundamental freedoms. I am pleased that during this summit we addressed this area of heartfelt importance and have ensured a continuing dialogue on human rights at the highest levels of our governments.

Our discussions on regional conflicts were no less to the point. These conflicts continue to take a heavy toll in lives and impose a heavy burden on East-West relations. The General Secretary and I expressed different points of view—we did so bluntly—and for that reason alone, our talks have been useful in this area. Moreover, we agree that it is necessary to search for real political solutions to these conflicts, that so far we cannot be satisfied with what has been achieved. We must now press ahead in the search for political solutions that advance the cause of peace and freedom for the people suffering in these wars. The door has been opened and it will stay open to serious discussion of ending these regional conflicts.

And as far as open doors, Mr. Gorbachev and I both agree on the desirability of freer and more extensive personal contact and the breaking down of artificial barriers between the peoples of the Soviet Union and the United States. As I said in my welcoming remarks, the fact that our governments have disagreements should not prevent our peoples from being friends.

Of course, the greatest accomplishment of these 3 days was the signing of a treaty to eliminate a whole class of U.S. and Soviet nuclear weapons. Another one of my predecessors, a President I have admired since my youth, Calvin Coolidge, once said, "History is

only made by action." Well, it took enormous effort and almost superhuman tenacity on the part of the negotiators on both sides, but the end-product is a treaty that does indeed make history. It is in the interest of both our peoples, yet I cannot help but believe that mankind is the biggest winner. At long last, we have begun the task of actually reducing these deadly weapons, rather than simply putting limits on their growth.

The INF Treaty, as proud of it as we are, should be viewed as a beginning, not an end. Further arms reduction is now possible. I am pleased some progress has been made toward a strategic arms reduction treaty over the last 3 days.

Individual agreements will not, in and of themselves, result in sustained progress. We need a realistic understanding of each other's intentions and objectives, a process for dealing with differences in a practical and straightforward manner, and we need patience, creativity, and persistence in achieving what we set out to do. As a result of this summit, the framework for building such a relationship has been strengthened.

I am determined to use this framework. My goal—which I believe you share, Mr. General Secretary—is a more constructive relationship between our governments—long-lasting rather than transitory improvements. Together, we can bring about a more secure and prosperous future for our peoples and a more peaceful world. Both of us are aware of the difficult challenges and special responsibilities inherent in this task.

During World War II, when so many young Russians served at the front, the poem "Wait For Me" became a prayer spoken on the lips of Russian families who dreamed one day of the happiness that their reunion would bring. The cause of world peace and world freedom is still waiting, Mr. General Secretary. It has waited long enough.

General Secretary Gorbachev, Mrs. Gorbachev, it is good that you came to America, and Nancy and I are pleased

to have welcomed you here. Your visit was short, yet I hope you will take with you a better sense of the spirit and soul of the United States of America, and when you get back to Moscow, please pass on to the Soviet people the best wishes of the American people for a peaceful and prosperous new year. Thank you, and Godspeed on your journey. [Applause.]

### General Secretary Gorbachev's

In these last hours before our departure for home, we note with satisfaction that the visit to Washington has, on the whole, justified our hopes. We have had 3 days of hard work, of business-like and frank discussions on the pivotal problems of Soviet-American relations and on important aspects of the current world situation.

A good deal has been accomplished. I would like to emphasize in particular an unprecedented step in the history of the nuclear age: the signing of the treaty under which the two militarily and strategically greatest powers have assumed an obligation to actually destroy a portion of their nuclear weapons, thus, we hope, setting in motion the process of nuclear disarmament.

In our talks with President Ronald Reagan, some headway has been made on the central issue of that process, achieving substantial reductions of strategic offensive arms which are the most potent weapons in the world, although we still have a lot of work to do. We have had a useful exchange of views which has clarified each other's positions concerning regional conflicts, the development of our bilateral ties, and human rights. On some of these aspects, it seems likely that we can soon identify specific solutions satisfactory both to us and to other countries. A useful result of the Washington talks is that we have been able to formulate a kind of agenda for joint efforts in the future. This puts the dialogue between our two countries on a more predictable footing and is undoubtedly constructive.

While this visit has centered on our talks with the President of the United States, I have no intention of minimizing the importance of meetings with Members of Congress, with other political leaders, public figures, members of the business and academic communities, cultural figures, and media executives. Such contacts enable us to gain a better and more profound knowledge of each other and provide a wealth of opportunities for checking one's views, assessments, and even established stereotypes.

All this is important, both for policymaking and for bringing peoples and countries closer together. These meetings have confirmed the impression that there is a growing desire in American society for improved Soviet-American relations. In short, what we have seen here is a movement matching the mood that has long been prevalent among Soviet people.

In bidding farewell to America, I am looking forward to a new encounter with it in the hope that I will then be able to see not only its capital, but also to meet face-to-face with its great people, to chat and to have some lively exchanges with ordinary Americans. [Applause.]

I believe that what we have accomplished during the meeting and the discussions will, with time, help considerably to improve the atmosphere in the world at large and in America itself in terms of its more correct and tolerant perception of my country, the Soviet Union.

Today, the Soviet Union and the United States are closer to the common goal of strengthening international security. But this goal is yet to be reached. There is still much work to be done, and we must get down to it without delay.

Mr. President, esteemed citizens of the United States, we are grateful for your hospitality and we wish success, well-being, and peace to all Americans. Thank you and goodbye.

## President Reagan's Address to the Nation, Dec. 10, 1987<sup>3</sup>

As I am speaking to you now, General Secretary Gorbachev is leaving on his return trip to the Soviet Union. His departure marks the end of 3 historic days here in Washington, in which Mr. Gorbachev and I continued to build a foundation for better relations between our governments and our peoples.

During these 3 days, we took a step—only a first step, but still a critical one—toward building a more durable peace; indeed, a step that may be the most important taken since World War II to slow down the arms buildup.

I'm referring to the treaty that we signed Tuesday afternoon in the East Room of the White House. I believe this treaty represents a landmark in postwar history, because it is not just an arms control but an arms reduction agreement. Unlike treaties of the past, this agreement does not simply establish ceilings for new weapons; it actually reduces the number of such weapons. In fact, it altogether abolishes an entire class of U.S. and Soviet nuclear missiles.

The verification measures in this treaty are also something new, with far-reaching implications. Onsite inspections and short-notice inspections will be permitted within the Soviet Union. Again, this is a first-time event, a breakthrough.

And that's why I believe this treaty will not only lessen the threat of war; it can also speed along a process that may someday remove that threat entirely. Indeed, this treaty—and all that we've achieved during this summit—signals a broader understanding between the United States and the Soviet Union. It is an understanding that will help keep the peace as we work toward the ultimate goal of our foreign policy: a world where the people of every land can decide for themselves their form of government and way of life.

## A Broader Agenda in U.S.-Soviet Relations

Yet, as important as the INF [intermediate-range nuclear forces] Treaty is, there is a further and even more crucial point about the last 3 days and the entire summit process: Soviet-American relations are no longer focused only on arms control issues; they now cover a far broader agenda—one that has, at its root, realism and candor.

Let me explain this with a saying I've often repeated: nations do not distrust each other because they are armed; they are armed because they distrust each other. And, just as real peace means the presence of freedom and justice as well as the absence of war, so, too, summits must be discussions not just about arms but about fundamental differences that cause nations to be armed.

Dealing, then, with the deeper sources of conflict between nations and systems of government is a practical and moral imperative. And that's why was vital to establish a broader summit agenda—one that dealt not only with arms reductions but also people-to-people contacts between our nations and, most important, the issues of human rights and regional conflicts.

This is the summit agenda we've adopted. By doing so, we've dealt not just with arms control issues but also with fundamental problems such as Soviet expansionism, human rights violations, as well as our own moral opposition to the ideology that justifies such practices. In this way, we have put Soviet-American relations on a far more candid and far more realistic footing.

It also means that while there's movement—indeed, dramatic movement—in the arms reduction area, much remains to be done in that area as well as in these critical areas that I've mentioned, especially—and this goes without saying—in advancing our goal of a world open to the expansion of human freedom and the growth of democratic government.





So much work lies ahead. Let me explain: on the matter of regional conflicts, I spoke candidly with Mr. Gorbachev on the issues of Afghanistan, an-Iraq, Cambodia, Angola, and Nicaragua. I continue to have high hopes—and he assured me that he did, too—at we can have real cooperation in solving regional conflicts on terms that promote peace and freedom. This is essential to a lasting improvement in our relations.

So, too, on human rights there was a very limited movement—resolution of a number of individual cases, in which prisoners will be released or exit visas granted. There were assurances of a more substantial movement, which we hope to see become a reality.

And, finally, with regard to the item on our agenda—scientific, educational, cultural, and economic changes—we agreed to expand cooperation in ways that will break down some of the artificial barriers between our nations. For example, agreement has been reached to expand and improve civil air service between our two countries.

### Acknowledging the Support of the American People

Let me point out here that while much work is ahead of us, the progress we have made, especially in arms reduction, does reflect a better understanding between ourselves and the Soviets. It also reflects something deeper. You see, since my first meeting with General Secretary Gorbachev in 1985, I have always regarded you, the American people, as full participants in our discussions. Though it may surprise Mr. Gorbachev to discover that all this time there has been a third party in the room with us, I do firmly believe the principal credit for the patience and persistence that brought success this year belongs to you, the American people.

Your support over these last 7 years has laid the basis for these negotiations. Your support made it possible for us to rebuild our military strength,

to liberate Grenada, to strike hard against terrorism in Libya, and, more recently, to protect our strategic interests and bolster our friends in the Persian Gulf. Your support made possible our policy of helping freedom fighters like those in Afghanistan, Nicaragua, Angola, Cambodia, and other places around the globe. And when, last year at Reykjavik, I refused Soviet demands that we trade away SDI—our Strategic Defense Initiative that could erect a space shield against ballistic missiles—your overwhelming support made it clear to the Soviet leaders that the American people prefer no deal to a bad deal and will back their President on matters of national security. In short, your support for our foreign policy goals—building a safer peace as we advance the cause of world freedom—has helped bring the Soviets to the bargaining table. It makes it possible now to hope for a real, fundamental improvement in our relations.

You know, the question has often been asked whether democratic leaders who are accountable to their people aren't at a grave disadvantage in negotiating with leaders of totalitarian states who bear no such burden. Well, believe me, I think I can answer that question; I can speak from personal experience. Over the long run, no leader at the bargaining table can enjoy any greater advantage than the knowledge that he has behind him a people who are strong and free and alert and resolved to remain that way—people like you.

And it's this kind of informed and enlightened support, this hidden strength of democratic government, that enabled us to do what we did this week at the Washington summit.

### Background on Arms Reduction Efforts

Now that the treaty's been signed, it will be submitted to the Senate for the next step, the ratification process. I will meet with the leadership of Congress here tomorrow morning, and I'm confident that the Senate will now act in an expeditious way to fulfill its duty under our Constitution.

To this end, let me explain the background in the mid- and late 1970s. The Soviets began to deploy hundreds of new, mobile intermediate-range missiles, capable of destroying major cities and military installations in Europe and Asia. This action was an unprovoked, new dimension of the threat against our friends and allies on both continents, a new threat to which the democratic nations had no comparable counter.

Despite intense pressure from the Soviets, NATO proceeded with what we called a "two-track policy." First, we would deploy a limited number of our own INF missiles as a deterrent but, at the same time, push hard in negotiations to do away with this entirely new nuclear threat. And we set out to do this with a formula I first put forward in 1981—it was called the zero-option. It meant the complete elimination of these missiles on both sides.

Well, at first, many called this a mere propaganda ploy, some even here in this country. But we were persistent, our allies steadfast, and eventually, the Soviets returned to the bargaining table. The result is our INF Treaty.

As you can see from the map on the screen now, the Soviet missiles, which will be removed and eliminated under the treaty, have been a major threat to the security of our friends and allies on two continents, Europe and Asia. Under the terms of this treaty, we will be eliminating 400 deployed warheads, while the Soviet Union eliminates 1,600, or four times as many.

Now, let me also point out that this does not, however, leave NATO unprotected. In fact, we will maintain a substantial deterrent force on the ground, in the air, and at sea. Our commitment to NATO's strategy of being able to respond, as necessary, to any form of aggression remains steadfast.

And with regard to verification, as I've mentioned, we have the breakthroughs of onsite inspections and short-notice inspections, not only at potential missile deployment sites but at the facility where the Soviets' SS-20 missiles and their components have been assembled. We have a verification

procedure that assures each side that the missiles of the other side have been destroyed and that new ones aren't built.

Here, then, is a treaty that shows how persistence and consistency eventually can pay off in arms negotiations. And let me assure you, too, that this treaty has been accomplished with unprecedented consultation with our allies and friends. I have spoken personally with the leaders of the major democracies, as have Secretary Shultz and our diplomats. This treaty has full allied support.

But if persistence is paying off in our arms reduction efforts, the questions of human rights and regional conflicts are still problems in our relations. But I am pleased that some progress has been made in these areas also.

#### Future Efforts

Now, in addition to these candid exchanges on our four-part agenda, Mr. Gorbachev and I did do some important planning for a Moscow summit next year. We agreed that we must redouble our efforts to reach agreements on reducing the levels of U.S. and Soviet long-range or strategic nuclear arms, as I have proposed in the START [strategic arms reduction talks] negotiations. He and I made real progress toward our goal, first agreed to at Geneva, to achieve deep, 50% cuts in our arsenals of those powerful weapons. We agreed that we should build on our efforts to achieve agreement on a START treaty at the earliest possible date; and we've instructed our delegations in Geneva accordingly.

Now, I believe deep reductions in these offensive weapons—along with the development of SDI—would do much to make the world safer. For that reason, I made it clear that our SDI program will continue and that when we have a defense ready to deploy, we will do so.

About the future, Mr. Gorbachev and I also agreed that, as nuclear weapons are reduced, it becomes all the more important to redress the disparities in conventional and chemical weapons, where the Soviets now enjoy significant advantages over the United States and our allies.

I think, then, from all of this, you can see not only the direction of Soviet-American relations but the larger framework of American foreign policy. As I told the British Parliament in 1982, we seek to rid the world of the two great nightmares of the postwar era—the threat of nuclear war and the threat of totalitarianism. And that's why, by pursuing SDI, which is a defense against offensive missiles, and by going for arms reduction rather than just arms control, we are moving away from the so-called policy of mutual assured destruction by which nations hold each other hostage to nuclear terror and destruction. So, too, we are saying that the postwar policy of containment is no longer enough; that the goal of American foreign policy is both world peace and world freedom; that as a people, we hope and will work for a day when all of God's children will enjoy the human dignity that their Creator intended. I believe we gained some ground with regard to that cause in these last few days.

#### A Dream of Freedom and Peace

Since my first days in office, I've argued that the future belongs not to repressive or totalitarian ways of life but to the cause of freedom—freedom of the marketplace; freedom to speak, assemble, and vote. And when we see the progress of democracy in these last years—from Latin America to Asia—we must be optimistic about the future of our children.

When we were together in Iceland, Mr. Gorbachev told me that this sort of

talk is sometimes viewed in the Soviet Union as a threat, but I told him then and I've said since then, that this is no threat at all, but only a dream—the American dream.

And it's a dream that's meant so much to so many—a dream that still shines out to the world. You know, a couple of years ago, Nancy and I were deeply moved by a story told by former *New York Times* reporter and Greek immigrant Nicholas Gage. It's the story of Eleni, his mother, a woman caught one of the terrible struggles of the postwar era—the Greek civil war at the end of World War II; a mother who was tried and executed because she smuggled her children out to safety in America.

It is also the story of how her son secretly vowed to return to Greece someday to take vengeance on the man who sent his mother to her death. But at the end of the story, Nicholas Gage finds he cannot extract the vengeance he promised himself. Mr. Gage writes, it would have relieved the pain that had filled him for so many years, but it would also have broken the one bridge still connecting him to his mother, the part of him most like her. As he tells: "And her final cry was not a curse on her killers, but an invocation of what she'd died for—a declaration of love." These simple last words of Mr. Gage's mother—of Eleni—were: "My children"

How that cry echoes down through the centuries, a cry for all children of the world, a cry for peace, for a world of love and understanding. And it is the hope of heeding such words—the call for freedom and peace spoken by a chosen people in a promised land, the call spoken by the Nazarene carpenter standing at the Sea of Galilee, the carpenter whose birth into the poverty of a stable we celebrate. It is these words that we remember as the holiday season approaches and we reflect on the events of this week here in Washington

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So, let us remember the children and the future we want for them. And let us never forget that this promise of peace and freedom—the gift that is ours as Americans, the gift that we seek to share with all the world—depends for its strength on the spiritual source from which it comes.

So during this holy season, let us also reflect that in the prayers of simple people, there is more power and insight than that possessed by all the great statesmen or armies of the earth.

Let us then thank God for all His blessings to this nation and ask Him for His help and guidance so that we might continue the work of peace and foster the hope of a world where human freedom is enshrined.

To sum up then: this summit was a clear success. We made progress on each item in our four-part agenda. Mr. Gorbachev and I have agreed to meet in several months in Moscow to continue what we've achieved during these past 3 days. I believe there is reason for both hope and optimism.

<sup>1</sup>Made on the South Lawn of the White House where General Secretary Gorbachev was accorded a formal welcome (text from Weekly Compilation of Presidential Documents of Dec. 14, 1987).

<sup>2</sup>General Secretary Gorbachev spoke in Russian, and his remarks were translated by an interpreter.

<sup>3</sup>Text from Weekly Compilation of Presidential Documents of Dec. 14, 1987.

<sup>4</sup>Press release 235 of Dec. 10, 1987.

<sup>5</sup>Press release 237 of Dec. 10.

<sup>6</sup>Foreign Minister Shevardnadze spoke in Russian, and his remarks were interpreted by a translator.

<sup>7</sup>Joint statement made by Secretary Shultz and Foreign Minister Shevardnadze. ■

## The INF Treaty

*President Reagan and General Secretary Gorbachev  
signed the Intermediate-range Nuclear Forces Treaty  
on December 8, 1987.*

*Following are the text of the treaty,  
memorandum of understanding  
regarding the establishment of the data base  
for the treaty, and  
the protocols on elimination and inspections.*

### Corrigendum

The Treaty printed herein appears as it was signed on December 8, 1987. In the course of review, the U.S. Government has identified certain technical errors in the text. These will be corrected through an exchange of diplomatic notes with the Soviet Union. As of January 15, 1988, the following corrections were to be made:

- (1) In the Memorandum of Understanding (MOU), section II, paragraph 2, page 32, concerning shorter range missiles and launchers, for the United States, the number of nondeployed missiles should read 178. Also, the aggregate number of deployed and nondeployed missiles should read 178. The aggregate number of second stages should read 182.
- (2) In the MOU, section III, paragraph 1(a)(ii), page 34, for Wueschheim, the geographic coordinates should read, in the pertinent part, 007 25 40 E. Also, the number of launchers should read 21.
- (3) In the MOU, section III, paragraph 2(a)(i), page 48, for training facilities: Ft. Sill, Ft Sill, Oklahoma, the number of launchers should read 38.
- (4) In the MOU, section IV, paragraph 2(a)(i), page 55, for the Longhorn Army Ammunition Plant, Marshall, Texas, the number of missiles should read 8, and the number of training missile stages should read 1.
- (5) In the Protocol regarding Inspections, section XI, paragraph I, lines 17-18, page 76, the reference should read "paragraph II of section VI of this Protocol."

## Treaty Between the United States of America and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics on the Elimination of Their Intermediate-Range and Shorter-Range Missiles

The United States of America and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, hereinafter referred to as the Parties,

Conscious that nuclear war would have devastating consequences for all mankind,

Guided by the objective of strengthening strategic stability,

Convinced that the measures set forth in this Treaty will help to reduce the risk of outbreak of war and strengthen international peace and security, and

Mindful of their obligations under Article VI of the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons,

Have agreed as follows:

### Article I

In accordance with the provisions of this Treaty which includes the Memorandum of Understanding and Protocols which form an integral part thereof, each Party shall eliminate its intermediate-range and shorter-range missiles, not have such systems thereafter, and carry out the other obligations set forth in this Treaty.

### Article II

For the purposes of this Treaty:

1. The term "ballistic missile" means a missile that has a ballistic trajectory over most of its flight path. The term "ground-launched ballistic missile (GLBM)" means a ground-launched ballistic missile that is a weapon-delivery vehicle.

2. The term "cruise missile" means an unmanned, self-propelled vehicle that sustains flight through the use of aerodynamic lift over most of its flight path. The term "ground-launched cruise missile (GLCM)" means a ground-launched cruise missile that is a weapon-delivery vehicle.

3. The term "GLBM launcher" means a fixed launcher or a mobile land-based transporter-erector-launcher mechanism for launching a GLBM.

4. The term "GLCM launcher" means a fixed launcher or a mobile land-based transporter-erector-launcher mechanism for launching a GLCM.

5. The term "intermediate-range missile" means a GLBM or a GLCM having a range capability in excess of 1000 kilometers but not in excess of 5500 kilometers.

6. The term "shorter-range missile" means a GLBM or a GLCM having a range capability equal to or in excess of 500 kilometers but not in excess of 1000 kilometers.

7. The term "deployment area" means a designated area within which intermediate-range missiles and launchers of such missiles may operate and within which one or more missile operating bases are located.

8. The term "missile operating base" means:

(a) in the case of intermediate-range missiles, a complex of facilities located within a deployment area at which intermediate-range missiles and launchers of such missiles normally operate, in which support structures associated with such missiles and launchers are also located and in which support equipment associated with such missiles and launchers is normally located; and

(b) in the case of shorter-range missiles, a complex of facilities located any place at which shorter-range missiles and launchers of such missiles normally operate and in which support equipment associated with such missiles and launchers is normally located.

9. The term "missile support facility," as regards intermediate-range

or shorter-range missiles and launchers of such missiles, means a missile production facility or a launcher production facility, a missile repair facility or a launcher repair facility, training facility, a missile storage facility or a launcher storage facility test range, or an elimination facility those terms are defined in the Memorandum of Understanding.

10. The term "transit" means movement, notified in accordance with paragraph 5(f) of Article IX of this Treaty, of an intermediate-range missile or a launcher of such a missile between missile support facilities, between such a facility and a deployment area or between deployment areas, or of a shorter-range missile or a launcher of such a missile from a missile support facility or missile operating base to an elimination facility.

11. The term "deployed missile" means an intermediate-range missile located within a deployment area or shorter-range missile located at a missile operating base.

12. The term "non-deployed missile" means an intermediate-range missile located outside a deployment area or a shorter-range missile located outside a missile operating base.

13. The term "deployed launcher" means a launcher of an intermediate-range missile located within a deployment area or a launcher of a shorter-range missile located at a missile operating base.

14. The term "non-deployed launcher" means a launcher of an intermediate-range missile located outside a deployment area or a launcher of a shorter-range missile located outside a missile operating base.

15. The term "basing country" means a country other than the United States of America or the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics on whose territory intermediate-range or shorter-range missiles of the Parties, launchers of such missiles or support structures associated with such missiles and launchers were located at any time after November 1, 1987. Missiles or launchers in transit are not considered to be "located."

### Article III

For the purposes of this Treaty, the following types of intermediate-range missiles are:

(a) for the United States of America, missiles of the types designated by the United States of America as the Pershing II and the GM-109G, which are known to the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics by the same designations; and

(b) for the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, missiles of the types designated by the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics as the RSD-10, the R-12 and the R-14, which are known to the United States of America as the SS-20, the SS-4 and the SS-5, respectively.

2. For the purposes of this Treaty, the following types of shorter-range missiles are:

(a) for the United States of America, missiles of the type designated by the United States of America as the Pershing IA, which is known to the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics by the same designation; and

(b) for the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, missiles of the types designated by the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics as the OTR-22 and the OTR-23, which are known to the United States of America as the SS-12 and the SS-23, respectively.

### Article IV

Each Party shall eliminate all its intermediate-range missiles and launchers of such missiles, and all support structures and support equipment of the categories listed in the Memorandum of Understanding associated with such missiles and launchers, so that no later than three years after entry into force of this

Treaty and thereafter no such missiles, launchers, support structures or support equipment shall be possessed by either Party.

2. To implement paragraph 1 of this Article, upon entry into force of this Treaty, both Parties shall begin and continue throughout the duration of each phase, the reduction of all types of their deployed and non-deployed intermediate-range missiles and deployed and non-deployed launchers of such missiles and support structures and support equipment associated with such missiles and launchers in accordance with the provisions of this Treaty. These reductions shall be implemented in two phases as that:

(a) by the end of the first phase, that is, no later than 29 months after entry into force of this Treaty:

(i) the number of deployed launchers of intermediate-range missiles for each Party shall not exceed the number of launchers that are capable of carrying or containing at one time missiles considered by the Parties to carry 171 warheads;

(ii) the number of deployed intermediate-range missiles for each Party shall not exceed the number of such missiles considered by the Parties to carry 180 warheads;

(iii) the aggregate number of deployed and non-deployed launchers of intermediate-range missiles for each Party shall not exceed the number of launchers that are capable of carrying or containing at one time missiles considered by the Parties to carry 200 warheads;

(iv) the aggregate number of deployed and non-deployed intermediate-range missiles for each Party shall not exceed the number of such missiles considered by the Parties to carry 200 warheads; and

(v) the ratio of the aggregate number of deployed and non-deployed intermediate-range GLBMs of existing types for each Party to the aggregate number of deployed and non-deployed intermediate-range missiles of existing types possessed by that Party shall not exceed the ratio of such intermediate-range GLBMs to such intermediate-range missiles for that Party as of November 1, 1987, as set forth in the Memorandum of Understanding; and

(b) by the end of the second phase, that is, no later than three years after entry into force of this Treaty, all intermediate-range missiles of each Party, launchers of such missiles and all support structures and support equipment of the categories listed in the Memorandum of Understanding associated with such missiles and launchers, shall be eliminated.

### Article V

1. Each Party shall eliminate all its shorter-range missiles and launchers of such missiles, and all support equipment of the categories listed in the Memorandum of Understanding associated with such missiles and launchers, so that no later than 18 months after entry into force of this Treaty and thereafter no such missiles, launchers or support equipment shall be possessed by either Party.

2. No later than 90 days after entry into force of this Treaty, each Party shall complete the removal of all its deployed shorter-range missiles and deployed and non-deployed launchers of such missiles to elimination facilities and shall retain them at those locations until they are eliminated in accordance with the procedures set forth in the Protocol on Elimination. No later than 12 months after entry into force of this Treaty, each Party shall complete the removal of all its non-deployed shorter-range missiles to elimination facilities and shall retain them at those locations until they are eliminated in accordance with the procedures set forth in the Protocol on Elimination.

3. Shorter-range missiles and launchers of such missiles shall not be located at the same elimination facility. Such facilities shall be separated by no less than 1000 kilometers.

### Article VI

1. Upon entry into force of this Treaty and thereafter, neither Party shall:

(a) produce or flight-test any intermediate-range missiles or produce any stages of such missiles or any launchers of such missiles; or

(b) produce, flight-test or launch any shorter-range missiles or produce

any stages of such missiles or any launchers of such missiles.

2. Notwithstanding paragraph 1 of this Article, each Party shall have the right to produce a type of GLBM not limited by this Treaty which uses a stage which is outwardly similar to, but not interchangeable with, a stage of an existing type of intermediate-range GLBM having more than one stage, providing that that Party shall not produce any other stage which is outwardly similar to, but not interchangeable with, any other stage of an existing type of intermediate-range GLBM.

**Article VII**

For the purposes of this Treaty:

1. If a ballistic missile or a cruise missile has been flight-tested or deployed for weapon delivery, all missiles of that type shall be considered to be weapon-delivery vehicles.

2. If a GLBM or GLCM is an intermediate-range missile, all GLBMs or GLCMs of that type shall be considered to be intermediate-range missiles. If a GLBM or GLCM is a shorter-range missile, all GLBMs or GLCMs of that type shall be considered to be shorter-range missiles.

3. If a GLBM is of a type developed and tested solely to intercept and counter objects not located on the surface of the earth, it shall not be considered to be a missile to which the limitations of this Treaty apply.

4. The range capability of a GLBM not listed in Article III of this Treaty shall be considered to be the maximum range to which it has been tested. The range capability of a GLCM not listed in Article III of this Treaty shall be considered to be the maximum distance which can be covered by the missile in its standard design mode flying until fuel exhaustion, determined by projecting its flight path onto the earth's sphere from the point of launch to the point of impact. GLBMs or GLCMs that have a range capability equal to or in excess of 500 kilometers but not in excess of 1000 kilometers shall be considered to be shorter-range missiles. GLBMs or GLCMs that have a range capability in excess of 1000 kilometers but not in excess of 5500

kilometers shall be considered to be intermediate-range missiles.

5. The maximum number of warheads an existing type of intermediate-range missile or shorter-range missile carries shall be considered to be the number listed for missiles of that type in the Memorandum of Understanding.

6. Each GLBM or GLCM shall be considered to carry the maximum number of warheads listed for a GLBM or GLCM of that type in the Memorandum of Understanding.

7. If a launcher has been tested for launching a GLBM or a GLCM, all launchers of that type shall be considered to have been tested for launching GLBMs or GLCMs.

8. If a launcher has contained or launched a particular type of GLBM or GLCM, all launchers of that type shall be considered to be launchers of that type of GLBM or GLCM.

9. The number of missiles each launcher of an existing type of intermediate-range missile or shorter-range missile shall be considered to be capable of carrying or containing at one time is the number listed for launchers of missiles of that type in the Memorandum of Understanding.

10. Except in the case of elimination in accordance with the procedures set forth in the Protocol on Elimination, the following shall apply:

(a) for GLBMs which are stored or moved in separate stages, the longest stage of an intermediate-range or shorter-range GLBM shall be counted as a complete missile;

(b) for GLBMs which are not stored or moved in separate stages, a canister of the type used in the launch of an intermediate-range GLBM, unless a Party proves to the satisfaction of the other Party that it does not contain such a missile, or an assembled intermediate-range or shorter-range GLBM, shall be counted as a complete missile; and

(c) for GLCMs, the airframe of an intermediate-range or shorter-range GLCM shall be counted as a complete missile.

11. A ballistic missile which is not a missile to be used in a ground-based mode shall not be considered to be a GLBM if it is test-launched at a test site from a fixed land-based launcher

which is used solely for test purposes and which is distinguishable from GLBM launchers. A cruise missile which is not a missile to be used in a ground-based mode shall not be considered to be a GLCM if it is test-launched at a test site from a fixed land-based launcher which is used solely for test purposes and which is distinguishable from GLCM launchers

12. Each Party shall have the right to produce and use for booster system which might otherwise be considered be intermediate-range or shorter-range missiles, only existing types of booster stages for such booster systems. Launches of such booster systems shall not be considered to be flight-testing of intermediate-range or shorter-range missiles provided that:

(a) stages used in such booster systems are different from stages used in those missiles listed as existing type of intermediate-range or shorter-range missiles in Article III of this Treaty;

(b) such booster systems are used only for research and development purposes to test objects other than the booster systems themselves;

(c) the aggregate number of launchers for such booster systems shall not exceed 35 for each Party at any one time; and

(d) the launchers for such booster systems are fixed, emplaced above ground and located only at research and development launch sites which are specified in the Memorandum of Understanding.

Research and development launch sites shall not be subject to inspection pursuant to Article XI of this Treaty.

**Article VIII**

1. All intermediate-range missiles and launchers of such missiles shall be located in deployment areas, at missile support facilities or shall be in transit Intermediate-range missiles or launchers of such missiles shall not be located elsewhere.

2. Stages of intermediate-range missiles shall be located in deployment areas, at missile support facilities or moving between deployment areas, between missile support facilities or between missile support facilities and deployment areas.



3. Until their removal to elimination facilities as required by paragraph 2 of Article V of this Treaty, all shorter-range missiles and launchers of such missiles shall be located at missile operating bases, at missile support facilities or shall be in transit. Shorter-range missiles or launchers of such missiles shall not be located elsewhere.

4. Transit of a missile or launcher subject to the provisions of this Treaty shall be completed within 25 days.

5. All deployment areas, missile operating bases and missile support facilities are specified in the Memorandum of Understanding or in subsequent updates of data pursuant to paragraphs 3, 5(a) or 5(b) of Article IX of this Treaty. Neither Party shall increase the number of, or change the location or boundaries of, deployment areas, missile operating bases or missile support facilities, except for elimination facilities, from those set forth in the Memorandum of Understanding. A missile support facility shall not be considered to be part of a deployment area even though it may be located within the geographic boundaries of a deployment area.

6. Beginning 30 days after entry into force of this Treaty, neither Party shall locate intermediate-range or shorter-range missiles, including stages of such missiles, or launchers of such missiles at missile production facilities, launcher production facilities or test ranges listed in the Memorandum of Understanding.

7. Neither Party shall locate any intermediate-range or shorter-range missiles at training facilities.

8. A non-deployed intermediate-range or shorter-range missile shall not be carried on or contained within a launcher of such a type of missile, except as required for maintenance conducted at repair facilities or for elimination by means of launching conducted at elimination facilities.

9. Training missiles and training launchers for intermediate-range or shorter-range missiles shall be subject to the same locational restrictions as are set forth for intermediate-range and shorter-range missiles and launchers of such missiles in paragraphs 1 and 3 of this Article.

## Article IX

1. The Memorandum of Understanding contains categories of data relevant to obligations undertaken with regard to this Treaty and lists all intermediate-range and shorter-range missiles, launchers of such missiles, and support structures and support equipment associated with such missiles and launchers, possessed by the Parties as of November 1, 1987. Updates of that data and notifications required by this Article shall be provided according to the categories of data contained in the Memorandum of Understanding.

2. The Parties shall update that data and provide the notifications required by this Treaty through the Nuclear Risk Reduction Centers, established pursuant to the Agreement Between the United States of America and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics on the Establishment of Nuclear Risk Reduction Centers of September 15, 1987.

3. No later than 30 days after entry into force of this Treaty, each Party shall provide the other Party with updated data, as of the date of entry into force of this Treaty, for all categories of data contained in the Memorandum of Understanding.

4. No later than 30 days after the end of each six-month interval following the entry into force of this Treaty, each Party shall provide updated data for all categories of data contained in the Memorandum of Understanding by informing the other Party of all changes, completed and in process, in that data, which have occurred during the six-month interval since the preceding data exchange, and the net effect of those changes.

5. Upon entry into force of this Treaty and thereafter, each Party shall provide the following notifications to the other Party:

(a) notification, no less than 30 days in advance, of the scheduled date of the elimination of a specific deployment area, missile operating base or missile support facility;

(b) notification, no less than 30 days in advance, of changes in the number or location of elimination facilities, including the location and scheduled date of a change;

(c) notification, except with respect to launchers of intermediate-

range missiles for the purpose of their elimination, no less than 30 days in advance, of the scheduled date of the initiation of the elimination of intermediate-range and shorter-range missiles, and stages of such missiles, and launchers of such missiles and support structures and support equipment associated with such missiles and launchers, including:

(i) the number and type of items of missile systems to be eliminated;

(ii) the elimination site;

(iii) for intermediate-range missiles, the location from which such missiles, launchers of such missiles and support equipment associated with such missiles and launchers are moved to the elimination facility; and

(iv) except in the case of support structures, the point of entry to be used by an inspection team conducting an inspection pursuant to paragraph 7 of Article XI of this Treaty and the estimated time of departure of an inspection team from the point of entry to the elimination facility;

(d) notification, no less than ten days in advance, of the scheduled date of the launch, or the scheduled date of the initiation of a series of launches, of intermediate-range missiles for the purpose of their elimination, including:

(i) the type of missiles to be eliminated;

(ii) location of the launch, or, if elimination is by a series of launches, the location of such launches and number of launches in the series;

(iii) the point of entry to be used by an inspection team conducting an inspection pursuant to paragraph 7 of Article XI of this Treaty; and

(iv) the estimated time of departure of an inspection team from the point of entry to the elimination facility;

(e) notification, no later than 48 hours after they occur, of changes in the number of intermediate-range and shorter-range missiles, launchers of such missiles and support structures and support equipment associated with such missiles and launchers resulting from elimination as described in the Protocol on Elimination, including:

(i) the number and type of items of a missile system which were eliminated; and

(ii) the date and location of such elimination; and

(f) notification of transit of intermediate-range or shorter-range missiles or launchers of such missiles, or the movement of training missiles or training launchers for such intermediate-range and shorter-range missiles, no later than 48 hours after it has been completed, including:

(i) the number of missiles or launchers;

(ii) the points, dates and times of departure and arrival;

(iii) the mode of transport; and

(iv) the location and time at that location at least once every four days during the period of transit.

6. Upon entry into force of this Treaty and thereafter, each Party shall notify the other Party, no less than ten days in advance, of the scheduled date and location of the launch of a research and development booster system as described in paragraph 12 of Article VII of this Treaty.

### Article X

1. Each Party shall eliminate its intermediate-range and shorter-range missiles and launchers of such missiles and support structures and support equipment associated with such missiles and launchers in accordance with the procedures set forth in the Protocol on Elimination.

2. Verification by on-site inspection of the elimination of items of missile systems specified in the Protocol on Elimination shall be carried out in accordance with Article XI of this Treaty, the Protocol on Elimination and the Protocol on Inspection.

3. When a Party removes its intermediate-range missiles, launchers of such missiles and support equipment associated with such missiles and launchers from deployment areas to elimination facilities for the purpose of their elimination, it shall do so in complete deployed organizational units. For the United States of America, these units shall be Pershing II batteries and BGM-109G flights. For the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics,

these units shall be SS-20 regiments composed of two or three battalions.

4. Elimination of intermediate-range and shorter-range missiles and launchers of such missiles and support equipment associated with such missiles and launchers shall be carried out at the facilities that are specified in the Memorandum of Understanding or notified in accordance with paragraph 5(b) of Article IX of this Treaty, unless eliminated in accordance with Sections IV or V of the Protocol on Elimination. Support structures, associated with the missiles and launchers subject to this Treaty, that are subject to elimination shall be eliminated *in situ*.

5. Each Party shall have the right, during the first six months after entry into force of this Treaty, to eliminate by means of launching no more than 100 of its intermediate-range missiles.

6. Intermediate-range and shorter-range missiles which have been tested prior to entry into force of this Treaty, but never deployed, and which are not existing types of intermediate-range or shorter-range missiles listed in Article III of this Treaty, and launchers of such missiles, shall be eliminated within six months after entry into force of this Treaty in accordance with the procedures set forth in the Protocol on Elimination. Such missiles are:

(a) for the United States of America, missiles of the type designated by the United States of America as the Pershing IB, which is known to the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics by the same designation; and

(b) for the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, missiles of the type designated by the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics as the RK-55, which is known to the United States of America as the SSC-X-4.

7. Intermediate-range and shorter-range missiles and launchers of such missiles and support structures and support equipment associated with such missiles and launchers shall be considered to be eliminated after completion of the procedures set forth in the Protocol on Elimination and upon the notification provided for in paragraph 5(e) of Article IX of this Treaty.

8. Each Party shall eliminate its deployment areas, missile operating bases and missile support facilities. A

Party shall notify the other Party pursuant to paragraph 5(a) of Article IX of this Treaty once the conditions set forth below are fulfilled:

(a) all intermediate-range and shorter-range missiles, launchers of such missiles and support equipment associated with such missiles and launchers located there have been removed;

(b) all support structures associated with such missiles and launchers located there have been eliminated; and

(c) all activity related to production, flight-testing, training, repair, storage or deployment of such missiles and launchers has ceased there.

Such deployment areas, missile operating bases and missile support facilities shall be considered to be eliminated either when they have been inspected pursuant to paragraph 4 of Article XI of this Treaty or when 60 days have elapsed since the date of scheduled elimination which was notified pursuant to paragraph 5(a) of Article IX of this Treaty. A deployment area, missile operating base or missile support facility listed in the Memorandum of Understanding that met the above conditions prior to entry into force of this Treaty, and is not included in the initial data exchange pursuant to paragraph 3 of Article IX of this Treaty, shall be considered to be eliminated.

9. If a Party intends to convert a missile operating base listed in the Memorandum of Understanding to be used as a base associated with GLBM or GLCM systems not subject to this Treaty, then that Party shall notify the other Party, no less than 30 days in advance of the scheduled date of the initiation of the conversion, of the scheduled date and the purpose for which the base will be converted.

### Article XI

1. For the purpose of ensuring verification of compliance with the provisions of this Treaty, each Party shall have the right to conduct on-site inspections. The Parties shall implement on-site inspections in accordance with this Article, the Protocol on Inspection and the Protocol on Elimination.

2. Each Party shall have the right to conduct inspections provided for by this Article both within the territory of the other Party and within the territories of basing countries.

3. Beginning 30 days after entry into force of this Treaty, each Party shall have the right to conduct inspections at all missile operating bases and missile support facilities specified in the Memorandum of Understanding other than missile production facilities, and at all elimination facilities included in the initial data update required by paragraph 3 of Article IX of this Treaty. These inspections shall be completed no later than 90 days after entry into force of this Treaty. The purpose of these inspections shall be to verify the number of missiles, launchers, support structures and support equipment and other data, as of the date of entry into force of this Treaty, provided pursuant to paragraph 3 of Article IX of this Treaty.

4. Each Party shall have the right to conduct inspections to verify the elimination, notified pursuant to paragraph 5(a) of Article IX of this Treaty, of missile operating bases and missile support facilities other than missile production facilities, which are no longer subject to inspections pursuant to paragraph 5(a) of this Article. Such an inspection shall be carried out within 60 days after the scheduled date of the elimination of that facility. If a Party conducts an inspection at a particular facility pursuant to paragraph 3 of this Article after the scheduled date of the elimination of that facility, then no additional inspection of that facility pursuant to this paragraph shall be permitted.

5. Each Party shall have the right to conduct inspections pursuant to this paragraph for 13 years after entry into force of this Treaty. Each Party shall have the right to conduct 20 such inspections per calendar year during the first three years after entry into force of this Treaty, 15 such inspections per calendar year during the subsequent five years, and ten such inspections per calendar year during the last five years. Neither Party shall inspect more than half of its total number

of these inspections per calendar year within the territory of any one basing country. Each Party shall have the right to conduct:

(a) inspections, beginning 90 days after entry into force of this Treaty, of missile operating bases, and missile support facilities other than elimination facilities and missile production facilities, to ascertain, according to the categories of data specified in the Memorandum of Understanding, the numbers of missiles, launchers, support structures and support equipment located at each missile operating base or missile support facility at the time of the inspection; and

(b) inspections of former missile operating bases and former missile support facilities eliminated pursuant to paragraph 8 of Article X of this Treaty other than former missile production facilities.

6. Beginning 30 days after entry into force of this Treaty, each Party shall have the right, for 13 years after entry into force of this Treaty, to inspect by means of continuous monitoring:

(a) the portals of any facility of the other Party at which the final assembly of a GLBM using stages, any of which is outwardly similar to a stage of a solid-propellant GLBM listed in Article III of this Treaty, is accomplished; or

(b) if a Party has no such facility, the portals of an agreed former missile production facility at which existing types of intermediate-range or shorter-range GLBMs were produced.

The Party whose facility is to be inspected pursuant to this paragraph shall ensure that the other Party is able to establish a permanent continuous monitoring system at that facility within six months after entry into force of this Treaty or within six months of initiation of the process of final assembly described in subparagraph (a). If, after the end of the second year after entry into force of this Treaty, neither Party conducts the process of final assembly described in subparagraph (a) for a period of 12 consecutive months, then neither Party shall have the right to inspect by means of continuous monitoring any missile production facility of the other

Party unless the process of final assembly as described in subparagraph (a) is initiated again. Upon entry into force of this Treaty, the facilities to be inspected by continuous monitoring shall be: in accordance with subparagraph (b), for the United States of America, Hercules Plant Number 1, at Magna, Utah; in accordance with subparagraph (a), for the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, the Votkinsk Machine Building Plant, Udmurt Autonomous Soviet Socialist Republic, Russian Soviet Federative Socialist Republic.

7. Each Party shall conduct inspections of the process of elimination, including elimination of intermediate-range missiles by means of launching, of intermediate-range and shorter-range missiles and launchers of such missiles and support equipment associated with such missiles and launchers carried out at elimination facilities in accordance with Article X of this Treaty and the Protocol on Elimination. Inspectors conducting inspections provided for in this paragraph shall determine that the processes specified for the elimination of the missiles, launchers and support equipment have been completed.

8. Each Party shall have the right to conduct inspections to confirm the completion of the process of elimination of intermediate-range and shorter-range missiles and launchers of such missiles and support equipment associated with such missiles and launchers eliminated pursuant to Section V of the Protocol on Elimination, and of training missiles, training missile stages, training launch canisters and training launchers eliminated pursuant to Sections II, IV and V of the Protocol on Elimination.

## Article XII

1. For the purpose of ensuring verification of compliance with the provisions of this Treaty, each Party shall use national technical means of verification at its disposal in a manner consistent with generally recognized principles of international law.

2. Neither Party shall:

(a) interfere with national technical means of verification of the

other Party operating in accordance with paragraph 1 of this Article; or

(b) use concealment measures which impede verification of compliance with the provisions of this Treaty by national technical means of verification carried out in accordance with paragraph 1 of this Article. This obligation does not apply to cover or concealment practices, within a deployment area, associated with normal training, maintenance and operations, including the use of environmental shelters to protect missiles and launchers.

3. To enhance observation by national technical means of verification, each Party shall have the right until a treaty between the Parties reducing and limiting strategic offensive arms enters into force, but in any event for no more than three years after entry into force of this Treaty, to request the implementation of cooperative measures at deployment bases for road-mobile GLBMs with a range capability in excess of 5500 kilometers, which are not former missile operating bases eliminated pursuant to paragraph 8 of Article X of this Treaty. The Party making such a request shall inform the other Party of the deployment base at which cooperative measures shall be implemented. The Party whose base is to be observed shall carry out the following cooperative measures:

(a) No later than six hours after such a request, the Party shall have opened the roofs of all fixed structures for launchers located at the base, removed completely all missiles on launchers from such fixed structures for launchers and displayed such missiles on launchers in the open without using concealment measures; and

(b) The Party shall leave the roofs open and the missiles on launchers in place until twelve hours have elapsed from the time of the receipt of a request for such an observation.

Each Party shall have the right to make six such requests per calendar year. Only one deployment base shall be subject to these cooperative measures at any one time.

**Article XIII**

1. To promote the objectives and implementation of the provisions of this Treaty, the Parties hereby establish the Special Verification Commission. The Parties agree that, if either Party so requests, they shall meet within the framework of the Special Verification Commission to:

(a) resolve questions relating to compliance with the obligations assumed; and

(b) agree upon such measures as may be necessary to improve the viability and effectiveness of this Treaty.

2. The Parties shall use the Nuclear Risk Reduction Centers, which provide for continuous communication between the Parties, to:

(a) exchange data and provide notifications as required by paragraphs 3, 4, 5 and 6 of Article IX of this Treaty and the Protocol on Elimination;

(b) provide and receive the information required by paragraph 9 of Article X of this Treaty;

(c) provide and receive notifications of inspections as required by Article XI of this Treaty and the Protocol on Inspection; and

(d) provide and receive requests for cooperative measures as provided for in paragraph 3 of Article XII of this Treaty.

**Article XIV**

The Parties shall comply with this Treaty and shall not assume any international obligations or undertakings which would conflict with its provisions.

FOR THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA

RONALD REAGAN

President of the United States of America

**Article XV**

1. This Treaty shall be of unlimited duration.

2. Each Party shall, in exercising its national sovereignty, have the right to withdraw from this Treaty if it decides that extraordinary events related to the subject matter of this Treaty have jeopardized its supreme interests. It shall give notice of its decision to withdraw to the other Party six months prior to withdrawal from this Treaty. Such notice shall include statement of the extraordinary event; the notifying Party regards as having jeopardized its supreme interests.

**Article XVI**

Each Party may propose amendments to this Treaty. Agreed amendments shall enter into force in accordance with the procedures set forth in Article XVII governing the entry into force of this Treaty.

**Article XVII**

1. This Treaty, including the Memorandum of Understanding and Protocols, which form an integral part thereof, shall be subject to ratification in accordance with the constitutional procedures of each Party. This Treaty shall enter into force on the date of the exchange of instruments of ratification

2. This Treaty shall be registered pursuant to Article 102 of the Charter of the United Nations.

DONE at Washington on December 8, 1987, in two copies, each in the English and Russian languages, both texts being equally authentic.

FOR THE UNION OF SOVIET SOCIALIST REPUBLICS

M. GORBACHEV

General Secretary of the Central Committee of the CPSU

**Memorandum of Understanding  
Regarding the Establishment of the Data Base  
for the Treaty Between the Union of Soviet  
Socialist Republics  
and the United States of America  
on the Elimination of Their Intermediate-Range  
and Shorter-Range Missiles**

Pursuant to and in implementation of the Treaty Between the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics and the United States of America on the Elimination of Their Intermediate-Range and Shorter-Range Missiles of December 8, 1987, hereinafter referred to as the Treaty, the Parties have exchanged data current as of November 1, 1987, on intermediate-range and shorter-range missiles and launchers of such missiles and support structures and support equipment associated with such missiles and launchers.

### **I. Definitions**

For the purposes of this Memorandum of Understanding, the Treaty, the Protocol on Elimination and the Protocol on Inspection:

1. The term "missile production facility" means a facility for the assembly or production of solid-propellant intermediate-range or shorter-range GLBMs, or existing types of GLCMs.
2. The term "missile repair facility" means a facility at which repair or maintenance of intermediate-range or shorter-range missiles takes place other than inspection and maintenance conducted at a missile operating base.
3. The term "launcher production facility" means a facility for final assembly of launchers of intermediate-range or shorter-range missiles.
4. The term "launcher repair facility" means a facility at which repair or maintenance of launchers of intermediate-range or shorter-range missiles takes place other than inspection and maintenance conducted at a missile operating base.
5. The term "test range" means an area at which flight-testing of intermediate-range or shorter-range missiles takes place.
6. The term "training facility" means a facility, not at a missile operating base, at which personnel are trained in the use of intermediate-range or shorter-range missiles or launchers of such missiles and at which launchers of such missiles are located.
7. The term "missile storage facility" means a facility, not at a missile operating base, at which intermediate-range or shorter-range missiles or stages of such missiles are stored.
8. The term "launcher storage facility" means a facility, not at a missile operating base, at which launchers of intermediate-range or shorter-range missiles are stored.
9. The term "elimination facility" means a facility at which intermediate-range or shorter-range missiles, missile stages and launchers of such missiles or support equipment associated with such missiles or launchers are eliminated.
10. The term "support equipment" means unique vehicles and mobile or transportable equipment that support a deployed intermediate-range or shorter-range missile or a launcher of such a missile. Support equipment shall include full-scale inert training missiles, full-scale inert training missile stages, full-scale inert training launch canisters, and training launchers not capable of launching a missile. A listing of such support equipment associated with each existing type of missile, and launchers of such missiles, except for training equipment, is contained in Section VI of this Memorandum of Understanding.

11. The term "support structure" means a unique fixed structure used to support deployed intermediate-range missiles or launchers of such missiles. A listing of such support structures associated with each existing type of missile, and launchers of such missiles, except for training equipment, is contained in Section VI of this Memorandum of Understanding.

12. The term "research and development launch site" means a facility at which research and development booster systems are launched.

## II. Total Numbers of Intermediate-Range and Shorter-Range Missiles and Launchers of Such Missiles Subject to the Treaty

1. The numbers of intermediate-range missiles and launchers of such missiles for each Party are as follow:

	USA	USSR
Deployed missiles	429	470
Non-deployed missiles	260	356
Aggregate number of deployed and non-deployed missiles	689	826
Aggregate number of second stages	236	650
Deployed launchers	214	484
Non-deployed launchers	68	124
Aggregate number of deployed and non-deployed launchers	282	608

2. The numbers of shorter-range missiles and launchers of such missiles for each Party are as follow:

	USA	USSR
Deployed missiles	0	387
Non-deployed missiles	170	539
Aggregate number of deployed and non-deployed missiles	170	926
Aggregate number of second stages	175	726
Deployed launchers	0	197
Non-deployed launchers	1	40
Aggregate number of deployed and non-deployed launchers	1	237

## III. Intermediate-Range Missiles, Launchers of Such Missiles and Support Structures and Support Equipment Associated With Such Missiles and Launchers

### 1. Deployed

The following are the deployment areas, missile operating bases, their locations and the numbers, for each Party of all deployed intermediate-range missiles listed as existing types in Article III of the Treaty, launchers of such missiles and the support structures and support equipment associated with such missiles and launchers. Site diagrams, to include boundaries and center coordinates, of each listed missile operating base are appended to this Memorandum of Understanding.<sup>1</sup> The boundaries of deployment areas are indicated by specifying geographic coordinates, connected by straight lines or linear landmarks, to include national boundaries, rivers, railroads or highways.

<sup>1</sup>For information on the availability of site diagrams and accompanying photographs, call or write: Public Information Service, Bureau of Public Affairs, U.S. Department of State, 2201 C Street, NW, Washington, D.C. 20520 (202-647-6575).

Missiles	Launchers	Support Structures and Equipment
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## UNITED STATES OF AMERICA

## i) Pershing II

*Deployment Area One*

The Federal Republic of Germany

## Boundaries:

The territory of The Federal Republic of Germany bounded on the north by 51 degrees 00 minutes 00 seconds north latitude; on the east by 012 degrees 00 minutes 00 seconds east longitude; on the south by 48 degrees 00 minutes 00 seconds north latitude; and within the national boundaries of The Federal Republic of Germany.

*Missile Operating Bases*

Schwaebisch-Gmuend 48 48 54 N 009 48 29 E	40 (includes 4 spares)	36	Launch Pad Shelter Training Missile Stage	0 24
Neu Ulm 48 22 40 N 010 00 45 E	40 (includes 4 spares)	43 (includes 7 spares)	Launch Pad Shelter Training Missile Stage	0 24
Waldheide-Neckarsulm 49 07 45 N 009 16 31 E	40 (includes 4 spares)	36	Launch Pad Shelter Training Missile Stage	0 24

## ii) BGM-109G

*Deployment Area One*

The United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland

## Boundaries:

The territory of The United Kingdom bounded on the north by 52 degrees 40 minutes 00 seconds north latitude; on the west by 003 degrees 30 minutes 00 seconds west longitude; on the south by the English Channel; and on the east by the English Channel and the North Sea.

*Missile Operating Base*

Greenham Common 51 22 35 N 001 18 12 W	101 with launch canister (includes 5 spares)	29 (includes 5 spares)	Training Missile Training Launch Canister	0 7
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*Deployment Area Two*

The United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland

## Boundaries:

The territory of The United Kingdom bounded on the north by 53 degrees 45 minutes 00 seconds north latitude; on the west by 002 degrees 45 minutes 00 seconds west longitude; on the south by 51 degrees 05 minutes 00 seconds north latitude; and on the east by the English Channel and the North Sea.

# ARMS CONTROL

	Missiles	Launchers	Support Structures and Equipment
<p><i>Missile Operating Base</i> Molesworth 52 23 00 N 000 25 35 W</p>	18* with launch canister	6*	Training Missile Training Launch Canister
<p><i>Deployment Area</i> The Republic of Italy Boundaries: The territory of The Republic of Italy within the boundaries of the Island of Sicily.</p>			
<p><i>Missile Operating Base</i> Comiso 36 59 44 N 014 36 34 E</p>	108 with launch canister (includes 12 spares)	31 (includes 7 spares)	Training Missile Training Launch Canister
<p><i>Deployment Area</i> The Kingdom of Belgium Boundaries: The territory of The Kingdom of Belgium.</p>			
<p><i>Missile Operating Base</i> Florennes 50 13 35 N 004 39 00 E</p>	20 with launch canister (includes 4 spares)	12 (includes 8 spares)	Training Missile Training Launch Canister
<p><i>Deployment Area Two</i> The Federal Republic of Germany Boundaries: The territory of The Federal Republic of Germany bounded on the north by 51 degrees 25 minutes 00 seconds north latitude; on the east by 009 degrees 30 minutes 00 seconds east longitude; on the south by 48 degrees 43 minutes 00 seconds north latitude; and on the west by the national boundaries of The Federal Republic of Germany.</p>			
<p><i>Missile Operating Base</i> Wueschheim 50 02 33 N 007 25 06 E</p>	62 with launch canister (includes 14 spares)	31 (includes 9 spares)	Training Missile Training Launch Canister
<p><i>Deployment Area</i> The Kingdom of the Netherlands Boundaries: The territory of The Kingdom of the Netherlands bounded on the north by 52 degrees 30 minutes 00 seconds north latitude and within the national boundaries of The Kingdom of the Netherlands.</p>			
<p><i>Missile Operating Base</i> Woensdrecht 51 26 12 N 004 21 15 E</p>	0 with launch canister	0	Training Missile Training Launch Canister

\*In preparation for operational status.



	Missiles	Launchers	Support Structures and Equipment	
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## UNION OF SOVIET SOCIALIST REPUBLICS

## i) SS-20

**Deployment Area**

## Postavy

55 12 13 N	027 00 00 E
54 52 47	026 41 18
54 43 58	026 04 07
55 01 13	026 03 43

**Missile Operating Base**

## Postavy

55 09 47 N	026 54 21 E
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9	9	Launch Canister	9
		Missile Transporter Vehicle	0
		Fixed Structure for Launcher	9
		Training Missile	0

**Deployment Area**

## Vetrino

55 28 44 N	028 42 29 E
55 01 03	028 15 03
55 01 16	027 48 46
55 16 22	027 49 05

**Missile Operating Base**

## Vetrino

55 24 19 N	028 33 29 E
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9	9	Launch Canister	9
		Missile Transporter Vehicle	0
		Fixed Structure for Launcher	9
		Training Missile	0

**Deployment Area**

## Polotsk

55 37 36 N	028 23 49 E
55 28 07	029 20 25
54 32 15	029 09 47
54 39 32	028 10 40

**Missile Operating Base**

## Polotsk

55 22 34 N	028 44 17 E
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9	9	Launch Canister	9
		Missile Transporter Vehicle	0
		Fixed Structure for Launcher	9
		Training Missile	0

**Deployment Area**

## Smorgon'

54 37 43 N	026 52 34 E
54 22 37	026 52 37
54 37 18	025 41 58
54 45 21	026 15 13

**Missile Operating Base**

## Smorgon'

54 36 16 N	026 23 05 E
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9	9	Launch Canister	9
		Missile Transporter Vehicle	0
		Fixed Structure for Launcher	9
		Training Missile	0

**Deployment Area**

## Smorgon'

54 29 01 N	026 26 40 E
54 05 04	025 53 59
54 24 14	025 31 18
54 35 27	026 19 10

**Missile Operating Base**

## Smorgon'

54 31 36 N	026 17 20 E
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9	9	Launch Canister	9
		Missile Transporter Vehicle	0
		Fixed Structure for Launcher	9
		Training Missile	0

# ARMS CONTROL

	Missiles	Launchers	Support Structures and Equipment
<i>Deployment Area</i>			
Lida			
53 45 24 N	025 29 02 E		
53 34 00	024 49 35		
53 42 25	024 38 15		
53 58 05	025 10 17		
<i>Missile Operating Base</i>			
Lida			
53 47 39 N	025 20 27 E	9	9
			Launch Canister Missile Transporter Vehicle Fixed Structure for Launcher Training Missile
<i>Deployment Area</i>			
Gezgaly			
53 38 53 N	025 25 38 E		
53 23 48	025 26 12		
53 12 46	025 08 38		
53 22 57	024 35 43		
<i>Missile Operating Base</i>			
Gezgaly			
53 32 50 N	025 16 48 E	6	6
			Launch Canister Missile Transporter Vehicle Fixed Structure for Launcher Training Missile
<i>Deployment Area</i>			
Slonim			
52 58 15 N	025 55 42 E		
52 45 02	025 31 08		
53 04 08	025 09 00		
53 08 45	025 30 20		
<i>Missile Operating Base</i>			
Slonim			
52 55 54 N	025 21 59 E	9	9
			Launch Canister Missile Transporter Vehicle Fixed Structure for Launcher Training Missile
<i>Deployment Area</i>			
Ruzhany			
52 55 21 N	024 58 40 E		
52 46 32	024 48 25		
52 45 52	024 16 26		
53 07 34	024 22 14		
<i>Missile Operating Base</i>			
Ruzhany			
52 49 29 N	024 45 45 E	6	6
			Launch Canister Missile Transporter Vehicle Fixed Structure for Launcher Training Missile
<i>Deployment Area</i>			
Zasimovichi			
52 37 55 N	024 48 50 E		
52 22 00	024 10 52		
52 32 36	023 56 54		
52 45 52	024 16 26		
<i>Missile Operating Base</i>			
Zasimovichi			
52 30 38 N	024 08 43 E	6	6
			Launch Canister Missile Transporter Vehicle Fixed Structure for Launcher Training Missile

	Missiles	Launchers	Support Structures and Equipment	
<b>Deployment Area</b>				
<b>Mozyr'</b>				
52 05 31 N	029 13 04 E			
51 39 05	029 39 31			
51 42 00	029 01 30			
51 52 57	028 51 32			
<b>Missile Operating Base</b>				
<b>Mozyr'</b>				
52 02 27 N	029 11 15 E	9	9	Launch Canister 9
				Missile Transporter Vehicle 0
				Fixed Structure for Launcher 9
				Training Missile 0
<b>Deployment Area</b>				
<b>Petrikov</b>				
52 16 29 N	029 03 04 E			
52 08 06	028 48 40			
52 08 33	028 13 37			
52 27 47	028 28 17			
<b>Missile Operating Base</b>				
<b>Petrikov</b>				
52 10 29 N	028 34 52 E	6	6	Launch Canister 6
				Missile Transporter Vehicle 0
				Fixed Structure for Launcher 6
				Training Missile 0
<b>Deployment Area</b>				
<b>Zhitkovichi</b>				
52 23 40 N	028 10 31 E			
52 08 35	028 10 07			
52 08 55	027 14 01			
52 24 01	027 14 06			
<b>Missile Operating Base</b>				
<b>Zhitkovichi</b>				
52 11 36 N	027 48 07 E	6	6	Launch Canister 6
				Missile Transporter Vehicle 0
				Fixed Structure for Launcher 6
				Training Missile 0
<b>Deployment Area</b>				
<b>Rechitsa</b>				
52 26 34 N	030 21 10 E			
52 05 27	030 43 26			
51 47 47	030 23 27			
52 13 08	030 00 53			
<b>Missile Operating Base</b>				
<b>Rechitsa</b>				
52 11 58 N	030 07 11 E	6	6	Launch Canister 6
				Missile Transporter Vehicle 0
				Fixed Structure for Launcher 6
				Training Missile 0
<b>Deployment Area</b>				
<b>Slutsk</b>				
53 28 29 N	027 57 50 E			
53 02 31	028 07 59			
53 13 35	027 25 09			
53 28 40	027 28 55			
<b>Missile Operating Base</b>				
<b>Slutsk</b>				
53 14 20 N	027 42 15 E	9	9	Launch Canister 9
				Missile Transporter Vehicle 0
				Fixed Structure for Launcher 9
				Training Missile 0

	Missiles	Launchers	Support Structures and Equipment
<i>Deployment Area</i>			
Lutsk			
51 08 14 N	025 54 51 E		
50 50 45	025 34 49		
51 16 24	025 16 49		
51 20 51	025 26 59		
<i>Missile Operating Base</i>			
Lutsk			
50 56 07 N	025 36 26 E	9	9
			Launch Canister
			Missile Transporter Vehicle
			Fixed Structure for Launcher
			Training Missile
<i>Deployment Area</i>			
Lutsk			
51 10 05 N	025 27 21 E		
50 43 54	025 07 49		
50 47 35	024 33 38		
51 11 22	024 35 49		
<i>Missile Operating Base</i>			
Lutsk			
50 50 06 N	025 04 02 E	9	9
			Launch Canister
			Missile Transporter Vehicle
			Fixed Structure for Launcher
			Training Missile
<i>Deployment Area</i>			
Brody			
50 14 00 N	025 29 11 E		
50 00 46	025 09 30		
50 17 32	024 41 55		
50 22 10	024 58 33		
<i>Missile Operating Base</i>			
Brody			
50 06 09 N	025 12 14 E	9	9
			Launch Canister
			Missile Transporter Vehicle
			Fixed Structure for Launcher
			Training Missile
<i>Deployment Area</i>			
Chervonograd			
50 41 07 N	024 33 58 E		
50 13 10	024 38 45		
50 19 02	024 11 30		
50 36 26	024 17 15		
<i>Missile Operating Base</i>			
Chervonograd			
50 22 45 N	024 18 16 E	9	9
			Launch Canister
			Missile Transporter Vehicle
			Fixed Structure for Launcher
			Training Missile
<i>Deployment Area</i>			
Slavuta			
50 18 55 N	027 03 22 E		
50 08 07	027 03 21		
50 07 59	026 16 22		
50 29 38	026 29 34		
<i>Missile Operating Base</i>			
Slavuta			
50 17 05 N	026 41 31 E	9	9
			Launch Canister
			Missile Transporter Vehicle
			Fixed Structure for Launcher
			Training Missile

	Missiles	Launchers	Support Structures and Equipment	
<b>Deployment Area</b>				
Belokorovichi				
51 10 19 N	028 12 04 E			
50 51 05	027 51 07			
51 21 28	027 01 43			
51 21 22	027 37 54			
<b>Missile Operating Base</b>				
Belokorovichi				
51 10 45 N	028 03 20 E	9	9	Launch Canister 9
				Missile Transporter Vehicle 0
				Fixed Structure for Launcher 9
				Training Missile 0
<b>Deployment Area</b>				
Lipniki				
51 11 38 N	029 10 28 E			
50 52 28	028 55 56			
51 05 53	028 22 14			
51 20 57	028 26 07			
<b>Missile Operating Base</b>				
Lipniki				
51 12 22 N	028 26 37 E	9	9	Launch Canister 9
				Missile Transporter Vehicle 0
				Fixed Structure for Launcher 9
				Training Missile 0
<b>Deployment Area</b>				
Vysokaya Pech'				
50 29 13 N	028 21 10 E			
50 09 49	028 20 37			
50 10 10	027 40 19			
50 29 33	027 43 58			
<b>Missile Operating Base</b>				
Vysokaya Pech'				
50 10 11 N	028 16 22 E	6	6	Launch Canister 6
				Missile Transporter Vehicle 0
				Fixed Structure for Launcher 6
				Training Missile 0
<b>Deployment Area</b>				
Vysokaya Pech'				
50 13 33 N	029 01 05 E			
49 56 07	029 10 23			
49 52 42	028 06 47			
50 07 39	028 20 33			
<b>Missile Operating Base</b>				
Vysokaya Pech'				
50 05 43 N	028 22 09 E	6	6	Launch Canister 6
				Missile Transporter Vehicle 0
				Fixed Structure for Launcher 6
				Training Missile 0
<b>Deployment Area</b>				
Korosten'				
50 54 31 N	029 02 51 E			
50 41 34	029 02 16			
50 42 05	028 28 20			
50 55 01	028 28 44			
<b>Missile Operating Base</b>				
Korosten'				
50 52 22 N	028 31 17 E	6	6	Launch Canister 6
				Missile Transporter Vehicle 0
				Fixed Structure for Launcher 6
				Training Missile 0

	Missiles	Launchers	Support Structures and Equipment
<i>Deployment Area</i>			
Lebedin			
50 35 26 N	034 41 41 E		
50 12 10	034 00 31		
50 14 25	033 50 28		
50 35 42	034 21 21		
<i>Missile Operating Base</i>			
Lebedin			
50 33 06 N	034 26 02 E	9	9
			Launch Canister
			Missile Transporter Vehicle
			Fixed Structure for Launcher
			Training Missile
<i>Deployment Area</i>			
Glukhov			
52 02 16 N	033 52 28 E		
51 36 21	033 55 26		
51 34 22	033 27 42		
52 02 21	033 38 28		
<i>Missile Operating Base</i>			
Glukhov			
51 41 00 N	033 30 56 E	9	9
			Launch Canister
			Missile Transporter Vehicle
			Fixed Structure for Launcher
			Training Missile
<i>Deployment Area</i>			
Glukhov			
51 42 59 N	033 27 47 E		
51 23 31	033 37 56		
51 23 37	032 56 33		
51 43 02	033 10 25		
<i>Missile Operating Base</i>			
Glukhov			
51 36 44 N	033 29 17 E	9	9
			Launch Canister
			Missile Transporter Vehicle
			Fixed Structure for Launcher
			Training Missile
<i>Deployment Area</i>			
Akhtyrka			
50 17 58 N	034 54 32 E		
49 49 59	034 50 05		
50 10 03	033 57 06		
50 18 24	034 24 13		
<i>Missile Operating Base</i>			
Akhtyrka			
50 16 01 N	034 49 53 E	9	9
			Launch Canister
			Missile Transporter Vehicle
			Fixed Structure for Launcher
			Training Missile
<i>Deployment Area</i>			
Akhtyrka			
50 10 43 N	035 34 34 E		
49 54 08	035 00 16		
50 18 24	034 24 13		
50 26 42	034 48 07		
<i>Missile Operating Base</i>			
Akhtyrka			
50 21 59 N	034 57 03 E	9	9
			Launch Canister
			Missile Transporter Vehicle
			Fixed Structure for Launcher
			Training Missile

	Missiles	Launchers	Support Structures and Equipment	
<b>Deployment Area</b>				
Novosibirsk				
55 51 09 N	083 52 28 E			
55 14 33	083 49 49			
55 21 52	083 08 41			
55 30 29	083 09 09			
<b>Missile Operating Base</b>				
Novosibirsk				
55 22 05 N	083 13 52 E	9	9	Launch Canister 9
				Missile Transporter Vehicle 0
				Fixed Structure for Launcher 9
				Training Missile 0
<b>Deployment Area</b>				
Novosibirsk				
55 06 17 N	083 34 11 E			
54 57 40	083 33 38			
55 04 53	082 52 45			
55 24 16	082 53 40			
<b>Missile Operating Base</b>				
Novosibirsk				
55 22 57 N	082 55 16 E	9	9	Launch Canister 9
				Missile Transporter Vehicle 0
				Fixed Structure for Launcher 9
				Training Missile 0
<b>Deployment Area</b>				
Novosibirsk				
55 31 47 N	084 08 57 E			
55 13 26	082 56 55			
55 20 01	082 49 41			
55 40 13	084 00 42			
<b>Missile Operating Base</b>				
Novosibirsk				
55 19 32 N	082 56 18 E	9	9	Launch Canister 9
				Missile Transporter Vehicle 0
				Fixed Structure for Launcher 9
				Training Missile 0
<b>Deployment Area</b>				
Novosibirsk				
55 08 01 N	083 53 07 E			
54 52 56	083 52 02			
55 11 17	082 56 49			
55 22 00	083 01 07			
<b>Missile Operating Base</b>				
Novosibirsk				
55 18 44 N	083 01 38 E	9	9	Launch Canister 9
				Missile Transporter Vehicle 0
				Fixed Structure for Launcher 9
				Training Missile 0
<b>Deployment Area</b>				
Novosibirsk				
55 03 58 N	084 18 27 E			
54 53 12	084 19 10			
55 04 49	082 56 30			
55 22 00	083 01 07			
<b>Missile Operating Base</b>				
Novosibirsk				
55 19 07 N	083 09 59 E	9	9	Launch Canister 9
				Missile Transporter Vehicle 0
				Fixed Structure for Launcher 9
				Training Missile 0

	Missiles	Launchers	Support Structures and Equipment
<i>Deployment Area</i>			
Drovyanaya			
51 44 02 N	113 08 33 E		
51 22 28	113 07 32		
51 22 49	112 46 52		
51 44 16	112 54 39		
<i>Missile Operating Base</i>			
Drovyanaya			
51 27 20 N	113 03 42 E	9	9 Launch Canister Missile Transporter Vehicle Fixed Structure for Launcher Training Missile
<i>Deployment Area</i>			
Drovyanaya			
51 37 34 N	113 08 14 E		
51 22 28	113 07 32		
51 18 39	112 36 23		
51 27 14	112 40 08		
<i>Missile Operating Base</i>			
Drovyanaya			
51 26 10 N	113 02 43 E	9	9 Launch Canister Missile Transporter Vehicle Fixed Structure for Launcher Training Missile
<i>Deployment Area</i>			
Drovyanaya			
51 24 52 N	112 53 51 E		
51 20 36	112 50 13		
51 18 54	112 15 44		
51 23 13	112 15 51		
<i>Missile Operating Base</i>			
Drovyanaya			
51 22 59 N	112 49 55 E	9	9 Launch Canister Missile Transporter Vehicle Fixed Structure for Launcher Training Missile
<i>Deployment Area</i>			
Drovyanaya			
51 26 54 N	113 00 50 E		
51 18 13	113 03 54		
51 18 47	112 26 03		
51 29 39	112 19 29		
<i>Missile Operating Base</i>			
Drovyanaya			
51 20 18 N	113 00 54 E	9	9 Launch Canister Missile Transporter Vehicle Fixed Structure for Launcher Training Missile
<i>Deployment Area</i>			
Drovyanaya			
51 33 19 N	113 04 35 E		
51 22 32	113 04 05		
51 22 49	112 46 52		
51 33 36	112 47 17		
<i>Missile Operating Base</i>			
Drovyanaya			
51 23 49 N	112 52 13 E	9	9 Launch Canister Missile Transporter Vehicle Fixed Structure for Launcher Training Missile



	Missiles	Launchers	Support Structures and Equipment	
<b>Deployment Area</b>				
Barnaul				
53 54 32 N	084 01 02 E			
53 43 46	084 01 48			
53 35 30	083 43 07			
53 44 16	083 36 24			
<b>Missile Operating Base</b>				
Barnaul				
53 46 08 N	083 57 11 E	9	9	Launch Canister 9
				Missile Transporter Vehicle 0
				Fixed Structure for Launcher 9
				Training Missile 0
<b>Deployment Area</b>				
Barnaul				
53 29 21 N	084 31 45 E			
52 58 43	083 47 57			
53 13 47	083 48 56			
53 29 02	084 17 18			
<b>Missile Operating Base</b>				
Barnaul				
53 18 21 N	084 08 47 E	9	9	Launch Canister 9
				Missile Transporter Vehicle 0
				Fixed Structure for Launcher 9
				Training Missile 0
<b>Deployment Area</b>				
Barnaul				
53 16 38 N	084 43 16 E			
52 59 32	084 51 20			
52 55 09	084 47 58			
53 16 02	084 14 31			
<b>Missile Operating Base</b>				
Barnaul				
53 13 29 N	084 40 10 E	9	9	Launch Canister 9
				Missile Transporter Vehicle 0
				Fixed Structure for Launcher 9
				Training Missile 0
<b>Deployment Area</b>				
Barnaul				
53 27 33 N	084 49 55 E			
53 16 42	084 46 52			
53 16 02	084 14 31			
53 26 58	084 21 02			
<b>Missile Operating Base</b>				
Barnaul				
53 18 47 N	084 30 27 E	9	9	Launch Canister 9
				Missile Transporter Vehicle 0
				Fixed Structure for Launcher 9
				Training Missile 0
<b>Deployment Area</b>				
Kansk				
56 32 14 N	096 12 14 E			
56 15 16	095 34 54			
56 28 30	095 20 13			
56 34 39	095 36 13			
<b>Missile Operating Base</b>				
Kansk				
56 22 31 N	095 28 35 E	9	9	Launch Canister 9
				Missile Transporter Vehicle 0
				Fixed Structure for Launcher 9
				Training Missile 0

	Missiles	Launchers	Support Structures and Equipment
<i>Deployment Area</i>			
Kansk			
56 30 47 N	095 12 33 E		
56 19 53	095 19 41		
56 13 45	094 59 58		
56 31 03	094 56 58		
<i>Missile Operating Base</i>			
Kansk			
56 20 09 N	095 16 34 E	9	9 Launch Canister Missile Transporter Vehicle Fixed Structure for Launcher Training Missile
<i>Deployment Area</i>			
Kansk			
56 19 29 N	096 20 56 E		
56 08 43	096 21 41		
56 08 17	096 02 24		
56 19 14	095 50 42		
<i>Missile Operating Base</i>			
Kansk			
56 11 19 N	096 03 13 E	9	9 Launch Canister Missile Transporter Vehicle Fixed Structure for Launcher Training Missile
<i>Deployment Area</i>			
Kansk			
56 14 50 N	096 05 46 E		
55 59 57	096 14 35		
55 59 41	096 03 03		
56 15 00	095 46 30		
<i>Missile Operating Base</i>			
Kansk			
56 02 19 N	096 04 58 E	9	9 Launch Canister Missile Transporter Vehicle Fixed Structure for Launcher Training Missile
(ii) SS-4			
<i>Deployment Area</i>			
Sovetsk			
55 05 33 N	021 52 38 E		
55 03 22	021 56 20		
54 57 04	021 29 58		
55 01 23	021 26 16		
<i>Missile Operating Base</i>			
Sovetsk			
54 59 07 N	021 36 36 E	5	6 (Launch Stand) Missile Transporter Vehicle Missile Erector Propellant Tank Training Missile
<i>Deployment Area</i>			
Gusev			
54 46 02 N	022 07 07 E		
54 24 14	022 28 42		
54 20 01	022 21 10		
54 43 58	021 55 53		
<i>Missile Operating Base</i>			
Gusev			
54 43 59 N	022 03 27 E	5	7 (Launch Stand) Missile Transporter Vehicle Missile Erector Propellant Tank Training Missile

	Missiles	Launchers	Support Structures and Equipment	
<b>Deployment Area</b>				
<b>Malorita</b>				
51 53 50 N	024 05 39 E			
51 43 09	024 09 49			
51 42 59	023 57 07			
51 53 45	023 57 50			
<b>Missile Operating Base</b>				
<b>Malorita</b>				
51 51 47 N	024 01 55 E	5	6	Missile Transporter Vehicle 14
		(Launch Stand)	Missile Erector	7
			Propellant Tank	48
			Training Missile	5
<b>Deployment Area</b>				
<b>Pinsk</b>				
52 15 03 N	025 49 43 E			
52 04 09	025 39 30			
52 03 56	025 22 00			
52 14 54	025 35 40			
<b>Missile Operating Base</b>				
<b>Pinsk</b>				
52 10 56 N	025 41 27 E	5	5	Missile Transporter Vehicle 13
		(Launch Stand)	Missile Erector	6
			Propellant Tank	47
			Training Missile	6
<b>Deployment Area</b>				
<b>Vyru</b>				
57 49 33 N	027 00 00 E			
57 43 05	027 00 00			
57 43 04	026 43 54			
57 49 32	026 43 51			
<b>Missile Operating Base</b>				
<b>Vyru</b>				
57 45 47 N	026 47 13 E	5	6	Missile Transporter Vehicle 11
		(Launch Stand)	Missile Erector	5
			Propellant Tank	51
			Training Missile	6
<b>Deployment Area</b>				
<b>Aluksne</b>				
57 25 51 N	026 56 00 E			
57 21 32	026 56 01			
57 17 12	026 40 06			
57 25 49	026 40 01			
<b>Missile Operating Base</b>				
<b>Aluksne</b>				
57 25 04 N	026 49 46 E	5	6	Missile Transporter Vehicle 12
		(Launch Stand)	Missile Erector	6
			Propellant Tank	45
			Training Missile	6
<b>Deployment Area</b>				
<b>Ostrov</b>				
57 38 21 N	028 20 22 E			
57 21 04	028 23 43			
57 21 14	028 07 47			
57 38 28	028 08 19			
<b>Missile Operating Base</b>				
<b>Ostrov</b>				
57 31 53 N	028 12 19 E	5	8	Missile Transporter Vehicle 12
		(Launch Stand)	Missile Erector	7
			Propellant Tank	48
			Training Missile	6

	Missiles	Launchers	Support Structures and Equipment
<i>Deployment Area</i>			
Karmelava			
55 06 12 N	024 22 04 E		
54 57 49	024 33 51		
54 55 00	024 04 05		
55 01 28	024 03 36		
<i>Missile Operating Base</i>			
Karmelava			
55 00 51 N	024 14 16 E	5	5 (Launch Stand) Missile Transporter Vehicle Missile Erector Propellant Tank Training Missile
<i>Deployment Area</i>			
Ukmerge			
55 17 41 N	024 59 06 E		
55 04 25	024 40 58		
55 08 35	024 33 12		
55 19 43	024 51 26		
<i>Missile Operating Base</i>			
Ukmerge			
55 07 51 N	024 38 36 E	5	6 (Launch Stand) Missile Transporter Vehicle Missile Erector Propellant Tank Training Missile
<i>Deployment Area</i>			
Taurage			
55 18 07 N	022 30 42 E		
55 09 30	022 30 22		
55 03 10	022 18 52		
55 13 35	022 21 01		
<i>Missile Operating Base</i>			
Taurage			
55 04 58 N	022 19 38 E	5	6 (Launch Stand) Missile Transporter Vehicle Missile Erector Propellant Tank Training Missile
<i>Deployment Area</i>			
Kolomyya			
48 45 01 N	024 55 59 E		
48 36 23	024 56 20		
48 36 04	024 40 04		
48 44 42	024 39 40		
<i>Missile Operating Base</i>			
Kolomyya			
48 39 32 N	024 48 04 E	5	6 (Launch Stand) Missile Transporter Vehicle Missile Erector Propellant Tank Training Missile
<i>Deployment Area</i>			
Stryy			
49 19 59 N	023 58 46 E		
49 11 22	023 58 29		
49 21 09	023 31 57		
49 29 46	023 32 24		
<i>Missile Operating Base</i>			
Stryy			
49 25 23 N	023 34 56 E	5	7 (Launch Stand) Missile Transporter Vehicle Missile Erector Propellant Tank Training Missile

	Missiles	Launchers	Support Structures and Equipment	
<b>Deployment Area</b>				
Skala-Podol'skaya				
48 54 37 N		026 17 26 E		
48 48 09		026 17 32		
48 48 02		026 01 12		
48 54 30		026 01 04		
<b>Missile Operating Base</b>				
Skala-Podol'skaya				
48 51 02 N	5	6 (Launch Stand)	Missile Transporter Vehicle Missile Erector Propellant Tank Training Missile	12 6 46 5

## 2. Non-Deployed

The following are missile support facilities, their locations and the numbers, for each Party of all non-deployed intermediate-range missiles listed as existing types in Article III of the Treaty, launchers of such missiles and support structures and support equipment associated with such missiles and launchers. Site diagrams for agreed missile support facilities, to include boundaries and center coordinates, are appended to this Memorandum of Understanding.

	Missiles	Launchers	Support Structures and Equipment	
<b>UNITED STATES OF AMERICA</b>				
<b>(i) Pershing II</b>				
<b>Missile Production Facilities:</b>				
Hercules Plant #1				
Magna, Utah	0	0	Launch Pad Shelter Training Missile Stage	0 0
40 39 40 N 112 03 14 W				
<b>Launcher Production Facilities:</b>				
Martin Marietta				
Middle River, Maryland	0	0	Launch Pad Shelter Training Missile Stage	0 0
39 35 N 076 24 W				
<b>Missile Storage Facilities:</b>				
Pueblo Depot Activity				
Pueblo, Colorado	111	0	Launch Pad Shelter Training Missile Stage	0 4
38 19 N 104 20 W				
Redstone Arsenal				
Huntsville, Alabama	1	0	Launch Pad Shelter Training Missile Stage	0 20
34 36 N 086 38 W				
Weilerbach				
Federal Republic of Germany	12	0	Launch Pad Shelter Training Missile Stage	0 0
49 27 N 007 38 E				
<b>Launcher Storage Facilities:</b>				
Redstone Arsenal				
Huntsville, Alabama	0	1	Launch Pad Shelter Training Missile Stage	0 0
34 35 N 086 37 W				

	Missiles	Launchers	Support Structures and Equipment
<i>Missile/Launcher Storage Facilities:</i>			
NONE			
<i>Missile Repair Facilities:</i>			
Pueblo Depot Activity Pueblo, Colorado 38 18 N 104 19 W	0	0	Launch Pad Shelter Training Missile Stage
<i>Launcher Repair Facilities:</i>			
EMC Hausen, Frankfurt Federal Republic of Germany 50 08 N 008 38 E	0	0	Launch Pad Shelter Training Missile Stage
Redstone Arsenal Huntsville, Alabama 34 37 N 086 38 W	0	10	Launch Pad Shelter Training Missile Stage
Ft. Sill Ft. Sill, Oklahoma 34 40 N 098 24 W	0	2	Launch Pad Shelter Training Missile Stage
Pueblo Depot Activity Pueblo, Colorado 38 19 N 104 20 W	0	0	Launch Pad Shelter Training Missile Stage
<i>Missile/Launcher Repair Facilities:</i>			
NONE			
<i>Test Ranges:</i>			
Complex 16 Cape Canaveral, Florida 28 29 N 080 34 W	3	0	Launch Pad Shelter Training Missile Stage
<i>Training Facilities:</i>			
Ft. Sill Ft. Sill, Oklahoma 34 41 N 098 34 W	0	39	Launch Pad Shelter Training Missile Stage
<i>Elimination Facilities:</i>			
(Not determined)			
<i>Missiles, Launchers, and Support Equipment in Transit:</i>	0	0	Training Missile Stage
(ii) BGM-109G			
<i>Missile Production Facilities:</i>			
McDonnell-Douglas Titusville, Florida 28 32 N 080 40 W	52 with launch canister	0	Training Missile Training Launch Canister
General Dynamics Kearney Mesa, California 32 50 N 117 08 W	48 with launch canister	0	Training Missile Training Launch Canister
<i>Launcher Production Facilities:</i>			
Air Force Plant 19 San Diego, California 32 45 N 117 12 W	2 with launch canister	4	Training Missile Training Launch Canister
<i>Missile Storage Facilities:</i>			
NONE			

	Missiles	Launchers	Support Structures and Equipment	
<b>Launcher Storage Facilities:</b>				
NONE				
<b>Missile/Launcher Storage Facilities:</b>				
NONE				
<b>Missile Repair Facilities:</b>				
SABCA	16	0	Training Missile	0
Gosselies, Belgium	with launch canister		Training Launch Canister	0
50 27 N 004 27 E				
<b>Launcher Repair Facilities:</b>				
NONE				
<b>Missile/Launcher Repair Facilities:</b>				
NONE				
<b>Test Ranges:</b>				
Dugway Proving Grounds	0	0	Training Missile	0
Utah	with launch canister		Training Launch Canister	0
40 22 N 113 04 W				
<b>Training Facilities:</b>				
Davis-Monthan AFB	0	7	Training Missile	2
Tucson, Arizona	with launch canister		Training Launch Canister	27
32 11 N 110 53 W				
Ft. Huachuca	0	6	Training Missile	0
Ft. Huachuca, Arizona	with launch canister		Training Launch Canister	8
31 29 N 110 19 W				
<b>Elimination Facilities:</b>				
(Not determined)				
<b>Missiles, Launchers, and Support Equipment in Transit</b>				
	15	0	Training Missile	0
	with launch canister		Training Launch Canister	2

0) UNION OF SOVIET SOCIALIST REPUBLICS

(i) SS-20

<b>Missile Production Facilities:</b>				
Votkinsk Machine Building Plant	36*	0	Launch Canister	36
Udmurt ASSR, RSFSR			Missile Transporter Vehicle	0
57 01 30 N 054 08 00 E			Fixed Structure for Launcher	0
			Training Missile	0
<b>Launcher Production Facilities:</b>				
Barrikady Plant	0	1	Launch Canister	0
Volgograd			Missile Transporter Vehicle	0
48 44 N 044 32 E			Fixed Structure for Launcher	0
			Training Missile	0

\*In various stages of manufacture.

	Missiles	Launchers	Support Structures and Equipment
<i>Missile Storage Facilities:</i>			
NONE			
<i>Launcher Storage Facilities:</i>			
NONE			
<i>Missile/Launcher Storage Facilities:</i>			
Postavy	2	3	Launch Canister Missile Transporter Vehicle Fixed Structure for Launcher Training Missile
55 10 N 026 55 E			
Gezgaly	2	2	Launch Canister Missile Transporter Vehicle Fixed Structure for Launcher Training Missile
53 36 N 025 28 E			
Mozyr'	2	2	Launch Canister Missile Transporter Vehicle Fixed Structure for Launcher Training Missile
52 03 N 029 11 E			
Lutsk	1	1	Launch Canister Missile Transporter Vehicle Fixed Structure for Launcher Training Missile
50 53 N 025 30 E			
Belokorovichi	2	2	Launch Canister Missile Transporter Vehicle Fixed Structure for Launcher Training Missile
51 09 N 028 00 E			
Lebedin	2	1	Launch Canister Missile Transporter Vehicle Fixed Structure for Launcher Training Missile
50 36 N 034 25 E			
Novosibirsk	1	1	Launch Canister Missile Transporter Vehicle Fixed Structure for Launcher Training Missile
55 16 N 083 02 E			
Drovyanaya	2	2	Launch Canister Missile Transporter Vehicle Fixed Structure for Launcher Training Missile
51 30 N 113 03 E			
Kansk	1	1	Launch Canister Missile Transporter Vehicle Fixed Structure for Launcher Training Missile
56 16 N 095 39 E			
Barnaul	1	1	Launch Canister Missile Transporter Vehicle Fixed Structure for Launcher Training Missile
53 34 N 083 48 E			
Kolosovo	144	0	Launch Canister Missile Transporter Vehicle Fixed Structure for Launcher Training Missile
53 31 N 026 55 E			
Zherebkovo	20	0	Launch Canister Missile Transporter Vehicle Fixed Structure for Launcher Training Missile
47 51 N 029 54 E			



	Missiles	Launchers	Support Structures and Equipment	
<i>Missile Repair Facilities:</i>				
NONE				
<i>Launcher Repair Facilities:</i>				
NONE				
<i>Missile/Launcher Repair Facilities:</i>				
Bataysk	0	11	Launch Canister	2
47 08 N 039 47 E			Missile Transporter Vehicle	4
			Fixed Structure for Launcher	0
			Training Missile	2
<i>Test Ranges:</i>				
Kapustin Yar	0	8	Launch Canister	0
48 37 N 046 18 E			Missile Transporter Vehicle	3
			Fixed Structure for Launcher	1
			Training Missile	0
<i>Training Facilities:</i>				
Serpukhov	0	6	Launch Canister	4
54 54 N 037 28 E			Missile Transporter Vehicle	1
			Fixed Structure for Launcher	0
			Training Missile	4
Krasnodar	0	1	Launch Canister	2
45 03 N 038 58 E			Missile Transporter Vehicle	1
			Fixed Structure for Launcher	0
			Training Missile	2
Training Center at Test Range Kapustin Yar	0	7	Launch Canister	12
48 38 N 046 10 E			Missile Transporter Vehicle	1
			Fixed Structure for Launcher	3
			Training Missile	12
<i>Elimination Facilities:</i>				
Sarny	29	68	Launch Canister	32
51 21 N 026 35 E			Missile Transporter Vehicle	35
			Fixed Structure for Launcher	0
			Training Missile	3
Aral'sk	0	0	Launch Canister	0
46 50 N 61 18 E			Missile Transporter Vehicle	0
			Fixed Structure for Launcher	0
			Training Missile	0
Chita	0	0	Launch Canister	0
52 22 N 113 17 E			Missile Transporter Vehicle	0
			Fixed Structure for Launcher	0
			Training Missile	0
Kansk	0	0	Launch Canister	0
56 20 N 095 06 E			Missile Transporter Vehicle	0
			Fixed Structure for Launcher	0
			Training Missile	0

*Missiles, Launchers, and Support Equipment in**Transit:*

NONE

(ii) SS-4

*Missile Production Facilities:*

NONE

*Launcher Production Facilities:*

NONE

Missiles                      Launchers                      Support Structures and Equipment

*Missile Storage Facilities:*

NONE

*Launcher Storage Facilities:*

NONE

*Missile/Launcher Storage Facilities:*

Kolosovo 53 31 N    026 55 E	35	1 (Launch Stand)	Missile Transporter Vehicle Missile Erector Propellant Tank Training Missile
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Zherebkovo 47 51 N    029 54 E	56	3 (Launch Stand)	Missile Transporter Vehicle Missile Erector Propellant Tank Training Missile
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*Missile Repair Facilities:*

Bataysk 47 08 N    039 47 E	0	0 (Launch Stand)	Missile Transporter Vehicle Missile Erector Propellant Tank Training Missile
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*Launcher Repair Facilities:*

NONE

*Missile/Launcher Repair Facilities:*

NONE

*Test Ranges:*

Kapustin Yar 48 35 N    046 18 E	14	2 (Launch Stand)	Missile Transporter Vehicle Missile Erector Propellant Tank Training Missile
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*Training Facilities:*

NONE

*Elimination Facilities:*

Lesnaya 52 59 N    025 46 E	0	0 (Launch Stand)	Missile Transporter Vehicle Missile Erector Propellant Tank Training Missile
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*Missiles, Launchers, and Support Equipment in Transit:*

NONE

(iii) SS-5

*Missile Production Facilities:*

NONE

*Launcher Production Facilities:*

NONE

*Missile Storage Facilities:*

Kolosovo 53 31 N    026 55 E	6	0	
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*Launcher Storage Facilities:*

NONE

*Missile/Launcher Storage Facilities:*

NONE

Missiles

Launchers

Support Structures and  
Equipment*Missile Repair Facilities:*

NONE

*Launcher Repair Facilities:*

NONE

*Missile/Launcher Repair Facilities:*

NONE

*Test Ranges:*

NONE

*Training Facilities:*

NONE

*Elimination Facilities:*

Lesnaya	0	0
52 59 N 025 46 E		

*Missiles, Launchers, and Support Equipment in**Transit:*

NONE

**3. Training Launchers**

In addition to the support equipment listed in paragraphs 1 and 2 of this Section, the Parties possess vehicles, used to train drivers of launchers of intermediate-range missiles, which shall be considered for purposes of this Treaty to be training launchers. The number of such vehicles for each Party is:

- (a) for the United States of America—29; and
- (b) for the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics—65.

Elimination of such vehicles shall be carried out in accordance with procedures set forth in the Protocol on Elimination.

#### IV. Shorter-Range Missiles, Launchers of Such Missiles and Support Equipment Associated With Such Missiles and Launchers

##### 1. Deployed

The following are the missile operating bases, their locations and the numbers, for each Party, of all deployed shorter-range missiles listed as existing types in Article III of the Treaty, and launchers of such missiles, and the support equipment associated with such missiles and launchers. Site diagrams, to include boundaries and center coordinates, of each listed missile operating base are appended to this Memorandum of Understanding.

	Missiles	Launchers	Support Equipment
(a) UNITED STATES OF AMERICA			
(i) Pershing IA			
<i>Missile Operating Base:</i>			
NONE			
(b) UNION OF SOVIET SOCIALIST REPUBLICS			
(i) SS-12			
<i>Missile Operating Bases:</i>			
Koenigsbrueck	19	11	Missile Transporter Vehicle Training Missile
German Democratic Republic 51 16 40 N 013 53 20 E			
Bischofswerda	8	5	Missile Transporter Vehicle Training Missile
German Democratic Republic 51 08 33 N 014 12 18 E			
Waren	22	12	Missile Transporter Vehicle Training Missile
German Democratic Republic 53 32 40 N 012 37 30 E			
Wokuhl	5	6	Missile Transporter Vehicle Training Missile
German Democratic Republic 53 16 20 N 013 15 50 E			
Hranice	39	24	Missile Transporter Vehicle Training Missile
Czechoslovak Socialist Republic 49 33 00 N 017 45 00 E			
Pashino	0	4	Missile Transporter Vehicle Training Missile
55 16 37 N 082 59 42 E			
Gornyy	36	14	Missile Transporter Vehicle Training Missile
51 33 10 N 113 01 30 E			
Lapichi	9	5	Missile Transporter Vehicle Training Missile
53 25 30 N 028 30 00 E			
Kattakurgan	9	5	Missile Transporter Vehicle Training Missile
39 38 18 N 065 58 40 E			
Saryozek	36	15	Missile Transporter Vehicle Training Missile
44 31 58 N 077 46 20 E			
Novosysoyevka	37	14	Missile Transporter Vehicle Training Missile
44 11 58 N 133 26 05 E			

	Missiles	Launchers	Support Equipment	
<b>(ii) SS-23</b>				
<i>Missile Operating Bases:</i>				
Weissenfels German Democratic Republic 51 11 50 N 011 59 50 E	6	4	Missile Transporter Vehicle Training Missile	3 18
Jena-Forst German Democratic Republic 50 54 55 N 011 32 40 E	47	12	Missile Transporter Vehicle Training Missile	8 3
Stan'kovo 53 38 30 N 027 13 20 E	40	18	Missile Transporter Vehicle Training Missile	18 10
Tsel' 53 23 38 N 028 28 06 E	26	12	Missile Transporter Vehicle Training Missile	11 9
Slobudka 52 30 30 N 024 31 30 E	26	12	Missile Transporter Vehicle Training Missile	12 10
Bayram-Ali 37 36 18 N 062 10 40 E	0	12	Missile Transporter Vehicle Training Missile	12 0
Sempalatinsk 50 23 00 N 080 09 30 E	22	12	Missile Transporter Vehicle Training Missile	12 4

## 2. Non-Deployed

The following are missile support facilities, their locations and the numbers, for each Party of all non-deployed shorter-range missiles listed as existing types in Article III of the Treaty, and launchers of such missiles and support equipment associated with such missiles and launchers. Site diagrams for agreed missile support facilities, to include boundaries and center coordinates, are appended to this Memorandum of Understanding.

	Missiles	Launchers	Support Equipment	
<b>UNITED STATES OF AMERICA</b>				
<b>(i) Pershing IA</b>				
<i>Missile Production Facilities:</i>				
Longhorn Army Ammunition Plant Marshall, Texas 32 39 N 094 08 W	0	0	Training Missile Stage	0
<i>Launcher Production Facilities:</i>				
Martin Marietta Middle River, Maryland 39 35 N 076 24 W	0	0	Training Missile Stage	0
<i>Missile Storage Facilities:</i>				
Pueblo Depot Activity Pueblo, Colorado 38 19 N 104 20 W	169	0	Training Missile Stage	53
<i>Launcher Storage Facilities:</i>				
NONE				
<i>Missile/Launcher Storage Facilities:</i>				
NONE				
<i>Missile Repair Facilities:</i>				
NONE				

# ARMS CONTROL

Missiles                      Launchers                      Support Equipment

*Launcher Repair Facilities:*

Pueblo Depot Activity                      0                      1                      Training Missile Stage  
 Pueblo, Colorado  
 38 19 N      104 20 W

*Missile/Launcher Repair Facilities:*

NONE

*Test Ranges:*

NONE

*Training Facilities:*

NONE

*Elimination Facilities:*

(Not determined)

*Missiles, Launchers, and Support Equipment in Transit:*                      1                      0                      Training Missile Stage

(b) UNION OF SOVIET SOCIALIST REPUBLICS

(i) SS-12

*Missile Production Facilities:*

Votkinsk Machine Building Plant                      0                      0                      Missile Transporter Vehicle  
 Udmurt ASSR, RSFSR                      Training Missile  
 57 01 30 N      054 08 00 E

*Launcher Production Facilities:*

Barrikady Plant                      0                      0                      Missile Transporter Vehicle  
 Volgograd                      Training Missile  
 48 44 N      044 32 E

*Missile Storage Facilities:*

Lozovaya                      126                      0                      Missile Transporter Vehicle  
 48 55 N      036 22 E                      Training Missile

Ladushkin                      72                      0                      Missile Transporter Vehicle  
 54 35 N      020 12 E                      Training Missile

Bronnaya Gora                      170                      0                      Missile Transporter Vehicle  
 52 37 N      025 04 E                      Training Missile

Balkhash                      138                      0                      Missile Transporter Vehicle  
 46 50 N      075 36 E                      Training Missile

*Launcher Storage Facilities:*

Berezovka                      0                      15                      Missile Transporter Vehicle  
 50 20 N      028 26 E                      Training Missile

*Missile/Launcher Storage Facilities:*

NONE

*Missile Repair Facilities:*

NONE

*Launcher Repair Facilities:*

NONE

*Missile Launcher Repair Facilities:*

NONE

	Missiles	Launchers	Support Equipment	
<i>Test Ranges:</i>				
NONE				
<i>Training Facilities:</i>				
Saratov	0	3	Missile Transporter Vehicle	2
51 34 N 046 01 E			Training Missile	0
Kazan'	0	2	Missile Transporter Vehicle	2
55 58 N 049 11 E			Training Missile	0
Kamenka	0	0	Missile Transporter Vehicle	0
53 11 N 044 04 E			Training Missile	0
<i>Elimination Facilities:</i>				
Saryozek (Missiles)	0	0	Missile Transporter Vehicle	0
44 32 N 077 46 E			Training Missile	0
Stan'kovo (Launchers and Missile Transporter Vehicles)	0	0	Missile Transporter Vehicle	0
53 38 N 027 13 E			Training Missile	0
<i>Missiles, Launchers, and Support Equipment in Transit:</i>				
NONE				
(ii) SS-23				
<i>Missile Production Facilities:</i>				
Votkinsk Machine Building Plant	0	0	Missile Transporter Vehicle	0
Udmurt ASSR, RSFSR			Training Missile	0
57 01 30 N 054 08 00 E				
<i>Launcher Production Facilities:</i>				
V.I. Lenin Petropavlovsk Heavy Machine Building Plant	0	0	Missile Transporter Vehicle	0
Petropavlovsk			Training Missile	0
54 51 N 069 09 E				
<i>Missile Storage Facilities:</i>				
Ladushkin	33	0	Missile Transporter Vehicle	0
54 35 N 020 12 E			Training Missile	42
<i>Launcher Storage Facilities:</i>				
Berezovka	0	13	Missile Transporter Vehicle	5
50 20 N 028 26 E			Training Missile	0
<i>Missile/Launcher Storage Facilities:</i>				
NONE				
<i>Missile Repair Facilities:</i>				
NONE				
<i>Launcher Repair Facilities:</i>				
NONE				
<i>Missile/Launcher Repair Facilities:</i>				
NONE				
<i>Test Ranges:</i>				
NONE				

	Missiles	Launchers	Support Equipment
<i>Training Facilities:</i>			
Saratov	0	3	Missile Transporter Vehicle Training Missile
51 34 N 046 01 E			
Kazan	0	3	Missile Transporter Vehicle Training Missile
55 58 N 049 11 E			
Kamenka	0	1	Missile Transporter Vehicle Training Missile
53 11 N 044 04 E			
<i>Elimination Facilities:</i>			
Saryozek (Missiles)	0	0	Missile Transporter Vehicle Training Missile
44 32 N 077 46 E			
Stan'kovo (Launchers and Missile Transporter Vehicles)	0	0	Missile Transporter Vehicle Training Missile
53 38 N 027 13 E			
<i>Missiles, Launchers, and Support Equipment in Transit:</i>			
NONE			

**V. Missile Systems Tested, But Not Deployed, Prior to Entry into Force of the Treaty**

The following are the missile support facilities, their locations and the numbers, for each Party of all intermediate-range and shorter-range missiles, and launchers of such missiles, which were tested prior to entry into force of the Treaty, but were never deployed, and which are not existing types of intermediate-range or shorter-range missiles listed in Article III of the Treaty. Site diagrams for agreed missile support facilities, to include boundaries and center coordinates, are appended to this Memorandum of Understanding.

	Missiles	Launchers	Support Equipment
<b>(a) UNITED STATES OF AMERICA</b>			
<b>(i) Pershing IB</b>			
<i>Missile Production Facilities:</i>			
NONE			
<i>Launcher Production Facilities:</i>			
NONE			
<i>Missile Storage Facilities:</i>			
NONE			
<i>Launcher Storage Facilities:</i>			
NONE			
<i>Missile/Launcher Storage Facilities:</i>			
NONE			
<i>Missile Repair Facilities:</i>			
NONE			
<i>Launcher Repair Facilities:</i>			
NONE			
<i>Missile/Launcher Repair Facilities:</i>			
NONE			



	Missiles	Launchers	Support Equipment
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**Test Ranges:**

NONE

**Training Facilities:**

NONE

**Elimination Facilities:**

NONE

**Missiles, Launchers, and Support Equipment in Transit:**

NONE

**UNION OF SOVIET SOCIALIST REPUBLICS****(i) SSC-X-4****Missile Production Facilities:**

NONE

**Launcher Production Facilities:**

Experimental Plant of the Amalgamated Production Works "M. I. Kalinin Machine Building Plant"	0	0	
Sverdlovsk	with		
56 47 24 N 060 47 03 E	launch		
	canister		

**Missile Storage Facilities:**

NONE

**Launcher Storage Facilities:**

NONE

**Missile/Launcher Storage Facilities:**

Jelgava	84	6	
56 40 N 024 06 E	with		
	launch		
	canister		

**Missile Repair Facilities:**

NONE

**Launcher Repair Facilities:**

NONE

**Missile/Launcher Repair Facilities:**

NONE

**Test Ranges:**

NONE

**Training Facilities:**

NONE

**Elimination Facilities:**

Jelgava	0	0	
56 40 N 024 06 E	with		
	launch		
	canister		

**Missiles, Launchers, and Support Equipment in Transit:**

NONE

**VI. Technical Data**

Following are agreed categories of technical data for missiles and launchers subject to the Treaty, support structures and support equipment associated with such missiles and launchers and the relevant data for each of these categories. Photographs of missiles, launchers, support structures and support equipment listed below are appended to this Memorandum of Understanding.

	P-II	BGM-109G	SS-20	SS-4	SS-5	SSC-4
<b>I. Intermediate-Range Missiles</b>						
<b>(a) Missile Characteristics:</b>						
(i) Maximum number of warheads per missile	1	1	3	1	1	1
(ii) Length of missile, with front section (meters)	10.61	6.40	16.49	22.77	24.30	8.0
(iii) Length of						
1st stage (meters)	3.68	—	8.58	18.60	21.62	—
2nd stage (meters)	2.47	—	4.60	—	—	—
(iv) Maximum diameter of	—	0.53	—	1.65	2.40	0.7
1st stage (meters)	1.02	—	1.79	—	—	—
2nd stage (meters)	1.02	—	1.47	—	—	—
(v) Weight of GLBM, in metric tons (without front section; for liquid-fueled missiles, empty weight)	6.78	—	—	3.35	4.99	—
1st stage	4.15	—	26.63	—	—	—
2nd stage	2.63	—	8.63	—	—	—
Missile in canister	—	—	42.70	—	—	—
(vi) Weight of assembled GLCM, in metric tons (with fuel)						
In canister	—	1.71	—	—	—	2.0
Without canister	—	1.47	—	—	—	1.7
<b>(b) Launcher Characteristics:</b>						
(i) Dimensions (maximum length, width, height in meters)	9.60 2.49 2.86	10.64 2.44 2.64	16.81 3.20 2.94	3.02 3.02 3.27	— — —	12.8 3.0 3.8
(ii) Maximum number of missiles each launcher is capable of carrying or containing at one time	1	4	1	1	—	6
(iii) Weight (in metric tons)	12.04	14.30	40.25	6.90	—	29.1
<b>(c) Characteristics of Support Structures Associated With Such Missiles and Launchers</b>						
Dimensions of support structures are as follows (maximum length, width, height in meters):						
(i) Fixed structure for a launcher	—	—	27.70 9.07 6.82	—	—	—
(ii) Launch pad shelter	74.00 14.60 10.00	—	—	—	—	—
<b>(d) Characteristics of Support Equipment Associated With Such Missiles and Launchers</b>						
Dimensions of support equipment are as follows (maximum length, width, height in meters):						
(i) Launch canister (Diameter)	— —	6.94 0.53	19.32 2.14	— —	— —	8.3: 0.6.

	P-11	BGM-109G	SS-20	SS-4	SS-5	SSC-X-1
(ii) Missile transporter vehicle (number of missiles per vehicle)	—	—	17.33 3.20 2.90 (1)	22.85 2.72 2.50 (1)	—	—
(iii) Missile erector	—	—	—	15.62 3.15 3.76	—	—
(iv) Propellant tank (Transportable)	—	—	—	11.38	—	—
Fuel	—	—	—	2.63 2.96	—	—
Oxidizer	—	—	—	10.70 2.63 3.35	—	—

Pershing IA                      Pershing IB                      SS-12                      SS-23

**Shorter-Range Missiles**

**a) Missile Characteristics:**

(i) Maximum number of warheads per missile	1	1	1	1
(ii) Length of missile, with front section (meters)	10.55	8.13	12.38	7.52
(iii) Length of				
1st stage (meters)	2.83	3.68	4.38	5.17
2nd stage (meters)	2.67	—	5.37	—
(iv) Maximum diameter of				
1st stage (meters)	1.02	1.02	1.01	0.97
2nd stage (meters)	1.02	—	1.01	—
(v) Weight of GLBM, in metric tons (without front section)	4.09	4.15	8.80	3.99
1st stage	2.45	—	4.16	—
2nd stage	1.64	—	4.64	—

**(b) Launcher Characteristics:**

(i) Dimensions (maximum length, width, height in meters)	9.98 2.44 3.35	9.60 2.49 2.86	13.26 3.10 3.45	11.76 3.13 3.00
(ii) Maximum number of missiles each launcher is capable of carrying or containing at one time	1	1	1	1
(iii) Weight (in metric tons)	8.53	12.04	30.80	24.07

**(c) Characteristics of Support Equipment Associated With Such Missiles and Launchers:**

Dimensions of support equipment are as follows (maximum length, width, height in meters):

Missile transporter vehicle (number of missiles per vehicle)	—	—	13.15 3.10 3.50 (1)	11.80 3.13 3.00 (1)
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## VII. Research and Development Booster Systems

Following are the numbers and locations for each Party of launchers of research and development booster systems.

	Number of Launchers
<b>1. Research and Development Launch Sites</b>	
<b>(a) UNITED STATES OF AMERICA</b>	
Eastern Test Range, Florida 28 27 N 080 42 W	1
Eglin AFB, Florida 30 36 N 086 48 W	5
White Sands Missile Range, New Mexico 32 30 N 106 30 W	4
Green River, Utah 38 00 N 109 30 W	2
Poker Flats Research Range, Alaska 65 07 N 147 29 W	6
Roi Namur, Kwajalein 09 25 N 167 28 E	3
Barking Sands, Kauai, Hawaii 22 06 N 159 47 W	4
Western Test Range, California 34 37 N 120 37 W	1
Cape Cod, Massachusetts 42 01 N 070 07 W	1
Wake Island 19 18 N 166 37 E	2
Wallops Island, Virginia 37 51 N 075 28 W	1
<b>(b) UNION OF SOVIET SOCIALIST REPUBLICS</b>	
Plesetskaya 62 53 N 040 52 E	3
Kapustin Yar 48 32 N 046 18 E	2

Each Party, in signing this Memorandum of Understanding, acknowledges it is responsible for the accuracy of only its own data. Signature of this Memorandum of Understanding constitutes acceptance of the categories of data and inclusion of the data contained herein.

This Memorandum of Understanding is an integral part of the Treaty. It shall enter into force on the date of entry into force of the Treaty and shall remain in force so long as the Treaty remains in force.

DONE at Washington on December 8, 1987, in two copies, each in the English and Russian languages, both texts being equally authentic.

FOR THE UNITED STATES OF  
AMERICA

RONALD REAGAN

President of the United States  
of America

FOR THE UNION OF SOVIET  
SOCIALIST REPUBLICS

M. GORBACHEV

General Secretary of the  
Central Committee of the CPSU

## Protocol on Procedures Governing the Elimination of the Missile Systems Subject to the Treaty Between the United States of America and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics on the Elimination of Their Intermediate-Range and Shorter-Range Missiles

Pursuant to and in implementation of the Treaty Between the United States of America and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics on the Elimination of Their Intermediate-Range and Shorter-Range Missiles of December 8, 1987, hereinafter referred to as the Treaty, the Parties hereby agree upon procedures governing the elimination of the missile systems subject to the Treaty.

### I. Items of Missile Systems Subject to Elimination

The specific items for each type of missile system to be eliminated are:

1. For the United States of America:
  - Pershing II:** missile, launcher and launch pad shelter;
  - BGM-109G:** missile, launch canister and launcher;
  - Pershing IA:** missile and launcher; and
  - Pershing IB:** missile.
2. For the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics:
  - SS-20:** missile, launch canister, launcher, missile transporter vehicle and fixed structure for a launcher;
  - SS-4:** missile, missile transporter vehicle, missile erector, launch stand and propellant tanks;
  - SS-5:** missile;
  - SSC-X-4:** missile, launch canister and launcher;
  - SS-12:** missile, launcher and missile transporter vehicle; and
  - SS-23:** missile, launcher and missile transporter vehicle.
3. For both Parties, all training missiles, training missile stages, training launch canisters and training launchers shall be subject to elimination.

4. For both Parties, all stages of intermediate-range and shorter-range GLBMs shall be subject to elimination.

5. For both Parties, all front sections of deployed intermediate-range and shorter-range missiles shall be subject to elimination.

### II. Procedures for Elimination at Elimination Facilities

1. In order to ensure the reliable determination of the type and number of missiles, missile stages, front sections, launch canisters, launchers, missile transporter vehicles, missile erectors and launch stands, as well as training missiles, training missile stages, training launch canisters and training launchers, indicated in Section I of this Protocol, being eliminated at elimination facilities, and to preclude the possibility of restoration of such items for purposes inconsistent with the provisions of the Treaty, the Parties shall fulfill the requirements below.

2. The conduct of the elimination procedures for the items of missile systems listed in paragraph 1 of this Section, except for training missiles, training missile stages, training launch canisters and training launchers, shall be subject to on-site inspection in accordance with Article XI of the Treaty and the Protocol on Inspection. The Parties shall have the right to conduct on-site inspections to confirm the completion of the elimination procedures set forth in paragraph 11 of this Section for training missiles, training missile stages, training launch canisters and training launchers. The Party possessing such a training missile, training missile stage, training launch canister or training launcher shall inform the other Party of the

name and coordinates of the elimination facility at which the on-site inspection may be conducted as well as the date on which it may be conducted. Such information shall be provided not less than 30 days in advance of that date.

3. Prior to a missile's arrival at an elimination facility, its nuclear warhead device and guidance elements may be removed.

4. Each Party shall select the particular technological means necessary to implement the procedures required in paragraphs 10 and 11 of this Section and to allow for on-site inspection of the conduct of the elimination procedures required in paragraph 10 of this Section in accordance with Article XI of the Treaty, this Protocol and the Protocol on Inspection.

5. The initiation of the elimination of the items of missile systems subject to this Section shall be considered to be the commencement of the procedures set forth in paragraph 10 or 11 of this Section.

6. Immediately prior to the initiation of the elimination procedures set forth in paragraph 10 of this Section, an inspector from the Party receiving the pertinent notification required by paragraph 5(c) of Article IX of the Treaty shall confirm and record the type and number of items of missile systems, listed in paragraph 1 of this Section, which are to be eliminated. If the inspecting Party deems it necessary, this shall include visual inspection of the contents of launch canisters.

7. A missile stage being eliminated by burning in accordance with the procedures set forth in paragraph 10 of this Section shall not be instrumented for data collection. Prior to the

itation of the elimination procedures set forth in paragraph 10 of this Section, an inspector from the inspecting Party shall confirm that each missile stage are not instrumented for data collection. Those missile stages shall be subject to continuous observation by such an inspector from the time of that inspection until the burning is completed.

8. The completion of the elimination procedures set forth in this Section, except those for training missiles, training missile stages, training launch canisters and training launchers, along with the type and number of items of missile systems for which those procedures have been completed, shall be confirmed in writing by the representative of the Party carrying out the elimination and the inspection team leader of the other Party. The elimination of a training missile, training missile stage, training launch canister or training launcher shall be considered to have been completed upon completion of the procedures set forth in paragraph 11 of this Section and notification as required by paragraph 5(e) of Article I of the Treaty following the date specified pursuant to paragraph 2 of this Section.

9. The Parties agree that all United States and Soviet intermediate-range and shorter-range missiles and their associated reentry vehicles shall be eliminated within an agreed overall period of elimination. It is further agreed that all such missiles shall, in fact, be eliminated fifteen days prior to the end of the overall period of elimination. During the last fifteen days, a Party shall withdraw to its national territory reentry vehicles which, by unilateral decision, have been released from existing programs of cooperation and eliminate them during the same timeframe in accordance with the procedures set forth in this Section.

10. The specific procedures for the elimination of the items of missile systems listed in paragraph 1 of this Section shall be as follows, unless the Parties agree upon different procedures to achieve the same result as the procedures identified in this paragraph:

**For the Pershing II:**

**Missile:**

(a) missile stages shall be eliminated by explosive demolition or burning;

(b) solid fuel, rocket nozzles and motor cases not destroyed in this process shall be burned, crushed, flattened or destroyed by explosion; and

(c) front section, minus nuclear warhead device and guidance elements, shall be crushed or flattened.

**Launcher:**

(a) erector-launcher mechanism shall be removed from launcher chassis;

(b) all components of erector-launcher mechanism shall be cut at locations that are not assembly joints into two pieces of approximately equal size;

(c) missile launch support equipment, including external instrumentation compartments, shall be removed from launcher chassis; and

(d) launcher chassis shall be cut at a location that is not an assembly joint into two pieces of approximately equal size.

**For the BGM-109G:**

**Missile:**

(a) missile airframe shall be cut longitudinally into two pieces;

(b) wings and tail section shall be severed from missile airframe at locations that are not assembly joints; and

(c) front section, minus nuclear warhead device and guidance elements, shall be crushed or flattened.

**Launch Canister:** launch canister shall be crushed, flattened, cut into two pieces of approximately equal size or destroyed by explosion.

**Launcher:**

(a) erector-launcher mechanism shall be removed from launcher chassis;

(b) all components of erector-launcher mechanism shall be cut at locations that are not assembly joints into two pieces of approximately equal size;

(c) missile launch support equipment, including external instrumentation compartments, shall be removed from launcher chassis; and

(d) launcher chassis shall be cut at a location that is not an assembly joint into two pieces of approximately equal size.

**For the Pershing IA:**

**Missile:**

(a) missile stages shall be eliminated by explosive demolition or burning;

(b) solid fuel, rocket nozzles and motor cases not destroyed in this process shall be burned, crushed, flattened or destroyed by explosion; and

(c) front section, minus nuclear warhead device and guidance elements, shall be crushed or flattened.

**Launcher:**

(a) erector-launcher mechanism shall be removed from launcher chassis;

(b) all components of erector-launcher mechanism shall be cut at locations that are not assembly joints into two pieces of approximately equal size;

(c) missile launch support equipment, including external instrumentation compartments, shall be removed from launcher chassis; and

(d) launcher chassis shall be cut at a location that is not an assembly joint into two pieces of approximately equal size.

**For the Pershing IB:**

**Missile:**

(a) missile stage shall be eliminated by explosive demolition or burning;

(b) solid fuel, rocket nozzle and motor case not destroyed in this process shall be burned, crushed, flattened or destroyed by explosion; and

(c) front section, minus nuclear warhead device and guidance elements, shall be crushed or flattened.

**For the SS-20:**

**Missile:**

(a) missile shall be eliminated by explosive demolition of the missile in its launch canister or by burning missile stages;

(b) solid fuel, rocket nozzles and motor cases not destroyed in this process shall be burned, crushed, flattened or destroyed by explosion; and

(c) front section, including reentry vehicles, minus nuclear warhead devices, and instrumentation compartment, minus guidance elements, shall be crushed or flattened.

**Launch Canister:** launch canister shall be destroyed by explosive demolition together with a missile, or shall be destroyed separately by explosion, cut into two pieces of approximately equal size, crushed or flattened.

**Launcher:**

(a) erector-launcher mechanism shall be removed from launcher chassis;

(b) all components of erector-launcher mechanism shall be cut at locations that are not assembly joints into two pieces of approximately equal size;

(c) missile launch support equipment, including external instrumentation compartments, shall be removed from launcher chassis;

(d) mountings of erector-launcher mechanism and launcher leveling supports shall be cut off launcher chassis;

(e) launcher leveling supports shall be cut at locations that are not assembly joints into two pieces of approximately equal size; and

(f) a portion of the launcher chassis, at least 0.78 meters in length, shall be cut off aft of the rear axle.

**Missile Transporter Vehicle:**

(a) all mechanisms associated with missile loading and mounting shall be removed from transporter vehicle chassis;

(b) all mountings of such mechanisms shall be cut off transporter vehicle chassis;

(c) all components of the mechanisms associated with missile loading and mounting shall be cut at locations that are not assembly joints into two pieces of approximately equal size;

(d) external instrumentation compartments shall be removed from transporter vehicle chassis;

(e) transporter vehicle leveling supports shall be cut off transporter vehicle chassis and cut at locations that are not assembly joints into two pieces of approximately equal size; and

(f) a portion of the transporter vehicle chassis, at least 0.78 meters in length, shall be cut off aft of the rear axle.

**For the SS-1:**

**Missile:**

(a) nozzles of propulsion system shall be cut off at locations that are not assembly joints;

(b) all propellant tanks shall be cut into two pieces of approximately equal size;

(c) instrumentation compartment, minus guidance elements, shall be cut into two pieces of approximately equal size; and

(d) front section, minus nuclear warhead device, shall be crushed or flattened.

**Launch Stand:** launch stand components shall be cut at locations that are not assembly joints into two pieces of approximately equal size.

**Missile Erector:**

(a) jib, missile erector leveling supports and missile erector mechanism shall be cut off missile erector at locations that are not assembly joints; and

(b) jib and missile erector leveling supports shall be cut into two pieces of approximately equal size.

**Missile Transporter Vehicle:** mounting components for a missile and for a missile erector mechanism as well as supports for erecting a missile onto a launcher shall be cut off transporter vehicle at locations that are not assembly joints.

**For the SS-5:**

**Missile:**

(a) nozzles of propulsion system shall be cut off at locations that are not assembly joints;

(b) all propellant tanks shall be cut into two pieces of approximately equal size; and

(c) instrumentation compartment, minus guidance elements, shall be cut into two pieces of approximately equal size.

**For the SSC-X-4:**

**Missile:**

(a) missile airframe shall be cut longitudinally into two pieces;

(b) wings and tail section shall be severed from missile airframe at locations that are not assembly joint and

(c) front section, minus nuclear warhead device and guidance elements, shall be crushed or flattened.

**Launch Canister:** launch canister shall be crushed, flattened, and cut into two pieces of approximately equal size or destroyed by explosion.

**Launcher:**

(a) erector-launcher mechanism shall be removed from launcher chassis;

(b) all components of erector-launcher mechanism shall be cut at locations that are not assembly joints into two pieces of approximately equal size;

(c) missile launch support equipment, including external instrumentation compartments, shall be removed from launcher chassis;

(d) mountings of erector-launcher mechanism and launcher leveling supports shall be cut off launcher chassis;

(e) launcher leveling supports shall be cut at locations that are not assembly joints into two pieces of approximately equal size; and

(f) the launcher chassis shall be severed at a location determined measuring no more than 0.70 meters rearward from the rear axle.

**For the SS-12:**

**Missile:**

(a) missile shall be eliminated by explosive demolition or by burning missile stages;

(b) solid fuel, rocket nozzles and motor cases not destroyed in this process shall be burned, crushed, flattened or destroyed by explosion; and

(c) front section, minus nuclear warhead device, and instrumentation compartment, minus guidance elements, shall be crushed, flattened or destroyed by explosive demolition together with a missile.



**Launcher:**

- (a) erector-launcher mechanism shall be removed from launcher chassis;
- (b) all components of erector-launcher mechanism shall be cut at locations that are not assembly joints to two pieces of approximately equal size;
- (c) missile launch support equipment, including external instrumentation compartments, shall be removed from launcher chassis;
- (d) mountings of erector-launcher mechanism and launcher leveling supports shall be cut off launcher chassis;
- (e) launcher leveling supports shall be cut at locations that are not assembly joints into two pieces of approximately equal size; and
- (f) a portion of the launcher chassis, at least 1.10 meters in length, shall be cut off aft of the rear axle.

**Missile Transporter Vehicle:**

- (a) all mechanisms associated with missile loading and mounting shall be removed from transporter vehicle chassis;
- (b) all mountings of such mechanisms shall be cut off transporter vehicle chassis;
- (c) all components of the mechanisms associated with missile loading and mounting shall be cut at locations that are not assembly joints to two pieces of approximately equal size;
- (d) external instrumentation compartments shall be removed from transporter vehicle chassis;
- (e) transporter vehicle leveling supports shall be cut off transporter vehicle chassis and cut at locations that are not assembly joints into two pieces of approximately equal size; and
- (f) a portion of the transporter vehicle chassis, at least 1.10 meters in length, shall be cut off aft of the rear axle.

**For the SS-23:****Missile:**

- (a) missile shall be eliminated by explosive demolition or by burning the missile stage;
- (b) solid fuel, rocket nozzle and motor case not destroyed in this process shall be burned, crushed, flattened or destroyed by explosion; and

(c) front section, minus nuclear warhead device, and instrumentation compartment, minus guidance elements, shall be crushed, flattened, or destroyed by explosive demolition together with a missile.

**Launcher:**

- (a) erector-launcher mechanism shall be removed from launcher body;
- (b) all components of erector-launcher mechanism shall be cut at locations that are not assembly joints into two pieces of approximately equal size;
- (c) missile launch support equipment shall be removed from launcher body;
- (d) mountings of erector-launcher mechanism and launcher leveling supports shall be cut off launcher body;
- (e) launcher leveling supports shall be cut at locations that are not assembly joints into two pieces of approximately equal size;
- (f) each environmental cover of the launcher body shall be removed and cut into two pieces of approximately equal size; and
- (g) a portion of the launcher body, at least 0.85 meters in length, shall be cut off aft of the rear axle.

**Missile Transporter Vehicle:**

- (a) all mechanisms associated with missile loading and mounting shall be removed from transporter vehicle body;
- (b) all mountings of such mechanisms shall be cut off transporter vehicle body;
- (c) all components of mechanisms associated with missile loading and mounting shall be cut at locations that are not assembly joints into two pieces of approximately equal size;
- (d) control equipment of the mechanism associated with missile loading shall be removed from transporter vehicle body;
- (e) transporter vehicle leveling supports shall be cut off transporter vehicle body and cut at locations that are not assembly joints into two pieces of approximately equal size; and
- (f) a portion of the transporter vehicle body, at least 0.85 meters in length, shall be cut off aft of the rear axle.

11. The specific procedures for the elimination of the training missiles, training missile stages, training launch canisters and training launchers indicated in paragraph 1 of this Section shall be as follows:

**Training Missile and Training Missile Stage:** training missile and training missile stage shall be crushed, flattened, cut into two pieces of approximately equal size or destroyed by explosion.

**Training Launch Canister:** training launch canister shall be crushed, flattened, cut into two pieces of approximately equal size or destroyed by explosion.

**Training Launcher:** training launcher chassis shall be cut at the same location designated in paragraph 10 of this Section for launcher of the same type of missile.

**III. Elimination of Missiles by Means of Launching**

1. Elimination of missiles by means of launching pursuant to paragraph 5 of Article X of the Treaty shall be subject to on-site inspection in accordance with paragraph 7 of Article XI of the Treaty and the Protocol on Inspection. Immediately prior to each launch conducted for the purpose of elimination, an inspector from the inspecting Party shall confirm by visual observation the type of the missile to be launched.

2. All missiles being eliminated by means of launching shall be launched from designated elimination facilities to existing impact areas for such missiles. No such missile shall be used as a target vehicle for a ballistic missile interceptor.

3. Missiles being eliminated by means of launching shall be launched one at a time, and no less than six hours shall elapse between such launches.

4. Such launches shall involve ignition of all missile stages. Neither Party shall transmit or recover data from missiles being eliminated by means of launching except for unencrypted data used for range safety purposes.

5. The completion of the elimination procedures set forth in this Section, and the type and number of missiles for which those procedures have been completed, shall be confirmed in writing by the representative of the Party carrying out the elimination and by the inspection team leader of the other Party.

6. A missile shall be considered to be eliminated by means of launching after completion of the procedures set forth in this Section and upon notification required by paragraph 5(e) of Article IX of the Treaty.

#### IV. Procedures for Elimination *In Situ*

##### 1. Support Structures

(a) Support structures listed in Section I of this Protocol shall be eliminated *in situ*.

(b) The initiation of the elimination of support structures shall be considered to be the commencement of the elimination procedures required in paragraph 1(d) of this Section.

(c) The elimination of support structures shall be subject to verification by on-site inspection in accordance with paragraph 4 of Article XI of the Treaty.

(d) The specific elimination procedures for support structures shall be as follows:

(i) the superstructure of the fixed structure or shelter shall be dismantled or demolished, and removed from its base or foundation;

(ii) the base or foundation of the fixed structure or shelter shall be destroyed by excavation or explosion;

(iii) the destroyed base or foundation of a fixed structure or shelter shall remain visible to national technical means of verification for six months or until completion of an on-site inspection conducted in accordance with Article XI of the Treaty; and

(iv) upon completion of the above requirements, the elimination procedures shall be considered to have been completed.

##### 2. Propellant Tanks for SS-4 Missiles

Fixed and transportable propellant tanks for SS-4 missiles shall be removed from launch sites.

#### 3. Training Missiles, Training Missile Stages, Training Launch Canisters and Training Launchers

(a) Training missiles, training missile stages, training launch canisters and training launchers not eliminated at elimination facilities shall be eliminated *in situ*.

(b) Training missiles, training missile stages, training launch canisters and training launchers being eliminated *in situ* shall be eliminated in accordance with the specific procedures set forth in paragraph 11 of Section II of this Protocol.

(c) Each Party shall have the right to conduct an on-site inspection to confirm the completion of the elimination procedures for training missiles, training missile stages, training launch canisters and training launchers.

(d) The Party possessing such a training missile, training missile stage, training launch canister or training launcher shall inform the other Party of the place-name and coordinates of the location at which the on-site inspection provided for in paragraph 3(c) of this Section may be conducted as well as the date on which it may be conducted. Such information shall be provided no less than 30 days in advance of that date.

(e) Elimination of a training missile, training missile stage, training launch canister or training launcher shall be considered to have been completed upon the completion of the procedures required by this paragraph and upon notification as required by paragraph 5(e) of Article IX of the Treaty following the date specified pursuant to paragraph 3(d) of this Section.

#### V. Other Types of Elimination

##### 1. Loss or Accidental Destruction

(a) If an item listed in Section I of this Protocol is lost or destroyed as a result of an accident, the possessing Party shall notify the other Party within 48 hours, as required in paragraph 5(e) of Article IX of the Treaty, that the item has been eliminated.

(b) Such notification shall include the type of the eliminated item,

its approximate or assumed location and the circumstances related to the loss or accidental destruction.

(c) In such a case, the other Party shall have the right to conduct an inspection of the specific point at which the accident occurred to prove confidence that the item has been eliminated.

##### 2. Static Display

(a) The Parties shall have the right to eliminate missiles, launch canisters and launchers, as well as training missiles, training launch canisters and training launchers, listed in Section I of this Protocol by placing them on static display. Each Party shall be limited to a total of 15 missiles, 15 launch canisters and 15 launchers on such static display.

(b) Prior to being placed on static display, a missile, launch canister or launcher shall be rendered unusable for purposes inconsistent with the Treaty. Missile propellant shall be removed and erector-launcher mechanisms shall be rendered inoperative.

(c) The Party possessing a missile, launch canister or launcher as well as a training missile, training launch canister or training launcher that is to be eliminated by placing it on static display shall provide the other Party with the place-name and coordinates of the location at which such a missile, launch canister or launcher is to be on static display, as well as the location at which the on-site inspection provided for in paragraph 2(d) of this Section, may take place.

(d) Each Party shall have the right to conduct an on-site inspection of such a missile, launch canister or launcher within 60 days of receipt of the notification required in paragraph 2(c) of this Section.

(e) Elimination of a missile, launch canister or launcher, as well as a training missile, training launch canister or training launcher, by placing it on static display shall be considered to have been completed upon completion of the procedures required by this paragraph and notification as required by paragraph 5(e) of Article IX of the Treaty.

This Protocol is an integral part of the Treaty. It shall enter into force on the date of the entry into force of the Treaty and shall remain in force so long as the Treaty remains in force. As provided for in paragraph 1(b) of Article XIII of the Treaty, the Parties may agree upon such measures as may be necessary to improve the viability

and effectiveness of this Protocol. Such measures shall not be deemed amendments to the Treaty.

DONE at Washington on December 8, 1987, in two copies, each in the English and Russian languages, both texts being equally authentic.

FOR THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA

RONALD REAGAN

President of the United States of America

FOR THE UNION OF SOVIET SOCIALIST REPUBLICS

M. GORBACHEV

General Secretary of the Central Committee of the CPSU

## Protocol Regarding Inspections Relating to the Treaty Between the United States of America and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics on the Elimination of Their Intermediate-Range and Shorter-Range Missiles

Pursuant to and in implementation of the Treaty Between the United States of America and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics on the Elimination of Their Intermediate-Range and Shorter-Range Missiles of December 8, 1987, hereinafter referred to as the Treaty, the Parties hereby agree upon procedures governing the conduct of inspections provided for in Article XI of the Treaty.

### I. Definitions

For the purposes of this Protocol, the Treaty, the Memorandum of Understanding and the Protocol on Elimination:

1. The term "inspected Party" means the Party to the Treaty whose sites are subject to inspection as provided for by Article XI of the Treaty.

2. The term "inspecting Party" means the Party to the Treaty carrying out an inspection.

3. The term "inspector" means an individual designated by one of the Parties to carry out inspections and included on that Party's list of inspectors in accordance with the provisions of Section III of this Protocol.

4. The term "inspection team" means the group of inspectors assigned by the inspecting Party to conduct a particular inspection.

5. The term "inspection site" means an area, location or facility at which an inspection is carried out.

6. The term "period of inspection" means the period of time from arrival of the inspection team at the inspection site until its departure from the inspection site, exclusive of time spent on any pre- and post-inspection procedures.

7. The term "point of entry" means: Washington, D.C., or San Francisco, California, the United States of America; Brussels (National Airport), The Kingdom of Belgium; Frankfurt (Rhein Main Airbase), The Federal Republic of Germany; Rome (Ciampino), The Republic of Italy; Schiphol, The Kingdom of the Netherlands; RAF Greenham Common, The United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland; Moscow, or Irkutsk, the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics; Schkeuditz Airport, the German Democratic Republic; and International Airport Ruzynye, the Czechoslovak Socialist Republic.

8. The term "in-country period" means the period from the arrival of the inspection team at the point of entry until its departure from the country through the point of entry.

9. The term "in-country escort" means individuals specified by the inspected Party to accompany and assist inspectors and aircrew members as necessary throughout the in-country period.

10. The term "aircrew member" means an individual who performs duties related to the operation of an airplane and who is included on a Party's list of aircrew members in accordance with the provisions of Section III of this Protocol.

### II. General Obligations

1. For the purpose of ensuring verification of compliance with the provisions of the Treaty, each Party shall facilitate inspection by the other Party pursuant to this Protocol.

2. Each Party takes note of the assurances received from the other Party regarding understandings reached between the other Party and the basing countries to the effect that

the basing countries have agreed to the conduct of inspections, in accordance with the provisions of this Protocol, of their territories.

### III. Pre-Inspection Requirements

1. Inspections to ensure verification of compliance by the Parties with the obligations assumed under the Treaty shall be carried out by inspectors designated in accordance with paragraphs 3 and 4 of this Section.

2. No later than one day after entry into force of the Treaty, each Party shall provide to the other Party a list of its proposed aircrew members, a list of its proposed inspectors who will carry out inspections pursuant to paragraphs 3, 4, 5, 7 and 8 of Article XI of the Treaty; and a list of its proposed inspectors who will carry out inspection activities pursuant to paragraph 6 of Article XI of the Treaty. None of these lists shall contain at any time more than 200 individuals.

3. Each Party shall review the list of inspectors and aircrew members proposed by the other Party. With respect to an individual included on the list of proposed inspectors who will carry out inspection activities pursuant to paragraph 6 of Article XI of the Treaty, if such an individual is unacceptable to the Party reviewing the list, that Party shall, within 20 days, so inform the Party providing the list, and the individual shall be deemed not accepted and shall be deleted from the list. With respect to an individual on the list of proposed aircrew members or the list of proposed inspectors who will carry out inspections pursuant to paragraphs 3, 4, 5, 7 and 8 of Article XI of the Treaty, each Party, within 20 days after the receipt of such lists, shall inform the other Party of its agreement to the

esignation of each inspector and  
ircrew member proposed. Inspectors  
shall be citizens of the inspecting  
arty.

4. Each Party shall have the right  
o amend its lists of inspectors and  
ircrew members. New inspectors and  
ircrew members shall be designated in  
the same manner as set forth in  
aragraph 3 of this Section with  
espect to initial lists.

5. Within 30 days of receipt of the  
nitial lists of inspectors and aircrew  
members, or of subsequent changes  
ereeto, the Party receiving such  
nformation shall provide, or shall  
nsure the provision of, such visas and  
ther documents to each individual to  
hom it has agreed as may be required  
o ensure that each inspector or  
ircrew member may enter and remain  
n the territory of the Party or basing  
ountry in which an inspection site is  
ocated throughout the in-country  
eriod for the purpose of carrying out  
nspection activities in accordance with  
ne provisions of this Protocol. Such  
isas and documents shall be valid for  
period of at least 24 months.

6. To exercise their functions  
ffectively, inspectors and aircrew  
members shall be accorded, throughout  
ne in-country period, privileges and  
mmunities in the country of the  
nspection site as set forth in the  
nnex to this Protocol.

7. Without prejudice to their  
rileges and immunities, inspectors  
nd aircrew members shall be obliged  
o respect the laws and regulations of  
he State on whose territory an  
nspection is carried out and shall be  
bliged not to interfere in the internal  
ffairs of that State. In the event the  
nspected Party determines that an  
nspector or aircrew member of the  
ther Party has violated the conditions  
overning inspection activities set forth  
n this Protocol, or has ever committed  
criminal offense on the territory of  
he inspected Party or a basing  
ountry, or has ever been sentenced for  
ommitting a criminal offense or  
xpelled by the inspected Party or a  
basing country, the inspected Party  
naking such a determination shall so  
otify the inspecting Party, which shall  
mmediately strike the individual from  
he lists of inspectors or the list of  
ircrew members. If, at that time, the  
individual is on the territory of the  
nspected Party or a basing country,  
he inspecting Party shall immediately  
remove that individual from the  
ountry.

8. Within 30 days after entry into  
force of the Treaty, each Party shall  
inform the other Party of the standing  
diplomatic clearance number for  
airplanes of the Party transporting  
inspectors and equipment necessary for  
inspection into and out of the territory  
of the Party or basing country in which  
an inspection site is located. Aircraft  
routings to and from the designated  
point of entry shall be along  
established international airways that  
are agreed upon by the Parties as the  
basis for such diplomatic clearance.

#### IV. Notifications

1. Notification of an intention to  
conduct an inspection shall be made  
through the Nuclear Risk Reduction  
Centers. The receipt of this notification  
shall be acknowledged through the  
Nuclear Risk Reduction Centers by the  
inspected Party within one hour of its  
receipt:

(a) For inspections conducted  
pursuant to paragraphs 3, 4 or 5 of  
Article XI of the Treaty, such  
notifications shall be made no less than  
16 hours in advance of the estimated  
time of arrival of the inspection team  
at the point of entry and shall include:

- (i) the point of entry;
- (ii) the date and estimated  
time of arrival at the point of entry;
- (iii) the date and time when  
the specification of the inspection site  
will be provided; and
- (iv) the names of inspectors  
and aircrew members.

(b) For inspections conducted  
pursuant to paragraphs 7 or 8 of  
Article XI of the Treaty, such  
notifications shall be made no less than  
72 hours in advance of the estimated  
time of arrival of the inspection team  
at the point of entry and shall include:

- (i) the point of entry;
- (ii) the date and estimated  
time of arrival at the point of entry;
- (iii) the site to be inspected  
and the type of inspection; and
- (iv) the names of inspectors  
and aircrew members.

2. The date and time of the  
specification of the inspection site as  
notified pursuant to paragraph 1(a) of  
this Section shall fall within the  
following time intervals:

(a) for inspections conducted  
pursuant to paragraphs 4 or 5 of  
Article XI of the Treaty, neither less

than four hours nor more than 24  
hours after the estimated date and  
time of arrival at the point of entry;  
and

(b) for inspections conducted  
pursuant to paragraph 3 of Article XI  
of the Treaty, neither less than four  
hours nor more than 48 hours after the  
estimated date and time of arrival at  
the point of entry.

3. The inspecting Party shall  
provide the inspected Party with a  
flight plan, through the Nuclear Risk  
Reduction Centers, for its flight from  
the last airfield prior to entering the  
air space of the country in which the  
inspection site is located to the point of  
entry, no less than six hours before the  
scheduled departure time from that  
airfield. Such a plan shall be filed in  
accordance with the procedures of the  
International Civil Aviation  
Organization applicable to civil  
aircraft. The inspecting Party shall  
include in the remarks section of each  
flight plan the standing diplomatic  
clearance number and the notation:  
"Inspection aircraft. Priority clearance  
processing required."

4. No less than three hours prior to  
the scheduled departure of the  
inspection team from the last airfield  
prior to entering the airspace of the  
country in which the inspection is to  
take place, the inspected Party shall  
ensure that the flight plan filed in  
accordance with paragraph 3 of this  
Section is approved so that the  
inspection team may arrive at the  
point of entry by the estimated arrival  
time.

5. Either Party may change the  
point or points of entry to the  
territories of the countries within  
which its deployment areas, missile  
operating bases or missile support  
facilities are located, by giving notice of  
such change to the other Party. A  
change in a point of entry shall become  
effective five months after receipt of  
such notification by the other Party.

#### V. Activities Beginning Upon Arrival at the Point of Entry

1. The in-country escort and a  
diplomatic aircrew escort accredited to  
the Government of either the inspected  
Party or the basing country in which  
the inspection site is located shall meet  
the inspection team and aircrew  
members at the point of entry as soon  
as the airplane of the inspecting Party  
lands. The number of aircrew members  
for each airplane shall not exceed ten.

The in-country escort shall expedite the entry of the inspection team and aircrew, their baggage, and equipment and supplies necessary for inspection, into the country in which the inspection site is located. A diplomatic aircrew escort shall have the right to accompany and assist aircrew members throughout the in-country period. In the case of an inspection taking place on the territory of a basing country, the in-country escort may include representatives of that basing country.

2. An inspector shall be considered to have assumed his duties upon arrival at the point of entry on the territory of the inspected Party or a basing country, and shall be considered to have ceased performing those duties when he has left the territory of the inspected Party or basing country.

3. Each Party shall ensure that equipment and supplies are exempt from all customs duties.

4. Equipment and supplies which the inspecting Party brings into the country in which an inspection site is located shall be subject to examination at the point of entry each time they are brought into that country. This examination shall be completed prior to the departure of the inspection team from the point of entry to conduct an inspection. Such equipment and supplies shall be examined by the in-country escort in the presence of the inspection team members to ascertain to the satisfaction of each Party that the equipment and supplies cannot perform functions unconnected with the inspection requirements of the Treaty. If it is established upon examination that the equipment or supplies are unconnected with these inspection requirements, then they shall not be cleared for use and shall be impounded at the point of entry until the departure of the inspection team from the country where the inspection is conducted. Storage of the inspecting Party's equipment and supplies at each point of entry shall be within tamper-proof containers within a secure facility. Access to each secure facility shall be controlled by a "dual key" system requiring the presence of both Parties to gain access to the equipment and supplies.

5. Throughout the in-country period, the inspected Party shall provide, or arrange for the provision of, meals, lodging, work space,

transportation and, as necessary, medical care for the inspection team and aircrew of the inspecting Party. All the costs in connection with the stay of inspectors carrying out inspection activities pursuant to paragraph 6 of Article XI of the Treaty, on the territory of the inspected Party, including meals, services, lodging, work space, transportation and medical care shall be borne by the inspecting Party.

6. The inspected Party shall provide parking, security protection, servicing and fuel for the airplane of the inspecting Party at the point of entry. The inspecting Party shall bear the cost of such fuel and servicing.

7. For inspections conducted on the territory of the Parties, the inspection team shall enter at the point of entry on the territory of the inspected Party that is closest to the inspection site. In the case of inspections carried out in accordance with paragraphs 3, 4 or 5 of Article XI of the Treaty, the inspection team leader shall, at or before the time notified pursuant to paragraph 1(a)(iii) of Section IV of this Protocol, inform the inspected Party at the point of entry through the in-country escort of the type of inspection and the inspection site, by place-name and geographic coordinates.

## VI. General Rules for Conducting Inspections

1. Inspectors shall discharge their functions in accordance with this Protocol.

2. Inspectors shall not disclose information received during inspections except with the express permission of the inspecting Party. They shall remain bound by this obligation after their assignment as inspectors has ended.

3. In discharging their functions, inspectors shall not interfere directly with on-going activities at the inspection site and shall avoid unnecessarily hampering or delaying the operation of a facility or taking actions affecting its safe operation.

4. Inspections shall be conducted in accordance with the objectives set forth in Article XI of the Treaty as applicable for the type of inspection specified by the inspecting Party under paragraph 1(b) of Section IV or paragraph 7 of Section V of this Protocol.

5. The in-country escort shall have the right to accompany and assist inspectors and aircrew members as considered necessary by the inspected Party throughout the in-country period. Except as otherwise provided in this Protocol, the movement and travel of inspectors and aircrew members shall be at the discretion of the in-country escort.

6. Inspectors carrying out inspection activities pursuant to paragraph 6 of Article XI of the Treaty shall be allowed to travel within 50 kilometers from the inspection site with the permission of the in-country escort, and as considered necessary by the inspected Party, shall be accompanied by the in-country escort. Such travel shall be taken solely as a leisure activity.

7. Inspectors shall have the right throughout the period of inspection to be in communication with the embassy of the inspecting Party located within the territory of the country where the inspection is taking place using the telephone communications provided by the inspected Party.

8. At the inspection site, representatives of the inspected facility shall be included among the in-country escort.

9. The inspection team may bring onto the inspection site such document as needed to conduct the inspection, as well as linear measurement devices; cameras; portable weighing devices; radiation detection devices; and other equipment, as agreed by the Parties. The characteristics and method of use of the equipment listed above, shall also be agreed upon within 30 days after entry into force of the Treaty. During inspections conducted pursuant to paragraphs 3, 4, 5(a), 7 or 8 of Article XI of the Treaty, the inspection team may use any of the equipment listed above, except for cameras, which shall be for use only by the inspected Party at the request of the inspecting Party. During inspections conducted pursuant to paragraph 5(b) of Article XI of the Treaty, all measurements shall be made by the inspected Party at the request of the inspecting Party. At the request of inspectors, the in-country escort shall take photographs of the inspected facilities using the inspecting Party's camera systems which are capable of producing duplicate, instant development photographic prints. Each Party shall receive one copy of every photograph.

10. For inspections conducted pursuant to paragraphs 3, 4, 5, 7 or 8 of Article XI of the Treaty, inspectors shall permit the in-country escort to observe the equipment used during the inspection by the inspection team.

11. Measurements recorded during inspections shall be certified by the signature of a member of the inspection team and a member of the in-country escort when they are taken. Such certified data shall be included in the inspection report.

12. Inspectors shall have the right to request clarifications in connection with ambiguities that arise during an inspection. Such requests shall be made promptly through the in-country escort. The in-country escort shall provide the inspection team, during the inspection, with such clarifications as may be necessary to remove the ambiguity. In the event questions relating to an object or building located within the inspection site are not resolved, the inspected Party shall photograph the object or building as requested by the inspecting Party for the purpose of clarifying its nature and function. If the ambiguity cannot be removed during the inspection, then the question, relevant clarifications and a copy of any photographs taken shall be included in the inspection report.

13. In carrying out their activities, inspectors shall observe safety regulations established at the inspection site, including those for the protection of controlled environments within a facility and for personal safety. Individual protective clothing and equipment shall be provided by the inspected Party, as necessary.

14. For inspections pursuant to paragraphs 3, 4, 5, 7 or 8 of Article XI of the Treaty, pre-inspection procedures, including briefings and safety-related activities, shall begin upon arrival of the inspection team at the inspection site and shall be completed within one hour. The inspection team shall begin the inspection immediately upon completion of the pre-inspection procedures. The period of inspection shall not exceed 24 hours, except for inspections pursuant to paragraphs 6, 7 or 8 of Article XI of the Treaty. The period of inspection may be extended, by agreement with the in-country escort, by no more than eight hours. Post-inspection procedures, which include completing the inspection

report in accordance with the provisions of Section XI of this Protocol, shall begin immediately upon completion of the inspection and shall be completed at the inspection site within four hours.

15. An inspection team conducting an inspection pursuant to Article XI of the Treaty shall include no more than ten inspectors, except for an inspection team conducting an inspection pursuant to paragraphs 7 or 8 of that Article, which shall include no more than 20 inspectors and an inspection team conducting an inspection activities pursuant to paragraph 6 of that Article, which shall include no more than 30 inspectors. At least two inspectors on each team must speak the language of the inspected Party. An inspection team shall operate under the direction of the team leader and deputy team leader. Upon arrival at the inspection site, the inspection team may divide itself into subgroups consisting of no fewer than two inspectors each. There shall be no more than one inspection team at an inspection site at any one time.

16. Except in the case of inspections conducted pursuant to paragraphs 3, 4, 7 or 8 of Article XI of the Treaty, upon completion of the post-inspection procedures, the inspection team shall return promptly to the point of entry from which it commenced inspection activities and shall then leave, within 24 hours, the territory of the country in which the inspection site is located, using its own airplane. In the case of inspections conducted pursuant to paragraphs 3, 4, 7 or 8 of Article XI of the Treaty, if the inspection team intends to conduct another inspection it shall either:

(a) notify the inspected Party of its intent upon return to the point of entry; or

(b) notify the inspected Party of the type of inspection and the inspection site upon completion of the post-inspection procedures. In this case it shall be the responsibility of the inspected Party to ensure that the inspection team reaches the next inspection site without unjustified delay. The inspected Party shall determine the means of transportation and route involved in such travel. With respect to subparagraph (a), the procedures set forth in paragraph 7 of Section V of this Protocol and paragraphs 1 and 2 of Section VII of this Protocol shall apply.

## VII. Inspections Conducted Pursuant to Paragraphs 3, 4 or 5 of Article XI of the Treaty

1. Within one hour after the time for the specification of the inspection site notified pursuant to paragraph 1(a) of Section IV of this Protocol, the inspected Party shall implement pre-inspection movement restrictions at the inspection site, which shall remain in effect until the inspection team arrives at the inspection site. During the period that pre-inspection movement restrictions are in effect, missiles, stages of such missiles, launchers or support equipment subject to the Treaty shall not be removed from the inspection site.

2. The inspected Party shall transport the inspection team from the point of entry to the inspection site so that the inspection team arrives at the inspection site no later than nine hours after the time for the specification of the inspection site notified pursuant to paragraph 1(a) of Section IV of this Protocol.

3. In the event that an inspection is conducted in a basing country, the aircrew of the inspected Party may include representatives of the basing country.

4. Neither Party shall conduct more than one inspection pursuant to paragraph 5(a) of Article XI of the Treaty at any one time, more than one inspection pursuant to paragraph 5(b) of Article XI of the Treaty at any one time, or more than 10 inspections pursuant to paragraph 3 of Article XI of the Treaty at any one time.

5. The boundaries of the inspection site at the facility to be inspected shall be the boundaries of that facility set forth in the Memorandum of Understanding.

6. Except in the case of an inspection conducted pursuant to paragraphs 4 or 5(b) of Article XI of the Treaty, upon arrival of the inspection team at the inspection site, the in-country escort shall inform the inspection team leader of the number of missiles, stages of missiles, launchers, support structures and support equipment at the site that are subject to the Treaty and provide the inspection team leader with a diagram of the inspection site indicating the location of these missiles, stages of missiles, launchers, support structures and support equipment at the inspection site.

7. Subject to the procedures of paragraphs 8 through 14 of this Section, inspectors shall have the right to inspect the entire inspection site, including the interior of structures, containers or vehicles, or including covered objects, whose dimensions are equal to or greater than the dimensions specified in Section VI of the Memorandum of Understanding for the missiles, stages of such missiles, launchers or support equipment of the inspected Party.

8. A missile, a stage of such a missile or a launcher subject to the Treaty shall be subject to inspection only by external visual observation, including measuring, as necessary, the dimensions of such a missile, stage of such a missile or launcher. A container that the inspected Party declares to contain a missile or stage of a missile subject to the Treaty, and which is not sufficiently large to be capable of containing more than one missile or stage of such a missile of the inspected Party subject to the Treaty, shall be subject to inspection only by external visual observation, including measuring, as necessary, the dimensions of such a container to confirm that it cannot contain more than one missile or stage of such a missile of the inspected Party subject to the Treaty. Except as provided for in paragraph 14 of this Section, a container that is sufficiently large to contain a missile or stage of such a missile of the inspected Party subject to the Treaty that the inspected Party declares not to contain a missile or stage of such a missile subject to the Treaty shall be subject to inspection only by means of weighing or visual observation of the interior of the container, as necessary, to confirm that it does not, in fact, contain a missile or stage of such a missile of the inspected Party subject to the Treaty. If such a container is a launch canister associated with a type of missile not subject to the Treaty, and declared by the inspected Party to contain such a missile, it shall be subject to external inspection only, including use of radiation detection devices, visual observation and linear measurement, as necessary, of the dimensions of such a canister.

9. A structure or container that is not sufficiently large to contain a missile, stage of such a missile or launcher of the inspected Party subject to the Treaty shall be subject to

inspection only by external visual observation including measuring, as necessary, the dimensions of such a structure or container to confirm that it is not sufficiently large to be capable of containing a missile, stage of such a missile or launcher of the inspected Party subject to the Treaty.

10. Within a structure, a space which is sufficiently large to contain a missile, stage of such a missile or launcher of the inspected Party subject to the Treaty, but which is demonstrated to the satisfaction of the inspection team not to be accessible by the smallest missile, stage of a missile or launcher of the inspected Party subject to the Treaty shall not be subject to further inspection. If the inspected Party demonstrates to the satisfaction of the inspection team by means of a visual inspection of the interior of an enclosed space from its entrance that the enclosed space does not contain any missile, stage of such a missile or launcher of the inspected Party subject to the Treaty, such an enclosed space shall not be subject to further inspection.

11. The inspection team shall be permitted to patrol the perimeter of the inspection site and station inspectors at the exits of the site for the duration of the inspection.

12. The inspection team shall be permitted to inspect any vehicle capable of carrying missiles, stages of such missiles, launchers or support equipment of the inspected Party subject to the Treaty at any time during the course of an inspection and no such vehicle shall leave the inspection site during the course of the inspection until inspected at site exits by the inspection team.

13. Prior to inspection of a building within the inspection site, the inspection team may station subgroups at the exits of the building that are large enough to permit passage of any missile, stage of such a missile, launcher or support equipment of the inspected Party subject to the Treaty. During the time that the building is being inspected, no vehicle or object capable of containing any missile, stage of such a missile, launcher or support equipment of the inspected Party subject to the Treaty shall be permitted to leave the building until inspected.

14. During an inspection conducted pursuant to paragraph 5(b) of Article XI of the Treaty, it shall be the responsibility of the inspected Party to demonstrate that a shrouded or

environmentally protected object which is equal to or larger than the smallest missile, stage of a missile or launcher of the inspected Party subject to the Treaty is not, in fact, a missile, stage of such a missile or launcher of the inspected Party subject to the Treaty. This may be accomplished by partial removal of the shroud or environmental protection cover, measuring, or weighing the covered object or by other methods. If the inspected Party satisfies the inspection team by its demonstration that the object is not a missile, stage of such a missile or launcher of the inspected Party subject to the Treaty, then there shall be no further inspection of that object. If the container is a launch canister associated with a type of missile not subject to the Treaty, and declared by the inspected Party to contain such a missile, then it shall be subject to external inspection only, including use of radiation detection devices, visual observation and linear measurement, as necessary, of the dimensions of such a canister.

**VIII. Inspections Conducted Pursuant to Paragraphs 7 or 8 of Article XI of the Treaty**

1. Inspections of the process of elimination of items of missile systems specified in the Protocol on Elimination carried out pursuant to paragraph 7 of Article XI of the Treaty shall be conducted in accordance with the procedures set forth in this paragraph and the Protocol on Elimination:

(a) Upon arrival at the elimination facility, inspectors shall be provided with a schedule of elimination activities.

(b) Inspectors shall check the data which are specified in the notification provided by the inspected Party regarding the number and type of items of missile systems to be eliminated against the number and type of such items which are at the elimination facility prior to the initiation of the elimination procedures.

(c) Subject to paragraphs 3 and 11 of Section VI of this Protocol, inspectors shall observe the execution of the specific procedures for the elimination of the items of missile systems as provided for in the Protocol on Elimination. If any deviations from the agreed elimination procedures are found, the inspectors shall have the right to call the attention of the in-



country escort to the need for strict compliance with the above-mentioned procedures. The completion of such procedures shall be confirmed in accordance with the procedures specified in the Protocol on Elimination.

(d) During the elimination of missiles by means of launching, the inspectors shall have the right to ascertain by visual observation that a missile prepared for launch is a missile of the type subject to elimination. The inspectors shall also be allowed to observe such a missile from a safe location specified by the inspected Party until the completion of its launch. During the inspection of a series of launches for the elimination of missiles by means of launching, the inspected Party shall determine the means of transport and route for the transportation of inspectors between inspection sites.

2. Inspections of the elimination of items of missile systems specified in the Protocol on Elimination carried out pursuant to paragraph 8 of Article XI of the Treaty shall be conducted in accordance with the procedures set forth in Sections II, IV or V of the Protocol on Elimination or as otherwise agreed by the Parties.

#### IX. Inspection Activities Conducted Pursuant to Paragraph 6 of Article XI of the Treaty

1. The inspected Party shall maintain an agreed perimeter around the periphery of the inspection site and shall designate a portal with not more than one rail line and one road which shall be within 50 meters of each other. All vehicles which can contain an intermediate-range GLBM or longest stage of such a GLBM of the inspected Party shall exit only through this portal.

2. For the purposes of this Section, the provisions of paragraph 10 of Article VII of the Treaty shall be applied to intermediate-range GLBMs of the inspected Party and the longest stage of such GLBMs.

3. There shall not be more than two other exits from the inspection site. Such exits shall be monitored by appropriate sensors. The perimeter of and exits from the inspection site may be monitored as provided for by paragraph 11 of Section VII of this Protocol.

4. The inspecting Party shall have the right to establish continuous monitoring systems at the portal specified in paragraph 1 of this Section and appropriate sensors at the exits specified in paragraph 3 of this Section and carry out necessary engineering surveys, construction, repair and replacement of monitoring systems.

5. The inspected Party shall, at the request of and at the expense of the inspecting Party, provide the following:

(a) all necessary utilities for the construction and operation of the monitoring systems, including electrical power, water, fuel, heating and sewerage;

(b) basic construction materials including concrete and lumber;

(c) the site preparation necessary to accommodate the installation of continuously operating systems for monitoring the portal specified in paragraph 1 of this Section, appropriate sensors for other exits specified in paragraph 3 of this Section and the center for collecting data obtained during inspections. Such preparation may include ground excavation, laying of concrete foundations, trenching between equipment locations and utility connections;

(d) transportation for necessary installation tools, materials and equipment from the point of entry to the inspection site; and

(e) a minimum of two telephone lines and, as necessary, high frequency radio equipment capable of allowing direct communication with the embassy of the inspecting Party in the country in which the site is located.

6. Outside the perimeter of the inspection site, the inspecting Party shall have the right to:

(a) build no more than three buildings with a total floor space of not more than 150 square meters for a data center and inspection team headquarters, and one additional building with floor space not to exceed 500 square meters for the storage of supplies and equipment;

(b) install systems to monitor the exits to include weight sensors, vehicle sensors, surveillance systems and vehicle dimensional measuring equipment;

(c) install at the portal specified in paragraph 1 of this Section equipment for measuring the length

and diameter of missile stages contained inside of launch canisters or shipping containers;

(d) install at the portal specified in paragraph 1 of this Section non-damaging image producing equipment for imaging the contents of launch canisters or shipping containers declared to contain missiles or missile stages as provided for in paragraph 11 of this Section;

(e) install a primary and back-up power source; and

(f) use, as necessary, data authentication devices.

7. During the installation or operation of the monitoring systems, the inspecting Party shall not deny the inspected Party access to any existing structures or security systems. The inspecting Party shall not take any actions with respect to such structures without consent of the inspected Party. If the Parties agree that such structures are to be rebuilt or demolished, either partially or completely, the inspecting Party shall provide the necessary compensation.

8. The inspected Party shall not interfere with the installed equipment or restrict the access of the inspection team to such equipment.

9. The inspecting Party shall have the right to use its own two-way systems of radio communication between inspectors patrolling the perimeter and the data collection center. Such systems shall conform to power and frequency restrictions established on the territory of the inspected Party.

10. Aircraft shall not be permitted to land within the perimeter of the monitored site except for emergencies at the site and with prior notification to the inspection team.

11. Any shipment exiting through the portal specified in paragraph 1 of this Section which is large enough and heavy enough to contain an intermediate-range GLBM or longest stage of such a GLBM of the inspected Party shall be declared by the inspected Party to the inspection team before the shipment arrives at the portal. The declaration shall state whether such a shipment contains a missile or missile stage as large or larger than and as heavy or heavier than an intermediate-range GLBM or longest stage of such a GLBM of the inspected Party.

12. The inspection team shall have the right to weigh and measure the dimensions of any vehicle, including railcars, exiting the site to ascertain whether it is large enough and heavy enough to contain an intermediate-range GLBM or longest stage of such a GLBM of the inspected Party. These measurements shall be performed so as to minimize the delay of vehicles exiting the site. Vehicles that are either not large enough or not heavy enough to contain an intermediate-range GLBM or longest stage of such a GLBM of the inspected Party shall not be subject to further inspection.

13. Vehicles exiting through the portal specified in paragraph 1 of this Section that are large enough and heavy enough to contain an intermediate-range GLBM or longest stage of such a GLBM of the inspected Party but that are declared not to contain a missile or missile stage as large or larger than and as heavy or heavier than an intermediate-range GLBM or longest stage of such a GLBM of the inspected Party shall be subject to the following procedures.

(a) The inspecting Party shall have the right to inspect the interior of all such vehicles.

(b) If the inspecting Party can determine by visual observation or dimensional measurement that, inside a particular vehicle, there are no containers or shrouded objects large enough to be or to contain an intermediate-range GLBM or longest stage of such a GLBM of the inspected Party, then that vehicle shall not be subject to further inspection.

(c) If inside a vehicle there are one or more containers or shrouded objects large enough to be or to contain an intermediate-range GLBM or longest stage of such a GLBM of the inspected Party, it shall be the responsibility of the inspected Party to demonstrate that such containers or shrouded objects are not and do not contain intermediate-range GLBMs or the longest stages of such GLBMs of the inspected Party.

14. Vehicles exiting through the portal specified in paragraph 1 of this Section that are declared to contain a missile or missile stage as large or larger than and as heavy or heavier than an intermediate-range GLBM or longest stage of such a GLBM of the inspected Party shall be subject to the following procedures.

(a) The inspecting Party shall preserve the integrity of the inspected missile or stage of a missile.

(b) Measuring equipment shall be placed only outside of the launch canister or shipping container; all measurements shall be made by the inspecting Party using the equipment provided for in paragraph 6 of this Section. Such measurements shall be observed and certified by the in-country escort.

(c) The inspecting Party shall have the right to weigh and measure the dimensions of any launch canister or of any shipping container declared to contain such a missile or missile stage and to image the contents of any launch canister or of any shipping container declared to contain such a missile or missile stage; it shall have the right to view such missiles or missile stages contained in launch canisters or shipping containers eight times per calendar year. The in-country escort shall be present during all phases of such viewing. During such interior viewing:

(i) the front end of the launch canister or the cover of the shipping container shall be opened;

(ii) the missile or missile stage shall not be removed from its launch canister or shipping container; and

(iii) the length and diameter of the stages of the missile shall be measured in accordance with the methods agreed by the Parties so as to ascertain that the missile or missile stage is not an intermediate-range GLBM of the inspected Party, or the longest stage of such a GLBM, and that the missile has no more than one stage which is outwardly similar to a stage of an existing type of intermediate-range GLBM.

(d) The inspecting Party shall also have the right to inspect any other containers or shrouded objects inside the vehicle containing such a missile or missile stage in accordance with the procedures in paragraph 13 of this Section.

#### X. Cancellation of Inspection

An inspection shall be cancelled if, due to circumstances brought about by *force majeure*, it cannot be carried out. In the case of a delay that prevents an inspection team performing an inspection pursuant to paragraphs 3, or 5 of Article XI of the Treaty, from arriving at the inspection site during the time specified in paragraph 2 of Section VII of this Protocol, the inspecting Party may either cancel or carry out the inspection. If an inspection is cancelled due to circumstances brought about by *force majeure* or delay, then the number of inspections to which the inspecting Party is entitled shall not be reduced.

#### XI. Inspection Report

1. For inspections conducted pursuant to paragraphs 3, 4, 5, 7 or 8 of Article XI of the Treaty, during post-inspection procedures, and no later than two hours after the inspection has been completed, the inspection team leader shall provide the in-country escort with a written inspection report in both the English and Russian languages. The report shall be factual. It shall include the type of inspection carried out, the inspection site, the number of missiles stages of missiles, launchers and items of support equipment subject to the Treaty observed during the period of inspection and any measurements recorded pursuant to paragraph 10 of Section VI of this Protocol. Photographs taken during the inspection in accordance with agreed procedures, as well as the inspection site diagram provided for by paragraph 6 of Section VII of this Protocol, shall be attached to this report.

2. For inspection activities conducted pursuant to paragraph 6 of Article XI of the Treaty, within 3 days after the end of each month, the inspection team leader shall provide

the in-country escort with a written inspection report both in the English and Russian languages. The report shall be factual. It shall include the number of vehicles declared to contain a missile or stage of a missile as large or larger than and as heavy or heavier than an intermediate-range GLBM or longest stage of such a GLBM of the inspected Party that left the inspection site through the portal specified in paragraph 1 of Section IX of this Protocol during that month. The report shall also include any measurements of launch canisters or shipping containers obtained in these vehicles recorded pursuant to paragraph 11 of Section VI of this Protocol. In the event the inspecting Party, under the provisions of paragraph 14(c) of Section IX of this Protocol, has viewed the interior of a launch canister or shipping container declared to contain a missile or stage of a missile as large or larger than and as heavy or heavier than an intermediate-range GLBM or longest stage of such a GLBM of the inspected Party, the report shall also include the measurements of the length and diameter of missile stages obtained during the inspection and recorded pursuant to paragraph 11 of Section VI of this Protocol. Photographs taken during the inspection in accordance with agreed procedures shall be attached to this report.

3. The inspected Party shall have the right to include written comments in the report.

4. The Parties shall, when possible, resolve ambiguities regarding factual information contained in the inspection report. Relevant clarifications shall be recorded in the report. The report shall be signed by the inspection team leader and by one of the members of the in-country escort. Each Party shall retain one copy of the report.

This Protocol is an integral part of the Treaty. It shall enter into force on the date of entry into force of the Treaty and shall remain in force as long as the Treaty remains in force. As provided for in paragraph 1(b) of Article XIII of the Treaty, the Parties may agree upon such measures as may

be necessary to improve the viability and effectiveness of this Protocol. Such measures shall not be deemed amendments to the Treaty.

FOR THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA

RONALD REAGAN

President of the United States of America

DONE at Washington on December 8, 1987, in two copies, each in the English and Russian languages, both texts being equally authentic.

FOR THE UNION OF SOVIET SOCIALIST REPUBLICS

M. GORBACHEV

General Secretary of the Central Committee of the CPSU

ANNEX

Provisions on Privileges and Immunities of Inspectors and Aircrew Members

In order to exercise their functions effectively, for the purpose of implementing the Treaty and not for their personal benefit, the inspectors and aircrew members referred to in Section III of this Protocol shall be accorded the privileges and immunities contained in this Annex. Privileges and immunities shall be accorded for the entire in-country period in the country in which an inspection site is located, and thereafter with respect to acts previously performed in the exercise of official functions as an inspector or aircrew member.

1. Inspectors and aircrew members shall be accorded the inviolability enjoyed by diplomatic agents pursuant to Article 29 of the Vienna Convention on Diplomatic Relations of April 18, 1961.

2. The living quarters and office premises occupied by an inspector carrying out inspection activities pursuant to paragraph 6 of Article XI of the Treaty shall be accorded the inviolability and protection accorded the premises of diplomatic agents pursuant to Article 30 of the Vienna Convention on Diplomatic Relations.

3. The papers and correspondence of inspectors and aircrew members shall enjoy the inviolability accorded to the papers and correspondence of diplomatic agents pursuant to Article 30 of the Vienna Convention on Diplomatic Relations. In addition, the aircraft of the inspection team shall be inviolable.

4. Inspectors and aircrew members shall be accorded the immunities accorded diplomatic agents pursuant to paragraphs 1, 2 and 3 of Article 31 of

the Vienna Convention on Diplomatic Relations. The immunity from jurisdiction of an inspector or an aircrew member may be waived by the inspecting Party in those cases when it is of the opinion that immunity would impede the course of justice and that it can be waived without prejudice to the implementation of the provisions of the Treaty. Waiver must always be express.

5. Inspectors carrying out inspection activities pursuant to paragraph 6 of Article XI of the Treaty shall be accorded the exemption from dues and taxes accorded to diplomatic agents pursuant to Article 34 of the Vienna Convention on Diplomatic Relations.

6. Inspectors and aircrew members of a Party shall be permitted to bring into the territory of the other Party or a basing country in which an inspection site is located, without payment of any customs duties or related charges, articles for their personal use, with the exception of articles the import or export of which is prohibited by law or controlled by quarantine regulations.

7. An inspector or aircrew member shall not engage in any professional or commercial activity for personal profit on the territory of the inspected Party or that of the basing countries.

8. If the inspected Party considers that there has been an abuse of privileges and immunities specified in this Annex, consultations shall be held between the Parties to determine whether such an abuse has occurred and, if so determined, to prevent a repetition of such an abuse.

# U.S., European Allies Sign INF Basing Agreement

Secretary Shultz departed Washington, D.C., on December 10, 1987, to consult with European allies and sign, for the United States, the agreement regarding inspections relating to the Intermediate-Range Nuclear Forces Treaty between the United States and the Soviet Union. His stops included Brussels (December 11-12), Copenhagen (December 12-13), Oslo (December 13-15), Bonn (December 15), and London (December 15-16). He returned to the United States December 16.

Following is the text of that agreement signed in Brussels on December 11.

**AGREEMENT AMONG  
THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA  
AND THE KINGDOM OF BELGIUM,  
THE FEDERAL REPUBLIC OF  
GERMANY,  
THE REPUBLIC OF ITALY,  
THE KINGDOM OF THE  
NETHERLANDS  
AND THE UNITED KINGDOM OF  
GREAT BRITAIN  
AND NORTHERN IRELAND  
REGARDING INSPECTIONS  
RELATING TO THE TREATY  
BETWEEN  
THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA  
AND  
THE UNION OF SOVIET SOCIALIST  
REPUBLICS  
ON THE ELIMINATION OF  
THEIR INTERMEDIATE-RANGE  
AND SHORTER-RANGE MISSILES**

The United States of America, the Kingdom of Belgium, the Federal Republic of Germany, the Republic of Italy, the Kingdom of the Netherlands and the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland, noting the terms agreed between the United States of America and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics for the elimination of their intermediate-range and shorter-range missiles,

Have agreed as follows:

## ARTICLE I General Obligations

1. Inspection activities related to Article XI of the Treaty between the United States of America and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics on

the Elimination of Their Intermediate-Range and Shorter-Range Missiles, signed at Washington on December 8, 1987, may take place on the territory of the Kingdom of Belgium, the Federal Republic of Germany, the Republic of Italy, the Kingdom of the Netherlands and the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland and shall be carried out in accordance with the requirements, procedures and arrangements set forth in the Protocol Regarding Inspections Relating to the Treaty between the United States of America and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics on the Elimination of Their Intermediate-Range and Shorter-Range Missiles and this Agreement.

2. The Kingdom of Belgium, the Federal Republic of Germany, the Republic of Italy, the Kingdom of the Netherlands and the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland, hereinafter the Basing Countries, hereby agree to facilitate the implementation by the United States of America of its obligations under the Treaty, including the Inspection Protocol thereto, on their territories in accordance with the requirements, procedures and arrangements set forth in this Agreement.

3. Except as herein agreed by the United States of America and the Basing Countries, nothing shall affect the sovereign authority of each state to enforce its laws and regulations with respect to persons entering, and activities taking place within, its jurisdiction.

4. The Basing Countries do not by this Agreement assume any obligations or grant any rights deriving from the Treaty or the Inspection Protocol other than those expressly undertaken or granted in this Agreement or otherwise with their specific consent.

5. The United States of America:

- a) Remains fully responsible towards the Soviet Union for the implementation of its obligations under the Treaty and the Inspection Protocol in respect of United States facilities located on the territories of the Basing Countries;

- b) Undertakes on request at any time to take such action, in exercise of its rights under the Treaty, including

the Inspection Protocol, as may be required to protect and preserve the rights of the Basing Countries under this Agreement.

## ARTICLE II Definitions

For purposes of the present Agreement:

1. The term "Treaty" means the Treaty between the United States of America and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics on the Elimination of Their Intermediate-Range and Shorter-Range Missiles;

2. The term "Inspection Protocol" means the Protocol Regarding Inspections Relating to the Treaty between the United States of America and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics on the Elimination of Their Intermediate-Range and Shorter-Range Missiles;

3. The term "Inspected Party" means the United States of America;

4. The term "Inspecting Party" means the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics;

5. The term "inspection team" means those inspectors designated by the Inspecting Party to conduct a particular inspection activity;

6. The term "inspector" means an individual proposed by the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics to carry out inspections pursuant to Article XI of the Treaty, and included on its list of inspectors in accordance with Section II of the Inspection Protocol;

7. The term "diplomatic aircrew escort" means that individual accredited to the government of the Basing Country in which the inspection site is located who is designated by the Inspecting Party to assist the aircrew of the Inspecting Party;

8. The term "inspection site" means the area, facility, or location in Basing Country at which an inspection provided for in Article XI of the Treaty is carried out;

9. The term "period of inspection" means the period from initiation of the inspection at the inspection site until completion of the inspection at the inspection site, exclusive of time spent on any pre- and post-inspection procedures;

10. The term "point of entry" means: in respect of Belgium, Brussels (national); in respect of the Federal Republic of Germany, Frankfurt (Rhein-Main Airbase); in respect of Italy, Rome (Ciampino); in respect of the Kingdom of the Netherlands, Schiphol; in respect of the United Kingdom, Great Britain and Northern Ireland, RAF Greenham Common;

11. The term "in-country period" means the period from the arrival of the inspection team at the point of entry until departure of the inspection team from the point of entry to depart the country;

12. The term "in-country escort" means the official or officials specified by the Inspected Party, one or more of whom may be nominated by the Basing Country within whose territory the inspection site is located, who shall accompany an inspection team throughout the in-country period and provide appropriate assistance to an inspection team, in accordance with the provisions of the Inspection Protocol, throughout the in-country period;

13. The term "aircrew member" means an individual, other than the members of an inspection team, diplomatic aircrew escort and in-country escort, on the aircraft of the Inspecting Party. The number of aircrew members on an aircraft shall not exceed ten.

### ARTICLE III Notifications

Upon entry into force of this Agreement, the Inspected Party and each Basing Country shall establish channels which shall be available to receive and knowledge receipt of notifications on a 24-hour continuous basis.

2. Immediately upon receipt of notice from the Inspecting Party of its intention to conduct an inspection in a Basing Country, the Inspected Party shall notify the Basing Country concerned thereof and of the date and estimated time of arrival of the inspection team at the point of entry, the date and estimated time of departure from the point of entry to the inspection site, the names of the aircrew and inspection team members, the flight plan (including the type of aircraft as specified herein) filed by the Inspecting Party in accordance with the International Civil Aviation Organization,

hereinafter ICAO), procedures applicable to civil aircraft, and any other information relevant to the inspection provided by the Inspecting Party

3. No less than one hour prior to the estimated time of departure of the inspection team from the point of entry for the inspection site, or in the case of successive inspections conducted pursuant to paragraphs 3, 4, 7 or 8 of Article XI of the Treaty no less than one hour prior to the inspection team's departure from an inspection site for another inspection site, the Inspected Party shall inform the Basing Country of the inspection site, described by place name and geographic coordinates, at which the inspection will be carried out.

### ARTICLE IV Pre-Inspection Arrangements

1. The Inspected Party shall provide the Basing Countries with the initial lists of inspectors and aircrew members, or any modification thereto, proposed by the Inspecting Party immediately upon receipt thereof. Within 15 days of receipt of the initial lists or proposed additions thereto, each Basing Country shall notify the Inspected Party if it objects to the inclusion of any inspector or aircrew member on the basis that such individual had ever committed a criminal offense on the territory of the Inspected Party or the Basing Country, or been sentenced for committing a criminal offense or expelled by the Inspected Party or the Basing Country. The Inspected Party shall thereupon exercise its right under the Inspection Protocol to prevent the named individual from serving as an inspector or aircrew member.

2. Within 25 days of receipt of the initial lists of inspectors or aircrew members, or of any subsequent change thereto, each Basing Country shall provide such visas and related documentation as may be necessary to ensure that each inspector or aircrew member may enter its territory for the purpose of carrying out inspection activities in accordance with the provisions of the Treaty and the Inspection Protocol. Such visas and documentation shall be valid for a period of at least 24 months. The Inspected Party shall immediately notify the Basing Countries of the removal of any individual from the Inspecting Party's lists of inspectors or aircrew members, and the Basing

Countries may thereupon cancel forthwith any visas and related documentation issued to such person pursuant to this paragraph.

3. Within 25 days after entry into force of this Agreement, each Basing Country shall inform the Inspected Party of the standing diplomatic clearance number for the aircraft of the Inspecting Party which will transport inspectors and equipment into its territory. At the same time each Basing Country shall inform the Inspected Party of the established international airways along which aircraft of the Inspecting Party shall enter the airspace of the Basing Country for the purpose of carrying out inspection activities under the Treaty.

4. Each Basing Country shall accord inspectors and aircrew members of the Inspecting Party entering its territory for the purpose of conducting inspection activities pursuant to the Treaty, including the Inspection Protocol, the privileges and immunities set forth in the Privileges and Immunities Annex to this Agreement. In the event the Inspecting Party refuses or fails to carry out its obligations under Section III, paragraph 7 of the Inspection Protocol to remove an inspector or aircrew member who has violated the conditions governing inspections, the inspector or aircrew member may be refused continued recognition as being entitled to such privileges and immunities.

5. Each Basing Country shall issue, at the point of entry, appropriate authorizations waiving customs duties and expediting customs processing requirements in respect of all equipment relating to inspection activities.

6. Each Basing Country shall provide, if requested, facilities at the point of entry for lodging and the provision of food for inspectors and aircrew members.

7. The Basing Country in which the inspection is to take place shall have the right to examine jointly with the Inspected Party each item of equipment brought in by the Inspecting Party to ascertain that the equipment cannot be used to perform functions unconnected with the inspection requirements of the Treaty. If it is established upon examination that a piece of equipment is unconnected with these inspection requirements, it shall not be cleared for use and shall be impounded at the point of entry until the departure of the inspection team from the country.

## ARTICLE V Conduct of Inspections

1. Within 90 minutes of receipt from the Inspected Party of notification that a flight plan for an aircraft of the Inspecting Party has been filed in accordance with ICAO procedures applicable to civil aircraft, the Basing Country in whose territory the inspection site is located shall provide the Inspected Party with its approval for the aircraft of the Inspecting Party to proceed to the point of entry via the filed routing, or an amended routing if necessary.

2. The Basing Country in whose territory the inspection site is located shall facilitate the entry of inspectors and aircrew into the country, and shall take the steps necessary to ensure that the baggage and equipment of the inspection team is identified and transported expeditiously through customs.

3. Upon notification by the Inspected Party, in accordance with Article III above, of the inspection site, the Basing Country in whose territory the inspection is to take place shall take the steps necessary to ensure that the inspection team is granted all clearances and assistance necessary to enable it to proceed expeditiously to the inspection site and

to arrive at the inspection site within nine hours of the Inspecting Party's notification of the site to be inspected. The Inspected Party and the Basing Country in which the inspection site is located shall consult with respect to the mode of transport to be utilized, and the Basing Country shall have the right to designate the routing between the point of entry and the inspection site.

4. Each Basing Country shall assist the Inspected Party, as necessary, in providing two-way voice communication capability for an inspection team between an inspection site within its territory and the embassy of the Inspecting Party.

5. The Inspected Party and the Basing Country within whose territory an inspection site is located shall consult with respect to aircraft servicing and the provision of meals, lodging, and services for inspectors and aircrew members at the point of entry and inspection site. The cost of the foregoing requested by the Inspected Party and provided by the Basing Country shall be borne by the Inspected Party.

6. In the event the Inspecting Party requests an extension, which shall not exceed eight hours beyond the original 24-hour period of inspection as provided for in Section VI, paragraph 14 of the Inspection Protocol, the Inspected Party shall immediately notify the Basing Country in whose territory the inspection site is located of the extension.

## ARTICLE VI Consultations

1. Within five days after entry into force of this Agreement, the Inspected Party and the Basing Countries shall meet to coordinate implementation of the inspection activities provided for by Article XI of the Treaty, the Inspection Protocol and this Agreement.

2. A meeting between the Inspected Party and any Basing Country to discuss implementation of this Agreement shall be held within five days of a request for such a meeting by the Inspected Party or a Basing Country.

3. Should any question arise which in the opinion of a Basing Country requires immediate attention, the Basing Country may contact the inspection notification authority of the Inspected Party. The Inspected Party will immediately acknowledge receipt of the inquiry or question and give urgent attention to the question or problem.

4. In the event that a Basing Country determines that an inspector or aircrew member has violated the conditions governing inspection within its territory, the Basing Country may notify the Inspected Party which shall inform the Inspecting Party of the disqualification of the inspector or aircrew member. The name of the individual will be removed from the list of inspectors or aircrew members.

5. A Basing Country may change the point of entry for its territory by giving six months' notice of such change to the Inspected Party.

6. Upon completion of an inspection, the Inspection Party shall advise the Basing Country within whose territory the inspection took place that the inspection has been completed, and upon request of the Basing Country provide a briefing for the Basing Country on the inspection.

7. The United States of America shall not, without the express agreement of the Basing Countries, propose or accept any amendment to Article I of the Treaty or to the Inspection Protocol that directly affects the rights, interests or obligations of the Basing Countries.

## ARTICLE VII Entry into Force and Duration

This Agreement shall be subject to a proval in accordance with the constitutional procedures of each Party, which approval shall be notified by each Party to each of the other Parties. Following such notification by all Parties, the Agreement shall enter into force simultaneously with the entry into force of the Treaty and shall remain in force for a period of thirteen years.

DONE at Brussels, on the eleven of December, 1987, in a single original which shall be deposited in the archives of the Government of the United States of America, which shall transmit a duly certified copy thereof to each of the other signatory Governments.

IN WITNESS WHEREOF, the undersigned, being duly authorized, have signed this Agreement.

For the Government of the Kingdom of Belgium:

LEO TINDEMANS

For the Government of the Federal Republic of Germany:

HANS-DIETRICH GENSCHER

For the Government of the Republic of Italy:

GIULIO ANDREOTTI

For the Government of the Kingdom of the Netherlands:

HANS VAN DEN BROEK

For the Government of the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland:

GEOFFREY HOWE

For the Government of the United States of America:

GEORGE P. SHULTZ

## ANNEX

## Provisions on Privileges and Immunities of Inspectors and Aircrew Members

order to exercise their functions effectively, for the purpose of implementing the Treaty and not for their personal benefit, inspectors and aircrew members shall be accorded the privileges and immunities contained herein. Privileges and immunities shall be accorded for the entire in-country period of the country in which an inspection site is located, and thereafter with respect to acts previously performed in the exercise of official functions as an inspector or aircrew member.

1. Inspectors and aircrew members shall be accorded the inviolability enjoyed by diplomatic agents pursuant to Article 29 of the Vienna Convention on Diplomatic Relations of April 18, 1961.

2. The papers and correspondence of inspectors and aircrew members shall enjoy the inviolability accorded to the papers and correspondence of diplomatic agents pursuant to Article 30 of the Vienna Convention on Diplomatic Relations. In addition, the aircraft of an inspection team shall be inviolable.

3. Inspectors and aircrew members shall be accorded the immunities accorded diplomatic agents pursuant to paragraphs (1), (2) and (3) of Article 31 of the Vienna Convention on Diplomatic Relations. The immunity from jurisdiction of an inspector or an aircrew member may be waived by the Inspecting Party in those cases when it is of the opinion that immunity would impede the course of justice and that it can be waived without prejudice to the implementation of the provisions of the Treaty. Waiver must always be expressed.

4. Inspectors and aircrew members of the Inspecting Party shall be permitted to bring into the territory of a Basing Country in which an inspection site is located, without payment of any customs duties or related charges, articles for their personal use, with the exception of articles the import or export of which is prohibited by law or controlled by quarantine regulations.

5. An inspector or aircrew member shall not engage in any professional or commercial activity for personal profit in the territory of the Basing Countries. ■

## Beyond the Summit: Next Steps in Arms Control

by Paul H. Nitze

*Address before the National Press Club on December 15, 1987. Ambassador Nitze is special adviser to the President and the Secretary of State on arms control matters.*

Before getting into the future, let me say a few words about the past.

When I was appointed to head the U.S. delegation to the INF [intermediate-range nuclear forces] negotiations at their outset in 1981, I made two immediate decisions.

First, we would prepare a draft of the "zero option" treaty we wanted before the negotiations began.

Second, we would keep an issues book in which we would enter, day-by-day, what had been said by either side on each issue that arose in the talks.

At the end of the first year, there were 35 issues in our book. Of those 35, five issues were clearly the most important, so we focused on those five. Over the succeeding years, especially at Reykjavik, we finally removed the five issues. But having removed those boulders blocking an agreement, we still faced a lot of rocks.

This past October, after the 2-day meeting in Washington between Secretary Shultz and Foreign Minister Shevardnadze in which the INF issues that loomed largest were resolved, it was left that Soviet Ambassador Viktor Karpov and I were to try to resolve the remaining issues the next day. I asked Karpov how many issues he had on his list, and he said there were 35, of which five were the most important.

I concluded that it is inherent in the human mind, when confronted with a very complex situation, to simplify it to 35 considerations, and then to 5.

### Next Steps

During last week's meetings, President Reagan and General Secretary Gorbachev accomplished a lot. They signed the INF Treaty we had been seeking for 6 years. They issued a joint statement which significantly advanced us toward a stabilizing START [strategic arms reduction talks] treaty. And they agreed on language on defense and

space which narrows the issues and promises to make them more manageable.

Where do we go from here? There are many tasks that come to mind; by rough estimate, about 35. But allow me to concentrate on the most important five. These are:

- Ratifying the INF Treaty;
- Continuing our work on a START treaty;
- Dealing with defense and space issues;
- Continuing our efforts on non-nuclear arms control; and
- Maintaining our focus on the broader context of U.S.-Soviet relations.

### Ratifying the INF Treaty

Clearly, our most immediate and important task is to get the advice and consent of the Senate in favor of ratification of the INF Treaty. All of our other efforts depend on this outcome.

Why should the Senate so advise the President? Because this treaty enhances the security of the United States and its allies, and it contains the verification measures necessary to monitor Soviet compliance with confidence and to detect any militarily significant noncompliance in time for us to respond appropriately.

To determine how the treaty enhances our security interests, one must recall how the INF issue and the ensuing negotiations arose in the first place.

In the late 1970s, the Soviet Union began deployment of SS-20 intermediate-range missiles, greatly enhancing the nuclear threat to both our European and Asian friends and allies. This raised concern, particularly among Europeans, of a significant imbalance in the spectrum of nuclear capabilities directly affecting not only NATO Europe but also other countries on the periphery of the U.S.S.R.

In its 1979 dual-track decision, the alliance determined to redress this imbalance. It decided:

First, to deploy comparable missiles of its own; and

Second, to seek to minimize, through negotiations, the number of such missiles either side would deploy.

In 1981, President Reagan proposed NATO's preferred outcome: the complete elimination of all U.S. and Soviet missiles of this class, or the "zero option." In meeting after meeting since, the NATO allies, and our Asian allies as well, reiterated their preference for this global zero outcome.

This, of course, is what we have now achieved. With the elimination of the SS-20s and all other Soviet missiles of this class, the Soviet Union will no longer possess INF missiles capable of threatening targets in Europe from Soviet soil. This perceived weakness in the structure of deterrence has been removed.

In sum, a security threat was identified, a strategy to address the threat was conceived and implemented, and an outcome was achieved that removed that threat. This is a NATO success story, enhanced by the fact that the reductions are decidedly asymmetric in NATO's favor, leading to an equal end point. This sets a good precedent for future arms reduction efforts.

It appears that much of the ratification debate will center on verification. In conducting this debate, it is important to understand the purpose of verification. We negotiate arms control treaties to limit the military capabilities of our adversary. The purpose of verification is to ensure that the treaties serve their intended purpose. That is, we want to be sure that the other side has not moved beyond the intended limits in any militarily significant way, and, if they do, we want to be able to detect such violations in time to respond as necessary.

Of course, our ability to detect and respond to violations serves to deter the other side from committing them in the first place. The type of verification regime I have described is what the President has in mind when he calls for effective verification. And we have it in the INF Treaty.

You have undoubtedly heard much about the INF verification regime. Simply put, we are entitled to onsite inspection to count Soviet INF missile systems and structures, to watch them being destroyed, to determine that no more are left after the elimination process is completed, and to check the former INF sites on short notice to make sure no missiles secretly return. We also will monitor the output of the production facility where SS-20 missiles were assembled in the past and could most readily be assembled in the future.

Does this mean that we are guaranteed that the Soviets cannot hide an INF missile somewhere on their territory? No. Only anytime, anywhere inspections without a possibility of refusal would provide hope of such a guarantee, and we believe that ceding the same right in the INF Treaty to Soviet inspectors on our territory is not in our own interests.

But if the Soviets were to succeed in secretly retaining some missiles, they could not test them, train troops in their operation, or maintain the basing infrastructure necessary to support them, all of which we could detect. Without these, the Soviets could not maintain a militarily significant capability. Thus the regime meets the standard of effective verification.

There is one final point I wish to make on the subject of INF ratification. From both sides of the Senate, we hear talk these days about the possibility of attaching reservations to the treaty, and one reservation often suggested is to delay final implementation of the elimination of INF missiles until the conventional imbalance is resolved. Alternatively, some suggest holding up a START agreement for this purpose.

I believe that either course of action would be most unwise. We have signed the INF Treaty because it is in our security interest, as I have explained. Similarly, the START agreement we are seeking would be in our security interest. If we succeed in reaching such agreements, we should not be barred from putting them into effect.

The conventional imbalance is a serious matter, but it is not a problem caused or exacerbated by an INF agreement. Indeed, one of the forgotten facts about INF is that, prior to 1977, when there was no perceived need by NATO for INF missiles, NATO faced a conventional imbalance and a large force of Soviet INF missiles—SS-4s and SS-5s—for which NATO had no corresponding systems. After the INF agreement, we will return to the pre-1977 situation, except that even the SS-4s and SS-5s will be gone.

The way to address the conventional force problem is through unilateral NATO programs and at the negotiating table, and we are working on both. We and our allies are currently seeking to establish a mandate for conventional stability talks between NATO and the Warsaw Pact, and we are discussing with our allies improvements in conventional capabilities.

But any realistic assessment of prospects in this area would lead one to conclude that it will be at least a year or two before the problem is resolved. In the meantime, why should we allow the SS-20 threat to Europe and Asia to remain, and why should we allow the promising momentum of the START negotiations to be dissipated?

As we move forward with INF and START, however, there should be no doubt that we will maintain the capabilities necessary to deter Soviet aggression. In Europe, this will include maintaining, after the elimination of INF missiles, approximately 4,000 nuclear warheads on a variety of deliver systems, some of which can reach deep into the Soviet Union.

Trying to resolve all of our security concerns in one fell swoop is just too difficult a task. As pieces of the problem are resolved, those solutions should be implemented, as long as they do not exacerbate other problems. Both INF and the agreement we seek in START would resolve critical security problems without aggravating others; we should move forward on them now.

## START

Now let me turn to the START area. Our talks last week with the Soviet arms control experts, we emphasized three groups of START issues: count rules, sublimits, and verification. Significant headway was made on all three.

Counting rules—that is, the agreed standards by which the sides determine how the systems and components to be limited will be counted against the limits—tend to get passed off as part of the technical details of arms control, but these rules can have a profound impact on an agreement's effects.

To agree on rules by which the number of warheads carried by missiles and bombers are to be counted is not an easy matter; an agreement that appeared to be equal could be anything but if it undercounted the systems possessed mainly by one side and overcounted the systems emphasized by the other.

Last week, we made real progress on counting warheads on ballistic missiles and ALCMs [air-launched cruise missiles] on heavy bombers. For the former, each side has declared the number of warheads deployed on each type of existing missile, and the other side will verify it through agreed procedures, including onsite inspection of deployed missiles.



For the latter, the problem is somewhat different because, unlike with ballistic missiles, ALCM loads for bombers are normally less than the theoretical capacity and can also be changed readily. The Soviets agreed to our idea of tributing for counting purposes a certain number of ALCMs to each type of heavy bomber, regardless of the maximum number that bomber could carry and the specific number it might be carrying at any given time. This approach reduces verification problems and takes into account operational realities.

The sublimit area is one on which we have been concentrating for some time. We have emphasized that 50% reductions are not inherently stabilizing; it is necessary to ensure, through sublimits, that a side cannot retain a preponderance of the most destabilizing systems.

Previously, the Soviets had agreed to a sublimit on heavy ICBMs [intercontinental ballistic missiles], the most stabilizing systems of all, at 1,540 warheads on 154 missiles, or 50% of the current Soviet level. Last week, they agreed to another sublimit, this one on ballistic missile warheads at the level of 900. This sublimit would force a reduction of slightly more than 50% in the warheads on the fast-flying Soviet ballistic missile force. In 1982, President Reagan proposed 5,000 for this number, so again, we have achieved a longstanding U.S. objective.

In the verification area, we were able to build on the foundation provided by INF. The Soviets agreed that START would include all of the types of inspections I mentioned earlier for INF, as well as, at least in principle, inspect-site inspections and more extensive monitoring of production facilities. This is necessary in START because we will be placing numerical limits on systems rather than banning them.

So where do we go next? Our negotiators in Geneva have created a joint crackered treaty text, just like the one we had for INF last summer. Wherever the two sides disagree on an issue, their positions are included in brackets.

The fact that we are far enough along to have such a text is promising, and the document helps to focus negotiating efforts, but many brackets currently remain, including in the three areas I have just discussed. We still need to agree on the number of ALCMs to attribute to each type of heavy bomber and to establish procedures for

verifying the number of warheads deployed on each type of existing ballistic missile. We need to address the U.S. proposal for a sublimit of 3,300 on ICBM warheads. And there is much work to be done in working out the details of verification procedures.

Beyond these questions, there are many more issues, such as the U.S. desire to ban mobile ICBMs, the number of SLCMs [submarine-launched cruise missiles] we allow outside the aggregate ceiling of 6,000 warheads and how we verify that limit, and the question of a possible linkage between defense and space and START.

Despite all the progress we've made in START, the list of remaining issues is daunting, and the question arises of whether it is possible to complete a treaty during this Administration. My own belief is that it will be very difficult but not impossible. We will be pushing forward intensively, and we will do our best to finish the job.

### Defense and Space

Since Reykjavik, the defense and space area has involved three primary issues: the length of time during which the sides would agree not to withdraw from the ABM Treaty in order to deploy defenses, what happens after the period, and what happens during the period. All three issues were discussed in detail last week; the differences remain, but progress was made on all three.

On the question of what happens after the nonwithdrawal period, the Soviets agreed that, unless the sides agree otherwise, "each side will be free to decide its course of action." This preserves the right to deploy we seek.

On the question of what happens during the nonwithdrawal period, we included language stating that the sides would observe the ABM Treaty "as signed in 1972," as well as language stating that the sides would "conduct their research, development, and testing as required, which are permitted by the ABM Treaty." This should take the sharp edges off the ABM debate, while assisting in protecting our program to proceed with SDI [Strategic Defense Initiative] research, testing, and development as a matter of national security need.

Over the next several months, as we push forward in START, we intend also to continue dealing with the three main defense and space issues.

### Non-Nuclear Arms Control

Our non-nuclear arms control efforts involve primarily conventional forces and chemical weapons (CW). As I mentioned earlier, we are in the midst of mandate talks for new negotiations on conventional stability.

These negotiations would involve the 23 countries of NATO and the Warsaw Pact and would address conventional forces in Europe from the Atlantic to the Urals. Our objective in the conventional stability talks is a verifiable agreement that would lead to a stable balance of conventional forces at lower levels. This will require far greater reductions in tanks, artillery, and other equipment on the Soviet side to eliminate the capability of the Warsaw Pact for surprise attack and sustained offensive operations and thus to restore equality and stability in conventional forces.

We hope the mandate talks will lead to actual negotiations as soon as possible, perhaps as early as next year. In the meantime, we will continue our current efforts with our NATO allies to put together a sound NATO position that we can introduce at the outset of the negotiations.

As for chemical weapons, the United States remains committed to achieving a comprehensive global ban, encompassing all nations with chemical weapons capability. We tabled a draft treaty calling for such a ban in 1984 in the 40-nation Conference on Disarmament in Geneva. Since then, we have negotiated hard to bring it about.

The key is getting a treaty that is both effective and verifiable. We are encouraged by recent Soviet agreement in principle to mandatory challenge inspection with no right of refusal and an early bilateral exchange of data.

However, there are a number of crucial issues remaining to be worked out. We have agreed with the Soviets to concentrate our bilateral talks on maintaining security during the destruction of CW stocks, protecting sensitive non-CW-related information during inspections, and the need to strengthen verification in light of new technologies, increasing proliferation, and a dual-capable chemical industry.

### The Broader Context

Attaining progress in the various arms control areas is only part of the complex equation of the difficult U.S.-Soviet relationship. A long-term, sustained improvement in the relationship

will depend greatly on resolving differences in other crucial areas.

For 2 years now, we have worked hard to establish with the Soviet Union a process that addresses a full range of issues—what we call the four-part agenda that encompasses arms reductions, human rights, regional conflicts, and bilateral relations. Serious differences in all of these areas have accumulated over the last four decades, and they are the source of the profound mistrust and suspicion that characterize East-West relations today.

We recently have seen greater Soviet willingness to discuss these matters in detail, and this has led to progress in some areas. For example, agreements reached over the last 2 years have greatly increased the opportunities for contact between U.S. and Soviet citizens. President Reagan and General Secretary Gorbachev have agreed that the effort to foster greater cooperation and contact on the basis of genuine mutual benefit should continue.

In two other areas—human rights and regional affairs—there remains a long way to go. We have recognized and welcomed recent Soviet human rights steps but have pointed out that human rights will remain a source of tension in East-West relations until the Soviet Union fully observes its international human rights obligations. Similarly, we have made clear that Soviet involvement in regional conflicts—whether directly, as in Afghanistan, or through support for such regimes as Vietnam or Nicaragua—inevitably will affect Western perceptions of the Soviet Union's ultimate intentions.

The United States is ready to address all the problems candidly and constructively. In the end, however, the Soviet Union must demonstrate that it is willing to deal with its own people and its neighbors through dialogue, not intimidation. The burden both sides will bear for the foreseeable future is to manage our competition peacefully and to build a more stable and constructive relationship.

## Conclusion

Thus, we have a very full agenda in the days ahead. We have no intention of resting on our laurels; to the contrary, we want our success in INF to be the springboard for progress in other areas.

If we are to find further success, it will be because we will succeed in replicating the elements that led to the INF Treaty: strength, domestic coherence, and unity with our allies. With these assets, and with patience, we can take further steps down the road to-

ward a safer and stabler world, with lower levels of offenses and increased reliance on effective defenses, should they prove feasible, and with a lessened risk of war. That is our ultimate goal. ■

## INF Treaty: A Success Story

### Background

On December 8 in Washington, President Reagan and General Secretary Gorbachev signed the historic INF [Intermediate-range Nuclear Forces] Treaty. This treaty eliminates the entire class of U.S. and Soviet intermediate-range nuclear missiles. The treaty is a direct consequence of the President's steadfast commitment to achieving real arms reductions, rather than merely limiting increases as in previous treaties. It is also the result of NATO solidarity in responding to the threat posed by Soviet deployment of SS-20 missiles.

### What's in the Treaty?

The treaty provides for the elimination of all U.S. and Soviet INF missile systems in the range of 500-5,500 kilometers (about 300-3,400 miles) and the elimination or conversion of related facilities within 3 years after it enters into force. The treaty bans all production and flight testing of these missiles immediately upon entry into force. After elimination is completed, the treaty will ban all facilities for deployment, storage, repair, and production of these missile systems.

### How Can We Verify It?

The President has said that it would be better to have no arms control agreements than agreements that cannot be effectively verified. A treaty cannot be based on trust; it must be supported by effective verification. Accordingly, this treaty contains the most stringent verification provisions in the history of arms control. Compliance with it can be effectively verified.

The treaty meets the objectives the United States has established for verification of the treaty's terms. These objectives are to:

- Ensure confidence in the agreement;

- Deter violation of the treaty by increasing the likelihood that such violations would be detected; and

- Permit timely detection of violations, so that we can take appropriate steps to protect U.S. and allied security.

Specifically, the verification provisions include:

- An unprecedented exchange of data on the systems limited by the treaty, including numbers, locations, and technical characteristics of all INF missiles and launchers;

- Inspections at INF sites to confirm the validity of the data exchange to help verify elimination of these weapons and related infrastructure, and to help verify that INF activity ceased;

- Short-notice onsite inspection at INF-related sites during the 3-year reductions period and for 10 years afterward;

- Resident inspectors at key missile final assembly facilities; and

- Prohibition on interference with verification by national technical means, which includes satellite imagery.

These provisions will facilitate effective verification of Soviet compliance with the treaty. We will be able to assess compliance in a timely manner, so that we can compensate for any risk posed to our security or that of our allies if the Soviets violate the accord.

### We've Strengthened U.S. and Allied Security

The INF Treaty is in the security interests of the United States and our allies. The Soviet Union will eliminate deployed systems capable of carrying more than 1,500 nuclear warheads; the United States, almost 400. This establishes the precedent of the Soviets undertaking greater reductions to reach equal levels with us. The treaty also

any future deployment of INF missiles, including the newly developed Soviet ground-launched cruise missile. Deployment of these missiles would be seriously complicated NATO air defense. Elimination of Soviet INF missiles will enhance the survivability of NATO forces by eliminating the most effective weapons against key NATO targets. NATO will retain a substantial clear capacity sufficient to ensure the continued viability of its strategy of flexible response.

### We've Achieved U.S. Objectives

The treaty meets longheld U.S. goals in INF negotiations. When the talks began in 1981, the President proposed a "zero option" for elimination of all *longer range INF missiles* (range 1000-5,500 kilometers or about 0-3,400 miles). In July 1987, the Soviets agreed to eliminate these systems. Similarly, the United States has sought *constrain shorter range INF missiles* (range 500-1,000 kilometers or about 300-600 miles) to prevent circumvention of an accord on longer range missiles by a Soviet buildup of shorter range missiles. The treaty satisfies this requirement by eliminating all Soviet and U.S. shorter range INF missiles. The United States has none of these missiles deployed.) In agreeing to worldwide elimination of these missiles, the Soviets have accepted the U.S. principle that *limitations on INF missiles must be global* to prevent transfer of the threat from Europe to Asia. The treaty also meets the U.S. demand that *U.S.-Soviet agreements cannot limit the forces of our allies.*

### U.S. and Allied Perseverance: NATO Triumph

The success of these negotiations has been made possible by Western determination to adhere to NATO's 1979 "dual track" decision to respond to Soviet SS-20 deployments through *employment* of U.S. longer range INF missiles while seeking through *negotiations* with the Soviets to reach an INF balance at the lowest possible level. NATO steadfastness has paid off. Through this treaty, we achieve elimination of the threat to NATO and European security posed by Soviet INF missiles. Furthermore, we and our allies have enhanced the credibility of our deterrent by demonstrating convincingly to the Soviets that we have the

unity and political will to make and stand by tough decisions to ensure our security.

### A First Step Toward A Safer World

Having achieved the INF Treaty, the United States continues its determined efforts to achieve a safer world, includ-

ing negotiations for deep reductions in strategic (intercontinental) weapons, greater balance in conventional forces in Europe, and an effective global ban on chemical weapons.

Taken from the GIST series of December 1987, published by the Bureau of Public Affairs, Department of State. Editor: Harriet Culley. ■

## NATO Defense Planning Committee Meets in Brussels

*The Defense Ministers of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) met in Brussels December 1-2, 1987. The United States was represented by Secretary of Defense Frank C. Carlucci. Following is the text of the final communique issued December 2.*

The Defense Planning Committee of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization met in ministerial session in Brussels on 1st and 2nd December 1987.

We reaffirmed that the objective of the Alliance is to preserve the security of its members through adequate defensive strength and to enhance stability through the development of a more constructive relationship between East and West. We welcomed the forthcoming meeting between President Reagan and Mr. Gorbachev as an important stage in this process. We welcomed and fully support the agreement between the United States and the Soviet Union for the global elimination of land-based INF [intermediate-range nuclear forces] missiles with a range between 500 and 5,500 kilometers. This has been made possible by the determination and solidarity of the allied governments over the years. We look forward to the prospect of the INF treaty being signed and ratified in the near future.

We will continue to explore all possibilities to improve security and stability. The reality with which we must contend is the scale of Soviet military power and its continuing improvement and modernization. In this respect, our strategy of flexible response and forward defense remains the most effective and appropriate means to safeguard our security. We are determined to continue to provide the level, quality and mix of systems, nuclear and conventional, necessary to ensure the credibility of this strategy.

Referring to our recent discussions on nuclear matters at Monterey, we reaffirmed that the INF agreement is a major accomplishment for the Alliance. At this meeting, we focused our attention on conventional forces where imbalances between NATO and the Warsaw Pact continue to concern us. We are determined to

improve our conventional forces through the implementation of the Conventional Defense Improvements (CDI) action plan. CDI concentrates attention on the key deficiencies in our defense posture and identifies those areas where extra effort will provide the greatest return. We welcome progress made thus far in addressing these key deficiencies. We shall continue to place special emphasis on these areas in our national planning.

It is with the objective of improving our forces firmly in mind that we discussed the result of the 1987 annual defense review and adopted the NATO force plan for 1988-1992. The defense review has demonstrated the further consolidation of CDI through the greater alignment of national plans with collectively agreed objectives. The provision of adequate resources and improving value for money, in accordance with the 1987 ministerial guidance, will continue to be a serious challenge for all nations.

The difficulty of reconciling resources with force requirements encourages us to pursue CDI more vigorously and to redouble our efforts to optimize our collective return through closer cooperation and coordination. We stressed the need for initiatives designed to offer cooperative solutions to potential problems which can be better dealt with collectively than by nations individually. We agreed that changes and adjustments to national plans should continue to be made within the overall framework of Alliance planning.

We stressed the need for broader participation by Alliance members in providing increased assistance to Greece, Portugal and Turkey to strengthen their conventional defense, in order that they may more effectively fulfill their proper roles in the collective defense of the Alliance. We also expressed particular interest in the continuing work of the independent European group on assistance to these countries which aims at permitting them to participate more fully as partners in armaments cooperation programs with their NATO allies.

We strongly supported proposals for the establishment of a NATO Conventional

Armaments Planning System (NATO CAPS) on a trial basis starting early next year. Such a system will improve NATO defense planning by enabling each member nation to get the best value out of its resources devoted to the research, development, production and procurement of conventional defense equipment, and thereby to meet better the needs of the Alliance.

We noted the progress made by the Conference of National Armaments Directors (CNAD) in cooperative projects, including those launched as a result of United States legislation. We reaffirmed the importance we continue to attach to the sharing of technology between the members of the Alliance, and to the protection of militarily relevant technology.

The Harmel Report, published 20 years ago, recognized that the Alliance has two main functions. First, to maintain adequate military strength and political solidarity to deter aggression and other forms of pressure and to defend the territory of member countries if aggression should occur. Secondly, in the resulting climate of stability, security and confidence, to pursue the search for progress towards a more stable relationship in which the underlying political issues can be solved. Recent progress illustrates the validity of this approach. As we move ahead, we must take care to sustain this balance between the military and political components of our strategy, and to ensure a comprehensive, integrated and coherent approach to all elements of arms control and security, nuclear and non-nuclear.

In this respect, noting the potential offered by negotiations to establish a stable and secure balance of conventional forces at lower levels in Europe, we welcomed progress made in Vienna to convene conventional stability negotiations covering the whole of Europe from the Atlantic to the Urals. The achievement of our priority objective of eliminating the Warsaw Pact capability for launching surprise attack and initiating large-scale offensive action would be a significant step towards greater security and stability. It will be important that defense plans and arms control policy objectives remain in harmony in order to ensure their complementary contribution to Alliance security policy. ■

## 34th Report on Cyprus

### MESSAGE TO THE CONGRESS, NOV. 20, 1987<sup>1</sup>

In accordance with Public Law 95-384, I am submitting to you a bimonthly report on progress toward a negotiated settlement of the Cyprus question.

I would like first to note the United Nations Secretary General's October 29 announcement of the appointment of a new Special Representative of the Secretary General on Cyprus, Oscar Hector Camilion. Mr. Camilion is a former Foreign Minister of Argentina and a distinguished diplomat with long and varied experience in the art of negotiation. Our best wishes and full support go with Mr. Camilion as he begins his efforts in the cause of establishing a long-lasting and equitable peace on Cyprus.

There was considerable dialogue on the Cyprus problem during this period between the United Nations Secretary General and the parties to the dispute and also between United States representatives and a wide range of interested parties. In the context of the opening of the 42nd United Nations General Assembly session, the Secretary General met separately, in early October, with both Cypriot President Spyros Kyprianou and Turkish Cypriot leader Rauf Denktash, as well as with the Foreign Ministers of Greece and Turkey. The Secretary of State held discussions with Cypriot Foreign Minister Iacovou, Greek Foreign Minister Papoulias, and Turkish Foreign Minister Halefoglu. Special Cyprus Coordinator M. James Wilkin-son met with Turkish Cypriot leader Denktash.

We continued to consult actively with UN representatives, allies, and concerned groups and individuals on the problem. In discussions regarding the Cyprus dispute, United States representatives emphasized the need for the parties to give the fullest cooperation to the efforts of the UN Secretary General.

We also added our voice to that of the Secretary General in reiterating concern about the potentially dangerous military buildup on the island, a serious situation

that the UN Secretary General once again pointed to in his latest "Report of the Organization," released on September 9. You find merit in the Secretary General's effort to address the issue through his proposal that the United Nations undertake a for-verification role on Cyprus. Although the parties to the dispute have not agreed to this concept, we would hope that constructive reviews with the Secretary General this or other ideas can be pursued in the interest of strengthening stability.

Also on the topic and further to my last report to the Congress, there have been additional reports of withdrawals of Turkish tanks from Cyprus. Recent reports indicate that Turkey has continued to remove older model tanks from the island consistent with earlier Turkish statements that a modernization program had caused temporary rise in the number of tanks.

The recent difficulties for the United Nations Force in Cyprus (UNFICYP), caused by the Swedish decision to withdraw its soldiers from the Force, have been resolved through the magnanimous offer of replacement troops by the Governments of Austria and Canada. On October 3, the UNFICYP spokesman released details of the arrangements under which the Canadian and Austrian soldiers will be deployed along the cease-fire line. These troops, added to the already sizeable contingent from those two countries and the other troop-contributing nations, will enable UNFICYP to continue its invaluable role on the island without interruption. Unfortunately, UNFICYP's funding problems have not been resolved, and we continue urging other countries to increase their contributions to the voluntary fund supporting UNFICYP.

Sincerely,

RONALD REAGAN

<sup>1</sup> Identical letters addressed to Jim Wright, Speaker of the House of Representatives, and Claiborne Pell, chairman of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee (text from Weekly Compilation of Presidential Documents of Nov. 23, 1987). ■

# Policies for Economic Development in Latin America

Peter D. Whitney

Address before the Peruvian Center for International Studies (CEPEI) in Lima on November 25, 1987. Mr. Whitney is Director of the Office of Regional Economic Policy in the Bureau of Inter-American Affairs.

I greatly appreciate the opportunity to speak at this CEPEI conference because the theme being discussed here—present world economic situation—how the United States and other countries of the Americas, including, importantly, Peru, are dealing with it—the central concern of the office I direct at the State Department. Also, on a personal level, I cannot tell you how pleased I am to be back in Peru after a long absence. I have been a Foreign Service officer for 20 years, but my overseas work began earlier in Peru, in 1962, when I had the good fortune to work for *El Pacifico* Insurance Company. The people I met at all levels of *El Pacifico* and in various neighborhoods of Lima where I went to help with policies for fire insurance, and in places such as Trujillo, Chiclayo, and Iquitos, could not have been more hospitable, hard working, and impressive. I remember visiting Chimbote as it was spurring from the fishmeal bonanza of 1962. I was excited about Peru and about Latin America. I saw it as an area of tremendous economic potential because of its enterprising people and untapped natural and human resources.

Twenty-five years after that initial experience, I reflect that my optimism about Peru's immediate economic future, and the immediate economic future of some other countries in Latin America, may have been excessive. Although I had studied Latin American history in college and was aware of the history of political instability in the region and although I was here during the July 28 coup in 1962 and present at the time of another coup in 1966 in Argentina, I did not then understand as much as I do now the importance of establishing a longrun, stable democratic tradition as a basis for sound economic development. Also, with 25 years of hindsight and with the benefit of an impressive array of empirical literature that has been published in recent years, I think there is now, more than

ever, ample evidence of the need for greater democracy and freedom in the political and economic marketplaces. In this regard, it is worth recording the unprecedented ascendancy of democracy and that, since 1976, 10 Latin American military regimes have moved decisively toward democracy.

## Democracy and Economic Growth

Many have argued that free markets and liberty of economic decisionmaking are necessary conditions for a stable democracy. Using the converse, others have argued that political democracy or pluralism are necessary conditions for equitable economic growth. My supposition is that there may be a lot of wisdom in both these approaches and that these philosophical arguments have a lot to do with why the United States wishes to encourage and support countries that are democracies or moving in the direction of greater democracy and why the United States has similarly sought to promote free-market-oriented economic development.

In more practical terms, we have found that our system simply meshes better with democratic governments and market economies and that our overall foreign relations and interests are better served with democracies than with other types of political systems. Authoritarian regimes may sometimes show a good side, but ultimately they are unstable. Societies characterized by economic and political pluralism respond better to the needs of their people and, therefore, tend to create greater guarantees for human rights and for all activities, including economic ones. Therefore, the United States is committed to supporting democratic forces in Latin America and the Caribbean. This involves not only seeking to stop the aggressive behavior of Nicaragua toward its neighbors, but it also means that a major objective of our policy has to be the promotion of economic development and improved standards of living, which we believe go hand in hand with strong democracies.

I would like to emphasize the word "promote" in talking about economic development because the United States probably has neither the resources nor the responsibility to solve our neighbors' problems. Resources, in fact, are one of Peru's and Latin America's

strengths; the central issue is how to organize them productively.

## Promoting Economic Development

How is economic development promoted? How can the United States or the industrialized countries as a group help the countries of Latin America and the Caribbean to improve the economic and political lives of their citizens?

Certainly, there are no definitive answers to these questions. Nonetheless, there is a wealth of evidence from many countries which suggests that, in addition to political predictability and democracy, there is a group of economic policies that is consistent with sustained economic growth. The policies need not be controversial if they are properly understood. For example, I believe that a general consensus could be developed among moderate Democrats and moderate Republicans in my country around these policies. I sincerely believe that if the measures I will describe had been in place in Latin America in the last 25 years, my high expectations for Latin America at that time would not have been misplaced.

The policies I will describe are defended:

- By the Council of Economic Advisers of the United States, which prepared an excellent review in 1986 of the economic experience and economic literature of dozens of countries;
- In the work of Jeffrey Sachs and others at Harvard University, who sought to answer the question of why the Far East has done so dramatically better than Latin America and the Caribbean in the last four decades; and,
- In an outstanding volume by Bela Balassa, Gerardo Bueno, Pedro-Pablo Kuczynski, and Mario Henrique Simonsen, entitled, *Towards Renewed Growth in Latin America*.

Other works which start from different approaches but arrive at similar conclusions include Lawrence Harrison's *Under Development is a State of Mind, the Latin American Case* and Hernando De Soto's *El Otro Sotero*.

*Towards Renewed Growth* compares the GDP [gross domestic product] per capita of various countries in 1985 with that of 1950 and computes a ratio. For Peru, the ratio is only 1.64. In other words, GDP per capita in Peru in 1985 is only 1.64 times what it was in 1950. Argentina's is 1.45. Brazil's is 3.25. Chile's is 1.51. Ecuador's is 2.27. Mexico's is 2.31. Venezuela's is 1.26. For Austria and Italy, which each had a similar GDP per capita than Argentina

or Venezuela in 1950, the ratios are 3.88 and 3.49. Japan jumped from a GDP of \$810 per capita in 1950 to \$7,130 in 1985, for a ratio of 8.8. For Korea, the ratio is 5.88 and for Taiwan, 6.22.

Why is there such a striking difference in economic performance? What are some of the policies that are associated with sustained economic growth?

**First**, market exchange rates have to be established. Too often, Latin American nations have maintained overvalued currencies. This has stimulated their imports and made their exports higher priced and less competitive and has generally contributed to lack of confidence and to capital flight. When my family arrive in Chile in 1981, it cost less for a Chilean to take a vacation in Miami than in southern Chile, which is one of the most beautiful places on this earth. Furthermore, overvalued exchange rates in many countries were sustained by barriers to trade and unsustainable levels of borrowing.

**Second**, general price inflation has to be brought under control. In the developing countries, there has been high growth even with inflation rates in the range of 20%-50%; but the historical record in Latin America is clear that rates higher than this have inevitably led to economic disruption and to problems of confidence, to lack of investment and savings, and to capital flight. Inflation reached the point in Argentina and Bolivia at which notes for 1 million pesos had to be used and at which it cost a million or more to buy a sandwich.

**Third**, a freer trade policy has to be established. Although both Latin America and Asia suffered through the same oil shocks and borrowed heavily from abroad, many of the East nations promoted exports and maintained competitive exchange rates, minimized import barriers and, therefore, were more efficient economies and more competitive exporters. As a result, a number of nations in East Asia continued to grow in the 1980s and to maintain access to international credit markets; and Latin America has much to learn from this example.

**Fourth**, true economic incentives must be created by allowing the price mechanism to function. In Latin America, there has been the extensive use of price controls, often in the presumed interest of low-income groups. A typical example is the control of the price of an agricultural commodity. The result has often been a shift in production toward other crops with higher market prices

and serious shortages in the goods whose prices were controlled. In many cases, this has led to serious declines in national food supply, a creation of a black market, and general inefficiencies which have hurt living standards. When we were in Brazil in the late 1970s, the price of black beans was controlled because beans and rice constitute the basic Brazilian meal. We were living in a bean-producing state, and we watched farmers shift to the industrial-use castor bean and other products, and eventually Brazil wound up importing food beans.

**Fifth**, greater fiscal discipline must be established. The U.S. Government has discovered how difficult this problem can be, and we have run up unprecedented deficits in the last two decades. Nonetheless, our deficit is equal to roughly 4% of our gross national product. This is too much, but, at least until October 19 and the 500-point drop in the stock market, there has been a fundamental confidence in our society and in our economy, and Americans and foreigners have been willing to buy our Treasury notes and finance our deficits. Also, even after October 19, key fundamentals of our economy remain strong, and there appears to be further progress in deficit reduction.

In Latin America, the relative size of the deficits has been much larger, and the confidence in the economies has not been as strong. For example, Mexico ran a fiscal deficit equal to 17.8% of GDP in 1982, just before it announced its inability to service its debt. The International Monetary Fund (IMF) agreements and some of the conditions of the World Bank loans are aimed at encouraging some of these debtor countries to reduce government spending. This inevitably causes difficulties in these nations, just as it does when spending cuts are attempted in our country; but it is important to recognize, if I may be permitted this analogy, that the hangover is a result of the binge and not of going on the wagon.

### The Role of Government

The discussion of fiscal discipline raises the question of the role of government and the size of government, which are inevitably related and which are controversial everywhere and notably in Latin America.

The previous five policy recommendations imply many important roles for government, but in general they also entail a lessening of the size of government and the level of government interference in the economy. In Latin

America, in the United States, and elsewhere, the question then is legitimately asked: "What if markets fail?" This could happen as a result of the inefficiencies of domestic monopolies or of externalities, i.e., when the benefits of costs associated with an economic activity are not reflected in a market price for that activity. Examples of externalities include education, which has a benefit that generally exceeds its cost, and pollution, which is a cost which is not reflected in the price of production. Based on the experiences many developed and developing countries, the answer to these dilemmas can be generalized as a sixth policy prescription, namely, correcting market failure by actions which do not create distortions of domestic markets. This means that:

- Governments should promote competition and restrict the market power of cartels and monopolies, many of which have been encouraged or supported by special incentives.

- Governments should avoid harmful distortionary effects of taxation, which generally occur where overall tax rates are high and taxation varies greatly on similar products or different uses of the same factors of production.

- Many public sector enterprises, such as public utilities and public transportation services (which might traditionally be provided by the private sector) should charge prices that make users recognize the cost of the goods and services they are using.

- Governments should also work toward establishing a stable policy environment so that individuals and corporations are not subject to the uncertainty of constant changes.

This general policy description at the examples all speak to making government more efficient. Some of you might say these individual policies make sense per se, but what about the vast number of truly suffering people who live on the other side of Rio Rimac, in the *favelas* of Brazil, or in the *villa miserias* and forgotten rural areas throughout the hemisphere? The answer, I believe, from the experience of many countries, is that special assistance for the poor should not only moral imperative, but it also is consistent with greater overall growth in the economy. If the governments reduce wasteful spending, it means that there are greater resources available for food distribution, health services, and education for low-income groups.

There are many examples that can be cited to illustrate these points.

- In the 1960s and 1970s, the National Steel Mill in Chile manufactured virtually every type of steel known to man, but in such low volumes that the mills were many times the world price. The mill provided jobs for a number of people who could appropriately be described as members of the middle class in Chile. But given the extremely high costs that also existed at that time, many more jobs were sacrificed by the fact that users of steel in Chile had to pay so much more for their inputs? Or, since the company ran huge operating deficits, which were financed by Chilean taxpayers, by money creation, or by borrowing domestically or from overseas, one has to question how much more effectively these resources could have been used in the service of the Chilean public.

- To balance the negative example in Chile, let me cite a positive one, which can also serve as a creative illustration for both making government more efficient and truly reaching the poorest members of society with government assistance. The World Health Organization has repeatedly cited Chile's outstanding performance in drastically reducing infant mortality. One of the important contributors to this success was an extensive program of child distribution using criteria for the distribution which better identified the most needy. These criteria included the degree of access to water, sewerage, and electricity and the number of years of education, as well as indices of income.

This overall discussion about government and the policy of limiting distributions of domestic products and factor markets can also be summarized by saying: is government contributing, promoting, encouraging development, or is it not, rather, an obstacle to water domestic and foreign investment and a creator of conditions that do not inspire confidence and longrun investment? With the results of Hernando DeSoto's careful research, we must ask: can governments in Latin America continue to make it so hard to acquire property, so difficult to get a license to perform a legitimate business activity, and continue to stifle the enterprise and the opportunities of the majority of their populations? Also, can a country such as Brazil, endowed with such immense natural resources, including a dynamic workforce, continue to have high growth rates if two-thirds all production is in the hands of the elite and the remaining one-third

(roughly one-sixth Brazilian private sector and one-sixth multinational corporation) operates under fairly extensive controls?

Without policy improvement or structural reform in the six general areas discussed, it is difficult to understand how Peru and other nations of this hemisphere can restore sustained economic growth. Sustained economic growth, by definition, means a rate of investment closer to the 25% of GDP which Japan and other nations of Asia registered for many years, which Brazil managed during the periods of high growth, and up from the approximate level of 15% which has been the average for Latin America from 1983 through 1986. So sustained economic growth then means undertaking the policies we have discussed so that both domestic and foreign investors regain confidence and become willing to take the risks that lead to production, jobs, and better standards of living.

In this regard, many find it curious how reluctant Latin America has been to receive the capital and technology that foreign investors bring. The United States would have only a fraction of its present GDP, were it not for foreign investment. For every year of its history up until World War I, the United States was a net importer of capital. Foreign investment created thousands of enterprises in our early history and continues to do so today.

### Promoting Economic Growth Policies

If we believe in these policies, how do we promote or encourage them? The answer is in our debt, aid, and trade policies.

Our debt policy, which was pointedly named the Program for Sustained Growth (although it also is called the Baker plan), has the following three elements:

- Serious economic reforms by the debtor countries of the type we have discussed;
- Financial support, principally from the multilateral development banks, to enable these reforms to occur; and
- Along with reforms and support from the World Bank (and other international financial institutions), further lending by the commercial banks.

The idea behind this policy is that the debtor countries, including those in Latin America, have to take steps to establish confidence in the future of their economies and to reverse capital

flight. This will take several years. Until confidence is reestablished and Latin savings and investment rates improve, additional financial support from abroad is needed; and this is why this strategy calls for new lending.

Here is where greater emphasis on World Bank lending comes in—structural adjustment loans and sectoral adjustment loans enter the picture.

Typical World Bank loans have been made over long periods of time and have been used to build dams or highways. The structural adjustment loans, or SAL, are different. They are relatively fast disbursing, and each disbursement is tied to specific steps in economic policy reform. For example, each disbursement of one of the loans might be made:

- After the debtor country takes another step toward divesting a money-losing public enterprise; or
- After the recipient country takes an additional step to liberalize trade, such as substituting a system of import licensing with tariffs; or
- Takes steps to improve basic tax collection.

If such reforms can be undertaken and if such reforms can be supported by World Bank and Inter-American Development Bank lending, then we think it is reasonable to expect the commercial banks to make some additional loans to promote growth in the region, to protect their assets, and, ultimately, to share in the long-term growth of the region.

Perhaps the one good thing to come out of the debt crisis is the beginning of an awareness of the need to adopt more appropriate economic policies. As a result of this realization and as a result of World Bank and IMF support, there have been some promising first steps in the past 18 months. For example:

- Efforts to reduce inflation have had mixed success. Argentina and Brazil tried "shock" programs, with initial success. But now they are seeing a worrisome resurgence of inflation because the underlying economic reforms necessary to support the programs have not yet been put into place. Bolivia's more conventional and more successful approach to its hyperinflation, on the other hand, was based on comprehensive structural reforms emphasizing fiscal discipline rather than price controls which mesh inflation while it continues.

- Belize, Costa Rica, Guyana, Honduras, Jamaica, Uruguay, and Chile are

among the countries making significant efforts to turn more public sector enterprises over to private sector ownership and management and improve public sector efficiency.

• Costa Rica, Colombia, and Ecuador are examples of countries which are taking steps to reduce market distortions in taxation and in other areas.

Our aid policy is based on the same premise as World Bank structural adjustment loans. For example, more than half of our economic assistance to Central America is in the form of economic support funds, which are tied, in written agreements, to specific policy changes of the type I have mentioned. Again, the idea is that no amount of aid to build roads, hospitals, and schools, to provide food aid—which we have done and we will continue to do—will, by itself, be enough to establish sustained growth. Only the developing countries themselves can do that.

On trade policy, we strive to keep as open a market as possible, and U.S. trade policy flows out of a deep and long-term commitment to maintain and improve access to the U.S. market and to the markets of other major trading countries. This does not mean that the U.S. record is perfect. But the negative tone of some statements on U.S. trade policy is unwarranted when the U.S. record is examined, and particularly when this record is compared with that of other countries.

Let me illustrate with particular reference to Latin America:

• A large share of U.S. imports from Latin America enter the United States free of duty. This share amounted to 39% in 1986 and has averaged around one-third in recent years.

• On those products entering the United States subject to duty, the actual rate of duty paid is relatively low—4.9% in 1986.

• It is true that the United States does maintain some significant nontariff barriers; for Latin America, these are primarily sugar quotas, textile restraints, and voluntary export restraint agreements on steel. However, it is important to note that these barriers are limited in number and do not affect a large proportion of trade or potential trade—only 17% of all developing country exports were affected in 1986, according to a World Bank study.

• The United States, along with other developed countries, maintains a special program—the Generalized System of Preferences (GSP)—to give better market access to developing countries than to developed ones. The

U.S. program eliminates duties on about 3,000 products (out of 7,000 classifications in the U.S. tariff schedule). U.S. imports from Latin America under the GSP have been growing. GSP imports last year totaled \$3.5 billion, equal to 7.9% of total imports. This represents 8% growth over 1985.

• In addition, the United States provides even more liberal duty-free access for countries of the Caribbean Basin under the Caribbean Basin Initiative.

• The President has devoted great effort to working with the Congress on responsible trade legislation and, in the past, has not hesitated to use his veto authority when necessary. The President's willingness to consider using his veto on the textile bill recently passed by the House of Representatives and the Administration's opposition to the protectionist portions of the omnibus trade bill are only the latest examples of our commitment to freer trade.

• Some criticisms of U.S. trade policy focus on U.S. countervailing and antidumping duties and section 301 of our trade law. These actions are frequently accused of being protectionist, but, in fact, they are directed against the protectionist or unfair trade practices of other countries and thus are designed to correct rather than increase distortions to free trade. Countervailing duties are meant to balance the export subsidies of other governments; antidumping duties are to balance dumping by foreign exporters (i.e., lower pricing in export markets than in domestic markets). Our actions are consistent with international rules (e.g., General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade). Similarly, section 301 allows the President to retaliate against unfair, discriminatory, and unjustifiable actions of other countries which harm U.S. commerce. For example, in response to Brazilian infringement of intellectual property and copyright on computers, we have just announced our intention to retaliate; and we hope this process will lead to an end to this protectionism. U.S. actions under this provision are meant to force open the markets of other trading partners and not merely to close down our market.

• A look at trends in Latin America's trade during the 1980s demonstrates the U.S. contribution to the development of exports from the region. During the decade, Latin America exporters increasingly have turned to the U.S. market. Since 1981, the U.S. share of Latin America's exports to the industrialized countries has risen from 52% to 57%. At the same time, the European Community's market share

has fallen from 31% to 28%. Japan's share has been flat at 8%.

• The trade balance of the industrialized countries with Latin America also are revealing. As a group, the industrialized countries moved from a \$1.5-billion trade surplus with Latin America in 1981 to \$15-billion trade deficit in 1986. The United States alone accounted for 87% of this deficit in 1986. In contrast, Japan has run trade surpluses with Latin America throughout the decade.

• These trade trends have continued in 1987. During the first quarter of 1987, the United States purchased 60% of Latin America's exports to the industrialized countries. The U.S. trade deficit with the region (\$3.8 billion) was larger than that of all the other industrialized countries combined (\$3.6 billion), as some other countries—especially Japan—registered trade surpluses.

• Thus, the U.S. market is relatively open in comparison to those of other OECD [Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development] countries, as detailed in the World Bank's 1987 World Development Report, which focuses on trade and economic development. In a study of LDC [less developed country] exports in 1986, the World Bank found that 23% of exports to the European Economic Community were subject to "hard-core" nontariff barriers (NTBs), compared to 22% of exports to Japan and 17% of exports to the United States (hard-core NTBs are those most likely to restrict trade and include such measures as import bars and voluntary export restraints).

### The Need for Policy Reform

The World Development Report of the World Bank carries an extensive look at macroeconomic policies in LDCs from 1963-85. The report presents strong evidence that economies which are more outward-oriented perform better than those which are inward-oriented. This trend has held true despite the element of protectionism in OECD countries. International financial statistics also document intraregional trade. In recent years, this has been around 13% of total trade in Latin America and around 27% for Asia, which suggests that many barriers to trade between Latin nations have yet to be addressed.

In its analysis of trade, the World Bank makes great effort to emphasize that many other factors than trade policy affect the ability of a country to industrialize and grow. It also concludes



at stepped-up efforts at policy reform, along the lines I have discussed, are crucial to sustained development. The message I wish to leave with you is that while I am confident that the World Bank, other international financial institutions, and the United States will continue to assist Latin America on its road for economic development, if a certain direction in economic policymaking is not undertaken by the Latin American nations themselves, it is difficult to see how sustained growth can be restored. No country on record has achieved solid growth without these essential policies. They include establishing and maintaining market exchange rates, bringing general price inflation under control, establishing a freer trade policy, creating true economic incentives by allowing the price mechanism to function, abolishing greater fiscal discipline, and making government a positive agent for creating confidence rather than an all-powerful interfering and disruptive actor in the economy. ■

**Current Actions**

**MULTILATERAL**

**Arms Limitation**

Treaty concerning inspections relating to the treaty of Dec. 8, 1987, between the U.S. and the U.S.S.R. on the elimination of their intermediate-range and shorter range missiles, with annex. Signed at Geneva Dec. 11, 1987. Enters into force following notification of approval by all parties in accordance with their constitutional procedures, agreement shall enter into force simultaneously with treaty.

**Signatures:** Belgium, Fed. Rep. of Germany, Italy, Netherlands, U.K., U.S., etc. 11, 1987.

**Authentication**

Protocol on the authentic quadrilingual text of the convention on international civil aviation (TIAS 1591), with annex. Done at Montreal Sept. 30, 1977.<sup>1</sup>

**Acceptance deposited:** Australia, Dec. 2, 1977.

**Commodities—Common Fund**

Treaty concerning establishing the Common Fund for Commodities, with schedules, Done at Geneva June 27, 1980.<sup>1</sup>

**Signature:** Swaziland, Nov. 18, 1987.

**Approval deposited:** U.S.S.R., Dec. 8, 1987.

**Conservation**

Convention on wetlands of international importance especially as waterfowl habitat.

Done at Ramsar Feb. 2, 1971. Entered into force Dec. 21, 1975; for the U.S. Dec. 18, 1986. [Senate] Treaty Doc. 99-28.

Protocol to the convention on wetlands of international importance especially as waterfowl habitat of Feb. 2, 1971. Done at Paris Dec. 3, 1982. Entered into force Oct. 1, 1986; for the U.S. Dec. 18, 1986.

**Proclaimed by the President:** Oct. 2, 1987.

Amendment to the convention of Mar. 3, 1973, on international trade in endangered species of wild fauna and flora (TIAS 8249). Done at Bonn June 22, 1979. Entered into force Apr. 13, 1987.

**Proclaimed by the President:** Oct. 2, 1987.

**Consular Relations**

Vienna convention on consular relations. Done at Vienna Apr. 24, 1963. Entered into force Mar. 19, 1967; for the U.S. Dec. 24, 1969. TIAS 6820.

**Notification of succession deposited:** Dominica, Nov. 24, 1987.

**Diplomatic Relations**

Vienna convention on diplomatic relations. Done at Vienna Apr. 18, 1961. Entered into force Apr. 24, 1964; for the U.S. Dec. 13, 1972. TIAS 7502.

**Notification of succession deposited:** Dominica, Nov. 24, 1987.

**Hydrography**

Convention on the International Hydrographic Organization, with annexes. Done at Monaco May 3, 1967. Entered into force Sept. 22, 1970. TIAS 6933.

**Accession deposited:** Oman, July 31, 1987.

**Industrial Property—Classification**

Nice agreement concerning the international classification of goods and services for the purposes of the registration of marks of June 15, 1957, as revised. Done at Geneva May 13, 1977. Entered into force Feb. 6, 1979; for the U.S. Feb. 29, 1984.

**Notification of ratification deposited:** U.S.S.R., Sept. 30, 1987.<sup>2</sup>

**Jute**

International agreement on jute and jute products, 1982, with annexes. Done at Geneva Oct. 1, 1982. Entered into force provisionally Jan. 9, 1984; definitively Aug. 26, 1986.

**Approval deposited:** European Economic Community (EEC), Dec. 16, 1987.

**Marine Pollution**

Annex V to the international convention for the prevention of pollution from ships, 1973. Done at London Nov. 2, 1973.<sup>1</sup> [Senate] Treaty Doc. 100-3.

**Instrument of ratification signed:** Dec. 2, 1987.

**Ratification deposited:** U.S., Dec. 30, 1987.

Convention for the protection and development of the marine environment of the wider Caribbean region, with annex. Done at Cartagena Mar. 24, 1983. Entered into force Oct. 11, 1986. [Senate] Treaty Doc. 98-13.

**Ratification deposited:** Panama, Oct. 7, 1987.

Protocol concerning cooperation in combating oil spills in the wider Caribbean region, with annex. Done at Cartagena Mar. 24, 1983. Entered into force Oct. 11, 1986.

**Ratifications deposited:** Grenada, Aug. 17, 1987; Panama, Oct. 7, 1987.

**Narcotic Drugs**

Single convention on narcotic drugs. Done at New York Mar. 30, 1961. Entered into force Dec. 13, 1964; for the U.S. June 24, 1967. TIAS 6298.

Protocol amending the single convention on narcotic drugs. Done at Geneva Mar. 25, 1972. Entered into force Aug. 8, 1975.

TIAS 8118.

**Accession deposited:** Brunei, Nov. 25, 1987.

Convention on psychotropic substances. Done at Vienna Feb. 21, 1971. Entered into force Aug. 16, 1976; for the U.S. July 15, 1980. TIAS 9725.

**Accession deposited:** Brunei, Nov. 24, 1987.

**Pollution**

Convention for the protection of the ozone layer, with annexes. Done at Vienna Mar. 22, 1985. [Senate] Treaty Doc. 99-9.

**Approval deposited:** France, Dec. 4, 1987.

**Ratification deposited:** Switzerland, Dec. 17, 1987.

**Red Cross**

Protocol additional to the Geneva conventions of Aug. 12, 1949 (TIAS 3362, 3363, 3364, 3365), and relating to the protection of victims of international armed conflicts (Protocol I), with annexes. Done at Geneva June 8, 1977. Entered into force Dec. 7, 1978.<sup>3</sup>

**Accession deposited:** Saudi Arabia, Aug. 21, 1987.<sup>4</sup>

**Ratifications deposited:** Burkina Faso, Oct. 20, 1987; Guatemala, Oct. 19, 1987.

Protocol additional to the Geneva conventions of Aug. 12, 1949 (TIAS 3362, 3363, 3364, 3365), and relating to the protection of victims of noninternational armed conflicts (Protocol II). Done at Geneva June 8, 1977. Entered into force Dec. 7, 1978.<sup>3</sup>

[Senate] Treaty Doc. 100-2.

**Ratifications deposited:** Burkina Faso, Oct. 20, 1987; Guatemala, Oct. 19, 1987.

**Refugees**

Protocol relating to the status of refugees. Done at New York Jan. 31, 1967. Entered into force Oct. 4, 1967; for the U.S. Nov. 1, 1968. TIAS 6577.

**Accession deposited:** Malawi, Dec. 10, 1987.

**Rubber**

International natural rubber agreement, 1987, with annexes. Done at Geneva Mar. 20, 1987.<sup>1</sup> [Senate] Treaty Doc. 100-9.

**Signatures:** Belgium, Denmark, European Economic Community (EEC), France, Fed.

# TREATIES

Rep. of Germany, Greece, Ireland, Italy, Japan, Luxembourg, Portugal, Spain, U.K., Dec. 18, 1987.

## Scientific Cooperation

Memorandum of understanding for collaboration on advanced materials and standards. Entered into force Apr. 2, 1987.

Parties: Canada, July 9, 1986; European Communities, Mar. 13, 1986; France, Jan. 30, 1986; Fed. Rep. of Germany, Apr. 2, 1987; Italy, June 4, 1986; Japan, Oct. 7, 1986; U.K., Feb. 10, 1986; U.S., Jan. 30, 1986.

## Seals

Convention for the conservation of Antarctic seals, with annex and final act. Done at London June 1, 1972. Entered into force Mar. 11, 1978. TIAS 8826.

Accession deposited: Fed. Rep. of Germany, Sept. 30, 1987.<sup>2, 5</sup>

## Trade

Agreement on technical barriers to trade (standards code). Done at Geneva Apr. 12, 1979. Entered into force Jan. 1, 1980. TIAS 9616.

Ratification deposited: Greece, Oct. 16, 1987.

Agreement on implementation of article VII of the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (customs valuation code). Done at Geneva Apr. 12, 1979, as amended by protocol done at Geneva Nov. 1, 1979. Entered into force Jan. 1, 1981. TIAS 10402.

Acceptance deposited: Zimbabwe, Oct. 9, 1987.<sup>3</sup>

United Nations convention on contracts for the international sale of goods. Done at Vienna Apr. 11, 1980. Entered into force Jan. 1, 1988. [52 Fed. Reg. 6262]

Ratifications deposited: Finland, Sweden, Dec. 15, 1987.

## Trade—Textiles

Protocol extending the arrangement of Dec. 20, 1973, regarding international trade in textiles (TIAS 7840). Done at Geneva July 31, 1986. Entered into force Aug. 1, 1986.

Acceptance deposited: Switzerland, July 21, 1987.

Ratification deposited: Austria, Sept. 4, 1987.

## Transportation—Foodstuffs

Agreement on the international carriage of perishable foodstuffs and on the special equipment to be used for such carriage (ATP), with annexes. Done at Geneva Sept. 1, 1979. Entered into force Nov. 21, 1976; for the U.S. Jan. 20, 1984.

Accession deposited: Hungary, Dec. 4, 1987.

## United Nations—Privileges and Immunities

Convention on the privileges and immunities of the United Nations. Adopted by the General Assembly of the United Nations on Feb. 13, 1946. Entered into force

Sept. 17, 1946; for the U.S. Apr. 29, 1970. TIAS 6900.

Notification of succession deposited: Dominica, Nov. 24, 1987.

## Whaling

International whaling convention and schedule of whaling regulations. Done at Washington Dec. 2, 1946. Entered into force Nov. 10, 1948. TIAS 1849.

Notification of withdrawal: Philippines, Dec. 7, 1987; effective June 30, 1988.

## Wheat

Wheat trade convention, 1986. Done at London Mar. 18, 1986. Entered into force July 1, 1986.<sup>6</sup> [Senate] Treaty Doc. 100-1.

Accession deposited: Algeria, Nov. 23, 1987.

## BILATERAL

### Bolivia

Agreement concerning reciprocal exemption from income tax of income derived from the international operation of ships and aircraft. Effected by exchange of notes at Washington July 21 and Nov. 23, 1987. Entered into force Nov. 23, 1987; effective with respect to taxable years beginning on or after Jan. 1, 1987.

### Burkina Faso

International express mail agreement, with detailed regulations. Signed at Ouagadougou and Washington Oct. 12, and Nov. 5, 1987. Entered into force Dec. 5, 1987.

### Egypt

Grant agreement for canal cities water and wastewater Phase II project. Signed at Cairo Sept. 24, 1987. Entered into force Sept. 24, 1987.

### Guatemala

Agreement for sales of agricultural commodities. Signed at Guatemala May 26, 1987.

Entered into force: Nov. 5, 1987.

### Hungary

Program of cooperation and exchanges in culture, education, science, and technology for 1988 and 1989, with annexes. Signed at Budapest Nov. 13, 1987. Entered into force Nov. 13, 1987; effective Jan. 1, 1988.

### Italy

Treaty on mutual assistance in criminal matters, with memorandum of understanding. Signed at Rome Nov. 9, 1982. Entered into force Nov. 13, 1985.

Proclaimed by the President: Dec. 2, 1987.

### Jamaica

Agreement relating to and amending the agreement of Jan. 15, 1987, as amended, for sale of agricultural commodities. Signed at Kingston Nov. 9, 1987. Entered into force Nov. 9, 1987.

## Korea

Agreement amending and extending the agreement of July 26, 1982 (TIAS 10571), concerning fisheries off the coasts of the U.S. Effected by exchange of notes at Seoul May 11 and 20, 1987.

Entered into force: Oct. 27, 1987.

Agreement extending the agreement of Nov. 22, 1976 (TIAS 8456), as extended, relating to scientific and technical cooperation. Effected by exchange of notes at Seoul Nov. 4 and 6, 1987. Entered into force Nov. 6, 1987.

## Malaysia

Agreement amending agreement of July and 11, 1985, as amended by agreement of Aug. 3, 1987, relating to trade in certain textiles, textile products, and apparel. Effected by exchange of letters at Washington Sept. 9 and 15, 1987. Entered into force Sept. 15, 1987.

## Mexico

Minute 273 of the International Boundary and Water Commission: recommendation for the solution of the border sanitation problem at Naco, Arizona—Naco, Sonora. Signed at El Paso Mar. 19, 1987. Entered into force Apr. 15, 1987.

Minute 274 of the International Boundary and Water Commission: joint project for improvement of the quality of waters of the New River at Calexico, California—Mexicali, Baja California, with joint report. Signed at Ciudad Juarez Apr. 15, 1987. Entered into force May 13, 1987.

Agreement concerning the provision of training related to defense articles under the U.S. international military education and training (IMET) program. Effected exchange of notes at Mexico Aug. 21 and Sept. 24, 1987. Entered into force Sept. 1987.

Understanding concerning a framework principles and procedures for consultative regarding trade and investment relation with agenda. Signed at Mexico Nov. 6, 1987. Entered into force Nov. 6, 1987.

Treaty on cooperation for mutual legal assistance. Signed at Mexico Dec. 9, 1987. Enters into force on date of exchange of instruments of ratification.

## Papua New Guinea

Memorandum of understanding concerning the operation of the INTELPOST field trial, with details of implementation. Signed at Boroko and Washington June 1 and Nov. 23, 1987. Entered into force Jan. 1, 1988.

## Saudi Arabia

Understanding on civil aviation. Signed Washington Dec. 1, 1987. Entered into force Dec. 1, 1987.

## Sweden

Memorandum of understanding relating to the principles governing mutual cooperation in the defense procurement area, with

ated exchange of letters. Signed at Washington and Stockholm June 11 and 16, 1987. Entered into force June 16, 1987.

**S.S.R.**

on the elimination of their intermediate-range and shorter range missiles, in memorandum of understanding and protocols. Signed at Washington Dec. 8, 1987. Enters into force on the date of the exchange of instruments of ratification. Agreement amending and supplementing the air transport agreement of Nov. 4, 1986, as amended (TIAS 6135, 6489). Effected by exchange of notes at Washington Dec. 9, 1987. Entered into force Dec. 9, 1987.

Agreement extending the agreement of Nov. 26, 1976, as amended and extended, concerning fisheries off the coasts of the U.S. (TIAS 8528, 10531). Effected by exchange of notes at Washington June 26 and July 24, 1987.

Entered into force: Dec. 8, 1987.

**United Arab Emirates**

General security of military information agreement. Signed at Abu Dhabi May 23, 1987. Entered into force May 23, 1987.

**United Kingdom**

Investment incentive agreement, on behalf of Anguilla. Effected by exchange of notes at London Nov. 9, 1987. Entered into force Nov. 9, 1987.

Supersedes as to Anguilla agreement of Nov. 21, 1968, relating to investment guarantees. TIAS 6596.

Agreement extending the agreement of July 26, 1984, as extended, concerning the Cayman Islands and narcotics activities.

Effected by exchange of notes at Washington Nov. 27, 1987. Entered into force Nov. 27, 1987; effective Nov. 29, 1987.

- <sup>1</sup> Not in force.
- <sup>2</sup> With declaration(s).
- <sup>3</sup> Not in force for the U.S.
- <sup>4</sup> With reservation(s).
- <sup>5</sup> Applicable to Berlin (West).
- <sup>6</sup> In force provisionally for the U.S. ■

**Department of State**

Free single copies of the following Department of State publications are available from the Correspondence Management Division, Bureau of Public Affairs, Department of State, Washington, D.C. 20520.

**President Reagan**

The Washington Summit: Progress Toward Peace, TV address to the nation, Dec. 10, 1987 (Current Policy #1032).

**Secretary Schultz**

National Success and International Stability in a Time of Change, World Affairs Council of Washington, Dec. 4, 1987 (Current Policy #1029).

**Africa**

South Africa: What Are America's Options?, Deputy Assistant Secretary Freeman, World Affairs Council of Inland Southern California, Riverside, Dec. 9, 1987 (Current Policy #1033).

**Arms Control**

INF Treaty: A Success Story (GIST, Dec. 1987).

**Economics**

Protectionism and Liberalization, Under Secretary Wallis, Propeller Club, Istanbul, Oct. 26, 1987 (Current Policy #1027).

Protectionism and Trade Barriers, Under Secretary Wallis, 9th German-American Roundtable on NATO issues, Oct. 29, 1987 (Current Policy #1028).

Export Control Policy and COCOM, Senior Representative Wendt, Subcommittee on International Economic Policy and Trade, House Foreign Affairs Committee, Nov. 3, 1987, and Conference on Strategic Export Controls sponsored by the Royal Institute of International Affairs at Chatham House, London, Nov. 19, 1987 (Current Policy #1031).

**Europe**

European Parliament (GIST, Dec. 1987).

**General**

Second Parliamentary Democracy Conference (GIST, Dec. 1987)

**South Asia**

Afghanistan: Eight Years of Soviet Occupation, Dec. 1987 (Special Report #173). Afghanistan (GIST, Dec. 1987).

**Western Hemisphere**

Policies for Economic Development in Latin America, Director of the Office of Regional Economic Policy Whitney, Peruvian Center for International Studies, Lima, Nov. 25, 1987 (Current Policy #1030).

U.S.-Mexican Relations (GIST, Dec. 1987). ■

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Press releases may be obtained from the Office of Press Relations, Department of State, Washington, D.C. 20520.

no.	Date	Subject
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29	12/7	Shultz: interview on ABC-TV's "This Week With David Brinkley," Dec. 6.
30	12/7	Shultz: interview on NBC-TV's "Today Show."
31	12/7	Shultz: address and question-and-answer session, Washington World Affairs Council, Dec. 4.
32	12/9	Shultz: interview on CBS-TV's "Evening News," Dec. 8.
33	12/8	Shultz: interview on "MacNeil-Lehrer Newshour."
34	12/9	Shultz: interview on CNN-TV's "Daybreak."
35	12/10	Shultz, Gorbachev: luncheon toasts, Dec. 9.
36	12/10	Shultz: interview on ABC-TV's "World News Tonight," Dec. 9.
37	12/10	Shultz, Shevardnadze: remarks after signing of diplomatic notes ceremony, Dec. 9.

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*239	12/11	Program for the official working visit to Washington, D.C., of Italian President Gorla, Dec. 15-18.
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*246	12/18	Shultz: news conference, London, Dec. 16.
*247	12/18	Shultz: remarks at Christmas tree lighting ceremony, Dec. 17.
*248	12/18	Shultz: dinner toast in honor of Italian Prime Minister Gorla, Dec. 17.
249	12/30	<i>American Foreign Policy: Current Documents, 1986</i> , released.
250	12/31	<i>American Foreign Policy: Current Documents, 1982. Supplement</i> , released.

\*Not printed in the BULLETIN. ■

## Current Documents Volumes Released

### CURRENT DOCUMENTS, 1986, DEC. 30, 1987<sup>1</sup>

The Department of State, on December 30, 1987, released *American Foreign Policy: Current Documents, 1986*.

This volume presents official public expressions of policy that best set forth the goals and objectives of U.S. foreign policy in 1986.

The volume presents the principal official pronouncements on the foremost foreign affairs events of 1986, including the Reagan-Gorbachev meeting at Reykjavik, the progress of the INF [intermediate-range nuclear forces] and START [strategic arms reduction talks] arms control negotiations, and the U.S. reaction to the Chernobyl nuclear accident. Also covered are military and diplomatic actions against Libya, U.S. policy toward South Africa, U.S. assistance to the Nicaraguan resistance, Central American peace negotiations, and the first revelations of the Iran-*contra* affair. Documentation is also included on general principles governing U.S. foreign policy as enunciated by President Reagan and Secretary of State Shultz, the defense budget, the Strategic Defense Initiative, U.S. limitations on the Soviet Mission at the United Nations, the Daniloff affair, the Tokyo economic summit, trade issues, the immigration Reform and Control Act, human rights, oil and energy, narcotics, terrorism, and the war in the Persian Gulf.

The volume is a collection of texts of major official messages, addresses, statements, interviews, press conferences and briefings, reports, congressional testimony, and communications by the White House, the Department of State, and other Federal agencies or officials involved in the foreign policy process. All of the documents included here were previously published or released. This 863-page volume, arranged chronologically within 15 geographic and topical chapters, includes a table of contents, editorial annotations, a list of names and abbreviations, and an index.

The Department of State has published the *American Foreign Policy* documentary series since 1955. Following the publication of three volumes covering 1941 to 1955, annual volumes entitled *American Foreign Policy: Current Documents* were issued for the years 1956-1967. After an interruption,

the series was resumed with the publication in August 1983 of *American Foreign Policy: Basic Documents, 1977-1980*. The annual volumes were revived with the publication of *American Foreign Policy: Current Documents, 1981*. Volumes for 1982 through 1985 have also been published.

Microfiche supplements to the 1981 and 1982 printed volumes are available. The release of microfiche supplements is planned for the later printed volumes in the series. These supplements include the full texts of many documents printed in part in the published volumes and provide a larger and more complete selection of documents.

*American Foreign Policy: Current Documents, 1986* was prepared in the Office of the Historian, Bureau of Public Affairs, Department of State. Copies of this volume (Department of State Publication No. 9620; GPO Stock No. 044-000-02194-3) may be purchased for \$26 (domestic prepaid) from the Superintendent of Documents, U.S. Government Printing Office, Washington, D.C. 20402. Checks or money orders should be made payable to the Superintendent of Documents.

### CURRENT DOCUMENTS, 1982, SUPPLEMENT, DEC. 31, 1987<sup>2</sup>

The Department of State on December 31, 1987, released *American Foreign Policy: Current Documents, 1982. Supplement*. This microfiche publication supplements the printed volume *American Foreign Policy: Current Documents, 1982*, published in June 1985. That volume, prepared in the Office of the Historian, Bureau of Public Affairs, is part of the Department of State *American Foreign Policy* series begun in 1950. Annual volumes for 1983, 1984, 1985, and 1986 have also been printed.

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the printed books. The supplements preserve and disseminate important portions of the historical foreign affairs record.

The 1982 supplement comprises more than 900 documents totaling about 8,000 pages on 85 microfiche cards and includes the full texts of many documents printed in part in the printed volume. Four series of documents are included, divided into part I. Department of State press releases; II. Department of State and White House special press briefings (on-the-record and background briefings on specific issues or events); III. Department of State daily press briefings; and IV. U.S. Mission to the United Nations press releases. An accompanying printed guide contains a table of contents and a list of the documents for parts I, II, and IV. For part III, the guide includes a comprehensive index of subjects and names mentioned in the Department of State daily press briefings.

*American Foreign Policy: Current Documents, 1982. Supplement* was prepared in the Office of the Historian, Bureau of Public Affairs, Department of State. Copies may be purchased for \$20.00 from the Superintendent of Documents, U.S. Government Printing Office (Department of State Publication No. 9501, GPO Stock No. 044-000-02153-6). Checks or money orders should be made payable to the Superintendent of Documents.

<sup>1</sup> Press release 249 of Dec. 30, 1987

<sup>2</sup> Press release 250 of Dec. 31. ■

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Second Class Mail  
Postage and Fees Paid  
U.S. Government Printing Office  
ISSN 0041-7610

OFFICIAL BUSINESS  
Penalty for Private Use \$300

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# *Department of State bulletin*

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Volume 88 / Number 2132 / March 1988

The DEPARTMENT OF STATE BULLETIN, published by the Office of Public Communication in the Bureau of Public Affairs, is the official record of U.S. foreign policy. Its purpose is to provide the public, the Congress, and government agencies with information on developments in U.S. foreign relations and the work of the Department of State and the Foreign Service. The BULLETIN's contents include major addresses and news conferences of the President and the Secretary of State; statements made before congressional committees by the Secretary and other senior State Department officials; selected press releases issued by the White House, the Department, and the U.S. Mission to the United Nations; and treaties and other agreements to which the United States is or may become a party. Special features, articles, and other supportive material (such as maps, charts, photographs, and graphs) are published frequently to provide additional information on current issues but should not necessarily be interpreted as official U.S. policy statements.

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The Secretary of State has determined that the publication of this periodical is necessary in the transaction of the public business required by law of this Department. Use of funds for printing this periodical has been approved by the Director of the Office of Management and Budget through September 30, 1988.

DEPARTMENT OF STATE BULLETIN (ISSN 0041-7610) is published monthly (plus annual index) by the Department of State, 2201 C Street, NW, Washington, D.C. 20520. Second-class postage paid at Washington, D.C., and additional mailing offices. POSTMASTER: Send address changes to Superintendent of Documents, U.S. Government Printing Office, Washington, D.C. 20402.

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For sale by the Superintendent of Documents, U.S. Government Printing Office, Washington, D.C. 20402.



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# Afghanistan: Eight Years of Soviet Occupation

Following report was prepared by [Name], Karp, Afghanistan analyst, with assistance of other analysts in the [Name] of Intelligence and Research Department officials. It is part of [Name] annual series of Special Reports on [Name] situation in Afghanistan.

## Introduction and Summary

Eight years of brutal war on the Afghan people, the Soviet attempt to control Afghanistan has failed. The conflict between the Soviet occupation and the Afghan resistance grinds on but it has changed. Death, destruction and the suffering of an innocent people continue, but military, diplomatic, and political events have moved on from the Soviets. These pressures lead Moscow to end its horrible ultimately futile endeavor in Afghanistan.

In the 8th year of Soviet occupation the military initiative in many areas passed to the *mujahidin*. They conducted a higher level of combat, which continued throughout the year and was subject to seasonal fluctuations. The regime announced a cease-fire in January and extended it in July and again in November, but its forces did not keep the cease-fire commitment. Soviet forces also were more active. The Soviets ultimately adopted a more reactive, defensive posture. In the latter part of the year, they pulled back from several key bases. The Soviets and their Afghan clients have seen their unquestioned dominance of the skies slip. They suffered increased losses in the air on the ground. Kabul's forces decreased repeatedly, sometimes by the hundreds, and force levels are maintained mostly by press-gang recruitment.

Despite a year-long effort, the Soviet proxies in Kabul failed to entice either their Afghan opponents or prominent neutrals to support or join a government dominated by Najibullah (Najib) and his People's Democratic Party of Afghanistan (PDPA). In January, Najib announced a campaign for "national reconciliation." Offers of some form of participation have been made to Afghanistan's former monarch, Zahir Shah, to a variety of prominent non-party Afghans, and to leaders of the resistance, who rejected these offers and refused to become "reconciled" to Soviet domination (even if disguised in Afghan clothes). The regime made more concessions over the year that also were unacceptable to the Afghan people.

The PDPA, Moscow's chosen instrument of rule, has become weaker. Party factionalism was further complicated by the purge of former party leader Babrak Karmal and his followers. Although Najib has little personal support, even within the party, he had himself named head of state in September. In December, when a new constitution was imposed by an illegitimate, party-packed assembly, Najib had himself elected president. At that session the regime changed its name from the "Democratic Republic of Afghanistan" (DRA) to the "Republic of Afghanistan" (RA).

The Afghan resistance continues to challenge Soviet and regime control from every corner of the country. In the last year, however, it became a greater threat. *Mujahidin* military capabilities grew in many ways—better cooperation and air defense meant that many areas of the country were effectively free of Soviet/regime control. *Mujahidin* morale is at an all-time high. Political cooperation within the seven-party resistance alliance in

Peshawar improved. In October, the Alliance members selected Maulavi Mohammed Yunis Khalis of the *Hezb-e-Islami* (Khalis) party to an 18-month term as its *Rais*, or leader.

The UN-sponsored indirect talks on the Afghan issue continued in 1987. The proximity talks—between Pakistan and the Kabul regime—narrowed differences on a timetable for the withdrawal of Soviet troops, the only outstanding issue. In two rounds, in March, and September, the gap narrowed to 16 months offered by Kabul and 8 months by Pakistan. By the end of the year, Najib suggested Kabul might accept 12 months or less.

Diplomatically, the Soviets tried to improve the government's international legitimacy by sending Kabul emissaries on a 6-month-long worldwide diplomatic and public relations campaign. Kabul scored some gains in diplomatic recognition, but the overall effort failed. Other countries continued to condemn the occupation and reject the Soviet assertion that there is any solution to the Afghan issue short of Soviet withdrawal. In November, at the General Assembly, 123 nations, the largest total to date, voted for a resolution calling for the immediate and complete withdrawal of foreign forces from Afghanistan. The resolution has passed with increasing margins every year since the Soviet invasion on December 27, 1979.

**Outlook.** The prospect of peace has great appeal for a people who have suffered 9 years of tyrannical rule backed by 8 years of foreign occupation. But the Afghans have made it clear that they will not accept peace at the price of continued foreign rule.

Moscow has stated repeatedly that "a political decision to withdraw has already been made." Soviet public statements on the eve of the December

Gorbachev-Reagan summit in Washington, D.C., raised expectations that the U.S.S.R. might bring an acceptable withdrawal proposal. In fact, the Soviets refused to commit themselves to an early "date certain" for a troop withdrawal.

The world will remain skeptical of Soviet intent until the Soviet Union agrees to and implements a settlement which provides for the rapid and complete withdrawal of its troops without preconditions.

## Military Activity

In many ways 1987 can be described as the year of the *mujahidin*, a year in which the resistance began to seize the initiative from the Soviets. Unlike past years, when the Soviets exercised more choice in their operations, the *mujahidin* generally dictated the pace and location of combat.

The level of fighting was consistently higher than in the past and less subject to seasonal variation. Combat escalated dramatically in the winter. Summer combat also was at historic levels, particularly in the Qandahar area, Kabul environs, and in Paktia Province. By late December, heavy fighting still raged in much of the eastern part of the country; the expected winter decline in fighting had not occurred.

### The War of the Cities

The Soviets and the regime increased their emphasis on urban security in 1987. As a result, *mujahidin* penetration and operations in major urban centers became more difficult and less frequent. The Soviets improved defensive belts around the cities, and resistance rocket attacks had to be made from greater distances. In the cases of Kabul and Qandahar, the defensive posture required costly and almost constant operations around the cities' edges to keep the *mujahidin* off balance. The sights, sounds, and casualties from nearby combat served to curb any increased sense of urban security.

**Kabul.** Kabul remains key to international perceptions of the security situation in Afghanistan, but calm in the city often coincides with heavy fighting in the surrounding areas.

Soviet upgrading of the defensive infrastructure—now three rings extending up to 20 miles from downtown—prevented major military losses like the spectacular destruction of the Kharga arms storage facility in 1986. About 22,000 Soviet troops are in the Kabul vicinity. They are supported by about 10,000 Afghan army troops and considerable numbers of militia, state security (KHAD), and *Sarandoy* forces.

Whenever there is a major security alert—because of threat, regime event, or high-level visit—the Soviets take charge of security in the capital. Soviet tanks guard key intersections every night during curfew. Security concerns were particularly apparent during the January visit of Foreign Minister Shevardnadze and CPSU [Communist Party of the Soviet Union] adviser Dobrynin; Kabul skies were well lit by the flares dropped by Soviet escort aircraft during their arrival.

Nevertheless, security remains a major problem, even in the city itself. The frequency of small arms fire from Soviet or Afghan security posts reflects the level of tension in the city. Protracted firing or exchanges usually indicate that the *mujahidin* have been spotted or have attacked security elements.

Intraparty or intraregime factional disputes also erupt frequently, with exchanges of fire clearly audible from regime installations. Urban dislocation, refugee influx, and degenerating regime cohesion also contributed to an increase of crime and attacks by regime and Soviet personnel on civilians, particularly in the spring.

The *mujahidin* focus their attacks on regime military and official and Soviet targets. Enjoying strong popular support, they avoid attacks which would harm the general population. The resistance may have reduced rocketing in recent years in order to avoid civilian casualties, although they also were deterred by Soviet security measures. Rocketings focused on specific targets, such as on the Soviet cultural center in

January, and four rockets that disrupted Najib's November *Loya Jirg*. In September, the Soviet Embassy complex was hit by mortars. Bombing increased in 1987.

**Kabul Vicinity.** If the capital is somewhat quieter this year, its roundings saw record combat. Bagram Airbase to the north of Kabul, perhaps the most important Soviet base in the country, often was hit by rocket attacks.

The area along the Salang highway to the Soviet Union was the scene of fierce fighting most of the year. In spring resistance attacks triggered severe Soviet retaliation in the Shomali area that caused numerous refugees to stream into Kabul. In August, this mile basin was hit by its most destructive Soviet attack since the invasion. Thousands of residents fled indiscriminate rocket, artillery, and air bombardment. Both *mujahidin* and Soviets suffered heavy casualties, but regime losses were limited to heavy desert. The highway itself was closed several times by resistance attacks and once in April, by a snowslide that completely destroyed a 70-man Soviet post at Khenjan, north of the Salang tunnel.

To the east of Kabul, in early July a coordinated attack on the Kabul-Jalalabad highway caused the loss of several Soviet outposts and a number of vehicles. In the west, the level of fighting fluctuated in Paghman throughout the year, beginning with an unusual winter offensive by the *mujahidin*. Artillery flashes and bomb blasts here were visible in Kabul. Soviet operations in August destroyed orchards to eliminate *mujahidin* cover.

**Herat and the West.** There are continued reports of heavy fighting and around Herat. The *mujahidin* were particularly effective in the spring. Damage in the city remains severe, though the regime has launched some repair programs. The Soviets have bulldozed a large swath across the west part of the city and turned the west outskirts into a free-fire zone. By late in the year, these security measures have apparently succeeded in limiting *mujahidin* operations in the city.


Resistance forces continue to operate outside the city, where they are targets of intense, but not precise, high-precision bombing. Regional commander Abdul Khan continues to broaden areas of influence (see Central Afghanistan). One of the largest regime formations in the Herat area decided to the resistance in early fall.

**Qandahar.** Qandahar remains a corn city. Soviet/regime forces continued during the winter, when Qandahar is traditionally the major theater of conflict. *Spetsnaz* (Special Forces) operations focused on reconnaissance resupply efforts and caravan destruction. But their efforts failed to have a major impact, as the resistance in Qandahar remained well stocked and able to move the logistics train deeper inside the country.

In Qandahar, the resistance is well organized with a local council, including mujahideen, presided over by a nonpartisan elder. Most actions involve the *ahidin* from several parties; they choose a leader from among the participating commanders at a war council. Early in the year, the resistance almost succeeded in gaining full control of the city from the regime.

By the onset of summer, the capital in southern Afghanistan and its surrounding areas had become the scene of the heaviest concentration of combat of the war. In June, Afghan forces led a drive up the Arghandab Valley. They were repelled back by well-entrenched *ahidin*, although prominent local commander Lala Malang was killed. Some military suffered severe losses, hundreds of troops deserted.

Soviet and regime forces launched several other operations over the summer. The regime was only able to probe troops for these operations by sending forces from all over Afghanistan, particularly the north. The long series of Soviet/regime drives into the Jwaj and Mahalajat Valleys were repelled and did not overwhelm resistance formations, but they did keep the *mujahidin* off balance. The Soviets missed the opportunity to extend the security belt around Qandahar. In addition,



tion, they bulldozed a grid network of roads through the old city, indiscriminately destroying homes and shops.

While resistance activity has been complicated, the *mujahidin* still operate in the city. Combat continued on a steady basis throughout the latter part of the year, with the *mujahidin* in full control of outlying areas.

In the latter part of the year, Soviet military correspondents in the Qandahar area painted a particularly grim picture. On September 18, an *Izvestiya* correspondent reported:

If you judge by newspaper reports, especially television portage, on what is happening in Afghanistan, especially in the south, you get the impression that columns of people returning home fill all the roads leading into Afghanistan, that the national reconciliation policy has already led to a situation where yesterday's enemies kiss each other in the city squares. But you go to Qandahar and you'll see how it really is.

The city is one big ruin. There is shooting all the time. Nobody would give a brass farthing for your life if you took it into your head, say, to walk down the street unarmed.

A Soviet drive established as many as 70 security posts to guard the road from Qandahar to the Pakistan border. These posts were manned with tribesmen loyal to militia leader Gen. Ismatullah Achekezai, who 2 years ago became the regime's prize defector from the *mujahidin*. In September, 35 groups belonging to six parties launched a coordinated attack along a 40-mile stretch and took many of the posts.

Ismatullah is a warlord without particular loyalty, who often fought party officials, especially Interior Minister Gulabzoi. In November, on his way into the Kabul *Loya Jirga* where he was a delegate, Ismatullah was wounded in a shootout with security guards. A number of his followers were killed in subsequent gunbattles. Whatever his ultimate fate, regime control in the south is shaken.

### The North

Over the past year, resistance activities markedly increased north of the Hindu Kush Mountains—once considered relatively secure for the Soviets—and even spilled over the Soviet border. *Mujahidin* actions included the storming of regime garrisons, a rocket attack on the city of Mazar-e-Sharif during the anniversary of the April coup, and a variety of attacks in the northwest (near the gasfields).

Comparatively little Soviet/regime offensive action occurred in the Panjsher Valley as *mujahidin* commander Masood concentrated his efforts north of the Hindu Kush. Following news of successes in the north, rumors spread that he was about to, as he did in 1985, storm the most exposed regime garrison in the valley, Peshghowr. In October, the base's defenders suddenly pulled further back into the valley, leaving Peshghowr to the *mujahidin*.

The Council of the North strengthened its organization and ties with parties other than the founding Jamiat-i-Islami. However, perhaps the heaviest fighting of the year anywhere in Afghanistan among *mujahidin* groups took place in this region.

*Mujahidin* in Masood's sphere are organized in four levels: self-defense units defend villages from attack; sec-



Commander Masood with captured Soviet artillery at Kalafgan. (Abdul Hafiz)

ond-level units defend whole valleys; mobile groups with training and heavy weapons attack and operate on a provincial level; and central units are the potential core of a professional resistance army and operate throughout the north. Extensively trained and experienced, they have been a crucial element in the garrison assaults. Fighters from a number of groups in the north and elsewhere have trained with Masood's units.

Northern council forces were responsible for some of the major resistance successes of the year. In July, they attacked and stormed Kalafgan, less than 50 miles from the Soviet border. More than 100 regime prisoners were taken, and large amounts of weapons, including light artillery, were seized. The operation was led by local *mujahidin*, including *Harakat-i Inqilab-i-Islami* (*Nabi*) forces, and planned by Masood. The garrison sits astride a major supply route for Soviet forces just inside Afghanistan. A late summer Soviet supply operation along this road was heavily contested by the *mujahidin*.

In October, local forces, *mujahid* from the Ittihad of Sayyaf, and coup forces overran the regime garrison at Koran va Monjan, in Badakshan, astride a critical supply path into the Panjsher.

Because of careful planning, Masood's assaults have been successful with relatively few casualties. The Soviet and the regime have not been able to recapture the garrisons overrun by Masood during the last 2 years.

Kabul broadly publicized the late summer defection of Abdul Rasul Phelwan, from Faryab Province in the northwest, who delivered French journalist Alain Guillo to the regime. The size of Phelwan's group testifies to the standing resistance presence in this sensitive region (near the gasfields at the Soviet border) which continued after his defection. In December 1988 Kabul media had reported that Phelwan had been killed by the regime security forces.

### Across the Soviet Border

The resistance has long operated across the Soviet/Afghan border, sometimes along traditional smuggling routes.


sally this movement has simply in-  
ded the distribution of Korans and  
y cards into the largely Muslim re-  
ies of Soviet Central Asia, but  
e have been occasional armed  
eks.

In 1987, for the first time, Soviet  
ia acknowledged two assaults, in  
ases after *mujahidin* claims were  
ayed in Western media. On March  
istance forces rocketed a match  
ory in Pyandzh, a city on the Amu  
za River border. Soviet media ac-  
vledged the raid in April. On April  
ASS reported that on April 9  
*mujahidin* slipped across the border  
attacked a contingent of Soviet  
er guards, killing two. It stated in  
h terms that the U.S.S.R. would  
everything necessary to protect its  
ler. Soon after, KGB chief  
brikov visited the area and ad-  
sed the border guards about the  
at to Soviet security. By May, So-  
media denied the existence of  
*mujahidin* incursions, which had  
d off. By the end of the year, how-  
; there was at least one additional  
*mujahidin* action inside the U.S.S.R.  
After both raids Soviet forces from  
U.S.S.R. immediately launched  
1 counterinsurgent and reprisal  
ats on Konduz and Takhar Provinces  
n apparent effort to construct a  
*zon sanitaire* south of the border.  
ilian casualties were enormous, and  
erous villages were destroyed. Ref-  
es from these attacks constituted  
most visible—and appeared the  
st miserable—group that entered  
istan all year. Few refugees had  
viously fled the north.

### Western Afghanistan

*Mujahidin* activity increased in the  
tern provinces. Several large Soviet  
ime operations occurred, but the  
-to-day Soviet/regime presence  
lined.

**Nangarhar and the Konar Valley.**  
ch of Nangarhar has become liber-  
d territory. Foreign journalists noted  
ners planting in areas under  
*mujahidin* control that previously had  
n abandoned. The provincial capital,  
alabad, was under constant re-  
sistance pressure. The road to Pakistan



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remained open, but the *mujahidin*  
exerted nearly as much control over  
what travels on it as the regime.

In late October and November, a  
long awaited *mujahidin* assault hit a  
number of Soviet and regime posts and  
garrisons in the Konar Valley. The op-  
eration—one of the most broadly coor-  
dinated operations of the war—involved  
several parties and attacks on almost  
every bivouac, from Barikowt almost to  
the Kabul River. Barikowt did not fall  
but remained under siege as it has been  
since the war began. A concentrated  
attack on the Soviet garrison at Asmar  
was an example of increased *mujahidin*  
readiness to target Soviets, as opposed  
to Kabul regime installations. Soviet  
and regime forces took substantial  
losses, but all garrisons in the valley  
held.

**Paktia.** Paktia Province, on the  
border of Pakistan, is the site of heavy  
resistance concentration and a hub of  
transport routes. It has been the scene  
of some of the heaviest fighting of the  
war.

In late May, a multiregimental  
force of about 5,000 Soviet troops  
moved to attack *mujahidin* near Ali  
Khel, in one of the key battles of the  
conflict. They were backed by tanks,  
armored personnel carriers, and artil-  
lery, including 152mm self-propelled  
guns along with Kabul forces.

The Soviet assault was accom-  
panied by intense air attacks, but the  
attackers dropped bombs from high al-  
titudes, apparently trying to stay out of  
the reach of *mujahidin* defense. Sev-  
eral Soviet/regime aircraft—perhaps a  
dozen—were shot down. Forced to rely



### Central Afghanistan

Afghanistan's Soviet forces evacuate their garrisons in Bamian—after a resistance attack—and in Chaghcharan, capital of Ghor Province, in the summer. However, the regime retained control in these cities, since Afghan forces remained.

In general, the situation in the Hazarajat was relatively quiet and free of regime presence. Most of the area remained under the influence of pro-Iranian groups, but the traditionalist Shi'a *Shura* party continued to hold fringe areas and operate against the Soviets.

A remote part of southern Ghor Province was the scene of one of the most broadly based meetings of commanders ever held inside Afghanistan. Chaired by Ismail Khan of Herat (Jadid), the meeting included hundreds of *mujahidin* and commanders from several parties and many of the provinces of western Afghanistan. For several weeks in July, this large group—unharrassed by Soviet/regime forces—discussed military and political issues.

Their communique, distributed inside and outside the country, called for practical measures to improve military coordination, including improved communication. It demanded military and political unity and chastised the political leaders for not being able to work together. It called for the establishment of a national commanders' council and its role in determining the future of Afghanistan.

### An Increasingly Powerful Resistance

The Afghan resistance is a broad national movement encompassing almost the whole population inside the country. Afghan refugees in Iran and Pakistan, and Afghans in exile throughout the world. The military side of the resistance, the *mujahidin* fighters, are grouped in hundreds of fronts in every part of the country. Most are affiliated with one of seven parties headquartered in Peshawar, Pakistan, which

less on air power, the Soviets attacked with the most intense artillery fire of the war.

The most dramatic engagement occurred when Soviet/regime forces tried to attack *mujahidin* positions near Bayan Khel. When initial air strikes and artillery barrages failed, Soviet troops, led by elite *Spetsnaz* commandos, charged. They were repulsed by the *mujahidin* in fierce hand-to-hand fighting with heavy casualties on both sides.

Some regime units at Bayan Khel attempted to surrender but were stopped when they were bombed by the Soviets and incurred heavy casualties. Despite such antidefection measures, hundreds of regime soldiers defected to the *mujahidin*. Observers in Kabul reported almost daily funerals. At one mass funeral, mourners clashed with the police. Kabul media claimed the regime captured a number of Arab nationalists who were fighting with the *mujahidin* in Paktia.

The battle was notable for the ability of the *mujahidin* to stand and fight, for their good logistics, and for the ex-

cellent cooperation between resistance parties. Several of the Peshawar resistance leaders personally participated in the battle, which boosted *mujahidin* morale. Despite substantial casualties, the *mujahidin* claimed a victory in Paktia, and their morale reached its highest level since the Soviet invasion.

In November-December, a major battle occurred around the regime garrison at Khowst, scene of a large resistance attack in 1985. The *mujahidin* tightened their siege of Khowst and on a number of regime positions on this vulnerable plain. In the city food was in short supply, and casualties were high.

A major Soviet-Afghan counteroffensive was launched from the provincial capital Gardez with an unprecedented amount of artillery firepower—in an apparent effort to open the road to Khowst, closed since 1979. By late December, the Soviets and their allies had not broken through. *Mujahidin* poured into the area to resist the advance, coordinated as in previous years by joint provincial commander Jallaluddin Haqqani (*Hezb-e-Islami Khalis*).

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joined to form the Islamic Alliance of Afghanistan Mujahidin (IUAM), generally referred to as the Alliance. (See also the seven parties and their leaders.)

The growing resistance threat is primarily due to the improvement in quantity and quality of resistance supplies in recent years. Despite recent efforts to disrupt resistance supply lines, the mujahidin have not been able to staunch *mujahidin* logistics flow. As a Soviet army correspondent described the supply train: "Caravans sometimes consist of up to 300 or 400 pack animals. They travel not only on camels but they use trucks and tractors. Their guards are mobile—on horseback or motorcycles."

Small arms are plentiful, and the *mujahidin* still get significant supplies from sympathizers or through capture of the regime military and from the Soviets. They have used 107mm and 120mm rockets, like the Soviet model 9M14 multiple rocket launcher, to exercise increased direct and standoff firepower.

Advanced surface-to-air missiles and improved resistance air defense have made heavy machine guns, still the mainstay of resistance air defense, less effective. Soviet/regime aircraft are on the rise, and more important, attacking pilots are more cautious—cutting the impact of their air power.

Improving resistance strength also comes from more training and combat experience (which leads to better tactics), expanded cooperation (intergroup fighting has steadily declined), and the development of a communications supply network in a country that in 1976 had only the most basic radio equipment. The Soviets have not been able to counter these developments, and while Soviet forces rotate, the *mujahidin* remain and know the terrain intimately. Over time, the *mujahidin's* strength has increased.

The resistance's cumulative military and political successes have greatly boosted their morale, which, in 1987, rose to its highest level since the revolution.



**Mujahidin with anti-aircraft gun (top) and with 107mm rocket (bottom).**

**Political Developments.** Whereas the pace on the battlefield was dictated by the *mujahidin*, many political efforts responded to regime initiatives. Reacting to Najib's January campaign, the Alliance held an unprecedented demonstration in January in Peshawar that was attended by hundreds of thousands of refugees and *mujahidin*. The seven leaders appeared publicly together and denounced the Kabul regime. They called for:

- A total and unconditional withdrawal of Soviet forces;
- An interim *mujahidin* government, which would hold free and fair elections; and,
- Resistance unity and arbitration of interparty disputes.

In April, the resistance parties announced a scheme for election, to be held among the refugees and the population inside Afghanistan, particularly among the commanders. The elections were postponed, however, due to the difficult security conditions inside the country. Also in the spring, having successfully completed the rotation of the role of spokesmen among all seven Alliance leaders, the parties decided to give Mohammed Yunis Khalis a second term as spokesman.



In July, again rejecting regime proposals, the party leaders in Peshawar reiterated their positions that, should the Soviets leave, they would not indiscriminately retaliate against Kabul regime personnel, would pursue non-alignment, and would maintain correct relations with Afghanistan's neighbors.

In October, as Khalis' term as Alliance spokesman expired, the Alliance met again to further refine its organizational arrangements. A *Shura*, or council, was chosen, with equal repre-

### Resistance Alliance Leadership

On November 18, 1987, the Islamic Unity of Afghanistan Mujahidin, the Peshawar Resistance Alliance, chose Mohammed Yunis Khalis as its *rais* for an 18-month term. (The term *rais* can mean president or chairman, but most Afghans understand it to mean leader.) Following is a listing of the seven Alliance parties and their leaders.

**Islamic Party (*Hezb-e-Islami-Khalis*):** Maulavi Mohammed Yunis Khalis. Khalis was born about 1920 in Nangarhar Province, near Pakistan. He was educated in religious schools in Afghanistan and Pakistan and acquired the title Maulavi (religious teacher). In the 1950s, Khalis lived in Kabul as an author, editor, and teacher of Islamic studies. In 1965, he became politically active and went into hiding after the Daoud coup in 1973. His son was arrested (and subsequently killed), but Khalis himself escaped to Pakistan. In the 1970s, he helped form the *Hezb-e-Islami* and took up arms against the communist regime. In 1979, Khalis became leader of the faction of the *Hezb-e-Islami* that bears his name. Among Khalis' adherents are some of the most effective commanders of the resistance: Abdul Haq of Kabul; Jallaluddin Haqqani of Paktia; and Mullah Malang of Qandahar. Khalis himself is renowned for going into Afghanistan and personally participating in combat.

Khalis was chosen as the first spokesman of the combined resistance alliance in 1985 and served 6 months as spokesman just before being named *rais* in October.

Following are other party leaders, beginning with the two who accompanied Khalis in October:

**Afghanistan National Liberation Front (*Jebh-e-Nejat-i-Melli*)**

**Afghanistan):** Sebghatullah Mojadeddi. Sebghatullah Mojadeddi comes from one of the most respected religious families in Afghanistan. Mojadeddi was born in Kabul in 1925. He has an MA degree in Islamic law from Al-Azhar University in Cairo and taught theology at Kabul University during the 1950s. In the 1960s, Mojadeddi was imprisoned by the former Afghan King, Zahir Shah, for suspicion of involvement in a plot to assassinate Khrushchev. He fled to Denmark where he lived and taught Islam. Mojadeddi has traveled extensively in support of the resistance.

**National Islamic Front for Afghanistan (NIFA) (*Mahaz-e-Melli*):** Pir Sayyid Ahmad Gailani. Gailani, about 55, is a hereditary religious leader. A graduate of the Faculty of Theology of Kabul University, for many years he was a religious adviser to King Zahir and later to President Daoud. He also was active in commerce. Gailani, who advocates a parliamentary system for Afghanistan, has been an articulate spokesman for the resistance.

**Islamic Party (*Hezb-e-Islami-Gulbuddin* since 1974):** Gulbuddin Hikmatyar. Gulbuddin Hikmatyar heads the Islamic Party (Gulbuddin faction), one of the largest and oldest resistance groups. A Pashtun, Gulbuddin was born in 1947 in Kunduz. While a student of engineering at Kabul University in the mid-1970s, he became a prominent figure in the Islamic movement. He fled to Pakistan in 1974 and launched armed resistance against the Daoud regime. Gulbuddin was recently reelected head of the *Hezb-e-Islami* (G).

**Islamic Society (*Jamiat-i-Islami*):** Burhanuddin Rabbani. Rabbani was born in Badakshan in 1942. Rabbani studied, then taught

Islamic law at Kabul University in the early 1960s. In 1968, he received a PhD in Islamic philosophy from Al-Azhar University in Cairo and returned to Afghanistan to become dean of the Faculty of Islamic Law at Kabul University. A *Jamiat* member since 1968, he was selected leader in 1972. He escaped arrest in 1974 and then moved to Pakistan. Rabbani is the leader of the party of Masood and Ismail Khan of Herat—two of the most effective resistance commanders.

**Islamic Revolutionary Movement (*Harakat-e-Inqilab-i-Islami*):** Mohammad Nabi Mohammadi. Nabi Mohammadi was born in Lowgar in 1925. He operated an influential Islamic school in Afghanistan in the 1960s where he was vociferously anticommunist. He was a member of the Afghan Parliament during 1970-74. He has lived in Pakistan since the 1978 coup. Nabi Mohammadi was elected joint Amir (chief) of an earlier resistance alliance by the *Jamiat* and *Hezb-e-Islami* (Hikmatyar) Parties in 1979. When that arrangement dissolved, he formed his own party.

**Islamic Union for the Liberation of Afghanistan (*Ittihad-i-Islami*):** Abd Al-Rab Abd ul-Rassul Sayyaf. Sayyaf, a Ghilzai Pashtun, was born in Paghman around 1944. He graduated from Kabul University with a BA in theology, then earned a masters from Al-Azhar University in Cairo. He then returned to teach at Kabul University where he was active in the Islamic movement. He was imprisoned for 6 years following the 1973 coup. After his release under a post-Soviet invasion amnesty in 1979, he fled to Pakistan. In 1980, Sayyaf was elected chairman of the Islamic Alliance for the Liberation of Afghanistan, and then served as the chairman of the old seven-party alliance from 1982 to 1985.

sentation from each party. The *Shura* chose Khalis for the new post of *rais*, or chairman, of the Alliance (see above). Although the Alliance displayed significant political development, its members continue to disagree on Afghanistan's future and sometimes on tactical issues.

**International Relations.** In 1987, Alliance leaders were increasingly visible on the world scene. Individual leaders were welcomed in many countries. In January, they attended the Islamic Conference in Kuwait. In November,

*Rais* Khalis led an alliance delegation to the United Nations for the UN General Assembly (UNGA) Afghanistan. Following the successful UN vote, Khalis took a delegation to Washington to meet with President Reagan.

## Soviets in Afghanistan

### Military: A Changing Strategy

Soviets have shifted their strategy the years. At first, their efforts were concentrated on the major cities and on the roads around the road between Kabul and the Soviet Union. They concentrated on large attacks. The Soviets moved up to 20,000 troops in their numerous drives into the Panjshir Valley and high-level carpet bombing. Several years ago, the Soviets began to notice an improvement in the *mujahidin* supplies and placed more emphasis on cutting off the flow. They moved on the border areas near Herat and increased helicopter use and adopted small unit tactics. Many have used these tactics would help build up an Afghan army and destroy the *mujahidin*, and these tactics were successful for a time. But the *mujahidin* learned how to counter these tactics so their success was temporary. In the past year, the Soviets again have been forced to shift their strategy. This time they were more on the defensive. They no longer have complete control of the air. The Soviets reduced their efforts to stop the movement of supplies, although they occasionally attacked caravans, and tended to operate in the border areas. Major operations appeared to keep the *mujahidin* in balance and unable to attack while the Soviets improved their defenses in major cities—Qandahar, Herat, and Jalal. Over the summer, Soviet forces moved out of several isolated bases, leaving much of the country without a Soviet presence.

**Infrastructural Constraints.** Under Soviet General Secretary Gorbachev, the Soviets have only marginally increased their forces in Afghanistan. This may not be a solely tactical decision; it also may reflect the logistical difficulties of supplying additional forces using the rudimentary transportation infrastructure in rugged Afghanistan. Indeed, because of the limited transportation network beyond the immediate border area, they have had some problems supplying the troops there now—particularly during periods of sustained combat.

**Soviets in Combat in 1987.** Soviet combat forces may have increased slightly since last year. A few new artillery units and slightly higher personnel levels in units already in the country, raised overall Soviet troop strength to about 120,000. According to most estimates, some 30,000 troops in the U.S.S.R., primarily just across the border, support combat operations, including flying combat air missions from the U.S.S.R. Most Soviet troops remain in static defensive/security deployments. The performance of the average conscripted Soviet soldier remains unimpressive.

During the past year, the Soviets drastically altered their tactics in the face of the resistance's improved air defense. While small sweep operations continued on the ground, they no longer had ample air support. Operations now include massive amounts of artillery and appear to develop more

slowly. Heliborne assaults by elite troops also decreased as casualties mounted.

Aircraft losses have soared over the past year. For some periods the Soviet/Afghan side lost an aircraft a day—or more—to resistance fire. Aircraft downings were particularly high in the early part of the year, then declined as pilots began to stay out of the reach of *mujahidin* gunners. Total Soviet/Afghan losses were in the range of some 150–200 aircraft for the year. These losses forced the Soviets to re-evaluate their tactics. In some areas there has been a marked decrease in Soviet air activity with a resulting drop in air losses.

Soviet and regime aircraft are flying higher and faster, which reduces the accuracy with which they can deliver their ordnance. They also employ countermeasures which degrade their performance. The Soviets may be more reluctant to use their devastating helicopter gunships, relying instead on faster—but less accurate—fixed-wing aircraft. Yet, even fixed-wing pilots have become more reluctant to challenge *mujahidin* air defense.

The Soviets have made efforts to reduce casualties—even though combat operations increased—and over the past year probably another 3,000 Soviets were wounded or killed, bringing the total number of Soviet casualties in Afghanistan since 1979 to at least 33,000–38,000, more than one-third of whom were killed. These estimates do not include heavy losses to disease. Total losses may be significantly higher; some Soviet sources cite 50,000 or more, or 25,000 killed over the course of the war. Despite publication of numerous requests for casualty data in Soviet media over the last year, Soviet authorities have only hinted that the numbers might be released after a Soviet withdrawal.

Moscow continues to place great faith in deploying *Spetsnaz* troops. With reduced air support, and increased *mujahidin* awareness of their tactics and methods, however, *Spetsnaz* troops have not been as successful as they were initially. Casualties have increased, morale has suffered, and they have been fought to a standstill and


### Zahir Shah

In addition to its appeals to the resistance Alliance, the Kabul regime, explicitly, and the Soviets, implicitly, have referred to the possibility of some future role for the former King of Afghanistan, Zahir Shah. In a November 1987 interview, Zahir stated that the determination of a role for him "is up to the Afghan nation."

Mohammed Zahir Shah was born in 1914 in Kabul into the Muhammadzai branch of the Durrani Pashtuns. He was educated in Afghanistan and France. Zahir was Assistant War Minister and Education Minister prior to ascending the throne in 1933, following the assassination of his father, and reigned for 40 years. In 1964, King Zahir promulgated a new constitution which allowed for a parliamentary system featuring a *Wolesi Jirga* (National Assembly) and excluded members of the royal family from government positions.

While on tour in Italy, Zahir was overthrown by his cousin and former Prime Minister Mohammed Daoud, who declared the Republic of Afghanistan. (Daoud was killed in the communist coup of 1978.) Zahir Shah has since lived in Rome.

## Significant Combat in Afghanistan - 1987



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sometimes defeated. *Spetsnaz* performance is now at about the same level as other regular forces in Afghanistan.

Throughout 1987, the Soviets continued to pour new equipment, especially artillery, into the country. Many of the new weapons were the best self-propelled artillery pieces in the Soviet inventory. For example, two types of

sophisticated 152mm cannons, a 122mm howitzer, and a new automatic 82mm mortar have all been sent to Afghanistan to compensate for reduced air support. Most of it was destined for Soviet forces, but Kabul's forces received a share.

Infrastructure improvements continued unabated—airfield runways are being improved, revetments made for

aircraft, and fuel and ammunition storage sites expanded to include the construction of mountaine and underground bunkers. Security zones around Kabul and other major cities are being increased. These defensive stallions are key to the Soviet strategy of protecting the cities. These measures indicate Soviet plans to depart the country, if any, have not yet been reflected in actions on the ground.

Soviet forces continue to suffer serious morale problems in what returning veterans have called "a dirty war." Soviet propaganda cannot obscure from their own troops the reality that they are fighting a war against the Afghan people. Disease is rampant, particularly dysentery and hepatitis caused by poor hygiene. Defectors report severe abuse of conscripts by other troops, including rape, extensive black marketeering, and alcohol and drug abuse. Some defectors fight alongside the *mujahidin*. The Soviets have made greater efforts to exchange captured *mujahidin* for Soviets held by the resistance.

### Soviet Political Moves

Soviet diplomacy in 1987 has concentrated on a single theme: Moscow's alleged desire to find a political solution to the conflict. The Soviets have announced repeatedly that the "political decision" to leave Afghanistan has been made. At the same time, they have backed down from their insistence that the PDPA play a leading role in any postwithdrawal regime. In essence, the Soviets have been pushing hard at the negotiating table for the victory that has become increasingly elusive on the battlefield.

There have been several different expressions of Soviet policy on Afghanistan over the past year, suggesting that Gorbachev's search for a solution in Afghanistan is a continuing process and that the Soviets are ready to consider less optimal solutions than in the past. However, there still is no sign that Gorbachev has made the hard decision to leave Afghanistan and let his PDPA clients depend on the will of the Afghan people for their political survival.

The past year has seen Soviet interest on a number of questions related to Afghanistan. On the issue of a withdrawal timetable for Soviet forces, for instance, the Soviet position has changed considerably. Whereas in 1986, the Soviet regime insisted on a 4-year timeframe, in February 1987, they reduced it to 18 months and in September to 16 months. In December, leading up to and during the Reagan-Gorbachev summit in Washington, Soviet spokesmen spoke repeatedly of 6 months (or less) timeframe. They referred to Najib's conditional offer of 6 months (or less). No formal offer has been tabled at Geneva, however. Still, there is no agreement on the important questions of when the timetable would begin or how the withdrawals would be scheduled.

The Soviet position that an end to "unilateral interference" must precede withdrawal of Soviet troops would appear to be satisfied in the draft Geneva text on "mutual noninterference." A key question here is one of definition. As long as Moscow maintains that the Soviet presence in Afghanistan is *prima facie* evidence of "outside interference," they are saying, in effect, that their troops must not leave until the war is won on their terms.

Over the past year, Soviet officials have discussed Afghanistan in many forums, although thus far they have been unwilling to deal directly with Afghan representatives. U.S. and Soviet officials have been holding regular exchanges on Afghanistan since 1985, and in late 1986 and early 1987, Soviet and Pakistani officials met for discussions as well.

In early November 1987, in a departure from past practice, a retired Soviet military officer appeared at a public forum in The Hague with a representative of a resistance party. This may foreshadow a Soviet willingness to deal directly with *mujahidin* leaders in the future. Soviet officials also have become more willing to consider alternative political arrangements for Afghanistan than before. In line with Gorbachev's "national reconciliation" policy, Soviet officials now call for a coalition government in Kabul, although they

still insist that their clients—the PDPA—must control the presidency and major ministerial portfolios, thereby ensuring a dominant PDPA role in any such arrangement. During the past year, Soviet officials have shown an interest in some role for the former king, Zahir Shah.

### Growing Unhappiness on the Home Front

Concern about the fighting in Afghanistan and its impact on life appears to be increasing, but there is little evidence of widespread opposition to the war. Complaints, however, have become more frequent, and Moscow is responding with vastly expanded and more realistic press coverage of the war and special counterpropaganda campaigns throughout the country.

This effort now appears to have backfired. These campaigns have had the unintended consequence of making Soviet citizens even more worried and ever more willing to question Moscow's policy. A letter published in *Pravda* on November 25, 1987, is typical: it stated that "There is talk that the war in Afghanistan would have ended long ago if along with the sons of [ordinary people] the children of the leaders were sent there as well."

Cynicism and anger are especially widespread among combat veterans and those who might be sent to Afghanistan. While many officers may have benefited from Afghan service, enlisted personnel have not. Many have returned home openly hostile to the war, bringing with them psychological, drug, and a wide variety of other problems. Efforts to help veterans or to draw them into patriotic propaganda work have generally failed. In the November 1987 *Ogonyok*, for example, one veteran urged journalists to "call a dirty war a dirty war," and another said: "The main question about Afghanistan is not the truth about the horrors and the deaths, but why are we there?" Partially as a result, draft evasion has increased to the point where military journals discuss it openly.

## The Kabul Regime

### Military and Security Forces

After massive infusions of equipment, training, money, and advice, the regime's armed forces cannot defend the government without major Soviet assistance. Combat experience over the last 9 years has not improved performance, which appears to have reached a new low.

Under Najib the armed forces have made no significant improvements. The army continues to retain about some 40,000 men, less than half its preinvasion level. The air force has approximately 10,000. The numbers of paramilitary, militia, Secret Police (KHAD), and border guards fluctuate with a total strength probably less than 100,000. Kabul can take little comfort in the questionable abilities and loyalties of its personnel.

In combat operations, Kabul's forces depend on Soviet air and artillery support and Soviet advisers. Regime troops have been unable to hold their own on any significant scale this past year. Indeed, the regime continues to lose numerous outposts as the *mujahidin* nibble away at Kabul's eroding authority. Afghan air force pilots occasionally have refused to fly.

### Conscription and Desertion.

Recruitment remains a serious problem, especially with regime control ebbing in many areas. Those party cadres still in the countryside also are charged with helping the conscription effort. A regular conscription cannot raise enough troops; the regime is forced to rely on forced conscription—press gangings. Young men throughout Afghanistan continue to leave school, invoke family connections in the party, go underground, or flee the country to avoid the sweeps of army units to drag down new recruits.

Draftees are thrown into battle with little or no training and with predictable result: high casualties and desertions. Most officers are poorly trained, with party loyalty being more important than professionalism. High casualty rates further reduce manpower; since medical care is rudimentary.

The most serious problem facing Kabul's forces is desertion. Troops desert by the hundreds. Several times Afghan units deserted as a whole. Other units were only prevented from deserting by force. Inductees from Kabul comprise an increasing part of the military since it is only in the capital that the army can capture enough youths.

Factionalism remains a chronic problem within Afghan units. Differences appear to have been accentuated in the aftermath of Karmal's removal, easing the way for increased *mujahidin* penetration. Karmal loyalists have largely been purged from key military and security positions.

**Militia.** Najib has placed more emphasis on the militias and directed more resources to them. Nevertheless, militia elements have even worse training and equipment than the regular army and have not significantly added to regime strength.

**Police.** The Ministry of the Interior, headed by Khalq faction chief Gulabzoi, includes some 30,000 police. Ministry of Interior paramilitary forces, the *Sarandoy*, are equipped as a light infantry force. In 1987, *Sarandoy* were increasingly posted outside Kabul in order to reduce their threat to the Najib regime and reinforce depleted military. On its limited combat operations, the *Sarandoy* suffered severe casualties. The Interior Ministry also has control over regional militias (revolutionary defense groups and civil defense youth militias).

Tribal militias are undependable, often remaining on the regime payroll only for the winter months. Under the nominal control of the Ministry of Tribes and Nationalities, these elements are normally used near the border with Pakistan in an attempt to limit infiltration. Some of the tribal militias facilitate regime military operations in their areas, which they know better than regular troops.

**The Secret Police (KHAD).** The Secret Police continues to be known by the Afghan acronym KHAD, from the days when Najib was its chief. When he was promoted to head the regime, he boosted the former State Information

Service to cabinet status as the Ministry for State Security (Dari acronym WAD). KHAD maintains a reputation for brutality and ruthlessness, including the use of torture.

KHAD now is led by Najib protege Ghulam Faruq Yaqubi, who was promoted both to Politburo status and to the military rank of Colonel General, the highest held by regime military. Numerous Soviet KGB advisers are reportedly very influential. KHAD has some 20,000 personnel. These numbers are maintained, in large part, because KHAD personnel are extremely well paid.

KHAD is responsible for regime security, counterintelligence, and the suppression of opposition—both in the resistance and among Afghans who continue to live under regime control. It has military forces under its command, which have played a small, but growing, part in the war. KHAD operatives are present at Afghan military installations to try to prevent desertions or defections to the resistance. KHAD also is responsible for foreign intelligence and, in large measure, for the terrorist campaign in Pakistan.

### National Reconciliation

The new year began with an announcement from Najib that the PDPA was willing to share power with its opponents. His January 1 call for "national reconciliation" had three main elements.

**First,** the regime (and Soviets) and the opposition would observe a cease-fire.

**Second,** opposition representatives would be invited to participate in the regime, creating a "national unity government."

**Third,** about 5 million refugees would be asked to return.

Ultimately, the purpose of the "national reconciliation" campaign was to convince the Afghan people to "reconcile" themselves to continued PDPA domination.

**Phantom Cease-fire.** Key to Najib's plan was a cease-fire, which he said the government would observe for 6 months from January 15, 1986. Najib

said the opposition must not fight, plant mines, transport, and store weapons and must refrain from subversive action. Afghan troops would return to bases but could conduct security tasks without restrictions on supply and transport.

Afghan and, to a lesser extent, Soviet troops for a short time did observe a cease-fire, but there were always some troops in action. Within 2 weeks major operations were again underway in contrast to Najib's claims that the regime observed the cease-fire for about 50 days. The *mujahidin* responded with a greater level of activity over the winter, which increased throughout 1987. Najib extended the cease-fire for an additional 6 months in June and again at the *Loya Jirga* in November. The regime and Soviets could not reduce operations after either of these extensions.

The offer to share power was a departure from previous regime initiatives which had sought to "broaden base," or include nonparty or neutral figures under the regime. The appeal was traceable to Gorbachev's July 19 speech in Vladivostok, which called for an opposition role in the regime. Najib made his New Year announcement shortly after returning from his first trip to the Soviet Union as Kabul's leader.

To induce refugees to return, Kabul made a number of material concessions. It promised to restore property confiscated from those who had fled, return seized financial assets, provide relief from accrued interest and tax obligations, defer military service (and halt to forced press gang conscription) and provide material assistance for resettlement. However, refugee return was less than Kabul's exaggerated claims (100,000 by year's end) and was exceeded by continued refugee exodus (see p. 20).

Few Afghans with political status before the Marxist takeover have joined the regime. Those who have joined have not brought major constituencies with them. Appeals to expatriate Afghans in the West have similarly failed.

Despite regime claims about defectors (30,000 in August 1987), *mujahidin* commanders have almost universally


ned Kabul's reconciliation efforts. Time announcements of local cease-fire areas can be read as an admission of widespread mujahidin control.

**Reconciliation Offer Enriched.** The failure of "reconciliation" to gain support led Kabul progressively to widen its offer. After the rejection by mujahidin of the January cease-fire, Kabul's concessions increased. In February, Najib offered to meet opposition representatives in a neutral setting—recognizing their status as equals. Kabul's offer to negotiate remains, but the resistance insists on coming to the Soviets rather than the puppet regime." By mid-winter 1987, Najib had offered to accept an undefined role for former king Zahir Shah.

On July 14, Najib extended the so-called cease-fire for an additional 6 months beyond its July 15 expiration date. He offered specific posts to the opposition, including more than a dozen cabinet seats and the posts of vice president and of deputy prime minister. He suggested that the post of prime minister could be negotiable. (This was not specifically offered.) Najib's offer did not include any of the ministries principally responsible for security, the Foreign Ministry, or even the Ministry of Finance.

Najib invited royalists and members of the "moderate" parties to assume these high-level, but powerless posts. Kabul targeted these groups in its appeals, apparently hoping to split the resistance. Najib promised a genuine division of power" but asserted that it "does not mean the PDPA would lose its authority."

On July 15, the regime finally issued a draft constitution (see p. 15). It is designed to replace its *Fundamental Principles*, promulgated in 1980 but never ratified. The regime launched a national public relations campaign to garner support for the new constitution. Ultimately, Kabul claimed that millions of Afghans approved the document and that it received 15,000 suggestions for changes. Many details, but the substance, were changed in the final draft, submitted to the November *Jirga*, or assembly.



**A Multiparty Facade.** By mid-year, Najib also began to speak of a multiparty system. Parties (organized under regime auspices) would be required to support the state and "national reconciliation" but would be allowed some independence. The constitution appears to associate the parties with the PDPA-dominated National Front. Regime spokesmen noted that the new parties would have to respect Afghanistan's historic "friendship with the Soviet Union."

In November, the establishment of four new parties was announced. Two were leftist groupings that had earlier been "merged" with the PDPA. Just as Najib forecast in early summer, there also were two regime-dominated parties identified with the "peasantry" and "patriotic clergy." Najib later said that he would welcome a party for the "national bourgeoisie."

The resistance (particularly the moderate leaders referred to by Najib) swiftly rejected the July 14 coalition offer, as it had his earlier proposals. Soon

after, Najib was called to Moscow to meet Gorbachev. A communique announced that they discussed "further measures" along the path of reconciliation. Najib, at a subsequent press conference, said that he would give up not only his position but his life, if he personally became an obstacle to peace.

In the fall, the "national reconciliation" offer broadened still further. At the October party conference, Najib forecast the "Second Stage of National Reconciliation"—including leftist democratic unity, coalition, and the strengthening of posts offered to the opposition. Najib specifically named the "seven [Alliance] parties" in his appeals. The opposition would be allowed to open offices and publish newspapers if they renounced their resistance.

Following his admission that Soviet troops had pulled back from some hinterland posts, Najib said Soviet troops would leave, and regime forces not operate in, areas where the mujahidin ceased their attacks. He implied the resistance could run those areas. At the November *Jirga*, he said that Soviet

troops could be withdrawn in 12 months or, less if the resistance would give up their fight against his regime.

**"De-conciliation."** Najib's "peace" campaign, combined with the modification of Soviet/Kabul positions on the timing of a withdrawal, have fed concern among Kabul regime supporters. There are numerous reports of regime members attempting to accumulate foreign exchange in preparation for an escape. Others established or upgraded contacts with the resistance.

The national reconciliation program exacerbated endemic PDPA factional disputes. Ideologically committed Marxists, particularly among the Khalq faction, opposed the offer to share power with the opposition and the tactical retreat on "progressive" policies. Although Najib acknowledged criticism from within the party of the reconciliation process, he repeatedly stressed that national reconciliation is "irreversible."

**Hopes for Peace.** Understandably, the "national reconciliation" campaign kindled sentiments in favor of return among the refugees and of hopes on both sides that the fighting might be ended inside Afghanistan. Ultimately, the refugees, by their refusal to return, and the *mujahidin*, by their continued resistance, maintain that there can be no peace while the Soviet occupation continues and the PDPA remains in power.

### Changes in Government

In 1987, the Soviet-sponsored regime in Kabul received a new name, a new constitution, a new head of state, and dozens of new faces. Most of these changes were associated with the "national reconciliation" effort. Despite a year of change, however, the regime remained under the thumb of the Soviets and their instruments of rule, the PDPA and Najibullah.

Najib continued to replace Karmal backers in the government as well as in the party. The Revolutionary Council, at a September 30 session, named Najib its chairman and head of state. He replaced nonparty H. M. Chamkani, acting chairman since Babrak Karmal's

ouster a year before. Chamkani remained vice chairman, but the second in command was apparently shifted to PDPA politburo member Nur Ahmed Nur, who as deputy chairman ran the council in Najib's absence.

The Democratic Republic of Afghanistan (DRA) transformed itself into the Republic of Afghanistan (RA) at a *Loya Jirga*, held November 29 and 30. The vast majority of the more than 1,300 delegates were ruling party members or regime functionaries. The session was the second so-called *Loya Jirga* held by the Kabul regime and was no more legitimate than the council convoked by Babrak Karmal in 1985. Like that session, Najib's meeting was quickly condemned by the Afghan resistance and ignored by most Afghans.

The *Jirga* also adopted the new constitution proposed in July, completely transforming the formal structure of government, which had retained a revolutionary structure since the 1978 Marxist coup. In one of their last acts, the delegates elected Najib as president of the Republic of Afghanistan. But at his inaugural press conference, the new president was embarrassed when he was forced to admit that his own, albeit estranged, brother had defected to the resistance.

**A Party in Disarray.** Change also shook the party, as Najib continued efforts to consolidate his position within the PDPA. Several party plenums were held to elicit, or coerce support among reluctant cadre for "national reconciliation."

However, since Najib took over, factions have proliferated in the party, within and beyond the two major groupings: Babrak's and Najib's Parcham, and the Khalq—now led by Gulabzoi.

Former leader Babrak Karmal continues to withhold his endorsement from Najib. Despite increasing purges from party, military, and government positions, Babrak's faction, nurtured by 6½ years of Soviet patronage, has not yet given up. A large demonstration by supporters of the deposed leader, at coup anniversary festivities in April, reportedly prompted the Soviets to "invite" Babrak to Moscow with his family a few days later. Babrak remained in the U.S.S.R. of the end of the year.

Action against Karmal's supporters continued throughout the year as the former president's brother Baryalai a close associate Anahita Ratebzad were removed from first the Politburo, the from the central committee. Ten additional Karmal backers were dropped from the central committee at the 17th plenum in October. Najib's protege Ghulam Faruq Yaqubi, head of the Secret Police, and Foreign Minister Wal earlier had been given full Politburo membership.

Party reorganization culminated the second PDPA party conference, held in mid-October. Its goal was to improve party unity and discipline and promote "reconciliation." Efforts to hold the conference had bogged down partly because several local party sessions, including a Kabul precinct, tried to elect Karmal as a delegate. At the conference, Najib painted a stark picture of party disarray: "A number of leadership and party personnel have brought doubt, panic, and pessimism. The result, according to Najib, was a party wracked with "factionalism, nepotism, and sometimes even revenge."

### The Afghan Economy

As the war in Afghanistan intensifies so has the destruction and erosion of the economic base. While estimates differ, the latest figure cited in regime and Soviet media for wartime destruction is 50 billion Afghanis. Included in the estimate of damages, which the regime attributes exclusively to the *mujahidin*, are about 2,000 schools, several hundred mosques, and more than 100 medical establishments.

At the PDPA conference in November, Prime Minister Keshtman who is responsible for the economy, noted severe problems on the industry side. In the last year, production of natural gas (Afghanistan's major export)



### An Illegitimate Constitution

On November 30, the *Loya Jirga* approved a new constitution. Najib introduced the draft as "the most important document of the national reconciliation policy." The document was swiftly rejected by the resistance and, like the so-called *Loya Jirga* that adopted it, is viewed by most Afghans as illegitimate.

Although it changed the name of the regime, dropping "Democratic" from the current name, "Republic of Afghanistan," Najib's constitution would perpetuate the power of Kabul's Soviet-backed Marxist rulers. It contains significant elements commonly found in Soviet-bloc constitutions and provides for leading roles for the PDPA and its associated organization, the National Front.

The most striking aspect of the constitution is its near total concentration of power in a strong presidency, unchecked by other branches of government. The president:

- Acts as supreme commander of the armed forces;
- Approves all laws, decrees, and resolutions;
- Convenes and dissolves the National Assembly and *Loya Jirga*;
- Appoints the prime minister, Supreme Court, and attorney general;
- Approves appointments of cabinet, high-ranking officials, and military officers;
- Declares a state of national emergency;

- Vetoes decisions of the National Assembly; and
- Declares war "with agreement of the *Loya Jirga*."

**Bicameral Legislature.** A lower house would have 10 representatives popularly elected from each of Afghanistan's 29 provinces. One-third of the upper house, or "Senate," would be appointed by the president. The assembly can override presidential vetoes by a two-thirds vote.

**Loya Jirga.** A *Loya Jirga* (or Grand National Assembly) is accorded its traditional role as Afghanistan's ultimate source of authority. However, contrary to the consensus tradition of the institution, decisions are by majority rule. Also breaking with tradition, it does not include tribal and traditional leadership. Instead, delegates are from the regime, the PDPA-directed National Front, the assembly, or are chosen by the president.

**The Courts.** The judiciary not only lacks independence but is clearly subordinate to the executive. The Supreme Court reports on the activities of all courts to the president, who appoints members for limited terms of 5 years.

**Foreign Policy.** The constitution provides that Afghanistan is non-aligned and "does not join military blocs nor allow establishment of foreign military bases." This provision would appear to be contravened currently by the presence of Soviet troops and bases.

**Rights and Liberties.** The constitution makes specific guarantees of a full spectrum of individual rights and guarantees equal rights to women. However, every right is paired with accompanying provisions that deprive it of its meaning; ultimately, "no one has the right to act against the public interest," which the state itself would define.

**Religion.** Article 2 establishes Islam as "the religion of Afghanistan." No law may be contrary to Islamic tenets "and the values enshrined in this constitution." Islamic law (Shari'a) is used as a guide to inheritance court judgment. However, "no citizen has the right to use religion for antinational or antipeople propaganda purposes, or contrary to the interests of the RA."

**Political Parties** are allowed, provided that they are "not opposed to the values embodied in the laws of this Constitution and in the laws of the country." Nevertheless, the PDPA is given a leading role as the formulator of national reconciliation. Marxist rule is further preserved by the importance given the National Front, a PDPA subsidiary. The National Front, described as "the most extensive sociopolitical organization," would unite parties and their members "on the basis of a common program." Among other powers, the front would be the only nongovernmental body authorized to propose laws to the National Assembly.

other basic goods slumped. Deficiencies in domestic production had to be made up by the Soviets.

Price levels depended on market fluctuations for a particular item or food. Inflation was noticeable but not dramatic for a wartime situation. Early in the year, anticipation of a settlement among the refugees and preparations for return drove the price of the *chani* (Afs) up in Pakistan. Toward the end of the year, erosion of the *chani* in part was due to efforts of regime members to accumulate foreign income in case they fled the country.

The Afghani remains officially pegged to the U.S. dollar at the rate of Afs/\$1. The rate on Kabul's unofficial

but free money market fluctuated around 150-155Afs/\$ for most of the year. It rose to about 180Afs/\$ late in the year.

### Agriculture and Food Supply

The wheat crop, Afghanistan's predominant food source, was generally the same and perhaps a little larger than in previous years. Yields in the subsistence, peasant agriculture that dominates in Afghanistan remain stable. There was no major crop failure anywhere in the country. However, the cities, especially Kabul, continue to be fed

by imports. Regular commercial channel imports from Pakistan rose. Wheat continues to be imported from the Soviet Union.

Food shortages continue to occur, in large part due to distribution problems or shortfalls in imports. Spot shortages often result from transport difficulties—the road system is severely degraded except for the segment between Kabul and the U.S.S.R. Shortages become most serious in late April-May before the harvest. Areas north of Kabul and Qandahar, Konduz, Paktia, and Paktika Provinces experienced the most problems. Land abandonment was aggravated by actual destruction of

crops and agricultural infrastructure by Soviet regime military operations.

Massive Soviet use of artillery and high-level saturation bombing caused total crop damage to increase, but overall damage remained a relatively small fraction of total area and production—probably 5%-10% of cultivated area has been damaged since the invasion. Fruit growing areas were particularly targeted by the Soviets.

There was significant damage to some agricultural areas in and around Qandahar, including grape arbors, that had previously been immune from damage. Sustained heavy fighting caused land abandonment near Qandahar, adversely affecting production. Konduz experienced serious damage, both in the spring and in August. Perhaps the worst hit area of the year was north of Konduz near the Soviet border, which was almost devastated. This was the site of reprisal raids for *mujahidin* activity in the Soviet Union. Shortages in Kabul were exacerbated by the city's growing population and because of destruction caused by heavy fighting in the nearby Shomali Valley, where Soviet forces destroyed grape arbor and other agricultural assets.

Despite destruction of both agriculture and industry, many Afghans continue their lives of subsistence farming, herding, and trading and are no worse off than before the coup and invasion. Afghanistan remains one of the poorest countries in the world (see below). According to the most recent International Monetary Fund estimate, gross national product is about \$200 a year (1986). According to some regime estimates, however, per capita income may be as low as \$130-\$150 per year.

### The Private Sector

Kabul continued to moderate disruptive economic reforms while continuing to promote, where possible, state enterprise. Efforts to stimulate the private sector continued. In February, Sayyid Amanoddin Amin, a businessman, was named vice chairman of the Council of Ministers (one of several deputy prime ministers). In April, the regime held a conference for private investors but failed to attract international or expatriate Afghan investors. An unusual development was the establishment of

joint ventures between the Soviet Government and Afghan private businesses.

### Trade

Keshtmand told the party conference that Afghanistan's foreign trade totaled \$1.4 billion in 1986-87. Of the total trade, 16% was with less developed countries and 68% with socialist countries (of which 60% was with the U.S.S.R.). Natural gas remained Afghanistan's major export, some 50% of total value. In the Afghan year ending March 1986, about 2.4 billion cubic meters were shipped north to the U.S.S.R., at the world market price according to Kabul's Minister of Mining and Industries.

### Soviet Aid in 1987

During the year, the U.S.S.R. continued its heavy budgetary support of the Afghan economy. In addition to about \$220 million in development assistance, the Soviet Union pledged a record \$405 million in grant commodities in 1987. Regime and Soviet media reported that this grant aid was intended to support the national reconciliation process.

### Statistics on Afghanistan, 1975-85<sup>1</sup>

Year	Military Expenditures (ME) (\$ millions)	Armed Forces (thousands)	Gross National Product (GNP) (\$ millions)	Central Government Expenditures (CGE) (\$ millions)	People (millions)	ME GNP (%)	ME CGE (%)	ME Per Capita (dollars)	Armed Forces Per 1,000 People	GNP Per Capita (dollars)
1975	104	130	3,788	410.9	14.1	2.7	25.3	7	9.2	268
1976	91	142	4,015	550.9	14.5	2.3	16.5	6	9.8	277
1977	92	143	4,164	479.4	14.9	2.2	19.2	6	9.6	280
1978	100	110	4,335	496.6	15.3	2.3	20.1	7	7.2	284
1979	260*	89	4,297	570.1*	15.6	6.1	45.7	17	5.7	276
1980	254*	43	4,164	788.7*	15.0	6.1	32.2	17	2.9	278
1981	219*	45	4,279	807.1*	14.1	5.1	27.1	16	3.2	304
1982	183*	55	4,093*	577.1*	13.6	4.5	31.7	13	4.0	300
1983	225*	75	3,955*	359.3*	13.7	5.7	62.7	16	5.5	289
1984	287*	60	3,735*	444.7*	13.8	7.7	64.4	21	4.3	270
1985	NA	55	3,438*	NA	13.9	NA	NA	NA	4.0	248

<sup>1</sup> All figures are expressed in constant 1984 dollars.

\* Estimate.

NA: Not available.

<sup>2</sup> Source: Arms Control and Disarmament Agency, *World Military Expenditures and Arms Transfers 1987* (to be published)

**U.S.S.R.: Economic Aid to Afghanistan**

(Disbursements)

Year	\$ Million
1980	350
1981	200
1982	220
1983	350
1984	220
1985	225
1986	205

Some of these aid commodities are, in fact, distributed in Afghanistan's towns and villages by Soviet troops or by Afghan military or party officials. On several occasions, Soviet and Afghan media directly chastised Afghan party and state officials for embezzling or misusing Soviet aid.

Moscow also made new allocations for projects already begun under some \$200 million of outstanding credit commitments. Preliminary information indicates that Soviet aid disbursements are substantially over the \$205 million in 1986, possibly to the record 1980 level.

The invasion of Afghanistan in December 1979 ushered in a more expensive era for the Soviet aid program in communist developing countries. The grant package provided Kabul in 1977 brought total commodity support to 1980 to \$1.4 billion. Until its first large-scale commitment of commodities to Kabul in 1980, the U.S.S.R. had steadfastly refused to provide more than token amounts of free commodities to any developing countries not associated with the Council for Mutual Economic Assistance (CMEA). In Afghanistan, Moscow was forced to provide consumer goods and food to support Kabul when it was cut off from other sources of imports and, more recently, to provide local funds for Soviet-sponsored projects.

The U.S.S.R. and Afghanistan signed a comparatively large number of agreements and protocols during the war. A protocol of cooperation between Afghanistan and the Soviet-bloc CMEA was signed in November.

A new economic and technical agreement in January 1987 also provides for increased assistance during Afghanistan's current 5-year plan (1986-91) to agriculture, water management, and power development, although it does not appear to provide new development credits. It mentioned aid for the centerpiece of Moscow's current program, a 10-year, \$150-million project to connect Kabul and several adjacent provinces with the Soviet power grid by 1991. In addition, major irrigation projects at Jalalabad and Nangarhar, completed in the 1960s and 1970s, would be renovated and expanded to irrigate 600,000 hectares of crop and grazing land. Moscow is scheduled to complete 130 projects during the 5-year development plan; its total aid accounting for up to three-fourths of all annual economic aid flows to Afghanistan through 1991.

In a departure from the traditional Soviet/Afghan aid relationship, separate agreements were signed directly between Afghanistan's 29 provinces and republics in the U.S.S.R. These were particularly concentrated between the northern part of Afghanistan and the adjacent republics of Soviet Central

Asia, but nearly all provinces were involved. For example, the Russian Republic made a direct transfer of agricultural machinery and fertilizer to Kabul City.

## Social Developments

### Youth and Education

Kabul's educational system remains dependent on the Soviets. In June, Afghanistan and the U.S.S.R. signed an education protocol "to ensure the teaching of various subjects," under which Soviet education advisers would be maintained in Afghanistan.

The Soviets continue to take Afghans of all ages to the U.S.S.R. for long-term education and training, in hopes of creating a loyal cadre. There are nursery schools specifically designed for Afghan children in the Soviet Union. About 1,700 Afghan children spent the summer at Pioneer (Komsomol) camps in the U.S.S.R. More than 10,000 Afghan youths are in the U.S.S.R. on long-term civilian and military training. Each year more than 1,850 are sent. At least 1,500 higher

### Afghanistan: Value of Arms Transfers and Total Imports and Exports, 1977-86\*

Year	Arms Imports (\$ millions)	Arms Exports (\$ millions)	Total Imports (\$ millions)	Total Exports (\$ millions)	Arms Imports Total Imports (%)	Arms Exports Total Exports (%)
1977	175	0	523	488	33.5	0
1978	192	0	585	475	32.9	0
1979	683	0	581	648	117.6	0
1980	624	0	688	836	90.6	0
1981	835	0	717	800	116.6	0
1982	507	0	749	763	67.6	0
1983	331	0	956	753	34.6	0
1984	650	0	1,390	633	46.8	0
1985	508	0	1,155	539	44.0	0
1986	565	0	NA	494	NA	0

\*Dollar amounts expressed in constant 1984 dollars  
NA—not available

Source: Arms Control and Disarmament Agency, *World Military Expenditures and Arms Transfers, 1987* (to be published)



Afghan girls at a school maintained by the resistance. (Mohammed Es-Haq, Jamat-i-Islami)

and professional students were sent to the U.S.S.R. for advanced training. There is no indication, however, that the regime's long-term efforts are producing a loyal communist political base among Afghans.

There continue to be credible reports that the regime is using child spies. In January, it was reported that children too young for the military were picked up in press-gang sweeps and then dispatched to the Kabul Police Academy for agent training.

Najib has claimed that some 40% of the teachers are members of the PDPA and that 30% of students either belong to the PDPA or to the Democratic Youth of Afghanistan (DYOA). DYOA Chief Farid Mazdak, a Najib protege, was elevated to the Politburo of the PDPA. Members or not, students must participate in forced labor; over the summer, several groups were dragged in Kabul to assist reconstruction in Qandahar.

### Health

The health situation in Afghanistan remains precarious. Facilities under regime control remain inadequate and overtaxed. During heavy fighting, when blood supplies ran low, Kabul's clinics forced patients to give blood. (Soviet media have reported intensive blood drives in Soviet Central Asia.)

The International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC) concluded an agreement with the regime in January to resume humanitarian work. ICRC workers had been expelled just after the Soviet invasion and allowed to return only 2 months in 1982. The agreement is keyed to the resumption of Red Cross work among regime prisoners, which ICRC remained unable to fully implement.

Volunteer foreign doctors continue to provide some medical care in areas under resistance control, but they are subject to attack inside the country. Medical care is increasingly being offered by Afghan "barefoot doctors," trained by some of the same organizations that have sent expatriate doctors into the country. Commander Jallaluddin Haqqani of Paktia told an interviewer that, for the *mujahidin*, health conditions had recently improved 50%-100%.

### Status of Women

The regime continued to pay lip service to its commitment to improve the status of women and referred to women's rights in its constitution. In practice, however, the status of women within the regime has never been as high as Kabul claimed; indeed, it has declined over the past year.

Najib admitted to the party conference that women make up only 3.6% of the party apparatus and about 9% of trade union officials. Even in ministries such as education, where women are 43% of the workforce, the regime has promoted no women into leading positions.

The highest ranking woman in the regime, Anahita Ratebzad, was purged from the party leadership, because of her support for the deposed Babrak Karmal. There are now no women on the Politburo.

### Religion

Despite claims it has become more Islamic, the regime has failed to convince Afghans that it is still not dominated by the atheistic, Marxist PDPA. Najib cited the Koran and a newly formed Council of Religious Leaders and Ulema as the original sources of the policy of national reconciliation.

Regime efforts to assume an Islamic mantle are perhaps best illustrated by Najib's reassumption of the Islam "Allah" (name of God), as a suffix to own name, upon being named preside by the Revolutionary Council in September. Though he had not used his name since he joined the party in the 1960s, Najib said he felt it was appropriate to reclaim it as leader of a nation.

One of Kabul's means of using religion to promote its control is by attempting to co-opt the clergy in areas under regime control. It claimed 2 billion afghanis were spent on mosques and to "help the prayer leaders," with out mentioning that these sums come from the religious institutions' own endowments. Najib, speaking at the shrine of Ali in Mazar-e-Sharif, claimed 16,000 mullahs, preachers, and clergy receive salaries from the state. Monetary inducements are backed up by coercion against those clergymen who do not cooperate.

Kabul also attempted to use its new-found piety to promote its image to the Islamic world. The regime held an international contest for Koranic recitation and opened an Institute of Islamic Scientific Research but has been unable to obtain support from religious institutions in the Muslim world. Cairo's Al-Azhar University closed a mission in Kabul.

## Illicit Drugs

Afghanistan remains a major producer of hashish and opium. Estimated hashish production in 1986 was 200-400 metric tons, one of the highest in the world. Afghanistan appears to be the leading producer of illicit opium in the Indian Crescent and the second largest producer in the world. The 1986 poppy harvest yielded an estimated 500-800 metric tons, a substantial increase from 1985. Good weather in producing areas suggests a similar figure for 1987. The opium is refined into heroin, principally in Nangarhar Province near the Pakistan border.

Much of Afghanistan's hashish and opium and nearly all of its heroin are exported to or through Pakistan and Iran. Illicit drugs also have been smuggled into the Soviet Union—complicating the domestic Soviet drug problem—through that country to Western markets.

Increased Soviet efforts against traffickers have produced evidence that the Soviet Union is used as a drug transit route. As a result of a joint Soviet-Canadian operation, approximately 10 tons of hashish were seized in Canada in August 1987. The hashish was unloaded from a Soviet ship docked in Montreal. On another occasion, authorities in Moscow announced they had seized \$30-million worth of hashish and opium for West Germany.

Current information on drug abuse in Afghanistan is difficult to obtain, but it is estimated that there are over 1,000,000 chronic opium abusers. Regime officials have hinted that Kabul has its own drug problems.

All major resistance organizations in principle oppose narcotics production, trafficking, and abuse, and most individual *mujahidin* adhere to this policy. Invoking Islamic disapproval, some resistance groups are waging an active antidrug use campaign, but illicit drug production and distribution is limited.

## Human Rights

Abuse of human rights remains a key element of the unpopular Kabul regime's efforts to maintain power. Arbitrary arrest and detention are common; a fair trial is not. Some prisoners are held for years without access to legal

assistance, family, or medical care. Prisons are overcrowded. Food, water, and sanitary facilities are in short supply, and many prisoners are chronically ill.

Torture and mistreatment of prisoners continue to be widespread and systematic in the Kabul regime's prisons. During incommunicado detention, physical and psychological torture is used to extract "confessions" and to intimidate regime opponents. Prisoners are beaten; subjected to electric shocks; burned with cigarettes; immersed in cold water or snow; forced to watch other people being tortured; placed in cells with the corpses of other torture victims; and deprived of water, food, and sleep. Human rights groups continue to receive credible reports concerning executions of political prisoners.

**Prisoners and Amnesty.** A major component of "national reconciliation" was amnesty for prisoners, but the regime has not lived up to its promises. According to regime spokesmen, some 6,000 prisoners were released through November. Local observers reported only 320 prisoners were released in March, versus 1,300 claimed by the regime.

Among the released prisoners were members of the PDPA's Khalq faction, some in jail since the Soviet invasion, and members of leftist/nationalist organizations. Old people, women, and children also were released. Few resistance prisoners and no significant *mujahidin* have been released. For the regime, the most important category was those imprisoned for military offenses. They and other able-bodied detainees were conscripted immediately upon release.

**Conscription.** One of the first announcements made by the regime during the recent "national reconciliation" campaign was the end of forced conscription. Despite this promise, the regime has resumed the practice. In its current drive to swell the ranks of the military, the regime has extended its "recruitment" to include 15- and 16-year-old youths along with recently returned refugees. Reports indicate that the regime gains recruits by surrounding high schools as graduation ceremonies take place. Parents have

demonstrated at Kabul conscription centers in search of their lost sons. Some were themselves taken away, and the demonstrations ended by gunfire.

**Human Suffering.** The most serious violations of human rights in Afghanistan are the pervasive violence and dislocation inflicted on the population by Soviet and Afghan forces. These include apparent Soviet violations of the humanitarian rules of war. Killings of civilians have continued unabated as Soviet/Kabul forces retaliate and attempt to create secure zones. Some sources report that from the end of last year until August of this year, about 15,000 civilians have been killed.

Indiscriminate air and artillery attacks, time bombs set to detonate during peak travel hours along popular supply routes, and boobytraps cleverly designed to be attractive to children are but a few of the tactics used against noncombatants by the Soviets and their regime allies. Resistance forces also occasionally commit violence against noncombatants, mostly political figures associated with the regime, but sometimes in the course of operations.

The Kabul regime also denies the following human rights to the Afghan people: freedom of speech and press; freedom of peaceful assembly and association; freedom of movement within the country, foreign travel, emigration, and repatriation; the right to privacy; and the right of citizens to change their government.

The nearly 10 years of Marxist rule and Soviet occupation have wreaked unprecedented tragedy on the Afghan people, according to the "Preliminary Findings From A Survey of Afghan Refugees," conducted by Gallup Pakistan. The survey, based on interviews with 1,300 refugee families, found that over the past 10 years, 9%—or 1 in 11 members—of the Afghan families surveyed have been killed in the past decade. This is greater than the fatality rate in the Soviet Union during World War II.

Forty-six percent of those killed (mostly women) died in aerial bombing of civilian houses or while fleeing; 33% died as a result of wounds from bullets; 12% from artillery shelling; 3% from mines; 2% from exhaustion; and 4%

from miscellaneous causes. About 5.5% of the refugee population died of natural causes such as aging or harshness of life as refugees. But the Afghans live on—about 24% of the present refugee population were born in exile in the camps.

#### UN Human Rights Commission.

Each year since 1984, the UN Human Rights Commission Special Rapporteur, Felix Ermacora, revealed overwhelming evidence of widespread massive human rights violations in Afghanistan. This year, the Kabul regime, which earlier tried to impugn the Special Rapporteur and his report, allowed Ermacora to visit Afghanistan for the first time. The regime thus acknowledged, also for the first time, the role of the Special Rapporteur. Ermacora paid a brief visit to Kabul and later to Peshawar, where Afghan refugees protested Kabul's attempt to cover up the ongoing use of torture in regime prisons.

Although Ermacora observed in his report that there has been some amelioration of human rights conditions in certain government-controlled areas in Afghanistan, he reiterated his previous statement that "there can be no meaningful self-determination for the Afghan people so long as the Soviet presence continues."

The Third Committee (Human Rights) of the UN General Assembly voted for a third consecutive year to adopt a resolution on human rights in Afghanistan. The vote was 85 for, 21 opposed, and 28 abstentions—an improvement over the 1986 vote of 79-23-36.

In the spring, at its 43d session, the UN Commission on Human Rights adopted two resolutions on Afghanistan. One, on the human rights situation, extended the mandate of Special Rapporteur Ermacora. A resolution calling for self-determination in Afghanistan was adopted by a vote of 30-5-6.

## Refugees

Afghans in Pakistan are the single largest group of refugees in the world. The Government of Pakistan reports registration of more than 2.9 million Afghans. Numbers continue to grow, although at a much slower pace than in the early years after the coup and invasion. In 1986, refugee officials in Pakistan registered only about 70,000 new refugees. Preliminary estimates from 1987 are lower still. Many areas of heavy fighting are already heavily depopulated.

Afghan refugees are sheltered in more than 320 camps, primarily in the rural areas of Pakistan's North West Frontier Province and Baluchistan. Relief assistance—including food, shelter, clothing, and medicine—is provided by the international community, primarily through the UN High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) and the World Food Program.

Although the number of new arrivals is lower in 1987 than in previous years, there is no indication that many refugees are returning to Afghanistan in response to the Kabul regime's national reconciliation campaign. UNHCR officials in Pakistan see no basis for Kabul's claim that 100,000 refugees have returned to Afghanistan in 1987. Neither UN nor Pakistani officials discerned a measurable drop in camp populations. It is unlikely that many would return under any PDPA-led, Soviet-sponsored regime. (Kabul also claims 37,000 refugees returned in the previous 7 years.) There were several reports in the summer and fall that some refugees have returned to newly secure resistance-controlled areas inside Afghanistan.

Despite considerable economic and political costs, the Government and people of Pakistan have extended an impressive welcome to the Afghans. The Pakistani Government estimates that the annual relief effort costs some \$360 million and that its share of this effort comes to nearly half that amount, chiefly expenditures for program administration and transportation of relief commodities. Pakistan is further strained by refugee competition for local jobs, grazing, and water supplies.

Refugee relations with Pakistanis have been surprisingly good, largely due to the strong cultural and social ties between the indigenous population and the newcomers. Soviet/regime agents continue their efforts to raise Pakistani concern over the refugee presence.

Between 1983 and 1986, the World Bank, in conjunction with the UNHCR, committed \$20 million for forestation, irrigation, and road-building projects that employ refugee and local labor in repairing environmental damage caused by the refugees. These projects were successful that Phase II, a \$40-million 3-year project was begun in 1987.

The U.S. Government, the largest contributor to the relief effort, pledged nearly \$68 million for Afghan assistance in fiscal year 1987 including \$38-million worth of commodities through the World Food Program. To date, total U.S. contributions for Afghan refugee assistance exceed \$551 million. Other major contributors are Japan, Canada, Australia, Saudi Arabia, and a number of West European nations.

The second largest concentration of Afghan refugees is in Iran. The Iranian Government estimates that up to 1.9 million Afghans are within its border. Many Afghans in Iran have successfully integrated into the local population. The Iranian Government provides some assistance. The United States is not a contributor to the UNHCR effort in Iran.

## Regional Environment

## Pakistan

For the Afghans themselves, Pakistan is the primary burden of the war in Afghanistan. In 1987, the war continued to spill directly into Pakistan. Pakistan's air raids on Pakistani and refugee villages intensified early in the year, climaxing during the opening days of the February-March session of the Geneva talks. Hundreds were killed and wounded. The cross-border raids stepped up when Pakistan threatened to resume the talks, but the raids recommenced after the talks recessed. Within a month, however, as Pakistan actively improved air defense, Soviet/Afghan tactics suddenly changed. Bombs had been carried by planes were delivered by Kabul-sponsored terrorists. At the same time, Kabul continued to destabilize the Pakistani border areas by providing arms to ex-tribe local, tribal, or communal disaffected. More people were killed and wounded in 1987 by Soviet/Afghan attacks in Pakistan than ever before (p. 22).

The Soviet/Afghan terror and subversion campaign in Pakistan was already more than 1 year old. Bombing operations have become an almost familiar sound in Peshawar restaurants, schools, cinemas, and other public places. Kabul-directed saboteurs also planted bombs at bridges and public places elsewhere in Pakistan's North West Frontier Province and Baluchistan, where the bulk of refugees are concentrated.

In 1987, Kabul agents for the first time exploded several bombs in the Pakistani heartland. The capital, Islamabad, and its sister city, Rawalpindi, were hit, as were Lahore in Punjab, Lahore, and even distant Karachi on the Arabian Sea, suffered civilian casualties from the terror campaign. The bombings are particularly frightening because Kabul's agents target public facilities like shopping centers and schools. A single bomb blast in Karachi in July killed more than 70 people.

More than 1,000 saboteurs have been arrested in Pakistan in connection with the terror campaign. Some have been tried and sentenced, some of them

to death. Most are Pakistani citizens. Many have confessed that they were paid, trained, and given targets by Afghan intelligence officials.

The public's fear of the bombs increased suspicion among Pakistanis toward the Afghan refugees, despite the fact that the public is generally aware that the bombs are Afghan/Soviet in origin. Nevertheless, Pakistan continues to be steadfast on the Afghan issue. Some politicians have advocated accommodation with Kabul, but the government and principal opposition figures continue to back the national consensus in support of the Afghan people.

In 1987, Islamabad intensified its efforts bilaterally with the Soviets and through the United Nations and other channels to find a political, negotiated solution to the Afghan conflict.

## Iran

Tehran has maintained its basic policy calling for the speedy and unconditional withdrawal of Soviet troops. Iran refuses to participate in the Geneva talks on the grounds that the *mujahidin* are not represented. In 1987, however, Iranian policies on Afghanistan fluctuated.

Iran's rejection of the Soviet occupation is an "Islamic" issue that has wide domestic support. Tehran's day-to-day Afghan policies, however, have always been subsidiary to the greater considerations of the Persian Gulf war, its overall Middle East/Islamic strategy, and the general state of relations with the U.S.S.R., with which Iran shares a long border.

Until 1987, Iran's Afghan policy was coordinated within Iran by Ayatollah Montazeri. In the beginning of the year, Iran apparently increased support for the resistance. Iran improved ties with the Sunni (Peshawar) resistance parties, as well as its traditional clients, Shia groups based in central Afghanistan. (Iran hosts the "Alliance of 8," mostly Shia Afghan resistance parties.) In January, for the first time, the Iranian Foreign Ministry invited Afghan Jamiat-i-Islami head Rabbani for an official visit to Tehran. His previous visits to Iran had been under quasiofficial clerical auspices.

Iran also launched its own "regional" peace initiative in February, when it proposed roundtable talks involving the Soviets, Pakistan, Iran, and the *mujahidin*. The Kabul regime was excluded from the offer. The proposed participants did not take up Tehran's offer.

Iranian-Afghan tensions continued as Kabul protested instances of violence against its diplomatic personnel by Iranian Revolutionary Guards. In August, both Iran and Afghanistan protested the violation of each other's territory at the main border crossing between Mashhad and Herat. Tehran charged its border post was hit by artillery shelling from the Afghan side. The Iranian pro-Soviet Marxist opposition groups, Tudeh and Fedayeen-e-Khalq, continue to be active in Kabul.

By late summer, the Iranians showed some accommodation toward Kabul in the wake of their improving relations with the Soviet Union. In the fall, Iran's ambassador in Kabul attended an official state function for the first time since the invasion. Support for the *mujahidin* and relations with the Sunni resistance parties also diminished. Nonetheless, Tehran continued to publicly condemn the Soviet occupation.

## China

China continues to cite the Soviet occupation of Afghanistan as a threat to regional security and a major obstacle to the improvement of its relations with the Soviet Union. China raised Afghanistan in its renewed bilateral discussions with the U.S.S.R.

During a June visit to Islamabad, Chinese premier Zhao Ziyang "confirmed China's support for Pakistan's principled position" on the Afghan issue. During the June visit, it was announced that the Chinese Government had donated a large quantity of goods for the refugees, including 1,250 tons of rice and a million yards of cloth.

## International Concern

The plight of the Afghan people continues to attract the world's attention. Demands for an end to the occupation can be heard year round. In December 1986, newspapers of varying ideological stripe (including communists) from numerous countries sharply criticized the Soviets for the occupation. Support was limited to a few editorials in papers published by pro-Moscow communist parties.

### India

India maintained its interest in a political solution to the Afghan problem and continued to call for an end to foreign intervention and interference in Afghanistan. India maintained good relations with the Kabul government and continued its modest pre-1979 program of foreign assistance. In 1987, India's contacts with Kabul became more visible. An early summer Indian trade fair in Kabul was one of the largest non-Soviet foreign-sponsored spectacles since the invasion.

India welcomed Kabul's "national reconciliation" effort. An unprecedented exchange of high-level official visits began with the visit of Afghan Foreign Minister Abdul Wakil to New Delhi in February. In July, Indian Foreign Minister Tiwari became the highest level non-Soviet-bloc official to visit

Kabul. Several regime delegations were subsequently received in New Delhi. Politburo member and Communications Minister Watanjar signed an agreement on communications assistance. Other technical assistance agreements were also initiated by New Delhi. In November, Indian efforts to obtain a "consensus" UN General Assembly Afghanistan resolution came to naught. Subsequently, India again abstained on the UNGA resolution.

### Islamic Countries

In January, the leaders of the resistance alliance attended the Organization of the Islamic Conference summit in Kuwait and then-spokesman Abd al-Sayyaf addressed the delegates. The summit once again issued a resolution supporting the Afghan refugees, the *mujahidin*, and Pakistan; calling for a withdrawal of Soviet forces; and suggesting that an end to the Soviet occupation would remove a major barrier to the improvement of relations between the Soviet Union and the Islamic countries. Kabul was rebuffed in its year-long effort to reclaim Afghanistan's seat in the conference. It also failed in its effort to gain entry to the South Asian Association for Regional Cooperation.

At the third general Islamic conference in Mecca in October, Abd al Rahman Abd al Khaliq from Kuwait called upon Islamic states to sever relations with the Soviet Union for its continued occupation of Afghanistan.

### European Support

Afghanistan remains a primary source of European criticism of the Soviet Union, both official and from groups otherwise sympathetic to Soviet policies. Kabul was moved to protest by French Foreign Minister Raimond with resistance alliance leaders during a May visit to Pakistan.

In December, the European Community (EC) issued a statement calling for an immediate end to the occupation of Afghanistan, including a Soviet withdrawal completed before the end of 1988. This followed a statement earlier in the year in which the EC provided the basis for a European diplomatic effort on Afghanistan, focused on the United Nations.

### Soviet Efforts To Curb Press Coverage

International public interest in the Afghan war remains high. It has never been easy, however, to get the news of Afghanistan. Kabul permitted most foreign journalists to visit, but most for regime events. Although they are not allowed to move about freely, journalists often witness evidence of regional frailty, such as the *mujahidin* shellin and the intermicne shootout that plagued the so-called *Loja Jirga*.

In contrast to the dramatic increase in the quantity and realism of Soviet media coverage, there has been an effort on the part of the regime and the Soviets to intimidate foreign re-

## Casualties Due to Border Violations by Soviet/Regime Forces and Terrorist Blasts in Pakistan, 1980-October 1987

Year	Air Attacks			Artillery Attacks			Terrorist Explosions			TOTAL	
	Violations	Persons Injured	Persons Killed	Violations	Persons Injured	Persons Killed	Incidents	Persons Injured	Persons Killed	Persons Injured	Persons Killed
1980	174	4	2	25	—	—	—	—	—	4	2
1981	94	3	5	17	—	—	—	—	—	3	5
1982	59	—	—	22	4	—	2	4	—	8	—
1983	93	2	—	41	8	—	47	27	4	37	4
1984	119	261	133	49	24	38	28	48	8	333	179
1985	256	38	19	121	19	25	118	173	96	230	140
1986	779	67	39	495	120	56	487	798	216	985	311
Oct. 1987	574	437	183	517	130	50	450	953	198	1,520	431



ers traveling with the resistance. Because of improved resistance air defense, however, there may have been a number of foreign correspondents inside Afghanistan in the summer of 1987 as previously.

In October, antipress efforts intensified. The regime protested the visit of a group of Pakistani journalists to Paktia Province. Near Kabul, a BBC-TV crew, which was invited by the regime, was threatened and detained by Soviet troops, who also detained diplomats who tried to intervene. A French journalist, Alain Guillo, was captured in December. He was still imprisoned at the end of the year, charged with trying to obtain military secrets. An Italian journalist was reported captured in December.

The campaign to target foreign journalists had more tragic results. American filmmakers, Lee Shapiro and Jim Lindelof, were apparently killed by a regime attack while traveling with the *mujahidin*. In 1986, Lindelof had been named paramedic of the year for his efforts training Afghan medical workers. In response to protests, the regime stated it could not "guarantee the security of foreign subjects" who were illegally, whose presence it views as evidence "of external interference."

### Kabul's Diplomatic Offensive

Kabul made only limited gains in its Soviet-supported worldwide effort to gain international legitimacy. The regime sent representatives to 52 countries in hopes of upgrading relations. Twenty countries turned away Kabul's representatives.

One of Kabul's major diplomatic triumphs was the June visit of Prime Minister Keshntmand to Iraq. Keshntmand was seen by Saddam Hussein, the high-level at which a regime functionary has never been received outside the Soviet bloc. They signed an agreement on trade and technical cooperation, ratified in September.

During 1987, the regime managed to establish diplomatic relations with Lebanon and Cyprus and reached agreements on opening embassies in the Democratic People's Republic of Vietnam, Nicaragua, and Austria, the regime's first embassy in Western Europe.

Kabul Foreign Minister Abdul Wakil was received at the Austrian Foreign Ministry when he journeyed to Vienna in September to open the embassy. Several African countries, under pressure from Moscow, agreed to exchange nonresident ambassadors.

Kabul's limited successes cost the Soviets some diplomatic capital, if not also tangible resources. However, the net effect inside Afghanistan or on the Afghanistan-tarnished Soviet world image was limited. More importantly, even those countries that in some way responded to Kabul's diplomatic entreaties did not budge on the UN General Assembly resolution, the major objective of Kabul's diplomatic efforts.

### UN Negotiations

Since January 1980, the UN General Assembly has voted nine times, by overwhelming and generally increasing margins, for a resolution calling for the complete withdrawal of foreign forces from Afghanistan, the restoration of Afghanistan's independent and non-aligned status, Afghan self-determination, and the creation of conditions that would enable the refugees to return home with safety and honor.

At the 42d UN General Assembly, introduced as in the past by Pakistan and cosponsored by 47 countries, the resolution passed on November 10 with a record vote of 123 (U.S.) to 19, with 11 abstentions, a one-vote increase over the 1986 affirmative vote total of 122. The vote was considered a decided defeat for the Soviet Union, in the wake of its year-long effort to erode support for the resolution.

In addition, the Soviets, the Kabul regime, India, Syria, and Democratic Yemen made last-ditch attempts to amend Pakistan's Afghanistan resolution with so-called consensus language on the eve of the November 10th vote. The Soviets and others, realizing that they lacked the necessary votes, withdrew their amendments just prior to the final vote.

UN attempts to negotiate a settlement date from a November 1980 mandate of the General Assembly. Negotiations are led by UN Under Secretary General for Special Political Affairs Diego Cordovez, the Secretary General's personal representative. Talks

have been held periodically since 1982 in Geneva. Cordovez shuttles between delegations from Pakistan and Afghanistan, officially informing Iran of the discussions while unofficially informing the Soviets.

The UN Secretary General has reported that the four instruments that would comprise the agreement are "virtually complete." The text is largely settled on three of four proposed instruments, the first dealing with mutual noninterference in Afghanistan's affairs, the second encompassing international guarantees, and the third governing the voluntary return of the refugees.

The fourth agreement, which is to address the key issue of a Soviet troop withdrawal and the interrelationship between that document and the other three, is unfinished. The principal outstanding issue remains an agreement on a realistic timetable for the withdrawal of Soviet troops.

Two sessions of the seventh round of the indirect talks were held in Geneva in 1987. The first, convened February 25, lasted until March 9. At the end of August, Kabul suddenly requested an early resumption of the talks and a second session was held September 7-10.

The first session was held during heavy cross-border attacks on Pakistan. For a week Afghan planes bombed and rocketed Pakistani villages, killing and wounding hundreds. On March 2, Pakistani Foreign Minister Sahabzada Yaqub Khan threatened to leave the talks if the attacks did not cease. The raids stopped, and after some preliminary negotiation, newly appointed Afghan Foreign Minister Abdul Wakil tabled a proposal that would reduce the period required for Soviet troop withdrawal to 18 months, less than half the 4-year position it maintained in 1986. Pakistan offered to accept 7 months, up from 4 months.

Kabul's insistence that a September round be convened at short notice fed widespread speculation that Kabul would table a 12-month timetable. Instead, Afghan Foreign Minister Abdul Wakil reduced the offer only 2 months, to 16 months. Pakistan countered with 8 months, but there was no Afghan counteroffer. Both Cordovez and Yaqub

expressed disappointment with Kabul's intransigence, particularly since the session had been proposed by Kabul.

In a speech to the UN General Assembly, Wakil said that "the policy of national reconciliation and the Geneva talks, as two separate processes, are contributing toward the achievement of a single objective." His implication of linkage between Kabul's futile efforts to gain domestic support and a Soviet withdrawal was rejected at the UN General Assembly by Pakistani Prime Minister Junejo, who charged that the Afghan call to Geneva was "false propaganda" aimed at the UN vote.

In his annual report on Afghanistan, the UN Secretary General reported that negotiations had reached "an advanced stage" and that "substantial, but not sufficiently sustained progress" had been made. He urged all Afghans "inside and outside their homeland" to look beyond a settlement and identify "processes and policies that they might deem appropriate to ensure continued peaceful conditions in Afghanistan and the region." All sides are committed to continuing the talks, which are expected to resume early in 1988.

## U.S. Policy

The United States seeks a negotiated settlement in Afghanistan which brings about the complete and prompt withdrawal of Soviet troops and self-determination for the Afghan people as outlined in the UN General Assembly resolutions passed by overwhelming majorities each year over the past 8 years. The United States supports the efforts of the UN Secretary General's personal representative to achieve a settlement. The single remaining issue to be agreed to is Soviet troop withdrawal. So long as the Soviet Union continues to occupy Afghanistan, the U.S. Government will maintain its strong support for the Afghan people's cause. The United States has noted recent Soviet professions of intent to

withdraw from Afghanistan. The U.S. Government urges the Soviet Union to match its words with deeds at the earliest possible time.

This was the primary thrust of President Reagan's message to Gorbachev at the December 1987 summit in Washington. The President urged the Soviets to agree to a short timeframe and declare a "date certain" for the withdrawal of Soviet forces from Afghanistan.

## Humanitarian Assistance

The U.S. Government contributes heavily to a sizable humanitarian assistance program designed to minimize the suffering of those who have chosen to remain in the villages of the war-ravaged Afghan countryside. Congress provided \$15 million for the program in FY 1986 and \$30 million in FY 1987. The projected funding for FY 1988 is \$45 million. In addition, the United States is donating wheat and vegetable oil to support the cross-border program. In FY 1988, a minimum of 40,000 metric tons of wheat, valued at \$7.6 million, will be provided.

The humanitarian assistance program is administered by the U.S. Agency for International Development. Through the program, hundreds of tons of food, medical supplies, cold weather clothing, and other humanitarian goods have been provided to war-affected Afghans to counter the ongoing, systematic destruction of their crops and property. The program also seeks to develop the capabilities of the Afghan resistance Alliance to provide education, health, and agricultural services to the people inside Afghanistan. To plan and implement its activities, the Alliance has set up technical committees.

Although still in the nascent stages of development, each of the committees can claim significant achievements. The Education Committee is implementing a program through which almost 660 schools inside Afghanistan are being supplied with textbooks, instructional aids, and administrative materials. It also has initiated a literacy program for adults which has thus far attracted an estimated 8,000 participants.

The Health Committee has developed a training program which is graduating 240 basic health workers every month. It is establishing and supplying hospitals and clinics inside Afghanistan and planning a major immunization campaign that will begin in early 1988. With less than a year of operational experience, the Agriculture Committee is already sponsoring the preparation and radio broadcast of agricultural extension programs and the rehabilitation of a number of irrigation canals.

To complement the activities of the Alliance committees, the U.S. Government supports private voluntary agencies from the United States, France, West Germany, Belgium, United Kingdom, and Sweden. In FY 1987, \$9 million was provided to 12 voluntary organizations for 15 activities. More than half of these funds were granted to support health activities. The remaining funds finance food, agriculture and education activities.

A separate program created by Congress in FY 1986 to help improve the living conditions inside Afghanistan is the Humanitarian Relief Program. Through this program, the Defense Department and the Agency for International Development provide nonlethal excess Defense Department property as well as transport humanitarian goods donated by private sector organizations to the Alliance. Under the same program, war wounded Afghan patients are transported to the United States, Europe, and Middle East for free medical treatment. To date, an estimated 450 patients have been placed, 270 of them in U.S. medical institutions. ■

## State of the Union Address

*Excerpt from President Reagan's press before a joint session of the Congress on January 25, 1988.*

... of the greatest contributions the United States can make to the world is to promote freedom as the key to economic growth. A creative, competitive America is the answer to a changing world, not trade wars that would close doors, create greater barriers, and deny millions of jobs. We should always remember: protectionism is destructive. America's jobs, America's growth, America's future depend on free trade that is free, open, and

This year we have it within our power to take a major step toward a new global economy and an expanded cycle of prosperity that reaches to the free nations of this Earth. I am making of the historic free trade agreement negotiated between our country and Canada. And I can also tell you that we are determined to expand this concept, south as well as north. Next month I will be traveling to Mexico where trade matters will be of foremost concern. And over the next several months, our Congress and the Canadian Parliament can make the start of such a North American accord reality. Our goal must be a day when the free flow of trade—from the tip of Patagonia to the Arctic Circle—unites the people of the Western Hemisphere in a bond of mutually beneficial change; when all borders become porous at the U.S.-Canadian border so long as they have been—a meeting place rather than a dividing line.

This movement we see in so many places toward economic freedom is indicative from the worldwide movement toward political freedom—and against totalitarian rule. This global democratic revolution has removed the specter—so frightening a decade ago—of democracy doomed to permanent minority status throughout the world. In South and Central America, only a third of the people enjoy democratic rule in 1976. Today over 90% of Latin Americans live in nations committed to democratic principles.

And the resurgence of democracy owed to these courageous people on most every continent who have struggled to take control of their own des-

tiny. In Nicaragua the struggle has extra meaning because that nation is so near our own borders. The recent revelations of a former high-level Sandinista major, Roger Miranda, show us that, even as they talk peace, the communist Sandinista government of Nicaragua has established plans for a large 600,000-man army. Yet even as these plans are made, the Sandinista regime knows the tide is turning and the cause of Nicaraguan freedom is riding at the crest. Because of the freedom fighters, who are resisting communist rule, the Sandinistas have been forced to extend some democratic rights, negotiate with church authorities, and release a few political prisoners.

The focus is on the Sandinistas—their promises and their actions. There is a consensus among the four Central American democratic presidents that the Sandinistas have not complied with the plan to bring peace and democracy to all of Central America. The Sandinistas again have promised reforms. Their challenge is to take irreversible steps toward democracy.

On Wednesday [January 27] my request to sustain the freedom fighters will be submitted which reflects our

ing and dying for the same democratic liberties we hold sacred. Their cause is our cause: freedom.

Yet, even as we work to expand world freedom, we must build a safer peace and reduce the danger of nuclear war. But let us have no illusions. Three years of steady decline in the value of our annual defense investment have increased the risk of our most basic security interests, jeopardizing earlier hard-won goals. We must face squarely the implications of this negative trend and make adequate, stable defense spending a top goal both this year and in the future. This same concern applies to economic and security assistance programs as well. But the resolve of America and its NATO allies has opened the way for unprecedented achievement in arms reduction. Our recently signed INF [Intermediate-Range Nuclear Forces] Treaty is historic because it reduces nuclear arms and establishes the most stringent verification regime in arms control history, including several forms of short-notice, on-site inspection. I submitted the treaty today, and I urge the Senate to give its advice and consent to ratification of this landmark agreement.

***Our recently signed INF Treaty is historic because it reduces nuclear arms and establishes the most stringent verification regime in arms control history....***

mutual desire for peace, freedom, and democracy in Nicaragua. I ask Congress to pass this request; let us be for the people of Nicaragua what Lafayette, Pulaski, and Von Steuben were for our forefathers and the cause of American independence.

So, too, in Afghanistan the freedom fighters are the key to peace. We support the *mujahidin*. There can be no settlement unless all Soviet troops are removed and the Afghan people are allowed genuine self-determination. I have made my views on this matter known to Mr. Gorbachev. But not just Nicaragua or Afghanistan. Yes, everywhere we see a swelling freedom tide across the world—freedom fighters rising up in Cambodia and Angola, fight-

In addition to the INF Treaty, we are within reach of an even more significant START [strategic arms reduction] agreement that will reduce U.S. and Soviet long-range missiles or strategic arsenals by half. But let me be clear; our approach is not to seek agreement for agreement's sake but to settle only for agreements that truly enhance our national security and that of our allies. We will never put our security at risk—or that of our allies—just to reach an agreement with the Soviets. No agreement is better than a bad agreement.

As I mentioned earlier, our efforts are to give future generations what we

never had—a future free of nuclear terror. Reduction of strategic offensive arms is one step; SDI [Strategic Defense Initiative] is another. Our funding request for our Strategic Defense Initiative is less than 2% of the total defense budget. SDI funding is money wisely appropriated and money well spent. SDI has the same purpose and supports the same goals of arms reduction. It reduces the risk of war and the threat of nuclear weapons to all mankind. Strategic defenses that threaten no one could offer the world a safer, more stable basis for deterrence. We must also remember that SDI is our insurance policy against a nuclear accident—a Chernobyl of the sky—or an accidental launch or some madman who might come along.

We have seen such changes in the world in 7 years. As totalitarianism

struggles to avoid being overwhelmed by the forces of economic advance and the aspiration for human freedom, it is the free nations that are resilient and resurgent. As the global democratic revolution has put totalitarianism on the defensive, we have left behind the days of retreat—America is again a vigorous leader of the free world, a nation that acts decisively and firmly in the furtherance of its principles and vital interests. No legacy would make me more proud than leaving in place a bipartisan consensus for the cause of world freedom, a consensus that prevents a paralysis of American power from ever occurring again.

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<sup>1</sup>Text from Weekly Compilation of Presidential Documents of Feb. 1, 1988. ■

## South Africa: What Are America's Options?

by Charles W. Freeman

*Address before the World Affairs Council of Inland Southern California conference on U.S. foreign policy in Riverside on December 9, 1987. Mr. Freeman is Deputy Assistant Secretary for African Affairs.*

I have been invited to speak to you about South Africa and what role the United States can play in promoting change there. This is a serious issue, and one of vital concern to Americans, as it is to Africans.

This is so, in no small measure, because of South Africa's dominant role in the region of which it is part. South Africa's political and economic fevers infect the 150 million people who live in the area from Zaire to Lesotho. All of southern Africa's nations—democracies, monarchies, and dictatorships; vigorous capitalist economies and bastions of socialist decrepitude alike—are enfeebled and imperiled by the death throes of apartheid. Events in South Africa will determine much of the future of this vast, strategically important region. This in itself justifies a high level of American and international concern about events in that country.

But what happens in South Africa is more than a strategic or regional issue. For Africans and Americans alike, apartheid is, first and foremost, a

moral issue. All Americans are deeply affronted by the intolerable injustice and grotesque perversion of Western values that apartheid represents. To borrow a poignant South African phrase, apartheid is a "black spot" on the world's conscience that must be removed. Americans have a strong interest in seeing South Africa embrace the Western democratic values it has so long professed but denied to the majority of its people in practice. As President Reagan has repeatedly affirmed:

Apartheid is morally wrong and politically unacceptable. The United States cannot maintain cordial relations with a government whose power rests upon the denial of rights to a majority of its people based on race. If South Africa wishes to belong to the family of Western nations, an end to apartheid is a precondition.

It is worth recalling that last year's debate about South Africa was not, in fact, about whether the United States should do all we can to help South Africans bring about the rapid, peaceful replacement of apartheid by a democratic system based on a universal franchise. All Americans share these objectives. The debate was about how best to pursue them. What, in fact, is America's most effective role in catalyzing change in South Africa? It is to that issue I would now like to turn.

It seems to me that at least three fundamental conceptual differences have lain beneath discussion of this issue in this country. The questions raised by these differing presuppositions have seldom been addressed explicitly by those engaged in public debate about policy toward South Africa. Nevertheless, they are important and the answers to them are not self-evident. I would like to speak briefly each of them. The questions are:

- Can rising violence push South Africans toward a negotiated compromise, or will it work to entrench apartheid?

- Will isolation of white South Africa hasten the replacement of apartheid by a truly democratic order or will it impede and slow this?

- Will inflicting economic pain on South Africa magnify the power of South Africa blacks to achieve a racially just society, or will their strength and bargaining position be diminished and eroded by such measures?

Finally, we Americans must ask ourselves what kind of South Africa we hope to see emerge from apartheid, and what can we do most effectively to help such a South Africa be born.

Let me now attempt to answer the questions I have posed.

### The Issue of Violence

First, the issue of violence: in the South African context, this question usually—like so many others—debates primarily in moral terms. Is violence justified or not? Clearly, some forms of violence—terrorist bombings of supermarkets or the slaying of nonviolent protestors, for example—cannot be justified by any respectable moral standard. But, beyond this, there is disagreement. Theologians have wrestled with this question for millennia, and I doubt that I can add anything significant to what they have said about it. Nor do I feel compelled to do so, because the real questions before the actors in South Africa is not whether violence is right or wrong, but what it will accomplish and where it will lead their country.

The record on this point is clear: escalating violence has done nothing to speed the end of apartheid. It has become a primary obstacle to a negotiated end to racial injustice in South Africa. Violence may well have become as South African as the *braai*—the outdoor barbecue that is the focus of middle-class Afrikaner social life—but it,

counterproductive. It is, therefore, a tragedy, whether it is carried out by armed soldiers in armored cars, by lavishly equipped infiltrators from South Africa's several liberation movements, or among political factions in black townships. Let us be clear about the effects of all these kinds of violence in South Africa.

The violence of the government serves simply to radicalize black opinion and drive it toward the left; to delegitimize the government in the eyes of blacks; to discredit the path of negotiations; to inhibit those who might otherwise be inclined to negotiate from doing so to justify counterviolence; and to add a further element of rage and hatred to South Africa's already embittered race relations. The violence carried out by the South African military against neighboring black-ruled states makes almost impossible even for those of them inclined to recognize the reality of South African power and to maintain a cooperative relationship with Pretoria to do so.

As the recent elections in South Africa illustrate, the violence of the apartheid movements similarly serves to harden white opinion and to drive it to the right; to cause most whites to view such movements as a security problem rather than as a legitimate voice for change; to inhibit those who seek an early end to apartheid from openly making common cause with black patriots; to give the government an excuse to deny the leaders of black opposition movements a voice in determining South Africa's future; and to add a distinctly unhelpful element of apprehension and outright fear to whites contemplating a future nonracial regime in their country. The cross-border operations of the liberation movements are cited by the South African military as justification for their reign of counterterror throughout the region.

An environment in which violent intimidation of dissent is the norm—whether in government action against black opposition or in the mayhem of political life in the townships—is a major school for democracy. The progress toward the institutionalization of violence in South Africa raises grave questions about the prospects for civic agency in that country. It is no consolation that most violence takes place among members of the same racial and ethnic group rather than between groups separated—even in this—by apartheid.

One telling measure of the emotional and intellectual chasm to be crossed in South Africa is the fact that all but a few black South Africans would agree wholeheartedly with what I have said about the effects on them of government and interethnic violence. And all but a few white South Africans would agree completely with my characterization of the effects of ANC [African National Congress] and PAC [Pan-African Congress] violence on their fellow whites. But neither side in South Africa is able to see that violence directed at the other side produces a mirror-image reaction.

Moreover, violence and counterviolence tend to strengthen the role of those who command its instruments and to weaken those who favor negotiation and compromise. Thus, with each ratcheting upwards of the stages of violence, the prospects for a negotiated outcome are lessened.

But if violence is a fundamental obstacle to negotiations, could it not be an effective alternative to negotiations?

I have heard a few Americans forthrightly justify their stand in favor of sanctions and other punitive measures against South Africa by their view that violent revolution may be the quickest and most effective answer to apartheid. They believe that a sharp rise in black misery could provoke an uprising that would overthrow apartheid. They reason that, since the South African victims of apartheid outnumber its white beneficiaries almost six to one, black victory would be quickly attained in such a revolutionary struggle.

Yet I know of no serious student of the South African scene who agrees that the overthrow of apartheid would be the outcome of a black uprising. Given the overwhelming superiority—in training, organization, discipline, equipment, weaponry, communications, and mobility—of the South African military over a brave but largely unarmed populace, the tragic result would almost certainly be the same as it has been in the past in South Africa—thousands upon thousands of dead, very few of whom would be white. And South Africa would have added open race war to all the other hobbles that hold it from a decent postapartheid future. To premise U.S. policy on the incitement of violent revolution in South Africa would be irresponsible and could implicate Americans in an unspeakable tragedy. Fortunately, South African opponents of apartheid know their own situation well; they are unlikely to risk any such thing.

## The Isolation of South Africa

This brings me to the question of the isolation of South Africa as a way of persuading white South Africans to accept that apartheid is morally indefensible and must be abandoned.

Isolation is a fine way of registering moral disgust but a very poor way, indeed, of influencing the opinion and actions of those being isolated. Threats to sever specific relationships are one thing, actual quarantine is quite another. Across-the-board isolation may be an appropriate response to the international behavior of foreign nations, but it has never worked as a means by which to change their human rights or other domestic practices. It did not work in China, and it will not work in South Africa. I mention China because I believe that the many positive changes which have taken place there in recent years might have come about earlier had the country not been isolated—and had it not isolated itself. That is, of course, speculation. What is fact is that the positive changes with which we are all familiar came only after the opening of the country to much more intensive contact and dialogue with the outside world. The same seems to me to have been true in South Africa.

There have, in fact, been significant changes in South Africa over the past decade—the recognition by the establishment Dutch Reformed Church that apartheid is without biblical sanction or any other moral justification; the ending of many forms of segregation and legal discrimination in the workplace and daily life; the organization of Africa's strongest trade union movement; the government's determined efforts to raise black educational spending and standards, and so forth. These changes came about during a period of intensified international contact by white South Africans, who are, today, a mostly urban, much more cosmopolitan people than their rural grandparents were, and far more open to foreign ideas. Change was catalyzed by exposure to challenging ideas and ideals from the West to which most South Africans—whether white or black—had not previously been exposed. It was produced when rising numbers of South Africans came to admit that their previous beliefs and practices needed reexamination, if South Africa was—in President Reagan's words—"to come home to the family of Western nations, where she belongs."

Many of the same people who declare the South African Government wrong to have banned contact and dialogue with the African National Congress because it prevents cross-fertilization of ideas and constructive dialogue about South Africa's future are quick to advocate banning international contact and dialogue with the South African Government, white South Africans, and the country's universities, churches, associations, and even its musicians and artists—black and white. I find this both ironic and sad. If there is, today, a crisis of conscience about apartheid among significant numbers of white South Africans, this comes because they have begun to accept and assimilate the ideals of freedom, equality, and brotherhood upon which modern industrial democracies are based and to seek to raise their own country to these standards. If such democratic ideals live in the battered hearts of black South Africans, their vitality comes, in part, from the personal discovery that South Africa is abnormal and that there is a more just world beyond its borders. If white South Africans have had to accept that the South African cultural achievement most esteemed by the Western world today is the music of black townships, this lively reminder of the black South African creative genius has come about because the misguided cultural boycott of the country was ignored by a color-blind American musician. It cannot be in the West's or the world's interests to avoid challenging—through direct exposure of South Africans to our ideas and our examples—the obnoxious doctrines and racial stereotyping to which too many of them continue to adhere.

A South Africa under boycott and siege is likely to be a South Africa both impervious and indifferent to the new ideas it must embrace if it is to have a democratic and prosperous future. Isolation can only work to protest South Africans from the need to reexamine their ideology and to sustain the moral fallacy and horror of apartheid. Conversely, the extent to which the world remains open to contact and dialogue with South Africa and the extent to which South Africa remains receptive to such contact and dialogue with the industrial democracies will strongly influence the speed and ease with which apartheid is dismantled and replaced by a system with liberty and security for all.

### Sanctions and Disinvestment

This brings me to the issue of inflicting economic pain on South Africa as a means of hastening the peaceful end of apartheid. With the exception of the few who seek a violent revolution in South Africa, to whom I have already alluded, almost all who advocate a comprehensive embargo do so in the hope that a sharp blow to the economy and to white living standards would force Pretoria to negotiate with the country's black majority, thereby accelerating the peaceful end to apartheid. Many go on to portray the application of broad international sanctions as the last, best chance before Armageddon and to assert that support for sanctions is the litmus test of opposition to apartheid.

Unfortunately, this seductively easy remedy for apartheid overlooks our historical experiences with sanctions in other contexts, the nature and structure of the South African economy, and the impact of economic misery on the relative bargaining positions of the apartheid state and its black opponents.

Embargoes can be an effective way of registering disapproval of another country's policy. They can even be an effective way of modifying its international behavior. (I think that it is only fair to note, however, that sometimes embargoes can produce unforeseen and unfortunate results even in this arena. U.S. sanctions against Japan led directly to the attack on Pearl Harbor and the Japanese seizure of Southeast Asia's oil and rubber resources.) What sanctions have never been able to accomplish is to force fundamental constitutional change inside the country against which they are targeted. Historically, they have tended to arouse a nationalist backlash and to unite those against whom they are directed more than to divide them or push them toward compromise and accommodation. South Africa seems highly unlikely to be an exception in this regard; indeed, the initial effects of the sanctions imposed on South Africa by the United States and the other industrial democracies last years seem to fall very much into this depressingly familiar pattern.

Moreover, South Africa's economy is peculiarly insulated against international sanctions. Three-fifths of the country's exports are gold and other minerals and metals that cannot be readily obtained from other sources outside the Soviet bloc and which are essential to modern industry in the West. (To cite only one example, if you drive a car, chances are that you have a

little piece of South Africa in the catalytic converter—pollution controls depend on platinum group metals from there.) Another fifth or more of South Africa's exports consists of widely traded, fungible products like coal, which can easily find loopholes in any wall of sanctions. So over three-quarters of the country's production for export can find a ready market abroad, regardless of sanctions.

But even if South African exports and imports could be drastically reduced, the impact would fall less on those white South Africans who support apartheid than on its victims and opponents. This is because Afrikaners have used their dominance of the country's government to ensure their employment in a huge state-capitalist economic sector. Over three-fifths of employed Afrikaners work for the government or state corporations. This sector, which includes the self-sufficient arms production industries South Africa has built since the United States led the way in imposing international embargo in 1962, is largely immune to the business cycle and affected positively, if at all, by downswings in foreign trade. The first consequence of falling tax revenues that would follow major economic contraction in South Africa would be reduced government expenditures on education, housing, and other services for blacks, all of which have been expanding rapidly in recent years. Moreover, to the extent that sanctions seemed to threaten South African access to key industrial inputs and technologies, the state's role in the economy would expand as the government redirected investment toward achieving the same self-sufficiency in other economic areas that it has successfully promoted in the arms industry.

This would be doubly tragic:

**First**, because it would concentrate even more in the hands of the apartheid state; and

**Second**, because it would deny black South Africans the opportunity to develop the economic muscle they need to strengthen their bargaining power against apartheid.

Skills, jobs and property are power, and destitution is next to powerlessness. Black South Africans could not, until the most recent wave of government-initiated reforms, own property, open businesses in the cities or engage in many kinds of business activity even in their own residential areas. There are still major obstacles erected by a paternalistic and insen-

ive bureaucracy, but now black South Africans can own property and engage in business of all kinds. The best hope for black South Africans to escape the status of propertyless labor pool to which white domination and apartheid have condemned them is through continued expansion of the South African economy. This is essential for the growth of black business, the strengthening of black labor unions, and the growth of black employment. It is essential for black dignity and the accumulation of black power in South Africa.

Unemployment among black South Africans already runs at around 30%—40% in some areas of the country. The economy needs to grow at least 5% just to provide jobs to the 300,000 new entrants into its job market each year. It is currently growing well below that level, and unemployment is rising. As jobs grow more scarce, competition for them becomes increasingly fierce.

Every time someone is fired, there are seven or eight others fighting to take his or her place. Americans are often surprised that black South Africans contend with each other to get into the lice, despite the fact that this makes them accomplices in the enforcement of apartheid. We should not be surprised; desperation robs men of their dignity. It can drive them to make Faustian bargains. Rising joblessness in South Africa is not a prescription for strengthening the bargaining position of blacks in their efforts to end apartheid. Rising black joblessness is a prescription for apartheid's perpetuation beyond its natural lifespan.

In conditions of rapid economic growth, that lifespan could be short indeed. The South African business community has known and said for years that apartheid is the very antithesis of capitalism and that its continuation is inconsistent with the development of a modern economy. That is why the private sector in South Africa has been the principal white voice for the steady dismantling of apartheid.

No section of the business community in South Africa has a prouder record of efforts to break down apartheid and build up black South Africans' role in the economy than American companies. Despite apartheid, American companies' workplaces are desegregated; they follow equal and fair employment practices and provide equal pay for equal work. They are steadily increasing the number of blacks, "coloreds," and Asians in supervisory positions, including supervision of white employees.

They have worked hard to upgrade the quality of their employee's lives, housing, schooling, transportation, recreation, and health facilities. And they are committed actively to work to eliminate laws and customs that impede social and political justice in South Africa. Over the past few years, American companies have committed over \$200 million and a great deal of management time to training programs, community development projects, scholarships, and other activities designed to put black South Africans in positions of authority and to prepare them for leadership roles in a future South Africa. It distresses me that their presence in South Africa is often maligned in the United States. I'd like to give you just a few examples of the kinds of things that those companies brave enough to stand against the ill-considered disinvestment campaign here are doing and which justify our being proud of them.

- One company arranged for children affected by the unrest at 25 schools in urban areas to attend rural schools. Because of the record of violence by many of these pupils, rural schools were reluctant to accept them. It was only after the company provided funds and considerable persuasion that these children could continue their education.

- Another company supports a school started by a group of concerned parents and teachers from virtually every South African racial and ethnic group, but located in an exclusively white residential area. Starting at the nursery school level, the school tries to teach the children appreciation and understanding of each other's different cultures before their thinking can be deformed by attendance at segregated schools.

- Yet another company sponsored a nationwide tour of black townships by a large group of Afrikaner ministers of the gospel. They arranged for them to stay with black families, to share meals with them, and to meet with black community leaders. The experience had such an impact on the group that some participants have since openly borne witness to the need for drastic steps on a wide range of issues. The company has made a commitment to repeat this highly successful initiative regularly with other groups.

I could give hundreds of other examples of this kind. These are small things, perhaps, but they are important; they make a difference. As American companies pull out of South Africa, these patient and often courageous efforts to help South Africans prepare

themselves for a postapartheid future will be greatly missed. More concretely, who will pick up the nearly 12,000 scholarships provided by American companies to black South Africans? Who will carry on the school lunch programs they finance? And what positive American influence will there be, on the ground, in South Africa when the American private sector presence is no more?

A final note on the issue of sanctions and disinvestment before I turn to more hopeful and constructive topics. It is often said that black South Africans demand sanctions and disinvestment and that the United States has no business second-guessing the clearly expressed judgment of those who have the most to gain or lose from these measures. Frankly, this argument is unconvincing. So are all the polling data that are cited to prove that most black South Africans oppose sanctions and disinvestment. The fact is that if black South Africans really want to shut down South Africa's imports and exports, they have it in their power to do so. They don't need Americans to do it for them. Similarly, if they believe that it would help them for Americans business to leave, all they have to do is go on strike to force companies out. The fact that there have been no strikes in favor of disinvestment, while there have been a number against it, speaks more eloquently about the attitudes of the black rank and file than the statements of their pro-sanction leaders, however, well-intentioned they may be. And, in the end, no advice from South Africans can excuse us from making our own considered judgments about what we can and should do to facilitate change there.

### The U.S. Role in South Africa

If neither sanctions, nor quarantine, nor violence will destroy racial injustice in South Africa, what can the United States do?

Surely, we must start from a clear-headed understanding of South African realities. While the striking gains registered in race relations in our own country in recent decades hold out hope for race relations in South Africa as well, the analogy of our civil rights struggle is not as relevant as many Americans imagine to South Africa. In the United States, it was a minority that was denied equality of participation in national life; in South Africa it is the majority that demands to be accommodated.

Here, the Declaration of Independence and the Constitution provided an incontrovertible moral and legal standard, accepted by all Americans, to which to appeal for justice; in South Africa, there is no such constitutional norm. Here, there was agreement on the free enterprise system as the avenue to black empowerment; in South Africa, an alliance of statism with ethnic nationalism clashes with alternatives ranging from genuine free enterprise to unreconstructed Stalinism. In short, our task in the United States was to affirm our values and political culture; in South Africa, it is to create a consensus where none yet exists and then to implement it.

In this light, let me return to the question of what we can do. Or to put it another way, what are our strengths? What leverage can we bring to bear to promote change in a tormented land 8,000 miles and a historical era away from us? I believe that:

First, our greatest strength is the moral power of our democratic ideas and experience and the evidence of our example. South Africans know what we are against; they need to know that we share the vision that most of them hold of a postapartheid South Africa built on the solid foundation of the elements of its heritage that are democratic rather than on the rubble of racial injustice. And they need to know that we will do all we can to help them achieve such constitutional democracy for all in their country.

Second, both our government and private sector need to remain involved on the side of change in South Africa. We need to do all we can—both through our aid program and through the activities of American companies—to help black South Africans gain the skills, the experience, and the confidence they need to assume their rightful role in the running of their country and to help them build the power they need to insist effectively on their right to do so.

Third, we must expand our own contacts with South Africans of all races and political opinions to challenge them to think seriously about the hard choices before them and to stimulate them urgently to consider alternatives to increasing violence, isolation from the world, and economic decline under apartheid.

Fourth, we must continue to use diplomatic, political, economic, and other appropriate forms of pressure to demonstrate to the South African Government and the white electorate that the costs of maintaining apartheid are

high, and rising, and to sustain the morale of those of all races working for a peaceful end to apartheid.

Fifth, we must lend our active encouragement to those in South Africa seeking democratic alternatives to apartheid and be prepared to help them to conduct the urgent dialogue across racial and political lines that must occur if South Africans are to define the difficult compromises all of them must prepare to make as they sit down to negotiate a just postapartheid order.

Finally, we must use all our influence to help South Africans find their way to the negotiating table and to secure the prosperous, democratic future for which the vast majority of them yearn and to which the natural endowment of their country has predestined them.

I would like to close by sharing with you what we believe decent and farsighted South Africans want for their country and what we should help them attain. The words are those of George Shultz on September 29th of this year in New York, but the ideas are common to the partisans of democracy in all times and places.

Here, then, are the basic ideas that we believe must be addressed by all South Africans as they negotiate a replacement for the current system in South Africa:

- A new constitutional order for a united South Africa establishing equal political, economic, and social rights for all South Africans without regard to race, language, national origin, or religion;
- A democratic electoral system with multiparty participation and universal franchise for all adult South Africans;
- Effective constitutional guarantees of basic human rights for all South Africans as provided for in the Universal Declaration of Human Rights and the canons of democracies everywhere, including: the right to liberty and security of persons; the right to freedom of speech and the press, peaceful assembly and association, and practice of religion; the right of labor to organize and pursue peacefully its economic objectives; the right not to be deprived of property except by due process of law and upon payment of just compensation; the right of movement within the country, emigration, and repatriation; and the right of individuals and communities to use their own languages and develop their cultures and customs;
- The rule of law, safeguarded by an independent judiciary with the power to enforce the rights guaranteed by the constitution to all South Africans;

• A constitutional allocation of powers between the national government and its constituent regional and local jurisdictions in keeping with South Africa's deeply rooted regional and cultural traditions; and

• An economic system that guarantees economic freedom for every South African, allocates government social and economic services fairly, and enables all South Africans to realize the fruits of their labor, acquire and own property, and attain a decent standard of living for themselves and their families.

Secretary Shultz went on to say:

Apartheid has condemned the majority of South Africans to an unjust state of economic underdevelopment. Certainly we can strive to do more. As South Africans move toward meaningful negotiations, the United States would be willing to encourage this process. One of the ways we could encourage it would be to expand our efforts to help the victims of apartheid lift themselves out of poverty.

If the contending parties in South Africa are ready to take risks for peace, we may be assured of the active political, diplomatic, and economic support of the United States and its allies. We will support those who are working toward these democratic goals. We are ready to take whatever steps we can—providing channels of communication or a site or lending our political support for meetings between South Africans interested in serious dialogue.

To play this role in South Africa will require us to cultivate virtues for which we Americans are not famous. We must be duly modest our ability to foster change in South Africa and use such influence as we have wisely to make a real difference when and where we can. We must be consistent in our approach and in our message of hope to South Africans. We must refrain from self-indulgent actions that do little or nothing to improve the prospects for a peaceful resolution of the issues in South Africa itself.

It is, perhaps painful, to admit that Americans cannot solve South Africa's problems; only South Africans can do that. But, if we cannot solve South Africans' problems for them, we should at least refrain from making them worse. And, when we can do good—however small—we should not disdain to do so. I believe that this is a course on which Americans can and should agree. ■



## The INF Treaty: Strengthening U.S. Security

*Secretary Shultz's statement before Senate Foreign Relations Committee on January 25, 1988.<sup>1</sup>*

I appreciate the three opening statements. Of course, I especially appreciate Senator Dole's unequivocal statement of support for this treaty. I welcome the fact that he studied it carefully; and I had the privilege of meeting with him and help in that regard. I want to assure you, Senator, that the Administration is prepared to work with the Senate to be sure that we do everything we possibly can on these three issues you identified on compliance and on verification and on extension of the European theater effects subject. Those are all important effects, and they are treated to a fair degree, as a matter of fact, in my opening statement.

I welcome, Senator Helms, your report for a careful and thorough and incisive review of this treaty; and we're pleased to do that—to devote all of the time necessary to do that—and to provide materials that you may wish to listen to carefully to your committee, and I think that as we go through this process they can be answered satisfactorily—at least, I hope—and we will work at all of them.

And, Senator Pell, I appreciate, Chairman [of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee], your opening comments, and I do hope to be able to get out to your satisfaction that this treaty doesn't represent some sudden change of heart on the part of the Reagan Administration. This treaty represents the result of a long and patient process and brings us to the place that the President set out to get in 1981, not long after he took office. So there has been a continuous effort to bring this treaty about. And one of the things that I hope to be able to do here—and I don't want to take undue time of this committee, but you've emphasized the importance of being thorough and careful—is to review with you carefully the negotiating process that we went through because I think it's a very inductive process in methods of dealing with the Soviet Union.

The President has forwarded to the Senate, for its advice, the treaty on the elimination of U.S. and Soviet intermediate-range and shorter range missiles. The treaty defines intermediate-range missiles as land-based systems having ranges between 1,000 and 5,500 kilometers. It defines shorter range missiles as land-based systems with a range between 500 and 1,000 kilometers. It requires the United States and the Soviet Union to eliminate their intermediate-range missiles within 3 years and their shorter range missiles within 18 months. Neither side can possess such missiles after they have been eliminated, nor can they produce or flight-test them.

The treaty contains a memorandum of understanding on data giving the locations, numbers, and characteristics of each side's intermediate- and shorter range missiles. It also includes a protocol that sets forth the detailed procedures for eliminating missiles, launchers, support structures, and support equipment. Finally, it contains a protocol that gives the detailed procedures for a variety of inspections associated with the treaty.

This treaty deserves, and I am sure will get, your careful, thorough, and complete examination. I particularly welcome this opportunity to testify today as you begin your consideration of the treaty, and I will look forward to working closely with you in that process.

The treaty is the result of our steady, patient approach to U.S.-Soviet relations, on the basis of realism, strength, and dialogue. We got this treaty because we were persistent at the bargaining table and because our allies went forward with deployments. The way we and our allies successfully met the Soviet INF challenge shows that tough-mindedness, clarity of purpose, and resolve pay off. The INF experience offers important lessons on how to proceed as we confront other challenges to our security.

The INF Treaty strengthens U.S. and allied security. It enhances international stability. It may be opening a new chapter in arms control—the beginning of reductions. It reduces nuclear weapons, rather than setting

guidelines for their future growth. It achieves U.S.-Soviet equality by eliminating substantially more Soviet weapons than American ones. It accomplishes the goals we and our allies set for ourselves 8 years ago, when the deployment of the SS-20 led to the NATO dual-track decision. In short, the treaty is an achievement—as our allies proclaimed last December—“without precedent in the history of arms control.”

### National Security

Before I discuss the treaty in detail and the process that brought it about, I want to put it in context. This means going back to first principles.

The first purpose of a government is to ensure the security of its citizens, both as individuals and as a nation. To this end, one of the objectives specifically listed in the Preamble to our Constitution is “to provide for the common defense.” This sets the standard we must all use to assess this or any other arms control agreement.

What are we trying to secure? Our strength and integrity as a nation? But there is more to it than that. Our purpose is, again quoting the Preamble, “to secure the blessings of liberty to ourselves and our posterity.” From the beginning, Americans recognized that their security could not depend on wishful thinking. The United States has survived and prospered as a nation because our predecessors, in both the executive and legislative branches, understood the need for strength and realism.

Realism means recognizing what is right for the times in which you live. George Washington was right in his farewell address to warn his country against foreign alliances. A century and a half later, Harry Truman was right to commit his country to such an alliance.

Strength does not mean simply military might, although military strength is essential. For most of our history, we were able to get by with much less formidable military forces than many other countries. This is because, for the century following the Napoleonic wars, two vast oceans saw to our country's security, while other countries maintained a balance of power across the Atlantic.

But the world does not stand still: distance can no longer guarantee safety, and stability is always under challenge. Advances in technology have transformed the oceans from barriers to highways. The development of the airplane, and later of the rocket engine, added a new dimension to warfare. And the European balance collapsed in 1914.

In the 30 years that followed, Europe was twice convulsed by war. Both times, the United States at first tried to stay aloof. Both times, we ultimately joined with our democratic allies and fought by their side until the war was won. Why? Because we recognized that our fundamental national security interests would be directly threatened by the defeat of democracy in Europe. In the aftermath of World War II, we joined with the European democracies to become part of the balance there, to ensure that the tragedy we and they had just suffered would never come about again.

Since 1945, the principal threat to our security, and to that of our friends and allies around the world, has come from the Soviet Union. It is a threat not just of open conflict but of political intimidation as well. Therefore, an overriding objective of every American Administration has been to prevent the loss of Europe to the Soviet Union—not by fighting a war but by deterring one. Every Administration has agreed that the way to do this is to make that commitment to defend freedom in Europe crystal clear.

The advance of technology has forever changed the stakes for our national security. The awesome destructiveness of nuclear weapons—especially when combined with the unprecedented speed and range of ballistic missiles—has given added urgency to the need to build a solid structure of peace. As President Reagan has reiterated many times, "A nuclear war cannot be won and must never be fought." General Secretary Gorbachev has said he agrees, most recently in the Washington summit statement.

The fundamental means of preventing a nuclear war is deterring it. The U.S. strategic triad is the ultimate deterrent. The President has assigned top priority to modernizing all three legs: intercontinental ballistic missiles, manned bombers, and submarine-launched ballistic missiles. Together, the three legs of the triad complement each other and provide a solid basis for deterrence.

Another essential element of our strategy of deterrence is our network of alliances with our fellow democracies.

These alliances have an importance to us that goes well beyond their strictly military role, but the military role is vital to deterrence. The U.S. strategic triad is one leg of the NATO triad. The other two legs are nuclear weapons based in Europe and conventional forces—just the two items that Senator Dole focused on in his comments.

All three legs of the NATO triad are vital to the success of deterrence. Their effect together is more than the sum of the individual parts. The U.S. strategic deterrent has a unique role, but the burden of the other two legs of the triad is widely shared. Thus, delivery systems for U.S. nuclear weapons in Europe are owned and operated by seven of our allies. In the case of a short-warning attack, the vast majority of the NATO forces involved would be from our allies, not the United States: over 90% of the ground forces, over 75% of the air forces, and over 50% of the naval forces.

Maintaining an effective deterrent is thus the key to a successful national security policy. At the same time, the United States has also sought to negotiate agreements with the Soviet Union to reduce the risk posed by nuclear weapons. As with the other elements of our security policy, this has been a bipartisan objective, carried out by Presidents, and supported by Senators and Members of Congress, of both parties.

There have been important accomplishments. Chairman Pell mentioned some. One was the Limited Test Ban Treaty in 1963, which you mentioned. Another arms control achievement was the Non-Proliferation Treaty of 1968. It remains the basis for our continuing efforts to halt the spread of nuclear weapons.

The Non-Proliferation Treaty also obliges the nuclear weapons states to negotiate in good faith to reduce nuclear weapons. In 1972, we agreed to the ABM [Anti-Ballistic Missile] Treaty, substantially reducing our right to defend ourselves against nuclear weapons. We did so—as the preamble to the treaty reflects—in the expectation that this would lead the Soviets to negotiate reductions in strategic offensive weapons. We have called this both the premise and the promise of the ABM Treaty. So far, that promise has not been kept. Whatever else they may have done, neither SALT I [strategic

arms limitation talks] nor SALT II achieved nuclear reductions. No agreement did—until now.

President Reagan knows that the only way to deal with the Soviet Union on arms control as on other areas of our agenda, is to return to first principles—strength and realism. And he knows that to succeed we need another quality that we lose sight of at our peril—patience, or, if you prefer, an ability to hang tough.

The President has understood all along that the important thing is not lose sight of the objective. His purpose is not to seek agreements for agreements' sake. It is to seek agreements that enhance our security. And one of his primary objectives is to enhance the system of collective security that we have established with our democratic allies around the world.

### Role of NATO

I've described the hard lessons that the World Wars taught the American people. That is why NATO is a cornerstone of American security policy. That is why it enjoys wider bipartisan support than any other international institution. It is also the reason we have entered into alliances in Asia and the Pacific with such partners as Japan, Austral South Korea, the Philippines, and Thailand.

NATO faces a real threat. The Soviet Union occupies almost one-sixth the world's land mass. It has a massive nuclear arsenal. The Warsaw Pact has conventional superiority over NATO in key categories of combat capability, such as manpower and equipment. It has the advantage of interior lines of logistic support. And it has the large chemical weapons stockpile in the world.

In these circumstances, the U.S. nuclear guarantee has been and remains essential to the security of our allies. It is the basis of extended deterrence. When and if the leaders of the Soviet Union contemplate an attack against a U.S. ally, they must continue to conclude that the risks far outweigh any possible gains.

At first, the prospect of massive retaliation by U.S. strategic forces served to deter attack. But the passage of time brings changes and challenges. The alliance has never failed to respond, to evolve, and to grow. Thus, in 1967, NATO formally adopted the strategy of "flexible response." Its basic premise is that NATO must deter and, if necessary, counter aggression at a

at any place in the NATO treaty. This requires a wide array of options so that NATO can defeat any attack at an appropriate level, or, if necessary, can make a deliberate political decision to raise the response to a higher level.

I'm not talking about a hypothetical "ladder" of escalation; I'm talking about options available to NATO if and when ever are needed. The U.S. strategic nuclear deterrent—clearly linked to the other two legs of the NATO triad—remains the ultimate guarantor of NATO's collective security. The Soviets understand that risks cannot be safely shared and that any act of aggression against a U.S. ally could lead, ultimately, to strategic retaliation against its own homeland. Flexible response clearly does not depend on any single weapon system; what is needed depends in part on the nature of the threat.

Thus, when NATO considered all options for the INF talks, it unanimously decided that getting rid of all U.S. missiles, U.S. and Soviet, would be the best outcome. From the standpoint of NATO's own security, NATO would retain a variety of systems that could perform the critical deterrence function. So President Reagan proposed a zero option for INF missiles, and, because we and NATO held together on that goal, that is what we got.

What holds NATO together so strongly? We and our allies share more than a common threat. We share the same purpose I mentioned before: to secure the blessings of liberty. NATO is more than a military alliance. It is a community of common values and political principles that we are all committed to protect and to foster. We share the goal of building a better life for our own people and of helping create the conditions that foster freedom and economic development elsewhere in the world as well.

The fact that we and our allies share more than just a threat in themselves deterrence. A major part of the strength of the alliance derives from the shared values that it is committed to defend.

Moreover, NATO is vital to our efforts to conduct a dialogue with the Soviet Union. NATO's twin commitment is to defense and dialogue; it is an alliance truism. But true it is. It has shaped NATO's approach to East-West relations for decades. It continues to do so today. It is precisely because of the strength of the NATO alliance that we

in the West are able to deal productively with the Soviet Union. The strong bonds between the Atlantic allies and our democratic partners in the Pacific—Japan and Australia, particularly—gives an even broader base to our dual approach of defense and dialogue.

INF has been at the center of the NATO agenda since 1979. Many thought it would weaken or even cripple the alliance. In fact, the INF experience has strengthened it. As we prepare for a NATO summit in a little over a month, I see a real dynamism in the alliance. There is certainly change underway, because living things must change. But the underlying facts are continuity, coherence, and cooperation within the alliance.

A continuing peacetime alliance is new not just for the United States but also for most of our allies. For centuries, many of them saw each other as enemies rather than friends. But support for NATO is as strong as ever in all 16 member nations—in some cases, even stronger than before the SS-20 threat arose.

### The INF Dual Track

Historians may come to see the INF experience as one of NATO's finest hours. We may never know what decisionmaking process the Soviet leadership went through before deciding to deploy the SS-20. The Soviets may have misunderstood how we and our allies would act during a period of so-called détente. They may have misled themselves into believing that the West no longer would do what was necessary to maintain a strong deterrent, whatever the provocation. If so, they were wrong, just as they were wrong when they calculated the political and military costs before they marched into Afghanistan.

From the late 1950s, the Soviet Union had deployed intermediate-range missiles. These are systems which could threaten most or all of NATO Europe but not reach the United States. The United States had deployed no such missiles since the mid-1960s, although some NATO military officers felt such deployments to be necessary (and I'm sure that when General Rogers appears before you, he will develop his view on that point). In arms control terms, at any rate, these systems were not considered "strategic." Thus, they were excluded from the arms control limits in the SALT process.

In 1977, the Soviet Union began to deploy the SS-20. It was a substantial improvement over its predecessors. It had longer range, greater accuracy, and enhanced mobility. Moreover, it had three independently targetable warheads, where previous systems had only one. Both its range and its deployment pattern soon made it a threat, not just to Europe but to all the Soviet Union's neighbors. By our count, 140 SS-20s, with 420 warheads, had been deployed by the end of 1979. When President Reagan and General Secretary Gorbachev signed the INF Treaty in December 1987, the Soviets—according to their own figures—had deployed 405 SS-20s, with 1,215 warheads.

NATO political leaders and military authorities carefully assessed this new threat and consulted extensively on how to counter it. They were concerned that, if left unmatched, this new Soviet capability could lead Moscow into believing that it could intimidate the alliance or even cause the Soviet Union to miscalculate the risks of aggression.

To prevent this, in 1979, NATO foreign and defense ministers adopted what has come to be called the "dual-track" decision. On one track, the United States would begin in 1983 to deploy 572 single-warhead intermediate-range missiles in the United Kingdom, Italy, Belgium, the Federal Republic of Germany (F.R.G.), and the Netherlands. There would be 464 ground-launched cruise missiles, which would be deployed four to a launcher. There would be 108 Pershing II ballistic missiles, each on a separate launcher. At the same time, on a second track, the United States would attempt to negotiate limits on U.S. and Soviet INF missiles at the lowest possible level.

As with so much else about NATO, INF policy has been fundamentally bipartisan. A decision taken under the previous Administration has been carried out by the present one. Congressional support for our efforts on both tracks has also been essential.

### Deployment Track

I'll turn to the deployment track. The INF Treaty was signed almost 8 years to the day after the 1979 dual-track decision was taken. Neither the deployment track nor the negotiating track was easy. But we succeeded because we and our allies stayed the course—on both tracks.

This took considerable political courage. In Europe, the so-called peace

movement took to the streets to try to block U.S. deployments. In the United States, the "freeze movement," in effect, wanted to reward the Soviets for deploying first, by letting them keep their advantage and removing any incentive to negotiate reductions. The Soviet Union threatened a new ice age in East-West relations if U.S. deployments went forward.

In 1983, initial deployments of U.S. missiles were scheduled to begin in three countries—the Federal Republic of Germany, Italy, and the United Kingdom. The leaders of all three countries unambiguously supported following through on both tracks of NATO's 1979 decision. In each case, they put their leadership to the ultimate test, the ballot. And in each case, they were confirmed in power. Similarly, the people of Belgium and the Netherlands have kept in power leaders committed to the 1979 decision. All five of these allies have gone forward with the commitments they made to NATO in 1979. The result is the treaty you now have before you.

Opponents of our deployments have been proven dead wrong. If we had heeded the "freeze movement" or the "peace movement," we would never have gotten this treaty. Instead, the Soviets would have kept their SS-20s and, worse yet, would have every reason to believe that they could bully and intimidate the alliance. This is not the peace movement's treaty. It is NATO's treaty. As President Reagan has said, "NATO is the real peace movement."

It is not for me, or any American, to speak on behalf of other countries—in Europe, Canada, or Asia. Our allies can speak for themselves, and they have. They all fully support this treaty. Ratification of this treaty will vindicate our friends, particularly in the INF-basing countries, who stood by their convictions and their commitment to NATO's dual-track decision. They knew that, to strengthen the peace and safeguard our freedoms, we must share the risks and responsibilities of deterrence. When the going got tough, they simply got tougher. They deserve our respect. The treaty they helped bring about deserves your support.

## Negotiations: Basic Approach

Turning to the negotiating track, U.S. INF deployments were absolutely necessary to our success in the negotiations. But they alone could not guarantee a good treaty. That took firmness, patience, and hard work at

the negotiating table to make good on the courage and steadfastness of our allies.

The President put some of our finest public servants in charge of this effort in Geneva. From 1981 to 1983, Ambassador Paul Nitze led the INF delegation, paired there with Ambassador Ed Rowny, who was then chairing the START [strategic arms reduction talks] delegation. Both are present here. From 1985 to 1987, Ambassador Mike Glitman was in charge, under the overall leadership of Ambassador Max Kampelman—both here. They did a simply splendid job.

Looking back over the negotiations, I think we can divide them into three periods.

- From the opening of talks in 1981 until the Soviet walkout in 1983, it is clear that Moscow was simply not willing to bargain seriously or in good faith. The Soviet goal was to block U.S. deployments while retaining their monopoly of INF missiles. They proposed variations on a freeze, which would have left the SS-20s in place and kept us at zero.

- The second phase began when the Soviets returned to the talks in 1985. They accepted the reality of U.S. deployments but were still insisting on terms for a treaty that we and our allies could not accept. Sometime in mid- or late 1986, they realized this wasn't going to work.

- The third phase began with the important progress the President made on INF at the Reykjavik summit. The Soviets finally agreed on many of the essential basic conditions for an equitable treaty. Wrestling the issues to the ground from then on, however, was a major effort. But we succeeded, including on the all-important verification issues.

The negotiating process was a very tough one. I believe it is quite instructive to go over the rhythm of it in brief so you can see how we achieved what we did. And with your permission, Mr. Chairman, I'd like to take the time to do it. We knew what we wanted, and we held out until we got it. Our hand was substantially strengthened by the fact that, on INF, we carried out the most extensive consultative process in the history of the NATO alliance. Moreover, we consulted closely with our friends and allies in Asia and the Pacific. Soviet efforts to split the alliance, or play Europe against Asia, flatly failed.

We established the following criteria for an INF agreement, which the President set forth.

- There must be equality of rights and limits.
- The negotiations must deal with U.S. and Soviet systems only.
- Limits must be global, with no transfer of the threat from Europe to Asia, or vice versa.
- There must be no adverse effect on NATO's conventional defense and deterrent capability.
- An agreement must be effectively verifiable.

From the outset our position also called for constraints on Soviet short range missiles, in order to enhance the effectiveness of the treaty.

Throughout the negotiations, the United States was willing to consider any approach that met these criteria. But we made clear all along that our strong preference, and that of our allies, was the "zero outcome" that President Reagan proposed in November 1981. We persisted in pushing this proposal, even when many derided it as unrealistic. But it was what we and allies agreed from the beginning would best enhance our security. Our hand was significantly strengthened as we by overwhelming votes of support for this proposal by both Houses of Congress in November 1981. And I call your attention, Mr. Chairman, to a resolution—Congressional Resolution 224—which explicitly endorsed the zero option. It says, "Whereas the President's willingness to cancel deployments of Pershing II and grand, large cruise missiles"—that's our zero—"if the Soviet Union dismantles its SS-20 SS-4 and SS-5 missiles"—that's the Soviet zero—"it is a dramatic and bold step toward real nuclear arms reduction." And both the Senate and the House voted for that. The Senate voted unanimously. And I might say that every member of this committee who was in office in November 1981 voted for that resolution. So the outcome you voted for and endorsed in November 1981 is the outcome that is in this treaty.

## Negotiations: 1981-83

Now, if I may, Mr. Chairman, I'll go through the ins and outs of this negotiating process because, as I said, I think it is instructive.

The Soviets initially refused to negotiate, insisting that NATO must first

ence deployments. NATO rejected the Soviets then proposed a so-called moratorium. As they defined this, they would have kept their monopoly on INF missiles in Europe and limited their buildup in the eastern U.S.S.R. against their Asian neighbors. NATO rejected this, too.

Ironically, this Soviet approach transformed what had been basically a NATO issue into a broader one, a global one. The range and mobility of SS-20 made it a threat to all of the Soviet Union's neighbors, wherever it was deployed. And Soviet insistence on excluding their missiles in the eastern U.S.S.R. from treaty limits reinforced our insistence, and that of our NATO allies, on global limits. As negotiations proceeded, our NATO discussions were paralleled by intense consultations with our friends and allies in the Far East, whose security was also at stake.

The standards I described above—just global limits but also U.S.-Soviet equality, no compensation for third-country systems, no adverse impact on NATO's conventional strength, effective verification—were all embedded in the original U.S. zero proposal. They were part of every interim proposal we later advanced. In contrast, the Soviets' opening position included all five of these security criteria. The Soviets' initial position would have allowed them to keep and expand their SS-20 force, while prohibiting any new deployments. It would have thused in U.S.-Soviet inequality. The treaty would have included independent U.S. and French forces, placed no limits on Soviet systems in Asia, and all eliminated from Europe U.S. aircraft which play a vital role in NATO's clear and conventional deterrent. It had no provisions for effective verification. That's where they started.

This basic Soviet approach persisted through the two ensuing years of negotiations. So did Soviet SS-20 deployments. For its part, NATO went forward with the necessary preparations on the deployment track.

In February 1982, the United States tabled a draft treaty embodying our proposal. The Soviets followed suit in May. We took the initiative in establishing working groups to supplement the efforts of the principal negotiators. We sought to work out common language where there was some convergence in the two draft treaty texts. At the time, we got nowhere on the issues of substance. But this approach could bear fruit later.

The formal negotiations were sometimes supplemented by informal explorations and suggestions. Ambassador Nitze was authorized to probe and explore areas of Soviet flexibility. In June 1982, he initiated a series of private discussions with his Soviet counterpart, Ambassador Kvitsinsky, in an effort to move the negotiations forward. These discussions came to be known as the "walk in the woods."

The two negotiators developed a package to present to their respective capitals for consideration. The details of the package are set forth in a 1983 NATO document, the "Progress Report to Ministers of the Special Consultative Group." The package was closely studied in Washington when Ambassador Nitze brought it back. There was concern about certain elements of it, in particular that the Soviets might treat it as a new U.S. offer and try to split the difference between it and a less forthcoming Soviet position. However, Ambassador Nitze was authorized to continue conversations in the informal channel, in the event Kvitsinsky was prepared to do so.

When Ambassador Nitze returned to Geneva, his Soviet counterpart said he had been instructed by Moscow to reject both the substance of the package and the informal channel itself. The Soviet Union continued to insist on all the unacceptable conditions I have outlined above and was not prepared to destroy a single SS-20 missile. So that was the end of that.

In March 1983, following extensive consultations with our NATO allies and Japan, the President made a new proposal. While making clear that the "zero outcome" remained our strong preference, he called for an interim solution. The United States would reduce its planned INF deployments if the Soviet Union reduced its own deployed INF missiles to an equal, non-zero level on a global basis. In May, the United States tabled a draft treaty embodying this proposal. We did not specify a level of an interim outcome but made clear we favored the lowest possible number.

The Soviets flatly rejected our proposal. The extent of Soviet flexibility in the spring of 1983 was their agreement in principle with our position that warheads on deployed missiles could be the unit of account. I might say this was an important thing for us to pocket since we had been arguing, not only in INF but in START, that it isn't just the launchers; it's the warheads and the throw-weight that matter. So this was, at least, something. Previously, they

had sought to treat their triple-warhead SS-20 the same as a single-warhead system. They still showed no willingness to engage us on the details of verification.

In September 1983, the Soviets stated they would "liquidate"—their word—all missiles that were to be reduced by an agreement. The term was vague and never clearly defined. Amazingly, this announcement garnered a lot of publicity at the time. Can you believe it? In retrospect it is hard to see why. If missiles that were reduced were not destroyed, what does it mean to "reduce" them? But it had taken almost 2 years of negotiations for the Soviets to get this far. Contrast this with the minutely detailed provisions that are in the elimination protocol of the treaty now before you.

Later that month, the President made a new proposal. The product of intense consultations within NATO and with Japan, it kept intact the principles I have outlined but dealt with three areas of stated Soviet concern.

- Within the context of equal global limits, the United States was prepared to consider a commitment to deploy only part of its overall entitlement in Europe.

- Since the Soviets had left a clear public impression that they were particularly concerned about the Pershing II, the United States was prepared to apportion reductions between Pershing II and cruise missiles appropriately.

- Finally, the United States was prepared to explore equal, verifiable limits on specific types—not all, just specific types—of longer range U.S. and Soviet land-based aircraft consistent with allied criteria for an INF agreement.

The Soviets refused to discuss all three initiatives—or any of them. Nor did they accept our procedural suggestion that the teams in Geneva supplement their plenary meetings with heads-of-delegation sessions or informal—we called them—"miniplenaries." Both ideas proved very useful, when the Soviets finally accepted them in 1987. But in 1983, the Soviets were not interested.

In October 1983, the Soviet Union offered what it portrayed as a new package of proposals. The proposals may have been new, but the essential outcome was the same: no U.S. deployments, inclusion of third-country systems, no binding limits on Soviet forces in Asia, and aircraft limits that included non-U.S. and sea-based planes.

The United States continued to press for progress. In November, we proposed a specific global ceiling of 420 deployed INF missile warheads, which took an earlier Soviet number but put it in the context of the U.S. proposal. That same month, the parliaments of Great Britain, Italy, and Germany each voted to support continued implementation of the dual-track decision. On November 23, 1983, the Soviets walked out of the talks, citing these votes. U.S. deployments began in December, in accordance with the schedule NATO had agreed on. By our count, the Soviets had deployed 360 SS-20s, with 1,080 warheads, at the time the first U.S. missiles were deployed. I make that point because sometimes people say our deployments were provocative, that we were causing the Soviet Union to deploy. But the evidence is stark.

I will not dwell on the Soviet threats about the dire consequences of U.S. deployments or the requirements they set for talks to resume. We were offered plenty of advice from "peace groups" and others who took Soviet propagandists at their word when they said Moscow would never again deal with the Reagan Administration. But we and our allies simply proceeded with the deployment program that had been agreed in 1979. At the same time, we made clear that we were ready to resume negotiations at any time without preconditions. We were steadfast, and steadfastness paid off.

## Negotiations: 1985 to Mid-1986

The Soviets agreed in January 1985 to resume negotiations on INF, as part of an overall negotiation on nuclear and space arms. The new INF talks began in March 1985.

Just as the President had refused to make concessions to get the Soviets back to the table, he saw no reason to change our positions simply because they had returned. The Soviets began by proposing new variants of their old moratorium ideas. We rejected these on the basis of longstanding NATO policy that the 1979 deployment track would continue on schedule until a binding and verifiable agreement was reached.

Much of the initial time in the new negotiations was taken up with Soviet propagandizing. They argued that U.S. deployments were "illegal" because they circumvented SALT II. This was completely spurious. But we learned a lesson from this reckless argument. We were careful to keep language out of the INF Treaty that could be twisted

by the Soviets in the future to make similar arguments whenever we and our allies act to maintain a strong deterrent.

The Soviets spent even more time trying to link INF to the START and space/defense negotiations. They suggested including U.S. INF missiles in the context of their START proposal, along with U.S. land- and sea-based aircraft within range of the Soviet Union. Comparable Soviet missiles and aircraft would be excluded. The Soviet START proposal, of course, was, in turn, linked to their demands in the defense and space negotiation, in which they sought to cripple our Strategic Defense Initiative (SDI).

The question of whether an INF agreement should be tied to agreements in other areas, such as START, was one which NATO had already considered in detail. NATO decided that such linkages were artificial and would only delay an agreement that was in Western interests. Accordingly, we have consistently ensured that our INF proposals stood on their own merits.

In November 1985, the President proposed a new approach to an interim agreement providing for equal global limits, while again stressing our strong preference for zero. We offered to cap deployments at the number of launchers scheduled for the end of 1985. In exchange, the Soviet Union would reduce its SS-20 launchers within range of NATO Europe to the same number. It would also reduce its remaining launchers—those directly threatening our friends and allies in Asia—by the same proportion as the reductions of launchers in range of Europe.

In the November 1985 Geneva summit, President Reagan and General Secretary Gorbachev agreed to work for an INF interim agreement. We saw this as an encouraging sign that the Soviets might eventually be willing to drop their linkage of INF to other areas of arms control.

In January 1986, the Soviets followed up by tabling a modified INF proposal which did not include a Soviet right to retain a force of SS-20s to match U.K. and French forces. It still called for commitments by those countries not to build up their forces, but for the first time there was an indication that the Soviets were getting the message on the need for U.S.-Soviet equality.

The next month, in February 1986, the President proposed the phased elimination of INF missiles by 1989, accompanied by detailed verification provisions. The Soviets rejected the proposal and declined to discuss verification. But there were signs of progress. By mid-1986, the Soviets were indicating a willingness to drop their demand to include aircraft in an INF agreement. Moreover, they had accepted the idea that shorter range missiles should be limited, although they would not go into details. And they were coming closer to the idea of including their Asian missiles in an agreement, although they were not there yet.

President Reagan wrote General Secretary Gorbachev July 25, 1986, a dressing the full range of our agenda with the Soviets. On INF, he made clear his continuing strong preference for zero but proposed to focus on an interim agreement to facilitate progress. The letter led to high-level discussions of arms control by experts in Moscow in August and in Washington in September, preparatory to a meeting held with Soviet Foreign Minister Shevardnadze later in September.

In the Washington meeting, the Soviets made some informal suggestion which, while falling short of an official proposal, seemed promising. They suggested each side be limited to 100 deployed INF missile warheads in Europe and that we match the Soviet Asian number with systems in the United States. We responded that we could accept this in the context of an equal global limit of 200 warheads. Clearly, we were making progress, but the Soviets still refused to get down to detail on verification.

## Negotiations: From the Reykjavik to the Washington Summit

The meeting between the President and General Secretary Gorbachev in Reykjavik in October 1986 was the breakthrough for the INF talks. Moreover, we made important advances in START and began to develop an approach to deal with the need for predictability as we move forward on strategic defenses. Reykjavik set the agenda for the future. From then on, has been clear that the watchword for the future of arms control is reduction, structured to enhance stability.

In INF, the President continued to make clear his strong preference for global zero. Mr. Gorbachev was not

pared to accept this, however, and two leaders agreed to equal global ceilings of 100 warheads, with none in Europe. This was, in essence, a variant of the approach that the President had proposed in September 1983 and that the Soviets had refused to discuss. A treaty along these lines would have meant that the entire Soviet INF missile arsenal would consist of 33 SS-20s—a massive reduction in the threat to both Europe and Asia. This would have been a very good result, and, in fact, we have done even better. Moreover, at Reykjavik, the Soviets accepted, definitively, that neither the U.S. and French forces nor U.S. aircraft were on the table in INF. They agreed that shorter range missiles were not of the INF agenda, although they were not prepared to accept equal global limits. And they at last agreed some general propositions concerning verification.

Let me stop to compare this situation with what the Soviets were saying in negotiations began 5 years earlier. Again, I will apply the five criteria outlined above. In three of them—U.S.-Soviet equality, no third-country terms, and no impact on NATO's conventional strength—the Soviets had been from totally disagreeing with us accepting what we required. The Soviets accepted a fourth criterion—global limits—for longer range missiles. Important details still had to be worked out, none more so than in the fifth principle—verification. Working these details out took more than a year. It was not an easy year. I became personally involved in negotiating those details to a degree I would never have anticipated. But we succeeded because we persisted; we thought through what we wanted; we never lost sight of our objectives; we were tough-minded at the negotiating table; and we and our allies proceeded with deployments.

This is not a one-sided agreement. Clearly benefits us. But Mr. Gorbachev would not have signed it if he did not feel that it served his interests to do so. Arms control treaties must, by their very nature, be of mutual benefit.

Following Reykjavik, the first hurdle to clear was one the Soviets kept moving on and off the negotiating track: linkage with other areas of arms control. Mr. Gorbachev had again made INF hostage to Soviet efforts to cripple CDI. We and our allies simply refused to accept this, and in February of last year, the Soviets fell off this demand. In doing so, however, they began to

equivocate about keeping shorter range missiles in an INF agreement.

In March 1987, the United States tabled a new draft treaty based on the progress made at Reykjavik and containing detailed verification provisions. After a brief recess, the Geneva negotiations resumed in April and continued without recess until the treaty was concluded in December. The pace of work accelerated. In April, the Soviets tabled a new draft treaty. On June 1, the U.S. and Soviet sides agreed on an initial joint draft treaty text. It was heavily bracketed, reflecting continuing areas of disagreement, but it formed the basis of the final treaty that you now have before you.

Meanwhile, in April, I held discussions in Moscow with Foreign Minister Shevardnadze. While there, I had an extended meeting with General Secretary Gorbachev. I stressed that the Soviet Union should drop its insistence on retaining 33 SS-20s and, instead, accept a global zero outcome. I noted the importance that the President attached to verification and made the point that verifying zero would be both simpler and surer than trying to verify any given number of deployed warheads. Our allies, in Europe and Asia, were also hammering home to the Soviets their strong preference for global zero.

While I was in Moscow, Gorbachev and Shevardnadze said that an INF treaty should include a zero outcome for shorter range missiles in Europe. I told them that any limits on shorter range missiles had to be global. These systems were highly mobile; it simply did not make sense to try to establish regional limits.

After some discussion, Mr. Gorbachev accepted this point and said he would be willing to accept global zero for shorter range missiles. I told him that we were agreed that the outcome must be on the basis of global equality. I added, however, that the United States and its allies needed to consider the question of whether zero was the right number. I stopped at NATO headquarters, because that was my plan on the way from Moscow, to begin a process of consultation on this subject.

At this point, the United States had no shorter range missiles deployed—we had zero—although we had a number still in storage in the United States. Thus, as we analyzed it, the choice was between accepting the concept of zero such missiles or of going forward with a new deployment program in NATO Europe. It made no sense to reject the idea of zero if we were not prepared to deploy ourselves.

After consulting with allied leaders and thoroughly considering the options, the President decided to propose the worldwide elimination of U.S. and Soviet shorter range missiles as part of the INF Treaty. This position was formally endorsed at the June meeting of the North Atlantic Council.

In July, the Soviet Union said that it would accept global zero not just for shorter range missiles but for intermediate-range missiles, as well.

The pace at the talks became even more intense. The hard work of our delegation in Geneva was supplemented by several meetings between me and Minister Shevardnadze. Together with our senior experts, we addressed remaining INF issues as well as the rest of the President's four-part agenda. Depending on whose capital they occurred in, either the President or Mr. Gorbachev were directly involved in these meetings as well, so they, in effect, provided a kind of way for the heads of state to talk to each other.

In INF, there were basically three key tasks remaining:

- Dealing with the issue of Federal Republic of Germany, Pershing IA missiles, an issue which the Soviets had elevated to sudden prominence;
- Reaching agreement on the details of effective verification; and
- Ensuring that all of the agreements reached were faithfully and clearly reflected in treaty text.

#### Treaty Details: Programs of Cooperation and Verification

We met our objectives in all three areas.

On the first point, the treaty completely protects our position of principle that there be no limits on third-country forces and no impact on existing programs of cooperation with our allies. Our program of cooperation with the Federal Republic of Germany on their Pershing IAs continues. Chancellor Kohl announced last August that if an INF treaty entered into force, and if the agreed timetable for eliminating INF missiles were adhered to, F.R.G. Pershing IA missiles would be dismantled with the final elimination of U.S. and Soviet INF missiles. At that point, in accordance with a sovereign German decision, our program of cooperation will have ended. Only then will the U.S. reentry vehicles now associated with the German Pershing IAs be subject to the elimination procedures of this treaty.

On verification, you will be hearing in great detail from other witnesses. But let me stress that this agreement has the most stringent and comprehensive scheme of verification in the history of arms control. We worked out our verification regime thoroughly in Washington, with full interagency participation.

We also consulted closely with our basing country allies, whose territory will be directly involved. It took time, but it was well worth it. When the Soviets were finally willing to discuss verification, we were ready. They did so on the basis of thoroughly considered U.S. proposals.

The treaty's verification provisions will ensure our ability to monitor treaty compliance with confidence. They include onsite inspection. "National technical means" are essential, but we simply are not willing to go back to the days of SALT I, when they were all that was allowed. One of the most important elements of the INF Treaty is the precedent it establishes in this area, including onsite inspection.

The structure of the verification regime has built-in redundancies. This sort of double-checking is what gives it its power. One layer of the regime builds on another, to provide a whole that is greater than the sum of its parts. Among other things, the treaty provides for:

- A detailed exchange of data, updated periodically, on the location of missile support facilities, the number of missiles and launchers at those facilities, and technical parameters of those systems;
- Continuing notification of movement of missiles and launchers between declared facilities; that happens once the treaty comes into force;
- An initial baseline inspection to verify the number of missiles and launchers at all facilities declared in the data exchange;
- An elimination inspection to verify the destruction of missiles and launchers;
- Close-out inspection to verify that treaty-prohibited activities have ceased at each of the declared facilities;
- Short-notice onsite inspections for 13 years at declared and formerly declared facilities;
- The right to monitor the Soviet SS-25 final assembly facility at Votkinsk around the clock, to ensure it is not being used for SS-20 assembly; and

- Enhancement of national technical means—specifically, six times a year, the Soviets must, on 6 hours notice, open the roofs of those SS-20 garages that are not subject to onsite inspection, in order to show that no SS-20s are concealed within, and must display the SS-25 launchers in the open.

In addition to its security advantages, the "zero option" makes verification easier and more certain. Once the elimination period is over, the existence of any intermediate-range or shorter range missile would be a violation.

We can never know for certain that a banned missile is not concealed somewhere in the Soviet Union. But the treaty does not permit the Soviets to maintain essential infrastructure for banned missiles or to conduct flight tests. Both testing and infrastructure can be detected by national technical means. Without them, the systems simply become obsolete.

Finally, there is the question of the fine print. It is all there for you to see. There are no secret understandings. My transmittal letter to the President includes a detailed explanation of the actual structure and functioning of the treaty and its associated documents. I believe you will find that the more you study the treaty, the more impressed you will be by the quality of what Ambassador Glitman and his team have negotiated.

## Achievements of the Treaty

It took years of tough bargaining to get where we are today. But the allied position prevailed. It did so because we and our allies made clear to the Soviets that an INF treaty had to meet NATO's security criteria. We held out for a good treaty, and we got it.

- The treaty reaffirms the principle of equality. There can be no other basis for U.S.-Soviet arms control.
- Because the Soviets had deployed more, the treaty also establishes the principle of asymmetrical reductions. The Soviets will eliminate deployed missiles and launchers capable of carrying about four times as many warheads as those eliminated by the United States.
- It keeps third-country systems and programs of cooperation with our allies completely out—essential precedents for future negotiations.
- It does not rely on Soviet good will but rather requires the most comprehensive verification regime ever, including onsite inspections.

- It eliminates the SS-20 threat which directly led to the dual-track decision.

- It does not limit U.S. aircraft—which make a critical contribution to NATO's defense.

- It strengthens deterrence by significantly complicating Soviet attack planning. From now on, they are denied options that for nearly 30 years they have been able to rely on in any consideration of an attack on NATO.

- Moreover, by banning shorter range missiles, it also improves NATO conventional military posture, by eliminating systems which could target nuclear, conventional, or chemical warheads against NATO's ports and airfields.

## Compliance

I want to take a few minutes to address head-on one question which I am sure is on your minds and which Senator Dole mentioned. The Soviet record of compliance with treaties is far from perfect. What does this mean for the INF Treaty?

The basis for negotiations in the first place is that the parties involved seek to agree on an outcome that is in their mutual interest. The Soviets would not have assumed the obligation in the INF Treaty if they had not found its terms satisfactory.

But we have also learned from experience. We have incorporated into the treaty some lessons we learned the hard way. Its terms are more detailed and precise than those of any of its predecessors. By making clear what obligations are, the treaty reduces—it doesn't eliminate, but it reduces—the prospect that the Soviet Union will be tempted to exploit ambiguities or to take actions that may seem to fall in a nebulous "grey area."

The structure of the reductions will give us a basis to assess Soviet compliance early on. After the treaty has been in force for 30 days, we have the right to conduct onsite inspections to check the data the Soviets have provided us. From 90 days after entry into force, if the Soviets have any deployed shorter range missile outside a declared elimination facility, that will be a violation. The treaty requires the Soviet Union to destroy all its shorter range missiles within 18 months. From that time on, the existence of any Soviet shorter range missile will be a violation.



This "front-end loading" means we will be able to see, from the get-go, whether or not they are complying with treaty obligations of real military significance. The United States will be corraling and destroying intermediate range systems in the same frame, but for us this will affect missiles in storage, not deployed systems.

The reductions in intermediate-range missiles will also be asymmetrical. Both sides will be reducing deployed intermediate-range systems. On the one hand, the United States will keep a substantial force of Pershing IIs until well into the final months of reductions. We should provide a further incentive for the Soviet Union to comply with the timetable it agreed to. At no time during the period of elimination will we be without missiles of our own.

Moreover, the verification provisions I outlined earlier are unprecedented. Increasing the likelihood of getting caught clearly decreases the attractiveness of cheating.

All of these safeguards are important. But no treaty in and of itself can guarantee compliance with its terms. No responsible U.S. official can tell you that we do not need to consider the possibility of cheating.

We must react vigorously to questionable Soviet activities. We have to use the willpower to press them on our concerns. This Administration has hesitated to do so. We have made energetic efforts to get the Soviets to take corrective actions. We have used diplomatic channels with the Soviets, we have reported the facts candidly to Congress, and we have consulted extensively with our allies.

If we detect a Soviet action that is in violation of their INF obligations, we will press them on it. Besides regular diplomatic channels in Washington and Moscow, we will now have a compliance forum. Article XIII of the treaty establishes the Special Verification Commission or SVC. If we detect a suspicious activity, we will initiate an immediate meeting of the SVC. The Soviets cannot refuse.

At the SVC, we will have the right to describe our concerns and require a response. The Soviets may be able to demonstrate that the activity in question was not a violation. The SVC will have the place to determine that. If our concerns are not resolved, we will call for corrective action. If the Soviets refuse to persist in violating the treaty, we would have to react. There must be a penalty for cheating.

In this area, the Administration has shown its determination to take the actions necessary to safeguard our security. Faced with continuing Soviet refusal to live by the rules set by SALT II, the President took an appropriate and proportionate response. Specifically, he decided in May 1986 that future U.S. decisions on strategic forces would be based on the nature and magnitude of the Soviet threat—not on standards set by a treaty that was being selectively violated by the Soviet Union. He has implemented this decision with prudence and restraint.

We have identified the Krasnoyarsk radar as a clear violation of the ABM Treaty. We will not agree to any further obligations regarding that treaty until that violation is dealt with satisfactorily.

The pattern of Soviet behavior is not one of wholesale violations of arms control treaties. Their violations have been selective and specific. We must be prepared to respond specifically and selectively, with the focus squarely on what is in our own interests.

I believe, for the reasons I have set forth today, that the INF Treaty is in the security interests of the United States. If the Senate does give the President its advice and consent to ratification, it will be because you agree with this judgment. And thus, if we ever were to determine that the Soviets were not complying with this agreement, this President, or any future President, should be able to count on the Senate's support to deal with that fact.

We as a country can safeguard our security only if we are willing to do what is needed to maintain and enhance our strength. If the Soviets cheat on this treaty, the President must be able to count on Congress to help him take the measures necessary to preserve our security and that of our allies.

For that is one of the key lessons of INF. If we have the willpower and the strength to see to our own security, we will succeed. If we do not, we have no one to blame but ourselves when we fail.

#### Lessons of INF

I have spoken at some length because I wanted to put the INF Treaty in the context of our overall approach to East-West relations. I wanted to explain how

it fits into the strategy with which we and our allies have preserved peace in freedom for four decades, a strategy which the Soviets set out to challenge in the 1970s. I have made clear that this treaty is a substantial achievement. It strengthens Western military security. It sets new standards for arms control. It is a political success for the alliance. Our common achievement, based on close consultations, further strengthens the transatlantic partnership.

The INF Treaty, for all its benefits, leaves us with many challenges still unmet. As we and our allies move forward, we must draw the right lessons from INF. We succeeded in getting a good treaty because we persisted in our approach. If we and our allies had not gone forward with deployments, or if we had not had the courage of our convictions at the bargaining table, none of this could have been achieved.

There is much more to U.S.-Soviet relations than arms control, and we need to conduct those relations for the long term. We must not be misled by atmospherics. We need to watch the substance. It is just as dangerous to fall victim to euphoria when things are going well as it is to succumb to hysteria when there are problems. In dealing with the Soviet Union, INF shows that the key to success is strength, solidarity, and a clear-eyed understanding of what we ourselves want to accomplish. That is the only basis on which to build a structure of peace that will weather both good times and bad.

We and our allies face many challenges. NATO must continue to field the forces necessary to carry out its commitment to flexible response. There are substantial U.S. nuclear forces in place in Europe, including weapons on aircraft that can reach deep into the Soviet Union. Together with the U.S. troop presence, they constitute a convincing deterrent in their own right and a clear link to the U.S. strategic nuclear guarantee. In 1983, NATO adopted the Montebello nuclear modernization program, which they agreed was essential whether or not we reached an INF agreement. We must proceed with it, so that our nuclear forces in Europe maintain their capability to fulfill their mission of deterrence.

This treaty does not resolve the conventional imbalance in Europe. That was not its objective. The security criterion which we established was that,

in improving the nuclear balance, the treaty not harm NATO's conventional capabilities. The treaty more than meets that standard.

NATO has agreed that the next priorities in arms control are 50% START cuts, a comprehensive global ban on chemical weapons, and establishing a stable and secure conventional balance in Europe by eliminating disparities. In all these areas, the INF Treaty sets precedents that will serve us well, including asymmetrical reductions and intrusive verification. And the treaty shows the importance of negotiating from strength and of being patient, determined, and purposeful at the bargaining table.

In START, as in INF, the initial concept proposed by the President is turning out to be the basis for a possible agreement. In the case of START, the President set the goal in his May 1982 proposal of significant reductions structured to enhance stability.

At each of his meetings with General Secretary Gorbachev, the President has moved us closer to this goal. At the December Washington summit, we agreed on essential constraints and counting rules and on verification guidelines that go even beyond the advances of INF. As we saw in INF, the indispensable next step is to translate these advances into treaty text. Doing so is a top priority for our team in Geneva.

We have an ambitious agenda. The INF treaty in no way signifies that we can relax our efforts. Instead, the treaty is a concrete demonstration of the fact that, in conducting our relations with the Soviet Union, we must hold true to our policy of realism, strength, and dialogue. And it also is a concrete demonstration that NATO, now nearly 40, with both the wisdom of time and the vigor of youth, continues to preserve peace in freedom for ourselves and for our allies.

<sup>1</sup>Press release 7. The complete transcript of the hearings will be published by the committee and will be available from the Superintendent of Documents, U.S. Government Printing Office, Washington, D.C. 20402. ■

## U.S., Soviets to Inspect Nuclear Test Sites

DEPARTMENT STATEMENT,  
JAN. 5, 1988<sup>1</sup>

A team of U.S. Government nuclear testing experts will depart on January 7 for the Soviet Union, where they will visit the Soviet nuclear test site at Semipalatinsk in Kazakhstan. The team of 20 experts is headed by Ambassador Robert B. Barker. Dr. Barker is also the head of the U.S. delegation to the nuclear testing talks. The team is expected to return to the United States in mid-January. A group of Soviet experts will be in the United States January 23-30 for a reciprocal visit to our nuclear test site in Nevada.<sup>2</sup>

Agreement to conduct these reciprocal visits was reached during the first round of the U.S.-Soviet nuclear testing talks and was formally announced by Secretary Shultz and Soviet Foreign Minister Shevardnadze on December 9, 1987. You may recall that in September of 1984, President Reagan initially proposed such visits for the purpose of facilitating the negotiation of the verification improvements to the Threshold Test Ban Treaty (TTBT) and the Peaceful Nuclear Explosions Treaty (PNET).

These visits are intended to enable each side to familiarize itself with the conditions and operations at the other test site. The familiarization visits will provide the basis for the design and conduct of joint verification experiments at each other's test site in order to improve verification of the TTBT and the PNET.

These experiments will provide opportunities to measure the yield of nuclear explosions, using techniques preferred by each side. From our perspective, the experiments are intended to provide the Soviets with more information on the U.S. CORRTEX [continuous reflectometry for radius vs. time experiment] method, which we believe is the most accurate way for effective verification of these two treaties. Effective verification of these treaties is a high priority goal in nuclear testing, a goal that President Reagan has been seeing since 1983.

<sup>1</sup>Read to news correspondents by Department spokesman Charles Redman.

<sup>2</sup>On January 22, 1988, the Department spokesman released a statement that a team of Soviet nuclear testing experts would arrive January 24 to take part in a 4-day visit to the Nevada test site. The Soviet team of 20 experts was to be led by Igor M. Palenyykh, head of the Soviet delegation to the nuclear testing talks.

## The INF Treaty: Negotiation and Ratification

*Statements by Ambassador Max Kampelman, head of the U.S. delegation to the nuclear and space arms negotiations, and Ambassador May-El W. Glitman, U.S. negotiator at intermediate-range nuclear force talks, before the Senate Foreign Relations Committee on January 26, 1988.*<sup>1</sup>

### AMBASSADOR KAMPELMAN

I am privileged to be invited to testify before you this morning in support of the INF [Intermediate-Range Nuclear Forces] Treaty. As Counselor of the Department of State and as head of the U.S. delegation on the nuclear and space talks since they began in March 1985, these negotiations have been a major responsibility of mine. I am accompanied today by Ambassador May-El W. Glitman, our negotiator for the INF talks, whose testimony today at the INF negotiations, in which he played a vital and significant role from the beginning, will, I am certain, add value to this committee as he discusses their history, purpose, objectives, and the effects of these negotiations on U.S. and allied interests. Here, too, his important professional service representing the United States in NATO will be of great value. We both want to be helpful to the committee.

Yesterday, many well-deserved compliments were exchanged across both sides of this hearing dais and across both sides of the aisle. I would be remiss if I did not express my appreciation and that of my colleagues for the very positive role which the Senate and many individual Senators have played during the course of the INF negotiations. From the time of the formation of the Senate Observers Group in 1985, when the INF negotiations resumed as part of the nuclear and space talks, the members of the Senate Observers Group, some of whom are members of this committee, have visited Geneva regularly to observe the negotiations, give us the benefit of their advice, and meet with the Soviet negotiators frequently, thereby giving us a helping hand. I am convinced that the Senate is better informed about the progress of the talks and their substance as a result of their visits and the steady flow of briefings that have taken place in the capital.

I personally have benefited enormously from this constant interchange with the Senate observers. I trust it has been mutually beneficial. This has been a successful and noteworthy pattern of cooperation between the executive branch and the Senate, and it has been bipartisan.

Yesterday, Secretary Shultz discussed the INF Treaty very fully. I will try not to cover the same material in the same way, but I will have some observations on the original 1981-83 negotiations and the resumed negotiations from 1985 to 1987, including the Soviet efforts to link INF to other nuclear negotiations. I believe it is also appropriate that I comment on our continuing negotiations now underway in Geneva. In doing so, I may be responding to some of your expressed interests.

### Negotiations: 1981-83

In retrospect, we can see why our initial INF negotiating effort in 1981-83 had little hope of success. We were, in effect, attempting to persuade the Soviets to trade a bucket of coal for a bucket of ashes. We had no negotiating assets; only implied threats and promises. We had no long-range intermediate nuclear force missiles (range: 1,000-5,500 kilometers) on the ground in Europe. European basing countries had made political commitments for deployments, but such commitments were

President Reagan meets with members of the U.S. delegation who negotiated the INF Treaty.



The House photo by Mary Anne Fackelman-Miner.

under fire from domestic critics willing to make nondeployment an election issue. The theme from the Soviets and their sympathizers was that U.S. deployments would make an INF agreement impossible. Does any one wonder that the Soviets thought that a walkout from the negotiations could be an effective tactic against deployments by Western democracies facing elections?

In any event, the Soviets had little to lose and much to gain. If the allies or the United States had broken ranks and altered their deployment commitments, the Soviets would have effectively reversed a major NATO security decision. And if Western cohesion held, Moscow could always return to the negotiating table. For the long-term objective of preserving Western security, we were fortunate that we and our allies held firmly to our commitment to deploy while still seeking negotiations to limit these systems at the lowest possible level. Furthermore, the Soviet walkout soon proved to be a serious political blow to them in Europe.

## Resumed Negotiations and Linkage

To slightly modify an old adage, "The Soviets follow the election returns." Indeed, quickly after the U.S. 1984 presidential elections, the Soviets renewed their interest in nuclear arms control negotiations. They insisted on "new" INF negotiations to be combined with negotiations on strategic systems and defensive space systems under the umbrella of "nuclear and space talks." It was not easy for them to sit down in the same seats they had earlier dramatically vacated; and there was no need for us to sharpen the point.

The main Soviet theme of these resumed negotiations was tight "linkage" between the three areas: INF, START [strategic arms reduction talks] and defense and space. In contrast, the United States urged that we make progress in each negotiation independently, reaching agreement in each area as it was ripe. Frequently during the negotiations, the Soviets sought to hold agreement or progress on INF and strategic arms issues hostage to U.S. concessions on SDI [Strategic Defense Initiative]. They sought to maximize joint negotiating sessions integrating INF, START, and defense and space. For a time at the outset, they sought to limit opportunities to address specific individual negotiations. The most blatant public illustration of this tactic was General Secretary Gorbachev's linkage of the progress achieved on INF at

Reykjavik in October 1986 to U.S. restrictions on SDI. At that juncture, clearly the Soviets were hoping to generate pressure from NATO allies anticipating an INF agreement to force the United States to accept restrictions on SDI. The United States rejected such a linkage, as did our allies, and the Soviets ultimately "delinked" in February 1987, resuming their pre-Reykjavik agreement that an INF treaty could be negotiated independently.

The Soviets attempted not only to link INF to other nuclear arms control negotiations but, within the INF negotiations, they repeatedly attempted to link discussions on INF missiles both to the nuclear systems of other NATO nations—the United Kingdom (U.K.) and France—or to other U.S. nuclear systems, such as dual-capable aircraft. Indeed, we were battling linkage in one form or another virtually until the end of the negotiation. Its final manifestation for INF was repeated Soviet pressure for a specific treaty commitment to "follow-on" INF negotiations, a major element of which would have been dual-capable aircraft. The Soviets did not drop this demand until the Geneva discussions I held with Soviet Deputy Foreign Minister Vorontsov on November 15-17, 1987.

I emphasize this persistent U.S. opposition to linkage in Geneva because I believe it made it possible for us to achieve the effective result being considered by your committee today, the INF Treaty. Having prevailed in our successful negotiating approach in Geneva, you can, perhaps, understand why we are reluctant to see the reintroduction of linkage as a part of the ratification process in Washington.

## Effect of INF on the NATO Alliance

Although Ambassador Glitman will review in detail the effect of the INF agreement on the NATO alliance, I wish to emphasize one point in particular. A repeated canard suggests that under various conditions an INF agreement could be dangerous to the NATO alliance. Critics are contending that the treaty should carry some sort of political label: "Caution, INF Treaty could be dangerous to your security." Let me here clearly assert that U.S. Government officials were keenly aware throughout the INF negotiations of the need to maintain the U.S. spectrum of deterrence—nuclear and conventional, strategic and tactical—to prevent Soviet intimidation of friends and allies and to maintain deterrence. We have

moved to reinforce U.S. commitment. These include our longstanding political and military alliances, the maintenance of more than 300,000 American troops and about 4,000 nuclear weapons, including a variety of nuclear delivery systems in Europe. I can assure you that our government's commitment to NATO's strategy of flexible response remains firm. Your negotiators made that very clear.

Let me also here inform this committee that your negotiators were in constant and continuous consultation with our NATO allies. Our normal pattern was to visit Lord Carrington at the North Atlantic Council in Brussels at or near the beginning of every round of talks, at the end of each round, and frequently in the middle. Many of our NATO foreign ministers and other diplomatic representatives visited us in Geneva, where we would carefully review negotiating details. Each of us, negotiators in Geneva, visited European capitals where we met at foreign ministries and with their parliament. This was all in addition to visits by Ambassadors Nitze and Rowny, Secretary of State Shultz, and other U.S. Government officials from the Department of State, Department of Defense and the White House. I am convinced that there could not have been a closer, more successful, or better appreciated program of allied consultation.

The effectiveness of our consultations and commitments is highlighted by the fact that those most directly affected by the treaty—the Europeans themselves—fully support the agreement. This is clear to me as I have traveled in Europe. Every European country has endorsed it. Every major political party and political leader in and out of power within the NATO countries strongly backs the INF agreement. Polls suggest that an overwhelming majority of European public opinion supports the agreement. While an unpopular position should never deter a critic, it is useful for us all to realize that the critical view is a distinctly minority one.

## Beyond "Trust but Verify"

It has also been suggested that implementation of the INF Treaty may introduce new tensions between the United States and Moscow on one point of treaty interpretation or another. I hope this will not be the case; nor do we assume it as a "given." While details of implementation will need to be discussed and we cannot exclude pos-

disputes, provisions of the inspection regime are designed to limit the scope of potential disagreement.

The detailed network of verifications, with its wide range of movement verifications and inspection arrangements, required a new, continually opening communications link. Rather than devise a separate body, the Nuclear Risk Reduction Centers, which derive their impetus from Congress, appeared the most efficient mechanism for day-to-day transactions.

The sides agreed, however, to constitute a separate body, the Special Verification Commission, to "resolve issues related to compliance" and "agree upon measures as may be necessary to improve the viability and effectiveness . . ." of the treaty. We do not anticipate that activity of this body will be an everyday affair. It is not necessary to review the experiences associated with the Special Consultative Commission (SCC) to recognize that a fresh start can be useful. The verification commission has an opportunity to set its own record, free from the burden of political confrontation associated with the SCC. In any event, the United States, mindful of previous difficulties with the Soviet record of noncompliance with previous arms control agreements, must be vigilant in its monitoring of Soviet compliance with the INF Treaty.

#### Next Steps

Whatever the merits of the INF agreement—and I think they are many—it is only one element in the spectrum of arms control negotiations. The treaty stands on its own as a contribution to security. It is, we hope, not an end in itself, rather, a beginning and a first step toward a more secure and stable peace. Let me now specifically address the next steps as they pertain to the nuclear and space talks.

The President places the highest priority on efforts to reach an equitable and effectively verifiable agreement with the Soviets for deep and stabilizing reductions in strategic nuclear weapons. In particular, we are seeking reductions in the most destabilizing nuclear weapons—heavy, intercontinental ballistic missiles (ICBMs) with multiple warheads.

There has been considerable progress in the START negotiations. Our negotiators in Geneva are now working on a joint draft text which reflects the progress of agreement reached between the President and Mr. Gorbachev in

Geneva (November 1985) and at Reykjavik (October 1986) for 50% reductions in strategic offensive nuclear arms. Specifically, this draft text reflects agreement on ceilings of 6,000 warheads on 1,600 deployed delivery vehicles for each side, a ceiling for heavy ballistic missiles and their warheads, and counting rules for heavy bombers and some of their armament.

At the December summit in Washington, there was further START progress, including agreement on a sublimit for ballistic missile warheads of 4,900, a procedure for counting warheads on existing ballistic missiles, and, building on the INF Treaty verification provisions, guidelines for verification.

Important differences remain: on mobile ICBMs, a warhead sublimit for ICBMs, sea-launched cruise missiles, and the details of an effective verification regime. The verification regime for START is a much more difficult problem than for INF, since a large strategic nuclear force will remain in contrast to all INF systems being eliminated; and it is simpler to verify a zero than a fixed number.

We believe it is possible to reach a START agreement in the months ahead, but I make no such prediction. The task is formidable, and we must be vigilant and careful as we work to protect our interests. Both sides have instructed their negotiators to work to complete such an agreement, if possible, in time for signature in the first half of 1988. But our overriding guidance from the President, as we all heard last night, is "better no agreement than a bad agreement," the same direction we received in negotiating the INF Treaty.

Our Geneva negotiators are also continuing work on strategic defense issues. At the recent Washington summit, the President and Mr. Gorbachev agreed to try to work out an agreement to commit both of our countries to observe the ABM Treaty, as signed in 1972, while conducting their research, development, and testing as required, which are permitted by the ABM Treaty, and not to withdraw from the ABM Treaty for a specified period of time.

Simultaneously, we are seeking to discuss with the Soviets the relationship between strategic offenses and defenses. We wish to discuss how, if effective defenses prove feasible, the United States and Soviet Union could jointly manage a transition to deterrence based increasingly on defenses

rather than exclusively on the threat of nuclear retaliation. One point should be apparent to all of us. Modern technology and science are moving at an unbelievably rapid pace. New developments will affect the military force structures of both the United States and the U.S.S.R. The great challenge we all face is how to make certain that the impact of the new technologies will be stabilizing.

Our negotiations in Geneva resumed during the second week of January when Round IX opened. I have only recently returned from the opening sessions of these negotiations. On January 22, we tabled a draft treaty in the defense and space negotiations embodying agreed principles. The Soviets gave us the written version of their proposal a week earlier. We hope to develop a joint working draft. Our START negotiating team is already at work on the joint draft treaty. Both we and the Soviet delegation understand there is a great deal of work to be done. We are proceeding seriously and carefully. I assure you, our delegation is well prepared.

I would like to conclude with a special note of tribute to Ambassador Glitman and the INF delegation. Since the INF negotiations resumed in 1985, he has provided the vigorous, dedicated professional leadership necessary to drive the treaty toward a successful conclusion. His leadership was complemented by a highly qualified inter-agency delegation characterized by their exceptional energy, experience, technical proficiency, and ability. Ambassador Glitman and his delegation have every reason to be proud of the treaty they produced. I am proud to have been associated with them.

#### AMBASSADOR GLITMAN

Thank you for the opportunity to appear before this committee to testify in support of the INF Treaty.

Soviet INF missile systems, defined as those ground-launched missiles with a range between 500 and 5,500 km, have posed a major problem for U.S. and alliance security for many years. We sought on several occasions to constrain these systems via arms control negotiations, but they escaped capture. For almost two decades, the Soviets had a virtual monopoly on longer range INF (LRINF) missiles, free from any limitations.

Then, during the time when the Soviet Union began to reach strategic parity with the United States, the SS-20 made its appearance. That, in turn, triggered off the series of events which culminated over 11 years later in the signing of the INF Treaty. That treaty not only captures INF missile systems, it provides for their elimination. The class of Soviet nuclear weapons which for decades has threatened our allies in Europe and Asia, decoupling weapons with a proven capability for political intimidation, will cease to exist under this agreement. In accepting this treaty, providing for the demise of this class of weapons, the Soviet Union recognizes the legitimacy of the United States and its NATO allies joining together in collective security arrangements to deter Soviet pressure against NATO Europe via the deployment in Europe of U.S. nuclear forces.

The INF Treaty, which accomplishes this result, comprises 125 pages of single-spaced text. The treaty proper is accompanied by an inspection protocol, outlining the detailed modalities of the inspection regime; an elimination protocol covering how each treaty-banned item will be eliminated; and a memorandum of understanding on data, declaring type, number, and location of each item to be eliminated.

The treaty is a legal document, and its detail and phrasing reflect this. But in its essence, it incorporates the basic arms reductions goals and policy that the United States, in close consultation with its allies, has pursued since the formal INF negotiations opened in late 1981. These goals and this policy, in turn, had their basis in NATO's December 1979 decision to overcome the challenge posed to alliance security by the Soviet intermediate-range missile force, through a dual-track approach of counterdeployments and negotiations.

### The U.S. Approach to the INF Negotiations

The negotiating approach the United States and its allies agreed upon was based on five principles.

- Equality of rights and limits between the United States and the Soviet Union;
- Limitations on U.S. and Soviet systems only;
- Global application of limitations;
- Unweakened maintenance of NATO's conventional defense capability; and
- Effective verifiability of any agreement.

In addition to these principles, the United States and its NATO allies also made inclusion in the INF Treaty of constraints on shorter range INF (SRINF) missiles a basic tenet of the U.S. approach to the negotiations.

President Reagan made clear, from the outset, to his negotiators that any INF agreement must fully incorporate these criteria. There was to be no agreement just to have an agreement. The President's approach, blending statesmanship, fortitude, and enlightened self-interest, was to be our guideline throughout the 6 years of the negotiations.

### Equal Rights and Limits

This fundamental principle is grounded in the UN Charter's provision for the right of collective defense. In concrete terms, it provides the foundation for the United States and its allies joining together to protect their freedom and independence, including through the basing of U.S. forces and systems in Europe. A substantial portion of the negotiation was devoted to achieving Soviet recognition of this principle.

The Soviet Union has long deployed missiles that could strike targets in Europe (and Asia) but not, it was claimed, the United States. Thus, so the Soviets contended, dealing with such Soviet systems was essentially an intra-European affair. However, U.S. systems deployed in Europe, it was argued, were more akin to strategic forces since they could strike the Soviet Union. Hence, the very basis for a negotiation on U.S. and Soviet INF systems was denied. The deployment in the mid-1970s of the mobile, accurate, triple-warhead SS-20, capable of threatening targets throughout Europe and elsewhere on the periphery of the Soviet Union, including much of Asia, marked a fundamental point in the area of INF missiles. In the context of Soviet achievement of strategic parity with the United States, and as the Soviet SS-20 missile force grew, our European allies became concerned that with no comparable U.S. INF force on the ground in Europe and with no limitations on Soviet INF missiles, Moscow might come to believe—however mistakenly—that U.S. forces could be “decoupled” from the defense of Europe. Consequently, West European leaders stressed the need for a NATO response to Soviet SS-20 deployments to foreclose a potential perceptual gap in NATO's deterrence as well as to address the military threat posed by the SS-20.

Well over a year of intensive alliance consultations culminated in NATO's December 1979 two-track decision. One track would redress the imbalance of INF through modernization and deployment in Western Europe of 572 U.S. longer range INF missiles (eventually defined as “intermediate-range missiles” with ranges between 1,000 and 5,500 kilometers). On the second track, the United States would enter negotiations with the Soviets to establish a global balance in U.S. and Soviet longer range INF missiles at the lowest possible level, which was understood to include zero.

The Soviets initially refused to negotiate, attempting to impose the condition that NATO must first renounce its modernization track. In essence, this argued that the United States had no right to deploy INF systems in Europe to help its NATO allies counter the threat of the SS-20 and similar Soviet systems. The opening Soviet position thus directly challenged the principle of equal rights and limits.

Finally, during the summer of 1981 the Soviets agreed to negotiate. A short set of preliminary talks were held that fall. Formal negotiations with the Soviet Union began in November 1982.

From the outset, the United States, under President Reagan's leadership, stressed the principle of equality and proposed the global elimination of all U.S. and Soviet longer range INF missile systems. This equal global “zero option” remained the U.S. preferred outcome throughout the negotiations. The Soviets, for their part, called, in essence, for a moratorium on INF deployment in Europe. This would have codified the Soviet INF missile monopoly which NATO had just rejected and, in effect, would have denied legitimacy of the equal rights and limits principle. Obviously, it was not acceptable.

In March 1983, in an effort to find common ground with the Soviet side, the United States, while continuing to prefer a zero outcome, proposed an interim agreement for equal global limits on LRINF missile warheads at any number below the planned U.S. deployment level. Both of these proposals—equality at zero or at a number above zero—were rejected by the Soviet side.

Soviet unwillingness to accept this fundamental principle of an equal outcome made the negotiations untenable. Eventually the Soviets, unable either to impose their negotiating position or to derail the deployments, walked out of the negotiations in November 1983.

## U.S. Tables Draft Defense and Space Treaty

**WHITE HOUSE STATEMENT,  
JAN. 22, 1988<sup>1</sup>**

Today the President directed our negotiators at the nuclear and space talks in Geneva to table a draft treaty in the defense and space forum of the negotiations. This step is in fulfillment of the agreement which the President and General Secretary Gorbachev reached at their recent summit in Washington.

In the joint statement following the summit, the United States and Soviet delegations in Geneva were instructed to work out an agreement that would commit the two sides to observe the Antiballistic Missile (ABM) Treaty as signed in 1972, while conducting their research, development, and testing as required, which are permitted by the ABM Treaty, and not to withdraw from the ABM Treaty for a specified period of time. It was also agreed that such an agreement must have the same legal status as the treaty on strategic offensive arms, the ABM Treaty, and other similar legally binding agreements.

The U.S. draft treaty we tabled today would accomplish and advance these goals. It calls for a separate and new treaty that faithfully embodies the

elements of agreement reached at the summit. It would help to provide a jointly managed, predictable, precise, and stable basis for developing, testing, and, when proven feasible, deploying advanced defenses against strategic ballistic missiles. Such defenses would decrease the risk of war.

We hope that the Soviet delegation will join us in serious discussions to conclude a defense and space treaty that achieves the important goals which the two leaders identified at the Washington summit. At the same time, we will press ahead with our negotiations to conclude a treaty providing for 50% reductions in U.S. and Soviet strategic offensive arms.

We hope, with today's tabling of a draft defense and space treaty, to hasten progress toward a safer and more stable world—one with reduced levels of nuclear arms and an enhanced ability to deter war based on the increasing contribution of effective strategic defenses against ballistic missile attack.

<sup>1</sup>Text from Weekly Compilation of Presidential Documents of Jan. 25, 1988. ■

In March 1985, contrary to the prediction of some and to their own rhetoric the Soviets came back. Not the reasons for their return to negotiating table was the recognition, absent an equal outcome, the deployment of U.S. INF missiles and take place.

During the course of the renewed negotiations, the United States continued to stress that any INF agreement had to be based on equal rights limits. The Soviets, after renewing a freeze proposal, came up with several variations on a theme—the one being to force the removal of INF missiles from Europe while the Soviets retained their monopoly. Thus, we were offered a zero outcome for the United States and a plus for the Soviet Union, with each being equal to U.K. and other nuclear forces. We were also that equality meant equal reductions, not an equal outcome. Despite obvious one-sidedness of this and other Soviet approaches, it took months of persistent effort inside and outside the negotiations to persuade the Soviets that neither the United States nor its allies would accept any deal along these lines.

That effort was ultimately successful. Slowly but surely, the Soviet position began to evolve until, by the summer of 1986, the issue of equality in essence, resolved on the basis of the principle of equal rights and limits between the two parties to the negotiations, i.e., the United States and Soviet Union. That principle is now incorporated in the INF Treaty. The focus is on an equal outcome between the United States and the Soviet Union, not on equal reductions. Indeed, in its very nature, the treaty will strengthen the precedent for asymmetrical reductions to an equal level.

### Inclusion of Third-Country Systems

This principle is closely connected to, indeed, is a subset of the issue of equal rights and limits for the parties to the treaty. As part of its argument on the INF issue was an intra-European affair and that the Europeans and Americans had no need (or right) to be in a collective approach to counteract INF, the Soviet side, for much of the negotiations, argued for the inclusion of, or compensation for, British and French systems. The United States stated that any INF agreement, like

the negotiations themselves, must be bilateral and limited only to U.S. and Soviet systems.

Behind this argument lay the conviction of the United States and its allies that U.S. INF deployments provided a legitimate counterweight to Soviet INF capable of reaching the European and Asian allies of the United States, but not (so the Soviets claimed) the United States itself, and that any negotiations concerning nuclear weapons between the United States and the Soviet Union should deal only with the systems of those two countries.

For much of the 6 years spent at the negotiations, this issue was the prime topic of discussion. The Soviets sought to use the inclusion of the U.K. and French forces as a means to prevent or remove U.S. INF deployments under the guise of an "equal" outcome among "European" states. In effect, they sought to balance off only a non-strategic class of Soviet weapons

against the entire British and French strategic arsenal, to gain leverage on the size and shape of British and French nuclear forces via their negotiations with us, and to establish the principle that INF was an intra-European matter in which the United States was an outsider—a principle which, had it been accepted, would have called into question the very foundation of the North Atlantic alliance as well as our security arrangements with Asian allies.

What followed was a major effort in Geneva and in the public arena to persuade the Soviets that an agreement was only possible if third-country systems were completely excluded. But here again, that effort was successful. Beginning with General Secretary Gorbachev's visit to Paris in October 1985, where he offered separate negotiations with the French and British, the Soviet position began to evolve.

Still, it took another year before the Soviets, in essence, adopted our approach. The INF Treaty is a purely bilateral one. The British and French nuclear forces are not included in any manner. Neither, as Secretary Shultz spelled out in his testimony, are the Pershing missiles belonging to the Federal Republic of Germany under an existing program of cooperation included in the treaty. The principle that nuclear arms control agreements between the United States and the Soviet Union will deal only with the forces of those two countries has been accepted and incorporated in the final outcome.

### The Global Application of Limitations

The capability of the SS-20—especially its range, mobility, and transportability—permitted it to impinge on the security of the United States and its allies in Europe and Asia, regardless of its deployment location. Yet for most of the negotiating period, the Soviet Union rejected U.S. proposals to apply limitations on INF missiles on a worldwide basis and sought to limit the treaty to Europe. In contrast, the United States argued that an INF agreement limited to Europe and not leading to reductions in Asia would neither provide real security for Europe nor provide equal treatment for Asia.

The United States held firm to this principle throughout the negotiations. The first hint of Soviet recognition that the U.S. argument had validity came in mid-1982 with the Soviet willingness to include a part of its territory east of the Urals under the INF agreement. The next sign of movement came in October 1983 when the Soviets offered to freeze their INF deployments in Asia upon entry into force of an INF agreement covering Europe. While not meeting our requirements, the Soviets did, thus, implicitly acknowledge that their Asian systems were relevant to the INF negotiations.

During the resumed negotiations, the Soviet argument shifted somewhat. They asserted that Soviet SS-20s in Asia should be kept out of an agreement because they were deployed solely to counter U.S. naval and air forces in the Pacific—conveniently ignoring their counterpart air and naval forces and the questionable military utility of using SS-20s against ships. However, they also reaffirmed their earlier freeze offer (and its implications). The United States, for its part, remained firm—INF limits would have to apply on a

global basis; anything less would not meet our or our allies' security requirements.

No real movement was made in this area for several months, with Soviet proposals continuing to be variations on the same theme: implying recognition that their Asian SS-20s were part of the INF problem but not putting this into meaningful concrete terms. Again, we remained firm. Equality in Europe but inequality globally was not an acceptable outcome.

Not until the Reykjavik meeting did the Soviets finally accept, in essence, our position—an equal global ceiling putting concrete limits on Soviet INF missiles in Asia as well as in Europe and providing for a similar number of U.S. INF missiles to be deployed in the United States. The final outcome, however, went beyond this. We secured not only global limits on Soviet long-range INF missiles, but on Soviet shorter range INF missiles as well. As a result, the INF Treaty fully incorporates the principle of global limitations which we and our allies had sought from the outset of the negotiations.

### Maintain NATO's Conventional Capabilities

This principle is directly related to the question of whether to include dual-capable aircraft in the INF negotiation.

The Soviets initially argued for their inclusion. In essence, the Soviets sought to create an equation between only some of their INF aircraft on the one hand and all dual-capable U.S., British, and French aircraft on the other. Moreover, the level they proposed would have effectively left little or no room for U.S. aircraft in Europe.

The United States firmly rejected this patently one-sided approach. Instead, the United States argued that an INF agreement should focus on missiles only, the most capable element in the INF force, and stressed a determination not to accept an outcome which would weaken the U.S. contribution to NATO's conventional defense.

In the fall of 1983, the United States, in an effort to find common ground, offered to discuss inclusion of selected INF aircraft in an agreement, but at levels that would not impact on NATO's conventional defense. The Soviets refused to discuss our proposal. They did, however, offer a counterproposal which moved somewhat in our direction, both in terms of coverage and levels, but continued to include allied aircraft and U.S. sea-based sys-

tems in the permitted "NATO" total, with the result that our contribution NATO's conventional defense would have been weakened.

The aircraft issue reappeared with the talks resumed in 1985. However, Soviets soon began to deemphasize the subject, concentrating, as did we, on missiles. Indeed, by mid-1985, the subject ceased to be a matter of serious discussion and, thereafter, effectively disappeared from the negotiations.

The end result: the INF Treaty covers only missiles, U.S. aircraft levels are not affected by the treaty, and U.S. dual-capable aircraft are available to help strengthen NATO's deterrent and conventional capabilities.

### Effective Verification

Effective verification is the keystone arms control. "Trust but verify" is more than a watchword for the United States; it is a practical recognition of the problems created by Soviet non-compliance with arms control agreements and the need to ensure that compliance problems do not create a situation in which an agreement becomes a source of misunderstanding and tension rather than a force for improved relations. As I will detail below, the procedures for verification in the INF Treaty are more comprehensive than for any previous agreement. The complex of constraints, inspections, and notifications coupled with national technical means (NTM) will greatly help ensure compliance with the treaty.

Getting to this outcome, however, took patience and persistence. The Soviet position as the talks opened was to argue that national technical means were sufficient to verify compliance. The United States, while not discounting the value of NTM, argued that, given the relatively small and mobile nature of INF missiles and given the record of compliance problems, more would be needed for INF verification to include onsite inspection.

The United States sought from the outset to engage the Soviets in full discussion of verification. The Soviets resisted, arguing that verification could not be considered until there was agreement on reductions and limitations. While much of the discussion was one-sided, we continued to put forward our views and to urge the Soviets to join us in concrete negotiations on verification provisions. Nevertheless, at the time of the Soviet walkout, the question of verification, because of the Soviet stance, had not been given the full treatment it required.



The pace of work on verification is to pick up with the resumption of talks in 1985. Soviet public rhetoric is to shift toward acceptance of more stringent provisions until, eventually, even onsite inspection was not precluded. Inside the negotiations, the Soviets continued to shy away from discussing concrete measures, but they did show a willingness "in principle" to accept effective verification measures.

The United States worked to transfer the Soviet public support for effective verification into real treaty provisions. In February 1986, we tabled elements of a comprehensive verification regime. These eventually became the foundation for the INF Treaty verification provisions, but the initial Soviet reaction was to say, in effect, "in principle but no to working on the issue. Indeed, they suggested putting off developing key provisions until after the treaty was signed and assigning this task to the SCC. We continued to argue for concrete work on all aspects of verification during the negotiations, in parallel with work on other treaty provisions.

Progress was made at Reykjavik, with the Soviets moving in the direction of matching practice to rhetoric. In exchanges, onsite observation of production, and onsite inspection of the remaining inventories were accepted in principle. But the details remained open. The United States continued to press for deeper negotiations on verification, putting forward in March 1987 further elaboration of our approach to verification. We added that verification could be better facilitated in a zero environment, citing this as an additional reason for the Soviets to agree to eliminate the 33 deployed SS-20s in Asia, which they would have been entitled to keep under the Reykjavik formula.

Finally, in April 1987, the Soviets tabled their own draft verification regime. While it followed the structure of the U.S. approach, it was more generalized than the U.S. proposal. Among other aspects, it omitted onsite inspection of baseline data, but called for onsite inspection of U.S. military bases in third countries. Many details were left to an inspection protocol, which was not provided.

Nevertheless, the sides had begun to engage on the subject. In subsequent months, with the United States taking the lead, specific articles on verification were tabled, along with the memorandum of understanding on data and the elimination and inspection protocols. By the summer of 1987, the So-

viets had joined us in moving ahead on fleshing out the details. This effort continued until the end of the negotiations.

In the process, new ground was broken for the construction of the unprecedented stringent verification regime of the INF Treaty. The principle of effective verification is thus fully incorporated in the treaty.

### Shorter Range INF Missiles

From the outset of the negotiations in 1981, the United States called for treaty provisions placing constraints on Soviet shorter range INF missiles (eventually defined as shorter range missiles with ranges between 500 and 1,000 kilometers). This was necessary because Soviet shorter range INF missiles could perform many of the same missions as Soviet longer range INF missiles. Thus, if left unconstrained, Soviet SRINF could undermine the effectiveness and viability of the treaty. After some hesitation, the Soviet side agreed with the concerns expressed by the United States and, indeed, included provisions dealing with shorter range INF missiles in its initial draft INF treaty. The United States, for its part, agreed to the application of such constraints to its shorter range INF missiles.

However, while the United States remained constant in its view of the need to constrain these systems, the Soviet Union, when the talks resumed in 1985, raised objections to including shorter range INF missiles in the proposed treaty. Instead, the Soviets argued that these missile systems should be dealt with in a follow-on negotiation.

For well over a year, the Soviets once again applied the technique of producing variations on the same theme, including a freeze proposal which would have legitimized a Soviet preponderance in this area, while maintaining their essential posture of putting off negotiations on shorter range INF missiles until after the conclusion of an INF treaty.

At Reykjavik the sides agreed on the need to place constraints on shorter range INF missiles in an initial INF agreement but disagreed on the level—the United States insisting on the right to match the Soviet level; the Soviets insisting on a freeze at current levels, i.e., zero for the United States and thousands for them. In early 1987, the Soviets backed away from even this limited area of convergence, calling again for separate negotiations on shorter range INF missiles.

Finally, beginning in the spring of 1987, the Soviet position began to evolve with the first hints that the Soviet side would be willing to consider the elimination of its SRINF missiles at least in Europe, as part of an INF outcome. By midyear the Soviets had moved to accept the global elimination of shorter range INF missiles, which the United States, in close consultation with its allies, was also prepared to accept.

The result is fully incorporated in the INF Treaty. Not only does it constrain Soviet shorter range INF missiles concurrently with limitations on longer range INF missiles, but it provides for their elimination along with the elimination of the longer range INF missiles. In a situation where we had zero deployed shorter range INF missiles and only nondeployed missiles in storage in Colorado, the Soviets accepted, in effect, an asymmetrical reduction which approached the unilateral.

### The Treaty Provisions

As for the treaty itself, it will:

- Totally eliminate in 3 years all U.S. and Soviet INF ballistic and cruise missiles, i.e., those ground-launched missiles with a range between 500 and 5,500 kilometers (about 300–3,300 miles); deployed Soviet shorter range missiles (500–1,000 kilometer range) will be moved to elimination facilities within 90 days, and the entire shorter range missile force will be eliminated in 18 months. Longer range INF missiles (1,000–5,500 kilometer range) will be eliminated in two phases. The first, lasting 29 months, will bring the sides to equal force levels prior to total elimination at the end of 3 years. Altogether, over 1,835 Soviet missiles, capable of delivering over 3,000 nuclear warheads, will be destroyed, along with over 850 U.S. missiles capable of carrying a nuclear warhead;
- Prohibit production and flight testing of these systems or development of "new types";
- Institute restrictions on the deployment and movement of INF missile systems until they are eliminated, including an extensive process of notifications for and limitations on any movements;

- Update the data provided in the memorandum of understanding on data, which includes a fully itemized declaration of the location, number, and technical specifications of all treaty-limited systems, support structures, and equipment;

- Provide detailed procedures for the elimination of INF missiles, launchers, support equipment, and unique support structures; and

- Provide a complex, overlapping inspection regime to assist in the verification of compliance, to include several kinds of onsite inspection. The treaty also sets up a Special Verification Commission as one means of addressing, as necessary, compliance concerns.

Just as its provisions calling for the elimination of an entire class of nuclear weapons are unique, the treaty's extensive verification provisions break new ground. The verification regime, lasting 13 years and covering nine countries, is the most comprehensive and stringent ever agreed upon. It will consist of:

- "Baseline" inspections, to be conducted shortly after the INF Treaty enters into force to verify the number of missiles and launchers at "declared" facilities, including bases at which missiles are operating, repaired, and stored;

- An annual quota of short-notice, onsite inspections of these INF facilities, both for the 3 years during which all INF missile systems and facilities are eliminated and for 10 years afterward. These inspections will help monitor U.S. and Soviet INF missile systems until all are eliminated and ensure that no such systems are produced;

- Onsite inspections to monitor the elimination of missiles and launchers and elimination of specific structures at missile bases. Each side will also be permitted to eliminate up to 100 longer range INF missiles in the first 6 months by launching them under restrictive conditions and monitored by onsite observation;

- A separate "close-out" inspection to ensure that only when all INF-associated activity has, indeed, terminated will a declared site be deactivated and removed from the list of declared facilities; and

- A continuous portal monitoring regime under which the United States will be able to monitor, for up to 13 years, the key Soviet missile assembly plant at Votkinsk or any other plant

where the final assembly of a GLBM [ground-launched ballistic missile] using stages, any stage of which is outwardly similar to a solid propellant GLBM listed in article III, is accomplished. This monitoring will include the permanent presence of U.S. inspectors at the Soviet facility. Votkinsk was chosen because the first stage of the Soviet SS-25 ICBM is outwardly similar to the first stage of the SS-20; they will be able to weigh and measure Soviet canisters and open up eight such canisters per year as they leave the plant to ensure the "nonproduction" of SS-20s. The Soviet Union will similarly be permitted to monitor a former Pershing II production facility in Utah.

To complement this inspection regime, and as a further step to help ensure that SS-20 missiles are not covertly deployed with SS-25 or other road-mobile ICBM missiles, the Soviet Union has agreed to the establishment of a program of enhanced national technical means. Six times a year for 3 years or until entry into force of a START agreement (whichever comes sooner), the United States can require the Soviet Union on short notice to open retractable roofs and display missile systems at selected Soviet road-mobile ICBM bases.

In sum, the verification regime of the INF Treaty provides an extensive network of checks and crosschecks, appropriate to a zero-level environment where the production, flight testing, indeed, the very existence of INF missiles is prohibited. It dramatically reduces the possibilities of maintaining a militarily useful covert INF missile force and serves as a deterrent to cheating.

## The Future

The INF agreement is of historic proportions. It is not hyperbole to note that never before have two world powers agreed to eliminate an entire category of existing weaponry, whether the weapons were battleships, bombers, or ballistic missiles. The suggestion that INF missiles are superfluous when compared with the vast number of strategic systems begs the question of why they were built and deployed in the first place and forgets the deep concern which Soviet and INF missiles engendered in Europe and Asia.

Elements of the INF Treaty can provide useful precedents for the emerging conventional stability negotiations as well as for START. Each of these negotiations, of course, has its own dynamics and requirements. Neither envisages a zero outcome. Nevertheless, recognition of the principle of equal rights and limits and of asymmetrical reductions to reach equality can be useful precedents in other arms control negotiations. The sides could also draw upon procedures in the INF elimination protocol and build on aspects of the INF inspection protocol in future negotiations.

More generally, the INF Treaty is a positive example of U.S. and Soviet determination and ability to resolve controversial issues. The United States and the Soviet Union have worked to resolve a security problem, long considered intractable, involving key allies both in Europe and Asia. Other issues will not necessarily be easier to negotiate, but at a minimum, the INF Treaty will demonstrate that difficult problems can be solved.

In addition, while our experience with previous nuclear arms control agreements with the Soviet Union has not always been a happy one, successful implementation and full compliance with the INF Treaty will provide an opportunity to establish a different record.

It remains fundamentally true that improved East-West relations cannot be based solely on arms control. Arms alone do not create insecurity. Arms are as much, if not more, a manifestation of tension as the cause of tension. Progress in arms control alone cannot therefore, resolve U.S.-Soviet differences if we remain at odds over the rest of the spectrum of our relationship. To be of lasting benefit, movement in arms control must be paralleled by the resolution of problems in other areas such as human rights and regional issues.

Nevertheless, while there is more to be done in these fields as well as in arms control, the successful negotiations of the INF Treaty demonstrates and illustrates the point that even though initially separated by major political and security differences, the United States and the Soviet Union can ultimately find the way to agreement. The knowledge that agreement can be achieved in a sensitive area despite major obstacles should be among the most important legacies of the INF negotiations and Treaty.

## Conclusion

would like to close by reflecting on a few points and lessons. My own involvement with INF dates back to the summer of 1976 when the United States first briefed its NATO allies on the SS-20. From that time until the present, whether in Washington, at NATO Brussels, or at the Geneva negotiations, I participated in the work which led to the deployments, to the negotiations, and eventually to this treaty.

Over this period, the United States maintained tactical flexibility, but there was constancy in our strategic approach. Our goal, and NATO's goal, was to preserve and strengthen our mutual security by overcoming the challenge posed to that security, to our freedom, and to the peace by Soviet INF missiles. That goal was articulated in the 1979 NATO decision to deploy and to negotiate.

We and our allies carried through both tracks. The provisions of this treaty are not only consistent with the 1979 decision, they are based on it, in spirit and in letter. The constancy of our strategic approach to the INF issue, to the deployment and negotiating tracks, provided the essential basis for achieving the results of this negotiation. NATO's 1979 decision has been carried out.

The INF negotiations had a very high political content. This is not to underplay the enormous destructive potential of INF missiles. Indeed, without that potential they would have had little political impact. But their ability to invalidate, their potential for inciting or for decoupling the United States from its allies, are what gave Soviet INF missiles their real force. They did not have to be used to be effective. They just had to be seen to exist in a situation where they were uncontrolled and unmatched.

Because of the importance of the political aspect of the INF issue, perceptions—for example, of NATO's ability to deter Soviet pressure, or the U.S. willingness to continue to join with its allies in supporting the deterrence, or of our and our allies' view of

how best to deal with the problems posed by Soviet INF missiles—played and still play a key part—even today as we debate the treaty—in determining how the INF issue impacts on our security relations with our NATO and Asian allies.

The political content of the INF issue also created a situation where the INF negotiations were conducted almost as much in the public arena as at the negotiating table. The democratic governments of the West carried the greater burden but also garnered the greatest gain from this phenomenon. For while our open societies engender open, often raucous, debate, they also provide, via the ballot box, a clear-cut and powerful indication of how our peoples want an issue to be resolved. In the case of INF, this was unequivocal: deploy and negotiate but only accept an agreement which incorporates NATO's agreed criteria.

Furthermore, in entering the public debate, the Soviet Union also, to an important extent, found itself forced to play by the rules. It could not, for example, expect to sway our publics when it made positive statements about verification in public but did not follow through at the negotiating table or when it called in public for improved relations with Asian states but sought to retain a residual force of SS-20s capable of being targeted against those states. It could not, as we pointed out to the Soviets and to the public at large, expect to maintain negotiating positions at variance with its public statements without having to change one or the other.

The INF Treaty meets the negotiating requirements we and our allies established in 1979. It effectively counters the threat posed by the Soviet INF missile force by eliminating that

force. In so doing, it will remove a major source of concern to our allies. It will deprive the Soviet Union of the ability to think it could create a fear in the minds of our allies that, because its INF missiles were not "aimed" at the United States, the United States would be less likely to come to their aid were they threatened by these weapons; in other words, to create an atmosphere of decoupling in capital letters.

While the treaty does what we set out to have it do, it cannot be expected to overcome other problems affecting Western security interests, be they in the conventional, chemical, or strategic areas. Nor will it relieve the United States and its allies from the continued need to maintain a solid defense so long as fundamental differences in other areas such as human rights and regional matters continue to be a source of tension between the United States and the Soviet Union.

The INF Treaty will eliminate some options for us and our allies, but, more importantly, it will eliminate far greater Soviet forces as well as Soviet military and political options and opportunities. How we and our allies respond to the continuing challenges of maintaining deterrence, the perceptions we Americans and our allies create concerning the roles each of us is prepared to play in meeting these challenges, our joint willingness to ensure that the heart of our security relationship remains solid, all this remains very much in our hands and well within our ability to resolve effectively. The successful conclusion of the INF agreement, the strength of purpose, the constancy and solidarity we and our allies maintained throughout a long period of trial, are proof that the heart of our relationship is strong and that we can meet the remaining challenges.

<sup>1</sup>The complete transcript of the hearings will be published by the committee and will be available from the Superintendent of Documents, U.S. Government Printing Office, Washington, D.C. 20402. ■

## Nuclear and Space Arms Talks Open Round Nine

AMBASSADOR KAMPELMAN'S  
STATEMENT,  
JAN. 13, 1988<sup>1</sup>

The U.S. delegation looks forward to the opening of the ninth round of the nuclear and space talks with the Soviet Union which begins tomorrow, January 14.

Our negotiations, which began here 34 months ago, have been difficult but productive. When President Reagan and General Secretary Gorbachev signed the 129-page INF [Intermediate-Range Nuclear Forces] Treaty in Washington on December 8, 1987, important new ground was broken. The elimination of the entire class of Soviet and U.S. nuclear missiles with a range between 500 and 5,500 kilometers goes far beyond any prior arms control agreement. The treaty is a dramatic demonstration that patient, realistic, and serious bargaining can produce agreement which is in the interest of both sides and makes a vital contribution to global stability and world peace.

But the U.S. delegation does not return to Geneva today to talk about the accomplishments of yesterday. The same patient, realistic, and serious bargaining that produced a good INF Treaty also brought about significant progress in the other areas of these nuclear and space negotiations. President Reagan and General Secretary Gorbachev noted and built upon the considerable movement which has been made here in Geneva toward conclusion of a START [strategic arms reduction talks] treaty which would bring about 50% reductions in strategic offensive arms. The leaders instructed us to work toward completion of a START treaty at the earliest possible date, preferably in time for signature at the next summit meeting in Moscow during the first half of this year. The U.S. delegation is ready to pursue that goal and fulfill its responsibilities.

The task will not be easy. Nonetheless, the sides are already working from a single joint draft treaty. We have built upon our agreement to cut our strategic weapons by 50% by attaching important numbers to that agreement. We have agreed to equal limits of 1,600 delivery vehicles, not more than 6,000 warheads on them,

and, within the 6,000 total, a limit of 1,900 ballistic missile warheads and a limit of 1,540 warheads on so-called heavy missiles. There will be a 50% reduction in throw-weight. These numbers protect our vital security interests as we proceed with significant reductions.

There are serious remaining differences of importance which must be resolved. And we also recognize the tremendous challenge of agreeing on stringent and effective verification measures, which must go beyond those set in place for the INF Treaty.

Our second objective at these negotiations is to reach for a treaty in the area of strategic defenses. Both the United States and the Soviet Union, as General Secretary Gorbachev recently confirmed, are engaged in extensive exploration of whether modern technology can develop defenses against nuclear ballistic missiles. President Reagan and General Secretary Gorbachev have agreed that neither of our countries will withdraw from the ABM [Anti-ballistic Missile] Treaty for a specified period of time not yet determined.

This means, as we see it, that our essential research, development, and testing programs will continue during the specified period. Neither side will deploy advanced defenses, if and as they evolve, until there has been an opportunity for full consultation between us. We would like to begin those consultations now. In any event, we have agreed with the Soviets that intensive discussions of strategic stability shall begin not later than 3 years before the end of the specified period, after which, in the event the sides have not agreed otherwise, each side will be free to decide its course of action.

The United States is fully persuaded in the area of strategic defenses that stability between our two countries and in the world would be strengthened if we could agree upon measures to enhance predictability in the area of strategic defenses. We will engage the Soviet delegation in a discussion of how to ensure such predictability in a manner that will strengthen deterrence and build confidence, thereby reducing the risk of nuclear war.

The tasks before us as we begin this decisive round of negotiations are clear. We must build upon the progress already made and resolve the important differences that remain. The United States will negotiate seriously, constructively, and in good faith. However there are no guarantees of success. We seek arms control agreements with the Soviet Union which enhance our mutual security, as well as that of the entire world. We would welcome the Soviet Union's joining us in the search for such agreements. With that joint effort, there is a real possibility of success.

I conclude by formally introducing to you the American Ambassadors who will have the primary responsibility for their respective negotiating subjects during this round. They are Read Hanmer, who will lead the START negotiating group and who will be assisted by Rear Adm. Dean Sackett, who is with us as a representative of the Joint Chiefs of Staff serving as his deputy; and Henry F. Cooper, who will lead the defense and space negotiating group, assisted by William Courtney, most recently of the National Security Council staff at the White House. I will continue as the head of the U.S. delegation to these talks.

PRESIDENT'S STATEMENT,  
JAN. 14, 1988<sup>2</sup>

Today marks the opening in Geneva of round nine of the nuclear and space talks between the United States and the Soviet Union. Our objective in these talks remains unchanged—achievement of equitable and effective verifiable arms reduction agreements with the Soviet Union which lessen the risk of war and make the world safer.

Last month, here in Washington, General Secretary Gorbachev and I signed the Treaty on Intermediate-Range Nuclear Forces (INF). This treaty is truly historic; for the first time, an entire class of U.S. and Soviet nuclear missiles will be eliminated. Through this treaty, we and our NATO allies achieve the goal we set forth in 1979—elimination of the threat posed our security by Soviet INF missiles.

Under this agreement, the Soviet are required to eliminate deployed INF missile systems capable of carrying almost four times as many nuclear warheads as the deployed systems we will eliminate. Furthermore, the INF Treaty provides for the most stringent

ification in the history of arms control. The asymmetrical reductions to achieve an equal U.S.-Soviet level and comprehensive verification provisions of the INF Treaty provide important precedents for future arms control agreements. The INF Treaty is in the security interests of the United States and our allies.

The treaty now goes to the Senate for its advice and consent as to ratification. I welcome the debate the Senate will hold, and I hope the Senate will move expeditiously in carrying out its important constitutional role.

The INF Treaty is not, however, an end in itself. It is part of our overall strategy for strengthening peace and ensuring strategic stability. Our focus will be on achieving 50% reductions in U.S. and Soviet strategic offensive nuclear arsenals. We particularly seek to reduce the most destabilizing nuclear arms—fast-flying ballistic missiles, especially heavy intercontinental ballistic missiles with multiple warheads.

Our negotiators returned to Geneva on my instructions to expedite work on a joint draft treaty which meets these objectives. This draft START treaty reflects progress already achieved in Geneva and the areas of agreement that General Secretary Gorbachev and I reached during our meetings in 1985 and 1986. This includes a ceiling of 600 warheads on 10 delivery vehicles for each side, a ceiling for heavy intercontinental ballistic missiles and their warheads, and limiting rules for heavy bombers and their armament.

During our meetings in Washington last month, the General Secretary made further progress. We reached agreement on a sublimit of 4,900 for the total number of ballistic missile warheads, a counting rule for existing ballistic missiles, and guidelines for effective verification of the treaty.

Despite the progress we have made, important differences remain, including such issues as mobile intercontinental ballistic missiles, sea-launched cruise missiles, and the details of effective verification.

A START agreement can be reached this year, if the Soviets return to Geneva ready to apply themselves with the same seriousness as the United States. The United States seeks a sound agreement, and we will not negotiate against arbitrary deadlines. It remains my operating principle that we would rather have no agreement than accept a bad one.

Our negotiators will also continue work at Geneva on strategic defense issues. In accordance with my agreement with General Secretary Gorbachev last month, I have instructed our negotiators to work out with the Soviets a separate new treaty calling for observing for a specified period of time the ABM Treaty, as signed in 1972, while both countries conduct research, development, and testing as required, which are permitted by the ABM Treaty. After this period, and unless otherwise agreed, both countries will be free to choose their own course of action.

During our meetings last month, I made clear to General Secretary Gorbachev my firm commitment to move forward with our Strategic Defense Initiative (SDI). I believe that he understands our insistence on investigating fully the feasibility of strategic defenses, especially since—as he acknowledged—the Soviet Union itself has long been conducting its own program in this vital area.

## Soviet Noncompliance With Arms Control Agreements

*Following is the President's unclassified report on Soviet noncompliance with arms control agreements along with his letter of transmittal to the Speaker of the House of Representatives and to the President of the Senate on December 2, 1987.*

### TRANSMITTAL LETTER<sup>1</sup>

In response to congressional requests as set forth in Public Law 99-145, I am forwarding herewith classified and unclassified versions of the Administration's report to the Congress on Soviet noncompliance with arms control agreements. (Detailed classified briefings will be available to the Congress in the near future.)

The information contained in this report, in addition to that provided in our previous reports, is essential to understanding the problems we face in seeking to achieve sound, equitable and verifiable agreements for arms reductions that will strengthen our security and that of our allies.

The Soviet Union to date has not corrected its noncompliance activities. Indeed, since the last report, there has been an additional case of Soviet violation of the ABM [Antiballistic Missile] Treaty in the

SDI offers the best hope of a safer world, one in which Western security would rely less on the threat of retaliation and increasingly on defenses, which threaten no one. SDI is the cornerstone of our security strategy for the 1990s and beyond. SDI is not a bargaining chip but our path to a more secure future.

Our negotiating team, led by Ambassadors Kampelman, Cooper, and Hanmer, returns to Geneva fully prepared to make progress on the difficult issues remaining in both offensive reductions and strategic defense.

<sup>1</sup>Max M. Kampelman is head of the U.S. delegation to the nuclear and space arms talks.

<sup>2</sup>Text from Weekly Compilation of Presidential Documents of Jan. 18, 1988. ■

deployment of an ABM radar at Gomel, and other violations are continuing.

No violation of a treaty can be considered to be a minor matter, nor can there be confidence in agreements if a country can pick and choose which provisions of an agreement it will comply with. The Gomel violation can be quickly corrected by the Soviet Union if it so chooses. We are urging them to take the actions needed to do so, and to resolve other longstanding violations, especially that of their radar located at Krasnoyarsk. Correcting their violations will be a true test of Soviet willingness to enter a more constructive relationship and broaden the basis for cooperation between our two countries on security matters.

I am confident the Congress fully shares my concern about Soviet noncompliance. Congressional support and consensus on this issue is an essential element of our efforts to secure corrective actions, and pursue the kind of arms reductions agreements that will best serve the interests of the United States and the world.

Sincerely,

RONALD REAGAN

## UNCLASSIFIED REPORT

At the request of Congress, I am submitting this report on Soviet non-compliance with arms control agreements. This report represents another in a series of reports to Congress by this Administration regarding this serious issue. The series includes reports dated January 1984, February and December 1985, March 1987, and the 1984 report on Soviet noncompliance prepared for me by the independent General Advisory Committee on Arms Control. Each of these reports has enumerated and documented, in detail, issues of Soviet noncompliance and our attempts to resolve the issues. Likewise, this report addresses questions of Soviet noncompliance with existing arms control agreements, including the Antiballistic Missile Treaty, the Biological and Toxin Weapons Convention (BWC), the Geneva Protocol on Chemical Weapons, and the Limited Test Ban Treaty (LTBT). Now that we have put the SALT I [strategic arms limitation talks] Interim Agreement and the SALT II Treaty behind us, Soviet activities with respect to those agreements are not treated in this report. I will report on the Threshold Test Ban Treaty (TTBT) at a later date. The provisions of the Helsinki Final Act that relate to military security and confidence-building have been superseded by the Stockholm Document, a development that is treated later in this introduction. When taken as a whole, this series of reports provides a clear picture of continuing Soviet violations and forms the basis for our concern that future agreements must be effectively verifiable and complied with.

In the December 23, 1985, report, I stated:

The Administration's most recent studies support its conclusion that there is a pattern of Soviet noncompliance. As documented in this and previous reports, the Soviet Union has violated its legal obligation under or political commitment to the SALT I ABM Treaty and Interim Agreement, the SALT II Agreement, the Limited Test Ban Treaty of 1963, the Biological and Toxin Weapons Convention, the Geneva Protocol on Chemical Weapons, and the Helsinki Final Act. In addition, the U.S.S.R. has likely violated provisions of the Threshold Test Ban Treaty.

I further stated:

At the same time as the Administration has reported its concerns and findings to the Congress, the United States has had extensive exchanges with the Soviet Union on Soviet noncompliance in the Standing Con-

sultative Commission (SCC), where SALT-related issues (including ABM issues) are discussed, and through other appropriate diplomatic channels.

The compliance concerns enumerated in this report are not unfamiliar to the Soviet Union. I expressed my personal interest in these issues directly to General Secretary Gorbachev during my meetings with him, both in 1985 in Geneva and then again in Reykjavik in October 1986. In addition, the Standing Consultative Commission discusses compliance concerns in detail during its biannual sessions. The classified report includes detailed summaries of this SCC dialogue. Most recently, Secretary of State Shultz raised U.S. concerns about Soviet noncompliance during his October 1987 visit to Moscow.

Additional time has passed and, despite these continuing intensive efforts and the critical stage we have entered in the negotiation of arms reductions of historic proportion, the Soviet Union has failed to correct its noncompliant activities; neither have they provided explanations sufficient to alleviate our concerns on other compliance issues. Indeed, recent Soviet activities at an electronics facility at Gomel have raised an additional compliance issue with regard to the ABM Treaty.

Compliance with treaty obligations is a cornerstone of international law; States are to observe and comply with obligations they have freely undertaken. In fact, in December 1985, the General Assembly of the United Nations recognized the importance of treaty compliance for future arms control, when, by a vote of 131-0 (with 16 abstentions), it passed a resolution that:

- Urges all parties to arms limitation and disarmament agreements to comply with their provisions;
- Calls upon those parties to consider the implications of noncompliance for international security and stability and for the prospects for further progress in the field of disarmament; and
- Appeals to all UN members to support efforts to resolve non-compliance questions "with a view toward encouraging strict observance of the provisions subscribed to and maintaining or restoring the integrity of arms limitation or disarmament agreements."

Congress has made clear its concern about Soviet noncompliance with arms control agreements. In February 1987, the Senate passed a resolution (S. Res. 94), by a vote of 93 to 2, which:

... declares that an important obstacle to the achievement of acceptable arms control agreements with the Soviet Union has been its violations of existing agreements, and calls upon it to take steps to rectify its violation of such agreements and, in particular, to dismantle the newly-constructed radar site at Krasnoyarsk, Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, since it is a clear violation of the terms of the Anti-Ballistic Treaty....

The Senate repeated its call for dismantlement of the Krasnoyarsk radar in a resolution dated September 16 1987. For its part, the House of Representatives, on May 6, 1987, voted 418 to 0 in support of a resolution (an amendment to H.R. 17) recognizing that by constructing the Krasnoyarsk radar, the Soviet Union was in violation of its legal obligations under the ABM Treaty.

Compliance with arms control commitments remains an essential element of my arms control policy. As I have stated before:

In order for arms control to have meaning and credibly contribute to national security... it is essential that all parties to agreements fully comply with their strict compliance with all provisions of arms control agreements is fundamental, and this Administration will not accept anything less.

I have also said that:

Soviet noncompliance is a serious matter. It calls into question important security benefits from arms control, and could create new security risks. It undermines the confidence essential to an effective arms control process in the future.... The United States Government has vigorously pressed, and will continue to press, these compliance issues with the Soviet Union through diplomatic channels.

Despite these continuous efforts, regret to report that during the period since my last report, the Soviet Union has failed to correct its noncompliance activity or to provide explanations sufficient to alleviate our concerns. Soviet explanations and actions are fully described in the report. The report presents and distinguishes between both violations and possibly noncompliant actions which are historical in nature and instances of ongoing and new non-compliant behavior.

### The ABM Treaty

We continue to have deep concerns about Soviet noncompliance with the ABM Treaty. One of our principal concerns is with the Krasnoyarsk radar, which is a clear violation of the treaty. The radar demonstrates that the Sovi-

we were designing and programming prospective violation of the ABM Treaty even while they were negotiating a new agreement on strategic offensive weapons with the United States. The only permitted functions for a new, phased-array radar (LPA) with location and orientation such as that of the Krasnoyarsk radar would be target-tracking and national technical means (NTM) of verification. Based on conclusive evidence, however, we judge that this radar is primarily designed for strategic missile detection and tracking, for space-tracking and NTM as the Soviets claim. Moreover, the coverage of the Krasnoyarsk radar closes a major gap in the coverage of the Soviet ballistic missile detection, warning, and tracking screen. Its location allows it to provide warning of a ballistic missile attack, to acquire attack characteristics data that will enable the Soviet strategic forces to respond in a timely manner and that could aid in planning battle for Soviet defensive forces. All LPAs, such as the Krasnoyarsk radar, have the inherent capability to track large numbers of objects accurately. Thus, they not only can perform as ballistic missile detection, warning, and tracking radars, but also have an inherent technical potential, depending on location and orientation, of contributing to ABM battle management.

LPAs have always been considered to be the long lead-time element of a possible territorial defense. Taken together, the Krasnoyarsk radar and other Soviet ABM-related activities give us concern that the Soviet Union is preparing an ABM defense of national territory. Some of the activities, such as the construction of new LPAs on the periphery of the Soviet Union and the upgrade of the Moscow ABM system, appear to be consistent with the ABM Treaty. The redundancy of coverage provided by these new radars and the disposition of these radars closely resembles the design of the U.S. Safeguard ABM program. The construction of the radar near Krasnoyarsk and the deployment of a Flat Twin and a Pawn Shop outside a permitted ABM system deployment area or designated ABM test range are violations of the ABM Treaty. Other Soviet ABM-related activities involve intentional or probable Soviet violations of other ambiguous activity. These other issues, discussed fully in the body of the report, are:

- The testing and development of components required for an ABM system that could be deployed to a site in months rather than years and the movement of parts of Flat Twin and Pawn Shop to a new location;
- The concurrent operation of air defense components and ABM components;
- The development of modern air defense systems that may have some ABM capabilities;
- The demonstration of an ability to reload ABM launchers in a period of time short enough to cause us concern as to Soviet capabilities and intent; and
- The locating of parts of a Flat Twin and Pawn Shop at a location that is neither a permitted ABM deployment area nor an agreed test range.

Soviet activities during the past year have contributed to our concerns. Construction is continuing on three additional LPAs similar to the Krasnoyarsk radar. These new radars are located near the periphery of the western U.S.S.R. and oriented consistent with the ABM Treaty's provisions on ballistic missile early warning radars (if they are for early warning). The primary mission of these radars is ballistic missile detection and tracking.

The Soviets have sought recently to convey the impression that they are addressing our concerns in a responsible fashion, but have not taken any actions which, in fact, redress our concerns regarding their possible preparation of a territorial defense. For example, on September 5, 1987, a U.S. congressional delegation was permitted to visit the Krasnoyarsk radar. Although the Soviet invitation represented a departure from the long Soviet history of secrecy in such matters, the observations of the congressional delegation regarding the stage of construction, the quality of construction, and other features of the radar in no way change the assessment that the radar is designed for ballistic missile detection and tracking. The radar is unquestionably an LPA, whose location and orientation are inconsistent with the ABM Treaty.

In recent years, we have gathered an increased amount of evidence on activities that could be associated with Soviet concurrent operations. This may or may not indicate an increase in Soviet concurrent operations. Also of significant concern is the initial deployment in the western U.S.S.R. to Soviet ground forces of the SA-12 defensive system, a variant of which has been tested against tactical ballistic missiles and may have some ABM capability.

Our continuing reexamination of Soviet ABM-related activities demonstrates that the Soviets have not corrected their outstanding violation, the Krasnoyarsk radar. With regard to Krasnoyarsk, on October 23, General Secretary Gorbachev told Secretary of State Shultz that the Soviets were imposing a 1-year construction moratorium on Krasnoyarsk. Although activities at Krasnoyarsk continue to be noted, the remaining work needed on the radar is interior work, so that it would be difficult to ascertain whether the Soviets have, indeed, ceased construction at the site.

The absence of Soviet dismantlement of the Krasnoyarsk radar, the new violation in the deployment of the Flat Twin and Pawn Shop observed at Gomel, and the totality of Soviet ABM-related activities in 1987 and previous years suggest that the U.S.S.R. may be preparing an ABM defense of its national territory.

The Soviet Union clearly continues to increase its capability to deploy an ABM defense. The Soviet programs involved a much greater investment of plant space, capital, and manpower than comparable U.S. programs. As I said in the December 1985 report, a unilateral Soviet ABM defense:

... would have profound implications for... the vital East-West... balance. A unilateral Soviet territorial ABM capability acquired in violation of the ABM Treaty could erode our deterrent and leave doubts about its credibility.

### Chemical, Biological and Toxin Weapons

The integrity of the arms control process is also hurt by Soviet violations of the 1925 Geneva Protocol on Chemical Weapons and the 1972 Biological and Toxin Weapons Convention. Information obtained in 1987 does nothing to allay our concern about Soviet noncompliance with these important agreements. Progress toward an agreement banning chemical weapons is affected by Soviet noncompliance with the Biological and Toxin Weapons Convention. Because of the record of Soviet noncompliance with past agreements, we believe verification provisions are a matter of unprecedented importance in our efforts to rid the world of these heinous weapons—weapons of mass destruction under international law.

The United States has determined that the Soviet Union has maintained an active offensive biological warfare

(BW) program and capability. Until recently, the Soviet Union has never acknowledged that it conducted even permitted BW-related activities, other than to say that it had been in compliance with its obligations under the BWC.

As a result of the 1986 BWC Review Conference, states party to the convention agreed to exchange information on facilities built for high-risk (high-containment) biological experiments and facilities engaged in other activities relating to the convention. The Soviet submission is an unprecedented public declaration of permitted Soviet BW-related facilities and is a welcome step.

An example of the discrepancy between Soviet public and private arms control diplomacy is the recent Soviet treatment of our concerns regarding an outbreak of anthrax in Sverdlovsk in 1979. The United States has evidence that the outbreak occurred as a result of an accidental release of large quantities of anthrax spores from a prohibited BW facility, contributing to our concerns about the Soviet BW program. We have raised the issue repeatedly with the Soviets as early as March 1980 and have been told that the outbreak stemmed from the consumption of contaminated meat.

Since the 1986 BWC Review Conference, the Soviets have provided additional details regarding the incident in various informal public fora. However, the Soviet account is inconsistent with information available to us and, in many aspects, is not consistent with a contaminated meat explanation.

Again, while we welcome the provision of new information and the opportunity to discuss these issues, our concerns regarding the Soviet biological warfare program and capability are unassuaged. The Soviets have maintained a prohibited offensive biological warfare capability. It may include advanced biological agents about which we have little knowledge and against which we have no defense. The Soviets continue to expand their chemical and toxin warfare capabilities, contrary to their public claims. Neither NATO retaliatory nor defensive programs can begin to match the Soviet effort. And, even though there have been no confirmed reports of attacks with lethal chemical, biological or toxin agents since 1984, previous activities have provided the Soviets with valuable testing, development, and operational experience.

## Nuclear Testing

The record of Soviet noncompliance with the treaties on nuclear testing is of legal and military concern. Since the Limited Test Ban Treaty came into force over 20 years ago, the Soviet Union has conducted its nuclear weapons test program in a manner incompatible with the aims of the Treaty. That conduct regularly resulted in the release of nuclear debris into the atmosphere beyond the borders of the U.S.S.R. When the Soviets ended their unilateral nuclear testing moratorium on February 26, 1987, they resumed their pattern of noncompliance with treaties on nuclear testing by conducting the test in a way which resulted in the release of radioactive matter into the atmosphere beyond the borders of the U.S.S.R. Even though the material from these Soviet tests does not pose calculable health, safety, or environmental risks, and these infractions have no apparent military significance, our repeated attempts to discuss these occurrences with Soviet authorities have been rebuffed. The United States presented demarches to the Soviets on two separate occasions of unambiguous venting in 1987 and received completely unacceptable explanations. Soviet refusal to discuss this matter calls into question their sincerity on the whole range of arms control agreements.

During their 1985-86 moratorium, the Soviets undoubtedly maintained their test sites because they quickly resumed testing and have since conducted a series of tests. One of these tests raised sufficient concern about Soviet compliance with the 150 kt limit of the Threshold Test Ban Treaty that the United States raised the issue with the Soviets.

In the March 1987 report we reaffirmed the December 1985 U.S. Government judgment that, "Soviet nuclear testing activities for a number of tests constitute a likely violation of legal obligations under the Threshold Test Ban Treaty." We also reported that the finding would stand until a number of studies, which had been initiated in an attempt to provide a somewhat improved basis for assessing Soviet compliance, could be completed. While significant progress has been made on those technically difficult issues, we do not expect to provide an update until next spring.

The United States and the Soviet Union have met several times at the

experts level to discuss the broad range of issues relating to nuclear testing. In a joint statement issued at the time of the September 1987 meeting between Secretary of State Shultz and Soviet Foreign Minister Shevardnadze, the two sides indicated their intention to design and conduct joint verification experiments at each other's test sites. On November 9, 1987, the United States and Soviet Union began full-scale, stage-by-stage negotiations in which the first step is to agree on effective verification measures which will make it possible to ratify the U.S.-U.S.S.R. TBT and Peaceful Nuclear Explosions Treaty (PNET). As a result of this first round of discussions, arrangements are being made for preliminary visits to each side's test sites.

## The Helsinki Final Act

The accord reached at the 1986 Stockholm Conference on Confidence- and Security-Building Measures [and Disarmament in Europe], containing new standards for notification, observation and verification of military activities, including onsite inspection, went into effect January 1, 1987. To date, Soviet military activity forecasts, subsequent notifications, and the acceptance of requests for two inspections have been consistent with their obligations under the new agreement. The Soviets have provided the minimum information required and have, therefore, remained within the scope of their obligations. View of this and without any new evidence, this compliance issue will not be treated in this report. However, we have exercised our prerogative for onsite inspection and will be carefully monitoring Soviet compliance with these new standards. While this accord appears to be a step in the right direction, we must continue to seek further confidence- and security-building measures.

## Compliance and Arms Control

A consistent and fundamental priority of my Administration has been achieving deep and equitable reductions in the nuclear offensive arsenals of the United States and U.S.S.R. That goal is closer to reality than it has ever been in the history of mankind, but it will be achieved only if effective verification and total compliance are integral elements of the process, both with respect to existing arms control agreements and possible new ones.



We must insist on effective verification of the provisions of these new agreements, respond appropriately to Soviet noncompliance, and continue to make our strategic decisions based on the nature and magnitude of the Soviet threat. A double standard of compliance with arms control obligations is unacceptable.

I look forward to continued close consultations with the Congress as we seek to make progress in resolving compliance issues and in negotiating arms control agreements.

The findings on Soviet noncompliance with arms control agreements follow.

## THE FINDINGS

### Antiballistic Missile Treaty

#### Treaty Status

The 1972 ABM Treaty and its Protocol on deployment of ABM systems exist that each party is permitted to deploy one ABM system around its national capital area or, alternatively, at a single ICBM [intercontinental ballistic missile] deployment area. The ABM Treaty is in force and is of indefinite duration. Soviet actions not in accord with the ABM Treaty are, therefore, violations of a legal obligation.

#### 1. The Krasnoyarsk Radar

• **Obligation:** To preclude the development of a territorial defense or providing the base for a territorial ABM defense, the ABM Treaty prohibits that radars for early warning of ballistic missile attack may be deployed only at locations along the periphery of the national territory of each party and that they be oriented outward. The treaty permits deployment (without regard to location or orientation) of large phased-array radars for purposes of tracking objects in outer space or for use as national technical means of verification of compliance with arms control agreements.

• **Issue:** The March 1987 report examined the issue of whether the Krasnoyarsk radar meets the provisions of the ABM Treaty governing phased-array radars. We have reexamined this issue.

• **Finding:** The U.S. Government reaffirms the conclusion in the March 1987 report that the new large phased-array radar under construction at

Krasnoyarsk constitutes a violation of legal obligations under the Antiballistic Missile Treaty of 1972 in that in its associated siting, orientation, and capability, it is prohibited by this treaty. Construction continued in 1987. The absence of credible alternative explanations has reinforced our assessment of its purpose. Despite U.S. requests, no corrective action has been taken. This and other ABM-related activities suggest that the U.S.S.R. may be preparing an ABM defense of its national territory.

#### 2. Mobility of ABM System Components

• **Obligation:** Paragraph 1 of Article V of the ABM Treaty prohibits the development, testing, or deployment of mobile land-based ABM systems or components.

• **Issue:** The March 1987 report examined whether the Soviet Union has developed a mobile land-based ABM system, or components for such a system, in violation of its legal obligation under the ABM Treaty. We have reexamined this issue and considered the impact of the Soviet actions at Gornel.

• **Finding:** The U.S. Government reaffirms the judgment of the March 1987 report that the evidence on Soviet actions with respect to ABM component mobility is ambiguous, but that the U.S.S.R.'s development and testing of components of an ABM system, which apparently are designed to be deployable at sites requiring relatively limited special-purpose site preparation, represent a potential violation of its legal obligation under the ABM Treaty. The recent movement of parts of a Flat Twin and Pawn Shop reinforces our concerns about ABM system component mobility. This and other ABM-related Soviet activities suggest that the U.S.S.R. may be preparing an ABM defense of its national territory.

#### 3. Concurrent Testing of ABM and Air Defense Components

• **Obligation:** The ABM Treaty and its protocol limit the parties to one ABM deployment area. In addition to the ABM systems and components at that one deployment area, the parties may have ABM systems and components for development and testing purposes so long as they are located at agreed test ranges. The treaty also prohibits giving components, other than ABM system components, the capability "to counter strategic ballistic

missiles or their elements in flight trajectory" and prohibits the parties from testing them "in an ABM mode." The parties agreed that the concurrent testing of SAM [surface-to-air missile] and ABM system components is prohibited.

• **Issue:** The March 1987 report examined whether the Soviet Union has concurrently tested SAM and ABM system components in violation of its legal obligation since 1978 not to do so. It was the purpose of that obligation to further constrain testing of air defense systems in an ABM mode. We have reexamined this issue.

• **Finding:** The U.S. Government reaffirms the judgment made in the March 1987 report that the evidence of Soviet actions with respect to concurrent operations is insufficient fully to assess compliance with Soviet obligations under the ABM Treaty. However, the Soviet Union has conducted tests that have involved air defense radars in ABM-related activities. The large number, and consistency over time, of incidents of concurrent operation of ABM and SAM components, plus Soviet failure to accommodate fully U.S. concerns, indicate the U.S.S.R. probably has violated the prohibition on testing SAM components in an ABM mode. In several cases this may be highly probable. This and other ABM-related activities suggest the U.S.S.R. may be preparing an ABM defense of its national territory.

#### 4. ABM Capability of Modern SAM Systems

• **Obligation:** Under subparagraph (a) of Article VI of the ABM Treaty, each Party undertakes not to give non-ABM interceptor missiles, launchers, or radars "capabilities to counter strategic ballistic missiles or their elements in flight trajectory, and not to test them in an ABM mode...."

• **Issue:** The March 1987 report examined whether the Soviet Union has tested a SAM system or component in an ABM mode or given it the capability to counter strategic ballistic missiles or their elements in flight trajectory in violation of their legal obligation under the ABM Treaty. We have reexamined this issue.

• **Finding:** The U.S. Government reaffirms the judgment made in the March 1987 report that the evidence of Soviet actions with respect to SAM upgrade is insufficient to assess compliance with the Soviet Union's obligations under the ABM Treaty.

However, this and other ABM-related Soviet activities suggest that the U.S.S.R. may be preparing an ABM defense of its national territory.

## 5. Rapid Reload of ABM Launchers

• **Obligation:** The ABM Treaty limits to 100 the number of deployed ABM interceptor launchers and deployed interceptor missiles at launch sites. It does not limit the number of interceptor missiles that can be built and stockpiled. Paragraph 2, Article V, of the Treaty prohibits the development, testing, or deployment of "automatic or semi-automatic or other similar systems for rapid reload" of the permitted launchers.

• **Issue:** The March 1987 report examined whether the Soviet Union has developed, tested, or deployed automatic, semi-automatic, or other similar systems for rapid reload of ABM launchers in violation of its legal obligations under the ABM Treaty. We have reexamined this issue.

• **Finding:** The U.S. Government reaffirms the judgment made in the March 1987 report that, on the basis of the evidence available, the U.S.S.R.'s actions with respect to the rapid reload of ABM launchers constitute an ambiguous situation as concerns its legal obligations under the ABM Treaty not to develop systems for rapid reload. The Soviet Union's reload capabilities are a serious concern. These and other ABM-related Soviet activities suggest that the U.S.S.R. may be preparing an ABM defense of its national territory.

## 6. ABM Components at Gornel

• **Obligation:** To preclude the deployment of a territorial defense or providing the base for a territorial defense, the ABM Treaty provides that ABM components cannot be deployed outside of the one permitted ABM system deployment area or designated ABM test ranges for any purpose.

• **Issue:** In March 1987, the U.S. Government observed the appearance of major parts of the original Flat Twin radar, including all of the modular sections of the radar body, and a Pawn Shop van at an electronics plant in Gornel, about 550 kilometers southwest of Moscow. The timing of the arrival of parts of the Flat Twin and Pawn Shop indicates that they came from the radars that were removed from the Sary Shagan Missile Test Center where, by January 1987, the Soviets

were observed disassembling a number of these ABM components. U.S. concern regarding the issue of mobile ABM components previously raised with the Soviets could be exacerbated by this Soviet action.

• **Finding:** The U.S. Government finds that the U.S.S.R.'s activities with respect to moving a Flat Twin ABM radar and a Pawn Shop van, a component of an ABM system, from a test range and initiating deployment at a location outside of an ABM deployment area or ABM test range constitute a violation of the ABM Treaty. While it is not likely that the actions at Gornel are to support an ABM defense at that locality, deployment of such radars at Gornel to carry out any function is inconsistent with ABM Treaty obligations. This and other ABM-related Soviet activities suggest that the U.S.S.R. may be preparing an ABM defense of its national territory.

## 7. ABM Territorial Defense

• **Obligation:** The ABM Treaty and protocol allow each party a single deployment area, explicitly permit modernization and replacement of ABM systems or their components, and explicitly recognize the existence of ABM test ranges for the development and testing of ABM components. The ABM Treaty prohibits, however, the deployment of an ABM system for defense of the national territory of the parties and prohibits the parties from providing a base for such a defense.

• **Issue:** The March 1987 report examined whether the Soviets have deployed an ABM system for the defense of their territory or provided a base for such a defense. We have reexamined this issue.

• **Finding:** The U.S. Government reaffirms the judgment of the March 1987 report that the aggregate of the Soviet Union's ABM and ABM-related actions (e.g., radar construction, concurrent testing, SAM upgrade, ABM rapid reload, ABM mobility, and deployment of ABM components to Gornel) suggests that the U.S.S.R. may be preparing an ABM defense of its national territory.

## Biological Weapons Convention and 1925 Geneva Protocol

### Chemical, Biological and Toxin Weapons

• **Treaty Status:** The 1972 Biological and Toxin Weapons Convention and the 1925 Geneva Protocol are multilateral treaties to which both the United States and the Soviet Union are parties. Soviet action not in accord with these treaties and customary international law relating to the 1925 Geneva Protocol are violations of legal obligations.

• **Obligation:** The BWC bans the development, production, stockpiling, possession, and transfer of microbial or other biological toxins except for a small quantity for prophylactic, protective, or other peaceful purposes. It imposes the same obligations in relation to weapons, equipment, and means of delivery of agents or toxins. The 1925 Geneva Protocol and related rules of customary international law prohibit the use in war of asphyxiating, poisonous, or other gases and of all analogous liquids, materials, or devices and prohibits use of bacteriological methods of warfare.

• **Issue:** The March 1987 report examined whether the Soviets are in violation of provisions that ban the development, production, transfer, possession, and use of biological and toxin weapons and whether they have been responsible for the use of lethal chemicals. We have reexamined this issue.

• **Finding:** The U.S. Government judges that continued activity during 1987 at suspect biological and toxin weapon facilities in the Soviet Union, and reports that a Soviet BW program may now include investigation of new classes of BW agents, confirm the conclusion of the March 1987 report that the Soviet Union has maintained an offensive biological warfare program and capability in violation of its legal obligation under the Biological and Toxin Weapons Convention of 1972.

There have been no confirmed attacks with lethal chemicals or toxins in Cambodia, Laos, or Afghanistan in 1987 according to our strict standards of evidence. Nonetheless, there is no basis for amending the March 1987 conclusion that, prior to this time, the Soviet Union has been involved in the production, transfer, and use of trichothecene mycotoxins for hostile purposes in Laos, Cambodia, and Afghanistan in

## U.S., Canada Sign Free Trade Agreement

ulation of its legal obligation under international law as codified in the Geneva Protocol of 1925 and the Biological and Toxin Weapons Convention of 1972.

### Limited Test Ban Treaty

#### Underground Nuclear Test Venting

- **Treaty Status:** The Treaty Banning Nuclear Weapon Tests in the Atmosphere, in Outer Space and Underwater (Limited Test Ban Treaty) is a multilateral treaty that entered into force for the United States and the Soviet Union in 1963. Soviet actions not in accord with this treaty are violations of legal obligation.

- **Obligation:** The LTBT specifically prohibits nuclear explosions in the atmosphere, in outer space, and underwater. It also prohibits nuclear explosions in any other environment "if such explosions cause radioactive debris to present outside the territorial limits of the State under whose jurisdiction or control such explosion is conducted."

- **Issue:** The March 1987 report examined whether the U.S.S.R.'s underground nuclear tests have caused radioactive debris to be present outside of its territorial limits. We have reexamined this issue including evidence obtained since the Soviets resumed nuclear underground testing in February 1987.

- **Finding:** The U.S. Government affirms the judgment made in the March 1987 report that the Soviet Union's underground nuclear test practices resulted in the venting of radioactive matter on numerous occasions and caused radioactive matter to be present outside the Soviet Union's territorial limits in violation of its legal obligation under the Limited Test Ban Treaty. The Soviet Union failed to take the precautions necessary to minimize the contamination of man's environment by radioactive substances despite numerous U.S. demarches and requests for corrective action. This practice has continued. Since the resumption of Soviet underground testing in February 1987, the United States has presented demarches to the Soviet Union on two separate occasions when unambiguously attributable venting has occurred.

<sup>1</sup> Identical letters addressed to Jim Wright, Speaker of the House of Representatives, and George Bush, President of the Senate (text from Weekly Compilation of Presidential Documents of Dec. 7, 1987). ■

### PRESIDENT'S STATEMENT, JAN. 2, 1988<sup>1</sup>

I am pleased to announce that Prime Minister Mulroney and I have today entered into an agreement to establish a free trade arrangement between the United States and Canada.

In the truest sense, this is a historic agreement for both sides. We will strengthen what is already a deep friendship between our people by enhancing economic opportunities and creating jobs in both countries. Moreover, the agreement firmly establishes that the trade environment between the two countries will, in the future, be founded on the principle of free and open trade.

This comprehensive agreement will benefit many sectors of the U.S. economy. Canadian and American tariffs will be phased out completely, saving consumers hundreds of millions of dollars while also improving our export opportunities. It will secure access to Canada's market for American manufacturing, agriculture, financial services, and high technology; improve national security through energy sharing; and provide important investment opportunities. Canada will benefit from the agreement in many of these same ways; the pact is truly reciprocal. As the agreement goes into effect, Canada's access to our large domestic market will grow, and Canadian industrial centers will gain opportunities to develop even more important roles in the economy of North America.

The agreement to establish a free trade area has important international implications as well. It will encourage supporters of free trade throughout the world by demonstrating that governments can remove trade barriers even in the face of protectionist pressures. We hope that the U.S.-Canada example will help set the tone for the Uruguay Round of multilateral trade negotiations.

Our negotiations with the Canadian Government leading to this agreement incorporated advice from Congress, industry, agriculture, and labor. Our Congress, as well as the Canadian Parliament, will review the agreement fully over the next several months. As this process begins, both sides should

be mindful that the decisions they make will help shape the relationship between our countries in the years to come and will send a signal to the rest of the world.

The creation of the world's largest free trade area will be a mark of leadership and presents a historic opportunity to the United States and Canada. We must not let this opportunity slip from our grasp.

### WHITE HOUSE FACT SHEET, JAN. 2, 1988<sup>2</sup>

The United States and Canada have entered into a free trade agreement that, if approved and implemented, will take effect on January 1, 1989. The agreement will eliminate all tariffs on bilateral goods trade within 10 years of implementation; reduce nontariff trade barriers; establish principles for the conduct of bilateral trade in services; establish rules for the conduct of bilateral investment; resolve many outstanding bilateral trade issues; enhance the energy and national security of the two countries; facilitate business travel; and establish a timely bilateral dispute settlement mechanism.

#### Economic Implications

Each year the United States and Canada exchange more goods and services than any two countries in the world. Bilateral trade in goods and services exceeded \$150 billion in 1986.

The elimination of tariffs and most other barriers to trade between the two countries will increase economic growth, lower prices, expand employment, and enhance the competitiveness of both countries in the world marketplace.

#### Chronology of the Negotiation

**March 1985:** President Reagan and Prime Minister Mulroney asked their trade officials to explore ways to reduce and eliminate existing barriers to trade between the United States and Canada.

**September 26, 1985:** Prime Minister Mulroney formally requested that the United States and Canada examine the potential for negotiating a comprehensive free trade agreement.

**December 10, 1985:** President Reagan notified the Congress of his intent to enter into bilateral negotiations with Canada using "fast track" procedures.

**June 17, 1986:** U.S. and Canadian negotiators on the free trade area met for the first time in Ottawa.

**October 3, 1987:** President Reagan notified Congress of his intent to enter into a free trade agreement with Canada.

**December 9, 1987:** U.S. and Canadian negotiators initiated a final text of the agreement.

**January 2, 1988:** President Reagan and Prime Minister Mulroney signed the final text of the agreement.

### The "Fast Track"

Section 102 of the Trade Act of 1974 authorizes the President to enter into bilateral free trade agreements and to have the Congress approve them on a "fast track" basis. Section 102 authority expires at midnight on January 2, 1988.

In order for a bilateral agreement to qualify for "fast track" consideration, several conditions must be met.

- The negotiation must be requested by the foreign country.
- The President must notify the House Ways and Means and Senate Finance Committees of the negotiations, giving them 60 legislative days in which to disapprove.
- The President must notify the Congress of his intent to enter into an agreement 90 days before doing so.

After entering into an agreement, the President must submit it to Congress, along with a draft implementing bill, a statement of any administrative action proposed to implement the agreement, an explanation of how the bill or statement changes or affects existing law, and a statement of reasons why the agreement serves the interests of U.S. commerce and why the bill and proposed action are required and appropriate.

The implementing bill is introduced in both Houses of Congress on the day it is submitted and is referred to the committees of jurisdiction. House committees have 45 days in which the House is in session to report the bill; they are discharged automatically from further consideration after that period. The House votes within 15 days in session after the measure has been received from the House committees.

After receiving the bill from the House, the Senate committees have 15 days in which the Senate is in session to report the bill; they are discharged automatically from further consideration after that period. The Senate votes within 15 days in session after the measure has been received from the Senate committees.

Amendments to the bill are not in order. A simple majority of each House is required for approval.

<sup>1</sup>Text from Weekly Compilation of Presidential Documents of Jan. 11, 1988.

<sup>2</sup>Text from White House press release. ■

## Indonesia: Entering the 1990s

by *Gaston J. Sigur, Jr.*

*Address before the American-Indonesian Chamber of Commerce "Day in Washington" on December 17, 1987. Mr. Sigur is Assistant Secretary for East Asian and Pacific Affairs.*

It is my pleasure to address, here in the Benjamin Franklin State Dining Room at the State Department, distinguished guests who contribute to our ties with Asia's third largest nation, Indonesia. I would like, in particular, to thank the American-Indonesian Chamber of Commerce, which promotes economic and commercial ties with Indonesia, and the Asia Society, which has long fostered cultural and educational bonds between our two societies, for the opportunity to address you today.

Earlier this year I visited Indonesia, where I had informative and productive meetings with President Suharto and his senior aides. I have also met this year with Indonesian leaders at the Association of South East Asian Nations' (ASEAN) postministerial conference in Singapore, at the UN General Assembly sessions, and here in Washington. Today I intend to share with you some thoughts on recent developments in Indonesia, Indonesia's future prospects, and the outlook for our bilateral relations.

To place my remarks in a broader context, a few words about trends in the region might be helpful.

### Asia-Pacific

Many scholars and businessmen have called this the age of the Pacific. Certainly we can agree that the stability and remarkable prosperity of most countries in the Asia-Pacific region have contributed to a broader and deeper American interest in the region. In the past decade, East and Southeast Asia have surpassed all other regions in

GNP [gross national product] growth and increased international trade. At the beginning of this decade, our total trade with this region surpassed that with Europe, and the gap has since continued to widen.

One consequence of stability and economic development in Asia in the past few decades has been a fundamental change in our perceptions of East Asians and, perhaps, in their perceptions of themselves. We sometimes forget that only 50 years ago, Asians were widely alleged to be fatalistic. Life was to be endured; tomorrow would be much the same as today. These ideas now appear quaint. The idea that the individual can influence his own destiny and make a difference in the evolution of his society is as much a feature of modern Asian as of American thought.

In my view, one consequence of economic development and, if you will, perceptual change has been a growth in the demand for increased freedom of choice. Freedom of choice, in turn, implies opportunities to participate in decisions affecting people's lives. These rising expectations are, quite naturally, often first expressed in economic terms. Market-oriented, flexible, and open economies, which provide citizens with options, are best suited to promote economic growth and best meet new expectations. Not surprisingly, we have seen that East Asia's free-market economies have been immensely successful.

### Indonesia: Early Success But Mixed Picture

Indonesia, of course, has a unique history, culture, and political system. As many of you know, since World War II Indonesia has passed through a series of wrenching changes, including the struggle for independence, the economic collapse and internal disarray of the late Sukarno era, and finally, stability and growing prosperity under the

leadership of President Suharto. His fundamental accomplishments in the past two decades have been to forge a consensus, in accordance with Indonesia's traditions of compromise and discussion, on a remarkably stable social and political system and a strong record of economic progress.

This stability has been essential for progress not just in Indonesia but in the region. On assuming power, President Suharto reconstructed close relations with Indonesia's neighbors. His commitment to ASEAN over the past 15 years has been indispensable to the success of this organization. ASEAN, in turn, has made a direct contribution to stability in the region as a whole.

In the search for domestic stability, President Suharto emphasized economic liberalization, food self-sufficiency, and infrastructure development. Boosted by booming petroleum revenues, this approach paid off, with 7%-8% percent annual growth rates in the 1970s and early 80s. As a consequence, Indonesians enjoyed greatly enhanced access to economic opportunity, health care, and education. However, the development policies Indonesia could afford in an era of high petroleum prices—an emphasis on the public sector led growth and major reliance on import substitution—are no longer appropriate or even possible. Indeed, since 1982 Indonesia has faced a new and less hospitable international economic environment and, therefore, a new challenge—to find new ways to promote economic dynamism while maintaining stability.

Unfortunately, as a result of earlier economic policies, businessmen in Indonesia, both domestic and foreign, have had to cope with an assortment of trade and industrial monopolies, a plethora of licensing requirements, and other bureaucratic barriers that discourage competition and investment, as well as initiative and entrepreneurship. Indonesians, moreover, have paid a heavy price for this type of regulation and protectionism; what they correctly call the "high cost economy" has severely disadvantaged Indonesia's manufacturers and placed a significant burden on the Indonesian consumer. Indonesians are increasingly aware of the fact that their country is at a crossroads; both to manage immediate economic problems and, in the 1990s, to proceed to the next stage of development, Indonesia will have to significantly reduce its reliance on the export of primary products, particularly petroleum, and reform the rules that now govern its economic life.

It will need to develop a competitive policy environment; one that does not hide behind external barriers or tolerate massive government interference in the private sector. This approach, in our view, will also help meet inevitable demands for economic opportunity and contribute to meeting calls for freedom of choice. Fortunately, President Suharto's government has been moving in precisely the right direction.

### Policy Response

It is important to recognize that, for over 20 years, President Suharto has demonstrated that he is, above all, pragmatic about Indonesia's needs. He knows that economic growth is fundamental to Indonesia's stability and "national resilience." In keeping with this conviction, his government has already undertaken a series of impressive and by now well-known adjustments, including:

- Austere budgets for the past several years;
- Beginning in 1983, a decision to scale back large, capital intensive import substitution projects;
- A major tax reform;
- Currency devaluations in 1983, and most recently in September 1986;
- Elimination of export subsidies through accession to the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT) subsidies code;
- Simplified customs procedures—in 1985, the government replaced an inefficient customs service with an SGS [Societe Generale de Surveillance] contract; this contract has just been extended for 3 years to allow time for development of a cleaner, more efficient customs service;
- The May and October 1986 trade and investment packages, which liberalized the import of inputs for manufacturers, reduced some tariffs, and granted foreign investors more equal treatment with domestic investors;
- New trade measures announced on January 15, 1987, which focused on simplification of licensing procedures for trade and investment and the reduction of nontariff barriers, particularly on inputs for export-oriented industries; and
- Intellectual property protection; Indonesia recently addressed the sensitive intellectual property issue through amendments to its copyright law, and we anticipate parliamentary consideration of a new patent law soon.

And the process continues. Economic Coordinating Minister Wardhana recently promised another package of measures to further deregulate trade and industry before the end of the year. Announcement of this package is expected momentarily.

### Meeting the Challenge

**Economic.** As a result of these reforms and slowly recovering petroleum prices, the Indonesian economy has picked up in the past year. Real GDP [gross domestic product] growth may, in fact, reach 4% in 1987.

A particularly encouraging development is the growth of nonpetroleum exports, which have topped \$700 million a month recently and should surpass petroleum and gas exports in the future. If evidence is needed for the efficacy of Indonesia's economic development strategy, these major improvements provide it.

It is true that any country's economic transition must proceed at a pace consistent with harmony and stability and, in Indonesia's case, in keeping with Indonesia's tradition of accommodation, compromise, and consensus building. Nevertheless, the reform effort, off to an impressive start, must continue, and conflicting signals must be avoided. It should be remembered that Indonesia will not reap the full benefits of prudent, far-sighted policy changes for several years. Unfortunately, now that the price of petroleum has recovered from its 1986 low point, arguments to slow the process of economic reform are beginning to surface. We believe these arguments are shortsighted and, given the prospect of rising domestic petroleum consumption, eventually dangerous. To meet the challenge, the pace of trade and policy reform must not flag.

On another front—investment—I think you will agree that policies need to be open, stable, and predictable. Foreign investors simply can't be expected to invest when policies are vague or involve government privilege for particular individuals or groups. Unfortunately, a recent survey of foreign investors in Indonesia by the ASEAN-U.S. business council still found the overall climate unfavorable in comparison with other countries in the region. This, along with the highly competitive environment for investment, may help explain why U.S. investment in Indonesia has leveled off in recent years. And investment is crucial.

Foreign equity investment can significantly reduce Indonesia's need to borrow from the international financial market and thus ease the country's debt servicing requirements in future years.

I should also point out that economic recovery in Indonesia will increase domestic consumption of Indonesia's petroleum. Because of the inevitable time-lag in exploration, development, and production from new petroleum finds, additional exploration for petroleum and gas through renewal of production-sharing contracts needs, in particular, to be strongly encouraged. We hope, therefore, that this will be an early priority for the Government of Indonesia in 1988.

**Social/Political.** As economic reform continues, over the next 5 years, we may also see less measurable and immediately apparent, but nonetheless significant, social and political developments. We believe President Suharto shares our view that constructive forms of public participation can contribute to the stability and welfare of the country. President Suharto has certainly set the stage for the future. Under his leadership, the government has assured religious tolerance, which in turn guarantees fundamental choices for the people and minimizes a potentially divisive political issue. The President's "new order" government has also forged a sense of Indonesian identity, thus submerging the separatist tendencies that once threatened to sunder the nation.

With these foundations in place, there are now indications that the government is encouraging political and social institutions which may permit greater popular participation in the future. One sign of this trend was this year's national election, which saw strong participation, both in the campaign and at the ballot box, and greater openness to the discussion of issues. Indonesians generally believe that the Indonesian Armed Forces adopted a more neutral stance than in the past and that all election contestants enjoyed greater opportunities for participation. More recently, we have been told that the various political groups in parliament are more active and involved in the legislative process.

A continuation of institution-building, whether this involves recognized "political parties" or rapidly growing nongovernmental organizations, is important as a means to provide opportunities for constructive involvement by

as many Indonesians as possible in decisions affecting their lives. As noted earlier, further developments will have to be compatible with Indonesia's heritage. Broader participation in the social and political processes of the country through recognized institutions will help answer those natural demands for participation that so often accompany economic development.

### U.S. Relations

In my opinion, our relationship with Indonesia is on a sound footing. There are few significant differences and many areas of mutual interest and productive cooperation. The agenda of bilateral discourse includes the launching of Indonesia's satellites, the sale of the first supercomputer to a developing state, the transfer of advanced fighter aircraft, and mutually beneficial scientific and technological exchanges. There is, moreover, room for the expansion of cooperation in increasingly sophisticated areas.

Over the next 5 years, our bilateral relationship with Indonesia is likely to become more mature, as benefits relations between two stable, self-reliant nations, and increasingly focused on critical economic issues.

As the relationship matures, certain traditional patterns in our bilateral relations are bound to adjust. For example, our worldwide security assistance programs are under intense budgetary pressure. Thus, although we have every intention of continuing to provide an essential security shield for the noncommunist countries of Southeast Asia, we may be compelled to continue to reduce traditional bilateral security assistance.

In the same vein, I should point out that since 1973 traditional economic assistance for Asia as a whole has declined by over 65%. Since Indonesia's independence, we have provided \$3.4 billion in traditional economic assistance. Our commitment to contribute to Indonesia's economic growth remains firm, but, with stable or falling levels of economic assistance, the means we use to help foster such growth will have to be more appropriate and creative. Increasingly, we expect to shift from traditional Agency for International Development (AID) projects toward a more sophisticated mix of economic policy dialogue, with emphasis on the role of the private sector, training and education, and science and technology cooperation.

Trade will continue to be an important component of our relationship. Our exports to Indonesia were just under \$ billion last year, and we took almost an equal amount of Indonesia's non-oil exports. In 1985, the United States took twice as much of Indonesia's processed goods as Japan. The United States absorbs over half of Indonesia's textile exports and more of Indonesia's plywood and veneer exports than Japan and the European Economic Community (EEC) combined. Despite rising protectionist sentiment in the United States, we continue to be, by a wide margin, the most open market in the world for manufacturing exports from developing countries. Although, as Secretary Shultz has noted, we can't sustain the level of imports of the past few years, we will continue to resist protectionism in the United States because it's in our own long-term interest to do so.

We expect Indonesia, in turn, to continue to open its economy to rational economic competition and foreign investment, primarily in the interests of its own efficiency and growth. As Indonesia opens up, all of us will have mutual interest in capitalizing on opportunities for Indonesia to obtain investment, technology, and management know-how and access to international markets. Indonesia thus has a fundamental interest in improving its investment climate. In this regard, as I mentioned earlier, intellectual property protection is critically important. Fortunately, on this sensitive subject, headway has already been made. In September 1987, Indonesia strengthened its copyright protection through amendments to its law, and we hope for similar progress on patents.

In the future, Indonesian-U.S. relations will increasingly involve the private sectors of both countries. You, the representatives of the U.S. private sector, will thus come to play a more prominent role in our bilateral relations. Your actions will, of course, be deeply influenced by Indonesia's commitment to deregulation of its economy. We believe this commitment will also encourage greater public participation a goal we support in its own right and for the stability and national resilience to which it will contribute in Indonesia.

### Conclusion

As my remarks today suggest, I am basically confident about Indonesia's future and the prospects for our bilateral relationship. The trends are positive.

future is not without perils, but Indonesia's reaction to the difficult economic environment of the past 5 years is impressive. We in the U.S. Government will do our part to advance mutual interests, often in more mature and sophisticated ways, but we realize she has largely up to the Indonesian Government to promote economic and trade reform. This reform is, in our view, es-

sential for continued growth, stability, and, increasingly, for private U.S.-Indonesian relations. With continued progress and attention to the accommodation of popular aspirations, I look forward, in the 1990s, to a more open and dynamic Indonesia, which will have progressively assumed a higher international profile commensurate with its size, population, and development. ■

## Recent Developments in the Philippines

*David F. Lambertson*

*Statement before the Subcommittee on Asian and Pacific Affairs of the House Foreign Affairs Committee on September 2, 1987. Mr. Lambertson is Deputy Assistant Secretary for East Asian and Pacific Affairs.*

Thank you for providing me with this opportunity to review with you recent developments in the Philippines. You and your colleagues in Congress have played a key role in reinforcing the Administration's strong support for President Aquino and her government. We value this cooperation and look forward to working with you in a concerted effort to help the Philippines meet its continuing needs.

I recently returned from Manila where I met with government and military officials, political figures, and community leaders. I continue to be impressed by the progress President Aquino is making at consolidating her political position in the face of formidable odds and by the depth of popular support for her and for democracy in the Philippines.

I am particularly pleased to appear with my Defense Department colleague, Karl Jackson, to dispel unfounded allegations that our two agencies do not share the same policy in the Philippines.

We have one Philippine policy—as underscored by President Reagan in his radio address November 7 and supported by Congress as well as the Administration. The policy of the U.S. Government toward the Philippines has been stated repeatedly and emphatically: we fully support President Aquino and the government she heads and the revitalized democratic process she has overseen. We are unalterably opposed to any attempts to destabilize her government.

In his radio address, President Reagan declared that "... Filipino democracy and President Aquino have America's full support ... we have a moral obligation to help all democracies succeed ... We will work with President Aquino to build a safer home for democracy in the Philippines. Most of the responsibility belongs to the people of the Philippines, but we can and will lend a hand."

### Restoration of Democratic Institutions

Moreover, the democratic institutions restored by President Aquino are functioning well. The new Congress is fully operating as the legislative body it was designed to be. Like this Congress, its members joined together to choose leaders, form committees, agree on parliamentary rules, hold hearings, and pass legislation. In addition, the Senate is now debating the House-passed budget. The institutional revival of a free and independent legislative branch after the absence of such a body for 15 years represents a major accomplishment.

The next crucial step in the process of restoring democratic institutions is the holding of local elections scheduled for January 1988. These elections will restore democratically elected local government, thereby providing an improved foundation to the revitalized Philippine democracy.

I observed first-hand the widespread interest in these elections during my recent visit to the Philippines. A large number of candidates will hotly contest elections for some 16,500 local government positions, including governors; city and municipal mayors; and provincial, city, and municipal boards. We anticipate that democratically elected, legitimate local leaders will be more responsive to local interests and better able to counter the influence of the insurgents.

### Executive Cohesion and Initiative

Since I last testified before the [Senate] Foreign Relations Asia-Pacific Subcommittee in mid-September, President Aquino has moved forcefully to deal with the problems her government faces and to continue the process of rebuilding democracy. She improved her Administration's teamwork and cohesion by reshuffling her cabinet. Palace paperflow apparently moves more smoothly, thereby facilitating rapid decisionmaking. Communication between the executive and legislative branches has improved since the August 28 coup attempt. The President is taking a more active role in leading the Congress to enact important legislation such as the military pay hike.

Her personal attention has also resulted in intensified efforts to address bottlenecks in the Philippines' foreign aid pipeline. President Aquino has decided to endorse candidates in the January local elections and is moving to compile a strong slate.

On October 20, President Aquino delivered to the business community what has been characterized as the most forceful, well-crafted speech of her presidency. She squarely confronted critics who doubted her ability to survive by exhibiting her determination to take charge. A reliable poll showed her performance rating in Manila rose from 66% to 77% immediately after this widely praised speech.

The President set out a checklist of issues upon which progress could be judged. She promised to deal with the problem of poor industrial relations and illegal strikes; almost immediately illegal barricades were removed, guidelines were issued for countering illegal strikes, and a tripartite council to improve industrial relations was formed. She revitalized her government's policy of privatization of government assets; the largest debt-to-equity conversion yet (the acquisition by the First Bank of Boston of part of Combank) is now going forward. In response to her pledges on the delivery of public services, garbage has been cleared, potholes filled, and a mechanism to improve telephone service implemented.

The President pledged to redouble her government's efforts to combat the communist insurgency; after her speech she gave limited endorsement to citizens' self-defense groups in Davao and took a tough stand on urban terrorism by authorizing police sweeps. A recent AFP [Armed Forces of the Philippines] operation resulted in the arrest of Juanito Rivera, a member of the cen-

tral committee and one of the founders of the outlawed Communist Party of the Philippines (CPP).

On November 14, President Aquino gave an impressive first progress report on government activity since October 20. She put further pressure on profitable government-owned companies such as the National Steel Corporation and the Manila Hotel to privatize by threatening to turn them over to the respected Asset Privatization Trust unless they prepared net asset valuation within 60 days.

### The Military and Self-Defense Groups

Concerning the insurgency, President Aquino noted that the government has become more active in the counterinsurgency and that "... the communist foe has predictably responded by escalating its terrorist activities. This is the price of vigorous action on our part. We must be ready to pay it."

The Philippine Government continues to face tremendous problems. Obviously there are still problems within the Armed Forces of the Philippines where some officers are uncomfortable with military and civilian leaders. President Aquino is attempting to alleviate military grievances but has only limited resources to bring to bear. The President has reached out to the armed forces and increased dialogue with them on the problems they face. She proposed and the Philippine Congress has acted on a major military pay increase to take effect imminently. She has visited regions such as Davao and Bulacan where close civil-military cooperation has led to progress in the counterinsurgency campaign. We anticipate that she will continue to demonstrate her concern by meeting with officers and enlisted men.

Late last month, the Philippine Government drafted guidelines which will regulate anticommunist self-defense groups alleged to have committed violations of human rights. These guidelines provide that weapons will be carried only by members already authorized to bear arms and that those members who commit human rights abuses will be prosecuted to the full extent of the law. Local civilian and military authorities are tasked with monitoring these groups and providing them with the supervision and training necessary to discharge their legitimate self-defense function. Our Embassy in Manila continues to investigate specific allegations of abuse which have been brought to our attention.

### The Communist Insurgency

The communist insurgency continues to pose a serious, long-term problem which is compounded by the difficulties facing the Armed Forces of the Philippines. A recent shift in New People's Army (NPA) tactics to greater use of criminal terrorist acts—including urban violence in Manila, economic sabotage, and targeting of foreigners—has resulted in an increase in violent insurgency-related incidents. Some 85 police and military personnel in Manila have been killed by communist terrorist assassination squads this year, including 12 in one recent week.

Satur Ocampo, chief spokesman of the Communist National Democratic Front, has now admitted communist terrorists were responsible for the October 28 killings of American servicemen outside of Clark Air Base. Ocampo stated that the military wing of the Communist Party, the NPA, has now "targeted" U.S. citizens in the Philippines who are involved in the Philippine Government's counterinsurgency effort. Communist culpability in the killings at Clark indicates a significant shift in their insurgency strategy. Over the years, communist gunmen have avoided confrontations with U.S. servicemen. Undoubtedly their objective is to create tension, foster instability, and, thereby, weaken U.S. support for President Aquino.

The communists in Mindanao have placed increasing pressure on U.S. companies in recent months. Early in November, small explosions occurred at two U.S. companies in Mindanao, but no injuries or property damage was reported. On November 20, communist insurgents attacked two U.S.-owned fruit packing plants in northern Mindanao causing an estimated \$250,000 in damage. There were no casualties in the attacks which occurred at night. Security around U.S. corporations has been tightened following these incidents.

This violence against innocent people suggests that the Communist Party may have abandoned its strategy of gaining influence through legitimate means (the so-called parliamentary struggle) in favor of a more hard-line destabilization policy of using increased terrorism to achieve its objective of attaining power. There is evidence in some areas, particularly in Mindanao, that communist terrorism has had the opposite effect, resulting in eventual loss of their mass base in a number of locales.

We deeply deplore terrorist violence in the Philippines which has led to the loss of innocent American and Filipino lives. We take seriously any threats against the safety of U.S. citizens in the Philippines and have advised Americans to be alert to the potential danger and take appropriate security precautions.

As we have not changed our policy in other parts of the world because of terrorist attacks, we will not alter our policy of support for the Philippines now because of the murder of the U.S. citizens outside of Clark Air Base. Our resolve will not be shaken by cowardly, terrorist acts. The Reagan Administration remains firmly committed to the Philippines and the democratic government President Aquino heads.

Demonstrating that unwavering commitment is even more important in the aftermath of the Clark shootings, President Aquino's presence at the memorial service for the murdered airmen was a particularly poignant gesture which demonstrated her compassion and concern for all victims of terrorism—Filipino or American. The terrorists in the Philippines hope to drive a wedge between the Aquino government and us. They must understand that terrorism will only serve to bring us closer together. We will continue to be responsive to requests for help in the Philippine Government's efforts to restore peace and order and put an end to the violence that undermines economic recovery.

### Expanding Economy

Despite the shocks to business confidence from the August 28 coup attempt and the resurgence of communist terrorism in the country, the Philippine economy continues to expand. We expect about 5% real growth this year. There is no question, however, that the destabilizing events of August took their toll. Trade Secretary Concepcion recently told me that inquiries at the Government of the Philippines' one-stop investment center fell 50% in September from the average of previous months. They have now returned to normal levels. There was also evidence of some capital flight in early September when the difference between the unofficial and the official exchange rates for the peso grew to 7%. There currently no indication of significant capital flight. Following the killings at Clark, company attendance at the U.S. Department of Commerce-sponsored



Phil Trade Show dropped dramatically from the anticipated level. However, the Euromoney conference in Manila in mid-November drew virtually who had registered.

### 5. Assistance Under Review

light of still urgent development and financial needs and the acute needs of Philippine Armed Forces, we are currently reviewing our assistance program for the Philippines. We are also speeding up deliveries of military equipment and looking at what we can do to make existing economic assistance programs more effective. During his recent visit to the Philippines, Under Secretary [for Political Affairs] Michael H. Armacost announced the expedited release of \$75 million in U.S. economic support funds (ESF) grant-in-aid-of-payment support assistance. We have asked the Congress to make additional resources available to the Philippine military immediately by converting \$29.6 million in previously appropriated credits for military equipment sales to grant assistance. The Administration is also moving now to determine the size and content of FY 1988 food commodity assistance to the Philippines.

In this review, we are looking at what should be done beyond the already substantial assistance program we have sought for FY 1988. We wish to do more but also must remember that even programs for high priority countries like the Philippines must be consistent with budgetary constraints. There is a need for a multiyear program aimed at the economic recovery of the country. Ideally, this would also be a multilateral effort. We will continue consulting closely with you as we proceed. I believe that you are aware of the Administration position that any additional assistance to the Philippines would have to be new money since the existing foreign assistance monies are already stretched to the limit.

Our Philippine policy involves more than foreign assistance. We are pleased with congressional recognition of the need for a sustained diplomatic effort to assist the Philippines and will be seeking to expand our already extensive efforts in that regard. Under Secretary Armacost's and Assistant Secretary [for East Asian and Pacific Affairs] Gaston J. Sigur's recent trips to Japan are part of this effort. We continue to urge friends and allies to cooperate with us in increasing assistance,

in opening markets, and in encouraging increased private-sector investment in that country.

In that regard, the recently announced Japanese 14th yen loan package for the Philippines includes new commitments of some \$572 million, in long-term, low-interest money for Philippine commodity purchases and development projects. We welcome this major commitment of resources by the Japanese Government to Philippine economic recovery and hope that other democratic governments will emulate this example.

### Conclusion

The Philippine Government embodies the aspirations of the Philippine people for the restoration of democratic in-

stitutions and the rekindling of economic growth. We share Philippine aspirations of promoting freedom and reviving the economy. Although it continues to face formidable challenges, the Philippine Government, under the leadership of its President, has made significant progress in just over 1½ years. Our commitment to the Philippines remains unshaken. We must continue to do whatever we can to assist the Philippines keep firmly on the path to stable democracy and sustained economic development.

<sup>1</sup>The complete transcript of the hearings will be published by the committee and will be available from the Superintendent of Documents, U.S. Government Printing Office, Washington, D.C. 20402. ■

## Export Control Policy and COCOM

by E. Allan Wendt

*Following are a statement before the Subcommittee on International Economic Policy and Trade of the House Foreign Affairs Committee on November 3, 1987, and an address before the Conference on Strategic Export Controls sponsored by the Royal Institute of International Affairs at Chatham House in London on November 19. Mr. Wendt is Senior Representative for Strategic Technology Policy.*

NOVEMBER 3, 1987<sup>1</sup>

Thank you for the opportunity to appear before this subcommittee to discuss the status of the multilateral effort to control exports of strategically significant commodities and technologies in international trade.

### Strengthening Multilateral Export Controls

For several years, the United States has sought to strengthen COCOM [Coordinating Committee for Multilateral Security Export Controls]—the multilateral system that safeguards the transfer of strategic technology. We have been working to clarify and prune the embargo lists, particularly the one that controls items with both civil and military applications. At the same time,

we have worked to strengthen the procedures by which these items are controlled. We have pursued both activities on a multilateral basis, and progress has been made.

A process is now underway both to review the entire control list for those items that no longer need to be controlled and to ensure that the control list, once purged of such items, continues to focus only on those items that are most critical militarily. This is not an "instant" decontrol activity, but rather, an accelerated review of all items on the control list in cooperation with our partners in COCOM, whereby the strategic concerns that warranted the inclusion of an item on the list are carefully reviewed and evaluated.

We have also been engaged in a parallel effort to improve the administration and enforcement of the controls. The United States and many of its allies have made significant progress in improving our national control systems and multilateral coordination of export controls. But, clearly, more needs to be done.

The illegal sale of multi-axis milling machines by Toshiba Machine Company and Kongsberg Trading Company clearly demonstrates that there are gaps. The United States and its COCOM partners face a determined Soviet effort to acquire militarily significant technologies and goods. This effort has sought to exploit the various differences in national export control sys-

tems, many of which were, unfortunately, based on outdated legislation or informal administrative arrangements. Resources needed to administer the export licensing system and enforce laws and regulations were also lacking in many places. Acknowledging the gaps, the Governments of Japan and Norway have taken major steps to strengthen their national export control and enforcement systems, including increases in penalties for violations and in the statutes of limitations governing prosecution. We welcome these measures.

Just as the Governments of Japan and Norway have moved quickly to remedy shortcomings in their control systems, we believe that all members of COCOM, including the United States, need to review their systems and meet certain minimum control standards. Building on the July special COCOM meeting, we have consulted with our allies in recent weeks on how COCOM can be strengthened further. These consultations are continuing this week and beyond.

#### New U.S. Initiative

Last month, the United States outlined a new initiative in export control policies and practices to a number of our COCOM partners. The initiative calls for a major revitalization of COCOM, based on improved public understanding of its objectives and on a common, standard level of effective protection for all exports of controlled strategic commodities, with a view to eventual elimination of licensing of dual-use commodities among COCOM countries once all have reached an adequate level of export control outside the COCOM community.

Based on our consultations with seven of our COCOM partners, I am impressed by their high-level commitment to improve COCOM and their national control systems. The countries I visited, with my colleagues from the Departments of Commerce and Defense and the U.S. Customs Service, had already begun to review their own national systems; without exception, those countries have taken or are planning to take specific steps, ranging from increased resources for licensing and enforcement, to upgrading the legal basis for administration and enforcement, to stiffer penalties and fines for violations, to longer statutes of limitation. Of course, we must reserve judgment on the impact of these efforts pending concrete results.

I want to emphasize that these countries are taking these steps because they have concluded that it is in their own national interest to do so. They also recognize that our common security is indivisible and will be strengthened by such improvements.

Our allies in COCOM have concluded, as we have, that only a multilateral approach to export controls is truly effective in safeguarding our mutual security. They believe that a threat to punish allies and friends for shortcomings in their control regimes is counterproductive to this multilateral approach. We agree, and that is why the administration opposes legislation mandating sanctions for export control violations in other countries.

In addition to improving our individual and collective export control efforts, we also see benefits from implementing certain common principles and minimum standards for licensing and enforcement. Specifically, we are thinking of reducing and eventually eliminating the licensing on exports of controlled dual-use goods among COCOM countries. Such an eventuality, combined with our parallel efforts to focus and streamline the dual-use list, would result in a significant reduction of the burden to all COCOM countries' industries engaged in West-West trade in general and among COCOM countries in particular. Our partners in COCOM are receptive to such a "license-free zone" concept and are studying it further.

#### Improving Public Awareness

One of the problems we face is that, because of the complexity of export control systems, our general public does not know very much about our export control program, especially its purpose and specific objectives. The only time people hear about export controls is when the media cover some spectacular illegal sale or diversion of sensitive equipment. It is ironic that the Soviets may be far better informed about our control system than is the U.S. public.

This is a situation that is not unique to the United States. We believe there should be increased public awareness of the purpose and goals of our control system and COCOM. I can tell you that this is a sensitive subject with some of our COCOM partners. They agree that COCOM's purpose, objectives, and basic information necessary for implementing controls must be better understood. At the same time, they view sensational "publicity" on in-

dividual cases, policy determinations, and occasional violations as counterproductive to their efforts to exert effective control.

#### Conclusion

In closing, I would like to point out that improvement of export control licensing and enforcement is not a new issue with our COCOM partners. Indeed, a lot of progress has been made in the past few years on a multilateral basis. We have stressed to our allies—and they agree—that a "business as usual" approach to COCOM is not in our security interest, either individually or collectively. We will be consulting with our partners over the next months on further steps that all members of COCOM can take, individually and collectively, to close the gaps in our control regimes.

NOVEMBER 19, 1987

I am pleased to have this opportunity to address this audience on an important topic—export control policy and COCOM. In my remarks today, I would like to describe what I believe to be a need for some changes in Western export control policies and briefly introduce a new U.S. initiative to reduce the burden of export controls while providing tighter security for truly sensitive goods and technology.

The recent Toshiba/Kongsberg incident demonstrates clearly that all is not well with COCOM or the overall Western effort to control sensitive strategic technology. As you are aware, in the case of Toshiba and Kongsberg, two leading Western firms with important defense contracts willfully violated the laws of their countries and provided a Soviet naval shipyard with the means mass-produce extremely quiet submarine propellers. Recent history has also brought other examples to light. The diversion of equipment that allowed the Soviets to build more accurate ICBMs [intercontinental ballistic missiles] and to develop a look-down/shoot-down radar seriously complicated allied defense planning. The resulting damage to our mutual security can only be repaired at great cost—a cost, I might add, that is far greater than the relatively trivial profits realized by the companies participating in these illegal sales or diversions.

It is time to put an end to this disregard for the rule of law and for our collective security. Companies must u

stand that their responsibility for their products does not end when a product is shipped, but rather, each must ensure that sensitive products reach responsible end-users. Comments about the length and complexity of the control lists are not an excuse for inaction. Those who undermine international security and violate export control laws and regulations endanger lives and well-being. They should be treated as criminals and imprisoned.

### Challenges Facing COCOM

Fundamental changes are required in the way strategic export control policy is handled by the West. First and foremost, political and business leaders and the general public must understand and support the policy of denying sensitive weapons and technology to proscribed nations. The public must also understand and have confidence in the institutions chosen to execute the policy. The policy of treating COCOM as a semisecret organization has effectively worked against building public support for COCOM.

COCOM, as you know, is the primary framework through which Western nations control exports of strategic goods. To be understood, it must be viewed in a similar light to NATO. It was created during the same time period as NATO, and its basic rationale is that members of the Western alliance face a common threat from the Warsaw Pact. Therefore, they must prevent exports of strategic goods and technology that would increase the threat. A second important objective was to keep our national defense spending at the lowest possible level in order to allow us to provide the maximum of social benefits to our societies. It is important to note, although there have been a number of shifts in East-West relations, this fundamental belief has never been seriously questioned.

COCOM has, by and large, actually done its job reasonably well over the years, especially in the area of munitions and atomic energy controls. Unfortunately, the past 15 years have seen the rise of several problems that neither COCOM nor members of the partnership have adequately responded to.

- The first is the emergence of the Italian sector as the dominant market for leading-edge technologies, thereby increasing the importance of the dual-control list and greatly expanding the reach of export controls to the average ordinary civilian exporter.

- Second is the rapid diffusion of high technology throughout the world. This means that efforts in COCOM to control many items will put firms of member countries at a competitive disadvantage if certain Third World countries do not cooperate or if COCOM member countries do not operate their control systems in harmony.

- Third, COCOM members increasingly see high technology as the key to future economic growth and competitiveness. No country or firm can countenance falling behind in high-technology industries. This fierce competitiveness will continue, and it is essential that our governments ensure that a level playing field exists for all members of COCOM.

- Finally, the Soviets have also recognized the importance of COCOM and have been willing to expend considerable effort and resources to circumvent the controls in order to facilitate cost-effective development of weapons for their military apparatus. The Soviet effort in its current form had its genesis 10-15 years ago, when the Soviets concluded that higher quality weapons were needed to accomplish their military objectives. To gain access to what was needed, the Soviets organized a massive, persistent, and centrally directed acquisition effort. A number of means have been employed, from illegal acquisition to espionage. These acquisitions save the Soviets money, cut lead times in development, and allow the Soviets to use their technical resources more efficiently.

If we are to meet the challenges facing COCOM today, we need tough national laws, adequate resources for licensing and enforcement, and strong political commitment. In a democratic society, this requires public knowledge and support of COCOM and a national effort to support COCOM agreements. It is clearly time to quit treating COCOM as a semisecret organization and inform the public on a major question of national policy.

### Enforcing Effective Export Control Systems

COCOM, however, is only as strong as the member countries' export control systems. I regret to say that recent events have made it clear that many countries do not have in place an export control system adequate to enforce the COCOM agreements effectively, particularly in the face of a determined and well-financed Soviet effort to acquire controlled items. Some countries appar-

ently rely almost entirely on the honesty of commercial firms. Our experience tells us that the problem is not with the vast majority of firms, who will not tolerate illegal activities on the part of their employees, but rather, with the highly profitable cottage industry of illegal diverters who will traffic in almost any strategic good or technology that will produce a profit.

In our view, a minimum export control system must be backed by the full force of a public law. Each member country should treat the issue as a national security matter rather than an economic irregularity; it should provide severe and frequently applied criminal penalties; it should have adequate resources for licensing and enforcement; and it should publish the control lists in the national language for all exporters.

I am pleased to say that all members of COCOM are now focusing on the need for stepped-up enforcement efforts in the wake of the Toshiba/Kongsberg revelations and the subsequent Norwegian police report. Japan and Norway have already moved quickly to push through tough, new export control legislation and add significant new resources for export licensing and enforcement. Other countries, including the United States, are also considering making changes to laws and adding new resources.

In the United States, shock and anger over recent revelations and dissatisfaction with COCOM have led to new legislative proposals to ban the importation into the United States of all products produced by companies found to have violated COCOM requirements. The Administration opposes the mandatory features of the legislation being considered. It also strongly advocates the multilateral approach to export controls inherent in the COCOM partnership, as opposed to unilateral actions by any of the partners. It is likely, however, that some kind of strong legislation will be passed and that both the Congress and the American public will insist on swift and harsh action against any future Toshiba/Kongsberg-type violators.

### Streamlining Export Control Lists

The COCOM export control regime exists not only to limit certain types of trade with proscribed destinations but also to provide a basis for legitimate trade. It is in pursuit of this objective that the COCOM control lists have be-

come so long and complex, as technical experts attempt to distinguish among various products and commodities to ensure that only the most important are really caught by the controls. It has never been COCOM policy to control only leading-edge, state-of-the-art technologies and products. Rather, it has sought to deny Warsaw Pact members the goods and technologies that will allow them to establish a modern military production base. This list, by definition, is long and will effectively cover a good part of what the Soviets are interested in buying from the West.

Much has been said about the need to streamline and rationalize the control lists. The United States supports this effort and reaffirmed this commitment during the special meeting of the COCOM partners last July. Perhaps this process should move faster. But let us not use this issue as an excuse for laxity in enforcement. No amount of streamlining would have prevented Toshiba/Kongsberg, which involved fraud, inadequate means of detection, an inability to prosecute those at fault, and a mindset that short-term gain was worth jeopardizing our collective security.

I do not believe that streamlining the lists, which is an ongoing activity, is at the heart of the regulatory problem faced by commercial firms. Rather, it is the phenomenon of applying these lists and export controls to West-West trade. With the explosion in high-technology trade, it is no surprise that the volume of such trade is overwhelming licensing and customs officials. The answer to such a problem is not to cease controlling our rather limited trade with the Soviet bloc but, instead, to eliminate the hindrances to trade among Western countries.

## Revitalizing COCOM

This point leads me to the new U.S. proposal to change the thrust of Western export control policies. The initiative calls for revitalizing COCOM through improved public understanding of its mission and a common, effective level of export licensing and enforcement throughout COCOM. Achievement of this objective would permit phased elimination of export licensing of dual-use commodities among COCOM countries. In pursuit of this initiative, we are proposing a senior political meeting of the COCOM partners that we hope will agree on concrete commitments to turn this initiative into a reality.

Admittedly, this will be a difficult task. Laws will need changing, resource allocations may need adjusting, and greater trust may be required among the various partners. But the payoff is potentially enormous, both in commercial and security terms. Commercial firms need relief from over-regulation, and our military and budget planners need relief from the current

laxity in export control enforcement. If we move vigorously now, we can go long way toward accomplishing both goals.

<sup>1</sup> The complete transcript of the hearings will be published by the committee and will be available from the Superintendent of Documents, U.S. Government Printing Office, Washington, D.C. 20402.

## Industrial Nations to Intensify Policy Coordination Efforts

*The finance ministers and central bank governors of Canada, France, West Germany, Italy, Japan, the United Kingdom, and the United States (represented by Secretary of the Treasury James A. Baker III and chairman of the Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System Alan Greenspan) issued the following statement, with accompanying annex, in Washington on December 22, 1987.*

1. The finance ministers and central bank governors of seven major industrial countries have conducted close consultations in recent weeks on their economic policies and prospects in light of developments in financial markets. They reaffirmed their conviction that the basic objectives and economic policy directions agreed in the Louvre accord [Feb. 22, 1987] remain valid and provide for a positive development of the world economy. They will continue to carry forward their economic policy coordination efforts in 1988 under the arrangements endorsed at the Venice summit.

2. The ministers and governors re-emphasized their view that the major external imbalances in the world economy must be corrected. The policies which have been implemented this year are gradually showing the intended effects. In particular, the balance between domestic demand and output in the United States and in Japan and the Federal Republic of Germany has shifted in the direction which promotes external adjustment, and in volume terms their trade imbalances are diminishing. The greater stability of exchange rates achieved for much of the past year, following the earlier substantial exchange rate changes, contributed to this adjustment. The market exchange rate changes over the past few weeks, however, stress the need to

strengthen underlying economic fundamentals and to continue policy cooperation.

3. Developments in stock markets since mid-October may have some adverse effect on prospects for economic growth for the industrialized countries as a group. The ministers and governors believe, however, that with sound economic policies and effective coordination, the rate of growth should be substantial. To this end, they agreed that appropriate policies for strengthening noninflationary growth in their countries are necessary.

4. Accordingly, the ministers and governors agreed to intensify their economic policy coordination efforts. The common efforts are directed toward reducing external imbalances. In particular, the United States has secured congressional action to implement the agreement between the President and the bipartisan congressional leadership on a 2-year package of additional budget savings that will reinforce progress in reducing the budget deficit. Japan has implemented a major stimulus program to strengthen domestic demand and will see to it that in the FY 1988 budget, the expenditure for general public works will not be less than that for the FY 1987 budget, including the July supplemental. The Federal Republic of Germany is supplementing the previously announced increase in tax reductions in 1988 with new measures to increase investment and will not seek to offset the budget revenue loss arising from recent developments. There have also been coordinated reductions in interest rates in Europe which should contribute to the expansion of domestic demand and reduce trade imbalances. The specific policy intentions and undertakings by each country are set forth in the annex to this statement.

5. The ministers and governors are of the view that the recent monetary policy decisions and the reduction of interest rates in some countries were appropriate and will contribute to a restoration of stability to financial markets. They agreed that monetary policies should continue to be directed toward providing adequate monetary conditions to achieve strong economic growth in the context of price stability, as well as to foster financial market stability.

6. The ministers and governors strongly rejected protectionist measures as a means of dealing with present imbalances. Protectionism constitutes a direct and serious danger to world prosperity and equilibrium and would have harmful consequences for those countries which resort to it. They reaffirmed their determination to fight protectionism and to promote an open world trading system.

7. The ministers and governors believe that the reduction of world trading imbalances requires cooperative action with other countries, particularly those with surpluses. They expressed particularly serious concern that some newly industrialized economies have failed to take adequate action to deal with large growing trade surpluses which are exacerbating global imbalances and fomenting protectionist pressures. They urged the newly industrialized economies to implement, without delay, trade and exchange rate policies that will facilitate the reduction of excessive trade surpluses and allow their currencies to reflect the strong competitive position of their economies.

8. The ministers and governors agreed that either excessive fluctuation of exchange rates, a further decline of the dollar, or a rise in the dollar to an extent that becomes destabilizing to the adjustment process could be counterproductive by damaging growth prospects in the world economy. They emphasized their common interest in stable exchange rates among their currencies and agreed to continue to cooperate closely in monitoring and implementing policies to strengthen underlying economic fundamentals to foster stability of exchange rates. In addition, they agreed to cooperate fully on exchange markets. The ministers and governors stressed the need for consistent and mutually supportive policies and believe that the measures being taken will accelerate progress toward the increased, more balanced economic

growth and sustainable external positions necessary for greater exchange rate stability.

## ANNEX

### Policy Intentions and Undertakings

The Government of Canada's fiscal strategy has succeeded in achieving a drop in the rate of growth of its spending and substantial, ongoing declines in the budget deficit. Marked progress has been made in slowing the growth of debt and toward the medium-term objective of stabilizing the debt-to-GDP ratio. Fiscal restraint has been accompanied by impressive growth of domestic demand, output, and employment. Major structural initiatives directed at enhancing competitiveness and the underlying potential of the economy have been undertaken, particularly tax reform and the negotiation of a free trade agreement with the United States. Monetary policy remains geared to noninflationary growth in a climate of orderly exchange markets.

The Government of France has fully met its commitment to reduce its fiscal deficit and tax burden. The fiscal deficit will be reduced by 0.8% of GNP from 1986 to 1988. Over the same period of time, tax cuts will amount to 1.3% of GNP. A further reduction of 45,000 million French francs in the fiscal deficit and an additional 45,000 million French francs in tax cuts are scheduled in a 1989-91, 3-year program which constitutes the long-term strategy of the government and will be implemented in the yearly budgets. The privatization program decided upon in early 1987 is being carried out, and its initial objectives have even been surpassed. The full implementation of the program will be resumed as soon as market conditions permit.

The French Government will continue to pursue its adjustment and liberalization policies. New measures to sustain household savings, develop financial markets, and improve the competitiveness of firms have been taken. Additional steps will be taken in the same direction in 1988.

The Government of the Federal Republic of Germany has increased the amount of the tax reductions for 1988 and beyond to about 14,000 million DM and will not seek to offset the budget revenue losses arising from recent developments. In addition, the necessary

decisions have been taken for the structural tax reform with a further net tax reduction of 20,000 million DM from 1990 onward.

In order to strengthen private and public investment, the federal government will provide special loans for the next 3 years of about 21,000 million DM under preferential conditions. Moreover, it will accelerate investment in telecommunication infrastructure and take initiatives for further deregulation of markets.

The Bundesbank has reduced short-term interest rates substantially during the last few weeks. Monetary policy will continue to maintain appropriate conditions for sustained noninflationary growth.

The Government of Italy, in the context of continuous significant growth, has taken temporary measures to halt the deterioration of the balance of payments, due to a higher rate of domestic demand in Italy than in other industrialized countries. For 1988 the objective embodied in the finance bill is to maintain a relatively high level of growth and to reduce inflation, while making progress in correcting the public sector imbalance.

In the medium term, to alleviate unemployment, the Italian authorities intend to achieve satisfactory rates of growth while maintaining the balance-of-payments current account in substantial equilibrium, to stabilize the debt/GDP ratio, and to devote more resources to the financing of productive as well as infrastructure investments, thus improving the quality of public services.

The Government of Japan noted that the Japanese economy is in a vigorous expansionary phase, led by domestic demand growth. The government will steadfastly continue implementing the 6,000,000-million-yen-plus package decided on last May and will see to it that in the FY 1988 budget, the expenditure for general public works will not be less than that for the FY 1987 budget, including the July supplemental.

The Bank of Japan will follow appropriate and flexible monetary policy supportive of noninflationary growth and exchange rate stability.

The United Kingdom Government, in the context of the British economy's continued vigorous growth of output and domestic demand, coupled with sound public finances, will continue to strive to reduce inflation by pursuing a

## Visit of Italian Prime Minister

prudent monetary policy, while increasing its capacity for noninflationary growth by further measures designed to free the operation of markets and increase the efficient use of resources, including tax reduction and tax reform. Public expenditures will continue to increase less rapidly than the growth of the economy as a whole, and the government will continue to work for the dismantling of barriers to trade both within the European Community and in the context of the Uruguay Round of the GATT [General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade].

The U.S. Government has secured congressional action to implement the agreement between the President and the bipartisan leadership of the Congress on a 2-year package of budget savings to reduce the U.S. budget deficit. This agreement provides for total budget savings, through a combination of spending restraint and increased taxes, in FY 1988 and 1989 of approximately \$76,000 million.

The budget agreement is part of an ongoing process of deficit reduction provided for under the revised Gramm-Rudman-Hollings legislation. It will reinforce the progress already achieved in reducing the deficit (including an FY 1987 cut of \$73,000 million, or 1.9% of GNP) that has brought the deficit down to 3.4% of GNP from a peak of 6.3%.

The Administration will also continue to oppose steadfastly protectionist trade measures, while working for legislation authorizing negotiations to foster a more open and fair system for the international exchange of goods, services, and investment. ■



(White House photo by Mary Anne Fackelmann-Miner)

*Prime Minister Giovanni Gorla of the Republic of Italy made an official working visit to Washington, D.C., December 15-18, 1987, to meet with President Reagan and other government officials.*

*Following are remarks made by the President and the Prime Minister after their meeting on December 16.<sup>1</sup>*

### President Reagan

It's our great pleasure to welcome to the White House a guest from a country with which we Americans have indissoluble ties of history, culture, and shared values: Prime Minister Gorla from Italy. Although this is the first time that the Prime Minister and I have had the opportunity to talk alone, I welcome him as I would an old friend, for Italy is an ally whose friendship America values and whose counsel we seek and trust.

You are visiting the United States at a moment when our European allies are very much on our minds. Just a week ago, Soviet General Secretary Gorbachev and I signed the INF [Intermediate-Range Nuclear Forces] Treaty. We in the United States are keenly aware that it was the political will and determination of European governments and peoples and our joint commitment to the NATO alliance that enabled us to conclude that treaty.

INF has given us a lesson that we should apply in all areas of East-West relations. We were tough from the start; we stood together, and we got what we wanted. Yes, we had a plan: building a safer peace and freedom through strength. We stuck to the plan even when many who are now taking bows tried to force us to abandon it, and the plan worked.

From the moment in 1979 when Italy stepped forward to do its part in deployment of INF weapons, it has been an indispensable partner and leader in this process for peace.

In addition to developments in Europe, the Prime Minister and I discussed the Persian Gulf, where the Italian and American Navies work side by side to keep international seaways open. Both our countries understand that the war between Iran and Iraq poses dangers that extend far beyond that troubled region. Both our nations will continue strong support in the United Nations Security Council for the efforts of the Secretary General to bring an end to the conflict.

When Prime Minister Gorla and I last saw each other, he was Minister of the Treasury, and we were both participants in the Venice economic summit. Today we again talked about the international economic situation and the steps necessary to strengthen international trade and finance.

Over the next few days, Prime Minister Gorla will be meeting with Secretary Shultz, Secretary of State James A. Baker, Secretary of Defense Frank C. Carlucci, congressional leaders, and private businessmen, among others. I'm happy to report that as he embarks on the remainder of this busy and important U.S.-Italian relations could hardly be better.

Mr. Prime Minister, we're indeed pleased and honored to have you as our

### Prime Minister Gorla

am deeply grateful to President Ronald Reagan for the particularly cordial welcome he extended to me in Washington today. This testifies to the longstanding friendship; solid alliance; common cultural, moral, and ideal values which historically bind Italy to the United States.

I have conveyed to President Reagan the greetings which the Italian nation, the President of the Republic, the honorable Francesco Cossiga, and the Government send to him and to the American people, a greeting which in warmth reflects our enduring friendship, our present sound cooperation and alliance, and our common and firm conviction of the need to work together for the future of our two countries.

I had the pleasure of recognizing, once and again, in President Reagan a statesman that the whole world respects and the friend which the Italian nation particularly admires—the statesman who was able to give a new and especially innovative dimension to the problems of nuclear disarmament by accomplishing the destruction of arms not through other arms but by means of an international treaty. Our talks were marked by a great mutual cordiality which have proved to be extremely fruitful. We reconfirmed our common commitment to seeking a more secure, more stable, and less threatened peace which we will be pursuing in the framework of the alliance which binds us.

I listened with the utmost interest when the President told me about his recent historic meeting with the General Secretary of the Soviet Communist Party, Mikhail Gorbachev. I very much wish to personally express the Italian Government's profound satisfaction in the results achieved during this summit, along with the deep-felt hope that

## Imports From the European Economic Community

### WHITE HOUSE STATEMENT, DEC. 24, 1987<sup>1</sup>

The President today signed a proclamation imposing and temporarily suspending duties on approximately \$100 million worth of exports from the European Community (EC) to the United States. This implements his November 23 decision to retaliate against an EC unfair trade practice, but to suspend the sanctions for as long as it does not restrict U.S. meat exports to Europe. The action follows careful analysis of comments received in public hearings.

In December 1985, the EC decided to ban the sale or import of meat produced from animals treated with growth hormones, effective January 1, 1988. This action would bar \$100 million in U.S. meat sales to the EC. The ban was announced as a health measure; however, the U.S. Food and Drug Administration and a prestigious panel of international scientific experts have concluded that use of such hormones poses no health hazards.

The EC recently voted to allow meat imports to continue for an additional year; therefore, the President has suspended today's sanctions pro-

vided U.S. meat exports to Europe continue without interruption. He has instructed the U.S. Trade Representative to monitor the situation. If U.S. meat exports to the Community are found to be interrupted during this period, the Trade Representative is authorized to reimpose the sanctions. The President hopes that a permanent solution can be found to this problem based on scientific evidence over the next year.

This action is being taken under authority granted to the President in section 301 of the Trade Act of 1974. This Administration has been more aggressive in using this enforcement tool against unfair trade practices than any previous administration. Today's actions are intended to maintain unimpeded access for American producers in a fair, competitive marketplace without improper interference from foreign governments. The President intends to continue to pursue aggressive enforcement of these laws and, when necessary, take retaliatory measures equal in severity to those unfair trade practices aimed at American exporters.

<sup>1</sup>Text from Weekly Compilation of Presidential Documents of Dec. 28, 1987. ■

## U.S., Spain Announce Framework for Defense Cooperation

### JOINT STATEMENT, JAN. 15, 1988

The Governments of the United States and Spain have reached agreement in principle on a new framework to replace the 1982 agreement on friendship, defense, and cooperation.

1. Under the terms of the new defense agreement, the use by the United States of operational and support installations in Spain and the authorizations for use of Spanish territory, territorial sea, and air space will be continued. Agreements shall also be concluded for crisis and wartime use of Spanish installations and land, sea, and air space by the United States in support of NATO reinforcement plans.

2. The initial term of the new agreement will be 8 years with provision for extension for successive 1-year periods.

3. In compliance with the sovereign decision of the Government of Spain, the United States will withdraw from Spain the 401st Tactical Fighter Wing within 3 years of the effective date of the new agreement.

4. There will not be in the agreement nor related to it any commitment by the parties concerning military or economic assistance in the form of grants or credits.

5. Future educational, cultural, scientific, and technological cooperation will be based on new and equitable formulas and will be separate from the new defense agreement. ■

the understandings reached may further develop, thus opening new negotiating prospects in the field of nuclear as well as conventional and chemical disarmament.

The agreement reached has the full support of the Italian Government, which expresses the hope that it will be promptly ratified. The agreement resulted in great part from the cohesion and steadfast determination which the Atlantic alliance demonstrated. In this context, President Reagan has particularly valued the role which Italy played in maintaining Western solidarity.

We expressed the common hope that within this framework of renewed dialogue with the Soviet Union a solution may also be found to the question of Afghanistan.

The President of the United States and I have reviewed the situation in the Middle East and the prospects of overcoming this longstanding crisis in the full respect for the sovereignty of the states and the rights of the peoples in the region.

A common concern was expressed over the war between Iran and Iraq in the Persian Gulf and the continuing conflicts and tensions in that delicate area despite United Nations repeated appeals for a cessation of hostilities.

I also exchanged views with President Reagan on the various regional crises, in particular, those concerning a continent, Latin America, which is especially close to us.

Particular attention was devoted to economic and international trade issues, to the prospects for encouraging a sustained and lasting development of trade, as well as to the problems of indebtedness.

I confirmed to President Reagan our commitment toward seeking a solution to these questions, also within the framework of the seven most industrialized countries of the West, in view of the Toronto summit next June.

We restated our intent to ever increasingly develop the bilateral relations between Italy and the United States and to promote trade and cooperation in all fields, as their progress must fully reflect the excellent political relations existing between our two countries.

We agreed that the same open spirit must inspire the relations between the United States and the European Community, a community which Italy considers a major point of reference and an essential political goal, which our country unanimously wishes to strengthen.

I will return to Italy in the awareness that my visit strengthened the special ties binding our two countries as well as my personal feelings of respect and friendship for President Reagan.

## Foreign Relations Authorization Act, Fiscal Years 1988 and 1989

### PRESIDENT'S STATEMENT, DEC. 22, 1987<sup>1</sup>

I have today signed H.R. 1777, the "Foreign Relations Authorization Act, Fiscal Years 1988 and 1989." Certain issues raised by its provisions, however, require comment.

Under our constitutional system of separation of powers, the President has special responsibilities in the area of foreign affairs. As the Supreme Court noted in *United States v. Curtiss-Wright Export Co.*, the President is "the sole organ of the Federal government in the field of international relations." Certain provisions in H.R. 1777, however, could be construed so as to interfere with the discharge of these responsibilities. The act forbids the closing of any consulates and requires both the initiation of specific foreign negotiations and the termination of the United States-Soviet Embassy agreements. I am signing the act only because, pursuant to House Joint Resolution 395 (the continuing appropriations measure which I also signed today), these provisions will not take effect until 2 years from today. During the remainder of my Administration, I shall seek repeal of these provisions.

Other provisions of H.R. 1777 require or prohibit the initiation of negotiations in the field of international relations. Consistent with my constitutional responsibility to conduct these negotiations, I construe these provisions as being subject to my exclusive authority to determine the time, scope, and objectives of any negotiations.

<sup>1</sup>Made at the South Portico of the White House (text from Weekly Compilation of Presidential Documents of Dec. 21, 1987).

<sup>2</sup>Prime Minister Gorla spoke in Italian and his remarks were translated by an interpreter. ■

Section 1003 of the act prohibits the establishment anywhere within the jurisdiction of the United States of an office "to further the interests of" the Palestine Liberation Organization. The effect of this provision is to prohibit diplomatic contact with the PLO. I have no intention of establishing diplomatic relations with the PLO. However, the right to decide the kind of foreign relations, if any, the United States will maintain is encompassed by the President's authority under the Constitution including the express grant of authority in Article II, Section 3, to receive ambassadors. I am signing the act, therefore, only because I have no intention of establishing diplomatic relations with the PLO, as a consequence of which no actual constitutional conflict is created by this provision.

Under Section 163 of the act the Department of State, by regulation, shall implement a program of counterintelligence polygraph examination for members of the Diplomatic Security Service. I am interpreting this requirement consistent with my position concerning the discretion of agency heads to determine when polygraph examinations will be conducted in specific cases.

Finally, in signing this act I intend as I understand the Congress intended that in those instances where there is any inconsistency between this act and H.J. Res. 395 the provisions of H.J. Res. 395 control.

<sup>3</sup>Text from Weekly Compilation of Presidential Documents of Dec. 28, 1987.



## S. Policy Toward the Occupied Territories

Richard W. Murphy

*Statement before the Subcommittee on Europe and the Middle East of the Senate Foreign Affairs Committee on November 14, 1987. Ambassador Murphy's Assistant Secretary for Near Eastern and South Asian Affairs.*<sup>1</sup>

come this opportunity to testify on the policy regarding the West Bank and Gaza, territories occupied by Israel since the June 1967 Middle East war. U.S. policy toward the West Bank and Gaza has two major objectives.

**First**, we support a resolution of the status of these territories in the context of a lasting peace to be achieved through direct negotiations between Israel and its Arab neighbors. **Second**, we want to improve the quality of Palestinian life in the territories.

These two objectives are complementary. An active peace process gives Israelis and Palestinians in the territories the promise of an end to the violence, genuine security, and a brighter future for themselves and their children. The expectation that a just and comprehensive peace is possible and that active efforts are continuing to achieve it preserves hope and encourages movement toward reconciliation. At the same time, practical measures improve the daily lives of Palestinians—help to reinforce efforts toward a comprehensive political settlement and reduce the frustrations that are the cause of extremism and violence. Active efforts for peace and improvements in the quality of life are, therefore, essential to sustain each other.

### Security in the West Bank and Gaza

state of war—now in its 40th year—and the occupation—now in its 20th year—exact a toll on the 1.5 million Palestinians in the territories, and on Israel as well. In the absence of peace and a political agreement, the prevailing atmosphere is one of tension and mutual mistrust. This environment provokes protest demonstrations by Palestinians, acts of violence by both Palestinians and Israeli settlers, and

harsh security measures by Israeli occupation authorities which are sometimes inconsistent with recognized international standards.

The situation in the occupied territories fluctuates between periods of calm and periods of unrest, but tensions are chronic and appear to be increasing, especially in the refugee camps and among younger Palestinians. Last week's eruption of violent confrontation reminds us of the deep communal conflict and of the unresolved political status of the West Bank and Gaza. At least seven Palestinians and one Israeli have been killed during these latest tragic events, and many more have been wounded.

Israel continues to limit severely Palestinian family reunification, which the United States regards as an important humanitarian issue. In 1986 about 1,400 individuals were allowed to rejoin their families, an increase over the previous 2 years' approval rate. This was encouraging; however, Palestinian sources state that over 10,000 applications, many for entire families, are pending.

The situation in the occupied territories is clearly unsatisfactory to both Palestinians and Israelis. Against this background, the United States, while continuing to encourage Israel and its Arab neighbors to find a way to the negotiating table, pursues a three-part policy toward the West Bank and Gaza.

- We condemn violence and extremism in all forms and from all sides.
- We support programs to improve economic and social conditions for the Palestinians.
- We encourage Israel to assure that its occupation practices are consistent with accepted international standards and the legitimate needs of maintaining security.

In keeping with our close and friendly relationship, we have an active and serious dialogue with Israel on these aspects of our policy.

### Economic and Social Conditions

Long-term economic development in the West Bank and Gaza is supported, in principle, by both Israel and Jordan, and certain policies have been adopted

by both governments to support growth. However, although the standard of living has risen, the potential of these areas is far from being realized because of the unresolved status of the territories and by various constraints and protectionist policies imposed by Israel and Jordan. As a result, job creation has not kept up with the rapidly growing and increasingly well-educated labor force. About 90,000 Palestinians are now employed in the service or manual labor sectors in Israel. However, there are very few opportunities for Palestinian secondary and college graduates in Israel.

Social problems in the West Bank and Gaza must be viewed in the context of the continuing occupation, the lack of economic development, and the absence of local public institutions. Social services, including secondary health care, sanitation, vocation training, and care of the elderly and handicapped, are largely undertaken by nongovernmental groups. Their funding is often precarious and their activities are subject to control by the occupation authorities. The problem is especially acute in Gaza, where the very rapid population growth rate has made it one of the most densely populated areas in the world and has significantly increased the demand for social services.

### U.S. Assistance Programs

U.S. assistance programs to the West Bank and Gaza respond to these economic and social problems. Our assistance flows through separate but mutually reinforcing channels—the direct program, Jordan's development program, and the UN Relief and Works Agency (UNRWA), which provides assistance to over 2 million Palestinian refugees, of whom over 800,000 reside in the West Bank and Gaza.

We have provided over \$76 million to fund projects of private voluntary organizations in the West Bank and Gaza since 1975. In addition to health and social services, we have increasingly directed our aid toward longer term development needs, particularly employment creation.

A major impediment to further private voluntary organization activities is our inability to fund the program adequately. For FY 1987, we requested \$18 million but were able to provide only \$8.5 million. For 1988, taking into account U.S. budget stringencies, we requested \$12 million. If funding remains at the 1987 level, it will be very difficult to undertake new projects.

In 1986 King Hussein announced an important new economic development program for the occupied territories. Jordan's program focuses on infrastructure development, education, and agriculture in the territories. We have provided \$18.5 million since September 1986 for King Hussein's initiative. Britain, Italy, and West Germany have also pledged support.

Jordan's program is making progress. Municipalities and other local organizations have submitted proposals whose costs far exceed Jordan's current ability to fund them, clearly indicating a willingness by West Bankers and Gazans to work with the Jordanians to improve their social and economic conditions.

To have a major impact, however, Jordan's program needs substantial additional funding. We are requesting an additional \$23 million for this year, beyond the \$7 million we sought in FY 1988. We continue to encourage our friends to contribute, but they are hesitant to allocate scarce resources to a new, untested program. Our strongest argument with them is that we have enough confidence in King Hussein's initiative for all of us to provide significant funding, even though we face a major budgetary crisis.

We support UNRWA's efforts to sustain decent conditions in the refugee camps. In 1987, UNRWA's expenditures in the territories were approximately \$82 million. The United States contributed \$67 million to UNRWA's \$200 million budget for activities in Lebanon, Syria, and Jordan, as well as the West Bank and Gaza.

### Private Sector Development

Economic assistance to the West Bank and Gaza cannot substitute for vigorous private sector growth and development. A variety of trade constraints imposed by Israel and Jordan continue to hamper the marketing of goods produced by Palestinians. These trade barriers protect Israeli and Jordanian commercial interests from Palestinian competition.

We believe artificial constraints should be eliminated, and there has been some modest success. The European Community has granted preferential access to certain commodities from the West Bank and Gaza and has sought Israeli approval to permit these goods to flow more freely to Western Europe. We understand that Israel and the European Community have made some progress in defining how Palestinians will be able to take advantage of these trade concessions. Export growth is critical to the economic future of the territories, and we hope that the sides will work to resolve outstanding issues.

In 1986 the first Arab bank to operate in the territories since 1967 was opened, and a second branch opened this year. Both have attracted sizable

deposits, and plans are underway to open a third branch. The provision of Arab banking services in the territory can help create a more normal environment for business expansion.

Ultimately problems in the West Bank and Gaza cannot be fully resolved in the absence of an agreement to end the occupation in a way that is acceptable to the Palestinian inhabitants, by Israelis, and by their Arab neighbors. Until then we will seek ways to improve conditions in the territories.

The complete transcript of the hearings will be published by the committee and will be available from the Superintendent of Documents, U.S. Government Printing Office, Washington, D.C. 20402. ■

## Visit of Israeli President



White House photo by Pete Souza

*President Chaim Herzog of the State of Israel made a state visit to the United States November 9-15, 1987, to meet with President Reagan and other government officials.*

*Following are remarks made by the two Presidents at the arrival ceremony on November 10.*

### President Reagan

*Shalom [hello]. I am very pleased and honored to extend a warm welcome to you, Mr. President, and to Mrs. Herzog on this historic occasion: the first state visit ever by a President of the State of Israel to the White House. Your visit is*

also a special event, because it takes place during the 40th anniversary of the independence of the State of Israel. Americans are proud, indeed, that on May 15, 1948, the United States was the first country to extend diplomatic recognition to the State of Israel. Your visit emphasizes the close and special relationship between our two countries.

Modern Israel was born in the aftermath of the tragedy of the Holocaust and the calamity of the Second World War. It was created to fulfill the long-standing dream of the Jewish people to return to the home of their biblical origins. This dream came true because

courage and determination of the Jewish people, both those already residing in Palestine and those who survived the Nazi death camps in Europe. I hope for freedom, for independence, for an end to centuries of persecution were instilled in the State of Israel.

Israel and the United States have been partners for 40 years. We are brought together by a shared commitment to democracy, to an open society, to individual achievement and economic progress, and to dignity and worth of man and every individual. And we stand together in the defense of these values against those who would destroy them. Our strategic cooperation is proof of that.

Today these values are reflected in our search for a just and lasting peace in the Middle East. We share the conviction that Israel can be secure and realize its full promise and genius only in security and lasting peace achieved. The United States remains committed in the quest for such a peace, a negotiated settlement of the Arab-Israeli conflict that would assure security and well-being of the people of Israel and its Arab neighbors. That goal will be realized when people of good will from all sides find a way to bridge a crevasse of hatred and distrust. The United States is ready, as ever, to help build that bridge.

We're encouraged by the progress that has been made in this noble endeavor. It was 10 years ago this month that President Sadat visited Jerusalem, a peace between Israel and Egypt created a new reality, proving that reconciliation between former enemies is possible. The past decade has shown the benefits of this peace to the people of Egypt and Israel. We want to work with Israel and its other neighbors to expand the horizon of peace and find a solution for the Palestinian people. We want to see an end to the scourge of international terrorism. We want to see an end to the conflict in the Persian Gulf, and to the war between Iran and Iraq.

We know that the people of Israel share these desires with the people of the United States. Together we also share a commitment to create better lives for all peoples of the world. Israel has provided leadership in harnessing science and technology to human needs, as reflected in the great strides we've made in agriculture and industry.

We're united by a common commitment to the universality of human rights. This is why America has championed the cause of Soviet Jews in their struggle for religious freedom and right, if they wish, to emigrate. We have rejoiced with you in the release of Natan Shcharanskiy, Ida Nudel, Vladimir Slepak, and others. Yet we know that many others, less well-known but equally entitled to enjoy these basic liberties, remain behind, still constrained by the Soviet system. I pledge to you that we will persevere in our efforts to persuade the Soviet Union to meet its international obligations under the Helsinki accords not just to Soviet Jews but to all the citizens of the Soviet Union.

We cannot meet on this day without noting the special significance it has for the Jewish people. On November 10th, 1983, a half-century ago—1938, I should say, a half century ago—the Nazis let loose a reign of terror against the German Jewry that is remembered as the infamous "crystal night." And on November 10th, 1975, the General Assembly of the United Nations passed an obscene resolution equating Zionism and racism. Both of these ugly actions share a common denominator: anti-semitism; but there is a major difference between them. In 1938 the State of Israel did not yet exist. In 1975 a proud and resolute Israeli Ambassador rose up in the United Nations to uphold the honor of Israel and the high principles on which the United Nations is founded.

The Ambassador, of course, was you, and it will always be a source of pride for all Americans that on that day our own Ambassador to the United Nations stood squarely at your side. That's how it was, and that's how it will be. For the people of Israel and America are historic partners in the global quest for human dignity and freedom. We will always remain at each other's side.

It is a special honor and privilege to welcome you to the White House.

### President Herzog

As I stand here on this momentous occasion, I can sense the movement of the wings of history. I arrive here on the occasion of the 40th anniversary year of our establishment as a free and independent state, an event which righted a historic wrong to our people over the centuries.

Surely at moments such as these, words are inadequate in which to express the sense of gratitude which the citizens of Israel feel toward this great country for its ongoing support in our struggle.

Like the United States, our small country, too, acquired its independence in bloody battle and gained its strength by providing a haven for the poor, the downtrodden, and the homeless. Despite the enormous differences in size and population, we are bound together in a partnership of such profound significance, a partnership which transcends the normal friendship existing between friendly nations. For ours is an alliance born of an identity of purpose and the principles of democracy, which are the cornerstones of our two societies.

I stand here and see the work of the hand of providence. For this year, as you have mentioned, marks the anniversary—49 years ago—of the Nazi onslaught on the Jewish people in Germany in "*kristall nacht*," the "night of the crystals," in which synagogues throughout Germany were put to fire. The Holy Bible and the scrolls of our Holy Torah, recording the five books of Moses, bearing the message of civilization and humanity, were burned in bonfires, ignited by barbarians outside the burning synagogues. The streets of Germany were covered in a film of crystals, created by the broken glass of Jewish synagogues, schools, homes, and stores, marking the headlong rush of Europe toward the abyss which led to the darkest years of the eclipse of civilization. In those nightmare years, one-third of the Jewish people were destroyed in the most terrifying holocaust ever seen in the history of mankind.

I stood moments ago and received the honors accorded me as the head of the State of Israel and thought of the day of infamy at the United Nations 12 years ago today. I had the privilege then, as you mentioned, of defending my people against the scurrilous and despicable attack on Zionism, which was mounted by a contemptible coalition of totalitarian states not only against our small country but against all that the Jewish people and their traditions stand for in human dignity and endurance.

As one recalls these events which occurred on this very day, on this solemn and moving occasion marking the first state visit from an Israeli head of state to the United States of America, with all that it implies, the significance

of the reemergence of Israel must surely be in the forefront of our consciousness.

At this moment, as I stand here as the President of a country born of the prayers of a nation over the centuries and a 2,000-year-old struggle against adversity, I cannot but give expression to the age-old Jewish prayer: "Thanks to the Almighty for having kept us alive and maintained us to reach this time."

Israel has been devoted to the cause of peace since we held out our hand to our Arab neighbors in our declaration of independence, and has over the years exerted every effort to achieve it. Under your inspired leadership and with the active support of your Administration, we continue these efforts to achieve the peace for which we, and I believe all the peoples of the Middle East, yearn.

Ten years ago next week, we crossed a major watershed with the historic arrival of President Sadat in Jerusalem and the enthusiastic and warm welcome accorded him by the then Government of Israel, by the *Knesset*, and by the people of Israel. That visit led, thanks to the active involvement in subsequent negotiations of the President and the Administration of the United States, to the first peace treaty signed by Israel with an Arab state—indeed, a leading state in the Arab world. That treaty, which concluded the first phase of the peacemaking process in the Middle East, was signed here on this very site. Israel is prepared, as you are well aware, to move forward with your involvement to a further phase of this process.

I thank you for your invitation and your welcome. I come to you representing a friend and an ally. Our two peoples are committed to the same principles and values which our Bible gave to the world. We acknowledge and appreciate the generous support of the American people extended to us in the mutual interest of our two countries to ensure the advancement of the cause of peace and stability in our area and, indeed, the peace of the world.

Your aid maintains the strength of a close ally which is committed to the defense of the cause of freedom and democracy in an area in which the longest war in the century is taking place, a brutal, bloody war fired by the fanatic extremism of religious fundamentalism which threatens the stability of so many countries in our area. A glance at

the map of our area and a realization of the implications of the waves of fanaticism which are sweeping across it must surely give added emphasis to the significance of your alliance with Israel, with all that it implies.

Mr. President, on behalf of the people of Israel, I salute you, the leader of the free world, and Mrs. Reagan, and I extend to the people of the United

States of America our prayers and profound wishes for the welfare of this great people and this unique country.

<sup>1</sup> Made in the East Room of the White House where President Herzog was accorded a formal welcome (text from Weel, *Compilation of Presidential Documents of Nov. 16, 1987*). ■

## Developments in the Persian Gulf

by Richard W. Murphy

*Statement before the Subcommittees on Europe and the Middle East and on Arms Control, International Security, and Science of the House Foreign Affairs Committee on December 15, 1987. Ambassador Murphy is Assistant Secretary for Near Eastern and South Asian Affairs.<sup>1</sup>*

I welcome this opportunity to appear before these subcommittees again to discuss developments in the Persian Gulf. Because misinformation about U.S. policy persists, I want to spell out where we stand and what we hope to see happen in the coming weeks and months.

Our main objective is bringing about a cease-fire and a comprehensive, negotiated end to the war. The conflict between Iraq and Iran—and continued Iranian pressure on third countries in the gulf—threaten vital economic and political interests of the industrialized democracies and threaten the stability and territorial integrity of nations in the gulf whose security long has been of great concern to the United States.

Much has been made of the military situation. Some have wrongly asserted that the crisis is caused by the foreign naval presence in the region. The instability that threatens global security in the Persian Gulf region is spawned by the Iran-Iraq war itself, not by any Western navy protecting nonbelligerent merchant ships. Our convoy system is running smoothly and will continue.

### Diplomatic Efforts to End War

UN Security Council Resolution 598 of July 20 [1987] was a unanimous demand for an immediate end to the war. A consensus among the five permanent

members of the Security Council was the heart of the Council's unanimity. I wholeheartedly shared in that consensus and gave full support to Resolution 598's implementation.

When Resolution 598 was adopted we expected that Iran would be unlikely to accept it as drafted unless the world community showed it was willing to back words with action. A key element of our strategy, shared by all permanent members of the Council, has been to preserve the unity of the five permanent members on this critical issue. Although we still prefer to move ahead in unity, there are limits to our patience. These limits are being pressed as the war damages our interests and those of our friends.

In early September the UN Secretary General returned from the region with an ambiguous answer from Tehran. On the 25th of that month, Secretary Shultz agreed with the foreign ministers of the other four permanent Security Council members to begin work on a followup resolution—to strengthen the Secretary General's hand in his negotiations. This was to a "second track" of multilateral diplomacy aimed at reinforcing the first—the UN Secretary General's consultations with the parties.

On October 15, to help the Secretary General in his efforts, the Council gave guidance that formed the basis for very specific interrogatories to Tehran and Baghdad. Once again the Iranian response was ambiguous. Iran had displayed only contempt for the UN Secretary General's efforts, contempt that was repeated when Iranian Deputy Foreign Minister Larjani finally came to New York on December 3.

For its part, Iraq remains committed to fulfilling all provisions of Resolution 598 as an integrated whole where, of course, Iran agrees to do so. Thus

UN Secretary General has been urged in his "first track" by Iranian insistence, making more immediate need for unified action by the Council in the "second track"—enforcement measures.

We did not believe in July and do believe now that Iran would easily be convinced to change its position. Its recent missile attacks against Kuwait illustrate that the Iranians will resort to brute intimidation to neutralize its supporters. Public and private messages from the Iranian leadership stated repeatedly that Iran will accept a cease-fire nor withdraw to internationally recognized borders until it is branded the aggressor and provisions are in train to exact reparations. This position contradicts Resolution 598.

As the recent Arab summit illustrated, the number of voices calling for an end to the war is growing. However, the states seem not to share our sense of urgency or apprehension about war's deadly and dangerous effects. They argue that Iran needs more time to explore the possibilities of Resolution 598. These positions have not been exhausted. Despite expressions of common interest in ending Resolution 598, they have failed at any effort to work on the "second track," an enforcement resolution.

We say forthrightly that drafting a resolution is long overdue. A new resolution to Resolution 598 would demonstrate world determination to limit the supply of weapons Iran could use to prolong and expand the war. At the very least, global cooperation would raise Iran's cost in continuing the war.

### Soviet Position

In discussions with the [Soviet] General Secretary and his party on the gulf this week were inconclusive. The Soviet position did not develop beyond intentions that Iran deserves more time, that voluntary compliance by Iran with Resolution 598 remains possible, and that a "real" force should be established by the United Nations to implement Resolution 598. We believe these Soviet positions reflect continuing efforts to play this issue both ways: avoiding actions in the United Nations which would sour Soviet-Iranian relations while doing just enough to blunt increasing criticism of the Arab states directed at Moscow.

Some have pointed to the Soviet Union's diplomatic activities with both parties and concluded that the United States has been shunted off to the side. This is a facile and erroneous interpretation of events. As they pursue their diplomacy in Tehran and Baghdad, the Soviets mix cooperation and political gain. Regrettably they have sought to exploit the situation in the gulf by asserting that our presence in the region violates the terms of Resolution 598. As I stated previously, the problem is the Iran-Iraq war, not our naval presence in the gulf.

The Soviets proclaim their desire that the United Nations assume a more central role in world affairs. They say they favor effective UN actions to end conflict. This argues for joining together, now, to enforce the Council's mandate and to help restore peace to this critical area of the world.

I have concentrated so far on updating you on the diplomatic track—I wish I had better news. In any event, Iran's unwillingness to accept Resolution 598 as drafted should make clear to those who said they needed more evidence that now is the time to move on the second resolution.

### Outside Cooperation

Our commitment to regional stability has won us increased support from the governments of the Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC), our Western allies, and Japan. The Dutch and Belgians will now keep their forces in the gulf until at least mid-1988. The Australians intend to send a team of divers to help in mineclearing operations.

As gulf states have become increasingly confident of the firmness of our commitment, they have offered valuable military cooperation. Without their assistance, our current naval deployments in the gulf would be impossible. Around the gulf, this cooperation ranges from helping clear mines in international waterways to providing the facilities necessary to move supplies and equipment to our forces operating in the area. Several gulf states also provide access and logistical support to the five Western naval contingents operating in the area.

### Bahrain's Special Support

In this regard, Bahrain has been a special friend to the United States, hosting our regional naval presence for nearly four decades. Bahrain's extraordinary support of the United States has made

it even more vulnerable to Iranian military threats.

Bahrain's air defenses are rudimentary. Its single squadron of F-5s may not be able to respond quickly to a cross-gulf attack. Its French-supplied Crotale missiles are in fixed positions with limited flexibility. To improve the mobility and flexibility of its air defenses, Bahrain seeks to purchase 16 Stinger launchers and 70 missile reloads to protect important economic and political targets and put on its naval craft as the United States had done with its ships in the gulf. The estimated cost of this sale is \$7 million.

The Stinger air defense missile system is precisely what Bahrain needs to fill gaps in its air defenses against the most likely threat. An improved Bahraini defense against such attacks would protect American forces in Bahrain, as well as Bahrain's. No other system can perform the task to the same degree, and the Bahrain defense force has an unblemished record for protecting sensitive weapons.

I understand the concern that Stingers not be diverted to terrorists. However, the way to protect our interests and security is not by leaving our friends at risk. The Administration's policy is that all Stinger sales must be conditioned on both need and a willingness to institute stringent safeguards. Bahrain has met both conditions.

As for the future, we have no hidden agenda in the Persian Gulf. When tensions recede, the need for augmented U.S. naval power also will recede. We have no designs for permanent military facilities in the gulf region. What we are doing today fits entirely within the context of our ongoing convoy operations and immediate protection requirements stemming from those operations.

### Stemming the Flow of Arms to Iran

In that connection, I should mention two other aspects of U.S. diplomatic policy aimed at containing the fighting in the gulf. One is Operation Staunch—the U.S. effort to stem the flow of arms to Iran through bilateral consultations with other countries. We request that other governments investigate possible arms transactions taking place within their jurisdictions as we learn of them. Most of the states with which we have consulted agree that the danger of continued instability in the gulf outweighs the profits to be gained from selling arms to Iran.

We have made some real progress in these efforts. In 1984, 23 Western nations sold arms worth more than \$1 billion to Iran. For the first half of this year, only four Western nations were detected shipping arms, and this for a total value of less than \$200 million. Significant East European sales, however, have continued unabated.

We continue to urge China to join us and our other friends in preventing arms from reaching Iran while we monitor possible arms transfers closely. During his recent visit to Beijing, Under Secretary [for Political Affairs Michael H.] Armacost repeated to Chinese leaders our concern over Iranian use of Chinese Silkworm missiles. He stressed that it is difficult to pursue the kind of strong bilateral relationship with China that we favor under these circumstances. We have taken note of General Secretary Zhao Ziyang's statement that China has taken measures in recent months to control strictly the export of Silkworms. The Chinese leadership is aware of how serious a matter it is when Chinese-supplied missiles are used to attack U.S. flagships and otherwise to threaten the freedom of navigation in a vital waterway.

I mention this today not to fault a country—China—with which we are otherwise working hard to broaden and deepen contacts and ties and with which we work constructively on the Security Council. I refer to it, however, to underscore the importance this Administration assigns to greater international cooperation in reducing tensions in the gulf region and bringing an end to the Iran-Iraq war.

Operation Staunch targets arms transfers from other countries. The second aspect I want to note is the control we exert over U.S.-Iranian transactions. On October 29, the President signed an Executive order [12613] prohibiting all imports from Iran and adding 14 broad categories of dual-use items to the list of proscribed exports to Iran. We believe our boycott in this period of global oversupply, combined with actions like the French embargo of Iranian oil, is having an impact. Iran is reportedly offering substantial price cuts and still is having problems finding buyers. This makes it that much more difficult for Iran to buy the weapons it needs to pursue the war against Iraq and its neighbors in the gulf—not to mention international shipping. We hope other countries around the world join in this effort to reduce the funds Iran has to spend on arms.

## Conclusion

Such are the observations I can offer about our success thus far and the challenges remaining in the gulf. Wide-spread support has been expressed in both Houses of Congress for our trade sanctions against Iran and our measured response to the attack on the *Sea Isle City*. Our European allies and Arab friends have also shown that they understand the need to stand firm in the gulf. Peace is not going to come to the gulf overnight. We will stay the course, continuing to work for maximum international cooperation to deny Iran war materiel and thereby help persuade its leadership to agree to a comprehensive cease-fire.

In conclusion the task of American diplomacy is to end this tragic war now. Both the Iranian and Iraqi peoples have suffered too long and paid a horribly high price in human lives and economic devastation. Again the cause of instability in the Persian Gulf is the continuation of the Iran-Iraq war. The United States appeals to all the parties in the region and in the international community to support fully and effectively the UN Secretary General in his efforts to achieve a negotiated settlement. We have shown ourselves ready to do our part.

<sup>1</sup>The complete transcript of the hearings will be published by the committee and will be available from the Superintendent of Documents, U.S. Government Printing Office, Washington, D.C. 20402. ■

## Arms Sale to Bahrain

WHITE HOUSE STATEMENT,  
DEC. 2, 1987<sup>1</sup>

The success of our policy and naval presence in the Persian Gulf is reflected in the action of the Arab states at their summit meeting in Amman, their unprecedented cooperation with us in the gulf, and the presence in the gulf of naval forces from five of our NATO allies. Prime Minister Shamir's [Prime Minister Yitzhak Shamir of Israel] recent statements strongly supporting our gulf posture and its contributions to stability and greater realism in the area also bear testimony to the wisdom of our approach. A critical element in the success of our policy is that our moderate Arab friends and our allies see the United States as being reliable.

The emergence of legislation in the Congress that would prohibit the sale of STINGER air defense missiles to countries with a legitimate need for them is a source of serious concern. The immediate target of the proposed amendment is a limited sale of STINGER to Bahrain.

For the past 40 years, Bahrain has been a good friend to the United States, consistently hosting our regional naval presence. In fact, it would have been impossible to accomplish this recent naval buildup in the gulf to protect U.S. flag ships from Iranian attack without the help of Bahrain. At the same time, Bahrain's extraordinary support for the United States has made it even more vulnerable to Iranian military threats.

Attacks against Bahrain could hit either U.S. or Bahraini targets, since U.S. ships and aircraft are frequent visitors at Bahrain's port and airfield. Improved Bahraini defense against such attacks would protect American force as well as Bahrain. The STINGER system is precisely what Bahrain needs to fill gaps in its defenses against the most likely threat, and no other system can do the job as well. U.S. Navy ships in the gulf are equipped with STINGER to defend against the very same Iranian aerial threat.

We fully share congressional concerns about preventing diversion of STINGER into hostile or terrorist hands, and so does Bahrain. That is why we have always insisted on reliable safeguards that rule out the possibility of transfer or diversion as an absolute precondition for any STINGER sale. Any government that will not accept such safeguards will not be sold STINGER. We must not forget that the likely alternative to careful, tight controlled and monitored STINGER sales to states who legitimately need them and with whom we have important defense relationships is a further proliferation of unsafeguarded, man-portable Soviet systems. That would create, not decrease, the terrorist threat in the area.

The Administration is actively seeking to work with Congress on the important issue to develop a mutually acceptable solution. The more we can cooperate in projecting an image of steadiness and resolve in the gulf, the more progress we are likely to make reassuring our friends, deterring our adversaries, and defending our vital interests in that critical region.

<sup>1</sup>Text from Weekly Compilation of Presidential Documents of Dec. 7, 1987.

# Refugees Worldwide and U.S. Foreign Policy: Reciprocal Impacts

Jonathan Moore

*Address before the World Affairs Council in Los Angeles on November 9, 1987. Ambassador Moore is Coordinator for Refugee Affairs.*

I want to discuss why refugee problems are not peripheral but are integral to U.S. foreign policy. I will set some general principles and cite specific applications, including recent firsthand observations in Africa and Asia. I will also review current accomplishments and project future efforts in refugee policy.

The attitude is expressed from time to time that "refugee policy" would be kept immune from "foreign policy" considerations, as if the former were pure and the latter tainted. This is tentatively incorrect. We can pursue refugee relief effectively only if we acknowledge the relationship—be it one of reinforcement or conflict—between refugee interests and other policy objectives. The task is to assure that there be reconciliation, not separation, that refugee concerns are not overridden by, but interact properly with, our commitments.

The United States has a historical, bipartisan, priority commitment to humanitarian assistance to refugees for reasons of reasons. Americans care about refugees because we are a compassionate people, because we ourselves are a nation of global ties, and because national interests abroad involve us inextricably in refugees' fate.

According to the UN High Commissioner for Refugees and our own count, there are some 12 million refugees throughout the world. The largest single population is the Afghans who have fled into Pakistan and Iran as a result of Soviet occupation. There are large numbers of Vietnamese, Cambodians, and Lao in first-asylum camps in Southeast Asia. Throughout the Continent of Africa, conflicts and crises continue to generate massive numbers of displaced people. Palestinians have been in camps throughout the Middle East for 40 years are joined by those fleeing continued fighting in Lebanon. There are refugees in several Central American countries who have fled the conflicts of that region. And

those who have risked everything to flee the Eastern bloc are being joined by increasing numbers of compatriots permitted to emigrate legally after long years of waiting.

The United States responds to the needs of refugees in many ways. One is through multilateral assistance to refugees in place. The U.S. Government this year will contribute more than \$200 million to refugee protection and relief. We channel this assistance through the UN High Commissioner for Refugees, the International Committee of the Red Cross, the Intergovernmental Committee for Migration, the UN Border Relief Operation, and the UN Relief and Works Agency, as well as dozens of nongovernmental voluntary organizations. Our funding provides basic protection, food, clothing, shelter, and health. Our leadership sets the standard for the rest of the world, but our contributions are multiplied more than threefold by those of others. When there is a shortfall in the U.S. contribution, that, too, is multiplied. This year we are looking at a shortfall of over \$15 million in our refugee relief account, and perhaps considerably more, depending on the outcome of the U.S. budget process.

We also encourage in various ways the countries of first asylum—themselves among the poorest in the world—to bear their refugee burdens. Without our assistance, the pressure to turn back refugees would be harder to resist. Our ability to advance basic human values and to influence broader global attitudes toward refugees is now diminished, however. U.S. foreign economic assistance has been reduced by over 25%. We are closing U.S. missions abroad and reducing the level of our presence. Secretary Shultz has described the current cutbacks as generating "our most serious foreign policy crisis." The lack of adequate foreign affairs resources pushes us toward retreat at the very time when the goals in which we believe are most in need of advancement.

Finally, the United States assists, along with other third countries, in resettling refugees by admitting some to become American citizens. Although this is a limited option, since less than 1% of the world's refugees are resettled in third countries in a given year, it is

proof of the core of our commitment, our society is enriched by their presence, and the intense need of a few is met by this program. Again, we are currently underfunded by over \$20 million to reach the 68,500 ceiling allocated worldwide for refugee admission to the United States in this fiscal year.

## Refugees Within U.S. Foreign Policy

Our international relations are multifaceted and interdependent. We seek to define our foreign policies in a manner consistent with our humanitarian traditions and instincts. Our ability to shape the future depends on our willingness to stay actively engaged in world affairs. We stand back at our material and spiritual peril.

In our intensely interconnected world, almost all societies are increasingly impacted by the flow of people. Refugees are virtually ubiquitous. They engage our domestic politics, our values and aspirations, and threats to our way of life. And U.S. refugee policy overlaps inseparably with human rights efforts, superpower competition, regional conflicts, security and economic pressures, and our long-term strategic interests.

U.S. attempts to advance human rights for people outside its borders directly involve our refugee admissions programs. When we press the right to emigrate from the Soviet Union for Jews, political dissidents, and relatives of foreign nationals, for instance, the legally authorized admissions ceilings, budgets, and processing of our refugee programs constitute the means by which they come to the United States.

Superpower ideological and security conflicts in the Third World affect refugees in the most fundamental ways. In Afghanistan and Cambodia, Soviet and Vietnamese troops are occupying the country, propping up puppet regimes. In Ethiopia, Nicaragua, and Angola, Soviet and Cuban military personnel are used to support authoritarian control. All of these situations have produced refugees. The number of Afghans who have fled their country since the Soviet invasion in 1979 today approaches 5 million. There are over a quarter of a million Cambodians living in destitute and perilous

conditions on the border with Thailand. Well over 1 million Ethiopians have fled drought and the Mengistu regime.

Some 400,000 refugees have left Angola. Fifty thousand Nicaraguans receive UN refugee assistance in neighboring countries, and many thousands more have sought refuge elsewhere, including the United States. These populations constitute the bulk of the world's refugees. To resolve their plight, there must be changes in the policies of the Soviets and their cohorts.

Insurgency struggles in various regions offer a profound example of the inseparability of foreign policy and refugees. Here some of the refugees are innocent victims of repression and violence, some are tenacious freedom fighters, and others are both. The United States supports democratic resistance forces fighting to achieve freedom as a principle and as a practical reality. Yet such conflicts are never clear cut: on the one hand, these conflicts generate refugees, while on the other hand, the refugees who participate in combat contribute to greater refugee flows. This is a tragic mix. In the midst of the turbulence, U.S. refugee efforts seek to protect refugees against forcible recruitment, the dangers of conflict zones, and the breakdown of access to food and supplies.

Refugee policies are also connected to security interests the United States shares bilaterally with a number of countries. Pakistan, Thailand, the Philippines, Somalia, Turkey, and Italy are countries with which we have various kinds of security relationships and which also struggle with varying degrees of refugee pressures requiring international help. Each bilateral relationship is multifaceted, involving a reciprocal mix of interests and responsibilities, and our security and humanitarian purposes are constrained by the sovereignty of each independent state.

Frequently, endemic refugee problems threaten to perpetuate political instability and economic stagnation. Particularly in Africa, large, seemingly permanent populations of homeless refugees and continuing flows of new refugees menace long-term peace and growth.

Finally, refugees and foreign policy are inextricably linked in terms of long-term progress in attacking the strategic root causes of refugee generation: political oppression, violence, and poverty. Without alleviating these phenomena, we cannot heal their sad product. This

is the most awesome linkage of all. And the absolutely essential assistance and protection for refugees in place, if left by itself, will perpetuate homelessness and destitution and engender dependency and resentment. Immediate assistance to refugees must be reinforced and eventually replaced by permanent homes and improvement in the conditions which caused their dislocation. We—the United States, the international community, humankind—have a poor record with these kinds of endeavors, which constitute the ultimate goals of foreign policy.

## Specific Intricacies in Africa and Asia

Accordingly, U.S. refugee programs interact with various other policy interests in specific situations around the globe. Let me cite a few key illustrations in Africa and Asia, where I have recently visited.

**Africa.** The continuing crisis in Ethiopia—where civil war, recurring famine, and government-imposed relocation schemes have caused hundreds of thousands to flee—creates a conflict for U.S. policy. Where we might wish to ostracize or impose sanctions on Addis Ababa for its treatment of its citizens, the international conscience requires that aid be provided, even though it is known that some of it will be kept by the military administrators or interrupted by rebels and never reach the needy. In Sudan, the U.S. refugee program apparatus played a significant role in getting relief to the Ethiopian political refugees and famine victims during the drought crisis 2 years ago. This aid effort advanced our foreign policy by shoring up a fragile government where a general breakdown might have threatened democracy from within or without.

In Somalia, with a per capita GNP [gross national product] of \$260, hundreds of thousands of refugees face the disruptions and dangers of ongoing fighting over the border and the prospect of staying permanently in camps unless there is voluntary repatriation to Ethiopia or permanent local resettlement in Somalia. The progress is slow, and more outside resources are needed. As senior officials in Mogadishu said to me, "A child born in a camp assumes he will live there and be fed forever.... We are creating parasites if we only leave them there." And the leader of Jalalqaqi camp #2 lamented that after

8 years, "The problems which have caused us to be here are not yet resolved."

Similarly, political, economic, and military crises in southern Africa have generated hundreds of thousands of Mozambican refugees, whose presence greatly burdens neighboring Zimbabwe and Malawi.

Overall U.S. goals in the region are to resolve conflicts without foreign intervention and to increase stability in which market-oriented economic activity and basic democratic political institutions have a chance to develop. Our refugee assistance programs, coordinated by international organizations, play a critical role in promoting this stability. Assistance to the victims of conflicts, both refugees outside their country of origin and persons displaced within their own nations, constitutes a major element of U.S. policy in Africa. Yet at present, the international and domestic resources available for relief efforts actually contribute little to the development needs of these societies.

**Asia.** In Thailand, the maintenance of first asylum in the face of large numbers of long stayers depends on the continuation of U.S. resettlement. The problems between our ally and its communist neighbors as well as continued political oppression within the societies make repatriation efforts very difficult. In Phanat Nikhom camp, a former major in the South Vietnamese army said: "Anyone who'll receive us I'll go. But not Laos or China or another communist country." Problems are especially intense along the Thai-Cambodian border, where the exigencies of refugee life in extremely crowded Khmer camps, exposure to security dangers from within, and vulnerability to the war nearby make the present miserable and the future bleak. Here is the dilemma of an insurgency which must protect its casualties as more of them are generated.

Continuing humanitarian attention to the needs of the refugee families in Pakistan is essential to a viable political settlement ending the Soviet occupation of Afghanistan. At the Jaluzai camp near Peshawar, the elders implored: "Kindly convey our thanks to the American people for their timely and generous assistance. Do not get tired. The tensions generated within the local Pakistani population by the presence of almost 3 million Afghan refugees is of crucial sensitivity, both to the treatment of the refugees and to the pros-



for an end to the war. At present, help, tolerance, and mutual support exist, and this mightiest of refugee assistance enterprises continues.

#### Recent Progress Future Efforts

We review some recent and ongoing accomplishments in help for refugees in the United States has actively contributed:

- Establishment of effective relief programs for massive numbers of refugees fleeing Mozambique, particularly Malawi;
- Voluntary repatriation of large numbers of refugees from eastern and northern Honduras to Nicaragua and El Salvador;
- Resumption of the orderly departure program from Vietnam, including Vietnamese, after Hanoi suspended inflows for 18 months;
- Efforts to strengthen protection processing for Cambodians at the I-Dang and border camps in Thailand;
- Initiation of a U.S. admissions program for refugees in Latin America and resumption of the special program for Cubans;
- Lifting of blocked exit visas, allowing hundreds of Ethiopian refugees to settle in the United States from 1980 to 1981;
- Sustained assistance to the 4 million Palestinian refugees through ongoing support for UNRWA, the UN Relief and Works Agency;
- Continuance of the giant relief support program for 3 million Afghan refugees in Pakistan, almost 10 years after the Soviet invasion;
- Effective response to the increased numbers of emigrating Jews and Armenians from the Soviet Union;

• Close monitoring of international organizations to ensure effective management and use of scarce financial resources.

Future commitment by the United States to the cause of refugees, in the event of prolonged flows and restricted resources, must be based on the seven fundamental efforts now underway:

- The care, maintenance, and protection of refugees in place;
- Pursuit of the three "durable solutions": voluntary repatriation, local integration, and third-country settlement;

• Tenacious diplomacy with countries of first asylum to encourage continued humanitarian treatment of refugees;

• Discouragement of flows of economic migrants to the extent feasible; and

• Attack on the root causes of refugees by the advancement of human rights, the just settlement of insurgency wars, and the alleviation of desperate poverty.

Beyond these basic activities, I would add the following priorities to our refugee policy agenda:

- Greater resources, both from the United States and through international burdensharing;
- Development of programs in country of origin for returning refugees in voluntary repatriation;
- Better capacity to get food and other relief safely through battle lines to refugees isolated by violence;
- Improved protection measures for exploited refugees by the international community;
- A refined, long-term, multilateral framework for dealing with the ongoing problem of Indochinese refugees;
- Integration of refugee assistance and aid programs to impacted local populations, emphasizing self-sufficiency and income generation, education, and economic development;
- Legislation creating a category for persons of special humanitarian concern who do not qualify as refugees or immigrants; and
- The shift of the executive-congressional consultations on admissions ceilings from September to June so they can be more deliberative and avoid last-minute scheduling problems prior to the beginning of the new fiscal year on October 1st.

#### Conclusion

These two lists demonstrate clearly that what we have already accomplished, although crucial, is inadequate and what we're committed to doing ahead of us will be extremely difficult to achieve. This calls attention to our most powerful resource and another aspect of refugee policy which is integral to foreign policy generally: our values and ideals.

The idealism inherent in refugee policy not only is essential to its own success but also can contribute to the character and conduct of overall foreign

policy. The injection of idealism from a part into the whole body of policy can have an enlightening and empowering effect. We must include our most precious values to have progressive international leadership which otherwise might be too susceptible to chauvinism or realpolitik. To divorce foreign policy from the voyage of the human spirit would be folly. A dynamic commitment to humanitarian assistance to refugees is one way of avoiding this. ■

## U.S. International Space Cooperation

by Michael A.G. Michaud

*Statement before the Subcommittee on Space Science and Applications of the House Committee on Science, Space, and Technology on December 10, 1987. Mr. Michaud is Acting Deputy Assistant Secretary for Oceans and International Environmental and Scientific Affairs.<sup>1</sup>*

Thank you for inviting us to testify today on the important subject of international cooperation and competition in space.

We welcome the effort by the National Aeronautics and Space Administration (NASA) Advisory Council Task Force to address international relations in space. The report is timely and addresses significant issues related to U.S. foreign policy. The report correctly emphasizes that the international environment for space activity has changed significantly since the late 1960s, when the United States clearly was the world leader in this field. Other space powers are challenging our position of leadership in several fields of space activity. This is a matter of foreign policy concern.

#### U.S. Civil Space Program: An Asset

Our civil space program has been a great asset to us in our foreign relations. It has symbolized our scientific and technological strength, our boldness in responding to challenges, and our openness as a society, and it has brought us international respect. It has made us an attractive partner for cooperation and has enabled us to offer to other countries a more appealing al-

ternative than dependence on the Soviet Union for access to space and the use of the space environment.

### Need for Long-Term Goals

We agree with the advisory council's view that the United States needs to define long-term goals in space and to have a sound long-term space program. It is important to do these things in order to sustain the position of the United States as a world leader in science and technology.

We also agree with the report's strong endorsement of continuing international cooperation in space. In our view, there are very real benefits to the United States from well-designed cooperative efforts. They can:

- Encourage other nations to associate their space activities with ours over the longer term;
- Increase the financial and human resources in support of the U.S. program, as in the space station;
- Increase the scientific return from space science projects and provide access to scientific data not available from U.S. domestic systems;
- Enable us to gain access to and communicate with foreign scientific and technological personnel and gain insights into foreign programs;
- Turn foreign institutions toward U.S. suppliers of goods and services, attracting commerce and opening markets, as it did in the case of communication satellites;
- Open opportunities for cooperation in other areas, such as telecommunications, and establish models for such cooperation;
- Enable us to respond to the priority needs of friendly foreign governments, such as Indonesia's ability to maintain telecommunications among its many islands;
- Assist the economic development of less developed countries through such applications as satellite communications and remote sensing and encourage them to look to the United States to advance their own science and technology; and
- Increase our ability to influence international practice, international law, and international institutions in the space area.

Our ability to gain these benefits depends on the strength of the civil space program. A vigorous civil space program is important to help create opportunities to advance our foreign policy interests through space cooperation.

It is the civil program that enables the United States to be an attractive partner for cooperation and to demonstrate our leadership and dynamism in a highly visible way.

### Cooperation in the Space Station

I would like to make special mention of international cooperation in the space station. This project is visionary not only in the technical sense but also in the political sense. It is the largest science and technology project in which we have sought international cooperation. If we are successful in our negotiations, this project could establish a powerful new model for cooperation between the United States and friendly nations.

### U.S. Leadership Role

I would like to close with some remarks about leadership, another issue addressed in the advisory council report. From the point of view of the foreign policymaker, international leadership has some intangible elements that are not easy to define. There is no better example of this than space leadership. It is not just a matter of counting launches or comparing space budgets.

Our scientific and technological competence, and our bold vision of what is possible, have strengthened the perception that the United States is the most influential shaper of the human future, the nation most worth emulating, the most attractive partner for association and cooperation, and the nation best able to provide high technology goods and services. There are many scientific and technological activities that influence those perceptions. But civil space activities, because of their unique visibility and impact on public opinion, remain flagships of the American scientific and technological enterprise.

The space shuttle, by carrying American and foreign astronauts into space, became a highly visible symbol of our technological leadership; other nations are proud to fly with us. We expect the space station to bring similar benefits.

In addition, our space science missions have been a symbol to the world of our scientific excellence and adventurous spirit. We have pioneered the exploration of the solar system and the use of orbiting astronomical observatories. We expect that future major space science missions, such as the Hubble space telescope and the Galileo mission

to Jupiter (both of which involve international cooperation) will reassert American leadership in this field.

Our space achievements, and the perception that we have preeminence in the key areas of space activity critical to achieving our national goals, have been important elements of our world leadership. My Department hopes that we will not allow our leadership in space to erode, as that can only diminish the ability of the United States to influence world affairs.

In the end, we diplomats have no choice but to play the hands we are dealt. We ask those who will decide the future of the American civil space program to give us the strongest hand they can.

The complete transcript of the hearing will be published by the committee and will be available from the Superintendent of Documents, U.S. Government Printing Office, Washington, D.C. 20402. ■

## Afghanistan

### PRESIDENT'S STATEMENT, DEC. 27, 1987<sup>1</sup>

This is the time of year when Americans gather in the company of their families and friends, make resolutions for the New Year, and reflect on the year gone by. It is precisely at this time, when we are thankful for our blessings of liberty, that we should remember the valiant struggle of a brave people located far from our shores.

Eight years ago—on December 1979—the Soviet Union invaded Afghanistan in an unprovoked and blatant affront to both human decency and international law. The Soviets promptly installed a series of puppet dictators and since then have attempted ruthlessly and systematically to destroy the ability of the Afghan people to resist. Despite 8 years of occupation, they have not been able to subdue the proud people of Afghanistan.

Some 5 million Afghans have felt the ravages of this Soviet war on the homeland and the oppression the Soviet Army has imposed. As many as 1 million Afghans have been killed. In destroying crops, factories, homes, schools, and mosques, the Soviet Union has sought to deprive its enemy—the whole Afghan nation—of the means to support and feed themselves, to sustain their culture and their faith, and thereby to bring them to their knees.

## Situation in the Occupied Territories

by Herbert S. Okun

*Statement made before the UN Security Council on December 22, 1987. Ambassador Okun is U.S. Deputy Permanent Representative to the United Nations.*

The United States has watched with profound concern the explosion of violence in the West Bank and Gaza over the past 2 weeks. My government is deeply grieved by the extensive loss of life and the large number of people who have been wounded in the demonstrations. The international media have made all of us keenly aware of the deep feelings of Palestinians and Israelis and of the great dangers to peace in the Middle East.

In determining its position on the resolution before the Security Council today, the United States has taken careful note of the underlying conditions that have led to the unfortunate and tragic events of recent days in the West Bank and Gaza.

The state of war, now in its 40th year, and the occupation, now in its 21st year, inevitably exact a toll on the 1.5 million Palestinians in the West Bank and Gaza as well as on the people of Israel. In the absence of peace and political agreement, the prevailing atmosphere is one of tension and mutual mistrust. This environment has again produced protest demonstrations, acts of violence by both sides, and unacceptably harsh measures by Israeli occupation authorities to restore security. To the best of my government's knowledge, these demonstrations were spontaneous expressions of frustration, and not externally sponsored.

The situation in the occupied territories is clearly unsatisfactory to Palestinians, Israelis, and the international community. It has fluctuated between periods of calm and periods of unrest. Tensions have been chronic and increasing, especially in the refugee camps and among younger Palestinians. This latest eruption of violent confrontation is a forceful reminder of the unresolved political status of the West Bank and Gaza as well as of the deep frustration of the Palestinian people whose daily lives are so profoundly affected.

These events inevitably have serious implications for the cause of peace. Violence impedes efforts to promote an atmosphere conducive to reconciliation and dialogue, not merely between Israelis and Palestinians, but between Israel and its other Arab neighbors as well. Over the years, provocations and harsh reprisals have inhibited those concerned from addressing the fundamental issue of how to find ways to achieve a just and lasting solution to the Palestinian issue. The United States has expressed these concerns in this forum, in its public statements, and in its diplomatic representations.

The United States has abstained on the resolution before the council for several reasons. The views of the United States on the use of live fire in certain circumstances are clearly known. However, this resolution, in addition to deploring this practice, goes beyond this in its first operative paragraph to a generalized criticism of Israeli policies and practices. The United States has repeatedly made known its view that Israel should meet its obligations under the Geneva conventions. The resolution, however, ignores the fact that Israeli lives are also at risk and that Israeli security forces have been faced by provocations and, in some cases, life threatening situations.

My delegation believes that the council should refrain from polemics in dealing with these tragic events. The challenge before all members of the council is how to assist in the search for a mutually acceptable political settlement of the Arab-Israeli conflict that will enable Israelis and Palestinians, and indeed people throughout the region, to live in peace and security.

USUN press release 131. ■

But the Afghan people will not be coerced. With an abiding faith in God and a passionate love of freedom, they have shown the world what price freedom are willing to pay to remain free.

They remind us that freedom is a gift but a cherished prize to be guarded and preserved by ceaseless struggle.

On a number of occasions, I have urged the Soviet leadership to explore opportunities to bring peace to Afghanistan. We have welcomed recent statements of an intent to withdraw. Unfortunately their deeds have not matched their words. General Secretary Gorbachev and I discussed this during our recent meetings here in Washington. At that time, I asked to announce a timetable for troop withdrawal, including dates when this withdrawal would begin and end. I call again on the Soviet Union to translate its declared intentions into reality by promptly and irrevocably withdrawing all Soviet forces from Afghanistan. Let 1988 be the year of freedom, the year that will see the Soviet Union end once and for all its brutal occupation of Afghanistan.

After 8 long years and despite unremitting efforts, the Soviets have failed to defeat the Afghan resistance on the battlefield. At the same time, the world has repeatedly and clearly called for the prompt withdrawal of all Soviet troops. The United States most recently approved by a two-thirds vote resolutions against the Soviet occupation and abuse of human rights in Afghanistan.

The people of Afghanistan have, as often as any people in history, won the right to freedom and independence. We applaud their commitment and steadfastness, for their cause is the cause of freedom for people everywhere. Let us pray that in the year to come, a free and independent Afghanistan will again find its place among the community of nations.

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Text from Weekly Compilation of Presidential Documents of Jan. 4, 1988. ■

## Israeli Deportations

*Following are statements by Herbert S. Okun, U.S. Deputy Permanent Representative to the United Nations, on January 5, 1988, and Vernon A. Walters, U.S. Permanent Representative to the United Nations, on January 14, before the Security Council, and the texts of two UN Security Council resolutions adopted on those days.*

### AMBASSADOR OKUN'S STATEMENT<sup>1</sup>

Over the last month the U.S. Government has followed with deep concern the outbreak of violence in the West Bank and the Gaza Strip. The United States recognizes that Israeli authorities have the responsibility to maintain order in the occupied territories and have the right to insist that the law is obeyed. But, as officials of the United States have said both publicly and in diplomatic representations, the actions of the occupying power must be in accordance with international law and practice.

On January 3, the Israeli Government announced its intention to deport nine Palestinian civilians whom it has identified as leaders of recent or other disturbances.

The view of the United States is that deportation of individuals from the occupied territories is a violation of Article 49 of the Fourth Geneva Convention which prohibits individual or mass forcible transfers "regardless of their motive." The United States further believes that such harsh measures are unnecessary to maintain order. They also serve to increase tension rather than contribute to the creation of a political atmosphere conducive to reconciliation and negotiation. We have, therefore, voted for the resolution which calls upon Israel to refrain from carrying out the envisaged deportations.

The United States hopes that this matter will be reconsidered by the Government of Israel. As we have stated in

the past, the United States regards the phrase "Palestinian and other Arab territories occupied by Israel since 1967, including Jerusalem," which appears in this resolution, as being merely demographically and geographically descriptive and not indicative of sovereignty.

### SECURITY COUNCIL RESOLUTION 607<sup>2</sup>

*The Security Council,*

*Recalling its resolution 605 (1987) of 22 December 1987,*

*Expressing grave concern over the situation in the occupied Palestinian territories,*

*Having been apprised of the decision of Israel, the occupying Power, to "continue the deportation" of Palestinian civilians in the occupied territories,*

*Recalling the Geneva Convention relative to the protection of civilian persons in time of war, of 12 August 1949, and in particular articles 47 and 49 of same,*

1. *Reaffirms once again* that the Geneva Convention relative to the protection of civilian persons in time of war, of 12 August 1949, is applicable to Palestinian and other Arab territories, occupied by Israel since 1967, including Jerusalem;

2. *Calls upon* Israel to refrain from deporting any Palestinian civilians from the occupied territories;

3. *Strongly requests* Israel, the occupying Power, to abide by its obligations arising from the Convention;

4. *Decides* to keep the situation in the Palestinian and other Arab territories occupied by Israel since 1967, including Jerusalem, under review.

### AMBASSADOR WALTER'S STATEMENT<sup>3</sup>

The U.S. position against Israeli deportations from the occupied territories is clear and unambiguous. It has been stated on numerous occasions and was most recently reflected in our vote in favor of Security Council Resolution 607 and in our subsequent explanation of that vote. We deeply regret the deportations that have taken place, and we urge Israel to avoid further deportations.

The United States abstained on the present resolution because we believe that repeatedly raising this issue in the Security Council does not assist the process of restoring calm to the territories or in addressing the problems that have contributed to the recent disturbances.

We also note that in this case the four individuals who had been deported declined to appeal to the Israeli Supreme Court and did not, therefore, follow the judicial process to run its course. While we do not minimize the seriousness of these deportations, we do not believe that selective attention to this issue in the Security Council is justified.

The United States does not believe that repeatedly raising this issue in the Security Council serves a useful purpose.

### SECURITY COUNCIL RESOLUTION 608<sup>4</sup>

*The Security Council,*

*Reaffirming its resolution 607 (1987) of 5 January 1988,*

*Expressing its deep regret* that Israel, the occupying Power, has, in defiance of that resolution, deported Palestinian civilians,

1. *Calls upon* Israel to rescind the order to deport Palestinian civilians and ensure the safe and immediate return to the occupied Palestinian territories of those already deported;

2. *Requests* that Israel desist forthwith from deporting any other Palestinian civilians from the occupied territories;

3. *Decides* to keep the situation in the Palestinian and other Arab territories occupied by Israel since 1967, including Jerusalem, under review.

<sup>1</sup>USUN press release 1.

<sup>2</sup>Adopted by a unanimous vote.

<sup>3</sup>USUN press release 2.

<sup>4</sup>Adopted by a vote of 14 to 0, with (U.S.) abstention. ■

## U.S. Support for Democracy in Chile

DEPARTMENT STATEMENT,  
27, 1987<sup>1</sup>

its long and profound democratic tradition is a resource on which the Chilean people will draw in their return to government by majority rule. The United States believes that if given the chance to select their leaders under conditions marked by respect for basic guarantees and freedoms, the people of Chile will soon once again take their rightful place in the community of democratic nations.

The people and Government of the United States share the aspiration of the Chilean people to have full democracy restored in their country. Two centuries of experience with representative government have convinced us that this is best accomplished when the will of the people is expressed freely and fully in elections. The fuller the observance of basic human and civil rights in the period leading up to and during the election, the greater will be the legitimacy of its outcome. This is totally in keeping with the tradition of Chile it-

self, a country that was long at the forefront of democracy in this hemisphere.

For the ideal of popular sovereignty to become reality in Chile, the United States believes that a climate of freedom and fair competition must be established many months before the actual balloting takes place. This atmosphere would be marked by easy and equitable access to the mass media, especially television, by unrestricted discussion of political issues, broad freedom of assembly, early announcement of the rules of any electoral proceeding, facilitation of registration by prospective voters, and freedom for citizens and political groups to campaign peacefully in favor of their ideas. States of exception which limit freedom of assembly, association, and expression are not compatible with a legitimate electoral procedure.

<sup>1</sup>Read to news correspondents by Department spokesman Charles Redman. ■

## Haitian Election

DEPARTMENT STATEMENT,  
25, 1988<sup>1</sup>

The new government in Haiti will take steps with a significant credibility prob-

leem at home and abroad. These actions do not signal the fulfillment of democratic transition. We have criticized the Haitian elections on a number of occasions and on a number of occasions. We hope that Mr. Manigat's administration will take the necessary

steps to build a free and fair democratic system under civilian control and will dedicate itself to economic development and respect for human rights.

Mr. Manigat is a distinguished political scientist with a long record of opposition to dictatorship.

<sup>1</sup>Made available to news correspondents by Department spokesman Charles Redman. ■

## Current Actions

### MULTILATERAL

#### Aviation

International air services transit agreement. Signed at Chicago, Dec. 7, 1944. Entered into force Jan. 20, 1945; for the U.S., Feb. 8, 1945. 59 Stat. 1693.

Acceptance deposited: Vanuatu, Jan. 14, 1988.

#### Fisheries

Treaty on South Pacific fisheries, with annexes and agreed statement. Done at Port Moresby, Apr. 2, 1987.<sup>1</sup> [Senate] Treaty Doc. 100-5.

Instrument of ratification signed by the President: Dec. 21, 1987.

Amended annex to the international convention of May 9, 1952, as amended, for the high seas fisheries of the North Pacific Ocean (TIAS 2786, 5385, 9242). Done at Vancouver, Apr. 9, 1986. Entered into force May 23, 1986.

Memorandum of understanding concerning enforcement relating to the international convention of May 9, 1952, as amended, for the high seas fisheries of the North Pacific Ocean (TIAS 2786, 5385, 9242). Signed at Vancouver, Apr. 9, 1986. Entered into force Apr. 9, 1986.

Memorandum of understanding concerning salmonid research relating to the international convention of May 9, 1952, as amended, for the high seas fisheries of the North Pacific Ocean (TIAS 2786, 5385, 9242). Signed at Vancouver, Apr. 9, 1986. Entered into force Apr. 9, 1986. Parties: Canada, Japan, U.S.

#### Human Rights

American convention on human rights. Done at San Jose, Nov. 22, 1969. Entered into force July 18, 1978.<sup>2</sup> Accession deposited: Suriname, Nov. 12, 1987.<sup>3</sup>

#### Marine Pollution

International convention for the prevention of pollution of the sea by oil, with annexes. Done at London, May 12, 1954. Entered into force July 26, 1958; for the U.S., Dec. 8, 1961. TIAS 4900.

Denunciation: Australia, Oct. 14, 1987; effective Oct. 14, 1988.

International convention on the establishment of an international fund for compensation for oil pollution damage. Done at Brussels, Dec. 18, 1971. Entered into force Oct. 16, 1978.<sup>2</sup>

Accession deposited: Ivory Coast, Oct. 5, 1987.

Annex V to the international convention for the prevention of pollution from ships, 1973. Done at London, Nov. 2, 1973.<sup>1</sup> [Senate] Treaty Doc. 100-3.

Ratification deposited: U.S., Dec. 30, 1987.

Protocol of 1978 relating to the international convention for the prevention of pollution from ships, 1973. Done at London, Feb. 17, 1978. Entered into force Oct. 2, 1983.

Accession deposited: Portugal, Oct. 22, 1987.

#### Maritime Matters

International convention on tonnage measurement of ships, 1969, with annexes. Done at London, June 23, 1969. Entered into force July 18, 1982; for the U.S., Feb. 10, 1983. TIAS 10490.

Accession deposited: Ivory Coast, Oct. 5, 1987.

Convention on the international regulations for preventing collisions at sea, with regulations. Done at London, Oct. 20, 1972. Entered into force July 15, 1977. TIAS 8587.

Accession deposited: Ivory Coast, Oct. 5, 1987.

International convention for the safety of life at sea, 1974, with annex. Done at London, Nov. 1, 1974. Entered into force May 25, 1980. TIAS 9700.

Accession deposited: Ivory Coast, Oct. 5, 1987.

Protocol of 1978 relating to the international convention for the safety of life at sea, 1974 (TIAS 9700). Done at London, Feb. 17, 1978. Entered into force May 1, 1981. TIAS 10009.

Accession deposited: Ivory Coast, Oct. 5, 1987.

International convention on standards of training, certification and watchkeeping for seafarers, 1978. Done at London, July 7, 1978. Entered into force Apr. 28, 1984.<sup>2</sup>

Accession deposited: Italy, Aug. 26, 1987; Ivory Coast, Oct. 5, 1987; Venezuela, Oct. 13, 1987.

International convention on maritime search and rescue, 1979. Done at Hamburg, Apr. 27, 1979. Entered into force June 22, 1985.

Accession deposited: Ivory Coast, Oct. 5, 1987.

#### Postal

Constitution of the Universal Postal Union, with final protocol. Done at Vienna, July 10, 1964; entered into force Jan. 1, 1966. TIAS 5881. Additional protocol. Done at Tokyo, Nov. 14, 1969. Entered into force July 1, 1971. TIAS 7150. Second additional protocol. Done at Lausanne, July 5, 1974. Entered into force Jan. 1, 1976. TIAS 8231. Accessions deposited: St. Christopher and Nevis, Nov. 26, 1987.

Third additional protocol to the constitution of the Universal Postal Union of July 10, 1964, general regulations with annex, and the universal postal convention with final protocol and detailed regulations. Done at Hamburg, July 27, 1984. Entered into force Jan. 1, 1986; for the U.S., June 6, 1986.

Ratifications deposited: Chile, Aug. 24, 1987; Hungary, Aug. 24, 1987; Norway, Dec. 10, 1987; Sri Lanka, Sept. 10, 1987. Accession deposited: St. Christopher and Nevis, Nov. 26, 1987.<sup>1</sup>

Money orders and postal travellers' checks agreement, with detailed regulations with final protocol. Done at Hamburg, July 27, 1984. Entered into force June 6, 1986; for the U.S., June 6, 1986.

Ratifications deposited: Chile, Aug. 24, 1987; Sri Lanka, Sept. 10, 1987.

Approvals deposited: Hungary, July 27, 1987; Norway, Dec. 10, 1987.

Accession deposited: St. Christopher and Nevis, Nov. 26, 1987.

Postal parcels agreement with final protocol and detailed regulations. Done at Hamburg, July 27, 1984. Entered into force Jan. 1, 1986; for the U.S., June 6, 1986.

Ratifications deposited: Chile, Aug. 24, 1987; Sri Lanka, Sept. 10, 1987.

Approvals deposited: Hungary, July 27, 1987; Norway, Dec. 10, 1987.

Accession deposited: St. Christopher and Nevis, Nov. 26, 1987.<sup>1</sup>

#### Rubber

International natural rubber agreement, 1987, with annexes. Done at Geneva, Mar. 20, 1987.<sup>1</sup> [Senate] Treaty Doc. 100-9. Signatures: China, Dec. 1, 1987; Thailand, Dec. 23, 1987.

Ratifications deposited: China, Jan. 6, 1988.

#### Satellite Communications Systems

Convention on the International Maritime Satellite Organization (INMARSAT), with annex. Done at London, Sept. 3, 1976. Entered into force July 16, 1979. TIAS 9605.

Operating agreement on the International Maritime Satellite Organization (INMARSAT), with annex. Done at London, Sept. 3, 1976. Entered into force July 16, 1979. TIAS 9605.

Accessions deposited: Colombia, Oct. 28, 1987; Israel, Oct. 13, 1987; Panama, Oct. 26, 1987; Peru, Oct. 30, 1987; Qatar, Sept. 28, 1987.

#### Space

Convention on international liability for damage caused by space objects. Done at Washington, London, and Moscow, Mar. 29, 1972. Entered into force Sept. 1, 1972; for the U.S., Oct. 9, 1973. TIAS 7762.

Declaration of acceptance deposited: European Telecommunications Satellite Organization (EUTELSAT), Jan. 26, 1988.

#### Trade

United Nations convention on contracts for the international sale of goods. Done at Vienna, Apr. 11, 1980. Entered into force Jan. 1, 1988. [52 Fed. Reg. 6262]

Accession deposited: Mexico, Dec. 29, 1987.

Ratification deposited: Austria, Dec. 29, 1987.

## BILATERAL

### Argentina

Agreement amending agreement of July 20, 1950 (TIAS 2088), for relief from dou taxation on earnings derived from operation of ships and aircraft. Effected by exchange of notes at Washington, Dec. 30, 1987. Entered into force provisionally Dec. 30, 1987; definitively on date of late notification that respective constitutional requirements have been satisfied; effect with respect to taxable years beginning or after January 1, 1987.

### Australia

Agreement amending the air transport agreement of Dec. 3, 1946, as amended (TIAS 1574, 3880). Effected by exchange notes at Washington, Dec. 22, 1987. Entered into force Dec. 22, 1987.

### Belgium

Supplementary protocol modifying and supplementing the convention of July 9, 1970 (TIAS 7463), for the avoidance of double taxation and the prevention of fiscal evasion with respect to taxes on income with exchange of notes. Signed at Washington, Dec. 31, 1987. Enters into force the fifteenth day after exchange of ratifications; effective with respect to dividend interest, and royalties credited or paid or after Jan. 1, 1988.

Treaty on mutual legal assistance in criminal matters, with attachment. Signed at Washington, Jan. 28, 1988. Enters into force on the first day of the second month after the exchange of instruments of ratification.

### Canada

Agreement with respect to imports into the United States of certain specialty products from Canada, with annexes. Signed at Washington, Oct. 19, 1987. Entered into force Oct. 19, 1987.

Free-trade agreement, with exchanges letters. Signed at Ottawa, Washington, Palm Springs, Dec. 22 and 23, 1987, and Jan. 2, 1988. Enters into force Jan. 1, 1988 upon exchange of notes certifying the completion of necessary legal procedures.

Protocol amending the treaty on extradition of Dec. 3, 1971, as amended (TIAS 8237), with exchange of letters. Signed Ottawa, Jan. 11, 1988. Enters into force upon the exchange of instruments of ratification.

Agreement on Arctic cooperation. Signed at Ottawa, Jan. 11, 1988. Entered into force Jan. 11, 1988.

### Cape Verde

Agreement concerning the provision of training related to defense articles under the U.S. International Military Education and Training (IMET) Program. Effectuated by exchange of notes at Praia, Dec. 9 and 1987. Entered into force Dec. 16, 1987.

ment relating to the establishment of a Peace Corps program in the Comoros. Entered into force Dec. 22, 1987.

**Rica**  
Agreement relating to trade in cotton and made fiber textiles and textile products with annexes. Effected by exchange of notes at San Jose, Nov. 25 and Dec. 14, 1987. Entered into force Dec. 14, 1987; effective June 1, 1987.

Agreement extending provisional application of the maritime boundary agreement of Oct. 16, 1977. Effected by exchange of notes at Washington, Dec. 16 and 21, 1987. Entered into force Dec. 21, 1987; effective Jan. 1, 1988.

**Trinidad and Tobago**  
Agreement extending the agreement of Dec. 25, 1985, as extended, concerning a Caribbean American Fund for the exchange of technology.<sup>5</sup> Effected by exchange of notes at Copenhagen, Dec. 29, 1987, and Jan. 7, 1988. Entered into force Jan. 7, 1988.

**Turkey**  
Agreement between the U.S. Treasury and the Central Bank of Ecuador, with an annex. Signed at Washington and entered into force Dec. 3, 1987.

**United States of America**  
Agreement regarding mutual assistance in customs matters. Signed at Washington, Dec. 1, 1988. Enters into force 90 days after the parties have notified each other that all necessary legal requirements have been fulfilled.

**United States of America and Sri Lanka**  
Agreement relating to agreement of May 2, 1987, for sales of agricultural commodities. Signed at Georgetown, Nov. 25, 1987. Entered into force Nov. 25, 1987.

**United States of America and Mexico**  
Memorandum of understanding concerning principles governing mutual cooperation in economic and development, scientist and engineer exchange, procurement and logistical support of defense equipment, with annexes. Signed at Washington, Dec. 14, 1987. Entered into force Dec. 14, 1987.

**United States of America and Japan**  
Memorandum of understanding regarding the consolidation and scheduling of certain debts owed to the United States, guaranteed by, or insured by the U.S. Government and its agencies, with annexes. Signed at Kingston, Nov. 12, 1987. Entered into force Jan. 7, 1988.

Agreement amending agreement of Nov. 9, 1987, for sale of agricultural commodities. Effected by exchange of notes at Kingston, Jan. 5 and 6, 1988. Entered into force Jan. 6, 1988.

**Japan**  
Agreement relating to limitation of imports of specialty steel, with annexes and agreed minutes. Effected by exchange of letters at Washington, Oct. 20, 1987. Entered into force Oct. 20, 1987.

Agreement extending the joint determination of Oct. 30, 1981, as extended (TIAS 10294), for reprocessing of special nuclear material of U.S. origin. Effected by exchange of notes at Tokyo, Dec. 24, 1987. Entered into force Dec. 24, 1987.

Agreement amending agreement of Nov. 8, 1983 (TIAS 10835), for the transfer of defense-related technologies. Effected by exchange of notes at Tokyo, Jan. 8, 1988. Entered into force Jan. 8, 1988.

**Korea**  
Agreement relating to limitation of imports of specialty steel, with annexes and agreed minutes. Effected by exchange of letters at Washington, Oct. 20, 1987. Entered into force Oct. 20, 1987.

**Mexico**  
Agreement concerning the provision of training related to defense articles under the U.S. International Military Education and Training (IMET) Program. Effected by exchange of notes at Mexico, Aug. 21 and Sept. 24, 1987. Entered into force Sept. 24, 1987.

Agreement extending the air transport agreement of Aug. 15, 1960, as amended and extended (TIAS 4675, 7167), and the agreement of Jan. 20, 1978, as extended (TIAS 10115), relating to reduced air fares and charter air services. Effected by exchange of notes at Mexico, Dec. 17 and 18, 1987. Entered into force Dec. 18, 1987; effective Jan. 1, 1988.

**Netherlands**  
Agreement on social security, with administrative arrangement. Signed at The Hague, Dec. 8, 1987. Enters into force on the first day of the third month following the date of the last notification by the parties of completion of their respective statutory and constitutional procedures.

**Poland**  
Agreement amending and extending agreement of Oct. 18, 1983, relating to limitation of imports of specialty steel. Effected by exchange of letters at Washington, Oct. 19, 1987. Entered into force Oct. 19, 1987.

**Spain**  
Agreement amending and extending agreement of Oct. 18, 1983, relating to limitation of imports of specialty steel. Effected by exchange of letters at Washington, Oct. 19, 1987. Entered into force Oct. 19, 1987.

**Sri Lanka**  
Agreement relating to agreement of Nov. 13, 1986, for sales of agricultural commodities. Signed at Colombo, Dec. 3, 1987. Entered into force Dec. 3, 1987.

**Supreme Headquarters Allied Powers Europe (SHAPE)**  
Agreement concerning support of the allied tactical operations center at Sembach Air Base, Germany, with annexes. Signed at Heidelberg and Sembach AB, Aug. 28 and Nov. 25, 1987. Entered into force Nov. 25, 1987; effective May 1, 1983.

**Sweden**  
Agreement amending and extending agreement of Oct. 20, 1983, concerning restrictions on imports of specialty steel. Effected by exchange of letters at Washington, Oct. 19, 1987. Entered into force Oct. 19, 1987.

**Turkey**  
Agreement amending and extending agreement of Oct. 18, 1985, as amended, relating to trade in certain textile products. Effected by exchange of notes at Washington, Nov. 10 and Dec. 11, 1987. Entered into force Dec. 11, 1987.

**Union of Soviet Socialist Republics**  
Agreement concerning trade in certain textile products, with annexes. Effected by exchange of letters at Washington, Dec. 4, 1987. Entered into force Dec. 4, 1987.

Agreement extending agreement of June 19, 1973, as amended and extended (TIAS 7651, 9349), on cooperation in studies of the world ocean. Effected by exchange of notes at Moscow and Washington, Nov. 23 and Dec. 9, 1987. Entered into force Dec. 9, 1987; effective Dec. 15, 1987.

**United Kingdom**  
Agreement extending the agreement of Sept. 18, 1986, concerning the Turks and Caicos Islands and narcotics activities. Effected by exchange of notes at Washington, Jan. 20, 1988. Entered into force Jan. 20, 1988; effective Jan. 21, 1988.

**Venezuela**  
Agreement for avoidance of double taxation with respect to shipping and air transport. Signed at Caracas, Dec. 29, 1987. Enters into force on date of later notification indicating that constitutional requirements have been satisfied; effective with respect to taxable years beginning on or before Jan. 1, 1987.

**Yugoslavia**

Agreement amending the nonscheduled air services agreement of Sept. 27, 1973, as amended (TIAS 7819, 9460), the air transport agreement of Dec. 15, 1977 (TIAS 9364), and extending the memorandum of understanding (TIAS 10450). Effected by exchange of notes at Belgrade, Jan. 15 and July 6, 1987. Entered into force Jan. 11, 1988.

<sup>1</sup>Not in force.

<sup>2</sup>Not in force for the U.S.

<sup>3</sup>With declaration(s).

<sup>4</sup>With reservation(s).

<sup>5</sup>With understanding. ■

**Department of State**

Press releases may be obtained from the Office of Press Relations, Department of State, Washington, D.C. 20520.

No.	Date	Subject
*1	1/7	Shultz: news conference.
*2	1/11	Program for the official working visit to Washington, D.C., of Japanese Prime Minister Takeshita, Jan. 12-15.
*3	1/14	Shultz, Clark: joint press conference, Ottawa, Jan. 11.
*4	1/14	Shultz: remarks at Martin Luther King, Jr. holiday reception, Jan. 12.
*5	1/14	Shultz: remarks at the Una Chapman Cox Foundation awards ceremony, Jan. 13.
*6	1/25	Program for the state visit to the United States of Egyptian President Mohammed Hosni Mubarak, January 26-30.
7	1/25	Shultz: testimony before Senate Foreign Relations Committee in support of the INF Treaty.
*8	1/26	Shultz: interview on CBS-TV's "This Morning."
*9	1/28	Shultz: remarks at reception to commemorate 30th anniversary of first U.S.-Soviet exchanges agreement, Jan. 27.
*10	1/29	Shultz: luncheon toast for President Mubarak, Dept. of State.

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*125	12/8	Byrne: decolonization, UN General Assembly, Dec. 3.
*126	12/8	Korn: economic situation in Africa, UN General Assembly
*127	12/11	Siljander: Middle East, UN General Assembly.
*128	12/11	Walters: UN financial crisis, Committee V.
*129	12/18	Nygaard: expanding membership in the Committee on Program and Coordination Committee, V., Dec. 17
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131	12/22	Okun: situation in the Occupied Territories, Security Council.
*132	12/21	Nygaard: 1988-89 biennium budget, Committee V.

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Free single copies of the following Department of State publications are available from the Correspondence Management Division, Bureau of Public Affairs, Department of State, Washington, D.C. 20520.

**Arms Control**

Beyond the Summit: Next Steps in Arms Control, Ambassador Nitze, National Press Club, Dec. 15, 1987 (Current Policy #1034).

Soviet Noncompliance With Arms Control Agreements, President Reagan's transmittal letter to the Congress and text unclassified report, Dec. 2, 1987 (Special Report #175).

Terms of INF Treaty, Memorandum of Understanding, and two protocols, D 1987 (Selected Documents #25).

**General**

Maintaining U.S. Leadership in the Changing World, Ambassador to the OAS McCormack, World Affairs Council of Inland Southern California, Rivers Dec. 9, 1987 (Current Policy #1035).

**Western Hemisphere**

Nicaraguan Biographies: A Resource Book, Jan. 1988 (Special Report #174).

U.S. Brazil Relations (GIST, Jan. 1988)

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