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# THE DEPARTMENT OF STATE BULLETIN

Volume LXXI • No. 1841 • October 7, 1974

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# THE DEPARTMENT OF STATE BULLETIN

VOL. LXXI, No. 1841

October 7, 1974

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*The Department of State BULLETIN, a weekly publication issued by the Office of Media Services, Bureau of Public Affairs, provides the public and interested agencies of the government with information on developments in the field of U.S. foreign relations and on the work of the Department and the Foreign Service.*

*The BULLETIN includes selected press releases on foreign policy, issued by the White House and the Department, and statements, addresses, and news conferences of the President and the Secretary of State and other officers of the Department, as well as special articles on various phases of international affairs and the functions of the Department. Information is included concerning treaties and international agreements to which the United States is or may become a party and on treaties of general international interest.*

*Publications of the Department of State, United Nations documents, and legislative material in the field of international relations are also listed.*

For sale by the Superintendent of Documents  
U.S. Government Printing Office  
Washington, D.C. 20402

PRICE:

52 issues plus semiannual indexes,  
domestic \$29.80, foreign \$37.25  
Single copy 60 cents

Use of funds for printing this publication approved by the Director of the Office of Management and Budget (January 29, 1971).

**Note:** Contents of this publication are not copyrighted and items contained herein may be reprinted. Citation of the DEPARTMENT OF STATE BULLETIN as the source will be appreciated. The BULLETIN is indexed in the Readers' Guide to Periodical Literature.

## A Framework of International Cooperation

*Address by President Ford*<sup>1</sup>

In 1946 President Harry Truman welcomed representatives of 55 nations to the first General Assembly of the United Nations. Since then, every American President has had the great honor of addressing this Assembly. Today, with pleasure and humility, I take my turn in welcoming you, the distinguished representatives of 138 nations.

When I took office, I told the American people that my remarks would be "just a little straight talk among friends." Straight talk is what I propose here today in the first of my addresses to the representatives of the world.

Next week Secretary of State Henry Kissinger will present in specifics the overall principles which I will outline in my remarks today. It should be emphatically understood that the Secretary of State has my full support and the unquestioned backing of the American people.

As a party leader in the Congress of the United States, as Vice President, and now as President of the United States of America, I have had the closest working relationship with Secretary of State Kissinger. I have supported and will continue to endorse his many efforts as Secretary of State and in our National Security Council system to build a world of peace.

Since the United Nations was founded, the world has experienced conflicts and threats to peace. But we have avoided the greatest danger: another world war. Today we have

the opportunity to make the remainder of this century an era of peace and cooperation and economic well-being.

The harsh hostilities which once held great powers in their rigid grasp have now begun to moderate. Many of the crises which dominated past General Assemblies are fortunately behind us. Technological progress holds out the hope that one day all men can achieve a decent life.

Nations too often have had no choice but to be either hammer or anvil—to strike or to be struck. Now we have a new opportunity—to forge, in concert with others, a framework of international cooperation. That is the course the United States has chosen for itself.

On behalf of the American people, I renew these basic pledges to you today:

—We are committed to a pursuit of a more peaceful, stable, and cooperative world. While we are determined never to be bested in a test of strength, we will devote our strength to what is best. And in the nuclear era, there is no rational alternative to accords of mutual restraint between the United States and the Soviet Union, two nations which have the power to destroy mankind.

—We will bolster our partnerships with traditional friends in Europe, Asia, and Latin America to meet new challenges in a rapidly changing world. The maintenance of such relationships underpins rather than undercuts the search for peace.

—We will seek out, we will expand our relations with old adversaries. For example, our new rapport with the People's Republic

<sup>1</sup> Made before the 29th United Nations General Assembly on Sept. 18 (text from Weekly Compilation of Presidential Documents dated Sept. 23).

of China best serves the purposes of each nation and the interests of the entire world.

—We will strive to heal old wounds reopened in recent conflicts in Cyprus, the Middle East, and in Indochina. Peace cannot be imposed from without, but we will do whatever is within our capacity to help achieve it.

—We rededicate ourselves to the search for justice, equality, and freedom. Recent developments in Africa signal the welcome end of colonialism. Behavior appropriate to an era of dependence must give way to the new responsibilities of an era of interdependence.

No single nation, no single group of nations, no single organization, can meet all of the challenges before the community of nations. We must act in concert. Progress toward a better world must come through cooperative efforts across the whole range of bilateral and multilateral relations.

America's revolutionary birth and centuries of experience in adjusting democratic government to changing conditions have made Americans practical as well as idealistic. As idealists, we are proud of our role in the founding of the United Nations and in supporting its many accomplishments. As practical people, we are sometimes impatient at what we see as shortcomings.

In my 25 years as a member of the Congress of the United States, I learned two basic practical lessons:

—First, men of differing political persuasions can find common ground for cooperation. We need not agree on all issues in order to agree on most. Differences of principle, of purpose, of perspective, will not disappear. But neither will our mutual problems disappear unless we are determined to find mutually helpful solutions.

—Second, a majority must take into account the proper interest of a minority if the decisions of the majority are to be accepted. We who believe in and live by majority rule must always be alert to the danger of the "tyranny of the majority." Majority rule thrives on the habits of accommodation, moderation, and consideration of the interests of others.

A very stark reality has tempered America's actions for decades—and must now temper the actions of all nations. Prevention of full-scale warfare in the nuclear age has become everybody's responsibility. Today's regional conflict must not become tomorrow's world disaster. We must assure by every means at our disposal that local crises are quickly contained and resolved.

The challenge before the United States [Nations] is very clear. This organization can place the weight of the world community on the side of world peace. And this organization can provide impartial forces to maintain the peace.

And at this point, I wish to pay tribute on behalf of the American people to the 37 members of the U.N. peacekeeping forces who have given their lives in the Middle East and in Cyprus in the past 10 months, and I convey our deepest sympathies to their loved ones.

Let the quality of our response measure up to the magnitude of the challenge that we face. I pledge to you that America will continue to be constructive, innovative, and responsive to the work of this great body.

The nations in this hall are united by a deep concern for peace. We are united as well by our desire to insure a better life for all people.

Today the economy of the world is under unprecedented stress. We need new approaches to international cooperation to respond effectively to the problems that we face. Developing and developed countries, market and nonmarket countries—we are all a part of one interdependent economic system.

The food and oil crises demonstrate the extent of our interdependence. Many developing nations need the food surplus of a few developed nations. And many industrialized nations need the oil production of a few developing nations.

Energy is required to produce food, and food to produce energy—and both to provide a decent life for everyone. The problems of food and energy can be resolved on the basis of cooperation—or can, I should say, [be]



made unmanageable on the basis of confrontation. Runaway inflation, propelled by food and oil price increases, is an early warning signal to all of us.

Let us not delude ourselves. Failure to cooperate on oil and food and inflation could spell disaster for every nation represented in this room. The United Nations must not and need not allow this to occur. A global strategy for food and energy is urgently required.

The United States believes four principles should guide a global approach:

—First, all nations must substantially increase production. Just to maintain the present standards of living the world must almost double its output of food and energy to match the expected increase in the world's population by the end of this century. To meet aspirations for a better life, production will have to expand at a significantly faster rate than population growth.

—Second, all nations must seek to achieve a level of prices which not only provides an incentive to producers but which consumers can afford. It should now be clear that the developed nations are not the only countries which demand and receive an adequate return for their goods. But it should also be clear that by confronting consumers with production restrictions, artificial pricing, and the prospect of ultimate bankruptcy, producers will eventually become the victims of their own actions.

—Third, all nations must avoid the abuse of man's fundamental needs for the sake of narrow national or bloc advantage. The attempt by any nation to use one commodity for political purposes will inevitably tempt other countries to use their commodities for their own purposes.

—Fourth, the nations of the world must assure that the poorest among us are not overwhelmed by rising prices of the imports necessary for their survival. The traditional aid donors and the increasingly wealthy oil producers must join in this effort.

The United States recognizes the special responsibility we bear as the world's largest producer of food. That is why Secretary of

State Kissinger proposed from this very podium last year a World Food Conference to define a global food policy. And that is one reason why we have removed domestic restrictions on food productions in the United States. It has not been our policy to use food as a political weapon, despite the oil embargo and recent oil price and production decisions.

It would be tempting for the United States—beset by inflation and soaring energy prices—to turn a deaf ear to external appeals for food assistance or to respond with internal appeals for export controls. But however difficult our own economic situation, we recognize that the plight of others is worse.

Americans have always responded to human emergencies in the past. And we respond again here today.

In response to Secretary General [of the United Nations Kurt] Waldheim's appeal and to help meet the long-term challenge in food, I reiterate:

—To help developing nations realize their aspirations to grow more of their own food, the United States will substantially increase its assistance to agricultural production programs in other countries.

—Next, to insure that the survival of millions of our fellow men does not depend upon the vagaries of weather, the United States is prepared to join in a worldwide effort to negotiate, establish, and maintain an international system of food reserves. This system will work best if each nation is made responsible for managing the reserves that it will have available.

—Finally, to make certain that the more immediate needs for food are met this year, the United States will not only maintain the amount it spends for food shipments to nations in need, but it will increase this amount this year.

Thus, the United States is striving to help define and help contribute to a cooperative global policy to meet man's immediate and long-term need for food. We will set forth our comprehensive proposals at the World Food Conference in November.

Now is the time for oil producers to define

their conception of a global policy on energy to meet the growing need—and to do this without imposing unacceptable burdens on the international monetary and trade system.

A world of economic confrontation cannot be a world of political cooperation. If we fail to satisfy man's fundamental needs for energy and food, we face a threat not just to our aspirations for a better life for all our peoples but to our hopes for a more stable and a more peaceful world. By working together to overcome our common problems, mankind can turn from fear toward hope.

From the time of the founding of the United Nations, America volunteered to help nations in need, frequently as the main benefactor. We were able to do it. We were glad to do it. But as new economic forces alter and reshape today's complex world, no nation can be expected to feed all the world's hungry peoples. Fortunately, however, many nations are increasingly able to help. And I call on them to join with us as truly united nations in the struggle to provide more food at lower prices for the hungry and, in general, a better life for the needy of this world.

America will continue to do more than its share. But there are realistic limits to our capacities. There is no limit, however, to our determination to act in concert with other nations to fulfill the vision of the United Nations Charter: to save succeeding generations from the scourge of war and to promote social progress and better standards, better standards of life in a larger freedom.

## **Members of U.S. Delegation to IAEA Conference Confirmed**

The Senate on September 16 confirmed the nomination of Dixy Lee Ray to be the Representative of the United States to the 18th session of the General Conference of the International Atomic Energy Agency.

The nominations of John A. Erlewine, Abraham S. Friedman, Dwight J. Porter, and Gerald F. Tape to be Alternate Representatives were also confirmed that day.

## **Prime Minister Rabin of Israel Visits Washington**

*Prime Minister Yitzhak Rabin of the State of Israel made an official visit to Washington September 10–13. Following is an exchange of remarks between President Ford and Prime Minister Rabin at a welcoming ceremony on the South Lawn of the White House on September 10, together with their exchange of toasts at a dinner at the White House on September 12.*

### **EXCHANGE OF GREETINGS**

Weekly Compilation of Presidential Documents dated Sept. 16

#### **President Ford**

Mr. Prime Minister and Mrs. Rabin: It is a very real pleasure for me to have the opportunity of welcoming both of you to the United States.

You are returning as the leader of a great country. You are returning to meet many of your friends over the years that you knew so well during your service here as Ambassador to the United States.

I trust that you and Mrs. Rabin will thoroughly enjoy this visit back to the United States.

The United States, Mr. Prime Minister, has been proud of its association with the State of Israel. We shall continue to stand with Israel. We are committed to Israel's survival and security.

The United States for a quarter of a century has had an excellent relationship with the State of Israel. We have cooperated in many, many fields—in your security, in the well-being of the Middle East, and in leading what we all hope is a lasting peace throughout the world.

Many of our people have a close personal relationship and association with your citizens, your fellow citizens in Israel, and we hope and trust that this relationship will grow and expand.

Over the last few months, there has been movement in the Middle East for a lasting and durable peace. Israel has cooperated;

Israel has been helpful. And we hope and trust that in the months ahead the foundation which has been laid will be built upon.

We want, you want, and others throughout the world want a lasting and durable peace in the Middle East.

The first steps have been taken; others will follow. And I am certain and positive that, as we meet here during the next several days, we can contribute to the building of a better and finer peace in the Middle East.

I hope that you and Mrs. Rabin have a delightful and warm welcome, which you so richly deserve, in the United States.

#### **Prime Minister Rabin**

Mr. President, Mrs. Ford: I am grateful to you for your kind invitation to come to Washington and for your warm words of welcome.

As you know, Mr. President, I am not a complete stranger in this country nor, indeed, in this city. But this is the first time that I come here in my capacity of Prime Minister of Israel.

You, Mr. President, have very recently undertaken new and awesome responsibilities, and I feel certain, therefore, that you can appreciate the weighty load that rests on my shoulders.

I represent a country which is faced—which is facing manifold problems, great challenges, but also great and new opportunities for internal progress and for peace with her neighbors.

In the performance of my new duties I am encouraged, as all my predecessors have been, by their binding friendship and by the ever-deepening ties which bind the people of Israel with the people of this, the greatest democracy, and with its leaders.

Ever since the renewal of Jewish independence in the land of our forefathers after long generations of suffering and martyrdom, Israel has enjoyed generous aid and support on the part of the United States. Our gratitude for this sustenance will be recorded forever in the annals of our people.

During all these times since 1948, Israel has seen periods of trials and hardships. Yet

she never swerved, even for a moment, from her supreme national goal, which is the quest for peace with her Arab neighbors.

So far, to our nation's deep sorrow, this goal has eluded us. Despite the recent test of arms, Israel is prepared to continue to seek progress toward peace.

We have in recent months demonstrated that we have taken risks for peace to see whether new efforts may possibly bring us nearer to its achievement.

I know, in this quest for peace in our region, we have in you, Mr. President, and in your colleagues in the Government of the United States, a strong and determined partner.

Indeed, you, Mr. President, pronounced the commitment of the United States to the quest of world peace as the central theme in your inaugural address only a few weeks ago.

The people of Israel stand united in the conviction that war is futile, that it cannot solve problems, that only human suffering is brought in its wake. As far as our part of the world is concerned, we are convinced that there is no issue, however complicated it may now appear, that it cannot be resolved by patient negotiations.

What is needed is an equal measure of desire and determination on all sides to achieve peace.

Much depends at this stage on what other governments in the area are prepared to do. At any rate, we in Israel are ready for the peacemaking effort.

I must, however, with a full sense of responsibility, add this: As you, Mr. President, assumed high office you conveyed to your people and to the world the message that a strong America is a paramount guarantee for peace in the world. This is true in the same measure as far as Israel and her own region are concerned. Only a strong Israel which has the capacity to deter aggression and to defend herself successfully by her own strengths has a chance of winning peace.

I cannot underline strongly enough our conviction that the constant maintenance of Israel's strength is an absolute prerequisite for the attainment of solutions to the problems of our troubled region.

On these and other matters of common interest and concern, I shall be exchanging views with you, Mr. President, and your colleagues, within the next few days. I look forward to doing so in the spirit of confidence and of the cultivation of a good future which has linked our governments and our people for so many years.

I am confident that I shall return to Jerusalem assured of the United States determination to support the well-being of Israel within a Middle East that we hope that will finally be advancing on the road toward a just and durable peace which assures security and progress for all its people.

### EXCHANGE OF TOASTS

Weekly Compilation of Presidential Documents dated Sept. 16

#### President Ford

Mr. Prime Minister, Mrs. Rabin, and honored guests: It is a great privilege and honor for Mrs. Ford and myself to be host to the two of you on this occasion and to warmly welcome you back to the United States in this capacity as the Prime Minister of your great country.

But I would also like to extend our warm welcome for all of your friends who are here and the many, many friends throughout the whole United States who are also good and firm friends of the two of you and to extend to you, representing your country, the depth and the warmth of the feeling that we in the United States have for Israel.

As I was sitting here chatting with you and talking to Mrs. Rabin, I couldn't help but note that 1948 was a somewhat significant year as far as your country is concerned, and it just happened that it was quite a year as far as the Fords were concerned. It was the year that we were married—

*Mrs. Rabin:* And the Rabins.

*President Ford:* Oh! [Laughter.] —and the year that I got elected to Congress but, more importantly certainly, the year that Israel gained its independence.

And I am pleased to note that our country

was the first of all countries in the world at that time to recognize Israel. And we were proud to do it then, and we are proud that it was done by America at that time.

It is especially nice to have the opportunity of meeting with you yesterday and today and tonight, tomorrow—a person who is a soldier, a diplomat, and a political leader—and to know that you represent your country so effectively and so well.

The American people have a great deal of understanding and sympathy and dedication to the same kind of ideals that are representative of Israel. And therefore I think we in America have a certain rapport and understanding with the people of Israel.

We, as two nations who believe in peace, have sought by joint action in conjunction with others a durable and stable peace in the Middle East which I think all of us agree is in the best interest of your country and the Middle East—the world as a whole.

We as a country are proud to be associated with Israel in this mutual effort to move and to continue to move in the direction of an even better, more stable, and more equitable peace in the Middle East.

I can't tell you how pleased that we are to have the opportunity of expressing our gratitude for all of the things that our countries have done together and all of the things that I hope that our two countries can continue to do in the future.

We have mutual aims and objectives. We have a friendship that is durable and growing. We have the kind of relationship that I think, if expanded worldwide, would be beneficial to all mankind.

And so if I may, Mr. Prime Minister, I would like to ask all of our guests here tonight to stand and to offer a toast to your President and to you and Mrs. Rabin: To the President.

#### Prime Minister Rabin

Mr. President, Mrs. Ford, distinguished guests: In the name of my wife and myself, I would like to thank you very much for inviting us and taking care of us during our visit here.

I remember, Mr. President, meeting you while you were the minority leader in the House. I had many talks then with you; I learned very much to admire you. And I know that by assuming the responsibilities of the President of the United States you have taken upon yourself tremendous—tremendous role not only for this country. But I believe that the President of the United States is the leader of the free world and has to bear in mind, if you would allow me to say so, not only the well-being of this country but the well-being of all countries that strive for freedom, for democracy, because in the world that we live today, it is not always possible to a small country to do it against odds.

The relations between the United States and Israel started many years ago. When our country was reborn we faced many problems. The first one was the absorption of many newcomers—immigrants—the remnants of the holocaust of Europe, the Second World War, the refugees that came from the Arab countries. I believe that we were a country that half of its population were refugees.

And then the United States offered Israel economic aid, technical aid, that made it possible to us to absorb these people, our brothers, in a way that the transformation from refugees to be part of our creative society was very much facilitated by your help.

During the years other problems appeared. The threat from outside became more apparent, and the United States added also military aid in terms of supplying us arms to be able to defend ourselves by ourselves.

I think that 26 years from 1948 have proved that your support to us was used in the best way for the well-being of our people and for preservation of a democracy and the free country in that part of the world.

And I would like to thank you and to thank everybody in this country that has made it possible till today.

I don't know, Mr. President, if you have seen it. I have given a small present to you. It is a sculpture, a sculpture that describes the struggle between David and Goliath. I

believe it is not only a story from the Bible; it is a story that started then and continues on till the present days.

And if there is something that symbolizes Israel today, it is the spirit of David facing Goliath. And the meaning of the spirit is, on the one hand, to seek peace, to believe in peace. We are a Jewish state, and we believe that part of being a Jew means to seek peace, to search peace; but on the other hand, to realize that peace is attainable only for those who are ready to take risks to dare to withstand Goliaths.

I believe that this is what is significant to Israel today, the spirit of David seeking peace and, at the same time, being ready and capable to meet some Goliaths.

I hope and I believe, Mr. President, that under your leadership the relations between our two countries will continue, will be strengthened in the unique spirit that was so significant till today—the search of peace and the understanding that strength helps to achieve peace.

Allow me, Mr. President, to raise my glass to the President of the United States.

*President Ford:* Thank you very much.

## President Ford's News Conference of September 16

*Following are excerpts relating to foreign policy from the transcript of a news conference held by President Ford in the East Room of the White House on September 16.<sup>1</sup>*

*Q. Mr. President, recent congressional testimony has indicated that the CIA, under the direction of a committee headed by Dr. Kissinger, attempted to destabilize the Government of Chile under former President Allende. Is it the policy of your administration to attempt to destabilize the governments of other democracies?*

*President Ford:* Let me answer in general. I think this is a very important question.

<sup>1</sup>For the complete text, see Weekly Compilation of Presidential Documents dated Sept. 23.

Our government, like other governments, does take certain actions in the intelligence field to help implement foreign policy and protect national security. I am informed reliably that Communist nations spend vastly more money than we do for the same kind of purposes.

Now, in this particular case, as I understand it and there is no doubt in my mind—our government had no involvement whatsoever in the Allende coup. To my knowledge, nobody has charged that. The facts are we had no involvement in any way whatsoever in the coup itself.

In a period of time, three or four years ago, there was an effort being made by the Allende government to destroy opposition news media, both the writing press as well as the electronic press, and to destroy opposition political parties.

The effort that was made in this case was to help and assist the preservation of opposition newspapers and electronic media and to preserve opposition political parties.

I think this is in the best interest of the people in Chile, and certainly in our best interest.

Now, may I add one further comment. The Forty Committee was established in 1948. It has been in existence under Presidents since that time. That committee reviews every covert operation undertaken by our government, and that information is relayed to the responsible congressional committees where it is reviewed by House and Senate committees.

It seems to me that the Forty Committee should continue in existence, and I am going to meet with the responsible congressional

committees to see whether or not they want any changes in the review process so that the Congress, as well as the President, are fully informed and are fully included in the operations for any such action.

*Q. Mr. President, in the face of massive food shortages and the prospects of significant starvation, will the United States be able to significantly increase its food aid to foreign countries, and what is our position going to be at the Rome conference on participation in the world grain reserves?*

*President Ford:* Within the next few days a very major decision in this area will be made. I am not at liberty to tell you what the answer will be, because it has not been decided.

But it is my hope that the United States, for humanitarian purposes, will be able to increase its contribution to those nations that have suffered because of drought or any of the other problems related to human needs.

*Q. Back to the CIA. Under what international law do we have a right to attempt to destabilize the constitutionally elected government of another country, and does the Soviet Union have a similar right to try to destabilize the Government of Canada, for example, or the United States?*

*President Ford:* I am not going to pass judgment on whether it is permitted or authorized under international law. It is a recognized fact that, historically as well as presently, such actions are taken in the best interest of the countries involved.

## Economic Interdependence and Common Defense

*Address by Deputy Secretary Robert S. Ingersoll*<sup>1</sup>

I am delighted to be the first speaker on the agenda. We are hardly strangers. It is a pleasure to return for the day to the associations and the issues that have shaped 35 years of my business life.

We have a joint purpose in our short time together. From my side, it is to put the issues as we see them in the Department in the clearest possible terms—to describe the connection we see between our domestic, foreign, defense, and economic policies. Your purpose, I think, is to challenge our premises and conclusions and to present your own. Out of this exchange we should all learn something useful.

My own subject was chosen quite deliberately. There is presumptive evidence, for example the recent Fortune poll, that the support you have traditionally given to our defense policies is eroding. We have a deep interest in this phenomenon. We need to know why. What is the basis for your disenchantment, if in fact it is as real as the polls suggest?

The last decade has been a difficult one for all Americans—the international, racial, and personal violence of the 1960's, a series of violent international crises—Viet-Nam, the Arab-Israeli war, three Cyprus crises, internal upheavals in Latin America, Africa, and Asia. We have an energy crisis, a food crisis, an inflationary crisis, and a series of monetary crises. And in Watergate

we have just had a domestic crisis of immense proportions.

Facing such a catalogue, it is easy to lose heart. But let us also recall our strengths:

—We enjoy a credibility with allies and adversaries alike for strength, for leadership, for reliability, enjoyed by no one else.

—We remain the largest single producer of most of the world's most important things, tools, energy, capital, and technology.

—We are uniquely the most important producer of food.

—Forty-five percent of the world's trade in wheat and almost 60 percent of its trade in feed grain and oilseed are of U.S. origin.

As a result, we have a very special, indeed moral, responsibility toward that two-thirds of the world that is chronically undeveloped and protein-short. It is a responsibility we have discharged well in the last quarter century and that we must continue to discharge in the future. In short, gentlemen, the United States has a great reputation for toughness, stamina, and initiative. The world expects much of us—rightly, I think, for we expect much of ourselves.

Let me put before you and explain two major realities within which our policy must be formulated:

—First, economic interdependence is a fact. We must resolve the paradox of growing mutual dependence and growing national and regional identities.

—Second, common defense is a necessity. We and our allies must be prepared to adjust

<sup>1</sup> Made before the National Foreign Policy Conference for Senior Business Executives at the Department of State on Sept. 5.

it to changing conditions and share burdens equally. We need a definition of security that our peoples can support and that our adversaries will respect in a period of lessened tensions.

### **The Fact of Economic Interdependence**

Let me discuss each of these more fully. You in this audience know economic interdependence is a commonplace.

Our exports and imports comprise some 14 percent of our national production of goods. This year our import bill will run close to \$100 billion; one-third of this will be raw materials—fuels, minerals, ores, and metals.

In a dozen critical materials we will be almost totally dependent on foreign sources—among them, bauxite, mercury, nickel, titanium, manganese, cobalt, tin, and chromium. There is a much longer list of critical materials where the margin of independence is critically thin. Oil leads the list, but it is by no means alone. Such basics as lead, zinc, and iron ore already comprise a large fraction of our import requirements. Nor is our dependence limited to raw materials. For years we were virtually the only exporter of services of every description from Peace Corps or elementary English teachers to the most arcane and sophisticated of aerospace technological services. But today, what American hospital could function without foreign interns, resident physicians, and nurses?

Looked at from the other side, the free world is no less dependent on us than we on them. There are 24 OECD [Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development] countries. Taken together, they represent the bulk of the world's productive capacity. The United States is formally linked to 17 of them by mutual security treaties. Last year they did almost 60 billion dollars' worth of business with us. They are the recipients of some 60 billion dollars' worth of direct United States investment. With few exceptions, notably Canada and Australia, the OECD group is far more dependent than we

on imports to survive—in fuels, in minerals, and in food. This immense traffic in essential goods and services demands that certain corollary conditions be met:

—There should be a reasonably stable monetary system.

—There should be some mechanism for allowing capital to flow across international boundaries to finance production capacity.

—There should be further liberalization on a nondiscriminatory basis of tariff and nontariff restrictions on trade.

—Finally, there should be a regime of law governing the great sea lanes.

### **The Defense Side of the Equation**

This leads me to the defense side of the equation.

Clearly, no military policy we can conceive of today can breach tariff barriers, impose monetary reform, or dictate international investment regulations. Neither, in truth, can it realistically police the thousands of miles of sea lanes of communication. What it can do is help to establish an environment in which reason and good sense can be applied to the problems that face an interdependent international economy.

A world that cannot be intimidated by the threat or the use of force is a world that has some prospect of negotiating its economic and other differences to tolerable solutions. Our security policies and those of our allies are to this extent a critical element in maintaining efficient and uninterrupted economic exchange.

As Secretary Kissinger put it on April 23, 1973:

The political, military, and economic issues . . . are linked by reality, not by our choice nor for the tactical purpose of trading one off against the other.

Let us, then, examine the military realities:

—Defense spending this year is expected to be in the \$82 billion range, or 6 percent of our GNP.

—About \$13 billion covers the costs of paying, training, and supporting U.S. forces



deployed abroad under our mutual security commitments to NATO and our six multi-lateral and bilateral security treaties in Asia. About \$4.5 billion of this sum enters our international balance of payments account. The entire European portion (\$2.1 billion), however, is covered by negotiated offset agreements, and the remainder by U.S. sales of military equipment worldwide.

—Our total military manpower is 2.1 million, of which something over 400,000 are abroad. Three-fourths of them are in Europe.

—Our major allies, in aggregate, spend about \$45 billion on defense, or roughly 4 percent of their aggregate GNP.

—They have  $4\frac{3}{4}$  million men under arms, over twice as many as we have.

These figures represent the gross dimensions of our joint security efforts. The questions now before us are:

—Are U.S. defense outlays supporting our alliances inconsistent with our foreign policy and economic interests?

—Is the United States bearing a disproportionate share of those costs?

The answer to both questions, I believe, is "No." On the first question: Ours is not a subsistence economy. Our per capita income is the highest of any developed country in the world. Our personal spending on automobiles and the wherewithal to run them last year exceeded our entire defense budget by a significant margin. What we spend annually as a nation on tobacco and alcohol would easily cover the direct cost of our foreign deployments. I cite these figures not as a criticism of our national sense of priorities but as a reminder that a narrow focus on defense spending masks other large figures in the public and private sectors of our economy that no one thinks to ask about.

This does not answer the question, however, whether \$82 billion is justified. It is inappropriate for the Department of State to attempt to defend any exact figure. It might be feasible to spend somewhat less; it might be prudent to spend somewhat more.

My concern is not so much the money but, rather, the forces.

—Money cuts must be translated into cuts in forces, equipment, and training.

—U.S. forces now in being are the smallest since the Korean war.

—The Communist forces present a formidable potential threat to precisely those countries in which we have the largest and most important trade and financial interests: to Germany, to the European members of NATO, to Japan, and to the smaller countries of Northeast and Southeast Asia.

The ideological, political, and other problems that have divided the free and Communist worlds since the end of World War II have not been resolved, although significant progress has been made. So long as they are unresolved there is always the possibility that our adversaries will resort to threat or force to impose the solutions they want.

In a nuclear-armed world, this is unacceptable. There is only one alternative: To foreclose that option by making clear to those who would try it that the costs and risks would be unbearably high. By this means, together with positive incentives we can offer, particularly in the economic field, we hope to induce the resolution of differences through negotiation.

I do not want to leave the impression from the foregoing of a never-ending spiral of defense spending.

We have tested and continue to test the negotiating route in SALT [Strategic Arms Limitation Talks], in MBFR [Mutual and Balanced Force Reductions], and CSCE [Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe], and the threshold test ban. Progress is slow, but this is to be expected, as you can appreciate. The subject matter is enormously complex, and we are dealing in an area that touches the most vital interests of the Soviets, ourselves, and our allies—national security. But you will also appreciate, I think, that we have no rational alternative to negotiations, no matter how difficult and sensitive.

Negotiation is a never-ending process, not

a state of equilibrium. It is a process that requires tenacity, clear sight, and endless patience. It entails an investment in time and money and, above all, ceaseless attention to maintaining a sturdy defense, a well-functioning economy, and a cohesive, cooperative set of relationships with those who have joined their strength and future with ours in the search for peace.

### Burden Sharing and Deterrence

On the second question, of fair shares:

—The statistics suggest that, in aggregate, our allies are doing a creditable job.

—They have increased their defense spending over the last four years. NATO spending, for example, has increased by about 28 percent; ours by less than 5 percent.

—Total defense expenditure by NATO allies, as I noted earlier, is about \$45 billion per year, the bulk of it devoted to general purpose forces. This is approximately the sum we spend annually to maintain our general purpose forces deployed worldwide and the forces we maintain at home, as a strategic reserve for reinforcement and for dealing with less than general war contingencies.

—Individually, some could undoubtedly do more. It is central to U.S. policy to see that they do.

—In the aggregate, our allies worldwide can field 10 soldiers for each one we have deployed abroad. The basic Nixon doctrine (1969) that “We shall look to the nation directly threatened to assume the primary responsibility of providing manpower for its defense” is thus fulfilled.

A limit to burden sharing is imposed by two things:

1. No ally alone or in combination can meet the formidable nuclear threat posed by the U.S.S.R. and the People’s Republic of China, nor is it in our national interest to encourage them to try through proliferation of national nuclear forces.

2. In the event an ally cannot find the necessary resources to defend himself, it is in the present self-interest of the United States to help.

Deterrence, not burden sharing, is the priority objective of U.S. defense policy.

Let me now restate my conclusions in brief form.

Our economic dependence on the world and its on us is already large. That dependence is irreversible and growing. In the next quarter century, our demand for such basic commodities as iron ore, oil, aluminum, copper, and sulfur will increase enormously, as indeed will world demand.

Self-sufficiency in the face of this expected growth is an illusion. This represents a threefold increase over world consumption of these commodities today. To produce, sell, and transport these basic commodities and the finished goods that result will require a degree of order, stability, and sophisticated economic planning unimaginable by today’s standards.

The free world’s military strength will continue to play an important role in the maintenance of a peaceful world—a sine qua non if the planet’s minimum economic, political, and social aspirations are to be met.

By virtue of our enormous economic capacity and our military strength, we have no alternative open to us but leadership of the most challenging kind. As President Ford put it:<sup>2</sup>

“Successful foreign policy is an extension of the hopes of the whole American people for a world of peace and orderly reform and orderly freedom.

“So long as the peoples of the world have confidence in our purposes and faith in our word, the age-old vision of peace on earth will grow brighter.”

<sup>2</sup> For an excerpt from President Ford’s address before a joint session of Congress on Aug. 12, see BULLETIN of Sept. 2, 1974, p. 333.

## Action Program for World Investment

*Address by Thomas O. Enders*

*Assistant Secretary for Economic and Business Affairs*<sup>1</sup>

In responding to Secretary Kissinger's invitation, a large majority of you indicated a desire to discuss foreign investment.

It is also one of our major preoccupations, made urgent by two compelling facts. One is the worldwide supply crisis; the other is the need to make the recycling of oil dollars work for as long as the current extraordinarily high oil prices require.

Let me take the supply problem first. The starting point here is that the world economy cannot solve the double problem of high inflation and stagnation in output without a quantum increase in and restructuring of investment.

It is noteworthy that investment as a percentage of total output has been relatively static or declining in the OECD [Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development] as a whole over a long period. Moreover, its structure has been suboptimal, as shows up in the persistence of major shortages in individual industries despite an overall stagnation of demand: basic chemicals, food, fertilizer, capital goods, pulp and paper, iron and steel, and a number of key non-ferrous metals.

Note also that cartel action in oil could not have been attempted had a strong rising demand for petroleum not been outrunning investment and supply. And we are currently seeing an attempt by some Caribbean bauxite producers to take advantage of the conjuncture of high demand and the close of an in-

vestment cycle in the aluminum industry to raise prices in the OPEC [Organization of Petroleum Exporting Countries] manner.

Taken together, sectors in which there have been major shortages this past 24 months and the oil sector account for a large share of recent price increases. Petroleum products, chemicals, and metals account for 40 percent of the rise in wholesale prices from July 1973 to July 1974.

For the shortage and cartelized sectors, the basic problem is thus how to create conditions in which the massive investment required in new capacity and in alternative sources of supply will occur.

Effective recycling of oil dollars is no less important. The economies of the industrialized world will not be able to grow and prosper over the medium term unless it works; rather, they will start to break apart in reciprocal beggar-your-neighbor actions.

For the first year of the oil crisis the great bulk of oil dollars were recycled to the Euromarket and done so efficiently.

However, one cannot expect the Euro-market again to handle in the next 12 months a comparable volume of funds unless there are massive new infusions of capital into the banking operations engaged in intermediating the short-to-medium-term deposits of oil-producing countries and the medium-to-long-term borrowing of consuming countries and enterprises. So far there has been no clear evidence that increase in capital of the kind required will be forthcoming. Thus it is commonly predicted that the great bulk of future recycling will flow through national

<sup>1</sup> Made before the National Foreign Policy Conference for Senior Business Executives at the Department of State on Sept. 5.

capital markets; through such state-to-state loans as Germany and Italy have just concluded; through direct lending by producing to consuming countries, as in the case of the large Iranian loans to Britain and France; or through the use of multilateral recycling facilities such as the Witteveen fund [the International Monetary Fund oil facility].

However, the mere fact that the recycling operation has worked relatively well up to the present and that these alternative mechanisms are available does not permit us to be confident that the operation will proceed effectively in the future; for we do not yet know what the impact will be of the accumulation of massive debts by the consuming countries and thus what further institutions may be needed to underpin the system.

#### **Climate for International Investment**

If the need for the free flow of international investment has never been greater, the climate in which it can occur has deteriorated both at home and abroad.

At home the acceleration of foreign investment both in industry and in real estate over the past 24 months has given rise to concern at the influence and power foreign investors may acquire over our economy.

The actual volumes of direct incoming investment are relatively small, although growing—in 1973 incoming was \$3.5 billion, versus \$14 billion outgoing—and much of the reaction stems from their concentration in a few states. But it would be wrong to dismiss these fears which, if not addressed fully and directly, could develop into a serious political problem. Equally, it would be very wrong to take ill-considered or hasty action on the basis of these fears.

Americans are just beginning now to experience what many other countries, notably in Europe and in Latin America, have experienced when foreign enterprise enters the economy on a substantial scale. In Europe and Latin America, ways have been found for mutual adjustment between the foreign enterprise and the host country. Similar adjustments are and will be found in the United States.

Overseas, changing attitudes toward the great transnational enterprises, and the rising number of investment disputes, are posing new uncertainties to potential investors.

Since the Second World War, American enterprise overseas has been the most dynamic single agent of economic change in the world, consistently outperforming every national economy, including Japan's. But the very success of the transnational enterprises has called forth reaction to them of two sorts:

—The first is political, doctrinal, emphasizing conflict between the separate jurisdictions of the host country and the country of incorporation, opposition between the political power of the host country and the economic power of the enterprise, and the dangers of "business culture." A few real abuses are cited, notably the grave ITT-Chile problem, but most arguments are in terms of potential abuses. Characteristically, proponents of this view regard transnational enterprises as very profitable and driven by a strong desire to invest. They see the problem as how to protect the smaller and developing countries from the intended or unintended power of these enterprises, how to right the balance of bargaining between individual host countries and transnational enterprises with flexibility to locate in many countries. In a word, they see the problem as how to regulate transnational enterprises for the common good. This view, which is set forth fully and in moderate terms in the report of the U.N. Group of Eminent Persons on Multinational Corporations, is widely held in developing countries and is common also in industrialized countries. In both it corresponds to deeply held political concerns. It would be a misreading to expect that the urge to regulate transnational enterprises will level off and wane; on the contrary, it will probably grow.

—The second reaction is the growth in the volume of investment disputes. The increase has not been as rapid or as great as many feared. But nonetheless the volume is significant. From June 30, 1971, through July 31, 1973, American firms with an aggregate

book value in excess of \$1.5 billion became involved in 87 new investment disputes. The statistic is somewhat artificial since the gravity of the dispute varies widely from case to case. Nor is it possible to give a good comparison from statistics of earlier years. But the total is clearly up from what it has been.

### **Narrowing Areas of Potential Conflict**

It is inefficient, indeed probably impossible, to deal with these investment issues in terms of principles.

No lawyer is going to devise a formula which will reconcile the principle of the Argentinian Carlos Calvo, according to which a foreign investor should renounce the protection of his home country, and the law of many countries under which their governments are required to extend assistance to their citizens overseas. Nor is there any way of determining at a high level of generality, as the U.N. Group of Eminent Persons would like to, what right package of services, equity, and technology transnational enterprises should offer developing countries. Nor can we expect, at any early point, agreement on what are good and what are bad takeovers, which seems by all odds to be the most sensitive issue.

Rather, progress will be best made by concentrating on individual practical issues.

Some of the most significant economic issues can be handled through tax treaties providing for national-treatment protection as well as negotiations between the national tax authorities on a case-by-case basis in disputes such as transfer pricing.

By limiting its ambitions, the current OECD exercise on capital movements can create a strong, clear area of agreement on the national treatment of already existing enterprises.

Additionally, the Working Group on Transnational Enterprises set up at a meeting of Foreign Ministers of the Organization of American States at Washington in April can lead to a new, more powerful procedure for factfinding in investment disputes.<sup>2</sup>

Each of these actions will tend to narrow the area of potential conflict. Such partial

and limited agreements will tend in turn to create the basis on which further limited agreements can be made. A sequence can thus be engaged by which the most intractable problems, which may in the end turn out to be largely theoretical in any case, are gradually circumscribed and limited.

For these are areas in which progress is all important.

The great outpouring of discourse about transnational enterprises in the last 15 years has shed astonishingly little new light on their economics and operations. But it has sensitized the enterprises themselves to many of the problems they face in entering or operating in foreign countries and enabled them to develop new and often quite imaginative ways of structuring or executing their business. Innovative capital structures, service contracts, participation arrangements, phaseout and access agreements have, as a result, been tried and in certain circumstances have proved to be feasible. At the same time many governments have become more sophisticated about foreign investment and about its basic principle—that without adequate expectations of return, there is no way to achieve the desired level of investment.

Progress is also important in dealing with the resolution of individual disputes. The most efficient means of doing so is to establish an agreed means of conciliation and, if necessary, arbitration. Sixty-five nations have chosen to do so by ratifying the treaty establishing the International Center for the Settlement of International Investment Disputes. ICSID now faces its first great test in the case of the Jamaican aluminum contracts.

For other countries, which do not accept the concept of international arbitration, alternative, if less efficient, procedures can be established. The most useful such devices are arrangements for factfinding and for encouraging and sustaining negotiations.

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<sup>2</sup> For text of a communique issued at Washington on Apr. 18 at the conclusion of a meeting of Western Hemisphere Foreign Ministers, see BULLETIN of May 13, 1974, p. 517.

Finally, national governments can play a great role in the solution of investment disputes. The U.S. Government cannot be impartial in a dispute in which it appears that the rights of American citizens or enterprises under international law are being infringed. But that is not the only and not necessarily the main role it plays in such disputes. Often our primary concern is to help structure and carry through a process of negotiation that will lead toward resolution.

### **The Insurance Function**

But even with major progress in the areas of tax agreements, capital movement codes, conciliation and arbitration, and dispute resolution, major uncertainties will inevitably remain in the area of foreign investment. These uncertainties can be made manageable and acceptable by insurance; this is the role of the Overseas Private Investment Corporation (OPIC).

Over the past year, with the renewal of OPIC's authorization, there has been much soul-searching about its proper role. Some have questioned whether it made sense to encourage, through insurance, private investment in developing countries given the greater incidence of investment disputes. Others have felt strongly that the insurance function could as well be performed by private insurers and have pressed for privatization of OPIC.

While these concerns are significant and privatization must be given a proper trial, they should not be allowed to determine the size of the OPIC program at a time when there is such an urgent need for new investment, particularly in basic commodities, but also in a range of key industrial operations. Thus the OPIC management must expand its insurance operations vigorously. The administration should be ready to seek new authority for OPIC should it reach insurable limits.

Increasing availabilities of products in short supply is first of all an investment problem worldwide—not just one for U.S.

investment, domestic or foreign. In this respect, the Export-Import Bank can play an important role in financing sound projects—sponsored by foreign as well as U.S. investors—which increase production of short-supply items.

### **Strengthening the Worldwide Investment Market**

I have spoken here of the need for a higher rate of investment, and of the climate in which it can occur, in worldwide terms.

It used to be that one could argue about foreign versus domestic investment as if there were a real option between them. The arguments go on, but the reality has shifted behind them. We still have the option of controls on outward capital flows, but our experience in the 1960's showed that if you could temporarily dam up outward investments you cannot really change their overall thrust. One can refuse entry to transnational enterprises, but with a significant percentage of the non-Communist world's GNP generated by them—and the most dynamic part of it—there is a significant penalty to doing so. One has the option of refusing oil producers' funds, but all our economies need a greater flow of savings. And you can't have it both ways, with one investment policy for incoming, and another for outgoing, capital.

In a very real sense, there is a single worldwide investment market. It needs strengthening and perfecting. This, as we see it, is the action agenda:

—First, we must sustain free access to the American capital market both for borrowers and for investors. The decision in January to end the decade-old controls and taxes on capital outflow constituted a major contribution to making the recycling of oil dollars work. There must be no return to controls on capital outflows or to taxes on them. Equally, we must continue to remain open to foreign investment. It is useful to go ahead with detailed studies like the Tariff Commission's on multinational corporations and the Culver-Inouye [Represent-

ative John C. Culver; Senator Daniel K. Inouye] proposal for a detailed survey of foreign investment in the United States. These studies will help sensitize foreign investors to problem areas and to practices that can usefully be avoided. They may also result in recommendations for addition of specific sectors to those that have traditionally been reserved for American investors only. We will certainly need a better reporting system.

—Second, we must be certain that the international banking system is able to continue to play its part in the oil recycling operation. For that we will need to make sure that each banking operation can have recourse to a “lender of last resort” in cases of illiquidity; at present there are a range of Euromarket banking operations, most of them subsidiaries of large banks, that are not so covered. And we may have to consider a system of multilateral guarantees by governments to cover oil deficits to make sure countries can borrow what they need in international capital markets.

—Third, we should continue to seek full national treatment for U.S. investment abroad, and we must insist on prompt, adequate, and effective compensation in the few cases of nationalization. Where needed and appropriate, we will bring to bear available political and economic influence to get a satisfactory resolution, recognizing that the basic sanction is the damage the host country does to its future investment prospects.

—Fourth, at the same time, we must take every opportunity to enlarge the area of non-legally-binding codes, guidelines, and understandings in which both host country and enterprise can have stable expectations about each other's behavior. Generalized discourse on these issues can go on at the United Nations; but our strategy will press for progress at the regional level, where real interest and real problems in investment are more easily identified. The OECD investment exercise and the Working Group on Transnational Enterprises are particularly

promising in this regard. We will press ahead very actively in these two forums.

—Fifth, it is important for the companies to continue to develop their sensitivity to host country concerns and problems. The great American enterprises that operate internationally have shown themselves to be highly adaptive. As host country problems are gradually identified, I am confident that new modes of investment will be invented to respond to them.

—Sixth, a yet greater effort can be deployed in the investment dispute area. Our policy cannot, of course, be designed essentially to avoid investment disputes; clearly there are other and more important equities in almost every case. But the American Ambassador abroad and the State Department at home will take the lead in seeking to identify possible procedures leading to a resolution and to encourage the parties to the dispute to make use of them.

—Seventh, we need to expand more rapidly the area of transactions governed by tax treaties. At present we have treaties with 22 countries and about 10 more are at various stages of negotiation. We shall actively press to expand that number. At the same time, the traditional scope of tax treaties should be broadened so as to include provisions for intergovernmental negotiations on transfer pricing and better protection against domestic taxation that has a confiscatory or discriminatory effect against foreign enterprise.

—Finally, we must actively support investment overseas through OPIC's program of insurance, expanding the program as necessary to cover the volume of investment that will be needed to overcome the major shortages in the world economy.

Let me end where I began. The world economy needs much more investment. These are the things we think we should be doing about it. But you are the experts in the field. We would very much like to know what you think ought to be done.

## Secretary Kissinger Pays Tribute to Former Secretary Acheson

*Following are remarks made by Secretary Kissinger on September 17 at a ceremony marking the presentation of a portrait of the late Secretary of State Dean Acheson to the National Portrait Gallery at Washington.*

Press release 365 dated September 18

We come here this evening to do honor to one of the greatest of my predecessors. We do so for many reasons—out of affection, for reasons of friendship, and because of our admiration for his genius.

As a historian I have long respected the heritage left by Dean Acheson the public servant. He brought unity from the chaos that was the legacy of war; he built a mighty alliance that gave hope and security to millions; he fashioned an international structure that lasted far past his own departure from the public scene. The magnitude of his accomplishments has assured that ever afterward he will serve as the standard against which his successors will inevitably be judged.

But for me this ceremony tonight is far more than mere history.

It is, first of all, an opportunity to give thanks for the gallantry he displayed toward me when I first came to Washington almost six years ago. I shall be forever grateful for his wise counsel during those difficult times, and I shall never forget his concern—free of partisanship—for the proper governance of this nation.

But most important, this ceremony provides an opportunity to remind ourselves that what Dean Acheson was, what he stood for as a man, remains vital and alive today and that he set a standard against which all of us—in government or out—must judge ourselves.

He was a man of dignity—in his person and in his view of the public process. He revered the greatness and majesty of the nation he served, and never demeaned it. He

felt deeply the duty his country demanded, and never shirked it.

He was, as well, a man of wit and humor; life was fun and it was fun to be around him. I shall, for example, never forget his description to me of a then senior statesman: "He reminds me of an amateur boomerang thrower practicing his art in a crowded room." On another occasion, though as a Harvard man I personally could not find it particularly amusing, he described President Truman as "a Yale man in the finest sense of the word." Finally—and much closer to home, given my former profession—he said in one of his remarkably articulate speeches:

While public men cannot escape historians, they would do well to forget them while they get on with their job. One cannot even be sure of fixing the jury by employing its members—though it may help temporarily—or by becoming a member and writing its verdict. . . .

So much, then, for historians. And so much for any thoughts I may have had about future employment once I depart my current position.

The Acheson legacy is nowhere more pervasive—nowhere more deeply felt—than in the institution I now head. He will not pass from the hearts and minds of those who worked with and for him, for he gave them an understanding of the great adventure they were embarked upon. And he inspired hundreds who knew him only as a legend. He took them beyond themselves, beyond the petty concerns that can stultify and smother a bureaucracy, and showed them the breadth and scope of the business they were really about—the peace, the security, and the well-being of their own nation and of all mankind. In charting his great enterprise, he engendered a sense of pride, of purpose and dedication, that put the Department of State at the center of the policymaking process—not because an organization chart indicated that it should be but because its quality demonstrated that it must be.

It is, perhaps, the ultimate compliment that any man can receive that more than 20



years after his departure from office his way of thought and action remains the test of quality and his example the goal for which those who have followed after him still strive.

As he was an inspiration to his subordinates, so was he devoted to his chief. As he said in describing himself:

Like General Marshall, his successor never forgot who was President, and the President most punctiliously remembered who was Secretary of State. This mutual restraint is basic to a sound working relation between the two.

And a sound relationship they did indeed possess. Nothing so briefly yet so eloquently sums up the depth of that remarkable relationship as does the simple dedication of "Present at the Creation"—"To Harry S. Truman 'The captain with the mighty heart'."

Finally, Dean Acheson was a man of rare honor and integrity—a man who saw the human condition, and the awful influences of power, more clearly than most. In an eloquent statement before a Senate committee in 1950 he said:

In the long days and years which stretch beyond that moment of decision, one must live with one's self; and the consequences of living with a decision which one knows has sprung from timidity and cowardice go to the roots of one's life. It is not merely a question of peace of mind, although that is vital; it is a matter of integrity of character.

The strength, the humanity, and the compassion of Dean Acheson are found in those few words. They are a reaffirmation of his greatness for all who loved or admired him;

they are a challenge to all who treasure his memory.

Justice Holmes once said, in a speech that Secretary Acheson was fond of quoting:

Alas, gentlemen . . . We cannot live our dreams. We are lucky enough if we can give a sample of our best, and if in our hearts we can feel that it has been nobly done.

Dean Acheson more nearly lived his dreams than any man I know of. He gave us his best. And it was, indeed, nobly done.

## **Senate Confirms U.S. Delegation to 29th U.N. General Assembly**

The Senate on September 17 confirmed the nominations of the following to be Representatives and Alternate Representatives of the United States to the 29th session of the General Assembly of the United Nations:

### *Representatives*

John A. Seali  
W. Tapley Bennett, Jr.  
Stuart Symington, U.S. Senator from the State of Missouri  
Charles H. Percy, U.S. Senator from the State of Illinois  
Thomas H. Kuchel

### *Alternate Representatives*

Oliver C. Carmichael, Jr.  
Joseph M. Segel  
William E. Schaufele, Jr.  
Clarence Clyde Ferguson, Jr.  
Barbara M. White

## Department Discusses Proposed Nuclear Reactor Agreements With Egypt and Israel

*Statement by Joseph J. Sisco  
Under Secretary for Political Affairs<sup>1</sup>*

It is a great pleasure to appear before you today to discuss with you our proposed commercial nuclear agreements with Israel and Egypt. Because you have already heard from my colleagues in the executive branch and because you are already well informed on the basic facts of these agreements, I will keep my opening remarks as brief as possible so we can go directly to your questions.

Let me explain at the outset exactly where discussions on this subject with Egypt and Israel stand. Both countries were given draft agreements in June. Since that time the United States has given both countries modifications to be made in the drafts, and the Egyptians have raised a number of questions as to the interpretation and intent of various of the provisions in the drafts. The most recent discussion with the Egyptian representatives was on August 15 in Washington. The Israelis have not given us their detailed views on these drafts.

Nuclear technology is a two-edged sword. The Middle East is a volatile and dangerous area. No one—least of all someone like my-

self who has been concerned with Middle Eastern affairs for many years—could lightly take a decision to sell U.S. nuclear reactors and fuel there.

I would like to make four general observations. We believe:

—That an offer to sell commercial power reactors and fuel to Egypt and Israel will help reinforce the momentum toward peace in the area;

—That our offer makes sound economic sense;

—That our offer limits the possibilities of adding to the dangers of nuclear weapons proliferation in the area; and

—That our offer will be accompanied by the most effective safeguards possible.

Let me elaborate on these four points.

We began with one key assessment: That if the United States did not cooperate with Egypt and Israel in their desire to obtain nuclear power reactors, others—who are far less concerned with nonproliferation goals—would. Only by taking a positive stance could we help shape the manner in which this technology was brought into a geographic area of vital concern to us.

Nuclear technology will inevitably find its way into Egypt and Israel, given the economic benefits of nuclear power plants for electrical generation. By selling reactors to

<sup>1</sup> Made before the Subcommittees on International Organizations and Movements and on the Near East and South Asia of the House Committee on Foreign Affairs on Sept. 16. The complete transcript of the hearings will be published by the committee and will be available from the Superintendent of Documents, U.S. Government Printing Office, Washington, D.C. 20402.

both countries at the same time and under comparable conditions, we will help insure that commercial-scale nuclear technology enters the region in a *balanced* and *symmetric* manner—a result which can minimize risks and reduce tensions.

But we also believed a positive response would add to the forces that can help turn the area from war toward peace.

Since the signing of the disengagement agreements between Israel and Syria and Egypt, we have been moving to sustain the momentum of the progress toward peace and to strengthen our relations with those countries whose contributions to its realization are indispensable. In August we had important discussions with Arab leaders, and we have just completed significant talks with the Prime Minister of Israel.

These consultations will be carried on later this month in the context of the opening of the U.N. General Assembly session. Our hope is that these will lead to understanding on the course of further negotiations. There must be continuing progress if we are to avoid risking what has already been achieved.

The intangible in this process is confidence. Our willingness to sell reactors and associated fuel to both countries provides evidence to Israel and Egypt of our interest in broad and continuing cooperation with them. On their part, it signifies their confidence in American technology and, more importantly, in the stability of their future relationship with the United States. That the power plants we are discussing would not become operational until the 1980's underlines this point. The mutual interest in friendly relations will be given material expression. But perhaps more importantly, the element of confidence—so indispensable to the peace-making process—will be reinforced.

There was also an economic dimension to our decision. Nuclear power reactors make economic sense in both countries. With the dramatic increase in oil prices, the World Bank, for example, which has been historically conservative about this technology, now

endorses it as economically viable for nations like Egypt and Israel.

So there were foreign policy purposes and an economic rationale for responding favorably to reactor requests. But we also have to be sure that the commercial nuclear equipment and materials provided by the United States could be protected with nuclear safeguards adequate to the very special dangers that pervade the Middle East.

Under our Nonproliferation Treaty obligation, we are obligated to insure that International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) safeguards are placed on material transferred to other states through agreements for cooperation in the peaceful nuclear field. We believe that in most areas of the world these IAEA safeguards are adequate to meet prevailing risks. An IAEA-safeguarded reactor has never been used for peaceful nuclear explosions or for diversion of plutonium.

It is clear to us, however, that IAEA safeguards must be supplemented to meet the unique circumstances of the Middle East. For example, the potential for uncertainty about weapons development has to be closed off, particularly the potential for uncertainty on the part of nations in the area. Doubts on one side about what the other side might be doing with his plutonium could have a devastating effect on Middle Eastern peace. It was for this latter reason that we saw the introduction of additional controls as a matter of self-interest in both Egypt and Israel.

Moreover, we were and are resolved to make the special safeguards on our nuclear power agreements not only adequate to risks but, just as importantly, precedent-setting as to their nonproliferation benefits.

As you are aware, the reactors we contemplate supplying are themselves without weapons potential, and the low-enriched uranium fuel cannot be used for nuclear explosives. Rather, the threat arises in three areas; we are determined that each be choked off:

—First, that either government will overt-

ly or covertly divert the plutonium byproduct of the reactors and make it into weapons. Against the risk of diversion, our agreements with Israel and Egypt will supplement inspection by the IAEA by specifying that the reprocessing and storage of the plutonium will be done outside each country.

—Second, that either government will use the material for what would be described as a peaceful nuclear explosion. Our agreement will explicitly preclude peaceful nuclear explosions. And let me say here we do not believe that there is any technical distinction between a peaceful explosion and a weapons explosion.

—Third, that some of the material could be stolen or that the reactors would be subject to terrorist attack. Against the risk of sabotage or attack, our agreements will provide for assurance that stringent physical security procedures are applied by both countries.

I summarize here only because I know how thoroughly you have studied the details of our planned safeguards. Two questions have almost certainly occurred to you, as they have to me. First, how can we be sure that both or either of the countries will not violate the safeguards we are writing into the agreements? And second, why don't we insist on adherence to the Nonproliferation Treaty as a condition for supplying the reactors? Allow me to respond to them.

There can never be an ironclad guarantee that a country will not violate an international agreement, whatever its nature and no matter how tightly written. But we think that the provisions of these agreements and the interests of both Israel and Egypt make violation extremely unlikely. We start from the premise that a violation could not be kept a secret from either the United States or the international community. Thus, in case of a violation:

—The United States would have the option to suspend its supply of fuel for the reactors, and the violating country would have great difficulty finding a new source, particularly

in circumstances where the world was in full knowledge of the violation.

—The violation would alert its adversary to the fact that it was building nuclear weapons.

—A violation would place in great jeopardy the offending country's economic, political, and diplomatic relationships with the United States.

The disincentives to unilateral abrogation are very great.

The United States is committed to seeking the widest possible adherence to the Nonproliferation Treaty. We hope that both Israel and Egypt will eventually join us and all other nations in subscribing to it. The agreements we propose to sign with them will reflect faithfully their support for the treaty's objectives.

However, it is clear that neither Israel nor Egypt sees its national interests presently served by becoming a party to the Nonproliferation Treaty. Over the short run virtually nothing is likely to alter these perceptions.

Our efforts must be bent to helping build the conditions in which those perceptions can change. It is our hope that provision of peaceful nuclear facilities under strict controls against military use can create in time a momentum toward a climate consistent with the goal of nonproliferation within the region and between both nations and the United States.

Mr. Chairmen, members of the subcommittee: Historians of a future age will undoubtedly comment on 20th-century man's efforts to match his political will to his technological grasp. That struggle is sharply etched in the issue you are considering today.

The most modern and potentially the most dangerous of technologies is at the threshold of an area where there has been no lasting vision of peace for a generation. Now such a vision is beginning to take shape. Through prudently molded agreements we propose to use technology to hasten progress toward its full development.

I hope that you can support us in this task.

## U.S.-Bulgaria Consular Convention Transmitted to the Senate

*Message From President Ford*<sup>1</sup>

*To the Senate of the United States:*

I am pleased to transmit for the Senate's advice and consent to ratification the Consular Convention between the United States of America and the People's Republic of Bulgaria, with an Agreed Memorandum and a related exchange of letters, signed at Sofia on April 15, 1974. I transmit also, for the information of the Senate, the report of the Department of State with respect to the Convention.

The signing of this Convention is a significant step in the gradual process of improving and broadening the relationship between the United States and Bulgaria. Consular relations between the two countries have not previously been subject to formal agreement. This Convention will establish firm obligations on such important matters as free communication between a citizen and his consul, notification to consular officers of the arrest and detention of their citizens, and permission for visits by consuls to citizens who are under detention.

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<sup>1</sup> Transmitted on Sept. 12 (text from White House press release); also printed as S. Ex. H., 93d Cong., 2d sess., which includes the texts of the convention, the agreed memorandum and related letters, and the report of the Department of State.

I welcome the opportunity through this Consular Convention to strengthen the ties between the United States and Bulgaria. I urge the Senate to give the Convention its prompt and favorable consideration.

GERALD R. FORD.

THE WHITE HOUSE, *September 12, 1974.*

## Congressional Documents Relating to Foreign Policy

### 93d Congress, 2d Session

- Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty. Report to accompany S. 3190. S. Rept. 93-1019. July 17, 1974. 3 pp.
- Duty-Free Entry of Telescope and Associated Articles for Canada-France-Hawaii Telescope Project. Report to accompany H.R. 11796. H. Rept. 93-1213. July 24, 1974. 13 pp.
- African Development Fund. Report to accompany S. 2354. S. Rept. 93-1029. July 25, 1974. 4 pp.
- Energy Transportation Security Act of 1974. Report, together with minority views, on H.R. 8193, to require that a percentage of U.S. oil imports be carried on U.S.-flag vessels. S. Rept. 93-1031. July 25, 1974. 66 pp.
- Russian Grain Transactions. Report of the Senate Committee on Government Operations made by its Permanent Subcommittee on Investigations. S. Rept. 93-1033. July 29, 1974. 67 pp.
- Increased U.S. Participation in the Asian Development Bank. Report to accompany S. 2193. S. Rept. 93-1040. July 30, 1974. 11 pp.
- Overseas Private Investment Corporation. Conference Report to accompany S. 2957. H. Rept. 93-1233. July 30, 1974. 13 pp.
- Passport Application Fees. Report to accompany H.R. 15172. H. Rept. 93-1242. July 31, 1974. 4 pp.

## INTERNATIONAL ORGANIZATIONS AND CONFERENCES

### Calendar of International Conferences <sup>1</sup>

#### Scheduled October Through December

ECE Group of Experts on Automatic Data Processing . . . . .	Geneva . . . . .	Oct. 1-2
ECAFE Committee on Industry and Technology and Housing . . . . .	Bangkok . . . . .	Oct. 1-8
OECD Oil Committee . . . . .	Paris . . . . .	Oct. 2
WIPO Working Group on Scientific Discoveries . . . . .	Geneva . . . . .	Oct. 2-4
OECD Export Credits Group . . . . .	Paris . . . . .	Oct. 3-4
IMCO Maritime Safety Committee: 31st Session . . . . .	London . . . . .	Oct. 3-4
ECE Working Party on Facilitation of International Trade Procedures.	Geneva . . . . .	Oct. 3-4
ILO Preparatory Meeting on Civil Aviation . . . . .	Geneva . . . . .	Oct. 3-10
ICAO Legal Subcommittee: 21st Session . . . . .	Montreal . . . . .	Oct. 3-22
ECE Ad Hoc Meeting on a New Chemical Study . . . . .	Geneva . . . . .	Oct. 7-8
NATO Civil Defense Committee . . . . .	Brussels . . . . .	Oct. 7-9
FAO Intergovernmental Group on Meat: 4th Session . . . . .	Rome . . . . .	Oct. 7-10
FAO Intergovernmental Group on Jute, Kenaf, and Allied Fibers: 9th Session.	Rome . . . . .	Oct. 7-10
ECE Group of Rapporteurs on Container Transport . . . . .	Geneva . . . . .	Oct. 7-11
GATT Committee on Budget and Administration . . . . .	Geneva . . . . .	Oct. 7-11
9th FAO Regional Conference for Europe . . . . .	Lausanne . . . . .	Oct. 7-12
U.N. ECOSOC Statistical Commission: 18th Plenary Meeting . . . . .	Geneva . . . . .	Oct. 7-18
OECD Development Assistance Committee . . . . .	Paris . . . . .	Oct. 8
ECAFE Typhoon Committee . . . . .	Manila . . . . .	Oct. 8-14
ECE Chemical Industry Committee . . . . .	Geneva . . . . .	Oct. 9-11
GATT Working Party on Trade With Poland . . . . .	Geneva . . . . .	Oct. 10-11
ECE Preparatory Meeting for Seminar on Construction in Seismic Regions With Difficult Ground Conditions.	Bucharest . . . . .	Oct. 12
GATT Balance of Payments Committee . . . . .	Geneva . . . . .	Oct. 14-16
ECE Group of Experts on Road Traffic Safety . . . . .	Geneva . . . . .	Oct. 14-18
CCC Permanent Technical Committee: 85th-86th Sessions . . . . .	Geneva . . . . .	Oct. 14-18
ECE Timber Committee . . . . .	Geneva . . . . .	Oct. 14-18
PAHO Executive Committee: 73d Meeting . . . . .	Washington . . . . .	Oct. 14-19
UNHCR Executive Committee: 25th Session . . . . .	Geneva . . . . .	Oct. 14-24

<sup>1</sup> This schedule, which was prepared in the Office of International Conferences on September 13, lists international conferences in which the U.S. Government expects to participate officially in the period October-December 1974. Nongovernmental conferences are not included.

Following is a key to the abbreviations: CCC, Customs Cooperation Council; CCITT, International Telegraph and Telephone Consultative Committee; ECAFE, Economic Commission for Asia and the Far East; ECE, Economic Commission for Europe; ECOSOC, Economic and Social Council; FAO, Food and Agriculture Organization; GATT, General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade; ICAO, International Civil Aviation Organization; ICEM, Intergovernmental Committee for European Migration; IHO, International Hydrological Organization; ILO, International Labor Organization; IMCO, Intergovernmental Maritime Consultative Organization; IOC, Intergovernmental Oceanographic Commission; ISVS, International Secretariat for Volunteer Service; ITU, International Telecommunications Union; NATO, North Atlantic Treaty Organization; OAS, Organization of American States; OECD, Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development; PAHC, Pan American Highway Congresses; PAHO, Pan American Health Organization; SEATO, Southeast Asia Treaty Organization; UNCTAD, United Nations Conference on Trade and Development; UNESCO, United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization; UNHCR, United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees; UNICEF, United Nations Children's Fund; UNIDO, United Nations Industrial Development Organization; WHO, World Health Organization; WIPO, World Intellectual Property Organization; WMO, World Meteorological Organization.

FAO Committee on Commodity Problems . . . . .	Rome . . . . .	Oct. 14-25
WMO Commission on Agricultural Meteorology: 6th Session . . . . .	Washington . . . . .	Oct. 14-26
FAO Committee on Fisheries . . . . .	Rome . . . . .	Oct. 15-22
18th UNESCO General Conference . . . . .	Paris . . . . .	Oct. 15-Nov. 20
IMCO Assembly: 5th Extraordinary Session . . . . .	London . . . . .	Oct. 16-18
GATT Balance of Payments Committee . . . . .	Geneva . . . . .	Oct. 21-22
ISVS Council: 16th Session . . . . .	Geneva . . . . .	Oct. 21-23
ECE Group of Rapporteurs on General Safety Provisions . . . . .	Rome . . . . .	Oct. 21-25
ECE Group of Experts on Customs Questions Affecting Transport . . . . .	Geneva . . . . .	Oct. 21-25
IMCO International Conference on Safety of Life at Sea . . . . .	London . . . . .	Oct. 21-Nov. 1
NATO Committee on the Challenges of Modern Society . . . . .	Brussels . . . . .	Oct. 22-23
OECD Development Assistance Committee (High Level Group) . . . . .	Paris . . . . .	Oct. 22-23
GATT Working Party on Romanian Tariffs . . . . .	Geneva . . . . .	Oct. 23-25
OECD Maritime Transport Committee . . . . .	Paris . . . . .	Oct. 23-25
ITU/CCITT Asian Planning Committee . . . . .	Tokyo . . . . .	Oct. 23-30
ECE Group of Experts on Long Term Prospects for the Steel Industry.	Geneva . . . . .	Oct. 28-29
ICAO Panel on Route Facility Cost Accounting: 2d Meeting . . . . .	Montreal . . . . .	Oct. 28-Nov. 1
ILO Working Party on Structure: 1st Session . . . . .	Geneva . . . . .	Oct. 28-Nov. 1
ECE Steel Committee . . . . .	Geneva . . . . .	Oct. 30-Nov. 1
FAO Indo-Pacific Fisheries Council . . . . .	Jakarta . . . . .	Oct. 30-Nov. 8
ECAFE Special Meeting for 2d UNIDO Conference . . . . .	Bangkok . . . . .	Oct. 31-Nov. 4
FAO World Food Program Intergovernmental Committee . . . . .	Rome . . . . .	October
SEATO Council of Ministers: 19th Meeting . . . . .	New York . . . . .	October
U.N. ECOSOC Policy and Program Coordination Committee: Inter- sessional Meeting.	New York . . . . .	October
NATO Senior Civil Emergency Planning Committee . . . . .	Brussels . . . . .	October
NATO Civil Communications Planning Committee . . . . .	Brussels . . . . .	October
GATT Council . . . . .	Geneva . . . . .	October
NATO Expert Working Group on the Middle East and Maghreb . . . . .	Brussels . . . . .	October
NATO Expert Working Group on Latin America . . . . .	Brussels . . . . .	October
NATO Expert Working Group on the Far East . . . . .	Brussels . . . . .	October
OAS/PAHC Committee III . . . . .	Caracas . . . . .	Nov. 4-7
ECE Gas Committee . . . . .	Geneva . . . . .	Nov. 4-8
Western Hemisphere Working Group on Transnational Enterprises . . . . .	Washington . . . . .	Nov. 4-8
UNCTAD Committee on Tungsten: 8th Session . . . . .	Geneva . . . . .	Nov. 4-8
ILO Governing Body and Its Committees: 194th Session . . . . .	Geneva . . . . .	Nov. 4-15
ICAO Special North Atlantic/Pacific Regional Air Navigation Meeting.	Montreal . . . . .	Nov. 4-15
U.N. Pledging Conference for UNIDO and U.N. Capital Develop- ment Fund.	New York . . . . .	Nov. 5
FAO Ad Hoc Consultations on Tobacco . . . . .	Rome . . . . .	Nov. 5-9
ECAFE Committee on Natural Resources Development . . . . .	Bangkok . . . . .	Nov. 5-11
CCC Valuation Committee: 65th Session . . . . .	Brussels . . . . .	Nov. 5-15
U.N. World Food Conference . . . . .	Rome . . . . .	Nov. 5-16
OAS/PAHC Permanent Executive Committee: 15th Regular Ses- sion.	Caracas . . . . .	Nov. 7-9
OECD Development Assistance Committee . . . . .	Paris . . . . .	Nov. 8
UNICEF Special Pledging Conference . . . . .	New York . . . . .	Nov. 11
ICEM Subcommittee on Budget and Finance: 29th Session (re- sumed).	Geneva . . . . .	Nov. 11-12
ECE Group of Experts on Transport of Dangerous Goods . . . . .	Bern . . . . .	Nov. 11-15
IMCO Legal Committee: 24th Session . . . . .	London . . . . .	Nov. 11-15
UNCTAD Intergovernmental Preparatory Group on a Convention on International Intermodal Transport: 2d Session.	Geneva . . . . .	Nov. 11-29
OECD Environment Committee: Ministerial Meeting . . . . .	Paris . . . . .	Nov. 13-14
ICEM Executive Committee: 46th Session . . . . .	Geneva . . . . .	Nov. 14-16
UNESCO Executive Committee of the International Campaign To Save the Monuments of Nubia: 24th Session.	Aswan . . . . .	Nov. 16
ICEM Council: 37th Session . . . . .	Paris . . . . .	Nov. 18-20
ICAO Statistical Panel: 4th Meeting . . . . .	Montreal . . . . .	Nov. 18-22
IMCO Marine Environment Protection Committee: 2d Session . . . . .	London . . . . .	Nov. 18-22

# Calendar of International Conferences—Continued

## Scheduled October Through December—Continued

GATT Meeting of the Contracting Parties . . . . .	Geneva . . . . .	Nov. 18-22
ECE Committee on Electric Power . . . . .	Geneva . . . . .	Nov. 18-22
ECE Group of Experts on Construction of Vehicles . . . . .	Geneva . . . . .	Nov. 18-22
CCC Working Party of the Nomenclature Committee . . . . .	Paris . . . . .	Nov. 18-23
FAO Council; 64th Session . . . . .	Rome . . . . .	Nov. 18-29
OECD Development Assistance Committee . . . . .	Paris . . . . .	Nov. 19-20
International Commission for the Conservation of Atlantic Tuna . . . . .	Madrid . . . . .	Nov. 20-26
UNESCO Executive Board; 96th Session . . . . .	Jakarta . . . . .	Nov. 21-22
ECAFE Committee on Statistics . . . . .	Jakarta . . . . .	Nov. 21-27
OECD Development Assistance Committee . . . . .	Paris . . . . .	Nov. 22
ECE Committee on Development of Trade . . . . .	Geneva . . . . .	Nov. 25-29
IMCO Subcommittee on Standards of Training and Watchkeeping . . . . .	London . . . . .	Nov. 25-29
ILO 2d Tripartite Technical Meeting for Hotels, Restaurants, and Similar Establishments.	Geneva . . . . .	Nov. 25-Dec. 6
WMO Regional Association III (South America); 6th Session . . . . .	Buenos Aires . . . . .	Nov. 25-Dec. 6
CCC Nomenclature Committee; 33d Session . . . . .	Brussels . . . . .	Nov. 25-Dec. 7
ICAO Supersonic Transport Panel; 5th Meeting . . . . .	Montreal . . . . .	Nov. 25-Dec. 13
Consultative Committee for the Economic Development in South and Southeast Asia (Colombo Plan).	Singapore . . . . .	Nov. 26-Dec. 5
ILO Conference of American States; 10th Session . . . . .	Mexico City . . . . .	Nov. 26-Dec. 6
NATO Food and Agriculture Planning Committee . . . . .	Brussels . . . . .	November
NATO Industrial Planning Committee . . . . .	Brussels . . . . .	November
ECE Committee on Development of Trade . . . . .	Geneva . . . . .	November
NATO Civil Aviation Planning Committee . . . . .	Brussels . . . . .	November
NATO Planning Board for European Inland Surface Transport . . . . .	Brussels . . . . .	November
U.N. Economic and Social Council; 57th Session (resumed) . . . . .	New York . . . . .	November
International Olive Oil Council; 31st Session . . . . .	Madrid . . . . .	November
NATO Petroleum Planning Committee . . . . .	Brussels . . . . .	November
NATO Expert Working Group on the Soviet Union and Eastern Europe.	Brussels . . . . .	November
CCC Extraordinary Session of Finance Committee . . . . .	Brussels . . . . .	Dec. 2-4
OECD Financial Markets Committee . . . . .	Paris . . . . .	Dec. 2-5
3d OAS Inter-American Conference on Radio Chemistry . . . . .	Rio de Janeiro . . . . .	Dec. 2-6
IMCO Subcommittee on Fire Protection; 16th Session . . . . .	London . . . . .	Dec. 2-6
ECAFE Committee on Trade . . . . .	Bangkok . . . . .	Dec. 2-9
U.N. ECOSOC Committee of Experts on the Transport of Dangerous Goods.	Geneva . . . . .	Dec. 2-10
UNIDO Permanent Committee; 5th Session, 1st Part . . . . .	Vienna . . . . .	Dec. 2-14
UNESCO Meeting of Governmental Experts To Review the International Standard Classification of Education.	Paris . . . . .	Dec. 3-11
Western Hemisphere Working Group on Transnational Enterprises . . . . .	Washington . . . . .	Dec. 9-13
ECE Senior Advisers on Science and Technology . . . . .	Geneva . . . . .	Dec. 9-13
ECE Working Party on Road Transport . . . . .	Geneva . . . . .	Dec. 9-13
IMCO Life Saving Appliance Committee; 8th Session . . . . .	London . . . . .	Dec. 9-13
ECAFE Committee on Economic Planning . . . . .	Bangkok . . . . .	Dec. 9-14
FAO/WHO Committee of Experts on Nutrition . . . . .	Rome . . . . .	Dec. 11-20
ECE Group of Rapporteurs on Pneumatic Tires . . . . .	Geneva . . . . .	Dec. 16-20
UNESCO/IOC International Coordination Group for Cooperative Investigations in the Mediterranean; 2d Session.	Monaco . . . . .	Dec. 16-21
ECAFE Transport and Communications Committee . . . . .	Bangkok . . . . .	Dec. 16-23
OECD Development Assistance Committee . . . . .	Paris . . . . .	Dec. 17-18
ICAO Meteorological Operational Telecommunications Network in Europe Regional Planning Group; 10th Meeting.	Paris . . . . .	December
IHO Commission on Radio Navigation Warnings . . . . .	Monte Carlo . . . . .	December
UNESCO/IOC International Coordination Group for Cooperative Studies of Kuroshio and Adjacent Regions; 10th Session.	Tokyo . . . . .	December
NATO Defense Planning Committee . . . . .	Brussels . . . . .	December
NATO; 54th Council Meeting at Ministerial Level . . . . .	Brussels . . . . .	December
UNESCO Bureau of the International Coordinating Council on Man and the Biosphere Program.	Paris . . . . .	December



## U.S.-Japan Migratory Bird Convention Enters Into Force

Press release 367 dated September 19

The Convention Between the Government of the United States of America and the Government of Japan for the Protection of Migratory Birds and Birds in Danger of Extinction and Their Environment entered into force on September 19 when Deputy Secretary of State Robert S. Ingersoll and Japanese Ambassador Takeshi Yasukawa exchanged instruments of ratification at Washington. The convention, which was signed in Tokyo on March 4, 1972, opens up a new field of cooperation between the United States and Japan.

The convention is the third bilateral agreement regarding migratory birds entered into by the United States. The first was with Canada, signed August 16, 1916; the second with Mexico, signed February 6, 1936. Both conventions remain in force. Like the two earlier conventions, the present convention reflects the expansion of scientific knowledge regarding the extraordinarily long distances that certain species of birds traverse in the course of their migrations and a concern for their conservation.

The convention marks the culmination of international efforts dating back to 1960 when the 12th World Meeting of the International Council for Bird Preservation in Tokyo passed a resolution proposing that countries of the pan-Pacific area conclude a convention for the protection of migratory birds. Subsequently, studies were undertaken by the Department of the Interior, the Smithsonian Institution, and their Japanese counterparts. After a meeting of experts of each country in October 1968, U.S. and Japanese delegations met in Washington in October 1969 and negotiated a draft convention which, with a few changes, provided the text for the present convention.

The convention is designed to provide for the protection of species of birds which are common to both countries or which migrate between them. At present there are 190 such species listed in the annex to the convention. Included are such endangered birds as the peregrine falcon, the short-tailed albatross, the Aleutian Canada goose, and the Japanese crested ibis and sacred crane. Provisions are included in the convention for review and amendment of the annex.

The convention provides that each party shall endeavor to establish sanctuaries and other facilities for the protection or management of migratory birds. Provisions are included for special protection of endangered species of birds indigenous to each country. Along with the instruments of ratification, notes were exchanged listing such birds. Finally, there are provisions for the exchange of research data regarding migratory birds and endangered species of birds and for the preservation and enhancement of their environment.

## Current Actions

### MULTILATERAL

#### Atomic Energy

Statute of the International Atomic Energy Agency, as amended. Done at New York October 26, 1956. Entered into force July 29, 1957. TIAS 3873, 5284, 7668.

*Acceptance deposited:* Korea, Democratic People's Republic, September 18, 1974.

#### Automotive Traffic

Convention concerning customs facilities for touring. Done at New York June 4, 1954. Entered into force September 11, 1957. TIAS 3879.

*Accession deposited:* Chile, August 15, 1974.

#### Bills of Lading

International convention for the unification of certain rules relating to bills of lading and protocol of signature. Done at Brussels August 25, 1924. Entered into force June 2, 1931; for the United States December 29, 1937. 51 Stat. 233.

*Accession deposited:* Syria, August 1, 1974.

#### Copyright

Universal copyright convention, as revised. Done at Paris July 24, 1971. Entered into force July 10, 1974. TIAS 7868.

*Ratification deposited:* Norway, May 7, 1974.

## Maritime Matters

Convention for the unification of certain rules with respect to assistance and salvage at sea. Done at Brussels September 23, 1910. Entered into force March 1, 1913. 37 Stat. 1658.

*Adherence deposited:* Syria, August 1, 1974.

## Telecommunications

International telecommunication convention with annexes and protocols. Done at Malaga-Torremolinos October 25, 1973.<sup>1</sup>

*Ratification deposited:* Mauritius, June 8, 1974.

Telegraph regulations, with appendices, annex and final protocol. Done at Geneva April 11, 1973. Entered into force September 1, 1974.<sup>2</sup>

*Notification of approval:* Norway, June 27, 1974.

Telephone regulations, with appendices and final protocol. Done at Geneva April 11, 1973. Entered into force September 1, 1974.<sup>2</sup>

*Notification of approval:* Norway, June 27, 1974.

## World Heritage

Convention concerning the protection of the world cultural and natural heritage. Done at Paris November 16, 1972.<sup>1</sup>

*Ratifications deposited:* Algeria, June 24, 1974; Sudan, June 6, 1974.

## BILATERAL

### Cyprus

Parcel post agreement, with detailed regulations for execution. Signed at Nicosia and Washington May 7 and June 8, 1973.

*Entered into force:* September 1, 1974.

### Haiti

Agreement modifying the agreement of October 19 and November 3, 1971, as amended and modified, relating to trade in cotton textiles. Effected by exchange of notes at Port-au-Prince September 12 and 13, 1974. Entered into force September 13, 1974.

### Japan

Convention for the protection of migratory birds and birds in danger of extinction, and their environment. Signed at Tokyo March 4, 1972.

*Ratifications exchanged:* September 19, 1974.

*Entered into force:* September 19, 1974.

<sup>1</sup> Not in force.

<sup>2</sup> Not in force for the United States.

Agreement amending the annex to the convention of March 4, 1972, for the protection of migratory birds and birds in danger of extinction, and their environment. Effected by exchange of notes at Washington September 19, 1974. Enters into force December 19, 1974.

### Jordan

Agreement relating to payment to the United States of the net proceeds from the sale of defense articles by Jordan. Effected by exchange of letters at Amman May 20 and August 24, 1974. Entered into force August 24, 1974, effective July 1, 1974.

### Macao

Parcel post agreement, with detailed regulations for execution. Signed at Macao and Washington February 23 and June 8, 1973.

*Entered into force:* August 1, 1974.

### Switzerland

Agreement relating to the application of the rules of country of origin to air charter traffic between the United States and Switzerland. Effected by exchange of notes at Bern June 12 and July 25, 1974. Entered into force July 25, 1974.

### Check List of Department of State Press Releases: September 16-22

Press releases may be obtained from the Office of Press Relations, Department of State, Washington, D.C. 20520.

No.	Date	Subject
*364	9/17	Passport application fee raised from \$2 to \$3.
365	9/18	Kissinger: remarks at National Portrait Gallery.
†366	9/19	Kissinger: Senate Committee on Foreign Relations.
367	9/19	U.S.-Japan Migratory Bird Convention enters into force.
*368	9/19	U.S. journalists tour U.S.S.R. under exchange visits program.
†369	9/20	U.S.-U.K. aviation agreement.
*370	9/20	Black sworn in as Ambassador to Ghana (biographic data).
*371	9/20	Cooper sworn in as Ambassador to the German Democratic Republic (biographic data).

\* Not printed.

† Held for a later issue of the BULLETIN.

**Agriculture.** A Framework of International Cooperation (Ford) . . . . . 465

**American Principles.** Secretary Kissinger Pays Tribute to Former Secretary Acheson (remarks at National Portrait Gallery) . . . . . 482

**Atomic Energy**

Department Discusses Proposed Nuclear Reactor Agreements With Egypt and Israel (Sisco) . . . . . 484

Members of U.S. Delegation to IAEA Conference Confirmed . . . . . 468

**Bulgaria.** U.S.-Bulgaria Consular Convention Transmitted to the Senate (message from President Ford) . . . . . 487

**Chile.** President Ford's News Conference of September 16 (excerpts) . . . . . 471

**Congress**

Congressional Documents Relating to Foreign Policy . . . . . 487

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# THE DEPARTMENT OF STATE BULLETIN

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# THE DEPARTMENT OF STATE BULLETIN

VOL. LXXI, No. 1842

October 14, 1974

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*The Department of State BULLETIN, a weekly publication issued by the Office of Media Services, Bureau of Public Affairs, provides the public and interested agencies of the government with information on developments in the field of U.S. foreign relations and on the work of the Department and the Foreign Service.*

*The BULLETIN includes selected press releases on foreign policy, issued by the White House and the Department, and statements, addresses, and news conferences of the President and the Secretary of State and other officers of the Department, as well as special articles on various phases of international affairs and the functions of the Department. Information is included concerning treaties and international agreements to which the United States is or may become a party and on treaties of general international interest.*

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For sale by the Superintendent of Documents  
U.S. Government Printing Office  
Washington, D.C. 20402

PRICE:

52 issues plus semiannual indexes,  
domestic \$29.80, foreign \$37.25  
Single copy 60 cents

Use of funds for printing this publication approved by the Director of the Office of Management and Budget (January 29, 1971).

**Note:** Contents of this publication are not copyrighted and items contained herein may be reprinted. Citation of the DEPARTMENT OF STATE BULLETIN as the source will be appreciated. The BULLETIN is indexed in the Readers' Guide to Periodical Literature.

## A Global Approach to the Energy Problem

*Address by President Ford*<sup>1</sup>

On behalf of the American people, on behalf of my home State of Michigan, on behalf of the city of Detroit, it gives me a very great privilege and pleasure to welcome you to the city which some blame for the energy crisis.

But I hasten to add this, if I might: This is also a city [to] which we, along with the world's other great industrial nations, look for significant solutions that I know are possible. This is a "can do," a problem-solving, city and state.

It was here in Detroit that the internal combustion engine was transformed from a plaything of the rich into basic transportation on which people all over the world now depend.

The whole structure of our world society rests upon the expectation of abundant fuel at reasonable prices. I refer to cities and suburbs, farms and factories, shopping centers and office buildings, schools and churches, and the roadways that connect them all.

The expectation of an assured supply of energy has now been challenged. The repercussions are being felt worldwide. There is widespread uncertainty and deep and serious apprehension. Today, at the opening of this conference, we are determined to provide guidance to a world in crisis.

Many people became aware that there was an energy problem for the first time last October when the oil embargo was imposed.

But those who were well informed about the energy situation had known for some time that a crisis was coming.

With burgeoning demand all over the world, they knew that we could not forever expect a steady supply of low-priced fuel. The embargo merely brought to a head what experts had known for many years: that energy sources must be expanded and wasteful use eliminated to keep pace with the needs of a growing and modernizing world.

Everyone can now see the pulverizing impact of energy price increases on every aspect of the world economy. The food problem, the inflation problem, the monetary problem, and other major problems are directly linked to the all-pervasive energy problem.

The American response to the oil embargo and recent oil price increases, along with production decisions, has taken the form of a program for action under the general title Project Independence. This integrated domestic energy program will seek in many, many different ways to reduce American consumption and to increase production of energy.

Officials of my administration will more fully describe to this conference our determination to achieve energy independence. We will take tough steps to obtain the degree of self-sufficiency which is necessary to avoid disruption of our economy.

We will make sure there is heat for our homes and power for the people who work in our plants. Realistically, this does not mean zero imports.

In the immediate future, we will expand

<sup>1</sup> Made before the ninth World Energy Conference at Detroit, Mich., on Sept. 23 (text from Weekly Compilation of Presidential Documents dated Sept. 30).

our efforts to increase our energy efficiency. This will reduce the growing dependence on foreign petroleum. Project Independence will also require us to increase the output of existing domestic resources. In mobilizing to achieve long-term goals, we will fully exploit one of our most powerful natural resources—U.S. technology. We are moving in this direction.

Last year, for example, the U.S. Government funding for energy research and development was approximately \$1¼ billion. This year we will spend over \$2¼ billion. These funds, together with those provided by private industry, will support a growing national effort. In terms of joint private and public resources, it will mean a commitment in excess of the successful one made by John F. Kennedy to put a man on the Moon in the last decade. I mention this highly successful Moon landing to dramatize the magnitude of the energy task before us, the dedication with which we approach it, and the national mobilization of attention and talent it will require.

We are also moving to improve the organization of the U.S. Government for carrying out our energy programs. A key step now awaiting final action by the Congress is the creation of an Energy Research and Development Administration. It will provide coordination and leadership in cooperation with private industry in developing the necessary technology to fulfill our long-range energy requirements.

Even if there had been no political interference in the production and distribution of petroleum, nations today would still be facing the problem of finding enough fuel at reasonable prices to continue the modernization of our world. Our needs then and now for energy are increasing much, much faster than our ability to produce it. But in addition, most industrialized nations experienced the direct impact of the oil embargo, which obviously greatly intensified the problem.

All nations have been adversely affected by price increases. When nations use their resources as political weapons against others, the result is human suffering. It is then

tempting to speculate on how much better off man would be if nature had distributed vital resources more evenly around the world, making every nation self-sufficient. But perhaps nature had a better idea; because vital resources are distributed unevenly, nations are forced to choose between conflict and cooperation.

Throughout history, nations have gone to war over natural advantages such as water or food or convenient passages on land and sea. But in the nuclear age, when any local conflict may escalate to global catastrophe, war brings unacceptable risks for all mankind. Now, more than any time in the history of man, nations must accept and live peacefully with the fact that they need each other. Nations must turn to international cooperation as the best means for dealing with the uneven distribution of resources.

American foreign policy rests on two obvious new facts: First, in the nuclear age, there is no rational alternative to international cooperation. Second, the more the world progresses, the more the world modernizes, the more nations need each other.

As you know, a theme of the foreign policy of this administration is international cooperation in an interdependent world, stressing interdependence. You may ask, Why is our domestic energy program called Project Independence? As I see it, especially with regard to energy, national sufficiency and international interdependence fit together and actually work together.

No nation can be part of the modern world and live unto itself. No nation has or can have within its borders everything necessary for a full and rich life for all its people. Independence cannot mean isolation.

The aim of Project Independence is not to set the United States apart from the rest of the world; it is to enable the United States to do its part more effectively in the world's effort to provide more energy.

Project Independence will seek new ways to reduce energy usage and to increase its production. To the extent that we succeed, the world will benefit. There will be much more energy available for others.



As America expands existing sources and develops new ones, other nations will also benefit. We especially want to share our experience and our technology with other countries in efforts to increase their own energy supplies. We are also aware that in some respects other countries are ahead of us, and we will seek to learn from them.

Sovereign nations try to avoid dependence on other nations that exploit their own resources to the detriment of others. Sovereign nations cannot allow their policies to be dictated or their fate decided by artificial rigging and distortion of world commodity markets.

No one can foresee the extent of damage, nor the end of the disastrous consequences if nations refuse to share nature's gifts for the benefit of all mankind.

I told the U.N. Assembly last Wednesday, and I quote:

The attempt by any country to use one commodity for political purposes will inevitably tempt other countries to use their commodities for their own purposes.

There are three ways, fortunately, that this danger can and must be avoided:

—First, each nation must resolve not to misuse its resources;

—Second, each nation must fully utilize its own energy resources; and

—Third, each nation must join with others in cooperative efforts to reduce its energy vulnerability.

In doing so, we emphasize that our actions are not directed against any other nations, but are only taken to maintain the conditions of international order and well-being.

The quest for energy need not promote division and discord. It can expand the horizons of the world's peoples. I envision a strong movement toward a unifying cooperation to insure a decent life for all.

I welcome the development in Brussels last Friday of a new international energy program by the Energy Coordinating Group of the Washington Energy Conference. We were pleased to participate in that meeting.

The 12 nations reached an ad referendum

agreement on a far-reaching cooperative plan to deal with such emergencies as embargoes by sharing available oil and by cutting consumption and using stocks on an equitable basis.

While seeking conservation, we and the other nations will work for expanded production of both conventional and nonconventional fuels. The cooperating countries are also creating an international agency to carry out this program.

The United States welcomes this demonstration of international action rather than words. Just as Americans are challenged by Project Independence, the world faces a related challenge that requires a Project Interdependence.

No single country can solve the energy problem by itself. As President, I offer America's partnership to every other nation willing to join in a common effort to expand the spirit flowing from the Washington Energy Conference.

A start has been made in Brussels. The momentum must be continued if true interdependence is to be achieved.

The economy of the world is facing unprecedented challenges. Old remedies are inadequate for new problems. New and appropriate solutions must be found without delay, and I am absolutely convinced that they will be found.

I firmly believe that the unselfishness of all nations is in the self-interest of each nation. We all depend on each other in so many ways that there is no way in today's world for any nation to benefit at the expense of others, except for the very short term and at a very great risk.

Without having planned it, we find ourselves in the strange situation in which the most selfish individual can figure out that it is profitable to live by what we call the Golden Rule.

We can help ourselves only if we are considerate and only if we are helpful to others.

The energy crisis is the clearest example of the world's interdependence. The industrialized nations need the oil produced by a few developing nations. And all developing na-

tions need the technology, the services, and the products of industrialized nations.

The opportunity for a great advance for the whole world is tantalizingly apparent, but so is the danger that we will throw away this very, very rare opportunity to realize mankind's hopes. Let us build and implement a global strategy for energy.

If I may, I call on this World Energy Conference and other international organizations to accept the challenge of formulating Project Interdependence, a comprehensive energy program for the world to develop our resources not just for the benefit of a few but for all mankind.

This task is surely monumental. But the United States believes that it is possible—that it is essential. To help you in the beginning to take the first steps let me propose some principles that could guide a global approach:

—First, all nations must seek to increase production, each according to its resources and its level of technology. Some can develop known and available resources; others can try to improve methods of extraction or intensify exploration, and others are capable of developing new sources of energy appropriate to their own circumstances. But all nations can and should play a part in enlarging and diversifying the sources of usable energy. Diversification can help deter nations from resorting to monopolistic prices or practices.

—Next, the rate of increase in consumption of energy must be reduced and waste eliminated. Americans will do their part in this necessary effort. But all nations can contribute to discovering new ways to reduce the energy we consume, partly through common sense, partly through self-discipline, and partly through new technological improvements. Whatever energy-saving methods are developed anywhere must be communicated quickly to all concerned. Energy-saving possibilities are promising, especially for the short term as production increases.

—Third, a cooperative spirit, a cooperative conduct, are essential to success in a global energy program. Nothing, in my judg-

ment, could be more harmful than policies directed against other nations. If we lapse into confrontation of exporters on the one hand and consumers on the other or an unseemly scramble of consumers being played off one against another, all hopes for a global solution will be destroyed.

—Fourth, we must be especially attentive to the situation of the poorest nations, which will suffer drastically if the energy problem does not come under control. Actually, they are the chief victims, even now, of the uncontrolled inflation driving world prices up, far beyond their reach, for all the goods and all the services they must import to survive.

—Finally, a global strategy must seek to achieve fuel prices which provide a strong incentive to producers but which do not seriously disrupt the economies of the consumer. We recognize the desires of the producers to earn a fair share or a fair price for their oil as a means of helping to develop their own economies. But exorbitant prices can only distort the world economy, run the risk of a worldwide depression, and threaten the breakdown of world order and world safety.

It is difficult to discuss the energy problem without lapsing unfortunately into doomsday language. The danger is clear. It is very severe. Nevertheless, I am very optimistic. The advantages of cooperation are as visible as the dangers of confrontation and that gives me hope as well as optimism. But good intentions will not be enough. Knowledgeable people, like all of you at this important conference, are needed to give understanding, analysis, technical competence, and solutions for the people and the leaders to consider.

I call on all of you to respond to the challenge and to propose to the world your recommendations for a global energy strategy. Whether you call it Project Interdependence, or some other name, is not the essential point. What is essential is the challenge be accepted and the job be done quickly and well.

Ladies and gentlemen, I now declare the ninth World Energy Conference officially open and thank you very, very much.

## President Hails Release of Mr. Kay; Urges New Efforts on Indochina MIA's

*Statement by President Ford*<sup>1</sup>

With all Americans, I welcome the news that Mr. Emmet Kay has been released as part of the prisoner exchange in Laos. This release marks a major positive step in carrying out the Vientiane accords which ended the war in that country last year. We are encouraged by this development and hope it will be followed by other positive steps to achieve peace and reconciliation in Laos.

At the same time, I remain concerned about the many Americans still unaccounted for in Southeast Asia. As Vice President, and during my time in the Congress, I had the opportunity to meet with the families of a number of our missing men. I have the highest regard for the strength and courage these families have shown in the long period since their loved ones were lost.

It has now been more than 18 months since the Paris agreement on Viet-Nam was signed in January 1973. In addition to the return of prisoners that agreement contained specific provisions on accounting for the missing and the return of the remains of the dead. The record shows that there has been almost no compliance with these humanitarian provisions. Although the Government of North Viet-Nam returned the remains of 23 American servicemen who died in captivity, there has been no progress on accounting for the missing and no further arrangements for the return of the remains of the dead.

The Communist side has refused to permit searches in areas under their control for crash sites, graves, and other information on the MIA's [missing in action]. We are prepared to carry out such searches by unarmed American teams, and we stand ready to discuss arrangements for the conduct of such searches by teams from neutral countries, the International Red Cross, other humanitarian

organizations, or by local authorities. The important thing is that we get on with this job now.

The families of our men have waited too long already, and I am sure that families of those of other nationalities who remain unaccounted for have a similar desire to know the fate of their loved ones. There should be no political or military controversy about this humanitarian problem, and I call for renewed efforts to resolve it.

## AID Donates Additional \$3 Million for U.N. Relief Fund for Cyprus

*AID Announcement, September 13*

AID press release 74-64 dated September 13

Daniel Parker, Administrator of the Agency for International Development, has pledged an additional AID grant of \$3 million to the United Nations for relief for an estimated 200,000 victims of the conflict on Cyprus.

The grant is in response to a Security Council resolution passed unanimously August 30, urging immediate relief measures for the Cypriots, and a September 6 request from the U.N. High Commissioner for Refugees.

The AID grant to the U.N. relief fund is in addition to a grant, relief supplies, and air transport provided by AID in recent weeks and valued at more than \$3,558,000. Included were a cash grant of \$725,000 to the International Committee of the Red Cross, tents, blankets, water trailers and containers, and cots, as well as several air-lifts.

AID has also responded to a request from Ambassador Crawford in Nicosia for two relief specialists from AID. AID's Foreign Disaster Relief Coordinator Russell S. McClure and AID specialist Bruno Kosheleff were to visit Nicosia to participate in an evaluation of additional requirements for emergency housing, food, and other needs.

<sup>1</sup> Issued on Sept. 18 (text from White House press release).

## An Age of Interdependence: Common Disaster or Community

*Address by Secretary Kissinger*<sup>1</sup>

Last year, in my first address as Secretary of State, I spoke to this Assembly about American purposes. I said that the United States seeks a comprehensive, institutionalized peace, not an armistice. I asked other nations to join us in moving the world from détente to cooperation, from coexistence to community.

In the year that has passed, some progress has been made in dealing with particular crises. But many fundamental issues persist, and new issues threaten the very structure of world stability.

Our deepest problem—going far beyond the items on our agenda—is whether our vision can keep pace with our challenges. Will history recall the 20th century as a time of mounting global conflict or as the beginning of a global conception? Will our age of interdependence spur joint progress or common disaster?

The answer is not yet clear. New realities have not yet overcome old patterns of thought and action. Traditional concepts—of national sovereignty, social struggle, and the relation between the old and the new nations—too often guide our course. And so we have managed but not advanced; we have endured but not prospered; and we have continued the luxury of political contention.

This condition has been dramatized in the brief period since last fall's regular session. War has ravaged the Middle East and Cyprus. The technology of nuclear explosives has resumed its dangerous spread. Inflation

and the threat of global decline hang over the economies of rich and poor alike.

We cannot permit this trend to continue. Conflict between nations once devastated continents; the struggle between blocs may destroy humanity. Ideologies and doctrines drawn from the last century do not even address, let alone solve, the unprecedented problems of today. As a result, events challenge habits; a gulf grows between rhetoric and reality.

*The world has dealt with local conflicts as if they were perpetually manageable.* We have permitted too many of the underlying causes to fester unattended until the parties believed that their only recourse was war. And because each crisis ultimately has been contained we have remained complacent. But tolerance of local conflict tempts world holocaust. We have no guarantee that some local crisis—perhaps the next—will not explode beyond control.

*The world has dealt with nuclear weapons as if restraint were automatic.* Their very awesomeness has chained these weapons for almost three decades; their sophistication and expense have helped to keep constant for a decade the number of states who possess them. Now, as was quite foreseeable, political inhibitions are in danger of crumbling. Nuclear catastrophe looms more plausible—whether through design or miscalculation; accident, theft, or blackmail.

*The world has dealt with the economy as if its constant advance were inexorable.* While postwar growth has been uneven and some parts of the world have lagged, our attention was focused on how to increase participation

<sup>1</sup> Made before the 29th United Nations General Assembly on Sept. 23 (text from Office of Media Services news release).

in a general advance. We continue to deal with economic issues on a national, regional, or bloc basis at the precise moment that our interdependence is multiplying. Strains on the fabric and institutions of the world economy threaten to engulf us all in a general depression.

The delicate structure of international cooperation so laboriously constructed over the last quarter century can hardly survive—and certainly cannot be strengthened—if it is continually subjected to the shocks of political conflict, war, and economic crisis.

The time has come, then, for the nations assembled here to act together on the recognition that continued reliance on old slogans and traditional rivalries will lead us toward:

—A world ever more torn between rich and poor, East and West, producer and consumer.

—A world where local crises threaten global confrontation and where the spreading atom threatens global peril.

—A world of rising costs and dwindling supplies, of growing populations and declining production.

There is another course. Last week before this Assembly, President Ford dedicated our country to a cooperative, open approach to build a more secure and more prosperous world. The United States will assume the obligations that our values and strength impose upon us.

But the building of a cooperative world is beyond the grasp of any one nation. An interdependent world requires not merely the resources but the vision and creativity of us all. Nations cannot simultaneously confront and cooperate with one another.

We must recognize that the common interest is the only valid test of the national interest. It is in the common interest, and thus in the interest of each nation:

—That local conflicts be resolved short of force and their root causes removed by political means.

—That the spread of nuclear technology be achieved without the spread of nuclear weapons.

—That growing economic interdependence

lift all nations and not drag them down together.

We will not solve these problems during this session, or any one session, of the General Assembly.

But we must at least begin to remedy problems, not just manage them; to shape events, rather than endure them; to confront our challenges instead of one another.

### The Political Dimension

The urgent political responsibility of our era is to resolve conflicts without war. History is replete with examples of the tragedy that sweeps nations when ancient enmities and the inertia of habit freeze the scope for decision. Equally, history is marked by brief moments when an old order is giving way to a pattern new and unforeseen; these are times of potential disorder and danger but also of opportunity for fresh creation. We face such a moment today. Together let us face its realities:

—First, a certain momentum toward peace has been created—in East-West relations and in certain regional conflicts. It must be maintained. But we are only at the beginning of the process. If we do not continue to advance, we will slip back.

—Second, progress in negotiation of difficult issues comes only through patience, perseverance, and recognition of the tolerable limits of the other side. Peace is a process, not a condition. It can only be reached in steps.

—Third, failure to recognize and grasp the attainable will prevent the achievement of the ideal. Attempts to resolve all issues at one time are a certain prescription for stagnation. Progress toward peace can be thwarted by asking too much as surely as by asking too little.

—Fourth, the world community can help resolve chronic conflicts, but exaggerated expectations will prevent essential accommodation among the parties. This Assembly can help or hinder the negotiating process. It can seek a scapegoat or a solution. It can offer the

parties an excuse to escape reality or sturdy support in search of a compromise. It can decide on propaganda or contribute to realistic approaches that are responsive to man's yearning for peace.

The Middle East starkly demonstrates these considerations. In the past year we have witnessed both the fourth Arab-Israeli war in a generation and the hopeful beginnings of a political process toward a lasting and just peace.

We have achieved the respite of a ceasefire and of two disengagement agreements, but the shadow of war remains. The legacy of hatred and suffering, the sense of irconcilability, have begun to yield—however haltingly—to the process of negotiation. But we still have a long road ahead.

One side seeks the recovery of territory and justice for a displaced people. The other side seeks security and recognition by its neighbors of its legitimacy as a nation. In the end, the common goal of peace surely is broad enough to embrace all these aspirations.

Let us be realistic about what must be done. The art of negotiation is to set goals that can be achieved at a given time and to reach them with determination. Each step forward modifies old perceptions and brings about a new situation that improves the chances of a comprehensive settlement.

Because these principles were followed in the Middle East, agreements have been reached in the past year which many thought impossible. They were achieved, above all, because of the wisdom of the leaders of the Middle East who decided that there had been enough stalemate and war, that more might be gained by testing each other in negotiation than by testing each other on the battlefield.

The members of this body, both collectively and individually, have a solemn responsibility to encourage and support the parties in the Middle East on their present course. We have as well an obligation to give our support to the U.N. peacekeeping forces in the Middle East and elsewhere. The United States applauds their indispensable role, as well as the outstanding contribution of Secre-

tary General Waldheim in the cause of peace.

During the past year my country has made a major effort to promote peace in the Middle East. President Ford has asked me to reaffirm today that we are determined to press forward with these efforts. We will work closely with the parties, and we will cooperate with all interested countries within the framework of the Geneva Conference.

The tormented island of Cyprus is another area where peace requires a spirit of compromise, accommodation, and justice. The United States is convinced that the sovereignty, political independence, and territorial integrity of Cyprus must be maintained. It will be up to the parties to decide on the form of government they believe best suited to the particular conditions of Cyprus. They must reach accommodation on the areas to be administered by the Greek and Turkish Cypriot communities as well as on the conditions under which refugees can return to their homes and reside in safety. Finally, no lasting peace is possible unless provisions are agreed upon which will lead to the timely and phased reduction of armed forces and armaments and other war materiel.

The United States is prepared to play an even more active role than in the past in helping the parties find a solution to the centuries-old problem of Cyprus. We will do all we can, but it is those most directly concerned whose effort is most crucial. Third parties should not be asked to produce miraculous outcomes not anchored in reality. Third parties *can* encourage those directly involved to perceive their broader interests; they can assist in the search for elements of agreement by interpreting each side's views and motives to the other. But no mediator can succeed unless the parties genuinely want mediation and are ready to make the difficult decisions needed for a settlement.

The United States is already making a major contribution to help relieve the human suffering of the people of Cyprus. We urge the international community to continue and, if possible, to increase its own humanitarian relief effort.

The United States notes with particular

satisfaction the continuing process of change in Africa. We welcome the positive demonstration of cooperation between the old rulers and the new free. The United States shares and pledges its support for the aspirations of all Africans to participate in the fruits of freedom and human dignity.

### **The Nuclear Dimension**

The second new dimension on our agenda concerns the problem of nuclear proliferation.

The world has grown so accustomed to the existence of nuclear weapons that it assumes they will never be used. But today, technology is rapidly expanding the number of nuclear weapons in the hands of major powers and threatens to put nuclear-explosive technology at the disposal of an increasing number of other countries.

In a world where many nations possess nuclear weapons, dangers would be vastly compounded. It would be infinitely more difficult, if not impossible, to maintain stability among a large number of nuclear powers. Local wars would take on a new dimension. Nuclear weapons would be introduced into regions where political conflict remains intense and the parties consider their vital interests overwhelmingly involved. There would, as well, be a vastly heightened risk of direct involvement of the major nuclear powers.

This problem does not concern one country, one region, or one bloc alone. No nation can be indifferent to the spread of nuclear technology; every nation's security is directly affected.

The challenge before the world is to realize the peaceful benefits of nuclear technology without contributing to the growth of nuclear weapons or to the number of states possessing them.

As a major nuclear power, the United States recognizes its special responsibility. We realize that we cannot expect others to show restraint if we do not ourselves practice restraint. Together with the Soviet Union we are seeking to negotiate new quantitative and qualitative limitations on strategic arms. Last week our delegations recon-

vened in Geneva, and we intend to pursue these negotiations with the seriousness of purpose they deserve. The United States has no higher priority than controlling and reducing the levels of nuclear arms.

Beyond the relations of the nuclear powers to each other lies the need to curb the spread of nuclear explosives. We must take into account that plutonium is an essential ingredient of nuclear explosives and that in the immediate future the amount of plutonium generated by peaceful nuclear reactors will be multiplied many times. Heretofore the United States and a number of other countries have widely supplied nuclear fuels and other nuclear materials in order to promote the use of nuclear energy for peaceful purposes. This policy cannot continue if it leads to the proliferation of nuclear explosives. Sales of these materials can no longer be treated by anyone as a purely commercial competitive enterprise.

The world community therefore must work urgently toward a system of effective international safeguards against the diversion of plutonium or its byproducts. The United States is prepared to join with others in a comprehensive effort.

Let us together agree on the practical steps which must be taken to assure the benefits of nuclear energy free of its terrors:

—The United States will shortly offer specific proposals to strengthen safeguards to the other principal supplier countries.

—We shall intensify our efforts to gain the broadest possible acceptance of International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) safeguards, to establish practical controls on the transfer of nuclear materials, and to insure the effectiveness of these procedures.

—The United States will urge the IAEA to draft an international convention for enhancing physical security against theft or diversion of nuclear material. Such a convention should set forth specific standards and techniques for protecting materials while in use, storage, and transfer.

—The Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons, which this Assembly has

endorsed, warrants continuing support. The treaty contains not only a broad commitment to limit the spread of nuclear explosives but specific obligations to accept and implement IAEA safeguards and to control the transfer of nuclear materials.

Mr. President, whatever advantages seem to accrue from the acquisition of nuclear-explosive technology will prove to be ephemeral. When Pandora's box has been opened, no country will be the beneficiary and all mankind will have lost. This is not inevitable. If we act decisively now, we can still control the future.

### The Economic Dimension

Lord Keynes wrote:

The power to become habituated to his surroundings is a marked characteristic of mankind. Very few of us realize with conviction the intensely unusual, unstable, complicated, unreliable, temporary nature of the economic organization . . .

The economic history of the postwar period has been one of sustained growth, for developing as well as developed nations. The universal expectation of our peoples, the foundation of our political institutions, and the assumption underlying the evolving structure of peace are all based on the belief that this growth will continue.

But will it? The increasingly open and cooperative global economic system that we have come to take for granted is now under unprecedented attack. The world is poised on the brink of a return to the unrestrained economic nationalism which accompanied the collapse of economic order in the thirties. And should that occur, all would suffer—poor as well as rich, producer as well as consumer.

So let us no longer fear to confront in public the facts which have come to dominate our private discussions and concerns.

The early warning signs of a major economic crisis are evident. Rates of inflation unprecedented in the past quarter century are sweeping developing and developed nations alike. The world's financial institutions are staggering under the most massive and

rapid movements of reserves in history. And profound questions have arisen about meeting man's most fundamental needs for energy and food.

While the present situation threatens every individual and nation, it is the poor who suffer the most. While the wealthier adjust their living standards, the poor see the hopes of a lifetime collapse around them. While others tighten their belts, the poor starve. While others can hope for a better future, the poor see only despair ahead.

It can be in the interest of no country or group of countries to base policies on a test of strength; for a policy of confrontation would end in disaster for all. Meeting man's basic needs for energy and food and assuring economic growth while mastering inflation require international cooperation to an unprecedented degree.

Let us apply these principles first to the energy situation:

—Oil producers seek a better life for their peoples and a just return for their diminishing resources.

—The developing nations less well-endowed by nature face the disintegration of the results of decades of striving for development as the result of a price policy over which they have no control.

—The developed nations find the industrial civilization built over centuries in jeopardy.

Both producers and consumers have legitimate claims. The problem is to reconcile them for the common good.

The United States is working closely with several oil producers to help diversify their economies. We have established commissions to facilitate the transfer of technology and to assist with industrialization. We are prepared to accept substantial investments in the United States, and we welcome a greater role for the oil producers in the management of international economic institutions.

The investment of surplus oil revenues presents a great challenge. The countries which most need these revenues are generally the least likely to receive them. The world's financial institutions have coped thus far, but



ways must be found to assure assistance for those countries most in need of it. And the full brunt of the surplus revenues is yet to come.

Despite our best efforts to meet the oil producers' legitimate needs and to channel their resources into constructive uses, the world cannot sustain even the present level of prices, much less continuing increases. The prices of other commodities will inevitably rise in a never-ending inflationary spiral. Nobody will benefit. The oil producers will be forced to spend more for their own imports. Many nations will not be able to withstand the pace, and the poorer could be overwhelmed. The complex, fragile structure of global economic cooperation required to sustain national economic growth stands in danger of being shattered.

The United States will work with other consuming nations on means of conservation and on ways to cushion the impact of massive investments from abroad. The preliminary agreement on a program of solidarity and cooperation signed a few days ago in Brussels by the major consumer countries is an encouraging first step.

But the long-range solution requires a new understanding between consumers and producers. Unlike food prices, the high cost of oil is not the result of economic factors—of an actual shortage of capacity or of the free play of supply and demand. Rather it is caused by deliberate decisions to restrict production and maintain an artificial price level. We recognize that the producers should have a fair share; the fact remains that the present price level even threatens the economic well-being of producers. Ultimately they depend upon the vitality of the world economy for the security of their markets and their investments. And it cannot be in the interest of any nation to magnify the despair of the least developed, who are uniquely vulnerable to exorbitant prices and who have no recourse but to pay.

What has gone up by political decision can be reduced by political decision.

Last week President Ford called upon the oil producers to join with consumers in de-

fining a strategy which will meet the world's long-term need for both energy and food at reasonable prices. He set forth the principles which should guide such a policy. And he announced to this Assembly America's determination to meet our responsibilities to help alleviate another grim reality: world hunger.

At a time of universal concern for justice and in an age of advanced technology, it is intolerable that millions are starving and hundreds of millions remain undernourished.

The magnitude of the long-term problem is clear. At present rates of population growth, world food production must double by the end of this century to maintain even the present inadequate dietary level. And an adequate diet for all would require that we triple world production. If we are true to our principles, we have an obligation to strive for an adequate supply of food to every man, woman, and child in the world. This is a technical possibility, a political necessity, and a moral imperative.

The United States is prepared to join with all nations at the World Food Conference in Rome to launch the truly massive effort which is required. We will present a number of specific proposals:

—To help developing nations. They have the lowest yields and the largest amounts of unused land and water; their potential in food production must be made to match their growing need.

—To increase substantially global fertilizer production. We must end once and for all the world's chronic fertilizer shortage.

—To expand international, regional, and national research programs. Scientific and technical resources must be mobilized now to meet the demands of the year 2000 and beyond.

—To rebuild the world's food reserves. Our capacity for dealing with famine must be freed from the vagaries of weather.

—To provide a substantial level of concessionary food aid. The United States will in the coming year increase the value of our own food aid shipments to countries in need. We make this commitment, despite great

pressures on our economy and at a time when we are seeking to cut our own government budget, because we realize the dimensions of the tragedy with which we are faced. All of us here have a common obligation to prevent the poorest nations from being overwhelmed and enable them to build the social, economic, and political base for self-sufficiency.

The hopes of every nation for a life of peace and plenty rest on an effective international resolution of the crises of inflation, fuel, and food. We must act now, and we must act together.

### The Human Dimension

Mr. President, let us never forget that all of our political endeavors are ultimately judged by one standard—to translate our actions into human concerns.

The United States will never be satisfied with a world where man's fears overshadow his hopes. We support the U.N.'s efforts in the fields of international law and human rights. We approve of the activities of the United Nations in social, economic, and humanitarian realms around the world. The United States considers the U.N. World Population Conference last month, the World Food Conference a month from now, and the continuing Law of the Sea Conference of fundamental importance to our common future.

In coming months the United States will make specific proposals for the United Nations to initiate a major international effort to prohibit torture; a concerted campaign to control the disease which afflicts and debilitates over 200 million people in 70 countries, schistosomiasis; and a substantial strengthening of the world's capacity to deal with natural disaster, especially the improvement

of the U.N. Disaster Relief Organization.

Mr. President, we have long lived in a world where the consequences of our failures were manageable—a world where local conflicts were contained, nuclear weapons threatened primarily those nations which possessed them, and the cycle of economic growth and decline seemed principally a national concern.

But this is no longer the case. It is no longer possible to imagine that conflicts, weapons, and recession will not spread.

We must now decide. The problems we face will be with us the greater part of the century. But will they be with us as challenges to be overcome or as adversaries that have vanquished us?

It is easy to agree to yet another set of principles or to actions *other* nations should take. But the needs of the poor will not be met by slogans; the needs of an expanding global economy will not be met by new restrictions; the search for peace cannot be conducted on the basis of confrontation. So each nation must ask what it can do, what contribution it is finally prepared to make to the common good.

Mr. President, beyond peace, beyond prosperity, lie man's deepest aspirations for a life of dignity and justice. And beyond our pride, beyond our concern for the national purpose we are called upon to serve, there must be a concern for the betterment of the human condition. While we cannot, in the brief span allowed to each of us, undo the accumulated problems of centuries, we dare not do less than try. So let us now get on with our tasks.

Let us act in the spirit of Thucydides that "the bravest are surely those who have the clearest vision of what is before them, glory and danger alike, and yet notwithstanding go out to meet it."

## Detente With the Soviet Union: The Reality of Competition and the Imperative of Cooperation

*Statement by Secretary Kissinger*<sup>1</sup>

### I. The Challenge

Since the dawn of the nuclear age the world's fears of holocaust and its hopes for peace have turned on the relationship between the United States and the Soviet Union.

Throughout history men have sought peace but suffered war; all too often, deliberate decisions or miscalculations have brought violence and destruction to a world yearning for tranquillity. Tragic as the consequences of violence may have been in the past, the issue of peace and war takes on unprecedented urgency when, for the first time in history, two nations have the capacity to destroy mankind. In the nuclear age, as President Eisenhower pointed out two decades ago, "there is no longer any alternative to peace."

The destructiveness of modern weapons defines the necessity of the task; deep differences in philosophy and interests between the United States and the Soviet Union point up its difficulty. These differences do not spring from misunderstanding or personalities or transitory factors:

—They are rooted in history and in the way the two countries have developed.

—They are nourished by conflicting values and opposing ideologies.

—They are expressed in diverging national interests that produce political and military competition.

—They are influenced by allies and friends whose association we value and whose interests we will not sacrifice.

Paradox confuses our perception of the problem of peaceful coexistence: if peace is pursued to the exclusion of any other goal, other values will be compromised and perhaps lost; but if unconstrained rivalry leads to nuclear conflict, these values, along with everything else, will be destroyed in the resulting holocaust. However competitive they may be at some levels of their relationship, both major nuclear powers must base their policies on the premise that neither can expect to impose its will on the other without running an intolerable risk. The challenge of our time is to reconcile the reality of competition with the imperative of coexistence.

There can be no peaceful international order without a constructive relationship between the United States and the Soviet Union. There will be no international stability unless both the Soviet Union and the United States conduct themselves with restraint and unless they use their enormous power for the benefit of mankind.

Thus we must be clear at the outset on what the term "détente" entails. It is the search for a more constructive relationship with the Soviet Union reflecting the realities I have outlined. It is a continuing process, not a final condition that has been or can

<sup>1</sup> Presented to the Senate Committee on Foreign Relations on Sept. 19 (text from press release 366). The complete transcript of the hearings will be published by the committee and will be available from the Superintendent of Documents, U.S. Government Printing Office, Washington, D.C. 20402.

be realized at any one specific point in time. And it has been pursued by successive American leaders, though the means have varied as have world conditions.

Some fundamental principles guide this policy:

The United States cannot base its policy solely on Moscow's good intentions. But neither can we insist that all forward movement must await a convergence of American and Soviet purposes. We seek, regardless of Soviet intentions, to serve peace through a systematic resistance to pressure and conciliatory responses to moderate behavior.

We must oppose aggressive actions and irresponsible behavior. But we must not seek confrontations lightly.

We must maintain a strong national defense while recognizing that in the nuclear age the relationship between military strength and politically usable power is the most complex in all history.

Where the age-old antagonism between freedom and tyranny is concerned, we are not neutral. But other imperatives impose limits on our ability to produce internal changes in foreign countries. Consciousness of our limits is recognition of the necessity of peace—not moral callousness. The preservation of human life and human society are moral values, too.

We must be mature enough to recognize that to be stable a relationship must provide advantages to both sides and that the most constructive international relationships are those in which both parties perceive an element of gain. Moscow will benefit from certain measures, just as we will from others. The balance cannot be struck on each issue every day, but only over the whole range of relations and over a period of time.

## II. The Course of Soviet-American Relations

In the first two decades of the postwar period U.S.-Soviet relations were characterized by many fits and starts. Some encouraging developments followed the Cuban missile crisis of 1962, for example. But at

the end of the decade the invasion of Czechoslovakia brought progress to a halt and threw a deepening shadow over East-West relations.

During those difficult days some were tempted to conclude that antagonism was the central feature of the relationship and that U.S. policy—even while the Viet-Nam agony raised questions about the readiness of the American people to sustain a policy of confrontation—had to be geared to this grim reality. Others recommended a basic change of policy; there was a barrage of demands to hold an immediate summit to establish a better atmosphere, to launch the SALT talks [Strategic Arms Limitation Talks], and to end the decades-old trade discrimination against the Soviet Union, which was widely criticized as anachronistic, futile, and counterproductive.

These two approaches reflected the extremes of the debate that had dominated most of the postwar period; they also revealed deep-seated differences between the American and the Soviet reactions to the process of international relations.

For many Americans, tensions and enmity in international relations are anomalies, the cause of which is attributed either to deliberate malice or misunderstanding. Malice is to be combated by force, or at least isolation; misunderstanding is to be removed by the strenuous exercise of good will. Communist states, on the other hand, regard tensions as inevitable byproducts of a struggle between opposing social systems.

Most Americans perceive relations between states as either friendly or hostile, both defined in nearly absolute terms. Soviet foreign policy, by comparison, is conducted in a gray area heavily influenced by the Soviet conception of the balance of forces. Thus Soviet diplomacy is never free of tactical pressures or adjustments, and it is never determined in isolation from the prevailing military balance. For Moscow, East-West contacts and negotiations are in part designed to promote Soviet influence abroad, especially in Western Europe—and to gain formal acceptance of those elements of the

status quo most agreeable to Moscow.

The issue, however, is not whether peace and stability serve Soviet purposes, but whether they serve our own. Indeed, to the extent that our attention focuses largely on Soviet intentions we create a latent vulnerability. If détente can be justified only by a basic change in Soviet motivation, the temptation becomes overwhelming to base U.S.-Soviet relations not on realistic appraisal but on tenuous hopes: a change in Soviet tone is taken as a sign of a basic change of philosophy. Atmosphere is confused with substance. Policy oscillates between poles of suspicion and euphoria.

Neither extreme is realistic, and both are dangerous. The hopeful view ignores that we and the Soviets are bound to compete for the foreseeable future. The pessimistic view ignores that we have some parallel interests and that we are compelled to coexist. Détente encourages an environment in which competitors can regulate and restrain their differences and ultimately move from competition to cooperation.

#### A. *American Goals*

America's aspiration for the kind of political environment we now call détente is not new.

The effort to achieve a more constructive relationship with the Soviet Union is not made in the name of any one administration or one party or for any one period of time. It expresses the continuing desire of the vast majority of the American people for an easing of international tensions and their expectation that any responsible government will strive for peace. No aspect of our policies, domestic or foreign, enjoys more consistent bipartisan support. No aspect is more in the interest of mankind.

In the postwar period repeated efforts were made to improve our relationship with Moscow. The spirits of Geneva, Camp David, and Glassboro were evanescent moments in a quarter century otherwise marked by tensions and by sporadic confrontation. What is new in the current period of relaxation of tensions is its duration, the scope of the

relationship which has evolved, and the continuity and intensity of consultation which it has produced.

A number of factors have produced this change in the international environment. By the end of the sixties and the beginning of the seventies the time was propitious—no matter what administration was in office in the United States—for a major attempt to improve U.S.-Soviet relations. Contradictory tendencies contested for preeminence in Soviet policy; events could have tipped the scales toward either increased aggressiveness or toward conciliation.

—The fragmentation in the Communist world in the 1960's challenged the leading position of the U.S.S.R. and its claim to be the arbiter of orthodoxy. The U.S.S.R. could have reacted by adopting a more aggressive attitude toward the capitalist world in order to assert its militant vigilance; instead, the changing situation and U.S. policy seem to have encouraged Soviet leaders to cooperate in at least a temporary lessening of tension with the West.

—The prospect of achieving a military position of near parity with the United States in strategic forces could have tempted Moscow to use its expanding military capability to strive more determinedly for expansion; in fact, it tempered the militancy of some of its actions and sought to stabilize at least some aspects of the military competition through negotiations.

—The very real economic problems of the U.S.S.R. and Eastern Europe could have reinforced autarkic policies and the tendency to create a closed system; in actuality, the Soviet Union and its allies have come closer to acknowledging the reality of an interdependent world economy.

—Finally, when faced with the hopes of its own people for greater well-being, the Soviet Government could have continued to stimulate the suspicions of the cold war to further isolate Soviet society; in fact, it chose—however inadequately and slowly—to seek to calm its public opinion by joining in a relaxation of tensions.

For the United States the choice was clear: To provide as many incentives as possible for those actions by the Soviet Union most conducive to peace and individual well-being and to overcome the swings between illusionary optimism and harsh antagonism that had characterized most of the postwar period. We could capitalize on the tentative beginnings made in the sixties by taking advantage of the compelling new conditions of the seventies.

We sought to explore every avenue toward an honorable and just accommodation while remaining determined not to settle for mere atmospherics. We relied on a balance of mutual interests rather than Soviet intentions. When challenged—such as in the Middle East, the Caribbean, or Berlin—we always responded firmly. And when Soviet policy moved toward conciliation, we sought to turn what may have started as a tactical maneuver into a durable pattern of conduct.

Our approach proceeds from the conviction that, in moving forward across a wide spectrum of negotiations, progress in one area adds momentum to progress in other areas. If we succeed, then no agreement stands alone as an isolated accomplishment vulnerable to the next crisis. We did not invent the interrelationship between issues expressed in the so-called linkage concept; it was a reality because of the range of problems and areas in which the interests of the United States and the Soviet Union impinge on each other. We have looked for progress in a series of agreements settling specific political issues, and we have sought to relate these to a new standard of international conduct appropriate to the dangers of the nuclear age. By acquiring a stake in this network of relationships with the West, the Soviet Union may become more conscious of what it would lose by a return to confrontation. Indeed, it is our hope that it will develop a self-interest in fostering the entire process of relaxation of tensions.

### *B. The Global Necessities*

In the late 1940's this nation engaged in a great debate about the role it would play

in the postwar world. We forged a bipartisan consensus on which our policies were built for more than two decades. By the end of the 1960's the international environment which molded that consensus had been transformed. What in the fifties had seemed a solid bloc of adversaries had fragmented into competing centers of power and doctrine; old allies had gained new strength and self-assurance; scores of new nations had emerged and formed blocs of their own; and all nations were being swept up in a technology that was compressing the planet and deepening our mutual dependence.

Then as now, it was clear that the international structure formed in the immediate postwar period was in fundamental flux and that a new international system was emerging. America's historic opportunity was to help shape a new set of international relationships—more pluralistic, less dominated by military power, less susceptible to confrontation, more open to genuine cooperation among the free and diverse elements of the globe. This new, more positive international environment is possible only if all the major powers—and especially the world's strongest nuclear powers—anchor their policies in the principles of moderation and restraint. They no longer have the power to dominate; they do have the capacity to thwart. They cannot build the new international structure alone; they can make its realization impossible by their rivalry.

Détente is all the more important because of what the creation of a new set of international relations demands of us with respect to other countries and areas. President Ford has assigned the highest priority to maintaining the vitality of our partnerships in Europe, Asia, and Latin America. Our security ties with our allies are essential, but we also believe that recognition of the interdependence of the contemporary world requires cooperation in many other fields. Cooperation becomes more difficult if the United States is perceived by allied public opinion as an obstacle to peace and if public debate is polarized on the issue of whether friendship with the United States is inconsistent with East-West reconciliation.

One important area for invigorated cooperative action is economic policy. The international economic system has been severely tested. The Middle East war demonstrated dramatically the integral relationship between economics and politics. Clearly, whatever the state of our relations with the U.S.S.R., the international economic agenda must be addressed. But the task would be infinitely more complex if we proceeded in a cold war environment.

International economic problems cut across political dividing lines. All nations, regardless of ideology, face the problems of energy and economic growth, feeding burgeoning populations, regulating the use of the oceans, and preserving the environment.

At a minimum, easing international tensions allows the West to devote more intellectual and material resources to these problems. As security concerns recede, humane concerns come again to the fore. International organizations take on greater significance and responsibility, less obstructed by cold war antagonisms. The climate of lessened tensions even opens prospects for broader collaboration between East and West. It is significant that some of these global issues—such as energy, cooperation in science and health, and the protection of the environment—have already reached the U.S.-Soviet agenda.

In the present period mankind may be menaced as much by international economic and political chaos as by the danger of war. Avoiding either hazard demands a cooperative world structure for which improved East-West relations are essential.

### III. The Evolution of Detente—The Balance of Risks and Incentives

The course of détente has not been smooth or even. As late as 1969, Soviet-American relations were ambiguous and uncertain. To be sure, negotiations on Berlin and SALT had begun. But the tendency toward confrontation appeared dominant.

We were challenged by Soviet conduct in the Middle East cease-fire of August 1970,

during the Syrian invasion of Jordan in September 1970, on the question of a possible Soviet submarine base in Cuba, in actions around Berlin, and during the Indo-Pakistani war. Soviet policy seemed directed toward fashioning a détente in bilateral relations with our Western European allies, while challenging the United States.

We demonstrated then, and stand ready to do so again, that America will not yield to pressure or the threat of force. We made clear then, as we do today, that détente cannot be pursued selectively in one area or toward one group of countries only. For us détente is indivisible.

Finally, a breakthrough was made in 1971 on several fronts—in the Berlin settlement, in the SALT talks, in other arms control negotiations—that generated the process of détente. It consists of these elements: An elaboration of principles; political discussions to solve outstanding issues and to reach cooperative agreements; economic relations; and arms control negotiations, particularly those concerning strategic arms.

#### A. *The Elaboration of Principles*

Cooperative relations, in our view, must be more than a series of isolated agreements. They must reflect an acceptance of mutual obligations and of the need for accommodation and restraint.

To set forth principles of behavior in formal documents is hardly to guarantee their observance. But they are reference points against which to judge actions and set goals.

The first of the series of documents is the statement of principles signed in Moscow in 1972.<sup>2</sup> It affirms: (1) the necessity of avoiding confrontation; (2) the imperative of mutual restraint; (3) the rejection of attempts to exploit tensions to gain unilateral advantages; (4) the renunciation of claims of special influence in the world; and (5) the willingness, on this new basis, to coexist peacefully and build a firm long-term relationship.

An Agreement on the Prevention of Nuclear War based on these principles was

<sup>2</sup> For text, see BULLETIN of June 26, 1972, p. 898.

signed in 1973.<sup>3</sup> It affirms that the objective of the policies of the United States and the U.S.S.R. is to remove the danger of nuclear conflict and the use of nuclear weapons. But it emphasizes that this objective presupposes the renunciation of *any* war or threat of war not only by the two nuclear superpowers against each other but also against allies or third countries. In other words, the principle of restraint is not confined to relations between the United States and the U.S.S.R.; it is explicitly extended to include *all* countries.

These statements of principles are not an American concession; indeed, we have been affirming them unilaterally for two decades. Nor are they a legal contract; rather, they are an aspiration and a yardstick by which we assess Soviet behavior. We have never intended to "rely" on Soviet compliance with every principle; we do seek to elaborate standards of conduct which the Soviet Union would violate only to its cost. And if over the long term the more durable relationship takes hold, the basic principles will give it definition, structure, and hope.

#### B. *Political Dialogue and Cooperative Agreements*

One of the features of the current phase of U.S.-Soviet relations is the unprecedented consultation between leaders, either face to face or through diplomatic channels.

Although consultation has reached a level of candor and frequency without precedent, we know that consultation does not guarantee that policies are compatible. It does provide a mechanism for the resolution of differences before they escalate to the point of public confrontation and commit the prestige of both sides.

The channel between the leaders of the two nations has proved its worth in many crises; it reduces the risk that either side might feel driven to act or to react on the basis of incomplete or confusing information. The channel of communication has continued without interruption under President Ford.

But crisis management is not an end in itself. The more fundamental goal is the elaboration of a political relationship which in time will make crises less likely to arise.

It was difficult in the past to speak of a U.S.-Soviet bilateral relationship in any normal sense of the phrase. Trade was negligible. Contacts between various institutions and between the peoples of the two countries were at best sporadic. There were no cooperative efforts in science and technology. Cultural exchange was modest. As a result, there was no tangible inducement toward cooperation and no penalty for aggressive behavior. Today, by joining our efforts even in such seemingly apolitical fields as medical research or environmental protection, we and the Soviets can benefit not only our two peoples but all mankind; in addition, we generate incentives for restraint.

Since 1972 we have concluded agreements on a common effort against cancer, on research to protect the environment, on studying the use of the ocean's resources, on the use of atomic energy for peaceful purposes, on studying methods for conserving energy, on examining construction techniques for regions subject to earthquakes, and on devising new transportation methods. Other bilateral areas for cooperation include an agreement on preventing incidents at sea, an agreement to exchange information and research methods in agriculture, and the training of astronauts for the Soviet-U.S. rendezvous-and-docking mission planned for 1975.

Each project must be judged by the concrete benefits it brings. But in their sum—in their exchange of information and people as well as in their establishment of joint mechanisms—they also constitute a commitment in both countries to work together across a broad spectrum.

#### C. *The Economic Component*

During the period of the cold war, economic contact between ourselves and the U.S.S.R. was virtually nonexistent. Even then, many argued that improved economic relations might mitigate international tensions; in fact, there were several congres-

<sup>3</sup> For text, see BULLETIN of July 23, 1973, p. 160.



sional resolutions to that effect. But recurrent crises prevented any sustained progress.

The period of confrontation should have left little doubt, however, that economic boycott would not transform the Soviet system or impose upon it a conciliatory foreign policy. The U.S.S.R. was quite prepared to maintain heavy military outlays and to concentrate on capital growth by using the resources of the Communist world alone. Moreover, it proved impossible to mount an air-tight boycott in practice since, over time, most if not all the other major industrial countries became involved in trade with the East.

The question, then, became how trade and economic contact—in which the Soviet Union is obviously interested—could serve the purposes of peace. On the one hand, economic relations cannot be separated from the political context. Clearly, we cannot be asked to reward hostile conduct with economic benefits, even if in the process we deny ourselves some commercially profitable opportunities. On the other hand, when political relations begin to normalize, it is difficult to explain why economic relations should not be normalized as well.

We have approached the question of economic relations with deliberation and circumspection and as an act of policy, not primarily of commercial opportunity. As political relations have improved on a broad basis, economic issues have been dealt with on a comparably broad front. A series of interlocking economic agreements with the U.S.S.R. has been negotiated side by side with the political progress already noted. The 25-year-old lend-lease debt was settled; the reciprocal extension of most-favored-nation (MFN) treatment was negotiated, together with safeguards against the possible disruption of our markets and a series of practical arrangements to facilitate the conduct of business in the U.S.S.R. by American firms; our government credit facilities were made available for trade with the U.S.S.R.; and a maritime agreement regulating the carriage of goods has been signed.

These were all primarily regulatory agree-

ments conferring no immediate benefits on the Soviet Union but serving as blueprints for an expanded economic relationship if the political improvement continued.

This approach commanded widespread domestic approval. It was considered a natural outgrowth of political progress. At no time were issues regarding Soviet domestic political practices raised. Indeed, not until *after* the 1972 agreements was the Soviet domestic order invoked as a reason for arresting or reversing the progress so painstakingly achieved. This sudden *ex post facto* form of linkage raises serious questions:

—For the Soviet Union, it casts doubt on our reliability as a negotiating partner.

—The significance of trade, originally envisaged as only one ingredient of a complex and evolving relationship, is inflated out of all proportion.

—The hoped-for results of policy become transformed into preconditions for any policy at all.

We recognize the depth and validity of the moral concerns expressed by those who oppose, or put conditions on, expanded trade with the U.S.S.R. But a sense of proportion must be maintained about the leverage our economic relations give us with the U.S.S.R.:

—Denial of economic relations cannot by itself achieve what it failed to do when it was part of a determined policy of political and military confrontation.

—The economic bargaining ability of most-favored-nation status is marginal. MFN grants no special privilege to the U.S.S.R.; in fact it is a misnomer, since we have such agreements with over 100 countries. To enact it would be to remove a discriminatory holdover of the days of the cold war. To continue to deny it is more a political than an economic act.

—Trade benefits are not a one-way street; the laws of mutual advantage operate, or there will be no trade.

—The technology that flows to the U.S.S.R. as a result of expanded U.S.-Soviet trade may have a few indirect uses for military

production. But with our continuing restrictions on strategic exports, we can maintain adequate controls—and we intend to do so. Moreover, the same technology has been available to the U.S.S.R. and will be increasingly so from other non-Communist sources. Boycott denies us a means of influence and possible commercial gain; it does not deprive the U.S.S.R. of technology.

—The actual and potential flow of credits from the United States represents a tiny fraction of the capital available to the U.S.S.R. domestically and elsewhere, including Western Europe and Japan. But it does allow us to exercise some influence through our ability to control the scope of trade relationships.

—Over time, trade and investment may leaven the autarkic tendencies of the Soviet system, invite gradual association of the Soviet economy with the world economy, and foster a degree of interdependence that adds an element of stability to the political equation.

#### D. *The Strategic Relationship*

We cannot expect to relax international tensions or achieve a more stable international system should the two strongest nuclear powers conduct an unrestrained strategic arms race. Thus, perhaps the single most important component of our policy toward the Soviet Union is the effort to limit strategic weapons competition.

The competition in which we now find ourselves is historically unique:

—Each side has the capacity to destroy civilization as we know it.

—Failure to maintain equivalence could jeopardize not only our freedom but our very survival.

—The lead time for technological innovation is so long, yet the pace of change so relentless, that the arms race and strategic policy itself are in danger of being driven by technological necessity.

—When nuclear arsenals reach levels involving thousands of launchers and over 10,000 warheads, and when the character-

istics of the weapons of the two sides are so incommensurable, it becomes difficult to determine what combination of numbers of strategic weapons and performance capabilities would give one side a militarily and politically useful superiority. At a minimum, clear changes in the strategic balance can be achieved only by efforts so enormous and by increments so large that the very attempt would be highly destabilizing.

—The prospect of a decisive military advantage, even if theoretically possible, is politically intolerable; neither side will passively permit a massive shift in the nuclear balance. Therefore the probable outcome of each succeeding round of competition is the restoration of a strategic equilibrium, but at increasingly higher levels of forces.

—The arms race is driven by political as well as military factors. While a decisive advantage is hard to calculate, the *appearance* of inferiority—whatever its actual significance—can have serious political consequences. With weapons that are unlikely to be used and for which there is no operational experience, the psychological impact can be crucial. Thus each side has a high incentive to achieve not only the reality but the appearance of equality. In a very real sense each side shapes the military establishment of the other.

If we are driven to it, the United States will sustain an arms race. Indeed, it is likely that the United States would emerge from such a competition with an edge over the Soviet Union in most significant categories of strategic arms. But the political or military benefit which would flow from such a situation would remain elusive. Indeed, after such an evolution it might well be that *both* sides would be worse off than before the race began. The enormous destructiveness of weapons and the uncertainties regarding their effects combine to make the massive use of such weapons increasingly incredible.

The Soviet Union must realize that the overall relationship with the United States will be less stable if strategic balance is sought through unrestrained competitive

programs. Sustaining the buildup requires exhortations by both sides that in time may prove incompatible with restrained international conduct. The very fact of a strategic arms race has a high potential for feeding attitudes of hostility and suspicion on both sides, transforming the fears of those who demand more weapons into self-fulfilling prophecies.

The American people can be asked to bear the cost and political instability of a race which is doomed to stalemate only if it is clear that every effort has been made to prevent it. That is why every President since Eisenhower has pursued negotiations for the limitation of strategic arms while maintaining the military programs essential to strategic balance.

There are more subtle strategic reasons for our interest in SALT. Our supreme strategic purpose is the prevention of nuclear conflict through the maintenance of sufficient political and strategic power. Estimates of what constitutes "sufficiency" have been contentious. Our judgments have changed with our experience in deploying these weapons and as the Soviets expanded their own nuclear forces. When in the late 1960's it became apparent that the Soviet Union, for practical purposes, had achieved a kind of rough parity with the United States, we adopted the current strategic doctrine.

We determined that stability required strategic forces invulnerable to attack, thus removing the incentive on either side to strike first. Reality reinforced doctrine. As technology advanced, it became apparent that neither side *could* realistically expect to develop a credible disarming capability against the other except through efforts so gigantic as to represent a major threat to political stability.

One result of our doctrine was basing our strategic planning on the assumption that in the unlikely event of nuclear attack, the President should have a wide range of options available in deciding at what level and against what targets to respond. We designed our strategic forces with a substantial measure of flexibility, so that the U.S. re-

sponse need not include an attack on the aggressor's cities—thus inviting the destruction of our own—but could instead hit other targets. Translating this capability into a coherent system of planning became a novel, and as yet uncompleted, task of great complexity; but progress has been made. In our view such flexibility enhances the certainty of retaliation and thereby makes an attack less likely. Above all, it preserves the capability for human decision even in the ultimate crisis.

Another, at first seemingly paradoxical, result was a growing commitment to negotiated agreements on strategic arms. SALT became one means by which we and the Soviet Union could enhance stability by setting mutual constraints on our respective forces and by gradually reaching an understanding of the doctrinal considerations that underlie the deployment of nuclear weapons. Through SALT the two sides can reduce the suspicions and fears which fuel strategic competition. SALT, in the American conception, is a means to achieve strategic stability by methods other than the arms race.

Our specific objectives have been:

1. To break the momentum of ever-increasing levels of armaments;
2. To control certain qualitative aspects—particularly MIRV's [multiple independently targeted reentry vehicles];
3. To moderate the pace of new deployments; and
4. Ultimately, to achieve reductions in force levels.

The SALT agreements already signed represent a major contribution to strategic stability and a significant first step toward a longer term and possibly broader agreement.

When the first agreements in 1972 were signed, the future strategic picture was not bright:

—The Soviet Union was engaged in a dynamic program that had closed the numerical gap in ballistic missiles; they were deploying three types of ICBM's [interconti-

mental ballistic missiles], at a rate of over 200 annually, and launching on the average eight submarines a year with 16 ballistic missiles each.

—The United States had ended its numerical buildup in the late 1960's at a level of 1,054 ICBM's and 656 SLBM's [submarine-launched ballistic missiles]. We were emphasizing technological improvements, particularly in MIRV's for the Poseidon and Minuteman missiles. Our replacement systems were intended for the late 1970's and early 1980's.

—By most reasonable measurements of strategic power, we held an important advantage, which still continues. But it was also clear that if existing trends were maintained the Soviet Union would, first, exceed our numerical levels by a considerable margin and then develop the same technologies we had already mastered.

The agreements signed in 1972 which limited antiballistic missile [ABM] defenses and froze the level of ballistic missile forces on both sides represented the essential first step toward a less volatile strategic environment.<sup>4</sup>

—By limiting antiballistic missiles to very low levels of deployment, the United States and the Soviet Union removed a potential source of instability; for one side to build an extensive defense for its cities would inevitably be interpreted by the other as a step toward a first-strike capability. Before seeking a disarming capability, a potential aggressor would want to protect his population centers from incoming nuclear weapons.

—Some have alleged that the interim agreement, which expires in October 1977, penalizes the United States by permitting the Soviet Union to deploy more strategic missile launchers, both land based and sea based, than the United States. Such a view is misleading. When the agreement was signed in May 1972, the Soviet Union *already* possessed more land-based intercontinental

ballistic missiles than the United States, and given the pace of its submarine construction program, over the next few years it could have built virtually twice as many nuclear ballistic missile submarines.

The interim agreement confined a dynamic Soviet ICBM program to the then-existing level; it put a ceiling on the heaviest Soviet ICBM's, the weapons that most concern us; and it set an upper limit on the Soviet submarine-launched ballistic missile program. No American program was abandoned or curtailed. We remained free to deploy multiple warheads. No restraints were placed on bombers—a weapons system in which we have a large advantage. Indeed, the U.S. lead in missile warheads is likely to be somewhat greater at the end of this agreement than at the time of its signature.

The SALT One agreements were the first deliberate attempt by the nuclear superpowers to bring about strategic stability through negotiation. This very process is conducive to further restraint. For example, in the first round of SALT negotiations in 1970–72, both sides bitterly contested the number of ABM sites permitted by the agreement; two years later both sides gave up the right to build more than one site. In sum, we believed when we signed these agreements—and we believe now—that they had reduced the danger of nuclear war, that both sides had acquired some greater interest in restraint, and that the basis had been created for the present effort to reach a broader agreement.

The goal of the current negotiations is an agreement for a 10-year period. We had aimed at extending the interim agreement with adjustments in the numbers and new provisions aimed at dealing with the problem of MIRV's. We found, however, that our negotiation for a two- or three-year extension was constantly threatened with irrelevance by the ongoing programs of both sides that were due to be deployed at the end of or just after the period. This distorted the negotiation and, indeed, devalued its significance. We shifted to the 10-year approach because the period is long enough to cover

<sup>4</sup>For texts of the ABM Treaty and the Interim Agreement on the Limitation of Strategic Offensive Arms, see BULLETIN of June 26, 1972, pp. 918 and 920.

all current and planned forces but not so long as to invite hedges that would defeat the purpose of an arms control agreement. In fact, it invites a slowing down of planned deployments; further, a period of this length will allow us to set realistic ceilings that represent more than a temporary plateau from which to launch a new cycle in the arms race. Future reductions thus become a realistic objective.

With respect to ceilings on strategic forces, we have defined our goal as essential equivalence in strategic capabilities. What constitutes equivalence involves subjective judgment. Because U.S. and Soviet forces are different from each other—in number and size of weapons, in technological refinement, in performance characteristics—they are difficult to compare.

Yet in the negotiations we shall, for example, have to compare heavy bombers, in which the United States is ahead, with heavy missiles, which the U.S.S.R. has emphasized. We shall have to decide whether to insist on equivalence in every category or whether to permit trade-offs in which an advantage in one category compensates for a disadvantage in another. The equation does not remain static. We shall have to relate present advantages to potential development, existing disparities to future trends. This is a difficult process, but we are confident that it can be solved.

Numerical balance is no longer enough. To achieve stability, it will be necessary to consider as well the impact of technological change in such areas as missile throw weight, multiple reentry vehicles, and missile accuracy. The difficulty is that we are dealing not only with disparate levels of forces but with disparate capabilities, MIRV technology being a conspicuous example. The rate of increase of warheads is surging far ahead of the increase in delivery vehicles. This is why the United States considers MIRV limitation an essential component of the next phase of the SALT negotiations. If we fail, the rate of technology will outstrip our capacity to design effective limitations; constantly proliferating warheads of increasing

accuracy will overwhelm fixed launchers. An arms race will be virtually inevitable.

The third area for negotiations is the pace of deployments of new or more modern systems. Neither side will remain in its present position without change for another decade. The Soviets are already embarked on testing an initial deployment of a third generation of ICBM's and on a third modification of submarine-launched missiles—though the rate of deployment so far has been far short of the maximum pace of the late sixties.

For our part, we are planning to introduce the Trident system and to replace the B-52 force with the B-1; we also have the capability of improving our Minuteman ICBM system, adding to the number as well as capability of MIRV missiles, and if we choose, of deploying mobile systems, land based or airborne. Thus our task is to see whether the two sides can agree to slow the pace of deployment so that modernization is less likely to threaten the overall balance or trigger an excessive reaction.

Finally, a 10-year program gives us a chance to negotiate reductions. Reductions have occasionally been proposed as an alternative to ceilings; they are often seen as more desirable or at least easier to negotiate. In fact, it is a far more complicated problem. Reductions in launchers, for example, if not accompanied by restrictions on the number of warheads, will only magnify vulnerability. The fewer the aim points, the simpler it would be to calculate an attack. At the same time, reductions will have to proceed from some baseline and must therefore be preceded by agreed ceilings—if only of an interim nature. But a 10-year program should permit the negotiation of stable ceilings resulting from the start of a process of reductions.

Détente is admittedly far from a modern equivalent to the kind of stable peace that characterized most of the 19th century. But it is a long step away from the bitter and aggressive spirit that has characterized so much of the postwar period. When linked to such broad and unprecedented projects as

SALT, détente takes on added meaning and opens prospects of a more stable peace. SALT agreements should be seen as steps in a process leading to progressively greater stability. It is in that light that SALT and related projects will be judged by history.

#### IV. An Assessment of Detente

Where has the process of détente taken us so far? What are the principles that must continue to guide our course?

Major progress has been made:

—Berlin's potential as Europe's perennial flashpoint has been substantially reduced through the quadripartite agreement of 1971. The United States considers strict adherence to the agreement a major test of détente.

—We and our allies are launched on negotiations with the Warsaw Pact and other countries in the conference on European security and cooperation, a conference designed to foster East-West dialogue and cooperation.

—At the same time, NATO and the Warsaw Pact are negotiating the reduction of their forces in Central Europe.

—The honorable termination of America's direct military involvement in Indochina and the substantial lowering of regional conflict were made possible by many factors. But this achievement would have been much more difficult, if not impossible, in an era of Soviet and Chinese hostility toward the United States.

—America's principal alliances have proved their durability in a new era. Many feared that détente would undermine them. Instead, détente has helped to place our alliance ties on a more enduring basis by removing the fear that friendship with the United States involved the risk of unnecessary confrontation with the U.S.S.R.

—Many incipient crises with the Soviet Union have been contained or settled without ever reaching the point of public disagreement. The world has been freer of East-West tensions and conflict than in the fifties and sixties.

—A series of bilateral cooperative agreements has turned the U.S.-Soviet relationship in a far more positive direction.

—We have achieved unprecedented agreements in arms limitation and measures to avoid accidental war.

—New possibilities for positive U.S.-Soviet cooperation have emerged on issues in which the globe is interdependent: science and technology, environment, energy.

These accomplishments do not guarantee peace. But they have served to lessen the rigidities of the past and offer hope for a better era. Despite fluctuations a trend has been established; the character of international politics has been markedly changed.

It is too early to judge conclusively whether this change should be ascribed to tactical considerations. But in a sense, that is immaterial. For whether the change is temporary and tactical, or lasting and basic, our task is essentially the same: To transform that change into a permanent condition devoted to the purpose of a secure peace and mankind's aspiration for a better life. A tactical change sufficiently prolonged becomes a lasting transformation.

But the whole process can be jeopardized if it is taken for granted. As the cold war recedes in memory, détente can come to seem so natural that it appears safe to levy progressively greater demands on it. The temptation to combine détente with increasing pressure on the Soviet Union will grow. Such an attitude would be disastrous. We would not accept it from Moscow; Moscow will not accept it from us. We will finally wind up again with the cold war and fail to achieve either peace or any humane goal.

To be sure, the process of détente raises serious issues for many people. Let me deal with these in terms of the principles which underlie our policy.

*First*, if détente is to endure, both sides must benefit.

There is no question that the Soviet Union obtains benefits from détente. On what other grounds would the tough-minded members of the Politburo sustain it? But the essential

point surely must be that détente serves American and world interests as well. If these coincide with some Soviet interests, this will only strengthen the durability of the process.

On the global scale, in terms of the conventional measures of power, influence, and position, our interests have not suffered—they have generally prospered. In many areas of the world, the influence and the respect we enjoy are greater than was the case for many years. It is also true that Soviet influence and presence are felt in many parts of the world. But this is a reality that would exist without détente. The record shows that détente does not deny us the opportunity to react to it and to offset it.

Our bilateral relations with the U.S.S.R. are beginning to proliferate across a broad range of activities in our societies. Many of the projects now underway are in their infancy; we have many safeguards against unequal benefits—in our laws, in the agreements themselves, and in plain common sense. Of course, there are instances where the Soviet Union has obtained some particular advantage. But we seek in each agreement or project to provide for benefits that are mutual. We attempt to make sure that there are trade-offs among the various programs that are implemented. Americans surely are the last who need fear hard bargaining or lack confidence in competition.

*Second*, building a new relationship with the Soviet Union does not entail any devaluation of traditional alliance relations.

Our approach to relations with the U.S.S.R. has always been, and will continue to be, rooted in the belief that the cohesion of our alliances, and particularly the Atlantic alliance, is a precondition to establishing a more constructive relationship with the U.S.S.R.

Crucial, indeed unique, as may be our concern with Soviet power, we do not delude ourselves that we should deal with it alone. When we speak of Europe and Japan as representing centers of power and influence, we describe not merely an observable fact but an indispensable element in the equilibrium needed to keep the world at peace. The coop-

eration and partnership between us transcend formal agreements; they reflect values and traditions not soon, if ever, to be shared with our adversaries.

Inevitably, a greater sense of drama accompanies our dealings with the Soviet Union, because the central issues of war and peace cannot be other than dramatic. It was precisely a recognition of this fact and our concern that alliance relations not be taken for granted that led to the American initiative in April of 1973 to put new emphasis on our traditional associations. We sought political acts of will which would transcend the technical issues at hand, symbolize our enduring goals, and thus enhance our fundamental bonds. Much has been accomplished. The complications attendant to adapting U.S.-European relations should not be confused with their basic character. We were tested in difficult conditions that do not affect our central purposes. Today relations with Europe and Japan are strong and improving. We have made progress in developing common positions on security, détente, and energy. The experience of the past year has demonstrated that there is no contradiction between vigorous, organic alliance relations and a more positive relationship with adversaries; indeed, they are mutually reinforcing.

*Third*, the emergence of more normal relations with the Soviet Union must not undermine our resolve to maintain our national defense.

There is a tendency in democratic societies to relax as dangers seem to recede; there is an inclination to view the maintenance of strength as incompatible with relaxation of tensions rather than its precondition. But this is primarily a question of leadership. We shall attempt to be vigilant to the dangers facing America. This administration will not be misled—or mislead—on issues of national defense. At the same time, we do not accept the proposition that we need crises to sustain our defense. A society that needs artificial crises to do what is needed for survival will soon find itself in mortal danger.

*Fourth*, we must know what can and can-

not be achieved in changing human conditions in the East.

The question of dealing with Communist governments has troubled the American people and the Congress since 1917. There has always been a fear that by working with a government whose internal policies differ so sharply with our own we are in some manner condoning these policies or encouraging their continuation. Some argue that until there is a genuine "liberalization"—or signs of serious progress in this direction—all elements of conciliation in Soviet policy must be regarded as temporary and tactical. In that view, demands for internal changes must be the precondition for the pursuit of a relaxation of tensions with the Soviet Union.

Our view is different. We shall insist on responsible international behavior by the Soviet Union and use it as the primary index of our relationship. Beyond this we will use our influence to the maximum to alleviate suffering and to respond to humane appeals. We know what we stand for, and we shall leave no doubt about it.

Both as a government and as a people we *have* made the attitude of the American people clear on countless occasions in ways that have produced results. I believe that both the executive and the Congress, each playing its proper role, have been effective. With respect to the specific issue of emigration:

—The education exit tax of 1971 is no longer being collected. We have been assured that it will not be reapplied.

—Hardship cases submitted to the Soviet Government have been given increased attention, and remedies have been forthcoming in many well-known instances.

—The volume of Jewish emigration has increased from a trickle to tens of thousands.

—And we are now moving toward an understanding that should significantly diminish the obstacles to emigration and ease the hardship of prospective emigrants.

We have accomplished much. But we cannot demand that the Soviet Union, in effect, suddenly reverse five decades of Soviet, and centuries of Russian, history. Such an at-

tempt would be futile and at the same time hazard all that has already been achieved. Changes in Soviet society have already occurred, and more will come. But they are most likely to develop through an evolution that can best go forward in an environment of decreasing international tensions. A renewal of the cold war will hardly encourage the Soviet Union to change its emigration policies or adopt a more benevolent attitude toward dissent.

## V. Agenda for the Future

Détente is a process, not a permanent achievement. The agenda is full and continuing. Obviously the main concern must be to reduce the sources of potential conflict. This requires efforts in several interrelated areas:

—The military competition in all its aspects must be subject to increasingly firm restraints by both sides.

—Political competition, especially in moments of crisis, must be guided by the principles of restraint set forth in the documents described earlier. Crises there will be, but the United States and the Soviet Union have a special obligation deriving from the unimaginable military power that they wield and represent. Exploitation of crisis situations for unilateral gain is not acceptable.

—Restraint in crises must be augmented by cooperation in removing the causes of crises. There have been too many instances, notably in the Middle East, which demonstrate that policies of unilateral advantage sooner or later run out of control and lead to the brink of war, if not beyond.

—The process of negotiations and consultation must be continuous and intense. But no agreement between the nuclear superpowers can be durable if made over the heads of other nations which have a stake in the outcome. We should not seek to impose peace; we can, however, see that our own actions and conduct are conducive to peace.

In the coming months we shall strive:

—To complete the negotiations for compre-



hensive and equitable limitations on strategic arms until at least 1985;

—To complete the multilateral negotiations on mutual force reductions in Central Europe, so that security will be enhanced for all the countries of Europe;

—To conclude the conference on European security and cooperation in a manner that promotes both security and human aspirations;

—To continue the efforts to limit the spread of nuclear weapons to additional countries without depriving those countries of the peaceful benefits of atomic energy;

—To complete ratification of the recently negotiated treaty banning underground nuclear testing by the United States and U.S.S.R. above a certain threshold;

—To begin negotiations on the recently agreed effort to overcome the possible dangers of environmental modification techniques for military purposes; and

—To resolve the longstanding attempts to cope with the dangers of chemical weaponry.

We must never forget that the process of détente depends ultimately on habits and modes of conduct that extend beyond the letter of agreements to the spirit of relations as a whole. This is why the whole process must be carefully nurtured.

In cataloging the desirable, we must take care not to jeopardize what is attainable. We must consider what alternative policies are available and what their consequences would be. And the implications of alternatives must be examined not just in terms of a single issue but for how they might affect the entire range of Soviet-American relations and the prospects for world peace.

We must assess not only individual challenges to détente but also their cumulative impact:

If we justify each agreement with Moscow only when we can show unilateral gain,

If we strive for an elusive strategic "superiority,"

If we systematically block benefits to the Soviet Union,

If we try to transform the Soviet system by pressure,

If in short, we look for final results before we agree to any results, then we would be reviving the doctrines of liberation and massive retaliation of the 1950's. And we would do so at a time when Soviet physical power and influence on the world are greater than a quarter century ago when those policies were devised and failed. The futility of such a course is as certain as its danger.

Let there be no question, however, that Soviet actions could destroy détente as well:

If the Soviet Union uses détente to strengthen its military capacity in all fields,

If in crises it acts to sharpen tension,

If it does not contribute to progress toward stability,

If it seeks to undermine our alliances,

If it is deaf to the urgent needs of the least developed and the emerging issues of interdependence, then it in turn tempts a return to the tensions and conflicts we have made such efforts to overcome. The policy of confrontation has worked for neither of the superpowers.

We have insisted toward the Soviet Union that we cannot have the atmosphere of détente without the substance. It is equally clear that the substance of détente will disappear in an atmosphere of hostility.

We have profound differences with the Soviet Union—in our values, our methods, our vision of the future. But it is these very differences which compel any responsible administration to make a major effort to create a more constructive relationship.

We face an opportunity that was not possible 25 years, or even a decade, ago. If that opportunity is lost, its moment will not quickly come again. Indeed, it may not come at all.

As President Kennedy pointed out: "For in the final analysis our most basic common link is that we all inhabit this small planet. We all breathe the same air. We all cherish our children's future. And we are all mortal."<sup>5</sup>

<sup>5</sup> For President Kennedy's commencement address at American University, Washington, D.C., on June 10, 1963, see BULLETIN of July 2, 1963, p. 2.

## Department Surveys U.S. Policy and Developments in South Asia

*Following is a statement by Alfred L. Atherton, Jr., Assistant Secretary for Near Eastern and South Asian Affairs, made before the Subcommittee on the Near East and South Asia of the House Committee on Foreign Affairs on September 19.<sup>1</sup>*

It has been 18 months since my predecessor, Mr. Sisco, now Under Secretary of State for Political Affairs, met with you for a similar review of the situation in South Asia and of our relations with the nations of that region. The period has witnessed progress toward regional reconciliation and a strengthening of our own bilateral ties with individual countries but also a distressing deterioration in South Asian economic prospects, largely because of factors external to the region.

South Asia is an area that has long involved the concern and interest of the United States. The record of our contributions in development and food assistance, and of relief in the case of all too frequent natural disasters, is evidence of the strong humanitarian regard of the American people for the people of South Asia and their hopes for development. While South Asia is not central to U.S. global strategic concerns, it is contiguous geographically to the Soviet Union and China, and their rivalries have an important impact on the area.

Our principal interest in a strategic sense has been to keep South Asia from becoming an area of great-power confrontation or conflict. We seek no political advantage, nor do we wish to impose any economic or political system. We look to other powers to exercise similar restraint, and with a regard for the legitimate interests of others. Within this context, we wish to see South Asia develop as a region which is characterized by:

—Peace and stability, so that energies may be fully devoted to the urgent tasks of development;

—Balanced relations with outside powers, in order that regional problems should be settled peacefully in a regional context;

—Accelerating development, particularly in the critical agricultural sector and complemented by effective measures to reduce population pressures; and

—Over the longer term, meaningful progress toward satisfactory regional relationships resting on the secure independence and integrity of each of the states of the area.

Against this background of what we seek, let us look now at the record of what has happened. In the recent past, regional trends as a whole have seemed to us reasonably encouraging from the political perspective, while the reverse is true on the economic front. Turning first to the good news, the process of peaceful reconciliation of regional problems initiated by Mrs. Gandhi [Prime Minister of India Indira Gandhi] and Prime Minister [of Pakistan Zulfikar Ali] Bhutto at Simla in July 1972 has again been resumed. For a period after the Indian nuclear test, the Simla process was stalled, but Indian and Pakistani representatives resumed their talks recently with discussions in Islamabad September 12–14 on ways to restore telecommunications and travel links existing before 1971. Last year, with the active participation of Bangladesh, India and Pakistan agreed to a massive exchange of POW's and civilians stranded by the results of the 1971 Indo-Pakistani war and the breakup of Pakistan. Over 300,000 people were moved, largely in an airlift supervised by the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees, to which this government contributed \$4.55 million. In related developments, Bangladesh agreed not to try Pakistani military personnel charged with committing war crimes, and Pakistan and Bangladesh exchanged mutual diplomatic recognition.

Pakistan, Bangladesh, and India have thus taken decisive steps to heal the wounds of

<sup>1</sup> The complete transcript of the hearings will be published by the committee and will be available from the Superintendent of Documents, U.S. Government Printing Office, Washington, D.C. 20402.

war and to adjust to the new situation created by the events of 1971. The United States welcomes these developments. We hope that the steps already taken foreshadow further advances toward a new era of regional stability.

Some developments, however, have aroused old suspicions and have had an unsettling effect on political relations. Among these was the explosion by India of an underground nuclear device on May 18. This event obviously introduced a new element into regional calculations, although it does not in itself alter the balance of power in the area. The implications for regional stability and the effect on the wider issues of nuclear non-proliferation cannot yet be fully assessed. Our own position is clear: We will continue to support nuclear nonproliferation as a fundamental element in our pursuit of world peace. We remain opposed to nuclear proliferation because of the adverse impact on regional and global stability.

A second source of concern has been increased tension between Pakistan and Afghanistan. From our perspective, both sides seem to desire a peaceful resolution of their differences. An effective and constructive dialogue, however, has failed to develop either in public or in private. The present atmosphere is a source of concern to this government and to others who are friends of both.

Since the dramatic events of 1971, however, it has been the chronic problems of poverty, inadequate food supplies, and unchecked population growth rather than politics that have preempted the attention of South Asian governments and dominated their relations with the outside world. No region has been more seriously affected or less capable of initiating offsetting policies in the face of the unprecedented worldwide price inflation in basic commodities such as petroleum, fertilizer, and food grains. Hardest hit has been Bangladesh, where an unprecedented international relief and rehabilitation effort mounted after independence has not yet proved adequate to create the conditions necessary for the beginning of solid

development. Another serious flood this year has further exacerbated an economic crisis which will engage the attention of this government and other donor nations at an IBRD-sponsored [International Bank for Reconstruction and Development] meeting next month.

A generally below normal monsoon, coupled with decreased availability of fertilizer, has also placed Indian hopes for food-grain self-sufficiency in serious jeopardy and contributed to the stagnation and galloping inflation that have dimmed its economic prospects. Of the major countries of South Asia, Pakistan has perhaps managed best to moderate the damage of recent international economic events. Pakistan's recovery from the effects of both civil war and last year's flood has been impressive, but continuing balance of payments difficulties cause some concern.

For both humanitarian reasons and in the interests of promoting a just and stable international economic system, the United States has continued to be an important participant in international efforts to encourage economic development in South Asia. Since 1971, new U.S. aid commitments, including concessional food sales, to Bangladesh and Pakistan have approached \$500 million for each country. We have participated in debt-rescheduling exercises for India and continue to discuss the framework for a cooperative economic relationship with that country. We have small but important assistance programs in Nepal, Sri Lanka, and Afghanistan.

Recent developments, however, have brought home as never before the point that this country on a bilateral basis cannot substantially alter the development prospects of the nations of South Asia. There is a growing recognition that these problems are international in scope and require international solutions. For this reason we have encouraged global conferences on both population and food in a search for new ideas and increased cooperation. On an urgent basis, however, South Asia also needs substantial direct resource transfers of the traditional

sort, and in this, the burden must be broadly shared, including by those who may possess surplus capital as a result of recent oil price increases. The development of closer ties, political as well as economic, between Iran and the nations of South Asia is an important demonstration of the potential for mutually productive relations between South Asia and the Middle East.

U.S. policy toward each of the countries of South Asia through this period has remained constant and in accord with our broad range of interests that I described at the outset above. Thus in the case of India, it should have become clear to all over the past 18 months that we appreciate the importance to regional questions which is imparted by its power and size. No one should doubt that we wish India well. As the Secretary said in his confirmation hearings:

We recognize India as one of the major forces in the developing world and as a country whose growth and stability are absolutely essential to the peace and stability of South Asia.

In this spirit, we have joined with the Government of India in a conscious search for the framework of what has come to be called a "more mature" relationship. The atmosphere surrounding Indo-American relations has improved significantly during this period. An important contributing factor in this was the agreement on disposition of our large holdings of Indian rupees reached earlier this year, a matter in which we consulted very closely with Congress. We are now engaged in a continuing and serious dialogue with the Indian Government which we trust and hope will result in putting our relationship on a solid long-range footing based on equality, reciprocity, and mutual interests. This is a goal which we are confident the Government of India also seeks.

The development of better relations with India need not be at the expense of any other nation. In particular, we intend to retain and strengthen our excellent relations with Pakistan. The warmth and importance of these ties were demonstrated again during the successful official visit to Washington in

September 1973 by Prime Minister Bhutto. As we made clear at that time, the sovereignty and territorial integrity of Pakistan remain an important concern of our foreign policy, as it should of all governments who wish to see stability and tranquillity firmly established in the area.

A stable regional system must provide for the prosperity and security of all states, large or small. We are gratified by the success of our efforts to develop good relations with all the nations of South Asia:

—With the new nation of Bangladesh, which we have this week warmly welcomed as a member of the United Nations, we have been generous. The long-suffering Bengalee people can be assured of our continuing sympathy and help.

—In Afghanistan, our traditional friendship has withstood the test of a transition to a new republican regime under the leadership of President Mohammed Daoud.

—We have maintained our warm ties, including a modest assistance program, with the Kingdom of Nepal, whose continued independent national development we strongly support.

—We feel a special affinity to Sri Lanka in its efforts to achieve economic development while maintaining a vigorous democracy. We are heartened by our continuing friendly relations.

Mr. Chairman, members of the committee: I believe you will agree that our policies toward South Asia are constructive. We are concerned, we are realistic, and we are determined to play a role which complements rather than impedes the natural dynamics of the region itself. We place great stock in a frank and open dialogue with the leaders of South Asia—a dialogue which Secretary Kissinger hopes to pursue when he makes his long-planned visit to South Asia. We have every confidence that this visit will give new meaning and substance to our relationship with what we hope will be an evolving system of progressive and peaceful state relationships in the region.

## Senate Asked To Approve Protocol to U.S.-U.S.S.R. ABM Treaty

*Message From President Ford*<sup>1</sup>

*To the Senate of the United States:*

I transmit herewith the Protocol to the Treaty between the United States of America and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics on the Limitation of Anti-Ballistic Missile Systems. This Protocol was signed in Moscow on July 3, 1974. I ask the Senate's advice and consent to its ratification.

The provisions of the Protocol are explained in detail in the report of the Department of State which I enclose. The main effect of the Protocol is to limit further the level and potential extent of ABM deployment permitted by the 1972 ABM Treaty. The Protocol furthers fundamental United States objectives set forth in President Nixon's message to the Senate of June 13, 1972 transmitting the Agreements reached at SALT ONE.

The ABM Treaty prohibits the deployment of operational ABM systems or their components except at two deployment areas, one centered on a Party's national capital area and the other in a separate area containing ICBM silo launchers. The Protocol would amend the Treaty to limit each Party to a single ABM deployment area at any one time, which level is consistent with the current level of deployment. However, each side would retain the right to remove its ABM system and the components thereof from their present deployment area and to deploy an ABM system or its components in the alternative deployment area permitted by the ABM Treaty. This right may be exercised only once.

This Protocol represents a further advance in the stabilization of the strategic relationship between the United States and the So-

<sup>1</sup> Transmitted on Sept. 19 (text from White House press release); also printed as S. Ex. I, 93d Cong., 2d sess., which includes the texts of the protocol and the report of the Department of State.

viet Union. It reinforces the ABM Treaty provision that neither Party will establish a nationwide ABM defense or a base for such a defense.

I believe that this Protocol strengthens the ABM Treaty and will, as an integral part of the Treaty, contribute to the reduction of international tension and a more secure and peaceful world in which the security of the United States is fully protected. I strongly recommend that the Senate give it prompt and favorable attention.

GERALD R. FORD.

THE WHITE HOUSE, *September 19, 1974.*

## U.S.-Australia Extradition Treaty Transmitted to the Senate

*Message From President Ford*<sup>1</sup>

*To the Senate of the United States:*

With a view to receiving the advice and consent of the Senate to ratification, I transmit herewith the Treaty on Extradition between the United States of America and Australia, signed at Washington on May 14, 1974. I transmit also, for the information of the Senate, the report of the Department of State with respect to the Treaty.

The Treaty will, upon entry into force, terminate, as between the United States and Australia, the Treaty on Extradition between the United States and Great Britain of December 22, 1931, as made applicable to Australia. This new Treaty represents a substantial modernization with respect to the procedural aspects of extradition.

The Treaty includes in the list of extraditable offenses several which are of prime international concern, such as aircraft hijacking, narcotics offenses, and conspiracy to commit listed offenses.

<sup>1</sup> Transmitted on Aug. 22 (text from White House press release); also printed as S. Ex. F, 93d Cong., 2d sess., which includes the text of the treaty and the report of the Department of State.

The Treaty will make a significant contribution to the international effort to control narcotics traffic. I recommend that the Senate give early and favorable consideration to the Treaty and give its advice and consent to ratification.

GERALD R. FORD.

THE WHITE HOUSE, August 22, 1974.

**TREATY INFORMATION**

**Current Actions**

**MULTILATERAL**

**Customs**

Convention establishing a Customs Cooperation Council, with annex. Done at Brussels December 15, 1950. Entered into force November 4, 1952; for the United States November 5, 1970. TIAS 7063.

*Accession deposited:* Bahamas, August 16, 1974.

**Satellite Communications System**

Agreement relating to the International Telecommunications Satellite Organization (Intelsat), with annexes. Done at Washington August 20, 1971. Entered into force February 12, 1973. TIAS 7532.

*Ratification deposited:* Turkey, September 26, 1974.

**Sea, Exploration of**

Protocol to the convention of September 12, 1964 (TIAS 7628), for the International Council for the Exploration of the Sea. Done at Copenhagen August 13, 1970.<sup>1</sup>

*Ratified by the President:* September 18, 1974.

**Seals—Antarctic**

Convention for the conservation of Antarctic seals, with annex and final act. Done at London June 1, 1972.<sup>1</sup>

*Ratification deposited:* United Kingdom, September 10, 1974.<sup>2</sup>

**Tonnage Measurement**

International convention on tonnage measurement for ships, 1969, with annexes. Done at London June 23, 1969.<sup>1</sup>

<sup>1</sup> Not in force.

<sup>2</sup> Extended to Channel Islands and Isle of Man.

*Accession deposited:* Czechoslovakia, April 10, 1974.

*Acceptance deposited:* Italy, September 10, 1974.

**BILATERAL**

**Bahamas, The**

Agreement relating to pre-sunrise operation of certain standard broadcasting stations. Effected by exchange of notes at Nassau January 30 and September 4, 1974. Entered into force September 4, 1974.

**Egypt**

Agreement amending the agreement for sales of agricultural commodities of June 7, 1974 (TIAS 7855). Effected by exchange of notes at Cairo September 11 and 12, 1974. Entered into force September 12, 1974.

**Check List of Department of State  
Press Releases: September 23-29**

Press releases may be obtained from the Office of Press Relations, Department of State, Washington, D.C. 20520.

Release issued prior to September 19 which appears in this issue of the BULLETIN is No. 366 of September 19.

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†372	9/23	"Foreign Relations" volume on Council on Foreign Ministers; Germany and Austria; 1948 (for release Sept. 30).
373	9/23	Kissinger: U.N. General Assembly.
*374	9/23	Study Group 5 of the U.S. National Committee for the CCIR, Boulder, Colo., Oct. 18.
*375	9/23	Study Group 6 of the U.S. National Committee for the CCIR, Boulder, Colo., Oct. 18.
*376	9/24	Program for the state visit of Italian President Giovanni Leone, Sept. 24-29.
†377	9/24	North Atlantic airfare negotiations.
†378	9/26	Kissinger, Leone: exchange of toasts, Sept. 25.
*379	9/26	Study Group 4 of the U.S. National Committee for the CCIR, Oct. 24.
*380	9/27	Regional foreign policy conference, Chicago, Oct. 16.
*381	9/27	Habib sworn in as Assistant Secretary for East Asian and Pacific Affairs (biographic data).
†382	9/27	U.S. and Jordan sign nonscheduled air service agreement (re-write).

\* Not printed.

† Held for a later issue of the BULLETIN.

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# THE DEPARTMENT OF STATE BULLETIN

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# THE DEPARTMENT OF STATE BULLETIN

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*The Department of State BULLETIN, a weekly publication issued by the Office of Media Services, Bureau of Public Affairs, provides the public and interested agencies of the government with information on developments in the field of U.S. foreign relations and on the work of the Department and the Foreign Service.*

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Washington, D.C. 20402

PRICE:

52 issues plus semiannual indexes,  
domestic \$29.80, foreign \$37.25  
Single copy 60 cents

Use of funds for printing this publication approved by the Director of the Office of Management and Budget (January 29, 1971).

**Note:** Contents of this publication are not copyrighted and items contained herein may be reprinted. Citation of the DEPARTMENT OF STATE BULLETIN as the source will be appreciated. The BULLETIN is indexed in the Readers' Guide to Periodical Literature.

## Assistant Secretary Enders Outlines Draft Agreement Reached by Energy Coordinating Group

*The Energy Coordinating Group (ECG) established by the Washington Energy Conference in February met at Brussels September 19-20. Following is the transcript of a news conference held at the Department of State on September 23 by Thomas O. Enders, Assistant Secretary for Economic and Business Affairs, who headed the U.S. delegation to the Brussels meeting.*

I thought it would be useful to come down here and talk very briefly and then answer questions about the agreement which has been reached in Brussels among the 12 ECG countries—that is to say, the European Community less France, Norway, Japan, the United States, and Canada—and which is now being submitted to governments for their consideration, their constitutional procedures, and approval.

This is a far-reaching agreement and a far-reaching expression of solidarity among the consuming countries. If it is approved by governments, as we expect it will be, it will form a very strong basis of cooperation in the energy field among a wide range of industrialized countries.

As such, we regard it as a very important step forward and a very important consequence of the Washington Energy Conference, which launched this cooperative work.

I would like to go into some detail on the provisions that it contains. Let me say a word about the substance and then a word about the procedure.

On the substance: I think the basic perception in this agreement is that the consuming countries need first to express their solidarity by determining what each would do in a new oil emergency and how each would

support the oil security of the group as a whole before they can fruitfully go on to other, more positive—eventually dominant—elements of the energy situation, which include major joint actions to conserve energy and thereby lower the net imports of the group as a whole; research and development; the development of alternative supplies, thereby increasing the output of energy in the group as a whole and decreasing net imports and therefore vulnerability.

This should create a situation in which the demand for and dependence on imported oil for the group as a whole will significantly diminish from what it is now.

Now, in contingency planning, the basic principle here is that each country in the group must share on an equitable basis in the preparation for a new emergency. That means that everybody must stockpile oil to cover their imports on the same basis. And the agreement sets a target of 90 days. We are very substantially below that in many countries now. This means a major commitment on the part of Japan and Western Europe—also to some degree on the part of the United States—to carry stocks equivalent to 90 days of imports.

The second thing is that all the countries agree to take similar actions in a new emergency to curtail oil consumption. This is complicated, and I will be glad to go into it. But basically what it says is that at certain levels of shortfall a given consumption cut will take place, and when the shortfall gets deeper, another level of common consumption cutback will be called for. Then, beyond a certain point, where no figures are foreseen, but where we get into a very severe crisis indeed, going toward cutbacks of

30 or 40 percent of available oil, then there is a strong commitment in the agreement to take all necessary further restrictions in demand and other actions to assure the security of the group.

So, this is a process which at the outset contains a series of very specific commitments for the kind of crisis that we had to face this past winter and a further general commitment for more serious crises should they develop.

Thirdly, there is a formula for sharing oil which is constructed as a function of the first two commitments in stockpiling and in consumption cutbacks. What it does is basically assure that available oil is sorted out as a function of the first two commitments, so that all countries use their oil stocks, their security provisions, in effect, at about the same rate and no country will run out of oil sooner than any other.

To express this basic contingency plan, the 12 countries have tentatively agreed that they should have a new institution which would be an international energy agency, an autonomous institution to be constructed within the framework of the OECD [Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development], having its own governing council at ministerial level and its own secretariat.

They have agreed on a series of decision-making provisions which are important and represent a significant innovation in international decisionmaking. They provide, in the case of action to overcome an oil contingency, a very strong presumption of action. That is to say, once a given shortfall of oil is identified, this shortfall would create a presumption—in effect would trigger the commitments to demand restraint and to sharing, unless a very strong majority of the countries in the group were to vote to overturn it. That strong majority must be expressed in terms of both a large number of the countries involved and countries representing a large majority of the oil consumption of the group. It would take, in effect, 60 percent of the weighted votes, and the weighting is calculated in such a manner that out of a total of 136 votes of the group,

oil votes weighted on consumption count for 100 with the remainder allocated three per country.

This voting system is complex in its execution but relatively simple in its concept, and the idea is that there should be a very strong presumption that this machinery comes into effect in a crisis.

Another aspect of that voting machinery is that it also can be used for all of the ordinary business of the group, so that the ability of the group to interpret its undertakings, to act on what it thinks its basic agreement means—and this is a carefully written agreement which runs now to 82 articles and is quite fully laid out—should also be very strong.

Now, thirdly, with regard to the contingency plan itself, there is provision for both protection against a general embargo affecting the group as a whole and for protection against a selective embargo, which might target one or two countries, as the United States and Holland were targeted last winter. This provision also creates a strong presumption of action, once the shortfall is identified. This, too, could be overturned, but only by a very strong majority vote. In this case, it would require 10 countries.

I should note that because of the structure of the American oil market, with most of the imports coming into the east coast—and this is also true of Canada—there is a separate provision that this selective trigger can be used in regard to a regional market of a given country, as well as to the national market. So there is, in effect, built-in protection for the east coast of the United States and the east coast of Canada.

Now, this contingency plan is the heart of the international energy program which has been agreed at this stage, but does not exhaust it and is regarded as a first stage.

The plan now contains the following other elements:

—One, a broad program of cooperative research and development which is to be guided by the new energy agency and undertaken partly on the basis of national groupings

with one individual member in the lead and partly on the basis of cooperative research to be done through the OECD itself by, if not by the whole group, by any collection of countries in the group.

—Secondly, there will be a broad program of conservation which is to be undertaken by this group. They will attempt to develop in the group national policies which will assist conservation in each country through an exchange of information and the identification of priorities.

—Thirdly, we expect to concentrate on some specific problem such as nuclear enrichment—how to provide the nuclear enrichment services which will be required for the group as a whole in the course of the next 15 or 20 years by the location and development of additional nuclear enrichment facilities.

—Fourthly, we expect to have under this program a broad new effort at predicting the demand and supply for energy, in an effort to put planning on a surer footing than it now is.

Now, turning to the procedure, as I say, this agreement is a tentative agreement. It is, in technical jargon, an agreement “without brackets”—without reservations on the part of national delegations. It is submitted now for formal consideration and decision by member governments. Many of them will be talking to their parliaments. We have talked already quite broadly on the Hill but will expect to do more of that now.

This undertaking will be open to new members, provided they are also members of the Organization for Economic Development and Cooperation, the OECD. And toward the end of October, we expect to be initialing this agreement, bringing it provisionally into force. We expect that in the course of November there will be a decision by the OECD as to whether or not they wish to accept this organization in their framework, and subsequently, we would expect the organization to be created.

I think the most important thing that has come out of this work is the beginning of an

expression by the consuming countries to consider their destiny and their security as energy consumers together. This is expressed in many ways—in the contingency provisions, in the majority voting, in the very strong commitments undertaken to improve their security.

Looking toward the future, though, this is an arrangement which is intended to be the base for working on the really important and positive aspects of the problem, of which the most immediate is conservation.

I think it is obvious that the conservation effort undertaken by the members of this group of 12 countries, or by any industrialized countries, has been very limited and that the group remains vulnerable as a whole to new cutbacks due to the fact that it has not slowed down very significantly its energy consumption. As a matter of fact, we saw recently in the case of the United States that gasoline consumption for the first time in a year was over its level of 12 months earlier.

This will be certainly one of the great tasks for this winter in all the industrialized countries and, we would expect, in the organization created by this undertaking.

That, in general, is where we are now. Let me see whether I can answer your questions.

*Q. Mr. Enders, reports from Brussels, which are four days old already, mention 7 percent as the threshold. I don't think you mentioned this percentage.*

*Assistant Secretary Enders:* No. If you like the detail, it is as follows.

The threshold for either a selective embargo or for a general embargo for the group as a whole is 7 percent. When there is a 7 percent shortfall, there would be a commitment to a 7 percent curtailment of oil consumption in all the countries, or in the case of a selective embargo which would not require such a general curtailment of demand, an equivalent sharing mechanism and commitment.

The next trigger level is at 12 percent. When the shortfall for the group as a whole is at 12 percent, there is a commitment to

take demand restraint measures at the 10 percent level. The idea is that one would also use some stocks in between to cover the shortfall.

There is a further general commitment that should the shortfalls exceed 12 percent the group would take the actions necessary to overcome the situation, including additional demand restraint as required.

*Q. Mr. Enders, is it the premise that an active and successful conservation program would eventually have an impact on driving down the price?*

*Assistant Secretary Enders:* I would put it the other way around, that if the price of oil remains at its present level there will be—there is already—such massive investment in alternative sources of energy that the market for imported oil from outside this group will, 10 years from now, be very small indeed.

A conservation effort would tend to result in a much more even progression of prices and demand. A major conservation effort here, I think, would convince the producers in much shorter order than they may otherwise be convinced that their present prices are unrealistic and unsustainable.

*Q. Is it possible to get specific at all about the dimensions of conservation approaches which were considered, or is this in a very generalized form? Is there any estimation of what is contemplated in terms, say, of cutback in gasoline consumption for automobiles or oil consumption for heating?*

*Assistant Secretary Enders:* Under this agreement?

*Q. Yes.*

*Assistant Secretary Enders:* The choice of conservation measures would have to be left to each country to do. On the other hand, the group as a whole would have to be satisfied that the measures that were available on a standby basis would be adequate.

Now, in the case of the United States there are two things to be said. One is that if the United States had to execute this agreement in the relatively near future it would

have the authority in the Allocation Act and in other acts to do it—probably by creating a situation like the one that prevailed last winter, using gas lines as an informal, and often very inequitable, form of rationing.

Therefore we expect to be going to the Congress at a point, probably at the start of the next session but conceivably later this year, to propose a broad set of standby authorities in demand restraint which might include a spectrum of things ranging from allocation authority, changes in such demand restraint measures as speed limits, thermostat regulation—a whole series of administrative measures of this kind—through to emergency tax measures and rationing to give the administration the kind of broad standby authority to achieve these goals on what we would regard as a more equitable basis than could be done at present.

*Q. Is all this in the law now, this authority for allocation?*

*Assistant Secretary Enders:* The allocation authority is there now.

*Q. Rationing?*

*Assistant Secretary Enders:* No. Or at least it's uncertain just how strong it is.

*Q. What is the likelihood of bringing France, and for that matter Japan as well, into this agreement?*

*Assistant Secretary Enders:* France has not participated in these talks. The French Government has not given us its studied, considered view on how it might relate to this work. We are still hopeful that sometime in the future France will join this effort. And I think that the transfer of this whole effort from a separate country grouping, the Energy Coordinating Group, toward the OECD may be helpful to France in coming in.

Let me note in this regard that a number of other countries have expressed an interest in this work—Australia, New Zealand, Spain, Switzerland, Sweden, Austria—so that we would expect that there will be at least several new members. It's not certain whether France will be among them yet.

As to Japan, again I don't want to pre-judge the Japanese decisionmaking processes, but certainly their attitude toward these negotiations, toward the conclusion, and toward the prospect has been very positive.

*Q. What about Norway?*

*Assistant Secretary Enders:* Norway. I would not, again, speak specifically to Norway. They have accepted this draft on the same ad referendum basis as other countries. Their position is formally no different from others.

I think we know that all foreign policy issues, and particularly all oil issues, have a particular importance—perhaps a particular delicacy—in Norway at this time. They will be in the process of making their decision in the course of the next month.

I don't think I should really comment on it more than that, other than to say that they are exactly at the same point in terms of negotiating as the other countries.

*Q. Mr. Enders, could you explain the sharing mechanism a bit further? It's unclear to me whether it would be triggered only in the case of a selective embargo so that there would be sharing of oil in the international marketplace or whether the oil to be shared would include oil produced from national resources for national uses; in other words, U.S. oil which does not normally go into the international marketplace.*

*Assistant Secretary Enders:* Oil to be shared would come from three sources: one, oil normally imported from outside the group into the group; secondly, oil drawn from stocks on an agreed basis; and thirdly, all domestically produced oil.

*Q. And you have different percentage levels?*

*Assistant Secretary Enders:* For each?

*Q. For each.*

*Assistant Secretary Enders:* No, they are considered as a pool.

*Q. They are all as a pool?*

*Assistant Secretary Enders:* Yes, sir.

*Q. But as a realistic matter, at the lower shortfall percentages you would not be going into the third reservoir, would you? I mean that would be more or less taken up from the oil that's in the international marketplace, wouldn't it? In other words, at what level would you actually be getting to a point where a nation that no longer exports oil on a net basis, such as the United States, would have to start sharing some of that oil?*

*Assistant Secretary Enders:* Well, this would occur only in a very severe crisis, under the agreed arrangement.

*Q. Is there at present a set of percentage triggers that would move the group from one level?*

*Assistant Secretary Enders:* Only the ones that I have cited. In other words, oil is treated as one pool for the purposes of this agreement. There is no differentiation between domestically produced oil, imported oil, and oil drawn from stocks. And the triggers that are available are the ones that I have cited here—7 percent, 12 percent, the ones which are available.

Now, in point of fact, in the sort of crisis that we had last winter, then of course one would share available stocks and imported oil.

During a very severe crisis, if there were to be a total shutdown of OPEC [Organization of Petroleum Exporting Countries] production, then you would get some sharing of American oil.

*Q. It depends on the length of the crisis.*

*Assistant Secretary Enders:* It depends on the depth, too.

*Q. If there is a selective embargo, boycott, as against, say, two countries, as there was in October, then the other countries involved, ones engaged in the sharing of their oil, would obviously become exposed to retaliatory measures from the oil producers in the normal course of events?*

*Assistant Secretary Enders:* Oh, I think that is true. I think the selective embargo is

by nature a very aggressive act. And I think one of the important aspects of this is that it would provide group solidarity against that. I think that's a fundamental principle.

*Q. Besides group solidarity, I'm under the impression that the agreement doesn't contain anything in the way of joint consultation, negotiation, or contact with the producers. Why?*

*Assistant Secretary Enders:* Yes, it does.

*Q. It does?*

*Assistant Secretary Enders:* Yes, it does. A chapter of the agreement, one out of 10 chapters in the agreement, is devoted to the process of consultation with the producers. And it contains there a strong commitment to explore ways of developing the dialogue with producers.

I should add that there's another provision of it that I've overlooked, and that is that the international oil companies—and that includes not only the majors but major national oil companies—are to provide to this new organization a range of information on their activities including their pricing and financial structure, which are important matters of national policymaking.

*Q. Well, could you clarify that point? Does it specifically provide for consultation by the consuming nations on oil pricing per se?*

*Assistant Secretary Enders:* No, it does not provide for consultation on oil pricing per se. The language is more broadly drawn.

*Q. Mr. Enders, on a question of the stockpile provisions—*

*Assistant Secretary Enders:* Yes.

*Q. —in terms of available supplies right now, how long would current stockpiles last? And, also, how long would it take—*

*Assistant Secretary Enders:* It depends on how deep the cut is.

*Q. —how long would it take to build up stockpiles so that they'd last for 90 days?*

*Assistant Secretary Enders:* It's very dif-

ficult to answer those questions in the abstract, because it depends on what kind of a cut you have. But I think you can get some idea from the following.

A few Europeans have 75 days of stocks; most have closer to 60 days of true emergency stocks, or maybe even less. The Japanese have 60 days of stocks at the present time, but how much of those are pure emergency stocks in the sense that they could be withdrawn and used without the system breaking down in the sense that there were major stock shortages throughout the economy is not entirely clear.

I think the important thing to say here is that there will be a substantial new demand for oil in order to build those stocks up to 90 days of true emergency stocks, and that will take probably several years.

*Q. How large is the U.S. stock?*

*Assistant Secretary Enders:* On this basis, we think that overall U.S. stocks are currently about 110 days of imports. However, the true emergency element in that is substantially smaller. I can't give you a specific figure; but it is definitely less.

*Q. Because of domestic production?*

*Assistant Secretary Enders:* Well, of course, the fact that we have domestic production means that we haven't carried emergency stocks in the same way other countries have.

On the other hand, there is a complicated engineering matter we still haven't got a clear fix on, as to just where the collapse point is of the system. Once we can identify that, we can answer this kind of question for the group as a whole.

*Q. Is this in the case of the 90-day stocks?*

*Assistant Secretary Enders:* In the case of individual countries, that is again a matter that has to be determined for each country.

*Q. In our case, would it be government stocks or would it be oil company stocks?*

*Assistant Secretary Enders:* That is a matter in which we have yet to make a proposal.



That would be included in our legislative package for this fall.

*Q. In practical terms, you mean it's unclear whether the naval petroleum reserves would be counted. Is that what you're saying?*

*Assistant Secretary Enders:* No. There's another detail of it that I've not mentioned. And that is that standby production can be counted against these stock totals under the terms of the agreement on a basis which has been agreed—a rather complicated formula—which takes account both of the lag in bringing in standby production in the course of a crisis and of the fact that of course standby production will last you much longer than stocks will. So that standby production for a country like the United States—Norway, prospectively—Great Britain, Canada—surely can count against the stock total.

*Q. If it takes several years, as I understood you to say, to build up to the 90-day stocks in most countries, doesn't that also mean that it will be several years before the useful impact of this plan is felt?*

*Assistant Secretary Enders:* Before its full impact is felt—yes.

The question of how rapidly you go up on stocks is a question of what the price impact would be. Obviously, a major new demand for oil in the world at the present time, at a time when the OPEC countries are making an effort to sustain a price that is threatened by an incipient surplus, would tend to have a price-strengthening effect—which is not desired, surely, by the consumers. Therefore we would expect that the stockpiling would occur over a certain length of time.

*Q. Is this agreement in itself subject to Senate confirmation?*

*Assistant Secretary Enders:* What we have told our contacts on the Hill is that given the fact that a broad program of legislation would, we think, be desirable and required to put it into effect, we have proposed that the agreement itself be an executive agreement—and of course it would be submitted

to lay before the Congress in the normal manner—and then we'd come in with a package of implementing legislation which would be acted on in a normal way.

*Q. Do your contacts on the Hill understand that the implementing legislation perhaps would involve rationing authority and tax changes?*

*Assistant Secretary Enders:* Yes, they do.

*Q. And they're favorable to them?*

*Assistant Secretary Enders:* Well, in principle. They obviously are going to look very closely at the package that comes up, and nobody in advance of an agreement of this kind is going to commit himself.

This is why we have had extensive consultations so far, and will again have, before going back and committing ourselves by initialing. Then we would envisage the further legislative process.

Let me say that in this regard, though, I think a great many people on the Hill, in the public—as well as in the administration—feel that we ought to be doing something about this problem. And I think that the notion that we must diminish our vulnerability by means of this kind and by means of conservation is a very widely held view.

*Q. I'm not sure of the chronology. Are you going to go before Congress for the implementing legislation before you sign the agreement or what?*

*Assistant Secretary Enders:* No. I think, legally, the way this would be set up would be to have an initialing—which is, basically, a commitment in principle, or the equivalent, a political commitment rather than a legal commitment—sometime in the course of the fall. And then countries would be asked to submit a certification that they had undertaken all necessary ratification and had all necessary authority to execute the agreement within a certain time period.

*Q. Is this proposal intended to be discussed this coming weekend when France's Foreign [and Finance] Ministers are here?*

*Assistant Secretary Enders:* That's an interesting—sort of a backdoor—question on that! [Laughter.]

*Q. Really.*

*Assistant Secretary Enders:* I'm sorry that I really can't get into the question about a meeting this weekend—

*Q. Why?*

*Q. Well, there have already been public references that a meeting Saturday and Sunday will take place.*

*Assistant Secretary Enders:* —other than to say that such a meeting is being worked out. But as to whether it will in fact occur and how it's going to occur, what might happen— [laughter].

*Q. You referred to an agreement of 82 articles. What is the volume size of this agreement here? Is it something in 30–40 pages? I'm just trying to get an approximation of what it is.*

*Assistant Secretary Enders:* Well, I can't really tell, to tell you the truth, because I think each of the articles has been written on a separate page at this time.

*Q. Mr. Enders, what about the weight of the votes? How many votes does the United States have, for instance?*

*Assistant Secretary Enders:* Each country would have three votes under this proposal, and then 100 votes would be allocated to the group for oil consumption. And of that total, I think the United States has 51. So it makes the U.S. vote 54.

*Q. Mr. Enders, is there anything in this program in a broad, general sense that you think would help drive down the price of oil?*

*Assistant Secretary Enders:* The purpose of this program is, in the first instance, defensive. The oil crisis—oil embargoes of last winter—caught the industrial countries very much unprepared. And the result was an extraordinary increase in prices and a lot of political friction and competition among them.

The first objective of this agreement is to create a situation in which a new shortfall in oil could be handled by those countries without that extraordinary increase in prices, the competition, and the friction—to enable them to adjust to it in a rational manner, should it occur.

Beyond that, of course, this is an expression of the solidarity of the consuming countries and a first step toward their doing something about their basic energy predicament—about the fact that they are more vulnerable than they would wish to be, and they should be, to foreign imports.

But the next steps, as I think I said before, are in terms of changing the demand-supply balance, getting prices down. The next steps are the important ones.

*Q. I'd like to ask just a variation of a question I asked earlier in terms of a selective boycott or embargo. Wouldn't the net effect of this be that if a selective boycott were attempted, the countries imposing the boycott would be faced with the probability that there would have to be a general boycott against all these countries, or not, because of the sharing arrangement?*

*Assistant Secretary Enders:* Well, I think that what you say suggests that you can't have solidarity without facing up to that danger. In effect, what the solidarity means is that producing countries cannot target individual countries without expecting that their embargo will be offset by this solidarity; and it raises that possibility. As such, I would expect it to be some deterrent to action of that kind.

*Q. I'm not clear yet, Mr. Enders. You said something about the enabling legislation would go to Congress either later this year or early next year.*

*Assistant Secretary Enders:* That's right. A decision hasn't been made.

*Q. Could we properly report then the Ford administration is going to ask Congress for rationing authority either later this year or early next year?*

*Assistant Secretary Enders:* I use the word "rationing" as illustrative. We have not yet determined the kinds of authority we wish to have under the heading of demand restraint. There's a very broad range of possibilities. And one possibility for the Ford administration would be to ask for some standby authority in each of the categories I mentioned. Another, of course, would be to ask for some specific authority in a given situation.

Let me just repeat that certainly tax authority, standby authority to raise the prices of petroleum products—which would have a similar effect—administrative measures such as changing speed limits, limits on thermostat settings, as well as rationing, are all potential possibilities. And these would be on a standby basis.

*Q. I'm interested in the whole question of conservation and whether there is unanimity of view about the need to think seriously about it throughout the government. And my question is really based on the publicly expressed attitudes of the Secretary of the Treasury, who has been going around talking about oil surpluses and prices going down and "Don't worry too much about this, fellows. It will all go away." Now, are you speaking today for the whole government or for part of it?*

*Assistant Secretary Enders:* With all due respect, you've set up a strawman whom I can't recognize as the Secretary of the Treasury. I could not answer to that. For his views, you can ask him his views now. But they don't in my view, as I understand him, correspond to what you said.

As to the question of conservation, that clearly is one of the major items that must be included and which is under serious study

in Project Independence. I'm not attempting to prejudge what measures the administration will adopt to accomplish that goal; but I think its goal is very clear, has been very clear, from the start of Project Independence—that this must be a major part of reducing our dependence on imported oil.

## United States Extends Recognition to Republic of Guinea-Bissau

*Following is the text of a letter from President Ford sent on September 10 to Luis de Almeida Cabral, President of the Council of State of the Republic of Guinea-Bissau.*

DEAR MR. PRESIDENT: I am pleased to inform you that the United States Government extends recognition to the Republic of Guinea-Bissau. It is our hope, with your agreement, that diplomatic relations can be established between our countries.

We congratulate your leaders and their Portuguese colleagues on the wise statesmanship, patience and depth of vision they have demonstrated in their negotiations.

In extending the congratulations of my country, I speak for a people who share with the people of Guinea-Bissau the knowledge that hard-won individual liberty and independence can be preserved only by unremitting labor and great sacrifice.

In the coming days we wish to strengthen and multiply our bonds of friendship with the Government and people of Guinea-Bissau. I am confident of a future in which our two peoples shall work together in the cause of freedom, peace and the welfare of mankind.

GERALD R. FORD.

## President Leone of Italy Makes State Visit to the United States

*Giovanni Leone, President of the Italian Republic, made a state visit to the United States September 25-29. He met with President Ford and other government officials in Washington September 25-26. Following are an exchange of greetings between President Ford and President Leone at a welcoming ceremony on the South Lawn of the White House on September 25, their exchange of toasts at a dinner at the White House that evening, and an exchange of toasts between Secretary Kissinger and President Leone at a luncheon that day, together with the text of a joint statement issued September 26.*

### REMARKS AT WELCOMING CEREMONY

Weekly Compilation of Presidential Documents dated Sept. 30

#### President Ford

Mr. President, and ladies and gentlemen: Mr. President, I warmly welcome you to the United States of America. I warmly welcome you on behalf of all Americans who are deeply grateful for the gifts of genius and beauty your country has given to all mankind. On behalf of the millions and millions of Americans who are proud to claim Italy as their ancestral homeland, I welcome you with a very special family affection.

You, Mr. President, are an honored leader of one of America's truest allies. In the past three decades, America has been very, very proud to have been associated with Italy in your successful efforts to build a democratic industrial society. I assure you, Mr. President, of America's continued commitment to a stable, free, and democratic Italy.

I also wish to restate most emphatically our intention to work closely with your coun-

try in strengthening Atlantic cooperation and Atlantic security. I think we must all admit that the road will not be easy. The problems of inflation and of assuring equitable access to fairly priced resources, for example, threaten the stability of every economy and the welfare of people in developed as well as in developing countries alike. The very—very nature of these problems defies solution by unilateral measures.

Mr. President, I look forward to our discussions over the next two days. I am confident that our talks will contribute to our mutual efforts to secure peace for all nations of the world. There is no doubt that they will serve to reinforce the ties that have bound our friendship over the many years.

Mr. President, you are most welcome to America.

#### President Leone <sup>1</sup>

Mr. President: I thank you for the invitation that you extended to me immediately after taking over your high office as President of the United States of America, thus confirming an invitation I had received last year. Thank you for the warm welcome you have given me and for the kind words of welcome that you have just spoken.

It is a great honor for me to represent Italy on this official visit to this great country, which is striking in its vitality and creative capacity, which is in the vanguard of progress, which is strong in its democratic institutions which date back to the birth of a free nation.

And it is precisely to celebrate with just pride the birth of a free nation that you are

<sup>1</sup> President Leone spoke in Italian on all occasions.

about to celebrate the bicentennial of the Declaration of Independence, which also carries the signature of an Italian, Guglielmo Paca.

It is an historic and solemn document which prepared the Constitution of the United States of America, among whose inspirers may I recall with pride the name of a great Neapolitan lawyer, Gaetano Filangieri.

The relations between our two nations have deep and longstanding roots embodied by those millions of Italians who at all times in every capacity, with their work and their intelligence and their thought, have made substantial contribution to the well-being and progress of this country.

Those relations are sustained by our common dedication to the principles of democracy and freedom and to the cause for peace.

Our common efforts, within the purview of our respective possibilities, are aimed at a constant quest for peace. The Atlantic alliance is conceived and experienced by the United States, by Italy, and by all its members as an instrument for security and peace.

The commitment that Italy is pursuing with constancy, energy, and firmness is to achieve a unity that is not only economic but also political, so as to convey and channel the considerable resources of the old continent, in the light of its great traditions, to the service of the well-being of nations and the consolidation of peace. The work of détente that Italy, like the United States and other countries, has been pursuing for years with constancy and firmness in close cooperation with its allies, knowing that we have the will of the peoples of the world behind us.

And it is in the same spirit that we think we must study and tackle the great economic problems which beset the world and the even greater problems posed by modern civilization, problems which affect very closely our social and private lives.

The vastness and urgency of the task and the importance of the resources that it requires are such as to call for a global answer resulting from the joint efforts of all.

I feel certain, Mr. President, that our talks

will consolidate the friendship between the people of America and of Italy and that they will develop our already excellent relations.

And I should like to extend to you also, on behalf of the Italian Government represented here by our Foreign Minister Signor Moro, my warmest greetings and my good wishes to you for your Presidency, and I should like also to extend those greetings on behalf of my wife to Mrs. Ford and to your children.

And in conclusion, Mr. President, it is with great pride that I bring the fraternal greetings of the people of Italy to the great and generous people of the United States of America.

## TOASTS AT WHITE HOUSE DINNER

Weekly Compilation of Presidential Documents dated Sept. 30

### President Ford

Mr. President: It is wonderful to have you and Mrs. Leone and your three sons with us this evening. As I said this morning at the time you came and joined us, the United States has a great debt of gratitude and a great sense of friendship for Italy because of the many, many people in this United States who have an ancestral background from Italy.

As I read and listen and look around our country, some 10 percent of our people have a background from Italy. We have superb artists, we have outstanding individuals in science, we have some very renowned athletes, we have many, many people in public life who have had a background from your country. And we are proud of them and their contributions to our country.

But I think, Mr. President, the broadest relationship that we have is what Italy has contributed to the United States, without personal identification, in the field—in those areas that one could describe as grace, humanity, tolerance, and an awareness of beauty.

We have a great American writer by the name of Mark Twain who once wrote—and he wasn't very complimentary to foreign-

ers—but one of his nicer moments, he wrote, “The Creator made Italy from the designs of Michelangelo.” And that was a nice comment. It was probably the best he ever made about any foreigners.

But to be serious, Mr. President, in all of the time that I had the privilege of serving in the Congress, the United States and Italy were building together. We were building in the process of reconstruction following the war. We were building in the process of Europe as a whole in the reconstruction period.

This 25-year span led, of course, to our alliance, where we have developed a friendship and an agreement for diplomatic, military, economic, and cultural expansion and reciprocity.

We dealt with Italy on a personal basis, and we have worked together in our relationships with our allies in Western Europe. And the net result has been a better relationship between us as people and our governments on behalf of our people.

But, Mr. President, it was a pleasure for me to meet you this morning and to be reassured of your willingness to talk in a frank and candid way about our mutual problems. And from one who spent a good share of his life in the political arena in the United States, I was greatly impressed with your wise statesmanship and your great knowledge of the problems in Europe and the rest of the world.

And so it was a privilege and a pleasure for me to meet you and to discuss these matters with you and to help in the process of building a better relationship between Italy and the United States.

And if I might, may I ask all of you to stand and join with me in a toast to the President of the Republic of Italy.

#### **President Leone**

For the second time today, Mr. President, I take my set speech and I set it aside. I am putting it back into my pocket because I want to speak from my heart. The set speech, the written paper, will remain. It will perhaps go

into the archives of state, but my speech will spring from my heart.

You, Mr. President, have said some very nice things about me and about my country. Now, the things you said about me, I am sure, were totally undeserved, and they merely stemmed from your very great kindness. But what you said about my country makes me very proud indeed.

You recalled the contribution that Italy has made to arts and to civilization. We present this heritage to you, which is the heritage of centuries. We present it to you as our friendly ally, not with pride—which might perhaps be justified—but as a sort of visiting card for you to understand us better.

Italy has inherited the greatest legal tradition of all times and Italy is the mistress of the arts. It can therefore only pursue ideals of democracy and freedom for all. And what other nation can better support us in these ideals than the United States.

Your Constitution, Mr. President, the first written constitution that ever existed, has laid the foundations of the free world. And we are making this visit to this great country with the Foreign Minister, Mr. Moro, who is an authoritative representative of my government, to reassert four things.

The first is the faithful, loyal, and constant friendship between our two nations, which is based, as you said, in part also on our common ancestry.

The second point is the Atlantic alliance. That is the second point we want to reassert. As I said this morning, it is seen by Italy, by the United States, and by all the member countries, as an instrument for détente and peace.

And we want to reassert, thirdly, our firm belief in the need to build a united Europe which will be complementary to the Atlantic alliance and which will not be against America, but with the United States of America.

And, fourthly, we want to tell you how very much we support your policy of détente, in which you have the great cooperation of your Secretary of State, which policy of détente expresses the will of the peoples

of the world that thirst for peace and justice.

Now, if these four points are confirmed—and they have already been confirmed indeed by our talks this morning with you, Mr. President, and this afternoon with your Secretary of State, and I am sure they will be reconfirmed again in the meeting you were kind enough to arrange with me tomorrow—if they are reconfirmed, Mr. President, then I can only say that I thank God for allowing me to represent Italy in this great country.

And, Mr. President, you were good enough to extend your greetings to my whole family, and this is somewhat unusual, because in Italy we tend to hide our families away. And I have broken away from this tradition; I have brought my wife and children with me to present to you a typical Italian family, one that is a sound family, that is respectful of moral values, and that is united.

Mr. President, may I take this opportunity to say how satisfied I am with the talks that we have had and how very glad I am that you have accepted my invitation to come and visit us in Italy. This has already made a favorable impression outside.

And I hope that the burden that is now weighing on your shoulders—but you have very square shoulders, indeed; I know that you are an athlete; I am not referring only to your physical strength—I hope that burden will yet give you some time to come to Italy where I can assure you of a very warm and affectionate welcome from the people of my country. And I hope that Mrs. Ford will be able to come with you.

And so I say to you, God bless you. And I invoke the blessings of God upon you as I do upon my own family.

And so I want to say now, thank you to the United States of America, and thank you very much for the music that you provided tonight. It was a touch of sentiment that I very much appreciated. I appreciated the Neapolitan song that was played.

I told you, Mr. President, in our private talk that Naples is my hometown. It is very beautiful, generous, and poor. And many parts of Italy are poor, and that causes us

some concern. I am mentioning this not with cup in hand at all but merely as a matter of interest.

And so now, Mr. President, ladies and gentlemen, I give you the toast: The health and prosperity of President Ford and his family, and the success and well-being of the people of America, and the consolidated friendship of the peoples of Italy and the United States of America.

#### **TOASTS AT LUNCHEON HOSTED BY SECRETARY KISSINGER**

Press release 378 dated September 26

#### **Secretary Kissinger**

Mrs. Leone, ladies and gentlemen: I speak here with some nervousness, not only because of the natural timidity which you all so frequently have seen in me, but also because I know I'm going to be followed by one of the great orators that I am familiar with. So if I prolong my remarks, it is to postpone the moment of truth. [Laughter.]

Mr. President, you are here at a time when many American institutions are under attack. But there is one American institution that seems to survive all trials, and that is your Ambassador to the United States. [Laughter.] I have had occasion at the lunch you so kindly arranged for me at the Quirinale to see whether my requirement to report to him could be reduced from twice to once a week, and I want to say that of course I'm delighted to report to him regularly, but I wonder whether it is really required that he gives a grade to my secretary as he leaves the office. [Laughter.]

Mr. President and Mrs. Leone, it is always a great joy to meet with you. You represent a country that has grown wise with many battles fought on its soil and skeptical with many ideas that proved to be not all that were presented—but also grown profound by the knowledge that ultimately everything depends on the quality of human relations. So we deal with you not only as political but as personal friends.

We have often spoken about the interdependence of the modern world. There is no country in Europe and few countries in the world which have experienced at such close hand the difficulties and the opportunities of the contemporary period. Italy is a country which has prospered enormously since the war, despite the absence of natural resources, because of the diligence of its population and the inventiveness of its leadership. In recent months, as a result of circumstances outside the control of Italy, many of these conditions have changed, and Italy faces economic difficulty. When Italy's friends, therefore, attempt to work out cooperative arrangements, it is not something that they do for Italy; it is something they do for themselves and for the structure of the modern world. It is no longer possible to conduct affairs on a national basis. It is a duty for all nations to attempt to face the fact that we are living in a period of enormous transformations of the nature of the economy, of the nature of political relations, and we in the West cannot possibly cope with our problems unless we develop a new feeling of creativity and a new spirit of cooperation.

That spirit always has existed in the relationship between Italy and the United States, and in all the great issues that confront us we have seen matters very much alike. We have supported Italy's participation in a united Europe because we in turn knew that Italy's attitude toward the United States would make such a Europe—if it depended on Italy—a partner and a friend of the United States. Our guest today has played a very noble role in these efforts.

Beyond all the political and economic matters that concern us, there is a very important gift that Italy has bestowed on all of its friends. We hear so much about the danger of conformity in the modern world and the loss of individualism. But who can speak of a lack of individualism in Italy? And whatever problems Italy has, conformity happily isn't one of them.

And so we welcome you, Mr. President and

Mrs. Leone, as old associates, as friends in the field of politics, and as personal friends. I'd like to propose a toast to President and Mrs. Leone, to the friendship of Italy and the United States.

#### President Leone

Dr. Kissinger has set a trap for me. He sent me a beautiful speech in which he even quoted Cicero, in the hope that I would follow the written outline that he'd prepared. And that is what we call in English a dirty trick; in Neapolitan we say "priest's trick." [Laughter.] So I'm going to counter that by setting aside my written speech, and fully respecting the political outline, the political policy, and guidelines of the Italian Government, which is authoritatively represented here by its Foreign Minister, Signor Moro, I shall now ad lib.

First of all, Mr. Secretary, I should like to thank you very much for the cordial invitation that you extended to me to come to this luncheon, which is attended by exponents of the U.S. political, economic, and journalistic worlds and also by my delegation and by some outstanding Italian representatives of the press. I should like to take this opportunity to thank you very much for your words of praise for our Ambassador, Signor Ortona. You had already told me how much you appreciated him in Rome, and I'm only sorry that I cannot vote on the retirement law now. I would like to do it at once so as to have Mr. Ortona at home.

Also, on behalf of the Foreign Minister of Italy, I would like to say how much we appreciate the work that has been done by your Ambassador, Mr. Volpe, who succeeds in combining a complete and untiring dedication to the interests of the United States with his affection for the country that his family came from originally. So I want to salute him here as a servant of the United States in his capital city and to thank him for what he does to further Italian-American relations.

Mr. Secretary, I agree with all that you



have just said. First of all, I share your global view of the economic drama that is being enacted on the world stage now and that we might consider to be a Biblical scourge that has hit humanity. There is, as you said, even more than ever before a great need for international cooperation and solidarity shown to the weaker nations by those nations that are privileged either because of their geographical position or because of their natural resources. Italy's most vital interests are at stake.

But it is not only of that that I want to speak now but also of the human solidarity that you are displaying. We have a poet in Italy who said that the life of man is mystery and only he who aids his brothers makes no mistake. This human solidarity, this realization, this understanding of the need for global cooperation, was expressed not only by you, Mr. Secretary, but by the President of the United States. I am happy to turn my thoughts to him now.

In any global vision of human affairs there are certain details, some more particular aspects that must be considered and which we are here to emphasize before you. They need your understanding, and it is in that spirit that we have come here. We have come here to reassert a century-old friendship with your country. We have only looked at each other in enmity across the ocean once in the course of history in the cause of the war that the Italian nation neither wanted nor decided. Our friendship was then reconfirmed in the Atlantic alliance, which was then reasserted in the Ottawa Declaration. As I said this morning, we consider that alliance to be an instrument of security, détente, and peace.

But there is a second aspect involved in the Atlantic alliance, and that is solidarity from the economic point of view. As I said this morning to President Ford, we in Italy are well aware of the need for European unity to foster the well-being of the peoples of Europe, many of which provided you with many of your ancestors. You here who have

originated from Europe, many of you, represent a seed of culture and civilization which must be safeguarded. The Ottawa Declaration showed that European unity can be complementary to the Atlantic alliance.

We have also come here, Mr. Secretary, to show you the true face of Italy. We thank you for saying so openly, so unreservedly, that you recognize that our problems were not generated entirely by ourselves. After all, Italy is a country which only 25 years ago lived on an outmoded and obsolete form of agriculture. A hundred years ago our best people used to come to the United States, seeking for jobs. Then there was the economic miracle, but we hardly dare speak of that nowadays; that's all over because Italy has been affected by the economic hurricane that has swept through the world. Now, we recognize, of course, that we have made mistakes, that there are shortcomings on our part, and we must be the first to put our house in order. We have taken at home what many considered to be extremely stringent measures to try and do that.

But Italy is here to say to you that it does not want to hide its difficulties; and through its President, it wants to say to you that it feels its difficulties can be overcome if Italy can be certain of the staunch support of the great nations of this world.

You said, Mr. Secretary, that the United States of America, this great and generous country, is prepared to look with sympathy on our problems. And so I say to you, we shall overcome. I should like to express to you here, Mr. Secretary, my personal friendship and also for Mrs. Kissinger. Unfortunately, I shall be away when you come to Rome, but one of these days I hope to welcome you there again.

I should like now to thank all of the American guests who are here for having attended this luncheon. I give you the toast to the President of the United States, the well-being of your country, and the friendship between the United States of America and Italy.

## TEXT OF U.S.-ITALIAN JOINT STATEMENT

President Giovanni Leone of Italy made a State visit to the United States of America September 25-29, 1974, at the invitation of President Gerald R. Ford of the United States of America. Accompanying the President were Mrs. Leone, Minister of Foreign Affairs Aldo Moro, and other Italian officials.

During the visit, President Leone and President Ford held extensive and cordial discussions on a wide variety of international questions in which Minister of Foreign Affairs Aldo Moro and Secretary of State and Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs Henry A. Kissinger participated. Minister Moro and Secretary Kissinger also held detailed talks on current issues of mutual interest.

President Ford and President Leone expressed their mutual satisfaction with the results of the talks. It was agreed that frequent consultations in the spirit of the Atlantic Declaration signed in Brussels on June 26 were a most desirable means of achieving better understanding of problems of common interest and possible solutions.<sup>2</sup> They were in full agreement that such consultations should in no way prejudice other existing obligations. As a result of their exchanges of views, the two Presidents noted the broad agreement between them with respect to their policies in numerous areas:

1. They noted that their policies will continue to be guided by their desire for the maintenance of peace, adherence to the principles of the United Nations Charter, and promotion of a stable structure of peace which reflects the diverse nature and needs of the nations of the world. In this connection, both sides emphasized their commitment to overcoming the sources of tension and conflict which are divisive factors in the international community.

2. There was full agreement on the importance of the North Atlantic Alliance as an instrument which has guaranteed the security of its members, strengthened international stability, enhanced confidence among peoples, and thus has permitted them growing and fertile contacts with all the peoples of the world and provided the indispensable basis for the process of détente.

3. They reemphasized in this connection the importance they attach to the Atlantic Declaration and their determination to seek the fulfillment of the principles set forth in the Declaration in concert with their other NATO allies. President Ford underlined the importance the United States attaches to

<sup>2</sup> For text of the Declaration on Atlantic Relations adopted by the North Atlantic Council in ministerial session at Ottawa on June 19 and signed by NATO heads of government at Brussels on June 26, see BULLETIN of July 8, 1974, p. 42.

Italy's continuing valuable contributions to the Alliance.

4. They recognized the importance attached by the Nine members of the European Community to their efforts toward European union, and welcomed the reciprocal undertaking by the members of the Community and the United States to strengthen their relations on the basis of enhanced consultations within the broad framework of Atlantic cooperation. President Ford welcomed particularly the constructive role played by Italy in strengthening this cooperation.

5. They noted their determination that current negotiations in furtherance of détente on matters related to security and cooperation in Europe must result in enhanced stability in the relationships among all nations concerned. They also emphasized their continuing commitment to achieving balanced and effective international arms control agreements resulting in undiminished security for all nations.

6. They noted their concern with developments in the Mediterranean Basin and pledged their efforts to achieve equitable solutions. The United States noted in this connection that it looks to Italy, as a Mediterranean nation which has made a signal contribution to world civilization, to play a leading role in the common pursuit of lasting peace in that area.

7. They expressed their conviction that only international cooperative efforts can overcome the trade and financial problems confronting the nations of the world. They recognized that the solutions to national problems have their impact on the international community as a whole. While individual nations have primary responsibility for their own problems, the two Presidents recognize that the solutions required in a modern and complex interdependent world may go far beyond individual capabilities and require cooperation among members of the international community. In this regard, the United States has taken careful note of Italy's major efforts to meet its own domestic economic and financial problems and the responsiveness of the international community to these efforts. President Ford stated that the United States is prepared to play an appropriate, constructive and responsible role in a return to economic equilibrium in Italy.

8. They recognized the great importance of industrial, technical, and cultural cooperation among all nations and the imperative need for the equitable distribution of world resources among all nations. They agreed to facilitate initiatives in this regard in appropriate forums.

9. Finally, the two Presidents particularly noted the extraordinarily broad human ties between Italy and the United States of America, and the shared values and goals which bind together the Italian and American peoples.

10. President Leone extended to President Ford an invitation to visit Italy in the near future. President Ford accepted with pleasure.

## Dinner at the National Gallery Honors French Foreign Minister

*Following is an exchange of toasts between Secretary Kissinger and Jean Sauvagnargues, Minister of Foreign Affairs of the French Republic, at a dinner at the National Gallery of Art at Washington on September 27.*

Press release 383 dated September 30

### SECRETARY KISSINGER

Mr. Foreign Minister, Madame Sauvagnargues, ladies and gentlemen: My staff had prepared some remarks for me of really devastating profundity but impossible to read by candlelight. So I will have to improvise a few remarks. [Laughter.]

As I was sitting at the table I thought of a reception I attended this afternoon. I was invited to a retirement party, and having read the New York Times for the last few weeks, I thought perhaps something had happened that I hadn't been officially informed of yet. So on the one hand I was reassured when I came to the reception to find out it was a retirement for Senator Fulbright. But on the other [hand] I was extremely sad. And I reflected about the special role that Senator Fulbright has played in our national life.

It occurred to me that the relationship that France has had with the United States has some similarity to the relationship that Senator Fulbright has had with the State Department. [Laughter.] There have been occasional criticisms, all the more irritating because they usually turned out to be right. But there also has been at the basis of the relationship an understanding that real friends are meaningful only if they have opinions of their own.

The great problem of our contemporary world is to know how much unity we need and how much diversity we can stand. In a period of great revolutionary change, there is the great danger on the one hand that

countries may lose their identity but on the other hand the problem, the danger, that one may not be able to find the basis for cooperative effort.

In the last year the United States and France have had some different perspectives. But on our side—and I know on the side of France as well—we have always understood that we belong to the same family and that we have common interests. We respect France's efforts to build Europe as a contribution to the cooperation on a larger scale that is an inevitable requirement of the present world. And we understand, too, that the insistence on achieving one's own identity can in the long run provide the basis for the best form of cooperation.

Foreign Minister Sauvagnargues and I have known each other only for a few months. In that period, I believe I can say that many of the misunderstandings have been worked out and also that we are meeting tomorrow to look at one of the deepest problems that faces the world today, the problem of achieving a cooperative approach to the big alteration in economic relationships that threatens to engulf us all. On our side, we are confident that France, in the position of leadership of Europe to which its history entitles it and in cooperation with the United States, will continue to play the role of a good friend, occasional critic, but always a steady partner.

We are delighted that we can welcome Foreign Minister Sauvagnargues, and Madame Sauvagnargues on her first visit to Washington. I would like to propose a toast to the Foreign Minister and to the friendship between the United States and France.

### FOREIGN MINISTER SAUVAGNARGUES

Mr. Secretary, Mrs. Kissinger, ladies and gentlemen: I am, of course, rather overwhelmed by this grand reception by this gathering of what's best in Washington [in] politics, science, arts, press, and even outer space. I can hardly find words, so I choose English because I've found in my

experience that when you are at a loss to say anything you must choose English. That doesn't mean that I won't say anything now; I'll try, although I just read [in] the Herald Tribune a nice anecdote about the head of government who suddenly found he had nothing to say to the United Nations and so said he would renounce his address, and of course the Foreign Minister had to speak for him. [Laughter.]

This doesn't mean that foreign ministers don't have anything to say, because the Secretary of State just told us fundamental things about the relations between the United States and France. And he told them with the simple words, without high-flown rhetoric, without any rhetoric as is apt to that kind of subject. That is also the lesson which is taught us by another messenger from France, the picture of the Magdalen de la Tour—a picture, I think, which we shall see a few minutes from now.<sup>1</sup>

Of course the relations between France and the United States is something that, when you talk about them you tend to invoke Lafayette, two-centuries-old traditions, et cetera. This is true, but it's also sort of engrained habit, and it's sort of family sentiment—a sort of belonging together, a sort of deeply engrained trust and confidence in each other which permits big fights and big quarrels as in families where quarrels are at their bitterest and yet the feeling of togetherness is not touched.

In our relations we had and we may still have—although if it's up to Secretary of State Kissinger and myself it won't happen—artificial quarrels. Thank God, they have been disposed of, and now we are faced with the real problems, and these real problems are bad enough. They are bad enough.

We are facing, as you said, Mr. Secretary,

<sup>1</sup>“The Repentant Magdalen,” by Georges de la Tour was acquired by the National Gallery on Sept. 26.

revolutionary times; the balance of the world has been deeply disturbed and disturbed for a long time to come. We will have to adjust to a new set of things, to this reshuffle of cards, where the industrialized nations will have to live up to the fact that they got poorer and they'll have to tighten their belts somehow. So that speaks for, certainly, for solidarity, even if it doesn't speak for confrontation, and on that I know you are in full agreement, Mr. Secretary, contrary to what the New York Times had to report yesterday or the day before yesterday.

But let's not attack the press, because the press is a very important power in this country and also in mine. Let's only wish that the press could now make news of the very important news, which is that the Secretary of State of the United States and the Foreign Minister of France are not fighting with each other. [Laughter.]

Well, I won't go on much longer on that. I'm convinced that the working relationship we have established, Mr. Secretary, will enable our governments to work together more closely as they should and deal with the very complex problems that are facing us. And I trust that this mutual effort will lead to a good result.

I again want to express the thanks and the gratitude of my wife for this grand reception. It's really the first time since I became Foreign Minister of France that I do feel not only the burden of this office but also its honor and its advantages, its joys. I understand this is one of the first occasions where dinner is given in this National Gallery I knew very well 20 years ago in Washington—I haven't been here to 20 years, you see; it's like Alexander Dumas remarked: *vingt ans après*. But this is really, truly a grand occasion. I want to thank the Secretary of State and Mrs. Kissinger for that. We will cherish that memory.

I want to raise my glass to the Secretary of State and his wife.

## The Dilemma of Controlling the Spread of Nuclear Weapons While Promoting Peaceful Technology

*Address by Fred C. Iklé*

*Director, U.S. Arms Control and Disarmament Agency*<sup>1</sup>

The U.S. Congress and successive administrations have had to grapple with the control of nuclear technology for almost three decades. The essence of the difficulty lies in the dual nature of this technology. From the very beginning there have been high expectations concerning peaceful uses of the atom. If nuclear power served only destructive purposes, we would not have had the ambivalence that has bedeviled all our attempts to control the spread of nuclear technology.

It is as if mankind had been burdened with a Biblical curse. The fruit of the tree of knowledge—the great accomplishment of our nuclear scientists—holds both promise and threat; it can help keep alive our civilization and it can destroy it.

It is hardly surprising that, historically, our ways of dealing with the nuclear presence on earth have pulled in two inconsistent directions. We have tried by one means and then another to reconcile the dichotomy of nuclear power.

In November 1945, some three months after Hiroshima and Nagasaki, President Harry Truman set a policy for the United States when he joined the Prime Ministers of Great Britain and Canada in signing a declaration among the three powers whose nuclear scientists and resources had been united during the war to build the first atomic bombs. The declaration argued

against the disclosure of information even about “the practical industrial application of atomic energy” before an international system of control was set up.

The following year Bernard Baruch, President Truman’s representative, made the American proposal to the United Nations for which he is still remembered. It called for placing the nuclear resources of the world under the ownership and control of an independent international authority. That is to say, the Baruch plan provided for strict international control of all nuclear technology that might be diverted to destructive purposes. You doubtless know the rest of the story: The Soviet Union did not find this proposal acceptable, and it was subsequently learned that the Soviets had in fact been working on the development of an atomic bomb since the middle of World War II.

The first legislation passed by Congress to control the atom was in the spirit of the 1945 three-power declaration in that it placed major emphasis on maintaining nuclear secrecy. Ironically, it went so far in this direction as to terminate nuclear collaboration with the other two signers of the declaration, Canada and Great Britain.

The promotion of peaceful uses was thus relegated to a distinctly secondary position, while full attention was given to preventing the spread of nuclear-weapons technology. In 1951 the Atomic Energy Act was amended but not with a view to promoting peaceful uses. It was amended so that military nuclear information could be shared to

<sup>1</sup> Made before the Duke University Law Forum at Durham, N.C., on Sept. 18 (text from ACDA press release).

strengthen the North Atlantic alliance. In practical terms this meant nuclear assistance to Great Britain.

### The "Atoms for Peace" Program

Meanwhile, however, the potentialities for peaceful uses of atomic energy became increasingly evident, particularly the use of reactors for generating electric power. And as these new possibilities opened up, a new American policy began to take shape. In part it was a policy of exploiting the inevitable—or so it must have been viewed by its proponents—but it was clothed in very appealing language: The program was called "Atoms for Peace."

More importantly, the promotion of peaceful commercial uses had now come to be regarded as a means of actually exorcising the evil side of nuclear energy, of reversing the trend toward acquisition of nuclear weapons. In addition, we had a commercial interest in reactor exports. Possibly, too, we were eager to demonstrate to the world that the United States had let loose a benevolent genie, not an evil one.

In the hearings on this new program, held by the Joint Committee on Atomic Energy in 1954, Secretary Dulles said that knowledge in this field was developing in so much of the world that we could not hope to set up an effective "dam against the flow of information, and if we try to do it we will only dam our own influence and others will move into the field with the bargaining that that involves." In general, these crucial hearings showed a tolerant attitude toward the proliferation of nuclear technology, or so it would seem to us today. The resultant Atomic Energy Act of 1954 called for making available to cooperating nations the benefits of peaceful applications of atomic energy "as widely as expanding technology and considerations of the common defense and security would permit." The act authorized the Atomic Energy Commission to negotiate cooperation agreements without Senate approval.

Based on this act, the U.S. Government facilitated the participation of American in-

dustry in atomic power activities abroad. Eventually, 26 American research reactors were installed in other countries. We organized large conferences to transmit technical know-how. We licensed foreign firms to produce and sell our reactors. And we shipped materials abroad to help other countries move ahead in nuclear technology. For example, in 1955, with the encouragement of Congress, we sold 10 tons of heavy water to India for her research reactor. All told, we spent hundreds of millions of dollars on spreading nuclear technology abroad (exclusive of weapons assistance to our allies but including the interest subsidy on Export-Import Bank loans).

The Eisenhower administration also took practical steps to build an international institution that could facilitate cooperation in peaceful nuclear technology with safeguards against diversion for military purposes. In his "Atoms for Peace" address at the United Nations, President Eisenhower had proposed the creation of an international atomic energy organization; and notwithstanding early Soviet objections to this idea, it finally was carried out. In 1957, the International Atomic Energy Agency, with headquarters in Vienna, was established, and the U.S. Senate adopted a resolution approving its statute. Today, this Agency is a viable organization making a substantial contribution toward the separation of peaceful from military uses of nuclear technology.

From hindsight, we might regard this Agency and the network of international agreements supporting it as the quid pro quo that the United States obtained in exchange for its very generous—perhaps overly generous—assistance in nuclear technology to a great many countries throughout the world.

### The Problem of Peaceful Nuclear Explosives

In the 1960's Congress maintained its interest in the peaceful application of nuclear technology. But now it showed renewed concern with the risk of spreading weapons technology. It took initiatives of its own to pave the way for the Nonproliferation

Treaty of 1968. Particularly important was the Pastore resolution in 1966, urging the government to negotiate a nonproliferation agreement.

As for the Nonproliferation Treaty itself, although there have been, and continue to be, some important holdout countries, the fact remains that it has been a successful arms control measure. Eighty-three countries have ratified it, another 23 have signed it, and there are prospects for additional adherences in the not too distant future.

This treaty obligates all parties not to facilitate the acquisition of nuclear explosives—whether called bombs or peaceful devices—by countries not possessing nuclear weapons. This obligation implies that the transfer of materials and know-how ought to be controlled or curtailed. At the same time, the treaty obligates the nuclear-weapons states that are party to it to provide assistance to all other parties on peaceful nuclear technology, including explosives for peaceful purposes. Thus this legal instrument incorporates the very dilemma that has troubled international control of nuclear technology from the first day.

The idea of using nuclear explosives for peaceful purposes has been around for some time. As early as 1949, after the first Soviet nuclear test, Andrei Vyshinsky told the United Nations that the Soviet purpose in developing nuclear explosives was to “blow up mountains and change the course of rivers.” Little was heard of this idea until the mid-1950’s, when American scientists promoted the Plowshare program—the use of nuclear devices for excavation. Thereafter the United States stressed the possible benefits of this technology, while the Soviet Union had turned skeptical. The program found considerable support in Congress in the 1960’s. But the American interest in peaceful nuclear explosives has since declined, and this year Congress explicitly prohibited the use of energy R&D funds for field testing such explosives. Now, in the meantime, some nuclear experts in the Soviet Union have become eager about exploring this technology. Hence it was at Soviet in-

sistence that the recent Threshold Test Ban Treaty left open the question of peaceful explosives for subsequent negotiations.

How can one distinguish “peaceful” from “military” explosives? The U.S. Government has gone on record many times to insist that the technology of making nuclear explosives for peaceful purposes is indistinguishable from the technology of making nuclear weapons.

The Indian explosion dramatized this dilemma. In the wake of the Indian explosion and the subsequent U.S. offer to sell nuclear reactors to Egypt and Israel, there has been very intense congressional interest in the problem of nonproliferation, as is evidenced by the number of bills and resolutions which have been generated. Of two bills providing for more stringent requirements in nuclear cooperation agreements and increased control by Congress, one has already been signed into law this year, and the other has been through conference; and a series of other bills, in somewhat similar vein, has been under consideration.

#### **Avoidance of Further Proliferation**

Turning now to the future prospects, I would stress to this audience that the avoidance of further nuclear proliferation is increasingly a matter of political restraint, which has to be reinforced by laws. The technical barriers to nuclear proliferation are gradually crumbling; and while export controls are now helpful and even essential, we have to assume that their effectiveness will diminish in the years ahead. Hence, the only dike to hold back the flood is the political self-interest of sovereign countries. And the political inhibitions can be greatly reinforced through international legal instruments—treaties and agreements—that will spell out and codify the mutual obligations.

Whether or not a country turns to nuclear weapons depends, of course, on a combination of capability and intent. Capability is governed by two factors: access to nuclear explosion technology, the principles of which are widely known, and access to nuclear

materials such as plutonium or enriched uranium, over which there are some controls.

In the matter of nuclear fuels, it has been widely assumed that a country wishing to take the nuclear-weapons road would use plutonium, which is produced as a byproduct in electric power reactors and can then be reprocessed into plutonium usable for nuclear explosives. There is, however, another possibility—that of enriching uranium. A relatively new technique, using centrifuges, may make this a more feasible route. The centrifuge process has proven to be effective, although the economics are not yet proven. A centrifuge plant is much smaller and less visible than the huge gaseous diffusion plant that we have used to enrich uranium in large quantities. Finally, we hear about a new possibility, involving the use of lasers to enrich uranium.

It is apparent that several of the industrial countries, like West Germany, Italy, Japan, and Canada, could produce nuclear arsenals of great power within a relatively short time. These countries with the greatest capabilities have taken clear political action, however, to indicate that they do not intend to pursue that course, by signing or ratifying the Nonproliferation Treaty and in other statements of their policies.

What is the United States doing to prevent the further spread of nuclear weapons? First of all, we are strong supporters of the International Atomic Energy Agency in the application of its safeguards inspection program, which seeks to prevent the diversion of nuclear fuels from peaceful uses to weapons manufacture. We give them technical advice and help them in devising instrumentation to make their safeguards more effective. We also use our influence in the Agency to make its agreements with other countries as effective as possible.

On the diplomatic front, we are naturally talking to some countries which have not ratified the Nonproliferation Treaty, pointing out the advantages of their doing so.

We are also preparing for the Nonproliferation Treaty Review Conference called for by the treaty, to be held by the parties in

May 1975. The outcome of this conference could be important for the future of the treaty. It is very much to be hoped—and it seems possible—that by the time the review conference is held, a substantial portion of the key industrial states will be parties to the treaty. If this indeed happens and if the review conference evokes an impressive degree of solidarity among them in support of preferential treatment for treaty parties, then the Nonproliferation Treaty will be given a new lease on life. Like any international treaty, this one has to accord with the self-interest of the parties. For the countries that decided to forgo nuclear weapons, it is, in essence, a mutual pledge among many neighbors in many regions. It expresses the national self-interest of these countries not to initiate a nuclear arms competition at their doorstep.

There are a few lines of policy and emphasis which I would like to suggest:

—We should provide more money for the safeguards regime of the International Atomic Energy Agency. I think Congress would now be receptive to this idea.

—More emphasis should also be placed on measures of physical security against theft and sabotage. We have already briefed Congress on this subject, in connection with our nuclear assistance agreements with Egypt and Israel. While physical security is inherently a national problem, the International Atomic Energy Agency can help in this respect by drawing up guidelines and insisting that agreements take physical security into account.

—There is an obvious relationship between what the United States and the Soviet Union do in restraining their “vertical proliferation” and the willingness of other countries to give up their own nuclear option. It is clearly important that the United States and the Soviet Union be able to demonstrate to these other countries that they can accomplish effective limitations and reductions in their massive nuclear arsenals.

—Many countries are now keenly interested in nuclear reactors, particularly since



the increase in the cost of oil. In responding to this interest, we can seek to encourage multinational cooperation so as to strengthen the acceptability and reliability of safeguards. Particularly, the processing of nuclear fuel can best be done in cooperative arrangements.

For the longer run, new efforts will be needed to cope with the worldwide diffusion of nuclear technology. We can slow down the spread of nuclear materials suitable for destructive purposes, but we cannot stop it. We can rely on international safeguards to help us detect diversion of material from peaceful uses to destructive ones, but we cannot rely on these safeguards to prevent such diversion altogether. We can give full support to the Nonproliferation Treaty, but we cannot expect this treaty to cover all countries or all the risks inherent in the spread of nuclear technology.

Thus, within a decade or two, nuclear explosives might be acquired by a much larger number of governments than today—even by subnational groups. Our strategic forces, on which we now rely to deter deliberate attack from a major nuclear power, are not designed to protect the security of the United States in such a world. A more diffused availability of nuclear explosives could lead to terrifying threats against the American people or disastrous destruction in our country. At such a time, the pressures on Congress and the administration for the most drastic action would be enormous.

Preventing a new dark age of unprecedented violence will depend on the determination and foresight we show today. We must not become disheartened. Our government had the courage to propose the Baruch plan; it had the vision to create the International Atomic Energy Agency; it had the farsightedness to promote the Nonproliferation Treaty. There seems no reason why we should not be able to create the additional international institutions and to advance the necessary arms control measures which will enable us to live in a world of widespread nuclear technology.

## 1973 Report on U.S. Participation in the U.N. Transmitted to Congress

*Message From President Ford*<sup>1</sup>

*To the Congress of the United States:*

I am pleased to send to the Congress the 28th annual report on United States participation in the work of the United Nations.

This report, covering Calendar Year 1973, encompasses the wide range of activities carried on by the United Nations and its subsidiary organizations. It demonstrates the growing conviction of United Nations members that many problems of international concern are best resolved through multilateral action, utilizing the machinery of mature international institutions.

In the fall of 1973 the United Nations demonstrated once again its ability to foster peace by the crucial role it played in the Middle East. Following the outbreak of war, the Security Council arranged a ceasefire and deployed United Nations troops to supervise disengagement agreements between Israel and Egypt and, later, between Israel and Syria. We cannot know what might have happened in the absence of such United Nations action. However, it is clear that the efforts of the United Nations, combined with bilateral diplomacy, are still crucial to promoting a just and lasting settlement of the Middle East dispute.

One area of increasing concern is the production and distribution of adequate supplies of food. Our concern with feeding the world can no longer be limited to relief activities in aid of victims of natural disasters. Population growth and better living standards have increased the total demand for food which in turn has increased the demand for energy sources and fertilizer. The pressure of these interlocking demands has pushed against limited supplies and caused spiraling prices. This is a worldwide problem requiring world-

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<sup>1</sup> Transmitted on Sept. 19 (text from White House press release); also printed as H. Doc. 93-360, 93d Cong., 2d sess., which includes the text of the report.

wide action for its solution. Secretary Kissinger proposed to the United Nations General Assembly in September 1973 that the organization sponsor a World Food Conference. The General Assembly acted favorably on this proposal and the Conference will be held in Rome in November 1974. The United States also took an active participation in the preparation for the first United Nations Conference on World Population, convened in Bucharest in August 1974.

The Third United Nations Conference on the Law of the Sea, which convened an organizational session in December 1973, is another example of how the United Nations can be utilized to attack contemporary world problems. The goal of the Law of the Sea Conference is a comprehensive international convention to govern man's use of the oceans. We need new understandings to govern international navigation, rational management of the ocean's living and non-living resources, and the protection of the life-sustaining processes of the marine environment. Success in the efforts to resolve conflicting claims over ocean jurisdiction would remove a major and growing source of conflict from the international arena.

The regular economic and social activities of the United Nations' family of organizations continued to absorb over 90 percent of its funds and personnel during 1973. In addition to the traditional operational programs, many special conferences during the year provided opportunities for nations to enlarge their understanding of and work toward consensus on such major international economic and social issues as development assistance, the role of multinational corporations, commodity agreements, and the economic rights and duties of states. Perhaps the most important series of negotiations were those held to carry out the first biennial review and appraisal of the progress toward the goals of the Second United Nations Development Decade. In these negotiations delegations from all parts of the world worked for months to formulate a report that refined the broad measures necessary to improve the world's economic and social situation. The United

States played a leading role in these negotiations.

Unfortunately, not all international problems dealt with by the United Nations were successfully approached in 1973. For example, it is generally believed in the United States that terrorism against innocent third parties, including the hijacking of aircraft, is a matter of international concern that calls for international solutions. The divergence of political views among member states, however, has made it impossible to agree on either a general definition of terrorism or a remedy for it. Despite the limit thus placed on the effectiveness of the United Nations forum in dealing with the problem, a start was made in 1973 with the adoption by the General Assembly of the Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of Crimes Against Internationally Protected Persons, Including Diplomatic Agents. On the other hand, neither the International Conference on Air Law nor the Assembly of the International Civil Aviation Organization, which met simultaneously, made progress on measures to improve security for aircraft passengers.

An important part of the United Nations record in 1973 was the admission to membership of the Federal Republic of Germany, the German Democratic Republic, and The Bahamas—admissions the United States supported. The United Nations has thus become still more representative of the world community.

Our participation in the United Nations reflects our fundamental belief that to assure a peaceful world it is necessary to cooperate with other nations in a multilateral framework on mutually agreed upon activities. This report records the successes and failures, the hopes and frustrations of many of those activities. Above all it records what we tried to accomplish through the United Nations to further the many interests that our citizens and our country share with the world community.

GERALD R. FORD.

THE WHITE HOUSE, *September 19, 1974.*

## President Ford Establishes Economic Policy Board

*Following are texts of a White House announcement issued on September 28 and an Executive order signed by President Ford on September 30.*

### WHITE HOUSE ANNOUNCEMENT

White House press release dated September 28

President Ford announced on September 28 the formation of a new Economic Policy Board, which will oversee the formulation, coordination, and implementation of all economic policy, and named Secretary of the Treasury William E. Simon as Chairman.

Secretary Simon will act as the principal spokesman for the executive branch on matters of economic policy. The new Board will be the focal point for economic policy decisionmaking, both domestic and international. Secretary Simon will also chair an Executive Committee of the Board, which will meet daily.

The President also announced the appointment of L. William Seidman as Assistant to the President for Economic Affairs. In addition to a wide range of other duties, Mr. Seidman will serve as a member and Executive Director of the Economic Policy Board and its Executive Committee. In his new roles, Mr. Seidman will be responsible for coordinating the implementation of economic policy and providing liaison with the Presidential staff and with other governmental activities.

Secretary Simon and Mr. Seidman will have responsibility for insuring that there is adequate coordination among existing and proposed committees relating to economic policy. Secretary Simon will serve as Chairman, and Mr. Seidman as Deputy Chairman, of the Council on Wage and Price Stability as well as the Council on International Economic Policy, the National Advisory Council on International Economic Policy, the National Advisory Council on International

Monetary and Financial Policies, and the President's Committee on East-West Trade Policy.

The other members of the Economic Policy Board will be:

Secretary of State Henry A. Kissinger  
Secretary of the Interior Rogers C. B. Morton  
Secretary of Agriculture Earl L. Butz  
Secretary of Commerce Frederick B. Dent  
Secretary of Labor Peter J. Brennan  
Secretary of Health, Education, and Welfare Caspar W. Weinberger  
Secretary of Housing and Urban Development James T. Lynn  
Secretary of Transportation Claude S. Brinegar  
Director of the Office of Management and Budget Roy L. Ash  
Chairman of the Council of Economic Advisers Alan Greenspan  
Executive Director of the Council on International Economic Policy William D. Eberle

Mr. Greenspan, Mr. Eberle, and a senior member of the Office of Management and Budget will serve as members of the Executive Committee. Dr. Arthur F. Burns, Chairman of the Federal Reserve Board, will attend both Board and Executive Committee meetings when appropriate.

### TEXT OF EXECUTIVE ORDER 11808<sup>1</sup>

#### ESTABLISHING THE PRESIDENT'S ECONOMIC POLICY BOARD, AND FOR OTHER PURPOSES

By virtue of the authority vested in me by the Constitution and laws of the United States, it is hereby ordered as follows:

SECTION 1. There is hereby established the President's Economic Policy Board (hereinafter referred to as the Board).

SEC. 2. The Board shall consist of the Secretary of the Treasury, who shall be its Chairman, the Assistant to the President for Economic Affairs, the Secretary of State, the Secretary of the Interior, the Secretary of Agriculture, the Secretary of Commerce, the Secretary of Labor, the Secretary of Health, Education, and Welfare, the Secretary of Housing and Urban Development, the Secretary of Transportation, the Director of the Office of Management and Budget, the Chairman of the Council of Economic Advisors, and the Executive Director of the Council on International Economic Policy. The Chairman of the Board of Governors of the

<sup>1</sup> 39 *Fed. Reg.* 35563.

Federal Reserve System is invited to attend meetings of the Board.

SEC. 3. The Economic Policy Board shall provide advice to the President concerning all aspects of national and international economic policy, will oversee the formulation, coordination, and implementation of all economic policy of the United States, and will serve as the focal point for economic policy decision-making. The Chairman of the Board shall act as the principal spokesman for the Executive Branch on matters of economic policy.

SEC. 4. (a) There is hereby established the Executive Committee of the Board. The Executive Committee shall consist of the Secretary of the Treasury, who shall be its Chairman, the Assistant to the President for Economic Affairs, the Director of the Office of Management and Budget, the Chairman of the Council of Economic Advisers, and the Executive Director of the Council on International Economic Policy. The Chairman of the Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System is invited to attend meetings of the Executive Committee.

(b) The Executive Committee shall meet daily to consider matters involving responsibilities of the Board.

SEC. 5. The Assistant to the President for Economic Affairs shall be the Executive Director of the Board and of the Executive Committee, and, as such, shall be responsible for coordinating the implementation of economic policy and providing liaison with the Presidential staff and with other Governmental activities.

SEC. 6. (a) The Secretary of the Treasury shall be a member of the Council on Wage and Price Stability and be its Chairman. The Assistant to the President for Economic Affairs shall be a member of the Council and be its Deputy Chairman.

(b) The Secretary of the Treasury shall be the Chairman of the Council on International Economic Policy. The Assistant to the President for Economic Affairs shall be a member of that Council and be its Deputy Chairman.

(c) Section 1(b) of Executive Order No. 11269, as amended (prescribing the composition of the National Advisory Council on International Monetary and Financial Policies), is further amended by inserting after "the Secretary of the Treasury, who shall be Chairman of the Council," the following "the Assistant to the President for Economic Affairs, who shall be Deputy Chairman of the Council".

(d)(1) Section 1(1) of Executive Order No. 11789 (prescribing the composition of the President's Committee on East-West Trade Policy) is amended to read as follows:

"(1) The Assistant to the President for Economic Affairs."

(2) Section 2 of that Order is amended to read as follows:

"Sec. 2. The Secretary of the Treasury shall be the Chairman of the Committee, and the Assistant

to the President for Economic Affairs shall be its Deputy Chairman."

SEC. 7. All departments and agencies shall cooperate with the Board, including the Executive Committee thereof, and shall, to the extent permitted by law, provide it with such assistance and information as the Chairman or the Executive Director of the Board may request.



THE WHITE HOUSE, September 30, 1974.

## Department Urges Prompt Action on North Atlantic Air Fares

*Department Statement, September 24*

Press release 377 dated September 24

The Department welcomes the positive action of the Civil Aeronautics Board (CAB) in undertaking to expedite consideration of the recent International Air Transport Association (IATA) agreement on North Atlantic scheduled fares before expiration of the old agreement November 1. The Board's action was in the form of a letter from CAB Chairman [Robert D.] Timm sent September 24 to the President of the European Civil Aviation Conference (ECAC). An ECAC resolution had called on governments to approve these agreements on scheduled and nonscheduled (charter) prices without undue delay. In view of the serious financial problems confronting our international air carriers, the Department believes it imperative that governments move promptly to insure that there is no lengthy period of uncertainty regarding the establishment this winter of cost-related North Atlantic air fares.

The CAB's announcement that it will move promptly toward a final decision on the fare package submitted September 5 for the Board's approval by the carriers of the International Air Transport Association should make it clear that U.S. Government action will be prompt and effective.

We also note that the proposed IATA package is dependent on an agreement being

reached by the North Atlantic scheduled and charter carriers establishing a minimum charter price (charter floor). Discussions have been underway to this end for several months, but full agreement has not yet been reached. Failure to agree on the charter floor would threaten the agreement already reached on scheduled services. We would urge the carriers participating in the scheduled-charter negotiations to resume their discussions and try to move without further delay toward a final agreement. If the charter talks were to break down or if the participants were unable to resolve their differences within a reasonable time before expiration of the present IATA fares, the Department is prepared to initiate direct consultations or negotiations with foreign governments as a means of removing remaining obstacles to the early institution for the winter season of a rational airfare system on the North Atlantic.

## **U.S. and U.K. Agree To Reduce Excess Airline Capacity**

*Representatives of U.S. and U.K. Government agencies met at Washington September 17-19. Following are texts of a Department announcement and a joint U.S.-U.K. press statement issued September 20.*

Press release 369 dated September 20

### **DEPARTMENT ANNOUNCEMENT**

The Department of State welcomes the agreement reached between U.S. and U.K. aviation delegations this week which will result in the improvement of the economic climate for U.S. airlines operations in the North Atlantic by cutting down excess airline capacity between the United States and the United Kingdom.

This agreement has been undertaken in accordance with the U.S. action plan approved by President Ford on September 18 to improve the competitive climate in which Pan Am and our other international air car-

riers operate. The Department of State is initiating early consultations with other European governments to achieve the elimination of capacity excess to market demand on services to these countries.

### **JOINT U.S.-U.K. PRESS STATEMENT**

Aviation delegations representing the United Kingdom and United States Governments reached agreement this week on the need for vigorous action to restore profitable airline operations in the North Atlantic market by eliminating excess capacity and establishing a cost-related fare structure.

Traffic demand across the North Atlantic for the coming winter season is expected to decline by some 10-20 percent over last winter.

In accordance with the objective agreed by the two governments, U.S. and British airlines providing scheduled services between the two countries have agreed to capacity reductions for the winter season November 1974 through April 1975 of some 20 percent compared with the equivalent period of last year. This covers services between London and New York, Boston, Washington, Philadelphia, Detroit, Miami, Chicago, and Los Angeles. Despite these substantial reductions, the airlines are confident that their services this winter will fully meet the public need. Consideration will be given later on to appropriate measures to rationalize capacity between the two countries for next summer.

During the consultations the two delegations expressed their full support for the current efforts of the North Atlantic airlines to develop an improved airline fare structure, taking account of the increased costs, particularly for fuel, being encountered by the industry. They welcomed the substantial progress already made towards establishing cost-related fares and minimum charter prices.

These actions reflect the determination of both governments to return the North Atlantic market to profitable conditions.

## General Conference of the International Atomic Energy Agency Holds 18th Session at Vienna

*The 18th session of the General Conference of the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) was held at Vienna September 16-20. Following is a statement made before the conference on September 17 by Dr. Dixy Lee Ray, Chairman of the U.S. Atomic Energy Commission, who was chairman of the U.S. delegation.*

U.S. AEC press release dated September 17

Mr. President [Gen. (ret.) Fernando Medina, of the Philippines]: It is a great pleasure to congratulate you, on behalf of my government, upon your election as our presiding officer. And for my part, once again I am proud to represent the United States at the Agency's General Conference. It has been a pleasure to renew personal acquaintances with many of you and to meet delegates whom I had not known before.

Director General [A. Sigvard] Eklund and the staff of the Secretariat deserve high praise and commendation for their responses to the difficult, urgent, and complex demands made upon them during the year just over. The initiative, imagination, and professional competence of the Agency probably will be tested even more in the years ahead. As his address clearly indicated, the Director General knows full well that these challenges must be faced and surmounted.

It is my privilege now to read the following message from President Ford:

On this, my first occasion to address the General Conference of the International Atomic Energy Agency, I want to emphasize the strong and affirmative role the United States has played in support of the IAEA. Our policy was initiated under President Eisenhower, sustained under succeeding Presidents and will continue.

The IAEA helps all nations in promoting world-wide peaceful development of nuclear energy, meeting the challenge of increased energy requirements, protecting both man and his environment and providing assurance against diversion of this resource for nuclear explosives.

The Agency exercises important responsibilities in carrying out safeguards in accordance with the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons, which I regard as one of the pillars of United States foreign policy. I wish to reaffirm my Government's offer to permit the application of IAEA safeguards to any U.S. nuclear activity except those of direct national security significance. This offer will be implemented when safeguards are being broadly applied under the Treaty in other industrial states. Our offer was made in order to encourage the widest possible adherence to the Treaty by demonstrating to other nations that they would not be placed at a commercial disadvantage by reason of the application of safeguards under the Treaty.

I have become increasingly aware of the world-wide expectation that nuclear energy should provide a far greater portion of power needs and of the world-wide concern about nuclear safeguards. The Member States of the IAEA and Agency staff face important challenges in simultaneously expanding nuclear power production and safeguarding its fuel cycle.

We in the United States look forward to continuing, and in fact increased, IAEA contributions in bringing the benefits of the peaceful atom to all mankind and in bringing about closer collaboration among the nations of the world.

It is a pleasure to extend to all delegates to this Conference my warmest greetings and best wishes for a successful meeting.

President Ford has clearly reaffirmed the strong support we give to the Agency's program.

As many of you may recall, the U.S. Atoms for Peace program and the establishment of this great international Agency were proposed by President Eisenhower in his historic message before the U.N. General

Assembly in December 1953. The development of peaceful uses of atomic energy during the subsequent 20 years has been characterized by an impressive record of international cooperation.

The ability of many countries to enter the nuclear age has been facilitated by the work of this Agency. There are 104 member nations in IAEA. There are nearly 50 countries who are actively probing the nature of matter and investigating the many effects and applications of radioactivity with research reactors. By the end of this year, the Agency has estimated that there will be 121 operational power reactors in 17 IAEA member countries other than the United States, with a total installed capacity of nearly 32,000 megawatts electric. And similar Agency projections this year show that by 1980 these figures will have risen to 244 power reactors in 25 member countries, with a total installed capacity of over 125,000 megawatts electric.

The significant role of the IAEA in fostering dissemination of nuclear knowledge and encouraging the responsible use of the technology that arises from it has been a remarkable accomplishment in the short period of 20 years. The importance of the IAEA certainly will increase in the years to come.

### **U.S. Support for IAEA Activities**

Now, what does lie ahead? The Director General has provided us with a carefully conceived and thought-provoking analysis of the problems facing nuclear energy throughout the world.

The United States strongly supports a broad review, as described by the Director General, of the prospects and problems of nuclear power in a world energy situation that is increasingly complex. As the availability of nuclear power for generating electricity expands in both developed and developing countries, problems of safety, fuel supply, and waste management will grow. They will require cooperation and exchange of information on an ever-broadening scale.

The United States supports the Agency's

expanded program in the safety field. As you know, we have just published in draft form results of a two-year independent study of safety in U.S. commercial nuclear power plants, referred to as the Rasmussen study. This definitive analysis finds the risks of serious accidents to be extremely low. Furthermore, even if an improbable accident should occur, the likelihood of deaths or illness or financial losses is far smaller than from several types of non-nuclear accidents to which people are already commonly exposed. The main report and a summary have been distributed to atomic energy organizations throughout the world, and a full set of the 14 volumes still in draft form has been provided to the Agency. We invite your review and comments. Detailed attention to safe design, construction, and operation of nuclear plants is essential everywhere because an accident in any nation would be of concern to all.

The less developed countries should benefit considerably from expanded IAEA activities in providing assistance in planning for nuclear power projects. The IAEA guidebook being circulated in draft at this General Conference, and the advisory services that the Agency provides, make this Agency the leading international body for assistance in evaluating an introduction of nuclear power in less developed countries.

With regard to fuel supply and fuel cycle services, the United States, as a major supplier of enriched uranium, views its responsibility in this area very seriously. The U.S. Atomic Energy Commission has recently contracted up to the present limit of its authority to meet the needs of approximately 355 domestic and foreign power reactors (representing about 320,000 megawatts). These contracts cover reactors that will require initial fuel deliveries through June 30, 1982. We are also examining the methods we will employ to extend our capacity so that we continue to serve the international market reliably for decades to come.

We recognize the need for much better data on uranium resources and enrichment capacity, and we fully support the Director

General's call for a major international conference in 1977 on prospects and problems for nuclear energy. We will, of course, participate actively in such a conference that will deal broadly with many issues in the nuclear field.

High-level radioactive wastes continue to pose long-term problems. We welcome the Board action on September 13 to define the kinds of wastes that are unsuitable for dumping at sea, pursuant to the London Convention. I can see the Agency playing a significant role in the development of standards and safety criteria and perhaps also of methodology for the handling of these wastes.

### Technical Assistance Programs

The technical assistance programs of the IAEA have long been of great value to many countries. We continue to support and participate in the Agency's multifaceted programs. For example, as an important early step in helping to prepare the less developed countries to use nuclear power, the United States has proposed to cosponsor with the IAEA a two- to three-week course in the principles and techniques of regulating nuclear power for public health, safety, and environmental protection. This course, proposed to be held at the U.S. Atomic Energy Commission headquarters, would assist representatives of perhaps 20-30 countries to organize and administer effective national energy regulatory programs. U.S. experience in this area has been wide ranging and intense and should be of considerable interest and utility to those member states planning to embark on nuclear power programs. We fully recognize the essential role of specialized manpower training in this relatively new area as well as those in which the IAEA has been engaged for some time.

In the same connection, it is most gratifying that the Agency has reached agreement on its program for the preparation of a set of standards, in the form of codes of practice and safety guides, for nuclear power reactors. Ambassador Tape [Gerald F. Tape,

U.S. Representative to the IAEA] made clear at the time the Board approved this program last Friday the great importance which my government attaches to this activity. The program will have the strong support of the U.S. Atomic Energy Commission and we hope that it will receive similar support from appropriate organizations in other member states. We are prepared to make important contributions, including expert services without cost to the Agency, to help accomplish the objectives of this program.

Also, may I suggest a possible new emphasis for IAEA, in close cooperation with the World Health Organization, to bring to developing countries the full benefits of nuclear medicine. Adequately trained medical personnel exist already in many countries, and the requisite radioactive materials can be shipped with modern air transportation. What appear to be lacking are sturdy, reliable, low-cost, yet sensitive instruments for diagnostic and therapeutic uses in a wide variety of facilities and environmental conditions. We suggest that the IAEA prepare an inventory of the potential world market for such equipment as a stimulus to manufacturers.

The United States renews its pledge, for the 16th consecutive year, to donate up to 50 thousand dollars' worth of special nuclear materials for use in Agency projects. As announced at the June Board of Governors meeting, parties to the Nonproliferation Treaty (NPT), will be given preferential consideration in the donation of these materials.

We continue to support the financing by voluntary contributions of the technical assistance program. We are confident that voluntary contributions bring more funds and more in-kind assistance than can assessments. The U.S. cash and in-kind assistance last year amounted to about \$2 million. For the coming year, subject to governmental appropriations, my government intends to contribute generously to the cash target and to make additional in-kind grants. Beginning in 1975 we intend to give preference in allo-



cation of in-kind grants to developing countries that are parties to the NPT. We consider both of these actions consistent with our obligations under article IV of the NPT.<sup>1</sup>

### **Safeguarding Nuclear Materials**

Events of the past year have caused a dramatic and renewed interest in nuclear energy as all nations reassess their requirements for energy supplies. And so I wish now to focus discussion upon what I believe is the most serious challenge facing this Agency and all of us interested in nuclear energy: The need to design and apply even more effective safeguards to nuclear materials and facilities in order to deter proliferation of nuclear-weapon capability and to provide additional measures to prevent the theft of nuclear materials.

Director General Eklund has taken the lead in addressing safeguards and proliferation issues at this General Conference. I am hopeful that my remarks will generate additional comments from other delegates. These remarks reflect policy developments in my own country, bilateral discussions with other nations, and a desire to share these views with all of you here.

Nations that export and nations that purchase nuclear technology, equipment, and fuels both have much to gain by making the international nuclear situation more secure. We are concerned about export practices, reasonable control of the entire fuel cycle, physical security of nuclear materials, safeguards accountability for nuclear materials, clearly defined international responses to acts or threats of nuclear terrorism, and implications of peaceful nuclear explosions for nuclear proliferation.

We continue to endorse fully the Nonproliferation Treaty and urge that nations which still have not become parties to the treaty do so as soon as is feasible for them. We also hope that nonparties, as well as parties to

the NPT, can join here at the IAEA in a concerted effort to enhance security and safeguards for nuclear plants and materials throughout the world. Let us examine a few aspects of this situation in a bit more detail:

1. *Conditions for export.* Some of the major nuclear-exporting countries, including the United States, have reached agreement on procedures and criteria that serve as minimum common standards for implementation of the requirements of article III.2 of the NPT, which calls for IAEA safeguards in connection with nuclear materials and equipment exported to non-nuclear-weapon states. Furthermore, the United States, United Kingdom, and U.S.S.R. have agreed, beginning October 1, to report to the IAEA detailed information on their export and import of nuclear materials to and from non-nuclear-weapon states.

We recognize that many nations have well-trained scientists and engineers capable of applying or developing sophisticated nuclear technology for military as well as for peaceful purposes. It is to their great credit that so many of these nations have chosen not to develop nuclear weapons. As Ambassador Tape emphasized at the June Board of Governors meeting, the use in or for any nuclear explosive device of any material or equipment subject to an agreement with the United States for cooperation for civil uses of atomic energy is precluded. We intend to maintain this policy, and we believe that other exporting countries share the view that explicit agreements and effective verification are essential.

2. *Control of the fuel cycle.* With the proposed and planned sale of reactors to countries in regions throughout the world, including areas that are politically troubled, questions have been raised about the impact of such sales on proliferation. If each country that moves into nuclear-generated electricity is faced with the necessity to develop its own means of handling the spent fuel, then each country will have to develop the technology for this purpose. As an alternative, the es-

<sup>1</sup> For text of the treaty, see BULLETIN of July 1, 1968, p. 8.

establishment of internationally approved facilities to handle all the spent fuel arising from power reactors may be helpful to participating countries. It may also be reassuring to the rest of the world.

Attention must be directed to the different types of fuel cycles as well. In the United States our experience has been mainly with the light water reactor using low-enriched uranium. Cycles using natural uranium and heavy water moderation, uranium and thorium, highly enriched uranium, or uranium and plutonium each will require careful analysis to provide the best safeguarding methods and most efficient handling. Each fuel cycle has different degrees of vulnerability and should be analyzed from that point of view also. In such analyses the member states and the staff of the IAEA could make great contributions. The United States is committed to such efforts on a national basis and will be pleased to participate in international activities in this area.

3. *Physical security.* In the face of terrorist activity in many places around the world, we have taken action in the United States to enhance significantly the physical security at AEC and AEC-licensed facilities and for materials during transport. We encourage other nations to do the same. Widespread publicity concerning details of security plans would be unwise, but through appropriate technical working groups we would be pleased to share useful aspects of our approaches to greater physical security.

In addition to improving conditions at existing locations, we anticipate that important changes can be incorporated into construction designs to enhance physical security in new facilities. The booklet "Recommendations for the Physical Protection of Nuclear Materials," published by the IAEA in 1972, provides useful guidelines and a basis for further IAEA recommendations.

We support the Director General's suggestion that prospects for an international agreement on minimum standards for physical security be explored. Further, we agree with his recommendation that the Agency prepare itself to serve as a source for advice

and assistance to those nations that recognize the desirability of improving their capability in physical security systems.

4. *Safeguards accountability for nuclear materials.* The IAEA has taken the lead for many years in safeguards accountability. Further improvements in methods can be anticipated and increased attention must be paid to correction of deficiencies identified in the process. As President Ford has reaffirmed, we are prepared to implement our offer to permit the Agency to apply its safeguards to any of the nuclear activities in the United States other than those with direct national security significance. We have offered to permit such safeguards when they are applied broadly in non-nuclear-weapon countries, in order to demonstrate our belief that there is no risk to proprietary information and no danger of suffering commercial disadvantage under NPT safeguards.

5. *Peaceful nuclear explosions (PNE's).* The use of PNE's is a highly complicated matter, with ramifications under the Limited Test Ban Treaty in the case of surface excavation, and with importance to the defining of threshold and complete test ban treaties. The IAEA has taken important actions to facilitate the exchange of information and to anticipate the needs for services. At the Board of Governors meeting last Friday, initial procedures were approved for Agency response to requests from members for such services. Also the Board authorized the Director General to establish within the Secretariat, at a suitable time, a separate organizational unit for implementing an international service for nuclear explosions for peaceful purposes under appropriate international control.

I would like to emphasize the need for in-depth studies to establish the feasibility and desirability of using peaceful nuclear explosions in any project under consideration. The United States stands ready to contribute to the planning and performance of such feasibility studies. Where these studies demonstrate the practicability of conducting a peaceful nuclear explosion project consistent with the provisions of pertinent treaties or

agreements, we are prepared to meet our obligations under article V of the NPT to provide PNE services at prices that will exclude any charges for research and development.

In closing, let me say that, clearly, the role of nuclear power is being accepted increasingly around the world and that significant progress has been made in enhancing reactor safety. I am confident that cooperative international effort will meet the serious challenge of safeguarding nuclear materials and facilities as the benefits of nuclear energy are brought to many more countries.

Let us resolve to attack these problems with all the good will and intelligence of which mankind is capable.

## **U.S. Calls for Worldwide Commitment To Assist Poorer Nations**

*Following is a statement by John Scali, U.S. Permanent Representative to the United Nations, made on September 27 before the first ministerial meeting of potential contributors to the United Nations Emergency Program, established by the sixth special session of the General Assembly.*

USUN press release 120 dated September 27

I am pleased to reaffirm what President Ford said in addressing the U.N. Assembly last week: That our government will not only maintain but increase the amount of funds we will spend for food shipments to other countries.

The exact sum, as well as the quantities of food to be provided, is still being reviewed at the highest levels of my government in an effort to maximize our response despite the new weather problems which have affected our late harvests.

The final figures will depend on cooperation by our Congress, the weather, and assistance in holding back the tide of inflation which threatens all. It is only too evident that recent rises in the price of oil, food, and fertilizer have created severe hardships for all nations.

The richer nations, however, can cut their consumption of food or fuel; and more importantly, they can pay the new, higher prices by increasing their exports or their borrowing. For the poorer nations, on the other hand, reduced consumption can mean mass starvation and economic collapse. These countries cannot, for the most part, increase their exports significantly in the short run, nor do they have the credit to finance even minimum consumption at the new and higher prices.

Clearly the only long-term solution is to increase the supply of critically needed commodities and lower their prices sufficiently to put them within the reach of all. Such a policy is in the real interests of not only the consuming nations, but of those who are the major producers. Fast profits may be made by temporary restrictions on production, but over the long run only a prosperous, dependable, and expanding market can protect the producer against equally dramatic losses in the future.

The United States is committed to a policy of expanding supply to meet legitimate demand. We are going all out to increase American food production. We are seeking to plant every acre which can produce food for a hungry world, and every planted field is now being harvested.

Unhappily, however, inflation is a global problem, and it requires a global response. Thus, in about a month the United States will join with other nations in Rome to determine what steps we can take in common to dramatically increase global food supplies and to put the price of bread within the reach of every man.

Just as no single nation can hope to contend with the force of global inflation, so no price reduction of any single commodity will be able to reverse the current trend.

We believe therefore that oil producers and oil consumers must cooperate in the same way that food producers and consumers are doing to meet legitimate world demand for fuel at prices which the poor, as well as the rich, can afford.

We are meeting here today, however, not

to focus on the long-range solution of the current world economic crisis but, rather, to determine what immediate steps can be taken to prevent the world's poorest nations from being overwhelmed even as we talk.

The United States believes that the primary responsibility for helping those nations whose economies are being devastated by higher oil prices rests with the oil-producing states. Nevertheless, we will not turn a deaf ear to the appeals of those in real need. In the 12-month period which ended in June 1974, U.S. aid to the countries which Secretary General Waldheim has listed as the "most seriously affected" amounted to \$714 million. During that same period, the United States provided another \$2 billion in aid to other countries, many of which have also suffered greatly as the result of higher oil and other prices.

For the next 12 months—that is, through June of 1975—the U.S. Government has asked Congress for nearly \$1 billion in aid for those countries on the Secretary General's list of most seriously affected. We have taken this step to increase our already substantial assistance to these countries at a time when we are trying to cut our Federal budget and economize in the face of inflation.

The American people and the American Congress have responded generously to appeals for help in the past. I believe that they will continue to do so, even at a time when our ability to help is increasingly limited. But we cannot be expected, nor should we be asked, to shoulder this burden alone.

My government welcomes the statements from a number of oil-producing countries announcing various forms of aid. We believe, however, that far more can and must be done. We encourage, therefore, further commitments from all states in a position to contribute, and particularly from those nations whose new wealth is growing so rapidly that it challenges their ability to spend it productively.

As the single largest provider of aid in the world for so many years, the United States has already established various bi-

lateral and multilateral channels for assistance to countries on the Secretary General's list. We believe that our assistance will be most effective if it continues to flow through these channels. We recognize, however, that donors who have not yet established aid programs may find the new United Nations Emergency Program, or the proposed Special Fund of the Secretary General, to be a useful and effective means for channeling their new aid.

In speaking frankly, as President Ford and Secretary of State Kissinger have done, about the need to control inflation, the United States seeks to draw world attention to the grim facts. We wish not to force confrontation, but to generate constructive cooperation. We believe that only by working together can the world community stop inflation, increase economic development, and create the more just world order which we all seek. We are calling, therefore, on others to join us in this effort. Let us go forward together in a spirit of friendship, in an atmosphere of mutual respect, and with a genuine belief that the interests of all nations can best be reconciled in a more prosperous and stable world.

## **U.S. Welcomes Bangladesh, Grenada, and Guinea-Bissau to the U.N.**

*Following is a statement made in the U.N. General Assembly by U.S. Representative W. Tapley Bennett, Jr., on September 17.*

USUN press release 116 dated September 17

Mr. President [Abdelaziz Bouteflika, of Algeria]: I would like to offer my sincere congratulations and those of the United States to you as you assume the Presidency of this 29th session of the General Assembly.

As the Representative of the host country, I have the great honor of welcoming three new members to this parliament of the world. Although Bangladesh, Grenada, and Guinea-

Bissau are located in three very different regions of this planet, they jointly share a desire to participate in this organization. Nothing could symbolize more dramatically the universality of man's aspirations for which the United Nations stands.

The United States recognized the Government of the People's Republic of Bangladesh on April 4, 1972. Formal diplomatic relations were established on May 18 of that year. My government has had continuous representation in Dacca since 1949. Through these years, ties of trade, shared concern for economic development, and personal friendships have grown even stronger. Consequently the U.S. Government has taken particular satisfaction in the development of the friendly bilateral relations which now exist between our two countries.

The American and Grenadan peoples have had warm and cooperative relations through the years. We share a deep interest in the affairs of the Caribbean region. We have been and will continue to be good neighbors. On February 7 of this year my government welcomed Grenada into the family of independent nations, and we wish Grenada well as she travels the road of independence.

Now Guinea-Bissau joins this world body as the culmination of a major historical process. As President Ford stated, the U.S. Government looks forward to a productive and friendly relationship with the Republic of Guinea-Bissau, which we recognized on September 10. In the months and years ahead, the United States hopes to broaden and strengthen the bonds between the governments and peoples of our two countries. We look forward to the constructive contribution Guinea-Bissau will make to the important work of the United Nations.

The President of the United States will speak to this Assembly tomorrow, and I would at this time like to express the hope of my government that the 29th session of the General Assembly will be a productive one where we will take new steps to move from ideological confrontation toward resolving of differences among nations.

## Agenda of the 29th Regular Session of the U.N. General Assembly<sup>1</sup>

1. Opening of the session by the Chairman of the delegation of Ecuador.
2. Minute of silent prayer or meditation.
3. Credentials of representatives to the twenty-ninth session of the General Assembly:
  - (a) Appointment of the Credentials Committee;
  - (b) Report of the Credentials Committee.
4. Election of the President.
5. Constitution of the Main Committees and election of officers.
6. Election of the Vice-Presidents.
7. Notification by the Secretary-General under Article 12, paragraph 2, of the Charter of the United Nations.
8. Adoption of the agenda.
9. General debate.
10. Report of the Secretary-General on the work of the Organization.
11. Report of the Security Council.
12. Report of the Economic and Social Council.
13. Report of the Trusteeship Council.
14. Report of the International Court of Justice.
15. Report of the International Atomic Energy Agency.
16. Election of five non-permanent members of the Security Council.
17. Election of eighteen members of the Economic and Social Council.
18. Election of fifteen members of the Industrial Development Board.
19. Election of nineteen members of the Governing Council of the United Nations Environment Programme.
20. Strengthening of the role of the United Nations with regard to the maintenance and consolidation of international peace and security, the development of co-operation among all nations and the promotion of the rules of international law in relations between States: report of the Secretary-General.
21. Co-operation between the United Nations and the Organization of African Unity: report of the Secretary-General.
22. Admission of new Members to the United Nations.
23. Implementation of the Declaration on the Granting of Independence to Colonial Countries and Peoples: report of the Special Committee on the Situation with regard to the Implementation of the Declaration on the Granting of Independence to Colonial Countries and Peoples.

<sup>1</sup> Adopted by the Assembly on Sept. 21 (U.N. doc. A/9751).

24. Reduction of the military budgets of States permanent members of the Security Council by 10 per cent and utilization of part of the funds thus saved to provide assistance to developing countries:
  - (a) Report of the Special Committee on the Distribution of the Funds Released as a Result of the Reduction of Military Budgets;
  - (b) Report of the Secretary-General.
25. Restoration of the lawful rights of the Royal Government of National Union of Cambodia in the United Nations.
26. Third United Nations Conference on the Law of the Sea.
27. Napalm and other incendiary weapons and all aspects of their possible use: report of the Secretary-General.
28. Chemical and bacteriological (biological) weapons: report of the Conference of the Committee on Disarmament.
29. Urgent need for cessation of nuclear and thermonuclear tests and conclusion of a treaty designed to achieve a comprehensive test ban: report of the Conference of the Committee on Disarmament.
30. Implementation of General Assembly resolution 3079 (XXVIII) concerning the signature and ratification of Additional Protocol II of the Treaty for the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons in Latin America (Treaty of Tlatelolco): report of the Secretary-General.
31. Implementation of the Declaration of the Indian Ocean as a Zone of Peace: report of the *Ad Hoc* Committee on the Indian Ocean.
32. International co-operation in the peaceful uses of outer space: report of the Committee on the Peaceful Uses of Outer Space.
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  92. Respect for human rights in armed conflicts: report of the Secretary-General.
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101. Establishment of a nuclear-weapon-free zone in the region of the Middle East.
102. Status of the European Economic Community in the General Assembly.
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110. Question of Cyprus.

## TREATY INFORMATION

### United States and Japan Sign New Textile Agreement

The Department of State announced on October 2 (press release 389) that in reference to article 4 of the Arrangement Regarding International Trade in Textiles, the United States and Japan had entered into a new bilateral agreement covering trade in cotton, man-made fiber, and wool textiles by exchange of notes in Washington on September 27. (For texts of the exchange of notes and related letters, see press release 389). The new agreement supersedes two previous agreements.

Under the terms of the new agreement, which runs from October 1, 1974, through

December 31, 1977, Japan will limit its exports of all textiles to the United States in the first agreement year to 1,691,272,000 square yards equivalent. The new agreement also provides inter alia for a higher rate of annual growth and increased inter- and intra-fiber flexibility, pursuant to the provisions of the Arrangement Regarding International Trade in Textiles.

## Current Actions

### MULTILATERAL

#### Biological Weapons

Convention on the prohibition of the development, production and stockpiling of bacteriological (biological) and toxin weapons and on their destruction. Done at Washington, London, and Moscow April 10, 1972.<sup>1</sup>

*Ratification deposited:* Pakistan, October 3, 1974.

#### Satellite Communications System

Agreement relating to the International Telecommunications Satellite Organization (Intelsat), with annexes. Done at Washington August 20, 1971. Entered into force February 12, 1973. TIAS 7532.

*Ratification deposited:* Haiti, October 3, 1974.

#### Wheat

Protocol modifying and extending the wheat trade convention (part of the international wheat agreement) 1971 (TIAS 7144). Done at Washington April 2, 1974. Entered into force June 19, 1974, with respect to certain provisions; July 1, 1974, with respect to other provisions.

*Ratification deposited:* United Kingdom, September 30, 1974.<sup>2</sup>

### BILATERAL

#### Czechoslovakia

Consular convention, with agreed memorandum and related notes. Signed at Prague July 9, 1973.<sup>1</sup>

*Senate advice and consent to ratification:* September 30, 1974.

<sup>1</sup> Not in force.

<sup>2</sup> Including Dominica, Saint Christopher-Nevis-Anguilla, Saint Vincent, The Bailiwick of Guernsey, The Isle of Man, Belize, Bermuda, The British Virgin Islands, Gibraltar, The Gilbert and Ellice Islands Colony, Hong Kong, Montserrat, Saint Helena and Dependencies, and Seychelles.

**Jordan**

Nonscheduled air service agreement, with annexes. Signed at Amman September 21, 1974. Entered into force September 21, 1974.

**Khmer Republic**

Agreement amending the agreement for sales of agricultural commodities of August 10, 1974. Effected by exchange of notes at Phnom Penh September 17, 1974. Entered into force September 17, 1974.

**Sample Questions From the Written Examination for Foreign Service Officers.** This booklet describes the written examination and presents samples of the kinds of questions that are asked in the written examination for selection of Foreign Service officers. Available free of charge from the Board of Examiners for the Foreign Service, Department of State, Washington, D.C. 20520.

**Space Laboratory—Cooperative Program.** Agreements with certain governments, members of the European Space Research Organization. TIAS 7722. 45 pp. 55¢. (Cat. No. S9.10:7722).

**Use of Veterans Memorial Hospital—Grants-in-Aid for Medical Care and Treatment of Veterans and Rehabilitation of the Hospital Plant.** Agreement with the Philippines. TIAS 7814. 9 pp. 25¢. (Cat. No. S9.10:7814).

**Single Convention on Narcotic Drugs, 1961—Addition of Difenoixin to Schedule I and Amendment of Schedule III.** TIAS 7817. 2 pp. 25¢. (Cat. No. S9.10:7817).

**Reciprocal Fishing Privileges.** Agreements with Canada extending the agreement of June 15, 1973. TIAS 7818. 5 pp. 25¢. (Cat. No. S9.10:7818).

**Economic, Technical and Related Assistance.** Agreement with the Yemen Arab Republic. TIAS 7820. 5 pp. 25¢. (Cat. No. S9.10:7820).

**Trade in Textiles.** Agreement with the Republic of China. TIAS 7821. 3 pp. 25¢. (Cat. No. S9.10:7821).

**Agricultural Commodities.** Agreement with the Philippines. TIAS 7822. 9 pp. 25¢. (Cat. No. S9.10:7822).

**Whaling—International Observer Scheme.** Agreement with Japan. TIAS 7823. 16 pp. 30¢. (Cat. No. S9.10:7823).

**Air Transport Services.** Agreement with Canada amending the agreement of January 17, 1966. TIAS 7824. 15 pp. 30¢. (Cat. No. S9.10:7824).

**Aviation—Preclearance.** Agreement with Canada. TIAS 7825. 24 pp. 35¢. (Cat. No. S9.10:7825).

**Nonscheduled Air Services.** Agreement with Canada. TIAS 7826. 57 pp. 60¢. (Cat. No. S9.10:7826).

**Agricultural Commodities.** Agreement with Sudan. TIAS 7827. 6 pp. 25¢. (Cat. No. S9.10:7827).

**Air Charter Services.** Agreement with the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland amending the agreement of March 30, 1973. TIAS 7832. 5 pp. 25¢. (Cat. No. S9.10:7832).

**PUBLICATIONS**

**GPO Sales Publications**

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Czechoslovakia . . . . .	Cat. No. S1.123:C99	Pub. 7758	8 pp.
Indonesia . . . . .	Cat. No. S1.123:IN2	Pub. 7786	8 pp.
Iran . . . . .	Cat. No. S1.123:IR1	Pub. 7760	5 pp.
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*385	9/30	Overseas Schools Advisory Council, Oct. 22.
*386	9/30	Government Advisory Committee on International Book and Library Programs, Oct. 24.
*387	9/30	Study Group 5 of U.S. National Committee for CCITT, Oct. 30.
†388	10/1	Kissinger, Naffa; exchange of toasts, New York, Sept. 30.
	10/2	U.S. and Japan sign textile agreement (rewrite).
†390	10/3	Kissinger, Molina; exchange of toasts, New York, Oct. 2.
*391	10/4	Program for the official visit of the First Secretary of the Central Committee of the Polish United Workers' Party, Edward Gierek, Oct. 6-13.
*392	10/4	Secretary's Advisory Committee on Private International Law Study Group on Hotelkeepers' Liability, New York, Nov. 8.
*393	10/4	Secretary's Advisory Committee on Private International Law Study Group on Matrimonial Matters, New York, Nov. 7.
*394	10/4	Advisory Committee on "Foreign Relations of the United States," Nov. 8.

\* Not printed.

† Held for a later issue of the BULLETIN.

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*The Department of State BULLETIN, a weekly publication issued by the Office of Media Services, Bureau of Public Affairs, provides the public and interested agencies of the government with information on developments in the field of U.S. foreign relations and on the work of the Department and the Foreign Service.*

*The BULLETIN includes selected press releases on foreign policy, issued by the White House and the Department, and statements, addresses and news conferences of the President and the Secretary of State and other officers of the Department, as well as special articles on various phases of international affairs and the functions of the Department. Information is included concerning treaties and international agreements to which the United States is or may become party and on treaties of general international interest.*

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PRICE:

52 issues plus semiannual indexes,  
domestic \$29.50, foreign \$37.25  
Single copy 60 cents

Use of funds for printing this publication approved by the Director of the Office of Management and Budget (January 29, 1971).

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## Secretary Kissinger's News Conference of October 7

Press release 395 of October 7

*Secretary Kissinger:* Before we go to questions, I would like to welcome 20 Polish journalists who are here to cover the visit of Mr. Gierek [Edward Gierek, First Secretary of the Polish United Workers' Party]. I would like to say that we attach great importance to this visit in further improving our relationship with Poland. And I am sure what you will see here will remind you of some of the deliberations in the Polish Diet of previous centuries.

*Q. A two-part question, Mr. Secretary, on your trip. Will you be emphasizing an Israeli-Egyptian settlement, an Israeli-Jordan settlement, or both? And do you plan, or are there any possibilities to meet with [Yasir] Arafat or any other Palestinian leader while you are in the Middle East?*

*Secretary Kissinger:* With respect to the second question, there is no possibility that I will see Arafat or any other Palestinian leader while I am in the Middle East.

As for the content of the negotiations, we have attempted, in discussion with both Israeli and Arab leaders, to determine what would be the most suitable next stage of the negotiations.

It has always been understood that progress in one area would have to be linked with progress in other areas. And therefore we are talking about timing and the particular stages that look most promising.

So I am not going with any fixed ideas, and I will discuss again with all of the leaders involved. And then one can form a common judgment.

I would like to point out that there will be no concrete results in terms of agreements

or dramatic announcements that can be expected out of this trip. The primary purpose is to give concreteness to the negotiating process and perhaps to agree on some timing.

As long as we are talking about the trip, I would like to add that I will also visit Saudi Arabia in connection with the negotiations and on the way home I will stop in Algeria and Morocco. And I will be back on the 15th.<sup>1</sup>

### Peaceful and Military Nuclear Explosions

*Q. Mr. Secretary, there have been published reports this morning, sir, that the agreement reached last summer, I believe, by President Nixon with the Soviets to limit underground testing may be broadened to include peaceful nuclear tests. Are these stories accurate?*

*Secretary Kissinger:* I am reaching the point now where before I read my cables I read the newspapers, because they have a better selection. [Laughter.]

This one is not correct in all respects. There was an agreement at the time of the negotiation of the threshold test ban that the threshold test ban would not be ratified unless there was also an agreement for the handling of peaceful nuclear explosions.

This had two aspects: peaceful nuclear explosions below the threshold and peaceful nuclear explosions above the threshold. "Below the threshold" presented no particular problem because explosions were permitted anyway, and it was primarily an issue of the site at which the explosion would take place.

<sup>1</sup> The Department had previously announced that Secretary Kissinger would visit Egypt, Syria, Jordan, and Israel Oct. 9-14.

"Above the threshold" required special negotiations for the development of criteria to distinguish a peaceful explosion from a military explosion and also to determine the compatibility of the explosion with a limited test ban.

These negotiations are now starting in Moscow, and the outcome will depend on how we can proceed with the ratification issue. But this has always been understood, so there is no new decision involved. What is involved is a clearer specification of the criteria by which these distinctions might be established.

*Q. Dr. Kissinger, if I may follow that up. When India exploded a peaceful nuclear device last May, I think the U.S. position was that there was no distinction between a peaceful device and a military one. The technology is the same. Is there now a distinction being drawn in this country?*

*Secretary Kissinger:* I think one has to make a distinction between countries that have not previously had access to nuclear explosive technology and those countries that have elaborated nuclear explosive technology.

In the case of a new nuclear country, the mere fact of an explosion is of significance because that is what enters it into the club of those who have set off nuclear explosions. And therefore in the early stages of nuclear development, the distinction between military uses and civilian uses may be in the mind of those that set off the explosion, but it is very difficult—in fact it is impossible—to establish a distinction.

In the case of elaborated nuclear technology, there are at least some cases in which criteria can be defined by which the explosion is either of a more rudimentary technology than has already been tested for military purposes or is of a nature that can be clearly demonstrated as not useful for military purposes.

So the distinction can be made only in cases of advanced nuclear countries. It cannot be made with respect to countries entering the nuclear club.

*Q. Mr. Secretary, what is your rationale for continuing as chairman on the 40 Com-*

*mittee on covert activities and clandestine operations overseas? And isn't this compromising to your role as Secretary of State and the relatively open diplomacy of your other hat?*

*Secretary Kissinger:* The 40 Committee, in one form or another, has existed since 1948. The Department of State has always been represented on the 40 Committee.

The role of the 40 Committee is to review covert operations in order to determine their compatibility with the national security and foreign policy objectives of the United States. It is not to operate the covert actions and not, for that matter, to design them. It is to give policy guidance and policy review.

So, in one form or another, the Department of State is a participant in the decision, and the final approval is in every case given by the President in any event.

#### Measures To Deal With Oil Prices

*Q. Mr. Secretary, you have repeatedly said that you do not desire confrontation with the oil producers. I would like to ask two questions about that. If you do not want confrontation, why did you and the President use such harsh rhetoric in addressing yourself to the problem, rhetoric that apparently you can't back up with action? And, two, why a full year after the energy crisis really hit have you not made any serious moves to get together with the producers?*

*Secretary Kissinger:* Do you want me to agree with your conclusions, or can I state some of my own? [Laughter.]

First of all, the definition of "harsh rhetoric" is of course quite a subjective one. The President and I stated that we are dealing with a very serious problem. If you look at my statements on the subject, you will find that I used substantially the same rhetoric in my Pilgrims speech last December in London, in the opening speech to the Washington Energy Conference in February, in the speech to the U.N. special session of the General Assembly in April, and now again in September.

We have stated, and I repeat, that present oil prices are putting a strain on the world

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economy that will, over a period of time, create an intolerable situation. It was the intention to emphasize these points.

Now, whether or not it can be backed up, again, is a question that requires some examination. Ever since the first speech last December we have made a systematic effort to bring about greater cohesion among the consumers, to protect them against emergencies, to bring about conservation, to bring about cooperation on alternative sources of energy and in research and development, and ultimately a greater degree of financial solidarity, at least with respect to the recycling problem.

These measures are required whether or not oil prices come down, especially if oil prices do not come down. They also will provide a basis for further discussion with the producers.

Until there is a degree of a common view among the consumers, discussions with the producers are simply going to repeat all the debates with which we are familiar. We have been talking with the producers. The Europeans have been talking with the producers. The only new element could be a greater degree of cohesion among the consumers, and that, at this point, we are in the process of forming.

*Q. Mr. Secretary, could I follow that up?*

*Secretary Kissinger:* Yes.

*Q. There have been statements by Arab spokesmen in the past couple of weeks drawing a clear link between the oil crisis and future Middle East negotiations. In your statement just a moment ago, when you talked about your upcoming trip to the Middle East, you didn't talk about the oil crisis, but just the negotiation. Is there any realistic way of separating the two?*

*Secretary Kissinger:* The major dynamics of the oil crisis—well, first of all, I wouldn't like the word "oil crisis"—of the impact of the high oil prices is not inevitably linked to the Arab-Israeli negotiations. And we are negotiating these two issues separately because the high oil prices affect many nations on a global basis that do not have the re-

motest connection with the Arab-Israeli conflict.

We believe that to some extent these negotiations should be conducted in separate forums, and we are conducting them in separate forums.

### **Improvement of U.S.-Polish Relations**

*Q. If I may ask you, on Mr. Gierek's visit, in the spirit of the Polish Diet, would you care to elaborate on this visit in a more general, wider context of the East-West détente, if you may?*

*Secretary Kissinger:* Well, as you know, the improvement of relations between the East and West has been one of the cardinal goals of our foreign policy.

We have always held the view that this is not confined to relations between the United States and the Soviet Union but it must include some of our traditional friends in Eastern Europe. And therefore we expect during the visit of the First Secretary to discuss and to agree on a number of cooperative projects in a variety of fields, economic and technological.

We realize of course the facts of geography and the realities of existing political relationships. But we believe that a considerable improvement in relations between Poland and the United States is possible and that this will contribute to the general easing of tensions and improvement of relations on an East-West basis.

### **Grain Sales; Emigration From Soviet Union**

*Q. Mr. Secretary, on Soviet-American relations, over the weekend the Soviets have lost a major grain purchase. Can you say how this in your mind affects Soviet-American relations; and was the U.S. Government properly informed about the Soviet intentions? And, two, can you bring us up to date on the status of your discussions with the Senators on the Jackson amendment, which now seem to have run into some trouble?*

*Secretary Kissinger:* With respect to the grain purchase, this grew out of an attempt

by the United States to contact major importers of grain and to discuss with them a general level which we thought was consistent with maintaining American grain prices and also with our ability to fulfill it.

In the process, I believe that a strong possibility exists that we may have misled the Soviet Union as to what we thought we could deliver over a period of time. And when a trading monopoly is given a certain level, it then may assume that it has the right to place orders for the whole amount immediately. This is where a disproportionate impact occurred. And therefore we ascribed the events of last weekend to a misunderstanding between bureaucracies.

Secretary [of the Treasury William E.] Simon will be in the Soviet Union at the end of the week and will discuss with responsible Soviet officials the grain exports which we believe we are able to make which are consistent with our attempt to fight inflation and with our other obligations on a global basis. So we are confident that this can be worked out on a constructive and cooperative basis.

With respect to the second question, the negotiations between the Senators and myself, the difficulty, such as it is, arises from the fact that there are some assurances that have been given to me that I can defend and which I can transmit. There are some interpretations of these assurances which some of the Senators would like to make. And that is their privilege. And we understand that they would apply their interpretations as a test of Soviet good faith.

What I cannot do is to guarantee things that have not been told to me. And so the question is whether we can work out something which makes clear that we take the Senators' views very seriously but which does not put us into a position of having to guarantee something beyond what has been discussed.

Now, the difficulty arose at a meeting with the congressional leadership in which we presented what had been discussed and pointed out what we could guarantee in the area in which we were not sure of what in fact would happen. And the unanimous opinion of the congressional leadership was that if we could

not be sure about certain aspects, then some of the formulations that had been used might lend themselves to misinterpretation later on.

We have every intention on our side of working this out with good will. We have no intention of having any debate with the Senators concerned. We share their objectives. And we believe that a reasonable solution can be found among honorable men.

*Q. Mr. Secretary, was the figure of 60,000 or any other figure understood in your discussions with the Soviet Union?*

*Secretary Kissinger:* I have always made clear that I could not guarantee any figure. How you interpret certain administrative agreements into figures, I have always made clear, could not be guaranteed by us.

*Q. Mr. Secretary, would you recommend Presidential intervention in the event that any of the oil-rich countries tried to make a wheat deal or a grain deal similar to the one that was blocked over this past weekend?*

*Secretary Kissinger:* Well, there has been a meeting in the Department of Agriculture this morning in order to work out a program of voluntary restraints and voluntary cooperation between agricultural exporters and the Department of Agriculture. That program will be announced this afternoon. And I believe that it represents a satisfactory compromise between the operation of a free economy and the overall global responsibilities of the United States.

*Q. Mr. Secretary, in reference to your earlier comments about the negotiations on the underground nuclear test ban, would you agree that the agreement has to be renegotiated fundamentally in order to get through the Senate, namely, that peaceful nuclear explosions also have to be limited to 150 kilotons? And secondly, also because it relates to U.S. negotiations with the Soviet Union, would you agree that the dispute concerning negotiations over emigration with members of the Senate represents a diminution of their willingness to agree with you on many of these issues which are in controversy recently?*

*Secretary Kissinger:* "They" meaning the Senators?

*Q. Yes, sir.*

*Secretary Kissinger:* Or the Soviets?

*Q. No, speaking of the mood—I was particularly referring to the mood in Congress as reflected recently. I am trying to get—*

*Secretary Kissinger:* To confirm your article. [Laughter.]

*Q. No—you are entitled to a rebuttal if you wish. What I am trying to ascertain is—we have discussed here two new issues: one, the emigration concept—*

*Secretary Kissinger:* I understand the question. I think I get the drift of its import. But first let me deal with the first part of the question.

I do not agree, nor is it the opinion of the President or of the government, that the threshold test ban has to be renegotiated. We agreed with the Soviet Union in June that we would make a good-faith effort to develop criteria for nuclear explosions, for peaceful nuclear explosions, recognizing the difficulty of defining criteria for explosions above 150 kilotons. We will nevertheless engage in these negotiations in good faith. And the judgment of whether it is possible to develop these criteria can be made only after the negotiations have been completed. It has not been affected by any consultations in the Senate. It will be determined entirely on the basis of the negotiations that are now opening in Moscow.

With respect to the second question, we are here in an area of ambiguity, in which I have to say, in fairness to the Senators concerned, they have always held the view that there should be a fixed number. This is not something new caused by recent discussions, but it is something that they have always held. And I have always held the view that I could not guarantee something that has not been told to me. The question now is whether we can formulate a criterion that can be applied as a test without putting the administration into the position of having misled them. This has nothing to do

with any recent debate that has gone on in the Congress.

But since you obviously also want an answer to the implication of your question, I believe it was inevitable that during the Watergate period, when much of the public attention and congressional attention was on domestic affairs, that there was a great reluctance to have a challenge to foreign policy. As we now have a more normal governmental process, it is also inevitable that there will be a more normal debate on the subject of foreign policy. And I consider that inevitable and, in the long term, desirable.

#### **Attitudes Toward Foreign Policy Issues**

*Q. Mr. Secretary, is the Nixon doctrine still an ongoing policy of the new administration, and if so, do you have the support of the Congress in seeing that it is implemented?*

*Secretary Kissinger:* First of all, the Nixon doctrine, defined as strengthening the capability of countries to defend themselves, is still the policy of the administration. It is also true, as a result of the war in Vietnam and of a generation of involvement in international affairs, that the general attitude of much of the American public toward foreign aid in general has become much more skeptical. And therefore the administration has greater difficulties than used to be the case a decade or two ago in its general ability to convince Congress to appropriate these sums, especially at a period when we have severe domestic economic strains.

We believe that it is our obligation to put before the Congress what we believe is in the national interest, just as it is the Congress' right to make its own judgment.

*Q. Sir, to clarify your earlier remarks about the 40 Committee, has the recent controversy about Chile caused any change in policy with regard to covert political activities?*

*Secretary Kissinger:* As I pointed out, the covert political activities have been carried out since 1948 under the general supervision

of the 40 Committee under various names. These operations are also briefed to the Congress by whatever procedures are established between the CIA and its oversight committees, and these procedures are not determined either by the 40 Committee or by the White House. They are left entirely to the arrangements between the CIA and the oversight committees.

Recently there has been an expansion of briefing the Foreign Affairs Committee of the House as to those activities that have foreign policy implications; that is, a small subcommittee of this [Foreign Affairs Committee].

I do not think it would be appropriate for me, in the nature of what is a covert operation, to go into the scale, but I believe that if one compares the scale now, or the scale even from the late sixties onward, to the previous period, one would find that the political direction has been tightened up and the number has decreased.

*Q. Mr. Secretary, before you became Secretary of State, you maintained that it was the job of the National Security Adviser to assure that the President got as wide as possible a range of foreign policy options and thinking within the government. Why do you believe now, as you apparently do, that your holding of both jobs, Secretary of State and the National Security Adviser, is not inconsistent with that function?*

*Secretary Kissinger:* Contrary to what I have read in the press, I have not entered this debate. I did not request the President to make the statement that he made in New York, nor did this issue come up between the President and me until he had already written that statement. The operation of the national security machinery depends on the President, and it must be organized in such a way that he feels comfortable in making those decisions. It is not a subject that any Cabinet officer can or should negotiate with the President. And therefore this is a matter that should be more properly addressed in another forum than by me.

*Q. Mr. Secretary, do you feel that the criticism that has been leveled against you*

*in the past month on a whole variety of issues is fair, and do you believe that that criticism has to any degree affected your capacity to run foreign policy?*

*Secretary Kissinger:* Well, I think it is fair to say that my own estimate of myself may be at variance with that of some of the critics. [Laughter.] But then I can't expect my critics to be right a hundred percent of the time. [Laughter.]

I think the fact of criticism is certainly fair and was certainly inevitable. I think that there may have been a period, as I pointed out, in which there may have been excessive restraint, and this may be counterbalanced now by finding the more critical aspects. I assume that it will even out over a period of time. I don't think it has affected my effectiveness.

#### Cyprus Negotiations

*Q. Mr. Secretary, sir, you have in the past week met with the Turkish and the Greek Foreign Ministers several times in New York. Could you now tell us as to what are the prospects for resuming the negotiations in Geneva; and, also, what are the prospects for peace in Cyprus?*

*Secretary Kissinger:* The progress in the negotiations on Cyprus depends on many factors. It depends on the domestic situation in both Greece and Turkey. Greece has elections scheduled, and Turkey is attempting to form a new government and may have elections scheduled. It depends on the status of the communal talks in Cyprus.

The attempt in the talks in New York with the Greek and Turkish Foreign Ministers was to see whether some basis could be found by which negotiations could ultimately start in a manner that was also compatible with the domestic necessities of each of the parties.

I do not have the impression that the resumption of the Geneva forum is imminent, and I don't think it would serve a useful purpose by making a prediction about when other talks will start. The United States strongly supports the communal talks which

are now going on and will in every other way do its utmost to enable the parties to reach a conclusion that is consistent with their dignity and self-respect.

*Q. Mr. Secretary, you have been reported widely as expressing concern that the economic crisis or the oil crisis might cause political upheaval toward Western Europe. Do you find that the Western allies with whom you met last week agree with your analysis, and do you think that you have now made progress toward some consensus on dealing with the oil crisis?*

*Secretary Kissinger:* I have been reported correctly as believing—indeed, I stated so publicly—that the continuation of these enormous balance of payments deficits will force governments, and especially those of Western Europe, into decisions that will, over a period of time, have significant domestic or international consequences.

I believe that this general analysis is shared, to a greater or lesser extent, by most of the countries with which we have talked. Therefore I am basically optimistic that we are making progress in the objectives we have set ourselves—which is to enable the consuming nations to withstand the impact of the economic situation in which they find themselves.

*Q. Mr. Secretary, could I follow that up? Would it be useful then for the major consuming nations to cooperatively reduce their consumption of oil by a specific amount, regardless of what that amount is?*

*Secretary Kissinger:* As I pointed out in the opening of the Washington Energy Conference in February, a restraint on demand is essential if progress is to be made in the solution of the oil problem.

Now, whether this restraint is achieved by international agreement or whether international discussions provide the impetus for essentially national decisions is not a major point. But a restraint on demand, in one form or another, is an essential component of the policy that we have sketched.

*Q. Mr. Secretary, on the \$50,000 gift to you from Nelson Rockefeller, is there any*

*reason why you did not disclose that when you were confirmed as Secretary of State?*

*Secretary Kissinger:* When Governor Rockefeller made this proposal to me, I asked the counsel to the President-elect to give me a legal opinion in terms of existing statutes and in terms of propriety. He gave me a written letter, a written statement, in which he pointed out that it was neither contrary to any law or statute nor involved any impropriety. And only after I had that written statement did I proceed, and then I put the money in trust for my children and did not benefit.

*Q. Who was that counsel, Mr. Secretary?*

*Secretary Kissinger:* I think it was Mr. [Edward L. ] Morgan. We will have this letter available this afternoon.

*Q. Mr. Secretary, on the Middle East, some Israelis have been insisting that the next stage should be the final stage. Is that now just out of the question?*

*Secretary Kissinger:* That is not my impression of what other Israelis have told me, and I don't want to speculate what the next stage will be; but it is not the impression that I have gained from my talks with all the parties.

*Q. Could you tell us from your assessment of the visit to Cuba of Senators [Jacob K.] Javits and [Claiborne] Pell whether you regard the reception they got as a kind of signal to the U.S. Government; and if so, how you might respond to such a signal?*

*Secretary Kissinger:* We have, I think, a rather clear understanding of the attitude of the Cuban Government to the problem of normalization of relations between the United States and Cuba. We are also discussing this matter in inter-American forums; and there will be a meeting of Foreign Ministers in Quito early in November to discuss the problem of OAS sanctions. We will proceed, first, in the inter-American forums to discuss the views of our colleagues, and then we will form a judgment as to how to proceed thereafter.

*Q. Mr. Secretary, why didn't the United States accept an agreement on the nuclear cooperation with Israel and Egypt? And, second, do you hope to sign this agreement during the visit of President Sadat next month in Washington?*

*Secretary Kissinger:* We haven't reached an agreement because some of the parties have not responded yet to our suggestions for additional safeguards. When the agreement will be signed—we do not have a fixed timetable, and we have not come to an understanding with anybody as to a specific time to sign the agreement.

*Q. Mr. Secretary, on that question, would you be prepared to give the nuclear plants only to those countries that will agree to the additional safeguards, even if some other countries did not agree to them?*

*Secretary Kissinger:* Well, we have not faced that question yet, and we expect that the countries concerned will accept the additional safeguards.

## **President Ford's News Conference of October 9**

*Following are excerpts relating to foreign policy from the transcript of a news conference held by President Ford in the Rose Garden at the White House on October 9.<sup>1</sup>*

I do have one business announcement. I am pleased to announce this afternoon that President Echeverría of Mexico and I have agreed to hold a meeting on the U.S.-Mexican border on Monday, October 21.

I am very much looking forward to this opportunity to meet with President Echeverría in the Nogales area, and we plan to visit both sides of the border. The United States and Mexico have a long tradition of friendly and cooperative relations. It is my hope that our meeting will contribute to maintaining that relationship and to

<sup>1</sup> For the complete text, see Weekly Compilation of Presidential Documents dated Oct. 14.

strengthen the good will between our countries over the years to come. At this meeting, we will discuss, obviously, a wide range of subjects of interest to both countries.

*Q. I am sure you have other questions on economics, but let me ask just one on international affairs. There are reports that you are planning some sort of a summit conference with Chairman Brezhnev of the Soviet Union. Can you give us some details on that?*

*President Ford:* When I took the oath of office, I indicated that I would continue our country's efforts to broaden and to expand the policies of détente with the Soviet Union.

Since I have been in office, I have had a number of discussions with responsible leaders in the Soviet Union. About 10 days ago, I met with their Foreign Minister, Mr. Gromyko.

Dr. Kissinger is going to the Soviet Union the latter part of this month to continue these discussions.

Now, as you well know, Mr. Brezhnev has been invited to come to the United States in 1975. If there is a reason for us to meet before that meeting in the United States, I will certainly consider it.

*Q. To follow up a little, do you expect the United States to have any kind of a proposal on arms to present to the Soviet Union before the end of the year?*

*President Ford:* We are resolving our position in this very important and very critical area. When Dr. Kissinger goes to the Soviet Union the latter part of this month, we will have some guidelines, some specific guidelines, for him to discuss in a preliminary way with the Soviet Union.

*Q. Mr. President, in your recent U.N. speech, you added some last-minute remarks praising Secretary of State Kissinger, and last night you made an extraordinary move of going out to Andrews Air Force Base to see him off on his trip abroad. Are you upset by the criticism that Secretary Kissinger is receiving from the press, the public, and Congress?*

*President Ford:* I would put it this way, Mr. Jones [Phil Jones, CBS News]. I am very fond of Dr. Kissinger on a personal basis. I have tremendous respect and admiration for the superb job that he has done since he has been the director of the National Security Agency (Council) and also as Secretary of State.

I think what he has done for peace in the world, what he is continuing to do for peace throughout the world, deserves whatever good and appropriate things I can say about him and whatever little extra effort I can make to show my appreciation. And I intend to continue to do it.

*Q. Sir, do you feel that his effectiveness is being undermined by this criticism?*

*President Ford:* I haven't seen any adverse effects so far. We are making headway, and I think constructively, in all of the areas where I think and he thinks it is important for us to do things to preserve peace and build a broader base for peace.

## Letters of Credence

### *Barbados*

The newly appointed Ambassador of Barbados, Cecil B. Williams, presented his credentials to President Ford on August 19. For texts of the Ambassador's remarks and the President's reply, see Department of State press release dated August 19.

### *Costa Rica*

The newly appointed Ambassador of the Republic of Costa Rica, Rodolfo Silva, pre-

sented his credentials to President Ford on August 19. For texts of the Ambassador's remarks and the President's reply, see Department of State press release dated August 19.

### *Ghana*

The newly appointed Ambassador of the Republic of Ghana, Samuel Ernest Quarm, presented his credentials to President Ford on August 19. For texts of the Ambassador's remarks and the President's reply, see Department of State press release dated August 19.

### *Spain*

The newly appointed Ambassador of Spain, Jaime Alba, presented his credentials to President Ford on August 19. For texts of the Ambassador's remarks and the President's reply, see Department of State press release dated August 19.

### *Syria*

The newly appointed Ambassador of the Syrian Arab Republic, Sabah Kabbani, presented his credentials to President Ford on August 19. For texts of the Ambassador's remarks and the President's reply, see Department of State press release dated August 19.

### *Venezuela*

The newly appointed Ambassador of the Republic of Venezuela, Miguel Angel Burellirivas, presented his credentials to President Ford on August 19. For texts of the Ambassador's remarks and the President's reply, see Department of State press release dated August 19.

## Annual Meetings of IMF and IBRD Boards of Governors Held at Washington

*The Boards of Governors of the International Monetary Fund (IMF) and the International Bank for Reconstruction and Development (IBRD) and its affiliates held their regular annual meetings at Washington September 30–October 4. Following are remarks made by President Ford before the Boards of Governors on September 30 and a statement made on October 1 by Secretary of the Treasury William E. Simon, U.S. Governor of the Fund and Bank.*

### REMARKS BY PRESIDENT FORD

Weekly Compilation of Presidential Documents dated October 7

It is a very great privilege and a very high honor to have the opportunity of making some preliminary remarks on this gathering here in the Nation's Capital of our country.

I extend to each and every one of you a very, very warm welcome. I and all Americans want your continuing friendship, and we welcome your constructive and thoughtful observations and recommendations. And I assure you at the outset that we will reciprocate in every way in order to make progress in this very vital area for each and every one of us.

We come together at an unprecedented time of challenge in our world's economy. But that makes my welcome to all of you—those of you who must solve these serious problems—an even warmer welcome. The serious problems that confront us today are extremely complex and, I presume, in some respects controversial.

We do this at a time of worldwide inflation at a rate far, far in excess of what any one of us can tolerate.

We come here today at a time of unparalleled disruptions in the supply of the world's major commodity. We are here today at a time of severe hindrances to the real growth and the real progress of many nations, including in particular some of the poorest and most unfortunate among us.

We in America view these problems very soberly and without any rose-tinted glasses. But we believe at the same time the spirit of international cooperation which brought about the Bretton Woods agreement a generation ago can resolve the problems today effectively and constructively.

My very capable Secretary of the Treasury, Bill Simon, will speak in greater detail on how we, the United States, view these problems and how we think they can be solved. But I think I can sum up in general our thinking quite briefly.

We in this country want solutions which serve very broad interests rather than narrow self-serving ones. We in America want more cooperation, not more isolation. We in America want more trade, not protectionism. We in America want price stability, not inflation. We in America want growth, not stagnation. We want for ourselves, as you want for yourselves, and we all want for the world a better life for ourselves and for those generations that follow.

You will help, and I am sure you will come forth with the kind of recommendations that will be beneficial. We want help to decide how this can best be done. The United States is fully prepared to join with your governments and play a constructive leadership role.

I say as I close, as I said at the outset, we want your friendship, your cooperation, and



we, as a country, will maximize to reciprocate in every way possible.

Again, welcome to our Capital, Washington, D.C., and the very, very best in this period of serious deliberation.

## STATEMENT BY TREASURY SECRETARY SIMON

Department of the Treasury press release dated October 1

Our recent annual meetings have reflected encouraging changes in the international economic scene. Three years ago our attention was focused on the new economic policy introduced by the United States to eliminate a longstanding imbalance in the world economy. Two years ago we launched a major reform of the international trade and payments system. Last year we developed the broad outlines of monetary reform.

This year circumstances are different. We face a world economic situation that is the most difficult since the years immediately after World War II.

Our predecessors in those early postwar years responded well to the great challenges of that period. I am confident we can also respond appropriately to the challenges of our day. But first we must identify the issues correctly.

Let me declare myself now on three of these key issues:

—First, I *do not* believe the world is in imminent danger of a drift into cumulative recession, though we must be alert and ready to act quickly should the situation change unexpectedly. I *do* believe the world must concentrate its attention and its efforts on the devastating inflation that confronts us.

—Second, I *do not* believe the international financial market is about to collapse. I *do* believe that situations can arise in which individual countries may face serious problems in borrowing to cover oil and other needs. For that reason we must all stand prepared to take cooperative action should the need arise.

—Third, I firmly believe that undue restrictions on the production of raw materials and commodities in order to bring about temporary increases in their prices threaten the

prosperity of all nations and call into question our ability to maintain and strengthen an equitable and effective world trading order.

With respect to the first of these issues, it is clear that most countries are no longer dealing with the familiar trade-off of the past—balancing a little more or less inflation against little more or less growth and employment. We are confronted with the threat of inflationary forces so strong and so persistent that they could jeopardize not only the prosperity but even the stability of our societies. A protracted continuation of inflation at present rates would place destructive strains on the framework of our present institutions—financial, social, and political.

Our current inflation developed from a combination of factors. In addition to pressures emanating from cartel pricing practices in oil, we have suffered from misfortune including bad weather affecting crops around the world; bad timing in the cyclical convergence of a worldwide boom; and bad policies reflected in years of excessive government spending and monetary expansion. As financial officials, we cannot be held responsible for the weather, but we must accept responsibility for government policies, and we must recommend policies that take fully into account the circumstances of the world in which we find ourselves.

In today's circumstances in most countries there is, in my view, no alternative to policies of balanced fiscal and monetary restraint. We must steer a course of firm, patient, persistent restraint of both public and private demand, and we must maintain this course for an extended period of time, until inflation rates decrease. We must restore the confidence of our citizens in our economic future and our ability to maintain strong and stable currencies.

Some are concerned that a determined international attack on inflation by fiscal and monetary restraint might push the world into a deep recession, even depression. I recognize this concern, but I do not believe we should let it distort our judgment.

Of course we must watch for evidence of excessive slack. The day is long past when

the fight against inflation can be waged in any country by tolerating recession. We must remain vigilant to the danger of cumulative recession. But if there is some risk in moving too slowly to relax restraints, there is also a risk—and I believe a much greater risk—in moving too rapidly toward expansive policies. If we fail to persevere in our anti-inflation policies now, with the result that inflation becomes more severe, then in time countermeasures will be required that would be so drastic as to risk sharp downturns and disruptions in economic activity.

There is a tendency to lay much of the blame on the international transmission of inflation. Certainly with present high levels of world trade and investment, developments in any economy, be they adverse or favorable, are quickly carried to other economies. But that does not absolve any nation from responsibility to adapt its financial policies so as to limit inflation and to shield its people from the ultimate damage which inflation inflicts on employment, productivity, and social justice in our societies.

#### **Financial Mechanisms To Recycle Oil Funds**

In addition to inflation, public concern has centered on methods of recycling oil funds and on whether we need new institutions to manage those flows.

So far, our existing complex of financial mechanisms, private and intergovernmental, has proved adequate to the task of recycling the large volumes of oil monies already moving in the system. Initially, the private financial markets played the major role, adapting in imaginative and constructive ways. More recently, government-to-government channels have increasingly been opened, and they will play a more important role as time goes by. New financing organizations have also been established by OPEC countries [Organization of Petroleum Exporting Countries]. Our international institutions, and specifically the IMF and World Bank, have redirected their efforts to provide additional ways of shifting funds from lenders to borrowers. The IMF responded rapidly in setting up its special oil facility.

In our experience over the period since the sharp increase in oil prices, three points stand out:

—First, the amount of new investments abroad being accumulated by the oil-exporting countries is very large; we estimate approximately \$30 billion thus far in 1974.

—Second, the net capital flow into the United States from all foreign sources, as measured by the U.S. current account deficit, has been small, about \$2 billion so far this year. During the same period our oil import bill has been about \$12 billion larger than it was in the comparable period last year.

—Third, markets in the United States are channeling very large sums of money from foreign lenders to foreign borrowers. Our banks have increased their loans to foreigners by approximately \$15 billion since the beginning of the year, while incurring liabilities to foreigners of a slightly larger amount. This is one kind of effective recycling. And while some have expressed concern that excessive oil funds would seek to flow to the United States and would require special recycling efforts to move them out, the picture thus far has been quite different.

No one can predict for sure what inflows of funds to the United States will be in the future. But it is our firm intention to maintain open capital markets, and foreign borrowers will have free access to any funds which come here. The U.S. Government offers no special subsidies or inducements to attract capital here; neither do we place obstacles to outflows.

Nonetheless some have expressed concern that the banking structure may not be able to cope with strains from the large financial flows expected in the period ahead. A major factor in these doubts has been the highly publicized difficulties of a small number of European banks and one American bank, which have raised fears of widespread financial collapse.

The difficulties of these banks developed in an atmosphere of worldwide inflation and of rapid increases in interest rates. In these circumstances, and in these relatively few

instances, serious management defects emerged. These difficulties were in no way the result of irresponsible or disruptive investment shifts by oil-exporting countries. Nor were they the result of any failure in recycling or of any general financial crisis in any country.

The lesson to be learned is this: In a time of rapid change in interest rates and in the amounts and directions of money flows, financial institutions must monitor their practices carefully. Regulatory and supervisory authorities, too, must be particularly vigilant. We must watch carefully to guard against mismanagement and speculative excesses, for example, in the forward exchange markets. And we must make certain that procedures for assuring the liquidity of our financial systems are maintained in good working order. Central banks have taken major steps to assure this result.

Although existing financial arrangements have responded reasonably well to the strains of the present situation—and we believe they will continue to do so—we recognize that this situation could change. We should remain alert to the potential need for new departures. We do not believe in an attitude of *laissez-faire*, come what may. If there is a clear need for additional international lending mechanisms, the United States will support their establishment.

We believe that various alternatives for providing such supplementary mechanisms should be given careful study. Whatever decision is made will have profound consequences for the future course of the world economy. We must carefully assess what our options are and carefully consider the full consequences of alternative courses of action. The range of possible future problems is a wide one, and many problems can be envisaged that will never come to pass. What is urgently needed now is careful preparation and probing analysis.

We must recognize that no recycling mechanism will insure that every country can borrow unlimited amounts. Of course, countries continue to have the responsibility to follow monetary, fiscal, and other policies

such that their requirements for foreign borrowing are limited.

But we know that facilities for loans on commercial or near-commercial terms are not likely to be sufficient for some developing countries whose economic situation requires that they continue to find funds on concessional terms. Traditional donors have continued to make their contributions of such funds, and oil-exporting countries have made some commitments to provide such assistance. Although the remaining financing problem for these countries is small in comparison with many other international flows, it is of immense importance for those countries affected. The new Development Committee which we are now establishing must give priority attention to the problems confronting these most seriously affected developing countries.

#### **Trade in Primary Products**

For the past two years, world trade in primary commodities has been subject to abnormal uncertainties and strains. Poor crops, unusually high industrial demand for raw materials, transport problems, and limited new investment in extractive industries have all contributed to tremendous changes in commodity prices. Unfortunately, new forms of trade restraint have also begun to appear.

In the past, efforts to build a world trading system were concentrated in opening national markets to imports. Clearly we need now also to address the other side of the equation, that of supply.

The oil embargo, and the sudden and sharp increase in the price of oil, with their disruptive effects throughout the world economy, have of course brought these problems to the forefront of our attention.

The world faces a critical decision on access to many primary products. In the United States we have sought in those areas where we are exporters to show the way by maximum efforts to increase production. Market forces today result in the export of many items, from wheat to coal, which some believe we should keep at home. But we

believe an open market in commodities will provide the best route to the investment and increased production needed by all nations.

We believe that cooperative, market-oriented solutions to materials problems will be most equitable and beneficial to all nations. We intend to work for such cooperative solutions.

### Prospects for the Future

In the face of our current difficulties—*inflation, recycling, commodity problems*—I remain firmly confident that with commitment, cooperation, and coordination, reasonable price stability and financial stability can be restored.

The experience of the past year has demonstrated that although our economies have been disturbed by serious troubles, the international trade and payments system has stood the test.

Flexible exchange rates during this period have served us well. Despite enormous overall uncertainties and sudden change in the prospects for particular economies, exchange markets have escaped crises that beset them in past years. The exchange rate structure has no longer been an easy mark for the speculator, and governments have not been limited to the dismal choice of either financing speculative flows or trying to hold them down by controls.

Another encouraging fact is that the framework of international cooperation has remained strong. Faced with the prospect of severe balance of payments deterioration, deficit countries have, on the whole, avoided shortsighted efforts to strengthen their current account positions by introducing restrictions and curtailing trade.

In the longer run, we look forward to reinforcing this framework of cooperation through a broad-gauged multilateral negotiation to strengthen the international trading system. In the Tokyo round, we hope to reach widespread agreement both on trade liberalization measures—*helping all countries to use resources more efficiently through greater opportunities for exchange of goods*

and services—and on trade management measures—*helping to solidify practices and procedures to deal with serious trade problems in a spirit of equity and joint endeavor*. It is gratifying that more and more governments have recognized the opportunities and the necessity for successful, creative negotiations on trade.

We in the U.S. Government recognize our own responsibility to move these negotiations along. Early last year we proposed to our Congress the Trade Reform Act to permit full U.S. participation in the trade negotiations. It is clear that in the intervening months the need for such negotiations has become all the more urgent. We have therefore been working closely with the Congress on this crucial legislation, and we shall continue to work to insure its enactment before the end of this year.

In the whole field of international economic relations, I believe we are beginning to achieve a common understanding of the nature of the problems we face. There is greater public recognition that there lies ahead a long, hard worldwide struggle to bring inflation under control. Inflation is an international problem in our interdependent world, but the cure begins with the policies of national governments.

Success will require on the part of governments uncommon determination and persistence. There is today increasing awareness that unreasonable short-term exploitation of a strong bargaining position to raise prices and costs, whether domestically or internationally, inevitably intensifies our problems.

Finally, I am encouraged that our several years of intensive work to agree on improvements in the international monetary system have now begun to bear fruit. The discussions of the Committee of Twenty led to agreement on many important changes, some of which are to be introduced in an evolutionary manner and others of which we are beginning to implement at this meeting.

For the immediate future, the IMF's new Interim Committee will bring to the Fund structure a needed involvement of world

financial leaders on a regular basis, providing for them an important new forum for consideration of the financing of massive oil bills and the better coordination of national policies. The Interim Committee should also increasingly exercise surveillance over nations' policies affecting international payments, thereby gaining the experience from which additional agreed guidelines for responsible behavior may be derived.

Moreover, discussions in the Interim Committee can speed the consideration of needed amendments to the Fund's Articles of Agreement. These amendments, stemming from the work of the Committee of Twenty, will help to modernize the IMF and better equip it to deal with today's problems.

For example, the articles should be amended so as to remove inhibitions on IMF sales of gold in the private markets, so that the Fund, like other official financial institutions, can mobilize its resources when they are needed. In order to facilitate future quota increases, the package of amendments should also include a provision to modify the present requirement that 25 percent of a quota subscription be in gold. Such an amendment will be a prerequisite for the quota increase now under consideration. And the amendment will be necessary in any event for us to achieve the objectives shared by all the participants in the Committee of Twenty of removing gold from a central role in the system and of assuring that the SDR [special drawing right] becomes the basis of valuation for all obligations to and from the IMF.

Preparation of an amendment to embody the results of the current quinquennial review of quotas offers us still another opportunity to reassess the Fund's role in helping to meet the payments problems of member nations in light of today's needs and under present conditions of relative flexibility in exchange rates.

The trade pledge agreed by the Committee of Twenty provides an additional framework for cooperative action in today's troubled economic environment. It will mitigate the potential danger in the present situation of self-defeating competitive trade actions

and bilateralism. The United States has notified its adherence to the pledge, and I urge other nations to join promptly in subscribing.

The new Development Committee, still another outgrowth of the work of the Committee of Twenty, will give us an independent forum that will improve our ability to examine comprehensively the broad spectrum of development issues. We look forward to positive results from this new committee's critical work on the problems of the countries most seriously affected by the increase in commodity prices and on ways to insure that the private capital markets make a maximum contribution to development.

### **The World Bank and Its Affiliates**

International cooperation for development is also being strengthened in other ways, notably through the replenishment of IDA [International Development Association]. A U.S. contribution of \$1.5 billion to the fourth IDA replenishment has been authorized by Congress, and we are working with our congressional leaders to find a way to complete our ratification at the earliest possible date. A significant new group of countries has become financially able to join those extending development assistance on a major scale. We would welcome an increase in their World Bank capital accompanied by a commensurate participation in IDA.

The United States is proud of its role in the development of the World Bank over the past quarter century. We are confident that the Bank will respond to the challenges of the future as it has so successfully responded in the past.

One of these challenges is to concentrate the Bank's resources to accelerate growth in those developing countries with the greatest need.

A second challenge is to continue the Bank's annual transfer of a portion of its income to IDA. The recent increase in interest rates charged by the Bank is not sufficient to enable the Bank to continue transfers to IDA in needed amounts. We

urge that the Bank's Board promptly find a way to increase significantly the average return from new lending.

A third challenge is that the Bank find ways to strengthen its commitment to the principle that project financing makes sense only in a setting of appropriate national economic policies, of effective mobilization and use of domestic resources, and of effective utilization of the private capital and the modern technology that is available internationally on a commercial basis.

I should mention also that we are concerned about the Bank's capital position. We should encourage the Bank to seek ways to assist in the mobilization of funds by techniques which do not require the backing of the Bank's callable capital.

Within the Bank Group, we are accustomed to thinking mainly of the IFC [International Finance Corporation] in considering private capital financing. While now small, the IFC is, in my view, a key element in the total equation and should be even more important in the future. But the Bank itself needs to renew its own commitment to stimulation of the private sectors of developing countries.

Finally, let me emphasize that the capable and dedicated leadership and staff of the World Bank have the full confidence and support of the United States as they face the difficult challenges of the current situation.

Ladies and gentlemen, the most prosperous period in the history of mankind was made possible by an international framework which was a response to the vivid memories of the period of a beggar-thy-neighbor world. Faced with staggering problems, the founders of Bretton Woods were inspired to seek cooperative solutions in the framework of a liberal international economic order. Out of that experience evolved an awareness that our economic and political destinies are inextricably linked.

Today, in the face of another set of problems, we must again shape policies which reflect the great stake each nation has in

the growth and prosperity of others. Because I believe that interdependence is a reality—one that all must sooner or later come to recognize—I remain confident that we will work out our problems in a cooperative manner.

The course which the United States will follow is clear. Domestically, we will manage our economy firmly and responsibly, resigning ourselves neither to the inequities of continued inflation nor to the wastefulness of recession. We will strengthen our productive base; we will develop our own energy resources; we will expand our agricultural output. We will give the American people grounds for confidence in their future.

Internationally, let there be no doubt as to our course. We will work with those who would work with us. We make no pretense that we can, or should, try to solve these problems alone, but neither will we abdicate our responsibility to contribute to their solution. Together, we can solve our problems. Let me reaffirm our desire and total commitment to work with all nations to coordinate our policies to assure the lasting prosperity of all of our peoples.

## **U.S. and Jordan Sign Agreement on Nonscheduled Air Services**

The Department of State announced on September 27 (press release 382) the United States and Jordan had signed on September 21 at Amman a nonscheduled air service agreement between the two governments. Ambassador Thomas R. Pickering signed for the United States and Nadim Zarou, Minister of Transportation, for Jordan. The agreement will provide the framework for charter operations between the two countries and will facilitate charter flights to the Holy Land and to historic religious sites in the Middle East. (For text of the agreement, see press release 382.)

## Secretary Kissinger Hosts Dinner for Members of Arab League

*Following is an exchange of toasts between Secretary Kissinger and Lebanese Foreign Minister Fu'ad Naffa', Chairman of the Council of the League of Arab States, at a dinner at the U.S. Mission to the United Nations at New York on September 30.*

Press release 388 dated October 1

### SECRETARY KISSINGER

Mr. Secretary General, Excellencies, friends: I first of all want to make clear that this is not the beginning of a confrontation about oil prices [laughter and applause]—especially as long as you all outnumber me here. [Laughter.]

I tried—I've seen so many of you over the past year so many times; in fact, I've seen more Arab leaders than any other part of the world—that I tried to promote my participation at the Arab summit later this month. [Laughter.] I must say the Foreign Minister of Morocco, who is very elegant and very subtle, did not speak English when the subject was raised. [Laughter and applause.] So maybe next year.

But we met here—many of us—about this time last year, and I had the impression that one or two of you had some slight reservations about my appointment as Secretary of State. And it is true, leaving aside any particular individuals, that for a period of many years the situation in the Middle East had become frozen.

I spoke to my friend Umar [Umar al-Saqqaf, Saudi Arabian Minister of State for Foreign Affairs] two weeks before the October war began, and I told him that we would try to make a major diplomatic effort in order to promote peace in the Middle East. And then there was the war, and since then we have had an opportunity to talk together about many problems.

I think great changes have occurred in the

Middle East. I think the peoples in the Middle East have realized that they should make a very serious effort to move toward peace which is based on the recognition of the rights of all peoples in the area. And the United States has understood that a conditional stalemate in the Middle East creates a constant source of tensions, and the economic consequences that flowed from this war have taught the whole world what was probably not intended; for instance, that our global economy is interdependent in a way that few of us had realized and that producers and consumers—consumers among you gentlemen—depend on an understanding of each other's necessities that has made the world a global community.

We have had the opportunity to meet many of you and to understand the aspirations for peace that exist in the area, and a beginning has been made toward a just and lasting peace. We recognize that it is only beginning. And in my speech to the General Assembly, I expressed the determination of the United States to use all its influence to continue the process that was started on a basis that takes care of the aspirations of all of the countries in the area and that encompasses the concerns of the parties.

I will be going to the Middle East next week to see whether this negotiating process can be started, and we will spare no effort. With your understanding, your support, I am confident that we will make progress. That, at any rate, is what we have dedicated ourselves to.

We also have started, as you all know, a discussion on the nature of the interdependence of the global economy. This is not the place to go into it. And my friend Umar has already told me that he has prepared a crushing reply to be made public very soon. [Laughter.]

I want to say that as far as the United States is concerned, we are not going to enter these discussions in a spirit of confrontation. It is our profound conviction

that what we are trying to convey to all of our friends is that it is impossible to achieve unilateral benefit and that it's peculiarly a situation where what is in the common benefit is also for the individual gain of everybody.

How that will be worked out in time depends on many discussions, but on our side we approach these discussions in a spirit of good will and with the certainty that a reasonable solution that is just to all can be found.

I want to take this opportunity, on a personal basis, to express my gratitude, the gratitude of the U.S. Government, to all of you who have welcomed my colleagues and me over the past year, on our many travels, with the proverbial Arab hospitality.

We are engaged in a very difficult process—all of us together—and I have appreciated your understanding of our friendship. And I am confident that the problems before us will be solved in a manner that all of us in this room can be proud to have worked together.

In this spirit I'd like to propose a toast to the friendship between the Arab peoples and the people of the United States.

#### **AMBASSADOR NAFFA'**

Mr. Secretary of State: I will thank you first because you didn't want to make confrontation with Arabs here about the oil problem, because—as you said—it's not here that we can discuss it, and on the other hand, it would have been a little difficult for me, with my weak English, to discuss this problem. [Laughter and applause.]

Anyway, we conceive interdependence of the nations and the economies as a global community, but we conceive that in the global community right and justice will have their word to say and to be applied.

About your participation at the conference—the summit conference—we cannot decide it here too. [Laughter.] You have to

apply [laughter and applause] and to see who will sponsor your application. [Laughter.] Maybe I will.

Mr. Secretary of State, I would like to express to you on my behalf and on that of my colleagues, the Foreign Ministers of the other Arab states, our thanks and appreciation for your gesture of inviting us this evening. We find this gesture an expression of your desire to establish friendly relations with us on a personal level, to continue the dialogue, and to strengthen the relations between the United States and our countries.

I would like to assure you that we welcome this gesture very much; for we all are open to dialogue, desirous to strengthen the good relations between us and to exchange views in honesty and frankness. Our hope is to be able to develop friendly relations with your country on the basis of understanding and cooperation in an atmosphere of mutual confidence and that these relations would serve real peace which is founded on the respect of the principle of right and justice.

I am confident that I am expressing the opinion of all my colleagues when I praise the great efforts which you have made during the past few months and the positive results which you have been able to achieve. I am also expressing their belief when I say that the present circumstances require intensification of these efforts, for the stage which we have reached today in cooperation with you has been necessary and useful. However, it is not sufficient to achieve peace. It is only a preliminary stage which has opened the door, provided that the intentions are sincere, to implement the basic requirements of achieving peace.

You know these requirements very well, Mr. Secretary of State, and you also undoubtedly know that the real chance for peace depends to a great extent on the position which the United States takes in the next few months because of the great influence which she enjoys and the big potentials she has in her possession.



For this reason, I can say that our expectations from you are as great as the responsibilities which you share.

I raise my glass to wish you health and prosperity.

## Secretary Kissinger Hosts Luncheon for Latin American Foreign Ministers

*Following is an exchange of toasts between Secretary Kissinger and Adolfo Molina, Foreign Minister of Guatemala, at a luncheon for Latin American Foreign Ministers and Permanent Representatives to the United Nations at the Center for Inter-American Relations at New York on October 2.*

Press release 390 dated October 3

### SECRETARY KISSINGER

Excellencies and friends: I speak before this group always with considerable hesitation, knowing the high quality of oratory that is assembled in this room and the judgments that will be made on my effort—not to speak of the replies that will be given either while I'm in the room or to the press after we all leave.

We met in this room just about a year ago today, and it isn't often that one attends lunch and one can say it makes a difference in the affairs of nations. But I like to think that the new dialogue which we started in this room last year has already made a difference and, if we carry out the promise that it contains, that it will make an even more important difference in the years ahead.

I told you then, and still believe, that relationships in the Western Hemisphere had been too long neglected and that if the United States could not establish a constructive and creative relationship on the basis of equality and mutual respect with its friends to the south, with so many historic ties connected

to it, then how can we speak of a world structure or expect to be creative in other parts of the world? The Foreign Minister of Costa Rica replied, and so did the Foreign Minister of Colombia; and out of this developed a series of meetings that we have had since then.

I believe that the new dialogue has already removed some misunderstandings; it has already identified some common problems; and it has already created some working groups—on science and technology, on the multinational corporations—that deal with some of our specific aspirations and with our particular grievances.

But we are only at the very beginning of this process. All of our countries face problems which have become global in nature. We all face the problem of inflation. Some of us are commodity exporters, some of us are commodity importers, and some of us are both. But we all realize that we have become part of an interdependent world community and that none of us—not the United States nor anybody else—can solve these problems by purely national policies. So the question isn't really whether they should be dealt with in a larger forum—about that we have no choice—but with what group we should discuss, in what manner, and to what purpose.

In this respect, as I have said to you in our several meetings over the past year, the United States attaches extraordinary importance to its Western Hemisphere relationships. In Mexico City I used the word which was criticized by one or two of you with great eloquence when I spoke of "community" in the Western Hemisphere. And in fact I told my friend the Foreign Minister of Jamaica if we could only have excluded the Caribbeans we would have a happy meeting. [Laughter.] And as our influence grows, I don't exclude the possibility. [Laughter and applause.]

But we do not insist on any particular phrase in the name of which we work together. We recognize several countries here have attended meetings of the nonaligned,

and we realize that all countries here want to pursue foreign policies that reflect their own national interests and their own regional concerns.

What we propose is that those problems which we identify as "common" we should deal with in a spirit of cooperation and on the basis of equality and thereby set an example to many other parts of the world of how problems must be dealt with. Nor is this proposed in any spirit of exclusivity, because eventually the problems I have enumerated can be dealt with only on a global basis.

The United States hopes that in the next year we can translate the dialogue into concrete achievement. We believe that the working groups that already exist can lead to tangible results. We hope, and are quite confident, that our own Trade Reform Act will pass so that the systems of preferences—which we have talked about for too long—can finally be instituted.

And beyond this, we are prepared to discuss the political relationships in the Western Hemisphere, the restructuring of the OAS, with an open mind and paying careful heed to the predominant views of our friends in the Western Hemisphere, both within the OAS and at the forthcoming Foreign Ministers meeting in Argentina.

We will work toward a concrete solution of our common problems. Within the United States, we will make an effort to anchor the Western Hemisphere relationship not only in the consciousness of our government but in the hearts of the people. And we believe that all of us have an obligation to contribute to this in our countries as much as we can.

I'm glad to say that our new Assistant Secretary of State for Latin American Affairs, Mr. William Rogers, who is here with us, has accepted this position, because he has had a long history of dedication to Western Hemisphere relationships. You have in him a guarantee that what we will do together will not be done by one country for others nor will it be done in a spirit of bureaucracy, but

with an attitude of friendship, with a feeling of humanity, and with a hope that what we do here in the Western Hemisphere is of significance not just for us ourselves but for a world that needs a demonstration of how free people working together can master their own future.

It's in this spirit that I would like to propose a toast to progress in the Western Hemisphere and to our close and growing friendship.

#### FOREIGN MINISTER MOLINA

Mr. Secretary of State, Your Excellencies, and ladies and gentlemen: It is indeed a great pleasure—coincidentally, because of the fact that Guatemala is at present presiding at the Latin American group of nations—that I have been singled out for the specific honor of acting here as spokesman for the Latin American Foreign Ministers as well as for the Latin American Ambassadors to the United Nations to respond to the invitation to this banquet.

In the first place, I should state—and I must state—that I want to thank you for your invitation to share bread and wine here with all of your colleagues in this spirit of friendship with the countries of Latin America and in the spirit of a continuous dialogue.

As was stated one year ago, when we held this meeting that has been referred to here, the dialogue is based on the basis of equality, as has been mentioned by Secretary Kissinger, as well as the principles of dignity of the members of the various countries of our hemisphere. It is because of this dialogue that started here—that we continued in Bogotá, Mexico City, Washington, D.C., and Atlanta—that we have been able to broach sudden problems in a practical manner with the practicalities that characterize Secretary Kissinger's approach, which can be summarized in use of few words and decisive action, in order to state that we here have a

responsibility to deal with the problems of the economic development of our countries, the problems that have been mentioned of transfer of technology, the problems of the transnational corporations, and also other points that are related.

We have a number of study groups that have met both in conferences. We have had working groups that have worked on all of the subjects that have been referred to as well as some of the others incorporated in the Declaration of Tlatelolco. It is in this spirit of Tlatelolco that the new dynamics of the relationships in the hemisphere toward greater economic development have been conducted.

This new year of the dialogue is one that brings with it numerous problems, as Secretary Kissinger has suggested, and reflects ominous clouds on the horizon in which the policies of the different countries will have to be defined. We have noted problems, such as the unbalance in the balance of payments that exists between our respective countries and, as has sometimes been also stated by the Secretary at the United Nations, the problems that come forth with diffusion of knowledge—specifically, with reference to nuclear technology—as well as the problems relating to the inflationary spirit which is affecting most countries in the world.

The history of the world confirms the fable of Nemesis—one that really rules the destiny of man, one of providing man with the type of abundance that he desires—that he might be led to the type of nuclear technology which could destroy humanity, one in which an excess in the amount of money or funds available could, in fact, engulf humanity in a situation as we conceived it.

With respect to the concept of interdependence, this is one that, I would like to point out, has both a positive and negative connotation. It is positive in the sense that the peoples of the world can no longer live in isolation. We all need from one another in order to help ourselves. But it also has a negative side in the sense that problems of

the world now affect everybody in the world and therefore we need joint solutions.

For the Latin Americans and Latin American countries, the question of economic security is of great importance, and that is why we attach special significance to the charter of duties and obligations of member states in the realm of economic relationships—in order to guarantee our mutual economic security. We find a twofold problem that we are facing, and this is one that I was specifically facing when I started to address this group. In the first place, I was not informed or aware of the points that Secretary Kissinger might bring up in his speech. And, secondly, I am not aware of the points of view that my colleagues in this room share with us.

I believe therefore that in order to fulfill the mission that was specifically assigned to me I should express to the Secretary of State, on behalf of all of you, our great interest in all of the issues that he has raised. The matters that have been raised here will be studied by our respective governments. They will be considered and reflected upon. And in the future we will be able to come to other meetings with specific proposals and recommendations to deal with them.

I believe that I express the gratification that we all share here at the appointment of William Rogers, who has always been, and is considered, a great friend of Latin America.

It is in this context that we want to point to our hopes that we will be able to carry forth in the extraordinary program and tasks that we have set for us and that Secretary Kissinger so well understands in our own hemisphere and also the extraordinary hope that we have because we know how well Secretary Kissinger is familiar and aware with the problems that confront all of the countries of the world and the repercussions that those world problems have on the Western Hemisphere.

Finally, I would like to express a great appreciation to you, Mr. Secretary, for the special hospitality, understanding, and soli-

parity that has been reflected here with all our friends of the Western Hemisphere, and I would like to express our hope that we may be able to continue this spirit of friendship and progress among our countries.

## Department Discusses Decolonization of Portuguese African Territories

*Statement by Donald B. Easum  
Assistant Secretary for African Affairs*<sup>1</sup>

My appearance before you today is particularly significant and timely in the light of the important changes that are taking place in southern Africa as the result of recent developments in Portugal and Portuguese-speaking Africa.

In March of this year, when a representative of my Bureau last appeared before this subcommittee, we stated that the then recently published book by General [António] Spínola presaged possible changes in the Portuguese territories. The book has now become history, and General Spínola has resigned from public office. But the Portuguese Government since the coup in April has remained dedicated to decolonization in its African territories.

We have been gratified to observe how Portuguese decolonization efforts have been, in the spirit of the Lusaka Manifesto, met by a responsible and helpful attitude on the part of African nations, a number of whom greatly assisted in the negotiating effort that enabled the Portuguese and Portuguese African nationalist movements to reach the agreements which have given such impetus to the program of self-determination in Portuguese Africa.

<sup>1</sup> Made before the Subcommittee on Africa of the House Committee on Foreign Affairs on Oct. 8. The complete transcript of the hearings will be published by the committee and will be available from the Superintendent of Documents, U.S. Government Printing Office, Washington, D.C. 20402.

As the committee is aware, the efforts of the parties concerned have brought Portuguese-speaking Africa to the threshold of total independence. On September 10 Portugal recognized the independence of Guinea-Bissau, which is now a fully independent member of the family of nations. On September 7 Portugal and the Liberation Front of Mozambique (FRELIMO) agreed, in Lusaka, to the installation of a joint transitional government that would prepare the country for full independence scheduled for June 25, 1975. This government was installed in Lourenço Marques on September 20. The territories of Angola, Cape Verde, São Tomé, and Príncipe are still Portuguese dependencies, but Portugal has agreed that each has the right to independence and has taken important steps toward that end.

In Angola, however, the decolonization process is seriously complicated by the fact that the three principal liberation movements remain divided among themselves. They have been unable to agree on a common position concerning negotiations with the Portuguese, who have offered them participation in a provisional government.

The United States is pleased by the progress that has been made in the decolonization of Portuguese Africa. As you know, the United States has long espoused the principle of self-determination for the peoples of these territories. We are fully aware of the difficulties still to be overcome before the achievement of complete independence in all of the territories.

The United States was happy to be able to recognize the new Republic of Guinea-Bissau on September 10. Earlier, on August 12, we had supported its application to the United Nations, in which it is now a full and participating member. President Ford's letter of recognition contained our offer to establish diplomatic relations with Guinea-Bissau. Based on recent conversations I have had with officials of the new Guinea-Bissau Government, I believe that this offer will be accepted.

The United States is also looking forward to establishing and strengthening mutually beneficial relations with each of the other emerging Portuguese-speaking African states. That includes not only contact with new governments but, we hope, meaningful dialogue with liberation movements and political groupings that continue to play such a vital role in the process of decolonization.

While we are giving our full moral support to the decolonization process, we also are looking into ways and means within congressional mandates of assisting the emerging states, if they desire our assistance. In this connection, a State/AID [Agency for International Development] Working Group has been established in the Department to study ways in which we might respond to requests for such assistance.

The Working Group is looking in particular at educational needs and at possibilities for assisting those segments of the societies that are under greatest hardship. They are also investigating the possible extension of existing regional programs into Portuguese-speaking Africa. Finally, we have already provided modest emergency assistance to help alleviate the dislocation resulting from the recent disturbance in Lourenço Marques.

I hope that I have made clear the hopeful and helpful attitude of the United States toward these new and encouraging developments in Africa. All of this must of course be looked at in the broader perspective of southern Africa and the basic right of all peoples to self-government.

We believe that a great deal of credit should go to the post-April government in Portugal and to those African states and individuals who have played such a driving and dedicated role in bringing about these significant developments. We can only urge that the patience and good judgment that have so far characterized the process of decolonization continue to prevail as the rest of Portuguese-speaking Africa moves toward independence in what we hope will be a peaceful and stable manner.

## Food for Peace Report for 1973 Transmitted to Congress

*Message From President Ford*<sup>1</sup>

*To the Congress of the United States:*

I am pleased to transmit to the Congress the 1973 annual report on agricultural export activities carried out under Public Law 480 (Food for Peace). This has been a successful program. It has provided a channel for humanitarian assistance, promoted economic development and, in general, supported foreign policy objectives of the United States.

Throughout the year, the Food for Peace program demonstrated its flexibility in a changing agricultural situation. Because of the tight commodity supply situation in the United States, shipments during the year were somewhat restricted. This was especially true of wheat and wheat product shipments. However, our food contributions to the drought-stricken African countries, including Ethiopia, were substantial. In both East and West Africa, United States food aid represented about 40 percent of the total supplied by the international community. The level of U.S. contributions to the World Food Program and the U.S. voluntary agencies was maintained and the Title I concessional sales programs continued in such high-priority countries as Bangladesh, Bolivia, Cambodia, Israel, Pakistan, and Vietnam.

The Food for Peace program continues to be the primary U.S. food aid activity. Concessional sales programs continued to encourage recipient countries to establish self-help objectives and also support economic development projects. The program retains its emphasis on improving the nutrition of pregnant and nursing mothers, babies, and pre-school children, the most nutritionally significant periods of human life. Although most programs have aspects of agricultural

<sup>1</sup> Transmitted on Sept. 25 (text from White House press release); also printed as H. Doc. 93-362, 93d Cong., 2d sess., which includes the text of the report.

market development, specific programs for trade expansion have been limited because of strong commercial demand. Such programs could be resumed under changed supply conditions.

As 1973 legislation authorized the extension of the Public Law 480 program through 1977, it will go on playing its vital role in terms of development assistance, trade expansion, and promotion of our foreign policy objectives.

GERALD R. FORD.

THE WHITE HOUSE, *September 25, 1974.*

## U.S. Welcomes Turkish Decision To Change Poppy-Harvesting Method

*Department Announcement*<sup>1</sup>

The Turkish Government announced its decision July 1 of this year to authorize the resumption of the cultivation of opium poppies. Since that time there has been an ongoing high-level dialogue between our two governments during which we have made clear our concern at the possibility of a renewed flow of heroin made from Turkish opium to the United States. We stressed the vital need for effective control.

A special U.N. team has also recently held discussions on this subject in Turkey. The Turkish Prime Minister has repeatedly assured us of his government's strong determination to prevent smuggling. The Turkish Government has informed us that it has decided in principle to adopt a method of harvesting the poppies called the "poppy straw process," which involves the collection by the Turkish Government of the whole poppy pod rather than the opium gum. Traditionally the opium gum was taken by the farmers through lancing the pod in the field. And it was a portion of this gum that was illegally diverted.

<sup>1</sup> Read to news correspondents on Sept. 20 by Robert Anderson, Special Assistant to the Secretary of State for Press Relations.

We are very pleased with this decision. With effective policing to make sure that the opium gum is not illegally extracted by the farmers, the reflow of heroin that we fear can be avoided.

## Congressional Documents Relating to Foreign Policy

### 93d Congress, 2d Session

- Department of State Appropriations Authorization Act of 1974. Report to accompany H.R. 16168. H. Rept. 93-1241. July 31, 1974. 8 pp.
- Temporary Suspension of Duty on Certain Forms of Zinc. Report to accompany H.R. 6191. S. Rept. 93-1058. August 1, 1974. 5 pp.
- Extending the Temporary Suspension of Duty on Certain Classifications of Yarns of Silk. Report to accompany H.R. 7780. S. Rept. 93-1059. August 1, 1974. 5 pp.
- Elimination of Duty on Methanol Imported for Certain Uses. Report to accompany H.R. 11251. S. Rept. 93-1060. August 1, 1974. 5 pp.
- Temporary Suspension of Duty on Crude Feathers and Downs. Report to accompany H.R. 11452. S. Rept. 93-1061. August 1, 1974. 5 pp.
- Temporary Suspension of Duty on Synthetic Rutile. Report to accompany H.R. 11830. S. Rept. 93-1062. August 1, 1974. 5 pp.
- Temporary Suspension of Duty on Certain Carboxymethyl Cellulose Salts. Report to accompany H.R. 12035. S. Rept. 93-1063. August 1, 1974. 4 pp.
- Suspension of Duties on Certain Forms of Copper. Report to accompany H.R. 12281. S. Rept. 93-1064. August 1, 1974. 5 pp.
- Temporary Suspension of Duty on Certain Horses. Report to accompany H.R. 13631. S. Rept. 93-1065. August 1, 1974. 4 pp.
- Telegraph and Telephone Regulations, 1973. Message from the President of the United States transmitting the telegraph regulations and the telephone regulations along with the appendices thereto and a final protocol to those regulations, done at Geneva, April 11, 1973. S. Ex. E. August 2, 1974. 33 pp.
- Ratification of the Geneva Protocol of 1925. Report to accompany H. Res. 1258. H. Rept. 93-1257. August 2, 1974. 10 pp.
- World Food Resolution. Report to accompany S. Res. 329. S. Rept. 93-1070. August 5, 1974. 3 pp.
- Amending the Export-Import Bank Act of 1945, and for Other Purposes. Report, together with supplemental views, to accompany H.R. 15977. H. Rept. 93-1261. August 6, 1974. 20 pp.
- Authorization of Icebreaking Operation in Foreign Waters. Report to accompany S. 3308. S. Rept. 93-1084. August 12, 1974. 3 pp.
- Situation in Cyprus. Report to accompany S. Res. 381. S. Rept. 93-1092. August 15, 1974. 2 pp.

## Cooperative Actions To Solve Economic and Social Problems

*Statement by Senator Charles H. Percy  
U.S. Representative to the U.N. General Assembly*<sup>1</sup>

On this speck of debris in the universe which we call earth, no individual, no nation, no race can be an island unto itself. The economic and social issues that face one face us all.

Philosophically, the United States is committed to improving the economic and social welfare of humanity. The great difficulty is to translate our philosophical commitments into political realities. It is easy to speak in platitudes, but much harder to talk in the political realities of what can be done.

Certainly the major issues facing the 29th Assembly will be economic. They will be interwoven in the fabric of virtually every topic discussed. Without economic resources, we cannot realistically move to solve the vast social problems that beset this planet. This does not mean that economic and social problems are separate. They are not. In fact, many of the solutions to the economic problem of increasing the wealth of the world are closely tied to social conditions.

The state of humanity necessitates that the agenda before us be broad. The issues we must deal with this year include inflation, trade reform, monetary reform, economic assistance, population planning, food production, the status of women, and education. But as essential to all these issues, we must resolve through open discussion and negotiation the lowering of the price of international crude oil.

<sup>1</sup> Made in Committee II (Economic and Financial) of the U.N. General Assembly on Oct. 1 (text from USUN press release 123).

The price of international crude oil is the most destabilizing element in the world economy today. Its price denies the developing countries of the world adequate energy supplies to run their economies and fertilizer to grow their crops. The most seriously affected nations must take the rise in price directly out of the very low standard of living of their populace.

While the developed countries can borrow funds among each other in the short run, they will not be able to stand the drain of funds for a long period. No matter how effective the recycling of dollars is from oil exporters to oil importers, regional and national balance of payments disparities will grow so great that even many now-developed countries will be faced with international insolvency.

Such events could collapse the trade and monetary systems that have been so painfully constructed since the end of World War II. This in turn could certainly mean economic catastrophe, first for the less developed nations of the world, then for oil-dependent countries, and last for such countries as the U.S.S.R. and the United States who have oil resources of their own. And further, what optimism can there be in the long run for nations, primarily oil producers, in such a world?

No one can benefit from a worldwide depression. What will be lost is years of economic growth, resulting in despair for at least a generation of the world's people. What will be lost is a chance to work on our

social and economic interests together. We must work together. There is no reasonable, rational alternative. Economic nationalism should not bring down the world economic system, and thus social and political systems; nor should that system be operated for the benefit of only a few.

An alternative solution, of course, to the problem of oil prices is the development of alternative energy sources. All nations must work cooperatively on energy research to achieve technical breakthroughs to harness new sources of energy and better develop existing energy sources.

At best, however, this is a longer term solution, and for the time being most nations will continue to be heavily reliant on oil. That is why the policy of certain oil-producing nations engaged in unilateral price fixing on a noneconomic basis, commonly known as cartels, poses such severe economic problems to the world.

Such practices, whether they be by sellers or buyers, by industrial nations or less developed, can be ruinous. Like retaliatory tariff barriers and competitive devaluations, economic nationalism can spread through the body of the world economy and essentially destroy it. The world has come too far to return to barter.

This body should further note that such practices are contrary to the principles and objectives of the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT) in that they are monopolistic, anticompetitive, and distort flows of resources.

To be more specific, three key international organizations—GATT, the IMF [International Monetary Fund], and the IBRD (World Bank) [International Bank for Reconstruction and Development]—are the basis for today's world trade and payments system. Thus the international payments system itself is threatened by these practices.

Unilateral price fixing on a noneconomic basis is usually bad no matter who does it—not just in oil but in all commodities. Those who decry the present oil crisis must also look to themselves—are they in the process of fixing other prices?

If these practices are continued, those shouldering the brunt of such practices, particularly in developing countries, can take only so much. Masses of unemployed and starving will bring a powerful political and economic reaction against those causing the problem.

Therefore we must all consider in this forum and send home to our governments the following message:

—Abandon monopolistic economic practices, wherever they may exist, that are now the main cause of distortion in our world economy.

—Return to and reaffirm the open trade and free payments principles of these organizations—the United Nations, GATT, IMF, and IBRD.

—Understand that the long-term prosperity of each nation depends to a degree on the prosperity of all nations.

—Understand that not to correct these problems is to threaten grave economic disruption worldwide.

My own country certainly has a strong responsibility to help achieve these ends. Less developed countries need more access to the markets of developed nations. While our trading system is built on the idea of comparative advantage, the realities of economics are such that it is difficult to penetrate major markets and risky to move against established competition.

The trade reform bill now before the U.S. Senate establishes the principle of trade preferences for less developed countries. It is not enough, I would be the first to admit, but it is a start. As a realist, I can only report that it may be politically difficult to get more.

### Need for New Solutions

The economic problems facing the world today have been further aggravated by world social problems and demonstrate the need to view economic and social questions as inextricably related. The solution of one without the other is impossible.



As stated by the U.N. Committee for Development Planning in its 1970 report: <sup>2</sup>

While it is evident that high rates of growth of output and income have to be realized in these (developing) countries in order to eliminate mass poverty, to generate fuller opportunities all round and to finance some of the social measures, the process of development has itself to be viewed in terms of fundamental structural changes and as much with reference to concepts and methods appropriate to planned social transformation as those customary to economic analysis and policy-making. . . . for this reason, *the distinction often made between economic and social objectives is not a very meaningful one to draw.* [Italic added.]

How true. In the search for solutions to our traumatic economic and social problems, we must find a rational balance between people and resources so that the quality of human life worldwide may be enhanced.

If the problems basic to human and national survival—the population explosion, food and resource shortages, mass poverty—are to be solved, new, nonstereotypic solutions are needed.

Central to the creative and innovative processes needed to produce these new solutions is education. Education is the fount of knowledge and thus the basis from which civilization, cultures, and humankind have grown and advanced. Education has been the basis from which the world has made its immense advances in science and technology. If the world's acute problems of poverty, disease, and hunger are to be resolved, education must continue to produce the breakthroughs necessary to expand agricultural, industrial, and technological productivity. Increasing technological progress, however, will require new skills and resources. Only through education will the need for expanded skills and resources keep in line with new demands.

That education is integral to national development goes without saying. Education, however, is also the basis for personal development. It is through education that people seek to improve themselves and reach full potential.

We have to take into account that we are

all committed to education. The more education people get, the more dissatisfied they become with their lives when the shackles of ignorance are thrown off, if their rising expectations are not met. They will become a destabilizing force within each nation if they have no hope and are faced only with despair.

#### Full Utilization of Talents of Women

The ultimate purpose of economic growth, stability, and well-being is to provide the opportunities for a better life to all people. Particularly important will be the elimination of mass poverty and social injustice.

One of the greatest economic mistakes and social injustices that almost every nation in the world has at one time or another been guilty of is the assignment of women to a second-class role in society.

Actually, the role women often do play in contributing to social and economic development has perhaps gone as unrecognized as the potential role they can play. But, with great justification, no longer are they going to tolerate it. Action must be taken to correct both of these problems if women are to be fully integrated into all aspects of national and international economic, political, and social activity.

Both economic and social development require the full utilization and recognition of all individuals in society—economic development because all potential resources must be utilized in this effort, social development because a fundamental precept of human rights is that all people must be allowed to participate in the economic and political processes by which decisions are made about their lives.

It was because of this that I sponsored legislation in the U.S. Senate requiring the United States to work so far as possible toward the integration of women into the implementation of our foreign aid programs. This requirement is now law, but we must work to assure that its intent is carried out.

Similarly, we must all work to assure that the principle of equality for women established in the original U.N. Charter is realized

<sup>2</sup> U.N. doc. E/4776.

—not only in the nations of the world but in the functioning of the United Nations itself. We must all work, individually and collectively, on the economic and social changes necessary to bring this about.

Education and the avenues for greater participation in society give birth to rising expectations, expectations which cannot be met without new economic development.

The United Nations has wisely designated 1975 as International Women's Year. But let us not wait until next year to develop programs to better utilize one-half of the world's human resources. ECOSOC [Economic and Social Council] has called for a World Conference on the Status of Women, which Colombia has offered to host, in June 1975. We fully support the objective of the Year and the conference and will do all we can to insure the success of both.

#### **Global Approach to Population Problems**

In another area involving the linking of economic and social issues, the United Nations was living up to its potential as a global problem-solving organization in naming 1974 as World Population Year and in sponsoring the World Population Conference in Bucharest. In sponsoring Population Year and the conference, the United Nations has successfully assumed a leadership role in urging upon the world community the need for a unified approach to development and the problems that accompany development.

At the Bucharest World Population Conference, I was particularly struck by the complex interrelationships of the economic and social problems we face. The subject of population was once the esoteric realm of demographers—scientists whose concern was with numbers and distributions of people. In 1974, however, the population issue can no longer be separated from the problems of agriculture, resources, land use, health, education, women's rights, as well as all other aspects of economic and social development.

In Bucharest, the global approach to problem solving worked well. Candid expressions of widely disparate views were heard, but they did not obscure the real desire of

participating nations to reach agreement on approaches to population problems. The World Plan of Action, the document resulting from the Conference, is an outline which any nation may follow in its search for improved living conditions and opportunities for its people.

The Plan of Action is an excellent base upon which the United Nations and its member nations can build. But the Plan of Action must be recognized as only an outline and only a foundation for continuing efforts. The United Nations must not delay in urging all nations to accept as their own and to implement the far-reaching recommendations of the Plan of Action. At this point, the Plan of Action is only a document. Concerted efforts by us here in New York and by the governments of all nations can, however, transform that document into a reality that will mean a higher quality of life for all people.

#### **Short-Term and Long-Term Food Problems**

Finally, no problem is more economically and socially intertwined or global in dimension or in greater immediate need of U.N. attention and assistance than the world food situation. During a recent visit to South Asia, I saw firsthand the magnitude of unmet nutritional needs the world faces.

The problem is that if food production only stays even with demand for the foreseeable future, then it will be impossible to upgrade the diets of those who exist on subsistence or lesser diets at present. Hundreds of millions of persons around the world are undernourished or even malnourished. Moreover, if production fails to live up to expectations for any one of a number of reasons, then the millions who are now malnourished because of subsistence diets will fall below this dietary level. They will starve.

We face two different but related problems. There is the short-term problem of providing food aid to meet existing food emergencies and of organizing a system to deal with similar situations which may arise in the next few years, and there is the longer

range problem of increasing worldwide production, particularly in developing countries. This latter problem requires nothing short of a revolution in the countryside of developing nations. Neither set of problems will be easily solved. For our part, the United States this year will increase the amount of money we spend on food aid for others.

Such aid, however, even from many nations, is not enough and can never be enough. Long-term relief can only be accomplished through increased agricultural production in developing countries. As a U.S. Senator from a major agricultural state, I know that the lives of millions in distant lands cannot be allowed to depend on crop success or failure in another country.

Developing countries must have fertilizer production capability and the technological base from which to guide their own growth. And the developed nations must assist them in achieving this independent base. This is the main avenue to economic and social growth with justice.

I find it encouraging that the concept of a U.N.-sponsored World Food Conference developed simultaneously in the U.S. Government and at the last Nonaligned Conference. The fact that we worked together in the last Assembly and the Economic and Social Council to bring this idea to fruition bodes well. But as with the Population Conference, the United Nations has responsibility to carry through, and well beyond the World Food Conference, with efforts to solve the problem of production, storage, and distribution we all face.

In summation then, what the global community must do and what the United Nations must actively encourage are the following:

1. The price of international crude oil must be lowered.
2. The development of alternative sources of energy must be encouraged.
3. Economic nationalism should be discouraged, and we must return to the open trade and free payments principles of the United Nations along with a monetary system adapted to our changing world.

4. Educational opportunities for all peoples must continue to expand, but opportunities for economic fulfillment must expand commensurately.

5. Women must be given a greater role in economic development.

6. The United Nations must help encourage countries to deal with population problems by developing plans to eliminate unrestrained population growth.

7. We must solve the world's food problems through an international system of nationally held food reserves and increased investments in research, fertilizer production, and development assistance.

Only if we really work together on these problems and dedicate ourselves to their solutions will we have the chance to actually benefit all of humankind. If we just let empty rhetoric consume our days this fall, then we will have empty stomachs. Nations will have to empty treasuries, and eventually we will all go down together. On the other hand, through cooperative action in the self-interest of all nations, we can find solutions to these problems which will be worthy of the objectives of this organization.

## **United States Makes Contribution to U.N. Fund for Namibia**

USUN press release 124 dated October 2

On October 2 the U.S. Mission to the United Nations forwarded a check for \$50,000 to the office of Secretary General Waldheim for the Fund for Namibia. The check honored the U.S. pledge of March 21. The United States fully recognizes the U.N.'s responsibility for Namibia and considers the Fund a necessary and appropriate effort to aid some of the territory's people. It is the belief of the U.S. Government that the U.N. Fund for Namibia should be supported solely by voluntary contributions. The U.S. contribution was made subject to the condition that it did not exceed one-third of the total contributions to the Fund.

## U.S. Explains Vote on Resolutions on South Africa

*Following is a statement made in the U.N. General Assembly by U.S. Representative John Seali on September 30, together with the text of a resolution adopted by the Assembly that day.*

### STATEMENT BY AMBASSADOR SCALI

USUN press release 121 dated September 30

My delegation finds the policy of apartheid an illegal and obnoxious violation of fundamental human rights. It is as contrary to that for which my government stands as it is to that for which the United Nations stands.

We understand why many seek this opportunity to assert their moral outrage at this heinous policy. We for our part, however, do not believe the question of credentials was an appropriate one for this purpose. The purpose of evaluating the authenticity of the credentials submitted to the Secretary General is clearly to insure that the individuals representing states in this body have been authorized to do so by the government of the country they are here to represent.

The policies of those governments are not a legitimate consideration in this context. There are other times and other contexts in which they may be. But what is unquestionably true is that here they are not. No one can reasonably argue with the facts that South Africa is a member of the United Nations, that the government which has sent representatives to this Assembly is indeed the government in power in that country, that an appropriate official of that country signed the necessary credential documents, and that they were submitted in a proper, timely way.

Since we do not regard this as the appropriate item for expressing the Assembly's views on the policy of apartheid or the representative nature of the Government of South

Africa or other members who do not elect governments by universal, free elections, our vote against this report does not diminish our opposition to these unfortunate practices.<sup>1</sup>

My delegation abstained on the resolution sending this matter to the Security Council. The preambular paragraphs contained statements of undeniable and tragic accuracy. As I said, the policy of apartheid we believe is illegal, immoral, and fundamentally repugnant. It is the obligation of the United Nations to be concerned and to seek to take steps to eliminate such outrages.

We are not convinced, however, that the Security Council is the appropriate forum for discussing such issues. For this reason we did not believe it appropriate to cast a positive vote. Since others wished to discuss this question in the Security Council—and we favor wherever legally possible the right of all members to state their views in the forum of their choice—we did not believe it appropriate for us to cast a negative vote. Since we were neither in a position to vote in favor nor of a mind to oppose, we have abstained.

Of course our abstention is without prejudice to the position my government will take in the Security Council when this matter is discussed there.

### TEXT OF RESOLUTION <sup>2</sup>

*The General Assembly,*  
*Recalling its resolutions 2636 A (XXV) of 13 November 1970, 2862 (XXVI) of 20 December 1971 and 2948 (XXVII) of 8 December 1972 and its decision of 5 October 1973, by which it decided to reject the credentials of South Africa,*

*Recalling that South Africa did not heed any of the aforementioned decisions and has continued to*

<sup>1</sup> The Assembly on Sept. 30 adopted by a recorded vote of 98 to 23 (U.S.), with 14 abstentions, Resolution 3206 (XXIX) approving the first report of the Credentials Committee (U.N. doc. A/9779), which included a recommendation not to accept the credentials of the representatives of South Africa.

<sup>2</sup> U.N. doc. A/RES/3207 (XXIX); adopted by the Assembly on Sept. 30 by a recorded vote of 125 to 1, with 9 abstentions (U.S.).

practise its policy of *apartheid* and racial discrimination against the majority of the population in South Africa,

*Reaffirming*, once again, that the policy of *apartheid* and racial discrimination of the Government of South Africa is a flagrant violation of the principles of the Charter of the United Nations and the Universal Declaration of Human Rights,

*Noting* the persistent refusal of South Africa to abandon its policy of *apartheid* and racial discrimination in compliance with relevant resolutions and decisions of the General Assembly,

*Calls upon* the Security Council to review the relationship between the United Nations and South Africa in the light of the constant violation by South Africa of the principles of the Charter and the Universal Declaration of Human Rights.

## United Nations Documents:

### A Selected Bibliography

*Mimeographed or processed documents (such as those listed below) may be consulted at depository libraries in the United States. U.N. printed publications may be purchased from the Sales Section of the United Nations, United Nations Plaza, N.Y. 10017.*

#### World Population Conference

World Population Conference documents:

Recent population trends and future prospects. Report of the Secretary General. E/CONF.60/3. 97 pp.

Population change and economic and social development. Report of the Secretary General. E/CONF.60/4. 65 pp.

Population, resources and the environment. Report of the Secretary General. E/CONF.60/5. 92 pp.

Population and the family. Report of the Secretary General. E/CONF.60/6. 78 pp.

World Population Conference background papers:

Report of the symposium on population and human rights, Amsterdam, January 21-29, 1974. E/CONF.60/CBP/4. March 19, 1974. 45 pp.

World population and food supplies: looking ahead. Prepared by Lester R. Brown, senior fellow, Overseas Development Council, Washington. E/CONF.60/CBP/19. March 22, 1974. 20 pp.

Research needed in the field of population. Prepared by the staff of the International Union for the Scientific Study of Population, Liège. E/CONF.60/CBP/28. April 3, 1974. 14 pp.

Population and education. Prepared by the U.N. Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization. E/CONF.60/CBP/20. April 12, 1974. 21 pp.

## TREATY INFORMATION

### Current Actions

#### MULTILATERAL

##### Aviation

Protocol relating to an amendment to the convention on international civil aviation, as amended (TIAS 1591, 3756, 5170, 7616). Done at Vienna July 7, 1971.<sup>1</sup>

*Ratifications deposited:* Romania, September 6, 1974; Tunisia, July 10, 1974.

##### Patents

Strasbourg agreement concerning the international patent classification. Done at Strasbourg March 24, 1971.<sup>1</sup>

*Ratification deposited:* Netherlands (applicable to Surinam and Netherlands Antilles), September 13, 1974.

##### Phonograms

Convention for the protection of producers of phonograms against unauthorized duplication of their phonograms. Done at Geneva October 29, 1971. Entered into force April 18, 1973; for the United States March 10, 1974. TIAS 7808.

*Notification from World Intellectual Property Organization that ratification deposited:* Monaco, September 2, 1974.

##### United Nations Charter

Charter of the United Nations and Statute of the International Court of Justice. Signed at San Francisco June 26, 1945. Entered into force October 24, 1945. 59 Stat. 1031.

*Admission to membership:* Bangladesh, Grenada, Guinea-Bissau, September 17, 1974.

##### Wheat

Protocol modifying and extending the wheat trade convention (part of the international wheat agreement) 1971. Done at Washington April 2, 1974. Entered into force June 19, 1974, with respect to certain provisions; July 1, 1974, with respect to other provisions.

*Accession deposited:* Dominican Republic, September 26, 1974.

##### Wills

Convention providing a uniform law on the form of an international will, with annex. Done at Washington October 26, 1973.<sup>1</sup>

*Signature:* United Kingdom, October 10, 1974.

<sup>1</sup> Not in force.

## BILATERAL

### Austria

Agreement amending and extending the agreement of July 11, 1969 (TIAS 6815), for cooperation concerning civil uses of atomic energy. Signed at Washington June 14, 1974.

*Entered into force:* October 8, 1974.

### Guatemala

Agreement relating to payment to the United States of the net proceeds from the sale of defense articles by Guatemala. Effected by exchange of notes at Guatemala September 20 and 27, 1974. Entered into force September 27, 1974, effective July 1, 1974.

### Poland

Convention for the avoidance of double taxation and the prevention of fiscal evasion with respect to taxes on income, with related notes. Signed at Washington October 8, 1974. Enters into force 30 days after the exchange of instruments of ratification.

Agreement on cooperation in the field of health. Signed at Washington October 8, 1974. Entered into force October 8, 1974.

Agreement on funding of cooperation in science and technology. Signed at Washington October 8, 1974. Entered into force October 8, 1974.

Joint statement on the development of agricultural trade. Signed at Washington October 8, 1974. Entered into force October 8, 1974.

## DEPARTMENT AND FOREIGN SERVICE

### Confirmations

The Senate on September 30 confirmed the following nominations:

William D. Rogers to be an Assistant Secretary of State [for Inter-American Affairs].

Edward S. Little to be Ambassador to the Republic of Chad.

### Appointments

George Bush as Chief, U.S. Liaison Office, the People's Republic of China, effective September 27.

## Check List of Department of State

### Press Releases: October 7-13

Press releases may be obtained from the Office of Press Relations, Department of State, Washington, D.C. 20520.

Releases issued prior to October 7 which appear in this issue of the BULLETIN are Nos. 382 of September 27, 388 of October 1, and 390 of October 3.

No.	Date	Subject
395	10/7	Kissinger: news conference.
*396	10/10	U.S. National Committee for the CCIR Study Group CMTT, Oct. 31.
*397	10/7	Rogers sworn in as Assistant Secretary for Inter-American Affairs (biographic data).
†398A	10/8	U.S.-Polish agreement on joint funding of scientific and technological cooperation.
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# THE DEPARTMENT OF STATE BULLETIN

Volume LXXI • No. 1845 • November 4, 1974

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# THE DEPARTMENT OF STATE BULLETIN

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*The Department of State BULLETIN, a weekly publication issued by the Office of Media Services, Bureau of Public Affairs, provides the public and interested agencies of the government with information on developments in the field of U.S. foreign relations and on the work of the Department and the Foreign Service.*

*The BULLETIN includes selected press releases on foreign policy, issued by the White House and the Department, and statements, addresses, and news conferences of the President and the Secretary of State and other officers of the Department, as well as special articles on various phases of international affairs and the functions of the Department. Information is included concerning treaties and international agreements to which the United States is or may become a party and on treaties of general international interest.*

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For sale by the Superintendent of Documents  
U.S. Government Printing Office  
Washington, D.C. 20402

**PRICE:**

52 issues plus semiannual indexes,  
domestic \$29.80, foreign \$37.25  
Single copy 60 cents

Use of funds for printing this publication approved by the Director of the Office of Management and Budget (January 29, 1971).

**Note:** Contents of this publication are not copyrighted and items contained herein may be reprinted. Citation of the DEPARTMENT OF STATE BULLETIN as the source will be appreciated. The BULLETIN is indexed in the Readers' Guide to Periodical Literature.

## First Secretary Gierek of the Polish United Workers' Party Visits the United States

*Edward Gierek, First Secretary of the Central Committee of the Polish United Workers' Party, made an official visit to the United States October 6-13. He met with President Ford and other government officials in Washington October 8-10. Following are an exchange of greetings between President Ford and First Secretary Gierek at a welcoming ceremony at the White House on October 8, their exchange of toasts at a White House dinner that evening, and their remarks on October 9 upon signing a joint statement on principles of relations and a joint statement on economic, industrial, and technological cooperation, together with the texts of the joint statements and a joint communique issued on October 13.*

### REMARKS AT WELCOMING CEREMONY

Weekly Compilation of Presidential Documents dated October 14

#### President Ford

Mr. First Secretary: It is a very distinct pleasure for me to welcome you and Mrs. Gierek to the United States. As you know, Mr. First Secretary, the family ties that bind our two peoples together in a very special way are very, very old, indeed, older actually than the United States itself.

You have already visited Jamestown, Virginia, where the first Poles arrived in 1608, only one year after it was first settled. From that day to this day, large numbers of your countrymen have helped to build this country and to mold our great American traditions.

America treasures these contributions to our growth, to our culture, and to our history. During your stay in this country, Mr. First Secretary, you and Mrs. Gierek will be able to see for yourselves the character of

our country and the role that men and women from Poland have played in America's history.

Our two nations have thus a fine foundation upon which to build. I have watched with very great interest the substantial growth of our bilateral trade in the last two years since the establishment of the joint Polish-American Trade Commission. And continuing expansion of contacts between officials and private citizens in the fields of such activities as science, technology, and the arts is another evidence of the dynamic development of Polish-American relations.

You, Mr. First Secretary, will surely agree with me that we must not allow our satisfaction with past progress to slow our pace or slacken our efforts in the future. We must use the opportunity your visit affords to seek new avenues of bilateral cooperation in many, many fields, including energy and environmental areas.

In many other areas of common interest—for example, our participation in the Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe and our participation in the force reduction talks—we are engaged in common endeavors for peace.

Today, economic problems almost everywhere are very, very severe. That stability of the world is in danger, and almost everywhere it develops, as well as in developing countries, the welfare of people on a global basis unfortunately is actually threatened.

Mr. First Secretary, Poland knows too well, perhaps better than any other nation, the fearful experience of war and its very painful consequences. A thorough review of all the dangers to peace for ourselves and the world must surely be a matter of highest priority.

We seek a peaceful world and a more prosperous world. Poland is a world leader in coal production and coal research. Poland has a very major role, a role to play in contributing solutions to the world energy problem; and you, Mr. First Secretary, with a lifetime of expertise, are able to make a very important personal contribution in this specific area. I look forward to exchanging views with you on the energy problem.

Mr. First Secretary, we, all of us in America, are pleased that you and Mrs. Gierek are here. I am very confident, Mr. First Secretary, that our meetings will deepen the friendship of our two peoples and broaden the cooperation of our two nations.

Thank you very much.

#### **First Secretary Gierek<sup>1</sup>**

I wish to thank you for your words of cordiality which you, Mr. President, have addressed to me, to Mrs. Gierek, and to members of my delegation. I take these words of yours as being directed to the people of Poland and to the Polish state, on behalf of which and upon your invitation I am visiting the United States.

I am pleased to have made this visit, as it adds new testimony to the friendly ties that have linked our two nations since the times of George Washington and Tadeusz Kosciuszko.

I rest assured that it is the desire of both our peoples not only to preserve these traditional relations but also to strengthen them through closer and broader cooperation in the world of today.

Indeed, Socialist Poland, dynamically developing her new potential and creating as she does new living conditions for her people, is vitally interested in this. I trust that the talks we shall hold and agreements we shall conclude will greatly contribute toward this end, that they will open up a broader prospect for cooperation between our countries.

I am pleased to have made this visit, also,

<sup>1</sup> First Secretary Gierek spoke in Polish on all three occasions.

because it represents yet another reaffirmation of international détente, which my country views as extremely significant and to which we try to make our utmost contribution.

That process, which originates from the very essence of the contemporary world, from the need for and necessity of peaceful coexistence among states with differing political systems, has been considerably enhanced in recent years.

We of Poland can only welcome it in our profound conviction that it is in the interest of all nations to make that process further extend, universal and irreversible. Precisely for this reason there is wide appreciation today that it is you, Mr. President, who is steering the U.S. policy toward this direction.

I am pleased to have made this visit, as it will enable me to get to know the United States, to acquaint myself with the outstanding accomplishments of the progress of civilization of the American people, whose history and achievements have since the very outset been and continue to be so much enriched by the Americans of Polish extraction.

Mr. President, I am profoundly convinced of the propitious conditions today and the right time for expansion of Polish-American cooperation in its new dimensions and in all fields of endeavor.

Mine is also a firm belief that we can work closer together for the great cause of peace. That is the purpose of my visit here, and I am happy that you, too, share these aspirations of ours.

Please accept, Mr. President, the best wishes from Poland to the United States, from the Polish people to the American people.

#### **TOASTS AT WHITE HOUSE DINNER**

Weekly Compilation of Presidential Documents dated October 14

#### **President Ford**

Mr. First Secretary, our wonderful guests: It is a great privilege and pleasure to have you and Mrs. Gierek here with us this eve-

ning. We have had a very delightful dinner, and we had a very helpful and constructive discussion during the day, and I am looking forward to further discussions tomorrow.

Mr. First Secretary, I come from a part of our country where we have roughly 30,000 people with a Polish heritage or background. And as I grew up, Mr. First Secretary, I had many wonderful personal experiences with families that had a Polish background, families that had the same great family strength, families that had a tremendous religious dedication, individuals with a Polish heritage that became leaders in our community, outstanding scholars, athletes, public servants. And so I had a great exposure to the finest, the best, with individuals who had come from your country to ours.

And then in 1958 or '59, I had the opportunity to go to Poland, and I wondered as I went to Poland whether there would be so many comparable wonderful people in Poland as I had known in my hometown in Michigan in the United States.

And I found, Mr. First Secretary, that instead of 30,000, there were 30 million. And all of them had the same warmth, friendship, family dedication, deep conviction, and all of them wanted to uplift their community, their state, and make their country a better and finer place in which to live.

So it seemed to me, Mr. First Secretary, that it was very easy for Poland and our country to start building a foundation some years ago which has now developed into a great relationship, a relationship predicated on understanding, a relationship that has a far broader vision.

We want to help one another, and we do. But we want to build from our relationship a broader effort to improve world relations between countries that did not understand one another but who now, hopefully, will—blocs that did not understand one another but, hopefully, will. And the net result is that because of our citizens who came from Poland, settled here, and have become so strong and vital in our society and yours, who are so strong and so vital in Europe, I hope and trust that we can move together in coopera-

tion and economic matters, cultural matters, educational matters, environmental matters, and set an example for all nations, because we do understand one another and we can, by history, work together.

And so I ask all of our guests here tonight to rise and join with me in offering a toast to the First Secretary and to Mrs. Gierek and offer them the best from all of us in the United States to the First Secretary, to the Polish people.

#### **First Secretary Gierek**

Dear Mr. President, ladies and gentlemen: I thank you, Mr. President, for your kind and friendly words. I thank you for the hospitality you have shown us, which both Mrs. Gierek and I greatly appreciate and sincerely hope to heartily reciprocate.

From the outset of our sojourn on the American soil, we have been accompanied by a good, matter-of-fact, and friendly atmosphere. This gladdens us and reaffirms in our profound conviction that my visit here will prove fruitful.

Our conversations with you, Mr. President, have above all reassured me in this. We have exchanged, in their course, views on the most important issues of Polish-American relations and on the further development of the process of international détente.

We have reached important conclusions which will be set down on our joint documents. I am confident that the results of our meetings will open up a new stage in the mutual relations between both our countries and nations.

I highly value, Mr. President, this direct contact with you, with the leader of the United States, who by his own deep understanding of and positive approach to issues of the present-day cooperation between our two nations confirms the willingness to develop it further in the friendly attitude toward Poland.

I am also satisfied over my meetings with the Secretary of State, Dr. Henry Kissinger, and with all eminent associates of yours.

It is my conviction, Mr. President, that

there exist very favorable conditions to a significant expansion of Polish-U.S. cooperation, which is the common concern of ours. These conditions, as you have pointed out a moment ago, stem from our longstanding tradition of friendly mutual bonds, dating back to the times of the founding of the United States, began by the participation of Tadeusz Kosciuszko, Pulaski, and other sons of the Polish people who struggled for the independence of the United States.

These bonds were subsequently strengthened by the sympathy toward and interest of the democratic forces of the American nation in the cause of Polish independence. And they were amply reaffirmed in our joint struggle for freedom, greatest in history, as it were, conducted by the great anti-Fascist coalition in the years of World War II.

These traditions have remained alive, although their early postwar phase has fortunately become a closed historical chapter.

As a result of its own heroic struggle and its cooperation with all other freedom-loving forces, the people of Poland found its road to durable independence, to enviable security, to dynamic development.

The people of Poland found it in its new Socialist homeland, in its consciously chosen alliance with the U.S.S.R. and other Socialist countries, in its active foreign policy of international security and peaceful cooperation.

Modern Poland, Mr. President, with a more than 1,000-year history and great traditions of love for freedom and progress, is proud of the great historic achievements of the past three decades which have essentially altered the course of our nation's tragic past and verily transformed the country, elevating it onto a new place in Europe and the world at large.

The Poland of today, one of the world's top 10 industrial producers, is a country of a dynamic economy, of high cultural and scientific standards, and constantly growing standards of living.

In recent years we have endowed her development with a still greater dynamism and higher quality. We still have much to accom-

plish. But the decisive stage is behind us and Poland could now enter the phase of accelerated growth of her economy. And the aspirations of my people are indeed in keeping with these vital needs and aspirations of all.

It is from this position and for this purpose that we also desire to eject new impetus and quality to our cooperation with other countries of the world. We are delighted to see considerable progress achieved in Polish-American relations, particularly in recent years. But we take it only as a harbinger of a much broader cooperation.

We therefore attach special importance to development of economic cooperation, which establishes most durable of bonds and provides for a material base of cooperation in all other fields.

We conceive of the United States as one of our principal partners in the West. There exist all opportunities that it be so. The essential thing is to create conditions that would make us seize of all those opportunities.

I strongly believe that arrangements we are now adopting and agreements we are concluding will be a decisive contribution toward this end.

In the overall framework of relations between our two countries, a major positive role can no doubt be played by the multimillion-strong group of Americans of Polish ancestry as good citizens of the United States and at the same time retaining their emotional ties with their old land. They have always been one of the important factors of mutual rapprochement between our two nations, and they can further make a substantial contribution to their friendly cooperation.

Mr. President, ladies and gentlemen, our thoughts constantly turn to the great and common cause of all mankind, the cause of peace.

The Polish nation, which paid the highest price for its freedom and is fully cognizant of the value of peace, attaches great importance to the process of détente, which has been developing in recent years. We see in it a true road toward the strengthening of in-

ternational security and development of cooperation among nations on the basis of peaceful coexistence of states with different political systems. This is the prime need and necessity of our time.

Let me say, Mr. President, that Poland fully appreciates the far-reaching and all-round significance of Soviet-American agreements for the cause of world peace and general improvement of international relations.

It was with greatest satisfaction that we welcomed progress already achieved here, and together with other countries we have noted with great appreciation the promise that these propitious trends will be continued.

It is only natural that Poland should attach particular significance to progress of détente and to consolidation of the facts of nearly three decades of peace in Europe. We have been actively cooperating to insure the success of the Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe. We believe that there exist very realistic conditions for its successful conclusion in the months to come.

We shall continue to make our constructive contribution to the Vienna talks on troops and arms reduction in Central Europe.

We are convinced that the United States is also vitally interested in a lasting peace on our continent and can indeed make a substantial and constructive contribution to that cause. We rest assured of the indivisibility of and the universal need for peace and of the desire common to all nations for security, justice, and a better morale.

I trust that also in the strivings to achieve these great objectives closer cooperation between both our countries is possible and necessary.

My first day in Washington and, above all, the talks I had with you, Mr. President, reaffirm me in my conviction that together we can open up new, broader prospects for the development of Polish-U.S. cooperation. I am reassured in this also by the good climate in which all our meetings are held and which is typical of the friendly relations obtaining between our two peoples.

Mr. President, I should like to propose a

toast: To your very good health and all success in steering the affairs of the great United States; for the speediest recovery of Mrs. Ford; to your good health, ladies and gentlemen; to the development of friendly cooperation between our peoples and states; to world peace.

## REMARKS UPON SIGNING JOINT STATEMENTS

Weekly Compilation of Presidential Documents dated October 14

### President Ford

Mr. First Secretary: We have just put our signatures on landmark documents.

The first, on principles of bilateral relations, recognizes the friendly state of those relations. It underlines our joint determination to not only continue this cooperation but to further expand it for mutual benefit. We will make a joint contribution to peace and security throughout the world.

The second document is more specifically directed to economic, industrial, and technological cooperation. If it is to succeed, cooperation requires the careful and continuing attention of nations, as I am sure you will agree.

Over the past few years we have made important advances in our economic and trade relations. We have now pledged our countries to even further advances toward realization of the full potential for cooperation that we both see and we desire. Our peoples will benefit and the economic international community will likewise benefit.

These documents should be reassuring to our friends and associates throughout the world. We discriminate against no one, nor do we prejudice any commitments we have already made to others. Indeed, the respect we show for each other and the cooperation that we seek is part of the international spirit we see emerging. This new spirit seeks to solve problems, not to make new tensions.

Mr. First Secretary, my signature on these documents is yet another expression of the deep interest of the people of the United States in the well-being of your nation and

its deserved place in the international community. We welcome these documents for the contributions they will make to the spirit of cooperation and peaceful endeavor throughout the world.

#### **First Secretary Gierek**

Mr. President, ladies and gentlemen: I do share, Mr. President, your appraisal of the weight of the documents we have just signed, the fruitful nature of our talks, and the importance of the agreements we have concluded. I greatly appreciate what you have said and wish to express my profound satisfaction over the headway we made and results we achieved during my visit to Washington. I especially enjoyed meeting with you, Mr. President, which I shall cherish in my memories as an important, sincere, and friendly encounter.

We are opening together a new chapter in relations between the Polish People's Republic and the United States of America. As of now, these new annals will be recording the future of our relations as well as our broader, closer, and more extensive cooperation. We are opening that new chapter aware of the entire tradition of the friendly mutual relations between the Polish and American peoples, in the desire of tightening the bonds which we have inherited from the past and continue to maintain at present.

In enhancing the progress made in our bilateral relations in recent years, we are likewise creating a groundwork for expanded economic, scientific, and technical cooperation, for cultural exchanges and various contacts between our respective peoples. Particularly important in this regard is expansion of reciprocally beneficial economic ties, which form the most durable basis for all other mutual relationships.

I firmly believe that the inauguration of a future-oriented phase of Polish-American relations concurs with the interests and wishes of our two peoples. We are doing it in accordance both with the principles and the spirit of peaceful coexistence among states with different systems. For the United States

and modern Socialist Poland are precisely such states. Poland for 30 years has been shaping new conditions of life and development of her people. She remains faithful to her alliances, and in the best of her tradition, she is actively involved in the strife for progress and peace.

I trust, Mr. President, that the results of our meeting will also contribute to the strengthening of international détente. This latter process, in particular fortified by the improvement of Soviet-American relations, which are of exceptional significance to world peace, has already brought about many favorable changes in the international situation. It has reduced dangerous tensions and provided new vistas for constructive cooperation.

We can particularly sense this in Europe, where the process has been advanced most. Yet, even there, a great deal still remains to be done in order to insure peace for the entire future to come. May we all move further along that road, to free mankind completely from the nuclear threat, to give the world of today and all its nations a feeling of lasting security, and to resolve successfully the great socioeconomic and civilization problems which confront us now and are likely to emerge in near future.

I am happy, Mr. President, that, as has been reflected in our joint statement, we are in agreement as to the need for further action at making irreversible the progress achieved in peaceful relations among states with different socioeconomic systems.

Mr. President, ladies and gentlemen, tomorrow morning I shall be leaving Washington to visit other centers of your great and beautiful country.

On behalf of Mrs. Gierek and persons accompanying me, as well as in my own name, I wish to thank you, Mr. President, for the friendly reception and hospitality accorded to us.

Permit me at the same time to reiterate my very cordial invitation for you and Mrs. Ford, whom we wish a very speedy recovery, to pay a visit to Poland. With the fresh memories of our Washington encounter, I shall be looking forward to meeting you again,



this time in our capital, the city of Warsaw.

I should also like to say once more how happy I was to have met the prominent representatives of the U.S. Congress. My meeting with them has reaffirmed me of the congressional favorable attitude toward matters concerning further development of Polish-American cooperation.

I take this opportunity to thank the Secretary of State, as well as your other collaborators, for their contribution to the fruitful results of my visit to Washington. I thank all who helped make this visit a success.

Through you, Mr. President, I wish to convey to the American nation my heartfelt greetings and best wishes which I am bringing from the people of Poland.

#### **President Ford**

Thank you very, very much, Mr. First Secretary. I have enjoyed meeting you, becoming well acquainted with you, and I look forward to the opportunity of visiting Poland.

I told Mrs. Ford on the telephone today of your kind invitation, and she remembers vividly our visit to Poland some years ago. She, as well as I, are looking forward to a return to your nation and to meet again the wonderful Polish people.

I can assure you, Mr. First Secretary, that as you travel around the rest of the United States—and I wish you could stay longer and visit more places—that you will find a great warmth on the part of the American people for the people of Poland and you will be welcome wherever you go. I know the warmth of the welcome here will be equal wherever you visit in our country.

We hope you will come back. I look forward to seeing you in the future.

#### **First Secretary Gierek**

I wish to thank you most heartily, Mr. President, and we are expecting you in Warsaw, and Mrs. Ford. We shall be trying to greet you, Mr. President and Mrs. Ford, according to the Polish tradition and our saying, "My home is your home."

*President Ford:* Thank you, sir.

## **JOINT STATEMENT ON PRINCIPLES OF RELATIONS**

### **JOINT STATEMENT ON PRINCIPLES OF UNITED STATES-POLISH RELATIONS**

The President of the United States of America, Gerald R. Ford, and the First Secretary of the Central Committee of the Polish United Workers' Party, Edward Gierek,

—having met in a cordial, businesslike and constructive atmosphere, which provided the opportunity for a useful and comprehensive exchange of views,

—mindful of the long-standing and rich traditions of relations between their two peoples and the feelings of friendship and respect toward each other,

—being convinced that further development of American-Polish relations and the expansion of mutual cooperation serves the interests of both nations and contributes to peace and security in the world,

agreed on a statement of principles of friendly relations and cooperation between the United States of America and the Polish People's Republic.

#### **I**

The President and the First Secretary reaffirmed that bilateral relations between the United States of America and the Polish People's Republic are founded on the purposes and principles of the United Nations Charter and international law, and in particular the following interrelated principles:

- sovereign equality;
- refraining from the threat or use of force;
- inviolability of frontiers;
- territorial integrity of states;
- peaceful settlement of disputes;
- non-intervention in internal affairs;
- respect for human rights and fundamental freedoms;
- equal rights and self-determination of peoples;
- cooperation among states;
- fulfillment in good faith of obligations under international law.

#### **II**

The President and the First Secretary expressed their determination to develop relations of the two countries in a spirit of cooperation and mutual respect.

They resolved to expand and encourage as appropriate the long-range development of commercial, economic, cultural, scientific and technical cooperation of the two countries under conditions of reciprocity of advantages and obligations, in particular in agriculture, industry, transportation, health and environment.

They also resolved to continue to support the development of cooperation through the Joint American-Polish Trade Commission, between organizations, institutions and firms, as set forth in the "Joint

Statement on the Expansion of Economic, Industrial and Technological Cooperation between the United States of America and the Polish People's Republic" signed on October 9, 1974. They affirmed that mutually beneficial economic relations are conducive to good political relations.

They will facilitate and support, through all appropriate means, agreements concerning exchange of experts, students, and other persons as well as exchanges in the fields of science, culture, the arts, education, and other fields, between their two governments or directly between research organizations, institutions and firms as well as people.

Being aware of the importance of cultural and scientific cooperation as a means of promoting mutual understanding and trust, they resolve to promote the development of cultural relations providing opportunities for the citizens of both nations to learn the language of each other and to acquire a better knowledge of their respective achievements and values.

They will support the expansion of contacts between citizens of the two countries, including tourism, as well as contacts between representatives of federal and local authorities and youth and vocational organizations.

They reaffirmed their commitment to develop further relations between the two countries through frequent consultations at various levels, on matters pertaining to their mutual relations, including implementation of the principles contained herein, as well as important international issues of mutual interest.

### III

The President and the First Secretary welcomed the progress in recent years toward the general relaxation of tension and the development of peaceful relations between countries of different socio-economic systems. In this connection they stressed the importance of making that progress irreversible. They are determined to continue efforts aimed at strengthening these positive changes to which all countries, irrespective of their size and potential, can and should contribute in the interest of peace and security of all nations.

They will continue to work toward strengthening European security, in particular by contributing to the success of the Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe and the negotiations on Mutual Reduction of Forces and Armaments and Associated Measures in Central Europe.

They stressed the importance of achieving effective measures of disarmament conducive to strengthening peace and security in the world.

They expressed their willingness to cooperate on various international matters concerning the consolidation of peace, international security and economic, social and cultural progress, with a view to making their own contribution to the settlement of important international problems in the spirit of good will and mutual trust.

They recognized the necessity of strengthening the effectiveness of the United Nations in the maintenance and consolidation of international peace, and in developing cooperation among all nations on the basis of the United Nations Charter.

They acknowledged that this Joint Statement does not infringe upon the obligations of the United States of America and the Polish People's Republic with respect to other states.

Washington, October 9, 1974

For the United States of America:      For the Polish People's Republic:

GERALD R. FORD

EDWARD GIEREK

*President of the United States of America*

*First Secretary of the Central Committee of the Polish United Workers' Party*

## JOINT STATEMENT ON ECONOMIC COOPERATION

### JOINT STATEMENT ON THE DEVELOPMENT OF ECONOMIC, INDUSTRIAL AND TECHNOLOGICAL COOPERATION BETWEEN THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA AND THE POLISH PEOPLE'S REPUBLIC

The President of the United States of America, Gerald R. Ford, and the First Secretary of the Central Committee of the Polish United Workers' Party, Edward Gierek,

—having held talks on the present state and further development of economic, industrial and technological cooperation between the United States of America and the Polish People's Republic,

agreed on the following statement:

#### I

The President and the First Secretary expressed gratification with the results achieved in their mutual economic and trade relations in recent years. They endorsed the guidelines for their further development that are set forth in this Joint Statement, and affirmed the positive role of these guidelines for the further development of mutual economic, industrial, and technological cooperation between the United States of America and the Polish People's Republic.

Recognizing further growth of international trade as fundamental to economic development and improved standards of living, and guided by the provisions contained in the Joint Statement on Principles of United States-Polish Relations, they reaffirmed their determination to seek continued expansion of economic and trade relations pursuant to a liberal export and import policy consistent with the legal requirements of each country and with the principles of the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade, including most-favored-nation treatment. They also ex-

pressed confidence that their two countries' bilateral trade relations would be strengthened by the participation of their countries in the multilateral trade negotiations.

They recognize the existence of favorable prospects for further rapid development of bilateral trade in the coming years. They anticipate that their trade may reach \$1 billion in 1976 and grow to \$2 billion by 1980. They will seek to ensure the existence of proper conditions for economic relations in order that these goals may be achieved. Fields offering particular opportunities for the development of their economic relations include various light industries, food-processing, chemical and petrochemical industry, construction and transportation equipment, machinery, electronic and electrical equipment industries, coal mining and utilization and nonferrous metallurgy.

## II

Considering industrial cooperation as a particularly important factor in the development of trade and the diversification of its structure, the President and the First Secretary will facilitate cooperation between American firms and Polish enterprises and economic organizations consistent with applicable laws and regulations of each of the two countries, including long-term understandings in production; construction of new industrial facilities, as well as expansion and modernization of existing facilities; technological cooperation and research including exchanges of know-how, licenses and patents; training and exchange of technicians and specialists; organization of exhibits and conferences; and market and management research; in both countries and in third countries.

They affirmed that favorable consideration should also be given to new forms and methods of industrial cooperation suggested by interested firms and organizations. With a view to the development of economic cooperation, they will examine ways and means for the application of customs and fiscal facilitation for goods assigned to, and resulting from, cooperation projects within the provisions of customs legislation in force in the two countries.

## III

Positively evaluating the development to date of scientific and technological cooperation between the United States and Poland, including cooperative projects undertaken in accordance with the United States-Polish Agreement on Science and Technology, the President and the First Secretary expressed the view that further cooperation of this kind in fields of interest to both countries should be pursued.

With a view toward the facilitation of projects for industrial and agricultural development, they, by mutual agreement, will exchange information concerning various fields in which the expansion of industrial and technological cooperation is desirable, and, on the basis of such exchange, will examine areas appropriate for consideration.

They positively evaluated the development to date of mutual financial and credit relations, especially the cooperation between the Export-Import Bank of the United States and the Bank Handlowy in Warsaw, which contributed to the rapid rise of trade and economic cooperation, and pledged continued cooperation in the development of these relations.

Attaching great meaning to the progress achieved in creating reciprocal trade facilities, they will examine ways of resolving administrative, tax, visa, and customs problems which may arise, and will facilitate as appropriate access to information concerning actual and potential markets, operation of business offices, trade promotion and other endeavors which contribute to the development of trade and economic cooperation.

Evaluating positively the work to date of the Joint American-Polish Trade Commission in developing and coordinating action in the area of mutual economic and trade relations, they will continue to work through the Commission to promote economic cooperation and resolve problems arising in the course of their economic, industrial and technological cooperation.

In issuing this Joint Statement, they express the hope that it will become an important practical contribution to utilization of the potential for development of economic, industrial, and scientific and technological cooperation between the United States of America and the Polish People's Republic.

Washington, October 9, 1974

For the United States of America: For the Polish People's Republic:

GERALD R. FORD

EDWARD GIEREK

*President of the  
United States of  
America*

*First Secretary of the  
Central Committee of the  
Polish United Workers' Party*

## JOINT U.S.-POLISH COMMUNIQUE

White House press release dated October 12; for release October 13

At the invitation of the President of the United States of America, Gerald R. Ford, and Mrs. Ford, the First Secretary of the Central Committee of the Polish United Workers' Party, Edward Gierek, and Mrs. Gierek, paid an official visit to the United States October 8 through 13, 1974.

The First Secretary was accompanied by: Mieczyslaw Jagielski, Deputy Chairman of the Council of Ministers, and Mrs. Jagielski; Stefan Olszowski, Foreign Minister, and Mrs. Olszowski; Ryszard Frelek, Member of the Secretariat of the Central Committee of the Polish United Workers' Party; Witold Trampeczynski, Polish Ambassador to the United States of America.

The First Secretary was also accompanied by a group of advisers and experts.

The official party also visited New York, Pittsburgh, and Houston.

During his stay in Washington, First Secretary Gierek held talks with President Ford on the development of relations between Poland and the United States as well as on international issues.

He also met with Secretary of State and Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs Henry A. Kissinger, Secretary of Agriculture Earl Butz, Secretary of Commerce Frederick Dent, Secretary of Health, Education and Welfare Caspar Weinberger, and Chairman of the Export-Import Bank William Casey.

The First Secretary paid a visit to Congress and met with members of the Senate and the House of Representatives. He also had talks with leading American businessmen and bankers.

Talks were also held between Foreign Minister Olszowski and Secretary of State Kissinger.

The talks and meetings were held in a friendly and businesslike atmosphere and were characterized by a mutual desire to expand and strengthen the relations between Poland and the United States.

In the course of the talks, the President and the First Secretary noted with satisfaction the significant progress which has recently been made in Polish-American relations. Both leaders expressed their desire to further develop these relations, which are based on the long-standing traditions of friendship and sympathy existing between the Polish and American peoples.

They agreed that the "Joint Statement on Principles of U.S.-Polish Relations" signed during the visit provides a firm basis for broad cooperation between the two countries and contributes to the process of strengthening world peace, security, and international cooperation.

The President and the First Secretary also attached importance to the "Joint Statement on the Development of Economic, Industrial and Technological Cooperation between the United States of America and the Polish People's Republic," which they signed. They agreed that the main directions and scope of cooperation stipulated in the field of trade, industrial and technological cooperation should contribute to the further advancement of bilateral economic relations.

The President and the First Secretary noted with satisfaction the rapid growth of trade between the United States and Poland in the past two years, accompanied by a substantial intensification of general economic relations between the two countries. They considered a mutual trade turnover of one billion dollars by 1976 and two billion dollars by 1980 to be a realistic and desirable goal.

They also agreed that the provisions contained in

the "Joint Statement on the Development of Agricultural Trade between the United States of America and the Polish People's Republic" create possibilities for a further expansion of trade in food and agricultural products as well as for cooperation in various sectors of the agricultural economy.

They noted that the Joint American-Polish Trade Commission plays an important role in the development of trade and economic cooperation.

President Ford and First Secretary Gierek expressed their deep satisfaction at the conclusion during the visit of agreements in the fields of: Coal research; Health; Environmental Protection; Cooperation in Science and Technology; and Avoidance of Double Taxation.

They also welcome the conclusion of an agreement on the establishment of working relationships between the U.S. and Polish Chambers of Commerce.

Both leaders stressed the significance of the broad development of cultural and scientific cooperation between the United States and Poland and expressed their conviction that this cooperation should be further developed.

The President and the First Secretary emphasized the importance of historical traditions in strengthening the bonds of sympathy and friendship between the United States and Poland. A positive role in this strengthening of mutual relations has been played by American citizens of Polish descent. Both leaders undertook to encourage and support further development of those and other contacts between the American and Polish people.

The President and the First Secretary conducted a broad and useful exchange of views on the most important international issues with special emphasis on European questions. They agreed that there exist a number of spheres in which both countries can contribute to the strengthening of peace and international security.

Both leaders expressed satisfaction with the results of the talks they held and agreed that consultations will continue between the two countries at various levels on matters concerning their mutual relations, including the assessment of the implementation of the agreements that were concluded as well as on important international issues of mutual interest.

The First Secretary and Mrs. Gierek expressed their warm gratitude for the hospitality and friendliness accorded to them in the United States.

The First Secretary extended an invitation to the President of the United States and Mrs. Ford to pay an official visit to the Polish People's Republic at a time convenient to them. The invitation was accepted with pleasure.

## Secretary Kissinger Visits Six Arab Nations and Israel

*Secretary Kissinger left Washington October 9 for a trip to the Middle East and returned October 15. Following is an exchange of remarks between President Ford and Secretary Kissinger upon the Secretary's departure from Andrews Air Force Base, together with exchanges of remarks with foreign leaders, statements, and press conferences by Secretary Kissinger in Egypt, Syria, Jordan, Israel, Saudi Arabia, Algeria, and Morocco.*

### DEPARTURE, ANDREWS AIR FORCE BASE, OCTOBER 9

White House press release dated October 9

#### President Ford

It is nice to see you all, and I just came out with all the Cabinet members and others in the administration to express our appreciation to the Secretary of State for going on this vitally important mission and to indicate my full support and the support of the administration for the, I think, tremendous efforts to bring peace in an area of the world that has been so volatile and controversial that it is important for the world, as well as the countries involved, that the maximum efforts for peace be made.

This country and this administration are going to work with the skill and imagination of Dr. Kissinger in seeking that result.

We wish you the very best.

#### Secretary Kissinger

I appreciate very much, Mr. President, your coming out to see me off. The problem of contributing to peace in the Middle East is a very complicated one; but as I have had

occasion to say before, it is a source of pride to all Americans that it is the United States that all parties trust, and that we will attempt to make some progress.

I would like to say to the President this is the first time in a long time that one can go on these missions with an America that is at peace with itself.

Thank you very much.

### ARRIVAL, CAIRO, OCTOBER 9

Press release 399 dated October 9

I am happy to be starting my tour in Cairo and to have this opportunity to talk to my friends. I'm here to see what the United States can do to contribute to progress toward peace in the Middle East. President Ford is committed to continue the efforts that the United States has made, and I will talk with my friends here in a spirit of making constructive progress.

Thank you.

### REMARKS AT AMERICAN EMBASSY, OCTOBER 9

Press release 405 dated October 11

Ladies and gentlemen: I've been coming here more often than I can remember in the last year, and you've all been taking very good care of me. These young ladies here have been bossing me around in such a way that I'm a strong supporter now of women's liberation, which, as I understand it, gives men equality. [Laughter.]

I came here for the first time last November. We had a very small Interests Section here that had to kill itself to help with the arrangements that were made for me. I am

particularly conscious of our Egyptian friends who worked with us through all the difficult years when we had no formal relationships, who stuck with us, and with whom we are proud to be associated now that our relationship has moved from one of coolness to one of growing friendship.

Since then we had an opportunity to reestablish relations and to contribute to agreements between Israel and Egypt which we hope will mark the beginning of a process toward peace in the Middle East. I am here today because President Ford and I are committed to continuing this process toward peace.

Now, none of these efforts are possible without the dedication and support of those of you who are working far away from Washington, convinced that your reports are never read—and I must say, if the State Department Secretariat had anything to do with it, that is exactly what would happen.

But, as it happens, to me the relationship between Egypt and the United States is not just an assignment that goes with the job of Secretary of State, but one of the profound conviction that the United States and the Arab people are natural friends. We have no conflicting interests. We have been separated for many years due to misunderstandings on both sides. But now I think we have begun a new and lasting period in which our relationship will grow ever closer.

We are very dependent on the support and the advice of people like yourselves in areas like the Middle East. We are happy the individual still counts for something. The human relationships played such an important role, and the function of our offices is decisive.

For a long time now I have wanted an opportunity to thank you all personally for what you have done and for the dedication which I have seen on my trips and for the depth of your reporting. Of course, I am a great admirer of your Ambassador [Hermann F. Eilts], and I'd steal him from you and bring him to Washington if the President and the Foreign Minister here would let him go. So, as it is, I am afraid you are stuck with him for a while.

I want you to know that the reporting we

get from here is very much what I have in mind. Usually when I go to Embassies I tell them: Don't tell me all the details of your conversations; I want to know what the trends are, I want to understand what the relationship of events is, and I want to know where we are going. I don't have to give you that instruction because that is what I get from here, and I want you to know that I appreciate it.

Now, you may not know that your Ambassador has been in the Foreign Service for quite some time. In fact, U.S.-Arab relations go back several hundred years, and I think Hermann has been affiliated with them for the greater part of that period. [Laughter.] But it says on his record, which I cannot believe, that he has been associated with the Foreign Service for only 30 years. Since that is what the records say, I would like to take this occasion to give him this certificate of official recognition and appreciation for his dedicated service of 30 years and to thank you all for being partners with us in Washington in what I think is one of the most important, one of the most exciting, trends in American foreign policy that I can remember—one that will continue and grow, and we shall all look back to it and remember that what we did made a difference.

Thank you.

#### NEWS CONFERENCE OF SECRETARY KISSINGER AND PRESIDENT SADAT OF EGYPT, OCTOBER 10

Press release 407 dated October 11

*President Sadat:* Dr. Kissinger is going to brief you.

*Secretary Kissinger:* I was just waiting for the President. The President and I have both last night and this evening reviewed the entire range of Egyptian-U.S. bilateral relationships as well as progress toward peace in the Middle East. I repeated to the President, President Ford's interest that progress toward peace in the Middle East be maintained. We reviewed the modalities both of procedures and of various points of view, the various aspects, in what I consider a very

constructive and positive manner and in the usual friendly atmosphere.

*Q. What are these modalities, Dr. Kissinger?*

*Secretary Kissinger:* Well, I'm at the beginning of my trip, and I have to visit many other countries. I will return here on Monday to review my conversation with President Sadat, so I would think I would be going through them then.

*Q. President Sadat, what would you hope would be the next stage in the effort to secure peace in the Middle East?*

*President Sadat:* Well, we have discussed this in broad lines and there are many items that we have already discussed. And as Dr. Kissinger says—the [inaudible] of the best relations that we have together—I think it is premature to tell you any details.

*Q. Do you expect further disengagement or withdrawal of the Israeli troops?*

*Secretary Kissinger:* I, of course, haven't visited, as I said, any of the other countries, but the Israeli Prime Minister has publicly stated that Israel is prepared to make territorial concessions in the proper context. That is what we are trying to discuss and explore.

*Q. Dr. Kissinger, do you think that your trip will come out with concrete steps toward peace, toward the Geneva Conference and complete Israeli withdrawal from the Arab territories?*

*Secretary Kissinger:* Before I left Washington I told the American press corps that there probably would not be any dramatic announcement on this trip, and I never disappoint the American press corps. But I do believe that this trip will contribute toward progress, toward peace in the Middle East, and I am encouraged by my talks with President Sadat.

*Q. Dr. Kissinger, a year ago you said that you thought the whole matter would take about a year. Now that a year has passed, do you think it will take another year?*

*Secretary Kissinger:* I don't think I should

make any predictions as to any time period except what I have already pointed out: That we reviewed all the modalities and possible approaches, that we are committed to contributing to peace and progress toward peace, and that I am encouraged by my talks.

*Q. Are you going to leave Mr. Sisco [Joseph J. Sisco, Under Secretary for Political Affairs] in the area or are you coming back yourself?*

*Secretary Kissinger:* I will take Mr. Sisco back with me as was always planned, and of course I plan to come back periodically to the area whenever my coming here can make a contribution toward peace.

*Q. Dr. Kissinger, after your talks with President Sadat, is the next step clearer in your prospectus toward keeping the peace momentum in the area?*

*Secretary Kissinger:* It is somewhat clearer in my mind.

#### **DEPARTURE, CAIRO, OCTOBER 11**

Press release 408 dated October 11

I just want to express my appreciation to President Sadat and the Foreign Minister for the excellent courtesy that has been extended, for the warmth of the reception. We have had good talks, and we plan to continue them on Monday when I come through.

It is always a pleasure to see my friends in Egypt.

Thank you.

#### **DEPARTURE, DAMASCUS, OCTOBER 11**

Press release 412 dated October 12

I just wanted to express my appreciation to the President and to the Foreign Minister for receiving me this past day. We had a session this afternoon and a longer session this evening. We reviewed bilateral relations between Syria and the United States, which are improving rapidly, and we also reviewed the prospects for peace in the Middle East in an overall perspective. We had very good,

very constructive talks in a friendly atmosphere.

*Q. Are prospects for peace in the Middle East also improving rapidly, Mr. Kissinger?*

*Secretary Kissinger:* I'm always encouraged.

*Q. Are you coming back, Mr. Secretary?*

*Secretary Kissinger:* I plan to come back on Monday for a few hours.

#### **ARRIVAL, AMMAN, OCTOBER 11**

Press release 413 dated October 12

*Secretary Kissinger:* Ladies and gentlemen, first of all I would like to express my great pleasure to be here with our friends in Jordan. As you all know, I'm taking a trip through the area in order to determine what possibilities exist for a second stage of peace negotiations and what framework would be most suitable. In that effort, of course, the views of our friends in Jordan will be taken with the greatest seriousness, and the United States has already expressed its view as to a manner in which progress can be made. So I look forward very much to my conversations with His Majesty and with the Prime Minister. I'm sorry I kept you all waiting out here.

*Q. Mr. Secretary, I don't like to sound impertinent, but I really wonder why you are here while Jordan has frozen its diplomatic initiatives.*

*Secretary Kissinger:* Because I was invited to come here.

*Prime Minister Zaid Rifai:* And he's always most welcome here.

#### **DEPARTURE, AQABA, OCTOBER 12**

Press release 414 dated October 15

I just wanted to thank His Majesty and the Prime Minister for the very warm reception that we have had here. We reviewed, of course, bilateral Jordanian-U.S. relations, which are excellent.

We also reviewed the prospects for peace negotiations which may develop. As is well known, the United States supports Jordan playing a role in any negotiations that may develop.

Thank you.

#### **ARRIVAL, BEN GURION AIRPORT, OCTOBER 12**

Press release 415 dated October 15

#### **Israeli Foreign Minister Yigal Allon**

Secretary of State Dr. Kissinger, Honorable Ambassador of the United States in Israel, Honorable Ambassador of Israel in the United States, friends: I am very happy to welcome here tonight our friend Dr. Kissinger. Dr. Kissinger is a frequent visitor to the Middle East and to this country, and usually, almost every visit of his is resulting with good news. We are very interested that the present mission, the mission of peace, which Henry Kissinger took upon himself will succeed, and the Government of Israel will do its best to contribute its share to keep the momentum going.

We welcome Dr. Kissinger as a great statesman and as a great friend, and we all hope and wish him and all of us in this region satisfactory progress toward our great goal, which is peace in the area.

#### **Secretary Kissinger**

Mr. Foreign Minister, friends: I have visited Israel many times over the past year, and I have always come in pursuit of an objective that no people needs as much and has searched for as much as the people of Israel—the objective of peace. We have often when I came had frank discussions, and there has been speculation in the press about this or that disagreement. But always we have spoken to each other as friends and partners, and always we have achieved results that were to the benefit also of the people of Israel.

I am confident that the talks I will have with my friend the Foreign Minister and with all of my friends in the Cabinet will be



characterized by frankness and honesty on both sides. But I am also positive we will come out, as we always have, with agreement that will be to the benefit of all of the peoples in this area, above all, to our friends here in Israel, who have suffered more than anybody from the absence of peace.

#### **DEPARTURE, BEN GURION AIRPORT, OCTOBER 13**

Press release 416 dated October 15

##### **Secretary Kissinger**

Ladies and gentlemen: We have completed extensive talks with the Prime Minister, the Foreign Minister, and the Defense Minister. We reviewed the bilateral relationships in a harmonious manner with a constructive outcome. We discussed what progress can be made toward peace and a settlement in the Middle East. We agreed on principles and procedures that might be followed, and the general tone and content of the discussion was, as I pointed out, harmonious.

Before I come to Israel I always read in the newspapers about difficulties and possible suspicions. But these attitudes, in my experience, have never survived the actual dialogue among friends, because peace in the Middle East is in everybody's interest, and as I said yesterday, in nobody's interest more than that of Israel's—which I have found prepared to work for it with its usual dedication and tenacity.

Thank you.

##### **Foreign Minister Allon**

When I came back from New York I told the press that the Secretary of State was about to pay a short visit to the Middle East, including Israel. In answering questions, I said that you don't have to expect too much from a short visit of this kind, that no complete substance may be already negotiated, that maybe principles and procedural problems may be discussed, exactly as Dr. Kissinger said just now.

But from our own experience I can tell you that this short stay of his and our exten-

sive talks yesterday and today were an indispensable phase in the process of peacemaking in the Middle East and that we are very grateful to Secretary Kissinger for coming to this country and I'm sure that this will be remembered as one of the necessary steps in our endeavor to achieve peace and stability in this area.

#### **DEPARTURE, RIYADH, OCTOBER 13**

Press release 417 dated October 15

##### **Secretary Kissinger**

I would like first of all to express my appreciation to His Majesty [and] my friend Umar Saqqaf for the very warm and gracious reception we received here. His Majesty and I reviewed the steps that seemed feasible toward peace in the Middle East, and I found His Majesty understanding and supportive. We also reviewed our bilateral relationships expressed in several of the joint commissions and in other matters, and we found them to be excellent. Nevertheless we decided to strengthen the already close relationship even further.

I explained to His Majesty our view with respect to the price of oil and the impact this can have on the whole structure of the world economy and the stability of the whole international system. His Majesty's attitude was constructive and enlightened. I believe the policy of the Kingdom will be in a constructive direction, keeping always in mind what we also believe—that the ultimate solution must be found on multilateral basis and cannot be found by isolated actions.

I am very grateful for the opportunity that was given to me here to exchange ideas with my friend Umar Saqqaf, the audience that was granted to me by His Majesty; and I leave here encouraged and with the conviction that I am indeed among friends.

##### **Saudi Arabian Foreign Minister Umar al-Saqqaf**

I will start where my friend finished. I assure him that he is in a friendly country

and among friends. We are proud of his friendship, as much as Saudi Arabia is proud of its friendship with the United States. We appreciate the great efforts which our great friend is exerting toward peace under the guidance of the President of the United States of America, for whom we have great appreciation and respect.

We say in Arabic, "Each theologian has his own school of thought." At the outset, I used to have inhibitions and, I might even say, doubts about the method followed by our friend in his peacemaking efforts. But with the passage of time, and as events unfolded, I began to be sold on his efforts toward solving problems.

I am not being a flatterer when I praise our friend Henry's methods, but it is a statement of fact. Suffice it to review a change which has occurred during only a few months in the way we used to be and are now received by the representatives of the press.

Still, while I say that we have achieved a lot, I must add that we are still at the bottom rung of the ladder in our efforts. But we believe that with the grace of God we shall achieve peace in the area, peace based on justice and the right to self-determination.

At the same time we feel we have achieved a wider cooperation on a bilateral basis between Saudi Arabia and the United States. It is my belief that these relations could not have been strengthened and realized had we not discerned a clear light pointing in the direction of a complete solution to the problem of the Middle East, a solution based on complete withdrawal of Israel from territories occupied in 1967, including Jerusalem, and the restoration of the Palestinian people of their rights.

My relationship with my dear friend has always been based on frankness. Time has proved that mutual frankness is the only path leading to friendship and solutions. Dr. Kissinger has heard from His Majesty the King the viewpoint of Saudi Arabia and an explanation of Saudi policy toward world questions and toward the problems of the area. This policy as expounded by the King is not an overnight policy; it's the traditional time-honored policy of Saudi Arabia. I will con-

tinue to strive to explain the details of this policy whether here or over there during my visits.

Our colleague Dr. Kissinger spoke about the question of oil. I want to explain what the attitude of Saudi Arabia on this problem is frankly and clearly. It is there for everyone with eyes to see and everyone with clean ears to hear. Saudi Arabia is following a policy on oil which bespeaks a sense of responsibility toward the welfare of the world community. As part of the world, we want to build the world and not destroy it. And we hope that other members of the world community come to appreciate the gravity of this responsibility and the importance thereof.

Oil is not everything, but it is a great thing. We will continue in the direction of the constructive policy laid down by His Majesty the King. It is the policy of cooperation, negotiation, and constructive cooperation between us and friendly nations of the world. Dr. Kissinger has expressed adequately his government's attitude toward oil when he said that Saudi Arabia should not be isolated in its oil policy. But we sincerely hope, and it is our prayer, that all of the other oil-producing countries will come around to following the policy of Saudi Arabia.

I would like to welcome our friend Dr. Kissinger and assure him of our welcome every time. We also appreciate the great efforts toward peace that our friend is exerting as well as his fathomless knowledge and deep wisdom. We wish him success in his tremendous efforts to achieve peace on the international level. All I wish to say on closing [is] that we hope he will take a few more days, not just a few hours, on his coming visit. Bon voyage and good luck.

#### ARRIVAL, CAIRO, OCTOBER 14

Press release 418 dated October 15

First of all, let me say what a pleasure it is to be back in Egypt. I have had a very useful, very interesting trip, in which I spoke to all the leaders that I met about how to move the Middle East toward a just and lasting peace. This is what I will really explore tomorrow

also with President Sadat and tonight with Foreign Minister Fahmy. I look forward to this talk very much.

Thank you.

## NEWS CONFERENCE OF SECRETARY KISSINGER AND PRESIDENT SADAT, OCTOBER 14

Press release 419 dated October 15

*Secretary Kissinger:* First of all, I would like to thank the President for receiving me during the fast. I reported to the President the problems of the area and about the conversations that I have had with various leaders in the countries that I have visited. I told him my conclusions that there are positive indications that we are making as much progress toward a just peace in the area as possible.

The President told me that he would discuss these with his colleagues, with the Government of Egypt, and with the other Arab leaders after the summit in Rabat. I therefore plan to return to the area during the first week of November, and we shall then attempt to set the progress toward peace in the Middle East on a firm and concrete basis.

*Q. Dr. Kissinger, do you expect this progress to be made on more than one front or on one front?*

*Secretary Kissinger:* We shall have to make this judgment after all the consultations among all the leaders have been completed; then I'll return to the area.

*Q. Could we ask about the line in Sinai? Has that been determined more or less?*

*Secretary Kissinger:* I repeat, there were no maps discussed and at this stage we are not dealing with detailed negotiations but rather with the framework and the similar prospects toward peace in the area, about which there are positive indications.

*Q. Does this mean, Dr. Kissinger, that no further Israeli withdrawal will take place?*

*Secretary Kissinger:* Well, as I said when I was here last, the negotiations obviously will concern the substance of Israeli with-

drawals in the framework of a general negotiation and obviously a topic of concern.

*Q. Mr. President, did you discuss the Geneva Conference in any substance?*

*President Sadat:* Well, I have discussed all this with Dr. Kissinger and, as he said, I am going to discuss them with my colleagues in the summit meeting.

*Q. To follow that up, Mr. President, will you tell us how you see the Palestinians being represented when negotiations in Geneva start?*

*President Sadat:* Well, we have already—among us, as Arabs, we have already asked for this and we shall always be asking for the Palestinians to be represented in Geneva because, as we have said, Palestine is the core of the whole problem.

*Q. Dr. Kissinger, at this stage what is your position on the Palestinian problem?*

*Secretary Kissinger:* I have pointed out previously that we believe that negotiations on the West Bank would be most efficiently carried out between Jordan and Israel, but it is the kind of decision that has to be made by all the parties concerned.

*Q. Mr. President, were the plans made for your visit to the United States tentatively?*

*Secretary Kissinger:* The President is always most welcome, and we are now thinking of a visit early in the new year.

*Q. Mr. President, what are you prepared to guarantee Israel in exchange for a withdrawal?*

*President Sadat:* Why am I asked about guarantees?

*Secretary Kissinger:* I've said the President would be delighted to negotiate the whole thing [garbled].

*President Sadat:* I need guarantees like the Israelis. I myself need guarantees.

*Q. Mr. President, how do you feel about the Rabat Conference?*

*President Sadat:* Very optimistic.

*Q. Mr. President, did you discuss the oil problem with Dr. Kissinger?*

*President Sadat:* The oil problem, well, it is part of the problem to discuss, but I am not an oil producer.

#### **DEPARTURE, CAIRO, OCTOBER 14**

Press release 420 dated October 15

I've already said everything I think I can say, but I want to thank President Sadat and the Foreign Ministry, Foreign Minister Fahmy, for the very warm reception we've received.

I'm leaving the area now; I think we've made some progress. I'll return early in November, and as I said before, I hope then to put the matter on a concrete and definite basis.

#### **DEPARTURE, DAMASCUS, OCTOBER 14**

Press release 421 dated October 15

I would like first of all to express my appreciation to President Asad and to the Foreign Minister for receiving me at the end of a day of fasting and for the extraordinary courtesy with which they treated me under what I know were personally difficult circumstances for them.

As I did this morning with President Sadat, I reviewed with President Asad the trends and developments I found in the area in the direction of peace and an ultimate settlement. I pointed out to him that I found some positive and encouraging signs and that our problem now was to put them into concrete focus. As I pointed out already this morning in Cairo, I intend to return to the area in the early part of November. By that time the Arab summit will have taken place and I can then resume consultations with the various leaders to see what concrete expression can be given to this search for peace in the Middle East.

I note that we're approaching the end of Ramadan, and I'd like to wish the people of the area a happy *Eid*.

#### **ARRIVAL, ALGIERS, OCTOBER 14**

Press release 422 dated October 15

Let me first make a general statement. This is my third visit to Algiers within a year, and it reflects the very high regard in which President Boumediene is held in the United States. We recognize his leading role among nonaligned, and we take his views on international affairs and economic matters with a great deal of seriousness.

Therefore I look forward to benefiting from his wisdom and to bringing him the personal greetings of President Ford. I will also discuss with him our views in international affairs, especially about developments in the Middle East. So, I look forward to my visit here very much.

As I have said earlier in the day in Cairo and Damascus, the purpose of my visit was to determine the trend and possibilities toward a just and lasting peace in the Middle East. I found some positive signs and some positive indications, and our aim now will be to give them concrete form, perhaps when I return to the Middle East during November. At that time, the leaders of the Arab countries will have had an opportunity to consult with each other at the summit and elsewhere.

As for the United States, President Ford has reaffirmed our determination to contribute what we can to the development of peace in the area to the extent that the parties concerned want our contribution and can agree on a course of procedure.

Thank you.

#### **DEPARTURE, ALGIERS, OCTOBER 15**

Press release 423 dated October 15

Let me make a few comments. First of all, I would like to thank President Boumediene and his colleagues for the very warm reception I have received here. I reviewed with President Boumediene first of all my impressions of my trip through the Middle East.

I told President Boumediene of the U.S. commitment to help the parties make prog-

ress toward a just and lasting peace if they can agree among themselves on principles and procedures for the next stage. I told him of some of the positive trends that I found. His advice was very helpful, and his attitude was very understanding. I told him that I would return to the area in November to attempt to give the positive trends a concrete expression after the Arab leaders have had an opportunity to consult with each other.

We also discussed our differing approaches to the question of oil prices, and we reviewed ways and approaches to reconcile these different points of view in the months ahead.

Finally, we reviewed the state of bilateral Algerian-U.S. relationships. We found that they had improved considerably in recent months. We are convinced that they will take a positive evolution in the near future.

It remains for me to thank my Algerian hosts for their characteristic hospitality, to express my regret that my friend the Foreign Minister was kept in New York by other duties; but this gave me the opportunity to meet the Minister of Interior.

Thank you.

#### **ARRIVAL, RABAT, OCTOBER 15**

Press release 425 dated October 15

I would like to express my great pleasure at this opportunity of being able to visit Morocco again. It is less than a year ago that I visited your country. It was the first Arab country on which I ever set foot.

I had a long and very fruitful conversation with His Majesty and with his Ministers, and the advice that I received was extremely helpful in the subsequent peace missions through the Middle East; and of course the friendship between Morocco and the United States is long and on a very firm basis.

I look forward very much to my conversations here which I am confident will strengthen that friendship and from which I will draw, I'm positive, guidance and advice for further peace efforts in the Middle East. I am also bringing to His Majesty the warmest greetings of President Ford, who is

looking forward to an opportunity to meet with His Majesty at an early occasion.

Thank you.

#### **DEPARTURE, RABAT, OCTOBER 15**

Press release 426 dated October 15

His Majesty and I had an extended conversation, which was joined later by our associates. We reviewed first of all the situation in the Middle East in the light of my recent trip as well as the contacts which His Majesty has had in preparation for the Arab summit. I explained to His Majesty some of the positive trends which I have found in the area. We discussed principles and methods which might lead step by step to a solution of all of the problems standing in the way of a just and lasting peace.

We hope that the Arab summit will make a contribution to a solution of all of these problems. As I have pointed out in other capitals, after the conclusion of the Arab summit I will return to this area to see in what way and by what methods these aspirations for peace can be given concrete context.

His Majesty and I reviewed bilateral American-Moroccan relations, which we found to be excellent. In order to cement further our traditional friendship, I extended the invitation of President Ford to His Majesty to visit the United States in the spring of 1975. His Majesty has accepted. We will not be able to match Moroccan hospitality, but we will do the best within the capabilities of a young country.

#### **ARRIVAL, ANDREWS AIR FORCE BASE, OCTOBER 15**

Press release 428 dated October 16

Ladies and gentlemen: My colleagues and I are delighted to be back. We went to the Middle East in order to see whether we could start a process toward another round of negotiations. We found a general receptivity to a step-by-step approach and a great willingness for the United States to continue to play a role.

Now, as you know, the various Arab leaders are consulting, and they are also meeting at a summit in Morocco in another couple of weeks. After that I shall return to the area and hope that we can continue the progress toward peace that has started in the last 11 months. It's a great pleasure to be home again.

Thank you.

## **President Ford Signs Defense Bill; Cautions on Viet-Nam Funding**

*Statement by President Ford*<sup>1</sup>

I am pleased to have signed H.R. 16243. Although not all administration recommendations were accepted, I recognize and appreciate bipartisan efforts made by the House-Senate conference committee to produce a defense appropriations bill acceptable to both Houses and sufficient for our national security needs.

The bill has, however, a major drawback. The \$700 million funding for South Viet-Nam is inadequate to provide for all of their critical needs if South Viet-Nam's enemies continue to press their attacks. It may therefore be necessary to approach the Congress early next year to work out some solutions to meet critical needs which arise.

Each year the President of the United States must sign into law an appropriations bill for our defense. From my experience in Congress, I know all too well the conflicts this defense bill can produce in the name of economy and other national interests. Thus, as I sign such a bill for the first time as President, I want to renew my pledge to build a new partnership between the executive and legislative branches of our government, a partnership based on close consultation, compromise of differences, and a high regard for the constitutional duties and powers of both branches to work for the common good and security of our nation.

## **Annual Meeting of SEATO Council Held at New York**

*Deputy Secretary Ingersoll was the chief U.S. delegate at the annual meeting of the SEATO Council held at New York October 3. Following is a press statement issued at the conclusion of the meeting.*

The Council of the South-East Asia Treaty Organization (SEATO), comprised of ministerial representatives from Australia, New Zealand, the Philippines, Thailand, the United Kingdom, and the United States, held its nineteenth annual meeting in New York on 3 October.

The Secretary-General announced that the Council held an informal and wide-ranging exchange of views on the situation in Southeast Asia and agreed to continue to uphold the objectives of the Manila Pact and its basic purpose of strengthening the fabric of peace in the region.

The Council affirmed that the recently reorganized structure and programmes of SEATO accorded with the goal of the treaty that member nations co-operate in promising economic progress, social well-being and peace in the treaty area, and were consonant with the currently prevailing conditions in Southeast Asia.

Satisfaction was expressed by the Council with the Secretary-General's reorganization of the staff at SEATO Headquarters in Bangkok in accordance with the directives of the Eighteenth Council Meeting held last year. It agreed that the integration of the civilian and military staffs of the organization, which came into effect on 1 February 1974, facilitated SEATO's current emphasis upon supporting the internal security and development programmes of the two regional members, the Philippines and Thailand.

The Council also noted that SEATO assistance to projects in the social and economic fields had been increased, with greater emphasis upon the rural economic development and rural education sectors. Member countries will continue multilateral or bilateral social and economic aid to the regional members under SEATO auspices.

<sup>1</sup> Issued on Oct. 9 (text from White House press release); as enacted, the bill is Public Law 93-437, approved Oct. 8.

## America's Purposes in an Ambiguous Age

*Address by Winston Lord  
Director, Policy Planning Staff*<sup>1</sup>

For 200 years America has been confident of its purposes, secure in its strength, and certain of its growing prosperity.

Throughout most of our history, isolation made possible an uncomplicated view of the world. In the period following World War II, our preeminent power encouraged us to believe we could shape the globe according to American designs.

Today, as we approach our third century, we find—like most other nations in history—that we can neither escape from the world nor dominate it. America is destined to cope with a shrinking planet of dispersed power, diverse goals, and interdependent economies.

We must define our national purposes in an ambiguous age:

—Our traditional partners have regained power and self-confidence. This can enlarge our common capacity for shaping events, or it can result in tests of strengths among us.

—Ideological conflict with Communist powers has diminished, and cold war tensions have decreased. But serious differences remain, and a renewal of confrontation would be even more treacherous than before.

—Nuclear superiority has given way to nuclear parity and the specter of proliferation. These new dimensions of power could compel restraint or unleash a cataclysm.

—National prosperity increasingly must be seen in the context of the world economy. Economic interdependence can enrich, or it can impoverish.

In this setting the United States cannot forfeit leadership out of weariness or frustration. While we are more aware than ever of our limits, others still see us as the strongest nation in the world. No other country can evoke the new sense of common purpose that our partnerships require, balance potential adversaries so as to induce cooperation and restraint, help mediate conflicts in areas of chronic tension, and offer leadership in a world of economic uncertainty.

Thus an era of transition offers both promise and peril. We must understand the changes we face, or we will be crippled by change itself. We must be conscious of both the limits to our strength and the responsibilities that strength entails. We must co-exist with other ideals without abandoning our own. We must accept complexity without losing our way.

In an era where we can no longer overwhelm our problems with resources, our vision may be the most crucial resource of all.

George Kennan, the first Director of the State Department's Policy Planning Staff, put the need concisely:

If we are to regard ourselves as a grown-up nation—and anything else will henceforth be mortally dangerous—then we must, as the Biblical phrase goes, put away childish things; and among these childish things the first to go . . . should be self-idealization and the search for absolutes in world affairs: for absolute security, absolute amity, absolute harmony.

These are the challenges we face in applying this prescription:

—First, with friends: to reconcile our in-

<sup>1</sup>Made before the Commonwealth Club at San Francisco, Calif., on Oct. 11 (text from press release 404 dated Oct. 10; as prepared for delivery).

dependent identities with continuing collaboration.

—Second, with possible adversaries: to reconcile the reality of competition with the necessity for cooperation.

—Third, with military power: to reconcile a strong national defense with the control of nuclear arms.

—Fourth, with economic power: to reconcile the national interest and the international interest.

Let me address each of these four challenges in turn.

### **Evolving Partnerships**

Partners in international politics, as in marriage, take each other for granted only at the risk of divorce. Our alliances must grow or they will wither—adjust to new conditions or become anachronistic.

Our relationships were molded in a period of American predominance, the threat of Communist expansion, and the presumption of economic growth. As the United States attempts to share the burdens of leadership, as Europe seeks unity, Japan its international role, Latin America equality, and as we seek together to grapple with the implications of détente and interdependence, some pangs of adjustment must be expected.

Our central concern is to strengthen our partnerships to deal with emerging realities:

—The United States supports Western Europe's historic striving for unity. But European identity must not be at the expense of Atlantic community, or both sides of the ocean will suffer. The "Year of Europe" was an effort to give renewed meaning and inspiration to transatlantic ties in a profoundly changed international environment. It began a healthy, if sometimes difficult, process of clarification and taking stock. The air has now been cleared. There is a solid basis for further progress.

—The United States encourages Japan's search for international identity. But we must maintain a sense of mutual security and common aspirations. Our evolving relation-

ship has been punctuated by occasional frictions; the episodes proved transient because our objectives have remained parallel. Our partnership is now on a sounder footing although it will deserve constant care.

—The United States is helping other allies in Asia to reach greater self-sufficiency. But the transition should be gradual; the manner of the transfer reflects the motive of the transfer. Moving too slowly would stifle our friends' incentive for self-defense and self-development; moving too fast would undermine their self-confidence and paralyze their will.

—The United States has launched a new dialogue with Latin America. But the search for a more mature partnership must lead to a new sense of community, not an adversary relationship. Our past policy for this hemisphere has oscillated between U.S. prescription and U.S. neglect. We are seeking a more stable approach based on realistic commitments and shared endeavors.

In short, with our friends we seek a balance between dominance and diffidence. The world is too complex, and our allies too independent, for American blueprints. At the same time, there is the continual danger that weary Americans and wary foreigners will translate self-reliance into abandonment. Our friends consider an active and creative American role essential for their interests and for a stable peace.

Therefore we must evoke initiatives from others while continuing to take initiatives ourselves. Where once we found inspiration in stewardship, we must now find it in partnership. Above all, we and our allies must act on the belief, once expressed by Jean Monnet, that "the inescapable forces which are molding the future bind us even more closely than memories of the past."

### **The Decline of Ideology**

For a generation the unity of our alliances and the support of the American people were sustained by the perception of a monolithic threat from the Communist powers. We were joined in a struggle which made



accommodation difficult, if not immoral.

This situation has profoundly changed. The fragmentation of the Communist bloc, the evolving strategic balance, and economic incentives suggested the possibilities for more constructive East-West relations. Moscow and Peking, while proclaiming basic Socialist tenets, have emphasized geopolitical interests. They are acting more like world powers and less like revolutionary movements.

We, in turn, have generally shed the notion that others should mirror our social and economic structures. We deal with foreign countries primarily on the basis of their foreign policies. We cannot transform their domestic systems, though we can hope that relaxed international tensions will promote a positive evolution.

This decline of ideological struggle is an encouraging trend. But it carries with it ambiguities and fresh problems.

Are reports of the death of Communist doctrine greatly exaggerated? We cannot be sure that future leaders will embrace the more constructive approaches now being pursued in some Communist capitals. The Communist powers could once again act like revolutionary states out to disrupt the international system rather than nation-states willing to accept its legitimacy.

The United States will heavily influence their course. We will need to continue our policies of providing incentives for cooperation while displaying firmness against pressures. But Americans tend to take for granted the improvement in East-West relations and the lowering of global tensions. Some therefore assume that continued progress is automatic; others believe in hardening our demands. Some would jeopardize the process of détente by removing the incentives; others would ignore the continuing need for firmness.

We need to avoid the poles of intransigence and euphoria.

For a generation, brief moments of improved relations with the Soviet Union gave way to prolonged periods of confrontation. We must now build an irreversible commit-

ment to preserving peace. In the nuclear era there is no rational alternative.

For a generation, we and the People's Republic of China were separated by a gulf of isolation and hostility. We must expand the hopeful openings of the last few years. In the nuclear era there is no rational alternative.

Can Americans rally to a pastel banner? There is possible ambiguity about our purposes. Whatever its demerits, anti-Communism was at least a clear-cut rationale for our foreign policy, easily understood by Americans and allies alike. This formed a solid consensus for a global foreign policy. As ideology has waned, it has been difficult to sound a new theme to weld consensus at home and cement alliances abroad.

This is largely a question of leadership. We must derive inspiration from the long-term building of a more stable world through negotiation, accommodation, and restraint. With friends, we have the foundation of shared values and ideals; we can sustain our bonds by working together on the many new problems on the global agenda. These positive tasks must inspire our diplomacy in a grayer world.

Finally, how do we reconcile the pragmatic pursuit of peace with the promotion of our ideals? Concerned Americans have wondered whether we can be true to our values while dealing realistically with adversaries, friends, and the nonaligned.

Secretary Kissinger described the tension between our goals in a speech he made a year ago:<sup>2</sup>

In a community of sovereign states, the quest for peace involves a paradox: The attempt to impose absolute justice by one side will be seen as absolute injustice by all others; the quest for total security for some turns into total insecurity for the remainder. Stability depends on the relative satisfaction and therefore also the relative dissatisfaction of the various states. The pursuit of peace must therefore begin with the pragmatic concept of coexistence . . .

We must, of course, avoid becoming obsessed with stability. An excessively pragmatic policy will be empty of vision and humanity. It will lack not only direction, but also roots and heart. . . . America can-

<sup>2</sup> For Secretary Kissinger's address before the Pacem in Terris Conference at Washington on Oct. 8, 1973, see BULLETIN of Oct. 29, 1973, p. 525.

not be true to itself without moral purpose. This country has always had a sense of mission. Americans have always held the view that America stood for something above and beyond its material achievements. A purely pragmatic policy provides no criteria for other nations to assess our performance and no standards to which the American people can rally.

So, our foreign policy must reflect our national ideals. Otherwise it cannot be sustained in a democracy. But for the first time in history man can destroy mankind. In this nuclear age the pursuit of peace is itself a profound moral concern. In this nuclear age the loss of peace could mean the loss of all values and ideals.

### **The Redefinition of Power**

While we must avoid a preoccupation with power alone, we must deal with the realities that it imposes. The need for a strong national defense stretches ahead for as far as we can see. This nation cannot mortgage its future to the good intentions of others.

But maintaining national security is more complex than ever before. For power is harder to define than ever before. Once, political, military, and economic power were closely related. But in the modern world additional armament cannot always be translated into additional political leverage; economic giants can be politically weak; countries can exert political influence without possessing either military strength or economic might. Power is spread more diffusely across the globe, and its use is more complex.

These conditions are most dramatically demonstrated by the nuclear dimension. The overwhelming destructiveness of nuclear weapons makes it difficult to relate their accumulation to specific objectives. Once a nation can destroy its opponent even after a surprise attack, it is difficult to know what numbers and capabilities would yield a superiority that has either military or political use. A massive shift in the balance would be needed to produce a decisive advantage. And clearly neither side will permit this to happen.

If superiority in the nuclear age is elusive, the pursuit of it is deeply destabilizing. Any course which conceivably threatens the sur-

vival of an opponent is bound to have severe impact. The relaxation of political tensions cannot proceed in the face of an unrestrained arms buildup. Yet to sustain such a race would require, and perpetuate, an atmosphere of hostility.

Against this background we face two essential challenges:

—First, we must slow, and ultimately reverse, the growth of nuclear weapons among major powers. The United States and the Soviet Union are heading for arsenals involving thousands of launchers and over 10,000 warheads. We will never accept the strategic preponderance of another power. We will do what is required. But the political decisions of our two nations must not be determined by the pace of technology and the inertia of mutual suspicion. We must move decisively to achieve comprehensive and equitable limits on strategic arms.

—Second, we must stop the spread of nuclear weapons to new nations and regions. We had become accustomed to a world of five nuclear powers; the recent nuclear explosion in India reminds us of the perils of proliferation. A world of 10 or 20 nuclear nations would clearly be less tranquil and secure. Chronic conflicts such as the Middle East could assume a nuclear dimension. Devastation in local wars could reach levels no civilized nation desires. The threat of major-power involvement might increase. Around the globe there would be greater risks of nuclear accident or theft or blackmail.

Last month at the United Nations, Secretary Kissinger underlined American determination to work with others to halt the spread of nuclear explosives. He proposed strengthened cooperation among the principal suppliers of nuclear materials, enhanced safeguards and security for these materials, and continuing support for the Treaty on Nonproliferation of Nuclear Weapons.

We will work to seal Pandora's box.

### **Growing Interdependence**

Even as we have dealt with more traditional problems, a whole new series of chal-

enges have burst upon us. They transcend ideological and geographic boundaries. They link national prosperity to international prosperity.

Global interdependence is no longer a slogan, but an insistent reality. The crises of oil, food, and inflation cast shadows over the future of developed and developing, rich and poor, consumer and producer nations alike. Not only the prospects for world growth are at stake. A serious economic decline could trigger widespread domestic instability and tear the fabric of international political cooperation upon which peace itself depends.

President Ford spoke to these issues of interdependence three weeks ago in New York. He pointed out that many developing nations need the food of a few developed nations, that many industrialized nations need the oil of a few developing nations, that energy is needed to provide food, food to produce energy, and both to provide for a decent life.

The size of the American grain crop may determine how many people live or die in South Asia. Long-term climate changes could eventually affect food production here, as well as spreading devastation in the African Sahel. The decisions of a few oil producers may ricochet around the world.

We will all advance together, or we can all slide back together. Nations no longer can afford to pursue national or regional or bloc self-interest without a broader perspective. Countries must find their self-interest in the common interest and, indeed, recognize that the two are often identical.

The United States might do better on its own than others. But we could not prosper. And we could never feel secure in a sea of human misery, rising tensions, and likely conflict.

The time of easy choices for this nation is gone. Accustomed to relative self-sufficiency, we now face the reality which has confronted Europe, Japan, and most other nations for decades—dependence on an open, cooperative international system for national growth. America must reconcile its national and global goals.

We no longer possess a vast surplus of food. But we retain an enormous productive

capacity. We have a moral obligation to help meet the world's growing hunger as well as to feed our own people. And we have a political interest in tracing a constructive pattern for other producers of other resources.

We no longer have a seemingly endless supply of energy. But we must join more vulnerable friends to conserve, to explore new sources, to share in emergencies—because of our interest in their stability and well-being.

We no longer have a low rate of inflation. But we must move carefully—with others—to regain control, lest we spark a world depression.

But these particular issues reflect a deeper phenomenon: Basic preconceptions of international and domestic policy are being rudely shaken. The structure of the postwar world is being challenged in ways for which we are not yet intellectually prepared.

Leaders must grasp the basic forces at work in the world and impart this vision to their peoples. The public does not expect instant solutions. But it must be confident that the problems are understood and that they are being addressed.

What is at stake is mankind's faith that man still shapes his future.

### **The Domestic Dimension**

At a time when the world is in flux and a new American role emerging, we are subjected as well to profound changes at home. A nation which first explored its own frontiers, and then stretched its presence around the world, now requires a new horizon. As our bicentennial approaches, America must maintain the vigor of youth, earn the wisdom of maturity, and shun the weariness of old age.

Our next frontier is to find peace within ourselves.

Let us begin by restoring our self-confidence. In the past dozen years, we have lost one President through murder, another through Viet-Nam, and another through scandal. We have agonized through our longest and most inconclusive war. Our once-predominant strength has been challenged and our once-predominant dollar battered. We have

endured riots, assassinations, racial and generational confrontations, a cultural revolution, and Watergate.

Yet we have surmounted these traumas, showing a resiliency that inspires the envy of others. Our democratic institutions have come through unprecedented trials with fresh vitality. We have recorded historic international achievements even as we tailor our role to new conditions. We are still the most advanced nation in the world, on the frontiers of the most important revolutions of our era—in technology, agriculture, communications, health. America can go forward if Americans can again reach for shared perceptions and exult in shared purposes.

Alexis de Tocqueville, the 19th-century observer of the American scene, once wrote, “. . . it is especially in the conduct of their foreign relations that democracies appear to me decidedly inferior . . .” There is, he said, a “propensity that induces democracies to obey impulse rather than prudence, and to abandon a mature design for the gratification of a momentary passion.”

I believe we can prove De Tocqueville wrong.

To do so, we must live comfortably with both our limits and our possibilities. A people torn between excessive pride and excessive pessimism, a nation torn between expecting too much of power and being ashamed of it, cannot flourish in a world of competing values and linked destinies.

For most of our history we believed that America was good for the world. Recently we have reined in the excess involvement that flowed from this perspective.

But we must not now yield to the view that America is bad for the world. We need a steadier course.

As a mature nation we must learn that success is a process and not a final condition, that exertion is perpetual and must be an end in itself.

In this way America can thrive in an age of ambiguity.

In this way America can rediscover peace at home and fully contribute to peace in the world.

## U.S. Opposes Participation of PLO in U.N. General Assembly Debate

*Following is a statement made in the U.N. General Assembly on October 14 by U.S. Representative John Scali, together with the text of a resolution adopted by the Assembly that day.*

### STATEMENT BY AMBASSADOR SCALI

USUN press release 135 dated October 14

It should be clear from many statements by my government over the past months and years that our vote today in no way reflects a lack of understanding or sympathy for the very real concerns and yearning for justice of the Palestinian people. Rather, it reflects our consistent conviction that the justice they seek will come only as part of a peace that is just for all the parties. This just peace must be negotiated with utmost care and must lead to an overall settlement of the Arab-Israeli conflict, at the heart of which we all recognize lies the Palestinian problem.

Our vote also reflects a deep concern that the resolution before us could be interpreted by some as prejudging that negotiating process and make a durable settlement more difficult to achieve. In that sense, the resolution could have the ultimate effect of working against the interests of a Palestinian settlement.

The world knows how tirelessly we have sought to move the Middle East from the scourge of war to the path of peace. For us to have voted other than we did would be inconsistent with and harmful to our efforts to help promote a just and lasting peace that takes into account the legitimate needs of all the states and peoples in the Middle East.

I should also like to express my government's profound concern over the resolution's departure from the longstanding precedent that only representatives of governments should be allowed to participate in plenary deliberations. Have we created a dangerous

precedent which may return to haunt this organization—perhaps cripple its effectiveness?

Mr. President, I want to make clear that the only basis for a just negotiated settlement is and must remain Security Council Resolutions 242 and 338. The resolution passed today cannot alter the basis, and our efforts will go forward in that established and widely accepted framework.

## TEXT OF RESOLUTION <sup>1</sup>

*The General Assembly,*

*Considering* that the Palestinian people is the principal party to the question of Palestine,

*Invites* the Palestine Liberation Organization, the representative of the Palestinian people, to participate in the deliberations of the General Assembly on the question of Palestine in plenary meetings.

## United Nations Documents: A Selected Bibliography

*Mimeographed or processed documents (such as those listed below) may be consulted at depository libraries in the United States. U.N. printed publications may be purchased from the Sales Section of the United Nations, United Nations Plaza, N.Y. 10017.*

### World Population Conference

World Population Conference background papers:

Fertility trends in the world. Prepared by the U.N. Secretariat. E/CONF.60/CBP/16. April 3, 1974. 28 pp.

Demographic trends in the world and its major regions, 1950-1970. Prepared by the U.N. Secretariat. E/CONF.60/CBP/14. April 16, 1974. 35 pp.

World and regional population prospects. Prepared by the U.N. Secretariat. E/CONF.60/CBP/15. April 16, 1974. 33 pp.

International migration trends, 1950-1970. Prepared by the U.N. Secretariat. E/CONF.60/CBP/18. May 22, 1974. 28 pp.

The availability of demographic statistics around the world. Prepared by the Statistical Office of the United Nations. E/CONF.60/CBP/27. May 22, 1974. 28 pp.

<sup>1</sup> U.N. doc. A/RES/3210 (XXIX); adopted by the Assembly on Oct. 14 by a vote of 105 to 4 (U.S.), with 20 abstentions.

## U.S. and Poland Sign Agreements During Visit of First Secretary

*Following are Department announcements issued October 8 concerning agreements between the United States and Poland signed that day.*

### INCOME TAX CONVENTION

Press release 398D dated October 8

Secretary of State Kissinger and Minister of Foreign Affairs of the Polish People's Republic Stefan Olszowski signed on October 8 at Washington an income tax convention between the United States and the Polish People's Republic.

The tax convention seeks to promote economic and cultural relations between the two countries by removing tax barriers to the flow of investment.

The new treaty is similar to other recent U.S. tax conventions. It incorporates the same basic principles with respect to the taxation of business income, personal service income, and income from investments and includes provisions for nondiscriminatory tax treatment and for reciprocal administrative cooperation.

Under the new convention, profits derived by a resident of either country would be subject to tax by the other country only to the extent that the profits are attributable to a "permanent establishment" in that other country. Employees would not be taxable by the other country on their personal service income unless the services were performed there during a stay lasting longer than six months of the year. The rates of tax imposed on dividends, interest, and royalties derived by residents of the other country would be reciprocally limited to 15 percent on portfolio dividends, 5 percent on dividends from a shareholding of 10 percent or more, zero (exemption) on interest, and 10 percent on royalties and film rentals. In the absence of the convention, the U.S. tax rate would be 30 percent of the gross amount, and the Polish

tax, imposed at graduated rates, also reaches 30 percent of the gross amount.

The tax convention is subject to approval by the U.S. Senate. It would take effect as of January 1, 1974, and would remain in force for a minimum of five years. It then would continue in force indefinitely, unless terminated by either nation.

## **AGREEMENT ON FUNDING OF COOPERATION IN SCIENCE AND TECHNOLOGY**

Press release 398A dated October 8

Secretary of State Kissinger and Deputy Prime Minister of the Polish People's Republic Dr. Mieczyslaw Jagielski signed on October 8 at Washington an agreement between the Governments of the United States and Poland providing for joint funding of their cooperative program in science and technology.

The agreement grew out of discussions held by President Nixon and Secretary of State Rogers in Warsaw in 1972 and is in furtherance of the U.S.-Polish agreement on cooperation in science and technology signed on October 31, 1972.

The new agreement provides for the establishment of the Marie Sklodowska Curie Fund. The U.S. share in the Fund, most of which was previously allocated for research in Poland, will be 558 million zlotys (one official exchange rate is \$1.00 = 19.92 zlotys). While most of this sum has already been earmarked, this total includes new zlotys for joint energy research. Under this agreement, the Government of Poland will match this 558 million zlotys, which we own from earlier U.S. Public Law 480 programs, with an equal sum. Before the new agreement, the research was funded entirely by U.S.-owned zlotys. The joint funding agreement will extend to December 31, 1981. A joint U.S.-Polish Board will establish the broad areas of research to be financed by the Fund.

At least one-third of the amount is to be used to finance energy and energy-related research. The Fund will also be used to finance ongoing and new research projects in medicine, health, environmental protection, agri-

culture, transportation, and other fields. Some of these projects are also the subject of the agreement for cooperation in coal research, the agreement on cooperation in the field of health, and the agreement on environmental protection, all signed October 8.

The agreement strengthens the basis of the cooperative efforts of the scientists of the two countries which have been underway since the early 1960's. Some examples of ongoing research include investigations relating to brain damage, evaluation of soybean protein concentrate additives, development of frost- and drought-resistant hybrid plants, reclamation of alkaline ash piles to reduce pollution while producing a usable product, and further research relating to important Polish contributions to the theory of gravity. The most important new research will be in the fields of coal utilization and coal extraction.

## **AGREEMENT ON COOPERATION IN HEALTH**

Press release 398E dated October 8

Secretary of Health, Education, and Welfare Caspar Weinberger and Deputy Prime Minister of the Polish People's Republic Dr. Mieczyslaw Jagielski signed on October 8 at Washington an agreement between the Governments of the United States and Poland to promote cooperation in the field of health. Attending the ceremony were Polish United Workers' Party First Secretary Edward Gierk and Secretary of State Kissinger.

The agreement established a Joint Committee for Cooperation in the Field of Health to determine the mechanisms and policy for the program under the agreement. The Joint Committee will serve to direct an expanded program of cooperative activities, including the exchange of junior and senior scientists, the facilitation of direct institute-to-institute relationships, the exchange of scientific and technical publications, the organization of joint scientific symposia and conferences, and the exchange of equipment, drugs, and biologicals.

This agreement is a reaffirmation and strengthening of the successful bilateral co-

operation which has been ongoing less formally for the last 12 years. Since 1962, U.S. and Polish scientists have undertaken numerous cooperative research programs in a broad range of health areas, including those related to maternal and child health, cardiovascular diseases, cancer, alcoholism, occupational and environmental health, neurologic and psychiatric disorders, rehabilitation, and infectious diseases. There are now 89 ongoing research projects, of which 16 were approved this past June.

Joint research activities have served to increase direct exchange and information sharing between scientists of the two countries and have resulted in some significant medical advances. One notable example is a project in which HEW's Social and Rehabilitation Service collaborated with doctors at the Konstancin Rehabilitation Center near Warsaw, leading to the development at that center of a technique for immediate postsurgical fitting of artificial legs which thereby makes it possible for a patient to walk within a short period of time after surgery. This technique has subsequently been adopted in the United States. This medical cooperation also recently included the development of the Krakow hospital for mothers and children, now considered one of the most dynamic of such institutions in Poland.

#### **JOINT STATEMENT ON DEVELOPMENT OF AGRICULTURAL TRADE**

Press release 398B dated October 8

Assistant Secretary of Agriculture Clayton Yeutter and First Deputy Minister of Trade and Maritime Economy of the Polish People's Republic Henryk Kisiel signed on October 8 at Washington a joint statement on the development of agricultural trade between the United States and Poland. Attending the ceremony were Polish United Workers' Party First Secretary Edward Gierek and Secretary of State Kissinger. The statement was negotiated at the fourth session of the U.S.-Polish Joint Commission for Trade, which took place in Washington September 9-10.

Under provisions of the joint statement, the two countries have agreed to exchange agricultural economic information—including forward estimates of supply and demand—to facilitate the growth of bilateral trade, to encourage the signing of long-term purchasing agreements between Polish foreign trade enterprises and private U.S. exporters, to develop further the cooperation between veterinary services which has assisted the two countries in increasing trade turnover, and to continue to treat imports in each country in accordance with the most-favored-nation principle under the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade.

The two countries also agreed to form a permanent working group within the framework of the Joint Trade Commission to exchange views on economic and trade matters and to explore areas for possible cooperation in various fields of agriculture. In addition, both countries expressed support of the upcoming multilateral trade negotiations and agreed that the joint statement will in no way prejudice or modify existing undertakings under the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade.

The statement notes that U.S.-Polish agricultural trade spans a period of some 50 years and has benefited the economies of both countries. In fiscal year 1974, U.S. agricultural exports to Poland reached the record level of \$306 million. Polish agricultural exports to the United States include hams and canned beef. Poland is America's largest agricultural trading partner in Eastern Europe.

#### **AGREEMENT ON COOPERATION IN ENVIRONMENTAL PROTECTION**

Press release 398F dated October 8

The United States and Poland concluded on October 8 at Washington an agreement to expand and intensify cooperation between the two countries in environmental protection and pollution abatement. Russell E. Train, Administrator of the Environmental Protection Agency, and Professor Witold Trampeczynski, Polish Ambassador to the

United States, representing the Polish Ministry of Land Economy and Environmental Protection, signed the agreement. Attending the ceremony were Polish United Workers' Party First Secretary Edward Gierek and Secretary of State Kissinger.

The new agreement implements a more general accord signed in October 1972 which established a policy of cooperation in many fields of science and technology. The new agreement provides for future cooperation in a wide range of matters related to protecting and improving the environment. Of special interest are water and air pollution, prevention of further environmental degradation, the effects of pollutants on human, plant, and animal life, noise abatement, controlling pollution associated with transportation, radiation, and municipal and industrial wastes. The agreement calls for joint scientific and technical research, the exchange of specialists, data, and documents, and the organization of conferences and symposia.

Administrator Train hailed the agreement as both an environmental and a political milestone. "It represents an irresistible process now underway to systematize and implement a multilateral and global approach to man's stewardship of the Earth," Mr. Train said. He added that the agreement also "marks the high point of cordial relations that have developed between the United States and Poland over the past two decades." Mr. Train stated that the agreement exemplified a new spirit of international cooperation and concern about environmental matters.

#### **AGREEMENT FOR COOPERATION IN COAL RESEARCH**

Press release 398C dated October 8

The United States and Poland concluded on October 8 at Washington an agreement to cooperate in energy research and development, with particular emphasis on coal utilization and coal extraction. Kent Frizzell, Solicitor, Department of the Interior, and

Benon Stranz, Deputy Minister of Mining and Power of the Polish People's Republic, signed the agreement. Attending the ceremony were Polish United Workers' Party First Secretary Edward Gierek and Secretary of State Kissinger.

The agreement grew from mutual recognition that both countries need to make more effective use of their substantial solid fuel resources to meet their growing energy demands, and in a manner that will be environmentally satisfactory. It is an important new development in international energy cooperation.

The United States and Poland each have intensive research and development programs to extract coal more efficiently and to convert the product into a clean fuel at reasonable costs. Many of these programs have common objectives. Through the new cooperation agreement, unnecessary duplication of research efforts will be avoided, valuable technologies will be shared, and new solutions will be sought to meet the universal demand for cleaner energy supplies.

As a first step toward the agreement, the United States and Poland last summer exchanged teams of coal research experts to study the energy research programs now underway in the two countries. These technical reviews showed that fuller cooperation could profitably be undertaken in coal liquefaction, coal gasification, magnetohydrodynamics, coal preparation, and improved coke manufacture.

Coal extraction research areas to be studied jointly cover the principles of mine planning and design, methane drainage and utilization from underground workings, subsidence prediction and control, automation of longwall systems, and the control of rock, coal, and gas outburst and the collapse of mineshafts.

This agreement will be implemented by joint research, the organization of joint symposia and seminars, exchange of research scientists and research results, and other forms of cooperation as needed to fulfill the requirements of the cooperation.



## Current Treaty Actions

### MULTILATERAL

#### Automotive Traffic

Customs convention on the temporary importation of private road vehicles. Done at New York June 4, 1954. Entered into force December 15, 1957.  
*Accession deposited:* Chile, August 15, 1974.

#### Aviation

Convention for the suppression of unlawful seizure of aircraft. Done at The Hague December 16, 1970. Entered into force October 15, 1971. TIAS 7192.  
*Ratification deposited:* Federal Republic of Germany, October 11, 1974.<sup>1</sup>

#### Containers

International convention for safe containers (CSC), with annexes. Done at Geneva December 2, 1972.<sup>2</sup>  
*Accession deposited:* German Democratic Republic, (with statements and a declaration), September 27, 1974.

#### Pollution

International convention for the prevention of pollution from ships, 1973, with protocols and annexes. Done at London November 2, 1973.<sup>2</sup>  
*Signature:* Poland (subject to ratification), October 2, 1974.

Protocol relating to intervention on the high seas in cases of marine pollution by substances other than oil. Done at London November 2, 1973.<sup>2</sup>  
*Signature:* Poland (subject to ratification), October 2, 1974.

#### Telecommunications

Telegraph regulations, with appendices, annex, and final protocol. Done at Geneva April 11, 1973. Entered into force September 1, 1974.<sup>3</sup>  
*Notification of approval:* Canada, July 10, 1974; Rwanda, July 16, 1974; Spain, July 8, 1974.

Telephone regulations, with appendices and final protocol. Done at Geneva April 11, 1973. Entered into force September 1, 1974.<sup>3</sup>  
*Notification of approval:* Canada, July 10, 1974; Rwanda, July 16, 1974; Spain, July 8, 1974.

### BILATERAL

#### Bangladesh

Loan agreement for financing manufacture and acquisition by Bangladesh of fertilizer, pesticides, and other agricultural inputs, with annex. Signed at Dacca September 19, 1974. Entered into force September 19, 1974.

<sup>1</sup> Applicable to Berlin (West), subject to understandings.

<sup>2</sup> Not in force.

<sup>3</sup> Not in force for the United States.

#### International Committee of the Red Cross

Amendment to the grant agreement of November 1, 1973, to provide assistance to refugees, displaced persons, and war victims in the Republic of Viet-Nam, Laos, and the Khmer Republic. Effected by U.S. letter of July 30, 1974. Entered into force July 30, 1974.

Agreement amending the grant agreement of November 1, 1973, to provide assistance to refugees, displaced persons, and war victims in the Republic of Viet-Nam, Laos, and the Khmer Republic. Signed at Geneva and Washington August 22 and September 6, 1974. Entered into force September 6, 1974.

### DEPARTMENT AND FOREIGN SERVICE

## Bureau of Oceans and International Environmental and Scientific Affairs

Press release 424 dated October 15

The Department's establishment of a Bureau of Oceans and International Environmental and Scientific Affairs became effective on October 14. The new Bureau, which is conformable with Public Law 93-126 of October 18, 1973, will bring together the Department's activities and responsibilities relating to all international scientific, technological, and environmental affairs including weather matters, the oceans, atmosphere, outer space, fisheries, wildlife, conservation, health, population, and associated subjects. It will be headed by an Assistant Secretary.

Pending the appointment of the Assistant Secretary, Thomas A. Clingan, Jr., who is Deputy Assistant Secretary for Oceans and Fisheries Affairs, will be the Acting Assistant Secretary. Within the Bureau, John V. N. Granger will be Deputy Assistant Secretary for Scientific and Technological Affairs, and Christian A. Herter, Jr., will be Deputy Assistant Secretary for Environmental and Population Affairs. Dr. Granger and Mr. Herter have hitherto been the senior officers in the Bureau of International Scientific and Technological Affairs.

The new Bureau's responsibilities for technological affairs will include atomic energy and energy-related research and development, space technology, and other advanced technological developments except those which are defense related. Its functions are to include the development of comprehensive and coherent U.S. policy in its designated areas of concern. It will be the central point of contact on such matters with other U.S. Government agencies and will provide foreign policy guidance and coordina-

tion for the execution of international scientific and technological programs.

In oceans and fisheries the new Bureau will assume the responsibilities of the Coordinator of Ocean Affairs and Special Assistant for Fisheries and Wildlife. These include numerous bilateral agreements and international organizations dealing with fisheries and marine science. The creation of the new Bureau will give greater emphasis to the importance of the difficult problems encountered in these areas. The Bureau will also permit a greater focus on certain wildlife, conservation, and marine pollution matters which had been dealt with by separate offices and which will now be together within the Bureau.

By amalgamating the handling of oceans, environmental, scientific, and technological problems hitherto assigned to separate units, the new Bureau is designed to give new weight to the consideration and administration of our increasing involvement in science and environment-associated matters relating to foreign affairs.

## PUBLICATIONS

### 1949 "Foreign Relations" Volume on Germany and Austria Released

Press release 372 dated September 23 (for release September 30)

The Department of State released on September 30 "Foreign Relations of the United States," 1949, volume III, "Council of Foreign Ministers; Germany and Austria." The "Foreign Relations" series has been published continuously since 1861 as the official record of American foreign policy. The volume now released is the first to be published of nine volumes documenting American foreign policy during the year 1949.

This volume of 1,324 pages presents documentation—hitherto unpublished and of the highest classification—on the problems of divided Germany and Austria. Primary emphasis is on relations among the four occupying powers, the establishment of the Federal Republic of Germany, resolution of the Berlin crisis, the complicated issues of reparations and restitution from Germany, and efforts to negotiate a treaty on the status of Austria. The volume also includes comprehensive documentation on the meetings at Paris of the quadripartite Council of Foreign Ministers as well as on efforts to maintain the independence and integrity of Austria. President Truman, Secretary of State Acheson, and such personages as

Ernest Bevin, Robert Schuman, Andrei Vyshinsky, Konrad Adenauer, John J. McCloy, Lucius D. Clay, Robert D. Murphy, and Lewis W. Douglas figure prominently in the events documented in the volume.

The "Foreign Relations" volumes are prepared by the Historical Office, Bureau of Public Affairs. Volume III for 1949 (Department of State publication 8752; GPO cat. no. S1.1:949/v. III) may be purchased for \$14.55 (domestic postpaid). Checks or money orders should be made payable to the Superintendent of Documents and sent to the U.S. Government Bookstore, Department of State, Washington, D.C. 20520.

#### Check List of Department of State

##### Press Releases: October 14–20

Press releases may be obtained from the Office of Press Relations, Department of State, Washington, D.C. 20520.

Releases issued prior to October 14 which appear in this issue of the BULLETIN are Nos. 372 of September 23, 398A–398F of October 8, 399 of October 10, 404 of October 10, 405, 407, and 408 of October 11, and 412 of October 12.

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415	10/15	Kissinger, Allon: arrival, Tel Aviv, Oct. 12.
416	10/15	Kissinger, Allon: departure, Tel Aviv, Oct. 13.
417	10/15	Kissinger, Saqqaf: departure, Riyadh, Oct. 13.
418	10/15	Kissinger: arrival, Cairo, Oct. 14.
419	10/15	Kissinger, Sadat: remarks following meeting, Oct. 14.
420	10/15	Kissinger: departure, Cairo, Oct. 14.
421	10/15	Kissinger: departure, Damascus, Oct. 14.
422	10/15	Kissinger: arrival, Algiers, Oct. 14.
423	10/15	Kissinger: departure, Algiers.
424	10/15	Bureau of Oceans and International Environmental and Scientific Affairs established, Oct. 14.
425	10/15	Kissinger: arrival, Rabat.
426	10/15	Kissinger: departure, Rabat.
†427	10/16	Kissinger: Alfred E. Smith dinner, New York.
428	10/16	Kissinger: arrival, Washington, Oct. 15.
†429	10/18	Notice of time for filing claims against Egypt by U.S. nationals.
*430	10/18	Rush sworn in as Ambassador to France (biographic data).
*431	10/18	Easum to visit nine African countries.

\* Not printed.

† Held for a later issue of the BULLETIN.

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# THE DEPARTMENT OF STATE **BULLETIN**

VOL. LXXI, No. 1846

November 11, 1974

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*The Department of State BULLETIN, a weekly publication issued by the Office of Media Services, Bureau of Public Affairs, provides the public and interested agencies of the government with information on developments in the field of U.S. foreign relations and on the work of the Department and the Foreign Service.*

*The BULLETIN includes selected press releases on foreign policy, issued by the White House and the Department, and statements, addresses, and news conferences of the President and the Secretary of State and other officers of the Department, as well as special articles on various phases of international affairs and the functions of the Department. Information is included concerning treaties and international agreements to which the United States is or may become a party and on treaties of general international interest.*

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For sale by the Superintendent of Documents  
U.S. Government Printing Office  
Washington, D.C. 20402

**PRICE:**

52 issues plus semiannual indexes,  
domestic \$29.80, foreign \$37.25  
Single copy 60 cents

Use of funds for printing this publication approved by the Director of the Office of Management and Budget (January 29, 1971).

**Note:** Contents of this publication are not copyrighted and items contained herein may be reprinted. Citation of the DEPARTMENT OF STATE BULLETIN as the source will be appreciated. The BULLETIN is indexed in the Readers' Guide to Periodical Literature.

## Secretary Kissinger Interviewed for New York Times

*Following is the transcript of an interview with Secretary Kissinger by James Reston on October 5 and 6 as published in the New York Times on October 13.*

*Mr. Reston: You have been sounding rather pessimistic in the last few weeks. Are you worried about the state of the West?*

*Secretary Kissinger:* I don't mean to sound pessimistic. I think that there are huge problems before us, and I'm trying to define them. I believe that the problems are soluble, but they require a major effort and, in some areas, new approaches, but I'm not pessimistic about the ability to solve them. We have—

*Q. Could I interrupt there to say that in reading what you have written in the past, I have a sense of pessimism in your writings, even of tragedy. Do you regard your thought as being essentially tragic, when you look at the last two generations?*

*Secretary Kissinger:* I think of myself as a historian more than as a statesman. As a historian, you have to be conscious of the fact that every civilization that has ever existed has ultimately collapsed.

History is a tale of efforts that failed, of aspirations that weren't realized, of wishes that were fulfilled and then turned out to be different from what one expected. So, as a historian, one has to live with a sense of the inevitability of tragedy; as a statesman, one has to act on the assumption that problems must be solved.

Each generation lives in time, and even though ultimately perhaps societies have all suffered a decline, that is of no help to any one generation, and the decline is usually

traceable to a loss of creativity and inspiration and therefore avoidable.

It is probably true that, insofar as I think historically, I must look at the tragedies that have occurred. Insofar as I act, my motive force, of which I am conscious, it is to try to avoid them.

*Q. Don't we have to bring this problem down to practical points, the difference between the ideals of a republic and what can be done? Is there a conflict now in America between the ideals of foreign policy that you see for the order of the world and what can actually be done in terms of public understanding and in actual votes in the Congress of the United States?*

*Secretary Kissinger:* I think almost every nation right now has the problem of reconciling its domestic view of itself with the international problem because every nation has to live on so many levels.

Certainly in every non-Communist nation—and probably even in Communist nations—public opinion in one way or another is becoming more and more important. But what public opinion is conscious of are the day-to-day problems of life. The remoter issues, geographically and in time, do not impinge on the average citizen.

In foreign policy, the most difficult issues are those whose necessity you cannot prove when the decisions are made. You act on the basis of an assessment that in the nature of things is a guess, so that public opinion knows, usually, only when it is too late to act, when some catastrophe has become overwhelming.

The necessity of the measures one takes to avoid the catastrophe can almost never be

proved. For that reason you require a great deal, or at least a certain amount, of confidence in leadership; and that becomes difficult in all societies.

But, speaking of the United States, if one looks at the crises through which America has gone over the last decade—the assassinations, the Viet-Nam war, Watergate—it is very difficult to establish the relationship of confidence.

Then the United States also has particular problems in terms of its historical experience. We never had to face the problem of security until the end of the Second World War, so we could afford to be very idealistic and insist on the pure implementation of our maxims.

To the average countries that were less favored, the problems of foreign policy have usually appeared in a much more complicated form; that is, their morality could not be expressed in absolute terms. Their morality had to give the sense of inward security necessary to act step by step in less than perfect modes.

We are now in a similar position, and therefore there is an almost instinctive rebellion in America against the pragmatic aspect of foreign policy that is security oriented, that achieves finite objectives, that seeks to settle for the best attainable rather than for the best. In this sense, we are having domestic problems.

On the other hand, there is a strain in America which is, curiously, extremely relevant to this world. We are challenged by the huge problems—peace and war, energy, food—and we have a real belief in interdependence; it is not just a slogan.

The solution of these problems really comes quite naturally to Americans; first, because they believe that every problem is soluble; secondly, because they are at ease with re-doing the world, and the old frontier mentality really does find an expression, and even the old idealism finds a way to express itself.

In what other country could a leader say, "We are going to solve energy; we're going to solve food; we're going to solve the problem of nuclear war," and be taken seriously? So I think it is true that there are strains in

our domestic debate; I think it is also true that there are many positive aspects in our domestic debate that can help us reach these larger goals.

#### Situation in Europe Today

*Q. Are you worried when you see the situation in Europe today? What's going on in Portugal, the fragility of Italy, the almost state of war between two members of the alliance, Turkey and Greece. Surely, from the point of view of Moscow, this looks like a fulfillment of their prophecy of the internal contradictions of the Western world.*

*Secretary Kissinger:* One of the troubles of the Western societies is that they are basically satisfied with the status quo, so that when you have governments like the previous government in Portugal, or the previous government in Greece, the tendency is not to change it.

I think that's a mistaken conception. But what comes after is so uncertain—and we really lack a philosophy for how to shape a new political evolution—that one tends to leave well enough alone. In the process, the political base erodes invisibly, and then, when the changes occur suddenly, there is no real base for a democratic, liberal, humane evolution—or at least it can be put together only with great difficulty.

So, in Portugal, after 50 years of authoritarian rule, the Communist Party was the best organized, most purposeful opposition and therefore has a very large influence on Portugal's contemporary orientation.

In Greece there are also massive domestic pressures. The problem of Italy and other countries is different, in that you have there a residual vote that has never been reduced by prosperity and goes to the Communists. This shows that there is a significant percentage of the population that does not consider itself part of the system.

If you take the authoritarian parties in Italy on the left and the right, you have only about 60 percent of the spectrum to work with for a democratic policy. When that is



split you have an inherent weakness; and it will be split, because that's the nature of the democratic process.

*Q. When you came to Washington in the first place after your study of history, it was said that you had a concept of how to achieve the order of the world, and yet in the last years, since you have been here, the tendency has been to say that you have not defined your concept but that actually what you have been doing is negotiating pragmatic problems and not really dealing with the concept or making clear the concept. What is that concept? First of all, is the criticism correct, and second, what is the concept that you see?*

*Secretary Kissinger:* Well, I think you will find few officials who will tell you that any criticism you can make of them is correct, but I don't think the criticism is quite correct. I do not have the choice, in any position, between imposing a theoretical order or negotiating, because if you don't solve immediate problems you can never solve long-term problems.

If you act creatively you should be able to use crises to move the world toward the structural solutions that are necessary. In fact, very often the crises themselves are a symptom of the need for a structural rearrangement.

I faced a number of problems partly of perception and partly of structure. I feel it is essential that when the United States acts in foreign policy that it understand first what the American national interest is in relation to the problem. And to define that, America has to know what the world interest is, not only in relation to the specific problem but in relation to the historical evolution from which any solution of a problem starts.

So I have tried—historians will have to judge with what success—to understand the forces that are at work in this period. My associates will confirm that when we tackle a problem we spend the greatest part of our time at the beginning trying to relate it to where America and the world ought to go before we ever discuss tactics.

I think somebody would have to go through my speeches and press conferences to see to what extent I have articulated general propositions. I don't think I should be the judge of this here.

#### **Debate Over Nature of Consultation With Europe**

*Q. When you made your speech at the Waldorf, I regarded it at that time as something equivalent almost to the offer of the Marshall plan. Yet we got no real response from Europe. Even when you went to London and talked about interdependence, there was no response. Now, something was wrong there. Could you define it?*

*Secretary Kissinger:* There are always at least two aspects to any problem. One is your definition of the problem; second, how you solve it—are you doing it correctly?

I believe that the issues that I've attempted to define are serious issues. Take my Waldorf speech, the so-called year of Europe speech.<sup>1</sup> It came at a period when we had opened to China and opened to the Soviet Union and when we had ended the Viet-Nam war.

Until we had accomplished at least some of those objectives, I did not see how a creative period of relationship with Europe would be possible, because the disagreement with our Viet-Nam policy in Europe was too deep. The fear of nuclear confrontation was too great, as was the fear that the United States was somehow to blame for this state of hostility in the world.

So in early 1973 I thought the time was opportune to move toward a serious dialogue with Europe, and I thought it was all the more essential because I did not want success to become identified in the public consciousness only with relations with adversaries, and I felt that the old Atlantic relationship would over a period of time become so much taken for granted and so much the province of an older generation that the next generation would consider it as something not relevant to itself.

<sup>1</sup> For text of the address, made at New York on Apr. 23, 1973, see BULLETIN of May 14, 1973, p. 593.

I think that this perception was essentially correct. Why did it lead to this intense dialogue? One reason is that, at that particular moment, Europe was enormously absorbed with itself. Every European country, it soon became apparent, had a leadership crisis of its own and was trying to sort out its own domestic problems. Beyond that, Europe was very much occupied in forming its own identity, and it had so much difficulty in doing so that any greater conception seemed a threat to whatever autonomy they had so painfully wrested from their deliberations.

So we became involved in an abstruse theoretical debate over the nature of consultation, something that could never be written down, because you can't wave a paper at somebody and tell him he's obliged to consult if he doesn't want to consult.

Then the Middle East war occurred, and that had a tendency to emphasize national frustrations, so that the larger dialogue that I had sought took a long time to get started; but finally the end result was pretty close to what we had asked, though not completely in the spirit I had hoped to evoke. We got the documents we wanted, but we didn't get the spirit of creativity that, for example, the Marshall offer evoked.

Now, similarly, with the Pilgrim speech in London.<sup>2</sup> It was not received very warmly, because, again, it was looked at very much from the national point of view. Nevertheless, events have moved us inevitably in that direction. The emergency sharing program which seemed revolutionary in February has now been accepted by all the countries. Even France, I hope, will find some way of relating itself to it.

And we are now engaged in discussions which will go far beyond what we could talk about last year. In the late 1940's the mere fact that the United States was willing to commit itself was a tremendous event. Now this is probably not enough, and our aspirations have to be expressed in action rather than in debate.

<sup>2</sup> For text of the address, made on Dec. 12, 1973, see BULLETIN of Dec. 31, 1973, p. 777.

## Need for a National Understanding

*Q. On that point, when you offer, as a basis for discussion with the Europeans and the rest of the world, a sharing of oil in a crisis, do you believe that the spirit of this country will accept it? When you come down to a question of producing oil for other countries who are in worse shape than we are, is it politically possible in this country to do it?*

*Secretary Kissinger:* There is undoubtedly a profound disillusionment in America with foreign involvement in general. We have carried the burden for a generation. In fact, if you go back to the beginning of World War II, it doesn't seem to end. Most programs have been sold to Americans with the argument that they would mean an end of exertion. Now we have to convince Americans that there will never be an end to exertion. That's a very difficult problem.

And if you look at some of our recent debates you would have to say we could fail. I don't think that those in key positions at this particular moment have any real choice. At a minimum, we have to tell the American people what we think is needed. If they do not agree, at least they will know 10 years from now, if there is a catastrophe, what happened. And then there is a chance of restoring a sense of direction. But if 10 years from now there is a catastrophe and people say, "Why didn't somebody tell us about this, and why didn't they ask us to do what they should have foreseen?", then I think our whole system may be in difficulty.

*Q. That's a critical point because I don't think the country—if one may presume to think about what the country thinks—has the vaguest idea of what it is called upon to do. We are complaining about how the oil-producing nations are using their resources, and yet we have larger reserves of food in North America than the nations of the Middle East have oil resources, and yet here we are now arguing our national interests. We are against high prices for oil, but we are still a very gluttonous, wasteful country. Can that be made clear?*

*Secretary Kissinger:* I think it is fair to say that we ourselves—I say “we,” those who have positions of responsibility at this moment—we ourselves are learning the magnitude of the challenges as we go along. In 1969, when I came to Washington, I remember a study on the energy problem which proceeded from the assumption that there would always be an energy surplus. It wasn't conceivable that there would be a shortage of energy.

Until 1972, we thought we had inexhaustible food surpluses, and the fact that we have to shape our policy deliberately to relate ourselves to the rest of the world did not really arise until 1973, when we did call for a world food conference.

But you are right. We have to tell the American people what they are called upon to do. That is our biggest problem. It's our biggest challenge right now. And will they support it? I hope that they will. I am, in fact, confident that they will.

*Q. Can you define what those questions are that should be put to the country? What does the government want the responsible citizen to do? He hasn't had much lead from you and your colleagues and the government as to what you wish him to do.*

*Secretary Kissinger:* I am not sure that I agree with whether he has received leadership from my colleagues and me. I think it is also fair to say that the nature of our debate for many years now has been so bitter that it's hard to put forward a conception that doesn't immediately get ripped apart by an attack on motives.

But leaving that aside, I think in foreign policy we need a national understanding of what is needed, what is meant by peace, and an understanding that we are living in a world in which peace cannot be imposed on others, which means that sometimes the outcomes must be less than perfect. I have been concerned about the détente debate because so often the issue is put in terms of—did the Soviets benefit from a particular deal? Of course, they must benefit, or they won't feel a stake in maintaining the resulting struc-

ture. So, we have to know what we mean by peace; we have to know what we mean by cooperation; and we have above all to understand these big issues which we have been discussing, like energy and food, in which our actions will crucially determine what happens in the rest of the world.

And of course what happens in the rest of the world will play back to us, so we cannot afford an isolated approach. If we try a solo effort in energy and as a result Italy collapses or Britain has a crisis, that is going to bring about so many political transformations that within a very brief period of time we would be affected in ways that even the average citizen would feel very acutely.

On food, the same is true in reverse. We there have an opportunity to demonstrate that when we talk interdependence, we are not just talking an American desire to exploit the resources of other nations. What we are saying is for our own benefit, of course. But it is also for the benefit of everybody else. Now, that requires many changes in our thinking. Of course, senior officials are always so busy with the day-to-day problems that they always seem to think one can wait for a day or a week to articulate the bigger issues.

It is also true that our people have been so preoccupied with domestic problems that it is not so easy to get attention for the longer term.

### **Vision of the World**

*Q. If we do not see this problem of interdependence, what's the vision that you have of the world? What will happen to Western civilization?*

*Secretary Kissinger:* If we do not get a recognition of our interdependence, the Western civilization that we now have is almost certain to disintegrate, because it will first lead to a series of rivalries in which each region will try to maximize its own special advantages. That inevitably will lead to tests of strength of one sort or another. These will magnify domestic crises in many

countries, and they will then move more and more to authoritarian models.

I would expect then that we will certainly have crises which no leadership is able to deal with and probably military confrontations. But even if you don't have military confrontations, you will certainly, in my view, have systemic crises similar to those of the twenties and thirties, but under conditions when world consciousness has become global.

*Q. Well, now, that is your nightmare.*

*Secretary Kissinger:* That's right.

*Q. What are your hopes? We are halfway between the end of the last world war, a little more, and the end of the century. As a historian, and not as a Secretary of State, looking back, if one can, from the end of the century to this era, how can the nations find some way of living together or going beyond the nation-state to something else?*

*Secretary Kissinger:* Looking toward the end of the century, I would hope that Western Europe, Japan, and the United States would have found a way of not just overcoming the current economic crisis but turning it into something positive by understanding the responsibilities they share for each other's progress and for developing cooperative policies that are explicitly directed toward world interests.

This requires a degree of financial solidarity, a degree of equalizing burdens, and a degree of ability to set common goals that cannot be done on a purely national basis. This, incidentally, requires a united Europe, because with a plethora of nation-states in Europe we'll never be able to do this.

In relation to the Soviet Union and Communist China, we should have achieved a position, not of having overcome all our difficulties, but having reached a point where the solution of these difficulties by war becomes less and less conceivable and, over time, should have become inconceivable.

This means that there must be a visible and dramatic downturn in the arms race. Otherwise that race itself is going to generate so

many fears that it can be maintained only by a degree of public exhortation that is inconsistent over a historic period with a policy of relaxation and maybe even with peace.

The underdeveloped nations—the now underdeveloped nations—should by then have lost their sense of inferiority and should feel not that they have to extort, but that they should participate. Thus what I said earlier about the relationship between Western Europe, the United States, and Japan should have begun to be institutionalized to embrace at least some of the key countries, and the Soviet Union and China must be related to that.

Take the food problem. I do not believe that over an indefinite future, we can solve the problem of world food reserves if the Soviet Union and Communist China do not accept obligations of their own or if they simply rely on the rest of the world's production to solve their problems on an annual basis.

*Q. What should they be doing?*

*Secretary Kissinger:* Well, I think—and I will speak about that at the World Food Conference—we have to develop over the next 5 to 10 years some conceptions of the reserves that should exist and the contribution that the major countries should make. Countries that will not participate should not then ask necessarily equal rights to participate in purchases of reserve stocks. But this is something that requires further study.

*Q. Do you foresee in the next decade the possibility of political disarray in Europe and of enormous human tragedy in other parts of the world?*

*Secretary Kissinger:* I think we are delicately poised right now. I genuinely think that the next decade could either be a period that in retrospect will look like one of the great periods of human creativity, or it could be the beginning of extraordinary disarray.

*Q. Is it possible—and it is obviously a Scottish Calvinist point of view that the greatest hope of progress is adversity—that*

*we are now really up against economic, financial, and social problems of such magnitude that we are suddenly being forced, even by inflation, into a view of life that could be more hopeful?*

*Secretary Kissinger:* While this period has more strain than, say, a decade ago, it has also infinitely more opportunities, because we really have no choice except to address our problems. Who would have thought of an international food policy or a world food conference 10 years ago, or could have been taken seriously if he had? Today, it is only a question of time until we develop it, and the real question is, will we develop it soon enough? I think we can.

*Q. Is there a danger that if we do not deal with the world problems that here at home we would become so frustrated that we would retreat, not into the oldtime isolationism but into a kind of chauvinism that would make the whole question of world order really quite impossible?*

*Secretary Kissinger:* It is a big problem. There is such a tendency in America; but at least part of our chauvinism is disappointed idealism, so it's always a question of whether one can evoke the idealism.

### **Foreign Policy Decisionmaking**

*Q. The charge is made, I think, that you have been so personal in the way in which you've dealt with the Department of State that you've not organized it; you've not put this great machine to work but actually you've replaced it with yourself.*

*Secretary Kissinger:* One has to ask oneself: What is it that needs to be done in the Department of State? For a variety of reasons, one could make a case for the proposition that since Dean Acheson, the Department of State has really not been used as an institution. There has been a succession of Secretaries of State, many of them outstanding individuals, who have tended to operate as Presidential advisers.

When I came in, I deliberately set myself the task of trying to turn the Department of

State into an institution that can serve succeeding Presidents and succeeding Secretaries of State. Now, in my judgment, this can work only if a number of requirements are met.

First, the work done in the Department of State has to be so outstanding that the issue of who is the principal adviser to the President does not arise as a bureaucratic problem, because if the work is of the requisite quality then inevitably the Department of State will be the organization for decision-making.

The second problem has been to put into the key positions younger, more forward-looking, and more creative people. That part of it, I believe, has been substantially accomplished.

The third problem is: How does the Department think of itself? What do the officers think their mission is? And this is where the difficulty has arisen. It exists on several levels. In calmer periods of American history the rewards, the incentives, the emphasis was on negotiating, not analysis. Therefore, the organization of the Department of State is more geared to producing cables and day-to-day tactical decisions than it is to getting a grip on national policy.

Now, I have attempted to get at the conceptual problem first and not to bother reorganizing the operational part particularly. I think the Policy Planning Staff is in a more central position in the Department of State today than it has been at any time since George Kennan. I believe the quality of its work is outstanding. The Bureau of Intelligence and Research, which in the past was a sort of adjunct to policymaking, has been given new vitality.

In the Bureaus—in the geographic Bureaus—the relationship between a more conceptual approach and a more operational approach has not yet been fully balanced. One of the results of having more power flow to the State Department has been that the Assistant Secretaries have spent so much more time with me—at least, those that I've worked with—that they have not had as much time to give to leading their Bureaus.

So, paradoxically, what some of the lower level people complain about is the result of the greater involvement of the middle and upper echelons.

Now, I have had over the last two months a series of meetings. I have a small group that is dealing explicitly with the problem of how the Foreign Service and the Department of State can be turned into intellectual leaders of American foreign policy—not bureaucratic operators, but intellectual and conceptual leaders.

It is too early to tell what the legacy will be. I feel very strongly that, partly based on my study of history, individual tours de force by Secretaries of State can be counterproductive if they don't leave a tradition behind, and the reason I have always admired Dean Acheson so much is because I believe he left a legacy of thought and of organization.

*Q. How do you rate the use of diplomatic appointments to this theme of superiority?*

*Secretary Kissinger:* Well, if you look at the diplomatic appointments that have been made since I became Secretary of State, in all the key departmental positions, I think we have outstanding personnel. In the overseas positions, we have reduced the number of political appointees and, quite frankly, have been quite resistant to purely political appointees in key posts, maybe a little less resistant in more peripheral appointments.

*Q. Is there anything to the charge that trying to be Secretary of State and head of the National Security Council (NSC) is doing too much?*

*Secretary Kissinger:* Well, all of these positions have to be seen also in relation to the history from which they evolve. I was head of the NSC staff for five years before I became Secretary of State. I think the two positions are really complementary. The basic responsibility of the Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs is to make sure that the President receives the fairest possible statement of his alternatives. It is against the national interest, and it is against, for that matter, a correct percep-

tion of the self-interest of the Assistant to load the dice.

I generally open an NSC meeting by presenting the options. The other heads of department or heads of agencies are there. If I loaded the definition of the options, they would in a short time know I was cheating. I don't believe the NSC job takes too much time. I do believe the two jobs complement each other. But of course every President must organize the decisionmaking process so that he is comfortable with it.

Contrary to what has been written, I never expressed to the President any particular view as to how he should organize himself. I never talked to the transition team, and I have always understood that the ultimate decision has to be the President's. He has to live with his decisions, and he has to live with the way these decisions are made.

#### Implementing Policies

*Q. Always there has been a problem between defining policy and then seeing that the policy is actually carried out down through the departments. I gather this is still a problem?*

*Secretary Kissinger:* The problem, I believe, is that the difference between great policy and mediocre policy or substantial policy and average policy is usually an accumulation of nuances. The intellectual debate tends to be put in absolutes, but I believe, in fact, it is nuances that count.

Now, how you fine-tune a big bureaucracy to be responsive to little shifts and to understand the psychological intangibles on which major decisions often depend is very hard.

In addition, the key men in any government are there because they usually are men of strong will. Obviously, they believe in what they are proposing. If a decision goes against them, they may believe they haven't heard it right, or that the President didn't understand them correctly. Or they may subconsciously try to interpret it as close to their convictions as they can. I don't say this critically; it is unavoidable.

Thus, how you can have enough control to

make sure that there is coherence in the actions, this is the big problem. But basically we have not done too badly in implementing decisions. I think in many respects—in at least the key areas of policymaking—we really haven't had too much to think of in getting it implemented.

*Q. I don't know how many years ago it was that Governor Rockefeller made Godkin lectures at Harvard. I always suspected you had something to do with it. He talked then about new concepts of confederation in the West. Now, one hears nothing about those concepts. Why is this?*

*Secretary Kissinger:* Because we have reached the paradoxical position that at the moment when the need for cooperative action is greatest, the national and regional sense of identity has also grown. Thus any attempt to institutionalize a new structure within, for example, a confederal framework would meet resistance out of proportion to what it could achieve.

Indeed, some of the efforts that were made last year tended in the direction of what Governor Rockefeller was talking about in 1961 without using those words. They were resisted for the reason that they seemed to be too formal and an intrusion into the sense of identity of others. Nevertheless, while the organization or the institution of a confederation may be more than the traffic will bear, the need for cooperative action is absolutely imperative.

#### **Soviet Union and China**

*Q. When I was in Europe just a few weeks ago, the question was raised there about your concept of China and of the Soviet Union. The question was raised whether in your mind you have not actually chosen one over the other and in the process were playing one up against the other. Could you clarify that?*

*Secretary Kissinger:* When one analyzes foreign policy, there is always the temptation to look at the day-to-day tactics and not at the underlying reality. Any attempt to

play off the Soviet Union and Communist China against each other would have a high risk that, at least for tactical reasons, they would combine against us. The rivalry and tensions between the Soviet Union and Communist China were not created by the United States. In fact, we didn't believe in their reality for much too long a time. They cannot be exploited by the United States. They can only be noted by the United States.

The correct policy for the United States is to take account of what exists and to conduct a policy of meticulous honesty with both of them so that neither believes we are trying to use one against the other. In the course of events, it may happen that one may feel that it is gaining benefit against the other as a result of dealing with us, but that cannot be our aim or purpose.

We have meticulously avoided forms of cooperation with the Soviet Union that could be construed as directed against China. We have never signed agreements whose chief purpose could be seen as directed against China, and conversely we have never participated with China in declarations that could be seen as aimed at the Soviet Union. We have developed our bilateral relationships with both and left them to sort out their relationships with each other. In fact, we have rarely talked to either of them about the other.

#### **New International Structure**

*Q. When you leave this office, what is it you want to have achieved at the end of your service?*

*Secretary Kissinger:* It used to be that the overwhelming concern of any President or Secretary of State had to be to make a contribution to peace in the traditional sense; that is to say, to reduce tensions among nations or regions. That remains, of course, an essential preoccupation. History has, I think, placed me in a key position at a time when we are moving from the relics of the postwar period toward a new international structure.

The administration did not invent that

structure. It did have, however, an opportunity to contribute to it—an opportunity that did not exist 10 years earlier and that may not exist 10 years later. Now, the difference between that structure and the previous period is that there are more factors to consider and that it has to be built not on the sense of the preeminence of two power centers, but on the sense of participation of those who are part of the global environment.

This has required a change in the American perception of the nature of foreign policy. What is described as excessive pragmatism is really a rather conscious attempt to try to educate myself, my generation, and my associates, insofar as I can contribute to living with the world as it is now emerging. Pragmatism unrelated to a purpose becomes totally self-destructive.

In addition, I would like to leave at least the beginning of a perception of a structure that goes beyond these centers of power and moves toward a global conception. There is no question in my mind that by the end of the century this will be the dominant reality of our time. I believe we have to move toward it now.

*Q. Can you define it?*

*Secretary Kissinger:* Before I go to that, let me say one other thing that I have been very much concerned with. However long I stay, it will be but a temporary episode. To succeed in these objectives, I will have to leave behind a public understanding and, above all, an intellectual understanding in the State Department that can carry on not only the detailed policies but an overall understanding of where America fits into the global scheme of things. I intend to give increasing attention to this problem.

*Q. One of your close friends once said to me, "Kissinger has a weakness for becoming melancholy and leaving the job." What is your perception of how long you wish to stay in this job?*

*Secretary Kissinger:* I may have a predilection for becoming melancholy, but there are very few jobs I believed in that I have

actually left. Jean Monnet once said that he isn't interested whether a man is ambitious; the question is whether he is ambitious to do something or ambitious to be something. I think the same is true of vanity or many other qualities that can be ascribed to people in key positions.

I'd like to leave at a moment when it is still clear that my ambition and my vanity are geared toward doing something and when holding onto the job does not become the central preoccupation or the chief focus of public debate. Now, when that is depends on many factors—obviously, on the confidence of the President, about which I have no problem; the degree of public support; the degree of congressional support.

I have felt very strongly that foreign policy must be a national effort and that while of course disagreements are inevitable, I'd rather them to cut across party lines, just as I hope the support would cut across party lines.

Now, if debate becomes too partisan, then I would have to look at the situation again, and I do not believe anyone is indispensable or should develop a policy that makes him indispensable, because that would contradict the whole perception of what I—

#### **Resumption of Foreign Policy Debate**

*Q. There has been a lot of talk on the Hill, since they cut your foreign aid bill and one or two other things, that the support you had on the Hill and in the country has been eroded recently. Is that true, in your judgment?*

*Secretary Kissinger:* Support in the country, I cannot judge. Whenever I appear in public, I seem to draw large crowds, but I am no expert on public support.

As to support on the Hill, I think one has to distinguish the very unusual situation that existed before President Nixon's resignation with what could reasonably be expected. Before President Nixon's resignation there was such a sense of horror at the disintegration of authority domestically that everybody had an interest in demonstrating that there was



no debate on our foreign policy. There was a desire to preserve one island of authority in this general disintegration.

Therefore, I probably had an unusually favorable situation on the Hill that no one could expect to preserve in normal circumstances.

So I would think what has happened now, after President Nixon's resignation, is the opening of foreign policy to normal partisan debate. Probably in the excitement the pendulum is swinging a bit too far and there are intrusions in day-to-day tactical decisions which Congress really isn't best equipped to handle. But I think the pendulum will swing back—not to where it was before, and that wasn't healthy, anyway—but to a normal kind of political debate.

*Q. You mentioned Jean Monnet, and he once said to me, not in recent years, in prior discussions about the CIA: "A democratic country as open as America can never really run a secret service, and if it tries to do so, in the end probably its losses are really greater than its gains." What do you think of that?*

*Secretary Kissinger:* I think an intelligence organization is essential for a great power. I don't think there is much dispute about the part of the intelligence organization that collects information, analyzes it, and tries to interpret the world to political leaders.

The debates arise where the intelligence organization is operational and attempts to affect political events in other parts of the world. In this case there is a serious problem, because there is a gray area between the exercise of diplomacy and the use of force. Admittedly, you may create political realities—or political realities may come about—of great magnitude.

There is no question that insofar as covert operations are conducted they should be carefully controlled, first of all within the executive branch, to make certain there is no alternative and that they meet political goals and, secondly, to the degree possible, by Congress. How to do this, I think, requires careful study.

## A View of America

*Q. I'm more interested in the rising generation than I am in the contemporary problem, and for that reason I wanted to ask you this: A colleague of mine went to see Willy Brandt and asked, "What does the young generation in Germany now think of America?" And Brandt replied, "The magic is gone." And when he was asked what he meant by that, it was that we have used power, he thought, in a way that did not comport to our ideals, particularly in Viet-Nam, but there was something beyond that, a kind of sense that we were engaged in a kind of disintegration. He mentioned the drug culture in America as being profoundly worrisome and that somehow we had lost our ideals in the way in which we approach the world.*

*Secretary Kissinger:* I was told last year that the public opinion polls in Germany in the second half of the year dramatically changed from showing a declining image of the United States to increasingly favoring the United States. The explanation I was given was the end of the Viet-Nam war and the decisive handling of the Middle East crisis.

The Germans, the younger Germans, again saw the United States as a nation that could solve problems—and that is one of the elements of the American appeal.

America has gone through many changes, dramatic changes, in the last decade. We even began to develop a new isolationism. The old isolationism was based on the proposition that we were too good for this world; the new isolationism was based on the proposition that we're not good enough for it.

When one looks at the process of growing up, it is largely a process of learning one's limits, that one is not immortal, that one cannot achieve everything; and then to draw from that realization the strength to set great goals nevertheless. Now, I think that as a country we've gone through this. We were immature in the sense that we thought the definition of goals was almost the equivalent of their realization.

Then we went to the opposite extreme, and I think from this point of view the Kennedy period is likely to be seen as the end of an era, rather than as the beginning of one: the last great flowering of the naive version of American idealism. And I don't say this as a criticism.

I think now that the drug culture, the student rebellion, are in that sense behind us. Of course, we still have the drug culture, but as problems that threaten the spirit of America, I think they either are behind us or could be behind us if we can now do what any adult has to do in his life. When you get to the recognition of your limits, then the question becomes whether you transcend them or wallow in them. That is a choice that is up to us.

*Q. From the period from Roosevelt through the Kennedy period, the central theme of this country was that we could do anything in the world, and then we ran into some disappointments and seemed to go into a phase of self-doubt in which we began to wonder whether we could do anything effectively. Now, do we have the self-confidence and the essential trust in one another and in our institutions to support the kind of foreign policy you want?*

*Secretary Kissinger:* I have to say this is the big question I ask myself. In some strange way, I think the American people have come through these recent crises in rather good shape. I would not have thought you could have assassinations, the Viet-Nam war, Watergate and all that went with it, and still have basic confidence in government.

Among the intellectual and political leadership groups, I'm not so sure. But even there, as I said earlier, during the Watergate period there was support for foreign policy. There is still a remarkable sense of national cohesion, so I am basically optimistic. But above all, I don't think we have any choice except to try, and in this respect the American idealistic tradition gives the United States a resource that exists in no other country in the world.

In this country, even with all the isolationism, when you talk about a sense of responsi-

bility, you touch the core of people; you can mention very few other countries of the world where it could be even a plausible argument.

*Q. At one point the West was bound together by certain religious ideals, certain moral ideals. What is it that binds the free world together today, if anything?*

*Secretary Kissinger:* Well, what binds us together on an unsatisfactory level is industrial civilization, which imposes common realities and necessities on all of us. We are also tied together by an approach to politics in which ultimately the fulfillment of human needs plays a central role. Now, the definition of what those needs are can be disputed, but that it does play a crucial role is clear. Indeed, much of the political turmoil in the industrialized world is caused by the uncertainty as to precisely what those deeper needs are.

We are tied together, too, by a perception of politics in which various groups and the individual play a crucial role. And the combination of industrial necessity plus the fact that a complicated society cannot be run by direction and must have a certain amount of consensus will in time begin to permeate even totalitarian regimes.

#### **Western Hemisphere Dialogue**

*Q. Do you see the possibility of a closer regional understanding and even structural development of regionalism within the hemisphere in the foreseeable future?*

*Secretary Kissinger:* Since I've become Secretary of State, I've spent a considerable amount of time on Western Hemisphere relationships. If it is true that the relations between industrialized and developing nations are essential features of our period, then in the Western Hemisphere, where we are dealing with countries of similar traditions and, indeed, similar history—this is where a beginning must be made. If we cannot solve it creatively here, it is hard to know how we can be creative about it elsewhere.

How formal that structure can be, I don't

know. I have found two things: One is that the mere act of dialogue in the Western Hemisphere has had an emotional response; and secondly, I have been struck in my meetings—I've now attended three Foreign Ministers meetings in the Western Hemisphere—by the fact that if one read the records without the mood of the meetings, one would find in them a litany of criticism of the United States. But if one actually was at the meetings, one had the sense that this was a family quarrel; that in some intangible way, one was talking as a member of the family.

So I think that in the Western Hemisphere we have the possibilities of a creative phase, provided the United States can shed its traditional predominance and recognize that the decisions that emerge must be genuinely felt by our friends in the Western Hemisphere to be theirs.

#### Need for Sacrifice

*Q. Is it reasonable for the American people to go on assuming, in a hungry world where raw materials are increasingly scarce, that our standard of living each year can go on going up, or do we have to face new responsibilities and even some sacrifices in this country in order to bring about some kind of world order?*

*Secretary Kissinger:* Now, here I'm talking off the top of my head. I would think, if we look ahead to the year 2000 and beyond, we have to be prepared to face a world quite different from what we have now. We see it already in energy. I believe that the day of the 400-horsepower engine is over, whether it's this year or five years from now. You're going to see different types of automobiles, and that affects our style of life.

We will have to develop a global food policy. We cannot deal with issues like this week's grain sale to the Soviet Union on a crash basis every few months. To do so will affect our whole perception of the relationship of agriculture to our society and our foreign policy.

*Q. When you talk about cooperation between the Communists and the capitalist*

*world, where do you see this leading? To the domination of one over the other, or to a combination of the two, or what?*

*Secretary Kissinger:* I think that any attempt at domination in a nuclear age is going to involve risks that are catastrophic and would not be tolerated. If we remain strong enough to prevent the imposition of Communist hegemony, then I believe that transformations of the Communist societies are inevitable. I believe that the imposition of state control of the kind that communism demands is totally incompatible with the requirements of human organization at this moment.

The pressure of this realization on Communist systems is going to bring about a transformation apart from any conscious policy the United States pursues, so long as there is not a constant foreign danger that can be invoked to impose regimentation.

What inherent reason is there that keeps the Communist societies in Eastern Europe from achieving the standard of living of those of Western Europe? The resources are about the same; the industrial organization is there. I think the reason is inherent in the type of society that has been created, and that, I believe, must inevitably change.

#### Looking Back

*Q. Looking back over these almost six years, is there anything in the conduct of our foreign policy that you regret, that you would like to change?*

*Secretary Kissinger:* I'm quite convinced that I'll be much more reflective a year or two after I leave here than I can be today. What I regret is that so much of the time had to be spent on the Viet-Nam war. If we could have got that behind us more rapidly, we could have brought the more positive side of our foreign policy to fruition at a time when attitudes were less rigidly formed.

The real tragedy was Watergate, because I believe that at the beginning of President Nixon's second term we had before us—due to changing conditions—a period of potential creativity. We contributed some of that

potential, but some of it was inherent in the objective situation.

Instead, we had to spend almost all of our energy in preserving what existed, rather than building on the foundations that had been laid. Even the year of Europe could have gone differently in a different environment. But you never know what opportunities may have been lost.

Those are my big regrets. There are many tactical things I would in retrospect perhaps do differently, but I think it's premature to speculate on those.

Now, what problems I leave to my successor depends, of course, at what time I leave, and I don't want to have this sound as a valedictory. If I resigned today, he would have the Middle East problem in mid-solution.

I think we are now at a point where the framework of the structure exists, if we can put it together. We have the raw material, we have the elements, we've identified them, I hope, correctly. We are at the beginning of building a consciousness of the global community that must come after us.

*Q. Can you see a settlement of the Middle East thing in, say, before we get to the bicentennial, or the end of this administration?*

*Secretary Kissinger:* Before we get to the bicentennial, I think we can make considerable progress, at least to a point where one can see the settlement emerging. But it could also go very badly. That is yet a delicate point.

#### **Role of Intellectuals**

*Q. You once said to me that you were relying very heavily—even when you were in the middle of your service in Washington this time—on concepts and intellectual support you had got from your colleagues in Cambridge way back in '59, and that you felt a lack of this as time went on. Is that still true?*

*Secretary Kissinger:* I think it is true. As

I look back, for example, at the area of strategic arms limitation, most of the creative thought with which I am familiar dates back to the late fifties and was then introduced into the government first in the Kennedy administration and then, I hope, in ours.

Two things are lacking now: One, the same sense of relationship toward the government that intellectuals had then; now they volunteer less and participate less. Secondly, there is a lack of relevant intellectual work.

Intellectuals are now divided into essentially three groups—those that reject the government totally, those that work on pure, abstract intellectual models which are impossible to make relevant, and a third group that's too close to power and that sees its service to the government as residing primarily in day-to-day tactics. No outsider can be very helpful on the day-to-day business, because he doesn't know enough of the current situation to really make a contribution.

The best service intellectuals can render is, first, to ask important questions—and that's a difficult problem—and second, to provide a middle-term perspective. But for that they need to have some compassion for the problems of the policymaker, just as he needs an understanding of their needs. I feel the lack, and I hope that now that our domestic climate is somewhat better we can restore mutual confidence.

*Q. Was it not a great mistake to wipe out the Office of the Science Adviser, who was bringing in objective thought? I felt that lack of it, for example, on the whole question of oil and other raw materials.*

*Secretary Kissinger:* I think it's a pity. I hope that some focal point is created which will look upon the intellectual community as its constituency, and that they will be listened to.

*Q. Just one last point: I take it that you are saying that you don't want this to be interpreted as a swan song?*

*Secretary Kissinger:* Yes.

## The Testing of American Commitment

*Address by Secretary Kissinger*<sup>1</sup>

I am for several reasons deeply honored to address this gathering—first, because of the many distinguished men who have spoken from this podium in years past; second, because I know and admire the humanitarian work which this dinner helps support; and most important, because we pay tribute tonight to a man who represented the best of America and embodied human qualities which are an inspiration to us still.

Al Smith's America was an optimistic country—a land that never doubted its ability to solve the problems before it, regardless of magnitude. We were a people confident in the worth of our moral values and the decency of our purposes.

Al Smith epitomized the irrepressible spirit of his time and his country. He never flinched from a battle, but he never let the battle consume him. His compassion and his dreams sustained him because he knew that all great achievements begin as ideals.

Our America, regrettably perhaps, has lost some of that innocence. We have learned that we are not omnipotent, and now we face the true test of maturity: Having learned our limits, are we prepared to marshal our strengths? Or will we shrink in frustration from our new challenges? It is a crucial question, for the world needs our optimism, our faith, and our creativity as never before.

Cardinal Cooke [Terence Cardinal Cooke, Archbishop of New York], in his gracious letter of invitation, asked that I share with

you my "vision of a better and more peaceful world."

It is not an easy task. For what is peace? Through most of our history Americans thought of peace as a static condition—a world living in the absence of war unless evil men intruded their darker designs. Secure behind two oceans, we left to others the day-to-day decisions that, over time, spelled war or peace, security or fear for less favored nations. We were spared the agony of reconciling the ideal with the practical, of making do with limited means and contingent ends.

But two World Wars and an era of involvement and conflict should now have taught us that peace is a process, not a condition. We have learned we must express moral values in steadfastness of purpose even while necessity imposes compromise. We now know that we are on a journey that has no terminal point, whose engine is reality, and whose beacon is a better life for future generations. And we have come to realize that if we are ever to have true peace there can be no end to our own exertions.

—Ours is a pluralistic world. It must find peace in conciliation rather than in the domination of any group or country. This is the kind of world we have always seen as reflecting our national ideals as well as our highest hopes.

—Ours is a world in which the needs of ordinary people cry out for economic and social progress, for self-respect, dignity, and justice. These were objectives to which Americans responded even in the most isolationist of times. They are our objectives still. Food

<sup>1</sup> Made before the annual dinner of the Alfred E. Smith Memorial Foundation at New York, N.Y., on Oct. 16 (as delivered).

aid and public health, scientific and technical cooperation, are fields in which international efforts have been sustained by our contribution. They now become not an exercise in charity but the cement of global community.

—It is, above all, a world of turmoil and change, a world much in need of a self-confident America that understands that without its leadership there can be no stability, no permanent improvement in the human condition, and no lasting peace. The irony of our time is that the simple faith of Al Smith's provincial America is precisely what the world desperately needs today.

In the past few years we have achieved important goals. We have ended our involvement in a divisive war; we have resolved the perennial postwar crisis over Berlin; we have begun hopeful efforts to achieve peace in the Middle East; we have bridged two decades of hostility with the world's most populous nation; we have taken major steps to diminish the danger of nuclear war and to build a more durable political relationship with our most powerful adversary; we have sought a more mature and equal partnership with our allies.

We have emerged from—and perhaps put behind us—a postwar structure of rigid East-West military and ideological confrontation.

But now—indeed, partly because of our success—we experience the birth pangs of a new order. We face a new dimension of challenges, more pervasive and complex, with perils at once more subtle and profound. A new world is emerging—a world whose security, well-being, and moral fulfillment demand interdependence; a world whose peoples are interlinked by technology and global communications, by the common danger of nuclear war, and by the worldwide thrusts of human needs; a world in which traditional structures and tenets of diplomacy are being overwhelmed.

At the midway point between the end of the Second World War and the end of this century, we find ourselves also midway between the nation-state from which we began

and the global community which we must fashion if we are ever to live in a lasting peace.

We face a new and fundamental crisis of the international system:

—Inflation is a global phenomenon infecting all societies and clearly beyond the power of any national government to control alone.

—The threat of global famine and mass starvation is an affront to our values and an intolerable threat to our hopes for a better world.

—The abrupt rise of energy costs, and the ensuing threats of monetary crisis and economic stagnation, threaten to undermine the economic system that nourished the world's well-being for over 30 years.

All these problems are dealt with in a clearly inadequate framework. National solutions continue to be pursued when, manifestly, their very futility is the crisis we face.

Inflation eats away the well-being of nations on the verge of development and of whole classes at the margin of society. Economic stagnation, or recession, will feed the frustration of groups whose expectations for a share in the prosperity they see around them are suddenly and cruelly rebuffed. Starvation will shatter the hopes of developing nations for progress. Thus the economic crisis threatens to magnify the discontent and ungovernability of all societies.

Only cooperative international solutions are equal to the challenge. With respect to energy, consumers must be prepared to share and conserve and provide mutual financial assistance; consumers and producers together must shape a mutually beneficial long-term relationship; there must be a determined and lasting commitment in each country to the conservation and discipline President Ford proposed to the nation a week ago.

The threat of mass starvation, in particular, requires a major commitment. Cardinal Cooke's eloquent appeal for assistance to the drought-ridden Sahel, which he has just visited, deserves our strong support. And at next month's World Food Conference in

Rome, the United States plans to launch a new long-term international program of action. To do less would violate moral imperatives as well as practical necessities.

Nor is the current crisis purely economic. After nearly 30 years without general war, the world has become dangerously tolerant of accelerating nuclear proliferation and the purposeless expansion of strategic arsenals. Festering political conflicts, whether in the Middle East or Cyprus or Indochina, ultimately could pose the same threat to general peace as did the more dramatic great-power confrontation of a decade ago.

Thus the requirements of peace and progress demand of all nations a new and unprecedented sense of responsibility to the international system.

The issues confronting America today are not, in their deepest sense, issues of economics, technology, or diplomacy. They are a challenge to our preconceptions, a test of our foresight, our will, and our strength of purpose. Dogmas left over from the 19th century—of national autonomy or economic determinism—do not even address, let alone resolve, the international issues of the last quarter of the 20th century. The fact is that all nations—East and West, aligned and non-aligned—are part of one global system and dependent on it for their peace, their well-being, and the achievement of their own national objectives. If that system fails through accident or design, no nation or bloc is spared the penalty.

Your Eminence, ladies and gentlemen: A great responsibility rests upon us here in America. For many years our country has carried a disproportionate share of the burden of maintaining the peace, of feeding the hungry, and giving hope to the world's dispossessed. It has been a heavy burden—which we did not seek and which we have often been tempted to put down. But we have not done so, nor can we afford to do so now, for it is the generations who follow us who would pay the price for our abdication.

For more than a decade we have been torn by war and then by constitutional crisis. We

have been enervated by our exertions and perhaps even more by self-doubt. But now the war is over and the crisis resolved. It is time we made peace with ourselves.

The bitterness that has characterized the national debate for most of a decade no longer has reason or place. Governments by their very nature must make difficult choices and judgments when facts are not clear and when trends are uncertain. This is difficult in the best of circumstances. It may grow dangerously erratic in a pervasive climate of distrust and conflict. Debate in a democratic society should find its ultimate limit in a general recognition that we are all engaged in a common enterprise. Let us never forget that at home a society thrives not on its internal victories but on its reconciliations.

A year ago your speaker ended with these words:

My own great hope is that all of us may do honor to the memory of Alfred E. Smith by loving this country as deeply as he did, and by serving her as faithfully.

That speaker was President Ford. These phrases are especially meaningful to someone for whom America was a haven and not something to be taken for granted.

This country is summoned once again to leadership, to helping the world find its way from a time of fear into a new era of hope. With our old idealism and our new maturity, let us disprove the impression that men and nations are losing control over their destinies. Americans still believe that problems are soluble if we try. We still believe it is right to seek to undo what is wrong with the world. And we still seek the excitement of new frontiers rather than shrinking from their uncertainty.

So we return to our starting point. Our "vision of a better and more peaceful world" must begin with a vision of ourselves. And in that context let us remember the jaunty little man from the sidewalks of New York who was not for nothing called the Happy Warrior. In him America proved that man achieves nobility not by his beginnings but by his ends.

## President Costa Gomes of Portugal Visits Washington

*Joint U.S.-Portuguese Communique*<sup>1</sup>

At the invitation of President Ford, His Excellency Francisco da Costa Gomes, President of the Republic of Portugal, visited Washington on October 18. President Costa Gomes, who was accompanied by the Foreign Minister, Dr. Mario Soares, had meetings with President Ford and with Secretary of State Kissinger and was the guest of honor at a luncheon given by Secretary Kissinger.

President Costa Gomes outlined the achievements of the Portuguese Government in light of recent events in restoring civil and political liberties to Portugal and in creating the basis for a return to democracy. He reported on the negotiations which had led to the independence of Guinea-Bissau and explained his government's plans for the granting of self-determination and independence to the remaining overseas territories. He reaffirmed his government's commitment to the North Atlantic Treaty and its desire to develop even closer ties to the United States.

President Ford expressed his admiration for the statesmanship shown by Portuguese leaders in undertaking to restore democracy to Portugal by holding free elections soon and in making possible the enjoyment of the right of self-determination and independence by the peoples of Portugal's overseas territories. He noted with pleasure President Costa Gomes' reaffirmation of Portugal's commitment to NATO and expressed his confidence that ties between the United States and Portugal will become ever closer.

The two Presidents agreed that, as these developments proceed, it would be in our mutual interest to intensify the cooperation between the two countries to embrace new activities in a broad range of areas, such as education, health, energy, agriculture, transportation and communications, among others.

They agreed that this expansion of their cooperation could begin with technical talks in the fields of agriculture, public health, education and financial and economic matters, as requested by the Portuguese authorities.

They also agreed that the two countries should continue and intensify negotiations relating to cooperation in the Azores.

## U.S.-U.S.S.R. Trade and Economic Council Meets at Moscow

*Following is a statement made by Secretary of the Treasury William E. Simon before the second board meeting of the U.S.-U.S.S.R. Trade and Economic Council at Moscow on October 15.*

Department of the Treasury press release dated October 15

Much has happened since the first meeting of the joint board last February in Washington. There have been unprecedented events in the political life of my country.

Many things have not changed however; high among these is the desire of the United States to further the development of peaceful, fruitful relations with the Soviet Union. As President Ford told the Congress shortly after taking office:

To the Soviet Union, I pledge continuity in our commitment to the course of the past three years. . . . there can be no alternative to a positive and peaceful relationship between our nations.

We are here today to discuss economic and trade relations between our countries. Nowhere is there more concrete evidence of the progress we are making than in this field.

Our bilateral trade is rapidly approaching the three-year goal of \$2-\$3 billion trade turnover which was set at the 1973 summit. In 1973 alone, U.S.-U.S.S.R. trade turnover was \$1.4 billion. Although total trade is down somewhat this year after the exceptionally large agricultural shipments of 1973, U.S. sales of machinery and equipment products have risen sharply, and U.S.S.R. exports to the United States have shown a very substantial increase.

<sup>1</sup> Issued on Oct. 18 (text from White House press release).



Seventeen American firms now have received permission to open accredited offices in Moscow. Export-Import Bank loans for the Soviet Union have increased to \$470 million. Impressive contracts have been signed in the last nine months for the Kama River truck plant, the Moscow Trade Center, the fertilizer project, and equipment for gas pipeline development.

The U.S. commercial office opened for business in Moscow last spring. In addition to smaller exhibits staged in its display area, my government recently sponsored U.S. firms' participation in two major Soviet trade shows (health and plastics manufacturing equipment) and organized a successful solo exhibition of American machine tools in Sokolniki Park.

Our two governments are pledged to continue this momentum. In the long-term agreement signed in June, both formally agreed to facilitate economic, industrial, and technical cooperation and exchange information on economic trends.

Progress has also been made in resolving the policy problems which could inhibit further growth. Soon after entering the White House, President Ford emphasized to Congress the importance he attached to granting most-favored-nation status to the Soviet Union. I look forward to early resolution of the trade reform bill which I believe will bring about satisfactory export-import legislation. This will clear the impediments on the path of an expanding trade relationship.

The U.S. Government will continue to help clear away obstacles to improvement in our economic and commercial relations. In the final analysis, however, the action responsibility for each U.S.-Soviet commercial transaction rests with the private sector of our economy. It is for this reason that we encouraged the formation of the Trade and Economic Council, which brings together officials from your ministries and trading organizations and top management representatives from our firms—it is these people who are doing the actual work of expanding trade.

As we all know, the Council was formed as the result of a protocol entered into in

June of 1973 by Minister [of Foreign Trade N.S.] Patolichev and my predecessor, Secretary [George P.] Shultz. It's important, however, to remember that while the Council is the creation of the two governments, on the U.S. side it has been adopted by the private sector—our business community. As an honorary director of the Council, I am pleased to note that the child of these two governments is healthy and growing at a rapid pace, and I am pleased with the care and upbringing it is being given by the U.S. Government. I voice our appreciation for the support and help given the Council since its inception by the Soviet Government.

While the role of the Council is to foster and promote the growth of the U.S.-Soviet trade and economic relationship, and while I am confident that the U.S. Congress will approve legislation so necessary to the normalization of this relationship, I also envisage that out of this improved relationship will emerge a larger joint economic role for our two countries.

Given the extraordinary global economic interrelationship of all countries, there is a greater-than-ever need for responsibility and cooperation between nations. It is hard to conceive of a solution fair to all countries, large and small, in any area of major interest without the full and close cooperation of the United States and the U.S.S.R.

Since February, the Council has developed into a fully functioning organization. Bina-tional staffs are now at work on some 60 major projects in New York and Moscow. The Council has found excellent office space in Manhattan, and yesterday we dedicated the attractive offices on the Shevchenko Embankment. The Subcommittee on Science and Technology concluded a productive first meeting a few days ago in New York.

This is an excellent beginning, but is only a beginning, and I am confident that it foreshadows even greater accomplishments in the future as the Council realizes its full potential in the development of fruitful economic relations between our countries.

As an honorary director of the U.S.-U.S.S.R. Trade and Economic Council, I com-

mend my fellow directors and the Council staff for the progress you have made so far. I wish you well in your deliberations at this meeting, and I urge you to work diligently to create an economic fabric between our two countries of so many strands so closely interwoven that not only is there no visible seam, but also that it is so strong as to be virtually unbreakable.

So while we work to intermesh and synchronize our different economic systems, we also work to prepare and strengthen ourselves for jointly addressing in harmony the problems of creating a better world for all countries and all people.

## **U.S.S.R. Agrees To Limit Purchases of U.S. Grain in Current Crop Year**

*Department of the Treasury Announcement*

Department of the Treasury press release dated October 19

Secretary of the Treasury William E. Simon announced on October 19 conclusion of an agreement with the Soviet Union on purchases of U.S. grains during the current crop year.

The Soviet Union agreed to limit its total grain purchases from the United States this crop year to 2.2 million tons, including 1 million tons of corn and 1.2 million tons of wheat.

An additional 1 million tons of grain contracted for earlier in October can be delivered from other exporting countries. The Soviet purchasing agency for grains will make the necessary purchase arrangements with U.S. export firms.

The Soviet Union also agreed to make no further purchases in the U.S. market this crop year, which ends next summer. Further, the Soviet Union agreed to work with the United States toward development of a supply/demand data system for grains.

The agreement followed talks in Moscow by Secretary Simon with Minister of Foreign Trade N. S. Patolichev. Secretary Simon was in the Soviet Union October 12-15 for the opening of the Moscow office of the U.S.-U.S.S.R. Trade and Economic Council.

The grain talks were scheduled following the Soviets' buying activity in the United States earlier in October. At that time, the Soviet Union placed orders with two U.S. export firms for the purchase of 3.2 million tons of U.S. grain, including 2.3 million tons of corn and 900,000 tons of wheat for delivery during the 1974/75 crop year, which ends next summer. Following talks with President Ford on October 5, the presidents of the two export firms agreed to hold these sales in abeyance until after Secretary Simon's visit to Moscow.

This year's Soviet purchases of U.S. grain will be small compared with purchases during the past two years. The Soviet Union bought 17 million tons of U.S. grain during 1972 and 7 million tons in 1973. The smaller purchases in 1974 are in line with smaller export availabilities of U.S. grain as a result of the disappointing corn harvest this year. The United States has harvested a record wheat crop, but the corn crop is expected to be down 16 percent from last year's record harvest. Total U.S. feed grain production is expected to be down 18 percent.

In his talks with Soviet officials, Secretary Simon emphasized that the United States wants to continue developing its agricultural trade with the Soviet Union. The Soviets advised Secretary Simon that the Soviet Union will have an adequate harvest this year but that imports are needed for specialized livestock production units.

Secretary Simon reviewed with Soviet officials the type of grain data that the United States receives from other countries that purchase U.S. grain. The Soviets agreed to work toward the development of a data exchange system on grain between the two governments.

## The World Population Conference: An Assessment

*Address by Philander P. Claxton, Jr.*

*Special Assistant to the Secretary of State for Population Matters*<sup>1</sup>

It will be a decade or more before the accomplishments of the World Population Conference can be fully judged. We have enough perspective now, however, to see the conference whole and to assess it generally. By any reasonable standard it was a remarkable success.

Although the results were not ideal and there were disappointments, it carried out the purposes for which it was established by the Economic and Social Council four years ago.

Even before the conference itself, preparations for it and the stimulation of World Population Year 1974 had caused many countries to review their own population and family planning policies. Several had moved toward more affirmative positions. Brazil, for example, the largest country without an affirmative national policy, had determined, and announced at Bucharest, a policy embracing recognition of the right of couples to determine the number and spacing of their children and the obligation of the government to make the necessary means available.

The fact that the world conference on this difficult and delicate subject was held at all was an outstanding achievement. It was all the more so because 137 nations attended—one of the largest U.N. conferences ever held—including all members of the United Na-

tions or its specialized agencies except South Africa, Saudi Arabia, and North Viet-Nam. They debated vigorously for two weeks, in a plenary, three committees of the whole, and a working group, and went away in good spirits with a sense of accomplishment.

The intense debate, too often burdened by polemics and ideologies, was nevertheless an important educational process which made all those attending more aware of the deeply held beliefs of others.

The adoption by acclamation (only one delegation reserving) of an excellent World Population Plan of Action, after a hundred-plus amendments—47 by votes—was, as the U.S. delegation said in its closing statement, an achievement of great magnitude.<sup>2</sup> We declared this achievement should not be considered as a victory or a defeat for any faction, nation, or group of nations, but as a triumph for the process of international cooperation under the United Nations.

The plan of action was agreed to only after intensive debate and negotiation. The debate began with a concerted five-pronged attack by Algeria, supported by a few African countries; Argentina, supported by three or four Latin American countries; an Eastern European group of eight Socialist countries; the People's Republic of China; and the Holy See.

The attack was directed primarily toward the conceptual basis of the draft plan of action presented by the Secretariat of the

<sup>1</sup> Made before a conference for nongovernmental organizations on "Bucharest and the Future" at the Department of State on Oct. 10 (text from press release 400). Mr. Claxton was a member of the U.S. delegation to the World Population Conference at Bucharest Aug. 19-30.

<sup>2</sup> For U.S. statements and an unofficial text of the plan of action, see BULLETIN of Sept. 30, 1974, p. 429.

United Nations rather than toward its operative provisions.<sup>3</sup> The major thrust of the attack was to assert the importance (or even the precondition) of social and economic development for the reduction of high fertility and to reduce the emphasis in the draft on population/family planning programs.

The equilibrium attained by these differing emphases is illustrated by the last four sentences of paragraph 1 of the plan:

The explicit aim of the World Population Plan of Action is to help co-ordinate population trends and the trends of economic and social development. The basis for an effective solution of population problems is, above all, socio-economic transformation. A population policy may have a certain success if it constitutes an integral part of socio-economic development; its contribution to the solution of world development problems is hence only partial, as is the case with the other sectoral strategies. Consequently, the Plan of Action must be considered as an important component of the system of international strategies and as an instrument of the international community for the promotion of economic development, quality of life, human rights and fundamental freedom.

At the same time the working group retained the language of the draft plan explaining the interrelation between population variables and development variables:

Population and development are interrelated: Population variables influence development variables and are also influenced by them; the formulation of a World Population Plan of Action reflects the international community's awareness of the importance of population trends for socio-economic development, and the socio-economic nature of the recommendations contained in this Plan of Action reflects its awareness of the crucial role that development plays in affecting population trends. (Par. 14(c).)

A new sentence was added to paragraph 2 concerning the relation of population policies to development:

Policies whose aim is to affect population trends must not be considered substitutes for socio-economic development policies but integrated with those policies to facilitate the solution of certain problems facing developing and developed countries and promote a more balanced and rational development.

It has always been the view of the United

States that population programs should be considered only a part, but an essential part, of economic and social development. It was and is our view that the importance of social and economic strategies and programs had been dealt with at length in earlier U.N. documents and did not need repetition in the Population Plan of Action.

From our point of view, the introduction of language desired by these proponents did not change or weaken the plan of action, except to make it somewhat more diffuse. From the point of view of the many developing countries seeking these changes, their accomplishment quite properly gave them an important sense of identification with the final document. This is right and good.

The same group of countries, particularly some of the Latin Americans, also opposed all concepts of quantitative goals or time frames for reduction of birth rates or population growth rates. One of the key provisions of the draft plan (par. 27(b)) urged all countries to:

Make available, to all persons who so desire, if possible by the end of the Second United Nations Development Decade, but not later than 1985, the necessary information and education about family planning and the means to practise family planning . . .

The working group adopted an Argentine amendment deleting the reference to 1980 and 1985 and changing the text to recommend that all countries:

Encourage appropriate education concerning responsible parenthood and make available to persons who so desire advice and means of achieving it. (Par. 29(b).)

The same group of countries also opposed paragraph 35 of the draft plan, which says that:

Countries which have a very high birth-rate may consider taking action . . . to reduce these rates by about 5 to 10 per 1,000 before 1985.

A compromise was reached for a substitute that restored the concept of quantitative goals and a time frame in less precise but broader terms:

In the light of the principles of this Plan of Ac-

<sup>3</sup> For text of the draft plan of action, see U.N. doc. E/CONF. 60/7.

tion, countries which consider their birth rates detrimental to their national purposes are invited to consider setting quantitative goals and implementing policies that may lead to the attainment of such goals by 1985. Nothing herein should interfere with the sovereignty of any government to adopt or not to adopt such quantitative goals. (Par. 37.)

The countries members of the Economic Commission for Asia and the Far East (ECAFE) had agreed at the consultative meeting on the draft plan of action held in Bangkok in May 1974 to propose amendments to the plan to strengthen the goals proposed in it. These amendments called for developed countries to aim for replacement levels of fertility by 1985 and stationary populations as soon thereafter as practicable and for developing countries to seek to attain replacement levels of fertility in two or three decades—all nations to attempt to attain replacement levels by 2000. The intensity of the attack on the concept of goals made it impossible to press for these ECAFE amendments.

The attention of the press was naturally drawn to the controversy over these issues. The less dramatic but fundamental substance of the plan of action as actually adopted received little attention; yet it constituted the real substance of the conference and its accomplishments.

The final plan is somewhat less urgent in tone than the draft submitted by the Secretariat but, in several ways, more complete and with greater potential. It contains 109 paragraphs, many with several subparagraphs. The sweeping scope and thoroughness of the plan can be fully appreciated only by a careful reading and rereading. However, the following highlights illustrate its character.

That the "explicit aim of the World Population Plan of Action is to help co-ordinate population trends and the trends of economic and social development" has already been noted. The "primary aim" of the plan of action is also asserted to be:

... to expand and deepen the capacities of countries to deal effectively with their national and sub-national population problems and to promote an appropriate international response to their needs by increasing international activity in research, the ex-

change of information, and the provision of assistance on request. (Par. 15.)

The plan of action lays down several important principles, some for the first time in a U.N. document:

1. Among the first-time statements is the assertion that the sovereign right of each nation to set its own population policies is "to be exercised . . . taking into account universal solidarity in order to improve the quality of life of the peoples of the world." (Par. 14.) This new provision opens the way toward increasing responsibility by nations toward other nations in establishing their national population policies.

2. There is recognized for the first time in a single declarative sentence that:

All couples and individuals have the basic human right to decide freely and responsibly the number and spacing of their children and to have the information, education and means to do so. (Par. 14(f).)

3. Also for the first time, a U.N. document links the responsibility of childbearers to the community:

The responsibility of couples and individuals in the exercise of this right takes into account the needs of their living and future children, and their responsibilities towards the community. (Par. 14(f) continued.)

It is now possible to build on this newly stated principle as the right of couples first recognized in the Tehran Human Rights Proclamation of 1968 has been built on.<sup>1</sup>

4. A sweeping declaration of the right of women is included:

Women have the right to complete integration in the development process particularly by means of an equal participation in educational, social, economic, cultural and political life. In addition the necessary measures should be taken to facilitate this integration with family responsibilities which should be fully shared by both partners. (Par. 14(h).)

5. A new statement of principles was added on resources and environment:

In the democratic formulation of national popula-

<sup>1</sup> For text of the Proclamation of Tehran, adopted by the International Conference on Human Rights on May 13, 1968, see BULLETIN of Sept. 2, 1968, p. 258.

tion goals and policies, consideration must be given, together with other economic and social factors, to the supplies and characteristics of natural resources and to the quality of the environment and particularly to all aspects of food supply including productivity of rural areas; the demand for vital resources increases with growing population and with growing *per capita* consumption; attention must be directed to the just distribution of resources and to the minimization of wasteful aspects of their use throughout the world. (Par. 14(j).)

6. The need for international action is accepted:

The growing interdependence among countries makes international action increasingly important to the solution of development and population problems. (Par. 14(k).)

The plan of action includes recommendations for: population goals and policies, population growth, mortality and morbidity, reproduction, family formation and the status of women, population distribution and internal migration, international migration, population structure, socioeconomic policies, data collection and analysis, research, development and evolution of population policies, the role of national governments and of international cooperation, and monitoring, review, and appraisal.

A score of these recommendations are the most important:

1. Governments should integrate population measures and programs into comprehensive social and economic plans and programs and their integration should be reflected in the goals, instrumentalities, and organizations for planning within the countries. A unit dealing with population aspects should be created and placed at a high level of the national administrative structure. (Par. 95.)

2. Countries which consider their population growth hampers attainment of their goals should consider adopting population policies—through a low level of birth and death rates. (Pars. 17–18.)

3. Developed countries are urged to develop appropriate policies in population, consumption, and investment, bearing in mind

the need for fundamental improvement in international equity. (Par. 14(j).)

4. Highest priority should be given to reduction in mortality and morbidity, and increase of life expectancy and programs for this purpose should reach rural areas and underprivileged groups. (Pars. 20–25.)

5. Countries should encourage appropriate education concerning responsible parenthood and make available to persons who so desire advice and means of achieving it. (Par. 29 (b).)

6. Family planning and related services should aim not only at prevention of unwanted pregnancies but also at elimination of involuntary sterility or subfecundity to enable couples to achieve their desired number of children. (Par. 29 (c).)

7. Adequately trained auxiliary personnel, rural extension, home economics, and social workers, and nongovernment channels should be used to help provide family planning services and advice. (Par. 29 (e).)

8. Governments with family planning programs should consider coordinating them with health and other services designed to raise the quality of life. (Par. 30.)

9. Countries wishing to affect fertility levels should give priority to development programs and health and education strategies which have a decisive effect upon demographic trends, including fertility; international cooperation should give priority to assisting such national efforts. (Par. 31.) Such programs may include reduction in infant and child mortality, increased education, particularly for females, improvement in the status of women, land reform, and support in old age. (Par. 32.)

10. Countries which consider their birth rates detrimental to their national purposes are invited to set quantitative goals and implement policies to achieve them by 1985. (Par. 37.)

11. Because the family is the basic unit of society, governments should assist families as far as possible through legislation and services. (Par. 39.)

12. Governments should insure full participation of women in the educational, economic, social, and political life of their countries on an equal basis with men—a new provision added at Bucharest. (Par. 41.)

13. A series of recommendations is made to stabilize migration within countries, particularly policies to reduce the undesirable consequences of excessively rapid urbanization and to develop opportunities in rural areas and small towns, recognizing the right of individuals to move freely within their national boundaries. (Pars. 44–50.)

14. Agreements should be concluded to regulate the international migration of workers and to assure nondiscriminatory treatment and social services for these workers and their families; also other measures to decrease the “brain drain” from developing countries. (Pars. 51–62.)

15. To assure needed information concerning population trends, population censuses should be taken at regular intervals and information concerning births and deaths made available at least annually. (Pars. 72–77.)

16. Research should be intensified to develop knowledge concerning the social, economic, and political interrelationships with population trends; effective means of reducing infant and childhood mortality; methods for integrating population goals into national plans, means of improving the motivation of people, analysis of population policies in relation to socioeconomic development, laws, and institutions; methods of fertility regulation to meet the varied requirements of individuals and communities, including methods requiring no medical supervision; the interrelations of health, nutrition, and reproductive biology; and methods for improving the administration, delivery, and utilization of social services, including family planning services. (Pars. 78–80.)

17. Training of management in population dynamics and administration on an interdisciplinary basis should be provided for medical, paramedical, traditional health personnel; program administrators; senior govern-

ment officials; labor, community, and social leaders. Education and information programs should be undertaken to bring population information to all areas of countries. (Pars. 81–93.)

18. An important role of governments is to determine and assess the population problems and needs of their countries in the light of their political, social, cultural, religious, and economic conditions; such an undertaking should be carried out systematically and periodically so as to provide informed, rational, and dynamic decisionmaking in matters of population and development. (Par. 98.)

19. International, intergovernmental, and nongovernmental agencies and national governments should increase their assistance in the population field on request. (Par. 100.)

20. The plan of action should be closely coordinated with the International Development Strategy for the Second United Nations Development Decade, reviewed in depth at five-year intervals, and modified as appropriate. (Pars. 107–109.)

The plan of action deals obliquely with projections of population growth and concepts of goals. It notes in paragraph 16 that the U.N. medium projections for population growth, which has been essentially the best estimate of demographers for the most likely growth of the world's population, would result in little change in population growth rates in the next decade. It then introduces the concept of the U.N. low projection and recognizes that:

According to the United Nations low variant projections, it is estimated that as a result of social and economic development and population policies as reported by countries in the Second United Nations Inquiry on Population and Development, population growth rates in the developing countries as a whole may decline from the present level of 2.4 per cent per annum to about 2 per cent by 1985; and below 0.7 per cent per annum in the developed countries. In this case the worldwide rate of population growth would decline from 2 per cent to about 1.7 per cent.

These projected reductions are said in paragraph 36 to be "consistent with declines in the birth rate of the developing countries as a whole from the present level of 38 per thousand to 30 per thousand by 1985." The plan points out that to achieve these levels of fertility by 1985 would, of course, "require substantial national efforts, by those countries concerned, in the field of socio-economic development and population policies . . ."

These statements are followed by paragraph 37, already referred to, which invites interested countries to consider setting quantitative goals and implementing policies to attain such goals by 1985.

If efforts to slow population growth along the lines of the low projection can be successfully continued, the reduction in the world's population in the year 2000, compared to the medium projection, would be approximately 500 million. By the year 2050 it would be approximately 2 billion. At the point when a stationary population would be reached, about a hundred years from now, the difference would be nearly 3 billion.

The World Population Plan of Action, despite its wordiness and often hesitant tone, contains all the necessary provisions for effective family planning programs and population growth control programs at national and international levels. It lacks only plain statements of quantitative goals with time frames for their accomplishment. These can be added by individual national action and by development in future U.N. documents.

The basis for suitable goals exists in paragraphs 16, 36, 37, and 107, referred to above. The concept of the U.N. low-variant projection used in these paragraphs is close to the goals proposed by the United States and other ECAFE nations already mentioned. The dangerous situation evidenced by the current food situation and projections for the future make it essential to press for the realization of these goals.

This assessment, directed at the amendment and adoption of the World Population Plan of Action, does not do justice to the accomplishments of the three committees of the whole, on Population Change and Economic and Social Development; Population, Re-

sources and Environment; and Population and the Family. Each of these considered the interrelation of population factors and their particular subject matter and adopted relevant resolutions of a positive content. These are extensive and important in their own right and deserve a separate, detailed assessment.

The U.S. delegation to the conference gave four undertakings of considerable future importance. From the U.S. point of view we should consider these also as part of the action agenda coming out of the conference. We said:

First, we will carry out the provision of the World Population Plan of Action to the best of our ability. Especially we will continue our effort to assure the availability of family planning services to all our people.

Second, we will undertake a collaborative effort with other interested donor countries and U.N. agencies—especially the World Health Organization (WHO), the U.N. Fund for Population Activities (UNFPA), the International Bank for Reconstruction and Development (IBRD), and the U.N. Children's Fund (UNICEF)—to assist poorer countries to develop low-cost basic preventive and curative health services, including maternal and child health and family planning services, reaching out into remote rural areas. We have already begun to use our communications satellites for medical consultation and diagnosis. If desired, we could extend these new techniques to family planning organizations and administration.

Third, we will join with other interested countries in a further collaborative effort of national research in human reproduction and fertility control covering biomedical and socioeconomic factors.

Fourth, (we) will be glad to join other countries in order to seek increased funds for assistance to bilateral and multilateral health and population programs in developing countries that desire our help and our voluntary contributions to the U.N. Fund for Population Activities. If other donor countries—especially the newly wealthy countries—indicate an interest in providing a steady increase in such funds over the next 10 years, (we) will bring that message home from this conference, and given some evidence of world interest, it is quite possible our Congress will respond favorably.

The World Population Conference has provided nations, international bodies, private organizations, and individuals with an impressive and valuable agenda for action. It is now in the hands of all of us to make its potential a reality.



## President Ford Vetoes Two Versions of Bill Restricting Aid to Turkey

*Following are statements by President Ford issued October 1 and 8, his remarks of October 14 upon signing a message to the House of Representatives returning H.J. Res. 1131 without his approval, the text of that message, his statement issued October 15 following the House vote sustaining the veto, the text of a message to the House on October 17 returning H.J. Res. 1163 without his approval, and his statement issued October 18 concerning H.J. Res. 1167, which he signed into law on October 17.*

### STATEMENT ISSUED OCTOBER 1

White House press release dated October 1

Last night the Eagleton amendment<sup>1</sup> to the continuing resolution authority was passed by the Senate. Today the continuing resolution itself will be brought to a Senate vote.

It is my conviction that approval of the continuing resolution containing the Eagleton amendment or similar language would destroy any hope for the success of the initiatives the United States has already taken or may take in the future to contribute to a just settlement of the Cyprus dispute. This view is shared by Secretary of State Kissinger, who is now in New York where he is making a major effort in his talks with Greek and Turkish representatives to bring about progress.

If the Eagleton amendment or similar language is adopted by the Congress, the United States will have lost its negotiating flexibility and influence. It thus hurts the very countries and objectives it purports to help.

It is my intention, therefore, to withhold my consent to any continuing resolution which reaches my desk containing language such as that found in the Eagleton amendment. I can, however, accept and, indeed, endorse the language relating to military as-

sistance to Turkey contained in the continuing resolution as reported to the full Senate by the Senate Appropriations Committee.<sup>2</sup>

I deeply appreciate the constructive efforts of the Democratic and Republican leadership in both the Senate and House of Representatives in their support for an amendment which would assist the diplomatic efforts of Secretary Kissinger in seeking an equitable solution to the Cyprus question. I hope a majority of the Senate will respond to this bipartisan leadership effort.

### STATEMENT ISSUED OCTOBER 8

White House press release dated October 8

Yesterday the House of Representatives, once again acting against the almost unanimous advice of its leadership, amended the continuing resolution granting funds for our foreign aid programs. The amendment requires an immediate cessation of all U.S. military assistance to Turkey and is, in my view, a misguided and extremely harmful measure.

Instead of encouraging the parties involved in the Cyprus dispute to return to the negotiating table, this amendment, if passed by the Senate, will mean the indefinite postponement of meaningful negotiations. Instead of strengthening America's ability to persuade the parties to resolve the dispute, it will lessen our influence on all the parties concerned. And it will imperil our relationships with our Turkish friends and weaken us in the crucial eastern Mediterranean.

But most tragic of all, a cutoff of arms to Turkey will not help Greece or the Greek Cypriot people, who have suffered so much over the course of the last several months. We recognize that we are far from a settlement consistent with Greece's honor and dignity. We are prepared to exert our efforts in that direction. But reckless acts that prevent progress toward a Cyprus settlement harm Greeks, for it is the Greek Government and the Greek Cypriots who have the most to gain from a compromise settlement. And it

<sup>1</sup> *Cong. Rec.*, Sept. 30, 1974, p. S17733.

<sup>2</sup> S. Rept. 1174, 93d Cong., 2d sess.

is they who have the most to lose from continued deadlock.

Thus I call upon the Senate to accept the original conference report language on Turkish arms aid<sup>3</sup> and to return the bill to the House of Representatives once again. And I ask the House of Representatives to reconsider its hasty act and, working with the Senate, pass a bill that will best serve the interests of peace.

#### REMARKS UPON SIGNING VETO MESSAGE, OCTOBER 14

White House press release dated October 14

Today, in the interest of preserving the ability of the United States to assist the Governments of Greece, Turkey, and Cyprus to negotiate a peaceful settlement of the Cyprus dispute, I am returning to the Congress without my approval the continuing resolution which the Congress has amended to cut off military aid to Turkey.

In so doing, I want to clear the air of a number of misunderstandings concerning the U.S. position toward the Cyprus crisis.

Since the outbreak of the crisis, our objectives have been to establish a cease-fire, to provide humanitarian aid to the refugees, to assist the parties toward a negotiation and a settlement, and to strengthen and to improve our historically friendly ties with Greece, Turkey, and Cyprus.

I have discussed these goals with the bipartisan leadership of the Congress and have received their unanimous and vigorous support. Our ability to pursue these goals depends, however, on being able to maintain a constructive relationship with the parties involved. The cutoff of assistance to Turkey is destructive of that relationship.

Further, it in no way helps the Greek people or the people of Cyprus, who have suffered so much in the past months. In fact, by dashing hopes for negotiations, it prolongs their suffering.

We recognize clearly the need to insure

that the honor and integrity of the Greek people be maintained. We seek a settlement which insures that fundamental requirement. U.S. friendship with Greece has been established through generations of cooperation and mutual respect based on shared values and common goals. I intend firmly to carry on and strengthen that relationship.

I cannot, however, carry out this pledge if my ability to act in the current crisis is undercut by restrictions imposed by the Congress. We all seek a peaceful resolution of this problem. We all seek justice for the people of Cyprus. We all seek to maintain the strength and cooperation in our relationship that is a cornerstone to Western security in the Mediterranean.

It is for these reasons that I return this resolution to the Congress and ask that it thoughtfully reconsider its position.

I pledge to continue working closely in partnership with the Congress to enable the United States to play a useful role in helping the parties toward a peaceful resolution of the Cyprus dispute.

I am now signing my veto message, which will be delivered today to the Congress.

Thank you very much.

#### MESSAGE TO THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES, OCTOBER 14

White House press release dated October 14

*To the House of Representatives:*

At the beginning of my Administration I pledged to work closely and cooperatively with the Congress. I believe I have kept that promise. I have appeared before two joint sessions of the Congress, I have met frequently with the leadership of both Houses, and I have agreed to appear personally before a subcommittee of the House of Representatives—a step no other President has undertaken in more than a century.

These actions are an earnest of my commitment to a new partnership between the legislative and executive branches of our government. They reflect my deep belief that the antagonisms that have too long divided our

<sup>3</sup> H. Rept. 1424, 93d Cong., 2d sess.

nation must be resolved, that hopes for partisan advantage must be put aside, and that we must get on with the business of doing the best we can for our country.

The cooperation I have received from the leadership of the Congress—Democratic and Republican alike—has been truly remarkable. The leaders have advised me and I have listened; I have explained my problems to them and they have responded with understanding and support. For this I am deeply grateful.

It is, therefore, with deep regret that I am returning today without my approval the recently passed Continuing Resolution, H.J. Res. 1131, granting funds for the operation of several departments and agencies and for the temporary continuation of our foreign aid programs. I take this step with great reluctance, but in the belief that I have no other choice.

The Continuing Resolution the Congress has passed and sent to me for signature contains an amendment requiring an immediate cut-off of all military assistance to Turkey. That amendment was passed despite my own public objection to it, and in the face of the unanimous opposition of the bipartisan leadership of both Houses of Congress. It is an act which is harmful even to those it purports to help.

The United States is making every effort to play a useful role in assisting the parties to a resolution of the Cyprus dispute. The Continuing Resolution as amended is entirely destructive of those efforts. Instead of encouraging the parties involved in the Cyprus dispute to return to the negotiating table, an arms cut-off to Turkey could mean the indefinite postponement of meaningful negotiations. Instead of strengthening America's ability to persuade the parties to resolve the dispute, it would lessen our influence on all the parties concerned. It would as well imperil our relationships with our Turkish ally and weaken us in the crucial Eastern Mediterranean. It directly jeopardizes the NATO alliance.

Most tragic of all, an arms cut-off would not help Greece or the Greek Cypriot people

who have suffered so tragically over the past several months. We recognize that we are still far from a settlement consistent with the honor and dignity of Greece, and are prepared to exert our influence to that end. But reckless acts that prevent progress toward a Cyprus settlement harm Greece, for it is the Greek government and the Greek Cypriots who have the most to gain from a compromise settlement. And it is they who have the most to lose from continued deadlock.

It is for these reasons that I am vetoing the bill sent to me. I do so because, should this measure become law, it would be impossible for the United States to continue to play any meaningful role in assisting the parties to resolve the Cyprus dispute. We would inevitably be forced to withdraw from the negotiations because the Congress would have taken from us the tools we need to affect the outcome.

My choice, then, is unavoidable; my responsibility clear. I ask that the Congress reconsider its action and send to me a bill that we can all support, a bill that provides the flexibility needed to carry forward the foreign policy of the United States.

GERALD R. FORD.

THE WHITE HOUSE, *October 14, 1974.*

#### STATEMENT ISSUED OCTOBER 15

White House press release dated October 15

I am deeply gratified by the House vote sustaining my veto of the continuing resolution. This wise and responsive action will serve the cause of peace on Cyprus while maintaining the strength of our vital security relationships in the eastern Mediterranean.

I want to thank the congressional leadership for its understanding and support. I look forward to working in partnership with the Congress to enhance the ability of the United States to assist the parties in negotiating a peaceful and lasting resolution of the Cyprus dispute and in responding generously to the humanitarian relief needs of the Cypriot people. At the same time, I ask

Congress for prompt action to provide continued funding, without encumbering restrictions, for the operation of several departments and agencies.

**MESSAGE TO THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES,  
OCTOBER 17**

White House press release dated October 17

*To the House of Representatives:*

I greatly regret that for the second time I must return without my approval the Continuing Resolution granting funds for the operation of several departments and agencies and for the temporary continuation of our foreign aid programs, H.J. Res. 1163.

My previous veto message and my public statements on this matter have clearly expressed our objectives with respect to the resolution of the Cyprus dispute as well as the dangers posed by legislative restrictions destroying our ability to assist the parties involved. The Congress, despite the best efforts of the bipartisan leaders of both Houses, has for the second time refused to recognize the realities of the situation.

While the language of this new bill is different, its effect is similar to the earlier Continuing Resolution which required my veto on October 14. I need not reiterate the extensive comments which I made at that time and which again compel a veto. The provisions of this bill as they would apply to Turkey would do nothing to bring an end to the suffering of the Cypriot people, would do nothing to encourage the two sides to resolve the dispute peacefully, and would bring a further deterioration of the posture of the NATO alliance in the crucial Eastern Mediterranean. It is for these reasons and those previously stated that I must reluctantly veto the bill before me.

In addition, I am compelled to point out again that should this measure become law, the United States would have lost the ability to play a useful role in this dispute and would in effect have to withdraw from the negotiations. Should the Congress force such an action, it must do so in the clear knowl-

edge that it assumes full responsibility for the situation which would then prevail.

I ask that the Congress not choose that path but that it reconsider its action and provide a bill which will permit the continued execution of United States foreign policy in a constructive and responsible manner.

GERALD R. FORD.

THE WHITE HOUSE, *October 17, 1974.*

**STATEMENT ISSUED OCTOBER 18**

White House press release dated October 18

I have signed, with serious reservations, the continuing resolution (H.J. Res. 1167) providing necessary funds after a three-week delay for the operation of several departments and agencies and for the temporary continuation of our foreign aid programs.

Despite two vetoes of similar versions of this bill and my public statements concerning the damage to our diplomacy that would result from its restrictions on military aid to Turkey, Congress has nevertheless persisted by clear majorities in a course which I consider ill advised and dangerous.

The restrictions imposed in this bill on our military assistance to Turkey create serious problems.<sup>4</sup> Without substantial benefit to any

<sup>4</sup> H.J. Res. 1167 (Public Law 93-448, approved Oct. 17) includes the following section:

"SEC. 6. None of the funds herein made available shall be obligated or expended for military assistance, or for sales of defense articles and services (whether for cash or by credit, guaranty, or any other means) or for the transportation of any military equipment or supplies to Turkey until and unless the President certifies to the Congress that the Government of Turkey is in compliance with the Foreign Assistance Act of 1961, the Foreign Military Sales Act, and any agreement entered into under such Acts, and that substantial progress toward agreement has been made regarding military forces in Cyprus: *Provided*, That the President is authorized to suspend the provisions of this section and said acts if he determines that such suspension will further negotiations for a peaceful solution on the Cyprus conflict. Any such suspension shall be effective only until December 10, 1974, and only if, during that time, Turkey shall observe the ceasefire and shall neither increase its forces on Cyprus nor transfer to Cyprus any U.S. supplied implements of war."

other country, these restrictions threaten our relations with a country which is a close ally, which is the eastern anchor of an alliance vital to the security of the United States, and which plays a fundamental role in the strategic interests of the United States in the eastern Mediterranean area. It is for these reasons—the national security interests of the United States—that we have been providing military assistance to Turkey.

The problem created by these legislative restrictions with respect to our relations with Turkey are not compensated for in any way by benefits to Greece or the Greek Cypriots. Contrary to the intentions of the supporters of these restrictions, this bill can only hinder progress toward a settlement of the Cypriot dispute, which is so much in the interest of both Greece and the people of Cyprus.

As a result of my vetoes of two earlier versions of this continuing resolution, the Congress has eased the most troublesome of the earlier restrictions. Nevertheless, the risks created by the remaining ones fail to provide compensating benefits. I will, of course, do my best to accomplish the goals which we had set before the Congress took this action. Whatever we can still do to assist in resolving the Cyprus dispute will be done. But if we fail despite our best efforts, those in the Congress who overrode the congressional leadership must bear the full responsibility for that failure.

## **Congressional Documents Relating to Foreign Policy**

### **93d Congress, 2d Session**

Emergency Marine Fisheries Protection Act of 1974.

Report, together with minority views, to accompany S. 1988. S. Rept. 93-1079. August 8, 1974. 54 pp.

Hungarian Claims. Report to accompany H.R. 13261. S. Rept. 93-1095. August 15, 1974. 12 pp.

Export-Import Bank Amendments of 1974. Report to accompany S. 3917. S. Rept. 93-1097. August 15, 1974. 47 pp.

International Nuclear Agreement Congressional Review Act. Conference report to accompany S. 3698. H. Rept. 93-1299. August 19, 1974. 4 pp.

## **Progress Toward Independence of Portuguese Africa**

*Following is a statement made in Committee IV (Trusteeship) of the U.N. General Assembly on October 11 by U.S. Representative Barbara M. White.*

USUN press release 131 dated October 11

I would like to express my government's deep satisfaction with the progress of the process of decolonization in Portuguese-speaking Africa during the past five months—satisfaction that the peoples of these areas are now assuming the full rights and responsibilities of self-government, which are their due, and satisfaction that the provisional government in Portugal has had the wisdom to accept the need for change as well as the courage to implement it.

We are gratified that Portugal's new policy already has borne fruit with Guinea-Bissau's entry into the community of states and membership in this organization. It is our hope that the evolution toward independence in Mozambique will be peaceful and that next year Mozambique, too, will take its seat in this body. We also commend the leaders of Guinea-Bissau and FRELIMO [Liberation Front of Mozambique] for the sense of realism and compromise they have shown in their negotiations with Portugal. We wish them well now as they go about the task of establishing new governmental institutions and policies to execute the will of their peoples.

The existence of several liberation movements in Angola makes the problem of decolonization in that territory more complicated than it was in Mozambique and Guinea-Bissau. We hope that the movements may resolve their differences expeditiously so that decolonization can proceed and the establishment of the structures of a new self-governing Angola can begin.

Other African governments and leaders have been of invaluable assistance in helping to arrange the negotiations concerning Guinea-Bissau and Mozambique. So has the dis-

tinguished Secretary-General of the United Nations, through his timely and statesman-like good offices. By helping to eliminate persistent sources of tensions, they have served not only Africa but the world. These countries and leaders deserve our hearty thanks for their past efforts and encouragement for the future.

It is indeed to the future that we should look today. The United States hopes to see the process of decolonization continue to a peaceful conclusion with the peoples of the remaining non-self-governing territories in Africa determining their own future. This will best serve the interests of the peoples themselves, of Africa, and of the world. We will do what we can to encourage progress toward this end.

## TREATY INFORMATION

### Current Actions

#### MULTILATERAL

##### Coffee

Agreement amending and extending the international coffee agreement, 1968. Approved by the International Coffee Council at London April 14, 1973. Entered into force October 1, 1973. TIAS 7809.

*Notification that constitutional procedures completed:* Japan, September 26, 1974.

##### Copyright

Protocol 1 annexed to the universal copyright convention, as revised, concerning the application of that convention to works of stateless persons and

refugees. Done at Paris July 24, 1971. Entered into force July 10, 1974. TIAS 7868.

Protocol 2 annexed to the universal copyright convention, as revised, concerning the application of that convention to the works of certain international organizations. Done at Paris July 24, 1971. Entered into force July 10, 1974. TIAS 7868.

*Ratification deposited:* Norway, August 13, 1974.

#### Load Lines

Amendments to the international convention on load lines, 1966 (TIAS 6331). Adopted at London October 12, 1971.<sup>1</sup>

*Acceptance deposited:* Cyprus, October 3, 1974.

#### Ocean Dumping

Convention on the prevention of marine pollution by dumping of wastes and other matter, with annexes. Done at London, Mexico City, Moscow, and Washington December 29, 1972.<sup>1</sup>

*Ratification deposited:* Denmark (not applicable to Faroe Islands), October 23, 1974.

#### World Heritage

Convention concerning the protection of the world cultural and natural heritage. Done at Paris November 16, 1972.<sup>1</sup>

*Ratification deposited:* Australia, August 22, 1974.

## BILATERAL

#### Bangladesh

Agreement for sales of agricultural commodities. Signed at Dacca October 4, 1974. Entered into force October 4, 1974.

#### Turkey

Agreement relating to payment to the United States of the net proceeds from the sale of defense articles by Turkey. Effected by exchange of notes at Ankara October 9 and 10, 1974. Entered into force October 10, 1974, effective July 1, 1974.

#### United Kingdom

Agreement amending the agreement of February 15, 1960, as amended (TIAS 4425, 6619), relating to the establishment and operation of a ballistic missile early warning station at Fylingdales Moor. Effected by exchange of notes at London October 3, 1974. Entered into force October 3, 1974.

<sup>1</sup> Not in force.

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†438	10/25	Advisory Committee for Foreign Service Institute, Dec. 2.
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†443	10/27	Kissinger: arrival, New Delhi.
†444	10/27	Kissinger, Chavan: exchange of toasts, New Delhi.

\* Not printed.

† Held for a later issue of the BULLETIN.

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# THE DEPARTMENT OF STATE BULLETIN

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November 18, 1974

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*The Department of State BULLETIN, a weekly publication issued by the Office of Media Services, Bureau of Public Affairs, provides the public and interested agencies of the government with information on developments in the field of U.S. foreign relations and on the work of the Department and the Foreign Service.*

*The BULLETIN includes selected press releases on foreign policy, issued by the White House and the Department, and statements, addresses, and news conferences of the President and the Secretary of State and other officers of the Department, as well as special articles on various phases of international affairs and the functions of the Department. Information is included concerning treaties and international agreements to which the United States is or may become a party and on treaties of general international interest.*

*Publications of the Department of State, United Nations documents, and legislative material in the field of international relations are also listed.*

For sale by the Superintendent of Documents  
U.S. Government Printing Office  
Washington, D.C. 20402

PRICE:

52 issues plus semiannual indexes,  
domestic \$29.80, foreign \$37.25  
Single copy 60 cents

Use of funds for printing this publication approved by the Director of the Office of Management and Budget (January 29, 1971).

**Note:** Contents of this publication are not copyrighted and items contained herein may be reprinted. Citation of the DEPARTMENT OF STATE BULLETIN as the source will be appreciated. The BULLETIN is indexed in the Readers' Guide to Periodical Literature.

## President Ford Meets With President Echeverria of Mexico

*President Ford and President Luis Echeverría of the United Mexican States held meetings at Magdalena de Kino, Sonora, Mexico, and Tubac, Ariz., on October 21. Following are remarks exchanged by the two Presidents upon President Ford's arrival at Nogales, Sonora, Mexico; their exchange of toasts at a luncheon at Tubac, Ariz.; the transcript of their news conference at Tucson, Ariz.; and their exchange of remarks at Davis-Monthan Air Force Base, Tucson, Ariz., upon departure.*

Weekly Compilation of Presidential Documents dated October 28

### REMARKS AT NOGALES, SONORA, MEXICO

#### President Echeverría<sup>1</sup>

Your Excellency, Mr. Gerald Ford, President of the United States of America: We bid you welcome to Mexico. The people of Mexico receive you with the expression of their friendship for the American people. Through me, our people wish to offer you the most cordial welcome, to convey a cordial greeting which we would ask you to take back with you for all the American people.

Coexistence between Mexico and the United States of America has been a long one. We have an extensive borderline between us. And all along this border for a long time now the sometimes dramatic and even tragic problems have been left behind.

During the last decades, it has been possible to solve the problems that affect us both through civilized practices by applying norms of law and of reciprocal respect. And now during the very difficult period that the entire world is living through, we both—the United States, in these difficult times, and Mexico—are making efforts so that our co-

existence will be a harmonious one, an understanding one, and a respectful one.

In our country, within our country domestically, we are struggling to foster social justice in accordance with old moral guidelines and with a spirit of cooperation which we believe would benefit all the countries of the world.

Internationally, we struggle to achieve norms of cooperation, balance, understanding on the part of each nation for all other countries. In Mexico, we believe that inflation is only one of the manifestations of lack of balance between the interests of the one and the other—between the rich and the poor, between the people that are just developing and the industrialized countries. We feel that we have to reach an equilibrium in order to fight against these problems. And we believe that it is possible that we can trust international relations and that we can find a system of cooperation that would lead to international balance, that would lead to peace and not to war.

We should understand that whatever problem comes up in any corner of the world—in Asia, Africa, Oceania, Latin America—are problems that affect all of us, even the richest and most industrialized countries, because we must understand that the destiny of mankind is one and indivisible.

President Ford, this is the doctrine of Mexico, sir, with which we receive you with great cordiality. We want you to feel at home among us.

#### President Ford

Mr. President, *amigos*: I am delighted to be here this morning to meet with you on

<sup>1</sup> President Echeverría spoke Spanish on all occasions.

our border at Nogales. I am delighted and highly honored to participate in these meetings today which will be partly held in Mexico and partly held in the United States, which symbolizes, Mr. President, the relationship between our two countries.

It is a working partnership of mutual cooperation which exemplifies the spirit behind the new dialogue into which we have entered with all nations of Latin America and which we will not forget, Mr. President, which started last year at Tlatelolco in Mexico City.

In our meetings today, Mr. President, let us give new meaning to the special relationship of us as two good neighbors—Mexico and the United States—through frank and friendly consultations.

It is very significant, Mr. President, that my first trip outside of the United States as President of our country is to Mexico, our longtime friend and very good neighbor. It provides a living demonstration of how we are inextricably linked by historical ties, by geographical position, by our mutual desire to be good neighbors.

It is my fervent wish that this meeting will mark the beginning of a very close personal relationship between us and contribute to the close cooperation and the very friendly relation of our peoples and our governments.

Our relationship is of very great mutual benefit. Each of our countries, Mr. President, receives much from the other—material goods of all kinds, increased understanding through tourism and cultural exchanges, and the enrichment of human life and consciousness through expanded knowledge and warm, warm friendship.

This exchange is especially evident in the border area. I thank all of you who have come here to welcome me and to see this spirit of friendship which exists between President Echeverría and myself representing our two countries.

Actually, we witness today the flow of people, goods, food, music, art, and language. We note the existence of a binational commission—not one, but several—and binational groups of many kinds. We see the

efforts by people on both sides of the border to work together in a joint effort to solve the everyday problems of their respective lives.

There are countless other instances demonstrating the strong, the vital, the flourishing, and friendly relations that exist between us. And in this border area, Mr. President, we also see living examples of how two governments disposed to work together in good will can meet and solve problems.

Along our common border, we have jointly faced and together resolved problems of flood control, sanitation, minor border adjustments necessitated by the vagaries of the Rio Grande.

We are extremely proud, Mr. President, of our recent resolution of longstanding and complex issues involving the salinity of the water of the Colorado River delivered to your country. Our successful efforts in these areas over the past few years are precedents for the solution of problems that may arise in the future. We must continue to draw upon the spirit of mutual respect, good will, which made this cooperation possible in the past.

Mr. President, let us today consider how we can cooperate in solving common problems which will result in a better and better life for the people of our two countries and for all the people everywhere.

*Muchas gracias.*

## **EXCHANGE OF TOASTS, TUBAC, ARIZ.**

### **President Ford**

Mr. President, distinguished guests, friends: I am very pleased to have the opportunity to have our distinguished guest here in Tubac, Arizona, and to reciprocate on this occasion for the warm welcome that he and the people of Mexico gave to me and to the American people during the day, which was an unbelievably pleasant, warm, and just a wonderful opportunity to be together.

I am most grateful to you, Mr. President, for having suggested that we meet in Magdalena de Kino for the meetings that we had during the day. Your sense of history, your

understanding of the great role that Father Kino played in the history of this part of the world, made it an ideal setting for the discussions that we had on very important matters.

Mr. President, the Jesuit priest whose statue is in the U.S. Capitol and whose statue is in the state capitol of Sonora and the capitol of Arizona lived and worked here almost three centuries ago. His efforts gave the first great stimulant to progress among the people of this part of the North American Continent, and we are all proud of his contribution to this flourishing part of our nation as well as yours.

Mr. President, with the horse, the cross, and the plow, he explored this area of your country as well as ours. He not only served his faith, Mr. President, but he also introduced agriculture, livestock, to the inhabitants of this area. And all of these ingredients, Mr. President, are vital to the progress of your country as well as ours.

Father Kino lives in the memories of those in the town that we visited this morning. On both sides of the border we owe him a very great debt of gratitude. The heritage of Father Kino is an inspiration for all of us to continue the work that he started three centuries ago.

Mr. President, as I am sure you realize, I am a great believer in personal dialogue. I believe that the straight talk that you and I had today contributed significantly to a better understanding, greater cooperation, and greater potentialities for your country as well as ours.

Mr. President, we had straight talk today with openness and candor, and as a result, it seems to me that the relationship between your country and mine has increased very significantly.

Your great patriot Benito Juárez said over 100 years ago, and I quote, "Respect for the rights of others is peace." And this relationship that has been built between Mexico and the United States is built on that foundation, which is solid rock.

Mr. President, we have discussed a number of very important issues, and we have done it with openness and candor, and the spirit

that we discussed these matters, I think, will be the foundation upon which we can continue the dialogue—a dialogue that will be beneficial to Mexico as well as to the United States, to Latin America, and to the world as a whole.

Mr. President, we are greatly honored to have on the soil of the United States the President of Mexico and his official party. We believe that the relationship between us will grow from this beginning under my administration and during your time as President, and we will work together to build a better and better world in this hemisphere as well as throughout the globe.

May I offer a toast to the President of Mexico and to the people of the great country of Mexico and to the growing and improved relationships between our people, our country, and you and myself.

#### **President Echeverria**

Mr. President of the United States of America: I believe, Mr. President, that among the many important points of agreement that we have reached during this very brief visit—but a very intensive one—we can mention the enormous success of this visit.

The cordiality, the expressions of welcome and affection with which you have been received in Magdalena and in Nogales, we all know would have been the same whatever part of the country you would have visited.

It is not only the fact of the coexistence between Mexicans and North Americans and U.S. citizens that intensifies the bonds that bring our two countries together; it is not only the relationship that exists on the two sides of the border. It is the fact that throughout all our history, the American history and the Mexican history, we have been able to bring up our problems very openly; we have been able to foster and foment our friendship.

When you and I, Mr. President, explored the different possibilities of meeting along the border area, we decided to meet in this vast region which was at that time a desert and which Father Kino discovered and civi-

lized. Father Kino's untiring work, Father Kino's great foresight and vision, and all his dedication are examples that are to be followed in the work that needs to be done in this very vast desert area in which we are at present.

In researching the work that was done by Father Kino, many students of the United States and many students of history of Mexico participated, and similarly to the way in which they joined forces and participated, we can join forces in order to solve the problems of the United States and of Mexico.

May I say out loud, Mr. President, that to deal with you personally is very gratifying, that, very simply and very directly and fully informed, you take up the most complex matters, that you do not elude the problems with a great many high-sounding phrases, and that it is easy to perceive that you are imbued with good faith in our bilateral relations, and that this will be beneficial for an international life which every day becomes more complex throughout the world and which makes it necessary for political leaders to contribute with the greatest intelligence and experience and all of their good will.

We know that the world is living through very difficult times and that it is only through the spirit of understanding, of frankness, that we can transcend these difficult times so that they will not become too long.

And, Mr. President, I do believe that if in the future the problems and all other matters that should come up are to be dealt with as we have dealt with our problems today in this border area, we will have done a great deal to lighten our burden and to solve these problems.

Mr. President, it has been a great pleasure for me to meet you personally, to dialogue with you, Mr. President, in the direct and clear manner in which you speak, not only from conviction but also because this is your way. And in Mexico, we have no doubt that this is a very, very favorable sign so that the friendship between the two countries will become deeper and will continue into the future, strengthened, vigorous, and without ever being blemished.

Gentlemen, I offer a toast to the health of the President of the United States and of the friendship of the two countries.

#### NEWS CONFERENCE, TUBAC, ARIZ.

*President Ford:* It has been a very great privilege and pleasure, Mr. President, to have the opportunity of visiting your country today and to discuss with you a number of very important issues. And let me just emphasize one.

You, of course, are the author and promoter of some very far-reaching action in the United Nations which, we believe, as a charter for economic development throughout the world, has very great merit and very great support, and I compliment you for it. And I can assure you that I and Secretary Kissinger will work with you and others in your government in trying to find the key and the answer to the economic development of all parts of our great globe.

It is nice to have you in the United States, and I thank you for the warm welcome given to me by you as well as all the people of Mexico.

Yes.

*Q. I would like to address a question to both Presidents. Among the issues you discussed today, was there a discussion of American access to the recently discovered oil deposits in southern Mexico, and could you give us an estimate of the size of those deposits?*

*President Echeverría:* Yes, Mexico is selling to whoever wants to buy the oil at the market price in the world market. We sell our surplus oil. I hope that we can drill for more oil in Mexico in order to be able to export a greater amount. We have sold to the United States, to Uruguay, to Brazil, and to Israel, and we hope to continue to sell without making any differences among the buyers in order to contribute to satisfy the demand.

*Q. I would like to know, President Ford, if, during your talks, there was any mention*

*made of the Trade Reform Act and, if so, what are the repercussions that this will have for Mexico?*

*President Ford:* I am very happy and very pleased that you raised the question. The new trade legislation, which I hope will pass the Congress this year, will significantly increase the trade relations between Mexico and the United States, helping to balance the trade between Mexico and the United States. This trade legislation, which I have worked very hard to promote, which I believe will pass the U.S. Senate and, I believe, the Congress, will be very helpful in making good trade relations between the United States and Mexico.

*Q. Can you tell us whether any progress has been made on a new approach resolving the question of migrant farmworkers from Mexico and the related questions involved in that?*

*President Echeverría:* Yes. Yes, we did discuss this point, and I brought it up in the name of Mexico—I told the President of the United States that we have definitely desisted from our intention of signing an agreement, and this is due to the fact that we made a revision of the previous agreement and we saw that in practice, in the way it works, it is not good. It gives opposite results from the ones we want.

What happened at that time was that, attracted by this agreement that we had with the United States, the migrant workers, or the would-be migrant workers, would come to the border cities of the United States. And then it happened that they did not receive a contract, and then they stayed at the border city and increased the number of the population or else they went illegally into the United States.

Now, with the policy of self-criticism that at present prevails in Mexico, we have reviewed this matter, and we have come to realize and accept that the responsibility belongs to Mexico.

In Mexico, we need to increase the sources of employment. We need to send more re-

sources out into the countryside. We need to organize the farmers in a better way. We need to keep them within the land. I do not know if President Ford has anything to add, because we analyzed this point jointly.

*President Ford:* As you can see, we discussed this matter in great depth. It has a long history. It has current problems. In fact, we have some new problems. And in order to get an up-to-date reading on what should be done, how we can best help, we have decided to reanalyze through a commission that will bring up the data that involves those going from Mexico to the United States and will update data that will involve individuals who are in the United States seeking employment, trying to find the right answer. And this revitalized commission, I think, will give both of us and our countries better answers to solve the problem.

*President Echeverría:* Now, however, there is a point that Mexico insists upon in reference to the migrant workers—whether they are legally in the country or illegally in the country. That is, Mexico insists that they enjoy the rights and prerogatives that is granted by the law to any person.

When a person is contracted legally and comes to work in the United States, this person under contract has certain rights—the right to a decent salary, the right to social security, and, that is to say, all the rights that are granted by the law. This is when the person comes to work legally.

Now, if the migrant worker comes in illegally, he still has some rights that must be observed—this is basic.

*Q. I have a question for President Ford. I would like to ask President Ford whether the hemispheric problems were taken up and, if they did take up the hemispheric problems, what is the attitude of the United States with reference to Cuba and if this attitude is to be maintained at the next conference of Foreign Ministers.*

*President Ford:* We did take up the question of the U.S. attitude toward Cuba. I indicated that we had not seen any change in the attitude of Mr. Castro or any of the other in-

dividuals in the Cuban Government and, inasmuch as there had been no change, no attitude that was different regarding the United States, it was not expected that our attitude would change toward Cuba.

We did discuss the meeting that is to be held in Quito, I think, on November 7 or 8, where the matter will be brought before the OAS. But our attitude, as of the present time, is since no change in the attitude of Cuba, we certainly have to retain our point of view concerning them.

*Q. President Echeverría, I wonder if you could answer one part of Mr. Shaw's [Gaylord Shaw, Associated Press] question which was not answered, and that is, can you give us some estimate of the size of the new oil discovery in Mexico?*

*President Echeverría:* Yes, the discoveries are very important and significant, and the significance we can find in the following figures: Of the 640,000 barrels a day that are obtained throughout all of Mexico, 37 percent—that is 241,000 barrels—come from only a few wells. This has made it possible for us now to begin to export, after having transcended the stage where it was necessary for us to import in order to satisfy our own consumption.

Therefore this is very important for the Mexican economy, first and foremost, if we take into account the prices that prevail for oil in the world market, prices which we respect.

*Q. This is a question for both Presidents. Can you give us a list of the specific agreements that you reached today?*

*President Echeverría:* Actually, no, we did not come to international agreements. It was the first meeting between the President of the United States and the President of Mexico in order to get together to discuss, to analyze, very frankly, very openly, very clearly, very directly, some of the problems that have already been dealt with in this room.

For me, the most important part of our meeting is the way in which President Ford underlined to me personally, and later on here during our meeting in this place, the impor-

tance that he gives the Charter of Economic Rights and Duties of States.

And I thank President Ford and the people of the United States for this opinion that has been expressed to me because, actually, this is a complete change from what it was before, and this is very valuable support for this charter that is gaining ground within the United Nations, and for the already 100-and-some-odd countries that are supporting the charter.

The United States had never before expressed as much interest as it has now in the approval of the Charter of Economic Rights and Duties of States. Of course, it rather matters that we still have to elucidate, that we have to define, but I feel very optimistic that we shall.

*The press: Muchas gracias.*

#### REMARKS AT DAVIS-MONTHAN AIR FORCE BASE, TUCSON, ARIZ.

##### President Ford

Mr. President: It has been a very great privilege and an extremely high honor for me to have had this opportunity early in my administration to meet with you and your very distinguished delegation, to have visited Nogales and Magdalena de Kino in your very great nation, and to have had the honor of your hospitality in Tubac. Let me say that the reception received in Magdalena, in Nogales, was unbelievable, and I can say to all of my friends here in Arizona we could not have had a warmer greeting and a friendlier reception.

Now, Mr. President, the time has been all too short, but what we have shared together has been most valuable to me in the handling of the problems that we see down the road. It provided a very opportune moment for a warm welcome, to know you personally, to be able to establish a close personal friendship—the friendship between the Presidents of two great countries—a neighbor to the north for Mexico and a good neighbor to the south from the United States. This opportunity provided us the establishment of a firsthand dialogue,



which is so important in the understanding and cooperation of our peoples and our governments. It provided a chance, Mr. President, to hear your points of view representing your great country and your great people on matters of mutual concern to our countries and to give me an opportunity to express to you the views of our people and our government.

To me, Mr. President, the personal relationship we have initiated today is equal to the substantive discussions we have held. I am confident that the meeting beginning early today and ending shortly will be only the beginning of a close personal relationship, an important link in the special relationship which unites our countries.

Mr. President, during my short visit to your side of the border this morning, you and the people made me feel very much at home, and I assure you that the warmth of this friendship by our people to you I hope equals that of your people to me.

As I say goodbye and take leave, let me wish you a safe and pleasant return journey, Mr. President. I will not say goodbye, but rather, following the tradition of your country, I will say *hasta luego*.

I know there will be other opportunities in the future to meet, to discuss the vital questions, but, more importantly, to get better acquainted.

It is a privilege and a pleasure to have had this opportunity on your border and ours. Mr. President, I thank you.

#### **President Echeverria**

President Ford: It is only due to the great spirit of friendship which unites our two countries that it has been possible in a few hours, and without any personal contact between the two of us previously—it has been possible, I repeat, to revise the enormous amount of matters that we have between our two countries.

We are practicing—and this is well for the people of the United States and for the people of Mexico to know—we are practicing a simple type of democracy, a democracy in which there is no secrets, a democracy in

which there is nothing hidden, a democracy that is characterized by frankness.

I believe that this conference between the United States and Mexico can set an example—can set an example that should be followed by all, by the great and the small countries, by the industrialized nations and the developing nations.

I see that from here on in, with good will, with the study of our common problems, with mutual understanding, the relationship between our two governments will improve.

Mr. President, in expressing my gratitude for your personal acquaintance, Mr. President, and for the hospitality that has been shown to us by the United States and also this expression of good will on the part of the people of the United States, I, too, wish to say *hasta luego*, until we meet again, because we hope that we will have you in Mexico City so that the Mexican people will get to know you as I do.

Mr. President, in taking my leave, I do so with a warm handshake, with an *abrazo*, Mexican style—with an embrace that we hope will travel to all the homes of the United States and convey the great affection of Mexico.

## **Senate Confirms U.S. Delegation to UNESCO General Conference**

The Senate on October 10 confirmed the nominations of the following-named persons to be Representatives and Alternate Representatives of the United States to the 18th session of the General Conference of the United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization:

#### *Representatives*

R. Miller Upton  
William B. Jones  
Rosemary L. Ginn  
E. Ross Adair  
Gordon H. Scherer

#### *Alternate Representatives*

Stephen Hess  
William G. Harley  
J. Roger Porter

## U.S. Congratulates Mozambique's Joint Transitional Government

*Following is an informal translation of a letter sent by Peter Walker, U.S. Consul General at Lourenço Marques, to Joaquim Alberto Chissano, Prime Minister of the Transitional Government of Mozambique, on September 20 upon the installation of the Transitional Government.*

SEPTEMBER 20, 1974.

EXCELLENCY: The Government of the United States of America has instructed me to express the congratulations and the pleasure of the people and Government of the United States for the successful conclusion of the negotiations which culminated in the installation of the government which will preside over the period of Mozambique's transition to independence.

The policy of the United States toward the peoples of Africa has long been one of support for their self-determination, and thus the United States strongly supports the efforts of the Portuguese Government in the decolonization of its African territories.

The Government of the United States is fully aware that the installation of the Transitional Government in Mozambique represents an important step toward the implementation of this policy of decolonization, and is convinced that the goodwill and enlightened leadership that made that step possible should also lead to the successful completion of the decolonization process next year.

The Government of the United States of America is hopeful that the friendship that has long existed between the people of the United States and the people of Mozambique will result in a relationship of increasing understanding and cooperation as Mozambique proceeds to independence.

I am pleased to enclose, for the information of Your Excellency, excerpts from the speeches delivered recently by the President of the United States of America and by Sec-

retary of State Kissinger to the General Assembly of the United Nations.<sup>1</sup>

Accept, Mr. Prime Minister, sincere expressions of my respect and highest consideration.

PETER WALKER  
*Consul General of the  
United States of America*

## Telecommunication Convention Transmitted to the Senate

*Message From President Ford*<sup>2</sup>

*To the Senate of the United States:*

For advice and consent to ratification, I herewith transmit to the Senate the International Telecommunication Convention reached at Malaga-Torremolinos on October 25, 1973. This transmittal also includes the Annexes and Final Protocol to the Convention, as well as a report by the Department of State.

This new Convention will abrogate and replace the International Telecommunication Convention of 1965. It generally follows the

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<sup>1</sup> Excerpt from an address made before the U.N. General Assembly on Sept. 18 by President Ford:

"—We rededicate ourselves to the search for justice, equality, and freedom. Recent developments in Africa signal the welcome end of colonialism. Behavior appropriate to an era of dependence must give way to the new responsibilities of an era of interdependence."

Excerpt from an address made before the U.N. General Assembly on Sept. 23 by Secretary Kissinger:

"The United States notes with particular satisfaction the continuing process of change in Africa. We welcome the positive demonstration of cooperation between the old rulers and the new free. The United States shares and pledges its support for the aspirations of all Africans to participate in the fruits of freedom and human dignity."

<sup>2</sup> Transmitted on Oct. 17 (text from White House press release); also printed as S. Ex. J, 93d Cong., 2d sess., which includes the texts of the convention, annexes, and protocol and the report of the Department of State.

provisions of the 1965 Convention with a considerable number of minor improvements and a few major modifications to take account of technical developments in the field and developments in international organizations.

One notable change from the 1965 Convention is the deletion of the separate membership of the territories of the several member States, including the United States. Although this change will deprive the United States of its vote on behalf of the territories, the redistribution of financial obligations which accompany this change will result in a relatively lower financial contribution from this country.

The International Telecommunication Convention constitutes the procedural and organizational framework for the orderly conduct of international telecommunications, and it is in the public and commercial interest of the United States to continue to play an active role within this framework. I recommend that the Senate give early and favorable consideration to this new Convention, and subject to a reservation noted in the State Department report, give its advice and consent to ratification.

GERALD R. FORD.

THE WHITE HOUSE, *October 17, 1974.*

## **Notice of Time for Filing Claims Against Egypt by U.S. Nationals**

*Department Announcement*<sup>1</sup>

On July 14, 1974, the Governments of the United States and of the Arab Republic of Egypt agreed to establish a Joint Committee to discuss compensation of U.S. nationals for their property in Egypt, with a view to reaching an appropriate settlement.

U.S. nationals who have claims against the Government of the Arab Republic of Egypt for the nationalization, expropriation or se-

questration of, or other measures directed against their property by the Government of the Arab Republic of Egypt should file their claims with the Department of State, Office of the Legal Adviser, 2201 C Street, N.W., Washington, D.C. 20520, during the period beginning October 22, 1974, and ending January 22, 1975.

U.S. nationals who, prior to June 1967, had communicated with either or both the American Embassy at Cairo and the American Consulate General in Alexandria, Egypt, concerning the nationalization, expropriation or sequestration of, or other measures directed against their property by the Government of the Arab Republic of Egypt should write to the Department of State, Office of the Legal Adviser, regarding the updating and the further preparation and development of their claims during the period October 22, 1974, to January 22, 1975.

## **Congressional Documents Relating to Foreign Policy**

### **93d Congress, 2d Session**

Oil and Asian Rivals—Sino-Soviet Conflict; Japan and the Oil Crisis. Hearings before the Subcommittee on Asian and Pacific Affairs of the House Committee on Foreign Affairs. 93d Congress, first and second sessions. September 12, 1973–March 6, 1974. 476 pp.

Human Rights in Chile. Hearings before the Subcommittees on Inter-American Affairs and on International Organizations and Movements of the House Committee on Foreign Affairs. December 7, 1973–June 18, 1974. 215 pp.

Foreign Investment in the United States. Hearings before the Subcommittee on Foreign Economic Policy of the House Committee on Foreign Affairs. January 29–February 21, 1974. 478 pp.

Critical Developments in Namibia. Hearings before the Subcommittee on Africa of the House Committee on Foreign Affairs. February 21–April 4, 1974. 305 pp.

Global Scarcities in an Interdependent World. Hearings before the Subcommittee on Foreign Economic Policy of the House Committee on Foreign Affairs. May 1–22, 1974. 259 pp.

U.S. Participation in African Development Fund. Hearing before the Senate Committee on Foreign Relations. June 27, 1974. 66 pp.

<sup>1</sup> Issued on Oct. 18 (press release 429).

## U.S. Reviews Disaster Relief Efforts for Hurricane Victims in Honduras

*Following is a statement made in the U.N. Economic Commission for Latin America by U.S. Representative Clarence Clyde Ferguson, Jr., on October 21.*

USUN press release 141 dated October 21

The Government of the United States and our people should like again to express our deepest sympathy to the government and people of Honduras, who have suffered so much from the devastation of Hurricane Fifi. Perhaps we shall never know the toll in lives lost in this most terrible disaster; we shall never know how many tens of thousands of Hondurans were left homeless; we shall never know how many millions of dollars in productive capacity vanished with the winds. We do know, however, that for the people of Honduras the dimensions of the disaster are enormous and that there is an undeniably pressing need for international relief and recovery assistance.

The distinguished Foreign Minister of Honduras has already spoken of the kinds and levels of help his country will require, and he has told us of the efforts of the government and people of Honduras to do what they can to deal with the immediate and longer term emergency problems.

We in this hemisphere know the enormous devastation in human and economic terms which can be visited upon any of us by hurricanes—the scourge of our part of the world. Since the turn of the century we have ourselves been ravaged more than two dozen times by major hurricanes. We know that for a developing country the tragedy of hurricane devastation can be even more cruel.

The meeting today was called by our distinguished Executive Chairman for the purpose of reviewing what Honduras' neighbors

and appropriate international agencies have contributed and will contribute to assure survival and recovery from this tragedy.

Mr. Chairman, this is an occasion of sadness. Nonetheless I am proud to be able to report that the United States was among the many large and small countries that reacted quickly and generously to the desperate needs of the Honduran people in the first hours and days after Fifi struck.

With full appreciation of the genuinely magnanimous response of other nations in this dire emergency, I would like to review here the scale and variety of my government's efforts to help the Honduran people find relief from the enduring agony and suffering caused by Fifi.

Even before the hurricane rains ceased, my colleague U.S. Ambassador Phillip Sanchez had transmitted to our government an official Honduran request for assistance on an emergency basis. Within hours my government dispatched two disaster survey teams to Honduras to help determine the extent of damage and the dimensions of assistance required.

These were followed by the assignment of four helicopters, two transport aircraft, and four boats for use in rescue and emergency food and medical distribution missions. U.S. military personnel were flown into Honduras to help establish and maintain an emergency communications network. Our Air Force immediately commenced a series of mercy flights which over the next few weeks airlifted to Honduras almost 200 tons of relief supplies, including food, blankets, sheets, tents, portable kitchens, insecticides, fuel, and clothing. The U.S. Government has also authorized or shipped to Honduras almost 2,000 metric tons of food supplies since the beginning of the emergency. Between September 19 and October 1, the total value of U.S. Government disaster relief assistance to Honduras exceeded \$1.6 million.

As a clear indication of his great concern with this disaster President Ford sent two personal emissaries to Honduras on September 28 to assess immediate relief requirements and longer term recovery needs. The emissaries, Messrs. Herman Kleine and Russell McClure, personally reported their findings to our President on October 7.

They recommended that the United States continue to participate in the provision of critically needed assistance for life support in the posthurricane emergency phase. They also reported that assessment and planning were already underway for the postemergency task of rebuilding the economy of the shattered northern region. "The magnitude of the task," they reported, ". . . will be beyond the crippled capacity of the Honduran economy. Help from outside will be needed."<sup>1</sup>

They outlined a role for the U.S. Government, through the Agency for International Development and through multilateral institutions. They recommended that AID assistance be addressed primarily to the rural sector and rural poor who were so grievously affected. They also noted that the requirements for the larger capital transfers might be appropriately addressed by the international agencies.

As significant as official U.S. Government assistance has been in the immediate posthurricane phase, it has not constituted the only or even the major U.S. response to the emergency. I am referring, of course, to the characteristically generous and spontaneous donations of funds and commodities by private U.S. citizens and the provision of relief supplies, equipment, funds, personnel, and transport by the state and local governments and by private groups and U.S. voluntary agencies.

We do not know and will never know the full value of private citizens' contributions to the relief efforts, as these contributions have poured into Honduras through so many different channels. We have attempted—without complete success—to record contributions of the many private organizations and volun-

tary agencies in the United States. We do know that the value of this assistance now exceeds \$5 million.

I cannot mention all of the organizations involved, but with your permission, Mr. Chairman, I would like to pay particular tribute to the very significant contributions of the American Red Cross, CARE, Catholic Relief Services, the Medical Assistance Program, the Salvation Army, the State of Alabama, and the Sister Cities Program.

Mr. Chairman, I am happy, too, to report that the continuing resolution voted by the U.S. Congress last Thursday, October 17, authorizes AID to conduct further relief and recovery operations in Honduras as well as in Bangladesh and Cyprus.

The U.S. AID Mission in Honduras is now consulting with appropriate agencies of the Government of Honduras on specific recovery projects where U.S. bilateral assistance efforts can best be focused. Preliminary indications are that our recovery assistance can most effectively help the Honduran Government in assisting farmers in replanting their crops, in providing minimal health facilities, getting available laborers working on small infrastructure repair projects, in cleaning up river channels and other watercourses, in repairing roads and bridges, and constructing emergency housing.

Finally, Mr. Chairman, I would like to close my remarks by pointing out that this disaster has again established the need for a more effective U.N. Disaster Relief Office. Representatives of my government have been in constant touch with UNDRO officials since the beginning of the emergency period, and we have nothing but praise and admiration for the contributions they have made within their sharply limited resources.

However, the need for greater, more efficient coordination of international disaster relief assistance becomes both clearer and more pressing with each natural disaster that occurs. It is not enough that nations respond generously to the perceived needs of those afflicted by disaster. We need not only international generosity and compassion but also direction and coordination by a UNDRO staffed with people who know how to work

<sup>1</sup> For text of the report, see AID press release 74-70 dated Oct. 7, 1974.

with a disaster-stricken government and who can tell all of us precisely what is needed where and for whom—not just food but what kind of food and how much, not just transport or personnel or communications but what kind and how much.

Mr. Chairman, from my own personal experience I can testify as to the enormous difficulties that can be created out of unrestrained generosity of those who seek to help in a disaster. In my involvement in relief to the civilian victims of the Nigerian civil war, I found such matters as the well-intentioned donation of cans of soup. Regrettably, as we know, most American liquid soups are 90 percent water; transporting that volume of water is inefficient when one considers dried soups would permit 90 percent more of this valuable nutrient.

Moreover, in many instances one must consider the traditional diet of those victims of disaster. In such circumstances introduction of new, strange, and exotic foods can even create additional problems. These I mentioned only as illustrative of the range of what appeared to be minor difficulties but which, in a disaster context, can become major additional problems.

Mr. Chairman, people who were on the ground and active in the Honduran emergency tell me that a substantial amount of the commodity assistance provided so generously by public and private donors around the world was not appropriate for this particular emergency. In some cases, I am given to understand, receipt and distribution of critically needed emergency supplies might even have been slowed down because of the obstruction in the supply system caused by the presence of quantities of unnecessary and unhelpful items.

An authoritative and efficient and experienced and well-staffed UNDR0 with the ability to communicate with and coordinate among member governments the precise kinds and amounts of assistance needed in any particular disaster would enable the international community to respond to disasters even more effectively than it did in this case.

## **U.S. Reaffirms Opposition to South African Apartheid**

*Following is a statement made in the Special Political Committee of the U.N. General Assembly by U.S. Representative Joseph M. Segel on October 17.*

USUN press release 138 dated October 17

Everything that can be said against apartheid has been said. Not one word has been said in defense of apartheid. And rightfully so. In a world in which there are all too many abuses of human rights, apartheid is among those which are absolutely indefensible. This pernicious form of systematized racial discrimination that continues to repress the non-white peoples of South Africa hangs heavy over the conscience of all mankind.

But what can be done to redress the wrongs of apartheid?

The worldwide attention that has been focused on this problem, principally through the efforts of the nations that are members of the Organization of African Unity, is a great help. We commend you for your persistence and for your devotion to the cause of eliminating this unjust and demeaning way of life that is imposed upon more than three-quarters of the population of South Africa.

The United States is among those countries that have taken unilateral action to help move this problem toward solution. And I just want to take a few moments to state for the record what the United States and its citizens have actually done and are doing, because there has been some incorrect information disseminated in the press and in this building regarding our government's activities and position on this important matter.

For one thing, the United States has strongly urged the relatively small number of American firms which have facilities in South Africa to set an example by improving working conditions, salaries, and wages of their non-white workers. We recognize that there are some who do not agree with this policy, but we believe that it is a help, not a hindrance. Further, this policy has borne

fruit. A number of U.S. firms in South Africa are now following the extraordinary practice (extraordinary for that country) of providing equal pay for equal work, regardless of race. American firms also have set the pace in providing improved educational, legal, and medical benefits to non-white workers in South Africa.

Secondly, the United States recognizes that it is wrong for any country to assist the South African Government in enforcing its apartheid policies. For this reason, we imposed an arms embargo against South Africa even before the United Nations did so. We have observed this embargo very carefully and continue to do so. Moreover, we have not engaged in any military or naval cooperation with South Africa in the last decade. And despite allegations to the contrary, the United States has not coordinated defense strategy with South Africa nor do we have any intention of now instituting such cooperation.

The U.S. Government and the people of the United States would like apartheid to end—to end as soon as possible. The people of South Africa have suffered far too long under this oppressive system.

We know from our own painful struggle with racial discrimination that change must be pursued vigorously and in many fields—education, labor, economic opportunities, housing, voting rights, et cetera.

Mr. Chairman, we are all aware that the diversity of South Africa's racial and economic groups creates special problems which must be taken into consideration. But five years have passed since the Lusaka Manifesto was issued, and although some changes have taken place, it is painfully obvious that the Government of South Africa has not risen to the challenge of this considered and responsible document.

We believe that apartheid can still be ended peacefully. It is clearly in the best interests of all the peoples of the world, including certainly those in South Africa, that the change come about this way.

Mr. Chairman, the United States calls on the Government of South Africa to reexam-

ine its policies and position in light of present-day realities. We say to the Government of South Africa: Your repressive racial system is indefensible; it is both wrong and unwise to try to continue to maintain it.

We most strongly urge the South African Government to bring a timely end to its apartheid policies and racial injustice and to recognize that it is in their own best interests to do this as rapidly as possible.

## **U.S. Takes Further Steps To Enforce Sanctions Against Southern Rhodesia**

*Following is a statement made in Committee IV (Trusteeship) of the U.N. General Assembly by U.S. Representative Barbara M. White on October 25.*

USUN press release 148 dated October 25

In his September 23 address before the U.N. General Assembly, Secretary of State Henry Kissinger declared that "The United States shares and pledges its support for the aspirations of all Africans to participate in the fruits of freedom and human dignity." I am glad to recall this statement, Mr. Chairman, as we discuss Southern Rhodesia, one of the parts of Africa where these issues are at stake today.

Over the past year, the continent of Africa has faced frustration, but it has also been the scene of historic progress. Guinea-Bissau has joined our ranks with universal acclaim for its newly won independence. Mozambique and Angola are moving quickly toward full independence and majority rule. These dramatic events are reshaping the face of Africa. They must also have telling effects—not the least of them psychological—upon the minority regime in Southern Rhodesia.

Up to now, that illegal regime has seemed to show little comprehension of what is happening within and beyond its borders. But we are hopeful that the quickening pace of events will induce it, too, to face the crying

need for change—to work out a peaceful settlement acceptable to the whole population of Southern Rhodesia as well as to the United Kingdom, which retains primary responsibility.

We believe that the effective enforcement by all nations of the Security Council's mandatory sanctions is necessary to increase the pressures upon the minority regime in Salisbury and thereby contribute toward an acceptable solution. Thus my government has been and is an active member of the Security Council Sanctions Committee.

During the past year, the United States has taken further steps to tighten its own enforcement of sanctions. When made aware that U.S. airlines maintained interline agreements with Air Rhodesia and that U.S. travel firms and airlines issued tickets for Air Rhodesia, the Federal Aviation Administration acted to end these practices. When it became evident that the operator of the Air Rhodesia office in New York was engaging in unauthorized transactions, the Department of the Treasury closed the office.

This committee is familiar with the Byrd amendment, which permits U.S. imports of certain strategic materials from Southern Rhodesia. I would like to report on the current situation.

The amendment has been repealed by the Senate and is awaiting action by the House of Representatives. On August 12, the White House announced the support of President Ford, who had assumed the office only three days before, for repeal of the amendment. The executive branch of the U.S. Government is committed to returning the United States to full conformity with the U.N. sanctions. In no way am I lessening that commitment, Mr. Chairman, when I point out that U.S. imports under the Byrd amendment have been minimal in relation to total Rhodesian trade, amounting to less than 5 percent of all exports from that country. Any realistic discussion must include this fact.

During this debate we have heard allegations that the United States, through South Africa, is assisting the Smith regime in military matters. I can state categorically that

these charges are totally without foundation.

Mr. Chairman, the United States deeply believes in and supports the principle of majority rule. It has been a fundamental part of our national tradition; it remains so today.

The United States wants to see a government in Southern Rhodesia which is the result of a free choice by all the people of that land.

We firmly support British efforts to end the Rhodesian rebellion.

We will do our best to see that U.N. sanctions are respected.

We earnestly hope that the march of events in Africa over the past six months will bear fruit in Southern Rhodesia as well and that she will move to become a true member of the African community, where her destiny must lie.

## **U.S. Supports Extension of Mandate of U.N. Force in Egypt-Israel Sector**

*Following is a statement made in the U.N. Security Council by U.S. Representative John Scali on October 23, together with the text of a resolution adopted by the Council that day.*

### **STATEMENT BY AMBASSADOR SCALI**

USUN press release 147 dated October 23

Mr. President [M. Michel Njine, Representative of the United Republic of Cameroon]: It is with great pleasure that I congratulate you for the good will and the patience and the leadership that you have demonstrated in leading us to this happy result—13 affirmative votes and no dissenting voices in approving this important resolution. At a time when there were dissenting and differing views, you have successfully led us to a consensus I think of which we can all be proud.

One year ago, renewed war broke out between Israel and her Arab neighbors, endangering the peace and the security of the



entire area. Today, a year later, the Security Council has made a second important contribution to preserving the present ceasefire and disengagement and, hopefully, to moving us closer to a lasting peace. By extending the mandate of the U.N. Emergency Force (UNEF) for another six months, we seek to allow the necessary time and opportunity for negotiations, which are indispensable.

This U.N. peace force has already made a historic impact for good in this highly strategic part of the world. It has a record of which we can all be proud. Despite some problems, UNEF has not only separated the combatants but has helped create the climate of peace that is essential to successful negotiations.

With this renewed mandate and our vote of confidence, we are confident these soldiers for peace will overcome any difficulties as successfully as they solved the inevitable problems that occurred in the first 12 months of the existence of the Force. No force of this kind can expect perfect conditions for its task. The important point is that it has been an effective force for good, and we are confident that it can continue its effective role.

Last year's tragic conflict brought about a realization by the parties that the only realistic means of settling disputes is by a process of step-by-step negotiations based on Security Council Resolutions 242 and 338. For the first time in 26 years, this approach has produced concrete progress toward such a settlement. Significant steps have been taken, particularly in the Egyptian-Israeli and the Israeli-Syrian disengagement agreements.

The United States has been privileged to participate actively in the negotiating process. Our government is convinced, and the successes of the past year have strengthened our conviction, that the only way to break through existing stalemates and move concretely toward peace is through a progressive series of agreements. Each step helps to change attitudes and create new situations in which further steps toward an equitable and permanent settlement can be agreed upon. The United States pledges to continue strenuous efforts to achieve this goal.

We thus note with approval that the Secretary General in his report, document S/11536, states that he considers the continued operation of UNEF essential not only for the maintenance of the present quiet but also to assist, if required, in further efforts for the establishment of peace in the Middle East as called for by the Security Council.

I am grateful for this opportunity to commend the UNEF for its outstanding work in maintaining the peace and preserving the climate in which the negotiating process can go forward. It is difficult to exaggerate the constructive role played by the soldiers for peace in these important first steps.

Therefore, I am pleased to extend my government's highest appreciation to the Secretary General and his headquarters staff and to the Commander in Chief of UNEF for their faithful and dedicated performance. I also wish to commend the civilian staff, the UNTSO [U.N. Truce Supervision Organization] observers, and most of all, the UNEF troops, who daily risk their lives far from their homes and families in the tasks of peace.

Our deepest sympathy is extended to the Governments of Canada, Peru, Finland, Panama, Indonesia, and Austria for the tragic loss of lives of members of their contingents who in the past few months have given their lives in the service of peace. We ask the delegations of these countries to convey our condolences to the bereaved families of these brave men. May their sacrifice inspire our efforts to achieve a permanent settlement.

We also wish to commend the troop-contributing countries for their commitment to international peace and security, for the beliefs which have motivated them to contribute troops for this peacekeeping operation.

The operation of UNEF has demonstrated effectively that the willingness of U.N. members to assume collective responsibility for international peacekeeping is important. All of us have agreed that it is vitally important that UNEF should operate with a maximum possible efficiency and at the lowest cost to U.N. members, all of whom share the financial burdens of peacekeeping.

We also are aware that the Secretary General, the troop contributors, all U.N. members, the Security Council, and the General Assembly are vitally interested in the effective and efficient operation of this Force. Efficient operation, in my government's view, must be coupled with maximum attention to economy. Indeed, the most efficient force is usually the leanest. My government strongly urges the Secretary General to continue his policy of keeping UNEF costs as low as possible consistent with efficient operation and fair compensation to troop-contributing governments. My delegation will be working to achieve these ends in the responsible organ of the General Assembly, the Fifth Committee.

Mr. President, the United States has voted in favor of the resolution just adopted which extends UNEF's mandate for another six months in the belief that further progress toward a Middle East settlement can be made during this period. We know that peacekeeping operations in the Middle East are essential to maintaining stability during the negotiations among the parties. But we also firmly believe that peacekeeping must not become a substitute for a just and permanent settlement.

#### TEXT OF RESOLUTION<sup>1</sup>

##### *The Security Council,*

*Recalling* its resolutions 338 (1973), 340 (1973), 341 (1973) and 346 (1974),

*Having examined* the report of the Secretary-General on the activities of the United Nations Emergency Force (S/11536),

*Noting* the opinion of the Secretary-General that "although quiet prevails in the Egypt-Israel sector, the over-all situation in the Middle East will remain fundamentally unstable as long as the underlying problems are unresolved",

*Noting also* from the report of the Secretary-General (S/11536) that in the present circumstances the operation of the United Nations Emergency Force is still required,

1. *Decides* that the mandate of the United Nations Emergency Force should be extended for an additional six-month period, that is, until 24 April

<sup>1</sup> U.N. doc. S/RES/362 (1974); adopted by the Council on Oct. 23 by a vote of 13 to 0, with the People's Republic of China and Iraq not participating in the vote.

1975, in order to assist in further efforts for the establishment of a just and lasting peace in the Middle East;

2. *Commends* the United Nations Emergency Force and those Governments supplying contingents to it for their contribution towards the achievement of a just and lasting peace in the Middle East;

3. *Expresses* its confidence that the Force will be maintained with maximum efficiency and economy;

4. *Reaffirms* that the United Nations Emergency Force must be able to function as an integral and efficient military unit in the whole Egypt-Israel sector of operations without differentiation regarding the United Nations status of the various contingents as stated in paragraph 26 of the report of the Secretary-General (S/11536) and requests the Secretary-General to continue his efforts to that end.

## United Nations Documents: A Selected Bibliography

*Mimeographed or processed documents (such as those listed below) may be consulted at depository libraries in the United States. U.N. printed publications may be purchased from the Sales Section of the United Nations, United Nations Plaza, N.Y. 10017.*

### Economic and Social Council

#### Statistical Commission:

Statistical classifications. Draft standard international trade classification (SITC), rev. 2. Note by the Secretary General. E/CN.3/456. May 28, 1974. 231 pp.

Statistical classifications. Draft international standard classification of all goods and services (ICGS). Report of the Secretary General. E/CN.3/457. Part I; June 17, 1974; 223 pp. Part II; June 12, 1974; 214 pp.

System of social and demographic statistics (SSDS). Potential uses and usefulness. Report of the Secretary General. E/CN.3/449. June 19, 1974. 26 pp.

### World Population Conference

#### World Population Conference background papers:

Health and family planning. Prepared by the World Health Organization. E/CONF.60/CBP/30. May 22, 1974. 41 pp.

Report on the second inquiry among governments on population and development. Report of the Secretary General. E/CONF.60/CBP/32. May 24, 1974. 105 pp.

World and regional labor force prospects to the year 2000. Prepared by the International Labor Office, Geneva. E/CONF.60/CBP/31. May 29, 1974. 37 pp.

**U.S. Policy Toward Governments of Peru, 1822–Present:  
Questions of Recognition and Diplomatic Relations**

**A TABULAR SUMMARY**

**Foreword**

This project is one of a series on U.S. policy toward various Latin American countries prepared at the request of former Assistant Secretary for Inter-American Affairs Jack B. Kubisch. It is based upon published and unpublished official documents and upon published secondary works. It represents a substantial revision and updating of this office's Research Project No. 350, "United States Recognition of Latin American Governments: A Tabular Summary of United States Recognition Action on Changes and Attempted Changes of Government and of Chief Executives; Part 4, Peru, 1821–1952."

The research and drafting for the revised paper were done by Dr. Ronald D. Landa under the direction of Dr. Mary P. Chapman, Chief of the Area Studies Branch.

EDWIN S. COSTRELL  
Chief, Historical Studies Division  
Historical Office  
Bureau of Public Affairs

Research Project No. 1066A (Revised)  
September 1974

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NOTE: The paragraphs on the left describe developments in Peru; the indented paragraphs describe U.S. responses to those developments.

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Developments

U.S. Response

U.S. RECOGNITION OF THE INDEPENDENCE OF PERU  
AND ESTABLISHMENT OF DIPLOMATIC RELATIONS, 1822-27

JULY 28, 1821. The independence of Peru was proclaimed by José de San Martín.

JAN. 30, 1822. The House of Representatives asked President James Monroe to furnish it with the correspondence with Spanish-American governments, as well as with information regarding the "political condition" of the new American nations.

MAR. 8. President Monroe complied with the House request by providing the desired correspondence and by pointing out in a special message to Congress that Peru and four other Spanish-American nations—Buenos Aires, Colombia, Chile, and Mexico—were in the "full enjoyment" of their independence and that the new governments had "a claim to recognition by other Powers, which ought not to be resisted."

MAR. 28. The House of Representatives passed two resolutions, one indicating concurrence with the President that the American provinces of Spain which had declared and were enjoying their independence "ought to be recognized by the United States as independent nations," and the other asking the Committee on Ways and Means to report a bill appropriating a sum to enable the President "to give due effect to such recognition."

MAY 4. Congress passed, and President Monroe signed into law, a bill providing an appropriation of \$100,000 to defray the expenses of "such Missions to the independent nations on the American continent" as the President might deem proper.

JAN. 13, 1823. President Monroe nominated John M. Prevost as the first U.S. Chargé d'Affaires to Peru, but the nomination was soon withdrawn.

MAY 2, 1826. The Senate confirmed the nomination of, and the President commissioned, James Cooley as Chargé d'Affaires to Peru. By this action the United States completed the formal recognition of the independence of Peru.

MAY 21, 1827. Cooley presented his credentials to the Peruvian Government in Lima, thus establishing diplomatic relations with Peru.

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U.S. NON-RECOGNITION OF THE BERMUDEZ REGIME, 1834

JAN. 4, 1834. With the assistance of former President Agustín Gamarra, Pedro Bermúdez deposed President Luis José Orbegoso through a military coup and named himself "Supreme Provisional Chief."

JAN. 11. The U.S. Chargé, Samuel Larned, informed Washington that he was "compelled to consider the administration of the general government in Peru as in abeyance" until the Bermúdez government took control of most of the other Departments (provinces) of the country. The "established practice of our government is to acknowledge governments *de facto* whenever they shall have succeeded in establishing themselves in the country," said Larned.

JAN. 28. After a popular uprising forced Bermúdez and his supporters to abandon Lima, Orbegoso reclaimed the office of President.

FEB. 13. Larned referred to the Bermúdez-Gamarra insurrection as the "late scandalous military movement" and expressed his belief that its purpose was to establish a monarchical government in Peru.

JUNE 25. Larned observed that "the civil war may now be considered at an end:—all the Departments, and the whole of the Army, having recognized the legitimacy of the Government" of President Orbegoso.

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#### U.S. NON-RECOGNITION OF THE SALAVERRY REGIME, 1835

FEB. 23, 1835. Felipe Santiago Salaverry, Inspector-General of the Army, led a revolt which again overturned the Orbegoso government. Two days later Salaverry named himself "Supreme Chief."

JUNE 23. Larned reported to the Department of State that he, as well as most of the Diplomatic Corps, was continuing to withhold recognition of the Salaverry regime as the *de facto* government, and that he had been addressing its representatives only as local authorities, "without once making use of a style of address, or phrase, that could be construed to imply a recognition, in them or their 'Supreme Chief', of a *national* government or administration . . ."

JUNE 24. Orbegoso signed a treaty with Bolivian President Andrés Santa Cruz, who agreed to enter Peru with his armies in order to help defeat Salaverry, who had allied himself with Gamarra.

JULY 10. Santa Cruz issued a declaration in which he outlined his plans for a Peru-Bolivian Confederation.

AUG. 13. Santa Cruz defeated Gamarra's forces in a battle near the lake of Yanacocha. Gamarra fled but was subsequently captured and, on October 19, 1835, was banished to Costa Rica.

Nov. 13. As the fighting continued between the forces of Salaverry and the combined armies of Orbegoso and Santa Cruz, Larned reaffirmed his support of Orbegoso: ". . . as the Council of State has been dissolved, and the Congress has not been allowed to assemble at its legal period,—President Orbegozo [sic] is the only member or representative of the constitutional government now in existence:—and he has all the forms and presumption of right and popular will on his side; whilst his adversary has neither the one nor the other; having nothing to support his authority but the armed force [sic]."

FEB. 7, 1836. Salaverry's troops were defeated near Arequipa. Salaverry was later taken prisoner and executed.

FEB. 13. Larned reported that all of Peru was again under Orbegoso's "undisputed sway," which he called "a splendid and cheering example afforded of the triumph of law, order and principles, over ambition, usurpation, and licentious despotism."

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U.S. RELATIONS WITH THE PERU-BOLIVIAN CONFEDERATION, 1836-39

OCT. 28, 1836. A decree was issued formally establishing the Peru-Bolivian Confederation, a union of North and South Peru and Bolivia. The Confederation had been taking shape for over a year. It was headed by Santa Cruz under the title of "Supreme Protector."

DEC. 20. Having learned of the plans for a Peru-Bolivian Confederation, Secretary of State John Forsyth told James B. Thornton, the new Chargé to Peru, who had also been accredited to the Bolivian Government to negotiate a commercial treaty, that when he arrived in Lima, "the government that may have been constituted to manage the joint affairs of Peru and Bolivia" hopefully "would not permit a matter of mere form to be an obstacle to your reception or to the transaction of business with you."

DEC. 28. Chile, supported by Gamarra and other Peruvian opponents of Orbegoso, declared war on the Confederation.

FEB. 16, 1837. Thornton, who had arrived in Lima on Feb. 9 just after Santa Cruz had left the city, submitted his letter of credence by mail to the Santa Cruz government. As there was no personal presentation of credentials, this action presumably consummated U.S. recognition of the Peru-Bolivian Confederation, which formally recognized Thornton as Chargé by a decree of Mar. 16.

AUG. 6. Chilean forces and Peruvians under Gamarra landed at Ancón and later in the month captured Lima.

JUNE 9, 1838. J. C. Pickett was commissioned as U.S. Chargé to the Peru-Bolivian Confederation, the first to be so accredited.

SEPT. 20. As two rival governments emerged to challenge the Confederation Government in North Peru, Acting Chargé Edwin Bartlett, who was in correspondence with all three, said that he had carefully avoided "anything like a committal of the United States in a recognition of either of the New Governments."

JAN. 20, 1839. The armies of the Confederation were defeated at the Battle of Yungay.

FEB. 20. The Peru-Bolivian Confederation was officially dissolved and Santa Cruz abdicated.

MAR. 7. According to a despatch from Bartlett, all the military authorities in Peru had acknowledged the authority of Gamarra as Provisional President when his forces captured Callao.

JUNE 13. Acting Secretary of State Aaron Vail rejected a proposal by recently appointed Chargé Pickett to send him new credentials to replace those addressed to the Peru-Bolivian Confederation and to accredit him to the Gamarra government.

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#### U.S. RELATIONS WITH THE GAMARRA GOVERNMENT, 1839-40

AUG. 15, 1839. Having put down the last traces of resistance, Gamarra was confirmed by Congress as Provisional President.

AUG. 23. The Gamarra government informally advised Pickett that his credentials, which were addressed to the Confederation, would not be accepted if presented.

OCT. 19. The Peruvian Minister of Foreign Affairs officially told Pickett that "the restored Republic of Peru, after having driven the conqueror from her territory, does not find herself in a situation to receive agents accredited to him, because the relations of the usurping Government were very different from those of the Republic."

OCT. 28. Pickett informed Washington that the Peruvian refusal to receive him was "rather unexpected," but that it was due to Gamarra's wish to avoid "any act that can be construed into an admission, that the Peru-Bolivian Confederation ever had a legal existence."

JAN. 30, 1840. Pickett was formally received by the Gamarra government, an action which he later called "as unaccountable as it was unexpected." He pointed out, however, that he was "required to produce new credentials, within a reasonable time, to be addressed to the Government of Peru." He added that he probably would hear nothing more of it, but should the new credentials be forwarded, "it may not be necessary to present them . . ." Apparently the new credentials were never sent.

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#### U.S. RECOGNITION OF ELIAS' ASSUMPTION OF POWER, 1844

JUNE 17, 1844. After two years of civil war and several changes of government, the prefect of Lima, Domingo Elías, renounced allegiance to President Manuel Ignacio Vivanco and invested himself as the supreme authority.

JUNE 20. At a conference of the Diplomatic Corps, Pickett signed a protocol which said that, because of a multiplicity of *de facto* governments, none of which exercised complete sovereignty, it was necessary to recognize each.

OCT. 30. In setting down guidelines for John A. Bryan, who had just been commissioned Chargé, Acting Secretary of State Richard K. Crallé said that "whoever may be in actual possession and exercise of the supreme power, whether by consent of the governed or by force, must be regarded as the *de facto* government of the country . . ." Whether rightfully or not, Elías was "in the actual possession and exercise of the supreme power at Lima, the seat of Government: and it appears that not only the civil and military authorities of the capital and other places had quietly submitted to his government, but there has been no actual resistance on the part of the people at large. He must, therefore, under such circumstances, be regarded as representing the Supreme Directory of the Republic . . ."

DEC. 23. Pickett reported that his signing the protocol recognizing various factions was an error, since it had been construed by the Diplomatic Corps as a U.S. commitment to join the other powers in protecting foreign commerce.

#### U.S. RECOGNITION OF THE CASTILLA GOVERNMENT, 1855

MAY-JUNE 1854. Political disintegration occurred as rival centers of power were established in four different cities.

JUNE 10. One of the contenders for power, Ramón Castilla, issued a circular proclaiming himself President.

JUNE 10. The Diplomatic Corps in Lima, including U.S. Minister John R. Clay, ignored Castilla's circular.

JAN. 5, 1855. Civil strife, which took on some characteristics of a popular upheaval against the army, was ended by Castilla's victory near Lima and his assumption of the position of Provisional President.

JAN. 8. Congratulations were offered to Castilla by Minister Clay, who remarked that the United States "have adopted the principle of recognizing the Government *de facto* in countries with which we are in amity."

#### U.S. DE FACTO RECOGNITION OF THE INSURRECTIONARY VIVANCO GOVERNMENT, 1858

OCT. 31, 1856. A revolt, whose leaders proclaimed General Manuel Ignacio Vivanco President and "Regenerator of the Republic," broke out at Arequipa.

DEC. 29. Vivanco's forces seized control of some guano islands off the coast of Peru and began selling guano there to anyone who wished it.

JAN. 24, 1858. A Peruvian Government steamer captured and confiscated the cargo of two U.S. vessels, the *Lizzie Thompson* and the *Georgiana*, for having loaded with guano at islands not open to foreign commerce and having done so under licenses from Vivanco's forces.



FEB. 8. Clay protested to the Peruvian Foreign Minister that the seizures were unlawful, since Vivanco's supporters had taken over the functions of government for more than a year in some of the guano islands. As belligerents in a civil war, declared Clay, Vivanco's party must be considered a *de facto* government.

MAR. 6. The civil war ended as President Castilla routed the insurgent forces at Arequipa and drove Vivanco into exile.

MAR. 18. The Peruvian Minister in Washington informed Secretary of State Lewis Cass that his government considered that Clay had behaved in an unfair and hostile way toward Peru and that his position on the case involving the two U.S. ships was imperiling the "friendly harmony" existing between the two nations.

MAY 28. Supported by the opinion of the U.S. Attorney General, Cass told the Peruvian Minister that the Vivanco forces had constituted a "*de facto* authority," whether or not recognized as a belligerent, and certainly had the authority to dispose of any national property even if contrary to the regulations of the national government.

Nov. 26. After several unsuccessful efforts to convince the Peruvian Government of the correctness of the U.S. position, Secretary Cass, in instructions to Clay, reaffirmed his belief that Peru had no right to capture a U.S. vessel whose master obeyed the authorities he found in a Peruvian port, "though they had been set up by a recent revolution." Clay was directed to inform the Peruvian Government that the United States expected reparation for the parties involved.

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U.S. SEVERANCE OF RELATIONS, 1860-62,  
OVER THE LIZZIE THOMPSON AND GEORGIANA AFFAIR

DEC. 2, 1858. The Peruvian Minister in Washington informed Cass that Peru was ready to submit the *Lizzie Thompson* and *Georgiana* controversy to the decision of any European nation chosen by President James Buchanan.

MAR. 2, 1859. Cass instructed Clay to reject the Peruvian suggestion of arbitration by a third power, since the majority of the owners of the vessels involved were opposed to the idea.

FEB. 27, 1860. Having already made several unsuccessful attempts to obtain indemnification from the Peruvian Government, Clay suggested to Cass that a U.S. embargo of two Peruvian frigates bound for the United States would "bring this Government to reason."

MAR. 12. After Cass had indicated on Feb. 23 that "further discussion with the Government of Peru upon the subject of the claims of our citizens is useless," Clay remarked that the time had come "when decisive action is required, to convince Peru and the other Republics of Spanish origin, that citizens of the United States are not to be dealt with at will, by military rulers . . . ."

JUNE 4. Delivering an ultimatum from the Department of State, Clay warned the Peruvian Foreign Minister that continued refusal to settle claims concerning the *Lizzie Thompson* and the *Georgiana* would be regarded as "incompatible with the continuance of cordial relations."

OCT. 19. Since the Peruvian Government remained intransigent on the issue, Clay suspended relations with Peru.

Nov. 26. At his own request, the Peruvian Minister in Washington was given his passport.

JUNE 8, 1861. Christopher Robinson received a recess commission as Minister to Peru, thus indicating the U.S. intention to resume relations with Peru. President Lincoln had decided that the differences between the two countries were "not as such to recommend a state of war."

JAN. 11, 1862. Relations were restored when Robinson was officially received in Lima.

JULY 9, 1864. Following an abortive attempt to have the King of Belgium arbitrate the dispute, Secretary of State William Seward informed the Peruvian Minister in Washington that the matter would not be pursued further.

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U.S. RELATIONS WITH THE DIEZ CANSECO AND PRADO GOVERNMENTS,  
1865-66

AUGUST 1865. After war had broken out the previous year between Spain and Peru, Mariano Ignacio Prado led a rebellion protesting the peace terms demanded by Spain and accepted by the government of President Juan Antonio Pérez. The rebels gained control of all Peru except Lima.

OCT. 10. Before his departure for Peru, Minister Alvin P. Hovey was instructed to recognize only Pérez's administration as the constitutional government, for "the United States are slow to recognize revolutionary governments."

Nov. 6. Pedro Díez Canseco became Provisional President upon the overthrow of Pérez's government.

Nov. 8. The Diplomatic Corps, meeting at the U.S. Legation, resolved unanimously to recognize Díez Canseco.

Nov. 9. Robinson, while awaiting Hovey's arrival, prematurely offered congratulations and "most friendly relations" to Díez Canseco.

Nov. 17. Upon his arrival, Hovey requested an audience for the presentation of his credentials to the new regime.

Nov. 26. Military leaders overthrew Díez Canseco and proclaimed Mariano Ignacio Prado as dictator. The decision was approved by a meeting of citizens in Lima.

Nov. 28. Hovey reported that he would not seek to present his credentials nor for the present recognize the new regime. He acknowledged that the Diplomatic Corps had been hasty in recognizing Díez Canseco.

DEC. 21. Relations were interrupted and the Prado government was still unrecognized when Robinson left Peru.

MAR. 8, 1866. Secretary of State Seward rejected a subsequent request by Hovey to recognize the Prado government. "The policy of the United States," said Seward "is settled upon the principle that revolutions in republican states ought not to be accepted until the people have adopted them by organic law, with the solemnities which would seem sufficient to guarantee their stability and permanency."

APR. 13. Hovey reported that "should the United States wait until Peru is governed by organic law, in fact as well as in name, . . . it will . . . be a far distant day before our country is represented at all in Peru."

APR. 21. Because of evidence of stability in Prado's government and concern over continuing hostilities between Spain and Peru, Hovey was instructed to recognize the Prado government.

MAY 22. Relations were resumed when Hovey presented his credentials to the Prado government.

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U.S. NON-RECOGNITION OF THE DIEZ CANSECO REGIME AND  
SUBSEQUENT RECOGNITION OF THE BALTA GOVERNMENT, 1868

JAN. 22, 1868. Pedro Díez Canseco arrived in Lima after defeating President Prado's armies and claimed the executive office on the basis of his former election as Vice President.

FEB. 14. Hovey indicated that Díez Canseco had been recognized as President *de facto* by all other diplomatic representatives, but that he had withheld U.S. recognition in accordance with the Department of State's instructions of Mar. 8, 1866.

APR. 1. José Balta was the apparent victor in a popular election for President, the results of which were to be sanctioned by Congress in July.

APR. 14. Hovey asked Washington that he be authorized, after Balta's confirmation as President, to establish relations with the Balta government immediately, because both he and the United States had been sharply criticized in Peru for withholding recognition from the Díez Canseco government.

MAY 7. In instructing Hovey to wait further for "legal evidence that the existing administration had been deliberately accepted by the people of Peru," Secretary of State Seward pointed out that the United States "must be entirely indifferent to political persons and parties in Peru, as in all South American republics, so long as all those persons and parties agree in maintaining a republican system as the only admissible form of government." Without this principle, he said, the constitutional vigor of the U.S. Government would be impaired, thus favoring "disorganization, disintegration, and anarchy throughout the American continent."

AUG. 2. Balta was inaugurated President after Congress had certified his election.

AUG. 5. The Ministry of Foreign Affairs delivered a note to the U.S. Legation announcing Balta's assumption of the Presidency and giving assurances that the rights of foreigners would be respected and that international agreements would be honored.

AUG. 10. In a note to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Hovey acknowledged receipt of its note of Aug. 5, thus extending formal recognition to the Balta government. Hovey believed that he was acting in accordance with the Department of State's instruction of May 7.

AUG. 17. Prior to receiving word of Hovey's recognition of the Balta government, Secretary of State Seward notified Hovey that, with Balta's election and confirmation by Congress, "no objection is now entertained to your holding full official intercourse with that government."

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#### U.S. RECOGNITION OF THE PARDO GOVERNMENT, 1872

OCT. 15, 1871. The Presidential election was accompanied by riots and the loss of lives, with each of five factions controlling its own voting tables and preventing a fair counting of the votes.

Nov. 17. The electoral colleges met but were unable to decide who had won the election. That decision was left to the Congress, which was to convene the following July.

JULY 15, 1872. Congress assembled and decided that Manuel Pardo had won the Presidential election. President Balta, who had supported another candidate in the electoral campaign, nevertheless accepted Congress' decision and prepared to transfer power to Pardo within a few weeks.

JULY 22. Angered by President Balta's inclination to yield the election to Pardo, Minister of War Tomás Gutiérrez took control of the army, dispersed Congress, made himself "Supreme Chief," and four days later had Balta assassinated.

JULY 25. U.S. Minister Francis Thomas replied to a note of July 23 from the Minister of Foreign Affairs announcing Gutiérrez's assumption of power by indicating that he would inform the U.S. Government of the developments in Peru and would await instructions. The Diplomatic Corps had agreed to recognize Gutiérrez only as a *de facto* ruler simply to secure protection for the lives and property of the citizens of their respective countries.

JULY 28. Gutiérrez was killed by a mob infuriated by his repressive measures. Balta's First Vice President, Mariano Heréncia Zevallos, assumed the Presidency until Pardo could be inaugurated.

AUG. 2. Pardo was inaugurated President.

SEPT. 26. Acting Secretary of State Charles Hale informed Thomas that "the indignation of the people of Peru at a cruel assassination and an attempted usurpation and overthrow of a representative government commands admiration, and their calm return to order gives promise of a stable condition of public affairs."

NOV. 23. Thomas formally extended recognition to the Pardo government by presenting to Pardo a letter from President Ulysses S. Grant congratulating him on his inauguration.

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#### U.S. RECOGNITION OF THE PIEROLA GOVERNMENT, 1880

DEC. 18, 1879. Faced with serious military setbacks eight months after Peru had joined Bolivia in a war against Chile (the War of the Pacific), President Mariano Prado left the country, reportedly to seek help in Europe. Although the First Vice President legally assumed the Presidency, the Minister of War, Manuel de La Coterá, became the real head of the government.

DEC. 24. After supporters of Gen. Nicolás Piérola had staged a mutiny in the army, La Coterá yielded the government to Piérola.

JAN. 1, 1880. Minister Isaac P. Christiancy joined the other members of the Diplomatic Corps in paying respects to Piérola, with the understanding that recognition was not thereby extended.

JAN. 31. Secretary of State William Evarts formally announced that the United States would recognize the Piérola regime, since it was understood that Peru was "driven to the acceptance of a new government on a provisional basis by the external pressure of their affairs and that the accession of General Piérola to power was not accomplished by civil strife or factious insurrection."

FEB. 5. In a note to the Minister of Foreign Affairs, Christiancy extended recognition on the basis that the Piérola government had the "cordial concurrence of the people."

## U.S. RECOGNITION OF THE CALDERON GOVERNMENT, 1881

JAN. 17, 1881. As the War of the Pacific continued, an invading Chilean army captured Lima. President Piérola left the city in an attempt to rally the interior of the country against the Chileans.

MAR. 12. Encouraged by the Chilean occupation authorities, who refused to recognize the Piérola government, Francisco García Calderón, who had been chosen Provisional President by an assembly of leading citizens in Lima and Callao, established a new government in the hamlet of Magdalena outside Lima.

MAR. 16. Christiancy told Secretary of State James G. Blaine, that he could not recognize the Calderón government "until it shall appear to be a government of Peru, instead of Lima and Callao." Without instructions from Washington, he emphasized, he could not extend recognition, even if Calderón held half the country, until he was satisfied that the majority of the people approved of the Calderón government and until it showed evidence it could sustain itself as the Government of Peru.

MAY 9. Blaine told Christiancy that if the Calderón government was supported by "the character and intelligence of Peru" and if it was "really endeavoring to restore constitutional government with a view both to order within and negotiation with Chile for peace," he was authorized to extend recognition. In addition, Blaine noted that he had already received in Washington a confidential agent of the Calderón government.

JUNE 16. Christiancy responded to Blaine's May 9 instruction by pointing out that the Calderón regime had the support of the wealthy sugar plantation owners and merchants and that it was attempting to restore order and reestablish constitutional government, but that it lacked a broad political base. It was not a government *de facto* in any part of Peru except in the hamlet of Magdalena.

JUNE 26. Rather reluctantly, Christiancy extended recognition to the Calderón government in a note to the Foreign Ministry. He later explained to Washington that he had done so, because *de facto* political control had not been made a condition of recognition and because Blaine had already received Calderón's agent in Washington. Moreover, Christiancy had heard a rumor, which turned out to be false, that his successor would not come to Peru until a peace settlement between Chile and Peru was reached. Therefore, he admitted, he did not want it to appear that he was delaying his successor's coming by withholding recognition.

JULY 6. Christiancy reported that he feared recognition may have been premature since some of Calderón's forces had begun to desert to Piérola's side.

JULY 11. Congress confirmed Calderón as President until a new President could be elected.

AUG.10. Stephen A. Hurlbut, who had replaced Christiancy as Minister to Peru earlier in the month, told the Department of State that he approved of Christiancy's recognition of the Calderón government. Even though it was not "a regular or constitutional government," he contended that it was "infinitely more so than that of Piérola, which was "a violent usurpation, autocratic and despotic." Hurlbut remarked, however, that Chile was not formally recognizing the Calderón government until it accepted Chile's terms for a peace settlement, something which Calderón had been reluctant to do.

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#### U.S. RECOGNITION OF THE MONTERO GOVERNMENT, 1881

SEPT. 26-28, 1881. The Chilean forces of occupation seized the Peruvian treasury, stopped payments, took over revenue collection, and decreed an end to President Calderón's authority.

SEPT. 29. In order to insure the constitutional succession, Congress quietly assembled in Lima and elected Adm. Lizardo Montero, then in command of the north of Peru beyond Chilean lines, as Vice President.

OCT. 4. Hurlbut gave Washington his view that "no act of Chile, whether from its civil or military authorities, can in any way operate upon the relations which the United States have maintained or may choose to maintain with any government in Peru, nor can any military order prevent my treating with Mr. Calderón as representing the sovereignty of Peru."

OCT. 31. Secretary of State Blaine instructed Hurlbut to continue to recognize the Calderón government.

Nov. 4. Calderón's Foreign Minister sent a circular note to the Diplomatic Corps in Lima announcing that Montero had declared his allegiance to Calderón.

Nov. 6. The Chilean forces in Lima arrested Calderón and his Foreign Minister and had them sent to Chile.

Nov. 9. Hurlbut informed the Department of State that Chile's obvious policy was to hold Peru under armed occupation until it could find or create a government with which to make peace on Chile's terms.

Nov. 15. Montero formally succeeded Calderón as President and established his government at Arequipa.

Nov. 30. Hurlbut answered a letter which had announced Montero's succession to the Presidency with a formal communication acknowledging Montero as "the lawful head" of the Government of Peru. However, Hurlbut did not transfer the Legation to Arequipa but remained in Lima, where he died on Mar. 27, 1882.

APR. 25, 1882. William H. Trescott, the special U.S. envoy to the three belligerent nations in the War of the Pacific empowered to help negotiate a peace settlement, visited President Montero in the interior of Peru and presented his credentials to Montero. He later explained to Washington that he had undertaken the journey because he believed that the presentation of his credentials "would strengthen what is unquestionably the real government of Peru, recognized and obeyed at present by all parties of the Peruvian people."

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DELAYED U.S. RECOGNITION OF THE IGLESIAS GOVERNMENT, JANUARY 1883–APRIL 1884

JAN. 2, 1883. Miguel Iglesias was chosen President of Peru by an assembly handpicked by Chile to serve as an instrument for making peace between the two countries.

OCT. 3. After months of uncertainty over the degree of support Iglesias had among the people, the new U.S. Minister, Seth L. Phelps, told a Chilean representative that recognition would be extended to the Iglesias government when there was proof the country accepted him. In the meantime, Phelps withheld the presentation of his credentials.

OCT. 20. Iglesias signed a peace treaty negotiated with Chile at Ancón, whereupon Chile recognized the Iglesias government.

Nov. 15. Secretary of State Frederick Frelinghuysen instructed Phelps to recognize the Iglesias government if the new Constitutional Assembly, which was to be elected the following January, represented Peru and favored Iglesias.

MAR. 1, 1884. The Constitutional Assembly elected in January named Iglesias Provisional President.

MAR. 19. In response to an inquiry from the Department of State, Phelps said that he now rejected recognition because the Iglesias government was supported by Chilean troops, had organized the assembly by fraud, and had proposed to govern without constitutional restraint.

MAR. 28. The Treaty of Ancón was ratified by the Peruvian Constitutional Assembly.

APR. 2. The Constitutional Assembly conferred dictatorial powers on Iglesias.

APR. 9. Informed that the Minister of Foreign Affairs in the Iglesias government, in an interview with the Diplomatic Corps, had demanded of them immediate recognition and when they had refused had suspended relations with the various legations, Secretary of State Frelinghuysen noted that the question of recognition was addressed to the "independent judgment and discretion" of the United States, uninfluenced by "anything in the nature of a menace."



APR. 18. Frelinghuysen authorized Phelps to present his credentials to President Iglesias if the Minister of Foreign Affairs would retract his statement to the Diplomatic Corps.

APR. 23. The Minister of Foreign Affairs told Phelps that his government desired to renew diplomatic relations "precisely as if nothing had occurred to interrupt them."

APR. 24. Phelps presented his credentials to President Iglesias, thus recognizing the Iglesias government.

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#### U.S. RECOGNITION OF THE CACERES GOVERNMENT, 1886

DEC. 2, 1885. Following several months of rebellion by forces of Andrés Avelino Cáceres against the government of President Iglesias, both men, through the good offices of the Diplomatic Corps, agreed that the government should be turned over to a Council of Ministers until popular elections for President could be held.

DEC. 16. In instructing Minister Charles W. Buck to withhold recognition, Secretary of State Thomas Bayard pointed out that the United States, "holding steadfastly to the principles of constitutional self-government, can not assume to forejudge the popular will of Peru by ratifying and confirming an experimental and provisional order of things they may have indirectly helped to create." While he was authorized to maintain relations with whatever government happened to be in power, Buck was also told that it was "for the President to determine when and how formal recognition of the new government of Peru by the United States shall be effected."

MAR. 14-21, 1886. National elections were held which resulted in the election of Cáceres as President.

APR. 28. President Grover Cleveland received the Peruvian Minister, who presented his letter of recall. The United States interpreted this action as having the effect of recognizing the Provisional Government under the Council of Ministers, with the understanding that it was soon to be succeeded by a President and Congress already elected by the people. Buck was authorized to announce "this friendly action" in Peru on the same day.

JUNE 3. Cáceres was inaugurated President.

JUNE 5. In acknowledging a note from the Foreign Minister the previous day, which had announced Cáceres' assumption of the Presidency, Buck called attention to President Cleveland's remarks to the former Peruvian Minister in Washington on Apr. 28 as a sign of the "sympathetic disposition" of the United States to Peru. By this acknowledgment the United States recognized the Cáceres government.

## U.S. RECOGNITION OF THE BORGONO AND CACERES GOVERNMENTS, 1894

APR. 1, 1894. After the death of President Remigo Morales Bermúdez, former President Cáceres led a faction which opposed the succession of First Vice President Pedro Alejandrino del Solar. In support of Cáceres police and military officers took orders from the Second Vice President, Justiniano Borgoño, who assumed the Presidency.

APR. 3. Minister James McKenzie withheld recognition and referred the matter to Washington.

MAY 26. The Department of State transmitted to the Legation at Lima President Grover Cleveland's acknowledgment of Borgoño's assumption of office.

JUNE 18. McKenzie personally delivered President Cleveland's letter to Borgoño, thus formally recognizing his government.

AUG. 10. Cáceres was inaugurated President after his election on June 3.

AUG. 14. McKenzie extended recognition to the Cáceres government by acknowledging receipt of the Foreign Ministry's note of Aug. 11 which announced the change in government and by reciprocating the new government's wish to continue friendly relations.

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U.S. RECOGNITION OF THE PIEROLA GOVERNMENT, 1895

MAR. 20, 1895. Following a revolt led by former President Piérola, President Cáceres turned over executive power to a Provisional Council, which was to call for a Presidential election in the near future.

MAR. 22. U.S. Minister McKenzie, who had joined the Diplomatic Corps in encouraging the transfer of power, extended recognition to the Provisional Council through a note addressed to the new government's Foreign Minister.

SEPT. 8. After his popular election in June and subsequent confirmation by the electoral college, Piérola was inaugurated President.

SEPT. 9. Chargé Richard R. Neill extended recognition to the Piérola government by acknowledging receipt of a note from the Foreign Minister on the same day announcing Piérola's assumption of the Presidency and by expressing the wish of the United States to continue friendly relations with the new government.

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U.S. RECOGNITION OF THE BENAVIDES GOVERNMENT, 1914

FEB. 4, 1914. A junta assumed power after rebel forces had stormed the palace of President Guillermo Billinghurst, taking him prisoner and forcing his resignation. Col. Oscar Benavides was named President of the junta.

FEB. 8. Minister Benton McMillin reported that there was no evidence of organized opposition to the new government and that none seemed probable. He requested instructions concerning recognition and gave his own view that ultimate recognition was inevitable.

FEB. 12. Secretary of State William Jennings Bryan advised McMillin that recognition should be extended to the junta as a provisional government, pending the establishment of a permanent executive, on the basis of the "uncontested exercise of executive power" by the junta and its acceptance by the people.

MAY 15. Oscar Benavides was elected Provisional President by Congress and immediately sworn in.

MAY 27. Under instructions, McMillin called on the Foreign Minister and informed him that the United States recognized the Benavides government.

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U.S. DE FACTO AND DE JURE RECOGNITION OF THE LEGUIA GOVERNMENT, 1919-20

JULY 5, 1919. President-elect Augusto Leguía assumed the office of Provisional President after the forcible deposition of President José Pardo, who allegedly was planning to annul Leguía's election in May.

JULY 7. Minister McMillin was instructed to "quietly avoid for the present any action" which would lead the new regime to believe it had been recognized.

AUG. 9. In answer to an inquiry from the Department of State, McMillin indicated that Leguía's support was strong enough, especially in the army, to enable him "to overcome any and all opposition that may arise against his rule for the present and near future."

AUG. 26. In elections for a new Congress, Leguía's party won an overwhelming victory.

AUG. 30. Under instructions, McMillin recognized the Leguía regime as the *de facto* government.

OCT. 12. Leguía was inaugurated President.

FEB. 6, 1920. Secretary of State Robert Lansing urged recognition of Leguía's government as *de jure* because of its absolute control, the new liberal constitution which had just been promulgated, its safeguarding of foreigners' rights to real and subsoil property, its efforts to place loans in the United States, and its recognition by other powers. President Woodrow Wilson deferred action on the recommendation.

APR. 24. *De jure* recognition was extended when the newly appointed Ambassador, William E. Gonzales, presented to President Leguía his credentials as well as a congratulatory letter from President Wilson on Leguía's assumption of the Presidency.

U.S. RECOGNITION OF THE SANCHEZ CERRO GOVERNMENT, 1930

AUG. 25, 1930. President Leguía resigned under threat of a military revolt.

AUG. 27. A junta headed by Col. Luis M. Sánchez Cerro assumed power.

AUG. 29. Authorizing the Embassy in Lima to convey his feelings to Sánchez Cerro, Secretary of State Henry Stimson expressed the hope that the new government would not revert to the days of "personal revenge" and implied that the new government's ability to protect the deposed members of the last government would be a factor in considering recognition.

SEPT. 13. Ambassador Fred Dearing recommended recognition of the junta because the people accepted it, it controlled all of Peru, it promised to live up to its obligations and restore constitutional government, and it was treating Leguía well.

SEPT. 18. Under instructions, Dearing informed the Foreign Minister that he was entering into full diplomatic relations with the junta, thus according it recognition.

---

U.S. CONTINUANCE OF RELATIONS WITH THE SAMANEZ OCAMPO GOVERNMENT, 1931

MAR. 1, 1931. Faced with increasing discontent among the armed forces and the civilian population, President Sánchez Cerro and the entire junta handed their resignations to an assembly of representative citizens, which then gave executive power to a Triumvirate headed by Ricardo Leonicia Elías.

MAR. 5. The Triumvirate headed by Elías was overthrown in a coup planned and executed by army officers led by Gustavo A. Jiménez.

MAR. 6. Ambassador Dearing rejected a request by Sánchez Cerro that Dearing and other members of the Diplomatic Corps help create a demand for his return to the country in about three months' time so that he could run for the Presidency.

MAR. 11. A new junta was installed, with David Samánez Ocampo as its head.

MAR. 12. The Foreign Ministry sent a note to the U.S. Embassy, informing it of the change of government and giving assurances that the new government would strictly comply with Peru's international obligations.

MAR. 13. Dearing reported that in view of signs of disaffection in the south of Peru, he was deferring any recommendations concerning recognition of the new government.

MAR. 18. Dearing was authorized to attend a reception being given that evening by the Foreign Minister for the Diplomatic Corps, but was instructed to make it clear that he was not attending in his "representative capacity."

APR. 10. The Department of State informed Dearing that it did not favor his suggestion that the United States support a joint mediation in Peru by several nations or by the League of Nations, a suggestion based on Dearing's belief that renewed civil strife may have been Communist-inspired.

MAY 8. Noting that only Spain and Norway had so far extended recognition, Secretary Stimson requested further information from Dearing on the government's stability and popular support.

MAY 15. Dearing reported that the government had the support of the military and the police and the acquiescence of the people in general. He recommended that the United States adopt the position of most of the other Latin American nations; namely, to continue relations with the new government without taking any special recognition action. He argued that such action would tend "to stabilize conditions in Peru and by regularizing our intercourse will greatly facilitate our current business."

MAY 20. Acting on instructions received the previous day, Dearing addressed a note to the Foreign Ministry acknowledging its note of Mar. 12 and stating that the recent change in government made no difference in the diplomatic relations between the two countries.

---

#### U.S. RECOGNITION OF THE SANCHEZ CERRO GOVERNMENT, 1931

JULY 2, 1931. Sánchez Cerro returned to Lima from abroad. Prior to his arrival, clashes occurred at Lima and Callao between his supporters and police, resulting in many injuries and several deaths.

OCT. 11. In a bitterly contested election for President, Sánchez Cerro defeated Víctor Raúl Haya de la Torre, the candidate of the *Alianza Popular Revolucionaria Americana* (APRA).

DEC. 8. Following certification of his election by the National Electoral Board despite claims by impartial observers that Haya de la Torre had won, Sánchez Cerro was inaugurated President.

DEC. 11. At a reception for members of the Diplomatic Corps, Dearing, in accordance with the Department of State's instruction of Dec. 2, conveyed to Sánchez Cerro the congratulations of President Herbert Hoover and his best wishes for the success of Sánchez Cerro's administration.

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#### U.S. CONTINUANCE OF RELATIONS WITH THE BENAVIDES GOVERNMENT, 1933

JULY 7, 1932. After President Sánchez Cerro had instituted a campaign to crush opposition parties and had Haya de la Torre arrested, an uprising broke out in Trujillo which resulted in widespread casualties.

APR. 7, 1933. Because of a variety of repressive acts by Sánchez Cerro, Ambassador Dearing told Washington that the basis for U.S. recognition of his government had been invalidated. Dearing proposed new courses of action toward Sánchez Cerro, including withdrawal of recognition, severance of diplomatic relations, and publicity of Sánchez Cerro's misdeeds.

APR. 30. Sánchez Cerro was assassinated. The government was turned over to a Council of Ministers which asked Congress, under the provisions of the Constitution, to elect a new President. That same day Congress chose Oscar Benavides to serve the remainder of Sánchez Cerro's term.

APR. 30. The United States continued diplomatic relations with the Benavides government, although there is no apparent record of the decision to do so or of the manner in which this was communicated to the Benavides government.

JULY 11. While noting that the situation had "changed materially" since Apr. 7 when Dearing had made his recommendations regarding U.S. policy toward Sánchez Cerro, the Department of State informed Dearing that it had disapproved those recommendations.

---

#### U.S. CONTINUANCE OF RELATIONS WITH THE ODRÍA GOVERNMENT, 1948

OCT. 30, 1948. In a bloodless coup d'état Gen. Manuel Odría forced the resignation of President José Luis Bustamante y Rivero and established himself at the head of a military junta.

OCT. 31. The Foreign Ministry informed the U.S. Embassy of the change in government and promised that the new government would respect Peru's international obligations.

OCT. 31. Ambassador Harold H. Tittmann, Jr., told the Department of State that unless he was instructed otherwise, he would contact Odría and his Foreign Minister within the next two days, basing his action on Resolution 35 of the Bogotá Conference held earlier in the year. This resolution said that continuity of diplomatic relations among the American states was desirable, that action with regard to diplomatic relations should not be used as a political weapon, and that establishment of diplomatic relations with a government did not imply any judgment on its domestic policy.

NOV. 12. The Department of State informed the U.S. representatives in the American Republics that in view of the "revolutionary and military character" of the Odría government, it was consulting with Organization of American States representatives in Washington before resuming relations. It also observed that it was not acting contrary to the Bogotá Conference Resolution 35, which had set no time limit concerning the resumption of relations.

Nov. 21. Acting on instructions received the previous day, Tittmann delivered a note to the Foreign Ministry, acknowledging receipt of its note of Oct. 31 and stating the desire of the U.S. Government to continue friendly relations with the Odría government.

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SUSPENSION OF RELATIONS WITH AND DELAYED U.S. RECOGNITION  
OF THE PEREZ GODOY GOVERNMENT, 1962

JUNE 10, 1962. In the Presidential election, although Haya de la Torre had more votes than either of his two opponents, none of the candidates received the necessary one-third plurality required for election. By law the President would be chosen by Congress when it convened on July 28.

JULY 13. The Joint Armed Forces Command, fearful of a deal that would give former President Odría the Presidency and Haya de la Torre control of the Cabinet, demanded that President Manuel Prado annul the entire election as fraudulent and that an interim government be established to serve after the end of Prado's term until new elections could be held.

JULY 18. An army combat team drove a tank through the gates of the Presidential Palace and arrested President Prado. Gen. Ricardo Pérez Godoy proclaimed himself President. Constitutional guarantees were suspended, Congress was dissolved, and the election results were annulled, with the promise that free elections would be held in June 1963.

JULY 18. The Foreign Ministry addressed a note to the U.S. Embassy announcing the change in government and giving assurances that the new government would honor its international obligations.

JULY 18. A statement issued by the Department of State said, "We must deplore this military coup d'etat which has overthrown the constitutional Government of Peru. . . . our diplomatic relations with Peru have been suspended." The Department of State announced the following day the suspension of the various assistance programs to Peru, "with certain relatively minor exceptions where important humanitarian factors are involved."

JULY 23. When asked at a press conference about the apparent inconsistency in withholding aid from a military dictatorship in Peru while at the same time asking Congress for discretionary power to continue most-favored-nation status for Communist dictatorships in Poland and Yugoslavia, President John F. Kennedy replied: "We are anxious to see a return to constitutional forms in Peru, and therefore until we know what is going to happen in Peru, we are prudent in making our judgments as to what we shall do. We think it's in our national interest, and I think the aid we're giving in other areas is in our national interest, because we feel that this hemisphere can only be secure and free with democratic governments."

AUG. 1. At a press conference President Kennedy indicated that the United States had been encouraged by signs that Peru was returning to "constitutional free government, which is the object of the Alliance for Progress."

AUG. 17. The Department of State announced that the United States was resuming relations with the Peruvian government and extending recognition to the Pérez Godoy junta by having Chargé Douglas Henderson acknowledge receipt of the Foreign Ministry's note of July 18. It is also stated that economic assistance to Peru was being resumed. Military assistance, however, was withheld.

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#### U.S. SUSPENSION AND RESUMPTION OF RELATIONS WITH THE VELASCO GOVERNMENT, 1968

OCT. 3, 1968. A group of military officers, supported by a column of tanks, forcibly removed President Fernando Belaúnde Terry from office and put him on a plane to Buenos Aires. A junta of military service commanders issued a Revolutionary Manifesto and Statutes, dissolved the Congress, and proclaimed as President Juan Velasco Alvarado, Commanding General of the Army and Acting President of the Armed Forces Command.

OCT. 4. It was announced at a Department of State press briefing that "the overthrow of the Peruvian Government by the military forces has the effect of suspending normal diplomatic relations between Peru and the United States." Aid programs to Peru were also suspended.

OCT. 9. The new government officially seized the major holdings of the International Petroleum Company.

OCT. 25. At a Department of State press briefing, a spokesman said that "the American Embassy in Lima advised the Peruvian Ministry of Foreign Affairs at noon today that the United States Government has resumed diplomatic relations with the Government of Peru." The decision was made, he said, after consultations with other Organization of American States members in accordance with Resolution 26 of the 1965 Rio de Janeiro Conference and after the new government had stated its intention to honor Peru's international obligations and to return to constitutional government. He also said that the seizure of the International Petroleum Company's holdings had not been a factor in the decision to resume relations. Aid programs for Peru remained "under review." (Most aid programs were soon resumed.)

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## TREATY INFORMATION

### Current Actions

#### MULTILATERAL

##### Atomic Energy

Memorandum of understanding in the field of nuclear science and technical information, with minutes of signature. Done at Brussels September 19, 1974. Entered into force September 19, 1974.

*Signatures:* Belgium, European Atomic Energy Community, Federal Republic of Germany,<sup>1,2</sup> Ireland, Italy, Luxembourg, Netherlands, and the United States, September 19, 1974.

##### Coffee

Protocol for the continuation in force of the international coffee agreement 1968, as amended and extended, with annex. Approved by the International Coffee Council at London September 26, 1974. Open for signature November 1, 1974, through March 31, 1975. Enters into force definitively October 1, 1975, if governments which have signed not subject to approval, ratification, or acceptance or which have deposited instruments of approval, ratification, or acceptance represent at least 20 exporting members holding a majority of the votes of exporting members and at least 10 importing members holding a majority of the votes of importing members or, provisionally, October 1, 1975, if above number of governments deposit notifications undertaking to apply protocol provisionally and to seek approval, ratification, or acceptance.

##### Cultural Property

Convention on the means of prohibiting and preventing the illicit import, export and transfer of ownership of cultural property. Adopted at Paris November 14, 1970. Entered into force April 24, 1972.<sup>3</sup>

*Ratification deposited:* Jordan, March 15, 1974.

##### Disputes

Convention on the settlement of investment disputes between states and nationals of other states. Done at Washington March 18, 1965. Entered into force October 14, 1966. TIAS 6090.

*Signature:* The Gambia, October 1, 1974.

##### International Court of Justice

Statute of the International Court of Justice (59 Stat. 1055).

*Declaration recognizing compulsory jurisdiction deposited:* India, September 18, 1974.<sup>4</sup>

##### Maritime Matters

Amendment of article VII of the convention on facilitation of international maritime traffic, 1965

(TIAS 6251). Adopted at London November 19, 1973.<sup>5</sup>

*Acceptance deposited:* Denmark, March 28, 1974; United Kingdom, October 7, 1974.

##### Oil Pollution

Amendments to the international convention for the prevention of pollution of the sea by oil, 1954, as amended (TIAS 4900, 6109). Adopted at London October 15, 1971.<sup>6</sup>

*Acceptance deposited:* United Kingdom, October 14, 1974.

##### Patents

Strasbourg agreement concerning the international patent classification. Done at Strasbourg March 24, 1971.<sup>7</sup>

*Ratification deposited:* Brazil, October 3, 1974.

##### Postal Matters

Constitution of the Universal Postal Union with final protocol signed at Vienna July 10, 1964 (TIAS 5881), as amended by additional protocol, general regulations with final protocol and annex, and the universal postal convention with final protocol and detailed regulations. Signed at Tokyo November 14, 1969. Entered into force July 1, 1971, except for article V of the additional protocol, which entered into force January 1, 1971. TIAS 7150.

*Accession deposited:* The Gambia, July 2, 1974.

Additional protocol to the constitution of the Universal Postal Union with final protocol signed at Vienna July 10, 1964 (TIAS 5881), general regulations with final protocol and annex, and the universal postal convention with final protocol and detailed regulations. Signed at Tokyo November 14, 1969. Entered into force July 1, 1971, except for article V of the additional protocol, which entered into force January 1, 1971. TIAS 7150.

*Ratifications deposited:* Malagasy Republic, January 9, 1973; Malaysia, May 17, 1974.

Money orders and postal travellers' cheques agreement, with detailed regulations and forms. Signed at Tokyo November 14, 1969. Entered into force July 1, 1971; for the United States December 31, 1971. TIAS 7236.

*Approval deposited:* Malagasy Republic, January 9, 1973.

##### Property—Industrial

Convention of Paris for the protection of industrial property of March 20, 1883, as revised. Done at Stockholm July 14, 1967. Articles 1 through 12 entered into force May 19, 1970; for the United States August 25, 1973. Articles 13 through 30 entered into force April 26, 1970; for the United States September 5, 1970. TIAS 6923, 7727.

*Notification from World Intellectual Property Organization that ratification deposited:* Netherlands (applicable to Surinam and Netherlands Antilles), October 10, 1974.

<sup>1</sup> With reservation.

<sup>2</sup> Applicable to Land Berlin.

<sup>3</sup> Not in force for the United States.

<sup>4</sup> With conditions.

<sup>5</sup> Not in force.

## Property—Intellectual

Convention establishing the World Intellectual Property Organization. Done at Stockholm July 14, 1967. Entered into force April 26, 1970; for the United States August 25, 1970. TIAS 6932.

*Ratification deposited:* Netherlands (applicable to Surinam and Netherlands Antilles), October 9, 1974.

*Notifications of intention to apply transitional provisions:* Cyprus, Indonesia, September 20, 1974.

## Space

Convention on international liability for damage caused by space objects. Done at Washington, London, and Moscow March 29, 1972. Entered into force September 1, 1972; for the United States October 9, 1973. TIAS 7762.

*Ratification deposited:* New Zealand, October 30, 1974.<sup>9</sup>

## Terrorism—Protection of Diplomats

Convention on the prevention and punishment of crimes against internationally protected persons, including diplomatic agents. Done at New York December 14, 1973.<sup>5</sup>

*Signature:* Ecuador, August 27, 1974.<sup>1</sup>

## Treaties

Vienna convention on the law of treaties, with annex. Done at Vienna May 23, 1969.<sup>5</sup>

*Ratification deposited:* Mexico, September 25, 1974.

## BILATERAL

### Iceland

Agreement relating to the continuation of the defense agreement of May 5, 1951 (TIAS 2266), with memorandum of understanding and agreed minute. Effected by exchange of notes at Reykjavik October 22, 1974. Entered into force October 22, 1974.

### Japan

Arrangement concerning trade in cotton, wool, and manmade fiber textiles, with related letters. Effected by exchange of notes at Washington September 27, 1974. Entered into force September 27, 1974, effective October 1, 1974.

### Viet-Nam

Agreement amending the agreement of November 8 and December 14, 1972 (TIAS 7534), relating to the transfer of scrap to Viet-Nam as supplementary military assistance. Effected by exchange of notes at Saigon September 3 and October 14, 1974. Entered into force October 14, 1974.

<sup>1</sup> With reservation.

<sup>5</sup> Not in force.

<sup>9</sup> With declaration.

## PUBLICATIONS

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**International Coffee Agreement.** Amending and extending the agreement of March 18, 1968. TIAS 7809. 237 pp. \$1.90. (Cat. No. S9.10:7809).

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**Extradition.** Treaty with Paraguay. TIAS 7838. 26 pp. 35¢. (Cat. No. S9.10:7838).

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Release issued prior to October 28 which appears in this issue of the BULLETIN is 429 of October 18.

No.	Date	Subject
†445	10. 28	Kissinger: Indian Council on World Affairs, New Delhi.
*446	10. 29	Shipping Coordinating Committee Subcommittee on Maritime Law, Nov. 20.
*447	10. 29	Chinese art and archaeological exhibition to tour U.S., Dec. 13–June 8.
†448	10. 29	Kissinger, Chavan: toasts, New Delhi, Oct. 28.
†449	10. 30	U.S.-India joint communique.
*450	10. 30	U.S. delegation to the World Food Conference.
†451	10. 30	Kissinger: news conference, New Delhi.
*452	10. 30	Advisory Committee on International Book and Library Programs, Nov. 22.
*453	10. 31	Emmet J. Kay to receive Tribute of Appreciation (biographic data).
†454	10. 31	Kissinger: remarks on All-India Radio, Oct. 30.
†455	10. 31	Kissinger: remarks to press, Dacca, Oct. 30.
†456	10. 31	Kissinger, Hossain: exchange of toasts, Dacca, Oct. 30.
†457	10. 31	U.S.-Bangladesh joint communique.
†458	11. 1	Ingersoll: remarks at presentation of award to Emmet J. Kay.
†459	11. 1	Kissinger, Bhutto: exchange of toasts, Rawalpindi, Oct. 31.
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*461	11. 1	Kissinger: departure, Islamabad.
†462	11. 1	U.S.-Afghanistan joint statement.
†463	11. 2	U.S.-Iran joint communique.
†464	11. 2	Kissinger, Ansary: news conference, Tehran.

\* Not printed.

† Held for a later issue of the BULLETIN.

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# THE DEPARTMENT OF STATE BULLETIN

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November 25, 1974

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*The Department of State BULLETIN, a weekly publication issued by the Office of Media Services, Bureau of Public Affairs, provides the public and interested agencies of the government with information on developments in the field of U.S. foreign relations and on the work of the Department and the Foreign Service.*

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PRICE:

52 issues plus semiannual indexes,  
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Single copy 60 cents

Use of funds for printing this publication approved by the Director of the Office of Management and Budget (January 29, 1971).

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## Secretary Kissinger Visits the U.S.S.R., South Asia, Iran, Romania, Yugoslavia, and Italy

*Secretary Kissinger visited the U.S.S.R., India, Bangladesh, Pakistan, Afghanistan, Iran, Romania, Yugoslavia, Italy, Egypt, Saudi Arabia, Jordan, Syria, Israel, and Tunisia October 23–November 9. Following are remarks by Secretary Kissinger and foreign leaders and texts of joint statements and communiqués issued through his visit to Italy.*<sup>1</sup>

### THE VISIT TO THE U.S.S.R., OCTOBER 23–27

#### Remarks by Secretary Kissinger Upon Arrival, Moscow, October 23

Press release 435 dated October 23

I want to express my pleasure at being in Moscow again. We expect to have very full, very friendly, and very constructive talks as a continuation of the dialogue which has gone on for many years now and which we believe is of benefit to the people of our two countries and to all of the peoples of the world in the interests of peace.

Thank you.

Q. [*Inaudible*].

*Secretary Kissinger:* Ever since 1972 there have been regular consultations between the United States and the Soviet Union across the whole range of international issues, so we will review bilateral relations, international relations, in a friendly spirit and with

<sup>1</sup> Secretary Kissinger's address before the World Food Conference Nov. 5 and remarks made Nov. 5–9 and at Moscow Oct. 26 will appear in later issues of the BULLETIN.

the attitude of making a constructive contribution toward peace.

Q. *How would you evaluate the present state of Soviet-American relations?*

*Secretary Kissinger:* I think the present status of Soviet-American relations is good, and we are determined to improve it still further.

Q. *What kind of progress can be expected in the nearest future?*

*Secretary Kissinger:* Well, I'm here with the attitude of making progress in these talks. I'm also delighted that my wife is with me for the first time.

Q. *Thank you very much.*

#### Luncheon Hosted by Foreign Minister Gromyko, Moscow, October 24

Press release 436 dated October 24

#### *Toast by Foreign Minister Gromyko*

Mr. Secretary of State, Mrs. Kissinger, ladies and gentlemen: We express our satisfaction with the fact that the Secretary of State is once again on a visit to the Soviet Union and we have another opportunity to exchange views between the Secretary of State and our leaders on very important questions of international politics. You had your first conversation with Leonid Brezhnev, the General Secretary of the Communist Party. He was pleased, together with my other colleagues, with this talk, and this is what I would like to say. This conversation was a very useful one with a very important

content. While there are still very important questions remaining to be discussed, I can say quite confidently that both sides are encouraged in these frank discussions and that this is in accord with the practice that has come into being between members of the Soviet Union and the United States.

Already on the basis of this discussion, I am sure that you have been able to draw the conclusion that the Soviet leadership on the whole and Leonid Brezhnev, our Secretary, is in favor of continuing the line that was initiated between our two countries. Achievements of great importance have been registered in Soviet-American relations. They are well known, and I will not go over them again. But now the main task is to continue the line jointly taken in these relations and develop and encourage these relations. The Soviet Government is still firmly in favor of continuing that line.

Leonid Brezhnev during that conversation expressed his satisfaction with the statements made by President Ford, who is in favor of developing Soviet-American relations and who is in favor of continuing that line. This is fully in accord with our own line of policy.

It goes without saying that this has indeed been emphasized on both sides; that further success—and we would like to say further and big successes—require efforts, and vigorous efforts, on both sides. We are prepared to make those efforts. I believe that if both sides display the determination to continue and advance along this path, both the United States and the Soviet Union and both the American people and the Soviet people can look confidently and optimistically into the future. As I said, there are still many more important questions to be discussed, questions of great importance, and it is therefore too early to speak or even hint at the possible outcome of these meetings. But I would like to express the hope that our meetings with you on these matters which are of immense interest for the entire world will lead to positive results.

We regret that this visit is all too brief, and once again you will not be able to see

very much outside of Moscow. As I see it, you still have certain doubts as to the existence of Leningrad. But we hope that after Mrs. Kissinger's trip to Leningrad, she will succeed in confirming to you that Leningrad does exist.

I would like to raise our glasses in a toast to the positive outcome of these meetings, to the strength of cooperation of the Soviet Union and the United States, of the joint interest in détente and the strengthening of relations between the Soviet Union and the United States.

#### *Toast by Secretary Kissinger*

Mr. Foreign Minister, distinguished guests and friends, and Mrs. Gromyko: I have been asked as usual a very direct question by the Foreign Minister, which is to affirm the existence of Leningrad. All I can say is that we are in the preliminary stage of our negotiations. It is too early to draw a final conclusion, but we have talked in a constructive and positive manner and I think with good will on both sides we may achieve a reasonable conclusion. We cannot expect to make a unilateral concession—on so grave a question that must be on a mutual basis.

On behalf of Mrs. Kissinger and myself and my colleagues, let me thank you for the characteristically warm reception that we have received here in a country that based its views on the predominance of objective factors. Those of us who come from an earlier stage of ideological development can perhaps say a personal word: When we come to Moscow we no longer feel that we are among foreigners. We have been colleagues now through many difficult negotiations through many complicated periods in pursuit of a common objective. We are committed to improving relations between our two countries, to strengthen détente and thereby enhance peace for all the peoples of the world.

We speak with great frankness, and there are many occasions when we do not agree. But we are always animated by the desire to narrow our differences and to achieve our common purposes.

As we look back at the past two years,



there have been, of course, a few disappointments. But the main trend has been extremely positive. We have agreed on major principles, and we have achieved many specific agreements. We exchange ideas on all great problems with great frankness and generally with very positive results.

When I came to Washington, the Soviet Union was considered a permanent adversary. Today one can already say that the possibilities of war between our two countries have been reduced to negligible proportions and the tensions which were so characteristic of earlier periods have largely been stemmed. Now our objective is to give this condition a permanent and irreversible basis. Through all the ups and downs in our relations, through a change in administration, it has been a firm and continuing principle of American policy that the United States and Soviet Union have a very special responsibility for preserving the peace in the world and for contributing to the positive aspirations of mankind. This positive peace responsibility will be fostered with great energy by our administration. It is in this spirit that we conducted our first talks this morning with the General Secretary.

I fully agree with the evaluation of the Foreign Minister that the talks this morning were useful. It was a very good beginning. I agree with him further that with great efforts on both sides we can mark very considerable progress in the months ahead. I can pledge these efforts from the American side. We note the comments made by the Foreign Minister with respect to the Soviet side, so we realize the potentialities that are before us. This process of détente which we started and are now continuing will mark a historic change in people and a major advance toward a lasting peace. It is in this spirit that we will conduct not only these discussions but our entire relations.

It is in this spirit that I would like to propose a toast to the Foreign Minister, to the expansion of relations between the Soviet Union and the United States, for the friendship between Soviet and American people, and to permanent peace.

## Communique on the Visit to the U.S.S.R.<sup>2</sup>

As previously agreed, Henry A. Kissinger, Secretary of State of the United States of America and Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs, visited Moscow from October 23 to October 27.

He had discussions with Leonid I. Brezhnev, General Secretary of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union, and Andrei A. Gromyko, Member of the Politburo of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union, Minister of Foreign Affairs of the USSR.

Taking part in the discussions on the Soviet side were:

The Ambassador of the USSR in the United States, A. F. Dobrynin  
Assistant to the General Secretary of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union, A. M. Alexandrov  
Member of the Collegium of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the USSR, G. M. Korniyenko.

On the American side:

The Ambassador of the United States to the USSR, Walter J. Stoessel, Jr.  
Officials of the Department of State: Helmut Sonnenfeldt, Arthur A. Hartman, Alfred A. Atherton, William G. Hyland, Winston Lord; and Jan M. Lodal and A. Denis Clift of the staff of the National Security Council.

In the course of the discussions, a thorough exchange of views took place on a wide range of issues concerning American-Soviet relations and on a number of current international problems.

The two sides noted with satisfaction that the relations between the USA and the USSR continue to improve steadily, in accordance with the course previously established.

In this connection they again emphasized the fundamental importance of the decisions taken as a result of the U.S.-Soviet summit meetings, and expressed their mutual determination to continue to make energetic efforts to ensure uninterrupted progress in U.S.-Soviet relations.

Particular attention was given to the problem of the further limitation of strategic arms. In their consideration of this problem the two sides were guided by the fundamental understanding with regard to developing a new long-term agreement which is to follow the Interim Agreement of May 26, 1972. Useful exchanges took place on the details involved in such an agreement. Discussions on these matters will continue.

The two sides noted that as a whole ties in various spheres between the USA and the USSR have been

<sup>2</sup> Issued at Moscow Oct. 27 (text from press release 442).

developing successfully. They agreed that full implementation of the agreements already concluded will open favorable prospects for further expansion of mutually beneficial cooperation between the two countries.

The two sides continue to be concerned over the situation in the Middle East. They reaffirmed their determination to make efforts to find solutions to the key questions of a just and lasting settlement in the area. The two sides agreed that the early reconvening of the Geneva Conference should play a useful role in finding such a settlement.

Noting the progress achieved by the Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe, the two sides will continue to work actively for its successful conclusion at an early date. They also believe that it is possible to achieve progress at the talks on mutual reduction of armed forces and armaments in Central Europe.

The exchange of views was marked by a businesslike and constructive spirit. Both sides consider it highly useful. In this connection they reaffirmed the positive value of the established practice of regular consultations between the two countries. Both sides emphasized the special importance of summit meetings for a constructive development of relations between the USA and the USSR. As has been announced, Gerald R. Ford, President of the United States, and L. I. Brezhnev, General Secretary of the Central Committee of the CPSU, will hold a working meeting in the vicinity of Vladivostok at the end of November 1974.

## **THE VISIT TO INDIA, OCTOBER 27-30**

### **Remarks by Secretary Kissinger Upon Arrival, New Delhi, October 27**

Press release 443 dated October 27

Mr. Foreign Minister: This is my first visit to India as Secretary of State, but I have been here on several previous occasions to exchange ideas and to meet old friends. In the past year or so relations between India and the United States have improved considerably. The two greatest democracies in the world have rediscovered their common purposes and have exchanged ideas on an ever-increasing range of topics. It is to continue this exchange that I have gratefully accepted the invitation of the Indian Government, the Foreign Minister, to visit the subcontinent.

I look forward very much to my talks with Prime Minister Gandhi and with all the other

Ministers who have been kind enough to make time on their schedules. I come here at a time of great difficulties in the world but also of great opportunity. There is the possibility of building a new international system based on peace and justice and cooperation, values to which both of our countries have long since been dedicated.

I appreciate the warmth of your reception. I look forward to my talks; and I know that when I leave, the already strong relationships between India and the United States will, hopefully, be further strengthened.

Thank you.

### **Dinner Hosted by Y. B. Chavan, Minister of External Affairs, New Delhi, October 27**

Press release 444 dated October 27

#### *Toast by Foreign Minister Chavan*

On behalf of the Government of India, I have great pleasure to extend a warm and cordial welcome to you and Mrs. Kissinger. I enjoyed meeting you in Washington a few weeks ago, and I am indeed happy that you were able to pay us an official visit and provide an opportunity to exchange views on important international problems and matters of bilateral interest.

India and the United States of America are both democratic countries with well-established traditions of representative government, social responsibility, and individual freedom. We have admired this creative genius of the American people and their contribution to human progress.

We are confident that our two countries can work together to create a better world in which men and women can realize their potential both as individuals and useful citizens and contribute to the development of society and welfare of mankind. It is also a unique feature of our relations that, in spite of occasional differences, we have been able to maintain dialogue and contact at all times and at all levels. This provides a good basis for our working together in the future also to promote mutual understanding, international peace, and progress.

Mr. Secretary, since your last visit to New

Delhi, far-reaching changes have taken place in this region. Out of the agony of the sub-continent, a new nation was born, underlining a historical truth that popular aspirations cannot be long suppressed. On the basis of the realities of the situation, we have been trying to build a new structure of peace, friendship, and cooperation in this region.

We note that your own country shares this view and has supported the Simla process of bilateral and peaceful normalization and reconciliation without external interference. It need hardly be stressed that peace is particularly essential to us and other countries of the region to meet the challenge of economic and social growth. We are fully conscious of our responsibilities and of the need to build friendship and cooperation with our neighbors. We have achieved this objective in our relations with most of our neighbors and hope to do the same with the remaining one or two governments.

Indo-American relations have improved in the last year or two. Although it would be idle to pretend that there are no differences between us, we both recognize the need for building up a mature and constructive relationship on the basis of equality, mutual respect, and mutual benefit. There is potential for strengthening our relations, and we look forward to our discussions with you on ways and means of furthering Indo-American understanding.

In today's world, no country can remain isolated or become totally self-sufficient in all its requirements. We are interested in promoting cooperation between India and America in various fields including trade, science, technology, education, and culture. I am confident that our discussions will enable us not only to remove past misunderstandings but also generate momentum for a better, more mature and realistic relationship in the months and years ahead.

Mr. Secretary, you are not a newcomer to India. However, since this is Mrs. Kissinger's first visit to our country, may I wish her a cordial welcome and a most pleasant stay here. In drawing up your program, we have taken particular care to insure that you, Mrs. Kissinger, have some opportunity to see

a bit of India. We hope you will come again and see more of our country. And we hope you, Mr. Secretary, would also come with her.

#### *Toast by Secretary Kissinger*

Mr. Foreign Minister, distinguished guests, ladies and gentlemen: I am delighted to have been able to accept the invitation to visit your great country in order to renew long-standing friendships, to remove old misunderstandings, and to build a new and mature relationship. This trip has been prepared over a considerable period of time by your distinguished predecessor and by the two indefatigable Ambassadors that represent our two countries.

As for our Ambassador, I would like to point out to you that those of his dispatches that appear in the New York Times are only the tip of the iceberg of what I have to contend with. And, indeed, what saves me from more exposure in the New York Times is the limitation of space which is inevitably imposed by a daily newspaper. But suffice it to say that our Ambassador to New Delhi never lets me forget for a moment how important our relationship is and he has worked with great dedication, sharing my own conviction and President Ford's conviction of the importance that we attach to close ties with India. As for your Ambassador, my friend Tikki Kaul [Triloki Nath Kaul], he checks on me periodically—but I would like to request of you, Mr. Foreign Minister, that you change his instructions so that he needs to call on me only twice a week to make sure that I am not tilting the wrong way. I would like to pay tribute to his friendship and to his dedication.

In the United States in recent years, just as has India, we have had to make many adjustments to new conditions. We are interested in building a worldwide structure of peace in which all the nations feel they have a sense of participation, and a structure of peace which transcends the antagonisms of the period of the cold war and tries to draw on the dedication of all parts of the world.

In this structure of peace, the structure of peace in the subcontinent to which the Foreign Minister has referred plays, of course,

a crucial role. The United States strongly supports the Simla process. The United States feels that the development of peace in the subcontinent, free of outside interference, on the basis of equality and negotiation, is an essential precondition to peace in the world. And our relationship prospers to the precise extent that this process has taken root and has continued.

The Foreign Minister pointed out India's desire to extend cooperative relationships with the United States in many fields. We reciprocate this feeling, and in the work which we will do here, in the institutions which we plan to create, we see but the beginning of further cooperative ventures to the joint benefit of both of our nations, of the peoples of the subcontinent, and all of the people in the world.

I look forward very much to my talks here with the Prime Minister, with the Foreign Minister, and with his colleagues. I want you to know that I come here with good will to contribute to the building of a strong relationship between two great democracies sharing many similar ideals—two democracies, which, whatever their occasional differences on particular issues, have a common interest in a peaceful world, in a developing world, and in a cooperative world. It is with this attitude that my colleagues and I will conduct our talks. It is in this spirit that I would like to propose a toast to the Foreign Minister and to friendship between the Indian and American people.

**Dinner Hosted by Secretary Kissinger,  
New Delhi, October 28**

Press release 448 dated October 29

*Toast by Secretary Kissinger*

Distinguished guests: Let me take this opportunity to welcome you at this elegant residence of our Ambassador, which reminds me of the house he lived in as a professor in Cambridge.

I would like to take this opportunity to thank all our Indian friends for the remarkable hospitality that has been shown to us,

for the warmth with which Nancy and I have been received here, and for the friendship and cordiality of our talks, which cannot be reflected in official communiqués.

The Indian philosopher Kautilya listed the qualifications for a minister with the subtlety for which Indians are known. These are the qualities of a minister as described by Kautilya: "native born"—that leaves me out already—"of high family; influential; well trained in the arts; possessed of foresight; wise; of strong memory; bold; eloquent; skillful; intelligent; possessed of enthusiasm, dignity, and endurance; pure in character; affable; firm in loyal devotion; endowed with excellent conduct, strength, health, bravery" and a few other things like that—"these are the qualifications of a ministerial officer." My staff will pass among you in a few minutes and certify that, except for the first quality, all of these are possessed by the Secretary of State. They will all say a few other things about the Secretary of State which I'd rather not hear. [Laughter.]

We have spent a very fruitful day today, Mr. Foreign Minister. We have had very good talks, and we have formed the Indo-American Commission, which I am confident will perform a significant service in the fields for which it has been designed.

But I believe that the real significance of this occasion is that we talked to each other for the first time in a long while free of complexes. We now understand that when we deal with each other the United States does not do favors to India but deals with India on the basis of a common interest. And we are not here to seek moral approbation from India, because we now realize that what ties us together is a common perception of the kind of world in which both of us can be secure and both of us can prosper.

These intangible qualities, I believe, will be even more important than the substantive results that have become apparent today or that will be reflected in the communiqué. The exchanges which I have had the pleasure of conducting with the Foreign Minister and the extended talks with the Prime Minister will be continued in the months ahead. We

will start the Subcommissions very soon.

We all look forward to the visit of the Foreign Minister—and we will arrange as relaxed and reflective a schedule for him as he has for me. So let me take this occasion to express the appreciation of myself and all of my colleagues for the manner in which we've been received, for the spirit that has animated our talks; to express the confidence that what we have started in these talks will be on a mature and enduring basis; and to look forward to renewing our acquaintance very soon in the United States. I'd like to propose a toast to the Foreign Minister.

#### *Toast by Foreign Minister Chavan*

Mr. Secretary of State, Mrs. Kissinger, Ambassador and Mrs. Moynihan: On my behalf and on behalf of my colleagues in the Government of India, let me take this opportunity to thank the Secretary of State and Mrs. Kissinger for giving this opportunity again of reconsidering the future of the commissions in a more useful manner.

Dr. Kissinger has been speaking of the very useful talks that we have had during the course of the day. I think he is right that these discussions we have had today were very frank and free of any conflicts, as he put it. I am sure it has helped us now and will continue to help us in the future to understand each other better. Naturally one can't say that there won't be difference in approaches, but at least we will try to understand why we prefer the way we do; but our emphasis will be to agree more and more on basic issues so that the understanding will be on a firmer foundation.

We have agreed today to sign an agreement for establishing a Joint Commission and to deal with different aspects of administration, economic cooperation, cultural cooperation, educational cooperation, and I think that will help us to come constructively together to win the mature relationship that we have envisaged. That is much more important.

I think that Dr. Kissinger's visit certainly will prove to be a very important step in re-

discovering, if I may quote him again, the common purposes in the approaches of United States and India. And that is why I consider this visit a very important visit which is sort of a nice landmark in our relationship. I can assure you that we will continue the same dialogue in the same spirit with a view to achieve what we both of us desire. I must request you gentlemen to raise your glasses and offer a toast to Dr. Kissinger and Mrs. Kissinger.

#### **News Conference by Secretary Kissinger, New Delhi, October 30**

Press release 451 dated October 30

*Kewal Singh, Secretary in the Ministry for External Affairs:* Ladies and gentlemen, we have as you see this morning with us Dr. Henry Kissinger, the Secretary of State for the United States of America, and perhaps the most eminent personality in the international diplomacy today. At one time with his very heavy schedule it seemed almost impossible if he'd be able to meet you, which he very much wanted to do. But as you all know, Dr. Kissinger has a flair for resolving the impossible. We are happy that he is here with us. The conference is exactly 30 minutes. After he has said a few words, you are welcome to shoot your questions. Before asking the questions, please kindly announce your name and the agency or the press you represent.

Thank you.

*Secretary Kissinger:* I want to express my appreciation and that of my colleagues for the extraordinarily warm receptions that we have received here. The talks were cordial, frank, and extremely useful. I think we have succeeded jointly in establishing a mature and good basis for the future relationship between India and the United States, and we also had enough opportunity to review world developments.

So, I believe we have turned a new page. On the part of the United States—my impression is, also on that of India—we will work with dedication and seriousness to give it a meaning that will be of benefit to both

of our peoples as well as to the peoples of the world.

Now I'll be glad to take your questions.

*Q. How successful do you think your visit has been?*

*Secretary Kissinger:* India and the United States are both major countries which are located of course in different parts of the world and do not necessarily have a complete identity of views on every subject. But in terms of the purpose that we set ourselves, which was to establish a basis for a new and mature relationship, I consider the trip completely successful.

*Q. Is there any rethinking on the part of the U.S.A. on lifting or relaxing the embargo on supply of lethal weapons to Pakistan in light of Mr. Bhutto's threat that Pakistan would go nuclear if the U.S.A. did not resume arms supply?*

*Secretary Kissinger:* I have had occasion to say in several meetings that I do not think it is appropriate for me to make statements that affect other countries of the subcontinent while I'm in New Delhi. Our current policy is well known. We have already stated that we would not participate in an arms race on the subcontinent. Beyond that I do not think it would be appropriate for me to go while I'm here.

*Q. The two points which have emerged from the joint communique published today are that you made no direct reference to economic aid to India in your talks with C. Subramaniam [Minister of Finance] and that the question of the supply of food to India will be in accordance with the decision of the forthcoming World Food Conference at Rome. Now, I just wanted to know whether you in the course of your talks threw any hint about the possibility of the resumption of economic aid to India and food supplies on a bilateral basis irrespective of the decisions that might be taken at the World Food Conference in Rome?*

*Secretary Kissinger:* Let me deal with this question in two parts. I think one of

the aspects of the relationship that is developing now between India and the United States is that we can talk to each other free of complexes. One of the complexes that has affected our relationship in the past has been who was asking whom for what, and secondly, whether the United States was doing anybody a favor by extending aid or other forms of cooperation.

Let me say first of all that when the United States undertakes a certain measure with respect to India, or any other country, it does so in its own interest as well as in the interests of the other country. Unless there is a joint interest there is no firm basis for common action. We have an interest in a stable, growing subcontinent; and therefore, when we discuss aid with India, it is not in the context of India asking us for a special favor but of defining joint objectives.

Now, the Commission that has been set up will provide an opportunity for discussing common objectives, in a realistic framework; and within that framework I am certain that the question of what measures can be taken by the United States to assist in the development of India in our joint interest will undoubtedly come up. In that context it also came up informally in some of the talks that were conducted.

With respect to the food problem, there are again two aspects. One is those measures which the United States takes as a country individually and those measures which it proposes that the world will take on a multilateral basis. At the World Food Conference, I intend to put before the other nations the entire U.S. approach to the world food problem—those steps that are taken on a national basis as well as those steps which are taken on a multilateral basis. Those steps which the United States is prepared to take on a national basis obviously do not have to wait for the decisions of the World Food Conference; and those steps will include, as far as the United States is concerned, a program of food assistance to India.

*Q. I want to ask you a fundamental question: The U.S.A. and India are the two biggest democracies in the world. Naturally,*

*it was expected there should have been best cooperation between the two. But instead it happened to the contrary. I am not going into the reasons, but what surprises me is that your country has made up with the two biggest Communist countries of the world and also supported some of the dictatorial countries. On our side, too, we had come closer with Socialist Communist countries headed by the U.S.S.R. Does it mean that the democratic countries of the world had no real faith in the principle of democracy? I am aware that you can reply only for your side. Does it also mean that the U.S.A., the staunch believer in the democracy, does not want democracy to flourish in other parts of the world?*

*Secretary Kissinger:* This is a question I hear occasionally at our press conferences in America, though stated with less eloquence. The United States has two categories of concerns in the world. One has to do with the problem of peace, security, and the avoidance of a holocaust. The second is influenced by the basic orientation of our values, in which of course our preference for democratic institutions plays a very important role.

Now, under ideal circumstances, those two strands of our policy should operate side by side. However, there are many circumstances in which a choice may have to be made. For example, the question of the prevention of nuclear war cannot wait for the emergence of democratic institutions in the Soviet Union, because when you have two countries capable of destroying human life you have a number of practical problems that arise. Similarly, it was our view that it was impossible to think of a peaceful international environment without an exchange of views and regular contacts between the United States and the People's Republic of China. This does not mean approbation of the domestic structure of these governments, but it does mean that there are certain practical problems that require solutions of an overwhelming importance.

In the area where we believe we have a

choice, our preference for democratic institutions and democratic governments ought to be clear; but there are these two strands of our policy which, for the sake of the peace of the world, have to be kept in view.

*Q. Mr. Secretary, has India asked for food, and if so, how much; and what is it that the United States is prepared to give?*

*Secretary Kissinger:* I do not like to have the question put in terms of: Has India asked for food? There have been discussions with respect to food, which would be difficult to reconstruct of exactly who initiated what, but there has been discussion as to the amount of food that the United States can make available.

As you know, the large surpluses which existed in the United States in the 1960's, both in terms of reserves as well as in terms of current production, have been substantially eroded, such that our food assistance to any country in the world now depends on our annual production and on our annual surplus. And given the worldwide shortage of food, this situation is rather tight. Because of the impact on the domestic market in the United States, we have had to make our decisions on a quarterly basis up to now. But we are now attempting to project them on an annual basis.

We have made some preliminary allocations, but we are reviewing all the allocations again, and I do not think a final judgment can be made until after I return to Washington. But I can say that we are reviewing the situation once again to see what the maximum is that the United States has available for this year, and after this year we hope to put it on a more long-term basis.

*Q. Mr. Secretary, can you tell us the current view of the United States on Israel negotiating with the Palestinian Liberation Organization?*

*Secretary Kissinger:* I have not had an opportunity to review the authoritative statements from the Rabat summit, nor have I had any formal communication from any of the participants or any communication from any of the participants at the Rabat

summit. The U.S. view as to the most effective way of negotiating has been stated previously, which is that it would be most effective if Israel negotiated with Jordan about the West Bank. We will now have to study the communique at Rabat to see what the implications are for future negotiations, and of course this depends very much on the views of all the parties and not just one of the parties.

*Q. Dr. Kissinger, you have made many impossible things possible. I would like to know what is your secret of success in diplomacy?*

*Secretary Kissinger:* Nothing is more dangerous than to claim success in diplomacy. I do not believe in statements of miraculous achievements. Anything that is done is the result of careful preparation and an enormous amount of detail, as well as the result of objective circumstances that exist, that cannot be created, that can only be used. But I appreciate the question.

*Q. The joint communique states that the countries of the subcontinent could live without outside interference. But unfortunately, as America's record recently suggests, the interference in Chile, the coup in Cyprus, as recorded by congressional committee evidence suggests that America is interested in activities fomenting the overthrow of constitutionally elected governments. How does it reconcile with the high-minded principle enunciated in the joint communique? Not wholly, or alone in the Indian context either, we all know from Ambassador Moynihan's telegraphic cable to you.*

*Secretary Kissinger:* As I have had occasion to say yesterday, Ambassador Moynihan sends me many cables of great eloquence designed to explain to me the point of view of Indians, and this is a point of view that you have just now repeated.

Now, in going through the particular events which you mention, no useful purpose would be served by going into each of the instances, except to point out that the United States did not foment the overthrow

of a constitutional government in Chile. That has been made sufficiently plain by the President. Secondly, the United States had nothing whatever to do with the coup in Cyprus; this is simply repeating totally unfounded propaganda. Thirdly, the United States is not engaged, directly or indirectly, in any attempt to influence the domestic situation in India. It has not authorized such a program; it is not engaged in such a program; and it has repeatedly pointed out that if any of its officials should ever be caught in an unauthorized action, we would take strong measures.

So, I reject the implication that the United States is engaged on a systematic basis in undermining any government and, particularly, constitutional governments. Exactly the opposite is true.

*Q. Dr. Kissinger, what is the special mission and program of your latest visit to India, and also kindly tell us what is your latest assessment about India-America relations?*

*Secretary Kissinger:* I agree with the assessment of your Prime Minister, who said that Indian-American relations are good and should be getting better. I agree that they are good. I believe that they are getting better, and our big problem now is—and I believe we will deal with it successfully—is to keep them on a steady basis, free of the fluctuations that have characterized them in the past.

*Q. Dr. Kissinger, do you think that the Indo-Soviet treaty for peace and friendship comes in the way of Indo-American friendship? Secondly, on your way to Delhi you stopped over in Moscow. Did you sense any sense of disquiet and concern about your visit to India, or did they wish you success and Godspeed?*

*Secretary Kissinger:* Well, I don't think that Soviet leaders are given to excessively emotional statements when I arrive or depart. But of course the Soviet leaders knew that I was going to India from Moscow prior to my going to Moscow. I found no expres-



sion of disquiet or unhappiness; but I think the Soviet leaders should speak for themselves.

As for the United States, we are interested in India conducting an independent foreign policy in a subcontinent free of outside pressures. If India conducts such a foreign policy, as I believe it has, then with what other countries it may have treaties of consultation is the business of India and not a matter in which the United States would express an opinion. We do not consider the treaty as it exists now, and the manner in which it has been implemented, an obstacle to improved relations with the United States.

*Q. You stated here, as you had previously at the United Nations, that the United States strongly favors an embargo on the export of nuclear explosive technology. What response did you receive from the Prime Minister?*

*Secretary Kissinger:* Well, first of all this is not exactly a precise description of what the U.S. position is. The U.S. position is that countries in a position to export nuclear technology should do so in a manner that does not contribute to the spread of explosive and especially of weapons technology and that this should be done on a multi-lateral basis by all countries that have a capability to export nuclear technology.

I was, first of all, as our communique makes clear, assured that India had no intention to develop a weapons program, and I took occasion to welcome this statement. Secondly, we will consult with India, with other countries, about the safeguards which we consider useful and which we are prepared to apply also to ourselves; so this is not intended in any discriminatory sense against any one country. And I believe that we can have useful discussions on that basis.

*Q. Dr. Kissinger, I asked you what the Prime Minister's response was.*

*Secretary Kissinger:* Well, I have given you as much as I am prepared to do on this basis of a private conversation.

*Q. We have come to know even from the American official sources that you gave a very careful listening whenever the Diego Garcia question arose in the talk. I want to know why not some clear expression came up from your side regarding this question and it remained only up to the listening point?*

*Secretary Kissinger:* I don't know whether it is correct to say that there was no clear expression of views. I think there was an absence of identity of views on that subject. We respect the Indian point of view, and of course we have our own on that matter.

*Q. During your visit in Rome, in addition to attending the Food Conference, are you planning to meet our President Leone to review the very heavy Italian political situation?*

*Secretary Kissinger:* I expect to have dinner with President Leone. But the Italian political situation is too complicated for me to understand. This will not be one of the subjects of our discussion. [Laughter.]

*Q. The U.S. President has said that what you did in Chile—namely, financing of opposition parties and papers and also strikes by labor and transport—it was according to the U.S.A. in the interests of the Chilean people. What guarantee is there that you will not do the same thing in India if the U.S.A. considers it to be in the interest of the Indian people?*

*Secretary Kissinger:* First of all, it has been repeatedly denied that the United States supported strikes in Chile. I don't think this is the appropriate place to go into details of a subject which is more complex than has been possible to discuss through a series of isolated leaks. The assurance you have is that I have stated that the United States has not, and is not now, intervening in any manner whatsoever, for any purpose whatsoever, in the domestic affairs of India. This assurance will be of course maintained.

*Q. In your speech to the Indian Council of World Affairs you linked the questions of*

*food with the energy crisis. Are you in fact saying that the United States cannot go on indefinitely providing massive food relief if countries in the Third World such as India do not support the American position—in fact your position—on the oil crisis?*

*Secretary Kissinger:* First of all, we have talked in a number of forums about the problems of food and the problems of energy—not to link them as conditions to each other, but in order to emphasize that current problems have become global, that the world has become interdependent, and that national solutions to any of these problems are impossible. There can be no victors in a bloc approach to these issues, because even those who control the resources, be it of food or of energy, would become the victims of an economic collapse that assumes worldwide proportions. This is the basic theme that the United States is urging. We are not making our approach in Rome on food conditional on having our views met on energy. We are presenting them in parallel as illustrations of a general problem.

Now with respect to energy, I believe that India is perfectly capable of making up its own mind as to the impact of high energy prices without pressure tactics from the United States, because it is precisely countries like India which suffer most from an increase in both energy and in food and fertilizer prices. And therefore I don't believe that there is any need for me to give long lectures to Indian leaders about a matter that affects them so immediately. I have not asked for formal support from India at either the Food Conference or with respect to energy since I'm confident that India is perfectly capable of making up its own mind on that subject.

*Q. Mr. Secretary, the Foreign Minister of India extended a cordial invitation to the distinguished lady accompanying you on this tour. May I extract a promise from you that whenever this distinguished lady prefers to come to India a second time, you would accompany her?*

*Secretary Kissinger:* Thank you very much. I will, yes.

**Remarks by Secretary Kissinger Broadcast on All-India Radio October 30<sup>3</sup>**

Good evening, ladies and gentlemen. I am happy to have this opportunity to speak to the people of India. I bring with me the best wishes of President Ford and the people of America.

Many believe that America and India are as different as two countries can be, because of geography, history, and stages of economic development. But I believe that because of our traditions, political systems, and human goals, we have much in common.

We were both once colonies, ruled from abroad. America won its independence almost 200 years ago in a long war. India won its independence just 26 years ago, also after a long struggle.

Our early years were spent in building one nation from many different states, each wanting to go its own way. In the same way, your country, with great success, has built one nation from what once were many separate provinces and princely states.

For our first 100 years and more the United States was a nation of farmers. Our people lived on small farms, in small villages and towns. Only gradually as we developed our industry did our cities grow. As eight out of ten Indians today live in the country, so was it in America until only a very short time ago.

I understand that there is an Indian proverb which says: When the Ganges flows, wash your hands. There is an American proverb very much like this, which comes from the tradition of our farmers: Make hay while the sun shines.

As I look at what has been achieved in India in the last 25 years, I think that you have indeed been "washing your hands as the Ganges flows." Great things have been achieved. Roads, dams, factories, irrigation, electricity, have spread through every state. Where once those with radios numbered thousands, today there are millions of radios on which you are hearing me tonight. There is,

<sup>3</sup> Recorded by Secretary Kissinger before his departure from New Delhi (text from press release 454 dated Oct. 31).

I believe, another old saying, "The ocean fills up drop by drop"; so it is with progress.

As there has been progress within our two countries, so also has there been great progress recently in the relations between our two countries. It is to build stronger bonds between our peoples and governments that I have come to visit your country.

I have held very friendly and successful talks with Prime Minister Gandhi, Foreign Minister Chavan, and other Ministers and leaders of your country. Mrs. Kissinger and I have also had a chance to see some of your countryside and the great monuments of India's history in and around New Delhi. Mrs. Kissinger traveled to Agra as well to see and admire, as have millions of people in the past, the beautiful Taj Mahal. We have also met many Indians in different professions and occupations during our visit.

In all our conversations we have talked as good friends, not as diplomats or politicians. As good friends we have found many things on which we agree, many areas for cooperation, and many objectives we share. But also as good friends we have been completely honest and told each other where we disagree. Your leaders have discussed their problems and their differences with my country. I have done the same with them.

These talks have been very reassuring and very helpful. We have erased many past problems and agreed on future opportunities. We have reaffirmed the friendship which has existed between the Indian and American people and the basic interests we share. We have set a new course for the future.

Today we are both conscious of the ideals we have in common and the challenges we have in common:

—We are the world's two largest democracies. Both of us believe in the dignity and freedom and well-being of the individual person.

—We both have great natural resources and technical skills. There is much we can trade with one another and much we can learn from one another.

—Both our peoples have always felt a great concern for peace in the world. We

share an overriding interest in stability and economic development and justice.

Your government and mine agree that we should leave behind us feelings of dependence or suspicions of interference or assertions that either side is always right on every issue.

Therefore the United States wants to strengthen our relations with India:

—We established a new Indo-U.S. Joint Commission for economic, scientific, and cultural cooperation.

—The United States will, as our own resources allow, help India's economic development in ways which India itself thinks most appropriate and helpful. We will work together on a basis of mutual benefit.

—The leaders of our two countries are consulting more and more on the world's great political, security, and economic problems. The United States wants to know India's concerns on these international issues. We have much to contribute together.

We are encouraged as well by the improvement in relations among our many friends in this region. The United States strongly supports the efforts of all the countries in South Asia to resolve their differences peacefully, free of outside pressure or interference. The wisdom and courage of the leaders of South Asia and the initiative of India have resulted in progress toward the goal agreed upon by Pakistan and India at the Simla Conference in 1972: "The promotion of a friendly and harmonious relationship and the establishment of a durable peace in the Subcontinent." We want stability and economic progress for South Asia just as the leaders of India and its neighbors do.

As India and America strengthen relations, we can better work side by side to resolve problems that concern all mankind.

Representatives of our two countries can cooperate in international meetings on extremely important problems that affect all nations regardless of their philosophies or social systems: international trade and commerce, energy resources, the oceans, the preservation of the environment and health of

this planet, and perhaps more important, ways to insure that there is sufficient food for the growing population of the world. Nations more and more depend on one another. They must help each other or everyone will suffer.

The United States is trying to reduce tensions and build cooperation with all countries in the world. We respect nonalignment. In recent years we have made great progress in our relations with both the Soviet Union and the People's Republic of China. We are doing our best to control the arms race and to make the world a safer place. And improvement of our relations with any one country cannot be—and will not be—at the expense of any other countries. We believe that a world of peace is in every nation's interest. That is America's highest objective.

Last week the Hindu population of India celebrated the festival which commemorates the eternal and eventual triumph of good over evil—Dashahara. The Muslim people of India, at almost the same time, celebrated the inspiration of the Prophet in composing the Koran.

It is this kind of faith that can overcome great difficulties and that can help achieve our hopes. It is this kind of faith that can be found in the people of America and the people of India. It has been the basis of our achievements and of yours, and it will be in the years ahead.

*Jai Hind.*

#### **Joint Communique Issued at the Conclusion of the Visit to India <sup>4</sup>**

At the invitation of the Government of India, the US Secretary of State, Dr. Henry A. Kissinger, paid an official visit to India from 27 to 30 October, 1974. The Secretary called on the President of India and held discussions with the Prime Minister, Foreign Minister and other senior Ministers and officials of the Government of India. He conveyed to the President and the Prime Minister, President Ford's personal greetings and his satisfaction over the improvement in US-Indian relations. The cordial and frank nature of the discussions during the Secretary's visit reflected the desire and interest

of both countries in broadening the basis for their relationship and in strengthening the many contacts and ties between the Indian and American people.

During the discussions there was an exchange of views on various aspects of bilateral relations, the situation in South Asia and neighboring regions and a review of the global situation including the world economic situation.

The Indian side explained the initiative and steps it had taken under the Simla Agreement towards normalization, and for the establishment of durable peace and cooperative relations between the countries of the Subcontinent. The American side expressed its satisfaction at the initiative taken by the Prime Minister of India and the effort of other leaders of South Asia and at the progress that had been made in bringing about regional peace and cooperation and expressed their support for the Simla process. Both sides agreed that it was in the interest of all the countries of the region to live in peace and harmony on the basis of sovereign equality and without intervention by outside powers or attempts by such powers to gain positions of special privilege in the region.

The two sides expressed their satisfaction at the improvement that has taken place in their bilateral relations and agreed that based on their democratic traditions, structure of government and past relationship, there was considerable scope for further strengthening of bilateral relations. Both sides affirmed that there is no conflict of national interests and that Indo-American relations are based on the principles of equality, mutual respect and mutual understanding.

The two sides agreed that it was desirable to promote cooperation between the two countries and that the agreement to set up an Indo-US Joint Commission which Secretary Kissinger and Foreign Minister Chavan signed on October 28 marked a significant step forward in building a framework for more mature and meaningful relations and active cooperation. They expressed confidence that the Joint Commission would facilitate contacts and exchanges in the fields of trade and commerce, economic cooperation, science and technology, education and culture and other fields. The first meeting of the Joint Commission was held in New Delhi on 28 October 1974 and the next meeting will be held in Washington early next year. It was also agreed that Sub-Commissions would soon be established and begin their regular meetings in New Delhi and Washington.

The Secretary reviewed recent developments toward a lasting peace in the Middle East. The Indian side welcomed the progress so far achieved. Both sides expressed the hope that a just and lasting peace will be achieved on the basis of Security Council Resolutions 242 and 338.

The Secretary reviewed progress to date in implementing the Paris Accords on Indo-China. Both

<sup>4</sup> Issued at New Delhi on Oct. 29 (text from press release 449 dated Oct. 30).

sides expressed the hope that just and lasting peace would be established in Indo-China on the basis of respect for the independence and sovereignty of the states of the region without any outside interference.

Both sides noted with satisfaction that series of agreements which have helped to reduce tension in Europe. They expressed satisfaction at the process of decolonization in Africa and expressed the hope that this process will be accelerated.

In reviewing the international situation, both sides expressed satisfaction that relaxation of tensions and development of cooperation are becoming the main characteristics of international life. They expressed their strong support for further efforts to reduce international tensions and build a global détente. On disarmament matters the Secretary described current US-Soviet efforts to accelerate progress in reaching agreements on strategic arms limitation. Both sides expressed their support for the realization of concrete measures in the field of arms limitation and disarmament. The Secretary also discussed US concern over the implications for regional and global stability of nuclear proliferation. The Indian side reiterated its consistent position that the highest priority in international efforts should be accorded to nuclear disarmament and that in order to achieve international peace and stability, all proliferation of nuclear weapons should be stopped. The Indian side also affirmed India's policy not to develop nuclear weapons and to use nuclear technology for peaceful purposes only. The US side welcomes the Government of India's affirmation in this regard. There was mutual recognition of the need of putting nuclear technology to constructive use, particularly for developing countries, and of ensuring that nuclear energy does not contribute to any proliferation of nuclear weapons.

In reviewing the current international economic situation and the rising prices of food, fertilizer, fuel, industrial materials and technology both sides agreed that cooperative efforts by governments were called for to prevent further deterioration of the world economic structure to the detriment of both the developed and the developing nations. The two sides noted the serious situation developing in the most seriously affected countries as a result of rising prices and the paucity of resources now available to them. They expressed the hope that the forthcoming World Food Conference in Rome will find a way of conserving world food stocks and making them available to the most seriously affected developing nations on more favorable terms. They also agreed to exchange views and technology on a bilateral and multilateral basis in order to achieve increase in national food production and ensuring the necessary inputs of energy, fertilizers, technology, etc.

The US Secretary of State thanked the Government of India for their cordiality and warm hospi-

tility and invited the Minister of External Affairs of India to pay an official visit to the USA. The invitation was accepted with thanks.

The Prime Minister conveyed an invitation for President Ford to visit India in 1975, and Secretary Kissinger accepted the invitation on behalf of the President.

## THE VISIT TO BANGLADESH, OCTOBER 30-31

### Remarks by Secretary Kissinger to the Press, Dacca, October 30<sup>5</sup>

*Secretary Kissinger:* Ladies and gentlemen, I first of all want to express my appreciation to the Prime Minister and to all of his associates for the very warm reception that we have received here.

I have long admired the Prime Minister. It isn't often that one has the privilege of meeting someone who has been the father to his country and who created a nation out of his convictions. We had a very good talk in New York in which I had the pleasure of making his acquaintance for the first time, and we continued our talk here.

We had a brief review of the international situation and then the Prime Minister explained to me his aspirations for his people and for his country—and Bangladesh wouldn't exist if the Prime Minister were not a man of vast conceptions. We reviewed those, and I expressed to the Prime Minister that the United States, ever since the independence of Bangladesh, has believed very strongly in the progress and development of Bangladesh and we will do what is within our capabilities to help with the problems of food and with the problems of development.

In the afternoon I reviewed some of those specific problems with the Foreign Minister, and I hope we can make some progress toward straightening out some of the difficulties. We discussed in general terms then the larger aspirations of Bangladesh with the Prime Minister, who also took the occasion to invite President Ford to visit Bangladesh.

<sup>5</sup> Made following a meeting with Prime Minister Rahman (text from press release 455 dated Oct. 31).

*Q. Sir, what are the difficulties?*

*Secretary Kissinger:* Well, the difficulties are not difficulties between our two countries, but problems in development, problems in the better utilization of American resources that have been made available, and matters of this kind. It isn't often that I have the pleasure of visiting a country with which we have no difficulties. Of course the Prime Minister said he will talk with you after I have left, and I do not know what he is going to say. [Laughter.]

*Q. Sir, in what way can the United States assist in resolving these difficulties you are referring to?*

*Secretary Kissinger:* Well, one of the problems of Bangladesh is of course the problem of food, and that has two aspects: the food that has to be imported, but in the long term the food that can be grown inside the country. This requires fertilizer, technical assistance of various kinds; and it is in this area where the long-term hope for Bangladesh resides and where the United States, I think, can be helpful in various ways. And we also believe that flood control is one of the areas in which we can cooperate.

*Q. Sir, did you discuss subcontinental relations?*

*Secretary Kissinger:* Yes, we discussed relations on the subcontinent, and I expressed my respect for the Prime Minister's generosity of spirit in contributing to a peaceful evolution on the subcontinent, and the United States of course supports the process of negotiations between the countries on the subcontinent and hopes for a full normalization of relations among all the states here.

*Q. Your Excellency, can we then hope for some solution of the existing problems between Bangladesh and Pakistan in respect to the division of assets and resources and the repatriation of Pakistanis?*

*Secretary Kissinger:* The Prime Minister of course had explained these problems to me eloquently already in New York, and we reviewed them again here, and I will have an occasion to discuss them in Islamabad, where I am going tomorrow. But I have made it a

practice not to make any predictions about one country while I am visiting another country.

*Q. Are you taking any proposals from here to discuss in Islamabad?*

*Secretary Kissinger:* No. The Prime Minister explained his general point of view to me, and I have no specific proposals. I am not acting as mediator, but as a friend.

*Q. Will you use your good offices in this respect to persuade Pakistan to come to an understanding with Bangladesh to solve the remaining problems?*

*Secretary Kissinger:* Well, I will explain what I have learned here.

*Q. Your Excellency, did (indistinct) with India with Pakistan?*

*Secretary Kissinger:* We did not discuss it, but in principle we are not averse to it, and this is a matter that we are prepared to take up.

*Q. Your Excellency, are you convinced that the economy of Bangladesh is viable?*

*Secretary Kissinger:* I think that Bangladesh—I am not an economist, but I think that there is great potential in this country, but as in many of the developing countries, there is a need for resources to begin the process of development, and the problem is to do it on a sufficient scale so that one is not simply going from crisis to crisis.

*Q. In view of the reports that former President Nixon is critically ill, might this alter your current travel plans?*

*Secretary Kissinger:* Well, I do not want to speculate on an eventuality that I hope will never arise.

**Dinner Hosted by Foreign Minister Hossain,  
Dacca, October 30**

Press release 456 dated October 31

*Toast by Foreign Minister Hossain*

It gives me great pleasure to extend on behalf of the Government and people of Bangladesh a warm welcome to you, to Mrs. Kissinger, and to the members of your dele-

gation, on your first visit to Bangladesh. We are indeed happy that you have found time, despite your many preoccupations, to come to Bangladesh soon after the recent meeting in Washington between President Ford and our Prime Minister Bangabandhu Sheikh Mujibur Rahman and our meeting in New York, when we were able to note with satisfaction the steady development of friendly relations between our two countries. Your visit to Bangladesh will contribute toward further development of the friendly relations which we both value.

The Bengalee people have known of the good will and friendly feelings that the American people have for them. Indeed, we recall with appreciation the sympathy and support of the people of the United States, including many of their representatives in Congress, during the difficult days of our liberation struggle. We therefore welcomed the establishment of relations between our governments soon after liberation and gratefully acknowledge the valuable economic assistance extended to us since liberation by the Government of the United States.

The emergence of sovereign, independent Bangladesh was a fulfillment of the aspiration of the Bengalee people to live in freedom. Independence meant for them an opportunity to recover from centuries of neglect and exploitation. The luxuriant green of Bangladesh reflects the innate fertility of our land. Yet today our people are prey to starvation and suffer from the scourges of poverty, hunger, disease, illiteracy, and unemployment.

Our highest priority upon independence has been to harness the resources with which nature had endowed us and which remained unexploited due to the investments necessary for their development having been denied in the past. Our fertile land, given investments in irrigation and inputs, has the latent potential for a three- to four-fold increase in food production, which, together with proper development of our other resources including deposits of natural gas, our forests, and our fisheries, would provide the foundations of a self-reliant economy. This task has been made enormously difficult by the impact of global

inflation, which has resulted in a steep escalation of the cost of development. The situation has been further aggravated by the devastating floods that we experienced this year.

The limits of endurance of a people have hardly been tested as those of the people of Bangladesh. Yet they have demonstrated, and continue to demonstrate, their strong determination to contend against adversity and to build a better future for themselves.

There is no doubt that the material assistance we have received from friendly countries, including the United States, has provided valuable support for the efforts of our people. Indeed, such support and assistance will continue to be of importance to our efforts to build a better life for our people.

We have steadfastly pursued an independent, nonaligned foreign policy, seeking to develop friendly relations with all countries on the basis of respect for sovereignty, equality, territorial integrity, and noninterference in each other's internal affairs. We have remained committed to the pursuit of peace in our subcontinent, in our region, and in the world. We have therefore appreciated, Mr. Secretary of State, your efforts for the promotion of détente and the easing of tensions in different parts of the world. It is our hope that lasting peace may be established in the Middle East in consonance with the just aspirations of our Arab brethren, including the people of Palestine.

We, who represent the poor and underprivileged majority of mankind, look forward to the creation of an enduring structure of peace in the world so that valuable resources may be released for promotion of the welfare of the people of the world. Involved as we are in fighting continuing battles in the global war against hunger, we have appreciated the contribution you have made in focusing attention on the problem of food and in proposing a world conference on this subject. It is our hope that this conference will result in a meaningful program of action to meet one of the most urgent problems of our times.

Consistently with our commitment to peace, we have striven to promote normalization of relations and the establishment

of durable peace in our subcontinent. We are fortunate in having the best of relations with our immediate neighbors. We have made our maximum contribution toward promoting normalization of relations with Pakistan. We remain ready to move forward toward this goal through solution of the remaining outstanding problems on the basis of discussions, in a spirit of fair play and mutual accommodation. We note with satisfaction that the Government of the United States has appreciated our efforts to promote the process of normalization in our subcontinent.

Mr. Secretary of State, your visit has provided a valuable opportunity to hold useful discussions, which will undoubtedly contribute toward further development of friendship and understanding between our two countries. We have appreciated your assurance that your great country will continue to extend valuable assistance to us in promoting the welfare of our people. I am confident that the bonds of friendship and cooperation between the United States of America and Bangladesh will continue to grow to the mutual benefit of our two governments and peoples.

Excellency, ladies and gentlemen, may I now request you to join me in a toast to the health, long life, and happiness of His Excellency Mr. Gerald R. Ford, President of the United States of America, to the health, long life, and happiness of our honored guest, Dr. Henry A. Kissinger, Secretary of State of the United States of America, and Mrs. Kissinger, and to the well-being and prosperity of the people of the United States of America.

#### *Toast by Secretary Kissinger*

Mr. Foreign Minister, Mrs. Hossain, distinguished guests: When I saw all these microphones brought and placed in front of us, I said to my friend the Foreign Minister that one of us had better say something intelligent and I am glad to know that he has already relieved me of any burdens that I may have with his eloquent toast. It is of

course difficult to respond to someone who speaks English better than I do.

I would like to express my great pleasure at being the first Secretary of State to visit Bangladesh, and it is a particular privilege for me because your Foreign Minister, whom I knew at Harvard, gave me an opportunity to renew my acquaintance with him first in New York and then here, and several other former colleagues from Harvard have also been invited to this occasion. But, above all, I am moved to be here because it is not often that one can visit a country whose courage and suffering earned its independence in a so-recent past and which symbolizes so much the necessities of our period.

Bangladesh has gone, in 10 years, from dependence to independence and now to interdependence. In the last century, when new nations came into being they thought they could then live a self-contained existence; and given the economies of that period, that was a reasonable aspiration. But Bangladesh came into being, as your Foreign Minister has pointed out, after centuries of suffering, at the precise moment when no nation could by its own methods achieve the aspirations of its people. All nations, however rich, however long established, have had to learn to live with the reality that all of us can achieve our objectives only by a common effort or not at all.

And so this country has found itself in a situation of increasing population, in a world of rising prices, and having to establish a basis for development and prosperity. The American people have always shared the aspirations for the independence and progress of Bangladesh and we have been able to contribute, to some small extent, to the realization of Bangladesh's hopes. We believe very strongly that a world in which children go hungry is an intolerable world and all of us, and all nations, face the problem of what to do about the challenge of food. Of course surplus countries can help, but the ultimate solution must be in increasing the productivity of the deficit countries,



and we agree with the Foreign Minister that in this respect the potential of Bangladesh has only begun to be tapped. The United States continues to be ready to cooperate with the deficit countries and especially with established friends like Bangladesh in achieving this aspiration.

In our talks this afternoon, we had an opportunity to discuss the whole range of development efforts of Bangladesh and to see in what way the efforts of other countries could be mobilized to help realize the aspirations of the people of this beautiful country. We agree that it is better to make a major effort than to stagger on from crisis to crisis overcoming only the symptoms.

As for the international goals stated by the Foreign Minister, they are compatible with the aspirations of my country for a world of diversity based on respect for national dignity and operating on the principles of equality and mutual accommodation. We hope that whatever disagreements remain on the subcontinent can be resolved in that same spirit, and we have applauded the generosity of spirit which Bangladesh has contributed to the negotiations that have been taking place in this area. The United States, whenever it can, will use its influence for a just and equitable peace, including, of course, in the critical area of the Middle East, and we know that those countries that cannot always participate directly in the negotiations will sustain us with their good wishes.

So, I want to say that my visit here has been too short. I have been touched by the warmth of Bengalee hospitality. I have been delighted to renew my acquaintance with so many old friends and to have met so many new ones. I was particularly pleased to have my talks with the Prime Minister, who had made a profound impression already when we met in New York and who had a very good and, I believe, very fruitful talk with President Ford.

So in bringing you the good wishes of our President I would like to propose a toast to the President of Bangladesh, to the Prime

Minister, to the Foreign Minister, and to the enduring friendship of our two peoples.

#### **Joint Communique Issued at the Conclusion of the Visit to Bangladesh<sup>6</sup>**

At the invitation of the Government of the People's Republic of Bangladesh, the United States Secretary of State Henry A. Kissinger, accompanied by Mrs. Kissinger, visited the People's Republic of Bangladesh on October 30 and 31, 1974. During his stay the Secretary of State was received by the President of the People's Republic of Bangladesh, Mr. Mohammadullah, the Prime Minister, Bangabandhu Sheikh Mujibur Rahman, and the Foreign Minister, Dr. Kamal Hossain. The President of Bangladesh expressed his pleasure at this visit, the first by an American Secretary of State to Bangladesh. On the evening of October 30 the Foreign Minister hosted a dinner and cultural presentation for the Secretary and Mrs. Kissinger.

The visit of the Secretary of State provided further opportunity to continue the discussions which started during the recent visit of the Prime Minister and the Foreign Minister to the United States at the time of the admission of Bangladesh to the United Nations.

The discussions were held in a cordial atmosphere reflecting the warmth in relations between Bangladesh and the United States. Subjects of discussion included the prospects for world peace, particularly in the Middle East, détente and the economic issues now affecting all the nations of the world.

Secretary Kissinger and Foreign Minister Hossain noted with particular satisfaction that the cordial relations between their two countries were developing satisfactorily to the mutual benefit of both. They agreed that the progress which has been made towards reconciliation among the nations of the Subcontinent since the events of 1971 is encouraging, and expressed the hope that the process of normalization will continue. Both governments took particular pleasure in noting the repatriation of about 230,000 persons between Bangladesh and Pakistan up to June of this year under the aegis of the UNHCR [United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees]. Both sides expressed the hope that all remaining issues would be satisfactorily resolved through negotiations for the benefit of the peoples of the Subcontinent and in the interest of peace, stability and progress in the region.

The Government of Bangladesh expressed appreciation for the assistance the United States has provided during the last three years, including recent bilateral agreements signed in Dacca covering food-

<sup>6</sup> Issued at Dacca on Oct. 30 (text from press release 457 dated Oct. 31).

grain and fertilizer loans amounting to approximately \$60 million worth of assistance. In addition, the substance of the discussions at the Aid-to-Bangladesh Meeting on October 24 and 25 in Paris was reviewed. Both sides agreed that this meeting represented a constructive development for the future of Bangladesh. The Bangladesh side expressed great satisfaction that the United States Government would assist Bangladesh within its capacity and that the United States would look forward to being an active participant in the efforts of the Aid-to-Bangladesh consortium to contribute to the future development of Bangladesh.

Both sides expressed the desire of their governments to continue their contacts and promote exchange at all levels aimed at the further development of friendly relations between the United States and Bangladesh.

## **THE VISIT TO PAKISTAN, OCTOBER 31- NOVEMBER 1**

### **Dinner Hosted by Prime Minister Bhutto, Rawalpindi, October 31**

Press release 459 dated November 1

#### *Toast by Prime Minister Bhutto*

Ladies and gentlemen: I have a written text of a speech in my pocket and I can take it out and read it. But it would be a dull conclusion to a very warm visit. So if you will bear with me, I would like to depart from the text and say a few words only which come sincerely from my heart. And since they come from my heart, this toast and this speech is not for Dr. Kissinger, the Secretary of State, but for Mrs. Kissinger, for one of two reasons. Firstly because they have been recently married; and she can say: "Well, you cannot say we have been recently married. We've been married for a few weeks or a few months." But a person like me, having been married for 20 years, would say, What are a few weeks or a few months? Especially when you travel so much, and Dr. Kissinger goes all over the world, leaving you behind in Washington, D.C., drab and dreary Washington, D.C. But you can read his books when he is gone. So this is a toast for Mrs. Kissinger and not for the Secretary of State. I re-

member fondly "Waltzing Matilda," but we prefer tilting Kissinger. But they say that Dr. Kissinger doesn't tilt anymore—but why did he get married?

We welcome you to Pakistan, Dr. Kissinger and Mrs. Kissinger. Your visit here is too short. But I know how terribly busy you are looking after your global responsibilities, and global responsibilities for a great power mean a lot to all of us because it means a world of peace and a world of stability. And we are all anxious to have peace and stability.

We know the great contributions your country has made and you have made as the exponent of your country's foreign policy for the achievement of a world equilibrium without an idealistic approach to world affairs. But when I say that it has not been idealistic, it does not mean that it has been devoid of idealism. Idealism can never be forgotten in this pragmatic world.

We who are your admirers would like you to be considered as a modern Metternich. But the difference is that Metternich's nation had lost the war and Metternich came after a Napoleon. You are casting and evolving the foreign policy of a great country without a war and as a victorious nation.

The economic and political situation is saturated. In a saturated economic and political situation, profound changes are difficult to achieve.

After the First World War and the Second World War it was possible to have a new international order, because you had to build a new international order on the ashes of war and on the debris of war. But when you have to evolve a new international economic and social order without war, without a clean slate, it is a more ingenious effort, and it requires more patience and more understanding of the whole international community.

What with the energy crisis, what with international inflation, what with the situation in Europe and in the Middle East and the situation evolving throughout the world—where are you going to pull the pulley and leave the structure intact? The pulleys have to be pulled, and yet the structure has to be kept intact. This is why your job is unen-

vious, and that is why you will have to devise new methods. You will have to bring to bear your full imagination, imagination of your great people. You have to have the forbearance of the pyramids.

You'll have to negotiate with different powers, different countries, different peoples, with conflicting interests and with different positions. And you have to waltz out of that situation like "Waltzing Matilda." Now, that's why we feel sorry for you—that on the one hand, you represent the greatest power on earth; on the other hand, you are incapacitated by the very power that you hold. We who come from smaller countries can express our views. We can express our views more freely. But these views do not have an affect on the changes in the international structure.

You have just come from India and Bangladesh. Believe me, we will be happy if your visit to India is successful and if your visit to Bangladesh is successful. You might say, is it not strange that Pakistan should say that, Pakistan with her differences with India, historical, way back God knows to when, time immemorial, thousands of years if not hundreds? But we say this is a new world. This is a different world. And we accept your position. We accept your big role in world affairs. You have come from Bangladesh, which was a part of our country. It is no longer a part of our country. Otherwise, three years ago, you would have come from East Pakistan into West Pakistan. Now they are separate. We wish them well. We would like them to prosper. We would like them to be happy, because in the subcontinent the biggest task we have is to face poverty and misery. If we can find a just solution to our problems—and we know that you will be happy if we can find these solutions—we would be very happy.

We have had very useful discussions today. I am happy with those discussions; I am very satisfied. Now the journalists, they will badger you tomorrow. I don't want the journalists to badger Dr. Kissinger. He has got enough problems as it is. And therefore, I'd like to tell the journalists that why do you want to trouble him unnecessarily and ask him silly

questions, pointed questions, "box items." Forget the box items, the small questions, forget the headlines. I say I am satisfied, and I speak now as a representative of Pakistan, and when I say I am satisfied, well then, that's enough.

And why should we expect results instantaneously? Results don't come instantaneously. We are not going into a cafeteria to order a hamburger. The question is that we have had discussions and I am satisfied with these discussions. That's good enough. It's the tip of the iceberg, and you shouldn't expect immediate results, or spontaneous, instantaneous decisions. Those days are gone. Those days no longer exist.

So I would say don't bother about the journalists. You go to Kabul. Say hello to Daoud for me and tell him that we'd like to be friends with them, and when you go after that to Iran, please give our warmest regards and affection and respects to His Majesty the Shah of Iran, with whom we have very close and cordial relations. And we wish you a very good journey to Rome, where we hope you will rest a little; and if your speech is still unwritten we have an excellent man in the Ministry of Agriculture, Mr. [Malik] Bucha, who can write a very good speech for you if you want him to write that speech.

So go back to the United States feeling satisfied with what you have achieved. And you have achieved a great deal. The fact that you have gone to India, the fact that you have gone to all these countries and come to us—we feel satisfied, we feel happy with your visit here. We wish you and Mrs. Kissinger to come again and stay a little longer in our country. You are always welcome; your leaders are always welcome.

And finally, ladies and gentlemen, I would like you to join me in a toast to Dr. Kissinger and his charming wife, Mrs. Kissinger, to our friendship with the United States of America—which is not a new friendship. It's an old friendship, it is over a generation, and it is a constant friendship. It has not gone through ups and downs. It has gone up and up, and there is no question of its going through ups and downs; because when you

have fundamental friendship, it doesn't go down—it goes up or it stays steady.

*Toast by Secretary Kissinger*

Mr. Prime Minister, Mrs. Bhutto, Excellencies, ladies and gentlemen: I wish, Mr. Prime Minister, you had pulled the speech from your pocket and read something pedantic and bureaucratic—which is what is usually prepared for one—because then my difficulty in following one of the more eloquent men of our times would not be so great. Of course the Prime Minister knows very well that his remarks about the press were not designed to calm them down, they were an incitement to riot. [Laughter.]

I appreciate the very warm remarks, and coming to this country is always returning to old friends. This is my second visit here as Secretary of State, and I met the Prime Minister for the first time under circumstances that were very difficult for Pakistan.

I admired his wisdom in that difficult period. And I could see how he had rebuilt a nation from a situation that could not have been more complex. And having lived through that period with him for a few days, I would like to remark on the generosity of spirit that was reflected in what he said about the relationship of Pakistan to India and to Bangladesh.

There is sometimes speculation of what I do when I go on these trips. And there are some articles that claim that I tell everybody what they would like to hear. The fact is that I try to tell everybody exactly the same thing. When I was in India, I pointed out that the United States believed in the process of peaceful accommodation in the subcontinent, that it welcomed the negotiations that were going on, and that it strongly favored a peaceful solution. But I also said there, as I say here, that the United States has an interest in a secure and unified and independent and sovereign Pakistan. And on this basis I believe that peace on the subcontinent can be achieved for the benefit of all of its people.

I appreciate very much, Mr. Prime Minister, your observations about the international

scene, because it is true that what the world faces today is how to build a peaceful international order for which there is no precedent. And in the absence of catastrophe, for which there is no immediate impetus, it is moreover a peaceful order which cannot be based simply on the equilibrium of power, because that is too dangerous. But also without an equilibrium, life is too insecure. But it must also reflect a sense of justice, where all the nations feel that they have a stake in maintaining that new international system.

Despite differences of ideology and despite differences in history, the United States is trying to do its bit in bringing about in this world conditions of a degree of interdependence which is unique in history. I have been speaking about the problem of interdependence for the last year. And I thought that I had been in the forefront of those who had coined this concept. But then I came across this speech of the Prime Minister, who as usual said the same thing more eloquently than I did. He said:

The world today is very different than the world in which Pakistan emerged an an independent nation 26 years ago. The passage of time has witnessed a gradual but perceptible transformation in the minds of men and their vision of the world. Competing ideologies no longer cause the fear or inspire the fervor that characterized the era of the Cold War. Above all, there is a greater perception of global unity and interdependence—a concern for using the world's riches more beneficially and sharing them more equitably—and a concept of justice and fairness transcending national frontiers.

Mr. Prime Minister, these views reflect exactly our attitude. And I have taken the liberty of quoting you because, when the formal talks are over and when one speaks of specific issues here and there, one tends to forget that the only reliable guarantee of nations dealing with each other is whether they have the same perception of the world and the same general objective with respect to the nature of peace.

I have appreciated in our talks today, Mr. Prime Minister, that we did not get lost in trivialities and spoke about the essentials. I share your feeling that the talks were useful

and that, as always, we talked as old friends and as constant friends. And I know that whenever we will come back here or whenever an American Secretary of State or President comes here, he will be meeting old and reliable friends.

And it is in this spirit that I would like to propose a toast to the Prime Minister and Mrs. Bhutto, to the people of Pakistan, and to the friendship between Pakistan and the United States.

#### **Joint Communique Issued at the Conclusion of the Visit to Pakistan <sup>7</sup>**

At the invitation of Prime Minister Zulfikar Ali Bhutto, the United States Secretary of State, Dr. Henry Kissinger, visited Pakistan from October 31 to November 1. Secretary Kissinger held comprehensive discussions with the Prime Minister and Minister of State [for Foreign Affairs and for Defense] Aziz Ahmed on Pakistan-United States bilateral relations and on a broad range of other international issues. The discussions took place in an atmosphere of mutual understanding and respect, in keeping with the special friendship and close ties that exist between Pakistan and the United States.

The Secretary conveyed to the Prime Minister, President Ford's personal greetings and reiterated the President's desire to maintain and expand the close and friendly relations which have traditionally existed between the two nations. The Prime Minister warmly reciprocated President Ford's message and welcomed the President's assurances that the U.S. would continue to support the sovereignty and territorial integrity of a strong, secure and prosperous Pakistan as an important element in the maintenance of international peace, and that this would remain an important principle of American foreign policy. The Prime Minister and the Secretary agreed that mutual respect for the principles of sovereignty, territorial integrity and non-interference in internal affairs was essential for peaceful relations among all states.

The Prime Minister reviewed with the Secretary the efforts the Government of Pakistan has made to restore peace and bolster stability in the South Asian region. The Secretary expressed U.S. admiration of the Prime Minister's efforts to normalize Pakistan's relations with India and Bangladesh. He told the Prime Minister that the visits he had recently completed to New Delhi and Dacca had heightened his awareness of the importance of the normalization process and his confidence in its continued progress.

<sup>7</sup> Issued at Islamabad on Oct. 31 (text from press release 460).

He expressed his particular satisfaction with the progress Pakistan and India had made in moving forward together toward the implementation of the provisions of the 1972 Simla Agreement.

The Prime Minister called the Secretary's attention to the proposal for a nuclear weapons free zone in South Asia which Pakistan has sponsored in the current session of the United Nations General Assembly. They took note of the adverse implications for stability of nuclear proliferation and agreed that renewed efforts should be made to prevent the spread of nuclear weapons.

The Prime Minister expressed his government's continued appreciation for the economic assistance the U.S. has over the years provided Pakistan. He welcomed the United States Government's decision to furnish approximately 100,000 tons of wheat under Public Law 480 program to help meet Pakistan's immediate needs. The Secretary assured the Prime Minister that the U.S. would continue to give careful consideration to Pakistan's additional requirements.

The Prime Minister and the Secretary took note of the increasing world economic interdependence and expressed concern over the steep rise in price levels of essential goods. They stressed the need for cooperative endeavors by all the governments concerned to prevent further aggravation of the world economic situation. They hoped that the forthcoming World Food Conference in Rome would succeed in taking necessary steps to stabilize the food situation and especially to mitigate the serious food shortages faced by the most seriously affected developing countries.

The Secretary welcomed the initiatives being taken by the Government of Pakistan designed to achieve self-sufficiency in food for Pakistan itself and to expand Pakistan's food exports to deficit countries. He noted that the U.S. has been assisting the Government of Pakistan's expanded agricultural research efforts and pledged further U.S. assistance in such high priority areas as fertilizer production and water resources utilization.

The Prime Minister and the Secretary reviewed the efforts now going forward to bring about further progress toward a just and lasting solution to the problems of the Middle East. The Prime Minister commended the Secretary for the initiatives he had taken during his recent visit to Middle Eastern capitals and urged him to continue these valuable efforts.

The Secretary expressed his deep appreciation to the Prime Minister for the warm hospitality he and his colleagues had again received in Pakistan. He and the Prime Minister agreed that the discussions they had held had been most useful and they looked forward to meeting again to exchange views. In this connection, Secretary Kissinger delivered an invitation to Prime Minister Bhutto from President Ford

to visit with him in Washington at a mutually convenient date within the first three months of the coming year. The Prime Minister accepted the invitation with pleasure. The Prime Minister conveyed an invitation for President Ford to visit Pakistan in 1975, and Secretary Kissinger accepted the invitation on behalf of the President.

## THE VISIT TO AFGHANISTAN, NOVEMBER 1

### Joint Statement Issued at the Conclusion of Secretary Kissinger's Discussions<sup>8</sup>

United States Secretary of State, Henry A. Kissinger, paid an official visit to the Republic of Afghanistan on November 1, 1974, at the invitation of the Government of Afghanistan. During his stay he was received by the Head of State and Prime Minister, Mohammad Daoud and met Mr. Mohammad Naim [adviser to the Prime Minister] and Deputy Foreign Minister Waheed Abdullah. He had lunch with the Head of State and Prime Minister Mohammad Daoud.

The two sides conducted frank discussions on a wide range of issues in the friendly atmosphere that characterizes U.S.-Afghan relations. The topics included bilateral relations, recent developments in the Near East and South Asia region, progress in international détente, and the mutual interests of both nations of securing a peaceful, stable, and cooperative world. The Afghan side informed Secretary Kissinger of its views and position on a number of international issues including the situation prevailing in the region to which Afghanistan belongs. Secretary Kissinger informed the Afghan side of his discussions with other governments in the region. They agreed that the way to find lasting, durable and peaceful solutions to existing problems and differences between states is through constructive and thorough discussions among all sides concerned.

Both sides expressed pleasure at the warm and friendly relations between their governments. In expressing his appreciation for this opportunity to visit Afghanistan, the Secretary affirmed his admiration for progress being made by the government and people of the Republic of Afghanistan. Secretary Kissinger also conveyed to President Daoud warm personal wishes from President Ford.

The Afghan and American sides stressed the importance of international cooperation in the field of economic and technical development and its major role in strengthening international stability and peace. The Afghan side expressed its pleasure at the contribution towards this end being made by the United States in Afghanistan through bilateral economic, technical, and educational cooperation.

<sup>8</sup> Issued at Kabul on Nov. 1 (text from press release 462).

The Secretary expressed the continuing desire of the United States to cooperate with the Republic of Afghanistan in achieving its economic development goals. In this connection the Secretary informed the Afghan side that he will ask a senior official of the U.S. Agency for International Development to visit Afghanistan in the near future to review with the Afghan authorities joint programs and progress in bringing projects to fruition.

## THE VISIT TO IRAN, NOVEMBER 1-3

### News Conference by Secretary Kissinger and Minister Ansary, Tehran, November 2

Press release 464 dated November 2

*Minister of Economic Affairs and Finance Hushang Ansary:* Gentlemen, we have just emerged from a meeting with Secretary of State Henry Kissinger and his distinguished colleagues. At this meeting let me start by saying we have expressed our pleasure and privilege at the opportunity to have the Secretary here in Iran and to discuss matters of mutual interest, not only with His Imperial Majesty the Shahanshah as was done last night, but also here at this Ministry in connection with the various aspects of our cooperation between the United States and Iran.

I took the opportunity at the meeting with the Secretary to express our great appreciation for the good work he has done and is continuing in connection with peacemaking efforts in the Middle East. We have followed his itinerary very closely, and we are highly appreciative of his personal contributions, which have been great, in bringing about conditions to create peace and stability in the area, as we have always felt in this country it is high time that the people of the region in this part of the world disengage themselves from the problems of confrontation and, instead, embark on extensive programs of economic development and social reform that should be aimed at raising the standard of living and insuring welfare and prosperity for the people of these countries. In that respect, we have expressed not only our appreciation for the great contributions of the Secretary of State but also wished him continued success in his efforts.

May I say also that we are very pleased that, concurrent with the visit of the Secretary, agreement has been reached on the formation of a Joint Commission at ministerial level to oversee and supervise the development of relations between the countries in many areas of special interest, including political and economic, scientific, cultural, and other subjects of interest. We are gratified that the Secretary personally has agreed to co-chair the Commission, and we are certain that as a result of the talks that we had this morning, the Commission should be able to make important contributions to the development of relations between the two countries, a relationship that has traditionally been very close and will continue to be close, taking its inspiration from the wishes of His Imperial Majesty and the leaders of your country, the United States. With that brief remark, ladies and gentlemen, may I now give you the Secretary of State.

*Secretary Kissinger:* Mr. Minister, ladies and gentlemen, after reading some of the accounts about the Iranian-American relationships over recent weeks, I think it is important to emphasize that I've come here to visit old and trusted and steady friends. All of my colleagues and I have been very grateful for the traditionally cordial and warm reception we have had here. I have had the privilege of spending over two hours with His Imperial Majesty last evening, and this morning the Minister of Finance and I, as well as our associates, had a very full exchange about the Commission that we have agreed to set up—but a Commission that makes sense only within the framework of compatible views about the future evolution of this area and of the world economy.

So all our talks here have been very positive and with an attitude that we share a common destiny. I think the communique speaks for itself, and I see no point in reviewing it. But it makes clear that a considerable amount of attention was devoted to a review of the international situation, in which we always benefit from His Majesty's advice and perceptions.

Another important part of our discussions both last evening and this morning was de-

voted to the future of the world and how to master some of the current dislocations. With respect to the related problems of energy, food, and inflation, there is a clear recognition on both sides that the stability and progress of the industrialized world as well as the development of the least developed parts of the world are essential to maintaining all that has been achieved in the last generation and equally essential to the future peace and stability of the whole world.

It was in this context—that of the general economic set of relationships—that the question of oil prices was discussed in a constructive and positive spirit and with a sense of hopeful evolution with respect to the contribution that can be made to the objective that I previously stated. Our Iranian friends have, in addition, a full recognition of the crucial importance of the problem of food, and we have discussed several methods by which our two countries can cooperate in meeting the needs of the world for additional food and for additional resources to produce more food.

And finally, we discussed in this context the necessity of mastering the world inflation, because none of these problems can be dealt with on an isolated basis. Within the next month we will set up subgroups in various fields including those that have been mentioned by the Minister of Finance and myself, which have been assured of the highest level attention in both countries, charged with preparing, hopefully, within six months, major advances in these fields for another meeting of the Joint Commission, which we plan to hold in Washington, though we will not be able to match the hospitality—and you will have to keep in mind that we have a shorter history in which to learn these civilized methods.

So, we are very pleased with our meeting here, and I would like to express my appreciation and to convey the greetings of President Ford, who hopes to make the acquaintance of His Imperial Majesty very soon.

*Q. Mr. Secretary, will you take some questions?*

*Secretary Kissinger:* Yes.

*Q. Put maybe overly simply, the United States favors lower oil prices, and Iran has favored higher oil prices. Based on your visit here, do you think there will be any narrowing of the views on prices?*

*Secretary Kissinger:* I think of course the statement of the issue, as you yourself said, is overly simple. I think that you of course all have to keep in mind that Iran cannot make these decisions unilaterally and will have to consult its partners in OPEC [Organization of Petroleum Exporting Countries] about any conclusions that it may reach with respect to oil prices. I think the views with respect to the linked problems of oil prices and inflation have been brought closer.

*Q. The suggestion of that, sir, is that you would hope that Iran at some point in the near future would use its influence in the direction of lowering prices. Is that correct?*

*Secretary Kissinger:* Well, as I've tried to explain on a number of occasions, the oil price problem has many aspects. When prices have been rising, there are many other things that can be done other than immediately lowering them. But, first of all, some of you will have an opportunity to meet with His Imperial Majesty. Secondly, I do not think it would be appropriate for me to go into details except to say that we had a constructive and positive talk on the subject and that our views have been brought closer.

*Q. Mr. Secretary, are you hopeful that in the medium run that oil prices might be reduced?*

*Secretary Kissinger:* I'm hopeful that the impact of oil prices on the world economy can be brought under control, and I believe that this requires, on the other side, some recognition of the impact of the inflation of the world on the oil-producing countries. But I think in that framework progress is possible.

*Q. But in the immediate future, do you anticipate any further rise in oil prices, perhaps not a very great one, but a further rise as a result of the OPEC meeting in Vienna?*

*Secretary Kissinger:* Well, I think we should wait until we see what His Imperial Majesty will propose at the OPEC meeting. Of course the hope of the United States is that further rises can be avoided.

*Q. Mr. Secretary, did you discuss with the Shah the prospects for a possible meeting between producers and the consumers anytime soon?*

*Secretary Kissinger:* Yes, we discussed the initiatives that have been made with respect to meetings of producers and consumers. I explained to His Imperial Majesty the general American approach to the problem of the dialogues. We, in any event, will remain in close contact with His Majesty, as we traditionally do, to make sure that we understand each other's views. The United States is not opposed to a dialogue between consumers and producers, and the problem is to conduct it in such a manner that it will achieve the desired results for both parties.

*Q. Mr. Secretary, on the Middle East, did you have a considerable discussion with the Shah on this issue, and would you tell us whether there is any fundamental difference in U.S. and Iranian views?*

*Secretary Kissinger:* I had an extensive discussion with His Imperial Majesty on the Middle East and benefited from his evaluation of the situation. I believe that, as has been the case in the past, our analysis is substantially congruent.

*Q. Mr. Secretary, what is the American view on His Imperial Majesty's proposal for a fixed price of just under \$10?*

*Secretary Kissinger:* We are not, in principle, opposed to the idea of a fixed price, but we are studying it further.

*Q. Mr. Secretary, has the question of food supply been linked with the question of energy supply?*

*Secretary Kissinger:* No, the issue of food supply has not been linked with the issue of energy supply. But on the other hand, there is an inherent connection between the will-



ingness of the world to take a global view to one problem and the ability of the world to take a global view to the other problem. This is not a question of a condition; this is a question of the approach.

We will proceed with our food policy without reference to any decisions that have been made or will be made. But any thoughtful person must recognize that reality establishes a connection between the ability of the world to deal globally with its problems in various fields.

But I would also like to add that, at least as far as Iran and the United States are concerned, this is not a problem.

*Q. Mr. Secretary, what is the U.S. view on the role that Iran should play in the Indian Ocean?*

*Secretary Kissinger:* Well, as you know, I'm trying to curb the missionary spirit in our bureaucracy, and therefore I'm trying to reduce our natural propensity of telling other people what to do. But Iran, by virtue of its resources, its political cohesion, and its perception of itself, can play a significant and stabilizing role. It has already attempted to contribute, and not without success, to easing relations between several of its neighbors, and I believe that this is a role it can continue to play.

In the field of agriculture, for example, Iran can make a major contribution to enhancing the productivity of other countries in the Indian Ocean, and we discussed various methods by which our technology and the Iranian resources can combine to bring this about, which will become apparent during and after the World Food Conference. So we consider that Iran's role in the Indian Ocean is a constructive one and one which we tend to support.

*Q. Mr. Secretary, can you tell us whether the United States is moving toward a reassessment of its attitudes toward the Palestinian Liberation Organization, and whether this subject came up—*

*Secretary Kissinger:* I have to tell you, Mr. Minister, this is the press that travels with

me that normally sees me on background, and now they are trying to ask on the record all the questions to which they have already heard my answers on background. [Laughter.] As I've pointed out to you gentlemen previously—

*Minister Ansary:* They were wondering if you'd changed your mind—

*Secretary Kissinger:* No, they want to get it on the record. As I pointed out to you gentlemen previously, I will probably visit the Middle East next week in order to assess and to talk to the participants at the Rabat summit and to other countries in the area that for obvious reasons were not at the Rabat summit about their conclusions with respect to recent events. The United States is not, at this moment, undertaking a reassessment of its policy; after I return from the area, naturally, the President and his senior advisers will consider the overall situation.

But I do not expect a change in American policy.

*Q. Mr. Secretary, following up on Mr. Koppel's [Ted Koppel, ABC News] question about the Indian Ocean, did you discuss with the Shah the prospect of an American base on the island of Diego Garcia? Could you tell us a little about that?*

*Secretary Kissinger:* I will answer that question, but I think you gentlemen have to recognize that I cannot in this press conference give a full account of a four-hour discussion with the Shah. We did not discuss this issue. But could we have some questions from the Iranian journalists present?

*Q. Yes. Mr. Secretary, could you kindly tell me if there is any chance of Iranian investment in American companies, like Iranian investment in Germany's Krupp Company?*

*Secretary Kissinger:* It is not an issue that came up directly, but it is the sort of issue that would be addressed by the Joint Commission. I can say that in principle we have no objection to this.

*Q. Mr. Secretary, will the work of the Joint Commission be limited to the bilateral*

*relations, or will you be doing things together in turn?*

*Secretary Kissinger:* Now, the work of the Commission will include such problems as possible investment in third countries, for example, and it will address itself, I believe, also to what can be contributed through our bilateral relations to the regional development in, for example, the Indian Ocean.

*Q. Mr. Secretary, did the question of arms deliveries to Iran come up, and if so, in what context?*

*Secretary Kissinger:* Well, as you know, we have an ongoing arms relationship with Iran, and one or two issues in connection with this came up tangentially. There there is no policy issue that requires a great deal of consideration at this moment.

*Q. Mr. Secretary, at the outset you said that the Joint Commission only makes sense in the light of the compatible views of the two countries on the world economy. Do you consider, after your talks, that both nations have a compatible view now on the world economy?*

*Secretary Kissinger:* I said that His Imperial Majesty and I discussed how essential it was for the industrial nations to maintain their stability, their possibility for progress, for maintaining the kind of earth that brought us to the present situation, or that brought us not to the present situation but brought about the evolution of the whole post-World War II period; and secondly, also, the necessity of helping the least developed countries. I believe, with respect to those objectives and to the objectives of bringing about global solutions to the problems of energy, food, and inflation, the objectives of the United States and Iran can be said to be substantially compatible.

*Q. Mr. Secretary, does what you have said on oil previously mean that you now expect Iran to support efforts to hold the line on oil prices?*

*Secretary Kissinger:* I don't think I should be any more specific than I have been, and I

think that you will just have to wait to see what position Iran will take.

*Q. Mr. Secretary, nevertheless, in speaking of the United States and leaving Iran out of it, you said that the hope of the United States is that further rises can be avoided. What happens to our hope for lower prices?*

*Secretary Kissinger:* Before you can have lower prices, you have to have stable prices.

*Q. Mr. Secretary, Iran has proposed this unitary price of \$9.85 in the gulf. Do you regard this as a true weighted average reflecting current rates in the gulf, or as an increase?*

*Secretary Kissinger:* I was warned before I got here under no circumstances to get myself involved in a detailed discussion of oil prices, because my Iranian counterpart would be infinitely more competent than I and would overwhelm me with statistics. So I'm not prepared to go into a discussion of what price would be considered the correct price by the United States or a price from which indexing might be considered appropriate. But it is one of the problems that has to be discussed.

*Q. Can we ask, perhaps, the question from Mr. Ansary? How would Iran regard an arbitration of the present oil price?*

*Minister Ansary:* Well, as you know, His Imperial Majesty has proposed that he would be prepared to link the price of oil with the rate of inflation in the industrial countries. Once you link the two together, they can move in either direction together.

*Q. Mr. Minister, when you say once you link them together they can move in either direction, do you believe that, in a period when there is massive world inflation, it is realistic to expect a downward trend in oil prices linked to a downward trend in other commodity prices?*

*Minister Ansary:* I stand on my statement that the idea is to link the two together. Once you do that, they both have the same destiny. Now, whether it's realistic or not depends on

the approach that we all make to the problem, toward inflation.

*Q. Mr. Ansary, I wasn't challenging your statement by any means, sir. I was seeking further amplification of it.*

*Minister Ansary:* As you know, we're all concerned with the rampant inflation with which the world has been faced. This proposal was made initially by His Imperial Majesty in the context of his desire for the entire community of nations to cooperate in lowering the rate of inflation, which is only beneficial to the entire world community.

*Q. Mr. Minister, does Iran want to mate the two at the present levels, when the price of oil is artificially high, or would it be willing to go back to some previous index level from previous years?*

*Minister Ansary:* All I can say is that linking can only take place at the time you talk about it. There was no question of making the link retroactive.

*Q. Mr. Secretary, did you and His Majesty specifically discuss his plan for indexing and for linking 20 or 30 commodities to the price of oil? And if so, I assume you're familiar with the criticism of that, that it amounts to institutionalizing inflation. Did that come up?*

*Secretary Kissinger:* Yes, that came up, and I will have to stand on what I said; I cannot go into more detail about it. I repeat what I said, that what we discussed was within the context of considering the impact on the world economy, especially on the industrialized nations as well as on the least developed nations, of the energy crisis, as well as the impact, on the producers, of inflation.

Now, obviously it is in neither side's interest to build an institutionalized system that accentuates the tendencies on both sides. And some means will have to be found to take account of these objectives, and I left the meeting with some encouragement that an evolution in a constructive direction was possible. Now, what form this will take, one will have to await Iran's proposals at the OPEC

meetings and other discussions that may take place.

*Minister Ansary:* Thank you very much, Mr. Secretary. I think since the Secretary has to leave for the airport immediately in about five minutes from now, we'll close the meeting. Thank you very much.

#### **Joint Communique Issued at the Conclusion of the Visit to Iran <sup>9</sup>**

At the invitation of the Government of Iran the Secretary of State of the United States, Dr. Henry A. Kissinger, visited Iran November 1-3, 1974. The visit was another expression of long-standing close and friendly relations between the two countries and their interest in further strengthening the ties between them.

During the visit Dr. Kissinger was received by His Imperial Majesty, Mohammad Reza Shah Pahlavi, Shahanshah of Iran. Secretary Kissinger conveyed to His Majesty the warm personal greetings of President Ford, together with the President's expressions of appreciation for His Majesty's leadership and statesmanlike role in world affairs. His Majesty and the Secretary of State reviewed the international situation and discussed matters of bilateral interest in the spirit of mutual respect and understanding that has long characterized U.S.-Iranian relations. Dr. Kissinger also met with Minister of Foreign Affairs Dr. Abbas Ali Khalatbary and Minister of Economic Affairs and Finance Hushang Ansary.

In their review of the international situation the two sides expressed satisfaction with the progress toward global détente and agreed on the need for further efforts to reduce tensions. The two sides also noted their close similarity of views on regional security issues. The U.S. side expressed its continuing support for Iran's programs to strengthen itself and to work cooperatively with its neighbors in the Persian Gulf and wider Indian Ocean regions. It also stated appreciation for Iranian efforts to promote peaceful solutions to disputes among its neighbors. The Iranian side explained its concept of increasing economic cooperation among the countries on the Indian Ocean littoral. Both sides reaffirmed their continued support of CENTO [Central Treaty Organization] and the contribution which it makes to regional security and economic development.

Secretary Kissinger described the efforts the United States is making in search of a lasting peaceful resolution of the Arab-Israeli conflict. The Secretary reaffirmed the determination of the United

<sup>9</sup> Issued at Tehran on Nov. 2 (text from press release 463).

States to press its efforts to help maintain the momentum of the negotiations begun earlier this year. The Iranian side reaffirmed its support for the peace-making efforts of the United States.

The two sides engaged in a full, constructive and friendly discussion of the global petroleum price and supply question in the context of a review of the overall world economic situation. The two sides also reviewed other aspects of the world economic situation and agreed on the need for cooperative efforts to check inflation and avert the common misfortune of a major economic crisis. The Iranian side explained its programs of bilateral financial assistance to other countries and its proposal for a new multilateral organization to aid developing countries. The American side welcomed Iran's far-sighted policies in this respect. The two sides agreed to cooperate in global and regional programs to eliminate the world food deficit. The two sides agreed to form a U.S.-Iran Joint Commission designed to increase and intensify the ties of cooperation that already exist between the two countries. It was decided that the U.S. Secretary of State and the Iranian Minister of Economic Affairs and Finance would serve as the co-chairmen of the Commission. The first meeting of the Joint Commission, which was held November 2, laid out a broad program of cooperation in the political, economic, cultural, defense, scientific, and technological fields. Joint working groups will be formed to carry out the work of the Commission and to enlist the energies and skills of governmental and private institutions in fulfilling the aims of the Commission. The next meeting of the Commission will be held in Washington next year.

A major element in the work of the Joint Commission will be a program in the field of nuclear energy, especially power generation, for which an agreement for cooperation is now under discussion. Meanwhile, contracts have been signed under which the United States is to provide enriched fuel for two power reactors. Contracts for fuel for six additional reactors will be signed in the near future. Iran will be discussing construction of the reactors with American firms. The Iranian side has also expressed interest in participating in a proposed commercial uranium enrichment facility to be built in the United States. The two sides were in full agreement on the need for better national and international controls over nuclear materials to prevent them from falling into irresponsible hands. They further agreed that every effort should be made to discourage further national development of nuclear weapons capabilities building on the principles of the Non-Proliferation Treaty to which both are parties.

Among other fields in which cooperation is already underway and will be further expanded are joint ventures with Iran in the fields of agriculture, the development of petrochemical and electronics industries, as well as animal husbandry, telecommunications, highway construction, geology, space tech-

nology, education and social services. Other fields of cooperation will be developed as the work of the Joint Commission progresses.

## THE VISIT TO ROMANIA, NOVEMBER 3-4

### Remarks by Secretary Kissinger to the Romanian Press, Bucharest, November 3

Press release 465 dated November 4

*Q. Your visit in Romania—the talks you have had and the contacts you made. Maybe you'll comment on them?*

*Secretary Kissinger:* The United States attaches considerable importance to its friendly relations with Romania. We have exchanged ideas over the years on a variety of subjects, and this is a continuation of the dialogue about international affairs and possibilities of the economic cooperation between Romania and the United States.

*Q. How do you characterize the talks you have had with the President?*

*Secretary Kissinger:* I consider the talks I have had with the President constructive, wide ranging, and friendly.

*Q. How do you see the development of American-Romanian relations?*

*Secretary Kissinger:* Well, I am hopeful that with the passage of the trade bill in the next month or so we will be able to extend most-favored-nation status to Romania, which would give new impetus to our economic relations. Our political relations have already been good, and we will maintain the close contact that has characterized them, so I think we are in a period which will show even more improvement in our relations.

*Q. Mr. Secretary, what is in your opinion the most controversial issue of the world which, if resolved quickly, would insure lasting peace in the world?*

*Secretary Kissinger:* There are several issues, but the Middle East problem is certainly one of the most difficult ones.

*Q. How precise could you be about your*

*scheduled trip to the Middle East? How do you see the continued prospects for negotiations after the Arab summit?*

*Secretary Kissinger:* Well, we have announced today that I will be visiting Cairo, Riyadh, Amman, Damascus, and Jerusalem starting Tuesday, and the purpose of the trip is to assess the significance of the Arab summit for peace negotiations in the Middle East. As far as the United States is concerned, our position is clear. We will do our utmost to promote a just and lasting peace in the Middle East within the framework of the relevant Security Council resolutions, and we will work with the parties that are interested to bring about such a peace.

*Q. What is the U.S. position for the European Security Conference?*

*Secretary Kissinger:* The United States favors the completion of the European Security Conference as expeditiously as it can be arranged, and we support the negotiations that are going on and take an active part in them.

*Q. There is much talk lately about new economic order in the world. How would you comment on that?*

*Secretary Kissinger:* Well, I have to comment favorably, because I made some of these speeches. I believe that the combination of the energy crisis, the food crisis, and inflation in many countries produces the need for global solutions in a number of fields. I'm going to the World Food Conference in Rome on Tuesday, and I plan to make some statements of the American position with respect to worldwide agricultural problems, and I think there is a necessity to organize ourselves to meet these needs.

*Q. Your Excellency, what are the roles of the small and middle-sized countries in solving the international problems?*

*Secretary Kissinger:* We are living in a world now where the superpowers can, and should, no longer attempt to control all decisions, because power is more diffused, and you cannot build a lasting peace except on the

agreement of all of the countries that will be affected by it.

### **Dinner Hosted by President Ceausescu, Bucharest, November 3**

Press release 466 dated November 4

#### *Toast by President Ceausescu*

I would like to express my satisfaction for the visit Secretary of State Kissinger is making to Romania, and I hope that this will mark a new stage in the development of cooperation between our countries. This is the second visit which the Secretary of State is making to Romania. I hope that his third visit will take place soon, together with President Ford.

I toast the good cooperation between our countries, and I wish the U.S. Secretary of State success in his activity and good health.

To the President of the United States.

#### *Toast by Secretary Kissinger*

I had the privilege to visit Romania five years ago, when I accompanied President Nixon. We had then one of the most important talks I have ever had in the company of the President, talks with consequences which extended far beyond the scope of our bilateral discussions. It was then that the basis for the development of very cordial and friendly relations between our countries was established. We exchanged views on many subjects and pledged cooperation in many fields. The United States, under the new administration, is resolved to continue this policy which was initiated on the occasion of that visit.

Now that there are good prospects for the trade bill to be passed by Congress, I am sure that we will soon grant Romania most-favored-nation status. Consequently the economic relations between our countries will be given a new impetus. I hope that we can find a mutually convenient time for President Ford's visit as soon as possible, and I believe we will be able to achieve that.

I am sure that my visit, and especially the meeting of the two Presidents, will acceler-

ate the development of our relations. It is in this spirit that I invite you to toast the friendship between Romania and the United States.

To President Ceausescu's health.

### Joint Communique Issued at the Conclusion of the Visit to Romania<sup>10</sup>

At the invitation of the Minister of Foreign Affairs of the Socialist Republic of Romania George Macovescu, Secretary of State of the United States of America Henry A. Kissinger, with Mrs. Kissinger, paid an official visit to Romania on November 3-4, 1974. The President of the Socialist Republic of Romania Nicolae Ceausescu received Secretary Kissinger, Minister of Foreign Affairs of the Socialist Republic of Romania George Macovescu also held talks with Secretary of State Kissinger. They had cordial and constructive exchanges of view both on bilateral relations as well as on various international issues of mutual interest. It was determined with satisfaction that a high degree of agreement exists on these matters, reflected in the continuing good and mutually beneficial relations between the two countries.

Both sides reaffirmed the importance attached by the two governments to the principles set forth in the joint declaration of the Presidents of the two states on December 5, 1973. Noting the favorable prospects for further development of relations between the two countries, they agreed that those principles—together with the joint declaration on economic, industrial and technical cooperation—provide a sound basis for implementing and expanding long-term cooperation between the two countries in all areas.

The two sides noted with satisfaction the recent growth in trade between the two countries and resolved to act to promote widened economic cooperation. The two sides agreed that introducing most-favored-nation status into bilateral economic relations as soon as possible is an important factor for developing cooperation between the U.S. and Romania in this field. The two sides agreed to the early opening of negotiations on a trade agreement. They also agreed to negotiate an agreement on long-term economic cooperation.

Previous experience in cultural exchanges and scientific and technical cooperation was evaluated and prospects for further expansion were deemed favorable. A new long-term agreement on cultural, scientific and technical cooperation is soon to be negotiated.

In accordance with the joint declaration of December 5, 1973, the two sides reaffirmed their intention

<sup>10</sup> Issued at Bucharest on Nov. 4 (text from press release 467).

to contribute to the solution of problems of a humanitarian nature.

In discussions marked by an open and friendly spirit on the main international problems of common interest, both sides underlined that solutions to the problems currently facing the world community must be pursued by peaceful means and negotiation without use of force or threat of force on the basis of respect for the independence, sovereignty, and juridical equality of all states, whatever their size or social, political and economic system. They also emphasized the need for efforts to move toward a world in which each nation can freely choose and develop its own political, social, economic and cultural life.

Special attention was paid to European security and cooperation. Both sides reaffirmed their determination to work constructively for an early and successful conclusion of the Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe, as an important stage in the process of building better understanding and cooperation between participating countries, in order to assure conditions where each is able to live in peace and security.

Both sides underlined their continued determination to strive for effective disarmament measures which strengthen the peace and security of all peoples.

In connection with the Middle East situation, both sides favorably noted the accords already reached. However, the need was underlined for continuing efforts to reach a just and lasting peace in this region.

The two sides underlined the need for a lasting political settlement of the Cyprus problem in keeping with the interests of the Cypriot people and all sides concerned and with international peace and understanding.

Current problems of the world economic situation were examined in the context of growing international interdependence. Stress was put on the need for finding solutions to the problems affecting the countries of the world, particularly those involving food, energy, population, and development. In this connection, emphasis was placed on the importance of conducting economic relations on an equitable basis.

Both sides agreed on the need to give effective support to the United Nations in strengthening world peace and developing international cooperation.

Both sides affirmed the importance of intensifying the contacts and consultations at all levels which characterize relations between the two countries, noting that these contribute both to increased mutual understanding between the Socialist Republic of Romania and the United States of America, and to the strengthening of the cause of world peace. In this connection, President Nicolae Ceausescu renewed his invitation to President Ford to visit Romania. Secretary Kissinger stated that President Ford ac-

cepts the invitation with pleasure. It was agreed that the visit will take place at the earliest possible date.

Secretary Kissinger expressed appreciation for the cordial reception he was accorded in Romania as well as for the full exchange of views during his visit in Bucharest.

## **THE VISIT TO YUGOSLAVIA, NOVEMBER 4**

### **Remarks by Secretary Kissinger Upon Arrival, Belgrade**

Press release 468 dated November 4

Mr. Foreign Minister, ladies and gentlemen: This is my first visit to Yugoslavia in four years. A country with which we have had friendly and cordial relations for almost the entire postwar period, Yugoslavia with its fierce spirit of independence and its independent policy has made a significant contribution to world peace. I look forward to exchanging ideas with the Foreign Minister, with President Tito, and with all of their colleagues in the spirit of frankness and cordiality that has always marked our relationship.

Thank you very much.

### **Remarks by President Tito and Secretary Kissinger <sup>11</sup>**

#### *President Tito*

We had today very good talks with the Secretary of State, Mr. Kissinger. The Secretary of State had talks before that with our Prime Minister and Foreign Minister. The talks were concerned with bilateral relations and also international problems, mostly the Middle East. As regards bilateral relations, we of course agreed to continue to develop and expand them. Current relations so far also are not bad; as regards international problems, especially the Middle East, concern was expressed on both sides because of the stagnation that is there. Much depends on the Government of the United States, which so far was the main influence in the

<sup>11</sup> Made at the conclusion of their meeting on Nov. 4 (text from press release 476).

carrying out of the disengagement and for a peaceful solution of the conflict between the Arab states and Israel. The Secretary of State will soon visit again this region, and he will know best what this situation is and what there is to do.

The discussions we had were very useful, and I am very glad Secretary Kissinger visited Yugoslavia, and on many things we discussed, our positions were identical.

#### *Secretary Kissinger*

I wanted to thank the President for the very cordial reception he has had for me and the very frank and friendly talks that we had. The President and I as well as his associates reviewed the bilateral relations between our two countries. I agreed completely with what the President said. Those relations were good to begin with and we decided to strengthen them through consultations and other means.

With respect to international problems, we reviewed several of them and special emphasis was paid to the Middle East. We, the United States, would like to do our best to prevent any stalemate from developing. This requires that all of the parties on both sides understand the special necessities of the other and make an effort to bring their positions closer to each other.

It is for this purpose that I am going to the Middle East to see whether useful negotiations can be conducted and in what manner, and I pledge that the United States will do its utmost to improve matters in the Middle East to a just and lasting peace.

Altogether I would evaluate my visit here very useful, contributing to mutual understanding and to the strengthening of our relationship.

### **Joint Statement at the Conclusion of the Visit to Yugoslavia <sup>12</sup>**

At the invitation of the Vice President of the Federal Executive Council and Federal Secretary for Foreign Affairs Milos Minic, the Secretary of State

<sup>12</sup> Issued at Belgrade on Nov. 4 (text from press release 475).

of the United States of America, Henry A. Kissinger, together with his wife, paid an official visit to Yugoslavia on November 4, 1974.

The President of the Socialist Federal Republic of Yugoslavia Josip Broz Tito received Secretary of State Henry Kissinger who, on that occasion, conveyed to the President of the Socialist Federal Republic of Yugoslavia a message from the President of the United States of America Gerald Ford. The President of the Republic entertained Henry Kissinger, together with his wife and associates, at lunch. Mr. Kissinger was also received by the President of the Federal Executive Council Dzemal Bijedic. Vice President and Federal Secretary Minic and Secretary of State Kissinger held talks concerning all questions of interest to the two countries.

The talks held during these meetings in an atmosphere of friendship and openness, covered the most important international questions and bilateral relations between the two countries. Special attention was devoted to crisis areas in the world, such as the Near East and Cyprus. The two sides put forth their views about the paths towards a settlement of these and other outstanding world problems, affirmed the importance of continued regular contacts and consultations at all levels in various fields of mutual interest, and stressed the benefit these provide to increased understanding and mutual respect for one another's viewpoints and positions.

On the basis of the progress achieved at the Conference on European Security and Cooperation for preserving and consolidating peace in Europe and for further advancement of all-round constructive cooperation among European states, the two sides stressed their mutual interest in continued coordination of efforts to attain acceptance of basic principles for inter-European cooperation and security, and an early and successful conclusion of that conference.

The two sides gave special attention to current problems in the sphere of international economic developments and relations. Recognizing the fundamental interdependence of all nations and peoples, the two sides agreed that real peace and stability in the world could come only with significant progress towards solution of the pressing problems facing mankind in the fields of international economic relations, world economy, and economic development. They agreed further that lasting solutions to these problems could be found only on the basis of respect for independence, sovereignty, equality and non-interference among all states regardless of whether they have similar or different social, economic or political systems.

Reaffirming the necessity for widespread cooperation based on equality of all members of the international community on the basis of the principles of the Charter of the United Nations in settling outstanding international problems, it was recognized

that Yugoslavia's policy of non-alignment makes an active contribution to greater understanding among peoples and the search for peaceful solution to international problems and conflicts.

Both sides assessed that bilateral cooperation between the Socialist Federal Republic of Yugoslavia and the United States of America is developing favorably, and stressed the interest and readiness for its further advancement and expansion, especially in the spheres of economic, financial and scientific-technological cooperation, as well as in joint investments. They emphasized particularly the importance of the agreement under which United States and Yugoslav firms are cooperating in construction of Yugoslavia's first nuclear power plant.

They also confirmed their readiness to actively encourage further expansion of cultural cooperation and expressed their expectation that the participation of Yugoslavia at the forthcoming bicentennial of the United States of America will contribute to the deepening of understanding between the peoples of the two countries. They also emphasized the significance of the contribution to the development of the United States of America by U.S. citizens of Yugoslav extraction who represent a strong link of lasting friendship between the peoples of the two countries.

Attaching extraordinary importance to the principles contained in the joint statement signed October 30, 1971 during President Tito's visit to the United States on which mutual relations of the two countries are based, as well as to the messages exchanged between Presidents Tito and Ford reaffirming these principles, the Vice President of the Federal Executive Council and Federal Secretary for Foreign Affairs Milos Minic and the Secretary of State Henry Kissinger noted that these are the documents which, for Yugoslav-American relations, constitute a lasting basis of stable friendly relations and broad, mutually advantageous cooperation between the two countries.

## THE VISIT TO ITALY, NOVEMBER 4-5

### Dinner Hosted by President Giovanni Leone, Rome, November 4

Press release 478 dated November 5

#### *Toast by President Leone*

Since this is the third time I have had the pleasure of meeting Mr. Kissinger, I would like to say that the cards between us are on the table, there is no bluffing, so it is useless to prepare speeches which won't be read and then thrown in the wastebasket—one speaks



extemporaneously. Mr. Kissinger played the last trick upon me when he gave me and Foreign Minister Moro a wonderful lunch. He had sent in a draft of his speech, but later he dropped it and spoke also of other things not on the draft. But, thank God, having some experience as a lawyer, I succeeded in answering him on the same plane. So this time we haven't even tried to play the traditional respectable diplomatic practice of exchanging speeches, refining the adjectives, changing the commas, and modifying the phrases. And then, how could one follow the rule, even such a noble rule, when the subject of the meeting is Mr. Kissinger, who revolutionized diplomacy and travels so generously, with dedication, with sacrifice, as a messenger of peace, as we welcome him once more here at the Quirinale Palace?

This is the third time we've met: exactly five months ago, Mr. Kissinger, July 5; two meetings in Rome, one of which is this one; and, in between, my official visit to the United States accompanied by Foreign Minister Moro. And today's meeting—a meeting which we requested and which you have so kindly accepted and welcomed—is a meeting which is due to the World Food Conference, which will open tomorrow and to which you will contribute your thought and the vigor and strength of the nation you represent. Well, that conference will make clear to the minds of all the responsible leaders of all countries how dramatic their commitment is at a truly significant and interesting moment in the evolution of history.

For years now studies have been made—and Italy gave its contribution with the Club of Rome, [Aurelio] Peccei, and others—and also in recent conferences as the one in Romania—for a very long time the dramatic plight forecast for humankind at the eve of next century has been studied the world over. This conference must therefore realize what are the responsibilities of the more developed countries and which country in this regard has a major responsibility—and that is your country, but also my country, although to a lesser extent—in supplying political will, moral strength, determination, tools, struc-

tures, and means to overcome the world's hunger.

Before receiving you, Mr. Kissinger, I met with Argentina's Foreign Minister; and we remarked with great regret that Argentina is not able to export its meat, while there is a meat shortage in other world areas, which means that there is lack of organization. I also met Mr. Waldheim [United Nations Secretary General Kurt Waldheim], who called attention to the importance of this conference, saying what I will take the liberty of saying tomorrow in bringing my country's welcome to the conference; that is, that this is a matter of political decision and will therefore involve cooperation, coordination, collaboration among all the people of the world.

President Ford and you, Mr. Kissinger, have launched that word "cooperation," and you are its herald in your trips throughout all the world's regions. And indeed the two pillars of Italian foreign policy respond to this purpose, to this aim of cooperation: the Atlantic alliance, whose role you, we, and all the member nations have always thought of as a defensive one as well as one of evolution, progress, and détente; and Europe, where we are struggling—with, unfortunately, moments of arrest, which sadden and worry us—to shape in this old and great continent, which still has something to say and has to work in the light of its great tradition, in order to shape a united political institution which would go against no one, and specially not against America, but instead would pose itself ahead of and at the side of America to work together for détente, for peace, for the progress of the world's people.

Mr. Secretary, Mr. Kissinger, in your trip you have traveled over three continents, Europe, Asia, and Africa, a trip which was to end here in Italy—as we were saying earlier in private—and you were longing for perhaps a day of rest in Italy or in the United States, while this is only a pause because international developments still require the vigorous contribution of the United States, a contribution of poise, of strength, of loyalty, of vigor and will. And tomorrow, after a tiring day, you will resume your journey, a

very noble pilgrimage for peace and for the construction of world solidarity.

You will be accompanied by our heartfelt best wishes as well as by the reaffirmation from me personally—and tomorrow you will hear this repeated by our Foreign Minister and our Prime Minister when you meet but who now here join me in welcoming you—of the renewed statement of Italy's loyalty to its friendship, the statement that, in the difficult fabric of international détente, Italy is at the side of the United States, of course in the minor position that her possibilities, her capacity, and her international weight permit. These statements will accompany you in your mission for détente, and whatever you do for détente on the world level among the major powers, whatever you do in the Middle East to pick up again the threads of peace—that peace which we were following with great interest, which we thought was forthcoming, and which kindles so much trepidation in spirits the world over—you will be accompanied by our trust and our sympathy.

With these feelings we welcome you in warmth and friendship to this palace. And we have the pleasure to welcome Mrs. Kissinger, whom you, her husband, when we met in Washington promised to take to see the 700-room palace. And I answered: I haven't counted them yet, and I don't believe that the years that God will allow me, if he will let me complete my turn, will be enough to count them. But I also added: My bedroom is very small. These rooms are for the guests only, and especially when the guests are as charming as you, Mr. and Mrs. Kissinger. These doors are wide open. These lights recapture their old splendor. These halls relive the great moments in Italy's life in order to say to you that we—as friends and allies, as a people proud of their freedom, their independence, and their history—we look at your country with sympathy, with great trust, with confident expectation.

With these feelings, I ask you, gentlemen, to join me in raising our glasses to the health of the U.S. President, Mr. Ford, and his

gracious wife, to whom we send a special greeting of best wishes, as well as to the health of Mr. Kissinger, to the success of his mission, to the gracious Mrs. Kissinger, to the friendship of our two peoples.

*Toast by Secretary Kissinger*

Mr. President: You made some very friendly remarks about the purposes of my trip, the solidarity between Italy and the United States, and it is true: When I come to Italy I feel that I am not in a foreign country, that I am with friends who share a common destiny.

We face in the West right now a profound crisis, and the crisis is not energy or inflation; it is whether the nations with similar traditions and common values can work together to master their destiny. If the nations of the West work together as they have for the past generation, then the problems that we now face can be turned into opportunities and we can begin a whole new period of creativity; and that is what the United States is trying to do, together with its friends in Europe, at this moment.

So, occasionally I am asked whether the United States will help Italy in its difficulties. But that is the wrong way of putting the question. Of course we will work together to solve our difficulties. But we are not helping Italy; we are helping ourselves. There is no part of the Western community that can have setbacks without affecting every other part. And that is the attitude with which we will work together.

The President spoke of the World Food Conference, and it is again my destiny that I have to follow him on this biggest platform. And it will turn out that he is saying very much what I am trying to express less eloquently—that is, I will express it less eloquently. He is absolutely right. The problem of food is not a technical problem. It is ridiculous that there should be surpluses in some areas, shortages in some other areas. It is therefore entirely a question of political will and political imagination. This is the opportunity we have at the World Food Confer-

ence; and it is appropriate that it should meet in Rome, which throughout its long and glorious history has had to look at the relationship among nations, and in Italy, with its tradition of humanity and compassion. And, selfishly, I am glad it is in Italy, because it gives me an opportunity to see my friends with whom it is always a pleasure to exchange ideas and from whom we always profit.

So, I would like to propose a toast to the President of Italy, and to the permanent friendship between Italy and the United States, and to Mrs. Leone.

**Dinner Hosted by Foreign Minister Aldo Moro,  
Rome, November 5**

Press release 479 dated November 5

*Toast by Foreign Minister Moro*

Mr. Secretary of State: First of all I wish to tell you how happy I am that your presence in Rome for the World Food Conference offered us the opportunity for this our latest meeting, allowing us to resume the constructive dialogue that we happily began with you a little more than a month ago in Washington. You come here at the end of a long trip during which you stopped in several capitals of Eastern Europe and Asia, displaying there your keen diplomatic activity for rapprochement among peoples. And from Rome you begin another delicate and difficult mission, for which we wish you the best success.

Italy, because of her position at the center of the Mediterranean area and of her active participation in the European Community, is extremely interested in stability and harmony within these areas of vital interest. And to these problems others are added today, complex and serious problems, created by the economic crisis which has heightened interdependence among states, making closer cooperation urgent.

I can reaffirm to you on this occasion that Italy, in the spirit of the Atlantic Declaration of last June, which confirmed the validity for security and peace of the political course our

two countries have followed for a quarter century and strengthened their traditional links, will give her constructive contribution to any effort aiming at consolidating an equitable and stable international order.

For this purpose, the exchange of views between the United States and Italy are very useful, as always, and we expect to continue them on the occasion of other meetings in the international forums in which, as allied and friendly countries, we both develop our common action for the security and peace of all the world's peoples.

Mr. Secretary of State, the tribute I wish to pay you today stems not from a matter of etiquette but from deeply felt conviction in praise of your untiring work, your exceptional tenacity, your clear vision of facts, your farsighted understanding of the close but not exclusive links which unite us and other peoples to your great country; we particularly value the capacity and will to safeguard and develop, through turbulent political events, the great principles of freedom and independence which underlie the birth, the tasks, and the destiny of the American nation.

With this hope, I am pleased to raise my glass to the success of your mission, to your personal well-being and the well-being of the gracious Mrs. Kissinger, and to the deep friendship which unites the American and Italian peoples.

*Toast by Secretary Kissinger*

Mr. Prime Minister, Excellencies, ladies and gentlemen: It is a very great pleasure for me to have this opportunity to see all my friends again on such a pleasant occasion.

The Foreign Minister is in the process of seeing whether a government can be formed, and after he has begun to explain to me the nuances and complexities, I don't know why it is that I am going to the Middle East. He seems to me much better qualified to handle that situation. But seriously, I have had the privilege of working for many years now with the Foreign Minister, and the principles of Atlantic solidarity based on European

unity have always been at the basis of his foreign policy. I remember many occasions when Italy contributed importantly to the success of our common efforts, such as for example, at the Washington Energy Conference last February and in the conclusion of the Atlantic Declaration to which the Foreign Minister referred.

I recall these events because, no matter who is President of the United States or what government is in power in Italy, the friendship and solidarity of our two peoples are basic factors of international politics. We consider ourselves part of the same family, and we seek our solutions not on the basis of what one can do for the other, but on the basis on what both can do for the common good. Whenever I talk to Italian leaders, we speak free of complexes and neither of us has the need to prove anything to the other.

So, in the difficult period that now exists in the world—an economic crisis and political difficulties in many countries—once again Italy and the United States have a common destiny. One of the most important problems that the world faces is that the nations of the West, who at the end of the Second World War through their unity achieved progress, once again manage to establish solidarity in the face of the crisis which we now confront. And having developed their solidarity, they can then work together on the basis of the interdependence of the whole world. This will be our attitude in the United States with respect to working with Italy to overcome present difficulties. I know that our friendship will lead to cooperation in the Atlantic world as well as in the world at large.

I would like to take this opportunity to thank, also on behalf of my wife, the Foreign Minister for the extraordinarily cordial reception we have had here and to tell to all our Italian friends that here we always feel at home, which means, to your sorrow perhaps, that you may have to attend many such lunches in the months ahead.

And it is in this spirit that I would like to propose a toast to my friend, the Foreign Minister, and to the friendship of the Italian and American people.

## President Ford's News Conference of October 29

*Following are excerpts relating to foreign policy from the transcript of a news conference held by President Ford in the Briefing Room at the White House on October 29.<sup>1</sup>*

*Q. Mr. President, I have a two-part question on foreign affairs. Number one, the emergence of the PLO [Palestine Liberation Organization] in the Middle East, how does this affect our position regarding the Middle East? And the second part, also on foreign affairs, negative reports out of Japan and anti-American feelings and items like that, whether you are reconsidering going to Japan.*

*President Ford:* Let me answer the second question first. No developments in Japan have changed my attitude. I intend to go to Japan, as has been planned for some time.

The decision by the Arab nations to turn over the negotiating for the West Bank to the PLO may or may not—at this stage we aren't certain what impact it will have on our role in the Middle East.

We of course feel that there must be movement toward settlement of the problems between Israel and Egypt on the one hand, between Israel and Jordan or the PLO on the other, and the problems between Israel and Syria in the other category.

We have not had an opportunity yet to make any firm decision on what impact there will be from this Arab decision. I can only say that we think it is of maximum importance that continued movement toward peace on a justifiable basis in the Middle East is vital to that area of the world, and probably to the world as a whole.

*Q. Mr. President, since Secretary Kissinger has been to Moscow, do you have any optimistic outlook now on the SALT agreement?*

<sup>1</sup> For the complete transcript, see Weekly Compilation of Presidential Documents dated Nov. 4, 1974.

*President Ford:* I believe that the Secretary's discussions with the General Secretary, Mr. Brezhnev, were very constructive. Some of the differences, as I understand it, between their view and ours have been narrowed. And as a result of the progress that was made in Moscow the announcement was made that I would meet with Mr. Brezhnev in Vladivostok the latter part of November. We hope that each step will mean more progress and that we will end up with a SALT Two agreement.

*Q. Mr. President, your Press Secretary, Mr. Nessen, has hinted or implied that you may be considering limiting oil imports; that is, limiting imports of Arab oil if necessary to make your goal of cutting oil imports by 1 million a day, perhaps in the form of a dollar limit on imports. Are you considering it? Is this a live possibility?*

*President Ford:* Our first objective is to cut the 6-million-barrels-per-day imports of crude oil by 1 million barrels. We believe that with the energy conservation recommendations we have made that objective can be accomplished.

However, if there isn't the saving of 1 million barrels per day of oil imports by voluntary action, we will of course move to any other alternative, including the possibility of mandatory limitations, to achieve that result. That is essential from the point of view of our economy, our balance of payments, et cetera.

*Q. Mr. President, in Oklahoma City, you said that overwhelming victories in Congress this fall by the opposition party, being the Democrats, would seriously jeopardize world peace. This is our first chance to question you on that. I was wondering if you would elaborate on that. Did you mean it in the sense that some Democrats accused you of demagoguery or is this consistent with your original announced policy that you were going to try to unify the country after Water-gate?*

*President Ford:* I think the facts that I referred to involved the conflict we had with a majority of the Members of the House and Senate over the limitations and restrictions they put on the continuing resolution.

Those limitations and restrictions on that particular piece of legislation, in my judgment and in the judgment of the Secretary of State, will make it more difficult for the United States to help the Greeks. It will make it more difficult for us to work to bring about a negotiated settlement in the Cyprus matter. That congressional limitation will not help our relations with Turkey.

I point out that both the United States and Turkey are members of NATO and if our relationship with Turkey is destroyed or harmed, it will hurt our interest as well as NATO's.

Secondly, we do have an agreement with Turkey as to some military installations and those installations are important for both Turkey and ourselves; and if, through congressional action, we undercut our relationship with Turkey, hurt our relations with NATO, hurt the Greeks, because it will make it more difficult for a settlement of the Cyprus matter, then I think the Congress has made a mistake; and if a Congress that is more prone to do that is elected on November 5, it will make our efforts much harder to execute and implement foreign policy to build for peace and maintain the peace.

As Mr. Nessen explained in a subsequent press conference, I was referring as much to Republicans as I was to Democrats who don't cooperate in giving a President of the United States an opportunity to meet the day-to-day problems that are involved in foreign policy.

A President has to be able to act. He has to be able to work with allies and with some potential adversaries; and if the Congress is going to so limit a President, whether he is a Democrat or Republican, that he has no flexibility, in my opinion, the opportunity for a successful foreign policy is harmed considerably.

## Toward a Global Community: The Common Cause of India and America

*Address by Secretary Kissinger<sup>1</sup>*

I am honored to be invited to address such a distinguished gathering; for the basic objective of this organization—to comprehend, communicate, and help shape the state of world affairs—has been the central purpose of my own life since long before I served in government. And I since have found that the statesman, too, has no more important task.

Former President Radhakrishnan once said:

Life becomes meaningful only when we grasp the character of the age we live in, see its significance, understand the objectives it sets for us and strive to realize them.

The fundamental reality of our age is that we live in a world inextricably linked by interdependent economies and universal aspirations, by the speed of communications and the specter of nuclear war. The political lesson of our age is that the national interest can no longer be defined or attained in isolation from the global interest, and the moral challenge of our age is to free ourselves from the narrow perception of the nation-state and to shape a conception of global community.

The three years since I was last in New Delhi have seen profound changes in the relationship between India and the United States, in the whole region, and in the world.

On my last trip to South Asia I paid my first visit to Peking. On this trip I have visited Moscow. Moving about among capitals only recently considered hostile is a new pattern for the United States. It signified

<sup>1</sup> Made before the Indian Council on World Affairs at New Delhi on Oct. 28 (text from press release 445).

the transition from a bipolar world locked in confrontation and seemingly destined for some final encounter to the new world of dispersed power and reduced tension.

This changed environment is more complex and therefore, for some, less assuring. Yet we see it as a world of hope. For the process of détente among major powers has not made the world more complex; it merely signifies that leaders have recognized its complexity. Those who ought always to have known how serious is man's predicament have learned how little benefit confrontation brings and how absolute is the need for cooperation.

This has not been an effortless transition for the American people. Nor is it without difficulties in other nations of the world, for it requires coming to terms with less simple views of right and wrong, of the possible and the ideal, than have permeated political thinking for a generation.

This new American view, it is appropriate to acknowledge, owes much to an old vision of India's national leaders. Jawaharlal Nehru perceived the impermanence of the postwar world—into which India was born—of frozen hostility between the superpowers and their insistent efforts to enlist other nations on one side or the other. Under Nehru and since India sought to deflect, to moderate, and to redirect those forces. This was the origin of the concept of nonalignment.

It is not necessary to debate now whether the United States should have welcomed the concept at that time in order to agree that in the present world it is for nations such as India an altogether understandable and practical position. The United States accepts

nonalignment. In fact, America sees a world of free, independent, sovereign states as being decidedly in its own national interest. Support of national independence and of the diversity that goes with it has become a central theme of American foreign policy.

Nowhere is this clearer than with respect to South Asia, where a fifth of mankind lives. In testimony before the U.S. Senate Foreign Relations Committee six weeks ago, I stated this principle of American foreign policy in explicit terms:

We do not look at the subcontinent as being composed of some countries that are clients of China, others that are clients of the Soviet Union, others that should be clients of the United States. We believe that we can have productive relationships with all of them. And we believe also, specifically with respect to India, that our relations are in a stage of dramatic improvement.

The warming of our bilateral relations has been increasingly manifest for some time. It began inevitably as the Simla process began, and it has proceeded and strengthened as that process has proceeded and strengthened. For it was conflict within the subcontinent that brought the involvement of outsiders in the first place. And correspondingly, the region's political capacity to resolve regional conflict has, to a considerable degree, diminished outside involvement. President Ford has asked me to affirm that the United States strongly supports the efforts of peaceful settlement on the subcontinent, free of imposition or pressure or outside interference. We want political stability and economic success for South Asia. That is what we believe South Asians hope for and what the rest of the world should hope for as well.

The statesmanship of all of South Asia's leaders has been at the heart of this process. It has taken great courage to persevere toward the goal agreed upon by Pakistan and India at the Simla Conference in 1972: "The promotion of a friendly and harmonious relationship and the establishment of a durable peace in the Subcontinent."

The size and position of India give it a special role of leadership in South Asian and world affairs. They confer on it at the

same time the special responsibility for accommodation and restraint that strength entails. The United States recognizes both these realities. They are wholly compatible with the close friendships and special bonds we have with all the nations of the region. As we wish South Asia well, we wish India well.

Thus a more mature and durable relationship is emerging between India and the United States—one which leaves behind the peaks and valleys of the past.

Both India and the United States still consider themselves youthful nations. The restlessness, the striving, and the ideals of our people attest to the reality of that image. But a basic quality of youth—enthusiasm unseasoned by experience—often caused us to assume or expect too much. We are two great nations of independent judgment and perspective; often our zeal and moral convictions have led us into disagreements with a passion that might not have been present had we not been conscious of similar ideals.

For a quarter of a century our relations tended to oscillate between high expectation and deep suspicion. The low point occurred in 1971 when a basic disagreement flowed from different political judgments. We faced these differences candidly; that crisis is now behind us. We have surmounted past strains and moved ahead with promise. We can now build our relationship free of past distortions and conscious of the interests and values we share.

From the events of the past—from our experience with the world as well as yours—we have both developed a more balanced view. Both of us independently have come to temper our zeal and understand limitations on our ability to bend the world to our expectations. In parallel with this, in our relations with each other we both stress the basic compatibility of our interests. This promises to provide a durable basis for cooperation and friendship.

For our new relationship to thrive, a great deal depends on our mutual understanding. Nations face different problems and different opportunities; their perspectives and power inevitably vary. Let me therefore briefly

sketch America's broader purposes, especially as they have evolved in recent years in a changing international environment.

### **America's Purposes**

Around the world today, the new and the old coexist in uneasy equilibrium. The frozen international landscape of the past quarter century has begun to thaw, but we have yet to put a durable structure of cooperation in its place. A new era of stability has begun in Europe and Asia, while chronic disputes in the Middle East and Indochina still endanger regional and global peace. The United States and the Soviet Union have perceived a common interest in avoiding nuclear holocaust, while some potential for conflict persists and the arsenals of the two sides continue to grow. The United States and the People's Republic of China have succeeded in overcoming two decades of estrangement, but important differences in philosophy remain. And as the old blocs among old powers decline, new blocs among new nations threaten to emerge.

The United States sees its central task today as helping the world to shape a new pattern of stability, justice, and international cooperation. We have rejected the old extremes of world policeman and isolation. But we recognize that America's principles, strength, and resources impose upon us a special responsibility.

Our goal is to move toward a world where blocs and balances are not dominant; where justice, not stability, can be our overriding preoccupation; where countries consider cooperation in the global interest to be in their national interest. For all that has been achieved, we must realize that we have taken only the first hesitant steps on a long and arduous road.

The United States has three principal policy objectives.

First, America has sought to foster a new spirit of responsibility and restraint among all powers.

The cornerstone of our foreign policy is—as it has been for a generation—our partnership with our Atlantic allies and Japan. These

bonds have served both the world's peace and its prosperity. Our cooperation provided a solid foundation for efforts to reduce tensions with our adversaries. It has enabled us to contribute to world economic growth. And the nations which provide the industrial, financial, and technological sinews of the global economy now share a heavy collective responsibility to concert their efforts in a time of global economic stress.

In the last five years the United States has also sought to put its relations with the Communist powers on a new and steady basis.

Since the dawn of the nuclear age, man's fears of holocaust and his hopes for peace have turned on the relationship between the United States and the Soviet Union. Never before have two nations had the physical ability to annihilate civilization. Never before has it been so important that the two nuclear giants maintain close contact with one another to avoid conflicts which would menace other nations as much as themselves.

Progress has been achieved in our relationship with the Soviet Union which would have been unthinkable a decade ago. We take the easing of tensions for granted only at the risk of the return of confrontation. In my discussions in Moscow I stated yet again the determination of the American Government to maintain the momentum of the process of détente and was assured by the Soviet leaders that they shared this intention. The United States will persevere to reduce military competition with the Soviet Union in all its aspects; to insure that our political competition is guided by principles of restraint, especially in moments of crisis; and to move beyond restraint to cooperation in helping find lasting solutions to chronic conflicts.

America's relations with the People's Republic of China are also of fundamental importance. There cannot be a stable peace in Asia—or in the world—without a pattern of peaceful international relationships that includes this powerful and talented nation. It was essential to end a generation of mutual isolation and hostility.

Yet rapprochement with the People's Re-



public of China is not sought at the expense of any other nations; on the contrary, it attempts to serve a wider purpose. The principles of the Shanghai communique commit our two nations to respect the independence, sovereignty, and integrity of all countries as we work to improve our own relationships.

Our relations with the nonaligned countries are another pillar of our foreign policy. No accommodation among countries, however powerful, can be durable if negotiated over the heads of others or if an attempt is made to impose it on others. Our attitude toward the nonaligned will be based on the principles of equality, mutual respect, and shared endeavors and on the premise that all countries have a stake in a peaceful world. Condominium, hegemony, spheres of influence, are historically obsolete and morally and politically untenable.

It is a corollary of this, however, that bloc diplomacy of any kind is anachronistic and self-defeating. We see a danger of new patterns of alignment that are as artificial, rigid, and ritualistic as the old ones. The issues the world faces are so urgent that they must be considered on their merits, on the basis of their implications for humanity and for world peace—rather than on some abstract notion of ideological or bloc advantage. In a real sense the world is no longer divided between East and West, North and South, developed and developing, consumer and producer. We will solve our problems together, or we will not solve them at all.

### **Limiting the Dangers of the Atom**

Second, America seeks to limit and ultimately to reduce nuclear weapons competition.

The relaxation of international tensions cannot survive an unrestrained arms race by the two strongest nuclear powers. And international stability will be seriously jeopardized by the proliferation of nuclear weapons. This is why the United States has made it a major objective to bring about a more stable nuclear environment.

The Strategic Arms Limitations Talks are

among the most crucial negotiations ever conducted. The agreements already signed by the United States and the Soviet Union represent a major step toward strategic stability. They placed a permanent limit on defensive weapons and an interim limit on offensive nuclear weapons. Our task now is to control the qualitative as well as quantitative advance of weapons. We seek a long-term agreement which would establish stable ceilings and other restraints, from which we could begin the long-sought process of arms reductions. Progress in this direction was made during my recent talks in Moscow.

At the same time, a world in which an ever-increasing number of nations possess nuclear weapons vastly magnifies the risks of both regional and global conflict. And proliferation complicates—if it does not inhibit—international cooperation in the peaceful uses of the atom.

Last month at the United Nations I proposed a comprehensive global effort. The United States is of the view that countries capable of exporting nuclear technology should agree to common restraints on a multilateral basis which would further the peaceful, but inhibit the military, uses of nuclear power.

We take seriously India's affirmation that it has no intention to develop nuclear weapons. But India of course has the capability to export nuclear technology; it therefore has an important role in this multilateral endeavor.

Needless to say, the United States does not ask other countries for restraint on the export of nuclear materials and technology which it is not prepared to apply to itself. We will work vigorously with others on the practical steps which should be taken to limit the dangers of the atom while furthering its potential for human good.

### **Global Cooperation To Meet Global Problems**

A third objective of American policy is to build global cooperation to meet unprecedented global problems.

The traditional agenda of international affairs—the balance among major powers,

the security of nations—no longer defines our perils or our possibilities. To some extent we have mastered many of the familiar challenges of diplomacy. Yet suddenly we are witnessing a new threat to the governability of national societies and to the structure of international stability. A crisis threatens the world's economic system. The industrialized nations see decades of prosperity in jeopardy; the developing countries see hopes for development and progress shattered or postponed indefinitely. And even the newly wealthy oil producers are beginning to perceive that their recent gains will be swept away in a global crisis.

The dangers are as self-evident for the United States as they are for India and other countries; rates of inflation unknown in the past quarter century, financial institutions staggering under the most massive and rapid movements of reserves in history, and profoundly disturbing questions about the ability to meet man's most fundamental needs for energy and food.

This is not a conventional political problem which can be dealt with by conventional diplomacy or on the basis of conventional premises of social and economic theory. It affects all countries and groups. There is no gain for one at the expense of another. Piecemeal solutions offer no hope; a global enterprise is imperative. No nation or bloc of nations can impose its narrow interests without tearing the fabric of international cooperation. Whatever our ideological belief or social structure, we are part of a single international system on which our national objectives depend. Our common destiny is now not a slogan; it is an unmistakable reality.

The United States is prepared to dedicate itself in practical ways to this global effort. At the World Food Conference next week we will offer a comprehensive program as our contribution to freeing mankind from the eternal struggle for sustenance. We recognize that America's agricultural productivity, advanced technology, and tradition of assistance represent a major obligation. We know that we cannot speak of the global responsibility

of others without practicing global responsibility ourselves. America pioneered in development assistance, particularly with respect to food; we are determined to step up our past contributions. We will increase our production at home so there will be more food available for shipment abroad. And we will help developing nations increase their own production, which is the only long-term solution to the problem.

The magnitude of the world's food needs—and the redistribution of the world's wealth—imply that others must enlist in the fight against famine. The United States will work cooperatively with other exporters, with food importers, and with those countries in a position to help finance increased food production in the developing countries.

But it is an objective fact that we cannot meet man's need for food, much less insure economic and social advance, without coming to grips with the energy crisis. Higher oil prices directly affect food prices by increasing the costs of fertilizer, of operating agricultural machinery, and of transporting food to deficit areas. This in turn contributes to the more general economic crisis of inflation and stagnation which will surely doom the ability of the economically advanced countries to fulfill their obligations to the less well endowed. Both consumers and producers have a parallel stake in a global economy that is stable and growing. The economic progress of 30 years has brought the goal of universal well-being closer; today's crisis puts it in jeopardy. This is why the United States has emphasized global interdependence and seeks cooperative global solutions.

#### **The United States and India**

The American purposes I have described are, we believe, consistent with India's purposes. We are nations whose values and aspirations are so similar that our disputes are often in the nature of a family quarrel. We have no conflict of interest, no basic animosity or disagreement that keeps us apart. And we face a world in crisis and transition that compels us to work together.

We are both democracies, with all that implies for the kinds of decisions we are able to make. The leaders of a democracy can only sustain policies which their electorate will support. If there are no general rules as to what such policies are likely to be, there are specific limitations as to what they cannot be. It is clear that our relationship cannot be based—in either country—on the dependence of one on the other. Nor can our relationship survive constant criticism of one by the other in all international forums. There must be a sense of common purposes in at least some endeavors. To India-American relations, equality and mutual respect are more than doctrines of international law; they are political necessities.

In the past year or two we have removed major obstacles to an improved relationship. Our energies are now focused on the positive content of our relationship. Even more importantly, we find once again that as two great nations we share certain aspirations for the world at large; we share a concern for cooperative solutions to man's fundamental needs.

The present crisis confronting both developed and developing nations reveals all too clearly the world's past failure to address global problems on a truly cooperative basis. India and the United States have much to contribute. The world's best minds must be mobilized; and India has the third largest pool of scientific talent, while the United States has the first. We must apply the great economic strength of our two nations; the United States has the largest industrial output in the world and India the 10th largest. Our economies are complementary; the fact that India is only the 26th largest trading partner of the United States reveals what potential is yet untapped.

The Joint Commission we are establishing—for scientific, cultural, and economic cooperation—provides a new means to match our resources with our challenges. It is the symbol of the new area of equality, and the United States stands ready to expand the concept of the joint commission into other areas.

We share a concern for economic development.

It is impossible to visit South Asia without being deeply affected by the plight of so many of the peoples of this region. Individual hopes for survival and national aspirations for development have been dealt a cruel blow by the crises in energy, food, and inflation.

The American people want to be helpful, while avoiding the dependence we both reject. Earlier this year, the United States wrote off the largest amount of foreign debt ever canceled in history. This year the United States will launch a modest bilateral aid program. A substantial portion of our multilateral aid already comes to India. Our new food program, which I will outline at the World Food Conference next week, will be of particular relevance to India.

We share a concern for world peace.

Neither India nor the United States will ever be satisfied with a world of chronic conflicts, uneasy truces, and offsetting blocs. We have a joint interest in a comprehensive, institutionalized peace, based not merely on a balance of forces but on a sense of justice.

In recent months our dialogue on the entire range of global concerns has assumed a new frequency and depth. Our consultation has defined areas where we agree and narrowed those where we do not. We have found anew the basis for collaboration in many areas.

Tagore wrote with foresight:

During the evolution of the nation the moral culture of brotherhood was limited by geographic boundaries, because at that time those boundaries were true. Now they have become imaginary lines of tradition divested of the qualities of real obstacles. So the time has come when man's moral nature must deal with this fact with all seriousness or perish.

The time has come for nations to act on this vision. Let there be hope rather than despair, creativity rather than disarray. The recognition and understanding of our problems are clearly emerging; we have the technical means to solve them. And the urgency of our tasks impels us.

Half a century ago, Mahatma Gandhi wrote

that we must launch "experiments with truth." In this spirit, let us resolve to strengthen the new beginnings between India and America. Let us build a relationship that can endure and serve common ends for a long time. Let us make our contribution to help mankind match its capacity to its challenges for the benefit of our two peoples and of all mankind.

## TREATY INFORMATION

### U.S. and India Agree To Establish Joint Commission on Cooperation

*Following is the text of an agreement signed at New Delhi on October 28 by Secretary Kissinger and Y. B. Chavan, Minister for External Affairs of the Republic of India.*

#### AGREEMENT BETWEEN THE GOVERNMENT OF THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA AND THE GOVERNMENT OF THE REPUBLIC OF INDIA TO ESTABLISH A JOINT COMMISSION ON ECONOMIC, COMMERCIAL, SCIENTIFIC, TECHNOLOGICAL, EDUCATIONAL AND CULTURAL COOPERATION.

The Government of the United States of America and the Government of the Republic of India,

Guided by a common desire to strengthen further the friendly relations between their two countries,

Determined to explore the possibilities of fostering mutually advantageous cooperation between them in the economic, commercial, scientific, technological, educational and cultural fields,

Have agreed as follows:

#### Article 1

The Government of the United States of America and the Government of the Republic of India hereby constitute a Joint Commission on Economic, Commercial, Scientific, Technological, Educational and Cultural Cooperation.

#### Article 2

The tasks of the Commission may include the following:

1. In the field of economic and commercial cooperation:

(a) to review matters concerning economic and commercial relations between the two countries;

(b) to identify and investigate areas for closer cooperation, to make joint studies in areas of common interest and to recommend programs concerning economic growth and development through mutual cooperation;

(c) to recommend measures and activities to stimulate two-way trade between the two countries consistent with their international obligations, which may include *inter alia* the sending of trade promotion missions and trade delegations;

(d) to promote possibilities of increased investment consistent with the investment policies of the two countries; and

(e) to explore possibilities of enhanced cooperation between financial, industrial and commercial institutions and organisations.

2. In the field of scientific and technological cooperation:

(a) to review and recommend plans for cooperation between the two countries and measures for their implementation and coordination, which may include *inter alia* the exchange of specialists and information and the organisation of bilateral seminars on problems of common interest;

(b) to identify common scientific and technological problems and to formulate and recommend joint research programs which might lead to application of results in industry, agriculture, health and other fields; and

(c) to explore possibilities of enhanced scientific and technical cooperation between the two Governments, their agencies and other institutions in the two countries.

3. In the field of education and cultural cooperation:

(a) to review and recommend programs, plans and priorities for cooperative efforts to facilitate the interchange of people, materials and ideas in the broad fields of education, scholarship, and such areas of cultural endeavour as performing arts, fine arts, libraries and museums, sports and mass communications; and

(b) to review periodically the progress and functioning of existing programmes and arrangements, making recommendations as may be appropriate.

4. The Commission may also consider matters arising in the course of the implementation of the agreements between the two countries in force from time to time in the fields of economic, commercial, scientific, technological, educational and cultural cooperation including those which may be signed hereafter and make recommendations for the successful fulfillment of those agreements.

5. The Commission shall also be competent to review other problems that might arise in the implementation of this Agreement and other related matters that might be brought up by either party.

#### Article 3

The Commission shall consist of representatives of the two Governments with the representation of each government headed by an official of ministerial or cabinet rank.

The Commission may appoint subcommissions and other bodies as may be necessary to deal with specific issues or fields of cooperation and to make appropriate progress reports.

#### Article 4

The Commission shall hold its meetings not less than once a year. Meetings of the Commission shall be held in each country alternately. The Commission may invite to such meetings, as may be mutually agreed, the required number of experts and advisers. Special meetings of the Commission may be convened by mutual agreement.

#### Article 5

Within its areas of competence, the Commission may submit mutually agreed findings or proposals to the respective Governments.

#### Article 6

Administrative expenses incidental to the meetings of the Commission and its Subcommissions shall be borne by the country in which the meeting is held. Each Government shall bear the expenses of its own representation at the meetings of the Commission and its Subcommissions, including the expenses of travel to such meetings as well as board and lodging and other personal expenses of its representatives. All procedural and administrative matters not provided for herein shall be determined by the Commission or its Subcommissions upon the mutual consent of the two sides.

#### Article 7

This Agreement shall remain in force, subject to the right of either Government to terminate it upon notification to the other Government in writing of its intention to do so, such notification being made not later than six months prior to the proposed date of termination of the Agreement. Unless otherwise agreed, the termination of this Agreement or of the activities of the Commission shall not affect the validity or duration of any other agreements entered into by the two Governments in the fields of economic, commercial, scientific, technological, educational or cultural cooperation.

#### Article 8

This Agreement shall come into force from the date of signature hereof.

DONE in New Delhi on October 28, 1974, in two original copies each in English and Hindi, both texts being equally authentic.

HENRY A. KISSINGER  
*Secretary of State*

Y. B. CHAVAN  
*Minister for External  
Affairs*

On behalf of the Govern-  
ment of the United  
States of America

On behalf of the Govern-  
ment of the Republic  
of India

## Current Actions

### MULTILATERAL

#### Biological Weapons

Convention on the prohibition of the development, production and stockpiling of bacteriological (biological) and toxin weapons and on their destruction. Done at Washington, London, and Moscow April 10, 1972.<sup>1</sup>

*Ratification deposited:* Turkey, November 5, 1974.

#### Coffee

Agreement amending and extending the international coffee agreement 1968. Approved by the International Coffee Council at London April 14, 1973. Entered into force October 1, 1973. TIAS 7809.

*Notification that constitutional procedures completed:* El Salvador, September 2, 1974; Rwanda, September 13, 1974.

#### Conservation

Convention on international trade in endangered species of wild fauna and flora, with appendices. Done at Washington March 3, 1973.<sup>1</sup>

*Signature:* Chile, September 16, 1974.

*Ratification deposited:* Sweden, August 20, 1974.

#### Consular Relations

Vienna convention on consular relations. Done at Vienna April 24, 1963. Entered into force March 19, 1967; for the United States December 24, 1969. TIAS 6820.

*Accession deposited:* New Zealand, September 10, 1974.

Optional protocol to the Vienna convention on consular relations concerning the compulsory settlement of disputes. Done at Vienna April 24, 1963. Entered into force March 19, 1967; for the United States December 24, 1969. TIAS 6820.

*Accession deposited:* New Zealand, September 10, 1974.

#### Containers

International convention for safe containers (CSC), with annexes. Done at Geneva December 2, 1972.<sup>1</sup>

<sup>1</sup> Not in force.

*Approval deposited:* France (with reservation), October 21, 1974.

### **Fisheries**

Protocol to the international convention for the Northwest Atlantic fisheries (TIAS 2089), relating to amendments to the convention. Done at Washington October 6, 1970. Entered into force September 4, 1974.

*Proclaimed by the President:* October 23, 1974.<sup>2</sup>

### **Finance**

Articles of agreement of the International Finance Corporation. Done at Washington May 25, 1955. Entered into force July 20, 1956. TIAS 3620.

*Signatures and acceptances deposited:* Cameroon, October 1, 1974; Western Samoa, June 28, 1974.

Articles of agreement of the International Development Association. Done at Washington January 26, 1960. Entered into force September 24, 1960. TIAS 4607.

*Signature and acceptance deposited:* Western Samoa, June 28, 1974.

### **Load Lines**

International convention on load lines, 1966. Done at London April 5, 1966. Entered into force July 21, 1968. TIAS 6331, 6629, 6720.

*Accession deposited:* Malta, September 11, 1974.

*Acceptance deposited:* Venezuela, October 15, 1974.

### **Phonograms**

Convention for the protection of producers of phonograms against unauthorized duplication of their phonograms. Done at Geneva October 29, 1971. Entered into force April 18, 1973; for the United States March 10, 1974. TIAS 7808.

*Notification from World Intellectual Property Organization that ratification deposited:* Spain, May 24, 1974.

### **Pollution**

International convention for the prevention of pollution from ships, 1973, with protocols and annexes. Done at London November 2, 1973.<sup>1</sup>

*Signatures:* German Democratic Republic, October 21, 1974;<sup>3 4</sup> Spain, September 20, 1974.<sup>5 6</sup>

### **Terrorism—Protection of Diplomats**

Convention on the prevention and punishment of crimes against internationally protected persons, including diplomatic agents. Done at New York December 14, 1973.<sup>1</sup>

*Signatures:* Czechoslovakia, October 11, 1974;<sup>2</sup> Rwanda, October 15, 1974.

### **Whaling**

Amendments to paragraphs 1, 11-15, 21, 24(b),(c) to the schedule to the international whaling convention. Adopted at London June 28, 1974. Entered into force October 2, 1974.

### **Wheat**

Protocol modifying and extending the wheat trade convention (part of the international wheat agreement) 1971. Done at Washington April 2, 1974. Entered into force June 19, 1974, with respect to certain provisions; July 1, 1974, with respect to other provisions.

*Ratification deposited:* Israel, November 7, 1974.

## **BILATERAL**

### **Chile**

Agreement for sales of agricultural commodities, with related notes. Signed at Santiago October 25, 1974. Entered into force October 25, 1974.

### **India**

Agreement to establish a Joint Commission on Economic, Commercial, Scientific, Technological, Educational and Cultural Cooperation. Signed at New Delhi October 28, 1974. Entered into force October 28, 1974.

### **Khmer Republic**

Agreement amending the agreement for sales of agricultural commodities of August 10, 1974. Effected by exchange of notes at Phnom Penh October 25, 1974. Entered into force October 25, 1974.

### **Turkey**

Agreement relating to payment to the United States of the net proceeds from the sale of defense articles by Turkey. Effected by exchange of notes at Ankara October 9 and 10, 1974. Entered into force October 10, 1974, effective July 1, 1974.

<sup>1</sup> Not in force.

<sup>2</sup> With an understanding.

<sup>3</sup> Subject to ratification.

<sup>4</sup> With a statement.

<sup>5</sup> Does not accept Annexes III, IV and V (Optional Annexes).

<sup>6</sup> With reservation.

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\* Not printed.

† Held for a later issue of the BULLETIN.

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# THE DEPARTMENT OF STATE BULLETIN

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*The Department of State BULLETIN, a weekly publication issued by the Office of Media Services, Bureau of Public Affairs, provides the public and interested agencies of the government with information on developments in the field of U.S. foreign relations and on the work of the Department and the Foreign Service.*

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For sale by the Superintendent of Documents  
U.S. Government Printing Office  
Washington, D.C. 20402

PRICE:

52 issues plus semiannual indexes,  
domestic \$29.50, foreign \$37.25  
Single copy 60 cents

Use of funds for printing this publication approved by the Director of the Office of Management and Budget (January 29, 1971).

**Note:** Contents of this publication are not copyrighted and items contained herein may be reprinted. Citation of the DEPARTMENT OF STATE BULLETIN as the source will be appreciated. The BULLETIN is indexed in the Readers' Guide to Periodical Literature.

## The Energy Crisis: Strategy for Cooperative Action

*Address by Secretary Kissinger*<sup>1</sup>

A generation ago the Western world faced a historic crisis—the breakdown of international order in the wake of world war. Threatened by economic chaos and political upheaval, the nations of the West built a system of security relations and cooperative institutions that have nourished our safety, our prosperity, and our freedom ever since. A moment of grave crisis was transformed into an act of lasting creativity.

We face another such moment today. The stakes are as high as they were 25 years ago. The challenge to our courage, our vision, and our will is as profound. And our opportunity is as great.

What will be our response?

I speak, of course, of the energy crisis. Tonight I want to discuss how the administration views this problem, what we have been doing about it, and where we must now go. I will stress two themes that this government has emphasized for a year and a half:

—First, the problem is grave but it is soluble.

—Second, international collaboration, particularly among the industrial nations of North America, Western Europe, and Japan, is an inescapable necessity.

The economic facts are stark. By 1973, worldwide industrial expansion was outstripping energy supply; the threat of shortages was already real. Then, without warn-

ing, we were faced first with a political embargo, followed quickly by massive increases in the price of oil. In the course of a single year the price of the world's most strategic commodity was raised 400 percent. The impact has been drastic and global:

—The industrial nations now face a collective payments deficit of \$40 billion, the largest in history and beyond the experience or capacity of our financial institutions. We suffer simultaneously a slowdown of production and a speedup of an inflation that was already straining the ability of governments to control.

—The nations of the developing world face a collective yearly deficit of \$20 billion, over half of which is due to increases in oil prices. The rise in energy costs in fact roughly equals the total flow of external aid. In other words, the new oil bill threatens hopes for progress and advancement and renders problematical the ability to finance even basic human needs such as food.

—The oil producers now enjoy a surplus of \$60 billion, far beyond their payments or development needs and manifestly more than they can invest. Enormous unabsorbed surplus revenues now jeopardize the very functioning of the international monetary system.

Yet this is only the first year of inflated oil prices. The full brunt of the petrodollar flood is yet to come. If current economic trends continue, we face further and mounting worldwide shortages, unemployment, poverty, and hunger. No nation, East or

<sup>1</sup> Made before a University of Chicago Board of Trustees banquet at Chicago, Ill., on Nov. 14 (text from press release 500).

West, North or South, consumer or producer, will be spared the consequences.

An economic crisis of such magnitude would inevitably produce dangerous political consequences. Mounting inflation and recession—brought on by remote decisions over which consumers have no influence—will fuel the frustration of all whose hopes for economic progress are suddenly and cruelly rebuffed. This is fertile ground for social conflict and political turmoil. Moderate governments and moderate solutions will be under severe attack. Democratic societies could become vulnerable to extremist pressures from right or left to a degree not experienced since the twenties and thirties. The great achievements of this generation in preserving our institutions and constructing an international order will be imperiled.

The destinies of consumers and producers are joined in the same global economic system, on which the progress of both depends. If either attempts to wield economic power aggressively, both run grave risks. Political cooperation, the prerequisite of a thriving international economy, is shattered. New tensions will engulf the world just when the antagonisms of two decades of the cold war have begun to diminish.

The potentially most serious international consequences could occur in relations between North America, Europe, and Japan. If the energy crisis is permitted to continue unchecked, some countries will be tempted to secure unilateral benefit through separate arrangements with producers at the expense of the collaboration that offers the only hope for survival over the long term. Such unilateral arrangements are guaranteed to enshrine inflated prices, dilute the bargaining power of the consumers, and perpetuate the economic burden for all. The political consequences of disarray would be pervasive. Traditional patterns of policy may be abandoned because of dependence on a strategic commodity. Even the hopeful process of easing tensions with our adversaries could suffer, because it has always presupposed the political unity of the Atlantic nations and Japan.

### The Need for Consumer Cooperation

This need not be our fate. On the contrary, the energy crisis should summon once again the cooperative effort which sustained the policies of North America, Western Europe, and Japan for a quarter century. The Atlantic nations and Japan have the ability, if we have the will, not only to master the energy crisis but to shape from it a new era of creativity and common progress.

In fact we have no other alternative. The energy crisis is not a problem of transitional adjustment. Our financial institutions and mechanisms of cooperation were never designed to handle so abrupt and artificially sustained a price rise of so essential a commodity with such massive economic and political ramifications. We face a long-term drain which challenges us to common action or dooms us to perpetual crisis.

The problem will not go away by permitting inflation to proceed to redress the balance between oil producers and producers of other goods. Inflation is the most grotesque kind of adjustment, in which all other elements in the domestic structure are upset in an attempt to balance one—the oil bill. In any event, the producers could and would respond by raising prices, thereby accelerating all the political and social dangers I have described.

Nor can consumers finance their oil bill by going into debt to the producers without making their domestic structure hostage to the decisions of others. Already, producers have the power to cause major financial upheavals simply by shifting investment funds from one country to another or even from one institution to another. The political implications are ominous and unpredictable. Those who wield financial power would sooner or later seek to dictate the political terms of the new relationships.

Finally, price reductions will not be brought about by consumer-producer dialogue alone. The price of oil will come down only when objective conditions for a reduction are created, and not before. Today the producers are able to manipulate prices at will and with apparent impunity. They are

not persuaded by our protestations of damage to our societies and economies, because we have taken scant action to defend them ourselves. They are not moved by our alarms about the health of the Western world, which never included and sometimes exploited them. And even if the producers learn eventually that their long-term interest requires a cooperative adjustment of the price structure, it would be foolhardy to count on it or passively wait for it.

We agree that a consumer-producer dialogue is essential. But it must be accompanied by the elaboration of greater consumer solidarity. The heart of our approach must be collaboration among the consuming nations. No one else will do the job for us.

### **Blueprint for Consumer Cooperation**

Consumer cooperation has been the central element of U.S. policy for the past year and a half.

In April 1973 the United States warned that energy was becoming a problem of unprecedented proportions and that collaboration among the nations of the West and Japan was essential. In December of the same year, we proposed a program of collective action. This led to the Washington Energy Conference in February 1974, at which the major consumers established new machinery for consultation with a mandate to create, as soon as possible, institutions for the pooling of effort, risk, and technology.

In April 1974 and then again this fall before the U.N. General Assembly, President Ford and I reiterated the American philosophy that global cooperation offered the only long-term solution and that our efforts with fellow consumers were designed to pave the way for constructive dialogue with the producers. In September 1974 we convened a meeting of the Foreign and Finance Ministers of the United Kingdom, Japan, the Federal Republic of Germany, France, and the United States to consider further measures of consumer cooperation. And last month President Ford announced a long-term national policy of conservation and

development to reinforce our international efforts to meet the energy challenge.

In our view, a concerted consumer strategy has two basic elements:

—First, we must create the objective conditions necessary to bring about lower oil prices. Since the industrialized nations are the principal consumers, their actions can have a decisive impact. Determined national action, reinforced by collective efforts, can transform the market by reducing our consumption of oil and accelerating development of new sources of energy. Over time this will create a powerful pressure on prices.

—Second, in the interim we must protect the vitality of our economies. Effective action on conservation will require months; development of alternative sources will take years. In the meantime, we will face two great dangers. One is the threat of a new embargo. The other is that our financial system may be unable to manage chronic deficits and to recycle the huge flows of oil dollars that producers will invest each year in our economies. A financial collapse—or the threat of it—somewhere in the system could result in restrictive monetary, fiscal, and trade measures and a downward spiral of income and jobs.

The consumers have taken two major steps to safeguard themselves against these dangers by collaborative action.

One of the results of the Washington Energy Conference was a new permanent institution for consumer energy cooperation—the International Energy Agency (IEA). This agency will oversee a comprehensive common effort—in conservation, cooperative research and development, broad new action in nuclear enrichment, investment in new energy supplies, and the elaboration of consumer positions for the consumer-producer dialogue.

Equally significant is the unprecedented agreement to share oil supplies among principal consumers in the event of another crisis. The International Energy Program that grew out of the Washington Energy Conference and that we shall formally adopt

next week is a historic step toward consumer solidarity. It provides a detailed blueprint for common action should either a general or selective embargo occur. It is a defensive arrangement, not a challenge to producers. But producing countries must know that it expresses the determination of the consumers to shape their own future and not to remain vulnerable to outside pressures.

The International Energy Agency and the International Energy Program are the first fruits of our efforts. But they are only foundations. We must now bring our blueprint to life.

To carry through the overall design, the consuming countries must act in five inter-related areas:

—First, we must accelerate our national programs of energy conservation, and we must coordinate them to insure their effectiveness.

—Second, we must press on with the development of new supplies of oil and alternative sources of energy.

—Third, we must strengthen economic security—to protect against oil emergencies and to safeguard the international financial system.

—Fourth, we must assist the poor nations whose hopes and efforts for progress have been cruelly blunted by the oil price rises of the past year.

—Fifth, on the basis of consumer solidarity we should enter a dialogue with the producers to establish a fair and durable long-term relationship.

Let me deal with each of these points in turn.

#### **Coordination of Conservation Programs**

Conservation and the development of new sources of energy are basic to the solution. The industrialized countries as a whole now import nearly two-thirds of their oil and over one-third of their total energy. Over the next decade, we must conserve enough oil and develop sufficient alternative supplies to reduce these imports to no more than

one-fifth of the total energy consumption. This requires that the industrialized countries manage the growth of their economies without increasing the volume of their oil imports.

The effect of this reduced dependence will be crucial. If it succeeds, the demand of the industrialized countries for imported oil will remain static while new sources of energy will become available both inside and outside of OPEC [Organization of Petroleum Exporting Countries]. OPEC may attempt to offset efforts to strengthen conservation and develop alternative sources by deeper and deeper cuts in production, reducing the income of producers who seek greater revenues for their development. The majority of producers will then see their interest in expanding supply and seeking a new equilibrium between supply and demand at a fair price.

Limiting oil imports into industrial countries to a roughly constant figure is an extremely demanding goal requiring discipline for conservation and investment for the development of new energy sources. The United States, which now imports a third of its oil and a sixth of its total energy, will have to become largely self-sufficient. Specifically, we shall set as a target that we reduce our imports over the next decade from 7 million barrels a day to no more than 1 million barrels, or less than 2 percent of our total energy consumption.

Conservation is of course the most immediate road to relief. President Ford has stated that the United States will reduce oil imports by 1 million barrels per day by the end of 1975—a 15 percent reduction.

But one country's reduction in consumption can be negated if other major consumers do not follow suit. Fortunately, other nations have begun conservation programs of their own. What is needed now is to relate these programs to common goals and an overall design. Therefore, the United States proposes an international agreement to set consumption goals. The United States is prepared to join an international conservation agreement that would lead to systematic and long-term savings on an equitable basis.

As part of such a program, we propose that by the end of 1975 the industrialized countries reduce their consumption of oil by 3 million barrels a day over what it would be otherwise—a reduction of approximately 10 percent of the total imports of the group. This reduction can be carried out without prejudice to economic growth and jobs by cutting back on wasteful and inefficient uses of energy both in personal consumption and in industry. The United States is prepared to assume a fair share of the total reduction.

The principal consumer nations should meet each year to determine appropriate annual targets.

### **Development of Alternative Energy Sources**

Conservation measures will be effective to the extent that they are part of a dynamic program for the development of alternative energy sources. All countries must make a major shift toward nuclear power, coal, gas, and other sources. If we are to assure substantial amounts of new energy in the 1980's, we must start now. If the industrialized nations take the steps which are within their power, they will be able to transform energy shortages into energy surpluses by the 1980's.

Project Independence is the American contribution to this effort. It represents the investment of hundreds of billions of dollars, public and private—dwarfing our moon-landing program and the Manhattan Project, two previous examples of American technology mobilized for a great goal. Project Independence demonstrates that the United States will never permit itself to be held hostage to a strategic commodity.

Project Independence will be complemented by an active policy of supporting cooperative projects with other consumers. The International Energy Agency to be established next week is well designed to launch and coordinate such programs. Plans are already drawn up for joint projects in coal technology and solar energy. The United States is prepared to expand these collective activities substantially to include such fields as uranium enrichment.

The area of controlled thermonuclear fusion is particularly promising for joint ventures, for it would make available abundant energy from virtually inexhaustible resources. The United States is prepared to join with other IEA members in a broad program of joint planning, exchange of scientific personnel, shared use of national facilities, and the development of joint facilities to accelerate the advent of fusion power.

Finally, we shall recommend to the IEA that it create a common fund to finance or guarantee investment in promising energy projects in participating countries and in those ready to cooperate with the IEA on a long-term basis.

### **Financial Solidarity**

The most serious immediate problem facing the consuming countries is the economic and financial strain resulting from high oil prices. Producer revenues will inevitably be reinvested in the industrialized world; there is no other outlet. But they will not necessarily flow back to the countries whose balance of payments problems are most acute. Thus many countries will remain unable to finance their deficits and all will be vulnerable to massive sudden withdrawals.

The industrialized nations, acting together, can correct this imbalance and reduce their vulnerability. Just as producers are free to choose where they place their funds, so the consumers must be free to redistribute these funds to meet their own needs and those of the developing countries.

Private financial institutions are already deeply involved in this process. To buttress their efforts, central banks are assuring that necessary support is available to the private institutions, particularly since so much of the oil money has been invested in relatively short-term obligations. Private institutions should not bear all the risks indefinitely, however. We cannot afford to test the limits of their capacity.

Therefore the governments of Western Europe, North America, and Japan should move now to put in place a system of mutual support that will augment and buttress private

channels whenever necessary. The United States proposes that a common loan and guarantee facility be created to provide for redistributing up to \$25 billion in 1975, and as much again the next year if necessary.

The facility will not be a new aid institution to be funded by additional taxes. It will be a mechanism for recycling, at commercial interest rates, funds flowing back to the industrial world from the oil producers. Support from the facility would not be automatic, but contingent on full resort to private financing and on reasonable self-help measures. No country should expect financial assistance that is not moving effectively to lessen its dependence on imported oil.

Such a facility will help assure the stability of the entire financial system and the creditworthiness of participating governments; in the long run it would reduce the need for official financing. If implemented rapidly it would:

—Protect financial institutions from the excessive risks posed by an enormous volume of funds beyond their control or capacity:

—Insure that no nation is forced to pursue disruptive and restrictive policies for lack of adequate financing;

—Assure that no consuming country will be compelled to accept financing on intolerable political or economic terms; and

—Enable each participating country to demonstrate to people that efforts and sacrifices are being shared equitably—that the national survival is buttressed by consumer solidarity.

We have already begun discussion of this proposal; it was a principal focus of the meeting of the Foreign and Finance Ministers of the Federal Republic of Germany, the United States, Japan, the United Kingdom, and France in September in Washington.

#### **Easing the Plight of Developing Countries**

The strategy I have outlined here is also essential to ease the serious plight of many developing countries. All consuming nations are in need of relief from excessive oil

prices, but the developing world cannot wait for the process to unfold. For them, the oil crisis has already produced an emergency. The oil bill has wiped out the external assistance of the poorer developing countries, halted agricultural and industrial development, and inflated the prices for their most fundamental needs, including food. Unlike the industrial nations, developing countries do not have many options of self-help; their margin for reducing energy consumption is limited; they have little capacity to develop alternative sources.

For both moral and practical reasons, we cannot permit hopes for development to die or cut ourselves off from the political and economic needs of so great a part of mankind. At the very least, the industrial nations must maintain the present level of their aid to the developing world and take special account of its needs in the multilateral trade negotiations.

We must also look for ways to help in the critical area of food. At the World Food Conference, I outlined a strategy for meeting the food and agricultural needs of the least developed countries. The United States is uniquely equipped to make a contribution in this field and will make a contribution worthy of its special strength.

A major responsibility must rest with those oil producers whose actions aggravated the problems of the developing countries and who, because of their new-found wealth, now have greatly increased resources for assistance.

But even after all presently available resources have been drawn upon, an unfinanced payments deficit of between \$1 and \$2 billion will remain for the 25 or 30 countries most seriously affected by high oil prices. It could grow in 1976.

We need new international mechanisms to meet this deficit. One possibility would be to supplement regular International Monetary Fund facilities by the creation of a separate trust fund managed by the IMF to lend at interest rates recipient countries could afford. Funds would be provided by



national contributions from interested countries, including especially oil producers. The IMF itself could contribute the profits from IMF gold sales undertaken for this purpose. We urge the Interim Committee of the IMF and the joint IMF-IBRD [International Bank for Reconstruction and Development] Development Committee to examine this proposal on an urgent basis.

### **Constructive Dialogue With Producers**

When the consumers have taken some collective steps toward a durable solution—that is, measures to further conservation and the development of new supplies—and for our interim protection through emergency planning and financial solidarity, the conditions for a constructive dialogue with producers will have been created.

We do not see consumer cooperation as antagonistic to consumer-producer cooperation. Rather we view it as a necessary prerequisite to a constructive dialogue, as do many of the producers themselves, who have urged the consumers to curb inflation, conserve energy, and preserve international financial stability.

A dialogue that is not carefully prepared will compound the problems which it is supposed to solve. Until the consumers develop a coherent approach to their own problems, discussions with the producers will only repeat in a multilateral forum the many bilateral exchanges which are already taking place. When consumer solidarity has been developed and there are realistic prospects for significant progress, the United States is prepared to participate in a consumer-producer meeting.

The main subject of such a dialogue must inevitably be price. Clearly the stability of the system on which the economic health of even the producers depends requires a price reduction. But an equitable solution must also take account of the producers' need for long-term income security and economic growth. This we are prepared to discuss sympathetically.

In the meantime the producers must recognize that further increases in the prices while this dialogue is being prepared and when the system has not even absorbed the previous price rises would be disruptive and dangerous.

On this basis—consumer solidarity in conservation, the development of alternative supplies, and financial security; producer policies of restraint and responsibility; and a mutual recognition of interdependence and a long-term common interest—there can be justifiable hope that a consumer-producer dialogue will bring an end to the crisis that has shaken the world to its economic foundations.

### **The Next Step**

It is now a year and a month since the oil crisis began. We have made a good beginning, but the major test is still ahead.

The United States in the immediate future intends to make further proposals to implement the program I have outlined.

Next week, we will propose to the new International Energy Agency a specific program for cooperative action in conservation, the development of new supplies, nuclear enrichment, and the preparation of consumer positions for the eventual consumer-producer dialogue.

Simultaneously, Secretary [of the Treasury William E.] Simon will spell out our ideas for financial solidarity in detail, and our representative at the Group of Ten will present them to his colleagues.

We will, as well, ask the Chairman of the Interim Committee of the IMF as well as the new joint IMF-IBRD Development Committee to consider an urgent program for concessional assistance to the poorest countries.

Yesterday, Secretary [of the Interior Rogers C. B.] Morton announced an accelerated program for domestic oil exploration and exploitation.

President Ford will submit a detailed and comprehensive energy program to the new Congress.

Let there be no doubt, the energy problem is soluble. It will overwhelm us only if we retreat from its reality. But there can be no solution without the collective efforts of the nations of North America, Western Europe, and Japan—the very nations whose cooperation over the course of more than two decades has brought prosperity and peace to the postwar world. Nor, in the last analysis, can there be a solution without a dialogue with the producers carried on in a spirit of reconciliation and compromise.

A great responsibility rests upon America, for without our dedication and leadership no progress is possible. This nation for many years has carried the major responsibility for maintaining the peace, feeding the hungry, sustaining international economic growth, and inspiring those who would be free. We did not seek this heavy burden, and we have often been tempted to put it down. But we have never done so, and we cannot afford to do so now—or the generations that follow us will pay the price for our self-indulgence.

For more than a decade America has been torn by war, social and generational turbulence, and constitutional crisis. Yet the most striking lesson from these events is our fundamental stability and strength. During our upheavals, we still managed to ease tensions around the globe. Our people and our institutions have come through our domestic travails with an extraordinary resiliency.

And now, once again, our leadership in technology, agriculture, industry, and communications has become vital to the world's recovery.

Woodrow Wilson once remarked that “wrapped up with the liberty of the world is the continuous perfection of that liberty by the concerted powers of all civilized people.” That, in the last analysis, is what the energy crisis is all about. For it is our liberty that in the end is at stake and it is only through the concerted action of the industrial democracies that it will be maintained.

The dangers that Woodrow Wilson and his generation faced were, by today's standards, relatively simple and straightforward. The dangers we face now are more subtle and more profound. The context in which we act is more complex than even the period following the Second World War. Then we drew inspiration from stewardship; now we must find it in partnership. Then we and our allies were brought together by an external threat, now we must find it in our devotion to the political and economic institutions of free peoples working together for a common goal. Our challenge is to maintain the cooperative spirit among like-minded nations that has served us so well for a generation and to prove, as Woodrow Wilson said in another time and place, that “The highest and best form of efficiency is the spontaneous cooperation of a free people.”

## Secretary Kissinger Visits Five Arab Nations and Israel

*Following are remarks made by Secretary Kissinger and foreign leaders during his trip to Egypt, Saudi Arabia, Jordan, Syria, Israel, and Tunisia November 5-9.<sup>1</sup>*

### THE VISIT TO EGYPT, NOVEMBER 5-6

#### Remarks by Secretary Kissinger Upon Arrival, Cairo, November 5

Press release 480 dated November 5

Ladies and gentlemen: I'm on a quick visit to Cairo to see President Sadat and Foreign Minister Fahmy to discuss with them their conclusions in the light of the Rabat summit as to how further progress can be made toward a successful and lasting peace in the Middle East. The United States stands ready, as it has throughout the past year, to be helpful in making rapid progress toward peace.

Thank you.

#### News Conference by Secretary Kissinger and President Sadat, November 6

Press release 481 dated November 6

*President Sadat:* I am glad that my friend Dr. Kissinger was able to come and exchange with me views and measures. As you well know, I have the fullest confidence in Dr. Kissinger, and we support his continuing efforts for achieving a lasting and just peace in the Middle East. We believe that the United States can play an active role toward further progress in this respect, and I want

<sup>1</sup> For documentation related to Secretary Kissinger's trip to the U.S.S.R., India, Bangladesh, Pakistan, Afghanistan, Iran, Romania, Yugoslavia, and Italy Oct. 23-Nov. 5, see BULLETIN of Nov. 25, 1974, p. 701.

to emphasize that the doors for progress are still open.

*Q. Mr. President, would you tell us if you are attempting or have attempted to bring about some kind of a dialogue between Secretary of State Kissinger and the PLO [Palestine Liberation Organization]?*

*President Sadat:* I leave this to Dr. Kissinger.

*Secretary Kissinger:* I simply want to make a general statement. The talks between the President and myself have been useful and constructive, as always. As I said upon arrival at the airport yesterday, the United States is prepared to remain actively engaged in attempting to bring about a just and lasting peace in this area. I emphasized on many occasions our views which can be most effectively achieved by a step-by-step approach.

I am just beginning a trip through the Middle East, and we will remain in active and close diplomatic contact with all of the parties to see what possibilities exist and to encourage progress wherever possibilities exist.

I want to thank the President for receiving me in spite of the fact that he has a very bad cold.

*Q. Mr. President, I would like to ask you, sir, what is your judgment as to how the Rabat summit conference affects the step-by-step negotiation process in which Egypt has been engaged with the United States?*

*President Sadat:* Well, I can't see at all that the Rabat conference has put any block in this. The Rabat conference has been mainly for the question of Palestine, and it was inevitable that at some time the Pales-

tinian question was going to be tackled as a political problem rather than a humanitarian problem.

*Q. Dr. Kissinger, are you optimistic?*

*Secretary Kissinger:* I believe that progress is possible, and with the cooperation of the parties, we will continue our efforts, and we believe that progress is possible.

*Q. Does that mean, Dr. Kissinger, that is not possible at the moment?*

*Secretary Kissinger:* No. We believe that progress is possible in the months ahead.

*Q. Mr. President, is Egypt ready to begin discussions with Israel about further withdrawals in the Sinai, whether or not there are similar discussions on the West Bank?*

*President Sadat:* Well, we shall always be in Egypt ready to regain whatever land we can.

*Q. Dr. Kissinger, last time you thought the United States was concerned by Jordan negotiating with Israel as regards the West Bank. You said that this was the U.S. point of view. Now that the PLO is going to take this role up, how do you think this can be resolved as regards to the United States?*

*Secretary Kissinger:* What my view was, and is, is that it will be the best solution, and we now have to see the impact of the recent visit with respect to that particular problem. In my own point of view it has complicated matters.

*Q. Mr. President, can you tell us how your discussions yesterday with Mr. Arafat affect your discussions with Dr. Kissinger?*

*President Sadat:* I don't see how my discussions with Arafat yesterday and with Dr. Kissinger yesterday and today make any contradictions. There is no contradiction.

*Q. Dr. Kissinger, are you going to meet Mr. Yasir Arafat here in Cairo?*

*Secretary Kissinger:* No.

*Q. Mr. President, when will you have another meeting with Dr. Kissinger?*

*President Sadat:* Well, this depends upon

the momentum of the process in the near future.

*Q. Would you expect that momentum to slow down or can you give us your expectation of when the negotiations between Egypt and Israel on the next disengagement will begin, sir?*

*President Sadat:* Well, the momentum is continuing, and it hasn't been hindered. As I said in my statement, the efforts of Dr. Kissinger in the near future are needed much more than they were needed before.

*Q. Thank you, sir.*

#### **Remarks by Secretary Kissinger Upon Departure, November 6**

Press release 182 dated November 6

*Q. During the talks with the President, did you submit any concrete proposals this time or the time before?*

*Secretary Kissinger:* I have not submitted a complete proposal on either of the trips, either in October or now. I am here to discuss in general manner the procedures and approaches that could be used, and I will cover exactly the same subjects in every country that I visit. I would like to remind you all that it is exactly one year today that I visited Cairo for the first time and many things have changed since then, and I hope that by this time next year other things will have changed.

*Q. Was there anything on the disengagements in the Sinai?*

*Secretary Kissinger:* We have had no concrete discussions on any specific plan.

#### **EXCHANGE OF REMARKS UPON DEPARTURE, RIYADH, SAUDI ARABIA, NOVEMBER 6**

Press release 484 dated November 7

#### **Foreign Minister Umar al-Saqqaf**

It has been customary so far for the Secretary of State to start speaking and to give his impressions of his visit to our country. I feel it my pleasant obligation now to turn

the tables on him and start expressing my appreciation for the Secretary's visit, if he agrees.

Dr. Kissinger's visit was a good one, a useful one; and it came at an appropriate time, following several activities in the Arab area. For instance, I would mention the Arab summit conference, which was a big conference. This was an international Arab summit conference pertaining to the Arabs, the heads of states, their countries, in which they discussed affairs of concern to their respective countries and also discussed world problems and problems of interest to the rest of the world. This was the nature of that Arab summit conference.

This conference was successful, constructive, and effective. It had nothing new that we demanded different from what was the case during the Algiers conference last year. The attitude we took in Algiers was still the same. Our conviction is still the same; namely, that the way followed by Dr. Kissinger is a way that would in the future realize the complete, expeditious Israeli withdrawal based on justice. We would never do without his efforts or those of the great country he represents.

Our two countries are friends—the United States of America and the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia. We insist on being friends. We insist on challenging or defying problems and surmounting them. We do not accept that the problems challenge us and beat us. That is why we wish all success to our friend Henry and his mission toward which he expended a lot of energy, a lot of intellect, and, what was more important, his having put to work without any restraint his deep convictions in bringing about justice.

Our policy is the same. We want to see complete withdrawal to the 1967 borders and the return of Arab Jerusalem to its people and the restoration of their legitimate rights to the Palestinian people. I have no new demands. This is what I said even before the Rabat conference. I am saying this and repeating it simply because we have no new demands.

There is another topic touched upon by

my friend Dr. Kissinger; namely, that of oil. I repeat that the policy of my King and my government is still the same as it was; namely, to keep the prices as they are and to try to reach a reduction, albeit a symbolic reduction, or if we can, a greater reduction—and we would be doing this because of our awareness and of the welfare of humanity at large.

Finally, I greet our guests, the Secretary of State and the colleagues who came with him, and look forward to seeing him in the not too distant future when at least part of these problems we have been discussing will have been solved.

### **Secretary Kissinger**

I have nothing much to add to what has been so eloquently expressed by my friend the Foreign Minister. We had very good talks, very useful talks, with His Majesty, explaining to our friends in the Kingdom the situation as we saw it and our determination, if the parties could cooperate, to move step by step toward a just and lasting peace. I found His Majesty understanding and supportive. With this encouragement the United States will continue its efforts to bring the parties closer together. I hope to make progress toward a just and lasting peace.

With respect to the question of oil, I had an opportunity, as the Foreign Minister pointed out, to explain the impact of the current prices on international stability. I would like to express our gratification for the statement of the Foreign Minister that the Government of the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia will continue to work for the lowering of prices.

The Foreign Minister, who has been a voice for moderation and wisdom in this area, will be coming to the United States next week to the General Assembly, and I look forward to continuing our discussions on that occasion. It remains only for me to thank him for all of my colleagues for the characteristic hospitality shown us on this visit to the Kingdom, and we leave determined

to strengthen even further the already warm relations between our two countries.

Thank you.

#### **DEPARTURE, AMMAN, JORDAN, NOVEMBER 7**

Press release 486 dated November 7

I would like to say that the talks we've had here were conducted in the warm, cordial, and friendly atmosphere of close cooperation that has always characterized the relationship between Jordan and the United States. We reviewed recent events in the area, and I expressed our view that I have also expressed elsewhere: that some recent decisions have complicated problems and possibilities for solution.

I have also explained that the United States would continue to make efforts to bring about a just and lasting peace in the area on the basis of the step-by-step methods we have been pursuing and that we believe are the only possible ones. As far as our relationship to the Kingdom of Jordan is concerned, Jordan is of course an old, valued, and trusted friend, and that friendship has, if anything, been strengthened by recent events.

The United States considers Jordan a major factor in the area, and it will continue to base its policy on that conviction. Our talks here have strengthened that relationship.

Thank you very much.

#### **DEPARTURE, DAMASCUS, SYRIA, NOVEMBER 7**

Press release 488 dated November 8

I wanted to say that the talks were conducted in the cordial atmosphere that has become characteristic of our conversations. President Asad explained to me his interpretation of the significance of the Rabat summit. I told the President that we remained ready to proceed on a step-by-step basis in bringing a just and lasting peace to the area and that this required the cooperation of all of the parties involved.

We decided that we would remain in contact with each other over the weeks ahead and that we would continue to exchange views. It was also agreed that, whatever happens in the negotiations, the strengthening of friendly relations between Syria and the United States, which is an objective of the policies of both countries, would continue.

Thank you very much.

#### **THE VISIT TO ISRAEL, NOVEMBER 7-8**

##### **Exchange of Remarks Upon Arrival, Jerusalem, November 7**

Press release 489 dated November 8

*Foreign Minister Yigal Allon*

I am delighted to welcome once more Secretary Henry Kissinger on his tireless mission to achieve peace in our area. We consider this as a very important visit of his, particularly that between his last visit and this one, as you all know, two events took place—one in the General Assembly of the United Nations, which decided to invite representatives of the so-called PLO to address the Assembly; the other one is the Rabat conference, which decided that only the so-called PLO will represent the Palestinians in seeking some sort of a solution. As you all know, we think that these two events are counterproductive, very harmful to the effort of achieving peace. Nevertheless, we mustn't get desperate.

All those who believe in peace, such as our government in this country—and of course Mr. Kissinger is one of the greatest believers in the necessity and the possibility of peace in this area—we should do our best to see to it that the momentum is not lost and [inaudible] further steps will be studied in order to achieve this great goal.

Welcome, Mr. Kissinger.

*Secretary Kissinger*

Thank you, Yigal. I'm here to discuss with our friends the impact of recent events and the possibilities for joint efforts toward peace. Since I have been here last, there has

been no change in American policy on any of the issues before us. Our friends and we will review all the possibilities. In every Arab capital that I have visited I have said what I shall also repeat here: The United States will make every effort, on a step-by-step basis, to contribute to a just and lasting peace in the Middle East. My friends here and I will review this evening what steps are possible, and we will do it in the atmosphere of frankness, cordiality, and warmth that has always characterized our relationship.

Thank you.

**Luncheon Hosted by Foreign Minister Allon,  
Jerusalem, November 7**

Press release 490-A dated November 8

*Toast by Foreign Minister Allon*

Mr. Prime Minister, Mr. Secretary, colleagues and friends: This is an informal lunch, so I am not going to make a speech. We do deserve a good lunch, after working hard for—what is it—some 20 hours. Some people are always asking me if the Americans are already pressing and squeezing me. I say to them, “not yet,” but I must admit that they are pressing us, because whenever Henry Kissinger and his friends are coming here, they make us work so hard that they are violating our own law of work and, after work, rest.

Anyhow, I can say this: We were looking forward to your visit, Henry, and Joe [Joseph J. Sisco, Under Secretary for Political Affairs], and friends. Because with Rabat, without Rabat, with that disappointing resolution of the Assembly, without it, we must concentrate our efforts in our tremendous undertaking to achieve a political settlement, which absolutely must lead to peace in this area. There are so many reasons to get desperate. It's a sort of perpetual effort; whenever you get closer to the horizon you find the horizon is a little bit further away, and still you have to stick to this dream, because this is one of the greatest dreams that our generation has to turn into a reality.

I know you are Secretary of State of a great country, but many people—across the world, across borders—look upon you not just as the Secretary of State of America but a man who undertook a special mission, which many people and many governments tried before, including ourselves, and unfortunately failed. What we need today is the combination of great vision, faith, and skill—three qualities that characterize you, Mr. Secretary—and we hope in this grave situation we did not have, neither you nor us, to take any decision, because no definite proposals have been put before us. But exchange of views in assessing the situation was so important for us, and for you and your colleagues, in our joint effort to achieve a joint goal—which I'm sure will be the goal of some of our neighbors at least—that this trip can be considered a very useful one, and I'm sure you can see yourself that the atmosphere was very friendly, [and I say this] not just diplomatically, as when we meet we usually say what we think in candor and respect.

And I would like to raise my glass to all of us here, and I'm sure the day will come when we will celebrate the great political achievement. *L'chaim* [“To life”].

*Toast by Secretary Kissinger*

Yigal and friends: I hope you all noticed when Yigal started, he started with “Mr. Secretary, Mr. Prime Minister, colleagues and friends”—so at least we know who is not his friends. [Laughter.] It is a policy of equilibrium.

This is my ninth trip here in the last year, and there is a sort of fever chart that precedes every trip, always profound analyses that the United States has now finally changed its policy, and at last what has always been suspected has come true—that the United States will now really press Israel and force Israel to do things that Israel does not want to do, and may already have done it, and if there is a word in some communique that is not exactly the same word as in the former one, and since we're

never given credit for stupidity, it is always a profound design.

That fever chart we have gone through nine times, and the interesting thing to me is that never have these predictions survived our first meeting, because we always, when we meet and analyze the situation, develop a common approach, and this is no accident, because our relationship is not based on personalities. And anybody who talks about peace in the Middle East will sooner or later be driven to the same conclusion—that a peace to be lasting must make the participants feel that they are secure, that they have a sense of participation—and therefore, knowing the rivalries and the suffering and the tensions of the past generation, we have deliberately moved step by step, to permit all those who negotiate an opportunity to feel that what is being negotiated is really their negotiation, and not something that the United States has given.

On this particular trip there have been important events. As I said at the airport, and as I have tried to say for a week, not always with great success, there has been no change in American policy. I'm not here because there is a change in American policy, but because there is a continuing American policy which, in the light of circumstances, has to be analyzed from time to time. The objectives have to be set so that we know what we are doing, with confidence in each other; that has always characterized our relationship. We are now in an extremely delicate phase—it is extremely complicated—in which a great deal depends on psychological understanding, political sensitivity, and on confidence in each other.

I feel that after our talks here there is no question about the confidence in each other; there is no question about the direction in which we should go. We will now have to see what is possible, how it is possible. We will stay in close touch; no doubt I will come back here; no doubt there will be stories again that I am here to announce at last the change that has always been predicted and has never happened, that at last we are going to bring the pressure that has

not occurred and that I am too cowardly to exercise anyway. [Laughter.]

Be that as it may, there is no pressure necessary, because we are in essential agreement on the course. I believe, I hope, and I pray that we will look back to this trip as one of those that ushered in a period in which new advances were possible, even though we have to move carefully and we have to see what possibilities exist in a very complicated situation that has arisen as a result of the Rabat summit and other developments internationally.

So we leave here with confidence and with appreciation not only for the reception we have had but for the very frank, useful, and friendly talks that we have conducted. I look forward to an early opportunity to resume contact, and of course we will stay in intimate touch. So if you could change the instructions to [Israeli Ambassador Simcha] Dinitz so that he calls only three times a day, it will enable us to conduct foreign policy on other matters occasionally. [Laughter.] That is actually the only major complaint we have. [Laughter.]

Anyway, I would like to propose a toast to the Prime Minister and the Foreign Minister.

#### **Exchange of Remarks Upon Departure, Jerusalem, November 8**

Press release 491 dated November 8

#### *Secretary Kissinger*

Ladies and gentlemen: I've said earlier that this is my ninth or tenth visit in one year, and we all now know that it follows a certain course. There's always, before I come, a great deal of speculation about the momentous changes that are going to be brought about in policy as a result of my visit and what new pressures may be brought on Israel. And then we meet, we agree, we pursue a common approach, and we remain on the same course, which is to move step by step toward a just and lasting peace in the area, a peace that no people can want more and no people deserve more than the



people of Israel. We have had two days of very cordial, very frank, very friendly talks, and we agreed that in the new conditions that have arisen in these months we need to explore carefully what possibilities do exist. We will jointly explore them. The United States stands ready to help all the parties that are ready to move forward, and the United States, as always, maintains the closest relations with its old friends in Israel.

So the talks have been good. We know where we're going. We will explore carefully and deliberately. We will stay in close touch with each other, and we have hope for the future.

*Foreign Minister Allon*

While I can't but endorse everything that the Secretary of State had to say about his visit to the Middle East in general and to Israel in particular, it was quite natural that the Government of Israel was most anxious to hear an authoritative assessment of the situation after the Rabat conference.

I couldn't think of another person in the world today but Dr. Kissinger who could go to any Arab capital he wishes and from there go to Israel when his hosts there know very well that he is about to visit Jerusalem and talk to us. This gives us in addition to what we know from our own sources what was going on in Rabat, to hear Dr. Kissinger's opinion about the possibilities of the continuation of our joint political effort to achieve durable and just peace in the Middle East even if this has to be achieved step by step.

We are very happy to hear from the Secretary of State that these options are not blocked altogether. It is true that the situation is very complicated, very delicate, and therefore what is needed today is a great vision, a faith in the need and possibility to achieve peace, and the skill of a mediator. Happily, Dr. Kissinger possesses all these qualities, and therefore we think his visit to this country was most useful. We had good talks, very frank ones and a very friendly atmosphere. We do hope that sooner or

later, better sooner than later, we shall hear some news about the possibilities of some political progress in order to keep the momentum alive.

I am very happy that Mrs. Kissinger, Nancy, could come with him, but unfortunately he keeps us so busy that it doesn't give us a chance even to look at her. I hope this isn't out of jealousy—just because we are hard-working people. So next time I hope he'll take an extra day and come to a nice place like my kibbutz and relax a little bit, not only politically but also physically.

## **THE VISIT TO TUNISIA, NOVEMBER 8-9**

### **Remarks by Secretary Kissinger Upon Arrival, Tunis, November 8**

Press release 492 dated November 8

Ladies and gentlemen: A little over a year ago I stopped in Tunisia on my first trip to the Middle East. I came here to get the benefit of the views of your President Bourguiba and of all his associates about how the United States could best proceed to contribute to a just and lasting peace in the Middle East. Since then some progress has been made, and I am again on a trip to find out what the next steps might be and such a journey would not be complete without exchanging ideas with our old friends in Tunisia.

I bring the greetings of President Ford and also the congratulations to your President for his recent reelection.

### **Exchange of Remarks Upon Departure, November 9**

Press release 493 dated November 11

#### *Secretary Kissinger*

Ladies and gentlemen: We have had a very brief but very warm, cordial, and useful visit here. The President and the Foreign Minister, who were in Rabat, explained to me their understanding of the significance of the conference of the Arab chiefs of state.

I told Tunisian friends that the United States believes that progress toward a just and lasting peace in the Middle East is possible on a step-by-step basis on which the United States would be prepared to participate if the parties involved were prepared to make the effort. President Bourguiba explained to me that in his own career he proceeded step by step against many obstacles and some criticism and finally prevailed in his objectives. We will come to draw courage from his example.

The Foreign Minister explained to me the important discussions that Tunisia arranged between the Foreign Minister of Portugal and the leaders of the independence movement in Angola that are taking place in Tunisia at this moment. The Foreign Minister also arranged an opportunity for me to meet the Foreign Minister of Portugal to discuss both bilateral Portuguese-U.S. relations and the important negotiations going on here in Tunisia. I believe that the negotiations now going on in Tunisia can be of historic importance and will be supported by the United States. I would like to congratulate the Foreign Minister of Tunisia and the Government of Tunisia for having taken this important initiative.

Finally, we reviewed the bilateral relationships between Tunisia and the United States, which are excellent. We are here among old friends. We agreed to begin discussions about setting up a commission between Tunisia and the United States to explore ways in which this relationship can be further strengthened in many fields.

It remains for me only to thank the Government of Tunisia, its great President, and its Foreign Minister for having arranged on short notice such a warm and successful visit.

*Foreign Minister Habib Chatti*

Ladies and gentlemen: As you see, we were very glad to welcome Secretary of State Kissinger and Mrs. Kissinger. This was a visit marked by friendship which shows very well this durable, old, and solid friendship that exists between Tunisia and the United States.

The talks with the Secretary of State were,

as always, extremely interesting, particularly on account of the trip he has just undertaken and the many issues with which he has been dealing, also because of his style of diplomacy.

Our talks were very interesting and, I would say, even very important, because they enabled us to gain an insight, a clear insight, into the situation as it exists in the Arab world and also in the United States, as an aftermath of the Rabat summit meeting. The situation as it now exists is quite difficult, and the task of the U.S. Secretary of State, in an effort to reach some middle ground between the Arab states and Israel, has become very difficult. We are facing a situation which is more difficult, but at the same time it is more clear, and therefore we must all act with determination so as to find the way to conciliation.

Tunisia, as well as the other Arab nations, are deeply dedicated to peace and wish to find a peaceful solution to this serious problem which poses a threat not only to the Mediterranean area but to the whole world.

The Secretary of State has assured us that he will continue to act toward conciliation with a view to finding a just and durable solution to the problems of the Middle East. We are particularly gratified by his good and sound determination.

President Bourguiba said yesterday to Secretary Kissinger that Tunisia will do all that is possible on its part in order to help the United States, and both Tunisia and its President consider that the United States can play an essential part to assure the attainment of this peace that is so much wished for in this region.

Without saying that we are optimistic regarding the evolution in the Middle Eastern situation, still we are not pessimistic. And since Secretary Kissinger is always optimistic, his optimism is definitely contagious. We wish him the greatest measure of success in the continuation of his mission because it does concern all of mankind.

Regarding bilateral relations I have not much to say except they are the very best possible and that the weather is always in the position of the fairest weather.

## Secretary Kissinger Hosts Luncheon at Moscow

*Following is an exchange of toasts between Secretary Kissinger and Soviet Foreign Minister Andrei A. Gromyko at a luncheon at Spaso House, Moscow, on October 26.<sup>1</sup>*

Press release 440A dated October 26

### SECRETARY KISSINGER

Mr. Foreign Minister, Mrs. Gromyko, distinguished guests: The reason for the slight delay at the beginning was because the Foreign Minister and I were negotiating how to allocate the hour and 45 minutes we set aside for the toast. [Laughter.]

First of all, on behalf of all of my colleagues and of Mrs. Kissinger, I would like to express our profound gratitude to our Russian hosts for the very warm hospitality we have been shown here. Nancy returned from a trip last night and has definitely confirmed the existence of Leningrad. But until I have been shown it myself, I will reserve my judgment.

We have spent three days here on this my third visit to the Soviet Union in one year. The frequency of these visits and the intensity of our talks reflect the enormous importance the United States attaches to the relationship with the Soviet Union. Through changes of administration there has been one constant recognition—that the peace of the world depends on the degree to which the United States and the Soviet Union can cooperate for common objectives. So when we meet we review all topics. We know each other well enough now so that we speak with total frankness about exactly what we think, and yet the atmosphere is both businesslike and friendly and cordial. I think we have on this trip made good progress in a number of fields, and we have set a course which we hope and expect will be to the benefit of our two peoples and for the benefit of mankind.

<sup>1</sup>For other documentation related to Secretary Kissinger's Oct. 23-27 visit to the U.S.S.R., see BULLETIN of Nov. 25, 1974, p. 701.

We intend to continue these frequent contacts and to find common points of view across an increasing range of activity.

And so with this attitude, I would like to propose a toast to Foreign Minister and Mrs. Gromyko, to the friendship of the Soviet and American people, and to peace in the world.

### FOREIGN MINISTER GROMYKO

Mr. Secretary of State, Mrs. Kissinger, ladies and gentlemen, comrades: I wish to note as a very significant achievement right from the start the fact that the doubts that the Secretary of State had entertained as regards the existence of Leningrad have now been removed. He did not believe anyone except his own wife, but that is all too understandable.

We sympathize with what Dr. Kissinger has said just now as regards the role played by the two powers. Although this is perhaps a repetition, it is not out of place to say this several times. The more often statements of this sort emanate from both Moscow and Washington—and better still, from other world capitals, too—the better it will be. And it will be better still if these statements are buttressed by the practical actions of these two nations in the interest of détente and peace. And it is to promote that objective that we are now holding these talks in Moscow during this visit by Secretary of State Kissinger.

As regards the prevalent atmosphere, I would say—and I trust that this does not differ from Dr. Kissinger's assessment—that it is good, friendly, and businesslike, and this, too, is a good augury. The second point that I would like to make is to stress that the questions which are under discussion during these talks are of exceptional complexity, and there is really no need to dwell on that, because this is indeed universally known. And, of course, during their discussion there do at times appear certain differences of views, if perhaps not in the ultimate objectives then in the means and methods to be used to achieve them. Such differences do sometimes occur. But there

are no important and complex problems, at least among those existing since the end of the last war, which could be resolved, so to say, at one go without any difficulties.

We would perhaps like to see such an ideal situation come about—that situation has not existed and does not exist. Such is the state of affairs both in Europe and in regards to questions concerning other parts of the world and questions which cannot be allocated to various geographical localities. But the important thing is that the two sides should not end their efforts to achieve agreement and that they should not weaken their desire or their determination to find a common language on the questions under discussion.

As regards the Soviet Union, we do have both the desire and the determination to find a common understanding with the United States and with the leaders of that country on the questions that we are discussing. Frequently negotiations have to go through several stages, and the important thing is that there should indeed be movement from one stage to the next, and secondly, each new advance from one stage to the other should bring with it new success at every stage—new success leading toward ultimate agreement and accord. That is how we see the necessary approach to the outstanding issues of the day and to those questions that are under discussion between the United States and the Soviet Union.

So if in the course of this present stage of exchange of opinions some questions are not resolved to their very end, we believe—and we trust that this does not run counter to the opinion of the Secretary of State—the two nations must continue their search for a final solution; we are prepared to do so. The very fact that taking part in these talks from beginning to end is the General Secretary of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union, Leonid Brezhnev, who has met with the Secretary of State several times, speaks for itself and most emphatically so. We should like to look ahead with optimism toward the future generally and in particular toward

the future of relations between the Soviet Union and the United States of America.

The Soviet Union and our leadership and I have already had an opportunity to draw your attention to this, Mr. Secretary. The Central Committee of our Party and the Soviet Government and personally the General Secretary of our Central Committee are fully determined to pursue the line that has been taken in Soviet-American relations, the line that we are following and the line which we intend to follow in the future. Improvement of relations between the Soviet Union and the United States is necessary not only in the interests of our two peoples; it is indeed in the interests of all the world. And this improvement should not be feared by any countries or by any people.

I believe we can say with full grounds that the results of the talks between the United States and the Soviet Union which have been held on several occasions and their positive outcome have been met with broad understanding and appreciation the world over, and I would venture to say almost everywhere in the world. That, we feel, is only too understandable, and this certainly heartens the Soviet people and the Soviet leadership. We trust this also evokes a positive attitude on the part of the United States leadership. This certainly goes to confirm the correctness of the path that we have jointly charted, aimed at improving relations between our two nations.

To the further development and improvement of relations between the United States and the Soviet Union; to both powers displaying determination to seek ways to resolve unresolved issues; to the useful and positive results of this new Soviet-American meeting in Moscow, even though it has not yet reached its conclusion; to your health, Mr. Secretary of State; to Mrs. Kissinger; to the health of all the representatives of the United States of America present here today, first and foremost the American Ambassador and his wife, in whose house we are all guests today; to all this I would like to ask all of you to raise your glasses and, if possible, drain them.

## Federal Chancellor Kreisky of the Republic of Austria Visits the United States

*Bruno Kreisky, Federal Chancellor of the Republic of Austria, made an official visit to the United States November 9–13. He met with President Ford and other government officials at Washington November 12–13. Following are an exchange of greetings between President Ford and Chancellor Kreisky at a welcoming ceremony in the East Room at the White House on November 12 and their exchange of toasts at a dinner at the White House that evening.*

### REMARKS AT WELCOMING CEREMONY

White House press release dated November 12

#### President Ford

Mr. Chancellor: It is a great privilege and a very high honor to welcome you to the United States.

I might apologize for the weather. We could not do much about that.

But speaking on behalf of the American people, let me say how very happy we are for this further opportunity to strengthen the ties of affection and the ties of respect that bind our two nations and our two peoples together.

Like all of the world, America has profited very greatly, Mr. Chancellor, from Austria's great contributions to the arts, to the law, education, medicine, and psychology, and of course there is the great legacy of music, the legacy of Vienna that the whole world treasures, the music of Mozart, the Strausses, and so many others; additionally, the great importance that Austria has served as a continuing force for peace and stability throughout the world.

Mr. Chancellor, modern Austria has proven beyond any doubt again and again in

recent years that a small country can make big contributions to world peace and world understanding. Your positive involvement in world affairs, your generous support of the United Nations, including an important role in the peacekeeping forces in the Middle East and Cyprus, your gracious hosting of important international conferences, such as the initial phase of the Soviet-American strategic arms negotiations and the force reduction talks now in process—all of these Austrian contributions are helping to build a better and more peaceful world.

We Americans, of course, are very, very proud of our long and sincere friendship with Austria. We cherish our many, many American citizens of Austrian ancestry, and we look with satisfaction and admiration at Austria's impressive economic achievements over the past 10 years.

Mr. Chancellor, we also look forward to our discussions and to the future good relations of Austria and the United States. The nations of the world face many, many challenges today—challenges in the field of finance, food, and energy, to name only a few. Meeting them will require our best common efforts and the counsel and understanding of many of our friends.

So, Mr. Chancellor, in anticipation of our session together and with our traditional Austro-American friendship in mind, America, one and all, bids you welcome and wishes you an enjoyable and most productive visit.

#### Chancellor Kreisky<sup>1</sup>

Mr. President: First of all, let me thank you for having invited me to come to Washington on an official visit at a time when you are extremely busy. We in Austria greatly

<sup>1</sup> Chancellor Kreisky spoke in German.

appreciate this high privilege, and we take it as proof of the strong and unimpaired friendship which has existed for decades between the American people and the Austrian people.

Mr. President, I come from a country which greatly appreciates the great contribution made by the United States—and we know this from experience—for the liberation of Europe and for the economic reconstruction of our continent.

We remember with great gratitude the sacrifices which the American people in so many ways have made for the restoration of peaceful conditions in Europe.

Today Austria is an economically prosperous country enjoying the blessings of freedom and democracy. We have not forgotten the significant contributions made by your country for this development.

Austria belongs among the smaller nations of Europe, and I regard it as an expression of international democracy that in its dealings with Austria, the United States has never disregarded the principles of equality and of respect for the sovereignty and freedom of our country. The friendship between our two countries and between our two peoples rests on the solid foundation of mutual trust and mutual respect.

Let me assure you, Mr. President, and Mrs. Ford, that Mrs. Kreisky deeply regretted to have been unable to join me in this trip and to see her fervent wish to be here unfulfilled.

Mr. President, I want to again thank you sincerely for this invitation, and I am looking forward to our discussions with my Minister also with the greatest of interest.

## **TOASTS AT WHITE HOUSE DINNER**

White House press release dated November 12

### **President Ford**

Mr. Chancellor and distinguished guests: It is a great privilege to honor you in the White House on this occasion. As I look around the room, I see many, many people that I know from personal experience, in-

cluding Mrs. Ford and myself, who have visited Austria and been the beneficiaries of the wonderful hospitality, the warmth, the friendship of the many, many fine Austrians who have bent over backwards to make us from America warmly welcome.

I must say to you, Mr. Chancellor, that sometime—I can't give you the date—but I am going to wander into Austria and take advantage of those wonderful Tyrolean Alps, because I do like to ski, and hopefully I will have an opportunity to do so just to not only enjoy the benefits of the mountains but the benefit of the wonderful people from your country.

There are many, Mr. Chancellor, who pass judgment on a country by its size and geography and its size in population. I don't think those are the most significant ways on which you really can judge a people or a country, and we recognize of course that Austria is relatively small in population and relatively small in geography, but as we look at the great history and the present in Austria, we find that looking from the outside to the country that you have a great humanitarian spirit, you have a great belief in friendship, but more importantly than almost anything, the people of Austria have a character.

And that is how we judge, in my opinion, the strength of a nation, despite its size either geographically or populationwise.

We know over the years since the end of the decade of the forties that Austria has contributed very significantly, despite many problems. You have contributed in the Middle East and Cyprus, and we commend you and we thank you for these efforts that have helped to preserve the peace and to build for it in the future.

I would simply like to express on behalf of all of us in the United States our gratitude for the friendship that we have with the people of Austria, the gratitude that we have for the actions of your government, and we look forward, I can say, Mr. Chancellor, without any reservation or qualification, the opportunity to work with you and the people of your country in the years ahead.

It is an enduring friendship predicated on a firm foundation of people to people and

government to government, and may I ask all of our distinguished guests here tonight to join me in a toast to Dr. Bruno Kreisky, the Chancellor of the Republic of Austria.

### Chancellor Kreisky <sup>2</sup>

Mr. President, Mrs. Ford, ladies and gentlemen: In your warm words of welcome, Mr. President, for which I sincerely thank you, you have mentioned the longstanding and proven ties between the United States and Austria. Certainly the peoples of the former Austro-Hungarian monarchy always harbored feelings of genuine friendship and admiration for the American people.

To the best of my recollection, however, the relations between the two governments were not always quite that cordial. [Laughter.]

It appears that His Imperial and Royal Apostolic Majesty Franz Joseph could not bring himself for a long time to receive the American envoy to Vienna.

Early in this century the developing official relations between Austria-Hungary and the United States of America, at least until the outbreak of World War I and the ensuing disintegration of the Austro monarchy, there really never was more than correct relations and therefore completely different from those we are fortunate to enjoy today.

Why do I choose to point this out? Because the development of our relations serves as a most convincing example which shows that a very special and close relationship between two nations can be developed in quite a few decades.

I see three reasons for this. In 1945 the United States became one of the four occupation powers in Austria and helped us from the very first day to lay all those foundations needed for the restoration of democracy. Nothing has made a greater contribution to the history of our democracy than the presence of the United States in Austria. You virtually were the guardian of our freedom, Mr. President.

Secondly, Austria was in ruins, and it

was hard to imagine at that time how our state could ever again become the home and heaven of our people. You gave to those of us who set out to clear the ruins not only a healthy dose of American optimism, but also the most generous material assistance.

Mr. President, I hope you will have the opportunity to see with your own eyes the fruits which have sprung from your country's contributions to the economic revival of Austria.

Aid under the Marshall plan was the foundation of our economic prosperity, and its effects are still being felt today. This aid constituted one of the chief reasons why twice as many people than in 1937 earn a good living in Austria today.

During the period from 1937 to 1970, our gross national product, given constant rises, quadrupled and has shown a marked increase since.

Let me add that your material assistance of that time still keeps giving today, as many Austrian firms receive lower interest, long-term investment loans from the ERP [European Recovery Program] counterpart front, which is sustained through repayment of earlier loans.

The fact that this aid by the United States for the restoration of our economy was given to us free of any contingencies of political dogma enabled us to utilize those sums, which appeared gigantic to us in the light of our circumstances, and complete independence.

And finally, the third reason. Through generous grants, Austrian scientists, engineers, and experts of every specialty have been afforded the opportunity to explore new dimensions in the advanced areas of your cultural and scientific life.

A further example is the considerable contribution made by the Ford Foundation to the Institute for Advanced Studies in Vienna, from which a great number of eminent social scientists have emerged in recent years. This constitutes ample reward for the contributions made by Austria to the cultural life of the United States.

Before raising my glass to the continued prospering of these relations, I would like

<sup>2</sup> Chancellor Kreisky spoke in English.

to again voice my regret that Mrs. Kreisky was unable, for reasons of health, to participate in this beautiful and impressive visit. She regretted this all the more because it robbed her of the opportunity to meet Mrs. Ford, whose restoration to health has made us all very happy and to whom I wish to extend warm personal wishes.

And now, ladies and gentlemen, I ask you to raise your glasses and join me in a toast to the health of the President of the United States and his charming wife and to the continued development of the excellent relations between our two countries.

## **U.S. Pledges Continued Efforts To Resolve Indochina MIA Question**

*Following are remarks made by Deputy Secretary Robert S. Ingersoll on November 1 upon presenting the Department of State's Tribute of Appreciation to Emmet J. Kay, an American civilian pilot who was held as a prisoner of Pathet Lao forces in Laos from May 7, 1973, to September 18, 1974.*

Press release 458 dated November 1

As we recognize Mr. Kay for his courage and endurance as a prisoner for over 16 months in Laos, we think also of the many Americans who remain unaccounted for in Indochina. There are some 2,400 in all, more than half declared dead with their bodies not recovered, the rest listed as missing.

They include men from our military services, as well as some 30 American civilians, among them several journalists. Their families have waited for years in hope of additional information—as promised in the Viet-Nam and Laos agreements of 1973. Some 20 months have elapsed since those agreements were signed, with virtually no progress on accounting for the missing and the return of the remains of the dead.

Despite continuing efforts to arrange this, the Communist authorities have refused to agree to searches for crash sites, graves, and other information in areas under their control. We have long been ready to carry out such searches by unarmed American teams,

and we are prepared to discuss arrangements for such searches by representatives of neutral countries, by the International Committee of the Red Cross, or by responsible local authorities. Such searches have helped resolve a number of cases in South Viet-Nam, and we continue to hope they can be extended to other areas of Indochina as well.

The release of Emmet Kay and the release of nearly 400 other prisoners held by both sides in Laos was a welcome forward step in carrying out the Laos agreement and protocol. We hope this action will be followed by constructive efforts to account for the missing in all parts of Southeast Asia where Americans were lost. The families of our men have waited too long already; it's time to get on with the task.

I am pleased to note that the Third Committee of the U.N. General Assembly this week approved a resolution on the subject of accounting for the missing and dead in armed conflicts. From our discussions of this subject at the United Nations and at other international meetings we know it is a matter of concern to people in many countries which have experienced this problem during and after hostilities. There should be no political or military disagreement about this humanitarian question, and I pledge our own continued efforts to help resolve it.

## **U.S. Members Named to U.S.-India Educational, Cultural Subcommittee**

Press release 474 dated November 4

The Department of State announced on November 4 the appointment of 10 distinguished Americans as members of the Educational and Cultural Subcommittee of the U.S.-India Joint Commission for Economic, Commercial, Scientific, Technical, Educational and Cultural Cooperation.

Establishment of this Subcommittee was provided for in the Agreement for a Joint Commission signed on October 28 by Indian Foreign Minister Y. B. Chavan and Secretary Kissinger during Secretary Kissinger's recent trip to New Delhi.



The members, who will serve for two-year terms, include:

- ROBERT GOHEEN (Chairman), Chairman of the Council on Foundations  
DR. RONALD S. BERMAN, Chairman, National Endowment for the Humanities  
CHARLES BLITZER, Assistant Secretary for History and Art, Smithsonian Institution  
EDWARD BOOHER, President, Book and Education Services Group, McGraw-Hill Co.  
DR. DANIEL BOORSTIN, Director, National Museum of History and Technology, Smithsonian Institution  
DR. EDWARD C. DIMOCK, JR., President, American Institute of Indian Studies, University of Chicago  
DR. FRED H. HARRINGTON, program adviser, Ford Foundation  
DR. FRANKLIN A. LONG, Henry Luce Professor of Science and Society, Cornell University  
DR. ELEANOR B. SHELDON, President, Social Science Research Council  
LEE T. STULL, Deputy Assistant Secretary for Educational and Cultural Affairs, Department of State

The American and Indian members of the Subcommittee will meet annually to review existing educational and cultural exchange activities and to explore opportunities for closer cooperation and expanded ties in educational and cultural fields.

The first meeting of the Subcommittee is expected to take place in New Delhi in January 1975. At this meeting the delegates will discuss proposals relating to Indian and American Studies, educational programs, collaborative research projects, media, library, and museum exchanges, performing arts, the role of foundations, and private cooperation and business involvement in exchange.

## Letters of Credence

### *Belgium*

The newly appointed Ambassador of the Kingdom of Belgium, Willy Van Cauwenberg, presented his credentials to President Ford

on October 4. For texts of the Ambassador's remarks and the President's reply, see Department of State press release dated October 4.

### *Greece*

The newly appointed Ambassador of Greece, Menelas Alexandrakis, presented his credentials to President Ford on October 4. For texts of the Ambassador's remarks and the President's reply, see Department of State press release dated October 4.

### *Indonesia*

The newly appointed Ambassador of the Republic of Indonesia, Rusmin Nurjadin, presented his credentials to President Ford on October 4. For texts of the Ambassador's remarks and the President's reply, see Department of State press release dated October 4.

### *Laos*

The newly appointed Ambassador of the Kingdom of Laos, Khamphan Panya, presented his credentials to President Ford on October 4. For texts of the Ambassador's remarks and the President's reply, see Department of State press release dated October 4.

### *Netherlands*

The newly appointed Ambassador of the Kingdom of the Netherlands, Age Robert Tammenoms Bakker, presented his credentials to President Ford on October 4. For texts of the Ambassador's remarks and the President's reply, see Department of State press release dated October 4.

### *Niger*

The newly appointed Ambassador of the Republic of Niger, Illa Salifou, presented his credentials to President Ford on October 4. For texts of the Ambassador's remarks and the President's reply, see Department of State press release dated October 4.

## U.N. Calls for Cooperation in Accounting for Missing and Dead in Armed Conflicts

*Following is a statement by Senator Charles H. Percy, U.S. Representative to the U.N. General Assembly, made in Committee III (Social, Humanitarian and Cultural) on October 21, together with the text of a resolution adopted by the committee on October 29 and by the Assembly on November 6.*

### STATEMENT BY SENATOR PERCY

USUN press release 136 dated October 21

The resolution before us deals with the problem of accounting for the missing and the dead in armed conflicts. Concern about this humanitarian problem has been evident since ancient times. During the wars between Rome and Carthage, it is recorded, mothers and wives waited for news of those who died and the missing. More recently, following the First and Second World Wars, we remember pictures of relatives at railroad stations and ports as prisoners and refugees returned, with signs asking, "Has anyone information on my son?"—or husband or brother, as the case may be.

There is much of death and suffering in the heat of battle, and there is suffering that lingers after the fighting is over: physical sufferings from wounds, mental trauma from psychological injuries, and grief for relatives for whom the outcome of the battle is measured in terms of the death of loved ones.

The aftermath of armed conflict also brings the quiet anguish of those who wait

for information on the missing. Many people in many countries attest to this. Indeed, there is hardly an armed conflict, regardless of location, regardless of character, that has not resulted in cases of men missing in action.

Surely all would agree that the certain knowledge of a missing person's fate is better than extended uncertainty about the fate of a loved one. Sometimes families wait for years—for a lifetime—never knowing for sure what has happened to a missing relative.

This subject is of particular concern to my government because at the present time in Indochina many persons on both sides—combatant as well as noncombatant—remain unaccounted for. Families of missing men in my country have told me personally of their distress.

In addition to emotional stress, there are legal and practical difficulties if a man's fate cannot be established. But above all, there is the lingering ache of uncertainty.

From talks with other delegates here, I know the same situation exists elsewhere as a result of other recent armed conflicts. It is not the purpose of this resolution to single out specific problem areas or to point the finger of blame at any government. Rather it is to state and reaffirm international concern about this humanitarian problem.

The resolution we have joined in proposing recalls that one of the fundamental purposes of the United Nations is the promotion of international cooperation to resolve hu-

manitarian problems. With all peoples and nations, we would hope that negotiations could supplant war. At the same time, we recognize that armed conflicts continue to cause widespread devastation and human suffering. The purpose of this resolution is to call attention to a sometimes-unrecognized consequence of armed conflicts—the lack of information on persons, civilians as well as military personnel, who are missing in action or who died in connection with the conflict.

The yearning to know the fate of relatives lost in armed conflict is a basic human emotion. It is not limited to any one country or area of the world. People everywhere, whatever their situation, regardless of nationality, share this emotion and experience the sorrow of loss when their sons or husbands are missing in time of conflict. Surely all would agree that provision of information on those who are missing or who have died in armed conflicts deserves a high priority and should not be delayed pending resolution of other issues.

The resolution calls on participants in an armed conflict—regardless of the nature of the conflict or of its location—to take actions within their power to find and mark the graves of the dead, to facilitate the return of remains if this is requested by families, and to provide information on the missing in action. These are minimal requirements which, if observed, would go far toward satisfying the longing for information on loved ones.

This resolution notes with approval the resolution on this subject adopted by the International Conference of the Red Cross at Tehran on November 14, 1973. The name of the Red Cross has long been associated with the plight of victims of armed conflicts and with the Geneva Conventions of 1949, which state fundamental humanitarian law on this subject.

The Red Cross Conference resolution on the missing and dead was initiated by the United States and cosponsored by the Gov-

ernments of Denmark, Mexico, the Netherlands, Norway, and Pakistan. It was also cosponsored by the Red Cross delegations of Australia, Brazil, Canada, Ethiopia, the German Democratic Republic, the United Kingdom, Iceland, the Netherlands, Pakistan, and the United States. The resolution, which was adopted unanimously, reads as follows:

The XXIInd International Conference of the Red Cross,

*Recognizing* that one of the tragic consequences of armed conflicts is a lack of information on persons who are missing or who have died, including those who died in captivity, and

*In conformity with* the humanitarian traditions of the Red Cross and with the spirit of the Geneva Conventions of 1949,

*Calls on* parties to armed conflicts, during hostilities and after cessation of hostilities, to help locate and care for the graves of the dead, to facilitate the disinterment and return of remains, and to provide information about those who are missing in action, and

*Further calls on* parties to armed conflicts to cooperate with protecting powers, with the ICRC and its Central Tracing Agency, and with such other appropriate bodies as may be established for this purpose, including National Red Cross societies, to accomplish the humanitarian mission of accounting for the dead and missing, including those belonging to third countries not parties to the armed conflict.

The International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC) has long sought to assist in resolving the cases of the dead and missing, in particular through its Central Tracing Agency, located in Geneva. During and after armed conflicts the ICRC and the tracing agency attempt to accumulate information on the missing and to record particulars on those who have died. This resolution endorses the efforts of the ICRC and the tracing agency in this area and calls on parties to armed conflicts to assist to the best of their ability in this humanitarian task.

It is appropriate and timely also for the United Nations to state concern on this subject, to give notice to all that accounting for the missing and dead in armed conflicts is a humanitarian subject of universal concern and a matter which should be kept

separate from political and military aspects of armed conflicts. It is hoped that approval of this resolution will remind parties to armed conflicts that the interests of humanity as well as the spirit of the Geneva Conventions of 1949 require that they make serious and timely efforts to account for the dead and missing.

I repeat—it is a consideration that applies to both sides and without regard to the character or location of a conflict. It applies to civilians as well as to military personnel—and to such special categories as journalists, whose protection has also been the subject of special consideration. The resolution concludes by asking the Secretary General to bring it to the attention of the Diplomatic Conference on Humanitarian Law, which resumes work in February 1975 in Geneva. It would be our hope that this diplomatic conference will be able to agree on improved methods for accounting for the missing and dead in armed conflicts.

I reiterate that the question of the missing in action is of special concern in my country but that this resolution does not single out specific problem areas nor does it point the finger of blame at any government. We mean only to state and reaffirm international concern about an important humanitarian problem.

## TEXT OF RESOLUTION<sup>1</sup>

*Assistance and co-operation in accounting for persons who are missing or dead in armed conflicts*

*The General Assembly,*

*Recalling* that one of the purposes of the United Nations is the promotion of international co-operation in solving international problems of humanitarian character,

*Regretting* that, in violation of the principles of the Charter of the United Nations, the resort to force has continued to occur, causing loss of human lives, widespread devastation and other forms of human suffering,

*Reaffirming* that it is one of the fundamental obligations of Member States to ensure and promote international peace and security by preventing or ending armed conflicts,

*Recognizing* that one of the tragic results of armed conflicts is the lack of information on persons, civilians as well as combatants, who are missing or dead in armed conflicts,

*Noting with satisfaction* resolution V, adopted by the twenty-second International Conference of the Red Cross held at Teheran from 28 October to 15 November 1973, calling on parties to armed conflicts to accomplish the humanitarian task of accounting for the missing and dead in armed conflicts,

*Bearing in mind* the inadmissibility of a refusal to apply the Geneva Conventions of 1949,

*Reaffirming* the urgent need to ensure full adherence to, and effective implementation of, the Geneva Conventions of 1949 on the protection of war victims by all States, and in particular those signatories to the Geneva Conventions of 1949,

*Considering* that the desire to know the fate of loved ones lost in armed conflicts is a basic human need which should be satisfied to the greatest extent possible, and that provision of information on those who are missing or who have died in armed conflicts should not be delayed merely because other issues remain pending,

1. *Reaffirms* the applicability of the Geneva Conventions of 1949 to all armed conflicts as stipulated by those Conventions;

2. *Calls* on parties to armed conflicts, regardless of their character or location, during and after the end of hostilities and in accordance with the Geneva Conventions of 1949, to take such action as may be within their power to help locate and mark the graves of the dead, to facilitate the disinterment and the return of remains, if requested by their families, and to provide information about those who are missing in action;

3. *Appreciates* the continuing efforts of the International Committee of the Red Cross to assist in the task of accounting for the missing and dead in armed conflicts;

4. *Calls* on all parties to armed conflicts to cooperate in accordance with the Geneva Conventions of 1949 with protecting Powers or their substitutes, and with the International Committee of the Red Cross, in providing information on the missing and dead in armed conflicts, including persons belonging to other countries not parties to the armed conflict;

5. *Requests* the Secretary-General to bring the present resolution to the attention of the second session of the Diplomatic Conference on the Reaffirmation and Development of International Humanitarian Law Applicable in Armed Conflicts.

<sup>1</sup> A/RES/3220 (XXIX); (A/C.3/L.2110/Rev.2, as amended; text from U.N. doc. A/9829); adopted by the Assembly on Nov. 6 by a vote of 95 (U.S.) to 0, with 32 abstentions.

## **U.S. Votes Against Expulsion of South Africa From the U.N.**

*Following is a statement made in the U.N. Security Council by U.S. Representative John Scali on October 30, together with the text of a draft resolution which was vetoed that day by the United States, the United Kingdom, and France.*

### **STATEMENT BY AMBASSADOR SCALI**

USUN press release 154 dated October 30

Over the past two weeks, distinguished members of our organization and individual petitioners to this Council have expressed their opposition to the South African Government's practice of apartheid. In virtually all cases, their arguments were predicated on the abhorrence of the unequal treatment of peoples within a society and a minority rule which discriminates against the majority on the basis of color.

Let there be no doubt or confusion, despite the efforts of some, about the attitude of the U.S. Government concerning apartheid. In simplest terms, Mr. President, the Government of the United States opposes it categorically and absolutely. It is evil. It is ugly.

The United States shares the indignation of those who during this debate have decried South Africa's persistence in holding on to the iniquitous and callous policy of apartheid. The system of legislated racial discrimination and associated repressive legislation that prevails in South Africa is an indefensible affront to the spirit and principles of the charter and to human dignity around the world. It denies what the U.N. Charter proclaims—the dignity and worth of every person and the equal rights of all men and women. It is a matter of profound concern to the United States that the South African Government has ignored calls in the Security Council and in the General Assembly to put

an end to its inhumane, outmoded, and short-sighted policies.

Despite all warnings and admonitions, the South African Government continues to practice apartheid. It continues to uproot non-whites and consign them to often-barren "homelands" in order to preserve the supremacy of the fifth of the population who are white. It maintains draconian restrictions on the movement of non-whites. It persists in providing to non-whites inferior education, keeping them in a disadvantageous position. Segregation and inequality in all areas of life are pervasive. Non-whites are not represented in the government that dominates and intrudes into almost every aspect of their lives.

South Africa's denial of basic human rights is compounded in Namibia by its illegal occupation of that territory. The United States finds it reprehensible that South Africa has failed to honor its obligations under international law to withdraw from Namibia in accordance with General Assembly and Security Council resolutions and the 1971 opinion of the International Court of Justice.

South Africa's continuing illegal occupation of Namibia is made all the more outrageous by the manner in which it administers the territory. The repression of peaceful political activity, the flogging of dissidents by the South African administration's surrogates, and the division of the territory into so-called homelands are indefensible and inconsistent with the responsibilities South Africa had assumed as administrator of a mandated territory.

But, Mr. President, I am obliged to point out that even in this grievous case, the United States continues strongly to adhere to the view that resorts to force and other forms of violence are not acceptable means to induce change. This is our view with regard to other serious problems throughout the world, and it is our view with respect to South Africa. Armed confrontation is no substitute for communication.

The description of South Africa's transgressions I have just presented is not new. Observers have agreed about the essential facts of apartheid for many years.

Some of the words I have just used are borrowed. Members of the Council may be familiar with the statement made in the Special Political Committee of the General Assembly on October 17 on the issue of apartheid by my distinguished co-delegate Mr. Joseph Segel. This is a personal statement, as well as an official one, delivered from the heart by a man now serving as a public member—I repeat, a public member—of the U.S. delegation. It is also a statement to which I subscribe, to which the U.S. Government subscribes.

We are heartened indeed by some encouraging words in this chamber voiced by the Permanent Representative of South Africa. On October 24, he himself implied that South Africa is responding not in a vacuum but in reaction to world events, not the least of which has been the condemnation of South Africa's apartheid, Namibian, and Rhodesian policies within this international organization. I have noted with special interest that a distinguished African leader, whose bitter experiences in the past make him an impressive witness today, has also found hopeful aspects in the new South African voices.

We believe that a just solution of South Africa's racial dilemma indeed lies within South Africa itself. Taking practical steps toward improving the condition of non-whites and seeking change through communication seem to us more likely to have impact than some other measures suggested.

American firms in South Africa, for example, have had notable success in improving the pay and working conditions of their non-white workers. They do this as a matter of enlightened policy—with the support of the U.S. Government. The United States believes that through its current cultural exchange program prominent South Africans of all races have gained a new, more accurate perspective of their country's problems and a determination to seek a solution to them.

At the same time, the United States con-

tinues to bar the sale of military equipment to South Africa. In this regard, I would like to state flatly that the United States has not collaborated with South Africa on military or naval matters for over a decade and has no intention of beginning such cooperation in the future.

The situation in southern Africa is significantly different now from that of six months ago. South Africa has no alternative but to reassess its position in light of recent events. The United States urges that in doing so, the South African Government look at the realities of the future.

We call on South Africa to make good the assurances it gave Secretary General Waldheim in April last year to allow the people of Namibia to determine the future of the territory by exercising their right of self-determination, and to withdraw from Namibia. We urge that South Africa simultaneously begin to bring an end to its apartheid policies and to establish the basis for a just society and government where all are equal. We believe that after a quarter of a century of warnings it is time for the South African Government to adopt the measures which will lead to a society of equal opportunity, equal rewards, and equal justice for all. We call on South Africa to fulfill its obligations under article 25 of the charter and to comply with Security Council resolutions on Southern Rhodesia.

Mr. President, some speakers have argued that the best way to bring the Government of South Africa to accomplish these objectives—to bring the South African Government to heel—is for this Council to recommend to the General Assembly that South Africa be expelled from membership in the United Nations organization.

My government believes that this kind of all-or-nothing approach would be a major strategic mistake, especially at a time when we have been hearing what may be new voices of conciliation out of South Africa. These new voices should be tested. We must not be discouraged, as we may have been last December when we instructed the Secretary General to abandon his contacts with the South Africans on Namibia.

Mr. President, many of our colleagues during the past weeks have cited time and time again the poetic reference to "winds of change." With the fresh winds of change blowing from an enlightened Portuguese policy toward Angola and Mozambique, effecting important and progressive changes in southern Africa, the United States believes that it is incumbent upon this organization not to deflect those very winds as they rush toward South Africa. By doing so, we confess that this organization is powerless to influence change there. My government does not accept the view that the United Nations is powerless; rather, we strongly believe that it is through both increased bilateral contacts and the strong will of a determined United Nations that peaceful change will occur in South Africa.

Mr. President, the United Nations was not founded to be simply a league of the just. Rather, in our view, it is a unique international forum for the exchanging of ideas, where those practicing obnoxious doctrines and policies may be made to feel the full weight of world opinion. There is therefore a clear, positive, and indispensable role for the United Nations in bringing change to South Africa.

My delegation believes that South Africa should continue to be exposed, over and over again, to the blunt expressions of the abhorrence of mankind for apartheid. South Africans could hear of this abhorrence only from afar were we to cast them from our ranks, beyond the range of our voices.

Our analysis is that expulsion would say to the most hardened racist elements in South Africa that their indifference to our words and resolutions had been justified. We think it would say to the South Africans that we have not heard, or do not wish to encourage, the new voices—the voices that augur hope of change.

We believe that the United Nations must continue its pressure upon South Africa, moving step by step until right has triumphed. It is self-defeating to fire a single last dramatic salvo with only silence to follow. History holds no example of a pariah state that reformed itself in exile. The pariah

is by definition an outlaw, free of restraint. There is no record of good citizenship in the land of Nod, east of Eden, where Cain, the first pariah, was banished.

My delegation has another grave concern about the wisdom of expelling South Africa. Even if this would help thwart the ugly crime of apartheid, expulsion would set a shattering precedent which could gravely damage the U.N. structure. It would bring into question one of the most fundamental concepts on which our charter is based—the concept of a forum in which ideas and ideals are voiced and revoiced along with conflicting views until elements of injustice and oppression are forced to give way to reason.

This, in sum, is the appeal of my delegation. Let us continue to hold the evils of apartheid under the light of world opinion until all our fellow human beings have seen it for what it is. Let us continue to press South Africa in this U.N. forum and others to move rapidly toward an era of equality and justice.

#### TEXT OF DRAFT RESOLUTION<sup>1</sup>

##### *The Security Council,*

*Having considered* General Assembly resolution 3207 (XXIX) of 30 September 1974, in which the Assembly called upon the Security Council "to review the relationship between the United Nations and South Africa in the light of the constant violation by South Africa of the principles of the Charter and the Universal Declaration of Human Rights",

*Having heard* the statements of the persons invited to address the Council on this issue,

*Taking note* of the special report of the Special Committee on *Apartheid* on "violations of the Charter of the United Nations and resolutions of the General Assembly and the Security Council by the South African régime" (S/11537),

*Mindful* of the provisions of the Charter of the United Nations concerning the rights and obligations of Member States, particularly Articles 1, 2, 6, 55 and 56,

*Recalling* its resolutions 134 (1960), 181 (1963), 182 (1963), 190 (1964), 282 (1970), and 311 (1972)

<sup>1</sup> U.N. doc. S/11543; the draft resolution was not adopted owing to the negative votes of three permanent members of the Council, the vote being 10 in favor, 3 against (U.S., France, U.K.), with 2 abstentions (Austria, Costa Rica).

on the question of the policies of *apartheid* of the Government of the Republic of South Africa,

*Reaffirming* that the policies of *apartheid* are contrary to the principles and purposes of the Charter of the United Nations and inconsistent with the provisions of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, as well as South Africa's obligations under the Charter,

*Recalling* that the General Assembly and the Security Council have more than once condemned the South African Government for its persistent refusal to abandon its policies of *apartheid* and to abide by its obligations under the Charter, as called for by the Security Council and the General Assembly,

*Noting with concern* South Africa's refusal to withdraw its police and military forces, as well as its civilian personnel, from the mandated Territory of Namibia and to co-operate with the United Nations in enabling the people of Namibia as a whole to attain self-determination and independence,

*Noting further* that, in violation of the pertinent resolutions of the Security Council, particularly resolution 253 (1968) of 29 May 1968, South Africa has not only given support to the illegal régime in Southern Rhodesia, but has also sent into that Territory military and police personnel for the purpose of strengthening that régime in its attempt to impede the exercise of their inalienable rights by the people of that Territory,

*Considering* that effective measures should be taken to resolve the present situation arising out of the policies of *apartheid* of the Government of South Africa,

*Recommends* to the General Assembly the immediate expulsion of South Africa from the United Nations in compliance with Article 6 of the Charter.

## **U.S. Commends Work of International Atomic Energy Agency**

*Following is a statement made in the U.N. General Assembly by U.S. Representative John Seali on November 5.*

USUN press release 160 dated November 5

Since its inception, nuclear technology has presented mankind with a fundamental dilemma. How are we to enjoy the fruits of this, our civilization's highest technical achievement, without also suffering its lethal poison? Never before in history has man possessed an instrument with such potential for

good or for evil. Never has man been more starkly faced with the moral responsibility to control the product of his own creation.

Events of the past year have highlighted our dilemma. Even the most reluctant must now acknowledge that the world community has yet to adequately exploit the potential benefits of nuclear technology or to fully control its awesome capacity for destruction. As a result, today's debate takes on a new and timely significance.

Recent dramatic developments in the field of energy have intensified the world search for new sources of energy. The fact that this new demand for alternate sources of energy results from an artificial restriction on oil production does not make the development of such alternates any less urgent.

The International Atomic Energy Agency's response to this new situation, particularly as it affects the developing countries, has been commendably swift and comprehensive. We congratulate the Agency for its decision to step up technical assistance to the developing countries. We are impressed with the Agency's recognition that an equally high priority must be placed on international standards for health, safety, and reactor reliability. We continue to attach the highest importance to all of these activities, and we congratulate the Director General [A. Sigvard Eklund] and his staff for the imaginative way in which they are carrying out their growing responsibilities.

As the world community expands access to the fruits of nuclear technology, we must also apply ever more rigorous and effective controls over its potential for destruction. "The challenge before the world," as Secretary Kissinger has remarked to the Assembly, "is to realize the peaceful benefits of nuclear technology without contributing to the growth of nuclear weapons or to the number of states possessing them."

Secretary Kissinger went on to set out a number of specific areas where action to control and limit the spread of nuclear arms is most urgent. These priority areas include the strengthening of safeguards and controls on



the transfer of nuclear materials and improving the physical security of such material. He also called for more comprehensive adherence to the Nonproliferation Treaty and the safeguards it provides.

I would like to take this occasion to say how impressed my government has been by the way in which the International Atomic Energy Agency is taking the lead in confronting each of these key issues.

In his message to the recent International Atomic Energy Agency General Conference, President Ford stated that the Nonproliferation Treaty was "one of the pillars of United States foreign policy." Director General Eklund has today reported to us on the status of the safeguards agreements concluded pursuant to that treaty. We share the Director General's concern over the delays in concluding these agreements. My government therefore would like again to urge those nations which have signed the Nonproliferation Treaty but have not yet concluded safeguards agreements to accelerate negotiations with the Agency in order to complete these agreements as soon as possible. We further urge these countries which have not yet become parties to the treaty to do so as soon as possible.

Secretary Kissinger suggested that the International Atomic Energy Agency consider urgently the development of an international convention to improve physical security against the theft or diversion of nuclear materials. We are very pleased to note that the Agency has already begun to turn its attention to this problem, and we look forward to cooperating fully with the Agency's efforts.

The addendum to the International Atomic Energy Agency annual report<sup>1</sup> tells of the Agency's recent actions to prepare itself to respond to requests for services related to nuclear explosions for peaceful purposes. Once again I would like to note that my government is pleased that the agency has established the necessary expertise to follow the work in this field, to keep abreast of the tech-

nological developments, and to carry out its responsibilities under article V of the Nonproliferation Treaty.

In closing, Mr. President, I would like to record my government's full support of the program of the International Atomic Energy Agency. We believe that under the forceful and imaginative leadership of Director General Eklund, the Agency is responding well to the unprecedented and still-increasing challenges of a nuclear age.

## TREATY INFORMATION

### Current Actions

#### MULTILATERAL

##### Antarctica

Recommendations relating to the furtherance of the principles and objectives of the Antarctic treaty. Adopted at Wellington November 10, 1972.<sup>1</sup>  
*Notification of approval:* Argentina, October 17, 1974.

##### Ocean Dumping

Convention on the prevention of marine pollution by dumping of wastes and other matter, with annexes. Done at London, Mexico City, Moscow, and Washington December 29, 1972.<sup>1</sup>  
*Ratification deposited:* Jordan, November 11, 1974.

##### Patents

Strasbourg agreement concerning the international patent classification. Done at Strasbourg March 24, 1971.  
*Accession deposited:* Israel, October 7, 1974.  
*Enters into force:* October 7, 1975.  
*Notification from World Intellectual Property Organization that accession deposited:* Egypt, October 17, 1974.

##### Property—Industrial

Convention of Paris for the protection of industrial property of March 20, 1883, as revised. Done at Stockholm July 14, 1967. Articles 1 through 12 entered into force May 19, 1970; for the United States August 25, 1973. Articles 13 through 30 en-

<sup>1</sup> U.N. doc. A/9722/Add. 1.

<sup>1</sup> Not in force.

tered into force April 26, 1970; for the United States September 5, 1970. TIAS 6923.

*Notification from World Intellectual Property Organization that accession deposited:* Zaire, October 31, 1974.

### Property—Intellectual

Convention establishing the World Intellectual Property Organization. Done at Stockholm July 14, 1967. Entered into force April 26, 1970; for the United States August 25, 1970. TIAS 6932.

*Ratification deposited:* Zaire, October 28, 1974.

*Notification of intention to apply transitional provisions:* Republic of Viet-Nam, October 30, 1974.

### Safety at Sea

International convention for the safety of life at sea, 1974, with annex. Done at London November 1, 1974. Open for signature November 1, 1974, until July 1, 1975. Enters into force 12 months after the date on which not less than 25 states, meeting certain requirements, have become parties.

*Signatures:* Bulgaria,<sup>2</sup> Byelorussian Soviet Socialist Republic,<sup>2</sup> Chile,<sup>2</sup> Congo (Brazzaville),<sup>2</sup> Czechoslovakia,<sup>2</sup> Denmark,<sup>2</sup> Egypt,<sup>2</sup> France,<sup>2</sup> Ghana,<sup>2</sup> Greece,<sup>2</sup> Hungary,<sup>2</sup> Iceland,<sup>2</sup> Indonesia,<sup>2</sup> Iran,<sup>2</sup> Israel,<sup>2</sup> Republic of Korea,<sup>2</sup> Liberia,<sup>2</sup> Mexico,<sup>2</sup> Monaco,<sup>3</sup> Portugal,<sup>2</sup> Sweden,<sup>2</sup> Switzerland,<sup>2</sup> Ukrainian Soviet Socialist Republic,<sup>3</sup> Union of Soviet Socialist Republics,<sup>2</sup> United Kingdom,<sup>2</sup> United States,<sup>2</sup> Venezuela,<sup>2</sup> Republic of Viet-Nam,<sup>2</sup> Yemen (San'a'),<sup>2</sup> Yugoslavia,<sup>2</sup> November 1, 1974.

### Sea, Exploration of

Protocol to the convention for the International Council for the Exploration of the Sea (TIAS 7628) amending article 14(2). Done at Copenhagen August 13, 1970.<sup>1</sup>

*Ratification deposited:* United States, October 31, 1974.

### Telecommunications

Telegraph regulations, with appendices, annex, and final protocol. Done at Geneva April 11, 1973. Entered into force September 1, 1974.<sup>1</sup>

*Notifications of approval:* Denmark, Overseas Territories for the international relations of which the United Kingdom is responsible, August 21, 1974; Finland, Japan, August 29, 1974; Luxembourg, September 4, 1974; Sweden, August 30, 1974; Thailand, August 14, 1974; United Kingdom, August 12, 1974.<sup>2</sup>

Telephone regulations, with appendices and final protocol. Done at Geneva April 11, 1973. Entered into force September 1, 1974.<sup>1</sup>

*Notifications of approval:* Denmark, Overseas Territories for the international relations of which

the United Kingdom is responsible, August 21, 1974; Finland, Japan, August 29, 1974; Luxembourg, September 4, 1974; Sweden, August 30, 1974; Thailand, August 14, 1974; United Kingdom, August 12, 1974.<sup>2</sup>

### Terrorism—Protection of Diplomats

Convention on the prevention and punishment of crimes against internationally protected persons, including diplomatic agents. Done at New York December 14, 1973.<sup>1</sup>

*Signatures:* Nicaragua, October 29, 1974; Paraguay, October 25, 1974.

### Trade

Arrangement regarding international trade in textiles, with annexes. Done at Geneva December 20, 1973. Entered into force January 1, 1974, except for article 2, paragraphs 2, 3, and 4 which entered into force April 1, 1974. TIAS 7840.

*Acceptance deposited:* Nicaragua, July 30, 1974.

*Accessions deposited:* Austria, August 22, 1974; Philippines, August 12, 1974.

### Treaties

Vienna convention on the law of treaties, with annex. Done at Vienna May 23, 1969.<sup>1</sup>

*Accession deposited:* Greece, October 30, 1974.

## BILATERAL

### Mexico

Agreement amending the agreement relating to the provision of support by the United States for a multi-spectral aerial photographic system capable of detecting opium poppy cultivation of June 10 and 24, 1974 (TIAS 7863). Effected by exchange of letters at México September 19, 1974. Entered into force September 19, 1974.

Agreement providing additional helicopters and related assistance to Mexico in support of its efforts to curb illegal production and traffic in narcotics. Effected by exchange of letters at México November 1, 1974. Entered into force November 1, 1974.

### Viet-Nam

Agreement for sales of agricultural commodities. Signed at Saigon October 8, 1974. Entered into force October 8, 1974.

<sup>1</sup> Not in force.

<sup>2</sup> Subject to ratification, acceptance, or approval.

<sup>3</sup> Without reservation as to ratification, acceptance, or approval.

<sup>4</sup> Not in force for the United States.

<sup>5</sup> Extended to Channel Islands and Isle of Man.

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No.	Date	Subject
440A	10/26	Kissinger, Gromyko: exchange of toasts, Moscow.
493	11/11	Kissinger, Chatti: departure, Tunis, Nov. 9.
*495	11/12	Secretary's Advisory Committee on Private International Law Study Group on Negotiable Instruments, New York, Dec. 4.
*496	11/12	Advisory Committee on International Intellectual Property, International Industrial Property Panel, Dec. 10.
*497	11/13	Secretary's Advisory Committee on Private International Law Study Group on Maritime Bills of Lading, Dec. 6.
*498	11/14	Working committees established for National Commission for Observance of World Population Year.
*499	11/14	Nordness appointed consultant to World Population Year Commission (biographic data).
500	11/14	Kissinger: University of Chicago.
†501	11/15	Kissinger: news conference.
†502	11/15	Kissinger, Boyatt: Foreign Service Day memorial ceremony.

\* Not printed.

† Held for a later issue of the BULLETIN.

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*The Department of State BULLETIN, a weekly publication issued by the Office of Media Services, Bureau of Public Affairs, provides the public and interested agencies of the government with information on developments in the field of U.S. foreign relations and on the work of the Department and the Foreign Service.*

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U.S. Government Printing Office  
Washington, D.C. 20402

PRICE:

52 issues plus semiannual indexes,  
domestic \$29.80, foreign \$37.25  
Single copy 60 cents

Use of funds for printing this publication approved by the Director of the Office of Management and Budget (January 29, 1971).

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## Secretary Kissinger's News Conference of November 15

*Following is the transcript of a news conference held by Secretary Kissinger in the auditorium of the Executive Office Building on November 15.*

Press release 501 dated November 15

*Ronald H. Nessen, Press Secretary to President Ford:* Ladies and gentlemen, in response to your request to talk to Dr. Kissinger about the Far East trip, here is Dr. Kissinger. This is all on the record for immediate release, no live broadcast, and those are the only rules.

*Secretary Kissinger:* If I had known there was no live broadcast, I wouldn't have come here. [Laughter.]

Let me make a few very brief remarks about the purpose of the trip, and then I will take your questions on that or any other subject.

You will remember that a visit to Japan by the President was foreseen in a Japanese-American communique last year. It was announced to take place by the end of 1974, and it was reaffirmed on a number of occasions afterward. It will be a historic event in that it is going to be the first visit by an American President to Japan, reflecting the great importance we attach to the relationship with Japan.

In recent years, our relations with Japan have undergone a series of adjustments brought about by new conditions in the Far East, the growing strength and self-confidence of Japan, and the emergence of a pattern of equality. We consider this relationship excellent.

We believe also that the future stability of the Pacific area depends importantly on a close understanding between the United States and Japan, which is symbolized by the visit of the President and by the occa-

sion that this will give for full exchanges with Japanese leaders.

The President called in the Japanese Ambassador on the first afternoon of the day that he was sworn in as President. On that occasion, in affirming the continuity of American foreign policy, he also specifically affirmed that he would meet the commitment of his predecessor to visit Japan by the end of 1974.

So, this trip was planned as one of the first acts of President Ford, and we consider it essential for the overall design of foreign policy. While being in Japan, we expect to review with the Japanese leaders bilateral relations of Japan and the United States, which, I repeat, we consider excellent, as well as to review the international situation and in order to make certain that we understand each other as to basic principles and objectives.

The visit to Korea is a natural complement to the visit to Japan. We could not be in that area and not visit Korea without raising grave doubts that our commitment to Korea was still what it has traditionally been. The visit to Vladivostok reflects the necessity of the leaders of the two nuclear superpowers to be in frequent touch with each other, a necessity which is particularly acute after a change of administration in the United States, to enable the two leaders to have an opportunity to exchange views on the whole range of our relationships, on possible difficulties that may arise, but even more importantly, on how to give momentum to the commitment to détente that they have both expressed.

This is the basic purpose of the trip, and now I will be glad to take your questions.

*Q. Mr. Secretary, with respect to the difficulties that may arise, before you get into*

*the questions on the trip I would like to ask what your assessment is of the possibility of an outbreak of warfare in the Middle East now, in view of a spate of reports yesterday and today from the area about possible preemptive Israeli attacks, the unloading of huge amounts of Soviet armaments in Syria, the visits to the Golan Heights and that. Could you give us your opinion?*

*Secretary Kissinger:* Obviously, we have seen these reports, and we are checking into them on an urgent basis. We cannot believe that any of the parties in the Middle East would resort to war under these circumstances.

We cannot believe that any major power would deliberately encourage war in a situation as serious and as potentially explosive as that in the Middle East. The United States would certainly oppose any idea that the problems of the Middle East can be solved by military action and will use its influence with all parties to prevent this from arising. It expects that all other countries that are in a position to do so would exercise a similar restraining influence.

So, we think that these reports are probably—if they are not exaggerated as to the facts, we do not believe that military actions are imminent.

*Q. Mr. Secretary, another point on your travels will be Peking this year, and it has been almost a year since you were there before. Do you expect this visit to bring further progress toward normalization of relations or anything of a substantive sort?*

*Secretary Kissinger:* The relationships between the United States and the People's Republic of China are good, and they are progressing in the manner that has been foreseen on our previous visits, including the last one.

Every trip is within the context of promoting the normalization of relationships and to represent a step toward the normalization of relationships. I do not expect any dramatic announcements as a result of this trip, but I expect a continuation of the steady progress that has marked our previous con-

tacts and a further improvement of our relationship.

*Q. Mr. Secretary, do you think it is inevitable that Israel is going to have to deal with Mr. [Yasir] Arafat and the PLO [Palestine Liberation Organization] in subsequent negotiations now that a certain amount of recognition in stature has been given the organization by Rabat and by the General Assembly and, if so, under what conditions would it be possible for Israel to do this?*

*Secretary Kissinger:* As you know, I expressed the view of the administration, which has not changed, that the proper negotiation, or the best negotiation for the future of the West Bank, was between Jordan and Israel, and the United States had used its influence to bring about such a negotiation.

As to any other parties that might negotiate, this is entirely a decision for Israel and for any of the other parties that may be involved, and it is not a matter on which the United States will give advice as to the conditions in which such negotiations may be appropriate, if indeed it is appropriate.

*Q. Mr. Secretary, could you give us your appraisal of the Arab and of the Israeli reactions to the fact that more than a month elapsed before General Brown [Gen. George S. Brown, Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff] apologized for his remarks at Duke and he was only mildly reprimanded by the President?*

*Secretary Kissinger:* I frankly have no view as to what the Arab or Israeli reaction to this is. It is my understanding that the President expressed his opposition to the views as expressed by General Brown, and this certainly reflects the view of the administration.

We don't consider this a subject of foreign policy decisions, because, clearly, the administration's view has been repeatedly enunciated and has been in no way affected by any remarks that were made by any military leader.

*Q. Mr. Secretary, isn't the President taking a sizable risk by traveling abroad like*



*this at a time when there is no Vice President in place?*

*Secretary Kissinger:* You have to remember that the President committed himself to this trip on his first day in office, at a time when it was considered inconceivable that a Vice President would not be confirmed by this time. To cancel a trip because a Vice President hasn't been confirmed would give an impression of domestic instability that would in itself be a foreign policy factor, and therefore the President decided to continue with a trip which we consider extremely important in its own right under conditions which could not be foreseen at the time the decision was made.

### **Middle East Tensions**

*Q. Mr. Secretary, you said a moment ago that you couldn't believe—or words to that effect—that any major power would deliberately encourage war in the Middle East?*

*Secretary Kissinger:* That is correct.

*Q. I assume you might mean the Soviet Union. I would like to ask whether you have any information or evidence to indicate that the Soviet Union might be encouraging war?*

*Secretary Kissinger:* We have no evidence that the Soviet Union is encouraging war, and as I have said, we are using all our influence with both parties, and we are certainly calling to the attention of all other countries the importance of restraint in the Middle East.

*Q. Is the Soviet Union using its influence in a positive direction, in your opinion, sir?*

*Secretary Kissinger:* This recent flareup has only come to our attention in the last few hours, and it isn't clear to us yet what it means. I would warn against overexaggerating the imminence of any conflict there. But we are certainly calling it to the attention of the Soviet Union.

*Q. Mr. Secretary, could you give us a more thorough view of your current appraisal of the Middle East situation as the President and you are about to depart for*

*a considerable period of time? Do you have any special anxiety that there will be a hiatus here during this period, when we are now at a stage of seeing considerable reports of imminent action? What is your basic view of the hazard here?*

*Secretary Kissinger:* The President and I met with Secretary [of Defense James R.] Schlesinger this morning, and we reviewed contingencies which might arise and mechanisms of how to deal with them if they should arise. I repeat, this is a normal precaution. We do not expect the contingencies to arise. We do not believe that prior to a meeting between the General Secretary [Leonid I. Brezhnev] and the President the Soviet Union would be encouraging military action in the Middle East, and we cannot believe that any of the parties in the Middle East would be so reckless as to engage in military action.

So, while we recognize that certain military precautions have been taken by both sides, and while there is always a risk that precautions could get out of hand, we do not think a war is likely. If it should occur, we have made contingency plans for dealing with it. Communications are of course very rapid, and we would deal with it on that basis.

*Q. Mr. Secretary, also on the Middle East, does the United States detect any change or moderation in the statements made by Mr. Arafat representing the Palestinians? Does that make any difference as far as the United States is concerned? And also, what are your plans on traveling to the Middle East?*

*Secretary Kissinger:* With respect to the speech itself, our reading of it is that it called for a state which really did not include the existence of Israel and therefore was dealing with a successor state, and we do not consider this a particularly moderate position.

With respect to my own plans, I have no plans now to go to the Middle East. This could change, but as I pointed out before, we think that this is now a period for quiet diplomacy, and I do not expect to return to the Middle East in the near future.

*Q. Before, I noticed you used the past tense in referring to our preference—"was"—for negotiations between Israel and Jordan. Do you think in the current situation there is a live possibility of negotiating with Jordan?*

*Secretary Kissinger:* It is my understanding that King Hussein has accepted the decisions of the Rabat summit to the effect that the PLO should be the principal negotiator on the West Bank, and this explains my reference to the past.

*Q. Mr. Secretary, has the Syrian Government indicated to you, as far as you know, its attitude toward an extension of the U.N. presence on the Golan Heights? And whether it has or hasn't, how much of any importance do you attach to its attitude toward that question that will soon be coming up?*

*Secretary Kissinger:* The Syrian Government has not given us a formal answer as to the extension of UNDOF [United Nations Disengagement Observer Force] on the Golan Heights, and to the best of my knowledge, I do not believe that they have given a formal answer to anybody. They have, however, indicated on a number of occasions grave doubts about the extension of UNDOF, and if one were to quote the statements that they have made, one could construe them as an indication that they probably will not agree to the extension.

It is our view that failure to extend UNDOF would cast doubts on the viability of agreements that may be made in that area, and we therefore believe that the extension of UNDOF is important for the continuation of the negotiating process and especially for negotiating prospects that may exist between Syria and Israel, and the failure to extend it would undoubtedly contribute to the tension in the area.

#### **Cooperation Among Energy Consumers**

*Q. Mr. Secretary, I would like to ask a couple of questions about your oil speech last night. Why did you say, "In the mean-*

*time, we will face two great dangers. One is the threat of a new embargo."? And secondly, what kind of a response can you expect from other consuming nations when the United States itself has not yet come up with a serious program for conservation or developing alternate sources of energy?*

*Secretary Kissinger:* With respect to the first question, it is obvious that the possibility of another embargo exists and the emergency program that will be agreed to next week—that has been agreed to but will be formally adopted next week—provides for precisely this contingency. We went through an embargo last year, and the possibility of an embargo cannot be ignored. Therefore, in order to enable the consuming nations to withstand political pressures, we consider this program is of the first significance.

Secondly, in my speech, which I went over carefully with the President before I gave it, we stated the goals that have to be met in order to meet the objectives that were set in the speech, the objectives being to reduce dependence on imported oil, to create a situation in which alternative sources, coupled with conservation restraints and financial solidarity, bring about a reduction in the price of oil.

And in any event, the cooperation among the consumers is essential whether or not the price of oil comes down. In fact, it is even more essential if the price of oil does not come down. The goals that I stated are the administration goals. The methods by which they are reached, whether they are done by voluntary restraints or by other measures, will be reflected in Presidential speeches to the Congress.

In any event, the United States has expressed its readiness in this speech to accept internationally binding consumption restraints, and therefore the question of whether or not we are now engaged in them is really irrelevant to the program that has been set forth which we are prepared to undertake on an international basis.

*Q. Mr. Secretary, I would like to ask a*

question about the wisdom and timing of the Far East trip, specifically with regard to visiting Prime Minister Tanaka and his problems at home. I would like—if you would, please, to address yourself to the fact that Mr. Tanaka may in fact be a lameduck Prime Minister. Also, if you would address yourself to the fact, please, that President Ford will be visiting Korea, where the government has come under severe criticism for being rather oppressive, contrary to democratic principles. And if you would, sir, please address yourself to the site of the meetingplace in the Soviet Union, which is either on or close to disputed territory with the Chinese.

*Secretary Kissinger:* With respect to the first question, the visit to any country is to the government and not to any particular individual. We don't express any view as to what difficulties Prime Minister Tanaka may or may not be in, and therefore I don't accept the basic premise of your question. But the fact of the matter is that the major figures in Japan with whom we will be dealing have shown considerable stability in terms of their participation in the government. Therefore, we believe that whatever may happen in Japan—and we do not accept that the contingency you foresee is inevitable—that, therefore, the trip should go forward.

Secondly, it is clear that the President of the Republic of Korea is being criticized. We did not think that this outweighs the consideration that I have mentioned before, that the failure to visit Korea might be understood as a reduction in the degree of the American commitment to the security of South Korea, which could have serious international consequence.

With respect to the site of the meeting with the Soviet Union, this is a matter that has been discussed, and we have received no complaints from the Chinese side.

*Q. Mr. Secretary, without disclosing your contingency plans, we have been reading about alleged NSC [National Security Council] memos and so forth, foreseeing a possi-*

*bility that the United States might go in this time if there was another Arab-Israeli conflict. Do you foresee any possibility?*

*Secretary Kissinger:* Do I personally foresee any possibility?

*Q. Yes, of the United States going into the Middle East war.*

*Secretary Kissinger:* First of all, I don't foresee a Middle East war. Secondly, I don't confirm that there are any NSC contingency plans for the United States to go into an Arab-Israeli war. The U.S. attitude will be what it has been in previous wars, and our attitude is basically to avoid a conflict and to bring it to the most rapid conclusion possible if there should be one. But we believe there is every possibility of avoiding a conflict now, and therefore there is no sense speculating on what we might do.

But it is clear that the U.S. intentions, unless there should be other outside intervention, would be to confine its role to what it has been.

*Q. Mr. Secretary, last night in Phoenix, President Ford, in answer to a general question on Middle East policy, mentioned that Israel has been urged to make peace, to reach agreements with Egypt and "other Arab nations." He was pressed on the question of whether the PLO should be recognized, and he repeated that Israel should reach agreements with Egypt and "other Arab parties," which left the answer ambiguous. I wish you would clear it up, whether or not we regard the PLO as a nation or a party or, in the final analysis, as a negotiating partner, although I recognize what you said earlier, that it is an Israeli decision.*

*Secretary Kissinger:* I have to repeat what I said earlier. The United States is not engaged in promoting any particular set of negotiations. I have stated what our view as to the most effective strategy has been, and we have not expressed any recommendation to any of the parties with whom they should negotiate.

*Q. What are your maximum hopes for a strategic arms achievement at the Vladivostok summit?*

*Secretary Kissinger:* The issue of strategic arms limitation is an extremely complicated one, involving many weapons systems, many technologies; and the fact is, as I have pointed out on a number of occasions, that the forces of the two sides have been designed in a different manner, with different characteristics, so that comparisons are sometimes difficult.

Therefore, it is hard to foretell any specific achievement. We believe that progress was made during my talks with General Secretary Brezhnev in Moscow. We think that this progress can be continued in Vladivostok. Whether the progress will lend itself to some formal statement, or whether it will lead to being transferred to the Geneva negotiations, or whether some other method will be chosen and the exchanges will continue, can really not be predicted until there have been some further discussions building on the discussions that took place in Moscow.

*Q. Mr. Secretary, in part of your speech last night, in your proposal to cut oil imports, were you just referring to Arab nations or were you also proposing to cut oil imports from Canada?*

*Secretary Kissinger:* I was referring to cutting overall oil imports, not just from the Arab nations.

### **Complex Food Aid Problems**

*Q. Mr. Secretary, given the position of moral leadership that the United States undertook in convening the World Food Conference, why was the decision reached not to follow the advice of the U.S. delegation and provide an extra million tons of food?*

*Secretary Kissinger:* First of all, as I understand it, this was not a recommendation of the U.S. delegation, but was a recommendation of some members of the U.S. delegation.

But let me make clear what our position had been with respect to the World Food

Conference. We face two problems: the basic problem of world food shortages, which is a structural one, and the immediate emergency problem of the shortages this year that cannot be dealt with by any structural changes.

The United States believes that no matter what food aid is given this year, structural adjustments in world agriculture policies are essential. This is why we proposed the Export Planning Group of the exporting nations and why we proposed a group to promote the increase in agriculture in the underdeveloped nations, which is one of the most essential elements, and why we proposed a reserve program.

Food aid is one relatively small part of the overall problem. Now, with respect to food aid, we have stated that we will do what is humanly possible in order to give the maximum food aid. The differences in the government concern tactics and not substance.

The difference concerns the question of whether we should announce a specific target before we know what the crop reports are and produce an increase in prices in this country and contribute to the inflation or whether we should continue to operate on a quarterly basis as we have been on the basis of crop reports and in a manner that enables us to make the decisions without having the undesirable consequences that I described.

As a matter of fact, most of the decisions that have been taken in the last quarter have been at the high end of the option, and I personally expect that by the time that the year is over we will have increased not only the dollar amount but the quantity of the food aid.

But the President wanted to reserve the option of looking at it every quarter so that the difference between those members of the delegation who ask for a flat commitment and the dominant trend in the administration, including the view of the President, is really primarily a matter of how to give food aid without producing inflationary pressures in this country and therefore maybe endangering the whole food aid problem.

I personally regret that the issue of the World Food Conference, which really should deal with the structural problem of food, has

been tied up with a one-year allocation of food aid, which is not going to be decisive in dealing with the overall issue that we have described.

*Q. Mr. Secretary, do you believe that there is any connection at all between the reports that we have been receiving now about mobilization in the Middle East and the fact that the President is about to embark on this trip? Can there be any linkage?*

*Secretary Kissinger:* I consider that extremely unlikely, and I would have thought that the imminent meeting of the President with the General Secretary should have a calming effect on the situation rather than an accelerated effect.

It must be obvious to the parties concerned that anyone who wantonly starts a war under these conditions would be putting himself into a very dubious position internationally and with its relationship with the United States, and obviously this must be clear to any of the Soviet leaders, whom we do not believe are encouraging the tensions right now, and we do not believe that a conflict is imminent.

*Q. It is not possible, you think, that, rightly or wrongly, that other powers might perceive that the United States in effect is in a weakened condition?*

*Secretary Kissinger:* It would be a very serious miscalculation.

*Q. May I also ask, do these reports in any way directly contradict assurances you had received, either from the Soviets or others during your Middle East travels?*

*Secretary Kissinger:* I did not have the impression on my Middle East travel that any of the parties were planning imminent military operations.

As far as the Soviets are concerned, it seems to me to go without saying that prior to a meeting between the General Secretary and the President they should not and, in my belief, are not taking action to exacerbate the situation.

*Q. Mr. Secretary, you said you didn't have*

*the impression. Did you have specific assurances in the Middle East about this situation?*

*Secretary Kissinger:* I have stated my view. Certainly all of the parties know that the United States would be opposed, strongly opposed, to the resumption of hostilities.

*Q. Mr. Secretary, do you expect any major agreements to be signed in Japan, or should we consider that trip primarily symbolic?*

*Secretary Kissinger:* I think a trip can be substantive without major agreements being signed. In negotiations with Japan it is very important to permit the Japanese consensus-building to develop and not to expect in a three-day visit to accelerate any particular decision.

We believe that there will not be any major agreement signed, but we nevertheless believe that the trip will be highly substantive.

If I may make one other comment about all these Middle East questions. There is a tendency, if I may say so, to overreact to reports. It was the case after the Rabat summit. It seems to me to be the case today.

In our judgment, we are not in a situation of imminent conflict, and I do not think that it contributes to stability to give the impression that we are.

*Q. Mr. Secretary, there have been reports recently that Egypt is now linking the re-opening of the Suez Canal to a further Israeli pullback in Sinai. Yet during the January disengagement agreement, we were told that the canal would be reopened as quickly as possible. Is there a tie-in between the two?*

*Secretary Kissinger:* We have not received any formal communication from the Egyptians to that effect. I have seen statements in the press which allege this, or in which Egyptian officials are quoted as having said this. We would consider this inconsistent with the disengagement agreement, but it will be a moot point until the canal clearance is completed, which is not yet the case.

*Q. What can you tell us about the likely degree of Japanese acceptance of the plan*

*you outlined last night, and would you expect something to come in Tokyo on that?*

*Secretary Kissinger:* I do not expect that in the period of three days there will be any major decisions taken on a plan that was as embracing as the one that was put forward last night. We undoubtedly will have some discussions on that subject. I think the final decisions will have to be taken in a multi-lateral framework and not on a bilateral basis between individual countries.

I would expect that progress will be made, not necessarily next week but in the months ahead, just as progress was made, after the Pilgrims speech last year, over a six-month period, in implementing both the proposal for an agency and the proposal for an emergency sharing program.

And we believe, since there is really no realistic alternative to the major direction that has been proposed, that over a period of months some of the main elements, or many of the main elements, of the proposal will be implemented.

We are not putting it forward on a take-it-or-leave-it basis. Within the framework of the general objectives, we are quite open-minded as to counter proposals. But we believe this is the direction in which the consuming nations ought to go, and we think this is the direction they will go.

## **President Ford's News Conference at Sigma Delta Chi Convention**

*Following are excerpts relating to foreign policy from the transcript of a question-and-answer session held by President Ford at a convention of the Society of Professional Journalists, Sigma Delta Chi, at Phoenix, Ariz., on November 14.<sup>1</sup>*

*Q. Peggy Roberson, the Birmingham News, Birmingham, Alabama.*

*Mr. President, recently we have seen horrifying pictures of starving people in the*

*world, and we have learned that energy and food are unbreakably linked. Are we prepared to use food as a weapon to force down energy prices so farmers can produce low-cost food to feed these people?*

*President Ford:* We are not going to use food as a weapon. We must recognize, however, that food is just as important to the world as oil and that in order to get a better distribution of oil that is held in vast reserves by other nations and food that is produced by us to a greater extent than any other nation in the world, we must get together and cooperate to make sure that that which is available in both cases is spread throughout the world for the benefit of all people.

Dr. Kissinger, the Secretary of State, has put together the group of oil-consuming nations. We expect to work with the oil-producing nations. I believe that there can be an understanding achieved that will be to the mutual benefit of the producers in food and oil and the consumers in both.

*Q. Mr. President, Norman Kempster of the Washington Star-News.*

*You have spoken of the danger of the Nation being without a Vice President. On Sunday you are planning a trip to Japan where some violence is threatened. What do you expect to achieve on this trip to Japan that can make it worth the risk?*

*President Ford:* There are three very important countries that I am visiting—and I should preface that with a comment that a President has two major responsibilities, one in the field of domestic policy and the other in the field of foreign policy.

And where we have three extremely important countries, two where we have good relationships, treaties, where we are allies—Japan and South Korea—where we want to strengthen that relationship, and the third,

<sup>1</sup>For the complete transcript of President Ford's opening remarks and questions and answers, see Weekly Compilation of Presidential Documents dated Nov. 18.

the Soviet Union, where we have been trying to achieve a détente and broaden it, where we are going to, hopefully, lay a broader foundation for SALT Two—when you add up the pluses, I think that there is convincing evidence that I, as President, should go to Japan, to expand our good relations with Japan; go to South Korea, a staunch and strong ally, and to work out some differences, if any, and to broaden our relations there; and to go to the Soviet Union to, hopefully, make some progress in détente, in the reduction of arms. I think it is a very worthwhile trip.

*Q. Mr. President, Russ Ward of NBC News.*

*There has been some recent talk in the Middle East about a possible reimposition of the Arab oil embargo. Do you have contingency plans for dealing with such a move, and might those plans include a possible change in our relations over there, either with Israel or the PLO [Palestine Liberation Organization]?*

*President Ford:* Our plans are aimed at trying to get the Israelis to negotiate a settlement or additional settlements with the Egyptians and the other Arab nations. Those are the plans we have which are affirmative and plans that I think, if we continue constructively, can bring about some success.

Until we have failed, and I don't think we will, in trying to get the parties to work together, I don't think it is appropriate to discuss what we will do if we don't achieve success.

*Q. Are you suggesting, Mr. President, that Israel should deal directly with the PLO? It has been the Israeli objection all along against recognizing the PLO as a bona fide political organization.*

*President Ford:* I didn't say that. I did say that the Israelis should negotiate with the Egyptian and other Arab parties. The Israelis have said they will never negotiate with the PLO. We are not a party to any

negotiations. I think we have to let the decision as to who will negotiate to be the responsibility of the parties involved.

*Q. Gene McLain, KTAR Television and Radio, Phoenix.*

*Mr. President, you are approaching your first hundred days in office. How do you size up your pluses and minuses, your major disappointments and successes?*

*President Ford:* I think the best things we have done—number one, nominating Nelson Rockefeller; number two, the conducting of the economic summit meetings, I think 12 all over the country, with two in Washington, and the formulation of a good, sound economic plan that meets the problems of a weakening economy and inflation.

I believe that we have laid additional groundwork for success in the Middle East. We have redirected some of our policies in the subcontinent areas. We have, in addition, enhanced the possibility of strategic arms limitation agreement number two, which I think will be enhanced by the meeting I am going to have in Vladivostok in about 12 days, hopefully to be followed by a meeting in Washington sometime in the summer of 1975.

Some of the disappointments—we had a few bad breaks. I think the Congress was dead wrong when they handicapped myself and Secretary Kissinger in the efforts that we could make in the settlement of the Cyprus question between Greece and Turkey. I think that was a terrible disappointment, and some of the things we warned about might happen, and it won't be helpful to Greece. That was a bad break.

Another was the failure on the part of the Congress to act more affirmatively on behalf of the nomination of Nelson Rockefeller. It should have been done before the campaign recess. I think the Congress also might have moved ahead more rapidly in some of the economic suggestions.

We have had some pluses, and we have had some minuses, but I believe so far we are a little ahead of the game.

## Under Secretary Sisco Discusses Middle East in "Today" Interview

*Following is the transcript of an interview with Under Secretary for Political Affairs Joseph J. Sisco by Richard Valeriani and Barbara Walters on the NBC "Today" show on November 20.*

Press release 507 dated November 20

*Mr. Valeriani: Mr. Sisco, you said on Monday in an interview to be published outside the country that the United States now regards the Palestine Liberation Organization (PLO) as the umbrella organization for all Palestinians. Now, that seems to go further than you've ever gone before.*

*Mr. Sisco: Dick, I think that was an unfortunate way to put it. Actually, what I was trying to reflect was that the Arabs consider the PLO as the umbrella organization. Now, let me make very clear that our policy is as stated by the President and the Secretary of State. We've accorded no recognition of any kind; our position remains unchanged.*

*I think some people have read something into that—I was really trying to state a fact as conceived by the Arabs, that the Arabs do conceive of the PLO as the umbrella organization.*

*Mr. Valeriani: You seem to be preparing the groundwork for bringing the PLO into the negotiations.*

*Mr. Sisco: No, I don't think that's the case, Dick. Again, I've got to underscore that our position remains unchanged. Let's look, for example, at the General Assembly for the moment. We had a major speech that was made by [Yasir] Arafat quite recently. I found no openings in that speech. As the Secretary of State said in his press conference last Friday, he hardly saw that as a moderate approach. There was no, for example, explicit or implicit implication of giving up terrorism as a matter of policy. The proposal for a secular state would really have the effect of negating the existence of the State of Israel as we know it. So that, I*

think, in terms of that particular speech, I saw no opening.

*Mr. Valeriani: But doesn't the decision by the Arab summit meeting in Rabat to allow the PLO to negotiate for all Palestinians in effect throw the negotiating process into deadlock?*

*Mr. Sisco: No, I don't think that we're at an impasse or at a deadlock. I'd be the first to admit that Rabat, I think, has been complicating to our effort. But, Dick, you were on this recent trip with the Secretary of State. The thing that struck me from this recent trip was that both sides were at great pains to emphasize that the doors of diplomacy remained open. Note, for example, the strong endorsement of the continuation of the Secretary's mission that came out of Cairo—likewise, in Saudi Arabia and elsewhere.*

*I think the doors remain open, and I think that what we can expect over the coming weeks is a period of quiet diplomacy, largely within the confines of diplomatic channels; but our efforts are going to continue, and they're going to continue primarily because both sides want our efforts to continue.*

*Miss Walters: First of all, Mr. Sisco—perhaps on your way to our studio—in our last hour we had the chief spokesman for the PLO delegation to the United Nations in this country, who said that the Palestinian attacks would continue until the Israelis negotiated with the PLO. I'd like to ask two questions. First of all, up until recently there had been the feeling as expressed by President Sadat of Egypt that the Arabs were beginning to recognize Israel as a sovereign Jewish state and would negotiate on those terms. Then with the recognition by the United Nations of the PLO, which says they want a secular state, one isn't too sure what the prevailing Arab point of view is and whether President Sadat's statements in the past did recognize Israel's existence now and in the future. Can you give us an idea of what the prevailing Arab viewpoint is now?*

*Mr. Sisco: Yes, I think I can, Barbara. I*



think it's important to remember that the principal Arab states that are involved in this matter have all in the past, and they have not changed their position in this regard, supported Resolution 242—the November 1967 Security Council resolution—and a subsequent resolution that calls for negotiations. I have detected, Barbara, no change in that attitude, and those two resolutions are based on the assumption of coexistence between Arab states and an Israeli state.

*Miss Walters: May I ask the second question then. Over the weekend when there was a scare of a possible war, the threat of a possible war, a very imminent war between Syria and Israel, Secretary Kissinger talked with the Israeli Ambassador, talked with Arab leaders, he also talked with the Soviet Union and received some kind of assurance that put a damper on the fears of the war. Can you give us any idea of what that conversation with the Soviet leaders involved?*

*Mr. Sisco:* Obviously, Barbara, I can't go into the details and you're right, the Secretary did undertake all of these discussions. The only thing I would say about Soviet policy, which indirectly really gets at what you've asked, is that I believe there is a mutual recognition, both in Moscow and in Washington, that there is a mutual interest that the Middle East not break out into another war. I think this is important—that both of the major powers recognize the danger of the situation.

You know, you look at the Middle East; not only do you have the differences between the Arabs and the Israelis, you have intra-Arab relationships that are important, then you've got superimposed the whole major-power complex—the interest of the major powers—and now on top of all of these, you have this very delicate relationship between producer and consumer. This is why I've often said that the Middle East today is the most complicated situation in the world. I fear and I'm concerned about this.

I would hope that—I thought that terrorism would be at an end. I find these terrorist acts deplorable; the State Department issued

a statement yesterday condemning this latest terrorist attack.<sup>1</sup> And these terrorist attacks have to be understood, I think, Barbara, as antipeace actions rather than actions that help negotiations or help make practical progress.

*Mr. Valeriani: In that connection, Mr. Sisco, earlier in the year there seemed to be a momentum toward peace in the Middle East. Now it seems to have shifted; there seems to be a momentum toward war as exemplified by the events of last weekend. How close is it?*

*Mr. Sisco:* Well, I'm not so sure that one can describe the present situation as a momentum toward war. Certainly there's been an increase in tension, but as long as the opportunities for diplomacy remain, as long as the people in the area feel that there is such an opportunity, then I think we've got a chance of more practical progress; and in this regard, I think the United States continues to remain key.

*Mr. Valeriani: Well, you'll have a very quick opportunity to test that when the mandate for the U.N. Force on the Golan Heights comes up for renewal. Are the Syrians going to agree to a renewal?*

*Mr. Sisco:* Well, the mandate for the U.N. Force on the Syrian front, as you say, comes up at the end of the month. The U.N. Force both on the Egyptian front as well as the Syrian front, in my judgment, is a major element of stability. Both sides have agreed to the positioning of this force, and I think it's all-important that there be an extension because it is part and parcel of the disengagement agreement itself. And I think we'll have to wait and see. My hope is that both sides will see the advantage of maintaining every element of the disengagement agreement—particularly in this very delicate and

<sup>1</sup> The following statement was issued by the Department's press spokesman on Nov. 19:

"Once again we have witnessed the tragic spectacle of a terrorist attack on innocent civilians (this, in reference to the attack on Beith Shean). We want to express our shock over these senseless murders."

tense period of time—and that the United Nations really serves the interest of both sides in these circumstances and is in the mutual interest of both sides.

*Mr. Valeriani: Do you expect it to be renewed?*

*Mr. Sisco: I'm saying that this matter obviously—no one can predict with any kind of certainty—I'm saying that it's important that it be renewed, and we're certainly going to work to this end.*

*Mr. Valeriani: You've emphasized over and over again, Mr. Sisco, about the key role of the United States. How much pressure do you feel because of the Arabs' oil weapon?*

*Mr. Sisco: Well, Dick, let me say very frankly—the Middle East today has gotten much more complicated than it has been over the years. The United States, after all, has very significant overall political, economic, strategic, and financial interests in the area. I think I'd be less than candid if I didn't say that oil was a factor in the situation, of course; it's an important source for oil. The whole monetary picture is of significance.*

But in this connection, I think the Secretary of State has charted the way very, very clearly in his speech that he gave recently—at my old alma mater, by the way—at the University of Chicago. I think he underscored really two things: One, we in this country must go ahead and take every measure to become as independent as possible from outside sources. In other words, to do everything possible to make Project Independence a reality. And secondly, alongside that, it's of major importance that we take the lead as we are in helping to organize the consumer nations so that they also, together with us, take the kind of parallel steps which will reduce the reliance on the outside. The Secretary feels, and I must say I feel equally strongly, that unless the consumers can organize themselves in this way then there will be difficulties and we will be subject to pressure.

*Mr. Valeriani: But that's long range, Mr. Sisco. What do you do now in the short term under these pressures?*

*Mr. Sisco: I think that we do everything that we can in the short range; we do what we can in terms of stabilizing the monetary situation, and I think we move as rapidly as we can. As you know, we have no interest in linking this whole matter with our own efforts toward a political solution. But as far as we're concerned, we would be going ahead trying to make practical progress on a political solution whether this other factor was there or not.*

*Mr. Valeriani: Thank you very much.*

## **President Ford Reports on NATO's Effect on Balance of Payments**

*Message to the Congress*<sup>1</sup>

*To the Congress of the United States:*

In accordance with Section 812(d) of the Department of Defense Appropriation Authorization Act, 1974 (Public Law 93-155), I am pleased to submit a report to the Congress on our further progress toward offsetting the balance of payments deficit resulting from the deployment of U.S. forces in NATO Europe.

I am now able to provide you with figures for U.S. expenditures in NATO Europe during fiscal year 1974. These figures were compiled by the Department of Commerce in consultation with the Department of Defense and the General Accounting Office. They indicate that in FY 74 the expenditures resulting from the deployment of U.S. forces in fulfillment of our NATO commitments and obligations amounted to \$1,983 million (including preliminary fourth quarter data subject to revision). Attached to this report is an appendix showing how this figure was derived and what adjustments were made to

<sup>1</sup> Dated Nov. 17; transmitted on Nov. 18 (text from White House press release).

conform our normal expenditure data to the letter and intent of Section 812. Minor changes in this data may occur as final quarter fiscal year 1974 figures are confirmed during the next few weeks.

As President Nixon reported to the Congress on May 16, 1974, the offset agreement concluded in April 1974 with the Federal Republic of Germany had a dollar value of approximately \$2.22 billion over fiscal years 1974 and 1975. Of that amount, the fiscal year 1974 portion, approximating \$1.1 billion, will be directly applicable toward meeting the requirements of Section 812, leaving approximately \$883 million to be offset by our other European NATO allies.

As I noted in my report of August 20, 1974, the NATO Economic Directorate, at the direction of the North Atlantic Council, has established a mechanism for identifying allied purchases of military-related items from the United States. This was an essential step to enable us to comply with the requirements of Section 812. Representatives of the Economic Directorate consulted in Washington on October 21-22 with the Departments of State, Commerce and Defense and reported that approximately \$1,050 million in purchases by allies other than the Federal Republic of Germany have been identified.

The Departments of Commerce and Defense have sought to confirm this figure by examining the U.S. balance of payments accounts and records in an effort to identify balance of payments receipts reflecting military-related sales and exports to our European NATO allies, on both a government-to-government and commercial category basis. However, this data is still incomplete and the U.S. accounting system in many cases is too aggregated to identify all of the specific

purchases and payments made by the European members of NATO. For this reason our calculation of the final offset total will take into account the information being provided through the NATO Economic Directorate by our European NATO allies. On the basis of the foregoing, I continue to expect that the requirements of Section 812 will be met.

GERALD R. FORD.

THE WHITE HOUSE, *November 17, 1974.*

APPENDIX

A. U.S. Defense Expenditures Entering the International Balance of Payments in NATO Europe During Fiscal Year 1974, (in millions of dollars):

Personal expenditures by US Military and Civilian Personnel and their Dependents . . . .	815
Payments to Foreign Nationals for direct and contract hire . . . . .	561
Major Equipment purchased in NATO Europe	81
Construction . . . . .	75
NATO Infrastructure System Payments . . . .	76
Petroleum Products (includes cost of crude oil imported into Europe) . . . . .	137
Materials and Supplies . . . . .	148
Payments to US and foreign contractors for contractual services . . . . .	444
All Other Payments (net) . . . . .	66
Total for Fiscal Year 1974 (preliminary)	2,403

B. Deductions Made Pursuant to Section 812 for Expenditures not Resulting From the Deployment of US Forces in Fulfillment of our NATO Commitments and Obligations (in millions of dollars):

Expenditures for US activities not related to NATO such as US strategic forces in NATO countries . . . . .	279
Major equipment purchased in NATO Europe and imported into the US and unrelated to US troop deployments in Europe . . . . .	81
Expenditures in NATO Europe for the afloat operations of the Sixth Fleet for US strategic purposes . . . . .	60
Total for Fiscal Year 1974 (preliminary)	420

C. Expenditures Less Deductions . . . . . 1,983

## Secretary of the Treasury Simon Discusses Energy Proposals

*Following is an address by Secretary of the Treasury William E. Simon made at New York, N.Y., on November 18 before the 61st National Foreign Trade Convention, sponsored by the National Foreign Trade Council, Inc.*

Department of the Treasury press release dated November 18

We meet today in serious times—times that demand plain speaking—and I intend to speak plainly and bluntly.

As all of you know, the policies of the oil cartel now pose a fundamental challenge to the economic and political structure which has served the international community for a quarter of a century. Some believe the world confronts the greatest economic crisis since the early postwar years. Yet, as President Eisenhower once observed, a crisis need not stampede men into headlong panic:

A crisis (he said) is also the sharpest goad to the creative energies of men, particularly when they recognize it as a challenge to their every resource, and move to meet it in faith, in thought, and in courage.

That was a lesson the leaders of the early postwar years had already learned, and they applied it well. Their vision and their work laid the foundations for a period of unprecedented growth and progress, not only among the industrialized nations but among the newly developing nations as well.

Today, the vision and creative energies and, indeed, the principles of those earlier years are needed once again. With consumers, we must seek a new unity of purpose and strength of common effort. With producers, we must seek to resolve our differences through mutual understanding and cooperation. And with developing nations, we must continue to provide help and assistance so that they may fulfill their dreams of ad-

vancement. This is the basis upon which the United States is moving forward today in both its trade and energy policies.

With trade deficits mounting in almost every nation outside the oil producing and exporting countries bloc, governments in many countries are increasingly tempted to restrict trade in the name of shortage, surplus, inflation, or unemployment. As we have learned once before in this century, however, beggar-thy-neighbor policies by one party are ultimately destructive for all. This is not a time for unconstrained bilateralism, for monopolistic restriction on supply, or for other administrative arrangements which distort normal patterns of trade and investment. The solutions to the problems of an interdependent world lie in more interdependence, not less. An expanding world economy with reasonably stable prices is essential to the political, social, and economic interests of all nations. This can only be achieved if conditions are established which permit foreign trade and investment to play their historical role as engines of economic progress.

Negotiations on trade and trade relations were never more appropriate or timely. In this regard, we place great importance upon enactment of the trade reform bill before the end of this year. A clean act, unencumbered by extraneous amendments, is a matter of urgent priority to the President. Only with this legislative mandate can our negotiators be effective in seeking an open and flexible world trading system, and only with the full participation of the United States can we solve common economic problems.

Previous international trade negotiations have focused on the problem of opening national markets to the exports of other countries. It is essential that the multilateral trade negotiations in Tokyo now turn to the

other side of the question—finding means to insure international access to food and raw material supplies.

This problem of gaining access to supplies has been pointedly raised, of course, by actions of the oil-exporting nations belonging to the OPEC [Organization of Petroleum Exporting Countries] bloc—first by the embargo last fall, then by a quadrupling of prices, and finally by their production cut-backs designed to maintain prices.

Before the price increase in October of last year, the average payment to producing countries for a barrel of oil—using Saudi Arabian light crude as a benchmark—was less than \$2; today it is approximately \$10. Payments to OPEC nations for oil, amounting to \$22 billion in 1973, are expected to exceed \$85 billion this year and as of this fall are running at an annual rate of about \$100 billion. This year alone the OPEC nations will have \$60 billion in earnings which they do not spend on imports of goods and services. A receipt for the OPEC group is obviously a payment for the oil importers, and a surplus for OPEC is a deficit for the rest of the world. Only by piling up debt to the OPEC nations can the importers, as a group, pay for the oil.

The costs imposed on the world economy by exorbitant oil prices are both severe and extensive. They make our battle against inflation more difficult and the inflation itself more virulent. As the world shifts resources to adapt to a new energy balance, there will also be serious frictions and unavoidable costs of structural adjustment. Reluctance to borrow year after year to finance oil purchases will cause nations to maintain lower levels of economic activity, and there will be slower economic growth. There is a clear danger that some countries might take inappropriate or disruptive actions, with the risk of retaliation and resort to competitive restrictions.

At some time, furthermore, real resources will have to be transferred to OPEC countries to pay for accumulated debt. The direct impact will not be equal for all countries—but directly or indirectly, all countries will

find their hopes for prosperity dimmed. I can think of no single change that would more improve the outlook for the world economy than a substantial decrease in the price of oil. And I can conceive of no development more essential to the preservation of our international trading system.

### **Why Oil Prices Must Eventually Fall**

The producing nations are aware that oil is not immune to the forces of supply and demand. The sharp jump in prices has already resulted in reduced oil consumption around the world, and as the passage of time permits further adjustments, such reductions will be far greater. In the oil-importing countries of the non-Communist world, consumption is projected to decline from the 1973 level of 48 million barrels per day to about 46½ million barrels per day this year. When it became evident that consumption was declining, a number of OPEC countries cut their output, not their price. Prior to the embargo last year, OPEC spare capacity was on the order of 1½ million barrels per day. Now they have unutilized capacity of nearly 8 million barrels a day. Even during their oil embargo, excess capacity did not reach this level. Inevitably, if that excess capacity grows, there will be increasing pressures for lower prices.

In the face of high prices, consumers are also accelerating development of their own sources of energy which, in time, will cost them significantly less than the current price of OPEC oil. If the OPEC nations persist in cutting back output in order to maintain price, they will find that both their market and their income have been drastically eroded. To me, the question is not whether oil prices will fall, but when they will fall.

I know there are energy doomsayers in the world who believe that the world is about to run out of oil. Those people are dead wrong. First of all, many experts believe that in the Middle East itself, proven reserves of nearly 400 billion barrels of oil are matched by additional reserves at least equal in amount. Nor are the world's energy con-

sumers locked in an OPEC vise. The world's oil and energy resources outside the OPEC nations are even larger than inside.

Here in the United States, our oil production potential is enormous, from new sources off our shores and in the Arctic and from older sources through improved and more intensive methods of recovery. And other traditional energy sources—natural gas, coal, and nuclear power—will become increasingly important as market incentives move our potential into production. Waiting in the wings, new sources of energy will be brought forth by technological progress and economic incentives—the same process by which our energy resources have always been developed.

Realistically, some potential sources of energy will require passage of time before they result in substantial production. But the oil market itself is already in the process of being transformed. In the past year alone, 26 significant new oil discoveries have been reported. At least 30 billion barrels of oil have been added to proven reserves outside the OPEC countries—an increase of 25 percent. Proven North Sea reserves have doubled since last fall; Mexico has discovered enormous new fields; even China has announced finds that allow it to become a significant oil exporter. Oil has also been found in commercial quantities in Guatemala, the Peru-Amazon Basin, the Tierra del Fuego region of Chile and Argentina, Gabon, Zaire, Cabinda, Angola, Tunisia, India, Bangladesh, Burma, Malaysia, Brunei, Thailand, South Vietnam, Taiwan, and Egypt. And all these discoveries have taken place in just one year.

Altogether these finds outside OPEC have an estimated production potential of 13 million barrels per day by 1980, all of which reduce OPEC's potential market. And this doesn't even include the oil which will be flowing from Alaska and our outer continental shelf.

We do have an energy crisis, but it's clearly solvable. The OPEC nations, by stringently limiting the rate at which their oil is flowing, are inevitably creating the conditions under which floods of energy from other sources will be forthcoming—and

forthcoming at prices well below current levels.

There is no justification today for the present price of oil. It bears no relationship to the costs of production. The contention by some OPEC members that the increase was required in order to keep pace with the rise in price of other commodities is just not true. A barrel of oil today buys in imports some five times what it did two decades ago and four times what it bought as recently as last September.

Let us also be clear that we are not faced with a case of producing companies rigging the markets. Profits of the oil companies have increased, but this is largely a shortrun phenomenon resulting from revaluation of inventories, profits in collateral activities such as chemicals and transportation, and other factors. Certainly the oil companies would not conspire to escalate the revenues of the OPEC countries so that the host countries would then take over their industry. Oil is now overpriced for one reason and one reason only: because a small group of countries have joined together to manipulate the price.

#### **Securing Cooperation Among Consumer Nations**

It has been our hope that these nations would recognize that their policies are in neither their own interests nor in the interests of the world. Their hopes as well as ours lie in the resumption of international trade on reasonable terms. Until now, however, our arguments have fallen on seemingly deaf ears. The United States has long recognized that logic and moderation might not prevail, and for that reason, over the past year and a half, we have been quietly but firmly laying the groundwork for a more effective response to this challenge by the major consumer nations.

A central thrust of our policy has been to achieve greater cooperation among consumer nations. In pursuit of that goal, literally hundreds of hours have been devoted to private and public diplomacy by the highest ranking officials of our government. Our record is clear:

—In April of 1973, President Nixon warned that energy was becoming a major problem and that close cooperation was needed between the United States, Western Europe, and Japan.

—In February of 1974, at our invitation, a dozen major consuming nations gathered here for the Washington Energy Conference. I submitted a detailed paper at that time on the financial and economic aspects of international oil prices and on the need for conservation and expanded production. At that conference, the international Energy Coordinating Group was established, providing essential machinery for consultation and negotiations among consuming nations.

—After extended discussions by members of that Coordinating Group, an agreement was reached in Brussels this September for an unprecedented plan to share energy resources among consumer nations during times of emergency. The Brussels agreement represents a major breakthrough, for it will provide mutual protection in time of need, and it was reached after previous attempts had failed. The Brussels meeting also produced guidelines for cooperative longrun efforts in energy conservation, production, and research and development and led to the formation of a new organization associated with the OECD [Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development] to carry out this program, the International Energy Agency (IEA). The Governing Board of this new Agency is holding its first meeting today.

These are all solid achievements, but now we must go further.

### **The New Proposals by the United States**

In many meetings with senior officials of other nations over the course of the past 10 months, Secretary Kissinger and I and our senior deputies have discussed our views of the current world economic situation and listened to theirs. We have continually stressed that energy, economic, and financial problems cannot be separated and that new initiatives in one area must be linked to

new initiatives in the other areas. In the past several weeks, we have presented a comprehensive set of proposals in private talks with a limited number of major industrial countries, and the discussions that followed have been very intensive and constructive.

Recently, feeling that the agreements reached in Brussels gave us solid foundations upon which to build, President Ford directed that the United States should finally make a public presentation of its proposals. That was the basis of Dr. Kissinger's speech in Chicago last Thursday night, when he outlined the global aspects of our position, and my talk here today, in which I will present the financial aspects of our proposals in greater detail.

The essence of the U.S. position can be succinctly described:

—The price of oil itself, not its financial repercussions, is the real source of trouble in the world economy.

—To help bring about lower oil prices and to reduce the economic burden of oil imports, major consuming nations should work together to achieve significant reductions in their imports of OPEC oil.

—They should also coordinate policies and pool their technical resources to increase energy production within their own nations.

—IMF [International Monetary Fund] resources should be more fully mobilized for all its member nations.

—A major new financial mechanism should be set up in association with the OECD to provide standby financial support in case any of the participating countries find themselves in economic trouble after having made reasonable efforts on their own part.

—Consideration should also be given to setting up a special trust fund managed by the IMF to help developing nations that are suffering the most and require financing on concessional terms.

—Finally, serious preparations should be made for an eventual dialogue between a consumer group and the producer nations.

Our ideas call for a forthright, earnest effort by the world's major industrial coun-

tries to resolve the international energy crisis. To implement such a far-reaching initiative will require further weeks of diplomacy with our allies and friends. We will need the cooperation of the Congress. And we will need your support and the support of all other Americans.

### **Reducing Oil Imports**

Let us look more closely now at these proposals. All major oil-consuming countries have adopted national programs of energy conservation to reduce oil imports. President Ford has announced a U.S. program to reduce oil imports by 1 million barrels a day below what they otherwise would have been by the end of 1975. The President has made it clear that we will meet this target and that whatever steps are necessary will be taken. The French Government announced some weeks ago that it would take actions to limit 1975 oil imports in France to a quantity costing no more than imports in 1974. Just last week, the British Government announced new taxes on gasoline in order to reduce oil imports. Other governments have adopted targets, goals, and policies differing according to national circumstances but all directed toward reducing oil imports.

These first steps toward conservation could be strengthened if the major industrial nations as a group were to place on the table their proposed conservation programs and their proposed programs for expanding energy production so that both could be internationally reviewed and discussed to determine their overall adequacy and the equity with which the effort is being shared among nations.

We believe that effective national programs of conservation could achieve a reduction in imports of the major industrial countries of the world by the end of 1975 of at least 3 million barrels a day—without unduly dampening economic activity and performance. Such a reduction in imports, were it to be agreed upon and implemented, would result in import savings at an annual rate of some \$11 billion at present price levels and would provide strong marketplace pressures to bring

down the price of oil. The impact of the efforts of each of us can be multiplied many times by the efforts of all of us.

I would be less than candid if I were to leave the impression that achieving this goal will be easy. But I would be less than honest if I were to pretend that what is easy will be effective.

Immediate efforts to reduce oil imports are essential. But equally essential are the efforts needed to promote energy conservation and production in the longer run.

Fortunately, we now have, in the new International Energy Agency, a forum for developing and coordinating new national and international policies to achieve these ends. It is no secret that administrative and policy barriers to conservation and to increased production still exist in almost all countries—including the United States. It is also no secret that international efforts to achieve these same objectives face many difficulties. But it is essential that we push ahead.

A basic requirement is to develop in the IEA a common longer term target for reducing the rate of growth of energy consumption and oil imports. Such a longer run objective will be helpful to governments as national policy decisions are made and will also serve to demonstrate to OPEC nations where their present course is leading.

We should also establish a review process within the International Energy Agency of the policies of the participating countries for developing new energy sources. Out of this process should evolve not only useful guiding principles for energy development but an increased awareness among all members of the requirements of successful policies in this field.

Another complex problem with which we must come to grips in the IEA is the so-called "downside risk" problem. Which energy resources will be developed in the future and at what rates will depend on investor estimates of the prospective price of oil. Prospective investors in energy projects can be expected to be cautious in a situation in which the price of oil could plunge as easily as it has soared. Thus we must begin to consider methods of international coopera-



tion to provide investors an appropriate degree of protection against such risks.

Finally, there remain unexploited opportunities for cooperation in energy research and development—in nuclear fusion, coal technology, the use of hydrogen, and enriched uranium—and the new International Energy Agency can usefully serve to expedite and facilitate such cooperation in these and other areas.

In all of these areas, a collective determination to move forward quickly and effectively will not only serve to reduce our dependence on oil from OPEC nations but also to accelerate the process by which the price of OPEC oil is brought down to acceptable levels.

### **Providing Financial Security**

At the same time, countries which agree to act together in energy need to be confident that if a financial emergency arises, credit will be available to them on reasonable terms. They could be given such confidence through a new supplementary financial mechanism which the major industrial nations could themselves establish. Among them they will receive the capital represented by the OPEC surpluses. The OPEC countries do not have to be offered special guarantees, above market rates of return, or value-indexing schemes. They can place their money where they choose. All that is needed are adequate arrangements—private and public—to insure that funds are distributed among the individual oil-importing states so as to avoid unnecessarily stringent economic difficulties in particular countries.

Existing private and public facilities have been doing this job of redistribution in the past, and there is no evidence that they cannot continue to do the job. The problems of financing higher oil bills can be managed until oil prices come down—not easily, not without strains, and not without effort, but they can be managed.

Substantial volumes of OPEC funds, probably \$45 billion in the first 10 months of this year, have been invested in a variety of ways.

Nearly one-quarter of these funds have been invested directly in the U.S. market and nearly another quarter in the domestic assets of other industrial countries. The OPEC countries have also lent directly to other governments and transferred additional amounts to international institutions—for example, the International Monetary Fund's special oil facility. In addition, substantial amounts have been placed in Euro-currency markets—but the total, less than 40 percent, is not as large as many have assumed. For borrowers, all these investments represent potential sources of funds and provide a wide range of alternative financing channels.

While the international financial system has worked well, we must recognize, however, that individual countries could find themselves in economic trouble, with needed credit too scarce or too expensive to permit them to maintain open economies at appropriate levels of activity. A supplementary loan facility, established by the major industrial countries associated with the OECD, would provide the backstopping that is needed to supplement existing channels of financing. This is the financial safety net that the United States is recommending.

Certain principles would be fundamental to such a mechanism:

1. Participation should be linked with a commitment to cooperate in reducing dependence on oil imports.

2. Participants would also undertake to follow responsible adjustment policies and avoid resorting to the use of trade-restrictive measures or other beggar-thy-neighbor policies.

3. Like any insurance policy, the facility should be large enough to do the job. It must be clear that the potential for borrowing is adequate to meet the need. We recommend a facility with total commitments by all members of \$25 billion in 1975. Additional financial resources would be provided in subsequent years in case of need.

4. The facility should supplement private market channels and other channels, including the IMF and other official institutions. It should not replace them. For this reason

it should do its lending on market-related terms.

5. Decisions on the provision of financial support should be made by a weighted vote of participants and should be based on the overall economic position of the borrower, not on any single criterion such as oil import bills.

6. Whenever support is provided by the facility, all members should share the credit risk on the basis of their share of participation.

Beyond these general principles there are many details to be worked out and on which we are openminded. One question that must be answered is the manner in which the facility would obtain the funds with which to lend. An individual government could lend directly to the new facility or could permit the facility to go into the capital markets of the world and borrow funds on the basis of its guarantee.

There would appear to be a number of advantages in having funds provided to the facility through direct lending by member governments rather than guarantees. Traditionally, the loan route is more efficient and it is cheaper. Nevertheless, it may be desirable in establishing the facility to provide some flexibility on this score simply because national practices and legislative requirements vary widely. Whatever means is chosen, the United States will need to obtain additional authority from the Congress in order to proceed.

For the United States, participation might best be accomplished through the Exchange Stabilization Fund. This Fund has the authority to engage in international lending operations for the purpose of stabilizing the value of the dollar, and this would be a basic purpose of our participation in the proposed facility.

Arrangements for administration of the facility will also have to be negotiated. Our initial feeling is that it should be associated with the OECD in a manner similar to that of the new International Energy Agency and administered by its own governing board, whose members might be drawn from among

the senior finance officials of the member countries.

The question of shares will be an important issue in setting up a facility of this nature. Various factors have been mentioned that might be taken into account, such as the size of the oil import bills of the member states, the relative value of gross national product, share in international trade, or some combination of these factors. The various possibilities will have to be carefully weighed.

It may also be important to state that in our current thinking, borrowing from the facility should not be related specifically to imports of oil. "Oil deficits" become increasingly indistinguishable from "nonoil" deficits. And even the concept of balance of payments deficits is of limited utility in the world we face today. In our view, access to this facility should be based on an overall judgment of a country's needs taken in conjunction with its resources, its basic economic policies, and the actions it is taking to reduce dependence on OPEC oil.

We have been discussing the broad outlines of how such a facility might work with a number of other governments for several months. Both my personal conversations with other finance ministers and our official-level contacts give me confidence that there will be support for this general line of thinking. We now intend to urge consideration of this idea more formally in official-level discussions in Paris this week. I should note that the Secretary General of the OECD has independently developed suggestions for a supplementary funding mechanism similar in many respects to the one I have just described. His ideas, which are very welcome, will also be on the table at the meetings this week in Paris of the OECD Working Party 3 and of the Group of Ten Deputies.

We will be prepared to devote many hours and many days of hard work over the next few weeks to translate these broad outlines into an operating program. We will need to work very closely with the authorities of the IMF and the newly established Interim Committee of that body. Intensive consultations with our Congress will also be undertaken,

and I am sure that our partners in this venture will be consulting intensively with their legislatures.

What we are suggesting is in no way intended to replace the International Monetary Fund as the permanent institution providing the basic financial support for a well-functioning world economy. The IMF is in a position to provide substantial additional support to any of its members. It has over \$10 billion of currencies which are effectively available and usable, quite apart from its holdings of gold. We are prepared, in the current review of IMF quotas, to support a substantial increase in that figure. Furthermore, we are prepared to support early measures to insure effective mobilization of the resources that the IMF now has.

At the same time we are suggesting an initiative outside the IMF, in part because of the magnitude of the possible transfer requirements among the major industrial countries and in part because the terms and conditions of IMF financial operations are not appropriate to the exceptional circumstances we now face. Moreover, it would be inappropriate—even if possible—to introduce into the IMF the full range of policy issues which must be taken into account when decisions and judgments are made with respect to financial support among major industrial countries.

### **Meeting the Needs of Developing Nations**

Of equal importance is our concern for the developing countries and the smaller industrial countries. Of course it is true that for the developing countries it is essential that the major industrial countries maintain healthy, growing economies in the face of the oil crisis. The developing countries depend on the industrial nations to take a growing volume of their exports and to continue essential concessional aid levels.

If we establish a facility which will help assure the maintenance of economic activity in the industrial countries, we are assisting the developing countries as well. Many of the developing countries have come to de-

pend on continued large capital flows to support their rapid economic growth.

By helping to assure orderly access to the major capital markets and thereby reducing the danger of undue competition for the surplus investment funds of the oil exporters, the establishment of a new financial mechanism for industrial countries would enhance the ability of many developing countries to attract the large amounts of capital they need and can productively employ. These countries will also be able to make appropriate use of the resources of the IMF.

One group of developing countries—those with the lowest per capita incomes and those seriously affected by natural disasters and other problems—will, however, still require concessional assistance. We and other developed countries have been redirecting our concessional assistance toward these countries and urging the international financial institutions to do the same. We also look to the oil exporters to provide a major part of the additional concessional funds needed by these countries because of the increase in oil prices. The additional amounts needed by these poorest countries—perhaps \$1.5 billion in 1975—is small in comparison with the oil exporters' surpluses. But although relatively modest in global terms, the sums involved bulk very large for the countries concerned because needs are this desperate.

We shall be addressing the problems of these countries on an urgent basis in the new Development Committee, where we shall keep the availabilities of funds under continual review as well as the efforts of developing countries to make maximum efforts to use available resources effectively.

One way to help these countries would be to establish a trust fund managed by the IMF and receiving contributions from OPEC states and from other sources. Perhaps the IMF itself could contribute to such a fund profits derived by the sale in the private market of some portion of its gold holdings. A trust fund of this nature which would offer credit at relatively low cost—perhaps 2 to 4 percent—and on moderately long maturities would provide funds to those most

seriously affected on terms which are not appropriate for other borrowers. We hope this suggestion will receive the urgent attention of ministers in the IMF Interim Committee and the IMF-IBRD [International Bank for Reconstruction and Development] Development Committee.

### Cooperation With the OPEC Nations

U.S. proposals for greater solidarity among major industrial countries in no sense stem from any desire for confrontation with the OPEC nations. We recognize and support the legitimate aspirations of these nations to accelerate their own development, establish their industrial and agricultural bases, and to improve the living standards of their peoples today and in the years to come.

We have established Joint Cooperation Commissions with the key oil producers in the Middle East to help them achieve these objectives. We have undertaken a major effort within our government to provide them the expertise we have achieved in developing the economy of our own country and to help make it adaptable to their development programs.

I personally visited a number of countries in the Middle East last July to launch this effort and intend to return soon to insure its momentum. My visit last summer was followed by meetings both here and in the Middle East of other U.S. officials, technicians, and experts with their counterparts, which have put flesh on the Commission structures that have been established.

We are prepared to continue to do what we can to accelerate the economic development of OPEC nations and to encourage the private sector of our country and other industrial countries to take an active role in this process. In the meantime, we will continue to permit these countries to invest in our markets, and I am confident they will be allowed to invest in the markets of other nations as well.

For their part the OPEC countries must recognize that their position in the world

economy has already changed dramatically. These countries will continue to have greater influence in the world even with a substantial fall in oil prices. These countries are now the major surplus countries of the world, with a surplus of a magnitude unprecedented in history. It is vital to the maintenance of a sound and equitable world economy that they accept without delay the responsibilities which have historically fallen upon major creditor countries.

I have spoken already of their responsibilities for assisting the needy of the world. They must also understand that their foreign investments can be treated no differently from the investments of others. They cannot realistically expect the rest of the world to devise a special system of guarantees for them alone. It is also incumbent upon them to shed the outmoded habits acquired when they were developing countries with limited resources. The resources of this group of countries are adequate to finance their legitimate development aspirations, even though the situation of individual OPEC countries may differ. Their excess revenues this year alone approximate six times the flow of development assistance to all developing countries last year. This new reality must be reflected in the policies of international financial institutions.

In my conversations with officials of OPEC nations and on my travels to the Middle East, I have found that there is widespread understanding in OPEC countries of the responsibilities inherent in their new international role. Certainly leaders of OPEC nations are well aware of the important stake they have in a healthy world economic system. I remain confident that a basis can be found for the industrial nations of the world to continue to work constructively with OPEC nations.

Of course, they must recognize that we continue to be strongly opposed to the actions they have taken to compel a massive temporary transfer of resources—real and financial—to them from the rest of the world. We believe they can achieve their development objectives on a more secure basis at a

substantially lower level of oil prices.

They must recognize, too, that each passing day takes us a step further away from an optimal utilization of the world's resources, as other nations revise their policies toward reliance on oil imports. Certainly, there is even now no possibility that oil-consuming countries can return to the energy practices of two years ago. But the full scope of consuming-country reaction is not yet defined, and the hope remains that reasonable men can find rational solutions.

We remain persuaded that extreme policies will in time prove very harmful to the basic economic and social aspirations of these nations and that there is a solid foundation for reaching agreement on a constructive resolution of this issue. Greater cooperation among the world's industrial countries along the lines that Secretary Kissinger and I have set forth last week and today will help establish the basis for such agreement.

In their own interest, and in the interest of the world as a whole, the time has now come when the major industrial nations must grasp the nettle. The evidence before us—of rapid inflation and economic stagnation—offers bleak encouragement for the future unless we now take decisive collective action to break the present train of events. We must act together to limit our dependence on imported oil and to promote our mutual economic and financial solidarity. Such action will inevitably be carried out through decisions and actions often appearing to be technical in nature and limited in scope. But underlying all of what we do must be a solid foundation of commitment—a political consensus that we will act together to determine our own destiny—and a mutual faith that we can do so.

We must maintain our commitment to expanding trade and foreign investment. We are too far down the road to interdependence to look back. We have it in our power to choose whether we are prisoners of a history yet to be written or the architects of a future yet to be seen. I have no doubt what our choice will be; we know what the required international response must be.

## Senate Asked To Approve Convention on Protection of Diplomats

*Message From President Ford*<sup>1</sup>

*To the Senate of the United States:*

With a view to receiving the advice and consent of the Senate to ratification, I transmit herewith a copy of the Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of Crimes against Internationally Protected Persons, including Diplomatic Agents, adopted by the United Nations General Assembly on December 14, 1973, and signed in behalf of the United States of America on December 28, 1973. The report of the Department of State with respect to the Convention is also transmitted for the information of the Senate.

The effective conduct of international relations depends in large part on the ability of diplomatic agents to travel and live freely and securely while representing the interests of their respective countries. We have witnessed in recent years an unprecedented increase in acts of violence directed against diplomatic agents and other internationally protected persons. This development has demonstrated the urgent need to take affirmative action to minimize the threats which can be directed against diplomatic agents. Although the legal obligation to protect these persons was never questioned, the mechanism for international cooperation to ensure that perpetrators of serious attacks against them are brought to justice, no matter where they may flee, was lacking.

The Convention is designed to rectify this serious situation by creating a legal mechanism whereby persons alleged to have committed serious crimes against diplomats will be prosecuted or extradited. It also sets out a framework for international cooperation in the prevention and punishment of such crimes.

<sup>1</sup> Transmitted on Nov. 13 (text from White House press release); also printed as S. Ex. L, 93d Cong., 2d sess., which includes the report of the Department of State and the text of the convention; for text of the convention, see BULLETIN of Jan. 28, 1974, p. 92.

This Convention is vitally important to assure continued safe and orderly conduct of the diplomatic process. I hope that all States will become Parties to this Convention. I recommend, therefore, that the Senate give early and favorable consideration to this Convention.

GERALD R. FORD.

THE WHITE HOUSE, *November 13, 1974.*

## **President Ford Maintains Current Tariffs on Sugar**

*Statement by President Ford*<sup>1</sup>

I am announcing actions designed to (1) insure the continued flow of sugar into this country from abroad and (2) encourage increased production domestically at the same time. The actions I am taking will maintain duties on sugar imports at the lowest permissible rate under the Tariff Schedules of the United States.

The Sugar Act is scheduled to expire on December 31, 1974. If no action is taken, tariffs on imported sugar will rise about 1.3 cents per pound on January 1, 1975. The law provides, however, that the President can continue the current rates in force if his proclamation extending the rates includes a quota on sugar imports. I have, therefore, decided to extend the current tariff rates and will set an annual global quota of 7 million short tons for 1975.<sup>2</sup> That quantity is more than adequate to meet anticipated import requirements. At the same time, it will insure a degree of stability for our own sugar industry to operate effectively in a period of very tight supplies.

Although there is no risk we will run out of sugar, we may well experience higher prices than we would like until production catches up with demand. Users of sugar can

help ease prices by buying wisely, conserving supplies, and consuming less sugar. I urge all Americans to reduce the amount of sugar in cooking and to put in half the amount usually used to sweeten coffee or tea.

The world sugar supply has tightened markedly in recent months. For the past three crop years, world sugar production has been rising. But even so, consumption has exceeded production by a small margin. Crop setbacks this year in a number of countries will prevent production from keeping pace with the normal growth of consumption. Since sugar production this year is expected to be about the same as last, worldwide sugar supplies will continue to be tight. Because we in this country import about one-half of the sugar we consume, we are directly affected by this worldwide problem. So far this year, our foreign suppliers have shipped 10 percent more sugar to the United States than last year.

The Council on Wage and Price Stability is working with sugar-using industries to stimulate conservation in the use of sugar. The Council will also hold public hearings to examine the margins charged by sugar processors, refiners, and distributors. The purpose of these hearings will be to insure that the retail prices of sugar and sugar products are not unduly increased.

In the past, sharp increases in sugar prices have always been temporary because they stimulated offsetting production increases of sugar cane and sugar beets. I have asked Secretary [of Agriculture Earl L.] Butz to insure that all American farmers are made aware of the excellent market opportunities offered by sugar beets and sugar cane and to make sure that there are no governmental impediments to increased production.

Early season contracting between farmers and processors could be very helpful in 1975, and long-term contracting between U.S. refiners and foreign suppliers could be very beneficial as well. Our traditional foreign sugar suppliers who have benefited from our sugar program in the past are also urged to continue providing sugar to our market.

Finally, I have directed the Economic Pol-

<sup>1</sup> Issued on Nov. 18 (text from White House press release).

<sup>2</sup> For text of Proclamation No. 4334, see 39 *Fed. Reg.* 40739.

icy Board to monitor the sugar situation on a weekly basis and to report to me any signs of speculation or market activity in world and domestic markets that would worsen the tight supply situation we face this year.

The administration recognized the inconveniences worked on the average American citizen by the current sugar situation. It will continue to do everything it can to improve matters and to remove some of the uncertainties for the future.

## U.S.-Canada Treaty on Extradition Transmitted to the Senate

*Message From President Ford*<sup>1</sup>

*To the Senate of the United States:*

With a view to receiving the advice and consent of the Senate to ratification, I transmit herewith the Treaty on Extradition between the United States of America and Canada, signed at Washington on December 3, 1971, as amended by an exchange of notes of June 28 and July 9, 1974.

The Treaty is one of a current series of extradition treaties being negotiated by the United States and contains provisions regarding extradition for the offenses of aircraft hijacking, narcotics and conspiracy to commit listed offenses.

The Treaty will facilitate the mutual efforts of the United States and Canada in combating international crime. In addition, modernization of the extradition relations between the United States and Canada is especially important in light of the ease of travel between the two countries. I recommend that the Senate give early and favorable consideration to the Treaty as amended and give its advice and consent to ratification.

GERALD R. FORD.

THE WHITE HOUSE, *September 12, 1974.*

<sup>1</sup> Transmitted on Sept. 12 (text from White House press release); also printed as S. Ex. G., 93d Cong., 2d sess., which includes the texts of the treaty and the report of the Department of State.

## Presidential Determination on Sale of 200,000 Tons of Wheat to Egypt

MEMORANDUM OF OCTOBER 31, 1974<sup>1</sup>

[Presidential Determination No. 75-5]

Finding and Determination Concerning Egypt

Memorandum for the Secretary of State;  
the Secretary of Agriculture

THE WHITE HOUSE,  
*Washington, October 31, 1974.*

Finding and Determination under Sections 103(d)(3) and (4) of the Agricultural Trade Development and Assistance Act of 1954, as amended—Egypt.

Pursuant to the authority vested in me under the Agricultural Trade Development and Assistance Act of 1954, as amended (hereinafter "the Act"), I hereby:

(a) Find, pursuant to Section 103(d)(3) of the Act, that the making of an agreement with the Government of Egypt for the sale, under Title I of the Act, of 200 thousand metric tons of wheat is in the national interest of the United States; and

(b) Determine, pursuant to Section 103(d)(4) of the Act, that the sale to Egypt of wheat in furtherance of such an agreement is in the national interest of the United States.

This Determination shall be published in the FEDERAL REGISTER.



STATEMENT OF REASONS THAT SALES UNDER TITLE I OF THE AGRICULTURAL TRADE DEVELOPMENT AND ASSISTANCE ACT OF 1954, AS AMENDED (PUBLIC LAW 480) TO EGYPT ARE IN THE NATIONAL INTEREST

Egypt is central to our efforts to achieve a just and lasting peace in the Middle East. Our ultimate success will depend in part on Egyptian confidence in our intention to develop a broad and constructive bilateral relationship with that country. Continuation of a program for concessional sales of agricultural commodities to Egypt will constitute a tangible demonstration of our intended role.

In response to current Egyptian needs, it is proposed to export to that country 200 thousand metric tons of wheat financed under Title I of the Agricultural Trade Development and Assistance Act of 1954, as amended (Pub. L. 480). This amount is based on Egypt's needs for not more than one fiscal year.

<sup>1</sup> 39 *Fed. Reg.* 39431, Nov. 7, 1974.

In order to enter into an agreement with the Government of Egypt for such a sale under Title I, it is necessary that the President find and determine that such sales would be in the national interest of the United States. Section 103(d)(3) of Pub. L. 480 prohibits the sale of agricultural commodities under Title I of the Act to any nation which sells or furnishes or permits ships or aircraft under its registry to transport to or from Cuba or North Vietnam any equipment, materials, or commodities (so long as those countries are governed by Communist regimes). However, if such activities are limited to furnishing, selling, or selling and transporting to Cuba medical supplies, non-strategic agricultural or food commodities, sales agreements may be made if the President finds they are in the national interest of the United States. Section 103(d)(4) also prohibits sales of commodities under Title I to Egypt unless the President determines such sales are in the national interest of the United States.

The considerations noted above, however, make the proposed sale important to the national interest of the United States notwithstanding the prohibitions contained in Sections 103(d)(3) and (4) of Pub. L. 480.

Section 410 of Pub. L. 480 prohibits sales under Title I of Pub. L. 480 to a country in violation of Section 620(e) of the Foreign Assistance Act of 1961, as amended, which concerns expropriation or nationalization of property of Americans without taking appropriate steps to discharge its obligations under international law. Egypt agreed to the establishment of a Joint Committee to discuss compensation of American nationals and, on July 15, Secretary Kissinger determined that such an agreement constituted appropriate steps under Section 620(e). The Committee continues active. Therefore, no waiver of that provision is required to permit this additional sale of wheat to Egypt under Title I of Pub. L. 480.

## Activation of the Energy Resources Council

### AN EXECUTIVE ORDER<sup>1</sup>

In my address to the Congress on October 8, 1974, I expressed my intention to create a new National Energy Board, under the chairmanship of the Secretary of the Interior, to develop, coordinate, and assure the implementation of Federal energy policy. Subsequent to my delivery of that address, the Congress completed action on the Energy Reorganization Act of 1974 which I have just approved into law. Section 108 of that act creates in the Executive Office of the President a new Energy Resources Council which would be charged with performing functions that are essentially the same as those I

had intended to assign to the National Energy Board. Consequently, I have determined that it would serve no useful purpose to create that Board. Instead, I am now exercising the authority vested in me by section 108 of the Energy Reorganization Act of 1974, to activate immediately the Energy Resources Council, to designate the Secretary of the Interior as its Chairman, and to designate additional officials as members thereof.

NOW, THEREFORE, by virtue of the authority vested in me as President of the United States of America by the Constitution and laws of the United States, particularly section 108 of the Energy Reorganization Act of 1974, and section 301 of title 3 of the United States Code it is hereby ordered as follows:

Section 1. Section 108 of the Energy Reorganization Act of 1974 shall be effective as of the date of this order and the Energy Resources Council shall be deemed to have been activated as of that date.

Sec. 2. The Council shall consist of the Secretary of the Interior, who shall be its Chairman, the Assistant to the President for Economic Affairs, the Secretary of State, the Secretary of the Treasury, the Secretary of Defense, the Attorney General, the Secretary of Commerce, the Secretary of Transportation, the Chairman of the Atomic Energy Commission, the Director of the Office of Management and Budget, the Chairman of the Council of Economic Advisers, the Administrator of the Federal Energy Administration, the Administrator of the Energy Research and Development Administration (upon entry into office), the Administrator of the Environmental Protection Agency, the Chairman of the Council on Environmental Quality, the Director of the National Science Foundation, the Executive Director of the Domestic Council, and such other members as the President may, from time to time, designate.

Sec. 3. The Energy Resources Council shall perform such functions as are assigned to it by section 108 of the Energy Reorganization Act of 1974, shall develop a single national energy policy and program, and shall perform such other functions as may be assigned to it, from time to time, by the President.

Sec. 4. All departments and agencies shall cooperate with the Council and shall, to the extent permitted by law, provide it with such assistance and information as the Chairman of the Council may request.

Sec. 5. The Committee on Energy, the establishment of which was announced on June 14, 1974, is hereby abolished.

Sec. 6. The Council shall terminate in accordance with the provisions of section 108 of the Energy Reorganization Act of 1974.

*Gerard R. Ford*

THE WHITE HOUSE, October 11, 1974.

<sup>1</sup> No. 11814; 39 *Fed. Reg.* 36955, Oct. 16, 1974.



## **U.S. Calls for Worldwide Effort To Eliminate Torture and Inhuman Treatment of Prisoners**

*Following is a statement by Senator Charles H. Percy, U.S. Representative to the U.N. General Assembly, made in Committee III (Social, Humanitarian and Cultural) on October 18, together with the text of a resolution adopted by the committee on October 22 and by the Assembly on November 6.*

### **STATEMENT BY SENATOR PERCY**

USUN press release 139 dated October 18

The Charter of the United Nations reaffirms faith in fundamental human rights, in the dignity and worth of the human person, in the equal rights of men and women and of nations large and small. This organization is thus based upon sacred ideals shared by societies throughout the world.

The protection of human rights by this organization has not been free from difficulty. While all peoples share the aspirations proclaimed in the charter, it remains nonetheless essentially within the jurisdiction of each sovereign state to find the means of fulfilling these aspirations.

The fundamental dilemma created by the inherent conflict between broad international goals and national prerogatives cannot, however, be permitted to frustrate our efforts to work together toward a more humane world.

Today, Madam Chairman, we consider a topic of central and vital importance in the struggle to safeguard human rights—the question of torture and other cruel, inhuman, or degrading treatment or punishment. We have before us the draft resolution contained in A/C.3/L.2106. The United States is pleased to be a cosponsor. I would like to

express our gratitude particularly to the delegation of the Netherlands, which took the lead in developing this resolution, and to other cosponsors who helped in promoting it.

All nations rightly condemn the practice of torture. No practice is more abhorrent. An absolute debasement of the function of government takes place when the overwhelming power of government is utilized not to protect individual human beings but to coerce them into subservience.

The problem of torture is one of particular interest to my government. In his statement before the General Assembly on September 23, the Secretary of State of the United States called for a major international effort to prohibit torture.

It is indisputable, however, that this problem must be viewed not as a concern of one or several countries but of the entire family of nations. Men and women of all races and creeds have been victims of this abuse. Torture has, regrettably, been practiced at one time or another by countries in all parts of the world. Only by a worldwide effort can we hope to eliminate this universally condemned practice.

We must address ourselves to the practical steps which can be taken. Are we innovative enough to find means whereby the international community can assist its members to prevent or lessen the practice of torture and yet not encroach upon the proper domestic jurisdiction of sovereign states? We believe that practical means can be found and that the draft resolution before us can be an important and major step in our efforts.

Since all states condemn the practice of torture by government officials, this practice

must take place contrary to the intentions of the highest governmental authorities, or at least their stated intentions. Governments should therefore consider taking steps to prevent the practice before the pressures for its utilization are greatest—in times of civil strife and in the aftermath of bitter internal conflicts.

Torture is an abuse which is most likely to prevail when associated legal protections do not exist. Codes of law regarding notification of arrest, right to counsel, right to appear promptly before a judge, can be instrumental in preventing the practice of torture.

While these subjects touch upon broad and fundamental issues of human freedom, they are also areas of technical legal expertise. The experience of many nations in seeking justice under law should be examined. The merits and problems of different statutory and constitutional solutions should be studied. The help of learned jurists should be sought. Model codes can and should be developed for the use of countries that wish to improve and strengthen their systems of justice.

The task will not be an easy one. The complexities of law to be examined will be great. The questions of balance and judgment will present difficult challenges. Detailed matters of police practice will have to be reviewed.

Let me illustrate with specifics. When the experts gather they should address such practical questions as these:

—How to assure the right legal assistance immediately upon detention.

—How to provide that an arrested person must be brought before a judicial authority promptly within a specified time after detention.

—How to specify that detained persons can communicate with their families.

—How to devise regulations regarding the permissible duration and manner of interrogation.

—How to establish when it is appropriate

or necessary to conduct medical examinations, either before or after interrogation.

—How to determine what records should be kept regarding the identity of arresting officials, interrogators, details of medical examinations.

—How to provide for procedural remedies in case of complaints of abuse, such as the procedure of habeus corpus or amparo.

In addition to questions of detailed procedure of the sort I have just described, there will be thorny questions of definition. Let me again illustrate with specifics. How can the essence of "torture" or "cruel or inhuman treatment" be defined? For example, we can all understand that it is often important for police authorities to question a suspect as soon as possible after detention and that questioning may need to continue for a considerable period of time. However, should it be permissible to deprive a suspect of sleep for a prolonged period? Is this the type of matter that can or should be defined in model legislation? Should it be left up to magistrates? Many similar questions of detail will undoubtedly arise.

The United States has already begun its technical and legal studies on these issues. We will now intensify our preparatory work for the meetings of the Fifth United Nations Congress on the Prevention of Crime and the Treatment of Offenders, which is to take place in 1975. We intend to participate constructively and creatively in fulfilling the tasks requested of this Congress by operative paragraphs 3 and 4 of the draft resolution.

I would note that the draft resolution also involves other U.N. bodies—the Commission on Human Rights, the Subcommission on Prevention of Discrimination and Protection of Minorities, the World Health Organization, and the General Assembly itself, which is to consider this matter again at its 30th session. We believe that all of these bodies can have important roles to play in the overall effort. We must of course recognize that the task we confront will require a long and sustained effort, and it will be necessary as

we proceed to determine in which forums we can take the most practical and effective steps forward.

Our purpose is to devote the effort required—and it will be considerable—to advance the development of model codes dealing with problems such as I have outlined by using any and all of the forums which have the competence, expertise, and motivation necessary for success. We do not anticipate that this effort can realize all of its goals at once, and we therefore welcome the fact that other interested governments have taken an initiative which parallels and complements our own expressed interest and ideas. We hope to work closely with all interested governments and are therefore particularly pleased to support this resolution's recommendations to the fifth Congress—one of the places we can make an early start on the practical pursuit of this task.

I would also call attention to operative paragraphs 1 and 2 of the draft resolution. These paragraphs request member states to furnish to the Secretary General relevant information and comments and ask the Secretary General to prepare an analytical summary. We urge that all members respond fully to this request. The work which is to proceed in the fifth United Nations Congress and in other U.N. bodies will clearly benefit greatly if it is based on broad and detailed knowledge of practice and opinion throughout the world.

It is a sad commentary, Madam Chairman, that this committee, just a little more than 25 years after the adoption by the General Assembly of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, finds it necessary to single out the problem of torture as one which today requires our attention. We share with many others feelings of dismay and outrage whenever we receive reports which seem to indicate that the practice of torture has been pursued officially. We need not, however, be discouraged if we view our work in the long perspective of history and if we recognize

the unique and practical opportunities which the United Nations and its organs afford to us.

In the past few centuries steady progress can be discerned toward the universal goal of protection of the rights of the individual person. As we all know, the world has witnessed serious and tragic lapses in the treatment of human beings over wide areas and for lengthy periods. Yet I have no doubt that, taking the world as a whole, there has been a gradual improvement over the years in the behavior of states toward their own citizenry.

From the very beginning, the United Nations has made a major contribution to the raising of standards of decency everywhere with the adoption of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights. The goals of this declaration are noble and high. No nation can properly claim to have attained them completely. Yet none of us can afford to relax in the endless struggle to achieve them. We can take heart from the gains that have been realized in the course of time. Some of the most degrading and inhuman practices have been tempered or eliminated. The institution of slavery, for instance, has been virtually removed from the face of the earth.

I am convinced that the time has now come to take another common step upward on the ladder of civilization. It is time to intensify greatly our work to prevent the practice of torture. We must do everything we can to end this abuse.

In his statement before the General Assembly, Secretary Kissinger urged that we should never forget that all of our political endeavors are ultimately judged by one standard—to translate our actions into human concerns. He added that the United States will never be satisfied with a world where man's fears overshadow his hopes.

When we work to build barriers against the practice of torture, we work to realize one of mankind's deepest aspirations—the ability of every person to lead a life of dignity and decency. The task before us de-

mands all of the creativity, the skill, the persistence, and the good will which we can bring to bear.

## TEXT OF RESOLUTION<sup>1</sup>

*Torture and other cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment in relation to detention and imprisonment*

*The General Assembly,*

Mindful of article 5 of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights and article 7 of the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights,

Reaffirming the rejection, in its resolution 3059 (XXVIII) of 2 November 1973, of any form of torture and other cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment,

Taking into account the report of the Secretary-General on the consideration given to this question by the Sub-Commission on Prevention of Discrimination and Protection of Minorities and by the Commission on Human Rights and other bodies concerned,<sup>2</sup>

Noting with appreciation the decision of the Sub-Commission on Prevention of Discrimination and Protection of Minorities to review annually the developments in the field of human rights of persons subjected to any form of detention or imprisonment,<sup>3</sup>

Noting also the draft principles on freedom from arbitrary arrest and detention contained in the relevant study on this matter,<sup>4</sup>

Recalling Economic and Social Council resolution 663 C (XXIV) of 31 July 1957, in which, *inter alio*, the Council approved the Standard Minimum Rules for the Treatment of Prisoners,<sup>5</sup> and Council resolution 1794 (LIV) of 18 May 1973 concerning the preparation of an international code of police ethics, as well as General Assembly resolution 3144 (XXVIII) of 14 December 1973 on human rights in the administration of justice,

Considering that the Fifth United Nations Congress on the Prevention of Crime and the Treatment of Offenders, to be held in accordance with General Assembly resolution 415 (V) of 1 December 1950,

<sup>1</sup> U.N. doc. A/RES/3218 (XXIX) (A/C.3/L.2106/Rev. 1); adopted by the Assembly on Nov. 6 by a vote of 125 (U.S.) to 0, with 1 abstention.

<sup>2</sup> U.N. doc. A/9767. [Footnote in original.]

<sup>3</sup> *Ibid.*, annex I. [Footnote in original.]

<sup>4</sup> See United Nations publication, Sales No.: E.65.XIV.2, para. 823. [Footnote in original.]

<sup>5</sup> *First United Nations Congress on the Prevention of Crime and the Treatment of Offenders: report by the Secretariat* (United Nations publication, Sales No.: 1956.IV.4), annex I.A. [Footnote in original.]

will take place in September 1975 at Toronto, Canada,

Convinced that, because of the increase in the number of alarming reports on torture, further and sustained efforts are necessary to protect under all circumstances the basic human right to be free from torture and other cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment,

1. Requests Member States to furnish the Secretary-General in time for submission to the Fifth United Nations Congress on the Prevention of Crime and the Treatment of Offenders and to the General Assembly at its thirtieth session:

(a) Information relating to the legislative, administrative and judicial measures, including remedies and sanctions, aimed at safeguarding persons within their jurisdiction from being subjected to torture and other cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment;

(b) Their observations and comments on articles 24 to 27 of the draft principles on freedom from arbitrary arrest and detention prepared for the Commission on Human Rights;

2. Requests the Secretary-General to prepare an analytical summary of the information received under paragraph 1 above for submission to the Fifth United Nations Congress on the Prevention of Crime and the Treatment of Offenders, to the General Assembly at its thirtieth session, to the Commission on Human Rights and to the Sub-Commission on Prevention of Discrimination and Protection of Minorities;

3. Requests the Fifth United Nations Congress on the Prevention of Crime and the Treatment of Offenders, under item 3 of its agenda, taking into account the consideration given to the question by the Committee on Crime Prevention and Control in pursuance of Economic and Social Council resolution 1794 (LIV), to give urgent attention to the question of the development of an international code of ethics for police and related law enforcement agencies;

4. Further requests the Fifth United Nations Congress on the Prevention of Crime and the Treatment of Offenders, under item 4 of its agenda, to include, in the elaboration of the Standard Minimum Rules for the Treatment of Prisoners, rules for the protection of all persons subjected to any form of detention or imprisonment against torture and other cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment, and to report thereon to the General Assembly at its thirtieth session;

5. Invites the World Health Organization, taking into account the various declarations on medical ethics adopted by the World Medical Association, to draft, in close co-operation with such other competent organizations, including the United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization, a

may be appropriate, an outline of the principles of medical ethics which may be relevant to the protection of persons subjected to any form of detention or imprisonment against torture and other cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment, and to bring the draft to the attention of the Fifth United Nations Congress on the Prevention of Crime and the Treatment of Offenders with a view to assisting the Congress in the implementation of the task set out in paragraph 4 above;

6. *Decides* to consider at its thirtieth session the question of torture and other cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment in relation to detention and imprisonment.

## **U.S. Challenges Ruling To Exclude South Africa From General Assembly**

*Following are statements made in the U.N. General Assembly on November 12 by U.S. Representative John Scali.*

### **FIRST STATEMENT**

USUN press release 166 dated November 12

My delegation cannot accept the argument that the vote in the Security Council on the South African issue last October 30 in any way changes the clear wording of articles 5 and 6 of the charter. Nor, in our view, does it in any way permit this or any other Assembly to deprive a member of the rights and privileges of membership.

I am deeply concerned with the criticism of my delegation's vote in the Security Council on the South African matter. I categorically reject any implication that our vote was anti-African, anti-United Nations, or was motivated by any support whatsoever for apartheid.

As I had hoped was clear from the many times my delegation has expressed this view, the U.S. Government thoroughly opposes the policy of apartheid. We support the self-determination as soon as possible of Namibia. We call on South Africa to fulfill its obligations under article 25 of the charter and to comply with Security Council resolutions on Southern Rhodesia.

Has it been forgotten that the United States imposed its own arms embargo on South Africa before the United Nations did?

Our vote in the Security Council, Mr. President, reflected our strong belief that the continued presence in the United Nations of South Africa would best allow members to continue pressure for necessary reforms in that nation as well as changes in Namibia and Rhodesia.

As I said in my explanation of vote before the Security Council last October 30, Mr. President [Algerian Foreign Minister Abdelaziz Bouteflika]:

My delegation believes that South Africa should continue to be exposed, over and over again, to the blunt expressions of the abhorrence of mankind for apartheid. South Africans could hear of this abhorrence only from afar were we to cast them from our ranks, beyond the range of our voices.

Our analysis is that expulsion would say to the most hardened racist elements in South Africa that their indifference to our words and resolutions had been justified. We think it would say to the South Africans that we have not heard, or do not wish to encourage, the new voices—the voices that augur hope of change.

We believe that the United Nations must continue its pressure upon South Africa, moving step by step until right has triumphed. It is self-defeating to fire a single last dramatic salvo with only silence to follow. History holds no example of a pariah state that reformed itself in exile. The pariah is by definition an outlaw, free of restraint. There is no record of good citizenship in the land of Nod, east of Eden, where Cain, the first pariah, was banished.

My delegation has another grave concern about the wisdom of expelling South Africa. Even if this would help thwart the ugly crime of apartheid, expulsion would set a shattering precedent which could gravely damage the U.N. structure.

Mr. President, my delegation further believes that the expulsion of South Africa would reverse the evolution of the United Nations toward ever wider membership.

These were our reasons and our only reasons. We hold them no less deeply than those who hold a different view. We respect that different view, and we expect no less in return. We also expect that the clear words of the charter will be honored. This Assembly may be master of its procedures, but not of our charter, which remains the paramount

document governing our existence as an organization based on law.

## SECOND STATEMENT

USUN press release 167 dated November 12

Mr. President: My delegation regrets that we have no choice but to challenge your ruling. We did not come to this decision lightly, and we do so only because of the overriding importance of the issue, the fundamental rights of a member state under the Charter of the United Nations.

There is also an obvious conflict, Mr. President, between your ruling and the legal opinion given to this Assembly on November 11, 1970, at the 25th session. Further, there is a conflict between your ruling and the practice that the General Assembly has consistently followed in the four years since then, at the 25th, the 26th, the 27th, and the 28th sessions and at the 6th special session held in spring this year. In addition, as we all know, during this 29th session, South Africa was allowed to vote without objection after the Assembly's decision on its credentials was made.

The legal opinion given at the 25th session remains as valid today, in our view, as it was then. It affirms that under the charter the Assembly may not deprive a member of any of the rights of membership. The Assembly may be master of its rules of procedure, but no majority, no matter how large, can ignore or change the clear provisions of the charter in this way.

We consider it to be a violation of the rules of procedure and of articles 5 and 6 of the charter for the Assembly to attempt to deny a member state of the United Nations its right to participate in the Assembly, through this type of unprecedented action. Article 5 of the charter expressly lays down rules by which a member may be suspended. Article 6 of the charter specifically provides the process by which a member may be expelled. The Assembly is not empowered to deprive a member of the rights and privileges of membership other than in accordance with articles 5, 6, and 19 of the charter. In our

view, none of these circumstances applies in this case.

At the 25th session of this Assembly, the then Legal Counsel of the United Nations ruled:

Article 5 of the Charter lays down the following requirements for the suspension of a Member State from the rights and privileges of membership:

(a) Preventive or enforcement action has to be taken by the Security Council against the Member State concerned;

(b) The Security Council has to recommend to the General Assembly that the Member State concerned be suspended from the exercise of the rights and privileges of membership;

(c) The General Assembly has to act affirmatively on the foregoing recommendation by a two-thirds vote, in accordance with Article 18, paragraph 2, of the Charter, which lists "the suspension of the rights and privileges of membership" as an "important question".

The participation in meetings of the General Assembly is quite clearly one of the important rights and privileges of membership. Suspension of this right through the rejection of credentials would not satisfy the foregoing requirements and would therefore be contrary to the Charter.

It is our view that nothing has transpired in the General Assembly or the Security Council to affect the validity of that ruling. Since the Security Council remains seized of the range of South African questions, there is all the more reason why the Assembly cannot properly seek to take action to deprive South Africa of its rights of membership. The effect of the resolution of September 30, 1974, on credentials has the same effect as resolutions of previous years.

Mr. President, your action is taken in the context of the Assembly's action on the credentials item. The policy of a government is not a legitimate consideration in this context. Those policies may rightly be examined at other times and in other contexts but not here. In the present case no one can reasonably argue with the technical propriety of the credentials of the South African delegation. South Africa is not the only member state whose government is not chosen by free elections where all adults are entitled to vote.

In our view, we must not seek to change the membership regulations to convert this

into an organization of like-minded governments. Were we to apply that criterion, we should cease to be a universal institution and would become very different indeed.

Those facts and a respect for the charter have led past Presidents of the General Assembly to rule that decisions involving the nonacceptance or rejection of South African credentials constitute an expression of international outrage at the heinous policy of apartheid. But each of those Presidents has also ruled that such decisions do not serve to deprive South Africa of its fundamental rights of membership—rights which include the right to take its seat in the General Assembly, to speak, to raise questions and make proposals, and to vote.

Mr. President, we consider that your ruling fails to take into account that law of the charter, the existing legal opinion, and the consistent series of applicable precedents. For those reasons and pursuant to rule 71, we must respectfully challenge your ruling. We request that, in accordance with rule 71, you put this challenge immediately to a vote. I request that a recorded vote be taken.<sup>1</sup>

## **U.S. Discusses Cyprus Situation in U.N. General Assembly**

*Following is a statement made in the U.N. General Assembly by U.S. Representative John Scali on November 1, together with the text of a resolution adopted by the Assembly that day.*

### **STATEMENT BY AMBASSADOR SCALI**

USUN press release 158 dated November 1

The present state of affairs on Cyprus satisfies no one. But if the world community is to contribute constructively to the improvement of this problem, it must do more than review the past and deplore the present.

<sup>1</sup> The Assembly voted 91 to 22 (U.S.), with 19 abstentions, to uphold the President's ruling excluding the delegation of South Africa from the work of the General Assembly.

That is too easy. Neither can we here hope and presume to dictate the specific ingredients of a better future. What we can and should do is to help create an atmosphere where meaningful negotiation, flexibility, and compromise are possible.

The United Nations has already played an important part in achieving what progress has so far occurred. In July the Security Council achieved a cease-fire on Cyprus. It also created a framework for negotiations between all the parties and established the essential principles to guide those negotiations.

Secretary General Waldheim has been a particularly active and constructive figure in Cyprus. He has personally initiated meetings between Mr. [Glafcos] Clerides and Mr. [Rauf] Denktash. Further, the Secretary General's Special Representative, Mr. [Luis] Weckmann-Munoz, continues to participate in these meetings. The Nicosia talks have—gradually, to be sure, but nonetheless successfully—produced agreement on the exchange of prisoners. The discussions are continuing and are focusing on other pressing issues. Most important, they have laid a fragile, but for that reason all the more critical, foundation of confidence and cooperation upon which broadened discussions can be based.

The U.N. High Commissioner for Refugees, in cooperation with the International Committee of the Red Cross, has responded to the most immediate and the most compelling aspects of the Cyprus tragedy. His assistance has been important in securing the release of prisoners, reuniting families, providing relief supplies, and ministering to the sick, the needy, and the helpless.

No discussion of the Cyprus situation would be complete without mention of the U.N. Force in Cyprus. These soldiers for peace have conducted themselves in a magnificent tradition to protect and assist the people of Cyprus and to maintain world peace. They personify the highest ideals of this organization. My government again would like to express its deepest gratitude to all of the nations who have provided contingents to the Force. We ask the Governments of Den-

mark, Austria, the United Kingdom, and Canada to convey our sincere condolences to the families of those men who have given their lives in the cause of peace and in the service of this organization.

The United States has worked throughout the recent Cyprus crisis within the United Nations and also directly with all of the parties. We have sought to prevent bloodshed, to stop the fighting, to maintain the peace, and to encourage progress toward a lasting settlement. Our first concern during the summer was to defuse the immediate crisis and to help the parties talk to one another again. We made strenuous attempts to prevent, and then to confine, the military activities on the island which took place in July and August. Thereafter the United States cooperated with the United Nations and with the parties most directly concerned in arranging a cease-fire which still holds today. Further, our government has actively supported efforts in Geneva, in pursuance of Security Council Resolution 353, to establish the outlines of a lasting settlement. We also vigorously encouraged discussions between the leaders of the Greek and Turkish Cypriot communities.

The United States continues to stand ready, as Secretary Kissinger recently told this Assembly, "to play an even more active role than in the past in helping the parties find a solution to the centuries-old problem of Cyprus."

My government has also responded to the real and immediate human needs of the people of Cyprus. We are contributing one-third of the \$22 million which the U.N. High Commissioner for Refugees estimates that he will need before the end of this year. Overall U.S. assistance for Cyprus relief this year will amount to over \$10 million. We remain prepared to make additional contributions as they are needed. We urge the international community to continue and if possible to increase its humanitarian efforts.

The numerous and varied efforts of the United Nations and of its individual members have served, we believe, to bring the parties closer. They have helped create an atmosphere in which negotiation can move

forward. Our continuing concern is to provide assistance, to whatever degree the parties consider useful, in meeting the imperative, urgent need for peace.

The United Nations has a long history of involvement in Cyprus. Its record there is honorable and its achievement substantial. Events of the past months have once again demonstrated, however, that peacekeeping is not a substitute for peace. We have once again learned that only the parties to a dispute can truly resolve their differences.

Those who are friends of Cyprus have an obligation to do their best to encourage and to protect all genuine efforts by these parties to work out such a settlement.

#### TEXT OF RESOLUTION <sup>1</sup>

*The General Assembly,*  
*Having considered* the question of Cyprus,  
*Gravely concerned* about the continuation of the Cyprus crisis, which constitutes a threat to international peace and security,

*Mindful* of the need to solve this crisis without delay by peaceful means, in accordance with the purposes and principles of the United Nations,

*Having heard* the statements in the debate and taking note of the report of the Special Political Committee on the question of Cyprus,<sup>2</sup>

1. *Calls upon* all States to respect the sovereignty, independence, territorial integrity and non-alignment of the Republic of Cyprus and to refrain from all acts and interventions directed against it;

2. *Urges* the speedy withdrawal of all foreign armed forces and foreign military presence and personnel from the Republic of Cyprus, and the cessation of all foreign interference in its affairs;

3. *Considers* that the constitutional system of the Republic of Cyprus concerns the Greek Cypriot and Turkish Cypriot communities;

4. *Commends* the contacts and negotiations taking place on an equal footing, with the good offices of the Secretary-General, between the representatives of the two communities, and calls for their continuation with a view to reaching freely a mutually acceptable political settlement, based on their fundamental and legitimate rights;

5. *Considers* that all the refugees should return to their homes in safety and calls upon the parties concerned to undertake urgent measures to that end;

<sup>1</sup> U.N. doc. A/RES/3212 (XXIX); adopted by the Assembly on Nov. 1 by a recorded vote of 117 (U.S.) to 0.

<sup>2</sup> U.N. doc. A/9820 [footnote in original].



6. *Expresses the hope* that, if necessary, further efforts including negotiations can take place, within the framework of the United Nations, for the purpose of implementing the provisions of the present resolution, thus ensuring to the Republic of Cyprus its fundamental right to independence, sovereignty and territorial integrity;

7. *Requests* the Secretary-General to continue to provide United Nations humanitarian assistance to all parts of the population of Cyprus and calls upon all States to contribute to that effort;

8. *Calls upon* all parties to continue to co-operate fully with the United Nations Peace-keeping Force in Cyprus, which may be strengthened if necessary;

9. *Requests* the Secretary-General to continue to lend his good offices to the parties concerned;

10. *Further requests* the Secretary-General to bring the present resolution to the attention of the Security Council.

## **U.S. Reaffirms Support of Decade for Action To Combat Racism**

*Following is a statement made in Committee III (Social, Humanitarian and Cultural) of the U.N. General Assembly by U.S. Representative Clarence Clyde Ferguson, Jr., on October 4, together with the text of a resolution adopted by the committee on October 10 and by the Assembly on November 6.*

### **STATEMENT BY AMBASSADOR FERGUSON**

USUN press release 127 dated October 4

As we all know, the General Assembly met in a special session on December 10 of last year to declare the period 1973-83 as the Decade for Action to Combat Racism and Racial Discrimination. It was fit and proper that this meeting was held on the 25th anniversary of the adoption of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights. It is equally fit and proper that this is the first item for consideration before this committee, the committee charged with primary responsibility for human and social concerns.

My delegation participated in the discussions in this committee and in the ECOSOC [Economic and Social Council] which resulted in the declaration of the Decade and the program for action. We suggested possi-

ble courses of action, some of which were accepted, others not. But at the end of the deliberations, our Representative to the last Assembly endorsed the program and promised the support of my government to the goals of the program—to eliminate all forms of racism and racial discrimination.

Our concerns in this area are real and immediate. The United States is in fact a multi-racial society. We must deal with the problems of racism here in our country on an everyday basis. Thus our adherence to the program of the United Nations, in particular those aspects involving national actions by member states, is but part of an ongoing domestic effort.

Madam Chairman, I had not intended to treat in any detail the situation in the United States. I had believed—and it is perhaps true—that most delegations were aware of our problems deriving from racism and were aware of actions taken to resolve these problems and were cognizant of the general state of progress in my country. My beliefs were shaken, however, when a few days ago a distinguished Foreign Minister asserted in this Assembly that blacks in this country existed in a condition akin to slavery. I myself am in the forefront of those recognizing the persistence of racism—institutional and otherwise—in our society. I have myself, as a lawyer and professor of law, been a part of the struggle to eliminate injustice in this country. Even now, I and many of my colleagues are concerned with excising the last vestiges of racism from our foreign policy establishment, both from the institutional sense and from the standpoint of substantive policy formulation. In this connection it should be noted that a large part of the problem lies in the attitudes of others beyond our shores. I trust, Madam Chairman, you will forgive these personal references, but I mention them only as token of the disappointment we feel when hearing assertions such as those made by the distinguished Foreign Minister.

Perhaps some instructive examples might be drawn from our past decade of the fight against racism in the United States. Just over 10 years ago we experienced the brutal

assassination of the president of the Mississippi chapter of the NAACP, who paid with his life for having the temerity to insist that blacks could exercise the constitutionally protected right to vote. Now, 10 years later, in the very region of the country which had so long engaged in every stratagem and subterfuge, and even violence, to deny blacks this basic political right of citizenship in the United States, there are today more than 500 black elected officials. These range from Congressmen to state senators and representatives, to sheriffs, to county executives and mayors.

Ten years ago in many places of public accommodation in this country, non-whites, no matter what their status or, I might add, nationality or citizenship, would have been barred from the ordinary privilege of decent lodging and food and entertainment. Now, 10 years later, no such problems exist. Ten years ago laws based on a combination of racist laws and regulations inhibited blacks from enjoyment of almost every basic right, from that of education to freedom of choice in marriage. Now, 10 years later, major efforts continue to remove these vestiges, most of which have been eliminated.

I mention these as illustrative of the fact that a decade of sustained action can in fact change the human condition. It is also illustrative, however, of the difficulty and complexity of completely eradicating this particular human disease.

Examining this past decade in the United States also reveals that a sustained struggle on all fronts benefits the entire society and not just simply those who have been the victims of racism and its evil practices. In the United States the reinvigoration of the movement for equality in all respects for women derived almost directly from the struggle of blacks for equal justice. We have also seen that others who had similarly been victimized took inspiration and courage from the demonstration that freedom will flow to those who first insist they will not live in a condition of less than equality and human dignity. In the last decade American Indians, our Latin Americans, and our Eskimos have

joined the struggle to eradicate racist stains from our social fabric.

There is another lesson taught by our last decade of experience. That lesson is simply that freedom, equality, and justice do not flow automatically from grand declarations or, in our case, from the grand clauses of our Constitution. A just society requires a constant vigilance and a constant concern and a constant action lest the virulent seeds of racism flower anew. In looking to the Decade we might draw a final lesson from our own experience. We in this country know from bitter experience that racist practices often take subtle disguises. Poverty often becomes the social mechanism by which racist exploitation persists. Class distinctions often mask racist criteria. In our own society—a society largely descended from immigrants, albeit some of our ancestors immigrated involuntarily—we found that the seemingly innocent concept of “country of origin” in our immigration laws was in fact the cover for the practice of racial exclusivity. Happily, this last vestige has been eliminated.

In spite of the progress we have made, we still face in America many serious problems which must continue to engage our best efforts. It is significant that at this stage in our development, our efforts are not directed toward hortatory declarations. Rather, we are attempting to translate words into reality—a far more difficult task, but one that is essential for all of us if this Decade is to have real meaning.

There is little doubt that internationally the evils of racism are most evident in South Africa and Rhodesia. We share with our colleagues the outrage at the continued existence of apartheid, an illegal and obnoxious violation of human rights. We disagree at points on the methods of promoting change. But I would like to emphasize that our relations with South Africa are designed not to support the present regime but to promote peaceful evolution with the goal that all South Africans can participate fully in the social, economic, and political life of their country. In our own diplomatic establish-

ment we seek to demonstrate our commitment to a racially just society. In social affairs we do not discriminate among our guests. Our visitation-to-the-U.S. program is extended to white and black South Africans. We insist that our companies wherever possible afford equal pay for equal work. On Rhodesia, I shall only note the continuing efforts of the administration to obtain the repeal of the Byrd amendment.

As I suggested, southern Africa fully deserves the concern and interest that has been expressed in this committee and in the other bodies of the United Nations. But the troubling situation there should not blind us to the evils of racism in other parts of the world or establish an exclusive target for our actions. Our goal in this Decade for Action is to seek the elimination of racism and racial discrimination throughout the world wherever it appears and whatever the form or, more positively, to promote racial harmony among all the peoples of the world. We are interdependent in our global social system no less so than in our economic system.

In connection with the international activities of my government in support of the U.N. Decade, I would be remiss if I did not make special mention of the activities of the U.S. National Commission for UNESCO [U.N. Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization]. The Commission has established a working committee to organize a major conference in 1975 for the purpose of highlighting U.S. participation in the U.N. Decade. If I may inject a personal note, Mrs. Whitney Young, who, as some of you may recall, was a member of our delegation to this committee last year, will serve as co-chairman of the working committee.

Madam Chairman, I did not intend this as a comprehensive statement of all U.S. activities in this area. I did wish, however, to reaffirm my country's commitment to the Decade for Action to Combat Racism and Racial Discrimination. In the discussions immediately before us, we will be faced with some specific issues—the draft resolution proposed by ECOSOC, the organization of an international conference, to name but two. I trust

that we can move swiftly to approve the ECOSOC resolution and to begin preparations for the international conference.<sup>1</sup>

May I in closing recall the words of Secretary Kissinger delivered before the General Assembly last week: <sup>2</sup>

... beyond peace, beyond prosperity, lie man's deepest aspirations for a life of dignity and justice. And beyond our pride, beyond our concern for the national purpose we are called upon to serve, there must be a concern for the betterment of the human condition. While we cannot, in the brief span allowed to each of us, undo the accumulated problems of centuries, we dare not do less than try.

Madam Chairman, our self-respect and the expectations of the international community demand no less than our best efforts.

### TEXT OF RESOLUTION <sup>3</sup>

#### *Decade for Action to Combat Racism and Racial Discrimination*

*The General Assembly,*

*Recalling* its resolution 2919 (XXVII) of 15 November 1972, in which it proclaimed a Decade for Action to Combat Racism and Racial Discrimination,

*Recalling* its resolution 3057 (XXVIII) of 2 November 1973, in which it reaffirmed its determination to achieve the total and unconditional elimination of racism and racial discrimination, against which the conscience and sense of justice of mankind have long been aroused and which in our time represent serious obstacles to further progress and to the strengthening of international peace and security,<sup>4</sup>

1. *Takes note* of Economic and Social Council resolution 1863 (LVI) of 17 May 1974;

2. *Takes note with appreciation* of the reports of the Secretary-General <sup>5</sup> submitted in accordance with paragraphs 18 (f) and 18 (h) of the Programme for

<sup>1</sup> The draft resolution recommended by ECOSOC (Resolution 1863 (LVI)), as amended, was adopted by the committee unanimously on Oct. 10.

<sup>2</sup> For Secretary Kissinger's address before the General Assembly on Sept. 23, see BULLETIN of Oct. 14, 1974, p. 498.

<sup>3</sup> A/RES/3223 (XXIX); (text from U.N. doc. A/9808); adopted by the Assembly on Nov. 6.

<sup>4</sup> For text of Resolution 3057, which includes the Program for the Decade for Action to Combat Racism and Racial Discrimination, see BULLETIN of Dec. 17, 1973, p. 742.

<sup>5</sup> U.N. doc. E/5474, E/5475; see also A/9666 and Add.1-5. [Footnote in original.]

the Decade for Action to Combat Racism and Racial Discrimination;

3. *Condemns* the intolerable conditions which continue to prevail in the southern part of Africa and elsewhere, including the denial of the right to self-determination and the inhumane and odious application of *apartheid* and racial discrimination;

4. *Reaffirms* its recognition of the legitimacy of the struggle of oppressed peoples to liberate themselves from racism, racial discrimination, *apartheid*, colonialism and alien domination;

5. *Urges* all Member States to co-operate loyally and fully in achieving the goals and objectives of the Decade by taking such actions and measures as:

(a) Implementing United Nations resolutions bearing on the elimination of racism, *apartheid*, racial discrimination and the liberation of peoples under colonial domination and alien subjugation;

(b) Signing and ratifying the International Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Racial Discrimination, the International Convention on the Suppression and Punishment of the Crime of *Apartheid*, the International Covenants on Human Rights and all other relevant instruments;

(c) Formulating and executing plans to realize the policy measures and goals contained in the Programme for the Decade;

(d) Reviewing internal laws and regulations with a view to identifying and rescinding those which provide for, give rise to, or inspire racial discrimination or *apartheid*;

(e) Supplying the Secretary-General with comments and views as to the draft agenda and timing of the world conference referred to in paragraph 13 (a) of the Programme for the Decade, as well as in relation to the implementation of that Programme;

(f) Complying, when due, with the provisions of paragraph 18 (e) of the Programme for the Decade, whereby the Secretary-General will circulate a questionnaire, on the basis of which the Economic and Social Council will consider every two years action undertaken or contemplated by Governments in implementation of their programmes for the Decade;

6. *Requests* national sports federations of Member States to refuse systematically to participate in all sports or other activities together with the representatives of the racist régime of South Africa;

7. *Urges* all States, United Nations organs and bodies, the specialized agencies and intergovernmental and non-governmental organizations to ensure, *inter alia*:

(a) Immediate termination of all measures and policies, as well as military, political, economic and other activities, which enable racist régimes in the southern part of Africa to continue the repression of the African people;

(b) Full support and assistance, morally and materially, to the peoples which are victims of *apar-*

*theid* and racial discrimination and to the liberation movements;

8. *Calls attention* to the vital importance of examining the socio-economic and colonial roots of racism, *apartheid* and racial discrimination with a view to eliminating them;

9. *Stresses* the importance of mobilizing public opinion in support, morally and materially, of the peoples which are victims of racism, *apartheid*, racial discrimination and colonial and alien domination;

10. *Commends* the active involvement of the Committee on the Elimination of Racial Discrimination in the implementation of the Programme for the Decade within its competence under the International Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Racial Discrimination;

11. *Expresses the hope* that adequate resources will be made available to the Secretary-General to enable him to undertake the activities entrusted to him under the Programme for the Decade;

12. *Decides* to consider at its thirtieth session, as a matter of high priority, the question entitled "Decade for Action to Combat Racism and Racial Discrimination".

## U.S. Urges Continued Momentum in Drug Abuse Control

*Following is a statement made in Committee III (Social, Humanitarian and Cultural) of the U.N. General Assembly by U.S. Representative Clarence Clyde Ferguson, Jr., on November 4.*

USUN press release 159 dated November 4

The international drug abuse problem remains a persistent and sinister intruder not only upon the world stage but in the lives of millions. Other threats to the peace and happiness of innumerable human beings have come and gone, and many more are likely to appear and disappear before the particularly pernicious trade in illicit drugs is brought under adequate control by the world community.

I would hope, however, that recognition of the tenacity and persistence of the drug abuse problem will not be interpreted as grounds for despair. Rather we should perceive it as a challenge to the human community to eliminate this most dangerous

threat to the happiness and health of its members. I believe that nations acting within their borders in cooperation with each other and international institutions have the means which, if regularly applied, will eventually bring illicit drugs under control. We must maintain the momentum of our past efforts without relaxation until the tide of drug abuse subsides.

The United States intends to persevere, both domestically and in cooperation with other governments and international organizations. We intend to strengthen the bilateral programs developed over recent years, and we plan to maintain our vigorous support for the international organizations seized of the problem of drug control.

In a proclamation dated October 18, our President called upon officials at every level of government, upon educators, medical professionals, and leaders in all community activities to rededicate themselves to the total banishment of drug abuse from American life. He urged all Americans to commit themselves wholeheartedly to what he described as "this supremely important humanitarian cause."

This last year has been a significant one for international narcotics control efforts. The Commission on Narcotic Drugs held a productive special session in February, which recommended several resolutions, later adopted by ECOSOC [Economic and Social Council], which should prove valuable in strengthening the world community's ability to attack the drug problem. The research efforts of the U.N. Narcotics Laboratory have also proceeded smoothly. They show promise of providing the world community with increased knowledge upon which to base future decisions in the narcotics field.

The International Narcotics Control Board, under the direction of its new President, and with the expert assistance of its Secretary, has continued to fulfill its mandate with vigor and imagination. The information and analyses which the Board puts at the disposition of the international community are useful not only to an under-

standing of the licit traffic but also of the illicit traffic and the general supply situation.

We hope the Board will continue its achievement as its responsibilities multiply with the coming into force of the Amending Protocol to the Single Convention and of the Convention on Psychotropic Substances.

We wish to urge all governments to ratify these conventions and the single convention itself. With these ratifications we may then complete the international system for controlling all drugs of abuse, both natural and manmade. My own government has ratified two of these conventions and is presently considering enabling legislation which will permit the ratification of the Convention on Psychotropic Substances.

The U.N. Fund for Drug Abuse Control, under the Acting Executive Director, has continued the development of programs already underway to respond to additional requests from governments for assistance in combating drug abuse. We believe it essential that the work of the Fund be continued. We urge all members to provide it with substantial and sustained contributions to enable it to carry out its responsibilities. Although we believe there is still room for improvement in the Fund's programming, operations, and project evaluation procedures, we note with satisfaction the speed and flexibility which it displayed in responding to the request from the Government of Turkey for technical advice on control procedures.

In this context, I believe it appropriate to note that the Turkish Government, after consultations with U.N. narcotics authorities, has informed us that it has decided in principle to adopt a method of harvesting poppies called the poppy straw process, which involves the collection by the Turkish Government of the whole poppy pod rather than simply the opium gum.

While we believe it would have been preferable that the ban on poppy cultivation which had been in effect for two years had been continued, we are very heartened that the Turkish Government has decided not to produce opium but, rather, to produce in-

stead poppy straw, a product much more amenable to efficient control. With effective policing to assure that opium gum is not illegally extracted, the reflow of heroin that has so long concerned so much of the world community can be avoided.

In conclusion, I believe it fair to say that past efforts toward creating an effective international system for controlling drugs have been successful in giving us the instruments needed for the task. There is still, however, no justification for self-satisfaction that the problem is solved. Rather, the world community must utilize all available instruments with skill, imagination, and determination to achieve our common goal. We therefore urge all governments to continue their support for all organizations dedicated to the elimination of drug abuse as a serious social problem.

## TREATY INFORMATION

### Current Actions

#### MULTILATERAL

##### Antarctica

The Antarctic treaty. Signed at Washington December 1, 1959. Entered into force June 23, 1961. TIAS 4780.

*Accession deposited:* German Democratic Republic, November 19, 1974.<sup>1</sup>

##### Atomic Energy

Protocol suspending the agreement of July 15, 1968 (TIAS 6524), between the International Atomic Energy Agency, the Philippines, and the United States for the application of safeguards and providing for the application of safeguards pursuant to the nonproliferation treaty of July 1, 1968 (TIAS 6839). Signed at Vienna February 21, 1973. *Entered into force:* October 16, 1974.

##### Ocean Dumping

Convention on the prevention of marine pollution by dumping of wastes and other matter, with annexes. Done at London, Mexico City, Moscow, and Washington December 29, 1972.<sup>2</sup>

*Accession deposited:* United Arab Emirates, August 9, 1974.

##### Pollution

International convention for the prevention of pollution from ships, 1973, with protocols and annexes. Done at London November 2, 1973.<sup>2</sup>

*Signature:* Bulgaria, November 8, 1974.<sup>3</sup>

##### Privileges and Immunities

Convention on the privileges and immunities of the United Nations. Done at New York February 13, 1946. Entered into force September 17, 1946; for the United States April 29, 1970. TIAS 6900.

*Accession deposited:* German Democratic Republic, October 4, 1974.<sup>4</sup>

#### BILATERAL

##### Bangladesh

Agreement amending the agreement for sales of agricultural commodities of October 4, 1974. Effected by exchange of notes at Dacca October 29 and November 8, 1974. Entered into force November 8, 1974.

<sup>1</sup> With declaration.

<sup>2</sup> Not in force.

<sup>3</sup> Subject to approval.

<sup>4</sup> With reservation.

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†508	11-20	Kissinger: news conference, Tokyo.
*509	11-21	Northwest Atlantic Fisheries Advisory Committee, Boston, Dec. 10.
†510	11-22	U.S.-Yugoslav Scientific and Technological Cooperation Board.

\* Not printed.  
 † Held for a later issue of the BULLETIN.

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# THE DEPARTMENT OF STATE BULLETIN

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# THE DEPARTMENT OF STATE BULLETIN

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*The Department of State BULLETIN, a weekly publication issued by the Office of Media Services, Bureau of Public Affairs, provides the public and interested agencies of the government with information on developments in the field of U.S. foreign relations and on the work of the Department and the Foreign Service.*

*The BULLETIN includes selected press releases on foreign policy, issued by the White House and the Department, and statements, addresses, and news conferences of the President and the Secretary of State and other officers of the Department, as well as special articles on various phases of international affairs and the functions of the Department. Information is included concerning treaties and international agreements to which the United States is or may become a party and on treaties of general international interest.*

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For sale by the Superintendent of Documents  
U.S. Government Printing Office  
Washington, D.C. 20402

PRICE:

52 issues plus semiannual indexes,  
domestic \$29.80, foreign \$37.25  
Single copy 60 cents

Use of funds for printing this publication approved by the Director of the Office of Management and Budget (January 29, 1971).

**Note:** Contents of this publication are not copyrighted and items contained herein may be reprinted. Citation of the DEPARTMENT OF STATE BULLETIN as the source will be appreciated. The BULLETIN is indexed in the Readers' Guide to Periodical Literature.

## World Food Conference Meets at Rome

*The World Food Conference met at Rome November 5-16. Following are texts of an address made before the conference on November 5 by Secretary Kissinger, an address made on November 6 by Secretary of Agriculture Earl L. Butz, chairman of the U.S. delegation,<sup>1</sup> and four resolutions adopted by the conference on November 16.*

### ADDRESS BY SECRETARY KISSINGER

Press release 477 dated November 5

We meet to address man's most fundamental need. The threat of famine, the fact of hunger, have haunted men and nations throughout history. Our presence here is recognition that this eternal problem has now taken on unprecedented scale and urgency and that it can only be dealt with by concerted worldwide action.

Our challenge goes far deeper than one area of human endeavor or one international conference. We are faced not just with the problem of food but with the accelerating momentum of our interdependence. The world is midway between the end of the Second World War and the beginning of the 21st century. We are stranded between old conceptions of political conduct and a wholly new environment, between the inadequacy of the nation-state and the emerging imperative of global community.

In the past 30 years the world came to assume that a stable economic system and spreading prosperity would continue indefinitely. New nations launched themselves confidently on the path of economic and social development; technical innovation and

industrial expansion promised steady improvement in the standard of living of all nations; surpluses of fuel, food, and raw materials were considered a burden rather than a blessing. While poverty and misery still afflicted many parts of the globe, over the long run there was universal hope; the period was fairly characterized as a "revolution of rising expectations."

That time has ended. Now there are fundamental questions about our capacity to meet even our most basic needs. In 1972, partly due to bad weather around the globe, world grain production declined for the first time in two decades. We were made ominously conscious of the thin edge between hope and hunger, and of the world's dependence on the surplus production of a few nations. In 1973, first a political embargo and then abruptly raised prices for oil curbed production in the world's factories and farms and sharply accelerated a global inflation that was already at the margin of governments' ability to control. In 1974, the international monetary and trading system continues under mounting stress, not yet able to absorb the accumulated weight of repeated shocks, its institutions still struggling to respond. The same interdependence that brought common advance now threatens us with common decline.

We must act now and we must act together to regain control over our shared destiny. Catastrophe when it cannot be foreseen can be blamed on a failure of vision or on forces beyond our control. But the current trend is obvious, and the remedy is within our power. If we do not act boldly, disaster will result from a failure of will; moral culpability will be inherent in our foreknowledge.

The political challenge is straightforward: Will the nations of the world cooperate to

<sup>1</sup> For names of other members of the U.S. delegation, see press release 450 dated Oct. 30.

confront a crisis which is both self-evident and global in nature? Or will each nation or region or bloc see its special advantage as a weapon instead of as a contribution? Will we pool our strengths and progress together or test our strengths and sink together?

President Ford has instructed me to declare on behalf of the United States: We regard our good fortune and strength in the field of food as a global trust. We recognize the responsibilities we bear by virtue of our extraordinary productivity, our advanced technology, and our tradition of assistance. That is why we proposed this conference. That is why a Secretary of State is giving this address. The United States will make a major effort to match its capacity to the magnitude of the challenge. We are convinced that the collective response will have an important influence on the nature of the world that our children inherit.

As we move toward the next century the nations assembled here must begin to fashion a global conception. For we are irreversibly linked to each other—by interdependent economies and human aspirations, by instant communications and nuclear peril. The contemporary agenda of energy, food, and inflation exceeds the capacity of any single government, or even of a few governments together, to resolve.

All nations—East and West, North and South—are linked to a single economic system. Preoccupation with narrow advantage is foredoomed. It is bound to lead to sterile confrontations, undermining the international cooperation upon which achievement of national objectives depends. The poorest and weakest nations will suffer most. Discontent and instabilities will be magnified in all countries. New dangers will be posed to recent progress in reducing international tensions.

But this need not be our future. There is great opportunity as well as grave danger in the present crisis. Recognition of our condition can disenthral us from outdated conceptions, from institutional inertia, from sterile rivalries. If we comprehend our reality and act upon it, we can usher in a

period of unprecedented advance with consequences far transcending the issues before this conference. We will have built an international system worthy of the capacities and aspirations of mankind.

### The Food Challenge

We must begin here with the challenge of food. No social system, ideology, or principle of justice can tolerate a world in which the spiritual and physical potential of hundreds of millions is stunted from elemental hunger or inadequate nutrition. National pride or regional suspicions lose any moral and practical justification if they prevent us from overcoming this scourge.

A generation ago many farmers were self-sufficient; today fuel, fertilizer, capital, and technology are essential for their economic survival. A generation ago many nations were self-sufficient; today a few food exporters provide the margin between life and death for many millions.

Thus food has become a central element of the international economy. A world of energy shortages, rampant inflation, and a weakening trade and monetary system will be a world of food shortages as well. And food shortages in turn sabotage growth and accelerate inflation.

The food problem has two levels—first, coping with food emergencies, and second, assuring long-term supplies and an adequate standard of nutrition for our growing populations.

During the 1950's and 1960's, global food production grew with great consistency. Per capita output expanded even in the food-deficit nations; the world's total output increased by more than half. But at the precise moment when growing populations and rising expectations made a continuation of this trend essential, a dramatic change occurred: during the past three years, world cereal production has fallen; reserves have dropped to the point where significant crop failure can spell a major disaster.

The longer term picture is, if anything, starker still. Even today hundreds of millions of people do not eat enough for decent and

productive lives. Since increases in production are not evenly distributed, the absolute numbers of malnourished people are, in fact, probably greater today than ever before except in times of famine. In many parts of the world 30 to 50 percent of the children die before the age of five, millions of them from malnutrition. Many survive only with permanent damage to their intellectual and physical capacities.

World population is projected to double by the end of the century. It is clear that we must meet the food need that this entails. But it is equally clear that population cannot continue indefinitely to double every generation. At some point we will inevitably exceed the earth's capacity to sustain human life.

The near- as well as the long-term challenges of food have three components:

—There is the problem of production. In the face of population trends, maintaining even current inadequate levels of nutrition and food security will require that we produce twice as much food by the end of this century. Adequate nutrition would require 150 percent more food, or a total annual output of 3 billion tons of grain.

—There is the problem of distribution. Secretary General Marei [Sayed A. Marei, of Egypt, Secretary General of the conference] estimates that at the present rate of growth of 2½ percent a year the gap between what the developing countries produce themselves and what they need will rise from 25 million to 85 million tons a year by 1985. For the foreseeable future, food will have to be transferred on a substantial scale from where it is in surplus to where it is in shortage.

—There is the problem of reserves. Protection against the vagaries of weather and disaster urgently requires a food reserve. Our estimate is that as much as 60 million tons over current carryover levels may be required.

In short, we are convinced that the world faces a challenge new in its severity, its pervasiveness, and its global dimension. Our minimum objective of the next quarter cen-

tury must be to more than double world food production and to improve its quality. To meet this objective the United States proposes to this conference a comprehensive program of urgent cooperative worldwide action on five fronts:

—Increasing the production of food exporters.

—Accelerating the production in developing countries.

—Improving means of food distribution and financing.

—Enhancing food quality.

—Insuring security against food emergencies.

Let me deal with each of these in turn.

#### **Increased Production by Food Exporters**

A handful of countries, through good fortune and technology, can produce more than they need and thus are able to export. Reliance on this production is certain to grow through the next decade and perhaps beyond. Unless we are to doom the world to chronic famine, the major exporting nations must rapidly expand their potential and seek to insure the dependable long-term growth of their supplies.

They must begin by adjusting their agricultural policies to a new economic reality. For years these policies were based on the premise that production to full capacity created undesirable surpluses and depressed markets, depriving farmers of incentives to invest and produce. It is now abundantly clear that this is not the problem we face; there is no surplus so long as there is an unmet need. In that sense, no real surplus has ever existed. The problem has always been a collective failure to transfer apparent surpluses to areas of shortage. In current and foreseeable conditions this can surely be accomplished without dampening incentives for production in either area.

The United States has taken sweeping steps to expand its output to the maximum. It already has 167 million acres under grain production alone, an increase of 23 million acres from two years ago. In an address

to the Congress last month, President Ford asked for a greater effort still; he called upon every American farmer to produce to full capacity. He directed the elimination of all restrictive practices which raise food prices; he assured farmers that he will use present authority and seek additional authority to allocate the fuel and fertilizer they require; and he urged the removal of remaining acreage limitations.

These efforts should be matched by all exporting countries.

Maximum production will require a substantial increase in investment. The best land, the most accessible water, and the most obvious improvements are already in use. Last year the United States raised its investment in agriculture by \$2.5 billion. The U.S. Government is launching a systematic survey of additional investment requirements and of ways to insure that they are met.

A comparable effort by other nations is essential.

The United States believes that cooperative action among exporting countries is required to stimulate rational planning and the necessary increases in output. We are prepared to join with other major exporters in a common commitment to raise production, to make the necessary investment, and to begin rebuilding reserves for food security. Immediately following the conclusion of this conference, the United States proposes to convene a group of major exporters—an Export Planning Group—to shape a concrete and coordinated program to achieve these goals.

### **Production in Developing Countries**

The food-exporting nations alone will simply not be able to meet the world's basic needs. Ironically but fortunately, it is the nations with the most rapidly growing food deficits which also possess the greatest capacity for increased production. They have the largest amounts of unused land and water. While they now have 35 percent more land in grain production than the developed nations, they produce 20 percent less on this land. In short, the largest growth in world

food production can and must take place in the chronic deficit countries.

Yet the gap between supply and demand in these countries is growing, not narrowing. At the current growth rate, the grain supply deficit is estimated to more than triple and reach some 85 million tons by 1985. To cut this gap in half would require accelerating their growth rate from the historically high average of 2 $\frac{1}{2}$  percent per annum to 3 $\frac{1}{2}$  percent—an increase in the rate of growth of 40 percent.

Two key areas need major emphasis to achieve even this minimum goal: new research and new investment.

International and national research programs must be concentrated on the special needs of the chronic food-deficit nations, and they must be intensified. New technologies must be developed to increase yields and reduce costs, making use of the special features of their labor-intensive, capital-short economies.

On the international plane, we must strengthen and expand the research network linking the less developed countries with research institutions in the industrialized countries and with the existing eight international agricultural research centers. We propose that resources for these centers be more than doubled by 1980. For its part, the United States will in the same period triple its own contribution for the international centers, for agricultural research efforts in the less developed countries, and for research by American universities on the agricultural problems of developing nations. The existing Consultative Group on International Agricultural Research can play an important coordinating role in this effort.

The United States is gratified by the progress of two initiatives which we proposed at the sixth special session of the U.N. General Assembly last April: the International Fertilizer Development Center and the study on the impact of climate change on food supply. The fertilizer center opened its doors last month in the United States with funds provided by Canada and the United States; we invite wider participation and pledge its resources to the needs of the

developing nations. And the important study on climate and food supply has been taken on by the U.N. World Meteorological Organization (WMO).

National as well as international research efforts must be brought to bear. The United States offers to share with developing nations the results of its advanced research. We already have underway a considerable range of promising projects: to increase the protein content of common cereals; to fortify staple foods with inexpensive nutrients; to improve plant fixation of atmospheric nitrogen to reduce the need for costly fertilizers; to develop new low-cost, small-scale tools and machines for the world's millions of small farmers.

We also plan a number of new projects. Next year our space, agriculture, and weather agencies will test advanced satellite techniques for surveying and forecasting important food crops. We will begin in North America and then broaden the project to other parts of the world. To supplement the WMO study on climate, we have begun our own analysis of the relationship between climatic patterns and crop yields over a statistically significant period. This is a promising and potentially vital contribution to rational planning of global production.

The United States will also make available the results of these projects for other nations.

Finally, President Ford is requesting the National Academy of Sciences, in cooperation with the Department of Agriculture and other governmental agencies, to design a far-reaching food and nutrition research program to mobilize America's talent. It is the President's aim to dedicate America's resources and America's scientific talent to finding new solutions, commensurate both with the magnitude of the human need and the wealth of our scientific capacities.

While we can hope for technological breakthroughs, we cannot count on them. There is no substitute for additional investment in chronic food-deficit countries. New irrigation systems, storage and distribution systems, production facilities for fertilizer, pesticide, and seed, and agricultural credit

institutions are all urgently needed. Much of this can be stimulated and financed locally. But substantial outside resources will be needed for some time to come.

The United States believes that investment should be concentrated in strategic areas, applying existing, and in some cases very simple, technologies to critical variables in the process of food production. Among these are fertilizer, better storage facilities, and pesticides.

Modern fertilizer is probably the most critical single input for increasing crop yields; it is also the most dependent on new investment. In our view, fertilizer production is an ideal area for collaboration between wealthier and poorer nations, especially combining the technology of the developed countries, the capital and raw materials of the oil producers, and the growing needs of the least developed countries. Existing production capacity is inadequate worldwide; new fertilizer industries should be created, especially in the developing countries, to meet local and regional needs for the long term. This could be done most efficiently on the basis of regional cooperation.

The United States will strongly support such regional efforts. In our investment and assistance programs we will give priority to the building of fertilizer industries and will share our advanced technology.

Another major priority must be to reduce losses from inadequate storage, transport, and pest control. Tragically, as much as 15 percent of a country's food production is often lost after harvesting because of pests that attack grains in substandard storage facilities. Better methods of safe storage must be taught and spread as widely as possible. Existing pesticides must be made more generally available. Many of these techniques are simple and inexpensive; investment in these areas could have a rapid and substantial impact on the world's food supply.

To plan a coherent investment strategy, the United States proposes the immediate formation of a Coordinating Group for Food Production and Investment. We recommend that the World Bank join with the Food and

Agriculture Organization and the U.N. Development Program to convene such a group this year. It should bring together representatives from both traditional donors and new financial powers, from multilateral agencies, and from developing countries, with the following mandate:

—To encourage bilateral and international assistance programs to provide the required external resources.

—To help governments stimulate greater internal resources for agriculture.

—To promote the most effective uses of new investment by the chronic deficit countries.

The United States has long been a major contributor to agricultural development. We intend to expand this contribution. We have reordered our development assistance priorities to place the central emphasis on food and nutrition programs. We have requested an increase of almost \$350 million for them in our current budget. This new emphasis will continue for as long as the need exists.

For all these international measures to be effective, governments must reexamine their overall agricultural policies and practices. Outside countries can assist with technology and the transfer of resources; the setting of priorities properly remains the province of national authorities. In far too many countries, farmers have no incentive to make the investment required for increased production because prices are set at unremunerative levels, because credit is unavailable, or because transportation and distribution facilities are inadequate. Just as the exporting countries must adjust their own policies to new realities, so must developing countries give a higher priority for food production in their development budgets and in their tax, credit, and investment policies.

#### **Improving Food Distribution and Financing**

While we must urgently produce more food, the problem of its distribution will remain crucial. Even with maximum foreseeable agricultural growth in the developing countries, their food import requirement is

likely to amount to some 40 million tons a year in the mid-1980's, or nearly twice the current level.

How is the cost of these imports to be met?

The earnings of the developing countries themselves of course remain the principal source. The industrialized nations can make a significant contribution simply by improving access to their markets. With the imminent passage of the trade bill, the United States reaffirms its commitment to institute a system of generalized tariff preferences for the developing nations and to pay special attention to their needs in the coming multilateral trade negotiations.

Nevertheless an expanded flow of food aid will clearly be necessary. During this fiscal year the United States will increase its food aid contribution, despite the adverse weather conditions which have affected our crops. The American people have a deep and enduring commitment to help feed the starving and the hungry. We will do everything humanly possible to assure that our future contribution will be responsive to the growing needs.

The responsibility for financing food imports cannot, however, rest with the food exporters alone. Over the next few years in particular, the financing needs of the food-deficit developing countries will simply be too large for either their own limited resources or the traditional food aid donors.

The oil exporters have a special responsibility in this regard. Many of them have income far in excess of that needed to balance their international payments or to finance their economic development. The continuing massive transfer of wealth and the resulting impetus to worldwide inflation have shattered the ability of the developing countries to purchase food, fertilizer, and other goods. And the economic crisis has severely reduced the imports of the industrialized countries from the developing nations.

The United States recommends that the traditional donors and the new financial powers participating in the Coordinating Group for Food Production and Investment make a major effort to provide the food and funds required. They could form a sub-



committee on food financing which, as a first task, would negotiate a minimum global quantity of food for whose transfer to food-deficit developing countries over the next three years they are prepared to find the necessary finances.

I have outlined various measures to expand production, to improve the earning capacity of developing countries, to generate new sources of external assistance. But it is not clear that even these measures will be sufficient to meet the longer term challenge, particularly if our current estimates of the gap by 1985 and beyond prove to be too conservative.

Therefore ways must be found to move more of the surplus oil revenue into long-term lending or grants to the poorer countries. The United States proposes that the Development Committee created at the recent session of the Governors of the World Bank and International Monetary Fund be charged with the urgent study of whether existing sources of financing are sufficient to meet the expected import requirements of developing countries. If these sources are not sufficient, new means must be found to supplement them. This must become one of the priority objectives of the countries and institutions that have the major influence in the international monetary system.

### **Enhancing Food Quality**

Supplies alone do not guarantee man's nutritional requirements. Even in developed countries with ample supplies, serious health problems are caused by the wrong kinds and amounts of food. In developing countries, the problem is magnified. Not only inadequate distribution but also the rising cost of food dooms the poorest and most vulnerable groups—children and mothers—to inferior quality as well as insufficient quantity of food. Even with massive gains in food production, the world could still be haunted by the specter of inadequate nutrition.

First, we must understand the problem better. We know a good deal about the state of global production. But our knowledge of the state of global nutrition is abysmal.

Therefore the United States proposes that a global nutrition surveillance system be established by the World Health Organization (WHO), the Food and Agriculture Organization (FAO), and the United Nations Children's Fund (UNICEF). Particular attention should be devoted to the special needs of mothers and young children and to responding quickly to local emergencies affecting these particularly vulnerable groups. Nutrition surveying is a field with which the United States has considerable experience; we are ready to share our knowledge and techniques.

Second, we need new methods for combating malnutrition. The United States invites the WHO, FAO, and UNICEF to arrange for an internationally coordinated program in applied nutritional research. Such a program should set priorities, identify the best centers for research, and generate the necessary funding. The United States is willing to contribute \$5 million to initiate such a program.

Third, we need to act on problems which are already clear. The United States proposes an immediate campaign against two of the most prevalent and blighting effects of malnutrition: vitamin A blindness and iron-deficiency anemia. The former is responsible for well over half of the millions of cases of blindness in less developed countries; the current food shortages will predictably increase this number. Iron-deficiency anemia is responsible for low productivity in many parts of the world. Just as the world has come close to eradicating smallpox, yellow fever, and polio, it can conquer these diseases. There are available new and relatively inexpensive techniques which could have a substantial impact. The United States is ready to cooperate with developing countries and international donors to carry out the necessary programs. We are prepared to contribute \$10 million to an international effort.

Finally, we need to reflect our concern for food quality in existing programs. This conference should devote special attention to food aid programs explicitly designed to fight malnutrition among the most vulner-

able groups. The United States will increase funding for such programs by at least \$50 million this year.

### **Insuring Against Food Emergencies**

The events of the past few years have brought home the grave vulnerability of mankind to food emergencies caused by crop failures, floods, wars, and other disasters. The world has come to depend on a few exporting countries, and particularly the United States, to maintain the necessary reserves. But reserves no longer exist, despite the fact that the United States has removed virtually all of its restrictions on production and our farmers have made an all-out effort to maximize output. A worldwide reserve of as much as 60 million tons of food above present carryover levels may be needed to assure adequate food security.

It is neither prudent nor practical for one or even a few countries to be the world's sole holder of reserves. Nations with a history of radical fluctuations in import requirements have an obligation, both to their own people and to the world community, to participate in a system which shares that responsibility more widely. And exporting countries can no longer afford to be caught by surprise. They must have advance information to plan production and exports.

We commend FAO Director General [A. H.] Boerma for his initiative in the area of reserves. The United States shares his view that a cooperative multilateral system is essential for greater equity and efficiency. We therefore propose that this conference organize a Reserves Coordinating Group to negotiate a detailed agreement on an international system of nationally held grain reserves at the earliest possible time. It should include all the major exporters as well as those whose import needs are likely to be greatest. This group's work should be carried out in close cooperation with other international efforts to improve the world trading system.

An international reserve system should include the following elements:

—Exchange of information on levels of reserve and working stocks, on crop prospects, and on intentions regarding imports or exports.

—Agreement on the size of global reserves required to protect against famine and price fluctuations.

—Sharing of the responsibility for holding reserves.

—Guidelines on the management of national reserves, defining the conditions for adding to reserves, and for releasing from them.

—Preference for cooperating countries in the distribution of reserves.

—Procedures for adjustment of targets and settlement of disputes and measures for dealing with noncompliance.

### **The Promise of Our Era**

The challenge before this conference is to translate needs into programs and programs into results. We have no time to lose.

I have set forth a five-point platform for joint action:

—To concert the efforts of the major surplus countries to help meet the global demand.

—To expand the capacity of chronic food-deficit developing nations for growth and greater self-sufficiency.

—To transfer resources and food to meet the gaps which remain.

—To improve the quality of food to insure adequate nutrition.

—To safeguard men and nations from sudden emergencies and the vagaries of weather.

I have outlined the contribution that the United States is prepared to make in national or multilateral programs to achieve each of these goals. And I have proposed three new international groups to strengthen national efforts, coordinate them, and give them global focus:

—The Exporters Planning Group.

—The Food Production and Investment Coordinating Group.

—The Reserves Coordinating Group.

A number of suggestions have been made for a central body to fuse our efforts and provide leadership. The United States is openminded about such an institution. We strongly believe, however, that whatever the mechanisms, a unified, concerted, and comprehensive approach is an absolute requirement. The American delegation, headed by our distinguished Secretary of Agriculture, Earl Butz, is prepared to begin urgent discussions to implement our proposals. We welcome the suggestions of other nations gathered here. We will work hard, and we will work cooperatively.

Nothing more overwhelms the human spirit, or mocks our values and our dreams, than the desperate struggle for sustenance. No tragedy is more wounding than the look of despair in the eyes of a starving child.

Once famine was considered part of the normal cycle of man's existence, a local or at worst a national tragedy. Now our consciousness is global. Our achievements, our expectations, and our moral convictions have made this issue into a universal political concern.

The profound promise of our era is that for the first time we may have the technical capacity to free mankind from the scourge of hunger. Therefore, today we must proclaim a bold objective—that within a decade no child will go to bed hungry, that no family will fear for its next day's bread, and that no human being's future and capacities will be stunted by malnutrition.

Our responsibility is clear. Let the nations gathered here resolve to confront the challenge, not each other. Let us agree that the scale and severity of the task require a collaborative effort unprecedented in history. And let us make global cooperation in food a model for our response to other challenges of an interdependent world: energy, inflation, population, protection of the environment.

William Faulkner expressed the confidence that "man will not merely endure: he will prevail." We live today in a world so complex that even only to endure, man must prevail. Global community is no longer a sentimental ideal, but a practical necessity.

National purposes, international realities, and human needs all summon man to a new test of his capacity and his morality.

We cannot turn back or turn away.

"Human reason," Thomas Mann wrote, "needs only to will more strongly than fate and it is fate."

#### ADDRESS BY SECRETARY OF AGRICULTURE BUTZ

Department of Agriculture press release dated November 6

The number-one responsibility of this conference is to move the world toward a higher level of food production. Its success in guiding and stimulating farmers to grow more food will be the ultimate measure of its achievement—the yardstick by which history will appraise our efforts of the next few years.

There are other subjects to consider, of course. There is the matter of food reserves. There is the question of emergency aid. There is the subject of improved storage, handling, and distribution of food. There is the need for further liberalization of trade in foodstuffs and in goods that are exchanged for foodstuffs. These, however, are issues that arise after food is produced—not before. We are not here to talk about what to do with less food. We are here to talk about what to do with more food.

There is enormous opportunity to produce more. During the two decades of the 1950's and 1960's, grain yields increased 63 percent in developed nations and only 32 percent in developing countries. Yet many of the developing countries have enormous potential, and many are making great progress in improving yields and building the rural institutions necessary for continued advancement.

Many of the answers to world food problems in the future—10 or 20 or 50 years from now—lie in yet-unknown methods that await discovery in laboratory and test plot. Some of the world's most spectacular achievements will come from such research, as they have in the past.

Much, however, remains to be done in

employing the technology we already have. We have at hand tremendous knowledge—of plant and animal breeding and nutrition, disease and pest control, mechanization, farm management, marketing, and other farm sciences. Merely stopping unnecessary waste in harvesting and storage and losses to insects and other pests would buy the world a large amount of time as we seek to increase production.

Finally, as we address ourselves to increasing production, there is the continuing challenge of identifying those factors that cause a farmer to produce. Farm production is not a constant. There is a world of difference in the way farmers utilize their productive ability. There is a difference from country to country, from region to region, from farm to farm, from season to season—the human differential. It is costly to produce food—costly in human effort, in capital investment, and increasingly in the purchase of production inputs. To produce at high cost requires incentive.

In my country, farmers respond to the incentive of profit. The opportunity for farmers to own and operate their own farms is an incentive. The desire for better living, a better home, and education for the children is an incentive. Pride in being a farmer is an incentive. The opportunity to share in the progress of community and nation is an incentive. In modern societies, these incentives are closely related to the ability to earn a fair return from one's investment—a decent reward for one's labor.

I strongly suspect that this is true in other countries as well as my own. I do not pretend to be an expert in the ways of other nations and peoples. But I ask each of you: Is it not true that your farmers respond best when they are rewarded with the means to live better and provide better for their families? Call it profit. Call it by another name. It's still a response to economic rewards.

In our own country, we believe that the opportunity to gain increased returns from the market will result in substantially larger production in the year ahead. The freeing of cropland from our former system of production controls has already had a great im-

pact on our agriculture. As recently as 1972, our farmers were holding out of production, under government programs, about one hectare for every five hectares that were in crops. Government programs have released all of this land, and farmers had returned well over half of this "set-aside" cropland into production by 1974.

We expect much additional land will be planted for harvest in 1975. The incentive is there in the form of market opportunity, the opportunity to profit.

Of course this takes time. At best an increase in production requires months. Often it requires years. Meantime people must eat. In a year like 1974 the subject of food aid becomes very important. This conference will spend a good deal of time on the question of food aid—how best to administer it and where best to assign the responsibility.

The United States welcomes the increased attention that other developed countries are giving to their own national food aid programs. We applaud the food programs of the Food and Agriculture Organization and other U.N. organizations. We support a further broadening of food aid responsibility among nations and international organizations. At the same time, the United States promises to increase its own commitment to international food aid.

Even in this year of short supplies and budget restraints, the United States expects that total programing under its Public Law 480 (Food for Peace) program will exceed the value level of last year. In the current year, we will be shipping more wheat and more rice than last year, but less feed grains and vegetable oils, due to availabilities. The United States has responded to world needs in the past. We are doing so again in the current year. We are trying to be flexible with the program to meet real needs in a time when supplies are tight and costly.

The other subject that has come to the fore, along with food aid, is the question of food reserves. As I have already noted, the best assurance of food security is increased production. We cannot conjure a reserve out of something we don't have. To lock away a part of current short food supplies in order

that the future might be more secure would call for less consumption this year, higher food prices, and more inflation. These are consequences that few nations would wish to entertain at the present time.

Our attitude on food reserves was outlined by President Ford in his speech to the U.N. General Assembly on September 18. He said:

... to insure that the survival of millions of our fellow men does not depend upon the vagaries of weather, the United States is prepared to join in a worldwide effort to negotiate, establish, and maintain an international system of food reserves. This system will work best if each nation is made responsible for managing the reserves that it will have available.

Thus we favor an internationally coordinated but nationally held system of reserves. We will cooperate in reasonable international efforts to sustain food reserves to meet emergencies. We do not favor food reserves of a magnitude that would perpetually depress prices, destroy farmer incentives, mask the deficiencies in national production efforts, or substitute government subsidies for commercial trade.

If a reserve system is to succeed, it requires a free exchange of adequate production, stocks, and trade information. In fact, such an exchange is essential to the whole objective of improved food security in the world. If grain-producing nations are to succeed in meeting world needs for both trade and aid, they must have adequate information on those needs. Importing nations must share information on food stocks and needs. Exporting nations must share information on production and supplies.

We must improve our methods of forecasting world crop yields, measuring global harvests, and monitoring national food needs and utilization. The United States stands ready to make such information readily available and to share freely the techniques of information gathering and forecasting.

The exchange of technology—really the sharing of people, their skills, and ideas—contributes enormously to world understanding as well as material betterment. The 400 U.S. agriculturalists assigned annually to

other countries, the 1,200 farm scientists who come to my country, the thousands of foreign students in U.S. colleges—these represent an incalculable contribution to the American experience. At Purdue University, where I was associated for so many years, we have had 100 to 120 foreign students in agricultural college at any given time. Today, wherever I travel in the world I meet former Purdue students at work in their own countries. To an educator, nothing could be more satisfying.

In closing, may I emphasize that the objectives of this great conference will require sustained effort—through years of plenty as well as in years of tight supply. Historically the concern over hunger has tended to wane and wax with the rise and fall in world production. The subject is too serious for that; it deserves continued high-level effort on all fronts, and I hope that this conference will be the beginning of such a sustained drive.

This conference must be remembered as a new dawn of hope and opportunity in man's age-old struggle against hunger and malnutrition.

## TEXTS OF RESOLUTIONS <sup>2</sup>

### Resolution I

#### *Objectives and strategies of food production*

#### *The World Food Conference,*

*Recalling* General Assembly resolution 3201 (S-VI) and 3202 (S-VI) of 1 May 1974, concerning the Declaration and the Programme of Action on the Establishment of a New International Economic Order and the subsequent ECOSOC resolution 1911 (LVII) on its implementation, as adopted,

*Recalling* General Assembly Resolution 3180 (XXVIII) of 17 December 1973 on the World Food Conference,

*Recognizing* that past trends in food production and productivity in the majority of developing countries have been unsatisfactory, for reasons, among others, of inadequate socio-economic structures, insufficient investment funds, paucity of trained manpower, and unfavourable trade relations,

*Noting* that if these trends were to continue the

<sup>2</sup> Adopted by the conference without vote on Nov. 16 (texts from U.N. doc. E/5587, report of the World Food Conference (provisional)).

expected increase in the demand for food in these countries will raise their import requirements to unmanageable proportions, aggravate malnutrition and intensify human suffering.

*Expressing* concern at the inadequate performance of agriculture, including livestock and fisheries, in many developing countries in relation to the targets of the Second United Nations Development Decade and their own national objectives, at the new constraints created by the scarcity of inputs and at the inadequacy of the present level of resources including development assistance flowing to agriculture in these countries,

*Considering* that agricultural production in the developing countries requires the availability of inputs at reasonable prices,

*Stressing* that an increase in agricultural productivity and sustained expansion of food production in these countries at a rate much faster than in the past is essential in order to meet the rapidly growing demand for food, due to rising population and incomes, the requirements for security stocks and the need to raise the consumption by undernourished people to universally accepted standards,

*Recognizing* the importance of fish products for the improvement of quality of human diet and the potential for increased fish production especially in developing countries,

*Recognizing* that in many developing countries there is considerable scope for increased production through bringing new land under cultivation or through more intensive use of land already under cultivation,

*Recognizing* that in many developing countries large quantities of food are lost between the farm field and the consumer and that the deterioration in the nutritional value of food before it reaches the consumer is a serious problem,

*Considering* that conditions in certain developed countries are favourable for the rapid increase of food production and recognizing that some countries can produce more food than they need and thus are able to export; that reliance on this production to supply the growing needs of the developing countries and some developed countries is increasing; that for years these exporting countries have been concerned that production at full capacity could create undesirable surpluses and thus depressed markets, which would deprive farmers of incentives to invest and to produce, and that in view of the present and prospective demand for food in the world, such a concern may no longer be relevant,

*Stressing* the urgent need for greater efforts by the developing countries themselves and for increased regional, sub-regional and international co-operation for agricultural<sup>3</sup> development in these

<sup>3</sup> Including livestock and fisheries. [Footnote in original.]

countries, as part of the International Development Strategy for the Second United Nations Development Decade,

*Stressing* the importance, in selecting the measures to be taken to achieve the urgently needed increases in food output, of taking into account the need for the most efficient use of land and water resources, the short and long-term effects of alternative technologies on the quality of the environment,

*Affirming* that in order to solve the food problem, highest priority should be given to policies and programmes for increasing food production and improving food utilization in developing countries, so as to achieve a minimum agricultural growth rate of 4 per cent per annum, placing appropriate emphasis on (i) providing adequate supplies of essential inputs, such as fertilizers, pesticides, quality seeds, farm and fishery equipment and machinery, fuel, breeding stock and water; (ii) ensuring sufficient incentives to farmers; (iii) developing rural infrastructures, including storage, processing, transportation, marketing, input supply systems, credit and educational and social amenities; (iv) conservation and improvement of existing cultivated and cultivable land; (v) reclamation and development of new land; (vi) promoting research training and extension; (vii) progressive social and structural transformation of agriculture; (viii) active participation of the rural population, particularly small farmers and landless workers in the development process, and (ix) providing the necessary financial resources,

1. *Resolves* that all governments should accept the removal of the scourge of hunger and malnutrition, which at present afflicts many millions of human beings, as the objective of the international community as a whole, and accept the goal that within a decade no child will go to bed hungry, that no family will fear for its next day's bread, and that no human being's future and capacities will be stunted by malnutrition,

2. *Calls on* the government of each developing country to:

(i) accord a *high* priority to agricultural and fisheries development;

(ii) formulate food production and food utilization objectives, targets and policies, for the short, medium and long-term, with full participation of producers, their families, and farmers' and fishermen's organizations, taking into account its demographic and general development goals and consistent with good environment practices;

(iii) take measures for agrarian reform and a progressive change in the socio-economic structures and relationships in rural areas; and

(iv) develop adequate supporting services for agricultural and fisheries development, including those for education, research, extension and training, marketing, storage and processing, transport, as well as

credit facilities and incentives to enable producers to buy the required inputs;

3. *Calls on all governments* able to furnish external assistance to substantially increase their official development assistance to agriculture in developing countries, especially the least developed and the most seriously affected countries, including capital assistance on soft terms, technical assistance, transfer of appropriate technology and programme loans for imports of essential inputs;

4. *Requests governments* to make arrangements whereby developing countries will have access to inputs such as fertilizer, pesticides, agricultural machinery and equipment in sufficient quantity and at reasonable prices;

5. *Urges governments* to respond to the appeal of the Secretary-General of the United Nations for contributions to the Special Programme, the urgent implementation of which is essential for ensuring progress in resolving the food problem of the developing countries seriously affected by the economic crisis, and to contribute generously to the International Fund for Agricultural Development proposed by the Conference;

6. *Urges the developed countries* concerned to adopt and to implement agricultural policies which encourage the early expansion of food production while taking into account a satisfactory level of income for producers and world food requirements and the need of maintaining reasonable prices for consumers, such policies should not impede or delay the increase in food production by developing countries, both for domestic consumption and for export;

7. *Requests all countries* to reduce to a minimum the waste of food and of agricultural resources, in particular land, water and all forms of energy; and to ensure the rational utilization of fisheries resources;

8. *Calls on the regional economic commissions* to continue their important contribution to the task of stimulating co-ordinated economic development in their respective regions, by co-operating in the efforts in this direction that the countries in those regions are making;

9. *Urges* FAO [Food and Agriculture Organization] in consultation with UNDP [United Nations Development Program] and other relevant international institutions, with due regard for national sovereignty:

(a) to formulate economic, social, physical and biological criteria for selecting suitable additional areas for food production,

(b) to make an inventory, on the basis of these criteria, of the areas most suitable for additional production,

(c) to make an inventory of resources available for financing additional production, and

(d) to indicate ways and means for carrying out programmes and projects for additional food production;

10. *Requests* the World Bank, Regional Banks, UNDP, FAO, UNIDO [United Nations Industrial Development Organization] and other international agencies, through modification of their existing policies and criteria as appropriate, to substantially increase their assistance for agriculture and fisheries in developing countries giving priority to programmes and projects aimed at benefiting the poorest groups of the population and placing equal emphasis on both economic and social benefits; simplify and streamline the procedures for the granting of such assistance; and mobilize the support of the entire international community including non-governmental organizations, for the urgent task of overcoming hunger and malnutrition.

## Resolution XVII

### *International Undertaking on World Food Security*

#### *The World Food Conference,*

*Stressing* the urgent need for ensuring the availability at all times of adequate world supplies of basic food-stuffs particularly so as to avoid acute food shortages in the event of widespread crop failure, natural or other disasters, to sustain a steady expansion of food consumption in countries with low levels of per capita intake, and offset fluctuations in production and prices,

*Recognizing* that very low levels of world food stocks, primarily cereals, pose a serious threat to consumption levels and make the world too dependent on the vagaries of weather,

*Welcoming* the progress already made through FAO [Food and Agriculture Organization] towards developing a common approach for attaining the objectives of world food security, and noting that all major food producing and consuming countries support these objectives,

*Reaffirming* the common responsibility of the entire international community in evolving policies and arrangements designed to ensure world food security, and in particular in maintaining adequate national or regional stocks as envisaged in the proposed International Undertaking on World Food Security,

*Recognizing* that universal participation of all producing and consuming countries is essential for the achievement of the global objectives of world food security, and stressing the importance of adherence to the objectives, policies and guidelines of the proposed International Undertaking by all Governments, taking account of its voluntary nature and the sovereign rights of nations,

*Recognizing* the difficulties currently faced especially by the developing countries in building up

stocks through lack of adequate domestic supplies in excess of current consumption needs, the present high prices of foodgrains in world markets and the constraints imposed by serious balance of payments difficulties, which require an immediate increase in the food production of the developed countries while the developing countries are simultaneously assisted to increase their food production and build up their own stocks,

1. *Endorses* the objectives, policies and guidelines as set out in the text of the proposed International Undertaking on World Food Security,<sup>1</sup> *invites* all Governments to express their readiness to adopt them and *urges* all Governments to co-operate in bringing into operation the proposed International Undertaking as soon as possible;

2. *Calls for* the early completion by the FAO bodies of the operational and other practical arrangements required for the implementation of the proposed International Undertaking, including the examination of practical economic and administrative problems involved;

3. *Invites* Governments of all major food, primarily cereals, producing, consuming and trading countries to enter as soon as possible into discussion in appropriate international fora, with a view to accelerating the implementation of the principles contained in the proposed International Undertaking on World Food Security, and also with a view to studying the feasibility of establishing grain reserves to be located at strategic points;

4. *Urges* Governments and the concerned international and regional organizations to provide the necessary technical, financial and food assistance in the form of grants or on specially favourable terms to develop and implement appropriate national food stocks policies in developing countries, including the extension of storage and transport facilities, within the priorities of their national development programme, so that they are in a position to participate effectively in a world food security policy.

## Resolution XVIII

### *An improved policy for food aid*

#### *The World Food Conference,*

*Recognizing* that, while the ultimate solution to the problem of food shortages in developing countries lies in increased production in these countries, during the interim period food aid on grant basis and any additional food transfers on concessional or agreed-upon terms to developing countries will continue to be needed, primarily for meeting emergency and nutritional needs, as well as for stimulating rural employment through development projects,

*Stressing* the importance of evolving a longer-term

<sup>1</sup>U.N. doc. E/CONF.65/4, chapter 14, annex A. [Footnote in original.]

food aid policy to ensure a reasonable degree of continuity in physical supplies,

*Noting* that contrary to earlier expectations, the year 1974 has failed to bring the good harvest needed for the replenishment of stocks and re-establishment of a reasonable degree of security in world food supplies, and expressing concern that most developing countries will not be able to finance their increased food import bills in the immediate period ahead,

*Stressing* that food aid should be provided in forms consonant with the sovereign rights of nations, neither interfering with the development objectives of recipient countries nor imposing the political objectives of donor countries upon them,

*Emphasizing* further the paramount importance of ensuring that food aid is provided in forms which are voluntary in nature and are consistent with the agricultural development plans of recipient countries with the ultimate aim of promoting their long-term development efforts and ensuring that it does not act as a disincentive to local production and cause adverse repercussions on the domestic market or international trade, in particular of developing countries,

*Taking note* with interest of the work of the General Assembly at its twenty-ninth session on the subject of strengthening the Office of the United Nations Disaster Relief Co-ordinator, in particular in relation to disaster preparedness and pre-disaster planning,

*Recognizing* the need to increase the resources of the World Food Programme, so as to enable it to play a greater and more effective role in rendering development assistance to developing countries in promoting food security and in emergency operations, and also recognizing the need to increase the resources of UNICEF [United Nations Children's Fund], to enable it to play a greater role in meeting the food needs of children in emergency operations,

1. *Affirms* the need for continuity of a minimum level of food aid in physical terms, in order to insulate food aid programmes from the effects of excessive fluctuations in production and prices;

2. *Recommends* that all donor countries accept and implement the concept of forward planning of food aid, make all efforts to provide commodities and/or financial assistance that will ensure in physical terms at least 10 million tons of grains as food aid a year, starting from 1975, and also to provide adequate quantities of other food commodities;

3. *Requests* that interested cereals-exporting and importing countries as well as current and potential financial contributors meet as soon as possible to take cognizance of the needs and to consider ways and means to increase food availability and financing facilities during 1975 and 1976 for the affected developing countries and, in particular, for those most seriously affected by the current food problem;

4. *Urges* all donor countries to (a) channel a



more significant proportion of food aid through the World Food Programme, (b) consider increasing progressively the grant component in their bilateral food aid programmes, (c) consider contributing part of any food aid repayments for supplementary nutrition programmes and emergency relief, (d) provide, as appropriate, additional cash resources to food aid programmes for commodity purchases from developing countries to the maximum extent possible;

5. *Recommends* that the Intergovernmental Committee of the World Food Programme, reconstituted as recommended in Conference resolution XXI [XXII] on arrangements for follow-up action, be entrusted with the task of formulating proposals for more effective co-ordination of multilateral, bilateral and non-governmental food aid programmes and of co-ordinating emergency food aid;

6. *Recommends* that Governments, where possible, earmark stocks or funds for meeting international emergency requirements, as envisaged in the proposed International Undertaking on World Food Security, and *further recommends* that international guidelines for such emergency stocks be developed as a part of the proposed Undertaking to provide for an effective co-ordination of emergency stocks and to ensure that food relief reaches the neediest and most vulnerable groups in developing countries;

7. *Recommends* that a part of the proposed emergency stocks be placed at the disposal of the World Food Programme, on a voluntary basis, in order to increase its capacity to render speedy assistance in emergency situations.

## Resolution XXII

*Arrangements for follow-up action, including appropriate operational machinery on recommendations or resolutions of the Conference*

*The World Food Conference,*

*Recognizing* that an assurance of adequate world food supplies is a matter of life and death for millions of human beings,

*Appreciating* the complex nature of the world food problem, which can only be solved through an integrated multi-disciplinary approach within the framework of economic and social development as a whole,

*Considering* that collective world food security within the framework of a world food policy should be promoted and its concept further defined and elaborated, so that it should foster the acceleration of the process of rural development in developing countries as well as ensure the improvement of international co-operation,

*Appreciating* the need to co-ordinate and strengthen the work of the international agencies concerned, and to ensure that their operational ac-

tivities are co-ordinated in an effective and integrated world food policy,

*Recognizing* in particular the need for improved institutional arrangements to increase world food production, to safeguard world food security, to improve world food trade, and to ensure that timely action is taken to meet the threat of acute food shortages or famines in the different developing regions,

1. *Calls upon* the General Assembly to establish a World Food Council, at the ministerial or plenipotentiary level, to function as an organ of the United Nations reporting to the General Assembly through the Economic and Social Council, to serve as a co-ordinating mechanism to provide over-all, integrated and continuing attention for the successful co-ordination and follow-up of policies concerning food production, nutrition, food security, food trade and food aid, as well as other related matters, by all the agencies of the United Nations system;

2. *Takes note* of the fact that interagency meetings between the Secretary-General of the United Nations and the heads of the specialized agencies provide an opportunity for considering necessary constitutional amendments to improve the functioning of the United Nations system;

3. *Requests* that the present resolution be taken into account in such consultations with a view to facilitating its early implementation;

4. *Recommends* that:

(a) The World Food Council should consist of . . . members, nominated by the Economic and Social Council and elected by the General Assembly, taking into consideration balanced geographical representation. The Council should invite the heads of United Nations agencies concerned to attend its sessions;

(b) The Council should elect its President on the basis of geographical rotation and approve its rules of procedure. It should be serviced within the framework of FAO [Food and Agriculture Organization], with headquarters at Rome;

(c) The Council should review periodically major problems and policy issues affecting the world food situation, and the steps being proposed or taken to resolve them by Governments, by the United Nations system and its regional organizations, and should further recommend remedial action as appropriate. The scope of the Council's review should extend to all aspects of world food problems in order to adopt an integrated approach towards their solution;

(d) The Council should establish its own programme of action for co-ordination of relevant United Nations bodies and agencies. While doing so, it should give special attention to the problems of the least developed countries and the countries most seriously affected;

(e) The Council should maintain contacts with,

receive reports from, give advice to, and make recommendations to United Nations bodies and agencies with regard to the formulation and follow-up of world food policies;

(f) The Council should work in full co-operation with regional bodies to formulate and follow-up policies approved by the Council. Committees to be established by these regional bodies should be serviced by existing United Nations or FAO bodies in the region concerned;

5. *Recommends* further that the FAO establish a Committee on World Food Security as a standing committee of the FAO Council. The Committee should submit periodic and special reports to the World Food Council. The functions of the Committee on World Food Security should include the following:

(a) to keep the current and prospective demand, supply and stock position for basic food-stuffs under continuous review, in the context of world food security, and to disseminate timely information on developments;

(b) to make periodic evaluations of the adequacy of current and prospective stock levels, in aggregate, in exporting and importing countries, in order to assure a regular flow of supplies of basic food-stuffs to meet requirements in domestic and world markets, including food aid requirements, in time of short crops and serious crop failure;

(c) to review the steps taken by Governments to implement the proposed International Undertaking on World Food Security;

(d) to recommend such short-term and long-term policy action as may be considered necessary to remedy any difficulty foreseen in assuring adequate cereal supplies for minimum world food security;

6. *Recommends further* that the Intergovernmental Committee of the World Food Programme be reconstituted so as to enable it to help evolve and co-ordinate short-term and longer-term food aid policies recommended by the Conference, in addition to discharging its existing functions. The reconstituted Committee should be called, and function as, the Committee on Food Aid Policies and Programmes. The Committee should submit periodical and special reports to the World Food Council. The functions of the Committee on Food Aid Policies and Programmes should include the following:

(a) to provide a forum for intergovernmental consultations on national and international food aid programmes and policies, with particular reference to possibilities of securing improved co-ordination between bilateral and multilateral food aid;

(b) to review periodically general trends in food aid requirements and food aid availabilities;

(c) to recommend to Governments, through the World Food Council, improvements in food aid poli-

cies and programmes on such matters as programme priorities, composition of food aid commodities and other related subjects;

7. *Recommends* further that the Governing Board of the proposed International Fund for Agricultural Development should submit information periodically to the World Food Council on the programmes approved by the Board. The Board should take into consideration the advice and recommendations of the Council;

8. *Recommends* that the World Food Council should receive periodic reports from UNCTAD [United Nations Conference on Trade and Development], through the Economic and Social Council, on the world food trade situation, as well as on the effective progress to increase trade liberalization and access to international markets for food products exported by developing countries. UNCTAD should take into consideration the advice and recommendations of the Council on these matters. The Council should also seek to arrange for the receipt of relevant information from the GATT [General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade]. In its recommendation on food trade matters, the Council should pay particular attention to the resolutions and recommendations of the Conference;

9. *Requests* the FAO to initiate urgent steps, through its Commission on Fertilizers, for following up on Conference resolution [III] on Fertilizers, and to take appropriate initiatives with respect to fertilizers, pesticides, fungicides and herbicides, working in close co-operation with UNIDO and IBRD [United Nations Industrial Development Organization; International Bank for Reconstruction and Development], and other agencies. The FAO Commission on Fertilizers should submit periodic reports to the World Food Council, and should be guided by the advice and recommendations of the Council;

10. *Requests* FAO to examine its ability to follow up on Conference resolution XVI on the Global Information System and Early-Warning System in Food and Agriculture, with a view to recommending to the FAO Council, at its sixty-fifth session in 1975, any new arrangements which may be necessary with respect to its activities in this field, and to initiate whatever other arrangements may be necessary to facilitate global coverage as called for by the above-mentioned resolution, drawing upon the help in this regard of ECOSOC, if necessary, as well as that of the International Wheat Council and other organizations. Periodic reports on progress should be submitted to the World Food Council;

11. *Requests* the Economic and Social Council to consider on an urgent basis, and make recommendations whether or not rearrangements in the United Nations system or new institutional bodies may be justified in order to ensure effective follow-up on Conference resolution V on nutrition, examining nu-

tritional activities within bodies such as the United Nations, the specialized agencies, in particular FAO and WHO [World Health Organization], UNICEF [United Nations Children's Fund], and the World Food Programme, and also giving appropriate attention to nutritional programmes being conducted on a bilateral basis;

12. *Requests* the Consultative Group on International Agricultural Research (CGIAR) and the Technical Advisory Committee to assume leadership in following up on the research aspect of Conference resolution IV on research;

13. *Requests* FAO, IBRD, UNDP [United Nations Development Program] and other relevant international organizations and interested Governments to investigate the desirability of introducing an organizational approach, along the lines of the Consultative Group-Technical Advisory Committee for Agricultural Research, for other sectors such as extension, agricultural credit and rural development;

14. *Requests* the IBRD, FAO and UNDP to organize a Consultative Group on Food Production and Investment in Developing Countries (CGFPI), to be composed of bilateral and multilateral donors and representatives of developing countries, chosen as in the case of the CGIAR, to be staffed jointly by the IBRD, FAO and UNDP, and *invites* this Consultative Group to keep the World Food Council informed of its activities to increase, co-ordinate, and improve the efficiency of financial and technical assistance to agricultural production in developing countries;

15. *Recommends* that the main functions of the CGFPI should be (a) to encourage a larger flow of external resources for food production, (b) to improve the co-ordination of activities of different multilateral and bilateral donors providing financial and technical assistance for food production and (c) to ensure a more effective use of available resources;

16. Anticipating the possibility that such measures as may be agreed to provide financial assistance to developing countries for procurement of food and necessary food production inputs, particularly fertilizers and pesticides, and for investment in food production and distribution systems, may not fulfil all needs, *requests* the Development Committee established by the IBRD and IMF [International Monetary Fund] to keep under constant review the adequacy of the external resources available for these purposes, especially to the less advantaged countries, and to consider in association with the CGFPI new measures which may be necessary to achieve the required volume of resources transfers.

## U.S.-Yugoslav Scientific Cooperation Board Meets at Washington

### *Joint Statement*<sup>1</sup>

The U.S.-Yugoslav Joint Board on Scientific and Technological Cooperation met at Washington, D.C. November 19-21, 1974.

The Board reviewed a number of projects in a wide range of fields and approved a number of them for financing from the U.S.-Yugoslav Joint Fund established in accordance with the Agreement between the United States and Yugoslav Governments on May 18, 1973.

The Board noted that the U.S.-Yugoslav Scientific and Technological Research Program has made a tangible contribution in a number of fields and stressed the importance that new sources of funding be developed. The Board noted with pleasure the intention of a number of United States Government agencies to make additional funds available for the program.

The United States was represented by Dr. Oswald H. Ganley, Director, Office of Soviet and Eastern European Scientific and Technological Programs, Bureau of Oceans and International Environmental and Scientific Affairs, Department of State, and Chairman of the Board; and Mr. William H. Mills, Scientific Attache, American Embassy, Belgrade. Yugoslavia was represented by Dr. Edo Pirkmajer, Secretary General of the Scientific Unions of Slovenia and a Member of the Federal Coordinating Committee for Science and Technology; and Mr. Milos Rajacic, Scientific Counselor, Embassy of the Socialist Federal Republic of Yugoslavia.

The Board agreed that its next meeting would take place in Yugoslavia in the Spring of 1975.

<sup>1</sup> Issued at Washington Nov. 22 (press release 510 dated Nov. 22).

## Southern Africa Five Years After the Lusaka Manifesto

*Address by Donald B. Easum  
Assistant Secretary for African Affairs*<sup>1</sup>

As you well know, black American interest in and concern for Africa are not of recent vintage. This interest and concern span many years. They can be found in the various, often philosophical, "Back to Africa" themes that date to the 18th century.

One of the first black American scholars to focus on Africa was the late Dr. W. E. B. Dubois. He gave expression to many of his views while serving as editor of the *Crisis*, the organ of the National Association for the Advancement of Colored People. In 1916, for example, Dr. Dubois proposed to the NAACP board that an *Encyclopedia Africana* be published in 1919 to mark the 300th anniversary of the permanent landing of black slaves at Jamestown, Virginia. Dr. Dubois suggested in 1917 that the association take steps at the Versailles Peace Conference to secure recognition of the rights of Africans.

The NAACP was in the vanguard of organized efforts to help the African peoples. The organization supported the various Pan-African Congresses organized by Dr. Dubois. A manifesto issued at the second such Congress, held in London in 1921, contained these words:

This is a world of men, of men whose likenesses far outweigh their differences, who mutually need each other in labor and thought and dream, but who can successfully have each other only on terms of equality, justice and mutual respect.

The decades since World War II have witnessed a dramatic flowering of these concepts

<sup>1</sup> Made before a symposium on black America and Africa at the Patterson School of Diplomacy and International Commerce, University of Kentucky, Lexington, Ky., on Nov. 26.

of equality and justice. For black Americans, this period saw important advances in making a reality for all Americans of the statements and goals of our Declaration of Independence and our Constitution. For Africans, this was a period of great transition as colonialism gave way to independent nationhood in most of the vast African continent.

The period of the sixties saw a remarkable growth and strengthening of programs of black studies and African studies on American campuses. These programs have served to broaden both the base and the scope of black American interest in Africa, as well as to substantially inform the American white community regarding the black experience in both the Old and the New Worlds. This rising awareness of the black experience has brought a greater knowledge of and interest in the issues of racial equality and decolonization in Africa.

It has been in the southern tier of Africa that Dubois' prescription of "equality, justice and mutual respect" was least observed. This is where—in Mozambique and Angola—14 million blacks were ruled by 600,000 whites and the basic decisions concerning peoples' lives were being made thousands of miles away in Lisbon. This is where—in Rhodesia—a white minority regime representing 250,000 whites refused to provide more than 5 million blacks with adequate human and civil rights in the society. This is where—in South West Africa, or Namibia, as it is properly called—South Africa defied U.N. demands to permit self-determination for a territory in which blacks constitute 88 percent of a total population of some 750,000.

And this is where—in South Africa—21 million non-whites (18 million blacks, 2.5 million coloreds, 700,000 Indians) are relegated to the separate and unequal status of apartheid by the decisions of a government representing 4 million whites.

At a meeting in Lusaka in April 1969 the leaders of 13 independent east and central African states issued a statement of their position on this state of affairs. The countries were Burundi, the Central African Republic, Chad, Congo, Ethiopia, Kenya, Rwanda, Somalia, Sudan, Tanzania, Uganda, Zaïre, and Zambia. Their unanimous affirmation of certain principles was to be called the Lusaka Manifesto on Southern Africa. In this manifesto the 13 countries declared:

... the principle of human equality, and all that flows from it, is either universal or it does not exist. The dignity of all men is destroyed when the manhood of any human being is denied.

Before addressing themselves to the particular condition of equality and freedom in the Portuguese African territories, Rhodesia, South West Africa, and the Republic of South Africa, the signers of the manifesto had this to say concerning their commitment to these principles:

By this Manifesto we wish to make clear, beyond all shadow of doubt, our acceptance of the belief that all men are equal, and have equal rights to human dignity and respect, regardless of colour, race, religion, or sex. We believe that all men have the right and the duty to participate, as equal members of the society, in their own government. We do not accept that any individual or group has any right to govern any other group of sane adults, without their consent, and we affirm that only the people of a society, acting together as equals, can determine what is, for them, a good society and a good social, economic, or political organisation.

... We recognise that at any one time there will be, within every society, failures in the implementation of these ideals. We recognise that for the sake of order in human affairs, there may be transitional arrangements while a transformation from group inequalities to individual equality is being effected. But we affirm that without an acceptance of these ideals—without a commitment to these principles of human equality and self-determination—there can be no basis for peace and justice in the world.

None of us would claim that within our own States we have achieved that perfect social, economic and political organisation which would ensure a reason-

able standard of living for all our people and establish individual security against avoidable hardship or miscarriage of justice. On the contrary, we acknowledge that within our own States the struggle towards human brotherhood and unchallenged human dignity is only beginning. It is on the basis of our commitment to human equality and human dignity, not on the basis of achieved perfection, that we take our stand of hostility towards the colonialism and racial discrimination which is being practised in Southern Africa. It is on the basis of their commitment to these universal principles that we appeal to other members of the human race for support.

If the commitment to these principles existed among the States holding power in Southern Africa, any disagreements we might have about the rate of implementation, or about isolated acts of policy, would be matters affecting only our individual relationships with the States concerned. If these commitments existed, our States would not be justified in the expressed and active hostility towards the regimes of Southern Africa such as we have proclaimed and continue to propagate.

The truth is, however, that in Mozambique, Angola, Rhodesia, South-West Africa, and the Republic of South Africa, there is an open and continued denial of the principles of human equality and national self-determination.

It was five years ago that the Lusaka Manifesto was issued. What is the situation today?

I have just returned—only two days ago—from a five-week trip to the countries of southern Africa. Three of these countries were signers of the Lusaka Manifesto; three were among its targets.

In Lusaka, I attended Zambia's 10th independence anniversary celebrations as an official guest of President Kaunda. In Zaïre, I visited one of the world's largest hydroelectric power installations, located downstream from Kinshasa in the gorges of the Zaïre River near the sea. In Tanzania, I participated in discussions of U.S. assistance programs in education and transportation. In Malawi, President Banda invited me to attend the opening of his Parliament and tour the new capital city of Lilongwe. In Botswana, I examined one of the world's largest beef slaughterhouses and packing plants. In Lesotho, government officials reviewed with me the status of joint U.S.-World Bank efforts to help combat erosion and solve the rural employment problem. In Swaziland, I discussed Peace Corps assistance in teaching

and health and looked at new possibilities for U.S. private investment.

I spent a week in the Republic of South Africa, visiting Cape Town, Johannesburg, Pretoria, and Durban—including areas where blacks and coloreds are assigned to live in the outskirts of Johannesburg and Cape Town, respectively. And I have just come from Mozambique and Angola, the last two stops on my trip, both of which are moving to full independence from Portugal.

I met with the Presidents or Prime Ministers of every country I visited, but I also talked with traditional chiefs and village mayors, with trade union leaders and churchmen, with students and civil servants, with businessmen and politicians, and with teachers and farmers.

I can report to you that two major issues dominated the thoughts of my hosts. They concerned, first of all, human dignity and racial equality in southern Africa, and, secondly, decolonization and national self-determination. And these same issues were dominant daily themes in the press, the radio, and—where it existed—the television output in these countries during the period of my visits.

It was as if the Lusaka Manifesto had been issued only yesterday, rather than five years ago.

### **Human Dignity and Racial Equality**

Why were human dignity and racial equality of such important concern to the people with whom I met? Let me illustrate why.

In the Republic of South Africa today, the life of every citizen of whatever race or color is controlled by a system—which is also a philosophy—called apartheid or separateness. This apartheid concept is institutionalized and endorsed by an elaborate set of laws, regulations, and practices that imposes separate status on the almost 21 million members of the South African society that the government classifies as non-white. Within what are called their Bantustans or homelands, South African blacks will be able to vote, own property, and move freely from one place to another. They will not have such

rights elsewhere. These homeland areas constitute 13 percent of the national territory. Some 70 percent of the nation's population is being assigned to live in these areas. This is a system legislated by the South African Parliament, where seats are held only by whites. The other racial groups are not represented in this Parliament.

This is what many of the people I met on this trip wanted to talk about. Remember that of the nine countries I visited outside the Republic of South Africa, six border on the Republic or on South West Africa. One of these, Lesotho, is totally surrounded by the Republic of South Africa. Another, Swaziland, is bordered on three sides by South Africa. Hundreds of thousands of workers from these countries are employed in South African mines, farms, and factories, where they learn about and are subject to apartheid.

South Africa's system of separateness restricts both whites and non-whites to designated living areas, strictly circumscribes the rights of blacks to own property or engage in trade, and excludes blacks from entering white urban areas unless they are required to be there to serve white employers. The system excludes blacks from most skilled jobs and does not allow them to join registered trade unions or to bargain collectively.

The South African Government says that these practices are necessary to protect and advance its policy of "separate development." Separate development, as currently defined by South African Government officials, means the creation of a bloc of black states that are to be politically independent and economically interdependent. One of these eight homelands, the Transkei, is scheduled to become at least nominally independent within the next few years.

This vast program requires moving masses of people, both black and white, but primarily black, from the places they now inhabit to new locations. If you are black, you are assigned to the homeland designated for the particular racial group to which you belong—or "tribe," to use the term one encounters in South Africa.

The theory behind the elaborate structure of rules and regulations designed to keep the

racism apart in the Republic of South Africa is that the separation is necessary in order to avoid ethnic frictions and thus preserve harmony and stability in the society. These conditions are believed to be essential for the protection of traditional cultures, including white culture, and for the continuance of the economic growth that is bringing increasing prosperity to both the white and non-white populations.

### The Issue of Decolonization

The second major preoccupation of black leaders in the countries I visited was decolonization and national self-determination. This is no new concern. Ever since the full tide of self-determination in the 1960's, which brought many of these countries to full independence, African leaders have worked to bring about the decolonization of these parts of Africa where self-determination was still denied. With regard to the choice they made between force or peaceful means for achieving decolonization, the Lusaka Manifesto was once again instructive. It spoke as follows:

We have always preferred, and we still prefer, to achieve [liberation] without physical violence. We would prefer to negotiate rather than destroy, to talk rather than kill . . . . If peaceful progress to emancipation were possible, or if changed circumstances were to make it possible in the future, we would urge our brothers in the resistance movements to use peaceful methods of struggle even at the cost of some compromise on the timing of change. But while peaceful progress is blocked by actions of those at present in power in the States of Southern Africa, we have no choice but to give to the peoples of those territories all the support of which we are capable in their struggle against their oppressors.

Thus it was that the independent countries of black Africa and their Organization of African Unity encouraged and gave support to a variety of liberation movements—sometimes called terrorists, sometimes called freedom fighters, depending on one's point of view—in an effort to bring freedom from continued colonial rule.

But African leaders remained open to the possibility of dialogue and peaceful persua-

sion if circumstances were to permit. And, indeed, following the change of government in Lisbon in April of this year, circumstances did so permit in three of the territories to which the Lusaka Manifesto addressed itself; that is, Portuguese Guinea, Mozambique, and Angola. With the assistance of such countries as Senegal, Algeria, Zaïre, Tanzania, and Zambia—to name only the principal ones—talking replaced fighting.

As a result of negotiations between the new Portuguese Government and the leaders of the PAIGC [African Party for the Independence of Portuguese Guinea and Cape Verde] liberation movement, Portugal recognized the independence of the new Republic of Guinea-Bissau in September. The United States warmly welcomed the Portuguese action.

In Mozambique, where I had conversations with the Portuguese High Commissioner, Admiral Crespo, and with the Prime Minister of the Transitional Government, Joaquim Chissano of the FRELIMO [Liberation Front of Mozambique] liberation movement, independence is scheduled for June of next year. In Angola, where I met with members of the junta, the Portuguese have offered independence to the territory and have begun discussions with the liberation movements on ways to bring it about.

These developments in Portuguese-speaking Africa have been greeted with great enthusiasm and gratification throughout black Africa, where they are viewed as a giant leap forward toward complete decolonization in southern Africa. But those with whom I spoke insisted that the effort could not be slackened so long as self-determination was not yet a fact in Rhodesia and in Namibia. Let's look at those two cases for a moment.

You will recall that the minority white government in Rhodesia unilaterally declared its independence of the United Kingdom in 1965. The United Kingdom has never accepted this action, and the United Nations has imposed economic sanctions against the illegal regime. Negotiations have consistently faltered because of the Rhodesian regime's unwillingness to offer terms acceptable to the black majority and the United Kingdom.

As for Namibia, the United Nations in 1966 terminated South Africa's mandate from the League of Nations to administer this territory. The World Court in 1971 affirmed the validity of the U.N. decision and held that South Africa's continued administration of the territory is illegal. But South Africa has refused to give up its control of the area.

Black African leaders with whom I met, without exception, stressed their conviction that self-determination in Namibia and Rhodesia is now more than ever a pillar of their countries' policies in southern Africa. They see South Africa as holding the key to solutions of both problems. They believe these solutions can and must be achieved by peaceful persuasion and negotiation rather than by force or violence.

They want South Africa to withdraw from Namibia and permit the area to decide its own future. They want South Africa to remove its police forces from Rhodesia and to cease all support of the Smith regime and apply economic sanctions against it as provided for by U.N. decisions. Finally, they want South Africa to abandon its present racial policies and take prompt steps to assure full dignity and equality for all South Africans, of whatever race or color.

#### **U.S. Position on Southern Africa**

What is the position of the U.S. Government on these issues?

With regard to Rhodesia, the United States continues to look to the United Kingdom as responsible for achieving a constitutional solution to Rhodesia's illegally declared independence, which is not recognized by any nation. The U.S. Government would welcome a negotiated solution that would be acceptable both to the United Kingdom and to the black majority of the Rhodesian population. We are convinced that a solution to the Rhodesian problem can and must be found through peaceful rather than violent means. We believe the Lusaka Manifesto still speaks to this point.

Economic sanctions voted by the United

Nations are intended to provide Rhodesians with an incentive to reach a peaceful settlement. With the exception of imports of chrome and certain other Rhodesian minerals under the Byrd amendment, the record of U.S. adherence to these sanctions has been good. In December of last year the Senate voted repeal of this amendment. President Ford has expressed his support for repeal, and we are hopeful of a favorable vote soon in the House.

The United States has supported the U.N. call for withdrawal of South African police and armed personnel from Rhodesia. We note with interest Prime Minister Vorster's recent statement that "all who have influence" on the Rhodesian problem "should bring it to bear upon all parties concerned to find a durable, just and honorable solution."

With regard to Namibia, the United States accepts the conclusions of the World Court advisory opinion of 1971 affirming the U.N. decision of 1966, which declared terminated the South African mandate from the League of Nations for South West Africa. This decision obliges all states to avoid acts that would imply recognition of the legitimacy of South Africa's administration of the territory. The U.S. Government carefully avoids any such actions. The U.S. Government discourages U.S. investment in Namibia, has cut off official commercial facilities for trade with Namibia, and has made clear that it will not intervene on behalf of the interests of any American investor who engaged himself in Namibia after October 1966. The United States closely follows developments in the territory and has protested South African violations of the rights and well-being of the inhabitants.

We hope that a formula may soon be found that would provide for prompt and peaceful self-determination by the people of Namibia. We are heartened by recent public indications that the South African Government is willing to accept the principle of self-determination in the territory, with all options open.

I need not remind this audience of the U.S. Government's position concerning South Af-



rica's racial policies. We have many times, in many forums, condemned South Africa's approach to the question of race and color. Apartheid, or enforced separation of the races, is utterly repugnant to us.

South Africa's racial policies continue to inhibit our official relationships with that government. We have since 1962 maintained a strict embargo on the sale or shipment of arms or military equipment of any sort to South Africa. This is despite contrary military supply policies of certain other governments and continuing pressure, for balance of payments and other reasons, for resumption of U.S. sales. We continue to maintain the ban instituted seven years ago on U.S. naval visits to South Africa. We have no intention of embarking on any kind of military or naval collaboration with South Africa.

While we impose these and other constraints on our relationship with South Africa, we maintain lines of communication open to all elements of South Africa's population—non-white as well as white—in our continuing efforts to elicit understanding of our policies and to contribute to a nonviolent resolution of South Africa's racial problems.

We, with Britain and France, recently vetoed the expulsion of South Africa from the United Nations in the belief that South Africa should continue to be exposed, as Ambassador Scali said, "to the blunt expressions of the abhorrence of mankind for apartheid." Furthermore, expulsion was opposed because it would set a precedent which could gravely damage the U.N. structure.

Basic to U.S. policy are efforts to encourage positive change in South Africa. Consequently, the U.S. Government encourages American firms in South Africa to adopt, maintain, or expand enlightened employment practices in their dealings with all their employees.

It is a matter of record that non-white workers in South Africa are not accorded equal treatment with white workers, a condition that has led some American citizens and organizations to demand that American firms, which now total more than 300, withdraw from South Africa.

The U.S. Government does not control decisions by American firms to invest in South Africa. Such decisions rest entirely with the companies and their shareholders. Withdrawing from or remaining in South Africa is an issue to be weighed by the companies and shareholders concerned. The U.S. Government has no legal authority to take action in either direction.

Many South Africans of all racial groups have made it clear that they want American firms to remain and to take the lead in raising the level and quality of employment and in increasing educational and training opportunities for non-white employees.

The U.S. Government shares this view. About two years ago, the Bureau of African Affairs sent to American firms doing business in South Africa a message which discussed employment practice goals that would improve the working conditions of their non-white employees in South Africa. This message suggested mechanisms that could be used or were being used by American companies to achieve these goals.

The industrial relations picture in South Africa is undergoing change. We have recently asked American companies in South Africa to give increased attention to improving their channels of communication with their employees of all races, including being prepared to engage in collective bargaining with representatives of unregistered black trade unions. Our request stresses the desirability of discussions and negotiations with legitimate representatives of black workers. It was read by a U.S. official at the annual meeting two months ago of the Trade Union Council of South Africa. It has been well received. The Johannesburg Star called this development "a commendable step" and the Rand Daily Mail observed that "once again the stimulus to change in South Africa's labor field is coming from abroad."

All this supports our belief that American trade and investment can be useful in improving the lot of non-white South Africans.

We welcome recent statements by Prime Minister Vorster concerning South Africa's desire to work for peace and stability in

southern Africa. We welcome the words of the South African Permanent Representative, Ambassador Botha, at the United Nations when he stated:

Let me put it very clearly: The whites of South Africa as well as the Government of South Africa are as much concerned about the implementation of human rights, human freedoms, human dignity and justice as any other nation or government of the world.

We and all the world await news of the implementation of these declarations.

The talk of change in South Africa was being heard on all sides during my recent visit there. Many South Africans cited a variety of changes that they said had already taken place over the past few years. Many of these changes had to do with what South Africans themselves call "petty apartheid," such as separate beaches, park benches, buses, and elevators for different racial groups. Some people argued that these changes in fact presage the eventual end of the apartheid structure. But how far away is this eventuality?

Whatever the answer to that question, there is an air of expectancy in southern Africa today. Black African leaders in the Republic and outside are watching carefully for actions by the South African Government that will match words.

Just a week ago the President of Botswana, Sir Seretse Khama, made the following statement before the opening of his Parliament (I remind you that Botswana is a country whose southern border joins South Africa across a distance of more than 800 miles):

We have always made clear that before there can be any prospect of a peaceful solution to the problems of this region of Africa, the governments of the white-ruled states of the region should first demonstrate positively a willingness to change their racial policies. Without such a commitment to change, violence will remain the only way to bring about change in white-ruled Southern Africa. This is the message which we put out to the world in the Lusaka Manifesto.

Now, at last, there are indications that the South African Government is not only ready to bring about the desired changes in South Africa itself, but is prepared to use its influence to bring about similar

changes in Rhodesia. This, indeed, as President Kaunda recently observed, is the voice of reason for which we have long been waiting. Given this attitude on the part of Mr. Vorster's government, there is every hope that the problems of Rhodesia, Namibia, and South Africa will be resolved without further bloodshed. This, in turn, will open up unlimited prospects of stability, cooperation, and development in Southern Africa. For these reasons, I welcome the recent indications of possible change in this part of Africa.

The United States has many times both privately and publicly made it clear that it, too, welcomes these indications.

Southern Africa is a region of vast resources, rich and diverse, human and physical. Their alchemy could be uniquely contributive to the growth and prosperity of all of Africa and beyond, provided the warning of 53 years ago by the Second Pan-African Congress is heeded. Let me remind us all of just what that warning was:

This is a world of men, of men whose likenesses far outweigh their differences, who mutually need each other in labor and thought and dream, but who can successfully have each other only on terms of equality, justice and mutual respect.

In closing, I would like for you to journey with me back to the England of 1647, an England that had experienced civil war. In the parish church of St. Mary's in Putney, England, representatives of the army gathered to hold one of the most important political debates of all times. Men of the stature of Oliver Cromwell met to discuss the future of their country, with debate centered mainly on human rights versus property rights.

Cromwell's son-in-law, Henry Ireton, argued persuasively that unless a man owned property he should not have a voice in government. This view was rejected by Col. Thomas Rainborough, who countered with an argument as persuasive and as valid today as then: "I think that the poorest He that is in England hath a life to live as well as the greatest He; and, therefore, truly, sir, I think it clear that every man that is to live under a government ought, first, by his own consent, to put himself under that government."

## U.N. Commends Outer Space Registration Convention

*Following is a statement made in Committee I (Political and Security) of the U.N. General Assembly by U.S. Representative Thomas H. Kuchel on October 15, together with the texts of resolutions adopted by the committee on October 18 and by the Assembly on November 12.*

### STATEMENT BY MR. KUCHEL

USUN press release 134 dated October 15

Mr. Chairman [Carlos Ortiz de Rozas, of Argentina]: It is a pleasure and an honor for me to participate in the deliberations of this committee under your distinguished leadership, and I look forward to a constructive and meaningful debate on the peaceful uses of outer space.

I believe it is an auspicious beginning for us to discuss recent developments in the peaceful uses of outer space. This is an area of exciting new promise for us, an area in which we have already shown that the combined intellectual and scientific genius of men can accomplish feats which were not so long ago thought quite impossible. And now it is an area to which we are increasingly looking for help in solving many of the practical daily problems of this planet. This has been an important year both in context of experiments undertaken and in the context of our discussions about how we as an international community might better go about organizing ourselves to develop further the peaceful uses of outer space.

We wish to join with the other members of this committee in appreciation of the work which the Outer Space Committee and its Legal Subcommittee have done in com-

pleting the draft Convention on Registration of Objects Launched into Outer Space. This is the fourth treaty negotiation successfully concluded by the Legal Subcommittee and approved by the full committee in less than a decade. In 1966 the Outer Space Treaty was completed. In 1967 the Astronaut Assistance and Return Agreement was finalized, in 1971 the Outer Space Liability Convention, and now in 1974 the Registration Convention.

My government is pleased to have been a major participant in the negotiation of each of these agreements, and we welcome the completion of the Registration Convention as a useful formalization on a mandatory basis of the voluntary U.N. registration system which has been followed since 1961.

When the voluntary system was first adopted, we and others considered that it could be useful for the international community to have available a central census of objects launched into outer space. Under that voluntary system the United States adopted the practice of reporting on its launchings at approximately two- to three-month intervals; and in order to help keep the central registry current, we have from the very beginning also reported when U.S. space objects have deorbited or when such objects have split into several fragments with different orbits.

Nearly all U.N. member states that have conducted space activities have reported at least on the fact of launchings. Registration statements have been filed by Canada, France, Italy, Japan, the Soviet Union, the United Kingdom, and the United States. Now that we are about to cross the threshold of adopting a mandatory prescribed system, we

hope that participation in this system will become universal.

The U.S. Representative to the Legal Subcommittee session in May gave a detailed statement on our interpretation of the Registration Convention, and so I will not attempt to go through the agreement article by article.<sup>1</sup> Many difficult compromises were reached in the negotiation of this convention, and we believe the agreement which resulted is a reasonable one accommodating diverse interests, which will prove to be a useful addition to the developing body of international law relating to the peaceful exploration and use of outer space.

We are also at an advanced stage of negotiations on a new treaty which will elaborate on the provisions of the 1967 Outer Space Treaty regarding exploration of and activities on the Moon and other celestial bodies. We hope that acceptable solutions will be found to the few remaining issues, particularly that concerning the natural resources of celestial bodies, and that this agreement will soon be successfully completed and approved by the United Nations.

Beyond acknowledging our satisfaction with completion of the Registration Convention, we also look forward to the other future work of the Outer Space Committee, work which is obviously filled with a great deal of challenge as we again address a number of issues of far-reaching significance.

### **Direct Broadcasting by Satellites**

At the request of the General Assembly, the Outer Space Committee, through its Legal Subcommittee, is engaged in a serious effort to draft guiding principles which should be followed in future direct international broadcasting of television signals by satellite. Considerable attention has been focused for several years on the complex questions raised by the possibilities of such broadcasting; and the Working Group on Direct Broadcast Satellites held a number of

<sup>1</sup> For a U.S. statement made in the Legal Subcommittee on May 31, see BULLETIN of July 8, 1974, p. 68.

constructive sessions addressing technical, economic, political, and legal issues.

Reviewing the situation in light of our previous consideration of direct broadcasting problems, early this year my government concluded that the most productive course for us to follow would be to attempt at this time to reach agreement on the considerable range of issues on which agreement now seems possible and to allow ourselves more time to work out the fundamental differences that continue to exist in some of the other, much more difficult areas.

In March of this year at the fifth session of the Working Group on Direct Broadcast Satellites the United States introduced a set of voluntary principles which we believe represent a realistic area of agreement in line with the views expressed by the members of the Outer Space Committee.<sup>2</sup> These proposed guidelines include among others that international direct television broadcasting should be conducted in accordance with international law, including in particular the U.N. Charter and the Outer Space Treaty, and in light of the Friendly Relations Declaration and the Universal Declaration of Human Rights. Such broadcasting should be within the technical parameters and procedures of the ITU [International Telecommunication Union] and its radio regulations.

In addition, those draft principles seek to encourage the free and open exchange of information and ideas while respecting the differences among cultures and maximizing the beneficial use of new space communications technologies. We would envisage that the sharing among states of the benefits from direct broadcasting should increasingly include, as practical difficulties are overcome, opportunities for access to the use of this technology for the purpose of sending as well as receiving broadcasts.

We believe that states and international organizations and other appropriate entities should cooperate in strengthening the capability of interested states, in particular the

<sup>2</sup> For a U.S. statement and text of a U.S. working paper, see BULLETIN of Apr. 22, 1974, p. 445.

developing countries, to make use of this technology as it may become available. We believe that such efforts should include increased training in technical and program production fields, with consideration being given to the establishment of regional centers and to the expanded exchange of programs and personnel. In addition, it is our belief that international professional associations such as those in the fields of medicine, agriculture, engineering, education, the arts, and law may have a great contribution to make thorough use of international direct broadcasting in solving social development problems.

In the U.S. draft principles we did not attempt to resolve all outstanding issues relating to future direct television broadcasting. Instead, we attempted to suggest acceptable formulations of principles which we felt could be generally agreed in the near future so that some meaningful progress could be made in developing international standards for conduct in this area.

In consonance with this approach, at least to the extent of deciding on the order of priority in which issues should be addressed, the Legal Subcommittee began last May to draft specific language for principles relating to direct broadcasting. That subcommittee made a beginning in an extremely complex field, and we look forward to a continuation of these thorough and constructive negotiations when that subcommittee meets again this coming February.

### **The Issue of Prior Consent**

The United States did not, either in our own draft principles on direct broadcasting or so far in our debates in the Legal Subcommittee, address what is probably the most controversial and vexatious issue involved: that of prior consent. There were two primary reasons for our position. First, it has become apparent from our discussions in the direct broadcasting working group that there is not anything close to agreement even on the definition of the issue itself. Second, we do not believe that the consider-

able differences which separate members of the Outer Space Committee can readily be closed without a good deal more work.

One of several points which must be seriously considered in the context of a system of prior consent is that such a principle could rule out direct broadcasting for entire regions. Because a satellite beam would usually cover many states, one country's objection to international broadcasts could prohibit many others from receiving such broadcasts, even if they specifically desired to receive them. This is a point which we believe must be seriously considered and a point the implications of which must be addressed by each state in light of its own regional context.

My government, for its part, does not believe that the international community's interests would be well served by establishing a right to prohibit an international direct television broadcast by withholding advance consent, through whatever means, to such broadcasts. Any such broadcasts would need to be conducted with sensitivity to the receiving audiences, but in our view this would be strongly in the interests of potential broadcasters as well as those of the potential listeners, and an appropriate and effective way to insure such sensitivity would be through voluntarily agreed performance standards among broadcasters.

We recognize that there are many legitimate concerns about the possible international impact of direct broadcasting technology, and we believe that these concerns must be addressed in a direct and open manner. However, our strongly held view is that the solution to those concerns lies in the future development and use of this new technology in an effective and constructive way, rather than in the inhibition of what contains at least the potential for great contributions; for example, in the educational and social communications fields. We would all benefit, I believe, from an increased and open exchange of ideas, rather than from less. In this world of rapidly increasing contacts and interaction among states we need to know and understand more about each other,

rather than less; indeed, we can hardly afford not to take whatever steps are possible to clarify and understand our differences as well as our common areas of agreement.

This kind of understanding obviously must involve an exchange of ideas, not simply a one-way conveyance. Thus my government proposed that there should be increased opportunity, as practical difficulties are overcome, for access to the use of this technology for sending as well as for receiving broadcasts. We must obviously be realistic about the practical limitations on initial participation, but at the same time we must keep in focus the necessity for increasing this participation as it becomes possible.

### Remote Sensing by Satellite

Another major area to which the Outer Space Committee and its subsidiary bodies have paid considerable attention during this past year is that of remote sensing of the earth and its environment by satellite. The Legal Subcommittee in its 13th session was able for the first time to focus significantly on the legal aspects of such remote sensing. The views of many states, including my own, were expressed in some detail at that meeting, and a number of proposals for international guidelines or instruments were introduced. That subcommittee had the benefit of the extensive and productive discussions in recent meetings of the Working Group on Remote Sensing.

The U.S. remote sensing program has from the very start been based on a system of extensive international cooperation, both in developing the experiments to be used and in interpreting the data which are derived. We have since the beginning of our National Aeronautics and Space Administration's (NASA) program insisted that the data derived from all of these experiments be made available to all interested parties so that the maximum amount of scientific investigation and the maximum range of potential benefits from our space program could be realized. We have participated in complex and fascinating international efforts to learn more about the world in which we live by

utilizing the unique point of view from a platform in outer space. The information derived can be of tremendous value to all of us and to our common welfare. Hence we have established a system in which no one is barred on political or any other grounds from the opportunity to obtain as much of this data about our earth and our environment as anyone else who inhabits this planet.

We believe that our policy of providing open access to the data derived from remote sensing activities is in specific conformity with a major goal of the 1967 Outer Space Treaty; namely, that states should conduct activities in outer space for the benefit and in the interests of all countries, irrespective of their degree of economic or scientific development. In addition, article XI of that treaty calls on states to inform the Secretary General of the nature, conduct, locations, and results of such activities. The Outer Space Treaty was foresighted in covering not only freedom of exploration but also the use of outer space. The primary focus, in fact, was on the possibility that space technology could be used as a new tool to improve certain conditions on earth. Our remote sensing experiments are specifically and directly oriented toward fulfilling that principle by developing our ability to acquire useful and beneficial data about the world in which we live.

Recently, however, some states have questioned whether a system of open data availability should be maintained on the international level. A number of suggestions have been made that data concerning one state should not be made available to another state without the first state's advance permission. In the view of the United States, such a policy would not only fail to protect the states who have expressed such concerns; it would also be likely to exacerbate any imbalance which might exist among different states as they endeavor to interpret and use this data.

It is technologically and economically infeasible to separate the images from these satellites along the lines of political borders; and hence we would here, too, be faced with a situation in which data for a region might

not be available because of the lack of consent from one state in that region. In addition, as our own experience and that of others who have participated in the ERTS [Earth Resources Technology Satellite] experiments have shown, perhaps the greatest advantage which a satellite-borne sensing system gives us is the ability to observe and study the earth on a regional and global basis. It would be most unfortunate for the international community not to be able to benefit from the broader approach.

An open system of data dissemination guarantees that all states can be assured of access to any data that any other state may have obtained from such a program. If a state which conducts remote sensing were unable to share freely the data obtained with all other interested parties, as a practical matter a system of irregular and hence discriminatory data dissemination would be virtually inevitable. Only a launching state might be able to obtain the most important benefits from this unique means of gathering information, and we for one would find this most unnecessary and most regrettable.

The United States has no intention of imposing our data on anyone who does not desire it. But, on the other hand, we do not wish to deny to our own citizens the data derived from a possible future U.S. program. Because of our open political system and because of certain universal aspects of human nature, it seems to us as a practical matter that even with restricted dissemination some states would obtain data while others would not. This would inevitably lead to imbalanced dissemination, whereas at the present time we have attempted to maintain a system in which all countries, rich or poor, would have an equal opportunity for access to such data.

In any case, these and other related questions will be the subject of our continued discussions in the Outer Space Committee and its subsidiary bodies, and we look forward to those further exchanges of views.

The Outer Space Committee has requested that we endorse two recommendations on this particular subject: First, that the Legal Subcommittee should consider the legal im-

plications of remote sensing at its next session, and second, that the Secretary General should undertake studies of the organizational and financial requirements of possible global and regional centers for dissemination of remote sensing data. We support these recommendations and believe that a practical understanding of the organizational and financial aspects of disseminating remote sensing data constitutes an essential basis for fruitful consideration of the legal aspects.

The role of the United Nations itself in the outer space area, in particular the work of the U.N. space applications program, conducted under the leadership of the Expert on Space Applications, was reviewed this past spring by the Scientific and Technical Subcommittee. That subcommittee decided to approve the substance of the program proposed for 1975, with the understanding that the Expert will seek all possible ways to carry it out within the same financial limitations as the 1974 program.

My government believes that, taking into account the serious financial situation facing all U.N. programs and activities, the need is great to focus on ways to increase the effectiveness of the space applications program by channeling its limited resources into activities that will be of the greatest benefit to the most countries, particularly the developing countries. In this connection, we fully share the feeling expressed by the subcommittee at its last session that the whole purpose of the space applications program and its proper and effective coordination should be given in-depth review by the subcommittee in 1975.

### Cooperation in Space Programs

Finally, I would like to say a few words about the actual programs which the United States has undertaken this year in the peaceful exploration and use of outer space. International cooperation in space has become a fact of life, and a new fabric of international scientific and technical relationships has emerged, rich in present value and bright with prospects for the future.

I am proud of the part that the United

States has played in developing the scientific and technical means for the exploration and use of outer space. I am even more proud of the efforts we have undertaken to promote bilateral and multilateral cooperation in this field, cooperation which is based on common interests among many nations. We have undertaken that cooperation through a system of free and open associations to which nations contribute according to their interests, skills, and means.

The Skylab program, completed last February, struck the world as a demonstration of what man can do in space, particularly in overcoming adversity. Less dramatic but perhaps even more significant was its demonstration of how manned orbiting laboratories can serve as international research facilities. Four foreign experiments flew on Skylab: Belgian, French, Japanese, and Swiss. In addition, a British scientist acted as a consultant in a NASA welding experiment, and physicians from the Federal Republic of Germany and the United Kingdom joined the Skylab biomedical team to evaluate effects of long-duration space flight on crews. Correlated astronomical sounding rocket programs were conducted with Germany and the United Kingdom, and foreign guest investigators from France, Japan, and the United Kingdom participated in the Skylab solar telescope programs.

One of Skylab's most significant payload components was its Earth Resources Experiment Package (EREP), a complement to ERTS-1, launched in 1972. Using data from both ERTS-1 and EREP, some 140 foreign investigations have involved scientists from 37 countries and two international organizations. In addition, Brazil and Canada have established their own ERTS data acquisition and processing facilities, and plans for similar stations are underway in Europe, Africa, and Asia. Last June, the Government of Italy, acting through the Italian company Telespazio, agreed to build a ground station to receive data from NASA experimental earth resources satellites.

Cooperative satellite launchings, one of the oldest and most productive cooperative activities in space, continued last August with the NASA launching of the Netherlands Astronomy Satellite, an ultraviolet telescope for the study of stars and stellar objects. Earlier in the year, an Italian crew successfully launched from the San Marco platform a NASA Scout rocket to place in equatorial orbit a joint Italian-U.S. satellite which will investigate the upper atmosphere. On this very day, October 15, an Italian crew is scheduled to use a NASA Scout launcher to orbit a United Kingdom satellite which will continue studies of stellar X-ray sources. If this trilateral project is successful, it will bring to 21 the number of satellites launched in NASA cooperative programs.

In addition to cooperative satellite projects, NASA launches on a cost-reimbursable basis satellites which other countries have developed as parts of their national programs. This assistance is provided on a nondiscriminatory basis for projects with peaceful purposes which are consistent with obligations under relevant international arrangements. There have been two such launchings so far this year. In March NASA launched the United Kingdom's X-4 satellite, an experimental satellite dedicated to demonstrating some new approaches to small satellite subsystems. In July NASA launched Aeros-B, a German satellite which will investigate the upper layers of the Earth's atmosphere. In mid-December NASA expects to launch Symphonie, the French-German experimental communications satellite. This will bring the total number of international reimbursable satellite launchings to 10. In addition, NASA has launched 18 communications satellites on behalf of Intelsat.

Last year we reported that after almost four years of negotiations, NASA and the European Space Research Organization (ESRO) had agreed to the development in Europe of a manned orbital laboratory, designated Spacelab. It would be used with the U.S. Space Shuttle in manned missions for



space science in the 1980's. NASA and ESRO have continued and expanded their planning efforts for the use of Spacelab, enlisting representatives of a broad variety of disciplines, including physics and astronomy, life sciences, communications and navigation, earth observations, and materials processing.

A quick look at some of the major events in the years ahead suggests the momentum and continuity of international space cooperation.

Before the next cycle of U.N. Outer Space Committee meetings begins early next year, we will have launched Helios-A, the first of two solar probes developed in cooperation with the Federal Republic of Germany. The spacecraft, developed in our largest cooperative satellite project to date, will carry seven German and three U.S. experiments to within 28 million miles of the sun, closer than any spacecraft has flown before. We expect these experiments to yield data on solar behavior which will help us better understand solar effects on Earth.

Early in 1975 NASA will launch a second Earth Resources Technology Satellite. Essentially the twin of ERTS-1, it will permit investigators throughout the world to continue their experimentation with remotely sensed data. Thirty-six countries and four international organizations have been assured data for their proposed studies.

Next summer will see the start of the Satellite Instructional Television Experiment (SITE), conducted in cooperation between NASA and the Indian Space Research Organization. The satellite, ATS-6, is already in geostationary orbit and is being employed in instructional and medical data transmission experiments to remote areas of the United States. In the coming months the satellite will also be used in educational broadcasts to schools in Brazil. Next summer the satellite will be moved eastward to a station over eastern Africa from where it will be able to relay a television signal to viewers in India. The Indian Government will then use it for about four hours a day

to conduct the SITE experiment.

In this experiment, India is developing its own programs on improved agricultural methods, family planning and hygiene, school instruction and teacher education, and occupational skills. The program will originate from Indian ground stations and will be received by augmented television sets of Indian design and manufacture. The U.S. contribution is to make the satellite available as a relay station for one year. We share the eagerness with which nations throughout the world look forward to the results of their effort to apply space technology to problems of economic and social development.

And last, permit me to mention the Apollo-Soyuz Test Project, the joint U.S.-U.S.S.R. flight to test compatible rendezvous and docking systems for future manned spacecraft. We expect the flight to take place on schedule in July 1975. The necessary compatible hardware is undergoing final testing, and the flight crews and flight controllers of both countries are well into their intensive joint training. A successful mission will contribute to a rescue capability for future manned space flights and broaden opportunities for U.S. and Soviet space cooperation in the years ahead. At this stage, joint manned flight operations of necessity fall to the nations with manned flight programs. We believe, however, that the flight has a broader significance, not simply just for what men may accomplish together in space but for what they may accomplish together on earth.

Cooperation in space is obviously a present reality. This cooperation has yielded practical benefits to both developed and developing countries. Projects now scheduled to fly justify the hope of more gains to come. Let us be alert in maintaining an international environment which encourages nations to work together in their common interest, to the limits of human imagination and skill, to the ends of the universe and beyond.

*International Co-operation in the Peaceful Uses  
of Outer Space*

*The General Assembly,*

Recalling its resolution 3182 (XXVIII) of 18 December 1973,

Having considered the report of the Committee on the Peaceful Uses of Outer Space,<sup>4</sup>

Reaffirming the common interest of mankind in furthering the exploration and use of outer space for peaceful purposes,

Recalling its resolution 1721 B (XVI) of 20 December 1961, in which it expressed the belief that the United Nations should provide a focal point for international co-operation in the peaceful exploration and use of outer space,

Reaffirming further its belief that the benefits deriving from space exploration can be extended to States at all stages of economic and scientific development, if Member States conduct their space programmes with a view to promoting maximum international co-operation, including the widest possible exchange of information in this field, and the expansion of international programmes for the practical applications of space technology to development,

Reaffirming the importance of international co-operation in developing the rule of law in the peaceful exploration and use of outer space,

1. Endorses the report of the Committee on the Peaceful Uses of Outer Space;

2. Invites States which have not yet become Parties to the Treaty on Principles Governing the Activities of States in the Exploration and Use of Outer Space, including the Moon and Other Celestial Bodies, the Agreement on the Rescue of Astronauts, the Return of Astronauts and the Return of Objects Launched into Outer Space and the Convention on International Liability for Damage Caused by Space Objects to give early consideration to ratifying or acceding to those international agreements, so that they may have the broadest possible effect;

3. Notes with satisfaction that the Committee on the Peaceful Uses of Outer Space has completed the text of the draft Convention on Registration of Objects Launched into Outer Space;

4. Notes with appreciation the useful work carried out by the Legal Sub-Committee of the Committee on the Peaceful Uses of Outer Space in the field of the progressive development and of the

codification of the law of outer space;

5. Notes that, in responding to the request of the General Assembly, the Legal Sub-Committee and the Committee itself have achieved further progress towards the completion of the draft treaty relating to the Moon;

6. Recommends that the Legal Sub-Committee should consider at its fourteenth session, with the same high priority:

(a) The draft treaty relating to the Moon with a view to completing it as soon as possible;

(b) The elaboration of principles governing the use by States of artificial satellites for direct television broadcasting with a view to concluding an international agreement or agreements, in accordance with General Assembly resolution 2916 (XXVII);

(c) The legal implications of remote sensing of the earth from space, taking into account the various views of States expressed on the subject, including proposals for draft international instruments;

7. Notes, in this context, that the delegations of Argentina and Brazil have introduced, during the present session of the General Assembly, draft basic articles of a Treaty on Remote Sensing of Natural Resources by Means of Space Technology for the consideration of the Legal Sub-Committee at its fourteenth session;

8. Also recommends that the Legal Sub-Committee should consider at its fourteenth session, as time permits, matters relating to the definition and delimitation of outer space and outer space activities;

9. Notes with appreciation the useful work carried out by the Working Group on Direct Broadcast Satellites, *inter alia*, in facilitating the work of the Legal Sub-Committee in elaborating principles governing the use by States of artificial earth satellites for direct television broadcasting;

10. Recommends that the Committee on the Peaceful Uses of Outer Space, bearing in mind the useful contribution that the Working Group on Direct Broadcast Satellites can make to its work, should consider reconvening the Working Group if or when it deems it useful;

11. Notes with satisfaction that, in promoting international co-operation in the application of space technology, the Scientific and Technical Sub-Committee and its Working Group on Remote Sensing of the Earth by Satellites have given considerable attention to the potential use of remote sensing of the earth by satellites in development programmes of all countries, especially of developing countries;

12. Welcomes the various efforts envisaged with a view to making more readily available the benefit

<sup>3</sup> Adopted by the Assembly on Nov. 12 (text from U.N. doc. A/9812).

<sup>4</sup> *Official Records of the General Assembly, Twenty-ninth Session, Supplement No. 20 (A/9620)*. [Footnote in original.]

of this new technology to all countries, especially developing countries;

13. *Welcomes further*, as a valuable step in the efforts to find appropriate patterns for the possible international organization of an operational remote-sensing system or systems, the request of the Committee on the Peaceful Uses of Outer Space that the Secretary-General undertake studies on the organizational and financial requirements of global and regional centres for remote sensing;

14. *Endorses* the opinion that further studies by the Scientific and Technical Sub-Committee of organizational and financial questions relating to remote sensing of the earth from space should progress, together with consideration by the Legal Sub-Committee of the legal aspects of remote sensing of the earth from space as a matter of priority;

15. *Commends* the Working Group on Remote Sensing of the Earth by Satellites for its accomplishment in assessing the current stage of development of remote sensing and in facilitating understanding of the potential benefits of this new space application for development, especially that of the developing countries;

16. *Notes with approval* that the Committee on the Peaceful Uses of Outer Space, having considered the various recommendations made by its Scientific and Technical Sub-Committee with regard to the work of the Working Group on Remote Sensing of the Earth by Satellites, as set out in the final report of the Working Group,<sup>5</sup> agreed to the recommendation that the Scientific and Technical Sub-Committee, at its twelfth session in 1975, should give to remote sensing the priority accorded to it in paragraph 49 of the Committee's report;

17. *Welcomes* the continuing progress achieved in developing the United Nations programme on space applications into a significant means of promoting international co-operation in this field, as set out in paragraphs 35 to 41 of the report of the Committee on the Peaceful Uses of Outer Space and in paragraph 29 of the report of the Scientific and Technical Sub-Committee,<sup>6</sup> and recommends that, in order to facilitate further progress in space applications, the Committee should explore the desirability of expanding the programme in the future, including the possibility of improving its effectiveness, taking especially into account the needs of the developing countries;

18. *Endorses* the United Nations programme on space applications, as referred to in paragraph 41 of the report of the Committee on the Peaceful Uses of Outer Space and in paragraph 29 of the report of the Scientific and Technical Sub-Committee, and recommends the continuing development of the pro-

gramme, taking especially into account the needs of the developing countries;

19. *Notes with appreciation* that several Member States have offered educational and training facilities, under United Nations sponsorship, in the practical application of space technology and draws the attention of Member States, particularly the developing countries, to those opportunities as outlined in paragraphs 35 to 38 and 40 of the report of the Committee on the Peaceful Uses of Outer Space;

20. *Further notes with appreciation* the actions, as mentioned in paragraph 37 of the report of the Committee, of several Member States in serving as hosts to the United Nations-sponsored panels, seminars and workshops in 1973 and 1974, and in agreeing to serve as hosts to the United Nations-sponsored panels, seminars and workshops in 1975;

21. *Further notes* the value of United Nations panels and training seminars in various fields of space application and hopes that Member States will continue to offer to serve as hosts to these panels and training seminars with a view to the widest possible spread of information and sharing of costs in this new area of development, especially that of the developing countries;

22. *Commends* to the attention of Member States the questionnaire, recently communicated to them for their reply, which has been prepared for the purpose of facilitating future planning of a more effective United Nations programme on space applications with particular regard to the needs of the developing countries for assistance in this field;

23. *Recommends* that, in accordance with paragraph 57 of the report of the Committee on the Peaceful Uses of Outer Space, the specialized agencies, such as the International Telecommunication Union, the International Civil Aviation Organization and the Inter-Governmental Maritime Consultative Organization, having existing responsibilities or programmes of studies pertaining to the geostationary orbit, should provide the Scientific and Technical Sub-Committee at its next session with background information brought up to date on the subject;

24. *Approves* continuing sponsorship by the United Nations of the Thumba Equatorial Rocket Launching Station in India and the CELPA Mar del Plata Station in Argentina, expresses its satisfaction at the work being carried out at those ranges in relation to the use of sounding rocket facilities for international co-operation and training in the peaceful and scientific exploration of outer space, and recommends that Member States should continue to give consideration to the use of those facilities for space research activities;

25. *Recalls* the principles governing the operation of such United Nations-sponsored facilities as set forth in the report of the Committee on the Peaceful

<sup>5</sup> U.N. doc. A/AC.105/125. [Footnote in original.]

<sup>6</sup> U.N. doc. A/AC.105/131. [Footnote in original.]

Uses of Outer Space in 1962<sup>7</sup> and originally endorsed by the General Assembly in resolution 1802 (XVII);

26. *Agrees* with the Committee on the Peaceful Uses of Outer Space, as set out in paragraph 45 of its report, that proper co-ordination is necessary for activities within the United Nations system relating to the peaceful uses of outer space;

27. *Recalls* its interest in receiving information concerning discussions in the Inter-Governmental Maritime Consultative Organization regarding the use of maritime satellites, particularly in view of the International Conference on the Establishment of an International Maritime Satellite System, scheduled to take place in 1975;

28. *Reiterates* its request to the World Meteorological Organization to pursue actively the implementation of its tropical cyclone project, while continuing and intensifying its other related action programmes, including the World Weather Watch and, especially, the efforts being undertaken towards obtaining basic meteorological data and discovering ways and means to mitigate the harmful effects of tropical storms and to remove or minimize their destructive potential, and looks forward to its report thereon in accordance with General Assembly resolutions 2914 (XXVII) of 9 November 1972 and 3182 (XXVIII) of 18 December 1973;

29. *Notes with appreciation* that the specialized agencies, in particular the World Meteorological Organization, the International Telecommunication Union, the United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization, the Food and Agriculture Organization of the United Nations and the Inter-Governmental Maritime Consultative Organization, have continued to take an active part in the United Nations programme for the promotion of international co-operation in the peaceful uses of outer space, including the practical application of space technology;

30. *Requests* the specialized agencies and the International Atomic Energy Agency to continue, as appropriate, to provide the Committee on the Peaceful Uses of Outer Space with progress reports on their work relating to the peaceful uses of outer space and to examine, and report thereon to the Committee, the particular problems that may arise from the use of outer space in the fields within their competence and that should, in their opinion, be brought to the attention of the Committee;

31. *Requests* the Committee on the Peaceful Uses of Outer Space to continue its work, as set out in the present and previous resolutions of the General Assembly, and to report to the Assembly at its thirtieth session.

<sup>7</sup> *Official Records of the General Assembly, Seventeenth Session, Annexes, agenda item 27, document A/5181. [Footnote in original.]*

## RESOLUTION 3235 (XXIX)<sup>8</sup>

### *Convention on Registration of Objects Launched into Outer Space*

*The General Assembly,*

*Reaffirming* the importance of international co-operation in the field of the exploration and peaceful uses of outer space, including the Moon and other celestial bodies, and of promoting the law in this new field of human endeavour,

*Desiring*, in the light of the Treaty on Principles Governing the Activities of States in the Exploration and Use of Outer Space, including the Moon and Other Celestial Bodies, the Agreement on the Rescue of Astronauts, the Return of Astronauts and the Return of Objects Launched into Outer Space and the Convention on International Liability for Damage Caused by Space Objects, to make provision for registration by launching States of space objects launched into outer space with a view, *inter alia*, to providing States with additional means and procedures to assist in the identification of space objects,

*Bearing in mind* its resolution 3182 (XXVIII) of 18 December 1973, in which it requested the Committee on the Peaceful Uses of Outer Space to consider as a matter of priority the completion of the text of the draft Convention on Registration of Objects Launched into Outer Space,

*Having considered* the report of the Committee on the Peaceful Uses of Outer Space,

*Noting with satisfaction* that the Committee on the Peaceful Uses of Outer Space and its Legal Sub-Committee have completed the text of the draft Convention on Registration of Objects Launched into Outer Space,

1. *Commends* the Convention on Registration of Objects Launched into Outer Space, the text of which is annexed to the present resolution;

2. *Requests* the Secretary-General to open the Convention for signature and ratification at the earliest possible date;

3. *Expresses its hope* for the widest possible adherence to this Convention.

### ANNEX

#### CONVENTION ON REGISTRATION OF OBJECTS LAUNCHED INTO OUTER SPACE

*The States Parties to this Convention,*

*Recognizing* the common interest of all mankind in furthering the exploration and use of outer space for peaceful purposes,

*Recalling* that the Treaty on Principles Governing the Activities of States in the Exploration and Use of Outer Space, including the Moon and Other

<sup>8</sup> Adopted by the Assembly on Nov. 12 (text from U.N. doc. A/9812).

Celestial Bodies of 27 January 1967 affirms that States shall bear international responsibility for their national activities in outer space and refers to the State on whose registry an object launched into outer space is carried.

*Recalling also* that the Agreement on the Rescue of Astronauts, the Return of Astronauts and the Return of Objects Launched into Outer Space of 22 April 1968 provides that a launching authority shall, upon request, furnish identifying data prior to the return of an object it has launched into outer space found beyond the territorial limits of the launching authority.

*Recalling further* that the Convention on International Liability for Damage Caused by Space Objects of 29 March 1972 establishes international rules and procedures concerning the liability of launching States for damage caused by their space objects.

*Desiring*, in the light of the Treaty on Principles Governing the Activities of States in the Exploration and Use of Outer Space, including the Moon and Other Celestial Bodies, to make provision for the national registration by launching States of space objects launched into outer space.

*Desiring further* that a central register of objects launched into outer space be established and maintained, on a mandatory basis, by the Secretary-General of the United Nations.

*Desiring also* to provide for States Parties additional means and procedures to assist in the identification of space objects.

*Believing* that a mandatory system of registering objects launched into outer space would, in particular, assist in their identification and would contribute to the application and development of international law governing the exploration and use of outer space.

*Have agreed on the following:*

#### *Article I*

For the purposes of this Convention:

(a) The term "launching State" means:

(i) A State which launches or procures the launching of a space object;

(ii) A State from whose territory or facility a space object is launched;

(b) The term "space object" includes component parts of a space object as well as its launch vehicle and parts thereof;

(c) The term "State of registry" means a launching State on whose registry a space object is carried in accordance with article II.

#### *Article II*

1. When a space object is launched into earth orbit or beyond, the launching State shall register the space object by means of an entry in an appropriate registry which it shall maintain. Each launch-

ing State shall inform the Secretary-General of the United Nations of the establishment of such a registry.

2. Where there are two or more launching States in respect of any such space object, they shall jointly determine which one of them shall register the object in accordance with paragraph 1 of this article, bearing in mind the provisions of article VIII of the Treaty on Principles Governing the Activities of States in the Exploration and Use of Outer Space, including the Moon and Other Celestial Bodies, and without prejudice to appropriate agreements concluded or to be concluded among the launching States on jurisdiction and control over the space object and over any personnel thereof.

3. The contents of each registry and the conditions under which it is maintained shall be determined by the State of registry concerned.

#### *Article III*

1. The Secretary-General of the United Nations shall maintain a Register in which the information furnished in accordance with article IV shall be recorded.

2. There shall be full and open access to the information in this Register.

#### *Article IV*

1. Each State of registry shall furnish to the Secretary-General of the United Nations, as soon as practicable, the following information concerning each space object carried on its registry:

(a) Name of launching State or States;

(b) An appropriate designator of the space object or its registration number;

(c) Date and territory or location of launch;

(d) Basic orbital parameters, including:

(i) Nodal period,

(ii) Inclination,

(iii) Apogee,

(iv) Perigee;

(e) General function of the space object.

2. Each State of registry may, from time to time, provide the Secretary-General of the United Nations with additional information concerning a space object carried on its registry.

3. Each State of registry shall notify the Secretary-General of the United Nations, to the greatest extent feasible and as soon as practicable, of space objects concerning which it has previously transmitted information, and which have been but no longer are in earth orbit.

#### *Article V*

Whenever a space object launched into earth orbit or beyond is marked with the designator or registration number referred to in article IV, paragraph 1 (b), or both, the State of registry shall notify the

Secretary-General of this fact when submitting the information regarding the space object in accordance with article IV. In such case, the Secretary-General of the United Nations shall record this notification in the Register.

#### *Article VI*

Where the application of the provisions of this Convention has not enabled a State Party to identify a space object which has caused damage to it or to any of its natural or juridical persons, or which may be of a hazardous or deleterious nature, other States Parties, including in particular States possessing space monitoring and tracking facilities, shall respond to the greatest extent feasible to a request by that State Party, or transmitted through the Secretary-General on its behalf, for assistance under equitable and reasonable conditions in the identification of the object. A State Party making such a request shall, to the greatest extent feasible, submit information as to the time, nature and circumstances of the event giving rise to the request. Arrangements under which such assistance shall be rendered shall be the subject of agreement between the parties concerned.

#### *Article VII*

1. In this Convention, with the exception of articles VIII to XII inclusive, references to States shall be deemed to apply to any international intergovernmental organization which conducts space activities if the organization declares its acceptance of the rights and obligations provided for in this Convention and if a majority of the States members of the organization are States Parties to this Convention and to the Treaty on Principles Governing the Activities of States in the Exploration and Use of Outer Space, including the Moon and Other Celestial Bodies.

2. States members of any such organization which are States Parties to this Convention shall take all appropriate steps to ensure that the organization makes a declaration in accordance with paragraph 1 of this article.

#### *Article VIII*

1. This Convention shall be open for signature by all States at United Nations Headquarters in New York. Any State which does not sign this Convention before its entry into force in accordance with paragraph 3 of this article may accede to it at any time.

2. This Convention shall be subject to ratification by signatory States. Instruments of ratification and instruments of accession shall be deposited with the Secretary-General of the United Nations.

3. This Convention shall enter into force among the States which have deposited instruments of ratification on the deposit of the fifth such instrument

with the Secretary-General of the United Nations.

4. For States whose instruments of ratification or accession are deposited subsequent to the entry into force of this Convention, it shall enter into force on the date of the deposit of their instruments of ratification or accession.

5. The Secretary-General shall promptly inform all signatory and acceding States of the date of each signature, the date of deposit of each instrument of ratification or accession to this Convention, the date of its entry into force and other notices.

#### *Article IX*

Any State Party to this Convention may propose amendments to the Convention. Amendments shall enter into force for each State Party to the Convention accepting the amendments upon their acceptance by a majority of the States Parties to the Convention and thereafter for each remaining State Party to the Convention on the date of acceptance by it.

#### *Article X*

Ten years after the entry into force of this Convention, the question of the review of the Convention shall be included in the provisional agenda of the United Nations General Assembly in order to consider, in the light of past application of the Convention, whether it requires revision. However, at any time after the Convention has been in force for five years, at the request of one third of the States Parties to the Convention and with the concurrence of the majority of the States Parties, a conference of the States Parties shall be convened to review this Convention. Such review shall take into account in particular any relevant technological developments, including those relating to the identification of space objects.

#### *Article XI*

Any State Party to this Convention may give notice of its withdrawal from the Convention one year after its entry into force by written notification to the Secretary-General of the United Nations. Such withdrawal shall take effect one year from the date of receipt of this notification.

#### *Article XII*

The original of this Convention, of which the Arabic, Chinese, English, French, Russian and Spanish texts are equally authentic, shall be deposited with the Secretary-General of the United Nations, who shall send certified copies thereof to all signatory and acceding States.

IN WITNESS WHEREOF the undersigned, being duly authorized thereto by their respective Governments, have signed this Convention, opened for signature at New York on \_\_\_\_\_.

## U.S. Opposes U.N. Resolutions on Question of Palestine

*Following is a statement made in the U.N. General Assembly by U.S. Representative John Scali on November 21, together with the texts of resolutions adopted by the Assembly on November 22.*

### STATEMENT BY AMBASSADOR SCALI

USUN press release 176 dated November 21

The question of Palestine, as the speakers who have preceded me have amply demonstrated, has commanded more attention from the United Nations than almost any other single issue. The United Nations has not resolved the basic conflict in the Middle East, but it has limited the terrible consequences of this dispute. As we once again confront this issue, it is fitting that we remind ourselves of the long and honorable history of the U.N.'s efforts to maintain the peace. We also should pay tribute to those who serve in the U.N. peace forces in the area and to those who provide humanitarian assistance to the victims of war.

We must not forget the thousands of human beings who have suffered and who continue to suffer from this conflict.

Those who seek a genuine resolution of the Middle East problem must keep ever in mind the continuing plight of people who have left their homes because of this conflict and have been unable to return. Continuing efforts by the international community to alleviate the hardships of these people are essential, but these efforts alone are not a solution.

Only a just and lasting solution of the Arab-Israeli dispute can halt the killing, stop the suffering, and heal the wounds. The goal of this organization must be to seek ways to promote movement to that end while

avoiding any measure which might make such movement more difficult.

Last year's outbreak of war in the Middle East demonstrated for the fourth time in a quarter century that military force cannot resolve the issues which divide Arab and Israeli. It must be clear by now that more violence cannot bring peace. It will only intensify hatreds, complicate differences, and add to the sum of human misery.

The sole alternative to the sterile pursuit of change through violence is negotiation. This path is less dramatic, but in the end it is far more likely to produce acceptable change. The great achievement of the past year has been that the parties to the conflict have at last accepted this alternative and that they have for the first time begun to make it work. A landmark in this effort, and in Arab-Israeli relations, is set forth in Security Council Resolution 338, in which the Security Council for the first time called for immediate negotiations "between the parties concerned under appropriate auspices aimed at establishing a just and durable peace."

The acceptance by the parties of the negotiating process set in motion by Resolution 338 has led to the convening of the Geneva Peace Conference and to the subsequent, successful efforts to negotiate separate disengagement agreements between the forces of Egypt and Israel, and Syria and Israel. In each of these disengagement agreements the parties reaffirmed their acceptance of the principle of a step-by-step negotiated settlement. They did so by agreeing to include the following statement as the final paragraph of each accord:

This agreement is not regarded . . . as a final peace agreement. It constitutes a first step toward a final, just and durable peace according to the provisions of Security Council Resolution 338 and within the framework of the Geneva Conference.

The consequences of a possible breakdown in this negotiating process cannot be over-emphasized. War has ravaged the Middle East four times in 26 years because people did not believe that constructive dialogue between the parties was possible. A fifth war would threaten the security of every country and produce no permanent gains for any.

The primary objective of the U.S. Government therefore has been to maintain the momentum of the negotiating process. Secretary Kissinger recently returned from a visit to the Middle East where he explored with every leader he consulted in the area the vital question of how to continue building on the progress already achieved. The answer to this paramount question still hangs in the balance.

If the negotiating process is to continue, each party must remain committed to negotiating. Each must be prepared to accept a negotiated peace with the others, and each must be prepared to see decisions on how to proceed evolve through understandings among the parties. This is how the Geneva Peace Conference was convened, under the cochairmanship of the Soviet Union and the United States. This is why, when the parties agreed to attend that conference, they also agreed that the role of other participants would be discussed at the conference.

The foundation of such steps toward peace is the acceptance by all parties of the principles of Resolution 338—to engage in the give-and-take of negotiation with the objective of achieving a permanent peace settlement among them on a basis that all parties can accept. If any of the parties rejects this governing principle or questions the right to exist of any of the parties to the negotiation, our best hopes for negotiation and for peace are lost. Certainly it must be understood by all that Israel has a right to exist as a sovereign, independent state within secure and recognized boundaries.

In the course of this debate there have been speakers who have sought to equate terror with revolution, who profess to see no difference between the slaughter of innocents and a struggle for national liberation.

There are those who wish to compare the American Revolution and the many other wars of liberation of the past 200 years with indiscriminate terrorism.

If there were instances during the American Revolution where innocent people suffered, there was no instance where the revolutionary leadership boasted of or condoned such crimes. There were no victims, on either side, of a deliberate policy of terror. Those who molded our nation and fought for our freedom never succumbed to the easy excuse that the end justifies the means.

We hope that all member nations will reaffirm their support for a negotiated settlement in the Middle East and their support for Security Council Resolutions 242 and 338. We know that these resolutions are the basis on which progress so far has been possible. We believe they remain the best hope for continued progress. To seek to alter them not only risks dangerous delay but could destroy prospects for peace in the foreseeable future.

Certainly we can all accept the fact that negotiations can take place only when the parties are willing to negotiate. My government is convinced—and the successes of the past year strengthen our conviction—that the only way to keep the parties committed to negotiations is to move forward through a series of agreements, each substantial enough to represent significant progress, yet each limited enough for governments and peoples to assimilate and accept. Each of these steps helps attitudes to evolve, creates new confidence, and establishes new situations in which still further steps can be taken. With this approach, the parties have, over the past year, succeeded in taking the first substantial steps in decades toward reconciling their differences.

It is my government's firm conviction that the way to move toward a situation more responsive to Palestinian interests is not through new resolutions or dramatic parliamentary maneuvers, but by weaving the Palestinian interests into the give-and-take of the negotiating process. Through this evolutionary process, Palestinian interests can



be better reflected in the new situations which are created.

The U.S. Government thus believes that the most important contribution this Assembly can now make toward resolving the issue before us is to help establish an international climate in which the parties will be encouraged to maintain the momentum toward peace. We are equally convinced that the legitimate interests of the Palestinian people can be promoted in this negotiating process and that these negotiations will lead to a just and lasting peace for all peoples in the Middle East.

## TEXTS OF RESOLUTIONS

### Resolution 3236 (XXIX)<sup>1</sup>

#### *Question of Palestine*

*The General Assembly,*

*Having considered* the question of Palestine,

*Having heard* the statement of the Palestine Liberation Organization, the representative of the Palestinian people,

*Having also heard* other statements made during the debate,

*Deeply concerned* that no just solution to the problem of Palestine has yet been achieved and recognizing that the problem of Palestine continues to endanger international peace and security,

*Recognizing* that the Palestinian people is entitled to self-determination in accordance with the Charter of the United Nations,

*Expressing its grave concern* that the Palestinian people has been prevented from enjoying its inalienable rights, in particular its right to self-determination,

*Guided* by the purposes and principles of the Charter,

*Recalling* its relevant resolutions which affirm the right of the Palestinian people to self-determination,

1. *Reaffirms* the inalienable rights of the Palestinian people in Palestine, including:

(a) The right to self-determination without external interference;

(b) The right to national independence and sovereignty;

2. *Reaffirms also* the inalienable right of the Palestinians to return to their homes and property from

which they have been displaced and uprooted, and calls for their return;

3. *Emphasizes* that full respect for and the realization of these inalienable rights of the Palestinian people are indispensable for the solution of the question of Palestine;

4. *Recognizes* that the Palestinian people is a principal party in the establishment of a just and durable peace in the Middle East;

5. *Further recognizes* the right of the Palestinian people to regain its rights by all means in accordance with the purposes and principles of the Charter of the United Nations;

6. *Appeals* to all States and international organizations to extend their support to the Palestinian people in its struggle to restore its rights, in accordance with the Charter;

7. *Requests* the Secretary-General to establish contacts with the Palestine Liberation Organization on all matters concerning the question of Palestine;

8. *Requests* the Secretary-General to report to the General Assembly at its thirtieth session on the implementation of the present resolution;

9. *Decides* to include the item entitled "Question of Palestine" in the provisional agenda of its thirtieth session.

### Resolution 3237 (XXIX)<sup>2</sup>

#### *Observer status*

#### *for the Palestine Liberation Organization*

*The General Assembly,*

*Having considered* the question of Palestine,

*Taking into consideration* the universality of the United Nations prescribed in the Charter,

*Recalling* its resolution 3102 (XXVIII) of 12 December 1973,

*Taking into account* Economic and Social Council resolutions 1835 (LVI) of 14 May 1974 and 1840 (LVI) of 15 May 1974,

*Noting* that the Diplomatic Conference on the Reaffirmation and Development of International Humanitarian Law Applicable in Armed Conflicts, the World Population Conference and the World Food Conference have in effect invited the Palestine Liberation Organization to participate in their respective deliberations,

*Noting also* that the Third United Nations Conference on the Law of the Sea has invited the Palestine Liberation Organization to participate in its deliberations as an observer,

1. *Invites* the Palestine Liberation Organization to participate in the sessions and the work of the General Assembly in the capacity of observer;

<sup>1</sup> U.N. doc. A/RES/3236 (XXIX); adopted by the Assembly on Nov. 22 by a vote of 89 to 8 (U.S.), with 37 abstentions.

<sup>2</sup> U.N. doc. A/RES/3237 (XXIX); adopted by the Assembly on Nov. 22 by a vote of 95 to 17 (U.S.), with 19 abstentions.

2. *Invites* the Palestine Liberation Organization to participate in the sessions and the work of all international conferences convened under the auspices of the General Assembly in the capacity of observer;

3. *Considers* that the Palestine Liberation Organization is entitled to participate as an observer in the sessions and the work of all international conferences convened under the auspices of other organs of the United Nations;

4. *Requests* the Secretary-General to take the necessary steps for the implementation of the present resolution.

## TREATY INFORMATION

### Current Actions

#### MULTILATERAL

##### Energy

Agreement on an international energy program. Done at Paris November 18, 1974. Enters into force on the 10th day following the day on which at least six states holding at least 60 percent of the combined voting weights have deposited a notification of consent to be bound or an instrument of accession; applicable provisionally by all signatory states, to the extent possible not inconsistent with their legislation, as from 18th November, 1974.

*Signatures:* Austria, Belgium, Canada, Denmark, Federal Republic of Germany, Ireland, Italy, Japan, Luxembourg, Netherlands, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland, Turkey, United Kingdom, United States.

##### Telecommunications

International telecommunication convention with annexes and protocols. Done at Malaga-Torremolinos October 25, 1973.<sup>1</sup>

*Accession deposited:* Bahrain, October 21, 1974.

##### Wheat

Protocol modifying and extending the wheat trade convention (part of the international wheat agreement) 1971. Done at Washington April 2, 1974. Entered into force June 19, 1974, with respect to certain provisions; July 1, 1974, with respect to other provisions.

*Ratification deposited:* Brazil, November 25, 1974.

##### Wills

Convention providing a uniform law on the form of an international will, with annex. Done at Washington October 26, 1973.<sup>1</sup>

*Signature:* France, November 29, 1974.

#### BILATERAL

##### Egypt

Agreement amending the agreement for sales of agricultural commodities of June 7, 1974 (TIAS 7855). Effected by exchange of notes at Cairo November 10, 1974. Entered into force November 10, 1974.

##### Viet-Nam

Agreement amending the agreement for sales of agricultural commodities of August 29, 1972 (TIAS 7452). Effected by exchange of notes at Saigon November 11, 1974. Entered into force November 11, 1974.

Agreement amending the agreement for sales of agricultural commodities of November 9, 1973 (TIAS 7768). Effected by exchange of notes at Saigon November 11, 1974. Entered into force November 11, 1974.

<sup>1</sup> Not in force.

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Press Releases: November 25–December 1**

Press releases may be obtained from the Office of Press Relations, Department of State, Washington, D.C. 20520.

Releases issued prior to November 25 which appear in this issue of the BULLETIN are Nos. 477 of November 5, and 510 of November 22.

No.	Date	Subject
†511	11/25	Kissinger: news conference, Vladivostok, Nov. 24.
†511A	11/25	Kissinger: news conference, Vladivostok, Nov. 24.
†512	11/25	Kissinger: remarks to press, Tokyo.
†513	11/26	Kissinger, Chiao Kuan-Hua: exchange of toasts, Peking, Nov. 25.
†514	11/29	Kissinger, Chiao Kuan-Hua: exchange of toasts, Peking, Nov. 28.

† Held for a later issue of the BULLETIN.

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# THE DEPARTMENT OF STATE BULLETIN

Volume LXXI • No. 1852 • December 23, 1974

PRESIDENT FORD'S VISIT TO JAPAN, THE REPUBLIC OF KOREA,  
AND THE SOVIET UNION

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**THE OFFICIAL WEEKLY RECORD OF UNITED STATES FOREIGN POLICY**

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# THE DEPARTMENT OF STATE BULLETIN

VOL. LXXI, No. 1852  
December 23, 1974

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*The Department of State BULLETIN, a weekly publication issued by the Office of Media Services, Bureau of Public Affairs, provides the public and interested agencies of the government with information on developments in the field of U.S. foreign relations and on the work of the Department and the Foreign Service.*

*The BULLETIN includes selected press releases on foreign policy, issued by the White House and the Department, and statements, addresses, and news conferences of the President and the Secretary of State and other officers of the Department, as well as special articles on various phases of international affairs and the functions of the Department. Information is included concerning treaties and international agreements to which the United States is or may become a party and on treaties of general international interest.*

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U.S. Government Printing Office  
Washington, D.C. 20402

**PRICE:**

52 issues plus semiannual indexes,  
domestic \$29.80, foreign \$37.25  
Single copy 60 cents

Use of funds for printing this publication approved by the Director of the Office of Management and Budget (January 29, 1971).

**Note:** Contents of this publication are not copyrighted and items contained herein may be reprinted. Citation of the DEPARTMENT OF STATE BULLETIN as the source will be appreciated. The BULLETIN is indexed in the Readers' Guide to Periodical Literature.

## President Ford's News Conference of December 2

*Following are excerpts relating to foreign policy from the transcript of a news conference held by President Ford in the auditorium of the Executive Office Building on December 2.<sup>1</sup>*

*President Ford:* Good evening. Perhaps I can anticipate some of your questions by summarizing my recent visits to Japan, the Republic of Korea, and the Soviet Union.

In Japan, we succeeded in establishing a new era of relations between our two countries. We demonstrated our continuing commitment to the independence and to the security of South Korea. At Vladivostok we put a firm ceiling on the strategic arms race, which heretofore has eluded us since the nuclear age began. I believe this is something for which future generations will thank us.

Finally, Secretary Kissinger's mission maintained the momentum in China with the People's Republic of China.

My meetings at Vladivostok with General Secretary Brezhnev were a valuable opportunity to review Soviet-American relations and chart their future course. Although this was our original purpose, Secretary Brezhnev and I found it possible to go beyond this get-acquainted stage.

Building on the achievements of the past three years, we agreed that the prospects were favorable for more substantial and, may I say, very intensive negotiations on the primary issue of a limitation of strategic arms.

In the end, we agreed on the general framework for a new agreement that will last

through 1985. We agreed it is realistic to aim at completing this agreement next year. This is possible because we made major breakthroughs on two critical issues:

—Number one, we agreed to put a ceiling of 2,400 each on the total number of intercontinental ballistic missiles, submarine-launched missiles, and heavy bombers.

—Two, we agreed to limit the number of missiles that can be armed with multiple warheads, MIRV's. Of each side's total of 2,400, 1,320 can be so armed.

These ceilings are well below the force levels which would otherwise have been expected over the next 10 years and very substantially below the forces which would result from an all-out arms race over that same period.

What we have done is to set firm and equal limits on the strategic forces of each side, thus preventing an arms race with all its terror, instability, war-breeding tension, and economic waste.

We have, in addition, created the solid basis from which future arms reductions can be made and, hopefully, will be negotiated.

It will take more detailed negotiations to convert this agreed framework into a comprehensive accord, but we have made a long step toward peace on a basis of equality, the only basis on which an agreement was possible.

Beyond this, our improved relations with the other nations of Asia developed on this journey will continue to serve the interests of the United States and the cause of peace for months to come. Economy, energy, security, and trade relations were discussed, which will be of mutual benefit to us all.

<sup>1</sup> For the complete transcript, see Weekly Compilation of Presidential Documents dated Dec. 9, 1974.

I would like to repeat publicly my thanks and gratitude for the hospitality extended to me by all of my hosts and, through me, to the American people.

Miss Thomas [Helen Thomas, United Press International], I am glad to respond to your question.

*Q. Mr. President, this pact permits the nuclear buildup to go ahead. Since you want to cut government spending, how many billions of dollars will this cost the American people over the years, and also, do you think that the Russians stalled last July because they knew that Mr. Nixon was doomed in the Presidency and preferred to deal with his successor?*

*President Ford:* I would like to correct, if I might, one impression. This does not permit an agreed buildup. It puts a cap on future buildups, and it actually reduces a part of the buildup at the present time.

It is important, I should say, however, in order for us to maintain equality, which is a keystone of this program, to have an adequate amount of military expenditures. But I can say this without hesitation or qualification: If we had not had this agreement, it would have required the United States to substantially increase its military expenditures in the strategic areas.

So, we put a cap on the arms race. We actually made some reductions below present programs. It is a good agreement, and I think that the American people will buy it, because it provides for equality and it provides for a negotiated reduction in several years ahead.

Mr. Cormier [Frank Cormier, Associated Press].

*Q. Mr. President, there are reports that you and Mr. Brezhnev made some progress in maybe fashioning a complementary approach to negotiations in the Middle East. More specifically, perhaps the Soviets would agree to try to persuade the PLO [Palestine Liberation Organization] to acknowledge that Israel has a right to exist, and we then might try to persuade Israel to talk to the PLO. Is there any truth to this?*

*President Ford:* Mr. Cormier, Mr. Brezhnev and I did discuss at some length our different views on the settlement of the Middle East. There are some differences, but they are not as major as it would appear.

We indicated that, in our judgment, it was important for continuous progress to be made, perhaps with negotiations between Israel and one or more of the other Arab nations.

We also agreed that at a certain point a Geneva Conference might be the final answer. So, as we discussed our what appeared to be different views at the outset, I think we came to an agreement that it was in the interest of the nations in the Middle East, the interest of the world at large, that both parties make a maximum effort to keep negotiations going.

We think our step-by-step approach is the right one for the time being, but we don't preclude the possibility of a Geneva Conference.

Yes, sir.

*Q. You say that this is going to reduce a part of the buildup. Does that mean, then, that we are going to spend less on defense next year than we are spending this year?*

*President Ford:* It does not mean that, because only a part of our total defense program is related to strategic arms research, development, deployment, and operations and maintenance. We do have an obligation within the limits of 2,400 on delivery systems and 1,320 on MIRV's to keep our forces up to that level.

And I think we can, with about the same expenditure level for the next fiscal year as at the present.

But in the other programs, in our tactical forces and other military programs, there is an inflationary cost. The military has that inflation just like you and I do, so we will probably have to increase our military budget next year just to take care of the costs of inflation.

Yes.

*Q. Just to follow up, we are not quite to that ceiling yet, are we? Do you intend to*



*stay below that ceiling, or are you going to try to reach that ceiling?*

*President Ford:* I intend to stay below the ceiling. That is the agreement, but we do have an obligation to stay up to that ceiling, and the budget that I will recommend will keep our strategic forces either up to or aimed at that objective.

*Q. Mr. President, since it is widely believed the Soviet Union has larger rockets capable of carrying heavier payloads and being MIRV'ed to a larger extent, carrying more warheads, can you tell us what the relative position would be between the United States and the Soviet Union in terms of warheads if each side goes to the maximum number of 1,320 on the MIRV'ed limit?*

*President Ford:* On delivery systems, we are equal. On the MIRV'ing, we are equal. I think the question you are asking is throw weight. It is recognized that the Soviet Union has a heavier throw weight, but the agreement does not preclude the United States from increasing its throw-weight capability.

A number of years ago, our military decided that we wanted smaller missiles that were more accurate. That has been the decision of our military.

Now, if the military decides at the present time that they want to increase the throw weight, we have that right under the agreement, and I can tell you that we have the capability to do so.

So, if there is an inequality in throw weight, it can be remedied if our military recommended and the Congress appropriates the money.

*Q. Mr. President, if you find the Soviet Union leaning, then, toward getting the maximum throw weight or the maximum number of warheads on their MIRV missiles, would you then recommend that the United States accelerate and move from smaller missiles to larger ones?*

*President Ford:* The Soviet military guidelines were for heavier missiles, heavier throw weight. Our military took a different point

of view some years ago. The Soviet Union is limited as to delivery systems and as to MIRV's within the delivery systems. They cannot go beyond those.

The agreement gives us the flexibility to move up in throw weight if we want to. It does not preclude the Soviets from increasing throw weight, but I think for good reasons they have no justification for doing so.

Yes, Mr. Sperling [Godfrey Sperling, Christian Science Monitor].

*Q. Wouldn't your stated accomplishments in Russia have carried more long-range credibility if they had been put initially and then described later on in less sanguine and more modest terms?*

*President Ford:* Well, if I understand the question, when I came back a week ago yesterday, we did not have in writing what is called an aide memoire, which was the specific agreement in writing that General Secretary Brezhnev and I had agreed to verbally. That has now been received.

Until that had been received and we had checked it out, we felt it was wise to speak in generalities. I am giving to you and to the American people tonight the specific figures. They are, I think, constructive. It is a good agreement. It is an agreement—if I might repeat—that puts a cap on the arms race, it makes some reductions, and it gives us an opportunity to negotiate.

So, I don't think a week's delay in the specifics has handicapped our presentation.

*Q. More specifically, what percentage of the state of progress in Russia was yours, and how much was Mr. Nixon's?*

*President Ford:* Well, I don't really think I ought to get into an evaluation of that. The United States has been working on a strategic arms limitation agreement for three or four years. I think we made headway in SALT One. I think we have made a real breakthrough in SALT Two.

*Q. Mr. President, I would like to get back to the cost of missiles for one moment, if we may. I understand we are now spending about \$15 billion a year in strategic arms,*

*and there is an enormous amount of missile building to be done under this agreement over the next 10 years, both in MIRV's and in throw weight. Will our costs continue at about the level they are now for the next 10 years, or will it be more?*

*President Ford:* My best judgment is that our strategic arms cost will hold relatively the same. It will not be substantially expanded other than for any increase resulting from inflation.

Yes.

*Q. Mr. President, under the agreement the U.S. tactical nuclear weapons at the forward bases in Europe were not included. Do you expect that they will be reduced or eliminated under some future mutual balanced force reduction agreement with the Soviet Union?*

*President Ford:* One of the very significant benefits of the agreement from Vladivostok was the fact we didn't have to include in the 2,400 or the 1,320—either the delivery systems or the MIRV's—as far as the forward-base systems were concerned.

I am sure you know we are involved in mutual balanced force reductions in Western Europe. When we get closer to an agreement there—and I hope we will; we are presently negotiating in Vienna in this area—it is hopeful that we can make some reductions both in numbers of military personnel between ourselves and the allies on the one side and the Warsaw Pact nations and the Soviet Union on the other, as well as any arms reductions.

*Q. Beyond your hope, is that a commitment that you made to the Soviet leaders in Vladivostok?*

*President Ford:* No, we made no agreement concerning the mutual balanced force reductions. We did agree to continue negotiations.

*Q. Mr. President, are you satisfied that the Soviets are carrying out the spirit and the letter of the 1972 arms limitation agreements?*

*President Ford:* We know of no violations, either on the part of the Soviet Union or by ourselves. There have been some allegations that the Soviet Union has violated the SALT One agreement. We don't think they have.

There are, however, some ambiguities. When the SALT One agreement was agreed to, there was established a Standing Consultative Commission made up of the Soviet Union and the United States. That Commission can meet twice a year to analyze any allegations as to violations of SALT One. It is our intention to call for a meeting of that group—I think in January of next year—to analyze any of the ambiguities that have been alleged. We don't think there have been any violations, but I have a responsibility to find out, and we intend to follow through under the agreed procedure of the 1972 agreements.

*Q. Mr. President, since there is no limit in this agreement on throw weight, and since there is no limit on multiple warheads, and since additional multiple warheads could be put on the bigger missiles, more or less ad infinitum, how can you say that this is a lid or cap on the arms race?*

*President Ford:* Well, it certainly, number one, puts a limit on the delivery systems—2,400—and as I indicated at the outset, this does result in a cutback as far as the Soviet Union is concerned.

The 1,320 limitation on MIRV's does put a lid on the planned or programed program for ourselves as well as the Soviet Union.

Now, the throw-weight problem is one that we can remedy if we want to. Our military took a different point of view some years ago when they designed our ballistic missiles, but we have that flexibility.

Now, if we decide to go to a heavier throw weight, we can add on a MIRV'ed missile a greater number of individual warheads. That is a choice of flexibility that we have, and I think it is one of the benefits of this agreement.

*Q. You wouldn't describe that as an arms race?*

*President Ford:* Well, it is an attempt, if

our military wanted to achieve an equality in this particular area. We have equality on delivery systems and the right to MIRV from those delivery systems. In the other, if it is our choice, we can go up in throw weight.

Yes, Sarah [Sarah McLendon, McLendon News Service].

*Q. Mr. President, I want to ask you, what about conventional weapons? We have heard from Senator [Barry] Goldwater, and we have heard from Admiral Zumwalt [Adm. Elmo R. Zumwalt, Jr., former Chief of Naval Operations] that we are very weak on conventional weapons and we need more of those, rather than the kind that you have in your agreement.*

*President Ford:* Well, of course, this agreement, Sarah, was limited to strategic arms. We hope, as I indicated a moment ago, to continue our negotiations for the mutual balanced force reductions in Europe. That, of course, would have a limit on the conventional weapons.

In the meantime, I think it is of mandatory importance for the United States to maintain its conventional capability—the Army, the Navy, the Air Force, the Marines—because the United States, through a responsible military program, can maintain the peace. If we cut back our defense in conventional weapons, I think we will have weakened our position for the maintenance of peace. I don't intend to propose a budget in that regard.

*Q. Mr. President, do you think that we can do both of these, then?*

*President Ford:* I think so.

*Q. To follow up on Frank Cormier's question, did you and Mr. Brezhnev discuss some kind of a trade-off whereby Israel would deal with the PLO and the PLO would recognize Israel's right to exist as a state?*

*President Ford:* We didn't get into that detail. Israel has indicated that it would not negotiate with the PLO. We have no way of forcing them to do so.

The discussion between Mr. Brezhnev and

myself, as far as the Middle East was concerned, was to state our position and their position; and as we discussed it, I think we came to a higher degree of agreement in that our position was understood by them and the prospect of a Geneva agreement was understood by us.

*Q. I understand you would like to devote about half of the news conference to domestic affairs, and I think we are about at the halfway point.*

*Q. Mr. President, this question perhaps goes back to the earlier part of the news conference, but it has an economic impact—and that is how much it will cost to reach the ceiling which you negotiated with Mr. Brezhnev, and when do you expect that the United States will reach this ceiling?*

*President Ford:* As I indicated in answer to an earlier question, I think we must continue our present strategic research development, deployment, maintenance programs. And we are going to move into the present program some additional new weapons systems—the B-1 aircraft, the Trident submarine. The net result is that costs will probably go up as we phase out some and phase in some and phase out others. Now, the total annual cost will be relatively the same plus the cost of inflation.

*Q. Is it \$18 billion?*

*President Ford:* It is in that ball park.

*Q. And for how many years do you expect this to continue, Mr. President?*

*President Ford:* Until we are able to negotiate a reduction below the 2,400 delivery systems and the 1,320 MIRV systems.

*Q. To follow up the question that is reaching but is still in the economic ball park, if the ceiling works, will there ever be a saving, an actual saving, in expenditures for strategic weapons?*

*President Ford:* Very, very definitely, and that is the fundamental question that we

have answered. If there had been no ceiling of 2,400 on launchers and 1,320 on MIRV's, we would have had an arms race. The Soviet Union had plans and programs, we believe, to substantially increase the number of launchers and to substantially go beyond 1,320 on the MIRV's.

And we have the capability. And, I think, if there had been an arms race with the Soviet Union going higher and higher and higher, we as a nation, for our own security, would have been forced to do precisely the same.

So, Mr. Brezhnev and I agreed that we

first had to cap the arms race, both in launchers and in MIRV's. We have done that, and I wish to compliment Mr. Brezhnev because his opening statement, if I can paraphrase it, was that he and I, his country and ours, had an obligation to not indulge in an arms race, to put a cap on the proposed expenditures in both categories.

It was a statesmanlike approach at the outset, and because he believed that and because I believe it, I think we made substantial progress, and I strongly defend what we did.

*The press: Thank you, Mr. President.*

## President Ford Visits Japan, the Republic of Korea, and the Soviet Union

*President Ford made a state visit to Japan November 18-22, visited Korea November 22-23, and met with Leonid I. Brezhnev, General Secretary of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union, at Vladivostok November 23-24. Following are remarks and toasts by President Ford during the trip and the texts of joint communiques issued at Tokyo and Seoul, a joint U.S.-Soviet statement on limitation of strategic offensive arms issued at Vladivostok, and a joint U.S.-Soviet communique signed at Vladivostok.*

### DEPARTURE REMARKS, THE WHITE HOUSE, NOVEMBER 17

White House press release dated November 17

Let me just say a word or two, and at the outset thank all of my friends for coming out to see us off.

I think this trip has great significance, both as to timing and as to substance. We all live in an interrelated world; no longer can we, in the United States, think in the terms of isolationism. What we do overseas has great significance for some of the problems that we have here at home.

This, I think, can be defined as a quest for peace, to broaden it, to strengthen it; and as I said in Arizona earlier this week, I would rather travel 1,000 miles for peace than take a single step for war.

We are visiting three great countries. The first is Japan, the first visit of an American President, a state visit, to that great country. We have a special relationship with Japan, and although we are separated by the broadest of oceans, we have the closest of friendships.

We also will be stopping in the Republic of Korea, a courageous and brave ally, an ally that joins with us in preserving peace in that part of the world.

The trip to the Soviet Union has special significance. There has been a tremendous effort over the years to broaden an effort of peace throughout the world, and I look forward to participating in the ever-increasing strengthening of our ties with the Soviet Union.

I go with optimism. I think we, as Americans, can be optimistic about the progress that has been made and will be made. I go with a dedication of service to my fellow Americans and a pride in our great country.

Thank you very, very much.

## THE VISIT TO JAPAN

### **Toast at Luncheon Given by Kakuei Tanaka, Prime Minister of Japan, Tokyo, November 19**

White House press release (Tokyo) dated November 19

Mr. Prime Minister, Excellencies, gentlemen: The reception that I received upon arriving in Japan and the warm reception received during the day today is further proof of the great hospitality that the Japanese people have for the Americans.

This very kind and gracious hospitality—the warm reception—is typical of the attitude of the Japanese Government and the Japanese people. When I stopped in Anchorage on the way to Japan, the last words I said to my fellow Americans were that although Japan and the United States were separated by the broadest of oceans, they were on the other hand the warmest of friends.

Mr. Prime Minister, you spent many years in your Parliament, and I spent better than 25 years in the Congress of the United States. I have a great liking for the Congress. I called it my home outside home.

I can't speak with any personal relationship to the Congress a hundred-plus years ago when they were alleged to be lacking in civilization, but I would have to say in defense of the Congress today—whether I agree with what they do or not, they are better behaved. [Laughter.]

Let me assure you, Mr. Prime Minister, Mrs. Ford deeply regrets she is not with me on this trip. She had long looked forward to visiting Japan, meeting the Japanese people, and she is terribly disappointed that it is impossible for her to be here on this occasion. I spoke with her on the telephone this morning. That didn't help any, because of her desire to be here. But I can say that she is here in spirit, if not in person, and she will come on some other occasions.

Mr. Prime Minister, the United States is a nation of citizens with many backgrounds, many ancestors. Some of our very finest citizens have a Japanese ancestry. We are proud of the tremendous contributions that they make to a better America. We are proud of them because of the significant

contributions they have made to our culture, to our industry, to our trade, to our education, and to our government.

Mr. Prime Minister, the dialogue that we began in Washington and which we have continued here in Tokyo indicates that we have many, many basic ties and many areas of common purpose. We have many problems, but the frank and open discussions that we have had and will continue to have involving areas of prosperity on a worldwide basis and peace on a global basis are beneficial to your country and to ours and to the world as a whole.

Our two countries, by working together, can significantly contribute to world peace, and we will. Our two nations, cooperating with one another, can make a significant contribution to prosperity in both of our countries and to the world at large.

Mr. Prime Minister, we must discuss and coordinate our economic policies in an era of energy shortages and some international monetary crises. We must work together in order to produce and distribute, make available the need of mankind for food throughout the world.

Mr. Prime Minister, we must join together in helping those nations throughout the world that are less fortunate than we. We have in the past, and we will expand those efforts in the future.

In contemplating these problems, the expansion of peace and the betterment of the world economically, it is good to know that we can discuss the issues and problems in an attitude and an atmosphere of mutual understanding in a spirit of good will.

Mr. Prime Minister, let us join in a toast which honors the friendship and the collaboration between our people and our nations; this is a characterization of what is good for all and in the best interests of each. To Japan.

### **Toast at Banquet Given by the Emperor, The Imperial Palace, Tokyo, November 19**

White House press release (Tokyo) dated November 19

Your Majesty: I am honored to be the guest of Your Imperial Majesties, and it is

with a very deep sense of this special moment that I speak this evening.

The first state visit of an American President to Japan is an occasion of very great importance to all of us. Your gracious hospitality symbolically honors the 213 million Americans that I have the honor to represent. I can reassure Japan that the United States is determined to perpetuate the unique ties that link our two nations for the common good.

Though separated by the broadest of oceans, Your Majesty, we have achieved between our two nations the closest of friendships. Our relationship transcends that of governments and heads of states. Each year the ties binding Americans with Japanese increase: trade, science, culture, sports, and many other areas, including cherished personal contact between individuals.

We share a common devotion to moral and to spiritual strength. Our paths are not always identical, but they all lead in the same direction—that of world peace and harmonious relations among mankind.

Let us continue to seek understanding with each other and among all peoples, Your Majesty. Let us trade. Let us share and perpetuate the prosperity of both nations. Let us work together to solve common problems, recognizing the interdependence of the modern world in which we all live.

America, I can assure you, Your Majesty, is determined to do its part. It is in a spirit of respect, the spirit of admiration for the Japanese nation, in dedication of our continuing collaboration, and with sincere and deep-felt confidence in the future, that I offer a toast to the health and to the well-being of Your Imperial Majesties.

**Address Before the Japan Press Club,  
Imperial Hotel, Tokyo, November 20**

White House press release (Tokyo) dated November 20

As the first American President to visit Japan while in office, I greet you on this unprecedented occasion. I thank the Japanese Press Club for inviting me and the National Television Network of Japan for

the opportunity to speak directly to the people of Japan.

I deeply appreciate the excellent coverage of my visit by the exceptional news media of Japan. I have always sought a good working relationship with the American journalists and have the same feeling toward their Japanese colleagues. It has been my objective at all times to treat journalists and all other people in the same manner that I would like to be treated.

I bring the warmest greetings of the American people. Our bipartisan political leadership in the American Congress sends its very best wishes. The distinguished leaders of both of America's national political parties have asked me to tell you of the very high value that all Americans attach to our partnership with Japan.

It is the American custom for the President to make a report every year to the Congress on our state of the Union. In the same spirit, I thought the people of Japan might welcome a report on the state of another union—the unity of American and Japanese mutual aspirations for friendship as Americans see that relationship.

In my hometown of Grand Rapids, Michigan, a Japanese company is now assembling musical instruments. Not only are the instruments harmonious in the melodies they produce, but the labor-management relationship followed by the Japanese created a model of harmony between workers and business.

In a nearby community, Edmore, another Japanese firm is manufacturing small electrical motors. This is yet another Japanese enterprise that has injected new energy, new good will, in our industrial life. There are similar examples throughout America, and we welcome them.

The time has long passed when Americans speak only of what we contributed to your society. Today traffic flows in both directions. We are both learning from each other.

To signify the value the United States attaches to partnership with Japan, I chose this to make my first overseas trip. I also met with your Ambassador to the United States on the first day that I assumed office, August 9.

I have long admired the richness and the diversity of Japan's culture, the products of your industry, the ingenuity, creativity, and the energy of your people, your courage as a fountain of resourcefulness in a troubled world.

My only regret is that Mrs. Ford could not join me on this visit in response to your very kind invitation. We both hope that she can come at some later date.

Americans are very proud of the way that we and the Japanese have worked together during the postwar period. We have had some disagreements. But we have remained friends and we have remained partners. Together we created conditions under which both nations could prosper. Together we expanded our relations in trade and travel.

The reality of America's economic, political, and strategic interdependence with Japan is very obvious.

America is Japan's greatest customer and supplier. Japan is America's greatest overseas trading partner. Japan is the best foreign customer for America's agricultural products.

The total trade between our two nations has doubled since 1970. It will surpass \$20 billion in 1974. American investments in Japan are the largest of any foreign state. Japan's investment in America is growing rapidly and accounts for one-fifth of all Japanese investment abroad.

The flow of Japanese visitors to the United States has grown from some 50,000 in 1966 to over 700,000 in 1974. This is also a two-way street. Over 350,000 Americans visited Japan last year, accounting for nearly one-half of all foreign visitors.

Together we removed the legacies of World War II. The reversion of Okinawa eliminated the last vestige of that war from our agenda. We have made independent but mutually compatible efforts to improve our relations with the Soviet Union and the People's Republic of China. We have devised better channels for open consultation. I particularly want you to know that I understand the dangers of taking each other for granted.

As we talk to each other, we must ask

each other what we regard as the central needs of our times.

First, of course, is peace. Americans and Japanese know the value of peace. We want to devote our resources and ourselves to building things, not tearing them down. We do not want to send our sons into battle again.

The alliance between Japan and the United States has helped to secure peace and can continue to help secure it. That alliance is not directed against any other country. It does not prevent us from improving our relations with other countries.

Our alliance does not signify that both nations subscribe fully to identical attitudes or identical styles. It does signify, however, that we clearly share a common resolve to maintain stability in East Asia, to help in the development of other countries that need our help, and to work together to encourage diplomatic and political rather than military solutions to world problems.

Our alliance was forged by peoples who saw their national interest in friendship and in cooperation. I am confident that our relations will remain solid and very substantial. I pledge that we shall work to make it so.

Peace, however, cannot be our sole concern. We have learned that there are many international threats and dangers that can affect the lives of our citizens. We face dwindling supplies of raw materials and food. We face international economic problems of great complexity. We must be more stringent in conservation than ever before.

We have worked together to solve the problems of the cold war. We succeeded because we worked together. Now we confront these new and even more complicated problems.

The Japanese reformer Sakuma Shozan wrote some lines in 1854 that provide an insight for 1974. Sakuma said, and I quote:

When I was 20, I knew that men were linked together in one province; when I was 30, I knew that they were linked together in one nation; when I was 40, I knew they were linked together in one world of five continents.

Now, 120 years later, the links between

nations are closer than ever. Modern technology has made the world one. What each man or each nation does, or fails to do, affects every other.

Some Americans wondered why I decided to accept your invitation to come to Japan at a time when we have unsolved problems at home. I replied to those Americans that many of the problems we have at home are not just American problems but the problems of the world as a whole. Like others, we suffer from inflation. Like others, we face recession. Like others, we have to deal with rising prices and potential shortages of fuels and raw materials. America cannot solve those problems alone. Nations can only solve those problems by working together.

Just as we worked together to maintain peace, we can work together to solve tomorrow's problems.

Our two nations provide the world with a model of what can be achieved by international cooperation. We can also provide a model for dealing with the new difficulties. We both have great technological skills and human resources, great energy, and great imagination.

We both acknowledge the responsibility to developing states. We envisage the orderly and peaceful sharing of essential national resources. We can work together to meet the global economic issues.

We believe that we are not just temporary allies. We are permanent friends.

We share the same goals—peace, development, stability, and prosperity. These are not only praiseworthy and essential goals but common goals.

The problems of peace and economic well-being are inextricably linked. We believe peace cannot exist without prosperity, prosperity cannot exist without peace, and neither can exist if the great states of the world do not work together to achieve it. We owe this to ourselves, to each other, and to all of the Japanese and the American peoples.

America and Japan share the same national pastime—baseball. In the game of

baseball, two teams compete. But neither can play without the other nor without common respect for each other and for the rules of the game.

I have taken the liberty of giving you my views on the world we live in. Now let me tell you, the Japanese people, a little bit about the American people. The American people have faced some difficult times in our history. They know they will face others in the future. Their burdens are enormous, both at home and abroad. Some observers, including American observers, say that Americans have lost their confidence, their sense of responsibility, and their creativity. It is not true.

I have traveled over much of my country during the past year. Each time, I return to Washington refreshed. Our people are determined and realistic. Our people are vigorous. They are solving their problems in countless towns and cities across the country. They continue to understand that history has placed great responsibilities on American shoulders. Americans are ready and willing to play their part with the same strength and the same will that they have always shown in the past.

Americans also know that no nation, however strong, can hope to dictate the course of history by itself. But the ability to understand the basic issue, to define our national interest, and to make common cause with others to achieve common purposes makes it possible to influence events. And Americans are determined to do that for constructive purposes and in the true spirit of interdependence.

In that spirit, let me make a pledge to you today. As we face the problems of the future, the United States will remain faithful in our commitments and firm in the pursuit of our common goals. We intend not only to remain a trustworthy ally but a reliable trading partner.

We will continue to be suppliers of goods you need. If shortages occur, we will take special account of the needs of our traditional



trading partners. We will not compete with our friends for their markets or for their resources.

We want to work with them.

The basic concepts of our foreign policy remain unchanged. Those concepts have a solid bipartisan and popular support. The American people remain strong, confident, and faithful. We may sometimes falter, but we will not fail.

Let me, if I might, end on a personal note. It is a privilege to be the first American President to visit Japan while in office. It is also a very great pleasure. I look forward to seeing Kyoto, the ancient capital of Japan.

Japan has preserved her cultural integrity in the face of rapid modernization. I have never believed all change is necessarily good. We must try to apply the enduring values of the past to the challenges and to the pressures of our times. Americans can learn from Japan to respect traditions even as we, like you, plunge ahead in the last quarter of the 20th century.

I also look forward to another deep privilege. Yesterday during my call upon His Imperial Majesty the Emperor of Japan, I renewed our invitation for the Emperor to visit the United States. It would be a great pleasure to be the first American President to welcome the Emperor of Japan to Washington and to show His Imperial Majesty our national shrines and treasures, including the graceful Japanese cherry trees whose blossoms provide a setting for the monuments to the great heroes of our own past.

I hope that my visit shall be the first of many by American Presidents. I hope that the leaders of our two countries will follow the example that our peoples have already set, to visit each other frequently and freely as our nations move together to deal with the many common problems and concerns that will affect the lives of all our citizens and all humanity.

I said in my first Presidential address to the Congress that my administration was based on communication, conciliation, com-

promise, and cooperation. This concept also guides my view of American policy toward Japan.

We both have much work to do. Let us do it together. Let us also continue the quest for peace. I would rather walk a thousand miles for peace than take a single step toward war.

#### **Toast at Reception Given by Japanese Diet, Hotel Okura, Tokyo, November 20**

*White House press release (Tokyo) dated November 20*

Mr. Speaker: I am deeply grateful for the very kind remarks and the toast given to me and to my country. It is very significant that I have an opportunity of joining with the members of your Diet.

I am sure all of you have recognized that I spent a quarter of a century of my political life as a member of our legislative body, the House of Representatives—or your Parliament.

This was a great experience for me. I think it is quite significant in addition that the first American President who visited your great country was an individual who had spent some time in the Parliament or the Legislature, the House of Representatives, and the United States Senate, as Vice President.

This, in my judgment, gives a President a broader perspective of the problems, of the solutions. It has always been my feeling that a person who has served in a Parliament or in a legislative body is extremely well qualified to understand the views of the people of a country, a person who is well qualified to seek a consensus or a solution to the problems, whether they be at home or abroad.

One of my very top staff members, a number of years ago, Mr. [Donald] Rumsfeld, initiated with members from your Parliament an exchange between Japanese parliamentarians and legislators from our Congress. It is my judgment that this exchange is a very, very important way of

building a constructive relationship between your country and our country.

I was never privileged to participate in the Japanese-American interparliamentary group, or exchange group, as I understand it is called. I did have an opportunity as a Member of the House of Representatives—our Congress—to be a member of the Interparliamentary Union delegation on three or four occasions. And I found this exchange between parliamentarians of great benefit, a tremendous asset, and I hope and trust that in the years ahead this exchange between members of parliamentary groups will broaden, will be more extensive—it will be very helpful to each country, to all countries.

Let me conclude by saying that I am honored to be among a group that I grew up with in politics in my country. I understand your problems; I understand each and every one of you. I was always in the minority in our Congress. We always were trying to challenge the majority. We had many differences, but I have found that in the differences in a parliamentary group in our country—and I believe in yours—that you can disagree without being disagreeable, which in my opinion is a true test of the strength and the character of a parliamentary body.

The discussions that I have had with your government have been constructive in seeking to solve problems—domestic, international.

The great opportunity that I had to meet with your Emperor and Empress, His Majesty and Her Majesty—it has been a great experience for me, and I thank them and the people of Japan for being so warm in their welcome. I will report to my people in the United States that they have great friends in Japan, that our governments are working together to seek solutions to the problems on a worldwide basis and between us, as two governments.

We are friends, we will work together, and we have a great future—the United States with the Government of Japan. And

it is therefore my privilege and honor to offer a toast to your government and to your people on behalf of my government and the American people.

#### **Toast at Reception by Nongovernmental Organizations <sup>1</sup> Hotel Okura, November 20**

White House press release (Tokyo) dated November 20

It is a very high honor and a very rare privilege for me to have the opportunity of joining with all of you on this occasion.

The trip by me as the first American President in office coming to Japan has been a memorable one, one that I shall never forget. The opportunity to meet with Their Majesties, the opportunity to meet with your high government officials, the opportunity to share some thoughts with the members of the Diet, the opportunity to have a governmental exchange at the highest level is of course of great significance.

It has been my experience in 25 years of political life, when I served in the House of Representatives, to work hand-in-glove with other members of the legislative branch and of course, in later years as a member of the leadership, to work with the legislative and executive branch.

And, of course, in the last 13 or so months, I have had the opportunity of serving in two offices in the executive branch.

I have learned, over a period of 26 years serving in the Federal Government, that all wisdom, all support for policies, doesn't necessarily come from government, but primarily from people in nongovernmental organizations and individuals who are not directly connected with government itself.

And as I understand it, this group here on this occasion is a nongovernmental group of Japanese and Americans who have spent a great deal of your time working together in a nongovernmental capacity to support a greater unity between our country, the United States, and your country, Japan.

<sup>1</sup> Given by the America-Japan Society, Inc., and the Japan-U.S. Economic Council.

I compliment you, and I thank you. Your contribution is of tremendous significance. Governments themselves can't do it.

Decisions can be made at the government level, and in our society that is essential. But if those decisions are not supported, if those decisions are not explained by people in positions of responsibility in nongovernmental areas, it is impossible for those decisions to be successful.

I learned that early in my career in politics. I always could be more successful in working to find a solution if I had the support not only among politicians but by those people, whether they were in management, in labor, in education, in local government. So I am deeply grateful for what you have done in the past, and I strongly urge that you continue these efforts in the future, because the Japanese Government and the United States Government, after the two days of talks we have had, yesterday and today, are embarking on a stronger unity, a stronger program of helping both in the maintenance of peace and the stimulation of prosperity. And this is what we want in Japan and in America and what we want for the rest of the world.

And so what you do is of tremendous significance. What you do in explaining to the thousands of Americans who are here in Japan, what the Japanese who are here can do to explain to the millions of Japanese, will not only be better for Japan and the United States but will be better for the world.

And I congratulate you, I thank you, and I wish you well. And may I offer a toast at this point to the Government of Japan and the millions and millions of Japanese.

**Toast at Dinner in Honor of the Emperor,  
State Guest House, Tokyo, November 20**

White House press release (Tokyo) dated November 20

Your Majesties: I am honored to have the privilege of welcoming Your Imperial Majesties to this dinner this evening. It

permits me to, in a small way, in a symbolic gesture, to reciprocate the wonderful hospitality so graciously extended to me this week.

It has been a period of enlightenment for me, and I will take home an inspiring impression of the possibilities available for an even greater friendship, greater cooperation and interdependence of our two nations.

America is now approaching its national bicentennial. Tonight I would like to recall another meaningful event 114 years ago, on May 14, 1860. That was the day when the first diplomatic mission ever sent by Japan to another nation arrived in Washington, D.C., our national capital.

I am very pleased, Your Majesties, to present on this evening to all of our distinguished guests a token of the durability of American-Japanese friendship. It is a medal bearing the likeness of President Buchanan, who had the honor of welcoming the Japanese delegation to the historic East Room of the White House. Since that occasion, the American Government has never ceased to look to the East as well as to the West.

Our visitors then regarded us as Americans, as strange creatures and observed us in every detail. It was with equal fascination that we viewed our Japanese visitors. We learned from each other then, and I and we are continuing to learn today.

The most important lesson that I have learned during this visit corresponds with a brilliant insight of one of the Japanese envoys on the first mission to the United States. The occasion was a visit to the New York home of the widow of Commodore Perry. The Japanese envoy expressed a very deep emotion at the realization that he was in the home of Commodore Perry and said—and I quote: "The time has come when no nation may remain isolated and refuse to take part in the affairs of the rest of the world."

That concept is even more compelling today. The links between our two nations can serve as a model for a world increasingly

aware of the need for greater international cooperation.

Accordingly, in recalling that first Japanese delegation to Washington, I pledge that my government will not isolate itself from the world or from Japan.

On behalf of the nation that I am privileged to represent, to lead, I reaffirm the spirit of friendship that endures between us. I reaffirm my determination to see that warm relationship continues and grows.

Your Majesties, in that spirit and with a heart filled with faith in the future and appreciation for our guests, I offer a toast to the health and to the well-being of Your Imperial Majesties.

### **Joint Communique Issued at Tokyo November 20**

JOINT COMMUNIQUE BETWEEN PRESIDENT GERALD R. FORD AND PRIME MINISTER KAKUEI TANAKA

#### **I**

President Ford of the United States of America paid an official visit to Japan between November 18 and 22 at the invitation of the Government of Japan. President Ford met Their Majesties the Emperor and Empress of Japan at the Imperial Palace on November 19.

#### **II**

In discussions held on November 19 and 20, President Ford and Prime Minister Tanaka agreed on the following common purposes underlying future relations between the United States and Japan.

1. The United States and Japan, Pacific nations sharing many political and economic interests, have developed a close and mutually beneficial relationship based on the principle of equality. Their friendship and cooperation are founded upon a common determination to maintain political systems respecting individual freedom and fundamental human rights as well as market economies which enhance the scope for creativity and the prospect of assuring the well-being of their peoples.

2. Dedicated to the maintenance of peace and the evolution of a stable international order reflecting the high purposes and principles of the Charter of the United Nations, the United States and Japan will continue to encourage the development of conditions in the Asia-Pacific area which will facilitate peaceful settlement of outstanding issues by the parties most concerned, reduce international tensions, promote the sustained and orderly growth of developing countries, and encourage constructive relation-

ships among countries in the area. Each country will contribute to this task in the light of its own responsibilities and capabilities. Both countries recognize that cooperative relations between the United States and Japan under the Treaty of Mutual Cooperation and Security constitute an important and durable element in the evolution of the international situation in Asia and will continue to plan an effective and meaningful role in promoting peace and stability in that area.

3. The United States and Japan recognize the need for dedicated efforts by all countries to pursue additional arms limitation and arms reduction measures, in particular controls over nuclear armaments, and to prevent the further spread of nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices while facilitating the expanded use of nuclear energy for peaceful purposes. Both countries underline the high responsibility of all nuclear-weapon states in such efforts, and note the importance of protecting non-nuclear-weapon states against nuclear threats.

4. The United States and Japan recognize the remarkable range of their interdependence and the need for coordinated responses to new problems confronting the international community. They will intensify efforts to promote close cooperation among industrialized democracies while striving steadily to encourage a further relaxation of tensions in the world through dialogue and exchanges with countries of different social systems.

5. In view of the growing interdependence of all countries and present global economic difficulties, it is becoming increasingly important to strengthen international economic cooperation. The United States and Japan recognize the necessity of the constructive use of their human and material resources to bring about solutions to major economic problems. The establishment of an open and harmonious world economic system is indispensable for international peace and prosperity and a primary goal of both nations. The United States and Japan will, to this end, continue to promote close economic and trade relations between the two countries and participate constructively in international efforts to ensure a continuing expansion of world trade through negotiations to reduce tariff and other trade distortions and to create a stable and balanced international monetary order. Both countries will remain committed to their international pledges to avoid actions which adversely affect the economies of other nations.

6. The United States and Japan recognize the need for a more efficient and rational utilization and distribution of world resources. Realizing the importance of stable supplies of energy at reasonable prices they will seek, in a manner suitable to their economies, to expand and diversify energy supplies, develop new energy sources, and conserve on the use of scarce fuels. They both attach great importance

to enhancing cooperation among consuming countries and they intend, in concert with other nations, to pursue harmonious relations with producing nations. Both countries agree that further international cooperative efforts are necessary to forestall an economic and financial crisis and to lead to a new era of creativity and common progress. Recognizing the urgency of the world food problem and the need for an international framework to ensure stable food supplies, the United States and Japan will participate constructively in multilateral efforts to seek ways to strengthen assistance to developing countries in the field of agriculture, to improve the supply situation of agricultural products, and to assure an adequate level of food reserves. They recognize the need for cooperation among food producers and consumers to deal with shortage situations.

7. For the well-being of the peoples of the world, a steady improvement in the technological and economic capabilities of developing countries must be a matter of common concern to all nations. In recognition of the importance of assisting developing countries, particularly those without significant natural resources, the United States and Japan will, individually and with the participation and support of other traditional aid-donors and those newly able to assist, maintain and expand programs of cooperation through assistance and trade as those nations seek to achieve sound and orderly growth.

8. The United States and Japan face many new challenges common to mankind as they endeavor to preserve the natural environment and to open new areas for exploration such as space and the oceans. In broad cooperation with other countries, they will promote research and facilitate the exchange of information in such fields as science, technology and environmental protection, in an effort to meet the needs of modern society, improve the quality of life and attain more balanced economic growth.

9. The United States and Japan recognize that their durable friendship has been based upon the continued development of mutual understanding and enhanced communication between their peoples, at many levels and in many aspects of their lives. They will seek therefore to expand further cultural and educational interchange which fosters and serves to increase such understanding.

10. In the spirit of friendship and mutual trust, the United States and Japan are determined to keep each other fully informed and to strengthen the practice of frank and timely consultations on potential bilateral issues and pressing global problems of common concern.

11. Friendly and cooperative relations between the United States and Japan have grown and deepened over the years in many diverse fields of human endeavor. Both countries reaffirm that, in their totality, these varied relationships constitute major founda-

tion stones on which the two countries base their respective foreign policies and form an indispensable element supporting stable international political and economic relations.

### III

This first visit to Japan by an incumbent President of the United States of America will add a new page to the history of amity between the two countries.

## THE VISIT TO THE REPUBLIC OF KOREA

### Arrival, Kimpo International Airport, Seoul, November 22

White House press release (Seoul) dated November 22

Mr. President, Excellencies, ladies and gentlemen: I am very pleased to return to the Republic of Korea, our faithful ally, on a mission of peace. Twenty-one years have elapsed since I was last here in Korea. I was then a Congressman, a Member of our House of Representatives.

Now I return as the third American President to visit you while in office. President Eisenhower came here in 1952 and again in 1960. President Johnson came in 1966. Those visits as well as mine demonstrate a close involvement of different American administrations over a quarter of a century. They reflect the same reality—our long and friendly ties to the Korean people.

When I came to Korea in 1953, I saw a heartrending scene. The Republic of Korea had been ravaged by war. You had made great sacrifices to repel aggression. Your economy was in ruins. I was deeply saddened by what I saw, but I was inspired by the determination of the Korean people to rebuild.

Today I am very happy to return. I want to see the great progress that so many have described so very vividly. I want to see for myself what you have built upon the ashes of war.

I am here, Mr. President, to reaffirm our friendship and to give it new life and meaning. Nothing binds nations together closer than to have fought side by side for the

same cause. Two times we have stood together, here as well as in Viet-Nam, to preserve the peace, to preserve the stability of Asia and the world. We can never forget this.

Though we have been together with you in war, America's deepest hope is for a world of peace. Let us now join to preserve peace and to prevent any recurrence of hostilities. That is our continuing commitment, which I today reaffirm.

I thank you very much, Mr. President, for this heartwarming welcome. My only regret is that my wife, Mrs. Ford, is not here at my side. She sends her greetings to the great Korean people. She looks forward to hearing in detail from me personally about this visit.

You were most gracious, Mr. President, to invite me. I am proud to come here on this my first overseas journey as President of the United States.

**Toast at Dinner Given by President Park,  
Capitol Building, Seoul, November 22**

White House press release (Seoul) dated November 22

Mr. President, distinguished guests, ladies and gentlemen: I am greatly honored by this occasion and appreciate the gracious hospitality you have accorded us this evening.

The warmth shown by the Korean people exceeds even that which I remember from my previous visit to Korea, this very hospitable land.

I am very, very much impressed by the dynamism of the Korean society, the energy and vitality of the Korean people, and the charm and the beauty of the Korean women.

Mr. President, I wish that I had time to see not only the impressive landmarks of the Korean miracle of material progress but also the famous historical shrines of your great country. On another day perhaps, Mr. President, my wife and myself and our family can come, and certainly we would like to return.

Mr. President, it was a great pleasure to meet the leaders of many sectors of the Korean society here tonight. In particular, I

am pleased to see the Speaker, and the other members of the National Assembly, including representatives of the various major political parties.

Having spent, Mr. President, a quarter of a century of my life in parliament, or our Congress, I place a great value in the legislative process of a representative government.

I came to your country, Mr. President, to demonstrate America's continued determination to preserve peace in Korea, in Asia, and throughout the world. Koreans and Americans were friends in war. We will remain friends in peace.

America seeks world peace for the good of all and at the expense of none.

Today, Mr. President, I enjoyed a rewarding and a very inspiring visit with your people. I also drew great encouragement by meeting with the armed forces of our American troops in which all of us take such great pride.

I pledge to you, Mr. President, that the United States will continue to assist and to support you. Our relationship and our dialogue will continue.

We live in a time of new international realities and new opportunities for peace and progress in Asia and elsewhere. President Park, your statesmanlike initiative in opening a dialogue with the North contributed constructively to efforts to find a peaceful and just solution to the Korean problem. With the perseverance and with the courage so typical of the American [Korean] people, I trust you will prevail in this effort.

Let us recognize the new world in which we all live. Let us envisage the interdependence of all nations, large and small. When we plan for such new international problems as energy shortages and financial crises, the United States considers the interests of all nations. We will continue to consult with you in common interests and in common problems.

America has great confidence in the people of Korea, just as we have great confidence in ourselves in America.

Mr. President, I am here on a mission of

peace. It is my deepest hope that the entire world will lift its gaze and broaden its vision. I have said before, but I repeat here tonight, I would rather walk a thousand miles for peace than take a single step for war.

Mr. President, the relationship between our two peoples was first formalized as long ago as May 22, 1882. The preamble to that treaty spoke of permanent relations based upon amity and friendship. We have proven that by more than diplomatic phrases. Our relationship has endured through war and through peace.

The welcome you accorded me today is symbolic of our very close ties—it demonstrated the great strength of the friendship between our two peoples. I was greatly touched, Mr. President, by the outpouring of good will from the countless thousands and thousands of people who greeted me so warmly. Their cheers, I am sure, were not only for me as an individual, but for the United States of America and our 213 million of which I have the honor to represent.

I wish to thank every Korean that I saw today on behalf of all of the American people.

Today I visited a very beautiful cemetery and the monument to the brave Koreans who fell in battle. They fought side by side with Americans. And let the continued friendship of our two nations pay tribute to the memory of the supreme sacrifices of your courageous men and our own.

Ladies and gentlemen, I ask you to rise and to join me in a toast to my distinguished host, President Park, and to the great people of the Republic of Korea.

#### **Joint Communique Issued at Seoul November 22**

##### **JOINT COMMUNIQUE BETWEEN PRESIDENT GERALD R. FORD AND PRESIDENT PARK CHUNG HEE**

At the invitation of President Park Chung Hee of the Republic of Korea, President Gerald R. Ford of the United States of America visited the Republic of Korea on November 22 and 23, 1974, to exchange views on the current international situation and to discuss matters of mutual interest and concern to the two nations.

During the visit the two Presidents held discussions on two occasions. Present at these meetings

were Prime Minister Kim Chong Pil, Secretary of State Henry Kissinger, Foreign Minister Kim Dong Jo, Presidential Secretary General Kim Chung Yum, Ambassador Richard L. Sneider, Ambassador Hahn Pyong Choon and other high officials of both Governments. President Ford also visited American forces stationed in the Republic of Korea.

President Ford laid a wreath at the Memorial of the Unknown Soldiers. He also visited the grave of Madame Park Chung Hee and expressed his deepest personal condolences to President Park on her tragic and untimely death.

The two Presidents reaffirmed the strong bonds of friendship and cooperation between their two countries. They agreed to continue the close cooperation and regular consultation on security matters and other subjects of mutual interest which have characterized the relationship between the Republic of Korea and the United States.

The two Presidents took note of significant political and economic changes in the situation in Asia in recent years. They recognized that the allied countries in the area are growing stronger and more prosperous and are making increasing contributions to their security as well as to that of the region. President Ford explained that the United States, as a Pacific power, is vitally interested in Asia and the Pacific and will continue its best effort to ensure the peace and security of the region. President Park expressed his understanding and full support for United States policies directed toward these ends.

President Park described the efforts being made by the Republic of Korea to maintain a dialogue with North Korea, designed to reduce tensions and establish peace on the Korean Peninsula, and to lead eventually to the peaceful unification of Korea. President Park affirmed the intention of the Republic of Korea to continue to pursue the dialogue despite the failure of the North Korean authorities to respond with sincerity thus far. President Ford gave assurance that the United States will continue to support these efforts by the Republic of Korea and expressed the hope that the constructive initiatives by the Republic of Korea would meet with positive responses by all concerned.

The two Presidents discussed the current United Nations General Assembly consideration of the Korean question. They agreed on the importance of favorable General Assembly action on the Draft Resolution introduced by the United States and other member countries. Both expressed the hope that the General Assembly would base its consideration of the Korean question on a recognition of the importance of the security arrangements which have preserved peace on the Korean Peninsula for more than two decades.

President Park explained in detail the situation on the Korean Peninsula, and described the threat

to peace and stability of hostile acts by North Korea, exemplified most recently by the construction of an underground tunnel inside the southern sector of the Demilitarized Zone.

The two Presidents agreed that the Republic of Korea forces and American forces stationed in Korea must maintain a high degree of strength and readiness in order to deter aggression. President Ford reaffirmed the determination of the United States to render prompt and effective assistance to repel armed attack against the Republic of Korea in accordance with the Mutual Defense Treaty of 1954 between the Republic of Korea and the United States. In this connection, President Ford assured President Park that the United States has no plan to reduce the present level of United States forces in Korea.

The two Presidents discussed the progress of the Modernization Program for the Republic of Korea armed forces and agreed that implementation of the program is of major importance to the security of the Republic of Korea and peace on the Korean Peninsula. President Ford took note of the increasing share of the defense burden which the Republic of Korea is able and willing to assume and affirmed the readiness of the United States to continue to render appropriate support to the further development of defense industries in the Republic of Korea.

President Ford expressed his admiration for the rapid and sustained economic progress of the Republic of Korea, accomplished in the face of various obstacles, including the lack of sufficient indigenous natural resources and continuing tensions in the area. President Park noted with appreciation the United States contribution to Korea's development in the economic, scientific and technological fields.

The two Presidents examined the impact of recent international economic developments. They agreed that the two countries should continue to foster close economic cooperation for their mutual benefit, and that they should guide their economic policies toward each other in the spirit of closer interdependence among all nations. They shared the view that coordination of their policies on new problems confronting the international community is necessary. Both Presidents expressed mutual satisfaction over the continuing growth of substantial bilateral economic relations which have been beneficial to both countries. They agreed that continued private foreign investment in Korea by the United States and other foreign countries is desirable. It was agreed that international efforts should focus on the reduction of trade distortions, establishment of a framework for ensuring stable food supplies, and realization of stable supplies of energy at reasonable prices.

President Park expressed his high expectations and respect for the efforts being made by President Ford to establish world peace and to restore world economic order.

On behalf of the members of his Party and the American people, President Ford extended his deepest thanks to President Park and all the people of the Republic of Korea for the warmth of their reception and the many courtesies extended to him during the visit.

President Ford cordially invited President Park to visit the United States of America and President Park accepted the invitation with pleasure. The two Presidents agreed that the visit would take place at a time of mutual convenience.

## THE VISIT TO THE SOVIET UNION

### Toast at Luncheon Given by General Secretary Brezhnev, Vladivostok, November 24

White House press release (Vladivostok) dated November 24

Let me say a few words if I might about the very special significance of this, our first official meeting.

The world has been accustomed in recent years to regular meetings between the leaders of the Soviet Union and the American people.

Cooperation between our two countries has intensified both in tempo and, more important, in substance during the past few years. As a result, all people, Mr. General Secretary, have a better chance to live in peace and security today.

The fact that these meetings have become more regular testifies to the significance attached to them by both countries. In these meetings, we are able to conduct our discussions in a businesslike and a constructive way. We are able to make important progress on the issues that concern our countries.

Mr. General Secretary, I look forward to continuing the close working relationship developed between the leaders of our two countries. In my first address to the Congress of the United States I pledged to the Soviet Union to continue America's commitment to the course followed in the last three years.

Mr. General Secretary, I personally reaffirm that pledge to you now. As nations with great power, we share a common responsibility not only to our own people but to mankind as a whole.

We must avoid, of course, war and the destruction that it would mean. Let us get on



with the business of controlling arms, as I think we have in the last 24 hours. Let us contribute, through our cooperation, to the resolution of the very great problems facing mankind as a whole.

Mr. General Secretary, the problems of food, population, and energy are not confined to any one country or to countries at an early stage of economic development. They affect people everywhere. If this age is to be remembered favorably in the history books, it will be because we met our responsibilities—your country and my country and our friends and allies throughout the world.

May I propose a toast to our joint search for solutions to the problems facing mankind and a toast to you, Mr. General Secretary, and to those associated with you in your government and to the people of the Soviet Union and to the people of the world, who will benefit from your efforts and, hopefully, mine. To the General Secretary.

#### **Joint Statement on Strategic Offensive Arms Issued at Vladivostok November 24**

##### **JOINT U.S.-SOVIET STATEMENT**

During their working meeting in the area of Vladivostok on November 23-24, 1974, the President of the USA Gerald R. Ford and General Secretary of the Central Committee of the CPSU L. I. Brezhnev discussed in detail the question of further limitations of strategic offensive arms.

They reaffirmed the great significance that both the United States and the USSR attach to the limitation of strategic offensive arms. They are convinced that a long-term agreement on this question would be a significant contribution to improving relations between the US and the USSR, to reducing the danger of war and to enhancing world peace. Having noted the value of previous agreements on this question, including the Interim Agreement of May 26, 1972, they reaffirm the intention to conclude a new agreement on the limitation of strategic offensive arms, to last through 1985.

As a result of the exchange of views on the substance of such a new agreement, the President of the United States of America and the General Secretary of the Central Committee of the CPSU concluded that favorable prospects exist for completing the work on this agreement in 1975.

Agreement was reached that further negotiations will be based on the following provisions.

1. The new agreement will incorporate the rele-

vant provisions of the Interim Agreement of May 26, 1972, which will remain in force until October 1977.

2. The new agreement will cover the period from October 1977 through December 31, 1985.

3. Based on the principle of equality and equal security, the new agreement will include the following limitations:

a. Both sides will be entitled to have a certain agreed aggregate number of strategic delivery vehicles;

b. Both sides will be entitled to have a certain agreed aggregate number of ICBMs and SLBMs [intercontinental ballistic missiles; submarine-launched ballistic missiles] equipped with multiple independently targetable warheads (MIRVs).

4. The new agreement will include a provision for further negotiations beginning no later than 1980-1981 on the question of further limitations and possible reductions of strategic arms in the period after 1985.

5. Negotiations between the delegations of the U.S. and USSR to work out the new agreement incorporating the foregoing points will resume in Geneva in January 1975.

November 24, 1974.

#### **Joint Communiqué Signed at Vladivostok November 24**

##### **JOINT US-SOVIET COMMUNIQUE**

In accordance with the previously announced agreement, a working meeting between the President of the United States of America Gerald R. Ford and the General Secretary of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union L. I. Brezhnev took place in the area of Vladivostok on November 23 and 24, 1974. Taking part in the talks were the Secretary of State of the United States of America and Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs, Henry A. Kissinger and Member of the Politburo of the Central Committee of the CPSU, Minister of Foreign Affairs of the USSR, A. A. Gromyko.

They discussed a broad range of questions dealing with American-Soviet relations and the current international situation.

Also taking part in the talks were:

On the American side Walter J. Stoessel, Jr., Ambassador of the USA to the USSR; Helmut Sonnenfeldt, Counselor of the Department of State; Arthur A. Hartman, Assistant Secretary of State for European Affairs; Lieutenant General Brent Scowcroft, Deputy Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs; and William Hyland, official of the Department of State.

On the Soviet side A. F. Dobrynin, Ambassador

of the USSR to the USA; A. M. Aleksandrov, Assistant to the General Secretary of the Central Committee of the CPSU; and G. M. Korniyenko, Member of the Collegium of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the USSR.

## I

The United States of America and the Soviet Union reaffirmed their determination to develop further their relations in the direction defined by the fundamental joint decisions and basic treaties and agreements concluded between the two States in recent years.

They are convinced that the course of American-Soviet relations, directed towards strengthening world peace, deepening the relaxation of international tensions and expanding mutually beneficial cooperation of states with different social systems meets the vital interests of the peoples of both States and other peoples.

Both Sides consider that based on the agreements reached between them important results have been achieved in fundamentally reshaping American-Soviet relations on the basis of peaceful coexistence and equal security. These results are a solid foundation for progress in reshaping Soviet-American relations.

Accordingly, they intend to continue, without a loss in momentum, to expand the scale and intensity of their cooperative efforts in all spheres as set forth in the agreements they have signed so that the process of improving relations between the US and the USSR will continue without interruption and will become irreversible.

Mutual determination was expressed to carry out strictly and fully the mutual obligations undertaken by the US and the USSR in accordance with the treaties and agreements concluded between them.

## II

Special consideration was given in the course of the talks to a pivotal aspect of Soviet-American relations: measures to eliminate the threat of war and to halt the arms race.

Both sides reaffirm that the Agreements reached between the US and the USSR on the prevention of nuclear war and the limitation of strategic arms are a good beginning in the process of creating guarantees against the outbreak of nuclear conflict and war in general. They expressed their deep belief in the necessity of promoting this process and expressed their hope that other states would contribute to it as well. For their part the US and the USSR will continue to exert vigorous efforts to achieve this historic task.

A joint statement on the question of limiting strategic offensive arms is being released separately.

Both sides stressed once again the importance and necessity of a serious effort aimed at prevent-

ing the dangers connected with the spread of nuclear weapons in the world. In this connection they stressed the importance of increasing the effectiveness of the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons.

It was noted that, in accordance with previous agreements, initial contacts were established between representatives of the US and of the USSR on questions related to underground nuclear explosions for peaceful purposes, to measures to overcome the dangers of the use of environmental modification techniques for military purposes, as well as measures dealing with the most dangerous lethal means of chemical warfare. It was agreed to continue an active search for mutually acceptable solutions of these questions.

## III

In the course of the meeting an exchange of views was held on a number of international issues: special attention was given to negotiations already in progress in which the two Sides are participants and which are designed to remove existing sources of tension and to bring about the strengthening of international security and world peace.

Having reviewed the situation at the Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe, both Sides concluded that there is a possibility for its early successful conclusion. They proceed from the assumption that the results achieved in the course of the Conference will permit its conclusion at the highest level and thus be commensurate with its importance in ensuring the peaceful future of Europe.

The USA and the USSR also attach high importance to the negotiations on mutual reduction of forces and armaments and associated measures in Central Europe. They agree to contribute actively to the search for mutually acceptable solutions on the basis of principle of undiminished security for any of the parties and the prevention of unilateral military advantages.

Having discussed the situation existing in the Eastern Mediterranean, both Sides state their firm support for the independence, sovereignty and territorial integrity of Cyprus and will make every effort in this direction. They consider that a just settlement of the Cyprus question must be based on the strict implementation of the resolutions adopted by the Security Council and the General Assembly of the United Nations regarding Cyprus.

In the course of the exchange of views on the Middle East both Sides expressed their concern with regard to the dangerous situation in that region. They reaffirmed their intention to make every effort to promote a solution of the key issues of a just and lasting peace in that area on the basis of the United Nations resolution 338, taking into account the legitimate interests of all the peoples of the area, including the Palestinian people,

and respect for the right to independent existence of all States in the area.

The Sides believe that the Geneva Conference should play an important part in the establishment of a just and lasting peace in the Middle East, and should resume its work as soon as possible.

#### IV

The state of relations was reviewed in the field of commercial, economic, scientific and technical ties between the USA and the USSR. Both Sides confirmed the great importance which further progress in these fields would have for Soviet-American relations, and expressed their firm intention to continue the broadening and deepening of mutually advantageous cooperation.

The two Sides emphasized the special importance accorded by them to the development on a long term basis of commercial and economic cooperation, including mutually beneficial large-scale projects. They believe that such commercial and economic cooperation will serve the cause of increasing the stability of Soviet-American relations.

Both Sides noted with satisfaction the progress in the implementation of agreements and in the development of ties and cooperation between the US and the USSR in the fields of science, technology and culture. They are convinced that the continued expansion of such cooperation will benefit the peoples of both countries and will be an important contribution to the solution of world-wide scientific and technical problems.

The talks were held in an atmosphere of frankness and mutual understanding, reflecting the constructive desire of both Sides to strengthen and develop further the peaceful cooperative relationship between the USA and the USSR, and to ensure progress in the solution of outstanding international problems in the interests of preserving and strengthening peace.

The results of the talks provided a convincing demonstration of the practical value of Soviet-American summit meetings and their exceptional importance in the shaping of a new relationship between the United States of America and the Soviet Union.

President Ford reaffirmed the invitation to L. I. Brezhnev to pay an official visit to the United States in 1975. The exact date of the visit will be agreed upon later.

For the United States  
of America:

**GERALD R. FORD**

*President of the United  
States of America*

November 24, 1974

For the Union of Soviet  
Socialist Republics:

**L. I. BREZHNEV**

*General Secretary  
of the Central Committee  
of the CPSU*

## ARRIVAL REMARKS, ANDREWS AIR FORCE BASE, NOVEMBER 24

White House press release dated November 24

Mr. Speaker, my very dear friends in the Congress, members of the Cabinet, distinguished guests, my fellow Americans: I thank you all very, very much for coming out this evening and welcoming us so very warmly.

Since I left Washington eight days ago, I have traveled some 17,000 miles for the purpose of peace and not a single step toward war. And every one of those miles, in my opinion, was most worthwhile. But as always when we return to our homeland, my companions and myself are very, very happy to be here.

Secretary Kissinger has a few more miles to go on this trip, but I will assure him that this warm welcome includes him as well.

Thursday is Thanksgiving. I cannot help but reflect on the many, many blessings that we Americans have. We do have some very serious problems, but we have much, much more to be thankful for. America is a strong country; Americans are very strong people. We are free, and we are blessed with good friends and allies.

On my trip I talked with the leaders of two of our allies, Japan and Korea. In both nations, I saw how much they value their relationship with us. We will continue to work together to strengthen our ties.

The visit to Japan marked my first trip outside North America since becoming President, and it was the first time that a President of the United States has visited that energetic and productive island nation.

Our trip was historic for another reason; for it marked a change in our relationship. In the past the central concern of our alliance was military security. This security relationship has now been broadened to include energy and food. I am particularly hopeful that by working together with Japan, one of the world's most technically advanced societies, we will be able to make a substantial joint contribution to resolving the energy crisis.

Japan emerged from the destruction of war with a deep commitment to peace. In Korea, a sturdy people rebuilt a nation from the ashes of another conflict. Only a little over 20 years ago, Korea was a battleground. Today it is a showcase of economic development.

Just over two decades ago, American fighting men were battling over the rugged mountains of Korea. Today the major burden of Korea's defense is borne by the Koreans themselves. American servicemen are stationed there, but like their comrades in Europe and elsewhere, they are there to help an ally maintain the peace, not to do the job alone.

A highlight of the trip for me was the opportunity to meet with our soldiers in Korea and to have lunch with them in one of their camps. They are outstanding fighting men and women doing a fine job. We can all be very proud of them.

The final stop on our trip was the Soviet Union. The meetings with General Secretary Brezhnev, I am pleased, went very, very well. They represent both a beginning and a continuation. They were the beginning of what I hope will be a productive personal relationship between Mr. Brezhnev and myself. We both, I believe, came away from Vladivostok with mutual respect and a common determination to continue the search for peace.

They were a continuation because we maintained the steady improvement of our relations begun three years ago. We talked, as American and Soviet leaders have in the past, about the Middle East, European security, and other bilateral relations. We often agreed, but not always. When we did not, we stated our differences quite frankly.

But on perhaps the most important issue facing the Soviet and American peoples, the further limitation of strategic arms, we found a large measure of agreement. We discussed the issue fully, and in the end we established a sound basis for a new agreement that will constrain our military com-

petition over the next decade. The understanding we reached resulted from an intensive round of give-and-take, the kind of give-and-take negotiations that recognized the legitimate security of both sides.

Many details remain to be worked out by our negotiators, but ceilings on the strategic forces of both nations have been accepted. A good agreement that will serve the interests of the United States and the Soviet Union is now within our grasp. Vladivostok was an appropriate ending to a journey designed to strengthen ties with old friends and expand areas of agreement with old adversaries.

I believe we accomplished what we set out to achieve and perhaps more. And in that process I pray that we have done all we could to advance the cause of peace for all Americans and for all mankind.

## **Death of U Thant, Former U.N. Secretary General**

*Statement by President Ford*<sup>1</sup>

I have learned with great sorrow of the death of former United Nations Secretary General U Thant. Above all, he was a man of peace. His distinguished leadership in the world community for a decade won him wide respect and the gratitude of all who cherish world peace. He gave unselfishly of himself in the highest tradition of service to mankind, and the world is better for the example he set.

U Thant's loyalty was not to any one power or ethnic bloc, but to humanity; and it is in this same universal spirit that all men will mourn his passing. On behalf of the people of the United States, I extend condolences to his family.

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<sup>1</sup> Issued on Nov. 25 (text from White House press release).

## Secretary Kissinger's News Conferences at Tokyo and Vladivostok

*Following are transcripts of news conferences held by Secretary Kissinger at Tokyo on November 19 and 20, at Vladivostok on November 24 at 1:35 a.m. and 4:18 p.m., and at Tokyo on November 25.*

### TOKYO, NOVEMBER 19

Press release 503 dated November 19

*Secretary Kissinger:* Ladies and gentlemen, I will confine myself to the meeting between the President and the Prime Minister this morning, which was attended by the two Foreign Ministers and two other individuals on each side.

We concentrated in this initial meeting first on stressing the great importance that the United States attaches to its relationship with Japan for peace in the Pacific, peace in the world, and for the economic progress of our two countries as well as of all other countries.

This led to a discussion of two related questions, the problem of food and the problem of energy. With respect to the problem of food, the President pointed out the interest that the United States has in an orderly long-term evolution of world agricultural policy as we have presented it at the World Food Conference, and in this context he assured the Prime Minister that Japan could count on a stable level of supplies of agricultural supplies from the United States. There were further discussions on agricultural issues, and it was agreed that they would be continued tomorrow when the President and the Prime Minister met again.

With respect to the problem of energy, the President stressed to the Prime Minister the importance the United States attaches to the program that we outlined last week of soli-

darity among the consumers. He made very clear that this is not intended in any sense to lead to any confrontation with the producers but, rather, to pave the way for a constructive dialogue between consumers and producers for the common benefit of both.

The Japanese side explained the special problems of Japan in terms of its heavy dependence on imported oil and the difference in the proportion of the consumption of energy between the United States and Japan, in that Japan consumes about 70 percent of its oil for industrial consumption and only 30 percent for personal use while in the United States the opposite percentage obtains, so that the margin for reductions in consumption in Japan is more limited than in the United States. But within that framework the Japanese point of view was one that seemed to us sympathetic to our general approach, and we pointed out that we would put more emphasis on the development of alternative sources and that we would share the results of research and development and technological innovation with Japan with respect to the new sources of energy.

There was a general recognition that Japan and the United States should cooperate on the usual matters of bilateral relations but also on the whole area of stability of international affairs and progress toward peace.

The discussions on all of these items as well as others will be continued tomorrow morning when the President, the Prime Minister, and their advisers will meet again.

I will be glad to take questions.

*Q. Mr. Secretary, were the Japanese sympathetic to your specific proposal in Chicago about the reduction of importing oil, or did their situation preclude that?*

*Secretary Kissinger:* Well, we did not have

a chance this morning to go into every aspect of my proposal. I think that, first of all, my specific proposal was that the importation of oil should be kept level through a combination of measures of conservation and the development of new sources of energy.

It may be that the mix in Japan between conservation and development of new sources has to be different than in the United States; and as far as the United States is concerned, we do not feel that exactly the same formula or exactly the same percentage has to be applied to every country, but that rather there must be understanding for the particular situation of each country.

I would say that there was sympathy to the general approach and that we will have to work out in subsequent discussions the particular manner in which it can be implemented for each country.

*Q. Mr. Secretary, did your statement to the Japanese indicating they could count on a stable level of agricultural products indicate that Japan is going to have a special position in America's agricultural export market?*

*Secretary Kissinger:* As we attempted to make clear at the World Food Conference, we believe that the whole problem of world agriculture has to be approached on a more systematic and planned basis. And the various proposals we made there, some of which got lost in the debate about food aid—the various proposals that we made there were all designed to assure a stable level of expectations and a more careful, systematic approach on an overall basis.

Now, on the one hand, we of course have a free market for agricultural products. On the other hand, we have set up a system which amounts to some voluntary allocations by the contacts between our major companies and the Department of Agriculture.

So, without using the word “preferred,” I think one can say that the President indicated that the United States, insofar as it is within our power of the government—and the government will have a considerable

voice in it—will see to it that Japan can count on a stable level of imports.

*Q. Dr. Kissinger, will the Japanese agree to import American beef—or was that discussed?*

*Secretary Kissinger:* That question was discussed, yes.

*Q. What was the conclusion? Were there any indications they might agree to let American meat enter their country?*

*Secretary Kissinger:* Well, I don't want to speak for the Japanese Government, but my impression was that the President's point will be taken very seriously.

*Q. Dr. Kissinger, does not the promise of a stable supply of U.S. agricultural products mean that we will not resort to putting off imports in order to curb rising food prices as we did with soybeans in 1973 and wheat?*

*Secretary Kissinger:* Well, as you know, we have asked major importers from the United States to give us some indication of their requirements over a period toward which we can plan. It does mean that under foreseeable circumstances we will not impose export control.

But we would like to have an informal arrangement with the key importers in which we can have some idea of their requirements over a period of time. This is not a major problem with Japan, with which we have a very satisfactory relationship in this respect.

*Q. Was Korea [inaudible]*

*Secretary Kissinger:* We have not yet had a chance to discuss the problem of Korea except in the context of our general desire to maintain peace and stability in the area. This is a subject which, if it comes up, will be discussed in greater detail tomorrow.

*Q. Mr. Secretary, have you had a chance to discuss China and/or the Soviet Union?*

*Secretary Kissinger:* There has been a discussion by the President of his meeting with the General Secretary in Vladivostok, and his general approach toward détente,

and also the connection between our friendship with Japan and the general approach to the Soviet Union.

There has only been a general reference to the relationships with the People's Republic of China. It was agreed, however, that I would stop in Tokyo on my return from Peking to brief the Japanese Government about my meetings in Peking.

*Q. Can you tell us what is on your agenda with your meeting tonight with the Finance Minister [Masayoshi Ohira]?*

*Secretary Kissinger:* The Finance Minister was an old friend with whom I worked closely in his previous portfolio. He requested the meeting, and it does not have any fixed agenda, but I would assume that we will discuss some of the problems of energy and food and any other subject that he may wish to raise, but I would expect those two to be the principal items.

*Q. Mr. Secretary, on the matter of the ratio of consumption for industrial versus private use of fuel, did Prime Minister Tanaka make any suggestions to President Ford of the possibility of reducing U.S. consumption in its proportion or ratio?*

*Secretary Kissinger:* Well, the goals of consumption restraint in the United States were publicly stated by the President in October. They were reaffirmed by me at the request of the President in my speech last Thursday. They state both the restraint on consumption for the next year and the overall restraints on imports and the development of new sources of energy over the next 10 years.

The President has made clear that these consumption restraints will be met either by voluntary action or by other action. There was no discussion of how this relates at this time to any measures that other countries would take.

We will, however, have technical discussions with Japan within the next month to go into the details of the implications of our proposal and how it could be put on a multi-lateral basis.

*Q. Mr. Secretary, was there any discussion of the nuclear controversy or security treaty in general?*

*Secretary Kissinger:* There was a discussion of the nuclear problem. The President expressed his understanding for the special sensitivities of Japan with regard to this matter. It was agreed that the nuclear issue would be handled as it has been handled throughout within the framework of the Mutual Security Treaty and that any special problems in connection with it would be handled on the basis of bilateral discussions between Foreign Minister Kimura and myself and within the framework of American understanding for the special sensitivities of Japan with respect to this issue.

*Q. Mr. Secretary, did you discuss resumed fighting in the Middle East, and did you discuss with the Japanese your plan for a step-by-step negotiation?*

*Secretary Kissinger:* We have not—first of all, as I pointed out in Washington before we left, we do not expect renewed fighting in the Middle East in the immediate future. We did not yet have an opportunity to go into detail on the evolution of the negotiations in the Middle East. There will be a meeting, of course, again between the Prime Minister and the President tomorrow morning, and my associates and I will be meeting with the Foreign Minister for several hours in the afternoon; and I am certain that by the end of the day these issues will have been discussed.

*Q. Mr. Secretary, even though you did not go into detail, has Japan begun to make any form of a request for the way that the diplomacy in the Middle East is to be conducted?*

*Secretary Kissinger:* I am having trouble hearing you, Barry [Barry Schweid, Associated Press].

*Q. I am sorry. With regard to Japan's need for oil and their interest in the Middle East, have they begun to lodge a special appeal with you as to how that diplomacy should be conducted?*

*Secretary Kissinger:* No.

*Q. Mr. Secretary, did the President invite the Emperor to the United States in the near future?*

*Secretary Kissinger:* The President extended an invitation to His Majesty to visit the United States for 1975, and we are pleased to report that this invitation has been accepted. We look forward to this visit.

*Q. Mr. Secretary, I did not quite understand. On the nuclear issue, you mean it has been brought up by the Japanese as a problem?*

*Secretary Kissinger:* I think I made clear that the issue has been, as I explained, the special sensitivities of Japan with respect to nuclear weapons, and then I have explained our reaction.

*Q. Mr. Secretary, what did the President say about Vladivostok and China?*

*Secretary Kissinger:* The President and the Prime Minister discussed the role of détente in current diplomacy and how we believe that our relations with the Soviet Union, as well as the People's Republic of China, can contribute to stability in the Pacific area. We also stressed, however, that the close friendship between Japan and the United States was one of the prerequisites for the effectiveness of this policy, and he gave the Prime Minister a brief preview of the subjects likely to be discussed in Vladivostok.

*Q. Mr. Secretary, you said that the President had told the Prime Minister about our own program for restricting our own oil consumption through voluntary and other means. Did the President indicate that we would be going to involuntary means shortly?*

*Secretary Kissinger:* Excuse me, Mr. Elfin [Mel Elfin, Newsweek], I did not say that the President explained our program. The question to which I replied was whether we would allocate consumption restraints on the basis of the relative personal users; and

I said that our overall program of consumption restraints, of import restraints, involved both restraint on consumption as well as the development of new sources, that with respect to that, the American goal for consumption restraint had been publicly stated. It was not, as a matter of fact, repeated to the Prime Minister, because it is well known; and I pointed out that the President is committed to achieving these restraints on consumption for next year, and on imports over a 10-year period through a combination of consumption restraints and new sources, and that he will achieve it either through voluntary restraints or through other measures that have not yet been decided upon.

I am afraid I can take only one more question because I have to meet ex-Prime Minister Sato.

*Q. Mr. Secretary, I have a question.*

*Secretary Kissinger:* Well, I will take two then. This gentleman and you.

*Q. Dr. Kissinger, in connection with the sources of energy for Japan and the United States, was there any discussion of the Siberian oilfields and possible development? Was that reviewed in any way?*

*Secretary Kissinger:* This is one of the issues which we expect to discuss before we leave here. It has not as yet come out, but we are prepared to discuss it.

*Q. What are we prepared to say?*

*Secretary Kissinger:* We will discuss it at the briefing after our meeting.

*Q. Mr. Secretary, in connection with the nuclear question, and your sensitivity to the Japanese sensitivity since their introduction of nuclear weapons, did you assure the Japanese that we have never, and would never, introduce nuclear weapons even in a transit situation?*

*Secretary Kissinger:* Well, I will not go beyond what I have said. The question of nuclear weapons will be discussed within the context of the Mutual Security Treaty,



and it will be handled as it has been handled within that framework.

I am afraid I must turn it over to Ron Nessen [Ronald H. Nessen, Press Secretary to President Ford]. Thank you very much.

## TOKYO, NOVEMBER 20

Press release 508 dated November 20

*Secretary Kissinger:* Ladies and gentlemen, let me sum up the communique, the meeting of the President with the Prime Minister this morning, and the meeting between the Foreign Minister and myself this afternoon, because they all cover similar topics.

First of all, let me take this occasion on behalf of everybody on the American delegation to thank the Japanese Government for the excellence of the arrangements, cordiality, the hospitality with which we have been received, and for the meticulousness of the planning.

Secondly, before I get into any of the specifics, I would like to say that perhaps the most important result of the visit—beyond any of the specifics that were discussed—has been the frankness, cordiality, and completeness of our exchanges. And the reference in the communique to the fact that this first visit by the incumbent President will add a new page to the history of amity between the two countries was put into practice in the discussions.

The discussions today concentrated primarily in the morning on an elaboration of the review of the international situation that was begun yesterday which is based on the premise that Japan and the United States must understand each other's purposes and harmonize them in the common interest of the two countries and of world peace.

There was a review of Chinese relationships, Soviet relationships, and indeed, a review of the whole world situation. There were discussions of the Middle East. Foreign Minister Kimura told us about his meetings with the Egyptian leaders on his recent trip, and we exchanged views as to the pros-

pects of peace in the Middle East. And we believe that there are possibilities for hopeful negotiations.

But there was a general understanding that security in the present age cannot be confined to military matters but that the cooperation between Japan and the United States in the field of energy, in the field of food, represents a new and positive dimension of the security which must be added to this already established military security—traditional security—relationship.

There was, as I have pointed out, an exchange of views in which the Japanese told us about developments in the latest exchanges in September on the occasion of the U.N. General Assembly and Japanese and Chinese relationships, and we did the same with respect to U.S.-Chinese relationships.

Of course, as you know, at the request of the President, I am returning here after the trip to Vladivostok and after my visit to Peking to brief the Japanese leaders about those developments.

We consider the exchanges here to have been of an extraordinarily useful and important character, and they lay the basis for a new era of partnership between Japan and the United States.

Now I will be glad to answer your questions.

*Q. Mr. Secretary, are you saying that the results of the visit exceeded the expectations of the President, and if so, in what specific ways?*

*Secretary Kissinger:* I would say that the results of the visit achieved perhaps the optimum of what one had hoped for. We have always attached the greatest importance to the friendship between Japan and the United States.

One can never, in advance of any visit or any exchange of views, predict how intense and how far-ranging the exchange will actually be. But I would say this exchange has been as candid, as frank, and as constructive as any I have attended since I have been in Washington and has had the most positive results.

*Q. Are there any specific results you can cite?*

*Secretary Kissinger:* I think that the approach that was taken to the question of energy, the question of food, to the realization of the interdependence of the present world economy and world political structure, was of very considerable scope.

*Q. Mr. Secretary, were your meetings with officials other than the Prime Minister and the Foreign Minister—specifically the International Trade Minister [Yasuhiro Nakasone] and Mr. [Masayoshi] Ohira—designed to determine in any way whether Japanese policy would continue as it is regardless of what happened?*

*Secretary Kissinger:* The meeting with Finance Minister Ohira and Minister Nakasone were at the request of those two Ministers, and they were not initiated by us. They were, however, natural requests.

The Finance Minister, as you know, was Foreign Minister until August, and I worked closely with him until that time. We established a very close working relationship and, of course, the problem of energy and food has implications also for finance.

Minister Nakasone was a student of mine at Harvard, and I have never been in Japan without having seen him, and it would have been unnatural for me to refuse to see him when he suggested a meeting.

In other words, the meetings were in no way designed to deal with the Japanese domestic situation or to gain any particular reassurances. We believe the Japanese policy is likely to remain stable.

*Q. Was the Japanese Foreign Minister sanguine about the prospects of a peaceful negotiation in the Middle East?*

*Secretary Kissinger:* I think the Japanese Foreign Minister ought to speak for himself, and he of course visited in the Middle East only Cairo.

As far as I am concerned, I don't know if "sanguine" is exactly the right word. I have indicated that I believe there are possibilities for a step-by-step approach. I recognize

that the situation in the Middle East is extremely complicated and that there are many issues involved.

I do believe, however, that with the determination and the good will, there are possibilities for progress in the Middle East, and I think the Japanese Foreign Minister should speak for himself, though I did not have the impression that he disagreed with my views.

*Q. Mr. Secretary, did you seek a specific commitment from the Japanese Government to participate in the financial safety net, and if so, what was the government's reaction?*

*Secretary Kissinger:* We did not go into the detail of every individual measure that I have proposed. We discussed in general terms the importance of consumer cooperation along the lines of my speech and of a dialogue that would grow out of this with the producers. We will have further discussions on the individual measures and on the implementation of the program, but I had the impression that there was a general sympathy to the approach.

*Q. Mr. Secretary, was there anything in section 3 of the communique dealing with nuclear weapons control that should be interpreted as referring to the question of transit of nuclear weapons in Japan?*

*Secretary Kissinger:* I discussed that subject yesterday.

*Q. I understand, but the communique did not refer to that.*

*Secretary Kissinger:* Not beyond anything I have said since yesterday.

*Q. As specifically as you can, were any assurances given Japan about pooling of energy resources by the United States should there be another oil squeeze?*

*Secretary Kissinger:* I must say, beginning a question as specifically as you have wounds me deeply. It is also against my professorial training.

*Q. As generally as you would like.*

*Secretary Kissinger:* The sharing of oil supplies is part of the emergency program

that was ratified last week and that will be formally adopted this week. There were no additional commitments made.

However, the United States has made it clear that it believes that consumer solidarity is an important element in overcoming the difficulties produced by the energy crisis and that it will work closely with the Japanese Government and other interested governments in dealing with this issue on the basis of consumer solidarity. And I repeat, I believe we had very fruitful and constructive exchanges on that range of issues.

*Q. Were there any additional agreements?*

*Secretary Kissinger:* There was no discussion on going beyond the emergency program that has just been adopted three or four days ago, so there was no reason to reach any additional agreements.

*Q. You said the United States is prepared to maintain a stable food supply to Japan. Do you contemplate being able to increase the level of supply to meet the increasing demand in Japan?*

*Secretary Kissinger:* Let me explain the U.S. basic approach to the food problem, which we reviewed again today in some detail in my meeting with the Foreign Minister and on which I believe there is a general agreement. And it is an approach that got overshadowed by the debate on food aid.

The United States believes that the basic problem of world food supply requires some structural adjustment. There is now in the underdeveloped countries a food shortage of about 25 million tons which will increase—may increase—to as much as 85 million tons over a decade. We therefore believe that it is important to increase agricultural production in the underdeveloped countries and to provide food reserves to cushion against emergencies.

In both of these efforts, we believe that the Japanese Government will cooperate with us, especially with respect to the underdeveloped countries, which is a problem of technology. And we will have some exchanges on that subject.

To the degree that food production rises

in those countries, more food supplies will also become available in the United States. To answer your question specifically, we will give special attention to the needs of Japan. We will, in planning our own export, also try to do this on a more long-term basis than has been the case in the past, and we will have intense consultations with Japan on what can be done to assure their needs.

*Q. Mr. Secretary, Japanese officials were basically sympathetic to your oil proposal. What have they learned since last Friday, when they were basically unsympathetic?*

*Secretary Kissinger:* I was not here last Friday, so I don't know what they said last Friday. I can only say what they said this week.

*Q. Mr. Secretary, have you had any requests for a meeting by either Mr. [Takeo] Fukuda or Mr. [Takeo] Miki, and in particular, Mr. [Erusaburo] Shina? If so, have you met them or have you talked with them any other way?*

*Secretary Kissinger:* I have not had a request for a meeting. I have run into Mr. Fukuda at social functions as I have also with Mr. Miki, but just to exchange a few words, and neither of them requested a meeting.

*Q. Were there any discussions on Korea?*

*Secretary Kissinger:* There was just a very brief discussion about the relationship between Korean security and the security of Japan. But there was no detailed further discussions.

*Q. Do you have any plans to see Le Duc Tho in Peking?*

*Secretary Kissinger:* No.

*Q. When you are traveling there?*

*Secretary Kissinger:* No.

*Q. In Moscow?*

*Secretary Kissinger:* I have no plans to see Le Duc Tho anywhere.

*Q. Never?*

*Secretary Kissinger:* "Never" is a very long time, but I have no plans to see Le Duc Tho on his current trip, which I understand is to last two weeks. I read that in the newspapers. But I have no plans to meet Le Duc Tho.

*Q. Mr. Secretary, the President seems to spend a lot of his time in ceremonial activities here. Wasn't it an unusual sort of program?*

*Secretary Kissinger:* I think the President spent a considerable amount of time on the bilateral talks. In addition, he spent some time on ceremonial activities, which, as I explained before we came here, constitute an important element in the symbolism of the relationship and in the mood, which is such an important attribute in which decisions tend to be made in this country.

*Q. Mr. Secretary, can you tell us why Mr. Rumsfeld [Donald Rumsfeld, Assistant to the President] is accompanying you to China?*

*Secretary Kissinger:* When we were flying across the Pacific, Mr. Rumsfeld suggested that maybe on my next trip to China I would take him along. I then said, "Well, as long as you are here this time, why don't we see whether we can still arrange it?"

I asked the President what he thought about it, and the President thought it would be a good idea if his chief of staff had some exposure to China. The explanation is as simple as this. It was an off-the-cuff idea that occurred to us as we were crossing the Pacific. I believe it will be helpful to have the President's chief of staff have some exposure to China, but it has no profound significance beyond this.

*Q. On the nuclear issue, what kind of further understandings came out between you and the President and the Japanese leaders?*

*Secretary Kissinger:* I mentioned yesterday the discussions, and of course there are always discussions within the framework—the Mutual Security Treaty that permits issues to be raised—and as I have said, we

will take into account the very special sensitivities of the Japanese people with respect to nuclear weapons.

*Q. Mr. Secretary, did you talk about U.S. and Japan's general approach to Siberian development planning?*

*Secretary Kissinger:* The Japanese side explained to us the general approach to Siberian development planning. We are in no position to make any judgments until the trade bill and the Export-Import Bank bill have been passed by our Congress. And therefore we will have to defer any decision and consideration of these issues until that time.

*Q. Dr. Kissinger, in your discussions with Japanese officials and former officials, have you made any inquiries into the state of Japanese domestic politics?*

*Secretary Kissinger:* I haven't made any inquiries into the state of Japanese domestic politics. It is impossible to have lunch with press people without being told certain things, but you must be as familiar with those as I am.

*Q. Mr. Secretary, the answer that the President gave in Phoenix on the subject of the PLO [Palestine Liberation Organization] was a bit confusing. At one point he referred to the desirability of Israel negotiating with the parties, and another time he was saying negotiations among nations. Could you say whether the United States favors negotiations with Israel and the PLO?*

*Secretary Kissinger:* I think I went into that issue in detail at my press conference on Friday before we left Washington. I made clear then that the United States is not urging anybody to negotiate with anybody else and any negotiation is of course up to the parties concerned. And it is our understanding that Israel has refused to negotiate with the PLO.

*Q. What was meant when the President said today at the press club, "We will not compete with our friends for their markets or for their resources." Is there a carving*

*up of sections of the world into Japanese markets and into American markets?*

*Secretary Kissinger:* I think what the President had in mind is we do not look at our relationship with Japan in terms of competition but that the relationship between the industrial nations and especially between Japan and the United States in the Pacific area should be on the basis of cooperation and that in an expanding world economy there is sufficient place for both of us. There is no carving up of markets that was discussed or is contemplated.

*Q. Mr. Secretary, do you think the next time an American President visits Japan, visits Tokyo, he could do it without having 25,000 police mobilized for his visit?*

*Secretary Kissinger:* Well, the security arrangements for the visit of any President are of course up to the host government, and it is natural that they would tend to over-insure his safety.

*Q. Dr. Kissinger, I would like to say further, your statement yesterday about the U.S. position on industrial oil consumers and their cooperation seems milder than the tone of your speech in Chicago just before you left. Is that a correct interpretation, and if so, has the position softened as a result of talks with the Japanese?*

*Secretary Kissinger:* Our position is unchanged. Our position is that the industrial oil consumers have to cooperate and establish some basic principles before there can be a productive dialogue with the producers. This position has not softened. It is not a position of confrontation either, because we believe that the ultimate solution must be found on a cooperative basis.

In developing cooperation among the consumers, obviously consideration has to be given to the special circumstances of individual countries in applying these various measures that were proposed. This is what I intended to point out yesterday. But the position remains as I outlined it on Thursday.

*Q. Mr. Secretary, there has been renewed speculation—I know you answered this last*

*Friday—but there has been renewed speculation that the fact that you and the President are meeting Mr. Brezhnev in Vladivostok has been a source of irritation in Peking. Is there any substance to that?*

*Secretary Kissinger:* We have had no indication whatever from Peking directly or indirectly through any sources that have reached us that it is a source of irritation to Peking. I repeat, we have had opportunity to obtain Peking's views.

*Q. Mr. Secretary, on your Chicago speech, you said you had the impression the Japanese Government was sympathetic to the approach spelled out in that speech. When do you anticipate seeing some concrete evidence of that?*

*Secretary Kissinger:* I believe that over the next month concrete exchanges will begin on the implementation of these ideas with various consuming countries, and I think that my statement will then be proved correct.

*Q. Dr. Kissinger, in view of the Japanese expression yesterday of their difficulty with reducing their energy consumption by the standards you outlined in Chicago, did you give them any refinement, especially for Japan to think about over the next month or so?*

*Secretary Kissinger:* I think it is very important to separate two things—the basic approach and individual technical applications of it on a Presidential trip with the relatively limited amount of time that is available. The conversations have to concentrate on the basic approach. They cannot go into the details of all the technical matters.

Secondly, as I pointed out yesterday, we did not say consumption had to be reduced by 10 percent in every country. We said that over a period of 10 years, imports should be kept level by the whole group on the basis of consumption restraints and the development of new sources of energy. The precise apportionment within the group of either consumption restraints or the bringing into being of new sources of energy has to be discussed.

I would like to remind you the same prob-

lems existed when the emergency sharing program was first proposed last February, and it took about three or four months to work out all the details. This is a technically highly complex issue, but we are on the whole encouraged by the talks that took place here.

*Q. Mr. Secretary, how does the President feel about his first big foreign trip?*

*Secretary Kissinger:* I think he feels extremely good about it.

*Q. Did he talk to you about it and say why?*

*Secretary Kissinger:* He talked to me about it in the two minutes from the south wing of the [Hotel] Okura to the main building, and therefore I don't think he could give me all the refinements of his judgment in that period.

*Q. Mr. Secretary, now that we are going to leave Japan and go to Korea, can you tell us whether the President is going to express any degree of dissatisfaction with the degree of political oppression in South Korea?*

*Secretary Kissinger:* We have stated the importance that we attach to the security of South Korea. We have also, I believe, made clear our general view with respect to the form of domestic conduct we prefer, but I do not want to predict now what the President will discuss in his private talks with President Park.

*Q. Mr. Secretary, there has been considerable talk in the Defense Department over the last few years about reducing the size of U.S. troops in South Korea. Are you about to do that now? Has the decision been made to do that? Is that why you are going to Korea?*

*Secretary Kissinger:* We are not going to South Korea in order to discuss—much less to announce—any reduction of forces. We are going to South Korea for the reason that I indicated before. It is an ally. It is a country whose security is important not only to the United States but also to Japan, and

it would have created all the wrong impressions for the President to be in Japan and not pay the visit over such a short distance to Korea.

*Q. Mr. Secretary, did the President and Tanaka discuss the implications of the Indian nuclear explosion?*

*Secretary Kissinger:* Not in my presence, and I was present at all the meetings.

*Q. Dr. Kissinger, I believe you did not answer the last question, which was: Are we going to reduce the troops in South Korea? Your answer was, We are not going to discuss, much less announce, it. But are we going to reduce?*

*Secretary Kissinger:* I know of no plans. There are no plans to reduce troops in Korea.

I will take two more questions.

*Q. Mr. Secretary, is it your understanding that Israel is refusing to negotiate with PLO, Palestinians in general, or only those Palestinians who want a separate Palestinian state?*

*Secretary Kissinger:* I haven't had an opportunity to learn all the refinements of the Israeli position on that point. My understanding is that they will not negotiate with the PLO, and I am not familiar with any other group that labels itself Palestinian that has come forward as a candidate for negotiations.

Last question.

*Q. Have you received any explanation why the Japanese Parliament hasn't yet been presented with a bill to ratify the nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty, and are you satisfied with the explanations?*

*Secretary Kissinger:* Since we have not received such an explanation on this trip, I can't, obviously, express any satisfaction or dissatisfaction with it. The United States favors the ratification of the Nonproliferation Treaty.

*The press: Thank you.*

VLADIVOSTOK, NOVEMBER 24, 1:35 A.M.

Press release 511A dated November 25

*Ronald H. Nessen, Press Secretary to President Ford:* Gentlemen, as you can see, the Secretary will brief you on today's meeting.

Let me quickly run through the sequence of events so the Secretary can devote his time to substance.

The first meeting lasted from 6:15 to 8:15 and all the participants who are listed in the briefing that Jack [John W. Hushen, Deputy Press Secretary] gave you took part in that. There was then a half-hour break, during which the President and the Secretary took a walk. The meetings resumed at 8:45 and lasted until 11:30.

The second meeting lasted from 8:45 to 11:30. The President, the General Secretary, the Secretary of State, and the Foreign Minister attended that. Then there was a half-hour break from 11:30 until midnight.

The last meeting lasted from midnight until 12:30. The four participants, plus Ambassador [Anatoliy F.] Dobrynin, took part in that. The dinner was then postponed. The President walked back to his dacha with his staff and had a snack, about which I will tell you later.

The schedule for tomorrow is for the meetings to resume at 10 o'clock until approximately 2 o'clock, at which time the dinner that was canceled tonight will take place—at 2 o'clock.

I will give you further details later, but I think at this point you would like to hear about the substance of the meetings from Secretary Kissinger.

*Secretary Kissinger:* I can't go into too much substance, and as a matter of fact, I am here primarily because I promised some of you on the airplane that I would be here.

There were two major topics discussed today on the train ride.<sup>1</sup> For about an hour and a half, there was a general review of

U.S.-Soviet relations and the world situation. It was a get-acquainted session between the President and the General Secretary. And I think it went very well.

All the rest of the discussions this evening concerned SALT—that is, all of the discussions that Ron Nessen mentioned dealt with the subject of SALT.

I think that you remember, as I told you, I believe that progress was made in October. I think that we went further along the road that was charted in October. We went into considerable detail and many aspects of it, and we will continue the discussions tomorrow morning. And certainly, enough has already been discussed to give impetus to the negotiations in Geneva.

Now, how much more precise we can be tomorrow, what further details can be developed, that remains to be seen, and we will of course brief you after the session tomorrow and let you have the results.

We will undoubtedly discuss other issues tomorrow, including the Middle East and Europe, but today, the exclusive focus after the train ride was on SALT.

Barry [Barry Schweid, Associated Press].

*Q. Mr. Secretary, did you say that there would be nothing left to discuss because you have already achieved the optimum of what you expected to achieve at this meeting?*

*Secretary Kissinger:* Well, if we had already achieved the optimum that is achievable, there would not be anything left to discuss tomorrow.

We had a very satisfactory talk today. I didn't have any very precise expectations about what we could get. I talked to a number of you, and I think I had explained that we will try to build on the discussions of October. That has been done. How much further we can go—we are really now in areas of considerable technical complexity and relationship of various types of forces to each other, but I would expect that we will make some further progress tomorrow morning. In fact, I am reasonably confident that we will.

Helen [Helen Thomas, United Press International].

<sup>1</sup> President Ford was greeted at Vozdvishenka Airport in Ussuriysk by General Secretary Brezhnev on Nov. 23; they traveled by train to Vladivostok.

*Q. Do you know if what has happened today could be called a breakthrough?*

*Secretary Kissinger:* No, I would not call this a breakthrough. The last time I used the word "breakthrough" I suffered from it for months to come.

I think, certainly, enough was discussed today to help the negotiators considerably.

*Q. Dr. Kissinger, was there a specific proposal that was put forward by one side or the other?*

*Secretary Kissinger:* The sequence of events has been as follows: In October, in Moscow, the Soviet Union made a proposal, or advanced considerations, that I considered that we have described as constructive. Building on these considerations, the United States made some counterproposals which will be before the Soviet leaders when we meet today.

The Soviet leaders, in turn, advanced some considerations of their own to which the President, in turn, responded today; so it is a process in which the views of the two sides are being brought closer without as yet being identical but we are in the same general ball park. We are talking about the same thing, on the same principles, and each exchange refines the issues more clearly and brings them closer.

*Q. Mr. Secretary, are you talking about MIRV's? Can you give us any specifics of what area you are talking about?*

*Secretary Kissinger:* We are talking about comprehensive limitations including numbers as well as MIRV's.

*Q. Including numbers?*

*Secretary Kissinger:* Including overall numbers as well as MIRV's.

*Q. Do you think now that you have come closer to your goal in 1975 on an agreement?*

*Secretary Kissinger:* Well, I think we have come closer to our goal of having an agreement in 1975.

*Q. Dr. Kissinger, when you say overall*

*numbers, as well as MIRV's, you are talking about total delivery systems or are you talking about total warheads or what?*

*Secretary Kissinger:* Well, this is one of the issues that is being discussed. But generally speaking, we are talking about total delivery systems.

*Q. Total delivery systems?*

*Secretary Kissinger:* Yes.

*Q. What—*

*Secretary Kissinger:* Total delivery systems.

*Q. Has this been one of the subjects of discussion, how to define the number that you then will make known?*

*Secretary Kissinger:* Well, obviously, when you discuss strategic limitations, you discuss what sort of numbers would be considered appropriate as well as how you would then define them and this is part of the discussion.

*Q. Dr. Kissinger, to follow up what I asked before, as I understand the events as you described them, the sequence, today the Soviets came forward with a proposal modifying their views on what we had given them earlier?*

*Secretary Kissinger:* Today, the Soviets responded to what we put before them, which in turn was the response to what they had put before us in October. That is correct.

*Q. And when was it that we gave this response to them?*

*Secretary Kissinger:* Oh, let's see. I guess on the Tuesday or Wednesday, whenever I had lunch with Ambassador Dobrynin. I guess on Wednesday before we left on the trip.

*Q. And it was at that lunch?*

*Secretary Kissinger:* That is right.

*Q. Dr. Kissinger, in connection with this meeting, are you optimistic?*

*Secretary Kissinger:* I am optimistic about this meeting, yes.



*Q. Mr. Secretary, how do the two men get along? Is there anything you can tell us about your personal view?*

*Secretary Kissinger:* I have the impression that the two men get along excellently. On the train ride, the atmosphere was friendly and was turning to cordiality toward the end. The subject of strategic arms is not one that lends itself to small talk, but in the breaks there was an easy relationship, and I think both sides are conscious of the responsibility they have in trying to make progress in this area and are conducting themselves accordingly. I think the relationship between the two men is good.

*Q. Was the absence of the Watergate ever—*

*Secretary Kissinger:* Well, it is a different atmosphere from the one in July for many reasons.

*Q. How so?*

*Secretary Kissinger:* Well, in any event, President Nixon was a lameduck President, leaving Watergate aside. President Ford has announced that he is running for reelection in 1976, so he is not a lameduck President.

In July, for a variety of reasons, things were not ripe for an agreement. I think now—I am not saying things are ripe for an agreement here, but I think both sides are making a very serious effort to come to an agreement during 1975.

*Q. Did you ask President Ford to run to improve his negotiating stance?*

*Secretary Kissinger:* Would you repeat that question?

*Q. Did you urge President Ford to run to improve his negotiating stance?*

*Secretary Kissinger:* Did I urge him to run to improve—that he run? Oh, did I urge him to run?

*Q. Yes.*

*Secretary Kissinger:* I saw that article. I am not involved in domestic politics, and any-

one who takes my advice on that is in deep trouble.

*Q. Dr. Kissinger, would you say that the amount of time you spent on SALT today and the canceled dinner indicate that you are behind schedule in terms of your own expectations of the pace of this meeting?*

*Secretary Kissinger:* No, I would say that we have gotten into technical subjects of a complication that might indicate the opposite.

*Q. Dr. Kissinger, the walk that you took with the President—was this just for relaxation, or was it necessary to discuss with the President in private certain decisions or other matters?*

*Secretary Kissinger:* It was to take relaxation in private.

*Q. Mr. Secretary, considering the decision to go for a 10-year treaty was a decision by a lameduck President, is it still the way to go about this? Has there been any change in your assessment?*

*Secretary Kissinger:* I am not saying that a lameduck President cannot make correct decisions.

*Q. I realize that.*

*Secretary Kissinger:* I am saying a lameduck President runs up against the difficulty that his protagonists know the time limit of his term in office, and I think that the decision to go for a 10-year agreement was absolutely the correct one—remains the correct one.

*Q. There were suggestions that it was an option that was not the top option, but it was an option just taking what could be—*

*Secretary Kissinger:* No. The fact of the matter is that when we analyzed in July, we were talking primarily about a five-year agreement, five years from now. As we analyzed the difficulties we faced, we came unilaterally to the conclusion that to try to resolve these difficulties would not be worth it

because both sides would be straining against the date that the agreement would last and therefore the breakout considerations would almost dominate the agreement itself. So, President Nixon and I came to the conclusion that in any event the effort that would have to be put into negotiating a five-year agreement and then selling it at home would not really be worth it in terms of its substantive merit and therefore we did not attempt to narrow the gap by concession here or there which could have kept the project going but, rather, moved it into a framework which seemed on substance more promising.

*Q. Has the progress been such that some sort of agreement will be signed here, and is there any change in our plans to leave tomorrow?*

*Secretary Kissinger:* No. I am certain that we will leave tomorrow. It may be a few hours later in the day than had been tentatively planned.

There is no possibility of signing a SALT agreement here. Whatever is provisionally agreed to here will have to be spelled out in very detailed negotiations which are going to be extremely complicated and which can easily fail. What we can do here is reach orders of magnitude, of directions in which to go, relationship of various categories to each other. That sort of thing can be done here.

Spelling this out, what it means, what restraints are necessary, what inspection, what requirements there are for this, there is not enough technical expertise here, and in any event it is inconceivable that an agreement will be signed here. How the guidelines will be given, that remains to be seen after the session tomorrow morning.

*Q. I take it that the Soviets are willing, however, to go into more detail here than you anticipated. You are saying that the Soviet Government is eager to sign an agreement next year. How much will the chance be improved now?*

*Secretary Kissinger:* Well, I really would rather wait with making an estimate on that

after the session tomorrow. I would think the chances have been somewhat improved.

*Q. Is it fair to say that the Soviets were willing to go into more detail here than what you had anticipated?*

*Secretary Kissinger:* No. I thought that there was a possibility that—we knew the order of magnitude of the discussion, because we had reached a point where a specific set of considerations had been put before us. We had replied in somewhat those terms.

We expect the answer to come back again in those terms, but the discussion obviously required some detailed analyses. I think that it has gone reasonably well.

*Q. Mr. Secretary, would you please speculate on what considerations, political or otherwise, may have prompted the Russians to move in this direction and come this far and this much progress?*

*Secretary Kissinger:* Don't go overboard yet on progress. I am trying to give you a sense of movement. I have always stressed that this is a very difficult subject, and it is quite possible that when we resume tomorrow, it will turn out that we will not go further than where we have reached tonight. I think both sides have realized, and I think the Soviet side has also realized, that at some point we will be so deeply involved on both sides in the next round of weapons development and procurement that that cycle will become irreversible. The cycles can really be mastered only at certain strategic intervals, and once they have gone a certain time, whatever that particular cycle is will tend to be completed, and one has to wait for the next one to come around.

I think that realization that we have been stressing for a year, I think it is now accepted by both sides. And it is obvious that if the race continues that the United States will have to enter certain areas of weapons development that it would prefer not to have to do. I think it was a combination of factors like this that has accounted for the progress of the discussions of recent months.

*Q. Mr. Secretary, you seem to carefully*

delineate between a provisional agreement and a formal signing. Is there a possibility that by the time you leave here tomorrow evening you might have reached a provisional understanding?

*Secretary Kissinger:* I have always believed, and have said so, that out of this meeting some guidelines to the negotiators could emerge, and some guides will certainly emerge. Now, whether they will take the form of announced guidelines or simply a general agreement to instruct the delegation, it is still too early to say.

I don't know what you would call a provisional agreement. There will not be a binding agreement; there will not be an agreement that reflects itself in the actions of the two sides at this meeting.

*Q.* The question then is whether you are going to sign or not going to sign.

*Secretary Kissinger:* That we cannot say until after the meeting tomorrow, but it depends on what you mean by "announce." There will certainly be something about SALT in the communique.

*Q.* Mr. Secretary, can you say whether or not the Soviets want to have our tactical nuclear weapons in Europe counted into numbers, strategic weapons?

*Secretary Kissinger:* Well, I don't think I should go into all the individual details, but when I said that the discussions concerned the relationship of various categories of weapons to each other, that has been one of the questions—overseas systems has been one of the questions that in the past has been raised.

*Q.* Dr. Kissinger, in the past, you talked about the desirability of trying to work out an agreement that would in fact be more simple than the complex arrangements that have previously been discussed. Are we in fact saying in our response that both we and the Soviets have started moving toward this more simple, more basic formulation?

*Secretary Kissinger:* Well, I think it is hard to answer this in the abstract. I think

it is probably fair to say that we are moving toward simplicity, yes, but that is a very relative concept.

*Q.* Do you have any limit on the amount of time you will devote to the SALT, and how much time are you prepared to spend on the Middle East?

*Secretary Kissinger:* These meetings are not clocked, and both of the principals are fairly gregarious and easygoing so you get into a topic and it runs, and we are not leaving on a scheduled airliner or from a regular airport. So, we will talk about the Middle East as long as either side has something to say about it. There is no fixed time. We are prepared to discuss it.

*Q.* In that connection, Mr. Secretary, you also said that you would take advantage, in the negotiations, of the momentum that has built up. Are you building up the kind of momentum now that would require the benefit from the additional time here? Do you feel pressured—the fact that we are sitting here at 2 o'clock in the morning—against some kind of a deadline?

*Secretary Kissinger:* No, because we don't have anything that we must finish here. We didn't come here to make an agreement. We are not going to make an agreement here. We have come here principally, as I said before we left, for the two leaders to have an opportunity to get to know each other and to review Soviet-American relations, hopefully to give some impetus to the SALT negotiations. That probably will be achieved.

Beyond that, we have no necessity—no intention, in fact—to reach any specific agreements because, after all, the two principals are going to meet again for a much more extended summit when the General Secretary visits the United States in the spring.

*Q.* Mr. Secretary, why haven't the two principals met alone, President Ford and Brezhnev?

*Secretary Kissinger:* They will certainly meet alone before the end of the visit here.

*The press:* Thank you, Mr. Secretary.

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*Secretary Kissinger:* If you are all through with reading the joint statement, let me deal with that. There is also a communique which we will distribute, and if it should not be finished by the time when I get through with the joint statement, I will talk from it.

The joint statement, in our judgment, marks the breakthrough with the SALT negotiations that we have sought to achieve in recent years and produces a very strong possibility of agreement, to be signed in 1975.

Perhaps the best way to talk about it would be to go back to the history of the negotiations, starting with the summit in July and the conclusion of the discussions since then, in relation to some specific issues before us.

In all of the discussions on SALT, there is the problem of aggregate numbers and then there is the problem of the numbers of weapons with certain special characteristics such as MIRV's. And finally, there is the problem of duration of the agreement.

In July, we were talking about an extension of the interim agreement for a period of two to three years, and we attempted to compensate for the inequality of numbers in the interim agreement by negotiating a differential in our favor of missiles with multiple warheads.

This negotiation was making some progress. But it was very difficult to establish a relationship between aggregate numbers. It would be an advantage on aggregate numbers on one side and an advantage in multiple warheads on the other. All the more so as we were talking about a time period between 1974 and at the end of 1979, during which various new programs of both sides were going into production at the precise moment that the agreement would have lapsed. That is to say, the United States was developing the Trident and the B-1, both of which will be deployed in the period after 1979, and the Soviet MIRV development would really not reach its full evolution until the period 1978 to 1979.

In other words, while we were negotiating the five-year agreement we became extremely conscious of the fact that it would lapse at the moment that both sides would have the greatest concern about the weapons programs of the other. And this was the origin of the 10-year proposal and the negotiation for a 10-year agreement that emerged out of the July summit.

No preparatory work of any significance could be undertaken in July on the summit, so that when President Ford came into office, the preparations for a 10-year agreement started practically from scratch.

Now, in a period of 10 years, the problem of numbers has a different significance than in the shorter period, because over that period of time, one would have to account, really, for two deployments of a cycle that is usually a five-year effort. And also, inequalities that might be bearable for either side in a five-year period would become much more difficult if they were trying over a 10-year period.

Finally, since we considered that any agreement that we signed with respect to numbers should be the prelude to further negotiations about reduction, it was very important the debates for reduction for both sides represent some equivalence that permitted a reasonable calculation.

I won't repeat on this occasion all the internal deliberations through which we went, the various options that were considered. There were five in number, but various combinations of quantitative and qualitative restraints seem possible for the United States.

Finally, prior to my visit to the Soviet Union in October, President Ford decided on a proposal which did not reflect any of the options precisely but represented an amalgamation of several of the approaches. This we submitted to the Soviet leaders about a week before my visit to the Soviet Union in October, and it led to a Soviet counterproposal which was in the general framework of our proposal and which, I have indicated to you, marked a substantial step forward on the road to an agreement.

It was discussed in great detail on the oc-

casation of my visit in October. The Soviet counterproposal was studied by the President and his advisers, and it caused us to submit another refinement, or an answer to the Soviet counterproposal, about a week before we came here, and then most of the discussions last night, all of the discussions last night, and about two and a half hours this morning, were devoted to the issue of SALT.

President Ford and the General Secretary, in the course of these discussions, agreed that a number of the issues that had been standing in the way of progress should be resolved and that guidelines should be issued to the negotiators in Geneva, which we expect to reconvene in early January.

They agreed that obviously, as the joint statement says, the new agreement will cover a period of 10 years; that for the first two years of that period, the provisions of the interim agreement will remain in force, as was foreseen in the interim agreement, that after the lapse of the interim agreement, both sides could have equal numbers of strategic vehicles, and President Ford and General Secretary Brezhnev agreed substantially on the definition of strategic delivery vehicles.

During the 10-year period of this agreement, they would also have equal numbers of weapons with multiple independent reentry vehicles, and that number is substantially less than the total number of strategic vehicles.

There is no compensation for forward-based systems and no other compensations. In other words, we are talking about equal numbers on both sides for both MIRV's and for strategic delivery vehicles, and these numbers have been agreed to and will be discussed with congressional leaders after the President returns.

The negotiations will have to go into the details of verifications, of what restraints will be necessary, how one can define and verify missiles which are independently targeted. But we believe that with good will on both sides, it should be possible to conclude a 10-year agreement by the time that the General Secretary visits the United States at the summit, and at any rate, we will make a ma-

ior effort in that direction.

As I said, the negotiations could be difficult and will have many technical complexities, but we believe that the target is achievable. If it is achieved, it will mean that a cap has been put on the arms race for a period of 10 years, that this cap is substantially below the capabilities of either side, that the element of insecurity, inherent in an arms race in which both sides are attempting to anticipate not only the actual programs but the capabilities of the other side, will be substantially reduced with levels achieved over a 10-year period by agreement.

The negotiations for reductions can take place in a better atmosphere, and therefore we hope that we will be able to look back to this occasion here as the period of—as the turning point that led to putting a cap on the arms race and was the first step to a reduction of arms.

Now, I will be glad to take your questions. Barry and then Peter [Barry Schweid, Associated Press; Peter Lisagor, Chicago Daily News].

*Q. Mr. Secretary, excuse me, but are bombers under "a"?*

*Secretary Kissinger:* Yes.

*Q. Bombers are included. When you say no compensation, you mean what we have in Europe counts against ourselves?*

*Secretary Kissinger:* No.

*Q. Excuse me.*

*Secretary Kissinger:* What I mean is forward bases, which are not included in these totals.

*Q. They don't count in this?*

*Secretary Kissinger:* Strategic bombers are included.

*Q. Yes.*

*Secretary Kissinger:* Forward-base systems are not included.

*Q. My question follows on that. What are the advantages for the Russians in agreeing*

on the numbers of MIRV's being equal, that they would not raise questions about compensating for our forward-base system?

*Secretary Kissinger:* Well, I think that we should ask the General Secretary for an explanation of why he—I can explain to you our point of view on these matters, but I believe that both sides face this problem.

The arms race has an impetus from at least three sources: one, political tension; second, the strategic plans of each side; and third, the intent of each side to anticipate what the other side might do. The most volatile of those in a period of exploding technology is the last one.

There is an element that is driving the arms race of insuring one's self against the potentialities of the other side that accelerates it in each passing year. I would suppose that the General Secretary has come to the same conclusion that we have, that whatever level you put for a ceiling, it is enough to destroy humanity several times over, so that the actual level of the ceiling is not as decisive as the fact that a ceiling has been put on it and that the element of your self-fulfilling prophecy that is inherent in the arms race is substantially reduced.

I would assume that it was considerations such as these that induced the General Secretary to do this.

*Q. My question derives from the fact that no bargainer would put himself at a disadvantage, and I am just wondering what, from our standpoint, would be the net advantage of maintaining our forward bases without the Soviets complaining that there is some imbalance or some inequality or inequation in the overall purpose.*

*Secretary Kissinger:* Well, as you know, the Soviet Union had maintained that forward-base systems should be included in the totals, and this was one of the big obstacles to an agreement previously. The progress that has been made in recent months is that the Soviet Union gradually gave up asking for compensation for the forward-base systems partly because most of the forward-base

systems, or I would say all of them, are not suitable for a significant attack on the Soviet Union. At any rate, this is an element that has disappeared from the negotiation in recent months.

*Q. Secretary Kissinger, have you reached agreement on the number of MIRV vehicles or the number of MIRV warheads?*

*Secretary Kissinger:* The number of MIRV'ed vehicles. The number of warheads could differ, and of course, there are some differentials in the throw weight of individual missiles at any given period, though there is nothing in the agreement that prevents the United States, if it wishes to, from closing the throw-weight gap. We are not going to do it just to do it.

*Q. Dr. Kissinger, when was the discussion of SALT matters concluded, and was that time used to discuss any other matter?*

*Secretary Kissinger:* The discussion of SALT matters was concluded around 12:30, and all the time between 12:30 and the time I came over here was devoted to other matters. The discussions were practically uninterrupted, and I will get into these other matters after we are finished with SALT.

*Q. I have a question on the delivery vehicles.*

*Secretary Kissinger:* Yes.

*Q. You speak of equality, which I take to mean some level that is roughly an equality of total U.S. delivery vehicles in a TRIAD mix and the same on the other side.*

*Secretary Kissinger:* That is right.

*Q. Would this, therefore, involve a larger number of total U.S. vehicles than existed under SALT One or by taking in the bombers are you still maintaining roughly the same number of land bases?*

*Secretary Kissinger:* By agreement, we are not giving up the number until the President has had enough opportunity to brief, but roughly speaking, the total number is composed of a combination of missiles, of

land-based missiles, submarine missiles, bombers, and certain other categories of weapons that would have the characteristics of strategic weapons. The total number that accurately is equal, and each side, with some constraints but not very major ones, has essentially the freedom to mix—that is to say the composite force—in whatever way it wants. There are some constraints.

*Q. Is there any further constraint on the total throw weight that one side or another side could have? Under SALT One, as I remember, there was a limit on the number of heavy missiles.*

*Secretary Kissinger:* The constraints of SALT One with respect to the number of heavy missiles are carried over into this agreement.

*Q. Up to 1985?*

*Secretary Kissinger:* Up to 1985.

*Q. Throughout the whole period of the agreement, you said there will be a substantial reduction. Is this approximately—*

*Secretary Kissinger:* No. I am saying it will be the objective of the United States now that we have achieved a cap on the arms race. We have achieved a cap on the arms race if we can solve the technical problems of implementing the agreement that was made here; but I believe, with good will, that should be possible.

We have always assumed that once we agreed on numbers, we could solve all the other problems, that from the basis of the cap that has been put on the arms race—so that both sides now have a similar starting point—it will be the U.S. objective to bring about a substantial reduction of strategic forces; but there has not yet been an agreement to any reduction, obviously.

*Q. Dr. Kissinger, is there any provision in here concerning other types of modernization—improvements, for example, of MIRV's? Was there any limitation of MIRV's discussed?*

*Secretary Kissinger:* No, there is no such

limitation, but this is something that can still be raised in the discussions; but there is no such limitation.

*Q. Mr. Secretary, what does this initial statement have to do with the Trident and B-1 program, if anything?*

*Secretary Kissinger:* Each side has the right to compose—what it means is that the Trident and the B-1 program had to be kept within the total number of the ceiling that will be established by the agreement. But except for the limitations on heavy missiles, the rest of the composition of the force is up to each side.

*Q. Are these limits higher than the existing forces of both sides and will both have weapons to reach the—*

*Secretary Kissinger:* No. By the United States. This is somewhat more complex to calculate, depending on what weapons you count. For the Soviet Union, it is clearly below the limits, and for both sides, it is substantially below their capability.

*Q. Will either side reduce its arms totals? I was not quite certain of your answer.*

*Secretary Kissinger:* I would say yes. But I think you will know about that better when the numbers become more—

*Q. Dr. Kissinger, would you identify for us what the main hangup was in the five earlier options, and what mix the President decided upon that was the key to advancing an acceptable proposal?*

*Secretary Kissinger:* The big hangup earlier was the combination of time periods and perhaps the complexity of the proposals; that is to say, when you are trying to calculate what advantage in the number of warheads compensates for a certain advantage in the number of launchers, you get into an area of very great complexity, and when you are dealing with a short, or relatively short, time period, you face the difficulty that each side throughout this time period will be preparing for what happens during the break-out period.

So, those were the big hangups through July. What I believe contributed to this agreement was, first, that with a 10-year program we were able to put to the Soviet Union a scheme that was less volatile than what we had discussed earlier for the reasons of the breakout problem.

Secondly, I believe that one of the problems that was raised yesterday—namely, that they were dealing with a new President—may have influenced Soviet decisions because it created a longer political stability.

Thirdly, the discussions, I think it can be safe to say, moved from fairly complex proposals to substantially more simple ones, and this permitted both sides finally to come to an agreement.

*Q. Mr. Secretary, if the goal at the end of the road is the signing of a strategic arms limitation treaty, in terms of percentages how far down that road does this joint statement put us?*

*Secretary Kissinger:* Whenever I have given percentages and made predictions, I have got into enormous difficulties. I would say I would stick by my statement earlier. I would say that we are over the worst part of the negotiation if both sides continue to show the same determination to reach an agreement that they did earlier.

The issues that are before us now are essentially technical issues; that is to say, they are issues of verifications, issues of collateral restraints, issues of how you identify certain developments. But those are issues on which substantial studies were made before we made our original proposals, and therefore, had we not believed that they were soluble, we would not have made the proposals, so we think that it is going to be a very difficult negotiation which could fail. But I think we are well down the road.

*Q. Sir, a couple of clarifiers, if I may, that I am not clear on. Do I understand that there will be a reduction in the number of U.S. MIRV's? And secondly, is there some limit on throw weight? Is that what you are saying or did I hear you wrong?*

*Secretary Kissinger:* No. There is no re-

straint on throw weight except the restraint that is produced by the continuation of the ban—of the limitation of heavy missiles, and there is a restraint on the number of vehicles that can be MIRV'ed.

What was the first part of the question?

*Q. Are we past that point where we have to cut back?*

*Secretary Kissinger:* No. We are not past that point, but we could easily go past that point if we wanted to.

*Q. I realize that, but we are not physically past that point.*

*Secretary Kissinger:* No. But don't forget, the Soviets have not even begun to MIRV their missiles yet. We are well down the road toward that goal.

*Q. I realize we have a larger plan at the moment. My question is whether we have to start to subtract.*

*Secretary Kissinger:* We do not have to start subtracting.

*Q. One other clarification question. This aggregate number is yet to be agreed upon?*

*Secretary Kissinger:* No, that number is agreed upon.

*Q. It has been agreed upon?*

*Secretary Kissinger:* The numbers in both "a" and "b" have been agreed upon.

*Q. Mr. Secretary, would you please—*

*Secretary Kissinger:* And the President will discuss them with the congressional leaders, but both leaders thought that they did not want to include them in this statement.

*Q. Well, they would then be included in a treaty?*

*Secretary Kissinger:* Yes.

*Q. Ratified?*

*Secretary Kissinger:* In other words, the agreement will not fail because of the numbers. The numbers have been set and the definition of what is counted in each number has already been set.



*Q. Mr. Secretary, what you are saying in effect is that you have already fixed the ceiling, but you are not prepared yet to disclose what that ceiling is?*

*Secretary Kissinger:* That is right.

*Q. And that will be disclosed at what point?*

*Secretary Kissinger:* Oh, I would expect during the week and certainly no later than by the time the instructions are drafted for the delegation.

*Q. Mr. Kissinger, does this not mean—in other words, will not our MIRV reduction be considerably greater than theirs if we have many more, and will not their reduction in nuclear missiles be greater than ours because they are allowed to have more in 1972?*

*Secretary Kissinger:* Well, when you are talking about a 10-year program, I would say within a 10-year program in the absence of an agreement both of these questions are highly theoretical, because over a 10-year period both we and they could easily go over the total number of permitted vehicles and easily go over the total number of MIRV vehicles.

In starting from the present programs I think it is correct to say that this strain on the Soviet total numbers is going to be greater and the strain on our MIRV numbers is going to be greater; but in practice it comes out about the same, because there is no question that, if we both kept going, the numbers of MIRV'ed vehicles would soon reach a point where even the most exalted military planner would find it difficult to find a target for the many warheads that are going to be developed.

*Q. Mr. Secretary, do you believe that this will be acceptable to the congressional leaders, particularly those—*

*Secretary Kissinger:* I think this will certainly be acceptable to the congressional leaders that have been—

*Q. Including Senator Jackson?*

*Secretary Kissinger:* Well, I am sure you can find a more convincing spokesman for

Senator Jackson than me, but it would meet many of the criticisms that he has made in the past. It meets the point that has been made by critics of the interim agreement, in my view, only about the inequality in numbers, because as I pointed out on many occasions, the inequality in numbers was not created by the interim agreement—that existed when the interim agreement was signed and it simply froze the situation that existed on the day the interim agreement was signed for a five-year period. But at any rate, what was acceptable for a five-year period was not acceptable for a 15-year period—5 plus 10—and therefore that principle of equality has to be maintained here.

*Q. Mr. Secretary, one last question, please. Would you address yourself to the question of good faith on this? This is very important and will be a very important agreement to the security of the people of both nations. What will you say as a statement of faith and a guarantee?*

*Secretary Kissinger:* When the security of both countries is involved and the national survival of both countries is involved, you cannot make an agreement which depends primarily on the good faith of either side. And what has to be done in the negotiations that are now starting is to assure adequate verifications of the provisions of the agreement. We think that this is no problem, or no significant problem, with respect to the total numbers of strategic vehicles. It may be a problem with respect to determining what is a MIRV'ed vehicle. Nevertheless we believe that that, too, is soluble, though with greater difficulty than determining the total numbers.

Good faith is involved in not pressing against the legal limits of the agreements in a way that creates again an element of the insecurity that one has attempted to remove by fixing the ceiling or, to put it another way, by putting a cap on the arms race. But I think that the agreement will be very viable, and that the element of good faith is not the principal ingredient in releasing the agreement, though it was an important element in producing the agreement.

*Mr. Nessen:* Mr. Secretary, you are going to miss your tour if you don't leave now. Also, we are now passing out the joint communique. The Secretary wants to make this tour.

*Secretary Kissinger:* Let me take another question.

*Q. I want to get this right. Do I understand while you are putting a cap on the future numbers, this agreed-upon total is higher than what each side has now in aggregate. The combination?*

*Secretary Kissinger:* I did not say this, no.

*Q. That is the inference I get.*

*Secretary Kissinger:* I said specifically it is lower than what the Soviet Union has and in our case it depends on how you compose the total number.

*Q. Mr. Secretary, was there any discussion on what each side will do for resuming the work of the Geneva Conference on the Middle East as soon as possible?*

*Secretary Kissinger:* No.

*Q. Does that mean the end of your own efforts, for example, in the area?*

*Secretary Kissinger:* No. This is a phrase that was also in the summit communique, and it has always been assumed that my efforts are compatible with the prospective efforts of the Geneva Conference.

*Q. To what extent did the talks get into the Middle East situation, Mr. Secretary?*

*Secretary Kissinger:* There was a rather lengthy discussion of the Middle East. Let me go through the topics that were discussed in addition.

There was discussion of the Middle East, of the European Security Conference, and forces in Europe and a number of issues connected with bilateral relations. These were the key other topics that were discussed.

*Q. Can you tell us about your discussions on the Middle East?*

*Secretary Kissinger:* Well, I think there is an agreement by both sides that the situation

has elements of danger, that an effort should be made to defuse it. We are not opposed to the Geneva Conference, and we have always agreed that it should be reconvened at an appropriate time and we agree to stay in further touch with each other, as to measures that can be taken to alleviate the situation.

*Q. What role does the Soviet Union think the PLO [Palestine Liberation Organization] should play in the negotiations? How should they be recognized, and how should they—*

*Secretary Kissinger:* Well, I think the Soviet view has been publicly stated. We did not go into the modalities of how they would execute it since we made our position clear at the United Nations last week.

*Q. Specifically the trade reform bill in the United States.*

*Secretary Kissinger:* That was touched upon.

*Q. Where did you leave the ESC?*

*Secretary Kissinger:* The European Security Conference. We had a detailed discussion of all the issues before the European Security Conference in which, as you all know, Foreign Minister Gromyko is one of the world's leading experts, and we sought for means to move the positions of East and West closer together, and we hope that progress can accelerate.

*Q. Mr. Secretary, can you compare the progress made on nuclear weapons with the progress made by the Soviets with the Middle East?*

*Secretary Kissinger:* Not even remotely.

*Q. You did not make any progress on the Middle East?*

*Secretary Kissinger:* I don't think that progress on the Middle East is for us to make, and it was a different order of discussion. The progress on SALT was a major step forward to the solution of a very difficult problem. The discussions on the Middle East I think may have contributed, and we hope will contribute, to a framework of restraint in enabling the two countries that have such

a vital interest in the area to stay in touch with each other, but it cannot be compared.

*Q. How much time do you estimate, Mr. Secretary, you spent discussing the Middle East?*

*Secretary Kissinger:* How much time was spent? I didn't keep track of it. An hour, but that is a rough order of—

*Q. Thank you, Mr. Secretary.*

*Q. Was there a question of future sale of any U.S. commodities with the Soviet Union?*

*Q. Questions—*

*Secretary Kissinger:* I didn't hear the question either, but it dealt with economics so I don't want to answer it.

## TOKYO, NOVEMBER 25

Press release 512 dated November 25

*Q. Mr. Secretary, can you tell us about your meeting with the Japanese Foreign Minister?*

*Secretary Kissinger:* We had a very good meeting in the spirit of partnership that was strengthened last week, and I briefed the Foreign Minister about our visit to Korea and the Soviet Union. He in turn told me about his conversations with the French Foreign Minister. And I thought it was a very friendly and satisfactory meeting.

*Q. And you discussed the latest developments on SALT?*

*Secretary Kissinger:* I explained to the Foreign Minister in great detail the breakthrough that was achieved in SALT.

*Q. Mr. Secretary, what do you foresee in the China visit?*

*Secretary Kissinger:* We will have an exchange of views and a review of the situation, as we do on an annual basis. I have no specific expectations.

*Q. Is there anything to the reports that this visit to China is meant to reassure the Chinese?*

*Secretary Kissinger:* No. It was scheduled

for a long time, and it's a regular annual visit. It has no purpose of reassuring—

*Q. And obviously SALT will be discussed there?*

*Secretary Kissinger:* Well, I will give the Chinese a report of it, but it is not the purpose of my visit. The purpose of my visit was agreed a long time ago before the Vladivostok trip was scheduled. It is in terms of Chinese-American relations, and it is not based on any need of specific reassurance.

## Secretary Kissinger Makes Visit to the People's Republic of China

*Secretary Kissinger visited the People's Republic of China November 25–29. Following are exchanges of toasts by Secretary Kissinger and Minister of Foreign Affairs Chiao Kuan-hua at a banquet given by the Foreign Minister on November 25 and at a banquet given by Secretary Kissinger on November 28, together with the text of a communique issued at Peking and Washington on November 29.*

### EXCHANGE OF TOASTS, NOVEMBER 25

Press release 513 dated November 26

#### Foreign Minister Chiao

The Honorable Secretary of State and Mrs. Kissinger, all the other American guests, comrades and friends: The last three years or more, Dr. Kissinger has come a long way across the ocean to visit our country on six occasions. We are glad that he has now come to Peking again, providing our two sides with an opportunity to continue the exchange of views on the normalization of Sino-American relations and on international issues of common interest. Here I wish to bid welcome to Secretary of State Kissinger, to Mrs. Kissinger, who is in China for the first time, and to the other American guests accompanying the Secretary of State on the visit.

A year has elapsed since the last visit of

Mr. Secretary of State. In this year the international situation has undergone great changes, which further demonstrate that the current international situation is characterized by great disorder under heaven. The entire world is amidst intense turbulence and unrest. This reflects the sharpening of various contradictions and is something independent of man's will. The history of mankind always moves forward amidst turmoil. In our view, such turmoil is a good thing, and not a bad thing.

The Chinese and American peoples have always been friendly to each other. After more than two decades of estrangement, the door was opened for exchanges between the two countries, and the friendly relations between the two peoples have developed. Here we ought to mention the pioneering role Mr. Richard Nixon played in this regard, and we also note with appreciation President Ford's statement that he would continue to implement the Shanghai communique.

China and the United States have different social systems, and there are differences between us on a series of matters of principle. But this does not hinder us from finding common ground on certain matters. It is always beneficial for the two sides to have candid exchanges of views and increase mutual understanding. On the whole, Sino-American relations have in these years been moving ahead. We believe that the current visit of Mr. Secretary of State will contribute to the further implementation of the principles established in the Shanghai communique.

I propose a toast to the friendship between the Chinese and American peoples, to the health of the Secretary of State and Mrs. Kissinger, to the health of all the other American guests, and to the health of all comrades and friends present here.

#### Secretary Kissinger

Mr. Vice Premier [Teng Hsiao-ping], Mr. Foreign Minister, distinguished guests, friends: I appreciate this warm reception on my seventh visit to China, which is all the

more meaningful to me because I am accompanied by my wife and by my children. I am glad that they can share what to the American people and to all of us in public life will always be one of the most significant initiatives of American foreign policy.

The beginning of the process of normalization of relations with the People's Republic of China, and its continuation in the years since then, has not been a matter of expediency but a fixed principle of American foreign policy.

Since I was here last, there have been many changes internationally and some changes in the United States. But it was no accident that the new American President saw your ambassador the first afternoon he was in office, within a few hours of having taken his oath of office, and that he reaffirmed on that occasion that we would continue to pursue the principles of the Shanghai communique and that we would continue to follow the goal of normalization of relations with the People's Republic of China.

And President Ford has sent me here to continue the fruitful exchanges of views that we have had in every year, to continue the process of normalization, and to affirm again the fixed principles of American foreign policy.

I look forward to my talks with the Vice Premier and the Foreign Minister. I am glad that I have already had an opportunity to see the Prime Minister and to recall the many occasions of previous visits when we exchanged views.

We live in a period of great change and a period that is characterized by much upheaval. We believe that this change must lead to a new and better order for all of the peoples of the world, and it is to this goal that American foreign policy is dedicated.

We consider the exchanges on these subjects as well as others with the leaders of the People's Republic of China of the greatest consequence.

We agree that in the last years, relations between our two countries have moved ahead steadily. I am here to continue this process,

and I am confident that it will succeed.

So, I would like to propose a toast to the friendship of the American and Chinese peoples and to the health and long life of the Vice Premier and the Foreign Minister, and to the health and long life of Chairman Mao, and to our lasting friendship.

## EXCHANGE OF TOASTS, NOVEMBER 28

Press release 514 dated November 29

### Secretary Kissinger

Mr. Vice Premier, Mr. Foreign Minister, friends: On behalf of all my colleagues, on behalf of my wife and my children, I would like to thank our Chinese hosts for the very warm and very friendly reception we have had here.

The Foreign Minister and I reached a very important agreement today, which is that we would keep our toasts short, to spare the mental agility of the press which is here.

I do want to say that this visit, my seventh to the People's Republic, continues the progress that has been made on each previous occasion. We reviewed international problems and deepened our common understanding. We committed ourselves to continuing the process of normalization along the lines of the Shanghai communique. Beyond the formal exchanges, we gained a better understanding of the Chinese point of view, which we will take seriously into account in conducting our foreign policy.

I said when I arrived here that the process of improving relations between the People's Republic and the United States is a fixed principle of American foreign policy. This principle was reaffirmed and strengthened during our conversations.

So, my colleagues and I and my family leave with very warm feelings and a feeling of substantive satisfaction. In this spirit, I would like to propose a toast to the friendship of the Chinese and American peoples, to the good health and long life of Chairman Mao, to the good health and long life of Pre-

mier Chou En-lai, to the good health and long life of the Vice Premier and the Foreign Minister. *Gan bei.*

### Foreign Minister Chiao

Mr. Secretary of State and Mrs. Kissinger, all the other American guests, comrades and friends: First of all, on behalf of all my Chinese colleagues present, I wish to thank Secretary of State Kissinger for giving this banquet tonight to entertain us.

In the last few days, our two sides have, in a candid spirit, reviewed the development of the international situation over the past year and exchanged views on international issues of common interest and the question of Sino-American relations. This has increased our mutual understanding and deepened our comprehension of our common points. Both sides have expressed their readiness to work, in accordance with the principles established in the Shanghai communique, for the continued advance of Sino-American relations.

Dr. Kissinger and his party are leaving Peking tomorrow for a visit to Soochow before returning home. Here we wish them a pleasant journey.

I propose a toast to the friendship between the Chinese and American peoples, to the health of President Ford, to the health of the Secretary of State and Mrs. Kissinger, to the health of all the other American guests, and to the health of all comrades and friends present here. *Gan bei.*

## TEXT OF JOINT COMMUNIQUE

### JOINT U.S.-PRC COMMUNIQUE

Dr. Henry A. Kissinger, U.S. Secretary of State and Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs, visited the People's Republic of China from November 25 through November 29, 1974. The U.S. and Chinese sides held frank, wide-ranging and mutually beneficial talks. They reaffirmed their unchanged commitment to the principles of the Shanghai Communique. The two Governments agreed that President Gerald R. Ford would visit the People's Republic of China in 1975.

## TREATY INFORMATION

### Current Actions

#### MULTILATERAL

##### Aviation

Convention for the suppression of unlawful acts against the safety of civil aviation. Done at Montreal September 23, 1971. Entered into force January 26, 1973. TIAS 7570.

*Accession deposited:* Colombia, December 4, 1974; Iraq, September 10, 1974.

##### Cultural Property

Convention on the means of prohibiting and preventing the illicit import, export and transfer of ownership of cultural property. Adopted at Paris November 14, 1970. Entered into force April 24, 1972.<sup>1</sup>

*Ratification deposited:* Zaire, September 23, 1974.

##### Cultural Relations

Agreement on the importation of educational, scientific and cultural materials, with protocol. Done at Lake Success November 22, 1950. Entered into force May 21, 1952; for the United States November 2, 1966. TIAS 6129.

*Notification of succession:* Zambia, November 1, 1974.

##### Maritime Matters

Convention on the Intergovernmental Maritime Consultative Organization. Done at Geneva March 6, 1948. Entered into force March 17, 1958. TIAS 4044.

*Acceptance deposited:* Colombia, November 19, 1974.

##### Oil Pollution

International convention relating to intervention on the high seas in cases of oil pollution casualties, with annex. Done at Brussels November 29, 1969.<sup>2</sup>

*Extension by the United Kingdom to:* Hong Kong, November 12, 1974.

<sup>1</sup> Not in force for the United States.

##### Safety at Sea

Convention on the international regulations for preventing collisions at sea, 1972, with regulations. Done at London October 20, 1972.<sup>2</sup>

*Extension by the United Kingdom to:* Hong Kong, October 30, 1974.

##### Terrorism—Protection of Diplomats

Convention on the prevention and punishment of crimes against internationally protected persons, including diplomatic agents. Done at New York December 14, 1973.<sup>2</sup>

*Signature:* Hungary, November 6, 1974.<sup>3</sup>

##### Wheat

Protocol modifying and extending the wheat trade convention (part of the international wheat agreement) 1971. Done at Washington April 2, 1974. Entered into force June 19, 1974, with respect to certain provisions; July 1, 1974, with respect to other provisions.

*Ratification deposited:* Spain, December 2, 1974.

#### BILATERAL

##### Chile

Agreement amending the agreement for sales of agricultural commodities of October 25, 1974. Effected by exchange of notes at Santiago November 22, 1974. Entered into force November 22, 1974.

##### Pakistan

Agreement for sales of agricultural commodities. Signed at Islamabad November 23, 1974. Entered into force November 23, 1974.

##### Syria

Agreement for sales of agricultural commodities. Signed at Damascus November 20, 1974. Entered into force November 20, 1974.

##### Trinidad and Tobago

Agreement extending and amending the agreement of June 20, 1968, as amended and extended, relating to a program of technical assistance in the field of tax administration. Effected by exchange of notes at Port-of-Spain October 22 and November 12, 1974. Entered into force November 12, 1974.

<sup>2</sup> Not in force.

<sup>3</sup> With a reservation.

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Press releases may be obtained from the Office of Press Relations, Department of State, Washington, D.C. 20520.

Releases issued prior to December 2 which appear in this issue of the BULLETIN are Nos. 503 of November 19, 508 of December 20, 511, 511A, and 512 of November 25, 513 of November 26, and 514 of November 29.

No.	Date	Subject
†515	12/2	Program for the official visit of the Chancellor of the Federal Republic of Germany, Helmut Schmidt, Dec. 4-7.
†516	12/3	Kissinger: Senate Finance Committee.
517	12/3	Claxton receives John Jacob Rog-er's Award.
†518	12/7	Kissinger: news conference.

\* Not printed.

† Held for a later issue of the BULLETIN.

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DEC 31 1974  
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THE DEPARTMENT OF STATE **BULLETIN**

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December 30, 1974

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*The Department of State BULLETIN, a weekly publication issued by the Office of Media Services, Bureau of Public Affairs, provides the public and interested agencies of the government with information on developments in the field of U.S. foreign relations and on the work of the Department and the Foreign Service.*

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For sale by the Superintendent of Documents  
U.S. Government Printing Office  
Washington, D.C. 20402

PRICE:

52 issues plus semiannual indexes,  
domestic \$29.80, foreign \$37.25  
Single copy 60 cents

Use of funds for printing this publication approved by the Director of the Office of Management and Budget (January 29, 1971).

**Note:** Contents of this publication are not copyrighted and items contained herein may be reprinted. Citation of the DEPARTMENT OF STATE BULLETIN as the source will be appreciated. The BULLETIN is indexed in the Readers' Guide to Periodical Literature.

## Secretary Kissinger's News Conference of December 7

Press release 518 dated December 7

*Secretary Kissinger:* First of all, my apologies for having made you come in on Saturday. I had planned to do this on Monday but forgot that I have a congressional appearance on Monday afternoon and Foreign Minister [of Israel Yigal] Allon on Monday morning.

I'd like to begin by reading a brief statement on military aid to Turkey, which I am doing on behalf of the President as well as myself.

As you know, Congress in October enacted legislation which will cut off military assistance to Turkey on December 10. As you are also aware, the Senate has now acted to extend the period prior to such a cutoff. It is absolutely essential, and the President and I strongly urge, that the House take similar action immediately.

To begin with, the congressional decision to terminate military assistance to Turkey has not served the purpose it was designed to accomplish. Rather, it undermines the ability of the U.S. Government to assist in bringing about a just settlement of the tragic conflict on Cyprus.

We had made progress with the Turkish Government in the development of steps designed to make possible the initiation of negotiations.

Congressional action in October setting a terminal date for military assistance contributed substantially to the difficulties that have prevented the beginning of negotiations. Unless the Congress acts now to permit the continued flow of military assistance, further efforts by the United States to assist in resolving the crisis will be thwarted and our ability to play a future useful role will be undermined.

The United States has made it clear that it

does not approve of actions taken by Turkey on Cyprus. We have equally made clear that Turkey should display flexibility and a concern for the interests of the other parties in that dispute.

The United States will continue to do all it can to assist the parties in arriving at an equitable and enduring resolution of the Cyprus problem. But if we are deprived of diplomatic flexibility, there will be little that we will be able to accomplish.

Even more important, the U.S. military assistance to Turkey is not, and has never been, granted as a favor. It has been the view of the U.S. Government since 1947 that the security of Turkey is vital to the security of the eastern Mediterranean, to NATO Europe, and therefore to the security of the Atlantic community.

These are the reasons, and these alone, that we grant military assistance. They were compelling when we first decided to grant such aid. They are equally compelling today.

In 1947, our commitment to assist Greece and Turkey marked the turning point in the building of a security system which has contributed to Western security. Are we now to establish a new turning point which will mark the end of our commitment to a system which has served the free countries so well?

The security interests of the West may be irreparably damaged unless the Congress takes immediate action to permit military assistance to Turkey to continue.

This statement is made on behalf of the President as well as myself.

*Q. Mr. Secretary, I wonder if you would care to use this, what I assume is a first public opportunity to answer the critics of the Vladivostok agreement. I had in mind especially two points. One, the argument that the*

*number you agreed upon in Vladivostok is too high and really wouldn't stop the nuclear arms race. And, second, that the throw-weight issue, which a senior official called a phony issue, wouldn't be phony, would be more serious, if the Soviets started MIRV'ing [multiple independently targetable reentry vehicles] their large missiles.*

### The Vladivostok Strategic Arms Agreement

*Secretary Kissinger:* Let me make a few comments about the Vladivostok agreement.

Throughout the SALT Two [Strategic Arms Limitation Talks] negotiations, our negotiators strove for the following objectives:

—One, to achieve a ceiling on the number of total delivery vehicles.

—Second, to achieve a ceiling on the number of MIRV'ed delivery vehicles.

—Third, to have these ceilings equal.

—Fourth, not to count forward-based systems.

—Fifth, not to count the British and French nuclear forces.

—Sixth, not to give compensation to any other geographic factors.

—And then we thought other technical objectives, such as the freedom to mix, which means that each side should be free to compose its strategic forces substantially according to its best judgment.

All of these objectives were achieved in the SALT Two negotiations.

Now, with respect to the total numbers. The significance of the numbers is that for the first time in the nuclear age, a ceiling has been put on the strategic forces of both sides. For the first time in the nuclear age, for a 10-year period the arms race will not be driven by the fear of what the other side might be able to do but only by the agreed ceilings that have been established.

This can be justly described as a major breakthrough, and its significance becomes all the more clear if one compares the numbers not with some hypothetical model that one might have in mind but with what would

have happened in the absence of this agreement.

In order to reach these numbers, the Soviet Union will have slightly to reduce its strategic forces, by some 5 percent, I would guess. If this agreement had not been reached, all our intelligence estimates agreed that both with respect to MIRV's and with respect to total numbers of forces that the Soviet Union would build would be considerably larger than those foreseen in the agreement, giving us the problem of whether we were to match these forces or whether we would permit a growing numerical gap against us to arise. So it is not a fair comparison to compare these figures with some abstract model but only with, one, the reality of existing strategic forces, and, second, what would, according to the best judgment of our intelligence community, have happened in the absence of such an agreement.

With respect to the argument that at this level a substantial capacity for overkill exists, this would be true at almost any foreseeable level, or at any level that has been publicly suggested by any of the protagonists in this debate. This is a problem that is inherent in the nature of nuclear weapons and in the size of existing nuclear stockpiles.

So, I repeat, the significance of this agreement is that for a 10-year period it means that the arms race will not be driven by the fear of each side of the building capabilities of the other side.

Now the argument that it does not stop the qualitative arms race. It is of course extremely difficult to stop qualitative changes in the best of circumstances, because it is very difficult to control what one is not able to describe, which is inherent in the nature of technological change.

However, it reduces substantially the incentive of an unlimited qualitative arms race. The nightmare in qualitative changes has always been the linkage of qualitative change with quantity. And it is the combination of technological improvement with increases in numbers that has produced the various models for strategic superiority that people were concerned about.

It is extremely difficult to conceive how, under the provisions of this agreement, foreseeable technological changes, if either side acts with a moderate—with even a modicum of circumspection—can produce strategic superiority.

And this gets to the throw-weight point and to the adjective “phony” as applied to the throw-weight point. It is rather difficult to be drawn into a debate about an adjective taken out of context from a deep-background discussion. But let me sum up my views with respect to throw weight.

Throw weight is, of course, one measure of strategic power. Throw weight is significant when it is converted into numbers of warheads and if these warheads are of sufficient accuracy to threaten a definable part of the opposing side's target system. It therefore is a function both of the power of the weapons and of the vulnerability of the targets. If one side acquires additional throw weight, the other side has the choice either of increasing its throw weight or reducing the vulnerability of the targets. For example, putting larger throw-weight missiles into our holes does not reduce the vulnerability of our silos. It increases the vulnerability of Soviet silos.

The major target system that is threatened by increases of throw weights are land-based silos. Over a period of 10 years, these are likely to become vulnerable on both sides, regardless of the throw weight that either side has, simply by improvement in accuracy and improvements in yield.

Under the agreement, the United States has the ability to increase its throw weight substantially if it is judged in our interests to do so. Even though there is a limitation on building new silos, our existing silos can accommodate missiles of a throw weight many times larger than the one we now have. And if we increased them by the permitted 15 percent, we can increase the throw weight even more. So there is no effective limit on the increase in our throw weight if we decide to match the Soviet throw weight.

We must remember, moreover, that the decision to accept the differential in throw

weight was made six years ago, or 10 years ago, as a unilateral decision by the United States and has nothing to do with this agreement.

But the major point I want to make is this: We have the possibility of increasing our throw weight. We have also the possibility of increasing the invulnerability of our forces by reducing reliance on land-based silos and increasing the number of our submarine-based missiles.

We will not match throw weight simply for the abstract purpose of being equal in every category. We will take whatever measures are necessary to assure the invulnerability of our forces and to maintain strategic equivalence. If we should determine that we need to increase our throw weight, we will do so, and there is nothing in this agreement to constrain us from doing so. And therefore from this point of view, the throw-weight argument is an unreal issue.

#### **International Energy Policy**

*Q. Mr. Secretary, I am sure there may be more questions about SALT, but I can't think of them at the moment, so I would like to ask you whether—*

*Secretary Kissinger:* I am able to answer without a specific question. [Laughter.]

*Q. Three weeks ago in Chicago you made a major speech calling for international cooperation to attack the energy problem and achieve a basis of consumer solidarity. Now, have you had any indications that this is going anywhere, that it is making an impression in Europe, and in that connection, do you intend next week, while you are over there in Brussels, to work on this at all?*

*Secretary Kissinger:* The history of the discussion with respect to consumer solidarity since the Washington Energy Conference has been that in fact there has always been more progress than has been generally apparent.

For example, in the interval between the Washington Energy Conference last February and October of this year, there was set

up the International Energy Agency and the system of emergency sharing, which creates at least a safety net in the case of some new embargo.

Since then, I have made specific proposals on how to take the next step in conservation and financial solidarity at Chicago.

We have had preliminary explorations with other consumers on that subject, specifically with the Federal Republic and with Japan and with others. And we are optimistic that the basic objectives of my Chicago speech can be realized and will be realized.

There will be technical disagreements about the size of the fund and other matters of this kind, but I am basically optimistic that the objectives that we set ourselves will be achieved, perhaps in an undramatic fashion.

*Q. Mr. Secretary, to put another way the same question—why is it that the United States has not yet announced its own program of conservation measures?*

*Secretary Kissinger:* The President, as he stated in his October speech to the Congress, wanted to give, and intends to give, the system of voluntary restraints a maximum opportunity to work. The President went over my Chicago speech in great detail before I gave it. He is fully aware of the domestic implications of the international program we have set forth. And based on extensive conversations I have had with him, I am certain that the United States will, in a measurable time, take the measures that are indicated by our program.

### **Strategic Arms Limitation**

*Q. Mr. Secretary, to return to the SALT question again, a senior American official was quoted as saying that the figures agreed on MIRV levels could have been lower. What did he mean? If they could have been lower, why were they not lower?*

*Secretary Kissinger:* There are too many senior officials speaking on background. [Laughter.]

*Q. I would think so, also, sir.*

*Secretary Kissinger:* I was saying that the MIRV limits resulted substantially from American proposals and not from Soviet proposals. Basically, the judgment of our Defense Department was that once the MIRV's went beyond the point where, over a period of time, the land-based missiles might become vulnerable, a difference of a few hundred was not decisive. And therefore we geared the MIRV limits to a minimum program that we had established as being in the interest of our own security and made the proposed number consistent with that program. No major attempt was made to see whether a hundred less would have worked.

*Q. Well, isn't that one of the major points in which the agreement is being criticized; namely, that these differences amount to, for example, in the case of a Trident submarine, a difference of 24 missiles can involve an expenditure of over a billion dollars per submarine. Is that not the basis for the criticism by Senator Jackson, particularly, that the agreement can result in the expenditure of additional billions of dollars beyond which the United States originally planned its own program?*

*Secretary Kissinger:* That is certainly incorrect. These levels do not involve expenditures beyond the levels that the United States had planned. But what the critics would also point out is that the levels at which we would have had to spend if the arms programs of both sides had gone on in an unconstrained manner—the very people who had insisted all along on numerical equality are now accusing us of having too-high levels of arms, at a level of equality below the existing Soviet forces and substantially below the foreseeable Soviet forces. Therefore the alternative to this agreement in an unconstrained situation, according to the very dicta of equality, would have been that we would have had to spend considerably more than we will have to spend under this agreement. And this agreement does not make us spend any more than we had planned to spend to begin with.

*Q. I thought Secretary [of Defense James R.] Schlesinger yesterday indicated that it would, sir.*

*Secretary Kissinger:* I think Secretary Schlesinger indicated yesterday that in composing our forces, some additional—I do not believe that he meant to indicate that it required additional expenditures beyond those planned. He may have meant to indicate that it might involve additional expenditures beyond those that are now being spent.

*Q. Mr. Secretary, we have become so injured to catastrophe that the figures 2,400 and 1,320 have an almost reasonable sound. But the projection has been made that by 1985 under this agreement the United States will have about 11,000 warheads and the Soviet Union 8,000 or 9,000. What would the war-head figure have been without this agreement?*

*Secretary Kissinger:* Well, without this agreement, on the projections of Soviet forces, they could have ranged anywhere from 20,000, certainly above 11,000, even for the Soviet forces. And again, I repeat, one has to compare here what would have happened without the agreement.

Secondly, one has to analyze the significance of the fact that a ceiling exists so that now, as I said before, the arms race is not driven by the expectations of each side or the worst fears of each side.

Thirdly, when people say one should have held out for lower numbers, the operational significance of holding out for lower numbers would be a substantially increased budget for our strategic forces next year. The only way we could plausibly have achieved lower numbers is to begin building up our strategic forces dramatically in order to produce an incentive to reduce numbers on the other side. On the basis of existing trends, where the gap would be increasing against us if we didn't increase our numbers, the incentive to achieve ceilings would decline and not increase. And therefore all these propositions must be seen in terms of the alternatives and not simply as abstract statements of desirable objectives.

*Q. The projected figures I gave are ceiling figures, but do they not also represent the inherent and enormous overkill of which you spoke?*

*Secretary Kissinger:* The word "overkill" is a figure of speech. If either side aims to exterminate the civilian population of the other, then it represents overkill. If you want strategic forces for specific military objectives, then whether it represents overkill gets you into complicated areas of strategic analysis.

If the figure had been 200 less, this so-called overkill problem would not have been substantially affected.

Once you have achieved a ceiling on strategic forces and a ceiling on MIRV's, it is our judgment that the follow-on negotiations for reductions will be a lot easier than they will be under conditions where both sides are still increasing their forces. Because the very argument that I have made of why it was not decisively different whether the level was 2,400 or 2,200 or, for that matter, 2,000 will then work in favor of the reductions.

#### **Relations With the People's Republic of China**

*Q. Mr. Secretary, on your last trip to China, the announcement came that President Ford would be going there next year. And also he has mentioned that he wanted to maintain the momentum of development of relations. What effect will this have on our relations with the Republic of China on Taiwan, and what effect does it have toward establishing relations with the mainland?*

*Secretary Kissinger:* We have stated constantly since the signing of the Shanghai communique that our objective was to bring about over a period of time normalization of relations between the People's Republic of China and the United States.

The visit of the President, following on the discussions that I have had in Peking, will be one further step along that route. The timing, the methods, and the forms remain to be determined as time goes on.

## Visit of Canadian Prime Minister

*Q. Mr. Secretary, do you believe the Trudeau-Ford meetings last week did anything to alleviate a possible trade war between Canada and the United States, and could you give us your explanation for the rather cold reception given to Trudeau by the administration?*

*Secretary Kissinger:* First of all, I think that the meetings between the Prime Minister and the President contributed substantially to the improvement of relations between the two countries and to the dialogue between the two countries.

I read that Prime Minister Trudeau was given a cold reception. This was certainly not our intention. It was an unofficial visit; it was always understood to be an informal visit. We followed the protocol that is used for these visits.

I attended all the meetings. And the relationship between the Prime Minister and the President was unusually cordial. And in fact, after the formal part was over—I don't know whether that was announced, but the President took Trudeau to the family quarters, and the Prime Minister and the President and the two Foreign Ministers sat around and had drinks for another hour.

So I just don't agree that it was a cool reception. The meeting was extremely cordial. And insofar as good personal relations between leaders contribute to easing foreign policy decisions, I think it made a major contribution.

*Q. Mr. Secretary, on the backdown on the oil, will the United States retaliate in any way?*

*Secretary Kissinger:* The backdown on the oil is a complicated problem, because it is a major domestic issue in Canada. And I think this is an issue that Canada and we will have an opportunity to discuss over many months.

## U.S. Reaction to U.N. Bloc Voting

*Q. Mr. Secretary, Ambassador Scali made a speech to the United Nations yesterday that indicates we are taking a new tack, a*

*new policy, toward that organization. Could you expand on that, please?*

*Secretary Kissinger:* We have been disturbed by some of the trends in the United Nations.

We believe that it is unfortunate that there is a bloc that votes automatically, regardless of the merits of the dispute. And we have some questions about the procedures that were adopted on various deliberations. We believe that if the United Nations is to fulfill its functions, it is essential for the debates in the General Assembly to be related at least to some extent to the merits of the dispute rather than to automatic voting patterns. And I think there must be a scrupulous observance of the charter and of the procedures.

We thought it was desirable for Ambassador Scali to express our concerns.

## Middle East Diplomacy

*Q. Mr. Secretary, there were two rather interesting developments in the Middle East in the last couple of days. One—Prime Minister Rabin's statement that Israel was prepared to make far-reaching territorial compromises. And a day or so before that, a story in Ha'Aretz in which Rabin was said to be willing to drop Israel's previous demand for a declaration of nonbelligerency from Egypt in return for demilitarization of the Sinai and creating a de facto situation. To what extent do you believe that these apparent concessions have made it easier for a new round of negotiations to begin with Egypt?*

*Secretary Kissinger:* Well, as you know, Foreign Minister Allon is coming here tomorrow. And to put minds at ease, I will be meeting him at the airport.

Foreign Minister Allon will be here tomorrow. We will then have discussions as to what the next steps might be.

We have felt very strongly that this phase of Middle East diplomacy should be done with a minimum of public declarations. And I don't believe that I would be contributing to progress by adding my voice to all of the



perhaps excessive speculations that have already been made. We hope that progress can be achieved.

### Emigration From Soviet Union

*Q. Mr. Secretary, this week you assured the Senate Foreign Relations Committee that through interested groups you would know whether the Russians were violating certain agreements they had reached with you.*

*Secretary Kissinger:* Senate Finance Committee.

*Q. Right—Finance. My accent. But at the same time, you testified that you could only speculate whether the decline by about 40 percent in 1974 was a result of decisions by applicants or whether it was affected by our administration's inability to live up to the terms of the trade agreement. Which statement is operative?*

*Secretary Kissinger:* I said that we would know whether applicants would be restrained from applying, whether there would be harassment of applicants, whether visas would be granted in relation to the numbers of applications, through a variety of sources.

We are still operating under the old guidelines where nobody is claiming that these three principles are being rigidly observed. So we still are reasonably confident that what I said is achievable—that is, that we will know whether there is interference with applications.

*Q. But you don't know yet.*

*Secretary Kissinger:* Not that I would want to speculate publicly.

### Steps To Solve the Energy Problem

*Q. Mr. Secretary, you talked before about the energy problem. I would like to go back to that. You said the United States will in the measurable period of time take certain steps. Is the administration now considering steps such as higher taxes on gasoline purchases or restrictions on gasoline purchases? Are those concrete steps you are considering?*

*And is the measurable period of time you are talking about when the President has to address the nation at the time of the state of the Union?*

*Secretary Kissinger:* Well, I have some idea of the program the President is now considering. I think the announcement of such a program obviously has to be left to the President. I would be surprised if it were delayed much beyond the address to the Congress when it reassembles. And that this is the time period in which I think the decisions will be taken. What the specific measures are, I think I will have to leave for Presidential announcement.

*Q. It goes beyond volunteer efforts.*

*Secretary Kissinger:* That is my impression.

*Q. Mr. Secretary, on the international aspects of that, you referred earlier to your belief that the program for financial assistance to deficit countries, the \$25 billion program, would be achieved ultimately despite some technical objections to the form and the size of it. Could you be more explicit, sir? Prime Minister Trudeau has expressed publicly his preference to go the IMF [International Monetary Fund] route. So did West German Chancellor Schmidt. And could you also tell us what your hopes are for bringing France into a degree of cooperation with the industrial nations' policy?*

*Secretary Kissinger:* With respect to the financial facility, the decision that the industrial nations have to make is whether they will finance their deficits, at least to some extent, by their own efforts or whether they want to put themselves into a position of being completely dependent on the producers for financing those deficits. This is an essentially political decision that they have to make.

We believe that it is important for the consuming nations to create at least some financial mechanisms to take care of at least some of the most difficult problems associated with the balance of payments.

We found in the initial discussions of the

emergency sharing program that many technical objections were voiced, which as the program became refined, were overcome. I still believe that when the problem of financial solidarity is viewed in its wider perspective, as something other than a purely technical financial problem, but something having to do with the political solidarity and in some respects the domestic tranquillity of the advanced consuming nations, that the advantages of doing it initially through methods such as we proposed will become overriding.

Now, with respect to France—we have always favored French participation in the efforts that we are proposing. The French have suggested a producer conference.

We are not opposed to a producer conference in principle. But it is misleading to give the impression that there is no consumer-producer dialogue going on now. The United States is engaged in an active consumer-producer dialogue through a number of commissions we have set up, such as with Saudi Arabia and Iran, through the frequent exchanges we have with Algeria. So we are engaged in a very active consumer-producer dialogue. The question we face is whether we want a consumer-producer conference in which all the consumers, or most of the consumers, meet most of the producers in a multilateral framework.

The only advantage of a multilateral framework is if there is a degree of consumer solidarity and a degree of consumer agreement as to basic approaches. Otherwise the producer conference will merely repeat the bilateral dialogues that are already going on.

Therefore the United States is prepared in principle to go along with a producer dialogue on a multilateral basis if it is preceded by consumer cooperation. And we are prepared to find mechanisms by which France can associate itself with this consumer cooperation.

It is our impression that this problem is soluble. It is certainly soluble from our side, because we have no interest at all to exclude France, and I think it is in the common interest of both consumers and producers

that we proceed by the methods that I have outlined.

#### **Possibilities of Cyprus Negotiations**

*Q. Mr. Secretary, in connection with your opening statement on aid, the aid bill and the possible damage that would be done by the House turning down the aid bill, on the relationship with Turkey. You have said a number of times in the past that you have been on the verge of achieving a breakthrough on the Cyprus question. Where does that stand now? Can you offer the House any hope that if they approve the bill that at some period before the cutoff date you will be able to achieve a breakthrough?*

*Secretary Kissinger:* Let me make two separate points:

First, military aid to Turkey is not given primarily in the context of the Cyprus question. Military aid to Turkey is part of the overall defense of the free world. It has always been considered as an essential part of NATO, and given the foreseeable crises in the eastern Mediterranean, it would seem to us axiomatic that one should not drive Turkey out of a defense relationship with the United States at this particularly crucial period.

So the fundamental point we are making is that military assistance to Turkey is not a favor we do to Turkey. It is a reflection of a basic relationship.

Secondly, on negotiations with respect to Cyprus, the United States has indicated on a number of occasions that in our view, concessions should be made by Turkey—that we would use our influence in that direction. And we have talked to the Greek, Cypriot, and Turkish Governments in that sense.

The congressional action in October provided a major setback to these efforts. The domestic crisis in Turkey was another principal factor.

We believe that over a period of the next few months, progress in getting negotiations started can be achieved. Indeed, it was my intention, well known to the parties long before this issue came up—and the

appointments had been made—to talk to both the Turkish and Greek Foreign Ministers at some length within the framework of the NATO meeting to see whether matters could not be moved forward.

Now I would like to emphasize that the question of military aid to Turkey does not indicate any particular predilection toward Turkey—nor does it indicate any support for Turkey on the particular issues that are before us in Greek-Turkish negotiations or on the Cypriot issue. It is to be seen in the context of the overall security of the West.

I do believe that progress is possible in negotiations on Cyprus, and the United States is certainly prepared to use its influence in the direction that I have indicated.

#### **Incentives for Restraint by Superpowers**

*Q. Mr. Secretary, last Tuesday, during your second session before the Senate Finance Committee, you were asked by Senator Byrd [Harry F. Byrd, Jr.] to confirm that Soviet action during the October war was a violation of the May 1972 U.S.-Soviet agreement on détente. And you candidly admitted that Soviet action was indeed in violation of that agreement. What has happened since the last war to indicate to you that Soviet action during another war, if another war would erupt in the Middle East, would not be a violation?*

*Secretary Kissinger:* My answer—the question was a little more specific, and my answer was more precise.

The question was: If the Soviet Union encouraged other countries to participate in the war in the Middle East, that this would constitute a violation of the principles that have been established. And I would have to say that if the Soviet Union encouraged other countries to participate, this would be considered a violation of the principles.

We are seeking to produce the maximum incentives for Soviet restraint on a global basis, including the Middle East, through a variety of measures, including of course direct conversations on the subject.

I would say that in fact the SALT agree-

ment ought to provide incentives for restraint if it is viewed as it should be—as a political and not only a military decision.

What the Soviet Union will do in a specific crisis, I cannot now foretell. Our attitude, in any event, is clear: We do not believe that either of the superpowers should encourage a widening of any conflict that might arise.

#### **Foreign Investment in the United States**

*Q. Mr. Secretary, as you are aware, sir, the governments of the Middle Eastern countries and citizens of those countries are using their oil money to buy into Western industries, most recently in Germany, and there was an unsuccessful attempt to buy into Lockheed Aircraft in this country. Yesterday, the Secretary of Defense indicated some reservations about any third countries and their nationals buying into key American industries, particularly defense industries and particularly those which have access to classified information.*

*What could you tell us is the official U.S. position on this, and have we made representations to other governments?*

*Secretary Kissinger:* No, we have not made representations to other governments, partly because we are not absolutely clear what the nature of the representation is that we ought to be making—since, on the one hand, we are trying to get them to spend oil income in this country.

What we are doing is to start a study on the implications of substantial investments, at least in the United States—how we can keep track of them and what the complete implications are, or at least to identify the dangers against which we should guard. We have just begun thinking about this, and it will take us several weeks to form a clear judgment.

#### **U.S. Policy Toward Expropriation**

*Q. Mr. Secretary, this morning the Venezuelan Government announced nationalization of U.S. Steel and Bethlehem Steel the first of the year. Now the companies, appar-*

ently, have agreed to the terms of the settlements, so that legalities don't arise—but I was wondering whether you, in general, have any attitude toward this and whether you foresee any trend in Latin America along this line?

*Secretary Kissinger:* Well, I have not yet seen the precise terms of the settlement. It is my understanding that the expropriation was negotiated with the companies, and my impression is that the companies are not dissatisfied by the terms.

The U.S. position is that while we do not recommend expropriation, and indeed, while it runs counter to the investment of private capital, which may be one of the best sources for the underdeveloped countries of capital, we do not, as a government, object to it if there is fair compensation and due legal process. And this seems to have been the case in Venezuela, though I want to study the precise terms.

#### **Need for Solidarity Among Energy Consumers**

*Q. Mr. Secretary, let's just get back to your Chicago speech. What kind of time scale do you envisage, and when do you think, and how will you certify that the consumers have made—in the main—expressed sufficient solidarity to the producers; and in that sense, how do you envisage bringing France into it?*

*Secretary Kissinger:* We believe that substantial progress toward consumer solidarity can be made within the next three or four months. We will know when adequate consumer solidarity has been achieved. We have rather clear ideas. They are, after all, the yardsticks that we have laid down in the Chicago speech.

On the other hand, we won't pretend that there is consumer solidarity when there isn't, and if there isn't, we will continue our own consumer-producer dialogue.

*Q. Well, at what point—I mean at what point do you think France can be persuaded that she has made the right gestures?*

*Secretary Kissinger:* We are not interested in gestures—we are interested in reality. And we are not looking for excuses by which to pretend that solidarity has been achieved.

There is a rather clear program—progress toward a program—that would enable us to proceed with a multilateral producer dialogue, and we think this can be settled amicably and with good will.

I believe that the conversations between President Ford and the French President in Martinique are going to make major progress toward this objective—at least this is the attitude with which we will approach it.

#### **Complex Middle East Negotiations**

*Q. At Rabat—but before the [Yasir] Arafat visit to the General Assembly, where he was hailed—President Sadat of Egypt promised you that he would continue along with your step-by-step strategy on the Middle East.*

*Now that position of Egypt seems a good deal more awkward than it may have seemed at the time, and you are seeing Allon, and Mr. Brezhnev is going to Cairo in January. Is Egypt still able to deliver on this promise, and what initiatives do you have with the Egyptians between now and the Brezhnev visit?*

*Secretary Kissinger:* As I have pointed out, we believe that the next phase of Middle East diplomacy will be most effective if we don't speculate about the intentions of various parties.

I have heard nothing so far to indicate that the positions that were publicly announced at the beginning of November have changed. Obviously, the Middle East is a volatile area in which conditions can change. I have not heard anything to this effect, nor do I have any indication that it has happened, so we just have to see what—

*Q. To follow up—when are you going to see your next Egyptian official? And where?*

*Secretary Kissinger:* No plans exist, right now, for my seeing any Egyptian official.

### **The SALT Agreement and Defense Spending**

*Q. Mr. Secretary, Senator Jackson, in the memorandum he distributed yesterday, called on his colleagues to send back the SALT agreement as it stands now, on the grounds that the numbers are too high. What would be the effect on overall political relationships with the Soviet Union if in fact you were not able to get approval of the agreement, if in fact it were signed with the numbers as they are now?*

*Secretary Kissinger:* I would say two things:

If the Senate or the Congress wants to send back the agreement to us with instructions to get lower numbers, they better send with it an authorization in the appropriations bill for \$5-\$10 billion to increase our strategic forces. It doesn't make any sense to instruct us to get better numbers without at the same time being prepared to pay the price of the arms buildup that will be the only possible incentive by which an agreement for lower numbers could be achieved. Of course the point might then also be reached at which 2,400 would represent a reduction of the overall forces of both sides—and so some theoretical satisfaction might be achieved politically.

One would have to say that the Soviet Union made very major concessions in Vlad-

vostok. Anybody familiar with the negotiating record must know that the Soviet Union gave up its position on a whole range of issues. Now, if this, too, leads to a divisive debate in the United States, and if the pattern of the trade bill is repeated, I think then the Soviet Union will only be able to conclude that a political détente with us faces domestic difficulties of an insuperable nature in the United States.

And therefore I believe that the consequences of such an action would be extremely serious on the political level. And the consequences in terms of the arms race would be equally serious. To refuse this agreement without being prepared for a massive increase in defense spending, especially on strategic forces, would compound all the difficulties that we confront.

### **The South Korean Regime and U.S. Aid**

*Q. Mr. Secretary, when you were in South Korea with President Ford, did you discuss with President Park the release of the political prisoners and the restoration of a democratic government, in view of the strong congressional opposition to further military aid to such a repressive regime?*

*Secretary Kissinger:* The Presidential Press Secretary pointed out in Korea that the subject was discussed, but it wouldn't be appropriate to go into detail.

*The press: Mr. Secretary, thank you very much for your time this morning.*

## The Trade Reform Act and Today's World Economic Problems

*Address by President Ford*<sup>1</sup>

It is a great privilege and a very high honor to have the opportunity of participating in this American Conference on Trade. And at the outset, let me assure you that I thank you and I congratulate you on the magnificent efforts that you have made during the day and previously, and I exhort you to continue your efforts until we are successful in the achievement of the objective that has been determined, which is in the best interest of our country.

Within the last several weeks, I traveled about halfway around the world. I met leaders of Japan, Korea, and the Soviet Union, and I am here tonight to call on you, my fellow Americans, to come with me on an even greater journey, a journey that could be, without a question of a doubt, the most important in our lives, yours and mine, and will affect countless of Americans for many, many years to come.

It is, very simply put, to redefine, to reshape, the role of the United States in world trade. Those of you who are serious and cognizant, and all of you are, about the problems we face on this globe, you know that it is a new world out there. We are witnessing today a worldwide economic revolution.

New, acute economic problems and concerns have moved onto the world scene with startling swiftness. Nations, large as well as small, are redefining their national interests. Some talk in terms of economic bloc

or area advantages. And there are those who face the increasing threat of a simple, very stark reality—survival.

The United States and most nations face the most serious economic challenge of the postwar period. Problems of energy, food, inflation, recession, pose unprecedented threats in all parts of the world. They threaten employment; they threaten income; they jeopardize international economic cooperation; and they menace political and security relationships that the United States has taken a generation to construct.

Unless we approach these problems constructively and cooperatively with our principal trading partners, we in the world may face a crisis of the most serious proportions.

These times call for positive, constructive American leadership. The United States cannot afford to drift in a sea of international uncertainty at a time when its highest economic interests call for very decisive actions. We cannot honestly claim leadership of the free world if we do not influence—with practical policies and real purpose—greater economic cooperation.

We must be under no illusion that we can go it alone. I think that is why all of you are here tonight and why I am here. And that is the reason the journey we undertake here must go on vigorously, effectively, and constructively. The word must go out from here tonight to the American people and to the people of other nations, and especially our friends in the Congress, that America has made a very serious decision: We must pass the Trade Reform Act—now. It is essential to the future of the United States trade policy and that of the world as well.

<sup>1</sup>Made at Washington on Dec. 3 before the American Conference on Trade, sponsored by a number of business, agriculture, consumer, and civic organizations (text from Weekly Compilation of Presidential Documents dated Dec. 9).

The health of our domestic economy and the strength—yes, the very structure—of our international economic relations are deeply involved.

The Congress must act—and I say this with the utmost seriousness—or its inaction will gravely affect my efforts or anybody else's efforts to turn our economy upward. It will severely limit my ability, or the ability of anybody else, to work for international economic cooperation abroad.

You and I know that this legislation will, in all probability, be long delayed, possibly stymied forever, if it is not passed in the current session of this Congress. From a very practical point of view, it means that for the next year or more when the economic situation calls for decisive decisions, I will serve as your President without the power to fulfill my responsibilities in the crucial area of our nation's trade.

This vital bill, the trade reform bill, has been pending before Congress for nearly two years. Actually, no President of the United States has had the authority to negotiate international trade matters since 1967. International trade relations have not been really revamped since that time. It has been 40 years, as we look back over the pages of history, since passage of the nation's historic and fundamental Trade Agreements Act of 1934.

The central issue of trade reform is the close interrelationship between our domestic economy on the one hand and our economic international relations. And let us look at this important interrelationship for just a moment.

Admittedly, the American economy is in a recession at the present time. Inflation pressures are many. Fear of unemployment is increasing among our people.

The highest priority of this administration in the weeks and months ahead, as has been said since I took office four months ago, will be to attack these growing and changing economic problems. And one of the most effective ways to start is to pass the trade reform legislation in our national self-interest.

Obviously, I will need the full cooperation

of the Congress. That is essential for all 213 million Americans. I will. And I have certainly welcomed the comments by the Senate Majority Leader, Mike Mansfield, for bipartisan cooperation. I commend the Senate Committee on Finance and Chairman Russell Long for acting with restraint and not attaching unrelated amendments.

The international economy faces very similar difficulties. Inflation is a worldwide problem. Most of the economies of the industrialized world have swung into a downward cycle, partly as a consequence of inflationary distortions.

International cooperation is absolutely essential if the world is to conquer this twin illness of global recession and global inflation. We in the United States must develop a coordinated domestic and international approach to inflation and to recession. Trade is vital, essential, critical, to that program.

Two-way trade for America amounted to \$163 billion for the first 10 months of this calendar year. Those are the latest figures. This leaves our current trade balance at a deficit of some \$2.3 billion. This is due chiefly to the huge increase in the cost of imported oil. In the first 10 months of this year, oil imports cost us \$20.1 billion compared to \$7.8 billion for all of 1973. Thus, without the enormous increase in oil costs, we would have a good-sized surplus this year. The United States enjoyed a \$1.3 billion surplus last year. This is important to note: Our exports for the first 10 months of this year are running at an annual rate of 36 percent above 1973.

These exports add up to many jobs for Americans in all parts of our country and in all sectors of our society. Some 3 million American workers owe their livelihood to our American exports—from stevedores to aircraft machinists to white-collar workers staffing American corporations. Even the smallest of our business organizations in this country, three out of five successful American exporters have fewer than 100 employees. More than 20 percent of American farm income derives from sales abroad.

Trade—everybody in this room knows—is the bread-and-butter issue to workers and

businesses in our communities, large, small, in all parts of our 50 states. That means farms on the one hand, business on the other, and industry as a whole.

Over the years the effect of trade on our economy has been highly favorable. The U.S. economy—consumers, workers—benefits from imports as well as exports. The explanation is relatively simple: Our total imports for the first 10 months of this year amounted to approximately \$83 billion. About \$37 billion of that figure were essential to American production—metals, foods, chemicals, minerals, including oil.

Many American businesses are heavily dependent on imported materials. Let me offer just a couple of specific examples of how imports help us as an industrial nation.

We are almost entirely dependent on foreign countries for such vital materials as chromium, platinum, titanium, manganese. More than 85 percent of our aluminum comes from overseas; so does most of our bauxite.

When we add the vigor from these imports to the strength of exporting, we can see the significance of trade to America's economic health. Trade adds to the income, the income of the American labor force, and to our economic preeminence in the world at large.

There will be no plus in our balance of trade this year because of the severe, high cost of importing oil. Otherwise, we could be and would be very much in the black.

Naturally, I consider the price we are paying for oil as much too high. It is raising havoc on our domestic economy. If you deduct the increased cost of oil imports, the United States exhibits a favorable trade balance of nearly \$8 billion during the first six months of 1974.

Oil price increases are upsetting the entire international economic system. The adjustments, the answers must come from international bargaining, from international cooperation, and that is the top priority of this administration.

The overall effect of our trade is highly favorable, but the Trade Reform Act makes specific provision to assist those who might be adversely affected by imports. No sectors of

our economy will be left to face serious disruptions. The legislation clearly states—and I will vigorously support such provisions—that we will assist workers, firms, communities adversely affected by imports.

In these very difficult times, it may be tempting for some in our great country to turn inward. Powerful forces in this country are not only thinking but actually urging an inward course on legislation, not only in the Trade Reform Act but in many other pieces of legislation. This, in my judgment, would reverse American postwar trade and other policies and would be enormously harmful to us as to the rest of the globe, our allies as well as our adversaries.

It is my strong feeling—and I say this with the deepest conviction—let us turn outward to view the complex picture of international trade. Our nation lives and acts in the world community within a very intricate framework. It is the framework of political, security, and economic ties that binds nations everywhere together.

There are those in the world who believe that unilateral and bilateral action promoting their own self-interest is the quickest and the most promising solution to their problems. I categorically reject that view. We must believe, and I certainly do, that this policy can only lead to conflict—an unending series of flareups and disputes in all parts of the world.

In contrast, the United States believes—and I am committed to this policy if the Congress will urgently let me negotiate—that the only real answer is the long-range solution of total world cooperation. I seek multilateral solutions to common problems that will benefit all nations, but I need the Trade Reform Act, and I need it now, if the President of the United States is to have any voice in the international scene.

Let me spell out, if I might, some of the consequences if I do not obtain this legislation from this Congress before it adjourns.

The coming GATT [General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade] international trade negotiations involving 105 members would be dealt a crippling setback. I would lack the



necessary legislative authority to implement my accords or any accords; therefore it would be virtually impossible to arrive at any substantial trade agreements.

The U.S. international political, military, economic commitments would be seriously undermined. This, in my opinion, would encourage unrest and would certainly encourage world instability.

But let's be even more precise, if I might. In energy, Secretaries Kissinger and Bill Simon [William E. Simon, Secretary of the Treasury] are working diligently on international cooperation. But this cooperation cannot be one in a world involved with increasing strife in trade.

The international monetary system needs significant improvement. If we slide back into trade wars, we undermine our honest efforts to keep the international monetary system functioning effectively. Friendly trade is a must if we are to improve our market imbalances.

Trade is necessary so that developing countries can pay back various forms of outside assistance. Some of the developing nations are directly involved in our own growth. They own raw materials and other commodities in short supply essential to our development.

The Trade Reform Act offers me sufficient negotiating authority to achieve a substantial reduction in tariff levels on a worldwide basis. It would allow me to work toward greater market access for U.S. products abroad, adding innumerable thousands of jobs in our own 50 states.

This means jobs for Americans. That means a healthier economy. That means Congress has a duty and an obligation to pass this legislation now.

Let me use one other fact, if I might. I can assure you from my recent experiences that the Soviets are not sitting back. They are not looking for a seat as a spectator. They want and they will get part of the action.

The Soviets are ready to trade—politically, economically—but it will take time. It will take negotiation on the one hand, some very hard bargaining on the other. We have made

a good beginning politically, a breakthrough on controlling the latest generation of nuclear weapons, a breakthrough for peace. Let us make the same breakthrough for trade essential for détente and progress around the world.

In 1973, the United States achieved a trade surplus of more than \$1 billion from the Soviet Union. Another \$900 million surplus came from other Communist countries around the world. Trade with these nations was, therefore, a very crucial factor in our overall trade surplus of \$1.7 [\$1.3] billion in 1973.

The Soviets will not deal unless we work to achieve mutually beneficial economic policies, including the elimination of discrimination against their trade, and unless we are willing to provide appropriate levels of credit within the framework established by the Congress.

Let's be very clear about this. Our competitive trading partners of Western Europe and Japan are issuing credits to Communist countries with which they are now trading. Their record shows that the Soviet credit is good. The credits we issue are small compared to our Western trading partners.

The world today looks to the United States of America for leadership. We have provided this since the end of World War II. We did not provide it prior to World War II. Therefore I would find it inexcusable, as would many Members of Congress and many Americans, if this legislation were to die as a result of delay and procrastination.

The Congress and the executive branch have cooperated more closely—and I might say at a greater length—on this bill than in any other single piece of legislation in the past six years. I can recount in the four months that I have been President a number of meetings with various Senators, various other Members of the Congress, in trying to find a reasonable, constructive compromise on how we might move this legislation forward. And I can assure you that I will personally continue these efforts in the remaining weeks of this session of the Congress.

And let me add this, if I might. And I see

how many members of my Cabinet are here—three, four. They are being told tonight, and everybody in their departments, that this is the job of highest priority—to get this legislation through between now and adjournment. And I will add a P.S. If they don't get it through, they are at fault, and you are, too. [Laughter.]

Well, let me just conclude with these observations and comments. I would find it inexcusable if this legislation were to become encumbered with nonrelated or nongermane amendments. This is somewhat technical, but those of us who have struggled in the Congress for some time know precisely what it means. These would be unrelated amendments, not related to the fundamentals of trade legislation under any circumstances.

They would be amendments that had no prior consideration at all in the Senate Committee on Finance. They would be extraneous to the subject matter that has brought all of you to the Nation's Capital.

I think the time has come; it is far too serious for this important legislation to be encumbered by these nonrelated or nongermane amendments. So, as you go through the halls and into the offices on Capitol Hill, make the point strongly, effectively, that this legislation must stand on its own and should not be overwhelmed with amendments that have no relationship to trade per se.

At this critical moment in our legislative history on this legislation, I don't think we can afford the gamesmanship of nonrelated, nongermane amendments.

I see some former colleagues of mine in the House of Representatives. In the main, we were able to keep nongermane amendments out of the House version of the bill. The burden is now on the United States Senate to do exactly the same.

And let me conclude with these final observations, if I might. I happen to believe that a society is great if its people think greatly, if its people act greatly, and this is a moment for greatness in America.

The journey which we together have started here tonight has no end. For the labor we undertake will never be complete—to help build a world economy that will contribute to

the health and prosperity of people everywhere throughout this globe.

Every nation must carry its share of that great burden to uplift itself on the one hand and others as we move ahead. Every nation must reach out, out to others, to work together, to share in sweat and in sacrifice, secure in the knowledge that none will have to go it alone. This truly, as I see it, could be one of the world's finest hours. With your help, with our cooperation, and with the dedication of everybody, we can make it so.

Thank you very, very much.

## Letters of Credence

### *Grenada*

The newly appointed Ambassador of the State of Grenada, Marie J. McIntyre, presented her credentials to President Ford on November 29.<sup>1</sup>

### *Honduras*

The newly appointed Ambassador of the Republic of Honduras, Roberto Lazarus, presented his credentials to President Ford on November 29.<sup>1</sup>

### *Luxembourg*

The newly appointed Ambassador of the Grand Duchy of Luxembourg, Adrien F. J. Meisch, presented his credentials to President Ford on November 29.<sup>1</sup>

### *United Arab Emirates*

The newly appointed Ambassador of the United Arab Emirates, Saeed Ahmad Ghobash, presented his credentials to President Ford on November 29.<sup>1</sup>

### *Uruguay*

The newly appointed Ambassador of the Oriental Republic of Uruguay, Jose Perez Caldas, presented his credentials to President Ford on November 29.<sup>1</sup>

<sup>1</sup> For texts of the Ambassador's remarks and the President's reply, see Department of State press release dated Nov. 29.

## Chancellor Schmidt of the Federal Republic of Germany Visits the United States

*Helmut Schmidt, Chancellor of the Federal Republic of Germany, made an official visit to the United States December 4-7. He met with President Ford and other government officials in Washington December 5-6. Following are an exchange of greetings between President Ford and Chancellor Schmidt at a welcoming ceremony on the South Lawn of the White House on December 5 and their exchange of toasts at a White House dinner that evening, together with the text of a joint statement issued on December 6.*

### REMARKS AT WELCOMING CEREMONY

Weekly Compilation of Presidential Documents dated December 9

#### President Ford

Chancellor Schmidt, gentlemen: I am delighted to welcome you here in Washington, our Nation's Capital, on behalf of the American people.

This is your first visit, Mr. Chancellor, to the United States as the leader of the German Federal Government. It comes at an historic time for both of our countries.

We in the United States are on the eve of our bicentennial. One of the things that we are particularly aware of is the prominent role played by men and women of German descent in the building of America over the past two centuries. They have made tremendous contributions in fields as widespread as education and science, culture and the arts.

A few months ago the Federal Republic of Germany marked its own 25th anniversary. During this quarter century the Federal Republic has become one of the world's

leading political and economic powers, and also one of its most responsible.

Throughout this entire period of relations between our two countries, it has been marked by a very close friendship and a very close cooperation, and we are particularly proud of that association.

Mr. Chancellor, we live in demanding times. In the effort to solve the formidable economic and political problems confronting us today, close cooperation and mutual help have become infinitely more important than ever. Only by working together can we overcome the current difficulties facing our economies and international economy.

I believe we can do it, and speaking for the American people, I appreciate the support your government has shown for strengthened economic cooperation in the international field.

We also recognize your international contributions in dealing with the problems of energy, food, and financial pressures.

A keystone, of course, of our present and future cooperation is the Atlantic alliance. At a time when all members of the alliance confront budgetary difficulties, difficult choices for all of them, we applaud and endorse your country's positive attitude toward maintaining the strength of NATO.

We also appreciate, Mr. Chancellor, your cooperation in helping to assure that no nation bear an unfair burden of the cost of our common defense.

We will have many important issues to discuss today and tomorrow, Mr. Chancellor. I look forward to those discussions in full confidence that these talks will contribute significantly to our efforts in creating more stable political and economic conditions throughout the world. I know that your

visit will further strengthen the already close friendship and partnership between the Federal Republic and the United States.

Mr. Chancellor, America bids you and your party a most cordial welcome.

#### **Chancellor Schmidt**

Mr. President, ladies and gentlemen: Thank you, Mr. President, very much for your warm welcome and for the kind words, regardful words, addressed to me and my party.

As you said, it is not my first visit to the United States, but the first time that I have come to this country as the head of government of the Federal Republic of Germany.

I am particularly glad to have this opportunity so soon after you, Mr. President, have assumed your office in order to exchange views on the main questions which do concern us.

In today's world we are faced with a multitude of difficult problems whose solutions will make unprecedented demands on our countries and will require us to harness our strength in the common effort.

The world is threatened by severe economic disruption. The Middle East conflict, whose settlement your administration is working so hard to bring about, and the energy crisis, which followed in its wake, have suddenly opened our eyes to the fragile nature of the foundations on which our economic and social and political stability does rest.

The strengthening of these foundations is a task that does concern us all, and which we can only master through broad international cooperation, as you said.

We in Germany are conscious of this challenge, and we are preparing ourselves to meet it. In this search we do attach specific importance to close cooperation and consultation between the United States of America and Europe and my own country.

The partnership between the United States and Europe has stood the test. It has existed for more than 25 years in the Atlantic alliance, which was strengthened by the Declaration of Ottawa in the middle of this year. It has also reflected our common

efforts to promote détente in Europe and in the world.

We are resolved to do everything within our capability to strengthen and to further develop this partnership.

The untroubled friendship between the United States and the Federal Republic of Germany seems to be an excellent basis for this, and it is my firm conviction that our meeting, Mr. President, will bring us closer to this goal.

Thank you very much.

#### **EXCHANGE OF TOASTS**

Weekly Compilation of Presidential Documents dated December 9

#### **President Ford**

Mr. Chancellor: It is a great privilege and a pleasure for me and our people to have you and your Foreign Secretary, Mr. Genscher, and the others from your party visiting us in Washington on this occasion.

We, of course, feel that this gathering is a reaffirmation of the longstanding friendship of your people as well as ours, your government as well as ours, a friendship that has a very broad base in military security, economic relations, people-to-people relations.

Of course, the pages of history in the United States are filled with contributions made over the 200 years of our nation's history, contributions made by people from your country.

It goes back as far as Baron Von Steuben, who was probably the finest military training officer as well as a fighting officer, who took a pretty ragged American outfit at Valley Forge and made it capable and competent to meet the challenges in the next spring.

And, of course, Abraham Lincoln had a very outstanding German who was a member of his Cabinet, who contributed significantly to our history in that day and that era.

Of course, the contribution by people from Germany to our country also includes the arts, it includes science, it includes literature. And as Larry Brown and I know,

there are some outstanding Germans who have contributed to our proficiency in athletics. One who may come to mind for some of us in the older age group, Lou Gehrig, was probably a legendary baseball player in our athletic history, and his ancestry, of course, was that of your country.

But with the people who have helped to make America great, and those that are working with us today in the field of the military, the economic areas, the rapport I think is good for not only each of us but for the world at large.

Twenty-five years of your history has been a period of 25 years of close personal relationship to the United States, and vice versa.

We seem to have the same philosophical views, the same ideological opinions as to how you can move ahead. We tend to subscribe in America to the views of one of Germany's greatest minds, one of the world's greatest—I am told, as I read history—Goethe. He once wrote that we can only earn our freedom and our existence by struggling for it every day.

For 25 years, day in and day out, the Federal Republic and the United States have worked together for a freer, better world in a spirit of mutual friendship and great mutual respect.

So, it is my privilege, Mr. Chancellor, in the spirit of our friendship and cooperation and mutual interest, to offer a toast to you and all that you embody and that of your great country: To the Chancellor and to the Federal Republic and its people.

#### **Chancellor Schmidt**

Mr. President, Mrs. Ford, ladies and gentlemen: I would like to thank you, Mr. President, for the kind and warm words you have addressed to my party and to me. I think one of the two of us has to confess to this distinguished gathering that, despite the fact that we did not intend to solve any bilateral problems between ourselves, because we don't have any bilateral problems [laughter], nevertheless we did make a bilateral agreement just tonight insofar as we

agreed to put away the speeches which were made for us. [Laughter.]

And so, the President did and I am going to do it, but we allowed for just one quotation from the speeches. You will later on detect me, or observe me, looking to my paper once. But before so doing, I would like to point out that I think you were especially generous, Mr. President, in talking of the last 25 years of our really very good and ever-improving relationship, a relationship between your great country and ours.

You were very gracious not to mention periods of history before that—I will not dig into it. But I would like to say that my compatriots and I myself, we are really thankful for the great help which we have received from your people immediately after the war and that we also are thankful for having had your assistance, your standing firm on matters vital for our own sake; for instance, for your standing firm on Berlin all these years.

You have just come back to the United States from a meeting with the number-one man of the Soviet Union. From what I understand from your report to us, you have clearly added one step further in the policy of bringing about balance in the world and the stability of that balance, and bringing about détente, if you wish to call it that, a policy which we have followed, both of our nations, both of our governments, parallel to each other, as we have all these long decades followed in common the policy of making ourselves capable, if need should arise, to defend ourselves against threats or pressures from outside.

It seems to me that so far we have been very successful together with our other partners within the Atlantic alliance. In the meantime, new problems have come up which we did not foresee 10 years ago, referring to the Middle East or referring to the oil price explosion—I think one might call it an explosion—and all our economies so far have not adapted to that enormous change, whether it is in the field of real incomes, whether that is in the field of balance of payments, whether it is in the field of aggravating the process of inflation.

We have talked at length today, and also your Secretaries and aides and my party have talked at length, about economic problems. We have exchanged our analyses, we have exchanged our attitudes, our plans for future actions. Advice was given freely and taken from both sides—this is the point where I have to look to my paper [laughter]—because I wrote down in my own handwriting a little quote.

I think it is from some American. He is not as famous as Goethe. Nevertheless, it reads: "Free advice is the kind that costs you nothing unless you act upon it." [Laughter.]

So, I warn you, Mr. President, to be careful in acting upon our advice, and we will be careful on our side as well.

But coming back to a more serious aspect of the matter, I think I could say on behalf of my party, especially my colleague Genscher, and the rest, that we were very thankful for this free exchange of analyses and thoughts and of the plans we might put into operation in the next time, because we do really feel that your great country, five times as big—I mean in economic size—than ours and our second biggest in terms of foreign trade, we do really feel that both our responsibilities, vis-a-vis the world's economy as a whole and the other partners in the free-world economy, request from us that we try as much as one can to coordinate our economic policies as we have coordinated our defense policies, as we have coordinated our détente policies, as we tried to coordinate our policies all over the globe.

Now, at this present stage I think in the economic field there lies a great part of our faith, not only of your people, also of ours, also of other peoples in the world.

If the economic future becomes bleak and uncertain, economic uncertainty and economic failure can lead to economic unrest not only, but also social unrest and also domestic political unrest in a number of countries, not in the first instance in the United States of America, not in the first instance in our country, but we might be infected in the course of time.

I think all my compatriots heard with great satisfaction what you said this afternoon about you would not permit an aggravation of the downward trend of the economy, which at present is characterizing all our economies.

I am not going to too much dig into that field. I only wanted—using this as an example, the economic exercise of ours as an example—to express again, sir, our gratitude for this really free and frank and candid exchange of views and to express our gratitude for the endeavor on both sides to coordinate and harmonize our policies, which in fact does not mean that both of our parts have to exactly operate along the same lines, but means that we will have to follow complementary policies in order to achieve the same goal that we have in common.

Ladies and gentlemen, I would like to rise and drink to the President of the United States and our charming hostess.

## TEXT OF JOINT STATEMENT

### JOINT UNITED STATES-FEDERAL REPUBLIC OF GERMANY STATEMENT

The President of the United States of America Gerald R. Ford and the Chancellor of the Federal Republic of Germany Helmut Schmidt met in Washington on December 5 and 6, 1974. They reaffirmed the relationship of friendship and trust and confidence between the United States and the Federal Republic of Germany, and they held wide-ranging talks embracing international and economic problems, security and defense policy, and current East-West discussions. Secretary of State and Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs Henry A. Kissinger and Foreign Minister Hans Dietrich Genscher participated in the discussions between the President and the Chancellor and held complementary talks. In the economic talks, the President was joined by members of his Economic Policy Board and the Chancellor was accompanied by representatives of labor and business.

The President and the Chancellor reviewed the world economic situation in depth and explored effective solutions for current economic problems. They were agreed that international energy problems, the sharp increases in world prices, the contraction of economic activities, and large-scale payments imbalance constitute a severe threat to political and social stability in many countries. A

creative new effort to coordinate economic policies between the United States and the Federal Republic of Germany, together with its partners in the European Community, will be required to master these difficulties.

The United States of America and the Federal Republic of Germany recognize the responsibility which falls to them for ensuring a prosperous international economy and safeguarding world trade. In this context they attach great significance to the upcoming multilateral trade negotiations. They reaffirmed their international pledges to avoid trade and payments restrictions which adversely affect other countries.

The President and the Chancellor agreed that in current circumstances they both have a responsibility to manage their domestic economic policies so as simultaneously to strengthen output and employment and to avoid new inflationary impulses. They affirmed that both countries have a need to encourage investment, to combat rising unemployment, and to act to increase confidence in the financial and the economic outlook. They recognized that the two countries are at different points in their fight against inflation, and that policies will take that fact into account. They are determined not to permit a serious deterioration in their economies to occur. If necessary, they will step in with adequate measures to prevent it.

The United States and the Federal Republic of Germany agreed that determination and cooperation are also necessary in dealing with energy-related problems. They underlined the importance of the International Energy Agency set up within the framework of the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development [OECD] to coordinate the energy policies of the industrialized countries. They attach particular importance to measures to reduce dependence on imported energy through conservation, more economic use of energy, and opening up of alternative sources. They stressed the need for cooperation in the field of research, notably in relation to coal processing and gasification.

Despite cooperative efforts to reduce dependence on energy imports, the President and the Chancellor recognized that in the coming year there will continue to be large scale imbalances in trade among nations and a corresponding necessity for large international flows of funds. They recognized that these flows for the most part have been, and in all probability will continue to be, handled by existing private and official channels. At the same time they agreed on the necessity of close cooperation among the financial authorities to insure the continued safe and orderly functioning of financial institutions in their expanding international roles. They agreed on the importance of the International Monetary Fund and other multilateral financial agencies being in a position in 1975 to provide flex-

ible responsive financial assistance to any member nation facing international payments difficulties arising from the rapidly changing world economic situation. In addition, to insure that industrial countries which follow prudent and cooperative economic and energy policies have access to adequate financial resources in case of need, the President and the Chancellor agreed that early consideration should be given by these nations to the establishment of a supplementary financial safety net in the framework of the OECD.

The President and the Chancellor also stressed their determination to improve cooperation with the oil-producing countries. They expressed the conviction that further economic progress in the world, both in the developing and the developed countries, can only be resolved by means of world-wide cooperation.

The United States and the Federal Republic of Germany recognize the necessity of international cooperation to improve the international food situation. They will undertake prompt discussions on an international system of nationally-held grain reserves, increased global food production and substantial growth in food output in developing countries in order to prevent the recurrence of major food problems in the future. Both recognize the need for cooperation between food producers and consumers to ensure equitable adjustment to shortages and deficits.

The discussions on political questions centered on the North Atlantic Alliance, the evolution of East-West relations, and the situation in the Mediterranean and in the Near East.

The President and the Chancellor reviewed the progress of matters before the Alliance on the eve of the NATO Ministerial meeting to be convened next week in Brussels. They agreed on the continuing importance to the Allies of maintaining their political cohesion and strong defenses as the indispensable prerequisites for continued efforts to advance the process of East-West detente. Against the background of current challenges to their strength and solidarity, they reaffirmed their support for the principles of the Declaration on Atlantic Relations signed by Allied Heads of Government in June 1974.

The President and the Chancellor reiterated their resolve to contribute to the process of detente and the growth of cooperation between East and West. President Ford reviewed the SALT negotiations in the light of his talks with General Secretary Brezhnev in Vladivostok. They noted with satisfaction that it has been agreed to aim for limitations on strategic nuclear weapons on the basis of equality. The Chancellor expressed his appreciation for the progress achieved in Vladivostok which he considered most important for the pursuit of the policy of detente and safeguarding peace. President Ford

## Prime Minister Trudeau of Canada Visits Washington

*Pierre Elliott Trudeau, Prime Minister of Canada, visited Washington December 4. Following is an exchange of toasts between President Ford and Prime Minister Trudeau at a dinner in the Blue Room at the White House that evening.*

Weekly Compilation of Presidential Documents dated December 9

### PRESIDENT FORD

Mr. Prime Minister and gentlemen: Let me say at the outset we are delighted to have you as our guests. I must say on behalf of my wife, she made a very special effort. This is the first opportunity she has had to have this room for this purpose, and she said she hoped that you would enjoy the atmosphere and setup. And if you say yes, I will tell her.

Let me, on a more serious note, say that we are delighted to have you here because of our deep respect and affection for you as the leader of one of our great friends and allies.

Let me add, if I might, that we in the United States know of no other country where the United States has some 4,000 or 5,000 miles of border, when you consider not only the north and south and also Alaska. And so there is a great reason for us to have a rapport and a particular affection, people to people and country to country.

And I might say the first trip that I ever took out of the United States—I was quite young and quite thrilled—was the trip that I took from Detroit to Windsor. [Laughter.] They didn't preclude me from going to Windsor, and I had no trouble getting back. [Laughter.]

But that was a thrill to me, and it was my first trip out of our country and to a foreign country.

But my memories of that trip left me with a great remembrance of the relationship that our country has with yours. The truth is, of course, good friends often have many

and Chancellor Schmidt agreed that the understandings of Vladivostok would have a salutary effect on the overall development of East-West relations.

The two delegations also discussed the state of negotiations in Vienna on mutual and balanced force reductions [MBFR] in Central Europe. They confirmed their shared view that the aim of MBFR should be to arrive at a common ceiling for forces of both alliance systems.

Both sides expressed the hope that the Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe would soon complete its initial consideration of texts dealing with all items on the agenda. It would then be possible to enter into the final stage of the negotiations. They agreed that certain progress had recently been made in reaching agreement on such areas as family reunification and improved access to printed information. They noted, however, that important texts still remain to be agreed, especially with regard to the Declaration of Principles governing Relations between States.

The President and Secretary of State Kissinger reviewed the United States' efforts to contribute to progress toward the achievement of a just and lasting peace in the Middle East. Both sides emphasized the importance of the disengagement agreements and of further results in the negotiating process.

As to developments in the Eastern Mediterranean, both sides stressed the responsibility of the parties immediately concerned. They stated their readiness to encourage Greece, Turkey, and Cyprus in the search for a mutually acceptable settlement of the dispute on the basis of the independence and territorial integrity of the Republic of Cyprus.

The German side reviewed the state of the relations of the Federal Republic of Germany with the GDR [German Democratic Republic] and of the issue of foreign representation of West Berlin by the Federal Republic of Germany. Both sides were agreed on the importance of maintaining and developing the ties between the Federal Republic of Germany and West Berlin as well as full and complete implementation of all other parts of the Quadripartite Agreement.

The President and the Federal Chancellor reaffirmed the attachment of their Governments and peoples to the high purposes of the United Nations. They reviewed the proceedings of the current General Assembly and expressed their hope that the spirit of cooperation would prevail over divergences and divisions so that the cause of international harmony, cooperation and a sound and enduring peace would be furthered.

The President and the Chancellor agreed to remain in close touch with one another, and to consult on all matters of mutual interest as might be required in the future.



differences, and among friends differences fortunately can be better debated or discussed than they can when a different relationship exists.

I have heard it said many times—and Rog Morton formerly served in the Congress—and Gale McGee and George Aiken and Bob McEwin; I hope I haven't missed any of the Members of Congress—we often say in the Congress that you can disagree without being disagreeable. And that is the way I think our relations between your country and ours has proceeded in the past, and I hope will proceed in the future.

We do have some differences. I felt that our meeting today was one of the most constructive, one of the most friendly, and with each of us expressing where we had some differences. It was a point of view and an understanding. If you have an understanding, I think you can come to reasonable and rational conclusions.

I look forward to subsequent meetings with you to broaden our personal friendship and to expand our two national relationships. It has been a pleasure for me to get to know your Ambassador. He did present to me about a week or 10 days ago a very thoughtful gift on behalf of your government commemorating the 1976 Olympics, which are to be held in Montreal.

It brought to my mind the fact that in 1976 we are celebrating our 200th anniversary. I hope that the people that come to your Olympics—and I hope to come if you will invite me, Mr. Prime Minister; I like that snow, you know—and that some of the visitors that come to the United States will go to Montreal and Canada, and vice versa.

But speaking of Montreal, I have had the privilege a long time ago of skiing at Mont Tremblant and Saint Jovite, which I thought was tremendous and I still do. And that was another experience that gave me a great affection and admiration for the people of Canada.

So, with my personal affection for you and the Canadian people and the United States strong conviction about our relationship, to you and your country, if I might, I would

like to offer a toast to you, Prime Minister of Canada, and to the Canadian people and to the Queen.

#### PRIME MINISTER TRUDEAU

Mr. President, gentlemen, and friends: When Canadians travel abroad, Mr. President, they spend all the time explaining to other people how they are different from the Americans. There is a great belief in other lands that Canadians and Americans are exactly the same. I am particularly distressed to find this when we are dealing with the Common Market. We are different, and we have different problems and different economic requirements.

But it does happen that we have to show how similar we are and how close our two peoples are. And the best example, I can find, when I have to explain that kind of thing, is to talk about in summer, in the baseball stadium in Montreal where tens of thousands of Canadians get together to cheer for the Canadian team against the visiting American team when every one of the players on both sides is American. [Laughter.] When I have stayed in some of your American cities, it is another story. In winter in your hockey forums, they cheer for the local team, and probably 95 percent of the players on both sides are Canadians—and the best ones.

And this, I think, shows really how close the people are in their goals, in their ways of living, in their love of sports, in their values, even in standards of their own lives.

And that makes your job and mine, Mr. President, so much easier when we meet. We find that most of the subjects which have to be discussed between heads of governments or heads of states when they meet, in our case, have been settled by the people themselves. The figure I was giving you this afternoon of 66 percent of the trade between our two countries being free trade, tariff free, and it will be 81 percent if that trade reform bill gets passed in the form that it went to the Senate committee.

So much of this is done by the people themselves in the trade area, in the cultural area, and the knowledge of each other by the constant visits across the border, that when we meet it is always a pleasant occasion.

As you said, and I realized this afternoon, we can talk to each other in complete candor. We know how the electorates and the press and the House of Representatives or the Senate or the House of Commons will react to various situations. And it is so much—we talk the same language—it is so much easier to deal with problems in this context.

You, as President, have been exposed to the electorates much more frequently than I have. I daresay that I have walked in the valley of the shadow and feel a little more closer than you have. But I think we would both agree that our peoples, Canadian and the American peoples, would cease to support us overnight if they thought that we were embarking on courses which were not friendly, which were not based on cooperation and understanding, on the desire to solve any differences that arise in that spirit of friendship rather than the spirit of hostility.

We, as your neighbors, realize the importance of the leadership that the United States is giving to today's world. Your great success in Vladivostok is something that was received in Canada with immense satisfaction. We know that in matters of Atlantic security, détente, and disarmament—we know that we can follow your lead because the principles on which your policies are based are the same as ours. And I think you know that you can trust us to support those principles in areas we consider essential.

For these reasons, I must say our tasks are easier, and I think we should renew the resolves that we mentioned to each other earlier that we will continue this type of meeting on an informal, nonprotocol, or the minimum protocol.

It has a great advantage for us to gather around a table such as this, a very beautiful one. Mrs. Ford will be told that we were struck by its beauty and the warmth of this room and the repast. Did she do the cooking? [Laughter.]

As far as the Olympics are concerned, we very much hope you will come and you will come before that, and that perhaps, perchance, we will find some way of being the forerunners in some ski race—

*President Ford:* I'm too young! [Laughter].

*Prime Minister Trudeau:* —prepared to test for the winter Olympics wherever they happen.

Mr. President, we hope you will come before that, that you will find it convenient, as your predecessor did, to talk on a very informal basis even by phone or by quick visits in and out which do away with all formality, permit us to come to the point right quickly, and to solve whatever small problems we may have.

So with this in mind and in the hopes that our friendship of which we talked and the candor with which we talked, will be brought out in the spirit of cooperation and understanding and the fairness with which all our meetings together are inspired, I would ask our guests here to raise their glasses in a toast to the President of the United States.

## Foreign Service Dead Honored at Memorial Ceremony

*Following are remarks made by Secretary Kissinger and Thomas Boyatt, President of the American Foreign Service Association, at an AFSA memorial ceremony on November 15, Foreign Service Day.*

Press release 502 dated November 18

### MR. BOYATT

Mr. Secretary, distinguished guests, ladies and gentlemen: In 1933 the American Foreign Service Association established a memorial plaque to commemorate those of our colleagues losing their lives under tragic, heroic, or otherwise inspirational circumstances in the service of this country abroad.

The first name on that list, William Pal-

frey, dates from 1780. In the two centuries which have elapsed since then, 110 names have been added—35 in the last decade, 10 in the last two years. And today it is our sad duty and our privilege to honor 11 additional colleagues whose names are on the plaque. Those colleagues are:

EVERETT D. REESE, AID, killed in 1955 in Viet-Nam when the plane he was riding in was shot down.

THOMAS RAGSDALE, Department of Agriculture, serving with AID, captured in 1968 during the Tet offensive. His body was found after the cease-fire.

DONALD V. FREEMAN, AID, killed in 1967 by Vietnamese machinegun fire.

ALBERT A. FARKAS, AID, killed by sniper fire in the Vinh Long area in 1968.

ROBERT W. BROWN, JR., Department of Defense, serving with AID, killed by the Viet Cong in 1968.

ROBERT W. HUBBARD, Department of Defense, serving with AID, killed in Hue in 1968.

RUDOLPH KAISER, AID, died in a Viet Cong ambush in the Mekong Delta in 1972.

JOHN PAUL VANN, Associate Director for AID, killed in a helicopter in a night battle in Kontum in 1972.

JOHN S. PATTERSON, vice consul in Hermosillo, Mexico, slain in 1974 while being held captive by kidnapers.

RODGER P. DAVIES, Ambassador to Cyprus, struck down by sniper fire in Nicosia during a mob attack this year on the American Embassy.

We all know what these terrible losses mean. Our colleagues involved lost their lives. The families lost loved ones. We lost friends. And this nation lost dedicated, effective, and brave public servants.

Earlier this year, in a public forum in New York City, former Secretary Dean Rusk said the following: "The gallantry of the Foreign Service in posts of danger and hardship is deeply moving if seldom recorded."

Well, we are here today to make such a record. And we call upon our fellow citizens in the Congress and the public at large to bear witness to the professionalism and dedication of Foreign Service people in life. And let us never forget that even as we talk hundreds, and maybe thousands, of our colleagues are overseas facing assassins' bullets, kidnappings, hijacking, skijacking, mob action, or deadly disease, as well as their courage and sacrifice and death.

We invited President Ford to be at this

ceremony today, and he very much wanted to be here, but his duties would not permit it. He has asked me to read the following message to you:

I send my warmest greetings to all who participate in this special ceremony at the Department of State to pay tribute to eleven members of the Foreign Service who lost their lives abroad in service to their country. These men, whose names have been added to the memorial plaque maintained by the American Foreign Service Association, will be part of an honored roster of heroism spanning almost two centuries—from William Palfrey in 1780 to Ambassador Rodger Davies in 1974. These dedicated Foreign Service personnel will always be an inspiring example of courage and devotion.

This occasion also gives me an opportunity to express our nation's appreciation to all the men and women of our Foreign Service for their selfless dedication, both at home and abroad, in helping to guarantee world peace and the future well-being of our country.

I would now like to call on Secretary Kissinger, who also has a message for us: Secretary Kissinger.

#### SECRETARY KISSINGER

Mr. Boyatt, ladies and gentlemen: We meet here on a somber occasion which reminds us that the most important word is the word "service" when we talk of the Foreign Service.

We think here not only of what our friends have accomplished who are no longer with us but what they attempted to do. Most of our work is mundane and ordinary. And in the day-to-day business of diplomacy we forget that—we sometimes forget—that what we are really here for is to build and to preserve the peace. No generation has had a more noble and a more important task, because no generation has faced the risks of ours or has confronted a world in such turmoil, with such suffering, and with such opportunity for lasting change.

I did not know all of those whom we honor today, but I worked with some of them. And therefore we are not dealing with statistics, but with a human experience. And all of us have been associated—all of us here have been associated with all of the men involved.

They went to posts in which they knew

that their mission was to help bring the peace or to alleviate suffering but where they might become the symbol for hatred or the object of a blind retribution. But they went and did their duty. And in so doing they ennobled all of us and reminded us that nothing is more important than to bring about a world in which such sacrifices will no longer be necessary and in which our officers can serve abroad under conditions that would fulfill the hopes and aspirations of those who gave their lives and of their families.

So we think of them with pride and affection and as an inspiration to the best in the Foreign Service.

Thank you.

## **Additional Food for Peace Wheat To Be Sent to Bangladesh**

AID press release 74-80 dated November 8

Bangladesh, plagued by severe floods and food shortages, will receive an additional 100,000 metric tons of wheat and wheat flour on concessional terms under the U.S. Department of Agriculture's Food for Peace program, USDA and the Agency for International Development announced on November 8.

Severe monsoon flooding struck Bangladesh this summer and destroyed or damaged large quantities of stored and standing rice. The concessional wheat sale announced on November 8, along with a similar sale of 150,000 tons of U.S. wheat and rice in October, will help Bangladesh alleviate its major food shortage. The 100,000 tons of wheat and wheat flour, valued at \$18.9 million in the export market, will provide almost a pound of wheat per day for 7½ million people for one month.

The first shipments of wheat under the

earlier sale should arrive in Bangladesh in early December. Under the terms of the new sale, the United States is to be repaid in U.S. dollars over 40 years, with no repayment of principal due in the first 10 years. Interest is payable at 2 percent during the first 10 years and 3 percent thereafter.

The agreement also allows the Government of Bangladesh to sell the grain on the open market and to use the proceeds for rehabilitation and development programs, particularly those intended to increase the nation's food production, as well as direct relief. Included would be more research in solving the problems of small farmers, strengthening formal and informal training programs, better food storage and distribution facilities, and improved land and water management.

Previous emergency assistance for flood relief has totaled \$3,086,865. The U.S. relief efforts included a cash donation by U.S. Ambassador Davis Eugene Boster to the Prime Minister's Relief Fund, an airlift from Guam of 596 tents and 14,946 blankets, and an airlift from the United States of 133,000 pounds of Civil Defense protein-fortified biscuits. The first 500-ton shipment of an additional 6,000 tons of biscuits was scheduled to arrive on November 8. AID also provided vegetable seeds from the United States.

In addition, AID has authorized the use of \$4 million under a previously committed AID relief and rehabilitation grant for purchase within Bangladesh of building materials to help restoration of flood-damaged homes and for purchase of locally available seeds to permit the farmers to replant crops.

Since Bangladesh achieved independence in 1971, the United States has granted or loaned on concessional terms more than \$500 million toward the economic development of the South Asian nation.

## Secretary Kissinger Calls for Early Passage of Trade Reform Act

*Statement by Secretary Kissinger<sup>1</sup>*

Thank you, Mr. Chairman [Senator Russell B. Long of Louisiana], for this opportunity to appear before your committee and particularly for your patience while scheduling difficulties were being worked out.

Let me first address the question of why the administration places such a high priority on passage of the Trade Reform Act—a priority which has increased since the bill was first introduced. At a time when the economic stability of the world has been severely shaken and difficult times still lie ahead, it is of critical importance to demonstrate that the nations of the world can still resolve critical economic problems and conduct their trading relationships in a spirit of compromise and a recognition of interdependence.

There are many causes of the current worldwide economic crisis. But one of the principal problems is the unwillingness of too many nations to face the facts of interdependence. The application of ever more restrictive trade practices, the insistence on the unfettered exploitation of national advantage, threatens the world with a return to the beggar-thy-neighbor policies of the thirties.

The U.S. Government has repeatedly urged the nations of the world to raise their sights and to avoid ruinous confrontation. In the fields of food and energy we have made far-reaching and detailed proposals to give effect

to the principles of interdependence for the common benefit. The trade negotiations which will be made possible by the bill before you are part of this overall design.

The major trading nations stand today uneasily poised between liberalized trade and unilateral restrictive actions leading toward autarky. If they choose the second course, global economic difficulties will be magnified and an international economic crisis will be upon us. This in turn will make all other international problems more difficult to solve. For such a catastrophe to result from our failure to act would be a blow to international stability of potentially historic proportions.

In my testimony before this committee of March 7, 1974, I stated the objectives of the Trade Act to be as follows:

—A mutual reduction of trade barriers among industrialized countries.

—A joint response by industrialized countries to the aspirations of developing countries which require the expansion of exports to sustain their development programs.

—A normalization of trade relations between the United States and the countries of Eastern Europe and the Soviet Union.

—A new start on emerging trade issues that are not covered under the present trade rules and procedures.

—Finally, the preservation and enhancement of a global multilateral economic relationship and the dampening of tendencies toward discriminatory arrangements among selected groups of countries.

<sup>1</sup> Made before the Senate Committee on Finance on Dec. 3 (text from press release 516). The complete transcript of the hearings will be published by the committee and will be available from the Superintendent of Documents, U.S. Government Printing Office, Washington, D.C. 20402.

Mr. Chairman, the importance of these objectives has been emphasized by events since. I am confident that current economic problems can be solved. We should bear in mind that the foreign policy implications of the Trade Reform Act are not limited to those provisions on which I wish to direct my main comments—our trade relations with Communist countries and generalized preferences for developing countries. The bill in its entirety is an absolutely essential tool if the United States is to be in a position to manage effectively its overall relations—political and economic—at a time when the world economy is at a critical point.

### The Emigration Issue

Mr. Chairman, you have asked me to return to your committee to comment specifically on the emigration issue as it relates to title IV of the trade bill, a problem dealt with in the Jackson-Vanik amendment to title IV.

Let me state at the outset that I deal with this matter with considerable misgiving because what is said on this occasion could, if not handled with utmost care, deal a serious setback both to the cause of freer emigration from the U.S.S.R. and to the more hopeful trend in U.S.-Soviet relations that has been maintained for the last few years and was recently strengthened in the President's meeting with Mr. Brezhnev [Leonid I. Brezhnev, General Secretary of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union] in Vladivostok.

As you are well aware, the administration since the beginning of détente had been making quiet representations on the issue of emigration. We were never indifferent to, nor did we condone, restrictions placed on emigration. We understood the concerns of those private American groups that expressed their views on this troubling subject. We believed, based on repeated Soviet statements and experience, that making this issue a subject of state-to-state relations might have an adverse effect on emigration from the U.S.S.R. as well as jeopardize the basic relationship which had made the steadily rising emigration possible in the first place.

We were convinced that our most effective means for exerting beneficial influence was by working for a broad improvement in relations and dealing with emigration by informal means.

It is difficult, of course, to know the precise causes for changes in emigration rates. We know that during the period of improving relations and quiet representations, it rose from 400 in 1968 to about 33,500 in 1973. We believe that increase as well as recent favorable actions on longstanding hardship cases was due at least in part to what we had done privately and unobtrusively. We are also convinced that these methods led to the suspension of the emigration tax in 1973. We can only speculate whether the decline by about 40 percent in 1974 was the result of decisions of potential applicants or whether it was also affected by the administration's inability to live up to the terms of the trade agreement we had negotiated with the Soviet Union in 1972.

Nevertheless, we were aware that substantial opinion in the Congress favored a different approach. We recognized that if our government was to be equipped with the necessary means for conducting an effective foreign policy it would be necessary to deal with the emigration issue in the trade bill. As I stated in my previous testimony before this committee, we regard mutually beneficial economic contact with the U.S.S.R. as an important element in our overall effort to develop incentives for responsible and restrained international conduct.

I therefore remained in close contact with leaders of the Congress in an effort to find a means of reconciling the different points of view. I remember that I was urged to do so by several members of this committee when I testified before you on March 7 of this year. Shortly afterwards, I began meeting regularly with Senators Jackson, Ribicoff, and Javits to see whether a compromise was possible on the basis of assurances that did not reflect formal governmental commitments but nevertheless met widespread humanitarian concerns.

We had, as you know, been told repeatedly that the Soviet Union considered the issue

of emigration a matter of its own domestic legislation and practices not subject to international negotiation. With this as a background, I must state flatly that if I were to assert here that a formal agreement on emigration from the U.S.S.R. exists between our governments, that statement would immediately be repudiated by the Soviet Government.

In early April, the three Senators agreed to an approach in which I would attempt to obtain clarifications of Soviet domestic practices from Soviet leaders. These explanations could then be transmitted to them in the form of a letter behind which our government would stand.

My point of departure was statements by General Secretary Brezhnev during his visit to the United States in 1973 to both our executive and Members of Congress to the effect that Soviet domestic law and practice placed no obstacles in the way of emigration. In conversations with Foreign Minister Gromyko in Geneva in April, in Cyprus in May, and in Moscow in July, we sought to clarify Soviet emigration practices and Soviet intentions with respect to them. It was in these discussions that information was obtained which subsequently formed the basis of the correspondence with Senator Jackson, with which you are familiar.

In particular, we were assured that Soviet law and practice placed no unreasonable impediments in the way of persons wishing to apply for emigration; that all who wished to emigrate would be permitted to do so except for those holding security clearances; that there would be no harassment or punishment of those who applied for emigration; that there would be no discriminatory criteria applied to applicants for emigration; and that the so-called emigration tax, which was suspended in 1973, would remain suspended.

It was consistently made clear to us that Soviet explanations applied to the definition of criteria and did not represent a commitment as to numbers. If any number was used in regard to Soviet emigration this would be wholly our responsibility; that is, the Soviet Government could not be held

accountable for or bound by any such figure. This point has been consistently made clear to Members of Congress with whom we have dealt.

Finally, the discussions with Soviet leaders indicated that we would have an opportunity to raise informally with Soviet authorities any indication we might have that emigration was in fact being interfered with or that applicants for emigration were being subjected to harassment or punitive action.

The points I have just cited have always been the basis for my contacts with Senators Jackson, Javits, and Ribicoff. I may add that these points have been reiterated to us by Soviet leaders on several occasions, including in President Ford's initial contacts with Soviet representatives and most recently at Vladivostok.

All these clarifications were conveyed to the three Senators and eventually led to the drafting of the exchange of correspondence published by Senator Jackson on October 18. The process took much time, however, because of the administration's concern that there be no misleading inference—specifically that there be no claim to commitments either in form or substance which in fact had not been made.

Within a week of being sworn in, President Ford took a direct and personal interest in settling the issues yet outstanding. He met or had direct contact with the three Senators (as well as with you, Mr. Chairman) on several occasions. He discussed the subject with leading Soviet officials. These contacts and conversations eventually resulted in the drafting of two letters, one from me to Senator Jackson and one from the Senator to me. The first of these letters contains the sum total of the assurances which the administration felt in a position to make on the basis of discussions with Soviet representatives. The second letter contained certain interpretations and elaborations by Senator Jackson which were never stated to us by Soviet officials. They will, however, as my letter to Senator Jackson indicated, be among the considerations which the President will apply in judging Soviet performance when he makes his determina-

tion on whether to continue the measures provided for in the trade bill; i.e., extension of governmental credit facilities and of most-favored-nation (MFN) treatment. We recognize of course that these same points may be applied by the Congress in reaching its own decisions under the procedures to be provided in the trade bill.

With the exchange of correspondence agreed, it became possible to work out a set of procedures—which, I understand, has now been offered as Senate amendment 2000—whereby the President will be authorized to waive the provisions of the original Jackson-Vanik amendment and to proceed with the granting of MFN and Eximbank [Export-Import Bank] facilities for at least an initial period of 18 months. These procedures will also provide for means whereby the initial grants can be continued for additional one-year periods.

Thus, Mr. Chairman, I believe a satisfactory compromise was achieved on an unprecedented and extraordinarily sensitive set of issues. I cannot give you any assurance concerning the precise emigration rate that may result, assuming that the trade bill is passed and MFN is extended to the U.S.S.R. As I noted earlier, it is difficult to know fully the causes of past changes in Soviet emigration rates. However, I do believe that we have every right to expect, as my letter to Senator Jackson said, that the emigration rate will correspond to the number of applicants and that there will be no interference with applications. If some of the current estimates about potential applicants are correct, this should lead to an increase in emigration.

I believe it is now essential to let the provisions and understandings of the compromise proceed in practice. I am convinced that additional public commentary, or continued claims that this or that protagonist has won, can only jeopardize the results we all seek. We should not delude ourselves that the commercial measures to be authorized by the trade bill will lead a powerful state like the Soviet Union to be indifferent to constant and demonstrative efforts to picture it as yielding in the face of external pressure; nor

can we expect extended debates of domestic Soviet practices by responsible U.S. public figures and officials to remain indefinitely without reaction. We should keep in mind that the ultimate victims of such claims will be those whom all of us are trying to help.

Therefore I respectfully ask that your questions take account of the sensitivity of the issues. There will be ample opportunity to test in practice what has been set down on paper and to debate these matters again when the time for stocktaking foreseen in the legislation comes. With this caveat, I shall of course answer your questions to the best of my ability.

As I indicated to this committee in March, we seek improved relations with the Soviet Union because in the nuclear age we and the Soviets have an overriding obligation to reduce the likelihood of confrontation. We have profound differences with the Soviet Union, and it is these very differences which compel any responsible administration to make a major effort to create a more constructive relationship. In pursuing this policy, we are mindful that the benefits must be mutual and that our national security must be protected. With respect to title IV of the trade reform bill, we believe we are now in a position to meet these vital concerns adequately while at the same time bringing important economic and political benefits to the United States.

#### **Generalized Tariff Preferences**

I would be remiss if I did not also take this opportunity to comment briefly on another part of the trade bill which has important foreign policy implications.

You will recall, Mr. Chairman, that I wrote to you in September to express my strong support for title V of the Trade Reform Act because I consider the prompt implementation of a meaningful system of generalized preferences important to U.S. relations with developing countries. I am gratified that this committee has agreed to endorse the concept of generalized tariff preferences. I have, however, serious questions



about the decision of your committee to exclude automatically certain categories of developing countries from the benefits of these preferences.

The concerns which these amendments reflect are, I believe, shared by all in both the executive and legislative branches of our government. I am not opposed to having these concerns put on the record.

However, these amendments, as we understand them, would result in the automatic denial of preferences to a number of important developing countries. Such automaticity could work to our disadvantage. For example, would it be in our interest to exclude all members of the Organization of Petroleum Exporting Countries, including those which did not participate in last year's oil embargo?

Moreover, many of the countries affected—including those who can play a role in helping prevent renewed conflict in the Middle East—are just those with which we are now actively engaged in efforts to strengthen our relations and to work out mutually acceptable solutions to difficult economic and political problems.

With respect to the automatic denial of preferences to countries expropriating U.S. property, the Congress recognized last year that inflexible sanctions are not effective in promoting the interests of American citizens or businesses abroad and modified the Hick-enlooper amendment to authorize the President to waive its sanctions when required for our national interest. The same authority should be provided in the Trade Act.

This committee has made several changes in title V which we consider to be distinct improvements. At the same time, I believe that title V, as passed by the House, contains ample authority to provide or to deny generalized preferences to any country whenever it is in the overall interest of the United States to do so. I can assure you that the administration will keep Congress fully informed in advance of the basis for any decisions on beneficiary status. I am confident that you and your committee will give serious consideration to the problems I have raised.

The trade bill is one of the most impor-

tant measures to come before the Congress in many years. It is essential to our hopes for a more stable, more prosperous world. This Congress in the time remaining to it thus has an opportunity to contribute to the construction of a safer and more peaceful world.

## Senate Asked To Approve Agreement on International Epizootics Office

*Message From President Ford*<sup>1</sup>

*To the Senate of the United States:*

To receive the advice and consent of the Senate to accession, I transmit herewith the International Agreement for the Creation at Paris of an International Office of Epizootics, originated in Paris on January 25, 1924.

In the nearly fifty years of its existence, the International Office of Epizootics (OIE) has become the most important organization in international control of animal diseases. Its current 79-nation membership includes most major developed countries other than the United States. The OIE provides timely warnings to its members of animal disease outbreaks, a form of exchange of technical information, and other valuable services. In these times of increased concern about food availability at home and abroad, the United States is obliged to help protect that supply. The cost of participation in OIE is small when weighed against its potential benefits. Also the United States can make its scientific and managerial experience in disease control available through OIE in an effective way to underline our international interest in food supply.

I, therefore, recommend that the Senate grant early and favorable consideration to the Agreement and give its advice and consent to accession.

GERALD R. FORD.

THE WHITE HOUSE, *December 2, 1974.*

<sup>1</sup> Transmitted on Dec. 2 (text from White House press release); also printed as S. Ex. M, 93d Cong., 2d sess., which includes the texts of the agreement and the report of the Department of State.

## U.N. Disengagement Observer Force in Israel-Syria Sector Extended

*Following is a statement made in the U.N. Security Council by U.S. Representative John Scali on November 29, together with the text of a resolution adopted by the Council that day.*

### STATEMENT BY AMBASSADOR SCALI

USUN press release 181 dated November 29

Since there are no additional members who wish to speak, I should like to express the views of the United States on the subject before us.

The establishment of UNDOF six months ago, like that of UNEF [U.N. Emergency Force] before it, marked a major step forward on the path to a lasting Middle East peace. That this road was long and difficult, that it would try men's patience and test their good will, no one doubted then or doubts now. Nevertheless what this Council did in establishing the two Middle East peace-keeping forces was no small thing. The U.N. peacekeeping provides a deterrent to renewed war after four tragic devastating conflicts. It offers time for passions to cool and for prudence and reason to prevail. In short, it offers to those who would grasp it an opportunity to move ahead toward peace.

By extending UNDOF's mandate today, the Security Council has demonstrated anew its awareness of the critical role this Force plays in helping to preserve the disengagement between Syrian and Israeli forces. My government at this time wishes to pledge anew that we will continue the search for a just and enduring peace through negotiations under Security Council Resolutions 242 and 338.

My government warmly welcomes the Council's action today in extending the man-

date of UNDOF. The resolution we have adopted with no dissenting votes assures the continuing operation of UNDOF for another six months under the same mandate in accordance with the recommendation which the Secretary General has made in his lucid and comprehensive report of November 27.

I have spoken already of the patience and good will that are so indispensable to peace in the Middle East. These qualities were sorely needed in the recent negotiations leading to agreement on the extension of UNDOF. My government is pleased to have been of assistance in this effort. May I take this opportunity, on behalf of my government, to pay a sincere tribute to the Governments of Syria and Israel for their determination to overcome all obstacles in the cause of peace and justice for their peoples.

I take special pleasure in extending my government's deep appreciation to the Secretary General for his continuing efforts and to his Headquarters staff. Their dedicated, tireless efforts have kept UNDOF operating efficiently. Our congratulations go also to the interim Force commander, to the officers and men of UNDOF, and to the UNTSO [United Nations Truce Supervision Organization] Military Observers assigned to UNDOF for the exemplary manner in which they have performed their duties. I have spoken on a number of occasions of our admiration for these men and of our appreciation for the hardships and sacrifice which they must endure. Some of these soldiers have given their lives so that other men, women, and children in the Middle East might live. We mourn in particular at this time the brave men who have died on the UNDOF front, and we ask the delegations of Canada and Austria to convey our sincere condolences to their bereaved families.

The Secretary General in his report and many members of this Council in their statements have emphasized the importance of moving toward settlement of the underlying problems of the Middle East conflict. My government shares this sense of urgency. In the months ahead we shall be bending every effort to advance step by step along the road

that leads to a just and lasting peace in the Middle East.

## TEXT OF RESOLUTION<sup>1</sup>

*The Security Council,*

*Having considered* the report of the Secretary-General on the United Nations Disengagement Observer Force (S/11563),

*Having noted* the efforts made to establish a durable and just peace in the Middle East area and the developments in the situation in the area,

*Expressing concern* over the prevailing state of tension in the area,

*Reaffirming* that the two agreements on disengagement of forces are only a step towards the implementation of Security Council resolution 338 (1973),

*Decides:*

(a) To call upon the parties concerned to implement immediately Security Council resolution 338 (1973);

(b) To renew the mandate of the United Nations Disengagement Observer Force for another period of six months;

(c) That the Secretary-General will submit at the end of this period a report on the developments in the situation and the measures taken to implement Security Council resolution 338 (1973).

## U.S. Gives Views on Guidelines for U.N. Peacekeeping Operations

*Following is a statement made in the Special Political Committee of the U.N. General Assembly by U.S. Representative Joseph M. Segel on November 19.*

USUN press release 173 dated November 19

I am pleased to present the views of the U.S. delegation to this committee as it considers the report of the Special Committee on Peacekeeping Operations.<sup>2</sup> Developments in the past year have, we believe, confirmed the importance of the special committee's work as well as the necessity to continue the

<sup>1</sup>U.N. doc. S/RES/363 (1974); adopted by the Council on Nov. 29 by a vote of 13 to 0, with the People's Republic of China and Iraq not participating in the vote.

<sup>2</sup>U.N. doc. A/9827.

effort to agree upon guidelines for the conduct of future peacekeeping operations under the authority of the Security Council.

Secretary of State Kissinger, in addressing the 28th General Assembly, noted that "The time has come to agree on peacekeeping guidelines so that this organization can act swiftly, confidently, and effectively in future crises." Since then, the United Nations has had to deal urgently with two crises, in the Middle East and in Cyprus, requiring the launching of one new operation and the reinforcement of another.

The practical experience of these peacekeeping operations and the recognition of the need for guidelines to facilitate future peacekeeping operations have affected the work of the special committee and, in particular, its working group. We are encouraged by the working group's accomplishment in drafting alternative paragraphs which reflect the range of views on particular questions and present concrete language on which the next series of discussions can focus. It is certain that substantially more work will be necessary, but the issues have become more clearly defined and significant progress has thus been made.

One of the fundamental questions facing the special committee is the degree of generality, or of detail, to be reflected in such guidelines. My government continues to believe that the ability of the Security Council to operate flexibly during crises enhances its capability to meet the problems unique to each operation. The establishment and functioning of the U.N. Emergency Force in the Middle East demonstrates that detailed peacekeeping guidelines, agreed in advance, are not required to mount a successful operation. The U.N. Force in Cyprus, modified to meet new conditions, has provided similar lessons. These two operations, tailored as they are to conditions in each area, underscore the importance of not losing flexibility.

Clearly, the central purpose to be served by agreed guidelines is to outline the division of responsibilities between the principal U.N. organs involved in peacekeeping, especially the Security Council and the Secretary General. If peacekeeping operations are to be

launched promptly and managed effectively, it is essential that general responsibilities be appropriately delineated. But it is also essential to provide for the practical and efficient resolution of rapidly changing daily operating problems.

The Security Council has primary responsibility under the charter for the maintenance of international peace and security. In this connection, it is responsible for authorizing peacekeeping operations and bears the ultimate responsibility for the direction of each operation. We believe that in exercising this general responsibility the Security Council should, in the formula proposed for article 1 of the draft guidelines, "determine the purpose and mandate of a peace-keeping force, its approximate size, the duration of its existence and manner of its termination, and such other matters as it considered necessary in establishing the purpose and terms of the mandate."

In order to accommodate views that envisage broader immediate responsibilities for the Security Council, the United States is now prepared to include among the Council's responsibilities approval of the peacekeeping force commander and of the composition of the force. In both cases, the Secretary General would make the initial recommendations. Mr. Chairman, these are significant concessions. We hope—indeed we expect—that they will be reciprocated in the same spirit of accommodation.

Once the operation is underway, the Security Council might best exercise its continuing responsibilities by such measures as requiring regular reports from the Secretary General on the conduct of the operation and reviewing periodically the work of the peacekeeping force. If a need to do so is perceived, the Security Council might also establish an advisory or consultative committee, perhaps under article 29 of the charter, to assist in its work.

Within the overall mandate established by the Security Council, we believe the Secretary General should be assured sufficient discretion to enable him and the force com-

mander responsible to him to effectively carry out their responsibilities in directing the actual activities of the force, without day-to-day intervention by the Security Council. The Secretary General's responsibilities should certainly include taking decisions on administrative and logistical questions, since his primary concern is to see that the operations authorized by the Security Council are managed properly and efficiently.

In this connection, the Secretary General must have at his disposal integrated and efficient military units. While due regard should be paid to achieving adequate geographic representation in the composition of the force, we believe that more attention should be paid to creating a force that can successfully carry out its mission. The composition of the force should thus take into consideration the nature of the dispute, where the force will serve, and the views of the host countries. It is therefore necessary that both the Security Council and the Secretary General maintain sufficient freedom of action concerning the selection and composition of the force's components to insure that the highest possible professional standards may be achieved.

The guidelines might constructively include provisions enabling the Secretary General to make standby arrangements for future peacekeeping operations, including model agreements with hosts and troop contributors, a continuing inventory of troop offers, facilities, or services that member nations would make available, and a roster of potential commanders.

Mr. Chairman, it cannot be denied that differences, some fundamental but others less difficult, still exist over the nature and scope of peacekeeping guidelines. The United States continues to believe that the work underway to reconcile these differences is significant and that an agreed set of general principles can be developed by the special committee. We do not exclude the possibility that some differences will not be fully resolved in the negotiations to establish initial

guidelines. However, if not, they can be left to ad hoc resolution by the Security Council, as problems arise and as we have done to date, with the hope that later agreement will permit us to further improve the guidelines. Moreover, we believe the guidelines should remain flexible enough so that they may evolve as we gain experience.

We remain open to constructive dialogue on this effort. Moreover, we have expressed our willingness to reach a compromise on outstanding issues that would on the one hand accommodate diverse views and on the other provide the most positive background for the effective discharge of this organization's peacekeeping responsibilities. We all know that these responsibilities are central to the purposes and ideals of the United Nations, and we must for that reason recommit ourselves to the task entrusted to the special committee. After nine years of work, while the end is not yet in sight we must persevere to a successful conclusion of our collective efforts. It will have to be done sooner or later. Let us grasp every opportunity to complete this vital task sooner rather than later.

## United Nations Documents: A Selected Bibliography

*Mimeographed or processed documents (such as those listed below) may be consulted at depository libraries in the United States. U.N. printed publications may be purchased from the Sales Section of the United Nations, United Nations Plaza, N.Y. 10017.*

### Economic and Social Council

#### Statistical Commission:

International trade reconciliation study. Report of the Secretary General. E/CN.3/454. June 5, 1974. 81 pp.

Statistics of the developing countries in the Second United Nations Development Decade. International technical assistance in statistics, 1975-79. Report of the Secretary General. E/CN.3/446. June 6, 1974. 61 pp.

Statistics of the environment. Report of the Secretary General. E/CN.3/452. June 14, 1974. 32 pp.  
Program objectives: implementation and prospects.

Regional conferences of statisticians and similar bodies. Report by the Secretary General. E/CN.3/466. June 24, 1974. 19 pp.

Statistics of the distribution of income, consumption, and accumulation; draft guidelines for the developing countries. Report of the Secretary General. E/CN.3/462. July 5, 1974. 59 pp.

Collective economic security. Report of the Secretary General. E/5529. June 6, 1974. 15 pp.

World Food Conference. Report of the Preparatory Committee on its second session. E/5533. June 11, 1974. 38 pp.

World Population Conference background papers:

Population policies and programs. Prepared by the U.N. Secretariat. E/CONF.60/CBP/21. June 20, 1974. 53 pp.

## TREATY INFORMATION

### Current Actions

#### MULTILATERAL

##### Agriculture

Amended constitution of the International Rice Commission. Approved at the 11th session of the FAO Conference, Rome, November 23, 1961. Entered into force November 23, 1961. TIAS 5204.  
*Acceptance deposited:* Kenya, November 4, 1974.

##### Narcotic Drugs

Protocol amending the single convention on narcotic drugs, 1961. Done at Geneva March 25, 1972.<sup>1</sup>  
*Accession deposited:* Lesotho, November 4, 1974.

##### Telecommunications

Partial revision of the radio regulations, 1959, as amended (TIAS 4893), to allocate frequency bands for space radiocommunication purposes. Done at Geneva November 8, 1963. Entered into force January 1, 1965. TIAS 5603.

*Notification of approval:* Cuba, September 30, 1974.

Partial revision of the radio regulations, 1959, as amended (TIAS 4893, 5603, 6332, 6590), on space telecommunications, with annexes. Done at Geneva July 17, 1971. Entered into force January 1, 1973. TIAS 7435.

*Notification of approval:* Pakistan, September 7, 1974.<sup>2</sup>

Telegraph regulations, with appendices, annex, and

<sup>1</sup> Not in force.

<sup>2</sup> Confirmed reservations made in final protocol.

final protocol. Done at Geneva April 11, 1973. Entered into force September 1, 1974.<sup>2</sup>

*Notification of approval:* Hungary, September 30, 1974.

Telephone regulations, with appendices and final protocol. Done at Geneva April 11, 1973. Entered into force September 1, 1974.<sup>1</sup>

*Notification of approval:* Hungary, September 30, 1974.

International telecommunications convention, with annexes and protocols. Done at Malaga-Torremolinos October 25, 1973.<sup>1</sup>

*Ratification deposited:* Singapore, September 16, 1974.

### Trade

Declaration on the provisional accession of the Philippines to the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade done at Geneva August 9, 1973. Entered into force September 9, 1973. TIAS 7839.

*Acceptances:* Australia, October 9, 1974; Pakistan, October 16, 1974.

*Ratification deposited:* Austria, September 24, 1974.

## BILATERAL

### Iran

Joint communique concerning U.S.-Iran relations and establishment of a Joint Commission for cooperation in various fields. Issued at Tehran November 2, 1974. Entered into force November 2, 1974.

### Italy

Agreement extending the agreement of April 30 and June 12, 1969 (TIAS 6809), regarding the launching of NASA satellites from the San Marco Range. Effected by exchange of notes at Rome November 25 and 26, 1974. Entered into force November 26, 1974.

### Jamaica

Agreement relating to the provision of helicopters and related assistance to Jamaica in connection with a program to interdict the illicit narcotics traffic between Jamaica and the United States (Operation Buccaneer). Effected by exchange of notes at Kingston August 9 and 21 and September 23, 1974. Entered into force September 23, 1974.

### Tunisia

Agreement relating to a program of grants of military equipment and materiel to Tunisia. Effected by exchange of notes at Tunis September 12 and October 25, 1974. Entered into force October 25, 1974, effective July 1, 1974.

<sup>1</sup> Not in force.

<sup>2</sup> Not in force for the United States.

## Confirmations

The Senate on December 2 confirmed the following nominations:

Theodore R. Britton, Jr., to be Ambassador to Barbados and to serve concurrently as Ambassador to the State of Grenada.

Frank C. Carlucci to be Ambassador to Portugal.

Charles W. Robinson to be Under Secretary of State for Economic Affairs.

### Check List of Department of State Press Releases: December 9-15

Press releases may be obtained from the Office of Press Relations, Department of State, Washington, D.C. 20520.

Releases issued prior to December 9 which appear in this issue of the BULLETIN are Nos. 502 of November 15, 516 of December 3, and 518 of December 7.

No.	Date	Subject
†519	12/10	Kissinger: Churchill centenary dinner, Dec. 7.
*520	12 11	Kissinger, Esenbel: exchange of remarks, Brussels.
†521	12/11	Kissinger, Bitsios: exchange of remarks, Brussels.
*522	12 11	Kissinger, Van der Stoel: remarks to press, Brussels.
*523	12 12	Kissinger, Esenbel: remarks to press, Brussels, Dec. 11.
†524	12 12	U.S.-Spain cooperation talks: communique.
*525	12 12	Kissinger, Dr. J. H. Van Roijen: remarks upon Secretary Kissinger's receipt of the Wateler Peace Prize, Brussels, Dec. 11.
*526	12 13	Watson receives Replogle Award.
†527	12 13	Economic and technical assistance to Portugal.
*528	12 13	Kissinger, Esenbel: remarks to press, Brussels, Dec. 12.
*529	12/13	Kissinger, Callaghan: remarks to press, Brussels.
†530	12/13	Kissinger: news conference, Brussels.

\* Not printed.

† Held for a later issue of the BULLETIN.

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
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


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