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THE DEPARTMENT OF STATE BULLETIN

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THE DEPARTMENT OF STATE BULLETIN

Vol. LXXII, No. 1867

April 7, 1975

The Department of State BULLETIN, a weekly publication issued by the Office of Media Services, Bureau of Public Affairs, provides the public and interested agencies of the government with information on developments in the field of U.S. foreign relations and on the work of the Department and the Foreign Service.

The BULLETIN includes selected press releases on foreign policy, issued by the White House and the Department, and statements, addresses, and news conferences of the President and the Secretary of State and other officers of the Department, as well as special articles on various phases of international affairs and the functions of the Department. Information is included concerning treaties and international agreements to which the United States is or may become a party and on treaties of general international interest.

Publications of the Department of State, United Nations documents, and legislative material in the field of international relations are also listed.

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International Partnership To Improve Tomorrow's World

*Address by President Ford*¹

The Fighting Irish of Notre Dame have become a symbol of the tenacity and determination of the American people.

But Notre Dame believes not only in might on the football field or on the basketball court but in a spiritual response to humanity's struggles for a decent life.

I have been told that many of you chose to go without a normal meal, eating only a bowl of rice, to save money to help feed the world's hungry. It is heartwarming to know that students are concerned about others abroad at a time when many here at home are finding it difficult to afford an education or to get a job.

Although life is hard for many Americans, I am proud that we continue to share with others. And that, in my opinion, is the measure of genuine compassion, and I congratulate you.

I am especially proud to be on a campus that looks up to God and out to humanity at a time when some are tempted to turn inward and turn away from the problems of the world. Notre Dame's great spokesman, Father [Theodore M.] Hesburgh, is known in Washington as a nonconformist. I must admit that I do not share all of the father's views. But he is following one nonconformist viewpoint to which I fully subscribe, and I quote:

Be not conformed to this world: but be ye transformed by the renewing of your mind, that ye may

¹ Made at Notre Dame University, South Bend, Ind., on Mar. 17 (text from Weekly Compilation of Presidential Documents dated Mar. 24; introductory paragraphs omitted).

prove what is that good, and acceptable, and perfect, will of God.

To conform to apathy and pessimism is to drop out and to cop out. In that sense, I fully reject conformity. In that sense, I am a nonconformist who continues to be proud of America's partnership with other nations and who makes no apology for the United States of America. America's goodness and America's greatness speak for themselves. I believe in this nation and in our capacity to resolve our difficulties at home without turning our back on the rest of the world.

Let me share a personal experience. I was elected to the Congress in the aftermath of World War II. A nonpartisan foreign policy was emerging at that time. America realized that politics must stop at the water's edge. Our fate was linked to the well-being of other free nations. We became the first nation to provide others with economic assistance as a national policy. Foreign aid was an American invention, or an American project, of which we can be justifiably proud.

Today, as I look back, I am grateful for the opportunity to serve in our government during the third quarter of the 20th century. These past 25 years, while not perfect, were incomparably better for humanity than either of the two previous quarters of this century. There was no world war nor global depression. Major nations achieved détente. Many new nations obtained independence. There has been an explosion of hope, freedom, and human progress at home as well as abroad.

America's role, considered in fair context, was a catalyst for change, for growth, and for betterment.

The Marshall Plan, unprecedented in world history, restored a war-ravaged Europe. Even earlier, U.S. relief and rehabilitation activities during World War II and assistance to Greece and to Turkey after the war had provided precedents and experience in America's overseas assistance.

In the same year that I came to Congress, 1949, President Truman advanced Point 4, an innovative, remarkable concept providing technical assistance to developing nations. It brought new American ideas and technology to people hitherto unable to benefit from advances in health, agriculture, and education.

The Food for Peace Act, designed to use America's agricultural abundance to assist others, was a product of the Eisenhower Administration. In the late fifties, we created the Development Loan program to help others help themselves. In 1961, the Congress established the Agency for International Development to consolidate and to administer the various activities and agencies that were carrying out the will of the Congress and the President at that time.

Foreign Assistance and World Peace

Programs to help people in the developing countries are an expression of America's great compassion, and we should be proud of them. But such aid is also part of the continuing effort to achieve an enduring structure of world peace.

It is no longer a question of just the Third World. I am deeply concerned by the problems of the "fourth world"—the very poorest world—where from 400 million to 800 million people suffer from malnutrition, where average per capita income is under \$275 per year, where life expectancy is 20 years less than in the developed countries, where more than 40 percent of the children will never reach the age of five, where more than half of the population has never been to school.

Despite these problems, the economies of

the developing countries have grown at an encouraging rate in the past 10 years, thanks in part—I think substantial part—to American assistance. Manufacturing output increased 100 percent, food production by over one-third. Enrollment in elementary schools doubled. Enrollment in secondary schools and colleges quadrupled.

But population growth and increased demand collided with inflation and energy shortages. Gains, in many, many instances, have been wiped out. At the very time when our policy seeks to build peace with nations of different philosophies, there remains too much violence and too much threat to peace.

The Congress defined the role of foreign aid this way, and I quote from the legislation itself:

The freedom, security, and prosperity of the United States are best sustained in a community of free, secure and prospering nations . . . Ignorance, want and despair breed the extremism and violence which lead to aggression and subversion.

Those words, written by the Congress, I think are so accurate. If nations are to develop within this definition, they must be able to defend themselves. They must have assurances that America can be counted on to provide the means of security, their own security, as well as the means of sustenance.

People with an affirmative vision of the future will not resort to violence. While we pursue a peaceful world in which there is unity in diversity, we must continue to support security against aggression and subversion. To do otherwise, in my judgment, would invite greater violence.

The United States, in this day and age, cannot avoid partnership with nations trying to improve the kind of world the children of today will face tomorrow. Recent events have demonstrated the total interdependence of all people who live on this planet.

The 1973 war in the Middle East showed that war confined to a limited region nevertheless has an economic impact not only in South Bend but in every corner of the world. Developing and developed countries are all part of a single interdependent economic system.

This audience, I am told, and this student body includes many students from over 60 foreign countries—and I congratulate you, Father Hesburgh. Let this demonstrate to all Americans that other people place a high valuation on what America has to offer. Let it demonstrate that the University of Notre Dame rejects what some call the new isolationism.

The World Food Problem

Let me share with you a specific problem that Father Hesburgh mentioned in his introduction. When the World Food Conference met in Rome in the fall of 1974, I—as the newly chosen President—was faced with a very perplexing problem.

Food prices in America were over one-fifth higher than in the previous year. Food reserves, as reported by the Department of Agriculture, were dwindling. The corn crop and other commodities were disappointing in 1974. There were concerns about hunger among our own people.

Against this background, I was presented with several alternative estimates on how much we should spend for Food for Peace for those in other lands.

At the Rome Conference, American spokesmen pledged that we would try our utmost to increase our food contribution despite our own crop problems. As crop reports improved, I designated—as was mentioned by Father Hesburgh—a sum even higher than the highest option recommended to me at the time of the conference.

A factor in my own decision was your fine president, Father Hesburgh, and you should be thankful that you have a person who has such broad interests as he as the president of your university.

A factor also in my judgment was that the program provided, and properly so, a reminder of America's moral commitment.

Food for Peace was increased from about \$980 million to \$1.6 billion. This will provide about 5.5 million tons of commodities, up from 3.3 million tons last year.

Most of the commodities will be wheat

and rice. But also desperately required—and also increased—are blended foods used in nutritional programs for mothers and for infants.

The United States, fortunately, is no longer the only country aiding others, but we continue to lead—and we will—in providing food assistance. In 20 years of Food for Peace, we shipped over 245 million tons of wheat, rice, and other grains, valued at roughly \$23 billion. Every American should be proud of that record. It is an illustration of the humane feeling and the generosity of the American people.

While food helps, only by technical assistance can emerging nations meet their needs. It has been often said, but I think it is appropriate at this time, that if a hungry man is given a fish he can eat for one day but if he is taught to fish he can eat every day.

The greatest opportunity lies in expanding production in areas where production will be consumed. The world is farming only about one-half of the potential croplands; yet there are insufficient farmer incentives in many countries, shortages of fertilizer, high fuel costs, and inadequate storage and distribution systems.

The answers to the world food problem are to be found in interdependence. We can and will help other nations, but simplistic paternalism may do more harm than good. Our help must take the form of helping every nation to help itself, and we will.

Self-Help and Cooperation

I am particularly concerned about the problem of fair distribution. America believes in equality of opportunity. This nation provides a showcase of change in providing better nutrition, education, health, to more and more people, including those who can least afford it. Now, some nations have made excellent use of our assistance to develop their own capacities. Other governments are still struggling with the issue of equality of opportunity and fair distribution of life's necessities.

Good world citizenship requires more than

moralizing about the role others should take. It requires each nation to put its own house in order. Good American citizenship requires more than moralizations about what is wrong with the United States. It requires personal involvement and action to bring about change. It requires voting and organizing and challenging and changing with the flexible and dynamic American political process. Our system, by any standard, works, and will work better, and you can be a part of it.

The developing nations of the world are increasingly successful in bringing prosperity to larger numbers of their own people. In fact, the assistance we have provided these nations is not just a one-way street. Thirty percent of U.S. exports are purchased by these developing nations, thereby obviously contributing to a better life for their people and jobs for ours.

In cases where countries have the means, let them join in sharing with us, as they should. Some have helped; others have not. We led the way, and we will not shirk from future burdens; but all nations must cooperate in developing the world's resources. We extend the hand of partnership and friendship to make a better world.

Another challenge facing the developing nations, as well as other nations, is to realize the need for peaceful accommodation with neighbors. An interdependent world cannot solve disputes by threat or by force. People now and in the future depend on each other more than they sometimes realize. For example, we in America import between 50 and 100 percent of such essential minerals as cobalt, bauxite, nickel, manganese, and others.

The challenge, as I see it, is for America and all other nations to take responsibility for themselves while building cooperation with each other.

The challenge is also the preservation of the freedom and dignity of the human individual throughout the world. Just as the world's nations can no longer go it alone, neither can the American people.

Woodrow Wilson said that "What we should seek to impart in our colleges is not

so much learning itself as the spirit of learning." Great universities that pursue truth face the challenge that confronts the entire American people. It is whether we will learn nothing from the past and return to the introversion of the 1930's, to the dangerous notion that our fate is unrelated to the fate of others.

I am convinced that Americans, however tempted to resign from the world, know deep in their heart that it cannot be done. The spirit of learning is too deeply ingrained. We know that wherever the bell tolls for freedom, it tolls for us.

The American people have responded by supplying help to needy nations. Programs—both government and the voluntary agencies—could not have been and cannot be, reenacted without popular support. CARE and Catholic Relief Services, pioneers in Food for Peace programs, are feeding over 28 million people around the world right today. Protestant, Jewish, and other groups are similarly involved.

At universities throughout the nation, researchers seek answers to world problems. Right here in Indiana, at Purdue University, scientists have made discoveries in high-protein aspects of sorghum, a basic food of more than 300 million people in Asia and in Africa.

Not only the scientists at Purdue but people throughout America realize that no structure of world peace can endure unless the poverty question is answered. There is no safety for any nation in a hungry, ill-educated, and desperate world.

In a time of recession, inflation, unemployment at home, it is argued that we can no longer afford foreign assistance. In my judgment, there are two basic arguments to the contrary:

—First, foreign aid is a part of the price we must pay to achieve the kind of a world in which we want to live. Let's be frank about it. Foreign aid bolsters our diplomatic efforts for peace and for security.

—But secondly, and perhaps just as importantly, even with a recession we remain the world's most affluent country, and the

sharing of our resources today is the right, the humane, and the decent thing to do. And we will.

But just as we seek to build bridges to other nations, we must unite at home. This Administration wants better communication with the academic world, and I express again my appreciation for the warmth of this reception.

But this communication must not just be a search for new technology, but for the human and spiritual qualities that enrich American life. In the future, fewer people must produce more. We must therefore unleash intellectual capacities to anticipate and solve our problems.

The academic world must join in the revival of fundamental American values. Let us build a new sense of pride in being an American.

Yes, you can make America what you want it to be. Think about that for just a moment, if you would. Is it really true? Yes, in my judgment, it is. But there is a catch to it. You will never see it come true. Perhaps your children or your grandchildren will. What you can do is move America slowly, but surely, along the right direction.

A Better Nation and a Better World

Admittedly, today's America is far from perfect, but it is much closer to the America that my class of 1935 wanted than it was when I left the University of Michigan.

Today's America is a far better place than it was 40 years ago when the lingering shadows of worldwide depression were being blotted out by the darker clouds of worldwide war. My generation did not wholly save the world, obviously. But we did, to a degree, help to move it along in the right direction.

We learned along the way that we are part of "one world." The author of that phrase was a Hoosier, the first political candidate about whom I got personally involved enough to volunteer as a campaign worker. His name was Wendell Willkie. Wendell Willkie, of Indiana, was never President, but he was

right. He fought for what he believed in against almost impossible odds. In the last Presidential campaign before Pearl Harbor, he believed most deeply—too far ahead of his time, perhaps—that America must be part of one world. He lost the 1940 election but he helped unite America in support of the truth, which has been our nonpartisan national policy since the Second World War, and I say with emphasis, there has been no third world war.

On the contrary, the prospects for long-range peace have slowly but surely improved.

Despite setbacks and current international problems, the standards of human life have been lifted almost everywhere. Yet today we hear another theme—that the tide of history is running against us, that America's example of American leadership is neither needed nor heeded at the present time, that we should take care of ourselves and let the rest of mankind do likewise, that our domestic difficulties dictate a splendid selfishness that runs counter to all of our religious roots as well as to all recent experience.

We are counseled to withdraw from one world and go it alone. I have heard that song before. I am here to say I am not going to dance to it. Nor do I believe this generation of young Americans will desert their ideals for a better nation and a better world.

You can and you will help to move America along in the right direction. Hopefully, you can do a better job than the class of 1935, but while the classes of 1975 and 1935 are still around, we have much to learn from each other.

We can renew the old American compact of respect for the conviction of others and faith in the decency of others. We can work to banish war and want wherever they exist. We can exalt the spirit of service and love that St. Patrick exemplified in his day.

I am not alarmed when I hear warnings that the tide of history is running against us. I do not believe it for a minute because I know where the tide of history really is—on this campus and thousands and thousands of others in this great country and wherever

young men and women are preparing themselves to serve God and their countries and to build a better world.

You are a part of the tide of this history, and you will make it run strong and true. Of that I am sure.

Thank you, and the top of the morning to you.

President Ford's News Conference at South Bend March 17

Following are excerpts relating to foreign policy from the transcript of a news conference held by President Ford at South Bend, Ind., on March 17.¹

Q. Mr. President, you have said that the question of personalities is really not vital to a settlement in Cambodia. My question is, is the survival of a non-Communist government in Cambodia vital to the U.S. security in Southeast Asia?

President Ford: Miss Thomas [Helen Thomas, United Press International], I think it is. I cannot help but notice that since the military situation in Cambodia has become very serious and since the North Vietnamese have apparently launched a very substantial additional military effort against South Viet-Nam, against the Paris peace accords, there has been, as I understand it, in Thailand—according to the news announcements this morning—a potential request from Thailand that we withdraw our forces from that country.

I noticed in the morning news summary before I left Washington that the President of the Philippines, Mr. Marcos, is reviewing the Philippine relationship with the United States.

I think these potential developments to some extent tend to validate the so-called

¹For the complete transcript, see Weekly Compilation of Presidential Documents dated Mar. 24.

domino theory, and if we have one country after another—allies of the United States—losing faith in our word, losing faith in our agreements with them, yes, I think the first one to go could vitally affect the national security of the United States.

Q. May I ask you one more question that has been on my mind for a long time? Since you supported the invasion of Cambodia five years ago, would you do the same today?

President Ford: Well, that is a hypothetical question, Miss Thomas, because under the law I have no such authority to do so.

I did support the activities then, the so-called Cambodian incursion, because the North Vietnamese were using that area in Cambodia for many military strikes against U.S. military personnel in South Viet-Nam. It was a successful military operation. It saved many American lives because those sanctuaries were destroyed.

Since I do not have the authority to undertake any such military obligation—we have no U.S. military forces in South Viet-Nam—I think it is a hypothetical question which really I cannot answer.

Q. Mr. President, in your speech here at Notre Dame earlier today, you made a strong pitch for continued foreign aid despite the recession, and I was surprised that you failed to mention your proposal for more military aid to Cambodia and South Viet-Nam. Now, I know military aid to Southeast Asia has been unpopular on many college campuses, and I wonder if your failure to mention that was because you feared you might be booed or there might be a walkout by students if you professed your policy on that issue.

President Ford: The speech that I made this morning on the Notre Dame campus was aimed at the broad concept that the United States must participate in world affairs, that this was one world in which we all live. I pointed out I had always supported as a Member of Congress the mutual security and

the foreign aid programs, both economic, Point 4, Food for Peace, as well as the military assistance program.

It seemed to me that we needed a restatement of the basic reason why foreign aid is important—that we live in an interdependent world and that the United States has to make its full contribution in that regard.

The details can be discussed, the details can be argued; but we needed a restatement, a strong restatement of the broad general reasons why this country has to be a part of the one-world concept, working with our allies, trying to eliminate difficulties between ourselves and our adversaries, and it seemed to me if that could be restated we could work out the details within that concept and not rekindle the differences and difficulties that existed while U.S. troops were stationed and fighting in South Viet-Nam.

Q. Mr. President, the State Department announced today that it had found some over \$20 billion [million] in 1974 funds that had been voted for aid to Cambodia and had not been sent and that it was making that money available now. Is this an artifice to get around congressional appropriations, and are there other sources of such funds that could be found?

President Ford: I was informed last Friday of what appears to be very sloppy book-keeping in the Department of Defense, and I condemn it, if it is, and I will not condone it in the future.

I was surprised by these revelations. I don't think it was anything malicious. I don't think it was any purposeful action. But if the money is available and was appropriated by the Congress for the purposes set forth, it will be used according to the law.

Q. Have similar investigations of past Viet-Nam appropriations been made?

President Ford: The Inspector General, as I understand it, found out the \$21 million in Cambodian military aid that was revealed

last week to me and publicly announced today. The Inspector General has a continuing responsibility to find out any and all circumstances such as the one that we are discussing.

1974 Underdelivery of Ammunition to Cambodia Disclosed by Audit

*Department Announcement*¹

We have been advised by the Department of Defense that a Defense Department audit commenced in May 1974 has resulted in a finding by the Department of the Army that ammunition for Cambodia having a value of \$21.5 million remains undelivered under the fiscal year 1974 military assistance program (MAP). This finding, which was made on March 10, 1975, resulted in a credit to the Cambodia MAP program on March 11, 1975, of the underdelivery under the fiscal year 1974 program.

The underdelivery resulted from a practice by the Department of the Army of pricing ammunition on the basis of delivery notifications received some weeks after actual delivery of the ammunition. Because the program was carried out during a period of rapidly rising prices, late pricing resulted in overcharges.

The computation of the \$21.5 million differential in the pricing dates was made at the request of the Inspector General for Foreign Assistance. The discrepancy in dating was disclosed by a prior U.S. Defense Department audit which was examined by the Office of the Inspector General. Computations were all made by the U.S. Army (U.S. Armaments Command).

A comprehensive review of ammunition-pricing methods for foreign military assistance programs has been initiated.

¹Read to news correspondents on Mar. 17 by Robert L. Funseth, Director, Office of Press Relations.

Foreign Investment and the Challenge of Interdependence

Address by Deputy Secretary Robert S. Ingersoll¹

I want to talk this afternoon about International Atlanta and your role in meeting a principal challenge of today's diplomacy—economic interdependence. I will keep my formal remarks short and leave ample time for your questions.

In 1974 this nation paid \$26 billion to other nations for oil imports. During the same year our exports increased to almost \$100 billion and supported over 3½ million American jobs. When we consider these figures, there can no longer be any doubt that the American economy is irrevocably linked to the world economy. The concept of fortress America has become an economic impossibility. Decisions taken in Brussels, Tokyo, and Saudi Arabia have a direct impact on the economic well-being of every American.

"International Atlanta" is not simply a slogan; it is a fact. Atlanta was host to the hemisphere at last year's meeting of the Organization of American States. Hartsfield International is the second busiest airport in the country and an important gateway to North America. The State of Georgia has opened permanent overseas offices in Brussels and Tokyo to expand international business and encourage investment.

In recognition of the importance other nations attribute to the commercial significance of Atlanta and the Southeast, six foreign consular offices have been established here since 1960. We are currently negotiating with

two other trading partners, Greece and Brazil, about opening consulates in your city.

Atlanta in many respects is a microcosm of an American economy increasingly involved in worldwide commerce. Over 450 of the "Fortune 500" corporations maintain offices in Atlanta, and most of them are engaged in export activities. Georgia's exports to the world in 1974 are estimated to have been in excess of \$1 billion.

The international flow of goods and capital, so important to the economy of Georgia and the nation, is a two-way street. Just as the Southeast exports to the world, so the area has attracted the commerce and investment of other nations.

Americans are accustomed to the concept and benefits of international trade. When Georgia was founded in 1733 the trustees envisioned an economy based on the production of silk and wine. They banned the importation of rum. This may have served the cause of sobriety among early Georgians, but it also precluded a prosperous trade in lumber with the West Indies. And since the ban on rum was an obstacle to trade, it did not last long.

Today international investment in this country—especially investment by the oil-rich Arab countries—is the subject of intense debate in the nation and in Congress.

Foreign investment is not new to America. Nor does it generally represent a threat to our security and integrity. Many of you are aware that capital from abroad, especially from England, was essential to the construction of our transcontinental railroad systems in the 1880's. When foreign investment in

¹ Made at Atlanta, Ga., on Mar. 17 before a luncheon sponsored by the Southern Council on International and Public Affairs (text from press release 148).

the United States becomes visible—such as substantial Kuwaiti equity in the new Atlanta Hilton or an Arab financial interest in a resort island off the coast of South Carolina—it becomes a public issue.

But let us take a closer look at the situation in Georgia. Japanese investment in this state amounts to over \$250 million and could go higher as a result of the visit by a high-level Japanese economic delegation this month. Some 2,500 Georgians work for the 25 Japanese firms doing business here. Dutch State Mines operates two fertilizer plants in Augusta. Over 100 foreign companies do business in Georgia; 50 of them are engaged in manufacturing. More than 12,000 Georgians work for these companies. Total foreign investment in this state is over \$665 million.

These foreign investments are not a threat to Georgia or the nation. Foreign capital can sometimes be more effective than domestic investment: one example is the recent takeover of the troubled Franklin National Bank by a European consortium. The size of the transaction and our antitrust laws would have precluded an American bank from rescuing Franklin National.

Free Movement of Goods and Capital

Investment from abroad is a source of capital, technology, management, and jobs—a welcome input to our economy. It is also a corollary to traditional American investment abroad.

In an era of economic interdependence we must be ready to receive, as well as to initiate, investment. If the Japanese can adjust to the Golden Arches of McDonald's in Tokyo, Americans should have no problems learning to live with Mitsubishi in Atlanta.

Under the authority of the Foreign Investment Study Act of 1974 the government is undertaking a comprehensive survey of foreign investment in the United States. The data from this survey will show the amount of foreign investment in every U.S. company of significant size, broken down by type of investment, kind of investor, and country of residence.

Data now available shows that at the end

of 1973 direct long-term foreign investment in our private sector had a book value of \$18 billion, a 25 percent increase over the previous year. Twelve billion dollars, or about two-thirds of this investment, comes from Europe. Canada accounts for an additional \$4 billion. U.S. direct investment abroad in 1974 had a book value of \$107 billion, almost six times the figure invested in this country.

Contrary to popular impression, America is not being inundated with investment money from oil-producing nations, although we must recognize the potential from this source. In the first nine months of 1974 the inflows of long-term investment as recorded in our balance of payments from all foreign investors was \$4.2 billion, of which only \$2.9 billion was direct—as opposed to portfolio—investment. This figure is slightly below the rate of investment in 1973.

We do not yet have an estimate of foreign direct investment in the United States during the fourth quarter of 1974, but we do know that foreign portfolio flows into U.S. private securities declined quarter by quarter last year and actually turned into an outflow in the fourth quarter. Foreign investors apparently did not take advantage of the bargains available in our securities markets.

For many years, U.S. policy has consistently been to reduce the barriers to international trade and investment—to encourage the relatively free international movement of goods and capital.

Our commitment to generally nonrestrictive treatment of foreign investment is embodied in an extensive network of treaties of friendship, commerce, and navigation. An important incentive for negotiating many of these treaties is our desire to establish conditions favorable to private investment abroad.

Under the terms of many of these treaties, the right to establish and, once established, operate majority interests in enterprises in the territory of the other party is governed by the national-treatment standard. This means that foreign investors should be treated generally on the same basis as domestic investors. Foreign control does not provide a basis for discrimination.

In the early sixties, the United States also played a major role in developing the Code of Liberalization of Capital Movements in the Paris-based Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development. This agreement has been a significant factor in persuading governments—Japan is a good example—to relax restrictive investment policies.

These treaties and codes are not intended, however, to throw our vital industries open to uncontrolled capital flows from abroad. There are Federal restrictions which limit the amount of foreign investment in areas such as atomic energy, radio and telegraph communications, shipping and domestic air transport, defense industries, and exploitation of government-owned natural resources. These restrictions are generally accepted internationally and are incorporated into most of our bilateral treaties.

Dealing With Potential Problems and Abuses

Although major OPEC [Organization of Petroleum Exporting Countries] investors have the capacity to make sizable investments in the United States and elsewhere, they have indicated that they do not desire to control large U.S. companies and, indeed, that they do not have the capabilities to manage such companies. They regard themselves as institutional investors seeking a diverse portfolio which will give them security for their investments and the best obtainable long-term return—certainly legitimate desires on the part of any investor.

Our traditional support for freedom of international investment flows must be responsive to the new situation created by the large capital accumulations in the hands of a few oil-producing countries. We must improve our capacity to monitor capital flows, enforce laws designed to protect our vital national industries, and safeguard against abuses such as the use of investments for political purposes. A coherent, comprehensive policy on national investment must therefore contain the following elements:

—An improved system for monitoring foreign investment coming into this country;

—Assurance that existing authority to deal with abuses by foreign investors is vigorously enforced and that any gaps in such authority are promptly recognized and steps taken to close them; and

—Finally, agreement with foreign governments, particularly those with a substantial capacity to invest, to insure that they consult with us prior to making major official investments in U.S. firms.

A recently completed extensive Administration review of government policy on private investment calls for prompt and effective action in each of these areas. The basic conclusion of the study was to reaffirm our traditional policy on investment as stated by President Ford last October:²

We continue to believe that the operation of free market forces will direct worldwide investment flows in the most productive way. Therefore my Administration will oppose any new restriction on foreign investment in the United States except where absolutely necessary on national security grounds or to protect an essential national interest.

We have existing reporting requirements and procedures for dealing with foreign investment abuses, but they are diffused throughout various departments and agencies. To remedy this situation the Administration will establish an office for gathering, consolidating, and reporting information on investments. An interagency board will also be set up to make policy recommendations to the President on inward-investment issues and to coordinate effective use of existing authority. Once established the interagency investment board would be the appropriate vehicle to insure that foreign investments in the United States are consistent with our interests.

Prompt agreement with the major oil-exporting countries to consult with us in advance of any major investments in the United States is also an essential feature of our proposed policy. Agreement could be achieved either formally through an exchange of notes or informally through diplomatic contacts

² For President Ford's statement upon signing the Foreign Investment Act of 1974, see Weekly Compilation of Presidential Documents dated Nov. 4, 1974, p. 1375.

and oral commitments. The fact that Iran consulted informally with us on its negotiations with Pan American suggests that the oil producers acknowledge our legitimate concerns regarding investments of a controlling nature in important U.S. firms.

The Joint Commissions we have established with various Middle East nations could prove to be a useful channel for exchanging information and consulting on contemplated major investments. A joint communique issued at the conclusion of the first Commission meeting with Saudi Arabia, for example, includes an understanding to consult on significant official investments.

The Administration feels it now has the tools to deal with the potential problems and abuses of foreign investment.

We are opposed to legislative initiatives that would make it more difficult for other nations to invest responsibly in the United States. Most of the proposed legislation dealing with foreign investment goes beyond what is necessary to safeguard our national interests. Proposals, such as the Williams bill [S. 425], to grant the President authority to screen and block, at his discretion, any investment leading to foreign control of more than 5 percent of a U.S. company could well discourage investments we would find desirable.

Legislation granting discretionary power to block foreign investments, or other unilaterally imposed impediments to the flow of capital, would also be in violation of many of our existing treaties. Actions of this nature could call into question our longstanding commitment to a high degree of freedom in trade and investment flows.

With the safeguards required to protect our national interests already in existence, our task is to utilize these measures more effectively, not to impede the flow of investment. Restrictive policies discourage foreign investment in job-creating industries, and this is particularly inappropriate when the economy is in a recessionary phase. I believe this is a policy the Georgia business community supports.

A basic concern of investment policy is not whether an investor is foreign, but whether

he is prepared to abide by our laws and regulations—to operate in the American context. This country is not prepared to pay a political—or economic—price for foreign investment. Business and capital from abroad are welcome in the United States; but in determining whether or not to place their assets in this country, foreign investors should be aware, in the President's words, that "discrimination is totally contrary to the American tradition and repugnant to American principles."³

Adjusting to the Reality of Interdependence

Foreign investment, of course, is but one aspect of the challenge of interdependence; our response to the energy crisis, our policies on food aid, our approach to law of the sea, and our policy on access to commodities are others. Our Trade Act of 1974 and the multilateral trade negotiations now underway in Geneva are foreign policy issues important both to Georgia and to a mutually dependent world economy.

How familiar are Georgia's manufacturers with the safeguard provisions of the Trade Act? How will restrictions on granting trade preferences to OPEC nations affect our trade with Latin America? How do our trade policies relate to détente with the Soviet Union, and what do these policies mean to you? International trade is an item of increasing importance to the economy of this nation, and you may wish to discuss our trade policies and opportunities during the question-and-answer period.

Historically, Americans have tended to focus on foreign affairs only when confronted with an immediate threat, when their sons are asked to put on uniforms and fight a war. In 1975 foreign policy extends to the gasoline pump, the price of bread, the cost of commodities, and to the bustling port of Savannah. International Atlanta is irrevocably linked to the world community; what goes on in the world is of very real concern to every person in this room.

³ For excerpts from President Ford's news conference at Hollywood, Fla., on Feb. 26, see BULLETIN of Mar. 17, 1975, p. 333.

Atlanta has a proud tradition of rising to challenges and meeting tough objectives—whether in the field of racial harmony, industrialization, or urban revival. Your attitude and your accomplishments have set an example to the nation. With the distinction between national and international problems becoming increasingly irrelevant, it is my sincere hope that the civic, academic, and business leaders of this community will devote more of their talents and creative energies to the field of foreign affairs. We need your ideas and your support.

The Southeast has a legacy of internationalism, but the foreign policy establishment in this area of the nation could be strengthened. The Atlanta community, with its obvious stake in a stable, orderly, and peaceful world, has the responsibility to assume a leading role in helping this nation adjust to the reality of economic interdependence. You can help to awaken all Americans to the importance of foreign affairs.

Recent studies have shown declining business support for foreign policy institutions in this country. Less than 1 percent of all corporate donations are directed toward organizations even remotely related to international activities.

Organizations such as the Southern Council on International and Public Affairs merit your attention and support. They play an essential role in forging a domestic consensus on national interests and international objectives, in strengthening the constituency for foreign policy.

Secretary Rusk, who is with us this afternoon, identified this problem over a decade ago when he said:⁴

There are those who say the Department of State has no constituency, but I know better. How we dispose of our affairs at home can decide elections; but how we dispose of our relations with the rest

⁴ For an address by Secretary Rusk made at St. Paul, Minn., on Dec. 10, 1963, see BULLETIN of Dec. 30, 1963, p. 990.

of the world can decide the survival of mankind. So we have our constituency—every man, woman, and child across our great nation.

Let us work together—government and the private sector—to develop this constituency and enlist its broad support for our efforts to come to terms with the challenge of an interdependent world economy.

U.S. Responds to Ethiopian Request for Ammunition

*Department Statement*¹

The U.S. Government has informed the Ethiopian Provisional Military Government that it is prepared to sell to Ethiopia for cash up to 7 million dollars' worth of ammunition. The United States took this decision, after detailed discussions with the Ethiopian authorities concerned, because it has been virtually the sole supplier of Ethiopia's military needs for over 20 years and it did not believe that it could be totally unresponsive to the most recent request.

At the same time the United States expressed to the Ethiopian Provisional Military Government its strong hope that the two sides in the Eritrean conflict would soon enter into negotiations in order to end the fighting in Eritrea and find an acceptable solution to that problem. In this respect, the United States notes some encouraging indications of progress toward meaningful negotiations between the Ethiopian authorities and the Eritrean Liberation Front and the Popular Liberation Forces.

We also wish to note that the United States is working on a parallel diplomatic track with other states in that area in an effort to try to get negotiations started.

¹ Read to news correspondents on Mar. 17 by Robert L. Funeseth, Director, Office of Press Relations.

"The Middle East: A Search for Peace"

The following interview is from "Bill Moyers' Journal: International Report," produced by WNET-13, New York, and broadcast nationally by the Public Broadcasting Service on March 6. Under Secretary of State for Political Affairs Joseph J. Sisco and George W. Ball, former Under Secretary of State and U.S. Representative to the United Nations, were interviewed by Bill Moyers.

Mr. Moyers: Mr. Sisco, before we get to some specific details, a lot of people are asking, why does the Middle East preoccupy so much of the State Department's time? So much energy, so much effort, so much of the American treasury? What is our stake out there, as the government sees it today?

Mr. Sisco: I think we've got very significant overall political, economic, and strategic interests in this area. And above all I think it's important to try to stabilize it in order to reduce the possible risk of confrontation between the major powers. I think it's the key hotspot in the world, and I think this helps to explain the active diplomacy of the past months and years.

Mr. Moyers: You really actually believe that there is a significant possibility of a confrontation between the two major powers if the Middle East remains a pressure point?

Mr. Sisco: No, I don't feel by any manner of means that it's imminent. I think that element is always there because you've got a very complicated area where there are differences between the Arabs and the Israelis. These regional differences, you have superimposed the major-power interests, and therefore this is the key area of possible conflict. I don't say that this is going to occur, but I think it's important that it be a stable area.

Mr. Moyers: George Ball, do you agree that

the Middle East occupies that much center gravity?

Mr. Ball: It's been a point of strategic significance from the earliest days, when Alexander the Great cast envious eyes on this area. It's the bridge between Europe and Africa. It's an area which dominates the whole southern littoral of the Mediterranean and therefore is key to the defense of Western Europe. It's an area in which the Soviet Union has had a long interest, ever since the days of the Czar. That's where—it also happens to contain the greatest pool of energy in the world. So no one can question its vital strategic importance, not only to the United States but to practically every other country.

Mr. Moyers: What does the Soviet Union, in particular, think of the Middle East in terms of their strategic interests?

Mr. Sisco: Well, I think if you want to look back, historically, of course, the desire for a warmwater port, the desire to become a Mediterranean power, the desire to have bases on the south coast of the Mediterranean, and an interest in oil—all of these things are vitally important. The Soviet Union is a Mediterranean power now, and it does have a potential very great stake in oil even though it may not need it immediately; but it has a stake also in the strategic, the geographical importance of the area. Let me just sum up the Middle East in two words—it's important geographically and geologically, as far as the world is concerned.

Mr. Moyers: Well, in that context, what are you trying to do—you and Secretary Kissinger—in the next phase of the step-by-step diplomacy as you return this week to the Middle East? What's your immediate goal?

Mr. Sisco: Let me say, first of all, that the

basic step-by-step approach seeks to try to take this thing on a piecemeal basis, on the assumption that if you can get a practical step and then another one it'll help build the kind of confidence between the two sides that in time could break down the distrust which has been so characteristic of the area. In other words, we're looking for practical tests of peace on the ground. So the fundamental assumption of the step-by-step approach has been not only that the problem is so complicated on an overall basis and therefore very difficult to tackle on an overall basis, but rather if one can develop such a step it will build and work toward the overall settlement.

Mr. Moyers: The focus right now is on Egypt and Israel. What does Egypt want?

Mr. Sisco: Egypt wants a substantial withdrawal of Israeli forces in the Sinai. And Israel in return is on public record saying that if they're going to withdraw, there must be also a substantial step forward toward peace, and the particular focus has been on a formal declaration of nonbelligerency.

Mr. Moyers: There have been some reports in the last few days that Secretary Kissinger would not go back to the Middle East if he didn't think some modest step is about to take place there between Israel and Egypt. Is that optimism realistic?

Mr. Sisco: It's very hard to be either optimistic or pessimistic, because the fact of the matter is—and I think we've got a fairly clear notion of what the negotiating positions of each side are, and that's as a result of the mission that we took about two weeks ago—there is a gap and that gap has to be bridged in order to achieve a successful conclusion. We think the stakes are very high. We think there's a chance to achieve this, and for this reason the Secretary is going back.

Mr. Moyers: How can Egypt give Israel the kind of assurance Israel wants without angering the Syrians, who fear a separate agreement by the Egyptians and the Israelis?

Mr. Sisco: Well, actually, any agreement the Egyptians may enter into—not only will

they have to justify it in terms of their own people, but in order for this kind of an interim step to be meaningful it really has to have the broad support of other elements in the Arab world, and this is a political fact of life. There are political realities, I might say, on both sides.

Mr. Moyers: If the Secretary were to get some kind of even modest agreement, would he then go immediately to Syria to work on the question of the Golan Heights and the West Bank?

Mr. Sisco: There are no definite decisions, Bill, that have been taken; but if a practical step can be achieved, certainly this will help establish the basis for further efforts, possibly on a broader basis. In terms of where we go, in the circumstance that you've described, I think what we would do is to consult both sides once again at the end of the process. We would consult with the Soviet Union to see what the next step might be.

Mr. Moyers: The Israelis say they need that oil that they're getting from the Sinai, which they occupied after the last war, and that unspokenly the word goes if they give up the claim on those oilfields there has to be some assurance from the United States that we will help them replace the oil. Is that a fact?

Mr. Sisco: We have not gotten into the details of this in any discussion with the Israelis. But the fact of the matter is that if there were such a withdrawal, ways would have to be found to compensate.

Mr. Moyers: What else would we have to give to the Israelis to make them willing to give up this land they won by war and hold by force?

Mr. Sisco: It's not a question of what we would have to give. I think this is—you must remember, Bill, that this is a negotiation between the two sides, and the middleman role that we're playing has largely been to try to reconcile the views of the two sides, and we have not, for example, put forward a proposal of our own. We did, at the crucial point, in the two previous disengagement

agreements that were concluded this past year. And I don't preclude that at some given point that we'll develop some ideas of our own, but essentially the focus is on the substantive positions of the two sides and the negotiations between the two sides.

Mr. Moyers: You talk about the middle-man role. There's been a good bit of criticism over the past year about our seemingly keeping the Soviets out, and Secretary Kissinger on my program a few weeks ago and you on "Meet the Press" recently said that he is playing the middleman role by the request of both sides. And the question arises, why do they want him to play that role?

Mr. Sisco: Well, I think they have confidence—both sides have confidence in our Secretary of State and in the United States in particular. The United States has relationships with both sides; that's not the case with respect to the Soviet Union. And we could not have played, and could not presently play, the kind of role unless this was the strong desire of each side; and that continues to be the case today.

Mr. Moyers: In the kind of discussions that he has been having, and will be having, are they formal? When he meets with Sadat [President Anwar al-Sadat of Egypt], when he meets with Rabin [Prime Minister Yitzhak Rabin of Israel], when he meets with Asad [President Hafiz al-Asad of Syria], is it "Mr. Secretary" and "Mr. President"? Would you describe what happens?

Mr. Sisco: Oh, it's very informal. Surprisingly informal. And this is one of the factors, I think, of the personal rapport. Now, this personal diplomacy, of course, is very important and very significant simply because each side has so much confidence in the man. However, one has to add very quickly the objective conditions of the situation in the area—the objective conditions of the situation in the world are really the principal factors that really impinge on this situation.

Mr. Moyers: Don't we hostage, in a sense, on his personal relations and the success or failure of one man?

Mr. Sisco: Not necessarily, Bill. I think this step-by-step approach, particularly if it should achieve a next step, I think will help provide a basis for moving on perhaps in a broader context.

Mr. Moyers: George, you've been rather critical of the step-by-step process and wrote not too long ago that it was going to fail, or it had already come to a dead end. Was that a premature obituary?

Mr. Ball: Well, let me say there's a difference between saying something's going to fail, which I did not say, and saying that I thought that it had come to a dead end. Quite frankly, I've been surprised at the way in which the possibility seems to have opened up for another round, because it seemed to me that after the first two negotiations of disengagement on the Egyptian front, the disengagement on the Syrian front, that that was probably as far as bilateral diplomacy could go, because at some point the very tough substantive problems would have to be tackled. Those were the problems particularly of the Palestinians, the problem of Jerusalem. Those problems were problems in which the interests of all of the Arabs were engaged and therefore they could only be dealt with in a multilateral setting.

Now Secretary Kissinger has undertaken one third round of bilateral diplomacy, with some prospect that it may succeed. If it does succeed, it seems to me it imposes very great strains on the unity of the Arab world, because what it really means is almost a separate peace as far as Egypt is concerned, or at least a substantial progress toward a separate peace. I think this is creating very serious alarm on the part of the Syrians and the Syrians have a measure of support from some of the other more activist Arab states in the area—Algeria, for example, or even Kuwait. Now, I would suppose that a very important factor here is what the attitude of King Faisal [of Saudi Arabia] will be, because he controls the finances of Egypt in a fairly realistic sense today. And if he should shut that tap off as far as Egyptian finances are concerned, I would think it would have a very great effect. His interest

is fundamentally in Jerusalem, and I would think that unless he sees some sign that the negotiation will move toward a plank where Jerusalem can become one of the elements of discussion that he may become quite impatient and this may make it very hard for this step to go forward.

Mr. Moyers: How far, George, can the moderate Arab leaders, like King Faisal, go before they antagonize irrevocably the radicals in their midst who want to see Israel destroyed?

Mr. Ball: Well, I think this is a very big question. All right, we want to live within the dynamics of Arab politics. I mean this is a fact that can't be ignored. And I think that Sadat has gone surprisingly far, much farther—looking at it from the outside—I would have thought that he would go. Now, this is splendid if the momentum can be considered or continued and it doesn't create too many serious repercussions in the Arab world which might actually interfere with further programs. What it would appear is that the United States, through the Secretary of State and the best offices that we've been providing—the good offices—may well be on the way to splitting the Arab world. Now, this may result in eliminating Egypt, which obviously—from potential hostility, which is obviously a big factor. But whether this can be done in such a way as not to create antagonisms throughout the Arab world that will build up trouble for the future, I don't know. And I think this is one of the doubtful elements here.

Mr. Sisco: Let me say a word about that, Bill, because, as George knows, the step-by-step approach has never been conceived by us as an end in itself. It's always been seen as a contribution to the overall settlement. Certainly we have no interest in dividing the Arab world. I don't think it's in the national interest of the United States. So that the point that I've been emphasizing all the way along is that if we can get this next step, I think it will make a contribution toward the process of an overall settlement. And I think this is—this is what I think is key at the moment. I would agree, basically, that there

may very well come a point where the process has to be approached in a broader way. But I'm struck with the fact that I can recall the Rabat Conference a few months ago where that decision was taken and there were many predictions that this step-by-step approach had run out of gas. Well, it has not, and we're there doing what we're doing at the behest of the parties, and that's the important thing.

Mr. Moyers: Let's go back to the step-by-step for a moment. Assuming the best possibilities, you would get an agreement between Egypt and Israel for a disengagement in the Sinai. Is that right?

Mr. Sisco: Well, I wouldn't use the word "disengagement." Bill. This negotiation goes beyond the purely military elements as was the case with respect to the two agreements achieved last year. One of the delicacies of this negotiation is that, yes, it does involve withdrawal but it also involves political elements or the Israeli view is that there must be political content in this next agreement.

Mr. Moyers: What do you mean by political content?

Mr. Sisco: Well, we've already discussed one element; namely, the whole question of nonbelligerency. They want to view this agreement in terms of what it contributes to the political process—meaning in this particular instance the process toward peace. In other words, they're feeling that they are not going to be vulnerable to an attack from Egypt if they are involved in a withdrawal. They're concerned over the security situation in Sinai, and in return they want certain assurances.

Mr. Ball: Let me just raise a question with regard to the whole step-by-step approach. It seems to me that this is rather a completely different tactic from the tactic that's been followed in trying to bring peace to the Arabs before—initiatives in which Secretary Sisco has been very much involved, as we all know, the initiatives in 1968, the initiatives under Secretary Rogers. In those cases the effort was made to try to work out the details of a complete settlement using

the—as a framework, Resolution 242 [November 22, 1967], which was passed by the U.N. Security Council. This seems to me an approach where there is an effort, through bilateral diplomacy, to make a little progress here, a little progress there, almost like following the stream of a river in an unknown terrain not knowing whether you're going to run into a cul de sac in the mountains or find another stream that takes you elsewhere—not being totally sure about where you come out at the end.

Mr. Moyers: What would have been the alternative? Are you saying we should have gone to Geneva?

Mr. Ball: Well, I'm not suggesting that going to Geneva would have—in those terms, would have meant anything. The one suggestion I did make was that it seemed to me that at some point in the process the Soviet Union had to be brought in and that there had to be a substantial agreement between the Soviet Union and the United States as to how Resolution 242 should be filled out, because that is the one document that represents an agreement between the Soviet Union and the United States.

Mr. Sisco: There's always been a fundamental difference, however, George, in the interpretation of that resolution, you will recall. Because one interpretation, the Israeli interpretation, has been that it does contain the principle of withdrawal but the final so-called secure and recognized borders are a matter of negotiation between the two sides. The Arabs, on the other hand, have interpreted that resolution to mean total Israeli withdrawal to the '67 borders. And, candidly, we and the Soviets have never really seen eye-to-eye on what the substance of—

Mr. Ball: It shows what you really accomplished when you took that definite article out, doesn't it?

Mr. Moyers: Do you disagree, at the moment, with the possibilities of the step-by-step?

Mr. Ball: No, I would like to see this stage played out, obviously, and of course I would

like to see it succeed. I can see, however, implicit in this, the possibilities of contention in the Arab world, which may or may not advance with the progress toward a final settlement. If, for example, the Syrians become completely disenchanted, PLO [Palestine Liberation Organization] feels that it's being so pushed out of the action that it starts another wave of terrorism—all of these things could, it seems to me, result, if the suspicion grows throughout the Arab world that what the Egyptians are basically up to is to making what amounts to a separate peace and really withdrawing themselves from—their military weight from the balance, because their military weight is enormous.

Mr. Sisco: I can see this happening, George, if this next step were the end in itself, but as you know we as a government have by no manner of means precluded the renewal of the Geneva Conference. We have no objection to the renewal of the Geneva Conference as a matter of principle. So that I think this may very well be something that may, in time, be in the offing. You know we ourselves have not taken any definitive decisions. As I said, Bill, if we get to that particular point we'll want to consult with everyone concerned. But the important thing is that we see this thing as a preparatory step, perhaps moving toward the broader considerations in Geneva.

Mr. Moyers: Including moving toward a full-scale Geneva Conference?

Mr. Sisco: The possibility of the renewal of the Geneva Conference in the aftermath of this next step I think is there, and it will depend on what our consultations show.

Mr. Moyers: How would we feel about the Palestinians, the PLO, attending that conference?

Mr. Sisco: Well, Bill, I think we're very clear in that regard. Our policy has been expressed by both the President as well as the Secretary, and that is that as long as the PLO is unwilling to recognize the State of Israel we don't see any possibility of negotiation and neither are we pressing any-

one to negotiate on this basis. The key, I think, is at least a recognition of the existence of the State of Israel.

Mr. Ball: I would see a real possibility of problems with Syria, however, because of the fact that the Golan Heights is not a question that can be settled pre-final-settlement on a bilateral basis. There simply isn't enough wiggle room in the situation. The terrain is too narrow, and the high points are of such vital strategic importance to each side. So that I would assume that this is something that only can be done as part of a final settlement. I would not see very much chance of another stage of bilateral negotiations that could result in anything like the same result as occurred in the Sinai where you have very large areas in which you can negotiate. There isn't much room to negotiate there.

Mr. Moyers: There's a third area, too, that's involved, if I understand step-by-step diplomacy and that would be the Gaza Strip to—from the Sinai to the Gaza Strip to the Golan Heights and into the question of the West Bank. Do you think the West Bank can be resolved in step-by-step diplomacy?

Mr. Ball: I think there's a very interesting development there. For example, there was an article by Marilyn Berger in the Washington Post this morning—a report from there that the Jordanians are pouring substantial funds into the area with the approval of the Israelis. And there seems to be a real effort on the part of King Hussein [of Jordan] to move back into the situation and to the point where conceivably the PLO would lose a good deal of their strength and status, because I don't think that they're very enthusiastically supported by many of the Arab leaders even though those Arab leaders feel a compulsion to support them because of past commitments and because of the general emotion throughout the area.

Now, if this is the case, then conceivably, I suppose, one could even have a negotiation between Hussein and the Israelis down the road, in spite of the decision that was made in Rabat and in spite of Mr. Arafat's [Yasir

Arafat, Chairman, PLO] appearance at the United Nations. Whether this, in fact, can occur or not, I think only time will tell.

Mr. Sisco: In the aftermath of Rabat, Bill, King Hussein has busied himself in development in the East Bank and he's been very careful, as George has indicated, in keeping open bridges to the west, that is, the West Bank, and maintaining his interest there.

Mr. Moyers: What I can't see is the consideration that is or isn't being given to the political—to the human dynamic of the political situation. The Palestinians would appear to many people to be in the same position that the Jews were back when the world was not paying any attention to their request for a homeland, and here the Palestinians, who probably don't feel they can trust the Israelis and they're not sure they can trust the United States, so their stake seems to me to be so enormous from their terms, from their standpoint, that they're willing to take radical actions to keep on the agenda. What are we doing about that? Have we moved the Arabs any closer to recognizing both the need of the Palestinians and the need of the Israelis to get together?

Mr. Sisco: As I say, as long as the situation is as it is, in terms of nonrecognition, you should not expect that the United States will take any step in this regard.

I would say this. We've used here, rather loosely, the word "Palestinians," or even the PLO. The reality is that this is a rather divided group, and there are divisions in terms of what the solution might be, where it might be, and so on. I'm struck with the fact that Mr. Arafat, of course, made his statement at the General Assembly, and that basically is the view. But I would not expect, in these circumstances, any negotiating process to begin, for the reason that I've given.

Mr. Moyers: Do you have any indication from any Israeli sources that they at least understand the problems of the Palestinians?

Mr. Sisco: Israelis are very strongly op-

posed to any negotiations with the PLO at this time. They're pretty well convinced—or they are well convinced, I should say—that their posture is one of nonrecognition, and therefore they refuse to deal with them.

Mr. Moyers: Does anyone have any indication from the Palestinians that they understand why the Israelis are so fearful of a Palestinian state?

Mr. Ball: Well, I think that the declared position of the PLO in favor of a secular state, which would include Israel, obviously means that they would expect opposition from the Israelis.

One of the interesting questions, it seems to me, is what the people who are now in West Bank really want, and I'm not at all sure that they're as enthusiastic for the PLO as the world might think.

Mr. Moyers: Well, you've both been involved over the years in various negotiations. What are the unexpected interventions that can suddenly turn a negotiation around? Could something happen that none of us can foresee at the moment?

Mr. Ball: We could have an unforeseen act of terrorism in the situation, obviously, which would be—it might have a brutal effect on the whole situation. Or you could have a position taken by Syria, for example, of total intransigence as far as this arrangement is concerned, which could lead to very serious problems. I don't know whether one—whether there is a serious possibility of the Soviet Union making a move. I really, at the moment, don't see what they can do very effectively.

Mr. Sisco: The interesting thing, George, about the area in the last 18 months, I wonder whether you would agree, is the fact that the war in '73 actually altered the objective conditions in the area. From the Arab point of view, you can recall after the 1967 war, this was defeat in their eyes, and the whole notion of going to the conference table or the whole notion of negotiations was really not a reality; and yet in the immediate aftermath of the October '73

war, negotiations became very respectable. In fact, the strategy pursued by Sadat in the '73 war, he announced ahead of time—that the purpose of that military action was to get a political process started. And in fact it did start a political process. And we are where we are principally because that October war, I think, did change the objective conditions in the area.

Mr. Moyers: How does that apply to where we are now?

Mr. Sisco: In this sense. Each side, in the aftermath of that war, concluded that the best route was the route of diplomacy and negotiations, and this is the reason why the United States was able to bring them together on these two disengagement agreements, and this is why this process is continuing today. And I think that if there is hope in the situation, it is that I have found—I've been to the Middle East now a little over three months over the last year—I really believe that each side is pretty sick and tired of war. I think the principal moderate leaders in the Arab world would like to find a way diplomatically. I think Israel would like to find an agreement on the basis of diplomacy.

And I think that basically represents a change in the situation in the aftermath of the October '73 war from that which existed beforehand.

Mr. Ball: Could I ask you this? It seemed to me that what happened was that before the October '73 war there was a feeling on the part of a great many Israelis that time was really running on their side and if they simply sat on the occupied territory long enough the world would come to recognize this as an accomplished fact.

On the part of the Arabs there was a feeling of considerable sense of failure or inferiority or frustration—the fact that they hadn't demonstrated the qualities that they knew they possessed. That the October '73 war reestablished their own sense of self-confidence. That the change in the oil prices obviously showed them that they were no longer financially inferior, or wouldn't be over time. The oil embargo gave them an-

other feeling that they had an additional weapon.

But instead of becoming then insistent on trying to press what was a new advantage to the conclusion they instead, it seems to me rather remarkably, have opted for trying to find a peaceful solution, which is something that I think is quite surprising and quite extraordinary.

Whereas on the part of the Israelis, they also have recognized that now time probably isn't working on their side or at least they can't make that assumption that it is and that therefore they have a greater interest in a peaceful solution—in a negotiated solution—than they have before.

Mr. Sisco: I tend to agree that there has developed, I think, a more conscious mutual interest in the diplomatic process, George. As I say, I think it's in the aftermath of the October '73 war, and if one can express oneself in a guarded way—in an optimistic way, very guardedly—it's that psychological factor which I like to point to.

Mr. Moyers: *The sticky issue remains the Golan Heights, which George said a minute ago was really indispensable to both sides: The absolute demand by the Palestinians that they have a home finally and a state and the absolute demand by the Israelis that the Palestinians not continue their aim of destroying the State of Israel.*

Mr. Ball: Well, when I suggested that the Golan Heights was indispensable to both sides, that is, if that is the only basis for their security, it's a purely security interest that they each have in the Golan Heights. And if there is some way of assuring security, then obviously some settlement is possible on the Golan Heights.

But I indicated that in my view that probably could only come about in terms of a final wrapping up of a great many of the difficult issues.

Mr. Moyers: *What do you see as the most desirable possibility for the kind of accord in the Middle East that would get this problem off of the main agenda of the world into*

a back seat where there could be some lasting peace?

Mr. Ball: Well, I think there are certain indispensable conditions to a final settlement that would be a durable one. One of them is, I feel myself, that it must be a settlement in which the United States and the Soviet Union are in accord. I don't think we can have a settlement in which the Soviet Union is totally left out and frustrated because, with the beachhead they already have in the area, I think they would continue to be a source of disequilibrium. That is one element.

Another element is that there must be the buffer zones and the injection of some kind of neutral force, whether it should be a neutral force in the traditional kind which neither side has much enthusiasm for, or one that's set up—a purely neutral status such as the Scandinavian peoples or the Indians or something like that.

However, there could be a force in which the United States and the Soviet Union would make a contribution—not necessarily being the exclusive elements in that force. It remains to be seen.

There is considerable discussion, at least in the radio news these days, about Egypt—interest in Egypt in bringing the French and British back into some kind of a guaranteeing role.

Now this again seems to be an element that has to be worked out in some way.

Mr. Sisco: Let me say a word about this. First, George, I obviously agree with you that you really can't have a durable peace in the Middle East unless the two major powers manifest that interest and support the peace. After all, I think, if anything, the discussion we've had here demonstrates that we all feel that the Soviet Union is a reality in the area; it has interests as we have interests.

On this question of guarantee, we've not really drawn any definitive conclusions and obviously we're looking—and looking at it, I might say, George, only in the context of an overall settlement, not in relationship to any next interim step. My own feeling

is this: That the principal assurance of any agreement really has to be that peace agreement between the two sides in which each side exchanges obligations with each other that's going to build a kind of confidence on the ground that's going to be required. Because years of distrust really have to be dispelled. So the principal assurance is whatever peace agreement Israel and the Arabs actually agree on.

I can see all sorts of situations where an endorsement by the major powers or some support for this agreement will add political force to this kind of an agreement as a supplement, complementary to the agreement.

I don't see it, however, as a substitute for the kinds of arrangements between the parties, the actual security arrangements on the ground, whatever peacekeeping forces may be decided upon, on the ground, and the obligations that they exchange with one another.

Mr. Moyers: As you speak, Joe, I see the forces that you're saying are bringing some equilibrium into the air with the exception of the Palestinians. We're there with the center of our gravity leaning toward Israel as has been the history of our involvement in the Middle East. The Arabs have the Soviets in the background. I don't see who is working in all of this complicated process to speak for the interest of the Palestinians.

Mr. Sisco: Well, maybe, Bill, it's because basically in the first instance this is a problem for the Arabs themselves to sort out. And I think we indicated there are different views on this in the area and it may very well be that it's really not the United States that can sort this out at a given time.

Mr. Moyers: What might bring a breakdown of this process and war? What do you fear most?

Mr. Sisco: Well, I think it's important that we achieve this next step, and I think it's important that some diplomatic process continue because, if there is a diplomatic void, tensions are apt to increase.

Mr. Ball: Yes, I would agree with this. I

think that if there should be a breakdown and the whole process loses momentum, then I would think that out of frustration and fear that time was in fact running against them there might be a great temptation on the part of Israel to move, perhaps to strike at Syria or something.

U.S. and India Sign Agreement on Wheat Sales Under P.L. 480

A U.S.-India agreement for sales of agricultural commodities was signed at Washington on March 20 by G. V. Ramakrishna, Minister (Economic), Embassy of India, and Sidney Sober, Deputy Assistant Secretary for Near Eastern and South Asian Affairs. Following are remarks made by Mr. Sober at the signing ceremony.

Pre's release 158 dated March 20

The agreement we are signing today is an important step by both of our governments in the development of a closer relationship, which we both seek.

This agreement provides for the sale under title I of Public Law 480 of 800,000 tons of wheat—a good deal more than we had originally expected to be able to supply to India this fiscal year. The sale is being financed by a long-term low-interest loan, and payment will be made in dollars.

I want to offer a special word of thanks to those people on both sides who worked so hard to bring these negotiations to a successful conclusion.

In New Delhi last October, Secretary Kissinger stated [upon signing the U.S.-India agreement to establish a Joint Commission on Economic, Commercial, Scientific, Technological, Educational and Cultural Cooperation] that “the interests of India and the United States are compatible and that we are only at the beginning of a period of cooperation whose possibilities have only begun to be exploited.” Today's agreement should be seen in that context. I am honored to be able to play a part.

Compelling Need for Assistance to Cambodia Reemphasized

Following is a statement made before the House Committee on Foreign Affairs on March 13 by Deputy Secretary Robert S. Ingersoll, who was Acting Secretary during Secretary Kissinger's visit to the Middle East.¹

I am pleased to have this opportunity to appear before the House Foreign Affairs Committee to address the urgent matter of assistance to Cambodia.

Since January 28 when the President asked Congress to lift the ceiling on overall U.S. assistance to Cambodia and authorize a supplemental budget request of \$222 million for military assistance, many witnesses have been heard.

On Tuesday, the subcommittee on foreign relations of the Senate voted a compromise which will be voted on in the full committee next Monday. Briefly, this would provide \$125 million more in drawdown authority for military aid to Cambodia, as well as an increase in the ceiling on economic assistance which will allow an additional \$73 million for Public Law 480 and \$15.5 million for other economic aid.

Just yesterday, this committee's Subcommittee on Investigations recommended an alternative compromise formula whereby the ceiling on military assistance would be increased to permit an additional \$20 million per month from available military assistance funds plus an additional \$7.5 million per month under the drawdown authority. This

formula would also permit an increase of \$17.7 million per month in food aid under Public Law 480.

While the Administration's request for the full \$222 million is based on our best estimate of the requirements of the situation, the Administration is prepared to accept a compromise in view of the urgency of the situation. The Senate approach comes closer to meeting what we consider to be the necessary levels of economic and military assistance. Nevertheless we hope both the Senate and the House will move expeditiously so that the necessary legislation can be enacted as quickly as possible.

I am appearing today as Acting Secretary of State to stress once more the absolute necessity for urgent congressional action.

The military situation in Cambodia has deteriorated since the President's January 28 request. For the first time in five years of war, the Mekong River has been temporarily closed to shipping. Munitions, food, and petroleum supplies must now be brought into Cambodia by airlift. Government forces, however, will be unable to continue their defense unless supplemental authority and funds are provided promptly for increased military assistance, 80 percent of which will be ammunition.

Unless the ceiling of total Cambodian aid is lifted, we shall be unable to continue the purchase and delivery of adequate foodstuffs to Cambodia. A delay on food aid means malnutrition and starvation for increasing numbers of Cambodians, particularly the very young and very old.

One of the most prevalent arguments against increased aid to Cambodia is that additional assistance may well prolong the killing and agony but will not provide any guarantee of negotiation and a compromise settle-

¹The complete transcript of the hearings will be published by the committee and will be available from the Superintendent of Documents, U.S. Government Printing Office, Washington, D.C. 20402.

ment—policy objectives long sought by the Khmer Government and the United States.

I contend that it is not up to the United States unilaterally to make that judgment for another sovereign government.

Neither we nor the Cambodian Government seek a military solution.

You will recall that last week the Administration provided a summary of our efforts—in support of and complementary to the efforts of the Cambodian Government—to find the way to a compromise, negotiated settlement to the Cambodian problem.

Let me repeat a point made previously by the President and other Administration spokesman: We honestly believe—and believe very strongly—that, with the provision of the additional assistance under discussion, there is a reasonable chance that the Khmer Government will survive the current crisis. This will permit the Cambodians and their friends, including the United States, to pursue vigorously their efforts to find a compromise settlement. I want to stress this.

Without the additional assistance there can be only one result to the situation in Cambodia: a military victory for the other side.

In addressing the President's request for aid to Cambodia, I hope members of the committee will not look at the country as an isolated area but as part of a mosaic which includes Indochina, Southeast Asia, and the whole world.

We have no legal commitment to Cambodia. Nevertheless, we responded to Cambodia's request for help to defend itself and have continued this assistance for five years. Are we now simply to abandon a friend whose will is to continue defending itself but whose ability to do so depends on us?

Our policy toward Cambodia is being watched with some concern by other nations, many of them our friends, as a possible indication of future U.S. policy. It will be so viewed, whether or not Congress intends this to be the case.

In conclusion, let me stress once more the

compelling need for the supplementary military aid request for Cambodia and the urgent requirement for congressional approval to lift the ceiling on overall aid to that country.

Department Discusses Arab Boycott of Israel

Following is a statement by Sidney Sober, Deputy Assistant Secretary for Near Eastern and South Asian Affairs, made before the Subcommittee on International Trade and Commerce of the House Committee on Foreign Affairs on March 13.¹

I am sure the subcommittee will understand that while we are in the middle of delicate negotiations in the Middle East, this is a particularly difficult time to be discussing the subject before us today. I nevertheless wish to be responsive to the subcommittee's interest in discussing the policy of the Department of State toward the Arab boycott of Israel and actions by the Department in connection with the boycott.

Let me begin by putting the boycott in its Middle East context.

The Arab boycott of Israel is one manifestation of the basic Arab-Israeli conflict and thus arises from deep-seated political and emotional factors. The initial boycott organization, which was set up as a committee of the Arab League Council at the beginning of 1946, applied a primary boycott to prevent the entry of certain products into Arab countries from what is now the State of Israel. The secondary boycott, designed to inhibit third parties from assisting in Israel's development, was introduced in 1951, and it is this secondary boycott that affects American economic relations with a number of Middle East countries.

¹ The complete transcript of the hearings will be published by the committee and will be available from the Superintendent of Documents, U.S. Government Printing Office, Washington, D.C. 20402.

The scope of the boycott has been broadened through the years, and it applies to a variety of activities which are seen by the Arab countries as constituting a special economic relationship with Israel. An extension of the boycott has involved the blacklisting of foreign actors, artists, and other entertainment figures (and their films or recordings) judged to have aided Israel, such as through fundraising. It is our understanding that, generally speaking, the act of trading with Israel—as such—does not violate any of the regulations of the boycott organization and does not of itself bring the boycott into effect. However, the Arab countries themselves reserve the power to interpret the boycott regulations and decisions, and our experience suggests that they are not uniformly applied. There are a number of firms which do business in Israel and Arab countries.

It is impossible to determine how much the boycott up to now has actually harmed Israel, whose economy has been growing at the rate of about 10 percent annually. We recognize, however, that the rapidly increasing economic strength of certain Arab countries has enhanced the Arab boycott as a potentially effective weapon against Israel. There is a likelihood that the growing attractiveness of commerce with Arab countries will place greater pressure on some foreign firms not to deal with Israel because of the boycott.

Now I want to come to the position of the United States with regard to the boycott. As stated on numerous occasions, our position is clear and it can be summarized as follows: The United States opposes the boycott. We do not support or condone it in any way. The Department has emphasized our opposition to the boycott to the Arab governments on many occasions as it adversely affects U.S. firms, vessels, and individuals. Where the commercial interests of American firms or individuals have been injured or threatened with injury, we have made representations to appropriate Arab officials.

Consistent with our policy of opposition to the boycott, as reflected in the Export Ad-

ministration Act of 1969, the Department of State has refused hundreds of requests from U.S. companies for authentication of documents relating to the boycott as being contrary to public policy.

A number of American firms with boycott problems have consulted with Department officials. These firms have been (a) reminded of their reporting responsibilities under the Export Administration Act and (b) encouraged and requested to refuse to take any action in support of restrictive trade practices or boycotts.

A fundamental factor which has to be faced is that Arab governments regard the boycott as an important element in their position toward Israel and one of the basic issues of the Arab-Israeli conflict to be dealt with as progress is made toward resolving that conflict. Indeed, this is one of the issues which we have very much in mind as we continue our diplomatic efforts to help the parties achieve a just and lasting peace. The problem has been how to change effectively the underlying conditions which led to imposition of the boycott. We believe we can best serve this objective not through confrontation but by continuing to promote with the parties directly concerned a peaceful settlement of basic Middle East issues. We believe that our present diplomatic approach is the most effective way to proceed.

Though the boycott emerged from the political problems of the Arab-Israeli conflict, we are also concerned by reports that it could be used for discrimination on outright religious grounds. On this subject President Ford has recently said [in a news conference on February 26]:

There have been reports in recent weeks of attempts in the international banking community to discriminate against certain institutions or individuals on religious or ethnic grounds.

There should be no doubt about the position of this Administration and the United States. Such discrimination is totally contrary to the American tradition and repugnant to American principles. It has no place in the free practice of commerce as it has flourished in this country.

Foreign businessmen and investors are most wel-

come in the United States when they are willing to conform to the principles of our society. However, any allegations of discrimination will be fully investigated and appropriate action taken under the laws of the United States.

In summing up, I want to reemphasize that we oppose the boycott and will continue to make our opposition to it known and that we will continue to oppose any efforts to discriminate against American firms or individuals on the basis of religion or ethnic background.

At the same time, we will continue to do our utmost to help the countries in the Middle East to find a basis for resolving the Arab-Israeli dispute and to arrive at a just and durable peace. It is our conviction that in the attainment of peace lies the fundamental basis for the resolution of the boycott issue, among others which we are discussing today.

Fifth Report on NATO Offset Transmitted to the Congress

*Message From President Ford*¹

To the Congress of the United States:

In accordance with Section 812(d) of the Department of Defense Appropriation Authorization Act, 1974 (Public Law 93-155), I am pleased to submit a fifth report to the Congress on our progress toward offsetting the balance of payments deficit resulting from the deployment of U.S. forces in NATO Europe.

As required by Section 812, the Department of Commerce has been working in consultation with the Department of Defense and the General Accounting Office to define the U.S. balance of payments deficit on military transactions incurred in Fiscal Year 1974 as a result of our NATO commitments. In my November report, I provided to the Congress tentative figures developed by the Commerce Department which estimated our

FY 74 expenditures at \$1.983 billion. This has now been confirmed as the final FY 74 expenditure figure.

The Commerce Department is now in the process of identifying U.S. FY 74 balance of payments receipts reflecting military-related sales and exports to our European NATO allies, through both official U.S. Foreign Military Sales (FMS) and commercial channels. Once total receipts have been identified, they will be subtracted from the \$1.983 billion in expenditures to establish the FY 74 deficit. While the Department has been able to confirm Allied purchases through FMS channels, it has been unable to settle on a figure for commercial receipts. The Commerce Department's balance of payments accounting procedures are not in sufficient detail to permit it to isolate all of these purchases. Using information provided by our Allies through the NATO Economic Directorate, the Commerce Department is making an effort to identify as many of these transactions as possible and to include them in its calculation of the balance of payments deficit.

An interagency committee within the Executive Branch has been working to identify other transactions which serve to offset this balance of payments deficit. Of major importance is the FY 74-75 US/FRG Offset Agreement, which was described in some detail in the May 1974 report. We have since been working in cooperation with our Allies to identify additional categories of offsets. These will include Allied purchases of U.S. military-related equipment which cannot be extracted from the U.S. balance of payments accounting system. I will provide details on these offset categories in my May 1975 report to the Congress.

Once our analysis has been completed and the FY 74 military balance of payments deficit has been established, I am confident that this deficit will be offset by the items we have identified and that the requirements of Section 812 will be met.

GERALD R. FORD.

THE WHITE HOUSE, *February 20, 1975.*

¹ Transmitted on Feb. 20 (text from White House press release).

U.S. Outlines Issues Before Resumed Conference of the Committee on Disarmament

Statement by Joseph Martin, Jr.

U.S. Representative to the Conference of the Committee on Disarmament¹

The President of the United States has directed me to convey to the CCD the following message, which I request be made a conference document:

As the Conference of the Committee on Disarmament begins its 1975 deliberations, I would like to extend my best wishes and express my fervent hope that its work this year will add new achievements to the Committee's substantial record.

The accomplishments of previous sessions have earned the respect of nations throughout the world. The General Assembly of the United Nations has entrusted to the Committee some of the most important and complex problems of our time. The dedication and seriousness of purpose that have characterized the work of the CCD have made it a most effective multilateral forum for dealing with arms control and disarmament questions.

The Committee's work resumes this year at a significant moment. One of its accomplishments, the Convention on the Prohibition of the Development, Production, and Stockpiling of Bacteriological (Biological) and Toxin Weapons and on Their Destruction, is about to enter into force. The Convention is a positive measure of the progress that can be made through responsible and constructive international negotiation.

A great many tasks—some continuing, some new—face the CCD. Few have simple solutions. No one can guarantee that agreed solutions can be achieved for every issue. For its part, the United States will do all in its power to promote agreement wherever and whenever possible.

I am confident that this Committee, through the constructive dialogue that is its hallmark, will con-

tinue to make its valuable contribution to the promotion of peace and security through effective arms-control measures.

GERALD R. FORD

We are resuming our work at a time when disarmament efforts are receiving increasing attention in the search for a more stable and secure world. Convincing evidence of the growing interest in arms control solutions to national and international security problems can be found in the extensive treatment of disarmament questions at the 29th U.N. General Assembly. It is also reflected in the unprecedented number of international meetings which are currently dealing with the subject.

Here in Geneva, Soviet and American negotiators are working out the specific provisions of a second-stage SALT [Strategic Arms Limitation Talks] agreement, the broad outlines of which were agreed at the Vladivostok summit. In Moscow, representatives of the United States and the Soviet Union are engaged in discussions aimed at reaching the agreement governing peaceful nuclear explosions that is called for in article III of the Threshold Test Ban Treaty. In Washington, representatives of the two countries have been considering the question of effective measures of restraint on environmental modification techniques. In Vienna, members of NATO and the Warsaw Pact are continuing their efforts to reach agreement on mutual and balanced force reductions

¹ Made before the opening session of the resumed Conference of the Committee on Disarmament (CCD) at Geneva on Mar. 4.

in Central Europe. In addition, the International Atomic Energy Agency is the focal point for international examination of safeguards on the peaceful uses of nuclear technology and of various aspects of peaceful nuclear explosions. Finally, two months from now the conference to review the operation of the Nonproliferation Treaty (NPT) will begin in Geneva.

The CCD occupies a unique and important position in this overall effort. In 1975 our newly enlarged Committee can expect a heavier workload than it has had in several years. The 29th General Assembly of the United Nations, in addition to urging the CCD to continue its work on a comprehensive test ban and chemical weapons limitations, called on the Committee to examine questions that have so far received relatively little attention in this forum; namely, environmental modification for military purposes, nuclear-free zones, and the arms control implications of peaceful nuclear explosions (PNE's). My delegation welcomes these new responsibilities and is confident that the CCD can make a valuable contribution in each of these fields.

Among the large number of items on the international disarmament agenda, the most pressing, in our view, concern nonproliferation and related nuclear issues. My government was gratified that at the 29th U.N. General Assembly many nations recognized that there is serious cause for concern in the prospect of the further spread of independent nuclear explosive capabilities. The United States feels that the wide support given to the Nonproliferation Treaty and the many calls for broader adherence to that treaty were constructive developments.

At the same time, a large number of delegations recognized that the prevention of the further spread of nuclear-weapons capabilities cannot be taken for granted and that a broad and determined international effort is needed to strengthen the nonproliferation regime.

My government is urgently considering what courses of action would contribute most effectively to achieving a more uni-

versal, reliable system of safeguards against diversion of nuclear materials and technology to military purposes. It is also considering what would be the most promising steps to increase the political and economic incentives which could lead a country to forgo the nuclear explosive option. My government looks to the NPT Review Conference to assess how well the treaty has functioned in the first five years of its existence, to consider how the treaty can be more effectively implemented, and to provide an impetus for the broadly based effort that will be essential if we are to avoid a proliferation of nuclear powers.

U.S.-U.S.S.R. Steps To Curb Nuclear Arms Race

The Review Conference will be concerned not only with the operation of those provisions of the NPT that deal directly with the spread of nuclear-weapons capabilities but also with the implementation of those provisions that were designed to halt and reverse the nuclear arms race, notably article VI. In this connection I am pleased to note that, since the CCD last met, the United States and the Soviet Union have taken another major step to curb their competition in nuclear arms. At Vladivostok President Ford and General Secretary Brezhnev set firm and equal numerical limits on the strategic forces of both sides. Specifically, they agreed to put a ceiling of 2,400 on the total number of intercontinental ballistic missiles, submarine-launched ballistic missiles, and heavy bombers for each country. They also agreed on a maximum number of 1,320 launchers for missiles that could be armed with multiple independently targeted reentry vehicles (MIRV's). With the agreement to place all these strategic delivery vehicles under the ceiling and to set an additional limit on MIRV's, this general framework for a new SALT accord goes well beyond the scope of the interim agreement concluded in 1972.

Because of this breakthrough at Vladivostok, for the first time in the nuclear age each side's strategic calculations and force plan-

ning will not be motivated by fear and uncertainty about a possible open-ended strategic buildup by the other side. Instead, they can be based with confidence on firm, established parameters. This can be expected to make a valuable contribution to the stability of the strategic relationship.

Of perhaps greater long-range importance, the ceilings worked out by the leaders of the two countries will provide a solid foundation for negotiating future arms reductions. While many details remain to be settled before this general framework can be transformed into a new agreement, the United States is confident that such an agreement can be concluded this year and that further negotiations on reducing the force ceilings can follow soon thereafter.

My government is aware of the importance attached internationally to a comprehensive test ban as a means of curbing the nuclear arms race. The United States remains firmly committed to seeking an adequately verified comprehensive test ban. The Threshold Test Ban Treaty, negotiated in Moscow last summer, is not only a step toward that objective but will be in itself a significant constraint on the nuclear arms competition between the United States and the U.S.S.R.

Question of Peaceful Nuclear Explosions

The question of peaceful nuclear explosions has recently become a major topic in international disarmament discussions. We must start from the facts that a number of uncertainties about the feasibility and practicability of PNE's have yet to be resolved and that the use of PNE's is a highly complicated matter both politically and legally. Recognizing these facts, the U.S. delegation at the recent General Assembly called for thorough international consideration of the PNE question. We accordingly supported the Assembly's request in resolution 3261D that the CCD consider the arms control implications of peaceful nuclear explosions.

Those implications have two aspects: implications for the development and testing of nuclear weapons by nuclear-weapon states

and implications for the spread of nuclear-weapon capabilities among non-nuclear-weapon states.

With respect to the first of these categories, it is clearly important to insure that nuclear explosions carried out ostensibly for peaceful purposes are not used to gain weapons-related information in circumvention of agreed limitations on weapons testing. This is the central task of the bilateral negotiations now underway in Moscow, where the two sides are discussing criteria to insure that PNE's are consistent with the Threshold Test Ban Treaty. An analogous question arises with respect to any form of international test ban agreement. Indeed, this question would be particularly crucial with a comprehensive test ban, since in the absence of any authorized weapons testing, there would be a greater incentive to seek weapons information in the course of a PNE program.

With respect to PNE implications for the spread of nuclear-weapon capabilities, my government's firm conviction remains that it would be impossible for a non-nuclear-weapon state to develop a nuclear explosive device for peaceful purposes without in the process acquiring a device that could be used as a nuclear weapon. It has been argued that the critical factor is not the capability to produce nuclear devices but the intention of the country producing the device. However, this is not the issue. The critical question is not whether we can accept the stated intentions of any country, but whether a world in which many states have the capability to carry out nuclear explosions—and in which all therefore fear the nuclear-weapon capability of others—would not be vastly less secure than a world that has successfully contained the spread of nuclear explosive technology.

Study of Nuclear-Free Zones

A notable development at the last General Assembly was the heightened interest in nuclear-free zones. Resolutions were adopted dealing with nuclear-free-zone proposals for South Asia, the Middle East, and Africa

and with the Latin American Nuclear-Free-Zone Treaty. Reflecting this renewed interest, and motivated in part by the diversity of the regional initiatives and the complexity of some of the issues involved, the General Assembly requested that an ad hoc group of governmental experts, under CCD auspices, undertake a comprehensive study of the question of nuclear-free zones in all its aspects.

My delegation welcomes this step and hopes it will contribute to a better understanding of the wide range of issues relating to nuclear-free zones. Given the differences that exist from region to region, we think it would be unrealistic to expect the experts to reach agreement on requirements for nuclear-free-zone arrangements that could be applied universally. One useful purpose of the study might be to identify issues where standardized provisions could be feasible, and others where they would not.

Unlike earlier studies undertaken under the auspices of the Secretary General, the study of nuclear-free zones will involve issues that are by nature primarily political rather than technical. This is the first such study to be carried out under the auspices of the CCD, and it was entrusted to this body with the understanding that a number of states not represented in the Committee would participate. My delegation has developed a number of ideas on the organization of this project which we will be discussing with members of the Committee in the next few days.

Restraints on Chemical and Biological Weapons

Turning to the area of restraints on chemical and biological weapons, I am pleased to be able to report two important actions recently taken by the U.S. Government. On January 22 President Ford signed the U.S. instrument of ratification of the Geneva Protocol of 1925. I should point out that, although not party to the protocol in the past, my government has always observed its principles and objectives.

The President also signed on January 22 the U.S. instrument of ratification of the

Biological Weapons Convention, a product of the expert and painstaking efforts of this Committee. As members of the CCD are aware, this convention is the first agreement since World War II to provide for the actual elimination of an entire class of weapons; namely, biological agents and toxins. With ratification procedures already completed by the three depositary governments and by many more than the required 19 additional governments, we expect the convention to enter into force in the very near future. It is our hope that this will prompt many other governments to adhere to the convention.

As members of the Committee are aware, article II of the Biological Weapons Convention requires parties to destroy or to divert to peaceful purposes, as soon as possible but not later than nine months after entry into force, all agents, equipment, and means of delivery prohibited in article I. In this connection I would like to state that the entire U.S. stockpile of biological and toxin agents and weapons has already been destroyed and our former biological warfare facilities have been converted to peaceful uses. My delegation, and I am sure other members of the Committee, would welcome similar confirmations of implementation of article II from parties to the convention.

The ratification of the Geneva Protocol and the ratification and entry into force of the Biological Weapons Convention are viewed by my government as significant steps toward our common objective of the effective prohibition of chemical and biological weapons.

My delegation is prepared at the current session to participate in the active examination of possibilities for further effective restraints on chemical weapons. An important element in this examination should continue to be a thorough analysis of the verification question in relation to the possible scope of any prohibition.

The U.S. interest in overcoming the dangers of the use of environmental modification techniques for military purposes was reflected in the U.S.-Soviet summit joint statement of July 3, 1974, in which both countries advocated the most effective measures pos-

able to accomplish that objective. At the U.N. General Assembly last fall my government indicated that it would be ready at the CCD to consider this subject further. We pointed out that little is known about the scientific and technological aspects of environmental modification and that many of the applications posed for discussion are at present only hypothetical. At the same time we stressed that we were prepared to participate actively and positively in further discussion of this matter. We would expect to contribute to the Committee's deliberations in that spirit.

In my statement today I have discussed a number of new responsibilities to be assumed by the Committee. There is another issue I think should be added to the list: the question of restraints on conventional arms. This Committee has always given the highest priority to the control of weapons of mass destruction. While my delegation regards this as entirely appropriate, we see no reason why possible controls on conventional weapons, which account for the largest share of world military expenditures, cannot be considered concurrently. I plan to return to this subject in a later intervention.

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A Selected Bibliography

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Commission for Social Development:

- The welfare of migrant workers and their families. Report of the Secretary General. E/CN.5/515. October 14, 1974. 45 pp.
- Rehabilitation of disabled persons. Report of the Secretary General. E/CN.5/500. October 18, 1974. 22 pp.
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TREATY INFORMATION

Current Actions

MULTILATERAL

Aviation

Convention on offenses and certain other acts committed on board aircraft. Done at Tokyo September 14, 1963. Entered into force December 4, 1969. TIAS 6768.

Accession deposited: Egypt, February 12, 1975.

Protocol relating to an amendment to the convention on international civil aviation, as amended (TIAS 1591, 3756, 5170, 7616). Done at Vienna July 7, 1971. Entered into force December 19, 1974.

Ratification deposited: Cuba, January 3, 1975.

Biological Weapons

Convention on the prohibition of the development, production and stockpiling of bacteriological (biological) and toxin weapons and on their destruction. Done at Washington, London, and Moscow April 10, 1972.¹

Ratification deposited: San Marino, March 17, 1975.

Coffee

Protocol for the continuation in force of the international coffee agreement 1968, as amended and extended (TIAS 6584, 7809), with annex. Approved by the International Coffee Council at London September 26, 1974. Open for signature November 1, 1974, through March 31, 1975.¹

Signatures: Finland, February 24, 1975;² Guinea, February 21, 1975.

Maritime Matters

Convention on facilitation of international maritime traffic, with annex. Done at London April 9, 1965. Entered into force March 5, 1967; for the United States May 16, 1967. TIAS 6251.

Accessions deposited: Chile, February 14, 1975; Syria, February 6, 1975.

Nuclear Weapons—Nonproliferation

Treaty on the nonproliferation of nuclear weapons. Done at Washington, London, and Moscow July 1, 1968. Entered into force March 5, 1970. TIAS 6839.

Accession deposited: Western Samoa, March 18, 1975.

Seals—Antarctic

Convention for the conservation of Antarctic seals, with annex and final act. Done at London June 1, 1972.¹

Acceptance deposited: France, February 19, 1975.

¹ Not in force.

² Subject to approval, ratification, or acceptance.

Telecommunications

International telecommunication convention, with annexes and protocols. Done at Malaga-Torremolinos October 25, 1973. Entered into force January 1, 1975.²

Ratifications deposited: Netherlands,¹ United Kingdom,³ December 31, 1974.

Accession deposited: South Africa, December 23, 1974.

Terrorism—Protection of Diplomats

Convention on the prevention and punishment of crimes against internationally protected persons, including diplomatic agents. Done at New York December 14, 1973.¹

Ratification deposited: Ecuador, March 12, 1975.

World Heritage

Convention concerning the protection of the world cultural and natural heritage. Done at Paris November 16, 1972.¹

Acceptance deposited: Niger, December 23, 1974.

BILATERAL

Bangladesh

Agreement amending the agreement for sales of agricultural commodities of October 4, 1974 (TIAS 7949). Effected by exchange of notes at Dacca February 28, 1975. Entered into force February 28, 1975.

Federal Republic of Germany

Agreement on cooperation in environmental affairs. Signed at Bonn May 9, 1974.

Entered into force: March 26, 1975.

India

Agreement for sales of agricultural commodities. Signed at Washington March 20, 1975. Entered into force March 20, 1975.

Pakistan

Agreement amending the agreement for sales of agricultural commodities of November 23, 1974 (TIAS 7971). Effected by exchange of notes at Islamabad March 3, 1975. Entered into force March 3, 1975.

¹ Not in force.

² Not in force for the United States.

³ Extended to Surinam and Netherlands Antilles.

⁴ Extended to Antigua, British Solomon Islands Protectorate, Brunei, Condominium of the New Hebrides, Dominica, St. Christopher-Nevis-Anguilla, St. Lucia, St. Vincent, and territories under the territorial sovereignty of the United Kingdom. Not applicable to Southern Rhodesia until the United Kingdom informs the Secretary General of the International Telecommunication Union that it is in a position to insure that the obligations imposed by the convention in respect of that territory can be fully implemented.

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Press releases may be obtained from the Office of Press Relations, Department of State, Washington, D.C. 20520.

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†144	3/17	Kissinger: departure, Damascus, Mar. 15.
†145	3/17	Kissinger: arrival, Amman, Mar. 15.
†146	3/17	Kissinger: departure, Amman, Mar. 16.
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148	3/17	Ingersoll: Southern Council, Atlanta.
*149	3/17	U.S. Advisory Commission on International Educational and Cultural Affairs meets Apr. 11.
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†151	3/17	Kissinger: arrival, Aswan.
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†157	3/19	Kissinger, Yamani: departure, Riyadh.
158	3/20	Sober: remarks at signing of U.S.-India P.L.-480 agreement.
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*160	3/20	Safety of Life at Sea Subcommittee of Shipping Coordinating Committee, Apr. 15.
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*163	3/21	Foreign basketball coaches to attend San Diego convention, Mar. 24.
†164	3/23	Kissinger, Peres: remarks, Mar. 21.
†165	3/23	Kissinger, Rabin: remarks, Mar. 22.
†166	3/23	Kissinger, Rabin: departure, Jerusalem.

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U.S. DEPARTMENT OF STATE
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DEPOSITORY

THE OFFICIAL WEEKLY RECORD OF UNITED STATES FOREIGN POLICY

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THE DEPARTMENT OF STATE BULLETIN

Vol. LXXII, No. 1868

April 14, 1975

The Department of State BULLETIN, a weekly publication issued by the Office of Media Services, Bureau of Public Affairs, provides the public and interested agencies of the government with information on developments in the field of U.S. foreign relations and on the work of the Department and the Foreign Service.

The BULLETIN includes selected press releases on foreign policy, issued by the White House and the Department, and statements, addresses, and news conferences of the President and the Secretary of State and other officers of the Department, as well as special articles on various phases of international affairs and the functions of the Department. Information is included concerning treaties and international agreements to which the United States is or may become a party and on treaties of general international interest.

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Secretary Kissinger's News Conference of March 26

Press release 172 dated March 26

I would like to begin with a brief statement concerning the suspension of the Middle East peace talks.

The step-by-step approach pursued by the United States attempted to separate the Middle East problem into individual and therefore manageable segments. Now that approach has suffered a setback, and the Middle East issues have to be dealt with comprehensively, under more difficult circumstances.

A moment of potentially great danger is not the time to assess blame between the parties or to indulge in recrimination. We need a calm appraisal of the situation and the U.S. policy best suited to the new conditions. Let me sum up the U.S. position:

—With the end of the step-by-step approach, the United States faces a period of more complicated international diplomacy. Consequently, a reassessment of policy is essential. This reassessment has been ordered by the President.

—The dangers which produced the need for progress toward peace are still with us. The United States therefore is determined to continue the search for peace in the Middle East. It is prepared to go to Geneva and will be in touch with the cochairman of the conference, the U.S.S.R., in the near future.

—The United States is prepared to consider any other approach acceptable to the parties.

—The United States remains fully committed to the survival of Israel.

—The search for peace can be nurtured only in an atmosphere of calm. The parties involved in the Middle East conflict thus

have a responsibility to moderate words and deeds and to refrain from threatening acts.

—All outside powers have a responsibility to exercise restraint and to follow a course of moderation.

We face a difficult situation in the Middle East and throughout the world. The times demand a renewed sense of national purpose.

We must understand that peace is indivisible. The United States cannot pursue a policy of selective reliability. We cannot abandon friends in one part of the world without jeopardizing the security of friends everywhere.

We cannot master our future except as a united people. Our energies should be directed, not at recriminations about the past, but toward a vigorous and constructive search for a lasting peace. And to this, the Administration is dedicated.

Now I'll take questions.

Q. Mr. Secretary, with respect to American policy and what you have just said regarding selective reliability—in 1965 the United States equated the defense of South Viet-Nam with the commitment to NATO; now it appears to be equating the additional aid to South Viet-Nam with regard to the Middle East and so forth.

Do you feel that during the past five years, the policy and the techniques of diplomacy which we have pursued have been wrong? Have the conditions been wrong? Or what has happened?

Secretary Kissinger: As I understand it, you are asking two separate questions. One is the policy, the relationship between Indochina and other parts of the world; and the

second is whether the policies pursued in the last five years have been wrong.

First, let me talk—

Q. I didn't mean "policies"; I meant "strategies."

Secretary Kissinger: Well, that's a distinction without much difference.

Q. In what way?

Secretary Kissinger: Well, if the strategy is wrong—I don't see how you can have the right strategy and the wrong policy—or the wrong strategy and the right policy.

So let me answer your question.

With respect to Indochina, we are not equating the intrinsic importance of each part of the world, and we are not saying that every part of the world is strategically as important to the United States as any other part of the world. The problem we face in Indochina today is an elementary question of what kind of a people we are.

For 15 years, we have been involved in encouraging the people of Viet-Nam to defend themselves against what we conceived as external danger.

In 1973, we negotiated a settlement in which we withdrew our forces and, in return, achieved the release of our prisoners. This settlement, it is well to recall now, was—while we were negotiating it—generally criticized for our holding out for stronger terms.

The fact of the matter is that now that we have withdrawn our forces and have obtained the release of our prisoners, there was never any question that the United States would continue to give economic and military aid to Viet-Nam. And what we face now is whether the United States—not just “will withdraw its forces,” which we achieved—and not just “will stop the, or end the, loss of American lives”—but whether it will deliberately destroy an ally by withholding aid from it in its moment of extremity.

This is a fundamental question of how we are viewed by all other people, and it has nothing to do with the question of

whether we should ever have gotten involved there in the first place.

Now, with respect to whether the basic policies have been correct in the last five years, that, of course, is a rather sweeping question which would require an answer that could easily occupy the better part of this press conference.

With respect to Indochina, I would urge people to look at the newspapers and the public debate during the period that these agreements were being negotiated to see what the imperatives were on the Administration in negotiating these settlements.

And the general conviction was that the United States had done enough in expending American lives and that the people of Viet-Nam should have an opportunity to defend themselves without American support. There was never any proposition that the United States should withdraw and cut off aid.

And these agreements were negotiated on the assumption that there would be—that the United States would continue economic and military aid to South Viet-Nam and also that there would be some possibility of enforcing the agreements.

And this is the basic problem with the policy in Viet-Nam.

With respect to other policies, I would rather answer specific questions.

Yes.

Q. Mr. Secretary, if I may follow up on that question, it appears that the Congress, at least, has felt that the Nixon doctrine has outlived itself and that now supplies will not be provided as have been committed by the United States in the past. Do you plan to reassess the alternatives as a result of the demise of the Nixon doctrine, particularly in reference to Viet-Nam, Cambodia, and Thailand?

Secretary Kissinger: We have to face the fact that there are many countries in the world which have no conceivable opportunity to defend themselves without American economic or military assistance. And therefore, if it becomes our national policy

that countries must at some point be able to rely entirely on their resources, we will have brought about a massive change in the international environment that in time will fundamentally threaten the security of the United States as well as the security of many of our friends.

The so-called Nixon doctrine was based on the assumption that the United States would help those countries that were prepared to help themselves. If this is no longer true, then we are likely to find a massive shift in the foreign policies of many countries and a fundamental threat over a period of time to the security of the United States.

Q. Mr. Secretary, how serious did you find in your Middle East negotiations the concern on the Arab—on the Egyptian—and the Israeli sides, the problems you are facing in getting aid for Indochina? Was this a factor in the breakdown of the talks?

Secretary Kissinger: I cannot assign any particular cause for the breakdown of the talks. There is no question that events in Portugal, Greece, Turkey, and Indochina had an effect on the conduct of the negotiations. On the part of our friends, it raised the question of the durability of our assurances. And since one of our problems was to substitute American assurances for some physical terrain features, this was a factor. On the part of those who were threatening our friends, there was the feeling that perhaps concessions were less necessary because the drift of events was in any case favorable.

Nevertheless I think that the major reason for the breakdown of the negotiations was intrinsic to the negotiations themselves. But the surrounding circumstances were certainly not favorable.

Q. Mr. Secretary, to pursue the question of the interrelationship of Indochina and other portions of the world, where does the Administration go from here? It is clearly at loggerheads with the Congress on this fundamental question. The U.S. policy, ac-

ording to the Administration apparently is immobilized diplomatically on Indochina. Is there any way over this barrier except a constant head-on clash with Congress?

Secretary Kissinger: I don't agree that U.S. policy is immobilized over Indochina. There is a philosophical disagreement which I have attempted to explain earlier.

I have believed ever since I came to Washington that it is overwhelmingly in our national interest to put the debate on Indochina behind us.

The Administration has proposed to the Congress a three-year program for phasing out American military aid to Viet-Nam, which would, if the Congress and the Administration can agree, remove this issue from the yearly congressional-executive battles.

I believe, as I pointed out, that we face a grave situation. The Administration cannot give up its convictions simply for the sake of a technical compromise. But we believe that this three-year program, if the levels are adequate, might provide an opportunity to get the debate behind us.

Reassessment of Middle East Policy

Q. Mr. Secretary, is the reassessment of U.S. policy toward the whole Middle East primarily aimed at prompting Israel to adopt a more relaxed or less intransigent negotiating posture?

Secretary Kissinger: At this moment, there are no negotiations going on, and therefore we would have no concrete proposals to make to Israel, even if Israel asked us what negotiating posture it should adopt.

The assessment of our policy that is now going on is made necessary by the new circumstances. Our policy had been designed, as I pointed out in this statement, to segment the issues into individual elements, to negotiate each element separately, and therefore to permit each party to adjust itself domestically and internationally to a process of a gradual approach toward peace.

Now that this approach has to be aban-

done, we face an entirely new situation in which, in all probability, all problems will have to be negotiated simultaneously, and in which, instead of a forum in which Israel deals with one Arab country through the mediation of the United States, the strong probability is that Israel will have to deal with all Arab countries in a multilateral forum.

The assessment of our policy is not directed against Israel. It is not designed to induce Israel to alter any particular policy. It is designed to develop a position that the United States can take in order to prevent an increasing radicalization in the area and an increasing tension and, above all, in order to avoid a war in which inevitably the United States would be involved at least indirectly, given the international circumstances.

Q. A very quick followup. You and your spokesmen have denied that this reassessment contemplates a cutoff, but I don't think anybody has denied that it might contemplate a reduction. Can you respond to that?

Secretary Kissinger: There is no level of aid right now that has been set for next year's—for the next year. And therefore the question of a reduction is an entirely academic one.

We have before us an Israeli request of rather large size which at this moment is being staffed on the entirely technical level and has been staffed on the entirely technical level for weeks. It has not yet reached either my desk or the President's desk.

We will make our decisions on aid to Israel on the basis of our national objectives and on the basis of the statement that I made here, that we remain committed to the survival of Israel.

Of course whatever conclusions we come to will be submitted to the Congress, and the Congress can make its independent judgment.

We are not approaching the reassessment with an attitude of cutting aid. And we are approaching it with the attitude of look-

ing at the overall situation in the Middle East to determine what the best course might be.

Q. Mr. Secretary, now that you have written an obituary on step-by-step negotiating, does that mean that you are writing off the possibility of unilateral American action in the Middle East? Are you now going to be walking step-by-step with the Soviet Union? What will be your approach?

Secretary Kissinger: Our approach will be whatever is most likely to lessen the dangers of war and to produce steps toward peace.

As I pointed out in our statement, the United States is prepared to go to Geneva. The United States is prepared also to go along with any other approach that the parties may request of it. So, we are not insistent on any particular approach. We will follow whatever approach is most likely to be effective and is requested by the parties. The obvious forum that is now open is Geneva, but we are prepared to look at other approaches.

Q. Mr. Secretary, to follow that up, could you say when you go to Geneva, would it not be likely that the talks would themselves become segmented into the various problems and that would provide an opportunity for the United States or other parties to play a role in each individual problem—Israel-Egypt, Israel-Syria, Israel-Jordan?

Secretary Kissinger: If that is the turn that the negotiations take, the United States will be prepared to participate in it. The United States has no fixed idea on which course to pursue.

At this moment, we have to consult with the other parties, and we of course also have to consult now with the cochairman of the Geneva Conference.

The United States will do what is most likely to reduce the danger of war and to promote peace, and if it should turn out that separate negotiations develop at Geneva, the United States will certainly support them.

Q. Mr. Secretary, it seems that—

Secretary Kissinger: Go ahead, and then you.

Q. You adverted to difficulties in Portugal, Greece, Turkey, and Indochina. One could add the dismemberment of Ethiopia by an Arab coalition, the sellout of the Kurds, and so on. To what extent do you consider that this—

Secretary Kissinger: An objective question. What do you want me to say—"yes"? [Laughter.]

Q. Would this reflect what Dr. Schlesinger [Secretary of Defense James R. Schlesinger] has described as a worldwide perception of American impotence?

Secretary Kissinger: I have pointed out at many press conferences over the years that the central authority of a major country cannot be under persistent attack without ultimately paying a price in foreign policy.

We have gone through the experience of Viet-Nam, through the anguish of Watergate. And I think the cumulative effect of nearly a decade of domestic upheaval is beginning to pay—to take its toll.

Foreign governments, when they deal with the United States, make a bet in their dealings on the constancy of American policy and on the ability of the United States to carry through on whatever it is we promise, or fail to promise, or threaten. And this is one of the big problems in foreign policy today. It is not a problem of the Congress at this particular moment, because the executive also shares a responsibility for it over a period of a decade.

At this moment, it is senseless to try to assess the blame. At this moment, the great need is to pull together and to see whether we can restore a sense of national purpose. And as far as the Administration is concerned, we will do our utmost to do this in a cooperative spirit.

Q. Mr. Secretary, it seems to me that part of the national debate over Viet-Nam has

come about because of what might be called the light-at-the-end-of-the-tunnel syndrome. And now you are suggesting that possibly with three more years of aid the Indochina question could be more satisfactorily resolved. Isn't this just another way of buying yet another slice of time?

Secretary Kissinger: Well, Mr. Koppel [Ted Koppel, ABC News], my own personal conviction, about which I have left no question, is that the right way to do it is to vote annually what is necessary. There are some problems in the world that simply have no terminal date. And in Indochina, as long as the North Vietnamese are determined to attack, it is not responsible to say that there is an absolute date in which an end can be achieved.

On the other hand—given the very strong feelings in the Congress, given the cataclysmic, or the very dangerous, impact on the U.S. position in the world, of destroying a country where we have lost 50,000 men, where we have fought for 10 years, and which we, as a country, projected into this conflict—we are prepared to go to a three-year program in which, with adequate aid, we believe that there is at least a chance that then, with the development of oil resources and other factors, that this country could be put on a more self-sustaining basis.

It is our offer, in order to take Viet-Nam out of the national debate for this period and in order to avoid what we think would be a very grievous blow to the United States.

Visit to Latin America

Q. Sir, in another part of the world, this is a question about your projected trip to Latin America. Is it still on, and what is the main purpose of the trip? And whom do you expect to see there?

Secretary Kissinger: Well, I have planned a trip to Latin America for the last six months. And as I pointed out in the speech in Houston a few weeks ago, the United States attaches great importance to its re-

relationships with Latin America, with which we have had the longest uninterrupted tradition of foreign policy in our history, which is a part of the world which is in a position somewhere between the less developed nations and the advanced nations, and with which we share many cultural and political traditions. And therefore we believe that Western Hemisphere policy is a central part of our overall policy and a test of our relationship to many of the less developed countries.

Now, I am planning to go to—I will definitely go to Latin America before the meeting of the OAS here in May. So I will definitely go in April. Given the various pressures that exist right now in Washington, I am not in a position to announce the exact date. But we will determine that within the next few days. But it is definite that I will go in April. I am planning to visit Argentina, Brazil, Peru, Chile, and Venezuela. And I plan to visit other Latin American countries later this year.

Reducing the Danger of War in Middle East

Q. Mr. Secretary, if the Geneva Peace Conference ends in a stalemate, as everybody seems to think it will, how great will the danger of another war in the Middle East be? And in that connection, do you expect Egypt and Syria to allow U.N. troops to remain in the buffer zone between them and Israel?

Secretary Kissinger: Let me take this in two parts. The longer there is a stalemate in the Middle East, the greater the danger of war becomes. The danger of war can best be reduced in the Middle East if all of the parties see a prospect of peace somewhere down the road and some plausible means of attaining it. And this is why we pursued the previous approach.

When the United States goes to Geneva, it will not go there with the attitude that it will end in a stalemate, but rather with the attitude of seeing whether this forum can now be turned into an arena for constructive progress. And therefore the United

States will go there with a positive attitude, and it will ask all parties concerned to go there with a similar attitude, keeping in mind the needs and requirements of everybody.

Was there another part to your question?

Q. What do you expect Egypt and Syria to do about the U.N. troops in the buffer zone between them and Israel?

Secretary Kissinger: Well, we believe that the U.N. Emergency Force in Egypt and the U.N. Disengagement Observer Force in Syria were essential components of the disengagement agreements. We hope that the mandates of both of these will be renewed as a contribution to peace and stability in the Middle East and to permit the process of negotiations to go forward in a tranquil atmosphere.

Q. Mr. Secretary—

Secretary Kissinger: Mr. Lisagor [Peter Lisagor, Chicago Daily News].

Q. Inasmuch as we deal with every Communist country in the world with the exception of Cuba today, why would we, to use your words, be "destroying" South Viet-Nam if it became Communist?

Secretary Kissinger: Well, on that theory we can give up all of our alliances, because we would not be destroying any ally if it were overrun by a Communist country. It is not a question of our not dealing with Communist countries. It is a question of countries that obviously have a desire to defend themselves being prevented from defending themselves by an American decision to withhold supplies. And therefore we would be destroying those people who have resisted, whom we have encouraged to resist, by such an action.

Now, I think it is interesting also to point out that, after all, the flood of refugees in Viet-Nam is going away from the Communist area of control. And even in Cambodia, under conditions that one would have to say are extraordinarily discouraging, somebody is still fighting around Phnom Penh. So that

we are here in a position where the United States is forcing people to surrender by withholding supplies.

Q. Mr. Secretary, Egypt, according to a senior American official, was willing to sign a pledge not to have recourse to force in the Middle East, that force was not the way to resolve the conflict in the Middle East, to refrain from military and paramilitary activities, and to allow Israel the right to renew any agreement at the expiration of its one-year term. In your view, did those concessions by Egypt satisfy the military side of nonbelligerency?

Secretary Kissinger: Well, the issue of non-belligerency is a complicated legal position, because nonbelligerency is an international status which you cannot approach simply in components. I don't think any useful purpose is served for me to give an assessment of the various negotiating positions. Both sides made a serious effort, and they did not succeed in bridging their differences.

Middle East Developments and Oil Situation

Q. Mr. Secretary, what is the impact on the world oil situation, and is the United States prepared to go ahead with the consumer-producer conference? Is that about to take place? Would you discuss also the impact of King Faisal's assassination on that situation?

Secretary Kissinger: Of course, it is commonly believed that tensions in the Middle East do not particularly help the world oil situation. The United States has taken the position that it would conduct its negotiations in the Middle East independent of any oil pressures. And American policy will not let itself be affected by oil pressures. We do not see any developing at this moment.

We believe that the consumer-producer conference is being conducted in the interests of both sides for the common benefit, for the interest, of a developing and thriving world economy, which is in the interest of producers as well as consumers and should not be tied to the situation in the

Middle East. Therefore we are proceeding with our preparations for the consumer-producer conference, and progress is being made in that direction, and we find it essentially on schedule.

King Faisal ruled a country of extraordinary importance to the energy picture of the world. And also, due to his extraordinary personality, he had a major influence on all of the Arab countries, being one of the few Arab leaders with a major influence on both the moderates and the radical elements in the Arab world. King Faisal was an element for moderation in the negotiations between Israel and the Arab countries. And he was a friend of the United States. His great personal prestige will be missed, even though we are convinced that the basic policies of Saudi Arabia are going to continue.

Consequences of Cutting Off Assistance

Q. Mr. Secretary, I would like to follow up on that question about the "light at the end of the tunnel" that was raised here earlier by Mr. Koppel. It seemed to me that your answer to that question really was that you did, given a three-year program in South Viet-Nam, see another light at the end of that tunnel. And I think the real question that is involved here is whether the Administration is perceiving reality. I think you have a problem with the public in this country. We have given 50,000 men. We have given \$150 billion. And it has not saved South Viet-Nam. You are asking people now to believe that if you get three more years of help, you, Henry Kissinger, believe it can be saved. Now, I would like to know if that is not telling people that you see a light at the end of the tunnel.

Secretary Kissinger: I am saying that if you do not give enough, then you are bringing about consequences very similar to what we are now seeing. Since May last year, South Viet-Nam has received only ammunition and fuel. It has received almost no spare parts and no modern equipment. Under those conditions, the demoralization of an army is inevitable. And therefore some of the con-

sequences we now see are not surprising.

I am saying that, as a people, we should not destroy our allies and that, once we start on that course, it will have very serious consequences for us in the world.

I have stated that it would be better if we did it on an annual basis. Given the enormous divisions that have arisen in this country, for the sake of avoiding these divisions we are prepared to go the other route. It is not our first choice. The better course is to do it by determining each year what is necessary.

And in the nature of things, there are many situations around the world in which the necessity of assistance depends on the degree of outside pressure. And if we cannot control the outside pressure, then our cutting off assistance means turning these countries over to their enemies.

Mr. Binder [David Binder, New York Times].

Developments in Portugal

Q. Mr. Secretary, could you give us your assessment of the events in Portugal, what U.S. policy is toward Portugal, and whether it might have to change?

Secretary Kissinger: Portugal, of course, is a member of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization and has had close and friendly relationships with the United States.

What seems to be happening in Portugal now is that the Armed Forces Movement, which is substantially dominated by officers of leftist tendencies, has now appointed a new Cabinet in which Communists and parties closely associated with the Communists have many of the chief portfolios. This was an evolution that was not unforeseeable over recent months, and it will, of course, raise questions for the United States in relationship to its NATO policy and to its policy with Portugal.

With respect to NATO, this is a matter to be discussed with all of our allies, and we are in close contact with them.

With respect to Portugal, the United States has a tradition of friendly relations with Por-

tugal, and it does not intend to take the initiative in breaking these friendly relations. However, we are disquieted by an evolution in which there is a danger that the democratic process may become a sham and in which parties are getting into a dominant position whose interests we would not have thought were necessarily friendly to the United States.

Aid to Viet-Nam After Peace Agreement

Q. Mr. Secretary, you said earlier that in 1973, when the Viet-Nam peace accords were negotiated, there was no doubt about continuing U.S. military and economic assistance. What assurances did you have then, in '73, that the Congress would continue this assistance?

Secretary Kissinger: We had no assurances. If you review now the nature of our domestic debate—say, from 1969 to 1973—it was essentially that American involvement in Viet-Nam should be terminated but that the Vietnamese should be given an opportunity to defend themselves; and the entire pressure of the domestic debate was on the withdrawal—at least, insofar as I became conscious of it—was on the withdrawal of American participation.

We stated, on the date that the agreement was signed, if you read my press conference of that day, that economic and military aid would continue. And none of this was ever challenged in '73 and '74.

In fact, the debate started this year over appropriating a sum of money that had already been authorized by the Congress; so a question of principle could not possibly have been involved, because the authorization was approved last year with very little division. There were no assurances, but it seemed to us inherent in the whole posture that we had taken that this would continue.

Q. If I could follow up on that, did you give at that time the South Vietnamese Government assurances that this aid would continue?

Secretary Kissinger: We told the South Vietnamese Government—not a commitment

of the United States that aid would continue—but that, in our judgment, if the South Vietnamese cooperated in permitting us to withdraw our forces and, therefore, to reclaim our prisoners, that in our judgment the Congress would then vote the aid that would be necessary to sustain Viet-Nam economically and militarily. It was not given as an American commitment.

We're not talking here of a legal American commitment; we are talking here of a moral commitment.

End of Step-by-Step Approach in Middle East

Q. Mr. Secretary, do you think there will be another Middle East war?

Secretary Kissinger: I think there is always a danger of a Middle East war, as long as the parties have such irreconcilable differences. We do not believe a Middle East war is inevitable. We believe a Middle East war would involve the greatest dangers to all of the countries concerned, as well as serious dangers of great-power involvement. And therefore the United States will work with determination and with confidence to avoid a war and to use its influence to promote a movement toward peace.

Q. Mr. Secretary, sir, did you look at the record of the assassin of King Faisal? I'm sure you must have. And did you find, when he was in the United States, any input or anything that might have contributed to this action?

Secretary Kissinger: Frankly, I have not looked at the detailed—I have just seen a brief summary of the record of the assassin, but I'm absolutely confident that nobody in the United States had anything to do with such an action, because we considered King Faisal a good friend of the United States.

Q. Mr. Secretary, can we ask another question on the step-by-step—

Q. Mr. Secretary, why is there such a presumption in this country at this moment, in newspaper articles, in the meaning—in the interpretation—of the reassessment of Mideast policy, that Israel somehow was at

fault for the breakdown of the talks and should somehow be punished by reduction in aid or some other manner?

Secretary Kissinger: Well, I cannot answer why people make certain assumptions. Many of you were on the plane with me, and you know how I attempted to explain the situation. We—the Administration has made no assessment of blame, nor will it serve any useful purpose to engage in that now.

Secondly, punishment of a friend cannot be the purpose of a national policy. We now face a new situation. No useful purpose is served by conducting it in a fit of pique or by encouraging even greater tensions in the area. We will make an assessment of the American national interest in relation to our long-term commitments, as well as the necessity of preserving the peace; and our policy will be based entirely on this. And in no sense is any consideration given to punishing any particular country.

Mr. Kalb [Marvin Kalb, CBS].

Q. Mr. Secretary, in that connection, going back to the step-by-step approach once again, since you started this approach, there was an agreement between Egypt and Israel in January of '74, an agreement between Syria and Israel in May of '74, an enhancement of the American diplomatic position in the Middle East, and one setback. In light of the balance on the pluses and minuses, why so radical and dramatic a change, a need for a major reassessment of policy? Why not continue along the old way, recognizing that there was one setback but a lot of pluses?

Secretary Kissinger: We obviously believe that there were large pluses. As I made clear before we went on this trip, it seemed to us that in any event, even if another step had succeeded, a reassembling of the Geneva Conference was the most likely next step, because we believed that the Geneva Conference would then have taken place under easier circumstances than will now be the case.

We have made the assessment that the

step-by-step approach, as it has been conducted up to now, is not likely to be able to be continued. And therefore we have to assess where we go from here, under conditions in which some of the presuppositions are no longer valid. And I don't consider anything particularly dramatic about assessing American policy when it finds itself in a new situation.

Q. Mr. Secretary, you have used the word "suspension" to describe the talks, and yet you said that the step-by-step approach is ended. Now, you just said it's not likely to be able to continue. Is there any chance whatsoever that the negotiations between Israel and Egypt on an interim settlement—that is, another step—can be revived?

Secretary Kissinger: My impression, from Egyptian public statements, is that this is extremely unlikely. Should, however, the parties request us, against our expectations, to undertake it, we would be prepared to do it. But we are making no effort to urge the parties to do so. We stand ready, if there should be any such request.

Q. Mr. Secretary, the question was being raised after your briefing on the Hill—

Secretary Kissinger: Miss Berger [Marylyn Berger, Washington Post], and then you.

Q. A question was being raised yesterday after your briefing to Congressmen on the Hill as to who made that decision that the step-by-step approach is now finished. Was

it your personal decision? Was it a decision of the parties? Could you tell us about how that decision was reached?

Secretary Kissinger: The Egyptian Foreign Minister announced, on the evening that he announced the suspension of the talks, that the step-by-step approach was now finished and that Egypt would return to Geneva. This is how the decision was reached.

The United States will do whatever it can—and whatever the parties agree to—to promote peace in the Middle East, and if the parties should request us to do it, we would be willing to entertain it.

Q. Mr. Secretary, would it, in your view, enhance the prospects to go to Geneva if the United States would move beyond the role of intermediary and take a publicly stated position on the substantive issues being negotiated there?

Secretary Kissinger: Well, we have generally refrained from taking a position of our own because we felt that when the peace and security of countries is concerned that they have to make their fundamental decisions. On the few occasions when the issues between them had narrowed sufficiently, the United States took a position.

Now, whether in the evolution of the negotiations—at Geneva or elsewhere—a moment will come when the United States should take a position of its own, that remains to be determined. We have not yet made this decision.

Secretary Kissinger Makes 16-Day Visit to the Middle East

Secretary Kissinger visited the United Kingdom, Belgium, Egypt, Syria, Israel, Turkey, Jordan, and Saudi Arabia March 6-23. Following are remarks made by Secretary Kissinger and foreign leaders on various occasions during the trip, together with remarks made by President Ford and Secretary Kissinger on March 23 upon the Secretary's return to Washington.

REMARKS, CARDIFF, WALES, MARCH 6¹

Coming here from overseas we realize that we stand at the center of a historic civilization. Cardiff and Wales have made seminal contributions to the life of Great Britain and the wider culture of the Western world. This is a land of great poetry and song, of economic leadership from the beginning of the industrial age, of social and political idealism. Wales looks out upon the ocean that touches all the Western nations. Your ideals and your spirit, which gleam far beyond your shores, have been among the beacons which join those nations into a single civilization.

I have been asked to speak for the assembled guests in extending our congratulations to the two men who have been honored today, James Callaghan and George Thomas. It is difficult to speak for so many and even more difficult to do justice to the achievements of our Right Honorable friends. Today, you have honored them for three decades of distinguished service to you in the House of Commons and as Ministers of the Crown.

¹ Made at a banquet given by the Lord Mayor of Cardiff in honor of British Foreign Secretary James Callaghan and George Thomas, Deputy Speaker of the House of Commons (text from press release 116).

I confess that I view their achievements, particularly those of my friend Jim Callaghan, from a perspective different than your own. By conferring the Freedom of the City upon him, you have symbolically welcomed him as a citizen of Cardiff and Wales. But I know him as a citizen of the world, as a statesman who has been my valued colleague in our common search for a more secure peace, a friend on whose word one can always rely and whose steadiness is a constant source of strength. By supporting Jim Callaghan during his long career in Parliament, Cardiff has given him the opportunity for the broad experience, at home and abroad, that now allows him to speak so effectively for Britain in the world community. Not only Britain but America must be grateful for your trust.

Over the past year, Jim Callaghan and I have been close partners in the effort to cope together with the serious new challenges that face us in the contemporary world. Jim Callaghan's wisdom has invariably been hardheaded and practical. But he has never forgotten that immediate solutions must prove barren unless they serve some larger conception and relate to some deeper human value. Our time needs strength and realism, but we must never forget that only idealists can have the strength to prevail and only men of vision can transform reality.

The cornerstone of all our efforts must be cooperation between Europe and the United States. For more than a generation, this transatlantic relationship has sustained our mutual safety and prosperity. And within that relationship the close tie of Britain and the United States has had a special place. Statesmen of both parties in both of our countries have contributed to its construction and have built on it in successive administrations.

It was Winston Churchill who foresaw, in the darkest hour of World War II, that the alliance of our nations could be a basis for the deliverance of the West from the dangers of tyranny, hardship, and war:

If we are together (he said) nothing is impossible. If we are divided all will fail. I therefore preach continually the doctrine of the fraternal association of our two peoples, not for any purpose of gaining . . . advantages for either of them, . . . but for the sake of service to mankind and for the honor that comes to those who faithfully serve great causes.

It was Ernest Bevin, one of the greatest British Foreign Secretaries, who joined, following the war, with the leaders of the United States to forge the system of collective security under which we still live.

Today, James Callaghan carries on that proud tradition. Under his guidance, we may be sure that the association between our peoples will, as Churchill happily put it, "just keep rolling along," as inexorable as ever. On a broad range of issues vital to our common security and progress—which means in effect the whole spectrum of international affairs—our intimate consultation, advice, and mutual assistance have become second nature. And the strength of our association has lent stability to the growing relationship between America and Europe as a whole.

And so as I leave tomorrow for the Middle East to seek progress toward a peace we all seek, I go reinforced by the opportunity to exchange views over many weeks with the British Government and especially extensive discussions with the Foreign Secretary. I also go saddened by the knowledge that innocent lives have again been sacrificed in the conflict between Arab and Israeli which has claimed so many lives over the decades. The terrorist incident in Tel Aviv last night and this morning—a random and senseless act—reminds us once more of the tragic dimensions of this conflict. Violence does not forward the cause of peace. It leads to counteractions in which more lives are lost, the tragedy is compounded, and the cause of

justice which both sides seek is made more difficult to achieve.

The peoples of the Middle East have suffered enough. They have earned a surcease from their agony. We shall therefore continue our efforts to promote negotiations and further steps toward peace in the Middle East, because we must, and because the alternative is more travail and tragedy, not only for the peoples concerned but ultimately for the world.

In the world at large much has changed in the last 35 years. Europe has gained new economic strength. Old reasons for economic solidarity, such as the cold war, have diminished in urgency. New motives, such as economic interdependence, have appeared. New powers, notably Japan, have joined the industrialized world; and new centers of influence, such as the oil producers, have arisen within the developing world. As we seek a new basis for Atlantic relations, we must be more aware of relations with the rest of the world than ever before.

But at a time of change, let us also reaffirm the enduring principles that have guided, and still guide, relations between America and Europe.

—Our association is based upon a deep community of values and interests. Our strategic interests closely coincide. Our economies are interdependent. Americans, most of whom are the descendants of Europeans, share Europe's commitment to the ideals of freedom, democracy, and a life of opportunity for all our peoples.

—A major common purpose of our policies is to preserve our civilization from pressures of insecurity or scarcity, to realize the opportunity for freedom and progress, and to achieve together a world at peace.

—Our relationship is based on partnership and friendship. Our inspiration is the need to vindicate man in an age of proliferating technology and to give hope to a world capable of self-destruction.

Jim Callaghan and I have the privilege of serving two nations whose historic partner-

ship has been central to the unity and the progress of the West. Our nations have common purposes that transcend the interests of Britain or America or Europe. We are the inheritors of a vision of what the unity of the West can mean for the future of all mankind.

Jim Callaghan and I are friends, as are our two peoples are friends, and we are partners as our two peoples are partners. I repeat to you my thanks for the opportunity to be here today. One understands a man better for seeing what shaped him. I want to extend my deep gratitude to Cardiff and to Wales for having helped make Jim Callaghan the man and the statesman he is. And I join my voice to yours in commemorating the great honor you have bestowed upon both our Right Honorable friends.

REMARKS TO THE PRESS, BRUSSELS, MARCH 7

Press release 121 dated March 10

Secretary Kissinger

Foreign Minister Bitsios and I have had another one of our series of friendly meetings to discuss the range of economic, military, and political matters concerning the Governments of Greece and the United States.

We paid particular attention to the urgent need of finding a solution to the problem of Cyprus. Foreign Minister Bitsios explained to me in detail the point of view of his government with respect to the full range of issues on Cyprus. I, in turn, explained to the Foreign Minister the readiness of the U.S. Government and my own personal readiness to do everything within my power to speed up a solution to this difficult and tragic problem. The Foreign Minister and I agreed to meet again in the near future at a time and place yet to be determined in order to review the progress that may have been made and that, we hope, will have been made on the issues that we discussed today.

Secretary Kissinger and myself felt that there was an accumulation of problems serious enough to make necessary another of our periodical friendly meetings. The subjects which we have discussed are difficult matters, so no spectacular results could be expected, but our discussion was to place in the spirit of mutual understanding and our determination and willingness to see progress made in all fields. We shall meet again, and I expect that by that time we shall have to report some further progress.

Thank you.

Questions and Answers

Q. Mr. Secretary, will that meeting take place jointly with the Turkish Foreign Minister?

Secretary Kissinger: We have not made any plans. I would expect that this will be a separate meeting between Foreign Minister Bitsios and myself. But we are of course in favor of anything that would facilitate negotiations.

Q. Mr. Foreign Minister, are you hopeful of early resumption of the negotiations with Turkey?

Foreign Minister Bitsios: The situation is such that I hope that there will be a breakthrough.

Q. Is there now a new approach that you have agreed on that could be presented to the Turks, hopefully, to lead to Turkish agreement to begin negotiations?

Secretary Kissinger: This was not a question today of discovering new approaches. I am sending Assistant Secretary Hartman [Assistant Secretary for European Affairs Arthur A. Hartman] to Ankara to report on the discussions. We hope that a framework can be found, both procedural and substantive, that will permit the progress of which Foreign Minister Bitsios and I have spoken.

Q. Have you proposed a solution to the Cyprus problem? [Summary of a question in Greek.]

Secretary Kissinger: I have not proposed any solution. The United States will do its best to facilitate a solution, but of course the basic positions will have to be taken by the parties concerned and it would not be proper for the United States to impose its own views on the parties. What the United States does do is to indicate its support for a speedy solution. The talks this afternoon in which Foreign Minister Bitsios explained, as I said, the full range of the Greek point of view will be studied with sympathy and will be dealt with in a manner that we hope will facilitate a settlement.

Q. How soon can a solution be found? [Summary of a question in Greek.]

Secretary Kissinger: I think it is premature to speculate as to time. I agree with Foreign Minister Bitsios that by the time we meet again, it may be possible to indicate a time frame and to report some specific steps that could be taken.

Q. Will you meet Foreign Minister Esenbel?

Secretary Kissinger: I am prepared to meet with the Turkish Foreign Minister, and I expect to meet with him within the next few weeks. We have not set a date.

Q. What is the status of the negotiations on U.S. bases in Greece?

Secretary Kissinger: That would be the last question, at least as far as I am concerned. Yes, we reviewed the negotiations that were started. They will be resumed in a few weeks after we have studied the Greek position that was submitted to us. These negotiations, too, are, in our judgment, being conducted in a constructive spirit.

Q. Are you now more optimistic?

Secretary Kissinger: I think it is premature to make any predictions. We are seriously trying to help toward a solution, and

again I think that after the Foreign Minister and I meet the next time, we may be able to hazard some predictions.

ARRIVAL, ASWAN, EGYPT, MARCH 8

Press release 122 dated March 10

I came to Egypt because I believe that progress toward peace is possible. I will do my very best, and I plan to stay in the area until we have achieved some definite progress.

Thank you.

NEWS CONFERENCE BY SECRETARY KISSINGER AND PRESIDENT SADAT OF EGYPT, MARCH 8²

Secretary Kissinger: As you know, the President and I have had extensive talks today, partly alone and partly together with our associates, to review all the elements that are involved in making another step toward peace in the Middle East. I will now go first to Syria and then to Israel, and I will discuss there a similar range of issues regarding the elements of another step. I will then return for further discussions with the President on Tuesday or Wednesday.

I am here because the United States believes very strongly that another step toward peace in the Middle East is in the interest of all of the peoples of the Middle East and of the world, and we are dedicated to making a major effort in this direction. I believe, based on the discussions that I have had, progress is possible.

Q. Have you discussed, Mr. Secretary, any possibility of another disengagement on the Syrian front?

Secretary Kissinger: We discussed the whole range of problems involved with peace in the Middle East, and of course that includes all fronts.

Q. Mr. Secretary, are you bringing con-

² Held at Aswan following their second meeting (text from press release 123 dated Mar. 10).

crete ideas to Israel that you have picked up here from President Sadat?

Secretary Kissinger: Obviously, in discussions with the Israelis we will be discussing ideas and elements of a possible step. I don't think the origin of these ideas and elements is of decisive importance.

Q. Mr. President, do you think enough progress has been made to make you optimistic about a settlement?

President Sadat: Well, as I said before, I am always optimistic, but I think we shall be having a very hard round this time.

Q. Did you discuss the Palestinian question, Mr. Kissinger?

Secretary Kissinger: I said we discussed the whole range of issues in the Middle East.

Q. Mr. President, when you said a "hard round," do you think it will take a long time? Do you think it might take three or four weeks?

President Sadat: Well, I shall be very happy to have Dr. Kissinger as long as he can afford to stay with me, but it is not a matter of weeks or so. As I said before, the mission of my friend Dr. Kissinger is very important this time because we are working on two very important points. The first point is the defusion of the explosive situation; the second is pushing the process of peace. For that I am saying it is the hardest.

Q. Mr. President, you said recently that you think now, for the first time, peace is possible. Can you please say what changed to make it such at this time? What elements have changed?

President Sadat: Well, I did not say this yesterday, or a week before. I said it a year before, when I met Dr. Kissinger, when we fulfilled the first disengagement agreement. My theory is this: For 26 years we have never enjoyed any confidence in Israel; and the same thing happened, that Israel never enjoyed any confidence in us. The moment came when Dr. Kissinger appeared on the stage, and he enjoyed my full confidence.

I think it must be mentioned also that he should enjoy the full confidence of Israel after all that he has done for Israel, and all that the United States has done. So I am saying, for the first time in 26 years peace is possible.

Q. Mr. President, do you think that no form of warfare is useful in the Arab-Israeli conflict?

President Sadat: This is quite true from my point of view, and I think the October war has proved that whatever power any party has, it cannot impose conditions on the other.

Q. What about other forms of warfare, Mr. President?

President Sadat: Well, do you have in mind what you call preventive war?

Q. Economic warfare.

President Sadat: When we discuss peace, we shall be discussing peace in all its dimensions. But let us first defuse the explosive situation; then after that we can discuss it.

Q. Mr. President, could you say that after your talks today you feel things look harder than they did before your talks today?

President Sadat: Well, my friend, it is true that I feel that this time it is harder. It is true.

Q. Is it harder, Mr. President, because you want to go further this time than you did last time in the range of what you are trying to achieve?

President Sadat: Well, as I told you, what we want to achieve this time is keeping the momentum of the peace cause and defusing the explosive situation.

Q. Are the prospects better or worse after today's talks?

President Sadat: I cannot tell until Dr. Kissinger returns.

Q. Mr. President, is the question of a written nonwar pledge by Egypt a negotiable issue as far as you are concerned?

President Sadat: We have not discussed this yet. We have not reached it. But do you mean nonbelligerency? As I told you, if I am going to agree to nonbelligerency while there is one Israeli soldier occupying my land, this would mean an official invitation to continue occupying my land, and I am not going to extend this invitation.

Q. Mr. Secretary, do you expect the Geneva Conference to meet soon?

Secretary Kissinger: We have always stated our readiness to go to Geneva. When I met Foreign Minister Gromyko [Soviet Foreign Minister Andrei A. Gromyko] in Geneva last month, we indicated that we were prepared for an early resumption at an early date.

Q. Have you discussed the visit of President Sadat to the United States?

Secretary Kissinger: President Sadat knows that he is always welcome, and I hope that after we conclude these negotiations we will be able to arrange some firm date.

DEPARTURE, ASWAN, MARCH 9

Press release 124 dated March 10

I can really add very little to what has been said. The President and I had a very good talk, and I am now going to Syria and Israel. We will try to formulate some ideas, and I will return here on Tuesday night or Wednesday.

ARRIVAL, DAMASCUS, MARCH 9

Press release 125 dated March 10

I just want to say that, as always, I'm glad to be in Syria, and I'll review steps that can be made toward peace, together with the President and the Foreign Minister; and of course we recognize that peace in the Middle East requires the participation of all countries.

Thank you.

EXCHANGE OF TOASTS AT A LUNCHEON AT DAMASCUS, MARCH 9

Press release 126 dated March 10

Secretary Kissinger

I would like to express the great pleasure we have in welcoming the Foreign Minister, Mrs. Khaddam, and all our other Syrian friends to the American Embassy. I had the pleasure of first meeting the Foreign Minister in December 1973. Since then I have been in Damascus about 30 times. I am one of the world's great experts on the route from the airport to the guesthouse, and on the tactics of the Foreign Minister, which consist of going on the attack immediately upon my arrival. In fact, I want to compliment him. He has compressed the time schedule now, and he can get into a full attack from a standing start in 10 seconds. [Laughter.] I can say with assurance that whatever else may happen in Syrian-American relations, it will not be due to the inadequate defense of Syrian interest by the Syrian officials that I have encountered.

In the year and a half that we have had the privilege of meeting, I have learned to understand the Syrian point of view, the Syrian pride, the Syrian dedication to its principles. We have worked together on one agreement, and while it was a difficult negotiation, I think it brought our two countries closer together. As I continue the American efforts in this area, it is based on the conviction that a lasting peace in the Middle East must include all of the concerned countries. This is our basic attitude in whatever contribution we can make to lasting peace. In the process, I believe that Syrian-American relations have dramatically improved, and we will do whatever is in our power so they will continue to improve. As we have learned to work together in mutual respect and growing understanding, I am confident we can surmount whatever difficulties exist from time to time. I have greatly appreciated the opportunity of working with the Foreign Minister, General Shihabi [Brig. Gen. Hik-

mat Khalil Shihabi, Chief of Staff for Intelligence], and of course with President Asad and others here. I would like to propose a toast to the friendship between the Syrian and American people.

Syrian Foreign Minister Abd al-Halim Khaddam

Mr. Secretary, ladies and gentlemen: From the bottom of my heart I thank you on behalf of myself and my colleagues and friends of the Syrian side for this gracious invitation to the residence of the American Embassy. And I also thank you for the gracious words you have uttered in appreciation of the good relations between the United States and Syria. You have referred to your repeated visits to our country, and I believe that during this period and through these visits you have come to appreciate and understand what we feel and how we feel about certain things.

As President Asad said ever since the first meeting, I would like to reiterate that our country wants and strives for peace. We have worked, we are still working, and we will continue to work toward the realization of a just peace. We were very clear when we said that peace means to us, first, the preservation for the Palestinian people of their legitimate rights; secondly, the complete withdrawal of Israeli forces from our occupied lands. And it is from this angle that we view efforts in this direction toward a just solution, and from this angle appears the comprehensive look at a just peace. That is why we in Syria and the rest of the Arab countries want just and permanent peace. And it was on this basis that we welcomed all the efforts that were spent within this framework and in this direction.

I wish you, Mr. Secretary, and you, Mrs. Kissinger, a very good sojourn in our country. And I would like to emphasize and assure you that our country stretches out the arm of friendship to meet the arm of friendship extended by any other country in the same spirit. We stretch out this arm of friendship toward any country which shares with us

mutual respect and which has mutual interests with us. In this connection, reference must be made to the efforts made by Dr. Kissinger to return to normalcy the relations between Syria and the United States of America.

Finally, I raise my glass in a toast to Secretary Kissinger, Mrs. Kissinger, and to all our other American guests here.

DEPARTURE, DAMASCUS, MARCH 9

Press release 127 dated March 10

The President and I and our colleagues had a very extensive discussion of all the elements involved in the progress toward peace in the Middle East. The talks were frank and friendly. We agreed that while I am in the area I would return to Damascus to continue this exchange of views.

We also talked about bilateral relations between the United States and Syria; we agreed that they are excellent and that they will be fostered.

Thank you.

ARRIVAL, BEN GURION AIRPORT, MARCH 9

Press release 128 dated March 10

Israeli Foreign Minister Yigal Allon

I would like to welcome Secretary of State Kissinger and Mrs. Kissinger and their colleagues on this visit of theirs which is already part of the great effort for achieving political progress in the area. It is quite natural that my colleagues and myself are very much interested to hear what Dr. Kissinger has to tell us about his impressions from his visits and talks in the neighboring Arab capitals.

I only hope that what he has to tell us would be more constructive and more hopeful than what the Arab media has to tell us from across the lines. Because, as you know, we are people who will never give up the idea of peace and would like to see progress taking place as soon as possible.

Mr. Foreign Minister: It is a great pleasure to be back in Israel again. We are here to see whether together we can make some progress toward peace. I will report to the Israeli Cabinet about my discussions in Egypt, also my discussions in Syria, and we will then see whether we can develop jointly some ideas that might provide the basis for further discussions.

Thank you.

REMARKS, JERUSALEM, MARCH 10³

As you know, we are at the beginning of the process of negotiations which are complicated and which will take some time. We are engaged here in analyzing all the ideas and elements that might be part of a possible agreement, and we are doing so with great care. We have done so in a very friendly, very comradely, and very positive atmosphere. I am going to Ankara this afternoon, and I am returning tomorrow evening—back to meet again tomorrow evening to continue this examination of the ideas and the elements of the possible agreement.

Q. Dr. Kissinger, you said the chances were 50-50 before you started out. Would you say they are better now or worse now?

Secretary Kissinger: I don't want to be in a position in which every day I have to give an assessment and a percentage figure, because we will be in a hopeless trap after a while. I came here because I believed that an agreement is possible. I have no reason to change my mind.

Q. Do you have any assessment of how long this mission will last?

Secretary Kissinger: I don't want to put myself into any particular time frame, because it is an agreement of some importance; if it is achieved, it has to be done with great care.

³ Made following a meeting with Prime Minister Yitzhak Rabin (text from press release 129).

ARRIVAL, ANKARA, MARCH 10

Press release 130 dated March 11

I would like to express our pleasure at visiting our old and trusted ally Turkey and our appreciation for the invitation on such short notice and in the face of many complexities. I look forward to an opportunity to exchange views with my old friend the Foreign Minister, with the Prime Minister, with your President, and with leading political personalities of Turkish political life. Our relationship with Turkey, which goes back 30 years, is based on mutual interest and a long tradition. It is a relationship which we value and which I have come here to strengthen. And we will do our best to settle together and to discuss together all the complex issues that confront both of our nations.

Thank you.

REMARKS, ANKARA, MARCH 10⁴

Mr. Eçevit and I had a very good and complete talk. As you know, we are old friends, and we reviewed all the relations between the United States and Turkey and other problems of mutual interest, such as Cyprus.

DEPARTURE, ANKARA, MARCH 11

Press release 135 dated March 11

Ladies and gentlemen: I came here to strengthen the old friendship between Turkey and the United States. This friendship, as the United States has repeatedly affirmed, is in the mutual interest of both countries, and it is not extended as a favor by one country to another country, and it is in that context that the Administration views the entire relationship between Turkey and the United States.

We are doing our best to overcome whatever difficulties exist in that relationship, and

⁴ Made following a meeting with Bulent Eçevit, Republican People's Party leader (text from press release 133 dated Mar. 11).

we are confident that we will emerge from these difficulties with an even stronger appreciation of each other's needs and with an even stronger commitment to the mutual friendship than before.

With respect to Cyprus, we reviewed the situation in a friendly spirit. The United States believes that the quickest possible solution is in the interest of all parties and of all of the countries. The problem is to begin the negotiations and to find a framework for the negotiations. And I believe that progress has been made in that direction during my visit.

Now I will be glad to take two or three questions [inaudible] from those who are not traveling with me. [Laughter.]

Q. [Inaudible] have you reached mutual grounds for discussions? [Paraphrased.]

Secretary Kissinger: Well, of course, the negotiations will have to be conducted, in our view, between Greek and Turkish communities. And we are trying to be helpful in finding a general framework. But the detailed plans and the detailed bases will have to be developed by the negotiators themselves.

Q. Mr. Secretary of State, do you think that in order to have further developments on the Cyprus issue it is likely you will return to Ankara or to Athens in the near future?

Secretary Kissinger: Well, Assistant Secretary Hartman is going to visit Athens, and I don't anticipate returning to Ankara before the end of May, when I will be coming here for a CENTO [Central Treaty Organization] meeting; and I look forward to that visit.

Q. Did you bring any specific concessions from Mr. Bitsios when you arrived in Ankara [inaudible] to Mr. Esenbel [inaudible] in any way instrumental in the progress you have made?

Secretary Kissinger: I did not come here with specific plans, and my purpose was in trying to interpret the ideas, as I had understood them, of the Greek side and to see

whether one could find a possible framework for the negotiations once the forum has been determined.

Thank you.

REMARKS, JERUSALEM, MARCH 12⁵

Secretary Kissinger: We continued our very detailed examination of elements of a possible agreement. In the nature of such an examination we cannot make a progress report every day, but the talks are being conducted in very friendly, very positive spirit, and nothing has changed in my estimate of the situation.

Q. Are you beginning to see the shape of an agreement even though it is kind of early?

Secretary Kissinger: I just don't want to give any estimates. I'll be back here in a couple of days. I'm going to Aswan—

Q. There are reports that you will be here another two weeks longer. What do you say?

Secretary Kissinger: I have absolutely no estimate of how long it could take, but I have some other duties in Washington, too.

Q. Have you found any areas of agreement between Israel and Egypt?

Secretary Kissinger: I just won't go into anything.

Q. Does that mean you might break off the talks and go back to Washington and then return?

Secretary Kissinger: No. I think that we will know within a reasonable time frame what is achievable, and I don't believe it will be necessary for me to go back and then return here.

ARRIVAL, ASWAN, MARCH 12

Press release 137 dated March 12

I am coming back to continue the discussion with President Sadat and Foreign

⁵ Made following a meeting with Prime Minister Rabin (text from press release 136).

Minister Fahmy, and I look forward to making further progress.

Thank you.

NEWS CONFERENCE BY SECRETARY KISSINGER AND PRESIDENT SADAT, MARCH 13

Press release 141 dated March 14

Secretary Kissinger: The President and I have had a very constructive and fruitful meeting. We have examined a number of principles and some concrete ideas, and I'll be taking some of these concrete ideas with me to Israel tomorrow.

Q. Mr. President, do you have anything to add?

President Sadat: I confirm Dr. Kissinger's statement.

Q. I would like to ask Dr. Kissinger whether he thinks that on the basis of the concrete ideas he is taking back to Israel the Israeli Cabinet will be in a position to make concrete ideas of its own on Saturday.

Secretary Kissinger: I am of course in no position to speak for the Israeli Cabinet, but I expect there will be some concrete Israeli ideas when I return.

Q. Mr. President, there have been reports this evening of troop movements on the Egyptian front. Can you tell us if these reports are based on anything substantial?

President Sadat: Not at all. The Egyptian side not at all.

Q. There has been no concentration of Egyptian forces along the Sinai front?

President Sadat: Not at all. We are honoring our signature on the disengagement agreement. We have with us General Gamassi [Gen. Mohamed Abdel Ghani el-Gamassi, Minister of War and Commander in Chief of the Armed Forces].

Q. [Garbled.]

President Sadat: [Translation from Arabic.] In my talks with Dr. Kissinger, we have

moved from generalities to specifics, which Dr. Kissinger will take with him to Israel, after which he will return to us. At this stage there is no room for guesswork. We await Dr. Kissinger's return.

Q. Mr. President, you told us last time that you expected this to be a hard round. Do you still feel that way, or do you think it will be any easier?

President Sadat: I expect it to be difficult and hard.

Q. Mr. Secretary, do you have a better estimate now of how long the shuttle might last?

Secretary Kissinger: I don't want to make any estimates as to the length of time. Of course, I think all parties have an interest in moving it as rapidly as possible.

Q. Mr. President, is Egypt now prepared to give written assurances to refrain from beginning hostilities against Israel?

President Sadat: Well, maybe you remember the statement I made in Paris. We are not aiming at all to start any hostilities, but assurance must be on a reciprocal basis, and it is premature now to speak about specifics.

Q. Mr. President, on the basis of the progress that has been made so far, do you believe that an agreement is now likely?

President Sadat: I hope so, but I can't confirm it until after Dr. Kissinger returns.

Q. Dr. Kissinger, are you carrying anything on paper to show anything at all in the form of maps, drawings?

Secretary Kissinger: We have not reached that point yet. I have had long discussions with the President and his associates on two successive evenings, and I think I can reflect their thinking in a rather precise fashion without the help of maps.

Q. [Inaudible.]

President Sadat: Well, as I have said before, I think the mission of Dr. Kissinger has two main aims. The first is to defuse the

explosive situation that exists in the area now, and the second, to push the peace process. I have stated also that the defusion of the explosive situation means that there must be some Israeli gesture of peace on the three fronts.

Q. Mr. President, could you give us some hint what your ideas are about?

President Sadat: It is premature, still premature.

Q. Mr. President, is it possible that the agreement will be in some sort of phased format; in other words, a series of stages of action by Israel and by Egypt? Is it possible it will be more along those lines?

President Sadat: Why don't you wait until it is achieved?

Q. Mr. President, Dr. Kissinger has said that he believes that both sides in these negotiations want peace. Do you believe that Israel wants peace?

President Sadat: Well, I shall be waiting the return of Dr. Kissinger here. Dr. Kissinger can see both sides, but I can't see the other side myself. I shall be awaiting the return of Dr. Kissinger.

Q. Mr. President, are you more optimistic now than you were before you heard the latest Israeli response through Dr. Kissinger? What is your feeling now?

President Sadat: I am still optimistic, yes.

Q. More than before?

President Sadat: Still optimistic, because it is my mood. I am optimistic always.

Q. Mr. President, could you describe or would you define for us what is the most difficult area of the talks? Do you have any specifics about what has been the most difficult area of negotiations?

President Sadat: I think you should ask Dr. Kissinger this question.

Secretary Kissinger: At this point it is not possible to make a judgment on which is the most difficult point.

Q. Mr. President, have you considered having joint patrols instead of a U.N. force to police the area that would be demilitarized?

Secretary Kissinger: Remember our agreement, Mr. President. [Laughter.]

President Sadat: As I said, in all these details it is premature to say anything now.

Q. You do not rule it out, exclude it?

President Sadat: Certainly, certainly. But as I said, it is premature.

DEPARTURE, ASWAN, MARCH 14

Press release 142 dated March 14

I expect to be back, probably on Monday, to continue our talks on that occasion. Everything of substance was already given to you yesterday.

REMARKS, JERUSALEM, MARCH 14⁶

We are moving from a discussion of general principles to the examination of concrete ideas. I brought the Egyptian considerations in this regard to the Israeli negotiating team, and we reviewed these as well as other aspects of the problem in great detail and in a very comradely, constructive, and positive spirit. Tomorrow I am going to Damascus and Amman. Then I will return here Sunday afternoon, and we will continue our deliberations, and based on those, I will return to Egypt.

Q. Dr. Kissinger, do you see any very big obstacles that might prevent an agreement from taking place now?

Secretary Kissinger: I think it is premature to predict an agreement. As I said, we are moving from general principles to concrete ideas. So there is some progress being made, but it is premature to predict an agreement.

⁶ Made following a meeting with the Israeli negotiating team (text from press release 143 dated Mar. 17).

Q. Are you planning to stay in the area until you do get an agreement?

Secretary Kissinger: I am planning to stay in the area until it is known either whether it is possible to get an agreement or whether it is not.

Q. Is the problem of nonbelligerency still the big sticking point?

Secretary Kissinger: Well, I do not want to talk about any of the specific issues.

Thank you.

DEPARTURE, DAMASCUS, MARCH 15

Press release 141 dated March 17

First of all I would like to thank the Foreign Minister for having delayed his departure so that he could receive me and participate in the talks. President Asad and I had a very full and detailed review of the prospects of peace in the Middle East, and we agreed that before I complete my stay in this area I would return to Damascus to continue those discussions.

Thank you.

ARRIVAL, AMMAN, MARCH 15

Press release 145 dated March 17

As always, it is a pleasure to visit our friends in Jordan. I will report to His Majesty and the Prime Minister on the American initiative in the Middle East and the prospects of peace as we see them. We will also discuss our bilateral relations, which are excellent. And it is a pleasure to be with friends.

Thank you.

Q. Could I assume from your frequent visits to Jordan that you are trying to convince the Jordanians to go to Geneva?

Secretary Kissinger: The decision to go to Geneva is entirely up to Jordan. We are not trying to influence anyone.

Q. Arriving late, is it a good sign of your talks in Damascus?

Secretary Kissinger: I will repeat what I said in Damascus. I am returning to Damascus.

DEPARTURE, AMMAN, MARCH 16

Press release 146 dated March 17

On behalf of my colleagues, I would like to thank His Majesty and the Prime Minister for the characteristically warm and friendly reception we have had here. We have had very extended discussions, and I gave His Majesty a very full and detailed report about the state of the negotiations in which I am engaged, and we exchanged ideas about future progress toward peace in the area. We also discussed bilateral relations, which are excellent.

On behalf of President Ford, I invited His Majesty to pay a visit to the United States toward the end of April, and His Majesty has accepted. I will stay in the closest touch with His Majesty as these negotiations continue and will keep him informed of all developments.

REMARKS, JERUSALEM, MARCH 16⁷

Foreign Minister Allon

The Secretary of State and myself divided labor among ourselves. I'll speak in Hebrew for the Israeli press, and the Secretary will say the same things, I hope, in English.

[Translated from Hebrew.] We held a detailed conversation for a number of hours with Dr. Kissinger and his group on the Egyptian proposals he brought, and we have conveyed to our guest our proposals and evaluation of the proposals he brought to us in accordance with the spirit of government policy from previous sessions and today's session. I say with satisfaction that these talks were held in good spirits and with a positive trend on the part of both parties. But because of the importance of the subject and the great amount of detail, we could not

⁷ Made following a meeting with the Israeli negotiating team (text from press release 147 dated Mar. 17).

complete the discussion this evening, and we will continue tomorrow morning.

Secretary Kissinger

The Israeli negotiating team and we reviewed all the elements of the negotiations in very great detail, in a very constructive spirit, based on the discussions that took place in the Israeli Cabinet today. The Israeli side presented the Israeli ideas in response to the Egyptian ideas that I brought here from Aswan, and I plan to go to Egypt tomorrow to present them. The Israeli and American negotiating team will meet again tomorrow morning.

Q. Did you introduce any ideas of your own?

Secretary Kissinger: No.

REMARKS, JERUSALEM, MARCH 17^s

We reviewed once again the ideas which I brought from Egypt and the Israeli reactions to those ideas as well as the considerations that the Israeli Cabinet and negotiating team are asking me to take to Egypt, and I will now go to Egypt this afternoon. I plan to be back by tomorrow evening, and we will meet again then. We had a very good and constructive meeting this morning in reviewing the Israeli ideas.

Q. How do you rate your chances for a settlement now, sir?

Secretary Kissinger: I am not going to make any guesses.

ARRIVAL, ASWAN, MARCH 17

Press release 151 dated March 17

Q. Mr. Secretary, reports here indicate that you have run into serious trouble in the talks with Israel. Is that true?

Secretary Kissinger: No. I am here to

*Made following a meeting with the Israeli negotiating team (text from press release 150).

bring some Israeli considerations and ideas, and I look forward to discussing them with the President and the Foreign Minister.

Q. Mr. Secretary, can you say whether those ideas are concrete ideas as you mentioned here on Thursday?

Secretary Kissinger: They are specific ideas.

NEWS CONFERENCE BY SECRETARY KISSINGER AND PRESIDENT SADAT, MARCH 18

Press release 155 dated March 18

Secretary Kissinger: The President and I reviewed in the usual friendly atmosphere the ideas which I brought from Israel. The President has given me some additional considerations and ideas to take back to Israel. I am returning there this afternoon, and I expect to continue the negotiations there. This is all I have to say.

Q. Can you see a breakthrough, Dr. Kissinger?

Secretary Kissinger: One can't, in negotiations, speak of any particular point at which there is a breakthrough. I am trying to narrow the gap between the two sides by explaining the ideas as carefully as I can.

Q. Mr. Secretary, have you already narrowed the gap between the two sides?

Secretary Kissinger: As I have said on several occasions, the gap has narrowed, but it always remains to be seen whether it can finally be closed.

Q. Mr. President, how would you characterize the progress, if any, in this specific session?

President Sadat: Well, as Secretary Kissinger has stated, we had a fruitful talk, and I have given him some new considerations as an answer to what he has brought here, and I think it is premature now to say more.

Q. Dr. Kissinger, are you determined to stay in the region?

Secretary Kissinger: As I have said on

many occasions, I am determined to stay until we either reach an agreement or it is clear that we cannot reach an agreement, so I am determined to stay here.

Q. Mr. President, in view of the views brought from Israel by Secretary Kissinger, do you believe that an agreement that would involve an Israeli withdrawal from the passes and from the oilfields would be within the realm of possibility?

President Sadat: I can answer your question on Thursday, let us hope, when Dr. Kissinger returns.

Q. Mr. President, are there some substantial areas on which you and the Israelis do agree?

President Sadat: Well, I think you should ask the Secretary this question.

Q. Mr. Secretary? [Laughter.]

Secretary Kissinger: I think there are some areas of agreement, and there are several substantial areas of disagreement.

Q. Mr. President, do you get the feeling that there has been progress in the last session here, in the last round of exchange?

President Sadat: I have the impression that, as I told you at the beginning, it is a very hard, difficult, and complicated round.

Q. Mr. President, the Israelis appear to be talking about a demand for the elements or the principles of nonbelligerency from Egypt. Is this any more acceptable to you than the per se demand for nonbelligerency?

President Sadat: I have stated our position, and it is quite clear. We shall not agree to nonbelligerency as long as there is any foreign soldier on our land, and I said that doing so means that I am inviting them to stay, so I think that this is quite clear.

Q. The idea of joint patrols with Israel, Dr. Kissinger, has been dropped completely?

Secretary Kissinger: I think the Foreign Minister has put out a statement on the Egyptian position which is clear and fully understood and has been fully communicated.

Q. Mr. President, do you believe that there should be a buffer zone in which there would be a strengthened U.N. Force between the Israeli and the Egyptian forces, if an agreement could be reached?

President Sadat: I think this is quite natural, because it is already there. There is a buffer zone between us in which the United Nations operates; it is already there.

Q. So that any area that will be evacuated by the Israelis as a part of a new agreement, could be replaced or could be soldiered by U.N. troops? Is that correct?

President Sadat: Well, you are driving again to try to find some of the details of what we are discussing.

Q. That's true, sir. [Laughter.]

Q. Mr. Secretary, the ideas you'll be carrying back to Israel now, are they a refinement or are they substantially different from the ideas you carried back last Friday?

Secretary Kissinger: In each round the ideas, of course, advance and sometimes cover collateral areas. But I don't want to get drawn into a discussion of whether they are entirely new or a refinement, but I think they represent, as I have said, additional input for the Israeli side.

Q. Do you think, Dr. Kissinger, that you can reach an agreement before the time of the renewal of the U.N. Forces?

Secretary Kissinger: Certainly, yes.

Q. Mr. President, do you have any time idea how long an agreement might take to implement?

President Sadat: We have not yet reached this point.

Q. But wouldn't time be a crucial element, some idea of how long it would take, would that not be a crucial element?

President Sadat: You were speaking of the implementation, and you are asking now about reaching an agreement.

Q. My point, Mr. President, is there has to be some understanding of how long it would

take to implement the agreement before an agreement could be signed.

President Sadat: When we agree first on the principles, I think the period of implementation can be discussed after that, but we have not yet agreed upon the principles.

Q. Do you think, Dr. Kissinger, you can reach the same kind of agreement?

President Sadat: We have not yet agreed upon the principles.

Q. Do you think there can be at the same time an agreement on the Syrian front?

Secretary Kissinger: The conditions in the different areas vary, so I do not want to say that principles can necessarily be automatically applied. But I have stated repeatedly and publicly that the process of peace applies to the whole area, that the United States will do its utmost to promote peace in the entire area.

Q. Have you discussed bilateral relations between Egypt and the United States?

Secretary Kissinger: We always discuss our bilateral relations, which we think are excellent. [The President nodded.]

Q. Do you think the idea of a single Arab delegation might be a way around the U.S. and Israeli objections to dealing with the PLO [Palestine Liberation Organization] in Geneva?

Secretary Kissinger: We have not had an opportunity to discuss this sort of idea, and when it comes time to organize the Geneva Conference, we can address specific issues of this nature.

Q. Mr. President, do you see any possibility of opening indirect trade to Israel, or indirect tourism, following a withdrawal from part of the Sinai?

President Sadat: I'll tell you, up to this moment we didn't agree on the principles of this very limited withdrawal, and you are raising issues that should be discussed there in Geneva after the final solution. You can't raise issues like this now.

Q. Mr. President, you must have an idea, though, what the final solution would look like. Can you give us in general terms what you would like to see so far as a final solution? Where would Israel exist? Where would its boundaries in general lay?

President Sadat: I have already stated this before—the borders of 1967. And if we can succeed in Geneva to end the state of belligerency, I think we would make a very big achievement for this generation. Sure, as I told you before and so I have stated before also, the core of the whole problem is the Palestinian problem. So if we can achieve in our generation the end of the state of belligerency between the Arabs and Israel and solve the Palestinian question, it will be a great achievement.

Q. With your foresight, sir—you always say "this generation"—can you look to the next generation perhaps with your foresight and tell us what situation you envision between the Arabs and Israelis in the next generation?

President Sadat: I have said before, it depends upon their conduct, and I can't speak for the next generation.

Q. Mr. President, clarification—do you mean to leave the impression in this current disengagement that you don't think it should include such things as improved commerce between Israel and Egypt or improved transportation between Egypt and Israel. There have been some proposals made in Israel that part of the agreement can be steps such as improving transportation from Cairo to Tel Aviv, or something like that.

President Sadat: Are you asking me?

Q. In answer to a previous question you said you thought that such matters should be taken up in Geneva and not within this disengagement agreement.

President Sadat: It is still premature, and it is really absurd to discuss such matters as this. As I said, if we had reached a state of ending the state of belligerency between the Arabs and Israel, this would be a great

achievement for our generation. There is no point at all in discussing these relations when we can't agree upon ending the state of belligerency.

Q. Mr. President, just how serious will it be if these negotiations fail?

President Sadat: Well, I have told my press that there is a possibility that we may not reach any agreement, and we are ready to face whatever comes.

Q. What would be the consequences, sir?

President Sadat: Well, as the British say, we can't cross that bridge until we reach it.

Q. And if an agreement is reached, is it a big push for peace?

President Sadat: Sure, it will be a turning point.

Q. Dr. Kissinger, do you believe it is at this stage the Palestinians would participate in these talks concerning their future?

Secretary Kissinger: I think the two press corps are competing in asking provocative questions.

Q. Mr. President, why do you think it would be a turning point? You said it would be a turning point if it succeeds. Could you elaborate?

President Sadat: The next time, the next visit of Dr. Kissinger, then I can elaborate.

Q. Thank you.

REMARKS, JERUSALEM, MARCH 18

Press release 156 dated March 19

The Israeli negotiating team and my colleagues and I reviewed the considerations and ideas that I brought from Aswan in reply to the Israeli considerations that I had put before the Egyptians. In the process, we have also reviewed the entire status of the negotiation, and the meeting was conducted in the characteristic friendly, comradely, and

positive spirit. We will meet again tomorrow morning, before I go to Saudi Arabia, and I will be back again in the evening for further discussions.

Thank you.

Q. Have you made any headway in these recent talks?

Secretary Kissinger: Well, we are examining the ways by which each side is trying to meet, or take into account, the considerations of the other, and in that sense we are making progress.

Q. There are reports, sir, that these talks have reached a dead end. Would you say this is justified?

Secretary Kissinger: That is not my view.

DEPARTURE, RIYADH, MARCH 19

Press release 157 dated March 19

Secretary Kissinger

First of all, I would like to thank His Majesty and his advisers for the very warm hospitality that has been extended to us and for the very useful talks that we have had. I reviewed with His Majesty the state of the negotiations in which I am engaged, and in which I am acting as a go-between, and the prospects of peace in the area in general. We also discussed with general agreement certain other issues in which the United States and Saudi Arabia have common interest.

In my conversations with Minister Yamani, the Acting Foreign Minister, and Prince Fahd, as well as with His Majesty, my attention was called to recent newspaper articles speculating on the military intentions of the United States in the area. I would like to state categorically here that our relation with Saudi Arabia is based on friendship and cooperation in which threats, military or otherwise, play no part and we base our relationship on cooperation and not on confrontation.

Mr. Secretary, this visit is a very constructive and fruitful one. We had a chance to discuss with you the future relationship between the United States of America and Saudi Arabia. We listened carefully to your report, and that strengthened our belief in the good intention and the good will of the United States in its efforts to bring peace to this area based on the implementation of the various resolutions by the United Nations. We just heard the official views about the fantasies of the newspapers, the articles written by certain groups of writers, and we are pleased that is now in public. We thank you for your efforts and wish you the best of luck.

REMARKS, JERUSALEM, MARCH 20⁹

Israeli Defense Minister Shimon Peres

As you know, the Cabinet yesterday empowered the team of Ministers that is negotiating with the Secretary of State to continue the negotiations. And in order to do so we had to clarify some points. This was done at the morning meeting, which was, as usual, conducted in a very friendly and serious air. Once we have the clarifications we are now returning to the Cabinet to report. That is the best news I can give you for the time being.

Secretary Kissinger

I can add nothing to the statement that the Minister of Defense has made. We had a good, constructive, and friendly meeting, and I will stay in Jerusalem until after the Cabinet meeting and meet again with our colleagues before I return to Egypt this evening.

Q. Dr. Kissinger, are you more confident now that you received the assessment of the

⁹ Made following a meeting of the U.S. and Israeli negotiating teams (text from press release 161).

Israeli Cabinet that an agreement can take place?

Secretary Kissinger: Well, I have told you all along that I wasn't going to give you estimates. I do feel that each side is making a very serious effort to try to take into account the considerations of the other, and this is certainly true of the Israeli side.

Q. Sir, do you have plans to see Mr. Gromyko [Soviet Foreign Minister Andrei A. Gromyko] in the next few days?

Secretary Kissinger: I do not have any firm plans at this moment.

REMARKS, JERUSALEM, MARCH 20¹⁰

Secretary Kissinger

We have had another meeting with the Israeli negotiating team, and they presented to us the ideas and proposals of the Israeli Government in response to the proposals and ideas of the Egyptian side that I brought here. I am now leaving immediately for the airport and will go to Aswan and will be discussing these Israeli proposals with President Sadat and his advisers.

Thank you.

Q. New proposals? Are they new proposals?

Secretary Kissinger: I think there are some new ideas, yes.

Q. Is an agreement close, sir? Would you say that it was closer?

Secretary Kissinger: I do not want to speculate. I will be back, I hope tomorrow, and I will be able to give a better assessment then.

Defense Minister Peres

We gave the complete proposal of the Israeli Cabinet to Dr. Kissinger.

¹⁰ Made following the evening meeting of the U.S. and Israeli negotiating teams (text from press release 162 dated Mar. 21).

Q. Were there amendments to the original Israeli guidelines for a settlement?

Defense Minister Peres: We have concluded our proposals this afternoon.

Q. Is the gap closing? Is the gap very wide? Has it narrowed somewhat?

Defense Minister Peres: Can I see from here up to Cairo how many gaps are there on the way? I wouldn't guess.

Q. Did Dr. Kissinger raise any of his own ideas?

Defense Minister Peres: Well, it is a dialogue, and both sides are suggesting and questioning and answering, as the nature of things are.

Q. Has he introduced American ideas?

Defense Minister Peres: Well, how can I speak for the United States? But, usually it is a negotiation, a clarification, and it works in a way of conversations, you know.

Q. When do you expect him back tomorrow?

Defense Minister Peres: I hope as early as possible. Before Shabbat comes in.

Thank you very much.

REMARKS, JERUSALEM, MARCH 21 ¹¹

I am running out of variations of these formulations, but I have brought the Egyptian countersuggestions to the Israeli proposals of yesterday to the Israeli negotiating team. It is my understanding that there will be a Cabinet meeting in a little while at which these Egyptian ideas will be discussed, and after that I will meet with the negotiating team again.

Q. Are you prepared to say now that an agreement is close?

Secretary Kissinger: I am not prepared to say that, no.

¹¹ Made following a meeting of the U.S. and Israeli negotiating teams (text from press release 164).

Q. Has the gap been significantly narrowed in the last 24 hours?

Secretary Kissinger: Well, as I have pointed out before, gaps can narrow and still remain, and there is still a gap.

Q. Dr. Kissinger, there are many reports that you are planning to leave the area in a day or two. Would you care to comment on that?

Secretary Kissinger: Why don't we wait until the Cabinet meets?

REMARKS BY SECRETARY KISSINGER AND DEFENSE MINISTER PERES, MARCH 22 ¹²

Press release 165 dated March 22

Defense Minister Peres: Well, as you know, we had an important and long Cabinet meeting this afternoon. Afterward we have reported to Dr. Kissinger about the deliberations in our Cabinet session, and we went into great details about the many and complicated problems ahead of us, and since today is Friday night we have decided to continue tomorrow. I hope the Secretary will remain so we shall be able to deal with the very serious matter in a relaxed and thoughtful way tomorrow night.

Q. Mr. Peres, are the talks deadlocked? Have you hit a really serious snag?

Defense Minister Peres: I would not like to conclude the negotiations as long as they go on. Let us be a little bit patient and not run ahead of time, neither with guesses nor with conclusions.

Q. Why the special session tonight, on Friday night?

Defense Minister Peres: Basically, I believe because we are a democratic country and decisions are being taken by the Cabinet.

Q. Could we get Dr. Kissinger's assessment?

Secretary Kissinger: I agree with what the

¹² Made following a meeting of the U.S. and Israeli negotiating teams (text from press release 165).

Defense Minister has said. We reviewed in great detail all the points that are involved in a potential agreement. We thought that both sides would benefit from a day of thinking over where we stand, and we are going to meet again tomorrow evening and continue our discussions.

Q. Secretary Kissinger, how do you react to these tales of deadlock? How would you characterize where it stands?

Secretary Kissinger: I would say that over the recent week the positions of the two sides have come closer to each other. Both sides have made a serious effort to take into account the considerations of the other, but a gap remains and, of course, as long as a gap remains there remains a lot of work to be done.

Q. Are you going to continue with the work? Do you plan to keep going, keep going to Aswan, keep up the shuttle?

Secretary Kissinger: I plan to continue the shuttle as long as I think there is a possibility of bridging the gap.

Q. And do you think so now, sir?

Secretary Kissinger: I think so now, and we will continue our discussions tomorrow.

Defense Minister Peres: Good night, gentlemen. Go and have a rest.

DEPARTURE, JERUSALEM, MARCH 23

Press release 166 dated March 23

Prime Minister Rabin

Mr. Secretary, I have come to see you off on your way back to Washington as an expression on behalf of the Government of Israel and the people of Israel for the special, unique relations that have existed and will continue to exist between our two countries. I believe that the relations between your country and our country have been based on many common concepts and interests, and I am sure that what has been done in 26 years will continue to be developed.

I have come here, Mr. Secretary, to express our deep appreciation to you. I know you, for many years, from my term as Ambassador of Israel to the United States. I know you as Secretary of State and especially in the last efforts to move this area from war toward peace. I know that you have done more than a human being can do in the efforts to move from war toward peace. I am sorry that the present efforts to bring about an interim agreement between Egypt and Israel have been suspended. I am sure that the United States and you will continue to find every possible option, every avenue, to move, or to help the parties to move, from war to peace.

Please accept our great respect, appreciation, and admiration for what you have done.

Secretary Kissinger

Thank you. Mr. Prime Minister, on behalf of my colleagues, let me express our appreciation for your consideration in coming to the airport to see us off. We have worked together for two weeks in the traditional spirit of friendship to move this area toward a peace that no people needs more than the people of Israel, gathered here after 2,000 years of dispersion and a generation of struggle. This is a sad day for America, which has invested much hope and faith, and we know it is a sad day also for Israel, which needs and wants peace so badly.

But the necessities that brought about this effort continue and the need to move toward peace cannot be abandoned. We will now have to look for different methods and new forums, but in any event the United States will do its utmost to contribute to a just and lasting peace in this area. We have had no other goal except to enable the young people in this area to grow up without the fear of war. And, as we leave, we wish the people of Israel all the best. And I want to thank, particularly, my old friend the Prime Minister for the wisdom with which he has conducted himself, for the friendship he has shown to us, and for the dedication that has animated all his action.

U.S. Mourns Death of King Faisal of Saudi Arabia

President Ford

Mr. Secretary: It is a great privilege for me to welcome you back on an extraordinarily difficult mission on behalf of the United States and the problems that are in the Middle East.

I know that you made a maximum effort. Unfortunately, for reasons beyond our control, it did not turn out the way we wanted it.

But let me say, the United States will continue to emphasize our desire to achieve a lasting peace in the Middle East by working with one country, other countries, and all countries.

It is in the national as well as in the international interest that we do everything we can with the emphasis on peace. Although we have, on a temporary basis hopefully, not achieved all that we had desired, I continue to be an optimist that the good judgment and the wise decisions of all parties will result in the ultimate objective of peace in the Middle East and its ramifications on a world-wide basis.

Henry, would you like to add anything?

Secretary Kissinger

Mr. President: I very much appreciate your greeting me here as you sent me off from here.

The necessities that produced the mission continue and the need for a lasting peace in the Middle East remains.

As the President pointed out, the United States remains ready to work with the parties and other interested countries to promote a peace of justice in the Middle East.

Thank you.

His Majesty King Faisal ibn Abd al-Aziz Al Saud of Saudi Arabia was assassinated at Riyadh March 25. Following is a statement by President Ford issued that day, together with a statement read to news correspondents by Robert Anderson, Special Assistant to the Secretary of State for Press Relations.

STATEMENT BY PRESIDENT FORD

White House press release dated March 25

It was with the deepest sorrow that I learned of the tragic death of His Majesty King Faisal, a close friend of the United States and a leader who achieved so much for his people and those of the Arab world and Islam, and whose wisdom and stature earned the respect of the entire world. On behalf of the American people I wish to extend my deepest sympathy to the royal family and to the people of Saudi Arabia, whose grief we share.

DEPARTMENT STATEMENT

It was with the greatest sorrow that the Secretary of State learned of the death of His Majesty King Faisal. As you know, the Secretary had the honor of an audience with the King only last Wednesday. It was the last of many meetings during which the Secretary had come to rely on His Majesty's wise counsels in the pursuit of peace in the Middle East. He will be greatly missed. The Secretary feels that this personal bond will form the basis for continuing close relations between Saudi Arabia and the United States. He has sent messages expressing his deepest sympathy to the royal family and the people of Saudi Arabia.

¹³ Made on the South Lawn of the White House (text from White House press release).

Prime Minister Dzemal Bijedic of Yugoslavia Visits the United States

Dzemal Bijedic, President of the Federal Executive Council of the Socialist Federal Republic of Yugoslavia, visited the United States March 18-21. Following is an exchange of toasts between President Ford and Prime Minister Bijedic at a luncheon at the White House on March 19, together with the text of a joint statement issued that day.

EXCHANGE OF TOASTS

Weekly Compilation of Presidential Documents dated March 24

President Ford

Mr. Prime Minister, distinguished guests: It is a pleasure to welcome you to Washington and to this historic house. I understand that in your birthplace of Mostar in Yugoslavia, there is a famous stone bridge which has been standing for a very long time. I hope, Mr. Prime Minister, the relationship between Yugoslavia and the United States will be as long as the history of that famous bridge.

The foundation, Mr. Prime Minister, as you well know, is the cooperative relationship between the United States and the People's Republic of Yugoslavia. It was built more than a quarter of a century ago—as a matter of fact, I was in the Congress of the United States at the time that this new relationship began and developed—and is now flourishing.

This relationship, Mr. Prime Minister, is anchored, as I see it, in a strong mutual interest in Yugoslavia's independence, its integrity, and its unity, as well as a mutual desire, Mr. Prime Minister, to maintain peace in Europe as well as in the rest of the world.

I think it symbolizes the cooperation be-

tween two countries with entirely different social and political systems.

Like the bridge in Mostar, Mr. Prime Minister, the one between our nations and our peoples has withstood the test of time. It has facilitated an impressive growth in trade, in business, in scientific and cultural cooperation, as well as tourism.

While the currents sometimes passing, Mr. Prime Minister, beneath this bridge, have ebbed and flowed, its basic structure has remained intact. The principles upon which it rests remain as sound today as two decades ago.

I look forward, Mr. Prime Minister, to the further strengthening of American-Yugoslav cooperation, and I know we are both aware that this will require a continuing commitment from both governments.

Bearing in mind our common interest in continued peace and security in the world, I think we must strive to eliminate misunderstandings and any narrow differences which sometimes unfortunately arise between us.

The history of this relationship indicates that we have made an excellent start. I am sure—it is my conviction—that it will be successful in the future.

I raise my glass to your health, Mr. Prime Minister, and to the bridge between our two countries. May it continue to facilitate cooperation, understanding and friendship between our two peoples.

Prime Minister Bijedic¹

Mr. President, gentlemen: Allow me to thank you for the words of welcome and friendship addressed to me and my asso-

¹ Prime Minister Bijedic spoke in Serbo-Croatian.

ciates. Our visit to the United States of America constitutes a further expression of mutual desire for the promotion of friendship and cooperation between our two countries, a friendship established upon longstanding tradition and alliance during two World Wars.

Our visit to your country is taking place at the moment when you have started preparations for the Bicentennial of the United States, the anniversary of the day on which, as the result of the struggle of American people against colonialism and foreign domination, the Declaration of Independence was adopted.

Many years later my country, too, went through the liberation war and revolution. I accentuate this because both of our peoples aspired toward the same objective—to live in freedom and independence, to freely determine their destiny and vigilantly guard it.

I shall call forth, Mr. President, another date in the history of the relations between our two countries. That is the year 1881, the year in which the first interstate agreement was concluded—the trade agreement between the United States of America and Serbia signed at Belgrade in October 1881, which is still in force.

Rare are today bilateral agreements which have stood a test of time. Our two countries have experienced together the most severe historic tests of this century, fighting as allies against the joint enemies.

Over the whole period following the Second World War, they have continually voiced their determination to promote all-round equitable cooperation and mutual relations, for their own benefit and in the broader interest.

Particularly important for the development of relations between Yugoslavia and the United States was the exchange of visits between the two Presidents in 1970 and 1971 and the visit of Secretary of State Dr. Kissinger to Belgrade a few months ago.

We are highly appreciative, Mr. President, of the message you have addressed to President Tito and in which you have clearly set forth the desire of the United States to con-

tinue the policy of good relations with Yugoslavia.

Likewise, we highly appreciate your acceptance of the invitation extended by President Tito to visit Yugoslavia in the course of this year. We are confident that this confirms once again the preparedness of your government and your own, Mr. President, for the continuation and promotion of mutual friendly relations. We will welcome you in Yugoslavia as a dear guest.

I share, Mr. President, your view and that of your government that relations between the United States and Yugoslavia have been developing successfully, regardless of the differences of stances and views in respect to some international issues.

It is our sincere desire that these differences, wherever it is possible, be reduced through mutual efforts, more frequent contacts, mutual understanding and respect for the positions of the other side.

Yugoslavia, as an independent, Socialist, and nonaligned country, has a constant interest in developing relations with the United States based on principles of the respect for sovereignty, equality, and noninterference; that is, the principles that are outlined in the joint statement of the Presidents of Yugoslavia and the United States signed at Washington in 1971.

Yugoslavia is particularly concerned that the solutions for the existing hotbeds of military conflicts, which at any moment may become sources of new and even more difficult large-scale international crises, be sought through negotiation and full respect for the Charter and resolutions of the United Nations, as well as through agreements reached between the parties concerned.

Mr. President, in expressing my thanks for the invitation extended to me to visit your beautiful country, the country of the people whose working energies and technological advances are admired throughout the world, I wish to emphasize our great satisfaction that we are coming here at a time when, in the relations between our two countries in many fields—particularly the economic, scientific, and cultural fields—a

significant upward trend has been registered. The trade between the two countries—and I mention this as an example—has increased by almost 60 percent in the course of one year. Significant banking and credit arrangements have been concluded. Joint ventures and the volume of industrial cooperation have been stepped up.

The same applies to the scientific and technological cooperation, the cooperation among universities, and the cultural exchange.

The celebration of the 200th anniversary of the United States, in respect of which preparations are in progress in Yugoslavia for participation in this historic jubilee, constitutes one more opportunity to display our constant concern for the continuation of our traditional cooperation and friendship with your country.

More than a million Americans of Yugoslav descent, loyal citizens of the United States, live here today. We feel proud that in the history of the United States, in its struggle for independence and the building up of its constitutionality, the names of many individuals of Yugoslav extraction have been inscribed, people who spared no effort and sacrificed their lives to contribute to the well-being of this country.

Allow me, esteemed Mr. President, to propose this toast to your health, to the health of your associates, for the progress and prosperity of the United States of America, for the strengthening and promotion of friendly relations and cooperation between our two countries, for peace and progress in the world, and for the same bridge that you have toasted for, which has already lived there for 410 years.

TEXT OF JOINT STATEMENT

At the invitation of the United States Government, the President of the Federal Executive Council of the Socialist Federal Republic of Yugoslavia, Dzemal Bijedic, accompanied by his wife, is visiting Washington, D.C., from March 19 to 21, 1975.

The President of the United States of America, Gerald R. Ford, gave a luncheon in honor of the President of the Federal Executive Council at the White House March 19. During their talks, the

President of the Federal Executive Council conveyed to the President of the United States a message from the President of the Socialist Federal Republic of Yugoslavia, Josip Broz Tito. The talks took place in an atmosphere of cordiality and openness.

The President of the Federal Executive Council will hold talks on bilateral relations and international questions of interest to the two countries with the Acting Secretary of State, Robert S. Ingersoll, who together with Mrs. Ingersoll, is giving a dinner on behalf of the United States Government in honor of the President of the Federal Executive Council and Mrs. Bijedic March 19. The President of the Federal Executive Council will meet with the Secretary of Commerce, Frederick B. Dent, the President of the Export-Import Bank, William C. Casey, and the President of the Overseas Private Investment Corporation, Marshall T. Mays. These meetings will focus on trade and other forms of economic cooperation between Yugoslavia and the United States.

The two sides devoted particular attention to areas of continuing crisis such as the Middle East and Cyprus. In setting forth their views concerning the paths to be followed in attempting to resolve these and other outstanding world problems, the two sides emphasized the benefit of regular contacts and consultation at all levels to heighten understanding and mutual respect for one another's views and positions.

Reaffirming their mutual interest in the preservation and consolidation of peace in Europe and the further advancement of constructive cooperation among European states in a wide variety of fields, the two sides emphasized their determination and mutual interest in the continued coordination of efforts to attain acceptance of basic principles of inter-European cooperation and security, and an early, successful conclusion of the Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe.

Both sides expressed continued determination to strive for effective disarmament measures which would strengthen the peace and security of all peoples.

The two sides affirmed that solutions to the problems which presently face mankind must be sought by peaceful means on the basis of respect for the principles of the Charter of the United Nations and the sovereign equality of all states irrespective of size or social, political and economic system. In this regard, it was recognized that Yugoslavia's policy of non-alignment contributes actively to greater understanding among peoples and the pursuit of peaceful resolution of international problems and conflicts.

Economic problems currently facing the world were discussed in the context of growing international interdependence. The two sides stressed the importance of finding solutions to such problems as energy and other raw materials, food, population,

the environment, and economic development. They agreed that genuine peace and stability in the world depend on the achievement of significant progress toward the resolution of these problems, and that such progress can best be achieved by cooperative efforts and agreements which take into account the rights and interests of all countries, and not by confrontation.

The two sides expressed satisfaction that continued progress has been registered in bilateral cooperation between the Socialist Federal Republic of Yugoslavia and the United States of America. They noted particularly the substantial and continuing growth of trade between the two countries in recent years and agreed to act to promote continued economic and financial cooperation, including joint investments. Both sides also expressed a desire to maintain a high level of joint scientific research between institutions and individual scientists of the two countries.

They also reaffirmed their intention to encourage the further expansion of cultural cooperation, reiterating their expectation that the participation of the Socialist Federal Republic of Yugoslavia in the forthcoming bicentennial of the United States of America will serve to deepen understanding between the peoples of the two countries. They also affirmed the importance to the development of the United States of America of American citizens of Yugoslav extraction who constitute an important link of friendship and communication between the peoples of the two countries.

The two sides underscored once again the continuing validity of the principles set forth in the Joint Statement of October 30, 1971, which constitutes a solid basis for stable, friendly relations and a broad spectrum of mutually beneficial cooperation between the two countries.

Congressional Documents Relating to Foreign Policy

93d Congress, 2d Session

Conservation and Efficient Use of Energy. Report of the House Committee on Science and Astronautics. H. Rept. 93-1634. December 18, 1974. 272 pp.

Trade Act of 1974. Summary of the provisions of H.R. 10710. Prepared by the staffs of the Senate Committee on Finance and House Committee on Ways and Means. December 30, 1974. 25 pp.

Multinational Oil Corporations and U.S. Foreign Policy. Report, together with individual views, to the Senate Committee on Foreign Relations by the Subcommittee on Multinational Corporations. January 2, 1975. 172 pp.

Foreign Diplomat Travel Program Praised by President Ford

Remarks by President Ford¹

It is really a great privilege and a very high honor to have the opportunity of being here again and participating in this sort of culmination of the program on a once-a-year basis. I was here once as a Congressman and last year as Vice President, and now I am equally honored to be here as President.

It has been said that in diplomacy there are no true friendships—only temporary alliances of convenience. In looking back on history and studying some of the things that have happened over the last two centuries, I think there is some truth to that. I think we have to recognize as well, this is not the whole picture, and the world would be a pretty grim place if it were.

There are many in this audience who are professional diplomats, and all of those who are know firsthand what it means to defend your country's interests and to negotiate on its behalf.

As participants and supporters of the Travel Program for Foreign Diplomats, you also know that human understanding, communication, and friendship between people and nations is also very real and a very vital force, an essential force, for peace in the world today.

In the past 12 years, this very worthwhile program has made it possible, as has been said on many occasions, for more than 4,000 diplomats to know the United States, to know America, our people, in a way that they never could have through official channels.

Cooperation of countless individuals, as well as individual families in the private sector, have supported this program and made it successful. I am delighted once again to

¹ Made on Mar. 20 at a luncheon at the Department of State for participants in Travel Program for Foreign Diplomats, Inc. (text from Weekly Compilation of Presidential Documents dated Mar. 24).

say a word of strong, strong endorsement of the program. This year, as it carries forward again, I hope and trust that its past progress will be multiplied. You are doing a fine job, and I thank each and every one of you—the sponsors, the participants, as well as others.

To see firsthand the beauty and the expanse of this great country, to get to know the day-to-day joys and frustrations of an average working family in one of our great cities, to experience the immense diversity of regional tastes and traditions that we call America—all of this is perhaps the only way to really comprehend our ideals, our aspirations, and great strengths underlying our national policies.

You cannot understand a nation without knowing its people. And only by getting to know individuals can you begin to know the people as a whole. By introducing foreign visitors to such a wide, wide range of Americans, the travel program performs a great service to our nation.

I hasten to add, however, that I do not see the travel program as a one-way street. It is just as necessary for the U.S. diplomats to get to know the people of their host nations and to appreciate fully the traditions and cultural achievements of the countries where they are posted. The friendships that you forge today will pay dividends in peaceful understanding for the years to come.

I have often said that the keystone of this Administration is openness. But when you get right down to it, the keystone of our American way of life is openness. We do not believe in hiding the truth, whether it is flattering or unflattering.

We recognize, of course, we know full well, that we have our faults, and we certainly have our problems, but we want our friends from abroad to see the truth, to see how we solve our problems openly, and to judge for themselves the success of our democratic government.

We live in a time unique for both its peril as well as its promise. The potential consequences of war today are more terrible than

they have ever been in human history. But at the same time, the possibility of lasting global peace and prosperity is closer than ever before.

The road to such a peace is bound to be long and very difficult, but I firmly believe that we are making headway. We will have our disappointments. And one of the things that makes that road a little smoother and the trip far more rewarding is a program like this and the true spirit that it represents.

U.S. and U.S.S.R. Hold Second Round of Environmental Modification Talks

Joint U.S.-U.S.S.R. Release¹

The second meeting of representatives of the United States of America and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics on the question of measures to overcome the dangers of the use of environmental modification techniques for military purposes was held in Washington from February 24 to March 5. The American delegation was headed by Thomas D. Davies, Assistant Director, U.S. Arms Control and Disarmament Agency. Academician Y. K. Fedorov headed the Soviet delegation.

The first meeting of representatives of the U.S.A. and the U.S.S.R. was held in Moscow in November 1974.

The discussions are being conducted in accordance with the U.S.-U.S.S.R. Joint Statement signed on July 3, 1974, at the Moscow summit meeting, and also on the basis of the understanding to continue an active search for a mutually acceptable solution to this question established in the joint U.S.-U.S.S.R. communique of November 24, 1974, on the results of the Vladivostok summit meeting.

In the course of the discussions conducted in the United States, the exchange of opin-

¹ Issued on Mar. 7 (text from ACDA press release 75-8).

ions on the most effective measures possible which could be undertaken to overcome the dangers of the use of environmental modification techniques for military purposes was continued. The examination of scientific and technical questions related to environmental modification and the familiarization with laboratories working in this area, which were begun in Moscow, were also continued.

The representatives of the U.S.A. and the U.S.S.R. consider that these meetings facilitate better understanding of the points of view of the sides on the questions discussed.

The sides intend to participate actively in the discussion of this question in the Conference of the Committee on Disarmament, which reconvened in Geneva this week, with the aim of achieving positive results.

TREATY INFORMATION

Current Actions

MULTILATERAL

Aviation

International air services transit agreement. Signed at Chicago December 7, 1944. Entered into force February 8, 1945. 59 Stat. 1693.

Acceptance deposited: Malawi, March 27, 1975.

Biological Weapons

Convention on the prohibition of the development, production and stockpiling of bacteriological (bio-

logical) and toxin weapons and on their destruction. Done at Washington, London, and Moscow April 10, 1972.

Ratifications deposited: Senegal, Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, United Kingdom,¹ United States, March 26, 1975.

Entered into force: March 26, 1975.

Oil Pollution

International convention relating to intervention on the high seas in cases of oil pollution casualties, with annex. Done at Brussels November 29, 1969. Enters into force May 6, 1975.

Proclaimed by the President: March 19, 1975.

BILATERAL

Egypt

Loan agreement for the foreign exchange costs of commodities and commodity-related services. Signed at Cairo February 13, 1975. Entered into force February 13, 1975.

Organization of American States

Agreement relating to privileges and immunities. Signed at Washington March 20, 1975. Entered into force March 20, 1975.

Agreement relating to privileges and immunities. Signed at Washington July 22, 1952. Entered into force July 22, 1952. TIAS 2676.

Terminated: March 20, 1975.

Portugal

Grant agreement for technical consultations and training. Signed at Lisbon February 28, 1975. Entered into force February 28, 1975.

Loan agreement for consulting services. Signed at Lisbon February 28, 1975. Entered into force February 28, 1975.

¹ Extended to British Solomon Islands Protectorate, Brunei, Condominium of the New Hebrides, Dominica, and territories under the territorial sovereignty of the United Kingdom. Not applicable to Southern Rhodesia until the United Kingdom informs the other depositary governments that it is in a position to insure that the obligations imposed by the convention in respect of that territory can be fully implemented.

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*167	3/24	U.S.-Canada International Joint Commission report on Lake Champlain regulation.
†168	3/24	U.S.-Brazil shrimp fisheries agreement.
†169	3/24	Executive order issued designating developing countries for generalized trade preferences.
*170	3/25	Conference of educators on population, Mar. 27.
†171	3/26	U.S. and Indonesia exchange notes on reimbursable satellite launches.
172	3/26	Kissinger: news conference.
*173	3/26	Study Group 5 of National Committee for CCITT, Apr. 28.
†174	3/27	U.S. designates EPA as U.N. Environment Program information center.
*175	3/27	Buchanan sworn in as Ambassador to Austria (biographic data).
*176	3/27	Canadian Environment Minister to visit U.S.

* Not printed.
 † Held for a later issue of the BULLETIN.

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THE DEPARTMENT OF STATE BULLETIN

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THE DEPARTMENT OF STATE

BULLETIN

Vol. LXXII, No. 1869

April 21, 1975

The Department of State BULLETIN, a weekly publication issued by the Office of Media Services, Bureau of Public Affairs, provides the public and interested agencies of the government with information on developments in the field of U.S. foreign relations and on the work of the Department and the Foreign Service.

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U.S. Discusses Trade Act, Commodities, and Food Problems in Inter-American Economic and Social Council

The 10th annual meeting of the Inter-American Economic and Social Council (IA-ECOSOC) at ministerial level was held at Washington March 10-17. Following are texts of a statement by Deputy Secretary Robert S. Ingersoll, head of the U.S. delegation, made in the inaugural plenary session on March 10; a statement by Maynard W. Glitman, Deputy Assistant Secretary for International Trade Policy, made in Committee I on March 11; and a statement by Deputy Secretary Ingersoll made in plenary on March 12.

DEPUTY SECRETARY INGERSOLL, PLENARY, MARCH 10

I am honored to have the opportunity to head the U.S. delegation to the Inter-American Economic and Social Council. I am further honored by your kind designation of me as third vice president of this meeting.

All of us are aware of the important role of the Economic and Social Council in the OAS framework. We also appreciate the complexity—and sometimes controversial nature—of the economic and social development problems confronting this hemisphere.

We are meeting in the context of new economic realities generally referred to as interdependence. Economic malaise in the developed states is felt in the developing world through a reduced demand for raw materials and manufactured goods. The higher prices of commodities and fuel contribute to economic stagnation in the more industrialized nations.

A successful approach to the problems and opportunities of interdependence will require

the closest possible cooperation between all nations—producer and consumer, developed and less developed, industrialized and agrarian. Equally important will be a willingness to understand each other's problems and concerns, a realization that we must work together to create a new international economic system acceptable to all nations.

It is in this spirit that the Inter-American Economic and Social Council meets today to address the problems of our hemisphere. The cooperative approaches to common problems we are able to fashion during this meeting may well serve as an example for what can be achieved on a global basis.

I recognize, of course, that one of the major items of interest to the Council will be international trade. I hope to return later in the week to address this subject; we acknowledge your concern and your right to understand precisely how our Trade Act of 1974 relates to your national interests.

In closing, Mr. Chairman, I also want to call attention to two areas critical to our future dialogue: hemispheric development and food. I hope that in our discussions we can get useful exchanges of points of view.

MR. GLITMAN, COMMITTEE I, MARCH 11

President Ford signed into law on January 3 what he described as the most significant trade legislation passed by the Congress since the beginning of the trade agreements program some four decades ago. Passage of the Trade Act of 1974, in and of itself a commitment to trade expansion and liberalization and a recognition of the increasing interdependence of nations, was no small accom-

plishment in the midst of one of the most serious domestic and international economic crises since World War II.

Many, following the arguments of the 1930's, would argue that trade liberalization is inappropriate in times of economic distress. As the Trade Act signifies, however, we have learned the lesson of history. We see trade negotiations, improvement of the trading system, and better relations as more essential than ever.

A central U.S. policy objective, now achievable as a result of the passage of the Trade Act, is to improve U.S.-Latin American trade relations. Many of the provisions of the Trade Act, particularly those of title V as developed by the Administration, were shaped with that in mind. As the President noted when he signed the Trade Act, we regret the rigidities contained in some of the provisions of title V. We have noted that many Latin American nations have indeed criticized the mandatory restrictions on countries which may benefit from our system of generalized tariff preferences.

While we thus recognize the concerns which led to such criticisms, we do not believe it is accurate to generalize from these particular concerns to conclude that the overall thrust of the Trade Act is coercive or protectionist.

The Trade Act is a complex and long document, and it is not surprising that different countries focus on different aspects of it. However, when one sees the act as a commitment to a more open trading system and another sees it as a protectionist tool, we have a problem. I hope this meeting can contribute to a better understanding on our part of your concerns and a better understanding on your part of our intentions.

An issue of concern to many delegations here, and particularly to the delegations of Venezuela and Ecuador, is the provision which appears to exclude all members of the Organization of Petroleum Exporting Countries (OPEC) from the benefits of a U.S. system of generalized tariff preferences. President Ford, in an address made on Feb-

ruary 13, and Secretary Kissinger, in his March 1 speech at Houston, have recently expressed publicly the Administration's continued objection to this provision of the Trade Act and supported its modification.

Moreover, bills introduced into Congress by Senators [Lloyd M.] Bentsen and [Edward M.] Kennedy and Representative [Michael J.] Harrington which would modify the OPEC provision in such a way as to permit both Venezuela and Ecuador to benefit are indications that Congress recognizes the problem.

Our consultations with Members of Congress on this matter—which are actively proceeding—reflect a willingness to consider modifications of this provision of the Trade Act in keeping with the President's statement of January 3. The President said: "In the spirit of cooperation with the Congress, I will do my best to work out any necessary accommodations."

Moreover, there is time in a practical sense to work out this problem. Generalized preferences cannot be implemented for at least several more months because of the procedural requirements of the legislation. Thus there is good reason to hope that all developing countries in this hemisphere will be able to benefit from our system of generalized tariff preferences when it actually comes into effect.

Implementation of Preference System

Let me turn now to the technical implementation of our preference system. Despite the complexity of the legislation we are moving promptly to put it into effect. I had hoped to be able to present to you today a list of beneficiaries and a list of products to be considered for preferential treatment. We may still be able to do so before the week is out.

We fully expect that all countries represented here, with the exception of Venezuela and Ecuador, are likely to be designated in the initial listing as beneficiaries.

Apart from the apparent exclusion of OPEC members, we have perceived a wide-

spread apprehension that the cartel provision of the Trade Act may be applied to Latin American countries which are members of or are contemplating membership in other producer organizations. The legislative history of the Trade Act makes it clear that this provision applies only to countries which participate in actions involving vital materials which cause serious disruption of the world economy. We do not consider this provision to be an impediment to legitimate economic action by raw-material-producing countries.

I should caution delegates here, however, that a determination that an action by a producer association is not disruptive of the world economy and does not therefore require a withdrawal of GSP [generalized system of preferences] beneficiary status should not be interpreted as a U.S. endorsement of such an action. We reserve the right to:

—Press our legitimate concerns through normal diplomatic channels;

—Defend ourselves against such egregious actions as politically motivated embargoes; and

—Argue for and seek cooperative negotiated bilateral or multilateral solutions to mutual problems, as opposed to unilateral measures.

As a brief statement of the U.S. position on commodity policy, I can do no better than quote Secretary Kissinger. He said in Houston on March 1:

We strongly favor a world trading system which meets the economic needs of both consumers and producers. Unilateral producer or unilateral consumer actions must not determine the equilibrium. A dialogue between them on commodity issues is therefore essential.

The nationalization provision of the Trade Act, which parallels such acts as the Hickenlooper and Gonzalez amendments which cut off aid in the event of nationalization without adequate and timely compensation, has also been a source of concern in Latin America. This provision provides that in the case of a nationalization, a written determination

must be furnished to Congress if the dispute has been resolved, that good-faith negotiations are in progress or that the country in question is otherwise taking steps to comply with international law, or that the matter has been submitted to arbitration. Since the passage of the Trade Act, the Administration has examined all outstanding investment disputes in the light of this provision. In all cases considered to date involving countries of this hemisphere, we were able to make the required determinations which permit the designation of these countries as beneficiaries.

Very shortly we will be sending a list of products proposed for preferential tariff treatment to the International Trade Commission. This list reflects a thorough and sympathetic consideration of the suggestions and requests made by a number of Latin American countries both bilaterally and through the Special Committee for Consultation and Negotiation. The list includes a broad range of manufactures and semi-manufactures and selected lists of agricultural and primary industrial products. These selected lists are expected to be significantly larger both in terms of the number of items and trade coverage than the illustrative list which the United States prepared in 1970. The studies of the OAS Secretariat on the probable impact of our preference system on Latin America are based on these 1970 lists and consequently may not fully reflect the potential benefits to be derived from our preference system.

Import-Sensitive Items

A major concern of governments represented here is the exclusion of import-sensitive items. Some are explicitly excluded by the act; others would be excluded only upon a determination by the President that they are import sensitive. It is our intention to refer all manufactures and semimanufactures to the International Trade Commission for consideration except textiles, footwear, watches, import-sensitive steel, and articles subject to

import relief and national security actions. Presidential determinations as to what additional items are import sensitive—import-sensitive glass and electronics items are explicitly excluded from GSP—will be made only after the advice on the economic impact on domestic producers given by the International Trade Commission is reviewed.

The Trade Act provides that the President should bear in mind three broad considerations when deciding to use the authority to implement GSP. These considerations are:

—The impact on the economic development of developing countries;

—Action being taken by other major developed countries; and

—The impact on domestic producers.

The United States elected not to apply a system of global ceilings or quotas which limit the overall amount of preferential imports of any product. Furthermore, our GSP will in every case result in duty-free entry for the designated products of beneficiary countries. However, no one can realistically expect that U.S. producers should be required to renounce their economic interests and those of their employees by unconditional inclusion of truly import-sensitive products in our preference system. Tariff reductions on most of the items excluded from preferences will, however, be considered in the context of the multilateral trade negotiations, a subject to which I will turn very shortly.

Mr. Chairman, we realize that the concerns of many delegations here extend beyond whether or not their countries are initially designated as beneficiaries of our preference system. I have heard the beneficiary provisions described as a sword of Damocles which may drop at any moment. I have heard complaints that these provisions constitute a demand for reciprocal treatment whereas GSP is supposed to be nonreciprocal.

We do not see these provisions as a request for reciprocity in the sense which that word conveys in trade negotiations. What they reflect is a natural belief that countries which receive special advantages in the U.S.

market should recognize a certain minimum degree of mutuality in their economic relations with the United States. In the absence of such mutuality, international economic problems in this age of interdependence cannot be resolved.

We have attempted to deal with the concerns noted above in a pragmatic manner taking into account our legal requirements. I can only urge the other countries represented here to respond in a similar way.

Simplicity and Flexibility of System

I have until now concentrated on the more troublesome of the GSP provisions because these are your primary concerns and they should be addressed. My own concern, however, is that preoccupations with the country and product restrictions of GSP have obscured the truly positive features of the legislation as a whole and the GSP provisions in particular. I will comment on only two of the latter: the simplicity of our preference system once in operation and the special features which promote export growth and diversification.

The legislative process has been lengthy and complex, and the implementation procedures are also very time consuming and complicated. Only in this way, however, is it possible for all interests to be taken into account. Once operating, however, our GSP will be quite simple. The virtue of this simplicity is that it is more easily understood by exporters in your countries. The preference system is likely, therefore, to be more effectively utilized. For example:

—All preferential treatment will be duty free;

—A single list of beneficiaries will apply to all categories of products; in other words, there are no special regimes for certain products or countries;

—Instead of global ceilings which vary from product to product, there will be uniform ceilings on the amount of preferential imports of any one item from any one country; and

—A single, quite reasonable, value-added criterion will apply in almost all cases.

Second, we believe that our system is well designed to promote export growth and diversification in the developing countries. The competitive-need ceilings are quite high, when compared with the tariff quotas of the European Community and Japanese systems. Moreover, the ceilings were modified in the Senate, in part in response to requests from Latin American countries, to make them more flexible. Imports of a single article from a single developing country now exceed \$25 million in only a handful of cases. Where the ceilings do operate they encourage not only a sharing of benefits among developing countries but export diversification within any one country.

Benefits of Overall Trade Liberalization

A fundamental objective of the Trade Act is to use trade to promote the economic growth of developing countries and to expand mutual market opportunities between the United States and the developing countries. Latin American countries in general have concentrated their attention on the legislative authority for generalized preferences. This is understandable since the benefits of preferences will begin to flow relatively quickly while the results of the multilateral trade negotiations still seem distant and uncertain.

Nevertheless we have stressed the importance of the authority contained in the act for the United States to enter into the current round of multilateral trade negotiations. We consider this authority to be of greater significance over the longer term than that of GSP. We are concerned that these other provisions, which can be expected to yield significant benefits for the trade of Latin American countries, have been overlooked. Even more disturbing are indications we have received from some countries that they consider these provisions will be applied in a protectionist way.

Behind the difference in emphasis lies a

fundamental difference in perception. Our law represents, in essence, a grant of authority by the Congress, in which the authority rests under the Constitution, to the President. If I may speak very frankly, Mr. Chairman, I feel sure that if my colleagues here will really ponder this important fact in the context of the U.S. constitutional system they will recognize why it is essential that the Congress, in giving such vast powers to the President to negotiate tariff reductions, must also assure itself that the President is not required to exercise those powers to the detriment of the congressional constituencies. We believe that the trade-negotiating authority should be looked upon in this way.

We consider generalized preferences a temporary measure designed to facilitate more active participation by developing countries in all sectors of international trade. Many developing countries believe that generalized preferences should be a more permanent institution. As a consequence of that interpretation, many developing countries tend to consider overall trade liberalization as a threat to the benefits which they enjoy or expect to enjoy under GSP.

I can only reiterate our view that generalized preferences are temporary and non-binding. Moreover, we believe that developing as well as developed countries have more to gain from the continued movement toward a more open international trading system than from a slide backward into protectionism, which would, especially in these difficult times, attend even a standstill in that movement. In addition, it is noteworthy that all the major preference systems have quantitative ceilings which trigger a return to ordinary duty rates and that many sensitive items are now and may well continue to be excluded from preferences. We therefore believe it is in the interest of developing countries to seek binding concessions in the trade negotiations on all items of interest to them, including items subject to preferences.

Many of your governments have brought to our attention the fact that the Trade Act makes no reference to the Tokyo Declara-

tion.¹ The Trade Act does nevertheless recognize as one of its specific objectives the need to enter into trade agreements which promote, inter alia, the economic growth of developing countries. The Trade Act does give us the authority to carry out the commitments made to the developing countries in the Tokyo Declaration, to which we continue to adhere.

Negotiating Authorities Under the Trade Act

I would in this connection like to outline briefly what I consider to be the most important negotiating authorities. I hope there will be time to go into as much detail as you may wish during the working groups.

The Trade Act authorizes the reduction to zero of duties now at 5 percent *ad valorem* or less and permits cuts of up to 60 percent on rates above the 5 percent level. This mandate is the largest in percentage terms that has ever been delegated to U.S. negotiators, and it puts the United States in a position to participate with other countries in a substantial reduction of high and moderate duties and complete elimination of low duties. As the United States indicated at the February 11 meeting of the Trade Negotiations Committee in Geneva, we intend to make maximum possible use of our tariff-negotiating authority to grant concessions on products of special interest to the developing countries.

The Trade Act also contains unprecedented authority to enter into agreements on non-tariff barriers (NTB's), subject to expeditious approval by Congress. U.S. negotiators have already indicated that the United States would like to give priority attention to liberalization of trade barriers resulting from standards, subsidies, and countervailing duties and government procurement practices, all of which can adversely affect

the trade of the United States and Latin American countries.

The potential benefit to developing countries of removal of these barriers is clear. Of particular interest in connection with these nontariff-barrier negotiations is the provision which permits the President to differentiate between countries and categories of countries, such as developing and industrialized, for the purpose of determining benefits and obligations under NTB agreements. We must all recognize of course that working out such arrangements will not be simple and will require close cooperation.

Easing Adjustment to Import Competition

A liberalized international trading system—including provision for greater access by developing countries to the markets of industrialized countries—must go hand in hand with provision for effective domestic adjustment to new competitive conditions. Both tariff preferences and negotiated tariff reductions have less value if safeguards, by which I mean escape clause actions such as quotas or tariff increases in relief of a particular domestic industry, are repeatedly invoked. Title II of the Trade Act establishes an improved program of adjustment assistance for U.S. workers, firms, and communities affected by imports. These improved adjustment measures provide the necessary domestic underpinning for our being able to enter into negotiations leading to the reduction of trade barriers.

In addition, however, the development of an effective multilateral safeguard system to ease the impact of adjustment to import competition should be an essential element of the multilateral trade negotiations. Adjustment assistance is designed to permit longrun structural changes. Also needed as a precondition to serious attempts to reduce or dismantle trade barriers are effective temporary measures to prevent immediate and serious injury caused by imports.

The Trade Act revises the import relief provisions of the 1962 act, which were found

¹ For text of the declaration, approved at Tokyo on Sept. 14, 1973, by a ministerial meeting of the Contracting Parties to the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT), see BULLETIN of Oct. 8, 1973, p. 450.

in practice to be too stringent. This should not be interpreted as protectionist but, rather, as providing the basis for far-reaching trade expansion. Import relief is to be given only temporarily in cases where there is serious injury for which imports are deemed to be a substantial cause. At the same time we recognize the need for enough multilateral discipline to prevent unwarranted action which negates benefits achieved in the negotiations.

Export Subsidies and Countervailing Duties

The Trade Act incorporates significant changes in the U.S. countervailing-duty law. These reflect the desire of Congress to resolve cases more expeditiously, recognize the potentially adverse effect that countervailing-duty actions could have on the multilateral trade negotiations, and underscore our desire to develop clearer agreed international rules concerning the use of export subsidies.

In the interest of negotiating successful NTB agreements, the act gives the Secretary of the Treasury limited discretion to refrain—until early 1979—from imposing countervailing duties provided certain specific conditions are met in each case. While we anticipate that this authority will be used only in a limited number of cases, we believe it can be useful in facilitating international agreement on the dual problem of subsidies and countervailing duties.

We are hopeful that an international code of conduct can be negotiated on this issue in the multilateral trade negotiations. We recognize the desire of many developing countries that such a code provide for differential treatment for them.

The Trade Act directs the President to take action to strengthen the principles of a fair and nondiscriminatory trading system including those embodied in the GATT [General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade]. Latin American countries share with the United States a common interest in negotiating revisions of goals and procedures embodied in the GATT to take account of current eco-

omic realities. We look forward to improving the trading system in a way which will provide for the constructive and permanent involvement of the Latin American countries.

The trade negotiations will help countries to review their own trade barriers which can constitute formidable obstacles to the national development of their own human and natural resources. I urge you both in this spirit and in keeping with the give-and-take of the bargaining process to come to these negotiations with some idea of contributions which your countries can make consistent with the Tokyo Declaration.

The Trade Act is only a structure of authorities and objectives, a structure which paves the way for action. The structure is important, but the intentions of the government which utilizes those authorities and works for the objectives is more important.

The United States is strongly committed to an open world trading system. We firmly believe that a liberal and nondiscriminatory world trading system is in all our interests. Passage of the Trade Act at this time of serious international economic difficulties for all countries should be convincing evidence of these commitments and beliefs.

We also are convinced that economic interdependence is a central fact of international and hemispheric relations. However meritorious our intentions, we cannot succeed without the cooperation of our trading partners.

Over the past years we have stressed time and time again the U.S. desire to work closely with the Latin American countries during the trade negotiations. We are ready to coordinate our positions with you in the trade negotiations and to work with your representatives in Geneva on as formal or as informal a basis as you wish.

We intend to be responsive to your needs and objectives. In return we ask that you consider our interests. A careful reading of the Trade Act should convince you that we are both willing and able to meet you more than halfway.

I am honored to head the U.S. delegation to this major meeting of the Inter-American Economic and Social Council. It has been a pleasure to renew acquaintances made in Quito last November and meet for the first time other distinguished delegates to this conference.

Our purpose in gathering is timely and serious. Today the world confronts an unprecedented challenge as it seeks to define new economic relationships. Governments are searching for cooperative solutions to such acute problems as food, population, trade, energy, law of the sea, and industrial development. Within our own hemisphere, we are attempting to fashion new working relationships reflecting the growing interdependence among ourselves and with other nations of the world.

This meeting is an integral part of the regional and world dialogue. Our task is to use this forum to achieve a more equitable, progressive, and stable economic and social order.

At Houston on March 1, Secretary of State Kissinger set forth three objectives of U.S. policy toward Latin America, which guide our delegation:

—To promote with our friends a new spirit of communication tempered by realism, elevated by hope, and free of distrust, despair, or resentment;

—To find new ways to combine our efforts in the political, economic, and social development of the hemisphere; and

—To recognize that the global dialogue between the developed and less developed nations requires answers that will be difficult to find anywhere if we do not find them in the Western Hemisphere.

Interdependence—or mutual dependence— is especially pronounced in this hemisphere. Each of our countries is interlocked in the world economy. We have seen how the shock waves of inflation and recession have spread through the world and have affected all of us.

The Inter-American Economic and Social Council provides a unique opportunity for a high-level examination of some of the key issues of interdependence which we confront

today. We have a common responsibility to ascertain the facts and clarify the issues as we deal with the important items on the agenda.

Trade Policy Objectives

Let me begin with the Trade Act, which I believe to be a much misunderstood issue.

We all recognize that the Geneva multilateral trade negotiations are vital to the health of the international economy. A more open trading system will allow our economies to maximize their productive potential and share equitably in the growth of the world economy. Without serious and productive global trade negotiations, the temptation for each country to seek a unilateral solution to its economic and trading problems may become irresistible. Without a strong and viable world economy, none of us will be able to meet our trade and development objectives.

With these factors in mind, the Administration sought legislation from our Congress enabling us to enter into a new round of trade negotiations. President Ford signed the Trade Act of 1974 on January 3 of this year. We can now begin to work constructively and positively toward an increasingly just and open world trading system.

I am keenly aware of the concern that certain sections of the Trade Act have caused in some Latin American countries. This is one reason my delegation welcomes this meeting and the coming meeting of the General Assembly of the Organization of American States.

We believe that a review of our trade objectives and a thorough examination of the act will lead to a realization that at least some of your concerns are unwarranted.

First, let me reassure you that we are firm in our resolve to implement the Tokyo Declaration with its special consideration for the needs of the developing countries. There is a specific mandate in the Trade Act giving special consideration to developing country interests. We do not expect full reciprocity from the developing countries for concessions we make in the course of the negotiations. We do expect, however, that all coun-

tries will contribute to building a new world trading system in proportion to their levels of development.

We hope the Geneva negotiations will resolve some of the outstanding problems in international trade. For example, if the negotiations produce an effective international code on export subsidies, problems that your countries might have with countervailing duties will become more manageable. We are willing to work together with you, both in Geneva and in the OAS Special Committee for Consultation and Negotiation, to find a satisfactory solution on this and other trade issues.

The Trade Act also gives us the authority to implement a generalized system of tariff preferences for our imports from developing countries. President Ford will soon issue an Executive order designating beneficiary countries. He will then send a proposed list of products for duty-free treatment to the International Trade Commission for public hearings and recommendations. As you know, this proposed list of products was developed in close consultation with your countries. It is a good list which contains a broad range of manufactures as well as some agricultural and primary industrial products.

We are keenly aware of another aspect which has drawn your criticism. President Ford and Secretary Kissinger have personally expressed concern over the rigidities in our Trade Act which would exclude Venezuela and Ecuador from participation in our system of preferences. As Secretary Kissinger said in Houston:

The Administration supports the purpose of the various bills which have been introduced into the Congress . . . to modify the provisions of the Trade Act which involve Venezuela and Ecuador.

We have now completed a series of consultations with the key members of the Senate Finance and House Ways and Means Committees to seek an equitable solution to this problem. Based on these consultations, we expect an early decision on further actions to solve this problem. In any event, we hope to resolve the question well before our system of preferences goes into effect this fall.

U.S. Approach to Commodity Problems

Let me now turn to another important concern of economic interdependence; namely, price and supply of the basic commodities so important to hemispheric trade. Increased pressures on raw material supplies over the past several years ultimately led to shortages and to prices that were not sustainable. Now, with a downturn in the world economy, we are experiencing a sharp fall in demand and prices, with consequent balance-of-payments problems for those countries most dependent on commodity exports other than petroleum products.

Recent events in commodity availabilities and prices have not altered the basic U.S. belief that market forces of supply and demand, when allowed to operate freely, are the best allocator of resources.

This is not to say we approach commodity problems with a closed mind. There may be flaws in the operation of the market system for a particular commodity, or the market may not be allowed to work at all in some instances. We believe, however, that we should attempt to create an atmosphere in which the free market forces can operate effectively, to the greatest extent possible.

We share a common goal in seeking new approaches serving the long-term interests of both producers and consumers. The limits in our Trade Act on who receives the benefits of the U.S. system of tariff preferences are directed only against those groups of countries which act in ways disruptive of the world economy.

We can benefit from earlier cooperative efforts to identify areas in which the self-interest of commodity producer and consumer must, in the longer term, become mutual interest. The London working sessions on drafting a new international coffee agreement demonstrate a real awareness of the need for shared interests in any effort at commodity stabilization.

The Promise of More Abundant Food

The third major subject on which I wish to comment this afternoon is food. This hemisphere can make a far greater contri-

bution to solving the worldwide food crisis. The United States has long been a major food exporter, but Latin America clearly possesses enormous and undeveloped agricultural potential. Developing this potential would mean for your countries higher farm incomes, slowing the population shift to the hard-pressed cities, and improved nutrition for all.

With effective use of new technology, Latin America could play a major role in meeting the food deficits of Africa, Asia, and Europe.

Some of this technology is already available but is not reaching the people who need it. It must be spread throughout the hemisphere. More research is necessary, not only to develop improved methods of cultivation and food varieties but also to increase the efficiency of the distribution system and reduce waste.

The challenge of food cannot be overcome by any nation in isolation.

Secretary Kissinger recently proposed new cooperative efforts to increase food production in the hemisphere, in a complementary effort to the global undertaking begun at the World Food Conference in Rome.

Our suggestion that an agricultural consultative group be established under the auspices of the Inter-American Development Bank could be a key element in this effort. The United States also supports the proposal on the agenda of this meeting for a specialized conference on food with the Inter-American Institute of Agricultural Sciences.

In each of the areas I have indicated—trade, commodities, and food—the United States is taking action or is prepared to take action in cooperation with you to meet the challenge of interdependence. The United States recognizes that its economic capacity gives it special responsibilities. We are willing to walk the extra mile to make interdependence a source of peace and prosperity rather than a cause of weakness and strife. We expect that other nations are also prepared to take our concerns into account.

We have come to an important point in our labors. The initial exchange of views and study of documentation is drawing to an end.

We have the responsibility, in drawing conclusions and in framing policy recommendations, to base them on a balanced and careful consideration of the issues.

I urge you, in considering the Trade Act, to take into account the benefits and the long-range significance of this legislation to the development process and to the future of the world economy.

We hope that this conference will make a constructive step forward in realizing the potential for hemispheric cooperation in trade and other fields. Secretary Kissinger will continue discussion of these issues on his South American trip. When the OAS General Assembly meets in May, we hope all of us will be in a strengthened position to address our mutual problems of interdependence.

President Ford Designates Countries for Generalized Tariff Preferences

Following are texts of a Department statement issued on March 24 and an Executive order signed by President Ford that day.

DEPARTMENT STATEMENT

Press release 169 dated March 24

President Ford on March 24 signed an Executive order designating 89 countries and 43 dependent territories as beneficiary developing countries for the purpose of participating in the new U.S. system of generalized tariff preferences. Issuance of this Executive order will permit the publication in the Federal Register and the transmittal to the International Trade Commission of a list of articles to be considered for preferential tariff treatment in the U.S. market.

The Trade Act of 1974 authorizes the President to join with 18 other developed countries in implementing a generalized system of preferences (GSP). The U.S. system will provide duty-free treatment, within certain specified limits, for imports of a broad range of manufactures and semimanufactures and of selected agricultural and pri-

mary industrial products from developing countries for a period of up to 10 years, for the purpose of stimulating their economic development and improving U.S. economic relationships with them.

An important U.S. foreign policy objective is to facilitate the economic development of less developed nations. Tariff preferences will provide additional export opportunities to these countries and encourage them to shift from reliance on production and export of agricultural and primary industrial products to more broadly based industrial growth. Implementation of a system of tariff preferences is particularly important to the U.S. policy of expanded trade relations with the developing countries in this hemisphere as well as those in other parts of the world. Also, two-way trade tends to expand as nations move up the ladder of production and strengthen their economies. U.S. trade should therefore also benefit.

The designation of beneficiary countries and the publication of potentially eligible articles are required procedural steps in implementing the preference system. During the next several months, the International Trade Commission (ITC, formerly the Tariff Commission) will hold public hearings and advise the President with respect to the probable domestic economic impact of granting preferences for the articles under consideration. The Administration also will hold public hearings concerning the product coverage of the preference system.

The Trade Act prohibits the granting of preferences to articles which the President determines to be import sensitive, as well as several defined categories of import-sensitive articles. The list now to be published contains all manufactures and semimanufactures except textiles, footwear, watches, import-sensitive steel, and articles subject to import relief and national security actions. In addition to the products listed above, import-sensitive glass and electronics items are explicitly excluded by law from GSP. Administration decisions as to what products, in addition to those now excluded from the list, may be import sensitive will be made following the public hearings and receipt of advice

from the International Trade Commission. Any article on the list may be removed by the Administration at that time.

In addition to designating beneficiary countries, the Executive order lists 24 other countries whose eligibility is under active consideration and requests ITC consideration of the impact of duty-free import of articles under consideration from those countries as well. This list includes all members of the Organization of Petroleum Exporting Countries (OPEC) and several other countries which may be affected by the eligibility provisions of the Trade Act which deny participation in the U.S. preference system to countries which engage in such actions as expropriation of U.S. property in violation of international law or which grant more favorable treatment to imports from other developed countries. Communist countries are ineligible for preferences unless they receive most-favored-nation tariff treatment in the U.S. market, are members of the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade and the International Monetary Fund, and are not "dominated or controlled by international Communism."

The President and Secretary Kissinger have expressed concern regarding certain provisions of the GSP authority contained in the Trade Act, particularly those which relate to oil-producing countries. The President announced when signing the Trade Act that: "In the spirit of cooperation with the Congress, I will do my best to work out any necessary accommodations." Consultations between the Administration and the Congress on possible ways to work out such accommodation are making good progress.

TEXT OF EXECUTIVE ORDER 11844¹

DESIGNATION OF BENEFICIARY DEVELOPING COUNTRIES FOR THE GENERALIZED SYSTEM OF PREFERENCES UNDER THE TRADE ACT OF 1974

Title V of the Trade Act of 1974, hereinafter referred to as the Act (Public Law 93-618, 88 Stat. 1978), provides for a Generalized System of Preferences by which eligible articles from a beneficiary developing country may be provided duty-free treatment.

¹ 40 *Fed. Reg.* 13295.

The Act authorizes the President to designate a country as a beneficiary developing country if such country meets the qualifications of the Act. Prior thereto, the President is to notify the House of Representatives and the Senate of his intention to make such designations and of the considerations entering into such decisions. I have so notified the House of Representatives and the Senate with respect to the countries listed in this Executive order.

In order to implement the Generalized System of Preferences, the Trade Act requires (1) designation of beneficiary developing countries, (2) publication and transmission to the International Trade Commission of the lists of articles which will be considered for designation as eligible articles for purposes of generalized preferences, and (3) submission by the International Trade Commission of its advice to the President within six months as to the probable economic effect on domestic producers and consumers of implementing generalized preferences for those listed articles.

Concurrently with publication of those listed articles and transmission thereof to the International Trade Commission for its advice as required by the Act, I also intend to ask the Commission to provide its advice, pursuant to Section 332(g) of the Tariff Act of 1930, as amended (19 U.S.C. 1332), with respect to articles of those countries designated and those which are still under consideration for designation as beneficiary developing countries.

The President is authorized to modify at any time the list of beneficiary developing countries designated herein, and for that purpose there shall be a continuing review of the eligibility of countries to be so designated under the provisions of the Act.

NOW, THEREFORE, by virtue of the authority vested in me by the Trade Act of 1974, and as President of the United States of America, it is hereby ordered as follows:

SECTION 1. The following named countries are designated as beneficiary developing countries for purposes of the Generalized System of Preferences authorized by Title V of the Act:

(a) *Those Responsible for Their Own External Relations.*

Afghanistan	Chad
Argentina	Chile
Bahamas	Colombia
Bahrain	Congo (Brazzaville)
Bangladesh	Costa Rica
Barbados	Dahomey
Bhutan	Dominican Republic
Bolivia	Egypt
Botswana	El Salvador
Brazil	Equatorial Guinea
Burma	Ethiopia
Burundi	Fiji
Cameroon	Gambia
Central African Republic	Ghana
	Grenada

Guatemala	Niger
Guinea	Oman
Guinea Bissau	Pakistan
Guyana	Panama
Haiti	Paraguay
Honduras	Peru
India	Philippines
Ivory Coast	Rwanda
Jamaica	Senegal
Jordan	Sierra Leone
Kenya	Singapore
Khmer Republic	Sri Lanka
Korea, Republic of	Sudan
Laos	Swaziland
Lebanon	Syria
Lesotho	Taiwan
Liberia	Tanzania
Malagasy Republic	Thailand
Malawi	Togo
Malaysia	Tonga
Maldiv Islands	Trinidad and Tobago
Mali	Tunisia
Malta	Upper Volta
Mauritania	Uruguay
Mauritius	Vietnam (South)
Mexico	Western Samoa
Morocco	Yemen Arab Republic
Nauru	Yugoslavia
Nepal	Zaire
Nicaragua	Zambia

(b) *Those for Whom Another Country Is Responsible for Their External Relations.*

Afars and Issas, French Territory of the	Mozambique
Angola	Netherlands Antilles
Anguilla	New Caledonia
Antigua	New Hebrides
Belize	Condominium
Bermuda	Niue
British Indian Ocean Territory	Norfolk Island
British Solomon Islands	Papua New Guinea
Brunei	Pitcairn Island
Cape Verde	Portuguese Timor
Cayman Islands	Saint Christopher-Nevis-Anguilla
Comoro Islands	Saint Helena
Cook Islands	Saint Lucia
Dominica	Saint Vincent
Falkland Islands (Malvinas) and Dependencies	Sao Tome and Principe
French Polynesia	Seychelles
Gibraltar	Spanish Sahara
Gilbert and Ellice Islands	Surinam
Heard Island and McDonald Island	Tokelau Islands
Macao	Trust Territory of the Pacific Islands
Montserrat	Turks and Caicos Islands
	Virgin Islands, British
	Wallis and Futuna Islands

SEC. 2. The following named countries are identified as under consideration for designation as beneficiary developing countries in accordance with the criteria set forth in Title V of the Act:

Algeria	Yemen, Peoples' Democratic Republic of
Cyprus	Portugal
Ecuador	Romania
Gabon	Qatar
Greece	Saudi Arabia
Hong Kong	Somalia
Indonesia	Spain
Iran	Turkey
Iraq	Uganda
Israel	United Arab Emirates
Kuwait	Venezuela
Libya	
Nigeria	



THE WHITE HOUSE, March 24, 1975.

Administration of the Trade Agreements Program

AN EXECUTIVE ORDER¹

By virtue of the authority vested in me by the Trade Act of 1974, hereinafter referred to as the Act (Public Law 93-618, 88 Stat. 1978), the Trade Expansion Act of 1962, as amended (19 U.S.C. 1801), Section 350 of the Tariff Act of 1930, as amended (19 U.S.C. 1351), and Section 301 of Title 3 of the United States Code, and as President of the United States, it is hereby ordered as follows:

SECTION 1. *The Trade Agreements Program.* The "trade agreements program" includes all activities consisting of, or related to, the negotiation or administration of international agreements which primarily concern trade and which are concluded pursuant to the authority vested in the President by the Constitution, Section 350 of the Tariff Act of 1930, as amended, the Trade Expansion Act of 1962, as amended, or the Act.

SEC. 2. *The Special Representative for Trade Negotiations.*

(a) The Special Representative for Trade Negotiations, hereinafter referred to as the Special Representative, in addition to the functions conferred upon him by the Act, including Section 141 thereof, and in addition to the functions and responsibilities set forth in this Order, shall be responsible for such other functions as the President may direct.

(b) The Special Representative, except where otherwise expressly provided by statute, Executive order, or instructions of the President, shall be the chief representative of the United States for each negotiation under the trade agreements program and shall participate in other negotiations which may have a direct and significant impact on trade.

(c) The Special Representative shall prepare, for the President's transmission to Congress, the annual report on the trade agreements program required by Section 163(a) of the Act. At the request of the Special Representative, other agencies shall assist in the preparation of that report.

(d) The Special Representative, except where expressly otherwise provided or prohibited by statute, Executive order, or instructions of the President, shall be responsible for the proper administration of the trade agreements program, and may, as he deems necessary, assign to the head of any Executive agency or body the performance of his duties which are incidental to the administration of the trade agreements program.

(e) The Special Representative shall consult with the Trade Policy Committee in connection with the performance of his functions, including those established or delegated by this Order, and shall, as appropriate, consult with other Federal agencies or bodies. With respect to the performance of his functions under Title IV of the Act, including those established or delegated by this Order, the Special Representative shall also consult with the East-West Foreign Trade Board.

(f) The Special Representative shall be responsible for the preparation and submission of any Proclamation which relates wholly or primarily to the trade agreements program. Any such Proclamation shall be subject to all the provisions of Executive Order No. 11030, as amended, except that such Proclamation need not be submitted to the Director of the Office of Management and Budget.

(g) The Secretary of State shall advise the Special Representative, and the Committee, on the foreign policy implications of any action under the trade agreements program. The Special Representative shall invite appropriate departments to participate in trade negotiations of particular interest to such departments, and the Department of State shall participate in trade negotiations which have a direct and significant impact on foreign policy.

SEC. 3. *The Trade Policy Committee.* (a) As provided by Section 242 of the Trade Expansion Act of 1962 (19 U.S.C. 1872), as amended by Section 602(b) of the Act, there is established the Trade Policy Committee, hereinafter referred to as the Committee. The Committee shall be composed of:

(1) The Special Representative, who shall be Chairman.

¹ No. 11846; 40 Fed. Reg. 14291.

- (2) The Secretary of State.
- (3) The Secretary of the Treasury.
- (4) The Secretary of Defense.
- (5) The Attorney General.
- (6) The Secretary of the Interior.
- (7) The Secretary of Agriculture.
- (8) The Secretary of Commerce.
- (9) The Secretary of Labor.
- (10) The Assistant to the President for Economic Affairs.

(11) The Executive Director of the Council on International Economic Policy.

Each member of the Committee may designate an officer of his agency, whose status is not below that of an Assistant Secretary, to serve in his stead, when he is unable to attend any meetings of the Committee. The Chairman, as he deems appropriate, may invite representatives from other agencies to attend the meetings of the Committee.

(b) The Committee shall have the functions conferred by the Trade Expansion Act of 1962, as amended, upon the inter-agency organization referred to in Section 242 thereof, as amended, the functions delegated to it by the provisions of this Order, and such other functions as the President may from time to time direct. Recommendations and advice of the Committee shall be submitted to the President by the Chairman.

(c) The recommendations made by the Committee under Section 242(b)(1) of the Trade Expansion Act of 1962, as amended, with respect to basic policy issues arising in the administration of the trade agreements program, as approved or modified by the President, shall guide the administration of the trade agreements program. The Special Representative or any other officer who is chief representative of the United States in a negotiation in connection with the trade agreements program shall keep the Committee informed with respect to the status and conduct of negotiations and shall consult with the Committee regarding the basic policy issues arising in the course of negotiations.

(d) Before making recommendations to the President under Section 242(b)(2) of the Trade Expansion Act of 1962, as amended, the Committee shall, through the Special Representative, request the advice of the Adjustment Assistance Coordinating Committee, established by Section 281 of the Act.

(e) The Committee shall advise the President as to what action, if any, he should take under Section 337(g) of the Tariff Act of 1930, as amended by Section 341 of the Act, relating to unfair practices in import trade.

(f) The Trade Expansion Act Advisory Committee established by Section 4 of Executive Order No. 11075 of January 15, 1963, is abolished and all of its records are transferred to the Trade Policy Committee.

SEC. 4. Trade Negotiations Under Title I of the Act.

(a) The functions of the President under Section 102 of the Act concerning notice to, and consultation with, Congress, in connection with agreements on nontariff barriers to, and other distortions of, trade, are hereby delegated to the Special Representative.

(b) The Special Representative, after consultation with the Committee, shall prepare, for the President's transmission to Congress, all proposed legislation and other documents necessary or appropriate for the implementation of, or otherwise required in connection with, trade agreements; provided, however, that where implementation of an agreement on nontariff barriers to, and other distortions of, trade requires a change in a domestic law, the department or agency having the primary interest in the administration of such domestic law shall prepare and transmit to the Special Representative the proposed legislation necessary or appropriate for such implementation.

(c) The functions of the President under Section 131(c) of the Act with respect to advice of the International Trade Commission and under Section 132 of the Act with respect to advice of the departments of the Federal Government and other sources, are delegated to the Special Representative. The functions of the President under Section 133 of the Act with respect to public hearings in connection with certain trade negotiations are delegated to the Special Representative, who shall designate an interagency committee to hold and conduct any such hearings.

(d) The functions of the President under Section 135 of the Act with respect to advisory committees and, notwithstanding the provisions of any other Executive order, the functions of the President under the Federal Advisory Committee Act (86 Stat. 770, 5 U.S.C. App. I), except that of reporting annually to Congress, which are applicable to advisory committees under the Act are delegated to the Special Representative. In establishing and organizing general policy advisory committees or sector advisory committees under Section 135(c) of the Act, the Special Representative shall act through the Secretaries of Commerce, Labor and Agriculture, as appropriate.

(e) The functions of the President with respect to determining ad valorem amounts and equivalents pursuant to Sections 601 (3) and (4) of the Act are hereby delegated to the Special Representative. The International Trade Commission is requested to advise the Special Representative with respect to determining such ad valorem amounts and equivalents. The Special Representative shall seek the advice of the Commission and consult with the Committee with respect to the determination of such ad valorem amounts and equivalents.

(f) Advice of the International Trade Commission under Section 131 of the Act, and other advice or reports by the International Trade Commission to the President or the Special Representative, the release or disclosure of which is not specifically authorized or required by law, shall not be released or disclosed in any manner or to any extent not specifically authorized by the President or by the Special Representative.

SEC. 5. *Import Relief and Market Disruption.*

(a) The Special Representative is authorized to request from the International Trade Commission the information specified in Sections 202(d) and 203(i) (1) and (2) of the Act.

(b) The Secretary of the Treasury, in consultation with the Secretary of Commerce or the Secretary of Agriculture, as appropriate, is authorized to issue, under Section 203(g) of the Act, regulations governing the administration of any quantitative restrictions proclaimed in order to provide import relief and is authorized to issue, under Section 203(g) of the Act or 352(b) of the Trade Expansion Act of 1962, regulations governing the entry, or withdrawal from warehouses for consumption, of articles pursuant to any orderly marketing agreement.

(c) The Secretary of Commerce shall exercise primary responsibility for monitoring imports under any orderly marketing agreement.

SEC. 6. *Unfair Trade Practices.*

(a) The Special Representative, acting through an interagency committee which he shall designate for such purpose, shall provide the opportunity for the presentation of views, under Sections 301(d)(1) and 301(e)(1) of the Act, with respect to unfair or unreasonable foreign trade practices and with respect to the United States response thereto.

(b) The Special Representative shall provide for appropriate public hearings under Section 301(e)(2) of the Act; and, shall issue regulations concerning the filing of requests for, and the conduct of, such hearings.

(c) The Special Representative is authorized to request, pursuant to Section 301(e)(3) of the Act, from the International Trade Commission, its views as to the probable impact on the economy of the United States of any action under Section 301(a) of the Act.

SEC. 7. *East-West Foreign Trade Board.* (a) In accordance with Section 411 of the Act, there is hereby established the East-West Foreign Trade Board, hereinafter referred to as the Board. The Board shall be composed of the following members and such additional members of the Executive branch as the President may designate:

(1) The Secretary of State.

(2) The Secretary of the Treasury.

(3) The Secretary of Agriculture.

(4) The Secretary of Commerce.

(5) The Special Representative for Trade Negotiations.

(6) The Director of the Office of Management and Budget.

(7) The Executive Director of the Council on International Economic Policy.

(8) The President of the Export-Import Bank of the United States.

(9) The Assistant to the President for Economic Affairs.

The President shall designate the Chairman and the Deputy Chairman of the Board. The President may designate an Executive Secretary, who shall be Chairman of a working group which will include membership from the agencies represented on the Board.

(b) The Board shall perform such functions as are required by Section 411 of the Act and such other functions as the President may direct.

(c) The Board is authorized to promulgate such rules and regulations as are necessary or appropriate to carry out its responsibilities under the Act and this Order.

(d) The Secretary of State shall advise the President with respect to determinations required to be made in connection with Sections 402 and 409 of the Act (dealing with freedom of emigration) and Section 403 (dealing with United States personnel missing in action in Southeast Asia), and shall prepare, for the President's transmission to Congress, the reports and other documents required by Sections 402 and 409 of the Act.

(e) The President's Committee on East-West Trade Policy, established by Executive Order No. 11789 of June 25, 1974, as amended by Section 6(d) of Executive Order No. 11808 of September 30, 1974, is abolished and all of its records are transferred to the Board.

SEC. 8. *Generalized System of Preferences.*

(a) The Special Representative, in consultation with the Secretary of State, shall be responsible for the administration of the generalized system of preferences under Title V of the Act.

(b) The Committee, through the Special Representative, shall advise the President as to which countries should be designated as beneficiary developing countries, and as to which articles should be designated as eligible articles for the purposes of the system of generalized preferences.

SEC. 9. *Prior Executive Orders.* (a) Executive Order No. 11789 of June 25, 1974, and Section 6(d) of Executive Order No. 11808 of September 30, 1974, relating to the President's Committee on East-West Trade Policy are hereby revoked.

(b) (1) Sections 5(b), 7, and 8 of Executive Order No. 11075 of January 15, 1963, are hereby revoked effective April 3, 1975; (2) the remainder of Executive Order No. 11075, and Executive Order No. 11106 of April 18, 1963 and Executive Order No. 11113 of June 13, 1963, are hereby revoked.



THE WHITE HOUSE, March 27, 1975.

Foreign Assistance Appropriation Act of 1975 Signed Into Law

Statement by President Ford¹

I have signed H.R. 4592 (the Foreign Assistance and Related Programs Appropriation Act of 1975) [P.L. 94-11, approved Mar. 26] with considerable misgivings. The considerable reductions in overseas assistance programs—which the Congress authorized only three months ago—could prove detrimental to American interests at home and abroad.

The Administration sought appropriations that would reflect the same spirit of constructive compromise that characterized our cooperative efforts in December. I continue to believe that the interests of the United States in an increasingly interdependent community of nations require our purposeful and responsible participation. Such participation is impossible if the Administration's best estimates of a balanced foreign assistance program are subjected to reductions of these drastic dimensions.

I am disappointed that harmful cuts were inflicted in both the development and security assistance sectors. Interdependence applies not only to the present political and economic realities of America's role in the global community but also to the various modes of foreign assistance which we employ in our foreign policy. Programs of a humanitarian or developmental nature cannot be productive if our friends and allies are unable to defend themselves.

In the areas of humanitarian and development assistance, the \$200 million reduction

¹ Issued on Mar. 27 (White House press release).

in food and nutrition funds renders our efforts to alleviate world hunger all the more difficult. The significant reduction in population planning funds will hamper initiatives related to this important factor in the long-term global food and health situation. I deeply regret the action of the Congress in reducing the request for Indochina postwar reconstruction funds by over one-half—from \$939 million to \$440 million. At this crucial time, our friends in Viet-Nam and Cambodia are under heavy attack on the battlefield and must cope with enormous refugee problems.

I am also disappointed that the request for our voluntary contribution to international organizations and programs has been severely reduced. The impact of this reduction will be felt in the lessening of our financial support to the United Nations Development Program. Our deep involvement in the UNDP over the years has been seen by many nations as symbolic of our commitment to work through multilateral as well as bilateral channels to assist the developing world.

In the area of security assistance, I am disappointed in the massive reduction in funding for the military assistance program. The program funds authorized by the Congress would have been barely adequate in terms of supplying needed military materiel to a small group of friendly countries unable to assume a greater financial share of their security burden through credit or cash purchases. However, the appropriation of less than half of this sum has jeopardized these critical programs. Simultaneously cutting its appropriations for foreign military sales credits accentuates the difficulties created by the deep cuts in the military assistance program.

Finally, I am troubled because reductions in the overall quantity and quality of our development and security assistance programs will occur at precisely the time when America's assistance is vitally needed. I fervently hope that the Congress will give urgent attention to the interlocking relationship of America's present problems at home and abroad and provide future funding that will be commensurate with our stated principles and national self-interest.

In this article based on an address he made on February 19 before the Rockland County Rotary Clubs at Bear Mountain, N.Y., Mr. Reich discusses the international dimensions of the Bicentennial commemoration and the importance of people-to-people diplomacy. He also gives suggestions on how community organizations can further international understanding during the Bicentennial.

From Independence to Interdependence—A Bicentennial Challenge

by Alan A. Reich

Deputy Assistant Secretary for Educational and Cultural Affairs

America's Bicentennial commemoration provides a unique opportunity to strengthen ties with other peoples of the world and thus contribute to international mutual understanding.

The Bicentennial commemoration has three major themes—Heritage '76, Festival USA, and Horizons '76. Each has important international implications.

The first, Heritage '76, recalls the ethnic origins and diversity of America. Our way of life owes much to other peoples of the world. Their contributions find rich expression throughout our country. Many ethnic organizations are planning Bicentennial programs linking the United States and their home countries. Reflecting together on our heritage and its meaning will result in significant and constructive international dialogue.

The second theme, Festival USA, suggests the opportunities international visitors have to discover and understand America and our people. The Festival theme is far broader and more meaningful than the view expressed by one foreign visitor on the occasion of our Centennial celebration in 1876. He observed:

The crowds come like sheep, run here, run there, run everywhere. One man start, thousand follow. Nobody see anything, nobody do anything. All rush, tear, push, shout, make plenty noise, say "damn" great many times, get very tired, and go home.

The President, through the Department of State and our embassies, has officially invited other nations to participate in the Bicentennial. There will be cultural, sports, arts, and other attractions both in the United States and abroad which should enhance the appreciation of our respective achievements and societies.

Recently I referred to "our Bicentennial" in a conversation with a Cabinet minister of a nation making plans for the commemoration. He interrupted and noted politely, "The Spirit of '76 belongs to us, too, you know!" His remark made me realize other peoples around the world share with us and hold dear the ideals and values we associate with our Revolutionary period. Other nations have been guided by the American model in establishing their governments. They see the United States as the custodian of democracy. George Washington's words, "The basis of our political system is the right of people to make and to alter their constitutions of government," have had and continue to have worldwide meaning.

Horizons '76, the third theme, is perhaps the most important. It looks to the future. John Adams put it succinctly when he said, "I like the dreams of the future better than the history of the past." The notion of the continuing revolution and all it stands for is captured in the growing awareness that we are interdependent.

If mankind is to survive, we must cooperate. Problems that were national a few years ago are now global. Our neighbors' problems are ours, and vice versa. Improving the quality of life is a worldwide challenge. Problems of population, inflation, food, and the use of resources require cooperative action. Neither we nor our children will have the luxury of working on our domestic problems if we do not succeed in bringing about peaceful cooperation throughout the world during the next few years. Whether we cooperate with our international neighbors because it is good, right, or necessary, we must get on with it while we are improving the quality of life at home.

President Ford stated in an address at Detroit last September:

... a theme of the foreign policy of this Administration is international cooperation in an interdependent world, stressing interdependence.

Secretary Kissinger said last fall at New Delhi:

Our goal is to move toward a world where power blocs and balances are not dominant . . . where countries consider cooperation in the global interest to be in their national interest.

The strengthening of informal relationships on a people-to-people basis helps improve the climate for cooperation in solving these problems which have no national boundaries. The Bicentennial commemoration is relevant not only to the American future but also to the goals and aspirations of mankind.

People-to-People Diplomacy

In a world of constant change, from the diplomat's point of view one of the most profound—and perhaps least understood—changes has been the increasing involvement of individuals everywhere in public affairs. More and more people every day become involved in local and national affairs and also, to an extraordinary degree, in world affairs. We live in an era of people-to-people diplomacy. Concerned citizens and private organizations the world over play key roles in influencing international relations.

Why are people-to-people relations and informal communications activities of concern to the U.S. Department of State? Formal diplomatic channels, of course, are crucial for official business and the resolution of differences between nations. To an unprecedented degree, however, the problems nations confront, the means they choose to solve them, and even the perceptions people of one country have of another, evolve outside official channels. Diplomacy has gone public. Foreign affairs is no longer the exclusive domain of the professional diplomat. Many foreign offices no longer confine themselves to speaking with other foreign offices for peoples; they help and encourage their peoples to speak for themselves across national boundaries. The tone and content of our international relations are set increasingly by the vastly expanded contacts between Americans and other peoples of the world.

This geometric increase in citizen involvement in world affairs has special significance for the diplomat. When people-to-people bonds and networks for two-way communication are fully developed, there will be a greater readiness to seek accommodation and to negotiate. When people know and understand each other and appreciate their differences, likelihood of confrontation diminishes. Prospects for peaceful solutions are enhanced. As Woodrow Wilson said, "When we truly know one another, we can have differences without hating one another." This rationale governs the State Department's interest in the furtherance of meaningful people-to-people interchange.

When you think of the Department's conduct of our international affairs, people-to-people diplomacy and exchange-of-persons programs may not come immediately to mind. It is nonetheless a significant Department activity carried out with 126 nations. The job of the Bureau of Educational and Cultural Affairs is to use its resources to reinforce the work of American individuals and organizations who want to help construct the foundation of better relationships with the rest of the world. The Bureau also coor-

dinates, as necessary, the activities of other government agencies with international exchange programs in such fields as health, education, social welfare, transportation, agriculture, military training, and urban planning.

There are several major elements in this government-sponsored cultural relations program. Annually, some 5,000 professors, lecturers, and scholars are exchanged to and from the United States. The international visitor program brings to this country about 1,500 foreign leaders and potential leaders annually for orientation tours of 4-6 weeks' duration. We send abroad several leading performing arts and sports groups as well as some 150 U.S. lecturers annually for brief lecture tours.

International Dimensions of the Bicentennial

The three Bicentennial themes were selected to provide for involvement of all our states, communities, and people. There will be no *single* national focus in one city. In addition to the American Revolution Bicentennial Administration in Washington and the 10 regional offices, each state has its own commission. Many cities and communities, too, have commissions and active programs.

A number of governments of the world, as well as private individuals and organizations of other nations, have asked the Department of State and the American Revolution Bicentennial Administration for suggestions on how to commemorate the Bicentennial and simultaneously to strengthen ties with the American people. Here are a few examples of Bicentennial projects planned by governments and peoples of other nations:

—Establishment of chairs in American studies in foreign universities.

—Establishment of chairs for studies about other nations in American universities.

—Symphony orchestra tours to the United States.

—National folk group participation in the Smithsonian Folklife Festival and in community festivals throughout the United States.

—Endowment of library collections of Americana, both in the United States and abroad.

—Commissioning of historical books, studies, and films about the American experience.

—Historical and philosophical conferences on American civilization to be held abroad.

—Theater and opera groups, museum collections, and exhibits to tour the United States.

As other nations develop their Bicentennial programs, Americans, too, are incorporating an international dimension in their planning. Many local activities planned by state and community Bicentennial groups involve people of other nations. For instance:

—Operation Sail '76 is a visit of tall-masted sailing vessels from around the world to New York City on July 4, 1976, and to other world ports.

—The World Theatre Festival, a non-profit foundation based in New York, will sponsor appearances of distinguished theatre companies from around the world.

—Utica, N.Y., will hold an ethnic arts festival celebrating America as a conglomerate of peoples. Fourteen nationality groups are expected to participate.

—Numerous international conferences are being planned, such as the world food conference to be held at Iowa University.

—Binational, international exchange, and ethnic organizations are developing new exchange-of-persons programs, such as the Polk County, Nebr., Bicentennial exchange with Japan.

—The American Council of Polish Cultural Clubs is conducting a poster contest on Polish immigration to the United States.

—The American Medical Association is inviting counterpart associations of other countries to attend its 1976 annual convention to review medical contributions to man's well-being over the past 200 years.

—The American Association of Museums is organizing a program for American museums to exhibit foreign contributions to America's development.

—Sister Cities International plans to in-

crease the number of U.S. and foreign cities affiliated in sister city relationships from 1,100 at present to 1,976.

—The American Historical Association is offering a prize to the author of the best historical work on the American Revolution written in a language other than English.

The Bicentennial Challenge

Service clubs and other private organizations are making a significant contribution to international mutual understanding through their people-to-people programs. For example, Rotary's international youth exchange program, its world community service program, and its small-business clinic program have had considerable impact.

Service clubs also contribute to the furtherance of international person-to-person relationships by others in their communities. In visits throughout the United States, I have been impressed with the extent to which service clubs have initiated and developed sister city affiliations, people-to-people exchanges, international hospitality programs, and international activities of local performing arts and sports groups.

I hope community organizations will do more of the same—demonstrating the capacity for commitment of the American people in solving that most important of all human problems, the achievement of a sustained world peace, by sponsoring exchanges, providing community leadership in international programing, helping peoples of other nations become less dependent, and strengthening international ties among key individuals and groups. Specifically, I urge community organizations to undertake in whole or in part the following 12-point program:

1. Expand home hospitality and community orientation programs for international visitors, including professional, business, diplomatic, military, and government leaders.

2. Expand and strengthen exchange programs of youth, cultural, and ethnic organizations.

3. Develop and improve community pro-

grams for foreign students in the United States.

4. Internationalize community involvement by affiliating with an appropriate international organization in cooperation with the U.S. National Commission for UNESCO.

5. Participate directly in and support the international exchange programs of the People-to-People International and of the People-to-People sports, music, handicapped, and other exchange committees.

6. Strengthen or initiate a sister city program or affiliate with a new sister city.

7. Develop programs for strengthening ties with international alumni of area universities and colleges.

8. Invite foreign professional counterparts and students to conferences and seminars.

9. Help expand the international public service activities of U.S. corporations operating internationally.

10. Form international institutional linkages affiliating U.S. and counterpart universities, colleges, hospitals, rehabilitation centers, schools, libraries, and museums for exchange relationships.

11. Establish university chairs of international studies.

12. Maximize the good will generated by insuring public visibility for these activities both here and abroad.

Secretary Kissinger, speaking before the U.N. General Assembly last September, posed the question: "Will our age of interdependence spur joint progress or common disaster?" In our 200 years as a nation we have matured from independence to interdependence. The challenge, the Bicentennial challenge of interdependence, is to increase international mutual understanding. These ties of interdependence should contribute in ways which will not sacrifice private sector initiative, dynamism, and diversity. They will indeed spur joint progress.

Such a Bicentennial program will be in the U.S. national interest and in mankind's interest, too, in providing an improved climate for solving our global problems and in helping to build the human foundations of the structure of peace.

EPA To Be U.S. Information Center for U.N. Environment Program

*Department Announcement*¹

The Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) has been designated as the U.S. information center in the global system established by the United Nations for speedy distribution of environmental data.

Selection of the EPA was made at the suggestion of Dixy Lee Ray, Assistant Secretary of State for Oceans and International Environmental and Scientific Affairs.

"I welcome the opportunity for EPA to play a leadership role in the development of an international environmental information system which will serve the needs of this country as well as provide assistance to other nations within the U.N.," EPA Administrator Russell E. Train said in acknowledging the designation.

The U.N.'s International Referral Service for Sources of Environmental Information, conceived at the 1972 Stockholm Conference on the Environment, has a central office at the headquarters of the United Nations Environment Program (UNEP) in Nairobi. The worldwide network operates through national focal points in each participating country which coordinate efforts for identifying sources of environmental information. They will contribute these sources to a computerized international directory UNEP is compiling. Pertinent sources from this data bank will be supplied upon request to researchers, scholars, managers, technicians, and others who need them.

A committee established by the Department of State provides policy guidance for the service. In addition to EPA, Federal agencies represented on the committee are the Departments of Agriculture, Commerce, Health, Education, and Welfare, Housing and Urban Development, Interior, and State;

¹ Issued on Mar. 27 (text from press release 174).

the National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration; the Council on Environmental Quality; the National Science Foundation; and the Library of Congress.

Delegation of State Governors To Visit U.S.S.R.

Press release 153 dated March 18

A delegation of Governors representing the U.S. National Governors' Conference and headed by Governor Calvin L. Rampton of Utah, chairman of the conference, will visit the Soviet Union for 12 days in May of this year.

The visit, to be made under the U.S.-U.S.S.R. General Agreement on Contacts, Exchanges, and Cooperation, is similar to one made to the U.S.S.R. by another group of Governors in October of 1971. The program is reciprocal. The 1971 trip was followed in May 1974 by a visit to the United States of a group of regional Soviet officials.

Soviet authorities are planning an itinerary which includes trips to Moscow, Leningrad, Kiev, and Tashkent. It is expected that during their stay the Governors will be given an opportunity to discuss with their Soviet counterparts matters of common concern, such as urban development, transportation, environmental control, and agriculture.

This visit is funded by the Department of State's Bureau of Educational and Cultural Affairs, which seeks to promote understanding and strengthened ties between the peoples of the United States and other nations through international exchange programs.

The delegation, in addition to Governor Rampton, will consist of Arch A. Moore, Jr., of West Virginia, Robert D. Ray of Iowa, William L. Waller of Mississippi, Thomas P. Salmon of Vermont, Marvin Mandel of Maryland, Wendell R. Anderson of Minnesota, and Richard F. Kneip of South Dakota.

United States Discusses Role of Industrialization in the Developing Countries

The Second General Conference of the United Nations Industrial Development Organization (UNIDO) was held at Lima March 12-26. Following is a statement made before the conference on March 18 by W. Tapley Bennett, Jr., Deputy U.S. Representative to the United Nations, who was chairman of the U.S. delegation.

USUN press release 26 dated March 28

We meet in the historic and dynamic city of Lima at a time of unprecedented challenge for the international community. Let us also regard it as a time of opportunity. The familiar patterns of international economic relations are changing. Old attitudes seem no longer wholly relevant to our present problems. Although blueprints for the replacement of the international economic system have been offered, the new community remains to be revealed. Only our growing interdependence is certain.

Let me at the outset of my remarks quote a statement made by Secretary of State Kissinger at the beginning of this month which I think is importantly relevant to the work of this conference. He said, on March 1:

The foreign policy of the United States has one overriding goal: to help shape a new structure of international relations which promotes cooperation rather than force; negotiation rather than confrontation; and the positive aspirations of peoples rather than the accumulation of arms by nations.

These are the concerns—the guidelines—of U.S. foreign policy today. We believe these are common concerns shared by us all. We have come to Lima to participate in a constructive dialogue. If this dialogue can

lead to a common resolve, this conference can contribute to the formulation of international policies and can agree on actions that are essential to encourage and support the efforts of the peoples of the developing countries for industrial development.

International economic activities are infinitely more diverse than was the case 30 years ago when the United Nations organization was created. Many of the older industrialized countries account for important new segments of world industrial production and world trade. Many other countries, including many developing countries, have established significant new industrial sectors. The result of this diversification is that nations are today subject to a degree of interdependence in their economic relationships unprecedented in world history. Any new international economic arrangements must take this growing interdependence into account. It requires a new approach to the problems that face us and a new sharing of responsibilities for decisions.

In the past, trade relationships between developed and developing countries were largely based on the exchange of raw materials for finished goods. We have the impression that, in some quarters, the belief exists that the relationship must therefore be an adversary one and that there is reluctance to help the developing countries industrialize because of a desire to maintain the old arrangements.

That is certainly not the position of the United States, and we do not believe it is the position of any country represented at this conference. The United States fully accepts the proposition that industrial development

has a fundamental role to play in improving the quality of life of the peoples of the developing countries. We have not assembled here to debate whether the developing countries should industrialize. The question before us is how they can most effectively and quickly expand the contribution of industry to their economic and social development. The United States is fully committed to assisting in this effort.

Our national experience reinforces the general view that agricultural and industrial development go hand in hand. It is sometimes overlooked that the industrial strength of the United States rests on a powerful agricultural base. The development of these two sectors of industry and agriculture, both nationally and globally, is a forceful expression of interdependence. Agriculture and agro-industrial development cannot be ignored or given second priority without impairing general economic development goals, including industrialization. Quite clearly, agricultural production can increase significantly only with the assistance of many industrial goods.

Agricultural production in the United States has for decades provided a welcome reservoir of foodstuffs available to all the world. Indeed, large areas of the world have been too dependent on the United States for food grains. The World Food Conference at Rome put emphasis on the urgent need for expanding world food production and stressed the interrelationship of agriculture and industry. We hope that the Lima Conference will be similarly successful in setting general guidelines for future development in the industrial field.

To help developing countries find new markets for the products of their industry in the United States, we are in the process of implementing our system of generalized tariff preferences. In the next few days, President Ford will issue an Executive order designating beneficiary countries. At the same time he will announce the list of products on which the U.S. Administration proposes, subject to public hearings and International Trade Commission advice, to eliminate import duties for developing countries

for 10 years. The system is expected to benefit over \$2 billion in existing developing countries' exports and to stimulate a substantial amount of new exports from these countries. President Ford and Secretary Kissinger have expressed concern with respect to certain provisions of the Trade Act, including those which relate to the eligibility of oil-producing countries. Consultations between the Administration and Congress on this issue are making good progress.

The long-awaited generalized system of preferences has not met, nor can it be expected to meet, all of the expectations of developing countries. We are nevertheless of the view that the U.S. system of generalized preferences is significant. It not only will provide additional trade opportunities in the short term, but it is also a substantive expression of our recognition of the need of developing countries for special treatment. It also demonstrates that we do not require or expect precise reciprocity in every case in our trade relations with developing countries.

However, the major significance of the Trade Act of 1974—its overwhelming importance—lies in the fact that it permits the U.S. Government to participate fully in the multilateral trade negotiations. It is our hope that those negotiations will result in substantially larger and permanent trade opportunities and consequently in improved standards of living for all through a more just division of labor. In accordance with the Tokyo Declaration,¹ the trade negotiations are intended not only further to liberalize general world trade but also to obtain additional benefits for the international trade of developing countries in the form of increased foreign exchange earnings.

No issue is more critical today in economic relations between developed and developing countries than that of commodities. With respect to trade in raw materials, the United States, as a principal exporter as well as

¹ For text of the declaration, approved at Tokyo on Sept. 14, 1973, by a ministerial meeting of the Contracting Parties to the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT), see BULLETIN of Oct. 8, 1973, p. 450.

importer of raw materials, is especially sensitive to the aspirations of both producers and consumers.

Abrupt swings in the prices for raw materials are harmful to all. We recognize that developing countries, regardless of their stage of development, have been especially vulnerable to these price fluctuations. We strongly favor a world trading system which meets the needs of both producers and consumers, which provides reliable and adequate export earnings for producers and at the same time assures adequate supplies at reasonable cost for the consumers. Unilateral actions by producers or unilateral actions by consumers will not result in a stable equilibrium. The time has come to consider together how these issues should be resolved, and we are ready to join in a serious effort to find a constructive solution which does justice to the concerns of all parties.

We appreciate that one of the fundamental desires of the developing countries is to develop the capacity to transform an increasing proportion of their own natural resources into finished or semifinished products. We agree with the logic of such a development, and we support it. Indeed, the economics of the situation may well point in this direction more and more frequently in the future. In this context, we would view this as a natural step in the achievement of a mutually beneficial division of labor.

General expansion of economic activity is to be expected in the very near future, following some 18 months of declining production. The production capacity of all nations will be strained by the upcoming recovery. In the short run, therefore, there will be fresh opportunities for industrial production in the developing countries. Beyond that, it is projected that over the next 25 years world population will double. Increases in consumption over that same period must at least keep up with the increase of population. Over the longer period ahead, there is no natural competition between developed and developing countries in meeting the challenges that will be presented by this

vast expansion in demand for goods.

Mr. President, the United States is committed to narrowing the gap between the standards of living of the peoples of the developed and the developing countries. It is our view that the best way to remedy existing inequalities is to increase the wealth and standard of living of the developing countries. Real improvement of living standards can only occur through increases in productivity and expanded opportunities for gainful employment.

The proposal that we work to increase over the next 25 years the proportion of the the world's industrialized goods which are produced by developing countries is completely uncontroversial. It represents the very essence of our task. We are all agreed on it. The present share of 7 percent is obviously distressingly low.

However, I must say in all frankness I am skeptical as to the utility of setting a formal target of this kind. There is no reliable, scientific basis upon which any particular figure could be set. The setting of such a target will neither add to nor subtract from the efforts required on the national, regional, and global levels.

If individual governments wish to indulge in indicative planning, including the setting of targets, that of course is their prerogative. And it can be useful. Today, half of the industrial production of the developing countries comes from five of its members. There is a danger, moreover, that the setting of a global target will obscure the special needs of the most seriously affected countries, the landlocked, and other special categories of developing countries.

For nations such as mine, global economic targets pose particular problems with respect to our participation. The U.S. Government is not in a position to guarantee that its private sector will perform in a way to meet any particular target. Our government does not have—nor does it wish to have—that type of control over our private sector. Neither will many other governments of the more successfully industrialized countries represented here.

The dynamic forces of industrial develop-

ment in the United States have always been largely in our people, or what we call our private sector. Decisions have not been centralized in our government. The overall success of our private industry, which operates under orderly government regulations, in producing more goods for more people has long stood in favorable contrast to other systems. Similarly our major contributions to industrialization of the developing countries have come through transfers of technology, management know-how, and capital by our private enterprises. These resources continue to be available, and the U.S. Government stands ready to facilitate access to them.

At the same time, the participation of our private enterprises in the industrialization of developing countries, whether through direct investment, loans, agreements for the transfer of technology, or management contracts, depends upon their reasonable expectations for the safety of the capital and effort they have invested. Actions by receiving countries, both individually and in international forums, will largely create the climate for the participation of the private sector in the industrialization process. This is a matter with respect to which each country will of course make its own choice, depending on whether it wishes to encourage private enterprise to participate in its industrial development or to discourage it from doing so. While we naturally believe that our own experience in achieving a highly industrialized society has relevance for many developing countries, we fully recognize that each nation must decide on its own path to industrial development in the light of the historical experience of its people, the natural and human resources available to it, and the opportunities or constraints of its geography.

One feature of 20th-century economic developments has been the growth of enterprises known as multinational corporations. Although the activities of multinationals, or transnationals, represent only one feature of a complicated set of transactions which link the economies of nations, it is one which has attracted passionate attention in my country as well as in many other countries represented here.

The effect of the multinational corporation on development and on international relations is not yet fully understood, and it is only natural that a study of this important subject is now underway elsewhere in the U.N. system. One thing is clear—the transnationals have proved themselves effective and rapid conveyors of capital and technical know-how.

At this point I find it interesting to note that today's controversy surrounding multinational corporations has much of the same ring as did the earlier controversy over the process of industrialization itself. I am sure we are all familiar with the literature of the 19th century which pictured industrialization as a threat to traditional values, a despoiler of the countryside, and an affront to the dignity of man. Today the general view of the desirability of industrialization has changed. I believe that we will in time come around to the view that multinational corporations, too, are instruments of production and, like any other instrument, are neither inherently good nor bad. I agree with the statement of the President of our conference, Minister Jiménez de Lucio [Rear Adm. Alberto Jiménez de Lucio, Minister of Industry and Tourism of Peru], in his perceptive and thoughtful address, when he said that foreign investment is neither all good nor all bad. The answer lies in orderly regulation.

The United States fully supports the view that national and international private and public development resources can and should be more fully mobilized and expanded to help the developing countries. Our bilateral and multilateral economic assistance will go forward. In short, my country is prepared to make continuing efforts to assist developing nations to achieve rapid economic development for the benefit of their peoples, despite some serious economic problems at home. All we ask is that the program we support be effective in achieving their development objectives.

Some of the most serious obstacles to development, however, are not international and do not arise from financial need. As many speakers have said here, there are problems

of internal structure and institutional shortcomings. These must be overcome by nations themselves if they are to absorb industrial development expenditures efficiently. Clearly, local entrepreneurs must be given proper incentives. Markets must be increased in size and depth—and here regional agreements can help—but more importantly by national efforts to draw more of the rural and urban population into the market.

One of the important subjects that this conference is called upon to consider is the future role of UNIDO—how it should be organized and what resources should be made available to it.

The question of UNIDO's long-term strategy has occupied our attention since the special international conference of June 1971. The United States continues to support the view of the ad hoc committee that the areas of first-priority attention by UNIDO should be the expansion and improvement of its operational activities. Its program of studies and research should support and reinforce the UNDP [United Nations Development Program] country programming process, as well as improve UNIDO's capability for advising countries on industrial development policies and strategy.

We have noted the suggestions which are before the conference looking to broadening UNIDO's mandate into the field of consultations on world industrial developments, and we are prepared to discuss these ideas during this conference.

We see serious difficulties, however, in the proposal that UNIDO be converted into a specialized agency of the United Nations. We believe that it could be seriously counterproductive to undertake such a major change in the organization's status at this time. It would inherently entail a long and costly

period of transition and uncertainty. The energies of the organization would be absorbed in that process rather than in its primary task of helping the developing countries.

We are now engaged in the task which the General Assembly set for this conference—the drawing up of a declaration on industrial development and a plan of action by member states to advance the industrialization of the developing countries. For this purpose, we have before us draft texts presented by the Group of 77.² We have been closely examining those proposals. We would hope that similar close study will be given by the conference to the paper prepared by Group B, a paper which represents very careful consideration by my country and other members of the developed group.

Mr. President, over the past year the industrialized nations and the Third World have seemed more often in confrontation than in harmony. This, I believe, has often been more apparent than real. The purposes we have in common are far more important than the issues on which we may differ. Extreme rhetorical demands and petulant exchanges in U.N. debates get us nowhere. They impede a true consensus, and they depreciate the value of resolutions. They reduce popular support or the work of the United Nations in my country and elsewhere. Let us try in UNIDO to reduce the gap between language and performance, between doctrine and reality. Let us intensify the process of consultation, cooperation, and negotiation. Our growing interdependence leaves us no choice.

²The conference on Mar. 27 adopted the Lima Declaration and Plan of Action on Industrial Development and Cooperation by a vote of 82 to 1 (U.S.), with 7 abstentions (Belgium, Canada, Federal Republic of Germany, Israel, Italy, Japan, U.K.).

Department Testifies on Preliminary IEA Agreement on Accelerated Development of New Energy Sources

Statement by Thomas O. Enders

Assistant Secretary for Economic and Business Affairs¹

You have asked me to discuss the latest developments in our efforts to develop a comprehensive framework of consumer country cooperation in energy.

In testimony before this committee last December, we described the International Energy Program (IEP) and the creation of the International Energy Agency. The IEA then consisted of 16 countries; New Zealand has since become a member and Norway an associate member.

As we emphasized during those earlier hearings, the International Energy Program represented a commitment by the participating countries to deal with the problems of economic and political vulnerability which have resulted from our excessive dependence on imported oil. The arrangement established under the IEP was designed to bring a prompt reduction in our vulnerability. Through a series of integrated commitments on emergency stockpiles, emergency demand restraint, and the sharing of available oil, it provides:

—A deterrent against future supply interruptions;

—A substantial improvement in our ability

¹ Presented to a joint hearing of the Subcommittees on International Organizations and on International Resources, Food, and Energy of the House Committee on International Relations on Mar. 26. The complete transcript of the hearings will be published by the committee and will be available from the Superintendent of Documents, U.S. Government Printing Office, Washington, D.C. 20402.

to withstand the economic impact of an embargo, should one occur; and

—Assurance that all member countries will come to the assistance of any partner which might be the target of a selective embargo.

However, the emergency program is basically a short-term insurance policy. It does not in itself deal with the problem of excessive dependence on imported oil. Therefore the International Energy Program also provided for the establishment of a long-term cooperative program of energy conservation and the development of new energy sources.

During the past four months we have proceeded to develop within the IEA the basic elements of this long-term program of cooperation. We have also agreed with the other members of the OECD [Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development] to establish a \$25 billion financial safety net to assure that the accumulation of petrodollars does not become an element of financial instability in Western economies. This fund is not an aid mechanism; rather, it will serve as a lender of last resort.

The Governing Board of the IEA agreed in February on the objective of reducing oil imports for the group as a whole by 2 million barrels a day by the end of 1975 below the level we would otherwise have reached. We also agreed to fix similar conservation objectives for the years beyond 1975. The U.S. share of this objective would be 1 million barrels a day, an amount proportionate with

our share of total IEA oil consumption. This is of course contingent upon the others doing their part. The U.S. contribution will of course be dependent on congressional action on the President's energy program.

In addition, we have established in the IEA a formal procedure for review of our individual national conservation programs and an assessment of their effectiveness. Through this cooperative approach, we can reinforce each other's national conservation programs. In addition, we will obtain assurance that the conservation efforts of one country are not offset by the laxness of other consuming countries.

Alternative Energy Development

On March 20, 1975, the IEA Governing Board confirmed a preliminary understanding of the major elements and basic principles of a coordinated system of cooperation in the accelerated development of new sources of energy. This is an essential part of our overall cooperative effort. Energy conservation can play a critical role in limiting our dependence on imported oil, especially over the next few years. But over the longer term, we must develop new sources of energy if we are both to achieve our reduced import dependence objectives and also to sustain a satisfactory rate of economic growth. In addition, the development of new sources of energy is essential to the creation of supply-and-demand conditions which will eventually force a reduction in the world oil price.

Higher oil prices will by themselves bring about important investments in new energy supplies. But the magnitude of the problem is so great that we cannot rely on market forces alone. Governments must act to reinforce and stimulate these market forces if we are to reduce our import dependence and our vulnerability to embargoes and arbitrary price increases.

The preliminary agreement reached in the IEA on a coordinated system of cooperation in the accelerated development of new energy is explicit recognition of this need for governmental action. The coordinated system would consist of three interlinked elements:

—An agreement to encourage and safeguard investment in the bulk of conventional energy sources through the establishment of a common minimum price below which we would not allow imported oil to be sold within our economies;

—A framework of cooperation to provide specific incentives to investment in higher cost energy on a project-by-project basis; and

—Cooperation in energy research and development, including the pooling of national programs in selected projects.

Common Minimum Price for Imported Oil

The first element of this system, agreement on a minimum safeguarded price, is designed to resolve the critical dilemma which we face in the development of new energy sources. As I mentioned previously, the IEA countries have substantial new energy sources which can be developed. However, most of these, such as outer continental shelf oil, Alaskan oil, coal, et cetera, are relatively high cost. Moreover, their development will require enormous capital investments. The OPEC [Organization of Petroleum Exporting Countries] cartel, with production costs averaging some 25 cents per barrel, would clearly have the capability to undercut the development of these alternative sources at will. Thus, unless we provide some level of protection to domestic investors against possible competition from very low-cost imported oil, we risk a shortfall in the investment needed to meet our reduced dependence objectives. Further analysis will be required before this minimum level of price is set. It would be substantially below current world oil prices, although higher than prices prevailing before October 1973.

It is equally important to underline what this minimum import-price agreement will not provide. It will not be a price guarantee for OPEC; rather, it would be a guarantee of minimum protection for domestic investors in IEA countries. Also, it will not provide a floor price for all energy sold domestically; it would apply only to imported oil.

Why is this proposed commitment to a common minimum price for imported oil in

the U.S. interest? First, as I have explained, it will help to assure that we get the investment needed in new energy to bring about over the medium term a sharp shift in the world supply-and-demand balance for oil. Only by making an unequivocal commitment to the accelerated development of alternative sources can we gain sufficient power in the marketplace to assure that OPEC will not be able to arbitrarily manipulate oil prices in the future.

At the same time it will help to equalize energy costs among the industrialized countries. Without an agreement of this type, the United States, which will make a major commitment to the development of relatively expensive energy, would find itself at a competitive disadvantage when the world oil price breaks and the other industrialized countries have the opportunity to import very low-cost oil.

This system of a minimum import price has several advantages over possible alternative schemes to encourage and protect investment in conventional energy sources such as a deficiency-payments mechanism. A deficiency-payments system would impose a massive financial burden on the taxpayer when world oil prices dropped and, by allowing lower prices, would stimulate consumption and imports. In contrast, the minimum safeguarded price mechanism would not only provide protection for new investment and a check on consumption but would also generate additional tax revenues when the world oil price declined.

At this point we are not inclined to try to dictate the policy mechanism which IEA countries might use to fulfill this commitment. We would propose that countries be left free to use a variable levy, import quotas, or other appropriate mechanisms.

Joint Undertakings and R. & D. Projects

The second basic element of the accelerated development system would promote, on a project-by-project basis, joint undertakings in higher cost energy projects. The development of synthetic fuels and other major energy projects, perhaps including some of a

conventional nature, would be fostered under this program. This measure would deal with projects involving large capital and developmental expenditures and would provide IEA countries with the opportunity to participate in each other's programs under agreed rules covering investment, access to technology, and access to production.

The third tier of the system is designed to encourage cooperative projects in research and development on energy. The IEA would assist in identifying and establishing joint R. & D. projects on which countries would pool national efforts. By definition, projects in this third tier would involve expenditures which are not likely to yield immediate returns but which offer significant potential for longrun cost savings or energy breakthroughs. Under this approach we can avoid duplication of effort and rationalize our spending.

Mr. Chairman, the coordinated system for accelerated development should be viewed in its entirety. It is designed to provide a balance of advantage between those countries with huge potential to develop indigenous energy supplies and those which will continue to have to rely on imported oil to meet a substantial portion of their energy requirements.

All consuming countries stand to benefit directly from the development of new energy in other consuming countries. These new energy supplies will impact directly on world supply and demand for OPEC oil and will contribute to the eventual decline in world oil prices. Thus we all have much to gain from cooperation which stimulates the development of new energy.

We will continue to consult closely with the Congress over the coming months on the elaboration of this preliminary understanding. Its implementation would of course require legislative authority in each country. The Administration has already requested legislation, title IX of the Energy Independence Act of 1975, which would provide such implementing authority. We will seek further consultations with the Congress on the manner in which such authority could be granted and used.

Mr. Chairman, we have had many opportunities for false comfort since the oil crisis began: A surplus of oil in the international market last summer because of seasonal factors and price resistance, some signs of undercover price cutting, and pronouncements that the oil cartel was about to break.

But, Mr. Chairman, the oil crisis will not simply go away. We must act to defuse it by bringing our own consumption of oil under control, by developing our own energy supplies, and by encouraging other consuming countries to do likewise. Only in this way can we achieve our two essential objectives: A significant decrease in the international price of oil and substantial U.S. self-sufficiency in energy.

Congressional Documents Relating to Foreign Policy

93d Congress, 2d Session

Improving the Quality of Filberts. Report to accompany H.R. 2933. S. Rept. 93-1414. December 19, 1974. 6 pp.

Minimum Rate Provisions by Nonnational Carriers in the Foreign Commerce of the United States. Report to accompany S. 2576. S. Rept. 93-1426. December 20, 1974. 12 pp.

94th Congress, 1st Session

Notice of Actions Proposed to be Taken Under the Trade Act of 1974. Communication from the President of the United States. January 14, 1975. H. Doc. 94-8. 5 pp.

Proposing a Supplemental Appropriation for Military Assistance, South Vietnamese Forces. Communication from the President of the United States transmitting a proposed supplemental appropriation for military assistance, South Vietnamese forces, and a budget amendment for military assistance for Cambodia in fiscal year 1975. H. Doc. 94-38. January 29, 1975. 2 pp.

Proposed Increase in the Amount of Enriched Uranium Which May Be Distributed to the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA). Report by the Joint Committee on Atomic Energy to accompany S. Con. Res. 13. S. Rept. 94-8. February 13, 1975. 4 pp.

Proposed Increase in the Amount of Enriched Uranium Which May Be Distributed to the European Energy Community (EURATOM). Report by the Joint Committee on Atomic Energy to accompany S. Con. Res. 14. February 13, 1975. S. Rept. 94-9. 6 pp.

Proposed Extension of Existing Research Agreement for Cooperation Between the United States and Israel Concerning Civil Uses of Atomic Energy. Report by the Joint Committee on Atomic Energy to accompany H. Con. Res. 114. H. Rept. 94-8. February 13, 1975. 9 pp.

TREATY INFORMATION

U.S. To Launch Satellites for Indonesia

The Department of State announced on March 26 (press release 171) that the United States and the Republic of Indonesia had that day entered into an agreement under which NASA will launch satellites on a reimbursable basis for the Indonesian Government's Directorate General of Posts and Telecommunications. (For text of the agreement, see press release 171.) The notes concluding the agreement were signed by Dixy Lee Ray, Assistant Secretary of State for Oceans and International Environmental and Scientific Affairs, and Roesmin Nurjadin, Ambassador of the Republic of Indonesia. This agreement was concluded pursuant to the launch policy announced by the President on October 9, 1972, which was developed for the purpose of promoting international cooperation in the peaceful uses of outer space and to make the capabilities of space available for all mankind.

The initial effort under this agreement will be the launch of a communications satellite for domestic use. The satellite is being built in the United States and will be launched by NASA in 1976 by a Delta launch vehicle. It will be placed in geostationary orbit near Indonesia. NASA and the Directorate General of Posts and Telecommunications of the Republic of Indonesia signed a memorandum of understanding which establishes the arrangements under which all launches to be conducted are to be coordinated. The communications satellite launch is the only one presently planned, and the launch contract is

being negotiated and will be signed shortly.

Previous reimbursable launches have been conducted for Canada, the United Kingdom, France, Germany, and the European Space Research Organization. Launches are planned for Japan, Canada, Italy, and ESRO, as well as Indonesia.

Current Actions

MULTILATERAL

Arbitration

Convention on the recognition and enforcement of foreign arbitral awards. Done at New York June 10, 1958. Entered into force June 7, 1959; for the United States December 29, 1970. TIAS 6997.

Accession deposited: Australia, March 26, 1975.

Consular Relations

Vienna convention on consular relations. Done at Vienna April 24, 1963. Entered into force March 19, 1967; for the United States December 24, 1969. TIAS 6820.

Ratification deposited: Lebanon, March 20, 1975.

Cotton

Articles of agreement of International Cotton Institute. Done at Washington January 17, 1966. Entered into force February 23, 1966. TIAS 5964.

Ratification deposited: Spain, March 31, 1975.

Cultural Relations

Constitution of the United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization. Done at London November 16, 1945. Entered into force November 4, 1946. TIAS 1580.

Signatures: Grenada, February 17, 1975; Guinea-Bissau, November 1, 1974; Korea, People's Democratic Republic of, October 18, 1974; San Marino, November 12, 1974.

Acceptances deposited: Grenada, November 29, 1974; Guinea-Bissau, November 1, 1974; Korea, People's Democratic Republic of, October 18, 1974; San Marino, November 12, 1974.

Disputes

Convention on the settlement of investment disputes between states and nationals of other states. Done at Washington March 18, 1965. Entered into force October 14, 1966. TIAS 6090.

Signature: Australia, March 24, 1975.

Program-Carrying Signals—Distribution by Satellite

Convention relating to the distribution of programme-carrying signals transmitted by satellite. Done at Brussels May 21, 1974.¹

Signatures: Argentina, Austria, March 26, 1975.

Space

Convention on international liability for damage caused by space objects. Done at Washington, London, and Moscow March 29, 1972. Entered into force September 1, 1972; for the United States October 9, 1973. TIAS 7762.

Ratification deposited: Senegal, March 26, 1975.

Convention on registration of objects launched into outer space. Opened for signature at New York January 14, 1975.¹

Signatures: Argentina, March 26, 1975; Belgium, March 19, 1975.

Terrorism

Convention to prevent and punish the acts of terrorism taking the form of crimes against persons and related extortion that are of international significance. Signed at Washington February 2, 1971. Entered into force October 16, 1973.²

Ratification deposited: Mexico, March 17, 1975.

Terrorism—Protection of Diplomats

Convention on the prevention and punishment of crimes against internationally protected persons, including diplomatic agents. Done at New York December 14, 1973.¹

Ratification deposited: Hungary, March 26, 1975.

Wheat

Protocol modifying and extending the wheat trade convention (part of the international wheat agreement) 1971 (TIAS 7144). Done at Washington April 2, 1974. Entered into force June 19, 1974, with respect to certain provisions; July 1, 1974, with respect to other provisions. TIAS 7988.

Accession deposited: El Salvador, March 27, 1975.

Women—Political Rights

Convention on the political rights of women. Done at New York March 31, 1953. Entered into force July 7, 1954.²

Signature: Guinea, March 19, 1975.

BILATERAL

Bangladesh

Loan agreement for the Ashuganj fertilizer project, with annex. Signed at Dacca February 12, 1975. Entered into force February 12, 1975.

Canada

Agreement relating to the exchange of information on weather modification activities. Signed at Washington March 26, 1975. Entered into force March 26, 1975.

Haiti

Agreement for sales of agricultural commodities. Signed at Port-au-Prince March 20, 1975. Entered into force March 20, 1975.

¹ Not in force.

² Not in force for the United States.

Indonesia

Agreement concerning the furnishing of launching and associated services by NASA for Indonesian satellites, with annexes. Effected by exchange of notes at Washington March 26, 1975. Entered into force March 26, 1975.

Iran

Agreement extending the agreement of October 6, 1947 (TIAS 1666), as amended and extended, relating to a military mission. Effected by exchange of notes at Tehran July 16, 1974, and March 16, 1975. Entered into force March 16, 1975.

Portugal

Agreement relating to trade in cotton, wool, and man-made fiber textiles and textile products between Macau and the United States, with annex. Effected by exchange of notes at Lisbon March 3, 1975. Entered into force March 3, 1975; effective January 1, 1975.

PUBLICATIONS

GPO Sales Publications

Publications may be ordered by catalog or stock number from the Superintendent of Documents, U.S. Government Printing Office, Washington, D.C. 20402. A 25-percent discount is made on orders for 100 or more copies of any one publication mailed to the same address. Remittances, payable to the Superintendent of Documents, must accompany orders. Prices shown below, which include domestic postage, are subject to change.

Background Notes: Short, factual summaries which describe the people, history, government, economy, and foreign relations of each country. Each contains a map, a list of principal government officials and U.S. diplomatic and consular officers, and a reading list. (A complete set of all Background Notes currently in stock—at least 140—\$21.80; 1-year subscription service for approximately 77 updated or new Notes—\$23.10; plastic binder—\$1.50.) Single copies of those listed below are available at 30¢ each.

Afghanistan	Cat. No. S1.123:AF3	Pub. 7795	7 pp.
Algeria	Cat. No. S1.123:AL3	Pub. 7821	7 pp.
Barbados	Cat. No. S1.123:B23	Pub. 8242	4 pp.
Botswana	Cat. No. S1.123:B65	Pub. 8046	5 pp.
Brazil	Cat. No. S1.123:B73	Pub. 7756	8 pp.
Dahomey	Cat. No. S1.123:D13	Pub. 8308	4 pp.

Scientific and Technological Cooperation. Agreement with the Socialist Federal Republic of Yugoslavia. TIAS 7914. 15 pp. 40¢. (Cat. No. S9.10:7914).

Space Research Program. Agreement with Australia. TIAS 7928. 8 pp. 30¢. (Cat. No. S9.10:7928).

Trade in Cotton, Wool and Man-Made Fiber Textiles. Arrangement with Japan. TIAS 7934. 73 pp. 85¢. (Cat. No. S9.10:7934).

Agricultural Commodities. Agreement with Guinea. TIAS 7942. 21 pp. 40¢. (Cat. No. S9.10:7942).

Cooperation in the Field of Health. Agreement with the Polish People's Republic. TIAS 7943. 13 pp. 30¢. (Cat. No. S9.10:7943).

Development of Agricultural Trade. Joint statement with the Polish People's Republic. TIAS 7944. 9 pp. 30¢. (Cat. No. S9.10:7944).

Second Nam Ngum Development Fund. TIAS 7946. 32 pp. 50¢. (Cat. No. S9.10:7946).

Joint Commission on Economic, Commercial, Scientific, Technological, Educational and Cultural Cooperation. Agreement with India. TIAS 7947. 10 pp. 30¢. (Cat. No. S9.10:7947).

Economic Assistance—Manufacture and Acquisition of Agricultural Inputs. Agreement with Bangladesh. TIAS 7948. 17 pp. 35¢. (Cat. No. S9.10:7948).

Agricultural Commodities. Agreement with Bangladesh. TIAS 7949. 21 pp. 40¢. (Cat. No. S9.10:7949).

Onchocerciasis 1974 Fund. TIAS 7950. 31 pp. 45¢. (Cat. No. S9.10:7950).

Defense—Ballistic Missile Early Warning Station at Fylingdales Moor, Yorkshire. Agreement with the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland amending the agreement of February 15, 1960, as amended. TIAS 7951. 5 pp. 25¢. (Cat. No. S9.10:7951).

DEPARTMENT AND FOREIGN SERVICE

Confirmations

The Senate on March 21 confirmed the following nominations:

Wiley T. Buchanan, Jr., to be Ambassador to Austria.

Donald B. Easum to be Ambassador to the Federal Republic of Nigeria.

Eugene V. McAuliffe to be Ambassador to Hungary.

John E. Reinhardt to be an Assistant Secretary of State [for Public Affairs].

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Press releases may be obtained from the Office of Press Relations, Department of State, Washington, D.C. 20520.

Releases issued prior to March 31 which appear in this issue of the BULLETIN are Nos. 153 of March 18, 169 of March 25, 171 of March 26, and 174 of March 27.

No.	Date	Subject
*177	3/31	McAuliffe sworn in as Ambassador to Hungary (biographic data).
*178	4/1	Mentorial service for Steven A. Haukness.
*179	4/2	Davis sworn in as Assistant Secretary for African Affairs (biographic data).
*180	4/2	Study Groups 10 and 11 of the U.S. National Committee for the CCITT, May 1.
*181	4/3	Cleveland Orchestra tour of Latin America Apr. 13-29.
†182	4/3	U.S.-Romania trade agreement signed.
†183	4/5	Kissinger: News Conference.

* Not printed.

† Held for a later issue of the BULLETIN.

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THE DEPARTMENT OF STATE BULLETIN

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THE DEPARTMENT OF STATE BULLETIN

Vol. LXXII, No. 1870

April 28, 1975

The Department of State BULLETIN, a weekly publication issued by the Office of Media Services, Bureau of Public Affairs, provides the public and interested agencies of the government with information on developments in the field of U.S. foreign relations and on the work of the Department and the Foreign Service.

The BULLETIN includes selected press releases on foreign policy, issued by the White House and the Department, and statements, addresses, and news conferences of the President and the Secretary of State and other officers of the Department, as well as special articles on various phases of international affairs and the functions of the Department. Information is included concerning treaties and international agreements to which the United States is or may become a party and on treaties of general international interest.

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President Ford Reviews U.S. Relations With the Rest of the World

*Address Before a Joint Session of the Congress*¹

Mr. Speaker, Mr. President, distinguished guests, my very good friends in the Congress, and fellow Americans: I stand before you tonight after many agonizing hours and very solemn prayers for guidance by the Almighty.

In my report on the state of the Union in January, I concentrated on two subjects which were uppermost in the minds of the American people—urgent actions for the recovery of our economy and a comprehensive program to make the United States independent of foreign sources of energy. I thank the Congress for the action that it has taken thus far in my response for economic recommendations. I look forward to early approval of a national energy program to meet our country's long-range and emergency needs in the field of energy.

Tonight it is my purpose to review our relations with the rest of the world in the spirit of candor and consultation which I have sought to maintain with my former colleagues and with our countrymen from the time that I took office.

It is the first priority of my Presidency to sustain and strengthen the mutual trust and respect which must exist among Americans and their government if we are to deal successfully with the challenges confronting us both at home and abroad.

The leadership of the United States of America since the end of World War II has sustained and advanced the security, well-being, and freedom of millions of human beings besides ourselves.

Despite some setbacks, despite some mis-

takes, the United States has made peace a real prospect for us and for all nations. I know firsthand that the Congress has been a partner in the development and in the support of American foreign policy which five Presidents before me have carried forward, with changes of course but not of destination.

The course which our country chooses in the world today has never been of greater significance for ourselves as a nation and for all mankind.

We build from a solid foundation.

Our alliances with great industrial democracies in Europe, North America, and Japan remain strong, with a greater degree of consultation and equity than ever before.

With the Soviet Union we have moved across a broad front toward a more stable, if still competitive, relationship. We have begun to control the spiral of strategic nuclear armaments.

After two decades of mutual estrangement, we have achieved an historic opening with the People's Republic of China.

In the best American tradition, we have committed, often with striking success, our influence and good offices to help contain conflicts and settle disputes in many, many regions of the world. We have, for example, helped the parties of the Middle East take the first steps toward living with one another in peace.

We have opened a new dialogue with Latin America, looking toward a healthier hemispheric partnership.

We are developing closer relations with the nations of Africa.

We have exercised international leader-

¹ Made on Apr. 10 (text from Weekly Compilation of Presidential Documents dated Apr. 14).

ship on the great new issues of our interdependent world, such as energy, food, environment, and the law of the sea.

The American people can be proud of what their nation has achieved and helped others to accomplish, but we have from time to time suffered setbacks and disappointments in foreign policy. Some were events over which we had no control; some were difficulties we imposed upon ourselves.

We live in a time of testing and of a time of change. Our world, a world of economic uncertainty, political unrest, and threats to the peace, does not allow us the luxury of abdication or domestic discord.

I recall quite vividly the words of President Truman to the Congress when the United States faced a far greater challenge at the end of the Second World War. If I might quote: "If we falter in our leadership, we may endanger the peace of the world—and we shall surely endanger the welfare of our own Nation."²

President Truman's resolution must guide us today. Our purpose is not to point the finger of blame, but to build upon our many successes, to repair damage where we find it, to recover our balance, to move ahead as a united people. Tonight is a time for straight talk among friends about where we stand and where we are going.

Human Tragedy in Viet-Nam and Cambodia

A vast human tragedy has befallen our friends in Viet-Nam and Cambodia.

Tonight I shall not talk only of obligations arising from legal documents. Who can forget the enormous sacrifices of blood, dedication, and treasure that we made in Viet-Nam?

Under five Presidents and 12 Congresses, the United States was engaged in Indochina. Millions of Americans served, thousands died, and many more were wounded, imprisoned, or lost. Over \$150 billion have been appropriated for that war by the Congress of the United States.

² For President Truman's address before a joint session of the Congress on Mar. 12, 1947, see BULLETIN of Mar. 23, 1947, p. 543.

And after years of effort, we negotiated, under the most difficult circumstances, a settlement which made it possible for us to remove our military forces and bring home with pride our American prisoners. This settlement, if its terms had been adhered to, would have permitted our South Vietnamese ally, with our material and moral support, to maintain its security and rebuild after two decades of war.

The chances for an enduring peace after the last American fighting man left Viet-Nam in 1973 rested on two publicly stated premises: First, that if necessary the United States would help sustain the terms of the Paris accords it signed two years ago; second, that the United States would provide adequate economic and military assistance to South Viet-Nam.

Let us refresh our memories for just a moment. The universal consensus in the United States at that time, late 1972, was that if we could end our own involvement and obtain the release of our prisoners, we would provide adequate material support to South Viet-Nam.

The North Vietnamese, from the moment they signed the Paris accords, systematically violated the cease-fire and other provisions of that agreement. Flagrantly disregarding the ban on the infiltration of troops, the North Vietnamese illegally introduced over 350,000 men into the South. In direct violation of the agreement, they sent in the most modern equipment in massive amounts. Meanwhile, they continued to receive large quantities of supplies and arms from their friends.

In the face of this situation, the United States—torn as it was by the emotions of a decade of war—was unable to respond. We deprived ourselves by law of the ability to enforce the agreement, thus giving North Viet-Nam assurance that it could violate that agreement with impunity. Next, we reduced our economic and arms aid to South Viet-Nam. Finally, we signaled our increasing reluctance to give any support to that nation struggling for its survival.

Encouraged by these developments, the North Vietnamese, in recent months, began

sending even their reserve divisions into South Viet-Nam. Some 20 divisions, virtually their entire army, are now in South Viet-Nam.

The Government of South Viet-Nam, uncertain of further American assistance, hastily ordered a strategic withdrawal to more defensible positions. This extremely difficult maneuver, decided upon without consultations, was poorly executed, hampered by floods of refugees, and thus led to panic. The results are painfully obvious and profoundly moving.

Military and Humanitarian Assistance

In my first public comment on this tragic development, I called for a new sense of national unity and purpose. I said I would not engage in recriminations or attempts to assess the blame.

I reiterate that tonight. In the same spirit, I welcome the statement of the distinguished majority leader of the U.S. Senate earlier this week, and I quote: "It is time for the Congress and the President to work together in the area of foreign as well as domestic policy."

So, let us start afresh. I am here to work with the Congress. In the conduct of foreign affairs, Presidential initiative and ability to act swiftly in emergencies are essential to our national interest.

With respect to North Viet-Nam, I call upon Hanoi—and ask the Congress to join with me in this call—to cease military operations immediately and to honor the terms of the Paris agreement.

The United States is urgently requesting the signatories of the Paris Conference to meet their obligations to use their influence to halt the fighting and to enforce the 1973 accords. Diplomatic notes to this effect have been sent to all members of the Paris Conference, including the Soviet Union and the People's Republic of China.

The situation in South Viet-Nam and Cambodia has reached a critical phase requiring immediate and positive decisions by this government. The options before us are few, and the time is very short:

—On the one hand, the United States could do nothing more; let the Government of South Viet-Nam save itself and what is left of its territory, if it can; let those South Vietnamese civilians who have worked with us for a decade or more save their lives and their families, if they can; in short, shut our eyes and wash our hands of the whole affair, if we can.

—Or, on the other hand, I could ask the Congress for authority to enforce the Paris accords with our troops and our tanks and our aircraft and our artillery and carry the war to the enemy.

There are two narrower options:

—First, stick with my January request that Congress appropriate \$300 million for military assistance for South Viet-Nam and seek additional funds for economic and humanitarian purposes; or

—Increase my requests for both emergency military and humanitarian assistance to levels which, by best estimates, might enable the South Vietnamese to stem the on-rushing aggression, to stabilize the military situation, permit the chance of a negotiated political settlement between the North and South Vietnamese, and if the very worst were to happen, at least allow the orderly evacuation of Americans and endangered South Vietnamese to places of safety.

Let me now state my considerations and my conclusions.

I have received a full report from General Weyand [Gen. Frederick C. Weyand, Chief of Staff, United States Army], whom I sent to Viet-Nam to assess the situation. He advises that the current military situation is very critical but that South Viet-Nam is continuing to defend itself with the resources available. However, he feels that if there is to be any chance of success for their defense plan, South Viet-Nam needs urgently an additional \$722 million in very specific military supplies from the United States.

In my judgment, a stabilization of the military situation offers the best opportunity for a political solution.

I must, of course, as I think each of you

would, consider the safety of nearly 6,000 Americans who remain in South Viet-Nam and tens of thousands of South Vietnamese employees of the U.S. Government, of news agencies, of contractors and businesses, for many years whose lives, with their dependents', are in very grave peril. There are tens of thousands of other South Vietnamese intellectuals, professors, teachers, editors, and opinion leaders who have supported the South Vietnamese cause and the alliance with the United States to whom we have a profound moral obligation.

I am also mindful of our posture toward the rest of the world and particularly of our future relations with the free nations of Asia. These nations must not think for a minute that the United States is pulling out on them or intends to abandon them to aggression.

I have therefore concluded that the national interests of the United States and the cause of world stability require that we continue to give both military and humanitarian assistance to the South Vietnamese.

Assistance to South Viet-Nam at this stage must be swift and adequate. Drift and indecision invite far deeper disaster. The sums I had requested before the major North Vietnamese offensive and the sudden South Vietnamese retreat are obviously inadequate. Halfhearted action would be worse than none. We must act together and act decisively.

I am therefore asking the Congress to appropriate without delay \$722 million for emergency military assistance and an initial sum of \$250 million for economic and humanitarian aid for South Viet-Nam.

The situation in South Viet-Nam is changing very rapidly, and the need for emergency food, medicine, and refugee relief is growing by the hour. I will work with the Congress in the days ahead to develop humanitarian assistance to meet these very pressing needs.

Fundamental decency requires that we do everything in our power to ease the misery and the pain of the monumental human crisis which has befallen the people of Viet-Nam.

Millions have fled in the face of the Communist onslaught and are now homeless and are now destitute.

I hereby pledge in the name of the American people that the United States will make a maximum humanitarian effort to help care for and feed these hopeless victims.

And now I ask the Congress to clarify immediately its restrictions on the use of U.S. military forces in Southeast Asia for the limited purposes of protecting American lives by insuring their evacuation, if this should be necessary. And I also ask prompt revision of the law to cover those Vietnamese to whom we have a very special obligation and whose lives may be endangered should the worst come to pass.

I hope that this authority will never have to be used, but if it is needed, there will be no time for congressional debate.

Because of the gravity of the situation, I ask the Congress to complete action on all of these measures not later than April 19.

In Cambodia, the situation is tragic. The United States and the Cambodian Government have each made major efforts over a long period and through many channels to end that conflict; but because of their military successes, steady external support, and their awareness of American legal restrictions, the Communist side has shown no interest in negotiation, compromise, or a political solution.

And yet, for the past three months, the beleaguered people of Phnom Penh have fought on, hoping against hope that the United States would not desert them but instead provide the arms and ammunition they so badly needed.

I have received a moving letter from the new Acting President of Cambodia, Sautham Khoy, and let me quote it for you:

Dear Mr. President (he wrote), As the American Congress reconvenes to reconsider your urgent request for supplemental assistance for the Khmer Republic, I appeal to you to convey to the American legislators our plea not to deny these vital resources to us, if a nonmilitary solution is to emerge from this tragic five-year-old conflict.

To find a peaceful end to the conflict we need time. I do not know how much time, but we all fully

realize that the agony of the Khmer people cannot and must not go on much longer. However, for the immediate future, we need the rice to feed the hungry and the ammunition and the weapons to defend ourselves against those who want to impose their will by force [of arms]. A denial by the American people of the means for us to carry on will leave us no alternative but inevitably abandoning our search for a solution which will give our citizens some freedom of choice as to their future. For a number of years now, the Cambodian people have placed their trust in America. I cannot believe that this confidence was misplaced and that suddenly America will deny us the means which might give us a chance to find an acceptable solution to our conflict.

This letter speaks for itself. In January, I requested food and ammunition for the brave Cambodians, and I regret to say that, as of this evening, it may be soon too late.

Members of the Congress, my fellow Americans, this moment of tragedy for Indochina is a time of trial for us. It is a time for national resolve.

It has been said that the United States is overextended, that we have too many commitments too far from home, that we must reexamine what our truly vital interests are and shape our strategy to conform to them. I find no fault with this as a theory, but in the real world, such a course must be pursued carefully and in close coordination with solid progress toward overall reduction in worldwide tensions.

We cannot in the meantime abandon our friends while our adversaries support and encourage theirs. We cannot dismantle our defenses, our diplomacy, or our intelligence capability while others increase and strengthen theirs.

Let us put an end to self-inflicted wounds. Let us remember that our national unity is a most priceless asset. Let us deny our adversaries the satisfaction of using Viet-Nam to pit Americans against Americans.

At this moment, the United States must present to the world a united front.

Above all, let's keep events in Southeast Asia in their proper perspective. The security and the progress of hundreds of millions of people everywhere depend importantly on us.

Let no potential adversary believe that our difficulties or our debates mean a slackening of our national will. We will stand by our friends, we will honor our commitments, and we will uphold our country's principles.

The American people know that our strength, our authority, and our leadership have helped prevent a third world war for more than a generation. We will not shrink from this duty in the decades ahead.

Let me now review with you the basic elements of our foreign policy, speaking candidly about our strengths and some of our difficulties.

Relations With Friends in Asia and Europe

We must, first of all, face the fact that what has happened in Indochina has disquieted many of our friends, especially in Asia. We must deal with this situation promptly and firmly. To this end, I have already scheduled meetings with the leaders of Australia, New Zealand, Singapore, and Indonesia, and I expect to meet with the leaders of other Asian countries as well.

A key country in this respect is Japan. The warm welcome I received in Japan last November vividly symbolized for both our peoples the friendship and the solidarity of this extraordinary partnership. I look forward, as I am sure all of you do, with very special pleasure to welcoming the Emperor when he visits the United States later this year. We consider our security treaty with Japan the cornerstone of stability in the vast reaches of Asia and the Pacific. Our relations are crucial to our mutual well-being. Together, we are working energetically on the international multilateral agenda—in trade, energy, and food. We will continue the process of strengthening our friendship, mutual security, and prosperity.

Also, of course, of fundamental importance is our mutual security relationship with the Republic of Korea, which I reaffirmed on my recent visit.

Our relations with Europe have never been stronger. There are no peoples with whom America's destiny has been more

closely linked. There are no peoples whose friendship and cooperation are more needed for the future; for none of the members of the Atlantic community can be secure, none can prosper, none can advance unless we all do so together. More than ever, these times demand our close collaboration in order:

—To maintain the secure anchor of our common security in this time of international riptides.

—To work together on the promising negotiations with our potential adversaries.

—To pool our energies on the great new economic challenge that faces us.

In addition to this traditional agenda, there are new problems involving energy, raw materials, and the environment. The Atlantic nations face many and complex negotiations and decisions. It is time to take stock, to consult on our future, to affirm once again our cohesion and our common destiny. I therefore expect to join with the other leaders of the Atlantic alliance at a Western summit in the very near future.

Complex Greek-Turkish Dispute Over Cyprus

Before this NATO meeting, I earnestly ask the Congress to weigh the broader considerations and consequences of its past actions on the complex Greek-Turkish dispute over Cyprus. Our foreign policy cannot be simply a collection of special economic or ethnic or ideological interests. There must be a deep concern for the overall design of our international actions. To achieve this design for peace and to assure that our individual acts have some coherence, the executive must have some flexibility in the conduct of foreign policy.

U.S. military assistance to an old and faithful ally, Turkey, has been cut off by action of the Congress. This has imposed an embargo on military purchases by Turkey, extending even to items already paid for—an unprecedented act against a friend.

These moves, I know, were sincerely intended to influence Turkey in the Cyprus negotiations. I deeply share the concern of many citizens for the immense human suf-

fering on Cyprus. I sympathize with the new democratic government in Greece. We are continuing our earnest efforts to find equitable solutions to the problems which exist between Greece and Turkey. But the result of the congressional action has been:

—To block progress toward reconciliation, thereby prolonging the suffering on Cyprus.

—To complicate our ability to promote successful negotiations.

—To increase the danger of a broader conflict.

Our longstanding relationship with Turkey is not simply a favor to Turkey; it is a clear and essential mutual interest. Turkey lies on the rim of the Soviet Union and at the gates of the Middle East. It is vital to the security of the eastern Mediterranean, the southern flank of Western Europe, and the collective security of the Western alliance. Our U.S. military bases in Turkey are as critical to our own security as they are to the defense of NATO.

I therefore call upon the Congress to lift the American arms embargo against our Turkish ally by passing the bipartisan Mansfield-Scott bill now before the Senate. Only this will enable us to work with Greece and Turkey to resolve the differences between our allies. I accept and indeed welcome the bill's requirement for monthly reports to the Congress on progress toward a Cyprus settlement. But unless this is done with dispatch, forces may be set in motion within and between the two nations which could not be reversed.

At the same time, in order to strengthen the democratic government of Greece and to reaffirm our traditional ties with the people of Greece, we are actively discussing a program of economic and military assistance with them. We will shortly be submitting specific requests to the Congress in this regard.

Proposed Amendments to Trade Act

A vital element of our foreign policy is our relationship with the developing countries in Africa, Asia, and Latin America.

These countries must know that America is a true, that America is a concerned, friend reliable both in word and deed.

As evidence of this friendship, I urge the Congress to reconsider one provision of the 1974 Trade Act which has had an unfortunate and unintended impact on our relations with Latin America, where we have such a long tie of friendship and cooperation. Under this legislation, all members of OPEC [Organization of Petroleum Exporting Countries] were excluded from our generalized system of trade preferences. This, unfortunately, punished two South American friends, Ecuador and Venezuela, as well as other OPEC nations such as Nigeria and Indonesia, none of which participated in last year's oil embargo. This exclusion has seriously complicated our new dialogue with our friends in this hemisphere.

I therefore endorse the amendments which have been introduced in the Congress to provide executive authority to waive those restrictions of the Trade Act that are incompatible with our national interest.

Peacemaking Efforts in the Middle East

The interests of America, as well as our allies, are vitally affected by what happens in the Middle East. So long as the state of tension continues, it threatens military crisis, the weakening of our alliances, the stability of the world economy, and confrontation with the nuclear superpowers. These are intolerable risks.

Because we are in the unique position of being able to deal with all the parties, we have, at their request, been engaged for the past year and a half in the peacemaking effort unparalleled in the history of the region.

Our policy has brought remarkable successes on the road to peace. Last year, two major disengagement agreements were negotiated and implemented with our help. For the first time in 30 years, a process of negotiation on the basic political issues was begun—and is continuing.

Unfortunately, the latest efforts to reach a further interim agreement between Israel

and Egypt have been suspended. The issues dividing the parties are vital to them and not amenable to easy and to quick solutions.

However, the United States will not be discouraged. The momentum toward peace that has been achieved over the last 18 months must and will be maintained.

The active role of the United States must and will be continued. The drift toward war must and will be prevented.

I pledge the United States to a major effort for peace in the Middle East, an effort which I know has the solid support of the American people and their Congress.

We are now examining how best to proceed. We have agreed in principle to reconvene the Geneva Conference. We are prepared as well to explore other forums.

The United States will move ahead on whatever course looks most promising, either toward an overall settlement or interim agreements should the parties themselves desire them. We will not accept stagnation or stalemate with all its attendant risks to peace and prosperity and to our relations in and outside of the region.

Relations With Potential Adversaries

The national interest and national security require as well that we reduce the dangers of war. We shall strive to do so by continuing to improve our relations with potential adversaries.

The United States and the Soviet Union share an interest in lessening tensions and building a more stable relationship. During this process we have never had any illusions. We know that we are dealing with a nation that reflects different principles and is our competitor in many parts of the globe.

Through a combination of firmness and flexibility, the United States, in recent years, laid the basis of a more reliable relationship, founded on mutual interest and mutual restraint.

But we cannot expect the Soviet Union to show restraint in the face of the U.S. weakness or irresolution. As long as I am President, America will maintain its strength, its alliances, and its principles as a prerequisite

to a more peaceful planet. As long as I am President, we will not permit détente to become a license to fish in troubled waters. Détente must be—and I trust will be—a two-way relationship.

Central to U.S.-Soviet relations today is the critical negotiation to control strategic nuclear weapons. We hope to turn the Vladivostok agreements into a final agreement this year at the time of General Secretary Brezhnev's visit to the United States. Such an agreement would, for the first time, put a ceiling on the strategic arms race. It would mark a turning point in postwar history and would be a crucial step in lifting from mankind the threat of nuclear war.

Our use of trade and economic sanctions as weapons to alter the internal conduct of other nations must also be seriously reexamined. However well-intentioned the goals, the fact is that some of our recent actions in the economic field have been self-defeating. They are not achieving the objectives intended by the Congress. And they have damaged our foreign policy.

The Trade Act of 1974 prohibits most-favored-nation treatment, credit and investment guarantees, and commercial agreements with the Soviet Union so long as their emigration policies fail to meet our criteria. The Soviet Union has therefore refused to put into effect the important 1972 trade agreement between our two countries.

As a result, Western Europe and Japan have stepped into the breach. Those countries have extended credits to the Soviet Union exceeding \$8 billion in the last six months. These are economic opportunities—jobs and business—which could have gone to Americans.

There should be no illusions about the nature of the Soviet system, but there should be no illusions about how to deal with it. Our belief in the right of peoples of the world freely to emigrate has been well demonstrated. This legislation, however, not only harmed our relations with the Soviet Union but seriously complicated the prospects of those seeking to emigrate. The favorable trend, aided by quiet diplomacy, by which

emigration increased from 400 in 1968 to over 33,000 in 1973 has been seriously set back. Remedial legislation is urgently needed in our national interest.

With the People's Republic of China, we are firmly fixed on the course set forth in the Shanghai communique. Stability in Asia and the world requires our constructive relations with one-fourth of the human race. After two decades of mutual isolation and hostility, we have, in recent years, built a promising foundation. Deep differences in our philosophy and social systems will endure, but so should our mutual long-term interests and the goals to which our countries have jointly subscribed in Shanghai.

I will visit China later this year to reaffirm these interests and to accelerate the improvement in our relations, and I was glad to welcome the distinguished Speaker and the distinguished minority leader of the House back today from their constructive visit to the People's Republic of China.

New Economic and Technological Issues

Let me talk about new challenges. The issues I have discussed are the most pressing of the traditional agenda on foreign policy, but ahead of us also is a vast new agenda of issues in an interdependent world.

The United States—with its economic power, its technology, its zest for new horizons—is the acknowledged world leader in dealing with many of these challenges. If this is a moment of uncertainty in the world, it is even more a moment of rare opportunity:

—We are summoned to meet one of man's most basic challenges: hunger. At the World Food Conference last November in Rome, the United States outlined a comprehensive program to close the ominous gap between population growth and food production over the long term. Our technological skill and our enormous productive capacity are crucial to accomplishing this task.

—The old order—in trade, finance, and raw materials—is changing, and American leadership is needed in the creation of new

institutions and practices for worldwide prosperity and progress.

—The world's oceans, with their immense resources and strategic importance, must become areas of cooperation rather than conflict. American policy is directed to that end.

—Technology must be harnessed to the service of mankind while protecting the environment. This, too, is an arena for American leadership.

—The interests and the aspirations of the developed and developing nations must be reconciled in a manner that is both realistic and humane. This is our goal in this new era.

One of the finest success stories in our foreign policy is our cooperative effort with other major energy-consuming nations. In little more than a year, together with our partners:

—We have created the International Energy Agency.

—We have negotiated an emergency sharing arrangement which helps to reduce the dangers of an embargo.

—We have launched major international conservation efforts.

—We have developed a massive program for the development of alternative sources of energy.

But the fate of all of these programs depends crucially on what we do at home. Every month that passes brings us closer to the day when we will be dependent on imported energy for 50 percent of our requirements. A new embargo under these conditions could have a devastating impact on jobs, industrial expansion, and inflation at home. Our economy cannot be left to the mercy of decisions over which we have no control. And I call upon the Congress to act affirmatively.

Essential Elements of National Security

In a world where information is power, a vital element of our national security lies in our intelligence services. They are essential to our nation's security in peace as in war. Americans can be grateful for the impor-

tant, but largely unsung, contributions and achievements of the intelligence services of this nation.

It is entirely proper that this system be subject to congressional review. But a sensationalized public debate over legitimate intelligence activities is a disservice to this nation and a threat to our intelligence system. It ties our hands while our potential enemies operate with secrecy, with skill, and with vast resources. Any investigation must be conducted with maximum discretion and dispatch, to avoid crippling a vital national institution.

Let me speak quite frankly to some in this Chamber, and perhaps to some not in this Chamber. The Central Intelligence Agency has been of maximum importance to Presidents before me. The Central Intelligence Agency has been of maximum importance to me. The Central Intelligence Agency, and its associated intelligence organizations, could be of maximum importance to some of you in this audience who might be President at some later date.

I think it would be catastrophic for the Congress, or anyone else, to destroy the usefulness by dismantling, in effect, our intelligence systems, upon which we rest so heavily.

Now, as Congress oversees intelligence activities it must, of course, organize itself to do so in a responsible way. It has been traditional for the executive to consult with the Congress through specially protected procedures that safeguard essential secrets, but recently some of those procedures have been altered in a way that makes the protection of vital information very, very difficult.

I will say to the leaders of the Congress, the House and the Senate, that I will work with them to devise procedures which will meet the needs of the Congress for review of intelligence agency activities and the needs of the nation for an effective intelligence service.

Underlying any successful foreign policy is the strength and the credibility of our defense posture. We are strong and we are ready, and we intend to remain so.

Improvement of relations with adversaries does not mean any relaxation of our national vigilance. On the contrary, it is the firm maintenance of both strength and vigilance that makes possible steady progress toward a safer and a more peaceful world.

The national security budget that I have submitted is the minimum the United States needs in this critical hour. The Congress should review it carefully, and I know it will. But it is my considered judgment that any significant reduction, revision, would endanger our national security and thus jeopardize the peace.

Let no ally doubt our determination to maintain a defense second to none, and let no adversary be tempted to test our readiness or our resolve.

History is testing us today. We cannot afford indecision, disunity, or disarray in the conduct of our foreign affairs. You and I can resolve here and now that this nation shall move ahead with wisdom, with assurance, and with national unity.

The world looks to us for the vigor and for the vision that we have demonstrated so often in the past in great moments of our national history.

And as I look down the road, I see a confident America, secure in its strengths, secure in its values—and determined to maintain both.

I see a conciliatory America, extending its hand to allies and adversaries alike, forming bonds of cooperation to deal with the vast problems facing us all.

I see a compassionate America, its heart reaching out to orphans, to refugees, and to our fellow human beings afflicted by war, by tyranny, and by hunger.

As President, entrusted by the Constitution with primary responsibility for the conduct of our foreign affairs, I renew the pledge I made last August: to work cooperatively with the Congress.

I ask that the Congress help to keep America's word good throughout the world. We are one nation, one government, and we must have one foreign policy.

In an hour far darker than this, Abraham Lincoln told his fellow citizens, and I quote:

... we cannot escape history. We of this Congress and this administration will be remembered in spite of ourselves. No personal significance or insignificance can spare one or another of us.

We who are entrusted by the people with the great decisions that fashion their future can escape neither responsibilities nor our consciences.

By what we do now, the world will know our courage, our constancy, and our compassion.

The spirit of America is good, and the heart of America is strong. Let us be proud of what we have done and confident of what we can do. And may God ever guide us to do what is right.

President Ford Reiterates Request for Assistance to Cambodia

Following is a statement read to news correspondents on April 12 by Ronald H. Nessen, Press Secretary to President Ford.

White House press release dated April 12

The President has asked me to express his concern over some reports that his speech on Thursday night, April 10, indicated that he was withdrawing or otherwise not renewing his request for urgent assistance to Cambodia.

The President's proposal for aid to Cambodia is still before the Congress. We maintain the request we have consistently and emphatically urged upon the Congress for three months.

The letter from Cambodian leader Sautham Khoy, cited by the President, reemphasized that request. The President's statement that it might soon be too late pointed out the urgency of the need.

The President still hopes that the Congress will act quickly to approve assistance to Cambodia.

U.S. Calls on North Viet-Nam To End Military Offensive

Following are texts of a note delivered by U.S. Missions on April 10 to non-Vietnamese participants in the International Conference on Viet-Nam and members of the International Commission of Control and Supervision (ICCS) and of a note delivered to the Embassy of the Democratic Republic of Viet-Nam at Paris by the U.S. Embassy on April 11.

NOTE TO NON-VIETNAMESE PARTICIPANTS IN CONFERENCE AND MEMBERS OF ICCS

Press release 193 dated April 11

The Department of State of the United States of America presents its compliments to [the Ministry of Foreign Affairs/Ministry of External Affairs of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, People's Republic of China, Great Britain, France, Hungary, Poland, Indonesia, Iran, and Secretary General of the U.N. Kurt Waldheim] and has the honor to refer to the Agreement on Ending the War and Restoring Peace in Viet-Nam signed at Paris January 27, 1973; to the Act of the International Conference on Viet-Nam signed at Paris March 2, 1973; and to the Department's Diplomatic Note of January 11, 1975, on the situation in Viet-Nam.

More than two years ago, the signatories of the Paris Agreement accepted a solemn obligation to end the fighting in Viet-Nam and to shift the conflict there from the battlefield to the negotiating table. All nations and peoples who love peace had the right to expect from that Agreement that the South Vietnamese people would be able to peacefully determine their own future and their own political institutions after the Paris Agreement was signed. The parties to the International Conference on Viet-Nam undertook a responsibility to support and uphold the settlement which the Agreement embodied.

The Democratic Republic of Viet-Nam has undertaken a massive, all-out offensive against South Viet-Nam in total contempt of the Paris Agreement. Their forces, which were built up over the past two years in violation of the Agreement, are more numerous and better equipped with modern weaponry than ever before during the course of the war. A human flight of historic proportions has taken place before the advancing North Vietnamese armies, and untold misery has been inflicted on the land which has already seen more than its share of misery.

We believe the suffering of the South Vietnamese people must be ended. It must be ended now. We therefore call upon the [addressee] to join the Government of the United States of America in calling upon Hanoi to cease its military operations immediately and to honor the terms of the Paris Agreement. The United States is requesting all the parties to the Act of the International Conference to meet their obligations to use their influence to halt the fighting and enforce the Paris Agreement.

The United States Government looks forward to prompt and constructive responses to this Note from all the parties.

NOTE TO NORTH VIET-NAM

Press release 193A dated April 11

The Department of State of the United States of America presents its compliments to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Democratic Republic of Viet-Nam and has the honor to refer to the Agreement on Ending the War and Restoring Peace in Viet-Nam signed at Paris January 27, 1973; and to the Act of the International Conference on Viet-Nam signed at Paris March 2, 1973.

More than two years ago, the Democratic Republic of Viet-Nam, as a signatory of the Paris Agreement and the Act of the International Conference on Viet-Nam, accepted a solemn obligation to end the fighting in Viet-Nam and to shift the conflict there

from the battlefield to the negotiating table. All nations and peoples who love peace hoped and expected from these Agreements that the South Vietnamese people would be able to peacefully determine their own future. Tragically, these hopes and expectations have been shattered by the Democratic Republic of Viet-Nam's total violation of these Accords.

The Democratic Republic of Viet-Nam has now undertaken a massive, all-out offensive against South Viet-Nam in total contempt of these Agreements. DRV forces in South Viet-Nam, which have been built up over the past two years in contravention of the Paris Agreement, are more numerous and better equipped than ever before during the course of the entire war. This North Vietnamese invasion has produced a human flight of refugees which is of historic proportions. By this calculated use of immense force North Viet-Nam has inflicted untold misery on a land which has already seen its share of misery.

We believe the suffering of the South Vietnamese people must be ended and must be ended now. We therefore advise the Government of the Democratic Republic of Viet-Nam to cease immediately its military offensive against South Viet-Nam and to honor the terms of the Paris Agreement. If the DRV does not reverse its present military course, it should have no doubt that it will be held responsible for the consequences.

Assistance in Evacuating Refugees From South Vietnamese Seaports

*Statement by President Ford*¹

A severe emergency exists in the coastal communities of South Viet-Nam which are swollen with helpless civilian refugees who have fled the North Viet-Nam offensive. They are desperately in need of any assistance we and other nations can provide.

To help the refugees reach safe haven

¹ Issued on Mar. 29 (text from White House press release).

further south, I have ordered American naval transports and contract vessels to assist in the evacuation of refugees from the coastal seaports.

I also call upon all nations and corporations that have ships in the vicinity of the South Vietnamese coast to help evacuate refugees to safety in the south.

I have directed that U.S. Government resources be made available to meet immediate humanitarian needs, and I have appointed Mr. Daniel Parker, Administrator of the Agency of International Development, as my Special Coordinator for Disaster Relief.

U.S. Personnel Evacuated From Phnom Penh

Following is a statement by President Ford issued on April 12, together with a statement issued on April 11 by Robert Anderson, Special Assistant to the Secretary of State for Press Relations.

STATEMENT BY PRESIDENT FORD

White House press release dated April 12

In view of the seriously deteriorating military situation around the Cambodian Capital of Phnom Penh, and on the basis of the recommendations of the American Ambassador to the Khmer Republic, I have instructed the personnel of the U.S. Mission to leave Phnom Penh.

In accordance with those instructions, American personnel have been evacuated. I also authorized that a number of Cambodians whose lives would have been jeopardized if they had remained in Cambodia be evacuated with the American Mission.

I sincerely regret that there was not timely action on my request to the Congress to enable the United States to continue to provide the assistance necessary to the survival of the Government of the Khmer Republic. That government had asked for this assistance and had clearly proven itself worthy of our help.

The United States wishes Cambodia to find its place in the world as an independent, neutral, and united country, living in peace. Our assistance was sought for that purpose. We also made numerous and vigorous diplomatic efforts, from the first to the last, to find a compromise settlement.

I decided with a heavy heart on the evacuation of American personnel from Cambodia because of my responsibility for the safety of the Americans who have served there so valiantly. Despite that evacuation we will continue to do whatever possible to support an independent, peaceful, neutral, and unified Cambodia.

We can all take deep pride in the U.S. armed forces that were engaged in this evacuation operation. It was carried out with great skill and in a manner that reflects the highest credit on all of those American servicemen who participated. I am deeply grateful to them for a job well done.

DEPARTMENT STATEMENT

In view of the seriously deteriorating military situation around Phnom Penh, the evacuation of all U.S. Mission personnel is taking place. We regret this development because of its obvious implications for the Government of the Khmer Republic.

This evacuation is taking place in an effort to insure the safety of U.S. citizens in Cambodia. To the extent we have the capability in the airlift we are also undertaking to evacuate third-country nationals working for the U.S. Government, U.S. press services, voluntary agencies, et cetera, as well as Cambodian employees of the U.S. Mission and their families and as many other Cambodians who have been associated with us as circumstances permit.

Because of the effective interdiction of Phnom Penh airport now by Khmer Communists' rockets, artillery, and mortars, this evacuation is being carried out by U.S. military helicopters from landing zones near the

American Mission in Phnom Penh. The evacuation operation is being protected as necessary by a security force of U.S. marines. Tactical aircraft are in the vicinity in the event they are needed. There is no intention to use force, but if necessary it will be applied only to protect the lives of evacuees.

The evacuees will be taken temporarily to Thailand before being moved onward to their destination of choice.

Because of the U.S. Ambassador's efforts in the past few weeks to reduce the number of potential evacuees to the barest minimum, we are not certain that we have up-to-date figures on the numbers likely to be involved. However, we anticipate that there will be several hundred people involved, including some 150 Americans.

President Ford Saddened by Deaths in Viet-Nam Orphan Airlift Crash

*Statement by President Ford*¹

I am deeply saddened at the loss of so many lives in the crash of the U.S. C-5A mercy flight today near Saigon.

I wish to convey my heartfelt condolences to the families and friends of the victims, many of whom were coming to new homes in the United States, and to the volunteers who were caring for them on the flight.

Our mission of mercy will continue. The survivors will be flown here when they are physically able. Other waiting orphans will make the journey.

This tragedy must not deter us from offering new hope for the living. The government and people of the United States offer this hope in our rededication to assisting the Vietnamese orphans as best and as quickly as we can.

¹ Issued at Palm Springs, Calif., on Apr. 4 (text from White House press release).

President Ford's News Conference at San Diego April 3

Following are excerpts relating to foreign policy from the transcript of a news conference held by President Ford at San Diego, Calif., April 3.¹

I have a short opening statement:

We are seeing a great human tragedy as untold numbers of Vietnamese flee the North Vietnamese onslaught. The United States has been doing, and will continue to do, its utmost to assist these people.

I have directed all available naval ships to stand off Indochina to do whatever is necessary to assist. We have appealed to the United Nations to use its moral influence to permit these innocent people to leave, and we call on North Viet-Nam to permit the movement of refugees to the area of their choice.

While I have been in California, I have been spending many hours on the refugee problem and our humanitarian efforts. I have directed that money from a \$2 million special foreign aid children's fund be made available to fly 2,000 South Vietnamese orphans to the United States as soon as possible. I have also directed American officials in Saigon to act immediately to cut red tape and other bureaucratic obstacles preventing these children from coming to the United States.

I have directed that C-5A aircraft and other aircraft especially equipped to care for these orphans during the flight be sent to Saigon. I expect these flights to begin within the next 36 to 48 hours. These orphans will be flown to Travis Air Force Base in California and other bases on the west coast and cared for in those locations. These 2,000 Vietnamese orphans are all in the process

of being adopted by American families.

This is the least we can do, and we will do much, much more.

The first question is from Mr. George Dissinger of the San Diego Tribune.

Q. Mr. President, are you ready to accept a Communist takeover of South Viet-Nam and Cambodia?

President Ford: I would hope that that would not take place in either case. My whole congressional life in recent years was aimed at avoiding it. My complete efforts as President of the United States were aimed at avoiding that.

I am an optimist, despite the sad and tragic events that we see unfolding. I will do my utmost in the future—as I have in the past—to avoid that result.

Q. Mr. President, I understand you are soon going to ask Congress for new authority to extend humanitarian aid in Southeast Asia. I wondered if you stand by your request, though, for more military aid for South Viet-Nam.

President Ford: We do intend to ask for more humanitarian aid. I should point out that the Administration's request for \$135 million for humanitarian aid in South Viet-Nam was unfortunately reduced to \$55 million by congressional action. Obviously, we will ask for more; the precise amount we have not yet determined.

We will continue to push for the \$300 million that we have asked for and Congress had authorized for military assistance to South Viet-Nam, and the possibility exists that we may ask for more.

Q. Mr. President, how and why did the United States miscalculate the intentions of the will of the South Vietnamese to resist?

¹For the complete transcript, see Weekly Compilation of Presidential Documents dated Apr. 7.

President Ford: I don't believe that we miscalculated the will of the South Vietnamese to carry on their fight for their own freedom.

There were several situations that developed that I think got beyond the control of the Vietnamese people. The unilateral military decision to withdraw created a chaotic situation in Viet-Nam that appears to have brought about tremendous disorganization.

I believe that the will of the South Vietnamese people to fight for their freedom is best evidenced by the fact that they are fleeing from the North Vietnamese, and that clearly is an indication they don't want to live under the kind of government that exists in North Viet-Nam.

The will of the South Vietnamese people, I think, still exists. They want freedom under a different kind of government than has existed in North Viet-Nam. The problem is how to organize that will under the traumatic experiences of the present.

Q. Unilateral decision by whom?

President Ford: It was a unilateral decision by President Thieu to order a withdrawal from the broad, exposed areas that were under the control of the South Vietnamese military.

Miss Thomas [Helen Thomas, United Press International].

Q. Mr. President, what is your response to the South Vietnamese Ambassador to Washington's statement that we had not lived up to the Paris peace accords and that the Communists are safer allies?

President Ford: I won't comment on his statement. I will say this: that the North Vietnamese repeatedly and in massive efforts violated the Paris peace accords. They sent North Vietnamese regular forces into South Viet-Nam in massive numbers—I think around 150,000 to 175,000 well-trained North Vietnamese regular forces—in violation of the Paris peace accords, moved into South Viet-Nam. We have objected to that violation.

I still believe that the United States, in this case and in other cases, is a reliable ally. And although I am saddened by the

events that we have read about and seen, it is a tragedy unbelievable in its ramifications.

I must say that I am frustrated by the action of the Congress in not responding to some of the requests for both economic and humanitarian and military assistance in South Viet-Nam. And I am frustrated by the limitations that were placed on the Chief Executive over the last two years.

But let me add very strongly: I am convinced that this country is going to continue its leadership. We will stand by our allies, and I specifically warn any adversaries they should not, under any circumstances, feel that the tragedy of Viet-Nam is an indication that the American people have lost their will or their desire to stand up for freedom anyplace in the world.

Q. Well, Mr. President, can you explain why President Thieu, with our close military ties as allies, did not tell you what he was going to do in terms of the retreat?

President Ford: I think the only answer to that can come from President Thieu.

Q. Mr. Ford, recently you said the fall of Cambodia could threaten the national security of this country. Now, considering the probable fall of South Viet-Nam to Communist forces, do you feel that will threaten our national security, and if so, how?

President Ford: At the moment, I do not anticipate the fall of South Viet-Nam, and I greatly respect and admire the tremendous fight that the Government and the people of Cambodia are putting up against the insurgents who are trying to take over Cambodia.

I believe that in any case where the United States does not live up to its moral or treaty obligations, it can't help but have an adverse impact on other allies we have around the world.

We read in European papers to the effect that Western Europe ought to have some questions. Let me say to our Western European allies: We are going to stand behind our commitments to NATO, and we are going to stand behind our commitments to other allies around the world.

But there has to be in the minds of some people a feeling that maybe the tragedy of Indochina might affect our relations with their country. I repeat, the United States is going to continue its leadership and stand by its allies.

Q. Are you, in fact, a believer of the domino theory—if Southeast Asia falls, then perhaps some of the other countries in the Pacific are next?

President Ford: I believe there is a great deal of credibility to the domino theory. I hope it does not happen. I hope that other countries in Southeast Asia—Thailand, the Philippines—don't misread the will of the American people and the leadership of this country to believing that we are going to abandon our position in Southeast Asia. We are not. But I do know from the things I read and the messages that I hear that some of them do get uneasy. I hope and trust they believe me when I say we are going to stand by our allies.

Q. Mr. President, as you are well aware, there are about 7,000 Americans still in Saigon. They are in danger not only from Communist attack but from South Vietnamese reprisals. There are reports that the South Vietnamese are in a bad temper toward Americans. Do you feel that under the War Powers Act and also under the limitations voted by Congress in 1973 on combat by Americans in Indochina that you could send troops in to protect those Americans, and would you, if it came to that?

President Ford: I can assure you that I will abide totally with the War Powers Act that was enacted by the Congress several years ago. At the same time, I likewise assure you that we have contingency plans to meet all problems involving evacuation, if that should become necessary. At this point, I do not believe that I should answer specifically how those contingency plans might be carried out.

Q. Sir, you don't want to talk specifically. Can you tell us, however, if you do believe that you do have the authority to send in troops? You are not saying, I understand,

whether you would, but do you have the authority?

President Ford: It is my interpretation of that legislation that a President has certain limited authority to protect American lives. And to that extent, I will use that law.

Q. Mr. President, despite your statement here this morning about war orphans, there apparently is a lot of red tape in Washington. A San Diego man who is trying to get four Vietnamese children out of that country has received hundreds of calls from people all over the Western United States wanting to help, even adopt children. But despite this outpouring of compassion by the American people, all he gets in Washington is, "No way. There is nothing that can be done." Why is he running into this problem, if we are trying to help?

President Ford: Well, having had some experience in the past with the Federal bureaucracy when we had a similar problem involving Korean orphans, I understand the frustration and the problem.

But I am assured that all bureaucratic red tape is being eliminated to the maximum degree and that we will make a total effort, as I indicated in my opening statement, to see to it that South Vietnamese war orphans are brought to the United States.

Q. Do you think something can be done before it is too late for many of them?

President Ford: I can only say we will do what has to be done, what can be done as a practical matter. I cannot guarantee that every single South Vietnamese war orphan will get here, but I can assure you that we intend to do everything possible in that humanitarian effort.

Q. Mr. President, if it would alleviate the refugee problem in South Viet-Nam and bring about something of a temporary ceasefire, would you urge President Thieu to resign?

President Ford: I don't believe that it is my prerogative to tell the head of state elected by the people to leave office. I don't

believe whether it is one head of state or another makes any difference in our efforts to help in the humanitarian program.

We are going to carry it on, I hope, with the full cooperation of the South Vietnamese Government. And I don't think it is appropriate for me to ask him, under these circumstances, to resign. And I don't think his resignation would have any significance on our humanitarian efforts.

Q. In that regard, are there any plans underway by the U.S. Government to accept large numbers of Vietnamese refugees in this country other than the 2,000 orphans that you have talked about?

President Ford: Under existing law, action by the Attorney General can permit refugees who are fleeing problems in their own country to come to the United States. This authority was used after World War II. This authority was used after the Hungarian invasion by the Soviet Union.

This authority has been used on a number of other occasions. I can assure you that that authority is being examined, and if it will be helpful, I certainly will approve it.

Q. Mr. President, you spoke a few minutes ago about being frustrated by the limitations of the War Powers Act. If it were not forbidden now, would you like to send American planes and naval forces and possibly ground forces into Viet-Nam to try to turn the situation around?

President Ford: I have said that there are no plans whatsoever for U.S. military involvement in Viet-Nam. On the other hand, I think history does prove that if a Chief Executive has a potential, it to some extent is a deterrent against aggressors.

Q. So, that is your frustration, because you do not have that power to at least threaten the possibility?

President Ford: I did not use the word "threat." I said the potential for power, I think, over the years has indicated that potential is a deterrent against aggression by one country against another.

Q. Mr. President, some people are saying this week that despite all our massive aid in Viet-Nam and all the lives that were lost there, that the whole thing has come to nothing. Now, how do you feel about this, and do you think there is any lesson to be learned in what has been happening over there?

President Ford: I believe that the program of the previous four or five Presidents—President Kennedy, President Johnson, President Nixon, and myself—were aimed at the—in the right direction, that we should help those people who are willing to fight for freedom for themselves.

That was a sound policy. Unfortunately, events that were beyond our control as a country have made it appear that that policy was wrong. I still believe that policy was right if the United States had carried it out as we promised to do at the time of the Paris peace accords, where we promised, with the signing of the Paris peace accords, that we would make military hardware available to the South Vietnamese Government on a replacement, one-for-one basis. Unfortunately, we did not carry out that promise.

Q. Well, are you blaming Congress for this, then?

President Ford: I am not assessing blame on anyone. The facts are that in fiscal year 1974 there was a substantial reduction made by the Congress in the amount of military equipment requested for South Viet-Nam.

In fiscal year 1975, the current fiscal year, the Administration asked for \$1.4 billion in military assistance for South Viet-Nam. Congress put a ceiling of \$1 billion on it and actually appropriated only \$700 million.

Those are the facts. I think it is up to the American people to pass judgment on who was at fault or where the blame may rest. That is a current judgment.

I think historians in the future will write who was to blame in this tragic situation. But the American people ought to know the facts. And the facts are as I have indicated.

I think it is a great tragedy, what we are seeing in Viet-Nam today. I think it could have been avoided. But I am not going to point a finger. The American people will make that judgment. I think it is more important for me and the American people and the Congress, in the weeks and months ahead, to do what we can to work together to meet the problems of the future.

That is what I intend to do, and I will go more than halfway with the Congress in seeking to achieve that result. I think we have the capability in America. I think we have the will to overcome what appears to be a disaster in Southeast Asia. To the extent that I can, I hope to give that leadership.

Q. Mr. President, regardless of what caused it, it seems apparent that for the first time in our nation's history, the enemy is about to win a war where Americans fought and died. Do you think those 55,000 lives were wasted?

President Ford: I do not think they were wasted, providing the United States had carried out the solemn commitments that were made in Paris, at the time American fighting was stopped in South Viet-Nam—at a time when the agreement provided that all of our troops should be withdrawn, that all of our POW's should be returned. If we had carried out the commitments that were made at that time, the tragic sacrifices that were made by many—those who were killed, those who were wounded—would not have been in vain. But when I see us not carrying through, then it raises a quite different question.

Q. Is that a yes, then, sir?

President Ford: I still think there is an opportunity to salvage the situation in Viet-Nam, and if we salvage it, giving the South Vietnamese an opportunity to fight for their freedom, which I think they are anxious to do if given an honest opportunity, then there was not a sacrifice that was inappropriate or unwise.

Q. In a speech you are going to deliver here in San Diego this afternoon, you warn

against fatalism, despair, and the prophets of doom. And yet, as I look back over the past eight months or a year—and I don't mean to suggest that these are in any way your responsibility or fault—I have a laundry list which cites Portugal as having a leftist government raising serious questions about its future in NATO; Greece and Turkey are at each other's throats, threatening the southern flanks of that alliance; we are familiar that Secretary Kissinger's mission failed in his peace talks with Egypt and Israel; and we don't need to rehash the situation in Cambodia and South Viet-Nam.

That being the case, sir, how can you say that the world outlook—and particularly as you address it in your speech next week on the state of the world—is anything but bleak for the United States, when many of the minuses which I cited are actually pluses for the Soviets?

President Ford: Well, the speech that I am giving to Congress and to the American people next week will deal with many of the problems that you have raised. I think we do face a crisis. But I am optimistic that if the Congress joins with me and the American people support the Congress and me, as President, we can overcome those difficulties.

We can play a constructive role in Portugal, not interfering with their internal decisions, but Portugal is an important ally in Western Europe.

We can find ways to solve the problem in Cyprus and, hopefully, keep both Greece and Turkey strong and viable members of NATO.

We can, despite the difficulties that transpire in the Middle East in the last several weeks, find a way to keep a peace movement moving in that very volatile area. It may mean—and probably does—that we will have to take the problem to Geneva. I would have preferred it otherwise.

But the facts are that if Congress and the American people and the President work together—as I expect they will—then in my judgment, those disappointments can become pluses.

Secretary Kissinger's News Conference at Palm Springs April 5

Following is the transcript of a news conference held by Secretary Kissinger at Palm Springs, Calif., on April 5.

Press release 183 dated April 5

Secretary Kissinger: Ladies and gentlemen, I just want to bring you up to date on the discussions that have been taking place. The President, General Weyand [Gen. Frederick C. Weyand, Chief of Staff, United States Army], and I met for about an hour and one-half this morning. General Weyand gave us a report about the military situation in South Viet-Nam as he sees it and some of the options which he believes should be considered.

The President invited General Weyand to return this afternoon, and on that occasion he will bring along with him two intelligence experts, as well as the Defense Department expert who has been handling military supplies. We will then go into the question of the political situation and the long-term supply situation in detail.

The President has also ordered an NSC [National Security Council] meeting for probably Tuesday afternoon. It could slip until Wednesday morning to permit General Weyand and his team to report to the entire NSC. In the meantime, he has ordered that the NSC staff, in close cooperation with the other agencies, develop for their NSC meeting a statement of the various options before us.

These are the procedures that are going to be followed. I make these points in order to indicate that we are at the very early stages of considering the report of General Weyand. No decisions will be taken while the President is in Palm Springs. Rather, we will use this opportunity for the fullest possible briefing of the President, and then

the staffs in Washington are going to analyze the reports, prepare the options, and then the entire NSC will consider the matter.

I might also point out that we are considering releasing the report of General Weyand after the President has had an opportunity to study it, with just some minor deletions, by the middle of the week so the public can have the general appreciation. This is where we stand, and I will be glad to answer questions.

Q. Mr. Secretary, considering the enormous amount of military equipment that has been lost in South Viet-Nam by the deterioration of the South Vietnamese Army, do you see any conceivable way that you can justify sending additional military equipment to South Viet-Nam until at least the South Vietnamese Army shows it can stand and hold its own territory?

Secretary Kissinger: The determination that has to be made is with respect to the military capacity of the South Vietnamese Army to defend the remaining territories. We have received another detailed analysis from General Weyand as to some estimates of what would be required to effect this.

The loss of territory in the north—I think it is important to understand what the military situation was. In flagrant violation of article 7 of the Paris accords, the North Vietnamese have introduced almost their entire army into South Viet-Nam, so that there are 18 North Vietnamese divisions in South Viet-Nam at this moment, leaving only two or three divisions in North Viet-Nam; and this is in flagrant, total violation of solemn agreements which were endorsed by the international community.

That created an unbalanced military situation in the north in which whatever the

South Vietnamese did it would be wrong. If they stood, they were going to be defeated piecemeal. If they retreated, they ran the risk of disintegration of the units that were retreating, which is in fact what happened.

But one of the aspects of our examination is of course what the military situation is and what degree of American help can be significant.

Q. Mr. Secretary, can the South Vietnamese Army defend the remaining territory, and what are the requirements of their army now to defend that territory?

Secretary Kissinger: As I pointed out, this is of course one of the issues that has to be looked at. There is a possibility for the South Vietnamese military forces to stabilize the situation. The next question is for what length of time and against what level of attack.

Then there is also the moral question for the United States—whether when an ally with which it has been associated for 10 years wishes to defend itself, whether it is the United States that should make the decision for it by withholding supplies, that it should no longer defend itself.

These are all questions that are involved in the examination that is now going on.

Q. Mr. Secretary, General Thieu [Nguyen Van Thieu, President of the Republic of Viet-Nam] seems to have adopted some of the Administration's language in explaining about why he retreated; namely, that the United States failed to supply him with aid. In fact, he said it would be an act of betrayal if we continued to fail to supply aid. Now, how is that going to help your problems with the U.S. Congress?

Secretary Kissinger: I think, Mr. Lisagor [Peter Lisagor, Chicago Daily News], that one of the most important things that all of us can do—the Administration, Congress, and if I may say so, the press as well—is to recognize that we are facing a great human tragedy and that we don't try to gloat over arguments that may have been made or to try to pick on things that men who obviously

are in despair now may be saying.

There are certain facts in the situation which may be difficult and unpleasant, but which are nevertheless true. It is a fact that the aid levels to Viet-Nam were cut by a third the first year and by another 50 percent the following year.

This coincided with a worldwide inflation and a fourfold increase in fuel prices, so that a situation was created, for a variety of reasons, in which almost all of the American military aid had to be given for ammunition and for fuel, very little for spare parts, and none for new equipment.

Even the ammunition had to be rationed, according to General Weyand, and so that individual guns could, for example, fire only two rounds a day. To what extent did such a situation contribute to the demoralization of the army, and to what extent the certainty, as they were looking at the situation, of constantly declining aid levels produced a decision to withdraw, which in turn produced a panic, I think is fairly evident.

This is far from saying this was the intention of those who cut the aid, and I think it is safe to say that you can tell from the public statements that senior Administration officials made that there was no expectation of a massive North Vietnamese attack this year.

So, there were a number of factors involved here, and I think there is some merit in what General Thieu is saying now. I think some of the adjectives he used are those of a desperate man who is in great anguish. And I think it is also fair to say that the United States, for 10 years, put in a great deal of its efforts and of its blood and of its treasure, and that, too, should weigh in the scale, and that we made a very great effort through a long period of time. So, we have to evaluate it over an extended period of time.

Q. Could I just follow that a moment? We keep talking about a massive North Vietnamese invasion, and many of us have been led to believe that this was a case of withdrawal by General Thieu. The President commented on that in San Diego, saying it was a poorly planned and unnecessary affair.

Would you be more precise about what happened?

Secretary Kissinger: To the best of our understanding, what happened was the following: In December, the North Vietnamese plan was to continue an intensified version of the operations of last year; that is to say, to pick off outlying district towns and perhaps to attack one or two provincial capitals.

In January, for a variety of reasons, the North Vietnamese decided to make a larger attack, and they concentrated on the Province of Phuoc Long, in total violation of the Paris accords. When they succeeded in that operation without significant opposition from the South Vietnamese Government, which felt itself overextended, and without any military reaction or even military moves by the United States, they decided to make an all-out attack this year.

From the middle of January on, a massive infiltration of North Vietnamese divisions started. President Thieu at that point was faced with a situation—also President Thieu found out during the battle of Ban Me Thuot, which followed the battle of Phuoc Long, of his fleet of C-130's only six were flyable because of the absence of spare parts so that his strategic mobility had been substantially reduced.

As he saw the North Vietnamese buildup and as he saw the prospects of American aid in any case declining whatever the decision of the Congress would be—I think it was a reasonable assumption that the level of aid would be declining—he made the strategic decision of consolidating his forces this year, depriving the North Vietnamese of the momentum of this campaign season, use his supplies up in the battles next year, and hope for new appropriations in 1977. This was his strategic assessment.

In terms of a strategic assessment, it made a lot of sense. The trouble was that in executing it, it was not planned with sufficient care, with sufficient understanding of the logistic system of South Viet-Nam. And it was compounded by the fact that the South Vietnamese divisions have their dependents living with them—so that when a

South Vietnamese division moved, all of their dependents moved with them, which in turn triggered a mass exodus of refugees, immobilizing these armies, and at some point along this retreat that turned into a panic where the soldiers were trying to take care of their families.

So, the decision was triggered by a correct evaluation of his prospects, the prospects being that if he kept his units strung out, they would probably be defeated by this massive North Vietnamese invasion; and to try to get to a more consolidated line, in executing what was probably a correct strategic decision, he of course brought about consequences with which we are familiar, which are tragic. I am just trying to explain our best understanding of what happened.

Q. Mr. Secretary, the United States has spent about \$140-\$150 billion in South Viet-Nam. What is it that makes the Administration think that \$300 million, or even an amount somewhat larger than that, would do any good? What is it that makes you think additional money is ever going to be able to make the South Vietnamese Army fight or solve the situation, when you spend \$140-\$150 billion and you are in the situation you are in now?

Secretary Kissinger: First of all, as I pointed out, this whole situation is going to be reviewed by the National Security Council on Tuesday, and I do not want to pre-judge all of these decisions.

There is, however, also involved a question of the obligations a country has that for 10 years has fought somewhere, which has encouraged millions of people to associate themselves with the United States, and whether it should then refuse to let them defend themselves if they want to defend themselves.

This is one argument on the military side. On the humanitarian side, I think it is important and decisive that the United States has an obligation to the hundreds of thousands who were closely associated with it and must make a maximum effort on the level of refugees and otherwise.

Q. I am not talking about the humanitarian side, Mr. Secretary. I am asking, in effect, whether \$140-\$150 billion is not as much moral obligation as the United States can undertake?

Secretary Kissinger: That is the decision that will have to be made by first the President and then the Congress.

Q. Mr. Secretary, would you anticipate that the President would make these decisions in time to tell us about them in the so-called "state of the world" address Thursday?

Secretary Kissinger: I have not had an opportunity to discuss with the President in great detail what he intends to say in this address. My impression is he will deal with the immediate foreign policy situation that he feels the United States is confronting, and I would think it is extremely probable that he would put before the Congress on that occasion at least some preliminary ideas of at least some immediate measures that in his judgment have to be taken.

Q. Dr. Kissinger, the New York Times has a report from Paris this morning that the French Government has initiated plans to implement the Paris peace accords and to reach a settlement on that basis. Also, that the French are going to be active in all of Viet-Nam in humanitarian and refugee work. Do you have any comment on that? Have you been informed of this, and what is the outlook of this taking place?

Secretary Kissinger: We would gratefully welcome any attempt by any nation, including France, to participate in the humanitarian effort.

Secondly, we have attempted to encourage all of the signatories of the Paris accords to bring about their implementation; and therefore, if France is attempting to bring about an implementation of the Paris accords, we would certainly look at their proposals with sympathy.

We have not received an official French proposal—and, indeed, I was not aware of this particular report—but the United States

strongly favors the implementation of the Paris accords, which have been grossly and outrageously violated by Hanoi, and it would support the efforts of any country that would attempt to bring about an implementation of those accords.

Helen [Helen Thomas, United Press International].

Q. Mr. Secretary, we have heard around here that this is not our war. We have also seen some pretty pessimistic reports from everywhere that the ball game is over. And also, you seem to neglect the area while you are concentrating on the Middle East. What do you have to say for that? Do you think Southeast Asia is still as viable as you thought it was two years ago?

Secretary Kissinger: First of all, my trip to the Middle East to deal with the question that I was dealing with, other problems, had been scheduled for many months; and when I left on the trip to the Middle East, we had a crisis in Cambodia, the nature of which was well understood and which really required a congressional decision. It did not require decisions by the Administration.

We did not expect an imminent crisis in Viet-Nam, and you remember that the Secretary of Defense stated a view, which all of us shared, that the attacks this year would not be of a critical nature; so that the disintegration of the situation in the northern half of Viet-Nam was quite unexpected to us in the sense that we were not told in advance of the decision to evacuate.

It really did not reach the proportions it has until after my return from the Middle East. There is no question that South Viet-Nam faces an extremely grave situation. There are 18 North Vietnamese divisions in South Viet-Nam, in blatant violation of the Paris accords. And there is no agreement in history that is self-enforcing. If the signatories of the agreement cannot enforce it, either by actions of their own or by aid to the aggrieved parties, then a difficult situation is inevitable.

Under the Paris accords, North Viet-Nam was not permitted to infiltrate or to add any additional forces to those it already had in

South Viet-Nam. At that time, it had something like 80,000 to 100,000 people in South Viet-Nam. Today, it has closer to 400,000 in South Viet-Nam.

Under the Paris accords, North Viet-Nam was not permitted to introduce new equipment except through ICCS [International Commission of Control and Supervision] checkpoints and in replacement on a one-to-one basis for equipment that had been lost, damaged, and destroyed.

The North Vietnamese never even permitted the establishment of these checkpoints and totally disregarded the agreement. This is what brought about the change in the military situation, which was compounded by the fact that the South Vietnamese Army inventories were running down while the North Vietnamese inventories were increasing.

This is the objective structure of what happened in the last two years.

Q. Mr. Secretary, has the Administration any indication from the Democratic leadership of Congress that Congress will be any more receptive to providing more military aid now than they were before they went into recess?

Secretary Kissinger: As you know, the Congress is in recess right now, and I am confident that the President is going to be in touch with the congressional leadership.

He has not had an opportunity, to the best of my knowledge, to be in touch with the congressional leadership, but again, let me make one point: It is unavoidable that when one analyzes the causes of a situation, it may be taken as a criticism of this or that group.

I think, in the history of Viet-Nam, there is enough criticism to go around. There have been mistakes made by the executive branch, and there have been misjudgments made by the legislative.

I think the major requirement for the United States, recognizing that we will now have a difficult set of decisions and a difficult set of debates, is to come out of this with dignity and without adding to the bitterness and viciousness which has so drained

us over the years. We will try to do our best to contribute to this. Whether we will always succeed, I don't know.

Q. Mr. Secretary, you said at your last press conference, in some very strong language, that the problem was that this was now a question of what kind of people we are and whether or not we will destroy deliberately an ally.

Secretary Kissinger: That is right.

Q. The scenario that you gave us today indicates that while that \$300 million would have been needed, there was a proper, comprehensible decision to make, yet it was poorly executed, and that is why we have the problem. Your scenario does not really seem to back up the question of laying the blame.

Secretary Kissinger: Wait just a minute. It is not just a question of \$300 million. It is a question that since 1973 the combination of declining aid levels, inflation, and rising fuel prices has led to a constant attrition of the South Vietnamese Army. It is not just a decision of this Congress to delay \$300 million. It is a process that has been going on for a period of two years.

The statement I made in the press conference, which was under slightly different military conditions, at least as they were then perceived in Washington, was in terms of those decisions; but nevertheless it is a very important moral question for the United States whether when people who, with its encouragement, have fought for many years should in their hour of extremity be told by the United States that while they want to continue fighting that the United States would no longer help them defend themselves against an enemy who has never been told by its allies that there is a limit beyond which they won't support them.

I maintain that is a question that we ought to ask ourselves as a people. Regardless of the probable outcome of the war, I think it is a serious question. It is not meant necessarily as a criticism of anybody, and I really believe that at this moment, having

paid so much in our national unity on this issue, we should conduct this debate not with an attitude of who is going to pin the blame on whom, but with an attitude that we are facing a great tragedy in which there is involved something of American credibility, something of American honor, something of how we are perceived by other people in the world, on which serious people may have different questions but in which, for God's sake, we ought to stop talking as if one side had the monopoly of wisdom, morality, and insight and that serious people trying to deal with this problem are trying to run a confidence game. This is all that I am trying to suggest.

Q. Mr. Secretary, if I may continue, my question really was getting toward, are you personally convinced that if we had voted that extra \$300 million that was requested for the emergency supplemental or if we had actually appropriated the full amount requested in the beginning, \$1.4 billion, that we would not have faced the situation we now face, either at this time or sometime down the road?

Secretary Kissinger: I believe personally that it is not just the \$300 million. It is the \$300 million coming on top of a lot of other things. I believe that if it had not been for the moralities of executive authority resulting from Watergate, if the aid levels had been appropriate over the years, and if we had been freer to conduct foreign policy than was possible under these circumstances—partly for reasons in which the executive shares a responsibility—I believe that certainly the difficulties we face this year could have been avoided for a number of years.

For how long, it is hard to say, but very often, if we look over the postwar period, a period of time gain gets a possibility of things developing. But I would add, moreover, that it would have made a lot of difference to us as a people, that if it happened, if it had more clearly happened as a result of actions not so much under our control. But I would finally add, since you asked the question, and I did not volunteer this statement, that at some point in this

discussion—we now cannot avoid the discussion—at some point in this discussion we ought to stop this inquiry and ask ourselves where we go from here.

Q. Mr. Secretary, I have two questions. One is, you keep referring to the massive violations by the North Vietnamese, and in view of their record, I wonder why you thought at the time the agreements were negotiated, or at any other time, that they were going to abide by them? We knew very early, as you said, they did not allow us to establish checkpoints.

My other question is, do you think there would be any benefit if the United States were able to provide some military aid now, through bombing or any other measure, to stem the tide of what is going on?

Secretary Kissinger: The first thing I think the people ought to remember is the kind of national debate that was going on in the United States in 1971 and 1972. I think it is indisputable that there was overwhelming consensus developing that the United States should end its participation in the war.

And you may remember that before I went on my last negotiation, the Democratic caucus had already voted to set a terminal date to our participation in the war; that is, January 1973.

Let me point out this did not affect the actual terms of the negotiations, which were substantially agreed to before that. So, I am simply trying to reconstruct the national mood, which was that the American military participation in the war had to be ended.

The major debate that then occurred was whether the United States should deliberately overthrow the government with which it was associated; and that we refused to do.

Now, that the North Vietnamese would press against the edges of the agreement was to be expected. What was not to be expected was that, partly through legislative action and partly through our internal divisions, we would find ourselves in a position where a forceful diplomacy became extremely difficult, and this certainly accelerated the violations and made them substantially free.

So, we had no illusions that we were dealing with a country other than one that had violated every other agreement that it had made, but under the conditions in which the agreement was made of a strong period in American foreign policy, we believed that we would be able to exercise sufficient influence on the situation to keep the violations to manageable proportions and also to obtain sufficient aid to permit the South Vietnamese to handle the problem.

So, those expectations, for reasons that no one could possibly predict at that time, were not fulfilled.

Q. Mr. Secretary, a look at the future rather than the past. I have two questions. One, isn't it likely that if we provided the \$300 million at this point, the likelihood would be that it would only prolong the fighting, cost more lives, and end in the same result? Two, the President and General Weyand have said they think the situation is salvageable. I wonder what evidence you have to give any hope that it is salvageable?

Secretary Kissinger: The President will study all the recommendations of General Weyand, plus the judgment of all of his senior advisers over the next days, and I think it is for the President then to make the judgment and to state it in his press conference.

I would like also to point out that even if this situation should finally wind up in some negotiation, it is not a matter of indifference whether it is done in such a way that permits the maximum extraction of refugees and of those whose very lives are at stake in the present situation.

So, there are very many levels of objectives that can be set. There is a point of view, which we will be examining, that the situation can be stabilized by a combination of the shortened lines, infusion of American aid, and other measures. That point of view, together with other points of view, will be considered over the next few days, and the President will report his conclusions to the Congress on Thursday.

My point in appearing here is to tell you primarily what the status of our discussion

is at this moment; and at this moment the President has really done nothing but spend about 90 percent of his time listening and asking questions to the purely military aspect of General Weyand's report.

He will get a further discussion of that this afternoon, together with the intelligence appraisal, and then this whole matter will be submitted to the National Security Council; so I do not want to preempt his decisions.

Q. Mr. Secretary, it would seem time is of the essence, and with the events happening as quickly as they are over there, isn't time being wasted with the President being out here? Isn't this whole policy-making process being delayed because of the distances between here and Washington?

Secretary Kissinger: I am not going to answer that question. Isn't time being wasted?

Q. Isn't time being wasted in the policy-making decision with NSC being all back in Washington, you are here, General Weyand is here, the President is here. Couldn't it be done faster if everything was concentrated back there? It seems the middle of the week is awfully late for something so important.

Secretary Kissinger: There are about \$175 million left in the pipeline in the current appropriations. We are expediting the shipment of that equipment to Viet-Nam. No matter what decision is made by the President, it could not take effect for a number of weeks.

Therefore we believe in decisions of this importance it is extremely crucial that there be a very careful and a very prayerful examination of all the choices before us, and there is no effective delay, no matter what decisions the President eventually decides.

Q. Dr. Kissinger, could you answer the other part of that question about whether bombing is still an option and whether that would be of any assistance, help to the South Vietnamese?

Secretary Kissinger: As you know, the introduction of American military forces in or over Viet-Nam is prohibited by specific

legislation that was passed in July 1973, which was, I may say, another complicated factor in the enforcement of the agreement.

It is not so much a question of what we would have done. It is a question of what the other side knew we could not possibly do. Therefore, before any such action could be contemplated, the President would have to ask authority from the Congress to do that; and I do not anticipate that.

Q. Mr. Secretary, one of the questions that is troubling many Americans and some people in this room, as you have already judged, is that what is happening in Viet-Nam today was foreseen by many people once the American troops withdrew. My question is, why then must the nation be asked to wear a hair shirt because of what has happened?

Secretary Kissinger: The problem is not whether the nation must be made to wear a hair shirt. The President is trying, to the best of his abilities, to make clear what he takes to be the causes of that situation.

We will never know whether it would have happened if enforcement had been carried out more aggressively and aid had been given more substantially. He is simply trying to point out his analysis of what brought about the present situation. After all, the people who predicted this could have been wrong. Maybe they could have been right. We do not know now.

Q. You do acknowledge that a great many people did predict it?

Secretary Kissinger: Oh, yes, and I am saying, of course, there were many people who made that argument, and that still does not change the question of whether the United States, having made all these investments, should not have carried out at least its moral obligations more fully.

Q. Mr. Secretary, could you tell us what some of the options are that are being considered? We are not going to get a chance to talk to General Weyand, so we don't know what the suggestions are.

Secretary Kissinger: I really cannot prop-

erly go into it. Partly this is due to the fact that this morning General Weyand concentrated, I would say, exclusively on two things—his analysis of the reasons for the development of the military situation and, secondly, his analysis of the military prospects.

We have not yet covered the humanitarian problems, the evacuation problems of refugees, the possibilities that were alluded to, of which we have no formal indication, of restoration of the Paris accords.

So, all of these will have to be issues that will have to be examined in developing the options, but what we are planning is to go over that this afternoon, to sketch out some of the main options as we see them.

Then, the Embassy staff, together with General Weyand, the Defense Department, and the Central Intelligence Agency, will pull them together into a more comprehensive option paper, which will then be put before the National Security Council on Tuesday or, at the latest, Wednesday morning.

Q. Mr. Secretary, the President spoke in his press conference of solemn commitments we had made to South Viet-Nam. This, I am sure you are aware, has raised many questions of secret agreements or tacit understandings or that kind of thing. First of all, what solemn commitments was the President referring to? Was he referring only to the one-for-one replacement, which, as I understand it, was not a commitment but an option? And if he was not referring to that, what was he talking about?

Secretary Kissinger: As I have explained, I think, at a previous press conference, he was not talking of a legal commitment. He was talking of a moral commitment. I believe that the South Vietnamese had every reason to think that if they permitted American troops to withdraw and if they enabled us to retrieve our prisoners, that we would carry out what we had called the Vietnamization process in enabling them to defend themselves.

We did not give them any specific figures, and we did not give them any definite prom-

ises, except to indicate that obviously, having signed the Paris agreement, we would have an interest in its enforcement.

But I believe that what the President was talking about was a moral obligation, not a legal commitment. He was talking about something growing out of a 10-year engagement of the United States ended by our withdrawal, not about secret clauses in particular documents.

There is no question that when we were negotiating the agreement we ourselves believed that the American debate had not concerned economic or military aid; and I think if you check the record, there was no debate on that subject at the time.

The American debate had concerned the question of whether enough Americans had died there and whether the South Vietnamese should not be able to defend themselves, and I believe, in all fairness, we all have to admit to ourselves, that we all believed that if the South Vietnamese would make the effort to defend themselves, there would be great receptivity in this country to help them do it as long as our prisoners could come back and Americans could stop dying there. That was the assumption within which we were operating, and I think if you read the back files of newspapers and congressional debates, that was the essence of our debate at the time.

Therefore it was never put in the form of a legal commitment, and it is not that we are violating a legal commitment. It is the President's perception of the moral obligation growing out of the context of events.

I just want to say again, many of you have heard me brief on this subject now for six years, and I think none of you have ever heard me question the travail and concern of those who have opposed the war, and all we can ask is that those of you who have been critical ought to keep in mind that there is a great human tragedy that those in the Administration are viewing and they are trying to deal with it in the best interest of the United States and in the best interests of world peace.

Thank you.

TREATY INFORMATION

Current Actions

MULTILATERAL

Aviation

Protocol relating to an amendment to the convention on international civil aviation, as amended (TIAS 1591, 3756, 5170, 7616). Done at Vienna July 7, 1971. Entered into force December 19, 1974.
Proclaimed by the President: April 2, 1975.

Customs

Customs convention on containers, 1972, with annexes and protocol. Done at Geneva December 2, 1972.¹
Ratification deposited: Romania (with declaration), March 6, 1975.

Energy

Agreement on an international energy program. Done at Paris November 18, 1974.¹
Accession deposited: New Zealand, March 11, 1975.

Gas

Protocol for the prohibition of the use in war of asphyxiating, poisonous or other gases and of bacteriological methods of warfare. Done at Geneva June 17, 1925. Entered into force February 8, 1928.
Ratification deposited: United States, April 10, 1975 (with reservation).
Entered into force for the United States: April 10, 1975.

Meteorology

Convention of the World Meteorological Organization. Done at Washington October 11, 1947. Entered into force March 23, 1950. TIAS 2052.
Accession deposited: Qatar, April 4, 1975.

Ocean Dumping

Convention on the prevention of marine pollution by dumping of wastes and other matter, with annexes. Done at London, Mexico City, Moscow, and Washington December 29, 1972.¹
Ratification deposited: Mexico, April 7, 1975.

Oil Pollution

Amendments to the international convention for the prevention of pollution of the sea by oil, 1954, as amended (TIAS 4900, 6109). Adopted at London October 12, 1971.¹
Acceptance deposited: Greece, February 28, 1975.

¹ Not in force.

Amendments to the international convention for the prevention of pollution of the sea by oil, 1954, as amended (TIAS 4900, 6109). Adopted at London October 15, 1971.¹
Acceptance deposited: Greece, February 28, 1975.

Patents

Strasbourg agreement concerning the international patent classification. Done at Strasbourg March 24, 1971. Enters into force October 7, 1975.
Proclaimed by the President: April 2, 1975.

Program-Carrying Signals—

Distribution by Satellite

Convention relating to the distribution of programme-carrying signals transmitted by satellite. Done at Brussels May 21, 1974.¹
Signature: Yugoslavia, March 31, 1975.

Safety at Sea

Convention on the international regulations for preventing collisions at sea, 1972. Done at London October 20, 1972.¹
Accession deposited: Canada (with a declaration), March 7, 1975.

International convention for the safety of life at sea, 1974, with annex. Done at London November 1, 1974.¹
Signature: Spain (subject to ratification), March 4, 1975.

Sea, Exploration of

Convention for the International Council for the Exploration of the Sea. Done at Copenhagen September 12, 1964. Entered into force July 22, 1968; for the United States April 18, 1973. TIAS 7628. Protocol to the convention for the International Council for the Exploration of the Sea (TIAS 7628). Done at Copenhagen August 13, 1970.¹
Accession deposited: German Democratic Republic, February 17, 1975.

Tourism

Statutes of the World Tourism Organization (WTO). Done at Mexico City September 27, 1970. Entered into force November 1, 1974.²

Declarations of approval deposited: Bangladesh, February 19, 1975; Cuba, January 8, 1975; Czechoslovakia, February 10, 1975; Dahomey, December 31, 1974; Ecuador, February 11, 1975; El Salvador, February 11, 1975; Hungary, November 12, 1974; Israel, January 20, 1975; Poland, February 21, 1975; Uganda, December 12, 1974.

Wheat

Protocol modifying and further extending the wheat trade convention (part of the international wheat agreement) 1971 (TIAS 7144, 7988). Open for signature at Washington from March 25 through April 14, 1975. Enters into force June 19, 1975, with respect to certain provisions and July 1, 1975, with respect to other provisions.

Signatures: Mauritius, March 25, 1975; Brazil, March 31, 1975; Korea, April 3, 1975; Pakistan, April 4, 1975; Union of Soviet Socialist Republics (with statement) April 8, 1975; Algeria, Austria, Egypt, Guatemala, South Africa, United States, April 10, 1975; Australia, Finland, Morocco, April 11, 1975.

Protocol modifying and further extending the food aid convention (part of the international wheat agreement) 1971 (TIAS 7144, 7988). Open for signature at Washington from March 25 through April 14, 1975. Enters into force June 19, 1975, with respect to certain provisions and July 1, 1975, with respect to other provisions.

Signature: United States (with statement), April 10, 1975.

BILATERAL

Brazil

Agreement concerning shrimp, with annexes, agreed minutes, exchanges of notes and aide memoire. Signed at Brasilia March 14, 1975. Enters into force on the date mutually agreed by exchange of notes, upon completion of the internal procedures of both parties.

Chile

Agreement amending the agreement for sales of agricultural commodities of October 25, 1974 (TIAS 7993). Effected by exchange of notes at Santiago April 1, 1975. Entered into force April 1, 1975.

Italy

Treaty on extradition. Signed at Rome January 18, 1973. Entered into force March 11, 1975.
Proclaimed by the President: April 2, 1975.

Sri Lanka

Agreement for sales of agricultural commodities. Signed at Colombo March 25, 1975. Entered into force March 25, 1975.

¹ Not in force.

² Not in force for the United States.

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Release issued prior to April 7 which appears in this issue of the BULLETIN is No. 183 of April 5.

No.	Date	Subject
*184	4/7	Easum sworn in as Ambassador to Nigeria (biographic data).
*185	4/9	Shipping Coordinating Committee, Subcommittee on Safety of Life at Sea, May 5.
*186	4/9	Shipping Coordinating Committee, Subcommittee on Safety of Life at Sea, May 9.
*187	4/9	Bowlder sworn in as Ambassador to the Republic of South Africa (biographic data).
†188	4/9	U.S.-Colombia joint communique.
*189	4/10	Laise sworn in as Director General of the Foreign Service (biographic data).
	4/10	International Women's Year staff appointments.
*191	4/10	Overseas Schools Advisory Council, May 12.
*192	4/11	Shlaudeman sworn in as Ambassador to Venezuela (biographic data).
	4/11	Diplomatic note on Viet-Nam.
193A	4/11	Diplomatic note to North Viet-Nam.
*194	4/11	Ruckelshaus to chair Commission on the Observance of International Women's Year.
*194A	4/11	Agenda of Commission on the Observance of International Women's Year.
*194B	4/11	Members of Commission on the Observance of International Women's Year.
*195	4/11	U.S. and Jamaica extend textile agreement.
*196	4/11	Seven leaders in higher education to visit the Soviet Union.

* Not printed.

† Held for a later issue of the BULLETIN.

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THE DEPARTMENT OF STATE BULLETIN

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May 5, 1975

The Department of State BULLETIN, a weekly publication issued by the Office of Media Services, Bureau of Public Affairs, provides the public and interested agencies of the government with information on developments in the field of U.S. foreign relations and on the work of the Department and the Foreign Service.

The BULLETIN includes selected press releases on foreign policy, issues by the White House and the Department, and statements, addresses and news conferences of the President and the Secretary of State and other officers of the Department, as well as special articles on various phases of international affairs and the function of the Department. Information included concerning treaties and international agreements to which the United States is or may become a party and on treaties of general international interest.

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U.S. Foreign Policy: Finding Strength Through Adversity

Following is an address by Secretary Kissinger made before the American Society of Newspaper Editors at Washington on April 17, together with the transcript of a question-and-answer session after the address.

ADDRESS BY SECRETARY KISSINGER

Press release 204 dated April 17; as prepared for delivery

I am here to sound a note of hope about the future of our foreign policy despite the fact that we are now going through a period of adversity.

A nation facing setbacks can submerge itself in acrimony, looking for scapegoats rather than lessons. It can ignore or gloss over its difficulties and fatuously proceed as if nothing serious had happened.

Or it can examine its situation dispassionately, draw appropriate conclusions, and chart its future with realism and hope.

President Ford has chosen this latter course. A week ago he called upon Congress and the American people to turn this time of difficulty into a demonstration of spirit—to prove once again our devotion and our courage and to put these into the service of building a better world.

For the entire postwar period our strength and our leadership have been essential in preserving peace and promoting progress. If either falters, major shifts in political alignments will occur all around the world. The result will be new dangers for America's security and economic well-being. The Middle East war and oil embargo of 1973 demonstrated how distant events can threaten world peace and global prosperity simultaneously. A reduction of American influence

in key areas can have disastrous consequences.

How other nations perceive us is thus a matter of major consequence. Every day I see reports from our embassies relaying anguished questions raised by our friends. What do events in Indochina, the southern flank of NATO, and the Middle East signify for America's competence—constancy—credibility—coherence? How will Americans react? What are the implications for future American policy? We can be certain that potential adversaries are asking themselves the same questions—not with sympathy, but to estimate their opportunities.

It is fashionable to maintain that pointing to dangers produces a self-fulfilling prophecy, that the prediction of consequences brings them about. Unfortunately, life is not that simple. We cannot achieve credibility by rhetoric; we cannot manufacture coherence by proclamation; and we cannot change facts by not talking about them.

We can do little about the world's judgment of our past actions. But we have it within our power to take charge of our future: if the United States responds to adversity with dignity, if we make clear to the world that we continue to hold a coherent perception of a constructive international role and mean to implement it, we can usher in a new era of creativity and accomplishment. We intend to do just that.

I know that it is not easy for a people that faces major domestic difficulties to gear itself up for new international efforts. But our economic future is bound up with the rest of the world—and with international developments in energy, trade, and economic policy. Our economic health depends on the preservation of American leadership abroad.

This country has no choice. We must,

for our own sake, play a major role in world affairs. We have strong assets: a sound foreign policy design, major international achievements in recent years, and the enormous capacities of an industrious and gifted people. We have the resources, and the will, to turn adversity into opportunity.

Indochina

Let me start with our most tragic and immediate problem.

I can add nothing to the President's request for military and humanitarian assistance for the anguished people of South Viet-Nam. I support this appeal and have testified at length to that effect before congressional committees over the past several days.

The time will come when it will be clear that no President could do less than to ask aid for those whom we encouraged to defend their independence and at whose side we fought for over a decade. Then Americans will be glad that they had a President who refused to abandon those who desperately sought help in an hour of travail.

In Indochina our nation undertook a major enterprise for almost 15 years. We invested enormous prestige; tens of thousands died, and many more were wounded, imprisoned, and lost; we spent over \$150 billion; and our domestic fabric was severely strained. Whether or not this enterprise was well conceived does not now change the nature of our problem. When such an effort founders, it is an event of profound significance—for ourselves and for others.

I, for one, do not believe that it was ignoble to have sought to preserve the independence of a small and brave people. Only a very idealistic nation could have persevered in the face of so much discouragement.

But where so many think that the war was a dreadful mistake, where thousands grieve for those they loved and others sorrow over their country's setback, there has been sufficient heartache for all to share.

The Viet-Nam debate has now run its course. The time has come for restraint and compassion. The Administration has made

its case. Let all now abide by the verdict of the Congress—without recrimination or vindictiveness.

The Design

Let us therefore look to the future. We start with a sound foreign policy structure.

We are convinced that a continuing strong American role is indispensable to global stability and progress. Therefore the central thrust of our foreign policy has been to adjust our role in the world and the conceptions, methods, and commitments which define it to the conditions of a new era—including an America fatigued by Indochina.

The postwar order of international relations ended with the last decade. No sudden upheaval marked the passage of that era, but the cumulative change by the end of the 1960's was profound. Gone was the rigid bipolar confrontation of the cold war. In its place was a more fluid and complex world—with many centers of power, more subtle dangers, and new hopeful opportunities. Western Europe and Japan were stronger and more self-confident; our alliances needed to be adjusted toward a more equal partnership. The Communist world had fragmented over doctrine and national interests; there were promising prospects for more stable relations based on restraint and negotiation. And many of our friends in other parts of the globe were now better prepared to shoulder responsibility for their security and well-being, but they needed our assistance during the period of transition.

At home, the American people and Congress were weary from two decades of global exertion and years of domestic turmoil. They were not prepared for confrontation unless all avenues toward peace had been explored.

The challenge for our foreign policy has been to define an effective but more balanced U.S. role in the world, reducing excessive commitments without swinging toward precipitate and dangerous withdrawal.

We have come a long way.

Our major allies in the Atlantic world and Japan have grown in strength politically and economically; our alliances are firm anchors

of world security and prosperity. They are the basis for close cooperation on a range of unprecedented new problems, from détente to energy.

We have launched a hopeful new dialogue with Latin America.

We are looking to a new era of relations with Africa.

We have taken historic steps to stabilize and improve our relations with our major adversaries. We have reduced tensions, deepened dialogue, and reached a number of major agreements.

We have begun the process of controlling the rival strategic arms programs which, unconstrained, threaten global security. When the Vladivostok agreement is completed, a ceiling will have been placed for the first time on the level of strategic arsenals of the superpowers.

We have helped to ease longstanding political conflicts in such sensitive areas as Berlin and the Middle East.

And we have taken the major initiatives to mobilize the international response to new global challenges such as energy, food, the environment, and the law of the sea.

In all these areas the American role has frequently been decisive. The design still stands; our responsibilities remain. There is every prospect for major progress. There is every reason for confidence.

The Domestic Dimension

If this be true, what then is the cause of our problem? Why the setbacks? Why the signs of impasse between the executive and the Congress? What must we do to pull ourselves together?

Setbacks are bound to occur in a world which no nation alone can dominate or control. The peculiar aspect of many of our problems is that they are of our own making. Domestic division has either compounded or caused difficulties from the southern flank of NATO to the Pacific, from the eastern Mediterranean to relations between the superpowers.

Paradoxically, herein resides a cause for

optimism. For to the extent that the causes of our difficulties are within ourselves, so are the remedies.

The American people expect an effective foreign policy which preserves the peace and furthers our national interests. They want their leaders to shape the future, not just manage the present. This requires boldness, direction, nuance, and—above all—confidence between the public and the government and between the executive and the legislative branches of the government. But precisely this mutual confidence has been eroding over the past decade.

There are many causes for this state of affairs. Some afflict democracies everywhere; some are unique to America's tradition and recent history. Modern democracies are besieged by social, economic, and political challenges that cut across national boundaries and lie at the margin of governments' ability to control. The energies of leaders are too often consumed by the management of bureaucracy, which turns questions of public purpose into issues for institutional bargaining. Instant communications force the pace of events and of expectations. Persuasion, the essential method of democracy, becomes extraordinarily difficult in an era where issues are complex and outcomes uncertain. A premium is placed on simplification—an invitation to demagogues. Too often, the result is a disaffection that simultaneously debunks government and drains it of the very confidence that a democracy needs to act with conviction.

All of this has compounded the complex problem of executive-legislative relations. In every country, the authority of the modern state seems frustratingly impersonal or remote from those whose lives it increasingly affects; in nearly every democracy, executive authority is challenged by legislators who themselves find it difficult to affect policy except piecemeal or negatively. Issues become so technical that legislative oversight becomes increasingly difficult just as the issues become increasingly vital. The very essence of problem-solving on domestic issues—accommodation of special interests—robs foreign policy of consistency and focus

when applied to our dealings with other nations.

Statesmen must act, even when premises cannot be proved; they must decide, even when intangibles will determine the outcome. Yet predictions are impossible to prove; consequences avoided are never evident. Skepticism and suspicion thus become a way of life and infect the atmosphere of executive-legislative debate; reasoned arguments are overwhelmed by a series of confrontations on peripheral issues.

America faces as well the problem of its new generation. The gulf between their historical experience and ours is enormous. They have been traumatized by Viet-Nam as we were by Munich. Their nightmare is foreign commitment as ours was abdication from international responsibility. It is possible that both generations learned their lessons too well. The young take for granted the great postwar achievements in restoring Europe, building peacetime alliances, and maintaining global prosperity. An impersonal, technological, bureaucratized world provides them too few incentives for dedication and idealism.

Let us remember that America's commitment to international involvement has always been ambivalent—even while our doubts were being temporarily submerged by the exertions of World War II and the postwar era. The roots of isolationism, nourished by geography and history, go deep in the American tradition. The reluctance to be involved in foreign conflicts, the belief that we somehow defile ourselves if we engage in "power politics" and balances of power, the sense that foreign policy is a form of Old World imperialism, the notion that weapons are the causes of conflict, the belief that humanitarian assistance and participation in the economic order are an adequate substitute for political engagement—all these were familiar characteristics of the American isolationism of the twenties and thirties. We took our power for granted, attributed our successes to virtue, and blamed our failures on the evil of others. We disparaged means. In our foreign involvement we have oscillated between exuberance and exhaustion, be-

tween crusading and retreats into self-doubt. Following the Second World War a broad spectrum of civic leaders, professional groups, educators, businessmen, clergy, the media, congressional and national leaders of both parties led American public opinion to a new internationalist consensus. Taught by them and experience of the war, the nation understood that we best secured our domestic tranquillity and prosperity by enlightened participation and leadership in world affairs. Assistance to friends and allies was not a price to be paid, but a service to be rendered to international stability and therefore to our self-interest.

But in the last decade, as a consequence of Indochina and other frustrations of global engagement, some of our earlier impulses have reasserted themselves. Leadership opinion has, to an alarming degree, turned sharply against many of the internationalist premises of the postwar period. We now hear, and have for several years, that suffering is prolonged by American involvement, that injustice is perpetuated by American inaction, that defense spending is wasteful at best and produces conflict at worse, that American intelligence activities are immoral, that the necessary confidentiality of diplomacy is a plot to deceive the public, that flexibility is cynical and amoral—and that tranquillity is somehow to be brought about by an abstract purity of motive for which history offers no example.

This has a profound—and inevitable—impact on the national mood and on the national consensus regarding foreign policy. In the nation with the highest standard of living and one of the richest cultures in the world, in the nation that is certainly the most secure in the world, in the nation which has come closest of all to the ideals of civil liberty and pluralist democracy, we find a deep and chronic self-doubt, especially in the large urban centers and among presumptive leaders.

Will the American people support a responsible and active American foreign policy in these conditions? I deeply believe that they will—if their leaders, in and out of government, give them a sense that they have

something to be proud of and something important to accomplish.

When one ventures away from Washington into the heart of America, one is struck by the confidence, the buoyancy, and the lack of any corrosive cynicism. We who sit at what my friend Stewart Alsop, a great journalist, once called "the center" tend to dwell too much on our problems; we dissect in overly exquisite detail our difficulties and our disputes.

I find it remarkable that two-thirds of the Americans interviewed in a nationwide poll in December, at a time of severe recession, still thought an active role in the world served their country's interests better than withdrawal. Even as other nations are closely watching the way we act in Washington, I suspect they marvel at the resiliency of our people and our institutions.

There is a great reservoir of confidence within America. We have the values, the means, and we bear the responsibility to strive for a safer and better world. And there is a great reservoir of confidence around the globe in this country's values and strength.

Where Do We Go From Here?

So, let us learn the right lessons from today's trials.

We shall have to pay the price for our setbacks in Indochina by increasing our exertions. We no longer have the margin of safety. In the era of American predominance, America's preferences held great sway. We could overwhelm our problems with our resources. We had little need to resort to the style of nations conducting foreign policy with limited means: patience, subtlety, flexibility. Today, disarray, abdication of responsibility, or shortsightedness exact a price that may prove beyond our means.

We are still the largest single factor in international affairs, but we are one nation among many. The weight of our influence now depends crucially on our purposefulness, our perseverance, our creativity, our

power, and our perceived reliability. We shall have to work harder to establish the coherence and constancy of our policy—and we shall.

We must give up the illusion that foreign policy can choose between morality and pragmatism. America cannot be true to itself unless it upholds humane values and the dignity of the individual. But equally it cannot realize its values unless it is secure. No nation has a monopoly of justice or virtue, and none has the capacity to enforce its own conceptions globally. In the nuclear age especially, diplomacy—like democracy—often involves the compromise of clashing principles. I need not remind you that there are some 140 nations in the world, of which only a bare handful subscribe to our values.

Abstract moralism can easily turn into retreat from painful choices or endless interference in the domestic affairs of others; strict pragmatism, on the other hand, robs policy of vision and heart. Principles without security spell impotence; security without principles means irrelevance. The American people must never forget that our strength gives force to our principles and our principles give purpose to our strength.

Let us understand, too, the nature of our commitments. We have an obligation of steadfastness simply by virtue of our position as a great power upon which many others depend. Thus our actions and policies over time embody their own commitment whether or not they are enshrined in legal documents. Indeed, our actions and the perception of them by other countries may represent our most important commitments.

At the same time, diplomacy must be permitted a degree of confidentiality, or most serious exchange with other governments is destroyed. To focus the national debate on so-called secret agreements which no party has ever sought to implement and whose alleged subject matter has been prohibited by law for two years is to indulge what Mencken called the "national appetite for bogus revelation." It goes without saying that a commitment involving national action must be known to the Congress or it is meaningless.

One lesson we must surely learn from Viet-Nam is that new commitments of our nation's honor and prestige must be carefully weighed. As Walter Lippmann observed, "In foreign relations, as in all other relations, a policy has been formed only when commitments and power have been brought into balance." But after our recent experiences we have a special obligation to make certain that commitments we have made will be rigorously kept and that this is understood by all concerned. Let no ally doubt our steadfastness. Let no nation ever believe again that it can tear up with impunity a solemn agreement signed with the United States.

We must continue our policy of seeking to ease tensions. But we shall insist that the easing of tensions cannot occur selectively. We shall not forget who supplied the arms which North Viet-Nam used to make a mockery of its signature on the Paris accords.

Nor can we overlook the melancholy fact that not one of the other signatories of the Paris accords has responded to our repeated requests that they at least point out North Viet-Nam's flagrant violations of these agreements. Such silence can only undermine any meaningful standards of international responsibility.

At home, a great responsibility rests upon all of us in Washington.

Comity between the executive and legislative branches is the only possible basis for national action. The decade-long struggle in this country over executive dominance in foreign affairs is over. The recognition that the Congress is a coequal branch of government is the dominant fact of national politics today.

The executive accepts that the Congress must have both the sense and the reality of participation; foreign policy must be a shared enterprise. The question is whether the Congress will go beyond the setting of guidelines to the conduct of tactics; whether it will deprive the executive of discretion and authority in the conduct of diplomacy while at the same time remaining institutionally incapable of formulating or carrying out a clear national policy of its own.

The effective performance of our constitutional system has always rested on the restrained exercise of the powers and rights conferred by it. At this moment in our history there is a grave national imperative for a spirit of cooperation and humility between the two branches of our government.

Cooperation must be a two-way street. Just as the executive has an obligation to re-examine and then to explain its policies, so the Congress should reconsider the actions which have paralyzed our policies in the eastern Mediterranean, weakened our hand in relations with the U.S.S.R., and inhibited our dialogue in this hemisphere. Foreign policy must have continuity. If it becomes partisan, paralysis results. Problems are passed on to the future under progressively worse conditions.

When other countries look to the United States, they see one nation. When they look to Washington, they see one government. They judge us as a unit—not as a series of unrelated or uncoordinated institutions. If we cannot agree among ourselves, there is little hope that we can negotiate effectively with those abroad.

So one of the most important lessons to be drawn from recent events is the need to restore the civility of our domestic discourse. Over the years of the Viet-Nam debate rational dialogue has yielded to emotion, sweeping far beyond the issues involved. Not only judgments but motives have been called into question. Not only policy but character has been attacked. What began as consensus progressively deteriorated into poisonous contention.

Leaders in government must do their share. The Administration, following the President's example, will strive for moderation and mutual respect in the national dialogue. We know that if we ask for public confidence we must keep faith with the people.

Debate is the essence of democracy. But it can elevate the nation only if conducted with restraint.

The American people yearn for an end to the bitterness and divisiveness of the past

decade. Our domestic stability requires it. Our international responsibilities impose it.

You, in this audience, are today in a unique position to contribute to the healing of the nation.

The Coming Agenda

Ralph Waldo Emerson once said "No great man ever complains a want of opportunity." Neither does a great nation.

Our resources are vast; our leadership is essential; our opportunities are unprecedented and insistent.

The challenges of the coming decades will dwarf today's disputes. A new world order is taking shape around us. It will engulf us or isolate us if we do not act boldly. We cannot consume ourselves in self-destruction. We have great responsibilities:

—We must maintain the vigor of the great democratic alliances. They can provide the anchor of shared values and purposes as we grapple with a radically new agenda.

—We must overcome the current economic and energy crisis. A domestic energy program is thus an urgent national priority. Looking ahead, we envisage a fundamentally reformed international economic system, a Bretton Woods for the 1980's and beyond.

—We must stand up for what we believe in international forums, including the United Nations, and resist the politics of resentment, of confrontation, and stale ideology. International collaboration has a more vital role now than ever, but so has mutual respect among nations.

—We must meet our continuing responsibility for peace in many regions of the world, especially where we uniquely have the confidence of both sides and where failure could spell disaster beyond the confines of the region, as in the Middle East. We will not be pushed by threats of war or economic pressure into giving up vital interests. But equally, we will not, in the President's words, "accept stagnation or stalemate with all its attendant risks to peace and prosperity."¹

—We must stop the spiral, and the spread, of nuclear weapons. We can then move on

to a more ambitious agenda: mutual reductions in strategic arms, control of other weaponry, military restraint in other environments.

—We must overcome two scourges of mankind: famine and the vagaries of nature. We reaffirm the food program announced at the World Food Conference last November. Our fundamental challenge is to help others feed themselves so that no child goes to bed hungry in the year 2000.

—We must continue to reduce conflict and tensions with our adversaries. Over time, we hope that vigilance and conciliation will lead to more positive relationships and ultimately a true global community.

—We must insure that the oceans and space become areas of cooperation rather than conflict. We can then leave to future generations vast economic and technological resources to enrich life on this earth.

Our nation is uniquely endowed to play a creative and decisive role in the new order which is taking form around us. In an era of turbulence, uncertainty, and conflict, the world still looks to us for a protecting hand, a mediating influence, a path to follow. It sees in us, most of all, a tradition and vision of hope. Just as America has symbolized for generations man's conquest of nature, so too has America—with its banner of progress and freedom—symbolized man's mastery over his own future.

For the better part of two centuries our forefathers, citizens of a small and relatively weak country, met adversity with courage and imagination. In the course of their struggle they built the freest, richest, and most powerful nation the world has ever known. As we, their heirs, take America into its third century, as we take up the unprecedented agenda of the modern world, we are determined to rediscover the belief in ourselves that characterized the most creative periods in our country.

We have come of age, and we shall do our duty.

¹For President Ford's address before a joint session of the Congress on Apr. 10, see BULLETIN of Apr. 28, 1975, p. 529.

Q. Arnold Rosenfeld, the Dayton Daily News. After the last round of Middle East talks, the Administration gave the impression that the burden of the failure of the talks rested mostly with Israel. If that implication was deliberate, on what specific points was Israel less forthcoming than Egypt; and what has been your personal recommendation to the Administration concerning the large grant of military aid subsequently asked by Israel?

Secretary Kissinger: The Administration statement had emphasized the fact that the responsibility for negotiations that are completed is rather difficult to apportion because it leads to very complicated assessments. And I don't think any useful purpose is served now by rehearsing all the complicated elements that went into this negotiation.

The major thrust of the assessment that is now going on concerns the direction of our diplomacy in the Middle East as we have to prepare, as a result of the suspension of these talks, for a more multilateral diplomacy. We have to develop a position for the Geneva Conference, when it takes place, and we have to approach the problem of relationships with many of the participants in the Middle East crisis.

The problem of assistance to Israel will be seen in that context. But as I have pointed out in my first press conference after I returned from the Middle East, the American commitment to the survival of Israel will not be affected and cannot be affected by this reassessment.

Q. Mr. Secretary, Charles Withers, Rochester, Minnesota, Post Bulletin. We had two prominent Democratic Senators who spoke to us this morning. One of them, Senator [Lloyd M.] Bentsen, was asked in a question how would he conduct foreign policy if he were elected President. He said the first thing he would do would be to put an end to one-man, personalized foreign policy. A bit earlier than that, Senator [Henry M.] Jackson was asked how he thinks the Mid-

dle East crisis should be settled or what should be done about it, and he said we should end this "Mickey Mouse" shuttle diplomacy and get the parties to the conference table. I wonder if you might have any comment on these observations by the Senators? [Laughter.]

Secretary Kissinger: Well, I understand the problem of the two gentlemen having to campaign for 18 months. [Laughter and applause.]

With respect to the last point, of getting the parties around the conference table—during World War II somebody suggested that the way to deal with the submarine problem was to heat the ocean and to boil them to the surface. [Laughter.] So he was asked how to do this. He said, "I have given you the idea. The technical implementation is up to you." [Laughter and applause.]

Q. Mr. Secretary, I'm Bill Mullen, Pompano Beach, Florida, Sun Sentinel. Do not the events in Southeast Asia attest to the tightening of Communist encirclement of the free world and the shrinking of our influence?

Secretary Kissinger: Events in Southeast Asia indicate many things. But they include the fact that the question of whether a terminal date should be put to assistance was obviously not asked by the Communist allies of Hanoi as insistently as it was asked in the United States. And this was certainly a factor in the development of the situation.

Now, we can ask a measure of restraint from the Communist countries. But I don't think détente has yet reached the point where we can ask them to reduce their aid to their allies when we reduce our aid to our allies.

But the impact of events is as I tried to describe it in my speech. It will require greater efforts from us and a greater determination to achieve a coherent foreign policy.

Q. Secretary Kissinger, my name is Dick Smyser, from the Oak Ridger, Oak Ridge, Tennessee. Senator Jackson, in his remarks

tion. And he has my full support.

Q. Mr. Secretary, there have been rumors of late pertaining to your possible resignation. There indeed has been some suggestion from editorial writers that you do that. My question is, today is it your intention to serve at least until after the 1976 Presidential election?

Secretary Kissinger: Well, as far as editorial writers are concerned, I can understand that even editorial writers cannot be right a hundred percent of the time. These stories of my resignation arise from time to time to sustain the morale of some of my closer associates [laughter] and even of some of our Ambassadors. But I have no intention of resigning. And I will serve as long as this is considered useful by the President.

Q. Mr. Secretary, Hodding Carter of Delta Democrat-Times of Greenville, Mississippi. You said very eloquently that the Viet-Nam debate has now run its course—we must look to the future without recrimination and vindictiveness. Do you agree that anyone who attempts to make it a good campaign issue in 1976 would be doing a disservice to the United States?

Secretary Kissinger: Well, Vice President Rockefeller, whom you are referring to, is a close friend of mine whom I admire enormously. I do not believe that he intends to make it an issue in the 1976 campaign. I have only seen fragmentary reports of comments. I think he was stating a general view of what might happen. I have stated the view of the Administration, which is shared by all high officials.

We must now, while this debate is going on, defend our view with respect to military and humanitarian assistance. We will accept the verdict of the Congress without recrimination and without scapegoating. And this will be our attitude.

Howard H. Hays, President, ASNE: We have time for one more question.

Secretary Kissinger: That's usually the one that destroys me. [Laughter.]

this morning, referred to the high Administration official who always seems to be on the Secretary of State's plane. In all seriousness, I would like to ask you how you think the comments that come from this high Administration official serve the Secretary of State, the press, and most of all, the public.

Secretary Kissinger: Well, my experience is that that high official almost always agrees with the Secretary of State. [Laughter.] And therefore it serves the coherence of the public presentation of American foreign policy.

The problem that exists when 14 or 15 members of the press travel with the Secretary of State is quite different from the relationship of the Secretary with the press here in Washington. When there has to be a daily briefing, it can be done in two ways—either by a spokesman on the record or by some of the chief actors on background. And in the particular circumstances of a delicate negotiation, I think that this arrangement has worked reasonably well, as long as the senior spokesman and the Secretary agree with each other. [Laughter.]

Q. Mr. Secretary, I am John McCormally, of the Burlington, Iowa, Hawkeye. The PRG [Provisional Revolutionary Government] has charged there are as many as 25,000 Americans in South Viet-Nam. The Secretary of Defense has put the figure at about 3,800. How many are there, and are you satisfied with Ambassador [Graham] Martin's handling of the situation?

Secretary Kissinger: First, the number that was there before we started reductions did not exceed 6,000. The number is now somewhat below 4,000. We are, as the President pointed out yesterday, attempting to reduce nonessential personnel. Ambassador Martin has an extraordinarily difficult job—to maintain the morale and the confidence of the government to which he is accredited and at the same time to reduce to the greatest extent possible the risks to the Americans in South Viet-Nam. He is discharging this responsibility with great skill and with great dignity in an extraordinarily difficult situa-

Q. Mr. Secretary, Robert Phelps of the *Boston Globe*.

Secretary Kissinger: I knew it. [Laughter.]

Q. I have what we like to call a two-pronged question. The first prong is this: Have you or has the U.S. Government directly or indirectly been in touch with the North Vietnamese regarding the possibility of evacuating South Vietnamese who have aided the United States and who would be endangered in case of the North Vietnamese and Viet Cong takeover? And the second prong is this: If you have, or if you haven't, would be willing to—would you favor a termination of—would you be willing to offer this: a termination of U.S. aid, economic and military, to South Viet-Nam in exchange for a free evacuation of those who would be in danger—South Vietnamese?

Secretary Kissinger: With respect to the second part of your question, it is the Administration's view that we will not make the decision for the South Vietnamese as to how long and under what circumstances they should resist. And we believe strongly that it will be seen to have been the right and honorable thing to do to ask for continued assistance to a people whom we encouraged and at whose side we fought, knowing all the passions and all the difficulties involved.

And we have therefore opposed a terminal date.

With respect to the first question, if the worst should come to pass and if it were not possible to stabilize the situation, we feel we have a moral obligation to help in the evacuation of many of those whose association with us now endangers their lives. How to bring this about and by what steps and at what period is an extraordinarily delicate question. And it is one that I really cannot answer in an open press conference.

Thank you very much.

U.S. Expresses Sadness at Fall of Government of Khmer Republic

Statement by President Ford¹

The United States views the fall of the Government of the Khmer Republic with sadness and compassion.

I wish to express my admiration for the Cambodian Government leaders and people, who showed great courage until the end, and to their armed forces, who fought valiantly with their remaining supplies.

¹ Issued Apr. 17 (text from White House press release).

President Ford Interviewed at Convention of American Society of Newspaper Editors

*Following are excerpts from the transcript of an interview with President Ford by a panel of editors and publishers at the annual convention of the American Society of Newspaper Editors at Washington on April 16.*¹

President Ford: I am very, very pleased to be with you today and to have this opportunity to continue a dialogue which has been my pleasure in many parts of the country with many of you in various regional meetings during the past few months.

Those exchanges and the one which will begin shortly are exceedingly valuable to me in providing an insight into the attitudes and the concerns of the people who are your readers and my constituents.

Before answering the questions put to me by the distinguished panel, let me add, if I might, a few comments to the speech that I made to the Congress last Thursday night, and to the American people.

Let me, if I might, express in broad terms some deep beliefs that I have.

First, I firmly believe that the United States must play a very major role in world affairs in the years ahead. It is a great and difficult responsibility, but it is one, in my judgment, that our nation must continue to have.

This has been my conviction, going back to my first political campaign in the fall of 1948. It was my conviction when I took my first oath of office on January 3, 1949. For a period of better than 25 years in the Congress—as a Member of the House and part of that time as a leadership role in the minority party—it has been my conviction.

¹For the complete transcript, see White House press release dated Apr. 16.

As long as I am President of the United States I will seek to carry on that very important responsibility of our country. I believe to be successful in this effort, this endeavor, the Congress and the President must work together.

It is my belief that if we are to be successful in the achievement of success in the area of foreign policy, the American people, to the degree that they can, must be united.

I also believe that our foreign policy, if you look at the record—at least during the period that I was honored to be a part of our government in the Congress or in the executive branch—that our foreign policy has been a successful one.

Of course, there have been some instances where we did not achieve all that we sought, in some cases because the circumstances were well beyond our control. In a few instances where we have not been as successful as we would have liked, I think we self-inflicted some problems that helped to bring that unfortunate result.

I also believe to maintain peace and to insure it, certainly in the future, the United States must remain strong militarily. We must have a broad, strong, well-led military establishment—and I include in that an intelligence system that can be extremely helpful to me and to Presidents in the future.

I believe also that we must work with friend and foe alike. We have many, many friends throughout the world. We have some potential adversaries, and we have some that are true adversaries. But if we are to achieve what we all want, we have to work with all.

It is my strong belief that we can achieve unity at home. I see no reason why the Congress and the President cannot work together. That doesn't mean that all 535

Members of the House and Senate will agree with me, but I can assure you that what I have said on more than one occasion I believe and I will try to implement, that I will work with the Congress and I know many, if not all, in the Congress will try to work with me.

If we do get this unity at home and if we do develop a closer relationship between the President and the Congress, I think we can continue a successful foreign policy in building a better world and achieving, on a more permanent basis, peace for all.

Thank you very much.

Mr. Reston [James B. Reston, member of the board and columnist, New York Times].

Q. Mr. President, two points. There is a story on the ticker this morning out of Geneva that the Cambodian Government has asked for a cease-fire and that this information has been passed to Prince Sihanouk in Peking. Could you tell us anything about that, sir?

President Ford: Mr. Reston, I just received a note from one of my staff members, Ron Nessen, indicating that we had gotten the information after I had left the White House to the effect that the Cambodian Government has communicated with Sihanouk indicating that the Cambodian Government will work with the Khmer Rouge to try and negotiate a settlement.

It is my recollection, from a quick look at that information that was given to me at the luncheon table, that Prince Sihanouk is in no position to really achieve or accomplish the results that we all want; namely, a negotiated settlement in that unfortunate situation.

I can only say from our point of view we will help in any way we can to further negotiations to end that conflict.

Q. On that same point, could I ask you whether you have been in touch with the North Vietnamese about a cease-fire in South Viet-Nam or with any other governments to try to bring that about?

President Ford: Over a period of time we have communicated with all of the signa-

tories of the Paris accords, which were signed in January of 1973. The efforts that we have made are broad and comprehensive, and when I say we have indicated our feelings to all signatories, of course that includes the North Vietnamese.

Mr. Funk [R. D. Funk, editor, Santa Monica, Calif., Outlook].

Q. Mr. President, is the United States in direct contact now, in a situation of negotiation, with the North Vietnamese for a cease-fire around Saigon?

President Ford: We are not in direct negotiations in that regard.

Q. Thank you.

Q. Mr. President, when a delegation of the American Society of Newspaper Editors was in China the last time around, there was considerable emphasis placed by the Chinese leaders, leading all the way from Premier Chou on down, that no firm relationship with the United States was possible until Taiwan, so to speak, was taken out of the picture and placed under Chinese rule. You are going back to China. Is that on your agenda?

President Ford: The relationship between the United States and the People's Republic of China, which was reopened several years ago, is predicated on the Shanghai communique. This relationship is continuing, I would say, on schedule.

I am going back to the People's Republic of China late this fall. I was there for about two weeks in June and July of 1972. I would say that no firm agenda for that forthcoming meeting has been established. So, I am not in a position to comment directly on the question that you ask.

Q. Mr. President, you have reaffirmed your confidence in the present American foreign policy, but I wonder if you could expand on that just a little bit. Are we committed to containing communism around the world? Are we committed to a heavy program of economic aid? Are we committed to a heavy program of military aid? Will we get into armed intervention in desperate cases?

President Ford: We are committed to a furtherance of a policy of détente with the Soviet Union. I think that policy is in our mutual interests. It won't solve all the problems where either we or they are involved, but it has helped to reduce tensions. It has helped in other ways where our joint cooperation could be helpful.

We do, as a country, at least while I am President, expect to continue our relationship with Western Europe, with NATO. We hope to strengthen it. We hope to eliminate some of the current problems, such as the problem between Greece and Turkey at the present time over Cyprus.

We do expect to continue working in the Middle East, which includes some economic aid, some military assistance for various countries in that area of the world.

I think we have an obligation to continue to have a presence in the Pacific, in Latin America, in Africa. It is my judgment that in each of these cases we will probably continue both economic and military assistance on a selective basis.

I am not saying this is the containment of communism. It is a furtherance of the policy of the United States aimed at our security and the maintenance of peace on a global basis.

Q. Mr. President, in response to Mr. Kirkpatrick's [Clayton Kirkpatrick, editor, Chicago Tribune] question, you mentioned our policy of détente in an affirmative way. The Chinese and Russian military aid to the North Vietnamese has been placed at approximately \$1.5 billion. My question is, doesn't that or does that violate the spirit of détente, and if so, of what purpose is détente?

President Ford: I think it is worthwhile to point out that none of the signatories to the Paris accords have sought to enforce the violations [provisions] of those accords, including, of course, the People's Republic of China and the Soviet Union.

In the agreement that was signed in Paris in January of 1973, the United States, as part of its agreement with South Viet-Nam, agreed to supply replacement war materiel,

to give economic aid.

The Soviet Union and the People's Republic of China, I assume, made the same commitment to North Viet-Nam.

It appears that they have maintained that commitment. Unfortunately, the United States did not carry out its commitment in the supplying of military hardware and economic aid to South Viet-Nam.

I wish we had. I think if we had, this present tragic situation in South Viet-Nam would not have occurred.

But I don't think we can blame the Soviet Union and the People's Republic of China in this case. If we had done with our ally what we promised, I think this whole tragedy could have been eliminated.

Nevertheless we hope to and are working through the countries that are a part or were a part of the Paris accords to try and achieve a cease-fire, and will continue to do so.

Q. On that point, you have asked for more than \$700 million worth of military aid. There is some obvious psychological and symbolic reason for simply asking, but militarily speaking, if you could get the package through Congress and get it to South Viet-Nam, would it militarily do any good at this point?

President Ford: I am absolutely convinced if Congress made available \$722 million in military assistance in a timely way by the date that I suggested, or sometime shortly thereafter, the South Vietnamese could stabilize the military situation in Viet-Nam today.

Q. Mr. President, you keep talking about commitments and promises, and we are getting hung up on these words. In the light of this controversy, why should the Thieu-Nixon correspondence not be released?

President Ford: It is not the usual custom for correspondence between heads of state, as I understand it, to be released. I can say from my own experience, not referring to the correspondence to which you refer, that if it is expected that such correspondence

will be public, I think on some occasions, or in some instances, you would have to compromise on what you would say. I think that would be true of any correspondence that I received from any other head of state. If you are going to have a frank, free exchange, I think it has to be between the heads of states.

Now, I have personally reviewed the correspondence to which you refer between President Nixon and President Thieu, and I can assure you that there was nothing in any of those communications that was different from what was stated as our public policy. The words are virtually identical, with some variation, of course, but the intent, the commitments are identical with that which was stated as our country's policy and our country's commitment.

Q. Sir, on that question of your trip to Red China that Mr. Isaacs [Norman Isaacs, president and publisher, Wilmington, Del., News Journal] raised, it seems that down the road it has been speculated that the policy or the purpose of détente is to establish normal diplomatic relations with a country that you described last Thursday as having one-quarter of the population of the world. That would assume the establishment of an embassy in Peking, which would automatically assume the de-recognition, of some kind, of Taiwan. If that is in the cards, what kind of guarantees would you seek, what kind of quid pro quo would you seek from Peking to insure the continued existence of Taiwan?

President Ford: I honestly don't believe that I should discuss, under these circumstances, any of the agenda or any of the details of the continuation of our relations with the People's Republic of China.

We have excellent relations, as I am sure you know, with the Republic of China. We value that relationship. We are concerned, of course, and will continue to be concerned about the Republic of China's security and stability.

And it doesn't seem to me at this time in this forum that I should discuss any nego-

tiations that might take place between the United States and the People's Republic of China.

Q. It is our policy for the continued existence and guarantee of the defense of Taiwan. Is that our continuing policy?

President Ford: I said, and if I might I would more or less repeat it, we do value that relationship between the United States and the Republic of China. I think that is best indicated by the high-level delegation that I sent for the funeral services of Chiang Kai-shek.² I believe that having sent Vice President Rockefeller there, with the others that were included, is a clear indication that we consider our relationship, our cooperation, with the Republic of China a matter of very, very great importance to us.

Q. Mr. President, there have been some conflicting news stories out of Viet-Nam about the possible, if it is necessary, evacuation of not only Americans but of South Vietnamese nationals from Saigon. Is there any plan or policy about such evacuation?

President Ford: I have ordered the evacuation of all nonessential U.S. personnel in South Viet-Nam, and we are phasing down on a daily basis such U.S. personnel who have no responsibilities either for the government or for whatever other purpose they are there.

The present plan is to keep those there who have a position of responsibility, a meaningful job. I am not in the position to speculate as to how many that will be or when there might be a change in the situa-

² Vice President Rockefeller headed the U.S. delegation to the funeral of President Chiang. Other members of the delegation were Senators Barry M. Goldwater, Arizona, and Hiram L. Fong, Hawaii; Representative Roy A. Taylor, North Carolina; Anna Chennault of Washington, D.C., vice president for international affairs, Flying Tiger Lines, Inc.; Jack M. Eckerd of Clearwater, Fla., chairman of the board, Jack Eckerd Corp.; Dr. Arnold O. Beckman of Newport, Calif., president, Beckman Instruments; Walter P. McConaughy of Atlanta, Ga., former Ambassador to the Republic of China; Dr. Walter H. Judd of Washington, D.C., former Representative from Minnesota.

tion. I think it is too fluid at this moment to make any categorical comment.

Q. That is speaking about Americans, and I think we understand that. But is there any policy about the potential evacuation of South Vietnamese?

President Ford: Excuse me. In my speech last Thursday, I indicated there are a number of South Vietnamese who, over a period of almost two decades, have stood with us in various official capacities—longtime employees of the Federal Government, our government, who have been dedicated to the cause that not I, but a number of Presidents, have pursued.

I think we have an obligation to them. To the extent that I can under the law or, hopefully, if the law is clarified, I think we have a responsibility to them. But I don't think I ought to talk about an evacuation. I hope we are in a position where we can clarify or stabilize the situation and get a negotiated settlement that wouldn't put their lives in jeopardy.

Q. Mr. President, you have talked a great deal about the moral obligation of this country to provide more military arms for South Viet-Nam. But what about the moral obligation to the suffering people of that country, the moral obligation to end that war?

President Ford: Mr. Reston, the agreement which was signed, I think, by 12 nations in January of 1973 in Paris—and I was there, I saw the signing—was accomplished with the expectation that that war would end. If the agreement had been lived up to, the war would not now be going on.

We have continued in various ways to try and achieve a cease-fire, and I can assure you that we intend to continue those efforts.

But it is tragic, in my judgment, that what everybody thought was good in January of 1973 has been violated and now we are faced with a terrible catastrophe at the present time.

Q. But would we not then a year from

now, or five years from now, still have the same moral obligation you speak of?

President Ford: It is my best judgment, based on experts within the Administration, both economic and military, that if we had made available for the next three years reasonable sums of military aid and economic assistance that South Viet-Nam would have been viable, that it could have met any of its economic problems, could have met any military challenges.

This is another of the tragedies. For just a relatively small additional commitment in economic and military aid, relatively small compared to the \$150 billion that we spent, that at the last minute of the last quarter we don't make that special effort, and now we are faced with this human tragedy. It just makes me sick every day I hear about it, read about it, and see it.

United States Mourns Death of Chiang Kai-shek

Chiang Kai-shek, President of the Republic of China, died at Taipei April 5. Following is a statement by President Ford issued that day at Palm Springs, Calif.

White House press release (Palm Springs) dated April 5

I was deeply saddened at the death of the President of the Republic of China, Chiang Kai-shek. His passing marks the end of an era in Chinese history.

President Chiang was a man of firm integrity, high courage, and deep political conviction. The last surviving major Allied leader of the Second World War, he will be remembered by people from all walks of life and from every part of the world for his dignity and dedication to principles in which he believed.

Mrs. Ford joins me in behalf of all Americans in expressing our sincere condolence to Madame Chiang, to President Chiang's family, and to his countrymen in this time of sorrow.

The National Interest and National Strength

*Address by President Ford*¹

This year especially, as we prepare for the celebration of our Bicentennial, it would be good for all Americans to do some soul-searching about where we are going as a nation and what we are doing with the precious heritage of freedom that we inherited. This is a good time both to look backward and to look forward—a good time to take stock.

In so doing, we should not fall into the trap of blind nostalgia—of persuading ourselves that America's best years are behind us. There is a lot of negative talk like that going around in Washington and elsewhere. I think it can best be answered in one word: Nonsense.

The truth is that if we were to somehow travel back in time together to the American Revolution, we might be more shocked by the similarities than by the differences. If anything, times were tougher then.

We were a divided people. Many historians estimate the colonists were split into three factions: those who favored independence, those who supported the royal cause, and those who straddled the fence waiting to see which side would win.

Inflation was more than a serious problem during the American Revolution. It was a near-fatal disease. Printing-press money, the so-called Continental dollar, was only worth a fraction of its paper value. Many farmers and merchants refused to accept it even from hungry American soldiers trying to buy provisions.

Too often, American armies were defeated, defeated in battle, and driven to humiliating retreats. Disease, lack of equipment, and lack of training were chronic. We were dependent on foreign assistance for many of our weapons, uniforms, and equipment—and even for foreign advisers to train our troops.

If the French Government had not spent millions to help equip American forces and if we had not been assisted by a French army and a fleet at Yorktown, the American Revolution might have dragged on inconclusively for many, many years.

Yet, out of all of the suffering and uncertainty, a new nation was born and grew up into one of the biggest and most powerful nations in the history of the world.

Character had a lot to do with it—the courage and vision of men like Washington, shared by thousands of soldiers and the valiant, patriotic women who sustained their fighting men, as they have in all struggles, with their work and with their prayers.

Values were also very, very important—the moral imperatives and political ideals that were expressed with such eloquence by Patrick Henry and Thomas Jefferson and with such clarity by Alexander Hamilton and James Madison.

And divine providence also had something to do with it. Nor were our forefathers ashamed to acknowledge their debt to this source of strength in their dire time of trouble. Call it divine providence or call it destiny, 13 small colonies clustered along the Atlantic coast somehow managed to produce one of the most brilliant generations of leaders known to history—the soldiers and

¹ Made before the 84th Continental Congress of the Daughters of the American Revolution at Washington on Apr. 15 (text from White House press release; introductory paragraphs omitted).

the statesmen we know as the founders of this great country.

But even more remarkable than the genius of the founders themselves is the fact that generation after generation of Americans have continued to build on the foundation that they left us. Fortunately for us and for the world, we have never lost sight of their great dream.

Other countries, of course, have had brilliant leaders. But no other country can point to two centuries dedicated to expanding and perfecting a continuing revolution in a free society.

This is what makes America unique in the history of nations.

And that is why, although our experience in Indochina has been one of heroic sacrifices and great disappointments, I am convinced that we can and will emerge from this ordeal stronger and wiser as a nation, just as we have from others even greater in the past.

This brings me to the soul-searching—the inventory of opportunities, of challenges before us today. How do we stand today? Are we still on the right course?

It would be impossible for me in the time here to go over every single issue—political, military, diplomatic, and economic—that this question raises, so let me focus, if I might, on just one of them—our national defense.

I ask this question: Are we strong enough today? And, just as important, will we be strong enough tomorrow?

The Importance of a Strong Defense Posture

According to a recent poll, some Americans have questions about our world position and the cost of maintaining that position. The poll indicated that Americans want the United States, and I quote, “to play an active role in the world.” Yet, at the same time, they believe the defense budget should be reduced. Some want it emasculated. Americans still believe that being strong militarily is important. They want, in the words of the poll’s report, “a powerful and militarily secure standing for the United States in the world.” What they don’t like is the price tag that comes with it.

This is a basic dilemma. When a nation wants to achieve contradictory goals, such as military security and less defense spending, sooner or later citizens must make a choice.

It is becoming fashionable in some quarters to charge that military force is outmoded in the modern world. It is argued, for example, that modern weaponry, especially nuclear armaments, are too destructive to use and that therefore they won’t ever be used.

Further, it is argued, when we have applied military power it has not produced the results we wanted, such as in Southeast Asia.

Finally, it is said that we are unlikely to be attacked in any event. Détente, according to this kind of reasoning, guarantees that future conflicts will be nonviolent ones which may be settled by negotiation.

It is my judgment that these arguments ignore a basic fact of international politics, one that has been proven repeatedly throughout history: National interest can be guarded only by national strength. In a conflict-ridden world, national strength in the broadest sense must be supported by military strengths.

It is often overlooked that détente—the process of reducing tensions with the U.S.S.R.—has been possible only because of U.S. strength and U.S. resolve.

It was after a prolonged period of cold war testing and confrontation, during which the United States and the rest of the Western world stood fast, that it became possible to move forward with the U.S.S.R. in negotiations aimed at reducing the chances for grave miscalculations and reducing the risk of nuclear war.

In these negotiations, we have safeguarded our vital defense interests. To weaken our defenses is to weaken one of the foundations of détente.

A posture of deliberate weakness is most dangerous when the worldwide military balance threatens to deteriorate, but at any time weakness would be folly for the United States, a great nation with interests spanning the globe.

If we were to cut ourselves back to such a

weak posture, as some recommend, we would soon find ourselves paying an unacceptable price. We cannot shrink our economy back to pre-1939 dimensions. We cannot turn our back on the rest of the world as we foolishly sought to do in the 1930's.

Like it or not, we are a great power, and our real choice is whether to succeed or fail in a role we cannot shirk. There is no other nation in the whole free world capable of stepping into our role.

If we conclude, as I believe we must, that we still need a strong national defense, the next issue is quite obvious: How much and what kind?

The answer depends on continuing vigilant assessment of the defenses needed to safeguard this great nation, an assessment measured in terms of the intentions and capabilities of potential adversaries and the common strength forged by our alliances.

Strategic Arms Balance

Our nuclear deterrent must be gauged against the nuclear capabilities and intentions of others and, in particular, the Soviet Union. It is for this reason that the SALT [Strategic Arms Limitation Talks] negotiations and the Vladivostok agreements I signed with General Secretary Brezhnev are of such importance. We are working responsibly to put a cap on the nuclear arms race. Similarly, the amount and the type of conventional forces required will depend on our continuing ability to maintain a truly effective national defense.

It will also depend on our ability to meet our security commitments and on our ability with our allies to work with the Warsaw Pact nations toward reduction in forces, which will increase the prospect for international stability.

It is of fundamental importance to both the United States and to the world that the strategic balance be maintained, and strategic nuclear forces are the foundation of our defense.

We will work toward further strategic arms limitations. We will maintain a strategic arms balance.

Neither we, nor our allies, can afford the consequences if this fundamental balance shifts against us. I promise you that no defense budget I submit to the Congress will ever sell us short or shift the balance against the United States of America.

I respectfully call upon each and every Member of the Congress, House and Senate, to make the same pledge; for our survival as a nation could well depend upon it. I call upon you to let your Senators and Congressmen know how you feel individually and collectively. Let us never forget this: that our Pledge of Allegiance is to "one nation indivisible," not one nation indefensible.

NATO Security and Conventional Forces

In the area of conventional forces, we also confront some difficult challenges. Our troops in Europe, for example, are a key element in shielding Europe from military attacks or pressures of one kind or another. Present force levels are necessary to maintain a satisfactory conventional military balance between the alliance on the one hand and the Warsaw Pact nations on the other.

Unilateral reductions by the United States would upset that balance and constitute a major political change. The United States has agreed with our allies that there will be no unilateral troop reductions, except through mutual negotiations.

Our troop levels in that part of the world are not an obstacle to improved East-West relations in Europe. On the contrary, a stable military balance has been the starting point for hopeful new diplomacy.

For their part, the Europeans contribute the largest part of the conventional defense of the alliance. Unilateral U.S. reductions would undercut their efforts and would undermine confidence in the United States for the support of the alliance.

There are two other crucial areas of conventional forces necessary to maintain our side of the strategic balance: one, our long-range air capability, and sea power.

If we are to sustain our ability to react appropriately to threats to our interests from faraway shores, we may need to in-

crease our already considerable abilities to airlift troops and supplies long distances.

The United States and its allies depend heavily on the freedom of the seas for trade and for commerce. Thus, it is vital for us to maintain a full range of capabilities on the many oceans of the world.

Last summer, the Atlantic alliance celebrated its 25th year—a quarter of a century anniversary—25 years of peace through strength on the European Continent. To mark the occasion and to reaffirm our collective resolve, we joined with other member nations in a Declaration of Atlantic Relations. I will be meeting personally with allied leaders in the very near future to seek further progress toward our common goal—a peaceful and a secure free world.

But neither NATO nor the United States can guarantee a peaceful and secure free world if we allow our defenses to erode.

Keeping America Strong

Now, what about the price tag? What is it costing us to maintain our military strength? Critics of a strong defense say that the defense budget is higher than ever. But the truth is—and this we must understand and we must tell others—in terms of what each dollar will buy, the defense budget is now lower than any time since 1964, prior to our Viet-Nam buildup.

The reason for this is that inflation has taken just as high a toll of the defense dollar's purchasing power as it has from every family, from every business, from every community. Take away the effects of inflation and real pay increases, which are necessary to recruit our new all-volunteer forces, and what is left of the defense budget has actually declined in purchasing power during the last four years.

For example, in 1968, defense spending represented about 60 percent of our total Federal Government spending. Today, it is down to about 27 percent.

We cannot afford, as I see it, to let our defense strength slide down while other nations build up their forces. It is the obligation, as I see it, of each of us to keep America

strong—the obligation of the Congress, of this Administration, and of each American concerned about the future of his or her great country.

And I pledge to you as solemnly and as strongly as I can that I will do my part, and I am sure each and every one of you will do your part.

A great hero who led our people both in war and in peace, Dwight Eisenhower, once said that “a true posture of defense is composed of three factors—spiritual, military, and economic.”

We have the economic and industrial strength it takes to keep America a first-rate power.

Spiritual strength is less tangible. It is hard to measure in any exact way. But I can tell you this: I have traveled to just about every corner of America since becoming President, and everywhere I found the same confidence, the same good spirit, and the same willingness to pull together to make this an even greater and better country.

That is the American spirit that we can be proud of today, as we have in the past.

Yes, we have our problems, our doubts, and some have many questions. Yet, we also have the strength to ask tough questions and to seek honest answers, painful though they may be. And the American people still have the character and the vision that was tempered in the forge of the Revolution 200 years ago.

Finally, there is our actual military establishment. I have already talked this morning about some of the hardware and some of the costs. I will just add that I don't think we have ever had finer, better motivated men and women serving under the American flag than we have today—and I have met a lot of these fine young people, and you and I should be very proud of them. They are of the stock which George Washington would have been proud to command. The commanders of today are proud of them.

George Washington made the point that I have tried to put across today. To be prepared for war, George Washington declared, is one of the most effective means of preserving the peace.

Peace is what we are really talking about, the building of peace and the preserving of peace. And only a strong America can build a strong and durable peace.

And as I conclude, let me say this: As children of the American Revolution, we owe this both to the patriots who came before us and to the generations who one day will inherit from us all that we have achieved together in two centuries of struggle.

Thank you very much.

Geneva Protocol of 1925 and Biological Weapons Convention

Following is a statement by President Ford issued on January 22 upon signing the instruments of ratification of the Geneva Protocol of 1925 and the Biological Weapons Convention,¹ together with the text of an Executive order signed April 8.

STATEMENT BY PRESIDENT FORD

White House press release dated January 22

I have signed today the instruments of ratification of the Geneva Protocol of 1925 and the Biological Weapons Convention, to which the Senate gave its advice and consent on December 16, 1974.

With deep gratification, I announce the U.S. ratification of the protocol, thus completing a process which began almost 50 years ago when the United States proposed at Geneva a ban on the use in war of "asphyxiating, poisonous or other gases."

While the ratification of the protocol has been delayed for many years, the United States has long supported the principles and objectives of the Geneva Protocol.

The protocol was submitted to the Senate in 1926 and again in 1970. Following extensive congressional hearings in 1971, during

¹ For remarks made by President Ford upon signing the instruments of ratification, see Weekly Compilation of Presidential Documents dated Jan. 27, 1975, p. 73.

which differing views developed, the executive branch undertook a thorough and comprehensive review of the military, legal, and political issues relating to the protocol. As a result, we have defined a new policy to govern any future use in war of riot control agents and chemical herbicides. While reaffirming the current U.S. understanding of the scope of the protocol as not extending to riot control agents and chemical herbicides, I have decided that the United States shall renounce as a matter of national policy:

1. First use of herbicides in war except use, under regulations applicable to their domestic use, for control of vegetation within U.S. bases and installations or around their immediate defensive perimeters.

2. First use of riot control agents in war except in defensive military modes to save lives, such as, use of riot control agents in riot situations, to reduce civilian casualties, for rescue missions, and to protect rear area convoys.

This policy is detailed in the Executive order which I will issue today. The order also reaffirms our policy established in 1971 that any use in war of chemical herbicides and riot control agents must be approved by me in advance.

I am very pleased to have signed a second international agreement, entitled the Convention on the Prohibition of the Development, Production and Stockpiling of Bacteriological (Biological) and Toxin Weapons and on Their Destruction. This is the first such agreement since World War II to provide for the actual elimination of an entire class of weapons. As you may recall, the United States had already unilaterally renounced these weapons before the convention was negotiated. Our entire stockpile of biological and toxin agents and weapons has been destroyed, and our biological warfare facilities have been converted to peaceful uses.

The convention provides that it will come into force upon the deposit of instruments of ratification by the three depositaries—the United States, the United Kingdom, and the U.S.S.R.—and at least 19 other coun-

tries. Thirty-seven countries have already ratified the convention. The United Kingdom has completed the parliamentary procedures for ratification, and the Soviet Union has announced its intention to ratify very soon. While I have signed the U.S. instrument of ratification today, its deposit will be deferred until we have coordinated that action with the United Kingdom and the U.S.S.R.²

It is my earnest hope that all nations will find it in their interest to join in this prohibition against biological weapons.

TEXT OF EXECUTIVE ORDER 11850³

RENUNCIATION OF CERTAIN USES IN WAR OF CHEMICAL HERBICIDES AND RIOT CONTROL AGENTS

The United States renounces, as a matter of national policy, first use of herbicides in war except use, under regulations applicable to their domestic use, for control of vegetation within U.S. bases and installations or around their immediate defensive perimeters, and first use of riot control agents in war except in defensive military modes to save lives such as:

(a) Use of riot control agents in riot control situations in areas under direct and distinct U.S. military control, to include controlling rioting prisoners of war.

(b) Use of riot control agents in situations in which civilians are used to mask or screen attacks and civilian casualties can be reduced or avoided.

(c) Use of riot control agents in rescue missions in remotely isolated areas, of downed aircrews and passengers, and escaping prisoners.

(d) Use of riot control agents in rear echelon areas outside the zone of immediate combat to protect convoys from civil disturbances, terrorists and paramilitary organizations.

I have determined that the provisions and procedures prescribed by this Order are necessary to ensure proper implementation and observance of such national policy.

Now, THEREFORE, by virtue of the authority vested in me as President of the United States of America by the Constitution and laws of the United States

² The U.S., U.K., and U.S.S.R. instruments of ratification of the Biological Weapons Convention were deposited Mar. 26; the U.S. instrument of ratification of the Geneva Protocol was deposited Apr. 10.

³ 40 Fed. Reg. 16187.

and as Commander-in-Chief of the Armed Forces of the United States, it is hereby ordered as follows:

SECTION 1. The Secretary of Defense shall take all necessary measures to ensure that the use by the Armed Forces of the United States of any riot control agents and chemical herbicides in war is prohibited unless such use has Presidential approval, in advance.

SEC. 2. The Secretary of Defense shall prescribe the rules and regulations he deems necessary to ensure that the national policy herein announced shall be observed by the Armed Forces of the United States.

THE WHITE HOUSE, April 8, 1975.

United Nations Documents: A Selected Bibliography

Mimeographed or processed documents (such as those listed below) may be consulted at depository libraries in the United States. U.N. printed publications may be purchased from the Sales Section of the United Nations, United Nations Plaza, N.Y. 10017.

Security Council

Report by the Secretary General on the United Nations operation in Cyprus (for the period May 23 to December 5, 1974). S/11568. December 6, 1974. 21 pp.

Seventh report of the Security Council committee established in pursuance of Resolution 253 (1968) concerning the question of Southern Rhodesia. S/11594. January 9, 1975. 48 pp.

Special report of the Security Council committee established in pursuance of resolution 253 (1968) concerning the question of Southern Rhodesia on external participation in the expansion of the Rhodesian Iron and Steel Company, Ltd. S/11597. January 15, 1975. 68 pp.

Special report of the Secretary General on developments in Cyprus. S/11624. February 18, 1975. 18 pp.

General Assembly

Letter dated January 20, 1975, from the Permanent Representative of Portugal addressed to the Secretary General transmitting the text of the agreement between Portugal and the three liberation movements of Angola, aiming at the establishment of the self-determination and independence of Angola. A/10040. January 22, 1975. 13 pp.

The Nonproliferation Treaty and Our Worldwide Security Structure

Address by Fred C. Iklé

Director, U.S. Arms Control and Disarmament Agency¹

It seems particularly appropriate that we should meet here on Capitol Hill to discuss nuclear proliferation. Congress has shown leadership on this issue since the first Atomic Energy Act, the McMahon Act of 1946. And Congress provides the necessary continuity and long-term concern. U.S. efforts to negotiate the Nonproliferation Treaty were given strong impetus by the Pastore resolution of 1966. Of the 56 original sponsors of that resolution, half continue to serve in the Senate today.

To prepare a new arms control initiative can take months; to negotiate it can take years. If agreement is reached, its effects may be felt over decades. The history of the Nonproliferation Treaty has already spanned the Administrations of three Presidents. Next month's Review Conference involves the fourth.

The role of Congress is also critical in backing up our policies, such as through legislation in behalf of export controls and financial support for international safeguards. Congress understands full well why it must give continuing attention to nuclear proliferation. The way this problem is managed will have the deepest impact on America's future. Our political system, our open society, could not survive in a world where the threat of nuclear destruction would be an everyday tool for political ends.

Now that I have pleaded for your active participation, I want to be frank and open

with you. The news on nuclear proliferation is bad.

Several countries not now nuclear-weapons states appear to be making determined efforts to acquire a capability that would enable them to build their own atomic bombs. How far they will go, and how many others will join them, are still open questions. And in the future we will have to face the fact that some governments might not be able to defeat all attempts of criminal groups to acquire the materials to make bombs. Unless we find new ways to cope with this risk, it will increase because of the growing spread of peaceful uses.

Indeed, today the spread of nuclear-weapons capability is riding on the wave of peaceful uses of the atom. The world's first five nuclear-weapons states clearly started out with a military program. Now it is peaceful technology that provides not only the means but also the cover in all cases where we fear that a new weapons program might be on the way. At the same time, we must of course recognize that beneficial uses of the atom will legitimately expand.

Many advanced industrial countries, because of their competence in technology, could have embarked on nuclear-weapons programs some time ago. Yet they held on to their decision not to do so. Canada, the Federal Republic of Germany, and Japan are conspicuous examples. Capability did not automatically produce intent. But now we suspect that the intent to make nuclear weapons exists in several places even though the capability is not yet there.

We can slow down the spread of nuclear-

¹ Made at Washington on Apr. 9 before a conference on the Nonproliferation Treaty sponsored by the Arms Control Association (text from ACDA press release).

weapons capability from country to country. We cannot stop it by ourselves. In a way, the United States has contributed to this spread, starting in 1954 when we abandoned the strict secrecy and tight controls on nuclear technology and began to help other countries acquire nuclear reactors and know-how.

Today we have to rely mainly on political incentives and political constraints to prevent nuclear arms competition from infecting country after country—to preserve a world in which nuclear weapons will not be used. This fact is what makes the Nonproliferation Treaty so important.

What does this treaty do?

It is true that the treaty does not include all the critical countries. For example, India, Israel, Brazil, and Argentina have indicated that at this time they will not be parties. Further, any party to the treaty could legally withdraw in three months if its supreme national interests are jeopardized, or a government could simply violate the treaty. But any arms control agreement can be abandoned by a determined, independent nation. The Nonproliferation Treaty is about as binding as most other treaties and is adequately verifiable. In this treaty, a common vision unites over 80 countries: they all look to a world so ordered that man's most destructive invention will threaten no one.

However, some have argued that the benefits of the treaty are unconvincing to non-nuclear-weapons states, since the principal nuclear powers have so far failed to undertake genuine nuclear disarmament. The treaty, they say, is merely a device for the superpowers to maintain their dominance.

This argument is wrong. While progress in nuclear arms control has been much slower than one would wish, the two major nuclear powers have imposed important arms limitations upon themselves. Indeed, through the Antiballistic Missile Treaty of 1972, the United States and the Soviet Union agreed not to build armaments precisely in the area where their worldwide monopoly was beyond dispute; no other country could build an ABM system in the foreseeable future.

Another criticism of the Nonproliferation Treaty (pressed mostly by less industrialized countries) is that the nuclear-weapons states have not been sufficiently forthcoming in providing peaceful nuclear assistance and that the controls on proliferation hinder peaceful development.

This charge is totally false. The less industrialized countries have reached their present level in peaceful nuclear technology only because of the assistance they received from nuclear-weapons states or from certain nuclear-industrial countries, such as Canada, that are strong supporters of the Nonproliferation Treaty. Our efforts to prevent the export of nuclear technology from spreading nuclear arms does not infringe on any right of any country. On the contrary, the only universal treaty obligation to export technology, that I know of, is the obligation created by the Nonproliferation Treaty—the obligation to contribute to the development of peaceful nuclear applications in non-nuclear-weapons states. The importing countries can't have it both ways, no matter how rich or poor they are; they cannot denounce the Nonproliferation Treaty and yet claim the right to nuclear assistance that was created solely by this treaty.

Other objections are that the treaty is inadequate to deal with one or another of the many problems of nuclear weapons—the control of nuclear technology through export restrictions and safeguards, the management of nuclear-waste disposal, and above all, the security of nations who agree to give up nuclear arms. The answer is not to discount the value of the treaty, but to supplement it.

We must continue efforts to separate nuclear exports that safely serve peaceful purposes from those that will proliferate weapons capabilities. But the U.S. Government cannot do this alone. The International Atomic Energy Agency must play a critical role here. We should give this Agency our fullest political and financial backing. It faces a gigantic task with quite limited means. As a contribution to this end, the U.S. Arms Control and Disarmament

Agency has developed a number of instruments to assist international inspectors in detecting theft or diversion of dangerous materials.

Unhappily, shortsighted commercial interests sometimes militate against the application of effective controls. It is essential that supplier nations agree not to undercut each other on nuclear safeguards. You would think that all nations willing to export nuclear materials or equipment would be anxious to prevent proliferation. Even the largest nations would suffer grievously if nuclear explosives became widely available, and the welfare and independence of medium-sized or smaller industrial nations might be even more threatened. Thus, I hope all the exporters of nuclear technology will keep their own long-term self-interest in mind.

Another problem we face is that of nuclear wastes. At the present time, these wastes—spent fuel from reactors—are simply accumulating, and of course they will accumulate increasingly as more reactors come into use. They are dangerous now from the standpoint of possible permanent contamination of the environment; but they might become far more dangerous still if there were a widespread effort to reprocess them and thus extract plutonium which could be used for weapons as well as for reactor fuel. Several imaginative solutions have been suggested, which seem promising on technical and economic grounds. But there are still great gaps in our knowledge.

The big question remains: Will nations agree not to acquire nuclear weapons?


The answer is this: A country will agree if, in its judgment, its security is served by doing so. The Nonproliferation Treaty, basically, ties together many countries into a multilateral commitment not to start nuclear arms competition with each other. Many nations understand that such competition would exacerbate existing conflicts in their area, raising new instability and the chances of nuclear war. Yet these countries will also consider whether their self-denial

of nuclear arms might not adversely affect their security from nuclear blackmail, or from armed attack, by the present nuclear powers.

Given the ideological and national conflicts in the world, nations forgoing nuclear weapons for defense will naturally seek protection by other means. Protection through a strong alliance, for many nations, is now the alternative to a desperate search for security by getting their own nuclear bombs. And let us face this fact squarely: Alliances protecting most of these countries at this time would not survive without continuing American support.

So we are presented with two choices. One is to prepare for an autarkic America, which, by terminating alliances, has in effect resigned itself to further nuclear proliferation, an America that tries to rely on its own resources only, an America that tries to protect itself behind barriers of air and missile defenses and a tightly guarded border. Our standard of living would be lower and our personal freedoms severely curtailed. But we could claim to be free of foreign entanglements, without troops and bases overseas, and no demands from allies to worry about.

The second choice hopefully open to us is to play a leading role in maintaining a worldwide security structure that will give non-nuclear nations the confidence to forgo their own nuclear forces. Unless we play this role, we will lose both our right and our capability to act against nuclear proliferation.

We can't have it both ways; we can't be free from foreign involvements and be effective against nuclear proliferation. 

U.S. Alternate Executive Director of IDB Confirmed

The Senate on March 11 confirmed the nomination of Yan Michael Ross to be U.S. Alternate Executive Director of the Inter-American Development Bank.

President Ford Names Commission on International Women's Year

White House press release (Palm Springs, Calif.) dated April 2

President Ford on April 2 announced his intention to appoint 33 persons as members of the National Commission on the Observance of International Women's Year, 1975. The President is also designating Jill Ruckelshaus to chair the Commission. The members are:

JILL RUCKELSHAUS, of Rockville, Md., Director, Organizational Relations, National Center for Voluntary Action, Washington, D.C.

ETHEL ALLEN, of Philadelphia, Pa., physician, surgeon, and Philadelphia city councilwoman.

ANNE L. ARMSTRONG, of Armstrong, Tex., former Counsellor to the President.

MARGARET LONG ARNOLD, of Saugerties on Hudson, N.Y., executive assistant to the executive director, National Retired Teachers Association, Washington, D.C.

ELIZABETH ATHANASAKOS, of Fort Lauderdale, Fla., attorney.

BARBARA R. BERGMANN, of Bethesda, Md., professor of economics, University of Maryland, College Park, Md.

PATRICIA T. CARBINE, of New York, N.Y., publisher and editor in chief, Ms. Magazine.

WESTON CHRISTOPHERSON, of Lake Forest, Ill., president, Jewel Companies, Chicago, Ill.

MARY STALLINGS COLEMAN, of Battle Creek, Mich., justice, Michigan Supreme Court, Lansing, Mich.

HELEN K. COPLEY, of LaJolla, Calif., chairman and chief executive officer of the Copley Newspapers.

AUDREY ROWE COLOM, of Washington, D.C., coordinator of the D.C. Child Advocacy Office, Children's Defense Fund.

RICHARD CORNUELLE, of New York, N.Y., author.

WINFIELD DUNN, of Nashville, Tenn., consultant, business and government, former Governor of Tennessee.

CATHERINE CLAIRE EIKE, of Lawrence, Kans., assistant to the dean of women, the University of Kansas.

PAULA GIBSON, of Four Lakes, Wash., student, Gonzaga University, Spokane, Wash.

GILDA BOJORQUEZ GJURICH, of Montabello, Calif., president and senior partner, Los Amigos Construction Co., Santa Fe Springs, Calif.

ELLA T. GRASSO, of Windsor Locks, Conn., Governor of Connecticut, Hartford, Conn.

HANNA HOLBORN GRAY, of New Haven, Conn., provost, Yale University.

MARTHA GRIFFITHS, of Farmington Hills, Mich., attorney, former Congresswoman.

LENORE HERSHEY, of New York, N.Y., editor in chief of the Ladies Home Journal.

MELMA MURPHY HILL, of New York, N.Y., assistant to the President, United Federation of Teachers.

PATRICIA HUTAR, of Glenview, Ill., U.S. Representative to the U.N. Commission on the Status of Women.

RITA Z. JOHNSTON, of Bethesda, Md., U.S. Delegate and Vice Chairman of the Inter-American Commission of Women, Organization of American States.

ELLEN I. KIRBY, of Petersburg, W. Va., public health nurse for Grant County, W. Va.

DOROTHY VALE KISSINGER, of Mesa, Ariz., coowner and manager, Sahuaro Lake Guest Ranch.

CLARE BOOTHE LUCE, of Honolulu, Hawaii.

WILLIAM CRAWFORD MERCER, of Wellesley Hills, Mass., president, New England Telephone and Telegraph, Boston, Mass.

ERSA H. POSTON, of Loudonville, N.Y., president, New York State Civil Service Commission, Albany, N.Y.

JOEL READ, of Milwaukee, Wis., president, Alverne College, Milwaukee, Wis.

BETTY SMITH, of Eugene, Oreg., member, National Board of Directors, YMCA.

BARBARA WALTERS, of New York, N.Y., cohost of the Today Show.

ANNIE DODGE WAUNKA, of Ganado, Ariz., member of the Navajo Tribal Council, Window Rock, Ariz.

GERRIDEE WHEELER, of Bismarck, N. Dak., president, National Association of Mental Health.

The Commission shall consist of not more than 35 members to be appointed by the President from among citizens in private life.¹ The President shall designate the presiding officer, who may designate from among the members of the Commission as many vice presiding officers as necessary.

The President of the Senate and the Speaker of the House of Representatives may designate two Members of each House to serve on the Commission.²

The Commission shall promote the na-

¹ President Ford announced on Apr. 14 (White House press release) two additional members of the Commission: Katherine Hepburn, of Old Saybrook, Conn., actress, and Alan Alda, of Leonia, N.J., actor and writer.

² The congressional members of the Commission are Senators Birch Bayh and Charles Percy and Representatives Bella Abzug and Margaret Heckler.

tional observance in the United States of International Women's Year. To this end, it will focus attention on the need to encourage appropriate and relevant cooperative activity in the field of women's rights and responsibilities.

The Commission shall conclude its work by the end of the year 1975 and make a report to the President within 30 days thereafter. The Commission shall then be terminated.

United States and Colombia Review Hemispheric Matters

Following is the text of a joint communique issued on April 9 at the conclusion of a visit to Washington by Indalecio Liévano Aguirre, Foreign Minister of Colombia.

Press release 188 dated April 9

The Foreign Minister of Colombia Dr. Indalecio Liévano Aguirre and the Secretary of State Dr. Henry A. Kissinger announced that they met on April 8 in Washington for the purpose of reviewing matters of common interest in the hemisphere. The Foreign Minister traveled to Washington at the invitation of the Secretary of State for consultations prior to the Secretary's Latin American trip. They discussed the forthcoming General Assembly of the OAS and the major agenda items for that meeting. They also reviewed the current state of the hemisphere and perspectives for U.S.-Latin American relations over the longer term. The Foreign Minister of Colombia delivered to the Secretary a letter to President Ford sent jointly by the Presidents of Colombia, Costa Rica and Venezuela.

The two principals also discussed preparations for the forthcoming state visit of President Alfonso López Michelsen scheduled for the fall.

The talks were helpful and constructive. They served to confirm the warm and cooperative spirit which characterizes rela-

tionships between the two countries.

The Secretary of State and the Foreign Minister of Colombia agreed that they would maintain an active exchange of views on the issues discussed in the months ahead and especially prior to the OAS General Assembly in May.

Presidential Determination for Generalized Tariff Preferences

MEMORANDUM OF MARCH 24, 1975¹

Determination Under Section 502(b) of the Trade Act of 1974

[Presidential Determination No. 75-11]

Memorandum for the Secretary of State

THE WHITE HOUSE,
Washington, March 24, 1975.

Pursuant to the authority vested in me under the Trade Act of 1974 (hereinafter "the Act"), I hereby determine on the basis of a review conducted by interested agencies of the Executive Branch of each of the relevant investment disputes that, in the case of each country listed below, good faith negotiations to provide prompt, adequate, and effective compensation under the applicable provisions of international law are in progress, or such country is otherwise taking steps to discharge its obligations under international law, as prescribed in Section 502(b) (4) (D) (ii) of the Act:

Afghanistan	Ethiopia
Argentina	India
Bangladesh	Morocco
Bolivia	Pakistan
Central African Republic	Sri Lanka
Congo (Brazzaville)	Sudan
Dahomey	Syria
Egypt	Tanzania
El Salvador	Zaire

In accordance with Section 502(b) (4) of the Act I am furnishing a copy of this determination to the Senate and House of Representatives.

This Determination shall be published in the FEDERAL REGISTER.

¹ 40 Fed. Reg. 15377, Apr. 7.

Military and Humanitarian Assistance to South Viet-Nam

Following are statements made before the Senate Committee on Appropriations on April 15 by Secretary Kissinger and before the House Committee on International Affairs on April 15 by Daniel Parker, Administrator, Agency for International Development, and on April 18 by Secretary Kissinger.¹

SECRETARY KISSINGER, SENATE COMMITTEE ON APPROPRIATIONS, APRIL 15

Press release 199 dated April 15

The long and agonizing conflict in Indochina has reached a tragic stage. The events of the past month have been discussed at great length before the Congress and require little additional elaboration. In Viet-Nam President Thieu ordered a strategic withdrawal from a number of areas he regarded as militarily untenable. However, the withdrawal took place in great haste, without adequate advance planning, and with insufficient coordination. It was further complicated by a massive flow of civilian refugees seeking to escape the advancing North Vietnamese Army. Disorganization engendered confusion; fear led to panic. The results, as we all know, were tragic losses—of territory, of population, of material, and of morale.

But to fully understand what has happened, it is necessary to have an appreciation of all that went before. The North Vietnamese offensive, and the South Vietnamese response, did not come about by chance—

¹The complete transcripts of the hearings will be published by the committees and will be available from the Superintendent of Documents, U.S. Government Printing Office, Washington, D.C. 20402.

although chance is always an element in warfare. The origins of these events are complex, and I believe it would be useful to review them briefly.

Since January 1973, Hanoi has violated—continuously, systematically, and energetically—the most fundamental provisions of the Paris agreement. It steadily increased the numbers of its troops in the South. It improved and expanded its logistics system in the South. It increased the armaments and ammunition of its forces in the South. And as you know, it blocked all efforts to account for personnel missing in action. These are facts, and they are indisputable. All of these actions were of course in total violation of the agreement. Parallel to these efforts, Hanoi attempted—with considerable success—to immobilize the various mechanisms established by the agreement to monitor and curtail violations of the cease-fire. Thus, it assiduously prepared the way for further military actions.

South Viet-Nam's record of adherence to the agreement has not been perfect. It is, however, qualitatively and quantitatively far better than Hanoi's. South Viet-Nam did not build up its armed forces. It undertook no major offensive actions—although it traded thrusts and probes with the Communists. It cooperated fully in establishing and supporting the cease-fire control mechanisms provided for in the agreement. And it sought, as did the United States, full implementation of those provisions of the agreement calling for an accounting of soldiers missing in action.

But perhaps more relevant to an understanding of recent events are the following factors.

While North Viet-Nam had available several reserve divisions which it could commit to battle at times and places of its choosing, the South had no strategic reserves. Its forces were stretched thin, defending lines of communication and population centers throughout the country.

While North Viet-Nam, by early this year, had accumulated in South Viet-Nam enough ammunition for two years of intensive combat, South Vietnamese commanders had to ration ammunition as their stocks declined and were not replenished.

While North Viet-Nam had enough fuel in the South to operate its tanks and armored vehicles for at least 18 months, South Viet-Nam faced stringent shortages.

In sum, while Hanoi was strengthening its army in the South, the combat effectiveness of South Viet-Nam's army gradually grew weaker. While Hanoi built up its reserve divisions and accumulated ammunition, fuel, and other military supplies, U.S. aid levels to Viet-Nam were cut—first by half in 1973 and then by another third in 1974. This coincided with a worldwide inflation and a fourfold increase in fuel prices. As a result almost all of our military aid had to be devoted to ammunition and fuel. Very little was available for spare parts, and none for new equipment.

These imbalances became painfully evident when the offensive broke full force, and they contributed to the tragedy which unfolded. Moreover, the steady diminution in the resources available to the Army of South Viet-Nam unquestionably affected the morale of its officers and men. South Vietnamese units in the northern and central provinces knew full well that they faced an enemy superior both in numbers and in firepower. They knew that reinforcements and resupply would not be forthcoming. When the fighting began they also knew, as they had begun to suspect, that the United States would not respond. I would suggest that all of these factors added significantly to the sense of helplessness, despair, and, eventually, panic which we witnessed in late March and early April.

I would add that it is both inaccurate and

unfair to hold South Viet-Nam responsible for blocking progress toward a political solution to the conflict. Saigon's proposals in its conversations with PRG [Provisional Revolutionary Government] representatives in Paris were in general constructive and conciliatory. There was no progress toward a compromise political settlement because Hanoi intended that there should not be. Instead, North Viet-Nam's strategy was to lay the groundwork for an eventual military offensive, one which would either bring outright victory or at least allow Hanoi to dictate the terms of a political solution.

Neither the United States nor South Viet-Nam entered into the Paris agreement with the expectation that Hanoi would abide by it in every respect. We did believe, however, that the agreement was sufficiently equitable to both sides that its major provisions could be accepted and acted upon by Hanoi and that the contest could be shifted thereby from a military to a political track. However, our two governments also recognized that, since the agreement manifestly was not self-enforcing, Hanoi's adherence depended heavily on maintaining a military parity in South Viet-Nam. So long as North Viet-Nam confronted a strong South Vietnamese army and so long as the possibility existed of U.S. intervention to offset the strategic advantages of the North, Hanoi could be expected to forgo major military action. Both of those essential conditions were dissipated over the past two years. Hanoi attained a clear military superiority, and it became increasingly convinced that U.S. intervention could be ruled out. It therefore returned to a military course, with the results we have seen.

The present situation in Viet-Nam is ominous. North Viet-Nam's combat forces far outnumber those of the South, and they are better armed. Perhaps more important, they enjoy a psychological momentum which can be as decisive as armaments in battle. South Viet-Nam must reorganize and reequip its forces, and it must restore the morale of its army and its people. These tasks will be difficult, and they can be performed only by the South Vietnamese. However, a successful defense will also require resources—arms,

fuel, ammunition, and medical supplies—and these can come only from the United States.

Large quantities of equipment and supplies, totaling perhaps \$800 million, were lost in South Viet-Nam's precipitous retreat from the northern and central areas. Much of this should not have been lost, and we regret that it happened. But South Viet-Nam is now faced with a different strategic and tactical situation and different military requirements. Although the amount of military assistance the President has requested is of the same general magnitude as the value of the equipment lost, we are not attempting simply to replace those losses. The President's request, based on General Weyand's [Gen. Frederick C. Weyand, Chief of Staff, United States Army] assessment, represents our best judgment as to what is needed now, in this new situation, to defend what is left of South Viet-Nam. Weapons, ammunition, and supplies to reequip four divisions, to form a number of ranger groups into divisional units, and to upgrade some territorial forces into infantry regiments will require some \$326 million. The balance of our request is for ammunition, fuel, spare parts, and medical supplies to sustain up to 60 days of intensive combat and to pay for the cost of transporting those items. These are minimum requirements, and they are needed urgently.

The human tragedy of Viet-Nam has never been more acute than it now is. Hundreds of thousands of South Vietnamese have sought to flee Communist control and are homeless refugees. They have our compassion, and they must also have our help. Despite commendable efforts by the South Vietnamese Government, the burden of caring for these innocent victims is beyond its capacity. The United States has already done much to assist these people, but many remain without adequate food, shelter, or medical care. The President has asked that additional efforts and additional resources be devoted to this humanitarian effort. I ask that the Congress respond generously and quickly.

The objectives of the United States in this immensely difficult situation remain as they were when the Paris agreement was signed

—to end the military conflict and establish conditions which will allow a fair political solution to be achieved. We believe that despite the tragic experience to date, the Paris agreement remains a valid framework within which to proceed toward such a solution. However, today, as in 1973, battlefield conditions will affect political perceptions and the outcome of negotiations. We therefore believe that in order for a political settlement to be reached which preserves any degree of self-determination for the people of South Viet-Nam, the present military situation must be stabilized. It is for these reasons that the President has asked Congress to appropriate urgently additional funds for military assistance for Viet-Nam.

I am acutely aware of the emotions aroused in this country by our long and difficult involvement in Viet-Nam. I understand what the cost has been for this nation and why frustration and anger continue to dominate our national debate. Many will argue that we have done more than enough for the Government and the people of South Viet-Nam. I do not agree with that proposition, however, nor do I believe that to review endlessly the wisdom of our original involvement serves a useful purpose now. For despite the agony of this nation's experience in Indochina and the substantial reappraisal which has taken place concerning our proper role there, few would deny that we are still involved or that what we do—or fail to do—will still weigh heavily in the outcome. We cannot by our actions alone insure the survival of South Viet-Nam. But we can, alone, by our inaction assure its demise.

The United States has no legal obligation to the Government and the people of South Viet-Nam of which the Congress is not aware. But we do have a deep moral obligation—rooted in the history of our involvement and sustained by the continuing efforts of our friends. We cannot easily set it aside. In addition to the obvious consequences for the people of Viet-Nam, our failure to act in accordance with that obligation would inevitably influence other nations' perceptions of our constancy and our determination.

American credibility would not collapse, and American honor would not be destroyed. But both would be weakened, to the detriment of this nation and of the peaceful world order we have sought to build.

Mr. Chairman, as our Ambassador in Phnom Penh was about to be evacuated last week he received a letter from a longtime friend of the United States who has been publicly marked for execution. Let me share that letter with you:

DEAR EXCELLENCY AND FRIEND, I thank you very sincerely for your letter and for your offer to transport me towards freedom. I cannot, alas, leave in such a cowardly fashion. As for you, and in particular for your great country, I never believed for a moment that you would have this sentiment of abandoning a people which has chosen liberty. You have refused us your protection, and we can do nothing about it.

You leave, and my wish is that you and your country will find happiness under this sky. But, mark it well, that if I shall die here on the spot and in my country that I love, it is too bad, because we all are born and must die one day.

Mr. Chairman, ladies and gentlemen, I suspect that neither Ambassador [John Gunther] Dean nor I will ever be able to forget that letter or the brave man who wrote it. Let us now, as Americans, act together to assure that we receive no more letters of this kind.

**MR. PARKER, HOUSE COMMITTEE ON
INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS, APRIL 15**

I come to your committee today to ask for your assistance. We are urgently proposing and seeking your approval for a humanitarian undertaking, an undertaking which I believe does credit to the spirit of charity and sympathy—especially for those with whom we as a people have long been associated—that has in the past been a well-spring of our national character.

In the past three weeks, the people of South Viet-Nam, a generation of whom have never known lasting tranquillity, have again been faced with a disruptive cataclysm of

enormous human proportions. These events are familiar to us all. In the face of an assault by North Vietnamese divisions in direct violation of the Paris peace accords, millions, motivated by a mixture of conviction, allegiance, and fear, fled the northern and central portions of South Viet-Nam. They left their villages and towns, they left their friends and sometimes their families, they left their belongings, and they left the soil from which they earned a living or the work in which they were otherwise employed. In this exodus, many died, and not all—or even most—escaped. The armies of the North rolled southward faster than those who sought to flee.

Our first thoughts and our first actions were to assist those who sought refuge in the territory still controlled by the Government of South Viet-Nam (GVN). We dispatched ships to augment the 40-odd craft made available for this purpose by the Government of South Viet-Nam and the several mercy vessels furnished by other nations. Events moved too rapidly, and we were only partially successful, but through these efforts about 150,000 people were brought to safety. Others, roughly estimated at 850,000, moved and are still moving by their own efforts on rivers and by land to the refugee sites that are under GVN control. To date, nearly 500,000 refugees have been officially registered by the government.

This process of counting by registration invariably lags behind the reality of displaced human beings, both because of the time involved in assembling data and because the movement of persons still continues. Our best estimate today—and I need not tell you that today's numbers may well be wrong tomorrow—is that the Government of South Viet-Nam will shortly face the responsibility of caring for approximately 1 million new refugees.

To assist in that effort we have allotted almost all of the limited Foreign Assistance Act resources remaining available to us; in addition, we have made 100,000 tons of rice and an additional 13,500 tons of high-protein

food supplements available on a grant basis under Public Law 480 to be distributed by both voluntary agencies and the South Vietnamese Government to those most desperately in need.

Let me note at this point that to the enormous problem of refugee relief must be added the weight of an already severe condition of unemployment and recession in the urban areas—a condition created in large measure by the withdrawal of American forces and funds—that with certainty must worsen drastically as the disruption of war takes its toll on the productive economy. Many will be without work. Any humanitarian effort must be no less concerned for those who suffer deprivation in the cities than for those displaced by the war. Suffering is made no less bearable for being once removed from its cause.

We are confident that the Government of South Viet-Nam possesses the all-too-experienced human resources to undertake an orderly and reliable relief effort, given some measure of assistance from the voluntary agencies, the international organizations, and AID personnel. (To the subject of those agencies and organizations I would like to return shortly.) We are equally certain, however, that without new financial resources from outside donors, misery and starvation and sickness, unacceptable on any human basis, will inevitably ensue.

I am here today to ask you approve the commitment by the United States of a large but by no means all-inclusive portion of those resources. Specifically, I am asking you to authorize an additional \$73 million for that purpose, which, taken together with the \$177 million previously authorized but not yet appropriated for assistance to Indochina, will make available \$250 million to lighten the burden and ease the suffering of the refugees, the war victims, and the unemployed of South Viet-Nam. At the same time I am asking you to waive previous allocations of Indochina funds which could impede the humanitarian effort.

Let me emphasize at the outset that the

program we sketch here is illustrative. Planning here and in Saigon is actively underway. Our objective is to assist the Government of South Viet-Nam to heal the human wounds of war by reuniting families, assisting them during a difficult transition period, resettling them in new homes, and bringing them back into the productive economy. The funds we seek will be contributed to meet these objectives. We will be attempting as best we can to fashion programs that adequately care for relief needs and also focus on the inextricably related objective of increasing jobs, reducing inflation, and in other ways creating an economic climate which permits the South Vietnamese people to move away from this hour of trouble toward productive, self-sufficient, and peaceful lives.

As we see the situation now, the funds we seek are not going to be expended on long-term projects. Rather, our request reflects our best estimate of the initial relief costs for the refugees and of the ongoing and elemental requirements for a period of six months of the people whom I have mentioned—the refugees, the war victims, the urban unemployed.

Let me describe briefly for you our projections of aggregate needs.

First, with respect to the emergency transportation of refugees to the temporary sites within South Viet-Nam, we have an estimated requirement of about \$10 million.

Second, with respect to the care of refugees, there are four broad categories of expenditures:

Temporary Refugee Sites must be developed and constructed. At present, we foresee the need for nine sites on the mainland to accommodate about 100,000 people each and one on the Island of Phu Quoc. The locations of the nine other sites have not been determined as yet, but we would expect them to be sited on good agricultural land in the delta. A site must be cleared, roads and shelters constructed, drainage ditches dug, water supplies and sanitary facilities

formed, medical, educational and administrative facilities provided. These items and many others related to providing essential goods and services are expected to cost roughly \$10 million per site, or \$100 million in total.

Refugee Relief Allowances and Camp Operations Costs of roughly \$10 per person per month must be provided. This will enable the refugees to buy food with which to supplement their rice ration of 500 grams per day, charcoal with which to cook, and cloth with which to clothe themselves. Additionally, these funds would pay for food handling and storage, transport, and related costs. The total cost for this for six months will be \$60 million.

Work Programs to employ the refugees must also be developed, in order to permit at least one family member to supplement the family's meager income. We expect most of the laborers would be women. Our past experience tells us that we can expect that some 200,000 people would be so employed, if given the opportunity, at \$1 per day. For six months this would require \$30 million. These refugees will provide the bulk of non-skilled labor needed in the construction of refugee camp facilities. They will also provide the non-skilled labor required to maintain minimal standards for sanitary facilities in the camps and maintain in good repair drainage ditches, roads, fencing, water facilities, and other camp infrastructure.

Integrated Relief and Resettlement Support Teams—The voluntary agencies are ready to assist in the refugee relief and resettlement program when the security situation stabilizes sufficiently to allow staff to operate with some degree of safety. Their contribution will be the provision of support and advisory teams that would include physicians, nurses, medical assistants, and others. Their major responsibility will be to provide advisory and other support needed in the relief effort. A total of \$12 million is planned for these teams.

Third, with respect to the rapidly growing needs of the urban unemployed, we would

begin developing, together with the Government of South Viet-Nam, programs to provide assistance to the urban destitute and to provide work for the unemployed and underemployed wherever feasible. We propose a program costing \$10 million.

Fourth, with respect to the refugees located on the Island of Phu Quoc, we believe that circumstances permit the immediate initiation of resettlement efforts. We should keep in mind that temporary camps give only some relief to human misery. Resettlement permits people to move into tolerable and productive lives.

The Phu Quoc resettlement program should move rapidly. The refugees have been given access to 18,000 hectares of land on the island. Clearing the land for agriculture use, grading for roadways and drainage ditches, and providing water wells and other structures await the necessary funding. The onset of the rainy season in June and July of 1976 is the critical target period for gaining access to the land if a December 1976 harvest is to be realized. The Norwegian Government has recently grant-financed a fishing project on Phu Quoc which will provide boats and fishing gear for 4,000 families (some 20,000 persons). Experts estimate this is the maximum-sized fishing enterprise that should be undertaken at this time. We have not yet received estimated GVN cost data. However, we anticipate that as a minimum, the Government of South Viet-Nam will provide teachers for the 250 classrooms we envisage for the Phu Quoc resettlement program as well as administrative and technical personnel for the refugee and resettlement site. We propose \$28 million for this resettlement program.

It is clear that the funds we seek are but a fraction of the total costs which will be incurred in South Viet-Nam. Our best present estimate is that approximately \$750 million to \$1 billion will be needed to carry a relief and resettlement program for refugees through to its conclusion. We are requesting \$250 million now to begin the job as quickly as possible. We hope and expect

that others will contribute to the effort.

American voluntary agencies with which AID has been working in both Cambodia and South Viet-Nam have assured us that they stand ready to respond to human need in any area where they are at liberty to operate. They are prepared to undertake relief and rehabilitation as well as their ongoing programs. Although their U.S. personnel have been reduced, those remaining, along with local staffs, are assisting with the refugee problem. And they have highly experienced staff standing on call in nearby countries awaiting the opportunity to assist once the situation stabilizes.

The foreign assistance dollars we provide will perform double duty. We estimate that 80 percent of our funds will be used to finance local piaster costs of the relief effort. The dollars will be available to the Government of South Viet-Nam to finance imports of essential commodities needed to keep the economy of Viet-Nam in balance by matching the increased money supply generated by the relief program with imported goods. Our objective is to require that the dollars be spent in the United States under the Commodity Import Program to the extent consistent with our primary objective of providing prompt financing for relief efforts and avoiding the general human suffering which can be caused by hyperinflation.

Let me conclude, Mr. Chairman, by frankly admitting that I cannot tell you what will happen to South Viet-Nam in the coming weeks and months. We think it has a chance. But I can tell you what will happen to the people of South Viet-Nam if we and others do not provide the needed humanitarian resources. Hundreds of thousands will starve. They will have no shelter, no schools, no medical facilities. They will live—some of them will live, for a while anyway—in unmitigated human misery. We must act urgently. The rains come in less than two months; as much of the infrastructure for refugee life as possible must be in place by then.

We believe that AID—through its long

experience and working relationships with the vast machinery of the South Vietnamese Government and with the voluntary agencies and organizations (which have performed a truly priceless service to the people of that embattled land)—is up to the task. I hope that we will have your quick support.

SECRETARY KISSINGER, HOUSE COMMITTEE ON INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS, APRIL 18

Press release 206 dated April 18

I welcome the opportunity to appear now before this committee. My remarks will be very brief in order to let you get directly to questions.

The tragedy in Viet-Nam has been discussed at great length in recent weeks, and my own views are well known to you.

Although we are no longer fighting in Viet-Nam, we are still involved there, and what we do—or fail to do—can still influence the outcome. Thus, we are faced with a difficult national decision.

The question before us now is what can be done and should be done to restore some prospect of a negotiated settlement such as we sought so earnestly in Paris and to provide for the safety and well-being of the people of South Viet-Nam caught up in this turmoil.

The President's request includes the provision of adequate military and humanitarian assistance. He has also asked the Congress to clarify existing provisions of law regarding the use of U.S. forces in the evacuation of Americans and Vietnamese should the worst come to pass.

The request for military assistance was made to provide the people of South Viet-Nam the means to defend against those who seek to impose their will by force. If South Viet-Nam is unable to continue its struggle, it should not be by virtue of the cessation of U.S. support so long as the will to resist remains.

No aspect of the situation in Viet-Nam touches the hearts of Americans today as

much as the enormous human tragedy represented by hundreds of thousands of uprooted refugees. They have our compassion, and they need our immediate help. The President's request for humanitarian assistance to provide the food, shelter, and medical care these unfortunate victims of the war must have.

In this regard, I want to acknowledge the serious and urgent efforts this committee has engaged in to adopt legislation for the kind of humanitarian and evacuation effort, if that should become necessary, which is consistent with our responsibilities. I commend the committee for its conscientious and expeditious accomplishment. I urge your colleagues in the other committees of the House and Senate to act as swiftly as you have.

Report on Use of U.S. Armed Forces in Evacuation From Cambodia

*Following is the text of a letter dated April 12 from President Ford to Speaker of the House Carl Albert.*¹

The Honorable the SPEAKER,
House of Representatives.

DEAR MR. SPEAKER: As you and other members of Congress were advised, in view of circumstances in Cambodia, the United States had certain contingency plans to utilize United States Armed Forces to assure the safe evacuation of U.S. Nationals from that country. On Friday, 11 April 1975, the Khmer Communist forces had ruptured Government of the Khmer Republic (GKR) defensive lines to the north, northwest and east of Phnom Penh and were within mortar range of Pochentong Airfield and the outskirts of Phnom Penh. In view of this deteriorating military situation, and on the

recommendations of the American Ambassador there, I ordered U.S. military forces to proceed with the planned evacuation out of consideration for the safety of U.S. citizens.

In accordance with my desire that the Congress be fully informed on this matter, and taking note of Section 4 of the War Powers Resolution (P.L. 93-148), I wish to report to you that the first elements of the U.S. forces entered Cambodian airspace at 8:34 P.M. EDT on 11 April. Military forces included 350 ground combat troops of the U.S. Marines, 36 helicopters, and supporting tactical air and command and control elements. The Marines were deployed from helicopters to assure the security of helicopter landing zone within the city of Phnom Penh. The first helicopter landed at approximately 10:00 P.M. EDT 11 April 1975, and the last evacuees and ground security force Marines departed the Cambodian landing zone at approximately 12:20 A.M. on 12 April 1975. The last elements of the force to leave received hostile recoilless rifle fire. There was no firing by U.S. forces at any time during the operation. No U.S. Armed Forces personnel were killed, wounded or missing, and there were no casualties among the American evacuees.

Although these forces were equipped for combat within the meaning of Section 4(a) (2) of Public Law 93-148, their mission was to effect the evacuation of U.S. Nationals. Present information indicates that a total of 82 U.S. citizens were evacuated and that the task force was also able to accommodate 35 third country nationals and 159 Cambodians including employees of the U.S. Government.

The operation was ordered and conducted pursuant to the President's Constitutional executive power and authority as Commander in Chief of U.S. Armed Forces.

I am sure you share with me my pride in the Armed Forces of the United States and my thankfulness that the operation was conducted without incident.

Sincerely,

GERALD R. FORD.

THE WHITE HOUSE, April 12, 1975.

¹ Released Apr. 14 (text from Weekly Compilation of Presidential Documents dated Apr. 21); an identical letter was sent to Nelson A. Rockefeller, President of the Senate.

Current Actions

MULTILATERAL

Atomic Energy

Agreement for the application of safeguards by the International Atomic Energy Agency to the bilateral agreement between the United States and Israel of July 12, 1955, as amended (TIAS 3311, 4407, 4507, 5079, 5723, 5909, 6091, 8019), for cooperation concerning civil uses of atomic energy. Signed at Vienna April 4, 1975. Entered into force April 4, 1975.

Signatures: Israel, International Atomic Energy Agency, United States.

Biological Weapons

Convention on the prohibition of the development, production and stockpiling of bacteriological (biological) and toxin weapons and on their destruction. Done at Washington, London, and Moscow April 10, 1972. Entered into force March 26, 1975. *Proclaimed by the President:* March 26, 1975.

Conservation

Convention on international trade in endangered species of wild fauna and flora, with appendices. Done at Washington March 3, 1973.

Ratifications deposited: Canada, April 10, 1975; Chile, February 14, 1975; Ecuador, February 11, 1975; Uruguay, April 2, 1975.

Enters into force: July 1, 1975.

Oil Pollution

International convention on civil liability for oil pollution damage. Done at Brussels November 29, 1969.

Ratifications deposited: France, Sweden, United Kingdom, March 17, 1975.

Accession deposited: Norway, March 21, 1975.

Enters into force: June 19, 1975.¹

International convention on the establishment of an international fund for compensation for oil pollution damage. Done at Brussels December 18, 1971.²

Ratifications deposited: Norway, March 21, 1975; Sweden, March 17, 1975.

Accession deposited: Syria, February 6, 1975.

Telecommunications

Telegraph regulations, with appendices, annex, and final protocol. Done at Geneva April 11, 1973. Entered into force September 1, 1974.³

Notifications of approval: Central African Republic, Fiji, January 3, 1975; New Zealand, December 4, 1974.

Telephone regulations, with appendices and final protocol. Done at Geneva April 11, 1973. Entered into force September 1, 1974.³

Notifications of approval: Central African Republic, Fiji, January 3, 1975; New Zealand, December 4, 1974.

International telecommunication convention with annexes and protocols. Done at Malaga-Torremolinos October 25, 1973. Entered into force January 1, 1975.³

Ratifications deposited: Canada, January 20, 1975; Ecuador, January 24, 1975.

Accession deposited: Maldives, January 16, 1975.

Wheat

Protocol modifying and further extending the wheat trade convention (part of the international wheat agreement) 1971 (TIAS 7144, 7988). Done at Washington March 25, 1975. Enters into force June 19, 1975, with respect to certain provisions and July 1, 1975, with respect to other provisions. *Signatures:* Argentina, Canada, Cuba (with statement), Dominican Republic, Ecuador, India, Iraq, Israel, Japan, Libya, Norway, Portugal, Sweden, Switzerland, Trinidad and Tobago, Vatican City State, Venezuela, April 14, 1975. *Declarations of provisional application deposited:* Argentina, Cuba, April 14, 1975.

Protocol modifying and further extending the food aid convention (part of the international wheat agreement) 1971 (TIAS 7144, 7988). Done at Washington March 25, 1975. Enters into force June 19, 1975, with respect to certain provisions and July 1, 1975, with respect to other provisions. *Signatures:* Australia, Finland, April 11, 1975; Argentina, Canada, Japan (with reservation), Sweden, Switzerland (with statement), April 14, 1975.

Declaration of provisional application deposited: Argentina, April 14, 1975.

BILATERAL

Egypt

Agreement amending the agreement for sales of agricultural commodities of June 7, 1974 (TIAS 7855). Effected by exchange of notes at Cairo April 1, 1975. Entered into force April 1, 1975.

Israel

Agreement extending the agreement of July 12, 1955, as amended (TIAS 3311, 4407, 4507, 5079, 5723, 5909, 6091), for cooperation concerning civil uses of atomic energy. Signed at Washington January 13, 1975.

Entered into force: March 24, 1975.

Jordan

Agreement amending the agreement for sales of agricultural commodities of November 27, 1974

¹ Will not enter into force for the United States on this date.

² Not in force.

³ Not in force for the United States.

(TIAS 7995). Effected by exchange of notes at Amman March 20, 1975. Entered into force March 20, 1975.

Korea

Agreement amending the agreement for sales of agricultural commodities of April 12, 1973 (TIAS 7610). Effected by exchange of notes at Seoul March 13, 1975. Entered into force March 13, 1975.

United Kingdom

Agreement extending the agreement of March 30, 1973, as amended and extended (TIAS 7594, 7832), relating to implementation and enforcement of civil aviation advance charter rules. Effected by exchange of notes at London April 2 and 3, 1975. Entered into force April 3, 1975.

Viet-Nam

Agreement amending the agreement for sales of agricultural commodities of October 8, 1974 (TIAS 7952). Effected by exchange of notes at Saigon March 13, 1975. Entered into force March 13, 1975.

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No.	Date	Subject
*197	4/14	ANZUS Council meeting, April 24-25.
*198	4/15	Fine Arts Committee, May 19.
199	4/15	Kissinger: Senate Appropriations Committee.
*200	4/16	Shipping Coordinating Committee, Subcommittee on Safety of Life at Sea, May 14.
*201	4/16	Northwest Atlantic Fisheries Advisory Committee, May 15.
*202	4/16	Archaeological exhibit from the People's Republic of China to visit San Francisco June 28-Aug. 28.
*203	4/16	Equal Rights Amendment ratification adopted as top priority of International Women's Year Commission.
204	4/17	Kissinger: American Society of Newspaper Editors.
*205	4/18	Shipping Coordinating Committee Meeting, U.S. National Center for the Prevention of Marine Pollution.
206	4/18	Kissinger: House International Relations Committee.
*207	4/18	Dr. Nag Chaudhuri, Vice-Chancellor of India's Jawaharlal Nehru University, named Lincoln Lecturer.
†208	4/19	Kissinger: L'Express interview.

* Not printed.

† Held for a later issue of the BULLETIN.

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THE DEPARTMENT OF STATE BULLETIN

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THE OFFICIAL WEEKLY RECORD OF UNITED STATES FOREIGN POLICY

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THE DEPARTMENT OF STATE BULLETIN

VOL. LXXII, No. 1872

May 12, 1975

The Department of State BULLETIN is a weekly publication issued by the Office of Media Services, Bureau of Public Affairs, provides the public and interested agencies of the government with information on developments in the field of U.S. foreign relations and on the work of the Department and the Foreign Service.

The BULLETIN includes selected press releases on foreign policy, issued by the White House and the Department, and statements, addresses and news conferences of the President and the Secretary of State and other officers of the Department, as well as special articles on various phases of international affairs and the functions of the Department. Information included concerning treaties and international agreements to which the United States is or may become party and on treaties of general international interest.

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An Agenda for America's Third Century

*Address by President Ford*¹

Today, America can regain the sense of pride that existed before Viet-Nam, but it cannot be achieved by refighting a war that is finished as far as America is concerned.

As I see it, the time has come to look forward to an agenda for the future, to unify, to bind up the nation's wounds, and to restore its health and its optimistic self-confidence.

In New Orleans, a great battle was fought after a war was over. In New Orleans tonight, we can begin a great national reconciliation. The first engagement must be with the problems of today, but just as importantly, the problems of the future.

That is why I think it is so appropriate that I find myself tonight at a university which addresses itself to preparing young people for the challenge of tomorrow.

I ask that we stop refighting the battles and the recriminations of the past. I ask that we look now at what is right with America—at our possibilities and our potentialities for change and growth, achievement and sharing. I ask that we accept the responsibility of leadership as a good neighbor to all peoples and an enemy of none.

I ask that we strive to become, in the finest American tradition, something more tomorrow than we are today.

Instead of my addressing the image of America, I prefer to consider the reality of America. It is true that we have launched our Bicentennial celebration without having

achieved human perfection, but we have attained a very remarkable self-governed society that possesses the flexibility and the dynamism to grow and undertake an entirely new agenda, an agenda for America's third century.

So I ask you to join me in helping to write that agenda. I am as determined as a President can be to seek national rediscovery of the belief in ourselves that characterized the most creative periods in our nation's history. The greatest challenge of creativity, as I see it, lies ahead.

We, of course, are saddened indeed by the events in Indochina; but these events, tragic as they are, portend neither the end of the world nor of America's leadership in the world.

Let me put it this way, if I might. Some tend to feel that if we do not succeed in everything everywhere, then we have succeeded in nothing anywhere.

I reject categorically such polarized thinking. We can and we should help others to help themselves; but the fate of responsible men and women everywhere, in the final decision, rests in their own hands, not in ours.

America's future depends upon Americans, especially your generation, which is now equipping itself to assume the challenges of the future, to help write the agenda for America.

Earlier today in this great community, I spoke about the need to maintain our defenses. Tonight I would like to talk about another kind of strength, the true source of American power that transcends all of the

¹ Made at Tulane University, New Orleans, La., on Apr. 23 (text from Weekly Compilation of Presidential Documents dated Apr. 28; introductory paragraphs omitted).

deterrent powers for peace of our Armed Forces. I am speaking here of our belief in ourselves and our belief in our nation.

Abraham Lincoln asked, in his own words, "What constitutes the bulwark of our own liberty and independence?" He answered:

It is not our frowning battlements, our bristling sea coasts, our army and our navy Our defense is in the spirit which prized liberty as the heritage of all men, in all lands everywhere.

It is in this spirit that we must now move beyond the discords of the past decade. It is in this spirit that I ask you to join me in writing an agenda for the future.

I welcome your invitation, particularly, tonight because I know it is at Tulane and other centers of thought throughout our great country that much consideration is being given to the kind of future that Americans want and, just as importantly, will work for.

Each of you are preparing yourselves for the future, and I am deeply interested in your preparations and your opinions and your goals. However, tonight, with your indulgence, let me share with you my own views.

I envision a creative program that goes as far as our courage and our capacities can take us, both at home and abroad. My goal is for a cooperative world at peace, using its resources to build, not to destroy.

As President, I am determined to offer leadership to overcome our current economic problems. My goal is for jobs for all who want to work and economic opportunity for all who want to achieve.

I am determined to seek self-sufficiency in energy as an urgent national priority. My goal is to make America independent of foreign energy sources by 1985. Of course, I will pursue interdependence with other nations and a reformed international economic system.

My goal is for a world in which consuming and producing nations achieve a working balance. I will address the humanitarian issues of hunger and famine, of health and of healing. My goal is to achieve or to assure basic needs and an effective system to achieve this result.

I recognize the need for technology that

enriches life while preserving our natural environment. My goal is to stimulate productivity but use technology to redeem, not to destroy, our environment.

I will strive for new cooperation rather than conflict in the peaceful exploration of our oceans and our space. My goal is to use resources for peaceful progress rather than war and destruction.

Let America symbolize humanity's struggle to conquer nature and master technology. The time has now come for our government to facilitate the individual's control over his or her future and of the future of America.

But the future requires more than Americans congratulating themselves on how much we know and how many products that we can produce. It requires new knowledge to meet new problems. We must not only be motivated to build a better America; we must know how to do it.

If we really want a humane America that will, for instance, contribute to the alleviation of the world's hunger, we must realize that good intentions do not feed people. Some problems, as anyone who served in the Congress knows, are complex. There are no easy answers. Willpower alone does not grow food.

We thought in a well-intentioned past that we could export our technology lock, stock, and barrel to developing nations. We did it with the best of intentions. But we are now learning that a strain of rice that grows in one place will not grow in another, that factories that produce at 100 percent in one nation produce less than half as much in a society where temperaments and work habits are somewhat different.

Yet the world economy has become interdependent. Not only food technology, but money management, natural resources and energy, research and development—all kinds of this group require an organized world society that makes the maximum effective use of the world's resources.

I want to tell the world: Let's grow food together, but let's also learn more about nutrition, about weather forecasting, about irrigation, about the many other specialties involved in helping people to help themselves.

We must learn more about people, about the development of communities, architecture, engineering, education, motivation, productivity, public health and medicine, arts and sciences, political, legal, and social organization. All of these specialties, and many, many more, are required if young people like you are to help this nation develop an agenda for our future, your future, our country's future.

I challenge, for example, the medical students in this audience to put on their agenda the achievement of a cure for cancer. I challenge the engineers in this audience to devise new techniques for developing cheap, clean, and plentiful energy and, as a by-product, to control floods. I challenge the law students in this audience to find ways to speed the administration of equal justice and make good citizens out of convicted criminals. I challenge education, those of you as education majors, to do real teaching for real life. I challenge the arts majors in this audience to compose the great American symphony, to write the great American novel, and to enrich and inspire our daily lives.

America's leadership is essential. America's resources are vast. America's opportunities are unprecedented.

As we strive together to perfect a new agenda, I put high on the list of important points the maintenance of alliances and partnerships with other people and other nations. These do provide a basis of shared values, even as we stand up with determination for what we believe.

This, of course, requires a continuing commitment to peace and a determination to use our good offices wherever possible to promote better relations between nations of this world.

The new agenda, that which is developed by you and by us, must place a high priority on the need to stop the spread of nuclear weapons and to work for the mutual reduction in strategic arms and control of other weapons.

I must say parenthetically the successful negotiations at Vladivostok, in my opinion, are just a beginning.

Your generation of Americans is uniquely endowed by history to give new meaning to the pride and spirit of America. The magnetism of an American society confident of its own strength will attract the good will and the esteem of all people wherever they might be in this globe in which we live.

It will enhance our own perception of ourselves and our pride in being an American. We can—we can, and I say it with emphasis—write a new agenda for our future.

I am glad that Tulane University and other great American educational institutions are reaching out to others in programs to work with developing nations, and I look forward with confidence to your participation in every aspect of America's future. And I urge Americans of all ages to unite in this Bicentennial year to take responsibilities for themselves, as our ancestors did.

Let us resolve tonight to rediscover the old virtues of confidence and self-reliance and capability that characterized our forefathers two centuries ago.

I pledge, as I know you do, each one of us, to do our part. Let the beacon lights of the past shine forth from historic New Orleans, and from Tulane University, and from every other corner of this land to illuminate a boundless future for all Americans and a peace for all mankind.

Thank you very much.

"A Conversation With President Ford"—An Interview for CBS Television and Radio

Following are excerpts relating to foreign policy from the transcript of an interview with President Ford by Walter Cronkite, Eric Sevareid, and Bob Schieffer broadcast live on CBS television and radio on April 21.¹

Mr. Cronkite: Mr. President, just this moment as we came on the air, I was surprised over this little machine here that the Associated Press and the United Press International are reporting from Honolulu that a large number of battle-equipped marines, 800 or so, have left Hawaii by air, on chartered aircraft. Can you tell us what their destination is and what is up?

President Ford: That is part of a movement to strengthen, or to bring up to strength, the Marine detachment in that area of the Pacific. It is not an unusual military movement. On the other hand, we felt under the circumstances that it was wise to bring that Marine group in that area of the world—the South Pacific—up to strength.

Mr. Cronkite: Can you tell us where they are going, sir?

President Ford: I don't think I should be any more definitive than that.

Mr. Cronkite: They are not going directly to Saigon?

President Ford: No, they are not.

Mr. Cronkite: Now that President Thieu [Nguyen Van Thieu, of South Viet-Nam] has resigned, which was the big news this morning, of course, are we involved in, are we acting as an intermediary in any negotia-

tions for a peaceful settlement out there?

President Ford: We are exploring with a number of governments negotiating opportunities, but in this very rapid change, with President Thieu stepping down, there really hasn't been an opportunity for us to make contact with a new government. And the net result is we are planning to explore with them and with other governments in that area or connected with that area so that we don't miss any opportunity to try and get a cease-fire.

Mr. Sevareid: Mr. President, what is your own estimate of the situation now? Do you think that the Hanoi people want to negotiate the turnover of the city, a peaceful turnover, or just drive ahead?

President Ford: Eric, I wish I knew. I don't think anybody can be absolutely certain, except the North Vietnamese themselves.

You get the impression that in the last few days they were anxious to move in very quickly for a quick takeover. On the other hand, within the last 12, 24 hours, there seems to be a slowdown. It is not certain from what we see just what their tactic will be. We naturally hope that there is a period when the fighting will cease or the military activity will become less intense so that negotiations might be undertaken or even a cease-fire achieved.

But it is so fluid right now I don't think anybody can be certain what the North Vietnamese are going to do.

Mr. Sevareid: Are they communicating with our government through third parties or otherwise?

President Ford: We have communications

¹ For the complete transcript, see White House press release dated Apr. 21.

with other governments. I can't tell you whether the North Vietnamese are communicating with them or not. I don't know.

Mr. Seavard: President Thieu, when he stepped down, said one of the reasons was American pressure. What was our role in his resignation?

President Ford: Our government made no direct request that President Thieu step down. There was no pressure by me or anyone in Washington in that regard.

There may have been some on the scene in Saigon who may have talked to President Thieu, but there was no pressure from here to force President Thieu to step down and he made, I am sure, the final decision all on his own.

Mr. Seavard: Surely our representatives there would not speak without your authority on this matter?

President Ford: It is a question of how you phrase it. We never asked anybody to ask him to step down. There were discussions as to whether or not he should or shouldn't, but there was no direct request from me for him to relinquish his role as the head of state.

After all, he was an elected President. He was the head of that government, properly chosen, so his decision, as far as we know, was made totally on his own.

Evacuation From Viet-Nam

Mr. Schieffer: Mr. President, on the evacuation, you have expressed hope that something could be arranged so tens of thousands of loyal South Vietnamese could be brought out of the country.

Do you think it is possible to have something like that if the North Vietnamese oppose it or if the Viet Cong are not willing to go along with it? Are any kinds of negotiations underway right now to try to set up some sort of an arrangement like that?

President Ford: I would agree with you that if the North Vietnamese make a military effort, it would be virtually impossible to do so unless we moved in substantial

U.S. military personnel to protect the evacuation. On the other hand, if the South Vietnamese should make it difficult in their disappointment that our support hadn't been as much as they thought it should be, their involvement would make it virtually impossible, again without a sizable U.S. military commitment. That is one reason why we want a cease-fire. That is why we want the military operation stopped—so that we can certainly get all the Americans out without any trouble and, hopefully, those South Vietnamese that we feel a special obligation to.

But at the moment, it does not appear that that is possible. We intend to keep working on it because we feel it is the humane and proper thing to do.

Mr. Schieffer: What if it is not possible? Then what do you do? Do you ask the Congress to let you send those troops in there, American troops to protect the withdrawal? Do you send them in without congressional approval? What do you do next?

President Ford: As you know, I have asked the Congress to clarify my authority as President to send American troops in to bring about the evacuation of friendly South Vietnamese or South Vietnamese that we have an obligation to, or at least I think we do. There is no problem in sending U.S. military personnel into South Viet-Nam to evacuate Americans. That is permitted under the War Powers Act, providing we give adequate prenotification to the Congress.

That is what we did in the case of Phnom Penh, in our personnel there. But if we are going to have a sizable evacuation of South Vietnamese, I would think the Congress ought to clarify the law and give me specific authority. Whether they will or not, I can't tell you at this point.

Mr. Schieffer: If you do send them in and if Congress gives you the authority, they will have to have airpower. It will have to be a sizable commitment. They will almost have to have an open-ended authority in order to protect themselves. That is what you are asking for, isn't it?

President Ford: Unless the North Viet-

namese and the South Vietnamese have a cease-fire, and then the evacuation of those South Vietnamese could be done very easily.

Now, if there is a military conflict still going on, or if either one side or the other shows displeasure about this, and if we decided to do it—there are a number of “ifs” in that—yes, there would have to be some fairly sizable U.S.—on a short term—very precise, military involvement, not on a broad scale, of course.

Factors Contributing to Vietnamese Pullback

Mr. Cronkite: Mr. President, when did you last talk to President Thieu?

President Ford: I have not personally talked to President Thieu since I became President. I have had a number of exchanges of correspondence with him, but the last time I talked to him was when he was in the United States and I was minority leader. That was roughly two years ago, as I recollect.

Mr. Cronkite: Gracious, we have this hot-line with the potential great-power adversary, the Soviet Union, and yet, with an ally who is in dire straits at this moment there is no communication between the Presidents. It seems strange.

President Ford: Well, there is very good communication between myself, our Secretary of State, and our Ambassador there. So, there is no lack of communication in and through proper channels. I don't think it is essential in this situation that there be a direct communication between myself and former President Thieu.

Mr. Cronkite: Might it help to solve some of the misunderstandings if you had talked directly to him?

President Ford: I don't think so. We have had communications back and forth, both by message and as well as by correspondence. I think we understand one another. I think some of his comments were more directed at our government as a whole than directed at me personally.

Mr. Seavareid: Mr. President, one of his comments was that the United States had led the South Vietnamese people to their deaths. Do you have any specific reply to that one?

President Ford: There were some public and corresponding private commitments made in 1972-1973 where I think that the President of South Viet-Nam could have come to the conclusion, as he did, that the U.S. Government would do two things: One, replace military hardware on a one-for-one basis, keep his military strength sufficiently high so that he could meet any of the challenges of the North, and in addition there was a commitment that we, as a nation, would try to enforce the agreements that were signed in Paris in January of 1973.

Now, unfortunately, the Congress in August of 1973 removed the latter, took away from the President the power to move in a military way to enforce the agreements that were signed in Paris.

So, we were left then only with the other commitment, and unfortunately the replacement of military hardware was not lived up to. I therefore can understand President Thieu's disappointment in the rather traumatic times that he went through in the last week. I can understand his observations.

Mr. Seavareid: What is the relative weight that you assign to, first, this question of how much aid we sent or didn't send, and his use of it, especially in this pullback? Where is the greater mistake? Because historically this is terribly important.

President Ford: It is my judgment—and history will be probably more precise—but it is my judgment at the moment that the failure of the Congress to appropriate the military aid requested—the previous Administration asked for \$1.4 billion for this fiscal year; Congress authorized \$1 billion; Congress appropriated \$700 million—and the failure to make the commitment for this fiscal year of something close to what was asked for certainly raised doubts in the mind of President Thieu and his military that we would be supplying sufficient mili-

tary hardware for them to adequately defend their various positions in South Viet-Nam.

Now, the lack of support certainly had an impact on the decision that President Thieu made to withdraw precipitously. I don't think he would have withdrawn if the support had been there. It wasn't there, so he decided to withdraw.

Unfortunately, the withdrawal was hastily done, inadequately prepared, and consequently was a chaotic withdrawal of the forces from military regions 1, 2, and 3.

How you place the blame, what percentages, our failure to supply the arms, what percentage related to the hastily and inadequately prepared withdrawal—the experts, after they study the records, probably can give you a better assessment; but the initial kickoff came for the withdrawal from the failure of our government to adequately support the military request for help.

Mr. Schieffer: Mr. President, what I don't understand is, if they are saying we have got to leave because the United States is not going to give us some more equipment, why did they leave all the equipment up there that they had? Why did they abandon so much of that equipment?

President Ford: As I was saying, the withdrawal was very poorly planned and hastily determined. I am not an Army man. I was in the Navy. But I have talked to a good many Army and Marine Corps experts, and they tell me that a withdrawal, military withdrawal, is the most difficult maneuver to execute, and this decision by President Thieu was hastily done without adequate preparation, and it in effect became a rout.

When you are in a panic state of mind, inevitably you are going to leave a lot of military hardware. It is tragic. There is no excuse for that kind of a military operation, but even though that happened, if they had been given military aid that General Weyand [Gen. Frederick C. Weyand, Chief of Staff, United States Army] recommended during the last month, I am convinced that with that additional military hardware on time,

there could have been a stabilization of the situation which, in my judgment, would have led more quickly to a cease-fire.

Mr. Cronkite: Mr. President, you have said you were not advised of this withdrawal of President Thieu's. Are you certain, however, that none of the American military or diplomatic advisers out in Saigon did not agree with him that a limited withdrawal might be effective in bringing pressure on Congress to vote these funds and that therefore there was an American participation in that decision?

President Ford: As far as I know, Walter, there was no prenotification to any, certainly high-ranking, U.S. military or civilian official of the withdrawal decision.

Mr. Seavard: This whole affair is going to be argued over. There will be vast books on it for years and years. Wouldn't it be wisest to publish the correspondence between former President Nixon and President Thieu, which is disputed now, the 1973 correspondence after the Paris accords?

President Ford: In the first place, I have personally read the correspondence. The personal correspondence between President Nixon and President Thieu corresponds with the public record. I have personally verified that. I don't think in this atmosphere it would be wise to establish the precedent of publishing the personal correspondence between heads of state.

Maybe historically, after a period of time, it might be possible in this instance, but if we establish a precedent for the publication of correspondence between heads of state, I don't think that that correspondence or that kind of correspondence will be effective because heads of state—I have learned firsthand—have to be very frank in their exchanges with one another, and to establish a precedent that such correspondence would be public, I think will downgrade what heads of state try to do in order to solve problems.

Mr. Seavard: Of course, there is no way to keep President Thieu from publishing it?

President Ford: No.

Mr. Seavard: Things like this have been judiciously leaked when it served the purpose of the President or the Secretary of State. You have no such plans for that?

President Ford: No, I have no such plans, and to be very frank about it, it seems to me that the American people today are yearning for a new start. As I said in my state of the world address to the Congress, let's start afresh.

Now, unless I am pressed, I don't say the Congress did this or did that. I have to be frank if I am asked the categorical question.

I think we ought to turn back the past and take a long look at how we can solve these problems affirmatively in the future. Viet-Nam has been a trauma for this country for 15 years or more. A lot of blame can be shared by a good many people—Democrats as well as Republicans, Congress as well as Presidents.

We have some big jobs to do in other parts of the world. We have treaty commitments to keep. We have relations with adversaries or potential adversaries that we should be concerned about. It is my judgment, under these circumstances, we should look ahead and not concentrate on the problems of the past where a good bit of blame can be shared by many.

Mr. Cronkite: Mr. President, Vice President Rockefeller suggested he thinks this would be an issue in the 1976 campaign. Will you make it an issue in 1976 or will you try to keep it out of the campaign?

President Ford: I will not make it a campaign issue in 1976.

Mr. Schieffer: Will Mr. Rockefeller? I didn't quite understand what he was driving at in that recent interview when he said, you know, if 2,000 or 3,000 Americans die in this evacuation, that raises some issues.

President Ford: Well, of course, the record—whatever a man in public office says—can be in and of itself a campaign issue. But I can speak only for myself, and I do not intend to go out and point the finger or make a speech concerning those who have differed

with me who I might privately think contributed to the problem.

By 1976, I would hope we could look forward, with some progress in the field of foreign policy. I think we have got some potential successes that will be very much possible as we look ahead.

So, rather than to replay the past with all the division and divisive feelings between good people in this country, I just hope we can admit we made some mistakes, not try to assess the blame, but decide how we can solve the problems that are on our doorstep.

And we have a few, but they are solvable if we stick together, if we have a high degree of American unity.

Mr. Cronkite: There is not much trouble—leaving the Viet-Nam issue as the nation has had, in leaving Viet-Nam here tonight, but I would like to ask just one more. Have you talked to former President Nixon about any aspects of this Viet-Nam thing in the last few weeks?

President Ford: After my state of the world speech April 10, he called me, congratulated me on it. We discussed what I had said. It was a rather short but a very friendly chat on the telephone.

Mr. Cronkite: Any talk about secret agreements?

President Ford: As I recall the conversation, he reiterated what I have said, that the public record corresponds with the private correspondence in reference to the commitments, moral or legal or otherwise.

Mr. Cronkite: Speaking of your state of the world address, there was speculation around just before that address that you were going to use it to put your own stamp on foreign policy. I think the phrase was "to get out from under the shadow" of Secretary Henry Kissinger. Do you feel you did that with that speech, or was that ever your intention?

President Ford: It wasn't done to show any particular purpose, other than the problems we had. Viet-Nam, of course, was number one on the agenda. We did want to

indicate that—and I must say “we,” it means the Administration—that we were strengthening NATO. We had to solve the problem of the dispute between Greece and Turkey over Cyprus.

It was sort of a world look, and I don't think it was necessary for me to put my own imprint. I think it is more important to deal with reality rather than to try and go off on my own.

The problems have to be solved, and I don't care who has the label for it.

Foreign Policy Decisionmaking

Mr. Seavereid: Mr. President, we all get the impression, and have since you have been in office, that you get your foreign policy advice exclusively from Henry Kissinger. If that isn't so, who else do you listen to?

President Ford: That is a good question, and I would like to answer it quite frankly. The National Security Council meets on the major decisions that I have to make—SALT [Strategic Arms Limitation Talks], MBFR [Mutual and Balanced Force Reductions], et cetera.

I get the recommendations from the National Security Council. It includes Secretary Kissinger, Secretary Schlesinger [Secretary of Defense James R. Schlesinger], the head of the CIA, the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff. The major decisions come to me in option papers from the National Security Council.

I meet daily with Secretary Kissinger for about an hour, because I think it is important for me to be brought up day by day on what the circumstances are in the various areas where we have potential decision-making on the agenda. But, the actual information that is involved in a major decision comes through the National Security Council.

Mr. Seavereid: Suppose there is a position paper or policy recommendation from somebody in the National Security Council to which the Secretary is opposed? Could it get to you? Could it get past him to you?

President Ford: Oh, yes. Surely. No question about that. As a matter of fact, in our discussions in the National Security Council, particularly when we were preparing for SALT Two negotiations, there were some options proposed by one individual or others.

There wasn't unanimity at the outset, but by having, as I recall, three or four NSC meetings, we resolved those differences. At the outset there were differences, but when we got there, there was unanimity on what we decided.

Mr. Seavereid: One more short question on this. It was the complaint of many people that worked with President Johnson on the Viet-Nam war that he never had time to read any of the books about Indochina, the French experience, the Viet Minh movement, and so on. Have you ever had time to read any of the books about that part of the world?

President Ford: I, over the years, have read four to five books, but I have had the experience of sitting on a Committee on Appropriations that had involvement going back as early as 1953, with economic-military aid to South Viet-Nam, and those hearings on appropriations for economic and military aid would go into the problems of South Viet-Nam, Laos, Cambodia, South Viet-Nam, in great depth.

So, this outside reading, plus the testimony, plus the opportunity to visit South Viet-Nam I think has given me a fairly good background on the history as well as the current circumstances.

Mr. Cronkite: John Hersey, in that excellent New York Times Magazine piece yesterday, said that you are quite impatient with palace feuds—

President Ford: That is an understatement.

Mr. Cronkite: —yet, reports have gone around quite continually here in Washington that there are members of your most intimate White House staff who would like to see Dr. Kissinger go. Are you aware of that?

President Ford: If they believe it, they have never said it to me. I happen to think Henry Kissinger is an outstanding Secretary of State. I have thought it since I have known him and he has been in the job.

Fortunately, my personal acquaintanceship with Secretary Kissinger goes back 10 or 15 years, so I have known him over a period of time, and it is my strong feeling that he has made a tremendous contribution to world peace.

He has been the most effective Secretary of State, certainly in my period of service in the Congress, or in the Vice Presidency, or the White House. I have never heard anybody on my staff ever make a recommendation to me that Secretary Kissinger should leave.

Mr. Cronkite: What about suggestions—

President Ford: I would strongly disagree with them and let them know it quite forthrightly.

Mr. Cronkite: What about suggestions that perhaps someone else should be the national security adviser, that he should give up one of those hats? How do you feel about that?

President Ford: If you were to draw a chart, I think you might make a good argument that that job ought to be divided.

On the other hand, sometimes in government you get unique individuals who can very successfully handle a combination of jobs like Secretary Kissinger is doing today as head of the National Security Council and Secretary of State.

If you get that kind of a person, you ought to take advantage of that capability. And therefore, under the current circumstances, I would not recommend, nor would I want, a division of those two responsibilities.

Mr. Cronkite: Is there any talk of his resigning?

President Ford: I have talked to Secretary of State Kissinger. I have asked him to stay and he is committed to stay through the end of this Administration, January 20, 1977.

Mr. Cronkite: Mr. President, you said last fall—changing the subject—regarding the CIA, that you were ordering a study on how better to keep Congress informed of CIA activities. Can you tell us how that study is coming, and can we expect any report on that in the near future?

President Ford: I appointed the Rockefeller Commission, an excellent group, and they are now in the process of taking testimony from people within the government and people outside of the government. It is a very thorough investigation. They have an outstanding staff.

I would expect within the next 60 to 90 days I would have from that commission its recommendations for any structural changes or any other changes that might be made, but I haven't gotten that report yet.

Mr. Cronkite: That is the only study. There is not a study on just congressional liaison with the CIA?

President Ford: No. That, to some extent, is a separate issue. The Congress, in recent years, has broadened the number of people who are filled in by the CIA.

When I was on the Committee on Appropriations, I don't think there were more than 10 or 12 people in the Congress, House and Senate, who were kept abreast of the budget of the CIA, the activities of the CIA, but today I would guess that it is close to 50 to 75.

Now, when the number of people being told reaches that magnitude, inevitably there can and will be leaks about some of the jobs or activities being undertaken by the CIA.

Of course, the CIA under those circumstances can't possibly operate effectively, either covertly or overtly, so I think we have got to find a better way of adequately keeping the Congress informed, but not enlarging the number who have to be informed.

Mr. Seavard: Mr. President, wouldn't the whole thing be safer and clearer and cleaner if it was simply the law that the CIA gather intelligence only and engage in no covert political operations abroad?

President Ford: If we lived in a different world—

Mr. Seavard: It might help to make the world different.

President Ford: Well, I can't imagine the United States saying we would not undertake any covert activities, and knowing at the same time that friends, as well as foes, are undertaking covert activity, not only in the United States but elsewhere.

That would be like tying a President's hand behind his back in the planning and execution of foreign policy. I believe that we have to have an outstanding intelligence-gathering group, such as the CIA or in the other intelligence-collection organizations in our government. But I also think we have to have some operational activity.

Now, we cannot compete in this very real world if you are just going to tie the United States with one hand behind its back and everybody else has got two good hands to carry out their operations.

Mr. Cronkite: Do you people mean by covert activities—I want to get clear on this—does this mean the use of the “dirty tricks” department to support friendly governments and try to bring down unfriendly ones?

President Ford: It covers a wide range of activities, Walter. I wouldn't want to get in and try to pinpoint or define them, but it covers a wide range of activities. I just happen to believe, as President, but I believed it when I was in the Congress, that our government must carry out certain covert activities.

Mr. Schieffer: Mr. President, what do we get for that, for these covert activities? We hear about this business of “destabilizing” the government in Chile—we didn't seem to help ourselves very much in that—the Phoenix program in Viet-Nam, the “secret war” in Laos. Is it that we just never hear of the successful ones?

President Ford: A good intelligence covert activity, you don't go around talking about.

Mr. Schieffer: Have there ever been any good ones?

President Ford: There have been some most successful ones, and I don't think it is wise for us today to talk about the good ones or even the bad ones in the past.

It is a very risky business, but it is a very important part of our national security, and I don't think we should discuss—certainly I shouldn't discuss—specifics. I shouldn't indicate we have done this or done that.

But I can assure you that, if we are to compete with foes on the one hand, or even be equal in the execution of foreign policy with our friends, we have to have covert activities carried out.

Mr. Cronkite: How in a democracy can the people have an input into what governments overseas they are going to knock off or what ones they are going to support? It seems to be antithetical to the whole principle of democracy.

President Ford: Every four years, Walter, the American people elect a President, and they elect a Congress every two years, or most of the Congress every two years.

The American people, I think, have to make a judgment that the people they elect are going to carry out, of course, domestic policy, but equally important, foreign policy.

And the implementation of foreign policy inevitably means that you are going to have intelligence gathering as well as operational activities by your intelligence organization.

Options for Middle East Negotiations

Mr. Cronkite: Can we move on to the Middle East now? Are you reconciled to a Geneva meeting now or would you still like to see some more direct diplomacy in the step-by-step Kissinger pattern?

President Ford: I think, following the very serious disappointment of the last negotiations between Israel and Egypt, we are committed, at least in principle, to going to Geneva.

Now in the meantime, we are going through this process of reassessment of our whole Middle Eastern policy which, prior to the suspension of the negotiations between

Egypt and Israel, had been a very successful one.

Now, there really are three options. You could resume the suspended negotiations without making a commitment to go to Geneva. You could go to Geneva and try to get an overall settlement, which is a very complicated matter. Many people advocate it, however. But while you were going through this negotiation for an overall settlement, as a third option you might have an interim negotiated settlement between two of the parties, such as Israel and Egypt.

Now, those are basically the three options. We have not made any decision yet. We have had our Ambassadors from the Middle East come back and report to me. We have undertaken a study under the leadership of Joe Sisco [Joseph J. Sisco, Under Secretary for Political Affairs] to bring together the best thinking and all of the options.

We have brought in, or Secretary Kissinger has brought in, some outside experts in the Middle East. Last week, I had a meeting with a former State Department official, Gene Rostow, who is an expert in this area. But right at the moment, we have made no firm decision as to what our next particular step will be in the Middle East.

Mr. Severeid: Mr. President, can you foresee any possible circumstances in which you would feel it right to send American armed forces into the Middle East on land or in the air? In other words, military intervention?

President Ford: I can't foresee any, Eric, but—and I see no reason to do so. So, I think the answer is pretty categorically no.

Mr. Severeid: What about a wholly different level, if there were agreement for a Russian-American peace patrol and the alternative to that was another Mideast war, would you go that far?

President Ford: You put it on about the most extreme alternatives. We want peace in the Middle East, and I think the Soviet Union does, too.

I would hope that there wouldn't be a need for either the United States or the Soviet Union having any peacekeeping responsibilities

with their own forces in the Middle East.

Mr. Schieffer: Mr. President, does the reassessment now going on of the Middle East policy also include a reassessment of the U.S. position toward the Palestinians?

President Ford: If you take the path of an overall settlement and going to Geneva, I think you have to have an analysis of what is going to happen there because the Palestinians are going to demand recognition.

But I don't mean to infer that we have made any decision. But the Palestinians have to be examined as a part of the overall Middle East situation. I am not making any commitment one way or another, but it has to be part of the problem that we are analyzing.

Mr. Schieffer: Let me ask you this just as a followup. Could the Palestinians be included if they refuse to deal with the Israelis?

President Ford: I don't see how, because the Israelis, in the first place, don't recognize the Palestinians as a proper party, and the PLO [Palestine Liberation Organization] doesn't recognize the existence of Israel. So, I think that is an impasse right there, and it will be one of the most difficult things that will have to be worked out if it is worked out at Geneva.

Mr. Schieffer: Do you have any feel for when there will be a date for the Geneva Conference reconvening?

President Ford: I have seen a lot of speculation early this summer, but no set time has been determined.

Mr. Cronkite: Mr. President, the Israeli Foreign Minister, [Yigal] Allon, is in Washington now, and there are reports out of Jerusalem today that he is going to suggest a summit meeting between you and President [Prime Minister] Rabin. Do you expect to have such a meeting?

President Ford: I wouldn't expect that I would make any commitment on that until we are further along in our reassessment. It may be desirable at some point. It may be desirable to meet other parties, or other

heads of state, in the Middle East, but I don't want to make any commitment tonight as to any one or as to more than one.

Mr. Cronkite: Doesn't that sort of imply that we are still being a little bit hardnosed in our disappointment over the Kissinger mission?

President Ford: No, I think it is wise for us to take a look ourselves at the new options or different options. I certainly wouldn't rule out a meeting with Mr. Rabin, but I don't want to make any commitment to one until we have moved a bit further down in the process of a reassessment.

I reiterate that if we meet with one, we certainly ought to give others an opportunity, other heads of state, to have the same input.

Mr. Cronkite: So, there won't be any favored-nation treatment of Israel in the future?

President Ford: I think we have to, in this very difficult situation, where the possibility of war is certainly a serious one, if you have a war, you are inevitably going to have an oil embargo—I think we have to be very cautious in our process of reassessment.

Republic of Korea Ratifies Nonproliferation Treaty

Remarks by J. Owen Zurhellen, Jr.¹

Today the Republic of Korea deposited the instrument of ratification by which it becomes a party to the Treaty on the Nonproliferation of Nuclear Weapons. The United States welcomes this important act by the Republic of Korea to join the 85 countries which have given concrete expression to their determination to combat the danger of nuclear proliferation by becoming parties to the NPT.

Korea is one of several countries which have completed ratification of the NPT in recent months. These developments enhance

the effectiveness of the treaty, which, as Secretary Kissinger said in his address to the U.N. General Assembly last autumn, deserves full and continuing international support. We hope the Korean example will encourage still other countries to become NPT parties, for we believe that the security of the international community and each of its members can be furthered by wider support for the treaty.

Secretary Regrets Postponement of Trip to South America

Statement by Secretary Kissinger²

Events in Indochina are unfolding with such unexpected speed that the President has asked me to stay in Washington in the days just ahead. It is with great reluctance and even greater personal regret that I must therefore postpone my trip to South America scheduled for later this week.

I have communicated with the Foreign Ministers of Argentina, Brazil, and Venezuela to inform them of this decision and of my determination to visit South America at a later date.

The forging of strengthened ties with our neighbors in this hemisphere is a cardinal objective of our foreign policy. The aspirations of Latin America and the United States are indissolubly linked and are of significance for the rest of the world.

For these reasons, I particularly regret the postponement of my South American trip under these circumstances. And I look forward to working with my colleagues at the OAS General Assembly here in Washington next month, where we will have another opportunity to discuss our common goals.

¹ Made at a ceremony in the Treaty Room of the Department of State on Apr. 23 (text from press release 213). Mr. Zurhellen is Deputy Assistant Secretary for East Asian and Pacific Affairs.

² Issued on Apr. 21.

Secretary Kissinger Interviewed for L'Express of France

Following is the transcript of an interview with Secretary Kissinger by Pierre Salinger of L'Express of France conducted at the Department of State on April 12.

Press release 208 dated April 19

Q. You have said on a number of occasions that you are more a historian than a statesman. I wonder whether you might step back a minute in your role of a statesman and take on your role as a historian and give me an assessment of American foreign policy from 1969 to 1975.

Secretary Kissinger: When I came into office with the Nixon administration, we were really at the end of a period of American foreign policy in which a redesign would have been necessary to do no matter who took over. I think myself, for example, in retrospect that the Kennedy period will be seen as the last flowering of the previous era rather than as the beginning of a new era. I don't say this as a criticism, but simply to define the problem.

What was the situation we faced? In most of the postwar period we could operate with a simplicity of the cold war until 1969—of absolute good against absolute evil or preventing military aggression against allies. Insofar as we were engaged in economic development, we did so really as a projection of this abroad on the theory that economic development would produce political stability. And we were operating with enormous self-confidence and self-assurance; that is, as the only major Western country that had come out of the war undamaged and indeed had been generally successful in everything that it attempted.

When we came into office in 1969, we faced a dramatically changed environment. First, Western Europe and Japan had regained

economic vitality and some political constancy. Secondly, the simplicities of the cold war began to evaporate.

The domestic pressures in all countries for putting an end to tension became greater and greater, and within the Communist world it was self-evident that we were no longer confronting a monolith. America had gone through two assassinations and a war in Viet-Nam which was a profound shock to us because we entered it rather lightheartedly and with great self-confidence, and when we came into office we found 550,000 men engaged in a war against which public opinion was increasingly turning, including the very people who had gotten us into the war.

With respect to newly developing countries it became clear that we faced a problem that was much more philosophical than economic in terms of their perception of the world.

So our problem was how to orient America in this world and how to do it in such a way that we could avoid these oscillations between excessive moralism and excessive pragmatism, with excessive concern with power and total rejection of power, which have been fairly characteristic of American policy. This was the basic goal we set ourselves.

I think we did establish a new relationship with Europe, with some strain, but I would say all our relations now are more mature and calmer than at any period since the fifties. The same is true of Japan.

I think we have taken, I hope, creative account of the polarity of the Communist world. We have tried to respond to the need to ease tensions, and we disengaged our military forces from Viet-Nam.

I think we have made progress in the Middle East, too, but I think we had better dis-

cuss that more as a tactical than as a philosophical problem.

What have been our difficulties? Our difficulties have been almost entirely domestic on a variety of levels.

In order to be able to unify the country when the war in Viet-Nam was finished, we believed that those who were opposed to the war in Viet-Nam would be satisfied with our withdrawal and those who favored an honorable ending would be satisfied if the United States would not destroy an ally.

We will never know whether there would have been a domestic tranquillity, but within three months of the end of that war we were projected into the middle of the Watergate crisis that no one could foresee and that had an enormously debilitating impact on our executive authority. The conduct of foreign policy without executive authority becomes extremely difficult.

This in turn triggered a series of actions by the Congress which in a number of cases such as Turkey and Indochina have accelerated our difficulties and encouraged pressure groups of all kinds to influence foreign policy. I think this has been an unexpected event or at least unpredicted by us.

So, we face now a problem that while the design of our foreign policy is intact, the authority to implement it may be impaired, and it is a primary responsibility to attempt to restore that through partnership with the Congress and through perhaps getting more of a public consensus.

Finally, all of this has happened at a time when the establishment that carried our foreign policy has been both disintegrated and demoralized.

At the time of the Kennedy period, you still had a group of people who had carried American foreign policy, who helped shape public opinion and on whom a President could count to perform missions. These people are now 15 years older and really have had no adequate replacements.

So that the administration—and I would say this would be true as well of a Democrat as well as a Republican administration—is more naked to day-to-day pressures of

public opinion than has been the case throughout the entire postwar period.

This is how I would assess the pluses and minuses of American foreign policy, and I am absolutely confident that we can restore the situation now that certain of our traumas are seen in that perspective.

Foreign Policy and Domestic Problems

Q. About three months ago in an interview with an American magazine, you said, and I quote. The political problem is that the whole Western world with the exception perhaps of the United States is suffering from a political malaise, inner uncertainty and from lack of direction. Those very words have been used in Europe to describe what is going on in the United States.

Secretary Kissinger: Well, I would say that they can probably be applied in some respects to the United States right now. I know there is a school of thought that says if you admit difficulties you are causing these difficulties. These are the people probably who would have recommended that Churchill in 1940 say that a group of British yachtsmen decided to cross the channel and happened to congregate off the coast of Dunkirk.

We have had assassinations and two Presidents driven from office, a war which as generally seen is not successful, so we have this problem. But we also have great strengths, great resources, and a basically correct design of foreign policy, and therefore I believe that we can overcome our domestic problems, and I believe that we can start a period of new creativity.

I would therefore reject the term "political malaise." We are having major difficulties. We are determined to overcome them. And I am confident we shall.

Q. Do you think realistically that in the short term the problems of American foreign policy, as they relate to internal politics in America, can be righted until you have an election and have a President who has been elected running the country?

Secretary Kissinger: Well, I think they can be, yes, and in fact they must be. History won't wait two years until we can have an election. Moreover, our election could easily be conducted in terms that would not of itself give a clear-cut answer, especially if the President doesn't exercise active leadership.

So the President has to act in terms of the problems he now faces, which he is determined to do.

We have some anomalies in our situation domestically in the sense that if there was ever an election fought on issues it was the last one. Sixty-two percent of the public voted for a strong foreign policy and moderate conservatism and, in a way, were disenfranchised because of the series of events over which they had absolutely no control, which were totally unforeseeable, and which produced the collapse of the Nixon Presidency. That is an anomalous situation.

There is no reason to suppose that a new election fought on those issues would produce a different result.

Q. Yet today public polls would indicate that less than 40 percent of the American people would be willing to intervene in Europe if there was a military overrun of Europe by the Soviet Union, less than 30 percent in Israel if Israel was to fall to the Arabs, and it seems that there is a real trend of isolationism in this country.

Secretary Kissinger: I think that there is a certain trend, but this I think is partly due to this disassociation from the political process that has resulted from Watergate.

Every public opinion poll shows that about 70 percent of the people support our foreign policy, which is certainly not isolationist, so a great deal depends on whether the public finds leadership with which it can identify.

Q. You have said that credibility of the United States in one part of the world is very important in how people in other parts of the world view that credibility. There are those who say that by saying that you are planting in people's minds the feeling that the American credibility is no longer to be counted on.

Secretary Kissinger: I believe that when a major country engages in a decade in a major effort which then does not obviously succeed, it raises questions about wisdom, judgment, and effectiveness, and questions about the impact of that setback on the psyche of the country.

Now, I say this is a problem the United States has to face. I cite it also as a problem we can overcome and will overcome. But we will surely not overcome it if we pretend that it does not exist and we are going to continue business as usual.

So I repeat: I think it has produced a problem that affects our general stance in the world. I want Americans to face this. When they face it, they can also overcome it. I don't believe that my saying it creates the problem. It is my duty as Secretary of State to describe the world as it is.

Q. And you have said that if American leadership is not there, there is no other leadership in the Western world. But as to that leadership present today, are you getting the impression from your reports from abroad that people still have confidence in American leadership?

Secretary Kissinger: I think right now people around the world, from what I can learn, are worried at a minimum about how America will assess its present situation. I believe we have to face the fact that the past decade has raised certain doubts about American leadership. I say this in order to reestablish American leadership and not to abdicate it.

I think the President is absolutely determined to conduct a strong foreign policy, and in the weeks ahead you will see that he will speak increasingly on foreign policy.

I believe that the design of our foreign policy can be maintained, and I believe also that our friends will be more reassured if we admit that we have a problem which we are trying to solve than if we pretend that we don't have a problem that they recognize.

Q. Let me go away from the past for a minute and ask you to look into the future a little bit. If you were to portray the best

and the worst scenario for American policy in the world over the next five years, how would you see those two possibilities?

Secretary Kissinger: Well, the best scenario would be one in which our cohesion with Europe is strengthened and the relationship across the Atlantic is fostered, in which we can develop a new set of relationships with Japan, Western Europe, and the United States that are adjusted to issues that transcend events, in which détente becomes not a tactical policy but the method of operation of the great powers, in which relations with China would continue toward normalization, and in which in our relationships with the underdeveloped world we overcome the present dilemma of simultaneous confrontation and cooperation in a spirit in which at least the general conceptions of a desirable world structure begin to emerge.

The worst scenario is one which will show a gradual disintegration of the domestic stability of all of our friendly countries, accompanied by a growing sense of impotence and less self-confidence by the United States, which will sooner or later trigger a series of more aggressive actions by hostile powers and increasing confrontations with the less developed world.

I would put into the best scenario also a creative solution to problems of energy, food, and raw materials, and in the worst scenario that these issues become increasingly issues of confrontation.

Both scenarios are possible. I believe we can achieve the best scenario. I think the building blocks are there, and I think the will is there. We are going through one of those difficult periods now which perhaps because of their very difficulty can be used to start new creations and so, in a funny way, I am more optimistic now than I was six months ago.

Six months ago I saw the dangers, but very few others agreed with me. Now I think most people can see the dangers and therefore they can also seize the opportunities. Six months ago people were satisfied that things were getting juggled into reasonable shape, and now they know they have got to

work for it. So I think the possibilities now are better, strangely enough, than say last October when I would give occasionally gloomy interviews and everyone was saying, "What in God's name is he talking about?"

Now that some of these events have happened, I think we are in a much better position to transcend our problems.

U.S.-Soviet Relations

Q. How would you assess the state of U.S.-Soviet relations and détente?

Secretary Kissinger: I think we have had a setback in the trade agreement. I think there is a tendency on the negative side to use détente as a sort of a palliative while the bureaucracies on both sides, and especially on the Soviet side, continue on traditional courses. I think in America too many people have taken détente for granted and have forgotten what it was like to live in the cold war, and so they think they can hack away at it and think that then there is no price for it.

I think we have a possibility and indeed a duty to attempt to transform the cold war into a more cooperative relationship. I think when two countries possess the capability to destroy civilized life, they cannot conduct foreign policy by traditional maxims. My disagreement with some of our domestic opponents is that they think that if they would only apply some of the old pure-power political terms to Soviet-American relations they might get some unspecified concessions, but they also might get a series of confrontations out of proportion to anything that we began. To be sure, we have to defend our vital interests, but Soviet-American relations are not designed for tests of manhood.

I think the relationship has had a setback. It has had a period of stagnation. I have the impression that the Soviet Union is now fairly anxious to pick it up again. I think that the possibilities to move in a positive direction still exist.

Q. Do you agree with those who say that the ability or the possibility of the super-

powers—the United States and the Soviet Union—to influence events in the world is becoming less and less?

Secretary Kissinger: Not when they are dealing with each other, but dealing with third powers. It depends on how determined they are to influence events. If they really are determined to influence them, I think that they can do it.

Q. If that is true, don't you think that the current perception of the American situation, whether that is true or not, may not influence the Soviet Union to start moving into areas where it has not traditionally moved?

Secretary Kissinger: It is one of the dangers of the situation; but I think that the Soviet Union will find over the next few months that this perception is not the real perception, because I think that the President and his associates are absolutely determined to strengthen American foreign policy.

Q. Are you in touch with the Soviet Union in any way to indicate to them this American determination?

Secretary Kissinger: Yes, but they also know our determination to pursue détente. They know both.

Middle East Negotiations

Q. Do you think there is any possibility of having a new round of talks in which the United States played a role before a new Geneva Conference was assembled?

Secretary Kissinger: It is entirely up to the parties. The United States cannot be in a position where it seems more interested in an interim settlement than the parties themselves.

It is not enough to have a desire to resume them. Something has to be put into the negotiations that is different from what preceded it, and until we see that from one or both of the parties, there is no point in our engaging ourselves.

Q. It is generally believed that the relations between the United States and Israel are less good today than they were before those negotiations because of the feeling that perhaps Israel could have gone further in those negotiations.

Secretary Kissinger: I wouldn't say our relations are less good, I would say our relations are now different in the sense that when we were the sole mediator there could be a degree of coordination that is more difficult to achieve than when we are dealing with a wider forum.

In any event, it forces us to assess how we are to conduct this diplomacy. This is the essence of our reassessment. Our reassessment isn't primarily concerned with questions of economic and military aid.

Q. There is a feeling in Israel that there is an erosion of support for Israel in the United States.

Secretary Kissinger: Well, of course, my friend Abba Eban once said to me that Israel considered objectivity 100 percent agreement with their point of view. So if you slip to 98 percent, you can already be accused of erosion and deterioration.

I think there are two separate problems—the relation between the Israeli Government and the U.S. Government, and the perception of the American public of the American role in the world. I think in general the readiness to give foreign aid and to run the risk of war has deteriorated in America, but I think that Israel has suffered less from that deterioration than almost any other country.

Q. What would be your prognosis if you went to Geneva without any further conversations?

Secretary Kissinger: I would send someone who has a lot of time.

Viet-Nam and Cambodia

Q. The Cambodian Ambassador was quoted as saying yesterday that after using Cambodia for five years and carrying out American policy in Southeast Asia, the

Americans have now abandoned a naïve people to their fate.

Secretary Kissinger: What happened in Cambodia is heartbreaking. In our domestic debate, Cambodia is often described as if we went into it because we didn't have enough of a war going on so we had to add another neutral country.

In fact, we entered Cambodia because there were 60,000 North Vietnamese in sanctuaries along the border, and we picked up between 15,000 and 20,000 tons of war materiel. After we entered Cambodia, our casualties dropped from over 100 a week to less than 50 a week and finally to 10 a week because, in effect, our operation in Cambodia deprived the North Vietnamese of the ability to conduct military operations in military regions 3 and 4, Saigon and the delta. So from the point of view of achieving our withdrawal, the operation in Cambodia was a success.

However, from the beginning, from 1970 on, we were prevented from conducting our operations in Cambodia for any purpose other than promoting the withdrawal of Americans. We were forced to put a limit of 30 miles on the extent of our penetration and from really conducting operations in a way that would have supported the Government of Cambodia.

I must say I have great admiration for the bravery of the government that stayed when we withdrew, and I am very saddened by the fact that in its final days we were not even able to give them ammunition. I am not proud of it.

Q. Isn't it entirely possible that the situation in Viet-Nam may be identical, the Americans may be evacuating, the last Americans from Viet-Nam?

Secretary Kissinger: I don't think it is settled, but it would be idle to deny that South Viet-Nam is in very grave danger. But there the situation is different. We cannot be accused of not having made an all-out fight. We can be accused in the last two years of having reduced our aid too precipitously and

maybe having triggered panic by the nature of our domestic debate this year and triggered panic and encouraged moves, but we have made a monumental effort in South Viet-Nam. Cambodia is always different.

Q. Those who are your harshest critics say if you had made an effort after the 1973 accord of Paris to bring about a political settlement in Cambodia and Viet-Nam instead of concentrating on military help, that this might not have happened.

Secretary Kissinger: Well, my experience in these negotiations is that you cannot have political settlement without military stabilization. I think we can demonstrate that in the summer of 1973 we were closer to a political settlement in Cambodia than at any other period and that this possibility evaporated when the right to conduct bombing in Cambodia was removed so that we lost the ability to trade the end of the bombing for some political concessions.

As for the rest, I believe that the North Vietnamese would have negotiated only under conditions in which any possibility of a military takeover was foreclosed to them, and as these conditions deteriorated, the possibility of a political settlement deteriorated, too.

Q. What is your reaction to the statement of President d'Estaing [Valéry Giscard d'Estaing, of France] this week about the need for political settlement in Viet-Nam?

Secretary Kissinger: I agree with him. The question is what kind of a political settlement and how it is going to be achieved, but I substantially agree with him.

Q. His statement pretty much let it be understood that a political settlement can only be achieved with the departure of President Thieu, the President of South Viet-Nam.

Secretary Kissinger: Well, the United States has been in Viet-Nam and Indochina now for 15 years. I would hate to think that everybody that ever worked with us wound up being discarded by the United States.

Now, basically the political evolution in Saigon depends on the people of South Viet-Nam, and the United States will accept any political settlement that the people of South Viet-Nam negotiate among themselves. But I don't think we will participate in any political preconditions of this kind.

Q. I remember the period from 1969 to 1972 when you were carrying out the policy of bringing Americans back home from Viet-Nam that you replied repeatedly to critics of your policy at that time and stated to them this was the way you had to do it in order to prevent a debate in this country that could tear the country apart in terms of trying to pin blame for the disaster in Viet-Nam.

Secretary Kissinger: I thought it was essential that America withdraw from Viet-Nam in a manner that Americans could feel carried out the obligations inherent in having 550,000 troops there, and very often, popular policies become much less popular when people recognize the consequences of what they have done. Chamberlain was extremely popular in Britain in 1938, and that didn't protect him from those very same people 18 months later.

Q. Are you concerned that the current effort of the Administration attempting to pin the blame for the problems in South Viet-Nam and Cambodia on the Congress will produce exactly the same kind of debate that you were trying to avoid?

Secretary Kissinger: Well, I believe that the debate that was started this year on the supplemental request was quite unnecessary and it wasn't started by us. But it is my intention, and I know it is the intention of the President, that we will not engage in a period of recrimination and we will not look for scapegoats.

Developments in Europe

Q. Let me turn, if I can, for a minute to Europe. NATO, which had its 25th anniversary last year, seems to be in more trouble right now than it has been in its entire history, with the Greeks and Turks questioning

NATO commitments, and you have the danger of Portugal leaving NATO.

Secretary Kissinger: Well, in the so-called southern tier we are having massive problems, and they haven't been made easier by our domestic events with respect to Turkey and Greece.

As I told you, the Western alliance now faces a period not so much of strain between Europe and the United States as adjustment of the domestic structures of various European countries. The Cyprus problem should be settled by negotiation, and I think can be settled by negotiation, if the parties are ever left alone long enough to develop some rhythm in their negotiations. We will try to be helpful.

The problem in Portugal, too, is very serious, because it could be taken as a test case for possible evolutions in other countries, and not only if the Communists take over. It could also be the case if the Communists become the sinews of non-Communist government, and perhaps especially so.

I would think in the Western alliance now the major problem is not the debate that seemed so important two years ago between Europe and the United States. I think that has been almost substantially or almost completely overcome by the domestic evolution in many European countries, and I would say, irrespective of Europe, also the domestic evolution in America.

Q. Would you see any responsibility on the part of European countries to try to do something about the evolution of matters in Portugal?

Secretary Kissinger: It is not an appropriate subject for me to discuss, but certainly it is a subject in which I am in close contact with my colleagues.

Q. How do you judge the current state of U.S.-French relations?

Secretary Kissinger: I think that the relations between France and the United States began to improve very rapidly after the beginning of the Presidency of Giscard d'Estaing and also under the foreign ministry of Sauvagnargues.

I think the meeting between the two Presidents in Martinique was one of the most successful meetings that I have attended, not only in the sense of formal agreements, although some substantial ones were made, but in the sense that I think both sides are now dealing with each other without complexes.

We recognize that France is performing or playing a somewhat special role in Europe. I think France understands that the last problem with respect to America now is an unquenchable thirst for domination—quite the contrary. So we are now dealing with each other in a much more matter-of-fact way, much less theological. We began to have many disagreements on the energy conference last November, and it was very rapidly settled, and since then I think it is correct to say that we have worked together most cooperatively.

It has become a matter of course for the two Presidents and for the two Foreign Ministers to exchange ideas as to events of major international importance, so much a matter of course that it isn't even reported any more when letters are exchanged.

I would say on the whole that the state of the relations between France and the United States is better than it has been since I have been involved in government, which is since 1961. This doesn't mean that there aren't some problems.

Q. What is your view on the termination of the preparatory energy conference this week?

Secretary Kissinger: Let me be clear: Of course we recognize the interconnection between energy and other resource issues, but experience has shown that a "global" negotiation on all issues leads to stalemate. Con-

sequently, we were prepared to respond positively to the French initiative for a multilateral conference focused on energy while other problems were dealt with in other forums, whether existing ones or, where required, new ones. We remain ready to proceed in this manner.

Q. How do you see your own future? What is the future of Henry Kissinger?

Secretary Kissinger: For the morale of some of our Ambassadors, I would like to keep open the possibility of a potential vacancy, and also, quite frankly, I was not overly eager to be involved or to have foreign policy involved in the political campaign.

But if my analysis of the situation is correct, as I believe it is, and if we have an obligation to rally other countries and our own people to the real tasks and opportunities before us, then this is not a time in which I can leave, unless the President asked me to leave, which he has not done.

So I would think that I would stay for a foreseeable future. What happens after that, I have absolutely no idea, and I have never thought about it. There aren't too many jobs for which being Secretary of State prepares you.

Mr. Salinger: Mr. Secretary, thank you.

Mr. Dent To Be Special Representative for Trade Negotiations

The Senate on March 19 confirmed the nomination of Frederick B. Dent to be Special Representative for Trade Negotiations, with the rank of Ambassador Extraordinary and Plenipotentiary.

President Kaunda of Zambia Visits Washington

Kenneth D. Kaunda, President of the Republic of Zambia, visited Washington April 18-21. He met with President Ford, Secretary Kissinger, and other U.S. Government officials. Following is an exchange of toasts between President Ford and President Kaunda at a dinner at the White House on April 19.

Weekly Compilation of Presidential Documents dated April 28

PRESIDENT FORD

Mr. President, Mrs. Kaunda, Kaweche Kaunda, distinguished guests: Let me say that Mrs. Ford and I are extremely delighted to have you, Mr. President, your family, and your distinguished guests with us here this evening. It has been a great pleasure for me to talk to your lovely wife and to know of your delightful family, and on behalf of Mrs. Ford and myself, we extend and wish to you our very, very best.

Your visit to Washington is a mark of friendship that has existed between our two nations since Zambia gained her independence in 1964.

America knows and respects you, Mr. President, but also I should say we know that in the modern history of Zambia and the history of Kenneth Kaunda, they are inseparable. Your moral and intellectual leadership guided your country to independence, and for that we praise you.

Your leadership has made your young nation an example of respect and admiration throughout the world. The American people join me in saluting you for your accomplishments, your dedication, and your wisdom in a controversial and difficult world.

We ask that you convey to your people in Zambia our admiration for them and for you and our greetings.

Mr. President, we have been following developments in southern Africa with great, great interest. For many years the United States has supported self-determination for the peoples of that area, and we continue to do so today.

We view the coming independence of Mozambique, Angola, and the island territories with great satisfaction, just as we viewed the independence of Guinea-Bissau just last year.

May I say, Mr. President, America stands ready to help the emerging countries, the emerging nations, and to provide what assistance we can, and we know, Mr. President, that these new states will continue to look to you for wise, wise counsel as they build to nationhood in the future.

Much still remains to be done in southern Africa. In this connection, Mr. President, we welcome your commitment to change through peaceful negotiations and understanding between the parties concerned, rather than through recourse to violence.

We deeply believe that patient diplomacy will bear great fruit, and we promise our continued efforts and our support as you seek, with others, to resolve these problems at the conference table.

Mr. President, in my April 10 speech to the Congress and to the American people, I noted that America is developing a closer relationship with nations of Africa, and I said that Africans must know that America is a true and concerned friend, reliable both in word as well as in deed.

Your visit, Mr. President, coming so soon after that occasion, is most timely for all of us. I hope that you will take back to your countrymen and to all Africans our renewed pledge of friendship.

Our wide-ranging discussions, Mr. President, this afternoon after my return from

some of our historic celebrations of our 200th, or Bicentennial, anniversary covered matters of common interest and concern, and it confirmed the relationship between your country and my country.

There is, however, one area, Mr. President, of mutual interest which we tacitly did not discuss. I have since found, tonight, from your lovely wife, that we have a close and intimate interest in a special area. I understand that you do enjoy playing golf. [Laughter.] I feel sure, Mr. President, that our common problems, nationally, internationally, bilaterally, on some occasions in the future can best be resolved by a little competition on the links. [Laughter.] I intend to make an honest effort to see if our friendship cannot be broadened by such an experience.

So, I say to you, Mr. President, to your lovely wife and your son and your colleagues here this evening, let me propose a toast to you, to the Republic of Zambia, and to the continuing excellent relations between our two countries: To you, Mr. President, and to your Republic and to your wonderful people.

PRESIDENT KAUNDA

Mr. President, Mrs. Ford, brothers and sisters: I first want to express my deep appreciation and gratitude for inviting me to visit Washington, D.C. I also thank you, the government, and the people of the United States for their warm welcome and the kind hospitality given to my wife and the entire Zambian delegation.

Mr. President, we are happy to be in Washington, D.C. It is a very brief visit, but since we come for specific objectives, it is not the duration that matters, but the results.

So far, we have done a lot. We find we have a lot in common on vital issues affecting mankind. Our discussions have been characterized by a spirit of frankness and cordiality.

This spirit, coupled by the definition of areas of urgent action, should move the United States and Africa closer toward the attainment of our common objectives.

We come, Mr. President, to America with a clear purpose. We simply want to be understood. We seek American understanding of Africa's objectives and America's fullest support in the attainment of these objectives.

The relations between Zambia and the United States cause me no concern, because they are cordial, although there is room for improvement through more sound cooperation.

What gives Zambia and Africa great cause for concern is, Mr. President, America's policy toward Africa—or is it the lack of it, which, of course, can mean the same thing.

I have not worked at the U.N., but I have been told that at the U.N. sometimes there are tricks in which an abstention in a vote can be a vote for or against. A no-policy position may not be a neutral position indicative of a passive posture, but a deliberate act of policy to support the status quo or to influence events in one direction or the other at a particular time.

We have, in recent years, been most anxious, Mr. President, about the nature and degree of the United States' participation in building conditions for genuine peace based on human equality, human dignity, freedom, and justice for all—for all—particularly in southern Africa.

You will forgive us, Mr. President, for our candor if we reaffirmed on this occasion our dismay at the fact that America has not fulfilled our expectations. Our dismay arises from a number of factors. We are agreed that peace is central, that peace is central to all human endeavors.

Our struggle for independence was designed to build peace, and thank God, our people have enjoyed internal peace.

We are agreed, Mr. President, that we must help strengthen peace wherever it is threatened. There has been no peace in southern Africa for a very long time, a very long time indeed, even if there was no war as such.

The absence of war does not necessarily mean peace. Peace, as you know, Mr. President, dear brothers and sisters, is something much deeper, much deeper than that.

The threat of escalation of violence is now real. It is our duty to avoid such an escalation. We want to build peace in the place of violence, racial harmony in place of disharmony, prosperity in place of economic stagnation, security in place of insecurity now dogging every family every day.

Mr. President, to build genuine peace in southern Africa, we must recognize with honesty the root causes of the existing conflict.

First, colonialism in Rhodesia and Namibia. The existence of a rebel regime in Rhodesia has since compounded that problem. Second, apartheid and racial domination in South Africa. Over the last few years, a number of catalytic factors have given strength to these forces of evil.

External economic and strategic interests have flourished in colonial and apartheid regimes. Realism and moral conscience dictate that those who believe in peace must join hands in promoting conditions for peace. We cannot declare our commitment to peace and yet strengthen forces which stand in the way of the attainment of that peace.

The era of colonialism has ended. Apartheid cannot endure the test of time. Our obligation is that these evil systems end peacefully, peacefully. To achieve our aim, we need America's total commitment, total commitment to action consistent with that aim.

So far, American policy, let alone action, has been low keyed. This has given psychological comfort to the forces of evil.

We become, Mr. President, even more dismayed when the current posture of America toward Africa is set against the background of historical performance in the late fifties and early sixties.

We cannot but recall that America did not wait for and march in step with the colonial powers but, rather, boldly, boldly marched ahead with the colonial peoples in their struggles to fulfill their aspirations—an America undaunted by the strong forces of reaction against the wind of change, whose nationals helped teach the colonial settlers about the evils of racial discrimination; an America whose Assistant Secretary for Afri-

can Affairs, "Soapy" Williams [G. Mennen Williams], could be slapped in the face by a white reactionary on our soil and yet, undaunted, still smile, still stand by American principles of freedom, justice, and national independence based on majority rule. Yes, the reactionaries hated Americans for "spoiling the natives," as they would say, for helping dismantle colonialism.

We ask and wonder what has happened throughout America. Have the principles changed? The aspirations of the oppressed have not changed at all. In desperation, their anger has exploded their patience. Their resolve to fight, if peaceful negotiations are impossible, is borne out by history.

So, their struggle has now received the baptism of fire. Victories in Mozambique and Angola have given them added inspiration. Africa has no reason, no reason at all, not to support the liberation movements.

Can America still end only with declarations of support for the principles of freedom and racial justice? This, I submit, Mr. President, would not be enough. Southern Africa is poised for a dangerous armed conflict. Peace is at stake.

The conflict with disastrous consequences can be averted, but I submit again, Mr. President, there is not much time. Urgent action is required.

At this time, America cannot realistically wait and see what administering powers will do or to pledge to support their efforts when none are in plan. America must heed the call of the oppressed.

America, once an apostle in decolonization, must not be a mere disciple of those which promise but never perform and thus give strength to evils of colonialism and apartheid.

If we want peace, we must end the era of inertia in Rhodesia and Namibia and vigorously work for ending apartheid. America must now be in the vanguard of democratic revolution in southern Africa.

This is not the first time we make this appeal. It is Africa's constant plea.

Now, Africa has taken an unequivocal stand on decolonization. We do not want to fight a war to win freedom and full national

independence in southern Africa. Africa wants to achieve these objectives by peaceful means; that is, through negotiations.

Our declaration to give high priority to peaceful methods to resolve the current crisis is a conscious decision, a conscious decision. We feel it to be our moral duty to avoid bloodshed where we can.

We are determined to fulfill this obligation—but, Mr. President, not at any price, not at any price, not at the price of freedom and justice. There we say no. No.

Africa has made it clear that if the road to peaceful change is closed by the stone walls of racial bigotry and force of arms by minority regimes, then we are equally duty-bound to take the inescapable alternative.

The oppressed people have a right to answer force with force, and Africa and all her friends in the world will support them.

Liberation movements fought fascist Portugal. We supported them. They won. Now we must turn to Rhodesia and Namibia.

Can America stand and be counted in implementing the Dar es Salaam strategy adopted by Africa? In Dar es Salaam early this month, Mr. President, Africa reaffirmed its commitment, its commitment to a peaceful solution to the crisis in southern Africa as a first priority.

Our strategy opens even new doors, now new doors to peaceful change, if those caught up in the crisis seek an honorable exit. Here is a chance in a century to achieve peace based on human equality and human dignity without further violence.

We call upon America to support our efforts in achieving majority rule in Rhodesia and Namibia immediately and the ending of apartheid in South Africa. If we are committed to peace, then let us join hands in building peace by removing factors underlying the current crisis.

If the oppressed peoples fail to achieve these noble ends by peaceful means, we call upon America not to give any support to the oppressors. Even now we call upon America to desist from direct and indirect support to minority regimes, for this puts America in direct conflict with the interests of Africa; that is, peace deeply rooted, deeply

rooted in human dignity and equality and freedom without discrimination.

We have recently demonstrated, Mr. President, our readiness to make peaceful change possible in Mozambique and Angola. We are equally committed to assist the oppressed if they should convince us that the road to peaceful change is closed and armed struggle is the only alternative.

The rebels in Rhodesia, assisted by South African troops, have committed some of the worst atrocities on the continent. Africa cannot allow them to continue, and we urge America not to allow them to continue.

Victory for the majority is a matter of time, a matter of time. Let us, therefore, make it as painless as possible to those who have dominated their fellow men for years.

Mr. President, we wish America, we wish America to understand our aims and objectives. We are not fighting whites; we are fighting an evil and brutal system. On this there must be no compromise, none at all.

America should also understand our strategy. We want to achieve our objectives by peaceful methods first and foremost. Africa is ready to try this approach with patience and exhaust all possible tactics—for peace is too precious, is too precious for all of us—but our patience and the patience of the oppressed has its limits.

Mr. President, we are here only for a short time. We have no other mission except to take the opportunity of the visit to put Africa's stand clearly. We want to avoid confrontation, but let us not be pushed.

Once again, Mr. President, on behalf of my wife and my compatriots, and indeed on my own behalf, I thank you, Mrs. Ford, and our colleagues, brothers and sisters, for this warm welcome and hospitality.

This is indeed a memorable visit, memorable because it has been fruitful, and it coincides with the launching only yesterday of your Bicentennial celebrations. We congratulate the people of the United States for their tremendous achievements since independence, which have justified the anti-colonialist struggle of their Founding Fathers.

Finally, I take the opportunity of inviting

you, Mr. President, and Mrs. Ford, to pay a visit to Zambia. We will be happy to receive you in our country at any time convenient to you.

And may I say, sir, at that time I might answer the challenge of playing golf. [Laughter.]

I now invite you, ladies and gentlemen, to join me and my wife and my colleagues in this toast to the President and Mrs. Ford: Mr. President, Mrs. Ford. Bilateral relations.

Congressional Documents Relating to Foreign Policy

94th Congress, 1st Session

Temporary Suspension of Presidential Authority To Impose Fees on, or Otherwise Adjust, Petroleum Imports. Report from the Senate Committee on Finance, together with minority and supplemental views, to accompany H.R. 1767. S. Rept. 94-11. February 17, 1975. 23 pp.

Proposed Legislation To Amend the Arms Control and Disarmament Act. Communication from the President of the United States transmitting a draft of proposed legislation to amend the Arms Control and Disarmament Act, as amended, in order to extend the authorization of appropriations, and for other purposes. February 19, 1975. H. Doc. 94-54. 3 pp.

Greece and Turkey: Some Military Implications Related to NATO and the Middle East. Study prepared for the Special Subcommittee on Investigations, House Committee on Foreign Affairs, by the Congressional Research Service, Library of Congress. February 28, 1975. 63 pp.

Standby Energy Authorities Act. Report of the Senate Committee on Interior and Insular Affairs, together with minority and additional views, to accompany S. 622. S. Rept. 94-26. March 5, 1975. 90 pp.

Foreign Assistance and Related Programs Appropriation Bill, 1975. Report of the House Committee on Appropriations, together with separate and dissenting views, to accompany H.R. 4592. H. Rept. 94-53. March 10, 1975. 71 pp.

Legislative History of the Committee on Foreign Relations, United States Senate, Ninety-Third Congress, January 3, 1973-December 20, 1974. S. Rept. 94-37. March 17, 1975. 196 pp.

Pan American Day and Pan American Week

A PROCLAMATION¹

Each year, we and other members of the Organization of American States celebrate our shared origins and the close ties that continue to flourish among us. To do this, we commemorate a significant event in the diplomatic history of the Western Hemisphere—the founding, late in the last century, of the International Union of the American Republics. This year marks the 85th anniversary of the establishment of that first inter-governmental regional organization and forerunner of the Organization of American States.

From its earliest days, the organization has taken for its two major objectives the maintenance of peace and the promotion of economic, social and cultural development in the Americas. The strength and longevity of inter-American cooperation in furtherance of these goals derives from its tested ability to evolve and reconstitute itself to meet new realities and new challenges over the years.

In the Americas, we have come to recognize the fresh challenge presented by a new interdependence, which is global as well as hemispheric, linking developed with less developed countries both in and beyond the hemisphere. We sense the opportunity for effective inter-American cooperation to advance our traditional goals of peace and progress for our hemisphere while strengthening the global cooperation decreed by our world.

NOW, THEREFORE, I, GERALD R. FORD, President of the United States of America, do hereby proclaim Monday, April 14, 1975, as Pan American Day, and the week beginning April 13, 1975, as Pan American Week, and I call upon the Governors of the fifty states, the Governor of the Commonwealth of Puerto Rico, and appropriate officials of all other areas under the flag of the United States to issue similar Proclamations.

IN WITNESS WHEREOF, I have hereunto set my hand this eleventh day of April, in the year of our Lord nineteen hundred seventy-five, and of the Independence of the United States of America the one hundred ninety-ninth.



¹ 40 Fed. Reg. 16643.

Preparatory Meeting for Proposed Conference of Oil Producers and Consumers Held at Paris

A preparatory meeting for the international conference on energy and related economic problems was held at Paris April 7-15.¹ Following is a statement made in the meeting on April 7 by Charles W. Robinson, Under Secretary for Economic Affairs, who headed the U.S. delegation, together with a statement by Thomas O. Enders, Assistant Secretary for Economic Affairs, issued to the press on April 15 at the conclusion of the meeting.

STATEMENT BY UNDER SECRETARY ROBINSON

The United States is pleased to participate in this preparatory meeting for the international conference on energy and related economic problems, which initiates an important—in fact an essential—dialogue between oil producer and consumer countries. We congratulate the Government of France for its initiative and express our appreciation for its efforts in convening this meeting today. We also extend thanks for the generous hospitality which is being extended to those of us fortunate enough to be invited to Paris in April.

There have been various analyses and interpretations of the oil crisis that began in the autumn of 1973. There are clearly differences of view among us, which will be discussed in the conference that we will be organizing at this preparatory meeting, but there are also many areas of common interest to which we will need to devote our primary efforts.

¹Attending the meeting were the United States, the European Common Market, and Japan for the industrialized consumer countries; Saudi Arabia, Iran, Venezuela, and Algeria for the producing countries; and Brazil, India, and Zaire for the developing consumer countries.

I believe that we can agree on at least two things.

First, the quintupling of oil prices over the past two years, although posing problems for the world economy, has heightened awareness of the interdependence of nations.

Second, the problems emanating from the current oil situation cannot be resolved through confrontation or by unilateral action, but only through cooperative efforts among all major parties.

We all share a common concern that the social and economic well-being of our peoples be enhanced rather than retarded, that developing nations be able to look forward to their rapid development rather than have their prospects undermined, and that the international financial and trading system be responsible enough and strong enough to cope with new stresses and meet our common needs.

In calling the Washington Energy Conference a little more than a year ago, we made clear from the outset that the initial discussion among the major industrialized importers of oil was only a first step toward the necessary dialogue between both consumers and producers of oil.

At the conclusion of the Washington Conference, ministers of the major industrialized countries stated their recognition of the "need to develop a cooperative multi-lateral relationship with producing countries, and other consuming countries that takes into account the long-term interests of all."

Returning to this theme in February, one year later, Secretary Kissinger stated that:

In an interdependent world, our hopes for prosperity and stability rest ultimately on a cooperative long-term relationship between consumers and producers.

The producers seek a better life for their peoples and a future free from dependence on a single depleting resource; the industrialized nations seek to preserve the hard-earned economic and social progress of centuries; the poorer nations seek desperately to resume their advance toward a more hopeful existence.

A year has passed since the Washington Conference. In that time, energy problems and the inflation and recession to which they have contributed have adversely affected large numbers of people throughout the world. We and other like-minded consumer nations have agreed on a series of collective measures to enable our economies and the world economy to meet the problems associated with the increased price of oil. We sought the consumer cooperation that we considered necessary to insure a substantive and constructive dialogue. The International Energy Agency, present today as an observer, was established last November in recognition that a degree of consumer solidarity had been achieved and to serve as the institutional vehicle for the further elaboration of necessary cooperative measures.

Our purpose at this preparatory meeting is to organize the procedures for the conference that will build on the dialogue initiated at this meeting. Toward this end, we need to strike a balance between the immense scale and complexity of the world energy problem on the one hand and the constraint of realistic expectations for concrete results on the other. It is certainly true that today we are living in a highly interdependent world economy. The countries of the world have an interest in many economic issues in addition to the international oil situation. But if we are to have a conference with a reasonable expectation of tangible results, we must set bounds as to what such a meeting is designed to achieve. We must therefore consider carefully the scope of both the agenda and participation of the conference.

With regard to the agenda, we are here, in the words of the invitation received from the President of the French Republic, to organize a conference "to examine the energy problems to which many aspects of

international economic relations are linked." The social, economic, and political dimensions of this problem are enormous, and the characteristics of the relations between producers and consumers of oil are in many respects unique. Our discussions are bound to overlap at times with other aspects of the world economy, and due account must be taken of such linkages. But I feel strongly that the work program to be developed here should be concentrated on the specifics of energy and related matters and not become diluted with parallel discussions of other issues, however important they may be.

I say this recognizing that oil is only one of the major commodities traded on world markets and that, indeed, all commodities are interrelated within the world trade and financial system. We recognize the need for imaginative new initiatives in this area and are indeed prepared to discuss these other issues elsewhere in appropriate fora, and I take particular note of the upcoming special session of the U.N. General Assembly in September. The point I wish to make here is simply that we have more than enough to handle with the energy-related problems in the effort we are initiating today. To broaden the scope of our discussions would substantially decrease the likelihood of a productive outcome.

As for the number of participants in the main conference, we would foresee a reasonable limitation in participation, but with balanced representation of industrialized consumer countries, developing consumer countries, and the oil-exporting countries. The total number should be sufficiently restricted to permit constructive discussions but large enough that all interests are adequately represented.

It will obviously be impossible for us in this preparatory meeting to designate in a specific manner the participants in the eventual main conference. However, we can concentrate on developing procedures under which participants can be designated in the period between the end of this meeting and the convening of the full conference.

In conclusion, we are initiating a process

of vital and far-reaching concern to the international economy. The people of our nations and of other nations expect and deserve constructive results from this process. We must respond with determination and imagination and take the initial steps at this meeting toward more harmonious relationships in energy and related economic fields.

I pledge the best efforts of the U.S. Government to that end.

STATEMENT BY ASSISTANT SECRETARY ENDERS

I wish to express appreciation to the Government of France for acting as host at this preparatory meeting, on behalf of Under Secretary Robinson, the U.S. delegation, and myself. It has provided a useful opportunity for an exchange of views among industrialized countries, oil-exporting nations, and developing countries on a range of subjects of mutual interest. The meetings have proceeded constructively, and there has been a genuine desire to understand and appreciate respective points of view.

We are disappointed that we have not been able to complete the arrangements necessary for the convening of a formal conference. We have agreed to return to our capitals to consider various points of view which have been discussed in considerable detail over the past nine days. We will remain in contact through appropriate channels to resume together preparations for a conference as quickly as possible.

As you are aware, the major subject of discussion during the last several days has been the proposed draft agenda for a full conference. I do not believe it useful to comment in detail on the various issues involved in these discussions. There has been a basic difference of view with regard to the scope and objectives of the proposed conference.

We were, of course, invited here by the President of the French Republic to prepare for a conference on energy and energy-related issues. We came here ready to discuss these issues, which are of central concern to all countries. Others have insisted on a much broader conference, extending to all

aspects of the relationship between the industrialized countries and the developing world.

We have been and will continue to be willing to discuss seriously raw materials and other development issues in forums more directly concerned with them and to attempt therein to seek mutually beneficial solutions. However, we believe that the proposed conference could achieve constructive results only if it were focused on a relatively limited number of points related to the central subject of energy.

I would like to stress that the discussions of the past nine days have taken place in an atmosphere of cordiality, and genuine attempts have been made to understand respective points of view. In this sense we must all consider this meeting has not been a failed effort. The United States attaches great importance to its exchanges with each of the countries represented at this meeting. Our intention is to continue our efforts to promote cooperation with them through all channels.

U.N. Force in Egypt-Israel Sector Extended for Three Months

Following is a statement made in the U.N. Security Council by U.S. Representative John Scali on April 17, together with the text of a resolution adopted by the Council that day.

STATEMENT BY AMBASSADOR SCALI

USUN press release 31 dated April 17

I would like to congratulate you, Mr. President [Louis de Guiringaud of France], for your leadership in the consultations which have led today to the agreement of the Council to renew the mandate of UNEF. The United States is pleased to join in this consensus and to support extension of the United Nations Emergency Force and its mandate.

Once again I wish to offer my government's appreciation to those countries which have supplied and maintained contingents for UNEF, to the civilian staff, the UNTSO [U.N. Truce Supervision Organization] observers in the field, and particularly to the U.N. troops who contribute so directly to the continuous search for peace in the area.

The Commander of UNEF, Lt. Gen. Ensio Siilasvuo, deserves a special tribute from us all for his exemplary and steadfast leadership of UNEF since its inception. His example provides an enviable model for any future U.N. peacekeeping endeavors.

The Secretary General and his headquarters staff also deserve our highest commendation for continuing to perform such a difficult task so well. The operational efficiency of the UNEF force is borne out by the latest report of the Secretary General. The most conclusive evidence of UNEF's effectiveness is that the situation has remained quiet and that both sides have generally complied with the agreement of disengagement and cooperated with UNEF. In consequence there have been no significant incidents since the preceding report of the Secretary General.

These U.N. peacekeeping troops are essential not only in maintaining the lines of separation between Egypt and Israel and providing a deterrent to renewed hostilities but also in creating a climate of trust and confidence upon which the success of further negotiations depends. The U.N. Emergency Force and the disengagement agreement between Egypt and Israel are both means to an end, not settlements themselves. They are part of the process toward an overall peaceful solution through negotiations as envisaged in Security Council Resolutions 242 and 338.

As a matter of principle, we would have preferred an extension for a longer period of time. But whether the mandate is extended for three or six months or even longer, we believe there is an urgent need to move ahead in achieving a negotiated settlement.

The last time this Council met to renew a U.N. peacekeeping force in the Middle East,

I said that no one could doubt that the road toward peace would be long and difficult, that it would try the patience and test the good will of all concerned. This has been proven all too true. But the essential point is that we are still on that road—the road toward a just and lasting peace in the Middle East. The United States is determined to continue that search. As President Ford said in his address to the joint session of Congress:

The United States will move ahead on whatever course looks most promising, either toward an overall settlement or interim agreements should the parties themselves desire them. We will not accept stagnation or stalemate with all its attendant risks to peace and prosperity and to our relations in and outside of the region.

Renewal of UNEF today is an important contribution toward continued movement in this process. We are happy to join with the Council in this action, and we pledge our best efforts in the continued search for peace in the Middle East.

TEXT OF RESOLUTION ¹

The Security Council,

Recalling its resolutions 338 (1973), 340 (1973), 341 (1973), 346 (1974) and 362 (1974),

Having considered the report of the Secretary-General on the United Nations Emergency Force (S/11670 and Corr. 1),

Having noted the developments in the situation in the Middle East,

Expressing concern over the prevailing state of tension in the area,

Decides:

(a) To call upon the parties concerned to implement immediately Security Council resolution 338 (1973);

(b) To renew the mandate of the United Nations Emergency Force for a period of three months, that is, until 24 July 1975;

(c) To request the Secretary-General to submit at the end of this period a report on the developments in the situation and the measures taken to implement Security Council resolution 338 (1973).

¹U.N. doc. S/RES/368 (1975); adopted by the Council on Apr. 17 by a vote of 13 to 0, with the People's Republic of China and Iraq not participating in the vote.

TREATY INFORMATION

Current Actions

MULTILATERAL

Coffee

Protocol for the continuation in force of the international coffee agreement 1968, as amended and extended (TIAS 6584, 7809), with annex. Approved by the International Coffee Council at London September 26, 1974.¹

Signature and acceptance deposited: Uganda, March 11, 1975.

Judicial Procedure

Convention on the taking of evidence abroad in civil or commercial matters. Done at The Hague March 18, 1970. Entered into force October 7, 1972. TIAS 7444.

Ratification deposited: Portugal (with reservations and declarations), March 12, 1975.

Maritime Matters

Convention on the Intergovernmental Maritime Consultative Organization. Done at Geneva March 6, 1948. Entered into force March 17, 1958. TIAS 4044.

Acceptance deposited: Austria, April 2, 1975.

Amendment of article VII of the convention on facilitation of international maritime traffic, 1965 (TIAS 6251). Adopted at London November 19, 1973.²

Acceptances deposited: Federal Republic of Germany (applicable to Berlin (West)), December 30, 1974; Tunisia, February 19, 1975; United States, April 2, 1975.

Narcotics

Single convention on narcotic drugs, 1961. Done at New York March 30, 1961. Entered into force December 13, 1964; for the United States June 24, 1967. TIAS 6298.

Ratification deposited: Italy, April 14, 1975.

Convention on psychotropic substances. Done at Vienna February 21, 1971.¹

Ratification deposited: Denmark, April 18, 1975.

Protocol amending the single convention on narcotic drugs, 1961. Done at Geneva March 25, 1972.¹

Ratifications deposited: Denmark, April 18, 1975; Italy, April 14, 1975.

Nuclear Weapons—Nonproliferation

Treaty on the nonproliferation of nuclear weapons. Done at Washington, London, and Moscow July 1, 1968. Entered into force March 5, 1970. TIAS 6839.

Ratification deposited: Republic of Korea, April 23, 1975.

Oil Pollution

International convention relating to intervention on the high seas in cases of oil pollution casualties, with annex. Done at Brussels November 29, 1969. Entered into force May 6, 1975.

Accession deposited: New Zealand, March 26, 1975.

International convention on civil liability for oil pollution damage. Done at Brussels November 29, 1969. Enters into force June 19, 1975.

Ratification deposited: Dominican Republic, April 2, 1975.

Accession deposited: Denmark, April 2, 1975.

Amendments to the international convention for the prevention of pollution of the sea by oil, 1954, as amended (TIAS 4900, 6109). Adopted at London October 12, 1971.¹

Acceptance deposited: France, March 24, 1975.

International convention on the establishment of an international fund for compensation for oil pollution damage. Done at Brussels December 18, 1971.¹

Accession deposited: Denmark, April 2, 1975.

Safety at Sea

Agreement regarding financial support of the North Atlantic ice patrol. Done at Washington January 4, 1956. Entered into force July 5, 1956. TIAS 3597.

Acceptance deposited: Poland, April 22, 1975.

Convention on the international regulations for preventing collisions at sea, 1972. Done at London October 20, 1972.¹

Accession deposited: Romania (with statements), March 27, 1975.

Space

Convention on registration of objects launched into outer space. Opened for signature at New York January 14, 1975.¹

Signature: Switzerland, April 14, 1975.

Telecommunications

International telecommunication convention, with annexes and protocols. Done at Malaga-Torremolinos October 25, 1973. Entered into force January 1, 1975.²

Accession deposited: Colombia, February 21, 1975.

BILATERAL

Australia

Agreement transferring the facility for research on aerospace disturbances at Amberley to the Australian National University. Effected by exchange of notes at Canberra January 31 and February 26, 1975. Entered into force February 26, 1975.

Agreement concerning a program of research on aero-space disturbances. Effected by exchange of notes at Canberra January 3, 1964. Entered into force January 3, 1964. TIAS 5510.

Terminated: February 26, 1975.

¹ Not in force.

² Not in force for the United States.

Agreement for the establishment and operation of additional facilities in connection with a program of research on aero-space disturbances. Effected by exchange of notes at Canberra April 12, 1965. TIAS 5801.

Terminated: February 26, 1975.

Bangladesh

Agreement amending the agreement for sales of agricultural commodities of October 4, 1974 (TIAS 7949). Effected by exchange of notes at Dacca April 11, 1975. Entered into force April 11, 1975.

International Committee of the Red Cross

Grant agreement concerning emergency relief and assistance to refugees, displaced persons, and war victims in the Republic of Viet-Nam, Laos, and the Khmer Republic. Signed at Washington and Geneva February 20 and March 16 and 17, 1975. Entered into force March 17, 1975.

Jamaica

Agreement amending and extending the agreement of September 29, 1967, as amended and extended, relating to trade in cotton textiles. Effected by exchange of notes at Washington April 2, 1975. Entered into force April 2, 1975.

Romania

Agreement on trade relations. Signed at Bucharest April 2, 1975. Enters into force on the date of exchange of written notice of acceptance by the two governments.

Syria

Loan agreement to assist Syria to increase its agricultural production. Signed at Damascus February 27, 1975. Entered into force February 27, 1975.

Grant agreement for general participant training. Signed at Damascus February 27, 1975. Entered into force February 27, 1975.

Grant agreement to promote the economic development of Syria. Signed at Damascus February 27, 1975. Entered into force February 27, 1975.

United Nations Children's Fund

Grant agreement concerning assistance for children and mothers in South Viet-Nam, Cambodia, and Laos. Signed at Washington and New York December 26 and 30, 1974. Entered into force December 30, 1974.

Agreement amending the grant agreement of December 26 and 30, 1974, concerning assistance for children and mothers in South Viet-Nam, Cambodia, and Laos. Signed at New York February 10 and 14, 1975. Entered into force February 14, 1975.

Viet-Nam

Agreement supplementing the agreement of November 5, 1957, as supplemented and modified (TIAS 3932, 5419, 6869), relating to investment guarantees. Effected by exchange of notes at Saigon January 13 and March 7, 1975. Entered into force March 7, 1975.

PUBLICATIONS

GPO Sales Publications

Publications may be ordered by catalog or stock number from the Superintendent of Documents, U.S. Government Printing Office, Washington, D.C. 20540. A 25-percent discount is made on orders for 100 or more copies of any one publication mailed to the same address. Remittances, payable to the Superintendent of Documents, must accompany orders. Prices shown below, which include domestic postage, are subject to change.

Privileges and Immunities for American Technicians Assisting in Modernization Program of Iranian Armed Forces. Agreement with Iran. TIAS 7963. 3 pp. 25¢. (Cat. No. S9.10:7963).

Certificates of Airworthiness for Imported Aeronautical Products and Components. Agreement with the Federal Republic of Germany. TIAS 7965. 12 pp. 30¢. (Cat. No. S9.10:7965).

Defense—Continuation of Agreement of May 5, 1951. Agreement with Iceland. TIAS 7969. 8 pp. 30¢. (Cat. No. S9.10:7969).

Narcotic Drugs—Provision of Helicopters and Related Assistance. Agreement with Jamaica. TIAS 7966. 5 pp. 25¢. (Cat. No. S9.10:7966).

Cooperation in the Fields of Economics, Technology, Industry and Defense. Agreement with Saudi Arabia. TIAS 7974. 10 pp. 30¢. (Cat. No. S9.10:7974).

Agricultural Commodities. Agreement with the Republic of Korea amending the agreement of April 12, 1973, as amended. TIAS 7976. 7 pp. 30¢. (Cat. No. S9.10:7976).

Launching of NASA Satellites From San Marco Range. Agreement with Italy extending the agreement of April 30 and June 12, 1969. TIAS 7972. 3 pp. 25¢. (Cat. No. S9.10:7972).

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**Check List of Department of State
Press Releases: April 21-27**

Press releases may be obtained from the Office of Press Relations, Department of State, Washington, D.C. 20520.

Release issued prior to April 21 which appears in this issue of the BULLETIN is No. 208 of April 19.

No.	Date	Subject
*209	4/21	Foreign agricultural and nutritional specialists visit U.S.
*210	4/22	Reinhardt sworn in as Assistant Secretary for Public Affairs (biographic data).
*211	4/22	Regional Foreign Policy Conference, Pittsburgh, Pa., Apr. 29.
*212	4/22	Study Group I of the U.S. National Committee for the CCITT, May 15.
213	4/23	Republic of Korea ratifies Nonproliferation Treaty.
*214	4/23	Shipping Coordinating Committee, May 22.
*215	4/23	Regional Foreign Policy Conference, Birmingham, Ala. May 7.
†216	4/24	U.S. and Canada extend Fisheries Agreement.
*217	4/25	Maj. Gen. David S. Parker, former Canal Zone Governor, receives Department of State award.

* Not printed.

† Held for a later issue of the BULLETIN.

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May 19, 1975

The Department of State BULLETIN is a weekly publication issued by the Office of Media Services, Bureau of Public Affairs, provides the public and interested agencies of the government with information on developments in the field of U.S. foreign relations and on the work of the Department and the Foreign Service.

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Secretary Kissinger's News Conference of April 29

Following is the transcript of a news conference held by Secretary Kissinger at the Old Executive Office Building on April 29.

Press release 220 dated April 29

Mr. Nessen [Ronald H. Nessen, Press Secretary to President Ford]: The briefing was delayed until the evacuation was completed, and the last helicopters are now in the air.

I would like to read a statement by the President.

[At this point Mr. Nessen read a statement by President Ford, the text of which follows.]

"During the past week, I had ordered the reduction of American personnel in the U.S. Mission in Saigon to levels that could be quickly evacuated during an emergency, while enabling that mission to continue to fulfill its duties.

"During the day on Monday, Washington time, the airport at Saigon came under persistent rocket, as well as artillery, fire and was effectively closed. The military situation in the area deteriorated rapidly.

"I therefore ordered the evacuation of all American personnel remaining in South Viet-Nam.

"The evacuation has been completed. I commend the personnel of the Armed Forces who accomplished it, as well as Ambassador Graham Martin and the staff of his mission, who served so well under difficult conditions.

"This action closes a chapter in the American experience. I ask all Americans to close ranks, to avoid recrimination about the past, to look ahead to the many goals we share, and to work together on the great tasks that remain to be accomplished."

Copies of this statement will be available as you leave the briefing.

Now, to give you details of the events of the past few days and to answer your

questions, Secretary of State Kissinger.

Secretary Kissinger: Ladies and Gentlemen, when the President spoke before the Congress [April 10], he stated as our objective the stabilization of the situation in Viet-Nam.

We made clear at that time, as well as before many congressional hearings, that our purpose was to bring about the most controlled and the most humane solution that was possible and that these objectives required the course which the President had set.

Our priorities were as follows: We sought to save the American lives still in Viet-Nam. We tried to rescue as many South Vietnamese that had worked with the United States for 15 years in reliance on our commitments as we possibly could. And we sought to bring about as humane an outcome as was achievable under the conditions that existed.

Over the past two weeks, the American personnel in Viet-Nam have been progressively reduced. Our objective was to reduce at a rate that was significant enough so that we would finally be able to evacuate rapidly but which would not produce a panic which might prevent anybody from getting out.

Our objective was also to fulfill the human obligation which we felt to the tens of thousands of South Vietnamese who had worked with us for over a decade.

Finally, we sought, through various intermediaries, to bring about as humane a political evolution as we could.

By Sunday evening [April 27], the personnel in our mission had been reduced to 950 and there were 8,000 South Vietnamese to be considered in a particularly high-risk category—between 5,000 and 8,000. We do not know the exact number.

On Monday evening, Washington time,

around 5 o'clock, which was Tuesday morning in Saigon, the airport in Tan Son Nhut was rocketed and received artillery fire.

The President called an NSC [National Security Council] meeting. He decided that if the shelling stopped by dawn Saigon time, we would attempt to operate with fixed-wing aircraft from Tan Son Nhut Airport for one more day to remove the high-risk South Vietnamese, together with all the Defense Attache's Office [DAO], which was located near the Tan Son Nhut Airport.

He also ordered a substantial reduction of the remaining American personnel in South Viet-Nam.

I may point out that the American personnel in Saigon was divided into two groups; one with the Defense Attache's Office, which was located near the Tan Son Nhut Airport; the second one, which was related to the Embassy and was with the U.S. Mission in downtown Saigon.

The shelling did stop early in the morning on Tuesday, Saigon time, or about 9 p.m. last night, Washington time. We then attempted to land C-130's but found that the population at the airport had got out of control and had flooded the runways. It proved impossible to land any more fixed-wing aircraft.

The President thereupon ordered that the DAO personnel, together with those civilians that had been made ready to be evacuated, be moved to the DAO compound, which is near Tan Son Nhut Airport; and at about 11:00 last night, he ordered the evacuation of all Americans from Tan Son Nhut and from the Embassy as well.

This operation has been going on all day, which of course is night in Saigon, and under difficult circumstances, and the total number of those evacuated numbers about 6,500—we will have the exact figures for you tomorrow—of which about 1,000 are Americans.

Our Ambassador has left, and the evacuation can be said to be completed.

In the period since the President spoke to the Congress, we have therefore succeeded in evacuating all of the Americans who were in South Viet-Nam, losing the two marines

last night to rocket fire and two pilots today on a helicopter.

We succeeded in evacuating something on the order of 55,000 South Vietnamese. And we hope we have contributed to a political evolution that may spare the South Vietnamese some of the more drastic consequences of a political change, but this remains to be seen. This last point remains to be seen.

As far as the Administration is concerned, I can only underline the point made by the President. We do not believe that this is a time for recrimination. It is a time to heal wounds, to look at our international obligations, and to remember that peace and progress in the world has depended importantly on American commitment and American conviction and that the peace and progress of our own people is closely tied to that of the rest of the world.

I will be glad to answer questions.

Q. Mr. Secretary, you made some reference a few weeks back to those who believe in the domino theory, and while I don't remember exactly your words, the point was it is easy to laugh at it but there is some justification for subscribing to that theory. Now that this chapter is over, can you give us your estimate of the security of Thailand and other countries in the area, or the near area?

Secretary Kissinger: I think it is too early to make a final assessment.

There is no question that the outcome in Indochina will have consequences not only in Asia but in many other parts of the world. To deny these consequences is to miss the possibility of dealing with them.

So, I believe there will be consequences. But I am confident that we can deal with them, and we are determined to manage and to progress along the road toward a permanent peace that we have sought; but there is no question that there will be consequences.

Q. Now that it is over, could you tell us, or elaborate in more detail, what we did through various intermediaries to bring about, I think you said, as humane a political solution as possible, and why those efforts seem to have failed?

Secretary Kissinger: I would not agree with the proposition that these efforts have failed because at least some of the efforts, especially those related to evacuation, were carried out through intermediaries. I think it is premature for me to go into all of the details, but we did deal with Hanoi and with the PRG [Provisional Revolutionary Government] through different intermediaries, and we were in a position to put our views and receive responses.

Q. May I follow on that by saying, why, then, was it necessary to stage a rescue operation in the final stages?

Secretary Kissinger: In the final stages, it was always foreseen that a helicopter lift for some contingents would be necessary. I believe that the dynamics of the situation in South Viet-Nam and the impatience of the North Vietnamese to seize power brought about an acceleration of events in the last day and a half.

But you will remember there was a period of about five days when both civilian and U.S. personnel were evacuated without any substantial opposition—in fact, more than five days, about a week.

Q. Mr. Secretary, on that point, do you now anticipate that the North Vietnamese intend to move in and forcefully seize Saigon? Do you anticipate there will be a bloody battle of Saigon, or is there still a chance for an orderly transition?

Secretary Kissinger: This is very difficult to judge at this moment. I think it is important to point out that the Communist demands have been escalating as the military situation has changed in their favor.

So, a week ago they were asking only for the removal of President [Nguyen Van] Thieu. When he resigned, they immediately asked for the removal of his successor, specifying that General [Duong Van] Minh would be acceptable. When President [Tran Van] Huong resigned in favor of General Minh, he was now described as a member of a clique which includes all of the members of his administration.

A week ago, the Communist demand was

for the removal of American military personnel. This quickly escalated into a removal of all American personnel.

Then a new demand was put forward for the dismantling of the South Vietnamese military apparatus. When that was agreed to, they added to it the demand for the dismantling of the South Vietnamese administrative apparatus. So, it is clear that what is being aimed at is a substantial political takeover.

Now, whether it is possible to avoid a battle for Saigon, it is too early to judge. I would hope—and we certainly have attempted to work in that direction—that such a battle can be avoided. And it is basically unnecessary because it seems to us that the South Vietnamese Government is prepared to draw the conclusions from the existing situation and, in fact, look forward to correspond to the demands of the Communist side.

Q. Mr. Secretary, do you consider the United States now owes any allegiance at all to the Paris pact? Are we now bound in any way by the Paris agreements?

Secretary Kissinger: Well, as far as the United States is concerned, there are not many provisions of the Paris agreement that are still relevant. As far as the North Vietnamese are concerned, they have stated that they wish to carry out the Paris accords, though by what definition is not fully clear to me. We would certainly support this if it has any meaning.

Q. May I ask one follow-up? Do you now favor American aid in rebuilding North Viet-Nam?

Secretary Kissinger: North Viet-Nam?

Q. North Viet-Nam.

Secretary Kissinger: No, I do not favor American aid for rebuilding North Viet-Nam.

Q. South Viet-Nam?

Secretary Kissinger: With respect to South Viet-Nam, we will have to see what kind of government emerges and indeed whether there is going to be a South Viet-Nam. We would certainly look at particular

specific humanitarian requests that can be carried out by humanitarian agencies, but we do believe that the primary responsibility should fall on those who supply the weapons for this political change.

Q. Mr. Secretary, I would like to ask a question about the length of time that it took to complete this evacuation. First, the question of whether days went by after the end became obvious before ordering the evacuation; second, if after ordering it there was a one-hour delay in helicopter landings, apparently caused by military confusion; third, whether the evacuation was prolonged by picking up thousands of Vietnamese instead of concentrating on Americans; and fourth, whether this was delayed even further by Ambassador Martin's desire to be the last man to leave the sinking ship.

In other words, I tried to put the specifics in order to ask you, did it take too long to get out of there, to write this last chapter?

Secretary Kissinger: We got out, with all of the personnel that were there, without panic and without the substantial casualties that could have occurred if civil order had totally broken down. We also managed to save 56,000 people whose lives were in the most severe jeopardy.

We had to make a judgment every day how many people we thought we could safely remove without triggering a panic and at the same time still be able to carry out our principal function and the remaining functions.

I think these objectives were achieved and they were carried out successfully. Therefore I do not believe that there was an undue delay, because an evacuation has been going on for two weeks.

The difference between the last stage and the previous period was that the last stage was done by helicopter and the previous stage had been done by fixed-wing.

I think the ability to conduct a final evacuation by helicopter without casualties during the operation, at least casualties caused by hostile action, is closely related to the policies that were pursued in the preceding two weeks.

As for Ambassador Martin, he was in a very difficult position. He felt a moral obligation to the people with whom he had been associated, and he attempted to save as many of those as possible. That is not the worst fault a man can have.

Q. Mr. Secretary, there have been numerous reports of American appeals to the Soviets, to the Chinese. Can you say today in the evacuation effort were either the Soviets or the Chinese helpful or unhelpful in this diplomatic effort?

Secretary Kissinger: I think that we received some help from the Soviet Union in the evacuation effort. The degree of it we will have to assess when we study the exchanges.

Q. Mr. Secretary, what caused the breakdown of the intent which was spoken of earlier on the Hill to try to achieve a measure of self-determination for the people of South Viet-Nam, and what is your total assessment now of the effectiveness or the noneffectiveness of the whole Paris accord operation, which you said at the outset was intended to achieve peace with honor for the United States?

Secretary Kissinger: Until Sunday night we thought there was some considerable hope that the North Vietnamese would not seek a solution by purely military means, and when the transfer of power to General Minh took place—a person who had been designated by the other side as a counterpart worth talking to, they would be prepared to talk with—we thought a negotiated solution in the next few days was highly probable.

Sometime Sunday night the North Vietnamese obviously changed signals. Why that is, we do not yet know, nor do I exclude that now that the American presence is totally removed and very little military structure is left in South Viet-Nam, that there may not be a sort of a negotiation, but what produced this sudden shift to a military option or what would seem to us to be a sudden shift to a military option, I have not had sufficient opportunity to analyze.

As to the effectiveness of the Paris accords, I think it is important to remember

the mood in this country at the time that the Paris accords were being negotiated. I think it is worth remembering that the principal criticism that was then made was that the terms we insisted on were too tough, not that the terms were too generous.

We wanted what was considered peace with honor, was that the United States would not end a war by overthrowing a government with which it had been associated. That still seems an objective that was correct.

There were several other assumptions that were made at that time that were later falsified by events that were beyond the control of—that indeed were unforeseeable by—anybody who negotiated these agreements, including the disintegration of or the weakening of executive authority in the United States for reasons unconnected with foreign policy considerations.

So, the premises of the Paris accords, in terms of aid, of the possibility of aid, and in terms of other factors, tended to disintegrate. I see no purpose now in reviewing that particular history. Within the context of the time, it seemed the right thing to do.

Q. Mr. Secretary, a follow-up question on that. What is the current relationship of the United States to the South Vietnamese political grouping, whatever you would call it?

Secretary Kissinger: We will have to see what grouping emerges out of whatever negotiations should now take place between the two South Vietnamese sides. After we have seen what grouping emerges and what degree of independence it has, then we can make a decision about what our political relationship to it is. We have not made a decision on that.

Q. Would you say diplomatic relations are in abeyance with the government in South Viet-Nam?

Secretary Kissinger: I think that is a fair statement.

Q. Mr. Secretary, looking back on the war now, would you say that the war was in vain, and what do you feel it accomplished?

Secretary Kissinger: I think it will be a

long time before Americans will be able to talk or write about the war with some dispassion. It is clear that the war did not achieve the objectives of those who started the original involvement nor the objectives of those who sought to end that involvement, which they found on terms which seemed to them compatible with the sacrifices that had been made.

What lessons we should draw from it, I think we should reserve for another occasion. But I don't think that we can solve the problem of having entered the conflict too lightly by leaving it too lightly, either.

Q. Mr. Secretary, looking toward the future, has America been so stunned by the experience of Viet-Nam that it will never again come to the military or economic aid of an ally? I am talking specifically in the case of Israel.

Secretary Kissinger: As I pointed out in a speech a few weeks ago [April 17], one lesson we must learn from this experience is that we must be very careful in the commitments we make but that we should scrupulously honor those commitments that we make.

I believe that the experience in the war can make us more mature in the commitments we undertake and more determined to maintain those we have. I would therefore think that with relation to other countries, including Israel, that no lessons should be drawn by the enemies of our friends from the experiences in Viet-Nam.

Q. Mr. Secretary, in view of the developments in the last week or so, would you agree that there was never any hope of stabilizing the South Vietnamese military situation after the withdrawal from the northern region?

Secretary Kissinger: When the President met with General Weyand [Gen. Frederick C. Weyand, Chief of Staff, U.S. Army] in Palm Springs, the judgment was that there was a slim hope, but some hope. Somewhat less than 50-50, but still some hope.

The situation deteriorated with every passing day. Those of you whom I briefed

at that time will remember that I said that whatever—and I said it in public testimony on innumerable occasions—that whatever objective we may set ourselves and whatever assessment we make about the outcome, the Administration had no choice except to pursue the course that we did, which was designed to save the Americans still in Viet-Nam and the maximum number of Vietnamese lives, should the worst come to pass.

Q. Mr. Secretary, could you tell us, are you now reassessing the amount of humanitarian aid which Congress should give to the South Vietnamese, and also, can you tell us the President's reaction and mood during the past 24 hours?

Secretary Kissinger: With respect to humanitarian aid for South Viet-Nam, we spoke to the congressional leadership this morning, and we urged them to pass the humanitarian part of the aid request that we have submitted to the Congress.

The President pointed out that he would make a later decision as to what part of that humanitarian aid could be used in South Viet-Nam after the political evolution in South Viet-Nam becomes clearer.

The President's mood was somber and determined, and we all went through a somewhat anxious 24 hours, because until the last helicopter had left, we could not really know whether an attack on any of these compounds might start and whether missiles might be used against our evacuation.

Q. Mr. Secretary, could I ask you to clarify something that seems rather important at this point? You said here and in the past that a weakening of the American executive authority was a factor in this whole outcome. Now, there have been reports that former President Nixon, with your advice, had decided in April of 1973 to resume the bombing of North Viet-Nam but that Watergate intruded and he could not carry through on that. Is that a historic fact or not?

Secretary Kissinger: To the best of my knowledge, President Nixon had never ac-

tually decided on any particular action. The Washington Special Action Group at that period was considering a number of reactions that could be taken to the beginning flagrant violations of the agreements. This was done on an interdepartmental basis—including the Department of State, my office, the Department of Defense—and had reached certain options.

Then President Nixon, as it turned out, never made a final decision between these options. To what extent it was influenced by Watergate is a psychological assessment that one can only speculate about.

Q. Mr. Secretary, there is a new Asia developing after the Indochina situation. What will the priorities of the United States be in recognizing its existing commitments and in making new ones?

Secretary Kissinger: We will have to assess the impact of Indochina on our allies and on other countries in that area and on their perceptions of the United States, and we will have to assess also what role the United States can responsibly play over an indefinite period of time, because surely another lesson we should draw from the Indochina experience is that foreign policy must be sustained over decades if it is to be effective, and if it cannot be, then it has to be tailored to what is sustainable.

The President has already reaffirmed our alliance with Japan, our defense treaty with Korea, and we, of course, also have treaty obligations and important bases in the Philippines. We will soon be in consultation with many other countries in that area, including Indonesia and Singapore and Australia and New Zealand, and we hope to crystallize an Asian policy that is suited to present circumstances with close consultation with our friends.

Q. Mr. Secretary, are you confident that all the Americans that wanted to come out are out of Saigon, and do you have any idea of the number of Americans who remained behind?

Secretary Kissinger: I have no idea of the number of Americans that remained behind.

I am confident that every American who wanted to come out is out, but how many chose to stay behind we won't know until tomorrow sometime. The last contingent that left was the Ambassador and some of his immediate staff, and we won't know really until we get the report from them.

Q. Mr. Secretary, is President Thieu welcome to seek asylum in this country, and is there any possibility that the United States would recognize an exile government of South Viet-Nam?

Secretary Kissinger: If President Thieu should seek asylum in the United States, he would be, of course, received.

The United States will not recognize an exile government of South Viet-Nam.

Q. Mr. Secretary, could you tell us what went wrong, what were the flaws in American foreign policy toward Indochina all these years? Why was it that so many Administrations repeatedly underestimated the power of the North Vietnamese and overestimated the capability on the part of the South Vietnamese?

Secretary Kissinger: As I said earlier, I think this is not the occasion, when the last American has barely left Saigon, to make an assessment of a decade and a half of American foreign policy, because it could equally well be argued that if five Administrations that were staffed, after all, by serious people dedicated to the welfare of their country came to certain conclusions, that maybe there was something in their assessment, even if for a variety of reasons the effort did not succeed.

As I have already pointed out, special factors have operated in recent years. But I would think that what we need now in this country, for some weeks at least, and hopefully for some months, is to heal the wounds and to put Viet-Nam behind us and to concentrate on the problems of the future. That certainly will be the Administration's attitude. There will be time enough for historic assessments.

Q. Mr. Secretary, you have repeatedly spoken of the potential consequences of what

has happened in Southeast Asia. I would like to ask if you feel that your personal prestige and therefore your personal ability to negotiate between other countries has been damaged by what has happened?

Secretary Kissinger: If I should ever come to the conclusion that I could not fulfill what the President has asked of me, then I would draw the consequences from this. Obviously, this has been a very painful experience, and it would be idle to deny this has been a painful experience for many who have been concerned with this problem for a decade and a half.

I think the problems in Viet-Nam went deeper than any one negotiation and that an analysis of the accords at the time will require an assessment of the public pressures, of what was sustainable, but I don't think, again, that we should go into this at this particular moment, nor am I probably the best judge of my prestige at any particular point.

Q. Mr. Secretary, what was it in particular that led you to believe until Sunday night that Hanoi might be willing to go for a non-military solution? Did you have some specific information from them to indicate that, because certainly the battlefield situation suggested otherwise?

Secretary Kissinger: Maybe to you, but the battlefield situation suggested that there was a standdown of significant military activity, and the public pronouncements were substantially in the direction that a negotiation would start with General Minh. There were also other reasons which led us to believe that the possibility of a negotiation remained open.

Q. Mr. Secretary, you have blamed the Soviets and the Red Chinese for breaking faith with the letter and the spirit of the Paris peace accords. The Soviet Union has apparently, through its broadcasts, encouraged a Communist takeover in Portugal. The Chinese have signed a joint communique with North Korea encouraging North Korea to unify South Korea by force.

My question is, why, in view of these violations in both the letter and in the spirit of

détente, does the United States continue to believe in détente; secondly, are we ever going to take some obvious action showing American displeasure at the behavior of the two Communist superpowers?

Secretary Kissinger: First, I think it is important to keep in mind that our relationship with both the Soviet Union and the People's Republic of China is based on ideological hostility but practical reasons for cooperation in certain limited spheres.

With respect to the Soviet Union, they and we possess the capability to destroy mankind. The question of how to prevent a general nuclear war is a problem that some Administration must solve before consequences that would be irremedial. Therefore there is always a common interest, and indeed a common obligation, to attempt to deal with this particular problem.

With respect to the various points you made, it is important for us to recognize that we cannot, in this situation, ask of the Soviet Union that it does our job for us. On the one hand, as I pointed out previously, of course the Soviet Union and the People's Republic must be responsible for the consequences of those actions that lead to an upset of the situation in Indochina, or maybe in the Middle East; that is, the introduction of massive armaments that will in all probability be used offensively is an event that we cannot ignore.

On the other hand, I think it would be a grave mistake to blame the Soviet Union for what happened in Portugal. It may have taken advantage of the situation in Portugal, but the fact that the Communist Party in Portugal has emerged despite the fact that it, in recent elections, had only 12 percent of the votes cannot be ascribed to Soviet machinations primarily, but due to causes that are much more complicated and also due to evolutions in Europe that have roots quite different from Soviet pressures.

So, we must not make the mistake of ascribing every reverse we have to our Communist opponents, because that makes them appear 10 feet tall. On the other hand, we must not make the mistake of lulling ourselves, with a period of détente, into believing

that all competition has disappeared.

Between these two extremes, we must navigate, seek to reduce tensions on the basis of reciprocity, and seek to promote a stabler world. When either of the Communist countries have attempted actively to bring foreign policy pressures, the United States has resisted strenuously, and again we have called their attention to the fact that the fostering of international conflict will certainly lead to a breakdown of détente. But the individual examples which you gave cannot be ascribed to Communist actions primarily.

Q. In ordering the evacuation, to what extent were you responding exclusively to the military situation and to what extent were you responding either to a request by "Big" Minh for all Americans to get out or to your own feeling that a total evacuation might facilitate a political settlement?

Secretary Kissinger: When the President ordered total evacuation, it was done on the basis that Tan Son Nhut Airport had already been closed and that therefore the American personnel in Saigon—and there were 45 in the province—might soon become hostage to the approaching Communist forces.

The order to evacuate was made before any request had been received from General Minh, and the principal, indeed the only, reason was to guarantee the safety of the remaining Americans.

Q. Mr. Secretary, there was a report last night that the Communists were backing away from the airport, the rockets seemed to be moving back. Was that a direct result of negotiations and were they prepared to let us move refugees out or Americans out on fixed-wing aircraft?

Secretary Kissinger: I don't know that particular report, but the shelling stopped about 9 p.m., last night. We could not operate fixed-wing aircraft, because the control at the airport broke down. And it was at this point that the President decided that with Communist forces approaching on all sides and with the airport being closed that we had to go to helicopter evacuation.

Q. Mr. Secretary, there is a report in New York that last week you sent a further request for the good offices of the Council of Ministers of the Nine, the European Communities.

Secretary Kissinger: We did not approach the Nine last week.

Q. Mr. Secretary, do you see any possibility of a negotiated settlement, and also, with respect to that, what can and should the South Vietnamese Government do now?

Secretary Kissinger: I have already pointed out that the Communist demands have been escalating literally with every passing day, that as soon as one demand is met, an additional demand is put forward. So, we should have no illusions about what the Communist side is aiming for.

The South Vietnamese, as far as I can tell, have met every demand that has so far been put forward on the radio. There have not been any direct negotiations with which I am familiar.

What is attainable in the transfer of power that would preserve a vestige of other forces than the Communist forces, that remains to be seen.

Secretary of Defense Schlesinger Commends Efforts of Armed Forces

Statement Issued April 29

Department of Defense press release 204-75 dated April 29

As the last withdrawal of Americans from Viet-Nam takes place, it is my special

responsibility to address to you, the men and women of our Armed Forces, a few words of appreciation on behalf of the American people.

For many of you, the tragedy of Southeast Asia is more than a distant and abstract event. You have fought there; you have lost comrades there; you have suffered there. In this hour of pain and reflection, you may feel that your efforts and sacrifices have gone for naught.

That is not the case. When the passions have muted and the history is written, Americans will recall that their Armed Forces served them well. Under circumstances more difficult than ever before faced by our military services, you accomplished the mission assigned to you by higher authority. In combat you were victorious, and you left the field with honor.

Though you have done all that was asked of you, it will be stated that the war itself was futile. In some sense, such may be said of any national effort that ultimately fails. Yet our involvement was not purposeless. It was intended to assist a small nation to preserve its independence in the face of external attack and to provide at least a reasonable chance to survive. That Viet-Nam succumbed to powerful external forces vitiates neither the explicit purpose behind our involvement nor the impulse of generosity toward those under attack that has long infused American policy.

Your record of duty performed under difficult conditions remains unmatched. I salute you for it. Beyond any question you are entitled to the nation's respect, admiration, and gratitude.

Adjusting to a Changing World Economy: Investment and Trade Policy

Address by Deputy Secretary Robert S. Ingersoll¹

We, as a nation, must not permit recent events in Indochina to detract from our vision of the future or cause us to turn away from the broader challenges of our time.

I want to talk to you this evening about the U.S. policy on international trade and investment, a topic of obvious relevance both to the nation, as we adjust to an era of economic interdependence, and to the work of this conference.

You, as businessmen and international traders, have a better appreciation than most Americans of the importance of our economic interaction with the rest of the world. You understand how the relatively unrestricted flow of capital and goods across international borders is vital not only to our economy but to general world stability and prosperity. In many respects, I am preaching to the converted, to an audience of experts deeply concerned about trade and investment among nations. I also understand the risks inherent in a long after-dinner speech and will therefore keep my remarks brief and to the point.

Let me turn first to U.S. policy on international investment, an issue of intense interest and debate in the nation today. Since the time of Alexander Hamilton, American policy has consistently been to welcome foreign investment and to support the generally free international movement of capital. We have, from time to time, turned protectionist in our trade policy, but not in our attitude toward investment.

Investment from abroad has historically

played an important role in building the economy and infrastructure of this nation; it was, as you are probably aware, an essential element in the construction of our trans-continental railway system during the last century. Foreign investment has never been a threat to our security or economic integrity. Today, in a recessionary period, it is an important source of capital, technology, management, and jobs.

Our longstanding commitment to the relatively nonrestrictive treatment of foreign investment is embodied in a wide-ranging bilateral network of treaties of friendship, commerce, and navigation with other nations. These treaties establish conditions favorable to private investment abroad, with many of them providing for a national-treatment standard to insure that foreign investment is not discriminated against in the recipient country.

You will have noticed that in describing our attitude toward the international flow of capital, I have consistently employed a qualifying word—"generally" free movement, "relatively" unrestricted. In discussing foreign investment, it is important to note that neither government policy nor our treaty system is intended to throw vital American industries open to uncontrolled investment from abroad. There are Federal restrictions effectively limiting the amount of foreign investment in areas such as atomic energy, communications, shipping and air transport, defense industries, and government-owned natural resources.

Let us be frank to admit the real cause of current public concern about foreign investment in this country; it is occasioned by the

¹ Made before the 38th Annual Chicago World Trade Conference at Chicago, Ill., on Apr. 30 (text from press release 221).

fact that in recent years certain oil-producing nations, many of them Arab, have accumulated vast foreign exchange holdings and, at least in theory, have the potential to invest heavily in American companies.

Response to New Investment Situation

The United States has long been accustomed to investing overseas; today we sense the shoe may be on the other foot, that we may become increasingly the target of investment. We read alarming reports about how, in a specified number of years, Saudi Arabia will have the resources to buy up all companies listed on the New York Stock Exchange.

International investment, like any cooperative endeavor, involves a sense of give-and-take; it is a two-way street. We cannot expect to dot the major capitals of the world with the Golden Arches of McDonald's and American branch offices without being prepared to accept the same kinds of investment in this country.

Our experience to date strongly suggests that OPEC [Organization of Petroleum Exporting Countries] investors do not desire to control large American companies and, indeed, lack the managerial capabilities to administer such establishments. These nations have shown themselves to be institutional investors, essentially conservative, with a legitimate objective: the best obtainable long-term return on their capital.

Contrary to popular impression, the United States is not being inundated with investment capital from abroad. Under the terms of the Foreign Investment Study Act of 1974, we are undertaking a comprehensive survey of foreign investment in this country. The survey has not yet been completed, but figures from other sources show that at the end of 1973, direct long-term foreign investment in our private sector had a book value of \$18 billion, a 25 percent increase over the previous year. About \$12 billion of this investment comes from Europe; an additional \$4 billion from Canada. By contrast, U.S. direct investment abroad in 1974 had a book value of \$107 billion.

These figures and observations are not intended to suggest that the United States can simply forget about foreign investment and let events take their course. Our traditional support for freedom of investment flows must obviously be responsive to the new situation created by unprecedented capital accumulations by a relatively small number of foreign governments.

Earlier this year the Administration undertook an extensive review of government policy on foreign investment. The conclusions of the study basically reaffirm our longstanding belief that the operation of free market forces will direct worldwide investment flows in the most productive way. But our review also calls for prompt and effective action in three areas:

—We need an improved system for collecting and analyzing data on foreign investment coming into this country.

—We must confirm that existing authority to deal with abuses by foreign investors is adequate and is being enforced where necessary.

—We should reach understandings with foreign governments, particularly those with a substantial capacity to invest, to consult with us prior to making major official investments in U.S. firms.

To meet these requirements, the Administration is moving to establish an Inter-agency Committee on Foreign Investment in the United States. The Committee will have primary responsibility for analyzing the impact on the U.S. economy of foreign investment and for coordinating U.S. policy on such investment. It will also review foreign investments that could be of major significance to our national interests and provide guidance on arrangements for advance consultation with foreign governments on major official investments.

An Office of Foreign Investment will also be established to assist the Committee in its work, particularly by improving the gathering and dissemination of information on foreign investment.

The Administration believes it now has the tools to deal with any potential problems

or abuses in the field of foreign investment. We are generally opposed to legislative initiatives that would make it more difficult for other nations to invest responsibly in this country.

Our task is to utilize existing safeguards more effectively, not to impede the flow of foreign investment or block it from job-creating industries in a time of recession.

Finally, while on the subject of investment, let me emphasize a point made clearly by the President: In determining whether or not to invest their assets in this country, foreign investors should be aware that discrimination is totally contrary to American tradition and repugnant to our principles. The basic concern of our investment policy is not whether a potential investor is foreign, but whether he is prepared to abide by our laws and regulations.

Private Sector Role in Trade Policy

Investment is but one aspect, and a risky one at that, of increasing world economic interdependence. All of us have at one time or another been burned on our investments, but the respectability and evident prosperity of this gathering strongly suggests that a person of talent can operate with fairly consistent success in the field of international trade.

If I may be permitted a quote from a former British Chancellor of the Exchequer, R. A. Butler: "It takes two to make love and two to make trade agreements work. Unrequited trade or exports pay no better than unrequited love." The freer flow of trade throughout the world is a cardinal point of American foreign policy, one soundly based on our national interest and the furtherance of our policy objectives.

The Trade Act of 1974 and the multilateral trade negotiations now taking place in Geneva are significant benchmarks in this country's longstanding commitment to help shape a more just and open international trading system. The Trade Act gives us the authority to do the job, consistent with our national interests. Geneva is the forum at which we and our trading partners will seek

to reconcile national differences and mutual concerns in the interest of expanded world trade and prosperity.

Many of you are aware that the Trade Act specifically calls upon the President to obtain the advice of the private sector regarding our negotiating objectives and bargaining positions at Geneva. An overall, 45-member advisory committee for trade negotiations is being established. It will include private sector representatives from all segments of the American economy—industry, agriculture, small business, consumers, retailers, and labor—and will play a central role in the consultative program.

Twenty-six industry sector advisory committees and eight agricultural technical advisory committees are also being formed to act as a liaison with representatives of the private sector as we attempt to remove obstacles to international trade. The initial round of consultations with business and agricultural interests is well underway. When public hearings on trade policy are concluded this summer, the Administration will have an unprecedented stock of information and advice from the private sector to use in determining our negotiating goals and strategy, both overall and with regard to specific products.

These committees include many members of the Chicago business community. They insure that your voices will be heard as your policy on international trade develops. As businessmen concerned with international commerce, you have a responsibility to make effective use of these avenues of communication with the government and then to take maximum advantage of export opportunities. And I want to emphasize the latter as well as the former. Taking maximum advantage of export opportunities requires good old-fashioned work, work that is essential to our survival as a great trading nation in a new world order.

During my business and diplomatic career in Asia and through frequent contact with American businessmen overseas, I have noticed a real concern about delivery schedules. American representatives abroad can frequently get the orders but have difficulty

in delivering the goods. If we are going to take advantage of freer trade and compete successfully in the international marketplace, our exporters must recognize the importance of foreign markets and treat overseas orders with the same priority as domestic demand. Production capacity must be adequate to meet both domestic and overseas markets.

Here at home, we also need the support and involvement of the American business community to obtain congressional support for repeal of restrictive domestic trade legislation. One example is the recent initiative by Congress to exclude all OPEC nations—including some which did not participate in the 1973 oil embargo such as Venezuela, Iran, Ecuador, Nigeria, and Indonesia—from the benefit of our generalized tariff preferences. Legislation of this nature calls into question our commitment to freer trade, creates needless irritants in our bilateral relations, and makes our task at Geneva all the more difficult.

Geneva Trade Negotiations

Let us take a look at some of the specific issues at Geneva, the problems and accomplishments to date.

The agreements reached by the 89 nations currently negotiating at Geneva will set the trade policies of much of the world for the coming decade. The success of these negotiations is of critical concern not only to the prosperity of this nation—which exported almost \$100 billion worth of goods in 1974—but to economic growth and stability around the world.

During the Kennedy round of trade negotiations in the sixties the international community made very substantial progress in reducing tariff barriers to trade. We were less successful in dealing with the question of nontariff barriers and with the liberalization of agricultural trade—an issue of obvious concern to Illinois, which leads the United States in agricultural exports. We expect to do better this time.

Given the significance of agriculture on our overall trade position, it is of the utmost importance that we be able to expand our

access to overseas markets. For their part, other nations understandably require of us assured access to our agricultural supplies. We can anticipate that the agricultural negotiations will continue to be difficult since there are basic differences between major agricultural producers such as the United States and the European Community over the relationship between domestic and international agricultural policy. The European Community, for example, is far more protective of its domestic agriculture than is the United States.

Resolving these differences on a basis leading to expanded international trade is important not only to the United States but to the future of the negotiations. Failure to reach accommodation on the important issue of agriculture could spill over into other areas at Geneva, crippling the negotiations before they are fully underway.

At the February 1975 multilateral trade negotiation meeting in Geneva, working groups were established to deal separately with the principal problems of negotiations: tariff and nontariff barriers, agriculture, and safeguards for affected domestic industries. A separate group was set up to work on tropical agricultural products, such as cocoa, bananas, and coffee, items on which there is opportunity for rapid progress in the negotiations.

Another group will examine the concept of a sector approach to trade negotiations by looking at the barriers to trade affecting a broad industry rather than specific products. We have under study at Geneva, for example, all restrictions relating to the metal industry—steel, copper, zinc, and lead—in an effort to evaluate the prospects for removing them on a sectoral basis. Where we anticipate that our interests are better served and our commitment to trade liberalization furthered, the United States is prepared to proceed on this integrated sector approach.

With the exception of those dealing with agriculture, all the working groups at Geneva are now engaged in the substantive stage of negotiations. Upon the conclusion of our domestic procedures for consultation with the private sector, we will begin the

process of tabling specific proposals in the various negotiations.

Nontariff Barriers and Commodities

We have unprecedented authority to reduce tariffs in return for mutual concessions by other nations. We also, for the first time, have explicit authority to attack the problem of nontariff barriers, which, with the success of the Kennedy round, have become increasingly important impediments to trade. We hope to reduce or eliminate some of the more onerous nontariff barriers by agreement on codes of conduct governing what is and is not acceptable internationally.

Export subsidies constitute an important nontariff obstacle to trade, and we recently achieved an important breakthrough on this issue when the United States and the European Community, through a process of negotiation and compromise, reached accord on the difficult problem of the European Community's policy of subsidizing cheese exports to the United States.

Other examples of our concern in the area of nontariff barriers are import quotas, discriminatory national standards in packaging or labeling, and government procurement practices favoring domestic industries.

Section 108 of the Trade Act gives us the authority to tackle a new dimension in trade negotiations: access to raw materials. Section 108 permits U.S. negotiators to seek agreements assuring that we and other countries enjoy continued access to raw material supplies at prices fair to both consumer and producer.

All nations stand to benefit from smoothing out the wide fluctuations in price that have recently characterized the commodities market. We can anticipate, however, that in return for concessions on commodities, producer states will press for modification in our tariff schedules which currently inhibit the processing of raw materials in the country of origin.

We recognize that the international com-

munity has a long way to go on the sensitive issue of commodity trade, an issue with serious potential for confrontation between developed and less developed nations.

We can expect that the developing nations will play an active role at Geneva; their concerns are by no means limited to commodities. They will seek recognition of the special requirements attributable to their relative underdevelopment, and we are prepared to respond to these needs. We and other industrialized nations, for example, have adopted a generalized system of tariff preferences giving developing nations substantially freer access to our domestic markets.

The latest round of the multilateral trade negotiations at Geneva has been a long time in coming. As you can see, progress on all fronts has not always been as rapid as we would like. Despite the existence of inevitable differences, there is an inherent importance to the fact that the nations of the world are engaged in active negotiations on the issues of interdependence, the issues of the future.

In a period of worldwide economic malaise, the Geneva trade negotiations hold out the prospect of resolving outstanding trade issues and help to forestall the possibility of unilateral initiatives to restrict imports or stimulate exports. Many nations are under substantial pressure to take precisely such measures, to return to an era of beggar-thy-neighbor economic practices which could quickly undermine the basis of the world trading system.

There has already been regrettable movement in the direction of unilateral action. Finland, for example, has recently adopted an import deposit scheme requiring a potential importer to place a deposit in the Bank of Finland, where it is held for six months and then returned without interest. The Australians have placed import quotas on cars and a ban on meat from abroad, while the British have begun to subsidize exports through a system of "inflation insurance."

Unilateral action must not be permitted to become the pattern of the future in international trade relations. The Geneva talks are a key element in the efforts of the world community to resolve problems in a manner that lays the foundation for an expanding world prosperity.

It is to our, and to the world's, credit that we are responding to economic challenge and adversity, adjusting to a changing world economy, by looking outward, by seeking ways to expand the opportunities for trade and investment. Our government can only increase the potential for world trade. Government and the private sector have a shared obligation to design a coherent national trade policy. But the responsibility to get out and compete wholeheartedly for world markets is mainly yours.

An effective American international economic policy, backed by a dynamic and creative business community, is essential to our continued prosperity. Such a policy demands your ideas, your understanding, your involvement, and your support.

King Hussein of Jordan Visits Washington

During a private visit to the United States, King Hussein of Jordan met with President Ford and other government officials at Washington. Following is an exchange of toasts at a dinner given by President Ford on April 29.

White House press release dated April 29

PRESIDENT FORD

Your Highness: I want again to extend to you my personal feeling, my strong conviction, that you and your country represent in this situation the finest in what we have to do in the area of peace in the Middle East.

You have been here many, many times

over the years; and on each and every occasion, your contribution to a solution has been all to the good from the point of view of all parties concerned. We are deeply grateful now, as well as in the past, for this contribution.

We had a very, I think, constructive meeting this morning, and I know you are going to be meeting with the Secretary of State tomorrow. Your personal contribution to this very difficult problem that the world faces in the Middle East is a very significant one.

We have had some disappointments with the efforts that the Secretary of State, and that I, made in the Middle East. But I for one do not believe that we can tolerate stagnation or stalemate, and we do not intend to do so.

The precise key, the precise answer, is still being analyzed here in our country, and I am sure in other parts of the world. But momentum for progress has to be continued. And one of the benefits of my meeting with you this morning was that we discussed the need and necessity not to look back and condemn one party or another, or to have any adverse comments about one party or another.

The important point is that we have to look forward. We have to be optimistic about what is good in the Middle East, but what, more importantly, is good for the world as a whole.

The situation in the Middle East is totally related to the improvement of world conditions on a global basis. We are thankful and very appreciative of your continuous statesmanship.

It has been evident to everybody over a long period of time, but I have personally had the opportunity to observe it, and I thank you.

We are most grateful, and in the months ahead we will be very mindful of your observations, your recommendations, as we try to find an answer to the problems, not only in the Middle East, but elsewhere.

So, it is my great honor and privilege,

Your Majesty, to offer a toast to you for all that you have done and all that you will do for the benefit of all of the people in the Middle East and the people in the world: Your Majesty.

KING HUSSEIN

This is indeed an honor and a very great pleasure for me, sir, to have had this opportunity to meet with you again, sir, and to be among friends.

We have indeed over the years been ever proud of the fact that those years that passed brought us closer together in many fields, and in many areas. We are proud of the friendship that has always existed between our two countries, the friendship that now we feel exists between the Arab nation and the United States, its government and its people.

We have a commonality of interests. On the one hand, we share the same principles, uphold the same ideals, have the same hopes and aspirations for a better world, for a world where people can live in peace and in dignity and divert their energies and resources to further build for the generations to come.

Our area is a troubled area, and trouble in our area is dangerous, not only to all those who live in it but to the future of mankind.

I am proud of the fact that I don't speak only for myself, but for many of the area's leaders, many of our present Arab world, and to say that we wish for nothing more than a just and durable peace.

We are proud of the fact that we have contributed our utmost toward that end, and we have determined to do our utmost for that end.

We know very well that the United States

will continue to look at our problems with interest and with determination to play the major role which only the United States can play for the attainment of the goal of peace.

We have watched with admiration and respect the many efforts made under your wise auspices and leadership; the efforts and initiatives of our great friend, Dr. Kissinger; the patience, the perseverance, and the dedication.

Regardless of the outcome to date, we admire the spirit and we appreciate the tremendous efforts, and we will always do so.

We look into the future with hope at the chance that is ahead of us—which may be the final chance—and a tragic history of lost opportunities may be taken by all concerned for the establishment of a just and durable peace.

We saw difficulties. We feel they are both in our area and in the world as a whole.

I thank you for the time and the patience, and I look forward to my days in Washington and the opportunity to meet and talk very frankly with all our friends on all issues of mutual interest.

I thank you for giving me this time, and I can assure you that we will continue to do our utmost to work together for a better future in our area and in the world, ever proud of the friendship that exists between us, ever determined to see that we strengthen the ties that happily exist and have existed for so long between our nations and our peoples.

Gentlemen, I would wish you to join me in drinking a toast to the President of the United States, his continued good health, success, and to the United States, and to the friendship that we hope will always grow between the Arab people and the people of the United States.

The Second Nuclear Era

Address by Fred C. Iklé

Director, U.S. Arms Control and Disarmament Agency¹

Mankind's first nuclear era began 30 years ago. Three-fifths of the people alive today had not yet been born. For those who remember that beginning, it offers mixed memories. People were stunned by the destructiveness of this new power. At the same time, they looked upon the bomb as bringing an end to a war that threatened to grow bloodier and go on for endless days.

And there was a widespread feeling that the world now had a singular opportunity to rebuild itself in a better way. Almost everyone recognized the world could never be the same—atomic power had revolutionized the nature of peace and war.

Americans were confident that their country would show the way. Our self-confidence found concrete expression in a proposal to the United Nations—a proposal that combined our hopefulness of that time with acceptance of our responsibility as sole possessor of the atom bomb. This proposal, known as the Baruch plan, envisaged placing all nuclear resources throughout the world under the ownership and control of an independent international authority. Its purpose was to assure that this new force served only peaceful ends.

Some debate has arisen about the realism of the Baruch plan and even about the sincerity with which it was offered. Let me lay a myth to rest.

Was it realistic? No, because its optimism demanded too great a change in the politics

of power. Yes, because its boldness matched the magnitude of the problem.

Was it sincere? While preparing and pressing this proposal, did we exploit our nuclear monopoly to the hilt, or did we exercise self-restraint?

What we did was this: First, the United States diminished its nuclear research and development from \$940 million in 1944 to \$280 million in 1946. Second, in 1946 and early 1947, the United States exploited its nuclear monopoly by having on hand a total stockpile of battle-ready weapons that numbered—I will give you the exact figure—zero. As late as April 1947, President Truman noted that we still had only few components of bombs and that our bombs were not assembled. Evidently, Harry Truman—that alleged cold warrior—had not ordered a crash program.

These facts are available to any historian. Yet they have been conveniently overlooked in recent attempts to rewrite the history of how the cold war began. We do not have to assert that we were without flaw during that period. But we should not forget the truth—the self-restraint and generosity in American foreign policy during that period, a period when the United States had a world monopoly on power without parallel in history.

The United States, during the critical years of 1946 and 1947, continued to press for an effective international system of control and ownership of the atom. It did not launch a massive research and development program to assure that its nuclear superior-

¹ Made before the 15th Annual Foreign Affairs Conference, U.S. Naval Academy, Annapolis, Md., on Apr. 23 (text from ACDA press release).

ity would remain unchallengeable. It did not rush to amass a stockpile of nuclear weapons. Thus it did not exploit its monopoly to impose its own interpretation of the World War II settlements. But at the end of 1947, it seemed clear that the Baruch plan—or any comparable, effective constraint on nuclear arms—would not be accepted. In 1949, the Soviet Union exploded its first nuclear bomb. Over the next 15 years, the nuclear arsenals grew competitively on both sides to incomprehensible levels of destructiveness.

The United States maintained its lead in this deadly competition. Nevertheless, in the mid-1960's it took the initiative of restraining the expansion of its strategic offensive and defensive forces, seeking stability by a renewed effort for agreed controls. This American self-restraint found formal expression in the 1969 decision to discard "strategic superiority" as official U.S. policy. The Soviet Union would thus be allowed to achieve equality where the United States had held an advantage for 25 years.

This decision was based on recognition that a stable world order cannot be achieved if either superpower engages in the futile and dangerous pursuit of unilateral advantages. We have pursued this principle of equality and mutual self-restraint through six years of difficult strategic arms talks, and we continue to pursue it in other East-West arms control negotiations.

Given the historic development of the American and Soviet positions in the world, parity between our strategic forces is a relationship that can add to stability. And strategic parity is to be anchored even more securely in the agreement on offensive arms based on the accord reached at Vladivostok. The agreement will complement the Antiballistic Missile Treaty of 1972 and its 1974 protocol. By that groundbreaking set of agreements, we and the Russians effectively renounced major weapons systems in the interests of world stability.

Now, these are substantial achievements. The world's two most powerful nations, to enhance their own security, have begun to rely on controlling their armaments. It might thus seem as if the road ahead were clear.

Successive limitations and reductions to be negotiated between the United States and the Soviet Union might seem all that is needed to avoid nuclear war.

But something more is needed.

Complex New Problems

For we are now moving into a new era that will differ fundamentally from the world to which we have, in part, adjusted. The revolutionary agent is the inexorable diffusion of nuclear technology throughout the world. We can slow down the spread of the means to make the bomb; but we—the United States—cannot stop it. As if to saddle mankind with a double curse, the nuclear technology now of greatest interest throughout the world—reactors to produce energy—is also a technology that yields the material necessary to build nuclear bombs. From a powerful mixture of economic and nationalistic motives, nation after nation will want this technology. The most dangerous material man has ever fashioned will gradually spread all over the world.

In the coming era, we will no longer be able to prevent use of the nuclear bomb solely by deterring one or two potential adversaries. Further, we will no longer be able to curb nuclear arms competition through bilateral agreements alone.

Realism forces us to recognize that most nations which acquire nuclear arms will insist on retaining sovereign control over them for decades to come. For this and other reasons, "general and complete disarmament" is not a guideline for policies to shape the foreseeable future. Yet realism also forces us to recognize that the continuing spread of nuclear materials cannot coexist for decades with the present structure of nuclear deterrence on the one hand and the present fragile controls over nuclear explosive technology on the other.

Political philosophers, to be sure, may wish to explore the possibility of a world in which nation-states as we know them will have disappeared in a dispensation of general and complete disarmament. Similarly, military strategists may wish to speculate

on how nuclear deterrence as we now understand it could survive in a world with several dozens of nuclear powers and where even criminal groups might obtain nuclear bombs. But I believe neither of these worlds is realistic. Something will have to give.

The coming era calls for realism and for vision, for an effort that will mobilize the support of other nations and draw on our own vast intellectual, scientific, and moral strength. The second nuclear age calls for a U.S. arms control program that reaches so far ahead that we can shape our future.

Tasks for the Coming Era

As I see such a program taking shape, three important tasks stand out.

First, for many nonnuclear powers, protection against nuclear threat or attack rests on American commitments. America's self-interest dictates that we sustain our alliances. If we withdrew our protection, or if confidence in it were shaken, strong internal pressures would arise in many countries to acquire nuclear armaments for their self-protection. Then their neighbors would feel threatened and follow suit.

To the degree that we appear to turn inward, we encourage nonnuclear nations—from Asia to Europe and the Middle East—to create their own nuclear forces. We will thus make the future less manageable and eventually bring arms control efforts to a dead end. How could arms control and disarmament make progress in a world where nations increasingly depend for security on a tangled web of nuclear threats and counter-threats among dozens of nuclear-armed countries? Our alliances help protect both other nations and ourselves from the dangers of nuclear proliferation.

A second task is to make safer our reliance on nuclear deterrence—to be very clear about its shortcomings and to find ways to correct them.

Never in man's history has the technology of warfare changed so sweepingly and so rapidly—and never without being tested in real battles. We can only be thankful, of course, that the generation which has grown

up since the Second World War has never been witness to the cruel impact of nuclear destruction. But to be spared such experience has also insulated this generation from the grim reality of nuclear arsenals. Today, nuclear strategists of all countries analyze a shadow world of abstract calculations. We are not moved by compassion or revulsion, and the corrective mechanism of learning from experience cannot work.

In past centuries, every advance in technology was eventually used for war. Then, however, the scope and suddenness of destruction were never so immense. Weaponry was never rigged in such a way that one single failure could mean the last chance had passed.

But we have made mutual deterrence hinge on cataclysmic speed. There would be no time for learning, no time for human compassion and mercy to call a halt, no pause in the battle long enough for governments to reflect and gain a sense of proportion. Over the long term, this emphasis on speed imposes a risk that is intolerable and unnecessary.

Major changes in deterrence will be needed in the second nuclear era, when the danger of nuclear war from deliberate attack may be overshadowed by the chances of war from accident or miscalculation.

We have already taken promising steps, both unilaterally and through agreement, to escape from the interlock of "hair-triggered" nuclear armaments where one tragic episode could lead to mutual genocide. We have reached agreements with the Soviet Union on measures against the risk of accidents and on improvements in the Washington-Moscow hotline. We must take further steps along this important road. Unilaterally, we continue to improve the controls and safety of our nuclear armaments.

We are also adjusting our strategic doctrine to changing conditions. Here we must carefully strike a balance. On the one hand, we must not stake our survival on one single gamble, the gamble that deterrence will never be seriously tested and that we will never require room for choice—after some nuclear weapons have been used—to avoid mutual genocide. On the other hand, we must not

slide back into errors of the past by permitting nuclear weapons to be regarded as a substitute for conventional defenses. We must not mistake nuclear war or the threat of it for an acceptable instrument of foreign policy.

A great deal more needs to be done to make deterrence safer. We must search for improvements with a distrust of anyone who pretends all is well. Year in, year out, the avoidance of nuclear war now depends on the proper working of farflung armaments, on the safety of alert missile forces halfway around the globe, on the integrity of military command chains stretched thousands of miles. We have to rely on the absolute control of these engines of destruction, all in a state of readiness day and night, month after month, all managed by people, large communities of people, with the usual admixture of heroes and villains, wise men and fools.

It would be an insult to the ingenuity of our strategic experts and our engineers to argue that for decades to come such an unbelievably explosive contraption is the best we can build.

International Guardianship

A third task is to create an international guardianship of peaceful nuclear technology.

To keep nuclear technology peaceful was a need manifest from the very beginning, but it will be far more compelling in the second nuclear era. Its urgency will increase as technology spreads and nuclear materials increasingly supply the world's energy needs. Hence, the effort to assure that these resources serve only peaceful ends must expand and intensify year by year.

Inevitably, the international guardianship of dangerous nuclear materials will become steadily more important. Its work will involve an increasing number of people and a broadening array of tools to coordinate or manage directly the flow of nuclear materials among a steadily growing number of countries. The timely supply of these fuels will be crucial to the economy of many; their per-

petual and total safety will be crucial to the safety of all people.

The activities of this guardianship will be a matter of daily concern rather than a matter of sporadic intervention in emergencies. It will have to deal chiefly with persistent problems, such as the growing worldwide need for nuclear-waste disposal and the ever-present danger of theft of nuclear materials.

Unlike mutual deterrence and the strategic analysis that supports it, it will not be condemned to live in a world of theory and abstraction. Its workings will be tested every day. Hence, it can learn from trial and error. Because failures will not inevitably be fatal, experience can teach.

Again unlike deterrence, the guardianship of the world's peaceful nuclear resources does not fix nations in a posture of deadly antagonism. The dangers which must be controlled—some manmade, some essentially natural forces—are the byproducts of peaceful activities, not the result of a hostile arms competition.

Can the nations of the world ever reach the kind of agreement that produces an effective and reliable guardianship? Over the last 20 years—when the risks were not yet so compelling—over 100 countries have learned to work harmoniously together in the International Atomic Energy Agency in Vienna. The fruitfulness of that collective effort—based on an American initiative—should give solid encouragement.

I do not mean to project some instant utopia. There will be pitfalls of many kinds. The effort to build an international guardianship might become entangled in the short-term politics of the struggle for resources. Or it could fail because of ideological schisms. There may be breakaway or outcast nations whose obsolete view of the world blinds them to the realities of their own interests. But we have the promise of the International Atomic Energy Agency. And over 80 nations support the Nonproliferation Treaty. These examples point the way to the political consensus we must create.

A decade hence, the performance of this

international guardianship will vitally engage the attention of governments throughout the world. It will affect the most elementary interests of the general public and political leaders alike: their welfare and their physical survival. By the nature of its task and the way it must work, it can forge a common bond among nations that may prove more fruitful and sturdy than any we have tried to create and teach a more meaningful collaboration than any we have known. Given America's position as the leader in nuclear technology and our skill in designing international institutions, we can play a particularly creative role.

U.S. and Greece Hold Second Round of Talks on Defense Matters

Joint Statement¹

Delegations representing the Governments of Greece and the United States met in Athens April 7-29 for a second round of negotiations concerning mutual defense matters.² The talks proceeded in a spirit of mutual understanding. The Greek and United States delegations, led respectively by Ambassador Petros Calogeras [of the Greek Foreign Ministry] and Minister Monteaegle Stearns [Deputy Chief of Mission, U.S. Embassy, Athens], having discussed all aspects of Greek-United States military cooperation, concluded the second round as follows:

1. At Greek request:

A. The United States agreed to terminate homeporting at Elefsis.

B. The United States base at Hellenikon will be closed. Certain United States facilities which contribute to Greek defense needs will continue to operate on the Greek Air Force Base at Hellenikon.

¹ Issued at Athens and Washington on Apr. 29 (text from press release 219).

² The first round of talks was held at Athens Feb. 10-14.

2. Agreement is also expected on the elimination, reduction and consolidation of other United States facilities in Greece.

3. The privileges, immunities and exemptions of American personnel in Greece were reviewed and satisfactory progress has been made.

The installations where United States facilities remain will be placed under Greek commanders. The scope and conditions of operations of remaining facilities will be discussed in detail in the third round.

ANZUS Council Meeting Held at Washington

Following is the text of a communique issued on April 25 at the conclusion of the 24th meeting of the ANZUS Council.

The ANZUS Council held its twenty-fourth meeting in Washington on April 24 and 25, 1975. Senator the Honorable Donald R. Willesec, Minister for Foreign Affairs, represented Australia; the Honorable Arthur J. Faulkner, Minister of Labor, represented New Zealand; and the Honorable Robert S. Ingersoll, Deputy Secretary of State, represented the U.S. Secretary of State Henry A. Kissinger also participated in the meeting.

The Ministers exchanged views on a wide range of strategic, political, and economic issues of concern to the ANZUS partners. They reaffirmed the enduring nature of the relationship among the three countries, based as it is on a substantial community of interests and a shared heritage of representative democracy, individual freedom, and the rule of law. The ANZUS treaty [Australia, New Zealand, United States Security Treaty] and the regular consultations for which it provides are a natural expression of this close relationship.

The Ministers welcomed the continuing process of détente among the major powers, and efforts to work toward a more stable and cooperative relationship among states. They expressed hope that renewed efforts might bring about peace in areas of continuing conflict such as Indochina, and more peaceful and stable relationships in areas of recent or potential conflict such as the Near East.

The Ministers reviewed the situation in Indochina. The Ministers noted the plight of refugees in

South Viet-Nam and regretted the continuing loss of life and the widespread human misery caused by the fighting. They recognized that an early end to the fighting, an adherence to the Paris Agreements, and a spirit of national reconciliation were prerequisites to an end to the suffering. The Council expressed the hope that the wounds of war in Cambodia would be speedily healed, and noted with satisfaction the continued peaceful evolution in Laos.

The Council welcomed the emergence of a new spirit of regional consciousness and self reliance in Southeast Asia and the practical measures being taken to develop the habit of regional cooperation. The Ministers applauded the progress made by the Association of Southeast Asian Nations and indicated the desire of their countries to assist this cooperation.

The Ministers agreed that the South East Asia Treaty Organization and the Five Power Defense Arrangements contributed to the climate of confidence in the area and provided a useful framework for practical cooperation.

The Council reviewed the world economic situation with special attention to its effects within the Asia/Pacific region. They discussed the difficulties caused by the present downturn in the world economic situation and also the collective international effort which has begun to evolve a more soundly-based world economic order. The Ministers agreed on the importance of close cooperation among themselves and with other nations on problems of international finance and trade. In particular, they agreed that in matters relating to trade in raw materials and primary products the interests of both producers and consumers should be taken into account. The Ministers expressed the hope that oil exporting and oil importing countries would seek to reconcile differences between them through dialogue. They affirmed the need for continued efforts aimed at liberalisation of international trade. The Ministers noted the special economic problems faced by the

less developed countries of Asia and the Pacific and agreed on the need for efforts to see that the net flow of resources to those countries is not diminished.

The Council reviewed progress toward arms limitations and the limiting of the proliferation of nuclear weapons. The Ministers agreed that further measures of arms control are a necessary concomitant of the continuing trend toward détente and the establishment of a just and stable world order. Noting the need for progress toward reduction in nuclear weapons, the Council expressed the hope that the Strategic Arms Limitation Talks between the United States and the USSR will make further progress. The Council supported the continuing negotiations to achieve mutual and balanced force reductions in Europe as an important stage in the effort to bring about the limitation of conventional arms. The Ministers noted that a conference of the Parties will review the operation of the Non-Proliferation Treaty, and expressed their hope for a strengthening of the non-proliferation regime. The Council noted the conclusion of a Threshold Test Ban Treaty and reaffirmed its support for the early achievement of an effective Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty.

The Ministers welcomed the continued development of a community of independent and self-governing states in the South Pacific, including the forthcoming independence of Papua New Guinea. They noted with satisfaction the constructive role Australia has played in assisting the emergence of this new state.

In conclusion, the ANZUS partners reaffirmed the great value each placed on the Alliance. They agreed that the continuity symbolized by the ANZUS treaty was important in a period of significant change, and that the Alliance continued to play an important role in the evolution of stability and normal relationships among states in the Asia and Pacific area. The three partners agreed to continue to consult closely on all matters of common concern.

Department Discusses Implementation of Recommendations of World Food Conference

*Statement by Thomas O. Enders
Assistant Secretary for Economic and Business Affairs¹*

This review of actions to follow up the recommendations of the World Food Conference seems to me to be especially timely, and I appreciate the opportunity to appear here today.

The World Food Conference succeeded in focusing attention on one of mankind's most basic and persistent problems—that of hunger. It laid a basis for the sustained global action needed to overcome this problem. In the intervening five months, the new institutional structures called for by the conference have begun to take shape. We are now passing to the implementation phase.

Our own program of action rests upon our analysis of the world food problem. The world's potential agricultural capacity is great enough, given present technology, to support the global population projected for the end of this century and beyond. The food problem therefore is one of meeting the needs of areas with rapidly growing populations and existing food deficits, particularly South Asia and parts of Africa. Overall, developing countries now import about 25 million tons of grain annually. This could rise to as much as 85 million tons by 1985, an amount which exporters, mainly North America, could pro-

vide but which would be virtually impossible to transport and finance on a sustained basis.

This import requirement of developing countries is the "food gap." It can be met in the short run by increasing production among traditional exporters and transferring increased amounts of food on concessional terms. For the longer run the only solution is to accelerate production in the food deficit areas.

A coordinate problem is the shrinking margin of safety between annual grain production and the consumption needs of a growing population, made acute by the present near-exhaustion of world grain reserves. To provide a dependable degree of security of supply and to avoid the extreme international price fluctuations, sharp domestic economic adjustments, and foreign political pressures of the past three years, it is desirable to establish an internationally coordinated system of national grain reserves.

Other spokesmen here today are best able to discuss the programs of the Agency for International Development in food aid, agricultural development assistance, and nutrition improvement, and the outlook of the Department of Agriculture on food production. My comments will focus on the institutional framework which has developed out of the Food Conference and on what I understand to be the subcommittee's particular interest in actions to improve world food security and on trade-related issues considered by the Food Conference.

¹Submitted to the Subcommittee on Foreign Agricultural Policy of the Senate Committee on Agriculture and Forestry on May 1. The complete transcript of the hearings will be published by the committee and will be available from the Superintendent of Documents, U.S. Government Printing Office, Washington, D.C. 20402.

Institutional Framework

The Food Conference proposed specific new institutional devices in the areas of food aid, agricultural development and finance, food security, and overall coordination. Arrangements for each of these are underway.

The prerequisite to institutional followup was acceptance of Food Conference resolutions by ECOSOC [U.N. Economic and Social Council] and the General Assembly. This was accomplished before adjournment of these bodies last December.

In the area of food aid, the Food Conference recommended that the Governing Body of the U.N.'s World Food Program be reconstituted as the Committee on Food Aid Policies and Programs. This was done in March when the former intergovernmental committee enlarged and reformed itself to discharge new responsibilities to review and recommend improved coordination between bilateral and multilateral food aid programs, in addition to continuing to guide operations of the World Food Program.

Work has gone forward under the joint auspices of the International Bank for Reconstruction and Development (IBRD), Food and Agriculture Organization (FAO), and U.N. Development Program (UNDP) on formation of a Consultative Group on Food Production and Investment to develop means for increasing food production in developing countries. The Group is to include representation from both donors and recipients. Donors are to be self-selected, with representation from recipients distributed regionally. The Group will not control distribution of development resources but is to address policy issues important to optimum benefit from agricultural investment, such as development objectives and the adequacy of resource flows; means for increasing resource transfers; investment strategies and food production policies. The initial response of both traditional donors and potential new donors among the oil-exporting countries has been positive. The recipient developing countries are in the process of selecting their representation, and a first meeting is being planned for July.

Food Conference staff analysts concluded that agricultural investment in developing countries should be increased from about \$1.5 billion currently to \$5 billion by 1985 to meet their growing needs. The conference grappled at length with the need for new institutions to finance this investment and concluded that new arrangements were justified only to the extent that they were required to generate additional capital. A resolution calling for establishment of a new international fund for agricultural development was proposed by a number of OPEC [Organization of Petroleum Exporting Countries] and other developing countries and was adopted. However, the proposed fund must meet two criteria established by the conference; there must be both the promise of substantial additional resources and of continued operation. U.N. Secretary General [Kurt] Waldheim will open a consultation in Geneva next week to explore establishing the fund. The United States will participate in this consultation confident of its unmatched record of financial support for agricultural development. The United States is receptive to the ideas of others and wishes to hear them before concluding whether a new institution is needed and how it should be structured.

To maintain high-level attention to the world food problem and to provide for continuing review of all food-related programs operated by U.N. agencies, the conference called for a World Food Council to meet at ministerial level. The United States is a member of this Council, which will have its inaugural session in late June. As these programs multiply and expand their operations, the Council's coordinating role will become increasingly important.

World Food Security

In a speech to the U.N. General Assembly last fall, President Ford expressed U.S. willingness to join in a worldwide effort to negotiate, establish, and maintain an international system of nationally held grain reserves.

At the World Food Conference in Rome in November, Secretary Kissinger proposed negotiation of an agreement on a reserves

system to include the following elements:

—Exchange of information on levels of reserve and working stocks, on crop prospects, and on intentions regarding imports or exports.

—Agreement on the size of global reserves required to protect against famine and extreme price fluctuations.

—Sharing of the responsibility for holding reserves.

—Guidelines on the management of national reserves, defining the conditions for adding to reserves and for releasing from them.

—Preference for cooperating countries in the distribution of reserves.

—Procedures for adjustment of targets and settlement of disputes and measures for dealing with noncompliance.

The World Food Conference adopted a resolution on food security, in accordance with which the United States convened an ad hoc meeting of 10 other governments in London in February to explore the elements of a possible reserves agreement. While no formal consensus was reached, the discussion concerned the following: commodity coverage; size of total reserve; criteria for distribution of stockholding responsibility among participants; rights and obligations of participants.

It is natural that the United States should take the initiative in discussing a grain reserves agreement. Our role in the world food economy is predominant. Since 1972, the United States has provided about 40 percent of world exports of food grains and about 60 percent of feed grains and oilseeds.

Having assumed this leadership role, we believe it essential to exercise it responsibly, both in support of our own interests and those of others. This does not mean subordinating our farm policy to our foreign policy; it means using it constructively in our dealings with other countries.

A reserves agreement, we believe, offers an opportunity to do just this. We share a general interest in preventing world food shortages and famine. The establishment of adequate grain reserves can play an impor-

tant role by assuring supplies of grain to offset production shortfalls. Other programs apart from reserves are being developed to assist countries to increase the general level of their production, to improve the means of food distribution and financing, and to provide food aid where needed. These are not, however, among the purposes of reserves. A reserves agreement should, in our view, aim only at assuring the availability of supply.

We believe that a reserves agreement would serve our own interests.

First, it would spread the responsibility for holding stocks among all participants.

Second, rules or guidelines providing for the accumulation of stocks would help to remove excess supplies from the market in those years when production exceeds normal requirements, thereby preventing uneconomic price drops.

Third, rules for the drawdown of reserves would reduce the threat of stocks being dumped on the market. This is a point of particular interest to U.S. producers, who have been concerned that the existence in the past of large government-held stocks not subject to such rules has depressed market prices. Whatever its validity in the past, this objection can be substantially overcome by making the release of reserves subject to internationally as well as nationally accepted rules which would clearly define the conditions which require additional supplies of grain. Taken together, these rules for the accumulation and release of stocks would work to moderate extreme fluctuations in prices, which in general benefit neither producers nor consumers, but need not interfere with normal market operations.

Fourth, by encouraging all major consumers to hold reserves, the agreement should work to avoid situations like 1972, when the U.S.S.R. preempted a major share of our grain crop at bargain prices, thereby shifting the burden of adjustment to their shortfall from the Soviet Union to the United States.

Finally, the establishment of a system of reserves subject to known rules governing their release would represent an important

assurance to importers of the reliability of the United States as a supplier of the grains they need and would reduce the threat of the abrupt imposition of export controls on these products.

These are the benefits which we believe an effective reserves system could offer to U.S. producers and consumers. Others may not fully agree, but major differences seem to concern not the benefits themselves but instead how these promises would be most effectively fulfilled and at what cost.

Subsequent to the ad hoc meeting of last February, work on technical aspects of a possible reserves agreement—such as development of quantitative, rather than price, indicators for signaling acquisition and release of stocks—began under the auspices of the International Wheat Council in a special preparatory group established to explore possible bases for a successor to the present International Wheat Agreement. The group is to report its progress to the next regular session of the Wheat Council in late June.

One important problem that has yet to be solved is the relationship of grain reserves negotiations to the Tokyo round of trade negotiations. Clearly there are major commercial implications in a reserves negotiation. Clearly also, the problem of food security transcends the commercial sector only. We are seeking now agreement with the other main grain producing and consuming countries on a formula permitting urgent negotiation of a reserves agreement but allowing the commercial aspects of grains to be fully taken into account in the Tokyo round.

Meanwhile, the U.N.'s Food and Agriculture Organization has completed and referred to member governments for their acceptance the International Undertaking on World Food Security, endorsed by the Food Conference. The undertaking outlines a set of nonbinding principles to guide national stock policies as a basis for international coordination. FAO members were

requested by the organization's Director General to notify him of their acceptance of the undertaking well before the meeting of the FAO Committee on World Food Security, whose establishment was recommended by the Food Conference. The United States informed the Director General of its acceptance of the undertaking last March.

The FAO has convened a special consultation on world food security for later this month, pending creation of the standing committee by the FAO Council when it meets this fall. We believe that FAO could usefully contribute to improving information about world supply, demand, and stock situation for major food grains through such a committee.

Trade-Related Issues

The World Food Conference adopted an elaborate resolution on trade, stabilization, and agricultural adjustment. It reflects both the concepts of preferential treatment and resource transfers via trade that developing countries put forward in advocating a new economic order, and of market liberalization included in the Tokyo Declaration that is the backdrop to the present multilateral trade negotiations (MTN). The conflicting objectives and issues are being joined in the framework of the MTN.

Meanwhile, work is going forward on particular elements of the resolution on trade. The Trade Act of 1974 has provided a basis for the United States to join with 18 other developed countries in extending a generalized system of preferences to developing countries. So far, 89 developing countries and 43 dependent territories have been designated for beneficial status under the act, with 24 other developing countries under consideration. Meanwhile, the U.S. International Trade Commission is proceeding with its study of the impact on U.S. producers and consumers of extending preferences to a list of products recommended by an inter-agency task force, as required by the act.

Other specific action has been taken by the FAO in response to this resolution. FAO is convening shortly a conference to discuss international agricultural adjustment in light of discussions at the Food Conference.

Mr. Chairman, the world has passed through three years of food shortages and food insecurity; this year, in considerable part thanks to freeing the productive capacity of the American farmer, we expect to have a better balance in food supplies. We must not allow this improvement to lull us into thinking the world food problem is solved. It is not. Rather we must use the improving market situation to rebuild a world food reserve on an agreed rational basis and to lay the basis for a long-term attack on what remains one of the great threats to the future of humanity.

Department Supports Legislation on National Emergency Authorities

*Statement by Mark B. Feldman
Deputy Legal Adviser¹*

The Department of State appreciates the opportunity to testify on H.R. 3884, a bill "to terminate certain authorities with respect to national emergencies still in effect, and to provide for orderly implementation and termination of future national emergencies." This bill is very much the same as S. 3957 passed by the Senate last session.

The Department of State believes that it is appropriate to reexamine the national emergency authorities at this time, to repeal obsolete authorities, and to set criteria for national emergencies which may be declared

¹ Made before the Subcommittee on Administrative Law and Governmental Relations of the House Committee on the Judiciary on Apr. 9. The complete transcript of the hearings will be published by the committee and will be available from the Superintendent of Documents, U.S. Government Printing Office, Washington, D.C. 20402.

in the future. H.R. 3884 does this and at the same time preserves major emergency authorities that are essential to the conduct of foreign relations. The Department wishes to speak particularly in support of section 602 of H.R. 3884, which preserves essential authorities.

The Department of State is primarily concerned with section 5(b) of the Trading With the Enemy Act, which provides the basic legal authority for a number of programs of major foreign policy importance. These include:

- Foreign Assets Control Regulations
- Cuban Asset Control Regulations
- Foreign Funds Control Regulations

Under these programs, transactions are prohibited which involve persons or property subject to U.S. jurisdiction and which take place with Cuba, North Viet-Nam, North Korea, and designated nationals of those countries, unless specifically or generally licensed. In addition, property in which those countries or their nationals have an interest has been blocked and is under U.S. Government control. We also are holding assets of the People's Republic of China blocked before May 1971 and assets of certain Eastern European countries. While the amounts of the blocked assets vary, in some cases it is substantial; for example, possibly in excess of \$80 million in the case of the People's Republic of China.

Mr. Chairman, an interruption of these programs would seriously prejudice the foreign relations interests of the United States and the interests of thousands of American nationals with outstanding claims against Cuba and the People's Republic of China. One effect of such interruption would be to release the blocked assets. Another would be to authorize transactions now prohibited without regard for the state of U.S. relations with countries concerned or the underlying U.S. interests served by these programs. Thus, for example, Cuban imports could come into the United States without

regard to other economic issues, and the relaxation of transaction controls with respect to North Viet-Nam would be without regard to any context of improved bilateral relations. As a result it would become very difficult, if not impossible, to negotiate satisfactory claim settlements, or to realize other U.S. objectives.

The Department wishes to stress that these are merely the current programs under section 5(b) of the Trading With the Enemy Act and the 1950 proclamation of national emergency. This authority has been utilized in the past for programs which have served their purposes and been terminated, and it may be necessary again. The present international situation has the potential for serious difficulties in international fiscal and economic matters, particularly in the energy area, which may call for measures requiring recourse to this authority. Therefore the Department believes it is essential that section 5(b) of the Trading With the Enemy Act be specifically exempted as section 602 now provides.

The Department has not opposed, and does not oppose, the replacement of section 5(b) by other permanent legislation. We do believe, however, that there are a number of serious legal and policy questions in connection with any such legislation that will require protracted congressional consideration, and we are convinced that it would be highly imprudent to cast away the authority of section 5(b) without any assurance of such a replacement.

Mr. Chairman, at this point I would like to make a comment on another authority which is of concern to the Department of State. Section 215 of the Immigration and Nationality Act, and the existing proclamation of emergency, are the only current authority for requiring American citizens to have a valid passport for leaving and entering the United States. I am advised that in the absence of this authority the Immigration and Naturalization Service would have a substantial additional administrative bur-

den of screening persons who claim to be American citizens but have no passport.

We would ask the committee to consider whether this additional authority, section 215 of the Immigration and Nationality Act, should not also be exempted for the reasons that I have given.

To sum up, the Department of State believes that H.R. 3884 preserves essential emergency authorities and eliminates obsolete ones, so the Department has no objection to its enactment.

International Economic Report Transmitted to the Congress

*Message From President Ford*¹

To the Congress of the United States:

America must adjust to turbulent global economic events. The world has moved from a period of slow economic growth in 1971 through a two-year expansionary boom to a sudden and pervasive recession. Recent events have caused the United States, as well as other countries, to reappraise international economic policies.

This, the third annual International Economic Report, describes the very difficult situation confronting us. It also reflects the progress made toward achieving our goal of an open world economy to serve the interdependent needs of all countries.

In 1974, most of the world's economies were beset by problems flowing from the unprecedented combination of recession and inflation. Additional pressures, including precipitous increases in energy costs and disappointing food harvests further strained the

¹ Transmitted on Mar. 20. The President's message, together with the Annual Report of the Council on International Economic Policy, is printed in "International Economic Report of the President, Transmitted to the Congress March 1975"; for sale by the Superintendent of Documents, U.S. Government Printing Office, Washington, D.C. 20402 (166 pp., \$3.60; stock no. 4115-00072).

world economy, particularly in the areas of trade and monetary flows and adjustments. Moreover, these factors contributed to the trend towards increasing economic nationalism which could frustrate our desire for an open world economy.

In recent years, many governments have elected more direct involvement in economic activities, notably through restrictive supply and pricing practices and, sometimes, by the expropriation of foreign investment. When governments manipulate international markets to maximize short-term benefits, they often do so at the expense of others and, ultimately, of themselves. Improved living standards and a more peaceful world are the rewards of an open world economy based on international cooperation. Such rewards are too great to allow short-sighted distractions to alter our course.

Building effective economic institutions and policies in today's economic environment is more difficult, but also more necessary, than ever. Unless we act constructively, energy and food problems, growing economic nationalism, the possibility of increased protection for trade, and the prospects of world recession and unemployment will jeopardize the world cooperation developed after World War II.

The United States does not and cannot govern the world economy. But it should fulfill its responsibility as an economic leader among nations. The Administration recognizes this responsibility. We have taken steps to turn the difficult food, energy, trade and investment issues into positive opportunities for achieving cooperation with trading partners and coordination between the Nation's domestic and international economic policies. Specifically, the Trade Act of 1974—which exemplified constructive cooperation between the Executive and Legislative Branches—reflects the U.S. commitment to an open and equitable world trading system.

The World Food Conference, proposed by the United States, set in motion international activities to improve world food reserves,

agricultural assistance, crop information systems and increased food production. At the time I signed the Foreign Investment Study Act of 1974 which authorized the collection and analysis of data on foreign investment in the United States, I reaffirmed American support for the operation of free market forces to direct worldwide investment flows in the most productive way. Therefore, we will oppose any new restriction on foreign investment in the United States except where absolutely necessary on national security grounds or to protect an essential national interest.

The goal of normalization of economic relations with the Communist countries has been reaffirmed. America also has continued its commitment to help the less developed countries. Moreover, we have proposed that an International Monetary Fund trust be established to provide special assistance to the least developed countries. We will shortly implement a generalized system of preferences in trading with less developed countries. We are also continuing our cooperative efforts to achieve equitable treatment for U.S. investment abroad.

Recently, I sent to the Congress a comprehensive energy and economic program. It is designed to reduce our dependence on imported oil. The plan provides incentives to increase domestic energy production and conserve energy use. The United States is meanwhile developing joint policies with other major oil-consuming countries aiming at increased resource development and more efficient use of energy. The major consuming countries must act jointly to build a constructive relationship with the oil producing nations. Such actions are essential to restore the international confidence in adequate and reliable energy sources.

These interrelated economic activities are aimed at achieving an improved international economic system. They are part of a balanced policy. They also accentuate the positive initiatives being taken to cope with the specialized problems of food, assistance

to less developed countries and East-West economic relations.

The United States firmly believes that our own problems, and those of the rest of the world, can be dealt with most effectively through international cooperation. We lead in the pursuit of peace. Therefore, our motivating principles, our standards of conduct and the guidelines we set for the conduct of international economic development are ever more crucial to our national well-being, and that of the world.

GERALD R. FORD.

THE WHITE HOUSE, *March 20, 1975.*

Senate Asked To Approve Protocol Extending Coffee Agreement

*Message From President Ford*¹

To the Senate of the United States:

I am transmitting herewith, for the advice and consent of the Senate to acceptance, the Protocol for the Continuation in Force of the International Coffee Agreement of 1968, as Extended. This Protocol, which was adopted by the International Coffee Council in its Resolution Number 273 of September 26, 1974, contains no operative economic provisions, but preserves the structure of the International Coffee Organization through September 30, 1976, or up to 12 months beyond that date if the conclusion of a new Coffee Agreement has progressed to the degree specified in the Protocol. Without this Protocol, the Coffee Organization would expire on September 30, 1975. The United States signed the Protocol at the United Nations Headquarters on January 15, 1975.

The purpose of this extension is to continue the International Coffee Organization as a source of statistical information and technical studies on developments in world

coffee markets and as a forum for discussion and eventual negotiation of a new coffee agreement whenever producing and consuming countries determine such action would best serve their common interests. This Protocol will preserve twelve years of institutional cooperation between seventeen major consuming countries (of which the U.S. is the largest) and forty-two producing nations of the developing world who rely on coffee exports for a significant portion of their foreign exchange earnings. In 1973, for example, coffee exports from ten major Latin American producers earned over \$2.5 billion and six Latin American countries obtained more than 20 percent of their foreign exchange from coffee. In that same year, the United States imported 37.3 percent of all coffee in world trade and 39.1 percent of Latin American coffee exports.

I believe that continued United States participation in the Coffee Agreement will serve both our foreign policy and our consumer interests. It will reaffirm our commitment to cooperate with the developing countries on this matter of vital interest to them. As the largest consuming nation, it will guarantee us a substantial voice in discussions and negotiations for a new coffee agreement. Preliminary work for such negotiations started in early January 1975. I am hopeful that the constructive spirit which has characterized the International Coffee Organization in the past will enable producing and consuming countries to again harmonize their interests in a mutually beneficial accord.

I am also transmitting, for the information of the Senate, the report submitted to me by the Department of State explaining the provisions of the Protocol extending the International Coffee Agreement of 1968, as Extended, and providing background on the current state of the world coffee economy.

I, therefore, recommend that the Senate give early and favorable consideration to this Protocol and give its advice and consent to acceptance.

GERALD R. FORD.

THE WHITE HOUSE, *April 16, 1975.*

¹ Transmitted on Apr. 16 (text from White House press release); also printed as S. Ex. B., 94th Cong., 1st sess., which includes the texts of the protocol and the report of the Department of State.

United States and Romania Sign Agreement on Trade Relations

The United States and the Socialist Republic of Romania signed a trade agreement on April 2. Following is a Department announcement issued April 3 and the texts of the agreement and annexes, together with the texts, dated April 24, of a letter from President Ford to the Speaker of the House and the President of the Senate, a proclamation, a message from President Ford to the Congress, and an Executive order.

DEPARTMENT ANNOUNCEMENT

Press release 182 dated April 3

The United States and the Socialist Republic of Romania signed a trade agreement on April 2 at Bucharest. The agreement was signed on behalf of the United States by Ambassador to Romania Harry G. Barnes, Jr., and on behalf of Romania by Ion Patan, Deputy Prime Minister and Minister of Foreign Trade. It is the first such agreement to be negotiated under the provisions of the Trade Act of 1974. In accordance with the provisions required under that act, it includes most-favored-nation (MFN) treatment for Romanian goods exported to the United States.

Negotiations leading up to the agreement began on January 14, 1975, in Bucharest. The agreement is designed to give further impetus to improved U.S.-Romanian political and economic relations. It will foster additional American exports to the growing markets of Romania and will remove the non-MFN discriminatory treatment of Romanian products in the U.S. market. MFN for Romania is a goal which the Administration has pursued for several years and rep-

resents a key to full normalization of U.S.-Romanian economic relations.

This agreement will now be submitted to both Houses of Congress for approval.

TEXTS OF AGREEMENT AND ANNEXES

Text of Agreement

AGREEMENT ON TRADE RELATIONS BETWEEN THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA AND THE SOCIALIST REPUBLIC OF ROMANIA

The Government of the United States of America and the Government of the Socialist Republic of Romania;

Conscious of the long-standing friendship between their countries and the American and Romanian peoples;

Desiring to develop their relations on the basis of the principles set forth in the Joint Statement of the Presidents of the two States at Washington on December 5, 1973, and reaffirming the continuing importance of the Joint Statement on Economic, Industrial and Technological Cooperation issued at Washington on December 5, 1973;

Having agreed that commercial and economic ties are an important element in the general strengthening of their bilateral relations;

Believing that an agreement embodying undertakings and arrangements for the conduct of trade between their countries will serve the interests of both peoples;

Acknowledging that favorable conditions exist for the further expansion of trade between their countries;

Recognizing that it is to their mutual advantage to continue to develop their commercial relations,

Have agreed as follows:

ARTICLE I

Most Favored Nation Treatment

1. Both Parties reaffirm the importance of their participation in the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade and the importance of the provisions and

principles of the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade for their respective economic policies. Accordingly, the Parties shall apply between themselves the provisions of the General Agreement, the Protocol for the Accession of Romania of October 15, 1971 to that Agreement, and Annexes to that Protocol including Annex B.

2. As provided in the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade, the Parties agree to grant each other's products most-favored-nation treatment immediately and unconditionally with respect to customs duties and charges of any kind imposed on or in connection with importation or exportation, and with respect to the method of levying such duties and charges, and with respect to all rules and formalities in connection with importation and exportation, and as otherwise provided in the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade, provided that to the extent that this or any other provision of the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade is inconsistent with any subsequent provision of this Agreement, the latter shall apply.

3. The Parties agree to maintain a satisfactory balance of concessions in trade and services during the period of this Agreement, and in particular to reciprocate satisfactorily reductions by the other Party in tariffs and non-tariff barriers to trade that result from multilateral negotiations. In this respect, it is noted that Romania, as a developing country, could be eligible for treatment accorded to developing countries.

ARTICLE II

Expansion of Trade

1. The Parties shall take appropriate measures, in accordance with applicable laws and regulations, to encourage and facilitate the exchange of goods and services between the two countries on the basis of mutual advantage in accordance with the provisions of this Agreement. In expectation of such joint efforts, both Governments envision that total bilateral trade in comparison with the period 1972-1974 will at least triple over the initial three-year period of this Agreement. In this respect, the Government of the Socialist Republic of Romania expects that during the period of this Agreement Romanian firms, companies and economic organizations will place substantial orders in the United States of America for machinery and equipment, agricultural and industrial materials, and consumer goods produced in the United States of America, while the Government of the United States anticipates that the effect of this Agreement will be to encourage increasing purchases by firms, companies, economic organizations and consumers in the United States of such products from the Socialist Republic of Romania.

2. Commercial transactions will be effected on the basis of contracts to be concluded between firms,

companies and economic organizations of the United States of America and those of the Socialist Republic of Romania, and in accordance with applicable laws and regulations. Such contracts will generally be concluded on terms customary in international commercial practice.

ARTICLE III

Safeguards

1. The Parties agree to consult promptly at the request of either Party should it determine that actual or prospective imports of products originating in the territory of the other Party are causing or threaten to cause, or are significantly contributing to, market disruption within a domestic industry of the requesting Party.

2. Either Party may impose such restrictions as it deems appropriate on imports originating in the territory of the other Party to prevent or remedy such actual or threatened market disruption.

3. The procedures under which the Parties will cooperate in applying this Article are set forth in Annex 1.

ARTICLE IV

Business Facilitation

1. In accordance with applicable laws and regulations, firms, companies and economic organizations of one Party may open, establish and operate representations (as these terms are defined in Annex 3) in the territory of the other Party. Information concerning rules and regulations pertaining to such representations and related facilities shall be provided by each Party upon the request of the other.

2. Nationals, firms, companies and economic organizations of either Party shall be afforded access to all courts and, when applicable, to administrative bodies as plaintiffs or defendants, or otherwise, in accordance with the laws in force in the territory of such other Party. They shall not claim or enjoy immunities from suit or execution of judgment or other liability in the territory of the other Party with respect to commercial or financial transactions; they also shall not claim or enjoy immunities from taxation with respect to commercial or financial transactions, except as may be provided in other bilateral agreements.

3. Firms, companies and economic organizations of one of the Parties shall be permitted to engage in the territory of the other Party in any commercial activity which is not contrary to the laws of such other Party.

4. Firms, companies and economic organizations of either Party that desire to establish representations or already operate representations in the territory of the other Party shall receive treatment no less favorable than that accorded to firms, companies and economic organizations of any third country in all matters relating thereto. The rights

and facilities set out in Annex 2 shall be among those that will be accorded such firms, companies and economic organizations which establish representations.

5. For the purpose of carrying on trade between the territories of the two Parties and engaging in related commercial activities, nationals of each Party and employees of its firms, companies and economic organizations and their families shall be permitted to enter, to reside and to obtain appropriate housing in the territory of the other Party, and to travel therein freely, in accordance with the laws relating to entry, stay and travel of aliens.

6. The Parties affirm that no restrictions shall exist in principle on contacts between representatives of American and Romanian firms, companies and economic organizations. To this end, representatives of firms, companies and economic organizations of either Party shall be permitted within the territory of the other Party to deal directly with buyers and users of their products, for purposes of sales promotion and servicing their products, in accordance with the procedures and regulations applicable in each country.

7. The Parties shall as appropriate permit and facilitate access within their territories by representatives of firms, companies and economic organizations of the other Party to information concerning markets for goods and services in accordance with the procedures and regulations applicable in each country.

8. Firms, companies and economic organizations of either Party shall be permitted in accordance with procedures and regulations applicable within the territory of the other Party to advertise, conclude contracts, and provide technical services to the same extent that firms, companies and economic organizations of the latter Party may do so. Duty-free treatment will be accorded to samples without commercial value and advertising materials, as provided in the Geneva Convention of November 7, 1952, relating to the importation of commercial samples and advertising material.

9. Each Party agrees to provide its good offices to assist in the solution of business facilitation problems and in gaining access to appropriate government officials in each country.

10. Each Party agrees to encourage the development on its territory of appropriate services and facilities and adequate access thereto and also to promote the activities of firms, companies and economic organizations of the other Party, which do not have representations, and their employees and representatives.

11. Each Party agrees to facilitate in its territory, to the fullest extent practicable, the activities of firms, companies and economic organizations of the other Party acting through employees, technicians,

experts, specialists and other representatives in carrying out contracts concluded between the firms, companies and economic organizations of the two Parties.

12. Each Party undertakes to facilitate travel by tourists and other visitors and the distribution of information for tourists.

13. The Parties confirm their commitment, as expressed in the Joint Statement on Economic, Industrial, and Technological Cooperation of December 5, 1973, to facilitate participation of their nationals, firms, companies and economic organizations in fairs and exhibitions organized in the other country. Each Party further undertakes to encourage and facilitate participation by nationals, firms, companies and economic organizations of the other country in trade fairs and exhibits in its territory, as well as to facilitate trade missions organized in the other country and sent by mutual agreement of the Parties. Subject to the laws in force within their territories, the Parties agree to allow the import and re-export on a duty-free basis of all articles for use by firms, companies and economic organizations of the other Party in fairs and exhibitions, providing that such articles are not transferred.

ARTICLE V

Industrial Property, Industrial Rights and Processes, and Copyrights

1. Each Party shall continue to provide nationals, firms, companies and economic organizations of the other Party with the rights with respect to industrial property provided in the Convention of Paris for the Protection of Industrial Property (as revised at Stockholm on July 14, 1967).

2. With respect to industrial rights and processes other than those referred to in paragraphs 1 and 3 of this Article, each Party shall provide the same legal protection to nationals, firms, companies and economic organizations of the other Party that is provided within its territory to its own nationals, firms, companies and economic organizations.

3. Each Party agrees to provide nationals, firms, companies and economic organizations of the other Party the rights with respect to copyrights set forth in the Universal Copyright Convention as revised at Paris on July 24, 1971.

ARTICLE VI

Financial Provisions

1. Nationals, firms, companies and economic organizations of each Party shall be accorded by the other Party most-favored-nation treatment with respect to payments, remittances and transfers of funds or financial instruments between the territories of the two Parties, as well as between the territory of such other Party and that of any third

country. For this purpose, the Parties agree to grant those authorizations which are necessary.

2. Financial transactions between nationals, firms, companies and economic organizations of the United States of America and those of the Socialist Republic of Romania shall be made according to applicable laws and regulations. All financial transactions shall be made in United States dollars or any other freely convertible currency mutually agreed upon by such nationals, firms, companies and economic organizations, unless they otherwise agree. However, expenditures in the territory of a Party by nationals, firms, companies and economic organizations of the other Party may be made in local currency received in an authorized manner in accordance with the regulations applicable to such expenditures. No restrictions shall be placed by either Party upon the export from its territory of freely convertible currencies or deposits, or instruments representative thereof, by the nationals, firms, companies, economic organizations or government of the other Party, provided such currencies, deposits, or instruments were received in an authorized manner. If either Party maintains more than one rate of exchange, it shall accord to nationals, firms, companies and economic organizations of the other Party treatment no less favorable in matters relating to rates of exchange than it accords to nationals, firms, companies and economic organizations of any third country.

3. Nationals, firms, companies and economic organizations of each Party shall be accorded most-favored-nation treatment by the other Party with respect to the opening and maintaining of accounts in local and any convertible currency in financial institutions and with respect to use of such currencies.

ARTICLE VII

Navigation

1. Vessels under the flag of either Party, and carrying the documents required by its law in proof of nationality, shall be deemed to be vessels of that Party both on the high seas and within the ports, places, and waters of the other Party.

2. The documents of a vessel, as well as the documents referring to crews, issued according to the laws and regulations of the Party under whose flag the vessel is navigating, will be recognized by the authorities of the other party.

3. Vessels of either Party (other than warships, as defined in the Geneva Convention on the high seas of April 29, 1958) shall have liberty on equal terms with vessels of any third country, to come with their cargoes to ports, places, and waters of the other Party open to foreign commerce and navigation, except insofar as requirements of national security limit such access; such vessels and cargoes shall then in all respects be accorded most-favored-nation treatment within the ports, places

and waters of the other Party except insofar as modified by port security requirements.

4. The provisions of paragraph 3 of this Article shall not apply to fishing vessels, fishery research vessels, or fishery support vessels. The Parties reaffirm the importance of their Agreement Regarding Fisheries in the Western Region of the Middle Atlantic Ocean, concluded at Washington on December 3, 1973, which shall continue to apply in accordance with its terms.

ARTICLE VIII

Disputes Settlement

1. The Parties reaffirm their commitment, as expressed in the Joint Statement on Economic, Industrial, and Technological Cooperation of December 5, 1973, to prompt and equitable settlement on an amicable basis of commercial disputes which may arise.

2. The Parties encourage the adoption of arbitration for the settlement of disputes arising out of international commercial transactions concluded between firms, companies and economic organizations of the United States of America and those of the Socialist Republic of Romania. Such arbitration should be provided for by provisions in contracts between such firms, companies and economic organizations, or in separate agreements between them in writing executed in the form required for such contracts. Such agreements (a) should provide for arbitration under the rules of arbitration of the International Chamber of Commerce in Paris; and (b) should specify as the place of arbitration a place in a country other than the United States of America or the Socialist Republic of Romania that is a party to the Convention for the Recognition and Enforcement of Foreign Arbitral Awards of New York on June 10, 1958; however, firms, companies and economic organizations party to a contract may agree upon any other form or place of arbitration.

ARTICLE IX

Governmental Commercial Offices

1. In order to promote the development of trade and economic relations between the Parties, and to provide assistance to their firms, companies and economic organizations, and to nationals who are engaged in commercial activities, each Party agrees to permit and facilitate the establishment and operation of governmental commercial offices of the other Party on a reciprocal basis. The establishment and operation of such offices shall be in accordance with applicable laws and regulations, and subject to such terms, conditions, privileges, and immunities as may be agreed upon by the Parties. The Parties agree that access, for commercial purposes, to such offices by nationals of either Party who are engaged in commercial activities will be unrestricted.

2. Governmental commercial offices, and their

respective officers and staff members, to the extent that they enjoy diplomatic immunity, shall not participate directly in the negotiation, execution, or fulfillment of trade transactions or otherwise carry on trade.

ARTICLE X
National Security

The provisions of this agreement shall not limit the right of either Party to take any action for the protection of its security interests.

ARTICLE XI
Review of Operation of Agreement

The joint American-Romanian Economic Commission, established in accordance with the Joint Statement on Economic, Industrial and Technological Cooperation of December 5, 1973, shall review the operation of this Agreement and as necessary prepare recommendations which shall be presented to the Governments of both countries for the further improvement of trade relations between the two countries.

ARTICLE XII
Duration and Entry Into Force

1. This Agreement shall enter into force on the date of exchange of written notices of acceptance by the two Governments, and shall remain in force as provided in paragraph 2 of this Article.

2. (a) The initial term of this Agreement shall be three years, subject to subparagraph (c) of this paragraph.

(b) If either Party encounters or foresees a problem with respect to the application of this Agreement, including a problem concerning its domestic legal authority to carry out any of its obligations under this Agreement, such Party shall request immediate consultations with the other Party. Once consultations have been requested, the other Party shall enter into such consultations as soon as possible concerning the circumstances that have arisen, with a view to finding a solution which would make action under subparagraph (c) unnecessary.

(c) If either Party is unable to carry out any of its obligations under this Agreement either Party may suspend or terminate the applicability of this Agreement or, with the agreement of the other Party, any part of this Agreement. If either Party takes action under this subparagraph, that Party will, to the fullest extent practicable and consistent with domestic law, seek to minimize disruption to existing trade relations between the two countries.

(d) This Agreement shall be extended for successive periods of three years each unless either Party has notified, in writing, the other Party of the termination of this Agreement at least 30 days prior to its expiration.

3. Annexes 1, 2 and 3 shall constitute an integral part of this Agreement.

IN WITNESS WHEREOF, the authorized representatives of the Parties have signed this Agreement.

DONE in two original copies at Bucharest this second day of April 1975, in English and Romanian, both texts being equally authentic.

For the United States of America

HARRY G. BARNES, JR.

For the Socialist Republic of Romania

ION PATAN.

Texts of Annexes

ANNEX 1

PROCEDURES FOR THE IMPLEMENTATION OF
ARTICLE III

1. (a) The consultations provided for under Article III shall have the objectives of presenting and examining together the factors relating to those imports that may be causing or threatening to cause or significantly contributing to market disruption, and finding means of preventing or remedying such market disruption. Such consultations shall provide for a review of the production, market, and trade situation of the product involved (and may include such factors as trends in domestic production, profits of firms within the industry, the employment situation, sales, inventories, rates of increase of imports, market share, level of imports, sources of supply, the situation of the exporter and any other aspect which may contribute to the examination of the situation).

Both Parties in carrying out these consultations shall take due account of any contracts between firms, companies and economic organizations of the United States of America and the Socialist Republic of Romania concluded prior to the request for consultations.

Such consultations shall be concluded within ninety days of the request, unless otherwise agreed during the course of such consultations.

(b) Unless a different solution is agreed upon during the consultations, the quantitative import limitations or other restrictions stated by the importing Party to be necessary to prevent or remedy the market disruption in question shall be implemented.

(c) At the request of the importing Party, if it determines that an emergency situation exists, the limitations or other restrictions referred to in its request for consultations shall be put into effect prior to the conclusion of such consultations.

(d) The rights of the exporting Party referred to in paragraph 4(D) of the Protocol for the accession of Romania to the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade of October 15, 1971 shall apply in the event that action contemplated in this Annex is taken.

2. (a) In accordance with applicable laws and regulations, each Party shall take appropriate measures to ensure that exports from its country of the products concerned do not exceed the quantities or vary from the restrictions established for imports of such products into the other country pursuant to paragraph 1 of this Annex.

(b) Each Party may take appropriate measures with respect to imports into its country to ensure that imports of products originating in the other country comply with such quantitative limitations or other restrictions.

ANNEX 2

BUSINESS FACILITATION

1. The firms, companies and economic organizations of one Party, in connection with the establishment and operation of their representations in the territory of the other Party, as well as the employees of such representations, shall enjoy rights and facilities as provided below.

1. Applications to establish representations and to obtain any necessary authorization shall be processed and acted upon expeditiously in accordance with procedures and standards no less favorable than those accorded to the firms, companies and economic organizations of any third countries.

2. Revocation or refusal to renew authorization to operate such representations shall require notice in writing at least three months prior to termination of authorization to such representation.

3. Such representation shall consist of natural or legal persons and shall be established and operated in accordance with procedures and regulations in the host country. Termination of the activities of a representation shall not be subject to any penalties when it does not contravene the provisions of any contract existing between the representation and the firms, companies and economic organizations of the host country.

4. The Parties recognize that reasonable levels and application of fees, taxes, rents and other charges, and adequate notice of changes therein to the concerned representations and their employees, are beneficial to commerce and cooperation between the two countries.

5. Representations shall be permitted to rent office space for their needs and housing for the use of their employees. The Parties, upon request, will use the good offices at their disposal to facilitate and expedite the obtaining and occupying of such office space and housing.

6. Representations shall be permitted to import, as promptly as desired, office machines, automobiles, and other equipment for the purpose of efficient and business-like operation of the representation, subject to applicable customs regulations.

7. The employees of the representations shall be permitted to import personal effects including furniture and appliances. Such personal effects shall

be entered duty-free in accordance with applicable customs regulations. Automobiles and similar means of transportation imported for the use of such employees will be permitted to enter in accordance with the applicable customs regulations. Such employees shall also be permitted to export their imported personal effects and automobiles, free of export duties.

8. Representations may acquire communications facilities, such as office or home telephones for their employees, extensions, and telex equipment, which will be made available as promptly as possible upon application therefor, in accordance with applicable law.

9. The term "employees" used in paragraphs 4, 5, 7 and 8 of this Annex refers to persons sent by firms, companies and economic organizations of one Party to perform services for their representations which are functioning in the territory of the other Party.

10. Representations may, subject to the applicable laws and procedures, select and employ any person, regardless of citizenship, lawfully residing in or admitted to the territory of such other Party. Neither Party shall impose restrictions on the termination of employees, other than the contractual provisions requiring notice and compensation. Neither Party shall restrict the total number of persons to be employed as long as they are reasonably needed for the conduct of business. Representations shall hire, compensate, and terminate the employment of employees in accordance with the provisions of contracts governing their employment. Each Party agrees to encourage the negotiation of contracts in such a way that the representations of the other Party shall have the broadest possible flexibility in selecting, hiring and compensating employees and in terminating their employment.

11. Each Party agrees to facilitate to the maximum extent possible the travel of persons employed by representations of the other Party desiring to enter its territory in furtherance of the purposes of this agreement and members of their immediate families. Each Party agrees to make available multiple entry visas of duration of 6 months or longer to such persons and to members of their immediate families. Persons who are employees of representations of the other Party shall be permitted to the maximum extent possible, in accordance with applicable regulations, to travel abroad for purposes related to the business of the representations by which they are employed.

11. For the purpose of applying paragraph 10 of Article IV, the Parties recognize that reasonable levels and application of fees, rents, and other charges and adequate notice of changes therein to the concerned employees and representatives are beneficial to commerce and cooperation between the two Parties.

11. For the purpose of applying paragraph 11 of Article IV, the Parties agree that the persons re-

ferred to therein should have access to adequate housing and office space and communication facilities, and the ability to utilize, in accordance with applicable procedures, local personnel necessary for the carrying out of their normal activities. In addition, in accordance with applicable customs regulations, the Parties will permit the import of tools, equipment and automobiles required for carrying out contracts, as well as, on a duty-free basis, imports of personal effects. The Parties will permit duty-free export of imported personal effects and automobiles. Each Party agrees to facilitate to the maximum extent possible travel of such persons and the members of their immediate families desiring to enter and leave its territory.

ANNEX 3 DEFINITIONS

1. In this Agreement "firms, companies and economic organizations" of the United States of America shall include corporations, partnerships, sole proprietorships, companies and other economic associations constituted under the laws and regulations applicable in the United States of America, and "firms, companies and economic organizations" of the Socialist Republic of Romania shall include state enterprises, industrial centrals, enterprises with the status of centrals and other enterprises which carry out foreign trade activities in accordance with laws and regulations applicable in the Socialist Republic of Romania.

2. In this Agreement "representation," in the case of the representations established in the United States of America, shall include subsidiaries or unincorporated branches or other forms of business organizations legally constituted under the laws and regulations applicable in the territory of the United States of America by firms, companies, or economic organizations of the Socialist Republic of Romania, and in the case of the representations established in the Socialist Republic of Romania, shall include the agencies referred to in Article 1 of Decree No. 15 of the Council of State of the Socialist Republic of Romania of January 25, 1971, established by a firm, company or economic organization of the United States of America.

LETTER FROM PRESIDENT FORD, APRIL 24¹

White House press release dated April 24

DEAR MR. SPEAKER: (DEAR MR. PRESIDENT:) In accordance with Section 407 of the Trade Act of 1974, I am transmitting herewith a copy of a Proclamation extending nondiscriminatory treatment to

¹Identical letters were sent to Speaker of the House Carl Albert and President of the Senate Nelson A. Rockefeller.

the products of the Socialist Republic of Romania. I am also enclosing the text of the Agreement on Trade Relations between the United States of America and the Socialist Republic of Romania, which was signed on April 2, 1975, and which is included as an Annex to the Proclamation.

I am enclosing herewith a copy of the report which was transmitted to the Congress this date as required by Section 402(c)(1) of the Trade Act of 1974, and I shall issue today an Executive Order waiving the application of subsections (a) and (b) of Section 402.

This agreement caps a decade of improvements in all areas of US-Romanian relations. It will place our trade with Romania on a nondiscriminatory basis that will promote continued development of mutually beneficial economic ties. It will thereby bring the structure of our economic relations into accord with the very satisfactory state of our political relations.

This agreement is consistent with the letter and the spirit of the Trade Act of 1974. In addition to providing for mutual extension of most-favored-nation tariff treatment, it meets the requirements of Title IV that are designed to ensure overall reciprocity of economic benefits. Its special safeguard arrangements provide the strongest possible assurance that our trade with Romania will continue to grow without injury to domestic firms or loss of jobs for American workers. American businessmen are assured of basic rights and facilities in establishing operations in Romania and doing business with Romanian enterprises. Other provisions include protection for industrial property rights, industrial processes, and copyrights; and encouragement of third-country arbitration of commercial disputes under the rules of the International Chamber of Commerce.

I urge that Congress act as soon as possible to approve the agreement under the provisions of Section 407.

Sincerely,

GERALD R. FORD.

TEXT OF PROCLAMATION 4369, APRIL 24²

AGREEMENT ON TRADE RELATIONS BETWEEN THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA AND THE SOCIALIST REPUBLIC OF ROMANIA

Pursuant to the authority vested in me by the United States Constitution, I, as President of the United States of America, acting through duly empowered representatives, entered into negotiation with duly empowered representatives of the Socialist Republic of Romania looking toward the conclusion

²40 Fed. Reg. 18389.

of an agreement governing trade relations between the United States of America and the Socialist Republic of Romania;

The aforesaid negotiations were conducted in accordance with the requirements of the Trade Act of 1974 (P.L. 93-618, January 3, 1975; 88 Stat. 1978);

An "Agreement on Trade Relations between the United States of America and the Socialist Republic of Romania," including the annexes thereto, in the English and Romanian languages, was signed on April 2, 1975, by duly empowered representatives of the Governments of the United States of America and the Socialist Republic of Romania, respectively, and is hereto annexed;

The said Agreement is in conformity with the requirements relating to bilateral commercial agreements as specified in section 405(b) of the Trade Act of 1974 (88 Stat. 1978, 2061);

It is provided in Article XII of the said Agreement that it shall enter into force on the date of exchange of written notices of acceptance by the Governments of the United States of America and the Socialist Republic of Romania; and

It is provided in section 405(c) of the Trade Act of 1974 (88 Stat. 1978, 2061) that a bilateral commercial agreement providing nondiscriminatory treatment to the products of countries heretofore denied such treatment, and a proclamation implementing such agreement, shall take effect only if approved by the Congress by the adoption of a concurrent resolution of approval, referred to in section 151 of the Trade Act of 1974 (88 Stat. 1978, 2001), of the extension of nondiscriminatory treatment to the products of the country concerned;

NOW, THEREFORE, I, GERALD R. FORD, President of the United States of America, acting under the authority vested in me by the Constitution and the statutes, including section 404(a) of the Trade Act of 1974, do hereby proclaim as follows:

(1) This Proclamation shall become effective and said agreement shall enter into force according to its terms, and nondiscriminatory treatment shall be extended to the products of the Socialist Republic of Romania in accordance with the terms of the said Agreement, on the date of exchange of written notices of acceptance in accordance with Article XII of the said Agreement, all of the foregoing to follow the adoption by the House of Representatives and the Senate, in accordance with the procedures set forth in section 151 of the said Act, of a concurrent resolution of approval of the extension of nondiscriminatory treatment to the products of the Socialist Republic of Romania, to the end that the same and every part of the said Agreement may be observed and fulfilled with good faith by the United States of America and the citizens thereof and all other persons subject to the jurisdiction thereof as of the date of its entry into force; and

(2) General Headnote 3(e) of the Tariff Sched-

ules of the United States is amended by deleting therefrom "Rumania" as of the effective date of this proclamation and a notice thereof shall be published in the Federal Register promptly thereafter.

IN WITNESS WHEREOF, I have hereunto set my hand this twenty-fourth day of April, in the year of our Lord one thousand nine hundred seventy-five, and of the Independence of the United States of America the one hundred ninety-ninth.

GERALD R. FORD.

MESSAGE TO THE CONGRESS, APRIL 24

White House press release dated April 24

To the Congress of the United States:

Pursuant to Section 402(c)(1) of the Trade Act of 1974, I shall issue today an Executive Order waiving the application of subsections (a) and (b) of Section 402 of the Trade Act of 1974 with respect to the Socialist Republic of Romania, and I am hereby making the report contemplated by Section 402(c)(1) of the Act.

I refer to the Declaration of the Presidents of the United States and of the Socialist Republic of Romania signed in Washington in 1973 wherein it was stated that "they will contribute to the solution of humanitarian problems on the basis of mutual confidence and good will." I have been assured that if and when such problems arise they will be solved, on a reciprocal basis, in the spirit of that Declaration. Accordingly, I am convinced that the emigration practices of Romania will lead substantially to the achievement of the objectives of Section 402 of the Act. I have therefore determined that the waiver contained in said Executive Order will substantially promote the objectives of Section 402 of the Act.

GERALD R. FORD.

THE WHITE HOUSE, April 24, 1975.

TEXT OF EXECUTIVE ORDER 11854, APRIL 24³

WAIVER UNDER THE TRADE ACT OF 1974 WITH RESPECT TO THE SOCIALIST REPUBLIC OF ROMANIA

By virtue of the authority vested in me by section 402(c)(1) of the Trade Act of 1974 (Public Law 93-618, January 3, 1975, 88 Stat. 1978, 2057), and having made the report to the Congress re-

³ 40 Fed. Reg. 18391.

quired by that provision, I hereby waive the application of subsections (a) and (b) of section 402 of said Act with respect to the Socialist Republic of Romania.

GERALD R. FORD.

THE WHITE HOUSE, April 24, 1975.

Current Treaty Actions

MULTILATERAL

Atomic Energy

Protocol suspending the agreement of March 1, 1972 (TIAS 7295), between the International Atomic Energy Agency, Sweden, and the United States for the application of safeguards pursuant to the nonproliferation treaty of July 1, 1968 (TIAS 6839). Signed at Vienna April 14, 1975. Enters into force on the date on which the Agency receives written notification from Sweden that its constitutional requirements for entry into force of the treaty safeguards agreement and of this protocol have been met.

Signatures: International Atomic Energy Agency, Sweden, and the United States.

Biological Weapons

Convention on the prohibition of the development, production and stockpiling of bacteriological (biological) and toxin weapons and on their destruction. Done at Washington, London, and Moscow April 10, 1972. Entered into force March 26, 1975.

Ratifications deposited: Afghanistan, March 26, 1975; Dahomey, April 25, 1975.

Exhibitions

Protocol revising the convention of November 22, 1928, as amended (TIAS 6548, 6549), relating to international exhibitions, with appendix and annex. Done at Paris November 30, 1972.¹

Ratification deposited: Denmark, March 20, 1975.

Nuclear Weapons—Nonproliferation

Treaty on the nonproliferation of nuclear weapons. Done at Washington, London, and Moscow July 1, 1968. Entered into force March 5, 1970. TIAS 6839.

Ratifications deposited: Belgium, Federal Republic of Germany,^{2,3} Italy, Luxembourg, Netherlands, May 2, 1975.

Ocean Dumping

Convention on the prevention of marine pollution by dumping of wastes and other matter, with annexes. Done at London, Mexico City, Moscow, and Washington December 29, 1972.¹

Ratification deposited: New Zealand (not applicable to the Cook Islands, Niue, or the Tokelau Islands), April 30, 1975.

Publications

Convention concerning the international exchange of publications. Done at Paris December 3, 1958. Entered into force November 23, 1961; for the United States June 9, 1968. TIAS 6438.

Acceptance deposited: German Democratic Republic (with declaration), February 19, 1975.

Convention concerning the exchange of official publications and government documents between states. Done at Paris December 3, 1958. Entered into force May 30, 1961; for the United States June 9, 1968. TIAS 6439.

Acceptance deposited: German Democratic Republic (with declaration), February 19, 1975.

Space

Convention on international liability for damage caused by space objects. Done at Washington, London, and Moscow March 29, 1972. Entered into force September 1, 1972; for the United States October 9, 1973. TIAS 7762.

Ratification deposited: Dahomey, April 25, 1975.

Telecommunications

Partial revision of the 1959 radio regulations, as amended (TIAS 4893, 5603, 6332, 6590), on space telecommunications, with annexes. Done at Geneva July 17, 1971. Entered into force January 1, 1973. TIAS 7435.

Notification of approval: Greece, February 11, 1975.

Telegraph regulations, with appendices, annex and final protocol. Done at Geneva April 11, 1973. Entered into force September 1, 1974.¹

Notification of approval: Federal Republic of Germany,² February 24, 1975.

Telephone regulations, with appendices and final protocol. Done at Geneva April 11, 1973. Entered into force September 1, 1974.¹

Notification of approval: Federal Republic of Germany,² February 24, 1975.

Terrorism—Protection of Diplomats

Convention on the prevention and punishment of crimes against internationally protected persons, including diplomatic agents. Done at New York December 14, 1973.¹

Accession deposited: Ghana, April 25, 1975.

BILATERAL

Bulgaria

Consular convention, with agreed memorandum and exchange of letters. Signed at Sofia April 15, 1974. *Ratifications exchanged:* April 28, 1975.

Enters into force: May 29, 1975.

¹ Not in force.

² With statements.

³ Applicable to Berlin (West).

⁴ Not in force for the United States.

Canada

Agreement extending the agreement of June 15, 1973, as extended (TIAS 7676, 7818), on reciprocal fishing privileges in certain areas off the coasts of the United States and Canada. Effected by exchange of notes at Ottawa April 24, 1975. Entered into force April 24, 1975.

Colombia

Agreement concerning an army mission, a naval mission, and an air force mission of the United States of America armed forces in Colombia. Signed at Bogotá October 7, 1974.

Entered into force: April 16, 1975.

Naval mission agreement, as amended. Signed at Washington October 14, 1946. Entered into force October 14, 1946. TIAS 1563, 3146, 4210.

Air force mission agreement, as amended. Signed at Washington February 21, 1949. Entered into force February 21, 1949. TIAS 1893, 3146, 4210.

Army mission agreement, as amended. Signed at Washington February 21, 1949. Entered into force February 21, 1949. TIAS 1892, 3146, 4210.

Terminated: April 16, 1975.

International Telecommunication Union

Agreement relating to a procedure to reimburse the International Telecommunication Union for reimbursement of personnel subject to payment of United States income tax. Effected by exchange of letters at Geneva April 2 and 7, 1975. Entered into force April 7, 1975; effective January 1, 1974.

Japan

Agreement relating to the use of interest accrued in connection with payments made under agreement of April 18, 1969 (TIAS 6724), concerning the trust territory of the Pacific Islands. Effected by exchange of notes at Tokyo April 18, 1975. Entered into force April 18, 1975.

Agreement extending the period for provision of products and services by Japan under the agreement of April 18, 1969 (TIAS 6724), concerning the trust territory of the Pacific Islands. Effected by exchange of notes at Tokyo April 18, 1975. Entered into force April 18, 1975.

Thailand

Agreement amending the agreement of March 16, 1972, concerning trade in cotton textiles, with related letters. Effected by exchange of notes at Bangkok April 21, 1975. Entered into force April 21, 1975; effective April 1, 1974.

PUBLICATIONS

GPO Sales Publications

Publications may be ordered by catalog or stock number from the Superintendent of Documents, U.S. Government Printing Office, Washington, D.C. 20402. A 25-percent discount is made on orders for 100 or more copies of any one publication mailed to the same address. Remittances, payable to the Superintendent of Documents, must accompany orders. Prices shown below, which include domestic postage, are subject to change.

Background Notes: Short, factual summaries which describe the people, history, government, economy, and foreign relations of each country. Each contains a map, a list of principal government officials and U.S. diplomatic and consular officers, and a reading list. (A complete set of all Background Notes currently in stock—at least 140—\$21.80; 1-year subscription service for approximately 77 updated or new Notes—\$23.10; plastic binder—\$1.50.) Single copies of those listed below are available at 30¢ each.

Germany, Federal	Cat. No. S1.123:G31	8 pp.
Republic of	Pub. 7834	8 pp.
Pakistan	Cat. No. S1.123:P17	8 pp.
.	Pub. 7748	8 pp.
Panama	Cat. No. S1.123:P19	5 pp.
.	Pub. 7903	5 pp.
Senegal	Cat. No. S1.123:SE5	4 pp.
.	Pub. 7820	4 pp.
Namibia (South-West Africa)	Cat. No. S1.123:SO8W	8 pp.
.	Pub. 8168	8 pp.
Tanzania	Cat. No. S1.123:T15	8 pp.
.	Pub. 8097	8 pp.

Narcotic Drugs—Training Program for Helicopter Pilots and Mechanics. Agreement with Mexico. TIAS 7982. 6 pp. 25¢. (Cat. No. S9.10:7982).

Narcotic Drugs—Provision of Assistance in Enforcement Training Activities. Agreement with Mexico. TIAS 7984. 5 pp. 25¢. (Cat. No. S9.10:7984).

Military Assistance—Payments Under Foreign Assistance Act of 1973. Agreement with Uruguay. TIAS 7985. 4 pp. 25¢. (Cat. No. S9.10:7985).

Agricultural Commodities. Agreement with Pakistan. TIAS 7971. 20 pp. 40¢. (Cat. No. S9.10:7971).

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Press releases may be obtained from the Office of Press Relations, Department of State, Washington, D.C. 20520.

Release issued prior to April 28 which appears in this issue of the BULLETIN is No. 182 of April 3.

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219	4/29	U.S.-Greek base negotiations: joint statement.
220	4/29	Kissinger: news conference.
221	4/30	Ingersoll: World Trade Conference, Chicago.
*222	4/30	Delegation of U.S. veterans to participate in Soviet observance of 30th anniversary of Allied victory in Europe.
*223	5/1	U.S.-Macau cotton textile agreement extended.
*224	5/1	Regional Foreign Policy Conference, Birmingham, Ala., May 5.
*225	5/1	Shipping Coordinating Committee, Subcommittee on Safety of Life at Sea, May 28.
*226	5/1	Study Group 7 of the U.S. National Committee for the CCIR, May 30.
*227	5/1	U.S. Advisory Commission on International Educational and Cultural Affairs, Mexico City, May 29-31.
†228	5/2	Sisco: George Washington University, May 4.
*229	5/2	Kissinger to visit St. Louis and Kansas City, Mo., May 12-13.
†232	5/2	Deposit of ratifications of Non-proliferation Treaty by five EURATOM countries.

* Not printed.

† Held for a later issue of the BULLETIN.

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THE DEPARTMENT OF STATE BULLETIN

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THE DEPARTMENT OF STATE BULLETIN

VOL. LXXII, No. 1874

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The Department of State BULLETIN, a weekly publication issued by the Office of Media Services, Bureau of Public Affairs, provides the public and interested agencies of the government with information on developments in the field of U.S. foreign relations and on the work of the Department and the Foreign Service.

The BULLETIN includes selected press releases on foreign policy, issued by the White House and the Department, and statements, addresses, and news conferences of the President and the Secretary of State and other officers of the Department, as well as special articles on various phases of international affairs and the functions of the Department. Information is included concerning treaties and international agreements to which the United States is or may become a party and on treaties of general international interest.

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Secretary Kissinger Interviewed for NBC "Today" Show

Following is the transcript of an interview with Secretary Kissinger by Barbara Walters which was conducted at the Department of State on May 3 and broadcast on the NBC television "Today" show May 5-8.

Press release 231, parts I-IV, May 5-8

PORTION BROADCAST MAY 5

Miss Walters: Mr. Secretary, we are about to celebrate our Bicentennial. Is Viet-Nam our first defeat in 200 years?

Secretary Kissinger: When a nation is engaged in a major effort for 10 years and then doesn't achieve its basic objectives, you have to say it is a significant setback, yes.

Miss Walters: Is Viet-Nam our first defeat in 200 years?

Secretary Kissinger: Well, it depends how you assess the War of 1812 and other events. It is a significant setback.

Miss Walters: You are responsible for the airlift of more than 100,000 Viet-Nam refugees. How do you answer the American people who are worried about further economic deprivation and are resisting the arrival of these refugees?

Secretary Kissinger: It has been the American tradition to take refugees throughout our history, even from countries to which we had no special obligation. We took 675,000 Cuban refugees. We took, I think, over 150,000 Hungarian refugees.

Here is a country in which for 15 years we were engaged in a major effort in which hundreds of thousands of people cooperated with us in the belief that the United States would see this effort through. The least we owe these people, those who were most seriously endangered, is that we make an effort to evacuate them.

I think when the American people reflect

about our obligation they will recognize that we could not decently do anything else. The number is about 120,000. It is one of the things that we can be proud of having achieved. I think it is a national duty to help them. Moreover, I believe that the impact in any one locality is going to be absolutely minimal.

Miss Walters: Mr. Secretary, right now at this point of our history how do you see the fundamentals of our foreign policy, and are they being redefined since the fall of Viet-Nam?

Secretary Kissinger: The fundamental goal of our foreign policy has to remain to preserve peace and to achieve progress—economically, humanly, and politically—in the world.

Now, there is a curious situation in which many people say there is no domino effect but we have to redo all our foreign policy. Both propositions cannot be true.

I believe that the major objectives which the United States has set itself are dictated by our history, by our values, by our geography. They are unaffected by what has happened in Viet-Nam. They are more difficult as a result of our setback, but we can master them, and we will master them.

While Americans have some reason to be unhappy for various reasons about the outcome of Viet-Nam, if we look at the whole postwar record, we have preserved the global peace. Almost every great initiative in the postwar period has either been initiated by America or has been carried out with our strong support. If we want to avoid a world of chaos, if we want to achieve a world of progress, the American role is absolutely imperative. I repeat, it is our goal to maintain it and, based on our recent experience, to strengthen it in a more mature way.

With respect to Indochina, it is important to remember that we found 550,000 Ameri-

cans in Indochina when we came into office. We didn't put them there. In fact, we withdrew them.

Our attempt has been to gear American commitments to American capabilities and necessities.

Miss Walters: I would like to divide our foreign policy questions now into different parts of the globe, starting with the Far East, to Viet-Nam. At the time of the Paris peace treaty many people felt, perhaps cynically, that it was only a matter of time before North Viet-Nam took over all of Viet-Nam and that the withdrawal of our troops was our way of getting out and saving face. These people wonder why you didn't know this and have some alternate plan should Viet-Nam push south.

Secretary Kissinger: First of all, if so many people knew it, they managed to keep it rather quiet. I don't remember any very vocal statements at the time that pointed out what you have just said.

Secondly, when you say why didn't we have an alternative plan, I would have to know what sort of a plan do people have in mind, what could we have done?

Miss Walters: Let me make a suggestion—not to run your foreign policy. But for example, one alternative is, after Congress had the arms cutoff, we might have gone to President Thieu and told him, "Look, it is a new world, and you had better negotiate unless you want defeat."

Secretary Kissinger: Let me first go back to where we were in January 1973 and where we wound up in April of '75. In January '73 we did not foresee that Watergate would sap the executive authority of the United States to such a degree that flexibility of executive action inherently would be circumscribed. We did not foresee that the Congress would pass a law which prohibited us from enforcing the Paris agreement; and while we probably might have done nothing anyway, it makes a lot of difference for Hanoi whether it thinks the United States probably will not or whether it thinks that we certainly can not.

I do not believe that Hanoi would have sent

19 of its 20 divisions south if these two things hadn't happened. Nor did we foresee that aid to Viet-Nam would be cut in successive years by 50 percent each year at a time when inflation quadrupled the oil prices and inflation increased the cost of everything—so that after May 1974 no new equipment of any kind was sent to Viet-Nam and not even spare parts in any substantial quantities reached Viet-Nam, so that ammunition had to be rationed for the Vietnamese forces. Maybe the South Vietnamese Army was not ever one of the better armies in the world, but even a good army would have been demoralized by these successive cuts.

None of this was predictable. After it became clearer that a gradual erosion of morale was occurring, we tried very hard to get negotiations started; and President Thieu, whatever you may think of him, on a number of occasions made proposals to get these talks started unconditionally.

But once the North Vietnamese realized what the trends were, they blocked all negotiations and went for a military solution.

Miss Walters: So that you feel there was no other possibility?

Secretary Kissinger: There was no other possibility.

Miss Walters: It is now known that President Nixon wrote a letter to President Thieu in January of 1973 promising that the United States would move "full force" to punish any violations of the Paris peace agreement. You obviously knew of the content of this letter.

Secretary Kissinger: Of course.

Miss Walters: Why didn't you reveal to Congress in the past months the content of that letter, especially when Senator [Henry M.] Jackson raised this question?

Secretary Kissinger: It is a very important question of the conduct of foreign policy. Presidents have been writing letters to foreign heads of state since the founding of the Republic. During the difficult months when we were trying to convince President Thieu to accept the Paris accords, many letters were written—just as every President, including

President Ford, is writing, has been writing letters to foreign heads of government.

If we begin revealing the contents of letters simply because a Senator—on top of it a Presidential candidate, but quite apart from this—a Senator alleges that there is something in these letters, then Presidential correspondence will lose its private character.

Moreover in this particular case, President Ford announced that the substance of these letters had been made public, not ascribed to correspondence, but in fact had been made public.

The reason President Ford decided to not release these letters was to maintain the principle of confidentiality of Presidential correspondence. We do have an obligation to tell the Congress about obligations which the country has undertaken. That was done in many public statements in 1973, and they were made moot by congressional actions and after that it was not an issue.

Miss Walters: Mr. Secretary, this brings up one of the criticisms about you today. That is, people say Henry Kissinger deals in excessive secrecy. There are other letters and other deals perhaps being made at other conferences and other summits that perhaps the Congress doesn't know about. How does one resolve that, and how do you answer that criticism?

Secretary Kissinger: Once certain stereotypes develop, it is very difficult to deal with them. I am certain that if I read top secret documents in front of the Washington Monument to a public assembly I would still be accused of conducting foreign policy too secretly. One has to separate it into two parts.

The first is: Secrecy in negotiations is absolutely essential because it enables each side to state views and explanations which could be extremely embarrassing if they became public. It is absolutely required for the foreign leaders who deal with us to know that they can talk to us frankly. Therefore the secrecy of the negotiating process must be preserved. Charles Evans Hughes said in 1923 that open diplomacy can only refer to results, not to the process.

The second point is: Are there secret

agreements that people don't know about and that have been kept from the public? Well, so far, with all the allegations that have been made, nobody has yet produced any secret agreement that has not been made public. At one time there was an allegation that we had made some secret agreement about 70 missiles. That turned out to be an absurdity, but it is so complicated to explain that I don't want to go into it now. At any rate, that was an absurdity.

The second argument that has been made is that we did not reveal a Gromyko letter about Jewish emigration. It is true that we did not reveal the letter, but the substance of that letter was fully disclosed to the Senate in the testimony before the Senate Finance Committee on December 3, 1974.

The third charge has to do with the war in Viet-Nam, with the end of the war in Viet-Nam. There, too, the substance was fully explained. There are no secret agreements. No one has as yet produced any secret agreements. All they have produced are limited statements that were fully revealed to the public.

Miss Walters: Mr. Secretary, do you see our government recognizing the North Vietnamese Government?

Secretary Kissinger: Well, we now have to see what the conduct of this Government is internationally and partially domestically. For example, we know that in Cambodia very tragic and inhuman and barbarous things are going on. We don't regret not having recognized Cambodia immediately.

We want to observe the conduct of the Vietnamese Government for a while before we make this decision.

Miss Walters: Can you tell us what part the Soviet Union played diplomatically, militarily, during the waning days of the South Viet-Nam collapse?

Secretary Kissinger: The Soviet Union played, in the last two weeks, a moderately constructive role in enabling us to understand the possibilities there were for evacuation, both of Americans and South Vietnamese, and for the possibilities that might exist for a political evolution.

On the other hand, I do not want to give the Soviet Union excessive credit for moderating the consequences that its arms brought about. Therefore we have to see it in perspective.

Miss Walters: Did the Soviet Union tell you that there would be no possibility of a negotiated settlement, that it was going to end in a takeover of the city?

Secretary Kissinger: That was not clear to me from the exchanges.

PORTION BROADCAST MAY 6

Miss Walters: We talk of détente with the Soviet Union, but how do we reconcile détente with the country that aids the collapse of an ally we are committed to defend?

Secretary Kissinger: We have to understand what détente represents. The Soviet Union is a country that we recognize as ideologically hostile. The Soviet Union is a great power that is in many parts of the world operating competitively with us. The Soviet Union is also a country that possesses an enormous nuclear arsenal and with which we have certain interests in common, such as the prevention of general nuclear war, such as limiting conflict in areas where both of us could get directly involved.

In those areas détente has worked reasonably well. What we cannot ask the Soviet Union to do is to keep itself from taking advantage of situations in which, for whatever reasons, we do not do what is required to maintain the balance.

It is true that Soviet arms made the conquest of South Viet-Nam possible. It is also true that the refusal of American arms made the conquest of South Viet-Nam inevitable.

Therefore, while the Soviet Union does have a heavy responsibility, we cannot expect the Soviet Union to police the world for us, and we have to be mature enough to recognize that we have to coexist, even in a competitive world, and perhaps hopefully be able to moderate over a period of years the competition in peripheral areas.

Now, eventually the Soviet Union must

realize that it is responsible for the consequences of its actions even in peripheral areas. But as a basic relationship détente has never meant the absence of competition.

Miss Walters: Where does China stand now as a result of the fall of Saigon?

Secretary Kissinger: Well, China now has 40 million Vietnamese on its frontiers who do not exactly suffer from a lack of confidence in themselves. I think China will look at the international situation from the point of view of the overall balance of power, from the point of view of its own national interests. I think it will conclude that the policy that led it to undertake normalization of relations with the United States remains the best course for it, just as we believe that the normalization of relations with the People's Republic of China is an important objective of American policy which will be maintained.

Miss Walters: Mr. Secretary, Thailand's Foreign Minister has said all American soldiers will be totally gone from that country within one year. What does that mean to us?

Secretary Kissinger: Basically, as we assess our policy around the world, it is important to understand that the United States does not do favors to other countries by being in an alliance with them nor do other countries do us favors by being our allies. If other countries want us to withdraw our troops, we will of course withdraw them.

Our security can be protected in many ways. What it means, however, is that for the Thai leaders the last few months have been a traumatic experience. Thailand supported our efforts in Viet-Nam and in Indochina because it believed its own security was intimately connected with it. And it is well known that we used Thai bases for many of the operations of the Indochina war. So naturally the Thai leaders are concerned about what this means, what our withdrawal from Cambodia and Viet-Nam means, about our general attitude in foreign policy. And I think they will find that we are going to stick by our commitments.

If they want us to reduce our forces, and they have indicated that they do, and if they

want us to withdraw them, we are prepared to discuss this with them, and of course we will accede by their wishes.

Miss Walters: Senate Majority Leader Mike Mansfield has said that we should withdraw our troops from South Korea, probably the next target of Communist pressure. Do you think we should? Has South Korea asked us to?

Secretary Kissinger: South Korea has not asked us to. In South Korea there can be no ambiguity about our commitment because we have a defense treaty ratified by the Congress. If we abandon this treaty, it would have drastic consequences in Japan and all over Asia because that would be interpreted as our final withdrawal from Asia and our final withdrawal from our whole postwar foreign policy.

Miss Walters: Is there a redefinition of the domino theory in light of the internal rebellions going on in such countries as Thailand, the Philippines, and Malaysia; and, as part of that, have we as a result of Viet-Nam stopped trying to persuade governments to resist communism?

Secretary Kissinger: There are two aspects to the domino theory. The first is: Is there a domino effect to foreign policy action? The second is: Can we, as a country, do something about every domino effect that may occur in the world?

Miss Walters: I like your questions much better than mine. They are more understandable. They are clearer.

Secretary Kissinger: With respect to my first question, there is in almost every major event a domino effect that is produced either by the change in the balance of forces, or by the perception of other countries of the actions of the various participants, or by the general psychological climate that is created in the world as to who is advancing and who is withdrawing. That is inevitable.

What the United States can do about it is another matter. For example, with respect to Indochina we now receive cables from places as far away as Latin America and Africa, that have no geographic interest in Southeast

Asia, simply questioning what this means about the American purpose.

Now, does it mean that the United States is no longer urging countries to resist internal subversion?

The first decision whether to resist internal subversion must come from the countries concerned. We probably made a mistake in Viet-Nam to turn Viet-Nam into a test case for our policy, and not for the Vietnamese policy, back in 1962 and 1963 when we first got ourselves involved there.

So our general attitude would be that the basic decision of how to react to internal subversion depends on the countries concerned.

Miss Walters: Let me go back to that. Does that mean we should have realized that the trend was toward communism and said we will stay out?

Secretary Kissinger: No, but we perhaps might have perceived it more in Vietnamese terms rather than as the outward thrust of a global conspiracy.

Miss Walters: Okay.

Secretary Kissinger: Then if there is a decision to resist internal subversion, I would think that the introduction of American military forces is the worst way of dealing with it, because that introduces a foreign element. If we want to be helpful we would be much better off strengthening the government's ability to resist and giving it assistance rather than introducing American military forces.

But as a general rule, one would really have to look at that country by country. We don't have a blanket policy in this respect that applies to every country in the world.

Miss Walters: Mr. Secretary, can we talk of the Middle East? President Ford and you are due to meet President Sadat in Austria next month and later with Prime Minister Rabin in Washington. What possible avenues for new negotiations do you see?

Secretary Kissinger: We do not have a plan that we want to present to these two governments now. But we do have the conviction that a prolonged stalemate in the Middle East involves a high risk of another Middle East

war with major consequences for the possibility of a conflict with the Soviet Union and with a major impact on the economies of all of the industrialized nations, including us. This is a danger that we are determined to avoid. We believe that it is also in the interest of all of the participants, all of the parties in the Middle East, including especially Israel.

So we will talk to President Sadat and, when we meet, Prime Minister Rabin and other leaders about their ideas of how the Middle East can be moved to a solution. And after that we will formulate a precise American policy.

Miss Walters: It has been widely noted that you and the President criticized Israel for not being more flexible. What was the purpose of this private criticism?

Secretary Kissinger: You know, Barbara, there are so many myths that go around. The President made a public criticism, not a private criticism, when he referred to inflexibility.

In terms of the long-term consequences, I have expressed the view that a strategy which on the whole had been agreed to with the Israeli Government did not succeed.

The purpose has been not of criticism, but the purpose of making clear the general American perception of the problem was to make clear that new decisions had to be taken by all of the parties and that the progress toward peace in the Middle East cannot be stopped.

Miss Walters: But when you publicly or privately criticized Israel, didn't this release President Sadat from reexamining his policy?

Secretary Kissinger: We have asked all parties to look at their policies, and the allegation of private criticism of Israel comes mostly from people who think they are helping Israel but who in my view are not helping Israel by making these allegations.

Our view is that all parties on both sides have an obligation to examine what they can do to produce peace. On the Israeli side this is a question of what territory they are prepared to give up. On the Arab side it is a question of what concrete commitments to

peace they are prepared to make.

Miss Walters: Almost six weeks ago, President Ford asked for a reassessment of our policy in the Middle East. I know you have not finished the reassessment. They say it will take another week or so. But can you tell us anything of what has emerged?

Secretary Kissinger: First of all, when President Ford announced this and set a tentative deadline, it was before events in Indochina took a great deal of our attention.

Secondly, it is a mistake to believe that there will be some clear terminal date at which one can say from now on the assessment is completed. But I believe that on the whole the decisions, the final decision, will not be made until President Ford has had an opportunity to meet with the leaders of the countries principally concerned.

But the conclusion to which we have come is certainly to continue a major American effort to produce progress toward peace in the Middle East and not to permit a long period of stagnation.

Miss Walters: What assurances do Israel and our other allies have that we will keep our commitments to them? As soon as Israelis hear "reassessment," and other allies, too, it seems to strike great fear that it could mean abandonment or great change. What assurances do they have?

Secretary Kissinger: The President has, on several occasions, made clear—and so have I—that we will stand by our existing commitments.

Miss Walters: Could Congress change this?

Secretary Kissinger: Certainly Congress can change our commitments, as it did in Viet-Nam—not our commitments, our implied obligations.

But the situation in Viet-Nam was quite different from the situation in other parts of the world. In Viet-Nam the situation was extremely controversial. It has not been that with respect to Israel or with respect to Western Europe and most of our other alliances. But Congress can certainly change any commitment we have.

Miss Walters: But do you feel that Israel and these other allies have good reason to be assured that the basic policy will not change?

Secretary Kissinger: Assurances are not achieved with words alone. It depends on our conduct as a people. In terms of the foreign policy of this Administration, our allies and friends have no reason to fear that we will abandon them.

In terms of our overall performance as a country, it is crucial that we restore a sense of unity between the executive and legislative branches and that we perform in such a manner that other countries know that we are dealing with them as a united people.

PORTION BROADCAST MAY 7

Miss Walters: If we turn now to Europe, our base in the Portuguese Azores was essential to the military airlift of aid to Israel in the October war. Portugal has said she may not allow this to happen again.

Secretary Kissinger: She said she will not allow it.

Miss Walters: Do we have alternate plans?

Secretary Kissinger: We have alternate possibilities, but they are much more complicated and involve a much longer route.

Miss Walters: Are you very concerned about this?

Secretary Kissinger: It is an additional problem in case there is a Middle East war.

Miss Walters: What are our relations now with Portugal? What do you see happening with this?

Secretary Kissinger: The situation in Portugal is in a state of evolution. There recently were elections which indicated gratifyingly that a majority of the Portuguese people favored the democratic parties. It is also a fact that the government has a very heavy Communist influence, out of proportion to the numerical strength that the party represents. So we have to assess what the foreign policy of Portugal will be before we can make any final decisions.

Miss Walters: You will be visiting and trying to reassess our relations with NATO, our participation in NATO. Do you expect Turkey and Greece to remain in NATO? Realistically, as things are now?

Secretary Kissinger: I hope very much that Greece and Turkey will stay in NATO. I think it is in their self-interest to stay in NATO, but the national passions are very great. They are now negotiating in Vienna—the Greek and Turkish communities in Cyprus are negotiating in Vienna. We hope that during the NATO summit the President and others will have an opportunity to exchange views with the Greek and Turkish leaders, and we hope that we can play a role in moving things toward a negotiated outcome.

Miss Walters: But you have expressed yourself as being very gloomy about what you see as the decline and erosion of the free world.

Secretary Kissinger: No, it has been alleged.

Miss Walters: It has been alleged. All right. Are you?

Secretary Kissinger: It is not always true.

Miss Walters: It has been alleged that you are gloomy about what you see as the decline and erosion of the free world. Is this true, that you feel this way?

Secretary Kissinger: As a matter of fact, it is; it is partly true. It is not so much erosion of the free world. I think if we look around the world today that in many countries Marxist ideologies and perceptions of the world which are contrary to our values are gaining in strength and that therefore we have in the world both a political problem and a philosophical problem; that is, a problem of the degree to which we appear relevant to other countries.

In Europe, in some European countries, the left is gaining in strength. I am stating this clinically, as a fact. I am not stating that necessarily the United States can do a great deal about it. It is something to be noted.

Miss Walters: If it happens, if it kept

growing little by little, will it reach us? Has it reached us?

Secretary Kissinger: Will it? The United States cannot be an island in this world any longer. We are tied to the rest of the world through the necessities of security, increasingly by the imperatives of economics, and inevitably by the modern means of communications.

So I would suppose that the intellectual and philosophical currents in the world will sooner or later affect the United States and then it is a question of what other currents exist here to deal with them.

Miss Walters: As a historian, do you see us going more to the left or more toward the right? How do you see the trends?

Secretary Kissinger: I don't think we are becoming socialistic in this country. This is not at all a trend. But we have had a very sharp division in this country which formerly centered around Viet-Nam, but for which Viet-Nam was really a symbol between a more radical trend and a more conservative trend. And for one of the rare occasions in our history the contest was fought out in almost—it sometimes took extralegal forms on both sides.

Now, I think it is too early to tell in which direction it goes in this country because in this country the traditional element is very strong. It is a country that has very great faith in its existing values. So it could really go in either direction. But the major point that I would like to make is that we have the great advantage over many other countries that our divisions are not yet unbridgeable and that people on both sides of political dividing lines can still talk to each other.

I think we must preserve this and try to develop common positions rather than become, as so many other countries, divided into ideological blocs.

Miss Walters: Mr. Secretary, is there any difference between the foreign policy of President Nixon and President Ford, and if so, how do they differ?

Secretary Kissinger: The foreign policy of a great country cannot be changed at the

whim of individuals. And if it is perceived that every President starts an entirely new foreign policy, that in itself will create an element of instability in the world.

So if you look at the entire American post-war foreign policy, you will find that the changes in the major directions of the foreign policy haven't been all that significant.

What is different between various Presidents is the style, the method of doing business; and when new problems come up they must make their own decisions.

Miss Walters: Is there anything significantly different between these two men that you can see in the way that they handle foreign policy that influences you, that changes the direction?

Secretary Kissinger: Well, I would think that in the conduct of shaping, that in shaping a domestic consensus, President Ford would, on the whole, be more conciliatory.

Miss Walters: Well, it is considered in general that he is weaker in foreign policy than President Nixon. In his last speech there was a good deal of feeling that President Ford was going to put his own implant on foreign policy, but what he did was to put Henry Kissinger's impact. You read the papers, so you know what I am saying.

Secretary Kissinger: This is the sort of gossip that comes out of every White House. President Ford worked on this speech for many weeks. He spent days and nights on that speech, with many advisers.

Now, if advisers choose to put out that there were different points of view which were never apparent in the room and that one adviser prevailed, this makes a dramatic story; but it is not true. This speech reflected the convictions of President Ford.

Miss Walters: You did not go in the last few days and—

Secretary Kissinger: That is nonsense.

Miss Walters: —keep yourself in the White House and make the final impact and implant?

Secretary Kissinger: That is nonsense.

There was only one draft of the speech. I never heard any philosophical disagreements stated while I was in the room, nor did I change anything that already existed. It was predominantly a speech by President Ford which various of his advisers helped to draft.

Miss Walters: Is he as knowledgeable about foreign policy as President Nixon?

Secretary Kissinger: I think he would be the first to admit that when he came into office he was not as knowledgeable about foreign policy. On the other hand, he spends an enormous amount of his time on foreign policy. He moves with great deliberation, great care, and great thoroughness; and he masters the subjects of foreign policy with extraordinary attention and skill.

Miss Walters: I am going to be visiting Cuba as this interview is aired. I will be going with Senator [George] McGovern and some other reporters. This week the Organization of American States meets here in Washington, and high on their list is a reassessment of the economic blockade of Cuba. It is suspected if Latin America does this we will go along. What would you want Cuba to do to establish normalcy, and if I do see Premier Castro, is there anything that I can ask him for you, for us?

Secretary Kissinger: Castro is without any question a remarkable man. I think it is important for Americans to understand that individuals who go into the mountains to lead a revolution are not motivated by economic considerations. If they were, they would be bank presidents and not revolutionaries.

We have made clear to Cuba that we are prepared to improve our relations. We have made certain gestures to Cuba, so far not reciprocated. We are prepared to discuss with the other countries of the Organization of American States the question of blockade, the economic blockade, and to enable them to express their majority view on this subject.

But I think, Barbara, that Castro knows how to get in touch with us. I don't want to make it too tempting for him by using you as an intermediary.

Miss Walters: Mr. Secretary, let's talk about you and the criticism that is all around you at this point.

Secretary Kissinger: All unjustified. That is my position, and I will maintain it.

Miss Walters: Well, let's start. It has been said that by your holding two positions—Secretary of State and national security adviser—the President doesn't have the benefit of hearing diverse views on foreign policy. That is a legitimate point of view.

Secretary Kissinger: Leaving aside now the question of whether a man should hold two positions and addressing the question of does the President get diverse advice on foreign policy, the whole purpose of the national security system as it exists is to make sure that the President gets every significant point of view that exists in the bureaucracy. Typically when a major decision has to be made, there will be first a paper in which every agency expresses its view, after which there will be a meeting of the National Security Council at which every agency is represented. So the possibility of keeping anything from the President does not exist. And, moreover, any person who has been in a senior position for any length of time knows that it is essential for the President to make sure that the President has heard conflicting points of view because, if he doesn't and anything goes wrong for a reason which you didn't tell the President, his whole confidence in the policy will be undermined.

Miss Walters: All right. Now you have often said when we have talked in the past about how you present things, how you presented things to President Nixon, that you outlined all the possibilities but you also made recommendations. You are wearing two hats. Should you be? If you were standing out there somewhere looking at this one man holding two jobs, do you really think it is best that he hold both of them?

Secretary Kissinger: First of all, I want

to make clear that the Secretary of Defense, the Director of the Central Intelligence Agency, and any other official who believes he has something relevant to say has very easy access to this President. It is not being blocked. Secondly, the decisions are made at meetings at which everybody is present. If the President wants to ask for my recommendations, he doesn't ask in what capacity he is asking it. Therefore the question cannot be answered in the abstract.

I agree with what the President said. If there is an individual who can handle both jobs and has the confidence of the President, the President should have the option of combining it. He should not be forced to either combine it or to separate it. He should have that option.

Miss Walters: Would you resign if either of these jobs were taken away from you?

Secretary Kissinger: I think this is not a time to talk about my resigning.

Miss Walters: I am going to have to because other people are. Mr. Secretary. Senator Frank Church, the leading Democrat in the Foreign Relations Committee, has called for your resignation as has the former Secretary of Defense Clark Clifford. How do you react to men of this stature saying the country would be better off without you? I would like to know how you react as the Secretary of State and how you react as Henry Kissinger when you walk out of the room.

Secretary Kissinger: Senator Church, as I understand it, didn't ask for my resignation. He said we should change our policies or I should resign. I think that whether I resign or not depends on two factors: One, on the President's views as to my utility; and secondly, on my assessment of whether I am serving the country.

After one has been in Washington for six and a half years as I have, under extremely difficult and sometimes passionate circumstances, holding a job does not in itself hold any particular attraction. What I have to consider is the impact internationally if successively the President, Vice President, and the Secretary of State resign, and for

what reason—what reasons are used to bring this about.

Miss Walters: This interview is going to run over a several-day period. I don't want to miss anything. Can I be assured that you will not resign between now and the end of the airing of this interview? Would you like to say something about it?

Secretary Kissinger: I save my resignations for visits to Salzburg.

Miss Walters: You only resign in Austria, is that it?

Secretary Kissinger: That is right.

Miss Walters: Mr. Secretary, let's talk a little bit about you on a personal level now. You have been married now, it is over a year, isn't it?

Secretary Kissinger: Over a year, yes.

Miss Walters: What has marriage brought you besides a very lovely wife?

Secretary Kissinger: I am very close to my wife. I think it has enormously contributed to my peace of mind and to my ability to deal with temporary adversity.

Miss Walters: Is there any particular criticism that you feel is particularly unfair and that is prevalent and that you would like to answer?

Secretary Kissinger: I don't—I haven't really thought about this.

Miss Walters: Perhaps the major one is that it has been personal diplomacy, that it is Henry Kissinger's personal one-to-one diplomacy and that hasn't worked.

Secretary Kissinger: Well, first of all, to say it has not worked is probably—

Miss Walters: That is what your critics say.

Secretary Kissinger: That is probably an overstatement. If you look at what has been done over the last six and one half years with China, with the Soviet Union, in energy, in food, in getting our troops out of Vietnam and our prisoners back, and in starting the process toward peace in the Middle East, I don't think it is correct to say that our

foreign policy hasn't worked. I don't want to identify our foreign policy with me personally.

Miss Walters: Everyone does.

Secretary Kissinger: But I do not think Americans should accept the proposition that their foreign policy hasn't worked, because it has worked. We have had some setbacks, but nobody is batting 1,000. Most of our setbacks, many of our setbacks, have been caused by domestic problems. But on personal diplomacy, all diplomacy is to some extent personal.

Finally, the thing that probably will last longest, one of the aspects that will last longest is to get into the key positions of the Department of State the ablest younger people in the Department, so that I think now the Department of State has the most tough-minded and most forward-looking group it has had in 20 years. I am not working alone. I am working very closely with my associates.

Miss Walters: How is your staff going to feel when they hear you complimenting them? Aren't they going to get the bends just from the change?

Secretary Kissinger: I will make it up in private meetings.

Miss Walters: In days past—

Secretary Kissinger: One of my associates has said the highest praise they can get from me is the absence of abuse.

Miss Walters: Are you really that tough?

Secretary Kissinger: I am a perfectionist. I like to try to make people do things that they didn't think they could do. But most of my close associates also become close personal friends.

Miss Walters: Mr. Secretary, in days past

you used to say—when we had conversations sometimes as well—that you wanted to leave office in a sense while you were ahead to avoid the kind of controversy and pain, for example, that a man like Dean Rusk went through. Having said that in the past, do you feel sometimes, do you wish, you could have left sooner?

Secretary Kissinger: For me selfishly it would have been better if I had left sooner. But I think, if I may say so, that was at a perhaps more immature period of my life because I should look at this not from the point of view of what may be better for me but for what is better for the country. Right now in these circumstances to leave in a period of turmoil, when people are looking for a sense of direction and when foreign nations are watching us, I think it would not be a service to the country if I left as long as the President has confidence in me and asks for me to stay.

If I ever questioned that, I would leave very quickly and without any difficulty.

Miss Walters: Mr. Secretary, you are a historian as well as a statesman. If you were writing the text, what was Henry Kissinger's greatest contribution and what was his greatest failure?

Secretary Kissinger: I am sure there are several things that I wish I had done differently, but when you are in the middle of it I think it is dangerous to claim successes and premature to insist on failures. But there are, I suppose, several things I might have done differently. But the main lines of the policy—this I want to repeat—the main lines of the policy, if I had to do it over again, I would do again, substantially the same way, which may make me unreconstructed and may be one reason why I am at peace with myself.

President Ford's News Conference of May 6

Following are excerpts relating to foreign policy from the transcript of a news conference held by President Ford in the Old Executive Office Building on May 6.¹

Q. Mr. President, what are the lessons of Viet-Nam in terms of the Presidency, the Congress, and the American people, in terms of secret diplomacy and fighting a land war in Asia? And also, would you welcome a congressional inquiry into how we got in and how we got out of Viet-Nam?

President Ford: Miss Thomas [Helen Thomas, United Press International], the war in Viet-Nam is over. It was sad and tragic in many respects. I think it would be unfortunate for us to rehash allegations as to individuals that might be to blame or Administrations that might be at fault.

It seems to me that it is over. We ought to look ahead, and I think a congressional inquiry at this time would only be divisive, not helpful.

Q. Mr. President, may I ask you, then, don't you think we can learn from the past?

President Ford: Miss Thomas, I think the lessons of the past in Viet-Nam have already been learned—learned by Presidents, learned by Congress, learned by the American people—and we should have our focus on the future. As far as I am concerned, that is where we will concentrate.

Miss Lewine [Frances L. Lewine, Associated Press].

Q. Mr. President, your forthcoming meetings with Egyptian President Sadat and Israeli Prime Minister Rabin, do they represent the beginning of a new American-led

negotiation in the Middle East toward a peace settlement?

President Ford: They do not represent a new negotiating process. I am meeting with President Sadat and Prime Minister Rabin for the purpose of getting from them any recommendations they might have as to how we can maintain the peace in the Middle East, how we can come to some final settlement that will be beneficial to all of the parties.

We are in the process of reassessing our Middle East policy, and they can make a very, very valuable contribution with their on-the-spot recommendations.

Q. Mr. President, do you now see any hopeful signs that there is any movement there off dead center?

President Ford: I am always optimistic. I believe that the leaders of all of the countries, both Arab and Israeli, as well as others, recognize the seriousness of any new military engagement in the Middle East and the ramifications that might come from it.

So, I am optimistic that as we try to move ahead—aimed at avoiding a stalemate, avoiding stagnation—that we can work with other countries in order to insure the peace and a settlement that will be satisfactory to all parties.

Q. Mr. President, you have been reported as being "damned mad" about the adverse reaction of the American people to the Vietnamese refugees. I would like to ask you, how do you explain that reaction? What in your judgment is the cause of that?

President Ford: Mr. Lisagor [Peter Lisagor, Chicago Daily News], I am primarily very upset because the United States has had a long tradition of opening its doors to

¹ For the complete transcript, see Weekly Compilation of Presidential Documents dated May 12.

immigrants from all countries. We are a country built by immigrants from all areas of the world, and we have always been a humanitarian nation. And when I read or heard some of the comments made a few days ago, I was disappointed and very upset.

I was encouraged this afternoon, however. I understand that the Executive Committee of the AFL-CIO passed a resolution urging that the United States open its doors and make opportunities available for the South Vietnamese who have been driven or escaped from their country.

I understand that the American Jewish Committee has likewise passed a resolution this afternoon endorsing the policy of making opportunities available in the United States for South Vietnamese. And I am very proud of those Governors, like Governor Pryor of Arkansas, Governor Askew of Florida, Governor Longley of Maine, Governor Evans of Washington, Governor Ariyoshi of Hawaii, as well as Mayor Alioto [of San Francisco], who have communicated with me and indicated their support for a policy of giving the opportunity of South Vietnamese to come from this country to explore the possibility of death in their country under the North Vietnamese and the Viet Cong, and individuals who wanted an opportunity for freedom.

I think this is the right attitude for Americans to take, and I am delighted for the support that I have gotten.

Q. May I follow that and ask you, why in your judgment is there such a widespread adverse reaction to this?

President Ford: I understand the attitude of some. We have serious economic problems. But out of the 120,000 refugees who are either here or on their way, 60 percent of those are children. They ought to be given an opportunity. Only 35,000 heads of families will be moved into our total society.

Now, I understand people who are concerned with our economic problems. But we have assimilated between 50,000 and 100,000 Hungarians in the midfifties, we have brought into this country some 500,000 to 600,000 Cubans; they have been good citi-

zens. And we ought to welcome these people in the same way. And despite our economic problems, I am convinced that the vast majority of Americans today want these people to have another opportunity to escape the probability of death; and therefore I applaud those who feel that way.

Q. Even though the war is over, sir, there are many Americans who must still live with the agonies that it caused them. I speak primarily of those wounded and crippled and the families of those who died. In very human and personal terms, how would you speak to them about the sacrifices that were made?

President Ford: Well first, let me say very emphatically, they made a great sacrifice. The 56,000 that died and the countless thousands who were wounded, I honor and respect them, and their contribution was most significant. I think their contribution was not in vain.

Five Presidents carried out a national policy. Six Congresses enforced that policy, which was a policy of our country. And they carried out that responsibility as a member of our Armed Forces.

I think we should praise them, congratulate them, and we have an unbelievable commitment to them in the future. All we can say is, thank you very much for what they have done for freedom.

Q. Mr. President, you mentioned that you spoke to some Virginia Republicans the week before last and at that time you said that in 1976 we will have some excellent results in foreign policy. After the past few weeks, we can all use a little good news. Can you tell us just what you do expect in 1976?

President Ford: Yes, I think between now and the end of 1976 we are going to make progress in the negotiations for a SALT Two agreement. It hasn't been finalized, but the atmosphere is good.

There's going to be some hard negotiating, but I will approach that important meeting with Mr. Brezhnev [Leonid I. Brezhnev, General Secretary of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union] aimed at achieving re-

sults, and I think his attitude will reflect the same.

I think you are going to find a greater solidarity in Europe. I am going to Europe the latter part of this month to strengthen that solidarity and to work on a more unified position in solving our joint economic problems, in trying to solve the energy problems that are serious for all of us.

It is my judgment that we can move ahead even in the Pacific. We will have to not reassess, but assess, how we can proceed; but it is my aim to tie more closely together South Korea with the United States, to reaffirm our commitments to Taiwan, to work more closely with Indonesia, with the Philippines and with other Pacific nations.

These are the kind of, I believe, forward movements in foreign policy that will be beneficial in the maintenance of peace.

Q. Mr. President, I would very much like to follow that up one second. Is your job going to be complicated by what happened in Southeast Asia? You have gone out of your way in the past week or two to say the United States will honor its foreign commitments. What sort of private feedback are you getting from foreign capitals? Is there a lack of confidence now? A loss of confidence in the United States?

President Ford: We do get reactions from foreign governments wondering what our position will be, asking where we will go and what our policy will be. We have indicated to our friends that we will maintain our commitments. We understand the perception that some countries may have as a result of the setback in South Viet-Nam.

But that perception is not a reality, because the United States is strong militarily; the United States is strong economically, despite our current problems. And we are going to maintain our leadership on a worldwide basis, and we want our friends to know that we will stand by them, and we want any potential adversaries to know that we will stand up to them.

Q. Mr. President, events in Indochina outran the deliberative process of the Con-

gress, and you weren't given the clearly defined authority to use U.S. forces to evacuate there because of Cambodia and Viet-Nam. My question goes to the matter of whether it was a personal dilemma for you as Commander in Chief to use U.S. forces without the expressed concurrence of the Congress.

President Ford: Our prime objective, of course, both in the evacuation from Phnom Penh in Cambodia and in Saigon was to bring all Americans out of both locations. Now, in the process, it did appear to be wise, particularly in Saigon, to take out a number of South Vietnamese. We did that because, number one, we felt that a number of these South Vietnamese had been very loyal to the United States and deserved an opportunity to live in freedom, and secondly, the possibility existed if we had not brought out some South Vietnamese that there could have been anti-American attitudes developed that would have complicated the evacuation of our American personnel.

So, I felt that what we did could be fully justified in not only evacuating Americans but evacuating some of the South Vietnamese who wanted to come to the United States.

Q. Mr. President, Secretary Kissinger said that all of the Americans who wanted to leave South Viet-Nam were evacuated, but there may be some reason to believe not all were evacuated. Some organizations, for example, report at least eight missionaries captured in the northern part of South Viet-Nam. So, I am wondering if there is some process to check this sort of thing out and what could be done about it.

President Ford: We certainly made a maximum effort to get every American out. We found in the last week that on a certain day they could tell us that there were 1,000 Americans that were ready to come out, and we would take 300 or 400 out, and then the next day we would find that a number of other Americans had come into Saigon and wanted to get out.

So, we certainly made a tremendous effort to get all Americans out. I am sure there are

some who are left. At this time, I can't give you the specifics as to how we will seek to get any Americans who are still there, but we will do all we can to achieve that result.

Q. Mr. President, you have praised Ambassador Graham Martin's record in Viet-Nam, and you have also defended the evacuation of Vietnamese civilians. Yet, there is some evidence that Mr. Martin's actions made it impossible for some Vietnamese to escape who were longstanding employees of the U.S. Government and others were evacuated on the basis of their ability to pay.

Have you investigated any of these charges, and do you still believe that Ambassador Martin's record is one of effectiveness?

President Ford: Because of the ability of Ambassador Martin to handle a tough situation—and it was very difficult—we got all Americans out and we got roughly 120,000-plus South Vietnamese.

Now, I am familiar with some individuals who are critical of the way in which Ambassador Martin handled it. I never had much faith in Monday-morning quarterbacks or grandstand quarterbacks. I would rather put faith in the man who carried out a very successful evacuation of Americans and a tremendous number of South Vietnamese.

Rather than be critical of somebody who I think did a good job, I think we ought to praise him. If some of these people want to in hindsight—who didn't have the responsibility—criticize him, I think we will accept it for what it is worth.

Q. You apparently had some intelligence reports about a bloodbath in Cambodia. I am wondering if you can bring us up to date on anything in this area in Cambodia and whether or not there is any report of a bloodbath in South Viet-Nam?

President Ford: We do have some intelligence reports to the effect that in Cambodia some 80 or 90 former Cambodian officials were executed, and in addition, their wives were executed.

This is very hard intelligence. That is, I

think, very factual evidence of the bloodbath that has taken place or is in the process of taking place in Cambodia.

Now, a turn to Viet-Nam. As you know, there is a very tight censorship in South Viet-Nam. The news that gets out is pretty heavily controlled by the North Vietnamese and by the Viet Cong. So, we really don't have the same kind of hard evidence there that we have had in Cambodia in the instance that I have indicated.

But I think probably the best evidence of the probability is that 120,000-plus South Vietnamese fled because they knew that the probability existed that if they stayed, their life would be in jeopardy. That is the best evidence of what probably will take place.

Q. Mr. President, to follow up on that, you say you don't have any hard evidence. Do you have any report, any intelligence reports that indicate this is going on?

President Ford: As of the moment, we have not.

The Contributions of the Statesman and the University in Today's World

*Address by Joseph J. Sisco
Under Secretary for Political Affairs¹*

My theme is drawn from the familiar opening line of Dickens' *A Tale of Two Cities*: "It was the best of times; it was the worst of times."

It seems to me this aptly describes the environment, domestic and international, in which we live and into which this graduating class enters. Never have we seen a decade of such affluence and material and technological progress as the past decade. Yet we seem to be going through a period which is painful, confusing, frustrating, and downright irritating.

¹ Made at commencement exercises of the Columbian College of Arts and Sciences, George Washington University, Washington, D.C., on May 4 (text from press release 228 dated May 2; introductory paragraphs omitted).

It brings to mind the schoolteacher who asked the class, "What shape is the earth?" A small boy quickly replied, "My father says it's in the worst shape it ever was." I daresay that each of us has probably said something like this in recent days.

This feeling is entirely understandable. After years of relative well-being, most of us regard any intrusion upon our way of life as an indignity not to be borne lightly.

At home, we have painfully experienced a decade of social turmoil and political assassinations. We witnessed the ignominy of Watergate and weathered the constitutional crisis that followed. Even now we face severe economic difficulties accompanied by pockets of misery, unemployment, and injustice.

On the international scene, the trauma and anguish of events in Indochina linger though the war is finished as far as America is concerned. The trouble spots in the eastern Mediterranean and the Middle East pose continuing grave risks; the attempt to stabilize our relations with our adversaries remains incomplete and uncertain; the imperatives of global economic interdependence are only partially met; and above all, the survival of man is no longer a figure of speech, but an operational problem before governments and peoples of the world.

For America—for a self-confident, buoyant, can-do America—this has been hard to take. As understandable as these feelings are, we cannot—we dare not—shirk our responsibilities at home or overseas. If in a time past the only thing we had to fear was fear itself, then today we must fear the temptation to submit to resignation, apathy, and cynicism.

Yes, it is "the worst of times" in a sense, but it is "the best of times" as well. I prefer to believe that we are entering a period of creative opportunity which will test our fiber, ingenuity, and fortitude and that we are equal to the test.

It is not in the American character to shrug and declare problems insoluble or take the attitude that it is for someone else to tackle. I have a favorite philosopher. His name is Charlie Brown. He has put it this way: "There is no heavier burden than a

great potential." I happen to believe that America and Americans still have the world's greatest potential. We have material strength, technological leadership, a strong defense, and political and social ideals rooted in our history. And I believe that the American people, despite all the alarm, are responsive to effective leadership.

What are the tasks ahead?

First, at home: Our priority requirement is to regain our sense of purpose and find ways to restore confidence in our leaders and institutions. As Macaulay put it so well, people need to "learn that it is the spirit we are of, not the machinery we employ, that binds us together."

A good beginning is to apply the lessons of Watergate. If we have learned anything from this horrendous development, it is that there must be greater probity and accountability in the exercise of governmental leadership by all of us who are in responsible positions. We must be pragmatic but at the same time be practitioners and shapers of values. I hope we at least learn from Watergate the political relevance of moral principle. The quality of our moral response to national and international problems has become a decisive issue in politics. This is due to the simple fact that many of today's problems present themselves in moral terms. Those who seek office in our next election will need to heed this reality more than ever if they are to gain and maintain the support of an informed electorate.

If this is the political challenge, we confront an equally important one on the economic front. With substantial unemployment and the country still in the throes of the recession-inflation syndrome, we are facing a serious period of adjustment. I am a product of the depression, and I hope I have not forgotten what recession means in human terms, despite years of living in the comfort and the protective cloister of suburbia. None of our experts have found an answer, including our economists. But I remain hopeful. America in 1975 is not the America of 1929. The world of the seventies is not the world of the thirties. We are not dealing with an economic crisis like that in 1929. We have

learned something from the past and have set about using what we have learned. We are more skilled in checking economic decline and more resourceful in mitigating the hardships that flow from it. The country has the talent and the will to do it. And we are beginning to take the hard measures necessary to overcome recession and cool inflation.

Our task overseas is equally demanding, and it presents itself in a context of rapid change. We are living in an interdependent world, living literally in each other's backyards. We have moved from the period of atomic supremacy through the cold war and now deal with problems in a world more complex as well as more perplexing. No longer can we make the distinction between domestic and international policies. America has faced great and seemingly overwhelming challenges before in its history and has shown its inherent capacity to overcome them and indeed create something new from the old. This is the critical task before us in our foreign policy as we strive to seize the historic opportunity to create a more stable and equitable world order.

While we are no longer directly engaged in war, we know that peace cannot be taken for granted. The nuclear equation makes restraint imperative; for the alternative is nuclear holocaust. We have come to realize that in the nuclear age the relationship between military strength and politically usable power is more complicated than ever before.

We have also learned, I believe, that our resources are not unlimited, that there cannot be a Washington blueprint or panacea for every international problem. We have learned, I hope, of both the potential and the limits of power, and we are aware that we are not omniscient nor can we be omnipresent.

It is clear that the United States no longer can play the role of world policeman. But the alternative is not to turn inward and withdraw to a new isolationism. It is essential that our policy be one of selective engagement, of establishing priorities based on their relevance to our interests and geared to our capacities.

For example, in the multipolar world of the seventies:

—We must continue to strengthen our alliances with Europe, Canada, and Japan.

—Our efforts to strengthen relations reciprocally between the United States and the Soviet Union must continue; for this relationship will probably determine more than any other single factor whether our hopes for peace and stability in the world are eventually realized.

—The dialogue and mutual understanding between the United States and the People's Republic of China should be strengthened.

—There can be no diminution of the U.S. effort to achieve practical progress toward peace in the Middle East and the Cyprus issue despite the recent setbacks, because vital stakes are involved.

—On the economic front, including questions of energy, food, population, and environment, there is no rational alternative to attacking problems globally and in a collaborative way. No individual nation has the capacity to solve these problems single-handedly; for the imbalance between limited resources and unlimited demand can only be met by the cooperation of all.

And our foreign policy, to be effective, must rest on a broad national base and reflect a shared community of values. This does not mean rubberstamping, and we cannot expect unanimity. But we must recapture the habit of concentrating on what binds us together to shape a broad consensus, a new unity, a renewed trust, and a fresh confidence.

Our ability as a nation to cope with critical issues at home and abroad is partly a function of the quality of our leadership and partly a function of education. The statesman and the educator have a common commitment to the development of an informed public opinion. The statesman seeks to inform and persuade so as to elicit its support; the educator to equip it with knowledge and discernment. And the students and alumni of a university—including the members of the class of 1975—have a responsibility to

carry forward into adult life the capacity for informed and critical opinion which your education has given you. You can have no more important purpose than to enrich, by your individual efforts and contributions, the tone and substance of our nation's public discourse. For if the strength of our institutions resides ultimately in the consent of the people, then it resides literally in you—in your strength and wisdom as individuals and as citizens. You are the future shapers and custodians of values.

Democracy is founded on the premise that, in order to judge their leaders, the people will be able to understand the issues the leaders face. Our problems threaten our well-being and security because they first threaten our understanding.

Your generation is faced with the prospect of continuing political turmoil, economic uncertainty, and threats to the peace. These dangers have raised doubts as to the ability of our society not only to overcome these challenges but also to satisfy the most basic needs of our people—the need to provide a sense of welfare, of equal justice, and of achievement and participation for all our citizens. Any organized society is, in the last analysis, judged by how it serves these basic human needs—and we can only measure our success against our own expectations of ourselves as a people.

In this respect, university students need both the breadth of the liberal arts and the specialization of scientific and technical studies. But beyond this, our primary need is not for information, which we have in abundance; it is for new ways of understanding and organizing this information. By so doing, we will enhance the capacity of Americans to adjust to a world in which power is diffused and centers of decisions are plural. The nature of our education and

the quality of our leadership are essential factors in determining whether or not we succeed. In the last analysis, our government can be no stronger than the men and women who lead it and the citizens who support it. I believe that both academia and the government can work together again in a shared endeavor, with government leaders creating the climate for the receptivity of ideas and the university making an input beyond criticism and dissent.

The task in meeting domestic and global issues before us is to draw on the best in our own historical experience and to formulate relevant policies. Amidst reverses and difficulties at home and abroad, our sense of disarray admittedly is still great. But if we view the scene with some discernment, the basis for a new assurance can emerge.

As a mature people with a historical perspective, we should no longer feel dismayed or feel betrayed if there is no perfect harmony in our domestic or foreign affairs. Despite the profound changes we have experienced at home, our democratic institutions have survived unprecedented trials. Abroad, common sense should teach us that history is complex and cannot be controlled or determined by any one nation. But America, because of its position and strength, will and must continue to influence world history in a major and decisive way.

In our effort to meet the emerging complex challenges at home and abroad, we as a people must display the same patient, practical wisdom and persistence that has served us so well in the past in our effort to secure the blessings of liberty, justice, and peace.

This great task is now rapidly becoming the responsibility of your generation. I am confident that you will grasp this historic opportunity to help make "the worst of times the best of times."

Prime Minister Nouria of Tunisia Visits the United States

Prime Minister Hedi Nouria of Tunisia made an official visit to the United States April 29–May 6. He met with President Ford and other government officials at Washington May 1–3. Following is an exchange of toasts between President Ford and Prime Minister Nouria at a dinner at the White House on May 1.

Weekly Compilation of Presidential Documents dated May 5

PRESIDENT FORD

Mr. Prime Minister: First let me welcome you and your party to the White House this evening. And may I express the warmth of the American people for you, and the people that you represent, and particularly President Bourguiba.

I thought the meeting that we had this morning discussing some of the very important matters involving the Mediterranean, Middle East were very helpful. We look forward to working with you and others in trying to make progress in that vital area of the world.

I couldn't help, as I looked at some of the material that came to me concerning your visit, to note the long, long relationship that your country and our country have had, going back to the latter part of the 18th century. We are proud of that longstanding as well as currently warm relationship. We trust that as we move into the days ahead there can be a broadening and expansion, deepening of that relationship.

As we look at the progress in your country, which includes great educational advancements for your people, social progress for the people of Tunisia, an increase in the per capita income of the people of Tunisia, you should be very proud of the progress that has been achieved. But, I know that the ef-

forts of your President, of you, and others are aimed toward greater progress in the days ahead.

We compliment you and congratulate you on what has been done, and let me assure you we will try to work with you in the mutual efforts that can be helpful to ourselves as well as to others.

I trust that the President can come here sometime in the future. We are very proud of our relationship with him and very anxious that he come and visit us.

May I extend to you, Mr. Prime Minister, on behalf of the American people, the warmest welcome and the very best wishes. And to you and your party, and particularly to your President, a toast at this time: To the people of Tunisia and to you, Mr. Prime Minister, and to the President.

PRIME MINISTER NOURIA ¹

Mr. President: I am deeply touched by the very flattering remarks that you have just addressed to me, remarks which beyond myself, I know, are directed to President Bourguiba, founder of new Tunisia, and to the Tunisian people.

I thank you most kindly and I want to express how deep is my joy to be in this great, generous, and hospitable land. The honor and the pleasure that I feel today are shared equally by the members of my delegation. I should like to express our gratitude for your kind invitation as well as for the very warm welcome extended to us.

The century-long relations between our two countries, interrupted by the colonial interlude, have known, since Tunisia became independent, a new impulse in the very

¹ Prime Minister Nouria spoke in French.

harmonious development. My visit, Mr. President, is not only to be viewed within the framework of the very strong and traditional friendship which is the mark of our relationship, but it reflects also the very high degree of respect and mutual esteem between our two governments and our two people.

It is that our two countries have had in common from the very beginning a deep attachment to the ideals of peace, liberty, and justice. And so it was that, from the very first years of independence of Tunisia, we found together, in a disinterested and fruitful cooperation, a very fertile ground to go together toward the concrete achievement of our special vision of man and society.

Tunisia, along these lines, is pledged to build its future, relying first and foremost upon her own resources, fully aware of the fact that development is first and foremost a national matter. Tunisians are investing considerable efforts to bring their own country out of its stage of undevelopment and to catch up the lag between our country and industrialized nations. The proportion of our national product which is devoted to investments, the level of saving in the country, cutting down national consumption—all those have reached very high degrees.

Under the impetus of President Bourguiba, Tunisia is at work. Stability, union, and progress have never been as evident as they are today, nor have they been as reassuring as they are today.

Haven of peace and land of action, Tunisia, over the span of very few years, carried out substantial progress in a number of different areas. We feel that economic and social problems cannot be separated from national security considerations. The solution to be found to these problems is therefore the first line of defense. That is why employment, overall development and speeded-up development, and improving the standard of living are our priority objectives.

In the fulfillment of this enthusiastic task which aims at giving man the potential to fulfill his own self fully, Tunisia, while it calls on its own resources, requests the aid of its friendly nations.

I must stress here that the United States has been of those who were first to respond to our appeal. The assistance that the great American people has given us has been a substantial aid. It has adapted and it has evolved constantly to fit very closely with the various stages of our development, to the national character of Tunisia, and to the psychological and human environment of our country. Faithful to an ideal and to a long tradition of support and assistance, yesterday vis-a-vis Europe and today for the countries of the Third World, the successive Administrations and Congresses of the United States who have led your great nation have always advocated and implemented a consistent policy of very close cooperation with Tunisia.

There remains much to be done to fully attain the objectives of creation of wealth and dissemination of well-being that Tunisia has set for itself. The contribution of our friends remains indispensable to the extent that they are the necessary complement to our own efforts and to the extent that, through technology and science transfer, they contribute to giving our development a new dimension and a determinant impulse.

Mr. President, whether we talk about our own problems or international matters, to which the Tunisian people pay particular attention, our political action has always been clear and consistent. Our calling is that of an Arab nation, of a Mediterranean nation, of an African nation. It is based upon the principles of law, justice, and freedom. Those are the very principles which guided us yesterday in our struggle for liberation, which guide us today in our will to develop our country.

The world in which we live will not lead you to all-out optimism. If détente appears to place itself within a historical context as a growing reality and if contacts among the great powers concerning disarmament are pursued, still many problems await to be solved.

In our part of the world, and more particularly in the eastern part of the Mediterranean area, peace remains precarious. We

have followed with sustained attention the very laudable efforts of Dr. Kissinger. Even though they have not succeeded to attaining tangible and immediate results, we believe that the mission of the Secretary of State has the great merit of bringing forth very clearly the responsibilities of each party. Now international opinion knows clearly that if it was not possible to bring about the initiation of the peace process, the fault lies primarily upon the intransigence of the Israeli leaders.

We must observe that today most international organizations, most nations, have finally recognized the legitimacy of the struggle waged by the Palestinian people, a people who derives its strength from its right to live in a sovereign manner upon the land of its ancestors in freedom and dignity. It is an illusion to attempt to build a just and durable peace in the Middle East without the participation of the representatives of the Palestinian people. That is why we have always advocated a return to international legality. The organization of the United Nations at the same time as in 1947 it was drawing up the document giving birth to the State of Israel was also simultaneously defining its boundaries.

Upon our African Continent, colonialism has not entirely laid down its arms. Millions of African nationals continue to suffer the injustices of discrimination and oppression. There also, we hope that reason will prevail, and we feel that the international community must strive to spare these innocents the unfortunate events which usually accompany violent reactions.

We must also observe sadly that the sufferings of the civilian populations of the Southeast Asian area do not appear to have reached their final point. We hope that the voice of reason and of the heart will prevail over any other consideration and that very soon a tragedy which has cost much and lasted long will come to an end.

Tunisia has consistently felt and stated that it is detrimental to resolve problems in an atmosphere of resentment and violence. We remain convinced that, throughout the world, dialogue must prevail over the re-

course to blind force and the judgment of arms.

Those are the lines along which we feel that the solution of the major issue preoccupying today the governments must be found, and I refer of course to the economic crisis which has broken out worldwide and which gives a more precarious character to international balance which already, by its very nature, is an unstable balance. We feel that it is urgent to reexamine the rules and principles which have, up to now, guided international relationships in the economic and financial fields.

In this connection, Tunisia feels that the new economic order is a vital need in order to raise the standard of living of hundreds of millions of men and women, and in order to exorcise the scourges of poverty, hunger, disease, and ignorance which weigh so heavily upon nearly half of mankind. Tunisia is convinced, not only for ethical and ideological reasons but because it feels deeply that this is the essential, the essential token for international security and that this is indispensable for the development and the harmonious fulfillment of the individual human being. Tunisia is also convinced that mankind as a whole must and can make progress toward setting up this new economic order in a serene and concerted manner, not in a fruitless confrontation.

Developed nations, particularly the United States, are facing historic responsibility to contribute to the setting up of this economic order which should be worldwide and more equitable, because it is very true that the economies of the rich nations and of the poor nations are interdependent and complementary. This has been demonstrated clearly.

There is wide opportunity for fruitful and promising cooperation in the interest of all, and consultation and dialogue should replace the passionate behavior or the sectarian attitudes and intransigent selfishness. The world is evolving in such a manner that a reconsideration of the relationship between industrialized nations and developing nations is a must. The laws of market alone may not rule these relationships, because if there is a certain legitimacy there, still it is not the

sole justification and it is not admitted without any restrictions by the Third World nations.

The main international bodies which arose out of World War II claimed—probably and this was the generous intent of their founders—claimed to take into account the interests of their members. But experience has proved that if they did indeed contribute substantially to those who were less well endowed, they were still not in a position to foresee the pace of evolution of our societies, and they were in a certain sense called upon to manage the interests of the stronger among nations. This has produced an accumulation of tensions in every area—even in every part of the world—which has been detrimental to some and which has been a catastrophe for the large number.

Because of its size, prestige, the genius of its people, and the wisdom of its leaders, the United States must play a decisive role in order to bring about a period of peace and prosperity throughout the world. When he came to Tunisia, Secretary Tabor [John K. Tabor, Under Secretary of Commerce] compared the world situation to a vessel which carries a large number of passengers but which also carries a very big and bulky elephant. Now, this is a very dramatic picture, and I believe that the passengers on this vessel want as much as the elephant to come together, to come to an understanding, so that they will not all together tumble overboard and find themselves at the bottom of the sea.

Mr. President, I am convinced that the meetings that we shall have with the high leaders of your Administration, as well as with some of the honorable Members of the Congress, will bring about very positive results and will strengthen the free and fruitful cooperation that has existed between our two countries within the framework of our common pragmatic approach, and the spirit of support and solidarity which has always motivated the Government and the people of the United States with respect to Tunisia.

When we think of the celebration next year of the Bicentennial of the United States,

Mr. President, I cannot keep myself from thinking back upon the faith of those proud founders, their vision, who, two centuries ago, united the American people to free their people and build here the greatest democracy the world has ever seen. As directed by President Bourguiba, Tunisia will be happy to participate in this manifestation, and it will offer as a contribution to the celebration an exhibition of some of the most beautiful mosaics, which retrace life in Tunisia under the Roman empire.

Throughout the ages and over time, from the very first steps of the Pilgrims who landed upon an unfriendly shore all the way to the first steps of your astronauts over the Moon, your history is a succession of stunning victories over nature, to wrest from nature its secrets and put them at the service of man. This has been made possible through the genius, the perseverance, and the courage of your research workers and your scientists.

I want to raise my glass, Mr. President, to peace and free cooperation among nations. And let us raise our glass to the prosperity of the American people and friendship between Tunisia and the United States.

U.S. Concerned at Price Increase for Canadian Natural Gas Exports

*Department Statement*¹

We are disappointed at the decision announced yesterday by the Canadian Government to increase the export price of natural gas from the present \$1.00 to \$1.40 per MCF [thousand cubic feet] on August 1 and to \$1.60 per MCF on November 1, 1975. This price increase will cost U.S. consumers of Canadian natural gas an additional \$583 million a year.

These latest increases follow substantial export price rises imposed by the Canadian Government on January 1 of this year and

¹ Issued on May 6 (text from press release 237).

earlier increases which have raised the prices paid by American consumers for Canadian natural gas under long-term, firm contracts more than 500 percent since 1973.

U.S. officials met with Canadian officials in Ottawa on April 22 to explain our concern over the serious impact another large price increase would have on regions in the United States which are substantially dependent on Canadian gas imports.

At that meeting, we emphasized our view that such an increase constitutes a further breach of the long-term contracts covering these exports. We expressed our understanding of the need to increase natural gas prices over a reasonable period of time to commodity value, which is also a U.S. policy objective.

It was noted, however, that the increase proposed by Canada, as in January, will be applied only to U.S. consumers—Canada's sole export customers—not to Canadian users. This price increase will further widen the gap between the export price and the price to Canadian consumers, thus increasing the discrimination against the United States.

At the April 22 meeting, as in previous discussions with Canadian officials, we dwell on the importance we attach to a continuing supply of gas under these long-term contracts. The question of supply continues to be of great concern to us, and we expect to have further consultations with Canada to discuss this issue.

This decision by the Canadian Government and Canada's stated intention to impose further increases in the export price for natural gas demonstrate the urgency for a clear U.S. energy policy to stimulate rapid development of our own resources and permit us to reduce dependence on foreign energy suppliers.

World Trade Week, 1975

A P R O C L A M A T I O N ¹

America approaches the 200th anniversary of national independence at a time when events at home and abroad demonstrate the interdependence of the community of nations.

Interdependence and its impact on all Americans is particularly apparent in world trade.

Through world trade, Americans expand with others the flow of goods and services to all peoples and enhance the economic well-being of all countries. In so doing, we recommit the United States to an open world economic order and reconfirm our pledge to international peace and understanding.

The Congress of the United States underscored America's dedication to more free and fair international commerce with passage of the Trade Act of 1974. That act enables us to move toward multilateral negotiations that will open the way to improved access to foreign markets for American goods and to vital raw materials.

In the face of economic stress at home, more exports mean more jobs for Americans, more purchasing power for America's consumers and more business for our manufacturers. Exports help us meet the swiftly rising cost of the energy we consume. They are the source of equilibrium in our balance of payments.

World trade joins nations in peaceful and creative partnership. It has greater significance today than ever before.

Now, THEREFORE, I, GERALD R. FORD, President of the United States of America, do hereby proclaim the week beginning May 18, 1975, as World Trade Week, and I call upon all Americans to cooperate in observing that week by participating with the business community and all levels of government in activities that emphasize the importance of world trade to the United States economy and to our relations with other nations.

IN WITNESS WHEREOF, I have hereunto set my hand this fifth day of April, in the year of our Lord nineteen hundred seventy-five, and of the Independence of the United States of America the one hundred ninety-ninth.

GERALD R. FORD.

¹ No. 4362; 40 *Fed. Reg.* 15861.

Department Discusses Preparatory Meeting of Oil Producing and Consuming Nations

*Statement by Charles W. Robinson
Under Secretary for Economic Affairs¹*

I am pleased to have this opportunity to appear before your subcommittee to provide testimony on the recently concluded preparatory meeting between oil producing and consuming nations and to discuss in broad terms the relationship of this meeting with our overall energy policy.

At the Washington Energy Conference in February 1974, the United States and 12 other industrialized nations agreed that, at the appropriate time, they should meet with developing consumer states and producing countries to explore possibilities for mutually acceptable solutions to the energy problem. The International Energy Agency (IEA), created nine months later, has as one of its goals the institution of contacts and dialogue with the producing nations.

We realized, however, that meaningful discussions could take place only after consuming nations had proved that they would not remain helpless over time to the arbitrary manipulation of the world oil market by the OPEC [Organization of Petroleum Exporting Countries] states. Before we could negotiate effectively, or even gain the necessary respect for serious discussions, we had to undertake unified actions in the energy field that would demonstrate strength and consistency of purpose.

¹ Made before the Subcommittee on International Resources, Food, and Energy of the House Committee on International Relations on May 1. The complete transcript of the hearings will be published by the committee and will be available from the Superintendent of Documents, U.S. Government Printing Office, Washington, D.C. 20402.

Consequently, our international energy efforts since the Washington Energy Conference have concentrated on the creation of a framework of close consumer-country cooperation. Through this effort, we seek to reduce, and eventually eliminate, our vulnerability to manipulation of our oil supply and oil prices.

Substantial progress has been made in building consumer solidarity over the past 14 months. In the IEA, we have agreed on emergency provisions that will enable a unified and coordinated response to any future embargo. Along with other OECD [Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development] countries, we have agreed to create within the OECD a \$25 billion support fund to act as a lender of last resort to industrialized countries suffering severe balance-of-payments costs because of high oil prices.

These efforts, basically short-term insurance policies, are complemented by essential longer term programs to reduce IEA members' collective dependence on imported oil. We have established as a conservation target the reduction of IEA oil imports by 2 million barrels a day by the end of 1975, and similar objectives will be established for later years. We have agreement in principle on a series of interrelated measures to accelerate the development of indigenous energy supplies; it is anticipated that implementation programs will be developed and approved by July 1.

The Paris preparatory meeting of April

7-15, or "Prepcon," took place as a result of a French initiative. Last fall the French President proposed a meeting of a small number of industrialized, developing, and producing countries in Paris to plan a multi-lateral conference on energy; invitations to such a meeting were issued in March. The French proposal was similar to one made earlier by Saudi Arabian Petroleum Minister [Ahmad Zaki] Yamani, and the French invited the same countries to the Prepcon that Minister Yamani had originally proposed. The Shah of Iran had also shown interest in a producer-consumer conference.

In December at Martinique, President Ford conditioned the participation of the United States in a producer-consumer conference on a sequential four-stage approach, which the IEA subsequently endorsed. In the first stage, consumer cooperation would be strengthened in the areas of finance, conservation, and accelerated development of energy; as I mentioned earlier, concrete programs in these areas have been agreed to. The second stage was to be the Prepcon. Stage 3 would involve intensified consumer cooperation and the development of common consumer positions. Stage 4 would be the holding of the conference. In the light of progress made toward consumer solidarity, we agreed in late March to proceed with the preparatory meeting.

Issues Discussed at Preparatory Meeting

The task of the Prepcon was to agree on the procedures and participants for the energy conference to be held later this year. The 10 participants included representatives from the industrialized countries (the United States, Japan, and the nine members of the European Community represented through a single spokesman), the developing consumer countries (Brazil, India, and Zaïre), and the OPEC nations (Saudi Arabia, Iran, Venezuela, and Algeria). As host, France, which has declined to join the IEA, provided the "technical chairman"; the French were also represented in the European Community delegation.

We went to Paris determined to be coop-

erative and constructive. We believed that the conference should be one in which rhetoric was minimized and real work toward concrete solutions was maximized. Therefore it was essential, in our view, to have an agenda for the conference that was manageable in size and which offered the promise of real progress.

Despite nine days of intense and grueling negotiations, the 10 delegations at the Prepcon could not reach agreement on the procedural issues for the conference. The talks failed to resolve the fundamental question of what type of conference it would be. The United States, the European Community, and Japan, unanimously supported by other members of the IEA, maintained that the conference should focus on energy and energy-related matters as proposed in the French invitation. The OPEC and LDC [less developed countries] representatives were willing for the conference to discuss energy but only if equal status were given to a wide range of problems relating to the economic relations between developing countries and the rest of the world. Specifically, they insisted that the conference treat raw materials, monetary reform, and assistance to most seriously affected countries on the same basis as energy.

The industrialized countries demonstrated considerable flexibility in the negotiations, offering to interpret quite broadly the topics that could be considered under the general energy rubric. We offered in addition to treat all non-energy-related subjects in other appropriate fora where work on them was already underway. We were not willing, however, to agree, as the OPEC and LDC representatives seemed to want, to create another unproductive forum to discuss the "new international economic order."

Even though the talks adjourned because of disagreement over this basic issue, several other issues were left undecided. The OPEC and LDC representatives sought specific agenda references to maintaining the purchasing power of export earnings and the real value of investments; i.e., indexation of prices and investments. We argued that we could not accept such references since they

prejudged the outcome of the conference. We said, however, that we were prepared for them to raise these subjects for discussion at the conference under an agenda formulation that was neutrally cast. Since the Prepcon's mandate was only procedural, we did not attempt to engage in substantive debate over indexation.

Spearheaded by Algeria, the OPEC and LDC states also opposed IEA attendance as an observer at the full conference. They maintained that IEA is a confrontational organization whose existence is not recognized by the OPEC nations. They argued that the presence of the IEA would give the conference too much of an energy orientation and that OECD presence at the conference should suffice for IEA representation. With unanimous support from other IEA members, the United States, the European Community, and Japan were prepared to condition their attendance at the conference, and acceptance of any agreed agenda, on IEA presence as an observer with the right to speak. We believed that to agree on IEA exclusion would be to accept implicitly the confrontational charge. Furthermore, IEA exclusion would prevent representation at the conference (via IEA) of many important consuming countries. This issue was not settled before the conference adjourned.

Let me note parenthetically that it was clear early in the first week that compromise on these fundamental differences was unlikely. Nevertheless the participants continued their negotiations for several extra days and nights in order to explore all possibilities for accommodation. The adjournment of the Prepcon was not accompanied by recrimination among the participants.

Major Conclusions Drawn From Meeting

Mr. Chairman, it is not correct, I think, simply to characterize the Prepcon as a failure. It is true that the main purpose of the meeting was not achieved. On the other hand, all participants gained a much greater appreciation of the others' views which may have a salutary effect on future bilateral and multilateral relations.

What are the major conclusions we have drawn from the Prepcon?

First, the OPEC states have succeeded in linking their interests with those of the LDC's even though high oil prices are seriously damaging the economies of many developing nations. Some LDC nations unfortunately find attractive the idea that they can help solve their economic problems by following the OPEC example; i.e., cartelizing and demanding higher prices for all raw materials. We expect the OPEC-LDC bloc under OPEC leadership to be a strong and vocal force in future international fora, at least until developing countries come to recognize that widespread cartelization will be neither practical nor productive.

Second, the industrialized nations demonstrated strong consumer solidarity, proving the tremendous progress that has been made in the IEA over the past 14 months. During the Prepcon, we coordinated our positions closely with other IEA members. The decision to hold firm in insisting on an energy conference and on IEA participation received unanimous endorsement from the IEA Governing Board, which is composed of representatives from the 18 member countries.

Finally, it appears that the timing is not yet right for a multilateral dialogue on key energy issues. The producers at the Prepcon showed little willingness to engage in serious discussion on energy unless the industrialized nations would consider at the same time the broader issues of LDC relations.

Effect of Meeting on U.S. Energy Policy

We regret that the Prepcon did not succeed. We remain willing to participate in a multilateral conference if one can be arranged that concentrates on energy. But we do not expect our own energy policies to be affected in a major way by the suspension of the Prepcon talks.

Our overall energy policy, pursued both in the United States and in coordination with other IEA countries, will continue to be to bring about a basic shift in the supply-demand balance in the world oil market. This will reduce our vulnerability to foreign

supply disruptions, reduce the ability of a small group of countries to manipulate world oil prices arbitrarily, and enable prices to approach their long-term equilibrium level.

The focus of our international efforts will remain in the IEA. We intend to insure that momentum is maintained as we press ahead to implement the conservation and accelerated-development programs.

The Prepcon proved that other IEA members share our belief in the necessity of consumer solidarity. They, too, believe the IEA has a key role to play in dealing with the energy problem. They will, we think, work with us to insure that the IEA's importance and influence will increase in the future.

Given the leading role which the United States has played in the development of the International Energy Agency, it is most important that the United States accede to the Agreement on the International Energy Program without reservation. The United States is now applying the agreement provisionally pending adoption of the requisite implementing legislation by Congress. Unfortunately, the legislation currently under consideration in the House of Representatives would not permit us to adhere to the International Energy Program without reservation. Specifically, this legislation does not fully meet vital IEA requirements relating to demand restraint; that is, conservation, the allocation of petroleum in case of another embargo, and the establishment of a petroleum reserve. The antitrust provisions of the legislation under consideration are also deficient. While this subcommittee is not immediately concerned with this legislation, may I take this opportunity to urge you and your colleagues in the House to make every effort to promptly approve legislation which will permit the United States to accede to the Agreement on the International Energy Program.

In the months ahead, we will also seek to intensify our cooperative bilateral relations with producing governments. We have many common interests which provide important opportunities to work together. For instance, our joint commissions with Saudi

Arabia and Iran are making significant progress in identifying key areas for cooperation. As we build on and broaden the scope of our activities with these two producers and with other OPEC states, we will create in time a set of economic and political relationships that should enable us to help them achieve important national goals and to appreciate more fully their responsibility for pursuing oil policies that lend stability to the international economy.

We are convinced, Mr. Chairman, that the oil crisis will not simply go away. Our policies are designed to meet the challenge of that crisis. They will, if properly and vigorously pursued, permit us to achieve our two fundamental objectives: an international price of oil set by free market forces and substantial U.S. self-sufficiency in energy.

President Ford Urges Legislation To Assist Viet-Nam Refugees

Following are texts of a letter from President Ford to the Speaker of the House dated April 30 and a statement by President Ford issued on May 1.

LETTER TO SPEAKER OF THE HOUSE, APRIL 30

White House press release dated May 1

April 30, 1975.

DEAR MR. SPEAKER: In view of the urgent need for funds to pay for humanitarian assistance and transportation of refugees from South Vietnam, I request that the House of Representatives act quickly to approve the Conference Report on H.R. 6096, the Vietnam Humanitarian Assistance and Evacuation Act of 1975. In making this request, I am aware that sections 4 through 9 of H.R. 6096 have been overtaken by events and have no further utility. Nevertheless, the enactment of the bill as recommended by the Conference Report is the most expeditious method of obtaining funds which are now desperately needed for the care and transportation of homeless refugees.

As I stated yesterday, the evacuation has

been completed. The Congress may be assured that I do not intend to send the armed forces of the United States back into Vietnamese territory.

Approximately 70,000 evacuees are now located on various safe haven islands, on U.S. Navy vessels and on civilian vessels. These individuals are being cared for by agencies of the United States Government while being processed through a system established to relocate them in the United States and in other countries.

Although the specific cost of activities related to the evacuation cannot be fixed at this point, it is estimated that direct U.S. expenditures to care for and process these evacuees, and contributions to international organizations and private voluntary agencies to assist in this effort, will exceed \$400,000,000. Available funds already appropriated to provide aid to Vietnam will be reprogrammed and utilized to the maximum extent possible. But the additional authority of \$327,000,000 will be required to fully meet immediate needs.

The authority of this legislation, followed by appropriations as soon as possible, is necessary to continue this operation, to integrate the evacuees into the United States and other countries and to permit consideration of further humanitarian assistance which may be consistent with the provisions of H.R. 6096 and American policy objectives.

I urge the immediate enactment of H.R. 6096.

Sincerely,

GERALD R. FORD.

STATEMENT BY PRESIDENT FORD, MAY 1

White House press release dated May 1

I am saddened and disappointed by the action of the House of Representatives today in rejecting assistance to the refugees from South Viet-Nam.

This action does not reflect the values we cherish as a nation of immigrants. It is not worthy of a people which has lived by the philosophy symbolized in the Statue of Liberty. It reflects fear and misunderstanding,

rather than charity and compassion.

Despite the House vote, I believe that in this tragic situation the American people want their country to be guided by the inscription on the Statue of Liberty:

Give me your tired, your poor,
Your huddled masses yearning to breathe free,
The wretched refuse of your teeming shore,
Send these, the homeless, tempest-tossed, to me:
I lift my lamp beside the golden door.

After World War II, the United States offered a new life to 1,400,000 displaced persons. The generosity of the American people showed again following the Hungarian uprising of 1956 when more than 50,000 Hungarian refugees fled here for sanctuary. And we welcomed more than a half million Cubans fleeing tyranny in their country.

Now, other refugees have fled from the Communist takeover in Viet-Nam. These refugees chose freedom. They do not ask that we be their keepers but only, for a time, that we be their helpers.

Some members of the House of Representatives apparently voted against the legislation to assist the refugees because of a section relating to evacuation from South Viet-Nam. The evacuation is complete.

I urge the members of the House of Representatives and of the Senate to approve quickly new legislation providing humanitarian assistance to the South Vietnamese refugees. To do otherwise would be a repudiation of the finest principles and traditions of America.

President's Letter to Congress on Oil Price Controls and Import Fees

Following is the text of identical letters dated April 30 from President Ford to Speaker of the House Carl Albert and President of the Senate Nelson A. Rockefeller.

White House press release dated April 30

APRIL 30, 1975.

DEAR MR. SPEAKER: (DEAR MR. PRESIDENT:) Three and one-half months have passed since I presented the Nation and the Congress with a comprehensive program to

achieve energy independence by 1985. Although the policy I put forth was not an easy solution, it was, and remains today, the only comprehensive and workable national energy program. Because of the seriousness of the problem, I also moved to cut energy demand and increase supply to the maximum extent within my administrative discretion by announcing a three step increase in the fees on imported petroleum starting last February 1 and complete decontrol of old oil prices by April 1.

After imposition of the first dollar of the additional import fees, the majority leadership in the Congress requested that I delay further actions to provide time to evaluate my proposals, to formulate an alternative comprehensive energy plan and to enact legislation. I granted a 60 day delay in the spirit of compromise, in spite of the fact that we had already waited much too long to make the hard decisions our country needs.

In the 60 days that followed, a number of Congressional energy programs were introduced and considered. Little progress has been made though. Thus, I am forced to again make a difficult administrative decision.

Since my State of the Union Message last January, there has been no improvement in the situation in the Middle East. The existing tensions only heighten my belief that we must do everything possible to avoid increasing our dependence on imported oil in the months ahead.

The recession is coming to an end. But the pending upturn will result in greater demand for imported oil. At the same time, however, it will put us in a better position to absorb the adjustments that greater energy conservation will require.

There are some encouraging signs in the Congress. Chairmen [Al] Ullman and [John D.] Dingell and ranking minority members [Herman T.] Schneebeli and [Clarence J.] Brown have been working diligently in their respective committees to formulate a comprehensive energy program. After extensive hearings and discussions, their efforts to date embody some elements of the energy

proposals which I sent to the Congress as well as several which could be potentially disastrous.

The Senate has also conducted many hearings. Yet the only legislation which has passed is a bill that would impose mandatory restrictions within 60 days on recreational and leisure travel, hours of business operation, and commercial lighting. This bill is ineffective and unrealistic. It would result in unwarranted government control of personal freedoms, and would cause unforeseen economic consequences.

I am hopeful that the weeks ahead can result in agreement between the Congress and the Administration. I believe it can if we are willing to work diligently, honestly, and more rapidly. But I am concerned about the possibility of the Congress passing politically popular legislation which will not only fail to meet our energy needs but which could create serious economic problems for the Nation. From my many years in the Congress, I know how easy it is to become embroiled in endless debate over tough decisions. I also know how easy it is for the Congress to enact legislation full of rhetoric and high sounding purpose, but short of substance. That must *not* happen in this case.

Neither the House nor the Senate has passed one significant energy measure acceptable to the Administration in these past few months. Hence, I must be a realist—since the time before final legislation will be on my desk is very long. I understand that in many ways the timing and substance is beyond the control of the individual committee chairmen. Yet, postponement of action on my part is not the answer. I am, therefore, taking these administration actions at this time:

—First, I have directed the Federal Energy Administrator to implement a program to steadily phase out price controls on old oil over two years, starting June 1, 1975. This program will not proceed until public hearings are completed and a plan is submitted for Congressional review, as required by statute. While I intend to work with the Congress, and have compromised on my

original decision to proceed with immediate decontrol, the nation cannot afford to wait indefinitely for this much needed action. I intend to accompany this action with a redoubling of my efforts to achieve an appropriate windfall profits tax on crude oil production with strong incentives to encourage maximum domestic exploration and production.

—Second, I will again defer the second dollar import fee on crude oil and the \$.60 per barrel fee on imported petroleum products in order to continue the spirit of compromise with the Congress. However, I will be forced to impose the higher fees in 30 days, or sooner, if the House and Senate fail to move rapidly on the type of comprehensive legislation which is necessary to resolve our critical energy situation. Such legislation must not embody punitive tax measures or mandated, artificial shortages, which could have significant economic impact and be an unwarranted intrusion on individual freedom of choice.

The administrative action that I have set in motion will help achieve energy self-sufficiency by 1985, stem increasing vulnerability during the next few critical years, and accomplish this without significant economic impact. Nevertheless, my actions alone are not enough. The Congress must move rapidly on a more comprehensive energy program which includes broader energy conservation and actions to expand supply. Action now is essential to develop domestic supplies and protect American jobs. It is my utmost desire in announcing these executive initiatives to balance our overwhelming need to move ahead with an equally important need not to force outright confrontation between the Administration and the Congress.

I pledge to work with the Congress in this endeavor. To the extent comprehensive and effective legislation is passed by the Congress, I stand ready to approve it. What I cannot do is stand by as more time passes and our import vulnerability grows. If this happens, I will not hesitate to impose the higher import fees. Meantime, my admin-

istrative actions must fill the gap in this endeavor. The country can afford no less.

Sincerely,

GERALD R. FORD.

Constituent Assembly Election in Portugal Discussed

Following is a statement by L. Bruce Laingen, Deputy Assistant Secretary for European Affairs, made before the Subcommittee on International Political and Military Affairs of the House Committee on International Relations on May 1.¹

Two months ago I had the pleasure of appearing before you for a detailed discussion of the political and economic situation in Portugal. Much has happened there since that time, and my colleagues and I are glad to have this further opportunity to exchange views with the committee.

The culmination of many of these events, of course, was in the constituent assembly elections held on April 25, the first anniversary* of the revolution in Portugal. An impressive 92 percent of Portugal's registered voters cast their ballots in what appears to have been an orderly and genuinely free balloting process.

The newly elected assembly, which consists of 247 delegates, is charged with the responsibility of drafting a new constitution, but within the strict guidelines set down by the Armed Forces Movement and recently agreed to by the principal political parties. The assembly will have 90 days to complete its work, with provision for an extension of another 90 days should that be necessary.

Of the 12 political parties participating in the elections, the Socialists recorded the greatest degree of popular support, with 38 percent of the ballot. The center left Popular Democratic Party received 26.4 percent, the

¹ The complete transcript of the hearings will be published by the committee and will be available from the Superintendent of Documents, U.S. Government Printing Office, Washington, D.C. 20402.

Communists 12.5 percent, and the Social Democratic Center 7.6 percent. The Communist-front Portuguese Democratic Movement recorded 4 percent, and 4 percent was divided among a range of smaller parties. Only 7 percent cast blank ballots.

While it would be inappropriate for me to comment in any detail on the outcome of the elections, I have no doubt that all Americans welcome them as demonstrating the democratic sentiments of the overwhelming majority of the Portuguese people. The electoral results are of special importance in recording, for the first time, the range and strength of political opinion among the people of Portugal. However, the relationship between the expression of democratic views and governmental action remains to be established. Their practical impact in the short term has been limited by the prior action of the Armed Forces Movement in laying down the essential outlines of the constitution which the elected members of the constituent assembly are now to develop in detail.

The elections are thus one further stage in a continuing process of change in Portugal, a process that is obviously not yet complete. As a friend and ally of long standing with Portugal, the United States will remain an interested and sympathetic observer. It is in that sense in particular that we welcome this renewed opportunity to share impressions with you and your committee.

Annual Report on Trade Agreements Program Transmitted to the Congress

*Message From President Ford*¹

To the Congress of the United States:

I am pleased to transmit herewith to the Congress the Nineteenth Annual Report of the President of the United States on the

¹ Transmitted on May 1 (text from White House press release); also printed as H. Doc. 94-123, 94th Cong., 1st sess., which includes the text of the report.

Trade Agreements Program. This report covers calendar year 1974.

The world economy in 1974 was characterized by deepening stresses and strains caused by persistent inflation, a downturn in economic activity, structural dislocations in the wake of the oil crises, high rates of unemployment, and widespread uncertainty as to the future. In such circumstances, most governments faced strong pressures to adopt unilateral restrictions on imports, to promote their export earnings and to secure access to essential supplies.

Fortunately, most governments have not forgotten the costly lessons of the nationalistic, go-it-alone policies and ensuing trade wars of the 1930s. With economic wisdom and political courage, the world's industrialized countries have in large part held the line against the proponents of short-sighted solutions involving unilateral measures restricting and distorting trade and competitive currency devaluations. Moreover, recognizing the need for positive cooperative approaches, most of the world's trading nations joined in technical preparatory work for far-reaching multilateral negotiations to reduce trade barriers, as had been agreed to by over 100 countries in September, 1973. By the end of 1974, this preparatory groundwork was largely completed.

Passage of the Trade Act of 1974 last December opened the way for the multilateral trade talks to move into the negotiating stage in February, 1975. Countries accounting for most of the world's trade are participating in negotiations which will include all types of tariff and nontariff barriers that affect agricultural as well as industrial trade. Both developed and developing countries expect major benefits from the results.

When these negotiations were launched in 1973 at a Ministerial-level meeting in Tokyo, the objective was to achieve the "expansion and even greater liberalization of world trade and improvement in the standard of living and welfare of the people of the world." This commitment has been reaffirmed in recent meetings of the Trade Negotiations Committee in Geneva. The

spirit of cooperation offers hope for broad and significant results.

The mandate given the President in the new trade legislation will enable the United States to play a leading role in these multilateral negotiations. Our position will be strengthened, moreover, by the close working arrangements which have been established between the Executive Branch and the Congress. Under these arrangements, representatives of the Congress have an important voice in U.S. policies and are participating fully in the negotiating sessions.

U.S. negotiators will also have the benefit of far more extensive advice from the public sector than in the past. Public hearings by the International Trade Commission are in progress. Hearings by the Executive Branch will open soon. Advisory committees, made up of a cross-section of the public interest and agriculture, industry, labor and consumer groups involved, will provide input for the U.S. negotiating effort at both the policy and technical levels.

The Trade Act, like the earlier Declaration of Tokyo, recognizes the importance of providing fair and reasonable market access to products exported by developing countries. As one step toward this objective, the Act provides for the granting of temporary generalized tariff preferences to such countries. The mandatory procedural steps for establishing the preference system have been initiated. When the system is in operation later this year, it will offer substantial benefits to many developing countries.

I am hopeful that, as implementation moves forward, the Congress will provide the necessary authority to include other developing countries through waiver of those restrictions of the Trade Act that are incompatible with our national interest and to which a number of countries have voiced strong objections.

At the same time, in signing the Trade Act on January 3, 1975, I expressed reservations about the wisdom of one of its provisions relating to restrictions on trade with

the Soviet Union which led the U.S.S.R. to repudiate its 1972 trade agreement with the United States. This action by the Soviet Union constitutes an unfortunate setback to normalization of our economic relations with that country. In a spirit of cooperation with the Congress, I am hopeful that a solution to this problem can be found.

In light of the serious economic problems in the United States and elsewhere in the world today, efforts to preserve and build upon past gains in the trade field are now more urgent and imperative than ever. A more open, fair, and nondiscriminatory system, providing access to both markets and supplies, can give a vital stimulus to economic recovery, increased employment, and sound growth both in the United States and in the world economy. Congress has provided the mandate for the United States to move forward toward these objectives in cooperation with other nations. It is my intention to carry out this mandate fully and expeditiously, in the interests of the health of the American economy and the strengthening of harmonious and mutually beneficial economic relations among all countries of the world.

GERALD R. FORD.

THE WHITE HOUSE, *May 1, 1975.*

President Reports on Export Laws and Safeguards on Nuclear Materials

*Message to the Congress*¹

To the Congress of the United States:

In accordance with Section 14 of Public Law 93-500, the "Export Administration Amendments of 1974", I am forwarding to the Congress a report on U.S. laws and regulations governing nuclear exports and on domestic and international safeguards. This

¹ Transmitted on May 6 (text from White House press release); also printed as H. Doc. 94-131, which includes the text of the report.

report considers the effectiveness of such laws and safeguards in preventing the diversion of nuclear capabilities to nonpeaceful purposes.

I have concluded that current laws provide ample authority to control the export and re-export of nuclear-related material, equipment and technology. Nevertheless, existing policies and regulations are constantly being reexamined and changed as appropriate. Domestic safeguards are under continuing review for the purpose of making them even more effective. The international safeguard system will detect and thus help to deter efforts to divert such materials by other nations.

As the volume of material and the nature of facilities grow in the world, commensurate increases and improvements in the international safeguarding system will be needed. The United States is encouraging the strengthening of international safeguards by aiding and supporting IAEA [International Atomic Energy Agency] safeguard development efforts. It is also seeking to enhance physical security through the adoption of an international convention. The U.S. is taking the lead in advocating in-depth physical protection measures necessary to preclude terrorist groups from capturing such material or conducting sabotage activities.

I wish to assure Congress that the prevention of the proliferation of nuclear weapons or the acquisition of nuclear explosive materials for possible nonpeaceful

uses is a priority concern in my Administration. Whatever efforts are needed to allow the U.S. and other countries to enjoy the benefits of nuclear power, without fear, will be taken by the Government of the United States.

GERALD R. FORD.

THE WHITE HOUSE, *May 6, 1975.*

Congressional Documents Relating to Foreign Policy

94th Congress, 1st Session

1974 Annual Report of the United States Tariff Commission. Fiscal year ended June 30. H. Doc. 94-26. 26 pp.

Supplemental Assistance for Cambodia. Report of the Senate Committee on Foreign Relations, together with minority views, to accompany S. 663. S. Rept. 94-54. March 21, 1975. 26 pp.

Making Appropriations, Foreign Assistance for Fiscal Year 1975. Conference report to accompany H.R. 4592. H. Rept. 94-108. March 21, 1975. 8 pp.

Proposed legislation to authorize additional military and economic assistance for South Vietnam, and to clarify the availability of funds for the use of United States armed forces for humanitarian evacuation in Indochina. Communication from the President of the United States transmitting drafts of proposed legislation. H. Doc. 94-103. April 14, 1975. 2 pp.

Requests for supplemental appropriations for refugee assistance and relief and for military assistance in South Vietnam. Communication from the President of the United States transmitting proposed appropriations. H. Doc. 94-104. April 14, 1975. 2 pp.

U.S. Suggests Consideration of Restraints on Conventional Arms

Statement by Joseph Martin, Jr.

*U.S. Representative to the Conference of the Committee on Disarmament*¹

Conventional arms have a central place in the military planning of virtually every country of the world, a daily and almost commonplace role in national and international affairs, and a profound long-term impact on the security of us all. Despite—or perhaps more realistically, because of—these factors, the subject of conventional arms control has occupied the efforts of the CCD only rarely in recent years.

My government has long stressed the importance of giving serious and detailed consideration to the question of possible restraints on conventional weapons. In this committee we have often stated our belief that suitable restraints in the conventional arms field could make a major contribution to the security and well-being of all states. In interventions over the last several years, we have emphasized the U.S. willingness to explore all practical approaches to the problem and have urged other delegations to express their views.

One of the approaches the U.S. delegation has discussed in the committee is that of regional arms control. In 1966 we presented six principles which could be used as a basis for regional agreements in the conventional arms field; in 1970 we recommended three additional steps that states could take unilaterally—steps “which in their cumulative effect, even without formal binding agreements, could constitute reliable arms limitations on a regional basis.”²

There are several reasons why my delegation believes it may be useful to consider restraints on conventional arms in a regional

context. First, in most cases the relationship of the size and character of a country's armed forces to the armed forces of other states within its region is much more relevant to its security than the relationship between its forces and those of more distant powers. Second, states near one another have generally tended to acquire similar and comparable military capabilities. Third, in several areas of the world there already exist regional cooperative arrangements which could serve as useful precedents for arms control initiatives, as well as regional institutions which could most conveniently take action on such initiatives.

Although these factors suggest in general terms why the regional or subregional approach to conventional arms control might be practicable and effective, prospects for actual arms control arrangements obviously vary widely from one region to another. In several areas of the world the prevailing political climate may not permit the successful negotiation of such arrangements for some time to come.

Nevertheless we should be encouraged that in two regions of the world significant efforts in the area of conventional arms control have recently taken place. In Europe, members of

¹ Made before the concluding meeting of the spring session of the Conference of the Committee on Disarmament (CCD) at Geneva on Apr. 10 (introductory paragraphs omitted).

² For a U.S. statement made before the CCD on Aug. 13, 1970, together with the text of a U.S. working paper incorporating the six principles presented in 1966, see BULLETIN of Sept. 14, 1970, p. 310.

NATO and the Warsaw Pact have been actively seeking a mutual and balanced reduction of forces in the central region of the continent. In Latin America, eight governments of that region agreed, in the Declaration of Ayacucho of December 9, 1974, to create conditions which permit effective limitation of armaments, to put an end to the acquisition of arms for offensive warlike purposes, and to dedicate all possible resources to the social and economic development of Latin American countries. Representatives from several Latin American governments subsequently met in Lima, Peru, to discuss possible means of achieving arms limitations. The United States supports the efforts of these Latin American countries and hopes they will be successful in reaching solutions that further the worthy goals outlined at Ayacucho.

My government continues to regard the regional approach to conventional arms control as a particularly promising one. In addition to the direct value of regional arrangements, the development of workable measures in one region may provide useful insights for solving arms control problems elsewhere. A sound principle for the development of regional arrangements—one which we have endorsed on several previous occasions—is that the initiative should come from within the region concerned. This principle reflects the view that in order that a regional arrangement may be effective and durable it must be firmly grounded in the desires and concerns of the local parties, who are obviously the most directly affected.

At the same time, we have also pointed out that states outside the region concerned can play an important, perhaps essential, supportive role in the success of a regional arms control arrangement. The willingness of outside powers—particularly potential arms suppliers—to respect regional arrangements can operate as a strong inducement to develop local initiatives. Such willingness can provide assurance both to local parties and to other outside powers that their efforts will not be undermined.

Outside powers might respect a regional arrangement in a variety of ways. They

would presumably be expected to agree not to take action inconsistent with the restrictions worked out by the local states. This would reinforce the obligations assumed by regional parties and create a double guarantee of compliance. Another way of respecting the arrangement might be to provide local parties with military equipment not proscribed and to render other types of support and assistance that might be important in satisfying those parties that their interests are adequately protected by the arrangement.

The United States stands ready to assist and cooperate in the development of regional and subregional arrangements in ways desired by the local participants. We are prepared to respect such arrangements in an appropriate manner provided, of course, that the measures do not impinge upon the legitimate security needs of the participants or undermine existing security arrangements contrary to their wishes and also provided that other outside powers respect the arrangements.

While pursuing the possibilities of regional arrangements, we believe it is important to explore ways of making progress in the conventional arms field in a broader context as well. We are convinced that this committee—in which countries from all regions of the world are represented—can make an important contribution by examining approaches to conventional arms control that are not limited in geographical scope and that could complement regional arrangements.

Views of Security Requirements

Today I would like to suggest one such approach. My delegation believes it would be useful for the CCD to identify and discuss principles of conduct that could be applicable on a worldwide basis to the acquisition or transfer of conventional arms. Before outlining some ideas about the content of such principles, I would like to discuss a number of factors which in our view should underlie conventional arms principles of this type.

Any practical attempt to deal with the question of restraints on conventional arms must be based on the assumption that, in

today's world, states will be determined to acquire the means necessary to safeguard their national independence and territorial integrity. Indeed, the acquisition of conventional arms may reinforce the stability of a local military balance and therefore reduce the likelihood of tensions and conflict.

All of us recognize, however, that there is another side to the impact of conventional arms. We live in an interdependent world with a panoply of modern weapon systems, an increasing ability of most states to manufacture or otherwise acquire virtually all the arms they desire, and a system of rapid communications media which often alert states to the conventional arms activities of others. In such a world, the continuing accumulation of conventional arms does not necessarily guarantee increased security. Efforts to provide for one's own defense needs may often affect the security of others. Moreover, the acquisition of arms by one state may lead to competitive reactions, or overreactions, by others. This process can result in a decreased sense of security for all concerned.

Any principles of conduct must take into account both of these sides of the conventional arms issue. In the light of the legitimate and often pressing security requirements of states, it would hardly be realistic to develop guidelines that would prevent the acquisition of arms altogether or would impose limits making it impossible for states to meet those requirements. Instead, the primary objective of such principles should be to encourage states to limit arms acquisitions to essential security requirements and thereby reduce the likelihood that those acquisitions of arms will appear threatening to others and increase tensions among states.

Reliance on Self-Restraint of States

Another important consideration relates to the nature of the restraints that would be called for in principles of conduct. Formal and legally binding restraints are often desirable in the arms control field and may be particularly appropriate in the case of regional conventional arms arrangements. However, considering the very early stage of

international efforts in the conventional arms area and the vastly differing perspectives on the problem held by countries throughout the world, it would be premature to expect states to accept firm obligations that would be applicable on a worldwide basis. At least initially, therefore, any universally applicable principles of conduct should rely largely on the self-restraint of states. Such principles should encourage governments to be fully aware that their actions affect the security concerns of others. They should also encourage them to exercise appropriate restraints in order that such actions will not have adverse consequences, not only for other states but for their own security as well.

My delegation believes that such an approach could have a significant damping effect on the competition in conventional arms. Self-restraint by one would create incentives for self-restraint by others. However, I wish to emphasize that such a voluntary guidelines approach could not succeed if the willingness of some states to abide by the guidelines were not matched by the self-restraint of others whose cooperation is deemed important. Thus it would be unrealistic to expect one arms supplier to continue to restrain his shipments if other suppliers were determined to take up the slack. Likewise, we could not expect continued self-restraint in the acquisition of arms if such restraint were not reciprocated.

Diversity of Local Circumstances

A third consideration is the wide variation not only in the types and military missions of the weapons systems currently in existence but also in the effects they are likely to have in differing regions of the world. The political and military implications for regional stability of a particular arms acquisition depend on many factors. Among these are the quantities involved; the extent to which the acquisition provides the acquiring state with a new military capability; the relationship of the acquiring state's armed forces to those of other states whose security calculations might be affected; the perceptions by leaders of these other states of how the acquisition affects the balance of forces; and the compatibilities of

the new weapon systems with the acquiring state's technical and support capabilities, climatic and terrain conditions, and other weapon systems already in its inventory.

These are, of course, only a few of the many factors that determine the effects of arms acquisitions internationally. They demonstrate, however, that the impact of arms acquisitions on stability depends as much on the political and military context in which arms are acquired as on the characteristics of the weapons themselves. It would rarely be possible to single out specific weapons or categories of weapons that would be likely to have the same impact on stability in all situations throughout the world. In some regions the acquisition of small arms and ammunition might contribute more to insecurity than the acquisition of advanced jet aircraft. In other areas, of course, the reverse could be true.

Because of the diversity of local circumstances, we think that conventional arms guidelines applicable on a worldwide basis should encourage individual states to exercise judgment in making the determination whether, in a certain political and military context, the acquisition of weapons in certain types or quantities would be likely to have an adverse impact on regional or international security. Since such a determination inevitably has a subjective component, the guidelines would have to provide governments with flexibility in making arms acquisition decisions.

A final consideration in developing practical guidelines concerns the relationship between conventional arms acquisitions and economic and social development. In my delegation's view, such guidelines should call on governments to think of security as more than a strictly military concept, in particular, to recognize that real security lies not only in adequate defense capabilities but also in economic and social progress.

Illustrative Principles

The foregoing considerations suggest the types of restraints that might appropriately be embodied in principles of conduct in the conventional arms field.

One principle might call on states to assume responsibility for making the judgment that the arms they acquire or transfer will not have adverse effects on regional or international security. As I mentioned earlier, the requirements for stability may differ markedly from one situation to another. Accordingly, this principle would involve a careful determination by states as to whether certain types or quantities of weapons would be destabilizing in a particular context.

Another principle might be based on the assumption that the acquisition of arms by one state may be a legitimate concern of those other states whose security is affected. Such a principle might indicate that consultations among interested states on possible effects of arms acquisitions could be useful in preventing or alleviating regional or international tensions. "Interested" states might include neighboring countries as well as others outside the region. The consultations could be held in the event of a potential or officially acknowledged arms acquisition of particular concern to others; and they might also be arranged from time to time without reference to a particular acquisition. The result could be to allay fears that might otherwise lead to competitive and possibly destabilizing actions by other states.

Another principle could be formulated to reflect the view that the concept of security cannot, and should not, be based solely on political-military criteria but must also encompass progress in the social, economic, and cultural fields. Such a principle might, for example, encourage states to limit their acquisition of arms to those deemed indispensable for their security so that resources would not be unnecessarily diverted from economic and social development. States themselves must be the judge of their national priorities and of what is indispensable for their security. However, acceptance of a principle along these lines by a significant number of states, and real efforts to abide by it, could increase the incentives for others to act in accordance with it.

Another principle could apply to the transfer of arms production capabilities rather than to the transfer of arms themselves. It

might recommend that the export of technical data and equipment used for the manufacture of arms should be subject to the same effective governmental review and authorization procedures as arms exports themselves. All arms-exporting countries require licenses or their equivalent for the export of weapons. Not all of them, however, require government authorization for the export of technical know-how and equipment for the manufacture of arms.

In some cases, therefore, there are fewer legal barriers against the transfer of an arms production capability than against the provision of the arms themselves. Observance would not restrict the ability of suppliers and recipient governments to engage in transfers of technology. It would, however, reduce the risk of unauthorized transfers that could lead to the creation of arms production capabilities in areas of potential conflict, thus heightening tensions.

We believe that if a wide number of states supported principles such as the ones I have just suggested and acted in accordance with them, this would have a marked favorable impact on the worldwide competition in conventional arms. Broad acceptance of the view that international security can be enhanced by practicing appropriate restraints could favorably affect the way governments approach decisions on arms procurement. Implementation of such principles by a significant number of states would constitute an important first step leading to more favorable conditions for arms control arrangements on a regional basis and for more binding restraints on a broader geographical basis.

The illustrative principles I have described this morning are of course not meant to be an exhaustive set of policy guidelines in the conventional arms area, nor should they be regarded as proposals in any formal sense. They are intended to provide a basis for further discussion, to focus attention and, hopefully, constructive efforts on an area of arms control that has so far not been amenable to effective solutions.

We hope that other delegations will com-

ment on the approach suggested today and possibly recommend principles of their own. We would also be interested in any alternative approaches for developing restraints on conventional arms that delegations may propose. Because the subject of conventional arms control is one which touches upon the vital interests of us all, it is essential that the needs and desires of all states be fully expressed and taken into account in our effort to find effective solutions.

United Nations Documents: A Selected Bibliography

Mimeographed or processed documents (such as those listed below) may be consulted at depository libraries in the United States. U.N. printed publications may be purchased from the Sales Section of the United Nations, United Nations Plaza, N.Y. 10017.

General Assembly

Committee on the Peaceful Uses of Outer Space:

Report on the needs of developing countries for assistance in the practical applications of space technology. Report prepared by the Secretariat. A/AC.105/143. February 26, 1975. 78 pp.

Report of the United Nations expert on space applications to the scientific and technical subcommittee. A/AC.105/144. March 4, 1975. 13 pp.

Report of the Legal Subcommittee on the work of its fourteenth session (February 10-March 7, 1975). A/AV.105/147. March 11, 1975. 25 pp.

Progress report (1974/1975) of the World Meteorological Organization (WMO) on its tropical cyclone project. A/AC.105/148. March 11, 1975. 8 pp.

Economic implications of sea-bed mining in the international area: report of the Secretary General. A/CONF.62/37. February 18, 1975. 17 pp.

Letter dated March 6, 1975, from the Permanent Representative of Portugal addressed to the Secretary General transmitting the text of the agreement between Portugal and the Partido Africano da Independência da Guiné e Cabo Verde (PAIGC), aiming at the establishment of the self-determination and independence of Cape Verde. A/10054. March 11, 1975. 5 pp.

Letter dated March 21, 1975, from the Permanent Representatives of the U.S.S.R. and the United Kingdom transmitting the text of the Joint U.K.-Soviet declaration on the nonproliferation of nuclear weapons. A/10060. March 21, 1975. 3 pp.

Economic and Social Council

- Commission on Human Rights. Periodic reports on human rights. Analytical summary of reports and other material on economic, social, and cultural rights for the period July 1, 1969 to June 30, 1973, received under Economic and Social Council resolution 1074 C (XXXIX). E/CN.4/1164. December 12, 1974. 51 pp.
- Population questions. World Population Year, 1974. Report of the Secretary General. E/5602. December 23, 1974. 6 pp.
- Commission for Social Development:
Social Indicators. Current national and international activities in the field of social indicators and social reporting. Report of the Secretary General. E/CN.5/518. January 2, 1975. 24 pp.
- Migrant Workers. ILO action on behalf of foreign and migrant workers and their families. Note by the Secretary General. E/CN.5/523. January 6, 1975. 25 pp.
- Population Commission. Biennial program of work for 1976-1977, medium-term plan for 1976-1979 and long-term perspectives with specific reference to the implications of the World Population Conference and the World Population Plan of Action. Note by the Secretary General. E/CN.9/317. January 22, 1975. 38 pp.

TREATY INFORMATION

Current Actions

MULTILATERAL

Biological Weapons

Convention on the prohibition of the development, production and stockpiling of bacteriological (biological) and toxin weapons and on their destruction. Done at Washington, London, and Moscow April 10, 1972. Entered into force March 26, 1975.

Ratifications deposited: Byelorussian Soviet Socialist Republic, Ukrainian Soviet Socialist Republic, March 26, 1975.

Gas

Protocol for the prohibition of the use in war of asphyxiating, poisonous or other gases and of bacteriological methods of warfare. Done at Geneva June 17, 1925. Entered into force February 8, 1928; for the United States April 10, 1975. *Proclaimed by the President:* April 29, 1975, with reservation.

Maritime Matters

Amendment of article VII of the convention on facilitation of international maritime traffic, 1965 (TIAS 6251). Adopted at London November 19, 1973.¹

Acceptance deposited: Spain, April 14, 1975.

Narcotic Drugs

Single convention on narcotic drugs, 1961. Done at New York March 30, 1961. Entered into force December 13, 1964; for the United States June 24, 1967. TIAS 6298.

Accession deposited: Bangladesh, April 25, 1975.

Oil Pollution

Amendments to the international convention for the prevention of pollution of the sea by oil, 1954, as amended (TIAS 4900, 6109). Adopted at London October 21, 1969.¹

Acceptances deposited: Malta, April 10, 1975; Monaco, March 18, 1975.

Amendments to the international convention for the prevention of pollution of the sea by oil, 1954, as amended (TIAS 4900, 6109). Adopted at London October 12, 1971.¹

Acceptance deposited: Malta, April 10, 1975.

Amendments to the international convention for the prevention of pollution of the sea by oil, 1954, as amended (TIAS 4900, 6109). Adopted at London October 15, 1971.¹

Acceptance deposited: Malta, April 10, 1975.

Patents

Patent cooperation treaty, with regulations. Done at Washington June 19, 1970.¹

Ratification deposited: Togo, January 28, 1975.

Accession deposited: Gabon, January 28, 1975.

Postal Matters

Second additional protocol to the constitution of the Universal Postal Union of July 10, 1964, general regulations with final protocol and annex, and the universal postal convention with final protocol and detailed regulations. Done at Lausanne July 5, 1974. Enters into force January 1, 1976.

Money orders and postal travelers' checks agreement, with detailed regulations. Done at Lausanne July 5, 1974. Enters into force January 1, 1976.

Property—Industrial

Nice agreement concerning the international classification of goods and services for the purposes of the registration of marks of June 15, 1957, as revised at Stockholm on July 14, 1967. Entered into force March 18, 1970; for the United States May 25, 1972. TIAS 7419.

Notification from World Intellectual Property Organization that ratification deposited: Netherlands, December 6, 1974.

Trademark registration treaty, with regulations. Done at Vienna June 12, 1973.¹

Accessions deposited: Gabon, March 6, 1975; Togo, January 28, 1975.

¹ Not in force.

Property—Intellectual

Convention establishing the World Intellectual Property Organization. Done at Stockholm July 14, 1967. Entered into force April 26, 1970; for the United States August 25, 1970. TIAS 6932.

Ratifications deposited: Gabon, March 6, 1975; Ivory Coast, February 1, 1974; Mexico, March 14, 1975; Niger, February 18, 1975; Portugal, January 27, 1975.

Accessions deposited: Chile, March 25, 1975; India, January 31, 1975; Togo, January 28, 1975; Republic of Viet-Nam, January 30, 1975.

Safety at Sea

Convention on the international regulations for preventing collisions at sea, 1972. Done at London October 20, 1972.¹

Ratification deposited: Iceland, April 21, 1975.

Wheat

Protocol modifying and further extending the wheat trade convention (part of the international wheat agreement) 1971 (TIAS 7144, 7988). Done at Washington March 25, 1975. Enters into force June 19, 1975, with respect to certain provisions and July 1, 1975, with respect to other provisions. *Ratification deposited:* South Africa, May 7, 1975.

Declaration of provisional application deposited: Spain, April 15, 1975.

Accession deposited: Malta, April 29, 1975.

Acceptance deposited: Union of Soviet Socialist Republics (with statement), May 6, 1975.

BILATERAL

Honduras

Agreement amending the agreement for sales of agricultural commodities of March 5, 1975. Effected by exchange of notes at Tegucigalpa April 18, 1975. Entered into force April 18, 1975.

India

Agreement regarding the consolidation and rescheduling of certain debts owed to the U.S. Government and its agencies, with annexes. Signed at Washington May 2, 1975. Enters into force when the United States notifies India in writing that domestic U.S. laws and regulations covering debt rescheduling have been complied with.

¹ Not in force.

Check List of Department of State Press Releases: May 5-11

Press releases may be obtained from the Office of Press Relations, Department of State, Washington, D.C. 20520.

Release issued prior to May 5 which appears in this issue of the BULLETIN is No. 228 of May 2.

No.	Date	Subject
*230	5/5	Assistance to Viet-Nam refugees: toll-free telephone number established.
231	5/5-5/8	Kissinger: "Today" show interview, parts I-IV.
*233	5/5	U.S. and Thailand amend textile agreement.
*234	5/5	Kissinger: statement on death of Ambassador Keating.
*235	5/5	Shipping Coordinating Committee, June 17.
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THE DEPARTMENT OF STATE BULLETIN

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The Challenge of Peace

Address by Secretary Kissinger¹

We meet here in the aftermath of the tragedy of Viet-Nam. It will be years before it is possible to make a dispassionate analysis of a conflict which we entered so innocently a decade and a half ago, which divided our country more than any event since our Civil War, and which ended so swiftly and painfully.

But the consequences are with us today. Around the world people are asking what recent events mean about our strength, our wisdom, and our constancy. And Americans now ask questions which go to the very heart of our foreign policy: What are our interests in the world? What should be our commitments? Where do we go from here?

Let me begin by stating a profound conviction: The fact that we failed in one endeavor does not invalidate all others. If in the aftermath of Viet-Nam we flee from responsibility as uncritically as we rushed into commitment a decade ago, we will surely soon find ourselves in a period of chaos and peril that will dwarf all previous experience. Global peace and America's security, global progress and America's prosperity, depend decisively on how we act in the months and years to come.

Americans have every reason to take pride in what their country has achieved in foreign policy. In the 30 years since World War II, the United States has done more to preserve peace and promote progress than any other nation in the world. The recovery of Western Europe and Japan, the formation and constant revitalization of our peacetime alli-

ances, the shaping and flourishing of the global trade and monetary system, the economic advance of the newer and poorer nations, the measures to control the nuclear arms race, the development of a new agenda of global cooperation—these are enduring achievements of American leadership.

We undertook these efforts not as charity, but in our enlightened self-interest. For a generation, we have understood that without this country global peace could not be maintained. For a generation, it has been clear that American prosperity is inseparable from and dependent upon a thriving world economy. Our international effort saved American lives and preserved American jobs.

And these goals have been pursued by every Administration—Democratic or Republican—since the war. They have reflected a consensus of the public, the Congress, and national leaders across the country, in and out of government.

This national unity was our most priceless resource. It was the foundation of our achievements. It must be restored.

If frustration, despair, or a desire for novelty alters the American perception of our international responsibilities and causes us to dismantle our accomplishments, we will produce instability in the world and create untold dangers for our country.

The debate over our international commitment must be placed in this perspective. No doubt we must weigh carefully—as we failed to do in the early sixties—the long-term consequences of new engagements. We must not overextend ourselves, promising what is not either in our interest or within

¹ Made before the St. Louis World Affairs Council at St. Louis, Mo., on May 12 (text from press release 247).

our capability. But we cannot shed our existing responsibilities without straining the fabric of international peace.

When people speak of redefining our existing commitments, which ones do they consider expendable? To take just one example, have they considered how abandonment of South Korea or the Philippines would affect the future of Japan and therefore the future of the entire Pacific area? Any ally that prefers alternative arrangements will not find us insistent on the status quo. But by the same token, any ally that prefers existing arrangements will not find us irresolute.

In any event, our obligations cannot be usefully debated in the abstract. A nation's commitments do not derive simply from legal documents or legislative undertakings. They are not merely preferences to be altered at will. If properly conceived, they rest on self-interest, based on the necessities of geography and history and national values. They are reflected in the sum total of a country's past policies and actions, the expectations it has created, the whole texture and record of its international conduct.

Thus we should not treat issues of prestige or credibility too lightly or too ironically. A nation's credibility, the value of its word, enables it to influence events without having to turn every issue into a test of strength. When a country's prestige declines, others will be reluctant to stake their future on its assurances; it will be increasingly tested by overt challenges. Given our central role, a loss in our credibility invites international chaos. There is no question that the trauma America has undergone in the last decade—from the assassination of one President to the resignation of another—has raised many doubts.

We must work hard to maintain our position. And we shall.

The leadership role we have exercised for a generation has never been more vital. The world of the 1970's is less predictable, more fluid than the world of 10 years ago. America's strength is less dominant, our margins for error narrower, our choices more complex and ambiguous. New centers of power and influence have emerged, and nearly a

hundred new nations have come into being since the Second World War. What we once considered a monolithic Communist bloc has been fractured by profound divisions. Our alliances have taken on new balance and are adjusting to new conditions. Developing countries are pressing their claims with fresh urgency and unity. Economic interdependence has become a fact of life. While the cold war structure of international relations has come apart, a new stable international order has yet to be formed.

A changing world places new demands on our leadership. Inevitably our policy must be more flexible, more complicated, more subtle, and more imaginative than in the early postwar period. But the link between our international performance and our national destiny remains fundamental; it has become, if anything, more crucial:

—Never before in history have the elements of national military power been so vast, so ready, so dangerous—and so ill suited to political objectives. An upsetting of the strategic equation could doom us; a spiraling arms race could produce a nuclear holocaust. We must prevent both dangers from arising.

—The contemporary world has many centers of power and initiative and many other dimensions of international concern besides military threats to security. In military power, the world is still essentially bipolar. In economic power, there are several poles—Western Europe, Japan, China, the producers of energy and key raw materials—in addition to North America and the Soviet Union. Political, military, and economic power are no longer necessarily commensurate with each other. Only the United States is strong in all categories. Our responsibilities are therefore inescapable. Our performance has profound consequences whether we act or fail to act.

—Regional and local conflicts still abound. The absence of world war for a generation has made the world too complacent about local wars. But if not contained or resolved through diplomacy, these wars pose grave dangers. A war in the Middle East, for example, carries with it profound risks of

global economic depression and confrontation among the major powers. We must do our utmost to prevent this.

—The Indian nuclear explosion of a year ago raises anew the specter of an era of plentiful nuclear weapons in which any local conflict risks exploding into a nuclear holocaust. As nuclear weapons proliferate, nuclear catastrophe looms more plausible—whether through design or miscalculation, accident, theft, or blackmail. The withdrawal or weakening of the American security mantle would accelerate this process. It would give an additional incentive to many countries to seek their security in the development of nuclear weapons.

—The advanced industrial nations and the developing nations are part of a single global economic system whose stability and growth is a vital American interest. The health of the dollar, the expansion of our trade, the free flow of investment, and the supply and price of energy, food, and other vital raw materials are all essential for our own prosperity. Whether we can accommodate the interests of consumers and producers, rich and poor, will determine whether our children inherit a world of tranquillity or of constant conflict.

—The future of the oceans will be shaped in the next few years. At stake are the reach of our navies, the safety of shipping lanes, the rights to vast economic resources, and the choice between chaos and the rule of law across three-quarters of this earth.

In short, as technology expands man's reach, the planet continues to shrink. Global communications make us acutely aware of each other. Human aspirations and destinies increasingly are intertwined.

We thus face a vast agenda. It is time for us to stop tormenting ourselves and get to work.

For Americans, our own destiny has always gone beyond material or physical well-being. To be true to ourselves, we have always been aware of what we mean to others, not only technically but morally. Our Revolution was conceived as vindication of universal truths and of the rights of man. Through the decades of our involvement in international affairs, we have drawn

strength from the conviction that our goals of economic and social advance and political freedom were the goals of all peoples; the inspiration for our own achievements lay in the vision of progress we presented to all.

This conviction must continue to inspire us. We cannot abandon values which are inseparable from America.

Though we are no longer predominant, we are inescapably a leader. Though we cannot impose our solutions, few solutions are possible without us. There is no other country so endowed to help build a better future. If we sit back, there will be no hope for stability, no resistance to aggression, no effective mediation of disputes, no progress in the world economy.

When force becomes the arbiter of conflicts, the standards of restraint in international conduct will erode sooner or later; instability and chaos will become the order of the day, with inevitable and tragic consequences for us as well as for others. If there is no accommodation of conflicting economic interests among the industrial nations, or between the industrial and the developing nations, we will face increasing economic strife, of which the oil price rise and embargo will be only the beginning.

So today we face these questions: Will the world be consumed in anarchy—in economic warfare, proliferating weapons of destruction, and regional conflagrations? Or will a new pattern of stable international relations be established, bequeathing a prospect of lasting peace to succeeding generations? Will Americans be so discouraged that we pull away the essential pillar of stability and progress that we have maintained for 30 years? Or will we continue to recognize that our contribution is essential to peace and progress?

We know too much depends on this country to allow us the luxury of retreat. If the United States responds to the challenge of building a peaceful and growing new world with imagination and perseverance, if we make clear to the world that we know where we are going and that we are on course, we have ahead of us a new era of great

achievement for all of mankind. That is our deepest obligation and our most important commitment.

The Design of Peace

In our effort to build a better and safer world, we start from the bedrock of our nation's physical strength—the vitality of our economy, already beginning to recover from recession; our technological supremacy; our military forces second to none. All of these have been indispensable to our security and progress. They remain so.

All foreign policy begins with security. No great nation can afford to entrust its destiny to the whim of others. Any stable international system therefore requires a certain equilibrium of power. Our security and that of our allies rest ultimately on deterrence of possible challenges, on insuring that others have no choice but to exercise restraint.

Therefore it is our national and international duty to maintain our military strength in categories relevant to the political dangers we face. An assault on our defense budget would give a dangerous impression of the trend of American policy, particularly at this moment. Of similar importance is the economic health of this nation—the recovery of full employment, production, and prosperity. For this is the foundation of our strength and that of all the industrial democracies.

But the more profound challenge is to anchor stability not in the negative restraint of deterrence but in the positive reconciliation of interests. The values and intangibles that motivate men and nations have profound weight in the international balance. A stable peace requires a shared stake in its preservation; it must be considered just.

Power without purpose is sterile; strength without direction leads to incoherence and inconsistency. To achieve peace and progress, we must understand the contemporary historical trends and have a design of our own to shape them. The achievement of peace requires a vision of peace.

And this vision must be broadly based.

Our people must understand the full complexity of our task; why we must maintain alliances even while striving to ease tensions with adversaries; why we need a design for cooperation between the rich and the poor nations even while many developing countries engage in the rhetoric and often the practice of confrontation. It must have scope to include both the new problems of interdependence and the persistent traditional issues of politics and security.

Allies and Friends. America's alliances, particularly with the industrial democracies of Western Europe, Canada, and Japan, have been the cornerstone of world stability and progress. We share common conceptions of the dignity of man, a common conviction of a linked destiny, and a common interest in peace and prosperity. This truth has been reinforced, not weakened, by changing global conditions. This is why this Administration considers our allies and friends our first priority. This is why the President will visit Western Europe two weeks from now to reaffirm our solidarity at a summit meeting of the leaders of the North Atlantic alliance. This will be the theme of our conversations with the Prime Minister of Japan in early August—and with every other ally.

We will stress that the cement of our relationship should not be verbal reassurances but joint great enterprises. We face a vast agenda. Our alliances were formed when the world was divided into two blocs and the United States was preponderant in the West; today we must harmonize the policies of strong independent states under conditions of eased international tensions. Our alliances represented initially a response to a military threat; today, we must base our unity on shared efforts across a broad range of human activity.

A whole spectrum of challenges calls the industrialized nations to joint action: the need for an equitable and stable world trading and monetary system, the imperative for cooperation in energy development and conservation and in dealing with the energy producers. We are beckoned by the entire agenda of interdependence in food, in raw materials, and in giving meaning and sig-

nificance to life in modern industrialized societies.

Thus, far from being gloomy about the prospects of our alliance, we shall call our friends to joint enterprises equally important and perhaps more exciting than the earlier quest for security. None of us can deal with this agenda alone. We are inseparably linked to each other—by interdependent economies and human aspirations, by instant communications and nuclear peril. Whether our alliances thrive today depends not on reiterating verbal pledges but on our ability to make our collaboration equal to our opportunity. It is with the conviction that our greatest period of creativity is ahead of us that the President will travel abroad in two weeks.

Détente. One of the legacies of a simpler period of American history is the conviction that we can pursue only one strand of policy at one time—either strength or conciliation, either relations with our allies or improving relations with our adversaries.

But the fact is that we do not have such a choice. In a complicated world in transition it is important to recognize that if we do not pursue all these strands, we shall not be able to pursue any of them. Our people expect their government to work for stability and peace, not to seek out confrontation. If we are faced with a crisis, the American people must know that it was forced upon us. Our alliances can be vital only if they are sustained by the conviction that their purpose is not to produce tension but to provide incentives for an ultimate settlement.

It is in this context that we must judge the contrast between the state of U.S.-Soviet relations today and 15 years ago. The world is no longer continually shaken by direct and bitter confrontations. There is a general understanding that tensions when they occur are not the result of U.S. intransigence, and this has enhanced our influence. It would be dangerous to take these achievements for granted; undoubtedly a world neatly divided between black and white was psychologically easier to handle, but it was also infinitely more dangerous.

We therefore should beware of the siren song that *détente* is a trap, a one-way street of American unilateral concession. In this Administration it will never be. In pursuing *détente* we will be guided by the following principles:

—We are not neutral in the struggle between freedom and tyranny. We know that we are dealing with countries of opposed ideology and values.

—But we owe our people and mankind an untiring effort to avoid nuclear holocaust. In the thermonuclear age, when the survival of civilization is at stake, we cannot defend peace by militant rhetoric.

—We must outgrow the notion that every setback is a Soviet gain or every problem is caused by Soviet action. In Portugal, the Middle East, even in Indochina, difficulties have resulted as much from local conditions or inadequate U.S. responses as from Soviet intervention.

—We cannot use *détente* as a substitute for our own effort and determination. Where a vacuum exists, it will be exploited. We have not yet reached the stage where vigilance can be relaxed.

These principles enable us to judge the state of our relations with the Soviet Union. These relations occur on many levels. The first order of business is the imperative of avoiding thermonuclear war. Both superpowers face a problem unprecedented in history; each possesses armaments capable of destroying civilized life. Therefore, however competitive we are and however ideologically opposed, neither can attempt to impose its will on the other without an intolerable risk of mutual annihilation. A President has no higher responsibility than sparing our people the dangers of general nuclear war. He can have no greater goal than to put a permanent end to a spiraling arms race which, uncontrolled, can jeopardize the peace.

The agreement in principle reached last November at Vladivostok between President Ford and General Secretary [Leonid I.] Brezhnev on a long-term agreement limiting strategic offensive weapons is a major step in this direction. When this negotiation is

completed later this year, a ceiling will have been placed on the qualitative as well as quantitative expansion of strategic forces for the first time in history. The momentum of military deployments will have been slowed; military planning will no longer be driven by fear of the unknown; a baseline will have been established from which reductions can be negotiated soon thereafter.

Direct communication and consultation between the United States and the Soviet Union and institutionalized cooperation in economic, scientific, and cultural fields constitute the second level of our relationship. The extent of these links is now unprecedented.

Naturally there are benefits for the Soviet Union, or else the Soviet Union would not participate in them. But they also serve our interest, or we would not conclude them. These agreements serve the additional purpose of engaging the Soviet Union at many levels in contacts with the outside world so as to provide incentives for restraint. And they occur in an environment where failure to proceed on our part only opens the door to other industrialized countries perhaps less able than we to withstand the political use of economic relationships—as happened after the failure of our trade agreement with the Soviet Union.

A third level of U.S.-Soviet relations involves the easing of tensions in areas where our vital interests impinge on each other. The Berlin Agreement of 1971 was both important and symbolic; it was a practical negotiated solution of a chronic dispute that on at least three occasions in 20 years had brought the world to the brink of war. The achievement of a stable political and military balance in Europe has always been a vital American interest, which we have pursued by resisting pressures where necessary and by negotiations when possible. In this spirit we are now engaged in broader negotiations dealing with mutual and balanced force reductions in Central Europe and with an agreement regarding European security and cooperation.

These achievements of détente must be

balanced against the record of the fourth level of U.S.-Soviet relations: the quest for stability in areas peripheral to the vital interests of the two so-called superpowers. Here the progress achieved in other fields of our relations has not been equaled. The expansion of Soviet military power and its extension around the world is a serious concern to us. The willingness of the Soviet Union to exploit strategic opportunities, even though some of these opportunities presented themselves more or less spontaneously and not as a result of Soviet action, constitutes a heavy mortgage on détente.

If détente turns into a formula for more selective exploitation of opportunities, the new trends in U.S.-Soviet relations will be in jeopardy. If our contention in peripheral areas persists, even more if it becomes exacerbated, the progress achieved in other areas of détente will ultimately be undermined. The United States is determined to maintain the hopeful new trends in U.S.-Soviet relations on the basis of realism and reciprocity. But it is equally determined to resist pressures or the exploitation of local conflict.

Our new relationship with the People's Republic of China is another priority in the design of American policy. Stability in Asia and the world requires our constructive relations with one-quarter of the human race. We remain committed to the goals of the Shanghai communique. President Ford will visit China later this year to reaffirm these interests and goals and work for the continuing improvement of our relations.

The Developing World

The fivefold oil price increase decided upon in 1973 by OPEC [Organization of Petroleum Exporting Countries] dramatized another dimension of American foreign policy—our relations with the developing world. For years it has been apparent that Asia, Africa, and Latin America have become major participants in the international system and that a new range of issues was upon us—not those between East and West

but between North and South.

Ideological and economic differences have come to dominate international forums such as the United Nations or the recent preparatory conference in Paris between oil consumers and producers.

The American people have supported the aspirations of developing countries since the postwar years of decolonization. Their economic development has been an objective of American policy for decades. Their genuine nonalignment and interdependence remain an American interest.

Without question, the new nations will have our sympathy and our help as, shaped by their own histories, they seek their own future. Our policy is based on the conviction that our policies are essentially complementary and that our destinies are shaped by interdependence.

At the same time all nations have a basic choice to make. They can pursue confrontation or they can pursue solutions; they can deal in rhetoric or they can deal with reality. They cannot do both. A policy of confrontation will ultimately work to the disadvantage of the weaker. The United States, for its part, is prepared for cooperation in every area of common concern, on the basis of mutual benefit and of mutual respect. Therefore:

—On energy, we will continue our efforts for solidarity among the consumers, and we look forward to an early, constructive dialogue with the producers.

—On the broader question of raw materials, we understand the interest of the producers in equitable prices. We in turn seek reliable supplies. We are prepared to discuss these questions in appropriate forums.

—On the law of the sea, we shall press for a successful outcome in the interest of security, prosperity, and peace.

—On food policy, the United States will strive to eliminate the scourge of hunger from the world and to turn this effort into a model of cooperation for the other global issues of an interdependent world.

We shall soon make specific proposals in all these fields.

The Domestic Dimension

We thus face a great opportunity. Only rarely in history does a people have the possibility to shape its international environment. We are at such a juncture. And the greatest obstacle, paradoxically, is not resistance abroad but division within our country.

Thirty years ago last week the greatest war ever fought by man came to a close in Europe. It took the lives of many millions of human beings, left millions more homeless and destitute, and virtually destroyed the institutional fabric of victor and vanquished alike. Had it not been for the farsighted involvement of the United States in the aftermath of that struggle, it is doubtful that democracy or prosperity would yet have returned to Western Europe. But we gave mightily of our substance in the hope that the generations to come would never again have to live through the agony and torment inflicted on the world in that struggle.

A later generation of Americans learned of the limits to what even we can accomplish—that not every struggle anywhere in the world is necessarily one in which the United States must involve itself; that not every injustice man inflicts upon his neighbor is something that America must or can seek to remedy.

There are lessons to be learned from both experiences. The question is whether we will learn from both or take our most recent experience too literally and, in the process, forget what the agony of a generation ago taught us unmistakably.

We came out of World War II a united people, secure in our belief that our cause was just, our purposes benign. We have come out of Viet-Nam a divided nation, full of distrust—and sometimes even malice—for our fellow countrymen and lacking confidence in the goodness of our design.

It is time—indeed it is more than time—for us to put a stop to this self-doubt and self-punishment.

It is time to remind ourselves that we still live in the greatest nation on earth; that nowhere has any nation come so close to the

ideals of liberty; that others throughout the world still look to us and depend upon us to lead them to a better, freer, and more secure life.

It is time to recognize that we cannot exist apart from the world around us, no matter how much we may wish it. A world imperiled by nuclear weapons forbids it; the reality of an interdependent world renders it self-destructive. We cannot compensate for a cult of action for its own sake by indulging in a cult of withdrawal for its own sake. Withdrawal in any event will give us no respite; it will be an invitation to new burdens.

So it is time that the executive and legislative branches of the government put an end to the divisiveness and distrust that have come to characterize their relationship.

We do not ask that the Congress rubber-stamp everything the executive puts before it—the advice and consent of the Congress is essential for any sustained policy. We have started new procedures of consultation and are prepared for new approaches to obtain advice. And we recognize that many difficulties have resulted from previous excesses by the executive branch. Nevertheless a delineation of responsibilities is now in the interest of both branches.

If the Congress moves from supervision to implementation, if it goes from the setting of guidelines to the insistence on tactics, if the legislative process is turned into a series of prescriptions of individual moves, our foreign policy will eventually be deprived of consistency, direction, strength, and flexibility.

The constitutional separation of powers is a concept that has served us well for almost 200 years. But our government can work and our nation can act only when each branch is prepared to exercise restraint. Without this cooperation, stagnation is in-

evitable. It is no exaggeration to say that a possible paralysis of leadership in America is the greatest fear today of all those who look to us for international leadership around the world.

We can have no higher national priority than to restore our unity. If we are mired in cynicism, recrimination, and immobility, we will add to the doubts of our friends and to the temptations of our adversaries to take chances with the peace of the world.

In the months ahead we must demonstrate that we still are confident of our purposes; that we remain a strong, energetic, and united people; that we continue to be dedicated to helping other nations help themselves; that we remain faithful to our treaty commitments; that we are concerned for the future of the world, because we know it will determine our own future.

Let us never forget that by any measurement, we have given more in the last 30 years than any other nation in history. We have successfully resisted serious threats to world order from those who wished to change it in ways that would have involved unacceptable consequences for democratic governments. We have provided more economic assistance to others than any other country. We have contributed more food, educated more people from other lands, and welcomed more immigrants. We have done so not only out of a generous spirit—though we should not apologize for this trait—but above all because the American people, after more than a century of isolation, had learned that assistance to others is not a gift to be given, but a service to be rendered for international stability and our own self-interest.

For our own sake and that of the rest of mankind let us now make sure that this lesson does not have to be learned again. And in that case we will usher in a period of progress and peace for which future generations will be grateful.

Strengthening the World Economic Structure

Address by Secretary Kissinger¹

Yesterday I spoke of the political challenges facing us in foreign policy—that we have a vast agenda ahead of us, that the world is poised on the brink of a new era of achievement or one of chaos, that America's role will be vital.

Our challenges in the economic field are no less urgent and important. Today I will discuss the international economic system and set forth a comprehensive American approach to the major issues at hand.

The paramount necessity of our time is the preservation of peace. But history has shown that international political stability requires international economic stability. Order cannot survive if economic arrangements are constantly buffeted by crisis or if they fail to meet the aspirations of nations and peoples for progress.

The United States cannot be isolated, and never has been isolated, from the international economy. We export 23 percent of our farm output and 8 percent of our manufactures. We import far more raw materials than we export; oil from abroad is critical to our welfare. American enterprise overseas constitutes an economy the size of Japan's. America's prosperity could not continue in a chaotic world economy.

Conversely, what the United States does—or fails to do—has an enormous impact on the rest of the world. With one-third of the output of the non-Communist world, the American economy is still the great engine of world prosperity. Our technology, our

food, our resources, our managerial genius and financial expertise, our experience of leadership, are unmatched. Without us, there is no prospect of solution. When we are in recession, it spreads; without American expansion, the world economy tends to stagnate.

For 30 years, the modern economic system created at the Bretton Woods Conference in 1944 has served us well. Its basic goals—open, equitable, and expanding trade, the stability and orderly adjustment of currencies, coordination in combating inflation and recession—have largely been achieved. World growth has surpassed any prior period of history.

But the system is now under serious stress. It faces shortages and disputes over new issues such as energy, raw materials, and food. And many of its fundamental premises are challenged by the nations of the developing world.

Obvious crises are the easiest to meet; the deepest challenges to men are those that emerge imperceptibly, that derive from fundamental changes which, if not addressed, portend upheavals in the future. These contemporary challenges to the world economic structure must be overcome, or we face not only an end to the growth of the last 30 years but the shattering of the hopes of all of mankind for a better future. Our economic strength is unmistakable. But what is tested now is our vision and our will—and that of the other nations of the world.

The international economic system has been built on these central elements:

- Open and expanding trade;
- Free movement of investment capital and technology;

¹ Made before the Kansas City International Relations Council at Kansas City, Mo., on May 13 (text from press release 250); for the transcript of the questions and answers which followed, see p. 727.

—Readily available supplies of raw materials; and

—Institutions and practices of international cooperation.

Within this framework, over the past quarter century, the industrialized countries have maintained an almost continuous record of economic growth. The developing countries have made unprecedented advances, though their progress has been uneven.

After the experience of the 1930's, the post-war system was designed—with the United States playing a leading role—to separate economic issues from political conflict and to subject them as much as possible to agreed multilateral procedures. The rules were designed to restrain unilateral actions that could cause economic injury to others.

The world's economic growth within this framework has been simultaneously the cause and the result of growing interdependence among nations. Revolutions in communication and transportation have shrunk the planet. The global mobility of capital, management and technology, and materials has facilitated the growth of industry. World trade has encouraged specialization and the efficient division of labor, which in turn have stimulated further expansion. The recession and inflation of the last few years—which spread around the world—have reminded us that nations thrive or suffer together. No country—not even the United States—can solve its economic problems in isolation.

Consciousness of interdependence has been most successfully implemented among the industrialized countries. When the energy crisis first hit us, the industrial countries agreed that they would not resort to unilateral restrictive trade measures to make up the payments deficits caused by high oil prices. That pledge was respected and will be renewed this year. And last fall, as the recession worsened, the President held a series of conversations with German, Japanese, British, and French leaders to devise a coordinated strategy for economic recovery. These policies have begun to bear fruit. The advanced industrialized countries have understood the imperative of coordinating their economic policies.

As our economies now turn toward expansion, we must insure that our policies remain coordinated, particularly for the control of inflation with its economic costs and attendant social dangers.

Against this background of cohesion, the industrial countries can act with renewed confidence across the entire range of political, economic, and security issues. The annual ministerial meeting later this month of the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD) is therefore of great significance. This body, composed of the industrialized countries of North America, Europe, and Asia, will assess where we stand and discuss even closer coordination and joint actions in economic policies. Secretary Simon [William E. Simon, Secretary of the Treasury] and I will represent the United States.

The Challenge From the Developing World

Global interdependence is a reality. There is no alternative to international collaboration if growth is to be sustained. But the world economic structure is under increasing challenge from many countries which believe that it does not fairly meet their needs.

The challenge finds its most acute and articulate expression in the program advanced in the name of the so-called Third World. This calls for a totally new economic order founded on ideology and national self-interest. It is stimulated by resentments over past exploitation, and it is sustained by the view that the current system is loaded against the interests of the developing countries. One of the central proposals is that the prices of primary products should be set by international agreements at new high levels and then pegged to an index of world inflation. The objective, as with the oil price increases, is a massive redistribution of the world's wealth.

This challenge has many aspects. At one level, it is an effort to make the availability of vital natural resources depend on political decision, particularly with respect to energy but increasingly involving other materials as well. More fundamentally, it is a result of the

new dispersion of economic power among developed and developing countries that springs from the unprecedented global economic expansion of the last 30 years.

The United States is prepared to study these views attentively, but we are convinced that the present economic system has generally served the world well. We are prepared to consider realistic proposals, but we are convinced that poorer nations benefit most from an expanding world economy. History has proved the prosperity of each nation requires expansion of global prosperity. This should be the focus of our efforts.

The United States is convinced that an international system overshadowed by the rivalry of nations or blocs will produce instability and confrontation. This will prove disastrous to every nation—but above all to the weakest and the poorest.

The United States therefore is committed to a cooperative approach. We recognize that an international order will be durable only if its members truly accept it. And while the participation of developing countries has increased, it is clear that the energy producers and the emerging nations in Latin America, Asia, and Africa have believed themselves to be outside the system. We have a duty to warn against, and to resist, confrontation. But we are prepared to strengthen and expand the international economic system.

A serious concern must be the needs of the poorest. They have been the most grievously affected by the food and energy crises of the past two years. Their fate affects us morally as well as materially. Their prosperity would contribute to ours. And their participation in the global economy is required so that all nations, and not only the richest, have a stake in the world which we are building.

The Choice on Energy

Let me now turn to the three most urgent challenges on the economic agenda: energy, food, and primary commodities.

It is in energy that the challenge to the economic system has been the most effective and has had the most severe impact.

For years the United States and other in-

dustrial countries built their prosperity on ever-increasing imports of inexpensive foreign oil. Now we see that both the price and availability of those supplies can be determined by decisions over which we have no influence. Our jobs, our output, our future prosperity, are at risk.

In response, at U.S. initiative, 18 major industrial countries created the International Energy Agency (IEA) to coordinate our efforts in a common strategy.

Our first responsibility was to protect ourselves against emergencies. We have to be prepared to deter the use of oil or petrodollars as political weapons or to defend ourselves if we are given no choice. To this end, we and our partners have developed a comprehensive plan to build up oil stocks, coordinate conservation measures, and share available supplies in the event of a new embargo. We have also agreed on a \$25 billion "financial safety net" to protect against the stresses of large oil deficits and possible financial manipulation.

The second objective of the strategy is to bring pressure on the oil price through the market. If we act decisively to reduce the consumption of imported oil and develop alternative sources, we will sharply reduce demand. The producers can restrict production to maintain high prices and allocate the cuts among them, but at some point the severe decrease in demand will become a burden on those countries who seek maximum revenue for development.

Accordingly, we and our partners first set joint conservation goals. We then reached preliminary agreement on a plan to stimulate alternative sources. The plan calls for cooperation in research and development and a common minimum price mechanism to protect domestic alternative energy sources from competition from imported oil. The ministers of the International Energy Agency meet later this month to accelerate the common effort. We shall propose ways to exploit our greatest asset—our technological capability and skill, particularly in the development of alternative energy sources.

In the end the key to the international effort will be what America does. We use fully

half of the industrial world's energy. If we bring our consumption under control, so will other industrial countries. Indeed, other countries are already ahead of us in adopting new taxes and other programs to curb energy use. But if we do not act now, while recession is holding down demand for oil, our vulnerability will grow again when our recovery gains momentum.

The choice is clear: either we pass now an effective program of energy conservation and energy development or we become dependent on foreign sources for half our oil within a few years and correspondingly vulnerable to political pressures or manipulation.

The Congress has before it President Ford's energy program. Its decision is therefore critical to our future well-being and that of the international community.

Ultimately, producers and consumers of energy must develop a new and balanced relationship. A first attempt at dialogue at the preparatory meeting called by President Giscard d'Estaing [of France] in April did not succeed.

The United States wants to say now that it is prepared to attend a new preparatory meeting. We believe that the meeting should be prepared through bilateral contacts between the consumers and producers. The United States will initiate such contacts with its partners in the IEA, with the Government of France, and with the producers. Our own thinking on the issue of raw materials, and the manner in which it can be addressed internationally, has moved forward. We can thus resume the dialogue in a new atmosphere. Let me now turn to the issue of raw materials.

U.S. Approach to Commodity Issues

The threat to our national security from a disruption in supplies of most raw materials is limited. We depend on imported raw materials for only 15 percent of our total needs; only 3 percent of our raw materials are imported from developing countries.

But we do have a concern for a flourishing world economy. In raw materials, interdependence is as real as in energy. There exist

common interests in a reliable and flourishing trade on mutually beneficial terms.

It is in our interest because the growth of the industrial nations will increasingly depend on raw material imports and because our growth depends on a healthy world economy. It is in the interest of developing countries because their exports are often the principal source of development financing. It is in the interest of the world community because the poorer countries can gain a sense of responsibility and participation only from the sense that their concerns are taken seriously.

The United States is aware of the dependence of many countries on their earnings from a single commodity. It is legitimate and reasonable that they should seek a reliable long-term stable source of earned income for their development.

However, we do not believe that tying commodity prices to a world index of inflation is the best solution.

First, price indexing would strengthen those least in need of help because most raw material production still takes place in the industrial countries; and price indexing would harm those most in need of help because the poorest, most populous states are net importers of raw materials. Finally, such a scheme would introduce artificial rigidities, which is likely to result in misallocation of resources and scarce capital and underutilization of needed productive capacity in many parts of the world.

We are prepared to discuss these issues in a cooperative spirit. We understand that development of many mineral resources is becoming increasingly dependent on heavy capital investment. The efficient development of lower grade ores now depends on sophisticated technology and very large-scale operations. We recognize that excessive swings in commodity markets entail heavy, perhaps growing, costs. In periods of slack demand, substantial excess capacity often appears. In periods of tight demand, skyrocketing prices force costly adjustments in manufacturing processes and pricing. We realize that the role of private capital, which traditionally has been responsible for development of most overseas minerals, is being increasingly

challenged on political grounds. To deal with these issues, the United States will adopt the following approach:

—First, since both producers and consumers want a more reliable basis to do business, we will propose that the multilateral trade negotiations now underway in Geneva develop new rules and procedures on such questions as freer access to supplies and markets, promotion of mining and processing industries, and settlement of disputes.

—Secondly, we are prepared to discuss new arrangements in individual commodities on a case-by-case basis as circumstances warrant.

—Thirdly, we will propose that the World Bank explore new ways of financing raw material investment in producing countries. We are particularly interested in exploring new ways of mobilizing capital and bringing it together with outside management and skills.

It is clear that both producers and consumers have much to gain from the settlement of the disputes over raw materials.

It is also clear that these issues are becoming of fundamental importance to the world's economic, and political, future. They have been brought to the center stage of world diplomacy. They represent an area of potential division. But they also contain the possibility of a new and challenging area of international cooperation.

An important first step will be to consider our approach together with other industrial countries. Other industrialized countries, the United Kingdom in particular, have advanced a number of proposals to this end. Raw material policy will be a primary focus of the upcoming OECD ministerial, and we expect the OECD to undertake a major study of the issue.

The United States is prepared to deal with the raw material question with economic realism, political imagination, and understanding for the concerns of the developing world.

Action Required on the Food Problem

Let me turn now to another issue on which international action has already begun and must now be accelerated. This is the prob-

lem of food. Last November the World Food Conference was convened in Rome at American initiative. On behalf of President Ford, I announced a proposal for a long-term international effort to eliminate the scourge of hunger. For we regard our good fortune and strength in the field of food as a global trust. We recognize the responsibilities we bear by virtue of our extraordinary productivity, our advanced technology, and our tradition of assistance. And we are convinced that the global response will have an important influence on the nature of the world that our children inherit.

The Rome Conference reached basic agreement on a comprehensive program in basic areas: Expanding the food production of the major producers; accelerating production in the developing countries; improving the means of food distribution and financing; enhancing the nutritional quality of food production; and developing a system of reserves to insure against food emergencies. A framework for international cooperation was established.

Fortunately, good crops this year will ease food supply problems. But we cannot let this lull us into complacency about the longer term. We cannot escape the reality that the world's total requirements for food are growing dramatically, not easing. The current gap between what developing countries produce themselves and what they need is about 25 million tons; at present rates of growth, the gap is expected to double or triple 10 years from now. There is no escape from the world's duty to deal with the problem of hunger with urgency.

To maintain the momentum begun at Rome, action is needed now in three areas:

—First, for the short term, until a major expansion of world production is brought about, food aid will continue to be vital. The United States sees this as a responsibility not only of major food producers but of all financially capable nations. The United States has provided more than 4 million tons of food aid in all but one of the 20 years of our food aid program. We will do our utmost to maintain this standard of performance.

—Secondly, food aid can only be a stop-gap measure. The long-term solution will require that food production be increased to its full potential. Food production in the developing countries can draw on a great deal of underutilized land resources. American assistance will henceforth place primary emphasis on research, fertilizers, better storage, transport, and pest control. We shall concentrate our aid capital in this sector of economic development.

—Thirdly, we must meet emergency shortages and protect world supplies in the face of crop failures and other catastrophes. To do so, we have proposed an international system of nationally held grain reserves. We must start now to build them.

Principles for Grain Reserves System

Let me discuss this issue of reserves more fully. Before 1972, the world had come to depend upon a few major producers, particularly the United States, to maintain the necessary grain reserves. Now, after three years of shortages and emergencies, adequate reserves no longer exist. The United States has therefore removed all governmental restraints on production. Our farmers have gone all-out to maximize their output. The world must take advantage of better crops this year to reconstitute stocks. But this is not enough.

In meetings later this month, the United States will formally propose a comprehensive international system of reserves based on the following principles:

—Total world reserves must be large enough to meet potential shortfalls in food grains production.

—Grain exporters and importers should agree on a fair allocation of reserve holdings, taking into account wealth, grain productive capacity, and trade.

—There should be agreed international rules or guidelines to encourage members to build up reserves in times of good harvest.

—Each participating country should be free to determine how its reserves will be

maintained and what incentives to provide for their buildup, holding, and drawdowns.

—Rules or guidelines should be agreed in advance for the drawdown of reserves, triggered by shortfalls in world production. There must be a clear presumption that all members would make reserves available when needed, and conversely, that reserves would not be released prematurely or excessively and thus unnecessarily depress market prices.

—In times of shortage, the system must assure access to supplies for countries that participate in it, and there must be special provision to meet the needs of the poorest developing countries.

—Finally, the system must encourage expanded and liberalized trade in grains.

The United States is prepared to hold an important part of an agreed level of world reserves. If others join us in negotiating such a system, the outline of an international reserves agreement can be completed before the end of the year.

U.S. Responsibility of Leadership

These are the problems of the economic structure. They represent, in their scope and implications, a basic challenge to the economic system of the past generation and a basic test of the world's political future. They have become one of the central concerns of our diplomacy.

The present international economic system has served the world well. Future prosperity in this United States and throughout the globe depends on its continued good performance. We are prepared to engage in a constructive dialogue and to work cooperatively on the great economic issues. We cannot accept unrealistic proposals, but we must act to strengthen the system in areas where it does not function well.

These issues are not technical. They go to the heart of the problem of international order: whether the major industrial nations and the developing nations can resolve their problems cooperatively or whether we are

headed for an era in which economic problems and political challenges are solved by tests of strength. Will the world face up to the imperative of interdependence, or will it be engulfed in contests of nations or blocs?

The role which the United States takes will be crucial. Will we fulfill our responsibility of leadership? If we know our own interest, we will.

For the United States still represents the single greatest concentration of economic wealth and power to be found on the planet. But what is asked of us now most of all is not our resources but our vision and will.

The American people have always believed

in a world of cooperation rather than force, of negotiation rather than confrontation, and of fulfillment of the aspirations of peoples for progress and justice. Such a world will never come about without our active contribution. The opportunities open to us are immense, if we have the courage and faith to seize them.

We have a stake in the world's success. It will be our own success. If we respond to the challenge with the vision and determination that the world has come to expect from America, our children will look back upon this period as the beginning of America's greatest triumphs.

U.S. Recovers Merchant Ship Seized by Cambodian Navy

STATEMENT BY WHITE HOUSE PRESS SECRETARY, MAY 12

White House press release dated May 12

We have been informed that a Cambodian naval vessel has seized an American merchant ship on the high seas and forced it to the port of Kompong Som. The President has met with the NSC. He considers this seizure an act of piracy. He has instructed the State Department to demand the immediate release of the ship. Failure to do so would have the most serious consequences.

STATEMENT BY WHITE HOUSE PRESS SECRETARY, MAY 13¹

The merchant ship *Mayaguez* at last report was anchored close to the island of Koh Tang, 30 miles off the coast of Cambodia. During the night, Washington time, it was escorted by two Cambodian naval vessels from the point where it was originally boarded (that point was eight miles from the rock island of Poulo Wai) toward its

present location. The ship is being kept under observation by U.S. military aircraft. The President was kept informed of developments during the night.

NOTICE TO MARINERS²

Special Warning: Shipping is advised until further notice to remain more than 35 nautical miles off the coast of Cambodia and more than 20 nautical miles off the coast of Vietnam including off lying islands. Recent incidents have been reported of firing on, stopping and detention of ships within waters claimed by Cambodia, particularly in vicinity of Poulo Wai Island. This warning in no way should be construed as United States recognition of Cambodian or Vietnamese territorial sea claims or as derogation

¹ Read by Press Secretary Ron Nessen at a news briefing at 6:54 a.m. e.d.t.

² Issued by the Defense Mapping Agency Hydrographic Center at 7:15 p.m. EDT, May 12; made available at the Department of Defense and the White House on May 13.

of the right of innocent passage for United States flag vessels, or derogation of the freedom of the high seas.

**U.S. LETTER TO U.N. SECRETARY GENERAL,
MAY 14**

USUN press release 40 dated May 14

DEAR MR. SECRETARY GENERAL: The United States Government wishes to draw urgently to your attention the threat to international peace which has been posed by the illegal and unprovoked seizure by Cambodian authorities of the U.S. merchant vessel, Mayaguez, in international waters.

This unarmed merchant ship has a crew of about forty American citizens.

As you are no doubt aware, my Government has already initiated certain steps through diplomatic channels, insisting on immediate release of the vessel and crew. We also request you to take any steps within your ability to contribute to this objective.

In the absence of a positive response to our appeals through diplomatic channels for early action by the Cambodian authorities, my Government reserves the right to take such measures as may be necessary to protect the lives of American citizens and property, including appropriate measures of self-defense under Article 51 of the United Nations Charter.

Accept, Mr. Secretary General, the assurances of my highest consideration.

Sincerely,

JOHN SCALI
*[U.S. Representative
to the United Nations]*

**U.S. LETTER TO U.N. SECURITY COUNCIL
PRESIDENT, MAY 14**

My Government has instructed me to inform you and the Members of the Security Council of the grave and dangerous situation brought about by the illegal and unprovoked seizure by Cambodian authorities of a United

States merchant vessel, the S.S. Mayaguez, in international waters in the Gulf of Siam.

The S.S. Mayaguez, an unarmed commercial vessel owned by the Sea-Land Corporation of Menlo Park, New Jersey, was fired upon and halted by Cambodian gunboats and forcibly boarded at 9:16 p.m. (Eastern Daylight Time) on May 12. The boarding took place at 09 degrees, 48 minutes north latitude, 102 degrees, 53 minutes east longitude. The vessel has a crew of about 40, all of whom are United States citizens. At the time of seizure, the S.S. Mayaguez was en route from Hong Kong to Thailand and was some 52 nautical miles from the Cambodian coast. It was some 7 nautical miles from the Islands of Poulo Wai which, my Government understands, are claimed by both Cambodia and South Viet-Nam.

The vessel was on the high seas, in international shipping lanes commonly used by ships calling at the various ports of Southeast Asia. Even if, in the view of others, the ship were considered to be within Cambodian territorial waters, it would clearly have been engaged in innocent passage to the port of another country. Hence, its seizure was unlawful and involved a clear-cut illegal use of force.

The United States Government understands that at present the S.S. Mayaguez is being held by Cambodian naval forces at Koh Tang Island approximately 15 nautical miles off the Cambodian coast.

The United States Government immediately took steps through diplomatic channels to recover the vessel and arrange the return of the crew. It earnestly sought the urgent cooperation of all concerned to this end, but no response has been forthcoming. In the circumstances the United States Government has taken certain appropriate measures under Article 51 of the UN Charter whose purpose it is to achieve the release of the vessel and its crew.

I request that this letter be circulated as an official document of the Security Council.

Sincerely,

JOHN SCALI

**STATEMENT BY WHITE HOUSE PRESS
SECRETARY, MAY 14**

White House press release dated May 14

In further pursuit of our efforts to obtain the release of the S.S. *Mayaguez* and its crew, the President has directed the following military measures, starting this evening Washington time:

—U.S. marines to board the S.S. *Mayaguez*.

—U.S. marines to land on Koh Tang Island in order to rescue any crew members as may be on the island.

—Aircraft from the carrier *Coral Sea* to undertake associated military operations in the area in order to protect and support the operations to regain the vessel and members of the crew.

**MESSAGE TO THE CAMBODIAN AUTHORITIES
FROM THE U.S. GOVERNMENT, MAY 14**

White House press release dated May 14

We have heard radio broadcast that you are prepared to release the S.S. *Mayaguez*. We welcome this development, if true.

As you know, we have seized the ship. As soon as you issue a statement that you are prepared to release the crew members you hold unconditionally and immediately, we will promptly cease military operations.

STATEMENT BY PRESIDENT FORD, MAY 15³

At my direction, United States forces tonight boarded the American merchant ship S.S. *Mayaguez* and landed at the Island of Koh Tang for the purpose of rescuing the crew and the ship, which had been illegally seized by Cambodian forces. They also conducted supporting strikes against nearby military installations.

I have now received information that the

³ Made in the press briefing room at the White House at 12:27 a.m. e.d.t., broadcast live on television and radio (text from White House press release).

vessel has been recovered intact and the entire crew has been rescued. The forces that have successfully accomplished this mission are still under hostile fire but are preparing to disengage.

I wish to express my deep appreciation and that of the entire nation to the units and the men who participated in these operations for their valor and for their sacrifice.

**PRESIDENT FORD'S LETTER TO THE CONGRESS,
MAY 15⁴**

MAY 15, 1975.

DEAR MR. SPEAKER: (DEAR MR. PRESIDENT PRO TEM:) On 12 May 1975, I was advised that the S. S. *Mayaguez*, a merchant vessel of United States registry en route from Hong Kong to Thailand with a U.S. citizen crew, was fired upon, stopped, boarded, and seized by Cambodian naval patrol boats of the Armed Forces of Cambodia in international waters in the vicinity of Poulo Wai Island. The seized vessel was then forced to proceed to Koh Tang Island where it was required to anchor. This hostile act was in clear violation of international law.

In view of this illegal and dangerous act, I ordered, as you have been previously advised, United States military forces to conduct the necessary reconnaissance and to be ready to respond if diplomatic efforts to secure the return of the vessel and its personnel were not successful. Two United States reconnaissance aircraft in the course of locating the *Mayaguez* sustained minimal damage from small firearms. Appropriate demands for the return of the *Mayaguez* and its crew were made, both publicly and privately, without success.

In accordance with my desire that the Congress be informed on this matter and taking note of Section 4(a)(1) of the War Powers Resolution, I wish to report to you that at about 6:20 a.m., 13 May, pursuant to my in-

⁴ Identical letters were sent to the Speaker of the House and the President pro tempore of the Senate (text from White House press release).

structions to prevent the movement of the Mayaguez into a mainland port, U.S. aircraft fired warning shots across the bow of the ship and gave visual signals to small craft approaching the ship. Subsequently, in order to stabilize the situation and in an attempt to preclude removal of the American crew of the Mayaguez to the mainland, where their rescue would be more difficult, I directed the United States Armed Forces to isolate the island and interdict any movement between the ship or the island and the mainland, and to prevent movement of the ship itself, while still taking all possible care to prevent loss of life or injury to the U. S. captives. During the evening of 13 May, a Cambodian patrol boat attempting to leave the island disregarded aircraft warnings and was sunk. Thereafter, two other Cambodian patrol craft were destroyed and four others were damaged and immobilized. One boat, suspected of having some U.S. captives aboard, succeeded in reaching Kompong Som after efforts to turn it around without injury to the passengers failed.

Our continued objective in this operation was the rescue of the captured American crew along with the retaking of the ship Mayaguez. For that purpose, I ordered late this afternoon [May 14] an assault by United States Marines on the island of Koh Tang to search out and rescue such Americans as might still be held there, and I ordered retaking of the Mayaguez by other marines boarding from the destroyer escort HOLT. In addition to continued fighter and gunship coverage of the Koh Tang area, these marine activities were supported by tactical aircraft from the CORAL SEA, striking the military airfield at Ream and other military targets in the area of Kompong Som in order to prevent reinforcement or support from the mainland of the Cambodian forces detaining the American vessel and crew.

At approximately 9:00 P.M. EDT on 14

May, the Mayaguez was retaken by United States forces. At approximately 11:30 P.M., the entire crew of the Mayaguez was taken aboard the WILSON. U.S. forces have begun the process of disengagement and withdrawal.

This operation was ordered and conducted pursuant to the President's constitutional Executive power and his authority as Commander-in-Chief of the United States Armed Forces.

Sincerely,

GERALD R. FORD.

Letters of Credence

Chile

The newly appointed Ambassador of the Republic of Chile, Manuel Trucco, presented his credentials to President Ford on April 29.¹

Colombia

The newly appointed Ambassador of the Republic of Colombia, Julio César Turbay Ayala, presented his credentials to President Ford on April 29.¹

Haiti

The newly appointed Ambassador of the Republic of Haiti, Georges Salomon, presented his credentials to President Ford on April 29.¹

Peru

The newly appointed Ambassador of the Republic of Peru, Vice Admiral (ret.) José Arce, presented his credentials to President Ford on April 29.¹

¹ For texts of the Ambassador's remarks and the President's reply, see Department of State press release dated Apr. 29.

Question-and-Answer Session and News Conferences Held by Secretary Kissinger at St. Louis and Kansas City

Following are transcripts of a news conference held by Secretary Kissinger at St. Louis, Mo., on May 12, a question-and-answer session following his address before the Kansas City, Mo., International Relations Council on May 13, and a news conference he held at Kansas City on May 13.

NEWS CONFERENCE AT ST. LOUIS, MAY 12

Press release 247A dated May 12

Q. Mr. Secretary, I think the question is fairly obvious. It is on everyone's mind, and that is the seizing of the U.S. vessel by Cambodia. Can we have some comments from you and some insight on perhaps what the President meant by saying that unless the ship is released immediately, or sometime in the near future, our relations may suffer serious consequences?

Secretary Kissinger: Well, I think that the President's statement speaks for itself. He called the action an act of piracy, and he demanded the immediate release of the American ship and crew. And he has pointed out that failure to do so could have serious consequences.

We are undertaking at present diplomatic efforts to bring about this release, and until they have had their chance, we will not make any further comment.

Q. Has a third nation been called into this as a possible intermediary—like China?

Secretary Kissinger: Well, we don't have any direct communications with the Cambodian authorities.

Q. Have you heard at all from the Cambodian authorities on this?

Secretary Kissinger: Not at the time that

I had left Washington. Not at the time that I came down here to give this speech.

Q. Mr. Secretary, Senator [James L.] Buckley said that the United States ought to react by surgical retaliatory bombings so this sort of thing wouldn't happen again. What is your reaction to that?

Secretary Kissinger: I don't think this is the time for me to give a checklist of possible American responses. I think our statement has made it clear that we will not accept this and that we are insisting on the release of the ship and the crew. But what specific steps we will take, if that cannot be achieved by diplomatic means, we will have to wait.

Q. Was your trip to St. Louis ever threatened by this incident? Was there any question at all whether you could come out here today?

Secretary Kissinger: Well, there is really not very much I can do about this situation in Washington today. But we had an NSC [National Security Council] meeting just before I came here—not to decide whether I should come, but to discuss that issue and its merits.

Q. Mr. Secretary, can you comment on this? Paul Lindstrom, the member of the Pueblo committee, has given the following information. He says he got from State Department sources that four crewmen were seriously wounded in the seizure and that, according to the Secretary General of the Communist Party in Cambodia, the members of the ship will be held as prisoners until there is an apology for some sort of criminal action against Cambodia and until the U.S.-made ships and planes used by refugees to flee Thailand are returned to Cambodia.

Secretary Kissinger: I don't know who the

State Department sources are that have told him that. I admit the State Department is organized to keep information from its top echelon. [Laughter.] I have not heard that particular information.

Q. What about the four wounded persons?

Secretary Kissinger: When I left, I checked with Washington before I came down here. I did not receive any report of this nature. So unless it happened in the last two hours, I just don't know about this report.

Q. Mr. Secretary, to change the subject for a minute—

Secretary Kissinger: I would be amazed if that person knew it, but I just don't know.

And we certainly haven't had any formal communication.

Q. Mr. Secretary, I wonder if you are now ready to be more specific about the OAS agreement that you say was intended to eliminate, to get rid of the economic sanctions against Cuba. Could you be more specific?

Secretary Kissinger: Well, there hasn't been any formal OAS action yet. What there has been is an informal exchange of views among the Foreign Ministers designed to respond to the desire of those who want to lift sanctions against Cuba. And that was a majority in the last meeting that addressed this question in Quito. So there will probably be another meeting that will address this problem.

But I think we have found a formula which will enable us to be responsive to the desires of our Latin American friends and yet enable us to conduct the policy we consider appropriate.

Q. To follow up, if I could, for a second, Mr. Secretary, when you say you have a majority vote in agreement, is that a substantial majority, or in terms of numbers?

Secretary Kissinger: At the last meeting that dealt with this issue that took place in Quito—let me explain the situation. According to the Rio Treaty, sanctions are imposed by a two-thirds majority and can be lifted only by a two-thirds majority. When the Foreign Ministers of the Western Hemisphere

met—of the Organization of American States—met in Quito, they were short of a two-thirds majority by one vote. The United States abstained. So there was a majority then.

We believe that for the formula we are now discussing, there will be an overwhelming majority but it will be somewhat different from the one that was discussed at Quito, and that makes it possible.

Q. I am still not clear. Does the United States support decision by a majority vote?

Secretary Kissinger: If we follow the legal procedures, there has been a proposal that sanctions should be lifted by majority vote. For that to be effective, it has to be ratified by the various governments, which is a time-consuming process. That we can support. But it will take time.

So then there is a question whether something can be done in the interim while the ratification process is continuing. And this is what we have to discuss with our colleagues. But I don't want to go further than that until the meeting actually has concluded.

Q. Mr. Secretary, may I ask you about a point in your speech tonight? You called for Western European countries to join with you in grand new designs. Hasn't the reaction to your oil-energy proposal shown the Western European countries, including Britain, too occupied with their own problems to join in such grand designs?

Secretary Kissinger: Well, I don't think I used the words "grand designs." We spoke of great joint enterprises. I believe, on the contrary, the reaction to our energy proposals proves that the Western European countries and Japan can cooperate with us when we have concrete issues that affect all of our interests.

I believe that the energy program has been one of the success stories of our relationship with our allies. We have, within the space of a year, created the International Energy Agency, developed joint programs of conservation, financial solidarity, and assured prices. And I believe that the energy program proves exactly the opposite of what

you are suggesting; namely, that we can cooperate, and that we can achieve unity of purpose, when the issue is concrete and not abstract.

Q. Mr. Secretary, could you provide any evidence to support the contention made by you and by the President that there is a bloodbath in progress in Indochina?

Secretary Kissinger: I am not aware that I have made the statement that there is a bloodbath in progress in Indochina. We were saying, prior to the collapse of Cambodia and Viet-Nam, that we supported additional aid for these countries because we feared a bloodbath.

Now, with respect to Cambodia, there can be absolutely no question that a tragedy and indeed an atrocity of major proportions is going on. When 3 million people are evacuated from a city and told to march into a countryside in which there will not be another harvest until November, when hospitals are cleared out, there is no question that there are going to be deaths numbering in the thousands, and probably in the tens of thousands. There is no press there to record this. All foreigners have been evicted. And in addition, we have some isolated information from various parts of Cambodia of executions of every official, and in some cases of their wives, of the previous government—and “officials” are defined in those cases to go down as low as second lieutenant.

Now, what is happening in South Viet-Nam is much less clear. And we have made no allegations about South Viet-Nam, except that one remembers that in 1954 when 900,000 people had fled North Viet-Nam, nevertheless, by their own admission, over 60,000 people were killed.

But we have no firsthand information about any significant events of this type in South Viet-Nam at this moment. We do have very clear information about what is going on in Cambodia.

Q. Do you have any idea of the numbers, Mr. Secretary? You talk about “all officials down to the level of lieutenant.” Is that hundreds, thousands?

Secretary Kissinger: All we have is iso-

lated instances of individual districts. So in one particular district, this amounted to 90 officials and their wives. But this was a small district town.

Now, if you extrapolate this across the country, you come to very large numbers. If you add to it the evacuation of all the urban centers into a countryside without any apparent plan or previous preparation, you get into very substantial numbers.

Q. [Inaudible] some persons are proposing, or suggesting, that perhaps Thailand will be the next country to be overthrown. Do you have any plans if such a thing were to occur?

Secretary Kissinger: Well, it will now be interesting to see whether Thailand—whether the North Vietnamese, who have been behind—who were conducting the Laotian war for most of the Viet-Nam period with their own troops and who have been supplying and supporting the Pathet Lao—whether they will now stop at the borders of Thailand or whether they will foment a guerrilla-type war in northeast Thailand. That still remains to be seen.

Q. Mr. Secretary, is there any likelihood that you would resume your shuttle diplomacy in the Middle East prior to a reconvening of the Geneva Conference?

Secretary Kissinger: As you know, the President is going to meet with President Sadat and Prime Minister Rabin. Until these two meetings have taken place, we cannot really make a decision as to which approach will be more effective—another attempt at a step-by-step approach or the Geneva Conference, which of course would, by definition, deal with an overall solution. We want to reserve our judgment until we have had these conversations.

Our interest is to prevent stagnation. As the President has said repeatedly, we cannot accept a diplomatic stalemate in the Middle East. Which method will be pursued depends very much on the wishes of the parties—depends crucially on the wishes of the parties.

Q. Mr. Secretary, do you still believe that the United Nations is a useful vehicle for the

United States to belong to in view of what has taken place?

Secretary Kissinger: I think the United Nations is a useful tool for the United States and a useful organization to belong to, as long as we understand its capabilities and its limits.

It often provides an opportunity for diplomatic exchanges that would be very difficult to arrange without it. In Cyprus, even occasionally on the Middle East, in certain conflicts in Africa, the United Nations has performed an extremely useful role.

But what concerns us is that in recent sessions of the General Assembly, an automatic kind of majority has been—has come about that reflects the so-called Group of 77 plus whatever other backing they can get, which develops an almost instinctive reaction which often are not in the American interest and which occasionally are against the Charter of the United Nations, such as the expulsion of nations from membership in the General Assembly.

These actions we oppose, and we shall make clear in the next General Assembly that the charter must be rigidly observed.

Q. Mr. Secretary, in your speech tonight, you said, "When a country's prestige declines, others will be reluctant to stake their future on its assurances; it will be increasingly tested by overt challenges." Do you think this country's prestige has suffered as a result of what's happened in Viet-Nam, in Cambodia, and what's happening in Laos—and what happened today to a merchant ship?

Secretary Kissinger: I think that our credibility has declined, and that one of the most important challenges to our foreign policy is to restore it, partly by bringing our commitments in line with our capabilities and partly by making sure that those commitments we make will be strictly carried out.

Q. Mr. Secretary, in your speech earlier tonight you said, and I am quoting now: "Though we are no longer predominant, we are inescapably a leader." Does that mean the predominance of American power as a global force has come to an end? Are we

seeing the decline of the so-called "American empire"?

Secretary Kissinger: Well, I don't believe there was an American empire.

Q. Who is the predominant force now?

Secretary Kissinger: I do believe that the degree of predominance we enjoyed in the fifties and early sixties has come to an end and therefore we have to conduct foreign policy more carefully, more thoughtfully, than we did at a period when we had such an overwhelming physical superiority that we could afford occasional mistakes that would be made up by our predominance.

We still are the strongest nation in the world. We still are, militarily, in a powerful position, but the margin of superiority that we possessed when we had an atomic monopoly has been eroded through the progress of technology as much as through anything else.

Q. What I am concerned about, when you say that we are no longer predominant—who is the predominant power? Is it the Soviet Union?

Secretary Kissinger: No, I don't think the Soviet Union is predominant. I think we are no longer as superior to all the other countries in physical strength as we were, say, 15 years ago. That doesn't mean that any other country has replaced us. We are still probably the strongest nation in the world, but our margin is no longer as great.

Q. You referred to peripheral areas in the Soviet competition. Do you have any specific peripheral areas in mind?

Secretary Kissinger: I mentioned some.

Q. You exempted the Middle East and Iraq and Indochina as a closed chapter, so—

Secretary Kissinger: I remember—let me make clear what I meant. I said, not every problem that is caused in the peripheral area is necessarily caused by the Soviet Union; it may be exploited by the Soviet Union. And I would most definitely include the Middle East.

And if there is a deliberate exacerbation of tensions in the Middle East, it would raise most serious doubts in our mind.

Q. Well, I think you did—I'm sorry—as I recall, I thought you spoke in terms of active competition now, between us and the Soviet Union, in peripheral areas, and détente can suffer as a result.

Secretary Kissinger: It can.

Q. It can?

Secretary Kissinger: Yes.

Q. So I am trying to find out in which peripheral areas is this competition going on. The Middle East is one. Are there others?

Secretary Kissinger: Yes, the Middle East is one. Basically, what I was—I don't want—

Q. I was asking about the Persian Gulf. Do you have that in mind?

Secretary Kissinger: I have—that is another possible area. But what I wanted to stress was that détente cannot survive if no limit is placed on competition. Some degree of competition is inherent in the conflicting ideologies and positions of the country. But if no—in the absence of self-restraint, détente will be in danger.

Q. Mr. Secretary, you mentioned in your speech that we came out of World War II as a united people and out of this recent conflict as distrustful and divided people. What effect do you think that the condition of our economy and the attitudes of our people in our political structure will have on our foreign policy in our future negotiations?

Secretary Kissinger: Well, I think that a strong and vital American economy is absolutely crucial—

Q. True.

Secretary Kissinger: —to the conduct of our foreign policy; that partly, when this country is in recession, it is very difficult for the American people to muster the willingness for the sacrifices that are implied by world leadership—and that is very understandable. The reaction to the Vietnamese refugees, the reluctance to engage in some other foreign activities, are partly the result of economic conditions within this country. So that preconditions for an effective

foreign policy is a vital American domestic economy—

Q. I had reference to the fact that election year is coming up—and is this a political football?

Secretary Kissinger: Election year, certainly, that does not have any conduct in foreign policy. [Laughter.]

Q. Mr. Secretary, just one more question: You left a paragraph out of your speech in which you reaffirmed the goals of the Shanghai communique—

Secretary Kissinger: That has absolutely no significance. I have asked Bob Anderson [Robert Anderson, Special Assistant to the Secretary for Press Relations] to explain that I occasionally cut paragraphs as I go through the speech, in the interest of reading time. I affirm that paragraph, and everything that is in the text that was distributed has the same validity as everything that I read.

Q. So the President is going to China in the fall?

Secretary Kissinger: So that has no significance. Yes. The same will happen in Kansas City. [Laughter.]

QUESTIONS AND ANSWERS FOLLOWING ADDRESS AT KANSAS CITY, MAY 13

Press release 257 dated May 14

William Linseott, President, Kansas City International Relations Council: I will ask the Secretary a few of the questions that I have here that are representative really of the groups, of the many that we do have.

The first question that I have asks: What is the Soviet Union's long-range foreign policy toward the Middle East and the Suez Canal? And, two, are we really going to take our ship back from Cambodia, or is this a verbal ploy?

Secretary Kissinger: Well, let me take the second question first. With respect to the ship, we have called it an act of piracy. We have said that we demand the release of the ship and the crew and the failure to release

the ship and the crew could have serious consequences.

We are now giving diplomacy a chance. Until this has been done, I do not think it would be useful to make any statements. But I can assure you that the statement released by the White House on behalf of the President yesterday was not said idly. I repeat that we insist on the release of the ship and the crew. [Applause.]

The other question is: What is the Soviet Union's long-range foreign policy toward the Middle East and the Suez Canal?

The Soviet foreign policy is dominated by many factors. It is important for us to remember that the Soviet Union is ideologically hostile to the United States. And we recognize that the Soviet Union, if it has an opportunity, will fill vacuums.

We are pursuing a policy of seeking to relax tensions, because we believe that we owe it to the American people to make clear that if there is a crisis it will not have been caused by an American failure to seek out every opportunity for honorable solutions.

On the other hand, we must recognize that this policy is not a substitute for our own efforts. If a vacuum exists, it will be filled. And therefore what the Soviet Union does in the Middle East depends importantly on what we are prepared to do in the Middle East as well as in other areas of the world.

If we are ready to act with a sense of responsibility to the overall balance of power, then I believe we can make progress toward peace in the Middle East. And this is our biggest effort at this moment.

So, on the whole, I believe that progress toward peace can be made in the Middle East, but it cannot be done on the cheap.

Mr. Linscott: Thank you. The next question I have is: After the Arab-Israeli negotiations broke down, there was an apparent cooling of U.S.-Israeli relations. How is the temperature today?

Secretary Kissinger: My friend Abba Eban, the former Foreign Minister of Israel, said to me once that the Israelis consider objectivity a hundred percent agreement with their point of view. [Laughter.] So, when

you begin to slide toward the 95 percent mark, you get accused of tilting toward the other side.

Our relations with Israel are friendly. We are engaged in close consultations about what steps to take next. Inevitably, the Israeli perspective is focused on its own survival and on the immediate problems of its area.

We, on the other hand, have interests also in better relations with the moderate Arab countries and in making sure that the situation in the Middle East does not explode into a war, which could bring on another massive recession and a threat of confrontation with the Soviet Union.

We believe that this is also in the long-term interest of Israel.

So I believe that as we go through our present period of reassessment, that we will come out with a policy that will be generally approved by the American people and will be compatible with the survival and security of Israel, as well as with our relations with the Arab world. And I think that our relations are basically good. [Applause.]

Mr. Linscott: The next question they ask, Mr. Secretary: Do you need congressional approval to take military action in the matter of the Cambodian piracy affair?

Secretary Kissinger: There is no question that the War Powers Act and the restrictions, the special restrictions, that have been placed on military operations in Indochina complicate the flexibility of the President as compared to a number of years ago.

On the other hand, it has generally been held that the President has inherent powers to protect American lives and American property when they are threatened. And I believe that the President—and I know that the President is operating on this assumption today. Of course, before any steps are taken we would discuss them with the leaders of the Congress.

Mr. Linscott: Will the forthcoming talks in Brussels bring about new dimensions of the U.S.-Common Market relationships? Do you anticipate changes in the troop commitments?

Secretary Kissinger: After recent events, the United States cannot afford a withdrawal of troops from Europe without creating a totally wrong impression about our determination and about our willingness to play an international role. And therefore this is an issue that we will not raise—we do not expect to raise in Brussels.

The purpose of the talks between the President and his colleagues will be to reaffirm the dedication of the Western democracies to common goals.

It is not enough to do this simply with verbal declarations. It is important that we are joined together in some great common enterprises. We are already doing it in the field of energy. I have indicated today in the economic parts of my speech some of the other areas where joint efforts are possible.

What united the Western countries in the fifties and sixties was not simply declarations, but joint efforts. We believe that such joint efforts can again be created. And therefore we believe that the Western alliance can emerge from the present period more vital than before.

Mr. Linscott: Are we going to revise our policy of containment and limited war in view of its minimal success in Viet-Nam?

Secretary Kissinger: Well, we do not have a policy of limited war. Our policy is to attempt to preserve the peace.

I think we must learn from the experience of Viet-Nam that if the United States—that the United States should think through all the implications of its commitments before it makes them. But also, if it makes them, that it cannot do so half-heartedly.

We believe that we cannot commit the world to be at the mercy of other Communist superpowers. Now what precise conclusions we will draw from that, in any individual instance, I cannot now say; but as a basic principle of our foreign policy, we cannot be indifferent to changes in the world balance of power, and we are determined to resist them. [Applause.]

Mr. Linscott: One last question: Mr. Secretary, would you serve as Secretary of State

under a Democratic President, if one were elected in 1976? [Laughter.]

Secretary Kissinger: I don't think that I will be—I would— [Laughter.] I have the conviction from some of the statements of the various hard-working candidates that this is a decision that I would not have to make. [Laughter.] But I also have the conviction that they will not be in a position to make a concession. [Laughter and applause.]

NEWS CONFERENCE AT KANSAS CITY, MAY 13

Press release 251 dated May 13

Mr. Anderson [Robert Anderson, Special Assistant to the Secretary for Press Relations]: I would like to make just one brief announcement before the Secretary comes. I said it to a number of you before. In the Secretary's speech today, you will notice that he omitted certain paragraphs. But the full speech stands as the Secretary gave it out.

Secretary Kissinger: I omitted some paragraphs to be able to take some questions. But I stand behind everything that is in the text that we distributed.

Q. Mr. Secretary, has the United States had any communication, direct or indirect, with the Cambodian Government about the ship? Second, have we entered a period when we must expect harassment in and around Indochina?

Secretary Kissinger: We cannot go beyond the statement that was released by the White House yesterday. In that statement, it was made clear that the President had instructed the Department of State to demand the release of the ship and of the crew. Those diplomatic efforts are in progress now. What the precise steps are, we will not discuss for the time being.

With respect to the second question, the United States will not accept harassment of its ships on international sealanes. And whether it can be expected or not is a question that I wouldn't want to answer. We will not accept it.

Q. Mr. Secretary, can you confirm a Reu-

ters report that a U.S. reconnaissance plane was fired on at the time the ship was seized?

Secretary Kissinger: I have not heard of such an event. I don't think this is true.

Q. Mr. Secretary—

Secretary Kissinger: At the time the ship was seized? Inconceivable, because we didn't know about it until three or four hours later.

Q. Mr. Secretary, we get sort of a puzzled picture out here in the Midwest. We are very much concerned, being midwesterners. We have a picture of troops poised for movement, ships sailing into the Gulf of Siam, aerial surveillance, and a meeting today of the National Security Council. Can you give us anything beyond what you have already said, without violating any security regulations, on a general assessment of the situation and whether this could be just an isolated incident or a pattern?

Secretary Kissinger: I really cannot tell you whether it is an isolated incident or a pattern, whether it was a deliberate action by the Cambodian Government or by some local commander, because what you should remember is that even in Washington, when these events occur the information can be very confused and fragmentary. At this point, we are making efforts to secure the release of the ship. At the same time, the words of the White House statement yesterday were carefully chosen, and they have been reiterated since. So you can assume that we are not taking the matter lightly. But we do want to give an opportunity for diplomatic efforts to succeed.

Q. Mr. Secretary, you have said, and the President has said, that we will pursue serious consequences unless this ship is released. Can you tell us what serious consequences the President could pursue without congressional approval?

Secretary Kissinger: Well, I didn't say he would pursue them without congressional approval. But he has certain inherent powers to protect American lives and American property. But it would be done in close consultation—whatever would be considered

would be done in close consultation with the Congress.

Q. What could be considered? What are your options?

Secretary Kissinger: That is what we are at the moment considering in Washington. And there will be other meetings on the subject.

Q. Mr. Secretary, recently Abba Eban said that the reason that you were not too successful with the Mideast peace was because the Israelis themselves caused you to have a few problems there. Would you comment on that, please?

Secretary Kissinger: The problem of the negotiations in the Middle East is extremely complicated. When you analyze it, it depends at what point in time you start. The negotiation is based on the fact that Israel has to give territory or contribute territory, which is a tangible thing, in return for intangible concessions in the form of promises, steps toward peace, new legal commitments, and so forth. Now, how to balance these two is under the best of circumstances an extremely difficult and complicated matter.

In this negotiation, it was further complicated by the fact that there were many Arab pressures; that within Israel there were many very profound political divisions. And I think that it is more useful for us to concentrate on what we will do in the future rather than going over what went wrong in that particular negotiation.

Q. Mr. Secretary, Prime Minister Rabin, according to the Associated Press, has had a book censored. According to the Prime Minister the book is "potentially explosive"—that if it were published it would force your resignation. Do you know of such a book, and what is your reaction to it being censored?

Secretary Kissinger: Well, there are so many competing groups trying to force my resignation [laughter] that I really don't want to give that much credit to any book that any Israeli journalist could be writing. I don't doubt that the publication of confidential negotiations and the exchange of

views between us and the Israeli Government could be embarrassing. Particularly given the closeness of our relationship, we are apt to speak with considerable candor about events and personalities. On the other hand, the main lines of our policy are clearly known, and I don't know about the book, I don't know about the event—somebody told me about this story. It seems to me that it is my fate at press conferences to talk about my resignation.

Q. Along the same line, the book alleges that you made a number of disparaging remarks about Soviet and Arab leaders. Do you think this will make them suspicious and affect future negotiations with the Arabs and the Soviets?

Secretary Kissinger: I am not particularly worried about this. I don't think it will affect future negotiations either with the Arabs or with the Soviets, with whom we are in constant touch, and they know our views.

Q. Mr. Secretary, you talk about a quid pro quo in the Middle East. We seem to be on the verge of normalizing relations with Cuba. What kind of quid pro quo do they expect there?

Secretary Kissinger: Just a moment—we are not on the verge of normalizing relations with Cuba. We faced in the OAS a situation where more and more countries were going ahead on their own in restoring diplomatic and commercial relations with Cuba, despite the fact that the OAS had voted sanctions. Last year in Quito there was a meeting of Western Hemisphere Foreign Ministers designed to lift the sanctions on Cuba. According to the statutes of the OAS, lifting of sanctions, as the imposition of sanctions, requires a two-thirds majority. This failed by one vote. Afterward a number of countries went ahead anyway to restore diplomatic and commercial relations with Cuba.

So the only issue that is being discussed at this moment is how to bring the practice of the OAS into line with the statutes. It does not affect the American policy directly. And it does not mean that we are going to normalize relations with Cuba.

I indicated in a speech a few weeks ago that we are in principle prepared to improve relations with Cuba on the basis of reciprocity. This, however, requires negotiations, and it requires negotiations with the U.S. Government, not with visitors. And until these negotiations have taken place—and they have not even begun yet—the implication of your question is quite premature.

Q. Mr. Secretary, President Ford expressed himself as quite upset and disappointed in the attitude of the American public towards the Vietnamese refugees. Do you share his anger and upset?

Secretary Kissinger: People who work with me know that my nature is very even-tempered, so anger is not something that they would associate with me.

No, I was also profoundly upset. This is, after all, a country in which we were heavily involved for 15 years. And we have an obligation to people who, in reliance on us, put themselves into a position where their well-being and perhaps their survival is in jeopardy as a result of their association with us. We therefore felt we had a moral obligation to help as many of those who felt threatened to escape from South Viet-Nam. And the lot of a refugee, cut off from his society and from everything that is familiar to him and moving into a totally new environment, is in any case very difficult.

I think we have an obligation to them. I think they deserve our compassion and our support. And I have the impression that since the initial hesitation, the American people have now rallied to the view of the President.

Q. Mr. Secretary, what is your reaction to the refusal of Thailand to allow the U.S. marines who are on Okinawa to go into Thailand for possible use to rescue the ship?

Secretary Kissinger: Well, I have not been informed that this has officially taken place. And if it has taken place—whether or not it has taken place—it is clear that recent events in Indochina have seriously affected the Thai perception of the degree to which they can remain closely associated with the United States, especially on issues that pri-

marily concern the United States. So leaving aside this particular report, whose authenticity I am not sure about, this is a basic fact of the present Thai situation.

Q. Mr. Secretary, why is the United States selling a Hawk air defense system to Jordan, and did you discuss this sale with King Hussein last November?

Secretary Kissinger: We have been discussing the sale of air defense equipment to Jordan—I forget when the discussion started—many months ago. This is not something that was started now. It is something that was started probably in November, maybe even before then. I don't have the exact date in my mind now.

Jordan has been extremely moderate, extremely restrained, did not participate in the last war; is under great pressure from neighboring countries that get a great deal of Soviet military equipment, some of which even offered their own equipment to Jordan. And we felt that it was in the overall interest of the United States and the overall interest of the stability of the area that we continue to be the principal supplier of military equipment to Jordan and as a means of encouraging a continuation of the moderate and restrained course. The fact that this agreement was finally concluded—it had been agreed to in principle many weeks previously, in fact, during March—and so it was just a question of—

Q. Do you recall discussing the issue with King Hussein when you were in Jordan last November?

Secretary Kissinger: It is highly probable that I did, but I would not want to tie myself to any date. I certainly discussed it last fall with him on a number of occasions, but whether it was in November I cannot remember. I could check it.

Q. A few months back, a New York Congressman was promoting a resolution to repeal the native-born requirement for U.S. Presidents. Do you have any interest in such a resolution?

Secretary Kissinger: I consider him one of the leading statesman legislators.

[Laughter.] I am campaigning for his reelection. [Laughter.]

Q. Mr. Secretary—

Secretary Kissinger: Yes, sir.

Q. —in some quarters the Kissinger personal shuttle diplomacy is considered dead and in other quarters is considered recessed. What is your own evaluation of the chances of another try for an interim agreement before Geneva?

Secretary Kissinger: Well, it depends very much whether both parties or one party—either party—comes up with something that makes it possible. The last shuttle diplomacy depended really on two concurrent negotiations—the negotiation between Egypt and Israel and the negotiation within the Arab world to make it possible for Egypt to go ahead.

It will not be easy to re-create these conditions, and in any event, it would be unwise and risky for the United States to engage its prestige at this level unless there were some assurance from the parties ahead of time of a probable success. So we will be able to make a better judgment on that after President Ford has spoken to President Sadat and Prime Minister Rabin.

At this moment, we are not familiar with any new ideas that have come from either side that would encourage us to resume shuttle diplomacy. On the other hand, we don't want to exclude it at any point in the next month—if conditions are such that this would be the best way to promote peace in the Middle East.

Q. Mr. Secretary, you mentioned in your speech—

Secretary Kissinger: It doesn't seem to make any difference whom I point to first [Laughter.]

Q. You mentioned in your speech this afternoon, or said that you are building world grain reserves.

Secretary Kissinger: Yes.

Q. It has come to our attention on the news wire service here that USDA [U.S. Department of Agriculture] has figures a

little bit opposed to what the State Department has recommended for a world grain reserves quota. I think the USDA wants 20 million tons of grain in the reserve, whereas the State Department wants 60 million tons put in reserve.

Secretary Kissinger: Just a nuance of difference. [Laughter.]

Q. I wonder if you have reached any conclusions, and if you have, what would your compromise be?

Secretary Kissinger: Well, the figure—the principles that I outlined today on the world food reserve have been agreed to by the Agriculture Department, and therefore it is a historic occasion when both the State Department and the Agriculture Department have a joint position.

Now, how you would translate—you remember that one of the principles is that the reserves should be able to meet foreseeable shortfalls, or something like that. I think that would tend to push them to the higher rather than to the lower figure on that spectrum, but obviously the precise figure is one that will have to be negotiated.

Q. Okay.

Q. Mr. Secretary—

Secretary Kissinger: Yes.

Q. —in several of his speeches, former President Nixon referred to the situation in Viet-Nam as “peace with honor.” Whatever happened to peace with honor? Did it ever really exist?

Secretary Kissinger: I think it is important in assessing any foreign policy to look, first of all, at the alternatives that were available. After all, we found 550,000 Americans engaged in combat in Viet-Nam when we took office, and we found an existing and constantly growing demand for the withdrawal of American forces and the release of American prisoners. And, if you remember, the criticism that was made of our efforts at the time was not that we were making too many concessions. The universal criticism was that we were asking for too-stringent conditions.

Secondly, it was our objective—for which we do not apologize—not to end a war in which the United States had suffered tens of thousands of casualties and spent untold treasure by overthrowing the government which we had been largely responsible for installing and with which we had been associated for so many years.

So our definition of peace with honor was a withdrawal of American forces, a release of American prisoners, and to create conditions in which that government would have an opportunity to survive.

Now, in the two years after the agreement was signed, many conditions changed in ways that were totally unpredictable at the time the agreement was signed. One was the total collapse, or the substantial collapse, of executive authority in the United States as a result of Watergate, which encouraged pressure. Secondly, there were a number of legislative restrictions. And, third, there were reductions in aid.

So we thought—and I still believe—that the terms we achieved were better than anybody thought possible at the time. And we thought that they were in the national interest and that the United States should not put it on itself to end such a war by overthrowing its allies.

Q. Mr. Secretary—

Secretary Kissinger: And I think the consequences we are seeing today would have been even more severe if we had done this. And that was the only alternative we had at that time.

Q. Secretary Kissinger, do you feel that in the light of recent events, such as Communist takeovers of South Viet-Nam and Cambodia—and now apparently Laos—that the domino theory is manifesting itself?

Secretary Kissinger: I have always held the view that any action in foreign policy has consequences—that you cannot end these consequences simply by denying that they exist. So a certain domino effect is inherent in any major action. And when a great country like the United States engages in a massive enterprise for 10 years and then

this enterprise founders, inevitably there is a certain domino effect.

Now, our problem is not to deny that this effect exists, but to manage the new situation. We would like to avoid a debilitating debate about these events. And I want to make clear that my answer on peace with honor was in response to a question; it is not an issue which we will raise.

It is now important to face the facts that we now confront and to deal with them. I believe we can deal with them, and we will deal with them. But we can't deny that there have been consequences.

Q. Mr. Secretary, can you say why you chose St. Louis and Kansas City as forums for foreign policy speeches?

Secretary Kissinger: Well, I believe that the conduct of our foreign policy requires, very strongly, the support of the American people, and I believe also that here in the center of America that we have too much of a tendency to take it¹ for granted. I've been invited for many months to visit St. Louis, and therefore I took the opportunity of this period when I believe that it is important for the public to understand that we have a purpose in foreign policy—that we think it can be realized—to talk about our political objectives in one part of Missouri and then of our economic objectives in another.

This is essentially why I chose to come here.

Q. Mr. Secretary, in North Korea, do you foresee any type of movement across the DMZ [demilitarized zone] there, or any jockeying for a more stronger position in that area?

Secretary Kissinger: Well, the President has strongly reaffirmed our commitment—our security commitment—to South Korea. As you know, this commitment is one that is embodied in a treaty which has been ratified; and therefore there is no ambiguity about what our commitment is.

I do not believe that there will be a North Korean military move unless North Korea

questions the validity of our commitment. And I think they would make a mistake if they did this.

Q. Do we have troops?

Secretary Kissinger: Well, we have 40,000 troops there.

Q. Mr. Secretary, since about 1919 the U.S. foreign policy with regard to the Communist countries generally has been based on the single theme of containment. You have talked about dealing with the consequences of recent developments in Indochina. It seems apparent that the idea of "what's theirs is theirs and what's ours we will talk about" has not worked too well. Is there any chance that there will be a major change in foreign policy?

Secretary Kissinger: The policy of containment does not mean what is theirs is theirs and what is ours we will talk about. And what hasn't worked in Indochina is not that they talked about what was ours, but that for a variety of reasons we were not prepared to sustain the effort there or the effort was never capable of being sustained.

But in any event, it is not a correct description of American foreign policy that what is theirs is theirs and what is ours we will talk about.

Q. Mr. Secretary, what are the prospects of Thailand and Burma? Will they need help?

Secretary Kissinger: Well, Burma is of course a neutralist country and has no direct—I mean it has diplomatic relations with us but it has no form of security relationship with us.

Thailand is a member of the Southeast Asia Treaty Organization and as such is connected with us in that military organization. What Thailand will do in the light of events in neighboring countries which the United States proved unable or unwilling to stem—I would expect that Thailand will review its policy, and indeed it has stated that it will review its policy. The willingness of all countries that are potentially threatened by North Vietnamese or other Communist pressures in Southeast Asia to resist is one

¹The center of America. [Footnote in transcript.]

of the issues that will have to be looked at in assessing the consequences of Indochina.

Q. Mr. Secretary, a report from Washington today indicates the possibility that the Mayaguez was carrying military weapons, in fact, under lease to the U.S. military. Is this correct?

Secretary Kissinger: To the best of my knowledge this is not correct. The last information that I had was that it was not carrying weapons, that it was a container ship carrying miscellaneous cargo, including some PX supplies. But it is not something to which I want to be finally held, because I have not seen the manifest. What I do know is that the highest officials of the government, when they learned of this, were dealing with it as a merchant ship, finding out information from the company to which it belonged, and therefore we are dealing with it as the seizure of an American merchant ship on peaceful trade in international waters. And I think no other interpretation has yet come to my attention or is valid.

Q. Mr. Secretary, what has been learned about Cambodia's possible reasons for taking the ship? Has there been any communication indicating—

Secretary Kissinger: I don't want to speculate on this. I have no—

Q. Have we been in communication with them?

Secretary Kissinger: I have said that we are pursuing diplomatic efforts to secure the release of the ship.

Q. Mr. Secretary, how much pressure is there on the Administration to use force now to get the ship back? If there is some pressure, where is it coming from, what part of the government?

Secretary Kissinger: Well, as you all know, I got out of town as soon as things got hot. [Laughter.] But I have been in close touch with Washington. We are proceeding with deliberation and determination. And we will make the decision not on the basis of what pressures are brought on us, but what

is most likely to secure the release of the ship.

Q. Who is bringing pressure on you—the Pentagon, Congress, any sector of Congress?

Secretary Kissinger: Well, I have seen a lot of public statements that have been made by various Congressmen with various points of view. But I think as far as the government is concerned—I attended one NSC [National Security Council] meeting, I have had a full report on another one—I have the impression that the government is fully united on the course that needs to be taken. There are no pressures within the government that are trying to push the President in a direction in which he doesn't want to go. So I think this ought to be looked at from the point of view of a problem that the country has, with which it is trying to deal in the most effective way possible.

Q. Mr. Secretary, have you taken a stand on participation in the Geneva Conference by the PLO [Palestine Liberation Organization]?

Secretary Kissinger: We have not taken a formal stand on it. Our view is that until the PLO recognizes the existence of Israel and the relevant resolutions, we don't have a decision to make, because until that is done, we don't see that any negotiation with it could be even theoretically contemplated. After that, we might look at the problem. But this situation does not now exist.

Q. Mr. Secretary, you were asked before about Hawks. Were you saying that the supplying of Hawks to Jordan was likely to keep Jordan from war with Israel?

Secretary Kissinger: It enables Jordan to pursue the kind of moderate policy that we have sought to encourage and to rely on its own resources rather than on those of its neighbors or other foreign countries.

Q. Wasn't its lack of air defense its reason for not being in the last war? And now they will have an air defense.

Secretary Kissinger: I think they would have no difficulty getting an air defense, if

they wanted it badly enough, from any number of sources.

Q. Mr. Secretary, why was it not possible, then, to keep that decision in abeyance until after the reassessment of Mideast policy?

Secretary Kissinger: Partly because there has been a whole series of ongoing shipments to Israel that have also continued during this period of reassessment. And this particular negotiation was more in the category of an ongoing one than of moving into a totally new area of technology.

Q. Wasn't it true that the Israelis have been asking also for new weapons systems, like the Lance and the F-15—

Secretary Kissinger: But the Lance and the F-15—the Israelis possess Hawks. The Lance and the F-15 are in a quite different category. Indeed, the F-15 cannot be delivered until late 1977, anyway. So no irrevocable decisions have been taken there.

The press: Thank you, Mr. Secretary.

Prime Minister Lee of Singapore Visits Washington

Prime Minister Lee Kuan Yew of Singapore made an unofficial visit to the United States May 5-11. Following is an exchange of toasts between President Ford and Prime Minister Lee at a White House dinner May 8.

Weekly Compilation of Presidential Documents dated May 12

PRESIDENT FORD

We are here, all of us this evening, to welcome to Washington the very distinguished Prime Minister and Mrs. Lee of Singapore, and we are delighted to have both of you here, Mr. Prime Minister and Mrs. Lee.

Regrettably, I have not yet had the opportunity, Mr. Prime Minister, to visit Singapore and, unfortunately, until this morning, I had never had the opportunity to get acquainted with you and to exchange views

with you. But obviously, because of your reputation and your country's reputation, I have known both of you.

And I must say that the reputation of both the country and yourself is carried very far throughout the world. In its brief existence, Mr. Prime Minister, a decade of independence, Singapore has compiled a tremendous reputation and record of accomplishment.

Asian traditions have blended in this case very successfully with modern technology to produce a prosperous and a very progressive society without sacrificing a distinctive cultural heritage.

Singapore has built for itself a position of great respect and influence in Southeast Asia and throughout the rest of the world, and I have noticed that in my many contacts with other leaders in the Commonwealth, as well as elsewhere.

As the principal architect of this success, the Prime Minister has become widely known, not only for what Singapore has accomplished under his leadership but also for his very broad grasp of international relationships.

Over the last decade, he has achieved a very special status among world leaders for his very thoughtful and his articulate interpretations of world events. He is a man of vision whose views are very relevant to world issues and whose advice is widely sought.

When the Prime Minister speaks, we all listen most carefully for good and sufficient reasons, and we come away from those experiences far wiser.

And I am especially pleased that we have an opportunity to exchange views with the Prime Minister at this time. We have had a tragedy in Indochina. It is affecting all of the countries in Southeast Asia, as well as all of us who are deeply concerned for the future of Southeast Asia and for the cause of freedom.

It has made the problems of Southeast Asia much more difficult. But let me say without reservation, we are determined to deal affirmatively with those problems, and we will deal with them.

The Prime Minister's visit gives us the benefit of his experience and his wisdom in assessing the current situation in that part of the world. It also gives me the opportunity to assure him that our commitments in Southeast Asia, and elsewhere if I might add, are honored and will be honored, and that our concern for the security and for the welfare of free nations in Southeast Asia is undiminished.

Mr. Prime Minister and Mrs. Lee, it is a great pleasure for Mrs. Ford and myself to have you here with us this evening and at last to have an opportunity to have an acquaintanceship and a fine evening with you. Both Mrs. Ford and I have looked forward to this for some time.

Ladies and gentlemen, I ask you now to raise your glasses and join with me in offering a toast to the Prime Minister of Singapore and to Mrs. Lee.

PRIME MINISTER LEE

Mr. President, Mrs. Ford, ladies and gentlemen: It is two years since I was here as a guest on a similar occasion—a guest of your predecessor. For America, her friends and allies, the world has been somewhat diminished since then.

In the first years after the end of World War II, the great events were the cold war, the Marshall plan, the Berlin blockade, the Korean war. In each one of these trials of will and strength, America and her allies in Western Europe, and later Japan, came out strong and united.

But the dramatic turn of events of the last two years—the war in the Middle East in October 1973, followed by an oil embargo, a fourfold increase in oil prices, the partitioning of Cyprus in June 1974, and more recently, the loss of Cambodia to the Khmer Rouge and the capture of South Viet-Nam by the North Vietnamese army—have weakened America and her allies.

Economic recession and increased unemployment on top of the crisis of confidence of a Watergate and other related issues bequeathed a host of problems on your great

office. They have become the more difficult to resolve because of bitterness and animosities within America and between America and her allies over past policies and, worse, over suspected future courses of action.

Then, as the United States was near distraction as a result of these problems, the North Vietnamese, who had been well supplied in the meantime with arms by her allies, struck with suddenness and boldness and brought off a great political coup, routing the South Vietnamese Army. They had judged the mood of America correctly. They got away with it. These events have grave implications for the rest of Asia, and I make bold to suggest, subsequently for the rest of the world.

I hope you would not think it inappropriate of me to express more than just sympathy or even sorrow that so many Americans were killed and maimed and so much resources expended by successive Democratic and Republican Administrations to reach this result. It was an unmitigated disaster. It was not inevitable that this should have been so, especially in this catastrophic manner, nor the problems would now end just with Communist control of Cambodia, South Viet-Nam, and Laos, and of their allegiance to competing Communist centers of power.

Now much will depend upon your Administration getting problems back into perspective. An economically weakened America with recession dampening the economies of Western Europe and Japan, leading to falling commodity prices for the developing world—other than the oil producers—was threatening to further weaken other non-Communist governments the world over.

Now it looks as if the worst may be over. It may take some time and no little effort to sort out the complex problems of the Middle East, to remove the threat of a sudden cut in supplies in oil, at reasonable prices.

Next comes the restoration of confidence in the capacity of the United States to act in unison in a crisis. No better service can be done to non-Communist governments the world over than to restore confidence that

the American Government can and will act swiftly and in tandem between the Administration and Congress in any case of open aggression, and where you have a treaty obligation, to do so.

If the President and Congress can speak in one voice on basic issues of foreign policy and in clear and unmistakable terms, then friends and allies will know where they stand and others will not be able to pretend to misunderstand when crossing the line from insurgency into open aggression. Then the world will see less adventurism.

When confusion reigns, it is more often because men's minds are confused rather than that the situation is confused. I found considerable clarity of exposition on future policies, both here in our discussions this morning and in most of my discussions on Capitol Hill. There was no congruence, complete congruence of attitudes and policies, but I believe there is or should be enough common ground on major issues. If this common ground can form the foundation of a coherent, consistent policy between now and the next Presidential elections, there would be great relief around the world.

Like the rest of the world, we in Asia have to get our people reconciled to slower rates of growth now that the cost of energy has nearly quintupled. But growth, however slow compared to what it used to be, would be of immense help in keeping the world peaceful and stable. Only then will great matters be accorded the priorities they deserve, and men's minds will be less confused.

One such confusion is that since Viet-Nam and Cambodia were not America's to lose in the first place, then nothing has been lost. It is this apologetic explaining away of a grave setback that worries many of America's friends. Since we do not belong to you, then you have lost nothing anyway if we are lost.

I am happy to tell you, Mr. President, that my immediate neighbors and I have not been lost. Indeed, we have every intention to coordinate our actions and policies to in-

sure that we will never be lost. It is a euphemism for a takeover, often by force. It will help if Americans, particularly those in the mass media, do not find this strange.

Mr. President, I have expounded this last week in Jamaica, as a consequence of which my friend, the British Foreign Secretary, Jim Callaghan, said it made him melancholy. And I went back and quoted a Chinese metaphor saying—4,000 years of variegated living, sometimes in prosperous, often in less prosperous circumstances, and the same language, polished and repolished over some 3000-plus years, one can usually find something apt.

It runs thus: Saiwung Chima—Saiwung is a name of a man who lived in the Sung Dynasty—he had many horses. One day he lost one. Who knows what tragedy he felt? The great chairman may not. I don't know whether this is ideologically purist in its approach, but it has a philosophical explanation for fortune and misfortune. The horse was a loss, great loss. The horse came back and brought another horse—profit. His son rode the horse and was thrown off and broke his leg. Great pity. War came and the young men were conscripted, but his son, having broke his leg, missed the conscription. Unlike his many other contemporaries, he survived—but with a broken leg, mended.

It is as much to console my friend Jim Callaghan as it is to give me that degree of solace and sometimes objectivity. Who knows—two years ago it was a different world; two years from hence could be better, could be worse, but I do not believe in Marxist-Leninist predetermination.

I have been able to spend a delightful evening beside your wife, Mr. President. I read of you, and it was as I found it—that you were open, direct, easy to get along with, but with decided views. I did not know, however, that you had a gracious wife who made me feel completely at home, and I enjoyed my evening.

So, ladies and gentlemen, if you would join me in wishing the President and Mrs. Ford good health, good fortune, long life.

The U.S. Role in the Search for Peace in the Middle East

Remarks by Joseph J. Sisco
Under Secretary for Political Affairs¹

The Middle East is a strategic area of the world in terms of geography, international politics, energy resources, trade and investment, communications, transit, and culture. Therefore it is an area of major interest to the United States. Moreover, it is the home of ancient and magnificent cultures and of people who should never be forgotten in favor of political abstractions. Our basic interests have been constant for the past quarter of a century. But the dramatically increased importance of the area has given a new dimension to our traditional interests.

There are certain fundamental considerations which guide U.S. thinking and policy in the Middle East:

—The United States has broad and far-reaching political, economic, and strategic interests throughout the region.

—The interests and concerns of two global powers, the United States and the U.S.S.R., meet in the Middle East, and the possibility of confrontation is evident. The Middle East situation also has important implications for Western Europe, Japan, and the developing nations.

—The United States is determined to continue the improvement of relations with the nations of the Arab world, where we have such important political, economic, and cultural ties. At the same time, the United States is determined to continue its support for Israel's security.

—The United States is determined to maintain a key role in seeking through the diplomatic negotiating process a peaceful and just settlement of the Arab-Israeli conflict; vital American interests are involved.

—The United States seeks to avoid polarization of the Middle East into antagonistic ideological camps where domination by one outside power would be facilitated.

—The United States desires to help the people of the area pursue their national development, knowing as all you do, that self-help is the key to achievement.

These are, therefore, basic factors which are involved in the formulation of our foreign policy in the Middle East. We have sought to preserve our interests in this area in one way: we have pursued an active diplomacy with a view to making practical progress toward a just and durable peace which will guarantee the security and peaceful existence of all the states in the area, including Israel, and meet the legitimate interests of all the peoples in the area, including the Palestinians.

America's interests can best be served by resolving the Arab-Israeli conflict by peaceful means. The absence of peace has kept the area in turmoil, created pressures on the U.S. position in the Middle East, and provided opportunities to our adversaries.

That is why peace has been our objective since 1948. But we have not yet found the secret to achieving it, although on several occasions it appeared possible. Indeed, the history of the Arab-Israeli struggle has been one of lost opportunities. Throughout the period of my involvement, the peoples of the area have been locked in incessant struggle, a cycle of wars followed by uneasy cease-fires, followed again by bloodshed and tragedy. Thus, two peoples have been thrown together in what history will undoubtedly recall not as a series of wars but as one long war broken by occasional armistices and temporary cease-fires.

Before 1967 no Arab government would speak of peace with Israel. In fact, the situation was quite the opposite, and U.S. policy was focused primarily on containing area tensions, not solving them.

In 1967 there was a historic change. The June war unfroze the situation, and U.N.

¹ Made before the third annual convention of the National Association of Arab Americans at Washington on May 9 (text from press release 244; introductory paragraphs omitted).

Resolution 242 established the framework for peace.

Unfortunately this opportunity was missed, and the situation froze again until 1971, when peace opportunities again appeared. However, in the absence of negotiations in which principles could be translated into specific commitments, there was no agreement. U.S. policy focused on seeking total solutions and later on maintaining the cease-fire, but the lack of progress led inevitably to the October 1973 war.

Another war once again unfroze the situation, and the United States moved rapidly to try again for a peaceful settlement. At that point we had two immediate objectives: First, to bring about a cease-fire and, second, to do so in a manner that would leave us in a position to play a constructive role with both the Arabs and the Israelis in trying to shape a more durable peace. It was evident that the search for peace would be arduous and that a lasting settlement could only be approached, at least initially, through a series of discrete steps in which the settlement of any particular issue would not be dependent upon the settlement of all issues.

Even though that approach suffered a setback in March 1975 with the suspension of the last Egyptian-Israeli talks on a further disengagement in Sinai, we must not forget the progress that has been made:

—For the most part the guns have remained silent.

—Disengagement agreements between Israel and Egypt and Israel and Syria have been concluded.

—We demonstrated that the United States can have relations of trust and understanding with Arab nations, and even improve those relations, while maintaining our support for Israel's security.

—We have helped the Arabs and Israelis to move at least a small step toward mutual

understanding. A dialogue has been started.

We know that there must be further stages in the diplomatic process. Our immediate objective is to prevent a diplomatic void. If there is no diplomatic progress, then the prospects for increased tensions in the area are enhanced. We do not want a return to the stalemated situation which led to the 1973 war; stagnation is not in the U.S. interest, and there is no realistic alternative to the United States remaining actively involved.

President Ford has recently ordered a reassessment of our Middle East policy. We seek a policy which will protect the overall U.S. interests I cited earlier. We are determined to recapture the momentum toward peace because the alternative is not a prolonged stalemate—the alternative is a likely deterioration to a renewal of hostilities.

We are studying all diplomatic options, including the possibilities of (a) picking up the negotiations where they broke off or (b) moving the negotiations to Geneva.

There is room for hope. Most of the countries in the area have adopted a more moderate course. Instead of concentrating solely on preparations for war, a number have demonstrated that they are ready to consider, however tentatively, the possible fruits of peace.

Let me assure you, as concerned Americans of Arab origin, that the United States will continue to play a major role in the search for peace in that troubled region of the world. It is evident that a stable and lasting peace in the world requires a stable and durable settlement in the Middle East.

I am convinced that the peoples of the area are sick and tired of war. They yearn for the blessings of peace in order to get on with the task of developing their societies. We shall endeavor to help them realize their aspirations.

Relief and Resettlement of Vietnamese and Cambodian Refugees

Following are statements by L. Dean Brown, Special Representative of the President and Director of the Interagency Task Force on Indochina refugee relief and resettlement, made before the Subcommittee on Foreign Operations of the House Committee on Appropriations on May 8, before the Senate Committee on Foreign Relations on May 12, and before the Subcommittee on Foreign Operations of the Senate Committee on Appropriations on May 13.¹

HOUSE SUBCOMMITTEE ON FOREIGN OPERATIONS, MAY 8

The tragic outcome of events in Indochina has thrust upon the United States a gigantic humanitarian responsibility. Over 130,000 Vietnamese and Cambodians have fled their countries in fear of persecution; all expected American help, even those who were rescued at sea—resulting in the largest movement of refugees over a short period of time that the United States has ever faced. Confronted by sudden tragedy, we have responded with all the means at our disposal; we must continue to do so if we are to transport to safety those refugees under our protection, resettle those who enter the United States, and support an international resettlement effort.

The urgency of the situation is clear to all of us. I am grateful to this committee for affording me the earliest of opportunities to describe the steps which the United States has taken to date in meeting its responsibilities and to report on the Refugee and Migra-

tion Act of 1975, which contains the funds necessary to continue this effort. The committee is aware of the pressing need for funding. Within several days we shall exhaust existing funds and without new obligation authority cannot transport or resettle even those refugees currently under our protection.

Let me review with you briefly the steps which we have taken to date:

—We have directly evacuated over 40,000 Vietnamese and 7,000 Americans principally by air, including a dramatic helicopter extraction under hostile and hazardous conditions.

—We have in addition rescued at sea or escorted some 67,000 other Vietnamese who escaped and sought refuge at great peril to their lives.

—We have established two staging centers in the Western Pacific to receive about 65,000 persons, manned by our military forces and civilians specializing in health, immigration, and refugee assistance, in less than a week.

—We have created and staffed three reception centers in the United States capable of receiving up to 42,500 refugees at one time.

—We have organized a massive air and sea transportation system to bring refugees from the Philippines and Thailand to Guam and Wake and on to the United States. The system at the same time furnishes the logistical support to our distant Pacific centers.

—We have launched a resettlement program in the United States in cooperation with nine voluntary agencies and those departments of government concerned with resettlement, including, inter alia, Health,

¹ The complete transcripts of the hearings will be published by the committees and will be available from the Superintendent of Documents, U.S. Government Printing Office, Washington, D.C. 20402.

Education, and Welfare; Defense; Housing and Urban Development; Transportation; Justice; Treasury; State.²

—We have begun to reunite separated families and have already brought more than 12,000 Vietnamese and Americans together with their American families and sponsors.

—We have undertaken a vigorous series of diplomatic initiatives with multilateral agencies and with nations worldwide to find resettlement opportunities in third countries. The results to date have not, quite frankly, been encouraging, but we continue to press this effort.

Now permit me to turn to the pressing order of business before us today. You must remember that we are making an initial assessment of a situation which remains quite fluid. We are projecting a figure for a total of 130,000 refugees for whom the United States may have to assume ultimate responsibility. We are also assuming that many of these refugees will be remaining in restaging areas for three months or longer. The numbers, however, might be less and the duration of their stay in these areas shorter.

The Migration and Refugee Assistance Act of 1975 provides statutory authorization for a temporary program, to extend no longer than fiscal year 1977, of relief and resettlement for refugees from Cambodia and Viet-Nam. The assistance will be provided under the Migration and Refugee Assistance Act of 1962, as amended, utilizing the established procedures and administrative machinery with which the voluntary agencies and state and local governments are familiar. The authorization provides for daily maintenance for the refugees at the staging areas; transportation to other areas in the United States; public health care; bilingual, vocational, and remedial educa-

² The cooperating voluntary agencies are: U.S. Catholic Conference; American Fund for Czechoslovak Refugees; Church World Service; Lutheran Immigration and Refugee Service; United HIAS Service, Inc.; Tolstoy Foundation, Inc.; International Rescue Committee; American Council for Nationalities Service; Traveler's Aid-International Social Services.

tion; adult education courses; possible welfare costs; and transportation costs for the movement of some refugees to third countries. These programs will be available only to those refugees who meet the requirements of financial need applicable to other refugees assisted under the 1962 act and will terminate no later than the end of fiscal year 1977.

The unexpected collapse of South Viet-Nam has resulted in the exodus of over 100,000 people in three short weeks, the largest influx of refugees in our history in so short a period of time. We have presented to the committee our estimate of costs based on the best information of the refugee situation available to the Administration today. Some of the costs are fixed and represent one-time expenditures—the costs of the staging and reception centers and transportation. Other costs are long-term investments. I feel very strongly that any reduction in this request will impede our resettlement efforts and lead to greater costs in the long run. A reduction would likely leave a larger portion of the refugees in the centers longer, offer fewer training opportunities, and dampen the enthusiasm of the voluntary agencies in their support of the program. We know from experience that a small investment in the short run is likely to pay off handsomely in the long run in the ability of these people to enter society productively.

America has a tradition of extending a warm hand of welcome to those who are forced to flee to our shores. We are asking for no more today.

SENATE COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN RELATIONS, MAY 12

The rapid collapse of the Governments of Viet-Nam and Cambodia has unleashed a virtual flood of refugees who, in the great majority, have turned to the United States for rescue and safe haven. The United States has welcomed to its shores hundreds of thousands of refugees from Europe and Latin America. We absorbed the flow successfully and to our general benefit. In the

present instance, however, we are faced with a situation of unprecedented dimensions. Never before have we been called upon to absorb as large an influx in so short a period of time or to move so many refugees over such great distances. We do not have the cushion which camps for displaced persons in Europe provided or the flexibility which the gradual arrival of Cubans over a period of several years afforded us.

The United States has responded magnificently in evacuating or rescuing at sea almost 120,000 Vietnamese and Cambodians; our military forces, which made the evacuation possible, deserve special credit. They have in addition readied staging areas in the Pacific and reception centers in the United States and provided the transportation and logistical system to support this gigantic movement.

The civilian agencies of government which the President drew together into an Inter-agency Task Force on April 18 have contributed impressively. The voluntary agencies traditionally charged with resettlement are straining to meet their responsibilities; and Americans—corporations, labor unions, state and municipal governments, and private citizens—have generously and, despite present difficult economic conditions, offered support.

We must continue to move with utmost speed if we are to accomplish the task so clearly at hand. The Administration has proposed legislation which will provide \$507 million. I am sure I speak for the President when I express appreciation to the Congress for setting aside normal practice in order to give the legislation urgent consideration.

The evacuation and resettlement of the refugees is of profound importance to the United States. The domestic implications are significant, albeit in our opinion manageable; our ability to care for these victims of the wars in Viet-Nam and Cambodia and the quality of our response has a foreign policy dimension. We support free movement of peoples, we are committed to the protection of refugees, and we stand by those whom we befriend when adversity becomes their turn.

Let me turn to the legislation you are now

considering. Our estimate of the refugee situation has not changed since the President proposed the present bill. Our principal assumptions and intentions are:

—Up to 150,000 Vietnamese and Cambodians will require resettlement in the United States and third countries.

—Almost 130,000 refugees will be resettled in the United States. In cooperation with private voluntary agencies, we will seek to disperse them geographically and will avoid locating them in areas of high unemployment. It is our intention that they reach their new homes prepared for life in the United States and capable of being absorbed into America's society and economy.

—About 10 percent of the refugees will find homes in third countries. We will continue to press on a multilateral and a bilateral basis a vigorous campaign to bring this humanitarian issue to the international community's attention and obtain its cooperation, but we assume the heaviest burden will fall to the United States.

In order to accomplish our objectives, we are asking the Congress to provide funds which will:

—Pay for the air and sea movement of refugees to the Pacific staging areas, the continental United States, and to third countries.

—Provide temporary food and medical care and screening at our staging and reception sites.

—Permit resettlement in communities throughout the United States under voluntary agency and similar auspices.

—Furnish limited vocational and language training.

—Provide adequate Federal support in the areas of health and welfare to defray charges to state and local governments.

The program is not new; it does not differ meaningfully from the assistance we have provided earlier generations of refugees. But speed is essential. Without new funds the resettlement effort cannot pick up the speed we require to clear our centers and

permit the movement of those refugees at our Pacific staging areas to the continental United States.

I would urge the members of this committee to give their urgent and favorable attention to the Administration's request for funds for evacuation and resettlement assistance. The problems we face in this last and tragic moment of the Indochina conflict call for a dramatic humanitarian response on the part of all Americans. We cannot afford to delay.

SENATE SUBCOMMITTEE ON FOREIGN OPERATIONS, MAY 13

I would like to address today some of the long-term aspects of the resettlement of refugees from Indochina.

At this point, we have about 115,000 persons in the U.S. system, of whom approximately 15,000 have completed processing and are already at homes in the United States. In my opinion, this initial flow will prove to be the easiest to absorb, since they are largely persons who are related to U.S. citizens or have an identifiable American sponsor. The more difficult task will come when we seek to resettle persons who have no specific sponsors.

How are we planning to deal with this larger and more difficult problem?

Our first effort has been to bring the voluntary agencies directly into the resettlement process, since they have traditionally been most effective in settling refugees from abroad, such as with the Hungarians and Ugandan Asians. The voluntary agencies will have the principal responsibility of finding sponsors who are capable of meeting their obligations, though the government will be able to assist the agencies by providing the names of those who have called to volunteer their help. The voluntary agencies will subsequently have to match qualified sponsors with specific groups of refugees before they can be actually moved out of the reception centers.

We have agreed on certain general guidelines with the voluntary agencies on how

this procedure should be carried out. First, we will avoid resettling the refugees in areas which are economically depressed and have high rates of unemployment; secondly, the refugees will not be concentrated in specific localities but will, rather, be resettled throughout the country to the maximum extent possible. For these reasons, I do not believe that the refugees are going to be a significant burden on our economy or are going to impact heavily on our unemployment problem, especially since we are only talking about finding jobs for 30,000-35,000 heads of household.

Once the refugee is placed in a community, the role of the voluntary agencies will be to provide an allowance if needed for initial resettlement costs such as food, clothing, and shelter, though in most instances we expect the sponsor will be able to pick up most of these expenses. They will also provide counseling to the sponsors and refugees as required and generally follow up to insure that the resettlement is proceeding smoothly.

There are a variety of other programs which we know from previous experience are needed to have a successful resettlement program over the long term. These include most importantly providing special language training and vocational training for those who need to improve existing skills or acquire new ones. We will also need a social services program which could provide assistance to refugees in order to prevent them from going on public welfare. These services would not go beyond those provided to other residents of the communities in which the refugees are located. They could include arranging for needed medical services, providing counseling in order to retain or obtain employment, or dealing with vocational rehabilitation for persons who have disabilities.

We must also face the problem of breakdowns in the system as a result of difficult placement cases or serious mismatches in the sponsorship process. We have started contingency Federal planning to develop information which could assist with residual resettlement problems. For example, we have asked Health, Education, and Welfare, in

operation with Labor, to report on employment sectors where skills are presently in short supply and Interior to analyze land availability in our Pacific or Caribbean areas for rice farming or tropical agriculture. I would emphasize, however, that we will rely heavily on the private voluntary agencies to provide these services to the extent possible when the system for whatever reason breaks down.

These are some of our views on how resettlement will take place over the coming months in the United States. We also expect that some refugees—I estimate 10 percent, or 10,000 to 15,000—will be resettled in other countries. Canada has moved quickly on this matter and has said they will accept 3,000 refugees over and above those who already have documentation to enter Canada. The United Kingdom has declared they will take “a number of refugees,” and I expect Australia and other countries will also help.

We have followed two tracks in our effort to involve the international agencies and other governments in the resettlement of refugees from Indochina. First, we appealed directly to a number of governments to accept refugees into their countries. Secondly, we have been in constant contact with the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) and the Inter-Governmental Committee on European Migration

(ICEM), who are the two principal international agencies responsible for resettlement.

Among other things, we have been providing these two agencies with the results of our approach to other governments in order that they can take followup action. The process has not moved as quickly as I would have liked. However, UNHCR has asked 40 countries to help by accepting refugees for permanent resettlement; and UNHCR, ICEM, and the ICRC [International Committee of the Red Cross] have representatives on Guam who are screening refugees who wish to go to third countries. The UNHCR also has the responsibility for taking care of those who wish to go back to Viet-Nam.

In conclusion, Mr. Chairman, I believe we have acted quickly in establishing a system and program to deal with the large number of refugees who fled Viet-Nam and Cambodia after their collapse. We can never forget this is a major human tragedy. Nor should we overlook that our present problems are unprecedented, given the large number of refugees who have been transported over great distances and received, fed, and sheltered in staging areas in the Pacific and reception centers in the United States and are now to be resettled permanently in the United States or other countries. Our requirements are urgent and need a speedy resolution.

Department Discusses Means of Insuring Investment in Energy Sector

Statement by Thomas O. Enders

*Assistant Secretary for Economic and Business Affairs*¹

I am pleased to be with you today to discuss our energy policy and particularly factors associated with the necessary investment in the energy sector.

We start from the premise that the present level of American dependence on imported oil is excessive and that without substantial efforts in the United States and other major consuming countries the future vulnerability of the United States will be unacceptably high. It is more than 18 months since the October embargo demonstrated our vulnerability to the manipulation of our oil supply and oil prices. The situation remains grave, and the work needed to correct it is enormous.

The Project Independence report estimated that more than 450 billion 1973 dollars would be required between 1975 and 1985 to meet the needs of our energy sector (under an accelerated supply scenario).

Although energy investments will be massive during this period, the total capital pool expected to be available for energy is also substantial. According to the Project Independence report, projected investment in coal, oil, gas, and utilities would constitute less than 23 percent of business fixed investment during the period 1975 to 1985, an amount consistent with the energy sector's historic share.

While there may be enough investment resources to support the projected energy investment in the aggregate, this committee is well aware that any project or sector must compete in the marketplace with other projects and sectors to command a share of the capital available at any given time. Specific sectors of the energy industry may not be able to maintain their traditional share of investment because of constraints on equity financing, long-term debt, and short-run liabilities. In addition, the peculiar nature of the international energy market, in which a small group of oil-producing countries has concerted to establish and maintain a severely inflated price, may itself serve as a disincentive to investment in domestic energy sources.

Oil is traded internationally at the price dictated by a handful of producing governments which have agreed together to reap \$10.12 for each barrel of oil they sell. This figure compares with production costs in the range of 10-25 cents a barrel in the most productive oil-exporting countries.

The great spread between production costs and the cartel price illustrates the potential for declines in the world price, either motivated by the predatory objective of eliminating energy investment in the consuming countries—where costs are substantially higher—or resulting from the collapse of the cartel.

This threat is a deterrent to investors in alternative energy sources that involve costs well below the current international price of oil but far higher than production costs for oil in the OPEC [Organization of Petroleum

¹Submitted to the Subcommittees on Financial Markets and on Energy of the Senate Committee on Finance on May 7. The complete transcript of the hearings will be published by the committee and will be available from the Superintendent of Documents, U.S. Government Printing Office, Washington, D.C. 20402.

Exporting Countries] countries. Without some assurance that cheap imported oil will not be sold domestically below a certain safeguard level, investors and financiers are frequently reluctant to undertake the larger, capital-intensive investments needed to reduce our dependence on imported oil in the future.

Proposed Legislation

President Ford took account of the need "to provide the critical stability for our domestic energy production in the face of world price uncertainty" in his state of the Union message in January. At that time, the President announced his intention to seek legislation, now proposed in title IX of the Energy Independence Act of 1975, to "authorize and require tariffs, import quotas, or price floors to protect our energy prices at levels which will achieve energy independence."

Such an approach will remove an element of uncertainty for investors in domestic energy sources and also serve to retain consumption when world oil prices fall. Both these effects will contribute substantially to our objectives of greater energy independence.

According to data projected for the Project Independence report, a drop in the price of oil in 1985 from \$7.50 to \$4.50 a barrel (in constant 1974 dollars), in the absence of a safeguard, or floor, price, would increase oil consumption by about 5 million barrels per day while it would reduce domestic production by some 11 million barrels per day. As a result, imports would increase from less than 6 million barrels per day to more than 21 million barrels per day; i.e., from about one-fourth of our needs to about three-fourths of our total oil consumption.

The Energy Development Security Act (title IX) would authorize and direct the President to adopt appropriate measures to prevent the domestic prices of imported petroleum from falling to levels that would substantially deter the development and exploitation of domestic petroleum resources or would threaten to cause a substantial in-

crease in petroleum consumption. This authority is an essential element of any comprehensive program to deal credibly with our energy problem.

International Dimensions of a Solution

The market for energy is a world market. Consequently, we have a major interest in the ways other major consuming countries approach their energy problems, and they have a stake in our energy programs, for several reasons:

—First, we do not want to be the only country making the tough decisions and committing scarce resources to programs to encourage more energy production in our own territory. If all major consumers do what they can to exploit their domestic energy resources, we will hasten improvements in the supply-demand balance in world energy markets.

—Second, having committed ourselves to do what is required to achieve greater self-sufficiency in energy, we do not want to find ourselves alone someday on a high-cost energy track while industry in other countries again has access to low-cost imported oil. This situation could place our industry at a competitive disadvantage in world markets, partly as the paradoxical result of the success of our own programs to reduce dependence on imported oil.

—Finally, in the absence of a common approach to achieve a price at which imported oil will be sold in the domestic markets of the industrialized countries, a break in the world price could kick off a sharp resurgence in the world demand for oil. This result, made possible in large part by American efforts, could undo the very success of our efforts. The cycle would begin again of growing reliance on cheap oil from unreliable sources, and we would have the conditions for a return to high world prices.

For these reasons, we have been negotiating with other members of the International Energy Agency to develop a coordinated system of cooperation in the accelerated development of new energy. A preliminary agreement in the IEA recognizes the need for

governmental action in providing three interrelated policies:

—A framework of cooperation to provide specific incentives to investment on a project-by-project basis in energy production, especially synthetics and other high-cost fuels.

—A comprehensive energy research and development program under which parties in two or more IEA countries would cooperate on a project-by-project basis.

—An agreement to encourage and safeguard investment in the bulk of conventional energy sources through the establishment of a common minimum price below which we would not allow imported oil to be sold within our economies.

Common Minimum Safeguard Price

Each IEA country will be free to implement its commitment to the common minimum safeguard price by a measure of its own choosing—a tariff, a quota, or a variable levy. These measures would not have to be applied until the world price of petroleum fell below an agreed level which remains to be established on the basis of technical analysis.

Obviously, given our interest in a common approach among industrialized countries, we cannot defer negotiations to establish such an approach until prices soften greatly or actually break. To achieve the desired results, this commitment must be in place before the price falls so that investors can make the critical investment decisions now and so that we are not forced to build a dike in the midst of a flood.

One should be clear in discussing the safeguard price that it will not prevent our economies from enjoying the benefits of the lower international price for oil if and when it falls below the minimum safeguard price. Importing countries would pay the exporting countries no more than the world price, however low it might fall, capturing the balance-of-payments and income gains of the lower price while maintaining the minimum price internally to protect domestic investment. Users of oil in importing countries would receive the benefit of

any drop in world prices down to the level of the minimum safeguard price. The government would get the benefit of any drop below the safeguard minimum through, for example, tariff revenues. These funds would be available for public purposes.

Other Approaches to Investment Protection

Obviously, a minimum safeguard price is not the only means available to protect our domestic energy investments. Other policies have been suggested, and the Administration has examined other approaches. I would like to comment on two other policies which have been proposed for dealing with the phenomenon of downward price risk.

A deficiency payments scheme has been suggested by some as their preferred approach. If this policy were adopted, and the world price of oil fell below a specified level, the government would compensate domestic producers. Such compensation could be based on the difference between a reference price and the prevailing market price, or it could be based on the difference between a firm's production costs and the market price.

The first system is far simpler to administer because it would not entail the enormous cost-accounting task inherent in operating a scheme based on actual production costs, and it would retain an incentive for any firm to operate efficiently. It is, however, apt to be far more expensive than the latter system, in which some firms would receive only a portion of the difference between the reference price and the market price because their costs could be assumed to be well below the reference price.

We have calculated some estimates of the cost of operating a deficiency payments scheme. Our figures are calculated for payments based on production costs. Such deficiency payments would be lower than those associated with the full spread between a reference price and the market price.

If we assume that in 1985 the world price of oil drops from \$7.50 to \$4.50 a barrel (in constant 1974 dollars), the Treasury would have to expend an estimated \$8.7 billion a year to meet its commitments under this

kind of deficiency payments scheme. Conversely, under the minimum safeguard price, the Treasury could collect some \$6.1 billion in revenues from the tariff, variable levy, or other device employed to implement our commitment to a safeguard price.

There are other differences in the approaches. Under a common minimum safeguard price, the U.S. balance of trade would enjoy a \$6.1 billion annual improvement. The full benefit of the price drop would be felt in the trade balance because the volume of imports would not change. Under a deficiency payments scheme, however, consumer prices for energy would fall, demand for energy in general and oil in particular would be stimulated, and oil imports would nearly double in volume. As a result, the payments gain associated with the fall in the world price would be more than offset by the additional outlays for the larger volume of imports. The result would be an annual loss in our trade balance of \$2.3 billion. The net difference in the trade results between the two options amounts, therefore, to \$8.4 billion a year.

In short, the benefits citizens would enjoy as consumers under a deficiency payments scheme would have to be weighed against the liabilities they would incur as taxpayers under that scheme as compared with a common minimum safeguard price. More serious, in many respects, would be the reversal of progress we expect to have achieved by 1985 in substantially reducing our dependence on imported oil. This reversal would be felt in terms of both increased vulnerability (with the possibility of very substantial losses of GNP and employment in case of an embargo) and a deterioration in our trade balance.

Another approach that has been proposed to protect against downward price risk is for the government to conclude long-term purchase contracts with domestic investors in energy. Such contracts would give producers an option to sell their output to the government at a specified price. Thus firms would be assured that they would be able to sell their production at prices no lower than the contracted level but above that level if the market price were higher. The

government would apply its energy purchases to its own needs or sell the excess, at a loss, at the lower market price. Conceptually, this approach is only a variation of the deficiency payments scheme, pegged to a reference price. It has all of the same difficulties associated with deficiency payments plus the inefficiencies inherent in a large governmental operation in the market.

A common minimum safeguard price will work on our problems of both supply and demand when world oil prices fall. It is a vital element in our program to achieve our two essential objectives: a substantial decrease in the international price of oil and substantial U.S. self-sufficiency in energy.

TREATY INFORMATION

United States and Canada Renew NORAD Agreement

Press release 240 dated May 8

The United States and Canada have agreed to renew the North American Air Defense (NORAD) Agreement for an additional period of five years. The renewal was effected on May 8 at Washington by an exchange of notes signed by the Canadian Ambassador Marcel Cadieux and Deputy Assistant Secretary of State for Canadian Affairs Richard D. Vine.

NORAD is an integrated U.S.-Canadian air defense command which is responsible for the surveillance and control of North American airspace and for the defense of North America against air attack. U.S.-Canadian cooperation in this field is conducted within the general framework of mutual responsibilities under NATO. Established in 1957, NORAD headquarters is in Colorado Springs, Colo. The present commander in chief is Gen. L. D. Clay, Jr., U.S. Air Force, and his deputy is Lt. Gen. Richard C. Stovel, Canadian Forces.

The NORAD renewal takes into account the changes in the character of strategic

weapons and the threat posed by them to North America which have occurred since NORAD was first established. The agreement makes clear that the continuing, if changing, threat from the manned bomber still calls for close U.S.-Canadian cooperation in air defense for North America. While participating in the warning, aerospace surveillance, and control functions of NORAD, Canada will not participate in any active antiballistic missile defense. Under the terms of the new agreement, close coordination and cooperation will take place between civilian and military airspace control authorities in the United States and Canada.

Current Actions

MULTILATERAL

Atomic Energy

Protocol suspending the agreement of March 1, 1972 (TIAS 7295), between the International Atomic Energy Agency, Sweden, and the United States for the application of safeguards and providing for the application of safeguards pursuant to the nonproliferation treaty of July 1, 1968 (TIAS 6839). Signed at Vienna April 14, 1975. Entered into force: May 6, 1975.

Aviation

Amendment to article V of the agreement of September 25, 1956 (TIAS 4048), on the joint financing of certain air navigation services in Iceland to increase the financial limit for services for 1973. Done at Montreal March 13, 1975. Entered into force March 13, 1975.

Amendment of article V of the agreement of September 25, 1956 (TIAS 4048), on the joint financing of certain air navigation services in Iceland by increasing the financial limit for services. Adopted by the ICAO Council at Montreal March 27, 1975. Entered into force March 27, 1975.

Amendment of article V of the agreement of September 25, 1956 (TIAS 4049), on the joint financing of certain air navigation services in Greenland and the Faroe Islands by increasing the financial limit for services. Adopted by the ICAO Council at Montreal March 27, 1975. Entered into force March 27, 1975.

Biological Weapons

Convention on the prohibition of the development, production and stockpiling of bacteriological (biological) and toxin weapons and on their destruction. Done at Washington, London, and Moscow April 10, 1972. Entered into force March 26, 1975. Ratification deposited: Portugal, May 15, 1975.

Conservation

Convention on international trade in endangered species of wild fauna and flora, with appendices. Done at Washington March 3, 1973. Enters into force July 1, 1975. Proclaimed by the President: May 12, 1975.

Customs

Customs convention on containers, 1972, with annexes and protocol. Done at Geneva December 2, 1972.¹ Accession deposited: Spain (with reservation), April 16, 1975. Enters into force: December 6, 1975.

Narcotic Drugs

Convention on psychotropic substances. Done at Vienna February 21, 1975.¹ Accessions deposited: India, Lesotho, April 23, 1975.

Nuclear Weapons—Nonproliferation

Treaty on the nonproliferation of nuclear weapons. Done at Washington, London, and Moscow July 1, 1968. Entered into force March 5, 1970. TIAS 6839. Ratification deposited: The Gambia, May 12, 1975.

Program-Carrying Signals—Distribution by Satellite

Convention relating to the distribution of programme-carrying signals transmitted by satellite. Done at Brussels May 21, 1974.¹ Signature: France, March 27, 1975.

Property—Industrial

Convention of Paris for the protection of industrial property of March 20, 1883, as revised. Done at Stockholm July 14, 1967. Articles 1 through 12 entered into force May 19, 1970; for the United States August 25, 1973. Articles 13 through 30 entered into force April 26, 1970; for the United States September 5, 1970. TIAS 6923.

Notifications from World Intellectual Property Organization that ratifications deposited: Ivory Coast, February 4, 1974; Niger, December 6, 1974; Portugal, January 30, 1975.

Notifications from World Intellectual Property Organization that accessions deposited: Egypt, December 6, 1974; Togo, Republic of Viet-Nam, January 30, 1975.

Space

Convention on registration of objects launched into outer space. Opened for signature at New York January 14, 1975.¹ Signature: United Kingdom, May 6, 1975.

Telecommunications

International telecommunication convention, with annexes and protocols. Done at Malaga-Torremolinos October 25, 1973. Entered into force January 1, 1975.² Accession deposited: Fiji, April 17, 1975.

¹ Not in force.

² Not in force for the United States.

BILATERAL

Bulgaria

Consular convention, with agreed memorandum and exchange of letters. Signed at Sofia April 15, 1974. Entered into force May 29, 1975.

Proclaimed by the President: May 12, 1975.

Canada

Agreement terminating the United States and Canadian reservations relating to the nonscheduled air service agreement of May 8, 1974 (TIAS 7826), subject to certain understandings. Effected by exchange of notes at Washington March 19 and 20 and May 2, 1975. Entered into force May 2, 1975; effective March 19, 1975.

Agreement relating to the organization and operation of the North American Air Defense Command (NORAD). Effected by exchange of notes at Washington May 8, 1975. Entered into force May 8, 1975; effective May 12, 1975.

El Salvador

Agreement relating to the limitation of imports from El Salvador of fresh, chilled, or frozen meat of cattle, goats, and sheep, except lambs, during calendar year 1975. Effected by exchange of notes at San Salvador April 15 and 30, 1975. Entered into force April 30, 1975.

Federal Republic of Germany

Agreement regarding mutual assistance between the customs services of the United States and the Federal Republic of Germany. Signed at Washington August 23, 1973.

Enters into force: June 13, 1975.

Japan

Agreement concerning an international observer scheme for whaling operations from land stations in North Pacific Ocean. Signed at Tokyo May 2, 1975. Entered into force May 2, 1975.

Mexico

Agreement relating to trade in cotton, wool, and manmade fiber textiles, with annexes. Effected by exchange of notes at Washington May 12, 1975. Entered into force May 12, 1975; effective May 1, 1975.

Nicaragua

Agreement relating to the limitation of imports from Nicaragua of fresh, chilled, or frozen meat of cattle, goats, and sheep, except lambs, during calendar year 1975. Effected by exchange of notes at Managua April 16 and 23, 1975. Entered into force April 23, 1975.

Poland

Agreement deferring purchase by the United States of dollar exchange for zlotys accrued under certain agricultural commodities agreements and terminating the agreement of August 6, 1968 (TIAS 7473), relating to U.S. Government pensions, with schedule. Effected by exchange of notes at Washington May 15, 1975. Entered into force May 15, 1975.

Agreement concerning the method of payment to persons residing in Poland of pensions due from American authorities. Effected by exchange of notes at Warsaw August 6, 1968. Entered into force August 6, 1968. TIAS 7473.

Terminates: June 30, 1975.

Saudi Arabia

Agreement on guaranteed private investment. Signed at Washington February 27, 1975.

Entered into force: April 26, 1975.

Thailand

Agreement amending the agreement of March 16, 1972, concerning trade in cotton textiles, with related letters. Effected by exchange of notes at Bangkok April 21, 1975. Entered into force April 21, 1975; effective April 1, 1974.

Union of Soviet Socialist Republics

Agreement amending the protocol of June 23, 1973 (TIAS 7658), on questions relating to the expansion of air services under the civil air transport agreement of November 4, 1966 (TIAS 6135). Effected by exchange of notes at Moscow December 9, 1974, and April 16, 1975. Entered into force April 16, 1975.

United Nations Children's Fund

Agreement amending the grant agreement of December 26 and 30, 1975, as amended, concerning assistance for children and mothers in South Vietnam, Cambodia, and Laos. Signed at New York April 1, 1975. Entered into force April 1, 1975.

DEPARTMENT AND FOREIGN SERVICE

Confirmations

The Senate on May 7 confirmed the following nominations:

Lawrence S. Eagleburger to be Deputy Under Secretary of State [for Management].

William C. Harrop to be Ambassador to the Republic of Guinea.

John L. Loughran to be Ambassador to the Somali Democratic Republic.

Laurence H. Silberman to be Ambassador to the Socialist Federal Republic of Yugoslavia.

Charles S. Whitehouse to be Ambassador to Thailand.

Designations

Carol C. Laise as Director General of the Foreign Service, effective April 10.

PUBLICATIONS

GPO Sales Publications

Publications may be ordered by catalog or stock number from the Superintendent of Documents, U.S. Government Printing Office, Washington, D.C. 20402. A 25-percent discount is made on orders for 100 or more copies of any one publication mailed to the same address. Remittances, payable to the Superintendent of Documents, must accompany orders. Prices shown below, which include domestic postage, are subject to change.

Background Notes: Short, factual summaries which describe the people, history, government, economy, and foreign relations of each country. Each contains a map, a list of principal government officials and U.S. diplomatic and consular officers, and a reading list. (A complete set of all Background Notes currently in stock—at least 140—\$21.80; 1-year subscription service for approximately 77 updated or new Notes—\$23.10; plastic binder—\$1.50.) Single copies of those listed below are available at 30¢ each.

Argentina	Cat. No. S1.123:AR3	Pub. 7836	6 pp.
Canada	Cat. No. S1.123:C16	Pub. 7769	8 pp.
Costa Rica	Cat. No. S1.123:C82	Pub. 7768	5 pp.
Denmark	Cat. No. S1.123:D41	Pub. 8298	6 pp.
Peru	Cat. No. S1.123:P43	Pub. 7799	7 pp.
Swaziland	Cat. No. S1.123:SW2	Pub. 8174	6 pp.
Sweden	Cat. No. S1.123:SW3	Pub. 8033	6 pp.
Yemen Arab Republic	Cat. No. S1.123:Y3	Pub. 8170	4 pp.

Youth Travel Abroad. This booklet includes a brief checklist and tips on passports and visas, work and study programs, penalties for drug and black market involvement, and the scope of U.S. consular assistance in emergencies overseas. Pub. 8656. 19 pp. 45¢. (Stock No. 044-000-01571-4).

Secretarial Task Force Report, Department of State. Texts of summary and committee reports of 15-man task force established July 23, 1974 to "take a good hard look at the role and future prospects for secretaries in the Department of State and the Foreign Service." Pub. 8806. 90 pp. \$1.55. (Cat. No. S1.69:8806).

**Check List of Department of State
Press Releases: May 12-18**

Press releases may be obtained from the Office of Press Relations, Department of State, Washington, D.C. 20520.

Releases issued prior to May 12 which appear in this issue of the BULLETIN are Nos. 240 of May 8 and 244 of May 9.

No.	Date	Subject
247	5/12	Kissinger: St. Louis, Mo., World Affairs Council.
247A	5/12	Kissinger: news conference, St. Louis.
†248	5/12	Stevenson: Law of the Sea Conference, Geneva, May 9.
*249	5/13	Program for state visit of the Shah of Iran, May 14-18.
*249A	5/13	Addendum.
250	5/13	Kissinger: Kansas City, Mo., International Relations Council.
251	5/13	Kissinger: news conference, Kansas City, Mo.
*252	5/14	Advisory Committee on the Law of the Sea, June 28.
*253	5/14	International Women's Year Commission, May 15-16.
*254	5/14	Eagleburger sworn in as Deputy Under Secretary of State for Management (biographic data).
*255	5/14	U.S.-Mexico textile agreement extended.
†256	5/14	Richardson: statement on East-West Center legislation.
257	5/14	Kissinger: question-and-answer session, Kansas City, Mo., May 13.
*258	5/15	Department sponsors International Women's Year study tour of the U.S. for women leaders from 24 countries, May 10-June 19.
*259	5/15	Silberman sworn in as Ambassador to Yugoslavia (biographic data).
*260	5/15	Secretary's Advisory Committee on Private International Law Study Group on Matrimonial Matters, Baton Rouge, June 4.
*261	5/15	Advisory panel on music.
*262	5/15	National Review Board for the East-West Center, Honolulu, June 20.
*263	5/15	Ocean Affairs Advisory Committee.
*264	5/15	Harrop sworn in as Ambassador to Guinea (biographic data).
†265	5/16	Kissinger: news conference.

* Not printed.

† Held for a later issue of the BULLETIN.

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Chile. Letters of Credence (Trucco) 722

China. The Challenge of Peace (Kissinger) 705

Colombia. Letters of Credence (Turbay Ayala) 722

Commodities. Strengthening the World Economic Structure (Kissinger) 713

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Europe. The Challenge of Peace (Kissinger) 705

Food. Strengthening the World Economic Structure (Kissinger) 713

Guinea. Harrop confirmed as Ambassador 751

Haiti. Letters of Credence (Salomon) 722

Israel. Question-and-Answer Session and News Conferences Held by Secretary Kissinger at St. Louis and Kansas City 723

Jordan. Question-and-Answer Session and News Conferences Held by Secretary Kissinger at St. Louis and Kansas City 723

Khmer Republic (Cambodia)

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U.S. Recovers Merchant Ship Seized by Cambodian Navy (statements by White House Press Secretary, U.S. letters to U.N., statement by President Ford, letter to House Speaker and Senate President Pro Tem) 719

Korea. Question-and-Answer Session and News Conferences Held by Secretary Kissinger at St. Louis and Kansas City 723

Middle East. The U.S. Role in the Search for Peace in the Middle East (Sisco) 739

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THE DEPARTMENT OF STATE BULLETIN

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THE DEPARTMENT OF STATE BULLETIN

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Secretary Kissinger's News Conference of May 16

Press release 265 dated May 16

Secretary Kissinger: I thought that in view of the events of this week and prior to my going to Europe we might meet here. I don't have any statement.

Barry [Barry Schweid, Associated Press].

Q. Mr. Secretary, there have been public complaints from Thailand about our landing of marines. Was there a violation of Thai sovereignty in this caper? And secondly, can you tell us if there was any concern in the strafing of Cambodian gunboats that since we weren't too sure where our own men were, that we might—the crew was—that we might have hit the American crew?

Secretary Kissinger: Well, first of all of course, I have to reject the description of what happened this week as a "caper." It was a serious situation in which we were trying to save a group of Americans and recover a ship.

With respect to Thailand, we have, of course, a treaty relationship with Thailand in SEATO [Southeast Asia Treaty Organization]. And we have had a series of base arrangements with them which over the period of years has led to a degree of cooperation in events in Indochina which were in the mutual interest and in which we have greatly appreciated the assistance that Thailand has given us.

In the course of this decade, it may be that a pattern of action has developed that made us assume that our latitude in using these bases was greater than the current situation in Southeast Asia would permit to the Thai Government. And therefore, insofar as we have caused any embarrassment to the Thai Government, we regret those actions.

At the same time, it is clear that any relationship between us and another coun-

try must be based on mutual interest. And we, I believe, have a reason, or have a right, to expect that those countries that have an alliance relationship with us look with some sympathy at matters that concern the United States profoundly.

If conditions in the area change, we are prepared to adjust our relationship to new conditions and to have discussions on that subject in a spirit of cooperation.

Q. Mr. Secretary, that was kind of a double-barreled question.

Secretary Kissinger: What was the second question?

Q. Since we were not so certain—

Secretary Kissinger: Oh, on the gunboats.

One of the most difficult and anguishing decisions we had to make was the risk to Americans in taking these gunboats under attack.

Now, we had to balance this, in our view, against the risk as we then saw it—of their being taken to the mainland—and we wanted to avoid a situation in which the United States might have to negotiate over a very extended period of time over a group of merchant seamen who had no connection whatever with any governmental activity.

There was one incident in which our pilots were told to determine, insofar as one can under those conditions, whether any Americans were likely to have been on the boat. There was one incident where a pilot beginning to take a boat under attack saw a group of individuals that looked to him as if they might have been Americans huddled on the boat, asked for instructions, and was told not to proceed with the attack. And that was one gunboat that reached Kompong Som. So we tried to take it into account, and

fortunately it seems there was no injury to anybody.

Q. Mr. Secretary, in light of the Thai Prime Minister's recall of his Ambassador and his announcement of a complete review of all treaties and agreements between the two countries, could you give us your assessment of the diplomatic strains now developing? Also, have you had any communication as yet from the Thai Ambassador?

Secretary Kissinger: We have not had any formal communication from the Thai Ambassador. But I am assuming that the story is correct.

The Thai Government finds itself, in general, in a complicated position after the events of Indochina, quite independent of this recent operation.

We had, prior to this recent operation, made it clear that we are prepared to discuss with the Thai Government its conception of its requirements, or of the necessary adjustment in the present period. We are still prepared to do this, and we recognize that the Thai Government is under some strains and under some public necessities. And they have to understand, however, that we, too, have our necessities.

Q. Mr. Secretary, was there at any time in this crisis any chance to resolve it diplomatically?

Secretary Kissinger: There was no chance during this crisis to resolve it diplomatically. That is to say, we never received a communication, proposition, that would have enabled us to explore a diplomatic solution, and it was—when—by Wednesday evening we had not yet received any reply that the President ordered the military operations to begin.

Mr. Lisagor [Peter Lisagor, Chicago Daily News].

Q. I would like to clear up one mystifying aspect of this: Why did the Chinese return the note 2½ hours later? And did they indicate at the time that it had gotten through to the Cambodian authorities?

Secretary Kissinger: In this matter the Government of the People's Republic was not

responsible for the content of the note. But I am assuming the Chinese Xerox machines can reproduce it within 24 hours.

Q. What was the significance of their returning it, Mr. Secretary?

Secretary Kissinger: Well, a degree of disassociation from the diplomatic process—

Q. Do you believe that they actually—

Secretary Kissinger:—a formal disassociation. I don't want to speculate on this, but I wouldn't be surprised.

Q. Mr. Secretary, in view of the attempts at détente with the People's Republic of China, are you dissatisfied with their apparent—or with the way they handled themselves in this situation?

Secretary Kissinger: The requirements of relationships with some of our potential adversaries have to be seen in a more complicated framework than is often stated.

Both the Chinese and we have certain common interests which have been laid down in the Shanghai communique, which we have reaffirmed, and which we consider remain valid.

At the same time, we do have different perceptions in different areas, and there we will maintain our differences.

Thirdly, one has to keep in mind in asking other countries to play a role what their real possibilities are in any given situation.

And finally, one has to leave it to those countries to play the role, either publicly or privately—if they choose to—that they consider appropriate.

So on the whole, I don't believe that this is a useful area for me to comment on.

Q. Mr. Secretary, in view of the earlier incidents involving a Panamanian freighter being detained and a South Korean freighter being fired upon, why was there no effort by this government, earlier on, before the Mayaguez seizure, to warn U.S. vessels to stay out of that area?

Secretary Kissinger: Well, my understanding is that insurance companies had been notified and that it had been assumed that they would get in touch with these ships.

So we were, frankly, not aware that there were any American ships in that area. And when the matter came to our attention—this was not a matter that had ever reached high levels of the government. It had been dealt with routinely by notification of the insurance companies, which are presumed to have the greatest interest in the preservation of these ships.

Bernie [Bernard Gwertzman, New York Times], you had a question before.

Q. I would like to go back to the Thailand question. Why was it, given the known sensitivities of the Thais to this situation in that area, that an effort was not made to at least consult with their government prior to the sending of the marines?

Secretary Kissinger: Well, the assumption was that we were in an emergency situation, in which, on occasion, we have acted without having had a full opportunity for consultation, and it was therefore thought that within the traditional relationship it would be a measure that would be understood.

In any event, it would have presented massive problems either way.

Q. Mr. Secretary, one of the effects of this incident appears to be a restoration of American credibility and, to some extent, morale. My question is: To what extent was that a consideration in the American operation?

Secretary Kissinger: The thrust of our discussions concerned the recovery of the ship and the rescue of the men. If there were any by-products, that can be considered a bonus to the operation, but it was not the principal impetus behind the operation.

We believed that we had to draw a line against illegal actions and, secondly, against situations where the United States might be forced into a humiliating discussion about the ransom of innocent merchant seamen.

If it had these by-products—I think to some extent it did have this effect. But this was not the primary motivation behind the action.

Q. Mr. Secretary, the Cambodian Minister of Information and Propaganda has charged that our planes began systematically strafing

and bombing the ship about 12 hours after it was seized—the area around the ship. Can you respond to that, please? This would be down on the morning of the 13th.

Secretary Kissinger: I would have to review the actual events. I don't have the log right here.

My recollection would be that it may have started somewhat later, but in any event, the decision was made. It was probably later than 12 hours afterward, but I don't want to tie myself to the time.

A decision was made to try to prevent ships from the mainland from reaching the ship—or ships from the island from reaching the mainland. That I think probably happened sometime during our night on Monday night. So the timing could be roughly correct—

Q. Mr. Secretary.

Secretary Kissinger:—but there must be some Defense Department statement of when the actual strafing started which would be correct.

Q. I just wondered how long we waited for the diplomacy to work before force was used.

Secretary Kissinger: The methods that were used were not strafing at first. The methods that were used were to try to force ships back to the island.

Q. Mr. Secretary, the only basic criticism that has been directed at the Administration's actions this week is that perhaps the Administration moved much too quickly militarily and did not give diplomacy a chance to work.

Secretary Kissinger: Come on, Marvin [Marvin Kalb, CBS]—break down. Maybe we did something right. [Laughter.] Statistically we are bound to do it sometimes. [Laughter.]

Q. Well, in that spirit, could you tell us, or respond to that kind of criticism?

Secretary Kissinger: Well, when you say diplomacy was given no chance to work—if any communication had been received back, either from Cambodia or from any other

source, then we would have had a subject matter for diplomacy on which to act. On the other hand, when this did not happen, and when we had received no communication whatsoever, we had to balance the risks that would occur if they tried to move the ship. Since we didn't know whether any of the crew was left on the ship or whether a Cambodian crew might have been put on the ship, we had to balance the risks if they tried to move the ship, the pressures we were under in neighboring countries, the difficulties that could arise. We therefore decided, after some 60 hours of diplomatic efforts, to try to seize the ship.

It was a balance that had to be struck. We thought the risks of waiting another 24 to 48 hours in the absence of any communication whatsoever from any government were greater than the risks of going ahead.

Q. When the Cambodians did say that they would release the ship, why was it, as I understand it, that the bulk of the military action followed the Phnom Penh radio broadcast that they would release the ship?

Secretary Kissinger: The Phnom Penh radio broadcast was received in Washington—it was received in the White House at about 8:16 that evening. At that time, we had 150 marines pinned down on the island, and we had the *Holt* approaching the ship. At that point, to stop all operations on the basis of a radio broadcast that had not been confirmed, whose precise text we did not at that moment have—all we had was a one-page summary of what it said—a broadcast, moreover, that did not say anything about the crew and referred only to the ship, it seemed to us it was too dangerous for the troops that had already been landed to stop the operation.

We therefore took rather drastic measures—drastic communications measures—of informing the Cambodian Government of the fact that we would stop all military operations as soon as the crew was released. And in order to make doubly sure, we released the statement that we had broadcast into Cambodia. We also released that state-

ment to the press—it was verbatim, the same statement—on the theory that perhaps they would read the news tickers faster than they could pick up the other means of communication that we were using.

About two and a half hours after that, the crew was released. And after that, we stopped all military operations except those which we judged necessary for the saving of Americans that were still on the island.

Q. Mr. Secretary, on that point, questions have been raised in Congress this morning as to whether there was a punitive intent by the United States. And secondly, in relation to that, wasn't there also a hazard that the bombing of the mainland could have hit the crewmen, because there were at least two circumstances where the crewmen could have been hit by American fire—while they were on the ship and while they were on the mainland?

Secretary Kissinger: Well, when you say “punitive intent,” the intent of the operation was as I described it—to rescue the men and to recover the ship. Obviously any damage that is done in the process has a punitive effect, whatever the intention is. We tried to gear the action as closely to the objective as was possible.

Now, as it turned out, there seems to have been some relationship between the release of the crew and the attacks on the mainland. That is to say, some members of the crew were told that they should tell the *Wilson*, or the officers on the *Wilson*, that they were being released on the assumption that this would end the bombing attacks. And when we received this word, around midnight—I mean this additional word, shortly after midnight—then all actions except those that were judged to be immediately necessary for the military operations were stopped. There was some risk. It was clear that either the attack on the island or the attack on the mainland could lead to American casualties if the Cambodians deliberately moved the prisoners into an area where they would be exposed to attack.

On the other hand, we tried to confine our

attack to clearly military objectives, so that there would have had to be a very provocative intent on the part of the Cambodians.

But it was one of the balances that had to be struck.

Q. Mr. Secretary, when you referred to 60 hours of diplomacy, actually I am told there was fighting which ran through this whole sequence—that there was fighting the night of the 12th, there was some shooting at American vessels the night of the 12th. The Cambodians say that we began strafing at dawn on the 13th. So there was, by both sides' accounts, even though they don't match—there seemed to have been a considerable amount of shooting all during the period when the diplomacy was being attempted. Could we have a better breakdown on that, possibly?

Secretary Kissinger: For about 60 hours we made no attempt to seize the ship. We made it very clear from the very beginning—the President in his statement, the communications that were sent to whoever we thought might have a possibility of reaching the Cambodians, and in a number of statements that I made on Monday and Tuesday—we made it absolutely clear that we insisted on the release of the ship and the men.

Then we took collateral actions to make it more difficult for them to move the men and to speed up the pace of their deliberations.

Q. Are you satisfied, Mr. Secretary, that the American message reached the Cambodians? And if you are satisfied, what gives you that—

Secretary Kissinger: Well, I am positive that our message reached the Cambodians because we delivered it to the Cambodian Embassy in Peking, in addition to everything else.

Q. A technical question for a moment. In response to Bernie before, did you say there was no full consultation with Thailand or no consultation with Thailand?

Secretary Kissinger: Well, after the troops got into—

Q. Before.

Secretary Kissinger: Before, there was no consultation.

Q. At all.

Secretary Kissinger: No.

Q. Mr. Secretary, in Palm Springs you said the United States would face a time of testing, what with events in Indochina. Now, granted that was a private conversation, but much of that conversation has since gone public anyway. I would like to ask you if you think this was indeed a time of international testing of the U.S. resolve; and also what useful purpose was served, that is, what has the world learned from the U.S. action regarding the Mayaguez?

Secretary Kissinger: I have said not only in private conversations, I have stated publicly, that events in Indochina would have international consequences and that they would affect other countries' perception of their position and of our own. I have also said that I believe those consequences were manageable if we were prepared to face them.

Now, this event could well have resulted from an isolated act of a local commander. I am not inclined to believe that this was a carefully planned operation on the part of the Cambodian authorities. Nevertheless, the impact on us was the same—and could have been the same as if it had been carefully planned if we had been drawn through irresolution into a negotiation over a period of months over the release of people that they had no right to seize to begin with.

What the impact of this may be internationally—I don't want to transform it into an apocalyptic event. The impact ought to be to make clear that there are limits beyond which the United States cannot be pushed and that the United States is prepared to defend those interests and that it can get public support and congressional support for those actions. But we are not going around looking for opportunities to prove our manhood.

We will judge actions in the light of our

interests and the extent of the provocation.

Q. Mr. Secretary, do you have any reason to anticipate a severance of relations with the United States by Thailand or that Thailand may move up the date by which we must remove our troops in that country, which I think is one year?

Secretary Kissinger: I do not personally anticipate a severance of relations with Thailand. I believe that relations with other countries must always be based on a mutual-ity of interest. We are doing other countries no favor when we have a well-considered alliance relationship, because it must be in the mutual interest. Other countries are doing us no favor by having diplomatic relations with us if it doesn't serve their interests. And therefore I am assuming that the Thai Government will look at its long-term interests as we will. We are prepared to discuss all issues with the Thai Government in a spirit of appreciation for what Thailand has done over several decades and with a cooperative attitude.

But, as I said the other day, we will not insist on arrangements that other countries no longer consider in their interests.

Q. Mr. Secretary, you spoke earlier about certain public necessities in Thailand. Are you implying to us that possibly the Thai Government is more interested in continuing a long-term relationship with the United States than some of its public statements might now suggest?

Secretary Kissinger: Well, I don't want to speculate about the interests of the Thai Government. There is this reality—that sooner or later the private views and the public views of a government must be brought into relationship with each other. And we can, over a long period of time, only act on those things that a government is able or willing to avow publicly.

I repeat: We are prepared to discuss in a spirit of friendship and cooperation all the concerns that the Thai Government has, and we do regret any embarrassment we may have caused them.

Q. May I just follow up on that, Mr. Secretary? When you say that the public and

private views must be brought into balance, that suggests again that there is a discrepancy between the public and private views.

Secretary Kissinger: I don't know. I was trying to respond to your question in which you said maybe there was a discrepancy. And I would say that, even granting there was a discrepancy, then they would have to be brought into balance.

Q. Is there a discrepancy?

Secretary Kissinger: I don't want to speculate on that.

Q. Well, I mean without speculation, Mr. Secretary, in their private views were the Thais as forceful as they have been publicly over the past few days?

Secretary Kissinger: I just don't want to comment on private views that individuals in the Thai Government might have. We take the Thai Government by its word, and we are acting on the basis of the official communications we've received.

Q. Are we witnessing in Thailand, Mr. Secretary, an example of the domino theory at work—

Secretary Kissinger: Yes.

Q. —a theory which you said was not invalid not so long ago?

Secretary Kissinger: I think we are seeing an effect of the domino theory at work. But it is almost self-evident that any major international event has consequences. The issue isn't whether there's a domino effect, but what we can do about the domino effect or whether we should do anything about the domino effect.

It is clear that a country that was peripherally involved in events in Indochina, but in a rather heavy way, must reassess its position in the light of Indochina events. So in that sense both Laos and Thailand indicate a certain domino effect.

Jerry [Jerry Schecter, Time magazine].

Q. Mr. Secretary, would you clarify for us the American communications with the Cambodians? Did we specify a deadline as to a specific time when we wanted the ship and the prisoners to be returned? And could

you clarify why the marines landed on an island where obviously the prisoners were not being held? How does that whole sequence work there?

Secretary Kissinger: We did not give a time limit. We were considering at various times whether we should give a time limit. Every time we considered it we came to the conclusion that the risk of giving it to any military operation that might be contemplated and to the crewmembers were greater than the benefits to be achieved by giving a specific time limit—since most of those benefits were really domestic, so that we could say that we had given warning.

So by constantly increasing the severity of our requests we tried to convey an increasing sense of urgency, and therefore we approached the Secretary General. First of all, a number of public statements were made. Secondly, we approached on Wednesday the Secretary General of the United Nations with a letter, which was made public, indicating very clearly that we were going to invoke article 51 of the U.N. Charter, the right of self-defense of the U.N. Charter. And therefore we felt we had in effect given an ultimatum without giving a specific time.

We had, in fact, drafted something with a specific time as an alternative, but we felt the risks were too great.

Now, with respect to landing on an island on which the prisoners were not. Almost anything we did would in retrospect be subject to this sort of question. We did not know whether the prisoners were on the ship, whether the prisoners were on the island, or whether the prisoners were on the mainland. We tried to design an operation where we would, as close to simultaneously as possible, bring maximum pressure on the authorities in each place so that if they were on the mainland there was some reason for the mainland authorities to release them, if they were on the island we could seize them, and if they were on the ship, that would, of course, have been the happiest event of all.

We genuinely thought, or at least we suspected, that a number of them might have been brought to the mainland. We thought that a substantial number of them would

probably be on the island. Had we not thought this, there was no reason to land on the island. As it turned out, the results achieved tend to justify what was attempted. There's no question that if it hadn't worked many of your questions would now be asked in a different atmosphere.

Q. Mr. Secretary, I have a question on the Middle East, if we could change the subject.

Secretary Kissinger: Can we finish this, and then I'll go back to the Middle East.

Q. Mr. Secretary, could one reasonably infer from several of your comments this morning that the United States would look with very great sympathy should the Thais decide to reconsider their involvement with SEATO and indeed conclude that it's in their best interests to withdraw from SEATO?

Secretary Kissinger: These are decisions which the Thai Government must make. We are in an existing relationship with the Thai Government. We have no reason on our side to change it. It is up to the Thai Government to decide what its interests require. And we will discuss the Thai concerns with the interest and sympathy that an old friend deserves. We are not suggesting to the Thai Government what position it should take.

Q. Mr. Secretary, let's get to something that might appear to be an inconsistency. I think you said that for 60 hours you waited before taking military action. Later on you said that we had to drive our point home with increasing severity. Did you mean that from the very beginning of this operation there was American military action taken to support existing diplomatic action?

Secretary Kissinger: No. What I meant by increasing severity—meant increasing severity of public statements. I did not mean increasing severity of military action. The military actions that were taken on Tuesday our time were exclusively designed at that point to freeze the status quo as much as possible to keep them from moving the ship and keep them from moving the crewmen. They were not designed as such to bring diplomatic pressure, although they obviously had that result.

Q. Could I ask a question about the disengagement from the operation once the objective of releasing the men had been accomplished? Did some of the heaviest attacks actually occur after the men had been released?

Secretary Kissinger: I would have to check that. Some attacks occurred after the men had been released. At that point our biggest problem was that we had several hundred marines on the island who were under very heavy attack. There were also 2,400 Communist forces on the mainland, and we wanted to absorb their energies in other things than attempting to intervene with our disengagement efforts on the island. That was the general concept of the operation.

Q. What are the latest figures on American casualties?

Secretary Kissinger: I think the Defense Department is putting them together and will release them today, or it may have done it already.

Q. Two other Asian matters. One, the PRG [Provisional Revolutionary Government] has been very insistent in trying to get the United States to accept, I gather, their sovereignty by turning over the Saigon Embassy to the Algerian Government. And secondly, do you have any personal comment on the revelation today that a major oil company gave \$4 million to the ruling party in South Korea?

Secretary Kissinger: Well, on the first, we are studying that question, and we have not yet reached a conclusion.

With respect to the second problem, we oppose illegal actions of American corporations abroad. This action, to the best of our understanding, is not illegal by American law, but it is a matter that we would hope that American companies would take—the propriety of which American companies would take into account if they should be tempted in the future to engage in political activities abroad.

Q. Dr. Kissinger, Gulf Oil has testified—

Secretary Kissinger: Who?

Q. Gulf Oil—I am referring to Bernie's case.

Secretary Kissinger: Oh, yes.

Q. —that it was forced to make \$4 million in payments to stay in business in Korea. What is our attitude toward governments which practice this kind of extortion? And why should we continue to give foreign aid to governments which conduct this kind of thing?

Secretary Kissinger: Let me separate two things. One, if this is true—which I am not in a personal position to confirm—then we would regret such an action by a foreign government toward an American company.

Secondly, what I said about Thailand applies—or what I said about our general attitude toward alliances applies, too. When we have a security relationship with a country, it is based not primarily on approbation of the governmental structure. It must be based on our belief that there is a mutual interest that both countries have in that security. If that mutual interest does not exist, then the arrangement cannot withstand any significant strain.

We believe that the defense of Korea and the security of Korea is important for the security of the whole Northeast Pacific, and it is very important for our—Northeast Asia—and it is extremely important for our relationship with Japan, and that is the primary reason we have.

Q. Mr. Secretary, to follow that up, if I may, just for a moment. Isn't there a lesson to be learned from what happened to this government in Indochina where, for security reasons, we allowed ourselves to become involved with governments which we might not approve of in terms of our own perception of what a government should be? And are we not in danger now of getting into exactly the same kind of situation in South Korea?

Secretary Kissinger: It is also a lesson to be learned from the consequences of the

collapse in Indochina in terms of international affairs.

I would not make this analogy. The history of our involvement in Indochina was quite different from the history of our involvement in Korea. And to answer this question in detail, I would have to go into a long analysis of the similarities and differences, which we can reserve, I think, for another occasion. Now, let me get the Middle East question.

Q. Have you had a chance yet to reassess the decision to supply Jordan with Hawk missiles in light of the reports that Syria has promised to supply Jordan with air cover in an exchange for a Jordanian pledge, commitment, to participate in the next war with Israel? And also in light of the reports that there are suspicious Jordanian troop movements along the Jordan River?

Secretary Kissinger: We have seen no confirmation of either of these reports. And it is of course precisely to enable Jordan not to have to participate in defense arrangements with other neighbors that we agreed to continue the discussions on air defense which go back for nearly a year.

Q. Mr. Secretary, would it be in the interests of the United States now to have a diplomatic presence in Saigon?

Secretary Kissinger: The whole question of our attitude toward the new authorities in Saigon is now being studied.

Q. Mr. Secretary, in your St. Louis speech [May 12], you cautioned the Soviet Union against trying to exploit what they may perceive as America's weakness, warning that this might put a heavy mortgage on détente. Have the Soviets toughened their position on either CSCE [Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe] or on the SALT [Strategic Arms Limitation Talks] negotiations?

Secretary Kissinger: I did not use the words "American weakness" in my remarks. I want to point out that I said there are four areas that are involved in détente, in which three were making reasonable progress, and

the fourth—that is, conflict in peripheral areas—was less satisfactory. I think both of these must be stressed and not just the part that was less satisfactory.

Secondly, we do not find that the Soviet Union has toughened its position at the European Security Conference.

With respect to SALT, we are at the exploratory technical phase, and it is now at a point where a political decision will have to be made by both sides to move the negotiations forward and to break some of the deadlocks.

Q. Mr. Secretary, you spoke about the diplomatic results of the Cambodian operation as a bonus. Are you glad this happened?

Secretary Kissinger: Nobody can be glad to be put into a position where the lives of Americans are at stake. And the anguish of these operations for those who have the responsibility is very grave, because the consequences of failure are very serious and the loss of life is never one that is easy to contemplate. We would far have preferred if this had not happened.

Our problem was that we could not choose our involvement. We were forced into this. And then when the incident had occurred, we had to act on the basis of what we thought would most save lives and was most in the interests of the United States. But we were not looking for an opportunity.

Q. Mr. Secretary, the last raid on the airfield near Sihanoukville [Kompong Som] was made a half an hour after the crew members were released, after the Cambodians had met the requirements for cessation of hostilities that the President laid down in his last public statement—that is, the ship was taken and the prisoners were released. Why was this raid not stopped?

Secretary Kissinger: Because we had some 200 marines on the island. And we were trying to extricate them, and we were trying to keep the military forces on the mainland from interfering with what could have been an extremely tricky and difficult operation.

The press: Thank you, Mr. Secretary.

Advisory Committee Established on Indochina Refugee Resettlement

Following are remarks made by President Ford in the East Room of the White House on May 19, together with the text of an Executive order he signed that day.

PRESIDENT FORD

White House press release dated May 19

Members of the Congress, members of the Advisory Committee,¹ members of the Federal establishment, members who are here just to participate: It is a great privilege and pleasure for me to welcome you to the White House on this occasion. I definitely am grateful for your coming to Washington on this occasion on such short notice, but time is of the essence.

If I might, I would like to now sign the Executive order and make a few comments at a later point.

We have a big job to do, and we have asked some outstanding people from all segments of our society to participate. I am delighted, of course, to have John Eisenhower act as Chairman. His experience in government, his leadership, will be invaluable as we try to meet this critical problem as quickly and as successfully as possible.

We got a great deal of support from many

¹ Members appointed to the President's Advisory Committee on Refugees on May 19 are: Joseph L. Alioto, Mayor of San Francisco; Archbishop Joseph Bernardin, president, U.S. Catholic Conference; Ashby Boyle, National Youth Chairman, March of Dimes; Dr. W. Sterling Cary, president, National Council of Churches; John Denver, professional singer; John Eisenhower, former Ambassador to Belgium; Gaetana Enders, wife of Thomas O. Enders, Assistant Secretary of State; Daniel Evans, Governor of the State of Washington; Maurice Ferre, Mayor of Miami; Minor George, of Parma, Ohio; Edgar F. Kaiser, corporation executive, Kaiser Industries; Philip M. Klutznick, former member of U.S. delegation to the United Nations; William J. Kuhfuss, president, American Farm Bureau; George Meany, president, AFL-CIO; Clarke Reed, Republican National Committeeman; Dr. Malcolm Todd, president, American Medical Association; Elder A. Theodore Tuttle, the First Council of the Seventy, the Church of Jesus Christ of Latter-Day Saints.

segments of our society. I was extremely pleased when we received a telegram from George Meany of the AFL-CIO. I am sorry George could not be here, but he is well represented.

We received a number of other communications from individuals and groups—business, agriculture, professions, labor, of course, many church organizations, government, state as well as municipal—and the response has really been most heartwarming and very encouraging to those of us who felt that our country had an opportunity to again reassert the open door policy that we have had for so long on behalf of people who wanted to come to this great land.

It seems to me that as we look back over our nation's history most, if not all of us, are the beneficiaries of the opportunities that come from a country that has an open door.

In one way or another, all of us are immigrants, and the strength of America over the years has been our diversity, diversity of all kinds of variations—religion, ethnic, and otherwise. I recall very vividly a statement that seems apropos at this time, that the beauty of Joseph's coat is its many colors. The strength of America is its diversity.

The people that we are welcoming today, the individuals who are on Guam or in Camp Pendleton or Eglin Air Force Base, are individuals who can contribute significantly to our society in the future. They are people of talent, they are industrious, they are individuals who want freedom, and I believe they will make a contribution now and in the future to a better America.

We do have some difficulties in trying to assimilate as quickly as possible some 100,000-plus, but the Congress has responded, organizations are participating, administrative people are working literally night and day, and the net result is we are making headway and progress.

I don't mean to discount the problems, but all of you and those that you represent can help tremendously in the days ahead.

I can assure you that we will give maximum attention, we will make every conceivable effort, to see to it that your job is made

easier so that our new friends can start a new life in this great country. We are a big country.

Some 35,000 heads of family are joining us. Sixty-five percent of those who are coming are children. They deserve a better chance. They deserve the warmth and the friendship which is typical of America.

I just thank all of you for what you have done and what you will do in making this job easier and better for people that we want as good Americans.

TEXT OF EXECUTIVE ORDER ²

ESTABLISHING THE PRESIDENT'S ADVISORY COMMITTEE ON REFUGEES

Since the arrival of the first settlers on our eastern seaboard nearly 400 years ago, America has been a refuge for victims of persecution, intolerance and privation from around the world. Tide after tide of immigrants has settled here and each group has enriched our heritage and added to our well-being as a nation.

For many residents of Southeast Asia who stood by America as an ally and who have lost their homeland in the tragic developments of the past few weeks, America offers a last, best hope upon which they can build new lives. We are a big country and their numbers are proportionately small. We must open our doors and our hearts.

The arrival of thousands of refugees, mostly children, will require many adjustments on their part and considerable assistance on ours. But it is in our best interest as well as theirs to make this transition as gracious and efficient as humanly possible.

I have determined that it would be in the public interest to establish an advisory committee to the President on the resettlement in the United States of refugees from Indochina.

NOW, THEREFORE, by virtue of the authority vested in me by the Constitution and statutes of the United States and as President of the United States, it is ordered as follows:

SECTION 1. *Establishment of a Presidential Advisory Committee.* There is hereby established the President's Advisory Committee on Refugees, here-

inafter referred to as the Committee. The Committee shall be composed of such citizens from private life as the President may, from time to time, appoint. The President shall designate one member of the Committee to serve as chairman.

SEC. 2. *Functions of the Advisory Committee.* The Committee shall advise the President and the heads of appropriate Federal agencies concerning the expeditious and coordinated resettlement of refugees from Southeast Asia. The Committee shall include in its advice, consideration of the following areas:

- (a) Health and environmental matters related to resettlement;
- (b) the interrelationship of the governmental and volunteer roles in the resettlement;
- (c) educational and cultural adjustments required by these efforts;
- (d) the general well-being of resettled refugees and their families in their new American communities; and
- (e) such other related concerns as the President may, from time to time, specify.

The Committee shall also seek to facilitate the location, solicitation, and channeling of private resources for these resettlement efforts, and to establish lines of communication with all concerned governmental agencies, relevant voluntary agencies, the Vietnamese-American community and the American public at large. The Committee shall conclude its work within one year.

SEC. 3. *Assistance, Cooperation, and Expenses.*

(a) All executive departments and agencies of the Federal government, to the extent permitted by law, are directed to cooperate with the Committee and to furnish such information, facilities, funds, and assistance as the Committee may require.

(b) No member of the Committee shall receive compensation from the United States by reason of service on the Committee, but may, to the extent permitted by law, be allowed travel expenses, including per diem in lieu of subsistence, as authorized by law (5 U.S.C. 5703).

SEC. 4. *Federal Advisory Committee Act.* Notwithstanding the provisions of any other Executive order, the functions of the President under the Federal Advisory Committee Act (5 U.S.C. App. 1), except that of reporting annually to Congress, which are applicable to the advisory committee established by this Order, shall be performed by the Secretary of Health, Education, and Welfare.

GERALD R. FORD.

THE WHITE HOUSE, May 19, 1975.

² No. 11860; 40 Fed. Reg. 22121.

President Ford and Secretary Kissinger Honor OAS Foreign Ministers

Following are texts of a toast given by Secretary Kissinger at a luncheon he hosted on May 9 in honor of chiefs of delegation to the General Assembly of the Organization of American States meeting in Washington and remarks made by President Ford at a reception at the White House in their honor on May 10.

TOAST BY SECRETARY KISSINGER AT A LUNCHEON ON MAY 9

Press release 215 dated May 9

I am pleased to be able to welcome you here personally. As friends and neighbors, you are always welcome. But I am especially pleased today; for the 12 months since the OAS General Assembly last met in Atlanta have encompassed enough dramatic world events to upset the best-laid plans—including, regrettably, some in which we were involved together.

This is not the time to go into the details of the issues we are discussing this week. But I want to reaffirm to you now the determination of the U.S. Government to move ahead positively on our hemispheric agenda.

President Ford and I have reviewed U.S. efforts to adapt our traditional friendship to the needs of the times. We agree with you that the historic international principles pioneered in this hemisphere—principles of nonintervention, the sovereign equality of nations, and mutual respect among partners—must not only be reaffirmed but supplemented by strengthened cooperation for the national development and economic security of our peoples.

In Houston last March I said that the ways in which we of the Americas—North and

South—approached these issues would have a profound impact on one of the central dilemmas of our times: the relations between the developing countries and the industrialized nations.

I would like to take a moment now to review with you the impact of recent events on our common search for new progress in the hemisphere and new equilibrium in the world.

We meet at a time of wrenching changes in Southeast Asia and of simmering conflict in the Middle East. Throughout the world, economic difficulties have struck so many countries, and occur against such a generalized backdrop of political uncertainty, that the need for a new set of international economic relationships is ever more apparent.

We would be shortsighted to let the inevitable growing pains and adjustments distract us from the immense potential of this historic period—and from the opportunities we have to realize that potential.

It has been clear for some time that the international system had entered a period of redefinition and that significant adjustments would be required of all countries, large and small.

The problems of improving political participation and eliminating poverty are critical to the quality of life on earth. We must give them growing priority. But we must simultaneously seek to assure life by avoiding nuclear catastrophe.

To meet this double challenge of development and security, the United States has developed a foreign policy designed to meet the requirements of the future by building on the gains of the past.

This approach requires broadened coop-

eration with our traditional friends in this hemisphere and elsewhere. And despite ideological antagonisms with our adversaries, it also requires the practical cooperation in certain limited spheres that has come to be known as détente.

The past year has shown that progress toward a new structure of international relations which promotes cooperation rather than force can be very uneven. But it has not affected the soundness of the objective nor altered its essential framework.

Since we last met as a group, we in the United States have reaffirmed our domestic democracy and the vitality of our institutions. This should not surprise you. You know us well, and you know from your own experiences that what may seem turmoil to outsiders frequently conceals inner strength.

It is also true, of course, that the past month has brought a serious reversal for the United States in Southeast Asia. The tragic collapse of the Government of South Viet-Nam has moved us deeply. But it must be understood clearly that the end of the war in Viet-Nam will not mean a withdrawal by the American people from international commitment. We remain committed to strengthening a peaceful world community based on self-determination and fulfillment of all peoples. We will stand by our friends and our commitments. Indeed, with the end of the war in Viet-Nam, we will be redoubling our attention to the great tasks of constructing a new international system.

In this effort, all of us are venturing onto new ground, where there has been little opportunity for ideas to mature or consensus to emerge. The great issues of global cooperation in agriculture, food, energy, and commodities have only begun to be defined. Yet the global agenda of interdependence gives us an opportunity to transcend traditional patterns of thought and action. The United States remains determined to continue to make a major contribution to this agenda.

To achieve our aspirations, the imperative for us all is one of restraint and cooperation. Our priorities and yours coincide in many ways. Our effort to contain the East-West

struggle is a strategic imperative. At the same time, the dampening of the cold war has provided a better opportunity for the expression of your political and economic concerns. Strategic security enables change in the less developed countries to be separated from the East-West struggle.

In the months ahead, the United States will continue to strive for a stable structure of world peace. We will enter a new phase of SALT negotiations with the Soviet Union. We will strengthen our alliances in Europe. And we will work with the nations of the Middle East to develop a solution that will prevent the current stalemate from deteriorating into war.

This background of global security will enable the dialogue between industrial countries and the less developed to move increasingly to the center stage. Like détente, it is too important to be overshadowed by temporary setbacks. The recent Paris conference between energy producers and consumers did not reach agreement—but it began an essential process of consultation.

U.S. initiatives to enhance world food production and our continuing search for an equitable and viable energy relationship mark the path we have decided to take. Our approach will be to seek functional producer-consumer action on concrete issues in support of mutually defensible goals. We will work hard to achieve a new International Coffee Agreement. We are giving careful study to the problem of raw materials.

In a general sense, the past year has demonstrated that the international structure we seek requires broad political participation, both domestically and internationally. It has shown that economic growth cannot be taken for granted, that productivity, whether of raw materials or of manufactures, requires a fair return, and that development is indivisible, requiring common effort on many fronts.

These general lessons apply directly to this hemisphere.

Trade, commodities, multinational corporations, technology, are intrinsically global problems. They cannot be dealt with as if we were isolated from the global arena.

But these problems acquire a special dimension in this hemisphere. The relations among our countries are intense and deeply rooted in our particular cultures and national histories. As in the past, our cooperation can make important contributions to improving the equilibrium between industrial and developing countries. And, as in the past, our cooperation can be a symbol of a larger world relationship. The United States will make a major effort to give new vitality to its Western Hemisphere relationships, but this can succeed only as a cooperative enterprise.

As we now move ahead on vital issues of trade and development, the lessons of the past year are important.

We have understood that we must move forward on a broad front which includes the settlement of outstanding political issues such as the Panama Canal as well as economic progress.

We have learned that progress requires the serenity to overcome temporary conflicts and misunderstandings.

The constructive atmosphere of this Assembly clearly demonstrates that we have learned to confront our problems with more perseverance than rhetoric, more humility than anger.

For we have learned that dialogue in itself does not bring instant change. Interdependence affects the entire fabric of our societies; its complexity will require special efforts from us all.

We must now broaden these efforts and support them with institutional structures that will enable us to translate our growing understanding into action.

I am confident that we will do so together:

—We have almost completed the modernization of the Rio Treaty, thereby strengthening our collective security.

—This General Assembly already reflects the new flexibility required to deal effectively with the challenges of development; we must now proceed to make the equally necessary changes in OAS structure and operations.

As I suggested in my Houston address, we can use our strengthened regional insti-

tutions to search for answers in this hemisphere to the challenges posed by development and interdependence.

I am convinced, for example, that the Western Hemisphere can show the way to the rest of the world in meeting the critical need for increased food production. The Inter-American Development Bank has already begun work to establish the hemisphere agricultural consultative group I suggested at Houston.

The Inter-American Development Bank is our most important regional development institution. The Administration will seek a substantial U.S. contribution to the capital replenishment to be considered soon.

All of us must examine how we can improve access of the poorer countries of the region to the Bank's concessional funds, while simultaneously broadening alternative sources of capital, management, and technology for all countries.

Above all, we must foster the humane vision of the future that has always marked the Americas. If we can fuse the insights of our artists and poets with the productive skills of our professionals and technicians, we will once again transform the American Continent into a vast crucible of ideas and progress worthy of our new attitudes and our special place in the world.

Friends, I invite you to join me in a toast to the health of our Presidents, to the self-reliance of our peoples, and to the success of our mutual efforts to bring them together.

REMARKS BY PRESIDENT FORD AT A RECEPTION ON MAY 10

Weekly Compilation of Presidential Documents dated May 19

Mr. President of the General Assembly, Excellencies, distinguished delegates, ladies and gentlemen: This is my very first opportunity as President to welcome the chiefs of delegation to the General Assembly of the Organization of American States. I am very delighted to be here, and it is a great privilege and pleasure to see all of you here this evening.

It has been my good fortune to have met

many of you when I was in the Congress and to meet many of you when I was Vice President. I have had an opportunity to see many of you as President, and it is a great pleasure to have you in the White House on this occasion.

Your presence here tonight is testimony to the wisdom of the Western Hemisphere's pioneering effort to create a free association of sovereign nations about a century ago. The durability of our inter-American system rests on its ability to adapt to changing hemispheric and world conditions and to respond to the new problems and the needs which arise.

I just noticed that some of my good friends and old colleagues in the House of Representatives and the Senate are here, and I welcome them as well.

Let me add at this point—it is a comment by my good friend and old colleague, Bill Mailliard [William S. Mailliard, Permanent U.S. Representative to the OAS], and he has said this, and I fully concur: The bedrock strength of this organization comes from the wealth of wisdom that the member states and their representatives bring to the solution of our common problems.

Today, this General Assembly is carrying on the tradition of adaptability to change, as we see it, in considering recommendations for reform. Just as the inter-American system was the pathfinder in the field of international organizations, it could, likewise, become a pioneer in reforming the traditional way in which international organizations do business. The basic concept which holds this organization together is that strength and progress come from cooperation rather than from conflict.

In this country, we are extremely proud of our achievements under a democratic form of government and a productive economic system. We recognize that every state has the right to adopt its own system of government and its own economic and social organization. Fortunately, we live in a hemisphere with a rich tradition of diversity.

One of our continuing tasks is to resolve issues that from time to time divide us. For example, we are now updating our relation-

ship with Panama over the issue of the canal. This new relationship will accommodate the important interests of both of our countries and all of the nations of the world which depend upon the canal.

The world we now live in is increasingly fluid and complex, containing many new centers of power. There are new and more subtle challenges to the well-being of mankind. And the new issues reflect the major concerns of our people—economic development, growth of trade, sufficient food production, a healthy environment, and managing the growth of population.

As the world economy becomes much more complex, the line between domestic and international economic policy becomes ever less distinct. We know we have differences, and we certainly will continue to have them. But despite such problems, I am personally confident that we will shape the relationships necessary to improve the lives of all of our people.

The nations of this hemisphere have individually and jointly made great progress in their efforts to promote the well-being of their peoples. Our cooperation for development requires constant redefinition and imaginative new solutions to the common problems that we face. The United States is proud of its continuing contribution to this joint effort. There is no reason we cannot conquer the last vestiges of poverty in a hemisphere which is so richly endowed.

The tradition of mutual cooperation, which is at the heart of our inter-American system, adds another dimension to the requirements of global interdependence. We must be particularly conscious of the need to avoid unnecessary damage to each other's interests. For this reason, I am supporting modification of recent legislation passed by the Congress which singles out a few nations of the hemisphere for what seems to be discriminatory treatment.

International cooperation that assures mutual respect among nations is more essential than ever, and the opportunities, particularly in this hemisphere, are without precedent.

I wish you the greatest success in your

deliberations and hope that together we can take full advantage of the opportunities for cooperation that present themselves to us, who are the fortunate inhabitants of these great Americas.

Prime Minister of the Netherlands Visits Washington

Prime Minister Johannes den Uyl of the Netherlands made a working visit to Washington May 13-15. Following is an exchange of toasts between President Ford and Prime Minister den Uyl at a dinner at the White House on May 14.

Weekly Compilation of Presidential Documents dated May 19

PRESIDENT FORD

Mr. Prime Minister: Let me extend on behalf of all of our people a very warm welcome on your first visit as Prime Minister to our country.

And may I point out in that capacity, that you and I have some similarities in our previous background—before you became Prime Minister and before I became President. It is my understanding from reading recent history that you had some long experience in politics in your country, and I had a few years in mine. And in the process, both of us served as the leaders of our party in the legislative branch in the process of moving from where we were to where we are.

So, we do have a common understanding and rapport which I felt was most helpful in our discussions this morning, as we were very frank in setting forth observations and comments concerning the situation in various parts of the world.

Our country, of course, has a tremendous indebtedness to those from your country. I understand that Amsterdam is dedicating its 700th year in 1976 and that New York City is doing the same for its 200th year.

The Dutch, of course, had a tremendous impact on New York City, for which we are most grateful. But the influence of people

from your country goes far broader than the impact of several hundred years ago in New York. I have had the personal experience, as I indicated to you this morning, of exposure to and benefiting from people with a Dutch background and heritage, and I personally am indebted.

But we in America are most thankful that so many of your people came to America in various waves and for various reasons, but they did contribute, and still do, to the kind of America that I—and I think everybody here—believes is the right kind of America.

So, I thank you for the contribution. It gives to us, as a result, an understanding between the Netherlands and ourselves as we seek to move ahead in the days before us in meeting the current challenges that are as important to you as they are to us.

I am looking forward to joining you and others in a few weeks in Brussels. I believe that this gives us another opportunity to help to solidify the common aims and objectives that are important not only to the Community but to Europe as a whole.

Let me assure you to the extent that words mean anything, this country—and I look around and see good Democrats and good Republicans—we are unified in this country in the strength, the solidarity, and the vision of Europe and the United States and the allies.

So, when I have the privilege of joining with you and with the others representing the NATO organization, I think I can speak for all of America in saying that we believe what was established in 1951 is as strong and as viable and as effective in the years ahead.

So, if I might, Mr. Prime Minister, may I offer to you and to your health, a toast, and to the health of Her Majesty Queen Juliana and to the lasting friendship between our peoples.

PRIME MINISTER DEN UYL

Mr. President: The Minister of Foreign Affairs joins me in expressing our sincere thanks for your warm hospitality and for your kind words of welcome this morning.

When you refer to the many ties that are

between the Netherlands and the United States, you are right. You, personally, you may testify about historical origins of those ties in the state where you come from and where many Dutch people have found a new homeland.

While the Dutch still have been active in history of the United States—they founded New Amsterdam—and while it should still be New Amsterdam—was it not that they sold it too much a low price to other people?—and while there are so many things of Dutch activities in the past in this nation that—well, you are right in saying that so much in the past and so much in the present unify us.

Well, let me say a few more words to what might be of importance in our relations.

You know, Holland is a small country. It is more dependent on international relations than a few other countries. We are densely populated. Our imports and exports together are as big as our gross national product.

When anything is wrong in the world—we feel it just today that it happens—we cannot live without the working of international institutions, and we firmly believe in the value and the importance of those institutions.

While the times that a little Dutch boy could solve an environmental crisis by just putting his finger in the dike belongs to the past, these problems can now only be adequately dealt with in major international organizations—the United Nations, the OECD [Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development], the energy action group.

The Netherlands is traditionally a strong supporter of such institutionalized international cooperation. Our support for NATO is increasingly linked to the considerable contribution to détente that this organization has been able to make during the last years and, hopefully, will make in the future. A historic breakthrough has been accomplished from the cold war years to a new era of, as we see it, dialogue and negotiations.

Let me say this is well known that in my country an intensive discussion is going on at the present and future role of NATO. For my government, it is essential that NATO will contribute to the developing and deepening

of democracy and the promotion of détente in East-West relations as we stressed in the Declaration of Ottawa last year.

While, Mr. President, this morning discussing our common problems, I referred to the great significance that the problems of the North-South relations have in my country, I told you that perhaps the very strong Calvinist tradition is true to the very important role we attach to North-South relations and to development of cooperation in the world. Churches in Holland are aware of that—political parties—and we consider it as our plight to come out for it.

Let me say a few more words to the problem. We do think that the problems of international peace and security are closely linked with social progress and economic well-being. You, Mr. President, and your collaborators, have on numerous occasions stressed the basic reality of worldwide interdependence.

In this respect, we cannot ignore the fact that in a world of what's called rising expectations, for too many the prosperity which our nations enjoy is still beyond their reach. In a world of true interdependence, we cannot afford to let our attention be diverted from the fact that many countries are as yet highly dependent on our level of aid and our respective trade policies.

Relations between the Western democracies and the countries of the Third World have, as I see it, been strained in recent years by an apparent lack of confidence in our willingness to share their burdens and to help them solve their immense problems.

While I am humble to say, but it is the experience of my country that a new basis of confidence can be established if we succeed in finding adequate forms of cooperation.

We have experienced, and it is our conviction that one of the major aims of the continuing cooperation between Western countries must be the creation of a reestablishment of a basis of confidence in the Third World.

In this context, the early start of a serious dialogue on raw materials has a special importance, as we discussed this morning and about which Mr. Secretary of State spoke yesterday.

We hope that the coming Special Assembly of the United Nations will provide a new basis for cooperation between developing and industrialized nations. I believe that in view of its wide responsibilities and its tremendous economic capacity, Mr. President, your country, the United States, can and will make a significant contribution in this respect. And we believe that a country like ours, the Netherlands, can also make a contribution to world peace and worldwide economic cooperation, albeit a more modest one.

My government is bound to raise development aid and transfer of real financial resources next year to 1½ percent of net national income. It is also in this context that we have welcomed today the opportunity to discuss with you international problems and our respective positions on a wide range of issues.

Meaningful ties between the United States and the Netherlands, the recognition that our responsibilities, Mr. President, are small compared with yours, but against that background, again, expressing our great appreciation for the hospitality and friendship which are being shown to us in Washington, I should now like to propose to you a toast to the health and the well-being of the President of the United States.

U.S. Provides Credits to Israel for Purchase of U.S. Goods

AID press release 75-40 dated April 28

Daniel Parker, Administrator of the U.S. Agency for International Development, and Simcha Dinitz, Israeli Ambassador to the United States, signed on April 28 an agreement which will provide Israel \$174.5 million in credits for the import of U.S. goods.

The AID grant brings to \$324.5 million the amount provided to Israel this fiscal year, the total amount appropriated by the U.S. Congress for this purpose. Congress appropriated \$652 million to assist the nations of the Middle East, saying this would help them

“in their efforts to achieve economic progress and political stability, which are the essential foundations for a just and durable peace.”

The grant has been made available to Israel in the form of credits for the purchase of chemical products, agricultural products, pharmaceuticals, textiles, metal products, structural steel, agricultural implements, computer hardware, manufacturing machinery, electrical transmission equipment, trucks, medical equipment, and other goods.

In addition, Israel this fiscal year has received 50,000 metric tons of wheat under the U.S. Food for Peace program, valued at about \$9 million.

Foreign Investment in the United States

AN EXECUTIVE ORDER¹

By virtue of the authority vested in me by the Constitution and statutes of the United States of America, including the Act of February 14, 1903, as amended (15 U.S.C. 1501 et seq.), section 10 of the Gold Reserve Act of 1934, as amended (31 U.S.C. 822a), and section 301 of title 3 of the United States Code, and as President of the United States of America, it is hereby ordered as follows:

SECTION 1. (a) There is hereby established the Committee on Foreign Investment in the United States (hereinafter referred to as the Committee). The Committee shall be composed of a representative, whose status is not below that of an Assistant Secretary, designated by each of the following:

- (1) The Secretary of State.
- (2) The Secretary of the Treasury.
- (3) The Secretary of Defense.
- (4) The Secretary of Commerce.
- (5) The Assistant to the President for Economic Affairs.
- (6) The Executive Director of the Council on International Economic Policy.

The representative of the Secretary of the Treasury shall be the chairman of the Committee. The chairman, as he deems appropriate, may invite rep-

¹No. 11858; 40 *Fed. Reg.* 20263.

representatives of other departments and agencies to participate from time to time in activities of the Committee.

(b) The Committee shall have primary continuing responsibility within the Executive Branch for monitoring the impact of foreign investment in the United States, both direct and portfolio, and for coordinating the implementation of United States policy on such investment. In fulfillment of this responsibility, the Committee shall:

(1) arrange for the preparation of analyses of trends and significant developments in foreign investments in the United States;

(2) provide guidance on arrangements with foreign governments for advance consultations on prospective major foreign governmental investments in the United States;

(3) review investments in the United States which, in the judgment of the Committee, might have major implications for United States national interests; and

(4) consider proposals for new legislation or regulations relating to foreign investment as may appear necessary.

(c) As the need arises, the Committee shall submit recommendations and analyses to the National Security Council and to the Economic Policy Board. It shall also arrange for the preparation and publication of periodic reports.

SEC. 2. The Secretary of Commerce, with respect to the collection and use of data on foreign investment in the United States, shall provide, in particular, for the performance of the following activities:

(a) The obtainment, consolidation, and analysis of information on foreign investment in the United States;

(b) the improvement of procedures for the collection and dissemination of information on such foreign investment;

(c) the close observation of foreign investment in the United States;

(d) the preparation of reports and analyses of trends and of significant developments in appropriate categories of such investment;

(e) the compilation of data and preparation of evaluations of significant investment transactions; and

(f) the submission to the Committee of appropriate reports, analyses, data and recommendations relating to foreign investment in the United States, including recommendations as to how information on foreign investment can be kept current.

SEC. 3. The Secretary of the Treasury is authorized, without further approval of the President, to make reasonable use of the resources of the Exchange Stabilization Fund, in accordance with section 10 of the Gold Reserve Act of 1934, as amended (31 U.S.C. 822a), to pay any of the expenses directly incurred by the Secretary of Commerce in the performance of the functions and activities provided by this order. This authority shall be in effect for one year, unless revoked prior thereto.

SEC. 4. All departments and agencies are directed to provide, to the extent permitted by law, such information and assistance as may be requested by the Committee or the Secretary of Commerce in carrying out their functions and activities under this order.

SEC. 5. Information which has been submitted or received in confidence shall not be publicly disclosed, except to the extent required by law; and such information shall be used by the Committee only for the purpose of carrying out the functions and activities prescribed by this order.

SEC. 6. Nothing in this order shall affect the data-gathering, regulatory, or enforcement authority of any existing department or agency over foreign investment, and the review of individual investments provided by this order shall not in any way supersede or prejudice any other process provided by law.

GERALD R. FORD.

THE WHITE HOUSE, May 7, 1975.

Amendment of Generalized Tariff Preference Provisions of Trade Act Supported by Department

Statement by Deputy Secretary Robert S. Ingersoll¹

Thank you, Mr. Chairman, for giving me this opportunity to appear before your subcommittee to testify on H.R. 5897 and related bills which would amend the generalized tariff preference provisions of the Trade Act of 1974. Frankly speaking, Mr. Chairman, we believe that H.R. 5897 does not go far enough, since we would have preferred the amendment to cover all countries that do not embargo us in the future. However, we consider H.R. 5897 a significant step forward, and we support it and urge its early adoption.

The generalized system of preferences, or GSP, is a commitment by all major non-Communist industrialized countries to extend preferential treatment to all developing countries. As such it represents a significant action by developed countries to meet the recognized need of developing countries for special treatment in the area of trade.

Other industrialized countries, 18 in number, now offer these tariff advantages in their markets. I am gratified that the United States now has the authority to join with them in fulfilling this promise. Still I fear that GSP is not well understood in the United States.

GSP is not, as is widely believed, a giveaway program. American consumers and

producers will benefit from it. The amount of tariff revenues which the U.S. Government actually gives up is estimated at only between \$100 and \$200 million annually. GSP does, nevertheless, stimulate development by promoting export expansion and diversification. To the extent that the program is successful in increasing the export earnings of poor countries, they will buy more of our products.

The legislation does anticipate that, in certain cases, tariff reductions can have an adverse impact on individual domestic producers. In addition to the normal escape clause provisions of the Trade Act, which apply to all imports, including GSP imports, there are other safeguards, including International Trade Commission investigations, exclusion of import-sensitive products, and country ceilings on preferential imports of any one product. Finally, the President may withdraw or suspend GSP in whole or in part should he find it appropriate to do so.

President Johnson first expressed U.S. willingness to consider trade preferences for the developing countries at a conference with Latin American heads of state in 1967. Perhaps the most important factor motivating this shift in traditional U.S. policy was the steady erosion during the 1960's of the most-favored-nation principle as the European Community extended its network of preferential trading arrangements throughout Africa and the Mediterranean region. These arrangements discriminate against third countries, including the United States

¹ Made before the Subcommittee on Trade of the House Committee on Ways and Means on May 7. The complete transcript of the hearings will be published by the committee and will be available from the Superintendent of Documents, U.S. Government Printing Office, Washington, D.C. 20402.

and Latin America. GSP was seen as an attractive alternative to regional or special preferences to meet the legitimate trade needs of poor countries with a minimum of discrimination and inefficiency. In a broader sense, the GSP concept helps to offset ever-present tendencies to divide the world into spheres of influence.

The GSP concept has three prongs. The preferences are to be generalized—all major industrialized countries would join in extending them. All developing countries, rather than just countries with historical ties with certain donor countries, would benefit (nondiscrimination). Developing countries would not be required to give something in return as they have heretofore been required to do as part of the European Community preferential arrangements (nonreciprocity).

We considered that implementation of GSP would encourage the phasing out of special preferential arrangements. Indeed, the provision of title V of the Trade Act which encourages the elimination of reverse preferences has in our estimation been a major factor in hastening the elimination of this type of discrimination, which adversely affected U.S. exports to those developing countries associated with the European Community.

Mr. Chairman, I have gone into considerable detail on these points to explain why the provision excluding OPEC [Organization of Petroleum Exporting Countries] members from GSP has come under sharp criticism from abroad as coercive, discriminatory, and in violation of our international commitments. While we believe that some countries have overreacted and that these charges are exaggerated, we must nevertheless deal with the consequences.

This critical attitude toward the OPEC provision is held not only by Ecuador and Venezuela, which are directly affected, but is also shared by Latin American countries which are not members of OPEC. Opposition to this provision resulted in indefinite postponement of a third meeting to further the new dialogue between Secretary Kissinger and the Latin American Foreign Ministers in Buenos Aires—an occasion which

was to have been an important step in further developing our relations with our friends in Latin America to meet the new challenges of global interdependence.

This provision also threatens to have serious adverse consequences on our relations with other countries with which we are actively seeking to strengthen our relations. Other countries which did not participate in the oil embargo against us have expressed to us their serious concern. Of these, Nigeria is an increasingly important supplier of crude petroleum to the United States. Indonesia is a key member of the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN)—which also includes the Philippines, Malaysia, Singapore, and Thailand. Both Indonesia and Nigeria have low per capita incomes and large populations. The importance of our relations with Iran was recently underlined in the meeting of the U.S.-Iranian Joint Commission, which announced an unprecedented expansion in trade between the two countries.

To date, the Arab members of OPEC have not expressed strong reactions to their exclusion from GSP. However, these countries export only a negligible volume of nonpetroleum commodities to the United States. Consequently, the direct economic impact of denying them GSP benefits is also negligible.

Clearly, the most unsettling reaction to the OPEC provision has been that of Latin America. U.S. support for the GSP concept has evolved in close relationship with our policy toward Latin America and is an important element in that policy. That explains why Bill Rogers [William D. Rogers], Assistant Secretary of State for Inter-American Affairs, is sitting here with me today instead of being at the OAS General Assembly meeting across town. It was in a policy address on Latin America in October 1969 that President Nixon announced that the United States would press internationally for a liberalized system of generalized preferences. A highlight of Secretary Kissinger's meetings with the Foreign Ministers of Latin America early last year in Mexico City and later in Washington was the renewal of the U.S. commitment to GSP. We

see the export, and consequent industrial, diversification which GSP will promote as an indispensable condition for the continued economic growth of the region, with concomitant improved markets for U.S. goods, and as a necessary ingredient in the continuing evolution of a mature and constructive partnership between Latin America and the United States.

While Indonesia has not made as much of a public issue about their exclusion from GSP, they have expressed to us their distress about this provision, which they consider discriminatory and unfriendly. They have the sympathetic support of the other members of ASEAN. Indonesia's exclusion from GSP may adversely affect the intensification of our economic ties with the region, an objective which both sides desire particularly in light of recent events in that part of the world.

The Administration position on this provision is quite clear. Both President Ford and Secretary Kissinger have expressed regret at the rigidity or automatic character of this provision. The adverse effect of automatic denial of GSP on our relations with the OPEC countries is in many cases wholly out of proportion to any advantage we might gain from excluding them. Tariff preferences are not appropriate policy instruments to influence the actions of petroleum exporters, because of the negligible trade losses which result from the denial of preferences. On the other hand, denial of GSP can have an unfortunate effect on the atmosphere for constructive negotiations with these countries—and with other countries not directly affected, as our experience with Latin America attests—and can needlessly threaten U.S. commercial interests in their markets. In his foreign policy address on April 10, President Ford noted the unfortunate and unintended impact which this provision has had and urged the Congress to reconsider it.

Further to my point on the inappropriateness of GSP as a policy instrument vis-a-vis the OPEC countries, we have examined the potential benefits to these countries of GSP treatment. Total U.S. imports from the 13

member countries of OPEC in 1973 were \$3.8 billion. Imports of items now under consideration for GSP treatment were \$64 million, or 1.6 percent of the total. This figure is likely to be further reduced by the quantitative ceilings. Most OPEC members are dependent and will continue to be dependent on crude oil exports and petroleum products for the bulk of their foreign exchange. Such products are generally not included among products under consideration for GSP treatment. From what we know about future OPEC exports, they are unlikely to benefit appreciably from GSP.

In sum, Mr. Chairman, we share the concerns of Congress with respect to the practice of embargoing supplies of vital raw materials and the related act of artificially raising prices which motivated section 502(b)(2) of the Trade Act. We believe subsequent events, including the unfortunate and unintended impact on our relations with the Latin Americans, have demonstrated that automatic denial of GSP benefits is not an appropriate policy instrument to deal with the problems of commodity pricing and supply.

We welcome the constructive and cooperative spirit with which Congress and, Mr. Chairman, this subcommittee in particular have approached a resolution of the problems caused by the OPEC restriction. H.R. 5897 would, assuming all other criteria of the Trade Act are met, permit the President to extend GSP to OPEC members which did not participate in last year's oil embargo, including Ecuador, Gabon, Indonesia, Iran, Nigeria, and Venezuela, if he determines that it is in the national economic interest to do so.

We distinctly prefer H.R. 5897 to the related bills now under consideration by this subcommittee which would exempt countries in the Western Hemisphere only from the restrictions of section 502(b)(2), although we appreciate the constructive spirit which motivated them.

We now anticipate the GSP will be implemented on November 1. We would hope that H.R. 5897 can be enacted prior to that time.

Department Urges Approval of Appropriations for International Financial Institutions

*Statement by Charles W. Robinson
Under Secretary for Economic Affairs¹*

The current world political and economic situation gives these hearings on appropriations for the international financial institutions special significance and relevance. The United States has reached a point in its history where we must clearly demonstrate our continuing leadership in international political and economic forums. Our historical tradition of responsible leadership, our size, our economic strength, and also our self-interest all dictate that we do so. Withdrawal in this world of interdependent nations and economies is no longer a real option.

U.S. relations with less developed countries constitute one segment of our foreign policy which currently requires positive action. A key facet of our relations with these countries is our development assistance programs.

Our development assistance effort is composed of complementary bilateral and multilateral programs. I would like to stress that these programs are not competitive. Bilateral assistance can be used as a flexible instrument of national policy focusing on countries and problems of particular interest to us. The multilateral framework enables us to share the development burden by tapping official and private capital markets of other industrialized nations. Taken together,

these programs permit a more efficient allocation of resources than either program by itself could achieve.

Our desire to promote the development of these nations cannot be based solely on altruism. We depend on the less developed nations to be both suppliers of many critical raw materials and important markets for our exports. Last year they purchased approximately one-third of our exports. In fact our balance-of-trade surplus with the non-oil-producing less developed countries was approximately \$5.5 billion. If these countries become more prosperous, we can anticipate selling more to them and buying more of their products. U.S. investment in less developed countries has grown to over \$30 billion as of last year. All these facts clearly show that economic interdependence is a reality.

In such an interdependent world, it is my judgment that the international financial institutions will be increasingly important. They will, if adequately supported, shoulder a significant portion of the international responsibility for building a peaceful and growing new world. They will play a crucial role in mobilizing the vast amounts of capital necessary for development of the world's supplies of food, raw materials, and energy. They hold promise as institutions that can help assuage conflicting economic interests between the industrialized countries and the developing world. They will be able to contribute to the resolution of some specific economic problems where individual nations

¹ Made before the Subcommittee on Foreign Operations of the House Committee on Appropriations on May 14. The complete transcript of the hearings will be published by the committee and will be available from the Superintendent of Documents, U.S. Government Printing Office, Washington, D.C. 20402.

or companies cannot. In short, the international financial institutions can serve as one important source, among others, of the initiative and resources required to assure progressive development of the global economic order, which is vital to America.

To be more specific about the advantages of the international financial institutions to the United States, these institutions meet the objective of sharing the burden of development assistance with other industrialized countries by mobilizing foreign official funds as well as tapping foreign private capital markets. The U.S. share of total multilateral aid has consistently been lower than the U.S. share of total bilateral aid. In other words, the multilateral channel attracts relatively more official foreign funding for each U.S. dollar invested than does an equivalent amount of U.S. bilateral aid. Our relative financial share in these institutions has steadily declined as other governments have been willing to contribute at a proportionally greater rate.

Market-Oriented Development Planning

A major benefit, in my opinion, has been the Banks' contribution to development planning based on market-oriented economies. The country and project analyses methodology of these institutions is generally accepted in most of the developing world. It encourages borrowers to consider their priorities in a market-oriented framework. Concepts such as fiscal responsibility, rates of return, free movement of goods and capital, investment rights, and self-help are stressed. Where government officials use these principles with the Banks, there is a good chance they will apply them in other sectors of the economy as well.

These Banks enjoy the status of impartial and expert observers of development issues. They are able to offer hard economic advice in an apolitical context which is less offensive to national sensibilities. Under the guidance of these institutions, less developed countries have the opportunity to assume primary responsibility for their development programs. Their assumption of this responsibility

means that the United States is able to reduce its overseas staff. Also the Banks provide assistance to countries where we would rather maintain a low political profile.

We must play a constructive role in the Banks. If we do not continue to provide a "fair share" in support of the development process, we will reduce the ability of these institutions to mobilize additional resources from other governments. Moreover, we will affect our own ability to obtain cooperation of other donors and developing countries in a whole series of international economic, trade, and monetary negotiations.

Continued U.S. support of the Banks will have a significant effect on the Banks' relations with oil-exporting countries. We believe that the oil exporters should channel a larger proportion of their development assistance funds through multilateral institutions. We are strongly urging them to do so.

The international financial institutions will help insure that oil exporters' aid funds are used efficiently and allocated in an apolitical manner to less developed countries. Investment of a sizable amount of oil exporter funds in these Banks will also help with the basic recycling problem. Within the framework of the Banks, the oil exporters and traditional donors will find they can cooperate more productively on the problems of development assistance. But it is hard for the United States to advance these arguments if our own support for these institutions is declining. We must demonstrate concretely to the oil exporters that we believe the international financial institutions are viable Banks in which they must become major participants if they are to have an important influence on development issues.

I would like to make some observations about each Bank.

The International Development Association

First, the International Development Association, which provides low-cost loans to the world's poorest countries. The United States must provide its fair share to the economic development of these countries

whose per capita gross national product is \$375 or less. In many of these nations our bilateral assistance programs are either small or nonexistent. Thus our contribution to the International Development Association becomes the primary symbol of our concern for their development.

Two years ago we negotiated the fourth replenishment of the resources of the International Development Association, with the U.S. share to be \$1.5 billion, or 33 percent of the total. The decrease from our 40 percent share in previous replenishments was made in recognition of the changed world economic picture.

The U.S. negotiating position in these replenishment talks was established after extensive consultations between the executive and legislative branches. We believe the results of the consultations are reflected in the final agreement. These hearings constitute yet another stage in the consultative process. It should be noted that the other major donor countries have proceeded with their initial contributions in anticipation of eventual U.S. participation. Without these contributions the International Development Association would have run out of funds last summer.

Were it to go out of business, the International Development Association's substantial contribution to the development needs of the poorest less developed countries would not be replaced from other sources. The International Development Association's lending record and projects are indeed impressive when one considers that they are working with countries which have very limited infrastructure and trained manpower.

The Inter-American Development Bank

I would like to strongly urge full appropriation of the \$275 million still due on our pledged contribution to the Fund for Special Operations of the Inter-American Development Bank—the FSO. Mr. Chairman, you are aware that the FSO finances projects for the poorest countries, and the poorest people in those countries. The requested amount

is long overdue and desperately needed. Whether it is appropriated provides a clear benchmark of whether we take seriously our statements about the importance to us of our neighbors in this hemisphere. Latin America is carefully watching U.S. foreign policy intentions at this time. We think it important to demonstrate that the United States intends to meet its commitments.

As you know, contributions to FSO under the 1971-73 replenishment were to be made over a three-year period ending in December 1973. The United States is the only nation which has not completed the terms of that replenishment.

Many of these nations which receive FSO moneys have been among the hardest hit by the dramatic increases in oil prices and by the crises in food and fertilizer. Concessional contributions will be coming in from other countries, including a large group of non-regional nations and, for the first time, from Latin American countries; but most of these will be made only over the next three or four years. Thus the \$275 million requested is needed now for the Bank to maintain its lending to those who need it most.

Secretary of State Kissinger has been meeting with Latin American representatives at the General Assembly of the Organization of American States here in Washington. In previous meetings with them, he has stated that the executive branch would urge the Congress to maintain aid levels to the hemisphere. Your early and favorable action on this request will make our discussions in the next replenishment—at the Bank's Board of Governors meeting later this month—more credible.

I also request that you remove the requirement, imposed by Senate initiative in action on the fiscal year 1975 appropriations request, for earmarking of \$50 million of the funds provided under the FY 1975 appropriations act for cooperatives and credit unions. Earmarking is inconsistent with the concept of multilateralism, which is basic to our participation in an international development bank. And it invites others to earmark, too, so as to include or exclude—in ways which we may not favor—particular

activities or countries. We recently successfully discouraged Venezuela from earmarking part of its new Inter-American Development Bank Trust Fund for certain purposes.

The Asian Development Bank

The Asian Development Bank is primarily an Asian institution, which has contributed to the U.S. policy goal of encouraging self-reliance for the countries in the region. The Bank has also succeeded in obtaining non-regional capital for development purposes. The United States, Canada, and 13 European countries, as well as Japan, Australia, and New Zealand, have contributed to the Bank's resources.

Our support of the institution is a concrete sign of our continued interest and concern for Asian economic development. Now, when our Asian allies are showing doubts about our commitment to them, it is of the utmost importance that we dispel those doubts by asserting our continued interest in their economic well-being. For this reason we must be forthcoming with our participation in the Asian Development Bank and make our fair contribution to it. The nations which over the past decade have received well over 75 percent of the Bank's loans are countries of critical importance to us—Korea, the Philippines, Pakistan, Thailand, Malaysia, Singapore, and Indonesia.

The proposed U.S. contribution of \$121 million to the Bank's ordinary capital resources is the second of three tranches. These funds will insure that we will keep our Executive Director position and match the contributions already made by others. The \$50 million being requested for the Special Funds is the final tranche in the Bank's current replenishment of its concessional funds resources. These funds have been used primarily for projects in the lowest income countries of the region.

A good example not only of Asian Development Bank concessional financing but also of cooperation among the international financial institutions is the Ashuganj Fertilizer Project in Bangladesh. The Internation-

al Development Association, Asian Development Bank, and four national assistance agencies including AID worked together to implement this \$250 million project to build a fertilizer plant. The project is designed to help meet the country's need for nitrogen fertilizer by using Bangladesh's abundant natural gas to produce it locally. Once the plant is working, it will save Bangladesh \$74 million a year in foreign exchange.

The African Development Fund

Mr. Chairman, there is one other subject which I would like to bring to the committee's attention today.

We realize that the members of the committee will not wish to discuss in depth an appropriation for the African Development Fund prior to passage of legislation authorizing us to join that institution. I would like to point out, however, that bills authorizing our long-overdue participation in this important African financial institution are pending in both the House and Senate. Our proposed contribution of \$15 million, paid in over a three-year period, would be less than 10 percent of the Fund's resources. We in the Department of State attach a high priority to early passage of an appropriation for the Fund when the authorization has been enacted. The continued deferral of American membership in the African Fund not only disadvantages American businessmen, who are not eligible to bid on the Fund's projects, but has raised questions concerning our willingness to participate in a meaningful way in the process of African development. It is our view that further delay would clearly be detrimental to our long-term interests in that part of the world.

The multilateral Banks have shown themselves to be efficient, effective institutions clearly meriting our continued support. Given today's economic interdependence, it is in our national self-interest as well as being in the interest of the less developed countries for the United States to continue to contribute its fair share to the international financial institutions.

Department Gives Views on Bills Relating to Foreign Investment in the United States

*Statement by Thomas O. Enders
Assistant Secretary for Economic and Business Affairs¹*

Mr. Chairman [Senator Daniel K. Inouye]: I appreciate this opportunity to present to your committee the Administration's views on S. 1303, S. 995, and S. 329, relating to foreign investment in the United States. You and the other members of this committee have made an important contribution to the development of U.S. policy in this area. We in the Administration were pleased to be able to work with you toward the enactment of the Foreign Investment Study Act last fall. We expect that our consideration of this new legislation will proceed in the same constructive and cooperative manner.

Since other Administration witnesses are addressing themselves to the technical and domestic economic policy issues raised by these three bills, I will direct my comments primarily to the foreign policy issues which they raise.

It has long been the policy of the U.S. Government generally to welcome foreign investment in recognition of the benefits which it brings to our economy. At the same time, both the legislative and executive branches of the U.S. Government are aware of the necessity to take whatever measures in the investment field are necessary to protect our national interests, recognizing, however, that such measures may involve costs in terms of

our other objectives. Thus, in the past, we have instituted restrictions on foreign investment only in those areas of the economy where it was determined that the national interest required them.

As you know, Mr. Chairman, the executive branch recently conducted an extensive review of U.S. policy on inward investment in which we examined the adequacy of existing safeguards in light of, inter alia, the rapid accumulation in the hands of a few oil-producing governments of funds available for investment abroad. As was explained by Administration witnesses before the Senate Subcommittee on Securities on March 4, the basic conclusion of our review was to reaffirm the traditional commitment of the U.S. Government to national treatment—i.e., treatment no less favorable than that which it accords to its own citizens in like circumstances—for foreign investors.

In addition, however, we concluded that we should take the following administrative actions to guard against the potential problems of foreign investment in the United States:

1. Establish a new high-level interagency body to serve as a focal point within the executive branch for insuring that foreign investments in the United States are consistent with our national interests;
2. Create a new office to gather, consolidate, and report on information on foreign investment in the United States which is collected by the various agencies of the U.S. Government; and

¹ Submitted to the Subcommittee on Foreign Commerce and Tourism of the Senate Committee on Commerce on May 7. The complete transcript of the hearings will be published by the committee and will be available from the Superintendent of Documents, U.S. Government Printing Office, Washington, D.C. 20402.

3. Seek assurances from those foreign governments that are capable of making very substantial investments that they will consult with the U.S. Government before making major investments in the United States.

We have now made significant progress in the implementation of this new program. An interagency Committee on Foreign Investment in the United States and an Office of Foreign Investment in the United States are presently being organized. In addition, we have already discussed the inward-investment issue with the principal oil-producer governments. We have found that they are understanding of our concerns in this area and now expect that they will consult with us in advance of any major investments in the United States. Our consultations with Iran concerning its prospective investment in Pan Am will set a useful precedent for these discussions.

Advantages of Administration Program

I would like to review several advantages of this Administration program.

First, it does not represent a departure from traditional policy on inward investment and hence is unlikely to have the negative effects upon U.S. foreign policy that new legislative restrictions on inward investment might produce.

The United States remains a leader in international economic relations. Other nations look to us to prevent a return to the divisive economic nationalism of the 1930's. In the past, the United States has fulfilled this role in part by seeking acceptance of the principle of nonrestrictive treatment of foreign investment through an extensive network of bilateral friendship, commerce, and navigation (FCN) treaties. In addition, the United States has played a key role in winning international support for the principles of the Code of Liberalization of Capital Movements of the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development. This code and the FCN treaties have contributed to the achievement of a regime of relatively unrestricted movements of capital among the developed nations of the world, a regime un-

der which American investors have made investments in foreign countries totaling more than \$100 billion in book value.

Today, as we consider new safeguards for our own economy, we must remember that the commitment of other nations to liberalized treatment of foreign investment, in some cases not as strong as our own commitment, may well prove to be all too easily reversible should the United States abandon its role of leadership in this area.

A second advantage of the Administration program is that it provides us with an effective central authority for the formulation and implementation of a coherent investment policy. Particularly important in this regard, the new machinery will act as a vehicle for the compilation and analysis of data on inward investment currently collected by a number of U.S. Government agencies. We anticipate that in performing these functions the new Office and Committee will be able to correct many of the shortcomings of current data collection programs revealed in the recent CIEP-OMB [Council on International Economic Policy; Office of Management and Budget] report. On the other hand, should any significant deficiencies prove intractable using existing powers, the Committee would make recommendations for new administrative or legislative action to deal with them.

Given the advantages which we see in this new Administration program, we would like to give it an opportunity to prove its worth before reaching conclusions concerning the need for new legislation. Therefore, although we share most of the concerns of the sponsors of S. 1303, S. 995, and S. 329, the Department of State cannot support the passage of these bills, at least until we have had the opportunity to assess the effectiveness of the Administration program.

Foreign Government Investment Control Act

In giving the Department's views of these bills, I will address myself first to S. 995 and then, since they are in many respects quite similar, to S. 1303 and S. 329 together.

S. 995, the Foreign Government Invest-

ment Control Act, would impose broad new restrictions upon investment in the United States by foreign governments and government enterprises. It aims to achieve by legislation part of what we are seeking to accomplish through the Administration program. There are two major reasons for our preference for the administrative approach.

First, a mandatory screening requirement of the kind proposed in S. 995 would tend to call into question our commitment to a policy of national treatment for foreign investors. By avoiding mandatory screening in favor of a more flexible approach, we are indicating that although we have concerns about inward investment and are acting upon them we nevertheless will seek to preserve our overall adherence to the national treatment principle. We believe that the Administration program will provide a satisfactory balance between our need to protect our national interests and our desire to minimize the burdens which we impose on foreign investors. In addition, it will permit us to welcome acceptable investments by governments in a manner consistent with the spirit of cooperation upon which we are seeking to base our overall relations with those countries.

A second problem of S. 995, related to the first, concerns our treaties of friendship, commerce, and navigation. A number of these treaties assure nationals of each of the parties to the treaty of nondiscriminatory treatment with respect to the establishment or acquisition of interests in enterprises in the territory of the other party. Nothing in these treaties indicates an intention to treat government investment differently from private investment. S. 995 would derogate from this national treatment principle by subjecting foreign governments to special restrictions not applied to domestic investors or to other, non-governmental, foreign investors. The Administration program is designed to maintain the integrity of these treaties, which are of importance to the actions of American investors and businessmen abroad.

In addition to the two general problems just mentioned, I would also mention that the Department of State questions the need

for section 3(c) of S. 995, which identifies areas of the economy in which foreign government investments are to be prohibited. It is not clear why these particular areas were chosen, especially since we already have restrictions on foreign investment from all sources in a number of these sectors.

Bills Extending Reporting Requirements

I will now present the views of the Department of State concerning S. 1303 [Foreign Investment Disclosure Act of 1975] and S. 329 [Foreign Investment Reporting Act of 1975]. Since these two bills are primarily designed to restructure and extend existing procedures for gathering data on inward investment, their foreign policy implications are relatively minor and I will make my remarks very brief.

First, the Department of State is concerned that S. 1303 and S. 329 would impose additional reporting requirements where we may in fact already have the information which we need or are capable of getting it under existing reporting requirements. For example, based in part upon the findings of the CIEP-OMB study, we are encouraged by the potential for obtaining information on most foreign investment in the United States through improvement in the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) reporting system. It was for this reason that the Administration last month indicated a desire to examine more closely those provisions of S. 425, the proposed Foreign Investment Act of 1975, designed to obtain increased disclosure of beneficial ownership, more effective sanctions to insure such disclosure, and identification of the national origin of foreign shareholders.

Reliance upon the SEC for the collection of data would also have the advantage of avoiding the appearance of discrimination against foreign investors, since the SEC collects needed information from both foreign and domestic investors on a nondiscriminatory basis. From a foreign policy point of view, we find this approach preferable to that of placing special reporting burdens on foreign investors only.

Under the new Administration program, an Office of Foreign Investment in the United States will be assigned the task of gathering data on inward investment being collected under existing programs. This effort, to be carried out in conjunction with the second stage of the CIEP-OMB study, should pinpoint any serious gaps in the data available to us. Since excessive reporting requirements are costly and may themselves serve as a deterrent to investment, we recommend that new ones not be imposed until the existing ones have been fully evaluated.

My second point relates to section 5(7) of S. 1303, under which the proposed [Foreign Investment] Administration is called upon to make policy recommendations directly to the Congress, and to section 7, under which the Secretary of Commerce is authorized to issue guidelines and policy statements with respect to foreign investments. In view of the fact that the inward-investment issue is a broad one involving concerns of many agencies, we feel that responsibility for formulating and making recommendations concerning inward-investment policy should not be given to any one department. Such responsibility would better be lodged with the Committee on Foreign Investment in the United States, comprising representatives of the State, Treasury, Defense, and Commerce Departments and of the Assistant to the President for Economic Affairs (with other agencies participating as appropriate), currently being established under the new Administration program.

Mr. Chairman, although the Administration cannot support passage of this legislation at this time, our opposition is founded

less on substantive disagreement with the bills than on a desire to avoid overreacting to an issue which we are hopeful can be handled with the resources already at our disposal. It is reassuring to find that the sponsors of S. 995, S. 1303, and S. 329 all share our commitment to the principle of freedom of international capital movements. In conclusion, I would urge that we seek together to pursue a course of action that will not endanger that commitment.

Congressional Documents Relating to Foreign Policy

94th Congress, 1st Session

- A Select Chronology and Background Documents Relating to the Middle East (Second revised edition). Senate Committee on Foreign Relations. February 1975. 313 pp.
- Vietnam and Korea: Human Rights and U.S. Assistance. A study mission report of the House Committee on Foreign Affairs. Submitted to the committee by Congressman Leo Ryan. February 9, 1975. 15 pp.
- Nomination of Nathaniel Davis to be Assistant Secretary of State for African Affairs. Hearing before the Senate Committee on Foreign Relations. February 19, 1975. 86 pp.
- Supplemental Assistance to Cambodia. Hearings before the Subcommittee on Foreign Assistance and Economic Policy of the Senate Committee on Foreign Relations. February 24-March 6, 1975. 204 pp.
- Acquisition, Operation, and Maintenance of Buildings Abroad. Hearings before the Subcommittee on International Operations of the House Committee on Foreign Affairs. March 4-12, 1975. 38 pp.
- Military Assistance to Turkey. Report of the Senate Committee on Foreign Relations to accompany S. 846. S. Rept. 94-74. April 10, 1975. 4 pp.

Third Session of Law of the Sea Conference Meets at Geneva

The third session of the Third United Nations Conference on the Law of the Sea was held at Geneva March 17-May 9. Following is a statement made before the conference on May 9 by John R. Stevenson, Special Representative of the President and chief of the U.S. delegation.

Press release 248 dated May 12

Many experienced diplomats would agree that the Law of the Sea Conference is the most important and complex global negotiation to take place since the founding of the United Nations. However, its importance to the public at large is frequently obscured by the complexity of the issues. Indeed, the response of states to the events of the last eight weeks here may well have a profound impact on the future of the oceans and man's ability to use them peacefully. The ultimate success or failure will influence the views of thoughtful men everywhere on the very capacity of the organized international community to deal with problems on a global scale in more than general and nonbinding terms.

At the end of the Caracas session of the Law of the Sea Conference last August, I reported that while the general outlines of the Law of the Sea Treaty had emerged, what was missing was the will to negotiate, to make the accommodations necessary to achieve specific agreements.

Obviously we have not reached the stage of any final agreement in Geneva. If I might summarize the situation as it now appears, I would say that there have been two concrete results.

First, there has been progress, and in some cases substantial progress, on filling in with specific articles the outlines of a treaty, par-

ticularly with respect to the duties in a 200-mile economic zone in which the coastal states would control both coastal fisheries and non-living resources. On other subjects, the discussions and negotiations were not as focused on the essential elements of agreement as they might have been; but there was no general debate, and because most of the meetings were informal there was far less talking for the record than at the Caracas session.

A second result has been a procedural one, and that is the single texts of treaty articles on virtually all subjects with which the conference is dealing that were distributed today.

I say that the texts are an important procedural result because early in the session it became evident that one of the things that was slowing the process of negotiation was the lack of a single text with which to work in each of the main committees. In Committee II we were, as you know, working with the main-trends paper prepared in Caracas, which included a number of alternative texts on all key issues.

The single text, as the President of the conference emphasized when he requested that the committee chairmen produce such a text on their individual responsibility, is not a negotiated or consensus text. It is a text intended for use as the basis for future negotiations and which, of course, will be revised and amended to reflect the agreements and accommodations that we hope will be possible at the next session. Nevertheless some important aspects of the text are in fact a reflection of the latest stage reached in some very productive negotiations. As you know, this document is a lengthy one and was distributed only this morning; so I can-

not comment on it at this time, other than to welcome its appearance as a device which may serve to speed the negotiations along.

While the single text is one visible result of the conference, there are other bases on which we might assess the work that has gone on here.

We have, as you know, agreed on another formal session in April next year, with provision for a second session next summer if the conference decides this is desirable, and on provision of conference and interpretation facilities for informal intersessional work.

On some important controversial issues, we have negotiated texts that come quite close to what might be generally acceptable. On a large number of technical issues such as baselines, innocent passage in the territorial sea, and high seas law, we have a large body of negotiated texts. Together with the single texts, these represent the tools with which we can proceed.

Whether or not we do proceed, and how fast, depends upon the answer to one question, and that is: Are governments willing to make the political decisions on a few critical issues which must be resolved to permit accommodation of fundamental interests? No amount of continuing discussion will avail unless, in this interim period, a number of governments determine that, in the interest of an overall agreement, some willingness to accept less than their view of the optimum possible result is necessary. It seems to me that, whether we wish it or not, events may overtake this effort and the time will be past in which a comprehensive law of the sea agreement is possible. Yet one of the difficulties we have faced in trying to move ahead is that many delegations do not share our sense of urgency and our concern that unilateral actions may overtake us.

This opportunity is not yet lost, and I for one would continue to urge patience and understanding of the enormous difficulty and complexity of the tasks we have undertaken. At the same time, I must emphasize that from the points of view of the United States and other countries at this conference, certain fundamental interests must be accommodated. We are prepared, and I think the rec-

ord of the many U.S. proposals that have been made in the course of these two sessions shows that we have been prepared, to accommodate the interests of other countries. But at the same time, we are not prepared to abandon those interests which we deem vital not only for the United States but for the world community as a whole.

On some very important issues we have arrived at the point where, if we continue to move ahead, an agreed text is possible.

On the economic zone, the Evensen group, an informal group of 40 countries meeting under the chairmanship of Minister Jens Evensen of Norway, has met almost daily during this session and completed a text of articles on the 200-mile economic zone, including fisheries questions. The text attempted, and I think in large measure succeeded in, the essential task of the economic zone negotiation: to establish the balance of rights and duties of coastal states, and of all other states, which have a vital interest in the many uses of an area which would amount to more than one-third of the world's oceans. Nevertheless we must bear in mind that the landlocked and geographically disadvantaged states do not believe adequate provision has yet been made to protect their interests.

The fisheries issue is a matter of great concern to the United States and to many other nations at this conference. The Evensen text provides for the right of the coastal state to manage coastal fish stocks in the 200-mile economic zone and for their conservation and full utilization in a world which has great need for additional food resources. Moreover, the Evensen text contains a new and very welcome development of great importance to our environmentalists and fishermen: recognition of the special interests of the state of origin in anadromous fish, such as salmon, that spawn in our streams. No agreement, however, was reached on the treatment in the economic zone of highly migratory fish such as tuna.

The economic zone is one part, although clearly a critical part, of a Committee II package of issues which includes also the resolution of the question of a territorial sea

and unimpeded passage through straits used for international navigation. There is a clear consensus in this conference for a 12-mile territorial sea and growing perception of the importance to the world community of fully guaranteeing unimpeded transit for ships and aircraft in straits used for international navigation.

I spoke to some of you a week or two ago on the issue of the continental margin, at which time I said I believed a compromise could be worked out which would couple coastal state jurisdiction over the continental margin in those areas where it extends beyond 200 miles with revenue sharing on production in that area beyond 200 miles. By way of illustration, we have presented a specific idea with respect to revenue sharing from the continental margin under coastal state jurisdiction beyond 200 miles. After five years of production at a site, the coastal state obligation to share revenues would begin at 1 percent of wellhead value and increase by 1 percent per year until it reached 5 percent in the 10th year, after which it would remain at 5 percent. Our experts tell us that if we assumed a given field would produce 700 million barrels of oil through a 20-year depletion period, and a value of \$11 per barrel, the total amount would be \$130 million per field. I should note that the oil and other minerals themselves, and revenues collected by the coastal state, would of course remain with the coastal state. This problem was discussed somewhat late in the conference, and I would hope that the details of such a compromise could be worked out early in the next session.

With respect to the deep seabed, we were encouraged early in the session by what appeared to be a sincere effort on the part of many states to create a regime which would serve the interests of the international community without obstructing, or subjecting to political judgments, the development of the mineral resources. The investment in this type of project is, as you know, an enormous one. And in a world where we have all felt the effects not only of scarcity of vital raw materials but of uncertainty of access to them, nations are not prepared, in my judg-

ment, to subject their access to seabed minerals to a system of exploration and exploitation and to a decisionmaking process in which they do not have reasonable assurances of security of access and may not be adequately represented. Moreover, I do not think it will be possible, seen against the background of today's developments in raw materials matters, to agree to give ultimate powers of exclusive exploitation to a single new international entity. The United States has been willing to work with all nations of the world to insure that a system of exploitation is devised that will permit both sharing in the benefits and future participation in the development of these resources. So far, however, basic compromises on this most difficult of issues have eluded all of us, although I am pleased to say that on some of the important questions progress has been made.

On problems of marine pollution, which concern us all, I think there is a growing agreement that pollution standards should be established internationally. Together with new and effective enforcement of such agreed standards, this is the only way in which the problem of pollution can effectively be dealt with.

I am particularly dismayed by continuing attempts to place restrictions on the conduct of marine scientific research. Knowledge of the oceans is important to all of us. Good science is free science; it is not a commodity that can be packaged and purchased in predetermined quantities. The conference should concentrate on means to insure that all will enjoy the fruits of science, not on means to restrict science for fear it will only benefit the few.

What we sometimes tend to lose sight of in the course of negotiations is that we are not here to decide what is yours and what is mine. We are not concerned solely with resources, or with navigation, or with scientific research, or with pollution, or with fisheries. What this agreement must do, if it is to be effective, is to create a balance of all these multiple uses of the oceans, so that while interests of coastal states are recognized, the interest of all in navigation and other nonresource uses of the oceans and

in their preservation as a productive and healthy environment is maintained.

Such a balance of interests is inevitably going to lead to disputes as to their interpretation, and this conference has also done some notable work in the drafting of general articles and alternative possibilities of means of binding settlement of such disputes. In the U.S. view, binding dispute-settlement procedures would be a necessary part of such a treaty. Otherwise we may simply convert disagreements about principles into disagreements about interpretation. There is serious doubt that this would serve anyone's interest.

This is a somewhat lengthy assessment of what has transpired here; yet it seems to me important not to lose sight of the progress we have made simply because these negotiations have not yet resulted in agreed treaty articles in all areas.

It may be that the reason that more fundamental agreements were not reached here had less to do with the willingness of states to make them than with the fact that the pace of progress did not earlier lead us to the point where such agreements were essential to further progress. Certainly, it is difficult to overestimate the difficulties inherent in a negotiation of some 140 states on matters of vital national interest to many.

I am hopeful that the common purpose that has sustained this difficult negotiation through its early stages is intact. That purpose is our shared conviction that law, not anarchy, will best serve man's future in the oceans. The real problems of nations and their citizens that make this negotiation difficult will not disappear if we do not succeed; they will get worse. There are basic differences of national interest and in the sense of urgency of resolving our oceans problems, as well as basic differences in perception of how best to protect common interests, but none, I think, would willingly choose the course of chaos in which greater power prevails at great cost.

TREATY INFORMATION

Current Actions

MULTILATERAL

Agriculture

International agreement for the creation at Paris of an International Office for Epizootics, with annex. Done at Paris January 25, 1924. Entered into force January 17, 1925.¹

Senate advice and consent to accession: May 5, 1975.

Antarctica

The Antarctic treaty. Signed at Washington December 1, 1959. Entered into force June 23, 1961. TIAS 4780.

Accession deposited: Brazil, May 16, 1975.

Arbitration

Convention on the recognition and enforcement of foreign arbitral awards. Done at New York June 10, 1958. Entered into force June 7, 1959; for the United States December 29, 1970. TIAS 6997.

Accession deposited: Holy See, May 14, 1975.

Aviation

Convention on international civil aviation. Done at Chicago December 7, 1944. Entered into force April 4, 1947. TIAS 1591.

Adherence deposited: Lesotho, May 19, 1975.

Convention for the suppression of unlawful acts against the safety of civil aviation. Done at Montreal September 23, 1971. Entered into force January 26, 1973. TIAS 7570.

Ratification deposited: Egypt (with a reservation), May 20, 1975.

Biological Weapons

Convention on the prohibition of the development, production and stockpiling of bacteriological (biological) and toxin weapons and on their destruction. Done at Washington, London, and Moscow April 10, 1972. Entered into force March 26, 1975.

Ratification deposited: Rwanda, May 20, 1975.

Genocide

Convention on the prevention and punishment of the crime of genocide. Done at Paris December 9, 1948. Entered into force January 12, 1951.¹

Accession deposited: Rwanda (with a reservation), April 16, 1975.

¹ Not in force for the United States.

Health

Amendment of article 24 and 25 of the Constitution of the World Health Organization of July 22, 1946, as amended (TIAS 1808, 4643). Adopted at Geneva May 23, 1967.

Acceptance deposited: United States, May 19, 1975.

Entered into force: May 21, 1975.

Amendment to article 34 and 55 of the Constitution of the World Health Organization of July 22, 1946, as amended (TIAS 1808, 4643). Adopted at Geneva May 22, 1973.²

Acceptance deposited: United States, May 19, 1975.

Judicial Procedure

Convention on the taking of evidence abroad in civil or commercial matters. Done at The Hague March 18, 1970. Entered into force October 7, 1972. TIAS 7444.

Signature: Sweden, April 21, 1975.

Maritime Matters

Amendment of article VII of the convention on facilitation of international maritime traffic, 1965 (TIAS 6251). Adopted at London November 19, 1973.²

Acceptances deposited: Netherlands (extended to Surinam and Netherlands Antilles), April 25, 1975; Sweden, April 28, 1975.

Nuclear Weapons—Nonproliferation

Treaty on the nonproliferation of nuclear weapons.

Done at Washington, London, and Moscow July 1, 1968. Entered into force March 5, 1970. TIAS 6839. *Accession deposited:* Rwanda, May 20, 1975.

Oil Pollution

Amendments to the international convention for the prevention of pollution of the sea by oil, 1954, as amended (TIAS 4900, 6109). Adopted at London October 21, 1969.²

Acceptance deposited: Italy, April 30, 1975.

Organization of American States

Charter of the Organization of American States. Signed at Bogotá April 30, 1948. Entered into force December 13, 1951. TIAS 2361.

Signature and ratification deposited: Grenada, May 13, 1975.

Racial Discrimination

International convention on the elimination of all forms of racial discrimination. Done at New York December 21, 1965. Entered into force January 4, 1969.¹

Accession deposited: Rwanda (with a reservation), April 16, 1975.

Safety at Sea

Convention on the international regulations for preventing collisions at sea, 1972. Done at London October 20, 1972.²

Ratifications deposited: Bulgaria, April 29, 1975; Sweden, April 28, 1975.

Space

Convention on registration of objects launched into outer space. Opened for signature at New York January 14, 1975.²

Signature: Nicaragua, May 13, 1975.

Tourism

Statutes of the World Tourism Organization (WTO). Done at Mexico City September 27, 1970. Entered into force November 1, 1974.¹

Declaration of approval deposited: Sudan, April 18, 1975.

Declarations to adopt the statutes deposited:

German Democratic Republic (with declaration), April 14, 1975; Mongolia, April 10, 1975;³ Netherlands, April 11, 1975;³ Togo, April 16, 1975; United States, April 10, 1975.³

Wheat

Protocol modifying and further extending the wheat trade convention (part of the international wheat agreement) 1971. Done at Washington March 25, 1975. Enters into force June 19, 1975, with respect to certain provisions, and July 1, 1975, with respect to other provisions.

Ratification deposited: Trinidad and Tobago, May 20, 1975.

Wills

Convention providing a uniform law on the form of an international will, with annex. Done at Washington October 26, 1973.²

Accession deposited: Niger, May 19, 1975.

Women—Political Rights

Inter-American convention on the granting of political rights to women. Signed at Bogotá May 2, 1948. Entered into force April 22, 1949.¹

Ratification deposited: Chile, April 10, 1975.

BILATERAL

European Economic Community

Agreement regulating trade in cheese. Effected by exchange of letters at Brussels December 20, 1974 and January 14, 1975. Entered into force January 14, 1975.

Iceland

Convention for the avoidance of double taxation and the prevention of fiscal evasion with respect to taxes on income and capital. Signed at Reykjavik May 7, 1975. Enters into force one month after the date of exchange of instruments of ratification.

¹ Not in force for the United States.

² Not in force.

³ Subject to approval.

Jamaica

Agreement for sales of agricultural commodities, with annex. Signed at Kingston April 16, 1975. Entered into force April 16, 1975.

Union of Soviet Socialist Republics

Agreement amending the agreement of September 30, 1971 (TIAS 7187), on measures to improve the direct communications link. Effected by exchange of notes at Moscow March 20 and April 29, 1975. Entered into force April 29, 1975.

U.N. High Commissioner for Refugees

Grant agreement concerning assistance to displaced and uprooted persons in South Viet-Nam and

Laos. Signed at Washington and Geneva November 13 and December 2, 1974. Entered into force December 2, 1974.

Agreement amending the grant agreement of November 13 and December 2, 1974, concerning assistance to displaced and uprooted persons in South Viet-Nam and Laos. Signed at Geneva December 16, 1974. Entered into force December 16, 1974.

Agreement amending the grant agreement of November 13 and December 2, 1974, as amended, concerning assistance to displaced and uprooted persons in South Viet-Nam and Laos. Signed at Geneva February 5 and 10, 1975. Entered into force February 10, 1975.

Check List of Department of State Press Releases: May 19-25

Press releases may be obtained from the Office of Press Relations, Department of State, Washington, D.C. 20520.

Releases issued prior to May 19 which appear in this issue of the BULLETIN are Nos. 248 of May 12 and 265 of May 16.

No.	Date	Subject
*266	5/19	13,000 calls received offering assistance to Viet-Nam refugees.
†267	5/19	Kissinger: arrival, Vienna, May 18.
†268	5/19	Kissinger: remarks, Vienna.
†269	5/20	Kissinger, Gromyko: remarks, Vienna, May 19.
†270	5/20	U.S.-U.S.S.R. joint statement, Vienna.
*271	5/15	Shipping Coordinating Committee, working group on container operations, June 18.
*272	5/20	Shipping Coordinating Committee, working group on radio communications, June 19.
†273	5/20	Kissinger, Gromyko: remarks, Vienna.
†274	5/20	Kissinger: departure, Vienna.
†275	5/20	Kissinger: arrival, Bonn.
†276	5/21	Kissinger: address, Berlin House of Representatives.
*277	5/21	Inter-Agency Task Force plans for fourth refugee reception center.
*278	5/21	Secretary's Advisory Committee on Private International Law, Study Group on Matrimonial Matters, cancellation of meeting, June 4.

†279	5/21	Kissinger, Genscher: departure, Bonn.
*280	5/22	Shipping Coordinating Committee, working group on subdivision, stability, and load lines, June 24.
*281	5/22	U.S. Delegation to the World Conference of the International Women's Year.
†282	5/22	Kissinger: arrival, Berlin, May 21.
†283	5/22	Kissinger: departure, Berlin, May 21.
†284	5/22	Bunker: Rainier Club, Seattle.
†285	5/22	Kissinger: toast, Berlin, May 21.
†286	5/22	Kissinger: statement, Berlin, May 21.
†287	5/22	Kissinger: arrival, Ankara, May 21.
†288	5/22	U.S. and Hungary amend air services agreement.
†289	5/22	Kissinger: statement at CENTO meeting, Ankara.
†290	5/22	Kissinger: interview following CENTO meeting, Ankara.
†291	5/22	Kissinger, Caglayangil: remarks, Ankara.
*292	5/23	U.S.-U.K. statement on airline commission rates.
*293	5/23	Museum directors from 18 foreign countries to visit seven U.S. cities.
†294	5/23	Kissinger, Ecevit: remarks to press, Ankara.
†295	5/23	Kissinger: remarks, Ankara.
†296	5/23	Kissinger: remarks at American Embassy, Ankara.
†296A	5/23	Kissinger: departure, Ankara.
†297	5/24	Kissinger: news conference.

* Not printed.

† Held for a later issue of the BULLETIN.

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June 16, 1975

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"A Conversation With the President: A European Perspective"

Following is the transcript of an interview with President Ford on May 23 by Robert MacNeil of the British Broadcasting Corporation, Henry Brandon of the London Sunday Times, Marino de Medici of *Il Tempo*, Adalbert de Segonzac of *France-Soir*, and Jan Reifenberg of the *Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung*. The interview was taped for broadcast on the BBC that day as well as broadcast on networks in a number of other countries and was shown on the Public Broadcasting System in the United States that evening.

Weekly Compilation of Presidential Documents dated May 26

Mr. MacNeil: Next week, Gerald Ford makes his first visit to Europe as President of the United States. It is an omnibus mission: a summit with NATO heads of government, talks on the Middle East with Egyptian President Sadat, and meetings with the Governments of Spain and Italy.

Today, Mr. Ford has invited us to the White House to discuss the issues facing the West. It is the first time an American President has met European journalists in a television program of this kind.

My fellow reporters are Henry Brandon of the London Sunday Times, Adalbert de Segonzac of France-Soir, Jan Reifenberg of the Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung, and Marino de Medici of Il Tempo of Rome—all Washington-based correspondents of long experience.

Mr. Ford's travels come at a pregnant time. He leaves an America somewhat doubtful about its world role as it absorbs the sudden, final collapse in Indochina. He faces a Western Europe hungry for reassurance, but again somewhat doubtful of America's present will and capacity to back up that reassurance.

Mr. President, we are gathered in the room

from which Franklin Roosevelt delivered his famous fireside chats to rekindle the American spirit during the Great Depression of the thirties. Do you see your travels to Europe as necessary to rekindle the spirit of the Atlantic alliance?

President Ford: I think the trip has a perhaps broader aspect or implication.

First, I should say that the closeness between the United States and the Western European countries has a long history and an important future. The trip, as I see it, is aimed at solidifying and making more cohesive this relationship economically, diplomatically, and militarily.

I also see it as an opportunity for us to take a look at the past and consult about the future and to make our personal relationships even better.

And if we approach it with that attitude or with those viewpoints, it is my opinion that we, as well as the other allies, can make substantial progress.

Mr. MacNeil: So many commentators see the Europeans in need of some reassurance. Do you feel that is part of your mission?

President Ford: I am sure that my presence there, and what we intend to say, and what we intend to indicate by our actions, will be very, very helpful in this regard.

Mr. MacNeil: Has your handling of the Mayaguez incident, in effect, done some of that work for you by reaffirming America's will to respond when challenged?

President Ford: I am sure that both domestically in the United States, as well as worldwide, the handling of the Mayaguez incident should be a firm assurance that the United States is capable and has the will to act in emergencies, in challenges. I think this

is a clear, clear indication that we are not only strong but we have the will and the capability of moving.

Mr. Brandon: Mr. President, it seems to me that the handling of the Mayaguez incident proved your own determined character but not necessarily the American will. It was short, and it didn't need any congressional decisions. What has weakened the credibility of the American commitments, I think in the eyes of the allies, are these restrictions and limitations that Congress has put on the Presidency. And then there is also feeling that a kind of neo-isolationism is rising in Congress. I was wondering how you would deal with this doubt in American credibility.

President Ford: There has been a tendency during and as an outgrowth of the American engagement in Viet-Nam—one after another, limitations placed on a President by the Congress.

Now, I believe there are some new indications that indicate that Congress is taking another look, and perhaps the *Mayaguez* incident will be helpful in that regard.

There were some limitations, but we lived within them, but it was rather short, and it didn't require an extensive commitment. But there are some things taking place in the Congress today that I think ought to reassure our allies that the United States—the President, the Congress, and the American people—can and will work together in an extended commitment.

Let me give you an illustration. This past week the House of Representatives, in a very, very important vote, defeated an amendment that would have forced the withdrawal of 70,000 U.S. military personnel on a worldwide basis. And of course that would have affected our commitment to NATO. And the vote in the House of Representatives was 311 to 95, as I recall. It was a much more favorable vote this year than the vote a year ago.

I think this is an indication that the American people are getting out from under the trauma of our problems in Viet-Nam. As a matter of fact, another indication: Senator Mansfield—the Democratic leader in the United States Senate—has always, in the

past, been demanding and favoring a withdrawal of U.S. military personnel from NATO. Just the other day, he publicly stated that he was reassessing his position and wondered if it was not now the time to perhaps keep our strength there until certain other circumstances developed.

During the debate in the House of Representatives, the Democratic leader, Congressman O'Neill of Massachusetts, said this was not the time or not the place or not the number for the United States to withdraw troops from overseas.

What I am saying is, we may be entering a new era, an era that will be very visible and very substantive in showing the United States capability and will to not only do something in a short period of time but to stick with it.

Mr. Brandon: Are you taking a congressional delegation with you to Brussels?

President Ford: No, I am not.

Mr. Brandon: I was wondering whether from the European point of view—I mean, I don't want to butt into Presidential business—it might not be very helpful for Members of Congress to explain the situation in Congress, and it may also have some advantages vice versa.

President Ford: Let me answer it in this way: We have a continuous flow of Members of the Congress, Senators and Congressmen, traveling to Europe, and I think it is good. They meet periodically with their counterparts in various European countries. So there is no doubt that the attitude of Congress will be well explained to heads of state and to other parliamentarians. I don't think it is necessary to take on this trip Members of the House and Senate.

Mr. de Medici: May I focus one moment on the shade of difference between the political and the military type of assurances the United States can give to Europe? Europeans are concerned not as much as the link between the American security and the European security but between American security and what we may call the future of European democracies, which are in trouble in some

cases. How do you look at the all-political problem from this point of view?

President Ford: We, of course, have to be most careful that we don't involve ourselves in the internal politics of any country, European or otherwise. We, of course, hope that there is stability in any and all governments, in Europe particularly, and that the political philosophy of the party that controls the country is one that as a relationship to our own political philosophy, not in a partisan way but in a philosophical way. And when we see some elements in some countries gaining ground, the Communist element, for example, it does concern us.

I think Portugal is a good example. We, of course, were encouraged by the fine vote of the Portuguese people. I think the Communist Party got only 12½ percent of the vote and the non-Communist parties got the rest. But, unfortunately, that vote has not as of this time had any significant impact on those that control the government, but nevertheless we approve of the political philosophy of the people of Portugal. We are concerned with some of the elements in the government.

Mr. MacNeil: *Mr. President, could I come back to the congressional question for a moment. Are you saying that as a result of the trends you see now in the Congress that you are no longer, as you were at your press conference on April 3, frustrated by the restrictions Congress has placed on the Chief Executive?*

President Ford: I said this was the beginning perhaps of a new era.

Mr. MacNeil: *Could it lead to the Congress reversing itself on the War Powers Act?*

President Ford: I doubt that. I think the Congress felt that the War Powers Act worked reasonably well in the *Mayaguez* incident. But there are some other limitations and restrictions imposed by Congress which I think are counterproductive or not helpful, for example, the aid cutoff to Turkey. Turkey is a fine ally in NATO. We have had over a long period of time excellent political and diplomatic relations with Turkey. I am working very hard, for example, to try and get the

Congress to remove that limitation on aid to Turkey.

We have been successful in the Senate. We hope to do so in the House. But there are some others plus that that I hope we can modify or remove in order for the President to act decisively, strongly, in conjunction with the Congress, but not hamstrung by the Congress.

Mr. de Segonzac: *Mr. President, the Europeans have been deeply struck by a poll recently indicating that the American people would only accept military intervention to defend Canada and no other country. Now, this seems to indicate a deep sense of isolationism or at least neo-isolationism, and I wonder what you feel about that question, what you think of that poll, and how you think you can react against that trend in your own country?*

President Ford: I am positive that that poll was an aftermath of our involvement in Viet-Nam. I believe that the United States, the American people, will completely live up to any international commitments that we have. That poll was taken in isolation, so to speak. It was not related to any crisis or any challenge. I think the record of the American people in the past is one that clearly indicates we will respond to a challenge, we will meet a crisis and will live up to our commitments. The history is better than some poll taken in isolation.

Mr. de Segonzac: *You don't feel that there is, then, an isolationist mood in America at this stage?*

President Ford: I think there was one developing during and even to some extent after the war in Indochina or in South Viet-Nam. But now that we are freed of that problem, it seems to me that the American people will feel better about their relationships around the world, will want me as President—and will want the Congress as their Congress—to live up to the commitments and be a part of an interdependent world in which we live today.

Mr. MacNeil: *Mr. President, could we move on to the relations with the Communist world and the question of détente. It seems to many*

that the United States is moving into a new emphasis in its foreign policy away from détente, toward more support for the allies. In fact, Secretary Kissinger has even used the word, of a need for a new abrasive foreign policy. How would you describe the post-Viet-Nam foreign policy, and is it shifting away from détente?

Detente and Easing Tensions

President Ford: I don't think there is a contradiction between reaffirmation and strengthening of our relationships with our allies and a continuation of détente.

The United States, through many Administrations following World War II, has had a consistent foreign policy. It is my desire, as President, to build on this foreign policy that has been developed over the years.

It does encompass working with our allies in Europe, in the Middle East, in Africa, in Latin America, in Asia, and in other parts of the world; and I think by strengthening those relationships it gives us a better opportunity to use détente for the purposes for which it was designed.

Détente was not aimed at solving all the problems. It was an arrangement—and still is—for the easing of tensions when we have a crisis.

Now, it can't solve every crisis, but it can be very helpful in some, and it can have some long-range implications, for example, SALT One [Strategic Arms Limitations Talks] and, hopefully, SALT Two.

What I am saying is that our policy can be one of working more closely with our allies and at the same time working, where we can, effectively with our adversaries or potential adversaries.

Mr. Reifenberg: Mr. President, Secretary Kissinger has just repeated the American commitment to West Berlin. He called it, as I recall it, the acid test of détente. Now, the Soviet Union has recently challenged the four-power status of Berlin by raising some questions about East Berlin. Do you think that this is helpful for détente or that this is something which goes into the general area that you just described?

President Ford: It would seem to me the broad description I gave can be very applicable to the problem raised involving Berlin. If the allies are strong, that will have an impact on any attitude that the Soviet Union might take, and at the same time the existence of détente gives the Soviet Union and ourselves an opportunity to work in the solution of the problem in an atmosphere with less tension.

Mr. Brandon: Do you get the feeling in Congress that there is a certain suspicion that the Russians are getting more out of détente, as some of the leading Members of Congress have said, than the United States?

President Ford: I think there are some Members of Congress—and perhaps some in the United States in the nonpolitical arena—who have the impression that the Soviet Union has been a bigger beneficiary than the United States.

I strongly disagree with that viewpoint. I think détente has had mutual benefits. And I would hope that as we move ahead, the mutuality of the benefits will continue. I don't believe that those who challenge détente and say it is one-sided are accurate. I think they are completely in error.

Mr. de Medici: May I put the question differently. Since détente is a way of looking at current affairs, do you subscribe to the argument that the United States should only do what it finds in its own interests, no matter how appealing détente may look at times?

President Ford: I am not quite clear—

Mr. de Medici: Should the United States stick only to what it finds in its own interests, no matter how appealing détente may look?

President Ford: You mean in the United States interest vis-a-vis the Soviet Union or the United States vis-a-vis its allies and friends around the world?

Mr. de Medici: Also, in terms of, say, the European Security Conference, for instance, where the question has been raised as to what the usefulness of this whole exercise would be for the Europeans and the Americans without a counterpart?

President Ford: I would hope that détente would have a broader application than only in our own self-interest. But I must say that we have to be very certain that what we do does not undercut our own security. Détente has been used on some occasions, if my memory serves me correctly, to ease tensions on a broader area than just in U.S.-Soviet Union relations.

Mr. Brandon: Could you tell us whether the recent talks between Dr. Kissinger and Mr. Gromyko have helped to overcome some of the obstacles that you encountered on SALT?

President Ford: They, of course, went into the status of our SALT Two negotiations. I don't think I should discuss any of the details. I would simply say that the talks were constructive. I think they will be helpful in the resolution of some of the negotiations that had to follow after the Vladivostok meeting last December.

Mr. de Segonzac: Dr. Kissinger has said that détente should not be selective. Do you feel that from now on, when there are certain problems going on the periphery of the Western world and of détente, you should take the Russians to task on those subjects in a harsher way than you have done up to now in Viet-Nam, for example, and the help they gave to the North Vietnamese?

President Ford: We have indicated quite clearly that we didn't approve of the supplying of Soviet arms to the North Vietnamese. We have clearly said that détente is not a fishing license in troubled waters. I think that the implication of that statement is very clear.

We intend to be very firm, but détente gives us an opportunity to be flexible, and flexible in a very meaningful way.

So, it will be orchestrated to meet the precise problem that is on the agenda. We can be firm when necessary, and we can be flexible when that attitude is applicable.

Mr. Reifenberg: Mr. President, on SALT, one more question, if I may. Do you think, sir, that to solve the problems that have come up in SALT Two, it requires a political im-

petus and decision by the two leaders involved, namely, yourself and the General Secretary?

President Ford: We found from the meeting in Vladivostok that there were certain issues that had to be solved at the very highest level, and Mr. Brezhnev and myself did do that. I suspect that as we move into the final negotiations it will be required that the General Secretary and myself make some final decisions. And therefore I would hope that the preliminaries can be gotten out of the way and most of the issues can be resolved, and then the final small print, so to speak, can be resolved when Mr. Brezhnev and I meet, hopefully, this fall.

The Atlantic Alliance

Mr. MacNeil: Mr. President, you said a moment ago, talking about détente, if the allies are strong, détente will work. A lot of commentators—and one noted one in *Newsweek* this week—see a perceptible sliding among the allies in Western Europe with the growth of pacifist spirit, a growth of Marxist philosophy in certain governments in the West, and wonder and are asking whether they are not going to end up in the embrace of the Soviet Union in making an accommodation with the Soviet Union. Do you have any slight fears as you set out for Europe that that is what is happening to the Western alliance and you need to do something about it?

President Ford: My impression is that the Western alliance is very strong and there is no reason why it can't be made stronger. I have followed the recent meeting of the secretaries of defense, so to speak, and the report I got back was encouraging. We do have to upgrade, we do have to modernize, our military capability in the alliance, and I think we will. I am convinced that in the political area the meeting we are going to have will be helpful and beneficial in that regard.

So although I see some problems in one or more countries internally, I think basically the alliance is strong. And as long as our allies in Europe see that the United States is

not going to pull out, that the United States will continue to be a strong partner, I think this will strengthen the forces favoring the alliance in our European allies.

Mr. de Segonzac: Mr. President, there are quite a number of problems in the alliance at this stage all along the Mediterranean border—in Portugal, in Turkey, in Greece. You say, however, that the alliance is strong. Therefore you believe that these problems can be settled without too much difficulty?

President Ford: I certainly recognize the problem between Greece and Turkey involving Cyprus. It is a tragic development, unfortunate. But I am encouraged. There have been some recent talks between the Foreign Ministers of Greece and Turkey.

There are to be both Karamanlis and Demirel in Brussels, and I hope to meet with both and see if we can in any way be helpful. I think this is a solvable problem and there is a beginning of the negotiating process that, hopefully, will lead to a solution. We have to recognize that everything is not perfect, but that does not mean we cannot solve those problems that are on our doorstep.

Mr. de Segonzac: Now, Mr. President, there is another problem, which is perhaps more important still, which is the one of Portugal. It is going to make, I suppose, discussions in NATO very difficult with a Portuguese Government which is dominated by the Communists. How do you feel that this can be handled? Do you think that eventually a new law or new regulation should be made so that countries who don't follow the ideology of the Western world can leave NATO or should be encouraged to leave NATO such as the pro-Communist Portuguese Government?

President Ford: I am concerned about the Communist element and its influence in Portugal and therefore Portugal's relationship with NATO. This is a matter that I will certainly bring up when we meet in Brussels. I don't see how you can have a Communist element significant in an organization that was put together and formed for the purpose of meeting a challenge by Communist elements from the East. It does present a very serious

matter, and it is one that I intend to discuss while I am in Brussels.

Mr. MacNeil: Mr. President, it has been reported that when the Portuguese elections were approaching and it looked as though the Communists were going to do much better in the elections than they actually did that you were in favor of some action by the United States to reduce the possibility of their success and possibly using the CIA in some form. Could you tell us about that?

President Ford: I don't think I ought to discuss internal matters that might have involved another country. The elections turned out very well. We had no involvement. So I think I should leave it right there.

Mr. de Medici: Mr. President, you and your mission in Europe will be very close to Portugal. You will be stopping in the Iberian Peninsula, in Madrid. Spain is one country which does not belong to the NATO community, and it does not belong to the Europe of Nine, either. The Spanish people have been asking for a long time to be more closely associated with the European defense—collective defense setup—and your government perhaps has looked with even more sympathy of recent to the Spanish request. How do you view this policy by the Spanish Government at this time?

President Ford: Well, the United States has had a long and friendly relationship with Spain. In 1970, we signed a friendship agreement. In 1974 we had a Declaration of Principles that involved our relationship in many, many areas on a broad basis.

We think Spain, because of its geographical location, because of other factors, is important in the Mediterranean, in Europe. We believe that somehow Spain should be eased into a greater role in the overall situation in Europe.

Mr. MacNeil: Actual membership in NATO?

President Ford: I am not sure that is something that has to be done at the present time, but it does seem to me that Spain, for the reasons I have given, ought to be brought

more closely as far as our relations in the alliance.

Mr. Reifenberg: Has the Portuguese development, Mr. President, preceded that thinking?

President Ford: I don't believe so, conscientiously. It may have subjectively.

Mr. de Segonzac: Mr. President, in your first speech when you became President, first important speech, you talked of Europe, you talked of alliance, and you never mentioned the word "Europe," and you were criticized for that in Europe and you still since have given the impression that, for you, Europe is more the NATO organization than the Community. I would like to ask you, do you consider Europe as an entity? Do you think it should have its own independence and its own unity? What are your views on that?

President Ford: I do consider Europe as an entity. On the other hand, we have direct relationships with the major nations in Europe through NATO.

On the other hand, we do in the future and have in the past worked within the economic system with Europe as a whole. For example, we have worked very closely with the International Energy Agency, which is a very important part of our efforts to avoid future problems and to develop some solutions in the field of energy.

We look upon Europe as an entity, but on the other hand, we deal in a specific way with Europe, or major nations in Europe, through our NATO alliance.

Mr. Brandon: How vital do you think is Britain's participation in Europe?

President Ford: I think it is very important. I don't believe I should get involved in how the vote is going to turn out on June 5, but I think Europe is strengthened by Britain's participation. I think our overall Western world economic strength is likewise improved and strengthened by Britain's participation.

Mr. Brandon: You mentioned the international energy organization, and there is a good deal of dissatisfaction among European governments that they have done much more

in reducing the consumption of petrol than the United States has. I know you have tried, and I was wondering now, in view of the fact that Congress did not come up with a bill, are you going to raise the import tax by another dollar?

Energy Policy

President Ford: I agree with you entirely. The European nations have done a much better job in reducing the consumption of petrol, or gasoline as we call it, and I admire them for it. As President, I have tried to convince the Congress that they ought to pass a comprehensive energy program that would aim at conservation on the one hand and new sources of energy on the other.

Now, I am going to make a decision in the next 48 hours as to whether or not I will increase by one dollar the import levy on foreign oil. The Congress has failed very badly. They have done literally nothing affirmatively to solve our energy problem.

Perhaps the imposition of the extra dollar will stimulate the Congress to meet the problem that is important from the point of view of not only ourselves but the consuming nations—those in Europe, ourselves, Japan. I am very disturbed, I might say, about Congress' lack of affirmative action.

Mr. Brandon: The statement by the Shah that he is going to increase the price again by 25 percent has not helped you in Congress, has it?

President Ford: I think it probably has helped us, because if the price of oil is increased and we have no defense against it, it proves the need and necessity for the United States to have the kind of an energy program that I have proposed.

If we had that program in place, the one I recommended to the Congress in January, the threat of an increase in the oil price would be far less. It is the lack of action by the Congress that puts us more and more vulnerable to price increases by OPEC [Organization of Petroleum Exporting Countries] nations.

So, I hope this prospective or threatened oil price increase will get the Congress to do

something such as what I have recommended. Then we would not have to worry about that.

Mr. MacNeil: Did you try and persuade the Shah not to raise the price of oil, as he is quite influential in the group of OPEC nations?

President Ford: We talked about it. He indicated that there might be an increase. I did point out that it could have very adverse economic impacts, not only on the consuming nations, like Western Europe, the United States, Japan, but it could have very, very bad effects on the less developed nations, who are more of a victim than even ourselves.

I would hope that there would be a delaying action, but in order to make ourselves less vulnerable for this one and for other threatened increases in the future, the United States has to have a strong energy program, an energy program that is integrated with that of Western Europe through the International Energy Agency. And I can assure you that we are going to keep urging and pressuring and trying to move the Congress so that we end up with a kind of a program that will preclude these increases.

Mr. MacNeil: Could I ask one other question on energy? Defense Secretary Schlesinger said in an interview this week that if there came another oil embargo, the United States would not be so tolerant this time and could act, and he even mentioned military action. Now, could you explain what that means?

President Ford: I would rather define our policy this way. We have sought throughout the Middle East to have a policy of cooperation rather than confrontation. We have made a tremendous effort to improve our relations with all Arab countries. And we have continued our efforts to have good relations with Israel.

If we put the emphasis on cooperation rather than confrontation, then you don't think about the potentiality that was mentioned by the Secretary of Defense. Since we do believe in cooperation, we don't consider military operations as a part of any policy planning that we have in mind.

Mr. MacNeil: But it is a contingency not

entirely ruled out if things should go wrong?

President Ford: Well, we put emphasis on cooperation, not confrontation, so we in effect rule out the other.

Mr. de Medici: In the spirit of cooperation, we are looking at the United States for leadership in the area of development of alternate sources of energy. We are particularly looking at you for obtaining a nuclear fuel—enriched uranium, natural uranium—and, very important for us, access to technology. What do you plan to do in this area, in this critical area for many countries of the world?

President Ford: It is very critical. I will be making a decision in the relatively near future as to how we can move affirmatively in this area to provide adequate sources of enriched uranium. We must do it. The basic problem is whether you do it through government on the one hand or private enterprise on the other. We will have a decision; we will get going because we cannot tolerate further delay.

Mr. Brandon: Mr. President, there is a great concern in the world about the proliferation of nuclear matter, and the more nuclear power plants are going to be built—the more the United States is going to supply them—the more of that material will be available in the world. I was wondering whether—the question is the reprocessing of this material. I wonder whether it would be possible to find a multilateral way of trying to reprocess this material, because there is a question of prestige with so many governments involved.

President Ford: We are concerned about the proliferation of nuclear capability. We are trying to upgrade the safeguards when power plants are sold or made available. We think there has to be continuous consultation on how we can do it technically and how we can do it diplomatically.

We are going to maximize our effort because if the number of nations having nuclear armaments increases significantly, the risk to the world increases; it multiplies. So this Administration will do anything technically, diplomatically, or otherwise to avert the danger that you are talking about.

Mr. MacNeil: Mr. President, the oil and energy race is intimately tied up, of course, with the Middle East. You and Secretary Kissinger have said recently that your reassessment of policy in this most explosive and dangerous area, which has been going on for two months, is not yet complete. It is a little difficult to understand how you could have spent two months and are, as you say, meeting President Sadat next week with no new policy.

President Ford: I think my meeting with President Sadat is a very understandable part of the process. He, of course, has a deep interest and concern in a permanent peaceful solution in the Middle East. I want to get firsthand from him his analysis, his recommendations. Of course, that meeting will be followed by one with Prime Minister Rabin here on June 11 where I will have the same intimate relationship, where he can give me his analysis and his recommendations. And sometime shortly thereafter we will lay out what we think is the best solution.

Mr. de Medici: Mr. President, it has been some time since there was an authoritative statement of U.S. policy vis-a-vis the Middle East with reference to U.N. Resolution 242, which calls for secure boundaries and withdrawal from occupied territories. Would you care to state the policy once again?

President Ford: Of course, the United States voted for U.N. Resolution 242 and 339, so we do believe that within the confines of those words any policy in the long run has to fit. But the details, because they were quite general in many respects—the details will be set forth in the policy statement that I will make sometime after meeting with President Sadat and Prime Minister Rabin.

Mr. de Medici: Do you think that the question of Russian policies and overtures in the Middle East should be duly linked perhaps to other areas?

President Ford: The Soviet Union, as a cochairman of the Geneva Conference, obviously has an interest in and a responsibility for progress in the Middle East. I notice that

they have been meeting officially, diplomatically, with representatives from Israel, and they have been meeting in the same way with many Arab nations. I think this could be constructive, and I certainly hope it is.

Mr. de Segonzac: Mr. President, Mr. Schlesinger has again stressed the possibility of using force in case of an embargo in the Middle East, and he said that if there was another embargo, the United States would not have so much patience as last time. How do you feel about that, and in what case do you think military force could eventually be used?

President Ford: As I said a moment ago, the policy of this government is one of cooperation, not confrontation. And if you put the emphasis on cooperation, then you don't include within any plans you have any military operations.

I don't think I should go beyond that, because everything we are doing in the Middle East—the numerous meetings I have had with heads of states, the many consultations that Secretary Kissinger has had with foreign ministers—it is all aimed in trying to, in a cooperative way, solve the problems of the Middle East. And none of those plans that we have incorporate any military operations.

Mr. Brandon: Mr. President, if you could give us a longer perspective of history. Some of your aides believe that the West is in decline. And I was wondering whether you share that outlook?

President Ford: I certainly do not. I think the West is in a very unique situation today. The West, so to speak, by most standards is technologically ahead of any other part of the world. The West, I think, under our system of free governments, is in a position to move ahead, taking the lead in freedom for people all over the world. It seems to me that whether it is substantively or otherwise, the West could be on the brink of a leap forward giving leadership to the rest of the world. So, I am an optimist, not a pessimist.

Mr. MacNeil: There is one aspect to the Middle East, Mr. President, which possibly concerns your visit to Europe this next week.

Some of your officials have said that one of your concerns was possibly to suggest to the alliance that it widen its sphere of attention and interest. Does that mean into the Middle East, and what exactly do you have in mind?

President Ford: I don't think the alliance, as such, ought to involve itself in the Middle East. Of course, every one of the countries in Western Europe, including the United States and Canada, have an interest in a permanent peaceful solution in the Middle East. And each of the countries will have an impact—some, for one reason or another, more than other nations. But I don't think the alliance should, as a unified body, move into these very delicate negotiations.

Mr. MacNeil: *What is this initiative that you are reported to be considering to suggest that it does widen its sphere of attention?*

President Ford: Well, it would be in a broad but not substantive way. The impact of each nation, if we could all agree, whether it was done through the alliance, would be extremely beneficial and most helpful in getting the Arab nations, as well as Israel, to resolve some of these longstanding volatile questions.

Mr. MacNeil: *Do you mean asking individual members of NATO to do more in the Middle East?*

President Ford: Right, and to not officially coordinate their efforts, but unofficially work together.

Mr. de Segonzac: *Back in NATO—I would like to move back to Europe very briefly, I would like to come back to your answer on your attitude toward the Common Market. I had a feeling by what you were saying that you have a slightly cool attitude toward the Common Market. Do you still believe and support the unity of Europe in the same way as President Kennedy supported it but which was less strongly supported by President Nixon? Where do you stand exactly?*

President Ford: I give full support to the Common Market, the European Community efforts in trying to resolve some of the difficult economic problems. Under this Administration, under my time as President, we

will work together, I hope. And there have been some recent illustrations where we have been able to resolve some very sticky problems in the field of agriculture in a very constructive way.

I think this will be our attitude. And I have some good evidence, I think, by recent developments that will be the attitude of the Community.

Mr. de Segonzac: *Mr. President, are you apprehensive of European rivalry?*

President Ford: Rivalry in the broadest sense?

Mr. de Segonzac: *Yes, in the broadest sense.*

President Ford: I am not apprehensive, because I think America is strong and we have the will and we have got the technical capability. I think we can compete with any segment of the globe. And I happen to think competition is good. I don't like to discount it, but I think competition is beneficial to everybody.

Mr. MacNeil: *Mr. President, could I just conclude—as we have come to the end of our time, could I just conclude by asking you a quick personal question? Since you have spent your first nine months in office cleaning up messes and reacting to things that were left on your plate as you took over the office, do you now feel yet that you have put a Ford stamp on the Presidency?*

President Ford: I think we have made a tremendous amount of progress in achieving that. Let me take two or three examples. We have a Ford energy program developed entirely under my Administration. We have a Ford economic program which will be successful. We are making substantial headway in building on past foreign policy, but as we work toward a SALT Two agreement, as we work toward some of the other problem areas in foreign policy, I think you will see a Ford Administration imprimatur. And therefore I am optimistic that we can see as we look back historically that before this date there was clear and convincing evidence both at home and abroad there was a Ford Administration.

Secretary Kissinger's News Conference of May 24

Following is the transcript of a news conference held by Secretary Kissinger in the Old Executive Office Building on May 24.

Press release 297 dated May 24

Secretary Kissinger: Let me begin with the trip and deal with the European portion first and then discuss briefly the meeting with President Sadat. And then we will follow the procedure that Ron [Ronald H. Nessen, Press Secretary to President Ford] outlined and I will take questions on the trip and on the Sadat portion and then any general questions that you might want to raise.

The basic purpose of the trip was outlined by the President in his speech to the Congress in early April. It was to have an opportunity to exchange views with the other leaders of NATO, to assess the current state of the alliance, to determine where the alliance should go in the period ahead, and to use this opportunity as well to discuss a number of special problems that may have arisen.

With respect to the NATO summit, it is obvious that in the post-Indochina period certain questions have arisen with respect to how the United States will react to accept that and what this means to its other alliance relationships.

But apart from this special problem, there is also the fact that the President has not had an opportunity to discuss with his colleagues as a group the future of the Western alliance and that the future of the Western alliance requires consideration quite apart from whatever special problems may have arisen for the United States.

I would put these in perhaps three categories: The problems that are inseparable from modernizing the original concept of NATO; that is to say, how to bring the defense arrangements of the Western alliance in line with current realities; the second is

to discuss the new issues that have arisen as a result of changing circumstances and of different emphases that must be given as a result of these changing circumstances; and the third is to use this opportunity to discuss a number of special problems that exist together with the relationship with the East European countries and the Soviet Union; that is to say, the relationship between détente and security. These will be the major issues that the President will address.

With respect to the military issues, they, of course, will have been discussed in some detail by Secretary Schlesinger [Secretary of Defense James R. Schlesinger] with his colleagues in the DPC [Defense Planning Committee], and there will be no need for the President to go into the technical details of all of these issues.

But the basic fact is that the alliance was conceived in a period of American nuclear monopoly, and it has to be adapted to conditions of effective nuclear parity. The alliance was developed in a period when the nature of the military threat seemed relatively clearcut, and it has to be adapted to circumstances when the military threat can take on many more complicated forms. The alliance was developed at a period of great American material preponderance, and it has to be adjusted to conditions more in keeping with the realities of the emerging European economic strength and therefore the balance that has to be achieved between the two sides of the Atlantic.

I repeat, those issues will have been discussed in specific terms by Secretary Schlesinger, but they will be discussed in their conceptual aspect by President Ford together with his colleagues; because while security is not enough as a basis for the Western alliance, without security there is no basis for the Western alliance at all.

The second set of issues concerns the new problems that have arisen growing out of the interdependence of the world economy and the impossibility of founding cooperation entirely on military measures.

Two years ago, when this was put forward in the proposal for the year of Europe, it led to rather intense debate. Today, the interrelationship between economic, political, and security elements is a fact. In fact, two years ago, there were some who argued that the Western alliance had no role except in the military field. Today, most of our allies insist on the proposition that the economic policies of the industrialized countries must be brought into some relationship with each other if there is to be any effective future. It is no accident that the summit is occurring at the end of a week that begins with the meeting of the IEA, goes through a meeting of the OECD, and culminates in the summit.

The IEA—the International Energy Agency, which we consider one of the success stories of the recent period—links together most of the consuming nations into an organization designed to enable the consumers to take some control over their economic destiny by cooperative programs of conservation, alternative sources, and financial solidarity. This will be the first ministerial meeting since the Washington Energy Conference, and it will take stock of the past and look into the future.

The OECD [Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development], comprising most of the industrial nations of the world, will address the problem of industrial growth and the relationship of the industrial nations to the less developed nations, so that the summit of the Western alliance is coming at the end of a period in which the Defense Planning Committee has looked at the security side, the other meetings have addressed the economic and energy aspects—so that the leaders of the Western alliance can look at the whole architecture of their relationship and develop a concept of security transcending the purely military aspect.

The third element that will be discussed at Brussels is the relationship between the

Communist and the non-Communist world, or between the Western alliance and the Communists.

As the Administration has repeatedly pointed out and as the President again emphasized yesterday, we consider the easing of tensions, where it can be honorably done, an essential goal of Western policy and we will make every effort to pursue the same.

We do not believe that the easing of tensions is an alternative to alliance policy. We think that both of these elements of policy are integrally related to each other. Without the strength of the alliance there would be no basis for détente that is based on equivalence.

But without demonstrating to our people that serious efforts are being made to improve international conditions, that confrontation is not an end in itself, we will also not be able to maintain the strength that is needed for realistic détente.

There are before the West three major areas in which negotiations are at this moment going on. The negotiations on SALT [Strategic Arms Limitation Talks], which concern the alliance indirectly but which are being conducted primarily between the United States and the Soviet Union; the negotiations on the mutual balanced force reductions, in which NATO is negotiating with the Warsaw Pact; and the negotiations on European security, in which all European nations—NATO, Warsaw Pact, as well as the so-called neutrals—participate.

No doubt the President will review with his colleagues, in plenary sessions and in the bilateral meetings, the status of these negotiations and will discuss how they can best be promoted.

While in Brussels, the President will have a series of bilateral meetings; indeed, after the completion of the Brussels meetings, he will have had bilateral meetings within the month with every leader of the Western alliance. You will have the schedule of those meetings, and therefore I will not go through them.

It is obvious that particular attention will be paid to his meetings with the Greek and Turkish leaders. He will see Prime Minister

Karamanlis and Prime Minister Demirel on Thursday morning.

As you know, the United States has played an active role, at the request of the parties, to be helpful in bringing about a solution of the Cyprus dispute as well as of the other issues that exist between Greece and Turkey.

It is a complex set of issues in which a long historic legacy profoundly complicates the solution and in which the domestic situation of the participants does not always facilitate progress, not to speak of our domestic situation.

Nevertheless we believe that the two sides, both in the communal talks and in the talks that have now begun between the Greek and Turkish Foreign Ministers, are beginning to grope their way toward positions that may prove to be negotiable; and insofar as we can make a contribution to this, we will do so. After all, our international involvement in the postwar period began with the Greek-Turkish aid program. We value our relations with both of these countries.

We believe that their tensions are a tragedy for the Western alliance and, in the long term, a tragedy for the countries concerned; and we will do our utmost to facilitate a solution.

But we must also keep in mind that it is not the United States that can produce a solution. The solution must be produced by negotiations among the parties. We can help, we can use whatever influence we have, but we cannot substitute for the parties concerned. But the President will give a considerable amount of attention to that problem.

You know that he will meet with the British Prime Minister and with the German Chancellor. He will also meet with the Prime Minister of Portugal, and there will be, as I pointed out, individual appointments with all of the leaders that he has not seen recently as a result of their visits to Washington.

Let me now turn to the visit to Spain. The United States believes that the relationship of Spain to Western Europe and to the Atlantic alliance is in a sense an anomaly. Spain is one of the principal countries of Western

Europe. Its security and its progress is closely linked to that of the rest of the continent, and the United States has believed that a relationship ought to be established between Spain and NATO. For a variety of reasons, that has not proved possible.

Therefore the President thought it desirable to visit Spain to discuss with the Spanish leaders their conception of the future evolution and the relationship of that to Western security and progress. We believe that through such conversations we can participate in what we will hope will be a beneficial evolution for all of the parties concerned.

The President, while in Western Europe, will also visit Italy, a country with which we have close ties and for which we have very special concerns, to exchange views with the leaders of Italy about their many complicated problems and to reaffirm a relationship to which we attach great importance.

Of course, he will see His Holiness the Pope, for his first meeting with His Holiness, to discuss his general conceptions of how peace can be promoted in this period and the many humanitarian concerns of the Vatican.

Let me say a word about the meeting with President Sadat.

As we have repeatedly pointed out, as indeed we have not been permitted to forget, we are engaged in a reassessment of American policy in the Middle East.

This is an effort that is not directed against any country or on behalf of any country. It was made necessary by the suspension of shuttle diplomacy and of the last attempt to achieve an interim agreement between Israel and Egypt. In the new circumstances that that fact created, with a high probability of the Geneva Conference being reconvened, it has been imperative for the United States to assess its policy in the light of these new conditions.

This process is going on, and in this process, personal meetings between the President and various of the leaders of the area play an essential role.

We intend to discuss with President Sadat, as we shall do later with Prime Minister Rabin, our conception of the alternative

routes toward peace as they present themselves to us.

We will be eager to hear President Sadat's view as to what he considers the most effective means of promoting peace in the Middle East.

After we have completed these discussions, one of two things is likely to happen. Either it will appear that the view of the two parties about method and perhaps about substance is sufficiently close so that negotiations can be encouraged, or it will appear that they are still so far apart that it may be necessary for the United States to suggest a procedure or a way to proceed.

In either event, the President has repeatedly stated that the United States believes that a stalemate in the Middle East cannot lead to anything other than a catastrophe for all of the parties concerned, and the United States is determined that diplomatic progress be resumed. The principal purpose of the reassessment is to devise means and to explore approaches that might facilitate this progress.

This, then, is the basic purpose of the President's trip. It is part of a foreign policy which, whatever recent disappointments, is based on the proposition that a major American role is essential to maintain the peace and to promote progress in the world. And the United States will play this role both in a general sense and in a particular sense in certain regions.

This is the attitude with which the President is undertaking this trip, and he is hopeful that it will contribute to the objectives that I have outlined here.

Now, if you agree, let us take the questions in the sequence that we suggested—first about the trip, the West European part of the trip, then about the Middle East part of the trip, and then any general questions that you might have.

Q. Will the President find, Mr. Secretary, in Western Europe widespread doubts about U.S. will and purpose in the world now as a result of the Mayaguez and the things the President talked about yesterday?

Secretary Kissinger: I wouldn't think that

as a result of the *Mayaguez* the President is going to find widespread—

Q. No, I mean, will the doubts be dispelled or partly dispelled by that?

Secretary Kissinger: I think that there are questions in many West European countries—not necessarily in all, but in many—about the impact on the United States of the events of recent months and about the significance for other areas of the way in which our involvement in Indochina, and I think these questions exist whether they are formally articulated or not.

They can be removed to some extent by words, and to a greater extent by actions but in this atmosphere it is important for the President to have an opportunity to sketch out a direction in which we can move together.

Mayaguez should not be overdramatized. It was important that the United States demonstrated that there was a point beyond which it could not be pushed, and it was a useful thing to have done. It will not of itself create the conditions that are necessary to deal with the situation that I have described.

Q. Mr. Kissinger, were you able to tell Foreign Minister Antunes last week that he could expect the NATO summit meetings to discuss, among other things, the conditions under which Portugal might have to be excluded from NATO, as the President alluded to yesterday, or were you as surprised as some of your colleagues in the State Department by the firmness of the President's remarks on that subject?

Secretary Kissinger: I don't know about my colleagues in the State Department, but if they had been talking to me, which is not always guaranteed, then they could not have been surprised.

I share the President's views on this matter, and what the President was pointing out was the anomaly of a Communist-dominated government being part of NATO. He was not saying that the Portuguese Government now is Communist dominated. In what way this particular issue will be discussed in Brussels remains to be seen.

I would expect that it will come up more naturally in bilateral talks between the President and his colleagues at a plenary session, and I might say that I have certainly expressed our concerns to the Portuguese Foreign Minister, and our views on this matter have not been kept secret from anybody.

Q. A followup on that. Is he going to ask them to discuss conditions under which Portugal should be excluded from the alliance?

Secretary Kissinger: I doubt that this will be put formally before the alliance. I think the President was pointing out a problem which will not go away simply by being ignored. He did not say that the problem had in fact already arisen. He was speaking about trends.

He, as you know, is meeting with the Portuguese Prime Minister and Foreign Minister and one other member of the Portuguese delegation.

We wish Portugal well. We hope that Portugal will have a democratic evolution in conformity with its own national aspirations. So we are not going to Brussels with the intention of producing a confrontation with Portugal or over Portugal, but we also believe that there are certain trends that will not disappear by being ignored or by assuming the most favorable possible outcome.

Q. Mr. Secretary, are you implying that—you talk about bilateral discussions—that there are certain things that could not be discussed with the Portuguese and therefore must be discussed with other countries, such as secrecy in NATO military matters and other matters which are too sensitive to be treated in public?

Secretary Kissinger: I am not implying that. But it is a fact that an alliance which is designed to prevent a Communist attack on Western Europe acquires unique features if it includes in its deliberations a government of which many members are Communist. That is a fact; we are not creating this.

Whether this is the occasion to raise that issue formally I would question, but that it

is an issue can also not be questioned, and what the President did yesterday was to call the attention of his colleagues to this problem.

It does not mean that it will be raised at the meeting in any explicit form.

Q. Mr. Secretary, if Portugal goes Communist in the literal sense, would you then recommend that it be removed from NATO?

Secretary Kissinger: If Portugal goes Communist, then we have obviously a situation which was not foreseen when NATO was originally formed, and then to pretend that this is something that need not be considered is an absurdity.

What exactly will be done under those circumstances requires the most intense consultation with our European allies, but that it requires intense consultation goes without saying.

Q. Mr. Secretary, at what point would you determine that this government had gone Communist? There is a nebulous situation there, with several parties involved. What I would like to know is, at what point do you decide that this government is Communist dominated?

Secretary Kissinger: When we think it is Communist dominated [laughter], and I think that there will be sufficient objective indications of that fact.

Q. Mr. Secretary, can you say what was the response of the Prime Minister to your observation?

Secretary Kissinger: I had a very friendly talk with him, and indeed, as we announced on that occasion, I invited him to visit the United States within the next three months, and he accepted.

Q. But did he show a will of his government to remain in NATO in any case?

Secretary Kissinger: Yes, he indicated a desire to stay in NATO.

Can we talk about some other problem except for Portugal?

Q. Mr. Secretary, in the broader European questions about the American commitment, did you find in your contacts and in

your recent trips that there are doubts about the American President being able to push his foreign policy through the American Congress, and how are you planning to resolve those doubts when you go to Brussels?

Secretary Kissinger: I have the impression that the relations between the executive and the legislative are of profound concern to many other countries. I found that on this trip; I found it at the OAS meeting previously here in Washington. I say this without assigning blame for this state of affairs. This is a fact.

Now, I believe that this relationship is in the process of improvement, and that many of the conditions that produced the tensions, such as Watergate and the war in Viet-Nam, now being behind us, the possibility for a much more creative cooperation exists.

This would certainly be our attitude. In any event, the President will make clear to his colleagues what the executive conceives our proper responsibilities to be, and we believe—and we certainly fervently hope—that we can obtain the necessary congressional support.

Q. By all accounts, the European allies are not very enthusiastic about bringing Spain into a closer relationship with NATO. Does the President have any new arguments, new pressures, or do you expect any change in his attitude?

Secretary Kissinger: No, we have stated our view on the matter. I don't think that this will be an issue that we need to raise with additional intensity. We have made our view clear over the weeks, and we have made our view clear by the trip that the President is taking to Spain, and this may be a matter that will have to be left to time.

Q. What is our government's attitude toward a new security arrangement with Spain?

Secretary Kissinger: We are in the process of negotiating this, of negotiating the extension of the base agreement; and in the process of these negotiations, that will be looked at.

Q. Mr. Secretary, is the President going

to see any members of the opposition in Madrid?

Secretary Kissinger: The President's schedule is not yet finally settled, and we will announce it when it is.

Q. Mr. Secretary, wholly apart from the stated intention of the U.S. reassessment of Middle East policy, isn't it true that it has now taken on a life of its own? I mean, isn't it true that it is being largely viewed, particularly by Israel, as a U.S. tool, a U.S. lever, a U.S. pressure device?

Secretary Kissinger: Can I set this question aside for one moment? I will answer this as the first question on the Middle East part. Let me see if there are two or three more questions on the European part, and then I will take it.

Q. Mr. Secretary, will the President confer with President Giscard, and what about France's role?

Secretary Kissinger: President Giscard has agreed to come to the dinner for NATO heads of state and heads of government that is being given by the King of the Belgians. In connection with the visit of President Giscard for that purpose, the President will have a bilateral meeting with the French President, and we look forward to that.

Q. Mr. Secretary, in the meeting of NATO in Brussels, could this not be the beginning of the end of NATO as we knew it before, a divergence of interests between the United States and Western Europe in coming years—the social, political, economic order of things?

Secretary Kissinger: I expect the opposite to happen. I expect that this meeting of NATO will stress some new dimensions for NATO and will usher in a period of new creativity.

Let me take one more question on the West European part, and then I will take your question, if I can still remember it. I will remember it.

Q. Mr. Secretary, I would like to question why it is necessary to reassure the NATO allies of the American commitment in view of the fact that that commitment to NATO

has been solid since the end of World War II, laying aside Viet-Nam, which was not a formal treaty commitment? Why is it necessary to reassure the NATO allies when it has been the British which have been cutting back on their troops, the French which pulled out of NATO, the Greeks which pulled out of NATO, and the Turks which want to throw the U.S. military bases out of Turkey?

Secretary Kissinger: Not without provocation.

Q. Well, that is debatable with the Congress, not me, sir. I am wondering why we have to go hat in hand to reassure them.

Secretary Kissinger: We are not going hat in hand to reassure them, and I did not say we are going to Europe to reassure NATO. If you read the record of what I said, I am sure you will find that I stated three major purposes—that the question of reassurance arose in response to queries that were put to me.

I stated that NATO is in need of adaptation to new circumstances in its original purposes, that NATO is in need of adaptation to new conditions that have arisen due to the interdependence of the modern economy, and that NATO is in need of a formal consideration of the relationship between its security objectives and the attempt to ease tensions with the East.

Those are the three principal purposes. If in the process reassurance results, that is fine, but quite apart from the issue of Indochina, the President's intention was, in any event, to have a meeting with the leaders of Western Europe.

Now, let me take the question—

Q. Let me try it again, if you didn't get it the first time.

Secretary Kissinger: No, I got the point. Let me see what I remember.

Q. Do you expect to pursue the date for the European Security Conference?

Secretary Kissinger: The date for the European Security Conference does not depend on the United States. The date for the European Security Conference will be determined by the negotiations that are now

going on in Geneva, in which there are a number of issues still outstanding on confidence-building measures, on human contacts, and on postconference machinery.

In each of these, the West has put forward certain initiatives and is either awaiting the responses or analyzing responses that it has just received. The date of the Security Conference cannot be settled independent of the progress of the negotiations, and the best way to speed that conference would be if the Soviet Union considered carefully some of these considerations that we had put forward.

Now, to the Middle East. The question, as I understood it, was whether reassessment has developed a life of its own and whether it is not conceived or intended as a pressure upon Israel.

Well, as I have said before, my friend Abba Eban used to say that Israel considers objectivity a hundred percent support of its position.

We did not intend this assessment either as pressure or as support for any party. It was made inevitable by the suspension of the negotiations and by the potential collapse of the interim approach. With Geneva becoming a probable outcome, it was imperative for the United States to consider procedures and substance—all the more so as it is the view of the Administration, which we have certainly not kept secret for years, that progress toward peace in the Middle East is in the interest of the parties concerned, in the interest of the West, and in the interest of the United States.

As such, it is not directed against any country. It is not intended as a pressure upon any country. It is as objective a look as we can get from our best conception of the American and world interest in this matter, of what is required to promote peace, and of course the United States has been committed to the existence of Israel as part of such a just peace.

Q. Mr. Secretary, as I understood you, you said the United States will be willing to put forward new proposals if neither of the principals came up with their own proposals for establishing progress.

Secretary Kissinger: At least as to procedures.

Q. Well, that was part of the question, actually. Do you mean to suggest that the United States will produce proposals in terms of its bilateral or multilateral relationships with the parties themselves or for Geneva, or in what context?

Secretary Kissinger: That depends on which route is chosen. It will be impossible for the United States to be at Geneva without expressing some view on the subject at some time.

Q. What are the chances of your renewing shuttle diplomacy, then?

Secretary Kissinger: We cannot judge which method will be most appropriate until the President has had an opportunity to talk to some of the parties principally involved.

Q. Mr. Secretary, will the letter from the Senators giving the broad-base support for Israel have any effect on your dealings with President Sadat or Prime Minister Rabin?

Secretary Kissinger: We will take seriously expressions from many quarters. At least some of the statements in that letter contain the ambiguities that have been at the heart of Middle East negotiations for many years, and therefore, as we move more deeply into these negotiations, we will have to discuss with the Senate as precisely what meaning is to be given to phrases such as "secure and recognized frontiers," which are also part of Security Council Resolution 242.

Q. If President Sadat brings up this letter, queries what effect it has on you and American policy, what is your answer?

Secretary Kissinger: Our answer will be that we are taking into account the views of many groups and, of course, congressional views with considerable seriousness, that after we have made a decision, we will discuss it at great length with the Senate and with the whole Congress, and that in the meantime we have to proceed according to our best judgment of the situation.

Q. Mr. Secretary, why do you believe the Syrians moved to extend the U.N. mandate

for six months, which puts them out of synchronization with the Egyptians, and what will the impact of that action be on the next three to six months?

Secretary Kissinger: I will answer that question, but if we could leave non-Egyptian-and-Israeli questions out until I get through the second part of my answers—but I will answer that question.

Q. On the Egyptians?

Secretary Kissinger: The impact is that it gives some more time for a development of peace initiatives less closely geared to imminent deadlines than seemed possible a few weeks ago, and therefore we welcome this step.

Helen [Helen Thomas, United Press International], did you have a question?

Q. Yes, I did. On the question of overdramatizing Mayaguez, don't you think that the Administration had a big part in that? Also, you were the one who said it was a bonus and benefits.

Secretary Kissinger: That it was what?

Q. A bonus and benefits.

Secretary Kissinger: No, I said our purpose was to free the ship and the crew, and if there were any collateral benefits, that was a bonus, but not the primary purpose. That is a different thing from saying that that was the exclusive purpose.

Q. Don't you think that it is being magnified into a major foreign policy representation?

Secretary Kissinger: I believe that it was explained in response to very intense queries. I have stated our view and what has happened previously. I don't want to—

Q. Mr. Secretary, do you believe that the two superpowers will inevitably impose a settlement on the sides in the Middle East if both sides will not come with new proposals?

Secretary Kissinger: We have not thought it wise to impose a settlement, and our policy has been designed to enable the parties con-

cerned to negotiate the structure of a just and lasting peace.

Q. Mr. Secretary, does the President plan mainly to listen during the Sadat and Rabin meeting, and if so, what is your expectation for any new position, new concessions, being made by either man? The reason I ask the question is that it suggests that the reassessment may hinge on the outcome of those talks.

Secretary Kissinger: No, I think the President will both talk and listen. He will give to both sides our assessment of the situation, and it will be as close to identical to both sides as we can make it.

He will then obviously ask their views on their assessment of the situation; and our reassessment, or at least the conclusions we will draw, will depend obviously to an important extent on the answers we receive.

Q. Mr. Secretary, President Sadat has said publicly now several times that he intends to press President Ford for an answer to what the American position is on supporting Israel, either in the present situation or back to the 1967 borders. What will the President say to President Sadat, or what do you think about that question?

Secretary Kissinger: If I tell you that, maybe President Sadat won't come to the meeting. [Laughter.]

I think we are in no position to give answers to final settlement until we have completed the assessment we are now making.

Q. Since we have already had no assessment on Mr. Gromyko, can you tell us a little bit of what he indicated to you was the Soviet position on the Middle East?

Secretary Kissinger: I think that the Soviet Union realizes that it is one thing to start a conference, it is another to bring it to a conclusion. And I think every party concerned so far has realized that it was less complicated to talk about Geneva than to bring it off.

Now that Geneva has become a very probable outcome, I think it behooves the two co-chairmen to discuss what steps they can take

to bring about the best atmosphere for talks and the best possible outcome for such talks, and this is the spirit within which we had our preliminary exchanges.

As you know, Foreign Minister Gromyko and I plan to meet again in July, and I think at that time, after we have substantially completed our assessment, we will be in a position to be more specific.

Q. Mr. Secretary, you say Geneva is a probable outcome, but as you also point out, it is a lot of trouble getting it off the ground. First, we thought it was going to meet early in the summer. Now it appears that it may not be until late in the summer, and the Egyptians are saying possibly not until the end of the year. Do you have any estimate of when Geneva will be?

Secretary Kissinger: I think I will be in a better position to answer that question in July, after I meet with Foreign Minister Gromyko, and after the President has met with President Sadat and with Prime Minister Rabin and after we have talked to some of the other interested Arab parties.

Q. When you talk about Geneva, are you talking about it in the context we understood it when it first began, that this would be a negotiation, or would it simply be a framework within which some variation of shuttle diplomacy might be able to work?

Secretary Kissinger: I don't think I can add anything to the three possible options that the President outlined yesterday.

Mr. Nessen: Why not take just a couple more minutes, Mr. Secretary? You have been at it for about an hour.

Secretary Kissinger: I haven't even gotten started yet. I will take two or three more questions.

Q. How would you define the main stumbling block to an interim settlement between Israel and Egypt? Is it the issue of non-belligerency?

Secretary Kissinger: The issue of the last interim negotiation has taken on the form of the Japanese movie "Rashomon"—there are so many versions of it around now that

I don't want to add to the general confusion.

I don't think there is any purpose served by reviewing the last negotiation, which takes on more epic proportions the longer one hears the various accounts. The major problem now is to focus on the future. That requires some stocktaking as to what the parties now conceive to be the essence of the problem as they now see it.

Once we understand that, then we can make some suggestions as to whether or how the deadlock might be broken, rather than go over again the last positions they had at that time, which under the pressure of events may now look somewhat different.

Q. Dr. Kissinger, you said that we have not thought it wise to impose a settlement. Do you have any reason to believe that we could impose a settlement that would be accepted unless it was acceptable to both sides?

Secretary Kissinger: We believe that a settlement must emerge out of a process of negotiation between the two sides in some form, either directly or indirectly.

Q. Mr. Secretary, in your meeting with Gromyko, was there any progress made on what appeared to be some differences on the Vladivostok SALT agreement, or is that coming along? And do you expect to have something final this year, yet?

Secretary Kissinger: The Vladivostok agreement settled most of the conceptual problems. It left open many of the technical issues in the implementation of the basic concepts. Being technical, these issues become extremely complicated. I believe that we are making progress in clarifying the issues and in narrowing the gap between the two sides.

I believe that the chances of completing the agreement this year are good, but it is a highly technical negotiation in which—I don't want to disillusion you—there is an enormous amount of consensus within our government as to what is required, and we are moving in that direction now.

Q. Mr. Secretary—

Secretary Kissinger: I think, Bernie, you had a question.

Q. The other Bernie.

Mr. Nessen: Bernie Kalb.

Secretary Kissinger: Oh, Bernie Kalb [Bernard Kalb, CBS News]. I didn't even see him.

Q. Mr. Secretary, in this immediate post-Viet-Nam era, do you believe that the firmness of your reiterations to outstanding American commitments is matched by an equal firmness of the will of the American people to follow through on those commitments?

Secretary Kissinger: Yes, I believe it is. I believe that the American people will support an American foreign policy designed to preserve global peace and to bring about conditions of progress which reduce international tensions and general tensions.

I think this is a question in part of the leadership of the Administration, which we intend to exercise, and I believe also that with the end of some of the divisive debates which this country has been subjected to in recent years we are in a better position to obtain public support and, indeed, we have a very large degree of public support for the kind of foreign policy that we have outlined.

The Press: Thank you, Mr. Secretary.

Secretary Kissinger Meets With Soviet Foreign Minister Gromyko at Vienna; Visits Bonn, Berlin, and Ankara

Secretary Kissinger visited Austria, the Federal Republic of Germany, Berlin, and Turkey May 18-23. He met with Soviet Foreign Minister Andrei A. Gromyko at Vienna and headed the U.S. observer delegation to the meeting of the Council of Ministers of the Central Treaty Organization (CENTO) at Ankara. Following are remarks by Secretary Kissinger and foreign leaders, his address before the Berlin House of Representatives, his statement before the CENTO Council, and the texts of a joint statement issued following his meetings with Foreign Minister Gromyko and the final press communique issued at the conclusion of the meeting of the CENTO Council.

ARRIVAL, VIENNA, MAY 18

Press release 267 dated May 19

Mr. Chancellor [Bruno Kreisky], ladies and gentlemen: I would like to express my pleasure at being in Vienna. The friendship between the United States and Austria means a great deal to us, and the independence and neutrality of Austria are firm principles of American foreign policy.

I have come to Vienna to meet with the Soviet Foreign Minister. The problems that concern the Soviet Union and the United States affect the peace of the world and the well-being of mankind. We will make every effort to improve prospects for peace. The United States, while firmly determined to defend its principles, its interests, and the principles and interests of its allies, will make every effort to bring about a more conciliatory and more peaceful world, and I hope that my talks with the Soviet Foreign Minister will help in this effort.

I would like to take this occasion to tell Chancellor Kreisky how much we have appreciated his visit to the United States and how much we have always valued his friendship and advice.

The President looks forward to seeing him in Salzburg in two weeks. I think it is a symbol of the importance of Austria, as a neutral independent state, that these meetings should be taking place in such a short period in this country.

I look forward to my stay in Austria. Thank you.

REMARKS FOLLOWING MEETING WITH CHANCELLOR KREISKY, MAY 19

Press release 268 dated May 19

Ladies and gentlemen: As I indicated yesterday, we consider the Chancellor and Austria good friends of the United States. Whenever we have an opportunity we try to get the benefit of the thinking of Chancellor Kreisky and of his associates.

Austria is a small country, but it is located centrally in Europe, with a long tradition, and its security depends importantly on the maintenance of peace and good relations. Therefore we always try to take advantage of every opportunity to exchange views.

We had a very good and detailed talk about the world situation and particular problems that Foreign Minister Gromyko and I plan to discuss here. It is, of course, symbolic that we should be meeting here 20 years after the [Austrian] State Treaty, and we want to express our appreciation to Chancellor Kreisky, the Austrian Government, and to the Austrian people for the very warm reception we have had here.

Thank you very much.

REMARKS BY SECRETARY KISSINGER AND
SOVIET FOREIGN MINISTER GROMYKO, MAY 19¹

Q. Mr. Kissinger, did you make any progress on SALT [Strategic Arms Limitation Talks]?

Secretary Kissinger: The Foreign Minister and I had a general review of the situation. We also discussed the European Security Conference, and we began a discussion of the Strategic Arms Limitation Talks. The talks were constructive and were conducted in a cordial and friendly atmosphere. We will resume tomorrow morning at 9:30. I would say that on the topics we discussed some progress was made.

Q. Will you go to the Middle East on your next discussions, Dr. Kissinger?

Secretary Kissinger: I have no plans to go to the Middle East tomorrow.

Q. How do you feel about it, Mr. Gromyko?

Foreign Minister Gromyko: I agree with the Secretary, the conversation was useful. Well, I do not want to repeat. You were very precise, and (the talks were held) in a constructive and friendly atmosphere.

REMARKS BY SECRETARY KISSINGER AND
SOVIET FOREIGN MINISTER GROMYKO, MAY 20²

Secretary Kissinger: The Foreign Minister and I had very good and useful discussions in a cordial atmosphere. We are going to issue a communique at 7:00 tonight, but I can say now that we agreed to meet again in the near future for a further detailed review of the Strategic Arms Limitation Talks, prospects of peace in the Middle East, and other matters of mutual interest.

Foreign Minister Gromyko: I agree with the Secretary. We discussed several problems. All of them are important. I think, I

¹ Made at the conclusion of their meeting at the Hotel Imperial, Vienna (text from press release 269 dated May 20).

² Made at the conclusion of their meeting at the Soviet Embassy, Vienna (text from press release 273).

am convinced, discussion is useful and it is necessary. We agreed, of course, to have further discussions with each other, how many of them we do not know, but at least one in the near future.

Q. Has any compromise been reached, sir, on the issue of verification, could you tell us?

Foreign Minister Gromyko: It's a small detail.

Q. Verification is a small detail?

Foreign Minister Gromyko: It's a small detail.

Q. It's been taken care of?

Secretary Kissinger: We can't go into the details of the various issues that were discussed, but as I said, the talks were useful and constructive, and we will meet again in the near future to go over any items that will still be unresolved at that point. Thank you.

Q. Did you discuss the Middle East, Dr. Kissinger?

Secretary Kissinger: The Middle East was discussed in detail.

Q. Did you agree on any date for the Geneva Conference?

Secretary Kissinger: We will meet again before that.

Q. Could the next meeting be in Vienna?

Secretary Kissinger: It hasn't been decided yet.

JOINT U.S.-U.S.S.R. STATEMENT,
VIENNA, MAY 20

Press release 270 dated May 20

In accordance with an earlier agreement, a meeting was held on May 19-20, 1975, in Vienna between the Secretary of State of the United States and Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs, Henry A. Kissinger, and Member of the Political Bureau of the Central Committee of the CPSU, Minister of Foreign Affairs of the U.S.S.R., A. A. Gromyko.

The two sides were unanimous in emphasizing their determination to continue to adhere firmly to the course of further improving and developing U.S.-Soviet relations in the interests of the peoples

of both countries and of strengthening peace.

An exchange of views took place on bilateral relations including those pertaining to a further limitation of strategic offensive arms. Also discussed were a number of international problems of mutual interest—the progress of the Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe and its speedy conclusion; the situation with regard to a just and lasting peace settlement in the Middle East, including the question of resuming the Geneva Peace Conference; and other matters. In these discussions both sides proceeded from the agreements and understandings reached as a result of the U.S.-Soviet Summit meetings held in Moscow, Washington and Vladivostok.

The conversations which proceeded in a constructive spirit were, in the opinion of both sides, useful.

DEPARTURE, VIENNA, MAY 20

Press release 274 dated May 20

Ladies and gentlemen: I would like to take this opportunity to thank the Austrian Government and Chancellor Kreisky for having arranged our visit here in such a warm and technically excellent manner. The talks themselves were useful and were conducted in a friendly atmosphere, and progress was made on the issues that were discussed.

Of course, the work of peace is never finished, and therefore Foreign Minister Gromyko and I will meet again in the near future to review outstanding issues, especially on the Middle East and Strategic Arms Limitation Talks, but also on other matters of bilateral concern.

On the whole I am satisfied with the visit here, and I leave with the conviction that relations between the United States and the Soviet Union are essential for the preservation of peace and for the progress of mankind and that we will do our utmost to keep them on course.

Thank you very much.

ARRIVAL, BONN, MAY 20

Press release 275 dated May 20

Ladies and gentlemen: I would like to say that the relations between the Federal Republic and the United States are so excellent that it is not necessary, for that reason, to have periodic meetings of the Foreign Minis-

ter [Hans-Dietrich Genscher] and the Chancellor [Helmut Schmidt] and leading American officials. On the other hand, we consider the Federal Republic one of the key countries in the preservation of peace and in the achievement of progress in Europe, in the Atlantic area, and all over the world.

It is therefore necessary, from our point of view, that we consult regularly with the Federal Republic, and I look forward to an opportunity to exchange views with my friends the Foreign Minister and the Chancellor, whose views mean a great deal to us. I will report to them fully about my just-concluded meetings with Foreign Minister Gromyko and talk to them also about East-West relations, the situation in the Middle East, the NATO summit, and any other matter of mutual interest.

It is for me always a great pleasure to visit the Federal Republic, where I know I am among friends, and a country which I know is a close ally and close associate.

Thank you very much.

DEPARTURE, BONN, MAY 21

Press release 279 dated May 21

Secretary Kissinger

I had very satisfactory talks in a very friendly atmosphere with the Foreign Minister and the Chancellor. We discussed all problems of Western relations and also our bilateral relations, which, as I said already yesterday, could not be better.

I am flying now to Berlin in order to express American ties to this brave city and to emphasize again our commitment to this city.

Foreign Minister Genscher

The talks with the American Secretary of State have again confirmed that the Federal Republic of Germany and the United States are in agreement in their assessment of all important world political questions.

We feel especially happy and grateful that the American Secretary of State is traveling to Berlin today. For us that is another confirmation of the ties of the United States to Berlin.

Press release 252 dated May 22

Ladies and gentlemen: I wanted to express the great pleasure at being able to visit Berlin. I am here to tell you on behalf of our President and of the American people that the close connection between the people of Berlin, between the security and freedom of Berlin and America, remains as valid today as it has throughout the postwar period.

No American can visit Berlin without a feeling of pride for what our people have together accomplished and a feeling of respect and admiration for the determination of Berlin to live in freedom and in security. So I look forward to being able to spend some hours in your city and to be inspired as we always are by the spirit of Berlin.

Thank you very much.

REMARKS AT THE U.S. MISSION, BERLIN, MAY 21

Press release 286 dated May 22

General Walker [Maj. Gen. Sam Walker, U.S. Commandant Berlin], ladies and gentlemen: I would like to tell you first of all how proud I am to be here in Berlin, a city which has been a focal point of American postwar efforts, a city in which Americans have every reason to be proud of their fortitude and of their association with the brave people who have stood for freedom throughout the postwar period. In America, in recent months, we have gone through some difficulties, and there are many, or at least there are some, who have questioned the role of America in the postwar period. I think that all of those who doubt what America has stood for should visit Berlin.

We remain committed to a strong foreign policy. We remain committed to defending our principles and our values, and we do not forget that the peace of the world has been preserved through American efforts and American cooperation with our allies, and we intend to maintain this.

You here in this city have had a very special role to play throughout the postwar

period. The freedom of Berlin has become a test case of American commitments and of American purposes.

We are now in a period in which we are negotiating with the Soviet Union and with other countries of the Communist world. We sincerely attempt to ease tensions. Any responsible leader has an obligation to avoid the dangers of war, and no group has a greater interest in this than the military personnel that will have to bear the brunt of a conflict or people in a city such as this that would be exposed to changes in international climate. But never in this effort to relax tension will we give up our principles, and never will we sacrifice the values or the interests of our allies.

In this somewhat more complex world that exists, more complex than the early postwar period, we will not forget the city of Berlin. And the Americans here in their dedication, their reporting, play a very special role. I want you to know how honored I felt by the ceremony I was privileged to participate in, want you to know how much it means to me to come to this city, where the basic issues do not require so much explanation and where all of you are performing a great task for your country, for the free peoples, and indeed for the peace of the whole world.

Thank you very much.

ADDRESS BEFORE THE BERLIN HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES, MAY 21

Press release 276 dated May 21

Mr. Governing Mayor, Mr. Foreign Minister, ladies and gentlemen: It is an honor to be in this city whose fortitude has preserved the peace and whose devotion has inspired all who love freedom. The people of West Berlin know better than anyone what freedom means. They know—and have proven—that peace requires security as well as conciliation, courage as well as hope. They have experienced that freedom can be preserved only by those who have faith in themselves and in the dignity of man.

I do not come to Berlin to lecture to you

on the requirements of peace and freedom in the modern world. It is we who have learned, and you who have taught:

—You have endured and prevailed during the darkest days of confrontation between East and West.

—You have experienced in the cruel division of your own city the consequences of ideological hostility.

—You survived and prospered because the solidarity of the Western allies has buttressed your security and the security of Western Europe.

—And now, in a new era of eased confrontation in Europe, the fate of Berlin will determine the future of the efforts to insure security through negotiation and cooperation. As Berlin was the greatest symbol of the heroism of the immediate postwar period, it is also the acid test of the period we now hope to enter.

Throughout the postwar era, the United States has stood shoulder to shoulder with this city, in times of crisis and in times of hope. The strength of our commitment thus derives not from formal documents alone but, above all, from our perception of our own objective interest and of a generation of shared experiences.

The security of West Berlin remains a vital interest of the United States. For us, much more is at stake here than the security of a city. To us you symbolize man's unquenchable yearning for freedom; you represent the capacity of democracy to summon the strength to defend its values. This is the cement of our tie with you, our sympathy for you, and our admiration for you.

My visit does not come in the midst of crisis; rather it takes place at a moment when this city is enjoying greater security than at any time in the last 30 years. But we shall not slacken our resolve or neglect our security, for we know that it has been our determination and our strength which have made the present opportunity for progress possible. By working to make restraint and negotiation the only realistic option, we

have created conditions for a more rational, hopeful, and reliable relationship with the East.

In the thermonuclear age, there is no alternative to peace. In the general interest—most of all of those whose homes would be the focal point of crisis—we seek just and reasonable solutions to outstanding issues. But America will never seek peace by abandoning principles or sacrificing friends.

In the delicate balance of relations between East and West, Berlin's position is pivotal. Throughout the period of détente the United States and its Western allies have shared the conviction that the hope of wider security and cooperation in Europe had to be vindicated in Berlin above all. We agreed that efforts to normalize relations in Central Europe had to begin with normalizing West Berlin's existence in safety and dignity.

Therefore we pressed for reliable, practical improvements in the conditions of access to Berlin and in life in this city; we made a major effort to remove Berlin as an issue in East-West confrontation. We consider the effectiveness, durability, and scrupulous observance of the Quadripartite Agreement on Berlin of September 1971 a crucial test of the process called détente.

Given the complex history of the issue, we cannot expect the Quadripartite Agreement to work every day without flaw. But no one, East or West, can deny the practical benefits which have accrued to both sides from the agreement and the arrangements which followed.

Before 1972, traffic on the vital access routes between Berlin and the Federal Republic was vulnerable to harassment on a variety of pretexts. The relationship between Bonn and West Berlin was subject to continuing dispute. And cruelly and tragically, the human connections between the people of West Berlin and their friends and families in the surrounding area were being stifled by Eastern controls.

Today, by contrast:

—Vital surface access routes are guaranteed in an international agreement; unim-

peded and preferential civilian traffic is enshrined in formally agreed procedures.

—Communications between West Berlin and East Berlin, between West Berlin and the German Democratic Republic, have been improved. Direct telephone links now exist. Visits to the East now number in the millions annually, nearly 300,000 during the recent Easter holiday alone.

—The Western allies' rights and responsibilities to safeguard the status of the Western sectors of Berlin have been specifically reaffirmed.

—The Soviet Union has formally accepted that the ties between West Berlin and the Federal Republic "will be maintained and developed." It has agreed that Berlin's interests abroad be represented by the Federal Republic and that the Federal Republic provide consular protection and representation for Berlin in international organizations. Berlin is also included in the increasingly important web of agreements governing intra-German ties.

While these legal guarantees are not necessarily self-implementing, they represent a significant achievement. We shall never relax our efforts to insure the strict implementation of the Quadripartite Agreement. We shall deal with challenges with the same determination to resist pressures and with the same spirit of readiness to negotiate that produced the agreement. Thus only if Berlin flourishes will détente flourish; only if you are secure will Europe be secure. This has been America's attitude for 30 years; it has not changed. On behalf of President Ford and the American people, I reaffirm our historic relationship today.

Mr. Governing Mayor, Mr. Foreign Minister, distinguished ladies and gentlemen: In this House resides the democratic tradition that gave Berlin the moral strength and resiliency to withstand the hardest trials of the last 30 years. And you embody the democratic ideals which represent Berlin's future.

The tradition of this House began in 1946 with an election which, tragically, remains the only free vote held in all sectors of

Berlin since the war. In 1975 you mark the 25th anniversary of the Berlin Constitution, which has provided the framework for your growth and progress in freedom.

In the world today, democratic principles are under grave challenge on many continents. Over the next decade we will learn whether—in the face of economic stresses, military peril, and political change—free men have the will and imagination to vindicate the values they believe in. For these values, however vital, do not defend themselves nor do they grow without dedicated effort.

All great achievements were an ideal before they became a reality. What the free societies need above all is the confidence that they can shape their own future. Our material strength is undisputed and unmatched; what is required now is to summon our reserves of faith and dedication. The Atlantic nations have shown in countless endeavors in 30 years the tremendous strength of the free association of free peoples.

At moments of difficulty, it is well to remind ourselves of what we have achieved—the reality of security and progress to which men and nations have aspired throughout history. The preservation of these achievements, and the world's hope for wider sharing, depend crucially on what we do together.

I have come to Berlin to tell you that America remains committed to the building of a just and peaceful, secure, and free world. We know our moral compass. We shall be true to the belief in freedom, progress, and human dignity which reflects America's best hopes.

This is why this city means so much to us. For 30 years you have symbolized our challenges; but for 30 years also you have recalled us to our duty. You have been an inspiration to all free men.

As we face a new era, with challenges more subtle and complex, Berlin will continue to be a symbol of freedom. We shall stand with you, and we are confident that history will record Berlin not merely as a great city but as a great principle in the story of man's struggle for freedom.

Mr. Governing Mayor, Mr. Foreign Minister, ladies and gentlemen: I appreciate your eloquent words and warm welcome. I have been coming to Berlin at infrequent but regular intervals since 1946. In general I have come from a westerly direction, where people sometimes feel the need of reassessment and are inclined to pull out their trees to see if the roots are still there.

This city has always been an inspiration to me, in difficult as well as calm times, because Berlin has always known where the fundamental values were and has always known the differences between freedom and terror and has always known that there are certain concessions that cannot be made.

The interdependence of the peoples of the West has found its major expression in Berlin, politically and strategically. As you said, Berlin is really in an impossible situation, but morally and politically we know—because we are reminded of this fact every day by the existence of Berlin—that there are things which are of fundamental value even though they cannot be measured by a computer.

One of these things is the freedom of Berlin. Were this to be impaired, the freedom and the self-respect of the West would receive a blow from which it could probably not recover.

Your courage is an inspiration for us. Our commitment to Berlin is partly legal. But neither in the United States nor in any country of the West is Berlin called into question.

Our fate is indivisible. We need your courage and determination just as much as you need our support. That is why it is important for me to be able to visit you now after some difficult times in America which, however, have not caused our contribution to the security of the world, the peace of the world, to lessen. The peace of the world has

³ Delivered at a luncheon given by Governing Mayor Klaus Schuetz (text from press release 285 dated May 22).

been maintained due to this American contribution.

I thank you also on behalf of Mrs. Kissinger for your warm reception in the spirit of the Berliners. I raise my glass to the Governing Mayor and Frau Schuetz and to the people of Berlin.

DEPARTURE, BERLIN, MAY 21

Press release 283 dated May 22

I want to say, ladies and gentlemen, that I would like to thank the Governing Mayor for the very warm reception that we have had here. As always, I leave Berlin with more courage, and I want to assure you that the commitment of the United States to Berlin not only remains unimpaired but will grow as our experiences together develop.

ARRIVAL, ANKARA, MAY 21

Press release 287 dated May 22

Ladies and gentlemen: I want to say first of all what a pleasure it is to be back in Turkey. I remember my reception here last March with the greatest warmth and the very useful talks I had with your government at the time.

My basic purpose in coming here is to attend my first meeting with the Central Treaty Organization. It happens at an important moment, and it gives me an opportunity to exchange with our allies their perception of the international situation under current conditions and also to affirm to them the basic theme of our foreign policy: that the United States will defend its interests and its principles and that it will stand by its friends in a forceful and understanding manner.

I also look forward to discussing with our host—with the Prime Minister [Süleyman Demirel] and the Foreign Minister [Ihsan Caglayangil]—the bilateral relations between Turkey and the United States. I will have an opportunity to express my gratification and the gratification of the President at the recent vote in the Senate for restoring

aid to Turkey. We will review the negotiations on Cyprus and other matters of common concern in the spirit of friendship and cooperation that characterizes our relationship.

STATEMENT BEFORE THE COUNCIL OF MINISTERS OF CENTO, MAY 22

Press release 289 dated May 22

Mr. Secretary General [Umit Bayülken], Mr. Prime Minister, Your Excellencies, distinguished guests, delegates, ladies and gentlemen: I am privileged to be here for the first time representing my country at the 22d meeting of Foreign Ministers of the nations of the Central Treaty Organization.

I would like to take this opportunity to thank the Prime Minister and the Foreign Minister of Turkey for the characteristically warm reception we have received and for the excellent arrangements they have made.

We meet at a timely moment when the United States is determined to reaffirm its ties to its allies. We meet at a moment when this region—at the crossroads of Europe, the Mediterranean, the Persian Gulf, the Middle East, and South Asia—has taken on an ever greater strategic, economic, and global importance.

We live in an era of rapid economic change and political turbulence. There have been disturbing tensions in the eastern Mediterranean. The Middle East stands poised on the brink either of new upheaval or of a hopeful process of movement toward peace. This region reflects, therefore, all the problems and hopes of a new era of international affairs. If our nations can thrive and maintain our collaboration, we will achieve much for ourselves, and we will contribute even more for the resolution of issues far wider in their impact and implications. We will demonstrate to our peoples and set an example for all peoples that even in an era of change men remain the masters of their own future.

President Ford has repeated before the Congress that "We will stand by our friends, we will honor our commitments, and we

will uphold our country's principles."⁴ The American people have learned, through experience that is irreversible, that our fate is closely linked with the rest of the world.

The world faces a new agenda—of economic progress, of relations between consumers and producers, of relations between developed and developing countries, of issues such as the law of the sea—in which the United States is in a unique position to make a vital contribution and determined to do so. And at this moment, after some months of trial, the American people are perhaps more conscious than in the recent past of the need to reaffirm our steadfastness of our dedication toward international peace, progress, and security.

Central to our foreign policy is the close relationship with our allies in NATO, of which Turkey is such an important member, and in Japan, and with our friends in other treaty relationships. Our relationships are based on considerations beyond security. Next week the Foreign Ministers of the International Energy Agency and the OECD [Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development] will meet in Paris to underline the importance of economic cooperation and economic progress. At the end of the week President Ford will meet with his colleagues at a summit in Brussels to emphasize America's ties to its friends.

In today's world our associations aim at peace and not confrontation. We seek to engage the Communist powers in constructive relations on the basis of our continued strength and security, individual and collective. But as we strive for peace we shall never give up our principles or abandon our friends.

In recent years the United States has attempted to build a more durable and constructive relationship with the Soviet Union, as my colleagues here have similarly done. We have taken historic steps of strategic arms limitation, of bilateral cooperation in various fields, and of resolution of differences in such areas as Berlin—which I visited

⁴ For President Ford's address before a joint session of Congress on Apr. 10, see BULLETIN of Apr. 28, 1975, p. 529.

yesterday. At the same time we are determined that in areas where our interests are not parallel to the Soviet Union's there must be a practice of reciprocal restraint and responsibility. We have always insisted, and we shall continue to insist, that the easing of tensions cannot occur selectively.

The United States, as you know, has also taken historic steps in recent years to end decades of estrangement with the People's Republic of China. This new relationship has served the cause of peace not only in Asia but globally. The development and improvement of this relationship is one of the priorities of American policy.

All the members of this organization have been similarly outward-looking in their policies. We all have important relationships which have strengthened each of us and thus served a common interest.

Within this region, we face a new era of challenges more complex than those when this organization was created:

—Pakistan's economic progress since its trials of three and a half years ago has been extraordinary. The United States takes pride in having been associated with this endeavor.

Prime Minister Bhutto had a highly productive visit to Washington. The territorial integrity of Pakistan remains a principal interest of the United States. At the same time the United States strongly supports the promising process of accommodation on the subcontinent which was begun at Simla.

—The rapidity of Iran's modernization is one of the most impressive demonstrations of national dedication in the world today. The recent Washington visit of His Imperial Majesty was the occasion for deepening American-Iranian friendship and for increasing the already close economic cooperation. Iran's role for peace and stability in the region is vital. We welcome the improvement in its relations with its neighbors, including Iraq.

—The United States regards Turkey as a valued friend and ally. We will make every effort for further progress in restoring our normal defense relationship with Turkey. The United States strongly supports efforts aimed at ending the disputes between Turkey

and Greece; for we consider their relationship important to the security of both countries, to the security of the Mediterranean, and to the security of Europe. We also will continue to do our utmost in the Cyprus dispute to encourage a just and durable solution that promotes the welfare of the people on the island and maintains the sovereignty, territorial integrity, and independence of Cyprus.

—The Arab-Israeli conflict remains a dangerous problem for the entire world. The two disengagement agreements established a momentum toward peace that the United States is committed to sustain. The challenge to diplomacy in the Middle East is to achieve agreement among the parties that will assure the territorial integrity, security, and right to national existence of all the states of the region and that will be seen to take into account the legitimate interests of all its peoples. Since the suspension of negotiations in March, we have reviewed the various approaches of assisting the parties to continue their progress. Our reassessment is still underway. But we are convinced that the present stalemate must not be allowed to continue. The United States has every intention of remaining actively involved; we shall promote practical progress toward a just and durable peace pursuant to Security Council Resolutions 242 and 338. Our challenges—as previous speakers have pointed out—are not confined to the political field. Indeed, in an era of interdependence, peace must be built on many pillars.

—Energy is an area of increasing importance to all of us. This organization embraces countries which are consumers, others which are producers, and developing nations seriously affected by the recent crisis of shortage and increase in price. The well-being of all our countries is affected in different ways. My government believes that a fair solution can be found serving all our interests—the consumers in a reliable supply at reasonable price, the producers in reliable long-term income for development, and the poorer nations' need for special consideration. This promise cannot be realized through tactics of confrontation or by taking advantage of

temporarily favorable market conditions; such tactics will produce counter organization, and by undermining the world economic structure, will ultimately hurt producers as well as consumers. The United States will spare no effort to find a cooperative solution.

The accomplishments of CENTO in the political, security, and recently, economic fields are considerable. The cohesion of this organization, now in its third decade of existence, is a remarkable testimony to the common interests and values of the nations comprising it.

With the wise leadership of our distinguished new Secretary General, and with renewed determination that this alliance shall be a vehicle for close collaboration in all fields, CENTO can make a fresh contribution to this region's security and economic progress.

The President has asked me to underscore the continued commitment of my country to these fundamental aims. The United States is deeply conscious of our responsibility. We know that the future of the world depends very much on our contribution and perseverance. We will remain fully engaged because of our own self-interest, because of the responsibility our wealth and power confer upon us, and because only by standing by our friends can we be true to the values of freedom that have brought progress and hope to our people.

TEXT OF CENTO FINAL PRESS COMMUNIQUE

ANKARA, *May 23, 1975*—The Council of Ministers of the Central Treaty Organization (CENTO) held its 22nd Session in Ankara on May 22-23, 1975.

The delegations were led by:

Iran	H.E. Dr. Abbas Ali Khalatbary, Minister of Foreign Affairs;
Pakistan	H.E. Mr. Aziz Ahmed, Minister of State for Defence and Foreign Affairs;
Turkey	H.E. Mr. Ihsan Sabri Caglayangil, Minister of Foreign Affairs;
United Kingdom	The Rt. Hon. Roy Hattersley, M.P. Minister of State, Foreign and Commonwealth Office;
United States	The Hon. Dr. Henry A. Kissinger, Secretary of State.

The meeting was opened by H.E. Mr. Umüt Halûk Bayülken, Secretary General of the Central Treaty Organization.

The Session was inaugurated by the message of H.E. Mr. Fahri Korutürk, President of the Republic of Turkey.

Following an address by H.E. Mr. Süleyman Demirel, Prime Minister of Turkey, opening statements were made by the leaders of delegations and the Secretary General of CENTO, expressing their thanks for the gracious message of the President of the Republic of Turkey and for the warm hospitality extended to them by the Turkish government.

H.E. Mr. Ihsan Sabri Caglayangil, Foreign Minister of Turkey, as representative of the Host Government presided at the Session.

In their discussions, held in a cordial and friendly atmosphere, the Council examined the international situation since their meeting last year in Washington and noted with satisfaction that peace, stability and economic and social progress were maintained in the CENTO Region. The Ministers noted with regret, however, that many problems posing a threat to world peace still remained unresolved. During these discussions, particular attention was given to matters of interest in the CENTO Region and the Ministers reviewed intensively the prospects for further promoting co-operation within the Alliance in all possible fields.

The Ministers, affirming that their efforts for peace and stability would also contribute to world peace, confirmed their support for all constructive steps that would help strengthen the cause of peace.

Members of the Council also made statements regarding problems of peace and security which are of special interest to their countries.

The Ministers reiterated their firm support for respect for the principles and the purposes of the United Nations and stressed the necessity of strengthening its role in the service of world peace and stability.

The Council took note of the recent developments in the relations between Iran and Iraq, conducive to the settlement of their disputes.

Having reviewed the situation in the Middle East, the Ministers agreed that the prolonged conflict in the area continued to constitute a grave threat to world peace and emphasized the urgent need for the establishment of a just, honourable and lasting peace in the Middle East in accordance with the principles and provisions of the United Nations Security Council Resolutions 242 of November 22, 1967 and 338 of October 22, 1973.

The Council of Ministers exchanged views on developments in Europe, especially with reference to the Conference on Security and Co-operation in Europe (CSCE) and the talks on Mutual and Balanced Force Reductions (MBFR). They expressed the hope that the CSCE would complete its work successfully in the near future and that there would

soon be corresponding progress in MBFR. In this context, the Ministers stressed that security in the CENTO Region constituted an important element in European security.

The Ministers noted the progress made during the past year towards the normalization of the situation in the South Asia Region. They expressed their appreciation of the efforts made by Pakistan despite difficulties, and expressed the hope that these efforts would continue between Pakistan and India with a view to paving the way towards a durable peace and security in the Region.

The Ministers re-affirmed the vital importance they attached to the preservation of the independence and territorial integrity of each of the member states in this region.

The Council reviewed the Report of the Military Committee. They took note that combined forces of the Member Countries had gained valuable experience during the year from naval, ground and air exercises, successfully carried out under the auspices of CENTO. The Ministers emphasized that the sole purpose of these exercises was to enhance the ability of their countries to safeguard their security and legitimate national interests.

The Council reaffirmed its agreement that the economic programme constitutes an important element of the CENTO partnership.

The Council, bearing in mind the important contributions made by CENTO to the strengthening of the economic links between the Regional Countries, endorsed the recommendations of the Economic Committee to consider support for activities related to rural development, agriculture and agro-industries.

The Council approved the Report of the Twenty-third Session of the Economic Committee and noted that the programme of scientific cooperation and cultural exchanges continued to create still better understanding among the peoples of the region.

Reviewing the work of the Multilateral Technical Cooperation Programme and of the CENTO Scientific programme, the Council noted that their projects were increasing in number and diversity and were making significant inputs to the technical and scientific advancement of the region. The Council noted that contributions to the Multilateral Science Fund would be increased for the coming year.

The Ministers considered the continuing threats of subversion directed towards the region and expressed the determination of their Governments to meet any such subversion with all the means at their disposal.

Concluding their review, the Ministers noted with appreciation the Annual Report of the Secretary General and extended a warm welcome to him on his first attendance at the Ministerial Council as the Secretary General of CENTO.

The Ministers were received by the President of the Republic of Turkey.

The Council accepted the invitation of the Government of the United Kingdom to hold the next session in May 1976 in London.

REMARKS FOLLOWING OPENING SESSION OF CENTO MEETING, MAY 22⁵

Mr. Koppel: (Question unclear, but concerns Syrian renewal of the U.N. Disengagement Observer Force.) . . . did this surprise you and does it strengthen your hand?

Secretary Kissinger: Well, I am pleased by this result, and I think it gets us some more time to see whether progress can be made.

Mr. Koppel: Did you know this was going to happen?

Secretary Kissinger: I did not know it through the whole period. I think Syria decided this in the last two weeks.

Mr. Koppel: Why do you think the Syrians agreed to go ahead, in effect, of the Egyptians? The Egyptians have given only three months' mandate. Now the Syrians' mandate will go through until November.

Secretary Kissinger: I do not want to speculate on Syrian motives, but I think it is a constructive development which we hope will give us an opportunity to work for progress in a calmer atmosphere.

Mr. Koppel: Does it in any way strengthen your hand unilaterally, or would it have to be still within the Geneva context?

Secretary Kissinger: Well, we have always maintained the position that we will proceed on whatever course seems most promising, and we do not insist on any particular formula—whichever will work best. I intend to go to Geneva, and we are prepared to use other means.

Mr. Koppel: May I ask another question on a different subject? There were reports today that the United States is beginning to evacuate people, as of tomorrow, out of Laos. Can you enlighten us on that?

Secretary Kissinger: We have been reduc-

⁵ Made in response to questions by Ted Koppel, ABC-TV (text from press release 290).

ing our personnel in Laos to make it conform more with the new political situation that has developed there, and in which, in the light of the harassment of our AID personnel, a reduction of at least regional offices is indicated. So there will be a very substantial reduction of our presence in Laos.

Mr. Koppel: Is this a complete evacuation?

Secretary Kissinger: It is not a complete evacuation at this point.

Mr. Koppel: Thank you very much.

REMARKS BY SECRETARY KISSINGER AND FOREIGN MINISTER CAGLAYANGIL, MAY 22⁶

Q. (First part unintelligible) . . . are you optimistic about any movement?

Secretary Kissinger: Well, as you know, the Foreign Minister has just returned from a conversation with the Greek Foreign Minister. The President will meet both the Greek and Turkish Prime Ministers at Brussels, and there will be many other occasions for exchanges, and no doubt the Turkish Government will evaluate the results of its conversations. But basically, I am always optimistic that progress can be made.

Q. Did you also discuss, sir, the lifting of the arms embargo?

Secretary Kissinger: Yes. We discussed the lifting of the arms embargo. As both the President and I have stated on many occasions, military aid to Turkey and the sale of arms to Turkey is not an act of American charity. It is something that is in the mutual interest of two allies. And therefore we oppose using the sale of equipment or military aid as a form of pressure. When the Congress reconvenes, we will pursue our proposals with the House of Representatives, and we hope that we will achieve a recognition of our point of view.

Q. Sir, there was a report in the Turkish press today—one newspaper—that you would mediate between Mr. Demirel's gov-

⁶ Made following their meeting at the Turkish Foreign Ministry (text from press release 291 dated May 23).

ernment and Mr. [Bulent] Ecevit on the Cyprus issue.

Secretary Kissinger: [Laughter.] Well, as you know, Mr. Ecevit is a student of mine, and I respect him very much, and I am having breakfast with him tomorrow morning. I am not mediating, but I will express my views to him, and we will have a good exchange as always.

Foreign Minister Caglayangil: I have nothing more to add to what Mr. Kissinger said. He summed up our talks very well.

Q. Will [Greek Prime Minister Constantine] Karamanlis and Demirel meet? Is there anything scheduled?

Foreign Minister Caglayangil: There will be a talk between Demirel and Karamanlis in Brussels.

Q. Mr. Caglayangil, did you inform the Secretary of State, Mr. Kissinger, what the Turkish Government would do if the arms embargo was not lifted?

Foreign Minister Caglayangil: We do not make any hypothetical comments.

Q. In your talk you said that if the embargo is not lifted in the near future, Turkey would be left in a position where she would have to reconsider her relations with the United States. What do you mean by "near future"?

Foreign Minister Caglayangil: Near future means the near future.

Q. Does this mean in summer or by the end of the year?

Foreign Minister Caglayangil: Naturally, it will be up to the decision to be taken by the government. It is not up to me to decide this period.

REMARKS BY SECRETARY KISSINGER AND BULENT ECEVIT, MAY 23⁷

Q. Well, we were wondering about the Prime Minister's statement to Le Monde. It

⁷ Made before and after a breakfast meeting at the home of Mr. Ecevit, Republican People's Party leader and former Prime Minister of Turkey (text from press release 294).

seems to have been taken by surprise in Athens (sic). Do you have any comments on that speech?

Secretary Kissinger: No, I do not think I should make any comment on the Prime Minister's statement. I had a talk with him yesterday, and I will see him again today about the possibilities of negotiations. But I better wait until I see him again.

Q. You do not think that it has been detrimental to a summit meeting in Brussels between Karamanlis and Demirel?

Secretary Kissinger: I think that has to be decided by the individuals primarily concerned. But I think that Turkey will make a serious effort to negotiate.

Q. Do you think that this time it will be more successful than the Rome meetings?

Secretary Kissinger: I just do not want to speculate. I am always hopeful that progress can be made.

Q. Do you have the impression that the opposition parties in Turkey are actually being more difficult about the Cyprus case now than they did before?

Mr. Eçevit: It is not fair asking that question while I am here. [Laughter.]

Secretary Kissinger: I have not even had a chance to talk to Mr. Eçevit. But I cannot imagine that he will be difficult or do anything which is not in the best interests of Turkey.

Q. (In Turkish to Mr. Eçevit) It is being said that the RPP [Republican People's Party] has separated itself from the government on the Cyprus issue and that the RPP is not of the same opinion as others on this. Would you please comment?

Mr. Eçevit: (In Turkish) As I have explained to you on many occasions, a political party cannot conduct a country's foreign policy when not in power. And if it tries to conduct this policy, it would be both an error and a presumptuous action; and the fact is that the government has not yet made a detailed announcement of its policy.

It would be a mistake if the opposition takes the lead and announces its view before

the government has announced its own policy or explains its policy to the opposition. This is something which can never take place in a democratic country. For this reason we are waiting to see what position the government will take.

Q. (In Turkish) Would you please explain why Mr. Necdet Uygur (RPP leader in Parliament) was not sent to lobby in the United States with other parliamentarians?

Mr. Eçevit: (In Turkish) We do not believe that this issue can be solved with such lobbying. And our parliamentarians and diplomatic friends could not be as convincing as Mr. Kissinger—

Secretary Kissinger: Steady now—

Mr. Eçevit: (In English) I will tell you what I said. (In Turkish)—in explaining to the Congress the reason the arms embargo on Turkey should be lifted. (In English) You see, she asked me, Mrs. Yalcin asked me, a question of the Foreign Ministry and suggested that we should send a small group of parliamentarians for lobbying in your Congress. We thought it would be useless—it could not be the right way—and she asked the reason why. I said, after all we cannot expect our parliamentarians to explain the reasons for lifting the embargo to the Congressmen better than Dr. Kissinger. Dr. Kissinger is in a much better position to explain the situation, and so we thought it would be a futile task. I am sure the Administration is doing everything to explain to the Congressmen that the embargo should be lifted.

Secretary Kissinger: As I said yesterday, we will do our utmost when the Congress reconvenes early in June to secure a lifting of the embargo.

Q. Dr. Kissinger, do you believe that the Congressmen will be satisfied that the dialogue has started but that it will take a long time to come to an agreement?

Secretary Kissinger: Well, I do not want to speculate on what the Congress will do. The President and I will present our strong convictions to the Congress, and we will present our view that aid to Turkey is not

given as a favor to Turkey but in the mutual interest of the United States and Turkey, and we hope they will see it the same way. Maybe we will answer the rest afterwards.

Mr. Ecevit: Yes, yes, I think the coffee is getting cold.

[Following breakfast.]

Secretary Kissinger: Mr. Ecevit and I had a very good talk. As you know, we are old friends, so we can talk very frankly and very completely. It was, of course, not an occasion to make any decisions. But we had a very good review of international affairs in general and of the Cyprus question in particular.

Mr. Ecevit: (In Turkish) My wife, myself, and my friends have been most pleased to welcome Mr. Kissinger and his esteemed friends at my home. At times of very important developments, my old friend and esteemed statesman Mr. Kissinger and I had found opportunity to talk even if this was over the telephone, and in this meeting we have taken the opportunity to discuss both the Cyprus issue and world issues in general.

It was a very useful meeting for me. Naturally, since we are not in power, reaching any agreement or taking a decision was out of the question. We only discussed our views on important issues. It was a very frank discussion. (Begin English) It was very nice of you to come.

Secretary Kissinger: Very nice to see you, too.

Mr. Ecevit: Give my best regards to Mrs. Kissinger.

Q. Has he given you any assurances about the role of the opposition on the Cyprus question?

Secretary Kissinger: We discussed the Cyprus question, and I am certain that it will be a responsible role as he has always said it would be.

Q. Did you like your breakfast?

Secretary Kissinger: Yes, it was a Turkish breakfast. It was very good. It was a little fattening, I would say. [Laughter] Goodby. It was very nice to see you again.

Mr. Ecevit: Goodby.

Q. Will you come to Turkey again?

Secretary Kissinger: I do not know. I always like to come to Turkey.

REMARKS AT THE U.S. EMBASSY, ANKARA, MAY 23

Press release 296 dated May 23

Mr. Ambassador [William B. Macomber], ladies and gentlemen: Wherever I have appeared the Ambassador has warned me that I must be extremely serious, and he has particularly warned me that the Foreign Service personnel here, not being used to my flatulations, must not be teased or criticized in any way whatsoever. So I have to tell you, however, that when Wells Stabler was sworn in as Ambassador to Spain, he said that the highest praise he ever got in the Department of State was the absence of abuse and that one day after he had worked for 24 straight hours I told him to go home and get some rest. He was elated that I paid any attention to him. But when he got home he had second thoughts and said, well, maybe I had lost interest in him. So he had another sleepless night and came in. And only after I made him rewrite a 10-page memorandum five times in two hours did he feel reassured, and then he went home and had a good night's sleep.

But I know the Ambassador doesn't treat you like this. And I wanted to reassure the Foreign Service officers that are assembled here that I am slowly getting housebroke. That is, I sign without question one out of five cables that are submitted to me, and in another year or two, I will sign most of them like good Secretaries of State should.

But, seriously, I want you to know that I have followed the work of this post with special interest. You have been here, and you are here, at a very difficult period. I think all of you here know how important our relation with Turkey is, and all of you know that that relationship is undergoing some strains as a result of decisions not recommended by the Embassy nor approved of by the Department of State, and so you have to navigate

under difficult circumstances and make progress in a complex situation here and, I may say, in a complex domestic situation in America.

We consider Turkey one of the key countries with which we are associated and one of our key allies. And with the extraordinary assistance of Ambassador Macomber, we are trying to get through this period in a way that hopefully even strengthens the long-term relationship.

I read the reports from this post with greater care than from many, and I want you to know that I consider that the work that has been done here has been extraordinary.

Beyond the relationship with Turkey, our entire international position has undergone some extraordinarily difficult months. No one should kid himself that the way the war in Indochina ended did not mortgage American foreign policy all over the world, whatever one may think or may have thought of various phases of our involvement earlier. But I also wanted you to know that the President, the senior members of the Administration, are determined that the United States continue to play a major role in the world.

We do this not out of any vanity, but because, if you look back at the postwar period beginning with the Greek-Turkish aid program, I think you will agree that—the fact that global peace has been preserved and that has been due importantly to American efforts. And most of the progress that has been made has been—in other fields—has been due to initiatives or at least American participation.

For us to withdraw into ourselves would invite conflict and chaos, and we have absolutely no intention of permitting this to happen. So with all the difficulties that America has experienced, we are determined to conduct a strong and a forward-looking policy, and we want to conduct ourselves with self-assurance and with conviction.

And posts such as this can make a major contribution, and I want you to know that what you do here is appreciated and that we depend on you and count on you.

Thank you very much.

Secretary Kissinger: As you know, we consider Turkey a good friend and a close ally, and we want to retain this relationship of friendship and alliance.

We are aware of difficulties that have arisen as a result of actions that our executive in America has opposed. And I have told the Turkish leaders and the Prime Minister, with whom I had a good and constructive talk, that we would do our utmost to restore all the relationships that should exist between Turkey and the United States.

In that spirit of friendship, we reviewed the relationships on all levels between our countries and also international affairs, including the Cyprus problem. The United States is not acting as a mediator, but whenever it can be helpful to bring about a just solution, it is willing to give whatever help it is asked to do.

I would like to thank the Prime Minister and the Foreign Minister for the very cordial reception we have had here, for the very good talks we have had, and I look forward to seeing them both in Brussels next week with our President. Thank you, Mr. Foreign Minister. Thank you, see you next week.

Q. Mr. Minister, would you take a few questions?

Secretary Kissinger: Go ahead.

Q. There are reports in the American press this morning that you are not very optimistic—or rather, pessimistic about the voting in the House of Representatives on the lifting of the embargo.

Secretary Kissinger: The reports have no basis. And after the President returns from the NATO summit, he will submit his recommendations to the House of Representatives.

DEPARTURE, ANKARA, MAY 23

Press release 296A dated May 23

As I leave a very useful meeting of CENTO, I would like to express my appre-

* Made following a meeting with Prime Minister Demirel (text from press release 295).

ciation and that of my colleagues to, first, the Secretary General of CENTO for having conducted the meetings in such an efficient and thoughtful manner and, secondly, to the Government of Turkey for the excellent arrangements that were made.

We consider Turkey an old friend and ally, and we greatly value our relationship with Turkey. We will do our utmost to remove any impediments to good relations, and when we return to the United States after the meetings at the summit, we will talk

to our Congress in that sense.

The talks I have had here have been useful, and I hope that they will help promote a peaceful evolution in this area. The United States is prepared to give whatever help is requested. We are not acting as mediators, but we are willing and ready to assist any of the parties who think we can be of use.

So I would again like to express my appreciation to the Government and people of Turkey and the Secretary General.

Thank you very much.

The Shah of Iran Makes State Visit to the United States

His Imperial Majesty Mohammad Reza Shah Pahlavi, Shahanshah of Iran, made a state visit to the United States May 14-18. He met with President Ford and other government officials at Washington May 15-17. Following are an exchange of greetings between President Ford and His Imperial Majesty at a welcoming ceremony on the South Lawn of the White House on May 15, their exchange of toasts at a dinner at the White House that evening, and their exchange of toasts at a dinner at the Embassy of Iran on May 16.

EXCHANGE OF GREETINGS, MAY 15

Weekly Compilation of Presidential Documents dated May 19

President Ford

It is an honor to welcome our distinguished guests, His Imperial Majesty the Shahanshah of Iran and Her Imperial Majesty the Shahbanou, once again to our national capital.

The visit of Your Imperial Majesties reflects the cordial personal and close governmental relations between the United States and Iran through many administrations. Ours is an old and tested friendship; it will continue to be so in the future.

Since Your Imperial Majesties last visited Washington, the world has seen many changes. But throughout this period the U.S. commitment to peace and progress for the world has remained firm. Our commitment to a continuity of relations and constructive cooperation with friends such as Iran has remained constant, even while the world has changed.

We continue to build on the longstanding foundation of our mutual interests and aspirations. The United States and Iran have expanded and intensified cooperation on many fronts. Together, we can create an example for others to follow in the new era of interdependence which lies ahead.

Iran is an amazing country—an ancient civilization that through the centuries has retained its distinctive national identity and culture. In recent years, Iran has achieved remarkable progress, serving as a model of economic development. Its extraordinary achievements have been inspired by one of the world's senior statesmen, our distinguished visitor, His Imperial Majesty.

I look forward, Your Imperial Majesty, to the talks which we shall have during your visit to review what has been accomplished by our two nations and to explore new dimensions for harmonizing the interests of our two nations and increasing the coopera-

tion between us in the cause of peace and prosperity for our two peoples and for the world.

On behalf of Mrs. Ford and the American people and our Government, it is my pleasure to welcome Their Imperial Majesties to Washington.

His Imperial Majesty

Mr. President: It is indeed an honor for the Shahbanou and myself for being the guests of President Ford and Mrs. Ford. This is not our first visit to your country—it dates back a long time ago when, for the first time, I set foot on this land of the free and the brave.

Since that day, and even before, very solid relations of friendship existed between our two countries. In the old days, we were looking to America as our friend and also the friend of all people who were striving for liberty and dignity. That feeling of my country toward yours and your people is today stronger than ever.

We would like to let you know that this friendship will never change on our part, because it was based not on selfish interest, but more on the basis that we share common ideals. I am sure that you will stand for those ideals as we will stand by them.

As you mentioned, Mr. President, the world is changing, and very rapidly—sometimes for the better and sometimes, I hope not, for the worse. But in that changing world, those who remain faithful to the principles of human dignity and human liberties will have, in a spirit of interdependence, to try to, if necessary, create that new world.

The new world must not be created by just a succession of events, but it must be created by the good will of countries deciding to create that world on a basis of more equality and justice.

My country will be alongside the United States in the creation of that new world. I am sure that during the privilege of my meetings with you, Mr. President, and the talks that we will have, we shall forge the way for this better world in the most

harmonious possible way between our two countries.

I bring the greetings of the people of my country to the great people of America, wishing you the best of luck and ever more prosperity and happiness.

Thank you, Mr. President, for your very kind invitation.

EXCHANGE OF TOASTS AT A DINNER AT THE WHITE HOUSE, MAY 15

Weekly Compilation of Presidential Documents dated May 19

President Ford

Your Imperial Majesties the Shahanshah and Shahbanou: I warmly welcome the Imperial Majesties to the White House this evening, and I am sure by the reception that has been indicated here, everybody joins me on this wonderful occasion.

Your visit here is, of course, a tribute to the long legacy of a very close and very cooperative tie between Iran and the United States, and I hope, on the other hand, that you will think upon this as a visit between old friends.

I am the seventh President, Your Imperial Majesty, to have met with you on such an occasion. The facts speak volumes for the continuity and the duration of our bilateral relations and the importance that we attach to the broadening and the deepening of those ties and those interests of peace and progress throughout the world. These are objectives to which the United States remains deeply committed. These objectives Iran shares with us.

Our nations have thus brought together a very unique relationship, working together cooperatively for the past several decades on the basis of a mutual respect, and I am looking forward to continuing this great tradition with yourself, and this country and your country. And it is, as I see it, a living and a growing tradition.

Recently, our common bonds have acquired a new scope as Iran, under Your Imperial Majesty's wise leadership, has made extraordinary strides in its economic de-

velopment and its relationships with other countries of its region and the world.

The progress that you have made serves as a superb model to nations everywhere. Iran has moved from a country once in need of aid to one which last year committed a substantial part of its gross national product to aiding less fortunate nations.

Iran is also playing a very leading role in what we hope will be a very successful effort to establish a more effective economic relationship between the oil producers, the industrialized nations, and the developing nations.

As an indication of Iran's economic importance to the world scene, I am impressed that civilian non-oil trade between the United States and Iran is expected to total over \$20 billion by 1980.

The present period will be seen by historians as a very major milestone in Iran's ancient and very glorious history. The leader whose vision and dynamism has brought Iran to this stage, His Imperial Majesty, is clearly one of the great men of his generation, of his country, and of the world.

Just as Iran's role and potential goes far beyond its own border, so, too, His Imperial Majesty is one of the world's great statesmen. His experience of over 30 years as Iran's leader has been marked by dedication to progress and prosperity at home and significant contributions to the cause of peace and cooperation abroad.

We deeply value our friendship and our ties with Iran, and we will remain strong in that friendship, now and for the future. In an interdependent world, we remain deeply grateful for the constructive friendship of Iran, which is playing a very important role in pursuit of a more peaceful, stable, and very prosperous world. And we, for our part, remain constant in our friendship with this great country. We pledge ourselves to insuring that our ties are creatively adjusted to meet the pressing problems and changing realities of the present world.

On a more personal note, let me add that Mrs. Ford and I have felt great pleasure in welcoming Her Imperial Majesty the Shahbanou of Iran on this visit. Your Im-

perial Majesty's dedication to progress within your country is widely known, as is your warmth and your beauty and your graciousness. Your presence is a high honor for us on this occasion.

Ladies and gentlemen, I welcome our distinguished guests, Their Imperial Majesties, and I ask that you join me in proposing a toast to Their Imperial Majesties the Shahanshab and Shahbanou of Iran.

His Imperial Majesty

Mr. President, Mrs. Ford, distinguished guests: It is difficult to find words to express our sentiments of gratitude for the warm welcome that you, Mr. President and Mrs. Ford, have reserved for us today.

I wanted to come to this country that I knew before to meet the President of this country for whom we have developed, since he assumed this high office, a sentiment of respect for a man who is not shrinking in front of events. And may I congratulate you for the great leadership and the right decisions that you took for your country and, may I add, for all the peoples who want to live in freedom.

This is precisely what this world needs—courage, dignity, and love of the other human being. We are proud of being a good and, I believe, a trusted friend of the United States of America, and this will continue because this friendship is based on permanent and durable reasons—these reasons being that we share the same philosophy of life, the same ideals. And I could not imagine another kind of living which would be worth living.

Your country has been of great help to us during our time of needs. This is something that we do not forget as what Iran can do in this changing world and this world of interdependency. In addition to our continuous friendship with you, we will try to be of any utility and help to other nations which would eventually need that help.

I have got to look to the future of the world—with all the seriousness of the situation—with hope because, without it, it will

be very difficult to work and to plan.

In that future, I know that we are going to walk together, work together to uphold the ideals in which we believe—for a world which will be rid of its present difficulties, a world which will not know again the word of famine, illiteracy, sickness, and disease.

Thank you again, Mr. President, for the warm sentiments of friendship that you have shown toward my country and my people. I only can reciprocate the same feelings for yourself and the great people of the United States and, in doing so, I would like to ask this distinguished audience to rise for a toast to the health of the President of the United States of America, of Mrs. Ford, and the people of America.

EXCHANGE OF TOASTS AT A DINNER AT THE EMBASSY OF IRAN, MAY 16

Weekly Compilation of Presidential Documents dated May 19

His Imperial Majesty

Your Excellencies, ladies and gentlemen: Will you rise for a toast to the health of the President of the United States of America and Mrs. Ford.

President Ford

Your Imperial Majesties Shahanshah and Shahbanou of Iran: Let me say that it has been a great experience becoming well acquainted with you, discussing matters of great importance to our respective countries and to the many problems that we mutually face, and others face, throughout the world.

I have been impressed, Your Majesty, with the friendship that you have long shown to our country. And I have been greatly impressed with the long friendship between our peoples and the mutual dedication that all of us have from our respective countries to a betterment for your country and for ours and for the world at large.

Your Excellencies, and others, will you join me, please, in a toast to the Shahanshah and Shahbanou of Iran.

U.S. Regrets Misunderstanding With Government of Thailand

Following is the text of a diplomatic note delivered by U.S. Chargé d'Affaires Edward Masters to the Foreign Minister of Thailand, Chatchai Choonavan, at Bangkok on May 19 (formal introductory and closing paragraphs omitted).

The United States regrets the misunderstandings that have arisen between Thailand and the United States in regard to the temporary placement of marines at Utapao to assist in the recovery of the SS Mayaguez. There is a long tradition of close and warm relations between the United States and Thailand, a tradition which has helped our two countries face many difficult periods together.

To inform the Royal Thai Government of the facts surrounding the seizure and recovery of the Mayaguez, there is enclosed an account of the incident¹ drawn substantially from the report President Ford submitted to the United States Congress on May 15. As this account demonstrates, speed of action was essential. The actions and public statements of the new Cambodian regime indicated to us that any delay in recovering the ship and rescuing the crew could have had the most serious consequences.

It is clear that by its action the United States was able to counter a common danger to all nations and to the world's ocean commerce presented by this illegal and unwarranted interference with international shipping routes in the Gulf of Thailand.

The United States Government wishes to express its understanding of the problem caused the Royal Thai Government by these procedures and wishes to repeat its regret. The policy of the United States continues to be one of respecting the sovereignty and independence of Thailand. The unique circumstances that have led to the recent turn of events do not alter this traditional relation-

¹ Not printed here.

ship, and are not going to be repeated; the Government of the United States looks forward to working in harmony and friendship with the Royal Thai Government.

Public Corporation Established To Operate East-West Center

Statement by John Richardson¹

On behalf of the Department of State, I welcome the news from Hawaii that Governor George Ariyoshi has signed legislation establishing a public corporation to administer the Center for Cultural and Technical Interchange Between East and West, known as the East-West Center.

Since its establishment by Congress in 1960, the East-West Center has played an increasingly significant role in intercultural understanding, bringing together more than 27,000 students and experts from nations of Asia, the Pacific, and the United States. Incorporation is a logical step in further development of this unique national institution so well designed to contribute to the human dimension of our international relations.

The Department of State is grateful to the members of the University of Hawaii Board of Regents, who have rendered outstanding service to our country in governing the East-West Center from its beginning, and we wish to express appreciation also to the President and faculty of the university for their continuing commitment to the success of the Center.

I believe incorporation will help the East-West Center continue to grow in distinction and to serve even more effectively the broad interests of the nation in achieving mutual comprehension and respect between the peoples of the United States and of Asia and the Pacific.

¹ Issued on May 14 (text from press release 256); Mr. Richardson is Assistant Secretary for Educational and Cultural Affairs. For further details on the legislation, see press release 256.

Foreign Service Examination

Press release 152 dated March 17

More than 11,800 persons took the written examination for the Foreign Service on December 7, 1974, in cities throughout the United States and at many Foreign Service posts abroad.

The written examination, given once a year in December, is the first step in the competitive selection of new Foreign Service officers and Foreign Service information officers for appointment to the Department of State and the United States Information Agency (USIA). The 1,750 who passed the most recent written examination are now eligible for an oral examination given by panels of examiners in Washington and in a number of other large cities in the United States. Candidates who are recommended from the oral examination undergo further processing after which a final review of their qualifications is made. From those who successfully complete the entire examination and selection process, the Department of State plans to appoint some 200 new officers and the U.S. Information Agency about 25 during the next fiscal year.

In recent years the Department of State has increased its efforts to recruit more junior officers who not only have the broad general background required of all Foreign Service officers but whose interest and skills lie in the economic/commercial and administrative fields. The Department and USIA also are making positive efforts to increase the proportion of women and members of minority groups entering the Foreign Service and have conducted specialized recruiting for them.

The Foreign Service is open to U.S. citizens 21 years of age and over. There are no specific educational requirements, and although most successful candidates are college graduates, no formal college degree is required. Information about the December 1975 examination will be available in July and may be obtained by writing to the Board of Examiners for the Foreign Service, Post Office Box 9317, Rosslyn Station, Arlington, Virginia 22209.

Department Gives Views on Proposed Legislation Concerning Executive Agreements

*Statement by Monroe Leigh
Legal Adviser¹*

I am grateful for the opportunity to appear before this subcommittee to consider with you an issue of fundamental importance both to the constitutional system of the United States and to the conduct of U.S. foreign policy. The subject of executive agreements has recently been the focus of very considerable interest and study in the Congress, and we welcome this examination as a means of further strengthening the relationship between the executive and legislative branches in a vital area of government decisionmaking.

Similar hearings held by this subcommittee in 1972 on the question of executive agreements were, in my view, extremely valuable. Since recent U.S. practice with respect to international agreements was set forth in some detail in our statement to the subcommittee in 1972, I do not wish to review that material again.² However, I think it might be useful to begin this morning by touching on two recent developments that relate directly to executive-legislative relationships in this area.

¹ Made before the Subcommittee on Separation of Powers of the Senate Committee on the Judiciary on May 13. The complete transcript of the hearings will be published by the committee and will be available from the Superintendent of Documents, U.S. Government Printing Office, Washington, D.C. 20402.

² For a statement made before the subcommittee by Legal Adviser John R. Stevenson on May 18, 1972, see BULLETIN of June 19, 1972, p. 840.

As the subcommittee is aware, on August 22, 1972, the President signed into law Public Law 92-403, known as the Case Act, under which the Secretary of State is required to transmit to the Congress the text of any international agreement other than a treaty, to which the United States has become a party, no later than 60 days after its entry into force. Since the adoption of the Case Act, the Department of State has transmitted the texts of 657 executive agreements to the Congress. In addition, although not required by law to do so, the Department has also transmitted with each agreement a background statement setting forth in some detail the context of the agreement, its purpose, negotiating history, and effect.

The Case Act makes special provision for transmittal of agreements "the immediate public disclosure of which would, in the opinion of the President, be prejudicial to the national security of the United States . . ." These agreements are transmitted to the Senate Committee on Foreign Relations and the House Committee on International Relations under "an appropriate injunction of secrecy to be removed only upon due notice from the President." Since the adoption of the Case Act, the executive branch has entered into and the Department has transmitted to the Congress 29 agreements under this category.

A second development of major importance in the three years since hearings were

held on this subject as the revision of the Department's Circular 175 procedure.³ The revised procedure has two objectives: (1) to meet requests by members of the Senate Committee on Foreign Relations to clarify the guidelines to be considered in determining whether a particular international agreement should be concluded as a treaty or as another form of international agreement; and (2) to strengthen provisions on consultation with the Congress.

With respect to the consultation provisions, section 723.1(e) of the Circular 175 procedure now requires those responsible for negotiating significant new international agreements to advise appropriate congressional leaders and committees of the President's intention to negotiate such agreements, to consult during the course of any negotiations, and to keep Congress informed of developments affecting them, including especially whether any legislation is considered necessary or desirable for the implementation of the new treaty or agreement.

The procedure also requires consultation with the Congress when there is a question whether an agreement should be concluded as a treaty or in some other form.

Mr. Chairman, in my view, further development of our procedures for consultation with the Congress remains the most fruitful approach to an acceptable institutional framework for executive-legislative cooperation in the making of international agreements. Perhaps using the new Circular 175 procedure as a starting point, we might be able to develop better institutional methods for achieving the common goal of enhancing the role of Congress without unduly constraining the effective conduct of U.S. foreign policy. After examining with you the bills before us as one possible approach toward this goal, I shall return to this theme.

Constitutional Deficiencies of Proposed Bills

Mr. Chairman, the bill introduced by Senator [Lloyd M.] Bentsen on February 7 (S. 632) would require that all executive agreements made on or after the date of the

bill's enactment be submitted for congressional review. Such agreements would enter into force only after a 60-day waiting period from the date of transmittal, unless within that period both Houses agreed to a concurrent resolution stating that both Houses do not approve of the agreement.

Section 5 of the Bentsen bill provides that these requirements "shall not apply to any executive agreements entered into by the President pursuant to a provision of the Constitution or prior authority given the President by treaty or law." This section, as we read the bill, would limit the bill's application since all executive agreements are negotiated by the President under the authority of the Constitution and all are entered into pursuant to the Constitution or prior statute or treaty. My interpretation of section 5 is that it excludes from application all categories of executive agreements. Even if a different interpretation were placed on section 5, only a tiny fraction, at most, of such agreements would be covered by the bill.

The Glenn bill (S. 1251), introduced on March 20, is much broader. It contains a similar 60-day waiting period, but it provides that executive agreements, very broadly defined, are subject to a one-House veto—by the Senate alone—rather than a two-House veto.

The Glenn bill and the Bentsen bill without section 5 would, in my view, be unconstitutional if enacted into law as presently written. They would appear to rest upon an assumption that there is no independent constitutional authority in the President to conclude executive agreements. It is true that the vast majority of executive agreements are made pursuant to statute or treaty, but some agreements are concluded under the authority of the President's independent constitutional power. With these Congress may not constitutionally interfere. This view is not peculiar to the Department of State or to the executive branch generally. Rather it has long been accepted by legal scholars and by the Supreme Court of the

³ Department of State Circular 25, May 15, 1953, superseded in 1955 by Circular 175, codified in 11 Foreign Affairs Manual (FAM) secs. 700 *et seq.*

United States. I refer to *U.S. v. Belmont*, 301 U.S. 324 (1937), and *U.S. v. Pink*, 315 U.S. 203 (1942).

Several provisions of the Constitution have long been held to authorize the making of executive agreements. Most generally, article II, section 1, provides that "The executive Power shall be vested in a President of the United States of America." In the case of *U.S. v. Curtiss-Wright Export Corp.*, 299 U.S. 304 (1936), the Supreme Court indicated that inherent in this executive power is the power to conduct foreign relations. Quoting John Marshall, the Court said that "The President is the sole organ of the nation in its external relations . . ." The Court also noted that the "powers of external sovereignty" of the nation included "the power to make such international agreements as do not constitute treaties in the constitutional sense." The executive power clause enables the President to conclude agreements for the purpose of settling differences with other governments in order to insure the satisfactory continuation of diplomatic relations.

Article II, section 2, of the Constitution provides that "The President shall be Commander in Chief of the Army and Navy . . ." Many wartime agreements concerning military matters, such as armistices, force deployments, and control of occupied areas, have been concluded under this authority.

The power to appoint and receive ambassadors and other public ministers, found in article II, sections 2 and 3, has been recognized by the Supreme Court, in the *Belmont* and *Pink* cases, as a basis for executive agreements incident to the recognition of foreign governments, such as the settlement of claims against foreign governments.

Mr. Chairman, if there is one issue upon which all observers agree, it would be recognition of the President's authority to conclude certain executive agreements, even if within a narrow category, under the powers granted him by the Constitution and without congressional interference or limitation. While the range of such agreements is narrow, and the total number thereof is no more than 2-3 percent of all U.S. executive

agreements, it is nevertheless an important aspect of Presidential powers. There is no method short of constitutional amendment whereby the President's independent constitutional authority to conclude executive agreements may be limited. For this reason alone, the Glenn bill as it now reads, and the Bentsen bill without section 5, would be unconstitutional if enacted.

Legislative Veto Provisions

There is another feature of these bills which renders them defective on constitutional grounds. In those areas of foreign policy in which both the President and the Congress share responsibility, the President is frequently authorized by treaty or statute to conclude executive agreements. In my opinion such treaty or statutory authority to enter into executive agreements may not constitutionally be overridden or amended either by means of a concurrent resolution as provided in the Bentsen bill, or by the Senate acting alone, as envisaged by the Glenn bill. Such procedure would be contrary to article I, section 7, of the Constitution, which requires that:

Every Order, Resolution, or Vote to which the Concurrence of the Senate and House of Representatives may be necessary (except on a question of Adjournment) shall be presented to the President of the United States; and before the Same shall take Effect, shall be approved by him or being disapproved by him, shall be repassed by two thirds of the Senate and House of Representatives, according to the Rules and Limitations prescribed in the Case of a Bill.

In my view, this mandatory language of the Constitution was intended to apply to any congressional action having legislative effect, or having the force of law. Since Assistant Attorney General [Antonin] Scalia will shortly present a detailed analysis of this issue in his statement, I will not review the background and constitutional history of article I, section 7. Suffice it to say that one of the primary purposes of the provision was to insure that Congress could not, through the technique of characterizing particular enactments having legal force as "orders" or "resolutions," evade the neces-

sity of Presidential participation in the legislative process.

It is true that legislative veto provisions have been enacted into law on many occasions since the early 1930's. But there are several factors that render these enactments of little value as legal precedent to support the Bentsen and Glenn bills.

First, such laws as do exist providing for a legislative veto have been attacked on constitutional grounds by many authorities on constitutional law. There have been no court tests of the validity of any of these acts, and the constitutional law questions they raise are not settled. The Bentsen and Glenn bills would raise these questions in a very new and disturbing way. Let us take one example.

Congress has granted the President specific authority to enter into P.L. 480 executive agreements:

... the President is authorized to negotiate and carry out agreements with friendly countries to provide for the sale of agricultural commodities for dollars on credit terms or for foreign currencies. (7 U.S.C. 1701.)

Now suppose that Congress, in a shift of policy having nothing to do with the merits of any particular executive agreement, decides it no longer approves of this P.L. 480 policy, but does not wish to repeal the statute directly. It would have the option, if the Bentsen or Glenn bills were constitutionally valid, of automatically passing resolutions of disapproval of each and every P.L. 480 executive agreement thereafter entered into by the President. If the option is exercised, is there any doubt that the original statutory authority has been effectively repealed without the Presidential participation required by article I, section 7?

Or suppose that the Congress decides that it no longer approves of the phrase "or for foreign currencies" in Public Law 480. The Bentsen and Glenn bills would give the Congress the option of disapproving by concurrent resolution all P.L. 480 agreements in which agricultural commodities are agreed to be sold for foreign currencies. If Congress has power to exercise such an option, the clear effect is to amend the original statutory

authority without Presidential participation.

In the most formalistic sense, the original statute still stands. But in substantive effect, the original legislative authority has been rendered unusable.

Second, the legislative precedents that do exist date only from the 1930's and are inconsistent with the practice in force from the beginning of the Republic until the 1930's. Given the specificity of the constitutional provision and the long years of practice in accordance therewith, the recent and legally controversial examples of congressional lawmaking by concurrent resolution are hardly persuasive to support an even more questionable example as set forth in the Bentsen and Glenn proposals.

Third, the Bentsen and Glenn bills would carry the legislative veto far beyond those areas for which any constitutional justification has ever been advanced to date.

For example, among the first legislative vetoes by congressional resolution were those of the Reorganization Acts of the 1930's and 1940's. In justifying the constitutionality of the 1939 act, the House committee which reported the bill proceeded on the constitutional theory that the power conferred upon the President by the act was "legislative in character." (H. Rept. 120, 76th Cong., 1st sess., at 4-6 (1939)) In delegating the legislative power of reorganization to the President, Congress retained a veto to make certain that the President's ultimate reorganization plan conformed with both the letter and intent of the delegated authority.

In subsequent reorganization acts, the inclusion of a legislative veto procedure was similarly justified under this "delegation" theory. (See *e.g.*, S. Rept. 638, 79th Cong., 1st sess., at 3 (1945).) The same has also been the case in other types of legislation. In trade acts, for example, Congress has delegated to the President the power to determine tariffs, duties, and import quotas—a power initially vested in the legislative branch—but Congress at the same time has retained supervision over this delegated authority through the legislative-veto procedure.

With the Bentsen and Glenn bills, however, this constitutional argument vanishes. The conduct of foreign relations is not a legislative power. While Congress may, as a practical matter in some cases, restrict by statute the substantive concessions that the President can make to a foreign power, nonetheless the actual drafting, initiation, and negotiation of the terms of an executive agreement belong entirely to the President. As the Supreme Court stated in the *Curtiss-Wright* case:

(The President) alone negotiates. Into the field of negotiation the Senate cannot intrude; and Congress itself is powerless to invade it.

Moreover, unlike prior vehicles for legislative vetoes, the bills by Senators Bentsen and Glenn do not involve the delegation by Congress of any powers. The substantive concessions which the President could make in negotiating an agreement would not be at all expanded by these two bills. Thus, the constitutional theory which has been raised in support of other legislative vetoes is inapplicable here. This means that if Congress wishes to disapprove an executive agreement, Congress' only constitutional recourse is to enact an appropriate statute under article I, section 7. Even then, such a statute would apply only to an executive agreement *not* concluded and implemented under the exclusive powers of the President.

Practical Problems Created by the Bills

Mr. Chairman, quite aside from the constitutional deficiencies, these bills involve a number of severe practical problems that render them, in our view, unworkable as a means of enhancing the role of Congress without placing unduly rigid restraints upon the conduct of foreign policy by the executive branch.

The bills present a serious national security problem in that they appear to be applicable in periods of declared war as well as in time of peace. Yet in World War II, for example, the President, under his powers as Commander in Chief, made hundreds of agreements necessary to the actual conduct of the war. Among these were agreements on

deployment of forces as well as armistice and cease-fire agreements whose delicate timing could not await a 60-day review period. Interference with the President's power to make such agreements as Commander in Chief would frequently be unacceptable from the standpoint of national security, and it naturally raises the most serious questions with respect to constitutional validity. This is a core area of the President's ability to make agreements solely on the basis of his authority as Commander in Chief under the Constitution.

Even in time of peace, the 60-day waiting period would make a rapid resolution of everyday practical problems impossible. Some of these are of a routine nature that require only a simple exchange of notes, perhaps to compose a small difference by adopting a minor amendment to a previously concluded executive agreement itself of a routine nature. On occasion a disaster or other emergency requires extremely rapid action. Surely an emergency agreement providing for assistance to earthquake victims, to take but one example, cannot be subjected to a 60-day delay. These bills, if valid, would substantially undermine the utility of the United Nations Participation Act, to take one specific example.

In addition, neither bill, but particularly the Glenn draft with its extraordinarily broad definition of executive agreements, distinguishes between important agreements of interest to the Congress and minor or routine items such as postal contracts, standing orders with the Government Printing Office, and educational exchanges. The efficiency of the executive, and its ability to conduct the multiple aspects of relations in a complicated world, would be significantly diminished, while the large majority of agreements transmitted would be of little or no interest whatever to the Congress. There is no benefit in this either to the executive or legislative branch.

Notwithstanding that Congress is interested in only a small number of such agreements, the Bentsen and Glenn bills would, if enacted, result in a substantial interference with the President's authority as

negotiator of almost all executive agreements. Because of the 60-day waiting period and the possibility of congressional disapproval, the United States would frequently be unable to obtain definite concessions from other governments because the President would be unable to give firm commitments on short notice, even on minor matters. And there would be a far greater risk of delicate compromises coming unraveled during the 60 days before the agreement could enter into force.

At the present time, the great majority of our executive agreements enter into force upon signature. Every foreign country enters into most of their agreements with us upon signature. Were either the Bentsen or Glenn bill to become law, the United States would be the only nation in the world unable to enter into any international agreement whatsoever either on signature or on short notice.

At best, the procedure would result in a great degree of uncertainty. In view of the congressional option procedure, the President would never be quite certain, even assuming prior consultation with Congress or prior statutory authorization, just what authority he possessed to negotiate and conclude agreements in a particular area. The uncertainty introduced into the negotiating process would clearly not be conducive to the effective conduct of U.S. foreign policy.

The Bentsen and Glenn approaches are also unnecessary and wasteful even from a congressional point of view. Any agreements involving an expenditure of funds (and most of those agreements of interest to the Congress involve such expenditures) are already subject to congressional review because Congress must authorize and appropriate the funds. This is important, for example, in the area of military base agreements. No military base can be constructed without congressional approval. Congress is intimately involved in the overwhelming majority of executive agreements on defense matters, either through authorizing legislation, such as the foreign aid legislation, or through review of programs by authorizing and ap-

propriating committees. Status-of-forces agreements are closely monitored by a subcommittee of the Senate Committee on Armed Services. Atomic energy agreements are reviewed by the Joint Congressional Committee on Atomic Energy.

Finally, Mr. Chairman, there are a number of important areas in which these bills, if enacted, would have a serious adverse impact. The bills would create confusion in the administration of existing legislative authorizations under which the President has administered programs of national importance. For example, the military assistance programs are implemented country by country under the terms of bilateral military assistance agreements entered into pursuant to prior statute. The present bills would substitute a new procedure for formalizing the international agreements between the United States and other countries with respect to these programs.

Mr. Chairman, if further legislative regulation of executive agreements is needed, which is a question requiring further study, it is our view that it would be wiser to treat directly, through legislation, particular substantive areas of agreement making, rather than attempting to control the entire range of executive agreements through a procedural device that fails in large measure because it both attempts to do too much and is constitutionally defective.

Alternative Possibilities

I think it is clear that great improvements have been made in increasing the flow of information to the Congress for purposes of enhancing its capacity to perform its functions in foreign policy. There are further ways of developing executive-legislative cooperation, and some ideas in this area have already been suggested to the subcommittee.

Perhaps building on the Circular 175 procedure, we might explore the possibility of having the several Assistant Secretaries of State provide the relevant committees of Congress with regular and detailed briefings

on developments in their areas of responsibility. This idea was put forward by Secretary of State Rogers in 1971 and repeated to this subcommittee by the then Legal Adviser, John Stevenson, in 1972.

Perhaps most important, Mr. Chairman, is the necessity to recognize that our constitutional framework concerning foreign affairs establishes, as one scholar put it, "a government of interdependent as well as separate powers." The basic meaning of this structure should be cooperation rather than conflict and a full flow of information permitting each branch effectively to carry out its functions in its areas of competence and interest.

Rigid controls of doubtful legality over a mass of agreements, most of which are of minimal or no interest to the Congress—that is simply not the best answer. Cooperation, consultation, full information, and recognition that both branches seek a healthy process of interaction in the making of foreign policy—that is the surest path toward a meaningful system of decisionmaking on behalf of the United States.

TREATY INFORMATION

United States and Hungary Amend Air Services Agreement

The Department of State announced on May 22 (press release 288) that by an exchange of diplomatic notes in Budapest on May 19, the United States and Hungary had agreed to amendments to the U.S.-Hungary Air Transport Agreement of 1973, implementing Pan American World Airways services between the United States and Budapest beginning May 22. (For text of the amendments, see press release 288.) Until now, there has been no direct U.S. or Hungarian airline scheduled air services between the two countries.

The new arrangements with Hungary are responsive to indications of growth in the air transport market between the United States and Eastern Europe. They set forth in some detail the scope of Pan American's commercial rights in Hungary and cover such things as ticket sales and local currency conversions. The amendments also permit the Hungarian airline, Malev, to open off-route sales offices in the United States.

Current Actions

MULTILATERAL

Biological Weapons

Convention on the prohibition of the development, production and stockpiling of bacteriological (biological) and toxin weapons and on their destruction. Done at Washington, London, and Moscow April 10, 1972. Entered into force March 26, 1975.

Ratifications deposited: Italy, May 30, 1975; Thailand, May 28, 1975.

Load Lines

International convention on load lines, 1966. Done at London April 5, 1966. Entered into force July 21, 1968. TIAS 6331.

Accessions deposited: Chile, March 10, 1975; Syria, February 6, 1975.

Nuclear Weapons—Nonproliferation

Treaty on the nonproliferation of nuclear weapons. Done at Washington, London, and Moscow July 1, 1968. Entered into force March 5, 1970. TIAS 6839.

Ratification deposited: Libya, May 26, 1975.

Phonograms

Convention for the protection of producers of phonograms against unauthorized duplication of their phonograms. Done at Geneva October 29, 1971. Entered into force April 18, 1973; for the United States March 10, 1974. TIAS 7808.

Notification from World Intellectual Property Organization that accession deposited: Hungary (with declarations), February 28, 1975.

Pollution

International convention for the prevention of pollution from ships, 1973. Done at London November 2, 1973.¹

Accession deposited: Jordan, March 17, 1975.

¹ Not in force.

Satellite Communications System

Agreement relating to the International Telecommunications Satellite Organization (INTELSAT), with annexes. Done at Washington August 20, 1971. Entered into force February 12, 1973. TIAS 7532.

Accession deposited: Panama, May 29, 1975.

Operating agreement relating to the International Telecommunications Satellite Organization (INTELSAT), with annex. Done at Washington August 20, 1971. Entered into force February 12, 1973. TIAS 7532.

Signature: Intercontinental de Comunicaciones por Satélite, S.A. (INTERCOMSA) of Panama, May 29, 1975.

Seabed Disarmament

Treaty on the prohibition of the emplacement of nuclear weapons and other weapons of mass destruction on the seabed and the ocean floor and in the subsoil thereof. Done at Washington, London, and Moscow February 11, 1971. Entered into force May 18, 1972. TIAS 7337.

Ratification deposited: Rwanda, May 20, 1975.

Tonnage Measurement

International convention on tonnage measurement of ships, 1969. Done at London June 23, 1969.¹

Accession deposited: Syria, February 6, 1975.

Acceptance deposited: Federal Republic of Germany (applicable to Berlin (West)), May 7, 1975.

World Meteorological Organization

Convention of the World Meteorological Organization. Done at Washington October 11, 1947. Entered into force March 23, 1950. TIAS 2052.

Accession deposited: Democratic People's Republic of Korea, May 27, 1975.

BILATERAL

China

Agreement relating to trade in cotton, wool, and man-made fiber textiles and apparel products, with annexes. Effected by exchange of notes at Washington May 21, 1975. Entered into force May 21, 1975; effective January 1, 1975.

Egypt

Agreement amending the agreement for sales of agricultural commodities of June 7, 1974 (TIAS 7855). Effected by exchange of notes at Cairo May 2 and 6, 1975. Entered into force May 6, 1975.

International Committee of the Red Cross

Agreement amending the grant agreement of February 20, March 16 and 17, 1975 (TIAS 8032), concerning emergency relief and assistance to refugees, displaced persons, and war victims in the Republic of Viet-Nam, Laos, and the Khmer Republic. Signed at Geneva and Washington April 24 and 30, 1975. Entered into force April 30, 1975.

Japan

Agreement concerning the furnishing of launching and associated services by NASA for Japanese satellites, with memorandum of understanding. Effected by exchange of notes at Washington May 23, 1975. Entered into force May 23, 1975.

Pakistan

Agreement relating to trade in cotton textiles, with annexes. Effected by exchange of notes at Washington May 6, 1975. Entered into force May 6, 1975; effective July 1, 1974.

Poland

Agreement regarding fisheries in the western region of the middle Atlantic Ocean, with annexes and exchange of notes. Signed at Washington May 29, 1975. Enters into force July 1, 1975.

Saudi Arabia

Joint communique on the first session of the U.S.-Saudi Arabian Joint Commission on Economic Cooperation. Done at Washington February 27, 1975. Entered into force February 27, 1975.

Singapore

Agreement relating to trade in cotton, wool, and man-made fiber textiles and apparel products, with annexes. Effected by exchange of notes at Washington May 21, 1975. Entered into force May 21, 1975; effective January 1, 1975.

¹ Not in force.

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No.	Date	Subject
†298	5/27	Kissinger: IEA, Paris.
†299	5/27	Kissinger: arrival, Paris, May 26.
†300	5/27	U.S. and Japan agree on reimbursable lunches by NASA (rewrite).
†301	5/27	Kissinger: remarks to press, Paris.
†302	5/28	Kissinger: OECD, Paris.
†303	5/28	Americans advised to register claims against the German Democratic Republic by July 1.
†304	5/28	Kissinger: news conference, Paris, May 27.
†304A	5/29	Kissinger, Koppel, ABC-TV: interview, Paris, May 28.
*305	5/29	Study Groups 10 and 11 of the U.S. National Committee for the CCIR, June 25.
*306	5/30	U.S. and Singapore sign textile agreement, May 21.
*307	5/30	U.S. and Republic of China sign textile agreement, May 21.
†308	5/30	Kissinger: news conference, Brussels, May 29.
†309	5/30	U.S. and Poland conclude mid-Atlantic fisheries agreement.

* Not printed.

† Held for a later issue of the BULLETIN.

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THE DEPARTMENT OF STATE BULLETIN

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The Department of State BULLETIN, a weekly publication issued by the Office of Media Services, Bureau of Public Affairs, provides the public and interested agencies of the government with information on developments in the field of U.S. foreign relations and on the work of the Department and the Foreign Service.

The BULLETIN includes selected press releases on foreign policy, issued by the White House and the Department, and statements, addresses, and news conferences of the President and the Secretary of State and other officers of the Department, as well as special articles on various phases of international affairs and the functions of the Department. Information is included concerning treaties and international agreements to which the United States is or may become a party and on treaties of general international interest.

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Secretary Kissinger Attends IEA and OECD Meetings at Paris

Secretary Kissinger visited Paris May 26-28, where he headed the U.S. delegations to the ministerial meetings of the Governing Board of the International Energy Agency (IEA) and the Council of the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD). Following are his arrival statement, his statements in the meetings, and a news conference and informal remarks, together with the texts of a communique issued at the conclusion of the IEA meeting and a communique and declaration issued at the conclusion of the OECD meeting.

ARRIVAL STATEMENT, MAY 26

Press release 299 dated May 27

Ladies and gentlemen: Secretary Simon [William E. Simon, Secretary of the Treasury] and I are here to attend the meetings of the International Energy Agency and of the OECD, two institutions which are designed to deal with the problem of interdependence of the industrialized societies as well as of the relationship of the industrialized societies with the developing countries. We consider the problems of energy, the problems of growth, and the problem of the relationship between the industrialized and the developing countries among the principal issues of our time.

We have come here with an attitude of cooperation and with the conviction that only through the close cooperation of the countries that will be represented here can major progress be possible. While I am here, I also look forward to an opportunity to exchange ideas with the President of France, who has kindly invited me to breakfast tomorrow with several other colleagues.

Thank you very much.

REMARKS TO THE PRESS, MAY 27¹

Q. What is the best birthday present you could wish?

Secretary Kissinger: Just to continue to make progress toward peace in all areas.

The President and I had a very good, a very cordial talk. We reviewed the state of our bilateral relations, which I judge to be excellent. The President explained his views about the formation of Europe, with which we are in general agreement. He informed me of the French contacts with various energy producers, and I told him of similar contacts that the United States had had. We discussed the energy preparatory conference in the spirit of reconvening it. We think the conditions are favorable to resume the work of the preparatory conference, and the United States will support whatever efforts France may make as the convening power to reassemble the conference.

Q. When do you expect the conference to resume, sir?

Secretary Kissinger: Well, this we will have to discuss, of course, in detail, and we also will have to discuss it with some of our partners in the IEA, but I think within the next months.

Q. Did you talk about the Middle East, sir?

Secretary Kissinger: We had just a very brief discussion, a brief reference.

Q. And the Atlantic alliance?

Secretary Kissinger: We discussed the Atlantic alliance and the forthcoming meeting between your President and President Ford.

¹ Made following a breakfast meeting with President Valéry Giscard d'Estaing of France (text from press release 301).

Q. What do you expect from the meeting between President Ford and President Sadat?

Secretary Kissinger: As I pointed out before, we would like to learn the precise views of the President of Egypt about how peace in the Middle East can be advanced. We, of course, have been undertaking an assessment of our policy, and we will inform President Sadat of our present tentative thinking which will not be concluded until we have also talked to Prime Minister Rabin [of Israel]. But we will make clear, as we have stated repeatedly publicly, that the United States is not prepared to accept a diplomatic stalemate in the Middle East and that we are convinced that progress toward peace in the Middle East must continue.

The press: Thank you, sir.

STATEMENT BEFORE MINISTERIAL MEETING OF THE IEA GOVERNING BOARD, MAY 27

Press release 298 dated May 27

Today we begin a week of deliberation on the central problems of the industrial democracies: energy, economic prosperity, the building of a constructive relationship with the developing nations, and insuring the security of our own countries.

Of these, no issue is more basic to the future than the challenge of energy. The fundamental achievements of our economies, and the modern civilization they sustain, have been built upon the ready availability of energy at reasonable prices.

The energy crisis of 1973 first brought home to us the full implications of the new reality of global interdependence. Energy stands as the first and most fundamental of these new problems; its magnitude compels us to cooperation. Without that cooperation, we risk a return to nationalistic rivalry and economic decline comparable to the bitter experience of the thirties. Now all nations—rich and poor, industrialized and developing—must decide whether growing interdependence will foster common progress or common disaster.

Our objective must be to construct a world

energy system capable of providing, on terms fair to all, the fuels needed to continue and extend the progress of our economies and our societies. The path that the members of this Agency have chosen begins with consumer solidarity. But a durable international system must ultimately encompass, and be built by, both the consumers and the producers of the world's energy.

This Agency has made remarkable progress since the Washington Energy Conference 15 months ago. We recognized at Washington that the energy crisis was the most severe challenge to industrial civilization since the Second World War. For a generation North America, Europe, and Japan increasingly allowed oil imports to replace their own energy production. In 1950 the industrialized world imported 5 percent of its requirements. In 1960, this had grown to 17 percent; by 1972, it had reached 39 percent.

The embargo and price rises of 1973 taught us how vulnerable we had become. We saw that neither the supply nor the price of a central factor in our economies was any longer under our control. Our well-being and progress had become hostage to decisions in which we could not take part. At the Washington Energy Conference we recognized that only collective action could reduce our excessive dependence on imported oil and restore to our governments mastery over our own economies and foreign policies. Separately we could never create conditions for lower oil prices. Nor could any one of us, except at exorbitant cost, defend against a new embargo. Our security, our economic growth, our role in the world, were at risk.

Nothing so vividly demonstrates the cooperative vitality of the industrial democracies as the speed and imagination with which this Agency acted on these conclusions. It articulated a realistic strategy for attacking the problems of price and supply and launched a series of major steps which together make up the elements of a comprehensive program:

—To safeguard against future energy emergencies, we committed ourselves to build

stocks of oil and, in the event of an embargo, to cut our consumption by an equal percentage and to share available oil.

—For financial solidarity, the nations comprising the OECD agreed on a fund of \$25 billion to protect against financial disruption from oil deficits or from arbitrary shifts of funds by the producers.

—To prevent an increase in our vulnerability over the next few years, we set conservation goals and agreed on procedures to verify their implementation.

—To lessen our long-term vulnerability, we agreed on an ambitious policy to develop new energy sources through cooperation on individual development projects and safeguarded by a minimum price mechanism.

—To develop the technology to achieve independence by the end of the century, we established a far-reaching program of cooperation in energy research and development.

—Finally, we recognized the reality of the new economic and political conditions in which we are acting. Over the long term, a stable world energy economy must have the support and serve the interests of both consumers and producers. Therefore we in this Agency have committed ourselves to seek a long-term cooperative economic relationship with the energy-producing nations. This Agency has been the principal forum for our preparation for the dialogue with the producers.

In the short term, our objective in this Agency has been to restore the balance in the international energy market. Through rigorous conservation and the development of alternative sources, we have sought to create such a surplus of capacity that the flexibility of decision of the producers will be reduced. As our conservation policies gain momentum, our dependence on imported oil can at least be kept constant, while our economies recover from the recent recession. As the proportion of our energy needs from our own production increases, the producers' market will begin to shrink, first relatively and then in absolute terms. The producers will have to distribute ever-larger cutbacks among themselves to maintain the high

prices, and even larger cutbacks to support an increase. Individual producers, especially those with ambitious development, defense, and other spending programs, will be under pressure to increase sales or at least to refuse further production cuts. Thus at some point, if this process succeeds, the cartel will have lost the exclusive and arbitrary control over prices.

We acknowledged from the start that our countries vary widely in energy needs and potential. Some of us have major and as yet untapped oil, gas, and coal reserves. Others must rely almost entirely on nuclear energy and new technology to reduce national dependence on imported oil.

This very diversity gives a strong impetus to our cooperation. Because of our interdependence, we all have an interest in each other's success. The action each country takes to reduce its vulnerability reduces the vulnerability of us all. And the decision to work cooperatively assures an equitable sharing of costs and benefits. The sacrifices of one country will not simply be offset by the failure of other nations.

All elements of our strategy are linked. Plans to deal with an emergency will prove empty if we permit our dependence on imported oil to mount year by year. Efforts to develop a new relationship with the producers will be thwarted if we fail to create the objective conditions for a new equilibrium through programs of conservation and the development of alternative supplies.

Many of the basic building blocks of our strategy are in place. But much remains to be done. This first ministerial meeting of the IEA faces the following urgent tasks:

—To impose determined conservation programs before our economies begin to expand again;

—To put into effect strong new incentives for developing alternative sources;

—To accelerate research on long-term development of nonconventional energy supplies; and

—To prepare thoroughly for a dialogue with the producers.

Let me deal with each of these in turn.

The cardinal objective of any energy program must be the limitation of growth of consumption. However much we augment our own energy production, in the medium term it cannot keep pace with the extravagant annual consumption increases of the 1960's.

Conservation will be particularly important over the next few years. Until North Sea and Alaskan oil and additional coal and nuclear power become available in quantity, it is the only means we have to limit our vulnerability.

In February, we agreed that the IEA countries should save 2 million barrels a day by the end of this year. The recession has put us ahead of that target. But the reduction in consumption caused by the recession has also led to complacency about the need for a strong conservation policy. This has delayed—in America and elsewhere—the imposition of conservation measures that will assure us of future savings.

We must recognize that most of our current savings result not from policy decisions but from the reduction in overall economic activity caused by the recession. During this spring's decline in demand for oil, the oil producers have absorbed the production cuts required to keep supply in line with demand, leaving the basic price structure intact. Price rises have been difficult. But as growth resumes in the industrial economies, and with a normal or cold winter, our demand for oil will inevitably increase.

Unless we convert our recession-induced conservation to policy-induced conservation, the producers will benefit from a stronger market. We will become increasingly vulnerable to price rises and the political manipulation of energy supply. Indeed, we have already been warned of new price increases. These would be economically unjustified, for there is much surplus production capacity, inflation is slowing, and oil prices are already at historic highs. Yet the market remains under the substantial control of the producers; it will become more so unless we impose upon ourselves a rigorous energy program and put immediate impetus behind our conservation efforts.

In January, President Ford set a goal for the United States of saving 2 million barrels a day by the end of 1977. Later today, the President will announce additional measures to discourage the consumption of imported oil.

Together with actions already taken, this will bring the total estimated U.S. savings to 1.2 million barrels a day by the end of 1977. The President hopes that the Congress will join him in common action to bring about the remaining savings needed to meet our goal of 2 million barrels. But should this not prove possible, he is prepared to use the powers available to him to assure that the United States does its part in the common conservation effort.

We believe it essential that the IEA develop conservation goals which will prevent our vulnerability from increasing during 1976 and 1977. Because the United States is responsible for half the total oil consumption of IEA members, it pledges itself to half the savings. If, together, we can save 4 million barrels a day by the end of 1977, we can prevent our collective imports of oil from increasing above present levels even after a period of economic growth. OPEC's [Organization of Petroleum Exporting Countries] ability to raise prices arbitrarily will have been diminished. And we will have reduced our oil payments deficit by many billions of dollars. But should we fail, the cost will be not only higher prices but also increasing economic and political vulnerability.

Alternative Sources

Over the longer term, our dependence on imported oil will become irreversible unless we rapidly develop new energy sources—oil, gas, coal, nuclear power. This is all the more urgent because the economic costs of the current level of high prices will multiply over time. At present, much of the producers' surplus revenues are recycled into investments in the industrialized countries. This is welcome as a short-term alleviation of the balance-of-payments drain. But, if current prices hold, sooner or later the im-

ports of producers will rise dramatically. There will occur an increasing drain of goods and services from our economies.

If we are to lessen our vulnerability, energy production from alternative sources must, at a minimum, substantially reduce current IEA imports of 25 million barrels per day. Three actions are needed to accomplish this:

—We must remove or modify many of our governmental constraints on energy production. Energy development is encumbered everywhere by legal, environmental, and regulatory limitations. Many of these reflect valid social goals; others could usefully be reviewed or modified, or alternative safeguards could be devised. We should use this organization as a clearinghouse for ideas to remove unnecessary obstacles to alternative energy sources.

—We must make sure that sufficient financing is available to assure energy development. Enormous amounts of capital will be required—perhaps a thousand billion dollars in the next 10 years. Each country should decide the arrangements best suited to meet this requirement, but we should proceed now to establish an IEA framework for project-by-project cooperation, including joint guarantees or other financial assistance to large cooperative projects.

—We must insure that our energy investments are protected against disruptive competition. For much of the Persian Gulf, production costs are only about 25 cents a barrel. Most of the major continental energy sources—new Alaskan North Slope oil, the U.S. outer continental shelf, North Sea oil, nuclear power everywhere—will be many times more costly to produce. If the cartel decides to undercut alternative sources by temporary, predatory price-cutting, investment in alternative sources may be inhibited or abandoned. The producers' pricing policies could thus keep us in a permanent state of dependence, and we would hardly have assurance that the price would not be raised again once our dependence was confirmed.

This is why we in the IEA have agreed in principle on the safeguard price mecha-

nism. Only if consumers develop massive new energy sources will the oil producers lose their ability to set prices at high, artificial levels. But these sources will not be developed if producers retain the ability to thwart our energy programs by temporary, predatory price cuts. A minimum safeguard price—well below the current world price level—can help insure that these alternative sources will be developed.

We are obviously not proposing a guaranteed price for OPEC. On the contrary, if our policy succeeds, and as large quantities of new energy become available, OPEC's selling price could fall below the protected level. The minimum safeguard price can be implemented in a variety of ways—through tariffs, quotas, or variable levies. The difference between the world price and the higher domestic price would thus accrue to our governments in the form of import taxes and levies. These could be used for social programs or rebates or other national programs of our own choosing. In short, the minimum safeguard price is not a device for maintaining artificially high world oil prices. On the contrary, it is a device for making sure that they come down. And it can be designed to yield the benefits from such reduction to the industrial countries.

The agreed deadline for elaboration of the IEA overall alternative sources program is July 1. We must meet it. President Ford has asked me to emphasize the urgency of this task. Without clear incentives for major new energy investments rapidly put into place, IEA countries can never hope to reduce their current excessive vulnerability.

Nuclear Power for Energy Production

In the quest for greater energy self-reliance, nuclear power will be critical. By 1985, the European Community hopes that nuclear power will generate about one-quarter of its electricity; Japan, a third; the United States, perhaps a third. But there are major problems associated with the orderly, safe, and prudent introduction of this important new technology.

In all our countries, the growth of nu-

clear power produces both hope and anxiety. On the one hand, we recognize it as the only potential large-scale energy substitute for the inevitable exhaustion of supplies of oil and gas which would occur by the end of this century. On the other hand, there are increasing doubts that sufficient nuclear fuel will become available. Enormous amounts of capital will be needed to build reactors, severely straining existing capital markets. And we all know of the questions raised by the public and some legislators regarding the environmental impact of the widespread construction of nuclear facilities.

Thus we must move urgently and decisively within the IEA on the following program:

—We must insure that needed uranium enrichment facilities are constructed on schedule. In this regard, the United States recognizes its responsibility to continue providing nuclear fuel under long-term contract. Our policy is to bring into being—preferably by private industry but by the Federal Government if necessary—additional enrichment capacity which will insure adequate future supply. Negotiations are now underway with a potential private source. These discussions will proceed quickly, and by June 30, the President will decide which course of action, private or public, is in the best interests of our own country and those abroad who rely on us. We will then be in a position to accept long-term orders.

—We must intensify our joint efforts to map and analyze future demand and supply of fuel, including assessing the availability of uranium resources.

—We should jointly project the capital requirements of the nuclear sector for the next 10 years and consider how our governments, individually and cooperatively, can assist in meeting those requirements.

—We should evaluate the economic necessity, plant requirements, and safety implications of plutonium reprocessing, recycling, and storage.

—We must undertake intensive efforts to improve the safety and security of nuclear materials, equipment, and operation.

—And finally, we should develop balanced information programs to bring perceptions

of the risks and benefits of nuclear energy in line with reality.

Several of the technical issues involved are already being dealt with by the OECD's Nuclear Energy Agency. That work should of course continue.

Research and Development

Beyond the next decade, a central issue will be how to create new nonconventional energy sources. It is in developing these new sources that IEA's program of cooperation may make its most important and lasting contribution.

For the long-range energy future depends not on the Persian Gulf, or the North Sea, or Alaska. It does depend on what we do in our laboratories to make better use of conventional newer sources and to develop more exotic sources.

The advanced nations have vast scientific and technical capabilities. Over the past year and a half, IEA member countries have expanded their national programs in energy research and development. In the United States our new Energy Research and Development Administration will spend more than \$2 billion in the fiscal year beginning next month. American industry will invest far more than that.

The U.S. program emphasizes improving the efficiency of energy generation, transportation, and use; improving the recovery of oil and new uses of coal; and converting coal to synthetic oil and gas. These projects are designed to produce major advances in energy production and use in this century. For the period beyond the year 2000, only three known potential sources of energy have virtually infinite potential for expansion: the breeder reactor, nuclear fusion, and solar energy. These all have a high priority in the U.S. program.

The IEA program in these fields reflects the conviction that technical advance will be accelerated through cooperative efforts and facilitate the flow of information and knowledge. We have decided to link our national programs through coordinated planning, intensified information exchange, and through

joint projects which pool our capital, industrial skills, and technology.

The early results are promising. We have moved forward rapidly on nine joint projects ranging from energy conservation to nuclear power. Important programs in coal processing, which involve substantial joint investments of money and manpower, are about to begin.

But a sustained program of cooperation requires much more. We have identified the existing and potential technologies that will have a critical impact on the future. We must now ascertain when these technologies can be implemented, what their production potential is, and which are best suited to large-scale joint projects.

As our cooperation expands, projects will increasingly operate at the frontier of technology. We will each have to recognize that we cannot retain the most promising projects solely for our own national purposes. We must establish guidelines which, while taking account of understandable concern over the sharing of information and the possible loss of commercial advantage, give impetus to multilateral cooperation.

Therefore, I propose that our leading research and development officials meet in early autumn at the special session of the Governing Board. Their goal would be to complete the design of a joint energy research and development program that will receive high priority in all of our national planning.

Relations With Producers

The final element of our energy strategy is the development of a cooperative relationship with producers. We must face the fact that the producers have the ability now and for some time to come to determine the supply and the price of our oil. But the decisions we make now on conservation and alternative sources will determine whether in the future prices will be set by political decision or economic competition.

Yet there exists no institution or agreed framework in which the exercise of the undoubted powers of both groups can be subject

to discussion and mutual accommodation.

Since its start, IEA has been committed to the search for a new relationship with the producers which would take into account the needs and aspirations of both sides. The solidarity we have achieved in IEA is a necessary condition for building that broader structure.

Before the recent preparatory conference between producers and consumers, the IEA agreed on several possible areas for joint action by producers and consumers. These remain fruitful topics for dialogue:

—First, we should discuss the management of financial recycling. Both producers and consumers have an interest in the effective reinvestment of surplus funds.

—Second, we should jointly examine the incoming-investment policies of the industrialized countries. The oil producers need attractive outlets for their revenues; the industrial countries, while they welcome new investment, will want to retain control of those sectors of their economies which they consider critical.

—Third, we can examine cooperative efforts to accelerate the development programs in producer countries. New industries can be established, combining the technology of the industrialized world with the energy and capital of the producers. Fertilizer is a promising example.

—Fourth, the oil-producing countries and the industrial consuming countries share responsibility for easing the plight of the poorest nations. International development efforts have been undermined by the current economic crisis; high prices for energy have shattered the hopes of developing nations for industrialization; high petrochemical costs have made needed fertilizer prohibitively expensive and compounded the difficulties of producing enough food to feed the hungry. Special efforts must be made on behalf of those most seriously affected. The newly rich producing nations have an obligation to join us in this effort.

—And finally, there is an obvious need for a forum in which producers and consumers can discuss the difficult issues of oil prices and security of supply. This dialogue

is not, of course, a substitute for our own efforts on conservation and the development of new supplies. But while we cannot protect these vital interests only by discussions with producers, both consumers and producers can benefit from a serious dialogue regarding their respective interests and objectives.

It has become clear—as a result of the April preparatory meeting—that the dialogue between the producers and consumers will not progress unless it is broadened to include the general issue of the relationship between developing and developed countries.

We in the IEA have no reason to recoil from a discussion of all the issues of concern to developing countries. I recently set forth my country's ideas on raw materials and commodities problems; I proposed that these now be addressed in the multilateral trade negotiations, in individual commodity groups, and in the World Bank. I shall put forward further proposals at the OECD tomorrow. I hope that these ideas as well as proposals put forward by others can help overcome the impasse in the producer-consumer dialogue.

The United States is prepared to have the preparatory meeting reconvene in Paris in the same format as before. In order to carry its work forward, commissions should be created to deal with critical areas such as energy, problems of the most seriously affected nations, and raw materials. Each commission would review the range of issues under its heading: finance, investment, trade, production. The commissions could meet consecutively or simultaneously, but without an arbitrary deadline for concluding their work. The commissions on raw materials and the problems of the most seriously affected nations would not supplant the already substantial work which is being done elsewhere. Rather, they would monitor, supplement, and orient that work and give it needed impetus.

Membership in these commissions should be limited if they are to be effective. We suggest that this be decided by objective criteria. In energy, for example, countries exporting or importing more than a certain

volume of energy in the world market should be members. On the commission dealing with the most seriously affected countries, those with the lowest per capita income would participate along with traditional and new aid donors. The commission on commodities could include the principal exporters and importers of food and non-oil raw materials.

We suggest that the IEA discuss these concepts and coordinate our contacts with the countries that attended the April meeting, and especially with France as the convening country, to determine when and how the preparatory meeting could be re-assembled.

This Agency has already demonstrated what can be accomplished if nations have the vision to perceive their interest and the will to act upon it. We have set ourselves important goals including broadening the pattern of cooperation already established here. We are called upon to make concrete progress; this will require readiness to look beyond our own concerns as industrialized nations to the broader needs of all mankind.

The progress we have made in a short 15 months should give us great hope for the future. Goethe said that "The web of this world is woven of necessity and chance." We stand at a point where those strands intertwine. We must not regard necessity as capricious nor leave change to chance. Necessity impels us to where we are but summons us to choose where we go. Our interdependence will make us thrive together or decline together. We can drift, or we can decide. We have no excuse for failure. We have it in our power to build a better future.

TEXT OF IEA COMMUNIQUE, MAY 27

PARIS, 27th May, 1975.

The Governing Board of the International Energy Agency met at Ministerial level in Paris on 27th May, 1975, under the Chairmanship of Mr. Renaat van Elslande, Minister for Foreign Affairs of the Kingdom of Belgium.

1. Ministers noted that the events of recent years have highlighted the importance for the world economy of a regular and stable energy supply. Solutions to current economic problems must rest upon the principles of inter-dependence of all coun-

tries, mutual support and shared responsibility, so that all countries, whatever their level of development, may be recognised as partners in the world economic system. Their continued economic and social development must be based upon world economic growth in conditions of stability and equity.

Ministers reiterated their determination that the Agency should contribute, as far as problems connected with energy were concerned, towards achievement of these objectives.

2. Ministers reviewed developments in the world energy situation since the establishment of the Agency on 15th November, 1974. They laid down guidelines and priorities for the Agency's future work and for the full implementation of the International Energy Program [IEP] and re-affirmed their commitment to work for the development of a co-operative multilateral relationship among oil producing and oil consuming countries.

3. They noted with approval that an emergency system has now been established to reduce oil consumption and to allocate oil supplies in conditions of shortage. This emergency system can be brought into operation at short notice if required, and will substantially reduce the economic effects of any future oil supply difficulties. They noted the importance of emergency reserves to insure the effectiveness of the emergency system, and noted that the Governing Board would reach a decision by 1st July, 1975, as to the date by which these emergency reserves should be raised to 90 days supply.

4. Ministers noted the importance of the collection and analysis of information on the oil market in order to ensure greater understanding and transparency in international oil trade. They agreed that the oil market information system should be promptly completed and evaluated.

5. Ministers confirmed their determination to begin the implementation of a programme on long-term co-operation on energy by 1st July, 1975, with a view to achieving the overall objectives of the Agency by making more efficient use of the world's limited available resources of energy in the interest of the world economy; by diversifying the sources of energy; and by reducing dependence on imported oil.

Ministers agreed that co-operation in the Long-Term Program, to be equitable and effective, should take into due consideration the specific economic and social conditions of Member countries. The program should ensure that the burdens and benefits deriving from joint efforts of participating countries are shared among them on an equitable basis, and that policies directed at achieving such a balance should be implemented within existing legislative and constitutional limitations. They further stressed that the overall efforts and undertakings of each participating country with respect to energy conservation, production of energy and research and development in the energy field should

be regularly reviewed within the Agency.

6. Ministers noted with satisfaction the progress that has been made in the field of conservation, in particular through the adoption of a group conservation target for 1975.

Ministers decided that the work of the Agency should be actively continued, and agreed that governments of the participating countries would need to increase their efforts to ensure that the energy conservation objectives of the Agency are achieved.

Ministers laid down as priorities for future work:

— the consideration of conservation objectives for the group for 1976 and 1977;

— the establishment of medium-term goals for 1980 and 1985; and

— the intensification of individual country reviews to strengthen the effectiveness of conservation programmes.

7. The Ministers agreed on the need to elaborate a co-ordinated programme of co-operation for the accelerated development of alternative energy sources as provided in the decision already taken by the Governing Board, including in particular a commitment to increase, encourage and safeguard investment by general and specific measures.

The Ministers agreed that the Agency should initiate promptly an examination of the potential for expanded co-operation in the area of nuclear energy. This co-operation in all fields will be directed toward ensuring the development of this important alternative source of energy with due regard to safety and environmental conditions. Amongst other questions shall be discussed the availability of nuclear fuel and technology to meet the problems of safety and waste management.

On the basis of the above mentioned decision Ministers insisted on the importance of the establishment of co-operative projects in the research and development fields specified in the IEP Agreement, particularly coal and nuclear questions. In this connection, they agreed to build further upon the progress already achieved by the Agency in the area of energy research and development. They resolved that productive results in this area will require a sustained effort to develop concrete international co-operation. In support of this objective, they agreed that a special session of the Governing Board, with attendance by senior research and development officials, should be held in the Autumn of 1975 to complete the formulation of a research and development program.

8. Ministers reviewed the relations among oil producing and oil consuming countries, developing and developed alike. With this in view they were aware of important and pressing problems of the developing countries which are not directly related to energy, and they were determined that these should be tackled with political determination and within a reasonable time-frame. Ministers noted that the Council of the OECD meeting at Ministerial

level on May 28th and 29th proposes to discuss the problems of development and of commodities, including foodstuffs, and expressed the hope that steps will be taken toward effective action for finding solutions to these problems. For its part, the Agency will do all within its competence to work for the solution of the problems of the developing countries, so far as they are concerned with energy.

Ministers noted that the Preparatory Meeting held in Paris from 7th-16th April, 1975, had provided an opportunity for full and serious discussion of the means of establishing closer relations among oil producing and oil consuming countries.

Ministers declared themselves ready to pursue discussions at any time and in any manner found mutually convenient, and reaffirmed their common willingness to continue the dialogue and to encourage initiatives directed towards further progress.

Ministers exchanged views on possible ways of pursuing the dialogue. They agreed to continue bilateral contacts with interested countries. They instructed their representatives in the Governing Board to address these questions as a matter of urgency, to co-ordinate their efforts to ensure that formal deliberations responsive to the interest of all countries concerned can be held as soon as possible, and to examine the manner in which the dialogue should be continued.

9. Ministers agreed that the work carried out in the Agency thus far has made an important contribution towards meeting the difficulties that have been encountered in the energy field. They stressed the importance of the solidarity among the Member countries, and emphasised the need for an intensification and, wherever possible, a broadening of co-operative efforts undertaken in this area. Acting in its operational capacity, the Agency will continue to develop further its co-operative energy programme in order to improve the overall energy supply and demand situation, which is of vital importance to the further development of the world economy as a whole.

NEWS CONFERENCE, MAY 27

Press release 304 dated May 28

Ladies and gentlemen: I will just make a very few remarks. The series of meetings that are taking place this week, at the IEA today, the OECD tomorrow, followed by the NATO summit, represent a kind of architecture of the structure of the world as we can foresee it developing.

I will not talk about the NATO summit today. I will make a few remarks about the IEA and the OECD. We consider the prog-

ress that has been made in energy cooperation among the members of the IEA one of the most significant achievements of the recent period. It symbolizes the ability of the industrial democracies to work together on a common problem. They have laid a foundation of major accomplishment in a very brief period of time since the Washington Energy Conference of February 1974.

The meeting today and the American position at that meeting was designed to take stock of what has been achieved and to chart the course for the future. It outlined the American proposals—outlined the objectives in the field of conservation, the development of alternative sources, the emphasis on nuclear power, the joint efforts in research and development that we believe can be undertaken by the IEA in the immediate future and that must be undertaken if the objective conditions that produced the energy crisis are to be alleviated and, over a period of time, eliminated.

We believe that these objectives are within our capacity to achieve. An important aspect of our view and that of our colleagues in the IEA has to do with producer-consumer relations, and this has to be seen in the context of what we shall do at the OECD tomorrow, mainly to sketch a new and, we hope, constructive approach to the relationship between the industrialized countries and the developing countries.

With respect to the consumer-producer dialogue, we have proposed a means by which the stalemate of the last conference can hopefully be overcome, by which it is possible to have discussions on energy which take place concurrently with discussions on raw materials and development in probably different forums that are related to each other but where each works on its own schedule.

Together with the specific proposals that we have made with respect to raw materials previously and that we shall elaborate tomorrow, we hope that the possibility has been created for a constructive dialogue between consumers and producers on energy and between industrialized and developing countries on a local basis. This is the approach that the United States is putting

forward, which we believe has the substantial support of our partners, and it offers hope for progress in the field of energy and, we hope, for a constructive dialogue with the developing countries.

Q. Mr. Secretary, the commissions you proposed today, are they entirely discussion groups and, if not, what else would they do?

Secretary Kissinger: The commissions we proposed—three commissions, although we are openminded on this, on energy, on raw materials, and on development—these commissions are to review the whole range of problems in their fields. In the case of energy, the commission should be, in effect, the energy conference. In the case of raw materials and development, there are other negotiations going on in other forums, and the role of these commissions would be to pull together the work in these other forums, to monitor it, to orient it, and therefore perhaps the emphasis in each group would be somewhat different. But we are not looking at them as simply discussion groups, but as groups that will contribute to the solution of the outstanding problems.

Q. Mr. Secretary, how do you respond to the reactions you are bound to get from some of the producing nations that this merely postpones coming to grips with the issues and that it puts the discussion off into the distant future?

Secretary Kissinger: First of all, I do not believe that this is the reaction that we will get from the producing nations, because we have had some preliminary talks with at least some producing nations in which that particular view—in which that particular criticism was not raised.

Secondly, if it were raised, it would not be a valid criticism, because in our government, as is well known, there was a rather firm objection to discussing the issue of raw materials at all, and therefore the readiness of the United States to discuss raw materials within the framework that we have proposed is a step that was deliberately intended to tell the developing nations that we were listening to their concerns and that while we may not agree with their solutions—and in

many cases do not agree with their solutions—we are willing to listen to their concerns, to discuss them, and to try to find equitable answers.

The particular procedure that we have proposed is not intended to postpone the solution, but rather to accelerate it. If everything were discussed in one commission or in one conference, it would be incapable of being brought to a point. By discussing it in separate commissions, each of which can then review the work that may already be going on in other forums, but supplement it when that is necessary, we believe we have proposed a procedure that can lead to as rapid a conclusion as the technical complexity of the subject permits.

Our intention was not to put it into the distant future but to come forward with a proposal that is something other than a huge meeting like the special session of the General Assembly and is specific enough to meet the concerns of the developing countries as well as reflect our own interests.

Q. Mr. Secretary, how do you explain the change in opinion since last April [in the United States, regarding commodities]?

Secretary Kissinger: You have to separate two things. One is the attitude we took at the producer-consumer conference, and we are still opposed to discussing energy development and raw materials all in one big meeting. But we are not opposed to discussing them in a way where their relationship is established. So we have not in this respect changed our view totally.

With respect to the second, we have had a study in our government looking at the problem of raw materials which has been going on for months and which came to fruition in recent weeks. That study had always been pointed toward the time of the OECD meeting and the special session of the General Assembly.

With respect to this, what the United States wants to do is to show its willingness, as I pointed out, to discuss issues that are of great concern to a major part of mankind. We will not necessarily accept their views on the specific remedies. We, for example,

are not in favor of indexation, but we have turned attention to the relationship between the industrial and developing countries. This is not a change and is not sudden. It has been in preparation for months as a result of a series of interdepartmental studies, and it was just brought to a focus at this moment.

Q. Mr. Secretary [Inaudible. In substance, asks if the Secretary has received support for his approach in bilateral discussions with any major OPEC nation].

Secretary Kissinger: Yes, we have. I do not want to embarrass any OPEC country, and obviously they are going to make their own decisions, but we have had exploratory talks with a number of OPEC countries, and my impression is that this general approach will find some support. In fact, it has found support among the countries with which it was discussed, which is, however, not all the OPEC countries.

Q. Mr. Secretary, what would be the relationship between various commissions? Would progress in one commission depend on progress in other commissions?

Secretary Kissinger: In our view that is not necessarily the case. As I understand the view of at least some of the OPEC countries, their view was not that all work had to be concluded simultaneously, but that they wanted to make sure that we would not talk only of the commodity that concerned us while all other issues were left for some indeterminate future. Therefore, each commission should set its own pace, and its conclusions should not necessarily be dependent on the conclusions of the other commissions.

But no doubt as the work develops there will be opportunities for exchanges of views between the commissions, and I think we should keep an open mind as this work continues. The point I want to make is that the United States is prepared to make a serious effort with good will and a cooperative attitude to deal with these problems and that we are calling on the developing countries in the energy field and on the producing countries to avoid confrontation and to deal with the practical problems. That will be

the theme of my speech at OECD tomorrow.

Q. With respect to the conference in Geneva on the Middle East, what is your expectation about it?

Secretary Kissinger: With respect to the conference at Geneva. As you know, President Ford is meeting President Sadat this weekend. He will subsequently be with Prime Minister Rabin. Until those discussions have been completed, it will be difficult for us to make a judgment when the Geneva Conference can be resumed. I have stated publicly that we believe that the Geneva Conference is a probable outcome of the present evolution.

I am also planning to meet again with Soviet Foreign Minister Gromyko, probably in July. At that point we will be able to give a clearer view as to when the Geneva Conference is likely to be reassembled.

Q. In what time frame would you put the resumption of the preparatory conference?

Secretary Kissinger: We have had a preliminary talk today with our partners in the IEA, and I had the impression, although I do not think any formal decision has yet been taken, that the general approach outlined was favorably received. We will, of course, be in close touch after completing our discussions in the IEA with the Government of France, as the convening country; and we would of course expect that France would again act as the convening country. We set no exact time frame, but we have no particular reason for delay either; so sometime over the next few months I believe that the time would be appropriate.

Q. Do you believe that this new American proposal will head off an oil price increase in September?

Secretary Kissinger: Well, the oil price increase, the projected oil price increase, depends of course on many considerations. We cannot gear our negotiations to an attempt to head off an oil price increase.

The U.S. position is that an oil price increase would be economically unjustified, that oil prices are at historic highs, and as recent studies have shown, that the price of other raw materials has not been out of

line. So we would oppose an oil price increase, and we hope that the OPEC countries will reflect further on the impact on the world economy of a continual increase in oil prices.

Q. [Inaudible. In substance asks why the Secretary did not mention the U.N. Conference on Trade and Development in his IEA speech, and if he opposes an UNCTAD role in dealing with the commodity problem.]

Secretary Kissinger: With respect to commodities? These are the specific proposals that we have put forward. We are prepared to examine other forums where this might be considered.

Q. Mr. Secretary, you spoke at the outset of developing a kind of architecture to structure the world as we can see it develop. In your talks this morning with the French President, did you find him looking at the same structure, or did he have a housing plan of his own?

Secretary Kissinger: Well, I think that France prides itself on its independent foreign policy. Obviously, we have no objections to France having an independent foreign policy. On the whole my impression was of a considerable mutuality of approach. There could be occasional differences in tactics. There might be a difference in emphasis, but I thought on the overall approach that the talks were very satisfactory and were conducted in a very constructive and positive atmosphere.

Q. Mr. Secretary, I notice that there is some change in the time frame; when you spoke this morning, I believe it was "a month," and now you are speaking of "a few months."

Secretary Kissinger: It could be a question of my accent—that you did not hear the "s." Nothing has changed between what I said this morning and what I said this afternoon. We are prepared to begin discussions immediately. We are in discussions now with our IEA partners. We will be discussing in the near future after conclusions have been reached with the Government of France and will continue exploratory talks with the

producers. We have no reason to hold up the resumption of the preparatory conference. Sometime in the next months, with an "s" at the end; and that's what I intended to say this morning.

Q. Following President Ford's discussion with President Sadat in Salzburg and Prime Minister Rabin in Washington, do you plan to go back to the area for a new shuttle diplomacy?

Secretary Kissinger: Well, the method of the diplomacy is not what is crucial, and it depends, of course, on what progress is made and toward what particular end. The United States has not excluded any particular approach. On the contrary, we are prepared to pursue any approach that makes progress toward peace. We have excluded a stalemate of any duration. So in principle we are prepared to be helpful in whatever direction the parties concerned believe would be most useful to them.

STATEMENT BEFORE THE MINISTERIAL COUNCIL OF THE OECD, MAY 28

Press release 302 dated May 28

When free nations join forces for the common good they can achieve great things.

This organization embodies the legacy and the hope of the Marshall plan, one of the most creative achievements of international collaboration. The nations represented here have every reason to be proud of the advances which they have achieved for their peoples during the past 30 years. Our progress has fostered global progress. Our success has demonstrated that hope, prosperity, and human dignity are not utopian dreams; they can become practical possibilities for all nations.

But the economic system which we labored so hard to construct is now under stress. The energy crisis of 1973 first dramatized the forces of change which threaten to outrun our capacity for cooperative action. A food crisis, a global recession, and a rate of inflation unprecedented in the postwar pe-

riod have further strained the structure of international cooperation. At the same time, the poorer nations have increasingly pressed their demands for greater benefits and more participation in the international system.

Economic expansion in the industrial world and economic cooperation with the less developed countries go hand in hand. Only economic growth can satisfy competing demands for more income and more opportunity within and among countries. An expanding world economy is essential for development. It stimulates trade, investment, and technology; it supports necessary bilateral and multilateral aid programs; it assures growing markets for the raw materials, manufactures, and agricultural products of the developing countries; it provides the best framework for accommodation on the difficult, potentially divisive issues of food, energy, raw materials, trade, and investment.

These issues go far beyond economic considerations. Economic stagnation breeds political instability. For the nations of the industrialized world, the economic crisis has posed a threat to much more than our national income. It has threatened the stability of our institutions and the fabric of our cooperation on the range of political and security problems. Governments cannot act with assurance while their economies stagnate and they confront increasing domestic and international pressures over the distribution of economic benefit. In such conditions, the ability to act with purpose—to address either our national or international problems—will falter. If they are to contribute to world security and prosperity, the industrialized nations must be economically strong and politically cohesive.

The Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development reminds us of our strengths. It calls attention to the wisdom of our predecessors, who saw that we multiply our effectiveness by our cooperation. This organization was originally created to promote cooperation among those few nations which were already most advanced. This is still a worthwhile objective, but today's realities demand that we also increas-

ingly base our policies on the recognition that growth in the industrial world is inextricably linked to our relationship with the rest of the world.

We thus face two important challenges:

—First, the challenge to the nations of the industrial world to restore sustained and stable economic growth, so essential to maintain confidence in their institutions.

—A challenge to all nations to improve the system of international economic cooperation, and thus provide greater opportunity for the less developed countries to share both the benefits and responsibilities of a growing world economy.

The industrialized nations are now experiencing the most serious economic crisis since the Great Depression of the thirties. We see it in widespread recession. We encounter it in the inflation that has become the bane of our societies. We note it in the increasing difficulty of governments to manage their economies and even to control their budgets. We observe it in the declining incentives to investment that many of the industrial democracies are willing to offer.

We see now how much all our social and economic objectives depend on the general trend of prosperity. A democratic society thrives on a political and social consensus. The distribution of economic benefit must be broadly accepted as just or as offering opportunity for those who seek it. Otherwise escalating wage and price demands, lagging work performance, and labor unrest will undermine productivity; and inflation, which destroys growth and shatters hope, will be the arbiter of social priorities. Stagnation magnifies all our difficulties; stable growth enhances our possibilities.

The Finance Ministers, meeting tomorrow, will discuss specific measures to achieve our goal. Secretary Simon will then describe in detail the trend of American economic recovery. Today, let me offer some general propositions about our long-term future.

Our first task is to rebuild confidence through decisive, coordinated, and mutually supportive action to promote sustained expansion. We must recognize, especially in

the short- and medium-term management of our economies, that the economic policies of one nation can have a profound impact on others. And the United States, because of the size and impact of its economy, has a particular obligation to recognize the magnitude of its responsibility.

In the past we have kept each other informed on short-term policy measures. In a new departure, this past winter President Ford consulted with Chancellor Schmidt [of the Federal Republic of Germany], Prime Minister Wilson [of the United Kingdom], President Giscard d'Estaing [of France], and former Prime Minister Tanaka [of Japan] on our efforts to combat the recession. The major industrial countries need to do so. It will greatly improve the chances of avoiding the sequence of boom and bust experienced these last three years. The United States is prepared to cooperate fully in such efforts.

Second, we must collaborate to sustain the growth of international trade and investment. The great postwar effort to liberalize trade, to lessen barriers to investment, and to maintain free monetary exchanges has nourished our prosperity for over a generation. Trade has consistently expanded at a rate twice that of our domestic economy. We must carry this momentum forward in the OECD by renewing our pledge not to resort to restrictive trade measures to cover deficits resulting from current world economic difficulties. And we must take advantage of the multilateral trade negotiations to lower tariffs and nontariff barriers and improve the world trading system.

Third, as I outlined yesterday in the IEA, we must collectively adopt strong national and international policies on energy conservation and the development of alternative energy sources. This is indispensable if we are to lower prices and inhibit the political exploitation of a scarce resource. We must end, or at least reduce, the vulnerability of our economies to external economic or political manipulation.

Finally, we must develop longer term growth strategies by systematically addressing some fundamental questions:

—How can the industrial nations bring about the massive capital formation required over the next decade for an adequate rate of growth and for a new quality of life?

—What policies are needed to restore a noninflationary environment, without which long-term growth cannot occur?

—How can we encourage the research and development necessary to advance the technology vital to growth and to share it with others?

To begin the search for answers to such questions, I propose that we constitute a special group of distinguished economists both in and out of government. Their purpose should be to identify measures that OECD nations can adopt to assure long-term growth. This group should draw on the projections now being developed within the Economic Policy Committee and turn them into policy recommendations for the next ministerial meeting.

The importance of our economic cooperation transcends immediate economic utility; it also fosters our sense of community and common interest. If we are to cooperate in times of political and military crisis, we cannot, in calmer periods, afford to be economically weak, or disunited, or preoccupied with clashing economic interests. The interrelationship of our political, economic, and security interests which the United States suggested two years ago is a fact, not a theory.

Moreover, eased relations with the Communist world presuppose the political unity and economic vitality of the industrialized countries. The East's incentive to play a responsible role in the world economy and to improve political relationships with the industrialized nations will be enhanced as its stake in our economic success grows. This has been one of the more hopeful trends of recent years and it is up to us to assure its continuation.

Cooperation With the Developing Nations

Let me now turn to another crucial issue: the relationship between the industrialized nations and the developing world.

The world's prosperity will depend primarily on the industrialized nations since we account for 65 percent of the world's output and 70 percent of its trade. But our economic well-being depends on a structure of international cooperation in which the developing countries are, and perceive themselves to be, participants. The new problems of our era—insuring adequate supplies of food, energy, and raw materials—require a world economy that accommodates the interests of developing as well as developed countries.

We in this organization all face the same challenge, and we must face it together. The political evolution and economic growth of the last 30 years have brought about a new diffusion of power. No nation or bloc can dominate any longer. Economic issues are turning into central political issues. Thus it has become a central test of statesmanship to insure the orderly reconciliation of conflicting interests and to prevent a slide into political and economic warfare. Misused economic power—as the past two years have borne stark witness—can reverse the trend of worldwide growth and retard progress for everyone. An international system will be stable only so long as its economic benefits are widely shared and its arrangements are perceived as just. The United States, and I am sure all of us in this room, are ready to seek solutions to the problems of international cooperation with imagination and compassion.

But it is evident that others must be ready to follow a similar course. Confrontation and cooperation cannot be carried on simultaneously. International meetings that exhaust themselves in self-indulgent rhetoric or self-righteous propaganda help no one and no cause. We do not consider it constructive to participate in such exercises; we have a clear interest in resisting bloc pressure tactics or attempts to impose solutions through hostility. Such methods are futile and counterproductive. If the terribly complex issues before us are to be resolved through tests of strength, it is not the advanced industrial powers who will pay the highest price. Instead, it will be the poorest and most dis-

advantaged—those in whose name and for whose benefit these tactics are purportedly used.

It is time to end the theoretical debate over whether we are seeking a new order or improving the existing one. Let us deal in reality, not rhetoric. Let us address the practical common concerns of all the world's peoples with realism, maturity, mutual understanding, and common sense. The United States welcomes a dialogue in that spirit. We will do all we can to make it succeed.

Simple labels falsify the many real communities of interest which exist—some overlapping, some competitive, some complementary. One of the striking features of the modern world economy is the diversity of its participants. Among the countries formerly classed as "developing," there have emerged in the last decade new economic powers with a growing capacity to export manufactures and raw materials. The most successful have fostered investment and growth at home. To these emerging powers have now been added the oil-rich countries. Any nation with a moral claim to world leadership—we as well as the newly wealthy—must contribute to easing the plight of the poorest countries. For who can deny that every economic problem—stagnation, inflation, high energy prices, food shortages—hits them hardest?

The United States recognizes the responsibility that accompanies its economic power. We are prepared to do our part, in a spirit of equality, mutual respect, and cooperation. Yesterday I discussed our proposals for achieving a successful multilateral energy dialogue. Today let me turn to food, raw materials, and trade and finance. A breakdown of the system in these areas would foster economic chaos and instability. Successful collaboration could usher in a new era of economic advance and human progress.

Food—A Moral and Political Challenge

The global problems in food are a central moral and political challenge. A world order in which tens of millions starve and millions more are undernourished will never be ac-

as just. The good harvests expected this year should not make us complacent, for the world's total food requirements continue to grow dramatically. The gap between what developing countries can produce and what they need currently amounts to about 25 million tons. At current rates of production and population growth, that gap is expected to double or triple in 10 years. Unless we act now, the world may face a series of increasingly unmanageable food crises over the next quarter century.

For the short term, food aid will continue to be vital to feed the victims of poverty and natural disaster. It is an international responsibility—to be shared by all financially able countries. The United States has pledged that it will make every effort to provide at least 4 million tons of food aid annually.

But this will not be enough. A long-term solution to the food problem requires that world food production capacity be greatly increased, especially in the developing countries, and an international system of grain reserves be created.

Let me turn to the U.S. proposals in these areas.

Fortunately, the less developed nations which are in greatest need also have the greatest potential for increased production. They possess large quantities of unused water and cultivatable land and the greatest possibility for improvement in crop yields. Their success, however, requires vast amounts of capital, new methods of planning and funding, and more effective agricultural policies and practices.

To these ends, the United States supports two new international mechanisms:

First, the International Fund for Agricultural Development—this Fund, proposed by the oil-producing nations, is designed to bring together all nations who are prepared to contribute additional resources, over some agreed base year, to agricultural development. President Ford has asked me to announce that the United States will participate in the creation of such a fund. We believe its resources should total at least \$1,000 million a year.

The link between funding and effective agricultural development strategies should be provided by a second organization, the Consultative Group on Food Production and Investment, which has already been organized as a result of the World Food Conference. This Group, sponsored by the World Bank [International Bank for Reconstruction and Development (IBRD)], the U.N. Development Program, and the Food and Agriculture Organization, plans its first meeting in July. It should be the central mechanism for cooperation among traditional donors, new donors, and the developing countries.

A crucial element in a long-term food strategy is grain reserves. Short-term fluctuations in food production, due to weather or natural or other catastrophes, cause sharp swings in price and availability of precious grains and cause plagues of starvation. A system of grain reserves would make it possible to alleviate famine in bad years as well as reduce pressures on supply and markets.

At the Rome Food Conference we agreed to negotiate a new international system of nationally held grain reserves. I recently outlined the suggested principles for such a system which the United States is prepared to begin negotiating immediately:

—First, total world reserves must be large enough to meet potential shortfalls in food-grains production.

—Second, grain exporters and importers should agree on a fair allocation of reserve holdings, taking into account wealth, productive capacity, and volume of trade.

—Third, there should be agreed international rules or guidelines to encourage members to build up reserves in times of good harvest.

—Fourth, each participating country should be free to determine how its reserves will be maintained and what incentives will be provided for their buildup and maintenance.

—Fifth, rules or guidelines should be agreed for the drawdown of reserves, triggered by shortfalls in world production. There must be a clear presumption that all members will make reserves available when

needed and, conversely, that reserves will not be released prematurely or excessively, thereby depressing market prices.

—Sixth, in times of shortage the system must assure access to supplies for participating countries.

—Seventh, there must be special provisions to meet the needs of the poorer countries.

—Finally, the system must encourage expanded and liberalized trade in grains.

The United States is prepared to hold an important part of an agreed level of world reserves. If others join us, agreement on the outlines of a reserve system can be achieved before the end of the year.

Commodity Issues, Trade, and Finance

A second area of increasing concern is commodities. The time is ripe for a detailed look at problems of commodity trade—for solutions that will benefit producers and consumers alike. The current system is marked by volatile prices, disruption of supplies, investment disputes, and increasing hostility to the private capital investment which remains indispensable for the transfer of resources and management skills.

Thus consumers as well as producers have an interest in effective arrangements. The consuming nations seek reliable supplies and prices. The producing countries seek reliable and growing export earnings to finance development and an adequate return on investments. All nations share an interest in ending the friction which characterizes the issue of raw materials. The debate is becoming more polarized and has already damaged other efforts for international cooperation. The failure of the preparatory energy conference last month is but a symptom of the larger problem we now confront. The longer we delay, the more difficult and painful it will be to find solutions.

The United States offers the following suggestions:

—First, we propose that new rules and procedures for access to markets and supplies be negotiated in the multilateral trade nego-

tiations now taking place in Geneva.

—Second, we do not believe that exclusive producers organizations are the best way to solve the commodity problem. In our view consumers and producers should jointly discuss their problems and possible remedial actions. We are prepared to do so. Specifically we are ready to discuss new arrangements for individual commodities on a case-by-case basis. We have already made proposals for a new International Coffee Agreement. We are ready to discuss other commodities as circumstances warrant.

—Third, I have recently suggested that the World Bank increase its financing of resource investments and explore new ways of combining its financing with private management, skills, technology, and capital.

—Finally, for most less developed countries, the key issue is the need for reliable long-term stability and growth in export earnings. Proposals have been made to review mechanisms for the stabilization of earnings, notably that of the IMF [International Monetary Fund] to protect the developing countries against excessive fluctuations in their export income. We are prepared to join others in this effort.

Others here will have their own views on how to proceed and on new ways of addressing the concerns of the developing nations. Cooperative action among the industrialized nations will multiply the effectiveness of our individual efforts and will insure that we have a clear understanding of common needs. The United States therefore strongly supports the OECD recommendation of a high-level group to study proposals on commodities.

The traditional areas of international economic cooperation, trade and finance, remain central elements of the economic structure. We cannot adequately provide for new areas of cooperation unless we first assure that the trading and monetary system is functioning effectively. While the present system has come through the last few years quite well, two problems stand out:

—First, developing countries with large and growing industrial sectors, particularly in East Asia and Latin America, require

expanding markets for their manufactured goods. The Tokyo Declaration's pledge to provide improved access to industrial world markets for developing countries must be implemented urgently for these countries.² And they should be given an opportunity to participate in the negotiations.

—Second, the poorest countries are badly in need of additional financial help. They now bear a double burden of higher prices for imported energy, food, fertilizer, and industrial goods and of reduced export earnings due to worldwide recession. We therefore support the creation by 1976 of a special trust fund of up to \$2,000 million under the IMF. We have proposed that gold now held by the IMF be supplemented by other contributions, especially from oil producers, and be used to provide resources for half of this total. I hope that the countries of the OECD could put this proposal forward for action at the meetings of the IMF Interim Committee and IMF-IBRD Development Committee two weeks from now.

In short, we propose to base the relationship between developed and developing nations on a spirit of cooperation and good will. We urge the developing countries to approach the issue with the same attitude. We must all realize that the actual diversity of parties and interests demands a variety of responses, that no single solution can be adequate, and that cooperation among the parties most concerned is the most effective means of addressing common problems.

The United States welcomes the Secretary General's proposal for a comprehensive review of our economic relationships with developing countries. We also support the proposal of the Government of Japan for a major study within the OECD of the longer run development of the advanced industrial societies in harmony with the less developed countries.

It is not often in history that a fundamental challenge is so clearly visible and

presents such an opportunity to shape our future. We are summoned to seize the possibilities inherent in the new era which the whole world is now entering. We should be confident and not timid; others are seeking to join in what we have built. Our challenge is to encourage progress and not abstract ideological confrontation. With this attitude we can look forward with optimism to the major international deliberations before us such as the seventh special session of the U.N. General Assembly this fall.

Politically as well as economically, our era has been shaped by the Industrial Revolution and the progressive economic growth that it brought. Its impact has been rapid, its results prodigious, its effects remarkable. It has created a new age of well-being and helped rapid economic growth, which was confined to Western Europe and the United States a century ago, expand into many parts of the globe.

At home, this economic progress has been an essential underpinning of our democracies. It is the basis of a stable, progressive, and just political and social environment.

The new nations now striving to industrialize have, with our help, a similar opportunity. We have every reason to expect similar success in working together with them on the new challenges of food, raw materials, and energy. But progress will not happen automatically.

So a great deal depends on our determination and vision. There are no plateaus in the affairs of mankind. What is not a step forward is at best stagnation; more often, it is a pause before retreat. There is no need to be dismayed by the problems we face, for progress implies problems. Circumstances have already provided the nations of the world with a unique perception of their interdependence. The opportunity to write a new and enduring chapter in the story of international cooperation is up to us.

We are prepared to respond to the imperatives we face. We have the awareness, the tools, and the determination. Let us now resolve to build the new era that our times demand.

² For text of the declaration, approved at Tokyo on Sept. 14, 1973, by a ministerial meeting of the Contracting Parties to the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT), see BULLETIN of Oct. 8, 1973, p. 450.

COMMUNIQUE

PARIS, 29th May, 1975.

1. The Council of the OECD met at Ministerial level on 28th May, under the chairmanship of the Right Honourable James Callaghan, MP, United Kingdom Secretary of State for Foreign and Commonwealth Affairs, and on 29th May, with the Right Honourable Denis Healey, MBE, MP, United Kingdom Chancellor of the Exchequer, in the chair.

The Economic Situation

2. Ministers expressed confidence that the policies of OECD governments will lead to a recovery of demand and employment and that this will be combined with further reductions in the average rate of inflation. They are determined to achieve these goals, and to ensure, by timely adjustments of policies, that the recovery is under-pinned should this prove necessary, and that, once under way, it does not degenerate into a new period of excessive demand pressures and inflationary tendencies. Ministers noted that the substantial international payments deficit on current account of OECD countries as a group, which has recently declined, is nevertheless likely to persist for some years. They also underlined the importance of ensuring that economic policies are such as to secure, among OECD countries, a less unbalanced distribution of current account positions, more compatible with a sustainable pattern of capital flows. Given such policies, Ministers were confident that, backed by official bilateral and multilateral arrangements, the financing of existing and prospective deficits could be continued on an orderly basis; in this connection they welcomed the steps being taken to obtain early ratification of the agreement establishing the OECD Financial Support Fund.

3. Ministers stressed that policy decisions concerned with the immediate future had to be related to the foreseeable medium and longer-term problems of structural change, and to broad strategies for resolving them. Ministers agreed that the OECD should carry forward and accelerate its re-assessment of the prospects for sustained economic growth and the constraints on such growth, particularly those arising from inflation, under the changing circumstances. They noted with interest the proposal made by the United States Government that a number of economists of international repute should be invited, drawing on this work, to examine the policy issues and make recommendations. In a broader and longer run context, Ministers also noted with interest a proposal initiated by the Japanese Government for a study of the future development of advanced industrial societies in harmony with that of developing countries.

Trade

4. Ministers¹ decided to renew, for a further period of one year, the Declaration adopted on 30th May, 1974, stating the determination of all OECD governments to avoid recourse to new restrictions on trade and other current account transactions and the artificial stimulation of visible and current invisible exports. In renewing the Declaration, Ministers stressed that the present situation required a high degree of economic co-operation. Noting that there had been a marked difference in the balance-of-payments situations of OECD Member countries, they welcomed the economic measures taken by certain of them; and they reaffirmed that, in the present state of the world economy, it remained of the highest importance to follow an economic policy which combatted inflation but also aimed at maintaining a high level of employment and expansion of world trade. The way in which this policy should be implemented must take account of the respective situations of Member countries.

5. Ministers agreed that, given the importance of the terms of export credits in international competition, an arrangement of a general nature in this respect, between as many as possible of the industrialised countries of the OECD, should be achieved. This would constitute significant progress in international co-operation. They also agreed on the need to continue close consultations on exchange-rate developments in the appropriate bodies. They noted that the problems of the developing Member countries have become more serious in several respects during the past year, and deserve to be considered with special attention within the OECD.

6. Ministers reaffirmed that liberal and expanded trade was of the utmost importance for the further development of the world economy and that, to this end, they would work together for the success of the multilateral trade negotiations now under way.

Energy

7. Ministers stressed the importance they attached to continuing and developing co-operation in the field of energy. A report from the Belgian Foreign Minister, Mr. Renaat van Elslande, Chairman of the Governing Board of the International Energy Agency's meeting at Ministerial level on 27th May, described the progress being made and the new impulse given to energy co-operation within that body.

8. Ministers agreed that increased co-operation between producer and consumer countries was needed in order to ensure equitable and stable conditions in the world energy market.

Commodities

9. Ministers stressed that adequate supplies of commodities at equitable and remunerative prices

¹The Government of Portugal is not, at this stage, in a position to renew the Declaration. [Footnote in original.]

are essential to the world economy. They recognised the interdependence and common interest of producers and consumers, both developed and developing countries, particularly in relation to the avoidance of excessive fluctuations in commodity markets, as well as the importance attached by producers to assured access to markets and by consumers to secure supplies. These questions, together with other aspects of the commodity problem, are of special concern to the developing countries in making the best possible use of their natural resources to foster economic development.

10. In responding to the concerns of developing countries in the commodity field and while recognising that circumstances vary greatly between commodities or groups of commodities and that this must be taken into account when working out practical arrangements, Ministers agreed on the need for a more active and broadly based approach to commodity problems aiming in particular, at:

—reducing market instability and promoting a better balance between production and consumption, including, where appropriate, through commodity agreements;

—ensuring adequate levels of investment in production of commodities;

—improving and increasing market outlets and local processing of commodities.

In addition, Ministers indicated their readiness to consider improved international mechanisms to stabilize export earnings of developing producing countries.

11. Ministers stressed the need for progress in the various international discussions on grains. In this context they noted that the better agricultural crops expected this year offered the opportunity to begin rebuilding stocks of essential foodstuffs, notably grains, and to ensure greater world food security. Ministers also re-iterated their readiness to contribute to the efforts needed to increase food production in the developing countries.

12. Ministers agreed that these questions should be pursued actively in all appropriate bodies with a view to reaching concrete solutions based on co-operation between producing and consuming countries. They welcomed the establishment of a high level group in the OECD to further develop Member countries' attitudes both on general aspects of their commodity policies and on specific action concerning particular commodities.

Relations with Developing Countries

13. Ministers adopted an OECD Declaration on Relations with Developing Countries (annexed to this Communiqué). They further agreed on a review within the OECD of economic relations between Member countries and developing countries, with a view to identifying what new and other constructive approaches could be adopted on selected substantive issues, and to giving support and new

impetus to negotiations in other bodies working on specific problems. Ministers invited the ad hoc high-level Group which has been created for this purpose to begin its work as quickly as possible and to submit a preliminary progress report before the end of July 1975.

14. Ministers agreed on the need to continue the dialogue between developed and developing countries. They recognised that, concurrently with the problems of energy and oil, there are other problems such as commodities, including foodstuffs, development questions and the intensified difficulties of the most seriously affected countries, which will have to be tackled with increased vigour in co-operation with all countries concerned. The need for renewed efforts along these lines was a recurring theme throughout the meeting of the OECD Ministers. Ministers expressed the hope that their deliberations will have provided a basis for the resumption at an early date of the dialogue which was initiated in Paris last April.

OECD DECLARATION ON RELATIONS WITH DEVELOPING COUNTRIES

PARIS, 28th May, 1975.

1. Ministers of OECD Governments meeting in Paris on 28th May, 1975, discussed relations with developing countries and agreed that, in the present situation, the widest measure of international co-operation is required.

2. They considered that while many developing countries have made major progress in their economic and social development, a large number of them have not been in a position to advance sufficiently and many are still faced with extremely severe problems of poverty.

3. Recalling the contribution which their countries have made to further the economic development of the developing countries, Ministers resolved to intensify their efforts to co-operate with these countries in their endeavours to improve the conditions of life of their people and to participate increasingly in the benefits of an improved and expanding world economy.

4. Given the fact of world economic interdependence, they believed that progress could best be made through practical measures which command wide support among all concerned—developed and developing nations alike.

5. They determined to consider policies aimed at strengthening the position of the developing countries in the world economy and expressed their willingness to discuss with the developing countries the relevant issues, with particular emphasis on food production, energy, commodities and development assistance for the most seriously affected countries.

6. They therefore expressed their firm determination to pursue the dialogue with the developing countries, in all appropriate fora, in particular the

forthcoming Seventh Special Session of the United Nations General Assembly, and in more restricted fora along the lines suggested by the President of the French Republic, in order to make real progress towards a more balanced and equitable structure of international economic relations.

REMARKS FOLLOWING MORNING SESSION OF OECD MEETING, MAY 28⁴

Mr. Koppel: Could you tell us something about the kind of mood you have found among European leaders? What will the President find on his trip?

Secretary Kissinger: I think the President will find a very constructive mood of friends wanting to work together and realizing what the fundamentals are.

Mr. Koppel: Now, in your speech today you talked about U.S. desire for cooperation, but you also warn against confrontation. Did you find any mood of confrontation?

Secretary Kissinger: Not among our European friends. That warning against confrontation was directed against some countries in larger forums such as the United Nations.

Mr. Koppel: Do you sense the same spirit of unity within NATO that existed when the Soviet Union was perceived as more of a threat?

Secretary Kissinger: Well, it is a different situation, more complicated, as is shown by the fact that this week we are putting so much emphasis on energy and economic cooperation. But I am very encouraged by the atmosphere in these meetings and by the very serious effort everyone is making to find a new basis for a new period of creativity.

Mr. Koppel: What will be the principal issues that the President takes up beginning tomorrow before NATO?

Secretary Kissinger: He will take up some of the conventional issues, such as security. He will then take up some of the issues that

have been discussed here, namely, the new problems that we are all facing—energy, economic cooperation, relations with the newly developed countries. And he will take up relations with the East, how détente fits into this whole structure.

Mr. Koppel: How about the internal problems of NATO—for example, Portugal, the problems between Turkey and Greece?

Secretary Kissinger: As you know, he is spending tomorrow morning with the Greek and Turkish Prime Ministers. These are subjects that will come up more in bilateral meetings than in the formal sessions.

U.S. Condemns Terrorist Murder of American Officers in Iran

Department Statement¹

The Department of State was deeply distressed to learn of the murder of two U.S. Air Force officers in Tehran today: Col. Paul R. Schaffer, Jr., and Lt. Col. Jack H. Turner.

We deplore and condemn this terrorist act of calculated brutality against American personnel assigned to duties in a country with which we enjoy close and friendly relations. We extend our deepest sympathy to the families of these two officers.

We are also confident that these murders, evidently carried out by a band of professional assassins, do not represent the sentiments of the Iranian people toward Americans serving there. The strong ties between our two countries, reinforced by the Shah's conversations during his recent state visit, remain.

I understand that the Prime Minister and Chief of the Supreme Commander's staff in Tehran have expressed their condolences for these killings.

We have also been assured that the Iranian authorities are launching an investigation to apprehend the murderers.

⁴ Made in response to questions by Ted Koppel of ABC-TV (text from press release 304A).

¹ Read to news correspondents on May 21 by Robert L. Funseth, Director, Office of Press Relations.

Panama and the United States: Toward a New Relationship

*Address by Ambassador at Large Ellsworth Bunker
Chief U.S. Negotiator for the Panama Canal Treaty¹*

I am happy to be with you this afternoon and to have this opportunity to speak on the efforts now underway to create a new relationship between Panama and the United States.

I know that the arrangements for the future operation of the Panama Canal are of great interest to a major maritime city such as Seattle.

But there are broader reasons why negotiations over the future of the canal should concern Americans. For the successful conclusion of a new agreement on the canal:

—Would demonstrate the possibility, in the conduct of our foreign relations, of resolving problems when they are susceptible to accommodation and compromise, rather than waiting until they raise the danger of confrontation and possible use of military force;

—Would provide concrete evidence of our country's willingness to move toward a more mature partnership with Latin America, where we have often in the past been accused of paternalism or neglect; and

—Would serve as an example of practical cooperation, between a large and a small country, a developed and a less developed country. Such cooperation is indispensable if we are to achieve what the Secretary of State recently described as the aim of U.S. foreign policy: "to help shape a new structure of international relations which promotes cooperation rather than force; negotiation rather than confrontation; and the

positive aspirations of peoples rather than the accumulation of arms by nations."²

In the past, when serving as a U.S. negotiator, I have made it a habit to keep my mouth shut publicly while negotiations were in progress. The fact that I have decided to discuss today some of the key issues in the current canal negotiations reflects another basic element of this Administration's conduct of foreign policy—the awareness that no foreign policy decision, and particularly no significant change in foreign policy, can take place without the advice and consent of Congress and the informed support of the American people, on the basis of candid and reasonable public discussion.

The story begins 72 years ago. In 1903 the newly independent Republic of Panama granted to the United States—in the Hay-Bunau-Varilla Treaty—a strip of its territory 10 miles wide and 50 miles long for the construction, maintenance, operation, and protection of a canal between the Atlantic and the Pacific. Panama also granted to the United States, in perpetuity, all of the rights, power, and authority to act within that strip of territory as "if it were the sovereign."

That the treaty favored the United States was acknowledged promptly. John Hay, then Secretary of State, told the Senate when it was considering the treaty for ratification, ". . . we shall have a treaty very satisfactory, vastly advantageous to the United States and, we must confess . . . not so advantageous

¹ Made before the Rainier Club at Seattle, Wash., on May 22 (text from press release 284).

² For Secretary Kissinger's address at Houston, Tex., on Mar. 1, see BULLETIN of Mar. 24, 1975, p. 361.

to Panama." Hay added, in writing to Senator John C. Spooner, "You and I know very well how many points are in the Treaty to which many patriotic Panamanians would object." The Senate ratified the treaty promptly.

The exploits of Goethals, Gorgas, and Walter Reed led to a magnificent engineering achievement which has served us well and of which we are justly proud.

For 60 years world shipping has been served efficiently and at low tolls. Today the canal, despite its age, is still of value to the United States. Economically, we continue to benefit from the shortened shipping lines and lower transportation costs it permits. Recent studies have estimated, for example, that some 9 percent of the total value of our exports and imports transited the canal in 1972.

However, we must be careful in assessing the canal's long-term value. It appears now that trading patterns are evolving and that alternatives to the canal have begun to emerge. As canal users take advantage of these alternatives, it appears likely that the canal's value will generally decline relative to our economy.

Militarily, the canal has also been important to the United States. Although our largest warships cannot use the canal now, it clearly enables us to shorten our supply lines to some areas. Its large contributions during the Second World War, Korean war, and Viet-Nam war have been amply documented.

But, again, we should bear in mind the canal's growing vulnerability to hostile attack, which points to the fact that we should not rely too heavily on it.

The point that I wish to make is that the canal's value, while of continuing importance, is probably not as great relatively speaking as in earlier years.

Moreover, our world today is a far different one than that of 1903.

No nation, including ours, would accept today a treaty which permits exercise of rights as if sovereign on a foreign land in perpetuity.

Panama has grown increasingly conscious of the fact that the treaty is heavily weighted

in our favor. Consequently, the level of its consent to our presence there has, over the years, persistently declined. And by Panama, I mean the Panamanian people of all strata, not simply their governments.

Causes of Decline in Consent

Among the aspects of the 1903 treaty which have caused this decline in consent, Panama cites the following:

—The United States occupies a strip across the heartland of its territory, cutting the nation in two and curbing the natural growth of its urban areas.

—The United States rules as sovereign over this strip of Panama's territory, the Canal Zone.

—It maintains a police force, courts, and jails to enforce the laws of the United States, not only upon Americans but upon Panamanians as well.

—It operates, on Panama's territory, a full-fledged government—a government which has no reference to the Government of Panama, its host.

—It operates virtually all commercial enterprises within the Canal Zone and denies to Panama the jurisdictional rights which would permit private Panamanian enterprise to compete.

—It controls virtually all the deep-water port facilities which serve Panama.

—It holds idle large areas of land and water within the Canal Zone.

—The United States pays Panama \$2.3 million annually for the immensely valuable rights it enjoys on Panamanian territory.

—Finally, and perhaps most importantly, the United States can do all these things, the treaty says, forever.

To these conditions Panama objects, saying that they deprive their country of dignity, of the ability to develop naturally, and indeed of full independence.

The United States attempted to respond to some of the Panamanian objections in the past. Treaty revisions were made in 1936 and 1955. But the most objectionable feature from Panama's viewpoint—U.S. exercise of rights as if sovereign in the Canal

Zone in perpetuity—has remained unchanged.

Panamanian frustrations over this state of affairs, and over the apparent disinclination of the United States to alter it, have intensified over the years. These frustrations culminated in demonstrations and riots in January 1964 when 21 Panamanians and three Americans were killed. Diplomatic relations were broken.

Following a major reassessment of our policy toward Panama, President Johnson after consultations with President Truman and President Eisenhower committed us—publicly and with bipartisan support—to negotiate a wholly new treaty to replace the old one. President Nixon and President Ford subsequently renewed that commitment. Our purpose was, and continues to be this: to lay the foundations for a new, a more modern, relationship between the two countries.

Partnership and U.S. Interests

Without such a changed relationship I believe it safe to say that Panama's already low level of consent to our presence will become lower still. It will approach zero.

While it is true, of course, that we could attempt to maintain our present position with regard to the Panama Canal, we would have to do so in an increasingly hostile atmosphere. In these circumstances we would likely find ourselves engaged in hostilities with an otherwise friendly country—a conflict that, in my view, the American people would not long accept.

At the same time, we should bear in mind that the canal is vulnerable to sabotage and terrorist acts. We would find it difficult, if not impossible, to keep the canal running against all-out Panamanian opposition.

The problem, in my opinion, simply will not go away.

Attitudes, not only in Panama but in the hemisphere at large, have changed. The Latin American nations have made our handling of the Panama negotiation a test of our intentions in the hemisphere.

When the Latin American Foreign Ministers met in Bogotá, Colombia, in November 1973 they voted to put the Panama ques-

tion on the agenda of the new dialogue proposed by Secretary Kissinger. In March of this year the Presidents of Colombia, Costa Rica, and Venezuela publicly expressed their support for Panama's cause. More recently, the General Assembly of the Organization of American States, meeting in Washington in the last two weeks, approved unanimously a resolution reaffirming their interest in the negotiation.

We no longer can be—nor would we want to be—the only country in the world exercising extraterritoriality on the soil of another country.

The evidence, it seems to me, strongly favors some form of partnership with Panama.

Partnership with Panama would help the United States preserve what it needs most respecting the canal. Partnership would provide an environment conducive to effective operation and defense of the canal by the United States. It would provide Panama with a meaningful stake in the operation and defense of the canal. It would help stimulate the cooperation and friendship both of the Panamanian people and of whatever government exists in Panama at any given time.

In short, partnership would mean that the United States would not have to divert any of its energies in Panama from the functions required for the efficient operation of the canal.

Putting it simply, I believe our interest in keeping the canal open and operating for our own strategic and economic purposes is best served by a partnership agreement for a reasonable additional period of time. The plain fact of the matter is that geography, history, and the economic and political imperatives of our time compel the United States and Panama to a joint venture in the Panama Canal.

We must learn to comport ourselves as partners and friends, preserving what is essential to each, protecting and making more efficient an important international line of communication, and, I suggest, creating an example for the world of a small nation and a large one working peacefully and profitably together.

Such a new relationship involves giving up something of what we now possess. We want to keep the power but discard what is nonessential to our purpose in Panama. Three examples should serve to explain my meaning:

—First, we will retain control over canal operations for the duration of the treaty, but Panama will participate progressively in these operations in preparation for its future role.

—Second, we will keep the lands and facilities we need to control and defend the canal but return what we can do without.

—Third, we will have defense rights but perform our defense tasks with Panamanian participation.

Simply stated, we will work together with Panama, but for the treaty's life we will operate the canal. We will secure the lands we need by releasing what we do not need. By having Panamanian participation in operation and defense we will have a more secure canal. In sum, we see a new treaty as the most practical means for protecting our interest.

Whereas continuance of the status quo will lead surely to prolonged problems—possible loss of what we are trying to preserve—partnership promises a greater assurance of success in achieving our essential interest: a canal that is open, efficient, and neutral.

The Negotiating Process

Turning to the negotiations, they have proceeded step by step during the past 21 months through three stages.

Stage 1 ended 15 months ago when Secretary of State Kissinger journeyed to Panama to initial with the Panamanian Foreign Minister a set of eight principles to serve as guidelines in working out the details of a new treaty.³ Perhaps General Torrijos, the Chief of Government in Panama, best characterized these principles when he said they constitute "a philosophy of understanding." Their essence is that:

³ For text of the joint statement of principles initialed on Feb. 7, see BULLETIN of Feb. 25, 1974, p. 184.

—Panama will grant the United States the rights, facilities, and lands necessary to continue operating and defending the canal; and

—The United States will return to Panama jurisdiction over its territory and arrange for the participation by Panama in the canal's operation and defense.

We have also agreed in the principles that the treaty will provide for any expansion of canal capacity in Panama that may eventually be needed, that Panama will get a more equitable share of the benefits resulting from the use of its geographical location, and—last but surely not least—that the new treaty shall not be in perpetuity but rather for a fixed period.

Stage 2 involved the identification of the major issues under each of the eight principles. This in turn provided the basis for substantive discussions.

Stage 3 began last June and continues. For almost one year now we have been discussing, with the helpful cooperation and support of the Department of Defense, the substantive issues associated with the statement of principles to which we agreed in February 1974.

Economic Benefits, Land Use, and Duration

We have made significant advances in important subjects, including agreements relating to jurisdiction, canal operation, and canal defense.

Besides these three issues several other major elements of a treaty package still require resolution. They concern:

—Increased economic benefits to Panama;

—Some capability to expand the canal should we wish to do so;

—The size and location of the land/water areas we will need for control of canal operation and defense; and

—Finally, and perhaps most importantly, the extent of duration of the treaty period.

I shall comment now on only three of these questions—economic benefits, land use, and duration—and then only in a general way.

On economic benefits, Panama for many years has complained that it receives a direct

annuity of only \$2.3 million. It has complained that the low tolls charged to canal users mean in effect that Panama has been subsidizing world shipping.

Moreover, Panama believes that it can obtain additional benefits from greater Panamanian exploitation of its geographic position and the presence of the canal by developing a wide range of commercial and service activities in the canal area and by deriving tax revenues from these activities—something Panama could do once it exercised jurisdiction over the area. For example, Panama says it could develop certain unused land areas; improve the Atlantic and Pacific ports by installing larger, more efficient cranes for handling cargo and developing greater port facilities; and expand the Colón Free Zone. Already Panama has plans which call for construction of an oil pipeline which would reduce the cost of transporting petroleum across the isthmus.

The United States agreed in the eight principles that Panama would receive greater economic benefits from the operation of the canal.

As for the issue of land use—that is, the land and water areas that the United States will need to continue to operate and defend the canal—it is not easily susceptible to rapid resolution.

Panama wishes to recover sizable land and water areas, especially those adjacent to its urban centers, that are now under U.S. jurisdiction and would be the most logical areas for urban expansion. For our part we want use, through the life of the treaty, of those lands and waters that are necessary for the operation and defense of the canal. The problem will be to insure that we get sufficient areas to efficiently perform these functions while at the same time reducing the physical presence which is so objectionable to Panama.

Closely linked to the question of land use is the issue of treaty duration. Panama has publicly said that “there is no colonial situation which lasts for 100 years or a Panamanian who could endure it.” For the United States it is difficult to predict with any accuracy the duration of the canal’s utility to

us. And yet we believe that the canal will have an importance for an extended period of time.

The agreements we reach on these issues will determine the final outcome of the negotiation. For better or worse, they could shape our relationship with Panama—and indeed with all Latin America—over the next decades. Although we have no fixed timetable, we are proceeding, as I have said, with all deliberate speed.

Misconceptions To Be Overcome

There is opposition in both countries.

In Panama some stand ready to challenge any “surrender” by their government of Panamanian aspirations to immediate control of the canal.

Here at home, I recognize that there are some who hold the view that we should not relinquish any rights acquired under the 1903 treaty. I understand this point of view. But for the reasons I have mentioned I believe it is time for a new relationship. I hope that it will be understood:

—That a new relationship means good foreign policy and good defense policy;

—That a new relationship based on partnership is consistent with good business management; and

—That a new relationship signals a new era of cooperation between the United States and the rest of the hemisphere.

We need to overcome several misconceptions. I will mention four:

First, we need to overcome the belief that sovereignty is essential to our needs.

In reality we have never claimed sovereignty over the Canal Zone. Under the 1903 treaty we have extensive rights. The new treaty would grant us continued rights to operate and defend the canal, but we would relinquish some rights which we don’t need to accomplish these missions. Our essential requirement is not abstract sovereignty but the specific rights—accepted by Panama—that give the control we need.

Second, we need to overcome the idea that perpetuity is essential to defense and operation of the canal.

On the contrary, U.S. insistence on perpetual control is likely to create the kind of hostile environment which will jeopardize our ability to operate and defend the canal for an extended period of time. What is required is a relationship based on mutual respect and dignity.

Third, we must overcome the belief that the Canal Zone is part of the United States or a U.S. territory.

In the 1903 treaty Panama granted us "rights, power and authority within the zone . . . which the United States would possess . . . if it were the sovereign of the territory . . ." We were not granted "sovereignty" as such. The United States for many years has considered the Canal Zone as Panamanian territory, albeit under U.S. jurisdiction.

Fourth, and last, we must overcome the notion that a new treaty will somehow lead inevitably to the canal's closure and loss.

This concern appears based upon an erroneous view of the Panamanians as well as a lack of knowledge about our negotiating objectives. There are still people who believe that Panamanians lack the technical aptitude and the inclination to manage the operation of the canal. These people ignore the fact that Panamanians already comprise over three-quarters of the employees of the canal enterprise. While it is true that many of these employees have not held supervisory positions, no one who has been to Panama and seen its thriving economy can persuasively argue that Panamanians, given the proper training, would not be able to keep the canal operating effectively and efficiently.

Whereas Panama's participation in the canal's operation and defense would increase its stake in the canal and provide it with a greater incentive to help us keep the canal open and operating efficiently, adherence to the status quo would more likely lead to the canal's closure and loss.

I firmly believe that our most critical prob-

lem at home is not fundamental antipathy to a new relationship with Panama. It is ignorance of why the new relationship is needed to protect our interests. We need a straightforward and productive dialogue. Considerable public education is needed if a new treaty is not to be regarded as bad politics domestically.

Debate on an issue of such national import is not only inevitable but desirable. After education, dialogue, and debate I believe that we will emerge with a reasonable and mutually satisfactory treaty which will be examined and which will stand on its merits.

U.N. Disaster Relief Organization To Receive U.S. Grant

USUN press release 36 dated May 6

Ambassador John Scali, U.S. Representative to the United Nations, signed a grant agreement on May 6 for a \$750,000 U.S. contribution to the U.N. Disaster Relief Organization to strengthen that body's capacity to provide an efficient and effective worldwide service of mobilizing and coordinating disaster relief.

Secretary Kissinger, in his address to the 29th General Assembly, first called for a substantial strengthening of the world's capacity to deal with natural disaster, especially the improvement of the U.N. Disaster Relief Organization. The United States subsequently introduced a resolution to this effect, which was approved by the 29th General Assembly.

This grant—pursuant to the provisions of Resolution 3243 (XXIX)—will cover a large portion of the first year's cost of improving UNDRO's coordination, prevention, and preparedness capabilities in accordance with a program drawn up by experts and approved by the U.N. Director of the Budget.

The United States and the Future of the United Nations

Statement by John Scali
*U.S. Representative to the United Nations*¹

The Chinese word for "crisis" combines the characters for danger and opportunity. This is a good description of the current state of the United Nations, an organization in crisis, poised between imminent opportunity and eventual disaster.

Over the past two years the United Nations has in assorted forums approved a series of thoroughly one-sided economic declarations. It has taken discriminatory action against Israel in UNESCO [United Nations Educational, Scientific, and Cultural Organization], invited Yasir Arafat to speak in New York, and illegally suspended South Africa.

Yet during this same period the United Nations played an indispensable role in limiting and eventually halting dangerous wars in the Middle East and on Cyprus. It convened successful world conferences on two of the most critical issues of our time, those of food and population. In just the past few weeks, it has moved swiftly to seek to bring relief to the war victims in Indochina.

Unpalatable and arbitrary as some recent U.N. decisions are, we must face the possibility that there may be worse in store. Unless we move with care and understanding, our confrontation with the Third World will worsen. If we, as a government, stand im-

movable in a rapidly changing world, we may wind up standing alone. If, on the other hand, we choose to lead the way, we can still lead the United Nations into an era of historic achievement.

No one can predict with any certainty which of these paths the United Nations will take. I do believe, however, that the decisive turning point will be reached sooner rather than later. I also believe that the United States can have a critical, perhaps a decisive, influence over this organization's future.

It is not hard to pinpoint the present sources of tension at the United Nations. There are three—the Arab-Israeli dispute, the battle for racial justice in southern Africa, and the growing gap in living standards between developed and developing nations. These three issues dominate all U.N. deliberations for a good reason: these are the problems that most of the world's people feel most keenly. For most member nations a United Nations which cannot promote progress on these issues is not worth having.

On December 6, I spoke to the General Assembly about the unfair, unrealistic, one-sided, and even illegal actions which the Third World majority was forcing on the United Nations in pursuing these goals. I warned of the damage these decisions were doing to the United Nations and to the real interests of all its members.

These remarks set off one of the most comprehensive and, in my opinion, most constructive debates in the Assembly's recent history. Representative after representative frankly laid out his country's policies, fears,

¹ Made on May 22 before the Senate Committee on Foreign Relations hearings on the role of the United States in the United Nations (text from USUN press release 44 dated May 21). The complete transcript of the hearings will be published by the committee and will be available from the Superintendent of Documents, U.S. Government Printing Office, Washington, D.C. 20402.

and hopes about the fundamental problems now faced by us all. This debate was helpful, but it did not resolve our differences. It did, however, create a more hopeful atmosphere and gave us a better idea of the deep-seated emotions that exist on both sides.

We and the nations of the Third World are divided on issues of major importance. We differ on how to achieve peace in the Middle East, how to bring social justice to southern Africa, and how to insure a more equitable sharing of the world's wealth. We are not divided on goals, however, and we are not fundamentally divided on the role which the United Nations can play.

There is no single sure-fire formula which can reform the United Nations and reverse the trend toward confrontation there. The tone in which we conduct our dialogue can soothe or it can inflame our current differences. Our language, our posture, can enhance or set back the prospects of compromise. But only sincere negotiation on the problems of critical importance to the Third World can halt the continued deterioration in our relations with these nations.

If, because of choice or neglect, the world community fails to make the United Nations work, the alternative is not cooperation elsewhere in some other more promising forum but inevitably a fundamental breakdown of the main path to international cooperation. The dream of an open and cooperative world order to which mankind committed itself 30 years ago will wither and die. In its place, there certainly will arise a world divided into exclusive, selfish, and rival camps, where each nation's gain is another's loss.

I see a different future, however. I see a United Nations capable at last of fulfilling the mandate of its founders. I see a United Nations serving as the international community's principal forum for peacemaking and peacekeeping. I see the United Nations being used by its members as the court of first resort to settle differences, rather than as the court of last resort for their conflicts. I see a world in which 150 nations live at harmony and in peace—their security preserved collectively and their prosperity pursued cooperatively. I see a world in which

nations frankly recognize that there may be deep differences on fundamental issues but continue to work at narrowing these differences and at the same time move ahead in areas where they are able to agree. And there are such areas where patient diplomacy can make the difference.

This is no dream. It is a realistic alternative. It requires only that we and other nations begin to use the United Nations to its capacity to help it fulfill its potential. In the Middle East and in Cyprus, the United Nations is showing that it can keep the peace. In crisis after crisis, the United Nations is demonstrating that when called upon in time it can respond effectively to the task at hand. At conference after conference, the United Nations is proving that 100 and more countries can be brought to meaningful agreement even on the most complex and controversial issues when they have the will to do so.

The United Nations need not be the sole institution for negotiating and managing the complex problems of interdependence. But it should have a central role in that process as the single universal organization that expresses in broadest terms the collective hopes and needs of all who inhabit this planet.

The fate of the United Nations rests with all of its members, but it rests most heavily with those in a position to help resolve the issues confronting it. The United States cannot singlehandedly bring peace to the Middle East, majority rule to southern Africa, or economic justice to the world. We can, however, continue to support these goals, and we can seek to lead—not as the sole headquarters of justice and wisdom, but as one who recognizes that new and exciting doors can be opened by many countries in an increasingly interdependent world.

The record of our country as a champion of freedom, social justice, and economic opportunity is one in which every American can take pride. No nation, however, can expect to be judged on its past. To the peoples of the Third World we can show that we are still the same nation which issued the Declaration of Independence, promulgated the Emancipation Proclamation, advanced

the principle of self-determination of peoples, created the concept of international development, and pressured its closest allies to free their vast colonial empires.

In southern Africa we can do more than decry racism—we can disassociate ourselves from it entirely. In the Middle East we can commit ourselves unequivocally to the pursuit of a just settlement which recognizes the rights and national aspirations of all the people of that area. In our relations with the developing nations we can move once more

into the forefront of those seeking to close the gap between rich and poor.

If the United States follows this course steadfastly, I believe we can realistically require that others meet their responsibilities to move with us on the course of cooperation.

If we listen as well as lead, I am convinced that the current trend toward confrontation will be reversed and that this will open a new era of achievement at the United Nations.

Preparations for the Seventh Special Session of the United Nations General Assembly

*Following are statements made on May 21 before the Subcommittee on International Organizations of the House Committee on International Relations by Roy D. Morey, Deputy Assistant Secretary for International Organization Affairs; Paul H. Boeker, Deputy Assistant Secretary for Economic and Business Affairs; and Clarence Clyde Ferguson, Jr., U.S. Representative on the U.N. Economic and Social Council.*¹

DEPUTY ASSISTANT SECRETARY MOREY

This afternoon I would like to describe the nature of the General Assembly's seventh special session and the U.S. approach to it. Deputy Assistant Secretary Boeker will speak in greater detail on the economic issues which are expected to form the bulk of the substantive agenda for the session. Ambassador Ferguson will describe the situation in New York during this preparatory phase.

¹ The complete transcript of the hearings will be published by the committee and will be available from the Superintendent of Documents, U.S. Government Printing Office, Washington, D.C. 20402.

Considering the prominence which the Assembly's sixth special session has acquired, I believe it would be useful to our discussion first of all to describe the background to the upcoming seventh special session, the impact of the sixth special session and other recent U.N. meetings on preparations for it, and the differences—which we hope will be significant—between the two.

The sixth special session, which met from April 9 to May 2 last year, was totally unexpected. It was convened at the request of President Boumediene of Algeria, largely as a reaction to the Washington Energy Conference and a French proposal to hold a world energy conference under U.N. auspices. The move served to divert attention from the oil price issue and to rally the developing countries around the theme of their allegedly disadvantageous trade position as commodity exporters. After only a few weeks of hurried preparation, the Assembly met and, under Algerian leadership, pushed through a call for the establishment of a "new international economic order." The declaration and the lengthy program of action which the developing countries pushed to adoption did not gain the concurrence of

the major developed countries on the principal substantive elements and, in general, represented only LDC [less developed country] views on trade, development assistance, monetary reform, and other economic issues.

The seventh special session has quite different antecedents. The economic problems of the developing world have been an issue of growing importance in the United Nations since the early 1960's. By the fall of 1973, the LDC's were pressing the case for their economic interests with great vigor in the General Assembly. Resolutions were adopted, with the support of both developed and developing countries, on the first review of implementation of the International Development Strategy, on international monetary reform, on the soon-to-be-opened trade negotiations and other economic matters. The compromise texts did not alleviate the intense dissatisfaction of the developing countries with what they felt to be the inadequate concern for their needs on the part of the developed countries.

This dissatisfaction resulted in the introduction of a resolution calling for what would have been the first special session of the General Assembly devoted to economic issues. As originally conceived, the General Assembly at its special session in 1975 was to consider the broad range of international economic issues, those of concern to the developing countries in particular, as well as the related reform of the structure of the United Nations itself. The United States, while concerned over the growing propensity of the LDC's to use the General Assembly as a forum to seek policy concessions from the industrialized world, did not object to their call for a special meeting to consider their problems.

Thus, while the sixth special session represented the immediate reaction to a critical world economic situation, the seventh special session is really the expression of longstanding concerns of the developing world which have had growing importance to the United Nations as a whole. At the same time, the adoption last fall of resolutions on the new international economic order and the Char-

ter of Economic Rights and Duties of States and the adoption of an equally unacceptable UNIDO [U.N. Industrial Development Organization] Declaration and Plan of Action of Lima in March of this year, reflect a new militancy on the part of the developing countries. The LDC's have demonstrated over the past year and a half a tight tactical unity, a determination not to compromise on issues of principle, and a conviction that they have the upper hand as a result of the success of OPEC [Organization of Petroleum Exporting Countries].

We have, fortunately, a considerably longer preparatory period for the seventh special session than for the sixth. The time is being used well, and the arrangements for the work of the session—both as to formal structure and substantive content—will be more careful and more thoughtful. The United Nations began working on its preparations in February. The United States began to consider the issues and problems as soon as the 1974 General Assembly session drew to a close in December.

Allow me to turn now to our preparations for the seventh special session and the opportunities and challenges presented to the United States.

Following our preliminary evaluation of the prospects for the session, a preparatory group was established in the State Department in February 1975. This group was launched under the chairmanship of Assistant Secretary [William B.] Buffum of the Bureau of International Organization Affairs. Under Secretary Sisco [Joseph J. Sisco, Under Secretary for Political Affairs] began to chair the group last month. In addition, our preparations have engaged the attention of Under Secretary Robinson [Charles W. Robinson, Under Secretary for Economic Affairs] and Secretary Kissinger.

The preparatory group has served to further identify the issues with which we will deal, to clarify the options available for our overall approach to the session, and to determine the various bilateral and multilateral channels we have available for us to achieve our goals.

With regard to this last point, we have been holding extensive bilateral consultations with developed country representatives for the past three months. Our contacts with the developing countries have centered in New York; Ambassador Ferguson will describe the situation there in greater detail. Last week we instructed our Embassies in about 25 major developing countries to initiate discussions on the seventh special session with their host governments.

We intend to establish close bilateral contacts with both developed and developing countries during the entire preparatory period.

With regard to the issues, we have instructed our Mission in New York and our Embassies in the field to inform the developing countries that we believe the special session can most usefully consider five general topics:

1. International commodity trade;
2. International food needs;
3. Transfer of financial resources;
4. Problems of the poorer developing countries; and
5. Structural changes in the U.N. system.

The problems of commodity trade are a principal concern of the developing countries. As Secretary Kissinger indicated in his speech in Kansas City [on May 13], we are prepared to discuss this problem with them in a responsible manner. We believe that further international action is needed in the area of food, building on the accomplishments of the World Food Conference. The potential sources of financial resources to finance the development efforts of the LDC's must be examined as a critical element of the world economic order. And we feel the international community must turn its attention to meeting the needs of the poorest developing countries in particular, for they are least able to help themselves.

Deputy Assistant Secretary Boeker will discuss these issues in greater detail. I would like to describe at this point our views on the fifth problem area, U.N. structural change.

The effectiveness of U.N.-system economic structures has drawn increasing criticism from both developed and developing countries. As I indicated previously, the dissatisfaction of the developing countries with the responsiveness of the U.N. system to their problems was a major reason for calling the seventh special session.

I do not need to remind this committee of the criticisms that the United States and other developed countries have expressed regarding inefficiencies in the U.N. system. Although the United States and the developed countries on the one hand and the developing countries on the other still find important benefits from their participation in the U.N. system, they are all convinced that major improvements in the structure and operations of the U.N. system can and must be made.

Our specific proposals to deal with the issue of U.N.-system structural change remain to be developed in detail, awaiting further consultations with other countries and more review within the government. However, I can indicate the basic objectives that will be guiding our efforts:

1. We believe that there should be a rationalization and streamlining of the presently fragmented and too-often duplicative development assistance mechanisms in the U.N. system.

2. We are anxious to have U.N. development assistance programs more heavily oriented toward helping those countries that are most in need—those that are least able to finance their own development or to attract and obtain other resources, both public and private, for their economic development.

3. We would like to see the specialized agencies of the U.N. system freed of their heavy responsibilities for executing development assistance projects and rededicated toward their original mandates which called for promoting international cooperation through activities such as information exchange, harmonization of national policies, the promotion of research, and the setting of standards.

4. We think that opportunities exist to streamline U.N.-system secretariat operations through the consolidation of matters such as personnel recruitment and management, payrolling, accounting, procurement, and buildings management activities.

5. Finally, we need to establish within the U.N. system an independent program-evaluation mechanism, a longstanding U.S. proposal. This sort of mechanism reporting directly to member governments on the effectiveness of U.N.-system operations should help to keep the U.N. system self-correcting and should suggest other structural changes as they become necessary.

What do we expect from the seventh special session? On the one hand, we do not believe that the General Assembly can be the scene of detailed negotiations on specific economic issues. Therefore, we will continue to resist the efforts of the developing countries to "legislate" issues of economic importance on the basis of their numerical majority in a one-country-one-vote situation.

However, the General Assembly has two characteristics which distinguish it from other international economic institutions. First, it is the only body that can look at all economic issues in their broadest context. Second, it is particularly a forum for the consideration of the problems of the have-not and weaker members of the world community. Thus we believe that the special session can provide an opportunity for the entire membership to identify problems, to discuss their priorities and interrelationships to reveal where consensus exists and to stimulate it where it does not, and to point the way for implementation of agreed conclusions or to further negotiations in areas of disagreement.

The session in particular presents the challenge of reestablishing a more productive discourse with the developing countries. We will make every effort to keep the debate away from the level of ideology and empty exhortation; we will try to chart channels of common effort aimed at practicable and effective solutions. This will not be easy.

But we are going to try to create mutual

understanding and to strengthen a common commitment to international cooperation, not confrontation, in meeting the urgent economic needs of both the developed and developing nations of the world.

DEPUTY ASSISTANT SECRETARY BOEKER

In the course of our participation at the seventh special session of the U.N. General Assembly in September, the United States intends to exercise its traditional role of leadership in addressing the array of economic problems besetting developing nations of the world. At the present time—with the cumulative effects of the energy crisis, widespread recession, and changing relationships between rich and poor nations—the environment for international cooperation is under severe strain. This is particularly noted in multilateral forums such as the United Nations, where the developing nations have banded together to achieve a dominant position in the deliberations on economic issues.

In essence, the developing nations are demanding the right to exercise greater influence in world affairs. In the economic field they are endeavoring to secure:

—Special access to markets for their export goods.

—Integrated regulation of commodity markets.

—"Indexation" of prices so that prices of raw materials are linked with those of manufactured goods.

—Increased transfer of real financial resources to developing nations, preferably through automatic mechanisms.

—Monetary reform, specifically including a greater voice by developing countries in the affairs of international financial institutions.

—Greater access to and control of technology as well as more rapid industrialization.

Although the U.N. General Assembly cannot be the forum for detailed negotiation of economic issues, the upcoming session does provide an important opportunity for the international community to discuss key prob-

approach, and to lay a basis for follow-on work in appropriate international bodies.

There are indications that many of the developing nations are willing to use this special session for consideration of a limited list of economic problems, as opposed to earlier instances when the primary objective seemed to be to cite a wide array of demands in an extreme posture. Recently, the so-called "Group of 77" nations—the U.N. caucus of developing countries—circulated a modified list of questions to be discussed: international trade, transfer of real resources for financing the growth of developing nations, monetary reform, science and technology, industrialization, and restructuring of the economic and social sectors of the U.N. system.

For our part, we are suggesting an agenda which would include: international food needs, problems of poorer developing countries, transfer of financial resources including private investment and financial arrangements to mitigate the plight of nations most affected by the current economic crisis, plus international commodity trade.

Meeting World Food Needs

In the area of food needs, the United States last November initiated a major international effort to eliminate the cycles of famine which periodically plague the developing nations. At the World Food Conference in Rome we reached agreement with other nations to expand food production in traditional food-exporting countries, promote greatly expanded production in developing countries, and develop a system of food reserves to be used for emergencies. We will affirm those goals at the special session.

In the shortrun period, however, many nations will continue to rely on food aid from the United States and other donor nations. We perceive this as the responsibility of all well-to-do nations, including major oil-exporting nations whose income has increased dramatically in the past two years.

In his May 13 speech in Kansas City, Secretary Kissinger called attention to the

fact that the United States has provided more than 4 million tons of food aid in all but one of the past 20 years, and he reaffirmed that we will do our utmost to maintain this high standard. This year's bilateral food aid program is nearly \$1.5 billion.

Some of the best prospects for increased food output are in developing nations. Increased production by these nations decreases their reliance on food aid and can lead to increased exports. The Administration is endeavoring to concentrate U.S. aid capital in this sector in LDC's with the best potential.

The World Bank [International Bank for Reconstruction and Development (IBRD)], with U.S. support, also is taking steps to double its lending to agricultural development. Increasingly, American assistance both in bilateral as well as multilateral forums will place emphasis on research, fertilizer supply, and improved transport, pest control, and storage of food grains.

For the past three years there has been a shortage of some grains in international trade despite the all-out efforts of U.S. farmers. This year the outlook for such crops is promising. To take advantage of this situation the United States is proposing a comprehensive international system of grain reserves. Secretary Kissinger recently advocated that a reserve system be created based on the following principles: agreed rules to engender stockpiling of grain in time of good harvests; fair allocation of the cost of such reserves by both grain importers as well as exporters; determination by each participant of how its reserve portion will be maintained; agreed guidelines for the use of the reserves so that the grain is available when needed but does not unnecessarily depress market prices; special provision to meet the needs of poorest developing nations; and lastly, a more liberalized trade in grains.

The Poorer Developing Countries

For more than a decade, the least developed nations have been lobbying for increased foreign assistance. At the first UNCTAD [U.N. Conference on Trade and

Development] conference in 1964, the LDC's secured adoption of the principle that they should receive "special attention." By 1968, at UNCTAD II in New Delhi, a resolution was passed calling for "special measures" for the as-yet-unidentified least developed countries.

By 1971, the United Nations formulated a list of 25 "least" developed nations (LLDC's). In 1974, the United Nations published a list of nations most severely affected by the current economic crisis (MSA's). Predictably, many countries have wished to be included in such lists in the expectation that tangible benefits would be forthcoming.

We recognize the special developmental problems of poorer nations and support the view that special measures are needed. This has been reflected in the modification of AID [Agency for International Development] allocations and procedures which are designed to serve the unique and differing needs of the poorer of the poor wherever they live.

Although we continue to be flexible and forthcoming with regard to emergency needs of LDC's, we still need to emphasize that external assistance to LDC's must be coupled with self-help policies in recipient nations which are aimed at increasing production, not just redistributing it.

Financial Resources and Commodity Issues

Many developing countries, particularly those characterized as the most severely affected by the current economic crisis are facing urgent balance-of-payments problems arising out of increased oil prices, higher food-import requirements, and the recession in industrial countries. These countries require an infusion of balance-of-payments assistance on highly concessional terms if they are to maintain even minimum acceptable rates of growth without incurring non-sustainable debt burdens. An international framework is needed within which this additional assistance can be provided. The U.S. Government has proposed that the framework best suited for this need would be a

trust fund under the International Monetary Fund (IMF).

The fund we propose would be legally separated from, but administered by, the IMF. It would obtain its funds in part by direct contributions from countries in a position to contribute—particularly the major oil-exporting countries—and in part from the use of a portion of IMF holdings of gold, which are currently valued at about one-fourth the market price. The fund as conceived would provide balance-of-payments loans to needy low-income countries at highly concessional terms, with a maturity of perhaps 10 years and a substantial grace period. The United States has suggested that the organization start with a lending capacity of \$1.5-\$2 billion per year.

We are pursuing vigorously our efforts to establish this loan facility—in consultations with other OECD [Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development] nations. The subject also is being discussed in the IMF-IBRD Development Committee. The developing nations are well represented in these negotiations, holding nine of the 20 seats on the committee. After the next Development Committee meeting on June 12-13, we should have a clearer idea of the prospects for this proposal. We may at that time wish to discuss it further in the course of the U.N. special session.

In the light of global attention currently focused on commodity problems, commodity trade will be a major issue at the seventh special session. We are aware of the dependence of countries on internationally traded commodities and recognize their interests in seeking steady supplies of internationally traded commodities.

A number of measures have been proposed in various forums to address commodity problems, including price-fixing arrangements, centrally managed stocks, indexation, endorsement of activities by producer associations, compensatory financing schemes, and integrated approaches using a combination of these mechanisms.

The United States recognizes that excessive shifts in commodity prices can entail unjustifiably heavy costs and uncertainties.

During periods of slack demand, the maintenance of excess capacity is costly in terms of investment and employment. When the demand cycle soars, rapid price hikes can be equally disruptive to orderly market operations. To deal with these issues, Secretary Kissinger has presented the main elements of a U.S. approach:

—The multilateral trade negotiations (MTN) now underway in Geneva should develop new rules and procedures on issues such as freer access of nations to supplies and markets, promoting of mining and processing industries vital to commodity trade, and settlement of international disputes in this field.

—The United States is prepared to discuss new arrangements for marketing of commodities on a case-by-case basis. Presently, for example, we are discussing marketing arrangements for tin, coffee, and rubber; discussions on other commodities may be initiated later.

—Finally, we will propose that the World Bank investigate ways to finance investment in raw material production in developing countries; the United States is especially interested in mobilizing new capital for commodities and combining it with existing management and technology skills.

Both producers and consumers have much to gain in settling differences and cooperating to assure adequate supplies and remunerative prices for commodities traded. The United States is prepared to respond to legitimate concerns of developing countries in this regard.

Overall, the U.S. objectives at the seventh special session are to engage in a cooperative, positive dialogue with the developing nations and to be responsive to legitimate economic objectives, consistent with our own economic and political interests. We enter into the preparatory phase of these meetings with the best of good will.

We will not shy away from a general discussion of the broad principles of development cooperation. We also wish, however, to have the discussions at this special session contribute to a record of specific accomplish-

ments in North-South issues. The United States, for example, already has initiated a major proposal to alleviate world hunger. The United States continues to support the establishment of a major capital fund through the IMF which would service the immediate balance-of-payments needs of poorer nations. We are now engaged in bilateral discussions designed to assure both adequate supplies and fair prices for particular commodities. At this U.N. special session we would hope to lay the basis for further action on such specific initiatives.

AMBASSADOR FERGUSON

I am pleased to have this opportunity of appearing before your committee, which is considering the matter of the upcoming seventh special session of the General Assembly. I should like to focus my testimony on the state of preparations for the seventh special session in New York.

Understanding the preparatory phase, the aims and objectives of the various groups, and the likely outcome of processes now in train requires some understanding of the groups which have emerged and evolved in the United Nations, particularly on economic issues.

We have heard much of such broad-scaled descriptions as the Third World, the non-aligned, the least developed, the developing, the developed, and the Group of 77.

The so-called Third World is not a monolithic entity, despite the impression created by the admittedly monolithic voting techniques applied recently in the General Assembly. The present Third World groupings in the United Nations evolved from two separate sources.

As you recall, the nonaligned movement was formed over a decade ago, principally under the leadership of Prime Minister Nehru of India and President Tito of Yugoslavia. It was conceived principally as a political alignment of developing non-Western countries to stake out an independent position between the Western countries and the Socialist countries. The emphasis—to repeat—was on political alignment or, as the title

implies, political nonalignment as between the two super blocs of the world.

On the other hand, the Group of 77—now numbering well over 90—originated as a grouping of developing countries designed to deal almost exclusively with economic problems. As a result of the sixth special session, and in particular certain attributes of the leadership of Algeria in that session, there has been a very substantial, but yet still not complete, merger of the Group of 77 and the nonaligned on economic issues.

In preparation for the seventh special session, General Assembly Resolution 3343 (XXIX) of December 17, 1974, called for (1) the preparatory committee for the special session to hold an organizational session in March and its major substantive session in June; (2) the Secretary General to submit to the second session of the preparatory committee a report on the state of international economic activities focusing on constraints of a general policy nature affecting the interests of developing countries in the overall pattern of international economic relations; and (3) the establishment of a group of high-level experts to submit to the second session of the preparatory committee a study containing proposals on structural changes in the U.N. system to make it more capable of dealing with the problems of international economic cooperation. A final report from the preparatory committee will be considered by the summer session of the Economic and Social Council this July in Geneva.

The first organizational session of the preparatory committee (March 3-7, 1975) agreed on plans for its second substantive session and urged further dialogue through informal consultations under the guidance of the preparatory committee bureau. During the session, developed country spokesmen stressed the need for cooperation on specific issues rather than confrontation over general declarations. Although Mexico and Algeria sounded the traditional themes concerning a new international economic order and the Charter of Economic Rights and Duties of States, the Group of 77 was relatively muted.

In the informal meetings of the preparatory committee to date (March 25, April 2, May 2, and May 9, 1975), although primarily focused on organizational matters, two substantive suggestions have surfaced.

First, on April 2, the United Kingdom informally circulated its procedural proposal for a three-tier approach to the session: (1) a general statement of principle; (2) specifications of areas of possible agreement and constructive action; and (3) identification of areas where agreement does not appear to be possible at this time and hence further work needs to be carried out.

Second, on May 2, the Group of 77 circulated a provisional list of specific areas for consideration at the special session grouped into five general categories: (1) international trade; (2) transfer of real resources and monetary reform; (3) science and technology; (4) industrialization; and (5) structural reform.

We welcome this "provisional list" as a significant effort by the Group of 77 to move away from an all-encompassing consideration of the broad spectrum of international economic relations and to focus on a limited number of problem areas. However, we believe that the list still covers too many areas and in its language it prejudges answers to problems rather than just stating the problems themselves.

Parenthetically, we are impressed that though these informal consultations are essentially exploratory, the mood has been conciliatory with an emphasis on finding areas and procedures for constructive action.

The Experts Group on United Nations Structure, appointed in accordance with General Assembly Resolution 3343 by the Secretary General is a group of 25 experts serving in their personal capacities. The experts come from countries in all of the major geographic regions. The U.S. expert and rapporteur for the group is Richard Gardner, professor of law and international relations at Columbia University and former Deputy Assistant Secretary for International Organization Affairs, Department of State.

The U.S. governmental preparations are

moving apace. Both the Department of State and the U.S. Mission to the United Nations have, over the last half year, been engaged in continuing consultations with key representatives of both developed and developing countries.

In our consultations we have stressed, first, the importance we attach to the seventh special session and the need to avoid confrontation; second, our willingness to be responsive to the legitimate needs of developing countries in "meaningful and realistic" ways; third, the seriousness of efforts being taken within the U.S. Government to review both substantive and structural questions; and finally, our belief that the outcome of the session will have an important bearing on American attitudes toward the United Nations.

The Mission and the Department have established special working groups to review U.S. policy on the issues most likely to be raised at the seventh special session. These reviews are not as yet complete. The effort, however, is to find effective ways to meet the growing concerns of both the developed and the developing world and, if possible, to field initiatives on substantive and structural issues.

Although not strictly defined in terms of preparing for the seventh special session, it is nonetheless clear that the Group of 77 countries are and have been preparing for the session in a series of meetings, the more important of these being: the conference of developing countries on raw materials in Dakar, February 3-8, 1975; the Group of 77 second ministerial meeting in Algeria, February 15-18, 1975; the OPEC heads of state conference in Algeria, March 3-6, 1975; and the third ministerial meeting of the coordinating bureau of nonaligned countries in Havana, March 17-19, 1975. This series of meetings will culminate in the meeting of Foreign Ministers of the nonaligned countries scheduled to be held in Peru in late August, just prior to the opening of the seventh special session. There is little in the formal final reports of these meetings to suggest any major weakening in the strong positions taken by

the Group of 77 at the sixth special session or the 29th General Assembly.

In addition, the Group of 77 countries have been pushing strongly their viewpoints in meetings of U.N. subsidiary bodies over the past half year, most notable being the U.N. Industrial Development Organization meeting held in Peru, March 12-26, 1975, and the preparatory conference for the French-proposed energy conference in Paris, April 7-15, 1975. However, our private bilateral consultations and the informal sessions of the preparatory committee have indicated that many of the developing countries are seriously interested in having positive pragmatic results come from the seventh special session.

Finally, Mr. Chairman, I am aware that self-quotation, if not a major vice, is at least one that must be forgiven. I beg your permission therefore to repeat a few words of my own delivered in New Delhi on February 28, 1975:

"Even at this stage in our deliberations it has been more than amply confirmed that the international community in all of its aspects is in the midst of a year of crisis. It is not an overstatement to assert that never before has the entire world been faced with such ominous choices. Failure to resolve the problems occasioned by current economic dislocations could result in the death of more people than in World War II. Failure to resolve our crisis could witness shifts in the global monetary system far exceeding any such in history. Failure to resolve the crisis could result in social and political collapse unprecedented in history as we know it. Consequently, the enormity of the responsibility on the international community and on the United Nations literally must bring forth our best, most compassionate, and most profound efforts.

"My government is prepared to examine, discuss, and compromise those issues which for various reasons divide us now.

"We look not to the past but to the future. We seek not to adjudge guilt but to fashion justice. Our hope for a better world may well lie in what we do in the course of the brief span from now until September."

Report on Development Coordination Transmitted to the Congress

Message From President Ford¹

To the Congress of the United States:

I hereby transmit to the Congress the First Annual Report on Development Coordination, in accordance with Section 640B(d) of the Foreign Assistance Act of 1961, as amended.

This is an appropriate time for the first report on the policies and actions of the United States affecting the development of the low-income countries. Over the past decade, the economies of the developing countries have grown at an encouraging rate. This was partially because of American assistance. Consequently, many nations no longer need assistance on the concessional terms we once extended.

Unfortunately, there remain a number of very poor nations suffering from malnutrition and disease, poor educational opportunities, and very low incomes. Our policies must continue to reflect our belief that American well-being is intimately related to a secure and prosperous international environment and humanitarian and economic concerns that have for so long motivated our assistance programs. The increase in petroleum prices and the food crop shortfalls of the past several years—as well as world recession and inflation—have hit the poorest countries with particular severity.

In 1974, the United States worked with other industrialized nations and with various international agencies to adjust our assistance and trade policies toward the less-developed countries to meet the new situation and to ensure a coordinated and constructive response from the international community.

¹ Transmitted on May 22 (text from White House press release). The report, prepared under the supervision of the Development Coordination Committee, is entitled "Development Issues, First Annual Report of the President on U.S. Actions Affecting the Development of Low-Income Countries."

We have:

—adapted our bilateral development aid program to give more assistance to the poor majority in the developing countries.

—supported multilateral institutions as a means for worldwide cooperation to promote economic and social development.

—responded to the world food problem by increasing food aid to the needy countries by increasing our assistance to help them grow more of their own food and by working with other nations to get a fully multinational response to food issues in accordance with the recent World Food Conference.

—signed into law a new Trade Act which will help enable poor countries to increase their trade with us, both by preferential treatment for their exports and by general lessening of barriers to world trade.

Much remains to be done. We must:

—work with other high income countries to help meet the continuing needs of the poorest countries in the present world economic situation.

—continue our efforts to meet the long-run problems of food scarcities through a coordinated program of increased food production in the poor countries, improved nutrition, increased food stocks and food aid, and research and development to boost food output everywhere.

—continue to provide opportunities for the developing countries to expand their trade with the United States and other industrialized nations.

—build on the results of the World Population Conference, fostering the maximum international cooperation in dealing with world population problems.

—find new techniques for working with those rapidly advancing countries that no longer require our concessional assistance, but are anxious to benefit from American skills and resources in their development programs.

The Development Coordination Committee was created to assist in ensuring that our

policies and actions with respect to the developing countries are coordinated to reflect our interest in their welfare and improved quality of life, and to advise me on how our actions are affecting these poor countries and our own economy.

In recent years, there has been disillusionment with our ability to help others in this world. Our efforts have slackened. We have looked too much at our failures and not enough at our successes. While our economic problems at home are serious, we remain one of the most productive countries in the world. We have much to contribute and we have much to gain from economic cooperation with developing countries and from their economic progress. Our own prosperity will be enhanced if we remain true to our long tradition of assisting those in need.

If we help them to help themselves, we can work towards a stronger and more just international economy for the future, lessen human suffering, and increase our own security in a rapidly changing world.

GERALD R. FORD.

THE WHITE HOUSE, May 22, 1975.

Final Report on NATO Offset Transmitted to the Congress

*Message From President Ford*¹

To the Congress of the United States:

In accordance with Section 812(d) of the Department of Defense Appropriation Authorization Act, 1974 (Public Law 93-155), I am pleased to submit to the Congress the sixth and final report on our progress toward offsetting the fiscal year 1974 balance of payments deficit resulting from the deployment of U.S. forces in NATO Europe.

Section 812 (the Jackson-Nunn Amendment) states that if our European NATO Allies fail to offset this deficit, then U.S. troops in Europe must be reduced by the percentage of offset not provided. I am pleased to report that our Allies have fully offset the U.S. fiscal year 1974 deficit and that the troop reduction provision will not have to be implemented.

The U.S. NATO-related balance of payments expenditures during fiscal year 1974 totaled \$1.997 billion. We sought to cover these expenditures in two ways. First, we negotiated with the Federal Republic of Germany (FRG) an Offset Agreement which had a total value of \$2.218 billion over the 1974-75 time period. The fiscal year 1974 portion of the agreement has come to \$1.150 billion. Secondly, our other NATO Allies have placed substantial military procurement in the U.S. They have been able to identify \$1.016 billion in such procurement, of which \$917 million can at this time be applied against FY 1974 expenditures. The NATO Allies and the NATO Economic Directorate deserve our special recognition for their cooperation in establishing a liaison mechanism for identifying these purchases. Appendix A provides an accounting of our compliance with the provisions of the Amendment.

The Jackson-Nunn Amendment also called upon our Allies to assist the U.S. in meeting some of the added budgetary costs that result from maintaining our forces in Europe rather than in the continental United States. The major form of this budgetary support is contained in the two-year U.S.-FRG Offset Agreement. The agreement includes approximately \$224 million to rehabilitate badly deteriorated barracks and other troop facilities used by American military personnel in the FRG. The FRG also agrees to absorb about \$8 million of real estate taxes and landing fees directly related to U.S. forces in Germany. Finally, very considerable budgetary relief is implicit in the FRG agreement to purchase DM 2,250 million in special U.S. Treasury securities at a con-

¹Transmitted on May 27 (text from White House press release); also printed as H Doc. 94-166, which includes the text of the annex.

cessional interest rate of 2.5 percent. The interest rate which Germany could have obtained through investment of these funds in marketable U.S. Treasury securities would, of course, have been much higher. The purchase of securities made by the FRG pursuant to the agreement were made at times when the market was paying just under eight percent interest. As a consequence, the FRG will have foregone approximately \$343 million in interest over the life of these securities. Essentially this represents a budgetary gain to the U.S.

A final provision of the Amendment requires that we seek to reduce the amount paid by the U.S. to support NATO's Infrastructure Program. NATO recently agreed to a new five-year program (CY 1975-79) totaling \$1.35 billion. The Allies have agreed to reduce the U.S. percentage from the current official level of 29.67 percent to 27.23 percent. The new program also includes a special category of projects totaling \$98 million which benefit only American forces and which would normally have been funded in the U.S. budget. When this special category is considered, the effective U.S. share is approximately 21 percent. Likewise, the U.S. share of funding for the Common European Pipeline deficit has been reduced from 36 percent to 25 percent.

The Amendment specifies that 22½ months (July 1, 1973-May 16, 1975) of Allied balance of payments transactions can be applied against the FY 1974 deficit. The balance of payments data we have used have been based on only the first 12 months of this period. We do not yet have complete data on Allied procurement expenditures during the last 10½ months of the statutory period. However, assuming that Allied expenditures in Foreign Military Sales (FMS) and commercial accounts remain at about the same levels as in FY 1974, there would be available an additional \$1.3 billion to offset our FY 1974 expenditures.

It should be noted that the Allied financial transactions reported here do not repre-

sent the total financial burden incurred by the Allies in support of U.S. forces in Europe. Our Allies absorb many of our troop-related operation and maintenance costs for facilities, building and repairing roads, and other payments which have a total value of several hundred million dollars a year.

A good economic argument can be made that some of our balance of payments expenditures would have occurred whether or not our troops were in Europe, and hence should not have been charged against the NATO balance of payments account. For example, the Department of Defense purchased approximately \$137 million of petroleum, oil, and lubricants (POL) in Europe during FY 1974, mostly for our Sixth Fleet operations. The great majority of these products were purchased from the Middle East. However, if the fleet had been brought home, its shift to U.S. POL resources would have forced other U.S. consumers to purchase their POL requirements from abroad. Thus, the impact on our balance of payments expenditures would have remained unchanged.

We should also recognize that, even if our troops were returned to the continental U.S., there would still be personnel-related expenditures for European goods and services. These personnel would continue to purchase some European goods. Also, we should not overlook the fact that some of our military-related balance of payments expenditures in Europe generate Allied or third nation purchases in the U.S.—both military and commercial.

Finally, we must consider that more than \$300 million of the U.S. defense expenditures in Europe merely reflect the effect of dollar depreciation. This depreciation was a contributing factor to the substantial improvement in the U.S. trade balance, but it has made relatively more expensive the goods and services purchased by our military forces in Europe.

GERALD R. FORD.

THE WHITE HOUSE, *May 27, 1975.*

U.S. Discusses Human Rights Items in OAS General Assembly

The General Assembly of the Organization of American States (OAS) met at Washington May 8-19. Following are texts of a statement by William D. Rogers, Assistant Secretary for Inter-American Affairs, who was Vice Chairman of the U.S. delegation, made in an informal session of heads of delegations on May 16; a statement by Francis J. McNeil, Alternate U.S. Representative to the OAS, made in Committee I (Juridical-Political Matters) on May 17; and two resolutions adopted by the Assembly on May 19.

ASSISTANT SECRETARY ROGERS, MAY 16

I wish to take this opportunity, Mr. Chairman, to make a few comments on the agenda item concerning the Inter-American Human Rights Commission report on Chile.

In article 3 of the Charter of the OAS, the member states affirm, and I quote:

The American States proclaim the fundamental rights of the individual without distinction as to race, nationality, creed, or sex.

The United States heartily endorses and reaffirms, for its part, these words from our charter. We deplore human rights violations wherever they occur.

In 1959 the member states established the Inter-American Human Rights Commission (IAHRC). The Council of the OAS prepared and approved its statute in 1960. The Second Special Inter-American Conference in 1965 increased its functions and powers.

The Commission, in carrying out its duties, has issued a number of significant reports over the years, including the report on the human rights situation in Chile.

The Chilean Government is to be com-

mended for having permitted the Commission to come to Chile. It has taken issue with certain aspects of the Commission's report. The report and the observations of the Government of Chile have merited the careful attention of us all.

The primary issue here, now, is not whether there may have been some defects or inadequacies in the IAHRC report. It is now somewhat dated. The more important issue is the future—the deep concern which we all have for the promotion of respect for human rights and the elimination of human rights violations wherever they occur, and our ability to build and strengthen an international system to consider matters so vital to the common human values of this hemisphere. In this connection the suggestions and recommendations of the Commission for the future deserve the attention of all, including the Government of Chile.

The U.S. position on such questions is clear. On June 27, 1974, Deputy Secretary of State Ingersoll wrote Chairman Morgan of the House Committee on Foreign Affairs with reference to our obligation under the U.N. Charter to promote respect for and observance of human rights and fundamental freedoms for all. Mr. Ingersoll said:¹

No matter where in the world violations of human rights occur, they trouble and concern us and we make our best efforts to ascertain the facts and promote respect for human rights and fundamental freedoms.

We do not regard human rights as an exclusively domestic concern. The states who are members of our organization adopted and have subscribed to an international series of standards. These standards are set down in the Universal Declaration of Human Rights [Dec. 10, 1948] and in the American Declaration of the Rights and Duties of Man [May

¹ For text of the letter, see BULLETIN of Aug. 26, 1974, p. 310.

2, 1948]. We are fortunate that the OAS has given the responsibility of inquiry, reporting, and recommendation, when violations of these standards are alleged, to its autonomous, independent, and expert Inter-American Human Rights Commission.

The Commission, except in certain respects as noted, received extensive cooperation from the Government of Chile. It has filed the report that is now before us. The Government of Chile has made observations about that report. I will not take the time of the Assembly to review the findings of the Commission and the comments of the Government of Chile. But I think it appropriate that we note our appreciation of the efforts of those who have now been able to place this matter before us so fully, and to commend what I sense to be a spirit, on all sides, of seeking an outcome fully consistent with our shared commitments and aspirations concerning human rights and fundamental freedoms.

We hope to continue to unite our efforts with those of the other members of this organization, including especially the Government of Chile, in placing the great weight of this Assembly behind constructive steps toward the promotion of human rights, here and elsewhere in the hemisphere. We are especially encouraged in this hope by the reaffirmation by the Government of Chile of its constructive attitude toward impartial international visits, observation, and study. Its decision to welcome and cooperate with a U.N. study group acting under a U.N. Human Rights Commission resolution recently approved by the U.N. Economic and Social Council was not lightly taken. It deserves the attention and respect of all member states in this regard.

We believe that this Assembly should take note of the forthcoming visit of the U.N. working group, applaud the Chilean Government's decision to cooperate with it, and state that we will keep the issue before us pending receipt of the forthcoming U.N. working group reports.

My delegation further believes that the Inter-American Human Rights Commission should remain seized of the issue. A process

of interaction between the Government of Chile and the Human Rights Commission is desirable, including opportunity for the Commission to keep its information up to date by all means appropriate.

In conclusion, I would stress that this agenda item represents a test of the system and of the capacity of the members of the Organization of American States rationally, objectively, and effectively to weigh human rights issues collectively. In a sense, all of us are on trial here—all of us, in our capacity to articulate a continuing standard and to develop fair and effective procedures for the application of that standard to individual cases.

It would be idle to pretend that this is an easy or simple task. Temptations exist in such circumstances, either to maintain silence or, in speaking out, to exceed somewhat the rhetorical needs of the matter before us.

But this, it seems to me, is a high challenge. No issue is more fundamental to the business of the hemisphere than the humane tradition which is common to us all—the sustenance of human freedom and individual dignity. It was this which drove us all to independence, and it is this which, above all else, tests the adequacy of our efforts to govern and lead our peoples.

As we have said, in the American Declaration of the Rights and Duties of Man:

All men are born free and equal, in dignity and in rights, and being endowed by nature with reason and conscience, they should conduct themselves as brothers one to another.

MR. McNEIL, COMMITTEE I, MAY 17

I would like to say simply that, in the view of this delegation, the annual report of the Inter-American Commission on Human Rights contains various general recommendations in the part of the report dealing with areas in which further steps are needed to give effect to the human rights set forth in the American Declaration of the Rights and Duties of Man.

These general recommendations deal with provisions concerning powers for exceptional

situations, rules for habeas corpus or amparo, and the availability of information about persons who have been detained.

My delegation believes that these recommendations merit the most careful consideration of all member governments so that each, according to its own constitutional and juridical situation, may determine how the basic objectives of these recommendations may best be achieved in its own country.

TEXT OF RESOLUTION ²

REPORT OF THE INTER-AMERICAN COMMISSION ON HUMAN RIGHTS ON "THE STATUS OF HUMAN RIGHTS IN CHILE"

WHEREAS:

It has received the report of the Inter-American Commission on Human Rights on "The Status of Human Rights in Chile," based upon materials presented to the Commission by various sources, including the Government of Chile, and on its *in situ* investigation of the facts during its visit to Chile from July 22 to August 2, 1974;

This report, together with the observations of the Government of Chile, was sent to the United Nations and was considered at the Thirty-first Session of the United Nations Commission on Human Rights;

As a result of this consideration, in which seven member states of the OAS took part, the United Nations Commission on Human Rights unanimously decided to send a working group to Chile to study the present status of human rights in that country; and

Consequently, both the Inter-American Commission on Human Rights and the next session of the General Assembly will have the additional benefit of a report based on further investigations to assist them in their work in the coming year,

THE GENERAL ASSEMBLY,

RESOLVES:

1. To take note, with appreciation, of the report of the Inter-American Commission on Human Rights on "The Status of Human Rights in Chile," as well as the observations of the Government of Chile on that report.
2. To take note, with approval, of the acceptance by the Government of Chile of the visit of the working group of the United Nations Commission on Human Rights.
3. To respectfully call upon all the governments, including the Government of Chile, to continue to

² OAS doc. AG/RES. 190 (V-0/75); adopted by the Assembly on May 19.

give the most careful attention to the suggestions and recommendations of the Inter-American Commission concerning human rights.

4. To request the Inter-American Commission to secure, by all appropriate means, additional information, to consider that information, and to submit a report on the status of human rights in Chile to the next session of the General Assembly, ensuring that the Government of Chile has reasonable time to submit its own observations.

TEXT OF RESOLUTION ³

ANNUAL REPORT OF THE INTER-AMERICAN COMMISSION ON HUMAN RIGHTS

THE GENERAL ASSEMBLY,

HAVING SEEN the annual report presented to its fifth regular session by the Inter-American Commission on Human Rights (AG/doc.520/75),

RESOLVES:

To take note of the annual report of the Inter-American Commission on Human Rights and to thank the Commission for the important work it has been doing.

Progress on Panama Canal Treaty Noted by OAS General Assembly

Following is a joint U.S.-Panama statement read by Secretary Kissinger on May 10 in an informal session of heads of delegations at the General Assembly of the Organization of American States, together with the text of a resolution adopted by the Assembly on May 15.

STATEMENT READ BY SECRETARY KISSINGER

The negotiations looking toward an agreement for a new canal treaty between the Republic of Panama and the United States of America began 11 years ago, when both countries signed a joint declaration on April 3, 1964, under the auspices of the Council of the Organization of American States.

In reviewing the present state of the nego-

³ OAS doc. AG/Res. 192 (V-0/75); adopted by the Assembly on May 19.

tations for a new canal treaty, we wish to emphasize that the recent efforts of both parties to be frank and open in their presentations has opened the door to advances in the negotiating process. We continue to believe that this is an indispensable prerequisite to the success of the conversations being held by the representatives of our respective governments and peoples.

We view the negotiations as a search for a total and complete agreement directed at eliminating all causes of conflict between the Republic of Panama and the United States of America, as an elaboration of that which was first set down in the statement of eight principles signed by the representatives of both countries on February 7, 1974. These eight principles constitute the fundamental framework within which the present negotiations are going forward, and it is on those principles that an entirely new treaty, of fixed duration, will be based.

The negotiations are a single whole; the subjects cannot be separated one from another. To arrange the procedures for the negotiations, the work has been divided into subjects taken up in a predetermined sequence so that the two parties in an objective and honest fashion might arrive at partial agreements leading to a single, coherent transaction.

During the last year there have been significant advances in important subjects; these include agreements relating to jurisdiction, to the administration of the canal, and to conceptual aspects on protection and defense of the canal. But it is still necessary to negotiate other fundamental subjects, among them the duration of the new treaty and the use of land and water.

It is clear that the negotiation is a delicate political process. The need for a new treaty is clear, but it has been developing over too long a time. We look toward a new type of relationship between Panama and the United States which will be truly equitable to both. We are convinced that it is imperative to achieve real and visible progress in the subjects to be negotiated, and both governments are bending their best efforts to that end, attempting to avoid unsurmountable difficul-

ties which might frustrate the ultimate success of the negotiation.

We realize that the hemisphere, which considers the canal issue a matter of common interest, will welcome with profound satisfaction that day in the not too distant future when two sovereign nations of the continent—Panama and the United States—present the final results of their efforts in the form of a new, just, and equitable treaty and lay to rest the possibility of an event of international political turmoil which would be of concern to all.

TEXT OF RESOLUTION¹

NEGOTIATIONS BETWEEN THE GOVERNMENTS OF PANAMA AND THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA ON THE QUESTION OF THE PANAMA CANAL

THE GENERAL ASSEMBLY,

HAVING HEARD the report on the negotiations concerning the Panama Canal question made by the representatives of the United States and Panama and

CONSIDERING:

That the Meetings of Foreign Ministers held in Bogotá, Tlatelolco, and Washington proclaimed the Panama Canal question to be of common interest for Latin America;

That on March 24, 1975, the Head of the Panamanian Government and the Presidents of Colombia, Costa Rica, and Venezuela signed in Panama City a Joint Declaration concerning the Panama Canal question; and

That the Declaration has as antecedents the Joint Declaration signed by the United States and Panama in the Council of the Organization of American States on April 3, 1964, and an eight-point agreement signed by the two countries on February 7, 1974, known as the Tack-Kissinger Statement,

RESOLVES:

1. To note with satisfaction that on February 7, 1974, the Foreign Minister of the Republic of Panama and the Secretary of State of the United States signed an eight-point Statement setting forth basic principles that will serve as a guide for the negotiators of the two countries, in which it is stipulated, *inter alia*, that the Panamanian territory of which the Panama Canal forms a part will soon be returned to the jurisdiction of the Republic of Panama, and that the Republic will assume total

¹OAS doc. AG/RES. 174 (V-0/75); adopted by the Assembly on May 15.

responsibility for the inter-oceanic canal on the termination of the new treaty.

2. To note with satisfaction the report presented by the Delegations of the United States and of Panama, which records the progress made.

3. To express the hope that a prompt and successful conclusion will be reached in the negotiations that the governments of the United States and the Republic of Panama have been conducting for eleven years for the purpose of concluding a new, just, and fair treaty concerning the Canal, which will definitively eliminate the causes of conflict between the two countries and be efficacious in strengthening international cooperation and peace in the Americas.

TREATY INFORMATION

Current Actions

MULTILATERAL

Antarctica

Recommendations relating to the furtherance of the principles and objectives of the Antarctic treaty of December 1, 1959 (TIAS 4780). Adopted at Wellington November 10, 1972 at the Seventh Antarctic Treaty Consultative Meeting.

Notification of approval: United Kingdom, May 29, 1975, with the exception of Recommendation VII-5.

Entered into force: May 29, 1975 for Recommendations VII-1 through VII-3, VII-7, and VII-8.

Aviation

International air services transit agreement. Done at Chicago December 7, 1944. Entered into force February 8, 1945. 59 Stat. 1693.

Effective date of succession: Bahamas, June 26, 1975.

Convention on international civil aviation. Done at Chicago December 7, 1944. Entered into force April 4, 1947. TIAS 1591.

Adherence deposited: Bahamas, May 27, 1975.

Biological Weapons

Convention on the prohibition of the development, production and stockpiling of bacteriological (biological) and toxin weapons and on their destruction. Done at Washington, London and Moscow April 10, 1972. Entered into force March 26, 1975.

Ratification deposited: Jordan, June 2, 1975.

Coffee

Agreement amending and extending the international coffee agreement 1968. Approved by the

International Coffee Council at London April 14, 1973. Entered into force October 1, 1973. TIAS 7809.

Notification that constitutional procedures completed: Peru, February 19, 1975.

Accession deposited: Yugoslavia, March 31, 1975.

Protocol for the continuation in force of the international coffee agreement 1968, as amended and extended, with annex. Approved by the International Coffee Council at London September 26, 1974.¹

Signatures: Ecuador,² Indonesia, January 28, 1975; Nicaragua,² February 14, 1975; Trinidad and Tobago,² February 19, 1975; Colombia,² March 3, 1975; Bolivia,² Cyprus, Ivory Coast, March 17, 1975; United Kingdom,³ March 14, 1975; France,² March 18, 1975; Jamaica,² Paraguay,² March 19, 1975; Ghana, Switzerland, March 24, 1975; Norway, March 25, 1975; Australia, Belgium,² El Salvador,² India, Kenya, Luxembourg,² Madagascar, March 26, 1975; Canada, Gabon, Federal Republic of Germany,² Haiti,² Honduras, Netherlands,² New Zealand, Nigeria, Peru,² Portugal,² Spain, Sweden, Togo, Cameroon, March 27, 1975; Czechoslovakia, Ethiopia, Tanzania, March 28, 1975; Burundi,² Central African Republic, Congo, Dahomey, Panama,² Sierra Leone, Yugoslavia,² Venezuela, March 31, 1975.

Ratifications deposited: Bolivia, April 1, 1975; Ecuador, February 11, 1975; Trinidad and Tobago, April 2, 1975.

Conservation

Convention on international trade in endangered species of wild fauna and flora, with appendices. Done at Washington March 3, 1973. Enters into force July 1, 1975.

Ratification deposited: Mauritius, April 28, 1975.

Customs

Convention concerning the international union for the publication of customs tariffs, regulations for the execution of the convention, and final declarations. Signed at Brussels July 5, 1890. Entered into force April 1, 1891. TS 384.

Accession deposited: Zaire, May 5, 1975.

Protocol modifying the convention signed at Brussels July 5, 1890 relating to the creation of an International Union for the Publication of Customs Tariffs. Done at Brussels December 16, 1949. Entered into force May 5, 1950; for the United States September 15, 1957. TIAS 3922.

Accession deposited: Zaire, May 5, 1975.

Economic Cooperation

Agreement establishing a financial support fund of the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development. Done at Paris April 9, 1975. Enters into force on the tenth day following the day on which member countries of the OECD holding at

¹ Not in force.

² Subject to approval, ratification, or acceptance.

³ Shall apply to Hong Kong.

⁴ Shall apply to Berlin (West).

least 90 per cent of the quotas, having complied with certain conditions, have deposited instruments of ratification, acceptance or approval, or notifications of consent to be bound.

Signatures: Australia, Austria, Belgium, Canada, Denmark, Federal Republic of Germany, Finland, France, Greece, Iceland, Ireland, Italy, Japan, Luxembourg, Netherlands, New Zealand, Norway, Portugal, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland, United Kingdom, United States, April 9, 1975.

Health

Amendment of Articles 24 and 25 of the constitution of the World Health Organization of July 22, 1946, as amended (TIAS 1808, 4643). Adopted at Geneva May 23, 1967. Entered into force May 21, 1975.

Accessions deposited: Congo (Brazzaville), May 28, 1975; Mauritania, May 21, 1975; Sudan, May 28, 1975; Uganda, May 22, 1975.

Ocean Dumping

Convention on the prevention of marine pollution by dumping of wastes and other matter, with annexes. Done at London, Mexico City, Moscow and Washington December 29, 1972.¹

Accession deposited: Afghanistan, April 2, 1975.

Space

Convention on registration of objects launched into outer space. Opened for signature at New York January 14, 1975.²

Signature: Iran, May 27, 1975.

Telecommunications

Telegraph regulations, with appendices, annex and final protocol. Done at Geneva April 11, 1973. Entered into force September 1, 1974.³

Notification of approval: Yugoslavia, March 20, 1975.

Telephone regulations, with appendices and final protocol. Done at Geneva April 11, 1973. Entered into force September 1, 1974.³

Notification of approval: Yugoslavia, March 20, 1975.

International telecommunication convention with annexes and protocols. Done at Malaga-Torremolinos October 25, 1973. Entered into force January 1, 1975.²

Ratification deposited: Trinidad and Tobago, March 13, 1975.

Partial revision of the radio regulations, Geneva, 1959, as amended (TIAS 4893, 5603, 6332, 6590, 7435) to establish a new frequency allotment plan for high-frequency radiotelephone coast stations, with annexes and final protocol. Done at Geneva June 8, 1974.¹

Notification of approval: Norway, April 2, 1975.

Tourism

Statutes of the World Tourism Organization (WTO). Done at Mexico City September 27, 1970. Entered into force January 2, 1975.²

Declarations to adopt the statutes deposited: Belgium,² May 12, 1975; Ireland,² May 1, 1975; Jamaica, April 24, 1975; Malaysia, May 8, 1974;

Mauritania,² May 3, 1975; United Kingdom,² May 13, 1975.

Weights and Measures

Convention concerning the creation of an international office of weights and measures, with annexes. Signed at Paris May 20, 1875. Entered into force January 1, 1876; for the United States August 2, 1878. TS 378.

Accession deposited: Iran, February 25, 1975.

Convention amending the convention relating to weights and measures. Done at Sevres October 6, 1921. Entered into force June 23, 1922; for the United States October 24, 1923. TS 673.

Accession deposited: Iran, February 25, 1975.

Wheat

Protocol modifying and further extending the wheat trade convention (part of the international wheat agreement) 1971 (TIAS 7144, 7988). Done at Washington March 25, 1975. Enters into force June 19, 1975, with respect to certain provisions and July 1, 1975, with respect to other provisions.

Declaration of provisional application deposited:

Portugal, June 5, 1975; Tunisia, June 4, 1975.

Accession deposited: Bolivia, June 2, 1975.

BILATERAL

Bangladesh

Agreement amending the agreement for sales of agricultural commodities of October 4, 1974 (TIAS 7949). Effected by exchange of notes at Dacca May 16, 1975. Entered into force May 16, 1975.

People's Republic of China

Agreement amending the agreement of October 28, 1974 regarding the holding of "The Exhibition of Archeological Finds of the People's Republic of China" in the United States, with related note. Effected by exchange of notes at Peking April 15, 1975. Entered into force April 15, 1975.

Hungary

Agreement amending the air transport agreement of May 30, 1972 (TIAS 7577). Effected by exchange of notes at Budapest May 9 and 16, 1975. Entered into force May 16, 1975.

Poland

Agreement regarding fisheries in the northeastern Pacific Ocean off the coast of the United States, with annexes and agreed minutes. Signed at Washington May 30, 1975. Entered into force June 15, 1975.

Romania

Agreement relating to trade in cotton textiles, with annex. Effected by exchange of notes at Washington June 2, 1975. Entered into force June 2, 1975.

¹ Not in force.

² Subject to approval, ratification, or acceptance.

³ Not in force for the United States.

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Press releases may be obtained from the Office of Press Relations, Department of State, Washington, D.C. 20520.

Releases issued prior to June 2 which appear in this issue of the BULLETIN are Nos. 284 of May 22, 298, 299, and 301 of May 27, 302 and 304 of May 28, and 304A of May 29.

No.	Date	Subject
*310	6/2	Soviet WWII veterans visit U.S., May 28-June 5.
†311	6/2	U.S. and Poland sign agreement on North Pacific fisheries.
†312	6/2	Kissinger: news conference, Salzburg.
†313	6/2	NATO summit communique, May 30.
†314	6/4	"Foreign Relations," 1949, Vol IV, Western Europe, released.
*315	6/4	Government Advisory Committee on International Book and Library Programs, June 17.
*316	6/4	Shipping Coordinating Committee, Subcommittee on Safety of Life at Sea, June 26.
†317	6/4	Kissinger: Council of the Americas.
*318	6/5	Summary of NATO CCMS activities.
*319	6/5	U.S. and Romania sign textile agreement.
*320	6/5	U.S. Advisory Commission on Educational and Cultural Affairs, June 26.
*321	6/6	Loughran sworn in as Ambassador to Somalia (biographic data).

* Not printed.
† Held for a later issue of the BULLETIN.

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THE DEPARTMENT OF STATE BULLETIN

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The Department of State BULLETIN, a weekly publication issued by the Office of Media Services, Bureau of Public Affairs, provides the public and interested agencies of the government with information on developments in the field of U.S. foreign relations and on the work of the Department and the Foreign Service.

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President Ford Visits Western Europe, Attends NATO Meeting, and Meets With President Sadat of Egypt at Salzburg

President Ford left Washington May 28 for a trip to Brussels, Madrid, Salzburg, Rome, and Vatican City, returning June 4. Following are texts of President Ford's address to the North Atlantic Council and the NATO communique, together with remarks and toasts exchanged by President Ford with Chief of State Generalissimo Francisco Franco and President of Government Carlos Arias Navarro of Spain, Chancellor Bruno Kreisky of Austria, President Anwar al-Sadat of Egypt, and President Giovanni Leone of Italy.

DEPARTURE, ANDREWS AIR FORCE BASE, MAY 28

Weekly Compilation of Presidential Documents dated June 9

Mr. Vice President: Let me say at the outset that this trip to Europe has great significance not only to us but I think on a much broader basis. We live in a world today which has issues of tremendous importance, whether it's energy, the economy, diplomacy, security. And, of course, all of the answers must come not just from ourselves but from our friends throughout the world.

Our first stop on this trip will be in Brussels, where I will meet with the leaders of the North Atlantic alliance to jointly assess the state of the NATO alliance and help to plan for a better future. I want to reaffirm at this time the U.S. commitment to the North Atlantic Treaty, which is so vital to America's security and America's well-being.

In Spain I will review with Spanish leaders the expanding cooperation which is essential and as Spain assumes an increasingly important role both in the Atlantic and the Mediterranean areas.

In Austria my meetings with President Sadat of Egypt will center on Middle Eastern developments and the evolution of U.S.-Egyptian relations. American interests as well as those of our allies depend upon events that come about in the months ahead in the Middle East. Our policy in that important area of the globe is one goal—that of achieving a just peace. And I also welcome the opportunity while in Austria to meet again with Chancellor Kreisky.

Following the NATO summit in Brussels, my meetings in Rome with President Leone and other leaders of the Italian Government will permit us to review the many important interests we share as allies and as very good friends. I look forward to the opportunity to meet with His Holiness Pope Paul VI to discuss humanitarian subjects of importance to people throughout the world.

There is much work to be done on this relatively brief trip. But I feel confident that I can represent a strong and united America—an America determined, with its allies, to safeguard our vital interests. The United States is equally determined to reduce the chances of conflict, to increase cooperation, and to enhance the well-being of Americans and all peoples. I go determined to advance our common interests with our friends and allies and with great pride in our great country.

ARRIVAL, BRUSSELS, MAY 28

Weekly Compilation of Presidential Documents dated June 9

Your Majesties, Prime Minister Tindemans, Secretary General Luns [Joseph Luns, Secretary General of NATO], ladies and gentlemen: Thank you so very much for

your warm and very gracious welcome to Brussels. It is always a great privilege and pleasure to return to the city that many know as the capital of Europe.

Thirty years ago, Western Europe was the victim of wartime devastation, facing hostile forces seeking to dominate the entire continent. The courageous leaders on both sides of the Atlantic responded by creating the North Atlantic Treaty Organization.

Our alliance has withstood the changes and the tests of the past 26 years. It has helped to secure freedom and prosperity for the Western world. It is fitting that the purpose of my first trip, Your Majesty, to Europe as President of the United States is to participate in a NATO summit.

I want my NATO colleagues and the people of Europe to know:

—That our great alliance remains very strong—to guarantee that vitality, we must vigorously address the problems confronting us;

—That the United States is convinced that détente with the East can only proceed on a foundation of strong and secure alliance defenses;

—That NATO is the cornerstone of U.S. foreign policy and has the unwavering support of the American public and of our Congress; and

—Finally, that our commitment to this alliance will not falter.

It is in this spirit that I meet with my colleagues in NATO to discuss issues of direct concern to the peace, the security, and the prosperity of our Atlantic community.

It is also in this spirit that I respond, Your Majesty, to your very warm welcome. Belgium's hospitality as a host to NATO and to the European Communities has made it the heart of both the European and the Atlantic worlds.

Relations between the United States and Belgium remain confident and mature. I know that we will continue as close friends and warm allies.

Thank you very much.

Mr. Secretary General, members of the Council: President Truman, in 1949, transmitted the text of the North Atlantic Treaty to the Congress of the United States with his assessment of its importance.

Events of this century (he wrote) have taught us that we cannot achieve peace independently. The world has grown too small.

The security and welfare of each member of this community depends on the security and welfare of all. None of us alone can achieve economic prosperity or military security. None of us alone can assure the continuance of freedom.

So spoke President Truman. These words, describing the interdependence of the North Atlantic nations, are as accurate today as they were a quarter century ago.

On the 25th anniversary of the signing of the North Atlantic Treaty, leaders of the NATO nations met here in Brussels to reaffirm the Declaration on Atlantic Relations, the fundamental purposes of an alliance that had fulfilled its promises by providing for the security, promoting the welfare, and maintaining the freedom of its members.

We meet here today to renew our commitment to the alliance. We meet to remind our citizens in the 15 member nations, by our presence, of the strength and stability of the transatlantic ties that unite us and to restate our pledge to collective self-defense.

We are assembled to address the serious problems we face and to review the steps we must take to deal with them.

Renewal of our commitment to the alliance is the most important of these purposes. The United States of America, unconditionally and unequivocally, remains true to the commitments undertaken when we signed the North Atlantic Treaty, including the obligation in article 5 to come to the assistance of any NATO nation subjected to armed attack. As treaties are the supreme

¹As prepared for delivery; issued at Brussels (text from White House press release).

law of my land, these commitments are juridically binding in the United States. These commitments are strategically sound, politically essential, and morally justifiable and therefore command broad support in the United States. They remain the firm foundation, as they have for 26 years, on which our relationship rests. This foundation has well served the purposes for which it was created. It will go on serving these purposes, even in the face of new difficulties, as long as we continue our common resolve.

In the treaty we signed 26 years ago, and from which we drew confidence and courage, we pledged:

—To live in peace with all peoples and all governments.

—To safeguard the freedom, common heritage, and civilization of our peoples founded on the principles of democracy, individual liberty, and the rule of law.

—To promote stability and well-being in the North Atlantic area.

—To settle by peaceful means any international dispute in which any one of us may be involved.

—To eliminate conflict in international economic policies and encourage economic collaboration.

—To maintain and develop our individual and collective capacity to resist armed attack, by means of continuous and effective self-help and mutual aid.

—To consult together when any one of us is threatened.

—To consider an armed attack against one as an armed attack against all.

There is no need today to improve on that statement of principles and purposes. It remains as clear, as resolute, and as valid today as when first adopted. But it is worth reminding ourselves of these pledges as we turn our attention and energies to the problems we now face both outside and within the alliance—problems very different from those we confronted 26 years ago.

As NATO heads of governments and friends, we have a duty to be frank and realistic with one another. Therefore, I must

cite the following matters of concern to the United States and of importance to the alliance:

—In Indochina, the events of recent months have resulted in enormous human suffering for the people of Cambodia and Viet-Nam, an ordeal that touches all human hearts. Because of the United States long involvement in Indochina, these events have led some to question our strength and reliability. I believe that our strength speaks for itself—our military power remains, and will continue to remain, second to none—of this let there be no doubt; our economy remains fundamentally sound and productive; and our political system has emerged from the shocks of the past year stronger for the way in which it met a severe internal test. Our actions will continue to confirm the durability of our commitments.

—There have been strains and difficulties within the alliance during the past year. Serious disagreements have marred relations among some members. The unity of the alliance and our common resolve have come into question.

—There are some problems that relate directly to our defense capabilities. I refer to increasing pressures to reduce the level of military commitments to NATO despite the fact that the forces of our potential enemies have grown stronger. We also face basic problems of military effectiveness. A generation after its creation, the alliance wastes vast sums each year, sacrificing military effectiveness. We have simply not done enough to standardize our weapons. We must correct this. We must also agree among ourselves on a sensible division of weapons development programs and production responsibilities. And we must do more to enhance our mutual capacity to support each other both in battle and logistically. The pressures on defense budgets throughout the alliance should by now have convinced each of us that we simply must rationalize our collective defense.

—In the field of energy, we are still not immune from the political pressures that result from a heavy dependence on external

sources of energy. Indeed, we are becoming more vulnerable each month. We have made joint progress in offsetting the effect of the action taken last year by the major oil-producing countries. But we have far more to do.

—In the Middle East, there remains a possibility of a new war that not only could involve the countries in the area but also sow discord beyond the Middle East itself, perhaps within our alliance.

This is a formidable array of problems. However, we have faced formidable problems before. Let us master these new challenges with all the courage, conviction, and cohesion of this great alliance. Let us proceed. It is time for concerted action.

At this important stage in the history of the alliance, we must pledge ourselves to six primary tasks:

—First, we must maintain a strong and credible defense. This must remain the foremost objective of the alliance. If we fail in this task, the others will be irrelevant. A society that does not have the vigor and dedication to defend itself cannot survive. Neither can an alliance. For our part, our commitment not to engage in any unilateral reduction of U.S. forces committed to NATO remains valid. But that is not enough. We must make more effective use of our defense resources. We need to achieve our long-standing goals of common procedures and equipment. Our research and development efforts must be more than the sum of individual parts. Let us become truly one in our allocation of defense tasks, support, and production.

—Second, we must preserve the quality and integrity of this alliance on the basis of unqualified participation, not on the basis of partial membership or special arrangements. The commitment to collective defense must be complete if it is to be credible. It must be unqualified if it is to be reliable.

—Third, let us improve the process of political consultation. We have made considerable progress in recent months but there is—as each of us knows—room for improvement by all parties if we are to maintain our solidarity. This is of particular importance

if we are to move forward together in our efforts to reduce the tensions that have existed with the Warsaw Pact nations for more than a quarter of a century. We should further cultivate the habit of discussing our approaches to those matters which touch the interests of all so that we can develop common policies to deal with common problems.

—Fourth, let us cooperate in developing a productive and realistic agenda for détente, an agenda that serves our interests and not the interests of others who do not share our values. I envision an agenda that anticipates and precludes the exploitation of our perceived weaknesses. One item on that agenda must be to assure that the promises made in the Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe are translated into action to advance freedom and human dignity for all Europeans. Only by such realistic steps can we keep CSCE in perspective, whatever euphoric or inflated emphasis the Soviet Union or other participants may try to give it. Another agenda item should be the negotiations on mutual and balanced force reductions in Europe. We in NATO should be prepared to take appropriate initiatives in these negotiations if they will help us to meet our objectives. But the Soviet Union and its allies should also be prepared to respond in good faith on the common objectives both sides should be working toward—undiminished security for all, but at a lower level of forces.

—Fifth, let us look to the future of the West itself. We must strengthen our own democratic institutions and encourage the growth of truly democratic processes everywhere. Let us also look beyond our alliance as it stands today. As an important topic on this agenda, we should begin now to consider how to relate Spain with Western defense. Spain has already made, and continues to make, an important contribution to Western military security as a result of its bilateral relationship with the United States.

—Sixth, we should rededicate ourselves to the alliance as a great joint enterprise, as a commitment to follow common approaches to shared aspirations. We must build on the contribution our alliance already makes

through the Committee on the Challenges of Modern Society in coping with the environmental problems of industrialized societies. We must address the issues of population, food, and raw materials. We must find ways to strengthen the world trading and monetary system and to meet the imperatives of energy development and conservation. With the wealth and technological skills which are the products of our free systems, we can make progress toward a better standard of life in all of our countries if we work together.

These six primary tasks of the alliance illustrate the breadth and depth of our responsibilities and opportunities. They reflect how very complex the world has become and how much more difficult it is to manage the alliance today than a generation ago. Then our problems were relatively simple to define. It was easier to agree on common solutions. Today the problem of definition seems more complicated. In many of our countries there has been a fragmentation of public and parliamentary opinion which has made it more difficult for governments to mobilize support for courses of action of importance to the alliance.

But there are constants as well, and they are, in the final analysis, more important than the complexities. Together, we continue to be the greatest reservoir of economic, military, and moral strength in the world. We must use that strength to safeguard our freedom and to address the grave problems that confront us.

I am proud of America's role in NATO, and I am confident of the future of our alliance.

As President of the United States, but also as one who has been a participant and close observer of the American political scene for close to 30 years, I assure you that my country will continue to be a strong partner. On occasion, in the public debate of our free society, America may seem to stray somewhat off course. But the fact is that we have the willpower, the technical capability, the spiritual drive, and the steadiness of purpose that will be needed. Today, we in the United States face our NATO

commitments with new vision, new vigor, new courage, and renewed dedication.

America's emphasis is on cooperation—cooperation within NATO and throughout the world. From diversity, we can forge a new unity. Together, let us build to face the challenges of the future.

TEXT OF NORTH ATLANTIC COUNCIL COMMUNIQUE, MAY 30²

1. The North Atlantic Council met in Brussels on 29th and 30th May, 1975 with the participation of Heads of State and Government.

2. As a result of their review of developments since the Ottawa Declaration on Atlantic Relations was signed in Brussels last year, the Allied leaders are strengthened in their resolve to preserve the solidarity of the Alliance and restore it where impaired by removing the causes which disturb it among Allies. They reaffirm that the essential purpose of the Alliance is to safeguard the independence and security of its members and to make possible the creation of a lasting structure of peace.

3. Serious problems confront the Allies in the pursuit of this purpose. The armed forces of the Warsaw Pact continue to grow in strength beyond any apparent defensive needs. At the same time, the maintenance of the Allied defence effort at a satisfactory level encounters new difficulties arising from the world-wide economic situation. The Allies are resolved to face such challenges together and with determination.

4. The collective security provided by the Alliance, on the basis of a credible capacity to deter and defend, is a stabilising factor, beneficial to international relations as a whole, and indeed an essential condition of détente and peace. In a troubled world subject to rapid transformation the Allies reaffirm that the security of each is of vital concern to all. They owe it, not only to themselves but to the international community, to stand by the principles and the spirit of solidarity and mutual assistance which brought them together as Allies. Accordingly the Allies stress their commitment to the provisions of the North Atlantic Treaty, and in particular Article 5 which provides for common defence.

5. The security afforded by the Treaty enables the Allies to pursue policies reflecting their desire that understanding and co-operation should prevail over confrontation. An advance along this road would be made if the Conference on Security and Co-operation in Europe were concluded on satisfactory terms and its words translated into deeds. The Allies hope that progress in the negotiations will

² Issued at Brussels at the conclusion of the meeting (text from press release 313 dated June 2).

permit such a conclusion in the near future. They reaffirm that there is an essential connection between détente in Europe and the situation relating to Berlin. The Allies participating in the negotiations in Vienna emphasize that the development of understanding and co-operation also requires mutual and balanced force reductions in Central Europe in a manner which would contribute to a more stable relationship and enhanced security for all.

6. The peoples of the Alliance share in the universal aspiration for justice and social progress. They desire that through concerted efforts there should emerge an international order which reflects the political, economic and social realities of our time. The Allies are resolved to co-operate with the other members of the international community on global problems such as those of population, food, energy, raw materials and the environment. The well-being of mankind depends on success in these common tasks.

7. The Allied leaders meeting in Council recall that the future of democracy and freedom throughout the world is closely linked to the future of those countries whose common heritage embraces these ideals and where they enjoy the widest popular support. With this in mind, they unanimously affirm that they will enhance the effectiveness and vitality of their association within the framework of the North Atlantic Treaty, which is fundamental not only to the security of the Allied nations but also to the preservation of the values to which they are deeply attached.

NEWS CONFERENCE, BRUSSELS, MAY 30

Weekly Compilation of Presidential Documents dated June 9

President Ford: Let me first set out the basic reasons why we welcomed the United Kingdom's proposal for this meeting at the highest level and why we gave it support and thought it was very timely.

We wanted to reaffirm the need for undiminished defense efforts and to have a general discussion of the problems associated with collective defense.

Second, we wanted an opportunity in this Atlantic forum to review the issues on what we have called the new agenda—the energy problem and its ramifications, the food problem, the interaction of national economies.

We think—and we very much agreed with Chancellor Schmidt [Helmut Schmidt, Chancellor of the Federal Republic of Germany] and others—that these problems affect the well-being and future of all of the countries

of the alliance, as much as would a potential military threat.

Of course, we know there are other international bodies to deal specifically with these problems but we feel that this political forum is a good and suitable one in which to have a broad discussion of the approaches.

Third, we felt it timely to review the status of East-West relations, the progress of our efforts to achieve meaningful détente with countries of the East. This is particularly so because the Geneva Conference on Cooperation and Security in Europe is in its decisive phase.

Fourth, and finally, there are clearly some problems within the alliance itself. We felt it was desirable to have an opportunity to review these; where appropriate, to have some bilateral and private contacts. Among these problems is the dispute between Greece and Turkey and the uncertain developments in Portugal, which concern us.

I have been extremely pleased by the tone and the content of the remarks that were made around the NATO table. I feel that these discussions, the numerous bilateral contacts, the informal talks at the King's dinner last night and the Secretary General's luncheon today, and the final public statements fully justified this meeting.

In terms of our objectives, the common interests of all of the allies in a strong defense and in safeguarding our security by common efforts were reaffirmed. We also recognize that there is much room for improvement in this area, including with respect to more efficient use of the existing resources.

I think new impetus has been given to the work of the military bodies of the alliance. All of us came away, in my judgment, with a sense of urgency in dealing with the items on the new agenda, and we were especially pleased to hear Chancellor Schmidt's review of these issues.

I think it was a good expression of political will by the allies following the recent sessions of IEA [International Energy Agency] and the OECD [Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development]. We reaffirmed the need for giving détente

real meaning in terms of the values of our countries.

We agreed to continue the close and full consultation among allies on East-West relations, as well as to continue to pool our efforts in ongoing negotiations like CSCE [Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe] and MBFR [mutual and balanced force reductions].

We faced alliance problems in a mature and a quite constructive way. I was struck by the fact that all allies stressed common interests even when—as in the case of Greece and Turkey—there exist differences in particular instances.

It is a measure of the general sense of satisfaction with this meeting that quite spontaneously there arose sentiment for holding these high-level meetings at more regular intervals, as proposed by Prime Minister Trudeau [Pierre Elliott Trudeau, Prime Minister of Canada]. I would strongly support this.

We can be quite flexible about the precise manner in which such meetings are prepared and held, but it is clear that there was widespread feeling among allies that contact at the highest level, the highest political level, is valuable.

Finally, I found it noteworthy that many allies stressed that they did not feel the need of any special American reassurance concerning our commitment to the alliance. They stressed that they consider our commitment firm and vigorous. Their confidence is fully justified.

With that, I will be glad to recognize Mr. Cormier [Frank Cormier, Associated Press].

Q. Mr. President, the NATO communique laid heavy emphasis on military preparedness, and I wonder if this reflects any misgivings about the future of détente?

President Ford: I certainly did not have that impression, Mr. Cormier. The feeling was that by strengthening our allied forces, we could be more effective in implementing the détente approach.

On the other hand, any weakening of our military forces within the alliance could make it more difficult to proceed with détente

between not only the United States and the Soviet Union but between the East and the West in general.

Q. Mr. President, would you use nuclear weapons if there was a conventional attack on Europe by the Soviet Union?

President Ford: Miss Thomas [Helen Thomas, United Press International], I don't think that I should discuss military decisions at this time. I think a decision of that kind would have to be made in the proper channels. I, of course, would not expect, if our strength continues and détente prospers, that that there would be any need for such a hypothetical circumstance developing.

Q. Mr. President, what do you consider to be the most important achievements of your visit to Brussels?

President Ford: Mr. Smith [Joseph Kingsbury-Smith, Hearst Newspapers], I think it was extremely healthy for the heads of state to get together on this occasion because there had been some difficulties, some traumatic experiences, in Southeast Asia. There were rumors to the effect that the United States, because of that experience there, was retreating to an isolationist stature. It seemed to me that it was wise, under those circumstances, for me to come here representing the United States and speak so firmly, so unequivocally as to our commitment to the alliance.

But in addition, the exchange of views among the heads of state on the need for close cooperation in the economic field, and I say the economic field in the broadest sense—we recognize that the free world must have a healthy economy if we are to sustain an adequate military stature. And it is important therefore that we work together to move us all out of the recession that has been plaguing us for the last few months, and the exchange of views in this area, in my judgment, will be helpful in meeting this particular challenge. Of course, within the parameters of the economic problems, we did follow on the IEA, the OECD, on the questions of energy and other commodities. So those three areas—particularly, plus, I think the meeting itself—gave the people of

the 15 countries a feeling that unity did exist and that we had a solidarity that would continue the blessings that we have had in the last 26 years.

Q. Mr. President, in your interview with the five foreign journalists last week, you expressed your concern about Portugal, and I wonder if, after your meetings with the Portuguese leaders, that concern has been eased or not?

President Ford: Mr. Lisagor [Peter Lisagor, Chicago Daily News], we had an extremely candid discussion with the Portuguese Prime Minister and his colleagues. The Portuguese Prime Minister explained the goals of the political movement in his country. He explained, in some detail, the political setup as it existed and as they anticipated it would be for a period in the future.

I spoke very frankly about the concern of democratic forces in Portugal, and I particularly emphasized this because all of us in the alliance greeted the revolution that took place there about a year ago. We had much hope and we had much sympathy for the trends that developed as a result of that revolution.

Equally, however, I did point out the contradiction that would arise if Communist elements came to dominate the political life of Portugal, and it is my judgment that others among the allies had a somewhat similar concern.

There is a general agreement that the situation must be watched with care and concern but also with deep sympathy and friendship with the people of Portugal.

What I said last week, I think, coincides with what I have said today. We are all hopeful, but we have to be watchful.

Q. Mr. President, after the NATO rebuff with Spain, what new proposals have you in mind to shape the American-Spanish agreement?

President Ford: Could the question be repeated?

Q. The NATO rebuff with Spain. What

proposals do you have in mind at this time?

President Ford: We will be negotiating, of course, with the Spanish Government for the extension of base rights and the bilateral relationship. I don't think it is proper for me at this time to get into the details of those negotiations and the talks that will take place tomorrow.

I might, since the question was raised about Spain, indicate the situation as it developed here in the last 24 to 36 hours.

As I think most of you know, I believe very strongly that the role played by Spain through its contribution to Western defense by its bilateral U.S. defense relations is an important one.

The bilateral relations that the United States has with Spain, as we see it, does contribute significantly to the defense of the West.

Now, without speaking personally for any one of the other allies, I think this is an understood fact and, hopefully, therefore the negotiations that you speak of can be concluded successfully.

Now, if I could add one other comment vis-a-vis Spain and the allies, we, the United States, continue to favor a Spanish relationship with the alliance. We think this is important, even though we recognize the unlikelihood of it taking place in the future, or the immediate future.

But it is an issue that the alliance must face, and we hope that as time moves on, there will be a better understanding of it and hopefully a developing relationship.

Q. Mr. President, in your address to the NATO conference, you talked about partial membership or special arrangements in the alliance. We all know that Greece has a special arrangement now and that France has a special arrangement now. Would you tell us the differences, as you see them, between those two relationships and what ought to be done with them?

President Ford: Well, the comment that was included in my prepared text did not refer to France's permanent relationship. The comment in the text had specific relation-

ship to the circumstances involving Greece.

As you know, following the Cyprus difficulties of last summer, Greece made a decision to terminate its previous relationship with the allies. It is now in a different relationship than any one of the others in the alliance.

It is a relationship, however, that—we hope, once the Greek-Turkish dispute is resolved over Cyprus, that Greece will return to its previous status within the alliance. And, of course, the meetings that have been held between Greece and Turkey over the last several months, and the meeting that the Foreign Ministers of Greece and Turkey are having tomorrow, will hopefully lead to some progress in this dispute.

If that progress materializes and the dispute is settled, we are most hopeful that Greece will return to its permanent previous relationship within the alliance.

Q. Mr. President, the NATO communique refers to the need for deeds in terms of the accomplishments projected for the European Security Conference, and you also have referred to that, sir. Also, we have the problem of the SALT [Strategic Arms Limitation Talks] negotiation to be concluded. Do you see, sir, any risk that the timetable may be upset, which could affect the convening of a summit conference in Washington with Secretary General Brezhnev [Leonid I. Brezhnev, General Secretary of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union]?

President Ford: The CSCE negotiations are reaching a point where there is some reason for optimism. There are some points that must be resolved, but progress is being made.

I am not in a position to forecast when the final agreement will be achieved, if it is, but there is a possibility that the time schedule of several months ago might materialize, and if it does, then I think the follow-on SALT Two meeting in Washington can also be on schedule.

But, in both cases, there is no final agreement, so I hesitate to be precise as to a date in either case.

Q. Mr. President, in your head-to-head talks with some of the leaders from the other nations, did you carry the ball in the discussions or did you rely on Secretary Kissinger to do most of your talking? [Laughter.]

President Ford: Those bilateral discussions between myself and the heads of state were carried out in the traditional fashion. In each case, the Foreign Minister representing the other government and Secretary Kissinger were present.

They were constructive. They were, I think, a free discussion where the parties there fully participated.

Q. Mr. President, in your meetings with the full Council and with the individual heads of state and government, did there come up in the conversation the difficulties you have had in trying to get a Middle East peace settlement, and did you come away with a feeling that you will have support of the member nations in your efforts in Vienna [Salzburg] with President Sadat and later, in Washington, with Rabin?

President Ford: In almost every bilateral meeting, the question of the Middle East did come up. In each instance, we gave our re-assessment procedure. We indicated that I was meeting with President Sadat in Salzburg and then subsequently meeting with Prime Minister Rabin in Washington.

We pointed out the three alternatives that have been well written about. We indicated that any views or recommendations that might be made by the heads of state or the foreign ministers would be most welcome.

We did reemphasize that our objective in the Middle East was peace, that we could not tolerate stagnation or a stalemate. We felt that movement was essential in the recommendations that I do make, sometime the latter part of June, early July, will be a position of movement aimed at the objective of a secure peace in the Middle East, and I think, the feeling of the allies here was one of—supportive of the general objectives without

getting into any of the procedures, or the details.

The press: Thank you, Mr. President.

ARRIVAL, MADRID, MAY 31

Weekly Compilation of Presidential Documents dated June 9

Generalissimo Franco, Mrs. Franco, friends of Spain and of the United States: I begin my visit in Spain with very real satisfaction that comes from renewing and underlining the traditional relationship and friendship between our two countries.

My last visit to Spain was at a time of mourning in the closing days of 1973. Today is a happier occasion. I look forward with keen interest to our discussions.

This is a time of rapid change and challenge worldwide. We shall respond to these new challenges, as we must, both individually and collectively. I have confidence in our proven ability to work together in the pursuit of common interests, and I have confidence in Spain, a nation with future of great promise.

The dignity, the pride, the resilience of the Spanish people have been forged over a history much longer than that of the United States. Spain has contributed much to the history and to the culture of the United States. Today, millions and millions of Americans speak the Spanish language.

My visit to Spain is above all a recognition of Spain's significance as a friend and as a partner. Our excellent relationship is confirmed in the 1974 Joint Declaration of Principles. Our peoples seek the same objectives of peace, progress, and freedom.

By geography and by history, Spain has a logical place in the transatlantic community. For more than 20 years, Spain has shared with America and with Europe the burdens of promoting the prosperity and the security of the Atlantic and Mediterranean regions. Spain can be proud of that contribution.

Generalissimo Franco, Your Excellencies, friends, it is my privilege to bring to you the greetings of the people of the United States. Our two countries look forward to a future

of expanding cooperation. I know that we will meet the challenges and the changes that lie ahead.

Thank you.

TOASTS BY PRESIDENT FORD AND SPANISH PRESIDENT ARIAS, MAY 31³

President Ford

Mr. President, Mr. Minister, Your Excellencies: For a quarter of a century, Spain and the United States have enjoyed the most cordial and the most productive ties, characterized by our common efforts to meet the danger of aggression against the Western community of nations and supported by mutual respect for the aspirations of our respective peoples to secure for themselves a better life.

Mindful as we have been of each other's concerns and needs, we have forged, fortunately, a harmonious and a very fine relationship.

We have met today to reaffirm our commitment to build this cooperation in a mutually beneficial manner.

The world has changed, as we well know, from when the first U.S.-Spanish friendship agreement which was signed in 1953. But the need for strong defenses has not lessened in any way whatsoever. Spain and the United States have, in the past, contributed together to the maintenance of a strong Western security. The present and future call for no less effort. The United States remains totally dedicated to this task.

It would be my observation that the cooperation being carried out in so many fields between our countries demonstrates the breadth of our interests, the depth of friendship, and the commitment of the United States and Spain to a better life for our citizens. Spain, of course, is an important part of our Atlantic conception.

³ Given at a luncheon hosted by President Ford at Moncloa Palace, Madrid; President Arias spoke in Spanish (text from Weekly Compilation of Presidential Documents dated June 9).

Mr. President, I raise my glass and propose a toast to this spirit of friendship. May our cooperation be preserved and strengthened. May it assure peace for Spaniards and Americans alike. Mr. President.

President Arias

Mr. President: It constitutes for me a great honor to attend this working lunch, which you have so kindly invited me to.

During the tight schedule of your visit to our country, we will have the opportunity to keep a broad exchange of views, which will constitute the basis of an understanding with which to cement an official and positive cooperation of the one that fortunately has guided so far the relations between our two countries.

Spanish-American relationships have blended throughout history. For Spain, it is a motive of deep pride in her glorious past to have so substantially contributed to the origins of the great American nation, both during its discovery and its independence.

In the past, European inhabitants of territories which then became the United States were of Spanish origin. Also Spanish was the initial impulse and backing received by the forefathers of America in the heroic days of her access to the concert of free nations.

The last 25 years of understanding and cooperation between Spain and the United States has become particularly intense. This cooperation has been, I am sure, one of the fundamental supports for the existence of the free world.

Spain believes that the hour has come for this direct, loyal, and disinterested contribution on her part to be acknowledged in specific and practical terms by the nations that formed the Western world, to which our country belongs, as well as for its geographical position, its history, and its culture and for its past and present contributions.

Mr. President, this is not the first time that Spain has had the honor to receive you. You have come to Madrid before, when you represented your country in the event of the tragic death of my predecessor, Almirante

Carrero Blanco, a sorrowful occasion for all Spaniards, especially for those of us who had the privilege of sharing the responsibilities of government under his command.

Your visits then and today, we believe, fit in that long tradition of cooperation that I have already mentioned; that is why the Spanish people, my colleagues in the government, and myself think that nobody better than you can understand the depth and importance of existing cooperation between our countries, as well as the need for preserving such understanding for the future sake of values that belong to our common civilization and that have been so efficiently defended so far.

We congratulate ourselves, Mr. President, and we thank you for your visit to Spain. We are certain that you share with us the desire to continue our friendship, already a tradition. You can be sure that Spain trusts your leadership in the Western world and knows that our common objectives can be reached.

Allow me, Mr. President, to raise my glass for the perseverance of that spirit of friendship and understanding existing between Spain and the United States, for the friendship of the American people, as well as for yours.

TOASTS BY PRESIDENT FORD AND GENERALISSIMO FRANCO, MAY 31¹

Generalissimo Franco

Mr. President: It has been for me both an honor and great affection to welcome here President Ford, whose human qualities and whose virtues as a statesman are well known to us all, also, his long political record in his service to his country and in the defense of world peace.

It also constitutes a special pleasure to my wife and to myself the presence among us of Mrs. Ford, whose personal charm and grace has conquered us all.

¹ Given at a dinner hosted by Generalissimo Franco at the Royal Palace, Madrid; Generalissimo Franco spoke in Spanish (text from Weekly Compilation of Presidential Documents dated June 9).

Finally, it is also noted with greatest affection to have here the distinguished guests that accompany you.

During nearly a quarter of a century, relations between Spain and the United States have followed a line of consolidation in our friendship, of participation in a series of common aims and objectives, of the nation of values that we as members of a free world share together.

With your visit now, you have intended to renew the attention of the government and the American people showed us on the occasion of former visits by your former predecessors, Presidents Eisenhower and Nixon.

I would like to extend to you, Mr. President, my gratitude and that of the Spanish people for proving to you in your visit to Madrid that Spain constitutes one of the fundamental stops in your visit to Europe, a visit which you are making as head of a country which leads the group of nations that forms the Western world.

Before the foreign threats that are looming over our civilization, on which we have to act now—subversion and terrorism, seeking without any doubt to destroy our way of life—the Western world is in need more than ever before for cohesion for the defense of values that are common to us all.

It can be said, Mr. President, that you will find in Spain a sincere friend ready to cooperate with generosity and reciprocity to defend those values, as well as to keep peace and justice among all nations.

Allow me, Mr. President, to raise my glass to the continued friendship of our two countries, to the personal welfare of yourself and Mrs. Ford, and to the peace and happiness of the country in whose name you are here today—the United States of America.

President Ford

Generalissimo Franco, Mrs. Franco, Your Royal Highnesses, distinguished guests, and friends: In 1953, our two nations embarked on a new course designed to increase cooperation and to enhance security. Our rela-

tionship is succeeding in its purposes in the past and at the present time. The independence of the West has been preserved. We have prospered in a manner that would have not been expected a quarter of a century ago. Our nations have both benefited.

Today's challenges, however, are much more complex. We must maintain strong and credible defenses while working to lessen tension. We live in a world that is becoming increasingly interdependent; cooperation becomes ever more important.

We are both proud of our independence, yet we recognize the need of working together. Each year marks increasing contacts, increasing cooperation between the Spanish and the American people in a growing number of fields ranging from medicine to urban development, to the arts, to agriculture, to science, and education.

To meet the needs of tomorrow, we must continue our cooperation, and I know this is a shared objective between your country and mine. As recognized in the 1974 Joint Declaration of Principles, our joint endeavor has strengthened the cause of peace. Through its bilateral defense cooperation with the United States, Spain is making a major contribution to the Western world.

Other nations of the transatlantic community have benefited from our cooperation, that of Spain and the United States. In our bilateral relations, we are prepared to draw practical consequences from these facts. We are both members of the international organizations created to increase cooperation among nations, such as the International Energy Agency. Such ties should be continually broadened to increase the strength of each, and we are determined that they will be.

Your Excellency, the warmth of your welcome today and the hospitality of the people of Spain has been very important to me and to my country. This delightful dinner in such splendid surroundings with so many friends has been the climax of a day filled with deeply moving experiences—from the demonstration of affection by the Spanish people who

greeted us today, to renewing friendships with you and Prince Carlos, and exchanging ideas for the first time, in a most profitable way, with President Arias Navarro. Each were very rewarding experiences.

They are eloquent testimony to the depth of friendship between our two countries.

I lift my glass to Spain and to the United States, to our growing friendship in the years ahead, to Generalissimo Franco, to His Royal Highness Prince Juan Carlos, and to the Spanish people.

STATEMENT ISSUED UPON PRESIDENT FORD'S DEPARTURE FROM MADRID, JUNE 1

White House press release (Madrid) dated June 1

As we depart Spain, Mrs. Ford and I wish to express our sincere gratitude to General and Mrs. Franco, to Prince Juan Carlos and Princess Sofia, to President and Mrs. Arias, and to the Spanish Government and to the Spanish people for the wonderful reception accorded to us.

The warmth with which we have been received, the cordial, frank, and productive discussions I have had with your highest officials, the friendship which we have found for the United States, have made our visit to Madrid an unforgettable experience which Mrs. Ford and I will long remember.

Many today question the course of the future, but I have no doubt of the increasingly important role Spain will play in that future, in the world as a whole and, particularly, in the West. Spain is a part, geographically and historically, of Europe. Spain is a part of the transatlantic community. Accordingly, I am sure the future holds for Spain a greater role in European and Atlantic organizations of importance to both of our countries.

You have our sincere thanks and appreciation for the wonderful welcome extended to us at all levels and during every moment of our stay. As a result of my meetings here, I am confident that the United States and Spain, working together, will produce a better life for our peoples and contribute to the prospects of a better life for people everywhere.

ARRIVAL, SALZBURG, JUNE 1

Weekly Compilation of Presidential Documents dated June 9

Mr. Chancellor, Mrs. Kreisky, ladies and gentlemen: Thank you for your gracious welcome to Salzburg—and I am sorry that I tumbled in.

I am very pleased to have this opportunity to renew my acquaintance with you, Mr. Chancellor, your country, and the Austrian people.

Mr. Chancellor, 20 years after the signing of the State Treaty in 1955, Austria is a stable, prosperous country and an active participant in European and world affairs. Your hospitality in offering Salzburg as the site for my meetings with President Sadat reflects Austria's constructive international policy and the traditional warmth of the Austrian nation.

Mr. Chancellor, I look forward to my personal discussions with you today. I know personally of Austria's commitment to reaching peaceful solutions to the international problems from our productive talks in Washington last fall.

America is committed to the reduction of tension and the increase of cooperation in our efforts to achieve a peaceful world. The talks that we will have can contribute to this process.

I thank you very, very much.

TOASTS BY PRESIDENT FORD AND EGYPTIAN PRESIDENT SADAT, JUNE 1⁵

President Sadat

Mr. President, distinguished friends: It is with great pleasure that I welcome you and look forward to our talks. This is so in the light of my firm conviction that we should grant this historical moment and combine our efforts in order to defuse the explosive situation in the Middle East and

⁵ Given at a luncheon hosted by President Sadat at Schloss Fuschl, Salzburg (text from Weekly Compilation of Presidential Documents dated June 9).

pursue the course of action we have initiated in the recent past for laying down a solid foundation for a just and durable peace.

Mr. President, it is seldom in history that the heads of state of two countries on which peace or war depends in such a strategic area as the Middle East meet together to build the foundation of normalcy, tranquillity, and the legitimacy for the peoples of the Middle East.

Salzburg, this beautiful city, will go into the annals of history marking a new development in our area, together with the evolution of our bilateral relations in such a manner that would promote more contact and understanding between the American and Egyptian people.

Mr. President, in a moment of such magnitude, what it needs is not only vision and wisdom but most of all leadership, coupled with the readiness and ability to take major decisions and implement them.

This is really the crux of the whole matter, and it is up to both of us to take the decision and restore peace and justice in conformity with the norms of international law and legitimacy.

Mr. President, it is often said that the Middle East problem is a complex one, and that this is the reason why it is not possible so far to find an equitable solution to that problem.

In my opinion and in all candor, I believe that there is no other problem which is easier to solve than the Middle East problem. It is a simple question as long as the parties concerned—including the superpowers who are, in one form or the other, wittingly or unwittingly, involved in the problem—adhere to the basic and undisputed principle: namely, the recognition of independence and territorial integrity of states, the inadmissibility of acquisition of territory by force, the acceptance and respect of the basic kind of self-determination for the Palestinian people and their right to live in a national home.

If all these principles are adhered to and respected by all the parties, then and only then belligerency can be terminated, and peace could reign over the Middle East with its strategic importance. Only then could the

countries of the area contribute to the progress and development of the international community at large. Hence, all countries existing in the area will continue to develop in their own way, and the state of peace and nonviolence will prevail.

In short, Mr. President, we are facing a historical challenge, and the whole world is watching our meeting. And I do not think that either of us will shrink his responsibility. Let us meet the challenge and prove to the world that we are people worthy of our own civilization and that the horizons of peace are not very far along as we act, and act with determination and vigor.

Distinguished friends, as a tribute to the wisdom of President Ford and his constructive efforts toward peace and friendship among nations and the mutual cooperation between our two countries, I invite you to drink a toast and wish him all the success and fulfillment.

Thank you.

President Ford

Mr. President and distinguished guests: I have long looked forward to meeting you, and I am especially happy that the arrangements were made for us to meet in this historic area in these beautiful surroundings.

I have heard so much from our Secretary of State concerning your forward-looking, statesmanlike views and attitudes; I am sure that we can have many, many constructive moments here in this wonderful area.

My great hope, of course, Mr. President, is that our next meeting will take place in the United States, where we can reciprocate for the warm and very gracious hospitality recently extended by you and the Egyptian people to so many of my fellow Americans, for which I thank you from the bottom of my heart.

Mr. President, we can take great pride in the accomplishment achieved through the very close cooperation of the past year and a half between your country and mine. Inevitably, there have been some disappointments. Nevertheless, I do not feel that these frustrations and difficulties should turn us

away from our mutual goal, which is the establishment of a durable peace, just and fair to all peoples of the Middle East.

I would like to take this opportunity to say with emphasis that the United States will not tolerate stagnation in our efforts for a negotiated settlement—stagnation and a stalemate will not be tolerated. A just and durable peace, fair and equitable to all parties, can and will be achieved.

Mr. President, you have impressed the American people and the world, in my judgment, by your statesmanship and by your wisdom. We understand quite clearly the historic significance of your policies and we will, in every way, attempt to be responsive to the opportunities that you have created.

I think you have demonstrated beyond any doubt, Mr. President, Egypt's sincere desire for peace by deeds as well as by your own fervent desire to turn the energies and the talents of your people toward the creation of a better life for them, and all peoples.

The United States is prepared. We recognize the problems you have and will do our utmost to be a helpful partner in your programs for progress of Egypt.

Mr. President, I would like to propose a toast: To your health and to your efforts on behalf of your people, and to the people of your country.

TOASTS BY PRESIDENT FORD AND AUSTRIAN CHANCELLOR KREISKY, JUNE 1⁶

Chancellor Kreisky

My dear Presidents, ladies and gentlemen: The people of Austria are honored and pleased that two leaders, two heads of state of such great importance, have decided to meet in Austria in order to become acquainted with one another here in the city and in the Land of Salzburg.

The Austrian Federal Government is aware of the political significance of this

meeting. It does not presume to seek a share in this dialogue. It only wants to express its hope that the deliberations between two statesmen of such great importance may serve the cause of peace and understanding among nations.

The Federal President has authorized me to raise my glass on his behalf and on behalf of the Austrian Federal Government to the personal well-being of the two Presidents and to the health and well-being of their nations.

President Ford

Chancellor Kreisky, President Sadat, honored guests, ladies and gentlemen: In the few hours that Mrs. Ford and I have been here, we have been struck by the remarkable charm and the character of Salzburg. And we thank our hosts in this area for their warmth and the friendship that they have shown us.

Austria and the United States have enjoyed warm and friendly ties over a long span of time. Our relationship during the postwar period has been especially close and mutually sustaining.

We value Austria's important role in the search for order and stability in the world, for its contributions in the Middle East, in Cyprus, and elsewhere, in the effort to preserve peace and work toward the negotiated resolution of international conflicts.

When I arrived this morning, I spoke of the reestablishment of a sovereign Austria, the 20th anniversary of which was celebrated just a few weeks ago. The State Treaty and subsequent rebuilding of Austria has served as a landmark for the postwar history.

This landmark demonstrates the possibility of achieving stability and security through negotiation and strict adherence to the principles of democratic self-determination and national sovereignty.

The conciliation demonstrated by all sides helped to produce the vigorous, dynamic, and prosperous Austria that we see today. It contributed to a stable, regional political environment. This experience proves a useful

⁶ Given at a dinner hosted by Chancellor Kreisky at the Residenz, Salzburg; Chancellor Kreisky spoke in German (text from Weekly Compilation of Presidential Documents dated June 9).

lesson in the search for peace in other regions.

I am particularly grateful to your government and to you, Mr. Chancellor, for providing these hospitable surroundings for the meetings with President Sadat.

In our talks today, we have had a welcome opportunity to review the recent positive trends and relations between the United States and Egypt. We have also begun a very useful review of developments in the Middle East, and the exchange of views has been extremely helpful. It is my fervent hope that our talks will contribute to a settlement in the Middle East.

Mr. Chancellor, I raise my glass to Austria and to the objectives that we seek and to you and to world peace.

REMARKS TO THE PRESS BY PRESIDENT FORD AND EGYPTIAN PRESIDENT SADAT, JUNE 2⁷

President Ford: President Sadat and myself have concluded extensive discussions. It has been a pleasure for me to personally meet President Sadat, and I am appreciative for the opportunity of establishing a relationship with him.

I explained the considerations that are important, from our point of view, of the dedication that we have for a permanent peace based on a fair and equitable settlement.

The meetings were conducted, I think, in a very constructive manner.

After leaving here, in the weeks ahead I will have further consultations that I trust will lead to the overall objective that I seek of a permanent peace that will be in the best interests of all of the parties.

President Sadat: Well, ladies and gentlemen, if I may add some words, I consider that the big achievement in this meeting is that I have made the acquaintance of President Ford. I have always said, before I met

him and when I saw Congress receiving him, that he is an honest and a straightforward man.

Now I must add that he is a peace-loving and peace-struggler, also. Added to what I said before, we had intensive talks and a complete survey of the whole situation, and we have discussed lots of considerations.

I shall be going back to my country, and we shall be discussing all the various aspects, and at the same time I shall be always in contact with President Ford.

And may I seize this opportunity to extend an invitation for President Ford to visit our country and to meet with our people, and we shall be very happy to have him among us.

Thank you.

Ronald H. Nessen, Press Secretary to President Ford: We will have a few questions. Miss Thomas [Helen Thomas, United Press International].

Q. I would like to address my question to both Presidents, and it is a two-part question.

Mr. President, first, did you reach any kind of an agreement on a second-stage disengagement which would involve step-by-step diplomacy? And two, did you discuss in any way the final form of a peace settlement within the context of the prewar 1967 borders?

President Ford: As I said in my opening statement, we took into consideration all of the circumstances that are necessary for any agreement, whether it was step-by-step or a comprehensive agreement. The considerations were on the broadest basis so that we could have a complete and total picture of what the problems are in seeking the solution that is what all of us want, which is peace on a fair and equitable basis, that being in the best interests of not only those in the Middle East but the world at large.

Q. My question is to Mr. President Ford. How do you expect the reaction in the Senate after the reassessment of the U.S. policy in the Middle East? And don't you consider the letter of the Senators to be—delivered

⁷ Made in the courtyard at the Residenz, Salzburg, at the conclusion of their meetings (text from Weekly Compilation of Presidential Documents dated June 9).

to you before this meeting with President Sadat—as a sort of pressure?

President Ford: The reassessment that I have been conducting for the last several months has included a great many suggestions from within the United States—experts in both political parties. It has included the observations and suggestions of those from other nations throughout the world, of course including the Middle East.

I have never felt that the suggestions that have come from any source in the context of pressure. We have sought to assemble all of the information that would be aimed at seeing all of the difficulties, all of the benefits. There is a wealth of information that is vitally important, and on the benefit of those recommendations my reassessment will be concluded with a plan that I will submit at the appropriate time.

Q. President Sadat, if I may, sir, I believe you have said that real peace between Egypt and Israel is not possible in this generation. Have you changed your mind or, in fact, has Egypt changed its position in any way since last March?

President Sadat: Well, I didn't say, for the first thing, that peace cannot be achieved. On the contrary. In my speech I said—in spite of the fact that it is a very complicated and difficult problem—but it is very easy to reach a solution when we solve the very simple, fundamental basis of the whole conflict.

I said, and I say always, that the biggest achievement we can do is that we end the state of belligerency that has already taken more than 27 years up till this moment. The peace process will be a long one, so it should be clear, and I think I made myself clear.

Q. President Ford, just to follow up your answer to Miss Thomas, what do you envisage the next step to be in the movement toward the settlement of the Middle East crisis?

President Ford: We have not made any decision as to the next step. There are, of course, a number of alternatives. I think it is premature at this time for me, not having

concluded the full consultation that I had programmed, to indicate in any way whatsoever that a final decision has been made. The objective is clear—it has been from the outset—and it will be the aim of whatever recommendation that I make as a result of the reassessment.

If I might, I would like to add, the discussions between President Sadat and myself have reaffirmed the bilateral relationship between Egypt and the United States, a bilateral relationship that I feel has been constructive, and the discussions that we have had for the last day or so have reaffirmed the continuity of this relationship.

The press: Thank you, Mr. Presidents.

TOASTS BY PRESIDENT FORD AND EGYPTIAN PRESIDENT SADAT, JUNE 2^{*}

President Ford

Mr. President: As you know, it has been a very high privilege for me to meet with you and discuss our mutual problems, as well as our hopes and our aspirations for a joint and a very durable peace in the Middle East [based] on Security Council Resolutions 242 and 338.

I am also glad to see so much of Henry here in Salzburg, I have often thought he might have been taking up residence in the Middle East. [Laughter.]

As you know, the United States will celebrate its 200th anniversary of independence next year. We are now taking a new look at our own early history. As our celebration begins, we have new pride in the courage, the vision, and the wisdom and determination of our forefathers.

America has long stood for peace and human progress based upon justice. And I want you to know, Mr. President, that these remain in our objectives now and, I am certain, in the future. They have the full

^{*} Given at a luncheon hosted by President Ford at Schloss Klessheim, Salzburg (text from Weekly Compilation of Presidential Documents dated June 9).

support of the American people, regardless of their political persuasion.

You and I have very thoroughly reviewed the situation in the Middle East and its implications for the area and the world as a whole. We have discussed the approaches to the continuing process of negotiation. The final decision, of course, cannot be made until other consultations have been held.

We both are totally agreed on the need, indeed, the imperative, of giving momentum to progress toward peace. And, as I have pledged to you, Mr. President, the United States will not permit a stalemate or a stagnation to develop in this all-essential progress. And I believe that our consultations have made a very important contribution toward this objective.

Mr. President, you gave me a very illuminating picture of your plans to put Egypt on the path of sustained economic progress for the future. And I assure you that the United States is prepared to provide Egypt with current assistance as a basis for a long-range economic development, both bilaterally and in cooperation with other states and other international institutions. And I will work with our Congress to give reality to this continuing pledge.

Mr. President, I have found in our talks that we both share the same goal—peace and progress for our peoples and for all humanity. For that reason, I am gratified that our two countries have strengthened friendship dramatically in the past 2½ years and begun cooperation in so many broad fields. I am determined, Mr. President, to continue and to expand this friendship.

Nothing is more apparent in today's world than the fact that the destinies of nations are intertwined. The interdependence of nations is not simply an abstract concept; it is a reality that all peoples and all nations must recognize. The problems of one are the problems of all; the progress of one contributes to the progress of all.

We in the United States will conduct our relations with you, Mr. President, in this

broad spirit. And we know this is your desire as well. Together, Mr. President, and in cooperation with other states that seek peace, progress, and human dignity, we will achieve our common goal.

Gentlemen, I ask all of you to join me in a toast to the President and to the people of Egypt, to peace in the Middle East, and in the cause of peace for all peoples.

President Sadat

Dear President Ford, distinguished friends: It was only yesterday when I first met President Ford in person to deepen the acquaintance, respect through the exchange of letters and views in the last few months.

I am pleased to say that our first get-together was a delightful and illuminating one, as it revealed to me President Ford's great vision, compassion, and genuine commitment to the cause of peace.

Not surprisingly, I found that the President agrees fully with me that the situation in the Middle East is an explosive one that makes it imperative on all the parties concerned to take the urgent actions and measured decisions if we are to avoid another unfortunate outburst of violence.

No one who is sincere in his desire to establish peace in that sensitive and strategic area can possibly tolerate a stalemate or stagnation. Such a state of affairs does not in the least reduce tension or stimulate the process of peace. On the contrary, it gives way to increased mistrust, accumulated frustration, and escalated tensions.

We cannot keep the conflict within manageable proportions unless we strive to maintain the momentum of peace through concrete actions that could convince people that peace is not only a desirable ideal but also a practical and workable proposition.

I am equally pleased with President Ford's sincere desire to strengthen the bilateral relations between our two countries and peoples in the interest of world peace and international cooperation.

Dear friends, while I invite you to stand

up and drink a toast for President Ford and the American people, I would like to state that we are looking forward to seeing the President and Mrs. Ford in Cairo.

ARRIVAL, ROME, JUNE 3

Weekly Compilation of Presidential Documents dated June 9

President Leone, Mrs. Leone, Mr. Prime Minister, Excellencies, and friends: Mr. President, Mrs. Ford and I express our grateful appreciation for the very warm and generous welcome. We are delighted to be here.

The United States and Italy are close friends and very close allies. This fact was apparent during President Leone's visit to Washington in 1974. That visit was memorable to me as the first visit by a European head of state to the United States during my Presidency. The very positive results of our discussions were reflected in the U.S.-Italian joint statement issued last September.

Now, during my first visit to Europe as a President, I come to Rome to continue our consultations on the many, many issues of great importance to both of our countries.

Our discussions today will be inspired and strengthened by the results of the NATO summit meeting in which both our countries participated last week, and by our reaffirmation, together with other NATO member nations, of our dedication to Alliance goals.

Extraordinary ties of friendship and kinship link our people. It is my pleasure to bring to you, Mr. President, the greetings and the very high regard of the people of the United States for Italy. In a world of rapid and dramatic change, Italian-American friendship stands out as a symbol of stability and resolve.

I know that our meetings, Mr. President, will reinforce the traditional bonds of affection and cooperation between our two countries, thus contributing to our goals of peace and prosperity for Italy, for the United States, and for all nations.

TOASTS BY PRESIDENT FORD AND ITALIAN PRESIDENT LEONE, JUNE 3⁹

President Leone

Mr. President: It is with great pleasure that I take this opportunity of again expressing to you, to Mrs. Ford, to the Secretary of State, Dr. Kissinger, as well as to the other eminent members of your party, the most cordial greetings of the Italian people, the government, and myself, and to confirm to you my great and sincere satisfaction at having you as so welcome a guest in our country.

I should like to say first of all how greatly we appreciate the fact that you have wanted to include this visit to Italy in the first trip that you are making to Europe, thereby giving us the opportunity of resuming the fruitful dialogue so happily begun on the occasion of my visit to the United States in September of last year, a visit of which I harbor the most happy memories and whose positive results were expressed in the joint declaration of Washington. To this document we attach the value of a substantial step forward in Italo-American collaboration. And a similar importance attaches to the two meetings that we have had here in Rome with the Secretary of State.

During this morning's talks, we noted with great interest your impressions regarding the results of your intensive diplomatic activity of these last few days. These talks have brought to the attention of our government and public opinion the significance and the importance of this first mission that you are undertaking to Europe in order to stress the solidarity between the United States and her European allies with a view to ever more promising developments of the process of détente among all nations and the consolidation of the cause of peace. We particularly

⁹ Given at a luncheon hosted by President Leone at the Quirinale Palace, Rome; President Leone spoke in Italian (text from Weekly Compilation of Presidential Documents dated June 9).

appreciate the efforts you are making to find a peaceful and lasting solution of the Middle East crisis, a matter, as you well know, to which Italy is particularly sensitive.

The objective of peace that the United States pursues offers new perspectives, thanks to the recent meetings of Salzburg and to the further diplomatic action that the United States intends to carry on. As always, Italy gives its full support to these efforts with the greatest commitment.

Italy continues to consider decisive the role that our friend the American nation can play in insuring for the international community an orderly and peaceful future based on the respect of the principles of freedom, democracy, and progress that constitute the common heritage of our civilizations, the firmest of foundations for our understanding and our alliance. For our part, we should like to assure you that we shall make every effort to collaborate—in the spirit of friendship and cooperation that binds us to the United States and to our European allies—in creating, maintaining, and consolidating everywhere a climate of confidence and peace and in promoting a harmonious economic development to insure the balanced progress of all peoples and nations. The grave problems of our times call for a full understanding and the active collaboration of all countries, the industrialized ones as well as the developing ones. Italy will make its convinced contribution to the farsighted action that the United States is undertaking to this end.

We have welcomed with profound satisfaction the accent that you placed at the recent Brussels meeting of the Atlantic alliance on the fundamental value of the relations between America and Europe for the purpose of strengthening security and insuring a more even development of the two sides of the Atlantic.

Italy, considering the Atlantic alliance as an irreplaceable instrument of equilibrium and peace, has always held that a more concrete and effective European dimension would also give new vigor to the alliance itself.

As you know, we in Italy feel a profound

European vocation. This vocation is reinforced by our realization that a strong and united Europe will be an essential element in an increasingly close collaboration with the United States and the West in general for the solution of the great problems of peace, stability, and harmonious progress of the whole world that characterize our times.

Our meeting of this morning will give new impetus to the already fertile collaboration that has been instituted between the United States and Italy with a view to attaining the solutions that we all look forward to in a framework of continued and, indeed, strengthened solidarity among the peoples of the West. I am sure that a similar result will be obtained by the discussions that you and the Secretary of State will have this afternoon with our Prime Minister.

Mr. President, America is about to celebrate the second centenary of the Declaration of Independence, a document that embodies ideals and aspirations that originated, among others, also in my own country. In this connection, I need only recall that the name of an Italian figures among the signatories of the Declaration and that Benjamin Franklin had frequent contacts with the more enlightened thinkers in Italy. And Italy therefore feels that it wants to participate wholeheartedly in this celebration.

In this spirit, then, I raise my glass to the good health and well-being of yourself, Mr. President, and Mrs. Ford, to the success of your lofty task at the head of the American nation, and to the live and deep-reaching friendship that binds Italy to the United States.

President Ford

Mr. President and Mrs. Leone, Mr. Prime Minister, and Excellencies: I am delighted to be in the Eternal City of Rome, the justly celebrated capital of Italy.

It is a pleasure and an honor to be with you today in this hospitable and historic palace. I am mindful of the symbolism of this visit, underlining as it does the traditional friendship and ties between our two countries.

We in America have just begun the cele-

bration of the 200th anniversary of the U.S. struggle for independence. The very name "America" derives from an Italian navigator. Among the Italian contributors to the early history of the American Republic are William Paca, a signer of the Declaration of Independence, Filippo Mazzei, a close friend and collaborator of Thomas Jefferson.

Since the very beginning of our country, the human ties between Italy and the United States have enriched America's life, America's culture, and have served to establish the basis for the deep and very warm friendship that exists today.

For a quarter of a century as a Member of the U.S. Congress, I served in our national Capitol building. As a result, I was mindful of the contributions of artists and skilled workers from Italy to design, to construct, and decorate our national Capitol.

The paintings, the carvings, and the statues of Italian conception and artistry have become enshrined at the very heart of our government as a part of America's history and America's heritage. This symbolizes only one aspect of our great debt to Italy.

Our hearts are lifted when we hear America's many bands playing stirring airs, and we do recall that President Thomas Jefferson, who loved the music of Italy, invited Italian musicians to create our first military band.

In considering those who have made distinguished contributions to the relations between our countries, I would like to take this occasion to express my appreciation for the outstanding service of your Ambassador to the United States, Ambassador Ortona. He has gained the respect and the appreciation of not only American Presidents and Secretaries of State, but also of the American people.

Americans in Italy never feel that they are among strangers. We always have the feeling that we are with close friends. In this relationship, our two countries share much in common:

—Our cultural, economic, fraternal, commercial, and social ties affirm our continued cooperation and close association.

—Our governments are committed to a

world of freedom and peace and to overcoming tensions which threaten the peace.

—We are committed to the strength of an alliance that has kept more than a quarter century—a quarter of century of peace on the continent and which is indispensable to our concerted efforts to reduce tensions and to increase cooperation.

—Of first importance, we share a firm dedication to democratic government and the principles of freedom and liberty.

We in America value the role of Italy in the world, your contributions to the Atlantic alliance, and your efforts toward a stronger and more cohesive Europe working with the United States.

These bonds and shared goals, Mr. President, were set forth in the joint statement issued on the occasion of your visit to the United States last year. They have been reaffirmed in our discussions today.

At the NATO summit conference in Brussels last week, the member nations of the Atlantic alliance renewed their commitment to the Atlantic alliance and to the principles of friendship and cooperation and the common defenses which are its foundation.

I must emphasize how much the United States values Italy's partnership and Italy's contributions to the alliance. We greatly admire the leaders and the people of Italy in carrying through difficult economic measures which are crucial in fighting today's economic difficulties. We are keenly aware of Italy's strengths. We are proud of our alliance with you and take confidence in the knowledge that this relationship is welcomed by you.

Mr. President, the warmth of the welcome given me today by you, by your gracious and charming wife, and by the people of Rome on behalf of all of the Italian people has been in the highest tradition of Italian hospitality. For me, this delightful luncheon with so many friends symbolizes the depth of friendship between our two countries.

In this spirit, I lift my glass in toast to the United States and to Italy, to our continuing, growing friendship in the years ahead, to President Leone, to Prime Minister Moro, and to the great Italian people.

Weekly Compilation of Presidential Documents dated June 9

President Ford

President Leone, Mr. Prime Minister, Your Excellencies: Upon our departure from Italy, Mrs. Ford and I wish to express our profound gratitude to President and Mrs. Leone, to Prime Minister and Mrs. Moro, and to the Italian Government and the Italian people for the wonderful reception accorded us on this occasion and this visit.

The warmth with which we have been received, the cordial and productive discussions that I have had with your highest leaders, and the friendship and good will expressed everywhere for the United States have made this a memorable experience for all of us.

For over a quarter of a century, Italy and the United States have had a remarkable identity of purpose in working as democracies with shared ideals toward the goals of an enduring peace and prosperity for our people.

We have worked together as allies in NATO to preserve peace and to insure stability in Europe and in the Mediterranean. We can take satisfaction in the successes we have achieved.

As a result of my many meetings here in Rome, I am confident that the United States and Italy together, as partners in the Atlantic alliance, will enjoy similar success in meeting the complex and difficult challenges before us.

In this way, we can contribute to the prospects of a peaceful and prosperous life for the people throughout the world.

On behalf of Mrs. Ford and myself, you have our sincere thanks, our deepest appreciation for the hospitality and the many kindnesses extended to us at all levels during every moment of our stay.

As we prepare to leave this beautiful country, I am reminded of the saying that fond

memories spare departures for final sorrow. Thus, we cannot leave Italy in sorrow, for we carry far too many warm memories of a very special day with gracious friends.

I thank you.

President Leone¹⁰

Mr. President: Upon your departure, I should like once again to say to you and Mrs. Ford how pleased we are to have had this opportunity of meeting you again.

The intensive and fruitful talks that I, Prime Minister Moro, Foreign Minister Rumor, and other members of the Italian Government have had with you and Dr. Kissinger have once again concerned the friendly, constructive, and firm spirit with which our two countries are facing the problems which concern them both on the bilateral and the general plane.

Your trip to Europe, in which you so opportunely included this short visit to Rome, has been of great importance. The Brussels summit in particular has shown the vitality of the alliance. It is a guarantee of our collective security and also an essential condition for détente and peace.

Our talks today have concerned the existence of a full agreement of views on this essential point and a common wish to seek the solution of problems relating to peace and to political and economic stability in Europe and in the Mediterranean, in particular in the Middle East area, as well as those problems of a global dimension which are characteristic of our ties.

Thank you for the kind words you have just said and for the lofty things you said about my country. In thanking you again for the good will that you have displayed to us, I wish you every success in our ongoing cooperation and in your enlightened work at the head of the American nation.

¹⁰ President Leone spoke in Italian.

Secretary Kissinger's News Conferences at Brussels and Salzburg

BRUSSELS, MAY 29

Press release 308 dated May 30

Secretary Kissinger: Ladies and gentlemen, I will begin with the President's presentation at the NATO session; then I will summarize the bilateral meetings that took place today. I know you have already been briefed on the ones this morning, but I will sum them up anyway.

On the speech that the President made to the NATO Council, you will have the text, and therefore there is no point in my going through all of the portions.

The President began by summing up the nature of the original American commitment, the purposes that NATO originally had been designed to serve, and stated his conviction that in his view these required no new restatement, that they were as valid today as they were then.

He then discussed a number of problems that he saw before the alliance, or problems that might affect the alliance in the field of defense, in the field of disagreements that had arisen between some allies, the field of energy, and with respect to the Middle East.

He then discussed six major areas that in his view required attention.

First, the need for a strong and credible defense. He pointed out that without security no other objectives would make any sense. He called for meeting the longstanding goals for common procedures of equipment, for a more systematic research and development, and reiterated our commitment not to engage in any unilateral withdrawal of American forces. You can take that as a given of our policy that outside the MBFR [mutual and balanced force reductions] framework the United States will not withdraw any forces from NATO.

The second point he stressed was the need to preserve the quality and integrity of the

alliance on the basis of unqualified participation and not on the basis of partial membership or special arrangements that individual countries might wish to make with the alliance.

Q. Does that mean that France—

Secretary Kissinger: I will answer questions later. Let me just run through this.

The third was a call for an improvement in the process of political consultation. As you know, it has been our position throughout our discussions with our allies that solidarity with respect to defense cannot be maintained for an indefinite period of time unless there is solidarity with respect to political objectives and, in our view, increasing them with respect to the new agenda which the President treated separately.

Fourth, the President asked for a joint action in developing a productive and realistic agenda for détente that serves our interest and not the interests of others, an agenda, in other words, that we could do jointly rather than each of the individual members separately. He related this to the European Security Conference and to the mutual balanced force reduction.

Fifth, he called attention to the future of the West itself, calling for the strengthening of our democratic institutions within the alliance and encouraging the growth of democratic processes within the members of the alliance.

Sixth, he emphasized that the vitality of the alliance depended on the conception by the members of the alliance as a great joint enterprise and not simply as a series of individual efforts and not purely as a defense, and he called attention to the agenda which we have been putting forward all week in other forums—of energy, of population, of food, and of raw materials in addition to the need for strengthening the world trad-

ing and monetary systems—and he called for cooperative action in all of these things.

He expressed his conviction that the United States had trials over the recent months; it is nevertheless in a strong position—that we possess the willpower, the technical capability, and the spiritual conviction to do what is needed to master the agenda that he outlined.

Now, so much for his presentation at the NATO Council. He was the only speaker except for a military briefing by the Chairman of the Military Committee.

Now, we can proceed in one of two ways: I can either sum up the bilateral talks and then take your questions, or I can take questions on this and then—should I continue?

Q. Yes. Sum it up.

Secretary Kissinger: Sum up the bilateral talks?

Q. Yes, that is correct.

Secretary Kissinger: The President met during the day, as you know, with the Prime Minister of Luxembourg, with the Prime Ministers of Greece and Turkey, with the Chancellor of the Federal Republic, the Prime Minister of Denmark, and with the Prime Minister of Portugal. If I have forgotten somebody, we are in a major diplomatic problem. [Laughter.]

As I understand it, you have already been briefed about the meetings that took place this morning. Let me just add one comment about the discussions that are taking place with the representatives from Greece and Turkey.

We are not, as we have repeatedly pointed out, acting as mediator. What we are attempting to do is, one, to contribute to a framework in which the negotiations between the parties would be eased. We are therefore talking to the parties about general principles and approaches that could be followed in moving toward a solution of the dispute between them, because we believe that the quarrel between two allies—both of whom we value—is against the interests of the alliance, against their own interests.

We believe that while these negotiations

are going on, neither side should take any military actions or make any military threat or take any steps that could lead to military action, and we have expressed that conviction to the parties concerned.

As you know, the Greek and Turkish Foreign Ministers are going to meet tomorrow, and the Greek and Turkish Prime Ministers are meeting on Saturday.

I will be meeting with the Greek Foreign Minister, maybe the Prime Minister, tomorrow, and I will also meet with the senior Turkish official.

We hope that this process will contribute not only to easing the tensions but to generating a framework in which a solution to their dispute becomes easier and is ultimately attained, and within these limits which I have described to you, we thought the talks went well.

As for the meeting with the German Chancellor, he is, of course, a very close ally and a very good friend. We reviewed the state of the alliance, the state of East-West relations. We had a brief discussion on the Middle East, but we spent most of our time on the nature of the economic conditions in the industrial world and the problem of industrial growth as they affected stability, cohesiveness of our societies and of our alliance, as well as the relationship between the industrial societies and the developing society.

The meeting with the Prime Minister of Denmark dealt with the general problems of the alliance, and were such common issues as their perception of the Portuguese situation and our joint views on East-West relations.

For the benefit of the fraternity of Foreign Ministers, I want to point out that in each case the Prime Ministers, or Chancellors, were accompanied by their Foreign Ministers, who made a major contribution to the discussion. Therefore I hope you will—yes, the American Foreign Minister also contributed. [Laughter.] Just a minute. You don't want to hear about Portugal? [Laughter.] I will be glad to take questions now.

In the meeting with the Portuguese Prime Minister, the discussion was very frank and was conducted in a friendly atmosphere. The President explained his views about the im-

fact on NATO of a government in which a Communist might play a significant role. The Portuguese explained to us the nature of their domestic structure, which is, as you all know, unique in the NATO alliance, and there was a very frank and, I believe, mutual exchange of views.

This is the extent of the bilaterals.

Now I will take some questions.

Q. Mr. Secretary, when you outlined the President's remarks, including the point that special arrangements could not be made, does that mean that if Portugal becomes Communist dominated, there is no way to fit it into NATO? Is that what he was trying to say?

Secretary Kissinger: No, I think that what we were saying, in elliptical diplomatic language, is that the special arrangements that various member nations have already attempted to make cannot become the normal pattern if the alliance is to survive in its present form.

Q. Do you mean Greece pulling out on the military side and Turkey threatening and that kind of thing?

Q. Question, sir?

Secretary Kissinger: The question is, in Helen Thomas' precise formulation, Greece pulling out of the alliance, Turkey threatening, or that sort of thing, and the answer is—

Q. Military bases.

Secretary Kissinger: The answer is we mean that sort of thing. [Laughter.]

Q. Dr. Kissinger, you are always so enlightening in your elliptical terms. Thank you. [Laughter.]

Secretary Kissinger: That is another sort of thing. [Laughter.]

Q. Mr. Secretary, did the Turkish Prime Minister, according to one report, tell the President that he would prefer not to have the United States act as a mediator or to intervene and leave it to both sides to settle this type of dispute?

Secretary Kissinger: No, that did not hap-

pen. We have never said that we were acting as mediators. We did not put ourselves forward as mediators, nor did the Turkish Prime Minister tell us what role he wanted us to play or that he didn't want us to play any role. The discussions with the Turkish leaders were in the framework that had originally been charted in my two visits to Ankara, and there was no such implication.

It is, of course, clear that the basic negotiation will have to take place between the Greek and Turkish communities on Cyprus, as well as between the Greek and Turkish Governments. Our role is to facilitate, to help, as we are requested, and perhaps to come up with an occasional idea.

Q. Mr. Secretary, the United States having expressed its concern about unqualified membership in NATO, what does it intend to do about it? Were there any specific proposals, or does the United States have any specific proposals to carry out this intention?

Secretary Kissinger: No.

Q. Question?

Secretary Kissinger: The question is, the United States having expressed its concern about the problem of—not unqualified support, qualified support—qualified membership in NATO, what is the United States going to do about it?

The purpose of the President's speech was to outline the problems he saw before the alliance and the issues that needed solutions. As you know, the whole day tomorrow will be devoted to discussion and there will, without any doubt, be additional Presidential intervention as the discussion continues. This was not an attempt to put forward all of the solutions to all of the problems he outlined.

Q. Mr. Secretary, when you, in several different formulations, warned the Turks and the Greeks against taking forceful action, why is it necessary to make that such a strong point?

Q. Question?

Secretary Kissinger: The question was, if in several formulations I warned the Greeks and the Turks against forceful action.

It was only in one formulation. I tried to sum up what our general view is, and our view happens to be that the use of force and the threat of force during these negotiations by either side would not be helpful and that the process of negotiation should have the primary role.

There is no specific threat of force at this particular moment, but given the potential tenseness of the situation, we simply wanted to state our view.

Q. Mr. Secretary, excuse me. If I could just follow up. Did the President make that same cautionary remark?

Secretary Kissinger: Of course. I am reporting about the President's conversation.

Q. Mr. Secretary, what did the President tell the Portuguese Prime Minister he thought the impact on NATO would be if Portugal were dominated by Communists?

Q. Question?

Secretary Kissinger: The question is, what did the President point out to the Portuguese Prime Minister that the impact on NATO would be if Portugal were dominated by Communists?

He pointed out that the impact would be unfortunate and somewhat incompatible with the purposes of NATO.

Q. Mr. Secretary, in connection with your discussion with the Portuguese, did they give any assurances that it is not the intention of the Portuguese Government to be a Trojan horse in a NATO structure, that that was not their purpose? Could you give us some of the language he might have used?

Q. Question?

Secretary Kissinger: I obviously cannot. The question is, did the Portuguese Prime Minister give us any assurances about Portugal not being a Trojan horse?

As a matter of fact, that was a phrase that came up in the discussion. We did not ask for any assurances. The purpose of this meeting was to make clear our view and to enable in the first meeting between the President and the Portuguese leaders—for them to express their views.

We also made clear that we welcomed a

change in Portugal from its previous system to a democratic system, and we expressed our good will toward such efforts.

The view of the Portuguese ministers was that they did not represent a Communist dominated government.

Q. During the course of the President's conversation with the Chancellor [of the Federal Republic of Germany], were the subjects of Spain and Portugal discussed?

Secretary Kissinger: The President pointed out in his speech, which you will get, our view that Spain should have a closer relationship to Western defense. There was some brief discussion about our views with respect to Spain—and on which there was perhaps not complete unanimity—and some brief discussion on Portugal.

We had already, last week when I was in the Federal Republic, extensive conversations with both the Chancellor and the Foreign Minister on Portugal, which, of course, the President was fully familiar with.

Mr. Nessen [Ronald H. Nessen, Press Secretary to President Ford]: The last question right over here.

Q. Sir, was the conversation with the Portuguese in English or was that through an interpreter?

Q. Question?

Secretary Kissinger: We can ask one more substantive question.

The question was, was the conversation with the Portuguese in English or through in interpreter? It was through an interpreter.

Q. Mr. Secretary, what about the meeting with d'Estaing [Valery Giscard d'Estaing, President of France] tonight and if you could answer that and tell us how it came about, would you also tell us what you think about France's special relationship within the NATO organization?

Secretary Kissinger: I think it is covered in the point that is made in the President's speech.

Q. Question?

Secretary Kissinger: With respect to the meeting of the two Presidents, President

called President Ford about two weeks ago and told him that he had decided to attend the meeting of the NATO heads of state and heads of government, and on that occasion suggested or it was mutually agreed, that while he attended this meeting a discussion between the two Presidents seemed appropriate.

We feel very strongly that this is the case, that a number of topics that we wish to discuss, including the energy problem, which I have already had a preliminary discussion with the French President about, Middle East, Atlantic relations, and the usual agenda of U.S.-French relations—and as you know, the two Presidents have a very warm personal relationship.

Q. You mentioned energy. You said meeting. You meant dinner?

Secretary Kissinger: I meant dinner. I am sorry. He was going to come to the dinner, and in connection with that dinner, a meeting would be appropriate.

SALZBURG, JUNE 2

Press release 312 dated June 2

Ronald H. Nessen, Press Secretary to President Ford: The two Presidents [President Ford and President Sadat of Egypt], of course, have given you their views of the meetings they held here. A number of you have asked for elaboration and further explanation of some of the points, so the Secretary of State has come down to do that. After Dr. Kissinger has talked to you I will have perhaps three or four items in the way of schedule announcements to make.

Secretary Kissinger: I need hardly say how much I have been looking forward to an opportunity to have the press conference in Salzburg. [Laughter.] I have been rehearsing for it for a year.

The two Presidents have really stated their positions, and there is nothing I could add to those, but I thought it might be helpful to answer some questions. So within the limit—yes?

Q. Can you give us your reaction to the

decision by the Israelis to thin out their forces east of the canal, please?

Secretary Kissinger: The question is to give my reaction to the decision of the Israelis to thin out their forces east of the canal.

We think that that is a constructive move. It has clearly the intention of easing possible Egyptian concerns about Israeli artillery in range of the canal, and while not decisive on—no unilateral step can be a decisive step at this point—I think it is a helpful contribution to the process which the United States is strongly attempting to encourage in which both parties should make an effort to move toward peace.

Q. Mr. Secretary, how long have you known about this Israeli decision?

Secretary Kissinger: Well, we have talked about this Israeli decision—I mean about this concept or about a concept like this—previously. The actual decision we learned about this morning.

Yes?

Q. Did the Egyptians indicate there was any change in their negotiating position since last March? And if there was, was there enough to encourage a resumption of a negotiation with Israel on a partial agreement?

Secretary Kissinger: The purpose of these talks was not for the two heads of state to get into detailed negotiations on the issues of peace in the Middle East or on the issues of an interim agreement between Egypt and Israel. As I pointed out to a number of you previously, the intention of this meeting was to permit the two leaders an opportunity to look over all the various roads to peace that have so far been identified in the Middle East and to see which of them might be more promising or how to pursue those that were available.

I think the discussion proceeded from the assumption that if progress toward peace is to be made all parties must make a contribution, and in that sense I thought there was a positive spirit. It is too early to tell whether it permits a resumption of any par-

ticular negotiation, because we must now talk to the Israeli Prime Minister and see whether his ideas coincide with those we have heard from the Egyptian President or whether there should be perhaps some American suggestions.

But the atmosphere was constructive; the attitude was constructive. And together with the Israeli move that was made today perhaps we are moving into a period where some momentum can be put behind peace efforts again.

Q. Mr. Secretary, do you anticipate Egypt making some parallel confidence-building moves? And also, does the shift of Syrian forces to the Iraqi front have any bearing or was it intended in any way to signal Syrian interests in a peace effort with Israel?

Secretary Kissinger: I believe that, of course, whether Egypt will make some response, it is too early to say. But in general, the Israeli announcement, as I understood it, was intended as a response to the Egyptian opening of the Suez Canal despite the suspension of the negotiations in March. So that maybe that concludes the sequence of moves.

We have no confirmed reports about the shift of Syrian forces away from the Israeli frontier, but it is very possible that if it did take place it is caused by reasons unrelated to the settlement issue, though it could have an effect on the settlement.

Q. Mr. Secretary, could you be a little more precise on what form an American policy statement will now take after you have conferred with the Israeli Prime Minister? Will it be a general statement, or will you lay out a specific set of recommendations?

Secretary Kissinger: Well, as you know, we have always been reluctant to make specific recommendations unless we felt the parties were sufficiently close for these recommendations to bridge the gap. Certainly, the President will state his general views at some point after he has talked to the parties concerned. Whether he will make any specific

proposals will really depend on how close he judges the parties to be.

Murrey [Murrey Marder, Washington Post].

Q. Mr. Secretary, that certainly was not a very happy, exhilarated-looking group in the courtyard today. The two Presidents and those of you who were standing with him did not exactly—did not by any means look like it had lived up in any way to President Sadat's talk of this meeting marking a historic moment.

Can you say whether from your perception the Egyptian leaders had much higher expectations which could not be fulfilled because of the American timetable? And secondly, can you tell us whether the deadline of the expiration of the mandate in the Sinai is pressing with any urgency on your considerations?

Secretary Kissinger: As I understood Mr. Marder's conclusions, I don't—if he formed the impression that this was not a happy, exhilarated group that he saw standing in the courtyard at the Residency—that is the name of the place—and he wondered whether the expiration of the mandate in the Sinai might have been pressing on the consciousness of the unexhilarated group that was standing there.

If I can be frank and not be offensive to you ladies and gentlemen, you didn't look like a pretty exhilarated group to me, either. [Laughter.] It could be that the atmospheric conditions had something to do with it, because I don't know how you show exhilaration when somebody holds an umbrella over you and rain is pouring down on your back. But I am just beginning my lecture.

Basically, we thought it was a very constructive meeting. It was not intended to reach any specific conclusions—and it achieved that purpose. It was not intended to reach any precise conclusions that would lead to an immediate negotiation. It was, however, very positive, very constructive, and I think it provides the basis for useful talks with the Israelis. And I really think,

Murrey, that your impression was just not right.

The second part of your question was whether the imminence of the UNEF [U.N. Emergency Force] expiration was weighing on the leaders. I don't think it played any role in the discussions. It was never involved; it was never mentioned by either side. But I really want to go back to the first point.

It was not an occasion in which you could say a conclusion—a final conclusion—was reached, but I think the possibility exists for constructive further discussions with other parties.

Q. Mr. Secretary, did President Ford promise President Sadat an American aid program at least as large as last year's? Was there talk or was there agreement reached on American participation in an international consortium that could help the economic development of Egypt?

Secretary Kissinger: No. The question is, did the United States promise aid at least as large as last year's, and did the United States promise participation in an international consortium on Egypt's long-term economic progress?

With respect to the first question, the final decisions on American aid figures to Middle East countries will be reached after the conclusion of the general reassessment. But it is clear that we will retain an interest—as the President made clear in his luncheon toast—in the economic development and progress of Egypt, and it is our intention to make a substantial contribution to that, but what the precise figure is we will have to wait until the general decisions are made.

With respect to the idea on the long-term program, I think the word "consortium" is probably exaggerated, but we have indicated to a number of other countries that we favor assistance to Egypt for its long-term economic problems.

Q. Mr. Secretary, to what extent do you feel there was a similarity of views between the two Presidents on what should constitute the basis of an overall settlement?

Secretary Kissinger: We did not go into a discussion of the details of a final settlement. We discussed, rather, what approaches would be used if a final—if that were the road that all parties decided they prefer to take and how the discussions might be conducted. Of course, we are familiar with the Egyptian point of view on these matters, which has been stated repeatedly and publicly, but we have not taken any position on—we have not taken a formal American position; for that matter, we have not taken an American position on an overall settlement.

Q. Mr. Secretary, the Egyptian spokesman here yesterday seemed to give short shrift to your shuttle diplomacy, and step-by-step seems to be landing in the ashcan. Did you have any consensus with Sadat—did Ford have any consensus with Sadat on the one promising route—you know, the approach to this problem?

Secretary Kissinger: The question is, the impression was created by the Egyptian spokesman yesterday that Egypt was not interested any longer in a step-by-step approach.

Q. For a prolonged period.

Secretary Kissinger: Of course, for a long period—and that this seems to have given short shrift to one of the promising avenues.

Let me make clear the United States is not pushing any one approach. As both the President and I have stated repeatedly, we are prepared to go to a Geneva Conference, and we are prepared to discuss in that framework. At the same time, our conviction is that whatever approach is most promising should be pursued; and therefore if other avenues open up we are prepared to pursue them.

I did not have the impression from the talks that any avenue was excluded or that there was any strong preference for one approach rather than another. There was a preference on which both parties agreed that some progress toward peace in the Middle East was essential. We do not want to commit ourselves to which of the approaches is

the more likely to succeed until we have heard the Israeli views on that subject.

But I did not have the impression that the Egyptian side precluded any of the approaches.

Q. Will you have a meeting of minds?

Secretary Kissinger: We cannot have a meeting of minds until we have heard from the Israelis.

Q. Well, I mean meeting of minds between the United States and Egypt?

Secretary Kissinger: I think that we clearly understand the Egyptian view of what is in their view—what are the elements of an interim agreement and also the Egyptian view of the procedures and content of an overall agreement. Now we have to get the Israeli views on this subject and then we can see how closely they mesh; and of course, as we have stated with respect to the interim agreement, both sides will have to look at their positions compared to what they were at the end of March, if one wants to get movement.

Q. Before this meeting began, a senior American official said that there probably would be no announcements. He also said that would not mean an important decision was not reached. Are you now telling us that there was no important development here?

Secretary Kissinger: No, I am trying to tell you that on the whole we are encouraged by these talks, in the sense that we believe that serious discussions can be continued now on the issue of moving toward peace.

I have stated previously—and so did the senior spokesman—that no dramatic announcement could be expected here. It is the nature of things, since the decisions involve many other parties. But we consider this meeting to have been helpful, and we plan to have other meetings, and of course you know of the other meetings which will now be taking place.

Q. Do you anticipate that any of the subsequent discussions will take place at Geneva—either at an overall conference or in a step-

by-step basis but in Geneva—with other parties participating, apart from the United States?

Secretary Kissinger: There is no question that the Geneva Conference will have to be reassembled at some point. This is a view we have always had, even during step-by-step diplomacy, and that view has not changed. All the parties are agreed to it. We are agreed to it.

What the next step will be, we want to reserve our judgment until we have had our other conversations. But it is my impression that on the basis of the discussions that have been taking place that there are possibilities for useful talks.

Q. You have said on about a half a dozen occasions—just now from the podium—that what happens now depends on talks with the Israelis. Would it be unfair to say that in some way the Israelis have a hangup to finding a path—

Secretary Kissinger: No. I think this—we have gone through this on many of the shuttles. There always is somebody you have talked to last and you are going to talk to next. It is therefore inevitable that when you get into the talks with the next person, that in the nature of the sequence, you have to get their views before you can determine what is going to happen.

We are not saying that any country is the hangup. We did not elaborate a specific proposal with Egypt that will now be put forward with Israel. Rather, after we have discussed with Israel, we will then be in a position to see whether both parties should be encouraged to come forward with specific proposals or whether the time isn't right to go toward a more comprehensive solution.

But it is not of a nature where we can say here is a proposal and now ask the Israelis to accept it. It is, rather, to get the Israeli point of view, and then we would perhaps be in a position—then we will be in a position to see whether both sides should be asked to be more concrete.

Thank you.

Secretary Kissinger Welcomes Council of the Americas

Following are remarks by Secretary Kissinger made before a meeting of the Council of the Americas at the Department of State on June 4.

Press release 317 dated June 4

As you know, I only returned late last night from the Presidential trip to Europe. But I wanted to take this opportunity to welcome you here, to make a few remarks about our interest in Latin America, and then perhaps to answer two or three questions.

Before I go into the subject of Latin America, let me emphasize a more fundamental point.

We are this moment, as a country, having to adjust our policies and our perceptions to a world that is fundamentally different from that of the early postwar period. When America first ended its more or less traditional isolation, we were the dominant country militarily, economically, and politically. Foreign policy for a lot of our friends really became an effort to influence our own decisionmaking process.

But in the last decade we have seen the split within the Communist world; we have seen the emergence of new centers of power around the world; we have seen the emergence of newly developing countries; we have seen our friends in Europe and Japan gain in strength and economic and political influence. In other words, we are dealing with a world infinitely more complex than the one in which the foreign policy of this country was first designed in the immediate postwar period.

And most particularly there has emerged in recent years the increasing importance of economic policy—the relationship among the industrialized countries, the relationship between the industrialized countries and the developing countries. The whole agenda of interdependence that is reflected in energy, in raw materials, in food, and in the attempt

of many nations, especially the less developed nations, to organize themselves to bring about what they consider a different approach to the economic arrangements of the world—all of this has involved the United States in a very profound way. And it involves us, not only as an economic problem, but from the point of view of the structure of the world, of the relationship various nations feel toward each other.

No international system has ever been maintained or has ever been relatively stable unless the countries that comprised it felt they had a stake in it. And one of the tasks that the United States has at this moment is to bring about, or contribute to, an international environment in which the major nations—and in which those who are associated with us in any way—feel that they have a stake in the maintenance of order, stability, and progress.

I have made these general observations because our relationships to Latin America are very crucial in this respect. Even though we have a tradition of isolation, our relationship with Latin America is more continuous than with any other part of the world. We are connected here with countries that have comparable political origins, with countries sharing similar cultural traditions and having comparable economic aspirations.

Therefore in many important ways the test case of America's ability to relate itself to the less developed nations is our ability to live in peace and progress in the Western Hemisphere. This is why we have started the so-called new dialogue, which attempts to cut through some of the shibboleths that have developed and enable the countries of Latin America and the United States to exchange views on their actual problems and which attempts also to solve some of the outstanding political issues, such as the Panama issue, before they become unmanageable.

Now, I think we have made some progress, and I believe that the recent OAS [Organization of American States] meeting, in the spirit of its discussions and in the relative

lack of acrimony, was a tremendous advance. But still a great deal remains to be done.

On our side, I think it is important not to proceed in too doctrinaire a fashion and to realize that unless the concerns of Latin America are heard here and are understood here, there is no basis for a serious dialogue. We have a great missionary tradition, and therefore our tendency is to try to believe that our maxims are the only possible ones. But unless we understand that other parts of the world have their own concerns, then this spirit of confrontation, which is already too widespread in the world, will grow unmanageable.

On the other hand, it is incumbent on Latin America not to seek its sense of identity simply by confrontation with the United States.

So both sides ought to approach the issues in a new spirit.

We have recently, at the OECD [Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development] and in other forums, made clear that we are prepared to approach the dialogue with developing countries with a fresh attitude, taking into account some of their serious concerns. And we are particularly prepared to practice this in the Western Hemisphere.

I have had, unfortunately, to postpone a trip I had planned to Latin America on a number of occasions, but I firmly plan to do it within the next few months. Under the leadership of Bill Rogers [William D. Rogers, Assistant Secretary for Inter-American Affairs], I believe that the State Department has had the most dynamic and interested concern for Latin America that has existed here in many a year.

So I am delighted that this group is meeting here. I strongly support what you are seeking to do. We hope you will find that the policies we are trying to pursue here help you in your efforts, and I know that what you are doing helps us in ours.

Perhaps the best way we can proceed now is that I will take a few questions and let you go to lunch.

Q. May I have the first question?

Secretary Kissinger: Don't make it too technical; it's been a long night. [Laughter.]

Q. Mr. Secretary, a question came up a couple of times during the meeting, and it was on the problem of the pricing of commodities—the famous commodity problem—and some of your predecessors asked us to ask you the question. [Laughter.]

Secretary Kissinger: Well, I read in the newspapers with rapt attention about all the tremendous intramural fights that are allegedly going on in Washington on this issue. And the new sport in Washington is to take to the newspapers those issues which you never raised in the departmental meetings. [Laughter.]

The view with respect to commodities: We are not attempting to organize global cartels which will fix the price of every commodity, or indeed of any commodity.

On the other hand, we are engaged in discussions with many countries on the problem of energy. It is also a fact that for many countries the primary source of development income derives from the sale of their commodities. It is a demand that has been made rather insistently in the energy context, and it has been made outside the energy context.

The United States is opposed to indexing. The United States is opposed to fixing the prices of commodities by international agreement. But there are many other issues with respect to commodities that can be discussed—the relationship between aid and income stabilization, for example—regardless of what the price of the commodity is. That does not have to be tied to fixing the price of the commodity. The problem of assured markets and assured supply.

I think there are many aspects with respect to the commodity issue that can be discussed in international forums and in which we can express our opinion and listen to the concerns of other countries.

The United States has offered, in the OECD meetings, to create a monitoring group that will review those negotiations

that will in any event be going on in other frameworks and to do any additional work that may be needed to meet the concerns of various groups. But we have specifically rejected the idea of indexation, and we do not anticipate international price-fixing agreements.

Q. [Inaudible.]

Moderator: Can you repeat the question? I can't hear.

Secretary Kissinger: No, I can; I heard the question all right. But I have the feeling that we've got a ringer here. [Laughter.] That's a newsman who is asking, who is trying to turn this into a press conference. [Laughter.]

Moderator: I didn't notice that. I can't see him.

Secretary Kissinger: Yes, I think his shape looks a little familiar. I can't swear— [Laughter.]

Moderator: May we have the question?

Secretary Kissinger: No, I'll answer the question. I don't want him to think that I am running away from him.

There was, as part of the new dialogue, a group that was dealing with multinational corporations and which would have dealt with this particular problem. As a result of the cancellation of the Foreign Ministers meeting, the subgroups that were related to these Foreign Ministers meetings also canceled their discussions. At the same time we have created, within the framework of the OAS, the sort of informal possibility of dialogue which these Foreign Ministers meetings were supposed to create when the OAS machinery was still more formal.

The United States is prepared to resume these discussions. We recognize that this is a concern of many Latin American countries; and if they are prepared to deal with it on a concrete basis and not on a highly theoretical basis, I think some progress can be made.

Moderator: Mr. Secretary, I think that I

interpret the feeling of all my members of the council and their guests in thanking you from the bottom of our hearts for coming here today. We know that you just got back yesterday from an extremely strenuous trip all over Europe, and we really don't want to detain you.

Thank you very, very much, sir.

President Ford Urges Action on Energy Program

*Address by President Ford*¹

Last January 15, I went before your Senators and Representatives in Congress with a comprehensive plan to make our country independent of foreign sources of energy by 1985. Such a program was long overdue. We have become increasingly at the mercy of others for the fuel on which our entire economy runs.

Here are the facts and figures that will not go away. The United States is dependent on foreign sources for about 37 percent of its present petroleum needs. In 10 years, if we do nothing, we will be importing more than half our oil at prices fixed by others—if they choose to sell to us at all. In 21½ years, we will be twice as vulnerable to a foreign oil embargo as we were two winters ago.

We are now paying out \$25 billion a year for foreign oil. Five years ago we paid out only \$3 billion annually. Five years from now, if we do nothing, who knows how many more billions will be flowing out of the United States. These are not just American dollars; these are American jobs.

Four months ago, I sent the Congress this 167-page draft of detailed legislation, plus some additional tax proposals. My program was designed to conserve the energy we now

¹ Made on television and radio from the Oval Office at the White House on May 27 (text from Weekly Compilation of Presidential Documents dated June 2).

have, while at the same time speeding up the development and production of new domestic energy. Although this would increase the cost of energy until new supplies were fully tapped, those dollars would remain in this country and would be returned to our own economy through tax cuts and rebates.

I asked the Congress in January to enact this urgent 10-year program for energy independence within 90 days, that is, by mid-April. In the meantime, to get things going, I said I would use the standby Presidential authority granted by the Congress to reduce our use of foreign petroleum by raising import fees on each barrel of crude oil by one dollar on February 1, another dollar on March 1, and a third on April 1. As soon as Congress acted on my comprehensive energy program, I promised to take off these import fees. I imposed the first dollar on oil imports February 1, making appropriate exemptions for hardship situations.

Now, what did the Congress do in February about energy? Congress did nothing—nothing, that is, except rush through legislation suspending for 90 days my authority to impose any import fees on foreign oil. Congress needed time, they said.

At the end of February, the Democratic leaders of the House and Senate and other Members concerned with energy came to the White House. They gave me this pamphlet outlining energy goals similar to mine and promised to come up with a congressional energy program better than mine by the end of April. I remember one of them saying he didn't see how they could ask the President to do more than postpone the second dollar for 60 days. If the Congress couldn't come up with an energy program by then, he said, go ahead and put it on.

Their request stretched my original deadline by a couple of weeks. But I wanted to be reasonable; I wanted to be cooperative. So, in vetoing their bill to restrict the President's authority, I agreed to their request for a 60-day delay before taking the next step under my energy plan.

What did the Congress do in March—what did the Congress do in April—about energy? Congress did nothing.

In fairness, I must say there were diligent efforts by some Members, Democrats as well as Republicans, to fashion meaningful energy legislation in their subcommittees and committees. My Administration worked very hard with them to bring a real energy independence bill to a vote. At the end of April, the deadline set by the congressional leaders themselves, I deferred for still another 30 days the second one-dollar fee on imported oil. Even then, I still hoped for positive congressional action.

So, what has the Congress done in May about energy? Congress did nothing and went home for a 10-day recess.

February, March, April, May—as of now, the Congress has done nothing positive to end our energy dependence. On the contrary, it has taken two negative actions—the first, an attempt to prevent the President from doing anything on his own; the second, to pass a strip-mining bill which would reduce domestic coal production instead of increasing it, put thousands of people out of work, needlessly increase the cost of energy to consumers, raise electric bills for many, and compel us to import more foreign oil, not less. I was forced to veto this anti-energy bill last week because I will not be responsible for taking one step backward on energy when the Congress will not take one step forward on energy.

The Congress has concentrated its attention on conservation measures such as a higher gasoline tax. The Congress has done little or nothing to stimulate production of new energy sources here at home. At Elk Hills Naval Petroleum Reserve in California, I saw oil wells waiting to produce 300,000 barrels a day if the Congress would change the law to permit it.

There are untold millions of barrels more in our Alaskan petroleum reserves and under the continental shelf. We could save 300,000 barrels a day if only the Congress would allow more electric powerplants to substitute American coal for foreign oil. Peaceful atomic power, which we pioneered, is advancing faster abroad than at home.

Still the Congress does nothing about energy. We are today worse off than we were

in January. Domestic oil production is going down, down, down. Natural gas production is starting to dwindle. And many areas face severe shortages next winter. Coal production is still at the levels of the 1940's. Foreign oil suppliers are considering another price increase. I could go on and on, but you know the facts. This country needs to regain its independence from foreign sources of energy, and the sooner the better.

There is no visible energy shortage now, but we could have one overnight. We do not have an energy crisis, but we may have one next winter. We do have an energy problem, a very grave problem, but one we can still manage and solve if we are successful internationally and can act decisively domestically.

Four months are already lost. The Congress has acted only negatively. I must now do what I can do as President.

—First, I will impose an additional one-dollar import fee on foreign crude oil and 60 cents on refined products, effective June 1.² I gave the Congress its 60 days plus an extra 30 days to do something, but nothing has been done since January. Higher fees will further discourage the consumption of imported fuel and may generate some constructive action when the Congress comes back.

—Second, as I directed on April 30, the Federal Energy Administration has completed public hearings on decontrol of old domestic oil. I will submit a decontrol plan to Congress shortly after it reconvenes. Along with it, I will urge the Congress to pass a windfall-profits tax with a plowback provision.

These two measures would prevent unfair gains by oil companies from decontrol prices, furnish a substantial incentive to increase domestic energy production, and encourage conservation.

When I talk about energy, I am talking about jobs. Our American economy runs on energy. No energy—no jobs. In the long run, it is just that simple.

The sudden fourfold increase in foreign

oil prices and the 1973 embargo helped to throw us into this recession. We are on our way out of this recession. Another oil embargo could throw us back. We cannot continue to depend on the price and supply whims of others. The Congress cannot drift, dawdle, and debate forever with America's future.

I need your help to energize this Congress into comprehensive action. I will continue to press for my January program, which is still the only total energy program there is. I cannot sit here idly while nothing is done. We must get on with the job right now.

U.S. States Concern for Americans Held in South Viet-Nam

*Department Statement*¹

I wish to state our serious concern about nine Americans who have been held by the Communist authorities in South Viet-Nam since before the closing of the U.S. Embassy.

Among the group are six missionaries captured March 10 at Ban Me Thuot, South Viet-Nam, with a Ford Foundation scholar, a USAID [Agency for International Development] official, an Australian tourist, and a Canadian missionary couple.

In addition, a U.S. consular officer assigned to Nha Trang was captured when Communist forces overran Phan Rang on April 16.

There is wide concern about these persons, who continue to be held long after the departure of official Americans from Viet-Nam. We consider their release and safe return a matter of urgent priority and concern.

Moreover, about 2,300 Americans continue to remain unaccounted for in Indo-China from the period before the 1973 cease-fire—900 of them (including 30 civilians) still listed as missing, the rest declared dead with their bodies not recovered.

¹ Read to news correspondents on May 29 by Robert L. Funseth, Director, Office of Press Relations.

² For text of Proclamation 4377 signed May 27, see 40 *Fed. Reg.* 23429.

Under the Paris agreement the Communist side undertook to help account for the missing and to return the remains of the dead. Progress on this is long overdue.

We continue to expect the Communist side to cooperate in resolving this humanitarian problem.

Foreign Aid Authorization Bill Transmitted to Congress

Following is the text of identical letters sent by President Ford on May 15 to Speaker of the House Carl Albert and President of the Senate Nelson A. Rockefeller.

White House press release dated May 15

MAY 15, 1975.

DEAR MR. SPEAKER: (DEAR MR. PRESIDENT:) I am transmitting today a bill to authorize Foreign Assistance programs for fiscal years 1976 and 1977 and for the transition period July 1, 1976 through September 30, 1976.

This proposal reflects both current realities and continuing uncertainties.

One reality is that we live in an interdependent world—a world in which the actions or inactions of any one great nation can affect the interests of all. By its actions, this nation will play its proper role in influencing the course of world events to make a better world for all. Foreign assistance is an essential element in the U.S. commitment to this objective.

A second reality, however, is that the recent events in Indochina have had a profound impact on the assumptions underlying the assistance requirements in my 1976 Budget, transmitted in February. There has not been sufficient time to fully assess the implications of these changes on foreign assistance requirements. What is abundantly clear, however, is the urgent need to assist

those people who have been forced to flee from Indochina. I have already requested legislation to permit us to meet this need and I urge speedy congressional action.

A third reality is the continuing tension in the Middle East—an area which has been wracked by war and even now knows only an uneasy peace. The United States has made every effort to assist in finding a solution to the problems in this part of the world and is now undertaking a thorough reassessment of every aspect of our relations with the countries of the Middle East.

These current realities are also the source of continuing uncertainties about the 1976 foreign assistance program.

In order to permit the fullest possible consideration of foreign aid requirements by the Congress, the legislation I am transmitting today contains specific funding proposals for development assistance and related programs. However, because of the uncertainties caused by changing events, this request does not include specific amounts for grant military assistance, foreign military credit sales and some economic supporting assistance programs at this time. For these accounts, I am requesting an authorization for such sums as may be necessary and will return to the Congress with specific funding proposals as soon as possible.

The review of our policies in the Middle East, which I initiated last month, will not be completed until later this summer. I have, therefore, also omitted specific requests for assistance to the four major Middle Eastern aid recipients until this review is completed.

With this bill, the Congress is now in a position to begin consideration of those elements of our foreign aid programs on which I have made firm recommendations. The other specifics will be transmitted as soon as our reviews permit. I urge that the Congress consider and enact this legislation.

Sincerely,

GERALD R. FORD.

U.S. Reaffirms Support for Nonproliferation Treaty at Review Conference

The Review Conference of the Parties to the Treaty on the Nonproliferation of Nuclear Weapons met at Geneva May 5-30. Following is a statement by Fred C. Iklé, U.S. Representative to the conference and Director of the U.S. Arms Control and Disarmament Agency, together with the text of the final declaration of the conference adopted May 30.

STATEMENT BY DR. IKLÉ, MAY 6

ACDA press release 75-16 dated May 6

It is my privilege to convey a message to this conference from the President of the United States:

This Review Conference offers an opportunity to focus new attention on our vital obligation to arrest the spread of nuclear weapons. It is a responsibility that confronts all nations equally and impartially. Nuclear energy can and should promote the fortunes of nations assembled at this conference. But its destructive potential can and must be contained.

Support for the Nonproliferation Treaty is a major tenet of American policy. Consequently, I hope this conference will:

—Convey the importance of nonproliferation to the security of all nations, hence to global stability;

—Promote international cooperation in peaceful uses of nuclear energy, while insuring that it not be misused as a means of mass destruction;

—Encourage the further development and wider application of effective safeguards and physical security measures for nuclear materials and facilities; and

—Review the considerable progress that has been made in arms control and disarmament since the treaty was signed, and promote efforts to build on what has been achieved.

We welcome the important recent additions to the roster of parties to the Nonproliferation Treaty,

as well as the indications that others are moving toward adherence. We recognize that the treaty's promise is not yet fully realized, but we take satisfaction from what has been achieved. We further recognize that no treaty by itself can prevent the proliferation of nuclear weapons. Yet we remain convinced that the Nonproliferation Treaty is an essential means of advancing this purpose.

Although we still have a long way to go, we see in reviewing the record that the cooperative undertaking to create a more stable world community is well underway.

I take this occasion therefore to rededicate the United States to the support of the Nonproliferation Treaty and to the high purpose of a stable peace which animates it.

Few international endeavors are more deserving of our attention and energy than containing the destructive potential of the atom. The stakes involved are enormous.

We cannot be complacent—and indeed we are not—about the nuclear arsenals that now exist. We must press ahead to make more comprehensive the limitations which have been imposed and begin to reduce the potential for destruction, a potential that we can scarcely grasp.

But it would be a fatal error if we assumed that we could move forward in reducing the threat of nuclear destruction while nation after nation began to build its own nuclear arsenals. We cannot move forward and backward at the same time. The risk of nuclear destruction—by design, miscalculation, or accident—cannot be reduced if nuclear competition drives a dangerous wedge between neighboring nations throughout the world.

Let there be no mistake. The dangers resulting from nuclear proliferation are shared by all, nuclear powers and non-nuclear-weapon states alike.

We therefore have a common interest in the success of the Nonproliferation Treaty. It is my government's hope that this conference will focus attention on the treaty's essential role in promoting the security of all states and that it will provide a stimulus for cooperative international effort to make the treaty as effective and universally applicable as possible.

The basic provisions of the treaty, articles I and II, have been followed faithfully by the parties. The safeguards resulting from article III make an important additional contribution to the security of all states.

But in our judgment, the effectiveness of all three articles can be strengthened best by securing the widest possible adherence to the treaty. Hence, it is most gratifying that several states have recently completed their ratification. The Republic of Korea ratified the treaty. Just last week major industrial countries of Western Europe also became parties to the treaty: Belgium, the Federal Republic of Germany, Italy, Luxembourg, and the Netherlands.

We welcome all the new parties. Several of them have attained world leadership in peaceful applications of nuclear technology. This offers telling evidence that the treaty is consistent with progress in the peaceful uses of the atom. In fact, the treaty not only supports peaceful uses but helps preserve the world order without which peaceful uses could not survive and expand.

The First Five Years of the Treaty

In its first five years, the treaty has clearly served to increase the volume of international nuclear commerce. The United States, for example, has entered into international arrangements for the enrichment of uranium to meet the needs of some 150 power reactors in non-nuclear-weapon states, having a total capacity of about 120,000 megawatts. In addition, the United States has exported 35 nuclear reactors since 1970. Most of this cooperation has been with states now party to the Nonproliferation Treaty or with signatories whose ratification appears imminent.

The United States has shared its peaceful

nuclear technology generously. It has provided information, offered training, supported research programs, supplied uranium enrichment services, and sold or donated research and power reactors embodying the most advanced technology.

Aid to the developing countries has also increased considerably since the treaty was opened for signature. We believe the developing countries party to the treaty should be given favored consideration in nuclear assistance. Last year, my government announced that parties will be given preference in the allocation of our in-kind contributions to the technical assistance program of the International Atomic Energy Agency. At the same time, we are increasing substantially the amount of our voluntary contribution for 1975.

Safeguards Over Peaceful Uses

A major purpose—indeed, a major accomplishment—of the Nonproliferation Treaty is to make possible the expansion of peaceful nuclear cooperation. But, as Secretary Kissinger stated to the United Nations last fall [Sept. 23, 1974], our policy of widely supplying nuclear fuels and other nuclear materials "cannot continue if it leads to the proliferation of nuclear explosives."

The rapid expansion of the peaceful uses of nuclear energy has raised massive new problems. One is meeting fuel-reprocessing needs in the safest and most economic way. Another is the disposal of the rapidly accumulating nuclear wastes. Fortunately, we still have some time to work out solutions. There is no economic need for reprocessing for several years to come, and spent fuel can still be kept in temporary storage. But nations must cooperate to solve these problems soon to protect the health and safety of all the people.

The promotion of peaceful uses of the atom is inseparably linked with safeguards to inspire international confidence that fissionable materials are not being diverted to destructive purposes. We can all take pride in what has been done about safeguards. Specifically, the International Atomic Energy Agency has

accomplished a great deal. Its efforts deserve the wholehearted support of us all.

Virtually every party to this treaty with nuclear facilities requiring safeguards has negotiated an agreement with the Agency; and almost every nuclear facility now operating in the non-nuclear-weapon states is subject to Agency safeguards or will be in the near future. This is a good record.

But much remains to be done. We need to insure:

—That all parties to the treaty conclude agreements with the Agency;

—That safeguards are effective and efficient; and

—That safeguards cover, as comprehensively as possible, the nuclear facilities of non-nuclear-weapon states not party to the treaty and preclude diversion of nuclear materials for any nuclear explosive device.

Also, we have to concern ourselves seriously with the threat of theft and other criminal seizure of nuclear material. We hope this conference will recognize the need for international measures to deal with this grim danger.

Peaceful Nuclear Explosions

Article V, as we all know, was included in the treaty to insure that the non-nuclear-weapon states adhering to the treaty would not be deprived of any potential benefits of peaceful nuclear explosions that might be realized by the nuclear-weapon states.

In the United States, there has been much research and experimentation on the use of nuclear explosions for peaceful purposes. But we have not yet reduced any application to practice, nor have we obtained any commercial benefits from this technology. If and when we should succeed in doing so, we would of course make those benefits available as called for in the treaty.

Questions remain to be resolved regarding the feasibility and practicability of peaceful nuclear explosions. Moreover, no request for such explosions has ever gone beyond the stage of preliminary feasibility studies. For these reasons, there has so far been no prac-

tical necessity to conclude the international agreement or agreements mentioned in article V. However, the United States stands ready to negotiate the requisite agreements when the practical need develops.

In the meantime, the United States is prepared to participate in consideration of the institutional arrangements that may be required to make the benefits of peaceful nuclear explosions available internationally. Toward this end, important steps have already been taken within the framework of the International Atomic Energy Agency. My government, as one of the potential suppliers of such services, has agreed to assist the Agency in a study of the related legal problems.

U.S.-Soviet Arms Control Agreements

When this treaty was opened for signature in 1968, the only other postwar arms control agreements were the Antarctic Treaty, the "Hotline" Agreement, the Limited Test Ban Treaty, and the Outer Space Treaty. While these were solid accomplishments, they did not reduce the levels of existing nuclear armaments.

At the signing ceremony of the Non-proliferation Treaty, my government and the Soviet Government announced that we would open negotiations to limit offensive and defensive strategic arms. The relationship between the treaty and this announcement was clear: the successful negotiation of this treaty had strengthened mutual confidence between the two largest nuclear-weapon powers and promised to keep nuclear arms control from becoming totally unmanageable.

Since then, serious and intensive negotiations on strategic arms limitations have continued steadily and received personal attention at the highest level of the two governments. The first fruits of these negotiations were the improved "Hotline" Agreement and the Agreement on Measures to Reduce the Risk of Outbreak of Nuclear War.

The culmination of the Strategic Arms Limitation Talks in 1972 brought the Treaty on Anti-Ballistic Missile Systems limiting

each side to two narrowly circumscribed complexes. In my country it led in fact to dismantling an anti-ballistic-missile complex already well under construction. By renouncing major anti-ballistic-missile systems, the United States and the Soviet Union gave up a potential new weapons system that they were in a unique position to exploit. No other country could have built such systems.

Along with the Anti-Ballistic Missile Treaty, an interim agreement was worked out to limit the number of strategic offensive launchers on both sides for five years, a period that would provide time to achieve more comprehensive limits.

At the summit meeting in the summer of 1974, the leaders of the United States and Soviet Union took a further important step by negotiating the Threshold Test Ban Treaty. I should point out that this was not only an important arms control measure in its own right; it was also a positive step toward a comprehensive test ban, to which we remain firmly committed.

Last November, at Vladivostok, a major milestone was reached when President Ford and General Secretary Brezhnev established specific guidelines for a new agreement to limit strategic offensive arms. Based on this accord, negotiations are now underway here in Geneva. The new agreement is to limit strategic offensive armaments, including strategic bombers and missiles equipped with multiple reentry vehicles (MIRV's), to equal totals on each side.

The implications of this breakthrough are far-reaching. By putting an overall ceiling on strategic armaments, we establish a promising basis for further reductions. We look forward to follow-on negotiations on further limitation and reductions as soon as the Vladivostok agreement is complete.

An encouraging precedent has already been set: only two years after the Anti-Ballistic Missile Treaty imposed comprehensive, equal ceilings on these systems, both sides agreed to reduce the permitted deployment levels by one-half.

Five years have now elapsed since the Nonproliferation Treaty went into effect. This period is only one-sixth of the nuclear

era that began at the end of the Second World War. Yet, in this short time, far more has been accomplished in the control of nuclear arms than in the preceding 25 years. In historical perspective, the treaty has proven to be both a prerequisite and a catalyst for progress toward nuclear disarmament. That process is underway. And it is up to all of us to encourage and sustain it.

The Nonproliferation Treaty is indispensable to nuclear disarmament. It is indispensable to achieving the maximum peaceful benefits of nuclear energy. It is indispensable to the security of all. The task of this conference is to provide the support and forward movement that are needed to enable the treaty to fulfill its great promise.

TEXT OF DECLARATION¹

FINAL DECLARATION OF THE REVIEW CONFERENCE OF THE PARTIES TO THE TREATY ON THE NON-PROLIFERATION OF NUCLEAR WEAPONS

PREAMBLE

The States Party to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons which met in Geneva in May 1975, in accordance with the Treaty, to review the operation of the Treaty with a view to assuring that the purposes of the Preamble and the provisions of the Treaty are being realized,

Recognizing the continuing importance of the objectives of the Treaty,

Affirming the belief that universal adherence to the Treaty would greatly strengthen international peace and enhance the security of all States,

Firmly convinced that, in order to achieve this aim, it is essential to maintain, in the implementation of the Treaty, an acceptable balance of mutual responsibilities and obligations of all States Party to the Treaty, nuclear-weapon and non-nuclear-weapon States,

Recognizing that the danger of nuclear warfare remains a grave threat to the survival of mankind,

Convinced that the prevention of any further proliferation of nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices remains a vital element in efforts to avert nuclear warfare, and that the promotion of this objective will be furthered by more rapid progress towards the cessation of the nuclear arms race and the limitation and reduction of existing nuclear weapons, with a view to the eventual elimination from national arsenals of nuclear weapons, pursuant

¹ NPT CONF 30 Rev. 1; adopted by consensus on May 30.

to a Treaty on general and complete disarmament under strict and effective international control,

Recalling the determination expressed by the Parties to seek to achieve the discontinuance of all test explosions of nuclear weapons for all time,

Considering that the trend towards détente in relations between States provides a favourable climate within which more significant progress should be possible towards the cessation of the nuclear arms race,

Noting the important role which nuclear energy can, particularly in changing economic circumstances, play in power production and in contributing to the progressive elimination of the economic and technological gap between developing and developed States,

Recognizing that the accelerated spread and development of peaceful applications of nuclear energy will, in the absence of effective safeguards, contribute to further proliferation of nuclear explosive capability,

Recognizing the continuing necessity of full co-operation in the application and improvement of International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) safeguards on peaceful nuclear activities,

Recalling that all Parties to the Treaty are entitled to participate in the fullest possible exchange of scientific information for, and to contribute alone or in co-operation with other States to, the further development of the applications of atomic energy for peaceful purposes,

Reaffirming the principle that the benefits of peaceful applications of nuclear technology, including any technological by-products which may be derived by nuclear-weapon States from the development of nuclear explosive devices, should be available for peaceful purposes to all Parties to the Treaty, and

Recognizing that all States Parties have a duty to strive for the adoption of tangible and effective measures to attain the objectives of the Treaty,

Declare as follows:

PURPOSES

The States Party to the Treaty reaffirm their strong common interest in averting the further proliferation of nuclear weapons. They reaffirm their strong support for the Treaty, their continued dedication to its principles and objectives, and their commitment to implement fully and more effectively its provisions.

They reaffirm the vital role of the Treaty in international efforts

—to avert further proliferation of nuclear weapons

—to achieve the cessation of the nuclear arms race and to undertake effective measures in the direction of nuclear disarmament, and

—to promote co-operation in the peaceful uses of nuclear energy under adequate safeguards.

REVIEW OF ARTICLES I AND II

The review undertaken by the Conference confirms that the obligations undertaken under Articles I and II of the Treaty have been faithfully observed by all Parties. The Conference is convinced that the continued strict observance of these Articles remains central to the shared objective of averting the further proliferation of nuclear weapons.

REVIEW OF ARTICLE III

The Conference notes that the verification activities of the IAEA under Article III, 1, of the Treaty respect the sovereign rights of States and do not hamper the economic, scientific or technological development of the Parties to the Treaty or international co-operation in peaceful nuclear activities. It urges that this situation be maintained. The Conference attaches considerable importance to the continued application of safeguards under Article III, 1, on a non-discriminatory basis, for the equal benefit of all States Party to the Treaty.

The Conference notes the importance of systems of accounting for and control of nuclear material, from the standpoints both of the responsibilities of States Party to the Treaty and of co-operation with the IAEA in order to facilitate the implementation of the safeguards provided for in Article III, 1. The Conference expresses the hope that all States having peaceful nuclear activities will establish and maintain effective accounting and control systems and welcomes the readiness of the IAEA to assist States in so doing.

The Conference expresses its strong support for effective IAEA safeguards. In this context it recommends that intensified efforts be made towards the standardization and the universality of application of IAEA safeguards, while ensuring that safeguards agreements with non-nuclear-weapon States not Party to the Treaty are of adequate duration, preclude diversion to any nuclear explosive devices and contain appropriate provisions for the continuance of the application of safeguards upon re-export.

The Conference recommends that more attention and fuller support be given to the improvement of safeguards techniques, instrumentation, data-handling and implementation in order, among other things, to ensure optimum cost-effectiveness. It notes with satisfaction the establishment by the Director General of the IAEA of a standing advisory group on safeguards implementation.

The Conference emphasises the necessity for the States Party to the Treaty that have not yet done so to conclude as soon as possible safeguards agreements with the IAEA.

With regard to the implementation of Article III, 2 of the Treaty, the Conference notes that a number of States suppliers of nuclear material or equipment have adopted certain minimum, standard requirements for IAEA safeguards in connexion with their exports of certain such items to non-nuclear-weapon States not Party to the Treaty (IAEA document

INFCIRC/209 and Addenda). The Conference attaches particular importance to the condition, established by those States, of an undertaking of non-diversion to nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices, as included in the said requirements.

The Conference urges that:

(a) in all achievable ways, common export requirements relating to safeguards be strengthened, in particular by extending the application of safeguards to all peaceful nuclear activities in importing States not Party to the Treaty;

(b) such common requirements be accorded the widest possible measure of acceptance among all suppliers and recipients;

(c) all Parties to the Treaty should actively pursue their efforts to these ends.

The Conference takes note of:

(a) the considered view of many Parties to the Treaty that the safeguards required under Article III, 2 should extend to all peaceful nuclear activities in importing States;

(b) (i) the suggestion that it is desirable to arrange for common safeguards requirements in respect of nuclear material processed, used or produced by the use of scientific and technological information transferred in tangible form to non-nuclear-weapon States not Party to the Treaty;

(ii) the hope that this aspect of safeguards could be further examined.

The Conference recommends that, during the review of the arrangements relating to the financing of safeguards in the IAEA which is to be undertaken by its Board of Governors at an appropriate time after 1975, the less favourable financial situation of the developing countries be fully taken into account. It recommends further that, on that occasion, the Parties to the Treaty concerned seek measures that would restrict within appropriate limits the respective shares of developing countries in safeguards costs.

The Conference attaches considerable importance, so far as safeguards inspectors are concerned, to adherence by the IAEA to Article VII.D of its Statute, prescribing, among other things, that "due regard shall be paid . . . to the importance of recruiting the staff on as wide a geographical basis as possible"; it also recommends that safeguards training be made available to personnel from all geographic regions.

The Conference, convinced that nuclear materials should be effectively protected at all times, urges that action be pursued to elaborate further, within the IAEA, concrete recommendations for the physical protection of nuclear material in use, storage and transit, including principles relating to the responsibility of States, with a view to ensuring a

uniform, minimum level of effective protection for such material.

It calls upon all States engaging in peaceful nuclear activities (i) to enter into such international agreements and arrangements as may be necessary to ensure such protection; and (ii) in the framework of their respective physical protection systems, to give the earliest possible effective application to the IAEA's recommendations.

REVIEW OF ARTICLE IV

The Conference reaffirms, in the framework of Article IV, 1, that nothing in the Treaty shall be interpreted as affecting, and notes with satisfaction that nothing in the Treaty has been identified as affecting, the inalienable right of all the Parties to the Treaty to develop research, production and use of nuclear energy for peaceful purposes without discrimination and in conformity with Articles I and II of the Treaty.

The Conference reaffirms, in the framework of Article IV, 2, the undertaking by all Parties to the Treaty to facilitate the fullest possible exchange of equipment, materials and scientific and technological information for the peaceful uses of nuclear energy and the right of all Parties to the Treaty to participate in such exchange and welcomes the efforts made towards that end. Noting that the Treaty constitutes a favourable framework for broadening international co-operation in the peaceful uses of nuclear energy, the Conference is convinced that on this basis, and in conformity with the Treaty, further efforts should be made to ensure that the benefits of peaceful applications of nuclear technology should be available to all Parties to the Treaty.

The Conference recognizes that there continues to be a need for the fullest possible exchange of nuclear materials, equipment and technology, including up-to-date developments, consistent with the objectives and safeguards requirements of the Treaty. The Conference reaffirms the undertaking of the Parties to the Treaty in a position to do so to co-operate in contributing, alone or together with other States or international organizations, to the further development of the applications of nuclear energy for peaceful purposes, especially in the territories of non-nuclear-weapon States Party to the Treaty, with due consideration for the needs of the developing areas of the world. Recognizing, in the context of Article IV, 2, those growing needs of developing States the Conference considers it necessary to continue and increase assistance to them in this field bilaterally and through such multilateral channels as the IAEA and the United Nations Development Programme.

The Conference is of the view that, in order to implement as fully as possible Article IV of the Treaty, developed States Party to the Treaty should

consider taking measures, making contributions and establishing programmes, as soon as possible, for the provision of special assistance in the peaceful uses of nuclear energy for developing States Party to the Treaty.

The Conference recommends that, in reaching decisions on the provision of equipment, materials, services and scientific and technological information for the peaceful uses of nuclear energy, on concessional and other appropriate financial arrangements and on the furnishing of technical assistance in the nuclear field, including co-operation related to the continuous operation of peaceful nuclear facilities, States Party to the Treaty should give weight to adherence to the Treaty by recipient States. The Conference recommends, in this connexion, that any special measures of co-operation to meet the growing needs of developing States Party to the Treaty might include increased and supplemental voluntary aid provided bilaterally or through multilateral channels such as the IAEA's facilities for administering funds-in-trust and gifts-in-kind.

The Conference further recommends that States Party to the Treaty in a position to do so, meet, to the fullest extent possible, "technically sound" requests for technical assistance, submitted to the IAEA by developing States Party to the Treaty, which the IAEA is unable to finance from its own resources, as well as such "technically sound" requests as may be made by developing States Party to the Treaty which are not Members of the IAEA.

The Conference recognizes that regional or multinational nuclear fuel cycle centres may be an advantageous way to satisfy, safely and economically, the needs of many States in the course of initiating or expanding nuclear power programmes, while at the same time facilitating physical protection and the application of IAEA safeguards, and contributing to the goals of the Treaty.

The Conference welcomes the IAEA's studies in this area, and recommends that they be continued as expeditiously as possible. It considers that such studies should include, among other aspects, identification of the complex practical and organizational difficulties which will need to be dealt with in connexion with such projects.

The Conference urges all Parties to the Treaty in a position to do so to co-operate in these studies, particularly by providing to the IAEA where possible economic data concerning construction and operation of facilities such as chemical reprocessing plants, plutonium fuel fabrication plants, waste management installations, and longer-term spent fuel storage, and by assistance to the IAEA to enable it to undertake feasibility studies concerning the establishment of regional nuclear fuel cycle centres in specific geographic regions.

The Conference hopes that, if these studies lead to positive findings, and if the establishment of

regional or multinational nuclear fuel cycle centres is undertaken, Parties to the Treaty in a position to do so, will co-operate in, and provide assistance for, the elaboration and realization of such projects.

REVIEW OF ARTICLE V

The Conference reaffirms the obligation of Parties to the Treaty to take appropriate measures to ensure that potential benefits from any peaceful applications of nuclear explosions are made available to non-nuclear-weapon States Party to the Treaty in full accordance with the provisions of Article V and other applicable international obligations. In this connexion, the Conference also reaffirms that such services should be provided to non-nuclear-weapon States Party to the Treaty on a non-discriminatory basis and that the charge to such Parties for the explosive devices used should be as low as possible and exclude any charge for research and development.

The Conference notes that any potential benefits could be made available to non-nuclear-weapon States not Party to the Treaty by way of nuclear explosion services provided by nuclear-weapon States, as defined by the Treaty, and conducted under the appropriate international observation and international procedures called for in Article V and in accordance with other applicable international obligations. The Conference considers it imperative that access to potential benefits of nuclear explosions for peaceful purposes not lead to any proliferation of nuclear explosive capability.

The Conference considers the IAEA to be the appropriate international body, referred to in Article V of the Treaty, through which potential benefits from peaceful applications of nuclear explosions could be made available to any non-nuclear-weapon State. Accordingly, the Conference urges the IAEA to expedite work on identifying and examining the important legal issues involved in, and to commence consideration of, the structure and content of the special international agreement or agreements contemplated in Article V of the Treaty, taking into account the views of the Conference of the Committee on Disarmament (CCD) and the United Nations General Assembly and enabling States Party to the Treaty but not Members of the IAEA which would wish to do so to participate in such work.

The Conference notes that the technology of nuclear explosions for peaceful purposes is still at the stage of development and study and that there are a number of interrelated international legal and other aspects of such explosions which still need to be investigated.

The Conference commends the work in this field that has been carried out within the IAEA and looks forward to the continuance of such work pursuant to United Nations General Assembly reso-

lution 3261 D (XXIX). It emphasizes that the IAEA should play the central role in matters relating to the provision of services for the application of nuclear explosions for peaceful purposes. It believes that the IAEA should broaden its consideration of this subject to encompass, within its area of competence, all aspects and implications of the practical applications of nuclear explosions for peaceful purposes. To this end it urges the IAEA to set up appropriate machinery within which intergovernmental discussion can take place and through which advice can be given on the Agency's work in this field.

The Conference attaches considerable importance to the consideration by the CCD, pursuant to United Nations General Assembly resolution 3261 D (XXIX) and taking due account of the views of the IAEA, of the arms control implications of nuclear explosions for peaceful purposes.

The Conference notes that the thirtieth session of the United Nations General Assembly will receive reports pursuant to United Nations General Assembly resolution 3261 D (XXIX) and will provide an opportunity for States to discuss questions related to the application of nuclear explosions for peaceful purposes. The Conference further notes that the results of discussion in the United Nations General Assembly at its thirtieth session will be available to be taken into account by the IAEA and the CCD for their further consideration.

REVIEW OF ARTICLE VI

The Conference recalls the provisions of Article VI of the Treaty under which all Parties undertook to pursue negotiations in good faith on effective measures relating

—to the cessation of the nuclear arms race at an early date and

—to nuclear disarmament and

—to a treaty on general and complete disarmament under strict and effective international control.

While welcoming the various agreements on arms limitation and disarmament elaborated and concluded over the last few years as steps contributing to the implementation of Article VI of the Treaty, the Conference expresses its serious concern that the arms race, in particular the nuclear arms race, is continuing unabated.

The Conference therefore urges constant and resolute efforts by each of the Parties to the Treaty, in particular by the nuclear-weapon States, to achieve an early and effective implementation of Article VI of the Treaty.

The Conference affirms the determination expressed in the preamble to the 1963 Partial Test Ban Treaty and reiterated in the preamble to the Non-Proliferation Treaty to achieve the discontinuance of all test explosions of nuclear weapons for

all time. The Conference expresses the view that the conclusion of a treaty banning all nuclear weapons tests is one of the most important measures to halt the nuclear arms race. It expresses the hope that the nuclear-weapon States Party to the Treaty will take the lead in reaching an early solution of the technical and political difficulties on this issue. It appeals to these States to make every effort to reach agreement on the conclusion of an effective comprehensive test ban. To this end, the desire was expressed by a considerable number of delegations at the Conference that the nuclear-weapon States Party to the Treaty should as soon as possible enter into an agreement, open to all States and containing appropriate provisions to ensure its effectiveness, to halt all nuclear weapons tests of adhering States for a specified time, whereupon the terms of such an agreement would be reviewed in the light of the opportunity, at that time, to achieve a universal and permanent cessation of all nuclear weapons tests. The Conference calls upon the nuclear-weapon States signatories of the Treaty on the Limitation of Underground Nuclear Weapons Tests, meanwhile, to limit the number of their underground nuclear weapons tests to a minimum. The Conference believes that such steps would constitute an incentive of particular value to negotiations for the conclusion of a treaty banning all nuclear weapons test explosions for all time.

The Conference appeals to the nuclear-weapon States parties to the negotiations on the limitation of strategic arms to endeavour to conclude at the earliest possible date the new agreement that was outlined by their leaders in November 1974. The Conference looks forward to the commencement of follow-on negotiations on further limitations of, and significant reductions in, their nuclear weapons systems as soon as possible following the conclusion of such an agreement.

The Conference notes that, notwithstanding earlier progress, the CCD has recently been unable to reach agreement on new substantive measures to advance the objectives of Article VI of the Treaty. It urges, therefore, all members of the CCD Party to the Treaty, in particular the nuclear-weapon States Party, to increase their efforts to achieve effective disarmament agreements on all subjects on the agenda of the CCD.

The Conference expresses the hope that all States Party to the Treaty, through the United Nations and the CCD and other negotiations in which they participate, will work with determination towards the conclusion of arms limitation and disarmament agreements which will contribute to the goal of general and complete disarmament under strict and effective international control.

The Conference expresses the view that, disarmament being a matter of general concern, the provision of information to all governments and

peoples on the situation in the field of the arms race and disarmament is of great importance for the attainment of the aims of Article VI. The Conference therefore invites the United Nations to consider ways and means of improving its existing facilities for the collection, compilation and dissemination of information on disarmament issues, in order to keep all governments as well as world public opinion properly informed on progress achieved in the realization of the provisions of Article VI of the Treaty.

REVIEW OF ARTICLE VII AND THE SECURITY OF NON-NUCLEAR WEAPON STATES

Recognizing that all States have need to ensure their independence, territorial integrity and sovereignty, the Conference emphasizes the particular importance of assuring and strengthening the security of non-nuclear-weapon States Parties which have renounced the acquisition of nuclear weapons. It acknowledges that States Parties find themselves in different security situations and therefore that various appropriate means are necessary to meet the security concerns of States Parties.

The Conference underlines the importance of adherence to the Treaty by non-nuclear-weapon States as the best means of reassuring one another of their renunciation of nuclear weapons and as one of the effective means of strengthening their mutual security.

The Conference takes note of the continued determination of the Depositary States to honour their statements, which were welcomed by the United Nations Security Council in resolution 255(1968), that, to ensure the security of the non-nuclear-weapon States Party to the Treaty, they will provide or support immediate assistance, in accordance with the Charter, to any non-nuclear-weapon State Party to the Treaty which is a victim of an act or an object of a threat of aggression in which nuclear weapons are used.

The Conference, bearing in mind Article VII of the Treaty, considers that the establishment of internationally recognized nuclear-weapon-free zones on the initiative and with the agreement of the directly concerned States of the zone, represents an effective means of curbing the spread of nuclear weapons, and could contribute significantly to the security of those States. It welcomes the steps which have been taken toward the establishment of such zones.

The Conference recognizes that for the maximum effectiveness of any Treaty arrangements for establishing a nuclear-weapon-free zone the co-operation of the nuclear-weapon States is necessary. At the Conference it was urged by a considerable

number of delegations that nuclear-weapon States should provide, in an appropriate manner, binding security assurances to those States which become fully bound by the provisions of such regional arrangements.

At the Conference it was also urged that determined efforts must be made especially by the nuclear weapon States Party to the Treaty, to ensure the security of all non-nuclear-weapon States Parties. To this end the Conference urges all States, both nuclear-weapon States and non-nuclear-weapon States to refrain, in accordance with the Charter of the United Nations, from the threat or the use of force in relations between States, involving either nuclear or non-nuclear weapons. Additionally, it stresses the responsibility of all Parties to the Treaty and especially the nuclear-weapon States, to take effective steps to strengthen the security of non-nuclear-weapon States and to promote in all appropriate fora the consideration of all practical means to this end, taking into account the views expressed at this Conference.

REVIEW OF ARTICLE VIII

The Conference invites States Party to the Treaty which are Members of the United Nations to request the Secretary-General of the United Nations to include the following item in the provisional agenda of the thirty-first session of the General Assembly: "Implementation of the conclusions of the first Review Conference of the Parties to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons".

The States Party to the Treaty participating in the Conference propose to the Depositary Governments that a second Conference to review the operation of the Treaty be convened in 1980.

The Conference accordingly invites States Party to the Treaty which are Members of the United Nations to request the Secretary-General of the United Nations to include the following item in the provisional agenda of the thirty-third session of the General Assembly: "Implementation of the conclusions of the first Review Conference of the Parties to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons and establishment of a preparatory committee for the second Conference."

REVIEW OF ARTICLE IX

The five years that have passed since the entry into force of the Treaty have demonstrated its wide international acceptance. The Conference welcomes the recent progress towards achieving wider adherence. At the same time, the Conference notes with concern that the Treaty has not as yet achieved universal adherence. Therefore, the Conference expresses the hope that States that have not already joined the Treaty should do so at the earliest possible date.

Five EURATOM Countries Ratify Nonproliferation Treaty

At a ceremony at the Department of State on May 2, the Ambassadors of Belgium, the Federal Republic of Germany, Italy, Luxembourg, and the Netherlands deposited with the United States their instruments of ratification of the Treaty on the Nonproliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT).¹ Following are remarks made at the ceremony by Deputy Secretary Robert S. Ingersoll and Ambassador Egidio Ortona of Italy, the ranking Ambassador.

Press release 232 dated May 2

DEPUTY SECRETARY INGERSOLL

The ratification today of the Treaty on the Nonproliferation of Nuclear Weapons by our close friends and allies, Belgium, the Federal Republic of Germany, Italy, Luxembourg, and the Netherlands, is an extraordinarily important development in the life of the NPT. The treaty now enjoys the support of the world's largest single group of industrialized states, states which are numbered among both the principal manufacturers and exporters of nuclear equipment and technology and also among the principal consumers of nuclear energy.

The simultaneous ratification of the treaty by these states symbolizes their close cooperation within the European Atomic Energy Community and evidences the common resolve of these partners to ratify the treaty together. The United States, of course, has had the benefit of working with EURATOM since its earliest days.

¹ For further details on the ceremony, see press release 232 dated May 2.

Today's ratifications add significant momentum to the global effort to prevent the spread of nuclear weapons. They also demonstrate the dedication of the governments here represented to the goal of nuclear arms control.

AMBASSADOR ORTONA OF ITALY

Mr. Secretary: It is an honor for me to answer your kind words on behalf also of the representatives of the countries of the European Community here present that together have now deposited the instruments of ratification of the Treaty on the Nonproliferation of Nuclear Weapons.

This is an act of greatest political relevance in which the countries here represented have shown their awareness of the importance of contributing to the creation of a world in which civilization must be protected against the risks of the uncontrolled use of nuclear technology and benefit instead from its positive peaceful exploitation.

The countries that are represented here as full members of the treaty will contribute actively to the work that will shortly begin in Geneva for its review and enhancement. They consider the treaty a fundamental contribution to peace in the world, to international détente and to the creation of a new international society based upon security and progress of mankind.

To achieve these ends we believe that particular importance has the commitment embodied in the treaty that the member countries, faithful to the Charter of the United Nations, must refrain from the use of force or of the threat of force against the integrity and the political independence of all states.

Today's ceremony is particularly significant. Some of the most industrialized countries of the world become full members of the Nonproliferation Treaty. We deeply hope that this will serve as a springboard for similar actions by other countries in various geographical areas who have not yet decided

to subscribe or to ratify the treaty.

We consider at the same time the treaty as a cornerstone for negotiations aiming at further measures of disarmament, and as it is clearly stated in the treaty, we declare our readiness to proceed to those negotiations both in the field of conventional and nuclear armaments.

A very important section of the treaty is related to the peaceful uses of nuclear energy. The countries that today deposit the instruments of ratification have already a wide cooperation in this field with the United States. We believe that our ratification will further enhance that cooperation and will bring about the fullest sharing of the benefits of peaceful utilization of nuclear energy.

May I conclude in saying on behalf of my colleagues and myself that we are glad to participate in any event which constitute a new pillar stone on the way of international cooperation and human progress.

Current Actions

MULTILATERAL

Consular Relations

Vienna convention on consular relations. Done at Vienna April 24, 1963. Entered into force March 19, 1967; for the United States December 24, 1969. TIAS 6820.

Ratification deposited: Iran, June 5, 1975.

Optional protocol to the Vienna convention on consular relations concerning the compulsory settlement of disputes. Done at Vienna April 24, 1963. Entered into force March 19, 1967; for the United States December 24, 1969. TIAS 6820.

Accession deposited: Iran, June 5, 1975.

Copyright

Universal copyright convention, as revised. Done at Paris July 24, 1971. Entered into force July 10, 1974. TIAS 7868.

Ratification deposited: Tunisia, March 10, 1975.

Accession deposited: Bulgaria (with a statement), March 7, 1975.

Protocol 1 annexed to the universal copyright convention, as revised, concerning the application of that convention to works of stateless persons and refugees. Done at Paris July 24, 1971. Entered into force July 10, 1974. TIAS 7868.

Protocol 2 annexed to the universal copyright convention, as revised, concerning the application of that convention to the works of certain international organizations. Done at Paris July 24, 1971. Entered into force July 10, 1974. TIAS 7868.

Ratification deposited: Tunisia, March 10, 1975.

Health

Amendment of articles 24 and 25 of the constitution of the World Health Organization of July 22, 1946, as amended (TIAS 1808, 4643). Adopted at Geneva May 23, 1967. Entered into force May 21, 1975.

Acceptances deposited: Greece, May 29, 1975; Morocco, June 2, 1975.

Judicial Procedure

Convention on the taking of evidence abroad in civil or commercial matters. Done at The Hague March 18, 1970. Entered into force October 7, 1972. TIAS 7441.

Signature: Luxembourg, May 2, 1975.

Ratification deposited: Sweden (with declarations), May 2, 1975.

Load Lines

International convention on load lines, 1966. Done at London April 5, 1966. Entered into force July 21, 1968. TIAS 6331.

Accession deposited: German Democratic Republic (with declarations), May 15, 1975.

Oil Pollution

International convention relating to intervention on the high seas in cases of oil pollution casualties, with annex. Done at Brussels November 29, 1969. Entered into force May 6, 1975.

Ratification deposited: Federal Republic of Germany, May 7, 1975.¹

Property—Industrial

Convention of Paris for the protection of industrial property of March 20, 1883, as revised. Done at Stockholm July 14, 1967. Articles 1 through 12 entered into force May 19, 1970; for the United States August 25, 1973. Articles 13 through 30 entered into force April 26, 1970; for the United States September 5, 1970. TIAS 6923.

Notification from World Intellectual Property Organization that ratification deposited: Gabon, March 10, 1975.

Safety at Sea

Convention on the international regulations for preventing collisions at sea, 1972. Done at London October 20, 1972.²

Accession deposited: German Democratic Republic (with declarations), May 15, 1975.

¹ Applicable to Berlin (West).

² Not in force.

Agreement relating to the International Telecommunications Satellite Organization (INTELSAT), with annexes. Done at Washington August 20, 1971. Entered into force February 12, 1973. TIAS 7532.

Accession deposited: Libya, June 9, 1975.

Operating agreement relating to the International Telecommunications Satellite Organization (INTELSAT), with annex. Done at Washington August 20, 1971. Entered into force February 12, 1973. TIAS 7432.

Signature: Libya, June 9, 1975.

Tonnage Measurement

International convention on tonnage measurement of ships, 1969. Done at London June 23, 1969.²

Accession deposited: German Democratic Republic (with declarations), May 15, 1975.

Wheat

Protocol modifying and extending the wheat trade convention (part of the international wheat agreement) 1971. Done at Washington April 2, 1974. Entered into force June 19, 1974, with respect to certain provisions and July 1, 1974, with respect to other provisions. TIAS 7144, 7988.

Acceptance deposited: Japan, June 6, 1975.

Protocol modifying and extending the food aid convention (part of the international wheat agreement) 1971. Done at Washington April 2, 1974. Entered into force June 19, 1974, with respect to certain provisions and July 1, 1974, with respect to other provisions. TIAS 7144, 7988.

Acceptance deposited: Japan (with reservation), June 6, 1975.

Protocol modifying and further extending the wheat trade convention (part of the international wheat agreement) 1971. Done at Washington March 25, 1975. Enters into force June 19, 1975, with respect to certain provisions and July 1, 1975, with respect to other provisions. TIAS 7144, 7988.

Ratifications deposited: India, June 12, 1975; Mauritius, June 10, 1975.

Declaration of provisional application deposited: Switzerland, June 12, 1975.

Protocol modifying and further extending the food aid convention (part of the international wheat agreement) 1971. Done at Washington March 25, 1975. Enters into force June 19, 1975, with respect to certain provisions and July 1, 1975, with respect to other provisions. TIAS 7144, 7988.

Declaration of provisional application deposited: Switzerland, June 12, 1975.

BILATERAL

Asian Development Bank

Agreement amending the agreement of April 19, 1974, relating to the United States contribution to the Multi-Purpose Special Fund of the Asian Development Bank. Effected by exchange of letters

² Not in force.

at Washington and Manila December 23, 1974, and April 1, 1975. Entered into force April 1, 1975.

Chile

Agreement amending the agreement for sales of agricultural commodities of October 25, 1974 (TIAS 7993). Effected by exchange of notes at Santiago May 22, 1975. Entered into force May 22, 1975.

Guatemala

Agreement relating to the limitation of imports from Guatemala of fresh, chilled, or frozen meat of cattle, goats and sheep, except lambs, during calendar year 1975. Effected by exchange of notes at Guatemala April 18 and 25, 1975. Entered into force April 25, 1975.

Honduras

Agreement concerning payment to the United States of net proceeds from the sale of defense articles furnished under the military assistance program. Effected by exchange of notes at Tegucigalpa May 9, 1974 and May 15, 1975. Entered into force May 15, 1975; effective July 1, 1974.

Malaysia

Agreement relating to trade in cotton, wool, and man-made fiber textiles and textile products, with annexes. Effected by exchange of notes at Kuala Lumpur January 8 and May 16, 1975. Entered into force May 16, 1975; effective January 1, 1975.

Nepal

Agreement amending the agreement of June 9, 1961 for financing certain educational exchange programs. Effected by exchange of notes at Kathmandu July 10 and December 13, 1974 and May 18, 1975. Entered into force May 18, 1975.

DEPARTMENT AND FOREIGN SERVICE

Confirmations

The Senate on June 9 confirmed the following nominations:

Daniel P. Moynihan to be U.S. Representative to the United Nations and U.S. Representative in the U.N. Security Council.

Andrew L. Steigman to be Ambassador to the Gabonese Republic.

Galen L. Stone to be Ambassador to the Kingdom of Laos.

Malcolm Toon to be Ambassador to Israel.

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Releases issued prior to June 9 which appear in this issue of the BULLETIN are Nos. 232 of May 2, 308 of May 30, 312 and 313 of June 2, and 317 of June 4.

No.	Date	Subject
*322	6/9	U.S.-Malaysia textile agreement.
*323	6/9	Interagency Indochina Task Force: chronology, fact sheet.
†324	6/10	"Foreign Relations," 1949, vol. VII, the Far East and Australasia, part 1, released.
*325	6/10	Program for the official visit of Yitzhak Rabin, Prime Minister of Israel, June 10-13.
†326	6/10	Kissinger, Rabin: remarks upon Prime Minister Rabin's arrival.
*327	6/12	Program for the state visit of Walter Scheel, President of the Federal Republic of Germany.
*328	6/12	U.S.-Colombia textile agreement.
*329	6/12	Advisory Committee on Transnational Enterprises established.
*330	6/12	Advisory Committee on Transnational Enterprises, June 30.
*331	6/12	Shipping Coordinating Committee working group on radio communications, July 17.
†332	6/12	Kissinger: news conference.
*333	6/12	Toon sworn in as Ambassador to Israel (biographic data).
†334	6/13	Members of East-West Center governing board named (rewrite).

* Not printed.

† Held for a later issue of the BULLETIN.

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Corrections for Volume LXXII

The editor of the BULLETIN wishes to call attention to the following errors in volume LXXII:

January 27, p. 123, col. 2: Line 29 should read "contained in L.1011 also commends itself to".

February 3, p. 134, col. 2: The second-to-last paragraph should read ". . . I will request legislation to authorize and require tariffs, import quotas, or price floors"

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
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
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
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