


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# THE DEPARTMENT OF STATE BULLETIN

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# THE DEPARTMENT OF STATE BULLETIN

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*The Department of State BULLETIN, a weekly publication issued by the Office of Media Services, Bureau of Public Affairs, provides the public and interested agencies of the government with information on developments in the field of U.S. foreign relations and on the work of the Department and the Foreign Service.*

*The BULLETIN includes selected press releases on foreign policy, issued by the White House and the Department, and statements, addresses and news conferences of the President and the Secretary of State and other officers of the Department, as well as special articles on various phases of international affairs and the function of the Department. Information is included concerning treaties and international agreements to which the United States is or may become a party and on treaties of general international interest.*

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## Secretary Kissinger's News Conference of September 11

Press release 429 dated September 11

*Secretary Kissinger:* Before I take questions I wanted to make a few points about the trip to Africa that I am undertaking starting on Monday.

First, the American diplomatic effort is being undertaken with the support and with the encouragement of all of the parties involved.

Second, there is no "American plan." The solutions have to be found in Africa and have to be found by negotiations among the parties.

Third, the United States has agreed to offer its good offices because no other country was available to perform this role and because the risks to world peace of an escalating violence in southern Africa were very severe.

Fourth, war had already started in southern Africa. The danger of its expansion, the danger of foreign intervention, the impact on the national security of the United States and on world peace dictated that we make an effort to find a peaceful solution. The worst that can happen if this effort fails is what was certain to happen if the effort is not made.

We are dealing with three problems: Namibia, Rhodesia, and South Africa—each having different aspects and each having different timetables.

On this trip we will deal primarily with the issues of Namibia and Rhodesia. It is not a negotiation that will lend itself to dramatic final conclusions, because there are, in the case of Rhodesia, four states, four liberation movements, the Rhodesian settlers, and South Africa involved; in the case of Namibia, several African states, again South Africa, the national movement

recognized by the Organization of African Unity, namely, SWAPO [South West Africa People's Organization], and several internal groups assembled in a constitutional conference.

We are pursuing this policy, which will not support violence and which stands opposed to foreign intervention, in the interest of world peace, in the national interest of the United States, and above all for the interests of the peoples of Africa.

Now I will be glad to take questions.

*Q. Mr. Secretary, do you think any arrangements you can help to make to resolve the problems of Rhodesia and Namibia can have any lasting relevance and stability in a region where the strongest nation, South Africa, is saying through Prime Minister Vorster that they intend to preserve their system of white rule?*

*Secretary Kissinger:* The solutions to Rhodesia and Namibia, if they can be achieved, can have a lasting character.

The purpose is to enable a transition to independence in Namibia and to majority rule and protection of minority rights in Rhodesia under conditions that will enable all the communities to live together and in which the bloodshed is put to an end.

The conditions in South Africa are more complicated and require a much longer timespan for their evolution.

*Q. Mr. Secretary, can you go into some detail on the apparent American-British incentive plan to help bring about a transition to black rule in Rhodesia? There has been a lot of speculation about it. I know you have spoken to people on the Hill about it. Could you provide us with some details?*



*Secretary Kissinger:* Obviously, any solution in Rhodesia will have to have political components and economic components. It should not be seen as an effort to buy out the white settlers. Rather, Rhodesia is a rich country that can have a substantial economic rate of progress after full independence is achieved.

What we have been discussing with the United Kingdom and with other interested parties is a scheme that can be used either for investment in Rhodesia to spur economic progress or as a safety net for those settlers who want to leave—or for both. Some of the funds can come from private sources that have economic interests there. Some can come from governments.

The leadership in this effort will have to be taken by the United Kingdom, which has the legal responsibilities for Rhodesia, with our support. We have talked to other countries, and the Government of France has already announced its support. So this plan is going to have a wide basis, but its exact features cannot be discussed until it has evolved further. But its basic philosophy is what I have outlined here.

#### **Establishing Framework for Negotiations**

*Q. Mr. Secretary, I would like to ask two questions based on your statement.*

*You say that this is not a negotiation which lends itself to final conclusions; therefore, what would you expect to achieve on this, and when might you get a final conclusion?*

*And then you also said that the worst that can happen if the effort fails is that what was certain to happen will happen, if the effort were not made. What is that?*

*Secretary Kissinger:* With respect to the second question: We are facing a situation now in which a so-called “armed struggle” is already taking place in Rhodesia and is beginning in Namibia.

The history of these struggles is that they lead to escalating violence, drawing in more and more countries, and have the danger of foreign intervention and the probability of the radicalization of the

whole continent of Africa, in which moderate governments will find it less and less possible to concentrate on the aspirations of their people and become more and more focused on events in southern Africa. For this reason, we want to provide a non-violent alternative to this prospect.

Now this prospect is before us. This prospect has a short time limit, and therefore it cannot wait for our own electoral processes. This is what will almost certainly happen if efforts of negotiation fail.

Now I have forgotten your first question.

*Q. The first question was that in your statement you said this is not a negotiation that will lend itself to dramatic conclusions—*

*Secretary Kissinger:* That's right.

*Q. What do you expect to achieve, and when might you expect a final conclusion?*

*Secretary Kissinger:* As I pointed out, we are dealing with about eight parties on the side of black Africa. In Rhodesia we are dealing with the white settlers and we are dealing with South Africa. And in Namibia also we are dealing with many different groups.

Therefore in both cases an objective is to establish a framework for negotiations in which then the details will have to be worked out by the various parties concerned. We cannot supply the details by which transitions to independence are achieved. What we can do is to bring the parties sufficiently close so that they think a negotiating effort—they believe in a negotiating effort—and perhaps, establish some of the basic conditions for the negotiations.

Whether this can be achieved in both cases in one trip, I would question; but progress toward these objectives can be made.

*Q. Mr. Secretary, how important is it to end the guerrilla struggle that is already taking place on Rhodesia's borders, and beginning in Namibia? And will you seek any commitments from the frontline nations to diminish their support of the guerrilla struggle if you*



succeed in creating the conditions for majority rule in Rhodesia?

*Secretary Kissinger:* I think everybody agrees that if a peaceful solution can be found, then there is no purpose in a guerrilla struggle. So the problem is: Can one find conditions in which all parties can agree to this?

But as I pointed out, the United States does not support violent solutions when peaceful alternatives are available.

Bernie [Bernard Gwertzman, New York Times].

*Q. Mr. Secretary, why do you feel that you yourself should engage in a shuttle diplomacy? Why cannot this be done through more orthodox diplomatic channels? While here has been widespread support on the Hill, one Congressman yesterday characterized this mission as "Lone Ranger" diplomacy, and I wonder if you would address yourself to why you feel you yourself must be involved.*

*Secretary Kissinger:* That Congressman was not very original, it seems to me. He plagiarized a Southern Governor. [Laughter.]

We have had three missions in Africa. The British have had two. And a point has nearly been reached where, since the Presidents of so many black African states are involved as well as the leaders of southern Africa, matters cannot be brought beyond this point by the exchanges of notes, by referring documents back for detailed instructions, and what is needed now is an impetus in which the negotiations can be conducted somewhat more flexibly.

This is true especially in South Africa as well, where some difficult decisions have to be taken.

So this is what led all of the parties concerned to believe that this was the best way to proceed.

*Q. Mr. Secretary, there are reports that you will be seeing some black African leaders within South Africa itself. Now, you mentioned earlier that you didn't expect to accomplish anything on the South African ques-*

*tion on this particular trip. What would be the purpose of your meeting with black Africans within South Africa?*

*Secretary Kissinger:* I expect to meet representatives of all communities in South Africa, and not only of the white community, primarily to inform myself on conditions there so that I can form a better judgment of what the right American policy might be.

#### U.S. National Interest

*Q. Mr. Secretary, many Americans believe that there is no U.S. interest in southern Africa and that our national security is not concerned there. You, however, have a contrary view, and I wonder if you can elaborate on that a bit more.*

*Secretary Kissinger:* As I pointed out, at issue is not only the future of two states in southern Africa but the potential evolution of all of Africa, with its profound impact on Europe and on the Middle East.

It is the fixed American policy that solutions to complicated international issues should not be sought by violence. And conversely, if the principle of violent solutions is established, it will have an impact on other areas of the world.

Secondly, all European countries recognize the interests that they have in a moderate evolution of events in Africa; and this is why we have received public support from the United Kingdom, with which we have been cooperating most closely, from the President of France, and from the Chancellor and Foreign Minister of the Federal Republic of Germany, together with diplomatic support from all our other allies.

Therefore the consequences of the radicalization of Africa would be serious in many other parts of the world. We are now at a moment when we can still, with relatively small effort, at least attempt to arrest this.

We have been urged, not only by the states of southern Africa but by all the moderate leaders in Africa, to engage in

this enterprise, because they understand what is at stake for the future of their countries.

And therefore we believe that the national interest of the United States is involved. Success is not guaranteed, but an effort must be made.

*Q. Mr. Secretary, do you expect the current situation to result possibly in any further currency devaluation, such as in the South African rand and the British pound?*

*Secretary Kissinger:* I don't think I should be asked economic questions, since there are so many people here who will tell you that I am an argument against universal suffrage on these issues.

I have not even thought about this. I don't expect that it will have any impact on devaluation.

*Q. Mr. Secretary, what role do you think the West German Federal Republic can play being helpful in this African settlement?*

*Secretary Kissinger:* As Chancellor Schmidt said at a press conference in Hamburg, the Federal Republic has a historic relationship to some of the population in Namibia. I understand there are about 30,000 people of German origin that live in Namibia, and so the Federal Republic can be helpful, especially helpful, in any efforts that may be made there; but it has indicated that it will give its general support to efforts in southern Africa generally.

*Q. Mr. Secretary, if this matter is so important to U.S. national security, why wasn't a great deal more done long ago when the positions were not so fixed and when it was more possible to make progress in the area?*

*Secretary Kissinger:* Because the conditions for making progress did not exist previously. Until the collapse of the Portuguese colonial empire, the conditions did not exist.

Secondly, the United States did not feel that it had a primary responsibility in an area that had been traditionally governed by European countries and where many

European countries had a longer historical interest; and therefore we wanted to give every opportunity to Great Britain, which was engaged in a diplomatic effort with respect to Rhodesia—for this effort to succeed.

It was the combination of a number of factors which made it clear that these methods would not work and that underlined the urgency of the situation.

### **Solution Primarily African Matter**

*Q. Mr. Secretary, is there any evidence that black Rhodesian unity is possible, and would you meet with any black Rhodesians on the trip?*

*Secretary Kissinger:* The meeting in Dar es Salaam, which was supposed to have brought together the so-called frontline Presidents and the various liberation movements, was more successful in bringing about unity among the frontline Presidents than among liberation movements. I would say that at this moment there is little evidence of unity among the movements.

With respect to whether I should meet with them or not, I will be guided by the recommendations of the African Presidents.

I have taken the position that in order to avoid foreign intervention on the model of Angola, the United States would not deal directly with the liberation movements, provided no other country would do this. If any of the Presidents think—if the Presidents think that it would be desirable for me to meet with them, then I would be prepared to do it.

But I must stress that the solution to these problems is primarily an African matter and for the parties concerned. The United States can act as an intermediary; the United States can offer suggestions. The United States cannot bring about unity; the United States cannot by itself bring about moderation; and the final outcome depends on the wisdom and the capacity to work together of the African parties.



*Q. How critical is unity among the liberation groups to your current effort?*

*Secretary Kissinger:* It is not for me to determine how a solution is to be achieved. If the African Presidents and the various liberation movements feel that they can negotiate by having individual teams, then it is not for me to decide that they should use another method.

So I would say that the organization of the negotiations on the black African side depends on the African Presidents and it is not going to be prescribed by the United States.

#### **Admission of Viet-Nam to United Nations**

*Q. To change the subject to another area, does the United States intend to block the admission of Viet-Nam to the United Nations? And if so, does this have any domestic political implications here or reasons for doing so?*

*Secretary Kissinger:* The President stated publicly this week that we considered the gesture of releasing the names of 12 missing in action as insufficient. And what we are considering is whether a government that is not fulfilling one of its basic obligations under an international agreement would be able to fulfill its obligations under the U.N. Charter, and this is—we will make our decision when the case actually comes before the Security Council.

*Q. Mr. Secretary, does President Ford feel that there is any political gain in your embarking on this diplomatic shuttle?*

*And, secondly, you are talking about the complexity of this issue. Is it possible for you to complete the beginnings of success in this issue, assuming you make progress, prior to the election or in the period prior to inauguration? Aren't you against some sort of political deadline?*

*Secretary Kissinger:* I think, first of all, with respect to political benefits it was accepted wisdom that the trip to Africa in April was not a spectacular success in

many of the primary elections that were then taking place.

It was undertaken, and it was supported by the President at the time, because he concluded that we could not, in the national interests of the United States, delay any longer.

Whether progress is possible before the election, I cannot say. But that progress needs to be made during this year if the situation is not to get dangerously out of control on at least some of the issues, I believe all the students of the subject agree to.

The impact of this negotiation on the election is impossible to determine. It should have no impact whatsoever. I was on the Hill yesterday meeting with 47 Senators, and I found that there was an essentially nonpartisan support.

What we are doing in the pursuit of peace in Africa is not a party matter. It is a matter for all the American people, and it will not be handled as a party issue, and I believe it will not be handled as a partisan issue by either side.

*Q. Mr. Secretary, when you talk about a framework of negotiations, does that mean that you need a commitment from Rhodesia to transfer power to the black majority within two years, and can you get that on this trip? Can you get it without having someone to whom to transfer power?*

*Secretary Kissinger:* I do not want to predict what is possible within any particular time frame. What we are trying to do on this trip is to move matters forward toward the point where negotiations can start and where some specific proposals may emerge.

I would not expect that this can be achieved with respect to Rhodesia on one trip.

With respect to Namibia, the issue is whether a framework of participants in possible negotiations can emerge. I am somewhat more hopeful on this. But even that issue involves so many parties, I would not want to predict until I had talked to them.



*Q. Mr. Secretary, to follow up Don Oberdorfer's question, it has been alleged not only that U.S. policy before last April was indifferent to Africa, but that it actively aided the white minority regimes. Particularly as a token of this is the Byrd amendment. Last April you promised that the Administration would take steps to repeal that amendment. That was almost five months ago. No steps have been made.*

*Are you going to be able to explain this to the African heads of state?*

*Secretary Kissinger:* I believe that the African heads of state understand that if a negotiation can be arranged over Rhodesia, the issue of sanctions will then be substantially irrelevant. The issue of sanctions arises only under conditions when there is no progress in the negotiations and no prospect for a transition in the governmental structure.

Therefore I have found that there is substantial understanding on the part of the black African Presidents for the steps we have been taking.

#### **Developments in Lebanon**

*Q. Mr. Secretary, during the period that you will be in Africa, Lebanon faces an important date in the transition of power from President Franjiyah to President Sarkis—President-elect Sarkis. And at the same time, there are reports that Syria is making intensive efforts to produce some sort of negotiated solution that will allow Sarkis to take power in normal conditions.*

*What are your expectations for Lebanon in the next two weeks, and what is your view of the Syrian efforts? Is the United States in favor of them?*

*Secretary Kissinger:* I had an opportunity yesterday to talk to two Foreign Service officers who just returned from the Christian part of Lebanon and who have had an opportunity to talk to President Sarkis. Also, I will be taking with me on this trip, an expert on the Middle East, so that

I can be in close touch with developments in Lebanon.

We favor a negotiated solution on the basis of the formula that was worked out in Damascus earlier this year, and we have generally supported the political efforts based on that formula.

Whether the advent of a new President would lead to a rapid solution is not yet clear.

We support the independence and territorial integrity and unity of Lebanon. We will use our influence in this direction. We have invited President Sarkis to send a representative to the United States for further talks soon after his installation and we will use our influence in the direction of the unity and integrity of Lebanon.

#### **Panmunjom Incident**

*Q. I have a two-part question. One, what is your evaluation of the aftermath of the Panmunjom incident? And, two, there have been conflicting reports about the role of the influence of the Soviet Union and China toward Kim Il-song's role in this case. Will you become a fair judge over this important issue [sic]?*

*Secretary Kissinger:* I believe that North Korea realized that the United States and its allies in the Korean Peninsula would not tolerate such brutal behavior. They, in effect, apologized for the incident. As a result of the discussions, the guardposts that they had on our side of the line in the Panmunjom area have been removed, and I believe that conditions have been created in which a repetition of such incidents is relatively less likely.

We have also shown our capacity to reinforce Korea very rapidly and our determination not to permit any transgression in Korea.

As for the role of the Soviet Union and the People's Republic of China, we are not familiar with any diplomatic initiative that they may have taken. We did not ask them to pass any messages. We noticed that their press was not particularly vocal

in support of North Korea, and we consider this positive, since it was a brutal act of murder.

*Q. Mr. Secretary, will you or the President or any senior member of the Administration be talking with former Defense Secretary Schlesinger when he returns from China?*

*Secretary Kissinger:* Well, I had an extensive talk with former Secretary Schlesinger before he went to China. I expect to have an extensive talk with him after he returns, and we have had reports of his—we've had some fragmentary reports of his conversations there, and he's behaved himself with a great sense of responsibility.

*Q. Mr. Secretary, you're an old hand at being a troubleshooter in many parts of the world. I'm wondering now, as you're about to leave, how would you rate your own chances of succeeding?*

*Secretary Kissinger:* I was afraid you meant as I'm about to leave office, and I thought 1981 wasn't that imminent. [Laughter.]

This is the most complex negotiation procedurally in which I've been engaged, and the chances of success are very difficult to evaluate, because it depends on so many intangibles and because there isn't any one interlocutor on each side.

Senator [Dick] Clark estimated my chances at success at 1 in 20. I rate my chances higher than that, but I don't want to give an exact percentage.

### **African Liberation Movements**

*Q. Mr. Secretary, twice this morning you've mentioned that your mission has the support of all the parties concerned in the area. By saying that, do you mean the black liberation movements? Do you have any word from them that they welcome the mission which you are about to undertake?*

*Secretary Kissinger:* I have made clear that we have not dealt directly with the

black liberation movements. So when I speak of the parties I speak of the states in the area; and the relationship of the liberation movements to this process is being worked out by the so-called frontline Presidents. We have not had any direct discussion with the liberation movements.

*Q. If I can follow that up, you said, as I understood it, that you would not deal with them—*

*Secretary Kissinger:* Excuse me. We've had a discussion with SWAPO with respect to Namibia, and I would apply my statement to them.

*Q. Well, that perhaps is the point I was making. Some of these movements, as I understand it, have had relations or have had contacts with other governments in the past. Where you said you would not deal with them as long as other governments did not, I wondered how you took that into account.*

*Secretary Kissinger:* Well, clearly, if outside powers become very active in southern Africa, then the danger of Africa becoming an arena for superpower conflict is very great, and I have said that the United States stands opposed to outside intervention in African affairs.

Up to now we have the impression that in the last months the Rhodesian liberation movements have dealt with the outside world substantially through the various frontline Presidents, which is the understanding that I have of the situation. Should that change, then the United States would also have to reexamine its position.

*Q. Mr. Secretary, back to Rhodesia, again on the financial aspects—what was the reaction of the people on the Hill to the dimensions of the plan? And could you be clearer—is it a case of the United States being asked to spend several hundred million dollars in allocations, or is it a kind of possibility; is it an insurance plan?*

*Secretary Kissinger:* We are talking primarily of an insurance plan. Nor are we saying that the American part of this in-



insurance plan has to come entirely from governmental sources; there are other sources that may also be available.

So we have not worked out a figure; we have not yet worked out a governmental participation. But we are talking of something that is essentially an insurance plan rather than a direct commitment, and we're talking of a consortium in which the United Kingdom will be the convoking country with our support and which will have the support, we expect, of most industrial democracies.

*Q. Mr. Secretary, do you anticipate being able to present this package to [Rhodesian] Prime Minister Smith during this trip?*

*Secretary Kissinger:* I have not yet decided whether I will meet with Prime Minister Smith on this trip. This depends on the evolution of the discussions and on our estimate of his basic attitude.

## **Death of Chairman Mao Tse-tung, People's Republic of China**

*Mao Tse-tung, Chairman of the Central Committee of the Chinese Communist Party, died at Peking on September 9. Following is a statement made by President Ford that day, together with the transcript of a news conference held that day by Secretary Kissinger.*

### **PRESIDENT FORD**

Weekly Compilation of Presidential Documents dated Sept. 13

The People's Republic of China announced today the passing away of Chairman Mao Tse-tung.

Chairman Mao was a giant figure in modern Chinese history. He was a leader whose actions profoundly affected the development of his own country. His influence on history will extend far beyond the borders of China.

Americans will remember that it was

under Chairman Mao that China moved together with the United States to end a generation of hostility and to launch a new and more positive era in relations between our two countries.

I am confident that the trend of improved relations between the People's Republic of China and the United States, which Chairman Mao helped to create, will continue to contribute to world peace and stability.

On behalf of the U.S. Government and the American people, I offer condolences to the Government and to the people of the People's Republic of China.

Thank you very much.

### **SECRETARY KISSINGER**

Press release 423 dated September 9

*Secretary Kissinger:* I will just read a statement, and then I will answer a few questions about Chairman Mao's death. I will probably have a press conference tomorrow where we can take other questions.

I extend my sympathy to the people and the Government of the People's Republic of China on the occasion of Chairman Mao Tse-tung's death.

Chairman Mao was a historic figure who changed the course of events in the world. He had a tremendous impact on the present and on the future of his country.

In the last years of his life, we worked closely with him on the improvement of relations between our two countries. His personal interest in that process was a vital factor in the Sino-American rapprochement which began in 1972.

We have since that time created a durable relationship based on mutual understanding and a perception of common interests; and we, for our part, will continue to cement our ties with the People's Republic of China in accordance with the Shanghai communique.

This is the formal statement, and I will be glad to take a few questions.



*Q. Mr. Secretary, to what extent do you think the opening between Washington and Peking was the result of Mao's philosophy and work?*

*Secretary Kissinger:* I believe that during his lifetime all the major decisions in China were either made by him or followed guidelines laid down by him. In the case of the opening of relations between the People's Republic and the United States, it is clear that that relationship bore his personal stamp; and on many occasions in my conversations with Prime Minister Chou En-lai, he would interrupt the meeting to say that he would have to consult with Chairman Mao in order to get further instructions.

*Q. Mr. Secretary, on the basis of what you know about Chinese leaders now, can you say with any confidence that China will continue to follow a policy of "open door" toward the United States?*

*Secretary Kissinger:* When any historic figure disappears, it is extremely difficult to predict everything that his successors will do. The basis of the relationship between China and the United States is mutual interest. I believe that these mutual interests are to some extent independent of personalities and that therefore the main lines of the policies are likely to be continued.

*Q. Mr. Secretary, are you at all personally regretful that the United States was not able to make more progress on the Taiwan issue while Chairman Mao was alive?*

*Secretary Kissinger:* The specific issues that are involved in the process of normalization of relations with the People's Republic of China cannot be tied to the lifetime of personalities. I had the occasion five times for extended conversations with Chairman Mao, and I believe he was a man of very great vision; but the relationship between our two countries cannot be given a timetable that is geared to individuals.

*Q. Mr. Secretary, do you have any expectation of visiting China between now and January 20, and has the death of Mao in any way affected those expectations?*

*Secretary Kissinger:* I have no expectation of visiting the People's Republic before the election. What travels I may undertake after the election could be affected by the outcome. [Laughter.]

*Q. Mr. Secretary, what do you think of the prospects that China might move now to remove the strain in relations with the Soviet Union, since Mao was considered to be personally hostile to the Russians?*

*Secretary Kissinger:* I believe that the basic line of the Chinese policy toward the Soviet Union has been determined by the fundamental interests of China and not by the personal preferences of an individual. It is therefore likely that the main lines of Chinese foreign policy will be continued, though there could be modifications of tactics.

*Q. Mr. Secretary, you've met with Mao, as you said, several times. Could you give us some flavor of those conversations—what kind of things you talked about, how he looked upon history, or something more than just the fact that you met with him?*

*Secretary Kissinger:* Well, Mao was an enormously forceful personality—a man who tended to be the center of the room simply by the enormous willpower that he reflected. He preferred to conduct his conversations in the form of a dialogue in which he made brief, epigrammatic, rather pithy comments and invited the other party's reaction to his comments.

I found that nothing he said, even though it seemed totally unplanned, was ever without purpose; and therefore these conversations tended to be rather complex and extremely illuminating.

*Q. Mr. Secretary, if the President were to telephone Peking and say, "I want to talk to the leader," who'd talk to him?*

*Secretary Kissinger:* I think he would talk to the Prime Minister.

*Q. Do you think he's the man who's in control there now?*

*Secretary Kissinger:* He is the man who is in charge of the government, and he would certainly be the interlocutor for the President.

*Q. Mr. Secretary, recently there have been reports of internal strife in China. Do you think Mao's death will intensify this?*

*Secretary Kissinger:* Well, there have been reports of various factions, but these reports occur repeatedly. The United States deals with the government in Peking, and the internal affairs of China are matters for the Chinese and not for us.

*Q. Mr. Secretary, do you think that normalization of relations will be easier or more difficult for yourself or your successor after Mao's death?*

*Secretary Kissinger:* I believe, from our side, as I pointed out in my statement, normalization will continue; and I'm sure that from the Chinese side the basic lines of the policy, as we have known them, will continue to be pursued.

*Q. Well, that doesn't really answer the question, though. Some people on the Chinese political scene seem to be a bit more antagonistic or hostile toward the United States. Now, if Mao's death gives them more power in the future, will this make it more difficult to settle Taiwan with them?*

*Secretary Kissinger:* Well, obviously, if people who are more hostile to the United States should take power in China, this might complicate our relationship. We have seen, as of now, no evidence of it; but, of course, it is very early to tell.

I do not believe that Chinese policy is basically influenced by the personal likes and dislikes of Chinese leaders, but by their assessment of what is in the long-term interest of China.

We have to remember that when a towering figure disappears from the scene not

even his successors can know exactly what the shape of events will be, and it is premature to speculate as to what the future evolution should be.

## **President Calls for Full Accounting of Americans Missing in Viet-Nam**

*The Vietnamese Embassy at Paris on September 6 published and furnished to the U.S. Embassy a list of 12 U.S. airmen whom they described as having died in air crashes in Viet-Nam. Following is a statement by President Ford made in the press briefing room at the White House on September 7.*

Weekly Compilation of Presidential Documents dated Sept. 13

At my direction, the American Embassy in Paris today contacted North Vietnamese representatives and informed them that we expect that the United States will be provided with a full accounting without further delay of all Americans missing in action in Viet-Nam.

Speaking on behalf of all Americans, I welcome the fact that the Vietnamese have finally begun to keep their promise to provide information on our men missing in action in Southeast Asia.

While the report on these 12 men was grim, it at least resolved their status and removed the crushing burden of anxiety and uncertainty from their relatives and their loved ones.

But none of us can be satisfied with this limited action by the Vietnamese. What they have done is to release information of only a dozen men. They still have information on hundreds more.

For wives, parents, and friends of the men still missing, the anxiety and the uncertainty continues. It is callous and cruel to exploit human suffering in the hope of diplomatic advantage.

The Vietnamese have an obligation to provide a full accounting of all Americans missing in action. I call upon them to do so without further delay. Normalization of relations cannot take place until Viet-Nam accounts for all our men missing in action.



## U.S. Responsibilities in World Population Issues

*Address by Marshall Green*

*Coordinator of Population Affairs*<sup>1</sup>

The population problem is too often defined in narrow Malthusian terms of too many people pressing on inadequate food supplies. This is but one dimension of the problem, and not the most serious one at present, although it may be some years hence. Today the most serious manifestations of overpopulation are an alarming increase in unemployment as well as widespread environmental degradation.

An excellent booklet recently circulated by the Worldwatch Institute, and funded in part by the United Nations, specifies 22 different ways in which current excessive worldwide population growth poses dangers to mankind. These dimensions include impending world food shortages, pollution and disruption of the earth's ecosystem, depletion of mineral and water resources, energy shortages, erosion, deforestation, expanding deserts, unemployment, overcrowded cities, crime and juvenile delinquency, deteriorating living conditions, social unrest, authoritarianism, and political conflict. Meanwhile, nuclear weapons are proliferating in a crowded, restive world.

No country is spared the impact of population growth, even countries like the United States where population growth rates are not large. For we all live on a shrinking planet, small enough that events half a world away have a large, growing impact upon us all.

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<sup>1</sup> Made before the Commonwealth Club of California at San Francisco, Calif., on Sept. 10 (text from press release 433 dated Sept. 13; opening paragraphs omitted).

Moreover, high population growth rates and resulting unemployment in the less developed world generate enormous pressures for migration. As Gen. [Leonard F.] Chapman, Commissioner of the Immigration and Naturalization Service, told this club last year, legal immigrants to the United States now number over 400,000 per year, but illegal immigrants in recent years have annually totaled over twice that figure. What impact does this have on our economy? Even more seriously, what is the impact on our society of such large-scale violations of our laws?

And we have our own internal population growth problems. Every year the equivalent of a city the size of Philadelphia is added to our population. Even relatively small increases in population slowly but relentlessly aggravate a lot of problems like air, water, and noise pollution; impose greater demands on resources; and contribute to the tensions of overcrowded cities, to higher and higher social costs, and to congested highways and recreational areas. Coping with all these issues will inevitably involve more and more permits, licenses, red tape, and bureaucracy—in short, increasing limitations on our vaunted free way of life. The Rockefeller Commission on Population Growth stated in its report to the President in March 1972 that Americans 50 years from now will look back with envy on what, from their vantage point, appears to be the relatively unfettered life of the 1970's.

I suspect that you are all fairly familiar

with these warnings, for the dangers involved in population growth are increasingly sensed. This is particularly true of young Americans. A recent survey conducted by the Overseas Development Council and the U.S. Coalition for Development showed that two-thirds of Americans 18-25 years old identified overpopulation as the second most serious world problem. The most serious was regarded as pollution, which is closely related to population growth. In fact, I coined the word "population" to cover them both.

Yet there is still a tendency on the part of too many people to see population growth as somebody else's problem, not their own, or as one to be left for future generations to solve. Leaders and bureaucrats are all too prone to give greater attention to the procedural and short-term than to the substantive and long-term.

### Obstacles and Achievements

The fundamental question is whether mankind can cope effectively with population growth. Perhaps not. That, in essence, summarizes the school of thought which sees mankind as having irretrievably lost the race to control population growth. Others espouse a totally contrary view. Herman Kahn of the Hudson Institute, for example, sees an abundant life for all a century from now, and he goes on to portray a happy world of 15 billion souls thriving on food substitutes derived from converting wood and agricultural waste into glucose.

My own view of the future, and the one I believe is generally shared in our government, is that mankind can still save itself even though the hour is late. I take this view despite the many obstacles to effective population programs around the world. We are still plagued with obstacles such as:

—Traditionalism (large families are just a way of life).

—Male machismo (you find these char-

acters all around the world, not just in Latin America).

—Ignorance, illiteracy, suspicion, and the desire of some countries or tribal areas to outnumber their neighbors.

—Desire for many sons and even daughters to provide for their parents in their old age. This in many ways is the most understandable reason for large families in the absence of social security systems which poor countries cannot afford or perhaps even operate.

A principal obstacle to combating population growth is lack of administrative competence and the prevalence of bureaucratic delays, inertia, and general inefficiency.

Moreover, few doctors and nurses are willing to serve in rural areas, understandably preferring the social and professional amenities of the cities. Many of them migrate abroad to strange places like Los Angeles where the pay is higher. I was told in India that most of the graduating class at Baroda Medical School last year piled into buses to go to our consulate in Calcutta to apply for U.S. visas.

But there is a much more hopeful side to the population problem.

Today the great bulk of the world's population lives in countries where family planning is not only accepted but where governments actually favor and promote family planning. This percentage is steadily increasing, although most of sub-Saharan Africa and much of Latin America are still hesitant to go the route of government-sponsored family planning programs. However, even in those countries, most governments have come to recognize that spacing of children is important for the health of mother and child alike and that high population growth rates dim prospects for economic growth and better conditions of life.

One of the most important achievements was the World Population Plan of Action adopted by consensus by 136 nations at the Bucharest Conference in 1974. They agreed that nations should have population programs and that every married



couple had the right to plan its family and to have the information and means to do so. Family planning had at long last gained worldwide respectability.

There is now mounting evidence that population programs launched some years ago are having a real impact on reducing birth rates in developing countries like China, Korea, Thailand, Colombia, the Philippines, Tunisia, and Costa Rica.

It is true that industrialization, modernization, and increased literacy are helping to reduce birth rates, but it would be wrong to deny the important role which family planning has played in that regard.

### **U.S. Support for Family Planning Programs**

The United States has taken the lead in promoting worldwide family planning. We started 10 years ago to help countries launch their programs, and ever since, we have contributed roughly one-quarter of all foreign and domestic funds devoted to that purpose, including those of receiving countries. The total worldwide sum, while growing, is not large. It involves from all sources, including contributions from all governments, organizations, and private groups, only about half a billion dollars a year, which is about half the cost of a Trident submarine.

Our support has largely taken the form of providing family planning supplies either directly through bilateral agreements or indirectly through U.N. organizations like the UNFPA [U.N. Fund for Population Activities] or nongovernmental international groups like IPPF [International Planned Parenthood Foundation] or private U.S. groups like the Population Council, Pathfinder Fund, Family Planning International Assistance, and the Ford Foundation. We have also financed a large share of worldwide biomedical and social sciences research involved in population issues.

The United States has a special obligation in this regard. We have long been the major aid donor nation, and our assistance

has enabled countries to reduce their mortality rates. This is as it should be, but we have thereby helped to promote the so-called population explosion. To be specific, we have been giving 16 times as much foreign aid to mortality reduction programs (such as food aid, nutrition, and health) as we have to fertility reduction programs; namely, family planning.

Clearly it is our responsibility to help insure that all of our aid has maximum developmental impact, that it stimulates receiving countries to increase their own food production, and that it assists the poorest people in these countries to increase their incomes. To serve these objectives, should not a larger percentage of our aid be in the form of support for other countries' population programs?

This is not to deny our awareness that whatever promotes economic development, improves education, and hastens modernization generally will also create a more favorable setting for helping countries to cope with excessive population growth rates. But it does raise the further question of how effective any outside economic assistance can be if the receiving country is inattentive to its own population problems.

Needless to say, the main task is not ours, but the countries threatened by excessive population growth. We can only help them in carrying out programs of their own devising. Some of these countries want no outside assistance; others are prepared to accept nonbilateral assistance; and still others have no restrictions on the sources of support. Our responses must be conditioned by these preferences.

### **Elements of Successful Population Programs**

However, I am strongly persuaded that the most successful population programs involve four interrelated elements and that if any country is really serious about coping with its population problems it would do well to give due weight to all four of these elements. They are:

1. Leadership commitment; that is, lead-

ers of countries with serious population problems speaking out clearly and firmly in support of population programs and seeing that effective national programs are carried out at the village or community level.

2. Innovative approaches designed to root family planning in the villages, such as wives' clubs of Korea and Indonesia or the community-based distribution systems that are beginning to appear in Asia and Latin America.

3. Training paramedics to provide general health services, including family planning, in the communities where these people are known and trusted. This offers extensive personalized family planning advice and services to people even in remote rural areas at costs which the poorer nations can afford. Currently we are supporting this approach in some 17 countries and hope to see it expanded widely. I should point out that innovative approaches combined with paramedic systems can produce rather dramatic results. For example, new acceptor rates in West Java have more than doubled in recent months with the introduction last January of the so-called STMK program. Involved are 1,200 teams of two persons each, one a health worker, the other a motivator, calling on each household to counsel on health and family planning. Personalized approaches are far more effective than billboards, radio programs, and the like.

4. Improved status of women. This is not just a question of liberating women from traditional endless childbearing. It is a political and economic necessity—politically, because human rights must be the ultimate purpose of government; economically, because women continue to be the most underrated economic resource of nations.

It will be readily seen that these basic elements of a successful population program demand intensive efforts by governments and extensive involvement of their people. In the economic jargon of our times, the problem requires a people-intensive solution. It would be a mistake to infer that our supply-oriented assistance can

solve other countries' population problems. It will definitely help, but the basic issue is, after all, not the supply of family planning services so much as creating the demand for those services. And that job is for governments and communities in developing countries to carry out as best they know how, drawing on the success stories of other countries tailored to their own requirements.

Particularly in the case of developing countries so far uncommitted to population programs, our help must take into account the various sensitivities and attitudes involved. We must, for example, avoid the language of "birth control" or "population control" in favor of "family planning" and "responsibility in parenthood," with emphasis on promoting basic human rights and the well-being of mother and child, as well as the economic benefits to a community and nation. Introduction and extension of primary health services provides the most widely acceptable way of moving toward family planning in most developing countries.

In all of our assistance, we would do well to maintain a low profile. It is probable that we will have to work more and more through international organizations and private voluntary groups since these non-U.S. Government entities are rather widely preferred in countries now entering the family planning field.

I suppose we can look back with some satisfaction to the indispensable role the United States has played in world family planning. We have been fortunate in having had the services of a number of dedicated, hard-working Americans both in and out of the government. On the other hand, the job could have been done even better had there been more involvement of our leaders and diplomats, especially our Ambassadors. The issue has, quite frankly, been left too exclusively in the hands of AID [Agency for International Development] officials without the involvement of our total diplomacy. The subject of population has rarely come up in meetings be-



tween our leaders and other leaders, or between our Ambassadors and the heads of governments to which they are accredited. Yet these are the American officials who have ready access to the leaders of other countries—often in an informal setting—and who are therefore in the best position to discuss population and related issues with men and women who decide policies and programs. It is not a matter of our lecturing them or they us, but of learning from each other.

If population is the key issue it is in some countries, why not talk about it? I am hopeful that this situation is now being corrected. Certainly, our Ambassadors over the past year have been given clear directions on this subject, and the results are beginning to show.

It is customary for after-luncheon speakers, especially diplomats, to end up with pleasant, optimistic conclusions that digest well along with the host's coffee and cigars, but I must desist. Population problems can only be aggravated by any attempts to gloss them over. The world has been far too slow in coming to grips with the population explosion. It has dillydallied until the problem has now reached the point where a horrendous spectacle of human misery threatens to unfold.

It was during our lifetime—yours and mine—that the worldwide population explosion occurred, and it is therefore our special responsibility, while time remains, to mitigate its effects as far as humanly possible. Otherwise, we leave a grim legacy to our children and their children. Our responsibility must be for the world forever.

## U.S. and U.S.S.R. Hold Consultations on Chemical Weapons Prohibition

*Following is the text of a communique agreed upon by U.S. and Soviet delegations at Geneva on August 30.*

Arms Control and Disarmament Agency press release 76-17  
dated August 30

Pursuant to an agreement between the USA and the USSR taken on the basis of the Summit communique of July 3, 1974, consultations were conducted in Geneva between August 16 and August 27, for the purpose of further consideration of issues related to a possible joint initiative in the CCD with respect to the conclusion of an international convention dealing with the most dangerous, lethal means of chemical warfare as a first step toward complete and effective prohibition of chemical weapons. The representatives of the U.S. and USSR to the Conference of the Committee on Disarmament, Ambassador Joseph Martin, Jr. and Ambassador V. I. Likhatchev, headed their respective delegations, which included technical experts. Questions, particularly those of a technical nature, linked to the definition of the scope of prohibition and with measures for verification of a possible agreement on chemical weapons, were considered. The discussions of these and several other problems were useful.

The delegations will submit the results of their deliberations to their governments. The consultations will be continued, after due consideration of the issues raised in the course of the discussions, at a time to be determined.



## Department Urges Congressional Approval of Agreement With Turkey on Defense Cooperation

*Statement by Philip C. Habib  
Under Secretary for Political Affairs*<sup>1</sup>

I am here today to describe the importance the Administration attaches to restoring a relationship of trust and confidence between the United States and Turkey, a relationship which has been beneficial to the United States and to Western security interests for almost three decades. Specifically I ask that the committee recommend approval of the U.S.-Turkish Defense Cooperation Agreement concluded in Washington on March 26, 1976, and transmitted to the Congress by the President on June 16, 1976.

Mr. Chairman, we believe that this agreement, and a comparable agreement now being negotiated with Greece, are essential elements if we are to refurbish and strengthen our ties with these two close friends and allies. Both agreements replace and supplement earlier mutual defense arrangements with these countries that have proven to be in our national interests. Both are designed to promote our continuing objectives in the vital southeastern flank of NATO and the general area of the eastern Mediterranean. Both have been structured in a way that we believe reflects the needs

and sensitivities of these two allies as well as our own basic national interests.

The Defense Cooperation Agreement with Turkey provides the basis for a reopening of strategic U.S. facilities in Turkey and the continued operation of other U.S. and NATO installations. The new agreement flows directly from our mutual responsibilities and obligations under the North Atlantic Treaty. It is consistent with, but not identical to, the 1969 Defense Cooperation Agreement with Turkey. Founded on reciprocal respect for the sovereignty of the parties, the new agreement authorizes U.S. participation in defense measures pursuant to article III of the North Atlantic Treaty. It is understood that when the agreement enters into force, activities will resume which were suspended by the Government of Turkey in July 1975, when the Turkish Government requested negotiation of a new defense cooperation agreement.

The agreement provides a mutually acceptable framework for this important security cooperation. The installations authorized by the agreement will be Turkish Armed Forces installations under Turkish command, but the agreement clearly provides for U.S. command and control authority over all U.S. Armed Forces personnel, other members of the U.S. national element at each installation, and U.S. equipment and support facilities.

<sup>1</sup> Made before the Senate Committee on Foreign Relations on Sept. 15. The complete transcript of the hearings will be published by the committee and will be available from the Superintendent of Documents, U.S. Government Printing Office, Washington, D.C. 20402.

The installations shall be operated jointly. In order to facilitate this objective the United States is committed to a program of technical training of Turkish personnel.

Other provisions of the agreement deal with traditional operational and administrative matters, including operation and maintenance of the installations; ceilings on levels of U.S. personnel and equipment; import, export, and in-country supply procedures; status of forces and property questions.

The installations and support facilities which Turkey has made available to the United States over the past 30 years have played an important strategic role. They have provided our easternmost operating base in the NATO area for combat aircraft, as well as major airlift, POL [petroleum, oil, and lubricants] storage, refueling, supply, training, and communications operations. U.S. intelligence collection in Turkey has allowed the monitoring of Soviet missile testing, has been a primary source of vital early-warning information on Soviet missile and satellite launchings, and has been an important data link on explosions of Chinese and Soviet nuclear devices.

Much of this lost information cannot be duplicated by other systems and sites now available to us. The adverse effect of this intelligence loss increases rather than diminishes with the passage of time, and we do not foresee resolution of the problem by the substitution of other-country sites or more sophisticated technology in the near future. In sum, we need the Turkish facilities.

The agreement provides also for continued U.S. assistance in helping Turkey meet its important NATO defense obligations. The agreement commits the United States to furnish Turkey a total of \$1 billion in grants, FMS [foreign military sales] credits, and loan guarantees over a four-year period. However, only one-fifth of this total will be grant aid. The balance, or \$800 million, will take the form of Federal

Financing Bank loan guarantees, which require an appropriation of only 10 percent of the principal amount of the guaranteed loans.

This level of assistance is modest, given the size of the Turkish military forces and their importance to us as key elements in the North Atlantic Treaty alliance. It is also consistent with past levels of U.S. military assistance to Turkey. It is responsive to U.S. needs in ways and at levels which we think are acceptable to the Congress and the American people.

### **Security of Mediterranean Region**

Mr. Chairman, I need hardly remind this committee of the crucial role of the southeastern flank of Europe in insuring the overall integrity of our common defense. Our position throughout southern Europe and the Near East is dependent on the maintenance of a system of security relationships which we have built up in the eastern Mediterranean and which have served this country well over many years. Turkey's role in this structure is of obvious importance, particularly in light of the increasingly strong Soviet military presence in the Mediterranean area. Turkey shares common borders with the Soviet Union and Bulgaria, and it controls the Turkish Straits. Turkey's Armed Force of 500,000 men is the largest of all our NATO partners and requires the Warsaw Pact to devote substantial ground and air forces to this area. Turkey borders on areas of the Middle East and Iran of increasing sensitivity to U.S. interests.

Turkey thus adds major strength to the Western alliance system and is a link to other important U.S. defense relationships in the area. In turn the NATO alliance and the American partnership provide Turkey a bulwark against pressures from its Soviet neighbor, the temptations of neutralism, and a too-close association with radical forces in the Arab world. Our alliance with Turkey and our close bilateral relationship



have thus served our mutual interests, and I believe it is clear to members of the committee from their own contacts with the Turkish leadership that this mutuality of interests should and can continue.

In our view, anything that undercuts these relationships will have the effect of undermining our security and vital interests throughout the Mediterranean region. Our facilities in Turkey have served our interests in many times of crisis, both in the context of NATO and in other areas of the eastern Mediterranean. They have given us mobility, in terms of both access and transit, that is not elsewhere available. Any weakening of this association could thus jeopardize, in times of real crisis, our ability to come to the assistance of our other friends and allies in the Mediterranean. For inevitably a loss of access to facilities in Turkey, both those now suspended and others which continue to function, would not be felt in Turkey alone but would impact on the utility of all our other defense arrangements in the area and on our capacity to be responsive to our commitments.

Mr. Chairman, it is for this, among many reasons, that we are concerned over Turkey's capacity to assist in the common defense. Since the imposition of the arms embargo, and even with the partial relaxation of restrictions subsequently enacted, Turkey's Armed Forces have suffered continued deterioration in their capability to fulfill important NATO responsibilities. Turkey is an active and dedicated participant in the NATO military structure. Its commitment to NATO remains public and strong. But NATO authorities are agreed that, under present U.S. restrictions, Turkey's military capability to conduct sustained combat operations in support of NATO has been impaired. Although several NATO members have acted to help meet this impairment, it is clear that Turkey's ability to maintain its vital contribution to NATO will continue to depend on the flow of equipment from the United

States, its major and historic supplier.

We regret that Turkey felt it necessary to suspend the operation of U.S. intelligence facilities in Turkey until new defense cooperation arrangements between us are worked out and approved. These intelligence facilities remain of great importance to the common defense, and we understand the committee will hear separately from other government agencies on this matter. I think we are all agreed, however, that what we are ultimately concerned with here is not only these individual facilities in themselves but also a restoration, through the agreement which we have concluded with Turkey, of an overall political relationship of fundamental significance.

In the postwar period Turkey has made tremendous strides forward in modernizing its economy and in moving toward an open and pluralistic society. Turkey fought with us in Korea. In 1952, with our encouragement, it joined NATO. Turkey's leadership is committed to continuation of the closest possible ties with Western Europe and the United States. These are policy directions we wish to encourage and support. The reestablishment of a close and effective security relationship will give us the means to do this.

#### Negotiation of Agreement With Greece

Mr. Chairman, in emphasizing the importance of this agreement with Turkey to the overall interests of the United States in the eastern Mediterranean, let me also emphasize our strong view that Greece remains equally important. We are in no sense making a choice for Turkey. We will make no choices among allies. Our security interests, and we believe those of Turkey and Greece as well, require that both countries remain committed to the NATO alliance and to the defense structure that has been served so well by Greek and Turkish participation in the past.

For that reason we seek also to update



and modernize our defense arrangements with Greece. Secretary Kissinger and Foreign Minister [Dimitrios S.] Bitsios of Greece agreed on a set of principles last April which is now being negotiated into an agreement between the two countries. Unlike Turkey, the Government of Greece has preferred to include all detailed arrangements for our facilities in Greece in appendices to the agreement itself. This has required highly technical and time-consuming discussions to assure that all points are covered to the mutual satisfaction of both parties. Several rounds of negotiations have been held, and a team headed by Ambassador [Jack B.] Kubisch is actively at work in Athens at this time.

### **The Cyprus Question**

Mr. Chairman, at this juncture I would like to say a few words about Cyprus and its relationship to the other subjects I have just been discussing. We are keenly and indeed painfully aware of the adverse implications of the continued impasse on Cyprus and of deepening Greek-Turkish distrust over conditions in the Aegean. American interests have suffered and will continue to suffer so long as this impasse and these conditions continue. So do the basic interests of Greece and Turkey, and those of the alliance as a whole.

For two years the U.S. Government has been in the forefront of efforts to restore peace and stability to Cyprus. We have seized every opportunity to advance the cause of a fair and equitable settlement to this difficult problem. We have worked directly with the parties themselves; we have worked closely with U.N. Secretary General [Kurt] Waldheim; we have worked with our Western allies, who share our firm desire that a satisfactory solution be found.

Secretary Kissinger has given special emphasis to the Cyprus problem in the numerous and frequent encounters he has had with his Greek, Turkish, and Cypriot counterparts; with U.N. Secretary General

Waldheim; and in consultations with our major Western allies. In several instances, the stalled negotiating process was set into motion following such an initiative by the Secretary. Unfortunately the history of the talks has been one of brief inconclusive rounds followed by long recesses—during which the position of each side seems to become more rigid and less susceptible to outside efforts at conciliation. The President's five Cyprus reports to Congress record the active efforts of the United States and other parties to convert the Cyprus situation from a series of lost opportunities into a sustained negotiating process which offers promise of a final resolution of this complex problem.

This experience has brought home one immutable fact of the Cyprus situation. The will to achieve results in Cyprus can have no effect unless it is shared by the parties themselves. We and our allies can advance the cause no further than the two Cypriot communities themselves are willing to do. Mutual suspicion and distrust still greatly hinder the parties' ability even to test one another by entering into serious discussions of the outstanding issues. Efforts at a dialogue are bogged down in procedural disagreements.

We do not intend to let our efforts flag. But it is patently evident that a long difficult path lies ahead. Our ability to act as an effective catalyst in this process depends in great measure on the depth and strength of our relationships with the parties involved. Anything that will ameliorate that relationship—anything that will strengthen mutual confidence—will add to our ability to help the parties on a path to an equitable settlement. Conversely, anything which vitiates our ability to so act will reduce the prospects for a reasonable conclusion of the Cyprus question.

An eventual solution will require compromise and new perspectives in the light of practical considerations and recognition that the situation which existed prior to 1974 is forever gone. The two sides must

come to the realization that both must demonstrate statesmanship and flexibility if the Cypriot people are to live again in a stable and secure environment.

### **The Aegean Dispute**

Let me comment similarly but briefly on the situation in the Aegean, where tension has recently received even more headlines than that in Cyprus. The Aegean problem involves deep and complex and emotional differences between Greece and Turkey, differences which we, together with our allies, have tried to help resolve.

On August 25 the U.N. Security Council adopted a resolution, cosponsored by the United States, Britain, France, and Italy. The resolution appealed to the parties to exercise utmost restraint in the present situation, to resume direct negotiations over their differences and to seek mutually acceptable solutions, and to take into account the contribution that appropriate judicial means, in particular the International Court of Justice, are qualified to make to the settlement of any remaining legal differences.

The fact that the Security Council was able to adopt a resolution on this controversial matter by consensus represents a very constructive step by the international community. We believe it should help to move Greece and Turkey toward a peaceful solution of this complex dispute. As for the United States, we will continue, as we have in the past, to do everything in our

power to urge the parties to settle this matter peacefully.

But I must emphasize again, Mr. Chairman; what is perhaps a truism but which is also basic, and that is that we can play a helpful role, on this or the Cyprus issue, only to the degree that we have a relationship of mutual confidence with both Greece and Turkey. It is that need that our Defense Cooperation Agreement with Turkey—as well as that with Greece—is designed to serve.

To sum up, Mr. Chairman, I would like again to emphasize the importance the Administration attaches to having a strong and stable Turkey firmly committed to NATO and the West. Only with a Turkish ally of this kind can our overall Mediterranean policies be firmly anchored. And only with the passage by Congress of a U.S.-Turkish Defense Cooperation Agreement can Turkish-American relations be restored. We ask the support of the Congress, therefore, in dealing with the whole complex of foreign policy issues which I have outlined this morning and which have been so detrimental to our interests for the past two years. All of us want to preserve our friendship and security ties with both Greece and Turkey. All of us want a just and durable Cyprus settlement and a peaceful resolution of the dispute over the Aegean. We believe this process can best begin by congressional approval of the U.S.-Turkish Defense Cooperation Agreement and the similar agreement with Greece. I ask your assistance in bringing this about.



## Department Testifies on Human Rights in Iran

*Statement by Alfred L. Atherton, Jr.*

*Assistant Secretary for Near Eastern and South Asian Affairs*<sup>1</sup>

The observance of basic human rights in all countries of the world and the willingness and ability of governments to carry out the aims of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights and the conventions on human rights are important foreign policy objectives of the United States. They are important because they are inherently right. They are important if we are to be true to our traditions and values, to our international obligations, and to the intent of the Congress. Even viewed in terms of realpolitik, we know that the observance or violation of human rights affects the long-term stability of countries and thus affects the realization of U.S. national interests and objectives.

As others of my colleagues have said before me, we must of course, in approaching the issue of human rights in every country, weigh our policies in the light of the totality of our interests in our relations with that country. We must also approach this issue in recognition of the fact that there are wide varieties of social and legal systems throughout the world, extraordinarily diverse cultures, and widely varying historical experiences and political and economic systems.

Our interests in our bilateral relations

with Iran, and the ways in which Iranian policies are congruent with and supportive of ours in the Middle East, in South Asia, and globally—all this is a matter of public record which I need not reiterate today.

It is important, however, to put the question of political and civil rights in Iran, which is basically what is before us today, in the perspective of Iran's historical experience and in the context of human rights in Iran in their broadest sense. I ask the subcommittee's indulgence, Mr. Chairman [Representative Donald M. Fraser], in what may at first seem a diversion but what I sincerely believe is directly relevant to an honest examination of the issues. I apologize that some of what I will say covers ground already gone over by Mr. Butler [William J. Butler, Chairman of the Executive Committee of the International Commission of Jurists] in his thoughtful testimony, but I am sure you will agree that it is important to have in the record executive branch views on some of the points he covered.

Iran, like Turkey and other ancient countries of the Near East, suffered in the 19th century what it regards as indignities at the hands of the West. Accordingly, they are today extraordinarily nationalistic and keenly sensitive to their sovereign rights and their distinctive cultural and political heritage.

Present-day Iran has a legacy of an ancient and complex culture and social system. It is an extraordinarily diverse land, with at least three or four major ethnic and

<sup>1</sup> Made before the Subcommittee on International Organizations of the House Committee on International Relations on Sept. 8. The complete transcript of the hearings will be published by the committee and will be available from the Superintendent of Documents, U.S. Government Printing Office, Washington, D.C. 20420.

linguistic groups and wide variations within the population in outlook, aspirations, expectations, and educational levels. It is not an exaggeration to state that for the last 40 to 50 years, Iranian leadership has been involved in the difficult and demanding task of creating and building a modern national state on the foundation of a traditional and, in many ways, feudal civilization.

The task of modernizing a traditional land and people with what were until recently very limited financial resources and a narrow skilled-manpower base is as great in Iran as it has been elsewhere. There have been severe social shocks to the system and disruption in the traditional way of life. The Government of Iran in the last few decades has made great progress in this process but has a long way yet to travel.

There are practices and procedures in Iran's judicial, penal, political, and informational systems which vary considerably from our own. Iran's legal system, for example, has for about 75 years been based on the Napoleonic Code, but it operates in a country whose very long history includes cultural, religious, and political systems which are in no way linked to Western traditions. Mixed with the Napoleonic Code are Islamic traditions and local customs. Among the latter, one of the most relevant to our discussion is the country's history of strong central leadership—a monarchical tradition that dates back 2,500 years.

However, we share with modern-day Iran many aspirations and hopes for our respective peoples, and this has been one of the bases for the particularly close and mutually beneficial relationship which has been firmly established over the last three decades.

The Shah of Iran for nearly two decades has been instituting what was first called the White Revolution and, later, the Shah-People Revolution. Whether it be called a revolution or a forced evolution, one thing is clear: Iran is undergoing a massive process of change in every sphere of human enterprise.

What I will sketch out here are some of the efforts which are being made rapidly to transform this traditional society into a modern one. Iranian leaders face major problems and would be the first to admit that their country has far to go to cope with all of them. The programs they have instituted can be considered very impressive efforts to raise the conditions of life for the Iranian people.

### **Economic and Social Reforms**

Land reform was among the most visibly successful elements of the social and economic reform instituted in the 1960's. In the first phase of land reform in 1962, nearly 600,000 farm families received titles to the land they were tilling for the large, in many cases absentee, landholders. In the second phase five years later, over 2 million farmers benefited from land distribution. One can roughly estimate that a third or more of the population was beneficially affected by these major initiatives.

Another major area of beneficial change resulted from the new Literacy Corps, which was first dispatched to the countryside in 1963. Since that time, approximately 100,000 young Iranians, over 10,000 of whom are women, have worked in the villages, teaching the children and adults to read and write and to acquire a number of other skills.

Perhaps one of the most significant features politically and socially of this effort has been bringing together the newly educated class in the corps with remote villagers. A result of this has been the spreading of new or modern ideas and concepts and presenting visible evidence that the leaders of government were concerned about the development of the nation's human resources. This has not always been the case in Iran's long history. Also, an unexpected dividend of this experience is that thousands of the corpsmen and women have elected to become teachers.

The success of the Literacy Corps, which has been popular in the villages, led in 1964 to the creation of the Health Corps



to bring medical care to rural areas where there were no doctors. In the 12 years that have followed, over 9,000 Health Corpsmen—about one-third doctors and the remainder trained medical assistants—have given regularly scheduled outpatient treatment from rural clinics and by the use of mobile vans. A Women's Health Corps has recently been formed, which will emphasize family planning.

The Health Corps program is universally popular in Iran, for it provides a service which everyone wants. It has been one more effort to meet the felt needs of the people.

The Extension and Development Corps is the last of these unique institutions—so reminiscent of our own Peace Corps—that I will mention today. This organization was envisioned as successor to the agricultural extension program which had been heavily emphasized during the period of American Point 4 aid to Iran. It was announced simultaneously with the Health Corps in September 1964 (although the first teams did not go to the field until May 1965) and was expected to function in tandem with that program and with the Literacy Corps. Service requirements are the same: 4 months of training and 14 months of service in a village. University-trained agronomists and veterinarians serve as second lieutenants, and high school graduates are extension agents with the rank of sergeant.

The Extension and Development Corps was to bring to the rural areas of Iran, in the Shah's words, "development, prosperity, advanced agricultural methods and a new method of social thinking." Roughly 5,000 corpsmen are serving, and the total number who have taken part in the program is over 24,000.

One of the most serious problems traditionally faced by farmers in Iran (and in many other developing countries) was access to a reasonably equitable juridical process to settle disputes. Traditionally, the landlord or his agent imposed a decision, or the headman of the village negotiated the dispute. The only appeal from the

landlord's decision was to the courts in a town or city, but the time and money involved effectively removed this form of potential redress from most of the peasantry.

To remedy this situation, the House of Equity decree was issued in December 1963. It provided for the election by secret ballot of three chief judges and two alternates from a list of villagers to serve as a village court. An interesting interconnection of these various reforms is that the Literacy Corpsman generally serves as the secretary to the court. These village courts are empowered to try all financial disputes involving less than 5,000 rials (about \$70) and to adjudicate cases such as inheritance, trespass, adultery, breach of promise, water sharing, and land boundaries—in other words, elemental disputes that often ravage villages and lead to violence. A somewhat similar concept has now been introduced in over 200 towns in Iran.

The most controversial reform when it was first brought up in 1962 involved voting rights, for it involved giving women the vote as well and generally improving their status in society. Whereas land reform benefited all the farmers working land where they lived, the advent of women's suffrage was unpalatable to all but the most liberal Iranians in all walks of life.

As in all social reforms, progress in women's rights has been gradual; laws have been passed giving women the right to hold property and to sue for divorce for cause, but social attitudes have changed more gradually than the laws. But the changes in the status of Iranian women, particularly in the cities, are impressive.

#### **Programs To Benefit City Dwellers and Workers**

Mr. Chairman, I have selected the above reforms out of the 17 which are included in the Shah-People Revolution because they relate directly to a number of fundamental economic and social rights: justice and equity for the farmers and villagers through land reform and village courts; increased literacy, without which no coun-

try can prosper; new efforts to provide health care; assistance in other forms of rural development; and improvement in the status of women. In sum, they amount to a significant improvement in the human rights of millions of Iranians.

Except for the voting reform, these reforms and most of the others of the 1960's largely benefited the rural areas where the vast bulk of the population still lives.

However, in Iran in recent years, as in all rapidly developing countries, the movement to the city from the countryside is altering the demographic balance. The Government of Iran is now facing the very problems—and the benefits—we all face with urbanization. Tehran, for example, is now a city of over 4 million people, whereas two decades ago the population would have numbered only several hundred thousand. Our own experience shows that there are no panaceas for the problems confronting the new urban proletariat. However, having made major changes in the rural areas, the government is now attempting to meet the needs of the city dweller and worker.

An early reform was a profit-sharing scheme which called for employers to pay bonuses to their workers based either on gross income, net profit, or production levels. A rough estimate is that 270,000 workers are benefiting from the program. The most recent addition to the reform program took place last year when the Iranian Government set in motion a stock divestiture program under which up to 49 percent of stock in a particular industry will be offered to workers and farmers. It is too early to say what the results of this bold plan will be, but it is reflective of the government's intent to provide ownership-participation and new benefits to the industrial worker.

In addition to these reforms—which I again note are a part of the Shah-People Revolution—the government has introduced a wide variety of measures aimed at implementing the social and economic rights of its people.

The prices of many staples—flour, salt, and sugar, for example—are heavily subsidized by the government to keep them within reach of even the less well-off citizen. The government spends approximately \$1 billion per year on this program.

Education is now free through the high school level, and a very large scholarship program provides for free college education. There are approximately 20,000 Iranians studying in this country, many of them with Iranian governmental financial assistance.

A new social security system, patterned on our own social security law, has been introduced.

There is a wide variety of other social and economic improvements which are being implemented or which will be commenced in the near future.

I will not go into further detail at this time, but you may be interested to know that of Iran's anticipated expenditure of \$92.5 billion (excludes foreign loan repayments, foreign investments by Iran, and miscellaneous items and welfare support; the latter item consists largely of the government's food commodity support program) in the current five-year plan, approximately 55 percent is dedicated to what can be fairly viewed as directly contributing to the social and economic betterment of the people. Per capita income is about \$1,600, compared to only \$700 a few years ago. The rich are getting richer, but even a short visit to Iran reveals much better than dry statistics that a substantial middle class is developing and more people have more disposable income.

Mr. Chairman, I have briefly touched upon some key elements of the programs and actions of the Government of Iran for two reasons:

1. The first is to draw more attention to the significant degree of social change which is bubbling in this traditional society and the major strides taken toward fulfillment of goals addressed in the international documents on human rights.



2. The second point I wish to make is that Iran is clearly in a period of major social change. The people who have bettered their lives, or have a reasonable expectation of doing so, are many. But other forces have also been deeply affected by the change—the vested interests whose power in society and body politic has been reduced or eliminated. In many societies, the position of traditional power elites is very frequently undermined by the process of change. In fact, modernization in the best sense of that word is possible only if the grip of older elites is loosened or a unique consensus of old and new is achieved. In Iran the large landholders and the leaders of large tribal groups have seen the bases of their strength severely eroded by land reform and the other reforms which I previously mentioned. The religiously conservative elements in the society, powerful in varying degrees in all Moslem countries, have at times vigorously opposed the whole process of modernization, which they consider to be sectarian and anti-Islamic.

The voting rights proposal referred to earlier, for example, brought about large-scale rioting in the streets of Tehran in 1963. These riots, which were put down with force by the government, had been organized by a leading cleric who exploited the strong antifeminist sentiment in the society.

### **Extremist Opposition Movements**

There is another important source of opposition to the Iranian changes of recent years. To this day, Mr. Chairman, the Government of Iran is confronted by the opposition—using at times brutal and harsh methods—of extremists from the Left and the Right.

I will not go into a long presentation on the development of the Communist or radical leftist movements in Iran, but let me recall that large parts of northern and western Iran were occupied by Soviet forces between 1941 and 1946. This was

the second occupation in this century by Russian forces of significant parts of Iran. In the war years the Soviet Union actively encouraged and abetted separatist movements in these areas and substantially helped in the development of an Iranian Communist Party, the Tudeh Party, which owed its principal allegiance at that time to the Soviet Union.

In the latter stage of Prime Minister Mossadegh's government in 1953, the Tudeh Party was virtually in control of and had organized a broad conspiracy throughout the country. When the Shah reasserted his control, the Tudeh Party and the advocacy of communism were outlawed. The advocacy of communism is still a crime, and the accused are tried in the military courts.

Thus the Government of Iran has faced during the past 30 years strong opposition from an extreme leftist movement, tied in various ways to the outside, and opposition from the indigenous, extremely traditional forces who resent change and modernity.

As I noted above, the opposition to the Government of Iran has frequently taken a violent and brutal turn. By this I mean terrorist actions, which we saw senselessly reflected only a week ago in the murders of three American civilians.

Terrorism as a form of political action is not a new phenomenon in Iranian history. It has long historical and cultural roots. Since the 1960's a number of separate terrorist groups whose principal platform has been the violent overthrow of the regime have come and gone, but this phenomenon continues. The victims of the terrorists have included an Iranian Prime Minister, numerous police and government officials, and six Americans. Plots to kidnap the Empress of Iran and the Crown Prince were uncovered, and several efforts to murder the Shah were made. You will also recall that in 1949 the Shah was wounded by a terrorist attack. Relatively little is known about the numbers of terrorists involved—they are not particularly

large, we are told—but through stealth and individual murder, they are able to make their presence felt.

Neither do we know a great deal about the various political programs of these groups, for their principal motivation appears to be the destruction of the current society and its leaders; these groups have not promoted constructive alternatives. It appears that, in effect, the terrorists come from two ideological currents—one extreme leftist if not neo-anarchist, and the other strongly influenced by extreme religious conservatism.

At times there have appeared to be two separate movements, both of which can be hazily linked to earlier terrorist organizations. But it also appears that the two groups have often worked together in individual political murders and may in fact be wings of the same movement brought together in a loose federation—having in common their hatred of the regime. We do know that elements representing at least one of these groups were involved in the murder of the two American colonels last year in Tehran.

It is also very clear that in addition to the indigenous support that the terrorists receive, they have established links with a variety of terrorist movements abroad and have received substantial financial assistance and very large quantities of arms. In recent successful attacks on terrorist safe-houses in Tehran, large caches of foreign arms—machineguns, hand grenades, pistols, et cetera—have been found, as well as sums of money.

All of us have been horrified by the Lod massacre, the murders at the Olympic games, the numerous hijackings of civilian airliners, and the numerous individual assassinations, including the murder of American Ambassadors and other officials, which have taken place throughout the world. The media, except on rare occasions, have not paid as much attention, quite understandably, to the fact that the Iranian leadership is faced today, and has been faced for many years, with a terror-

ist movement which need not take second place to any group in its brutality. This problem—this cancer—must be kept in mind when we view events in Iran.

### Investigation and Trial Procedures

In view of these disruptions and their threat to the security of the state and to its leaders, the Government of Iran through its legislative processes has determined that persons charged with actions against the security of the state or of actions against official persons and property will be tried by the military court system.

The International Commission of Jurists and others have criticized this procedure and have made a number of charges concerning the treatment given to people who fall within the military court system. The procedures of that court system do not, in fact, meet the criteria set forth in relevant international conventions or those we have established for our court systems, although the courts do operate according to Iranian law.

Investigating authorities in Iran have the power to detain suspects during investigations of alleged crimes without formal charges being immediately placed. Detention for persons involved in crimes having to do with state security can either last only a few hours for the initial questioning—which is probably the case for the vast majority of cases—or up to one to four months for the rare fuller investigations of detainees on whom prima facie evidence of a crime has been gathered or who have a previous record.

When formal charges are made, the accused has a right to select counsel from a list and, to the best of my knowledge, this right is generally observed in practice. If the accused prisoner does not make a choice of counsel from the list, the court appoints counsel.

We understand that visits from family and friends are not permitted during the investigatory stage but that during the



trial and later, if the individual is sentenced, such visits are generally permitted.

We have also seen reports from individuals who claim that torture has been used in the investigatory period. While we have no direct verifiable evidence of this, it is difficult to discount the many persistent reports, particularly in the context of terrorist violence, that there have been cases of harsh methods being used by the Iranian police and security services. I do not condone such treatment in the Iranian system or any other system. I simply must reiterate again the context of the charges. Most of the charges of torture are at least two to three years old. The only recent charges, largely made by Iranians abroad, all concerned terrorists who were allegedly killed or maimed under torture.

As Mr. Butler noted, it is very difficult to obtain information on this situation. However, in a number of specific cases that our Embassy in Tehran has been able to examine, we have found that many of those alleged to have been tortured had been killed or wounded in armed exchanges with the security forces or suffered wounds during the clandestine preparation of explosives.

I should at the same time point out that while the Iranian penal code imposes severe penalties on those who order or practice torture, we have no information on cases where these penalties have been imposed.

### **Political Crimes and Sentences**

Mr. Chairman, a fair amount has been written about the number of "political prisoners," and in your invitation to me you requested that I comment on this matter. There is no precise definition of the term "political prisoner" in the Iranian context, but there may well be a number—perhaps 100 to 150—who would fall within the definition in your letter; that is, "persons who have been detained, arrested or punished for their beliefs or opinions but who have neither used nor advocated violence."

As I said earlier, membership in a Communist movement or the advocacy of communism is illegal under Iranian law. I simply do not know how many persons are jailed for what we would consider normal political dissent. I am reasonably certain that the large majority of prisoners who have gone through the military court system were convicted for involvement in planning or carrying out violent acts against the security of the state or overtly engaged in acts of terrorism or were associated in some way with the terrorists. The number of such people in prison today is probably in the range of 2,800 to 3,500.

Iran has for some years had an amnesty program, and this month 307 prisoners convicted by military tribunals were released to commemorate the golden jubilee of the Pahlavi dynasty, as were nearly 1,800 persons convicted in civil courts for various offenses. Earlier this year 247 persons convicted in military courts were pardoned and released. This is the largest single group in recent times, as far as I am aware, but each year substantial numbers of prisoners who were not directly involved in terrorist murders have been amnestied. Last year over 200 were released.

We estimate that over 90 percent of the ex-members of the Tudeh Party who were arrested have been released and integrated into the society. In fact, in one recent Cabinet, two members were ex-Tudeh Party members.

You also wished me to comment upon the number of persons convicted of "political crimes" and the sentences which they have received. We have no information on the numbers convicted, but sentences have ranged from a few years to life imprisonment and to the death sentence. In his report Mr. Butler wrote that of the 424 prisoners whose names were listed, ". . . 75 have been executed, 55 have been given life sentences, 33 have been sentenced to between 10 and 15 years imprisonment and others have been given lesser sentences." Mr. Butler's statistics are probably within a reasonable order of magnitude, but let

me add that recently an American journalist from a major U.S. newspaper visited an Iranian prison and was introduced to and interviewed a number of prisoners who opponents of the Government of Iran have long claimed had died in prison from torture.

The Iranian criminal code specifically calls for the death penalty for persons involved in actions against internal security which result in the death of others or in the destruction of major government property. Conspiracy to commit such crimes can result in sentences of up to three years. Violence against an individual which does not result in his death has been punishable by from three to five years of hard labor, but a recent law has required a minimum sentence of five years for crimes involving a threat to state security.

In addition to the executions referred to by Mr. Butler, a number of others found guilty in the courts have been executed this year in conformance with the law. Among these were the chief planner and some of the persons actively involved in the murder of the two American colonels last year.

The Iranian Government also deals firmly with other acts of terrorism. A couple of years ago, Iraqi terrorists who hijacked a plane to Iran were tried and executed under Iranian law.

Mr. Chairman, I would like briefly to address two other questions which you put to me and to submit as an enclosure to this statement, in order to save time, answers to a few other matters in which you have shown interest. I would be glad to answer questions on those matters as well.

We believe that the Iranian Government has no doubt as to U.S. views on the observance of human rights. The Iranian Government is also aware of the legislation in which you have played a prominent role, Mr. Chairman.

However, we have not made official representations to Iran on the condition of human rights in that country for two reasons. First, we believe that the administra-

tion of Iranian judicial and penal systems is above all a matter of internal Iranian responsibility and that one sovereign country should not interfere lightly in another's domestic affairs. This is admittedly a matter of fine judgment on which there can be honest differences. In reaching our judgment, we have also taken into account the remarkable progress which has been made in Iran in many areas of human rights as well as the unique and extraordinarily difficult problems of terrorism and other manifestations of social disruption. If Iran's internal practices in matters relating to human rights were a growing affront to international standards, we would of course reconsider our judgment. The trend appears to us, however, to be in the opposite direction.

In applying section 502B of the Foreign Assistance Act to Iran, we are about to begin the formulation of fiscal year 1978 security assistance programs. Available evidence regarding Iran's observance of internationally recognized human rights will be taken into account in this process, and a report to Congress on human rights in Iran will accompany our fiscal year 1978 legislative request.

The human rights situation in Iran was considered by the U.N. Commission on Human Rights in 1975. The Commission members determined that there was not sufficient evidence presented to the Commission on which to base further action. The Commission adopted the following consensus decision: "The Commission decides that in the case of Iran, no action is called for under [Economic and Social] Council resolution 1503."

Finally, Mr. Chairman, the United States no longer has economic or military assistance programs with Iran, although Iran has purchased through the foreign military sales system a substantial amount of military equipment to strengthen its security and to permit it to play a responsible security role in the area.

In summary, Mr. Chairman, I credit



Iranian leadership for its considerable skill and hard work in developing the land and training the people so that all Iranians will in time have a better life. Because this goal is violently opposed by both the extreme Left and the extreme Right without regard for the rights of their victims, there have been times that practices and procedures to deal with that opposition which we could not approve for ourselves have taken place. But when I place these in the broad context which I have tried to develop for you today, I believe that the advances which have been made in improving the human rights of the broad majority of Iran's population under considerable adversity far outweigh such abuses as have occurred in an attempt to control the violent challenges to the government.

## U.S.-Republic of Korea Convention on Taxation Transmitted to Senate

*Message From President Ford*<sup>1</sup>

*To the Senate of the United States:*

I transmit herewith, for Senate advice and consent to ratification, the Convention signed at Seoul on June 4, 1976, between the Government of the United States of America and the Government of the Republic of Korea for the Avoidance of Double Taxation and the Prevention of Fiscal Evasion with Respect to Taxes on Income and the Encouragement of International Trade and Investment, together with a related exchange of notes.

There is no convention on this subject presently in force between the United States and Korea.

The Convention follows generally the form and content of most conventions of this type recently concluded by the United States. Its primary purpose is to identify clearly the tax interests of the two countries to avoid double taxation and to help prevent the illegal evasion of taxation.

For the information of the Senate, I also transmit, a covering report of the Department of State with respect to the Convention.

This Convention would promote closer economic cooperation and more active trade between the United States and Korea.

I urge the Senate to act favorably at an early date on this Convention and its related exchange of notes and to give its advice and consent to ratification.

GERALD R. FORD.

THE WHITE HOUSE, *September 3, 1976.*

## Congressional Documents Relating to Foreign Policy

### 94th Congress, 2d Session

Disaster Assistance in Angola. Hearings before the Subcommittee on International Resources, Food, and Energy of the House Committee on International Relations. November 5, 1975–March 10, 1976. 207 pp.

Human Rights in Indonesia and the Philippines. Hearings before the Subcommittee on International Organizations of the House Committee on International Relations. December 18, 1975–May 3, 1976. 119 pp.

Activities of the Korean Central Intelligence Agency in the United States. Hearings before the Subcommittee on International Organizations of the House Committee on International Relations. Part I. March 17–25, 1976. 110 pp.

Proposed Sale of C-130's to Egypt. Hearings before the Subcommittee on Foreign Assistance of the Senate Committee on Foreign Relations. March 31–April 2, 1976. 121 pp.

To Require Certain Actions by the Overseas Private Investment Corporation. Hearings before the Subcommittee on International Economic Policy of the House Committee on International Relations. May 25–June 8, 1976. 180 pp.

Anti-Semitism and Reprisals Against Jewish Emigration in the Soviet Union. Hearing before the Subcommittee on International Organizations of the House Committee on International Relations. May 27, 1976. 26 pp.

<sup>1</sup> Transmitted on Sept. 3 (text from Weekly Compilation of Presidential Documents dated Sept. 6); also printed as S. Ex. P, 94th Cong., 2d sess., which includes the texts of the convention and the exchange of notes and the report of the Department of State.

## TREATY INFORMATION

### Current Actions

#### MULTILATERAL

##### Agriculture

International plant protection convention. Done at Rome December 6, 1951. Entered into force April 3, 1952; for the United States August 18, 1972. TIAS 7465.

*Adherences deposited:* Mexico, May 26, 1976; Papua New Guinea, June 1, 1976.

##### Coffee

International coffee agreement 1976, with annexes. Done at London December 3, 1975.<sup>1</sup>

*Signatures:* Bolivia, Portugal, July 15, 1976; India, July 16, 1976; Indonesia, Kenya, July 22, 1976; Peru, July 23, 1976; Ireland, Jamaica, July 26, 1976.

*Ratifications deposited:* Sweden, July 7, 1976; Trinidad and Tobago, July 2, 1976.

*Acceptance deposited:* Peru, August 31, 1976.

##### Conservation

Agreement on the conservation of polar bears. Done at Oslo November 15, 1973. Entered into force May 26, 1976.<sup>2</sup>

*Senate advice and consent to ratification:* September 15, 1976.

##### Consular Relations

Vienna convention on consular relations. Done at Vienna April 24, 1963. Entered into force March 19, 1967; for the United States December 24, 1969. TIAS 6820.

*Accession deposited:* Equatorial Guinea, August 30, 1976.

##### Containers

International convention for safe containers (CSC), with annexes. Done at Geneva December 2, 1972.<sup>1</sup>

*Senate advice and consent to ratification:* September 15, 1976.

##### Customs

Customs convention on containers, 1972, with annexes and protocol. Done at Geneva December 2, 1972. Entered into force December 6, 1975.<sup>2</sup>

*Ratifications deposited:* Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, August 23, 1976; Bulgaria, Byelorussian Soviet Socialist Republic, Ukrainian Soviet Socialist Republic, September 1, 1976.

*Senate advice and consent to ratification:* September 15, 1976.

#### Diplomatic Relations

Vienna convention on diplomatic relations. Done at Vienna April 18, 1961. Entered into force April 24, 1964; for the United States December 13, 1972. TIAS 7502.

*Accession deposited:* Equatorial Guinea, August 30, 1976.

#### Inter-American Development Bank

Agreement establishing the Inter-American Development Bank, with annexes. Done at Washington April 8, 1959. Entered into force December 30, 1959. TIAS 4397.

*Signatures:* Austria, Belgium, Denmark, Federal Republic of Germany, Israel, Japan, Netherlands, Spain, Switzerland, United Kingdom, Yugoslavia, July 9, 1976.

*Acceptances deposited:* Belgium, Federal Republic of Germany,<sup>3</sup> Israel, Japan, Spain, Switzerland, United Kingdom,<sup>3</sup> Yugoslavia, July 9, 1976.

*Ratification deposited:* Denmark, July 9, 1976.

#### Load Lines

Amendments to the international convention on load lines, 1966 (TIAS 6331, 6629, 6720). Adopted at London October 12, 1971.<sup>1</sup>

*Acceptance deposited:* Israel, August 25, 1976.

#### Narcotic Drugs

Single convention on narcotic drugs, 1961. Done at New York March 30, 1961. Entered into force December 13, 1964; for the United States June 24, 1967. TIAS 6298.

*Ratification deposited:* Indonesia, September 3, 1976.

Protocol amending the single convention on narcotic drugs, 1961. Done at Geneva March 25, 1972. Entered into force August 8, 1975. TIAS 8118.

*Ratification deposited:* Indonesia, September 3, 1976.

#### Property—Industrial

Convention of Paris for the protection of industrial property of March 20, 1883, as revised at Lisbon October 31, 1958. Done at Lisbon October 31, 1958. Entered into force January 4, 1962. TIAS 4931.

*Notification of succession:* Bahamas, August 31, 1976.

#### Seals

1976 protocol amending the interim convention on conservation of North Pacific fur seals (TIAS 3948). Done at Washington March 17, 1976.<sup>1</sup>

*Senate advice and consent to ratification:* September 15, 1976.

#### Seals—Antarctic

Convention for the conservation of Antarctic seals, with annex and final act. Done at London June 1, 1972.<sup>1</sup>

<sup>1</sup> Not in force.

<sup>2</sup> Not in force for the United States.

<sup>3</sup> With statements.



*Senate advice and consent to ratification:* September 15, 1976.

## Space

Convention on international liability for damage caused by space objects. Done at Washington, London, and Moscow March 29, 1972. Entered into force September 1, 1972; for the United States October 9, 1973. TIAS 7762.

*Ratification deposited:* Czechoslovakia, September 8, 1976.

Convention on registration of objects launched into outer space. Opened for signature at New York January 14, 1975.<sup>1</sup>

*Signature:* Singapore, August 31, 1976.

## Tin

Fifth international tin agreement, with annexes. Done at Geneva June 21, 1975. Entered into force provisionally July 1, 1976.

*Ratification deposited:* Romania, September 3, 1976.

*Senate advice and consent to ratification:* September 15, 1976.

## Trade

Protocol of provisional application of the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade. Concluded at Geneva October 30, 1947. Entered into force January 1, 1948. TIAS 1700.

*De facto application:* Angola, November 11, 1975; Cape Verde, July 5, 1975; Guinea-Bissau, September 10, 1974; Mozambique, June 25, 1975; Sao Tome and Principe, July 12, 1975.

## Wheat

Protocol modifying and further extending the wheat trade convention (part of the international wheat agreement) 1971. Done at Washington March 17, 1976. Entered into force June 19, 1976, with respect to certain provisions, and July 1, 1976, with respect to other provisions.

*Ratification deposited:* Nigeria, September 15, 1976.

*Accession deposited:* Syria, September 15, 1976.

## BILATERAL

### Republic of China

Agreement concerning fisheries off the coasts of the United States, with annexes and agreed minutes. Signed at Washington September 15, 1976. Enters into force on a date to be mutually agreed by exchange of notes.

### Ecuador

Agreement relating to eligibility for U.S. military assistance and training pursuant to the International Security Assistance and Arms Export Con-

trol Act of 1976. Effected by exchange of notes at Quito August 17 and September 3, 1976. Entered into force September 3, 1976.

### Indonesia

Agreement relating to eligibility for U.S. military assistance and training pursuant to the International Security Assistance and Arms Export Control Act of 1976. Effected by exchange of notes at Jakarta August 3 and 24, 1976. Entered into force August 24, 1976.

### Kenya

Agreement relating to eligibility for U.S. military assistance and training pursuant to the International Security Assistance and Arms Export Control Act of 1976. Effected by exchange of notes at Nairobi August 10 and 24, 1976. Entered into force August 24, 1976.

### Korea

Agreement amending the agreement for sales of agricultural commodities of February 18, 1976 (TIAS 8261). Effected by exchange of notes at Seoul August 9, 1976. Entered into force August 9, 1976.

### Mexico

Agreement amending the agreement of September 12, 1975, to indemnify and safeguard the U.S. Government, its personnel and contractors for liability arising out of aircraft operations training in support of the cooperative program to curb illegal narcotics traffic. Effected by exchange of letters at Mexico August 13, 1976. Entered into force August 13, 1976.

### Pakistan

Agreement amending the agreement for sales of agricultural commodities of August 7, 1975 (TIAS 8189). Effected by exchange of notes at Islamabad August 10, 1976. Entered into force August 10, 1976.

### Poland

Agreement amending and extending the air transport agreement of July 19, 1972 (TIAS 7535). Effected by exchange of notes at Warsaw August 26, 1976. Enters into force November 1, 1976.

### Swaziland

Arrangement for radio communications between amateur stations on behalf of third parties. Effected by exchange of notes at Mbabane July 7 and August 20, 1976. Entered into force September 19, 1976.

### United Kingdom

Extradition treaty, with schedule, protocol of signature, and exchange of notes. Signed at London June 8, 1972.<sup>1</sup>

*Instrument of ratification signed by the President:* September 10, 1976.

<sup>1</sup> Not in force.

<sup>1</sup> Not in force.

## PUBLICATIONS

### GPO Sales Publications

*Publications may be ordered by catalog or stock number from the Superintendent of Documents, U.S. Government Printing Office, Washington, D.C. 20402. A 25-percent discount is made on orders for 100 or more copies of any one publication mailed to the same address. Remittances, payable to the Superintendent of Documents, must accompany orders. Prices shown below, which include domestic postage, are subject to change.*

**The United States Passport, Past, Present, Future.** History of the U.S. passport including issuance authority; regular passports; no-fee passports; fees; documents in lieu of passports; passport application processing equipment; and Passport Office policies. Includes list of exhibits, tables, glossary, and index. Pub. 8851. Department and Foreign Service Series 153. 242 pp. \$5.10. (Cat. No. S1.69:8851). (Stock No. 044-000-01608-7).

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*431	9/13	Shipping Coordinating Committee (SCC), Subcommittee on Safety of Life at Sea, working group on container transport, Oct. 13.
†432	9/13	Kissinger: departure, Andrews Air Force Base.
433	9/13	Green: Commonwealth Club, San Francisco, Sept. 10.
*434	9/14	Advisory Panel on Folk Music and Jazz, Oct. 14.
†435	9/14	Kissinger: arrival, Dar es Salaam.
†436	9/15	U.S. and Republic of China sign new fisheries agreement.
†437	9/15	Kissinger: news conference, Dar es Salaam.
†438	9/16	Robinson: Conference Board, New York, N.Y.
†439	9/16	Kissinger, Mwale: arrival, Lusaka.
*440	9/17	Study Group 7 of the U.S. National Committee for the International Radio Consultative Committee, Oct. 5.
*441	9/17	SCC, Oct. 19.
*442	9/17	Government Advisory Committee on International Book and Library Program, Oct. 27-28.
†443	9/16	Kaunda, Kissinger: remarks, Lusaka.
*444	9/17	Program for the state visit of President William R. Tolbert of Liberia.
*445	9/17	U.S.-Italian scientific meeting on Sept. 16 on release of toxic substances at Seveso in July.
†446	9/17	Kissinger: statement on Law of the Sea Conference.
†447	9/17	Kissinger: departure statement and news conference, Lusaka.
†448	9/19	Kissinger: remarks following meeting with Rhodesian delegation at U.S. Embassy residence, Pretoria.
†449	9/19	Kissinger: remarks following meeting with Rhodesian delegation at South African Prime Minister's residence.

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*The Department of State BULLETIN is a weekly publication issued by the Office of Media Services, Bureau of Public Affairs, provides the public and interested agencies of the government with information on developments in the field of U.S. foreign relations and on the work of the Department and the Foreign Service.*

*The BULLETIN includes selected press releases on foreign policy, issued by the White House and the Department, and statements, addresses and news conferences of the President and the Secretary of State and other officers of the Department, as well as special articles on various phases of international affairs and the functions of the Department. Information included concerning treaties and international agreements to which the United States is or may become party and on treaties of general international interest.*

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## U.S. Business and Government in a World of Change

*Address by Deputy Secretary Charles W. Robinson<sup>1</sup>*

Secretary Kissinger regretted very much that he could not be here today. He had counted on this occasion for two important reasons. First, he has taken a great interest in the role of business in the international arena. He fully recognizes its critical importance in relations among the industrial democracies, between them and the developing world, and in East-West relations as well. Second, the Secretary is well aware of the significance of the Conference Board, which represents the highest echelons of America's private sector—and which constantly has demonstrated the will and the capacity to contribute ideas and new approaches to the most pressing problems of our society.

My remarks today will, of course, reflect the Secretary's views. They will reflect not only the official view, but also my own particular dual perspective, developed from my recent experience in government following my earlier career as a businessman. This experience has strengthened my long-held conviction that government and business executives have many interests in common.

—First, we both are confronted by a series of short-term crises which must be managed decisively without benefit of all the relevant information. If we wait until all the facts are marshaled, we are generally too late. This calls for judgment and a large quotient of courage. Furthermore,

although anyone who is making no mistakes very likely is making no contribution, we must be right most of the time. You in business face an annual audit, with performance measured in profit and other financial terms. We in government also have to face an audit—every morning when the editorial pages go to press, in addition to the quadrennial variety, the national elections.

—Second, although we both deal with day-to-day crises, our ultimate success or failure will depend on the extent to which we are sensitive to the dynamics of our respective worlds and move intelligently in anticipation of future conditions. The Bible says: "Where there is no vision the people perish." However, both business and government face a world in which change is taking place at such speed that long-range vision is blurred. Yet, we know that basing our long-range policies on nothing more than current conditions will doom our ventures to failure at the outset.

—Third, our increasing interdependence, coupled with increasing domestic demands on government, is forcing a growing government involvement in international economic affairs. Today, even in the case of the United States, where the private sector plays the lead role in international economic activities, the government is forced to take a close look at international trade and investment, assurance of supply of critical materials, and the global implications of domestic economic policies. This poses for government and business com-

<sup>1</sup> Made before the Conference Board at New York, N.Y., on Sept. 16 (text as delivered).

munity alike the challenge of creating a new cooperative relationship.

We are pleased that this conference is addressing this critical challenge, and we will be greatly interested in your conclusions. Thus we share interests—and we both must look at history to insure sound decisions.

### Historical Trends

The foundations of the political situation we are facing were laid during the three decades following World War II. To understand the forces now at work on our global society we must first focus on the basic changes during this period, which are now emerging with increasing clarity.

The United States is no longer able to dominate world events as in the 1950's and 1960's. We can and must continue to play the lead role in resolving global problems, but this requires a more subtle and an increasingly multilateral approach. For example, there is no way the United States could solve the energy crisis alone, without cooperating with the other industrialized oil importers and the principal exporters. Yet at the same time no solution to this problem could possibly come about without the active leadership and participation of the United States.

—We have moved from a bipolar to a multipolar world, at least in economic matters, with shifting international groupings related to specific issues. Institutions tailored to old requirements must be adjusted to the new ones. Because the United States cannot go it alone, we need new structures of multilateral relations. Older economic institutions, established by and substantially for the developed nations—the World Bank, IMF [International Monetary Fund], GATT [General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade], and others—must find ways of serving global interests involving responsible participation by the newly rich oil exporters, the less developed countries, and ultimately the Communist countries.

—Attitudes on foreign assistance have

changed. In the past we tended to justify aid in anti-Communist terms. The decline of bipolarity in the world has contributed to a decline in real terms in U.S. foreign aid. We must develop a new national consensus on foreign assistance which reflects both our moral obligation and our self-interest in the improvement of economic opportunity and buying power throughout the world. It is in both our short- and long-run interests to assure accelerated development in the less developed countries. Otherwise we will pay the higher costs of instability, confrontation, and dangerous political upheaval.

—During the 30 years since the founding of the United Nations, its membership has nearly tripled, from 51 to 144. Many of these new nations are on the margins of economic viability; yet they are deeply nationalistic. Meanwhile, the continued expansion of world industrialization and trade, and the need for foreign investment and assistance for the less developed nations, have created a stubborn reality of international economic interdependence which runs counter to the spirit of absolute political and economic independence. Opening the doors to full participation by the developing world in a new international economic order will be a task ahead for the industrialized democracies over the next decade.

### Challenges to Government and Business

As a result of these developments, both American business and government face important challenges. Developing the dialogue with the previously neglected sector of the world's economic community can be accomplished through closer government-business partnership and also through business and government acting singly, but in mutually supportive roles.

In the time available to me, I will not attempt an exhaustive listing of challenges and responses, but will highlight a few. I like to stress the word "challenge" or "opportunity," a positive approach which



derives from my own experience in business.

I would like to cite five important areas of challenge in the global economy which will have a critical bearing on future business and governmental behavior and policies.

—Economic cooperation among the industrial countries, for this is a key to global economic welfare and prosperity.

—North-South economic relations, for here the politics of numbers, the growth of material interdependence, and the demands of fair play will press for changes in the global economy.

—East-West economic policy, for it is time to take a fresh look at this entire area which fuses business, politics, and security.

—Energy, for this is not only a critical long-term economic challenge rooted in our past patterns of behavior, but its connection to the nuclear proliferation issue makes it a pivotal problem for world peace.

—Managing the wealth of the oceans, which tests the world community's ability to agree on rules and procedures for tapping the vast resources which are a common global heritage.

### **Collaboration Among Industrialized Countries**

First, let me discuss the common challenge which the industrial democracies face in managing our economies. An unprecedented expansion of trade and investment, pressure on resources, the 20th-century revolution in technology, transportation, and communication, and the imperative of improving the environment and the quality of life, together have created conditions in which no one country can satisfy its domestic requirements in isolation. There is no alternative to closer cooperation among the industrial democracies—to control inflation, to maintain smoothly functioning economic arrangements among the countries in which the overwhelming amount of global activity

takes place, and to develop further the ties that bind us to the countries of the world that share our most fundamental moral values.

In fact, during the past few years collaboration with Western Europe, Canada, and Japan has become the bedrock of our foreign economic policy. Our relationship has become one of greater equality and sharing of initiative and responsibility. We have worked closely together on the management of national economic policies, including the process of recovery, as illustrated by the Rambouillet and Puerto Rico summits as well as by the reinvigoration of other coordinating mechanisms like the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development in Paris. We have collaborated to avert protectionist tendencies in trade and consulted closely on the issues of energy and raw materials. We have also worked to strengthen the trade and monetary systems and to develop balanced guidelines for private international investment, in order to devise an effective framework for the operation of private enterprise. And we have made considerable progress in developing a long-range strategy for the West to meet the challenge of the energy crisis.

The leaders of the Western nations—President Ford and his counterparts—demonstrated determination and wisdom in preserving an open world market and avoiding panic reactions in dealing with global recession. They led us through the worst recession of the post-World War II era with a minimum of recrimination and with a maximum of cooperation. Today economic cooperation among the industrialized democracies probably is the closest in at least a decade.

For the future we face two key challenges with regard to economic relations with Canada, Western Europe, and Japan. First, we must continue, expand, and improve the policy collaboration which has begun. And second, we must cooperate to extend the benefits and vitality of our economies to other parts of the world. For the

arrangements which are fashioned among the industrial democracies must be seen as only a first step in a more extensive structure of global cooperation which includes the developing countries and must also take account of the centrally planned economies of the East.

### **North-South Relations**

A second major challenge we face is our relations with the developing countries. After our industrial partners, it is the Third World where our economic interests are most at stake. It is this region from which we will be importing a substantial and increasing portion of our raw materials in the future and which holds the potential for future growth in export markets. Efforts to improve the functioning of the global economic system cannot be successful without responsible cooperation from key developing countries. Nor can a stable, prosperous international community be constructed and sustained unless all its principal participants feel that they have a stake in cooperating and believe that their views are heeded.

Be it resource development, technology transfer, the activities of multilateral corporations, or commodity trade, the need now and in the future will be for the development of policies which are responsive to the economic imperatives of interdependence but which also recognize the diversity among countries and allow governments sufficient flexibility to exercise their legitimate national prerogatives.

Political leaders in the developing world are calling for a new economic order. They want greater benefits from the international economic system and a greater voice in the management of the global economy. We believe that it is imperative that the United States and other industrial democracies respond with measures that contribute to development and to the evolution of a more orderly and progressive world economy. We are therefore proposing pragmatic solutions to concrete problems in trade,

finance, resource, and technology issues. A good example is Secretary Kissinger's recent proposal for an International Resources Bank to restore the flow of private capital and technology to Third World resource projects. This pragmatic initiative is responsive to the deteriorating climate for private investment in resource development in the Third World and designed to benefit both industrial and developing nations. We need more ideas like this one. And in their creation and their execution we need your advice and your participation.

Another area where your active participation is essential is in the formulation of our responses to the demand of the developing countries for greater and more liberal access to Western industrial technology. We are calling an initial meeting on November 11 of business executives and representatives of other nongovernmental groups to discuss the issues we face in a series of forthcoming U.N. conferences on science, technology, and development. Your advice at this early stage will contribute to more constructive and practical U.S. positions.

Our objective is to create conditions for global growth from which all countries benefit. We are firmly convinced that forms of private investment and technology transfer which are adapted to the changing international environment are the most efficient mechanism for achieving this.

### **East-West Economic Relationship**

We must also devote renewed attention to our relations with the centrally planned economies of Eastern Europe, where we face special difficulties. Yet this element in the global economy cannot be ignored. The past effect of Soviet purchases on the world grain market is a good illustration; but other examples, such as energy development, rising Eastern debt to Western commercial banks, and the growing role of state-controlled shipping, demonstrate the increasing economic relationship between East and West.



The future course of this relationship will require the attention of both the public and private sectors. We must consider how economic relations can be organized so as to provide appropriate benefits to all parties; how East-West cooperation can be applied to the pressing international economic issues of our time, such as food security and adequate resource development; and how relations with the centrally planned economies can make a positive contribution to the stable political environment we all seek.

### The Energy Problem

The details of the energy crisis need no elaboration. The oil embargo, escalating oil prices, and the growing percentage of U.S. energy consumption which is imported are well known to everyone here. To respond to these challenges we are moving in four areas:

—We are pursuing domestic measures to reduce our vulnerability to international pricing and supply decisions by gradually lifting price controls, directing more research into alternative energy sources, and building a national oil stockpile.

—We are cooperating with other industrialized oil-consuming nations to reduce our collective vulnerability to manipulation of oil supplies and prices.

—We are cooperating with the non-oil developing countries. We have proposed the establishment of an International Energy Institute, to provide assistance and cooperation in technology and research to help these countries develop appropriate alternative energy sources.

—And we are trying to cooperate with the oil-exporting nations to encourage responsible international action on supply and prices. We are doing this in various multilateral forums and bilaterally, including cooperation with the business community in the context of joint commissions.

But the magnitude of the challenge demands that we all do more in all of these

areas. Largely because of congressional inaction or opposition, our domestic energy policy is not yet adequate to our need to reduce our vulnerability to foreign oil supply pressures. Moreover, we must devote increasing attention to the longer term picture and our transition to the post-oil age. The complexities of this transition are already apparent, for the imperative of providing for future energy needs has stimulated a drive by developing nations to acquire nuclear power plants with all its implications for the proliferation of nuclear weapons.

### Law of the Sea

The law of the sea negotiations are among the most complex and difficult of our age. The delegations now meeting in New York are seeking to establish a viable legal regime for 70 percent of the earth's surface. The interests involved cut across the traditional North-South and East-West rivalries, and no country has a greater interest in their successful conclusion than the United States.

Technology has enabled us to drill for oil farther and farther out from the coasts in ever deeper waters, to exploit the living resources of the oceans ever more efficiently, to carry crude oil by sea in huge supertankers controlled by computers, and in the near future, to mine the deep seabed for industrial minerals.

The proposed law of the sea convention sets forth broad obligations and responsibilities on the part of both maritime and coastal states to preserve the oceans' integrity and to cooperate with other states in protecting the oceans from pollution. The convention also will insure the freedom of navigation through and over straits and in the economic zone so that maritime trade can be carried out effectively.

Recently the Secretary of State presented a package proposal to resolve the outstanding issues dealing with mining for mineral nodules on the ocean floor. Individual nations and their companies would

have assured access to mining sites, along with an international Enterprise which would be an arm of the proposed Seabed Authority. We and other countries are willing to assist this international Enterprise in a broadly shared financing and staffing of its intended operations with the understanding that all nations would also have assured access to the seabed.

Above all, the law of the sea negotiations are aimed at establishing an order for the oceans that will prevent or resolve peacefully conflict over the uses of the oceans among more than 150 states. Success in this effort could give hope to all that the community of nations can cooperate to solve the complex global challenges ahead.

### Importance of Sharing Views

These challenges confront both business and government with the opportunity to work together to forge new patterns of cooperation. I am not suggesting that American business support American foreign policy regardless of its profit consequences. Businessmen do have both the right and the obligation to make their foreign policy views known to the Administration and, of course, to the Congress. That approach may not be as much fun as sitting back and complaining when, in your judgment, the government makes a mistake. But in the long run, it is essential if the private sector's interests are to be preserved.

By the same token, the government cannot afford to regard the actions of American business abroad as natural phenomena which cannot be influenced when national interests are at stake. For example, the U.S. Government is quite rightly concerned about the consequences of questionable payments by American firms to foreign government officials. Even though such

payments may be the mother's milk of domestic politics in certain foreign countries, our government cannot stand idly by and watch as foreign governments friendly to us are shaken to the roots because of revelations of questionable or illegal payments.

The Conference Board was among the first to recognize the need for positive action by the business community to improve its corporate citizenship in overseas operations and to avoid the taint of corruption. Your international corporate social responsibility program has, over the past five years, stimulated practical measures by scores of U.S. companies and by other business associations to improve both the actual behavior and the image of U.S. business.

We stand at a point in history when values and realities are often in a state of tension. It is a time of tension between the value of freedom and the need for order; between the intensity of nationalism and the reality of interdependence; between the dynamism of free enterprise and the demands for economic equality. The genius of America lies in reconciling positions which to others often seem hopelessly contradictory—and in doing so without detracting from the great principles that are our special heritage. Nowhere is the possibility of such achievement more obvious or more needed than in the interface of the private and public sectors of this country.

We have begun to perceive the challenges we face and to delineate the forms of our future cooperative progress. No other nation has our advantages; no other nation can provide the leadership needed if the world of tomorrow is to preserve the values we care about while dealing effectively with changing realities. The problems are vast indeed, but never in history have our problems more truly offered us such opportunities for progress.



## Department Testifies on Proposed Military Sales to Foreign Governments

*Statement by Philip C. Habib  
Under Secretary for Political Affairs<sup>1</sup>*

I am particularly happy to have this opportunity to discuss with the members of the International Political and Military Affairs Subcommittee the important role of arms transfers in our foreign relations with friendly and allied governments.

The occasion for this meeting is of course your consideration of the notifications before the Congress of our intention, in response to requests from 14 foreign governments, to provide a variety of military equipment and defense services. The total value of these proposed sales is over \$6 billion, a figure that has naturally attracted considerable notice and comment. The figure is an impressive one, but I believe we can place it in better perspective through an examination of its component parts.

Before turning to the specific cases before you, however, I would like to make one general comment that applies to all of them. That is, as we know from hard experience, it simply costs a vast amount more today to erect an adequate defense than it did 20 or even 5 years ago.

Not only does sophistication add substantially to the price, but there is a con-

stant rise in costs owing to inflation. In the early 1950's, when our security assistance program almost wholly consisted of *grants*, we provided allies with equipment worth about \$5 billion a year; in today's prices that would be well over \$10 billion a year—higher than today's sales figures. So from the inflationary point of view alone, the dollar values of today's arms transfers are not out of line with those of earlier periods.

More significantly, the actual number of weapons systems transferred is smaller in many cases because of the high unit cost of sophisticated weapons. As an example, the most modern jet fighter available in the 1950's would have cost about \$700,000 in fiscal year 1975 dollars; today's most modern jets cost 10 or 15 times that figure. The cost of even far less exotic hardware, such as tanks, has more than doubled owing to increasing sophistication.

In short, because of both inflation and sophistication a billion dollars buys far less arms than in earlier years.

### The Middle East

Now I would like to comment on the specific proposals for sales included among the notifications before you.

Let me first speak of Iran. There are eight letters of offer for Iran, which total \$4.4 billion. Over \$3.8 billion, or over half

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<sup>1</sup> Made before the Subcommittee on International Political and Military Affairs of the House Committee on International Relations on Sept. 21. The complete transcript of the hearings will be published by the committee and will be available from the Superintendent of Documents, U.S. Government Printing Office, Washington, D.C. 20402.

of the total amount of all 43 notifications, is attributable to Iran's request to purchase 160 F-16's with follow-on support.

Iran wishes to have the F-16 aircraft as its aircraft of the 1980's and 1990's. Deliveries will not begin until the early 1980's and will take several years to complete. The delivery schedule has been planned in order not to overburden Iranian facilities or available trained manpower and not to interfere with our own or NATO acquisition of the plane. Although, if this transaction is approved, some payments will be made by Iran next year, the schedule of payments and deliveries will stretch well into the 1980's.

This purchase is characteristic of the Iranian Government's desire to project its development requirements into the future and to act now rather than to delay a decision which might be adversely affected by inflation or other external factors.

To put in perspective the sums involved in the F-16 sales package, we should not ignore the fact that our nonmilitary trade with Iran will, it is estimated, total \$22-\$23 billion during the period 1975-80, with a \$6-\$7 billion surplus in our favor in civilian goods alone.

More basically, our military sales to Iran add to the strength of a valued ally and to that nation's ability to continue to carry out a policy on which we and the Iranians agree. They also provide the essential assurances that the United States has not changed its mind about Iran, that we remain committed to a close relationship in all fields, and that close coordination with the United States on the part of the Iranians is still justified. For we are not only talking about past and present policies, including relevant military sales, but also about our future relations.

The next group of requests for military equipment is from Israel. Seven letters of offer, totaling \$266 million, cover largely helicopters and munitions for systems already in Israel's inventory. These sales are a part of our continuing supply of military equipment to Israel. Since the October

1973 war, the United States has provided over \$5 billion in funds for the purchase of military items to support our ongoing assistance to Israel. Several major letters of offer, totaling approximately \$1 billion, were submitted several months ago. These letters of offer are in addition to those major requests and are fully supportive of efforts to assure Israel's security.

The next country I wish to discuss is Saudi Arabia. Ten letters of offer have been submitted at a value of \$664 million, of which \$555 million is attributable to construction, inflationary increases, or support equipment. Thus, less than one-sixth of the Saudi package represents money for new weapons.

Saudi Arabia is a good example of where a large percentage of sales is not for arms. Even the dollar amounts listed do not necessarily reflect money that will flow to the United States. We should bear in mind that the actual construction work, which will be managed by the Corps of Engineers in the cases under consideration, will be open to international tender and not reserved for U.S. firms.

The two items on the Saudi list that have given most concern have been letters of offer for 850 Sidewinder missiles and 650 Maverick missiles. Both of these requests would supply the armaments needed for the 110 F-5 aircraft that we have already sold the Saudis. The missiles will be specially fitted on the F-5's and cannot be readily shifted to other aircraft. Both letters of offer have been considerably reduced from the original Saudi request and in response to congressional concerns, from the level we believe justifiable. These proposed sales are, I believe, minimal in terms of what is required to arm the Saudi aircraft.

Saudi Arabia, like Iran, is a strong force for moderation in the Middle East. Its support for the moderate Arab governments that are committed to a negotiated solution of the Arab-Israel dispute is of great importance to our own interest in seeing a lasting Middle Eastern settlement.



achieved. Saudi Arabia is also the force for restraint on oil price increases within OPEC [Organization of Petroleum Exporting Countries].

With few other Arab countries has the United States enjoyed such a steady long-term relationship of cooperation. Saudi Arabia looks to the United States not only as the power most likely to preserve peace in the world but as the most reliable supplier of its own requirements for civilian and military development. Expenditures under the current Saudi five-year development plan are estimated to total \$142 billion. If we are to enjoy a close and productive relationship with Saudi Arabia in those policy areas that are important to us, we should expect to meet reasonable requests in other areas of mutual importance.

It is a key component of our well-founded relationship with Saudi Arabia that we respond positively to reasonable requests for the arms the Saudis need for self-defense. This large country has vast resources and a small and scattered population. It has no significant geographical barriers and, with radical Arab regimes to the north and the south, believes that it must equip itself with weapons that make up for its deficiencies and vulnerabilities.

The armaments requested in the notifications before you are reasonable in terms of Saudi requirements for national defense. They are justifiable in terms of the parallel course that U.S. and Saudi policies have followed and may be expected to follow across a broad spectrum of our interests.

#### **Pakistan and East Asia**

Five letters of offer, totaling \$84 million, provide munitions and support equipment for the Pakistani Armed Forces. Granting Pakistan's request for these armaments is a modest response indeed in terms of the condition of the country's military forces. We do not believe that the supply of these armaments will contribute to an escalation of arms purchases in South Asia.

A relatively small portion (less than \$355 million) of the total is proposed for four countries of the East Asian region. It includes OV-10 aircraft, M-48A1 tanks, and Sidewinder missiles for Korea, F-5E aircraft and 105mm howitzers for the Philippines, aircraft for Australia, and F-5E aircraft and Sidewinder missiles for Singapore.

We believe that these transfers will serve U.S. interests by assisting allied and friendly governments of this area to improve their defense capabilities and thereby contribute to continuing peace and stability in East Asia.

The tanks for Korea have been well used by the U.S. Army. Before they are placed in service the Republic of Korea Army will give them a major overhaul and modification. These tanks will replace the existing seriously overage M-47 tank force. As you know, North Korea maintains a preponderantly larger tank force. The F-5E's and the Sidewinder missiles are part of our longstanding efforts to modernize the Korean Air Force.

The balance of the letters of offer before you are destined for European countries. I do not believe there are any items for concern among them, but we would be happy to answer any questions on those letters of offer.

#### **Decisionmaking Process on Arms Sales**

Before concluding, Mr. Chairman, I would like to make some general remarks about the background of these proposed sales.

I can assure you that we are very much aware of the criticism that has been directed at our decisionmaking on arms sales. I would like to stress that the proposed sales that are before you have been subjected to a thorough review process and decided on their own individual merits. We have not relaxed our standards in deciding whether or not to sell military equipment abroad. Indeed, both the Department of State and the Department of De-

fense view their primary responsibility as regulating and managing sales programs, not promoting them.

The review process begins generally in the field where our military missions and our Embassies first receive an indication of foreign interest in a U.S. defense article or service. Our people are not salesmen and do not push the sales of weapons abroad; rather they work with their foreign counterparts when possible to assure that estimates of national defense requirements are accurate and reasonable. Thus frequently a foreign nation's desire for a particular system is either reduced in number or delayed in time following the advice of our personnel. On many occasions, we have been successful in persuading foreign counterparts that a particular glamorous system is not appropriate to their requirements.

Our arms industry—like our agriculture and our other advanced technology industries—happens to be the best in the world. We not only manufacture the best planes, ships, and other systems; we provide better training and more reliable logistical support. We do not seek to force arms sales on others. Our products are sought by modernizing states. Further, this preference for dealing with the United States indicates a confidence in the United States as a responsible world power whose policies are directed toward the goals of peace and stability, rather than disruption, subversion, or the stimulation of conflicts.

When a request is relayed by our military missions or Embassies to Washington, it is carefully studied in the Departments of State, Defense, ACDA [Arms Control and Disarmament Agency], and other agencies. A large number of factors are evaluated, but a crucial factor is the role the country plays, its relationship to U.S. interests in its area, and how our response will affect the furtherance of our specific policy goals and our own national interests.

Let me emphasize that we do not sell arms unless there is a very substantial area

of policy congruence—particularly security policy—between ourselves and the recipient. All of the nations which we are discussing today can meet that standard.

Among the other factors in our predecision review, we examine whether the introduction of a new military system would affect the regional security balance or perhaps stimulate other requests from neighboring countries that would lead to imbalances. We also have to examine realistically the alternative sources of supply that the country may have and whether a refusal on our part to sell a particular system would simply result in another supplier—e.g., the Soviet Union—making the sale.

The desire for modern arms by our friends and allies is understandable when they see potential adversaries well supplied with modern hardware by the Soviet Union and its friends. The continuing efforts by the Soviets to provide weapons to its friends have added to the sense of insecurity of many friendly governments. Iraq, for example, which has less than a third of Iran's population, has a rough equivalency in number of Soviet-supplied modern tanks and aircraft. As we have seen in widely scattered areas, the Soviet Union is not constrained in the supply of weapons to its friends.

In our review process, we are not governed by U.S. balance-of-payments considerations. The sale and its relation to our broad national interests are dominant. But economic and social factors are taken into account. A proposed sale is vetted in terms of the country's development goals and its ability to finance the particular system.

We have to make a clear judgment that the supply of a system to a foreign country would not weaken the readiness of our own forces. In addition, we weigh the threat to be countered or deterred and the burden that a new system would place on the foreign nation's ability to absorb new equipment. The value of our defense cooperation with the proposed recipient



country is of importance. We have to calculate how a positive or negative decision on a proposed sale might affect any special interests, such as access to facilities or airspace rights, that we may enjoy with the recipient country.

Finally, except in special circumstances, we do not sell or otherwise transfer certain sensitive items which would tend to weaken our technological lead or which we feel it otherwise inappropriate to sell to foreign nations. There have been a number of cases in which we have refused to sell arms to our friends, although for obvious reasons these do not normally make the headlines nor do we seek to publicize them to the detriment of our relations.

Mr. Chairman, I know that the need to consider such a large number of cases at one time imposes a heavy burden on the Congress. We would have avoided this, had it been feasible to do so. We were faced, however, with the fact that all of these cases were ready for submission to the Congress by the end of the summer or the early fall. This meant that to prevent disruptions in planned production and delivery schedules, to meet the desires of nations anxious to avoid delays in the receipt of equipment and services, and to prevent inflation from raising the cost of the items involved, these cases should be submitted as soon as possible. We were also aware, however, of your strong desire to have 30 days while the Congress is in session to review such cases and of the intention of Congress to recess in early October.

To delay these submissions until January would, it was clear, have resulted in a delay of at least five months in each case, and perhaps longer, with consequent harmful effects to the programs and to our relations with the recipient nations. It would also have meant that the new Congress would have been faced with a problem of even greater magnitude in the early months of next year if it had to deal with almost a half year's backlog of sales in addition to the continuing flow of new sales requests.

For the countries involved, it would have simply meant further significant delay, increased costs, and possibly disrupted production schedules.

In conclusion, let me again stress that we take very seriously the obligation we have to consult with Congress on our sales of military equipment abroad. To the extent we can, we are ready to provide you with the information you need to further your deliberations. I shall be pleased now to attempt to answer your questions and to receive your comments.

## U.S. Calls for Equitable Resolution of Law of the Sea Issues

*Following is a statement by Secretary Kissinger issued on September 17 upon the completion of the fourth substantive session of the Third U.N. Conference on the Law of the Sea.*

Press release 446 dated September 17

The law of the sea negotiations have just ended their current session in New York on September 17. The work they have undertaken is among the most important, complex, and difficult of any negotiations in this century. The delegations are attempting to establish a legal regime for nearly three-quarters of the surface of the globe. With some 150 nations participating, each seeking to protect its interests, it is not surprising that progress has been slow, given the diversity of views represented. However, significant progress has been made since the first substantive session in 1974.

The present revised single negotiating text represents a consensus on a large number of issues before the conference. This text has been maintained in this session as the basis for negotiations. A broad consensus already exists in certain key areas, including a 12-mile territorial sea, establishing coastal state resource and other rights in a 200-mile economic zone,

protecting navigational rights, and marine pollution. However, the United States believes the present text remains imperfect and requires further changes in a certain number of key areas, such as:

—A regime for mining deep seabed minerals.

—The nature of the economic zone.

—The provisions for marine scientific research in the economic zone.

—The articles dealing with the exploitation of resources in the continental margin beyond 200 miles.

—The rights of landlocked and geographically disadvantaged states in the economic zone.

During meetings between myself and certain other delegations September 1-2, the United States put forward important new ideas on a number of key topics still at issue. With respect to deep seabed mining we proposed a package approach which would include assured access in all its aspects to deep seabed mining sites by all nations and their citizens along with a financing arrangement to enable the proposed Enterprise (the independent operating arm of the International Seabed Authority) to get into business. As part of that package we further proposed that there could be a review, in 25 years perhaps, to determine if the provisions of the treaty regarding the system of seabed exploitation were working adequately. This was a significant move which generated considerable interest which we believe can be transformed at the next session into specific treaty language.

A number of delegations, representing all concerned groups, have expressed to us their belief that our package proposal represented a constructive contribution to the negotiations. This reaction is encouraging, and we intend in this same spirit to follow up this initiative both during the period between sessions and at the next session. On the other hand, some delegations chose tactics of confrontation. Such tactics cannot work and will inevitably lead to deadlock and unilateral action.

With respect to the issues in Committee II of the conference dealing with navigation and the nature of the economic zone, the United States continues to believe that a satisfactory solution is within reach. While specific language on the nature of the proposed economic zone has not yet been agreed, several promising ideas have been considered. We believe that a solution can be found which will provide for both the legitimate interests of the coastal states in protecting their resource and other interests and the high seas freedoms of the international community in the economic zone. These provisions are important in maintaining global security and supporting our allies in this dangerous age.

In Committee III the United States is seeking protection of the marine environment and preservation of the right to conduct marine scientific research. The present text already contains important provisions on ocean pollution which we seek to strengthen. With respect to marine scientific research in the economic zone, we have proposed a compromise which will give the coastal states the right to control marine scientific research directly related to resource exploitation but which will insure the right to conduct other forms of marine scientific research which benefit all mankind.

In order for an overall package settlement to be viable, the treaty must contain provisions for comprehensive, obligatory and binding third-party dispute settlement. This session has made considerable progress toward that goal.

We believe that equitable resolution of these and other key issues in these negotiations can be found. Unless this is the case various governments may conclude agreement is not possible, resulting in unilateral action which can lead to conflict over the uses of ocean space.

The United States has a major interest as a global power in preventing such conflict and thus will continue to seek overall solutions acceptable to all groups of countries. In so doing, however, we will continue vigorously to safeguard essential



American interests. We will work cooperatively with other nations, but we expect a reciprocal attitude of good will and reasonableness. There are limits beyond which the United States will not go, and we are close to such limits now.

We must now move toward businesslike negotiations and toward a recognition that the alternative to a treaty would serve no national or international community interest. I continue to believe that a law of the sea convention can be achieved. The United States will seek to build on the progress made to date and will continue its intensive efforts to achieve a treaty. A successful outcome will bring major benefits to this nation and help shape a more peaceful and prosperous international community.

## **Policy of Refusal To Negotiate With Terrorists Reiterated**

*Following is a statement read to news correspondents on September 15 by Frederick Z. Brown, Director, Office of Press Relations.*

I would like to state categorically and for the record that the policy which involves a refusal on the part of the U.S. Government to negotiate with terrorists, to comply with monetary or in-kind ransom demands, or to accede to any terrorist demands has not changed and will not change.

The maintenance of this no-negotiations, no-concessions policy is based on our firm belief that future incidents can be deterred only when it is widely understood and recognized that such acts cannot succeed and will not further the cause of the individual terrorist or international terrorist organization.

American Ambassadors are, and for some time have been, authorized to demand the well-being of hostages and request their unconditional release on humanitarian grounds. American Ambassadors are not, and never have been, authorized to make concessions of any kind. Ambassador [to France Kenneth] Rush operated in the full cognizance of this policy [during the September 10-12 hijacking to Paris of a TWA New York-Chicago flight] and in no way violated those standard instructions.

This may be the most difficult of policies to follow and in any individual incident may require difficult decisions. However, as Secretary Kissinger stated in Orlando last September, ". . . our general position has been that we will not negotiate, as a government, with kidnapers of Americans because there are so many Americans in so many parts of the world . . . that it would be impossible to protect them all unless the kidnapers can gain no benefit from such acts."<sup>1</sup>

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<sup>1</sup> For remarks by Secretary Kissinger and questions and answers before the Southern Governors Conference at Orlando, Fla., on Sept. 16, 1975, see BULLETIN of Oct. 6, 1975, p. 516.

## Department Discusses Policies in the Nuclear Field With Respect to the Republic of China

*Following is a statement by Arthur W. Hummel, Jr., Assistant Secretary for East Asian and Pacific Affairs, submitted to the Subcommittee on Arms Control, International Organizations, and Security Agreements of the Senate Committee on Foreign Relations on September 22.<sup>1</sup>*

It is my honor to appear before this distinguished committee and to testify concerning our policies in the nuclear field with respect to Taiwan.

The Administration is deeply committed to preventing the further proliferation of nuclear weapons. In recent years, great effort has been devoted to restricting the spread of national uranium enrichment and spent fuel reprocessing facilities. I believe we have made significant progress in these areas; we are determined to do more.

Our nuclear policies with respect to the Republic of China combine cooperation in the peaceful uses of nuclear energy with determined vigilance against the possibility of potential nuclear proliferation. The main elements of our policy are:

—To cooperate with the Republic of China's plans to meet a growing portion of its electric power needs from nuclear reactors;

—To cooperate in those areas of peaceful nuclear research and training for which

the Republic of China has a legitimate need;

—To insure that the Republic of China abides by its policy not to develop nuclear weapons; and

—To insure that the Republic of China does not obtain a national reprocessing or enrichment capability.

In many respects, the issues we confront and the policies we are pursuing in the nuclear field with the Republic of China are similar to those we face in other areas of the world. However, our nuclear relations with Taiwan are unique in other respects.

First, we are, in a practical sense, Taiwan's only source of reactors and enriched uranium fuel for its nuclear power program. This reduces the problems of coordination with other suppliers and increases Taiwan's dependence on a cooperative U.S. attitude in order to maintain its nuclear power program.

Second, our nuclear policies in the Republic of China must be determined within the context of our overall China policy. They must be compatible with our commitment to normalize our relations with the People's Republic of China and with our interest in encouraging a peaceful solution of the Taiwan problem.

For these reasons, our nuclear policies with respect to Taiwan are formulated with great care and circumspection.

Since the late 1960's, the Republic of China has been planning to meet an increasing portion of its energy requirements from nuclear power. The Republic of China

<sup>1</sup> The complete transcript of the hearings will be published by the committee and will be available from the Superintendent of Documents, U.S. Government Printing Office, Washington, D.C. 20402.



has industrialized rapidly over the past decade and expects this trend to continue. Its energy needs have grown proportionately. Domestic energy sources, largely hydroelectric, meet only a fraction of Taiwan's needs. As the Republic of China's efforts to develop offshore oil have yet to bear fruit, the Republic expects to remain totally dependent for the foreseeable future on imports for its growing fossil-fuel needs. Consequently, the Republic of China is convinced that diversification into nuclear power is essential to its continued economic growth; the energy crisis in 1973 reinforced their belief in the correctness of this decision.

There are presently four nuclear generating units under construction on Taiwan; two others are in the planning stage. The first nuclear generating unit is scheduled to begin operation next year. These four generating units will provide approximately a third of total projected electric generating capacity when they become operational. When all six are completed in the mid-1980's, nuclear power will provide 45 percent of the island's electric generating capacity. The Republic of China is aware that this program is crucial to its continued economic vitality. Moreover, it will be investing several billion dollars in this program, a sizable stake in terms of Taiwan's economy. The nuclear power plants and the low enriched uranium to fuel them are all being supplied by American companies.

In addition to its nuclear power program, the Republic of China has been conducting a modest program in nuclear research since the late 1950's. This program began at Tsinghua University, which has a small research reactor supplied by the United States. In the mid-1960's the government intensified its research program and established a government agency, the Institute for Nuclear Energy Research (INER), for this purpose. INER has developed plans for research into all aspects of the nuclear fuel cycle. INER has an operational fuel-fabri-

cation plant and a Canadian-supplied 40-megawatt research reactor. The Institute has been constructing a small reprocessing laboratory since 1969, but this laboratory is not yet operational.

U.S. involvement in Taiwan's nuclear power and research programs is governed by the terms of the U.S.-Republic of China Agreement for Cooperation in the Civil Uses of Atomic Energy. This agreement restricts our nuclear cooperation to peaceful purposes, provides for the application of IAEA [International Atomic Energy Agency] safeguards and gives the United States a veto over the reprocessing of U.S.-supplied fuel. All U.S.-supplied facilities and materials are under IAEA safeguards and have been periodically inspected by the IAEA, most recently in July of this year.

Over the years the Administration has restricted U.S. cooperation to those areas where we believe that Taiwan has legitimate research and training requirements and which do not endanger our nonproliferation objectives. Despite the interest of Republic of China scientists in all aspects of the nuclear fuel cycle, we have not extended such cooperation to reprocessing and, in fact, have made clear our determined opposition to such activities. We do not believe that Taiwan's nuclear power program provides an economic justification for a national enrichment or reprocessing program. We have made clear that any attempt by the Republic of China to develop such programs will seriously jeopardize our cooperation in the peaceful uses of nuclear energy.

The Republic of China has enunciated a consistent policy with respect to nuclear weapons and nonproliferation. The main elements of its policy are that:

—The Republic of China has been a party to the Nonproliferation Treaty since its inception and will abide by its treaty obligations.

—The Republic of China has no intention to develop nuclear weapons.

—All nuclear facilities in the Republic of China are for peaceful purposes.

—All nuclear facilities in the Republic of China are subject to IAEA safeguards. The IAEA's inspections have not revealed any irregularities.

Premier Chiang Ching-kuo publicly reiterated this policy last week following a meeting of his Cabinet. In doing so the Premier publicly stated for the first time that the Republic of China does not plan to acquire a facility for reprocessing spent nuclear fuel. We welcome this commitment.

Over the past few years American officials have made clear to the Republic of China this Administration's determined opposition to any activities which would cast doubt on its commitment to nonproliferation. This position was again conveyed to the Republic of China early this month and resulted in assurances to us by the Premier similar to his public ones of last week. These have been subsequently confirmed in a note to us by the Republic of China stating that:

The Government of the Republic of China has no intention whatsoever to develop nuclear weapons, or a nuclear explosive device, or to engage in any activities related to reprocessing purposes.

We are pleased with this forthcoming position, which should eliminate any ambiguities concerning nuclear activities on Taiwan. This development is continuing evidence of the seriousness which we attach to preventing the spread of sensitive nuclear facilities. I can assure you, Mr. Chairman, that the Republic of China is fully aware:

—That the United States is opposed to the proliferation of nuclear weapons and nuclear explosive devices;

—That the United States is opposed to the spread of national reprocessing facilities; and

—That actions by the Republic of China contrary to these policies would fundamentally jeopardize continued U.S. cooperation

with the Republic in the peaceful use of atomic energy as well as other important relationships.

I can also assure you, Mr. Chairman, that the Republic of China is fully cognizant of section 305 of the International Security Assistance and Arms Export Control Act of 1976, which denies economic and military assistance to countries which import unsafeguarded national reprocessing facilities.

Our approaches to the Republic of China on nonproliferation have been supplemented by bilateral consultations which we have undertaken this year and previously with the governments of countries which are potential suppliers of nuclear equipment to Taiwan. These consultations have been designed to insure that the policies of various suppliers are compatible. The responses from other governments have been favorable.

The Republic of China, in common with an increasing number of other nonnuclear states, has the economic and scientific base from which to develop nuclear weapons or a nuclear explosive device, should they choose to do so and if they were in a position to procure or produce the necessary quantities of weapons-grade fissionable materials. Their declared national policy is not to acquire nuclear weapons or explosive devices nor to develop the technology which would enable them to produce materials required to accomplish this. I cannot overestimate the seriousness with which the U.S. Government would view any deviation from this declared policy by the Republic of China.

I can assure you that we follow every aspect of Taiwan's nuclear program with the utmost diligence. Our contacts with Taiwan in the nuclear field have evolved over a period of years, and they will continue to do so in the future. Our cooperation in peaceful uses has been mutually beneficial. Our nonproliferation objectives have been maintained, and their continued maintenance will be an essential aspect of our relationship with the Republic of China.



## Department Testifies on Question of Human Rights in North Korea

*Following is a statement by Oscar V. Armstrong, Deputy Assistant Secretary for East Asian and Pacific Affairs, submitted to the Subcommittee on International Organizations of the House Committee on International Relations on September 9.<sup>1</sup>*

I appreciate the opportunity to appear before you to testify on the question of human rights in North Korea.

Let me begin by saying that North Korea is perhaps the most closed society in the world. The press and other media are totally controlled by the party. Only a few carefully selected officials are permitted to leave the country, and then only on official business. Foreign visitors or diplomats in North Korea, including even those from other Communist countries, are prevented from having contacts with ordinary citizens, and their movements are carefully controlled.

Virtually nothing is heard from this tightly closed society except what the totalitarian regime permits. Under these circumstances, it is difficult to obtain detailed information on civil practices or on the extent to which dissatisfaction or underground dissent exists within North Korea. Nevertheless, the silence which emanates to the outside world from other than official sources is in itself an indication of the absence of basic human rights in North Korea.

The situation can be briefly summarized. Although P'yongyang has promulgated formal guarantees for individual rights, North Korean theory and practice deny these same rights in the name of the collective good, and the regime has established an extensive network of sanctions to enforce that denial.

North Korea's Constitution, adopted in

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<sup>1</sup> The complete transcript of the hearings will be published by the committee and will be available from the Superintendent of Documents, U.S. Government Printing Office, Washington, D.C. 20402.

December 1972, includes the following guarantees:

—"The right to elect and be elected" regardless of party affiliation and political views.

—"Freedom of speech, press, assembly, association and demonstration."

—Religious liberty.

—"The inviolability of person and residence and privacy of correspondence."

—"Equal rights" in political, economic, and cultural life.

At the same time, the Constitution also lists fundamental "duties" which provide a theoretical basis for denying individual rights. Thus, all citizens must:

—"Strictly observe the laws of the state and the socialist norm of life and the socialist rules of conduct."

—"Display a high degree of collectivist spirit."

—"Voluntarily and honestly participate in work."

—"Heighten their revolutionary vigilance against the maneuvers of the imperialists and all hostile elements."

Moreover, the regime clearly places more importance on respect for the authority of Kim Il-song, who is both head of government and head of the Korean Workers Party (the Korean Communist Party), than on respect for civil liberties. The September 1974 issue of the authoritative party monthly *Kulloja*, for example, maintained:

Adherence to the absolute principle of the execution of the Leader's instructions means accepting the Leader's instructions as law and supreme command, and carrying them through to the end, with total devotion and self sacrifice, without complaints on grounds of trivial reasons, excuses or unfavorable conditions, and with such strong will, that even death does not relieve one of his duties to carry through the Leader's instructions to the end.

I would like to mention some specific aspects of what we would consider to be essential human rights. One is the electoral process. Elections are held for national and local assemblies, but the regime does not permit the election of candidates whose

views differ from those of the leadership. Thus in national elections in 1967 and 1972, the government announced 100 percent voter participation and 100 percent approval of the officially sanctioned slates.

The regime has permitted a few members of two minor parties—the Korean Democratic Party and the Chondokyo (or Young Friends) Party—to be elected to the Supreme People's Assembly, which is the national legislature. But these parties exist in little more than name only. The Korean Workers Party has total control of the state and its operations. All key officials and the vast majority of the members of the Supreme People's Assembly belong to it.

Despite the constitutional facade, freedom of speech, press, assembly, association and demonstration, and religion simply do not exist. There is virtually no opportunity for open expression of views contradicting the official line. The regime controls and censors all information media, whose officials come from the top ranks of trusted party cadre.

In more private milieus, such as the factory, school, or neighborhood, the expression of dissenting views is discouraged by a pervasive police presence, the outlawing of unauthorized gatherings, preemption by the party of much of the citizen's free time, and the organization of residential areas into small citizens' units that spy upon their own members. Regimentation of the society is further implemented by required participation in mass organizations.

Religious groups have been severely restricted, and public worship may have been banned entirely. After 1945 the state confiscated most of the land belonging to Christian and Buddhist organizations. P'yongyang's main theological seminary became Kim Il-song University. Christians were discriminated against in jobs and the education of their children.

Like free speech, privacy has political significance and is therefore restricted. Information obtained in earlier years showed that the political police, called the Political

Defense Bureau, had used wiretaps, mail intercepts, and searches without court authorization to uncover opposition. In addition there were paid informants in every village and factory. Surveillance was used both to gather evidence and to intimidate. There is no evidence that these practices have changed.

Freedom of movement exists neither in principle nor in practice. Travel within the country requires special food rations plus permission from local security authorities and one's employer. Changing jobs requires official permission. Transfers, therefore, are most commonly dictated by the desire of the state rather than the individual's wishes, and undesirable work assignments in remote areas are used as a form of punishment.

North Korean law defines espionage, sabotage, treason, and agitation against the state as political crimes. Other crimes are termed economic and moral. Evidently the more serious crimes are those in the "political" category.

In the past, severe punishment has been meted out for these crimes. In 1952 and 1953 several top officials apparently died as scapegoats for the unsatisfactory outcome of the Korean war. Ho Ka-I, a Vice Premier, "committed suicide" after he was criticized for malfeasance. Former South Korean Labor Party leader Pak Hon-yong, who went to P'yongyang during the Korean war, and 10 of his supporters among the top leaders of the Korean Workers Party were executed for allegedly plotting against the government.

The country's most severe political crackdown occurred in 1958 and 1959. During what was called a "collective guidance campaign," virtually the entire population was screened and subjected to intense interrogation about their political loyalty. South Korean sources claim that several hundred people were killed, about 2,000 imprisoned, 5,000 assigned to labor reform, and 8,000 families resettled.

During this period, some criticism of Kim Il-song occurred. Kim responded by



purging the party of members of factions known to oppose him. Since then, he has taken pains to recruit leaders loyal to him, including a large number of relatives: Kim's uncle is a Vice President; Kim's younger brother is a Vice Premier; his wife is head of the Korean Women's Union; an in-law is Foreign Minister. Kim has also apparently designated his son to succeed him as head of the party and government.

Little is known about the current treatment of persons convicted of political crimes, although North Korean propaganda suggests there is an official preference for "rehabilitating" them through intensive political indoctrination. Indeed, the very effective prevention of open dissent may reduce the need for more severe forms of punishment. Nevertheless, a North Korean defector in 1967 stated that the central authorities but not the local police used physical coercion and that army units were permitted to use electric shock or to beat suspected enemy agents.

I might note that the South Korean people have no illusions about individual freedoms in the North. Today in South Korea, even the most ardent domestic critics maintain that the nation must remain strong to prevent the imposition of communism by the North.

I will close by quoting two North Korean statements spanning 18 years. In 1956, as de-Stalinization started in the Soviet Union, North Korean judicial officials began to discuss the need to end legal discrimination based on class distinctions. These officials incurred the wrath of Kim, who responded in 1958 with a purge of the legal profession. In April that year Kim appeared before a convention of jurists and condemned those who had advocated that "law should be applied equally to everyone" and that "human rights" should be upheld. Kim asserted that on the contrary, law must be used as a weapon to safeguard the Socialist system and the dictatorship of the proletariat.

In 1972 the regime adopted the constitution which included the guarantees I

mentioned earlier. But the North Koreans continue to hold that the function of law is not to protect the individual but to insure his conformity to norms imposed by the party. Thus the government newspaper *Minju Choson* observed in March this year:

"The law of our country serves to uproot outdated thoughts and conventions in the minds of our people, and to indoctrinate and transform them through legal sanctions . . . (It) guarantees the task of dyeing the whole society one color with the revolutionary thought of the great leader by serving as a weapon of dictatorship to destroy all sorts of obstructive machinations by class enemies."

## United States Reaffirms Commitment to Integrity and Unity of Lebanon

### *Department Statement*<sup>1</sup>

The United States is convinced that the occasion of the installation of a new President of Lebanon offers an opportunity which must not be lost to bring an end to the fighting and to begin rebuilding national institutions. It will be essential for all parties in Lebanon to support and strengthen the authority of Lebanon's new President elected by legitimate processes so that all Lebanese may promptly begin their return to productive life.

The violence and destruction in Lebanon have gone on far too long. The costs in human suffering have been far too high. It is clear that no one can gain from continued fighting: countless more men, women, and children will lose lives, property, and hope for the future. It is a time for magnanimity, restraint, and compromise.

The United States believes that a solution can be found that will preserve the country's independence, territorial integ-

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<sup>1</sup> Read to news correspondents on Sept. 23 by Frederick Z. Brown, Director, Office of Press Relations; also issued as press release 464.

rity, and national unity. Solutions based on the partition of Lebanon are invitations to further strife and instability. The states so created would not be viable and would invite external intervention.

We continue to believe that the principles for a political accommodation among the Lebanese parties enunciated last January and February provide a basis for institutions that will meet the needs of the Lebanese people and nation. We hope that President Sarkis will be able to bring his countrymen to the roundtable talks he has proposed as soon as possible so that the process of reconciliation and rebuilding can begin.

The major objective in negotiating a solution will be to preserve a united country, led by a central government which will assure security and opportunity for all individuals and communities in the country. The principles proposed in January and February were designed to give practical political expression to the concept that there should be a partnership of equals in a reunited Lebanon. In our view, this calls for political, economic, and social adjustments that all Lebanese will perceive as fair and equitable. It presupposes that the government will have at its disposal security forces loyal to it which can restore confidence in the authority and ability of the government to maintain domestic order. And it will require that the Palestinians in Lebanon live in peace with their Lebanese hosts and neighbors without challenging the authority of a central Lebanese administration.

The governments of the area and the Arab League are in a position, each in its own way, to make constructive contributions to a political solution of the conflict. Continuation of the fighting cannot serve their interests. Peace in the Middle East and international stability will be in jeop-

ardy as long as the fighting continues. An end to the fighting in turn would create conditions more conducive to a resumption of the search for a negotiated settlement of the broader Middle East question which would take into account the concerns of the states of the area for their security and territorial integrity, as well as the legitimate interests of the Palestinian people.

We are prepared to help to bring an end to the fighting in Lebanon and to achieve a political solution. The interests of the United States lie in alleviation of human suffering, in the restoration of unity and stability based on justice in Lebanon, and in the reduction of tension and the establishment of peace among the nations of the Middle East. We will be prepared to support or undertake any diplomatic initiative requested by the parties.

We will continue our humanitarian programs, which already amount to more than \$10 million in hospital and other medical equipment and supplies and foodstuffs distributed as fairly as possible on both sides of the lines. We will do this and more as necessary. We are considering ways of shipping substantial quantities of wheat under Public Law 480.

We will also play our part, after a settlement is achieved, in helping President Sarkis and his government rebuild Lebanese institutions and the Lebanese economy. We have invited him to send a personal envoy to Washington as soon as he considers it appropriate in order to discuss specific ways in which we can be helpful. We have sought from the Congress an appropriation of \$20 million to begin the process.

This is a time of opportunity and hope for a suffering people in an area already too long devastated by war. The United States shares the conviction that this opportunity must not be lost.



## The U.N. Conference on Human Settlements (Habitat), May-June 1976

by Stanley D. Schiff<sup>1</sup>

The United Nations Conference on Human Settlements (Habitat) was held at Vancouver May 31-June 11. Habitat was the latest in a series of major U.N. conferences (the environment, population, food, and the role of women) which have directed world attention at significant aspects of the planetary condition.

The idea for this conference originated at the Stockholm Conference on the Human Environment in 1972. Many of the developing countries there believed that the concern of the industrialized countries with environmental pollution was remote from their own concerns about poverty and the manmade environment. The Stockholm meeting recommended that a Conference on Human Settlements be held. The 27th U.N. General Assembly endorsed the recommendation in December 1972 and accepted the invitation of the Canadian Government to hold the conference in Vancouver, British Columbia.

In its Resolution 3128 (XXVIII), adopted on December 13, 1973, the U.N. General Assembly stated that the purpose of the conference would be:

... to serve as a practical means to exchange information about solutions to problems of human settlements against a broad background of environmental and other concerns which may lead to the formation of policies and actions by Governments and international organizations.

The conference had other purposes. Probably the most important of these was

to alert governments, private citizens, and the international community to the conspicuous lack of correlation between economic growth and the quality of life in human settlements. This was not an argument against growth; rather, it was an appeal for recognition that growth by itself is no guarantor of better living conditions. If quality and not just quantity was to be the guiding consideration, then priorities would have to be altered and thinking habits would have to be modified. That is a message Habitat aimed at imparting.

Carla A. Hills, Secretary of Housing and Urban Development, headed the U.S. delegation, and Russell W. Peterson, Chairman of the Council on Environmental Quality, served as her alternate. In her statement to the conference on June 1, Secretary Hills said:

Habitat is a creative challenge. Since it is certain that our often sterile—and too often rigid—thinking of the past will not serve the awesome needs of the future, this conference demands a radical change in our entire perception of human settlements. Above all, it calls for a long-range comprehensive approach to the problems and opportunities of human settlements rather than dealing separately and short range with each contributing factor.

### Recommendations for National Action

A 56-nation preparatory committee had agreed that the conference would concentrate its attention on three documents: a Declaration of Principles; Recommendations for National Action; and a Program of International Cooperation. Of the three, national action would be the centerpiece in-

<sup>1</sup> Report prepared especially for the BULLETIN. Mr. Schiff was Coordinator of U.S. Participation in the Habitat Conference.

asmuch as settlement problems are primarily national responsibilities. The role of the international community would be essentially supportive of national efforts.

The framework for the national action recommendations comprised six major topics:

- Settlement Policies and Strategies
- Settlement Planning
- Institutions and Management
- Shelter, Infrastructure and Services
- Land
- Public Participation

The 64 recommendations for national action, under these six headings, are cast in the form of general guidelines; they do not form a rigid blueprint for universal application. While the document as a whole emphasizes the Third World's problems, much of the thinking incorporated in it is relevant to the industrialized countries.

Together the recommendations constitute a powerful argument for changes in thinking which respect and do not deny complexity. That is almost revolutionary doctrine, since most governments are accustomed to dealing with such problems as industry location, housing, transportation, and water supply in isolation from each other. What the conference urges is a new approach which attempts to comprehend all of these elements—and more—in dealing with settlements. It also suggests that governments will have to alter priorities if improvements in the quality of life are to be more equitably distributed among regions within a country and among socioeconomic groups.

The basic thought underlying the national action recommendations is summarized in the preamble to the section of the document relating to settlement policies and strategies:

Human settlements of today embody the outcome of generations of ideas, decisions and physical investment; it is not possible, therefore, to achieve radical modifications overnight. But population growth and rapid changes in the location of human activities proceed at such a pace that, by the end of the century we shall have to build "another world on top of the present one". If properly directed, this formidable

task could mobilize untapped resources and be turned into a unique opportunity for changing our man-made environment: this is the challenge of human settlement strategies.

Habitat added another dimension to the development process—the dimension of the use of space and of land, a dimension not well appreciated by economic policymakers and decisionmakers. Where industry and other economic activity are located has a significant influence on which settlements grow and which stagnate or decline. What Habitat suggests to governments is that they seek consciously to consider the spatial consequences of their investment decisions.

But the document is as much concerned with social, economic, and environmental factors as it is with the physical. Its recommendations are laced with repeated references to measures designed to safeguard against further environmental degradation. Woven into the recommendations is recognition of the need to include women in the planning and decisionmaking that affect the quality of their lives. Compassion for the poorest elements in society and for children, the elderly, and the handicapped is writ large in the documents.

There are two other ideas incorporated in the recommendations that are notable. The first is the acceptance of the important role which regional and local governments have to play in the formulation and execution of human settlements policy. It is an admission that the problems are too complex to be dealt with effectively by a central government acting alone. Secondly, the conference put a rather surprising degree of emphasis on the necessity for governments to consult their publics actively in the formulation and implementation of human settlements actions so that policy would be more responsive to their needs.

### International Cooperation

The conference had a twofold task in the area of international cooperation: to devise an institutional arrangement within



the United Nations for dealing with human settlements activities and to recommend specific programs of activity.

Within the U.N. system, virtually every organ and agency carries on activities which might come under the heading of human settlements. However, two organizations have responsibilities which are most clearly associated with the major subject-area interests identified by the preparatory committee. They are the Center for Housing, Building and Planning, which comes under the U.N.'s Department of Economic and Social Affairs and is located in New York, and the U.N. Foundation for Habitat and Human Settlements, which is attached to the U.N. Environment Program (UNEP) and is located in Nairobi.

Within the preparatory committee a strong consensus had developed on two basic points: that no new and separate organization to deal with human settlements should be created and that the Center and the Foundation should be consolidated to form the secretariat of a human settlements unit. Where views divided was on the question of whether the consolidated unit should be responsible to the Department of Economic and Social Affairs or to UNEP and whether it should be located in New York, Nairobi, or possibly elsewhere.

The conference reached a consensus on an organizational arrangement with the following main features:

—At the global level, a consolidated secretariat comprised primarily of the staffs of the Center for Housing, Building and Planning and the U.N. Foundation for Habitat and Human Settlements and an inter-governmental body of no more than 58 members which would provide policy guidance to that secretariat.

—At the regional level, a small human settlements secretariat unit in each of the regional economic commissions and an intergovernmental committee.

The organization would serve as a focal point within the United Nations for human settlements activities. The framework for

its future programs is based on the six topics which formed the framework for the national action recommendations. The motive in using an identical framework was to forge a direct link between national action and international cooperation. Using those six topics as a framework, the organization will identify selective priorities in its future activities based on the needs and problems of the regions and countries within the regions.

The document also reflects a concern that was broadly shared; namely, the need for better coordination within the U.N. system as a whole and the maintenance of close links with the World Bank and the U.N. Development Program (UNDP). In addition, the conference recommended that at both global and regional levels cooperation should be sought with universities, research and scientific institutes, and non-governmental organizations and voluntary organizations.

Left in optional form in the document for General Assembly decision were the questions about organizational link and location. The basic options were those described above. They were the ones which received the greatest attention in Vancouver; and among those delegations which expressed a preference, a very clear majority favored integrating the human settlements unit with the Department of Economic and Social Affairs and locating it in New York.

This was the position expressed by the U.S. delegation. Among the reasons cited by the United States in support of this view were:

—The need for closer integration of human settlements policy with economic and social policy at the national level has its parallel at the international level.

—The kinds of international programs that will be needed will have an essentially developmental and not environmental character.

—Most of the funds that will be required for activities in these areas are going to have to come from the UNDP and interna-

tional financial institutions. That will require close working relations with the UNDP and the World Bank.

—If the Human Settlements Foundation is to perform the kind of financial function that was foreseen for it, it should be close to a major capital market.

However, the majority of delegations did not indicate any preference at all, and it was this which made it impossible to envisage getting a final recommendation in Vancouver, whether by consensus or vote. Thus, the resolution of these questions was left up to the General Assembly.

### **The Declaration of Principles**

Intended as the inspirational message from the conference, the Declaration of Principles was also the most political of the documents in Vancouver.

The process of shaping the draft declaration during the preparatory phase had been largely free of contentious political issues. The preparatory committee membership, dominated by urban managers, planners, and environmentalists, had developed an esprit de corps which took it beyond cooperativeness to cordiality. This was reflected in the suggestion made by one delegate, to which no one took exception, that it might be better to postpone the conference and just allow the committee to continue its existence indefinitely.

Psychologically, the conference was totally unprepared for the political assault which occurred in Vancouver. Long-unresolved political issues, many relating to the Palestinian problem, were cast into human settlements terms and injected into the discussion not only of the Declaration of Principles but of the Recommendations for National Action as well. The repugnant Zionism-racism resolution adopted by a deeply divided U.N. General Assembly in November 1975 was resurrected. References to the New International Economic Order and the Charter of Economic Rights and Duties in the declaration multiplied and were proposed in forms which would have required

countries which opposed these resolutions when they were debated in the U.N. General Assembly to modify their positions substantially.

At a quite early stage in the consideration of the declaration, the Group of 77 produced a revision of the draft prepared by the Secretariat which was so substantial that it represented an almost new draft. A working group identified 13 paragraphs in that document as controversial. Negotiations were to concentrate on those issues. The negotiations never materialized, because the Group of 77 made acceptance of the Zionism-racism resolution a precondition to their willingness to negotiate on the other 12 disputed provisions. This offer was rejected. Consequently, it was decided to forgo committee discussion of the document and instead refer it directly to the plenary.

In plenary, a U.S. procedural proposal that the document be voted on as a whole (rather than paragraph by paragraph) was accepted.

The final vote on the declaration was 89-15, with 10 abstentions. The United States was among those countries which voted against adoption. In a statement following the vote, the U.S. delegation said:

... we are sorely disappointed that so much time and effort has been expended in discussions of problems of a political nature, essentially extraneous to the substantive work of this conference. There is good reason to believe that public esteem for the United Nations will be seriously impaired by this record. Continuation of this type of tactic does not bode well for my country's support and participation in future U.N. conferences concerned with global problems demanding international attention. Now, Mr. President, does it contribute to cooperation and progress at conferences such as these to have the rules of procedure deliberately subverted to the political objectives of a numerical majority?

The references in the U.S. statement to the subversion of rules of procedure related to parliamentary maneuvering which occurred during plenary consideration of the committee report and particularly to a Cuban amendment which "condemned settlement planning and implementation for the purpose of prolonging and consolidating occupation and subjugation in territo-



ries and lands acquired through coercion and intimidation" as violations of U.N. principles and the Universal Declaration of Human Rights.

The Pakistan delegation proposed that the conference rules of procedure be changed so that amendments on substantive matters could be approved by a simple majority rather than a two-thirds vote. The conference President stated that the Pakistani proposal was itself a substantive one and therefore required a two-thirds majority. When he asked the conference to support his view, he was overruled by a vote of 59-30 (U.S.), with 6 abstentions. Following that, the plenary went on to approve the Cuban amendment by a vote of 77-8 (U.S.), with 20 abstentions.

### **Achievements of the Conference**

At its first meeting in January 1975, the Habitat preparatory committee settled on an assumption which subsequently shaped the structure and content of the conference. That was that human settlements problems are essentially national rather than international and that national (and local) governments bear the primary responsibility for dealing with them.

Those problems are most acute in the developing world, where rapid population growth, poverty, and underdevelopment give them a dimension unknown in the industrialized countries.

Among its larger purposes, Habitat was intended to bring world attention to bear on this complex of problems and to encourage governments to undertake commitments to respond to them. But Habitat also sought to alter the nature of the response. It aimed at persuading governments (and their publics) to develop approaches which would integrate human settlements policy with social and economic policy. It aimed at stimulating governments to consider carefully the interrelationships among important sectors of human settlements activity (housing, transportation, for example) rather than ignoring them. It sought to

stress the need for governments to modify domestic policies and priorities so as to give the poor access to basic shelter and services. In brief, it had a strong conceptual thrust.

The primacy assigned to national action implied that the role of the international community would be a somewhat limited one. Consequently, the international aspects of the conference would be of subordinate importance. It is against this general background that the accomplishments of the conference need to be assessed.

Perhaps the most impressive achievement of Vancouver was the ability of over 130 nations, diverse in so many ways, to produce, in the Recommendations for National Action, a meaningful document centered on domestic political and economic issues and to adopt it by consensus.

This was significant in several respects. First, it indicates quite clearly that, politically, it is possible for a large group of countries to discuss serious substantive problems in a serious way and arrive at a mutually satisfactory result despite the many obvious differences among them.

Secondly, the document—while hardly perfect—is a high-quality one. It embodies the conceptual thrust the conference aimed at.

Since it had to accommodate diversity, it could not be—and is not—a rigid blueprint for all governments to follow. The recommendations represent a set of guidelines which governments can draw on as they deem fit. But they are comprehensive in scope, reflect a concern and compassion for the poor, and are democratic in spirit. And, most importantly, they can be of real value, especially to developing countries.

Habitat produced a large measure of agreement on the details of an institutional arrangement for international action, thus laying the groundwork for a decision by the U.N. General Assembly at its fall 1976 session. Those details establish a broad framework within which specific programs of assistance can be designed. That frame-

work provides for a close link between national action and future international programs.

Habitat brought modern communications technology into major international conferences for the first time. Approximately 235 films were submitted by governments for use at the conference.

One of Habitat's objectives was to make possible a global exchange of experiences. Films were selected as the vehicle for communicating to a global audience the lessons learned from national experience—the successes and the failures in human settlements activities. It was an invitation to candor which some accepted and others—blinded by ideology to failure—did not. Nevertheless, there were some insightful films produced and shown.

Provided the General Assembly approves the recommendations made by the conference, the audiovisual program will be continued. Some of the films will be valuable training material.

Each of the previous major U.N. conferences—environment, population, food, and the role of women—examined the planetary condition from a different perspective. Each was able to build upon the gains achieved in previous conferences and to extend man's recognition and understanding of global interdependence in new directions.

The Habitat national action recommendations reflect a profound concern for the safeguarding of the natural environment. They reiterate the necessity of giving women opportunity to participate fully and actively in the processes which determine the quality of life in human settlements. Although the national action paper does not include the more specific provisions on family planning that the United States and a number of other countries wanted—due to inadvertence and misunderstanding—there is no doubt that the significance of rapid population growth to human settlements problems is fully appreciated by most countries.

Habitat in these areas represented con-

solidation. But it broke new ground of its own—in altering perceptions of domestic problems and their priorities and in gaining acceptance of the fundamental principle that people should be given the opportunity to participate in decisions which affect the quality of their lives.

## Current Treaty Actions

### MULTILATERAL

#### Coffee

International coffee agreement 1976, with annexes. Done at London December 3, 1975.<sup>1</sup>

*Instrument of ratification signed by the President:* September 21, 1976.

#### Containers

International convention for safe containers (CSC), with annexes. Done at Geneva December 2, 1972.

*Ratifications deposited:* Byelorussian Soviet Socialist Republic,<sup>2</sup> Ukrainian Soviet Socialist Republic,<sup>2</sup> September 6, 1976.

*Enters into force:* September 6, 1977.<sup>3</sup>

#### Finance

Articles of agreement of the International Monetary Fund. Done at Washington December 27, 1945.

Entered into force December 27, 1945. TIAS 1501.

*Signature and acceptance:* Comoros, September 21, 1976.

#### Maritime Matters

Amendments to the convention of March 6, 1948, as amended, on the Intergovernmental Maritime Consultative Organization (TIAS 4044, 6285, 6490). Adopted at London October 17, 1974.<sup>1</sup>

*Acceptance deposited:* Israel, September 8, 1976.

#### Scientific Cooperation

Memorandum of understanding amending the memorandum of understanding of July 21 and 22, 1976, for a transatlantic balloon program. Opened for signature at Washington August 9, 1976. Entered into force August 13, 1976.

#### Space

Convention on registration of objects launched into outer space. Opened for signature at New York January 14, 1975.

*Ratification deposited:* United States, September 15, 1976.

*Entered into force:* September 15, 1976.

<sup>1</sup> Not in force.

<sup>2</sup> With statement.

<sup>3</sup> Not for the United States.



Wheat

Protocol modifying and further extending the wheat trade convention (part of the international wheat agreement) 1971 (TIAS 7144, 8227). Done at Washington March 17, 1976. Entered into force June 19, 1976, with respect to certain provisions, and July 1, 1976, with respect to other provisions. *Accession deposited:* United Kingdom, September 23, 1976.<sup>4</sup>

Protocol modifying and further extending the food aid convention (part of the international wheat agreement) 1971 (TIAS 7144, 8227). Done at Washington March 17, 1976. Entered into force June 19, 1976, with respect to certain provisions, and July 1, 1976, with respect to other provisions. *Accession deposited:* United Kingdom, September 23, 1976.

BILATERAL

Afghanistan

Agreement for sales of agricultural commodities, with minutes of understanding. Signed at Kabul August 8, 1976. Entered into force August 8, 1976.

Australia

Agreement between the United States and Australia on procedures for mutual assistance in administration of justice in connection with the Lockheed Aircraft Corporation matter. Signed at Washington September 13, 1976. Entered into force September 13, 1976.

Costa Rica

Agreement relating to the limitation of meat imports from Costa Rica during calendar year 1976. Effected by exchange of notes at San José April 23 and August 6, 1976. Entered into force August 6, 1976.

Haiti

Agreement amending the agreement of March 22 and 23, 1976 relating to trade in cotton, wool, and man-made fiber textiles and textile products. Effected by exchange of notes at Washington September 14, 1976. Entered into force September 14, 1976.

Indonesia

Agreement amending the agreement for sales of agricultural commodities of April 19, 1976 (TIAS 8308). Effected by exchange of notes at Jakarta September 8 and 11, 1976. Entered into force September 11, 1976.

<sup>4</sup> Applicable to Dominica, Saint Christopher, Nevis and Anguilla, Saint Vincent, Bailiwick of Guernsey, Isle of Man, Belize, Bermuda, British Virgin Islands, Gibraltar, Gilbert Islands, Hong Kong, Montserrat, Saint Helena and Dependencies and Tuvalu.

Nepal

Agreement relating to the improvement of production technology for foodgrain crops and cropping systems, with annexes. Signed at Kathmandu June 30, 1976. Entered into force June 30, 1976.

Spain

Treaty of friendship and cooperation, with supplementary agreements and related notes. Signed at Madrid January 24, 1976. *Ratifications exchanged:* September 21, 1976. *Entered into force:* September 21, 1976.

GPO Sales Publications

*Publications may be ordered by catalog or stock number from the Superintendent of Documents, U.S. Government Printing Office, Washington, D.C. 20402. A 25-percent discount is made on orders for 100 or more copies of any one publication mailed to the same address. Remittances, payable to the Superintendent of Documents, must accompany orders. Prices shown below, which include domestic postage, are subject to change.*

**Background Notes:** Short, factual summaries which describe the people, history, government, economy, and foreign relations of each country. Each contains a map, a list of principal government officials and U.S. diplomatic and consular officers, and a reading list. (A complete set of all Background Notes currently in stock—at least 140—\$21.80; 1-year subscription service for approximately 77 updated or new Notes—\$23.10; plastic binder—\$1.50.) Single copies of those listed below are available at 35¢ each.

Iceland . . . . .	Cat. No. S1.123:IC2	
	Pub. 8227	4 pp.
India . . . . .	Cat. No. S1.123:IN2/2	
	Pub. 7847	7 pp.
Iraq . . . . .	Cat. No. S1.123:IR1/2	
	Pub. 7975	4 pp.

**Air Transport Services.** Agreement with Ecuador supplementing the agreement of January 8, 1947, as amended. TIAS 8205. 28 pp. 45¢. (Cat. No. S9.10:8205).

**International Wheat Agreement, 1971—Modification and Extension of Wheat Trade Convention and Food Aid Convention.** Protocols with other governments. TIAS 8227. 67 pp. 85¢. (Cat. No. S9.10:8227).

**Universal Postal Union.** Second additional protocol to the constitution, convention, and related documents with other governments. TIAS 8231. 450 pp. \$4.60. (Cat. No. S9.10:8231).

**Extradition.** Treaty with Australia. TIAS 8234. 18 pp. 35¢. (Cat. No. S9.10:8234).

**Technical Cooperation.** Agreement with Iran. TIAS 8235. 5 pp. 35¢. (Cat. No. S9.10:8235).

**Extradition.** Treaty with Canada. TIAS 8237. 39 pp. 55¢. (Cat. No. S9.10:8237).

International Council for the Exploration of the Sea. Protocol with other governments amending article 14(2) of the convention of September 12, 1964. TIAS 8238. 9 pp. 35¢. (Cat. No. S9.10:8238).

Relations. Memorandum of understanding with Brazil. TIAS 8240. 7 pp. 35¢. (Cat. No. S9.10:8240).

Criminal Investigations. Agreement with Nigeria. TIAS 8243. 5 pp. 35¢. (Cat. No. S9.10:8243).

Criminal Investigations. Agreement with Colombia. TIAS 8244. 5 pp. 35¢. (Cat. No. S9.10:8244).

Criminal Investigations. Agreement with the Netherlands. TIAS 8245. 5 pp. 35¢. (Cat. No. S9.10:8245).

Atomic Energy—Research Participation and Technical Exchange. Agreement with Japan. TIAS 8246. 6 pp. 35¢. (Cat. No. S9.10:8246).

Remote Sensing From Satellites and Aircraft. Agreement with Canada amending and extending the agreement of May 14, 1971. TIAS 8247. 8 pp. 35¢. (Cat. No. S9.10:8247).

Cooperation and Mutual Assistance in Mapping, Charting and Geodesy. Memorandum with Mexico. TIAS 8248. 4 pp. 35¢. (Cat. No. S9.10:8248).

Air Charter Services. Agreement with Austria amending the interim agreement of November 6, 1973. TIAS 8250. 3 pp. 35¢. (Cat. No. S9.10:8250).

### Checklist of Department of State Press Releases: September 20–26

Press releases may be obtained from the Office of Press Relations, Department of State, Washington, D.C. 20520.

No.	Date	Subject
†450	9/20	Kissinger: arrival, Lusaka.
†451	9/21	Kissinger: departure, Lusaka.
†452	9/21	U.S.-Brazil joint groups on scientific and technological cooperation and on energy, Brasília, Sept. 16–17.
*453	9/22	Nguza, Kissinger: arrival, Kinshasa, Sept. 21.
*454	9/22	Advisory Committee on the Law of the Sea, Nov. 4–5.
†455	9/22	Kissinger: news conference, Kinshasa.
*456	9/22	Shipping Coordinating Committee. Subcommittee on Safety of Life at Sea, working group on radiocommunications, Oct. 21.
*457	9/22	U.S.-Canada discussions on Great Lakes levels.
*458	9/22	Ralph E. Becker sworn in as Ambassador to Honduras (biographic data).
*459	9/22	Osogo, Kissinger: arrival, Nairobi.
*460	9/23	Julius L. Katz sworn in as Assistant Secretary for Economic and Business Affairs (biographic data).
*461	9/23	Study group 5 of the U.S. National Committee of the International Telegraph and Telephone Consultative Committee, Oct. 28.
*462	9/23	Northwest Atlantic Fisheries Advisory Committee, Boston, Oct. 14.
*463	9/23	Kissinger: interview by ORTF, Kinshasa, Sept. 22.
464	9/23	Statement on occasion of inauguration of President Elias Sarkis of Lebanon.
*465	9/23	Kissinger: remarks. Nakuru, Kenya.
*466	9/23	Osogo, Kissinger: departure, Nairobi.
*467	9/23	Callaghan, Kissinger: remarks before meeting, London.
*468	9/23	Callaghan, Kissinger: news conference following meeting, London.
*469	9/23	Kissinger: interview by Walter Cronkite via satellite.
*470	9/23	U.S. and Haiti amend textile agreement.
*471	9/24	Donald S. Lowitz and Monroe D. Donsker elected Chairman and Vice Chairman of Board of Foreign Scholarships (biographic data).
†472	9/24	Kissinger, Crosland: news conference, London.
†473	9/24	Kissinger: arrival, Andrews Air Force Base.

\* Not printed.

† Held for a later issue of the BULLETIN.



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# THE DEPARTMENT OF STATE BULLETIN

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# THE DEPARTMENT OF STATE BULLETIN

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*The Department of State BULLETIN a weekly publication issued by the Office of Media Services, Bureau of Public Affairs, provides the public and interested agencies of the government with information on developments in the field of U.S. foreign relations and on the work of the Department and the Foreign Service.*

*The BULLETIN includes selected press releases on foreign policy, issued by the White House and the Department, and statements, addresses and news conferences of the President and the Secretary of State and other officers of the Department, as well as special articles on various phases of international affairs and the functions of the Department. Information included concerning treaties and international agreements to which the United States is or may become party and on treaties of general international interest.*

*Publications of the Department of State, United Nations documents, and legislative material in the field of international relations are also listed.*



## Southeast Asia: U.S. Interests and Policies

*Statement by Arthur W. Hummel, Jr.*

*Assistant Secretary for East Asian and Pacific Affairs<sup>1</sup>*

It is a pleasure to be with you today to discuss the situation in Southeast Asia and U.S. policy toward the area.

I think it would be most useful first to look at the broad trends that seem to be at work in Southeast Asia, then to move on to consider our interests and policies in the region, and after that to mention regional cooperation, before talking briefly about individual countries in the area, including those of Indochina.

First, I would like to review the broad trends evident in the foreign and domestic policies of the non-Communist states of Southeast Asia since the fall of Saigon.

These nations were greatly concerned that events in Indochina might cause the United States to withdraw from the region and that Hanoi might move strongly to undermine its neighbors. These initial fears have largely subsided as we have reassured these nations of our continued interest and commitment to the area. Our determination to continue to play a role in the area was symbolized by visits of President Ford to Indonesia and the Philippines last December and Vice President Rockefeller to Malaysia, Singapore, Australia, and New Zealand this spring.

At the same time, the nations of the area have modified their policies, often in direc-

tions already underway before 1975, to adapt themselves to the changed international environment.

As you know, these states had been moving toward improving relations with the People's Republic of China for some time, particularly since the visit of President Nixon to China in 1972. Malaysia established relations with China in 1974, and Thailand and the Philippines followed suit in 1975 after Saigon's fall. Singapore and Indonesia have not yet done so, but Prime Minister Lee of Singapore was well received on a recent trip to the People's Republic of China. These countries now all have diplomatic relations with the Soviet Union and also with the Socialist Republic of Vietnam.

At the same time as they balanced their close ties with the West by new openings to Communist countries, these nations have also modestly increased the attention they pay to their own security, recognizing that they must take the primary responsibility for their own defense, especially internal security.

Indochina developments have also encouraged these nations to emphasize their own self-reliance and independence in other ways. One aspect of this more self-reliant mood has been some increase in emphasis on ties with the Third World and the nonaligned movement and, more specifically, support for the New International Economic Order, the detailed program of Third World demands on the industrialized countries.

On the economic side, these countries are

<sup>1</sup> Made before the Special Subcommittee on Investigations of the House Committee on International Relations on Sept. 28. The complete transcript of the hearings will be published by the committee and will be available from the Superintendent of Documents, U.S. Government Printing Office, Washington, D.C. 20402.

now emerging from the world recession in reasonably good shape. In some cases their recovery has lagged somewhat behind that of the industrialized countries, because improvement in their export picture necessarily depends on the prior improvement of the economies of the industrialized nations, including Japan.

Since the fall of Saigon we have not seen a major increase in the level of Communist insurgent activity in Southeast Asia. At present none of the insurgencies represents a threat to the existence of the central government of the country in which it operates, and these nations have a reasonably good chance of coping successfully with the various rebel movements even though it will be very difficult to suppress them entirely.

In concluding this discussion of the broader aspects of Southeast Asia at present, I would note there seems to be a rough equilibrium among the interests of the major powers at the present time. There have been continuing good ties with the United States, and in some ways our relationships are becoming broader and deeper. The People's Republic of China and the U.S.S.R. are competing for influence in the area but are doing so through such traditional means as diplomatic relations, trade, and aid, rather than through any significantly increased support to insurgent movements or Communist parties. Japan is an important economic influence and, like the United States, it would like to see stability in the area preserved. Thus at present no major power is aggressively seeking a predominant role in the region.

#### **Policies Derived From U.S. Interests**

Now, let me turn to U.S. interests in the region.

—First, we support the sovereignty and independence of the countries in the region and would like to see the maintenance of an equilibrium which will preserve their independence.

—Second, American strength is basic to any stable balance of power in the Pacific and contributes to peace and progress. Our use of bases in the Philippines is important to us as an element of stability not only in Southeast Asia but in East Asia as a whole, as well as being related to the global strategic picture. Similarly we have an interest in maintaining free use of the sea and air lanes through this area connecting the western Pacific with the Indian Ocean.

—Third, we desire friendly political relationships with the non-Communist nations which will facilitate the resolution of bilateral problems and gain their support in multilateral forums.

—Fourth, we have mutually beneficial economic relationships with the non-Communist nations in this area. Indonesia supplies a growing percentage of our oil requirements and is even more important to our ally Japan. The area is also an important source of tin, copper, rubber, and other materials. It is also an important market and a region offering significant investment opportunities.

—Fifth, we have an interest in reducing tensions and working for a stable peace.

Our policies in the region derive quite naturally from the interests which I have just stated. As President Ford stated last December 7 in his review of our Asian policy: “. . . American strength is basic to any stable balance of power in the Pacific. . . . without security, there can be neither peace nor progress.”

Part of our military presence in the Asia-Pacific region is the Philippine bases. We also undertake various diplomatic efforts to preserve our naval and aerial mobility by maintaining access to the various straits in the region. One aspect of this effort is carried out in the law of the sea negotiations designed to preserve our mobility on a worldwide basis.

We maintain a friendly political dialogue with the nations in this area. By discussing our policies with these countries on a regular basis, we help maintain the existing



friendly relationships and also improve the prospects of gaining their support on broader international questions, especially in the United Nations.

In the economic area we seek to keep open the channels of trade and investment. In recent years there have been some efforts by these nations to increase the benefits they derive from foreign investment, which in some cases have had the effect of reducing their attractiveness to investors. This trend was compounded by the economic recession. Despite this, the leaders of these nations generally realize the vital role that private foreign investment can play in their economic development plans, and they understand that to attract foreign investment they have to permit foreign investors a fair return. It can also be said that American companies now understand more than before that their relations with these countries must involve mutual benefit.

These countries are also of interest to us in the global negotiations on economic issues which are usually referred to as the North-South dialogue. While they are firm supporters of changes in international economic relationships which they believe are necessary to increase the rate of development in their countries, these are moderate nations which have indicated their willingness to cooperate with the United States as we show them we are on a constructive path. Thus our economic relations with these nations also have an important multilateral element.

Our policies include continuing modest economic and military assistance to those nations that need it. In the economic sphere, obviously Singapore, with a per capita income well over \$2,000, does not need our assistance; and we are phasing out economic aid to Thailand, which has a basically healthy and growing economy. On the other hand we are continuing aid to Indonesia, which has great natural resources but also great problems of population pressures and organization for development as well as a very low per capita

gross national product. With regard to security assistance it should be noted that arms acquisitions in the area are modest and there is no arms race taking place. A significant proportion of our economic assistance is supplied through multilateral institutions, notably the Asian Development Bank, which utilizes its resources effectively and deserves more vigorous U.S. support.

### Regional Cooperation

In 1967, Indonesia, Malaysia, Singapore, Thailand, and the Philippines formed a group for regional cooperation called the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN).

The gradual development of this organization was given a new stimulus by Indochina developments, and the member countries held their first summit meeting last February in Bali, which gave further impetus to ASEAN's general cohesiveness and area of cooperation. At this meeting the leaders signed a number of interlocking documents including a Declaration of Concord, a Treaty of Amity and Cooperation, and an agreement on the establishment of an ASEAN Secretariat. It also was agreed that the organization should move ahead with joint industrial projects, preferential trade arrangements, and organization of a permanent secretariat with an Indonesian as the first ASEAN Secretary General. This organization has a consultative arrangement in the economic field with the European Economic Community and similar arrangements with several other countries.

We welcome the efforts of the Southeast Asian nations to strengthen their own independence by increasing their efforts at regional cooperation. We would be prepared to enter into economic consultation with the ASEAN nations but are leaving the initiative to them.

One of the question marks in Southeast Asia during the past year or more has been

how relations would develop between the new Communist states of Indochina and the ASEAN grouping. In July and August the Vietnamese Vice Minister of Foreign Affairs made official visits to all ASEAN capitals except Bangkok, and the Thai Foreign Minister went to Hanoi and Vientiane in August. During these visits the Vietnamese emphasized their desire for peaceful and friendly relations and seemed to accept the assurances of host government officials that ASEAN is a truly neutral group. Diplomatic relations were established with the Philippines July 12 and with Thailand August 6, completing the establishment of such relations between the Socialist Republic of Vietnam and all ASEAN members.

However, at the recent nonaligned meeting in Colombo, Vietnam and Laos opposed a Malaysian position advocating a zone of peace, freedom, and neutrality in Southeast Asia, which has been a standard ASEAN concept since 1971. Vietnam and Laos proposed language welcoming the Communist victories and demanding an end to U.S. alliances and bases. Furthermore, they sharply attacked ASEAN and ASEAN members for allegedly supporting U.S. "aggression" in the Indochina conflict. This incident suggests that the future of relations between Indochina and the ASEAN nations remains to be defined and that Hanoi can be expected to continue its efforts to reduce or eliminate the U.S. presence in Southeast Asia and to influence the foreign and domestic politics of its neighbors.

### **Indochinese Nations**

Vietnam maintains ties with both the Soviet Union and the People's Republic of China, but their relations appear to be closer with Moscow than with Peking. The Vietnamese are very influential in Laos, and the two countries work together closely. Cambodia, on the other hand, has gone its own way. The Cambodian population has become strictly regimented, as the new Communist leaders have carried out

their ruthless revolution. The Soviet Union is active in Hanoi and Vientiane but has not been allowed to open an Embassy in Phnom Penh, where there are only a handful of embassies and the principal foreign ties are with the People's Republic of China. Cambodia recently established nominal ties with a number of Western countries and with Japan.

During the first year after the fall of Saigon, Hanoi was largely occupied with moving toward the reunification of the country. This was formally accomplished in July of this year, although many problems of establishing firm political control over the South, of administration, and of economic unification and development remain to be overcome. In contrast to Cambodia, the new Socialist Republic of Vietnam has been conducting an active foreign policy and is seeking to enter a large number of international organizations, often claiming the seat previously held by the Republic of Vietnam.

We look to the future and not to the past in our relations with Vietnam. We are prepared to meet to discuss all issues and have indicated this willingness to the Vietnamese. So far no discussions have taken place. For us the most serious single obstacle to proceeding toward normalization of relations is the refusal of Hanoi to give us a full accounting for those missing in action (MIA's). Hanoi for its part continues to demand economic assistance under the Paris agreement. We believe that the Paris agreement was so massively violated by Hanoi that we have no obligation to provide assistance, and in any case Congress has prohibited such assistance by law.

On September 13 we indicated our intention to veto Vietnam's application for membership in the United Nations on the grounds that their actions so far on the MIA issue do not reflect willingness to fulfill the humanitarian obligations of the U.N. Charter. Security Council consideration of the Vietnamese application has been deferred.

We have maintained an Embassy in Laos



which has been headed by a Chargé for the past year. There is little substance to our relationship at the present time.

### **Non-Communist Southeast Asian Nations**

I would now like to say a few words about each of the six non-Communist nations of Southeast Asia.

#### *Burma*

Burma attempts to maintain a policy of strict neutrality in its external relations, and the Burmese Government has chosen economic policies which offer little scope for American trade or investment. Thus our relationships with Burma are not so diverse as those with other Southeast Asian countries. The Burmese Government has an active antinarcotics effort, which is also, of course, a matter the United States is very concerned with, and we have provided the Burmese Government with some equipment for this purpose, including helicopters.

#### *Thailand*

The nation most affected by Indochina developments was Thailand, which has common borders with Laos and Cambodia. The fall of Saigon brought immediate concern based on the potential of a revolutionary and well-armed Hanoi and fear of a complete U.S. withdrawal from the region. One reaction was to proceed rapidly to establish diplomatic relations with the People's Republic of China, which was perceived as a counterweight to Hanoi, with the latter's close association with the Soviet Union.

Thailand also sought to initiate talks with the new Communist governments in order to establish friendly relations and discuss common problems. At present Thailand has diplomatic relations with all three Indochina states, although Embassies have not yet been established in Hanoi and Phnom Penh. Negotiations between Thailand and its neighbors have made some progress on such issues as trade, refugees,

and the avoidance of border incidents. At the same time, Vietnam apparently has not increased its support for Thai insurgents, although the type of Hanoi support rendered in the past continues. Communist insurgencies continue to exist in the North and Northeast, and Moslem separatists are troublesome along the southern border.

We were already drawing down our troop presence in Thailand in the spring of 1975, and further reductions were contemplated for the future. We were prepared to retain some residual facilities; but it was not possible to come to agreement on status-of-forces issues, and our last troops departed July 20 of this year except for a small group involved with military assistance.

In 1973 Thailand's military government was overthrown. The most recent elections were held last April, bringing to power Prime Minister Seni Pramot, who presides over a coalition of four parties in the National Assembly. We wish this democratic experiment well and hope it will succeed.

Thailand has a rather healthy economy which has permitted us to begin phasing out economic aid. We are still assisting the Thai with a modest military assistance program which is focusing increasingly on credit sales and less on grant aid.

#### *Malaysia*

This relatively prosperous and well-run nation, with a per capita gross national product of about \$700, has a strategic location on the Malacca Strait and is a source of rubber and tin. Its moderate government shares our goal of a peaceful and stable Southeast Asia.

The new Prime Minister is making a strong effort to continue strengthening the Malaysian economy and to deal equitably with the divisions between the Malay majority and the large Chinese minority. He must also deal with a longstanding Communist insurgency which, although not of a magnitude seriously to threaten the nation's security, has increased its activities noticeably since the fall of Saigon.

## *Singapore*

Singapore is unique in the area for its small size (225 square miles) and its large per capita income (\$2,200). Prime Minister Lee Kuan Yew is publicly skeptical of Hanoi and supportive of a continued American military presence in the region in order to balance other major powers.

We, of course, desire friendly relations with this strategically situated and energetic country. We are also interested in Singapore's position as the leading Southeast Asian commercial center, in its large oil-refining industry, and in encouraging our already large (\$900 million) investment stake in this country.

## *Indonesia*

Indonesia's 135 million people give it half the population of the region, and it stretches over an archipelago 3,000 miles long that dominates the sea routes between the western Pacific and the Indian Ocean. In spite of its great natural resources, especially oil, Indonesia remains among the poorest countries of the region in terms of per capita income. The government which took over in 1966 following an abortive Communist-supported coup in late 1965, although predominantly military, has consciously kept military spending to a minimum so as to devote the maximum of resources to economic development.

The changed situation in Southeast Asia following the fall of Saigon has indicated to the Indonesian leadership the need to upgrade modestly the efficiency and mobility of Indonesian forces to insure the defense of this farflung island nation. We are helping through a small program of grant aid and military sales credits.

Indonesia supplies about 8 percent of U.S. oil imports, and a larger percentage of Japan's. Indonesia has been a stable supplier; it did not participate in the 1973 Arab embargo. Increasing supplies of oil and liquefied natural gas are expected to be available in the future. We already have about \$2 billion in private investment in

the country, mostly in the energy field.

There is no question that Indonesia, its resources, and its friendly, moderate government are of political, strategic, and economic importance to us. Although Indonesia is careful to maintain its nonaligned position, our relations have been close. President Suharto visited Washington in July 1975, President Ford visited Jakarta last December, and consultations between Secretary Kissinger and Foreign Minister Malik, took place in Washington last June.

## *Philippines*

We have close historical ties with this nation, consecrated by our joint struggle in World War II. However, we are careful not to take the Philippines for granted, and we deal with that country as a fully independent nation which has the duty of safeguarding its own interests.

After the Communist takeover in Indochina, President Marcos called for a "reassessment" of the American military presence in his country. When President Ford visited the Philippines last December, he and President Marcos agreed that the military bases used by the United States in the Philippines remain important in maintaining an effective U.S. presence in the western Pacific in support of the mutual objectives of the defense of both countries, security of the Pacific region, and world peace. The two Presidents also agreed that negotiations to revise existing arrangements would be conducted "in the clear recognition of Philippine sovereignty." These negotiations began in April and are still continuing. We are confident that they will eventually prove successful, but complex issues remain to be resolved.

Our economic interests are significant—over \$2 billion in investments and a flourishing trade relationship. Last year we began discussion with the Philippine Government of a new agreement regarding economic and commercial relations, which would replace the expired Laurel-Langle Agreement.



The Philippine Government's desire to make clear its independence, and also to further its economic interests, has led it to take an active part in the Group of 77, which coordinates economic policy among the less developed countries on certain issues. The Philippines has also balanced its close Western ties by establishing relations with the People's Republic of China in June 1975 and with the Soviet Union in June 1976. But I am confident we can continue to have close and friendly relations based on mutual respect and mutual interest.

#### **U.S. Support for Southeast Asian Aspirations**

In conclusion, I think it is important that we approach the problems of Southeast Asia with the understanding that the future of this area will depend primarily on the internal strength and efforts of the countries themselves. They themselves recognize this and indeed have made great strides over the years in improving their economies and modernizing their societies.

They have also gained experience and confidence in their own abilities. The international context of Sino-Soviet tension and U.S. détente policies with both of the major Communist powers has contributed to the general equilibrium which appears to have been established in the area.

We intend to maintain a strong military presence in the western Pacific. Our presence there is an important element for stability in Southeast Asia as well as for the strategic balance in the western Pacific region as a whole.

Under present conditions the challenges the countries of Southeast Asia face are primarily economic, political, and social in nature, with serious external threats a less likely contingency. In these circumstances we should do what we can to support the aspirations of the peoples of Southeast Asia, based on our common interest in the preservation of their sovereignty and independence.

## **Department Discusses Arms Sales and U.S.-Saudi Arabia Relations**

*Following is a statement by Alfred L. Atherton, Jr., Assistant Secretary for Near Eastern and South Asian Affairs, submitted to the House Committee on International Relations on September 27.<sup>1</sup>*

I appreciate very much the opportunity to appear before this committee to discuss an issue of key importance to broad U.S. interests—our military supply relationship with Saudi Arabia, which in turn is an integral part of the overall relationship between our two countries.

An aspect of this longstanding relationship is under question—the Administration's proposal to sell 650 Maverick missiles. This issue is of gravest concern to the Administration. We are deeply concerned that singling out Saudi Arabia by disapproving this sale could do serious damage to our national interests and those of our allies in the industrial nations.

This committee is aware that our excellent relations with Saudi Arabia represent years of mutual effort to develop trust.

This committee is aware of the major expansion in that relationship in recent years. Our arms supply relationship is but one aspect of broad ties which have served U.S. interests remarkably well, but it is an important aspect and integral to the pursuit of our broader interests.

This committee is well aware of the importance of Saudi Arabia to our search for peace in the Middle East, to our concern for the security of the Persian Gulf, and to the world's economic health.

Against this background I would stress a few central points:

—Over many years, as the United States has sought peace in the explosive Middle East, Saudi Arabia has remained a stead-

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<sup>1</sup> The complete transcript of the hearings will be published by the committee and will be available from the Superintendent of Documents, U.S. Government Printing Office, Washington, D.C. 20402.

fast friend and a force for moderation. Its political and financial support for the Arab nations that are committed to a negotiated settlement of the Arab-Israeli conflict is a critical component of our efforts to achieve a Middle East peace.

—This year we expect to export over \$3 billion in American goods and services to Saudi Arabia, providing thousands of jobs for Americans. Only a fraction of these exports will represent military items.

—Saudi Arabia has been a stalwart partner in our objective of resisting the expansion of Soviet influence and radical movements in the Arabian Peninsula and Persian Gulf.

—Saudi Arabia is playing a key role in seeking to bring the tragedy and travail in Lebanon to an end.

—Saudi Arabia has been supportive of our position on a number of important issues in various international fora. At the recent nonaligned conference in Colombo, for example, it entered reservations on resolutions hostile to our positions on Korea and Puerto Rico.

—Saudi Arabia is a major and constructive force in the world economy, in finance, in economic development, and, most significantly, in energy. It is Saudi Arabia which has prevented further increases in crude oil prices this year. The world looks to Saudi Arabia to restrain efforts by other OPEC countries [Organization of Petroleum Exporting Countries] to increase prices sharply in the years to come. The growing share of our energy imports that comes from Saudi oil is a well-known fact.

In this context our concern for Saudi security insures that Saudi Arabia will feel confident enough in its relationship with us to continue to be helpful to our national objectives in the Middle East and throughout the world.

Clearly Saudi Arabia pursues the policies it does because it considers those policies in its own national interest, not because they are in the U.S. interest. It has been a fundamental tenet of Saudi policy for over

30 years that a close relationship with the United States is in the Saudi national interest because of our position of leadership in the non-Communist world and because of the benefits Saudi Arabia derives from that relationship in the economic and technological development of its society. In many spheres the policies of the Saudi Government and its close ties with the United States are under attack by radical states and movements in the area. It has withstood those attacks because of its confidence in the constancy of the relationship between us.

This is what is at stake in the issue we are considering today. When I say that disapproval of this sale could do serious damage to our national interests, I do not mean this one act would destroy our relationship overnight. The Saudis and we have an interest in preserving that relationship. What I do mean is that the assumptions on which that relationship is based would be called into question in Saudi minds. An erosion of confidence, already shaken by what Saudi Arabia sees as a pattern of attacks in this country on the U.S.-Saudi relationship, would be set in motion, whose consequences we would come to regret over time.

Secretary Kissinger has asked me to emphasize on his behalf what we risk if we treat a proven friend in this way, singling it out for disapproval from among all the nations to which we supply defense articles and striking at the spirit of mutual confidence on which that friendship is based.

What we risk is nothing less than undermining moderation and stability in the Middle East and jeopardizing our own economic well-being. The issue today transcends the narrow question of whether or not we sell Maverick missiles to Saudi Arabia, and how many we sell. It goes to the heart of a relationship that has served well our interests and the interests of peace in the Middle East.

Mr. Chairman, I would like now to turn to the specific question which lies before us—the letter of offer for 650 Maverick mis-



siles for Saudi Arabia. Various questions and reservations have been raised about this sale. I would like to try briefly to address these.

First, why do we consider it important to supply military equipment to Saudi Arabia?

For over a quarter of a century our military supply relationship has been one of the foundation stones of an overall relationship which has fostered Saudi confidence in this country and Saudi receptivity toward our international goals. Our long cooperation in this field has been a major factor inducing the Saudis to value consultation on a wide variety of other subjects including, as I noted previously, support for our Middle East peacemaking efforts and efforts to hold down oil prices.

Secondly, why should this particular weapon—the Maverick—be sold to Saudi Arabia?

These missiles, like all other arms we have sold to Saudi Arabia, are intended to defend the Kingdom against external aggression and, with specific reference to the Maverick, against ground attacks by hostile armored units. Saudi Arabia, with 2 trillion dollars' worth of oil reserves to protect, is as large as the United States east of the Mississippi and has long borders to defend; and much of the terrain is highly suited to armor operations.

An important fact to keep in mind is the small size of the Saudi Army. While Israel, Iran, Iraq, Syria, and Jordan measure their ground forces in corps or armies or at least divisions, Saudi Arabia can muster only brigades. It thus becomes apparent why the Saudis need to support such small and dispersed defensive forces through the use of a weapon like the Maverick.

Thirdly, some question has been raised about the appropriateness of the precise number of these missiles in this letter of offer.

Our proposal to sell the Maverick rests on professional American military judgments related to a carefully devised program for modernizing the Saudi Armed Forces. The original proposal was to sell

1,500 of these weapons, in addition to the 1,000 already supplied. We have reduced that figure to the present 650 not because we thought the original figure was arrived at through faulty analysis, but because of the strong feelings among some members of Congress about the sale of a larger number at this time. The original figure of 1,500 Mavericks requested by Saudi Arabia itself represented a reduction, at U.S. Air Force prompting, of an earlier Saudi request. We held advance informal consultations with the Congress on this and other sales and made a bona fide effort to take congressional concerns into account by reducing the numbers of both Sidewinder and Maverick missiles agreed upon in negotiations with Saudi Arabia. This decision itself was not without some costs to our relationship, but those costs will be magnified many times if the sale is rejected in its totality.

Finally, concerns have been expressed that these missiles may become a threat to Israel, either because Saudi Arabia might use them itself in an attack on Israel or because Saudi Arabia might transfer some of these missiles to a third country.

Obviously, there is never a 100 percent guarantee of what may or may not happen in the future. Even should these concerns prove justified by later events, however, a sale of 650 Mavericks will not have any appreciable impact on the balance of power in the Arab-Israeli context. A fundamental principle of American Middle East policy is the preservation of the security and survival of Israel. It would be unthinkable on the face of it that we should, by this or any other sale of military goods and services to Saudi Arabia or any other country, undermine that basic policy of support for Israel's security and survival.

But the main point I want to stress here is the following. Both experience and logic strongly suggest that the concern that the sale of these missiles will pose a threat to Israel is an unjustified concern. In the Arab-Israeli dispute, there is no doubt about where Saudi sympathies lie politi-

cally. But Saudi Arabia has never been a combatant in any Arab-Israeli war. Its armed forces are small in number, and their primary mission is to defend the vast territory and resources of the Kingdom. Furthermore, Saudi Arabia knows that were it to use for aggressive purposes the weapons we sell it, it would jeopardize the entire relationship with the United States which it so highly values. And most important of all, the entire thrust of Saudi policy is directed toward a peaceful settlement of the Arab-Israeli conflict, toward avoiding further Arab-Israeli wars, not toward promoting them.

Secondly, let me address the concern about unauthorized arms transfers to third parties. Over many years Saudi Arabia has never made an unauthorized transfer of U.S. equipment. Saudi Arabia values its military supply relationship with us. We believe they would not wish to jeopardize this relationship—and very directly, their own security—by such irresponsible acts as the transfer of weapons in violation of their agreements with us. In the specific case of the Maverick, moreover, there are additional technical considerations which make transfer extremely unlikely. Mavericks cannot be used on aircraft other than those which have been specifically designed to handle them, and in the Arab Middle East only the Saudis have such aircraft.

Mr. Chairman, in recent months there has been much publicity about the flow of arms to the Persian Gulf. The Administration is convinced that U.S. policy in this regard is sound and supportive of peace and security in this area. But however much honest men may differ on this complex question, there is no doubt that refusal to sell this one item—the Maverick—to Saudi Arabia can only be regarded by the Saudi Government as a discriminatory act.

I have sought to be candid with the committee about the repercussions upon our relationship with Saudi Arabia and on our national interests that we believe could flow from a decision to deny this request.

We must ask ourselves whether we wish—whether, indeed, it is justified in any way—to give a signal to an old friend which would seem to repudiate the trust and confidence it has long placed in the United States as the main supporter of its national security.

Today our relations with Saudi Arabia rest on hard-won mutual confidence. Our relationship has been reflected in cooperation, not confrontation. But in prudence we must not take Saudi good will for granted. The Administration is deeply concerned that blocking the Maverick sale will do serious damage to a relationship which over the years has produced major dividends for the United States and could have over time the most serious political and economic repercussions for our own national interests.

## Department Reviews Recent Trends in India

*Following is a statement by Adolph Dubois, Deputy Assistant Secretary for Near Eastern and South Asian Affairs, made before the Subcommittee on International Organization of the House Committee on International Relations on September 23.<sup>1</sup>*

It is our understanding that the committee is interested in a discussion of U.S. economic assistance, both multilateral and bilateral, to India and a review of developments there over the past year. My colleague Arthur Gardiner from AID [Agency for International Development] is prepared to speak directly on the subject of economic assistance. With your permission, Mr. Chairman, I would like to provide background to his remarks by sketching out the main Indian internal trends since the proclamation of the emergency.

<sup>1</sup>The complete transcript of the hearings will be published by the committee and will be available from the Superintendent of Documents, U.S. Government Printing Office, Washington, D.C. 20402.



June 26, 1975, and by saying a few words about the state of Indo-U.S. relations.

India is the world's second most populous country, a nation with over 600 million people which, in its 29 years of independence, has been trying to cope with massive developmental problems. The high rate of illiteracy, currently estimated at 70 percent, the approximately \$120 per capita annual income, and the country's 14 official languages and regional diversity point up the magnitude of the problems and the complexity of dealing with these problems in a country whose population exceeds that of Latin America and Africa combined.

In the South Asian region our primary concerns have been the promotion of regional stability and the normalization of relations between the nations of the subcontinent and the avoidance of interference by outside powers. We hope that the governments of the region can focus their main attention on their massive human and social development problems.

In keeping with American concerns for the developing world, we hold a longstanding interest in the economic progress of the countries of South Asia and over the years have provided substantial economic assistance to India. We have no security assistance with India except for a small MAP [military assistance program] training program under which six officers attended U.S. service schools in fiscal year 1975 and 17 in fiscal year 1976.

India has been dominated since independence by the Congress Party. In June 1975 the President of India, acting on the advice of the Prime Minister, invoked article 352 of the Indian Constitution to declare a national emergency on the grounds that the security of India was threatened by internal disturbance. The proclamation gave the central government broad powers to take executive action and other emergency measures that restrict the fundamental rights provided under article 19 of the Indian Constitution.

In justifying the emergency, the Indian Government stated that elements of the

political opposition were creating a situation that threatened the security of the state. In particular, the government cited the call by opposition leader J. P. Narayan for the police and the military to disobey orders as well as the effort for a nationwide strike and other measures designed to paralyze the functioning of the Administration.

The government, using emergency powers, arrested a substantial number of political opponents. The Indian Home Minister has suggested publicly that about 12,000-14,000 such persons may currently be detained. It is our understanding that among those currently detained are 30 members of the Indian Parliament. In accordance with the Maintenance of Internal Security Act, which has just been extended by Parliament to June 1977, individuals detained under the emergency do not have recourse to the judiciary and the government need not file specific charges.

India also imposed press censorship and postponed national elections which would normally have been held by March 1976. Both of these measures were later approved by Parliament. In the case of the press, Parliament has enacted legislation which provides for certain curbs to continue after the emergency is lifted. However, press curbs on foreign newsmen were recently removed.

The government has stated on a number of occasions that the emergency is a temporary measure but has not, so far, indicated when it will be lifted. Some political prisoners, including opposition leader J. P. Narayan, have been released from jail, but many remain under detention. The major opposition parties have continued to function, although a number of smaller groups, which the government branded as communal, terrorist, or antinational, were banned last year.

Economically, the situation in India has improved in the past year and a half after an extended period of stagnation. The government announced a 20-point program which included a variety of measures such

as abolition of bonded labor and implementation of land reform. The government in 1976 also announced a national population program signaling a far more serious intent to come to grips with what observers have long felt is India's major economic problem—the need to control its burgeoning population.

Following an excellent summer and winter harvest, food production in 1975–76 has reached an alltime record of an estimated 115–117 million tons. Industrial production, after a period of poor performance, has also increased. Especially noteworthy has been a drastic reduction in the rate of inflation, which was running close to 30 percent and during the past year was down to zero.

An excellent monsoon explains much of the improvement. Since agriculture represents 45 percent of India's gross national product, the rains continue to have a major impact on overall Indian economic performance.

In India's external relations there have been signs of a strengthened trend toward regional stability and indications of interest in more balanced relations than previously was the case with major external powers.

In South Asia, India and Pakistan have made significant progress toward normalization of relations. Diplomatic relations were resumed in July 1976 for the first time since 1971, and rail and air links were restored at the same time after a rupture of 11 years.

Relations between India and Bangladesh have recently been less satisfactory, and the Bangladeshis have taken the dispute over the Farakka Barrage to the United Nations. However, here, too, the situation is not without hope. Both countries have affirmed their desire for a peaceful and mutually satisfactory resolution of outstanding problems.

India has signaled an interest in reduced tensions with the People's Republic of China by sending an Ambassador to Peking for the first time since the 1962 border

war. China has reciprocated, and the new Chinese envoy arrived in Delhi just a few days ago.

Our own relations with India have been relatively stable in recent months, with fewer ups and downs than a year or so ago. There have been recent signs of Indian interest in further improvements. The September 20 New York Times interview by the Indian Ambassador-designate, Kewal Singh, reflects this upbeat mood. Our own attitude toward India remains basically unchanged. As we have stated on many occasions:

—We regard India as an important country whose stability and viability will have a major impact on the peace and stability of Asia.

—We believe that stable and productive relations between our two countries, on the basis of mutual respect and reciprocity, serve our national interest.

—We recognize that, given our differing geographic positions and historical experiences, working out a "mature relationship" will take time; but this remains a goal worth pursuing.

With regard to the human rights situation in India, the President and the Secretary of State have made clear our preference for democratic norms in India as elsewhere. This Administration is also on the record in making clear that the promotion, respect, and observance of basic human rights in all countries is an important foreign policy objective of the United States. We do not condone repressive measures taken by other governments against their citizens or others. We have remained circumspect in official comment on specific facets of the situation in India.

In realistic terms, we have limited influence with India. Since a principal complaint on our part about the Indian conduct toward the United States has been the tendency, although not recently, of the Indian Government to address problems through public polemic, it would seem inappropriate for us to pursue the very



course which we have asked the Indians not to follow.

I know you will have specific questions on the situation in India, and I will be happy to answer these as fully and frankly as I can.

## **President Tolbert of Liberia Visits the United States**

*President William R. Tolbert of the Republic of Liberia made a state visit to the United States September 20–26. While in Washington September 21–24, he met with President Ford and other government officials and addressed a joint meeting of the Congress. Following are remarks by President Ford and President Tolbert made at a welcoming ceremony on the South Lawn at the White House on September 21.<sup>1</sup>*

Weekly Compilation of Presidential Documents dated Sept. 27

### **PRESIDENT FORD**

President Tolbert, Mrs. Tolbert, ladies and gentlemen: I am particularly pleased to welcome back to Washington a distinguished friend of the United States of America. President Tolbert, your state visit is the first by an African leader in our third century of American history. We are proud and honored to have the red, white, and blue of Liberia fly side by side with our own colors.

Americans and Liberians share a very unique and special relationship. Both countries were founded by men and women who deeply believe in liberty and justice. The Liberian national motto, "The love of liberty brought us here," could apply just as well to the United States of America.

<sup>1</sup> For an exchange of toasts between President Ford and President Tolbert at a White House dinner on Sept. 21, see Weekly Compilation of Presidential Documents dated Sept. 27, 1976, p. 1362; for President Tolbert's address before a joint meeting of the Congress, see Congressional Record of Sept. 23, 1976, p. H 10951.

You have arrived here at a time when Americans are seeking to assist Africans to achieve peaceful solutions to extremely difficult problems. I have sent our Secretary of State to Africa, in full knowledge of the complexity of the problems and of the limitations of our role. Any realistic and enduring settlement must be made in Africa. We can only offer our assistance in encouraging the parties to negotiate to prevent increased violence and bloodshed.

Mr. President, as a distinguished African statesman, you are fully aware of the danger and the challenge that faces all men and women of good will in the southern portion of your continent. We greatly appreciate and value your wise counsel, your moderation, and your support. We assure you that the United States will remain a trusted friend, worthy of your confidence and that of all Liberians and all the peoples of Africa.

Americans have noted with admiration the determination [with] which Liberia is developing its potentialities. We will continue to help Liberia help herself.

As President of Liberia, you have contributed much to the material and spiritual evolution of your people. But you have also given yourself internationally as an ordained Baptist minister, through your leadership of the Baptist World Alliance. As the first black elected president of the Baptist World Alliance, you have advanced the vision of President Tubman [William V. S. Tubman, President of Liberia 1944–71] through your inspired work for the benefit of man and the glory of God.

We thank you and all the people of Liberia not only for your visit, but for Liberia's many manifestations of friendship in this Bicentennial Year. I was especially gratified to know of your personal participation, Mr. President, in our Fourth of July celebration in Monrovia.

Mr. President, you are a welcome visitor to the nation's capital and to the White House. I look forward to our discussions. Through these exchanges, we can advance

the cause of peaceful progress for Africa and for all humanity. The American people join in welcoming you and strengthening, during this visit, the very close ties between our two peoples.

#### **PRESIDENT TOLBERT**

Mr. President, Mrs. Ford, distinguished ladies and gentlemen, friends: We are profoundly touched by your thrillingly warm remarks of welcome, Mr. President, extended to Mrs. Tolbert, members of my official party, and to me, at the commencement of our visit to your great nation on this most historic and significant occasion.

We are gratified that you have paid my country—and Africa—the signal honor of this unique invitation to share with you, and all citizens of America at the captivating joys of your historic Bicentennial celebrations. Impressed as we are by your exhilaratingly warm reception of us, we sincerely ask, in turn, that you accept of us, Mr. President, our heartfelt appreciation and gratitude.

As we enthusiastically rejoice with you in the Spirit of '76, we salute you and all the great people of the United States of America and extend our hearty congratulations as you enter upon your third century of dynamic and inspiring nationhood.

The microcosm of the whole world, America has illuminated the limitless potentials of the human family when it is free to think, free to decide, and free to act. America is a viable land of spectacular and expanding opportunity. The model of resiliency and renewal, America is an historic land where challenges are pursued with courage and with skill. A mosaic of devotion and resolve, the American people are

admired for their ingenious quests, for excellence in science and statecraft, in industry and enterprise.

America is indeed a creative land of surging patriotism and surging proficiency. With her towering stature and commanding influence in the comity of nations, she has defended and expanded democracy around the world, fostering integrity, spawning opportunities, and endeavoring to sever the scourge of injustice and indignity from the noble family of mankind.

The Liberian nation and people are proud to have traditionally enjoyed with you, Mr. President, and the great American people, a unique and special friendship during the span of our 130 years of independence. We have drawn exceptional inspiration from your unrelenting and outstanding leadership in the world for genuine understanding and productive cooperation, and we embrace the fervent hope that America's innovative initiative will be clearly evident in man's continuing search for peace and in the struggle against poverty, exploitation, suppression, oppression, injustice, and human indignity.

It is indeed our deepest wish, Mr. President, that the essence of the Spirit of '76 will enrich the living conditions of our one world so that all God's children may obtain a better quality of life in a framework of equality, of vibrant opportunity, and of social justice.

We ask that you be so kind as to accept from the government and people of Liberia, and in our own name, Mr. President, our fondest wishes for unprecedented heights of happiness and achievement for the enterprising, most industrious and illustrious nation and people of the United States of America.

Thank you.



## Agricultural Trade and Commodity Arrangements

*Address by Julius L. Katz*

*Assistant Secretary for Economic and Business Affairs*<sup>1</sup>

I am pleased to participate in this symposium on free markets sponsored by the Chicago Board of Trade. No principle has been more important to our nation's development and to the elaboration of our foreign economic policy than the concept of free markets. It is appropriate that we should review the role that markets continue to play in our national economic life.

I have been asked to address the question of government policies and free international agricultural markets. It is my intention to approach this topic by discussing our market-oriented agricultural policies, our attempts to reduce barriers to agricultural trade, and our general commodity policy. I then propose to examine the relationship of these approaches to two current sets of issues affecting agricultural trade: Grain reserves discussions and the multilateral trade talks, and the UNCTAD [United Nations Conference on Trade and Development] "common fund" proposal.

For the past decade the United States has been moving toward a more market-oriented agricultural policy which permits farmers to obtain maximum returns from their land. The shift in farm policy, from supply management techniques to a market-oriented approach, is embodied in the Agriculture and Consumer Protection Act of 1973, the basic farm legislation of the nation.

During the period of transition, the

United States enjoyed unprecedented success in world markets. By dismantling the decades-old system of production restraints, the United States has been able to serve the growing foreign demand for U.S. agricultural output and at the same time provide ample supplies for American consumers. The response of U.S. farmers in producing the extra food and fiber needed by the world has demonstrated again the powerful incentive to production that free markets can provide.

The success of our market-oriented agricultural policy at home depends critically on substantially increased foreign demand for agricultural products. Growing foreign markets, although not accounting for all the increased demand for U.S. farm products, have been the most dramatic and best publicized factor in our success.

U.S. Government support of efforts to reduce barriers to trade, including those that restrict exports of agricultural products, is one of the oldest themes of U.S. foreign economic policy.

As early as 1934 the United States, under the authority of the Reciprocal Trade Agreements Act, sought to negotiate mutual reductions in trade barriers.

After World War II the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade established a framework for further liberalization of trade among the world's trading nations.

In subsequent rounds of tariff negotiations held during the postwar years, much progress has been achieved in reducing the level of tariff protection, particularly in

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<sup>1</sup> Made before the Chicago Board of Trade on Sept. 24.

industrial goods. Progress in lowering barriers to agricultural trade has been much slower, although the United States did obtain some benefit for its farm sector during this period. The European Community's duty-free binding on soybeans, negotiated during the Dillon round, is probably the most important concession the United States received in this area.

U.S. support for efforts to reduce barriers to trade over the last 40 years stems from our belief that freer trade and markets are the best means to build the international economy. Unfettered markets allow producers to maximize the return from their assets, encourage a rational allocation of investment over the long run, and increase consumer choice at lower prices.

### **International Action on Specific Commodities**

Our support of market-oriented policies is also evident in the commodity field, where our fundamental objective is to allow international markets to operate as fully and freely as possible with a minimum of restrictions on the flow of goods, services, capital, and technology across international borders.

We know of course that international commodity markets do not always operate perfectly. Markets are subject to a variety of restrictions, and the degree of competition varies from commodity to commodity. Moreover, some commodities are subject to severe and volatile price swings which actually operate in some instances to destabilize rather than stabilize the process of rational decisionmaking by those involved in investment, production, and consumption. Producers of such commodities are subject to sudden and unpredictable changes in incomes, while consumers have to cope with sudden and unpredictable changes in prices.

Many countries believe that commodity agreements designed not only to stabilize prices but to raise them, and thereby transfer resources from the developed consum-

ing countries to the developing producing countries, can provide generally applicable across-the-board answers to all commodity problems. This approach is based on several fundamental misconceptions. First, more than 70 percent of non-fuel commodities are produced by developed rather than developing countries; thus the net effect of an across-the-board price rise would be to penalize the developing countries, not to assist them.

More importantly, we have strong reason to question the feasibility of arbitrary pricing without regard to basic market trends. While prices for particular commodities can be maintained at fixed levels for certain periods of time at high cost, such a policy over time will cause misallocation of investment and distortion of consumption patterns. Uneconomically high prices encourage unneeded production and discourage needed consumption, and someone pays for this inefficiency through support of stocks and/or price supports until the system finally breaks down.

Our own approach begins with a strong preference for arrangements which will improve the functioning of markets and will avoid, whenever possible, resort to restrictionist approaches. It combines this with a recognition that the problems of and solutions for each commodity are different.

For some commodities, the problem is chiefly one of excessive restrictions on the free flow in international trade of that commodity or processed versions of it. For others it is a problem of instability of returns to producers, which can best be handled through compensatory financing measures such as that already existing within the International Monetary Fund.

For some commodities, efforts at price stabilization around longer term market trends may be desirable. The means for achieving such improved price stabilization can vary from simple improvements in exchange of market information to formal international agreements, which may in-



clude provision for buffer stocks, such as the tin agreement, or standby export quotas, such as the coffee agreement.

In this context, I would like to emphasize the commitment the United States has undertaken internationally to examine commodity problems on a case-by-case basis in international forums. We are committed, and rightly so, to the idea of improved cooperation between producers and consumers with respect to commodities which are traded internationally. We have pledged ourselves to assure that an adequate and effective means of communication, in the form of producer-consumer groups, exists for all major internationally traded commodities.

The fact that the United States is not only willing but committed in a positive sense to establishing and making such groups work effectively does not in any way undermine the basis on which we enter into such international discussions. Our aim is to make the international markets for commodities work better—in the negative sense of opposing any arrangements which would undermine their effectiveness and in the positive sense of promoting measures which will further strengthen these markets.

### **Grain Reserves and the Trade Talks**

I would like now to comment briefly on two sets of current issues directly affecting agricultural markets. The first involves the grain reserves discussions in the International Wheat Council and the multilateral trade negotiations in Geneva. The other issue involves UNCTAD's proposal for a common fund.

The central element of world agricultural markets is grain. Over the past several years, after a generation of relative calm, we have experienced conditions of perhaps unprecedented change and uncertainty. Fortunately, the producer response to these conditions has been positive and dynamic. Thanks largely to the reaction on the part of American farmers, the world

weathered the food crisis of the early 1970's. But the question is: What lies ahead? It would be well to recall the disruptions we have experienced—inflation, the adverse impact on livestock producers and consumers, and export interruptions—and think about how we should regard the future.

We have undertaken several steps to avoid recurrence of some of these problems. We have increased our levels of food aid to provide more effective assistance to those poorest nations who suffer the most in times of short supply. We have negotiated a long-term arrangement that will moderate the disruptive impact of the Soviet Union in world markets.

Last year the United States made an attempt to address the problems of world food security in a comprehensive manner. In the forum of the International Wheat Council in London, the United States proposed the negotiation of a new international arrangement on world grains—an arrangement centered on the establishment of an international system of national reserves that would provide food security in time of disruptive shortfalls in grain production and also provide for an equitable sharing of the burden and responsibility for carrying those reserves when production is normal or in surplus.

Our proposal is still on the table and in fact is being discussed in London this week. So far the discussions have not achieved much progress toward a new grains arrangement because of lack of support from other countries and here at home.

Lack of support from other countries is understandable, since they are accustomed to the United States being the residual supplier, carrying the world's grain stocks and bearing the financial cost. Naturally, they like the United States to play this role.

Lack of support at home, however, especially from the farm community has, I believe, been caused in part by a misunderstanding of our proposal. Some have thought, for example, that the U.S. reserves proposal would put the government back

in the grain business, controlling stocks and depressing prices. Government-owned stocks are not a part of the proposal and in fact were carefully avoided in its preparation.

The essential issue with respect to our reserves proposal was, and is, not whether reserves will exist, but how reserves will be distributed in the world.

American farmers came into this crop year carrying stocks of 600 million bushels of wheat. The U.S. Department of Agriculture forecasts that they will carry out 900 million bushels. Two or three years of this kind of experience will inevitably drive land out of production and raise the possibility that a serious production shortfall in one or a group of countries could throw world grain markets once again into a crisis situation.

The U.S. reserves proposal is an attempt to provide some insurance against such an occurrence, insurance for which we would not be the only one paying the premium but for which there would be reasonable burden-sharing among all participating countries, exporters and importers alike.

The results of work in London toward a new grains arrangement could well be the foundation for the efforts of the negotiators in Geneva working to liberalize further the international trading system.

This latest round of trade talks, the multilateral trade negotiations, differs from its predecessors in important respects.

First, the success of previous negotiations in reducing tariffs has made relatively more important such nontariff barriers to trade as standards, subsidies, and variable levies.

Second, the trading nations have agreed to give certain less developed countries (LDC's) special and differential treatment during this round. This approach, in some respects, marks a departure from the policy of equal treatment that had prevailed during the last 30 years.

Finally, the United States has insisted that agriculture fully share in the fruits of trade agreements negotiated during the multilateral trade negotiations. We believe

agriculture, in which the United States has a demonstrated comparative advantage, could benefit significantly from the achievement of our negotiating objectives in agriculture for greater access to foreign markets and measures to deal with export subsidies.

### **UNCTAD's Common Fund**

Another international activity with possibly important implications for free agricultural markets is the so-called common fund scheme recently proposed by the United Nations Conference on Trade and Development and on which negotiations will begin shortly.

The objective of such a fund would be to improve LDC earnings from commodities by at least stabilizing commodity prices around a long-term trend, but preferably by raising commodity prices to levels higher than they would otherwise be. The primary device to achieve this objective would be the creation of buffer stocks for individual commodities. Buffer stocks would be established for at least 10 "core" commodities representing roughly three-quarters of the value of agricultural and mineral commodity exports by less developed countries, according to UNCTAD.

The fund is estimated at \$6 billion, with \$2 billion paid in by governments and the balance to be raised by borrowing. Under the UNCTAD Secretariat's various formulas for financing, the U.S. share would be from 8 to 11 percent, or about \$200 million.

The proposal for a common fund has become a major objective for many less developed countries. Many of the developing countries have made it a yardstick by which progress in the dialogue between the developed and developing worlds is to be measured.

The United States has serious objections to the common fund approach, which is based on serious misconceptions: (1) that price is, in itself, a generally feasible and desirable measure to improve the export earnings of less developed countries; and



(2) that the chief obstacle to the establishment of buffer stocks is the lack of money.

As I indicated earlier, price fluctuation is only one aspect of the commodities problem. The costs and benefits of price measures must be assessed in the broader context of problems of each commodity, including diversification, market promotion, vulnerability to substitutes, and other aspects. Even in those cases where price stabilization is desirable, the obstacles to buffer stocks are not financial as much as:

—The lack of agreement by exporters and importers on price objectives;

—The unworkability in many cases of buffer schemes because of perishability, cost of storage, or competition from substitutes; and

—The ineffectiveness of some of the market improvement proposals for a number of commodities.

We continue to believe that we should rely to the greatest extent possible on freely operating markets to facilitate the flow of goods between producers and consumers and to deal with serious problems in ways that will expand, rather than restrict, trade. Our fundamental consideration in evaluating proposals for any specific commodity arrangement will continue to be whether it would contribute to improvement in the functioning of the market for that commodity.

In addition to considering buffer stocks and their financing, we will also continue to emphasize (1) adequate investment in resource development to meet market demand in the decades ahead; (2) improvement of market access for the processed goods of developing countries; (3) security of supply for consumers; and (4) stable growth for the commodity export earnings of the developing countries.

It is clear that we are involved in a phase of intensive international discussions on a range of matters which could directly affect the operation of international markets. Such issues have come to the fore as the world economy has become increas-

ingly interdependent and as new voices have been heard on the world scene seeking international solutions to economic problems.

We enter these discussions prepared to explore all suggested approaches fully and with an open mind. It remains our basic premise and conviction, however, that fully functioning markets are the preferred model since they are the most efficient allocators of investment, production, and consumption.

## **U.S. and Peru Reach Agreement on Marcona Mining Co. Issue**

### *Department Announcement*<sup>1</sup>

The United States has reached agreement with the Government of Peru on compensation for the assets of the Marcona Mining Company that were nationalized in July 1975. A long and complicated problem has thus been resolved to the satisfaction of all concerned.

The settlement consists of a cash payment to Marcona and a contract for sales of Peruvian iron ore in the United States that will increase Peru's foreign exchange earnings and provide Marcona with additional compensation. The aggregate value of this settlement constitutes just compensation under international law and within the meaning of the laws of both the United States and Peru.

Full details of the settlement are contained in an intergovernmental agreement, which will be made public as soon as it is approved by the Peruvian Cabinet. In substance, the compensation consists of \$37 million in cash and an ore sales contract at prices the Government of Peru estimates will provide Marcona an additional compensation of \$22.44 million but which, depending on market conditions, may ultimately produce more or less compensation than the valuation amount. Finally, Mar-

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<sup>1</sup> Issued on Sept. 23.

cona will receive approximately \$2 million in compensation from a previously concluded shipping contract.

This agreement will have a broad and positive impact. It removes an obstacle to the constructive relations to which both governments are committed. Because it demonstrates that fair and equitable treatment for foreign capital can be assured within the Peruvian revolutionary process, the settlement constitutes a point of departure for increased private as well as public cooperation and practical progress on a wide variety of fronts.

This agreement marks the successful conclusion of painstaking negotiations that required imaginative effort on both sides.

The United States was represented by an interagency team headed by former Under Secretary of State Carlyle E. Maw acting as Special Representative of President Ford.

## **President Issues Policy Statement on International Air Transportation**

*Statement by President Ford*<sup>1</sup>

International aviation is essential in a world that has become economically interdependent. Historically, the United States has had a leadership role in the development of international air transportation and intends to continue that role.

Aviation is an essential part of the foreign commerce of the United States. It is required for mail, high priority cargo, government, business, and urgent personal travel. A desirable low-cost means of international pleasure travel, aviation helps

bring the people of many cultures and nationalities together, creating a greater sense of friendship and mutual understanding.

The United States seeks an international economic environment and air transportation structure conducive to healthy competition among all air carriers. We shall rely upon competitive market forces to the greatest extent feasible, for it is a basic tenet of our economic philosophy that marketplace competition provides improved services and permits the well managed carrier to earn a profit while lowering total costs. At the same time, we recognize that other nations may differ in their view as to how such transportation should be organized and operated. We shall work through appropriate bilateral and multilateral forums to bring about constructive change for the benefit of air travelers, shippers, and carriers of all nations.

The international air carrier industry should continue to have the primary responsibility for adapting its air transport product to public demand. Regulatory regimes imposed by governments should not stifle the industry's flexibility to respond to this demand, nor should they remove incentives to keep costs low.

The Economic Policy Board Task Force on International Air Transportation Policy, chaired by the Departments of Transportation and State, has recommended a comprehensive statement of United States policy. The statement sets forth the objectives the United States will seek in negotiations with other nations. It also calls for balanced revisions of certain regulatory policies of the Civil Aeronautics Board.

I am approving this statement of international air transportation policy to supersede the one issued June 22, 1970, and am directing that this new statement of policy guidance be used henceforth by officials of the Government in dealing with international aviation matters.

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<sup>1</sup> Issued on Sept. 8 (text from White House press release); also printed in the 32-page policy statement entitled "International Air Transportation Policy of the United States," which is available from the Office of Public Affairs (S-80), Department of Transportation, Washington, D.C. 20590.



## Department Summarizes Programs and Objectives in International Narcotics Control

*Statement by Deputy Secretary Charles W. Robinson<sup>1</sup>*

I am pleased to appear before you today to discuss the activities of the Department of State in narcotics control. This is the first time the Department of State has testified before this newly created select committee; and I wish to take the occasion to congratulate you, Mr. Chairman [Representative Lester L. Wolff], and all of the members of the committee on your selection for this important assignment. We look forward to working with you in the period ahead as we all strive to make our drug abuse control efforts more effective.

Drug abuse reached dramatic proportions in the United States during the last decade. Because much of the narcotics abused in the United States came from abroad, curtailing the illegal flow into the United States became a high-priority foreign relations issue. In 1971, the Department of State was given the leadership role in developing and coordinating an international drug control program. For this purpose, the President created the Cabinet Committee on International Narcotics Control, chaired by the Secretary of State. An organization chart of the committee is submitted for the record.

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<sup>1</sup> Made before the House Select Committee on Narcotics Abuse and Control on Sept. 27. The complete transcript of the hearings will be published by the committee and will be available from the Superintendent of Documents, U.S. Government Printing Office, Washington, D.C. 20402.

Under this Cabinet Committee, plans were developed to obtain cooperation from foreign governments. Working through our Embassies, narcotics control action programs were prepared for the principal countries involved in illicit production and trafficking. These programs have been under continuing review. Their major emphasis has been on law enforcement cooperation and exchange of narcotics intelligence, building foreign institutions for narcotics control, and control or eradication of crops producing these drugs. Opium and opiates, particularly heroin, and cocaine have been the main objects of our international program.

Our diplomatic initiatives have been supported by international narcotics control funds appropriated in the Foreign Assistance Act but administered by the Department of State with the advice and assistance of the agencies in the Cabinet Committee structure.

Such expenditures, which have amounted to \$147 million over the past five years, have been used to furnish training and equipment to build up the law enforcement capability of foreign governments, to assist them in controlling or eradicating narcotics-producing crops, and to support the U.N. narcotics control structure. The principal funded projects have been in Turkey, Mexico, Thailand, and Burma. A country

breakdown of our control program funds for fiscal years 1975-77 is also submitted for the record.

In addition, there has been a significant buildup in U.S. enforcement liaison personnel stationed abroad. There are 287 Drug Enforcement Administration personnel now assigned to our Embassies and consulates to work with foreign enforcement officers. They numbered 91 in 1971. Moreover, we have a Foreign Service officer serving as Narcotics Coordinator in each of our Embassies playing a role in this field, and there are AID [Agency for International Development] technicians helping with our major programs.

Drug abuse in the United States, after improving from 1972 to 1973, took a turn for the worse early in 1974. This deterioration led the President to ask the Domestic Council to establish a task force to review the overall effort and recommend ways to make the Federal drug abuse program more effective. The resulting "White Paper on Drug Abuse" underscored the increasing availability and use of illicit drugs and estimated the social cost of drug abuse at \$17 billion a year.

The international narcotics control program is an essential part of the national strategy called for in the white paper. As long as demand continues high in the United States, traffickers will make every effort to find sources of drugs to supply that demand. However, we have seen that lowered availability results in reduced addiction rates. Therefore we endeavor to reduce supply.

We are informed that customs and police efforts here and abroad are quite successful if they seize 10 to 20 percent of the drugs that are flowing in the illicit trade. Thus the only way to achieve sharply higher percentages of supply reduction is to control or eradicate the crops that produce these drugs. The international program is charged with this extraordinarily

difficult task. Obviously, success requires high levels of cooperation from foreign governments.

#### **Narcotics Control Assistance to Mexico**

The principal challenge today is, as it was five years ago, the flow of heroin into our country. But the primary source has changed. Prior to 1972 most of the heroin smuggled into the United States came from Turkish opium which had escaped that government's controls. It was processed into heroin in France and smuggled into our country in a trade which became known as the "French connection." The French connection was neutralized following the Turkish Government ban on opium poppy cultivation and highly effective cooperative enforcement actions of the French authorities. Unfortunately, however, Mexico then emerged as the most important source of heroin on the U.S. market, according to seizure data.

Mexico is therefore our first-priority country program. For fiscal year 1976, which includes an additional interim quarter, our narcotics control assistance to Mexico amounted to \$14.5 million, or 30 percent of the total program. An additional \$11 million for Mexico is programed for fiscal year 1977.

This assistance has been mainly aircraft and related technical assistance. The Mexican Government is pursuing a very vigorous program in poppy crop destruction. It is also attempting to interdict illicit trafficking.

A year ago the Mexican Government decided to move from the manual destruction of poppy plants to spraying them with herbicides by helicopters. Over 20,000 fields were sprayed and destroyed earlier this year, virtually all of those then planted to poppy. However, a number of the fields had unfortunately been harvested before they were destroyed, and we can assume that most of them were replanted soon



after destruction. Therefore, lasting effectiveness of the eradication program will require continuation of the efforts by the Mexican Government. We can take heart in the stated intention of President-elect Lopez Portillo to continue with the eradication program.

### **Programs in Burma and Thailand**

With the prospect that the Mexican source of heroin may be brought under control, we are increasingly concerned that traffickers will turn to other sources of opium, such as Burma, Thailand, Pakistan, and Afghanistan. We are stepping up our efforts to help these governments reduce illegal opium production and trafficking there.

Burma produces the largest quantity of illicit opium in the world, estimated at 450 tons per year. Two years ago, the Burmese Government began a campaign to crack down on opium production and trafficking. To do the job, it needed helicopters to support raids on illegal poppy fields and heroin laboratories located in areas not under its full control.

With the arrival of six U.S.-supplied helicopters in late summer of 1975, the Burmese authorities began mounting major operations against narcotics refinery sites, drug caravans, and trafficking organizations. During the 1975-76 growing season, they seized and destroyed 17 major heroin laboratories, intercepted nine large drug caravans, and destroyed 18,000 acres of opium poppies. These efforts reduced significantly the amount of heroin that would have been available that year for export from Burma.

For fiscal year 1976, we programmed 12 additional helicopters for Burma to augment its capabilities. Six of these have been delivered, and the final six are scheduled for delivery by the end of calendar year 1976. Our narcotics control expendi-

tures for Burma for fiscal year 1976 were \$13.3 million. Our fiscal year 1977 request is for \$3.6 million, essentially to maintain the current program.

Despite the successes in Burma, we recognize that virtually all the growing areas are outside of government control and that sizable levels of production are likely to continue for years to come. Such supplies will remain a potential source for trafficking destined for the United States, especially if our other sources are diminished.

In Thailand, the great majority of illicit opium is discovered while it is in transit from Burma to the international markets. Several important steps were taken in various narcotics-related areas during the past year. Thai customs, aided by a U.S. customs advisory team, has increased narcotics seizures at Bangkok International Airport. Specially trained narcotics-sensor dogs also began checking outgoing luggage. In the port area, the newly organized customs narcotics unit made its first drug seizures on ships departing the harbor.

While such efforts are all to the good, we should like to see a more successful and determined Thai program to disrupt the flow of narcotics through Thailand. We have discussed this matter with the Thai Government and have received assurances of increased activity.

### **Pakistan and Afghanistan**

In Pakistan about 150 tons of illicit opium are produced annually in areas either not under government control or where the local economy has dependence upon opium production. With U.N. and U.S. assistance, the Pakistan authorities are undertaking studies and pilot projects designed to provide alternative sources of income for the traditional growers of opium. We are also providing transportation and communications equipment to help the Government of Pakistan establish a

network of 25 field investigation units at strategic points throughout the country to concentrate on the interdiction of illicit opium traffic.

Progress is not as rapid as we would like to see with respect to both the income replacement project and the establishment of the investigation units, and we recently brought our concern to the attention of the Government of Pakistan. The Pakistan Government has stated that these programs will be moved ahead as rapidly as possible.

About 150 tons of opium are also illicitly produced in uncontrolled areas in Afghanistan. There is a U.N. program supporting police narcotics control efforts, and the Government of Afghanistan is seeking a program to provide alternative sources of income to its farmers. Afghanistan is a non-aligned country and wants all international narcotics assistance channeled through the United Nations.

#### **Colombia, Peru, and Bolivia**

Recently, new possibilities have opened for us to deal with the flow of cocaine to the United States. Much of the cocaine smuggled into our country is refined in Colombia from coca paste produced from coca plants grown in Peru and Bolivia.

In June 1976, President Banzer of Bolivia and Secretary Kissinger met and laid the groundwork for an expanded action program directed at coca.

We then sought and obtained President Ford's approval of a program which provides funding over a five-year period of up to \$45 million of AID concessional loan funds for agricultural assistance to poor farmers in the coca-growing areas, if the two governments can develop promising projects and programs leading to effective control of coca production. We wish eventually to see production reduced to approximately the levels required by the traditional chewers among the population of the high Andes and for the small legal require-

ment for coca flavoring. The program also calls for up to \$8 million in additional narcotics control funds to strengthen enforcement.

We have a request from Peru for a similar program.

In September 1975, President Lopez of Colombia and President Ford discussed the increasing cocaine problem. Subsequently, the President directed that we expand our assistance to the Colombian efforts to interdict cocaine traffic destined for the United States.

#### **Importance of U.N. Fund**

A few comments on Turkey. The Turkish Government rescinded its ban on opium poppy cultivation in 1974. However, with assistance and technical advice from the U.N. Fund for Drug Abuse Control, the Turkish authorities are thus far effectively controlling their production, which is now in poppy straw form. The role the U.N. Fund played in helping the government attain successful control over the Turkish poppy crop—a control not attained before—underscores the importance to U.S. national interests of the U.N. Fund.

Since its inception we have provided about 80 percent of the financial contributions the Fund has received. We are hopeful that other nations will see it in their interest to give stronger support in the future to the Fund. Nevertheless it remains important to us to be sure the Fund has the resources necessary to meet assistance requests, particularly in cases where narcotics likely to come to the United States can thereby be controlled.

#### **Convention on Psychotropic Substances**

Mr. Chairman, we are greatly interested in action by the Congress which would enable U.S. ratification, without much further delay, of the 1971 Convention on Psychotropic Substances. We were the moving force behind the Vienna Conference which



drew up this convention extending controls to the psychotropic substances, the man-made mind-bending drugs, such as amphetamines, barbiturates, and hallucinogens, which were then, and still are, heavily abused. While the convention was sent to the Senate for ratification in mid-1971, that action unfortunately awaits congressional approval of enabling domestic legislation. This delay, we believe, is prejudicial to our national interests.

It would be awkward for us to urge the developing countries to approve increased international controls over opium poppy straw and bracteatum poppy straw—which we would like to do now—while we ourselves have not agreed to parallel controls on the manmade drugs manufactured in the industrialized countries. And in the absence of our ratification, we cannot effectively persuade the other industrial nations to subject their psychotropic substances to international controls. We must, however, as we are victimized by these drugs made abroad and being smuggled into the United States through third countries.

The Cabinet Committee agencies will continue the activities described. They will also pursue coordinated efforts to obtain U.S. jurisdiction over drug traffickers through extradition and expulsion. At the same time, a new program is being implemented to exchange judicial evidence for prosecution abroad in cases where foreign traffickers are more likely to be caught and tried there. Further, increased action will be directed against the financial resources of narcotics traffickers.

This, Mr. Chairman, is an overview of the programs and objectives. We are dealing with a heightening problem of national concern, and I assure you that the Department of State and the other agencies represented on the President's Cabinet Committee on International Narcotics Control will energetically pursue the goal of reducing the flow of drugs of abuse into the United States.

## U.S.-Brazil Science and Technology and Energy Groups Meet at Brasilia

### *Joint Statement*<sup>1</sup>

The first meetings of the U.S.-Brazil Joint Groups on Scientific and Technological Cooperation and Energy Technology were held at Itamaraty, Brasília on September 16 and 17, 1976. The two Joint Groups were established in connection with the understanding concerning consultations on matters of mutual interest reached between the Secretary of State of the United States and the Minister of External Relations of Brazil on February 21, 1976, in Brasília.

Ambassador Frederick Irving, Assistant Secretary of State for Oceans and International Environmental and Scientific Affairs, served as U.S. Cochairman at both meetings. The Brazilian Cochairmen for the meetings on science and technology and on energy were Ambassador Francisco de Assis Grieco and Ambassador Cabral de Mello, respectively.

These Joint Group meetings represent one effort among others by both countries to build upon a tradition of friendship and cooperation, to determine new areas where interests converge, and to forge new ties based on mutual benefit and shared objectives and goals in science, technology, and energy.

The Joint Group on Scientific and Technological Cooperation adopted terms of reference for its future activities, recommended renewing and broadening the 1971 Agreement between the United States and Brazil on Scientific Cooperation to include technological as well as scientific cooperation, and identified new areas with potential for scientific and technological cooperation, including agriculture, scientific and technical information, natural resources,

<sup>1</sup> Issued at Washington and Brasília (text from press release 452 dated September 21).

medical science, basic and applied sciences, and technology.

Both sides agreed to search for mutually acceptable ways and mechanisms for expanding scientific and technological cooperation.

Both delegations agreed on the mutual interest of the two countries in the question of the transfer of technology as well as the importance of cooperation in the context of, and compatible with, ongoing multilateral international activities.

In its discussions, the Joint Group on Energy Technology reviewed national programs in various new energy technologies such as solar power, hydrogen, coal gasification, and bioconversion and identified a number of topics of interest to both countries. The above-mentioned technologies were considered by both sides to hold the highest priority for potential cooperation. The Joint Group decided to exchange visits of experts in solar energy and hydrogen technology in the next two months to discuss possible cooperative projects. Specialists in hydrogen are slated to meet in Brazil in October; a meeting of experts in solar energy technology will take place in the United States in November.

The Joint Groups agreed to meet next in Washington on mutually acceptable dates.

## **U.S. and Republic of China Sign New Fisheries Agreement**

### *Joint Statement*<sup>1</sup>

Representatives of the Governments of the Republic of China and the United States signed on September 15 an agreement relating to fishing activities by the Republic of China off the coasts of the United States, which will come into force after the completion of internal procedures by both governments.

<sup>1</sup> Issued on Sept. 15 (text from press release 436).

The agreement sets out the principles and arrangements which will govern fishing by nationals and vessels of the Republic of China within the fishery conservation zone of the United States beginning March 1, 1977.

The Honorable James C. H. Shen, Ambassador of the Republic of China to the United States, signed for the Republic of China. Ambassador Rozanne L. Ridgway, Deputy Assistant Secretary of State for Oceans and Fisheries Affairs, signed for the United States.

Ambassador Shen and Ambassador Ridgway headed delegations which began negotiating the new agreement in Washington, D.C., September 8. The negotiations, held in an atmosphere of friendship and cooperation, were completed September 10. Both delegations expressed their satisfaction with the new accord.

## **Congressional Documents Relating to Foreign Policy**

### **94th Congress, 2d Session**

Development, Use, and Control of Nuclear Energy for the Common Defense and Security and for Peaceful Purposes. Second annual report to the Congress by the Joint Committee on Atomic Energy pursuant to section 202(b) of the Atomic Energy Act, as amended. H. Rept. 94-1347. July 19, 1976. 197 pp.

Audit of the Saint Lawrence Seaway Development Corporation, Calendar Year 1975. Communication from the Comptroller General of the United States transmitting a report on the audit. H. Doc. 94-568. July 28, 1976. 17 pp.

To Implement the Treaty of Friendship and Cooperation Between the United States and Spain. Markup sessions of the House Committee on International Relations on S. 3557. July 29-August 4, 1976. 22 pp.

Implementation of the Treaty of Friendship and Cooperation Between the United States and Spain. Report of the House Committee on International Relations to accompany H.R. 14940. H. Rept. 94-1393. August 5, 1976. 55 pp.

Tijuana River Flood Control Project. Report of the House Committee on International Relations to accompany H.R. 14973. H. Rept. 94-1399, Part 1. August 9, 1976. 10 pp.



# Current Treaty Actions

## MULTILATERAL

### Health

Amendments to articles 34 and 55 of the constitution of the World Health Organization of July 22, 1946, as amended (TIAS 1808, 4643, 8086). Adopted at Geneva May 22, 1973.<sup>1</sup>

*Notifications of acceptance:* Israel, September 8, 1976; Philippines, September 17, 1976.

### Maritime Matters

Convention on the Intergovernmental Maritime Consultative Organization. Done at Geneva March 6, 1948. Entered into force March 17, 1958. TIAS 4044.

*Acceptances deposited:* Bahrain, September 22, 1976; Gabon, September 28, 1976.

Amendments to the convention of March 6, 1948, as amended, on the Intergovernmental Maritime Consultative Organization (TIAS 4044, 6285, 6490). Adopted at London October 17, 1974.<sup>1</sup>

*Acceptances deposited:* Bahrain, September 22, 1976; Morocco, September 17, 1976.

### Oil Pollution

International convention relating to intervention on the high seas in cases of oil pollution casualties, with annex. Done at Brussels November 29, 1969. Entered into force May 6, 1975. TIAS 8068.

*Ratification deposited:* Finland, September 6, 1976.

### Postal

Second additional protocol to the constitution of the Universal Postal Union of July 10, 1964 (TIAS 5881, 7150), general regulations with final protocol and annex, and the universal postal convention with final protocol and detailed regulations. Done at Lausanne July 5, 1974. Entered into force January 1, 1976. TIAS 8231.

*Ratifications deposited:* Austria, July 29, 1976; Barbados, July 22, 1976; Vatican City State, August 17, 1976.

*Accession deposited:* Maldives, July 22, 1976.

Money orders and postal travellers' checks agreement, with detailed regulations. Done at Lausanne July 5, 1974. Entered into force January 1, 1976. TIAS 8232.

*Ratifications deposited:* Austria, July 29, 1976; Vatican City State, August 17, 1976.

### Slave Trade

Convention to suppress the slave trade and slavery. Concluded at Geneva September 25, 1926. Entered

into force March 9, 1927; for the United States March 21, 1929. TS 778.

*Notification of succession deposited:* Barbados, July 22, 1976.

### Wheat

Protocol modifying and further extending the wheat trade convention (part of the international wheat agreement) 1971 (TIAS 7144, 8227). Done at Washington March 17, 1976. Entered into force June 19, 1976, with respect to certain provisions, and July 1, 1976, with respect to other provisions. *Ratifications deposited:* Switzerland, September 27, 1976; Kenya, September 28, 1976.

Protocol modifying and further extending the food aid convention (part of the international wheat agreement) 1971 (TIAS 7144, 8227). Done at Washington March 17, 1976. Entered into force June 19, 1976, with respect to certain provisions, and July 1, 1976, with respect to other provisions. *Ratification deposited:* Switzerland, September 27, 1976.

## BILATERAL

### Canada

Agreement on mapping, charting and geodesy, with annexes. Signed at Ottawa August 24, 1976. Entered into force August 24, 1976.

### Israel

Agreement for sales of agricultural commodities, relating to the agreement of December 16, 1974 (TIAS 7978). Signed at Washington September 30, 1976. Entered into force September 30, 1976.

### Oman

Agreement relating to investment guaranties. Effected by exchange of notes at Muscat September 9, 1976. Entered into force September 9, 1976.

### Portugal

Loan agreement relating to construction of schools, with annex. Signed at Lisbon August 13, 1976. Entered into force August 13, 1976.

Agreement amending the grant agreement of February 28, 1975, for technical consultations and training. Signed at Lisbon August 13, 1976. Entered into force August 13, 1976.

Loan agreement for basic sanitation, with annex. Signed at Lisbon August 13, 1976. Entered into force August 13, 1976.

### Turkey

Procedures for mutual assistance in the administration of justice in connection with the Lockheed Aircraft Corporation and the McDonnell Douglas Corporation matters. Signed at Washington July 8, 1976. Entered into force July 8, 1976.

<sup>1</sup> Not in force.

## GPO Sales Publications

*Publications may be ordered by catalog or stock number from the Superintendent of Documents, U.S. Government Printing Office, Washington, D.C. 20402. A 25-percent discount is made on orders for 100 or more copies of any one publication mailed to the same address. Remittances, payable to the Superintendent of Documents, must accompany orders. Prices shown below, which include domestic postage, are subject to change.*

**The United States and the Third World.** In the first of a series of discussion papers, the Department of State provides some essential facts and alternative views on issues involving the United States and the Third World. Topics include Third World grievances, development, population, environment, the U.S. AID program, trade, commodities, energy, investments, debts, and multinational corporations. Pub. 8863. General Foreign Policy Series 301. 65 pp. \$1.05. (Cat. No. S1.71:8863).

**The United States and the United Nations.** This Department of State Discussion Paper examines the value of the U.S. role in the United Nations. The focal point for the discussion is the contradictory concepts of great power primacy and sovereign equality and how they relate to recent actions in the General Assembly. Pub. 8875. General Foreign Policy Series 302. 17 pp. 35¢. (Cat. No. S1.71:8875).

**Air Charter Services.** Agreement with France extending the agreement of May 7, 1973, as amended and extended. TIAS 8236. 3 pp. 35¢. (Cat. No. S9.10:8236).

**Reciprocal Fishing Privileges.** Agreement with Canada extending the agreement of June 15, 1973, as extended. TIAS 8251. 6 pp. 35¢. (Cat. No. S9.10:8251).

**Double Taxation—Taxes on Aircraft Earnings.** Agreement with Chile. TIAS 8252. 5 pp. 35¢. (Cat. No. S9.10:8252).

**Fisheries—Shrimp.** Agreement, with agreed minute, with Brazil. TIAS 8253. 38 pp. 50¢. (Cat. No. S9.10:8253).

**Monitoring of the Stratosphere.** Agreement with other governments. TIAS 8255. 16 pp. 35¢. (Cat. No. S9.10:8255).

**Agricultural Commodities.** Agreement with Sri Lanka. TIAS 8256. 12 pp. 35¢. (Cat. No. S9.10:8256).

**Agricultural Commodities.** Agreement with Egypt amending the agreement of October 28, 1975. TIAS 8259. 10 pp. 35¢. (Cat. No. S9.10:8259).

**Agricultural Commodities.** Agreement with the Republic of Korea. TIAS 8261. 24 pp. 45¢. (Cat. No. S9.10:8261).

**Agricultural Commodities.** Agreement with Chile amending the agreement of July 31, 1975. TIAS 8262. 4 pp. 35¢. (Cat. No. S9.10:8262).

### Checklist of Department of State Press Releases: Sept. 27–Oct. 3

Press releases may be obtained from the Office of Press Relations, Department of State, Washington, D.C. 20520.

No.	Date	Subject
*474	9/27	Advisory Committee on International Intellectual Property, International Industrial Property Panel, Nov. 4.
*475	9/28	Davis Eugene Boster sworn in as Ambassador to Guatemala (biographic data).
†476	9/28	Kissinger: NBC-TV "Today" show.
*477	9/28	Regional foreign policy conference, Salt Lake City, Oct. 21.
*478	9/28	Ronald D. Palmer sworn in as Ambassador to Togo (biographic data).
*479	9/28	U.S. mayors to attend Conference on Culture and Urban Development, Munich, Oct. 10–17.
*480	9/29	T. Frank Crigler sworn in as Ambassador to Rwanda (biographic data).
*481	9/29	Foreign specialists to study key U.S. economic sectors, Oct. 11–Nov. 5.
†482	9/29	Kissinger, Chatti: toasts, New York.

*483	9/29	Kissinger: remarks to press prior to meeting with U.N. Secretary General Waldheim.
*484	9/29	Kissinger: questions and answers following meeting.
†485	9/30	Kissinger: U.N. General Assembly.
*486	9/30	Francois Dickman sworn in as Ambassador to United Arab Emirates (biographic data).
*487	10/1	Advisory Committee to U.S. National Section of International Commission for Conservation of Atlantic Tunas, Oct. 27.
*488	10/1	Shipping Coordinating Committee (SCC), Subcommittee on Safety of Life at Sea (SOLAS), working group on ship design and equipment, Oct. 27.
*489	10/1	SCC, SOLAS, working group on ship design and equipment, Oct. 28.
†490	10/1	U.S.-Spanish Council: joint communiqué.
*491	10/1	William C. Bradford sworn in as Ambassador to Chad (biographic data).
†492	10/2	Kissinger: National Conference of Editorial Writers, Hilton Head, S.C.

\* Not printed.

† Held for a later issue of the BULLETIN.



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# THE DEPARTMENT OF STATE BULLETIN

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*The Department of State BULLETIN, a weekly publication issued by the Office of Media Services, Bureau of Public Affairs, provides the public and interested agencies of the government with information on developments in the field of U.S. foreign relations and on the work of the Department and the Foreign Service.*

*The BULLETIN includes selected press releases on foreign policy, issued by the White House and the Department, and statements, addresses and news conferences of the President and the Secretary of State and other officers of the Department, as well as special articles on various phases of international affairs and the functions of the Department. Information included concerning treaties and international agreements to which the United States is or may become a party and on treaties of general international interest.*

*Publications of the Department of State, United Nations documents, and legislative material in the field of international relations are also listed.*



## Toward a New Understanding of Community

*Address by Secretary Kissinger<sup>1</sup>*

Let me first congratulate this body for electing Ambassador [Hamilton Shirley] Amerasinghe of Sri Lanka to preside over this 31st session of the General Assembly. He is a diplomat of great international stature who, among his many distinctions, has provided indispensable leadership to the crucial negotiations on the law of the sea.

I would also like to pay tribute to the Secretary General for his tireless efforts on behalf of the world community. He successfully embodies the charter's principles of fairness, impartiality, and dedication to the causes of global peace and human dignity.

The United Nations was born of the conviction that peace is both indivisible and more than mere stability, that for peace to be lasting it must fulfill mankind's aspirations for justice, freedom, economic well-being, the rule of law, and the promotion of human rights. But the history of this organization has been in considerable measure the gradual awareness that humanity would not inevitably share a single approach to these goals.

The United Nations has survived—and helped to manage—30 years of vast change in the international system. It has come through the bitterness of the cold war. It has played a vital role in the dismantling of the colonial empires. It has helped moderate conflicts and is manning truce lines in critical parts of the world. It has carried

out unprecedented efforts in such areas as public health, development assistance, and technical cooperation.

But the most important challenge of this organization lies still ahead: to vindicate mankind's positive and nobler goals and help nations achieve a new understanding of community.

With modern communications, human endeavor has become a single experience for peoples in every part of the planet. We share the wonders of science and technology, the trials of industrialization and social change, and a constant awareness of the fate and dreams of our fellow men.

The world has shrunk, but the nations of the world have not come closer together. Paradoxically, nationalism has been on the rise at the precise time when the most serious issues we all face can only be resolved through a recognition of our interdependence. The moral and political cohesion of our world may be eroding just when a sense of community has become indispensable.

Fragmentation has affected even this body. Nations have taken decisions on a bloc or regional basis by rigid ideologies, before even listening to the debate in these halls; on many issues positions have been predetermined by prior conferences containing more than half the membership of the United Nations. The tendency is widespread to come here for battle rather than negotiation. If these trends continue, the hope for world community will dissipate and the moral influence of this organization will progressively diminish.

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<sup>1</sup> Made before the 31st United Nations General Assembly on Sept. 30 (text from press release 485).

This would be a tragedy. Members of this organization are today engaged in a multiplicity of endeavors to find just solutions for complex and explosive problems. There is a fragile tranquillity, but beneath the surface it is challenged by fundamental forces of change—technological, economic, social. More than ever this is a time for statecraft and restraint, for persistence but also daring in the pursuit of peace and justice. The dogmas of perpetual strife produce only bloodshed and bitterness; they unleash the forces of destruction and repression and plant the seeds of future conflict. Appeals to hatred—whether on the basis of race or class or color or nationality or ideology—will, in the end, rebound against those who launch them and will not advance the cause of freedom and justice in the world.

Let us never forget that the United Nations benefits the smaller and weaker nations most of all. It is they that would suffer most from its failure. For without the rule of law, disputes would be settled as they have been all too frequently and painfully in history—by test of strength. It is not the weak that will prevail in the world of chaos.

The United States believes that this 31st General Assembly must free itself of the ideological and confrontational tactics that marked some of its predecessors and dedicate itself to a program of common action.

The United States comes to the General Assembly prepared to work on programs of common action. We will offer concrete proposals. We will listen to the ideas of others. We will resist pressure and seek cooperation.

### **The Problem of Peace**

Let me now discuss the three principal challenges we face: the problem of peace, the challenge of economic well-being, and the agenda of global interdependence.

The age of the United Nations has also been an age of frequent conflict. We have been spared a third world war but cannot

assume that this condition will prevail forever, or without exertion. An era of thermonuclear weapons and persistent national rivalries requires our utmost effort to keep at bay the scourge of war. Our generation must build out of the multitude of nations a structure of relations that frees the energies of nations and peoples for the positive endeavors of mankind, without the fear or threat of war.

Central to American foreign policy are our sister democracies—the industrial nations of North America, Western Europe, the southern Pacific and Japan, and our traditional friends in the Western Hemisphere. We are bound to these nations by the ties of history, civilization, culture, shared principles, and a generation of common endeavors.

Our alliances, founded on the bedrock of mutual security, now reach beyond the common defense to a range of new issues: the social challenges shared by advanced technological societies, common approaches to easing tensions with our adversaries, and shaping positive relations with the developing world. The common efforts of the industrial democracies are not directed at exclusive ends but as a bridge to a broader, more secure and cooperative international system and to increasing freedom and prosperity for all nations.

The United States is proud of its historical friendships in the Western Hemisphere. In the modern era they must be—and are—based on equality and mutual benefit. We have a unique advantage: the great dialogue between the developed and the developing nations can find its most creative solution in the hemisphere where modern democracy was born and where cooperation between developed and developing, large and small, is a longstanding tradition.

Throughout history, ideology and power have tempted nations to seek unilateral advantage. But the inescapable lesson of the nuclear age is that the politics of tests of strength has become incompatible with the survival of humanity. Traditional power



politics becomes irrational when war can destroy civilized life and neither side can gain a decisive strategic advantage.

Accordingly, the great nuclear powers have particular responsibilities for restraint and vision. They are in a position to know the full extent of the catastrophe which could overwhelm mankind. They must take care not to fuel disputes if they conduct their rivalries by traditional methods. If they turn local conflicts into aspects of a global competition, sooner or later their competition will get out of control.

The United States believes that the future of mankind requires coexistence with the Soviet Union. Tired slogans cannot obscure the necessity for a more constructive relationship. We will insist that restraint be reciprocal not just in bilateral relations but around the globe. There can be no selective détente. We will maintain our defenses and our vigilance. But we know that tough rhetoric is not strength, that we owe future generations more hopeful prospects than a delicate equilibrium of awesome forces.

Peace requires a balance of strategic power. This the United States will maintain. But the United States is convinced that the goal of strategic balance is achievable more safely by agreement than through an arms race. The negotiations on the limitation of armaments are therefore at the heart of U.S.-Soviet relations.

Unprecedented agreements limiting and controlling nuclear weapons have been reached. A historic effort is being made to place a ceiling on the strategic arsenals of both sides in accordance with the Vladivostok accord. And once this is achieved we are ready to seek immediately to lower the levels of strategic arms.

The United States welcomes the recent progress that has been made in further curtailing nuclear weapons testing and in establishing a regime for peaceful nuclear explosions for the first time. The two treaties now signed and awaiting ratification should be the basis for further progress in this field.

Together with several of our European allies, we are continuing efforts to achieve a balanced reduction in the military forces facing each other in Central Europe. In some respects this is the most complex negotiation on arms limitation yet undertaken. It is our hope that through patient effort reciprocal reductions will soon be achieved that enhance the security of all countries involved.

The United States remains committed to the work of the Geneva Disarmament Committee. We welcome the progress there on banning environmental modification for destructive purposes. We will seriously examine all ideas, of whatever origin, to reduce the burdens of armaments. We will advance our own initiatives not for purposes of propaganda or unilateral advantage but to promote peace and security for all.

But coexistence and negotiations on the control of arms do not take place in a vacuum. We have been disturbed by the continuing accumulation of armaments and by recent instances of military intervention to tip the scales in local conflicts on distant continents. We have noted crude attempts to distort the purposes of diplomacy and to impede hopeful progress toward peaceful solutions to complex issues. These efforts only foster tensions; they cannot be reconciled with the policy of improving relations.

And they will inevitably be resisted. For coexistence to be something better than an uneasy armistice, both sides must recognize that ideology and power politics today confront the realities of the nuclear age and that a striving for unilateral advantage will not be accepted.

In recent years the new relationship between the United States and the People's Republic of China has held great significance for global security.

We came together out of necessity and a mutual belief that the world should remain free of military blackmail and the will to hegemony. We have set out a new path: in wide-ranging consultations, bilateral ex-

changes, the opening of offices in our respective capitals, and an accelerating movement toward normalization. And we have derived reciprocal benefits: a clear understanding of the aspirations of our peoples, better prospects for international equilibrium, reduced tensions in Asia, and increased opportunities for parallel actions on global issues.

These elements form the basis for a growing and lasting relationship founded on objective common interests. The United States is committed to strengthen the bonds between us and to proceed toward the normalization of our relations in strict conformity with the principles of the Shanghai communique. As this process moves forward, each side must display restraint and respect for the interests and convictions of the other. We will keep Chinese interests in mind on all international issues and will do our utmost to take account of them. But if the relationship is to prosper, there must be similar sensitivity to our views and concerns. On this basis, the progressive development of our relations with the world's most populous nation will be a key element of the foreign policy of the United States.

The world today is witness to continuing regional crises. Any one of them could blossom into larger conflict. Each one commands our most diligent efforts of conciliation and cooperation. The United States has played, and is prepared to continue to play, an active role in the search for peace in many areas: southern Africa, the Middle East, Korea, and Cyprus.

### *Southern Africa*

Racial injustice and the grudging retreat of colonial power have conspired to make southern Africa an acid test of the world's hope for peace and justice under the charter. A host of voices have been heard in this chamber warning that if we failed quickly to find solutions to the crises of Namibia and Rhodesia, that part of the globe could become a vicious battleground with consequences for every part of the world.

I have just been to Africa, at President Ford's request, to see what we could do to help the peoples of that continent achieve their aspirations for freedom and justice.

An opportunity to pull back from the brink now exists. I believe that Africa has before it the prize for which it has struggled for so long: the opportunity for Africans to shape a future of peace, justice, racial harmony, and progress.

The United Nations since its inception has been concerned with the issue of Namibia. For 30 years that territory has been a test of this institution's ability to make its decisions effective.

In recent months the United States has vigorously sought to help the parties concerned speed up the process toward Namibian independence. The United States favors the following elements: the independence of Namibia with a fixed, short time limit, the calling of a constitutional conference at a neutral location under U.N. aegis, and the participation in that conference of all authentic national forces including, specifically, SWAPO [South West Africa People's Organization].

Progress has been made in achieving all of these goals. We will exert our efforts to remove the remaining obstacles and bring into being a conference which can then fashion, with good will and wisdom, a design for the new state of Namibia and its relationship with its neighbors. We pledge our continued solicitude for the independence of Namibia so that it may, in the end, be a proud achievement of this organization and a symbol of international cooperation.

Less than a week ago the Rhodesian authorities announced that they are prepared to meet with the nationalist leaders of Zimbabwe to form an interim government to bring about majority rule within two years. This is in itself a historic break from the past. The African Presidents, in calling for immediate negotiations, have shown that they are prepared to seize this opportunity for a settlement. And the Government of the United Kingdom, in expressing



its willingness to assemble a conference, has shown its high sense of responsibility and concern for the rapid and just independence of Rhodesia.

Inevitably after a decade of strife, suspicions run deep. Many obstacles remain. Magnanimity is never easy, and less so after a generation of bitterness and racial conflict. But let us not lose sight of what has been achieved: a commitment to majority rule within two years, a commitment to form immediately a transitional government with an African majority in the Cabinet and an African prime minister, a readiness to follow this with a constitutional conference to define the legal framework of an independent Zimbabwe.

The United States, together with other countries, has made major efforts, and we will continue to do what we can to support the hopeful process that is now possible. But it is those in Africa who must shape the future. The people of Rhodesia, and the neighboring states, now face a supreme challenge. Their ability to work together, their capacity to unify, will be tested in the months ahead as never before.

There may be some countries who see a chance for advantage in fueling the flames of war and racial hatred. But they are not motivated by concern for the peoples of Africa or for peace. And if they succeed they could doom opportunities that might never return.

In South Africa itself, the pace of change accelerates. The system of apartheid, by whatever name, is a denial of our common humanity and a challenge to the conscience of mankind. Change is inevitable. The leaders of South Africa have shown wisdom in facilitating a peaceful solution in Rhodesia. The world community takes note of it and urges the same wisdom—while there is still time—to bring racial justice to South Africa.

As for the United States, we have become convinced that our values and our interests are best served by an Africa seeking its own destiny free of outside intervention. Therefore we will back no faction, whether

in Rhodesia or elsewhere. We will not seek to impose solutions anywhere. The leadership and the future of an independent Zimbabwe, as for the rest of Africa, are for Africans to decide. The United States will abide by their decision. We call on all other non-African states to do likewise.

The United States wants no special position or sphere of influence. We respect African unity. The rivalry and interference of non-African powers would make a mockery of Africa's hard-won struggle for independence from foreign domination. It will inevitably be resisted. And it is a direct challenge to the most fundamental principles upon which the United Nations is founded.

Every nation that has signed the charter is pledged to allow the nations of Africa, whose peoples have suffered so much, to fulfill at long last their dreams of independence, peace, unity, and human dignity in their own way and by their own decisions.

### *Middle East*

The United Nations, since its birth, has been involved in the chronic conflict in the Middle East. Each successive war has brought greater perils: an increased danger of great-power confrontation and more severe global economic dislocations.

At the request of the parties, the United States has been actively engaged in the search for peace in the Middle East. Since the 1973 war, statesmanship on all sides has produced unprecedented steps toward a resolution of this bitter conflict. There have been three agreements that lessen the danger of war, and mutual commitments have been made to pursue the negotiating process with urgency until a final peace is achieved. As a result we are closer to the goal of peace than at any time in a generation.

The role of the United Nations has been crucial. The Geneva Conference met in 1973 under its aegis, and the implementation of subsequent agreements has been negotiated in its working groups. Security

Council resolutions form the only agreed framework for negotiations. The U.N. Emergency Force, Disengagement Observer Force, and Truce Supervision Organization are even now helping maintain peace on the truce lines. I want to compliment the Secretary General and his colleagues in New York, Geneva, and on the ground in the Middle East for their vigorous support of the peace process at critical moments.

The United States remains committed to help the parties reach a settlement. The step-by-step negotiations of the past three years have now brought us to a point where comprehensive solutions seem possible. The decision before us now is how the next phase of negotiations should be launched.

The United States is prepared to participate in an early resumption of the work of the Geneva Conference. We think a preparatory conference might be useful for a discussion of the structure of future negotiations, but we are open to other suggestions. Whatever steps are taken must be carefully prepared so that once the process begins the nations concerned will advance steadily toward agreement.

The groundwork that has been laid represents a historic opportunity. The United States will do all it can to assure that by the time this Assembly meets next year it will be possible to report significant further progress toward a just and lasting peace in the Middle East.

Since the General Assembly last met, overwhelming tragedy has befallen the people of Lebanon. The United States strongly supports the sovereignty, unity, and territorial integrity of that troubled country. We oppose partition. We hope that Lebanese affairs will soon be returned to the hands of the people of Lebanon. All members of the United Nations, and all the conflicting parties in Lebanon, have an obligation to support the efforts of the new President of Lebanon to restore peace and to turn energies to rebuilding the nation. And the agencies of the U.N. system can play an important role in the reconstruction effort.

## *Korea*

The confrontation between North and South Korea remains a threat to international peace and stability. The vital interests of world powers intersect in Korea; conflict there inevitably threatens wider war.

We and many other U.N. members welcome the fact that a contentious and sterile debate on Korea will be avoided this fall. Let this opportunity be used, then, to address the central problem of how the Korean people can determine their future and achieve their ultimate goal of peaceful reunification without a renewal of armed conflict.

Our own views on the problem of Korea are well known. We have called for a resumption of a serious dialogue between North and South Korea. We have urged wider negotiations to promote security and reduce tensions. We are prepared to have the U.N. Command dissolved so long as the armistice agreement—which is the only existing legal arrangement committing the parties to keep the peace—is either preserved or replaced by more durable arrangements. We are willing to improve relations with North Korea provided that its allies are ready to take similar steps toward the Republic of Korea. We are ready to talk with North Korea about the peninsula's future, but we will not do so without the participation of the Republic of Korea.

Last fall the United States proposed a conference including all the parties most directly concerned—North and South Korea, the United States, and the People's Republic of China—to discuss ways of adapting the armistice agreement to new conditions and replacing it with more permanent arrangements. On July 22 I stated our readiness to meet immediately with these parties to consider the appropriate venue for such a conference. I reaffirm that readiness here today.

If such a conference proves impracticable right now, the United States would



support a phased approach. Preliminary talks between North and South Korea, including discussions on the venue and scope of the conference, could start immediately. In this phase the United States and the People's Republic of China could participate as observers or in an advisory role. If such discussions yielded concrete results, the United States and China could join the talks formally. This, in turn, could set the stage for a wider conference in which other countries could associate themselves with arrangements that guarantee a durable peace on the peninsula.

We hope that North Korea and other concerned parties will respond affirmatively to this proposed procedure or offer a constructive alternative suggestion.

### *Cyprus*

The world community is deeply concerned over the continuing stalemate on the Cyprus problem. Domestic pressures, nationalistic objectives, and international rivalries have combined to block the parties from taking even the most elementary steps toward a solution. On those few occasions when representatives of the two Cypriot communities have come together, they have fallen into inconclusive procedural disputes. The passage of time has served only to complicate domestic difficulties and to diminish the possibilities for constructive conciliation. The danger of conflict between Greece and Turkey has spread to other issues, as we have recently seen in the Aegean.

All concerned need to focus on committing themselves to achieve the overriding objectives: assuring the well-being of the suffering Cypriot people and peace in the eastern Mediterranean.

A settlement must come from the Cypriot communities themselves. It is they who must decide how their island's economy, society, and government shall be reconstructed. It is they who must decide the ultimate relationship of the two communities and the territorial extent of each area.

The United States is ready to assist in

restoring momentum to the negotiating process. We believe that agreeing to a set of principles might help the parties to resume negotiations. We would suggest some concepts along the following lines:

—A settlement should preserve the independence, sovereignty, and territorial integrity of Cyprus;

—The present dividing lines on Cyprus must be adjusted to reduce the area currently controlled by the Turkish side;

—The territorial arrangement should take into account the economic requirements and humanitarian concerns of the two Cypriot communities, including the plight of those who remain refugees;

—A constitutional arrangement should provide conditions under which the two Cypriot communities can live in freedom and have a large voice in their own affairs; and

—Security arrangements should be agreed that permit the withdrawal of foreign military forces other than those present under international agreement.

I have discussed this approach with the Secretary General and with several Western European leaders. In the days ahead the United States will consult along these lines with all interested parties. In the meantime we urge the Secretary General to continue his dedicated efforts.

### **Economic Development and Progress**

The economic division of our planet between the Northern and Southern Hemispheres, between the industrial and developing nations, is a dominant issue of our time. Our mutual dependence for our prosperity is a reality, not a slogan. It should summon our best efforts to make common progress. We must commit ourselves to bring mankind's dreams of a better life to closer reality in our lifetime.

There are many reasons why cooperation has not made greater strides:

—The industrial democracies have sometimes been more willing to pay lipservice

to the challenge of development than to match rhetoric with real resources.

—The oil-producing nations command great wealth, and some have been generous in their contribution to international development. But the overall performance in putting that wealth to positive uses has been inadequate to the challenge.

—The countries with nonmarket economies are quite prepared to undertake verbal assaults, but their performance is in inverse ratio to their rhetoric. Their real contribution to development assistance has been minimal. Last year, for example, the nonmarket economies provided only about 4 percent of the public aid flowing to the developing nations.

—The developing nations are understandably frustrated and impatient with poverty, illiteracy, and disease. But too often they have made demands for change that are as confrontational as they are unrealistic. They sometimes speak of new economic orders as if growth were a quick fix requiring only that the world's wealth be properly redistributed through tests of strength instead of a process of self-help over generations. Ultimately such tactics lose more than they gain, for they undermine the popular support in the industrial democracies which is imperative to provide the resources and market access—available nowhere else—to sustain development.

The objectives of the developing nations are clear: a rapid rise in the incomes of their people, a greater role in the international decisions which affect them, and fair access to the world's economic opportunities.

The objectives of the industrial nations are equally plain: an efficient and open system of world trade and investment; expanding opportunities and production for both North and South; the reliable and equitable development of the world's resources of food, energy, and raw materials; a world economy in which prosperity is as close to universal as our imagination and our energies allow.

These goals are complementary; indeed

they must be, for neither side can achieve its aims at the expense of the other. They can be realized only through cooperation.

We took a major step forward together a year ago, at the seventh special session of this Assembly. And we have since followed through on many fronts:

—We have taken steps to protect the economic security of developing nations against cyclical financial disaster. The newly expanded compensatory finance facility of the International Monetary Fund (IMF) has disbursed over \$2 billion to developing nations this year alone.

—An IMF trust fund financed by gold sales has been established for the benefit of the low-income countries.

—Replenishments for the World Bank, the Inter-American Development Bank, and the Asian Development Bank will provide additional resources for development.

—Worldwide food aid has expanded. We have committed ourselves to expand the world supply of food. With a U.S. contribution of \$200 million, we have brought the International Fund for Agricultural Development close to operation.

—The major industrial nations have moved to expand trade opportunities for the developing world. We have joined in a solemn pledge to complete by next year the liberalization of world trade through the Tokyo round of multilateral trade negotiations. For its part, the United States has established a system of generalized preferences which has significantly stimulated exports from developing nations to the United States.

The United States continued this process by putting forward a number of new proposals at the fourth ministerial United Nations Conference on Trade and Development in May 1976. We proposed a comprehensive plan to improve the capacity of the developing countries to select, adapt, improve, and manage technology for development. We committed ourselves to improvements in the quality of aid, proposing that a greater proportion of aid to poor coun-



ries be on a grant basis and untied to purchases from donor nations. We agreed to a serious effort to improve markets of 18 basic commodities.

These measures undertaken since we met here just a year ago assist—not with rhetoric and promises, but in practical and concrete ways—the peoples of the world who are struggling to throw off the chains of poverty.

Much remains to be done.

First, the application of science and technology is at the very heart of the development process. The United States, conscious of its pioneering role in technology, has put forward three basic principles, which we will support with funds and talent:

—To train individuals who can identify, select, and manage the future technology of the developing world;

—To build both national and international institutions to create indigenous technology, as well as adapt foreign designs and inventions; and

—To spur the private sector to make its maximum contribution to the development and transfer of technological progress.

To achieve these goals, we are today extending an invitation to the World Conference on Science and Technology for Development, now scheduled for 1979, to meet in this country. In preparation for that meeting, we have asked members of the industrial, academic, and professional scientific communities throughout the United States to meet in Washington in November. They will review the important initiatives this country can take to expand the technological base for development, and they will strive to develop new approaches.

Second, the ministerial meeting of the conference on International Economic Cooperation in Paris should be given new impetus. We are making several new proposals:

—We will seek to help nations facing severe debt burdens. For acute cases we will propose guidelines for debt renegotiation. For countries facing longer term problems,

we will propose systematic examination of remedial measures, including increased aid.

—We will advance new ideas for expanded cooperation in energy including a regular process of information exchange among energy producers and users, and an expanded transfer of energy-related technology to energy-poor developing nations.

Third, the industrial democracies have been far too willing to wait for the demands of the developing countries rather than to advance their own proposals. Now, however, the OECD [Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development] countries, at the suggestion of the United States, have agreed to examine long-range development planning and to develop a more coherent and comprehensive approach to global growth and economic justice.

Fourth, natural disaster each year takes thousands of lives and costs billions of dollars. It strikes most those who can afford it the least, the poorest peoples of the world. Its toll is magnified by a large array of global issues: overpopulation, food scarcity, damage to the ecology, and economic underdevelopment. The United Nations has a unique capacity to address these global concerns and thus improve man's odds against nature. We urge this body to take the lead in strengthening international cooperation to prevent and alleviate natural calamity.

Our dream is that all the children of the world can live with hope and widening opportunity. No nation can accomplish this alone; no group of nations can achieve it through confrontation. But together there is a chance for major progress—and in our generation.

### **Interdependence and Community**

It is an irony of our time that an age of ideological and nationalistic rivalry has spawned as well a host of challenges that no nation can possibly solve by itself:

—The proliferation of nuclear weapons capabilities adds a new dimension of dan-

ger to political conflicts, regionally and globally.

—As technology opens up the oceans, conflicting national claims and interests threaten chaos.

—Man's inventiveness has developed the horrible new tool of terror that claims innocent victims on every continent.

—Human and civil rights are widely abused and have now become an accepted concern of the world community.

Let me set forth the U.S. position on these topics.

### *Nuclear Nonproliferation*

The growing danger of the proliferation of nuclear weapons raises stark questions about man's ability to insure his very existence.

We have lived through three perilous decades in which the catastrophe of nuclear war has been avoided despite a strategic rivalry between a relatively few nations.

But now a wholly new situation impends. Many nations have the potential to build nuclear weapons. If this potential were to materialize, threats to use nuclear weapons, fed by mutually reinforcing misconceptions, could become a recurrent feature of local conflicts in every quarter of the globe. And there will be growing dangers of accidents, blackmail, theft, and nuclear terrorism. Unless current trends are altered rapidly, the likelihood of nuclear devastation could grow steadily in the years to come.

We must look first to the roots of the problem:

—Since the 1973 energy crisis and drastic rise in oil prices, both developed and developing nations have seen in nuclear energy a means both of lowering the cost of electricity and of reducing reliance upon imported petroleum.

—In an age of growing nationalism some see the acquisition and expansion of nuclear power as symbols of enhanced national prestige. And it is also clear that

some nations, in attaining this peaceful technology, may wish to provide for themselves a future option to acquire nuclear weapons.

A nation that acquires the potential for a nuclear weapons capability must accept the consequences of its action. It is bound to trigger offsetting actions by its neighbors and stimulate broader proliferation, thereby accelerating a process that ultimately will undermine its own security. And it is disingenuous to label as "peaceful" nuclear devices which palpably are capable of massive military destruction. The spread of nuclear reactor and fuel cycle capabilities, especially in the absence of evident economic need and combined with ambiguous political and military motives, threatens to proliferate nuclear weapons with all their dangers.

Time is of the essence. In no area of international concern does the future of this planet depend more directly upon what this generation elects to do—or fails to do. We must move on three broad fronts:

—First, international safeguards must be strengthened and strictly enforced. The supply and use of nuclear materials associated with civilian nuclear energy programs must be carefully safeguarded so that they will not be diverted. Nuclear suppliers must impose the utmost restraint upon themselves and not permit the temptations of commercial advantage to override the risks of proliferation. The physical security of nuclear materials—whether in use, storage or transfer—must be increased. The International Atomic Energy Agency must receive the full support of all nations in making its safeguards effective, reliable, and universally applicable. Any violator of the IAEA safeguards must face immediate and drastic penalties.

—Second, adherence to safeguards, while of prime importance, is no guarantee against future proliferation. We must continue our efforts to forge international restraints against the acquisition or transfer of reprocessing facilities which produce



separated plutonium and of enrichment facilities which produce highly enriched uranium—both of which are usable for the construction of nuclear weapons.

—Third, we must recognize that one of the principal incentives for seeking sensitive reprocessing and enrichment technology is the fear that essential nonsensitive materials, notably reactor-grade uranium fuel, will not be made available on a reliable basis. Nations that show their sense of international responsibility by accepting effective restraints have a right to expect reliable and economical supply of peaceful nuclear reactors and associated nonsensitive fuel. The United States, as a principal supplier of these items, is prepared to be responsive in this regard.

In the near future President Ford will announce a comprehensive American program for international action on nonproliferation that reconciles global aspirations for assured nuclear supply with global requirements for nuclear control.

We continue to approach the proliferation problem in full recognition of the responsibility that we and other nuclear powers have—both in limiting our weapons arsenals and in insuring that the benefits of peaceful nuclear energy can be made available to all states within a shared framework of effective international safeguards. In this way the atom can be seen once again as a boon and not a menace to mankind.

### *Law of the Sea Negotiations*

Another issue of vast global consequence is the law of the sea. The negotiations which have just recessed in New York represent one of the most important, complex, and ambitious diplomatic undertakings in history.

Consider what is at stake:

—Mankind is attempting to devise an international regime for nearly three quarters of the earth's surface.

—Some 150 nations are participating, reflecting all the globe's diverse national

perspectives, ideologies, and practical concerns.

—A broad sweep of vital issues is involved: economic development, military security, freedom of navigation, crucial and dwindling living resources, the ocean's fragile ecology, marine scientific research, and vast potential mineral wealth.

—The world community is aspiring to shape major new international legal principles: the extension of the long-established territorial sea, the creation of a completely new concept of an economic zone extending 200 miles, and the designation of the deep seabeds as the "common heritage of mankind."

We have traveled an extraordinary distance in these negotiations in recent years—thanks in no small part to the skill and dedication of the distinguished President of this Assembly. Agreement exists on key concepts: a 12-mile territorial sea, free passage over and through straits, a 200-mile economic zone, and important pollution controls. In many fields we have replaced ideological debates with serious efforts to find concrete solutions. And there is growing consensus that the outstanding problems must be solved at the next session.

But there is hardly room for complacency. Important issues remain which, if not settled, could cause us to forfeit all our hard-won progress. The conference has yet to agree on the balance between coastal state and international rights in the economic zone, on the freedom of marine scientific research, on arrangements for dispute settlement, and most crucially, on the regime for exploitation of the deep seabeds.

The United States has made major proposals to resolve the deep seabed issue. We have agreed that the seabeds are the common heritage of all mankind. We have proposed a dual system for the exploitation of seabed minerals by which half of the mining sites would be reserved for the International Authority and half could be developed by individual nations and their

nationals on the basis of their technical capacity. We have offered to find financing and to transfer the technology needed to make international mining a practical reality. And in light of the many uncertainties that lie ahead, we have proposed that there be a review—for example, in 25 years—to determine whether the provisions on seabed mining are working equitably.

In response some nations have escalated both their demands and the stridency with which they advocate them.

I must say candidly that there are limits beyond which no American Administration can, or will, go. If attempts are made to compel concessions which exceed those limits, unilateralism will become inevitable. Countries which have no technological capacity for mining the seabeds in the foreseeable future should not seek to impose a doctrine of total internationalization on nations which alone have this capacity and which have voluntarily offered to share it. The United States has an interest in the progressive development of international law, stable order, and global cooperation. We are prepared to make sacrifices for this—but they cannot go beyond equitable bounds.

Let us therefore put aside delaying tactics and pressures and take the path of cooperation. If we have the vision to conclude a treaty considered fair and just by mankind, our labors will have profound meaning not only for the regime of the oceans but for all efforts to build a peaceful, cooperative, and prosperous international community. The United States will spend the interval between sessions of the conference reviewing its positions and will approach other nations well in advance of the next session at the political level to establish the best possible conditions for its success.

### *International Terrorism*

A generation that dreams of world peace and economic progress is plagued by a new, brutal, cowardly, and indiscriminate form of violence: international terrorism. Small

groups have rejected the norms of civilized behavior and wantonly taken the lives of defenseless men, women, and children—innocent victims with no power to affect the course of events. In the year since I last addressed this body, there have been 11 hijackings, 19 kidnappings, 42 armed attacks, and 112 bombings perpetrated by international terrorists. Over 70 people have lost their lives, and over 200 have been injured.

It is time this organization said to the world that the vicious murder and abuse of innocents cannot be absolved or excused by the invocation of lofty motives. Criminal acts against humanity, whatever the professed objective, cannot be excused by any civilized nation.

The threat of terrorism should be dealt with through the cooperative efforts of all countries. More stringent steps must be taken now to deny skyjackers and terrorists a safe haven.

Additional measures are required to protect passengers in both transit and terminal areas, as well as in flight.

The United States will work within the International Civil Aviation Organization to expand its present technical assistance to include the security of air carriers and terminal facilities. We urge the universal implementation of aviation security standards adopted by the ICAO. We are prepared to assist the efforts of other governments to implement those standards.

The United States will support new initiatives which will insure the safety of the innocent. The proposal of the distinguished Foreign Minister of the Federal Republic of Germany against the taking of hostages deserves the most serious and sympathetic consideration of this Assembly.

The United States will do everything within its power to work cooperatively in the United Nations and in other international bodies to put an end to the scourge of terrorism. But we have an obligation to protect the lives of our citizens as they travel at home or abroad, and we intend to meet that obligation. Therefore, if multi-



lateral efforts are blocked by those determined to pursue their ends without regard for suffering or death, then the United States will act through its own legislative processes and in conjunction with others willing to join us.

Terrorism is an international problem. It is inconceivable that an organization of the world's nations would fail to take effective action against it.

### *Human Rights*

The final measure of all we do together, of course, is man himself. Our common efforts to define, preserve, and enhance respect for the rights of man thus represent an ultimate test of international cooperation.

We Americans, in the year of our Bicentennial, are conscious—and proud—of our own traditions. Our founders wrote 200 years ago of the equality and inalienable rights of all men. Since then the ideals of liberty and democracy have become the universal and indestructible goals of mankind.

But the plain truth—of tragic proportions—is that human rights are in jeopardy over most of the globe. Arbitrary arrest, denial of fundamental procedural rights, slave labor, stifling of freedom of religion, racial injustice, political repression, the use of torture, and restraints on communications and expression—these abuses are too prevalent.

The performance of the U.N. system in protecting human rights has fallen far short of what was envisaged when this organization was founded. The principles of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights are clear enough. But their invocation and application, in general debates of this body and in the forums of the Human Rights Commission, have been marred by hypocrisy, double standards, and discrimination. Flagrant and consistent deprivation of human rights is no less heinous in one country or one social system than in another. Nor is it more acceptable when practiced upon members of the same race than when in-

flicted by one race upon another.

The international community has a unique role to play. The application of the standards of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights should be entrusted to fair and capable international bodies. But at the same time let us insure that these bodies do not become platforms from which nations which are the worst transgressors pass hypocritical judgment on the alleged shortcomings.

Let us together pursue practical approaches:

—To build on the foundations already laid at previous Assemblies and at the Human Rights Commission to lessen the abominable practice of officially sanctioned torture;

—To promote acceptance of procedures for protecting the rights of people subject to detention, such as access to courts, counsel, and families and prompt release or fair and public trial;

—To improve the working procedures of international bodies concerned with human rights so that they may function fairly and effectively; and

—To strengthen the capability of the United Nations to meet the tragic problems of the ever-growing number of refugees whose human rights have been stripped away by conflict in almost every continent.

The United States pledges its firm support to these efforts.

Mr. President, Mr. Secretary General, distinguished delegates: The challenge to statesmanship in this generation is to advance from the management of crises to the building of a more stable and just international order—an order resting not on power but on restraint of power, not on the strength of arms but on the strength of the human spirit.

Global forces of change now shape our future. Order will come in one of two ways: through its imposition by the strong and the ruthless or by the wise and farsighted use of international institutions through which we enlarge the sphere of common

interests and enhance the sense of community.

It is easy and tempting to press relentlessly for national advantage. It is infinitely more difficult to act in recognition of the rights of others. Throughout history, the greatness of men and nations has been measured by their actions in times of acute peril. Today there is no single crisis to conquer. There is instead a persisting challenge of staggering complexity—the need to create a universal community based on cooperation, peace, and justice.

If we falter, future generations will pay for our failure. If we succeed, it will have been worthy of the hopes of mankind. I am confident that we can succeed.

And it is here, in the assembly of nations, that we should begin.

## Senate Confirms U.S. Delegation to 31st U.N. General Assembly

The Senate on September 22 confirmed the nominations of the following-named persons to be Representatives and Alternate Representatives of the United States to the 31st session of the General Assembly of the United Nations:

### *Representatives*

William W. Scranton  
W. Tapley Bennett, Jr.  
George McGovern, U.S. Senator from the State of South Dakota  
Howard H. Baker, Jr., U.S. Senator from the State of Tennessee  
Rev. Robert P. Hupp

### *Alternate Representatives*

Albert W. Sherer, Jr.  
Jacob M. Myerson  
Nancy V. Rawls  
Stephen Hess  
Ersa Hines Poston

## United Nations Day, 1976

### A P R O C L A M A T I O N<sup>1</sup>

On October 24 we will observe the 31st anniversary of the United Nations Charter, adopted in 1945 by governments determined to prevent a repetition of world war, to encourage the development of human rights and justice, and to remove the underlying causes of conflict by promoting economic and social progress for all nations.

The United States has played a leading role in encouraging the Organization to fulfill the promise of the Charter. We, and the rest of mankind, have benefited greatly from the vital contributions made by the Organization, particularly the Security Council, to the maintenance of world peace—the most striking reminder being the current peacekeeping role of the United Nations in the Middle East.

The United Nations has also been a forum for other areas of international concern: conferences to work out laws to govern the use of the oceans, to promote arms control, and to focus world attention on such problems as human rights, health, education and hunger; new programs to promote trade and economic developments; and other activities designed to solve many of the new problems associated with independence in today's world.

NOW, THEREFORE, I, GERALD R. FORD, President of the United States of America, do hereby designate Sunday, October 24, 1976, as United Nations Day. I urge the citizens of this Nation to observe that day with community programs that will promote the United Nations and its affiliated agencies.

I have appointed Edgar Speer to be United States National Chairman for United Nations Day and through him, I call upon State and local officials to encourage citizens' groups and all agencies of communication to engage in appropriate observances of United Nations Day in cooperation with the United Nations Association of the United States of America and other interested organizations.

IN WITNESS WHEREOF, I have hereunto set my hand this seventh day of September in the year of our Lord nineteen hundred seventy-six, and of the Independence of the United States of America the two hundred and first.

GERALD R. FORD.

<sup>1</sup> No. 4454; 41 *Fed. Reg.* 38147.



## Secretary Kissinger Discusses Southern African Issues With African and British Officials

*Secretary Kissinger visited Tanzania September 14-15 and 21, Zambia September 15-17 and 20-21, South Africa September 17-20, Zaire September 21-22, Kenya September 22-23, and the United Kingdom September 23-24. He met with the Presidents of Tanzania, Zambia, Zaire, and Kenya; at Pretoria he met with South African Prime Minister Balthazar Johannes Vorster and with a Rhodesian delegation headed by Ian D. Smith; he met with British Prime Minister James Callaghan and Secretary of State for Foreign and Commonwealth Affairs Anthony Crosland at London. Following are statements and news conferences by Secretary Kissinger and a news conference held by the Secretary and Foreign Secretary Crosland.<sup>1</sup>*

### ARRIVAL, DAR ES SALAAM, TANZANIA, SEPTEMBER 14

Press release 435 dated September 14

I have come here at the direction of President Ford to talk with President Nyerere about the prospects for peace in southern Africa.

This initiative started at the request of African leaders during my visit in April. Every step that has brought us here has been carefully discussed with leaders in Africa, and especially with the frontline Presidents. Every step we will take in the future will be closely coordinated with the frontline Presidents.

<sup>1</sup> Other press releases relating to the Secretary's trip are Nos. 432 of Sept. 13, 439 of Sept. 15, 443 of Sept. 16, 448 of Sept. 19, 450 of Sept. 20, 451 of Sept. 21, 453 and 459 of Sept. 22, and 463 and 465-469 of Sept. 23.

The United States wants nothing for itself except its interest in peace and in economic and social progress. The conflict that we are trying to end is a conflict which will affect most of all the peoples of Africa. The progress we are trying to bring will benefit, above all, the peoples of Africa.

We will do what we are asked to do; we will do nothing that is not requested; we will take no initiatives that are not invited; and whatever progress will occur depends on the attitude of the parties and the good will of the participants. We are prepared to make the effort that is encouraged.

And in this spirit I look forward very much to my talks with the distinguished leader of this country, President Nyerere, with whom we have had close communications over the recent months and who has encouraged us in our enterprise.

### NEWS CONFERENCE, DAR ES SALAAM, SEPTEMBER 15

Press release 437 dated September 15

*Secretary Kissinger:* I understand this is a day of press conferences. We will go right to the questions.

*Q. Mr. Secretary, we've just come from a press conference with President Nyerere which was, to say the least, not encouraging for your mission. On both the Namibian and the Rhodesian questions, he said he received nothing of encouragement. In fact, on the Namibian question he said he is now less hopeful than before. Does this reflect your views on the future?*

*Secretary Kissinger:* I have said from the

beginning that whatever can be achieved depends on the attitude of the parties. All the United States can do is to enable the parties to deal with each other; to bring whatever ideas they have; occasionally to offer a suggestion, based on the knowledge of having talked to the parties, of what might be possible. But ultimately it is up to the parties to decide.

Nothing has changed from what was known a week ago, and therefore I cannot make judgments based on fluctuating moods.

*Q. Mr. Secretary, isn't the fact alone that nothing has changed since last week an unhopeful sign?*

*Secretary Kissinger:* No, nothing could change since last week, since the positions of the parties—the purpose of my visit here was to get clear about the view of Tanzania. I will then take the views of the frontline Presidents to Pretoria, and then I will return to Lusaka and here. At that point we will be able to judge whether any progress has been made. But it is not possible to judge that on the first day.

*Q. Mr. Secretary, one of the other purposes of your visit here was to find out what decisions were taken at the five-nation African summit. Can you give us some idea as to what the consensus was at that summit?*

*Secretary Kissinger:* I have a rather clearer idea now of what the views were. I do not believe that it is up to me to discuss the decisions of the five-nation African summit. I think this is a question that should be addressed to President Nyerere.

*Q. Mr. Secretary, what if the worst comes to the worst? Should the peaceful negotiations you are undertaking right now fail and the armed struggle is intensified, which side will the United States support?*

*Secretary Kissinger:* We can give no blank check in advance. We are here to find peaceful solutions. We have at this moment not given up expectations of peaceful solutions, and that is a question that can

be addressed when we know the circumstances which made peaceful solutions impossible.

*Q. Will you clarify the four points put by the Tanzanian Government on fear of the American intervention in the present situation in southern Africa?*

*Secretary Kissinger:* The United States has made clear on many occasions that it has no intention of intervening in southern Africa. The United States pursues a policy that African development should be in the hands of Africans. We also oppose the intervention of any other outside powers. The United States has no intention by itself to initiate intervention in Africa.

*Q. Mr. Secretary, President Nyerere made clear that he thought only the South Africans and SWAPO [South West Africa People's Organization] should be represented at a constitutional conference on Namibia. Is it the American view that the tribal and ethnic groups that were represented at the Windhoek conference should also participate?*

*Secretary Kissinger:* The United States is putting forward no program of its own. The United States communicates the positions of the parties, each to the other, with the explanation that each party gives for its position. At the end of that process the parties will have to decide whether they can reconcile their differences. And in any negotiation each side has a tendency to state its optimum conditions at the outset, and if a solution is reached, it will depend on whether there is a willingness to compromise by one or both sides. That determination will have to be made later.

*Q. Mr. Secretary, both in the statement by the Tanzanian Government yesterday and in the press conference of President Nyerere, there was a strong implication and a fear expressed in a way that your approach, the American approach, toward the problems of southern Africa is unduly obsessed with the fear of the spread of communism here. Since this does seem to be a rather important fear*



here, I wonder if you would address yourself to it?

*Secretary Kissinger:* They are two separate problems. We do not say that the liberation movements are Communist, and we do not fear the liberation movements, either in their own right or because they are Communist. On the other hand, we are concerned when there are interventions from outside the continent here. But, in themselves, our concern here is to help bring a peaceful solution, to enable the peoples of this area to make progress.

We can only repeat that the lives that will be saved will be African lives. The progress that will be made will be African progress. It is not something from which the United States benefits, and it is not a part of an anti-Communist crusade against any particular movement, because it is precisely these movements that will ultimately benefit from a peaceful solution.

*Q. Mr. Secretary, on the basis of what you heard here today, are you more or less hopeful about the possibilities of finding a peaceful solution?*

*Secretary Kissinger:* My views are approximately those with which I came. That is to say, I have heard the views now explained in greater detail by the President of Tanzania. I am certain that since this is the beginning of the process they were not understated. These views have been expressed; they will be faithfully conveyed in Pretoria. The views of the other side will be equally faithfully repeated here.

I found no surprises and nothing to change my basic view, which is that the chances are somewhat less than 50-50; that the worst that can happen if this mission does not succeed is what is certain to happen without this mission; that no one else was available—no other country was available—to undertake it; that the effort has to be made, and if it should fail and conflict should prove unavoidable, at least we will know it is not because the United States failed to make a major effort.

*Q. Would you be able to confirm what President Nyerere said, and that was that Cuban intervention in Angola took place only after South African intervention?*

*Secretary Kissinger:* First, I hope you all realize I have not seen a transcript of President Nyerere's press conference.

Our understanding is that Cubans were in Angola before South Africans, and I seem to recall a speech by Fidel Castro in which he pointed out that the reason they reinforced the Cubans is because some of them had been killed by South Africans, from which one would assume they were there before the South Africans. But I would have to check this to make sure.

*Q. Mr. Secretary, another thing President Nyerere indicated was that—in fact, he said something to the effect—that he didn't understand how even intelligent people could be so preoccupied with the subject of Cuba. I think we might infer from that that there has been rather a difference of opinion between yourself and the President on the subject. Has it come up?*

*Secretary Kissinger:* The subject of Cuba was not discussed between President Nyerere and myself.

*Q. Mr. Secretary, yesterday the Tanzanian Government asked that the United States declare its support for the freedom fighters in the event that negotiations fail. Have you given President Nyerere such assurances, or are you prepared to make such a declaration of support?*

*Secretary Kissinger:* As I have indicated, we do not operate on the assumption that negotiations will fail, and until the negotiations have failed, we cannot make any such commitment.

*Q. Mr. Secretary, President Nyerere put it slightly differently today. He said that because of an ambiguity it would be a good thing if the United States would say it will not help those who are fighting majority rule—in other words, the Smith regime—if the*

*guerrilla war should become worse. Can you—*

*Secretary Kissinger:* We stated our position in the Lusaka speech, and this remains American policy.<sup>2</sup> I am conducting my conversations with President Nyerere privately and not by commenting on his press conference.

*Q. Mr. Secretary, can you at this point clarify at all what you regard as the specific obstacles you are facing in trying to be helpful in both the Rhodesian and the Namibian situations?*

*Secretary Kissinger:* It is clear that a conflict that has gone on for so many years and has such a long history has created profound distrust and so many efforts have failed that the parties are becoming more and more committed to the process of struggle rather than to the process of negotiation. I think this is the basic underlying obstacle—the reluctance of anybody to admit that negotiations are possible before they know that negotiations will succeed. And of course they will never find out whether negotiations will succeed until they first admit that they are possible. This is the underlying difficulty.

Then there are many specific issues: the composition of conferences, the basic agenda that conferences might address, what issues should be dealt with as preconditions, and which issues can be left to the conference. All of these are before the various parties, and all of these will be explored over the next few days.

*Q. I'd like to follow that up. Have you made at this stage any advance in these procedural questions?*

*Secretary Kissinger:* An advance has been made over the time that these discussions started. But it would be rash to say that a solution is in sight.

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<sup>2</sup>For Secretary Kissinger's address at Lusaka, Zambia, on Apr. 27, see BULLETIN of May 31, 1976, p. 672.

*Q. Would the process of negotiation in Rhodesia toward majority rule be hastened if the present government were to be removed or otherwise removed itself?*

*Secretary Kissinger:* We are dealing with the issues and not with the personalities and structures. We are telling each side what we believe the requirements of a successful negotiation are.

Which authorities carry this out is for the people concerned to determine.

*Q. Early this year the United States participated in the Security Council triple veto which saved South Africa from U.N. military and economic sanctions. With U.S. national investments and political interests in South Africa, do you really think the United States can be an impartial peacemaker in southern Africa?*

*Secretary Kissinger:* On my visit to Africa in April, every African leader that I saw urged me to get in touch with Prime Minister Vorster since it was their belief that he held the key to a solution in southern Africa.

We would not be engaged in this process if we did not believe that our influence can bring about peace and in the direction that has been requested by black African leaders. Whether it will succeed or not is for the future to determine and depends on the attitude of all of the parties.

*Q. Mr. Secretary, President Nyerere spoke of the possibility of a proclamation between yourself and Ian Smith being drawn up. Can you tell us if this was in fact discussed? And secondly, was the question of compensation for white settlers in Rhodesia discussed today?*

*Secretary Kissinger:* There is absolutely no possibility of a joint proclamation between Ian Smith and the U.S. Government. The question of compensation—the issue isn't compensation. The question of a financial-guarantees plan was discussed and met with the approval of President Nyerere.



*Q. The President said that this did crop up. Do we take it from that that you rejected the question of a joint proclamation?*

*Secretary Kissinger:* The issue of a joint proclamation has never come up, was never discussed between President Nyerere and myself, has never been requested by the Rhodesians or anybody else. Indeed, we have not been in touch with the Rhodesians, so it could not have come up. At any rate, that is not a possibility.

*Q. Mr. Secretary, one of the apparent issues of difference, though, is that President Nyerere said that it was his belief that the great majority of whites in Rhodesia would leave. Is that an African consensus, and how does it square with your own views on the future of Rhodesia?*

*Secretary Kissinger:* I do not know whether he said "should" or "would." And our position has been that the communities should be enabled to live together, that there should be no discrimination of one side against the other, but that the final relationship between the communities is one that has to be settled by a constitutional conference or some other device, which is at this point premature.

*Q. Mr. Secretary, I appreciate your problem about measuring any degree of progress at this particular time. But after all, you've had a weekend of talks with Prime Minister Vorster; you've had today with President Nyerere. Do you find, even in a tentative way, the possibility of coinciding views that in fact makes you a touch more optimistic than you're prepared to concede today?*

*Secretary Kissinger:* There are several coinciding views and several sharply different views. The question which we face in the next week is whether the different views can be bridged. This I cannot judge until we have had further conversations. If there were not some possibility of bridging these views we would not have undertaken the journey.

*Q. On the question of guarantees to the white community in Rhodesia—in addition to the perhaps billion dollars that is being talked about to safeguard the white minority in Rhodesia, there seems to be another element, an element concerning the relationship or some guarantees being given by a black majority government to the white community in Rhodesia. Now, would these guarantees include things like the right to live, work, and vote in Rhodesia like any other citizen, or is there something else involved?*

*Secretary Kissinger:* It has always been my understanding from the African Presidents that they want a society that is not based on any racial discrimination from either side. I have never been given any other indication.

What specific guarantees will be worked out in this connection will depend on a conference, if there is a peaceful settlement, that will eventually have to take place between Rhodesian nationalists and the Rhodesian white settlers under British aegis. I am in no position to go into the precise details. The United States is not prescribing the details of the settlement. The United States indicates its general attitude on the kind of solution it favors, but it cannot compel the parties to accept that preference.

*Q. Certain circles have said that the sudden interest the United States has shown in the southern Africa problem is because of the fear of communism. Would you subscribe to that?*

*Secretary Kissinger:* Well, I do not know who these circles are. On my previous visit all of the leaders I met were very critical of the United States for not showing sufficient interest in Africa and urged us to show interest in Africa. Now we are showing interest in Africa. Why can you not ascribe it to the persuasiveness of your leaders? [Laughter.]

*Q. Mr. Secretary, wouldn't it be logical for anybody, for an African in particular, to take*

*the U.S. initiative suspiciously, particularly when you consider that it is the Americans who are propping up the Smith regime economically?*

*Secretary Kissinger:* What we are seeking to achieve is what African leaders have been asking for. Every move we have made has been made in close consultation with the leaders of Africa. If the leaders of Africa are suspicious and if the leaders of Africa believe that the American initiative cannot be helpful, then we will of course stop this initiative. We will have to be judged by the results. And we have tried in good faith to prevent a conflict the major impact of which will be on Africa. It is now up to Africans to decide whether they will wish to continue to cooperate with this or not. So far everything that has been done has been with the encouragement and with the approval of African leaders.

*Q. Mr. Secretary, there are American troops in [inaudible]?*

*Secretary Kissinger:* The United States has no objection to the MPLA [Popular Movement for the Liberation of Angola] as a political force. The FRELIMO [Mozambique Liberation Front] in Mozambique, whose political views are nearly indistinguishable from MPLA, was recognized by the United States as soon as it took office, and we have established a reasonable relationship with Mozambique.

Our objection to Angola was the massive infusion of Soviet military help to begin with, followed by the sending of an expeditionary force, which was not—or could not have happened on the part of so small a country as Cuba without Soviet support. Therefore it seemed to us a massive outside intervention into the affairs of Africa.

This is the view of the United States on that subject, and it is a quite different matter whether an expeditionary force appears in a civil war or as part of a normal alliance relationship.

*Q. Mr. Secretary, last week the summit conference was attended by President Agos-*

*tinho Neto [of Angola]. In view of the fact that your government does not recognize his government, do you expect you might have to meet with him at some point, and how would you surmount this problem?*

*Secretary Kissinger:* I do not believe that I will meet President Neto on this trip.

*Q. Last month the State Department stated that the South African promise to grant Namibia independence did not go far enough. What would you find acceptable in terms of independence?*

*Secretary Kissinger:* We have stated that simply giving a date for independence did not go far enough. Our view is that there has to be a procedure by which all authentic groups can participate in the negotiations, and a conference which is acceptable to those parties most concerned.

*Q. On the question of South Africa, I understand that you did discuss this with President Nyerere today, but it was widely reported that during your talks with Prime Minister Vorster in Zurich you were seeking to find out whether or not Vorster was willing to detach or separate the future of South Africa from the futures of Namibia and Zimbabwe. You have yourself stated on several occasions that you see the necessity for the end of the apartheid system in South Africa. But the logical extension of ending apartheid in South Africa is black majority rule, and therefore it would seem that any detachment or separation of the issues of southern Africa would only be a matter of time.*

*If it is correct to assume that eventually we would be looking for black majority rule in South Africa, then what kind of time period are we talking about? Are we talking about one year, ten years, or maybe a hundred years?*

*Secretary Kissinger:* I would not want to speculate about the amount of time. You are quite right that time is what is implied by the phrase of separating the problem.

But time is of the essence if a peaceful



solution to so complex a problem as that of South Africa is to be found. We have no precise timetable. Some timetables were given publicly by African leaders. We have no timetable of our own.

## DEPARTURE STATEMENT, NEWS CONFERENCE, LUSAKA, ZAMBIA, SEPTEMBER 17

Press release 447 dated September 17

*Secretary Kissinger:* Mr. Foreign Minister, on behalf of my whole delegation, I would like to thank you and President Kaunda for the warm reception we have received here. This was not a stop for negotiation. It was a stop to clarify the principles that will be taken to Pretoria and that we hope will form the basis for progress toward justice and peace in southern Africa.

We were encouraged by the spirit of the talks and by the moral support which we have received here, but it is of course clear that the serious negotiation lies ahead of us and that the decisions on whether the objective of peace—in human dignity—can be achieved are not going to be made in Lusaka.

So, Mr. Foreign Minister, I leave with the determination to make a major effort. I have been strengthened in this by my conversations with your President and his associates, and I want to thank you once again for the extraordinary reception we have had here.

Now I will be glad to take a few questions.

*Q. Will your stop in Pretoria be a negotiating stop?*

*Secretary Kissinger:* My stop in Pretoria, I hope, will move matters forward so that when I return to Lusaka we will have something more precise to work with than is the case today.

*Q. Are you going to see Smith?*

*Secretary Kissinger:* I stated last Saturday before I left Washington that I would meet

Smith only under the condition that this was the final element in reaching a satisfactory conclusion. I do not have this knowledge today, and therefore there is no basis for my meeting him at this time.

*Q. Could you spell that out for us, Mr. Secretary?*

*Secretary Kissinger:* I have stated my view and the American position. There is no point in repeating it every day, since I have not heard anything yet about the discussions between Prime Minister Vorster and Mr. Smith. I will not see Mr. Smith to negotiate; I will see him if it helps to move matters to a conclusion and only if some clear result is in prospect. Since that is not the case today, there is nothing that I can add to what has already been said.

*Q. Mr. Secretary of State, if your negotiations fail and other friends of Africa come to help with the only other alternative of armed struggle, will you still be talking about outside intervention?*

*Secretary Kissinger:* The United States is opposed to outside intervention in Africa. All the African Presidents with whom I have spoken mentioned their determination to deal with these questions as an African problem. There is no point in my speculating now about what may happen, since I have not come here to fail.

*Q. Dr. Kissinger, what are your chances now that you have had two views from Tanzania and Zambia that the armed struggle should be intensified? What are your chances in the event of total rejection of your initiatives?*

*Secretary Kissinger:* I do not want to speculate about what the United States will do in the case of the failure of a mission whose failure we do not anticipate. We stated our policy here in Lusaka as supporting the objectives of majority rule, minority rights, freedom, and human dignity in southern Africa. These objectives we will support regardless of the success of one diplomatic mission.

*Q. With regard to your talks with John Vorster, how nearer is Namibia to independence?*

*Secretary Kissinger:* I believe that we have made some progress, or I would not have come here. I thought that the progress that had been made warranted this effort because I agree with President Kaunda's statement of yesterday—that if we do not make this effort and if peaceful efforts fail, the consequences for the southern part of Africa will be too ghastly to contemplate.

*Q. Dr. Kissinger, are you worried about Communist influence in Namibia and Rhodesia?*

*Secretary Kissinger:* I have to separate two problems. One is the internal direction of African movements. We believe that African nationalism will take care of its own evolution and of its own direction.

The second problem is outside military intervention from outside Africa, either from the Soviet Union or from other countries supported by the Soviet Union. That we oppose.

The direction of the liberation movements is a matter for Africans to settle, and we will not intervene in this.

*Q. Has Britain got any special role to play in your initiatives?*

*Secretary Kissinger:* Britain has the legal and historic responsibility for Rhodesia. Every initiative that we have taken has been taken in the closest coordination with Great Britain. And if my efforts either on this trip or later should succeed, Great Britain will have to provide the legal framework by which a further evolution takes place. This has been agreed to by all of the parties.

*Q. Mr. Secretary, I wonder if you would share with us your feelings as you are about to embark on the South African trip?*

*Secretary Kissinger:* I believe that a combination of factors has produced a situation where the United States, alone in the world, is in a position to make a contribution to avoiding a conflagration. We have this responsibility, which we did not seek.

It is in the interest first of the peoples of southern Africa, but eventually of all of the peoples of the world, that the world not be divided between races, that there not be a race war, and that outside powers not manipulate the aspirations of the people. If I can help on behalf of the United States, I believe that this reflects the values of human dignity and freedom and justice for which the United States has always stood.

*Q. Mr. Secretary, can you be a little more specific about what you hope to accomplish in South Africa?*

*Secretary Kissinger:* I have stated the objectives repeatedly. We will try to move Rhodesia and Namibia toward independence, majority rule, minority rights, and a constitutional framework in which, as President Kaunda said yesterday, all the races and all the people can live side by side in human dignity.

*Q. Mr. Secretary, how do you explain America's late arrival on the scene?*

*Secretary Kissinger:* The United States has gone through a very difficult decade in which it was occupied with many problems in other parts of the world.

Secondly, until the process of decolonization had reached a certain point, it was not possible for the United States to make its influence felt the way it is attempting to do now.

*Q. Mr. Secretary of State, the frontline countries have discussed this type of negotiations before, but it failed. Now they have adopted that the only solution is to intensify armed struggle. Now America has arrived on the scene late. Are you genuinely shuttling*



*diplomacy, or are you simply displaying some kind of intellectual superiority?*

*Secretary Kissinger:* Well, I do not see how I can demonstrate intellectual superiority by failing. I am here. When I was in Africa in April, all of the African countries, including this, urged the United States to make an effort. I know all previous efforts have failed, and I told President Kaunda this morning that if we fail we will join a distinguished company. But I also said I have not come here to fail.

A just peace and a just solution must be one that the people of the area accept and believe in. It cannot be one that outsiders impose on them. And it has nothing to do with demonstrating any particular quality.

*Q. Dr. Kissinger, there are four frontline states; that is, Zambia, Tanzania, Botswana, and Mozambique. But the Secretary of State has only visited Tanzania and Zambia. Is there any special reason why he has not gone to Mozambique or Botswana?*

*Secretary Kissinger:* Associates of mine have already visited Mozambique, and other associates of mine will visit Botswana on Saturday. And in any event, we recognize that the decisions will be taken by the four frontline Presidents. We count on their unity, and we will work with them cooperatively.

*Q. But precisely, has John Vorster indicated to you at any time that he is prepared to give independence to Namibia?*

*Secretary Kissinger:* I hope that when I return here the principle of independence for Namibia will be beyond question.

*Foreign Minister Mwale:* Mr. Secretary of State, Madame Kissinger, once again on behalf of the party, the Government, and indeed the people of Zambia, we wish you all the success in your difficult task and wish you a safe trip to Pretoria and back to Zambia.

Thank you very much.

## STATEMENT, PRETORIA, SOUTH AFRICA, SEPTEMBER 19<sup>3</sup>

I reported to Mr. Smith the propositions developed jointly by the United States and the United Kingdom in close consultation with the Presidents of black Africa. Mr. Smith and his colleagues considered these propositions, and they have now returned to Salisbury. I am satisfied that Mr. Smith and his three close collaborators will report favorably to their other colleagues. After consultation with their colleagues, they will have to present these propositions to their party caucus.

While the Rhodesian institutional processes are taking place, I will seek certain clarifications from the Presidents of black Africa, particularly President Kaunda and President Nyerere. We expect that this process of clarification and consultation will be concluded toward the end of this week.

## NEWS CONFERENCE, KINSHASA, ZAIRE, SEPTEMBER 22

Press release 455 dated September 22

*Q. What did you discuss with our President?*

*Secretary Kissinger:* We had a very friendly and cordial talk in which we reviewed primarily the situation in southern Africa. After this press conference we will have another meeting over lunch in which we will discuss primarily U.S.-Zairian bilateral relationships.

I reported to the President about the diplomatic steps that have been taken to attempt to ease the situation in southern Africa and to bring progress toward inde-

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<sup>3</sup> Made following a meeting with Prime Minister Vorster and the Rhodesian delegation at the Prime Minister's residence (text from press release 449, which also includes questions and answers).

pendence and majority rule. Of course I had kept the President informed throughout by letters and cables, and we had a very good exchange of views on the situation in southern Africa and throughout Africa.

*Q. We will have a chance to ask President Mobutu later, but do you now feel you have the support of the Zairian Government in your plan to set up negotiations in southern Africa?*

*Secretary Kissinger:* Of course the President will have to answer for himself, but I had the impression of being given great encouragement.

*Q. One has the impression that your government attempts to avoid direct contact with African nationalists. What is your government doing for the African nationalists?*

*Secretary Kissinger:* This is not correct. Our position is that the problems of Africa should be dealt with by Africans and therefore we have asked all superpowers to avoid contact with the African nationalist movements and to permit the African Presidents to deal directly with the nationalist movements. On this basis and on this basis alone do we believe that the evolution of Africa can be in African hands.

We will meet with African nationalist movements if the African Presidents ask us, but we do not want superpowers or anybody else to begin supporting one group against another, because this will export the rivalries of the superpowers into the continent and it will prevent these nationalist movements from pursuing nationalist objectives. So we have given the leadership of these various conflicts in Africa to the African Presidents, and we are working through the African Presidents.

*Q. But still, Mr. Secretary, you do not hesitate to have direct contact with the holders of power of white rule in southern Africa?*

*Secretary Kissinger:* When I was in South Africa I talked to a group of black leaders,

many of whom were in strong opposition—in fact, all of whom were in strong opposition—to the governmental leaders; and members of my party talked to other black leaders. So in South Africa I made it a point to talk to the leaders of the black and colored communities.

*Q. Mr. Secretary, can you confirm that Ian Smith has accepted the principle of the accession of the majority to rule?*

*Secretary Kissinger:* For me to perform the function that I am trying to exercise it is important that I do not speak for the parties and permit the parties to speak for themselves. I have indicated that I believe considerable progress has been made. I think it is clear that majority rule is the objective. So I will wait until Mr. Smith has spoken for himself—which I understand will take place on Friday [September 24]—but I have indicated that, in my judgment, considerable progress has been made.

*Q. The last time we were here, sir, there was great concern about the presence of Cuban troops in Angola, which is a neighboring state. Could you tell us now what the situation is with respect to the Cubans in Angola?*

*Secretary Kissinger:* We have no clear indications. We received reports of some having been withdrawn, maybe on the order of 2,000 to 3,000; but on the other hand, we also have reports of many civilians coming in to replace them.

The withdrawal of the Cuban troops, if there has been any, has not been strategically significant, because over 10,000 still remain; and we remain concerned about an African country whose government can sustain itself only by the presence of an expeditionary force from across the ocean.

*Q. Since your talks with President Nyerere, have you communicated any further views of the black African Presidents to the Smith regime in order to provide any further clari-*



*fication which would produce a positive decision by the Rhodesian white minority?*

*Secretary Kissinger:* As part of my efforts here, I attempt to make sure that all of the parties know what the other parties are thinking. I have conveyed through the South Africans my understanding of the thinking of President Kaunda as well as of President Nyerere to the Rhodesian authorities so that they can take it into their consideration as they make their decisions this week.

*Q. You've talked about Rhodesia. Now I should like to know what you have resolved about Namibia.*

*Secretary Kissinger:* The discussions about Namibia are still in progress. Everybody agrees that progress has been made.

The United States is in favor of the participation of all the authentic groups, including SWAPO, in any discussions concerning Namibia. We are also in favor of a U.N. role in this. And I believe that progress has been made toward achieving these objectives, as well as South Africa's role in the discussions. The precise relationship of the various groups to each other in these negotiations still remains to be worked out, but we are hopeful that in the weeks ahead we can make further progress toward the objective of setting up a conference about the independence of Namibia.

Before we end the press conference I want to say that in my discussions with President Mobutu he suggested that it would be important that the OAU [Organization of African Unity] be formally informed about the results of our efforts in southern Africa. I accepted his suggestions, and I will send an emissary to see the President of the OAU to inform him of the efforts that have taken place during the last week.

*Q. Who is the President of the OAU?*

*Secretary Kissinger:* That's the Prime Minister of Mauritius.

## NEWS CONFERENCE BY SECRETARY KISSINGER AND BRITISH FOREIGN SECRETARY CROSLAND <sup>1</sup>

*Secretary Kissinger:* First of all, I wanted to thank Mr. Crosland for agreeing to come over here. After it had been set up as a press conference for me, he agreed to join me.

I wanted to make only one point before we go to questions: that I have seen many references that the Rhodesian authorities are now considering a Kissinger proposal. I think it is well to understand what is being considered in Salisbury, or what has been considered in Salisbury all week.

First of all, the basis of the proposals is the plan put forward by Prime Minister Callaghan on March 22. This has been elaborated in detailed consultations between the British and American Governments. There have been five missions to Africa, three American and two British, in which these ideas were discussed in great detail with the African Presidents and refined in the light of their comment.

So what is being considered in Salisbury is not the plan of an individual, but what we hope reflects a consensus between the United States, the United Kingdom, and the essential requirements of the leaders of Africa. It is on this basis that we hope to make our contribution to the solution of the future of southern Africa.

*Foreign Secretary Crosland:* I would like to underline that. The British Government for the last two or three weeks has deliberately remained in a not very visible position on the grounds that you couldn't have people trying to negotiate vicariously over a distance of 5,000 miles or whatever it is.

But what Dr. Kissinger says is right. This has been very much of a joint plan. I think my first event as Foreign Secretary was to meet Dr. Kissinger on an airfield in Lincolnshire and since then we have met six times at least, with the Prime Minister

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<sup>1</sup> Held at London on Sept. 24 (text from press release 472).

very often, to discuss this. Respective officials—British officials—have been to Washington many times; State Department officials have been to London many times; and as Dr. Kissinger says, the missions to southern Africa have been, to some extent, shared between the two countries.

So he's quite right to say—though I should add that this in no way diminishes the very high proportion of the total credit that he, Dr. Kissinger, deserves—he's quite right to say that the plan within the broad framework of which he's been operating in recent weeks, and indeed in recent months, has been to a very large extent a collective one.

*Q. Mr. Secretary, if I could follow that up with a question to both of you gentlemen. Now that the shuttle is finished—I presume you are not going back—does the lead in the diplomatic process now pass to the British?*

*Secretary Kissinger:* If the Rhodesian authorities decide favorably, the next step will have to be a discussion of legal and governmental coordination in Rhodesia. Britain has a historic and legal role in this respect, and it would therefore seem to us natural that Britain would be in a position to be very helpful to the parties, if the parties requested it.

But the United States will be prepared to back up whatever efforts Britain will make and to continue its interests in a peaceful solution of this problem.

*Foreign Secretary Crosland:* I think that's absolutely right. Britain has a constitutional and a legal responsibility which, of course, the United States does not have, and therefore it will fall to Britain in any event to carry through the required legislation to validate and legalize what, hopefully, will emerge in Rhodesia.

But quite apart from that, if diplomatic help is wanted to bring the two sides together, in the early stages in particular, Britain, I think, would have to take the lead in providing such diplomatic assistance as we could which would help toward an agreed settlement.

*Q. Mr. Secretary, assuming that there is a peaceful transfer of power in Rhodesia, what steps have you taken, or what guarantees have you sought, that you won't end up with another Angola, where the Russians come in and back one faction very heavily and there's a civil war and a radical regime takes over?*

*Secretary Kissinger:* Of course, the major responsibility to prevent this will be with the Presidents of Africa, and we would assume that they could not want Africa turned into an arena for great-power competition. It is our understanding that once an interim government has been formed, guerrilla war would cease.

*Q. Two points, sir. Has a document of any kind been passed to the Smith government? Is there anything that has been signed, initialed, or exchanged in the form of papers? And secondly, you started to say what happens if the operation goes well in the hand-over to the British. What happens if it gets sticky?*

*Secretary Kissinger:* We'll get the blame. [Laughter.]

*Foreign Secretary Crosland:* That's right. [Laughter.]

*Secretary Kissinger:* With respect to your first question, no document has been initialed or signed. Several points have been put forward as our best distillation of the consensus that I have earlier described, and it is those points which the Rhodesian authorities have been discussing all week.

We do not know precisely what Mr. Smith is going to say tonight, although he knows precisely what we think the basis of a settlement would be.

*Q. Could you just follow up on that? Are those points oral, or are they in writing so there can be less ambiguity about what's been said?*

*Secretary Kissinger:* We gave him the points in writing.

*Q. Could you describe the arguments that you put to Mr. Smith when you talked to him*



*in South Africa and which seem to have persuaded him to accept a deal?*

*Secretary Kissinger:* I don't believe I should go into it at this [inaudible].

*Q. Secretary Crosland, could you please tell us, in view of the possible threat of outside intervention in Rhodesia or to one of the liberation groups, what is your feeling about how quickly the constitutional conference should be convened and an interim government should come into existence?*

*Foreign Secretary Crosland:* Well, generally as quickly as possible. It's impossible to lay down or foresee a precise timetable for this. But the last thing we want—assuming that Mr. Smith's response tonight is "yes," unequivocally "yes," the last thing we want then is a long delay in which everything would get muddled and other people would start poking their noses in and the rest of it.

I can't set a time, but I would much rather that it was a matter of weeks at the most—anyway, as soon as possible.

*Q. Before the constitutional conference or before an interim government?*

*Foreign Secretary Crosland:* Well, first of all, before talks take place between the whites and the blacks on the formation of an interim government and, secondly, before the formation of an interim government. And, as soon as an interim government is formed, then we will take in London the necessary legal and parliamentary action to legalize it.

*Q. Dr. Kissinger, have you any doubts at all as to whether Mr. Smith will accept the peace plan?*

*Secretary Kissinger:* I am hopeful that he will. I have no doubt at the moment, but we just cannot be sure until he has spoken.

*Q. Do you think that the Rhodesia peace plan has removed the danger of a race war in southern Africa if it proceeds according to plan?*

*Secretary Kissinger:* I think it has given

us the possibility to avoid that danger, and it has already sharply reduced it.

*Q. Can you give any idea of the cost to Great Britain and the United States of the peace plan if it's carried out?*

*Secretary Kissinger:* We are going to be studying this next week jointly in Washington. We have not arrived at a figure yet.

*Q. Do you think that at some point that, as part of this process, Rhodesia will have to renounce UDI [unilateral declaration of independence]?*

*Foreign Secretary Crosland:* Well, if this process goes well there are two constitutional acts that are involved.

The first one is to legalize the interim government that will come, we hope, into being in a short space of time; and the second is at the end of two years, when majority rule has been achieved within the conditions laid down by the Prime Minister on March 22. We shall then need final legislation which will confer total independence on what will then be a majority black government in Rhodesia.

*Q. Sir, did you mean to say "at the end of two years" as firmly as that?*

*Foreign Secretary Crosland:* Well, I can't say. Nobody has laid down the actual day; but Dr. Kissinger, as I understand it, and the British Government have been consistently talking within the phrase used by the Prime Minister on March 22, of 18 months to two years.

*Q. Is that Dr. Kissinger's view, too, about the terms in which he has been conducting the talks?*

*Secretary Kissinger:* That is and has been my view.

*Q. You spoke of the talks within Rhodesia between black and white about the formation of an interim government before any U.K. legislation. Is there a possibility that those talks could break down in view of the divisions on the African side, or do you have*

*assurances from the African side that an interim government can be formed?*

*Secretary Kissinger:* Well, we have taken consistently the position that the African side is responsible for its representation and for its program. The African Presidents seem to be confident that they can produce a delegation; and we would expect that, after all the anguish that both sides have gone through, they would conduct the discussions with a sense of responsibility. And on that basis we believe a solution could be found.

*Q. Mr. Secretary, given the history of military dictatorships and so forth in Africa, what kind of future do you see for Rhodesia in the event that black majority rule is established?*

*Secretary Kissinger:* Well, I think we should—we have not even taken the first steps on that road yet, and it is premature to speculate until we see how these discussions are going.

*Q. Mr. Crosland, this two years more or less—when does the clock start running—today, at the point of Mr. Smith's announcement, or at the beginning of a constitutional conference or when?*

*Foreign Secretary Crosland:* I can't give you a cut-and-dried answer on a particular day. Let's wait and see what Mr. Smith is going to say tonight. Let us wait and see what reaction there is to that from the black African states, and then we shall be able to lay down the kind of timetable and program which we want to see fulfilled.

*Q. Mr. Secretary, since you have been so concerned about the danger of the racial war in southern Africa, I wonder if you could explain once more how the establishment of black, and quite possibly militant, regimes on the borders of South Africa, will reduce the pressure leading to such confrontations in that country.*

*Secretary Kissinger:* We now have a war going on in Rhodesia, and we have the

danger of war in Namibia. What we are attempting to do is to demonstrate the possibility of peaceful solutions and of the utility of negotiations. Any step that is taken is not going to be a final step in that process. We believe that if this process that, hopefully, will start today will be carried out to its conclusion, it will contribute to moderation in Africa and to creating additional incentives for negotiated solutions.

*Q. Mr. Secretary, two questions. Is it your understanding that during the interim government Mr. Smith will remain as Prime Minister? Secondly, who do you now understand will chair the constitutional talks?*

*Secretary Kissinger:* You must understand that before Mr. Smith has spoken it would not be appropriate for me to go into the details of all the ideas that he may put forward for all of the negotiations that would ensue.

The United States has generally taken the position that it is for each side to put forward its representatives and that the United States would not prescribe to either side who should represent it in any talks that might result. And so let us wait until after Mr. Smith has spoken and then see what delegations are actually being produced by the two sides.

*Q. On the constitutional talks?*

*Secretary Kissinger:* On the constitutional talks—we haven't actually thought through the chairmanship.

We believe that Britain has an important contribution to make. How it will exercise this will obviously depend on the parties and on the decisions of the British Government.

*Foreign Secretary Crosland:* Could I just add one word to that? We can't see the nature of the constitutional talks at the moment. We don't know whether this will take the form of a standard, regular type of conference or whether the talks will be very much more informal.



So any discussions of who will take the chair is premature, but I repeat what I said earlier—that as far as diplomatic help and activity is concerned, the British Government will give all the assistance that it possibly can to whatever talks occur and to make sure they come to a successful conclusion.

*Q. Does that mean, Foreign Secretary, that you are opposed in principle to Britain taking the chair at such constitutional talks?*

*Foreign Secretary Crosland:* No. I'm not opposed in principle; I'm not in favor in principle. I can't see the scenario and so I've got to keep all the options open until I can see the scenario more clearly.

*Q. Mr. Crosland, are you expecting Mr. Smith to come to London for the constitutional conference as part or as head of that delegation, and would you be happy for that to take place?*

*Foreign Secretary Crosland:* I think it highly unlikely that the constitutional conference would take place in London to begin with. I think it would almost certainly take place in Africa.

*Q. And would the British Government be happy for Mr. Smith to be part or head of that Rhodesian delegation?*

*Foreign Secretary Crosland:* Well, we wouldn't be responsible. I've said we'd give what help we can to the constitutional conference but the people to answer that question would be the black negotiating team, not the British Government.

*Q. But you're still prepared for Mr. Smith to be the head of the interim government until the transfer of power takes place?*

*Foreign Secretary Crosland:* I'm not either prepared nor unprepared. This is a matter which has got to be the subject of agreement between the white Rhodesians whoever they're led by in a week's time, on the one hand, and the black Rhodesians, or the black Presidents behind them, on the other

hand; and it's not for the British Government at this moment of time to say what we think should come out of that negotiating process.

*Q. Mr. Secretary, could we hear from both you and from Mr. Crosland, if you could, on your views as to what has produced what you hope will be a successful conclusion? What have been the factors which at this time, after 11 years, seemingly have brought the situation to this climax?*

*Secretary Kissinger:* Personal charm. [Laughter.] I think—

*Foreign Secretary Crosland:* As soon as he said "personal charm," someone said "Mr. Crosland." [Laughter.]

*Secretary Kissinger:* It was a combination of factors. A continuation of the war, the assessment by the Rhodesian authorities of the likely trends, the participation of the South African Government in the negotiations, and the commitment of the U.S. Government to a peaceful solution and its willingness to engage itself, together with the efforts that Great Britain has been making consistently, produced new factors in the situation.

*Q. Mr. Crosland, could you tell us which will come first, the constitutional conference or the interim government?*

*Foreign Secretary Crosland:* No, I can't tell you.

*Q. Mr. Crosland, do I take it from your earlier reply of the two constitutional acts that are required, that it will be unnecessary for Mr. Smith to actually renounce UDI in a formal way?*

*Foreign Secretary Crosland:* Let me make this absolutely clear—that we have—that Dr. Kissinger has been pushing, as a joint approach to both sides, a certain number of possibilities that form part of a plan which we hope will be broadly adopted and will lead to the two sides negotiating together. But if Mr. Smith says what we hope and if the African sides react favor-

ably to that, then at that point it becomes for negotiations in Africa to answer the various questions that have been raised during the last two or three minutes.

It is not for the U.K. Government nor—if it comes to that—for the U.S. Government to say in advance they want this, they don't want that, the other. This is for the whites and blacks in Africa to agree amongst themselves.

*Q. Mr. Secretary, President Nyerere of Tanzania is quoted as saying that you put a lot of pressure on Rhodesia through South Africa. What kind of pressure did you put, and what kind of ultimatum did you deliver?*

*Secretary Kissinger:* We delivered no ultimatum, and we reviewed the likely evolution of events and the alternatives that were available and we believe that this contributed to the decision. There were no addition—there were no threats or pressure.

*Q. Mr. Secretary, may I bring you back to the question of money, please? There have been reports that in order to get this plan, a safety net in the amount of \$1.5–\$2 billion is being considered, with an American contribution that could run to \$400–\$500 million. Could you now sort out the money figures for us, please?*

*Secretary Kissinger:* No, none of the figures have any official status. Secondly, the idea of a safety net is a somewhat crude description of a complicated scheme that has been discussed among officials, that would be alternatively available for the investment or for an insurance scheme for those who might eventually wish to emigrate.

There will be discussions next week in Washington between American, British, and South African officials to try to refine this and come up with specific figures. At this point no specific figures have been agreed to.

*Q. You said just now that you assumed that*

*there would be a cease-fire in the guerrilla war as soon as the basic settlement had been accepted by Mr. Smith. Mr. Smith has used the device of saying that there has not been a cease-fire to wriggle out from previous obligations. Are you now confident—*

*Secretary Kissinger:* No, I said when an interim government is formed. But I believe that this, too, should await Mr. Smith's speech and the negotiations that we hope will follow this speech.

*Q. Has Mr. Smith asked that the guerrilla cease-fire should be a condition of his implementing your suggestions?*

*Secretary Kissinger:* Again, I believe that Mr. Smith will have to speak for himself but I—my impression is that he will put forward whatever—if he—what he says without preconditions.

*Q. Is there any room for Mr. Smith today to say, "yes, but," or does he have to say "yes" or "no" specifically to the total package? Is there any room for him to hedge on this?*

*Secretary Kissinger:* I really am in no position to speak for Mr. Smith. Our impression is, as he has said himself, that his statement will be clear and unambiguous and will leave no room for evasion; this I gather from his own public statements.

*Q. But does he have to accept the total or reject the total or can he accept most of it and say, "but I don't want this piece"?*

*Secretary Kissinger:* We'll know in a few hours. We think the process would be helped most if the total package were put forward.

*Q. If there is any prospect of them not accepting the total package, would you consider returning, or would you say that that's the end of negotiations?*

*Secretary Kissinger:* I think that the matter has gone so far that it must be con-



cluded. But why speculate about what may happen tonight?

*Q. I just wondered what you think might happen if he didn't accept.*

*Secretary Kissinger:* Well, I don't operate on that assumption. I operate on the assumption that—that the total package will be put forward.

*Q. Which do you think should come first, the constitutional conference or the formation of a government?*

*Secretary Kissinger:* I think it extremely important that the solutions for southern Africa be seen to be African solutions and that the United States and the United Kingdom, whose primary interest has been to produce peace in southern Africa, not appear to be dictating the precise outcome. Therefore I believe that we should wait for, first, Mr. Smith's speech and then the African reaction.

As my colleague has already stated, the United Kingdom is willing to be helpful; the United States is prepared to be supportive; but let us first get some other reactions on the table.

*Q. Have you spoken with Mr. Smith since leaving Africa or any representative of his government?*

*Secretary Kissinger:* No, I have not.

*Q. Do you expect any trouble from the Soviet Union, Dr. Kissinger, because they have been kicking you rather hard over what you have been trying to do? Do you think that they can stir up diplomatic trouble in the United Nations or elsewhere in Africa to try and sabotage the whole plan?*

*Secretary Kissinger:* We believe that it should be in the interest of all countries to promote peace in southern Africa; and we would hope that the Soviet Union would not, for the sake of ideology or great-power rivalry, try to introduce an element of contention which must above all hurt

the peoples of southern Africa and destroy an opportunity for peace.

*Q. Mr. Kissinger, it seems from both you gentlemen, then, the United States and the United Kingdom do not want to take much responsibility for the actual solutions. Can you say how it would be possible for the blacks and whites in Rhodesia to work out an interim government by themselves?*

*Secretary Kissinger:* No, we did not say they should do it by themselves. I think we both said that we would be active, supportive, cooperative, in any way that we are asked and in any way that can be useful.

Thank you, gentlemen.

#### ARRIVAL, ANDREWS AFB, SEPTEMBER 24

Press release 473 dated September 24

The mission to Africa which I undertook on behalf of the President was aimed at the achievement of the most fundamental values in which all Americans believe: peace, justice, and human dignity. We have made encouraging progress.

We believe there is now a good opportunity for settling the issue of Rhodesia and making progress toward negotiations on Namibia. Much remains to be done that depends on the good will of all the parties concerned. The United States remains prepared to give its good offices and to cooperate with Great Britain, which, with respect to Rhodesia, has a historic and constitutional role to play.

I would like to thank all of the governments whose cooperation was so essential and whose representatives did me the courtesy of coming out here and all of my associates whose indefatigable work made this possible.

I now will report to the President immediately, and early next week I will report to the Congress.

## President Ford Pledges U.S. Support for Efforts for Solution in Africa

*Statement by President Ford*<sup>1</sup>

I am very pleased to hear of the announcement today by Ian Smith of Rhodesia. On behalf of the Rhodesian authorities, he has accepted proposals that can head off an escalating conflict and should produce negotiations which can bring southern Africa closer to peace.

The United States is proud to have made a contribution—but we have not done so alone. The principles of the settlement set forth are based on the plan outlined by Prime Minister Callaghan on March 22. I wish to pay tribute to the Prime Minister and to the United Kingdom, with whom we have closely cooperated. Farsighted and indispensable contributions were also made by the various African Presidents. I would like as well to acknowledge the constructive role played by Prime Minister Vorster of South Africa.

The road is now open for an African solution to an African problem—free of outside intervention, violence, and bitterness. This has been the objective of the United States, and the purpose of the skillful and energetic diplomacy that we have pursued. We call on other nations to support, not impede, the African search for a peaceful settlement.

The United States is prepared to continue to help. We will not prescribe for the peoples of Africa what only they can bring about. But we will be available to lend our full support to the efforts of the British, the Rhodesians of both races, and the African states concerned.

It is my earnest hope that the several parties will now move swiftly to establish the conditions for independence in which

all of its peoples can live together in harmony. Today we have seen an act of realism that is the first step toward that goal. With good will on all sides, that vision can become a reality.

A threat to world peace has been eased. We can take satisfaction in the role we have played. I extend my best wishes to the peoples of Rhodesia and of all Africa. I call on all nations to help them shape a future of peace, prosperity, and human dignity.

## Secretary Discusses Southern Africa in Interview for NBC "Today" Show

*Following is the transcript of an interview with Secretary Kissinger by Tom Brokaw and Richard Valeriani recorded on September 27 and broadcast on the NBC-TV "Today" show on September 28.*

Press release 476 dated September 28

*Mr. Brokaw: Mr. Secretary, you worked out the details of a two-year transition to black majority rule in Rhodesia. Mr. [Ian D.] Smith stated the conditions in a speech to Rhodesians last Friday. Now the black Presidents who have been participating in these negotiations are very critical of at least an element of those conditions. What has happened?*

*Secretary Kissinger: The basic proposals that were put forward were for majority rule in two years, a transitional government to be established immediately, a constitutional conference to work out the constitution at the end of the two years; and those points have been accepted.*

*Secondly, it isn't correct to say that Smith made these proposals. The proposals that Smith put forward were the result of discussions between the United States, Great Britain, and the African Presidents prior to my meeting with Smith.*

*I think one has to understand that each*

<sup>1</sup> Made in the press briefing room at the White House on Sept. 24 (text from Weekly Compilation of Presidential Documents dated Sept. 27).



of these leaders has his own constituency. For African leaders to say they accept proposals of Smith is almost impossible.

They have indicated that there are certain things they want to negotiate. They have indicated that they made no preconditions. We have received messages today from three of the leaders who attended the meeting, stressing that they think matters are on track and that they are looking forward to early negotiations.

So, I think we should cut through the rhetoric and look at the reality. And there is going to be a lot of rhetoric in the next few weeks.

*Mr. Brokaw: But are you saying that these African leaders have been critical for their own domestic political purposes?*

*Secretary Kissinger:* I am saying that obviously there will have to be negotiations for the transition.

*Mr. Brokaw: How many of these conditions does Mr. Smith think are negotiable?*

*Secretary Kissinger:* The composition of the government, the allocation of ministers—none of this has been settled yet. This requires negotiation. Prior to this, it is quite possible for both sides to make public statements that may seem irreconcilable.

But we should always remember that the biggest steps have been taken and that the differences that remain are relatively small compared to the steps that have already been taken.

*Mr. Valeriani: Mr. Secretary, have the African Presidents rejected anything that they told you they would approve, or are they upping the ante now?*

*Secretary Kissinger:* The African Presidents have not indicated a rejection of anything specific. The African Presidents have made a general statement that they will not accept the dictation of Smith with respect to all the details of the transitional government.

On the other hand, what Smith has put forward was not his idea, but in itself reflected a compromise between many points of view. So, we will have to wait until a conference meets to find out what the real differences are.

The British are sending a minister to Africa within the next day, with the explicit purpose of getting the conference which all sides have now asked for to meet to work out the details.

*Mr. Valeriani: There is no chance that you are going to go back, is there?*

*Secretary Kissinger:* There is no chance that I will go back.

*Mr. Brokaw: Will the conference have to take place in Rhodesia, as Mr. Smith seemed to indicate on Friday when he said it would be worked out in Rhodesia?*

*Secretary Kissinger:* The locale of the conference in Rhodesia was not part of those five points. And I think that the basic point is that it should meet at a mutually agreeable place.

*Mr. Valeriani: Mr. Secretary, if I can look back, it is very difficult to believe that this came about without your putting a great deal of pressure on Rhodesia or a great deal of pressure on South Africa to put pressure on Rhodesia in turn. How much pressure did you have to apply on South Africa? What did you have to promise South Africa?*

*Secretary Kissinger:* We promised nothing to South Africa. Leaders make a decision on the basis of their assessment of what is likely to happen. South African leaders understood, as the Rhodesian leaders came to understand, that the alternative to a negotiation and to a peaceful settlement is an escalating war whose outcome would be extremely problematical for them and which has the great risk of expansion without changing the outcome.

Those were the basic facts that everybody faced. And when those facts became

clear, certain conclusions followed. We did not have to bring any additional pressure other than an analysis of the facts.

*Mr. Valeriani: What is to prevent the Russians from coming in now and backing a faction as they did in Angola, stirring up a civil war and having another Angola, which you are specifically trying to avoid?*

*Secretary Kissinger:* This has to be largely the responsibility of the African Presidents. It is up to the Africans to decide whether they want their continent to become the arena for great-power rivalry—because inevitably, outside intervention, as a regular pattern, cannot be ignored—or whether they want African solutions to African problems.

As far as the United States is concerned, we seek no sphere of influence in Africa. Up to now, the African Presidents have prevented any of the outside powers from backing any one of the factions. We support this; and if this continues, there can be a moderate, responsible, and peaceful outcome to Rhodesia.

*Mr. Brokaw: What do you see as the U.S. continuing role in Rhodesia during this interim period over the two years—economically, in terms of assistance, and so on?*

*Secretary Kissinger:* The immediate problem is to bring the various parties to the conference table within the framework of the principles that have been laid out.

Britain has to take the lead in this because Britain has the constitutional and historical responsibility.

We will back it up diplomatically. We have been in close contact with all of the African Presidents in recent days, and nothing we have heard would indicate that this conference will not take place.

After the conference has met, after the transitional government is established, then it will be our policy to encourage this transitional government, and we will be prepared to talk with anyone about economic and other relationships.

*Mr. Brokaw: But no commitments have now been made prior to the establishment of that?*

*Secretary Kissinger:* There are no secret commitments. There are plans for economic cooperation, which are in the process of being worked out and which will be submitted to the Congress before they are implemented.

*Mr. Valeriani: You apparently have made a lot of guarantees to Rhodesian whites, or provisions for Rhodesian whites.*

*Secretary Kissinger:* That is not correct.

*Mr. Valeriani: Well, there is an international fund of some sort, isn't there?*

*Secretary Kissinger:* There is the idea of a fund that can be used for investment as well as for guarantees. The purpose is not to drive the whites out, but to enable the whites to stay there.

*Mr. Valeriani: Why should the American taxpayer provide that kind of guarantee for Rhodesian whites?*

*Secretary Kissinger:* Because the consequences of a race war in southern Africa with foreign intervention and of the radicalization of all of Africa, which would be the alternative, would cost the American taxpayer infinitely more than what we are thinking about now might cost.

*Mr. Brokaw: What is the next step in South Africa, in that country? What kind of pressure does this put now on Prime Minister Vorster?*

*Secretary Kissinger:* I think South Africa has to face the necessity of change and the domestic pressures that its system has imposed, and Prime Minister Vorster will have to consider what the evolution of his own country should be.

*Mr. Brokaw: In the not too distant future?*

*Secretary Kissinger:* In the not too distant future.



*Mr. Brokaw: After Rhodesia has a change to majority rule?*

*Secretary Kissinger: I do not want to go into details of what the South African Government should do. But most thoughtful South Africans I met realize that some changes were necessary.*

*Mr. Brokaw: Mr. Secretary, very briefly, is this the last of your major shuttle-diplomacy efforts in far-distant points? Can you foresee any other place you will have to go?*

*Secretary Kissinger: Not before the election.*

*Mr. Brokaw: Thank you very much, Mr. Secretary.*

## **International Economic Support for Rhodesia Settlement Discussed**

*Following is a press statement issued on October 7 at Washington.*

Meetings were held for two days, October 6-7, between senior officials of the United States and Great Britain, and periodically in consultation with the South African Ambassador to the United States. The officials discussed ways and means of providing international economic support for a Rhodesian settlement.

The purpose of this international effort

should be to assist a new government to promote:

—Widespread economic and social development of Zimbabwe;

—Rapid expansion of economic opportunities and skills of the black majority; and

—Economic security for all segments of the population so that they might contribute their skills and enthusiasm to Zimbabwe development.

The officials discussed the resources that might be required and the kinds of programs for development and economic security that might be supported by an international fund. They examined ways of administering and operating the fund for prompt and effective assistance to the Zimbabwe economy. They discussed how the fund could work with the interim government and the future independent government of Zimbabwe. They considered how development assistance to Zimbabwe might be related to development needs in the southern Africa region after the lifting of economic sanctions against Rhodesia.

The officials discussed how they might communicate the views expressed and progress achieved at these meetings to other potential participants in the international fund. Toward this end, the officials will consult with their respective governments over the next few days and resume their discussions next week in London.

## The Search for Peace in Southern Africa

*Statement by William D. Rogers  
Under Secretary for Economic Affairs*<sup>1</sup>

This is a critical moment in our relations with Africa. The Secretary of State has just returned from two weeks in Africa. The purpose of his trip was to explore whether the United States could play a constructive role in the search for peaceful solutions to the crises of Namibia and Rhodesia.

We began the effort convinced that the prospects were less than favorable. You, Mr. Chairman [Senator Dick Clark], estimated them to be 1 in 20. It now appears, however, that in fact we have made some progress on Namibia and that there may be at hand a major breakthrough toward majority rule in Rhodesia within two years.

I would like to say a few words about this effort, since it is not unrelated to the central issue before this committee—South Africa—nor was South Africa entirely irrelevant to the effort. First, however, I would like to express our appreciation to you, Mr. Chairman, for your interest and understanding and for the interest and understanding of other members of this committee and of the Senate. As you know, we have made particular efforts to keep the Senate advised of the Department's initia-

tives. A few hours before he left, the Secretary met with almost half the Senate for a full briefing.

We have tried, both before and since the trip, to keep you and others, Mr. Chairman, advised. And we will continue to do so, for we entertain no illusions that the search for peace in southern Africa is the monopoly of any single branch of our government nor, may I add, of any single party of our political system.

I would like, first, to discuss with you the reasons for undertaking this effort and, second, where we stand.

Why have we made the effort?

I should stress first why we did not make the effort. We did not make the effort to establish a sphere of influence for the United States. We did not make the effort to place our own nominees in power in Rhodesia or Namibia. We did not make the effort to perpetuate injustice.

We made the effort because the alternative to a peaceful solution is violence: race wars in Namibia and Rhodesia, wars which will pit blacks against whites, pride against vengeance, and which would be an open invitation to foreign intervention and the radicalization of all of Africa.

Sustained racial warfare in southern Africa would polarize international relations everywhere and poison the atmosphere for international cooperation. In addition it could inflame old passions in our

<sup>1</sup> Made before the Subcommittee on African Affairs of the Senate Committee on Foreign Relations on Sept. 30. The complete transcript of the hearings will be published by the committee and will be available from the Superintendent of Documents, U.S. Government Printing Office, Washington, D.C. 20402.



own country. We have enjoyed three decades of progress in race relations in the United States. A full-blown race war on the television screens of this country could set us back a considerable way.

It was for these several reasons—and because all other efforts had finally failed—that the Secretary undertook his trip to southern Africa earlier this month.

Its purpose was to get the parties themselves to undertake to find African solutions to African problems, not on the battlefield but at the bargaining table. We could impose no final result, and we knew this from the outset. We could only help to begin the process, a process by which those directly affected could agree to consult together, to determine for themselves the shape and structure of a free, independent, and unitary Namibia and Rhodesia.

On Namibia, we have made progress. We consulted at considerable length with South Africa. The decisive moment has not yet come to hand, but our meetings give us reason to believe that there is room for compromise and hope on this issue, as the Secretary will suggest in his statement to the General Assembly of the United Nations today.

### **Complex Problem of Rhodesia**

On Rhodesia, events unfolded rather more rapidly than many had thought possible. Rhodesia, as you know, is an extraordinarily complex problem. The parties involved include the four frontline Presidents, the highly diverse national liberation movements, the British Government, the South African Government, and the authorities in Salisbury.

We and the British undertook some five missions to Africa to consult with African leaders prior to the meeting in early September in Zurich with Prime Minister Vorster [of South Africa]. After that meeting we had a most careful review of the situation with both President Nyerere [of

Tanzania] and President Kaunda [of Zambia]. Following that review, the Secretary traveled to Pretoria to meet with Prime Minister Vorster and then with Mr. Smith [Ian D. Smith, of Rhodesia]. We then communicated the views of Mr. Smith to the frontline Presidents through Presidents Nyerere and Kaunda. The proposals which we discussed were derived from working papers which the United Kingdom and the United States put together.

On Friday of last week, Mr. Smith announced that, for the first time since 1965 when Salisbury announced its independence from Britain, he would accept majority rule and that majority rule would occur, furthermore, within two years. In addition, he agreed that Britain should enact the enabling legislation necessary to legitimate the process to majority rule and that a government of transition should be immediately organized with major black participation.

The Presidents of the frontline states have responded by stating that they also agree that an early meeting should be called to organize the new government and have accepted the basic proposals put forward for majority rule within two years.

The United Kingdom announced yesterday that, in view of the acceptance of this framework, it is convening a conference of the parties to begin now the establishment of the government of transition.

In our view, the path is now open to the parties for the peaceful resolution of the crisis of Rhodesia. We have no illusions about the process which has begun, however. There will be problems, difficulties, and hitches enough in the months ahead. Rhodesia knows hatred, fear, and frustration. The sense of conciliation and the spirit of compassion and understanding which are so essential to compromise and negotiation are hard to maintain in such an atmosphere. Already the African Presidents have said publicly that, though the Rhodesian nationalists will take no preconditions to the bargaining table, they

cannot accept all that Smith has, at our suggestion, put forward as to the structure of the two-year transitional government.

All we can be certain is that the opening is at hand. It rests with the parties now to determine whether they can seize the opportunity before them. We and the United Kingdom, which has the ultimate legal and constitutional responsibilities in Rhodesia, are pledged to do all in our power to bring them together.

### **Easing Economic Shock of Transition**

Mr. Smith also mentioned in his statement on September 24 a summary of ideas which the United Kingdom and the United States had put together relating to the extent to which the international community can cooperate to ease the economic shocks of the transition to majority rule.

The objective of this effort would be to maintain confidence in the future of Rhodesia. This proposal would be intended to give an incentive to those who have a positive contribution to make to stay in Rhodesia and work for the future of the country. Its overall aim would be to expand industrial and mineral production in Rhodesia, to enhance agricultural potential, and to provide the funds for necessary training and skills.

Its broader purposes would be: to equip black Rhodesians to take advantage of the opportunities which will be opened to them in a majority-ruled Rhodesia, to expand investment in the country, and to allow the economy to adjust to the removal of sanctions.

It is not a plan to buy out the holdings of the white Rhodesians. No one would be paid to leave. It is not like the program the British Government employed in Kenya. As I have said, its overall objective is to maintain a sense of confidence in the economic future of the country, not to encourage emigration and capital flight.

At this point we are not able to say what the dimensions of an American contribution to such a plan might be. As you know,

we will be holding tripartite meetings here in Washington shortly with representatives of both the British and South African Governments to elaborate the concept and work out the shape of the financial commitment which might be necessary. As soon as these studies are completed, we will share their results with the Congress and with the several other nations which we expect will join us.

This has been the purpose and effect of the Secretary's recent efforts in Africa. Its emphasis, in terms of practical, immediate results, has been on Namibia and Rhodesia. But we have not lost sight of South Africa itself.

### **U.S. Interests in South Africa**

I know you have expressed concern, Mr. Chairman, as have others, that with our concentration on these two territories we would ignore, or compromise, our interests in the problem of South Africa itself. But we do not think that an effort in Rhodesia and Namibia will dilute our capacity to influence favorably developments in South Africa. To the contrary. If we can somehow avoid war in those two neighboring areas and shift from violence to negotiation as the way to resolve racial conflict, we may have a profoundly positive effect on the circumstances within South Africa itself and its own prospects for peaceful evolution.

I am grateful, therefore, to have this opportunity to review with you our interests in South Africa, our policy toward that country, and the implications of recent developments in South Africa.

South Africa plays an important role in the world economy, and it is located at the crossroads of major trade routes used by ourselves and our allies. It is an important and populous African country, a source of valuable raw materials.

Our investment and trade in South Africa each constitute slightly more than 1 percent of our total worldwide private



foreign investment and total worldwide trade. Nonetheless, South Africa is an active trading partner. In 1975 the United States exported about 1.3 billion dollars' worth of goods to South Africa, which accounted for about 30 percent of our total exports to all of Africa and 1.4 percent of our total exports to all countries. Last year we imported \$840 million in products from South Africa, which was equivalent to about 10 percent of our total imports from Africa and slightly less than 1 percent of our total imports from worldwide sources.

South Africa is also an important but not vital source of a variety of essential minerals such as antimony, manganese, vanadium, chromite, and platinum. The book value of American private investment in South Africa at the end of 1974 totaled \$1.46 billion, which was about 40 percent of our total investments in Africa but only slightly more than 1 percent of our total worldwide private foreign investments.

Our strategic interests in South Africa are modest. While South Africa is strategically located on the lines of communication between the Atlantic and Indian Oceans, we have determined that U.S. use of South African port facilities is not now vital to our defense needs. While we continue to maintain, on a standby basis, the contract-operated tracking station, near Johannesburg, of the U.S. Air Force South Atlantic Missile Test Range, it has been used only infrequently in recent years.

South Africa's agricultural lands are varied and productive; it has been endowed with an unusually broad range of mineral resources. Its people, too, are a significant resource, with a strong sense of pride and an eagerness for advancement. Drawing on its natural and human resources, South Africa has been able in the past century to create a solid base for industrial development. Especially in the postwar years, South Africa has undergone a period of rapid economic growth.

I review these elements of South Africa's potential for two reasons: to point up the

future that could be South Africa's and to place the material American interests there in perspective.

### **South Africa's Policies of Apartheid**

As to South Africa's system of institutionalized racial discrimination, the views of the United States have been clear and consistent. They were publicly reaffirmed by Secretary Kissinger in his address in Lusaka in April and in other public statements since that time, and he will restate them today to the U.N. General Assembly. They have been privately reaffirmed in his discussions with Prime Minister Vorster.

The United States views those policies not only as unjust but also as unwise. As the Secretary stated in Philadelphia on August 31: "No system that leads to periodic upheavals and violence can possibly be just or acceptable—nor can it last." The violence which has persisted in South Africa since last June has eliminated with tragic finality any thought or pretense that the system of institutionalized discrimination will ever be accepted by the black people of that country.

This was impressed upon all of us in moving terms by the South African black leaders we met in Pretoria two weeks ago. In two momentous meetings, the Secretary heard the full spectrum of views on South Africa. He learned much. And, I add, by listening to them, he symbolized the American commitment to interracial cooperation.

U.S. representatives have frequently described those elements of our policy toward South Africa which are designed to communicate our strong views on apartheid to the South African Government and people. Without pretending to have the solutions to South Africa's complex problems, we intend to use our influence to bring about peaceful change, equality of opportunity, and basic human rights for all South Africans.

We recognize, however, that there may

be additional ways to further social development and meaningful change within South Africa. We agree with witnesses, Mr. Chairman, who have testified in recent days about the positive effect that American firms in South Africa, committed to enlightened business practices, could have on developments there.

We believe it is important, for example, for American business to continue to reflect the principles of the United States in their operations in South Africa, and we believe that this can be done despite the existence of institutionalized racial discrimination.

You are aware, Mr. Chairman, of our policy to encourage American businessmen to take positive steps to enhance the well-being of their black employees. We believe that American businesses can do, and will find it in their interest to do, more in this regard. In examining this question further, we will take into account the proposals expressed by the witnesses who have discussed this subject with your subcommittee.

Other measures designed to exert a positive influence on the pace of progress in South Africa have included our extensive exchange program under which South Africans, representing a broad cross section of South Africa's population, have visited the United States. In addition the American Embassy and our three consulates general in South Africa have vigorously worked to project, through their activities and the behavior of their staffs, the values for which we stand. I believe you may be able to testify, Mr. Chairman, to the commitment of our official representatives to these objectives.

The conviction that communication and exposure to positive influences are important if change is to be brought about in South Africa is also an important element behind our determination to continue to oppose the isolation of South Africa from the rest of the international community. We believe that excluding South Africa, and other nations as well, from interna-

tional organizations can have serious detrimental effects both on South Africa and on the organizations themselves.

Mr. Chairman, these aspects of our policy toward South Africa have not changed.

What has changed is that we are now actively engaged in a positive effort to effectuate change in southern Africa by finding solutions to the most immediate and acute problems there. Events both inside and outside South Africa have added a measure of urgency to the need for change in South Africa. The key role that South Africa must play if the peaceful evolution of Namibia and Rhodesia to independence and majority rule is to take place has long been recognized, and American officials have long been urged by African leaders to "use their influence" with South Africa to this end. The Secretary discussed this point with African leaders during his first visit to the continent in April. Since then, we have been in close touch with the South African Government, as well as with leaders of black Africa, in recent negotiations on Namibia and Rhodesia. All these parties played a positive and constructive role in this effort, including Prime Minister Vorster of South Africa.

But I wish to make it clear that South Africa's participation in these efforts was not secured by any trades or concessions involving other aspects of our policy which I described earlier. None were asked, and none were offered. There was no quid pro quo. Secretary Kissinger stated in June that the United States would not sacrifice its principles elsewhere in the search for peaceful solutions for Namibia and Rhodesia.

Recent events have shown the tragic proportions of the South African problem. It is, as I said earlier, a highly complex one. It is not a conventional case of decolonization. Blacks and whites have been in that land for hundreds of years. Neither is alien; all of its peoples are, in a root sense, African.

The search for a solution will demand



the most extraordinary effort of will, compassion, understanding, and conciliation by all South Africans. It is the issue of justice and decency which transcends Africa and reaches out to touch the moral sense of all mankind. The United States cannot be indifferent to it. And as the Secretary of State has made clear in his Lusaka statement and since, we shall not be.

## **Report on 1975 U.S. Participation in the U.N. Transmitted to Congress**

*Message From President Ford*<sup>1</sup>

*To the Congress of the United States:*

I am pleased to send to the Congress the 30th annual report on United States participation in the United Nations and its many subsidiary bodies.

This report shows how the United States worked to advance its interests through the main activities of the United Nations system during Calendar Year 1975. It describes the outcome of important meetings such as the seventh special session of the General Assembly on world economic cooperation and the landmark International Women's Year conference; it covers the work of the Security Council in the Middle East and other areas; and it reports on such contentious political issues as the resolution of the 30th General Assembly equating Zionism with Racism with which we vigorously disagreed. These events, and many other UN activities, reflect an active year for the United States in the United Nations during which we persisted in our long-term effort to promote peace, economic progress and social justice within a worldwide framework.

<sup>1</sup> Transmitted on Oct. 1 (text from White House press release); the report, entitled "U.S. Participation in the UN—Report by the President to the Congress for the Year 1975," is for sale by the Superintendent of Documents, U.S. Government Printing Office, Washington, D.C. 20402 (Department of State publication 8880; 410 pp.).

In the area of security and crisis management, the United Nations was effective in carrying out its primary purpose: contributing to the maintenance of international peace. United Nations peacekeeping forces in both the Sinai and the Golan Heights areas of the Middle East continued to separate previous combatants while the search for a more durable peace continued. Similarly, in Cyprus, United Nations peacekeeping forces helped to patrol the lines where confrontation existed and contributed to humanitarian needs. The Security Council, in addition to making the arrangements for the continuation of the mandates for these forces, also helped reduce tensions over the Western Sahara and East Timor.

A major area of activity of direct importance for American interests was the seventh special session of the General Assembly on development and international economic cooperation. Convened September 1 just prior to the 30th regular session, this meeting established a new agenda for international cooperation on the planning of our emerging global economic system. Prior to this meeting there had been division, confrontation and acrimony within the United Nations and elsewhere, over how to improve the world economic system and how to accelerate the process of development. Determined to make the most of this opportunity and to search for common ground, the United States outlined a broad program of practical initiatives which would be of benefit to both developing and developed countries. The participants in this historic meeting responded positively to the U.S. approach, adopting a consensus resolution which embraced most of our proposals. This session demonstrated that the UN can help to advance America's fundamental interests when we exercise leadership in the organization.

An international conference of great importance to the United States was the World Conference of the International Women's Year in Mexico City. This meeting, which grew out of a 1974 U.S. initia-

tive, marked the first time that the problems of women had been the subject of such a major international conference. With some exceptions the conference recorded a number of major achievements. The United States made significant contributions to the World Plan of Action which was adopted at the conference, thus setting in motion a program that will gradually help the world to realize the full rights and potential of half of its people.

At my direction in November 1975, Secretary of State Kissinger sent a letter to the Director General of the International Labor Organization announcing our intention to withdraw from that organization in 1977 unless reforms are made before then. We cited four special areas of concern: erosion of tripartite representation; selective concern for human rights; disregard of due process; and increasing politicization of a technical agency. We took this step only after the most careful deliberation and, as we have stated, we will make every effort to promote conditions that could permit us to continue to participate in the organization.

The 30th session of the General Assembly was marked both by cooperation and contention. Many economic and social issues were debated, resulting in resolutions adopted by consensus. But political differences arose among the members over such issues as Korea, the Middle East, human rights and decolonization. Among other actions, a resolution equating Zionism with Racism was adopted over strong United States opposition. We view this resolution as a fundamental distortion of the truth and, as a result of its adoption, announced that we would not participate in the activities of the Decade for Action to Combat Racism and Racial Discrimination.

These are but a few of the important events in the United Nations during the past year. Much of the work of the United Nations is unknown because it is not regularly reported through the news media. The economic, social and technical coordination work of the United Nations, which

account for more than 90 percent of its total resources, include such important activities as:

- Maintaining international aviation safety standards;

- Helping to prevent the spread of nuclear weapons;

- Working to combat illicit drug production and trafficking;

- Improving health conditions and standards worldwide and combating disease and plague;

- Setting improved international standards for the environment;

- Improving international food standards and preventing plant and animal disease from crossing borders;

- Providing economic development and technical assistance to the poorer nations of the world; and

- Providing food assistance and disaster relief.

As the world's strongest economic power with the greatest global reach, the United States derives many tangible benefits from these United Nations activities, many of which resulted from American initiative and leadership.

Despite difficulties inherent in working within an organization of so many sovereign states having differing interests and backgrounds, I believe that we are making progress in achieving our purposes in the United Nations. The United States is working actively to defend its interests, to oppose irresponsible actions and to promote cooperation among UN members in fulfillment of the great purposes of the Charter which we helped to frame.

As the world grows increasingly complex and interdependent, I conclude that United States leadership and participation in the United Nations serves our interests and hopes for realizing mankind's aspirations for a world of peace, economic progress and social justice.

GERALD R. FORD.

THE WHITE HOUSE, *October 1, 1976.*



## TREATY INFORMATION

### Current Actions

#### MULTILATERAL

##### Aviation

Amendment of part IV of annex I of the 1956 agreements on the joint financing of certain air navigation services in Greenland and the Faroe Islands and in Iceland by deletion of requirements for provision of LORAN services. Adopted by the ICAO Council at Montreal June 14, 1976; effective December 29, 1977.

##### Coffee

International coffee agreement 1976, with annexes. Done at London December 3, 1975.

*Notifications of provisional application deposited:* Guatemala, August 16, 1976; Congo, September 10, 1976; Kenya, September 17, 1976; Mexico, September 23, 1976; Finland, France, Tanzania, September 24, 1976; Belgium, Luxembourg, September 28, 1976; Italy, Japan, September 29, 1976; Benin, Ethiopia, Ghana, Guinea, Indonesia, Liberia, Nigeria, Spain, Cameroon, Yugoslavia, Zaire, September 30, 1976.

*Ratifications deposited:* Denmark, September 17, 1976; Jamaica, United States, September 24, 1976; Federal Republic of Germany, September 29, 1976; Australia, September 30, 1976.

*Accession deposited:* Madagascar, September 29, 1976.

*Provisional entry into force:* October 1, 1976.

##### Conservation

Agreement on the conservation of polar bears. Done at Oslo November 15, 1973. Entered into force May 26, 1976.<sup>1</sup>

*Instrument of ratification signed by the President:* September 30, 1976.

##### Health

Amendments to articles 34 and 55 of the constitution of the World Health Organization of July 22, 1946, as amended (TIAS 1808, 4643, 8086). Adopted at Geneva May 22, 1973.<sup>2</sup>

*Acceptances deposited:* Madagascar, September 27, 1976; Laos, September 28, 1976.

##### Maritime Matters

Amendments to the convention of March 6, 1948, as amended, on the Intergovernmental Maritime Consultative Organization (TIAS 4044, 6285, 6490). Adopted at London October 17, 1974.<sup>2</sup>

*Acceptance deposited:* Tanzania, September 28, 1976.

##### Seals

1976 protocol amending the interim convention on conservation of North Pacific fur seals (TIAS 3948). Done at Washington May 7, 1976.<sup>2</sup>

*Instrument of ratification signed by the President:* September 29, 1976.

*Ratifications deposited:* Canada, October 6, 1976; United States, October 4, 1976.

*Acceptance deposited:* Japan, October 6, 1976.

##### Tin

Fifth international tin agreement, with annexes. Done at Geneva June 21, 1975. Entered into force provisionally July 1, 1976.

*Instrument of ratification signed by the President:* September 30, 1976.

##### Wheat

Protocol modifying and further extending the wheat trade convention (part of the international wheat agreement) 1971 (TIAS 7144, 8227). Done at Washington March 17, 1976. Entered into force June 19, 1976, with respect to certain provisions, and July 1, 1976, with respect to other provisions. *Accession deposited:* Federal Republic of Germany, October 7, 1976.<sup>3</sup>

Protocol modifying and further extending the food aid convention (part of the international wheat agreement) 1971 (TIAS 7144, 8227). Done at Washington March 17, 1976. Entered into force June 19, 1976, with respect to certain provisions, and July 1, 1976, with respect to other provisions. *Accession deposited:* Federal Republic of Germany, October 7, 1976.<sup>3</sup>

#### BILATERAL

##### Canada

Arrangement relating to information in the nuclear field, with patent addendum and annexes. Signed at Ottawa and Washington August 6 and September 8, 1976. Entered into force September 8, 1976.

##### German Democratic Republic

Agreement concerning fisheries off the coasts of the United States, with annexes, agreed minutes, and related letter. Signed at Washington October 5, 1976. Enters into force on a date to be mutually agreed by exchange of notes.

##### Federal Republic of Germany

Agreement concerning mutual assistance in the administration of justice in connection with the Lockheed Aircraft Corporation matter, with agreed minutes. Signed at Washington September 24, 1976. Entered into force September 24, 1976.

<sup>1</sup> Not in force for the United States.

<sup>2</sup> Not in force.

<sup>3</sup> Applicable to Berlin (West).

## Greece

Agreement relating to payment to the United States of net proceeds from the sale of defense articles and eligibility for United States military assistance and training under the military assistance program. Effected by exchange of notes at Athens August 31, 1976. Entered into force August 31, 1976.

## Guinea

Agreement for sales of agricultural commodities, relating to the agreement of April 21, 1976, with memorandum of understanding. Signed at Conakry September 22, 1976. Entered into force September 22, 1976.

## Israel

Cash grant agreement to provide necessary foreign exchange to support the economic requirements of Israel. Signed at Washington September 22, 1976. Entered into force September 22, 1976.

Loan agreement to promote the economic and political stability of Israel, with attachments. Signed at Washington September 22, 1976. Entered into force September 22, 1976.

Program assistance grant agreement to promote the economic and political stability of Israel, with attachments. Signed at Washington September 22, 1976. Entered into force September 22, 1976.

## Italy

Procedures for mutual assistance in the administration of justice in connection with the Lockheed Aircraft Corporation matter. Signed at Washington March 29, 1976.

*Entered into force: April 12, 1976.*

## Peru

Agreement relating to compensation for the expropriated assets of the Marcona Mining Company. Signed at Lima September 22, 1976. Enters into force upon signature and acceptance of the promissory note and ore sales contract referred to in the agreement.

## Philippines

Convention with respect to taxes on income. Signed at Manila October 1, 1976. Enters into force 30 days after the exchange of instruments of ratification.

## Syria

Agreement amending the agreement of April 20, 1976, for sales of agricultural commodities. Effected by exchange of letters at Damascus September

ber 28 and 29, 1976. Entered into force September 29, 1976.

## Union of Soviet Socialist Republics

Agreement modifying and extending the agreement of October 18, 1972, relating to establishment of the Temporary Purchasing Commission for the procurement of equipment for the Kama River Truck Complex. Effected by exchange of letters at Moscow and Washington June 7 and September 13, 1976. Entered into force September 13, 1976.

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*493	10/4	U.S. Advisory Commission on International Educational and Cultural Affairs: cancellation of Oct. 8 meeting.
*494	10/5	Walter J. Stoessel, Jr., sworn in as Ambassador to Federal Republic of Germany (biographic data).
*495	10/6	Advisory Committee on Transnational Enterprises, Oct. 28.
†496	10/6	U.S. and German Democratic Republic sign fisheries agreement.
*497	10/6	Experts from world's major science museums to study U.S. centers, Oct. 10-Nov. 14.
†498	10/7	Kissinger: toasts at luncheon for Latin American delegations to U.N., New York.
*499	10/7	U.S.-Canada discussions on border television, Oct. 6: joint communique.
*500	10/7	Edward E. Masters sworn in as Ambassador to Bangladesh (biographic data).
†501	10/8	Kissinger: toast at luncheon for African delegations to U.N., New York.
*502	10/8	Patricia M. Byrne sworn in as Ambassador to Mali (biographic data).
*503	10/8	Shipping Coordinating Committee, Subcommittee on Safety of Life at Sea, working group on carriage of dangerous goods, Nov. 9.
*504	10/8	Kissinger, Waldheim: news conference following meeting.

\* Not printed.

† Held for a later issue of the BULLETIN.



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# THE DEPARTMENT OF STATE **BULLETIN**

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*The BULLETIN includes selected press releases on foreign policy, issued by the White House and the Department, and statements, addresses and news conferences of the President and the Secretary of State and other officers of the Department, as well as special articles on various phases of international affairs and the function of the Department. Information is included concerning treaties and international agreements to which the United States is or may become a party and on treaties of general international interest.*

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## Secretary Kissinger Interviewed at Annual Meeting of the National Conference of Editorial Writers

*Following is the transcript of an interview with Secretary Kissinger by a panel at the annual meeting of the National Conference of Editorial Writers (NCEW) at Hilton Head, S.C., on October 2. Members of the panel were Robert Barnard, Louisville Courier-Journal; Sig Gissler, Milwaukee Journal; Paul Greenberg, Pine Bluff Commercial; and Joseph Stroud, Detroit Free Press. John Zakarian, president of the conference, St. Louis Post-Dispatch, was the moderator.<sup>1</sup>*

Press release 492 dated October 2

*Secretary Kissinger:* . . . I thought I could perhaps lead things off by making a few general observations about the conduct of foreign policy.

The basic foreign policy of the United States is determined by the objective conditions in which the United States finds itself, by the values of our people, and only to some extent by the views of the leaders. The foreign policy of a great nation cannot change every four or eight years. It must reflect some permanent characteristics. To the extent that other nations believe that the United States changes its fundamental policy at regular intervals—to that extent, we become a factor of instability and insecurity.

Of course there are practical differences. And of course it can be that mistakes are made of such magnitude that a radical shift is necessary. But sooner or later we must develop a consensus about our fundamental direction and our basic interests that is not

in itself subject to partisan debate. I am not saying it isn't subject to debate, but not to partisan debate. The basic goals that any administration has to pursue concern the problem of peace, the problem of world order, and the problem of the relationship of our values to the values of other societies.

The problem of peace has, in our age, an unprecedented character. Throughout history it would have been inconceivable that any nation could accumulate too much power for effective political use. As late as the end of World War II, every increment of additional power would have been militarily useful.

Today we live in a period in which a nuclear war would mean destruction for all parties and in which the relative advantage of one side against the other pales compared to the destruction that is involved, which could well be the end of civilized life as we understand it. Therefore the traditional power politics, the accumulation of marginal advantages, the posturing vis-a-vis opponents, has to be carried out today, if at all, with a sense of responsibility and a degree of circumspection that is unparalleled. And every President will, sooner or later, be driven to the conviction which was first enunciated by President Eisenhower: There is no alternative to peace.

Therefore the problem of how to control nuclear arms, how to prevent the spread of nuclear weapons, must be a paramount concern of American policy. And tough rhetoric is no substitute for the perception of this overriding necessity.

To be sure, we have to make certain that

<sup>1</sup> Mr. Zakarian's introduction of Secretary Kissinger and the opening paragraphs of the Secretary's remarks are not printed here.

the desire for peace does not lead other countries to try to seek unilateral advantages. And we have to be able to combine a concern with our values and our interests, and those of our allies, with a readiness to seek honorable solutions with adversaries. Where to strike this balance is one of the problems with which policymakers have to deal and which will no doubt come up in our discussions.

The second problem is the problem of world order. If it is true that conflicts cannot be settled by tests of strength, then we need an international system most of whose participants feel that they have a stake in it and are therefore not prepared to test it by military means.

This presents us with the problem of how to relate ourselves to our friends and allies; how to deal with opposing ideologies committed to revolutionary theories, if not always practice; and how to find a place in such a world for the hundred or so new nations that have come into being since World War II with experiences quite different and problems quite different from those of the older states.

And thirdly, there is the problem of the relationship of our values to the other goals of our foreign policy. Without security, there can be no peace. But pure pragmatism leads to paralysis; it makes every problem insoluble. Moral issues appear in absolute form. But in foreign policy, at any one time, only partial solutions are possible. And if every nation of the world insists on the immediate implementation of all of its principles, eternal conflict is inevitable.

Therefore the difficult aspect of foreign policy is that one constantly has to strike balances between conciliation and security, between order and progress, between values and what can be attained at any period. This is where the act of judgment comes in—an act that is compounded by the fact that when the scope for action is greatest, the knowledge on which to base such action in foreign policy is at a minimum; when the knowledge is greatest, the

scope for action has often disappeared.

Nobody can ever prove that an assessment is true until it is too late to effect it.

In 1936, when the Germans occupied the Rhineland, it would have been very easy for France to stop the advance of Hitler. But if they had done it, if France had done this, the world would still be debating today whether Hitler was a maniac bent on world domination or a misunderstood nationalist. By 1941 everybody knew that he was a maniac bent on world domination. It was a knowledge acquired at the cost of 20 million lives.

So the policymaker is always faced with the dilemma that when he can act, he cannot prove that he is right. And by the time he can prove that he is right, then he can no longer very often be creative.

Of course, not everything you cannot prove is right. And this is where the uncertainties in our debates arise and frankly, where the credibility gap that our newspapers are so fond of emphasizing very often develops.

But I think I have explained enough complexities to turn this over to the panel. And I see that all of our distinguished friends here have copious notes in front of them so let me volunteer for assassination [Laughter.]

### Initiatives in Southern Africa

*Mr. Barnard: Mr. Secretary, this is rather general [inaudible], typical of American editorial writers. You have just returned from your first African safari, I believe, and I wonder if Rhodesia's black-ruled neighbors agreed to the terms for a transitional government announced by Ian Smith. And there is still a question of funds for members of the white minority who choose to sell out and leave the country. What share of those funds which I think we have seen estimated at perhaps \$2 billion, would the United States, in your view, be expected to pay? And would you anticipate any difficulty in persuading Congress to put out the money?*

*Secretary Kissinger: Let me perhaps first*



make clear one point. The terms that Mr. Smith announced were not terms he had originated and was putting to his neighbors. They represented a U.S.-U.K. distillation of months of consultations, of five missions—three American, two British—to Africa, of what we thought the best available compromise might be that would move matters toward majority rule under conditions in which the rights of the minorities would be protected and under conditions in which the transition would occur with moderation and yet with all possible speed. So it is not something that was originated by Mr. Smith.

On the whole, I believe that the program that is now being discussed has in many of its main elements been acceptable as a basis for negotiation. Of course there are many elements that were left open—the composition of most parts of the government. And of course every party at a negotiation is free to raise whatever issue it wishes. But much of what one reads today should be seen as a process by which the various parties establish their negotiating position.

Now with respect to the fund, the fund we are discussing is not designed to buy out the white population. The fund is more designed to enable the white population to stay by developing the Rhodesian economy, and only as its second function is a sort of insurance scheme for those who want relief. The fewer people, of course, the less has to be paid out of this fund for the purpose of the settlers.

Now, we are attempting to do this as an international project. The United Kingdom, France, and other European countries have already agreed in principle. We are discussing it also with Canada, Australia, and we hope to have a very wide base of support for it.

As far as the United States own contribution is concerned, we think that perhaps part of it can be contributed from private sources. Discussions as to the amount, of the total amount, will begin next week in Washington, and we don't have a figure to

put before the public yet. When we do, of course, the part of it that has to come from public funds will have to go to the Congress.

Will we get support for it? I believe that the American public will understand that the cost of a moderate evolution in southern Africa is much less than the ultimate cost of an escalation of violence there. And therefore we hope that we can get support. We have briefed many congressional committees. And so far we haven't been able to give them any figures, but we have briefed them on the concept before we left and since we returned, and we have had very good and, I must say, bipartisan reaction on it.

*Mr. Barnard: And what is your best guess—estimate? The current uncertainty over whether black leaders will accept the terms announced [inaudible].*

*Secretary Kissinger:* You see, some of the things that the black leaders have rejected are not central to the issue. For example, whether the conference should take place inside Rhodesia, which Ian Smith proposed—that was not part of the five-point program we recommended. And I think that this will have to find a solution by mutual agreement, because obviously a conference should take place at a place that is mutually acceptable.

I believe that, secondly, a lot depends on how some of the African nations sort out the relationship between the more moderate and the more radical elements.

Our impression is that, as of now, progress is being made toward assembling the conference and that the basic framework that they accepted in Lusaka, which is to say a conference which creates a transitional government which leads to a constitutional conference which drafts a constitution for full independence, that that framework is going to be implemented. It will take a few weeks to sort all of this out, but it is going about as we expected.

*Mr. Gissler: Mr. Secretary, I have a perhaps personal question. Fatigue can often*

lead to slips in judgment. If your style of diplomacy is marked by hectic activity, shuttling, jet lag, hopscotching, always with a briefcase full of explosive questions, I wonder, how do you deal with the inevitable stress and guard against diplomatic blunders occurring perhaps just through sheer exhaustion?

*Secretary Kissinger:* By beating my dog. [Laughter.]

*Mr. Gissler:* After the dog is dead, sir, what happens?

*Secretary Kissinger:* I don't know how you can guard against blunder. One problem may be that there is a gap between the public perception of how diplomacy is conducted and how it is actually conducted.

Before I go on one of these trips, there are months of very careful preparation. I do not go on one of these trips unless I and my colleagues have made the judgment that we have carried matters to the maximum point they can be carried through the exchange of diplomatic notes.

The shuttle that concluded last week was started in April with the speech in Lusaka, was carried forward through a series of meetings and a series of missions to Africa. And what we have to balance is the stress of this type of diplomacy against the problem that we might not be able to carry it off at all if one circulated notes.

But I am not saying that this style of diplomacy is the way it must be conducted by every Secretary of State and every President.

We have faced a number of issues that tended to crystallize in a dramatic way and that required some intermediary to bring them to a point of decision, in Africa, for example. Now I would think that in the negotiation on the constitution that is now started, the role of high-level diplomacy would be very minimal.

So I would say one cannot make a general judgment as to how foreign policy should be conducted. And any style of diplomacy has its risk of failures, and ultimately it has to be judged by its record.

*Mr. Greenberg:* Mr. Secretary, you come out for majority rule in Rhodesia. Would you also be in favor of majority rule in South Africa?

*Secretary Kissinger:* Yes, I am in favor of the principle of majority rule in South Africa, but I think one also has to understand that the situation in South Africa is infinitely more complicated than it is in Rhodesia, in the sense that the settlers have been there for hundreds of years and that a system has developed that is repugnant to us but that it will take some time to change. And therefore, while I believe strongly that the system must be changed—I have emphasized this in a number of public speeches—I also believe that it would be in the interests of all the people, black and white, if it occurs in an evolutionary manner and without violence.

*Mr. Greenberg:* How would you envision this process? Would one day you be making a similar shuttle for South Africa, say?

*Secretary Kissinger:* I have to tell you quite candidly that I have no blueprint for the future of South Africa. I believe that the first, the major steps must be taken by the Government of South Africa, and that to the degree that it can be handled in the South African context, to that extent it would be to everybody's benefit.

If the problem becomes internationalized it means it has almost certainly already got out of control. They now have some little time to consider the consequences of the internal situation in South Africa. And we hope that it will move in a—that they will take advantage of this period.

### **Diplomatic Process in the Middle East**

*Mr. Stroud:* Mr. Secretary, what reason do you have now to believe that the reconvening of the Geneva Conference on the Middle East would be productive? And isn't there the danger now that the critics who said that the step-by-step process would deal away some of your trump cards too early may be proven right?



*Secretary Kissinger:* You always have to compare the—of course you have to remember that it is unlikely, despite my well-known objectivity, that I will agree with my critics. [Laughter.]

But you always have to compare the alternatives that were in fact available. In 1973 the United States had no diplomatic relations with any of the key Arab countries. The Soviet Union was acting as the lawyer of the Arab countries. Israeli armies were confronting the Arabs along dividing lines that were extremely unstable.

To attempt a comprehensive solution under those circumstances involved—if an oil embargo was still in force, to attempt a comprehensive solution under those circumstances involved a high risk of an explosion. And a step-by-step approach enabled the parties to get used to the process of negotiation, to gain confidence that progress could be made.

It was always envisaged that the step-by-step approach would sooner or later lead to a more comprehensive approach. It was never conceived as an alternative to a comprehensive solution, but as a step toward a comprehensive solution.

I think now the conditions are approaching where comprehensive solutions can result. Whether it has to be one grand solution, or whether a series of stages within a larger framework, that will have to be seen as the negotiations begin.

I do not believe that we have given away any key bargaining chips that will be needed later. On the contrary, I think we created conditions from which comprehensive solutions can now be attempted without the risk of an explosion and without the risk of an alienation of some of the major countries involved.

*Mr. Stroud:* What is the leverage from this point on?

*Secretary Kissinger:* Well, what was the leverage in 1973? In 1973 we were all subject to an oil embargo. We had no diplomatic relations with any of the key countries. And it is an illusion to believe

that we had a leverage in 1973 that we have lost in 1976.

The leverage that we have now is that we are the only country that is in friendly relations with all of the chief actors in this process. We are the only country without whose help progress simply is not possible. And that leverage is the chief contribution we can make to the process.

The basic leverage as to the Israelis and the Arabs is about what it was in 1973; that is to say, the Israelis have territory which the Arabs want, and the Arabs have legitimacy which the Israelis want. Now, how to balance off the tangible return of territories, which has to be part of the settlement, against the Arab commitment to peace, which is certainly more revocable than is the giving up of territories, that has been the essence of the negotiation all along. And the Israelis have not given up so much territory that this problem has changed.

This is the essential issue in the negotiation. What has improved is the readiness of the Arab countries to accept the existence of Israel. What has improved also is the greater confidence Israel has acquired in the process of negotiation. What has fundamentally changed is the diplomatic position of the United States in the Middle East, which is a dramatic reversal of what it was in 1973. And this is why the conditions now, either for a Geneva Conference or some other diplomatic process, seemed to us better now than they have been at any period since the end of the war.

### **The Conflict in Lebanon**

*Mr. Barnard:* While we are on the Middle East—enormous supplies of arms seem to have poured into Lebanon and complicated the problem there. Can you tell us whether the United States or Israel has given either overt or covert support to any faction there, particularly the Christians? And if not, where do you think all those arms have been coming from?

*Secretary Kissinger:* The United States has

not given any arms to any of the factions. We have no official knowledge of what Israel may have done. But the majority of arms, the overwhelming majority of arms in Lebanon, come from the Soviet Union one way or the other, either through Libya or through Syria.

The chief conflict is between the Syrians and the Palestinians, both of which are armed by the Soviet Union and come directly from Soviet sources.

*Mr. Greenberg: Mr. Secretary, there would seem to be at least one part of the Middle East where American policy would seem to have been very ineffectual, and that would be in Lebanon, where we seem to have adopted a policy of just waiting for the blood to settle. I wonder if that doesn't raise the larger question of morality in foreign policy. A recent poll by the State Department indicates that Americans feel—to quote one of its findings—that Washington simply has not appeared to be animated in the last decade or so by the same root sense of right and wrong as the American people. How would you respond to that kind of feeling?*

*Secretary Kissinger:* First of all, let me make clear what the poll is.

The State Department—we have started in the last year, in order to find out what the public is concerned about, to hold a series of town meetings around the country in which we have invited concerned citizens to state their criticism. And we are sending senior officials to sessions which are entirely devoted to the public expressing their concerns. Our officials then write reports to me about what they consider to be these concerns, and we distribute these reports, also, to the newspapers in the towns where the town meetings were held. So this is not a very secret operation. Now, somebody leaked one of these reports in Washington that had already been distributed to the hometown newspapers of the people concerned.

I just want to make clear all of these reports are going to be critical, because the town meetings are organized to elicit concerns and not elicit approvals.

Now, let me get to your question of morality last and deal with Lebanon first.

Whatever our moral convictions may be, we cannot carry them to the point where the United States must settle every conflict in every part of the world in order to be cured.

We have in Lebanon passions that have been built up over centuries. We have armies that have been built up over decades.

For the United States to attempt to impose peace by our own forces would make us the policeman of the world. We have attempted to do our best to prevent outside intervention. We have sent a special envoy there. We have lost an Ambassador, who was murdered there on a peace mission.

We have stopped short of military intervention, because that would require a massive degree of an American commitment that we do not feel is warranted in these circumstances. But we also believe that the evolution in Lebanon, painful as it is, could lead to a situation in which the overall peace process can be resumed under conditions where all of the parties have learned how tenuous and fragile the situation is.

This does not mean that we would not want to have the war ended as quickly as possible. And we have offered repeatedly our good offices. The only thing we have refrained from doing is to send in American military forces.

Now, on the basic question of the roots of American morality and its relationship to American foreign policy.

The United States for the greatest part of our history, or at least for the greatest part of our modern history, could live with the conviction that we could dip in and out of foreign policy as we chose. And we could be both isolationists and interventionists on the principle that we were morally superior to the rest of the world, partly caused by the fact that we never had to make the hard choices of security that countries that did not have two great oceans had to confront.

Now, in the sixties and the seventies—



the late sixties and seventies—we have suddenly come up against the limitations of our power. And we now have to conduct foreign policy the way most other nations have had to conduct it throughout their history, where we cannot do everything we want, where we cannot implement all our preferences, and where we cannot impose all our values. And this produces a certain resentment, and it produces the illusion that, somehow or other, we could go back to an earlier pattern if only those in power were more morally committed.

Now, I am not saying that security considerations have to be dominant. In fact, I believe that without moral convictions to serve as a compass point, foreign policy becomes entirely practical and entirely irrelevant. But the role of our moral values in foreign policy is to give us the strength to approach our goals in stages and to set a general direction which we hope is compatible with the values of our society.

But what the American people will be learning in the years ahead, as we have already learned in Vietnam and elsewhere, is how to reconcile our needs with our limits and how to be moral without being able to be absolutists. That is a very tough problem, and it is one of the uncertainties in our foreign policy.

*Mr. Greenberg:* Mr. Secretary, earlier you quoted President Eisenhower approvingly. Would you consider his intervention in Lebanon to have been a failure?

*Secretary Kissinger:* No, I think that President Eisenhower, under the conditions that then existed, with the forces that were then at work in Lebanon, conducted an operation that was a marginal success. A similar [inaudible] the United States today would require many divisions, would involve us in all the inter-Arab disputes that you now see in Lebanon, and could not be justified to the American people by American purposes that we could explain afterward.

After all, what is the conflict of Lebanon? You have the Christian community

and the Moslem community that have co-existed side by side for many decades, but not always. You have within the Moslem community, the splits between the radical factions and the moderate factions. And you have the presence of the Palestinians, who constitute almost a state within a state. All of this overlaid by Arab rivalries in which the Libyans and the Iraqis back the radicals and the Syrians have backed the moderate Arabs and have cooperated with the Christians.

For the United States to inject American military power into such a situation, under present circumstances, would lead us into a morass.

I think there are certain situations which, tragic as they are, we cannot overcome with military power. And that is the only thing that we have not done in Lebanon.

#### Public Discussions on Foreign Policy Issues

*Mr. Gissler:* Mr. Secretary, your remarks about the moral core of American foreign policy suggest that certain widespread public understanding or an agreement on certain objectives is essential, yet some very thoughtful critics say that you have done relatively little, especially after the collapse in Vietnam, to stimulate the kind of great debate necessary in this country to achieve that kind of understanding.

*I wonder if the hard truth is that top policymakers, even in a democracy, are fearful of taking really tough questions to the people for thorough free-swinging discussion?*

*Secretary Kissinger:* When I was in private life, nothing used to infuriate me more than a public official who, when being questioned at my university, would explain that nothing he had ever done could possibly have been wrong. Well, I am here to tell you that nothing I have ever done could possibly have been wrong. [Laughter.]

There are two problems. Did I try to explain American foreign policy to the American people? I think I have made a major effort. I have gone to 28 cities in the last 18 months. Wherever I have gone, I have

given a speech. I have subjected myself to a question period from the audience. I have met with leaders of the community. I have met with the newspaper editors and publishers. I have spent a whole day in order to explain some aspect of foreign policy, as I understood it, and to respond to questions. And we have had these town meetings which I described.

There is, however, inherent in high office the problem that almost all of the problems one deals with are imposed on one and that the time for reflection, with the best will in the world, is limited. And obviously—and I think this panel and this discussion prove it—it stands to reason that I have to believe that what we did was right or we wouldn't have done it.

Now, obviously, in retrospect one can change one's mind about something. But on the whole, if one has been serious and thoughtful, one will tend to believe that one was right.

So as you go through eight years, you tend to accumulate a certain vested interest in the policies that have been carried out inevitably, and as you go through eight years, the times available for reflection are limited. This will be true of any possible successors as well as of any possible incumbent.

So in the process of government it may not always be possible, even with the best intentions, to put everything before the public. But I have attempted to make a serious effort, and I think—I have spent a lot of time on the speeches that I have given publicly, but I am sure that there is always a lot more that could be done.

*Mr. Gissler: Do you have any suggestions as to how we can raise the level of serious public discussions on questions like for whom and for what we might be prepared to fight in the world if necessary?*

*Secretary Kissinger:* I am not sure that that is a question that can be answered in a serious public discussion by senior officials in this way. I think we can ask, in a

serious public discussion, what we take to be our basic purposes in the world, what kind of a world we are trying to bring about, what our overall conception is of the nature of the security, of the nature of peace. Those are questions, I think, that we can and should debate.

I think to ask a question in the abstract—are we prepared to fight, say, for Korea—without having answered these other questions first is going to lead to a rather bitter debate that may not be very meaningful.

### Relations With Vietnam

*Mr. Stroud: Speaking of the debate about foreign policy issues, there is still great concern among many Americans about the Americans missing in action in Vietnam. And I am curious, is this a real impediment now to the normalization of relations with Vietnam? Or is the election the real impediment to the normalization of the relations with Vietnam?*

*Secretary Kissinger:* I think that the missing in action are a real impediment to the normalization of relations with Vietnam.

Basically we have no conflict with Vietnam now. After our experience in Vietnam we are the one great power that can be guaranteed not to have any national objectives to achieve in Indochina. So eventually the normalization of relations between us and Vietnam will come.

On the other hand, we believe that the behavior of the North Vietnamese in not turning over to us lists which we are confident they must have is a cruel and heartless act and one for which we are not prepared to pay any price. If that is accomplished, normalization will follow very rapidly.

*Mr. Stroud: Can you define what sort of response would be considered adequate?*

*Secretary Kissinger:* We would feel that there is no reason for the North Vietnamese not to turn over all the information



they have on the missing in action. It would be a humane gesture. It is not something that does us any good as a nation, but it will help ease the minds of many hundreds of people.

We therefore believe that it should be done. It would wipe the slate clean. And we will certainly be prepared to normalize relations rapidly after that.

*Mr. Barnard: Mr. Secretary, we know the Secretary of State and the American people endure a lot of election rhetoric—*

*Secretary Kissinger: So far it has not been as bad as the primary rhetoric. [Laughter.]*

*Mr. Barnard: Several weeks ago, you were quoted, I think, as saying that despite some of the things that Jimmy Carter was saying, you didn't see any substantial difference in the foreign policy. Since then, he has given the B'nai B'rith speech and has been quoted lustily in Playboy [laughter], referring again to you not only as "the Lone Ranger" but criticizing you for a number of your policies, including insufficient stress on morality and other assorted sins.*

*I notice it is creeping into the columns now, into at least one column, which presumably is a token of more to come, that there is some hope in the Carter camp that you can be hung around Ford's neck as some sort of albatross. Does this change your perception of how a Carter administration might operate in foreign policy?*

*Secretary Kissinger: I was asked on that occasion to comment on one speech, but that was before Governor Carter had developed the full complexity of his thought. [Laughter.] Now that he has developed his thinking in several directions [laughter], I would not necessarily make the same statement again. But the President will have an opportunity to debate foreign policy with Mr. Carter on Wednesday, and I don't want to preempt his preparations for this.*

*Mr. Zakarian: I see you're whetting your knife.*

## U.S. Arms Sales Abroad

*Mr. Greenberg: There is one area of the foreign policy in which you might have a special knowledge or interest, and that is the arms sales abroad. The Democratic candidate for President has not been alone in deploring the size of American arms shipments abroad, on the theory that they will actually ignite wars and we will be drawn into them. Do you see any of that sort of danger in the amount of armaments this country is shipping to various nations abroad?*

*Secretary Kissinger: One has to analyze where the arms are going before one can judge whether they will ignite wars and, secondly, whether the United States will be drawn into those wars if they are ignited.*

Many of the figures that are being used are vastly inflated. I see references, for example, to \$7.5 billion of arms to Saudi Arabia. Of that \$7.5 billion, the overwhelming part of it is going for construction by the Corps of Engineers, and it is not going for weapons. And it is technically in the military budget, but it is to build cantonments for the Saudi Army and has nothing to do, as such, with the arms race.

Another percentage goes to Iran. Now Iran has pursued a policy that has been very parallel to ours in the Middle East. It has not joined the embargo. It has declared that it wouldn't join the embargo. It has sold oil even to Israel during this period.

Countries that threaten it are countries like the Soviet Union and countries armed by the Soviet Union, such as Iraq. And therefore I cannot foresee—nor has Iran ever transferred arms to another country. So it is difficult to foresee any war that Iran would start that would draw us in. And to the extent that Iran is capable of protecting itself, we are less likely to be drawn in than we would be if it were defenseless.

On the other hand, I do agree that we should look at the question of arms sales more systematically, and we have created, now, a new group to make sure that the

question you put is being dealt with in a responsible manner.

It is my judgment that the arms sales have contributed much more to stability than to the opposite. But we are not pushing arms sales. We are responding to needs that countries feel—and most of which they would be in a position to get anyway from other sources.

*Mr. Greenberg: But, Mr. Secretary, those figures on Saudi Arabia include something like 600-700 Sidewinder missiles. Now what possible defense justification could there be for a country like Saudi Arabia to have that many missiles, except perhaps to defend its interests against Iran, which we have also supplied with—*

*Secretary Kissinger: Much more to defend its interests against some neighbors it has that are armed by the Soviet Union. And of the Sidewinders, a large—a significant percentage is going to have to be used for training purposes. So that what will be left is a minimum defensive package. And if you look at the countries surrounding Saudi Arabia, you would not pick Iran as the most likely one to attack it.*

#### **Lesson of Vietnam War**

*Mr. Gissler: Mr. Secretary, your remarks addressed toward Lebanon as a potential policy quagmire bring to mind our tragedy in Vietnam. It is often said that one thing we can salvage from Vietnam is a lesson. Yet there seems to be continuing disagreement over precisely what that lesson is. Some say it shows the limits of American imperialism. Others, including, I think, the Republican platform writers, indicate that the lesson is that we should never again fight such a war unless we intend to fight it all out and win. I wonder if you could tell us what you feel the fundamental lesson of Vietnam is?*

*Secretary Kissinger: I think that a fundamental lesson of Vietnam is that before the United States gets itself militarily engaged*

*in any war, it must make an assessment of what its fundamental interest is, and secondly, whether it can serve this interest by military means.*

*I do agree that when the United States becomes militarily engaged, it should prevail, and if it cannot prevail, it should not engage itself. But before the United States engages itself, it must have the perception—not in abstract slogans, but through the best analysis that can be made—of what the fundamental American interest is, what the nature of its engagement is, and what limits we want to set to that engagement.*

*Otherwise we are going to be drawn from one commitment to another in order to make good the previous commitment. But it is important also to understand what involves a commitment. I do not believe that selling arms to a country commits us then to the series of events that led to Vietnam.*

*Mr. Gissler: What about South Korea? We are not just selling arms. We also have combat troops stationed there.*

*Secretary Kissinger: South Korea—our interest in South Korea is produced by the confluence there of many power centers, by our historical relationship, and above all, by the fact that Japan considers that its security is closely affected by what happens on the Korean Peninsula. And therefore, for the United States to suddenly disengage from Korea would have drastic consequences in Japan and in all of North-east Asia.*

*Mr. Stroud: Mr. Secretary, in the wake of the fall of Saigon, you were quoted a number of times with a fairly pessimistic appraisal of the world perception of the United States after Vietnam and the feeling we had a great need to reestablish the authority of the United States in the world, the credibility of the United States in the world. Do you feel that that perception has changed significantly?*



*Secretary Kissinger:* We have to face the fact that it is a combination of the tragedies of the last four years. Many countries around the world were asking what the role of the United States—or to what extent it could rely on the United States as a stabilizing factor or as a factor for progress.

I believe that since the collapse of Vietnam, we have conducted a policy that has restored some of our credibility and resolved some of the doubts, but it continues to be, for several reasons, including some of our domestic debates, one of the challenges of American foreign policy.

*Mr. Zakarian:* Members of the panel, thank you. We shall receive questions from the floor. We have about 15 minutes, and questions are open only to members of NCEW. Please state your name and your newspaper, and then ask the question.

*Q. Mr. Secretary, my name is Smith Hempstone, and I am a syndicated columnist.*

*You were described, I believe, in the Oriana Fallaci interview several years ago as a historian having a tragic sense of destiny.*

*In Admiral [Elmo R.] Zumwalt's book, while he may have confused Athens with the Theban League, he puts across the impression, in his view, that you feel that your role has been one of trying to get the best deal possible in a declining power situation.*

*I wonder if you could tell us precisely how you do view your role in the past seven and a half years, and how you foresee the shape of the world evolving in the next few years and America's role in it?*

*Secretary Kissinger:* First of all, I have nominated Admiral Zumwalt on a number of occasions for the Pulitzer Prize for fiction. [Laughter.] I think it took him a while to realize that his opponent in Virginia was called Byrd and not Kissinger.

Anybody who has ever been on a train going to an Army-Navy game would think it is not the most suitable place for reflections on the philosophy of history [laughter]—or normally believe that the partici-

pants in any conversation necessarily would recollect exactly what was said, particularly what was said on the way home from the game [laughter].

Now, what did I conceive to be my role? I believe, seriously now, that I am likely to be more reflective about this out of office in 1981 than I am likely to be at this time. [Laughter.]

But I have served in Washington during a period of fundamental transition when the United States had to liquidate a war which we found when we got there. The first such experience in our history when we had to adjust our relations with our allies, when we had to find new ways of dealing with our adversaries, and when the revolution that is inherent in the process by which these new nations came into being is beginning to gather momentum.

It has been my conviction that we could not continue to operate by managing crises or by abstract declarations of political intent, but that we had to develop some perception of the national interest that could be maintained over an indefinite period.

Now, this is a difficult thing to put across in America, because we have almost no strand in our foreign policy thinking that is geared to this. We have an idealistic tradition. We have a pragmatic tradition. We have an international law tradition. But we do not have a tradition of thinking of the world as a political process with no terminal date in which whatever you do only buys you an entrance price to another problem.

So it is inevitable that there is a lot of debate. And it is inevitable that people who think that there should be neat and final solutions would believe that one preferred contingent solutions.

It is indeed my conviction that we cannot define a terminal date at which we can say all our problems have disappeared. We are now part of an international process which is unending insofar as I can foresee, which we can manage, which we can direct, and in which our purposes have to be



clearly defined, but in which we can no longer sell our programs the way we did in the immediate postwar period by promising the American people an end to exertion and an end to problems if only one more program were carried out.

And I think this explains some of the sort of criticism that Admiral Zumwalt makes.

*Q. Mr. Secretary, Stuart Loory of the Chicago Sun-Times.*

*Coming back to your quotation from President Eisenhower about there being no alternative to peace, the Congress, within the past couple of weeks, appropriated \$104 billion for defense spending in the next year. There are reports that the Pentagon is going to request \$130 billion in the authorization for next year. Are you satisfied that the United States is spending the least amount of money necessary for defense to further American foreign policy aims?*

*Secretary Kissinger:* I am satisfied that we need, under present conditions, the amounts that have been requested. I am not satisfied that we can continue international relations indefinitely on the basis of an arms race. And therefore I have believed strongly that limitations of strategic arms and negotiations on the limitations of other arms are necessary.

I believe that the constant accumulation of armaments on both sides is going to lead to a situation that could have some of the characteristics that led to World War I, in which the political leadership at some point lost control over events. But I do not believe that we can achieve this unilaterally. Until we can negotiate an agreed limitation of arms, I am afraid we have to match what the other side is doing.

*Q. Gil Cranberg of the Des Moines Register and Tribune.*

*Mr. Secretary, the Church committee [Senate Select Committee To Study Governmental Operations With Respect to Intelligence Activities] reported that the United States has an extensive covert propaganda operation*

*abroad. This involves having hundreds of foreign journalists on the U.S. payroll and the planting of false and misleading information, some of which unavoidably is picked up and published in this country.*

*The Church committee complained about it. This organization is complaining about it. Our complaint was directed to the CIA [Central Intelligence Agency]. Since this activity presumably is in the furtherance of U.S. foreign policy objectives, perhaps the complaint should have been directed to you. In any case, would you tell us why you think such covert propaganda activity is desirable, and whether you would consider having it discontinued?*

*Secretary Kissinger:* Well, I don't believe that putting misleading information out as news is ever justifiable. The problem arises that in many parts of the world the media are dominated by, or heavily influenced by, foreign powers that are hostile to us, and an attempt is made to get our point of view across.

But I would not accept this as saying that it is ever justified to put out misleading information. I would think that any information that is placed through any American governmental organization should be such that it could be published here without misleading the American public.

*Q. So you disagree with the practice.*

*Secretary Kissinger:* I disagree with the practice of placing misleading information into foreign newspapers.

*Q. Do you have the power to order that?*

*Secretary Kissinger:* I am not sure I have. If it was done in the past—I doubt very seriously that it is being done today.

*Q. Mr. Secretary, I am Fred Sherman of the Miami Herald.*

*You achieved great success in the Middle East in getting the Israelis to talk to the Arabs. You pulled off an apparent miracle in Africa getting the white minority and the blacks to talk. Do you think there is any Foreign Minister in the world with the same*



measure of genius that could get Havana and Washington off the same way? [Laughter.]

*Secretary Kissinger:* Well, as to the first part of your question, the answer is obviously no. [Laughter.]

But as far as Havana and Washington are concerned, we were beginning to move toward normalizing relations when Cuba placed 15,000 troops into Angola. This cannot be justified on any Cuban grounds.

That made clear that either Cuba is acting as a surrogate for the Soviet Union or it is pursuing a revolutionary foreign policy in distant parts of the globe or, what is more likely, it was a combination of the two. That, plus the extremely aggressive Cuban policy vis-a-vis Puerto Rico, has made it very difficult for us to get into a sensible dialogue.

*Q. Sir, in your concern over the Rhodesian situation, did you have any fear that the Cubans might move into Rhodesia?*

*Secretary Kissinger:* I believe that there is a danger that if the evolution in Africa is not channeled into a moderate direction, foreign intervention, whether Cuban or otherwise, would become more and more probable. As this accelerates, a race war becomes more and more inevitable. And if a major race war starts, it is bound to radicalize all of Africa and have serious consequences in other parts of the world.

And therefore we are trying very hard to return African—the evolution in Africa into African hands and to keep all foreign powers out, including ourselves.

*Q. Mr. Secretary, I am Tom Caulfield from Savannah Morning News.*

Partly, you—I don't think anyone at all has had much to say about the Soviet Union, so I will ask a question about that. And this is a local question, because in Savannah, which is located 40 miles from here across the Savannah River, we had last week develop a situation in which an American company has announced intention to set up a redistribution headquarters in Savannah for

the distribution of Russian-made automobiles. And this will employ about 150 people at the outset and 300 people ultimately.

We have an anomalous situation, therefore, a communistic government being involved in a capitalistic society. And some people at home have expressed misgivings because Savannah was captured by the British and captured by the Yankees [laughter], and here perhaps is a good case for us to get captured again [laughter].

But my question is, this is an obvious product of détente, and in such a trade-off of American jobs for dollars going to Russia, who is the net winner—the United States or the Soviet Union?

#### Trade With the U.S.S.R.

*Secretary Kissinger:* Well, I don't believe that Savannah is going to be captured by Russian automobiles, unless they have developed a new one in the last few weeks. [Laughter.]

But to answer your question, who is the net winner in trade between the Soviet Union and the United States? It is a difficult question to answer in the abstract. I would think that an economy of the size of ours can afford to trade with the Soviet Union without any danger of our economy being in any way significantly influenced by the Soviet Union.

The second question is whether our trade with the Soviet Union strengthens the Soviet Union in any competition they may engage in with the United States.

Well, this depends on what sort of trade we engage in and also what moderation the Soviet Union shows in the conduct of its foreign policy.

If the Soviet Union conducts itself in an extremely hostile and aggressive manner, then I would think the possibilities for normal trade between our two countries would be very small. If relations over a period of years become calm, if the Soviet Union shows restraint in other parts of the world, then I think trade, especially in non-strategic items, might contribute to giving

an additional incentive for this moderation.

We have always believed that trade should follow political accommodation. And therefore a great deal depends on the basic state of our relations with the Soviet Union as to whether it is beneficial or not.

## **President Ford Signs Ratifications of Conventions on Terrorism**

*Statement by President Ford*<sup>1</sup>

Within the last few months we have witnessed a new outbreak of international terrorism, some of which has been directed against persons who carry the important burdens of diplomacy. Last summer we were grieved by the brutal murders of our Ambassador to Lebanon [Francis E. Meloy, Jr.] and his Economic Counselor [Robert O. Waring]. We also have seen a series of acts of violence directed against diplomatic missions in the United States for which we have host-country responsibilities. These acts cannot and will not be tolerated in the United States, nor should they be tolerated anywhere in the world. Preventing or punishing such acts is a prime concern of this government and one which I will pursue with all the force of this office.

Today [October 8] I am pleased to affix my signature to three documents which once again demonstrate the commitment of the United States to sustain its struggle against international terrorism. Through our efforts and with others in the United Nations, the Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of Crimes Against Internationally Protected Persons, Including Diplomatic Agents, was adopted in 1972. A few years previously we had supported the adoption in the Organization of American States of the Convention To Prevent and Punish the Acts of Terrorism Taking the Form of Crimes Against Persons and Related Extortion That Are of International Significance.

The Senate gave its advice and consent to the ratification of both of these conventions, and implementing legislation was requested from the Congress which would enable us to discharge our obligations under them. I congratulate the Members of Congress whose prompt and effective efforts have made this bill available for my signature. The Act for the Prevention and Punishment of Crimes Against Internationally Protected Persons (H.R. 15552)<sup>2</sup> will serve as a significant law enforcement tool for us to deal more effectively with the menace of terrorism, and it will assist us in discharging our important responsibilities under the two international conventions which I am today authorizing for ratification.

An important feature of this bill will be to give extraterritorial effect to our law in order to enable us to punish those who commit offenses against internationally protected persons, wherever those offenses may occur. With this law we will in many cases in the future have an improved basis to request extradition and, if granted, to prosecute such criminal terrorists as those who murdered Ambassador Meloy and Economic Counselor Waring.

I call upon all nations to join in this vital endeavor. I particularly urge those countries which have not become parties to these conventions to do so.

I hope that a new initiative against terrorism as it affects innocent persons and disrupts the fabric of society will be addressed at the current session of the United Nations General Assembly. The full force of world opinion and diplomatic action must be brought to bear on this threat to world peace and order.

I pledge our full support to any constructive proposals to combat terrorism. I am therefore happy to sign this act and these instruments of ratification as a reaffirmation of the commitment of the U.S. Government to bring an end to terrorism.

<sup>1</sup> Issued at Dallas, Tex., on Oct. 10 (text from White House press release).

<sup>2</sup> Public Law 94-467, approved Oct. 8.



## The Western Hemisphere Relationship: Foundation for Future Efforts

*Following is a toast by Secretary Kissinger at a luncheon at New York on October 7 in honor of Latin American heads of delegations to the 31st U.N. General Assembly and Permanent Representatives to the United Nations.*

Press release 498 dated October 7

In this decade the cardinal objective of U.S. foreign policy—over all the world—has been to create a tradition of cooperative international relations based on equality, mutual respect, and shared benefit. We have done so in the recognition that the world would not operate according to an American design and that the world's problems would not be solved by prescription. But more importantly, we have done so in the firm conviction that the community of nations has before it now an opportunity for unprecedented progress toward building a better world—and that a new structure of peace and progress could be constructed in which other nations felt a sense of participation, so that in forming it they could make it their own.

Nothing has been more central to our hopes than the relationships of the nations of this hemisphere. They are a priceless foundation of past achievement, a vital and progressing process of present cooperation, and our brightest vision for the future of what like-minded nations can accomplish by working together.

We have sustained an awareness that our destinies are linked: by geography, culture, history, and shared ideals.

We have achieved the crucial elements of successful cooperative effort: ours is a hemisphere of peace, in which problems are solved not by resort to international

conflict or rhetorical confrontation but by responsible discussion and negotiation conducted with a unique spirit of mutual regard and respect.

Our achievement is all the more durable and impressive because it has not been easily won. The United States, in its relationship with its sister republics in the Western Hemisphere, has gone through many cycles. There was a time when we unilaterally declared what foreign nations could do in the Western Hemisphere. Two generations ago we centered our relations around a Good Neighbor policy based upon the principle of nonintervention in the internal or external affairs of another. The 1960's brought the Alliance for Progress, in which, on the whole, the United States sought to develop a program for all of the Western Hemisphere.

In recent years we have, I believe, entered a new and exciting era in our relationships—bringing wider scope for diversity and openness. We are achieving a new and productive balance of responsibility and effort within the Americas. It is a time increasingly marked by consultation, cooperation, and brighter prospects for building stronger and more mutually beneficial relations in our hemisphere—and making our advancement a model for the wider international progress among nations that our times so clearly demand.

It is to these ends that the President and his Administration vent our best efforts to intensify and strengthen the cooperation between Latin America and the United States.

That is why I have attended every session of the General Assembly of the OAS held since I became Secretary of State, and

that is why I have traveled twice to Latin America this year, and that is why I have held meetings with the Presidents and chiefs of state of most nations of the hemisphere and with virtually all the Foreign Ministers.

I have done so out of the conviction that the long and close ties among the countries of the New World now provide an unprecedentedly sound foundation upon which our nations can come together to work to solve the most compelling issues of our time.

My visits to 10 of your countries this year have reaffirmed my conviction that we share that recognition, that we are moving ahead to adapt and advance our ties to meet the needs of our era.

We have done much in the last three years:

*Bilaterally*, we have made special efforts to accommodate differences, to find areas of common interest rather than attempt to dictate to each other's policies. We have shown through practice that trade and investment can be promoted to mutual benefit. Our commitment to conciliation has led us to unprecedented negotiations, with Panama, and, on particular bilateral concerns, with Peru.

These intensified bilateral contacts, both formal and informal, are laying the groundwork for important multilateral progress on pressing international problems, from corporate conduct to cooperation for development, from narcotics to law of the sea.

*Regionally*, we have reaffirmed our commitment to the Organization of American States and to efforts to make it responsive to the concerns of all its members.

In Costa Rica 15 months ago, we ratified our support for the Rio Treaty as an instrument of collective security. At the OAS General Assembly last June, we confirmed the important role of the OAS in protecting human rights and maintaining regional peace—and we began to develop positive

new forms of cooperation on trade and technology.

*Globally*, our countries have shown growing awareness of the need for a new era of economic relations between the nations of North and South. We have brought more than our individual perspectives on commodities, trade, debt, and technology to the United Nations, UNCTAD [United Nations Conference on Trade and Development], and CIEC [Conference on International Economic Cooperation]. By drawing on our special experience with the complexities of interdependence, we of the Americas are helping to define new and workable approaches to these vital issues which require the best of our private as well as our public talents and energies. The United States is dedicated to cooperate in development throughout the world. But as we seek progress on a wider scale, we recognize our close and special ties to the nations of the Americas. We regard the concerns of this hemisphere as our first priority.

In all these areas, the record is one of practical case-by-case progress. We seek no sweeping solutions, we will not force our relations into a single mold or formula. It is a good record. It needs no flowery rhetoric to embellish it. The days of inflated claims and goals are over. Today, ours is a hemisphere of mutual confidence and growing cooperation for peace and progress.

Yet it is in the nature of the unending challenge of foreign affairs that we can never solve all problems. And in this present era, new issues constantly arise. We must therefore do all we can to insure that problems we face are dealt with constructively and that we work together to determine the future directions of our cooperation. This is why the processes of consultation we have recently emphasized among us are particularly important. Yet consultations without the broader framework of a shared vision could well become little more



than sterile recountings of our respective limitations and problems.

We in this hemisphere have that shared vision.

Far more than any like region of the world, we are bound together by a common heritage. And yet we are not European. Our traditions and institutions have something new in them. Men were searching for it before they were sure there *was* an America. Columbus wrote to Ferdinand and Isabella that:

Your Highnesses ordained that I should not go eastward by land in the usual manner but by the *western way* which no one about whom we have positive information has ever followed.

Columbus found his new western way. We who now inhabit the lands he discovered 484 years ago next week similarly are finding ways to the future that are both new and western.

Thus our hemisphere has for centuries symbolized man's readiness to grasp his own destiny, to set out upon uncharted ways in search of a better world.

Today that spirit is more alive and more important than ever. But the challenges of our time require even more than boldness and readiness for tomorrow.

Ours is a time of complex uncertainty. We are called upon to reconcile fundamental philosophical dilemmas:

—We must pursue our commitment to great human equality without removing the incentives for individual initiative;

—We must preserve the security and independence of our nations without sacrificing the resources needed for economic development; and

—We must learn to balance our need for social order with our responsibility to individual freedom. We must vindicate our own commitment to human rights.

The tension between equality and initiative lies at the heart of our desires for a fair yet dynamic global system. In the United States, we emphasize the importance of a market economy based on an

open play of economic forces. We believe growth depends importantly on individual entrepreneurship. Other nations emphasize the need for greater state intervention in their economies to insure more equitable distribution of the fruits of growth.

These differing emphases in economic policy can frequently be significant, but they are not a cause for ponderous ideological confrontation. Each of our countries, to be successful, will have to find a route to special progress that does not end individual incentive. Not to strive for equality is to risk violent revolution; not to provide incentives is to risk decay.

Our mutual dependence, furthermore, requires us to extend our economic cooperation beyond our national borders. That is why we have held intensive bilateral consultations on the Geneva trade negotiations. That is why the United States has ratified its participation in commodity agreements for wheat, coffee, and tin; why we have joined in producer-consumer consultations on copper in the past two weeks; and why we look forward to hemisphere consultations on sugar prior to the negotiations to take place next April.

Recent events have taught us all that global prosperity is indivisible; no nation can prosper alone. The challenge we face is to reconcile our often distinct but interacting dimensions of concern on the basis of respect and an openminded assessment that differing approaches can offer common benefits.

There is a tension as well between the demands of security and development. We in the Americas have done far better than most regions of the world in avoiding armed conflict. In Latin America as a whole, defense expenditures as a percentage of national income are the lowest of any region in the world. These records are enviable. To maintain them in the face of the spiraling costs and offensive potential of modern military technology will require increased cooperation among potential antagonists as well as friends.

This is easier said than done. The need to cooperate with perceived adversaries in the restraint of defense expenditures provides no emotional satisfaction. But vast domestic expenditures are needed if we are to hope to fulfill the positive aspirations of our peoples. None of us in this room will see a time when there are enough resources to enable us to forgo the necessity for choice.

And finally, the balance between freedom and order is inherently tenuous and constantly changing. It will vary for each of us, in accordance with national traditions and historical circumstances.

But all of our nations were founded to protect human freedom and dignity. Man is the measure of all our effort. This hemisphere is the world's laboratory of human freedom, the just and ultimate refuge of the rights of man. We must not turn away from what is best in our own tradition. If we deny these principles in the search for growth and stability, we hazard the very foundations of our national existence and what is most precious to our common experience.

There are tensions that no nation or group of nations can ever fully resolve, of course—tensions which are inherent in the conduct of public affairs. In our time, they pose special challenges. Each nation must find its own equilibrium. But there is much we must do together to enhance, protect, and further respect for human rights in the Americas.

And as we cooperate to resolve these discrepancies of the human relationship, we must also engage together the immediate material needs before us. Our concrete, common problems are real enough, and our cooperative response can do as much as anything to forward all our hopes for a dynamic, secure, and just future for all our peoples.

Several proposals made in the last General Assembly of the OAS in Santiago provide a basis for new forms of cooperation.

These proposals establish our regional agenda for the coming year. They include mechanisms for:

- Financing basic resource development;
- Increasing agricultural productivity;
- Facilitating social and infrastructural projects in middle- as well as low-income developing countries; and
- Improving the development, adaptation, and transfer of technology.

Our best effort will be needed to develop these proposals in a manner worthy of our common potential in the next half year. We must insure that the Special General Assembly on development and the companion Special General Assembly on the structure of the OAS are the culmination of our common efforts.

The international scene today is marked by shifting constellations of problems, tensions, and opportunities. We in our hemisphere experience them in as great a range and intensity as any group of nations on earth.

In the last few years we have, I believe, astutely perceived the problems, the opportunities, and the foundations upon which we can build. And we have begun to go forward—not on the wings of inflated rhetoric and unrealistic goals, but maturely, responsibly, and practically.

The world is aware of our work. In a time when international cooperation is an imperative for each nation, we can be assured that all will closely monitor those from whom the most progress can be expected—those whose shared experience, values, and outlook are the moral origin of a unique intimacy and a unique potential for progress.

Let us resolve to continue to go forward, not just for this year and next—but to make our work together a model for the world for the rest of this century.

Gentlemen, I offer a toast to the future of inter-American cooperation.



## Strengthening the Relationship Between the United States and Africa

*Following is a toast by Secretary Kissinger at a luncheon at New York on October 8 in honor of African Foreign Ministers and Permanent Representatives to the United Nations.*

Press release 501 dated October 8

I've been so much in Africa in the past year that I am filing an application to be an honorary member of the OAU [Organization of African Unity]. Then you will have to sit through even more of my speeches.

When we met here a year ago, I said that America's policy toward Africa was founded upon three principles:

—That self-determination, racial justice, and human rights spread to all of Africa;

—That Africa attain prosperity for its people and become a strong participant in the international economic order; and

—That the continent be free of great-power rivalry or conflict.

I think none of us could then have foretold the dramatic events which have taken place this past year in pursuit of each of these goals.

A year ago, events in Rhodesia seemed to be moving inexorably and swiftly toward war, a war that would have had devastating consequences for that country and its neighbors. There was every prospect of conflict that would leave a legacy of bitterness, division, and confrontation that could well set back the progress of southern Africa for generations.

Today, as a result of the resolute determination of the African people and the re-

sponsible and far-seeing decisions of their leaders, the situation has changed dramatically. A breakthrough has been achieved. A negotiation is about to begin; the framework of a settlement exists. An opportunity is now before us for a peaceful transition to a majority-ruled multiracial society in Zimbabwe.

A year ago the prospects were dim that the Namibian problem could be rapidly or satisfactorily resolved.

Today, the inevitability of Namibian independence is accepted by all parties concerned. More important, a way toward agreement among Namibia, South Africa, and the United Nations now appears open. Determined efforts are now underway to bring about a constitutional conference at a neutral location under U.N. aegis in which all authentic national forces, specifically including SWAPO [South West Africa People's Organization], will be able to fashion a design for the new state of Namibia.

And in the course of the year past, the forces of change have asserted themselves dramatically in South Africa. It is manifest that the internal political, economic, and social structure of that country must change. A system based on institutionalized injustice, and that brings periodic violence and upheaval, cannot last. The leaders of South Africa have taken responsible steps to help facilitate a process of change in Rhodesia. The world now looks to them to exercise the same wisdom to bring racial justice to South Africa.

The past year also has brought the beginnings of what could be a new economic

era for Africa. And it is clear that ultimately it is economic development which will determine whether the aspirations of the African people for progress and human dignity will be fulfilled.

Africa's great natural wealth and considerable potential for agricultural and industrial development have long been impeded by an array of problems:

—Recurrent drought and natural disaster;

—Heavy reliance by many nations on the production of a single commodity and, as a result, extraordinary dependence on the vagaries of the world economy; and

—A crushing historical burden of poverty.

In the past year the international community has laid the groundwork for an attack on all these problems. It is increasingly recognized that in place of sporadic relief efforts to ease the aftereffects of natural disasters, what is needed is comprehensive international programs to address fundamental conditions. Last May in Dakar I outlined one such program, a program for international cooperation to help the nations of the Sahel develop additional water resources, increase crop acreage through modern agricultural techniques, and improve food storage—all aimed at making the Sahel less vulnerable to crisis in the future.

Broad-based multinational cooperation has been accelerated to reform the global economic system for the benefit of the developing nations. In the past year—since the seventh special session [of the U.N. General Assembly]—major steps proposed at that session have been implemented and promising new measures discussed. Steps have not only been proposed but carried out—to expand agricultural production worldwide, to improve the earnings potential and market stability of key raw materials, to reduce trade barriers to tropical product exports into the United States, to help those hard hit by increasing energy costs, and to stimulate the flow of modern

technology so as to promote growth and diversify economies now excessively dependent on a single commodity. Africa is a principal beneficiary of these reforms in the international economy.

Africa's trade with and investment from the United States and the industrial nations of the West are crucial and expanding. Africa wants to earn its way. But for some, particularly the poorest and least developed, trade and investment are not enough to overcome the legacy of pervasive poverty. U.S. bilateral assistance programs will therefore concentrate increasingly on these countries, and in sectors where the need is greatest.

The United States also believes that closer cooperation among the industrial democracies of North America, Western Europe, and Japan can mean a much greater contribution to the economic development of Africa. Therefore we welcome the proposal of President Giscard d'Estaing of France for a fund to organize and coordinate Western assistance efforts to Africa. We hope to move ahead on this proposal. And we are seeking to further strengthen coordination through the OECD [Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development] to insure that the collective efforts of the industrial nations are efficiently organized to bring the maximum benefit to Africa.

Economic development is a painful and long-term process which depends most of all on the sustained and substantial efforts of the developing countries themselves. But this has been a historic year in the effort of the community of nations to narrow the gulf between North and South both economically and politically. All those who seek either order or progress are beginning to recognize that we can have neither unless the last quarter of this century is an era of international cooperation.

The advances made toward racial justice and economic progress, if they are maintained and built upon, can strengthen the basis of African unity and self-determination and thereby serve as a bulwark



against unwanted outside intervention in the affairs of the African people.

The United States is firmly committed to the concept of Africa for Africans. That is why, for example, we have agreed with the Presidents of Botswana, Mozambique, Tanzania, and Zambia that non-African nations should not deal directly with the liberation movements of southern Africa. The United States seeks no bloc and plays no favorites among groups or leaders; we will not oppose any African faction or group, regardless of its ideology, if it is truly independent and African. We will continue our firm opposition to the extension of great-power rivalry or conflict to the African Continent.

Thus, in the course of the past year, Africa's drive for justice, for progress, for true independence, has been severely tested in every dimension. Africa has survived those tests and finds itself at a possible turning point in its history.

The statesmanship of Africa's leaders has won widespread recognition. The resilience of Africa's economies and the determination of its peoples to achieve racial justice have been amply demonstrated to the world.

But progress achieved will not continue automatically. Difficult decisions must be made, additional statesmanship must be shown, if just solutions are to be achieved.

Yet continued progress is crucial. For we are all aware that the important steps toward peace and justice in Rhodesia, steps to avert bloodshed and widening war, can easily be undone. And there are those who, for their own purposes, do not want to see a peaceful settlement in either Rhodesia or Namibia.

Together, African states, the United Kingdom, and the United States have fashioned an opportunity for peace and foundation for progress in southern Africa. Essential elements of a negotiated settlement have been achieved:

—The authorities in Rhodesia have accepted the principle of majority rule within two years.

—The parties have agreed that an interim government will be established immediately.

—Agreement has been reached on the time and place for a conference.

—A number of Western governments have agreed to participate in a fund to facilitate the transition to majority rule and to enhance the economic future of an independent Zimbabwe.

For the first time in 11 years, a rapid, satisfactory, and peaceful end to the Rhodesian crisis is within reach. To lose this opportunity would be monumental tragedy. To seize it can mean a new day of hope to southern Africa. History will not forgive a failure to seize the moment. Whether by neglect or design, such a failure will be tantamount to a decision to choose violence, chaos, and widening destruction over a rapid and peaceful solution. No country in southern Africa will be spared either the pain of warfare or the judgment of history.

Continued movement toward an accord for Namibia is also crucial. My talks with leaders of black African states, the South African Prime Minister, and Mr. Sam Nujoma of the South West Africa People's Organization lead me to believe that those involved want a peaceful solution and are willing to modify their positions in order to achieve it. As in Rhodesia, success is not assured. Nevertheless, with determination and a readiness to compromise, the parties are now in a position to end the dispute that has been a source of serious international discord for almost three decades.

The focus of the moment is on the southern part of the continent, but the U.S. commitment applies to all of Africa and to all the great issues I have mentioned: justice, progress, and independence.

Last year I said to the permanent members of the OAU who met with me that strengthening the relationship between the United States and Africa is a major objective of American policy. It was then, it is now, and shall continue to be so in the future. Africa can count on us.

There can no longer be any question that America is committed to Africa's goals and to working with the nations of Africa to solve the continent's problems. In return, we expect to find respect for our concerns and perspectives.

Let us set aside the suspicions of the past and work for our common future. Together we can reconstitute the community of man on the basis of mutual benefit and shared endeavor. We can show that races can live together, that there is an alternative to hatred.

If Africa succeeds, it will have much to teach the world, and so much to contribute to it.

I therefore ask you to join me in a toast:

—To the well-being of the peoples of Africa;

—To friendship and cooperation between the United States and Africa; and

—To peace, prosperity, and justice for peoples everywhere.

## Secretary Kissinger Reaffirms Principles for Middle East Peace

*Following is a toast by Secretary Kissinger at a luncheon at New York on September 29 in honor of Arab states' heads of delegations to the 31st U.N. General Assembly and Permanent Representatives to the United Nations.<sup>1</sup>*

Press release 482 dated September 29

This is the fourth time I have met with you since I've become Secretary of State. I have just returned from Africa, and I don't want to say anything insulting to my Arab friends; but I must tell you that compared to the passions that exist in Africa the Middle East has almost Anglo-Saxon restraint. [Laughter.]

<sup>1</sup> A toast by Tunisian Foreign Minister Habib Chatty and the opening paragraphs of Secretary Kissinger's toast, which are included in press release 482, are not printed here.

I have visited many of your countries, and I know we cannot compete in hospitality. With respect to hospitality, we are the underdeveloped region compared to our experiences in the Middle East.

But as I look back over the four meetings we have had, the first time we assembled here everyone wanted to know with great suspicion what we were going to do. And I said all the conventional things about Security Council Resolution 242.

You saw to it that, soon after, another Security Council resolution became necessary. But as I look back, I feel that despite all the ups and downs very great progress has been made toward peace in the Middle East. First of all, the traditional friendship between the United States and the countries of the Arab world has been restored with respect to at least very many of them. And we have had an opportunity to make a contribution to three agreements that have begun the difficult and complicated process toward peace.

When I met with you last year, I pointed out four principles which I would like to repeat today:

—The first was that the only durable solution is a just and comprehensive peace and that the United States remains committed to that objective.

—Second, we recognize that peace in the Middle East is not divisible. Each nation and people which is party to the Arab-Israeli problem must find a fair satisfaction of its legitimate interests.

—Third, it is in the nature of movement toward peace that all the key problems must be dealt with in a balanced way. The questions of territory, borders, military deployments, cannot be dealt with unless at the same time political and economic settlement are given equal attention.

—And fourth, any step taken must be judged in the light of the alternatives that are available.

We have proceeded on a step-by-step basis, but we believe that now conditions



exist that make comprehensive solutions the most useful approach. And we believe also that conditions are coming about in which the search for peace can be resumed with energy and with conviction. And I want to assure you that the United States remains committed to this objective and that we hope that significant progress can be made in the months ahead.

Since we last met, also there has been the tragedy of the civil war in Lebanon. As we stated on the occasion of the inauguration of the new Lebanese President, the United States is committed to an independent, sovereign, and united Lebanon. We do not favor partition. We favor an opportunity for the people of Lebanon to live their own lives and to determine their own destinies. And we will be available to give any advice and assistance that the parties may request of us.

We can only express the hope now that this tragic conflict will soon come to an end, because it is the unity of the Arab nations that is an essential precondition to an effective policy of peace in the Middle East. And if we are to achieve the objectives of a just and lasting peace about which we have spoken so long, which we must strive to implement, then unity among the Arab nations is of the greatest importance.

Our countries are also concerned with many economic problems and the relations between the developed and developing nations. The countries of the Middle East are playing an increasingly important role. The oil-producing countries, because of their wealth and because of their influence on the global economy, have an unparalleled responsibility which must be exercised for the benefit of all. We are discussing it with them and other countries of the Middle East in the United Nations, in the Conference on International Economic Cooperation; and we are doing so with the attitude that the dialogue between the industrial and the developing world is perhaps the deepest challenge of our time.

We must solve it cooperatively. We cannot create a world community in which one party is condemned to permanent poverty. We cannot create a world community either through tactics of confrontation. So the United States is prepared to work cooperatively and constructively with the nations assembled in this room for the common benefit of all mankind.

Now, distinguished friends, let me conclude by saying that I know that we have not yet traveled except the beginning of the road toward peace. But I also believe that we have created conditions from which the rest of the distance can be traveled if we work on it with conviction and with confidence in each other.

I have personally valued the associations that have been formed with so many of you over the years. And I am grateful that you have done me the honor of joining me again for this meeting. So I would like to propose a toast to peace in the Middle East and to the lasting friendship between the peoples of the Middle East and the American people.

## **United States-Spanish Council Holds Inaugural Session**

### *Joint Communiqué<sup>1</sup>*

The United States-Spanish Council, established by the Treaty of Friendship and Cooperation, which entered into force September 21, 1976, was formally constituted on October 1, 1976, at a meeting under the joint Chairmanship of Secretary of State Henry A. Kissinger and Foreign Minister Marcelino Oreja Aguirre. The meeting was also attended by the permanent military representatives on the Council, General George Brown, Chairman of the United States Joint Chiefs of Staff and Lt. General Carlos Fernandez Vallespin, President of

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<sup>1</sup> Issued following the meeting at Washington on Oct. 1 (text from press release 490).

the Council of Chiefs of Staff of Spain, by Ambassador Wells Stabler, United States Ambassador to Spain and permanent U.S. representative on the Council and, as participants in this meeting, by Spanish Ambassador to the U.S. Jaime Alba, Spanish Ambassador-at-Large Juan José Rovira y Sanchez Herrero and Mr. Juan Duran Loriga Rodriganez, Director General of North American and Pacific Affairs of the Spanish Foreign Ministry.

In fulfillment of its responsibility for overseeing implementation of the Treaty of Friendship and Cooperation, the Council noted with approval the plans for early constitution of the various bodies under its aegis, and expressed confidence that these bodies will soon be operating effectively to achieve the aims and objectives of the Treaty.

The Council's review of the current world situation reaffirmed the value of the Treaty at this juncture in world affairs and its important contribution to the Western Community.

In the field of defense cooperation, the Council underlined the commitment of both governments under the Treaty to develop appropriate plans and coordination between their respective armed forces in order to enhance their own security and that of the Western World. The Council likewise confirmed the importance of establishing coordination with the North Atlantic Treaty Organization. The Council took note of preparations to establish the Combined Military Coordination and Planning Staff in Madrid as provided in the Treaty, and requested the Joint Military Committee, with the assistance of the Combined Staff once it is established to develop a work program to carry out their responsibilities under the Treaty for review by the Council at its next meeting. The Joint Military Committee is also meeting on October 1 in Washington, D.C.

With regard to economic cooperation, the Council noted the importance of the Joint Economic Committee, which has been created under the Treaty to serve as the

principal vehicle for bilateral economic consultations, and which will be convened in the fall. This Committee will also seek to coordinate the positions of both governments on questions of mutual interest, both bilateral and multilateral.

The Council similarly approved plans for early convening of the Joint Committee on Educational and Cultural Affairs and the Joint Committee on Scientific and Technological Cooperation, both of which will be expanding cooperative programs in their respective fields. The Council in particular took favorable note of preliminary discussion already held on the development of joint solar energy research programs.

In all of these fields, it is an objective of the two countries to contribute to closer European and Atlantic cooperation.

The Council, which is to meet at least semi-annually, will next be convened at the call of the Co-Chairmen.

## **Increase in Customs Duties on Sugar Announced**

*Statement by President Ford*<sup>1</sup>

Since July the price of raw sugar has steadily declined and is now below the cost of production for most U.S. sugar producers. At current price levels many U.S. sugarbeet and sugarcane producers are unable to operate profitably. I have watched these developments with growing concern, mindful of the important contribution that our sugar industry makes to the national economy. Consequently, when prices plummeted in August, the interagency Task Force on Sugar Policy was reconstituted to update the supply, demand, and price outlook for the remainder of 1976 and to consider the policy implications of these projections. The task force has now completed

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<sup>1</sup> Issued on Sept. 21 (text from White House press release).



its review and has reported to me its analysis of the problem and the policy options.

After reviewing the work of this task force and determining the views of members of Congress from the affected areas, I have decided to give my full support to the request of the Senate Finance Committee for an escape clause investigation by the U.S. International Trade Commission under section 201 of the Trade Act of 1974. I fully agree with the Finance Committee that this matter requires a full and complete examination by the USITC. Further, because of the urgency of the problem for America's sugar producers, I am asking the USITC to expedite its review and to report its findings as soon as possible.

In addition, in view of the depressed state of the sugar industry, I have decided, pending completion of the USITC investigation, to raise the duty on imported sugar from .625 cents per pound to 1.875 cents per pound effective immediately. Increased custom duties will offer domestic producers some protection from imports while the USITC investigation is underway. I emphasize that this is an interim measure which I will review following receipt of the findings of the USITC and that I am not prejudging the eventual findings and recommendations of the USITC with respect to the question of injury or possible remedial measures.

## **U.S. and German Democratic Republic Sign Fisheries Agreement**

### *Joint Statement*<sup>1</sup>

On October 5, 1976, representatives of the Governments of the United States of America and the German Democratic Republic signed an Agreement which will govern future fishing activity by vessels of the German Democratic Republic off the coasts of the United States. The Agreement will come into force upon completion of

internal procedures by both governments.

Ambassador Rozanne L. Ridgway, Deputy Assistant Secretary of State for Oceans and Fisheries Affairs, signed for the United States. Mr. Werner Lange, Head of the Department of International Relations of the Ministry for District Managed Industry and Foodstuffs Industry, signed for the German Democratic Republic.

Negotiations on the Agreement began on September 27, 1976, and were concluded this week. Both delegations expressed satisfaction with the new accord, and the hope that it will contribute to mutual understanding and cooperation between the two governments.

## **Congressional Documents Relating to Foreign Policy**

### **94th Congress, 2d Session**

U.S. Policy Toward Africa. Hearings before the Subcommittees on African Affairs and on Arms Control, International Organizations and Security Agreements and the Senate Committee on Foreign Relations. March 5–May 27, 1976. 336 pp.

Allocation of Resources in the Soviet Union and China—1976. Hearings before the Subcommittee on Priorities and Economy in Government of the Joint Economic Committee. Part 2. Executive sessions. May 24–June 15, 1976. 122 pp.

Extension of the Export Administration Act of 1969. Hearings before the House Committee on International Relations; June 8–August 24, 1976; 809 pp. Markup sessions of the committee; August 26–September 1, 1976; 92 pp. Report of the committee, together with supplemental and additional views, to accompany H.R. 15377; H. Rept. 94-1469; September 2, 1976; 54 pp.

The Right-to-Food Resolution. Hearings before the Subcommittee on International Resources, Food, and Energy of the House Committee on International Relations. June 22–29, 1976. 632 pp.

Security Assistance to Spain. Communication from the President of the United States transmitting notice of his intention to exercise his authority under section 614(a) of the Foreign Assistance Act of 1961, as amended, to waive the restriction of section 620(m) of the act as it applies to security assistance to Spain for fiscal year 1976. H. Doc. 94-549. July 19, 1976. 3 pp.

Revolution Into Democracy: Portugal After the Coup. A report by Senator George McGovern to the Senate Committee on Foreign Relations. August 1976. 111 pp.

<sup>1</sup> Issued on Oct. 6 (text from press release 496).

## United States Restates Position on U.N. Decade Against Racism

*Following is a statement made in Committee III (Social, Humanitarian and Cultural) of the U.N. General Assembly by U.S. Representative Jacob M. Myerson on October 6.*

USUN press release 110 dated October 6

The subject before us—the elimination of all forms of racial discrimination—is one which my country and my government address with pride. Americans are this year consciously renewing the basic commitments made when our nation was founded 200 years ago. In particular, we recall the proposition in our Declaration of Independence that “all men are created equal.” Our nation and our society are based on the principle that freedom, equality, and dignity are inherent attributes of the individual and not a privilege accorded by the state. Our Constitution guarantees equality under the law. As is well known, the United States has struggled to sustain and improve the implementation of this principle, a struggle that has met with dramatic success in recent times.

Just as we have worked within our own borders, we have also joined in efforts on the international level aimed at ending the practice of racial discrimination wherever it is practiced. We believe that the United States has an important contribution to make in this area.

The statements and actions of Secretary Kissinger provide evidence of our determination to pursue these matters in relation to the African Continent. In a recent statement in Lusaka, the Secretary said:<sup>1</sup>

Of all the challenges before us, of all the purposes we have in common, racial justice is one of the most basic. This is a dominant issue of our age, within nations and among nations.

We know from our own experience that the goal of racial justice is both compelling and achievable. Our support for this principle in southern Africa is not simply a matter of foreign policy but an imperative of our own moral heritage.

Thus the United States firmly opposes apartheid and racism as those terms have been broadly understood over the years. We are speaking and acting in the interest of racial justice.

What I have just said, Mr. Chairman, is by way of background to the brief comments my delegation wishes to make as the General Assembly once again considers the progress achieved under the Decade for Action To Combat Racism and Racial Discrimination.

In his report on the results of the 29th session of the Commission on Human Rights, held in 1973, the U.S. Representative described what was in his view the outstanding single event of that session. This was the unanimous adoption of a program for the Decade for Action To Combat Racism and Racial Discrimination. The consensus achieved in the Commission on Human Rights was manifested several weeks later in the Economic and Social Council. Finally, the General Assembly by consensus approved Resolution 3057 designating the period beginning December 10, 1973, as the Decade. In this same resolution the Assembly approved the associated program.

The genuine agreement embodied in Resolution 3057 was due, above all, to an aversion to racism that is common to members of this organization. It was also due to the skillful and devoted efforts of a number of individuals and delegations to find common ground in treating a malady that

<sup>1</sup> For Secretary Kissinger's address at Lusaka, Zambia, on Apr. 27, see BULLETIN of May 31, 1976, p. 672.



has plagued mankind for centuries. The measures provided for in the program—at the national, the regional, and the international levels—gave us hope that by 1983 we would be able to look back with satisfaction to a record of significant progress.

My government joined wholeheartedly in supporting the Decade. Our national efforts, especially in the years just prior to 1973, had included the enactment of much new legislation with critical provisions for implementation. Steps taken at that time have led to significant advances in assuring true equality for all Americans. Our own history, as well as the history of other countries, has demonstrated the great difficulty of overcoming ancient prejudices and vested interests and the complexity of the measures needed. In particular, our experience has repeatedly demonstrated the necessity of a strong supporting consensus rising above differences of economic status, geography, or political affiliation.

My government remains eager to join in supporting all legitimate efforts, including those originally proposed in the framework of the Decade. But our present discussion takes place in an altered setting due to the adoption by the 30th General Assembly of Resolution 3379 purporting to equate Zionism with racism and racial discrimination.

Mr. Chairman, I wish to make clear that the passage of one year has in no way diminished the force or totality of our rejection of Resolution 3379 or the thinking that lies behind it. Not only was its adoption misguided and highly disruptive, but its effects have, as we all know, distorted the Decade and raised the most serious obstacles to carrying out its program. My government deeply regrets this state of affairs. We hope that men of good will can find ways and means to overcome the barriers raised by this resolution and to right the wrong that was done at the 30th General Assembly. We continue to hope that actions can be taken to restore the Decade's original objectives. Until that happens, however, the United States will maintain the position it announced last

year: we shall neither participate in nor support the Decade for Action To Combat Racism and Racial Discrimination.

Mr. Chairman, it is thus with regret but with equal confidence in the rightness of our views that we have today restated our position on the Decade, our rejection of the proposition that Zionism is a form of racism or racial discrimination, and our commitment to all genuine and sincere efforts to overcome racism and racial discrimination.

## Agenda of the 31st Regular Session of the U.N. General Assembly<sup>1</sup>

1. Opening of the session by the Chairman of the delegation of Luxembourg.
2. Minute of silent prayer or meditation.
3. Credentials of representatives to the thirty-first session of the General Assembly:
  - (a) Appointment of the Credentials Committee;
  - (b) Report of the Credentials Committee.
4. Election of the President.
5. Constitution of the Main Committees and election of officers.
6. Election of the Vice-Presidents.
7. Notification by the Secretary-General under Article 12, paragraph 2, of the Charter of the United Nations.
8. Adoption of the agenda.
9. General debate.
10. Report of the Secretary-General on the work of the Organization.
11. Report of the Security Council.
12. Report of the Economic and Social Council.
13. Report of the International Court of Justice.
14. Report of the International Atomic Energy Agency.
15. Election of five non-permanent members of the Security Council.
16. Election of eighteen members of the Economic and Social Council.
17. Appointment of the Secretary-General of the United Nations.
18. Election of fifteen members of the Industrial Development Board.
19. Election of nineteen members of the Governing Council of the United Nations Environment Programme.

<sup>1</sup> Adopted by the Assembly on Sept. 24 (items 1-122) and Oct. 4 (items 123-124) (text from U.N. doc. A/31/251 and Add. 1).

20. Election of twelve members of the World Food Council.
21. Election of twelve members of the Board of Governors of the United Nations Special Fund.
22. Election of seven members of the Committee for Programme and Co-ordination.
23. Election of the members of the International Law Commission.
24. Election of seventeen members of the United Nations Commission on International Trade Law.
25. Implementation of the Declaration on the Granting of Independence to Colonial Countries and Peoples: report of the Special Committee on the Situation with regard to the Implementation of the Declaration on the Granting of Independence to Colonial Countries and Peoples.
26. Admission of new Members to the United Nations.
27. Question of Palestine:
  - (a) Report of the Committee on the Exercise of the Inalienable Rights of the Palestinian People;
  - (b) Report of the Secretary-General.
28. Co-operation between the United Nations and the Organization of African Unity: report of the Secretary-General.
29. The situation in the Middle East.
30. Third United Nations Conference on the Law of the Sea.
31. International co-operation in the peaceful uses of outer space: report of the Committee on the Peaceful Uses of Outer Space.
32. Preparation of an international convention on principles governing the use by States of artificial earth satellites for direct television broadcasting: report of the Committee on the Peaceful Uses of Outer Space.
33. Implementation of the Declaration on the Strengthening of International Security: report of the Secretary-General.
34. Reduction of military budgets: report of the Secretary-General.
35. Incendiary and other specific conventional weapons which may be the subject of prohibitions or restrictions of use for humanitarian reasons: report of the Secretary-General.
36. Chemical and bacteriological (biological) weapons: report of the Conference of the Committee on Disarmament.
37. Urgent need for cessation of nuclear and thermonuclear tests and conclusion of a treaty designed to achieve a comprehensive test ban: report of the Conference of the Committee on Disarmament.
38. Implementation of General Assembly resolution 3467 (XXX) concerning the signature and ratification of Additional Protocol II of the Treaty for the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons in Latin America (Treaty of Tlatelolco).
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42. Implementation of the Declaration on the De-nuclearization of Africa.
43. Comprehensive study of the question of nuclear-weapon-free zones in all its aspects: report of the Secretary-General.
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48. Prohibition of the development and manufacture of new types of weapons of mass destruction and new systems of such weapons: report of the Conference of the Committee on Disarmament.
49. General and complete disarmament:
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  - (b) Report of the International Atomic Energy Agency;
  - (c) Report of the Secretary-General.
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51. Effects of atomic radiation: report of the United Nations Scientific Committee on the Effects of Atomic Radiation.
52. Policies of *apartheid* of the Government of South Africa:
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  - (b) Report of the Secretary-General.
53. United Nations Relief and Works Agency for Palestine Refugees in the Near East:
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  - (c) Technical co-operation activities undertaken by the Secretary-General;
  - (d) United Nations Volunteers programme;
  - (e) United Nations Fund for Population Activities;
  - (f) United Nations Children's Fund;
  - (g) World Food Programme.
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  - (b) Report of the Secretary-General;
  - (c) Habitat: United Nations Conference on Human Settlements: report of the Secretary-General;
  - (d) Election of the Executive Director.
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68. Technical co-operation among developing countries.
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  - (b) Reports of the Committee on the Elimination of Racial Discrimination;
  - (c) Status of the International Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Racial Discrimination: report of the Secretary-General;
  - (d) Status of the International Convention on the Suppression and Punishment of the Crime of *Apartheid*.
70. Adverse consequences for the enjoyment of human rights of political, military, economic and other forms of assistance given to colonial and racist régimes in southern Africa.
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100. Scale of assessments for the apportionment of the expenses of the United Nations: report of the Committee on Contributions.
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102. Personnel questions:
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  - (b) Other personnel questions: report of the Secretary-General.
103. Report of the International Civil Service Commission.
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106. Report of the International Law Commission on the work of its twenty-eighth session.
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118. Question of Cyprus.

119. Observer status for the Commonwealth Secretariat at the United Nations.
120. Co-operation and assistance in the application and improvement of mass communications for social progress and development.
121. Situation arising out of unilateral withdrawal of Ganges waters at Farakka.
122. Question of the Comorian island of Mayotte.
123. Drafting of an international convention against the taking of hostages.
124. Conclusion of a world treaty on the non-use of force in international relations.

## TREATY INFORMATION

### Current Actions

#### MULTILATERAL

##### Coffee

International coffee agreement 1976, with annexes. Done at London December 3, 1975. Entered into force provisionally October 1, 1976.

*Ratifications deposited:* Brazil, Central African Republic, Ecuador, September 28, 1976.

*Notifications of provisional application deposited:* Dominican Republic, Ireland, Paraguay, Togo, European Economic Community, September 28, 1976; Angola, Honduras, Rwanda, Sierra Leone, September 30, 1976.

##### Containers

International convention for safe containers (CSC), with annexes. Done at Geneva December 2, 1972. Enters into force September 6, 1977.<sup>1</sup>

*Instrument of ratification signed by the President:* October 8, 1976.

##### Cultural Property

Convention on the means of prohibiting and preventing the illicit import, export, and transfer of ownership of cultural property. Done at Paris November 14, 1970. Entered into force April 24, 1972.<sup>2</sup>

*Ratification deposited:* Nepal, June 23, 1976.

##### Customs

Customs convention on containers, 1972, with annexes and protocol. Done at Geneva December 2,

<sup>1</sup> Not for the United States.

<sup>2</sup> Not in force for the United States.

1972. Entered into force December 6, 1975.<sup>2</sup>  
*Instrument of ratification signed by the President:*  
October 8, 1976.

## Health

Amendments to articles 34 and 55 of the constitution of the World Health Organization of July 22, 1946, as amended (TIAS 1808, 4643, 8086). Adopted at Geneva May 22, 1973.<sup>3</sup>  
*Acceptance deposited:* Argentina, October 4, 1976.  
Amendments to articles 24 and 25 of the constitution of the World Health Organization of July 22, 1946, as amended (TIAS 1808, 4643, 8086). Adopted at Geneva May 17, 1976.<sup>2</sup>  
*Acceptance deposited:* Surinam, October 4, 1976.

## Refugees

Protocol relating to the status of refugees. Done at New York January 31, 1967. Entered into force October 4, 1967; for the United States November 1, 1968. TIAS 6577.  
*Accession deposited:* Uganda, September 27, 1976

## Safety at Sea

Amendments to the international convention for the safety of life at sea, 1960 (TIAS 5780). Adopted at London October 12, 1971.<sup>3</sup>  
*Acceptance deposited:* Israel, September 23, 1976  
Amendments to chapters II, III, IV, and V of the international convention for the safety of life at sea, 1960 (TIAS 5780). Adopted at London November 20, 1973.<sup>3</sup>  
*Acceptance deposited:* Israel, September 23, 1976.  
Amendment to chapter VI of the international convention for the safety of life at sea, 1960 (TIAS 5780). Adopted at London November 20, 1973.<sup>3</sup>  
*Acceptance deposited:* Czechoslovakia, September 23, 1976.

## Seals

1976 protocol amending the interim convention on conservation of North Pacific fur seals (TIAS 3948). Done at Washington May 7, 1976.  
*Acceptance deposited:* Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, October 12, 1976.  
*Entered into force:* October 12, 1976.

## Slave Trade

Protocol amending the slavery convention signed at Geneva on September 25, 1926, with annex. Done at New York December 7, 1953. Entered into force December 7, 1953, for the protocol; July 7, 1955, for annex to protocol.  
*Notification of succession:* Barbados, July 22, 1976.

## Terrorism

Convention to prevent and punish the acts of terrorism taking the form of crimes against persons and related extortion that are of international significance. Signed at Washington February 2, 1971. Entered into force October 16, 1973.<sup>2</sup>  
*Instrument of ratification signed by the President:*  
October 8, 1976.

Convention on the prevention and punishment of crimes against internationally protected persons, including diplomatic agents. Adopted by the U.N. General Assembly December 14, 1973.<sup>3</sup>  
*Instrument of ratification signed by the President:*  
October 8, 1976.

## World Heritage

Convention concerning the protection of the world cultural and natural heritage. Done at Paris November 23, 1972. Entered into force December 17, 1975. TIAS 8226.  
*Ratification deposited:* Poland, June 29, 1976.

## BILATERAL

### Federal Republic of Germany

Agreement on cooperation in the field of biomedical research and technology. Signed at Bonn September 22, 1976. Entered into force September 22, 1976.

### Israel

Agreement amending the agreement for sales of agricultural commodities of September 30, 1976. Effected by exchange of notes at Washington October 12, 1976. Entered into force October 12, 1976.

### Mexico

Agreement amending the agreement of November 9, 1972, as amended (TIAS 7697, 8152, 8301), concerning frequency modulation broadcasting in the 88 to 108 MHz band. Effected by exchange of notes at México September 9 and 15, 1976. Entered into force September 15, 1976.  
Agreement relating to the provision of additional assistance by the United States to curb illegal traffic in narcotics and amending the agreements of August 9, 1976, and May 18, 1976. Effected by exchange of letters at México September 30, 1976. Entered into force September 30, 1976.

### Pakistan

Agreement amending the agreement for sales of agricultural commodities of August 7, 1975 (TIAS 8189), with minutes. Effected by exchange of notes at Islamabad August 20, 1976. Entered into force August 20, 1976.

### Spain

Treaty of friendship and cooperation, with supplementary agreements and exchanges of notes. Signed at Madrid January 24, 1976. Entered into force September 21, 1976.  
*Proclaimed by the President:* October 8, 1976, with declaration.

<sup>2</sup> Not in force for the United States.

<sup>3</sup> Not in force.



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No.	Date	Subject
*505	10/12	U.S. Advisory Commission on International Educational and Cultural Affairs, Nov. 4.
*506	10/12	Shipping Coordinating Committee (SCC), U.S. National Committee for the Prevention of Marine Pollution, Nov. 8.
*507	10/12	SCC, Subcommittee on Safety of Life at Sea (SOLAS), working group on standards of training and watchkeeping. Nov. 10.
*508	10/13	Monteagle Stearns sworn in as Ambassador to Ivory Coast (biographic data).
*509	10/14	Wat T. Cluverius sworn in as Ambassador to Bahrain (biographic data).
†510	10/12	Recent developments on IFAD.
*511	10/14	Resolution of U.S.-U.K. civil aviation dispute.
*512	10/14	U.S. Advisory Commission on International Educational and Cultural Affairs releases 12th annual report.
*513	10/15	Melissa F. Wells sworn in as Ambassador to Cape Verde and Guinea-Bissau (biographic data).
*514	10/15	Kissinger: interview with Barbara Walters for ABC-TV Evening News, Oct. 14.
*515	10/15	Advisory Committee on "Foreign Relations of the United States," Nov. 12.
*516	10/15	SCC, SOLAS, working group on safety of navigation, Nov. 17.
*517	10/15	SCC, SOLAS, working group on radiocommunications, Nov. 18.
†518	10/15	Kissinger: news conference, Harvard University.

\* Not printed.  
† Held for a later issue of the BULLETIN.

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# THE DEPARTMENT OF STATE BULLETIN

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*The Department of State BULLETIN a weekly publication issued by the Office of Media Services, Bureau of Public Affairs, provides the public and interested agencies of the government with information on developments in the field of U.S. foreign relations and on the work of the Department and the Foreign Service.*

*The BULLETIN includes selected press releases on foreign policy, issues by the White House and the Department, and statements, addresses, and news conferences of the President and the Secretary of State and other officers of the Department, as well as special articles on various phases of international affairs and the function of the Department. Information is included concerning treaties and international agreements to which the United States is or may become party and on treaties of general international interest.*

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## Secretary Kissinger's News Conference at Harvard October 15

*Following is the transcript of a news conference held by Secretary Kissinger on October 15 at Cambridge, Mass., where he participated in the Harvard East Asia Conference.*

Press release 518 dated October 15

*Professor Fairbank:* Ladies and gentlemen, I am John Fairbank, representing Harvard University.

Harvard has called this press conference and is extremely glad that Secretary Kissinger is able to come here today, because we have an interest in East Asia that we think is absolutely essential to develop in the public interest. The Secretary is helping us in this way at our request. We appreciate it very much. I hope each of you will identify your paper as you ask questions.

*Q. Mr. Secretary, what is this Administration doing at this moment to secure a final accounting of American servicemen missing in action in Southeast Asia, and also a comment from you on the cooperation of the present government in Vietnam on this matter?*

*Secretary Kissinger:* We have made it clear to the Government of Vietnam that progress toward normalization and progress toward better relations with the United States absolutely depend on an accounting for the missing in action. We are prepared to discuss this with the Vietnamese. We've had diplomatic exchanges in Paris, and we expect to start some discussions with them in the near future on that subject.

Now, so far, the Vietnamese Government has not been particularly cooperative. They have been feeding out just a few names to influence particular decisions. But we think

that as a question of principle we cannot let the Vietnamese Government blackmail American families with an anguish that has been going on for years in order to do something that they should have done under the armistice agreement to begin with.

So we hope that in the future that we will get a complete accounting for the missing in action, and that will then permit progress toward normalization.

*Q. Just a followup on that: Is this Administration prepared to veto the entrance of the Government of Vietnam into the United Nations until this matter is resolved?*

*Secretary Kissinger:* Well, we have vetoed it before. We have made it clear that we would veto it before, and the President has stated that this is a precondition.

### Cuba's Statement on Hijacking Agreement

*Q. Mr. Secretary, how is the State Department responding to Fidel Castro's statement [on Oct. 15] that his country is canceling the 1973 skyjacking agreement with the United States?*

*Secretary Kissinger:* First, in my speech to the United Nations I condemned terrorism as an instrument of national policy pursued by any nation, for whatever cause. The United States is not engaged in any activity of this kind, and the charge by Fidel Castro that the United States or its government or any agency of the government had anything to do with the explosion of that airliner is totally false.

Secondly, we think that it is an act of complete irresponsibility to encourage hi-

jacking at this moment at a time when the—when one of the biggest of human problems is the taking of hostages that cannot possibly influence political decisions or foreign policy decisions.

And we have stated today, and I repeat again, that we will hold the Cuban Government accountable for any actions that result from their decision.

*Q. Mr. Kissinger, the Democratic Presidential nominee, Jimmy Carter, says that when it comes to foreign policy that you, in fact, are the President of the United States in that particular area, that you really have the responsibility, that President Ford apparently has very little input in foreign policy matters. Could you respond to that?*

*Secretary Kissinger:* I will respond to that question. But could I ask you to—in your other questions to leave them out of the partisan areas. You can mention criticisms and ask me to comment on criticisms, but don't get me into specific references to personalities. In this particular case I think I would have to say that this shows that Mr. Carter has more experience as a Governor than at the Federal level.

There is no such thing—Dean Acheson used to say that there can be a strong President and a strong Secretary of State as long as the Secretary of State knows who is President.

The final decisions are always made by the President. I see the President three or four times a week. I am on the telephone with him constantly. There is no major decision that is taken which is not made by the President.

In the day-to-day conduct of foreign policy every President has to delegate certain tactical decisions to somebody—to his security adviser, to his Secretary of State—and that, too, has happened with every President in the postwar period. President Ford and I have had a very close working relationship, and it is in the nature of such a relationship that the points of view of the two partners merge.

But it is always clear who is the senior partner and who is the junior partner.

*Q. Mr. Secretary, isn't it true that in a sense when President Ford admittedly made a blunder during the second debate with Jimmy Carter on the Eastern European situation, that that indicated that he was not on top of the situation, that he wasn't aware fully of certain foreign policy issues?*

*Secretary Kissinger:* No. That indicated that under the pressure of a debate he did not make a point as felicitously as he might have made it, as he has since admitted.

Nobody who knows his record could believe that on this particular issue he did not know exactly what the facts were. He had one thing in mind and he expressed it in a manner that created the wrong impression, and he has stated that publicly and has clarified it.

But there was no misapprehension in his mind as to the presence of Soviet divisions in Eastern Europe. And we have been negotiating for years to reduce the number of those divisions. And he has personally visited three East European countries.

*Q. Mr. President—*

*Secretary Kissinger:* I appreciate the promotion, but [laughter] there's a constitutional provision against it.

### **Negotiating New Panama Canal Arrangements**

*Q. Mr. Secretary, what was your reaction to Carter's remarks on the Panama Canal, and has that affected the negotiations in any way?*

*Secretary Kissinger:* Could you leave names out of these questions? [Laughter.]

It has not affected the negotiations, which are just on the verge of resuming.

We have stated repeatedly that with respect to the Panama Canal it is not an issue between the United States and Panama. It is an issue of the U.S. position with respect to the Western Hemisphere and ultimately



with respect to all of the new nations in the world.

If there is a consensus in the Western Hemisphere on any point, it is that the existing arrangements in Panama are to be changed. And if the United States relies simply on the physical assertion of its power—which we have, and of course we are stronger than Panama—then we are going to mortgage the possibilities of a more creative relationship in the Western Hemisphere.

So therefore the problem is whether we can assure access through the canal, free and unimpeded access through the canal, by arrangements different from those that now exist.

This is the essence of the negotiation, and I do not think it helps to make extreme statements in this regard.

Any agreement that we make—first of all, there's no doubt—not one line of an agreement exists at this moment. Once a concept of an agreement is agreed to, it will be discussed with the Congress. Once the treaty exists, it will have to be approved by two-thirds of the Senate.

So there is plenty of opportunity for a full debate, and it will take an overwhelming majority to pass it. And we believe that the negotiations are in the national interest, and I believe that any President will come to the same conclusion that every President has come to since 1964; namely, that these negotiations should be continued and that all possibilities should be explored.

*Q. Mr. Secretary, could you tell us a little bit about the East Asia Conference and why it is important for you to be meeting with businessmen? Will you give us a little bit of your concept of the role of multinationals in East Asia?*

*Secretary Kissinger:* Well, first of all, I am meeting with this conference primarily because my friend John Fairbank has asked me to meet with it. And I did not call the

conference, nor did I have anything to do with the membership of the conference.

As I understood it, Harvard is calling a conference of Americans with interests in Asia and attempting to bring that group together with faculty members that have been studying the problems of Asia.

Now, I believe that this is an excellent idea. I think that Americans who are active in Asia ought to understand the cultural, political, and economic conditions of the area. And I believe that professors who are studying the area can benefit from some of the practical experiences which some of these corporations and others who are interested in the area have. I have always believed that one of the problems in our society is to bring together those who have an opportunity to reflect about the problems with those who have to be active in the area.

So I have welcomed this opportunity and, as you know, I am speaking off the record. I am not using it to make any public pronouncement. I am doing it to help my former colleagues at Harvard and my old institution to engage in a worthwhile program.

### **Impact of Change of Leadership in China**

*Q. Mr. Secretary, could you please tell us if you or President Ford have plans for visiting the new Chinese leader at any time in the near future? And could you also give us your assessment of the kind of relations we are likely to have with the new government?*

*Secretary Kissinger:* There are no plans now for either President Ford or myself to visit China, because while we have no doubt about the election, there is a certain decorum about making plans [laughter] until the results are clear.

It has been more or less an annual event that the Secretary of State would visit China at some point during the year, and that could happen, although no plans exist now.

There are no plans whatever for the President to visit China. And there is something to be said for perhaps having a return visit at some point or to meet at some other place. But this, I think, has to be decided after the election.

As for the impact of changes in leadership on policy, the long-term policy of any country, and especially of a country that moves with the care and thoughtfulness of the People's Republic of China, doesn't depend so much on personalities as on a perception of their interests and of their values.

I think that the basic factors that brought the United States and China into contact with each other are still operating and are likely to continue.

Of course personalities affect the style of diplomacy and may affect how certain things are carried out, but I do not expect a fundamental change in the relationship, and it is too early for us to tell what differences of style might emerge.

#### **Southern African Liberation Movements**

*Q. Mr. Secretary, in reference to South Africa, why do you refuse so far to meet with key African liberation organizations, particularly the African National Congress and the Pan African Congress? And why do you schedule meetings excluding these legitimate organizations, spokespersons for the African people in Namibia, Zimbabwe, and South Africa?*

*Secretary Kissinger:* Let's separate the liberation movements in Rhodesia—Zimbabwe—from those in Namibia, for a moment.

When I visited Africa in April, I met with the Presidents of the so-called frontline states. They all felt at the time that the experience of Angola should not be repeated; that is to say, they did not want any of the outside powers to back one particular liberation movement and thereby get a fight started among the liberation movements.

I then agreed with President Nyerere [of Tanzania] and President Kaunda [of Zambia] and President Khama [of Botswana] that the United States would not get in touch directly with the liberation movements, in order to permit the African problems to be dealt with by Africans. And we agreed to deal with these liberation movements through the frontline Presidents provided that all other countries did the same.

They have seen to it that these liberation movements would not become the plaything of great-power rivalry. And it is not failure to recognize these movements; it is, rather, our attempt to insulate the problem from superpower rivalry.

Now that they are going to Geneva, we will of course deal with them, and our whole policy has been to put these liberation movements into a position where they could negotiate directly for the future of their own country.

With respect to the liberation movement in Namibia, which is to say SWAPO [South West Africa People's Organization], I have met with [Sam] Nujoma and my representatives have met with Nujoma. In that case, we do not have the special conditions of many movements, since as one movement he deals also with Communist countries. And we deal with him and we have recognized him as an important factor, as a key factor, in the negotiations. In fact we are just now waiting for him to come back to New York from Africa, before I have another meeting with him.

With respect to, again, to the Rhodesian movements, I want to repeat: we recognize them; we accept them; we do not want to choose among them. That is to say, we want the African Presidents and the leaders themselves to determine their own relationships, but we will recognize them and we support them.

*Q. Well, is it not a fact that the State Department has had a preference for Joshua Nkomo in Zimbabwe?*

*Secretary Kissinger:* That is not a fact.



*Q. That is not a fact?*

*Secretary Kissinger:* No. Nkomo was recognized by all of the movements as the chief negotiator at the last negotiation, in February, which broke down.

At this moment, we are meticulously staying away from indicating any preference. And when Mr. Schaufele [Assistant Secretary for African Affairs William E. Schaufele, Jr.] visited Salisbury he was in touch with [Bishop Abel] Muzorewa as well as with Nkomo, as well as with representatives of [Robert] Mugabe.

### **Aircraft Hijacking**

*Q. Mr. Kissinger, on the hijacking question, do you feel at this point that these incidents of skyjacking will increase? And also, what can the United States do about it now that Castro has canceled the arrangement?*

*Secretary Kissinger:* I don't want to speculate what exactly Castro intends to do with this arrangement and what it means with respect to his actual performance.

Theoretically he could carry out the same obligations, which is to say to return the skyjackers without having the formal obligation to do so. If he, however, deliberately encourages skyjackings to Cuba, it would be an act of extraordinary irresponsibility. Because I think whatever the disputes between countries may be, no country should use the suffering of innocent people who, I repeat, have absolutely no possibility of affecting events for the sort of rivalry that now exists.

*Q. What can the United States do about that?*

*Secretary Kissinger:* Well, I said we will hold them accountable. What we will do we will have to study.

*Q. Dr. Kissinger, because you are returning to help Harvard for the East Asia Conference, would you give any thought to returning to Harvard in any capacity after you leave office?*

*Secretary Kissinger:* Well, this won't be a problem before 1981, so we will have many opportunities to discuss this. [Laughter.]

*Q. Dr. Kissinger, last night the President said that Jimmy Carter had slandered the name of the United States when he criticized American foreign policy under yourself in the Ford Administration. How far can a Democratic candidate go in his criticism before the President has to go run and hide behind the American flag to defend against it?*

*Secretary Kissinger:* Well, I consider the office of the Secretary of State essentially a nonpartisan office, and I think the candidates have to determine for themselves how far they should go and what they can say.

*Q. Mr. Secretary, in your answers you gave before about staying on until 1981—*

*Secretary Kissinger:* That was a joke. [Laughter.] That was to demoralize my staff.

*Q. Does that mean you are prepared to stay with President Ford if he is reelected?*

*Secretary Kissinger:* No. I've said repeatedly that eight years is a long time—especially eight years as turbulent as these have been—that I did not want to state before the election was over what I would do before the President has talked to me, but that on the whole I thought that eight years is a long time. So I have not made my final decision. I want to wait until the President has talked to me.

*Q. Mr. Kissinger, aren't you in fact saying you'd prefer to leave, although you will serve at his request if he's reelected?*

*Secretary Kissinger:* I haven't really stated what I will do, because I want to look at it under the conditions that then exist and I owe the President the opportunity to discuss it with me.

*Q. Is there any other job you prefer to take?*

*Secretary Kissinger:* No.

*Q. Mr. Secretary, I'd like to ask you, is it true that—is it possible that recent arms sales by the United States to Israel were motivated by political considerations before the election?*

*Secretary Kissinger:* Well, I think the President has answered this yesterday. These items have been before the Administration for several months. They come up for an almost monthly review. And the President decided to act because he thought, as he pointed out yesterday, that it was in the best interests of the United States.

*Q. Mr. Secretary, I'd like to follow up on Mr. Krimer's question of before, since you said your answer to that was a joke. Taking for granted that you will at some point leave the State Department, would you at that point consider returning to Harvard? And if so, have you at any time discussed that possibility with any member of the Harvard administration?*

*Secretary Kissinger:* I haven't discussed it with any member of the Harvard administration, and I have really not given any systematic thought to what I'm going to do when I leave this position. I have taken the view that after I've announced my resignation, or after the voters announce my resignation for me [laughter], I can then make the decision on what I might want to do. But I think it's inappropriate for somebody in my office to discuss his future with anybody until he's resigned.

*Q. Mr. Kissinger, I understand the United States is investigating the cause of the crash of the Cuban plane off Barbados.*

*Secretary Kissinger:* Yes.

*Q. Can you tell me who is doing the investigating, what the investigation has learned so far?*

*Secretary Kissinger:* To the best of my information, we have asked the CIA [Cen-

tral Intelligence Agency] to check into it. I don't know whether the FBI [Federal Bureau of Investigation] is making a formal investigation of it.

We have offered the governments concerned any assistance that they might request, since it did not occur on American soil. But I can state categorically that no official of the U.S. Government, nobody paid by the American Government, nobody in contact with the American Government, has had anything to do with this crash of the airliner. We consider actions like this totally reprehensible.

### **The Issue of Chile**

*Q. Mr. Secretary, speaking of the CIA, the CIA has been accused by some Southeast Asia observers of more or less manipulating the recent military takeover in Thailand. Now, have the U.S. interests gone so far as to try to emulate the type of military dictatorship that was set up in Chile? Are we talking about that topic?*

*Secretary Kissinger:* "Emulate," you mean? We have had absolutely nothing to do with the upheaval in Thailand, and therefore there's no point comparing it with Chile. We had absolutely nothing to do with it. We didn't know about it beforehand.

*Q. Is Chile still an issue?*

*Secretary Kissinger:* That depends with whom.

*Q. With the United States, with the recent car blowup in Washington, D.C.?*

*Secretary Kissinger:* Well, we of course totally condemn the murder of former Ambassador [of Chile to the U.S. Orlando] Letelier, whom I knew personally and respected even when we had our differences. We have seen no evidence yet as to who was behind this assassination. But whoever was behind it, it is an absolutely outrageous act.

We also had nothing to do—as the



Church committee [Senate Select Committee To Study Governmental Operations With Respect to Intelligence Activities] said—with the overthrow of the Chilean Government. We had nothing to do with the military junta that overthrew it.

*Q. Despite some of the evidence to the contrary?*

*Secretary Kissinger:* The Church committee made clear that we had nothing to do with the military junta. What we were attempting to do was to strengthen the democratic parties, who in turn had nothing to do with the overthrow, for the 1976 election. That was a different matter.

*Q. Can we say without a doubt that the United States had nothing to do with the recent bombing in Washington, D.C.?*

*Secretary Kissinger:* You mean of Letelier?

*Q. Exactly.*

*Secretary Kissinger:* Absolutely.

*Q. Thank you.*

*Q. You mentioned earlier that you're going to consider your fate following the election, and perhaps that fate might be decided by the voters. How much of an impact do you yourself feel your performance during the last eight years will have on this election?*

*Secretary Kissinger:* Well, foreign policy is inevitably an issue in any election, and that's inevitable. These have been eight turbulent years. I believe that they were the period in which we had to make the change from a belief in American omnipotence, in which we could overwhelm every problem with our power, to a period in which we have had to conduct foreign policy the way other nations have had to conduct it throughout history—with a consciousness of a national purpose, a choice of means—where we have had to establish new relationships with old allies, open new relationships with old adversaries, liquidate vestiges of a war which we found,

and deal simultaneously with a revolution that is represented by the new nations.

I don't want to judge myself how effectively all of this has been done, and I don't frankly believe that candidates are in the best position to judge that either, although obviously they must make their cases.

We will leave to history what the ultimate assessment is. But without doubt, an eight-year record in foreign policy will be subject to discussion.

*Q. Will you be an asset to Gerald Ford on election day, or a liability?*

*Secretary Kissinger:* I don't go into the public opinion or polling business, and I can't judge it. My obligation is, under the direction of the President, to conduct foreign policy and to advise the President as to what I believe to be in the best interests of the United States and world peace.

Now, I understand that most polls show that I have an adequate public support, but this is not the ultimate test of a Secretary of State.

### **China and World Equilibrium**

*Q. Secretary Kissinger, do you think that at some point the United States should or might sell arms to China, provide any kind of defense equipment to China?*

*Secretary Kissinger:* We have never had any request for the sale of arms to China. We have never had any discussions with China about the sale of arms.

We believe that the territorial integrity and sovereignty of China is very important to the world equilibrium, and we would consider it a grave matter if this were threatened by an outside power. But we have never had any defense discussions with China. I don't foresee any, but I do have to state our general view that it would not be taken lightly if there were a massive assault on China.

*Q. Is it correct, as former Secretary [of Defense James R.] Schlesinger has said, that*

*the State Department withheld invitations for him to visit China?*

*Secretary Kissinger:* I don't believe that Secretary Schlesinger said this; and the only formal invitation to Secretary Schlesinger that was issued happened to coincide with his departure from the government, so that the problem of withholding it did not arise.

*Q. He said that two invitations were extended previously.*

*Secretary Kissinger:* Well, with respect to the first—I don't think he said it. I think a member of his party must have misunderstood. There was no formal invitation the year before.

*Q. Mr. Secretary, if this does turn out to be your last year in office, could you look back and think about what might be the major disappointment and major accomplishment during your period as Secretary of State?*

*Secretary Kissinger:* You know, when you are in this sort of a position, you perform almost like an athlete, in the sense of reacting to the series of situations that develop very rapidly. I would think that I would be much more reflective about it after I'm out of office than while I'm in office.

I would think that the major accomplishment would be the attempt to shift American foreign policy from a perception that we could do everything simultaneously to an attempt to relate our commitments to our means and our purposes and to our possibilities. This involved recasting our relationships with allies, developing new relationships with adversaries, and beginning new approaches to the new countries.

The disappointment has been that in the period after 1973, the executive authority of the United States was so weakened by a series of crises that many of the building blocks that were in place in 1973 could not be used as rapidly as I would have hoped and that perhaps more energy had to be spent on preserving what existed than on building what might have been possible.

I could list specific things that were disappointing, as you would expect in an eight-year period, but if you want it on a general plane, these would be what I consider the accomplishments and what I consider the sadnesses.

*Q. More specifically, Mr. Kissinger, are you disappointed that the United States did not establish full diplomatic relations with mainland China before Mao Tse-tung's death and that perhaps now this period is going to be a longer period because of the transition that mainland China is going through?*

*Secretary Kissinger:* I think that the process of normalization is one to which we're committed and which we intend to carry out. I don't think it is tied, nor has it ever been tied by the Chinese, to a personality or to a specific leader. And I believe that that process can continue.

*Q. When will it be completed, or what's holding it up now?*

*Secretary Kissinger:* Well, what has held it up is to discuss the modalities about the future of Taiwan, which will have to be discussed with the new leadership.

*Q. I'll give a scenario to you. Suppose that you do get your walking papers from the electorate in November. You say you don't know what job you're going to take. But most of us, I think, would concede in all probability you will receive an offer to write your memoirs or write a book on your eight years. On balance, given equal office space and background, would you rather write that on the banks of the Potomac or the banks of the Charles? [Laughter.]*

*Secretary Kissinger:* Almost certainly not on the banks of the Potomac. [Laughter.] Where else, I don't know, but almost certainly not on the banks of the Potomac.

*Q. Recently I have read that Mexico was going to communism, quoting from one declaration of one of the Senators of the United States. What is your point of view about that? Do you think Mexico is really going to the Communists?*



*Secretary Kissinger:* Absolutely not. I know Mexico a little. I know its leaders very well. I know its incumbent President well. I know the President-elect well.

Of course, Mexico is given to heroic rhetoric, which may not always be literally understood in the United States. [Laughter.] But Mexico is not going toward communism, and I know no leader in Mexico who has any Communist biases, though of course the Mexican Revolution produces a certain sympathy for Third World causes. And, inevitably, when a country has as powerful a neighbor as the United States, there are going to be many points of friction. But the fact is we usually solve our points of friction. And we have repeatedly rejected this accusation that has been made by several Congressmen and Senators.

*Q. A few minutes ago you said that public opinion polls are not the ultimate test for a Secretary of State.*

*Secretary Kissinger:* Of a Secretary of State.

*Q. Yes. If they are not, what is the ultimate test?*

*Secretary Kissinger:* I think the ultimate test of a Secretary of State—the obligation of a Secretary of State is to give his best judgment to the President as to what is in the national interest. And if he is responsible, he'll understand that the national interest cannot be separated from the world interest. The President then has to make the political decision as to how this judgment can be carried out within the American political context. It's the President who has to make that decision.

I don't think a Secretary of State should take his own public opinion polls as to his own popularity. The Secretary of State ought to be expendable and usually is ex-

pendent [laughter], but he should not worry about his own popularity primarily. He should advise the President. Then the President has to make the judgment. And eventually he'll be judged by history and whether he's left the world somewhat more peaceful and perhaps more progressive than he found it.

*The press:* Thank you very much.

## Commission on Security and Cooperation in Europe

White House press release dated October 12

President Ford announced on October 12 the appointment of three individuals to serve as executive branch Commissioner-Observers to the Commission on Security and Cooperation in Europe. Those individuals represent the Departments of State, Defense, and Commerce.

MONROE LEIGH, Legal Adviser, Department of State  
JAMES G. POOR, Principal Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense (International Security Affairs)  
MANSFIELD SPRAGUE, Counselor to the Secretary of Commerce

The purpose of the Commission is to monitor the acts of the signatories as they affect compliance with or violation of the articles of the Final Act of the Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe, in particular regard to the provisions relating to cooperation in humanitarian fields.<sup>1</sup> The Commission is also authorized to monitor and encourage the development of programs and activities of the U.S. Government and private organizations with a view toward taking advantage of the provisions of the Final Act to expand East-West economic cooperation.

<sup>1</sup> For text of the Final Act, adopted at Helsinki on Aug. 1, 1975, see BULLETIN of Sept. 1, 1975, p. 323.

## The Foundation of U.S.-Japan Ties: Common Interests and Shared Values

*Address by Arthur W. Hummel, Jr.*

*Assistant Secretary for East Asian and Pacific Affairs*<sup>1</sup>

I am pleased to be your guest this evening. The Japan-America Society has long been a consistent and sensible advocate in this town of the importance of Japan to the United States and the need to maintain in good repair our ties with that country. There have been periods in the last decade when the priority of our relations with Japan has been temporarily obscured—by our concerns elsewhere in Asia or the world or, conversely, by a tendency to impute to the relationship a degree of automaticity, to assume that because Japan and the United States share so many common interests our relations are bound to proceed smoothly.

None of us wants the U.S.-Japan relationship to dominate the headlines, since headlines ordinarily highlight problems rather than accomplishments. Nor do we necessarily believe that the central preoccupation of policymakers in either government should be the bilateral relationship. In fact, for so complex an organism it does run remarkably smoothly. On the other hand, because it is so large, so successful, and so complex the U.S.-Japan relationship should be both a source of great satisfaction and a focus of our continuing intense attention. The Japan-America Society and other similar groups around the country help us in insuring that our Japan connection receives the recognition and the attention it deserves.

One problem which those of us who deal with Japan and speak about Japan constantly face is that the American people, and most particularly groups such as this one, are increasingly knowledgeable and sophisticated observers of U.S.-Japan relations. The broad outlines of our respective policies are known and understood, and in attempting to review them it is difficult to avoid what seem to be cliches. Quite correctly, people tend to challenge cliches. Even people in government.

I would say that our ties with Japan, and our policies toward it, are examined as constantly and as critically as is any other relationship this country maintains. We think we are on the right track. We do not believe that, simply because our approach toward Japan has achieved a certain maturity, sharp new departures are called for. We do not expect our present policies, or those of Japan, to prove immutable in every respect. Policies must reflect circumstances, and circumstances change. But we do think that the essential foundation of the U.S.-Japan relationship, constructed of common interests and shared values, will endure.

In other words, many of those cliches about Japan and the United States are true. At the risk of repeating a few of them I want to sketch briefly how we currently see our relations with Japan, as we near the end of what has been a very eventful year.

I think a useful way to approach a discussion of U.S.-Japan ties is to examine

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<sup>1</sup> Made before the Japan-America Society at Washington on Oct. 19.



them in three broad categories, separate but interrelated—the economic, security, and political dimensions of our relationship.

### **Bilateral and Multilateral Economic Spheres**

First, the economic. Despite the major challenges both our economies have faced in the last two years in restoring noninflationary growth, our bilateral economic ties have been remarkably trouble-free, in pleasant contrast to the situation of the early 1970's. The bilateral problems of those years—a massive trade imbalance; difficult textile negotiations; the need for Japan to eliminate import restrictions, liberalize foreign investment regulations, and revalue the yen—were largely resolved by 1974 to the satisfaction of both sides.

This was achieved through a process of continuing consultations at all levels and reflected both governments' awareness of the reality and the necessities of interdependence. And as that process went forward, I believe people on both sides of the Pacific came to understand better the importance of sustaining sound economic ties and to recognize that bilateral problems, however difficult they may appear, can indeed be resolved.

Today our bilateral economic ties are healthy and growing again after the 1974-75 recession. There are problems on specific trade issues, ranging from citrus fruits to specialty steel, and negotiations are now underway in two areas where we have significant differences—civil aviation and fisheries. In addition, as always, there is a need to keep an eye on the overall health of our trading relationship. Huge surpluses on one side tend to exacerbate protectionist sentiments on the other. In an economic relationship of this magnitude and complexity, there inevitably will be problems. But recent experience has demonstrated convincingly that those problems need not become contentious issues between our two countries. Where there is a will, there is a way.

As our techniques for resolving bilateral economic problems have become more refined and effective, both governments have been able to focus increasingly on the broader multilateral aspects of the U.S.-Japan economic relationship—e.g., questions of trade expansion, monetary reform, energy, food, and law of the sea—which have a pervasive influence on the prosperity of both countries and the world as a whole. The United States and Japan share a common approach to most of these global issues, and our two governments have cooperated effectively in seeking solutions to them.

For example, we have worked with Japan in the new International Energy Agency to strengthen cooperation among oil-consuming countries and coordinate our positions vis-a-vis the producers on price and supply questions. Our respective approaches toward the myriad North-South economic issues are similar, and we consult closely with Japan in this area. Japan is an increasingly weighty factor in world monetary affairs and has given important support to our initiatives in the IMF [International Monetary Fund] for reform of the international monetary system. Prime Minister Miki participated in the economic summits at Rambouillet and San Juan, which sought to improve the overall coordination of the economic policies of the major industrial nations. We consult closely with Japan on law of the sea issues, where major interests of both nations are at stake, i.e., with respect to a deep seabeds regime, continental shelf jurisdiction and the concept of an economic zone, and fisheries regulation. We are actively engaged with Japan in the multilateral trade negotiations (MTN); and in fact many formerly bilateral economic questions—e.g., liberalization of import quotas, standardization of antidumping codes, et cetera—are now treated in the MTN context.

There are of course important differences in the economic circumstances of Japan and the United States, the most obvious being Japan's virtually total dependence



on outside sources of supply for its energy and raw materials needs; and these differences compel differing approaches toward certain specific multilateral economic issues. Nevertheless, U.S. and Japanese interests in the multilateral economic sphere are fundamentally alike: we wish to sustain conditions which are conducive to a stable world economic environment, in which the economic needs of our societies—and those of other industrialized and developing nations alike—can be fulfilled. Close cooperation between our two governments is essential if those interests are to be preserved and an equitable world economic order sustained. I have no doubt that such cooperation will continue to be forthcoming from both sides.

### **Cooperation on Security Issues**

Secondly, let me touch upon the security dimension of our relationship. The U.S. alliance with Japan is a keystone of our security policy toward East Asia, an essential factor in the maintenance of the peace and stability of the region, and a crucial element in our worldwide security strategy. For Japan the alliance is a major pillar of the nation's foreign policy, providing a strategic foundation from which it can pursue with confidence its relations with potential adversaries. Both our governments are determined to preserve and strengthen cooperation on defense issues, based on a common recognition of the benefits to both nations of this constructive alliance.

Within the framework of the alliance, Japan's own security role remains limited, focusing on the defense of its home islands. We think this is appropriate and wise. The United States is not urging Japan to undertake a larger role. However, I believe both our governments would agree that while a major quantitative expansion of Japan's security responsibilities is inappropriate, there is room for qualitative improvement—particularly in the areas of antisubmarine warfare and airborne early-warning systems—and the Japanese Govern-

ment is addressing this issue. There can also be, within established limits, more effective cooperation and coordination between U.S. and Japanese defense elements. One new instrumentality for that purpose has already been created—the Subcommittee for Defense Cooperation—and other approaches are being discussed.

During the past year and more, we have noticed in Japan a new tendency toward a more realistic, and less emotional, consideration of defense issues. Out of this has emerged a broader public awareness and understanding of the security environment in Northeast Asia and Japan's place in it. The essentiality of a Japanese defense role, albeit limited, and of Japan's security relationship with the United States, has become more broadly accepted. We think this is a healthy development; we also believe it is one that must proceed at its own speed. So long as this country continues to demonstrate steadiness in its approach to the security issues of East Asia, and sensitivity toward the particular political and historical characteristics of Japan and its people which shape Japan's approach toward those issues, the U.S.-Japan security relationship will remain strong, as it must.

### **Political Dimension of the Relationship**

Finally, I would like to say a few words about a more intangible aspect of the interrelationship between Japan and the United States, but one which profoundly influences all the others. As one of the world's largest and most dynamic democratic societies, Japan shares with the United States a fundamental goal: that of preserving and strengthening democratic institutions and values in a world increasingly hostile to them. Japan is a strong and lively democracy. Its parliamentary system is firmly established, it has a free and highly irreverent press, and its people and government are second to none in their respect for human rights. These institutions and these values, and the importance both countries place on maintaining them, in themselves



constitute a strong bond between us in a world in which authoritarianism of left or right is all too prevalent in other countries.

I think I should mention in this context a problem with which both our governments contended earlier this year and which remains a difficult issue in Japan—the Lockheed affair—because to be seen in proper perspective it must be viewed in relation to the institutions and values which were brought to bear in resolving it.

Both Japan and the United States, their people and their governments, deplore corruption, whether private or public, and recognize the corrosive effects of bribery upon society. In both countries, public opinion, the media, and governments demanded a thorough investigation of the allegations which were raised. The United States proposed, and the Japanese Government agreed, that cooperative efforts to investigate the scandal and punish the guilty should insofar as possible be removed from the political arena and placed in a legal framework. To that end, an agreement was reached between the U.S. Department of Justice and the Japanese Justice Ministry for the exchange of all relevant information, in a manner which would at the same time protect the rights of individuals to the due process of law.

The agreement—which became a model for agreements with other nations touched by this scandal—has worked well. The Japanese Government has expressed its appreciation for the assistance our investigators have provided, and our two governments are pledged to work together in an international effort to devise a code of conduct which will prevent repetitions of this brand of corporate misconduct.

Despite its potential for doing so, the Lockheed affair has not significantly damaged U.S.-Japan relations. By treating the affair as a legal issue and placing it solely within the purview of law enforcement agencies, the bilateral political relationship was successfully insulated.

In a broader sense, the common political values which anchor our relations with

Japan also mean that our approaches to major international issues—whether political, economic, or security—stem from a similar world view and tend therefore to be complementary. For example:

—Japan, like the United States, seeks improved relations with both the Soviet Union and China on a basis of equality and reciprocal benefit, while avoiding any involvement in Sino-Soviet differences.

—In Southeast Asia, Japan, like the United States, supports the desires of the non-Communist nations of the region to maintain their independence and identity and to develop their economies, and its economic and political policies toward the area are designed toward this end.

—Toward the Third World, Japan's policies are positive and constructive as, I hasten to add, are ours. It recognizes the legitimate aspirations of the developing countries and is seriously seeking ways to meet them.

—In the United Nations, Japan eschews flamboyant and meaningless rhetoric, while working quietly behind the scenes in support of rational and equitable solutions to the political, economic, and security issues constantly before the world community.

—In the area of science and technology, including questions of nuclear power, Japan has a well-developed sense of the benefits as well as the potential hazards of new applications and brings a reasoned and measured approach to technological issues.

In short, as this audience well knows, Japan's is an increasingly active and influential voice in world affairs. As Japan's role grows, so too does the importance of our bilateral relationship and its potential for constructive action. While perhaps a truism, it is nonetheless correct to say that our two nations can accomplish far more working together than could be achieved through the sum of our separate efforts.

In a speech last year to the National Press Club [at Washington], Prime Minister Miki spoke of the broad mutuality of

interests between Japan and the United States and termed Japanese-American amity "a powerful and positive force in the world." The U.S. Government fully shares that view. U.S. ties with Japan are indeed of vital importance to this country and to the peace and progress of mankind. I can report to you that they are in good shape. Our two countries can take pride in what we have achieved together, and we can face with confidence the challenges before us.

## **International Navigational Rules Act Vetoed by President Ford**

### *Memorandum of Disapproval*<sup>1</sup>

I have withheld my signature from H.R. 5446, a bill to implement the United States obligations under the Convention on the International Regulations for Preventing Collisions at Sea, 1972.

The bill includes a provision which I believe to be unconstitutional. It would empower either the House of Representatives or the Senate to block amendments to the Convention's regulations merely by passing a resolution of disapproval.

This provision is incompatible with the express provision in the Constitution that a resolution changing the force and effect of law must be presented to the President and, if disapproved, repassed by a two-thirds majority in the Senate and the House of Representatives. It extends to the Congress the power to prohibit specific transactions authorized by law without changing the law—and without following the constitutional process such a change would require. Moreover, it would involve the Congress directly in the performance

of Executive functions in disregard of the fundamental principle of separation of powers.

I believe that this procedure is contrary to the Constitution, and that my approval of it would threaten an erosion of the constitutional powers and responsibilities of the President. I have already directed the Attorney General to become a party plaintiff in a lawsuit challenging the constitutionality of a similar provision in the Federal Election Campaign Act.

In addition, this provision would allow the House of Representatives to block adoption of what is essentially an amendment to a treaty, a responsibility which is reserved by the Constitution to the Senate.

This legislation would forge impermissible shackles on the President's ability to carry out the laws and conduct the foreign relations of the United States. The President cannot function effectively in domestic matters, and speak for the nation authoritatively in foreign affairs, if his decisions under authority previously conferred can be reversed by a bare majority of one house of the Congress.

The Convention—which has already been approved by the Senate—makes important changes in the international rules for safe navigation. It will enter into force in July of 1977. The United States should become a party to it. If the United States does not implement the Convention before it enters into force, there will be major differences between the navigational rules followed by U.S. ships and by the ships of many other countries. These differences will increase the danger of collisions at sea and create hazards to life and property at sea.

I strongly urge the 95th Congress to pass legislation early next year that will be consistent with our Constitution, so that the United States can implement the Convention before it enters into force.

**GERALD R. FORD.**

<sup>1</sup> Released at Dallas, Tex., on Oct. 10 (text from Weekly Compilation of Presidential Documents dated Oct. 18).



## United States Reviews Progress and Problems in International Economic Development

*Statement by Senator George McGovern  
U.S. Representative to the U.N. General Assembly*<sup>1</sup>

This is an important occasion for me. I have followed many aspects of the work of the United Nations closely in the past, as a member of the House of Representatives, as Director of the Food for Peace Program under President Kennedy in 1961 and 1962, as a member of the Senate, and in recent years as a member of the Senate Committee on Foreign Relations.

I am more directly familiar with the U.N.'s work in the area of food, which has been among my chief concerns throughout my public career. Because of that interest I regarded it as a special privilege to attend the World Food Conference in Rome in 1974.

But I am a newcomer to the work of the General Assembly. I am honored to have been asked by the executive branch of my government to serve as a delegate to the 31st session of the U.N. General Assembly and to share this forum with so distinguished a body of men and women, who not only represent 145 nations of the world but who themselves represent a significant and highly diverse range of talents. The distinguished chairman of this committee [Jaime Valdéz, of Bolivia] is but one example. I congratulate him and his colleagues on the bureau on their election, and I

pledge to them and to all present the cooperation of my delegation.

Through most of its three decades the United Nations has been regarded primarily as a political organ—as indeed, in great measure, it still is. The organization is still deeply engaged in the historic process of decolonization, which ranks as one of the most important of this century. The challenge confronting the nations of the world, and this organization in particular, is to insure the enjoyment of basic rights by all the people of the world, such rights as my country has been committed to for 200 years.

We are all aware that the political process of decolonization—which will soon include Namibia and Zimbabwe—must be joined to a more balanced and equitable international economic order as well. Patterns of dependence must give way to a real interdependence, consistent with the needs and interests of all countries. As Secretary Kissinger pointed out before the plenary session of the General Assembly on September 30:

Our mutual dependence for our prosperity is a reality, not a slogan. It should summon our best efforts to make common progress.

The work of the seventh special session of the U.N. General Assembly had as its theme the concept of interdependence. This same theme has been expressed in the

<sup>1</sup> Made in Committee II (Economic and Financial) of the Assembly on Oct. 14 (text from USUN press release 114).

Declaration of Abidjan,<sup>2</sup> and it is the guidepost for continuing negotiations in the various fora of UNCTAD [U.N. Conference on Trade and Development], in the multilateral trade negotiations under GATT [General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade] in Geneva, at the Conference on International Economic Cooperation in Paris, and elsewhere.

It would be a delusion to ignore our differences on some issues. But let us also stress our common goals. The United States can subscribe to the statement of principle in the Declaration on the Establishment of a New International Economic Order<sup>3</sup> which affirms that:

... the interests of the developed countries and those of the developing countries can no longer be isolated from each other, that there is a close interrelationship between the prosperity of the developed countries and the growth and development of the developing countries, and that the prosperity of the international community as a whole depends on the prosperity of its constituent parts.

We agree, too, that:

International cooperation for development is the shared goal and common duty of all countries.

Our objections to certain concepts and measures in the declaration and program of action passed at the sixth special session are well known. It is not surprising that differences should persist over matters of this magnitude. There is merit in being clear about where we stand. However, we are firmly convinced that the interests of all, developing and developed countries alike, will be served by building on areas of agreement and avoiding confrontation or ideological disputes.

A constructive approach has been suggested by Gen. Carlos P. Romulo, of the Philippines, one of the founders of this organization. In his speech before the General Assembly two weeks ago, General Romulo noted that our task was to seek and promote meaningful change in the

lives of the majority of the world's people, "not through recrimination and confrontation but through the recognition and reconciliation of legitimate interests."

### Progress Since the Seventh Special Session

At the seventh special session of the General Assembly, just over a year ago, an effort was made to begin that process of reconciling interests. Despite disappointments, progress was also made at UNCTAD IV at Nairobi.

The United States was pleased to have been able to join in the consensus on Resolution 3362 in the seventh special session.<sup>4</sup> When I studied that resolution, I was impressed not only by the scope and the seriousness of the text but also at how much has already been done to follow up on it since.

At the same time, much remains to be done. The fact that development is first and foremost a responsibility of the developing countries themselves has been widely recognized. Self-reliance is a concept we Americans understand and applaud. Thus it is only natural that we welcome the goal of enhanced cooperation among developing nations in the expectation that this goal will be approached in a manner consistent with the need for broad international cooperation.

As Secretary Kissinger has noted in his address to the General Assembly:

The industrial democracies have sometimes been more willing to pay lipservice to the challenge of development than to match rhetoric with real resources.

I, too, as a U.S. Senator, regret these discrepancies. We Americans no longer claim, if ever we did, that our country—and its economic system—has all the answers to the problems of development. We also recognize the value of contributions made by states with different social systems. But by the same token the United

<sup>2</sup>Economic and Social Council Resolution 2009 (LXI), adopted on July 9, 1976.

<sup>3</sup>General Assembly Resolution 3201 (S-VI), adopted by the sixth special session on May 1, 1974.

<sup>4</sup>For text of the resolution, see BULLETIN of Oct. 13, 1975, p. 558.



States is not prepared to agree with suggestions that the substantial efforts we have made and are making on behalf of development and economic cooperation are of limited or of little use.

One reason I am here, as a legislator, is to learn from you so as to bring back to the American Congress a better understanding of the problems of the forthcoming Third Development Decade. But it may nonetheless be worthwhile to review some of the progress we have made in this last year.

At the seventh special session, agreement was reached on the need to begin work on the restructuring of the economic and social sectors of the United Nations to make them more capable of dealing with the problems of international cooperation and development. The U.S. delegation has participated actively in the deliberations of the ad hoc working group established for this purpose. I am advised by my executive branch colleagues that, although they had hoped for more progress by now, they are nonetheless impressed by the seriousness of purpose shown during the working group's deliberations. There would seem to be grounds for hope that the working group will be able to develop action-oriented proposals.

An important portion of Resolution 3362 concerned world trade. On January 1 of this year my own country put into effect its system of generalized preferences. It is a system covering over 2,700 tariff items from nearly 100 countries. I would urge governments of developing countries concerned to study carefully the prospects for increased exports of industrial products which this measure offers.

Also of great longrun importance are the multilateral trade negotiations now underway in Geneva. All participating countries agreed in initiating these negotiations that one of their major objectives is to secure additional benefits for the international trade of developing countries through reductions in both tariff and nontariff barriers.

We agreed at the fourth conference of UNCTAD in Nairobi to take up, case by case, the problems of 18 key commodities. The United States will participate fully in this effort. We will be prepared to examine in depth the real problems confronting each market. We believe these preparatory meetings can be most helpful if they focus on the substantive and practical issues.

In the International Monetary Fund (IMF) we have agreed on an important extension of compensatory financing facilities to aid in stabilizing the incomes of producers of primary products. This year this facility will distribute some \$2 billion, as compared with \$1.3 billion for the first 13 years of its existence. In the same context, the IMF has established a Trust Fund, financed through sales of IMF gold, which will permit concessional balance-of-payments assistance to the poorest countries.

#### **U.S. Assistance Programs**

Another of the concerns of the seventh special session was the transfer of real resources. This is not a matter of words and expressions of solidarity—still less of rhetoric about moral obligations for sins of the past—but of concrete contributions. I would like to say a word on the efforts of my country.

During the course of the past month, the U.S. Congress passed and President Ford signed economic, security, and supporting foreign assistance legislation for our fiscal year 1977, which began October 1. These funds total \$4.1 billion.

This legislation contains a number of features which I believe you will find of special interest.

In the U.S. bilateral aid program, the amount of money provided for the key sector of population and health has risen by 46 percent, funds allocated to food and nutrition have increased by 15 percent, while funds for education have risen by 18 percent. One hundred million dollars was earmarked for UNDP [U.N. Develop-

ment Program], \$20 million for UNICEF [U.N. Children's Fund], \$10 million for the U.N. Environment Program. The United States is making its first contribution to the U.N. Revolving Fund for Natural Resources Exploration.

In fiscal year 1977 the United States will be providing \$375 million to permit the continuation of the soft-loan facilities of the International Development Association, the World Bank's soft-loan window. The United States also intends to participate in a major way in the fifth replenishment of the International Development Association, which will be negotiated in the near future.

Provision has also been made for U.S. contributions to the Asian and Inter-American Development Banks, and to the African Development Fund, which I hope we in the Congress will soon authorize the United States to join.

In addition to our regular assistance activities in Africa, we have supported the African states which enforce economic sanctions against Rhodesia at great costs to their own economies. In the fiscal year just ending, for example, we concluded a \$10 million grant agreement with the Government of Mozambique, and we have also provided Mozambique with significant food assistance. Moreover, the United States is providing over \$30 million of assistance to Zambia. Let me express here my personal hope that the negotiations which are about to begin on both Zimbabwe and Namibia will result in a successful conclusion, so that the peoples of these countries may all benefit from international trade and economic assistance.

Finally, to permit all of these sources of assistance to be used in the most effective way possible, we hope to pass legislation which will permit the United States to join with other members of the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD) in untying much of our assistance to developing countries so that purchases must be made in the most advantageous

markets. Procurement of goods and services in developing countries is already authorized under U.S. economic assistance legislation.

### **Multilateral and Private Efforts**

The Conference on International Economic Cooperation in Paris has passed to its active phase. The United States and the European Community have made a proposal to help meet the problems of nations facing severe debt burdens. We have raised again in this forum our proposal for an International Resources Bank (IRB).

This proposal will also be studied by a new working group on official capital flows established by the Interim Committee of the International Monetary Fund.

We believe that the IRB could make a significant contribution to the development of mineral resources. Under Secretary General Van Laethem [Gabriel Van Laethem, of France, U.N. Under Secretary General for Economic and Social Affairs] has signaled the massive demand for mineral and energy resources which projected levels of development will bring about.

We continue to urge other countries to heed the recommendation of the seventh special session for a replenishment of the capital of the International Finance Corporation, which we see as another means of helping to bring increased development capital to where it is needed.

It has been estimated that by the end of this decade, even conservative goals for economic growth in the developing countries will require transfers of some \$40 billion a year from developed to developing countries. Official development assistance, whether bilateral or multilateral, cannot be expected to fulfill anywhere near this entire need. The development process must continue to have recourse to private capital as well.

If private capital flows are included, I would note that in 1975 the countries of



the OECD did arrive at the goal of 1 percent of GNP [gross national product] in transfers to the developing countries. Moreover, this is not just a question of funds. Direct private investment is a powerful instrument for transferring technology, modern methods of organization, knowledge of markets, and other advantages.

To be sure, countries which import capital have every right to insist on terms which are in the greatest conformity with their national economic goals. What is most important, however, is the recognition by all parties that the only sound basis for investment is mutual confidence. Private capital has a major role to play. Generalized slogans about "capitalist imperialism" may serve the political aims of some. But they disserve the cause of economic development, and they inhibit efforts to solve the real problems multinational corporations pose for us all.

I cite these efforts not as a catalogue, but to stress the necessity of genuine international cooperation among governments, international institutions, and private entities. The record also underscores my contention that there has been a genuine renewal of commitment in my government to the second great mandate of the U.N. Charter: that true peace is not only the absence of war but the realization of economic and social justice as well.

#### **Problem of Corrupt Practices**

Now let me mention several areas which I believe require urgent attention.

If trade and investment is to make a maximum contribution to development, illegal or corrupt practices should be eliminated. We have recognized this in the United States, where the Congress has conducted well-publicized investigations of illicit practices.

This summer's meeting of ECOSOC [U.N. Economic and Social Council], under the Presidency of the able Ambassador of the Ivory Coast, Mr. [Siméon] Ake, passed

one important resolution indicating that these practices are an international concern. The resolution created an intergovernmental working group to examine corrupt practices in international commercial transactions and, most important, to work out the scope and content of an international agreement to prevent and eliminate illicit payments. We look forward to the prompt organization of this group so that it can begin its working sessions this year.

#### **World Food Situation**

A problem with which I personally have been deeply concerned is that of feeding the world's people. In no other activity in this committee of the United Nations does our work touch more directly on the lives of the people we are representing here.

It has been estimated that between 300 million and 500 million people in developing countries do not now get enough to eat. The U.S. Congress has given a priority to the countries most seriously affected by food shortages in determining assistance programs. At least 75 percent of food sold under title I of Public Law 480 is to be provided to countries with an average per capita GNP of \$300 or less, circumstances permitting.

We have also been greatly encouraged by the responses of many nations to the World Food Conference recommendation for the establishment of a new International Fund for Agricultural Development. The purpose of IFAD is to help finance programs and projects which support increased and more efficient agricultural production and, by so doing, to improve the nutritional level in the poorest food-deficit countries. The United States has made a pledge of \$200 million to the initial budget of \$1 billion set for this Fund. Good progress has been made toward reaching this target.

But the creation of this major new source of assistance should not make us in any



way complacent about the world's food and agricultural outlook. Despite successful harvests last year in the United States, Canada, the Soviet Union, and elsewhere, there are clouds on the horizon.

Little has been done to insure that when drought or floods or severe winters again become punishing in certain areas—this year's conditions in Western Europe are an example—there will still be adequate supplies and that needy nations will have access to them.

Beyond these seasonal dangers remains the grave problem of malnutrition. Governments and international organizations have been slow in adopting measures designed to reduce postharvest losses and gain maximum benefit from existing supplies. We have adopted a 10-year target for reducing losses by 50 percent, but how seriously are we pursuing it?

The United States pledges to intensify its approach toward a resolution of the world food situation, and we urge other nations also to increase their efforts. Thanks in part to the nearly 6 million tons of food grains provided by the United States, the 10-million-ton target [for food aid for the 1975–1976 season] established by the seventh special session appears attainable.

Likewise encouraging is the fact that for 1975–76 governments have far oversubscribed the World Food Program target of \$440 million. For this period, pledges now total over \$600 million. We think there is little doubt but that the 1977–78 target of \$750 million also will be met. Toward this 1977–78 target, the United States has now pledged \$188 million in commodities, shipping services, and cash. This represents a substantial increase in the U.S. contribution to this important program.

We have proposed and will continue to support an international system of nationally held grain reserves to improve world food security, and we hope very much that progress can be made in this area before calamity strikes again.

## Technology Transfer

The third area of importance I would like to mention is the sharing of resources in science and technology. The United States believes it can make a particularly important contribution in the area of technology transfer. It has been our consistent intention to make as much of this great storehouse of knowledge as possible available to the developing countries.

The United Nations has begun to find means to facilitate these transfers of technology. We in the United States were very pleased at the fact that three resolutions in this field were passed at UNCTAD IV in Nairobi, providing for the strengthening of the technological capacity of the developing countries.

We wish also to commend the special interagency task force, and the group of experts who assisted, for their work leading to the Secretary General's report on "The Establishment of a Network for the Exchange of Technological Information."<sup>5</sup> We are pleased that the U.S. proposal made at the seventh special session to establish an International Center for the Exchange of Technological Information is among the suggestions melded into the task force's proposal. The network concept should enable all nations to make use of existing national and international capabilities for the transfer of technology, including both public and private sources of information. Where adequate capabilities do not exist, we expect they will be built up. One component, for example, might be the Industrial Technological Development Bank, for which UNIDO [U.N. Industrial Development Organization] has been preparing a feasibility study.

The seventh special session resolution envisages a U.N. Conference on Science and Technology for Development. We support this proposal. We support the requests and recommendations made in Resolutions

<sup>5</sup> U.N. doc. E/5839, June 14, 1976.



2028 and 2035 passed at the 61st session of ECOSOC this summer. We intend to provide the U.N. Secretariat with whatever help we can in preparing the conference. We have called a meeting to be held in November of American scientists from industry, government, and the academic world so that we may review all the possibilities of applying research in the United States more closely to the needs of the developing countries.

Finally, we have extended an invitation for the U.N. Conference on Science and Technology for Development to meet in the United States in 1979. I would urge all governments to give consideration to this invitation. In our view, holding the conference in the United States is the best means of assuring a maximum contribution of the American scientific community and a maximum opportunity for our scientists to get firsthand information on scientific and technical needs of developing countries.

Mr. Chairman and fellow delegates, this committee has a heavy load of work awaiting it. Our object, as before, will be to achieve a consensus on many positive resolutions.

We are seeking to improve economic relations between all nations and, above all, to find new means of relating world patterns of assistance, of trade, and of investment more closely to the needs of the developing nations.

But these words—consensus, economic relations—are the words of diplomacy. In the subjects we are discussing, they are means, but not ends in themselves. Let us always remind ourselves that the object of our effort is to help people. In the end, the success or failure of the 31st session of the General Assembly will not be judged only by foreign offices or by national legislators but by farmers and workers, by men and women whose expectations have been awakened and who are looking to us for practical steps toward realizing those expectations.

## U.S. Vetoes Resolution on Namibia in U.N. Security Council

*Following is a statement made in the U.N. Security Council by U.S. Representative William W. Scranton on October 19, together with the text of a draft resolution which was vetoed that day by the United States and two other permanent members of the Security Council.*

### STATEMENT BY AMBASSADOR SCRANTON

USUN press release 119 dated October 19

The U.S. concern with the Namibian problem has been demonstrated dramatically by the continuing efforts of Secretary of State Kissinger to assist the parties involved in finding a peaceful solution to the problem. As you know, Secretary Kissinger outlined the U.S. position on the Namibian and Rhodesian negotiations in a speech two weeks ago to the General Assembly. On the question of Namibia the Secretary said:

In recent months the United States has vigorously sought to help the parties concerned speed up the process toward Namibian independence. The United States favors the following elements: the independence of Namibia within a fixed, short time limit; the calling of a constitutional conference at a neutral location under U.N. aegis; and the participation in that conference of all authentic national forces including, specifically, SWAPO [South West Africa People's Organization].

Progress has been made in achieving all of these goals. We will exert our efforts to remove the remaining obstacles and bring into being a conference which can then fashion, with good will and wisdom, a design for the new state of Namibia and its relationship with its neighbors. We pledge our continued solicitude for the independence of Namibia so that it may, in the end, be a proud achievement of this organization and a symbol of international cooperation.

Mr. President, it is my firm belief that while the sensitive process of consultation is going on it does not serve a useful purpose for the Security Council to take new initiatives on the Namibian question. After

many years of frustration in trying to bring Namibia to independence, we have now for the first time the prospect of results. Substantial progress has been made toward reaching a peaceful settlement to the Namibian problem in consultation with South Africa and the interested African parties. We have in sight the possibility of independence for Namibia, which this Council has sought so persistently for so many years.

We do not feel that the measures called for in the resolution before us will improve the chances to gain a free and independent Namibia. In fact, they could just do the opposite. It would be tragic if the delicate fabric of negotiations were to be torn asunder by any precipitate move at this time. For these reasons, Mr. President, my delegation will vote against the draft resolution.

Mr. President, at this point I want to cover very briefly one element of the resolution. The United States has continued to enforce its own arms embargo toward South Africa. We initiated this embargo in 1962, even before the Security Council called for a voluntary embargo against South Africa in the following year.

In closing, I want to emphasize and emphasize strongly to this Council that the United States has made clear to South Africa the urgent need for unqualified independence for Namibia. We are keeping Secretary General Waldheim informed of the progress of our negotiations, and we will continue to do so and are in regular contact with the frontline Presidents. The United States will not flag in these efforts.

#### TEXT OF DRAFT RESOLUTION <sup>1</sup>

*The Security Council,*

*Having heard* the statement by the President of the United Nations Council for Namibia,

*Having considered* the statement by Mr. Sam Nujoma, President of the South West Africa People's Organization (SWAPO),

*Recalling* General Assembly resolution 2145 (XXI) of 27 October 1966, which terminated South Africa's mandate over the Territory of Namibia, and resolution 2248 (S-V) of 19 May 1967, which established a United Nations Council for Namibia, as well as all other subsequent resolutions on Namibia, in particular, resolution 3295 (XXIX) of 13 December 1974 and resolution 3399 (XXX) of 26 November 1975,

*Recalling also* Security Council resolutions 245 (1968) of 25 January and 246 (1968) of 14 March 1968, 264 (1969) of 20 March and 269 (1969) of 12 August 1969, 276 (1970) of 30 January, 282 (1970) of 23 July, 283 (1970) and 284 (1970) of 29 July 1970, 300 (1971) of 12 October and 301 (1971) of 20 October 1971, 310 (1972) of 4 February 1972, 366 (1974) of 17 December 1974 and 385 (1976) of 30 January 1976,

*Recalling further* the advisory opinion of the International Court of Justice of 21 June 1971 that South Africa is under obligation to withdraw its presence from the Territory,

*Reaffirming* the legal responsibility of the United Nations over Namibia,

*Concerned* at South Africa's continued illegal occupation of Namibia and its persistent refusal to comply with resolutions and decisions of the General Assembly and the Security Council, as well as with the advisory opinion of the International Court of Justice of 21 June 1971,

*Gravely concerned* at South Africa's efforts to destroy the national unity and territorial integrity of Namibia, and its recent intensification of repression against the Namibian people and its persistent violation of their human rights,

*Gravely concerned* by the colonial war which South Africa is waging against the Namibian people, its use of military force against civilian populations and by the widespread use of torture and intimidation by military forces against the people of Namibia,

*Gravely concerned also* at the utilization of the Territory of Namibia by South Africa to mount aggression against independent African States,

1. *Condemns* South Africa's failure to comply with the terms of Security Council resolution 385 (1976) of 30 January 1976;

2. *Condemns* all attempts by South Africa calculated to evade the clear demand of the United Nations for the holding of free elections under United Nations supervision and control in Namibia;

3. *Denounces* the so-called Turnhalle constitutional

<sup>1</sup> U.N. doc. S/12211; the draft resolution was not adopted owing to the negative vote of three permanent members of the Council, the vote being 13 in favor, 3 against (France, U.K., U.S.), with 2 abstentions (Italy, Japan).



conference as a device for evading the clear responsibility to comply with the requirements of Security Council resolutions, and in particular resolution 385 (1976);

4. *Reaffirms* the legal responsibility of the United Nations over Namibia;

5. *Reaffirms* its support for the struggle of the people of Namibia for self-determination and independence;

6. *Reiterates its demand* that South Africa take immediately the necessary steps to effect the withdrawal, in accordance with resolutions 264 (1969), 269 (1969), 366 (1974) and 385 (1976), of its illegal administration maintained in Namibia and to transfer power to the people of Namibia with the assistance of the United Nations;

7. *Also demands* that South Africa put an end forthwith to its policy of Bantustans and so-called homelands aimed at violating the national unity and the territorial integrity of Namibia;

8. *Reaffirms its declaration* that in order that the people of Namibia be enabled to determine freely their own future, it is imperative that free elections under the supervision and control of the United Nations be held for the whole of Namibia as one political entity;

9. *Demands* that South Africa urgently comply with the foregoing provisions for the holding of free elections in Namibia under United Nations supervision and control, undertake to comply with the resolutions and decisions of the United Nations and with the advisory opinion of the International Court of Justice of 21 June 1971 in regard to Namibia, and recognize the territorial integrity and unity of Namibia as a nation;

10. *Demands again* that South Africa, pending the transfer of power provided for in the preceding paragraphs:

(a) Comply fully in spirit and in practice with the provisions of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights;

(b) Release all Namibian political prisoners, including all those imprisoned or detained in connexion with offences under so-called internal security laws, whether such Namibians have been charged or tried or are held without charge and whether held in Namibia or South Africa;

(c) Abolish the application in Namibia of all racially discriminatory and politically repressive laws and practices, particularly Bantustans and so-called homelands;

(d) Accord unconditionally to all Namibians currently in exile for political reasons full facilities for return to their country without risk of arrest, detention, intimidation or imprisonment;

11. *Acting* under Chapter VII of the United Nations Charter,

(a) Determines that the illegal occupation of Namibia and the war being waged there by South Africa constitute a threat to international peace and security;

(b) Decides that all States shall cease and desist from any form of direct or indirect military consultation, co-operation or collaboration with South Africa and shall prohibit their nationals from engaging in any such consultation, co-operation or collaboration;

(c) Decides that all States shall take effective measures to prevent the recruitment of mercenaries, however disguised, for service in Namibia or South Africa;

(d) Decides that all States shall take steps to ensure the termination of all arms licensing agreements between themselves or their nationals and South Africa and shall prohibit the transfer to South Africa of all information relating to arms and armaments;

(e) *Decides* that all States shall prevent:

(i) Any supply of arms and ammunition to South Africa;

(ii) Any supply of aircraft, vehicles and military equipment for use of the armed forces and paramilitary or police organizations of South Africa;

(iii) Any supply of spare parts for arms, vehicles and military equipment used by the armed forces and paramilitary or police organizations of South Africa;

(iv) Any supply of so-called dual-use aircraft, vehicles or equipment which could be converted to military use by South Africa;

(v) Any activities in their territories which promote or are calculated to promote the supply of arms, ammunition, military aircraft and military vehicles to South Africa and equipment and materials for the manufacture and maintenance of arms and ammunition in South Africa and Namibia;

12. *Decides* that all States shall give effect to the decisions set out in paragraph 11 of this resolution notwithstanding any contract entered into or licence granted before the date of this resolution, and that they shall notify the Secretary-General of the measures they have taken to comply with the aforementioned provision;

13. *Requests* the Secretary-General, for the purpose of the effective implementation of this resolution, to arrange for the collection and systematic study of all available data concerning international trade in the items which should not be supplied to South Africa under paragraph 11 above;

14. *Requests* the Secretary-General to follow the implementation of the resolution and to report to the Security Council on or before \_\_\_\_\_;

15. *Decides* to remain seized of the matter.

## TREATY INFORMATION

ing convention of December 2, 1946 (TIAS 1849). Adopted at London June 25, 1976. Entered into force October 1, 1976.

## BILATERAL

### Current Actions

#### MULTILATERAL

##### Maritime Matters

Convention on the Intergovernmental Maritime Consultative Organization. Done at Geneva March 6, 1948. Entered into force March 17, 1958. TIAS 4044.

*Acceptance deposited:* Surinam, October 14, 1976. Amendment of article VII of the convention on facilitation of international maritime traffic, 1965 (TIAS 6251). Adopted at London November 19, 1973.<sup>1</sup>

*Acceptance deposited:* Finland, October 4, 1976.

##### Narcotic Drugs

Protocol amending the single convention on narcotic drugs, 1961. Done at Geneva March 25, 1972. Entered into force August 8, 1975. TIAS 8118.

*Ratification deposited:* Luxembourg, October 13, 1976.

##### Terrorism

Convention to prevent and punish the acts of terrorism taking the form of crimes against persons and related extortion that are of international significance. Signed at Washington February 2, 1971. Entered into force October 16, 1973.

*Ratification deposited:* United States, October 20, 1976.

*Entered into force for the United States:* October 20, 1976.

##### United Nations Charter

Charter of the United Nations and Statute of the International Court of Justice. Signed at San Francisco June 26, 1945. Entered into force October 24, 1945. 59 Stat. 1031.

*Admission to membership:* Seychelles, September 21, 1976.

##### Whaling

Amendments to paragraphs 1, 6(a)(4), (5), (6), 6(b)(3), 6(c)(2), 11-14, 15(c), 21, 23(1)(c), 23(2)(b) to the schedule to the international whal-

<sup>1</sup> Not in force.

##### Bangladesh

Agreement amending the loan agreement of May 28, 1976, relating to installation of a 50 megawatt hydrogenerating unit at Karnaphuli Power Station, Kaptai. Signed at Dacca September 17, 1976. Entered into force September 17, 1976.

##### Denmark

Agreement amending the agreement of July 7, 1960, concerning establishment and operation of certain aeronautical facilities and services in Greenland, with appendix (TIAS 4531). Effected by exchange of notes at Copenhagen March 26 and September 6, 1976. Entered into force September 6, 1976; effective January 1, 1976.

##### Sri Lanka

Agreement extending the agreement of May 12 and 14, 1951, as amended and extended (TIAS 2259, 4436, 5037, 7126), relating to facilities of Radio Ceylon. Effected by exchange of notes at Colombo May 19 and October 1, 1976. Entered into force October 1, 1976.

##### Thailand

Loan agreement relating to a project for the establishment of modern sericulture technology in Thailand, with annex. Signed at Bangkok September 8, 1976. Entered into force September 8, 1976.

Agreement amending the loan agreement of December 11, 1975, to assist Thailand in financing an improved seed development program. Signed at Bangkok September 8, 1976. Entered into force September 8, 1976.

## Correction

The editor of the BULLETIN wishes to call attention to the following error which appears in the October 25 issue:

p. 500, col. 2, line 21: "with" should read "within."



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†519	10/19	Kissinger: Synagogue Council of America, New York, N.Y.
*520	10/18	Shipping Coordinating Committee (SCC), U.S. National Committee for the Prevention of Marine Pollution, Nov. 23.
*521	10/18	Department receives portrait of Thomas Jefferson.
*522	10/22	Overseas Schools Advisory Council, Dec. 8.
†523	10/22	Digest of U.S. Practice in International Law, 1975, released.
*524	10/22	Northwest Atlantic Fisheries Advisory Committee, Boston, Nov. 16.
†525	10/22	U.S.-Tunisian Joint Commission communique.
†526	10/22	Kissinger, Chatty: remarks at signing of minutes of U.S.-Tunisian meeting.
*527	10/22	SCC, Subcommittee on Safety of Life at Sea, working group on subdivision and stability, Nov. 18.
†528	10/24	Kissinger: remarks at U.N. Day concert, Oct. 23.
†529	10/24	Kissinger: interview on "Face the Nation."

\* Not printed.  
† Held for a later issue of the BULLETIN.

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# THE DEPARTMENT OF STATE **BULLETIN**

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*The Department of State BULLETIN, a weekly publication issued by the Office of Media Services, Bureau of Public Affairs, provides the public and interested agencies of the government with information on developments in the field of U.S. foreign relations and on the work of the Department and the Foreign Service.*

*The BULLETIN includes selected press releases on foreign policy, issued by the White House and the Department, and statements, addresses, and news conferences of the President and the Secretary of State and other officers of the Department, as well as special articles on various phases of international affairs and the functions of the Department. Information is included concerning treaties and international agreements to which the United States is or may become a party and on treaties of general international interest.*

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## Moral Promise and Practical Needs

*Address by Secretary Kissinger<sup>1</sup>*

Americans are today in the midst of the quadrennial debate about our past, our present, and the future we hope to create. It is a dramatic demonstration of the strength of our democracy and the greatness of our nation. Whatever the outcome, Americans should take pride that they have once again shown the vigor of a free society which gives hope to the countless millions around the world who are dominated by oppressive regimes and intolerant ideologies.

It is also, let us be frank, a time of confusion and of exaggeration. Some tell us we are weak; others tell us we are strong. Some tell us that our prestige is declining; others assert that our global influence for peace and progress has never been greater. Some tell us we are in retreat around the world; others tell us we have never been more respected, more successful abroad than we are today.

As Secretary of State I am of course detached from partisan debate, although I seem to find my sympathies, for some reason, lying with "others" rather than the "some."

But no matter how strongly Americans may disagree on specific issues, the history of the postwar period has left no doubt about the nature of our global responsibility. Without America's commitment, there can be no real security in the world.

Without our dedication, there can be no progress. Without our strength, peoples all over the world will live in fear. Without our faith, they will live in despair.

America's contribution to world affairs has derived from our conviction that while history is often cruel, fate can be shaped by human faith and courage. Our optimism has enabled us to understand that the greatest achievements were a dream before they became a reality. We have learned through experience, as few people have, that all that is creative is ultimately a moral affirmation—the faith that dares in the absence of certainty; the courage to go forward in the face of adversity.

All of us here are deeply concerned about the survival and security of Israel. But we also know that the fate of even our closest friends cannot be assured in a vacuum. Peace, progress, and justice will not be securely won for America or Israel unless they are embedded in a peaceful, progressive, and just international order. The task of building such an order is the fundamental challenge of our time.

No people has experienced more of man's exaltation—and man's depravity—than the Jewish people. The Jewish people know that survival requires unending struggle. But they know, as well, that peace, if it is to be more than a prophet's dream, must rest on the conscience of mankind made real by the concrete efforts of all peoples and all nations.

America, because of its own heritage, is perennially engaged in such a search of

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<sup>1</sup> Made before the Synagogue Council of America at New York, N.Y., on Oct. 19 (text from press release 519).

its conscience. How does our foreign policy serve moral ends? How can America carry forward its role as a humane example and champion of justice in a world in which power is still often the final arbiter? How do we secure both our existence and our values? How do we reconcile ends and means, principle and survival?

These questions have been asked throughout our history; they are being posed again today, as they should. But they require more than simple answers and easy slogans.

There is no doubt that policy without moral purpose is like a ship without a rudder, drifting aimlessly from crisis to crisis. A policy of pure calculation will be empty of both vision and humanity. It will lack not only direction but also roots and heart. Americans have always held the view that America stood for a moral purpose above and beyond its material achievements.

But we must recall, as well, that policy is the art of the possible, the science of the relative. We live in a world of 150 sovereign states, profound ideological differences, and nuclear weapons. Our power is enormous, but it is still finite. A truly moral policy must relate ends to means and commitments to capabilities. America, to be true to itself, must keep its eyes on distant horizons; we must also keep our feet planted firmly in reality. We must learn to distinguish morality from moralizing. We must remember that the invocation of lofty principles has led, in our history, as frequently to abdication as to overcommitment. Either tendency would be disastrous for international order and our well-being.

The challenge of American foreign policy is to live up to America's moral promise while fulfilling the practical needs of world order. How we meet it will determine the peace and progress of America and of the world.

This is the subject I would like to discuss with you today.

## American Ideals and American Foreign Policy

Americans always have believed that this country had a moral significance that transcended its geographic, military, or economic power. Unique among the nations of the world, America was created as a conscious act by men dedicated to a set of political and ethical principles they believed to be of universal applicability. Small wonder, then, that Santayana concluded that: "Being an American is, of itself, almost a moral condition."

But this idealism has also been in constant tension with another deep-seated strain in our historical experience. Since Tocqueville, it has been frequently observed that we are a pragmatic people, commonsensical, undogmatic, and undocinaire, a nation of practical energy, ingenuity, and spirit. We have made tolerance and compromise the basis of our domestic political life. We have defined our basic goals—justice, liberty, equality, and progress—in open and libertarian terms, enlarging opportunity and freedom rather than coercing a uniform standard of conduct.

America has been most effective internationally when we have combined our idealistic and our pragmatic traditions. The Founding Fathers were idealists who launched a new experiment in human liberty. But they were also sophisticated men of the world; they understood the European balance of power and manipulated it brilliantly to secure their independence.

For a century thereafter, we devoted our energies to the development of our continent, content to influence the world by moral example. Shielded by two oceans and the British Navy and blessed by a bountiful nature, we came to believe our special situation was universally valid, even for nations whose narrower margin of survival meant that their range of choices was far more limited than our own. We disparaged power even as we grew strong; we tended to see our successes as the product not of fortunate circumstances but of virtue and purity of motive.



As our power grew, we became uncomfortable with its uses and responsibilities and impatient with the compromises of day-to-day diplomacy. Our rise to the status of a great power was feared and resisted by many Americans who foresaw only a process of deepening involvement in a morally questionable world.

In the early decades of this century we sought to reconcile the tension between ideals and interests by confining ourselves to humanitarian efforts and resort to our belief in the preeminence of law. We pioneered in relief programs; we championed free trade and the cause of foreign investment. We attempted to legislate solutions to international conflicts—we experimented with arbitration, conciliation, judicial arrangements, treaties to abolish war, neutrality legislation, collective security systems.

These efforts to banish the reality of power were aborted by our involvement in two World Wars. While we had a clear security interest in a Europe free from domination by any one power, we clothed that interest in assertions that we would do battle for universal moral objectives—"a war to end all wars" or the unconditional surrender of the aggressor.

Disillusionment set in as the outcome of both World Wars necessarily fell short of expectations. After the first war, a tide of isolationist sentiment rose, in which moral proclamations were coupled with an unwillingness to undertake concrete commitments. We were loath to face a world of imperfect security, alliances of convenience, recurrent crises, and the need for a political structure that would secure the peace.

We undertook our first sustained period of peacetime world leadership in the decades after World War II with a supreme self-assurance fortunately matched by overwhelming material superiority. And we faced an antagonist whose political system and actions on the world scene explicitly threatened the very existence of our most cherished principles.

In a period of seemingly clear-cut, black-and-white divisions, we harbored few doubts about the validity of our traditional approach. We saw economic problems around the world—which we had solved successfully in our own country—and sought to overwhelm them with the sheer weight of resources, often with startling success. We projected our domestic experience overseas and assumed that economic progress automatically led to political stability. And in the process, without making a conscious decision to do so, we were trying to shape the world to our design.

### **The Complexities of the Contemporary World**

Our postwar policy was marked by great achievements: the reconstruction of Europe and Japan, the resistance to aggression, the encouragement of decolonization.

But we no longer live in so simple a world.

We remain the strongest nation and the largest single influence in international affairs. For 30 years our leadership has sustained world peace, progress, and justice. Our leadership is no less needed today, but it must be redefined to meet changing conditions. Ours is no longer a world of American nuclear monopoly, but one of substantial nuclear equivalence. Ours is no longer a world of two solid blocs and clear-cut dividing lines, but one of proliferating centers of power and influence. Ours is no longer a world amenable to national or regional solutions, but one of economic interdependence and common global challenges.

Thus, for the first time in American experience, we can neither escape from the world nor dominate it. Rather we, like all other nations in history, must now conduct diplomacy with subtlety, flexibility, persistence, and imagination if we are to preserve and forward our national goals.

We can no longer impose our own solutions; yet our action or inaction will influence events, often decisively. We cannot banish power from international affairs,

but we can use our vast power wisely and firmly to deter aggression and encourage restraint. We can encourage the resolution of disputes through negotiation. We can help construct more equitable relations between developed and developing nations and a wider community of interest among all nations. And we must continue to stand for freedom and human dignity in the world.

These are worthy goals. They can be achieved. But they summon a different dimension of moral conviction than that of a simpler past. They require the stamina to persevere amid ambiguity and endless exertion, the courage to hold fast to what we believe in while recognizing that at any one time our hopes are likely to be only partially fulfilled.

We must always keep in mind that it was precisely under the banners of universal moralistic slogans that a decade and a half ago we launched into adventures that divided our country and undermined our international position. It is only in the last few years that we have finally begun to bring our commitments into line with our capabilities.

Clearly we must maintain our values and our principles; but we risk disaster unless we relate them to concepts of the national interest and international order that are based not on impulse but on a sense of steady purpose that can be maintained by the American people for the long term.

This is not a choice between morality and pragmatism. We cannot escape either and still remain true to our national character or to the needs of the world community. Our cause must be just, but it must prosper in a world of sovereign nations and competing wills. We can achieve no positive ends unless we survive, and survival has its practical necessities. Neither moralistic rhetoric nor obsession with pure power politics will produce a foreign policy worthy of our opportunity or adequate for our survival.

## The Morality of Ends and Means

America, and the community of nations, today faces inescapable tasks:

—We must maintain a secure and just peace.

—We must create a cooperative and beneficial international order.

—We must defend the rights and the dignity of man.

Each of these challenges has both a moral and a practical dimension. Each involves important ends, but ends that are sometimes in conflict. When that is the case we face the real moral dilemma of foreign policy: the need to choose between valid ends and to relate our ends to means.

### *Peace*

In an age when nuclear cataclysm threatens mankind's very survival, peace is a fundamental moral imperative. Without it, nothing else we do or seek can ultimately have meaning. Let there be no mistake about it: averting the danger of nuclear war, and limiting and ultimately reducing destructive nuclear arsenals, is a moral as well as political act.

In the nuclear age, traditional power politics, the struggle for marginal advantages, and the drive for prestige and unilateral gains must yield to an unprecedented sense of responsibility. History teaches us that balances based on constant tests of strength have always erupted into war. But common sense tells us that in the nuclear age history cannot be permitted to repeat itself. Every President, sooner or later, will conclude with President Eisenhower that there is no alternative to peace.

But peace, however crucial, cannot be our *only* goal. To seek it at any price would render us morally defenseless and place the world at the mercy of the most ruthless. Mankind must do more, as Tacitus said, than make a desert and call it peace.



There will be no security in a world whose obsession with peace leads to appeasement, but neither will there be security in a world in which mock tough rhetoric and the accumulation of arms is the sole measure of competition. We owe our people a convincing justification for their exertions; we can spare no effort to bequeath to future generations a peace more hopeful than an equilibrium of terror.

Barely four years ago demonstrations in the streets demanded "peace" as overriding all other considerations; today policies of conciliation are frequently denounced as unilateral concessions. Both extremes falsify our challenge. In the search for peace we are continually called upon to strike balances—between strength and conciliation, between the need to defend our values and our interests and the need to take into account the views of others, between partial and total settlements.

The task of foreign policy is to find that balance between competing ends and between ends and means. The problems of timing, method, and feasibility impose themselves on any conscientious policy decision. There are certain experiments that cannot be tried, not because the goals are undesirable, but because the consequences of failure would be so severe that not even the most elevated goal can justify the risk.

The Middle East provides a vivid example. No people yearn for comprehensive peace more than the people of Israel, whose existence has not been recognized by any of its neighbors throughout its history. There are those who argue that in the aftermath of the 1973 war the entire complex of Arab-Israeli issues—borders, peace obligations, refugees—should have been approached simultaneously at one conference. But the proponents of this course ignore the fact that at the time it would probably have proved disastrous:

the United States had no diplomatic relations with several of the key Arab countries; the Soviet Union was in effect the lawyer for the Arab cause; an oil embargo was still in effect; and hostility between the Arab states and Israel remained at the flashpoint. Under such conditions the chances for success of a comprehensive approach were slight and the penalties for failure were far-reaching: a continuation of the oil embargo, a prolonged freeze in U.S. relations with the Arab world, the corresponding growth of Soviet influence, strains with our allies in Europe and Japan, the increased isolation of Israel, and the likelihood, therefore, of a resumption of the Middle East war in even more difficult circumstances.

We chose to proceed step by step on those issues where room for agreement seemed to exist. We sought to establish a new relationship with the Arab world, to reduce the Soviet capacity for exploiting tensions, and to build a new sense of confidence in the parties directly involved so that overall solutions would someday be possible. We approached peace in stages but with the intention of ultimately merging individual steps into a comprehensive solution.

In the brief space of 18 months three agreements were reached, two between Egypt and Israel and one between Syria and Israel. As a result, the possibilities of achieving a genuine peace are greater today than they have ever been.

Deep suspicions remain, but the first important steps have been taken. The beginnings of mutual trust—never before in evidence—are emerging. Some Arab states for the first time are openly speaking of peace and ending a generation of conflict. The capacity of outside countries to exacerbate tensions has been reduced. The step-by-step approach has thus brought us to a point where comprehensive approaches are the logical next step. The decision be-

fore us now is not whether, but how, the next phase of negotiations should be launched. And we will engage in it, together with our Israeli friends, with new hope and confidence.

### *International Cooperation*

America's second moral imperative is the growing need for global cooperation.

We live in a world of more than 150 countries, each asserting sovereignty and claiming the right to realize its national aspirations. Clearly no nation can fulfill *all* its goals without infringing on the rights of others. Hence, compromise and common endeavors are inescapable on some issues at least. The growing interdependence of states in the face of the polarizing tendencies of nationalism and ideologies makes imperative the building of world community.

We live in an age of division, division between East and West and between the advanced industrial nations and the developing nations. Clearly a world in which a few nations constitute islands of wealth in a sea of poverty, disease, and despair is fundamentally insecure and morally intolerable. Those nations that consider themselves dispossessed will become the seedbed of upheaval. But the tactics of confrontation with which some of the developing nations have pursued their goals are also both intolerable and unsafe.

The challenge of world community will require realistic assumptions and actions by North and South alike. The industrial nations should not be obsessed with guilt or wedded to the status quo. The developing nations should not seek to gain their objectives through extortion or blackmail. What is required all around is a serious dedication to the requirements of cooperation, without which neither group can achieve its goals.

The objectives of the developing nations are clear: they want economic development, a role in international decisions that affect them, and a fair share of global

economic benefits. The goals of the industrial nations are equally clear: widening prosperity, an open world system of trade and investments with expanding markets for North and South, and reliable and equitable development of the world's resources of food, energy, and raw materials.

The goals of both sides can be achieved only if they are seen as complementary rather than antagonistic. The process of building a new era of international economic relationships will continue through the rest of this century. If those relationships are to be equitable and lasting, negotiation and compromise among diverse and contending interests will clearly be required. Above all, a moral act will be necessary: on the part of the industrial nations, a willingness to make, while there is still time for conciliation, the sacrifices necessary to build a sense of community; and on the part of the developing nations, a readiness to forgo blackmail and extortion, now, before the world is irrevocably split into contending camps, and to seek progress through cooperation.

For its part, the United States is committed to the path of cooperation, to build a stable and creative world which all nations—new and old, weak and strong, rich and poor—have a stake in preserving because they had a part in its shaping.

### *Human Values*

Our third moral imperative is the nurturing of human values. It is the tragedy of our times that the very tools of technology that have made ours the most productive century in the history of man have also served to subject millions to a new dimension of intimidation and suffering and fear.

Individual freedom of conscience and expression is the proudest heritage of our civilization. All we do in the search for peace, in the struggle for greater political cooperation and for a fair and flourishing international economy, is rooted in our belief that only liberty permits the fullest expression of mankind's creativity. We



know that technological progress without justice mocks humanity; that national unity without freedom is a hollow triumph; and that nationalism without a consciousness of human community, including a concern for human rights, is likely to become an instrument of oppression and a force for evil.

It is our obligation as the world's leading democracy to dedicate ourselves to assuring freedom for the human spirit. But responsibility compels also a recognition of our limits. Our alliances, the political relationships built up between ourselves and other nations over the years, serve the cause of peace by strengthening regional and world security. If well conceived, they are not favors to others but a recognition of common interests. They should be withdrawn when those interests change; they should not, as a general rule, be used as levers to extort a standard of conduct or to punish acts with which we do not agree.

In many countries—whatever our differences with their internal structures—the people are unified in seeking our protection against outside aggression. In many countries, our foreign policy relationships have proved to be no obstacle to the forces of change. And in others the process of American disengagement has eroded the sense of security, creating a perceived need for greater internal discipline while at the same time diminishing our ability to influence the domestic practices we criticize.

There is no simple answer to the dilemma a great democracy faces under such circumstances. We have a moral, as well as practical, obligation to stand up for our values and to combat injustice. Those who speak out for freedom and expose the transgressions of repressive regimes do so in the best American tradition. They can have—and have had—a dramatic and heartening impact. But there are also times when an effort to teach another country a moral lesson can backfire on the values we seek to promote.

This Administration has believed that we must bend every effort to enhance respect for human rights but that a public crusade is frequently not the most effective method. Our objective has been results, not publicity. We were concerned—and with good reason—that when such sensitive issues are transformed into tests of strength between governments, the impulse for national prestige will defeat the most worthy goals. We have generally opposed attempts to deal with sensitive international human rights issues through legislation, not because of the moral view expressed, which we share, but because legislation is almost always too inflexible, too public, and too heavyhanded a means to accomplish what it seeks.

Through quiet diplomacy, this Administration has brought about the release or parole of hundreds of prisoners throughout the world and mitigated repressive conditions in numerous countries. But we have seldom publicized specific successes.

The most striking example has been the case of Jewish emigration from the Soviet Union. The number of Soviet Jews who were permitted to emigrate in 1968 was 400; by 1973 that number had risen to 35,000. The reason for this quantum leap lies largely in persistent but private approaches to the Soviet Government and the parallel overall improvement in U.S.-Soviet relations.

Hundreds of hardship cases were dealt with in quiet personal discussions by the President or his senior officials. No public announcement or confrontation ever took place. But the results were there for all to see.

When even greater advances were sought by confrontation and legislation, the result was tragic. Today Jewish emigration from the Soviet Union has dropped to approximately 10,000 a year. I stress this not to score debating points against men whose seriousness of purpose and dedication to Jewish emigration I greatly respect. Rather it is to indicate that moral ends are often

not enough in themselves. The means used also have a moral quality and moral consequences.

And whatever honest differences of opinion may have existed between concerned individuals about the problem of Jewish emigration from the Soviet Union, this Administration remains dedicated to the objective. It will spare no effort to increase the flow of emigrants once again and will cooperate with the relevant organizations in that effort.

The issue of human rights is not, as I have said, an easy one, and it should be presented with a full awareness of its complexity. The experience of the last decade should have taught us that we ought not to exaggerate our capacity to foresee, let alone to shape, social and political change in other societies. With this painful lesson in mind, let me state the principles that guide the actions of the Ford Administration:

—Human rights are a legitimate international concern and have been so defined in international agreements for more than a generation.

—The United States will further the cause of human rights in appropriate international forums and in exchanges with other governments. We will use all our influence to encourage humane conduct within and between nations.

—We will be mindful of the limits of our reach; we will be conscious of the difference between public postures that satisfy our self-esteem and policies that bring positive results.

—We will never forget that the victims of our failures, of omission or commission, are human beings and thus the ultimate test of all we do.

We thus return to the central problem of ends and means. If every nation of the world presses for the immediate implementation of all of its values, hopes, and desires, eternal conflict is inevitable. If we

insist that others accept all our moral preferences, are we then ready to use military force to protect those who do as we urge? And if those who refuse our prescriptions are deprived of our support, what will we do if the isolation of these governments tempts external pressures or attack by other countries even more repressive? Will we have served moral ends if we thereby jeopardize our own security?

If we back up universal moral claims with power, we take upon ourselves the role of the world's policeman, a role which the American people have rejected in a decade of turmoil. But if we fail to back up these claims, we will lose relevance and credibility; we will be conducting a policy of self-gratification without effectiveness and ultimately without stature. Is it more moral to attempt what cannot be accomplished and fail than to make only those commitments that we know we can keep?

There is nothing more essential for Americans today than the need to recognize the inevitable and inescapable tension between our moral aims, which of necessity are stated in universal terms, and the constant imperative of choice that is imposed upon us by competing goals and finite resources. The making and implementing of foreign policy is, like life, a constant effort to strike the right balance between the best we want and the best we can have, between the ends we seek and the means we adopt.

We need moral strength to select among often agonizing choices and a sense of ethical purpose to navigate between the shoals of difficult decisions. But we need, as well, a mature sense of means, lest we substitute wishful thinking for the requirements of survival. The ultimate test of morality in foreign policy is not only the values we proclaim but what we are willing and able to implement.

I have discussed the dilemmas of moral choice not to counsel resignation but as a



message of hope. Fond as we are of self-flagellation—especially in years divisible by four—Americans can take pride in the achievements of their foreign policy in recent years, which have both a moral and a practical foundation:

—We have ended the war we found and preserved the peace.

—We have restructured and strengthened our partnerships with the industrial democracies and our sister republics in this hemisphere.

—We have opened new relationships with adversaries.

—We have begun to curb the nuclear arms race.

—We have helped to sow the seeds of peace in the Middle East and begun the process of conciliation in southern Africa.

—We have put forth and begun to implement a comprehensive agenda for cooperation between the industrial and developing worlds to combat poverty, ignorance, disease, misery, and hunger.

—We have worked with others on new global challenges that transcend boundaries and ideologies: the problems of pollution, of sharing the resources of the sea, of the transfer of technology.

—We have defended our values and interests around the globe.

But an agenda of such scope inevitably remains unfinished. Great opportunities lie before us:

—The industrial democracies can usher in a new and dynamic period of creativity in their relations with each other and lay the foundation for a new approach to the developing world.

—We have an early opportunity to place a ceiling on strategic nuclear arsenals and move on from there to reduce them.

—We can build on the promising foundations of the new relationship with the People's Republic of China.

—We have the possibility of major prog-

ress toward peace in the Middle East while strengthening our commitment to the security and survival of Israel.

—We can help the peoples of Africa reach for conciliation, human justice, and development rather than violence and hatred.

—We can see to it that the atom is used for mankind's benefit, not its destruction.

—The developing countries can become true partners in the international community.

—All countries can work together to fashion a global community both on land and in the vast domains of the oceans.

In pursuing these goals, we must have the courage to face complexity and the inner conviction to deal with ambiguity; we must be prepared to look behind easy slogans and recognize that great goals can only be reached by patience, and often only in gradual stages.

A world of turmoil and danger cries out for structure and leadership. The times summon a steady, resolute, purposeful, and self-assured America. This requires confidence—the leaders' confidence in their values, the public's confidence in its government, and the nation's collective confidence in the worth of its objectives. It is time to remind ourselves that while we may disagree about means, as Americans we all share the same dreams: peace, prosperity, and justice in our nation and throughout the world.

Many years ago Abraham Lincoln proclaimed that no nation could long endure "half slave and half free" and touched the conscience of a nation. Today people the world over cry out for liberty, dignity, respect; and they look with hope and longing to America, for we have touched the conscience of all mankind. If we hold to our ideals, if we set our sights high but without self-indulgence, the generations that come after us may at last be able to say that no man is a slave and no man a master.

## Secretary Kissinger Interviewed on "Face the Nation"

*Following is the transcript of an interview with Secretary Kissinger on the CBS television and radio program "Face the Nation" on October 24. Interviewing the Secretary were Henry S. Bradsher, Washington Star, and George Herman and Bob Schieffer, CBS News.*

Press release 529 dated October 24

*Mr. Herman: Mr. Secretary, last July you said publicly what you had, I gather, been saying privately for some time—namely, that Jimmy Carter's policies to that point were fairly consistent with the policies of the Ford Administration. I believe you called the policies of the Carter and Ford people "compatible." Do you still think, these many months later, that the two policies are compatible?*

*Secretary Kissinger: Well, first, I made that comment when Governor Carter had given exactly one speech on foreign policy, and he had not yet exposed the full complexity of his thought. I would say now that there are significant areas of difference between his statements and our policy.*

*Mr. Herman: Well, Mr. Secretary, I guess I'm in the position of a questioner whose next question has been pretty well determined by your first answer. You say there are a number of differences now between the Ford Administration policies and those enunciated by Governor Carter, and I guess the next thing to do is to fairly quickly list them.*

*Secretary Kissinger: We would have a difference in attitude toward Communist participation in the governments of Europe. We would have a difference with respect to arms sales to many countries, because our view would be that if we cannot be the world's policeman and if we*

*cannot sell arms to threatened countries, then there is bound to be a vacuum that somebody is going to fill. There is a difference in the attitudes toward countries, for example, like Kenya and Zaire. There is a difference in the degree of explicitness with which we should state what we will or will not do in the case of certain contingencies, such as came up with respect to Yugoslavia. And there is a difference about the level of the defense expenditures.*

*Mr. Bradsher: Do you think that the suggestion of not being willing to defend Yugoslavia in case of a Soviet attack really increases the danger of an attack? You mentioned this as one of the problems. How can you draw a line around the world and say that we will stand at certain places, or not draw the line, as has been suggested—as Governor Carter did?*

*Secretary Kissinger: Well, I think it is dangerous to state that certain countries are outside the American defense perimeter if these countries are of a great strategic importance and when it is generally recognized that their change in alignment would have serious consequences.*

*In 1949, a number of then Administration officials were drawing a line this way which left Korea outside the perimeter. Whether that in fact contributed to the attack on Korea, we do not know. What we do know is that in 1950 when the attack occurred, the Administration had to change its view.*

*My concern is that no miscalculation arise. Six Administrations, starting with President Truman—three Democratic and three Republican—have declared that the independence and integrity and nonalign-*



ment of Yugoslavia are major American interests. This is a view unanimously shared by all of our West European allies, and I believe that it is important that the other side understand that pressure on Yugoslavia would have grave consequences for the relationship with the United States, without spelling out what exactly we would do, and that the bipartisan consensus that has existed with respect to this issue be restored as rapidly as we can do it.

*Mr. Schieffer:* Mr. Secretary, are you suggesting then that by saying that an invasion of Yugoslavia would not directly threaten the security of the United States, that Governor Carter was issuing an invitation to the Soviet Union—

*Secretary Kissinger:* No.

*Mr. Schieffer:* —to take some action there?

*Secretary Kissinger:* I am sure that that was not his intention, and I'm positive that if he were to be elected and looked at the facts he would reconsider that statement. I believe that if the statement were left to stand it would raise serious ambiguities. It is inconsistent with the entire postwar policy of every Democratic and Republican Administration, incompatible with the views of our West European allies, and would be dangerous if it became American policy.

*Mr. Schieffer:* You're not suggesting that in some circumstance the United States would actually send troops to Yugoslavia if something like that arose?

*Secretary Kissinger:* I'm suggesting that for the United States to spell out exactly what it will do in circumstances which no one can yet foresee is unwise. I'm saying also that to declare a country of the geographic and strategic importance of Yugoslavia as lying outside an American security interest, however we may want to vindicate that interest, is dangerous, inconsistent with our NATO policies. In foreign policy—the art of foreign policy is to prevent crises from arising and not to create

ambiguities which the opponent might be tempted to probe.

*Mr. Herman:* Mr. Secretary, let me ask you about—you were going down a list of differences between the Ford Administration, as you see it, and in Governor Carter's positions. Two that are of some interest to me and that you had not mentioned were Governor Carter on preventing an Arab oil embargo and Governor Carter on using American economic leverage to get the Soviet Union out of places like Angola. Are those not—was that omission inadvertent?

*Secretary Kissinger:* No, but I wanted to keep my answer short.

On an Arab oil embargo, of course the United States should oppose it firmly.

I believe, in general, it is unwise to be excessively precise about everything that you might do—especially if the threat is one that, according to all the experts, is going to have extremely limited effectiveness. For almost all of the items in our trade, particularly as Governor Carter has specifically excluded grain, there are substitute sources in other countries.

Again, the art of foreign policy is to prevent an embargo from happening and not to stake everything on what you will do when the embargo in fact occurs.

So our policy has been to attempt to avoid an embargo, and we should also keep in mind that there are many things that the oil producers can do between doing nothing and a total embargo. And then we have to have policies to deal with those contingencies and not just for the most extreme one.

### Encouraging Humane Values

*Mr. Bradsher:* Governor Carter has criticized your policies as lacking what he considers to be morality—that you've been willing to deal with dictatorships rather than deal with matters of principle and standing up for liberals in some countries. Does this really enter into your mind as a consideration in dealing with a country—whether it's dictatorial, whether it's accused of torturing people?

*Secretary Kissinger:* In foreign policy, the United States has two objectives—at least two objectives. One is to maintain our security and the security of our allies. The second one is to live in a world which is compatible with our values.

Both of these objectives are important. We therefore, wherever we possibly can, try to encourage political forces that represent the humane values and the democratic values for which we stand. And therefore, in Santiago, Chile, at an OAS meeting, I made an extended statement on the problem of human rights. I did so again before the United Nations.

At the same time, there are certain security requirements. And you cannot implement your values unless you survive.

In World War II, we supported Communist Russia against Nazi Germany—not because we agreed with its values, but because we considered it essential for our survival at the time. And there are governments around the world whose independence, the independence of whose countries, is essential for American security and which we therefore support. Wherever we can, we are trying to nudge them in a direction that is compatible with our values.

But to pretend that we can simply declare our values and transform the world has a high risk of a policy of constant interventionism in every part of the world and then sticking us with the consequences.

So we are trying to conduct a policy in which our commitments are put into some relationship with our capabilities.

*Mr. Bradsher:* We haven't really succeeded in nudging anybody though, have we?

*Secretary Kissinger:* No, I don't think that is correct. I think through quiet diplomacy we have managed in many—

*Mr. Bradsher:* Can you give an example, sir?

*Secretary Kissinger:* Well, I can. For example, in Chile, we have been responsible for the release of hundreds of prisoners.

*Mr. Bradsher:* Have we prevented the arrest of many more, though?

*Secretary Kissinger:* I believe that, on the whole, we have contributed to an evolution that has not gone as rapidly as we would wish. But, again, we have to look at the alternatives of what happens if we throw our weight around too much. The end result will be that we lose all influence.

In the case of the Soviet Union, we managed to increase emigration of Jews from 400 to 35,000 a year as long as it was done by quiet diplomacy. As soon as it became a matter of confrontation and the national pride of the states was involved, it went down again to 10,000.

### **World Security and China**

*Mr. Herman:* Let me try nudging you in a different direction, Mr. Secretary. A Soviet—I guess you'd call him a propagandist—Victor Louis said on the 15th of this month that unless China adopts a more conciliatory attitude within a month, it will face an irreversible decision in Moscow. It was taken by some people to be sort of a—kind of a Soviet indirect threat to the new government in China. And you responded in your statement, your news conference at Harvard, with a sort of a counterpressure.

*How do you evaluate the situation? What was the meaning of that Soviet threat, if in fact it was a Soviet threat?*

*Secretary Kissinger:* Well, of course, we don't react to newsmen—at least, not to foreign newsmen. [Laughter.]

*Mr. Herman:* Even when they are arms of the government, if they are?

*Secretary Kissinger:* My statement at Harvard was made in the context, of which perhaps Victor Louis' statement was one relatively minor part, of a situation that might be interpreted as turmoil and might give rise to some temptation.

Now, it is clear that China—a country of vast historical and political importance, of large size—if it were the subject of a mas-



sive assault, that this would set a pattern for the security of the world that would be extremely unfortunate. And we therefore made more explicit what we had really said in a more guarded form earlier: that an attempt to upset the world equilibrium by a massive assault on China would not be taken lightly by the United States.

Now, I am not saying that this is likely, and I think, in any event, one shouldn't conduct foreign policy on the basis of an assessment of other countries' intentions. One has to create the obstacles in a preventive fashion.

*Mr. Herman: Have you?*

*Secretary Kissinger:* I believe that we have made clear that it would be a matter of the most serious complications if such an event occurred. But I am not saying such an event is likely. But, insofar as our views affect other countries' calculations, we wanted to make that clear.

*Mr. Schieffer: Well, Mr. Secretary, exactly what does that mean, though, and what does that entail when you say we would not take it lightly. Obviously there would be intense diplomacy, but does that mean that we would consider some sort of arms sales to China?*

*Secretary Kissinger:* As I pointed out, China has prided itself on its self-reliance, and we have never had any military discussions with China. We have never had any request for the purchase of arms from China. So that issue has never been formally considered by the U.S. Government.

*Mr. Schieffer: Mr. Schlesinger, the former Defense Secretary, when he came back from China recently, said we should not reject out of hand any request for arms sales to China if that should come about. Would you agree with that?*

*Secretary Kissinger:* This is one of those issues that is very difficult to answer in the abstract. It would depend on the circumstances, on the imminence of the threat, on how important we thought the threat was to our security.

But certainly we would take an extremely dim view of a military attack, or even military pressure, on China.

*Mr. Schieffer: Well, do you really see any possibility of that, any real possibility of that coming about?*

*Secretary Kissinger:* It is the task of foreign policy to prepare against contingencies and to lower temptations on the other side. I do not think it is a probability. I think that any American policymaker, given the importance of the issues that would be raised, would have to take it into account.

*Mr. Bradsher: Is this the same category as Yugoslavia? Can you relate the two?*

*Secretary Kissinger:* I think there are two kinds of American interests in the world. There are interests where we have a formal legal obligation, like in NATO. Then there are interests where the importance of a country is such that whether we have an obligation or not, we might feel our security affected.

I think the problem is comparable as between China and Yugoslavia in the sense that an attack, a successful attack on either, would affect the world equilibrium and would affect the calculations of other countries and therefore could in time affect American security even if it didn't do so immediately. And it is the task of our foreign policy not to plan now how we are going to conduct military operations, because that is what we are trying to avoid; nor have we ever said that that is what we would do. What we are trying to do is to prevent the situation from coming about.

#### **Framework for Rhodesia Negotiations**

*Mr. Herman: Let me turn you toward one of your own more personal pieces of work, and that has been to negotiate a settlement of the struggle in Rhodesia. That matter is now in the forum at Geneva, and a number of comments have been made by one side or another that the Kissinger plan, as it has sometimes been called—I think you prefer to*

call it the Kissinger-Callaghan, or the Callaghan-Kissinger—but in any case that the Kissinger plan is dead.

*Is it? Have we lost out on that, whatever share or interest we had in it?*

*Secretary Kissinger:* First, let us get clear what it is we were trying to do.

We were trying to stop the drift toward racial conflict. We were trying to bring about a peaceful transition toward majority rule that in the judgment of all knowledgeable people was inevitable in any event, except with much more bloodshed. We were trying to limit the influence of all outside countries, including our own, on the evolution in Africa.

I believe we have a good chance of achieving all of these objectives.

The particular terms that may have been worked out in order to get the process started could well be modified in the process of negotiations.

*Mr. Herman:* You do not take Mr. Smith [Ian D. Smith, of Rhodesia] at his word when he says it is the Kissinger plan, all or nothing?

*Secretary Kissinger:* I believe that you have here five parties negotiating with each other that have been fighting each other for 11 years, between whom there is enormous distrust, each of which has a constituency to which they must appeal.

I believe that the negotiations haven't even started yet. It is clear that there must be some room for negotiation. There will be many exalted statements of an epic nature in the process of the negotiations. I think the chances are better than even that they will succeed unless some radical elements take over the process and make demands that cannot be met.

*Mr. Herman:* Let me ask you about one not so exalted set of statements that has been made; that is, the—well, I have to back into it a little bit.

*You have told us that you consulted with the Presidents of the black countries on the borders of Rhodesia and that the plan was*

*worked out in full consultation, at least as I understand it, with them. They are now saying—or some of them are now saying, their leaders are now saying—that that is not so, that the plan that you discussed with them is not the plan as outlined by Mr. Smith, and the question comes up as to who struck John? Who is telling the truth? Did you present them with a plan? Are they exaggerating the differences?*

*Secretary Kissinger:* I think everybody is telling the truth. We had three American and two British missions in Africa before I went there on that last shuttle.

The main lines of the ideas to be presented to Smith were discussed with at least those African Presidents that were reached by these missions and that I had a chance to talk to personally.

In addition, Mr. Smith added a few considerations of his own which it seemed to us would be better for him to put forward formally and permit them to be the subject of discussion, rather than wait until the Geneva conference, or wherever the conference would have taken place, and then create the impression that there was some sort of secret understanding.

We did our best to check the framework of the proposals. And the essence of the framework has been accepted. There are several details about which there is dispute, as you would expect.

So I think that everybody is telling the truth and everybody has different constituencies to whom they must appeal in the process of reaching a settlement.

*Mr. Schieffer:* Dr. Kissinger, Governor Carter seems to agree with your efforts in Africa, but he suggested that perhaps the timing of your trip there and your shuttle had a little something to do with an election coming up in the United States. Is that a valid criticism to make?

*Secretary Kissinger:* When I first went to Africa in April, I think it is safe to say that it did not have the unanimous approval of many members of the Republican Party,



and it was in the middle of the primary campaign, and there was much criticism that we did this.

We did it because we thought it was in the national interest. If matters had been permitted to drift, it was our judgment—it was the judgment of every knowledgeable person—that things would be out of control by the middle of next year, which would have been the next time anybody could have gotten hold of it, or by early next year, since the time after the election, whoever wins, will have to be devoted in part to restructuring administrations and so forth. It had nothing to do with the election campaign. And it hasn't been used in the election campaign, either.

*Mr. Bradsher: Mr. Secretary, six months or so ago, you used to make little jokes and quips about how your time to retire might be coming, that you were looking forward to relief from the job—the type of job you have held for about eight years now. More recently, your little quips seem to be going the other way. You talk about going on until 1981. Is this showing your loyalty to the President in assuming in your quips that he is going to be elected, or does this mean a change in your own personal attitude?*

*Secretary Kissinger:* Well, I have to give a terminal date, or give some hope of a terminal date, to my colleagues in the State Department or their morale will break completely. Then, as that date approaches, I tend to push it a little bit more into the future, to spur them to new efforts.

I have not made a final decision. When the President is reelected, I will discuss it with him at that time.

*Mr. Schieffer: The President has said that you can have the job as long as you want. He is on the record on that. How long do you want it, Mr. Secretary?*

*Secretary Kissinger:* I don't want to deprive my colleagues in the State Department of all hope of a termination of their suffering.

*Mr. Herman: I guess that is what is called a diplomatic answer.*

*Let me ask you sort of a nondiplomatic question. We have been asking you for I don't know how many years to be a guest on Face the Nation, and you have always turned us down. Now, all of a sudden, a week before election day you accept us, and I am reminded of your many statements that the Secretary of State job is a nonpolitical job.*

*Was there any little element of politics in your accepting our offer this morning?*

*Secretary Kissinger:* No. As you said, you have been asking me for several years, and I seem to have been doing one of these shows a year, and I don't consider a press conference in which I don't control the questions—have any idea what the questions will be—a political activity.

## **U.S.-Tunisian Joint Commission Meets at Washington**

*The U.S.-Tunisian Joint Commission met at Washington October 19–21. Following are remarks made by Secretary Kissinger and Tunisian Minister of Foreign Affairs Habib Chatty on October 22 at the signing of the minutes of the meeting, together with the text of the joint communique of the Joint Commission they signed that day.*

### **REMARKS AT THE SIGNING CEREMONY**

Press release 526 dated October 22

#### **Secretary Kissinger**

*Mr. Foreign Minister:* It is not often that I meet a colleague who is engaged in shuttle diplomacy. Since I saw you last, two weeks ago in New York, you have been presiding over a meeting of the Ministers of the Arab League and, indeed, you had to postpone your return here because of your duties in the Middle East. I want to express my appreciation to you for the im-

portance that you obviously attach to our Joint Commission by returning here to sign together with me these documents and to give me the opportunity to benefit from your views on the bilateral relations between our two countries and developments in the Middle East.

In a world in which irrationality and passions are dominant, it means a great deal to the United States to have as a trusted friend a country like Tunisia. Throughout its history, Tunisia has stood for balance, progress, and good sense in its dealings with its neighbors with respect to peace in the Middle East and with respect to its own development. The United States attaches great importance to the independence of Tunisia and does what it can to encourage the progress and economic development of that country. We have had distinguished visitors from Tunisia here this year—the son of President Bourguiba. We have had visits of our 6th Fleet to Tunisia. We have contributed substantially to the economic development of Tunisia, and we have in this Joint Commission an instrument by which these ties are institutionalized.

Mr. Foreign Minister, I look forward to our talks. I am glad about the progress made by our Commission, and I welcome you here as a personal friend and as the representative of a country whose friendship we value, whose independence and progress we consider very important.

#### Foreign Minister Chatty <sup>1</sup>

Mr. Secretary: I was very touched by the words you have just expressed concerning my country. The relations between the United States and Tunisia are very good. They go back to the very first years of the independence of our country, and there have never been any clouds over those relations. Even before independence and in spite of the alliances in which the United States and France were engaged and in spite of the vicissitudes of the cold war, we

enjoyed the benefit of the friendship and the sympathy of the United States.

Following independence you supported us greatly. Tunisia went through some very painful moments with the bombing of Sakiet. All of this was caused by the Algerian war then raging. During this very serious period, the United States stood by our side, and it was through the good offices of the United States that we were able to resolve the problem of the stationing of French troops on our territory. From an economic standpoint, the aid extended to us by the United States has been most significant, and it has been the most important aid of all of the assistance that we have received from other countries. As you yourself have stressed, Mr. Secretary, this aid has been well used. There are a number of major achievements in Tunisia that testify to this.

We could say that the relationship between the United States and Tunisia stands out as an example from the political as well as the economic standpoint. From the political standpoint the United States has always respected our positions on the Middle East and in other areas. The United States has never attempted to exert an influence upon any political decision taken by Tunisia. From the economic standpoint, the technological and economic aid extended has been most fruitful.

Tunisia is known for its moderation, its realism, and its spirit of conciliation. In this Mediterranean area which is so seriously beset by problems today, we have endeavored to be an agent of moderation, of dialogue, and to foster the settlement of differences through a dialogue. And in this we share many viewpoints with you personally, Mr. Secretary, because since you came to the Department of State you have brought with you a new spirit, a new style, in the Middle East—that of direct and indirect dialogue as a means to settle problems.

Concerning now the Joint Commission, I am satisfied with the results as stated. I want to thank you and all your associates for the welcome extended to our side and

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<sup>1</sup> Foreign Minister Chatty spoke in French.



for the spirit of understanding that was extended to them on this occasion. But in spite of all that is being done, Tunisia is being forced to make very special efforts for its development, at a time of the economic takeoff of the country. We need the assistance of all of the friends that we have in the world, and the United States occupies a leading place among our friends. We know what problems you face, having to spread your assistance throughout the world, but as we near takeoff American assistance is truly indispensable. The experience we have had so far would be hampered if we were to fail to receive this assistance.

I hope that the Joint Commission has been helpful in enabling the United States to understand the meaning and significance of our fifth [development] plan and the projects which will be carried out in the coming years. Thus, aided by this fuller understanding, the United States, we hope, can make a more meaningful contribution to our fifth plan. And I look to the day, next year at the forthcoming meeting of the Joint Commission, when we shall have the pleasure to have you with us in Tunisia, Mr. Secretary, and to have you sign documents which will reflect a greater contribution of the United States to our plan.

Again, thank you for your welcome, for the spirit you are extending to me personally, to my President, and to my country. And I rejoice in this unbreakable friendship between the United States and Tunisia, a friendship of which we shall take very good care.

## TEXT OF JOINT COMMUNIQUE

Press release 525 dated October 22

The U.S.-Tunisian Joint Commission held its third meeting in Washington October 19-21, 1976. Minister for Planning Moustapha Zaanouni, for Tunisia, and Under Secretary of State William D. Rogers, for the United States, jointly presided over plenary sessions.

Unforeseen obligations prevented the planned participation of the Tunisian Minister of Foreign Affairs, Habib Chatty, and consequently, that of

U.S. Secretary of State Henry A. Kissinger. As Co-chairmen of the Commission, Minister Chatty and Secretary Kissinger reviewed and signed the Agreed Minutes of the meeting and held bilateral discussions on October 22.

The Foreign Minister and the Secretary welcomed this opportunity to review the excellent relations existing between Tunisia and the United States and to exchange views on a broad range of regional and global issues. In particular, Foreign Minister Chatty described the intensive efforts now being undertaken under the aegis of the Arab League to restore peace and tranquility in Lebanon. Secretary Kissinger appreciated the opportunity to hear about these efforts from the Foreign Minister and to reaffirm the support of the United States for all steps directed toward the objective of bringing an end to the fighting and assuring the political independence, territorial integrity and national unity of Lebanon. The Secretary reaffirmed the commitment of the United States to work for a just and lasting peace in the Middle East. He also stressed the importance the United States attaches to the independence and national development of Tunisia as a factor of moderation and stability in the Mediterranean region.

The two Ministers noted with satisfaction the support extended to Tunisia by the United States Senate in a resolution on August 3, 1976, on the occasion of President Bourguiba's birthday. This resolution, which had a most favorable effect on the Tunisian people, expresses the sense of the Senate that: "The continuation of Tunisia's economic and social development in circumstances of peace, liberty and independent sovereignty is important for the stability of the Mediterranean area and for the interest of the United States." And: "The United States should continue to contribute to the maintenance of peace and the economic and social development of Tunisia through the provision of appropriate levels of economic and military assistance."

The U.S.-Tunisian Joint Commission met in two plenary sessions and in a series of sessions of the Subcommittee on Economic Development and the Subcommittee on Trade and Investment.

The two delegations conducted a review of U.S.-Tunisian cooperation in trade, investment, development and cultural affairs and discussed areas of past and prospective cooperation in multilateral bodies dealing with international economic and political policy issues.

They reaffirmed their historic friendship and common commitments to work for peace in the Mediterranean and the Middle East. Speaking for the United States, Under Secretary Rogers said Tunisia would continue to find the United States to be a willing partner. He praised the statesmanship of President Habib Bourguiba in both international affairs and in the achievement of a "model" system of economic and social development which nurtures democracy and private initiative.



Minister Zaanouni and other members of the Tunisian delegation presented and explained the Fifth Tunisian Plan for Economic and Social Development, for the years 1977-81, and invited U.S. private investment and public technical and financial assistance. The plan requires a sharp increase in both domestic savings and foreign public and private investment in Tunisia. It is intended to achieve an economic growth rate of 7.5 percent, the addition of 48,000 jobs annually, and food self-sufficiency by 1981.

In keeping with the sense of the U.S. Senate noted above, the U.S. delegation stated the readiness of U.S. Government agencies to contribute significant assistance, within their legal and policy guidelines and resources, to the achievement of the new Plan. The U.S. delegation said that it expected U.S. Government agencies to make available to Tunisia as much as \$65 million in grants, loans, and government-guaranteed private credits before the end of 1977 for financing food supply programs, projects in agriculture and rural development, health and family planning, housing, technical cooperation and training and military equipment purchases. In addition, private bank credits and private direct investment by U.S. enterprises are expected to grow in pace with Tunisia's broadly based economic development.

Subject to the development of mutually agreed projects, the U.S. delegation foresaw substantial increases in financing by the U.S. Export-Import Bank and the initiation of direct loans and loan guaranties on U.S. private investment projects by the Overseas Private Investment Corporation.

The U.S. delegation announced that a group of U.S. private businessmen who are members of the Agribusiness Council, with the support of OPIC and a representative of AID, will undertake project identification in the field of agribusiness during the month of November in Tunisia.

In order to assist in relieving a shortfall in Tunisia's wheat crop, the United States agreed to reprogram its Food for Peace allocations so as to provide 40,000 tons of wheat on liberal credit terms under Public Law 480 and an equal amount, if required, on shorter supply credits. Grants for school lunch and pre-school feeding programs will continue.

The Agency for International Development, which is currently required to concentrate its program in low-income areas, will nevertheless continue to provide capital assistance in selected priority areas and expanded technological assistance to Tunisia. AID will concentrate on science and technology transfers to enhance Tunisian development, rural health and family planning, housing and an expanded technical cooperation program including training.

AID announced at the Joint Commission meeting approval of a \$20 million program of Housing Investment Guaranties, the first tranche of \$10 million

to be provided in the current fiscal year and the second half of next fiscal year. This year's program will finance construction and installment sale of about 1,500 low-income housing units in Tunis.

The total estimate of U.S. financial assistance includes \$25 million in military equipment purchase credits during the 15 months which began July 1, 1976.

The two delegations also noted the effective contributions of the U.S. Peace Corps, especially in the field of public health and vocational training, and that of private voluntary U.S. organizations in these and other fields of development and social welfare.

The U.S. delegation outlined plans for an International Industrialization Institute, whose programs of research and analysis would be particularly useful to Tunisia and other countries well advanced along the course of industrialization. The Tunisian delegation asked for additional details.

The delegations agreed to expand and invigorate trade-promotion programs in both countries so as to diversify and enlarge commercial relations. They agreed to provide assistance to each party's market research efforts in the other country.

They expressed gratification at the growth of cultural relations, highlighted currently by the traveling exhibition in the United States of antique Tunisian mosaics and plans for Tunisian instructors to serve as French language teachers in Louisiana state and church schools.

The Co-chairmen agreed that the 1977 meeting of the Joint Commission would be held in Tunisia at a mutually convenient date to be arranged.

HENRY A. KISSINGER  
*Secretary of State*

HABIB CHATTY  
*Minister of Foreign  
Affairs*

October 22, 1976, Washington, D.C.

## Secretary Kissinger Marks United Nations Day

*Following are remarks by Secretary Kissinger made at the United Nations Day concert at Washington on October 23.*

Press release 528 dated October 24

Long ago, Sir Francis Bacon envisioned a new human community which would cause men's minds "to move in charity, to rest in providence, and to turn upon the poles of truth." In the more than three and a half centuries since then, men and nations



all too often have been vengeful rather than charitable, shortsighted rather than provident, mendacious rather than truthful. But the failings which have clouded mankind's hopes since the dawn of time have, in our era, a new and fearful dimension. For ours is an age of potential nuclear cataclysm and of wars that can afflict entire populations. Ours is a time when the hope of millions for a better life seems perpetually elusive, as the fortunate seem to prosper while the destitute founder. And ours is a world in which too often truth and those who speak it are the objects of repression and regimentation.

Our task and our necessity is to turn back the tides of hatred, discord, and fear and to weave from our effort a new story of shared human progress. The obstacles before us are massive, but the chance for achievement is great.

As the world organization we honor tonight dramatically symbolizes, the nations have become for the first time in history an almost universal community, and the shared experiences of the modern age have heightened our awareness of each other and of our common predicament.

We are coming to share an abhorrence of war, of the absolute injustice it brings to the innocent who are brutalized or uprooted, and of the catastrophe it could bring to civilization and, indeed, to all of life on our planet. We can recognize now that ours has become a single global economy, bringing complex problems but also the potentiality for the first time in history of eradicating poverty, hunger, and needless human misery. And we can perceive the need to strengthen the institutions and procedures of reason to form a bulwark between humanity and the crude and degrading applications of coercion.

But let us be honest. While the impera-

tives of community are emerging, the practices of confrontation persist. Too often we witness coercion rather than conciliation, the resort to pressure rather than the search for cooperation, and one-way morality rather than the universal conscience of humanity. Thus it is ours to choose how we will reflect our interdependence. It is ours to choose whether nations will make the last quarter of this century a time of spiraling conflict and chaos or the dawn of a true human community.

Surely, we have the means to surmount our problems. The reach of technology can conquer all but the most malevolent forces of nature; and our learning and our sense of history and place continuously advance. What we now have need of is the strength to persevere and the vision of where we are going. For success is a process, and not a final condition; and great achievements are dreams before they become realities. In the words of Homer: It is a thing possible to do if our hearts bid us to do it.

So let us learn to distinguish truculence from strength and build a peace more promising than an equilibrium of force. Let us reconcile the national interest and the world interest so that we may increase the bounty of our planet to the benefit of all. And in all our labors let us extend the horizons of liberty and thus unshackle the oppressed and the despairing.

Pablo Casals once said: "The first thing is to do with purpose what one proposes to do." No generation in history has had so much to do nor such noble purposes to fulfill. Striving together, we can harvest our hopes, shaping that community of which our ancestors dreamed and to which the United Nations is devoted, a human family in which all people can find peace, our children can pursue their dreams, and the human spirit can find a new day of freedom.

## Trade and Investment: Another Dimension in U.S.-Africa Relations

*Address by David B. Bolen*

*Deputy Assistant Secretary for African Affairs*<sup>1</sup>

I welcome this opportunity to be with you this evening, and to participate in your conference. Colloquia such as yours are essential if we are to have a basic understanding of American foreign policy and support for its purposes and goals. This is all the more meaningful in today's turbulent world.

No people understand better than the American people how to respond creatively to the demands of rapid change. And no people have been more successful at finding practical solutions to the conflicts which change inevitably creates.

Our own history is characterized by dramatic transformation. We have grown from a small to an immense country. We have developed from an agricultural to an industrial giant. And we have evolved from a country preoccupied with its own concerns to a nation burdened with the responsibilities of world leadership.

Beyond our borders, the world itself changes with extraordinary rapidity. We are all familiar with the revolutions of our century—in technology, in global communications, in the creation of weapons of mass destruction, and in the explosion of population growth. These have produced major challenges to our leadership.

Nowhere is this more vividly revealed than in the area of trade and investment.

I would like to approach the subject of

trade and investment in the context of the broader issues that create the climate for U.S. business in Africa.

There is a tired cliché that until very recently we had no coherent African policy. I think it is accurate to say that we had not been as actively involved in African political matters as we are now, but the initiatives we have undertaken in southern Africa are grounded in principles and policies supported by four successive Administrations.

Foremost has been our opposition to all systems of racial discrimination and our support for majority rule. The other elements of our policy have been: recognition of our obligation to assist in African economic development and concern with keeping the continent free of great-power rivalry.

As I said, what is new about our policy is the level of U.S. involvement.

Two principal factors affect U.S.-Africa relations: southern African issues and problems of economic development.

Southern Africa is moving rapidly toward a confrontation that can have deep and incalculable implications for international stability. Rhodesia is under attack. Violence threatens to escalate in Namibia. In South Africa the unrest and flashes of violence may be a harbinger of worse to come unless some way can be found to ease racial tensions. Racial wars in southern Africa would have tragic consequences for all concerned and would poison the

<sup>1</sup> Made before the Conference on American Public Policy and Private Enterprise in Africa at the University of Houston, Tex., on Oct. 14.



atmosphere for international cooperation.

Because of the gravity of the situation, and in spite of the odds against success, the United States undertook to use its influence to start a process for a negotiated solution. We assumed this role with the open encouragement and active support of the parties involved.

We have not sought to impose remedies on the Africans. As the Secretary has repeatedly stated, we believe in African solutions for African problems. From the outset our goal has been to get a process started that would offer an alternative to violence. Within that context we have had three objectives. First, in Rhodesia, where the threat is most immediate, we have worked to establish a framework for negotiating the peaceful transfer of power to the black majority, at the same time protecting minority rights. In Namibia our aim has been to find a formula for negotiating the transition to independence. In South Africa we continue to press the whites to extend equality of opportunity and basic human rights to all South Africans.

### **Reality of Interdependence**

This, in very broad brush, is the political background against which we must view U.S. economic relations with Africa. Here the key word is "interdependence," which best describes the increasing interrelationship of both industrial and developing nations. We are learning, sometimes painfully, that we can neither escape the world nor dominate it. International economic interdependence is a reality. Our prosperity is becoming more and more dependent on economic cooperation with other countries.

The aspiration of the less developed countries (LDC's) for a change in basic economic relationships with the United States and other industrialized countries is understandable. Both of our interests dictate compromise, based on the following elements: (1) self-regulating agreements

with Third World suppliers of raw materials and other commodities that provide us with reasonable security of access and them with assured income; and (2) an arrangement that insures transfers of resources from the industrialized countries to the poorer less developed countries to provide for minimum human needs and an increment to underpin the economic potential of the poor countries.

The challenge of interdependence will be especially acute in the decade ahead. Few states will be able to meet their economic needs independently or to insulate their societies and economies from increasing dependence on external influences. Industrial countries will be unable to manage their national economies without one another's cooperation in regulating the international system of money, trade, and investment. Technological developments will reinforce the need for joint endeavors to deal with such problems as energy, food, raw materials, and environmental pollution.

While our interdependence will increase, we should all recognize that nationalism will remain the dominant ideology. And nationalist sentiment may well be further stimulated in those countries that find progress in economic development elusive or are confronted with deteriorating trade situations.

### **Africa's Problems and Potential**

Unfortunately, poverty is still pervasive in most of Africa. Of the world's 29 least developed countries, 18 are African. Depressing social and economic indicators attest to the effect of poverty on the quality of life. In the least developed countries, life expectancy barely averages 43 years, compared to 53 years in the developing world and 71 years in the United States. A single physician serves an average population of 15,000—almost five times the number in the developing world. Only 28 percent of school-age children attend school, and the overall illiteracy rate exceeds 80 percent.

In addition to the burden of extreme poverty, Africa is heavily dependent on external economic forces over which it has little control. Many African states rely on a single commodity for their export earnings. Price fluctuations of raw materials in the international marketplace can have a drastic effect on African economies.

A case in point is Zambia, the world's fifth largest producer and one of the largest exporters of copper. Over 90 percent of Zambia's foreign exchange and one-third to one-half of the government's revenue, mainly through export taxes, are derived from copper. When the price of copper fell from a high of \$1.50 a pound to as low as 55 cents, it posed major economic problems which the government has not yet resolved. Zaire faces similar problems.

Vulnerability to widely fluctuating commodity prices is only one of the obstacles to African development. Boundaries, many of them a legacy of the colonial era, are frequently arbitrary with little regard for natural economic regions. Agriculture, the mainstay of the majority of African states, is often a victim to the capriciousness of nature. A dramatic example is the Sahel, the chronically drought-ridden region on the southern edge of the Sahara, where the desert is steadily encroaching on once-fertile lands.

Most African countries lack an adequate infrastructure—the roads and railways and harbors essential for nationbuilding. Another serious handicap is Africa's lack of skilled manpower. African states place a high priority on education including vocational and management training. Foreign enterprises which are willing to provide training and opportunities for Africans for advancement to positions of responsibility are making a sound investment in terms of building a reservoir of good will in the host country.

The world recession and spiraling oil prices hit the poorest nations hardest. Caught between the rising costs of food and manufactured goods they needed to

import and the lower prices they were receiving for their own commodities, many of them were forced to cut back on their development.

In spite of these problems, Africa has enormous growth potential. If you will bear with me for a few more statistics, they will demonstrate the extent of that potential. Africa possesses 96 percent of the world's known reserves of chromite, 42 percent of its cobalt, 23 percent of its manganese reserves, and 64 percent of its platinum-group metals. Africa's iron reserves are twice those of the United States and two-thirds those of the Soviet Union. The African Continent is estimated to have 16 percent of the world's waterpower. Africa's petroleum reserves have not yet been assessed; however, Nigeria for several years has been a major supplier of crude oil to the United States. And finally, there are still vast unused areas of arable land, pasture, and forest. With proper irrigation and modern agricultural techniques, every important crop in the world can be grown in some part of the continent.

These figures are of more than passing interest to the United States, which is the world's leading consumer. While Americans constitute 6 percent of the world's population, we consume approximately 27 percent of its production of raw materials. Projections indicate that by the end of this century the United States will be dependent primarily on foreign sources for 12 of the 13 basic industrial raw materials required to maintain a modern economy.

In more specific terms, how will this dependency relate to Africa? Nigeria is obvious. There are other examples. Zaire and Zambia are major producers of copper. Gabon has large reserves of uranium and manganese. Niger has large deposits of cassiterite, and Mauritania is rich in top-quality iron ore. Guinea has two-thirds of the world's known deposits of bauxite.

In spite of Africa's natural wealth there are great disparities. At one end of the scale, Nigeria, Liberia, Gabon, Botswana,



Angola, Zaire, and Zambia have good development prospects because they are mineral producers. Other African countries, as I have indicated, are much less fortunate.

### **Assistance, Trade, and Investment**

The United States is not indifferent to the problems of the developing world. We are willing to explore measures to improve and stabilize markets. We seek satisfactory international arrangements to encourage investment, such as the International Resources Bank. We have received authority from Congress to make a greater contribution to the African Development Fund. We will make major efforts to stimulate the flow of modern technology to Africa to promote growth and diversify economies now excessively dependent on one or two commodities.

U.S. bilateral assistance to Africa has averaged \$250 million a year over the past three fiscal years. In addition, we have provided multilateral assistance through such agencies as the International Development Association, where our share of credits last year was \$140 million.

The Peace Corps is a "people-to-people" approach to development assistance. The Peace Corps program currently involves 2,100 volunteers in 25 different African countries at a cost this year of \$23 million. Each host country contributes another \$2-\$3 million. The program is active primarily in the areas of education, agricultural and rural development, and health and social services.

While many African states will continue to need development assistance for some time to come, their eventual goal is to achieve an economy based on expanded trade and investment. The commercial dollar flow is substantially larger than the aid. Sub-Saharan African export receipts from the United States now reach almost \$6 billion per year. New U.S. investment, which plays an important role in promoting sub-Saharan African exports, now

totals between \$100 million and \$200 million per year.

Although many African states retain special trade relationships with their former metropolises, most of them are eager to diversify their sources of trade and investment. American technology and the widely recognized quality of our products make us an attractive alternative in African eyes.

U.S. trade with Africa is still relatively small, but growing rapidly. Total trade with sub-Saharan Africa was over nine times greater in 1975 than in 1960. Due to our petroleum imports, notably from Nigeria, the growth in imports from Africa has overshadowed that of U.S. exports. So while figures for exports from Africa do represent a sixfold increase over the past 15 years, our share of Africa's import market has remained at around 10 percent.

Because of its large oil exports, Nigeria accounted for 42.7 percent of U.S. trade with sub-Saharan Africa in 1975. Nigerian oil is also the reason why the United States continues to have an overall trade deficit with Africa in spite of a substantial increase in U.S. exports. Most of this increase was in manufactured products such as civilian aircraft and parts, automobiles and parts, and electrical machinery.

The principal market for American goods continues to be South Africa, although its share of U.S. exports to the region is declining. In 1975 the United States exported about 1.3 billion dollars' worth of goods to South Africa, which represented about 26 percent of our total exports to all of Africa.

Sub-Saharan Africa is also increasingly important to us as a source of imports. It supplied a significant percentage of the following imports to the United States in 1975: coffee, 28 percent; crude petroleum, 17 percent; gem diamonds, 34 percent; cocoa, 47 percent; manganese and ferromanganese, 32 percent; platinum-group metals, 48 percent; chrome and ferro-

chrome, 39 percent; cobalt, 57 percent; and bauxite, 22 percent.

U.S. direct investment in sub-Saharan Africa has risen dramatically to reach a book value of over \$3 billion in 1975, over five times what it was in 1960.

The principal recipients of U.S. investment are Angola, Gabon, Ghana, Guinea, Liberia, Kenya, Nigeria, Zaire, Zambia, and South Africa. Approximately two-thirds of American investment is in the extractive sector. The only African countries currently receiving a significant investment in manufacturing are Kenya, Ghana, Zaire, and South Africa.

### **Two Problems in Pattern of U.S. Investment**

Two elements in the pattern of American investment in Africa pose serious problems for our relations with Africa: the fact that about one-third of that investment is in South Africa and the heavy concentration of our investment in the extractive industries.

Let's take our investment in South Africa first. The majority of black Africans regard a \$1.6 billion American investment in South Africa at best with suspicion, at worst as evidence of U.S. support for apartheid. American groups have joined with black Africans in urging that we discourage further American investment in South Africa. Some have gone so far as to urge American companies to withdraw completely as a sign of their disapproval of South Africa's racial policy. If violence escalates, demands that we sever our economic ties with South Africa may well increase.

In fact, our policy has been neither to encourage nor discourage American private investment in South Africa. We have placed restrictions on the extension of Eximbank lending facilities to South Africa. And we have urged American firms—there are over 350 of them doing business in South Africa—to improve the working conditions, wages, training, and opportunities for advancement of their black African employees.

The second problem is the heavy concentration of American investment in the extractive industries. These industries are most vulnerable to expropriation and nationalization as developing countries become more insistent on absolute control over their own natural resources.

While we recognize the right of foreign governments to nationalize industries within their territory, we insist that any nationalization of American firms be accompanied by prompt, adequate, and effective compensation. There are legislative penalties attached to U.S. aid to any country that fails to meet this requirement.

Most African governments recognize the important contribution foreign investment can make to their development. They are aware that foreign private investment is the principal vehicle for the transfer of capital and technology and the urgently needed training for local manpower. For these reasons many African countries continue to welcome and provide incentives to encourage foreign investment.

### **Improving the International Economic System**

Believing that trade and investment are the engines of development for Third World countries, and in particular for African nations, the United States has taken the initiative to propose improvements in the international economic system in these areas. Many of these proposals have been brought to fruition through the joint efforts of the developed and the developing nations. Other aids to trade and investment have been the result of unilateral U.S. decisions or policies.

One important U.S. proposal at the seventh special session of the United Nations General Assembly led to the expansion of the IMF [International Monetary Fund] compensatory financing facility. This facility helps to insure basic economic security against economic cycles in industrial countries that reduce export earnings and undermine development plans. This year IMF has disbursed more than \$2 billion from this facility.



Another action concerning the IMF has been the establishment of a Trust Fund for poorer developing countries based on profits from the sale of IMF gold. As you know, three gold sales have been held. The Trust Fund lending is expected to begin in early 1977.

Another of Secretary Kissinger's proposals was to proceed with the establishment of the International Fund for Agricultural Development. Draft articles establishing the Fund have been negotiated, and pledges are still being accepted until the \$1 billion target has been reached. The purpose of this Fund is to provide concessional financing to the developing nations to finance increased food production.

At the May UNCTAD Conference [United Nations Conference on Trade and Development] in Nairobi, the United States proposed the establishment of an International Resources Bank. This new institution would promote more rational, systematic, and equitable development of resources in developing nations. It would help insure supplies of raw materials to fulfill the growing needs of the world economy.

In another aspect of the commodity situation, the final UNCTAD resolution called for consultations on 18 individual commodities. The United States is participating in these consultations without conceding our firm policy to consider commodity agreements only on a case-by-case basis. We feel that not all commodities are suitable for commodity agreements. The United States is a member of the International Coffee Agreement and the International Tin Agreement.

Both developed and developing countries are engaged in the multilateral trade negotiations underway in Geneva. Products of special interest to the developing countries are currently the subject of negotiations in the tropical products group. Tariff reductions would be a more binding concession and help integrate the developing countries into the world trading system.

In contrast to the multilateral nature of the negotiations in Geneva, the U.S. gen-

eralized system of preferences is a unilateral grant of duty-free entry to over 2,700 tariff items when produced in beneficiary developing countries. We believe this opportunity for LDC exports to enter the U.S. market duty free should help to encourage expansion and diversification of their exports.

While helping improve the U.S. trade balance with Africa, the Export-Import Bank also assists African development by making it possible for these countries to purchase U.S. technology equipment. The Export-Import Bank has an exposure of almost \$1.5 billion spread among 32 sub-Saharan African countries. The Export-Import Bank participates to some extent in virtually all large sales of U.S. products to African countries. Many sales of U.S. products to Africa would not be made if it were not for Eximbank financing, since financing is a key factor in sales to most countries of Africa. Products which account for most of the Eximbank loans to Africa are aircraft, locomotives, mining equipment, industrial equipment, telecommunications, and electric power generating equipment.

The purpose of the Overseas Private Investment Corporation is to facilitate U.S. private investment in friendly developing countries. OPIC provides insurance against loss resulting from currency inconvertibility, expropriation, and war, revolution, and insurrection. It has been particularly active in Africa, where it has investment guarantee agreements with 35 sub-Saharan countries. Among the projects which OPIC has financed or insured are an aluminum refinery in Ghana, a hotel complex in Ivory Coast, and a dairy plant in Nigeria. OPIC leads investment missions to Africa, and it regularly holds seminars to acquaint businessmen with investment opportunities in Africa.

Doing business in the developing world requires patience and a special effort—an effort which sometimes may hardly seem warranted by the size of the market. However, looking beyond the immediate return to possible future benefits of expanded

markets and access to raw materials, the effort should be seen as well worthwhile.

Statistics are soon forgotten, but there are a few important points I hope will stay with you:

—We don't do business in a vacuum. Political issues have a direct bearing on the climate for trade and investment.

—In the increasing world competition for resources and markets, the United States will become more dependent on Africa.

—Dependence, however, is a two-way street. Africa needs American capital and technological know-how to fuel its economic development.

—American prosperity is tied to economic development in the poorer countries. Countries with a per capita income of under \$100 offer little opportunity for trade and investment. However, they do provide fertile ground for instability, and they can change the character of international relations. Therefore, since our fortunes are inextricably linked, we must do what we can to build a community of interest and improve conditions in the poorer countries. Trade and investment are the principal means of achieving this end.

## **Sixth Progress Report on Cyprus Submitted to the Congress**

*Message From President Ford*<sup>1</sup>

*To the Congress of the United States:*

Pursuant to Public Law 94-104, I am submitting my sixth periodic report on the Cyprus negotiations and the actions which this Administration is taking to assist in the search of a lasting solution to the problems still facing the people of the Republic of Cyprus.

In my last report I reviewed recent steps

taken by the Administration to bring about further progress in the Cyprus talks, and I emphasized the need for the parties to set aside procedural problems and move on to discussions of key substantive issues.

Our efforts during the past sixty days have been directed to encouraging the resumption of such negotiations. We have been in close contact with our major Western allies regarding new ideas which might contribute to progress in the Cyprus talks and have continued to work closely with United Nations Secretary General Waldheim. Secretary of State Kissinger met with Mr. Waldheim in New York in late August to discuss the Cyprus question. Following that meeting Secretary General Waldheim asked the chief Cypriot negotiators from both sides to come to New York for individual consultations with him on how the negotiations might best be resumed. These consultations developed into a series of joint meetings at which both sides discussed the issues which were blocking further progress. After these meetings, the two Cypriot negotiators agreed to continue their consultations in Nicosia, under the chairmanship of the Secretary General's Special Representative for Cyprus. It is my hope these talks will lead to resumption of meaningful discussion on the main issues.

In his meetings with the Foreign Ministers of Greece and Turkey at the United Nations last week, Secretary Kissinger urged their strong support once again for a new round of talks. We will continue to work as closely as possible with the Governments of Greece and Turkey, with the UN Secretary General, with our Western allies, and with the parties themselves, to insure that every opportunity is seized in pursuing a just and lasting settlement on Cyprus.

To focus the world's attention on the need for rapid progress, Secretary Kissinger stated anew the position of my Administration in his speech before the UN General Assembly on September 30 when he emphasized that our overriding objectives remain the well-being of the Cypriot

<sup>1</sup> Transmitted on Oct. 4 (text from Weekly Compilation of Presidential Documents dated Oct. 11).



people and peace in the Eastern Mediterranean. Calling upon all concerned to undertake a new commitment to achieve these ends, he underlined once again the position I have repeatedly voiced:

A settlement must come from the Cypriot communities themselves. It is they who must decide how their island's economy and government shall be reconstructed. It is they who must decide the ultimate relationship of the two communities and the territorial extent of each area.

This Administration believes that in order to restore momentum in the negotiations a set of principles along the following lines might help the parties to resume talks on substantive issues:

—A settlement should preserve the independence, sovereignty and territorial integrity of Cyprus;

—The present dividing lines on Cyprus must be adjusted to reduce the area currently controlled by the Turkish side;

—The territorial arrangement should take into account the economic requirements and humanitarian concerns of the two Cypriot communities, including the plight of those who remain refugees;

—A constitutional arrangement should provide conditions under which the two Cypriot communities can live in freedom and have a large vote in their own affairs; and

—Security arrangements should be agreed that permit the withdrawal of foreign military forces other than those present under international agreement.

It is my strong hope that these ideas may be given careful consideration by all concerned.

In addition to these steps, the United States also continues to provide financial assistance to the people of Cyprus so that they may overcome the burdens imposed on them by the events of 1974. I have just signed into law a bill authorizing \$17.5 million in U.S. relief assistance for Cyprus in the coming fiscal year. Our assistance thus far, some \$50 million over the past two years, has been a major factor in providing

adequate homes for almost all of those unfortunate Cypriots uprooted in 1974, and, in addition, has made a substantial contribution toward the medical needs, emergency food aid and the general welfare of the many displaced from their homes. We will continue to offer our help wherever it is needed.

The United States also continues to be the largest financial contributor to the maintenance of the United Nations Peacekeeping Force on Cyprus, which has done such a highly effective job. We continue actively to support both the work of the UN Peacekeeping Force and the UN resolutions calling for a just and lasting solution to the Cyprus problem, respect for the sovereignty and territorial integrity of that island, and withdrawal of all foreign military forces not authorized by agreements. While I strongly endorse all of these precepts, the last is of special importance since the cause of peace can only be poorly served when men confront each other with arms. I was therefore gratified to hear of the withdrawal last month of a further portion of the Turkish armed forces from Cyprus.

In summary, during the past sixty days we have increased our efforts to bring the two sides together once more for discussions in any area which might contribute to a more secure and normal life for the people of Cyprus. We have reaffirmed our determination to continue direct bilateral assistance on a large scale. We have worked with other members of the international community to bring about the best possible set of conditions for resumption of the Cyprus talks at an early date.

My Administration will further intensify its efforts to bring both sides together again with the hope, based on their meetings in New York last month, that some further significant advances may occur.

The people of the United States remain keenly interested in promoting an equitable and lasting settlement on Cyprus. My Administration has been active at every opportunity in encouraging such a settlement.

We believe the people of both the Greek Cypriot and Turkish Cypriot communities share equally a desire for peaceful, productive and secure lives. We will continue to use every opportunity further to encourage the leaders of both sides toward a common solution which will achieve these goals.

GERALD R. FORD.

THE WHITE HOUSE, *October 4, 1976.*

## **United States Encouraged by Progress at Preparatory Discussions on IFAD**

Press release 510 dated October 12

The Preparatory Commission (Prepcom) of the International Fund for Agricultural Development (IFAD) met in Rome September 27-30 to discuss the interim steps required to establish IFAD. IFAD was an OPEC [Organization of Petroleum Exporting Countries] initiative at the November 1974 World Food Conference. It is a proposed \$1 billion multilateral mechanism which will provide OPEC and OECD [Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development] countries with a unique opportunity to cooperate in the financing of increased food production in the developing world on highly concessional terms. IFAD will emphasize assistance to the poor food-deficit countries.

The United States is encouraged by the businesslike atmosphere which characterized the Prepcom discussions among OPEC, OECD, and non-oil LDC [less developed countries] governments. We were especially heartened by the considerable optimism among Prepcom participants that sufficient pledges would be forthcoming so that IFAD could be established soon. The United States has pledged \$200 million, contingent on a total level of pledges of \$1 billion and equitable burden-sharing among the categories of contributors.

At the Prepcom meeting the Iranian delegation announced that Iran has agreed to contribute \$20 million in addition to the pledge it has already made to IFAD. Previous Iranian pledges totaling about \$105 million have been made through the OPEC Special Fund. As of September 30, total IFAD convertible pledges were about \$965 million, with \$535 million from the OECD countries, \$420 million from the OPEC countries, and \$10 million from the non-oil LDC's.

The United States welcomes this significant additional Iranian contribution as an important step toward attaining the \$1 billion target necessary to get IFAD established. This pledge further underlines the importance which the Government of Iran attaches to this initiative, which Iran has been involved in since its inception. It is another evidence of Iran's constructive role in international relations.

## **Report on World Weather Program Transmitted to the Congress**

*Message From President Ford*<sup>1</sup>

*To the Congress of the United States:*

Weather and climate are at once familiar and sources of deep concern. Through technology, we have minimized the harmful effects of weather and have adapted our civilization to a wide range of climatic conditions. Yet, we now know how fragile is the balance between our activities and the environment. Understanding that balance is the key to the successful management of energy, food, and water resources and the beneficial application of technol-

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<sup>1</sup> Transmitted on Sept. 28 (text from White House press release); the 73-page report, entitled "World Weather Program—Plan for Fiscal Year 1977," is for sale by the Superintendent of Documents, U.S. Government Printing Office, Washington, D.C. 20402.



ogy. Our national goals in improving weather predictions and warnings and coping with the vagaries of climate cannot be accomplished except in the context of a world-wide endeavor. All nations play roles; the United States can be truly proud of our contributions.

The World Weather Program is the U.S. commitment to an effort that will affect every one of us. I am pleased to report significant and continuing progress in furthering the goals of the World Weather Program. The following accomplishments are representative of the progress being made:

—There has been a smooth transition into the operational use of geostationary meteorological satellites. The Western Hemisphere, much of the Atlantic, and part of the Pacific are now observed continuously. A nationwide network of Satellite Field Service Stations has been implemented by NOAA [National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration] to capitalize on these new data. Hurricane and typhoon forecasting has been aided, for example, as has the observation, tracking, and warning of severe weather over the United States.

—The data processing system at the World Meteorological Center, Suitland, Maryland, has been expanded through the operational use of a third, fourth-generation computer. This system is essential to handle the improved forecast models and the increased volume of data being received from the World Weather Watch.

—Augmented environmental monitoring and climatic programs have been initiated at the South Pole, American Samoa, and Barrow, Alaska.

—Engineering tests have been completed on large meteorological and oceanographic buoys. The first prototype operational system was moored 240 miles off the Oregon coast. Others are scheduled for operation this summer.

—The initial data-processing phase for

the Global Atmospheric Research Program's (GARP) Atlantic Tropical Experiment has been completed and scientific analysis is well underway.

—A series of Data Systems Tests have been completed as a dress rehearsal for the First GARP Global Experiment which starts in 1978.

—The Global Experiment received major impetus when over 40 nations met in February 1976 and agreed to commit ships, buoys, balloon systems, satellites, and other critical facilities for the observational period planned for 1977–1979.

It is with pleasure that I transmit this annual report describing current planned Federal activities contributing to the World Weather Program. The report details how the United States is following the intent of Senate Concurrent Resolution 67 of the 90th Congress to participate in this international program.

GERALD R. FORD.

THE WHITE HOUSE, *September 28, 1976.*

## **President Signs Whale Conservation and Protection Study Act**

*Statement by President Ford*<sup>1</sup>

I am pleased to sign H.R. 15445, the Whale Conservation and Protection Study Act.<sup>2</sup>

This bill authorizes the Secretary of Commerce to conduct comprehensive studies of all whales found in waters subject to U.S. jurisdiction and to report to Congress the results of these studies by January 1, 1980. The bill also provides that the Secre-

<sup>1</sup> Issued on Oct. 18 (text from White House press release).

<sup>2</sup> Public Law 94-532, approved Oct. 17.

tary of State will initiate negotiations with Mexico and Canada to develop appropriate bilateral agreements for the protection and conservation of whales.

Although much is known of the habits of whales, the vastness of the oceans and the mobility of these mammals make it very difficult to monitor adequately their many species. This legislation will allow the collection of scientific information that will permit us to determine the most appropriate means of preventing the exploitation of whales and thus avoid their extinction.

The United States has placed great emphasis on multilateral efforts with other nations through the International Whaling Commission to achieve effective conservation of whales throughout the world. The negotiations with Mexico and Canada directed by this bill will reinforce the efforts of our three nations within the Commission.

## **President Signs Bill Amending Bretton Woods Agreements Act**

*Statement by President Ford*<sup>1</sup>

I have approved H.R. 13955, an act "To provide for amendment of the Bretton Woods Agreements Act, and for other purposes."<sup>2</sup> This legislation authorizes U.S. acceptance of amendments to the Articles of Agreement of the International Monetary Fund and U.S. consent to a proposed increase in its quota in the Fund.

The reforms of the international monetary system which the United States accepts through these amendments are the culmination of years of debate and negotiation following the breakdown of the Bretton Woods par value system in 1971. This new international monetary system recognizes that development of stable

underlying economic and financial conditions is an essential prerequisite to the achievement of international monetary stability. At the same time, the new system will provide the increased flexibility, resilience, and reliance on market mechanisms which today's monetary relationships require, replacing the exchange rate rigidity and gold emphasis of the Bretton Woods system.

In the post-World War II era, we have increasingly recognized the importance of a smoothly functioning international monetary system to American jobs, production, and growth and to the maintenance of a prosperous and stable world economy. The attainment of the international economic as well as political and national security objectives of the United States depends in large measure on our success in maintaining a strong and healthy world economy, and that in turn requires a sound, smoothly functioning, and equitable international monetary system.

For all these reasons, I am especially pleased to sign into law this act to provide for amendment of the Bretton Woods Agreements Act.

## **Congressional Documents Relating to Foreign Policy**

### **94th Congress, 1st and 2d Sessions**

The Vietnam-Cambodia Emergency, 1975. Hearings before the House Committee on International Relations and Its Special Subcommittee on Investigations. Part I—Vietnam Evacuation and Humanitarian Assistance; April 9–May 8, 1975; 240 pp. Part II—The Cambodian-Vietnam Debate; March 6–April 14, 1975; 291 pp. Part III—Vietnam Evacuation: Testimony of Ambassador Graham A. Martin; January 27, 1976; 89 pp. Part IV—Cambodia Evacuation: Testimony of Ambassador John Gunther Dean; May 5, 1976; 64 pp.

Shifting Balance of Power in Asia: Implications for Future U.S. Policy. Hearings before the Subcommittee on Future Foreign Policy Research and Development of the House Committee on International Relations. November 18, 1975–May 18, 1976. 236 pp.

<sup>1</sup> Issued on Oct. 21 (text from White House press release).

<sup>2</sup> Public Law 94-564; approved Oct. 19.



## TREATY INFORMATION

### Current Actions

#### MULTILATERAL

##### Aviation

Convention for the suppression of unlawful acts against the safety of civil aviation. Done at Montreal September 23, 1971. Entered into force January 26, 1973. TIAS 7570.

*Ratification deposited:* Barbados, August 6, 1976.

##### Coffee

International coffee agreement 1976, with annexes. Done at London December 3, 1975. Entered into force provisionally October 1, 1976.

*Ratifications deposited:* Ghana, Guinea, Honduras, Paraguay, October 11, 1976; Dominican Republic, Indonesia, October 14, 1976.

*Notification of provisional application deposited:* Gabon, October 11, 1976.

##### Conservation

Convention on international trade in endangered species of wild fauna and flora, with appendices. Done at Washington March 3, 1973. Entered into force July 1, 1975. TIAS 8249.

*Ratifications deposited:* Iran, August 3, 1976; Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, September 9, 1976.

##### Customs

Customs convention on containers, 1972, with annexes and protocol. Done at Geneva December 2, 1972. Entered into force December 6, 1975.<sup>1</sup>

*Ratification deposited:* Switzerland, October 12, 1976.

##### Finance

Articles of agreement of the International Bank for Reconstruction and Development. Done at Washington December 27, 1945. Entered into force December 27, 1945. TIAS 1502.

*Signature and acceptance:* Comoros, October 28, 1976.

##### Health

Amendments to articles 34 and 55 of the constitution of the World Health Organization of July 22, 1946, as amended (TIAS 1808, 4643, 8086). Adopted at Geneva May 22, 1973.<sup>2</sup>

*Acceptances deposited:* Kenya, September 17, 1976; Mauritania, September 21, 1976.

##### Maritime Matters

Amendments to the convention of March 6, 1948, as amended, on the Intergovernmental Maritime Con-

sultative Organization (TIAS 4044, 6285, 6490). Adopted at London October 17, 1974.<sup>2</sup>

*Acceptance deposited:* Ghana, October 18, 1976.

### Terrorism—Protection of Diplomats

Convention on the prevention and punishment of crimes against internationally protected persons, including diplomatic agents. Done at New York December 14, 1973.<sup>2</sup>

*Ratification deposited:* United States, October 26, 1976.

#### BILATERAL

##### Egypt

Agreement concerning claims of nationals of the United States, with agreed minute and related notes. Signed at Cairo May 1, 1976. Entered into force October 27, 1976.

##### Honduras

Arrangement for hydrographic and nautical cartography. Signed at Tegucigalpa August 30, 1976. Entered into force August 30, 1976.

##### Jamaica

Agreement for sales of agricultural commodities, relating to the agreement of April 16, 1975 (TIAS 8130). Signed at Kingston September 30, 1976. Entered into force September 30, 1976.

##### Japan

Agreement concerning enrollment of Japanese employees of the Okinawa office of the Voice of America in the Employment Insurance Scheme of Japan. Effected by exchange of notes at Tokyo September 30 and October 15, 1976. Entered into force October 15, 1976; effective April 1, 1976.

##### Mexico

Agreement regarding mutual assistance between the United States and the Mexican customs services. Signed at Mexico September 30, 1976. Enters into force 60 days after the date on which the parties notify one another by an exchange of diplomatic notes that they have accepted the terms of the agreement.

##### United Kingdom

Extradition treaty, with schedule, protocol of signature, and exchange of notes. Signed at London June 8, 1972.

*Instruments of ratification exchanged:* October 21, 1976.

*Enters into force:* January 21, 1977.

*Extended to:* Antigua; Belize; Bermuda; British Indian Ocean Territory; British Virgin Islands; Cayman Islands; Dominica; Falkland Islands

<sup>1</sup> Not in force for the United States.

<sup>2</sup> Not in force.

and Dependencies; Gibraltar; Gilbert Islands; Hong Kong; Montserrat; Pitcairn, Henderson, Ducie and Oeno Islands; St. Christopher, Nevis and Anguilla; St. Helena and Dependencies; St. Lucia; St. Vincent; Solomon Islands; Sovereign Base Areas of Akrotiri and Dhekelia in the Island of Cyprus; Turks and Caicos Islands; Tuvalu.

## Venezuela

Agreement amending the air transport agreement of August 14, 1953, as amended (TIAS 2813, 3117, 7549). Effected by exchange of notes at Caracas September 22, 1976. Entered into force September 22, 1976.

## PUBLICATIONS

## GPO Sales Publications

*Publications may be ordered by catalog or stock number from the Superintendent of Documents, U.S. Government Printing Office, Washington, D.C. 20402. A 25-percent discount is made on orders for 100 or more copies of any one publication mailed to the same address. Remittances, payable to the Superintendent of Documents, must accompany orders. Prices shown below, which include domestic postage are subject to change.*

**Background Notes:** Short, factual summaries which describe the people, history, government, economy, and foreign relations of each country. Each contains a map, a list of principal government officials and U.S. diplomatic and consular officers, and a reading list. (A complete set of all Background Notes currently in stock—at least 140—\$21.80; 1-year subscription service for approximately 77 updated or new Notes—\$23.10; plastic binder—\$1.50.) Single copies of those listed below are available at 35¢ each.

Niger . . . . .	Cat. No. S1.123:N56	
	Pub. 8293	6 pp.
Sierra Leone . . . . .	Cat. No. S1.123:SI1	
	Pub. 8069	4 pp.
Yugoslavia . . . . .	Cat. No. S1.123:Y9	
	Pub. 7773	8 pp.

**The Great Seal of the United States.** This illustrated pamphlet traces the history of the Great Seal of the United States from its commission by the Continental Congress to its present-day uses. Pub. 8868. 6 pp. 40¢. (Cat. No. S1.69:8868).

**Agricultural Commodities.** Agreements with Jordan amending the agreement of October 14, 1975. TIAS 8257. 9 pp. 35¢. (Cat. No. S9.10:8257).

**Agricultural Commodities.** Agreement with Guinea. TIAS 8258. 31 pp. 45¢. (Cat. No. S9.10:8258).

**Agricultural Commodities.** Agreements with Bangladesh amending the agreement of September 11, 1975. TIAS 8260. 12 pp. 35¢. (Cat. No. S9.10:8260).

**Agricultural Commodities.** Agreement with Pakistan amending the agreement of August 7, 1975. TIAS 8263. 9 pp. 35¢. (Cat. No. S9.10:8263).

**Agricultural Commodities.** Agreement with Portugal. TIAS 8264. 20 pp. 35¢. (Cat. No. S9.10:8264).

**Passenger Charter Air Services.** Agreement with Belgium extending the memorandum of understanding of October 17, 1972. TIAS 8265. 2 pp. 35¢. (Cat. No. S9.10:8265).

**Air Transport Services.** Agreement with Mexico extending the agreement of August 15, 1960, as amended and extended. TIAS 8266. 4 pp. 35¢. (Cat. No. S9.10:8266).

**Trade in Cotton, Wool and Man-Made Fiber Textiles and Textile Products.** Agreement with Haiti. TIAS 8268. 21 pp. 35¢. (Cat. No. S9.10:8268).

**Trade in Cotton Textiles.** Agreement with Thailand amending the agreement of March 16, 1972, as amended. TIAS 8269. 3 pp. 35¢. (Cat. No. S9.10:8269).

**Trade in Textiles—Consultations on Market Disruption.** Agreement with the Hungarian People's Republic. TIAS 8270. 3 pp. 35¢. (Cat. No. S9.10:8270).

**Trade in Textiles—Consultations on Market Disruption.** Agreement with the Socialist Federal Republic of Yugoslavia. TIAS 8271. 5 pp. 35¢. (Cat. No. S9.10:8271).

**Trade in Cotton, Wool and Man-Made Fiber Textiles.** Agreement with Mexico amending the agreement of May 12, 1975. TIAS 8272. 5 pp. 35¢. (Cat. No. S9.10:8272).

**Trade in Cotton, Wool and Man-Made Fiber Textiles.** Agreement with Hong Kong amending the agreement of July 25, 1974. TIAS 8274. 3 pp. 35¢. (Cat. No. S9.10:8274).

**International Energy Program.** Agreement with Other Governments. TIAS 8278. 134 pp. \$2. (Cat. No. S9.10:8278).

**Mutual Defense Assistance.** Agreement with Norway amending Annex C to the agreement of January 27, 1950, as amended. TIAS 8280. 3 pp. 35¢. (Cat. No. S9.10:8280).

**Tracking Station.** Agreement with Ecuador. TIAS 8282. 13 pp. 35¢. (Cat. No. S9.10:8282).



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**Checklist of Department of State  
Press Releases: October 25-31**

Press releases may be obtained from the Office of Press Relations, Department of State, Washington, D.C. 20520.

No.	Date	Subject
*530	10/26	Kissinger: dedication of Dean Acheson Auditorium and Loy Henderson International Conference Room.
*531	10/27	Mrs. Dean Acheson, Loy Henderson: dedication ceremony, Oct. 26.
†532	10/27	"Foreign Relations," 1949, volume I. National Security Affairs; Foreign Economic Policy, released.
†533	10/28	Kissinger: news conference, Hartford, Conn., Oct. 27.
*534	10/29	Charles A. James sworn in as Ambassador to Niger (biographic data).
*535	10/29	Entry into force of U.S.-Egypt claims agreement, Oct. 27.
*536	10/29	Ratifications of protocol to Interim Convention on Conservation of North Pacific Fur Seals, Oct. 12.
*537	10/29	Twelve foreign environmentalists to meet with U.S. counterparts.
*538	10/29	Northwest Atlantic Fisheries Advisory Committee, Boston, Nov. 22.

\* Not printed.

† Held for a later issue of the BULLETIN.

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# THE DEPARTMENT OF STATE BULLETIN

Volume LXXV • No. 1952 • November 22, 1976

## NUCLEAR POLICY

*Statement by President Ford 629*

SECRETARY KISSINGER'S NEWS CONFERENCE  
AT HARTFORD, CONNECTICUT, OCTOBER 27 640

THE OFFICIAL WEEKLY RECORD OF UNITED STATES FOREIGN POLICY

*For index see inside back cover*

# THE DEPARTMENT OF STATE BULLETIN

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*The Department of State BULLETIN, a weekly publication issued by the Office of Media Services, Bureau of Public Affairs, provides the public and interested agencies of the government with information on developments in the field of U.S. foreign relations and on the work of the Department and the Foreign Service.*

*The BULLETIN includes selected press releases on foreign policy, issued by the White House and the Department, and statements, addresses, and news conferences of the President and the Secretary of State and other officers of the Department, as well as special articles on various phases of international affairs and the functions of the Department. Information is included concerning treaties and international agreements to which the United States is or may become a party and on treaties of general international interest.*

*Publications of the Department of State, United Nations documents, and legislative material in the field of international relations are also listed.*



## Nuclear Policy

*Statement by President Ford*<sup>1</sup>

We have known since the age of nuclear energy began more than 30 years ago that this source of energy had the potential for tremendous benefits for mankind and the potential for unparalleled destruction.

On the one hand, there is no doubt that nuclear energy represents one of the best hopes for satisfying the rising world demand for energy with minimum environmental impact and with the potential for reducing dependence on uncertain and diminishing world supplies of oil.

On the other hand, nuclear fuel, as it produces power, also produces plutonium, which can be chemically separated from the spent fuel. The plutonium can be recycled and used to generate additional nuclear power, thereby partially offsetting the need for additional energy resources. Unfortunately—and this is the root of the problem—the same plutonium produced in nuclear power plants can, when chemically separated, also be used to make nuclear explosives.

The world community cannot afford to let potential nuclear weapons material or the technology to produce it proliferate uncontrolled over the globe. The world community must insure that production and utilization of such material by any nation is carried out under the most stringent security conditions and arrangements.

Developing the enormous benefits of nuclear energy while simultaneously develop-

ing the means to prevent proliferation is one of the major challenges facing all nations of the world today.

The standards we apply in judging most domestic and international activities are not sufficiently rigorous to deal with this extraordinarily complex problem. Our answers cannot be partially successful. They will either work, in which case we shall stop proliferation, or they will fail and nuclear proliferation will accelerate as nations initially having no intention of acquiring nuclear weapons conclude that they are forced to do so by the actions of others. Should this happen, we would face a world in which the security of all is critically imperiled. Maintaining international stability in such an environment would be incalculably difficult and dangerous. In times of regional or global crisis, risks of nuclear devastation would be immeasurably increased—if not through direct attack, then through a process of ever-expanding escalation.

The problem can be handled as long as we understand it clearly and act wisely in concert with other nations. But we are faced with a threat of tragedy if we fail to comprehend it or to take effective measures.

Thus, the seriousness and complexity of the problem place a special burden on those who propose ways to control proliferation. They must avoid the temptation for rhetorical gestures, empty threats, or righteous posturing. They must offer policies and programs which deal with the

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<sup>1</sup> Issued on Oct. 28 (text from White House press release).

world as it is, not as we might wish it to be. The goal is to prevent proliferation, not simply to deplore it.

The first task in dealing with the problem of proliferation is to understand the world nuclear situation.

More than 30 nations have or plan to build nuclear power plants to reap the benefits of nuclear energy. The 1973 energy crisis dramatically demonstrated to all nations not only the dangers of excessive reliance on oil imports but also the reality that the world's supply of fossil fuels is running out. As a result, nuclear energy is now properly seen by many nations as an indispensable way to satisfy rising energy demand without prematurely depleting finite fossil fuel resources. We must understand the motives which are leading these nations, developed and developing, to place even greater emphasis than we do on nuclear power development. For unless we comprehend their real needs, we cannot expect to find ways of working with them to insure satisfaction of both our and their legitimate concerns.

Moreover, several nations besides the United States have the technology needed to produce both the benefits and the destructive potential of nuclear energy. Nations with such capabilities are able to export their technology and facilities.

Thus, no single nation, not even the United States, can realistically hope—by itself—to control effectively the spread of reprocessing technology and the resulting availability of plutonium.

The United States once was the dominant world supplier of nuclear material, equipment, and technology. While we remain a leader in this field, other suppliers have come to share the international market—with the United States now supplying less than half of nuclear reactor exports.

In short, for nearly a decade the United States has not had a monopoly on nuclear technology. Although our role is large, we are not able to control worldwide nuclear development.

For these reasons, action to control pro-

liferation must be an international cooperative effort involving many nations, including both nuclear suppliers and customers. Common standards must be developed and accepted by all parties. If this is not done, unrestrained trade in sensitive nuclear technology and materials will develop—with no one in a position to stop it.

We in the United States must recognize that interests in nuclear energy vary widely among nations. We must recognize that some nations look to nuclear energy because they have no acceptable energy alternative. We must be sure that our efforts to control proliferation are not viewed by such nations as an act to prevent them from enjoying the benefits of nuclear energy. We must be sure that all nations recognize that the United States believes that nonproliferation objectives must take precedence over economic and energy benefits if a choice must be made.

#### **Previous Action**

During the past 30 years, the United States has been the unquestioned leader in worldwide efforts to assure that the benefits of nuclear energy are made available widely while its destructive uses are prevented. I have given special attention to these objectives during the past two years, and we have made important new progress, particularly in efforts to control the proliferation of nuclear weapons capability among the nations of the world.

In 1974, soon after I assumed office, I became concerned that some nuclear supplier countries, in order to achieve competitive advantage, were prepared to offer nuclear exports under conditions less rigorous than we believed prudent. In the fall of that year, at the U.N. General Assembly, the United States proposed that nonproliferation measures be strengthened materially. I also expressed my concern directly to my counterparts in key supplier and recipient nations. I directed the Secretary of State to emphasize multilateral action to limit this dangerous form of competition.



At U.S. initiative, the first meeting of major nuclear suppliers was convened in London in April 1975. A series of meetings and intensive bilateral consultations followed.

As a result of these meetings, we have significantly raised international standards through progressive new guidelines to govern nuclear exports. These involve both improved safeguards and controls to prevent diversion of nuclear materials and to guard against the misuse of nuclear technology and physical protection against theft and sabotage. The United States has adopted these guidelines as policy for nuclear exports.

In addition, we have acted to deal with the special dangers associated with plutonium.

—We have prohibited export of reprocessing and other nuclear technologies that could contribute to proliferation.

—We have firmly opposed reprocessing in Korea and Taiwan. We welcome the decisions of those nations to forgo such activities. We will continue to discourage national reprocessing in other locations of particular concern.

—We negotiated agreements for cooperation with Egypt and Israel which contain the strictest reprocessing provisions and other nuclear controls ever included in the 20-year history of our nuclear cooperation program.

—In addition, the United States recently completed negotiations to place its civil nuclear facilities under the safeguards of the International Atomic Energy Agency—and the IAEA has approved a proposed agreement for this purpose.

#### **New Initiatives**

Last summer, I directed that a thorough review be undertaken of all our nuclear policies and options to determine what further steps were needed. I have considered carefully the results of that review, held discussions with congressional leaders, and benefited from consultations with lead-

ers of other nations. I have decided that new steps are needed, building upon the progress of the past two years. Today I am announcing a number of actions and proposals aimed at:

—Strengthening the commitment of the nations of the world to the goal of non-proliferation and building an effective system of international controls to prevent proliferation;

—Changing and strengthening U.S. domestic nuclear policies and programs to support our nonproliferation goals; and

—Establishing, by these actions, a sound foundation for the continued and increased use of nuclear energy in the United States and in the world in a safe and economic manner.

The task we face calls for an international cooperative venture of unprecedented dimensions. The United States is prepared to work with all other nations.

#### **Principal Policy Decisions**

I have concluded that the reprocessing and recycling of plutonium should not proceed unless there is sound reason to conclude that the world community can effectively overcome the associated risks of proliferation. I believe that avoidance of proliferation must take precedence over economic interests. I have also concluded that the United States and other nations can and should increase their use of nuclear power for peaceful purposes even if reprocessing and recycling of plutonium are found to be unacceptable.

Vigorous action is required domestically and internationally to make these judgments effective.

—I have decided that the United States should greatly accelerate its diplomatic initiatives, in conjunction with nuclear supplier and consumer nations, to control the spread of plutonium and technologies for separating plutonium.

Effective nonproliferation measures will

require the participation and support of nuclear suppliers and consumers. There must be coordination in restraints so that an effective nonproliferation system is achieved, and there must be cooperation in assuring reliable fuel supplies so that peaceful energy needs are met.

—I have decided that the United States should no longer regard reprocessing of used nuclear fuel to produce plutonium as a necessary and inevitable step in the nuclear fuel cycle and that we should pursue reprocessing and recycling in the future only if they are found to be consistent with our international objectives.

We must insure that our domestic policies and programs are compatible with our international position on reprocessing and that we work closely with other nations in evaluating nuclear fuel reprocessing.

—The steps I am announcing today will assure that the necessary increase in our use of nuclear energy will be carried on with safety and without aggravating the danger of proliferation.

Even with strong efforts to conserve, we will have increasing demands for energy for a growing American economy. To satisfy these needs, we must rely on increased use of both nuclear energy and coal until more acceptable alternatives are developed. We will continue pushing ahead with work on all promising alternatives such as solar energy, but now we must count on the technology that works. We cannot expect a major contribution to our energy supply from alternative technologies until late in this century.

To implement my overall policy decisions, I have decided on a number of policies that are necessary and appropriate to meet our nonproliferation and energy objectives.

—First, our domestic policies must be changed to conform to my decision on deferral of the commercialization of chemical reprocessing of nuclear fuel which results in the separation of plutonium.

—Second, I call upon all nations to join us in exercising maximum restraint in the transfer of reprocessing and enrichment technology and facilities by avoiding such sensitive exports or commitments for a period of at least three years.

—Third, new cooperative steps are needed to help assure that all nations have an adequate and reliable supply of energy for their needs. I believe, most importantly, that nuclear supplier nations have a special obligation to assure that customer nations have an adequate supply of fuel for their nuclear power plants, if those customer nations forgo the acquisition of reprocessing and uranium enrichment capabilities and accept effective proliferation controls.

—Fourth, the United States must maintain its role as a major and reliable world supplier of nuclear reactors and fuel for peaceful purposes. Our strong position as a supplier has provided the principal basis for our influence and leadership in worldwide nonproliferation efforts. A strong position will be equally important in the future. While reaffirming this nation's intent to be a reliable supplier, the United States seeks no competitive advantage by virtue of the worldwide system of effective nonproliferation controls that I am calling for today.

—Fifth, new efforts must be made to urge all nations to join in a full-scale international cooperative effort—which I shall outline in detail—to develop a system of effective controls to prevent proliferation.

—Sixth, the United States must take new steps with respect to its own exports to control proliferation, while seeking to improve multilateral guidelines.

—Seventh, the United States must undertake a program to evaluate reprocessing in support of the international policies I have adopted.

—Finally, I have concluded that new steps are needed to assure that we have in place when needed, both in the United States and around the world, the facilities for the long-term storage or disposal of nuclear wastes.



## Actions To Implement Our Nuclear Policies

In order to implement the nuclear policies that I have outlined, major efforts will be required within the United States and by the many nations around the world with an interest in nuclear energy. To move forward with these efforts, I am today taking a number of actions and making a number of proposals to other nations.

### I. *Change in U.S. Policy on Nuclear Fuel Reprocessing*

With respect to nuclear fuel reprocessing, I am directing agencies of the executive branch to implement my decision to delay commercialization of reprocessing activities in the United States until uncertainties are resolved. Specifically, I am:

—Directing the Administrator of the Energy Research and Development Administration (ERDA) to:

- Change ERDA policies and programs which heretofore have been based on the assumption that reprocessing would proceed;
- Encourage prompt action to expand spent fuel storage facilities, thus assuring utilities that they need not be concerned about shutdown of nuclear reactors because of delays; and
- Identify the research and development efforts needed to investigate the feasibility of recovering the energy value from used nuclear fuel without separating plutonium.

### II. *Restraint in the Transfer of Sensitive Nuclear Technology and Facilities*

Despite the gains in controlling proliferation that have been made, the dangers posed by reprocessing and the prospect of uncontrolled availability of plutonium require further, decisive international action. Effective control of the parallel risk of spreading uranium enrichment technology is also necessary. To meet these dangers:

—I call upon all nations to join with us in exercising maximum restraint in the

transfer of reprocessing and enrichment technology and facilities by avoiding such sensitive exports or commitments for a period of at least three years.

This will allow suppliers and consumers to work together to establish reliable means for meeting nuclear needs with minimum risk, as we assess carefully the wisdom of plutonium use. As we proceed in these efforts, we must not be influenced by pressures to approve the export of these sensitive facilities.

### III. *Assuring an Adequate Energy Supply for Customer Nations*

—I urge nuclear suppliers to provide nuclear consumers with fuel services instead of sensitive technology or facilities.

Nations accepting effective nonproliferation restraints have a right to expect reliable and economic supply of nuclear reactors and associated nonsensitive fuel.

All such nations would share in the benefits of an assured supply of nuclear fuel, even though the number and location of sensitive facilities to generate this fuel is limited to meet nonproliferation goals. The availability of fuel cycle services in several different nations can provide ample assurance to consumers of a continuing and stable source of supply.

It is also desirable to continue studying the idea of a few suitably sited multinational fuel cycle centers to serve regional needs, when effectively safeguarded and economically warranted. Through these and related means, we can minimize incentives for the spread of dangerous fuel cycle capabilities.

The United States stands ready to take action, in cooperation with other concerned nations, to assure reliable supplies of nuclear fuel at equitable prices to any country accepting responsible restraints on its nuclear power program with regard to reprocessing, plutonium disposition, and enrichment technology.

—I am directing the Secretary of State

to initiate consultations to explore with other nations arrangements for coordinating fuel services and for developing other means of insuring that suppliers will be able to offer, and consumers will be able to receive, an uninterrupted and economical supply of low-enriched uranium fuel and fuel services.

These discussions will address ways to insure against economic disadvantage to cooperating nations and to remove any sources of competition which could undermine our common nonproliferation efforts.

To contribute to this initiative, the United States will offer binding letters of intent for the supply of nuclear fuel to current and prospective customers willing to accept such responsible restraints.

—In addition, I am directing the Secretary of State to enter into negotiations or arrangements for mutual agreement on disposition of spent fuel with consumer nations that adopt responsible restraints.

Where appropriate, the United States will provide consumer nations with either fresh, low-enriched uranium fuel or make other equitable arrangements in return for mutual agreement on the disposition of spent fuel where such disposition demonstrably fosters our common and cooperative nonproliferation objectives. The United States seeks no commercial advantage in pursuing options for fuel disposition and assured fuel supplies.

—Finally, the United States will continue to expand cooperative efforts with other countries in developing their indigenous nonnuclear energy resources.

The United States has proposed and continues to advocate the establishment of an International Energy Institute, specifically designed to help developing countries match the most economic and readily available sources of energy to their power needs. Through this Institute and other appropriate means, we will offer techno-

logical assistance in the development of indigenous energy resources.

#### *IV. Strengthening the U.S. Role as a Reliable Supplier*

If the United States is to continue its leadership role in worldwide nonproliferation efforts, it must be a reliable supplier of nuclear reactors and fuel for peaceful purposes. There are two principal actions we can take to contribute to this objective.

—I will submit to the new Congress proposed legislation that will permit the expansion of capacity in the United States to produce enriched uranium, including the authority needed for expansion of the government-owned plant at Portsmouth, Ohio. I will also work with Congress to establish a framework for a private, competitive industry to finance, build, own, and operate enrichment plants.

U.S. capacity has been fully committed since mid-1974, with the result that no new orders could be signed. The Congress did not act on my full proposal and provided only limited and temporary authority for proceeding with the Portsmouth plant. We must have additional authority to proceed with the expansion of capacity without further delay.

—I will work closely with the Congress to insure that legislation for improving our export controls results in a system that provides maximum assurance that the United States will be a reliable supplier to other nations for the full period of agreements.

One of the principal concerns with export legislation proposed in the last Congress was the fear that foreign customers could be subjected to arbitrary new controls imposed well after a long-term agreement and specific contracts for nuclear power plants and fuel had been signed. In the case of nuclear plants and fuel, reliable long-term agreements are essential, and we



must adopt export controls that provide reliability while meeting nonproliferation objectives.

#### *V. International Controls Against Proliferation*

To reinforce the foregoing policies, we must develop means to establish international restraints over the accumulation of plutonium itself, whether in separated form or in unprocessed spent fuel. The accumulation of plutonium under national control, especially in a separated form, is a primary proliferation risk.

—I am directing the Secretary of State to pursue vigorously discussions aimed at the establishment of a new international regime to provide for storage of civil plutonium and spent reactor fuel.

The United States made this proposal to the International Atomic Energy Agency and other interested nations last spring.

Creation of such a regime will greatly strengthen world confidence that the growing accumulation of excess plutonium and spent fuel can be stored safely, pending re-entry into the nuclear fuel cycle or other safe disposition. I urge the IAEA, which is empowered to establish plutonium depositories, to give prompt implementation to this concept.

Once a broadly representative IAEA storage regime is in operation, we are prepared to place our own excess civil plutonium and spent fuel under its control. Moreover, we are prepared to consider providing a site for international storage under IAEA auspices.

The inspection system of the IAEA remains a key element in our entire nonproliferation strategy. The world community must make sure that the Agency has the technical and human resources needed to keep pace with its expanding responsibilities. At my direction, we have recently committed substantial additional resources to help upgrade the IAEA's technical safeguards capabilities, and I believe we must

strengthen further the safeguards functions of the IAEA.

—I am directing the Secretary of State and Administrator of ERDA to undertake a major international effort to insure that adequate resources for this purpose are made available and that we mobilize our best scientific talent to support that Agency. Our principal national laboratories with expertise in this area have been directed to provide assistance, on a continuing basis, to the IAEA Secretariat.

The terrible increase in violence and terrorism throughout the world has sharpened our awareness of the need to assure rigorous protection for sensitive nuclear materials and equipment. Fortunately, the need to cope with this problem is now broadly recognized. Many nations have responded to the initiatives which I have taken in this area by materially strengthening their physical security and by cooperating in the development of international guidelines by the IAEA. As a result of consultations among the major suppliers, provision for adequate physical security is becoming a normal condition of supply.

We have an effective physical security system in the United States. But steps are needed to upgrade physical security systems and to assure timely international collaboration in the recovery of lost or stolen materials.

—I have directed the Secretary of State to address vigorously the problem of physical security at both bilateral and multilateral levels, including exploration of a possible international convention.

The United States is committed to the development of the system of international controls that I have here outlined. Even when complete, however, no system of controls is likely to be effective if a potential violator judges that his acquisition of a nuclear explosive will be received with indifference by the international community.

Any material violation of a nuclear safeguards agreement—especially the diversion of nuclear material for use in making explosives—must be universally judged to be an extremely serious affront to the world community, calling for the immediate imposition of drastic sanctions.

—I serve notice today that the United States will, at a minimum, respond to violation by any nation of any safeguards agreement to which we are a party with an immediate cutoff of our supply of nuclear fuel and cooperation to that nation.

We would consider further steps, not necessarily confined to the area of nuclear cooperation, against the violator nation. Nor will our actions be limited to violations of agreements in which we are directly involved. In the event of material violation of any safeguards agreement, particularly agreements with the IAEA, we will initiate immediate consultations with all interested nations to determine appropriate action.

Universal recognition of the total unacceptability of the abrogation or violation of any nonproliferation agreement is one of the most important steps which can be taken to prevent further proliferation. We invite all concerned governments to affirm publicly that they will regard nuclear wrongdoing as an intolerable violation of acceptable norms of international behavior which would set in motion strong and immediate countermeasures.

## VI. *U.S. Nuclear Export Policies*

During the past two years, the United States has strengthened its own national nuclear export policies. Our interests, however, are not limited to controls alone. The United States has a special responsibility to share the benefits of peaceful nuclear energy with other countries. We have sought to serve other nations as a reliable supplier of nuclear fuel and equipment.

Given the choice between economic benefits and progress toward our nonproliferation goals, we have given, and will continue to give, priority to nonproliferation. But

there should be no incompatibility between nonproliferation and assisting other nations in enjoying the benefits of peaceful nuclear power, if all supplier countries pursue common nuclear export policies.

There is need, however, for even more rigorous controls than those now commonly employed and for policies that favor nations accepting responsible nonproliferation limitations.

—I have decided that we will henceforth apply new criteria in judging whether to enter into new or expanded nuclear cooperation:

- Adherence to the Nonproliferation Treaty will be a strong positive factor favoring cooperation with a non-nuclear-weapon state.

- Non-nuclear-weapon states that have not yet adhered to the Nonproliferation Treaty will receive positive recognition if they are prepared to submit to full fuel cycle safeguards, pending adherence.

- We will favor recipient nations that are prepared to forgo, or postpone for a substantial period, the establishment of national reprocessing or enrichment activities or, in certain cases, prepared to shape and schedule their reprocessing and enriching facilities to foster nonproliferation needs.

- Positive recognition will also be given to nations prepared to participate in an international storage regime, under which spent fuel and any separated plutonium would be placed pending use.

Exceptional cases may occur in which nonproliferation will be served best by cooperating with nations not yet meeting these tests. However, I pledge that the Congress will not be asked to approve any new or amended agreement not meeting these new criteria unless I personally determine that the agreement is fully supportive of our nonproliferation goals. In case of such a determination, my reasons will be fully presented to the Congress.

—With respect to countries that are current recipients of U.S. nuclear supply, I am



directing the Secretary of State to enter into negotiations with the objective of conforming these agreements to established international guidelines and to seek through diplomatic initiatives and fuel supply incentives to obtain their acceptance of our new criteria.

We must recognize the need for effective multilateral approaches to nonproliferation and prevent nuclear export controls from becoming an element of commercial competition.

—I am directing the Secretary of State to intensify discussions with other nuclear suppliers aimed at expanding common guidelines for peaceful cooperative agreements so that they conform with these criteria.

In this regard, the United States would discuss ways of developing incentives that can lead to acceptance of these criteria, such as assuring reliable fuel supplies for nations accepting new restraints.

The reliability of American assurances to other nations is an asset that few, if any, nations of the world can match. It must not be eroded. Indeed, nothing could more prejudice our efforts to strengthen our existing nonproliferation understandings than arbitrary suspensions or unwarranted delays in meeting supply commitments to countries which are dealing with us in good faith regarding effective safeguards and restraints.

Despite my personal efforts, the 94th Congress adjourned without passing nuclear export legislation which would have strengthened our effectiveness in dealing with other nations on nuclear matters.

—In the absence of such legislation, I am directing the Secretary of State to work closely with the Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) to insure proper emphasis on nonproliferation concerns in the nuclear export licensing process.

I will continue to work to develop bipartisan support in Congress for improvements in our nuclear export laws.

## VII. *Reprocessing Evaluation Program*

The world community requires an aggressive program to build the international controls and cooperative regimes I have just outlined. I am prepared to mount such a program in the United States.

—I am directing the Administrator of ERDA to:

- Begin immediately to define a reprocessing and recycle evaluation program consistent with meeting our international objectives outlined earlier in this statement. This program should complement the Nuclear Regulatory Commission's ongoing considerations of safety safeguards and environmental requirements for reprocessing and recycling activities, particularly its Generic Environmental Statement on Mixed Oxide Fuels.

- Investigate the feasibility of recovering the energy value from used nuclear fuel without separating out plutonium.

—I am directing the Secretary of State to invite other nations to participate in designing and carrying out ERDA's reprocessing and recycle evaluation program, consistent with our international energy cooperation and nonproliferation objectives. I will direct that activities carried out in the United States in connection with this program be subjected to full IAEA safeguards and inspections.

## VIII. *Nuclear Waste Management*

The area of our domestic nuclear program dealing with long-term management of nuclear wastes from our commercial nuclear power plants has not in the past received sufficient attention. In my 1977 budget, I proposed a fourfold increase in funding for this program, which involves the activities of several Federal agencies. We recently completed a review to determine what additional actions are needed to assure availability in the mid-1980's of a Federally owned and managed repository for long-term nuclear wastes, well be-

fore significant quantities of wastes begin to accumulate.

I have been assured that the technology for long-term management or disposal of nuclear wastes is available but demonstrations are needed.

—I have directed the Administrator of ERDA to take the necessary action to speed up this program so as to demonstrate all components of waste management technology by 1978 and to demonstrate a complete repository for such wastes by 1985.

—I have further directed that the first demonstration depository for high-level wastes which will be owned by the government be submitted for licensing by the independent NRC to assure its safety and acceptability to the public.

In view of the decisions announced today, I have also directed the Administrator of ERDA to assure that the waste repository will be able to handle spent fuel elements as well as the separated and solidified waste that would result if we proceed with nuclear fuel reprocessing.

The United States continues to provide world leadership in nuclear waste management. I am inviting other nations to participate in and learn from our programs.

—I am directing the Secretary of State to discuss with other nations and the IAEA the possibility of establishing centrally located, multinationally controlled nuclear waste repositories so that the number of sites that are needed can be limited.

#### **Increased Use of Nuclear Energy in the U.S.**

Even with strong conservation efforts, energy demands in the United States will continue to increase in response to the needs of a growing economy. The only alternative over the next 15–20 years to increased use of both nuclear energy and coal is greater reliance on imported oil, which will jeopardize our nation's strength and welfare.

We now have in the United States 62 licensed nuclear plants, providing about 9 percent of our electrical energy. By 1985

we will have from 145 to 160 plants, supplying 20 percent or more of the nation's electricity.

In many cases, electricity from nuclear plants is markedly cheaper than that produced from either oil or coal-fired plants. Nuclear energy is environmentally preferable in a number of respects to other principal ways of generating electricity.

Commercial nuclear power has an excellent safety record, with nearly 200 plant-years of experience (compiled over 18 chronological years) without a single death from a nuclear accident. I have acted to assure that this record is maintained in the years ahead. For example, I have increased funds for the independent Nuclear Regulatory Commission and for the Energy Research and Development Administration for reactor safety research and development.

The decisions and actions I am announcing today will help overcome the uncertainties that have served to delay the expanded use of nuclear energy in the United States. While the decision to delay reprocessing is significant, it will not prevent us from increasing our use of nuclear energy. We are on the right course with our nuclear power program in America. The changes I am announcing today will insure that we continue.

My decisions today do not affect the U.S. program of research and development on the breeder reactor. That program assumes that no decision on the commercial operations of breeder reactors, which require plutonium fuel, will be made before 1986.

#### **Conclusion**

I do not underestimate the challenge represented in the creation of a worldwide program that will permit capturing the benefits of nuclear energy while maintaining needed protection against nuclear proliferation. The challenge is one that can be managed only partially and temporarily by technical measures.

It can be managed fully if the task is faced realistically by nations prepared to



forgo perceived short-term advantages in favor of fundamental long-term gains. We call upon all nations to recognize that their individual and collective interests are best served by internationally assured and safeguarded nuclear fuel supply, services, and storage. We ask them to turn aside from pursuing nuclear capabilities which are of doubtful economic value and have ominous implications for nuclear proliferation and instability in the world.

The growing international consensus against the proliferation of nuclear weapons is a source of encouragement. But it is certainly not a basis for complacency.

Success in meeting the challenge now before us depends on an extraordinary coordination of the policies of all nations toward the common good. The United States is prepared to lead, but we cannot succeed alone. If nations can work together constructively and cooperatively to manage our common nuclear problems, we will enhance our collective security. And we will be better able to concentrate our energies and our resources on the great tasks of construction rather than consume them in increasingly dangerous rivalry.

## **Immigration and Nationality Act Amendments Signed Into Law**

*Statement by President Ford*<sup>1</sup>

I have signed H.R. 14535, the Immigration and Nationality Act Amendments of 1976.<sup>2</sup> This legislation brings our immigration procedures for the Western Hemi-

<sup>1</sup> Issued on Oct. 21 (text from White House press release).

<sup>2</sup> Public Law 94-571; approved Oct. 20.

sphere into line with those for the Eastern Hemisphere. Among other things the enrolled bill would:

—Apply the preference system currently applicable to Eastern Hemisphere immigrants to natives of countries of the Western Hemisphere (with minor modifications);

—Apply the 20,000-per-country limit to countries of the Western Hemisphere;

—Make Western Hemisphere immigrants eligible for adjustment of status to that of lawful permanent residents on an equal basis with Eastern Hemisphere immigrants;

—Apply the labor certification requirements equally to immigrants native to both hemispheres; and

—Provide that Cuban refugees covered under the Cuban Refugee Act of 1966 will not be charged to the Western Hemisphere quota (of 120,000 per year).

This legislation will also facilitate the reunification of Mexican-American families by giving preference to Mexican nationals who are close relatives of U.S. citizens or lawful permanent residents, or who have needed job skills. I am concerned, however, about one aspect of the legislation which has the effect of reducing the legal immigration into this country from Mexico. Currently about 40,000 natives of Mexico legally immigrate to the United States each year. This legislation would cut that number in half.

The United States has a very special and historic relationship with our neighbor to the south. In view of this special status we have with the Mexican Government and the Mexican people, I will submit legislation to the Congress in January to increase the immigration quotas for Mexicans desiring to come to the United States.

## Secretary Kissinger's News Conference at Hartford, Connecticut, October 27

*Following is the transcript of a news conference held by Secretary Kissinger on October 27 at Hartford, Conn., where he addressed the Executive Forum of the Connecticut World Affairs Center.*

Press release 533 dated October 28

*Q. Mr. Secretary, the other day an authoritative Iranian source, namely, the Shah, was interviewed by CBS, and he said that he has SAVAK secret service agents, or secret police agents, on duty in the United States and they are there, he said, "checking up on anybody who becomes affiliated with circles, organizations held hostage by a country, which is the role of any intelligence organization," and he went on to say that "they are there with the knowledge and consent of the U.S. Government." First, is that true? And second, if it is true, is that in conformity with American law?*

*Secretary Kissinger:* It is true, undoubtedly, that there are members of the Iranian intelligence services attached to the Iranian Embassy, just as there are members of the intelligence services of other countries attached to the Embassies of their country. It is not the practice in diplomacy to challenge the credentials that a country gives to its diplomatic personnel.

It is not correct that the United States is aware of the fact that Iranian intelligence personnel are checking on individuals living in the United States or keeping them under surveillance. We are making inquiries about this matter, and if it is correct we are going to ask that it be stopped.

*Q. Mr. Secretary, the Geneva talks open*

*tomorrow on the future of Rhodesia. Can you tell us if you had the explicit approval of the frontline African states—and, indeed, of the Rhodesian nationalists—for the six-point package that Ian Smith says cannot be broken apart, has to be swallowed whole or not at all?*

*Secretary Kissinger:* I have pointed out before that the negotiation about Rhodesia is an extremely complicated one. It involves four nationalist participants in Geneva. It involves Ian Smith. It involves the British. In addition, the so-called frontline states have observers there. So we're dealing with an extremely complicated situation.

The five points that Ian Smith presented grew out of discussions that he and I had in Pretoria; and they, in turn, grew out of five missions—three American and two British—that had gone to Africa to determine what a possible basis for a settlement would be.

Obviously the conference is assembled for the purpose of negotiation. The five points included items which we believe could form the basis for discussion and which, in their major part, might be acceptable. However, one cannot prejudge the outcome of a negotiation, and I think we have to wait now until the negotiations actually get going before we can determine what the outcome will be.

*Q. If I may follow up, are you saying, then, that the African states and the Rhodesian nationalists understood at the time that the five points would be negotiable in Geneva, and did Smith understand that?*



*Secretary Kissinger:* The genesis of the five points is a rather complicated one, with a central core of it and some points that were added in the course of negotiations.

In the course of these negotiations, it was not possible to assemble all of the frontline Presidents, nor did we talk to any of the nationalist leaders, because we were following an agreement we had made with President Nyerere of Tanzania that we would not deal directly with nationalist leaders and let the frontline Presidents do it. Now, therefore, each of the participants must be given an opportunity to express himself before any final determination can be made.

*Q. Mr. Secretary, if the talks stalemate in Geneva, will you intervene directly? If not, will that give credence to critics who say that your African shuttle diplomacy was political, for Presidential politics per se?*

*Secretary Kissinger:* Let's remember, now, when this African policy started. We took the first steps in March. I took my first trip to Africa in April at a time when it was the common wisdom of everybody that it would be a liability to President Ford in his primary campaign. At that time we had no idea of when it would culminate. On the other hand, it would have been very strange for the United States not to take a step toward peace in southern Africa just because a campaign was going on in this country—all the more so since this is not a controversial item in American politics as between the two parties.

So the United States is pursuing its policy in Africa for the peace of the world, to prevent a race war in Africa, and to make its contribution toward a peaceful evolution based on justice. If the negotiations in Geneva stalemate, which I do not expect, the United States will do its best to get them started again. We have an observer in Geneva now. We will—next week, when the talks start in earnest we will reinforce our delegation in Geneva, which is there not technically as an observer but as a con-

tact point. We will do what we are asked by the parties and what can be helpful to bring the negotiations to a successful conclusion.

*Q. I include the portion about the Presidential politics because of the fact that it was thought that this road was taken because of the election that's coming up for the black Americans who are going to vote.*

*Secretary Kissinger:* The road was taken—first of all it was started about eight months ago. The route was taken because it seemed to us—and it was a judgment confirmed by everybody—that a race war was imminent in southern Africa, that it would lead to tremendous loss of life, that it would have global consequences. And we wanted to bring about an evolution toward justice, majority rule, and minority rights in southern Africa by an evolutionary process including negotiations. It was the judgment of all the people, including foreign leaders, that if it were not done now the situation might get out of control. There were no political intentions, and it hasn't been used politically.

#### **Relations Between the U.S.S.R. and China**

*Q. Mr. Secretary, the Soviet newspaper Pravda has accused you of trying to obstruct normalization of relations between the Soviet Union and China. And I cite your recent remarks that the United States would view with great concern the outside pressures or intervention in China. Pravda called the remarks "a clumsy invention," and said you were doing this for reasons of Presidential politics.*

*Two questions: What's your general reaction to that? And secondly, have the Soviets totally misread your warning?*

*Secretary Kissinger:* I suppose it's going to be impossible for me to do anything until November 2 which isn't going to be charged to Presidential politics. I don't know whether the Soviet Union, with its record of elections, is the best to judge what affects American politics.

The statement was made in response to a question; it was not volunteered. I pointed out, in the unsettled conditions which were then existing and which were in part generated by Soviet newspaper articles, that an attack by the Soviet Union on China would be a grave matter.

The Soviet Union knows better than we whether it has any intention of attacking China. We did not say that they were intending to attack China. We simply stated our position in case this happened. We are not attempting to obstruct normalization of relations between these two countries. That is beyond our capacity to do, and it isn't our policy. We pointed out the consequences of actions which we did not necessarily predict in order for there to be no misunderstanding during conditions that were, after all, somewhat unsettled.

*Q. Mr. Secretary, if President Ford is elected on Tuesday, will you continue as Secretary of State? If Jimmy Carter is elected, what will you do?*

*Secretary Kissinger:* I have made no plans for what I will do in the improbable event that your second question raised. [Laughter.] In case President Ford is elected, I have indicated for many months that I would then discuss my plans with him. And of course I would want to hear his reactions and his views before I make any final decision.

*Q. Mr. Secretary, there was a report last week that you might continue for a year. Is there any truth to that?*

*Secretary Kissinger:* I have not had any discussion with the President. You know his public statements about his views on the matter, but I have had no discussion with him about it.

*Q. Let me ask you a question about Connecticut. Several months ago a Colt firearms employee was sentenced to a prison term for his part in illegally selling guns to South Africa. There's a grand jury investigation continuing in Connecticut involving both Colt and Win-*

*chester. Part of the evidence developed is that both companies had open dealings with gun dealers in South Africa in violation of the U.S. embargo.*

*Does the State Department tacitly approve these sales? And they went on for five years before there was any action. Doesn't the State Department—*

*Secretary Kissinger:* You're asking me whether—

*Q. Wasn't the State Department aware of the sales? Did it tacitly approve them?*

*Secretary Kissinger:* Well, I have to tell you candidly I don't know this case. It is inconceivable to me that the State Department tacitly approved the sale of arms when it is American policy to embargo the sale of arms to South Africa. So without knowing the facts of the case, which I'll have to look into—

*Q. Even so, the case went so far that at least one gun dealer to South Africa visited the companies in Connecticut to arrange the sale.*

*Secretary Kissinger:* Well, South Africans are free to travel in the United States. The question is, did the Department of State cooperate with them or did anyone close his eyes to their purchases? And it is the policy of the Department of State to enforce the arms embargo against South Africa.

#### **Nonrecognition of Republic of Transkei**

*Q. I had one other question about South Africa. The United Nations, in the General Assembly, voted yesterday 134 to 0 to, in effect, ignore the new Republic of Transkei. The United States abstained. Do you approve of that abstention?*

*Secretary Kissinger:* Well, it is safe to assume that I instructed our delegation to abstain. [Laughter.]

Now, with respect to the Transkei, the United States will not recognize the Transkei, will not establish diplomatic relations



with it. Our objection did not concern the essential points of the resolution. And in fact, if the resolution had been checked with us ahead of time, I am certain we could have modified it to a point so that we would not have had to abstain.

The difficulty with the new resolution was that, on the one hand, they refused to recognize—called on members not to recognize the Transkei, and that part we agreed with; on the other, they called on all members not to have any dealings with anybody in the Transkei, which had the consequence almost of recognizing it. And the United States, precisely because it will continue to deal with Transkei as if it were part of South Africa, cannot accept the proposition that we cannot deal with people that live in the Transkei just because South Africa has declared it an independent state.

So our objection was a technical one, and if the United Nations had separated that one part of it from the rest of it, we would have voted for it.

*Q. Mr. Secretary, the Canadian press has expressed its concern about Arab boycott policy to the effect that American-owned companies in Canada [inaudible]. Now, are there other allies who share the same concern?*

*Secretary Kissinger:* We have had over a period of years, consistently, difficulty with American laws that we are attempting to apply in other countries—to American subsidiaries domiciled in foreign countries or to corporations of foreign countries that have a large number or a significant number of American directors. We had this problem in connection with the Cuba boycott, and we have it now in connection with the Arab boycott.

This is a matter which we are studying and which has no easy solution, because if we exempt the American subsidiaries abroad then any American company can avoid a great deal of American legislation simply by letting its subsidiaries abroad handle those matters that are the subject

of the legislation. On the other hand, we can understand the concern of a country about the attempt to apply American legislation in its own jurisdiction. I discussed this subject with the Canadian Foreign Minister when he visited me two weeks ago, and we're going to pursue these discussions in order to find an amicable solution.

*Q. Mr. Secretary, President Ford has made the most of Governor Carter's remarks on Yugoslavia, and Governor Carter has done the same with the President's remarks on Eastern Europe. And you yourself have joined and jumped in on the remarks that the Governor made about Yugoslavia. Do you seriously believe that these observations are prompted by reactions of substance, or are the Governor, the President, and you yourself making the most of this for political reasons?*

*Secretary Kissinger:* Well, first of all, I made my comments in response to questions. I was not volunteering any comment.

Secondly, I would make a distinction between what the President said and what the Governor said. What the President said was a statement of fact, which was correctable. What the Governor said concerned an issue of policy, which could affect the calculation of foreign countries. It is my responsibility as Secretary of State that foreign countries not misunderstand what America considers to be its security interest—which concerns me more than the practical measures we might take to implement our security interest. And therefore I stated what six other Administrations have stated; namely, that the United States has an interest in the independence and nonalignment of Yugoslavia.

Now, I do not believe that it is fruitful to pursue this matter in the middle of a political campaign. I have noticed that Governor Carter yesterday modified his original statement. I think this is too serious an issue; it does affect the security of the United States. I do not believe that it is useful to belabor it in a political campaign,

and it should be addressed again after the campaign is over. There are only four more days.

*Q. Since it has come up, may I ask you whether you from your position, in the event of Soviet action against Yugoslavia, would recommend that the United States send troops to Yugoslavia's support?*

*Secretary Kissinger:* I think this is a totally wrong way to state the issue. I do not believe that the United States should give a checklist ahead of time, in areas where it does not have any formal commitments, about what precisely it would or would not do. I have stated, as have six Administrations before this one, that the United States would consider a threat to the independence and sovereignty and nonalignment of Yugoslavia a matter of grave concern. How we would implement this concern depends on the circumstances that will arise, and it is the purpose of our policy to prevent this threat from arising and not to give a checklist ahead of time of how we will meet it.

*Q. Mr. Secretary, in the latest edition of New Times magazine there is a story, I think—*

*Secretary Kissinger:* What magazine?

*Q. New Times—suggesting that you may have played more than a passive role in the wiretapping of Morton Halperin, among others. What exactly was your role in that?*

*Secretary Kissinger:* This is a subject that has been exhaustively gone into before congressional committees. It is now before the courts. There is voluminous testimony going into the thousands of pages by now, and it is impossible to answer it in a press conference. I stand on everything that I have said before congressional committees and in depositions before the courts.

*Q. Mr. Secretary, speaking of November 2, as you just did, what do you think about the propriety of a Secretary of State making a public appearance, talking about foreign policy only four or five days before the election,*

*while the Administration is making foreign policy and the lack of experience on the other side a major campaign issue?*

*Secretary Kissinger:* I haven't drawn any issue in foreign policy with respect to Governor Carter in this appearance. I'm answering questions by the press, and my speech here is on an off-the-record basis to a group of leading citizens of this area who invited me in July to come to this affair.

For the last two years, I have spoken at intervals of about two to three weeks in various parts of the country. And during the campaign I have made most of my appearances on an off-the-record basis before selected groups.

*Q. Mr. Secretary, can I follow that with a somewhat more philosophical question? Every four years it seems that we have a semiparalysis effect, partly because of political reasons and partly because of the uncertainties in a Presidential election. Obviously—there are obvious hazards. Can you see any solution of separating the conduct of foreign affairs and making it relatively stable and continuous, despite our democratic political system?*

*Secretary Kissinger:* I don't completely agree that there's a paralysis in foreign affairs. After all, we conducted the African initiative in the middle of the electoral campaign. But it is true that the American election tends to create a major factor of uncertainty in international affairs at regular intervals, and I think it is important to keep in mind that the interests of the United States and the values of the United States do not change every four years.

I have always believed that the foreign policy of the United States should be nonpartisan. I would certainly cooperate with any effort—whether I'm in office or out of office—to put it on a nonpartisan basis and to insulate it as much as possible from the ordinary political campaign, unless there is a fundamental issue of principle involved, which can happen occasionally.



## OPEC Oil Pricing

*Q. Mr. Secretary, William Seidman, the President's economic adviser, was here this morning, and he said that talks were going on in an effort to persuade the Arabs not to raise the prices of oil in December. I want to ask you a two-part question: what is the likelihood of persuading the Arabs to do that, to hold the line on oil prices? And if that persuasive talk fails, is there any counteraction that the United States could take to force a rollback of prices?*

*Secretary Kissinger:* Of course, it's technically not correct to speak only of the Arabs. It's OPEC [Organization of Petroleum Exporting Countries], which includes Iran, Venezuela, and several other major producers that are not part of the Arab countries.

With respect, however, to American actions in case present efforts—which are extensive—fail, the most effective method is a major American energy program; that is, a significant program of conservation, a significant program to develop alternative sources of energy. Until we reduce our dependence on imported oil, our bargaining position with respect to oil prices is likely to remain not as strong as it should be. And therefore in the new Congress it will be extremely important that a comprehensive energy program be passed because that, over the long term, is our most effective way of bringing a pressure on oil prices.

*Q. What about Mr. Carter's comments about a possible economic boycott if there were another Arab oil embargo?*

*Secretary Kissinger:* Well, Mr. Carter applied that to the case of an embargo, not to the case of an individual action such as the oil price rise. We have our questions whether an economic embargo will work, particularly as it exempted, in Mr. Carter's formulation, grains, which is the one irreplaceable item that we are supplying.

But again we are dealing here with a case in which we're attempting to prevent such a situation from arising and in which the gravest dangers are not the dangers of

a total embargo but of many intermediate steps that can be taken short of an embargo. We have improved our relationships with the Arab countries to a point where an embargo is conceivable only in the most extreme circumstances of a total collapse of all Middle East efforts, which we do not foresee.

## Helsinki Provisions on Human Rights

*Q. Mr. Secretary, as you mentioned earlier, one of the reasons that America intervened diplomatically in southern Africa was to restore basic human rights and dignity to the black majority there. In the same diplomatic breath, however, we have extended a friendly hand in terms of economic and political gains (sic) to Communist and military dictatorships where these basic human rights are only a dream. Does this mean that our foreign policy has a double standard?*

*Secretary Kissinger:* No. Our foreign policy has to set—first of all, it has to set priorities.

Secondly, with respect to Communist countries, the United States has always used its influence to promote emigration, to promote a greater liberalization to make it easier for families to be reunited, to give press greater access. In the Helsinki document, in the so-called basket 3, for the first time there has been an international acceptance by the Communist countries that participated that certain essential human rights were part of an international agreement.<sup>1</sup> Now, to be sure, they have not lived up to all its provisions and even most of its provisions; but it does give us criteria to which to appeal and criteria to which we will appeal in the 1977 review conference of the European Security Conference that will take place in Belgrade.

So we pursue the same principles in other countries, but the method of application will have to differ with circumstances.

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<sup>1</sup> For text of the Final Act of the Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe, see BULLETIN of Sept. 1, 1975, p. 323; for "basket" 3, Co-operation in Humanitarian and Other Fields, see p. 339.

*Q. Mr. Secretary, could you tell us the degree of accuracy to reports that South Korea has been engaged in a campaign of bribery here in the United States on Capitol Hill?*

*Secretary Kissinger:* With respect to these stories, they are now being investigated by the Justice Department. The Department of State has made available all its information over a period of months to the Department of Justice, which will have to make the final decisions as to the validity of these charges.

#### **Situation in Lebanon**

*Q. Mr. Secretary, Arab leaders have announced agreement on what they call a peace plan for Lebanon after a two-day conference in Cairo. Can this be a true step forward for peace in the Middle East, and especially for Lebanon, with Syria insisting on maintaining most of its 20-or-so thousand troops as about two-thirds of a peace force there?*

*Secretary Kissinger:* There have been of course, I believe, 60 cease-fires in Lebanon. And therefore to predict that any one agreement is going to mark the end of the conflict is hazardous. It's interesting that we had a report from Beirut yesterday that for the first time in months there was a traffic jam, which meant that the population felt secure enough to go out into the streets.

I believe that the Riyadh accord, as ratified by the Cairo summit, might well mark the beginning of a peaceful solution for Lebanon. The composition of the Arab force has not yet been agreed upon, but one would assume that it would have a preponderance of Syrians, since they are the largest number of troops that are there now.

The problem that now awaits solution is the relationship between the Christian and the Moslem communities in Lebanon.

The United States has always supported the independence and unity of Lebanon, but it also favors the ability of each community to lead its own life according to its

own traditions. And this remains to be worked out.

*Q. Mr. Secretary, is it true the United States is [inaudible] on international affairs, as charged by Jimmy Carter?*

*Secretary Kissinger:* I think in the last week of a campaign many things are said in which the candidates get carried away with themselves. The United States attempts to make no promises that it doesn't keep and to make no threats it doesn't intend to execute.

*Q. Mr. Secretary, along those lines, the major foreign policy issues in this campaign appear to have been the President's mistake on Eastern Europe and Jimmy Carter's reluctance to send troops to Yugoslavia. In view of the fact that there are some very important foreign policy questions—I think you have SALT [Strategic Arms Limitation Talks], what to do next in the Middle East, what to do next in China—questions which will face any new Administration, what is your feeling about the quality of the foreign policy debate in this campaign?*

*Secretary Kissinger:* Of course, since I believe we have been correct in the foreign policy we've carried out, I'm assuming that the absence of more fundamental criticisms would tend to support this.

As I pointed out before, I really do not think that foreign policy should lend itself to a detailed partisan debate. And therefore I think it is in the interest of the United States that at least major tactical questions not become the subject of foreign policy disputes.

*Q. Dr. Kissinger, I'd just like to followup and mention the SALT talks. In view of the fact in the last 10 years the U.S.S.R. has spent \$10 billion on civil defense and military armaments, isn't it a waste of time—the SALT talks, that is?*

*Secretary Kissinger:* The SALT talks on the limitation of strategic armaments derive from the fact that both sides are developing nuclear weapons of enormous



destructiveness and that both sides, the Soviet Union and the United States, for the first time in history face a situation in which two countries could destroy all of humanity. That is an unprecedented situation that leaders of no country in the world have ever had to face before.

What we're attempting to do in these talks is to put a ceiling on the strategic armaments of both sides, whatever they may have spent in the past, to put a ceiling on these strategic armaments and then to use that ceiling as a point of departure from which to make reductions in these strategic armaments. We have a preliminary agreement to establish a ceiling that will be equal for both sides, and we are now negotiating what categories of weapons fall under each ceiling. This is what has held up the conclusion of the negotiations. I would think that the negotiations are about 85-90 percent concluded, that there are two issues that still remain to be settled. But whatever one thinks of what either country may have done in the field of armaments, it is in the interest of humanity that a ceiling be put on these weapons and that then they be reduced.

*Q. I had in mind to sort of ask you a two-part question, if I could.*

*Speaking of Lebanon as you were, first I'd like to ask you whether you have any information that Israel is actively involved in supplying arms or manpower to help the Christians in Lebanon.*

*And secondly, I would like you to comment on the provision of the peace agreement that authorizes the Palestinians to go back to their old positions across the border from Israel and do what they can—I can't quote directly—but do what they can to make trouble for Israel.*

*Secretary Kissinger:* With respect to the first question, we have no authenticated information that any provision of the American law which prohibits the transfer of American defense equipment has been violated.

With respect to the second question, the

United States has always opposed terrorism as an instrument of national policy. Whether in fact the Palestinians will go back to exactly all the camps they had occupied before, or whether that will no longer be technically feasible for a variety of reasons that have happened in recent weeks, only the future can tell. But the United States has never supported the concept of terrorist warfare by any country or by any group.

*Moderator [Rolf Bibow, vice president, International Division, United Technologies Corp.]: I think in closing I should make it very clear to everybody that Secretary Kissinger is here as a guest of the Executive Forum and it is at our request that he addressed this group. We wouldn't want our friends in the press to have missed this opportunity. So that is the specific purpose for his being here.*

*Thank you very much, Mr. Kissinger.*

## **U.N. Emergency Force in the Sinai Extended for One Year**

*Following is a statement made in the U.N. Security Council by U.S. Representative Albert W. Sherer, Jr., on October 22.*

USUN press release 123 dated October 22

This Council has acted today to continue for a period of one year the essential peace-keeping services of the United Nations Emergency Force (UNEF) in the Sinai.<sup>1</sup> The Emergency Force has played an indispensable role in helping to maintain the cease-fire called for by this Council in Resolution 338 and reaffirmed in the agreement between Egypt and Israel of September 4, 1975.

Maintenance of the cease-fire, however, was only one element of the carefully balanced formulation contained in Resolution 338. In renewing UNEF for an additional

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<sup>1</sup> The Council on Oct. 22 adopted Resolution 396 (1976) by a vote of 13 to 0 (the People's Republic of China and Libya did not participate in the voting).

year, we must remind ourselves in the most urgent terms that negotiation of a just and durable peace was the ultimate purpose of that resolution.

In welcoming this renewal, the United States wishes to reiterate its commitment to a determined effort to achieve an overall settlement in the Middle East acceptable to all the parties. In this regard, I would recall that Secretary of State Kissinger said on September 30, in speaking to the General Assembly:

The United States will do all it can to assure that by the time this Assembly meets next year it will be possible to report significant progress toward a just and lasting peace in the Middle East.

That pledge is equally appropriate in the context of this Council's deliberations today.

The performance of the UNEF Command in responding to its expanded responsibilities during the past year has been exemplary in every respect. The territorial scope of its activities substantially widened as a result of the agreement of September 4, 1975. In addition, as the Secretary General noted in his report,<sup>2</sup> UNEF has to an increased extent been called upon to exercise its good offices to resolve problems in the implementation of that agreement which might otherwise have posed difficulties. We were fortunate that during this critical period the United Nations peacekeeping forces in the Middle East were ably led by Lt. Gen. Ensio Siilasvuo. Our appreciation goes also to Lt. Gen. Liljestrand for his efforts as Commander of UNEF for the last 14 months.

The Secretary General has noted in his report that UNEF has enjoyed the full cooperation of the parties concerned in discharging its complex and vital responsibilities. We would like to pay tribute here to the constructive spirit in which both sides have approached their responsibilities in fulfillment of the cease-fire and subsequent agreements.

We are particularly gratified to observe that the Secretary General has been able through judicious management to reduce the UNEF budget for the coming year without sacrificing its operational effectiveness in any way. I heartily congratulate him and his staff for this achievement.

## **Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act To Take Effect January 19, 1977**

*Following are texts of a statement by President Ford issued on October 22 and a letter dated November 2 from Department of State Legal Adviser Monroe Leigh to Attorney General Edward H. Levi.*

### **STATEMENT BY PRESIDENT FORD**

White House press release dated October 22

It is with great satisfaction that I announce that I have signed H.R. 11315, the Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act of 1976.<sup>1</sup> This legislation, proposed by my Administration, continues the longstanding commitment of the United States to seek a stable international order under the law.

It has often been said that the development of an international legal order occurs only through small but carefully considered steps. The Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act of 1976, which I sign today [Oct. 21], is such a step.

This legislation will enable American citizens and foreign governments alike to ascertain when a foreign state can be sued in our courts. In this modern world where private citizens increasingly come into contact with foreign government activities, it is important to know when the courts are available to redress legal grievances.

This statute will also make it easier for our citizens and foreign governments to turn to the courts to resolve ordinary legal

<sup>2</sup> U.N. doc. S/12212.

<sup>1</sup> Public Law 94-583, approved Oct. 21.



disputes. In this respect, the Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act carries forward a modern and enlightened trend in international law. And it makes this development in the law available to all American citizens.

**TEXT OF LETTER TO THE ATTORNEY GENERAL  
FROM DEPARTMENT OF STATE LEGAL ADVISER**

NOVEMBER 2, 1976.

Honorable EDWARD H. LEVI  
*Attorney General*  
*Department of Justice*  
*Washington, D.C., 20530*

Re: The Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act  
of 1976, P.L. 94-583

DEAR MR. ATTORNEY GENERAL: Since the Tate Letter of 1952, 26 Dept. State Bull. 984, my predecessors and I have endeavored to keep your Department apprised of Department of State policy and practice with respect to the sovereign immunity of foreign states from the jurisdiction of United States courts. On October 21, 1976, the President signed into law the Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act of 1976, P.L. 94-583. This legislation, which was drafted by both of our Departments, has as one of its objectives the elimination of the State Department's current responsibility in making sovereign immunity determinations. In accordance with the practice in most other countries, the statute places the responsibility for deciding sovereign immunity issues exclusively with the courts.

P.L. 94-583 is to go into effect 90 days from the date it was approved by the President, or on January 19, 1977. We wish to advise you of how the Department of State proposes to treat sovereign immunity requests prior to January 19, 1977, and what the Department of State's interests will be after that date.

*Immunity from suit.* Until January 19, 1977, the Department of State will apply the Tate Letter, in the event that it makes any determination with respect to a foreign government's immunity from suit. It should be noted that P.L. 94-583 embodies in many respects the practice under the Tate Letter.

*Immunity from attachment.* Until January 19, 1977, the Department will continue to give prompt attention to diplomatic requests from foreign states, for recognition of immunity of foreign government property from attachment. The Department of State's policy until now has been to recognize an immunity of all foreign government property from attachment—unless (1) the property in question is devoted to a commercial or private use; (2) the

underlying lawsuit is based on a commercial or private activity of the foreign state; and (3) the purpose of the attachment is to commence a lawsuit and not to assure satisfaction of a final judgment.

The Department does not contemplate changing this policy before P.L. 94-583 takes effect. We have noted that until P.L. 94-583 takes effect, it may be difficult for a private litigant to commence a suit against a foreign state or its entities. Also, since P.L. 94-583 will not have any effect whatsoever on the running of the statute of limitations, a continuation of existing policy on attachment until January 19, 1977 might be the only way a claim for relief could be preserved.

P.L. 94-583 will make two important and related changes in the Department's sovereign immunity practice with respect to attachment. First, the statute will prescribe a means for commencing a suit against a foreign state and its entities by service of a summons and complaint, thus making jurisdictional attachments of foreign government property unnecessary.

Second, Section 1609 of the statute will provide an absolute immunity of foreign government property from jurisdictional attachment. Such jurisdictional attachments have given rise to diplomatic irritants in the past and, in recent years, have been the principal impetus for a Department of State role in sovereign immunity determinations. It appears that after January 19, 1977, any jurisdictional attachment of foreign government property could, under Section 1609 of P.L. 94-583, be promptly vacated upon motion to the appropriate court by the foreign state defendant.

*Immunity from execution.* The Department of State has in the past recognized an absolute immunity of foreign government property from execution to satisfy a final judgment. The Department does not contemplate changing this policy in the period before January 19, 1977. On or after that date, execution may be obtained against foreign government property only upon court order and in conformity with the other requirements of Section 1610 of P.L. 94-583.

*Future Department of State interests.* The Department of State will not make any sovereign immunity determinations after the effective date of P.L. 94-583. Indeed, it would be inconsistent with the legislative intent of that Act for the Executive Branch to file any suggestion of immunity on or after January 19, 1977.

After P.L. 94-583 takes effect, the Executive Branch will, of course, play the same role in sovereign immunity cases that it does in other types of litigation—e.g., appearing as *amicus curiae* in cases of significant interest to the Government. Judicial construction of the new statute will be of general interest to the Department of State, since the statute, like the Tate Letter, endeavors to incorpo-

rate international law on sovereign immunity into domestic United States law and practice. If a court should misconstrue the new statute, the United States may well have an interest in making its views on the legal issues known to an appellate court.

Finally, we wish to express appreciation for the continuous advice and support which your Department has provided during the ten years of work and consultation that led to the enactment of P.L. 94-583. We believe that the new statute will be a significant step in the growth of international order under law, to which the United States has always been committed.

Sincerely,

MONROE LEIGH.

## Congressional Documents Relating to Foreign Policy

### 94th Congress, 2d Session

United States-Soviet Union-China: The Great Power Triangle. Hearings before the Subcommittee on Future Foreign Policy Research and Development of the House Committee on International Relations. Part II. March 23-June 23, 1976. 194 pp.

International Monetary Fund Amendments. Hearings before the Senate Committee on Foreign Relations; June 22-August 3, 1976; 142 pp. Report of the committee to accompany H.R. 13955; August 10, 1976; 21 pp.

Communications from the Assistant Secretary of the Treasury (Enforcement, Operations, and Tariff Affairs) transmitting determinations waiving the imposition of countervailing duties on imports for a temporary period not to extend beyond January 3, 1979. Waiver of Countervailing Duties on Norwegian Cheese; H. Doc. 94-553; 7 pp; July 19, 1976. Waiver of Countervailing Duties on Finnish Cheese; H. Doc. 94-554; 6 pp; July 19, 1976. Waiver of Countervailing Duties on Swedish Cheese; H. Doc. 94-555; 9 pp; July 19, 1976. Waiver of Countervailing Duties on Brazilian Leather Handbags; H. Doc. 94-560; 9 pp; July 20, 1976.

The Assassination of American Diplomats in Beirut, Lebanon. Hearing before the Special Subcommittee on Investigations of the House Committee on International Relations. July 27, 1976. 43 pp.

Mercenaries in Africa. Hearing before the Special Subcommittee on Investigations of the House Committee on International Relations. August 9, 1976. 75 pp.

International Coffee Agreement, 1976. Report of the Senate Committee on Foreign Relations to accompany Ex. H., 94-2. S. Ex. Rept. 94-30. August 20, 1976. 7 pp.

National Emergencies Act. Report of the Senate Committee on Government Operations to accompany H.R. 3884. S. Rept. 94-1168. August 26, 1976. 42 pp.

Duty Free Importation of Loose Glass Prisms Used in Chandeliers and Wall Brackets. Report of the Senate Committee on Finance to accompany H.R. 8656. S. Rept. 94-1173. August 26, 1976. 2 pp.

Suspension of Duties on Certain Elbow Prostheses if Imported for Charitable Therapeutic Use, or for Free Distribution, by Certain Public or Private Nonprofit Institutions. Report of the Senate Committee on Finance to accompany H.R. 11321. S. Rept. 94-1174. August 26, 1976. 3 pp.

Suspending the Duties on Certain Bicycle Parts and Accessories Until the Close of June 30, 1978. Report of the Senate Committee on Finance to accompany H.R. 12254. S. Rept. 94-1175. August 26, 1976. 4 pp.

Energy Conservation and Production Revenue Act of 1976. Report of the Senate Committee on Finance to accompany H.R. 6860. S. Rept. 94-1181. August 27, 1976. 48 pp.

## TREATY INFORMATION

### Current Actions

#### MULTILATERAL

##### Conservation

Agreement on the conservation of polar bears. Done at Oslo November 15, 1973. Entered into force May 26, 1976.

*Ratification deposited:* United States, November 1, 1976.

*Entered into force for the United States:* November 1, 1976.

##### Law of the Sea

Convention on the high seas. Done at Geneva April 29, 1958. Entered into force September 30, 1962. TIAS 5200.

*Accession deposited:* Mongolia, October 15, 1976.

##### Load Lines

International convention on load lines, 1966. Done at London April 5, 1966. Entered into force July 21, 1968. TIAS 6331, 6629, 6720.

*Accessions deposited:* Algeria, October 4, 1976; Seychelles, October 1, 1976.

##### Maritime Matters

Amendments to the convention of March 6, 1948, as amended, on the Intergovernmental Maritime Con-



sultative Organization (TIAS 4044, 6285, 6490).  
Adopted at London October 17, 1974.<sup>1</sup>  
*Acceptance deposited:* Finland, October 19, 1976.

## Oil Pollution

Amendments to the international convention for the prevention of pollution of the sea by oil, 1954, as amended (TIAS 4900, 6109). Adopted at London October 12, 1971.<sup>1</sup>

*Acceptance deposited:* Algeria, October 4, 1976.

Amendments to the international convention for the prevention of pollution of the sea by oil, 1954, as amended (TIAS 4900, 6109). Adopted at London October 15, 1971.<sup>1</sup>

*Acceptance deposited:* Algeria, October 4, 1976.

## Postal

Constitution of the Universal Postal Union with final protocol signed at Vienna July 10, 1964 (TIAS 5881), as amended by additional protocol, general regulations with final protocol and annex, and the universal postal convention with final protocol and detailed regulations. Signed at Tokyo November 14, 1969. Entered into force July 1, 1971, except for article V of the additional protocol, which entered into force January 1, 1971. TIAS 7150.

*Accession deposited:* Cape Verde, August 27, 1976.

Second additional protocol to the constitution of the Universal Postal Union of July 10, 1964 (TIAS 5881, 7150), general regulations with final protocol and annex, and the universal postal convention with final protocol and detailed regulations. Done at Lausanne July 5, 1974. Entered into force January 1, 1976. TIAS 8231.

*Ratifications deposited:* Guinea, August 30, 1976; Jamaica, August 17, 1976.

*Accession deposited:* Cape Verde, August 27, 1976.

Money orders and postal travellers' checks agreement, with detailed regulations. Done at Lausanne July 5, 1974. Entered into force January 1, 1976. TIAS 8232.

*Ratification deposited:* Guinea, August 30, 1976.

*Accession deposited:* Cape Verde, August 27, 1976.

## Property—Intellectual

Convention establishing the World Intellectual Property Organization. Done at Stockholm July 14, 1967. Entered into force April 26, 1970; for the United States August 25, 1970. TIAS 6932.

*Accession deposited:* Bahamas, October 4, 1976.

## Safety at Sea

International convention for the safety of life at sea. Done at London June 17, 1960. Entered into force May 26, 1965. TIAS 5780, 6284.

*Acceptance deposited:* Seychelles, October 1, 1976.

Convention on the international regulations for preventing collisions at sea, 1972. Done at London October 20, 1972. Enters into force July 15, 1977.

*Accession deposited:* Algeria, October 4, 1976.

## Seals

1976 protocol amending the interim convention on conservation of North Pacific fur seals (TIAS

3948). Done at Washington May 7, 1976. Entered into force October 12, 1976.

*Proclaimed by the President:* October 25, 1976.

## Tin

Fifth international tin agreement, with annexes. Done at Geneva June 21, 1975. Entered into force provisionally July 1, 1976.

*Ratification deposited:* United States, October 28, 1976.

## Tonnage Measurement

International convention on tonnage measurement of ships, 1969, with annexes. Done at London June 23, 1969.<sup>1</sup>

*Accession deposited:* Algeria, October 4, 1976.

## BILATERAL

### Bangladesh

Loan agreement relating to small-scale irrigation, with annex and related letter. Signed at Dacca September 29, 1976. Entered into force September 29, 1976.

### Bolivia

Agreement relating to the transfer of commodities to Bolivia for use in a community development and training program. Signed at Washington September 22 and October 18, 1976. Entered into force October 18, 1976.

### Dominican Republic

Loan agreement relating to the agricultural sector, with annex. Signed at Santo Domingo September 30, 1976. Entered into force September 30, 1976.

### Egypt

Agreement amending the agreement for sales of agricultural commodities of October 28, 1975 (TIAS 8201). Effected by exchange of notes at Cairo September 28 and 29, 1976. Entered into force September 29, 1976.

### Haiti

Project agreement relating to integrated agricultural development. Signed at Port-au-Prince September 28 and 30, 1976. Entered into force September 30, 1976.

### Korea

Guaranty agreement relating to a housing loan. Signed at Washington July 1, 1976. Entered into force July 1, 1976.

Guaranty agreement relating to a housing loan. Signed at Washington July 26, 1976. Entered into force July 26, 1976.

### Mexico

Agreement extending the agreement of July 31, 1970, as amended and extended, for a cooperative mete-

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<sup>1</sup> Not in force.

orological observation program in Mexico. Effected by exchange of notes at México and Tlatelolco June 15 and July 12, 1976. Entered into force September 28, 1976.

### United Nations

Agreement relating to the transfer of certain foreign excess property of the Sinai Support Mission to the United Nations Emergency Force, with annexes. Effected by exchange of letters August 26 and September 30, 1976. Entered into force September 30, 1976; effective July 1, 1976.

### World Intellectual Property Organization

Agreement relating to a procedure for United States income tax reimbursement. Effected by exchange of letters at Geneva September 7 and 15, 1976. Entered into force September 15, 1976; operative January 1, 1976.

## PUBLICATIONS

### 1949 "Foreign Relations" Volume on National Security, Economic Policy

Press release 532 dated October 27 (for release November 5)

The Department of State released on November 5 "Foreign Relations of the United States, 1949," volume I, "National Security Affairs, Foreign Economic Policy." The "Foreign Relations" series has been published continuously since 1861 as the official record of American foreign policy.

This volume presents 836 pages of previously unpublished documentation (much of it newly declassified) on the regulation of armaments, national security policy, the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade, foreign financial policies of the United States, and tentative planning for the internationalization of the Antarctic. Extensive coverage is given on the views held and the actions taken by the President, the Secretary of State, other high officials, and the National Security Council regarding international threats to the security of the United States. The volume also presents documentation on reaction to the first test of a nuclear device in the Soviet Union in September 1949, the decision by the United States to develop the hydrogen bomb, and the continued inability of the United Nations Atomic Energy Commission to agree upon a plan for international control of atomic energy.

"Foreign Relations," 1949, volume I, was prepared in the Office of the Historian, Bureau of Public Affairs, Department of State. Four volumes for 1949 and the first half of a fifth have already been published, and 3½ are in preparation. Copies of volume I (Department of State publication 8850; GPO cat. no. S1.1: 949/v. I) may be obtained for \$11.00 (domestic postpaid). Checks or money orders should be made out to the Superintendent of Documents and sent to the U.S. Government Book Store, Department of State, Washington, D.C. 20520.

### GPO Sales Publications

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No.	Date	Subject
*540	11/3	Shipping Coordinating Committee (SCC), Subcommittee on Maritime Law, Dec. 16.
*541	11/3	Study Group 7, U.S. National Committee for the International Radio Consultative Committee (CCIR), Greenbelt, Md., Nov. 29.
*542	11/3	Study Groups 3 and 4, U.S. National Committee for the International Telegraph and Telephone Consultative Committee, Nov. 30.
†543	11/4	Maritime boundaries between the U.S. and Canada.
*544	11/4	SCC, Subcommittee on Safety of Life at Sea, working group on safety of fishing vessels, Dec. 3.
*545	11/4	Study Group 9, U.S. National Committee for the CCIR, Dec. 9.
*546	11/4	U.S. National Committee for the CCIR, Dec. 16.
*547	11/5	Agreement reached on draft text of U.S.-Mexico treaty on transfer of sanctions.

\* Not printed.  
† Held for a later issue of the BULLETIN.

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# THE DEPARTMENT OF STATE BULLETIN

VOL. LXXV, No. 1953

November 29, 1976

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## U.S. Foreign Economic Relations: Some Future Prospects

*Address by William D. Rogers  
Under Secretary for Economic Affairs<sup>1</sup>*

This morning I would like to say a word or two about our foreign economic engagements from three perspectives.

First, I will try to locate the issues in the framework of our recent history. Second, I will describe where we stand now—our recent initiatives, our current policies, and the purposes which inform them. And third, I will look to some of the critical issues which will tax our wit and wisdom in the years immediately ahead.

Let me begin with a brief historical perspective. The seventies already are beginning to look like not one but two eras.

The first was 1970–73. During this time the international monetary system of fixed parities collapsed. The tradition of a trading system geared to deliberate reductions of trade barriers, nondiscrimination, and reciprocity began to show strains. And conflicts emerged in the area of private direct investment, for which there were few rules of the game and little consensus about what the rules, if any, should be. As the Vietnam era closed and an American President journeyed to Peking, there was an increasing awareness of the need to reform the international economic system.

But this was overtaken in the second period, from late 1973 to the present, by a series of unprecedented and unanticipated shocks in the global economy. First,

inflation and recession managed to ravage the world's trade and financial centers at the same moment. Second, OPEC [Organization of Petroleum Exporting Countries] arranged a stunning increase in the price of oil, and this produced a massive shift of wealth to a handful of countries.

At the same time, through a combination of manmade policies and acts of God, global food reserves suddenly began to shrink, and serious students of the condition of man began to suspect that we were on the brink of massive food shortages and a massive shortage of energy and other raw materials as well. Finally, the shift in financial resources to the oil exporters produced a growing concern whether the world's existing financial institutions could in fact recycle OPEC's new funds and cope with the rising debt of both industrial and developing countries.

At bottom was a growing doubt about the viability of the international economic structure developed since the Second World War and a growing fear that inflation, recession, and the financial crises would drive nations in desperation to resolve their domestic economic difficulties at the expense of other countries.

So it was that the central objective of international economic policy of the industrialized democracies during this period had to be to keep themselves afloat, prevent backsliding, and avoid beggar-thy-neighbor policies.

<sup>1</sup> Made before the National Planning Association's Committee on the Changing International Realities at San Francisco, Calif., on Nov. 5.

## Concrete Programs for Cooperation

In fact, I think it fair to say we came through the period of crisis in 1973-75 remarkably well.

Our achievements are several:

—Under the pressure of events, we have considerably strengthened the ties which bind us to the other industrialized democracies. We have established a tradition these last several years of working more closely together on economic issues than ever before. Rambouillet and the ministerial meeting last June of the OECD [Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development], at which both Secretary Simon and Secretary Kissinger spoke, and the summit meeting of heads of state at Puerto Rico in June established a commitment on the part of each of the major economic powers of the free world that their domestic economic policies cannot work effectively in disharmony, that there is a need for effective cooperation, and that we will work together. This newly emerged economic alliance is the very centerpiece of our international economic policy.

—Trade is the vital engine of international economic growth, and we are well started on the present round of reducing both tariff and nontariff barriers in Geneva. In this respect, the United States has tabled a generous tariff-cutting formula which would reduce existing tariffs on the average of 55 percent. At the same time, we have unilaterally instituted our own generalized scheme of preferences for the developing countries. These generalized preferences will give duty-free access to over \$2½ billion of imports coming from over 100 developing countries. The beneficiaries will be not only the developing countries themselves but also our own consumers.

—We have not forgotten the lessons of 1973-75 for resources. We are alert now to the need to make a special effort to insure that the world has the resources it requires for future growth. In the area of

energy and industrial raw materials, where both costs and risks are increasing, Secretary Kissinger has proposed the establishment of an International Resources Bank to facilitate a variety of cooperative arrangements between private enterprise and governments and spur the expansion of resource output, particularly in the developing countries.

—We are committed to a system of free movement of private capital, management, and technology in the interest of global growth. For this reason, we have made a major effort to improve the often uneasy environment in which international business can operate. The OECD investment declaration was a remarkable achievement, committing the major economic powers of the OECD to equal treatment for foreign investment and the avoidance of competitive incentives or disincentives to free investment flows. With this commitment, we can move forward to a system of capital movements that will enhance the prospect of efficient investment based upon comparative advantage. In addition, we are making a constructive contribution to the efforts of the U.N. Commission on Transnational Corporations, which will establish an information center for corporations and governments.

—Beginning with Secretary Kissinger's address at the United Nations General Assembly seventh special session, we have made a major effort to redesign our policies toward the developing countries, to address their special needs for growth and development. The United States has authored virtually all of the new accomplishments in this area, beginning with the expansion of the International Monetary Fund's compensatory financing facility, the expansion of the lending capabilities of the World Bank and other multilateral financial institutions, efforts to improve LDC [less developed country] access to our capital markets, and the forthcoming world conference on technology transfers, which is of such vital interest to the developing world.



In addition, we have also taken the lead in setting up financial facilities to help low-income countries weather severe balance-of-payments problems. Specifically, we proposed the establishment of the currently operating Trust Fund of the International Monetary Fund to subsidize loans to the developing countries with proceeds from the sale of IMF gold.

Over the last several years, we have re-focused our concessional development assistance on the low-income countries and on the poorer sectors within those countries. Nearly all of our foreign development assistance now goes to promote health, education, food production, and population.

At the World Food Conference, and in its subsequent actions, the U.S. Government has focused on assistance to developing countries to increase food production. We are contributing \$200 million to the newly established International Fund for Agricultural Development. This year we are also supplying 60 percent of the 10-million-ton food aid target established by the World Food Conference.

At the same time, we have not forgotten the lessons of the oil embargo. Under the International Energy Agency in Paris, we and 17 industrialized-country members have established an extensive framework for cooperation on emergency energy sharing as well as on the expansion of future production, conservation, research, and development. In addition, we have proposed the establishment of an International Energy Institute to assist developing countries in formulating their own national policies and to expand development and production of energy in energy-poor developing countries.

We have, in short, emerged from a period of severe difficulty with a comprehensive international economic policy and a series of specific and concrete programs to implement that policy. And it is well that this should be so—because some of the palpable lessons of the recent years of turmoil and struggle have been the increasing importance of international economic

developments to our own domestic interests, the heightened sensitivity of our economy to impulses from abroad, and the absolute necessity for forging a comprehensive program that will enhance our own international interests through international economic cooperation.

The world is with us:

—This year we will import 44 percent of our total petroleum consumption. By 1980, this dependence may approach 50 percent, a question with serious policy implications to which I will return.

—We import 90 percent of our bauxite, 20 percent of chromium, 95 percent of platinum, 82 percent of manganese, 65 percent of our tin, nearly a third of our iron, all of our rubber.

—This year U.S. exports will be in the neighborhood of \$113 billion. This amounts to nearly 14 percent of our total output of goods and is directly responsible for perhaps 3.5 million of the more highly paid and technologically advanced jobs in our own economy.

—American business has invested about a quarter of a trillion dollars abroad. The annual return on these investments is over \$17 billion—an important share of total U.S. corporate profits.

Clearly then, a major concern of our foreign policy must be the enhancement of international economic cooperation.

### **Seven Challenges To Address**

Let me now look ahead for a few minutes.

The future is never a simple extrapolation from the past. It would be captious to imply that we can rest content to do in the future what we have done in the past, no matter how well we may have done it. New challenges emerge. Indeed, new challenges are emerging even now, as I earlier suggested.

### *The Industrialized Democracies*

First, and perhaps foremost, is the economic condition of the industrialized de-

mocracies of North America, Europe, and the Far East.

We speak constantly of interdependence. In fact, the synchronization of the economies of the major industrialized powers in recent months has been extraordinarily surprising. All began the process of recovery from the trough of the recession at about the same time. Most experienced a surge of quick growth; in our own case, annual growth rates for the first half of the year were 9 percent. Virtually all now, however, are in a pause.

The prospects for the world economy for 1977 are for slower rates of real growth than in 1976. This is largely because a number of industrial countries will be constrained, by difficulties in financing balance-of-payments deficits, to adjustment policies which slow the growth of aggregate demand in the short run. There clearly will be growth. But that growth will likely be below historic trends for the industrial world overall in the coming two years.

In addition, several structural factors may make it more difficult to recover higher growth rates.

Overall for the OECD countries, the share of national income going to wages and compensation has increased dramatically over the last decade and a half. Between 1960 and 1964 on the one hand, and mid-1974-75, the share of consumption in relation to total domestic product has risen; for example, in Italy, from 47 percent to 60 percent, and in the United Kingdom, from 64 percent to 71 percent.

In addition, the relative growth in fixed investment, as opposed to private consumption expenditures, has altered. Consumption in the OECD area has been growing more rapidly than investment. This is not a promising change from the standpoint of future growth prospects.

Finally, of course, inflation continues to be a serious problem, though more so in some countries than others, as does unemployment.

These structural shifts will make the process of adjustment for future growth in

the industrialized democracies more difficult.

The United Kingdom and Italy, of course, are taking major action to promote needed adjustment. Both have indicated their intention to apply for additional IMF assistance, and the International Monetary Fund is now discussing with them the conditions for additional Fund help for the two countries. Although the U.S. Government is not a party to those discussions, we have made clear our deep and abiding interest in the success of the efforts of the United Kingdom and Italy to resolve their current economic difficulties.

President Ford said explicitly last week that we stand ready to support the further efforts of the United Kingdom under an IMF-arranged agreement.

Beyond that, however, let me emphasize that it is essential that we follow up on the 1974 proposal by Secretaries Kissinger and Simon to create a special new contingency financing mechanism among the OECD industrial democracies. The OECD Financial Support Fund, or so-called "safety net," has been ratified by most other industrial countries. U.S. participation is now imperative.

#### *Possible Oil Price Increase*

Second, OPEC will contemplate another increase in the price of its oil at its upcoming December meeting.

Some commentators in this country have ventured the opinion that a 10-percent increase, for example, is not likely to be significant. Not so. An increase in the price of oil—any increase—will decidedly not be a matter of indifference to the economies of the industrialized democracies, or to the developing countries, by any stretch of the imagination.

A few blunt facts:

—The world's import bill for OPEC oil this year is \$125 billion. OPEC's balance-of-payments surplus, which is the mirror image of the balance-of-payments deficit of



the rest of the world, will be about \$45 billion in 1976.

—A 10-percent price increase would add more than \$12 billion annually to the global import bill.

—The effect will be to transfer additional resources to OPEC, reduce the import capacity of oil-importing countries, add to the cost of the energy component of all we consume, and thus add to pressures for inflation worldwide.

The weaker economies in the OECD area, and the developing countries, would be the most seriously affected. And these are the countries which can least cope with an additional shock now. Even without an oil price increase, a number will, as I have said, face difficulties in financing the payments deficits that would be implied by the maintenance of present growth policies. These countries will be required to undertake difficult adjustment policies to reduce those deficits in any event.

An oil price increase will have an adverse effect, which cannot be ignored, on the prospects for sustained, inflation-free recovery across a wide spectrum of countries and so on the global economic system as a whole.

### *Relations With the Developing World*

Third, we also face an important challenge now in our relations with the developing world.

Americans are a generous and humane people. We have a long and impressive record of cooperation with poor countries. During the late 1960's and early 1970's, however, our relationships took a turn for the worse. Increasingly frustrated in their efforts for rapid economic growth and impressed with the results of the OPEC price increases, the developing countries were increasingly tempted to stridency, rhetoric, and the alluring slogans of automatic redistribution of wealth.

As I have indicated earlier, we have responded, beginning at the special session of the United Nations General Assembly last

year, on the one hand, with a series of positive proposals to enhance the growth prospects of the developing world. We have, at the same time, tried to make clear that we think we are beyond the point where rhetoric serves to increase public understanding and sympathy for the developing countries among the citizens of the industrialized democracies. And, we have pointed out, it is to those nations—not to the Soviet Union and East Europe—which the LDC's must look for the official aid and market opportunities which they want and need.

These tensions of the dialogue between the rich and the poor of the world will be close to the surface in the meeting of the Conference on International Economic Cooperation (CIEC), which is due to hold its concluding ministerial meeting in Paris next month. A successful conclusion to this one-year analytical effort of 27 developed, developing, and oil-exporting members of the conference is by no means assured. Major issues divide the North and the South in the CIEC conference:

—The developing countries are proposing generalized relief or moratoria on the repayment of the heavy debts they have recently run up. The developed countries oppose this generalized approach to LDC debt. They favor a case-by-case examination of those countries experiencing financial difficulties and a principled effort to cope with overall balance-of-payments problems by tested aid and financing techniques.

—The developing countries are also asking for the indexation of the prices of their exports. We believe such an approach to international economic relations, even if it were technically feasible, would create major difficulties for the global economy and would be against the interests of most LDC's as well.

My own view is that the time has come to strike a new balance in the relationships between the North and the South. The new balance should emphasize development assistance and liberal market access—not

automatic resource-transfer devices—as the economic mechanisms most efficient for LDC development and most effective in shaping a global economy that serves our own objectives.

The industrialized democracies as a group are beginning to articulate their own affirmative proposals for action to that end. At the June ministerial meeting of the OECD, pointing out that the North had fallen into the habit of reacting to the claims of the South, Secretary Kissinger urged that a program be developed by that organization in a way which would permit the industrialized democracies to take the initiative and demonstrate at the same time our commitment to help the poor nations in their struggle for development.

The design of this program will be a major challenge for us and our allies of Europe and the Far East in the months and years ahead.

### *Food Supply*

A fourth priority area for the future will be food.

As I have said, we have analyzed the problems we face in this area, and we have made proposals to address them. But the tough part remains—making these policies work.

This year, for example, good harvests were a temptation for complacency. Yet the underlying structural problems in the global agricultural system remain. Malnutrition is not decreasing, future production shortfalls are a certainty, and the incapacity of many countries to purchase grain when they most need it will continue to be a fundamental challenge to the international system and a tragedy in the poorest countries. Many analyses show that the food deficit in the developing world is actually growing larger, so that by 1985 the developing countries will have to import more than the 85 million tons projected at the Rome Food Conference.

Under these circumstances, the international community must move urgently to

establish a system of food reserves, to coordinate food aid programs, and to encourage developing countries to take the difficult domestic measures to increase agricultural production. Unless we are able to make significantly more progress than we have to date, the world may, over the next quarter of a century, face a series of unmanageable food crises which could confront the United States, as the world's largest food producer and exporter, with agonizing choices between domestic and international priorities.

### *Challenge of Energy*

Fifth is the challenge of energy.

We have made progress in the past year in managing the energy problems created by OPEC. But let me be frank—we have not done enough. This is critically the case with respect to our domestic policies.

In the years since the oil embargo the United States has increased its dependence on Persian Gulf oil. We are today more vulnerable to OPEC price and supply policies than we were in 1973. Within the OECD area, our domestic conservation efforts are so relatively ineffective that they constitute an embarrassment for us in our relations with Europe and Japan. The prospects are that demand for imported oil will level off in the other Western countries. Our consumption will increase—in fact, it will increase so substantially in the years ahead that we alone may insure the continued strength and viability of the OPEC cartel.

The plain fact is that we do not have a credible domestic energy policy. We sorely need one.

The longer term issues are systemic. They cut across all aspects of our international economic policy. The first is our dependence on a few, potentially unreliable suppliers. For the foreseeable future, U.S. energy independence may be an illusion. This adds urgency to our policies for diversifying sources of supply and for developing alternative energy sources. The second set of issues concern the adequacy of the



world's supply of oil and how we make the transition to the post-oil age. Extensive co-operation and policy coordination of all countries will be required if this transition is to be smoothly managed.

We are facing up to these key issues, ranging from the technology we need to the global capital requirements for energy development, in the Paris Conference on International Economic Cooperation. On the leadership which we and our allies provide, and on the choices we make in this area, hinge our economic welfare and our future security.

### *East-West Economic Relations*

Sixth is the issue of East-West economic relations.

Trade between OECD members and the Soviet Union and East Europe has quadrupled in six years. We in the West have come to realize that in certain areas at least—agriculture being the clearest case—the Eastern economies can no longer be dealt with as afterthoughts but must be dealt with as integral factors in the world economic equation. And we are just beginning to come to grips with this new truth.

A number of issues have emerged as a result:

—How does one define effective reciprocity between market and nonmarket economies?

—What role will the Eastern economies play in the global energy and raw materials markets?

—How do we deal with the exploding debt of the Soviet Union and Eastern Europe?

For the near future we will probably proceed on two tracks.

The United States is tied down by the Jackson-Vanik amendment to the Trade Act, which bars normal trade relations with countries which do not move quickly enough to open up emigration. We should spare no reasonable effort to address the issue of human rights abroad. But the rec-

ord is clear that the trade policy is too blunt and too public an instrument. Under Jackson-Vanik, we get neither trade nor human rights. We are forgoing important trade opportunities open to Europe and Japan. And emigration is not improving. Hopefully, we may see some way out of this in the months ahead.

In addition, we need to work more closely with our allies in examining the entire range of East-West economic issues which we all face. A first step is an analysis of the evolving East-West trade and investment patterns to get a better notion of the trends in such areas as energy development, agricultural trade, and technology transfer. We have never examined the facts with our allies before. Such an effort is also now getting underway in OECD in response to Secretary Kissinger's initiative last June. We expect this analysis to be a major contribution to East-West economic relations and opportunities.

### *Law of the Sea Negotiations*

Seventh, we must make additional progress in the law of the sea negotiations.

The most recent session on the law of the sea treaty ended two months ago in New York. This was the most ambitious effort to create international law in this century. Much is at stake:

—One hundred and fifty nations are attempting to design an international regime for three-quarters of the earth's surface.

—A broad sweep of issues is involved: economic development, military security, freedom of navigation, crucial and dwindling living resources, the oceans' fragile ecology, marine and scientific research, and vast mineral wealth.

—The international community is attempting to reach agreement on entirely new international legal principles: the creation of an economic zone extending 200 miles and the designation of the deep seabed as the "common heritage of mankind," principles which never existed before.

Progress has been made in these negotiations. But much remains to be done, and it may be that the next session is our last chance, before nations begin to turn to unilateral action and the understandings which we have patiently woven so far begin to unravel. In the next several months, we must move decisively on the following issues:

- The balance between coastal state and international rights in the economic zone;
- Freedom of marine scientific research;
- Arrangements for dispute settlement;

and

- Most difficult and important of all, the manner in which the mineral wealth in the deep seabeds will be exploited.

The deep seabeds issue is the key to the negotiations. Many of the developing countries are trying to impose a doctrine of total internationalization on the industrial countries, which alone have the technological and financial capacity for mining the seabeds in the foreseeable future. The United States has offered to find financing and to transfer the technology to make international mining a reality. But total internationalization is out of the question. We have made the most forthcoming proposal which we can, but there are limits beyond which we cannot and should not go.

In short, in this issue as well we face a major international economic challenge to our wit and wisdom.

I have attempted here to review our foreign economic policy from the early 1970's on into the future. Vital issues are at stake now—not only our economic well-being but the larger structure of inter-

national economic relationships as well. And the significance of all this for our political and security interests is unmistakable.

These challenges I have catalogued are also opportunities. We may be standing on the edge of a period of political and economic achievement unparalleled in our generation. It remains for us to summon the wisdom, the compassion, and the political will to face the critical choices before us.

## **U.S. Encouraged by U.K. Decision To Seek Standby Agreement With IMF**

*Statement by President Ford*<sup>1</sup>

The United States has the highest confidence in the ability of the United Kingdom to overcome its present economic difficulties. The British Government has taken a number of positive steps.

We are further encouraged by Britain's decision to seek a standby agreement with the International Monetary Fund. As I have already stated publicly, the United States will fully support an agreement reached between Britain and the IMF.

As a matter of general policy, it is the abiding purpose of the United States to see the United Kingdom as a vigorous member of the European Community, the North Atlantic alliance, and other international institutions whose goal it is to build a better and safer world.

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<sup>1</sup> Issued at Cincinnati, Ohio, on Oct. 28 (text from White House press release).



## Goals for UNESCO

*Statement by John E. Reinhardt*<sup>1</sup>

President Kenyatta set the tone for this conference Tuesday morning [October 26] with his call for "harambee." Let us work together for the good of all, our distinguished host urged.

This 30th-anniversary conference of UNESCO must heed President Kenyatta's exhortation. For here in Kenya we must begin to develop a new working consensus if UNESCO is to play an effective part in a changing global system of social and economic relations.

Let us be clear about where we stand. The last General Conference ended in dissension. That dissension must be overcome. A new basis for consultation and cooperation must be adopted.

I recall a Swahili proverb which says: "One stone will not support a cooking pot." In a world where interdependence has become one of the basic elements of our existence, we must keep our foundation stones together—or our organization, too, may fall to the ground.

The United States is present at this conference to work with all nations to find a basis for consultation and cooperation.

A few months ago, in this same conference hall, Secretary Kissinger stressed this same point. Speaking at the U.N. Conference on Trade and Development, Dr. Kissinger noted that the accelerating forces of

modernization—technological, social, and political—link the peoples of the world as never before. These forces can intensify conflict—or they can provide us with unprecedented possibilities for advancing our common aims. All nations are part of a global economic system. If this system is to flourish, it must rest on the firm foundation of security, fairness, and opportunity for all who wish to participate—rich and poor, North and South, East and West, consumer and producer. It must embrace the interests of all if it is to be supported by all.

How do we achieve this objective?

First, there must be commitment by all to bring about a constructive and cooperative relationship between the so-called developed and the so-called developing countries. I say "so-called" because all states, in a sense, are evolving—each continually advancing in accordance with its own cultural strengths, each with its own historical past, each according to its own potentialities, each using its own model or approaches to development.

No one model, no one ideology, should be unduly advocated. No one model should be unduly condemned. The United States bases its successful development on growth with equity and justice, on the benefits of a free market economy, and on stressing human rights, individual freedoms, a free press, freedom of choice, the abundance of educational opportunities, and the free exchange of ideas and information.

These are our beliefs. We share them with many other nations around the world.

<sup>1</sup> Made before the 19th General Conference of the United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization (UNESCO) at Nairobi on Nov. 1. Ambassador Reinhardt, who is Assistant Secretary of State for Public Affairs, was chairman of the U.S. delegation to the conference.

Other nations choose other roads, but there is no reason why this should lead to conflict. Nor should this impede the building of a more stable and just international order—an order resting not on power but on restraint of power, not on the strength of arms but on the strength of the human spirit.

UNESCO can take the lead in this challenge. The central issue is to reduce the continued disparities between the rich and the poor within countries and between developed and developing countries, to achieve growth with equity, and to pay special attention to the poorest of the poor within nations and among nations.

To accomplish these goals, we must build upon the constitutional foundation stones of UNESCO—the sharing and the encouraging of development in education, science, and culture.

We in the United States are wholeheartedly dedicated to these specific goals. And we recognize that UNESCO has already made significant contributions in each of these areas.

The First and Second Development Decades represent giant steps in concept. The Director General's [Amadou Mahtar M'Bow, of Senegal] mid-decade report details progress being made.

UNESCO's analytic work on this report is impressive. Especially important, for example, is the emphasis given by the report to the role of women, the improvement of education, and the increased consideration accorded to other social factors in the development process.

Much can be expected from long-range scientific and technological planning and sharing, and great credit here goes to UNESCO.

For example, the entire U.N. system, under the leadership of the Secretary General of the United Nations, is mobilizing to address the issue of science and technology applied for development.

A major conference has been proposed for 1979. The United States strongly supports its objectives and has offered to host

this conference. Preparations for it will provide opportunities for the developed and developing countries and for organizations such as UNESCO to review their responsibilities for the sharing and use of technology. This presents an important opportunity for UNESCO—together with its companion U.N. agencies, each having major contributions to make in science and technology—to mount a concerted attack on this problem.

Mr. President, the U.S. delegation would like to congratulate the Director General for his work in the medium-term plan and in the program and budget documents he presented to this conference. We have read with interest the Director General's views on a possible new world order in his book, "Moving Toward Change." He has ably emphasized the special role that UNESCO plays in the U.N. system with its focus on man as the center of development.

We agree with Mr. M'Bow that UNESCO must be a forum from which broad philosophical perspectives can be formulated on the problems of our times.

#### **Advancing the Common Aims of All Nations**

We recognize that we are moving through a period of historic change as the world becomes an increasingly interrelated system and as the Western orientation that prevailed for several centuries comes to share in a more multicentered system of international relations.

But to return to my earlier question. I repeat, we have unprecedented possibilities for advancing the common aims of all nations—rich and poor, North and South, East and West, consumer and producer. How do we achieve our objective?

We feel that what is required to make UNESCO and other agencies effective as instruments of change is a political consensus that can support creative program initiatives and combine the best of the old and the new.

We feel that it is indeed important to address the social and cultural dimensions of our changing world and, as the Director



General has said, to move toward a new human order. But need we abandon those aspects of each nation's development which have been beneficial? Too drastic action may bring regrets. And a wise African proverb suggests that "Regrets are like a grandchild; they come some considerable time after the event."

We hold that many features of the Western experience are especially significant in development today:

1. It has become fashionable to decry economic growth in some countries. But I ask you to recall that the concept of "growth" and especially "growth with equity" is not only an economic phenomenon in Western development. The roots of this concept lie more deeply in the ideas of progress essential to the Scientific Revolution and to the Enlightenment's notion of man's dignity and his capacity to deal with physical forces.

2. Industrialization has not been non-cultural. Great cultural traditions have persisted and, indeed, become enriched under the pressures of rapid scientific and technological change. The will for cultural identity is no less intense in developed than it is in developing countries.

3. It is the industrialized countries which first became increasingly responsive to the ecological risks of uncontrolled material growth. Since 1969 the United States—with the passage of the National Environmental Planning Act—has begun a continuing study of the impact of technological changes and taken steps to guard the public interest. Pollution is not limited to the developed countries.

4. The ideas of freedom and the protection of human rights—enunciated in the West—are essential to progress and change. They are values that need to permeate any new system of international relations. Nowhere are they more important, for that matter, than in those fields that are the special concern of UNESCO: in human rights and fundamental freedoms, in the freedom of scientific research and scholarly inquiry, in the freedom and

rights of the creative artist, in the free access of all people to educational and cultural opportunities, and in a free flow of information.

We in the United States are fully committed to cooperative enterprises for bettering relations among peoples and for reducing disparities and dependencies. We are not for abandoning the great fundamental goals which have been widely shared guideposts in man's development.

It is the hope of the United States that during the course of our deliberations in this UNESCO meeting we can work with the Director General, with his staff, and all member nations to develop guidelines for future planning. In developing this new framework for UNESCO planning, two central objectives should stand out as UNESCO's contribution to reducing disparities and dependencies in the movement toward new international relations:

1. The worldwide dissemination and growth of knowledge, skills, and technology must not be slowed.

2. The right of all peoples to preserve their own cultural heritages and the freedom of all peoples to develop their own ways of living must be protected and encouraged.

To these objectives, we need to add the assurance that UNESCO will carry out its programs to serve the needs of all peoples, whatever their cultural patterns and socio-economic systems. UNESCO programs must embrace the working philosophy that honors and gives full value to the dignity of man as an individual with equality in rights and freedoms.

### **Freedom of Information and Expression**

In the working out of these goals there is certain to be some disagreement over means.

From the beginning of the United Nations, we have found basic agreement at the international level on commitment to the free and open exchange of ideas. This

commitment is expressed most clearly in the Universal Declaration of Human Rights and in the Constitution of UNESCO.

Nevertheless, wide differences exist among nations regarding the underlying issues of communications in the light of particular social and political systems. This is true especially in the role of the mass media in the interrelationships among individuals as well as among peoples.

The United States, from the start of its life as an independent nation, has had a strong commitment to the maintenance of the right of free speech, however exercised, a right which we have insisted be relatively unfettered by government. How did this commitment come about? Why have we adhered to it with what some would call almost religious fervor? Because we believe that free speech is our chief weapon against tyranny—that only through the unfettered exchange of ideas is it possible even to come close to “truth.”

This approach, we realize, is not universally shared. Other governments have at times adopted different domestic standards, which in turn affect their attitudes toward standards for free flow of information and ideas in the international sphere.

Accordingly, the United States wishes to use this occasion to articulate once more in the strongest possible way its commitment to freedom of information and expression and to the fundamental human right of every individual to seek, receive, and impart information and ideas through any medium and regardless of frontiers. We are eternally vigilant to prevent any infringement on this freedom.

In affirmation of this fundamental belief, we make the following statement: The United States, recognizing the vital importance of communications in the development of peoples and nations and of the friendly relations between them, is concerned that all peoples should have the

opportunity to share in the potential benefits of modern mass communications. It reaffirms its belief in full and equal opportunities for the education of all, in unrestricted pursuit of objectivity, and in the free exchange of ideas and knowledge, and it asserts that the wide diffusion of culture and the education of humanity for justice and liberty and peace are indispensable to the dignity and fulfillment of man and constitute an obligation which all nations must fulfill in a spirit of mutual assistance and concern.

The United States is determined to help develop and to increase the means of communication among peoples, while yet preserving the independence, integrity, and fruitful diversity of sources of information.

### **Insuring Two-Way Flow of Information**

It is appropriate that the international community look very hard at how we can insure that the flow of information and ideas is truly two-way. It is our conviction that the most effective way to reduce the current imbalance is not by inhibiting the communications capacity of some but by increasing the communications capacity of all.

In furtherance of this approach, the United States has consistently offered to share its knowledge and expertise regarding communication facilities available for experimental undertakings. For example, the United States offered its ATS-6 [Applications Technology Satellite] communications satellite to India for a yearlong educational experiment.

Through the ATS-6 satellite, the Indian Government was able to transmit programs on agricultural techniques, family planning and hygiene, school instructions, teacher education, and occupational skills. The telecasts were broadcast in different languages to Indians in 5,000 villages in seven Indian states. Schoolchildren gathered around television sets outdoors and in



schoolhouses, receiving daily lessons from the "blackboard in the sky," as Indian journalists labeled the ATS-6.

Following this successful joint project with the Government of India, the United States has been making available for several months, to interested developing states, opportunities to participate in the use of the ATS-6 satellite to demonstrate various applications for national development that communications satellites make possible. Some 30 countries are taking advantage of this opportunity.

Concern for effective two-way communications between the various societies of this world and its people is an appropriate interest of UNESCO. Restricting the use of satellites—or of special competencies in the mass media—will not help.

We believe that the United States and other nations in which are found highly developed mass media facilities and capabilities should endeavor to make available, through bilateral and multilateral channels, both private and governmental, assistance to other states in helping to develop their mass media. Furthermore, it is the strong conviction of the United States that UNESCO itself, in its future planning, must accord a high priority to expanding and strengthening, through its regular program and budget, assistance to member states in helping them further develop their communications capacities.

These positive approaches would encourage the greatest possible international exchange of information and ideas. These approaches would facilitate a more balanced flow of communications. These approaches would foster greater understanding among peoples, respect for the value of diversity among cultures, and speed the sharing of knowledge and ideas that are essential to the cause of peace and achievement of political, social, cultural, and economic progress.

## Structure and Operations of UNESCO

Mr. President, we cannot pay so much attention to the goals of UNESCO without looking also at its structure.

The Director General in his first address in 1974 spoke to us of improvements he wished to make in the methods of programming and in the means of implementing UNESCO activities. We have seen with interest the many changes he has made during the last two years. We welcome more discussions of the dynamics of restructuring of the Secretariat, recognizing that the real test can only come from working experience.

A more focused framework for planning is one prerequisite for making UNESCO an effective mechanism for international co-operation. Another is the strength and structure of the organization itself, and the strategies and procedures it adopts to carry out its work.

Means are needed to assess the performance of UNESCO undertakings. A process is necessary by which the managers of the Secretariat and the members of the governing bodies can know what progress is being made and why and what problems are being encountered and why.

The Director General has already undertaken certain steps to change the structure and methods of operation and has informed the General Conference of his actions in document 19 C/46. He has taken on this task of reorganization with unusual vigor, and we applaud this initiative.

We agree with the new emphasis that has been given to the operational activities of UNESCO. However, care must be taken to see that UNESCO's intellectual resources and its operational programs are closely linked and that neither one overshadows the other. For there is danger that operations without strong intellectual content will lose their relevancy and quality. Likewise, intellectual activities without a strong operational content can become sterile and

unrelated to pragmatic needs of the member states. Close, effective relations with UNESCO's networks of NGO's [nongovernmental organizations] will contribute much to avoiding this.

### Realities of World Situation

Mr. President, we now want to end by returning to the point we raised earlier: the need for a new consensus among member states. I trust that I have made clear the spirit and the will that the United States brings to this General Conference.

We agree with the Director General that UNESCO's activities over the next decade must be carried out within the context of changing international relationships. The dimensions and shape of a different world order will emerge from our debates, our consultations, our actions—here and elsewhere. What we agree upon is that, in bringing about change, we must confront:

1. The disparities between developed and developing countries as a central issue of changing international relations;
2. The links between national development and international structures;
3. The need to bring disadvantaged groups into the mainstream of development actions and development benefits; and
4. Dependencies that exist in an increasingly interdependent world.

These are realities that the United States recognizes as the essential characteristics of the world situation within which UNESCO works. They are characteristics, moreover, which underscore the importance of education, natural and social sciences, and culture in enhancing national development and in reducing dependencies in a new era of international relations. They stress the need to pay special attention to the role and participation of women, to the poor and marginal populations within countries, and especially to the rural poor. They also, more deeply, emphasize the in-

tense desire of all peoples to preserve their cultural identities under the pressure of scientific and technological change. They establish, in turn, the central contributions of UNESCO to a changing pattern of relations among the peoples of the world.

Our task at this General Conference is to make UNESCO an effective organization through which we can cooperate. The requirements are fourfold:

1. A framework for planning, assessment, and operations that sharply focuses on UNESCO's direct responsibilities and its achievements and shortfalls in the fields of education, the sciences, and culture;
2. A well-organized and well-staffed administrative structure leading to maximum effectiveness and efficiency;
3. A close link within intellectual operational activities which stress renewal and innovation to meet the real needs of member states; and
4. A common determination to focus upon the objectives in the Constitution of UNESCO, to which all of us, as members, have subscribed—political consensus among member states that reflects a sense of community and rejects confrontation over narrow and disrupting interests.

If I have spoken at great length and candidly, I have done so only because I recognize the seriousness and urgency of the problems confronting this 30th-anniversary conference of UNESCO. I believe my apprehension is shared by others.

I cannot speak for the Director General, but I recall the words of Mr. M'Bow at the close of the UNESCO Conference in 1974. As that conference ended, Mr. M'Bow called on the UNESCO member states to resolve their disputes through dialogue, tolerance, and understanding, rather than through confrontation. Specifically, Mr. M'Bow said:

We must avoid those conflicts that take on the character of systematic confrontations. We should perhaps avoid even the adoption of resolutions, no matter how strong the majority behind them, that



leave profound bitterness among some of us. I want to launch an urgent appeal for tolerance and understanding and seek consensus through patient dialogue.

I look forward to a closing statement this year that will show how UNESCO member states met and debated and tugged and perhaps even fought vocally—but ended with a sense of “harambee.”

## Maritime Boundaries Between the U.S. and Canada

Press release 543 dated November 4

On November 1, Canada published an order giving the 60-day advance notice required by Canadian law of the 200-mile fisheries zones it intends to implement on January 1, 1977. The order sets out the lateral limits of the zones asserted by Canada in the Atlantic and Pacific Oceans, including areas off the coasts of the United States.

The United States and Canada have had maritime boundary and related resource questions under active discussion for a number of months, but we have not yet reached agreement on our continental shelf or fisheries zone boundaries. Thus the United States does not accept all of the limits published by Canada.

In view of the Canadian publication, the Department of State has today [November 4] had published in the Federal Register the coordinates of the boundaries of the continental shelf and fisheries jurisdiction asserted by the United States in the areas

off the coasts of the United States and Canada.<sup>1</sup> In a number of areas, the coordinates are different.

The two governments are thus taking steps to insure that their assertions of jurisdiction will not prejudice the claims or interests of either party or adversely affect our ongoing negotiations. To this end, the Canadian order and the U.S. Federal Register notice each make clear that these assertions of jurisdiction are without prejudice to the negotiation of any maritime boundary between the two countries.

The two governments recognize the need to continue serious and active negotiations toward a mutually acceptable boundary settlement, mindful that the two governments will need to consider third-party procedures if the negotiations do not make progress. The two governments are also continuing negotiation of mutually acceptable long-term arrangements in respect of living and nonliving resources. In the meantime, they are also negotiating mutually acceptable interim fisheries arrangements. Both countries will also avoid steps for the time being relating to the development of nonliving resources in the boundary areas concerned which could prejudice negotiation of a boundary settlement.

The United States will continue negotiation of these offshore issues in confidence that the important national interest of each country in the cooperative development of our offshore resources will lead the United States and Canada to a mutually agreeable and beneficial resolution of these questions.

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<sup>1</sup> Public Notice 506, 41 *Fed. Reg.* 48619, Nov. 4, 1976.

## U.S. Reviews International Cooperation in Space Activities and Work of the U.N. Outer Space Committee in 1976

*Following is a statement made in Committee I (Political and Security) of the U.N. General Assembly by U.S. Representative W. Tapley Bennett, Jr., on October 18.*

USUN press release 117 dated October 18

The year 1976 has been an active and successful year both in outer space and in the U.N. Committee on the Peaceful Uses of Outer Space. We would like to take this opportunity to call to your attention several developments which we regard as particularly interesting and significant.

During the past year, the United States has continued to participate cooperatively with other nations in the exploration of outer space. We have, for example, launched Helios-2, built by the Federal Republic of Germany, the second scientific satellite to investigate the properties of interplanetary space close to the Sun. In January we launched the CTS [Communications Technology Satellite], an experimental high-powered communications satellite developed jointly with Canada.

In cooperation with the Agency for International Development, using the ATS-6 satellite [Applications Technology Satellite], NASA is currently conducting demonstrations of the applications of space-age technology for the benefit of developing countries. These demonstrations will be seen in 27 countries in Asia, the Middle East, Africa, and Latin America.

In addition, consistent with our pledge to provide nondiscriminatory reimbursable launch assistance for foreign satellite projects for peaceful purposes, we launched the

first Indonesian communications satellite (Palapa) and another in a series of INTEL-SAT [International Telecommunications Satellite Organization] launches.

During July the United States, as one event in the Bicentennial of American independence, made the first successful soft landing on the planet Mars with a Viking lander; this feat was repeated in September. Dissemination of early results of this historic program has already begun, adding further to our understanding of the universe. Later this afternoon we will be presenting a slide showing together with a commentary by the distinguished scientist and researcher Professor Carl Sagan of Cornell University dealing with the Mars landing.

With a new Space Transportation System based on the reusable shuttle rapidly becoming a reality, increasing emphasis has been given in 1976 to planning for its international use. Four announcements of opportunity have been issued worldwide to solicit proposals for experiments to be carried on the shuttle during its orbital flight test program, on the first two missions which will use the shuttle's Spacelab, and on a free-flying Long Duration Exposure Facility. The development of Spacelab, which is an unprecedented European contribution to the Space Transportation System, is being managed by the European Space Agency. It passed the midway point in 1976. Development was begun this year on a Canadian contribution to the Space Transportation System, a remote manipulator system for use with the Space Shuttle orbiter vehicle.



On July 31, 1976, India completed the one-year broadcast phase of the Indian Satellite Instructional Television Experiment using the NASA Applications Technology Satellite ATS-6 to transmit educational programs directly to some 2,400 villages in rural India. The TV programs, ground transmitting station, and village receiver sets were all funded and built by India. The social impact of the programs in the villages is still being analyzed, but the experiment has demonstrated the practicality of satellite-based instructional broadcasting for developing countries and has aroused interest throughout the world. Programs containing clear do-it-yourself instructions—in agriculture and animal husbandry, for instance—were particularly popular. I am sure our distinguished colleague the Representative of India will say more on this point.

Our intensified upper atmospheric research program has focused on the possible threat to the Earth's stratospheric ozone shield from manmade fluorocarbon compounds, widely used as refrigerants and aerosol propellants. Because of the global nature of this problem, we made special efforts in 1976 to undertake cooperative international stratospheric research activities and to inform as broad a segment of the world scientific community as possible about research underway in the United States. To foster improved international coordination of stratospheric research and policy planning, an international conference on the stratosphere and related problems was held at Utah State University, Logan, Utah, September 15-17, 1976. The conference included sessions on recent scientific research findings and discussions of the policy implications of stratospheric pollution.

We share what appears now to be the general belief that all states, regardless of their stage of economic and technical development, can realize substantial benefits

from an open system of Earth observation from satellites such as the Landsat system with which we are experimenting. The United States has already shared and continues to make available to all interested parties at least one-time coverage of over 90 percent of the Earth's land surface. Researchers and scientists in over 125 countries are obtaining Landsat data for a wide variety of uses.

This ever-growing international interest stems primarily from the many benefits that can be derived from use of Landsat data. Let me briefly cite just a few of the many significant results that have been reported.

Geologists in Bolivia have recently discovered deposits of lithium and potassium as a result of computer-aided interpretation of Landsat data. A new iron ore deposit was discovered in Egypt using Landsat data as well. In Bangladesh, Landsat investigators discovered that eight new islands with an area of 100 square miles had developed in the Bay of Bengal as a result of the buildup of sediment washed down from the Himalayas. A forest inventory in Thailand using Landsat revealed to forestry managers that there had been a significant previously unobserved decline in the amount of forested area in that country.

The World Bank has also been using Landsat information extensively in some of its projects. For example, Landsat imagery taken before and at the height of flooding in Pakistan was used by the Government of Pakistan and the Bank to assess the extent of damage and to direct timely aid to farmers attempting to reclaim their cropland.

Mexican investigators have compiled land use maps of the entire country and have been using Landsat to study potential land use as well, including potential agricultural productivity, carrying capacity for cattle, and erosion risk.

We look forward to an ever-broadening circle of benefits from this highly valuable program.

Mr. Chairman, the Outer Space Committee will be holding its 15th annual session next year. The anticipation of this occasion suggests a moment's reflection on the work of this unique institution.

I would cite but a few examples of the invaluable work undertaken and accomplished by member states in the Outer Space Committee forum.

Although the first three years of the committee's activities, the period 1963 through 1965, were marked by political and ideological controversy, its 28 members during 1966 proved able to negotiate the Outer Space Treaty, the basic and much-applauded treaty instrument establishing rules to encourage international cooperation in the conduct of peaceful space activities.

A principal adornment of the treaty is the prohibition in article IV against orbiting or otherwise placing nuclear or other weapons of mass destruction in outer space. The treaty negotiators had the foresight to take action to prevent developments which no one wanted but which otherwise might have become inevitable. They gave proof to what a former Permanent Representative of the United States, Governor Adlai Stevenson, once described as the call to action in the truism that it is far easier to agree not to arm an arms-free environment than to disarm an environment bristling with military hardware.

The Outer Space Treaty's insistence on international cooperation in space-related programs as the fundamental objective of the community of nations remains as bright a beacon for the next decade as it has been in the past 10 years.

Its establishment of a regime characterized by openness and nonappropriation, the guarantee of freedom for every nation and group of nations to explore and use space without discrimination, the requirement of continuing and substantial exchanges of scientific information, and the expressed goal that space activities should be carried on for the benefit of all mankind

rather than for narrowly or selfishly conceived purposes represent an encouragement for the future as well as an achievement of the past.

### Television Broadcasting by Satellite

A second example of the high achievement of the Outer Space Committee, now comprising 37 members, is its work in the field of television broadcasting by satellite.

The full application of this technology is still largely prospective; broadcasting by satellite directly into unmodified conventional individual television sets is not yet a possibility. But the technology is already being widely tested in Canada and India and has just been demonstrated further through a series of broadcasts in Latin America, Africa, and the Middle East. The Outer Space Committee has made a fundamental contribution through its educational work in acquainting governments with the likely benefits and costs involved in these future activities.

We are looking forward to the evaluation being made by the Government of India of the Satellite Instructional Television Experiment, which I have already mentioned. An appreciation and realistic appraisal of this U.S.-India experiment and of possible patterns of international cooperation have been greatly stimulated by the Outer Space Committee. Its Scientific and Technical Subcommittee undertook the first international analysis on a governmental level of this new technology, and a special Working Group on Direct Broadcast Satellites held five sessions which demonstrated that its benefits can be realized only if the subject is approached on an interdisciplinary basis.

Direct broadcast by satellite provides an illustration of the indispensable need of bringing together diplomats and experts from the scientific, technical, economic, institutional, and legal disciplines in order to understand what can flow from prospective technologies.



It is against this background of multidisciplinary analysis that the Legal Subcommittee this year intensified its work of trying to draft principles that can be accepted by states and broadcasting entities for the conduct of satellite television broadcasting once this becomes technically feasible. The subcommittee has drawn up statements of nine proposed principles.<sup>1</sup> These deal with such matters as broadcasting purposes, international legal parameters, rights and benefits for states, international cooperation, state responsibility, consultation procedures and peaceful settlement, copyright and neighboring rights, and provision of information to the United Nations.

This work has been undertaken on the basis of mutual benefit and conciliation. Extremely difficult issues remain for examination and negotiation. They involve such matters as participation by interested states and broadcasters and practical assistance to that end.

Direct broadcast satellite technology can make a great contribution to the values proclaimed by the Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe. In the Final Act of the Helsinki Conference, participating states stated that they consider "the development of contacts to be an important element in the strengthening of relations and trust among peoples" and that they "make it their aim to facilitate the freer and wider dissemination of information of all kinds, to encourage co-operation in the field of information and the exchange of information with other countries . . . ." The participants further pledged "to develop the mutual exchange of information with a view to a better knowledge of respective cultural achievements" and "to seek new fields and forms of cultural cooperation." It is in this light that the United States will participate in the difficult but

absorbing work of the Legal Subcommittee in 1977.

The character of international institutions and their procedures is of considerable interest to contemporary diplomats. Wisely conceived procedures can greatly stimulate mutual understanding and mutual appreciation of the problems of other nations. On the other hand, lack of attention to enlightened traditions and practice can make cooperation impossible, as can rigid rules applied without reference to the political and social purposes for which they were originally established.

The history of the Outer Space Committee and its various subsidiary bodies bears witness to the fact that significant results can flow from processes of discussion and mutual conciliation. No vote has ever been taken in the committee. In all these years the committee has always operated under the guiding statement made by its chairman at its first session, on March 19, 1962, that its work would be accomplished by consensus with every effort being made to avoid voting. We recognize that, under a consensus procedure, action may for a time become impossible if one or more members engage in obstruction. But over the long run, objective needs for progress and the desire of participants to be seen as constructive and mutually sympathetic can achieve far more than results brought about by conventional voting procedures with all their confrontational characteristics and consequences.

### **Remote Sensing by Satellite**

Mr. Chairman, I have already touched upon current U.S. experience with our Landsat remote sensing activities. This year the Scientific and Technical Subcommittee has again noted that the Landsat system continues to provide the international community with data and experience in the new field of remote sensing by satellite of the natural resources and the environment of the Earth. Landsat 1 has been operating

<sup>1</sup> For texts, see annex II to U.N. doc. A/AC.105/171, report of the Legal Subcommittee on the work of its 15th session.

for four years, Landsat 2 for more than a year, and an improved Landsat C has been scheduled for launching in the 1977-78 timeframe. Consideration is now being given to a fourth Landsat, among whose characteristics could be improved spectral and spacial resolution.

Turning to the ground segment of our Landsat system, I would like to point out that, in addition to the United States itself, reception facilities in Canada, Brazil, and Italy receive data directly from these satellites in accordance with the terms of bilateral agreements they have negotiated with our National Aeronautics and Space Administration. Argentina, Chile, Iran, and Zaire have also concluded agreements with us, and the construction of facilities in these four countries is underway or expected. A temporary station is operating in Pakistan. The Economic Commission for Africa has just endorsed a comprehensive training and station development program for Africa, and the European Space Agency has formulated a plan for rationalizing Landsat data acquisition and use in Europe.

A number of other nations are considering the possibility of establishing stations in 1977 and 1978. As we told the Outer Space Committee, the United States intends to continue to be responsive to the growing interest in the Landsat network.

What are the main fields in which remote sensing technology holds promise for development? As the Scientific and Technical Subcommittee report identifies them, they include mapping areas of the world and changes in the conditions and use of the Earth's surface; agricultural forecasting as an aid to production and distribution; geologic mapping to facilitate mineral resource exploration and development; hydrological surveys for water resource identification, planning, and pollution monitoring; and land use surveys for development and transmigration planning.

These various uses have interest for developed and developing countries alike. Every country in this hall is concerned with these matters, whatever its particular stage

of development and the history and character of its most pressing economic and social needs.

A working system will be practicable only if data dissemination policies are marked by the same openness and nondiscriminatory access that is a hallmark of the Outer Space Treaty. While complete global coverage could be achieved with satellites of the Landsat type with approximately 15 Earth stations, the entire system is dependent upon the availability of data without condition or discrimination. The facilities in Argentina, Brazil, Canada, Chile, Iran, Italy, and Zaire will be acquiring data on a regional basis. The bilateral agreements under which they are established oblige the station operators to provide data on reasonable terms without discrimination to all interested neighboring and other states.

A certain caution as to the development of this technology is desirable. The costs involved in the space segment are large, and ground segment requirements for adequately trained personnel are considerable. An analysis made by the Scientific and Technical Subcommittee helps to understand the system elements and flow of data involved in remote sensing. It observes that a first element is data acquisition involving the use of satellites and control stations. There follows data reception, utilizing ground-based antennas and receivers. Formatting and recording are then involved in what may be called data pre-processing. There is also data storage and dissemination, involving archiving and reproduction. Resulting data must then be analyzed by means of interpretation or user processing. And the objective of these elements is information utilization; that is, practical applications by users.

A further note of circumspection is appropriate. Even with our extensive experience with Landsat 1 and 2, we are still in a pre-operational/experimental phase. A fully operational phase remains some years away. What is clear, and we want to underscore this point, is that neither in the current phase nor in an operational framework



can this technology develop unless there is ongoing regional cooperation. Observation from space can only be accomplished as a practical matter without regard to boundaries; indeed, much of the valuable information on geology and hydrology, to give but two examples, requires regional observation and would be seriously impaired even if it were practical to observe on a national basis. Moreover, the costs involved, both human and financial, are of such a magnitude that few would be able to expect benefits except through open programs of regional and global cooperation.

The United States looks forward to continuing our active participation in the invaluable work of the Scientific and Technical Subcommittee in widening understanding of remote sensing. We commend to all delegations a reading of the remote sensing section of the report of the subcommittee in document A/AC. 105/170. We hope others will join in disclosing their plans in this fascinating field so as to maximize its contributions to economic and social development around the globe.

We also look forward to participating in the work of the Legal Subcommittee in drafting principles that states may wish to adopt for the planning, establishment, and operation of remote sensing activities. The underlying themes of international cooperation and mutually agreed sharing of benefits will be as relevant to remote sensing as they are to the Legal Subcommittee's work in the field of television direct broadcasting.

There will be a new matter before the Outer Space Committee in 1977, which has been put on its agenda through an initiative of the committee's distinguished chairman, Ambassador Jankowitsch of Austria, and of the delegation of Argentina. This summer the committee agreed that member states should be asked to provide the Scientific and Technical Subcommittee with information on programs in the field of generation and transmission of solar energy by means of space technology. Of course the Outer Space Committee is not competent to consider energy questions generally,

and it will not be getting into the energy business. But we agree that its mandate can properly include a consideration of the use of space technology for possible programs involving solar energy generation and transmission and that a review of the technology by the competent scientists of the Scientific and Technical Subcommittee will be desirable.

Mr. Chairman, my delegation's discussion this afternoon of some focal points of space activities has necessarily been impressionistic. But even while recognizing the limitations imposed by scarce human, scientific, technical, and financial limitations, we have great enthusiasm for the future. Bilateral and regional cooperation in space programs is growing mightily. The Outer Space Committee is enhancing international understanding of the potential benefits and costs of space technologies. This is exactly what the United Nations should be doing. We applaud its activities in this field and the benefits which they may help bring to people everywhere.

## **U.S. Announces \$20 Million Pledge to UNICEF for 1977**

*Following is a statement by Michael N. Scelsi, U.S. Representative on the Executive Board of the United Nations Children's Fund (UNICEF), made at the annual United Nations Pledging Conference on the United Nations Children's Fund on November 4.*

USUN press release 141 dated November 4

Another momentous year has passed since we last gathered here to indicate our support for UNICEF. UNICEF has made a tremendous effort in the past year on behalf of children the world over. Nonetheless, their lot is still a critical one. Our best efforts barely stem the tide. Children everywhere deserve a better life than they are getting; and nations, as well as UNICEF, should give renewed special attention to the needs of children, who are,

after all, the human resources upon whom the future of the world will depend.

May I take this occasion to express appreciation by all of us for the hard-working and dedicated headquarters and field staff of UNICEF and its distinguished leader, Harry Labouisse. We provide the financial resources; but without their devoted resources, nothing could be accomplished. Under their guidance, the principle of basic services for children in developing countries has made considerable progress during the past year, and a paper on the subject drafted by the Executive Board will be under consideration by the General Assembly at the current session.

In past years the timing of our legislative process has not permitted me to indicate at this meeting the extent of U.S. support for UNICEF, other than in glowing terms of praise. This year I am happy to announce that the President and Congress of the United States have appropriated for UNICEF for 1977 the sum of \$20 million, which shows our continued high regard and support for the objectives and ideals of UNICEF.

## Congressional Documents Relating to Foreign Policy

### 94th Congress, 2d Session

Amending Sections 2734a(a) and 2734b(a) of Title 10, United States Code, To Provide for Settlement, Under International Agreements, of Certain Claims Incident to the Noncombat Activities of the Armed Forces. Report of the Senate Committee on the Judiciary to accompany H.R. 7896. S. Rept. 94-1121. August 5, 1976. 10 pp.

Protocols for the Third Extension of the International Wheat Agreement, 1971. Report of the Senate Committee on Foreign Relations to accompany Ex. I, 94-2. S. Ex. Rept. 94-31. August 20, 1976. 3 pp.

Designation of Portugal as a Beneficiary Developing Country. Communication from the President of the United States transmitting notice of his intention to designate Portugal as a beneficiary developing country for purposes of the generalized system of preferences, pursuant to section 502(a)(1) of the Trade Act of 1974. H. Doc. 94-587. August 23, 1976. 1 p.

## TREATY INFORMATION

### Current Actions

#### MULTILATERAL

##### Biological Weapons

Convention on the prohibition of the development, production and stockpiling of bacteriological (biological) and toxin weapons and on their destruction. Done at Washington, London, and Moscow April 10, 1972. Entered into force March 26, 1975. TIAS 8062.

*Ratification deposited:* Togo, November 10, 1976.

##### Energy

Agreement on an international energy program. Done at Paris November 18, 1974. Entered into force January 19, 1976. TIAS 8278.

*Provisional accession deposited:* Greece, September 15, 1976.

##### Health

Amendments to articles 34 and 55 of the constitution of the World Health Organization of July 22, 1946, as amended (TIAS 1808, 4643, 8086). Adopted at Geneva May 21, 1973.<sup>1</sup>

*Acceptance deposited:* Chad, November 3, 1976.

##### Maritime Matters

Amendments to the convention of March 6, 1948, as amended, on the Intergovernmental Maritime Consultative Organization (TIAS 4044, 6285, 6490). Adopted at London October 17, 1974.<sup>1</sup>

*Acceptance deposited:* Cameroon, November 1, 1976.

##### Narcotic Drugs

Convention on psychotropic substances. Done at Vienna February 21, 1971.<sup>2</sup>

*Ratification deposited:* Federal Republic of Germany, November 8, 1976.

##### Ocean Dumping

Convention on the prevention of marine pollution by dumping of wastes and other matter, with annexes. Done at London, Mexico City, Moscow, and Washington December 29, 1972. Entered into force August 30, 1975. TIAS 8165.

*Extended by Denmark to Faroe Islands:* November 15, 1976.

##### Racial Discrimination

International convention on the elimination of all forms of racial discrimination. Done at New York

<sup>1</sup> Not in force.

<sup>2</sup> Not in force for the United States.



December 21, 1965. Entered into force January 4, 1969.<sup>2</sup>

*Accession deposited:* Liberia, November 5, 1976.

## **Tin**

Fifth international tin agreement, with annexes. Done at Geneva June 21, 1975. Entered into force provisionally July 1, 1976.

*Ratification deposited:* Australia, November 8, 1976.

*Acceptance deposited:* Federal Republic of Germany, September 29, 1976.<sup>3</sup>

## **Women—Political Rights**

Convention on the political rights of women. Done at New York March 31, 1953. Entered into force July 7, 1954; for the United States July 7, 1976.

*Ratification deposited:* Luxembourg, November 1, 1976.

## **BILATERAL**

### **Chile**

Agreement for sales of agricultural commodities, relating to the agreement of October 25, 1974 (TIAS 7993). Effected by exchange of notes at Santiago October 29, 1976. Entered into force October 29, 1976.

### **Egypt**

Agreement for sales of agricultural commodities, relating to the agreement of June 7, 1974 (TIAS 7855). Signed at Cairo October 26, 1976. Entered into force October 26, 1976.

### **Indonesia**

Agreement amending the agreement for sales of agricultural commodities of April 19, 1976 (TIAS 8308). Effected by exchange of notes at Jakarta October 15, 1976. Entered into force October 15, 1976.

Agreement amending the agreement for sales of agricultural commodities of April 19, 1976 (TIAS 8308). Effected by exchange of notes at Jakarta October 18 and 19, 1976. Entered into force October 19, 1976.

### **Poland**

Agreement concerning the reciprocal acceptance of certificates of airworthiness for imported civil glider aircraft. Effected by exchange of notes at Washington September 16 and 27, 1965. Entered into force September 27, 1965. TIAS 5868.

*Terminated:* November 8, 1976.

Agreement relating to the reciprocal acceptance of airworthiness certifications, with annex. Effected by exchange of notes at Washington November 8, 1976. Entered into force November 8, 1976.

<sup>2</sup> Not in force for the United States.

<sup>3</sup> Applicable to Berlin (West).

## **Spain**

Agreement providing for consultations should exports of textiles or textile products from Spain cause market disruption in the United States. Effected by exchange of notes at Madrid September 23, 1976. Entered into force September 23, 1976.

## **Sri Lanka**

Agreement for sales of agricultural commodities, relating to the agreement of March 25, 1975 (TIAS 8107). Signed at Colombo October 29, 1976. Entered into force October 29, 1976.

## **Syria**

Loan agreement relating to economic development programs of Syria. Signed at Damascus September 30, 1976. Entered into force September 30, 1976.

## **PUBLICATIONS**

### **1975 Digest of U.S. Practice in International Law Released**

Press release 523 dated October 22

The Department of State released on October 22 the "Digest of United States Practice in International Law, 1975," edited by Eleanor C. McDowell of the Office of the Legal Adviser.

This third annual "Digest" covers all significant developments in U.S. practice in international law during the calendar year 1975. It includes chapters on international economic law, aviation and space law, treaty law, legal regulation of the use of force, the position of the individual in international law, state territory and jurisdiction, and many other subjects.

Of special interest in the 1975 volume are legal matters related to the winding down of the Vietnam war, including the evacuation of U.S. citizens and foreign nationals from areas of hostilities; the U.S. response to the Cambodian seizure of the SS *Mayaguez*; the role of Secretary of State Kissinger as a mediator in the Middle East conflict and the U.S. undertaking to maintain an early-warning system in the Sinai; U.S. activity in the United Nations and the Organization of American States; U.S. efforts to deal with corrupt practices involving multinational corporations and to establish international guidelines recognizing the rights and duties of both host governments and such corporations; Federal regulations responding to the discriminatory effect of foreign boycotts; U.S. participation in the Inter-

national Energy Program; legislative proposals regarding executive agreements and Department of State criteria for determining what constitutes an "international agreement"; the role of U.S. courts in litigation involving foreign states, including the executive branch view of certain limitations on the act-of-state doctrine; and proposed U.S. legislation to codify the restrictive theory of sovereign immunity under international law.

Orders for the "Digest of United States Practice in International Law, 1975," accompanied by checks or money orders, should be sent to the Superintendent of Documents, U.S. Government Printing Office, Washington, D.C. 20402. The price of the 1975 volume (Department of State publication 8865; GPO catalog no. S7.13:975; GPO stock no. 044-000-01605-2) is \$11.00.

## GPO Sales Publications

*Publications may be ordered by catalog or stock number from the Superintendent of Documents, U.S. Government Printing Office, Washington, D.C. 20402. A 25-percent discount is made on orders for 100 or more copies of any one publication mailed to the same address. Remittances, payable to the Superintendent of Documents, must accompany orders. Prices shown below, which include domestic postage, are subject to change.*

**Background Notes:** Short, factual summaries which describe the people, history, government, economy, and foreign relations of each country. Each contains a map, a list of principal government officials and U.S. diplomatic and consular officers, and a reading list. (A complete set of all Background Notes currently in stock—at least 140—\$21.80; 1-year subscription service for approximately 77 updated or new Notes—\$23.10; plastic binder—\$1.50.) Single copies of those listed below are available at 35¢ each.

Burundi . . . . .	Cat. No. S1.123:B95	
	Pub. 8084	6 pp.
Congo, Brazzaville . . . . .	Cat. No. S1.123:C76/2	
	Pub. 7896	4 pp.
Guinea . . . . .	Cat. No. S1.123:G94	
	Pub. 8057	4 pp.
Ivory Coast . . . . .	Cat. No. S1.123:IV7	
	Pub. 8119	6 pp.
Sao Tome and Principe . . . . .	Cat. No. S1.123:SA6	
	Pub. 8871	4 pp.

**Foreign Policy and the Department of State.** This illustrated pamphlet traces the history of U.S. foreign policy and diplomacy from its unofficial beginnings in the colonial period and the establishment of the Department of State in 1781 to the present day. It also describes the administrative structure of today's State Department, its building in Washington, and its overseas posts. Pub. 8869. Department and Foreign Service Series 154. 30 pp. 90¢. (Cat. No. S1.69:8869).

**Military Mission to Iran.** Agreement with Iran extending the agreement of October 6, 1947, as amended and extended. TIAS 8279. 4 pp. 35¢. (Cat. No. S9.10:8279).

**Atomic Energy—Cooperation in Regulatory and Safety Matters.** Arrangement with the Republic of Korea. TIAS 8283. 12 pp. 35¢. (Cat. No. S9.10:8283).

**Cooperation in Technology, Research and Development.** Agreement with Egypt. TIAS 8284. 7 pp. 35¢. (Cat. No. S9.10:8284).

**Weather Stations—Continuation of Cooperative Meteorological Program in the Cayman Islands.** Agreement with the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland. TIAS 8285. 18 pp. 35¢. (Cat. No. S9.10:8285).

**Whaling—Amendments to the Schedule to the International Whaling Convention of 1946.** Adopted at the twenty-seventh meeting of the International Whaling Commission. TIAS 8286. 6 pp. 35¢. (Cat. No. S9.10:8286).

**Atomic Energy—Application of Safeguards to Uranium from Canada.** Interim arrangement with Canada. TIAS 8287. 3 pp. 35¢. (Cat. No. S9.10:8287).

**Trade in Cotton, Wool and Man-Made Fiber Textiles and Textile Products.** Agreement with Thailand. TIAS 8288. 14 pp. 35¢. (Cat. No. S9.10:8288).

**Political Rights of Women.** Convention with other governments. TIAS 8289. 34 pp. 45¢. (Cat. No. S9.10:8289).

**Mapping, Charting and Geodesy.** Agreement with Ecuador. TIAS 8290. 13 pp. 35¢. (Cat. No. S9.10:8290).

**Criminal Investigations.** Agreement with Belgium. TIAS 8292. 5 pp. 35¢. (Cat. No. S9.10:8292).

**Defense—Establishment of Communications Circuit.** Agreement with Canada. TIAS 8293. 2 pp. 25¢. (Cat. No. S9.10:8293).

**Narcotic Drugs—Additional Cooperative Arrangements to Curb Illegal Production and Traffic.** Agreement with Mexico. TIAS 8294. 4 pp. 35¢. (Cat. No. S9.10:8294).

**Narcotic Drugs—Cooperative Arrangements to Curb Illegal Production and Traffic.** Agreement with Mexico amending the agreements of December 11, 1974, as amended, and February 4, 1976. TIAS 8295. 8 pp. 35¢. (Cat. No. S9.10:8295).

**Narcotic Drugs—Indemnification for Liability from Flight Operations.** Agreement with Mexico. TIAS 8296. 5 pp. 35¢. (Cat. No. S9.10:8296).

**Frequency Modulation Broadcasting.** Agreement with Mexico amending the agreement of November 9, 1972, as amended. TIAS 8301. 6 pp. 35¢. (Cat. No. S9.10:8301).



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Checklist of Department of State  
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Press releases may be obtained from the Office of Press Relations, Department of State, Washington, D.C. 20520.

No.	Date	Subject
*548	11/8	Robert P. Smith sworn in as Ambassador to Ghana (biographic data).
*549	11/9	National Meeting on Science, Technology, and Development, Nov. 17.
*550	11/10	Shipping Coordinating Committee (SCC), Committee on Ocean Dumping, Dec. 13.
*551	11/10	SCC, Subcommittee on Safety of Life at Sea, working group on container transport, Dec. 15.
*552	11/10	Study Group 5, U.S. National Committee for the International Radio Consultative Committee, Dec. 17.
*553	11/10	Study Group 1, U.S. National Committee for the International Telegraph and Telephone Consultative Committee (CCI-TT), Dec. 9.
*554	11/10	Study Group 5, CCITT, Dec. 8.
*555	11/10	Fine Arts Committee, Dec. 6-7.
556	11/11	"Foreign Relations," 1948, volume V, "The Near East, South Asia, and Africa," part 2. released.

\* Not printed.  
† Held for a later issue of the BULLETIN.

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# THE DEPARTMENT OF STATE BULLETIN

Volume LXXV • No. 1954 • December 6, 1976

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# THE DEPARTMENT OF STATE BULLETIN

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*The Department of State BULLETIN, a weekly publication issued by the Office of Media Services, Bureau of Public Affairs, provides the public and interested agencies of the government with information on developments in the field of U.S. foreign relations and on the work of the Department and the Foreign Service.*

*The BULLETIN includes selected press releases on foreign policy, issued by the White House and the Department, and statements, addresses and news conferences of the President and the Secretary of State and other officers of the Department, as well as special articles on various phases of international affairs and the functions of the Department. Information is included concerning treaties and international agreements to which the United States is or may become a party and on treaties of general international interest.*

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## America's Role in the World: A City Upon a Hill

*Address by Winston Lord  
Director, Policy Planning Staff<sup>1</sup>*

It is a privilege to speak in this lecture series honoring a distinguished American and Secretary of State. Christian Herter is remembered in this nation and abroad for the integrity he brought to his office and the quiet courage he displayed in the face of a crippling illness. In my early apprenticeship in diplomacy, in the Kennedy round of trade negotiations, I saw a demonstration of those qualities, an experience for which I count myself fortunate.

Christian Herter oversaw foreign affairs in a period which some now recall with nostalgia. It was a simpler era. It was a time of apprehension and of heavy international burdens for America, but we were united in our approach to adversaries and friends and our foreign policy goals.

Today the landmarks of the postwar era are gone. We see an unfamiliar landscape.

This evening I want to take note of some of the new elements in foreign policy and draw some general conclusions.

Statesmanship involves a perception of where the deep forces of history are tending. There is always an irreducible element of conjecture. But today, as the pace of history accelerates, the factor of uncertainty is magnified. In our time diplomacy in-

spires the humility of Tennyson, who once safely predicted that:

Far away beyond her myriad coming changes  
earth will be  
Something other than the wildest modern guess  
of you and me.

(As a prominent Georgian said recently, "You can depend on it.")

For most of the generation past, we lived within a well-established structure of international power, dominated by the antagonism of the two blocs which emerged in the wake of the last great global conflict. During the last decade we have moved beyond the old structure, but a new one has yet to be fully formed. We are in the midst of redefining America's world role. To do so, we have to come to terms with our past; for our historical sense as a people inevitably shapes our outlook on the future.

### The Paths of the Past

In 1630, at the founding of the Massachusetts Bay Colony, John Winthrop spoke of America's peculiar relationship to the world. "The eyes of all people are upon us . . . we shall be made a story and a by-word through the world," he said. ". . . we shall be a City upon a Hill."

It is a striking image, and prophetic of America's later attitudes toward the world:

—It expresses confidence that isolation need not diminish our influence.

<sup>1</sup> The 1976 Christian Herter Lecture given at the Johns Hopkins School of Advanced International Studies at Washington, D.C., on Nov. 11 (text as delivered).

—It reveals a conviction that separation from, or involvement in, the world is a matter of choice rather than necessity.

—It suggests a unique American destiny, yet a sense of being in the vanguard of a universal destiny.

Layers of subsequent experience hardened these patterns of thought as America's relationship with the world evolved through three historical phases.

The first period, from the Treaty of Paris to the war with Spain, provided ample evidence for Bismarck's maxim that a "special Providence" looked after "fools, drunks, and Americans." Our security was a product of fortuitous conditions: a balance of power on the Continent, our geographic remoteness, the interposition of the British Fleet, the primitive state of military technology, a vast open territory to the west, unhostile neighbors to the north and south.

The safety of the nation seemed a natural condition. Our energies were released to populate and develop the North American territory and to perfect domestic institutions. And we did so without major foreign wars, a large military, or an activist diplomacy.

Lincoln expressed it best:

Shall we expect some trans-Atlantic military giant to step the ocean and crush us at a blow? Never—all the armies of Europe, Asia and Africa combined, with all the treasure of the earth in their military chest, with a Bonaparte for a commander, could not by force take a drink from the Ohio or make a track on the Blue Ridge in a trial of a thousand years.

A tide of immigrants fleeing tyranny and privation deepened the national conviction that we were beyond the reach of corrupt and oppressive powers. Other nations' pre-occupations with security—or imperialistic ambitions—only confirmed our sense of rectitude and uniqueness.

In the second period, from Manila Bay to V-J Day, we discovered that we had become too powerful, or could be too seriously menaced, to remain aloof from great-power politics. We responded to challenge, but maintained an aversion to permanent involvement. We extended our sway to the

Philippines, yet failed to take the steps needed to defend them. We fought two World Wars as though they were temporary rescue operations. Defeat of the enemy was an end in itself. We failed to think through our continuing relationship with friends or foes. We harbored the illusion of choice between detachment and involvement. We became a creditor nation, yet erected tariff barriers which impeded our debtors from earning the foreign exchange necessary to repay us. We chose to withdraw when our ideals appeared defiled or when developments, like the depression, drew our energies inward.

If prior to World War II we refused to assume our due rank in the world, the third phase of our history thrust primacy upon us—from the Truman doctrine to the Vietnam war. Our enemies were defeated, our allies exhausted; colonial empires were crumbling. The Soviet Union appeared bent on exploiting these conditions to create a new Eurasian empire.

Our military potential was unmatched, as was our industrial prowess. We possessed a nuclear monopoly and the lion's share of the world's financial assets. We had the votes in the newly created United Nations. Our prestige and moral authority were at a peak.

And our responsibilities seemed clear: to mobilize and lead a coalition of nations sharing a stake in containing Soviet power, to reconstruct the European economy, to reform the world's trade and monetary system, and to promote economic development in the new nations. It was an effort that tapped wellsprings of American statesmanship and creativity.

We achieved success because our strategic interests complemented our moral concerns. It seemed clear that our domestic tranquillity and prosperity were reinforced by our endeavors overseas. Assistance to our friends and resistance to freedom's enemies were seen not as a burden, but as a responsibility for international peace and stability.

Our extraordinary exertions confirmed



and perpetuated our ascendancy. But by the end of the 1960's American predominance was ending. Our allies' growth in strength and confidence required a devolution of responsibilities and new patterns of partnership. The Soviets acquired essential equivalence in the strategic balance even as the Communist world splintered, presenting us with opportunities as well as complexities. With the dismantling of colonial empires, a host of newly independent nations were making themselves heard. And technology was creating new possibilities for international cooperation even as it generated new competition.

At home, the consensus underpinning our active foreign policy faded. Our financial and psychological resources were strained by two decades of exertion and the war in Indochina. It was apparent that the world would not be shaped to an American design. And many urgent problems defied immediate solution.

The formulas of the past offered no remedy:

—Neither our security nor our prosperity could be pursued in splendid isolation from the world.

—Nor could our external involvement be sporadic. We were permanently engaged in international affairs.

—And we could no longer overwhelm problems with sheer resources. Influence required a clearer sense of purpose, a more subtle and dextrous diplomacy, and an ability to evoke the assent and contribution of others.

Thus the times called for fresh departures in American foreign policy. For the past several years we have been in transition to a new era in our historical experience. Any Administration would have had to adjust our role in the world.

The goal of the United States is to help shape a global environment which will promote our interests and foster our ideals.

Many of the building blocks are now in place, due to vigorous efforts over the past several years. But much work remains:

—Working in close concert with our friends;

—Pursuing without respite the design of peace;

—Shaping new and wider contours of international cooperation.

### **Shared Strength and Purpose**

America's purposes cannot be realized in isolation. The industrial democracies of Western Europe, North America, and Asia most closely share our concerns and our values.

By the late 1960's certain patterns were emerging:

—While mutual defense would remain fundamental, we faced new issues beyond security. And if we did not collaborate on these, our security itself could be endangered.

—World peace would have to rest on more than a balance of power. Important East-West negotiations required the allies to harmonize our approaches.

—The cohesion of the industrial democracies would be central to shaping a more equitable world economy and a more cooperative world community.

—In all endeavors it was time to move from American tutelage to more equal sharing of initiative and responsibility.

—We needed to give fresh meaning to our alliances for a generation that was not "present at the creation."

In the early 1970's progress was uneven. The United States looked to the bettering of our alliances. But our disengagement from Southeast Asia and new relations with the Communist powers seemed to overshadow ties with Europe and Japan. And a series of economic problems caused strains.

To reaffirm our solidarity the United States proposed in 1973 that our collaboration be given new impetus and definition. This was read erroneously by some as a challenge to European identity. But the air began to clear; our consultations deepened; concrete cooperation went forward.

—We are working to enhance our collective strength: improving our military posture, designing new institutions of energy cooperation, and using mechanisms such as the OECD [Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development] and summit meetings to spur economic recovery and chart our future.

—We are harmonizing our approaches to Communist nations: in our bilateral dealings with Moscow and Peking, in the strategic arms talks, and in joint positions on MBFR [mutual and balanced force reductions] and CSCE [Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe].

—And we have begun to coordinate our approaches to the developing nations: through OECD consultations and working in parallel at major international meetings, albeit with mixed success.

The recent record therefore belies the view that our alliances are in disrepair. Indeed, they are generally flourishing. But there is hardly room for complacency. Differing geopolitical or commercial positions could strain our cohesion in dealing with the Communist powers. This could weaken our own ties—and set back the cause of peace itself. Our unequal economic strengths and vulnerabilities could fragment our response to the regional conflicts and the needs of the developing world. This could generate new frictions—and set back the cause of development itself.

Our ability to meet external challenges together rests on the vitality of our own economies and political systems. Our peoples' well-being, our common defense, and our relations with the nations of both East and South depend on the health of our economies. The industrial democracies generally have emerged from recession, but still seek a formula for steady growth with high employment. (I myself have a deep interest in the problem of unemployment right now!) The energy crisis exposed longstanding structural problems in some European countries, and other economies remain troubled. On the southern flank new democracy remains fragile, and allies

are at loggerheads. In Japan established political patterns are under stress.

Ultimately the future of democratic institutions and processes is at stake. If social and political tensions continue to be exacerbated by economic stagnation or failure of leadership, the impression could gain that the forces of democracy are not equal to modern challenges.

This tests the rhetoric of interdependence. Are structural problems—social and political—really susceptible to outside assistance? If prosperous friends lend money to buy time for those in trouble, do they also define how that time should be spent? Will parliaments and publics sustain defense efforts when threats are less stark? Can the young find purpose in alliances created a generation ago? Can the leaders of democracies recover the trust of their citizens and restore confidence in their societies?

Our collaboration will never, of course, bring unanimity in perspective or practice. Indeed, our diversity can be a source of strength. And whatever our differences, there are profound bonds in our common values and aspirations in the world at large.

Therefore I believe the industrial democracies have every reason for confidence. Democracy has taken hold in some nations that had been deprived of it. We have surmounted many economic difficulties, and we have begun to act in the awareness that the problems of some Western nations are the problems of all. The sterility of Communist societies is increasingly evident. The demands which the poorer nations place on us testify to our strength. And there is the special resiliency of peoples who are free.

### **The Unending Process of Peace**

E. B. White said, "Peace is not simply nothing bad happening; it is something good happening." In other words, peace is a process, not a natural state; it must open positive avenues of human endeavor, and not just deter war.



That is a lesson that has come hard to Americans. For the first time in our history, we are learning that no final state of tranquillity is possible, that the pursuit of peace is unending.

By the end of the 1960's America's military predominance had given way to a rough equivalence of strategic power and greater Soviet ability to project its influence. The once-solid Communist bloc had long since dissolved in Asia and Eastern Europe, thus expanding the scope for diplomacy. And regional conflicts posed new threats of global dislocation.

In such circumstances, there is no substitute for maintaining the elements of stability. But a durable peace also requires long-term efforts to build positive relations with potential adversaries and to ease regional tensions.

Major progress—much of it now taken for granted—has been made:

- In curbing the spiral of strategic arms;
- In reducing the danger of conflict in such flashpoints as Berlin;
- In developing some habits of East-West cooperation and incentives for peace through bilateral agreements;
- In seeking—with uneven results—to resist adventurism in local disputes;
- In ending a generation of hostility with the People's Republic of China; and
- In defusing tensions in certain regional conflicts.

In the early 1970's there were great strides forward with both Moscow and Peking. More recently, momentum has slowed. Our interests—and the world's—require better relations with both. Whether the hostility between them will diminish is a matter of conjecture. But it is not a factor we can control—nor one on which our policies should rest. We have our own reasons for making progress with Moscow and Peking. At the same time we must make clear that we are neither colluding with, nor accommodating, one at the expense of the other. The record suggests that improvement in our ties with one does not

harm our ties with the other. Indeed, our relations with both were at their peak in the same period, 1972–73.

With the Soviet Union, both firmness and conciliation will be required.

Moscow has relentlessly built up its industrial and military power, giving it capabilities that we can neither remove nor ignore. Together with our allies, we must maintain defenses that cannot be challenged. And we will need to resist a pattern of exploiting unstable local situations that could, over time, unhinge the global balance. It is precisely in these areas that mutual cooperation and restraint are least developed.

But the Russians are not towering giants. Nor can all our disappointments in the world be traced to their machinations. They face serious long-term problems on their Asian and European fronts; they have major structural problems in their economy, agriculture, and technology; their influence as an ideology and model of development has atrophied; they face incipient nationalities problems; and their diplomacy is not infallible (in contrast to ours!). Thus the West clearly has the capacity to preserve a global balance.

But equilibrium is a prerequisite, not a guarantee, for lasting peace. In the nuclear age there is an obligation to reach beyond a delicately poised truce.

Opportunities exist to negotiate ceilings on strategic arms and then to reduce nuclear arsenals. We should continue to develop other areas of mutual benefit—in arms control, in bilateral cooperation, and on those multilateral issues, such as nuclear nonproliferation and law of the sea, where our interests substantially converge.

For Americans, the most fundamental challenge is to pursue a steady, long-term course with the Soviet Union. It is time we left behind our traditional fluctuation between euphoria and gloom, between good will and indignation.

Basic questions arise. Can we turn our debates on Soviet intentions into efforts to influence Soviet actions? Will we distin-

guish between firmness and bluster? Between conciliation and gullibility? And will we understand that we cannot achieve all our goals at once, that compromise and incremental progress are often essential, that the best can be the enemy of the good?

I believe that with confidence in our own strengths, with resolve and patience, we can over time shape relations which should give peace a more hopeful dimension.

The new relationship between the United States and the People's Republic of China is a momentous development in world affairs. We came together out of necessity and a mutual belief that the world should remain free of hegemony or military pressure. And we and the Chinese have derived reciprocal benefits—better prospects for international stability, reduced tensions in Asia, more constructive bilateral ties, and increased opportunities for parallel action on international issues.

Three main factors will affect future U.S.-China relations:

—First, and most important, China's perception of America's reliability as a force in the world. An active, purposeful American role is an essential inducement to Peking for a strengthened relationship.

—Second, the state of our bilateral relations. In the process of normalization delicate issues will arise, some of which must be settled by all the Chinese themselves. But the direction of our course should be clear.

—And third, the domestic situation in the two countries. This is a time of transition for both of us, but the factors that brought us together should deepen our ties in the future.

Peace is hardly the province of the major powers alone. The world today is witness to continuing regional crises which, in an era of nuclear proliferation and economic interdependence, can gravely affect global stability and progress.

The United States will continue to have a role in resolving those conflicts where we have commitments or historic obligations

or where we alone hold the trust of all parties.

In the Middle East since 1973 the United States has helped bring about three agreements that have lessened the danger of war. In so doing we have stood by Israel, improved relations with the Arabs, and launched a hopeful process toward peace among them. Step-by-step efforts have laid the foundations for more comprehensive solutions. The negotiating process, interrupted by the tragedy in Lebanon, must be resumed. Another outbreak of fighting in the Middle East could bring big-power confrontation, worldwide economic disruption, and fresh strains among the industrial democracies.

In southern Africa events were heading inexorably toward a conflict that could shatter African cohesion and independence, set back development, and poison race relations not only in Africa but among Americans as well. As a result of diplomatic efforts of the United States and other nations, an opportunity now exists to pull back from the brink. The decisions rest with the parties directly concerned. If America and other responsible countries support moderate solutions, if all powers exhibit restraint, Africa can pursue its difficult path toward peace, freedom, unity, and human dignity.

These are the two most urgent regional crises, but others could flare up—in Korea, on Cyprus, between Vietnam and its neighbors. To defuse such mercurial situations will require insulation from great-power rivalry, genuine efforts by the parties themselves, and in some cases, the good offices of the United States.

We should avoid false analogies with the past. Our real choices lie not at the extremes of total abstention or direct military intervention. A measured American participation in the processes of peace will continue to be imperative in many corners of the globe.

The United States has sought world peace for a generation, but we are embarked on a road without end. And we are



learning that peace must rest on justice as well as stability, that to endure, it must fulfill aspirations around the globe.

### The New Dimensions of Cooperation

Technology is shrinking the physical and psychological distances between nations. As vital issues, both traditional and unprecedented, assume global dimensions, our national interest is increasingly bound up with the world interest. America's role will be pivotal in two great tasks before us:

—To strengthen a world economy under the strains of interdependence.

—To resolve global problems that transcend boundaries and ideologies.

Events in recent years dramatically brought home the link between every nation's prosperity and the international economy: the end of the Bretton Woods monetary system, an uncertain climate for trade and investment, the 1973 oil embargo, volatile food prices, and simultaneous inflation and recession. These shocks and shifts have spurred us to seek long-term solutions to deep structural problems.

(To those who have been concerned about Secretary Kissinger's alleged lack of economic knowledge, I can tonight reassure you by revealing that I have been a close adviser to him on these matters. I am not an economist myself, but I get the general drift of it. As John Maynard Keynes once said when asked for his telephone number: "I'm not quite sure, but I know it's up there in the *high* numbers.")

A beginning has been made. The United States took the lead in creating a flexible exchange rate system and urging wider monetary reforms, promoting comprehensive multilateral trade negotiations, fashioning OECD investment guidelines for firms and governments, organizing a comprehensive international approach to the food problem, and launching new forms of energy cooperation with both consumer and producer countries.

Some major policy blueprints have been

drawn. We must continue to flesh them out

We need to work out techniques for monitoring a flexible exchange rate regime. The tough bargains have yet to be struck in the multilateral trade negotiations. It remains to be seen whether voluntary guidelines for transnational investment will be honored and whether similar rules can be extended beyond the OECD area. While we have expanded food aid, the hard work of increasing global food production, distribution, and security still lies ahead. The failure of Congress and the President to agree on a comprehensive American energy policy has undercut our international efforts; today we are more vulnerable to OPEC [Organization of Petroleum Exporting Countries] price and supply policies than ever.

Finally, we need to build a long-term relationship between the developed and the developing countries. We have begun to move from polemics to serious negotiations. But clearly many of the key problems, such as commodities and debt relief, will not yield to quick and easy fixes.

Devising the right approach to the North-South problem is as challenging intellectually as it is important for the planet. First, while the developing countries continue to show solidarity in multilateral forums, they are becoming more and more heterogeneous in economic strengths and political aspirations. Second, the varying economic vulnerabilities and perspectives of the OECD partners make difficult a coordinated approach to the South. Third, the demands of the developing countries impinge directly on an often discordant array of interests and agencies here at home.

We will need perhaps the wisdom of Solomon, the patience of Job, and the self-confidence of Muhammad Ali. But we can only persevere. For our economic stake in the developing areas is growing. Our values impel us to alleviate the plight of those living in misery around the world. And a planet of stark contrasts will be one of mounting despair and insecurity for all.

We will need a long-term strategy. Some of its components seem clear:

—Our policy should reflect the diversity of the Third World. With the “middle-income” countries, our basic tools will be trade liberalization and easier access to our capital markets, technology, and management services. Other instruments will be needed for assisting the poorer countries, including concessional assistance and food aid.

—We must continue to deepen our bilateral ties with key developing countries.

—We must encourage regional efforts which promise to enhance the collective self-reliance of developing countries.

—International institutions should be used in a pragmatic way, suited to particular tasks. Mass rallies are not conducive to solving complex issues. Forums generally should include those countries with a stake in a problem, a capacity to assist in its resolution, and a willingness to assume obligations.

—And in the North-South dialogue the developed countries should be less defensive and more precise in defining their own interests.

At the heart of these international economic issues lie questions that are basically political. Governments in the industrial countries are pressed by powerful domestic constituencies and are assuming wider responsibilities for managing national economies. Can we resist the temptation to export economic problems to others?

Difficult domestic policies—such as increasing energy conservation, removing trade barriers, and controlling inflation—must be carried out, or we lose credibility in our international initiatives. Can we muster the political will necessary?

The developing countries demand more equitable distribution of the world's wealth. Can we respond in ways which jeopardize neither our own growth nor the continued expansion of the global prod-

uct—on both of which the development of others importantly depends?

A new international structure requires more than reform of the economic system. Technology spawns a fresh agenda of problems which defy unilateral, bilateral, or even regional solutions. The two most urgent are the law of the sea and nuclear nonproliferation.

In a world of dwindling resources, the oceans contain vast, untapped wealth. In a world of restrictions and contention, freedom of navigation remains essential. In a world of scarcity, the seas are a rich storehouse of protein. And the very life of our planet depends upon the health of the oceans.

The current negotiations on the law of the sea are therefore among the most complex and important ever. Significant progress has been made in defining the territorial seas, new economic zones, and a new straits regime. But unresolved issues persist: the balance between coastal state and international rights in the economic zone, the freedom of marine scientific research, arrangements for settlement of disputes, and most difficult of all, a new regime for exploiting the deep seabeds.

Unless positions are soon reconciled, there is danger of spiraling conflict. Unilateral claims already proliferate. A scramble for gain in the oceans could echo the consequences of imperialist ambitions on land. The current negotiations may be the last chance to design a peaceful community for two-thirds of the world's surface.

Of all the global problems, none is more ominous than the spread of nuclear weapons. Rising oil prices have led more and more countries to look to nuclear energy to meet their development needs. But such technology carries with it the danger of diversion of fissionable materials for weapons purposes.

Our own security, and the world's, may well hinge upon success in sealing this Pandora's box. As a major exporter of nu-



clear power the United States has a dual responsibility: to assist countries to obtain this new source of energy and to work with other suppliers to check the diversion of sensitive materials. Throughout, commercial competition should not undercut nonproliferation efforts.

In the last two years there have been important, not always publicized, advances. With others, the United States has taken promising steps to enhance international safeguards, to prevent sensitive reprocessing and enrichment facilities from being used to make explosives, and to insure reliable and economical supplies of fuel for peaceful uses.

But such measures, however crucial, address only the technical dimensions. The deeper impetus for proliferation lies in motives of security, political advantage, and prestige—intangibles not easily controlled or safeguarded. There is no more awesome challenge than to curb the growing menace of nuclear conflict, blackmail, accident, or theft. And this will only be done in an environment where the pressures for nuclear arms are relieved by a growing sense of stability and progress.

An era of economic interdependence and technological revolution offers both promise and peril. It will bring us face to face with new issues, in new settings, requiring us to break free from past habits. Already in policy meetings with the Japanese, at the top of the agenda is fish. Today whole communities abroad are greatly affected by social security remittances from the United States. Our future relations with Mexico may well focus not on the issues of Alliance for Progress days, or even on oil—although Mexico's deposits are greater than Alaska's—but on the fact that Spanish-speaking Americans may be this country's largest ethnic minority by the year 2000. And water development may well be the key in some areas, such as part of the Indian Subcontinent, are to be spared mass starvation on a scale that

could dwarf the recent tragedies in the Sahel.

Clearly, then, there is uncharted territory ahead.

### Conclusion

America has traversed many frontiers— independence, continental expansion, global involvement. The next frontier is within ourselves.

During the past decade and a half Americans felt the sting of discord between races and generations, the turmoil of great social and cultural change, and the cynicism and divisions aroused by a foreign war. Serious abuses of power occurred in government, business, and other institutions. We lost three successive Presidents— through assassination, Vietnam, and scandal. We have had to recover our balance under a President who had not been elected. And perhaps most crucial for our role abroad, there has been struggle between two branches of government.

Our nation has endured enough to have earned a respite. But instead we are continually challenged to define our place in the world. We must work with other nations to reach our objectives; we must reconcile ourselves to permanent exertion; we must learn to live with both our limits and our possibilities. And all that we do abroad will require a fresh union of purpose at home.

It is a challenge we can meet. The travails of recent years and a tendency toward self-criticism should not blind us to our profound strengths. The rest of the world has never lost sight of America's power and potential, even as many Americans have once again recalled them during this Bicentennial year.

Our military, economic, and technological strength; our creativity in diplomacy; the enduring trust of other nations; the vigor and optimism of our people—these are tremendous assets, unmatched by any other nation.

Material strengths are of little avail unless guided by vision. Here, too, we have reason for confidence.

We are the world's most vital democracy. People everywhere still look to us as the champion of human dignity and human freedom.

Our institutions have shown a remarkable resiliency through domestic turbulence and constitutional crisis.

And the American people are beginning to heal the wounds of recent years and recover a sense of pride and purpose.

It is only fitting that I leave you with the thoughts of Chairman Kissinger. Two years ago, at a less hopeful time, he sensed the national spirit when he said:<sup>2</sup>

This country is summoned once again to leadership, to helping the world find its way from a time of fear into a new era of hope. With our old idealism and our new maturity, let us disprove the impression that men and nations are losing control over their destinies. Americans still believe that problems are soluble if we try. We still believe it is right to seek to undo what is wrong with the world. And we still seek the excitement of new frontiers rather than shrinking from their uncertainty.

I believe that is the growing mood of this nation. Americans have learned that if we are not innocent in our relations with the world, neither are we corrupt; if we are not young, neither are we old; if we are not paramount, neither are we pawns of destiny.

America remains "a City upon a Hill": unique, endowed, an example to others. Now we are also part of a wider human community, engaged in creating a better world—a peaceful commonwealth for all peoples.

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<sup>2</sup> For Secretary Kissinger's address before the annual dinner of the Alfred E. Smith Memorial Foundation at New York, N.Y., on Oct. 16, 1974, see BULLETIN of Nov. 11, 1974, p. 643.

## United States Assists Relief Efforts of the ICRC in Lebanon

AID press release 76-105 dated November 5

The United States, through the Agency for International Development, has authorized a \$3 million grant to the International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC) in support of emergency relief activities in Lebanon. This grant brings to \$7 million the total U.S. contribution to ICRC since its relief program started in Lebanon a year ago. During the past year, ICRC has issued international appeals totaling \$31 million to support these activities. The latest of these appeals—for \$18.4 million—was issued on October 8 and prompted the present U.S. response.

Since October 1975, ICRC has managed under extremely difficult conditions to expand its relief efforts from the provision of medical treatment to a few hundred patients to thousands of war victims today in many areas of Lebanon. ICRC provides its services to patients through a large number of dispensaries and hospitals, including its own small hospital near Beirut that handles over a thousand patients a week. Funds from ICRC's latest appeal will continue these medical services as well as provide food, blankets, and basic household items through the coming winter months to hundreds of thousands of persons displaced by the war.

In addition to the total of \$7 million contributed to ICRC, the United States also has provided over \$6 million to the American University Hospital in Beirut to support the hospital's efforts to provide medical services to a number of Lebanon's war victims and \$1 million to the United Nations in support of its planned Lebanon relief programs.



## U.S. Nuclear Cooperation Policies

*Address by Frederick Irving*<sup>1</sup>

Every fourth year, the joint annual conferences of the Atomic Industrial Forum (AIF) and the American Nuclear Society (ANS) are designated as international conferences and devote special emphasis to the interests of nuclear communities abroad and to nuclear issues of international significance. This year the European Nuclear Society is also serving as a sponsoring organization, and we offer our particular thanks to that society for the cooperation which it has extended to help make this event of such value to the international nuclear community.

No comparable period in the history of the nuclear industry has been marked by such dramatic events and fundamental changes as have the four years which have passed since the last AIF-ANS international conference. In 1972, while such problems as increasing capital costs and public acceptance were a source of deep concern, few doubted the important role of nuclear power as a major contributor to the world's energy requirements.

Since then, to cite only a few principal developments:

—The energy crisis sparked by the Middle East hostilities of 1973 has brought the era of low-priced oil to an unexpectedly sudden end, with profound repercussions not only for nuclear energy but for the entire world economic structure.

—In 1974, a sixth country joined the ranks of those which have conducted nuclear explosions, marking the first occasion on which nuclear assistance supplied for peaceful purposes had been applied to such a development and sparking renewed worldwide concern over proliferation of nuclear weapons.

—Also in 1974, the uranium enrichment capacity of the United States, which has served as a major building stone of nuclear power development both in the United States and abroad, became fully committed, raising uncertainties as to the future availability of enrichment services from the United States.

—Throughout the period, and especially since the energy emergency of 1974, escalating costs for nuclear plants, uranium, and enrichment services have pushed projected generation costs to levels previously unthinkable for nuclear power.

—Public acceptance has become an increasingly serious problem in a number of countries. In some cases this has probably limited nuclear power development below the level which might otherwise be achieved on the basis of economic considerations.

—Declining growth in electric power demand, high interest rates, and other factors have led to plant cancellations or deferrals and sharply reduced nuclear power forecasts in the United States and most other major markets.

However, other developments, favorable to the application of nuclear power, have also occurred. Nuclear initiatives to re-

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<sup>1</sup> Made before the Atomic Industrial Forum at Washington, D.C., on Nov. 15. Ambassador Irving is Assistant Secretary for Oceans and International Environmental and Scientific Affairs.

strict the use of nuclear energy in several states of the United States have been defeated, demonstrating public recognition of the usefulness of nuclear power for meeting this nation's energy needs. The outstanding safety record of nuclear power remains intact. Despite some uncertainties, the availability of fuel material and enrichment services has not limited the expansion of nuclear power, and no serious observer doubts that sufficient enrichment capacity will be constructed in the United States and abroad to meet requirements.

### Meeting the Proliferation Threat

These, however, are topics which will be discussed in other sessions of your conference on a far more authoritative basis than I can treat them. Today, I want to concentrate on one particular problem area—the threat that inadequately controlled growth of nuclear power can contribute to the spread of nuclear weapons. I am convinced that our collective response to this threat will be one of the principal determinants in the future worldwide growth of nuclear power. And I am equally convinced that, by adopting wise policies and taking resolute actions now, we can not only meet the proliferation challenge but help generate the renewed confidence in nuclear energy which is so badly needed if we are to reduce our unacceptably high dependence on imported fossil fuels.

I obviously cannot speak for the new Administration which will take office on January 20. I will therefore address my remarks to present American policy. I should stress in this regard that since the original legislation establishing the Atomic Energy Commission in 1946, there has been consistent bipartisan support for our efforts to prevent the spread of nuclear weapons, and I believe our policy has been distinguished by much continuity. Although I am a newcomer to the field, my long diplomatic career has made me aware of the broad consensus among informed Americans on the need for a co-

operative, multilateral approach to these problems, on the unique role of the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA), and on the importance we attach to the nonproliferation treaty.

The threat of proliferation was the central issue dealt with in a major nuclear energy policy statement by President Ford on October 28.<sup>2</sup> Unlike some of the issues which the nuclear industry faces, where the immutable laws of nature must be obeyed, the problem of proliferation is one within the control of people and their institutions. The world community has it within its power to avoid further proliferation or, by ignoring or undervaluing the risk, to allow it to grow. In the President's words:

The problem can be handled as long as we understand it clearly and act wisely in concert with other nations. But we are faced with a threat of tragedy if we fail to comprehend it or to take effective measures.

To deal with the threat of proliferation, concerted action is necessary by the world community. The United States no longer possesses, if it ever did, the ability to control worldwide nuclear developments. Neither is the task for governments alone, although they must play the leading roles. Industry can, by acting judiciously and with restraint, greatly reinforce the effectiveness of government policies in the field of nonproliferation. By doing so, industry will also be acting in its own interests by helping to create the conditions which must attend the widespread use of nuclear power.

### Decisions on Reprocessing

Let me turn now to the policies proposed by President Ford, concentrating on those which are of particular significance to the nuclear industrial community. In doing so, I am assuming that most, if not all, of this audience has read the statement. I will therefore make no effort to describe it in

<sup>2</sup> For text, see BULLETIN of Nov. 22, 1976, p. 629.



detail but instead will seek to explain its basis from the foreign policy point of view.

Underlying the entire recommended program is a major new policy determination:

... that the reprocessing and recycling of plutonium should not proceed unless there is sound reason to conclude that the world community can effectively overcome the associated risks of proliferation.

From this fundamental premise, a number of specific policy initiatives, in both the domestic and international spheres, logically flow.

It is of the utmost importance that the international nuclear community, and its industrial sector in particular, understand this fundamental decision clearly and evaluate it objectively. If this is done, I am confident that industry can give this determination, and the policies which rest upon it, the support which will help insure success in our struggle against proliferation. In concluding that reprocessing and recycling of plutonium should not proceed unless proliferation risks are found to be manageable, we need in no sense condemn nuclear power itself or take exception to its increasing use, which is critical to our energy development.

On the contrary, there is convincing evidence that at this time the economic value and the environmental effects of spent fuel reprocessing and plutonium recycle, far from being essential to the utilization of nuclear power, may be doubtful. Indeed, in the present status of the nuclear industry, the unnecessary or premature allocation of scarce resources to these fuel cycle steps could easily represent a setback rather than a gain to the growing use of nuclear power. The presumption of the inevitability—and I stress this word—of reprocessing for light water reactors is a heritage which must be discarded not only by governments but by industry and the public as well if we are to overcome the specter of proliferation.

But there is, however, no need to substitute one unsubstantiated presumption for another. It is essential that we acquire ob-

jective information on all facets of reprocessing and recycle—economic, environmental, and above all, on the ability to subject these operations to effective controls—so that the necessary decisions can be made on an informed basis. Recognizing the importance of reprocessing decisions being made on a worldwide basis if they are to be meaningful in nonproliferation terms, the President specifically invited the participation of other nations in designing and carrying out an evaluation program on a basis which is consistent with nonproliferation objectives. This evaluation program therefore is one of several important phases of the Administration's program in which domestic and international policies are closely linked.

#### **Export Restraints and Supply Assurances**

The decision to defer commercial reprocessing is linked to other key proposals in the program. First and foremost is the call for maximum restraint on the part of all nations in avoiding exports or commitments for the export of reprocessing and enrichment facilities for a period of at least three years.

Second, new cooperative steps have been proposed to insure adequate supplies of nuclear fuel, with special emphasis on the needs of countries willing to forgo the acquisition of national reprocessing and enrichment facilities and to accept other effective proliferation controls. The concept that restraints should be balanced by incentives for those who extend their cooperation is one of the most important features of the new program, and we hope to develop new incentives in close collaboration with the other major suppliers. While the form which these arrangements may take has been left to future definition, we would expect in appropriate cases, and as one option, that consumers could return spent fuel to a supplier or dispose of it in other agreed ways and receive in return fresh enriched fuel of equivalent energy value.

The statement also contemplates that these new arrangements would meet two extremely important criteria:

—First, that they avoid economic disadvantage to any cooperating consuming country; and

—Second, that they avoid commercial advantage or disadvantage to any cooperating supplier country.

The United States has long counseled and followed a policy of placing nonproliferation objectives ahead of commercial gain. U.S. enriched uranium and enrichment services have been made available without regard to whether they were to be used in reactors of U.S. manufacture or that of other nations. The statement follows longstanding policy in calling for application of the same principle of seeking no commercial advantage for U.S. exports in elaborating multinational arrangements for assuring reliable fuel supplies to cooperating countries.

Our continued determination to provide appropriate enriched uranium assurances to responsible partners should provide a continued incentive to the use of nuclear power under carefully controlled conditions. The recycling of plutonium as fuel for light water reactors, in addition to its proliferation problems, involves major economic uncertainties. Thus, in view of these uncertainties, reliance on plutonium recycle for a portion of a nation's nuclear fuel supply may in fact be unrealistic, and the potential value of plutonium recycle to energy independence may have been overstated in the past.

The Presidential statement proposes measures to maintain the traditional U.S. role as a major and reliable supplier of reactors and fuel for peaceful purposes—a role which has been a key factor enabling the United States to exercise leadership in the field of nonproliferation. The President has underscored his conviction that the United States remain a reliable supplier of enrichment services.

## Storage and Waste Management

A theme which runs throughout the President's program is the necessity for multilateral, in contrast to unilateral, efforts to prevent proliferation. The United States is acutely aware of its responsibilities as a pioneer and leader in nuclear matters. However, we cannot dictate the course of events and must look for cooperative efforts by the world community to create an environment where we can safely proceed with the enormous promise of nuclear energy and bring its inherent risks fully under control.

I have already mentioned our decision to invite international participation in our proposed evaluation of reprocessing and recycling. We also are exploring a multilateral approach to the problem of the accumulation of plutonium under national control, perhaps the greatest single proliferation risk.

Study has already begun on a new regime to provide storage under the auspices of the International Atomic Energy Agency of plutonium—whether in spent fuel elements or separated form—produced in civil power reactors. This proposal takes advantage of the statutory authority of the IAEA to establish depositories and thus builds upon a longstanding international understanding on the appropriateness of this function.

In one of the most dramatic aspects of this proposal, the President has pledged that once a broadly representative IAEA storage regime is in operation, the United States will place its own excess civil plutonium and spent fuel under its control. This step is analogous to the U.S. offer, made in connection with the Nonproliferation Treaty, to place its own civil nuclear facilities under IAEA safeguards—a step which contributed significantly to securing the adherence to the Nonproliferation Treaty of the principal industrial non-nuclear-weapon nations. With U.S. civil facilities under IAEA safeguards and U.S. civil plutonium deposited in an IAEA stor-



age regime, concerns expressed by other nations over possible discrimination in the application of effective nonproliferation controls should be overcome.

Another new initiative, also with multi-lateral dimensions, relates to the problem of waste management. Implicit in the President's decision that reprocessing and recycle should not be regarded as inevitable is the conclusion that the planned demonstration depository for high-level wastes should be able to accommodate spent fuel elements as well as any products of reprocessing. The statement also indicates that other countries will be invited to participate in the U.S. waste management program.

There has been a widespread presumption both in the United States and abroad—understandable in light of the assumption that reprocessing would be generally and soon undertaken—that long-term storage of high-level waste depended on the reduction of fission products to separated form. This is one of the several presumptions which we must, on a cooperative basis, assist each other in overcoming if the proposals favoring a cautious approach to reprocessing are to gain the necessary widespread support. In fact, fuel elements, which have been designed to withstand severe reactor conditions, generally constitute an acceptable and easily retrievable form of packaging fission product wastes for extended storage. Storage requirements for spent fuel elements—both in terms of capital investment and space—are modest. The primary problem which has deterred adoption of this form of storage is the presumption that it would not be needed. The United States is prepared and anxious to work with other nations and the IAEA to develop the storage technology and depositories which are necessary to give effect to a policy of deferral of commercial reprocessing.

Another important international proposal advanced by the President is that the United States should strengthen its own criteria for entering into nuclear co-

operation agreements and should advocate the adoption of similarly strengthened criteria by other suppliers. In particular, greatly increased emphasis would be given to the following criteria in negotiating any new cooperative arrangements:

—Adherence, in the case of a non-nuclear-weapon state, to the Nonproliferation Treaty or the acceptance of IAEA safeguards on all its nuclear activities.

—The other party's willingness to forgo national reprocessing or enrichment or to use any such facilities to foster nonproliferation objectives.

—The other party's willingness to participate in the international storage regime which I have just described.

Recognizing the desirability of placing existing cooperation agreements on the same basis, the statement contemplates that this be accomplished through negotiations which offer, where appropriate, suitable fuel supply incentives to compensate for any additional restraints which are proposed.

Finally, while the focus of the Presidential statement was on nuclear policy, it recognizes that the application of nuclear energy may be neither desirable nor feasible in some countries. The statement thus proposes expanded cooperative efforts with other countries in developing indigenous nonnuclear energy resources. There is also growing emphasis in our own research and development programs on alternative technologies in the energy field.

The necessity for avoiding the proliferation of nuclear weapons while preserving the benefits of peaceful nuclear energy has challenged the ingenuity of governments and policymakers for three decades. The record to date in achieving this goal is not a perfect one, but it provides a basis for optimism that the task can be accomplished. Its achievement requires the full cooperation of all parties—governments, industry, and the public. By working together, we can assure the accomplishment of one of the most urgent tasks of our time.

## U.S. Joins Security Council Consensus on Occupied Arab Territories

*Following is a statement made in the U.N. Security Council by U.S. Representative Albert W. Sherer, Jr., on November 11, together with the text of a Security Council consensus statement read that day by Jorge Enrique Illueca, Representative of Panama and President of the Council for the month of November.*

### STATEMENT BY AMBASSADOR SHERER

USUN press release 147 dated November 11

Mr. President, the United States has joined the other members of the Security Council in the consensus statement which you have read because we believe this statement affirms several important principles in regard to the occupied territories.

First is the principle that the Fourth Geneva Convention applies to the present situation in the occupied territories. Under this convention and under international law the occupying power has rights as well as responsibilities. Secondly, we have supported and continue to support the principle that persons displaced in the 1967 war should be permitted to return to their places of habitation at the time of that war. Finally, we welcome the concern in this statement for the sanctity of the holy places, which we consider to be a particularly sensitive and important matter.

While my government has associated itself with the results of this debate, I must in candor observe that the criticism of Israel which dominated these proceedings has been largely one-sided and excessive. This was particularly true as regards the question of access to the holy sites, specifically the burial sites of the Patriarch Abraham.

We agree with the other members of the Security Council that the Fourth Geneva Convention, specifically article 27, provides

the standard for measuring Israeli conduct in this matter. We are also fully aware that in recent weeks there have occurred deplorable acts of desecration and violence in and around this site which is holy to Moslems, Jews, and Christians alike.

However, it is only fair and proper to point out that the Israeli Government has condemned and opposed these activities and has, most recently, brought charges in a military court against a rather prominent Israeli citizen for his role in them.

The question of access to and worship within this site is a particularly complex and difficult matter, but we believe that the occupying authorities have acted in good faith to protect and preserve the religious rights set forth in the Fourth Geneva Convention.

The Council's statement of consensus speaks of the danger to peace of *any* act of profanation of the holy places. This we take to mean any act by the population, the local authorities, or the occupying power.

In closing, I would like to observe that in this debate we have been dealing with the symptoms of the problem rather than with the problem itself. The conditions we have been discussing will be satisfactorily resolved only in the context of the negotiation of a just and lasting peace in accordance with Security Council Resolutions 242 and 338, with respect to which we stand by all of our previous positions.

There is good reason to hope that conditions in the Middle East have improved to the point that renewed efforts toward such a settlement will be possible. The recent meetings of Arab leaders in Riyadh and Cairo promise to contribute to an end to the fighting in Lebanon and to the preservation of its independence, territorial integrity, and national unity, to which we attach the highest importance. More broadly, the statesmanship displayed by the governments principally involved promises to establish the constructive atmosphere and



the conditions necessary if there is to be progress toward resolving the problems which continue to beset the Middle East.

## SECURITY COUNCIL CONSENSUS STATEMENT

As a result of consultations over which I presided with all members of the Council, I am authorized as President to make the following statement on behalf of the Council.

Following the request submitted by Egypt on 20 October 1976, the Security Council held four meetings between 1 November and 11 November 1976 to consider the situation in the occupied Arab territories, with the participation of the representative of the Palestine Liberation Organization.<sup>1</sup> After consulting all the members, the President of the Council states that the Council has agreed on the following:

(1) To express its grave anxiety and concern over the present serious situation in the occupied Arab territories as a result of continued Israeli occupation;

(2) Reaffirmation of its call upon the Government of Israel to ensure the safety, welfare and security of the inhabitants of the territories and to facilitate the return of those inhabitants who have fled the areas since the outbreak of hostilities;

(3) Its reaffirmation that the Fourth Geneva Convention relative to the Protection of Civilian Persons in Time of War is applicable to the Arab territories occupied by Israel since 1967. Therefore, the occupying Power is called upon once again to comply strictly with the provisions of that Convention and to refrain from any measure that violates them. In this regard the measures taken by Israel in the occupied Arab territories that alter their demographic composition or geographical nature and particularly the establishment of settlements are accordingly strongly deplored. Such measures which have no legal validity and cannot prejudice the outcome of the search for the establishment of peace constitute an obstacle to peace;

(4) It considers once more that all legislative and administrative measures and actions taken by Israel, including expropriation of land and properties thereon and the transfer of populations which tend to change the legal status of Jerusalem, are invalid and cannot change that status, and urgently calls upon Israel once more to rescind all such measures already taken and to desist forthwith from taking any further action which tends to change the status of Jerusalem. In this connexion the Council deplores the failure of

Israel to show any regard for Security Council resolutions 237 (1967) of 14 June 1967, 252 (1968) of 21 May 1968 and 298 (1971) of 25 September 1971 and General Assembly resolutions 2253 (ES-V) and 2254 (ES-V) of 4 and 14 July 1967;

(5) Its recognition that any act of profanation of the Holy Places, religious buildings and sites or any encouragement of, or connivance at, any such act may seriously endanger international peace and security.

The Council decides to keep the situation under constant attention with a view to meeting again should circumstances require.

## Secretary Discusses U.S. Action on Security Council Consensus

*Following is the text of a letter dated November 16 from Secretary Kissinger to Senator Jacob K. Javits, of New York, together with the text of a summary attached to the letter.*

### TEXT OF LETTER FROM SECRETARY KISSINGER

NOVEMBER 16, 1976.

DEAR SENATOR JAVITS: I have received your letter of November 15 concerning the United States' action in associating itself with the consensus statement in the recent Security Council meeting on the Israeli occupied territories. I welcome the opportunity to discuss our reasons for adopting this position.

I want to make clear at the outset, in response to your specific question, that this action of the United States does not represent in any way a change in U.S. policy towards Israel, its security, or its relations to its neighbors and the United States. Our commitment to the security of Israel remains a fundamental element in American foreign policy. Our friendship towards Israel tested over the years remains fundamental.

Our decision in the Security Council was a reflection of the policy we have followed

<sup>1</sup> For a U.S. statement on participation of the PLO in the debate, see USUN press release 136 dated Nov. 1.

for years toward Israel's rights and responsibilities in the occupied territories.

It is important to regard our action in New York against the background of our handling of Middle East issues in the Security Council over the past year and to take into account as well the problems that we know lie before us. We were facing a situation in New York in which, after having vetoed or blocked at least six Security Council actions critical of Israel in the last year alone, we now had a proposed statement that eliminated the very elements that had led us to oppose earlier actions, specifically a Council statement in May. The statement, moreover, drew on language we had ourselves used with respect to Israeli policies in the occupied territories. It is hard to see how we could have failed to associate ourselves with a statement incorporating language we had ourselves used and deleting clauses to which we had previously objected.

At the same time, looking ahead, we recognized that we would be facing a series of Middle East issues in the UN in the weeks ahead, in the first instance the renewal of the UNDOF [U.N. Disengagement Observer Force] Mandate at the end of November. Our capacity to be effective in opposing measures that are clearly objectionable requires us to maintain the credibility of our position by not opposing measures that are basically consistent with our policy. We had not chosen to have this Security Council meeting but had nonetheless to respond to the situation with which it confronted us.

The consensus statement as it was finally put forward in the Council reflected long and publicly-stated United States policy on the occupied territories. This policy was most recently enunciated by Ambassador Scranton in the Security Council on May 26 of this year, but it had been the subject of other public statements going back several years. The U.S. Permanent Representative stated in the Council (in 1969) that "The occupier must maintain the occupied area as intact and unaltered as possible

without interfering with the customary life of the area, and any changes must be necessitated by immediate needs of the occupation. . . . My Government regrets and deplores this pattern of activity and it has so informed the Government of Israel on numerous occasions since June 1967." In the following year, on March 20, 1970, the U.S. Representative to the UN Commission on Human Rights, stated in the debate on the Question of Human Rights in the Territories Occupied as a Result of Hostilities in the Middle East: "Article 46 of this [Geneva] Convention prohibits the occupying power from transferring parts of its civilian population into the territories it occupies. It also prohibits individual or mass transfers or deportations of people from occupied areas . . . . With respect to transfer of civilians into those areas, my Government has stated time and time again that it has strong reservations about these or any other steps which might prejudice an ultimate political settlement of the Arab-Israeli dispute." Essentially the same point was made by the spokesman of the Department of State of June 9 of the following year.

During the consultations in New York that led up to the consensus statement, we reviewed with Israeli representatives our position on the proposed statement and informed them of the efforts we were making to soften the language. We made clear to them that we would not be able to act inconsistently with our past positions should we succeed in these efforts. We had no reason to expect the intensity of the present Israeli reaction.

I would like to emphasize that our position on the question of Israeli conduct in the occupied territories has had also positive elements. We believe, in particular, that Israel has carried out its obligations to safeguard the holy places in an exemplary manner, and we have made this point firmly in discussing the question of the occupied territories. In his statement in the Security Council following the reading of the consensus statement on Novem-



ber 11, U.S. Ambassador Sherer stated, "We believe that the occupying authorities have acted in good faith to protect and preserve the religious rights set forth in the Fourth Geneva Convention." He also made a point that we felt needed to be stressed when he said, "Under this [Geneva] Convention and under international law, the occupying power has rights as well as responsibilities."

In situations where we have felt United Nations resolutions to be unjustly critical of Israel, or where they have contained language that we considered harmful to goals that we and Israel share in the Middle East, we have not hesitated to oppose them even if this required, as it frequently has done, standing alone. We voted against numerous General Assembly Middle East resolutions that we considered unbalanced, and in the United Nations specialized agencies we have led the opposition against efforts to limit Israel's full participation. We have also consistently defended Israel's interests against unjust criticism in the Security Council and have insisted on balance in the Council's actions. I am attaching a brief summary of the occasions during this past year when we have blocked what we considered to be unacceptable Council measures.

I want to emphasize in conclusion that our policy toward Israel has not changed and that a measured consistency on our part in responding to such a situation as that which faced us this month in the Security Council is important not only in the context of the Council itself but also in respect to our broader responsibilities in the Middle East, in particular our efforts to help achieve a Middle East peace settlement. If we are to continue to play the important role that we have played in this respect in recent years, we must above all maintain the conviction among the parties involved that we stand by statements we have made over the years. Just as Israel has been able and will be able to count on it, so must the other parties. Israel has always understood that our policy in support

of a peaceful settlement requires us also to take the views of other parties to the peace process into account. As is evident from views we have reiterated throughout the period since 1967, had we been presented with this consensus statement at any time, we would have supported it. We all want to see peace in the Middle East, and we all recognize that only through peace will we finally resolve the issues such as those that have led to this recent meeting of the Security Council.

Best regards,

HENRY A. KISSINGER.

ATTACHMENT: Summary

### TEXT OF SUMMARY

#### *Summary of Occasions During Past Year when the United States Has Blocked Unacceptable Security Council Measures*

—On December 8, 1975, the U.S. vetoed a resolution "strongly condemn[ing] the Government of Israel for its premeditated air attacks against Lebanon . . ."

—On January 26, 1976, the U.S. vetoed a resolution affirming "that the Palestinian people should be enabled to exercise its inalienable national right of self-determination including the right to establish an independent state in Palestine . . ."

—On March 25, 1976, the U.S. vetoed a resolution on the occupied territories, which, *inter alia*, expressed deep concern "at the measures taken by the Israeli authorities . . . aimed at changing the physical, cultural, demographic, and religious character of the occupied territories . . ."

—On May 26, 1976, the U.S. refused to join a Security Council consensus statement on the occupied territories because it called upon Israel "to rescind" any measure that would violate the Fourth Geneva Convention. (This phrase, among others, was deleted from last week's consensus statement because of U.S. insistence.)

—On June 29, 1976, the U.S. vetoed a resolution affirming "the inalienable rights of the Palestinian people to self-determination, including the right of return and the right to national independence and sovereignty in Palestine . . ."

—On July 14, 1976, the U.S. prevented the adoption of a resolution, following the Entebbe raid, that condemned Israel's "flagrant violation of Uganda's sovereignty and territorial integrity" by introducing a counter-resolution with the U.K. which condemned hijacking.

## U.S. Proposes System of Disclosure in Treaty on Illicit Payments

*The United Nations Economic and Social Council's Intergovernmental Working Group on Corrupt Practices held its first meeting at New York on November 15. Following is a statement made at that meeting by U.S. Representative Mark B. Feldman, who is Deputy Legal Adviser of the Department of State.*

USUN press release 148 dated November 15

I consider it a privilege to join with you in this meeting which initiates the first serious effort of the international community to control corruption that preys upon international commerce. During the past 18 months we have seen disclosures of bribery, extortion, and other questionable payments involving approximately 200 business enterprises and public officials in a large number of countries on every continent. While only a small percentage of business enterprises and of public officials may be involved, these disclosures have had very serious consequences in many countries.

In one case a head of government has been removed from office following allegations of bribery. In other cases prominent political leaders and personalities have been indicted or come under censure. A number of corporate executives have lost their positions, and criminal investigations are being pressed forward in several countries. Although corruption in one form or another is as old as organized society, the disclosures of recent months have revealed a pattern of corrupt practices that has shocked international public opinion.

There can be no doubt that these corrupt practices—bribery, extortion, and influence peddling—undermine the integrity and stability of governments and distort international trade and investment. They raise the cost of goods and services in all countries, particularly in the developing countries, which can least afford this additional burden on their balance of payments. Moreover, corrupt practices involving major corporate enterprises and public officials

undermine public confidence in the basic institutions of our society.

The United Nations General Assembly recognized the seriousness of this problem when it adopted Resolution 3514 by consensus last December. That resolution condemned all corrupt practices, including bribery by transnational and other corporations, intermediaries, and others involved, and called upon both home and host governments to take all necessary and appropriate measures to prevent such practices.

In August the Economic and Social Council took the decision to establish this working group to examine the problem of corrupt practices, in particular bribery, in international commercial transactions and to elaborate in detail the scope and contents of an international agreement to prevent and eliminate illicit payments, in whatever form, in connection with international commercial transactions as defined by the working group.

It is evident that no legal measures can quickly or completely eradicate corrupt practices which are widespread and deep-rooted in human society. On the other hand it is equally clear that the events of the last year have disclosed a problem that can no longer be ignored. Public opinion demands that our governments act, and a process has begun that will compel change. Recognizing that the problem is complex and touches upon delicate questions of social organization and economic interest, the U.S. delegation believes that if this working group focuses its attention on the most urgent problems and addresses them with serious purpose, it can devise legal measures that will eventually gain broad acceptance and produce significant results.

At this stage of our discussion, I should like to review with you the actions the U.S. Government is taking to control illicit foreign payments by American enterprises and to consider briefly some aspects of this complex problem. We would welcome similar information and perspectives from other delegations. At a later stage on our



agenda, the U.S. delegation will be prepared to indicate some preliminary views on the possible scope and content of an international agreement. We will want to hear the views of other delegations before making any formal proposals to the working group.

Over the past year the U.S. Government has developed a substantial program to deal with questionable foreign payments by U.S. enterprises. That program includes more vigorous enforcement of existing laws, enactment of new legislation, and cooperation with other governments in the investigation of criminal offenses and in other measures to deter illicit payments.

Under U.S. law, the Securities and Exchange Commission, an independent regulatory agency, has responsibility for administering the securities laws which require regulated companies to make public disclosure of information that is relevant and material to investors. When the Commission discovered that companies were not making disclosure of foreign payments, which it deemed material to the financial condition of the enterprise or to the integrity of management, it initiated a program, both by judicial enforcement and voluntary disclosure, that has uncovered questionable foreign payments involving nearly 200 different firms. A number of these firms have publicly declared their intention, or have been ordered by courts, to terminate these practices. The Commission has also issued general guidance on the disclosure it will expect from all regulated companies in the future; these requirements can be expected to act as a significant deterrent as far as U.S. firms are concerned.

The Internal Revenue Service is also concerned with foreign payments, as U.S. tax law prohibits the deduction as a business expense of any foreign payment that would have been illegal if it had been made in the United States. Accordingly, the Service has recently issued a questionnaire to 2,000 large enterprises requiring a full report of foreign and domestic payments. We understand that serious questions have been

raised in a number of cases and that indictments can be anticipated. Obviously this action will have a strong influence on U.S. enterprises.

In the field of new legislation, the U.S. Congress included provisions in the Arms Export Control Act of 1976 requiring reports of payments—including political contributions and agents' fees—that are made or offered to secure the sale of defense articles or defense services for the armed forces of a foreign country or an international organization. The Department of State has issued detailed regulations implementing this statute.<sup>1</sup>

The Congress has also enacted new tax legislation which provides a further deterrent to illicit foreign payments by U.S. firms. Under the new law, a foreign payment that would have been illegal if made in the United States is treated as taxable income to the U.S. taxpayer.

Last March, President Ford established a Cabinet-level task force to review U.S. policy concerning questionable foreign payments. That task force has recommended legislation which would require U.S. enterprises to report for public disclosure a broad class of payments made by or on behalf of U.S. enterprises or their foreign affiliates in connection with transactions with foreign government agencies or other official acts of foreign officials for the commercial benefit of these enterprises. The Administration bill would establish criminal penalties for failure to make the required reports or for false reporting. The Congress is also considering several other bills which provide either for criminal penalties for the bribery of foreign officials or for disclosure of a class of foreign payments that could be used as a conduit for such bribes. It is likely that the Congress will enact general legislation in 1977 including one or both of these approaches.

While the actions being taken by the U.S. Government will contribute to a solution of

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<sup>1</sup> 22 CFR Part 130; 41 *Fed. Reg.* 40608, Sept. 20, 1976.

this problem, they cannot be effective unless they are matched by comparable actions of other developed and developing countries. The problems of corrupt practices are not limited to any one country or group of countries or to any one type of enterprise or form of government. All of our countries are affected by this problem, and we must all cooperate to solve it.

Thus, from the outset the United States determined that it must cooperate with other governments who wish to eradicate corrupt practices in their countries. Accordingly, the United States has concluded bilateral agreements for the exchange of information with the law enforcement authorities of 12 countries. In addition, we have cooperated with other governments who have established new requirements for the disclosure or regulation of agents' fees paid in connection with sales to or contracts with government agencies.

Our experience has brought the conviction that the illicit payments problem can only be solved by collective international action based on a multilateral treaty to be implemented by national legislation. We have also come to believe that the traditional criminal laws cannot solve the problem by themselves. A survey of national legislation shows that nearly every country of the world has legislation prohibiting bribery of its officials. However, this legislation can be difficult to enforce and has not proved to be a meaningful deterrent. Thus, a new approach is required.

The basic concept of a new approach, as outlined by the U.S. delegation to the Lima meeting of the United Nations Commission on Transnational Corporations last March, would be a comprehensive system of disclosure of a defined class of payments to be agreed upon in a treaty and to be enforced by all the contracting parties. The theory of disclosure, which has been demonstrated by long experience in the United States, is that public scrutiny is an effective deterrent to improper activities by private enterprise or by public officials.

Obviously a disclosure approach raises

many technical questions of definition as well as potential problems of administration. To be practicable it needs to be carefully focused. Therefore it is important to recognize that the problem of illicit, or questionable, payments consists of a number of separate but related problems that may require differentiation if we are to take effective action:

—There are cases of simple bribery in which an individual or an enterprise pays or offers a large sum of money to a public official to obtain a benefit which the official has the discretion to authorize. These bribes might be paid to obtain what the briber cannot win through fair competition, but they might also be made to match the bribes offered by competitors. Sometimes these competitors are of the same nationality as the briber. In other cases the competitors are nationals of the host country or of third countries.

—There are also cases of extortion in which public officials demand illicit payments from enterprises subject to their jurisdiction. These demands are frequently made in connection with particular contracts or other matters under bid or negotiation, but demands are also made of established investors by officials whose continuing good will is essential. Extortion can take the crude form of demands for personal benefits or the subtler form of solicitation of contributions for political or even charitable purposes.

—There is the related problem of agents' fees. In many fields of commerce, sales agents and intermediaries perform a useful function in facilitating commerce for which they earn a legitimate and reasonable compensation. However, large agents' fees can be a conduit for the payment of bribes to public officials and other influential persons, particularly where slush funds and questionable accounting practices are used to obscure the flow of payments. Inflated agents' fees also can be used for the embezzlement of corporate funds and for other illegal purposes.



—There is a fourth problem of petty corruption, of so-called “expediting” payments. It appears that in many countries payments to clerks and functionaries are necessary to obtain routine administrative action. These practices may be illegal, but they may be accepted in the community and very difficult to eradicate.

—There are other problems such as political contributions or commercial kickbacks. Each of these presents complex dimensions of its own.

This working group has the mandate to determine the scope and contents of an international agreement on illicit payments. It might be easier to agree on a treaty of broad scope and weak commitments, but the U.S. delegation believes our work will be more meaningful if we can focus the treaty on the most urgent problems and agree on effective measures to deal with them. We look forward to a full exchange of views on these issues.

## **U.S. Responds to U.N. Special Appeal for Relief Programs in Lebanon**

*Following is the text of a letter dated November 3 from William W. Scranton, U.S. Representative to the United Nations, to U.N. Secretary General Kurt Waldheim.*

USUN press release 140 dated November 3

**NOVEMBER 3, 1976.**

**DEAR MR. SECRETARY-GENERAL:** The United States Government has followed with concern the tragic unfolding of events in Lebanon over the past eighteen months of fighting. We thus consider your Special Appeal for the creation of a \$50 million fund to alleviate the consequences of the fighting to be most appropriate and worthy of support and are pleased that United Nations agencies are now prepared to initiate relief programs in that country.

The President of the United States, through his Special Coordinator for Humanitarian Assistance, has accorded me

the honor to inform you that the United States will give \$1 million immediately to the Special Fund. We hope that this donation will prompt similar humanitarian gestures from other countries in response to your appeal.

The United States will support your efforts in every way possible, and will continue, along with other United Nations members, to be responsive to further relief requirements of the Special Fund as you define them.

Sincerely yours,

**WILLIAM W. SCRANTON.**

### **TREATY INFORMATION**

## **Current Actions**

### **MULTILATERAL**

#### **Cotton**

Articles of agreement of International Cotton Institute, as amended (TIAS 6184). Done at Washington January 17, 1966. Entered into force February 23, 1966. TIAS 5964.

*Accession deposited:* Iran, November 8, 1976.

#### **Maritime Matters**

Amendments to the convention of March 6, 1948, as amended, on the Intergovernmental Maritime Consultative Organization (TIAS 4044, 6285, 6490). Adopted at London October 17, 1974.<sup>1</sup>

*Acceptances deposited:* Ghana, October 18, 1976; Malta, November 2, 1976.

#### **Narcotic Drugs**

Protocol amending the single convention on narcotic drugs, 1961. Done at Geneva March 25, 1972. Entered into force August 8, 1975. TIAS 8118.

*Ratification deposited:* Togo, November 10, 1976.

#### **Oil Pollution**

International convention for the prevention of pollution of the sea by oil, as amended. Done at London May 12, 1954. Entered into force July 26, 1958; for the United States December 8, 1961. TIAS 4900, 6109.

<sup>1</sup> Not in force.

*Acceptances deposited:* Argentina, September 30, 1976; Bulgaria (with a reservation), October 28, 1976.

### **Slave Trade**

Protocol amending the slavery convention signed at Geneva on September 25, 1926, and annex. Done at New York December 7, 1953. Entered into force December 7, 1953; July 7, 1955, for annex to protocol. TIAS 3532.

*Signature:* Spain, November 10, 1976.

### **Wheat**

Protocol modifying and further extending the wheat trade convention (part of the international wheat agreement) 1971. Done at Washington March 17, 1976. Entered into force June 19, 1976, with respect to certain provisions and July 1, 1976, with respect to other provisions.

*Accession deposited:* Lebanon, November 16, 1976.

## **BILATERAL**

### **Philippines**

Agreement relating to the reciprocal granting of authorizations to permit licensed amateur radio operators of either country to operate their stations in the other country. Effected by exchange of notes at Manila October 25, 1976. Entered into force October 25, 1976.

Agreement extending the agreement of November 3 and December 15, 1975 (TIAS 8204), concerning the continued operation of Loran-A stations in the Philippines. Effected by exchange of notes at Manila July 29 and October 28, 1975. Entered into force October 28, 1975, effective January 1, 1977.

## **PUBLICATIONS**

### **Department Completes Publication of 1948 "Foreign Relations" Volumes**

Press release 556 dated November 11 (for release November 20)

In releasing on November 20, "Foreign Relations of the United States," 1948, volume V, "The Near East, South Asia, and Africa," part 2, the Department of State has completed publication in nine volumes of the major documents of American diplomacy

for the year 1948. The "Foreign Relations" series has been published continuously since 1861 as the official record of U.S. foreign policy.

Part 1 of this volume, published in August 1975, treats relations with countries of the Near East (except Israel) as well as South Asia and Africa. Publication of part 2 was deferred to permit inclusion of material that has only recently become available in the Harry S. Truman Library, Independence, Mo., and elsewhere.

Part 2 contains 1,197 pages and presents previously unpublished documentation on the interest and policies of the United States with respect to the Palestine question and the creation of the State of Israel in the year 1948.

The volume begins in the aftermath of the partition resolution adopted by the United Nations General Assembly on November 29, 1947, with documentation concerning U.S. exchanges with Arab and Jewish leaders and other interested powers at the United Nations and at world capitals, the reports of the United Nations Palestine Commission, the U.S. proposal for the establishment of a temporary trusteeship for Palestine, and the convening of the second special session of the General Assembly in April.

The volume continues with documents regarding the interest of the United States in achieving a cessation of hostilities in Palestine and support for the Security Council Truce Commission and for the appointment of a United Nations Mediator in Palestine. Of particular note is documentation concerning the events of May 14, 1948, and after: the expiration of the British mandate for Palestine, the proclamation of the independence of the State of Israel, the extension by the United States of de facto recognition to the Provisional Government of Israel, and the entry of Arab forces into Palestine. The volume records the strong interest in the Palestine question on the part of President Truman and such close advisers as Clark Clifford and the important roles played by Secretary of State George C. Marshall; Loy W. Henderson, then Director of the Office of Near Eastern and African Affairs; Dean Rusk, Director of the Office of Special Political Affairs; and Warren R. Austin, U.S. Representative at the United Nations.

"Foreign Relations," 1948, volume V, was prepared in the Office of the Historian, Bureau of Public Affairs. Copies of parts 1 and 2 (Department of State publications 8802 and 8840; GPO cat. no. S1.1:948/v. V, pts. 1 and 2) may be obtained for \$8.25 and \$15.00 (domestic postpaid), respectively. Checks or money orders should be made out to the Superintendent of Documents and should be sent to the U.S. Government Book Store, Department of State, Washington, D.C. 20520.



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*557	11/15	Shipping Coordinating Committee, Subcommittee on Safety of Life at Sea, working group on radiotelecommunications, Dec. 16.
*558	11/15	Study Groups 10 and 11, U.S. National Committee for the International Radio Consultative Committee, Dec. 9.
*559	11/16	ECOSOC Intergovernmental Working Group on illicit payments, New York, N.Y., Nov. 15.
†560	11/16	Kissinger: North Atlantic Assembly, Williamsburg.
†561	11/17	Kissinger: National Meeting on Science, Technology, and Development.
†562	11/18	Egyptian-American Joint Working Group on Education and Culture, Nov. 14-16.
*563	11/18	United States and El Salvador terminate textile agreement, July 15.
†564	11/18	"Foreign Relations," 1950, volume II, "The United Nations; the Western Hemisphere," released.

\* Not printed.  
† Held for a later issue of the BULLETIN.

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# THE DEPARTMENT OF STATE BULLETIN

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THE OFFICIAL WEEKLY RECORD OF UNITED STATES FOREIGN POLICY

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# THE DEPARTMENT OF STATE BULLETIN

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*The Department of State BULLETIN, a weekly publication issued by the Office of Media Services, Bureau of Public Affairs, provides the public and interested agencies of the government with information on developments in the field of U.S. foreign relations and on the work of the Department and the Foreign Service.*

*The BULLETIN includes selected press releases on foreign policy, issued by the White House and the Department, and statements, addresses, and news conferences of the President and the Secretary of State and other officers of the Department, as well as special articles on various phases of international affairs and the functions of the Department. Information is included concerning treaties and international agreements to which the United States is or may become a party and on treaties of general international interest.*

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## Secretary Kissinger Meets With NATO Parliamentarians

*Following are informal remarks by Secretary Kissinger and the transcript of his question-and-answer session with members of the North Atlantic Assembly at their 22d annual session held at Williamsburg, Va., on November 16.<sup>1</sup>*

Press release 560 dated November 16

Now, distinguished delegates, when I accepted this invitation it was at the advice of our Policy Planning Staff, which felt that it was safe to use this occasion to articulate the policies of the new Ford Administration. [Laughter.] But you have to remember that not even our Policy Planning Staff can be right 100 percent of the time. So I think there are one or two Congressmen here who, even if I attempted to bluff, would be eager to tell you that I cannot fully speak for the policies of the forthcoming Carter Administration.

Nevertheless, the policy of the United States toward NATO, the basic foreign policy objectives of the United States, have always been treated as nonpartisan issues in the United States. When a Republican Administration was in office, the main lines of our foreign policy have been supported by leading Democrats. And now that a Democratic Administration is about to assume office, the main lines of our policy, you can be certain, will be supported by leading Republicans. We will not treat foreign policy as an issue between the parties in any event. The relationship between the United States and its allies in the Western alliance goes back over the whole

postwar period. It has been pushed forward by every President, of both of our parties; and it reflects enduring realities.

The United States will always stand for peace. It will always uphold the security of its friends and of free people, and it will always strive for bringing about a world that is better than the one in which we may find ourselves at any moment.

It is fashionable in discussions of the NATO alliance to emphasize the difficulties, and sometimes the shortcomings, of the alliance. But we should keep in mind that one can think of few alliances in history that have lasted such a long time while gaining in strength and cohesiveness. What started out as an attempt to deal with a military danger has expanded in significance to encompass economic and political cooperation, which is turning our alliance more and more into a cooperative, creative partnership.

I thought that the most useful thing I could do today is to make a few observations about the basic problems that any American Administration faces in the conduct of foreign policy and then to answer your questions.

Inevitably, the NATO alliance faces the need to adjust itself to new realities. Weapons technology has changed enormously since the early days of NATO. At that time the United States had a nuclear monopoly. Today, as a result of unavoidable industrial and technological changes, there exists an effective parity.

We can discuss forever which side has a marginal advantage in what category of strategic weapons. The basic fact remains that the predominance of strategic weap-

<sup>1</sup> Congressman Jack Brooks' introduction of Secretary Kissinger and the opening paragraphs of Secretary Kissinger's remarks are not printed here.

ons which characterized the 1950's and the greater part of the 1960's is no longer the case and cannot be recaptured at any level of American effort. Therefore NATO inevitably faces the necessity of adjusting its defense to these new conditions.

That challenge is being met now. Major efforts have been made in recent years to improve the defensive capability of NATO; and this challenge must continue to be met, and I am confident will continue to be met, in the years ahead.

The second problem we face is the political and economic cooperation between the nations of the North Atlantic. Whether this is done within the framework of the NATO organization or through ad hoc arrangements adopted to specific circumstances is less important than for us to remember that military defense without a political and economic consensus will, over a period of time, prove empty. The nations of the North Atlantic have to have some common vision of the future and a parallel approach to some of the crucial issues of our period.

I believe that in recent years the degree of consultation among the allies has expanded enormously in all fields and that very great progress has been made in developing this consensus in the field of economic cooperation.

I remember when in 1973 I pointed out the need for the nations of the North Atlantic to cooperate in the field of economics, there were some who pointed out that this was not necessarily part of the NATO charter. And that was true. But the events of subsequent years have left no doubt that our nations are interdependent, that we are the engines of the world economy, that none of us can achieve economic prosperity in isolation, and that none of us can master the problems either of East-West economic relations or North-South economic relations by separate policies.

And finally, there is the problem of relations with the Communist world, the problem that brought us together in the first

place. We face adversaries that are gaining in military strength, and we therefore have the necessity of building up our own military strength. But we also must remember that we have an obligation to the future and an obligation to our peoples to demonstrate that military power is a means and not an end, that we must spare no effort to bring about a more peaceful world and one less fraught with risks.

We must avoid, on the one hand, the danger of illusionism and of wishful thinking that substitutes the desire for peace for the reality. But we also have to avoid the danger of excessive truculence and of thinking that tough rhetoric is the same as substantive policy.

But we face these problems, I believe, in an atmosphere of increasing confidence between the allies. In the two political campaigns in NATO countries that took place this year, the debate between the parties was as to who would do a better job in strengthening the alliance. And while the incumbents, of course, always believed that the criticism that was made of them was unjust, unfair, and a few other words I would not wish to use here, nevertheless the fact of the criticism is healthy for the alliance because it shows that in this country there is no dispute about the importance of NATO. There is no dispute about the central role the Atlantic relationship plays in our foreign policy. There is only a dispute as to who can most effectively realize the objectives all Americans share.

And now, in any event, that the campaign is over, all Americans will without doubt support the strengthening of NATO, the fostering of the partnership between Western Europe and the United States, and the common achievement of peace, of progress, and of security.

Now I will be glad to answer your questions.

*Rear Adm. Morgan Morgan-Giles, British House of Commons: Mr. Secretary of State, in your very interesting remarks, you spoke*



about the broadening of the original NATO alliance into political and economic fields. But I am, as an old military man, concerned with the processes within the alliance for taking military decisions for military crisis management below the threshold of any shooting war. And could you say whether during your time as Secretary of State you have been satisfied with the arrangements and the procedures and, in particular, the communications for taking military decisions within our alliance in conditions below a shooting war?

*Secretary Kissinger:* Well, during my term of office we did not have a major European crisis, and therefore the military arrangements of NATO were never tested as far as I was concerned in a crisis situation.

I have the feeling, based on no very hard evidence, that an improvement in the communications would be helpful. I have had more experience with political consultation, but again not under crisis conditions. There the relationship between the NATO Council and consultations in capitals does not always work as smoothly as one would expect. And in very acute crises, the tendency has been to consult more immediately in the capitals than in the NATO Council.

### **Greek-Turkish Disputes**

*Constantin Koniotakis, Greek Parliament:* I am a retired Air Force general who has served with SHAPE [Supreme Headquarters Allied Powers Europe] for three years under Gen. [Lauris] Norstad as military representative of Greece.

I am, sir, very much concerned, as I am sure all of us here are, about the weakness in the effectiveness of the southern flank of the alliance, which, as all of us know, is due to the existing state of tension in our relations with Turkey.

But Greece is asking nothing that belongs to any of her allies. The Turks, after 20 years of smooth cooperation in the alliance, are claiming today rights that belong to us ac-

cording to existing international treaties.

So I ask on which side lies the bulk of responsibility for creating such problems which produce generally this tension. I know, sir, that is a very delicate question to answer, but I am certain that as long as NATO's attitude toward such problems in the alliance is to be, or seems to be, influenced not so much by objectiveness but by other considerations, I am afraid that the cohesion of the alliance will continue to suffer.

*Secretary Kissinger:* Well, I am reckless, but I am not suicidal. [Laughter.]

In my limited but intense exposure to the Greek-Turkish problem, it has become apparent to me that in the history in which Greece and Turkey have impacted on each other over the centuries, there has developed a legacy of distrust in which an outsider would better not attempt to apportion the responsibility.

The major problem we face today is that the disputes between Greece and Turkey, and the attempt to settle these disputes by military means, are a disaster for both countries and a disaster for the alliance. These issues have, moreover, become enmeshed in our own domestic affairs, and I think that the most useful role that the United States can play is to seek to bring about a resolution of these conflicts by acting as an honest broker between the parties, using its influence, because there can be no victory for either side between Greece and Turkey. Everybody will lose.

I think the major role in this will have to be played by the new Administration. But again, all concerned Americans will support any serious effort to bring an end to these disputes.

### **Angola and Portugal**

*Amaro da Costa, Portuguese Assembly of the Republic:* Mr. Secretary of State, I would like to put to you two questions concerning Angolan affairs and one question concerning Portuguese affairs.

*As you know, and all of us know, two former liberation movements in Angola are now conducting or leading or initiating a new guerrilla war aiming, according to their own declarations and statements, to put an end to the presence and domination of Cuban and Soviet military forces in Angola. I would like to have your reaction on that issue, on those new events, and on the possible consequences of this new state of affairs in the interests of the alliance.*

*A second question, sir, it will be concerning the recent reports indicating that the Cuban military forces in Angola are responsible for genocide in the south of the country, and I would like to have your comments on such reports.*

*The third question, sir, concerns Portugal. The United States and other countries have been giving a positive response to the financial and monetary needs of their own country, and I would like to know if you think that the present level of cooperation is enough to overcome the present economic difficulties of my country.*

*Secretary Kissinger:* With respect to the first question, we are aware that a guerrilla war is going on in some parts of Angola. We are not supporting it. And to the extent that it occurs, it seems to reflect the inability of the authorities in Luanda to establish their control, even with the presence of 12,000–13,000 Cuban troops.

We have strongly opposed the presence of these Cuban troops. We think that their introduction was incompatible with the spirit of détente or with the practice of détente. And we believe that any future efforts like this would raise very serious questions about Soviet long-range intentions.

But we are not ourselves participating directly or indirectly in any of these actions.

With respect to genocide in the southern part of Angola, we have seen no confirmed reports, and our information is probably no different from yours. It comes from stories

from various surrounding countries. But we have had no independent confirmation.

With respect to the economic problems of Portugal, the United States has strongly supported the democratic government that is now in office in Portugal and the democratic system that has been established. We have under consideration now a program for substantially increased economic aid, and I think that within the next week a decision on this will be communicated to the Portuguese Government and, I think, in a constructive sense.

### **Rhodesia Negotiations**

*Sir Geoffrey de Freitas, British House of Commons:* Like the last question, mine goes far beyond NATO, but it concerns Africa. May I ask the Secretary of State to say something about the Administration's policy on Rhodesia?

*Secretary Kissinger:* The United States has supported the principle of majority rule in Rhodesia with respect for minority rights and was instrumental in bringing about the acceptance by Mr. [Ian D.] Smith of the principle of majority rule within two years and of the establishment immediately of a transitional government before full majority rule comes into being.

There is now in Geneva a negotiation under British chairmanship that is enormously complex because it brings together four nationalist groups of different persuasions, the Rhodesian authorities, various African observers—and therefore the negotiations have a very complex character.

Nevertheless I think both the British Government and we are cautiously optimistic that the negotiations are going forward. Each of the parties, of course, has the necessity of making public statements for its own constituents, but we hope that progress—well, we believe that some progress has already been made, and we believe that the negotiations to establish a transitional government can be pushed forward.



## European Unification; NATO Standardization

*Arne Christiansen, Danish Folketing: Mr. Secretary, you mentioned among other things the economic interdependence. One of your former Ambassadors to the European Community recently published a book called "The Unhinged Alliance." I think it was Ambassador [J. Robert] Schaetzel. In this book he indicates some reluctance from the Americans in recognizing the efforts and endeavors of the Europe of the Nine.*

*As a European, I would like to hear your comment on that point of view and, in the same connection, also your opinion with a view to the standardization and rationalization within NATO, your view on the European program group.*

*Secretary Kissinger:* Well, of course, you have to remember I am leaving public office as an illiterate. I don't read any non-classified document [laughter], and I don't know whether I am still capable of reading a sentence that doesn't have five dependent clauses [laughter].

So I have not read the book of Mr. Schaetzel, but I assume, from a general acquaintance with his views, that he is not in complete agreement with the policies of this Administration.

Now, I don't know what is meant by recognizing the efforts of the Nine. Our view has been that in the fifties—and maybe in the early sixties—it may have been appropriate for the United States to be the chief engine of European unification. But at some point in that process, the process of European unification had to develop its own momentum. We have believed that Europe could not be unified by the United States and that frantic efforts by the United States to bring about what has to be an organic evolution would not advance the prospects.

We welcome European unification. We believe it is in the interests of the West, in the interests of the Atlantic alliance. We will cooperate with European unification. But I think that the chief impetus for European unification must come from the

Europeans, and the United States cannot adopt a patronizing attitude in which we tell the Nine how they should organize their own internal affairs.

Now, in that sense, we may not have been as active as our predecessors. But it is also an imperative, if Europe is ever to be an independent force, that at some point it take over responsibility for its own evolution. We welcome that evolution. We will support it. We are willing and eager to deal with it.

On the issue of standardization, in principle we support it. It is, in fact, highly desirable. In practice, when the issue arises there are very often conflicting pressures in which theory and practice do not always mesh. But certainly the standardization of weapons in NATO is a highly important and desirable objective.

## Normalization of Relations With P.R.C.

*Roderick MacFarquhar, British House of Commons: Mr. Secretary, after an initial breakthrough, the Administration of Mr. Nixon and Mr. Ford did not succeed in normalizing relations with the People's Republic of China. I wonder if you could explain why that was and whether you would recommend, if asked, that the new Administration should and could proceed rapidly in that direction.*

*Secretary Kissinger:* I have done my utmost to curb my propensity of telling others how to conduct their affairs, and I don't think it would be appropriate for me to give advice to an Administration that hasn't even taken office yet and especially somebody who was not short of advice while I was in office. I will try to be somewhat more sparing than was the case when I was here.

But, basically, I would point out that our relationship with China has at least two components—the component of normalization and the component where two great nations have parallel objectives even in the absence of normalization of relations.

The parallel interest has been expressed

repeatedly in public statements by both sides in our concern with preventing world hegemony by any country. And we believe that we can cooperate, and have in fact on occasion developed parallel views, whether or not normalization has in fact been completed.

The United States has committed itself to work toward normalization. I would assume that the new Administration will continue this process; but I don't want to make cooperation on one of these categories dependent on full completion of the other, nor do I want to tell the new Administration with what speed it should proceed.

### **Peaceful Alternative in Southern Africa**

*Claude Roux, French National Assembly [in French]: Mr. Secretary, our colleague Chairman [Michel] Boscher very clearly expressed the views of the French delegation regarding your action at the service of peace.*

*We especially appreciate your successful efforts for the safeguarding of peace in the Near East and for the strengthening of alliances. Perhaps this has not been brought out sufficiently, but I would like to tell you that public opinion and the opinion of our colleagues as well is that, as regards Africa, we have the feeling that there is a certain passiveness on the part of the American Government.*

*Our Portuguese colleague raised a question a moment ago regarding the development of guerrilla warfare in Angola. There are Cuban troops who cross the Atlantic, and we would like to have some clarifications on the attitude of the U.S. Government at this point and regarding the future developments of the situation in the whole of southern Africa.*

*Secretary Kissinger:* Of course now we will have to see whether my French is adequate to my self-confidence. But since my answers are usually sufficiently opaque, you may not know. [Laughter.] You may never know whether I understood your question.

With respect to southern Africa, first of all, we believe that the decision that was taken by our Congress last year with respect to Angola had extremely unfortunate consequences and set in motion a series of events which we are now attempting to master. But I think this has to be understood as a background to the current situation.

Our attempt in Africa is to demonstrate that there is a peaceful alternative—to strengthen the moderate elements, to prevent further incursions of military forces from outside of Africa, and at the same time, to encourage an evolution in the direction that is compatible with the aspirations of the African peoples.

Now, under the circumstances which we have faced, this is a very difficult and complicated operation. And the fact is that the Soviet Union had at first actively opposed it and it is now certainly not cooperating with it. Still, I believe it is an attainable objective.

The alternative is the radicalization of all of Africa, with impact on Europe that this group knows better than I do, and perhaps even on the Middle East. And therefore the stakes in a peaceful evolution and a strengthening of moderate forces in Africa cannot be underestimated.

### **Middle East Issues in the United Nations**

*Philip Goodhart, British House of Commons: Mr. Secretary of State, I wonder if you could say a few words about the significance of America's last vote at the United Nations on the Middle East [in the Security Council on November 11], particularly in view of the widespread, if cynical, belief that that vote might have been different if it had come before rather than after the last elections.*

*Secretary Kissinger:* Well, that belief is totally incorrect. We have confronted in the United Nations a series of resolutions, of which we have vetoed seven in this year alone. We have before us this month the renewal of UNDOF [United Nations Dis-



engagement Observer Force]. We have before us a general debate on the Palestinian question in the General Assembly. And we also have the necessity that if we are going to contribute to peace in the Middle East we must be prepared to take into account the views of all of the parties.

In this case, we faced a resolution drawn from statements the United States had made over a period of four years.

In May we had abstained from a similar resolution because it contained two offending clauses. Both of these clauses were eliminated from the resolution that was put before the Security Council. Therefore the resolution that went through the Security Council was specifically adapted to meet American concerns and would have been infinitely stronger but for this.

Secondly, it was passed as a consensus statement by the chairman, which, as you know, has in itself no legal force; it simply reflects a view.

And, thirdly, it was based on statements which the United States itself had made over the period of a decade.

Given our overall responsibilities, given the fact that peace in the Middle East is of profound concern to all of the parties, we felt that we had an obligation to go along with the consensus, and especially if we have to keep in mind the positions we may have to take in the months ahead. It did not reflect a change of American policy. It reflected our convictions that had been expressed over many months, over many years, and I would like to think that had that same resolution come up earlier, we would have voted for it, though one can never know that now.

But the fact is that in May we had indicated we would vote for this resolution if it eliminated two offending sentences. At that time the Arabs refused to delete the sentences. This time they did delete them; and therefore we felt, particularly at this period of great uncertainty in the Middle East, that it was in the national interest, it was in the interest of peace in the Middle East, that we voted as we did.

## Middle East Peace Process

*Erik Blumenfeld, Federal German Bundestag: Mr. Chairman, allow me to put a question to the Secretary of State in his capacity as the main architect of peace in the Middle East so far.*

*I should like to know whether his experience goes in the direction we could say that future development will best be served if in the near future the Geneva Conference could be reconvened as the Egyptian President seems to have suggested—or whether, prior to that, between Israel, Egypt, the Syrian Government, the Jordan Government, prenegotiations should take place under the guidance of the United States.*

*Second question: Does the Secretary of State see a more important role for the European partners in our alliance, with a view to a future peace solution in the Middle East? If so, in which direction does he see that?*

*Secretary Kissinger:* With respect to the first question, we have indicated our willingness to reassemble the Geneva Conference. We also on other occasions pointed out that a preparatory conference might be a good way to insure the success of the Geneva Conference.

Our approach to this issue has been pragmatic; that is, to encourage those negotiations that have the greatest hope for success.

We believe that the objective conditions for progress toward peace in the Middle East are better now than they have been perhaps at any time since the creation of the State of Israel. We believe that the countries of the Middle East, through the experiences of the last few years, have learned that nobody can impose its program on the other and that the easing of the tensions between Syria and Egypt may create conditions in which progress can again be started toward peace negotiations.

Since these are tactical questions of great complexity, I don't want to prescribe how to do this except to say that we should be

flexible about whichever approach seems to offer the greatest prospects.

Now, with respect to European participation in this process, it depends on the degree to which European actions can be coordinated with those of the United States.

I think if Europe and the United States began to diverge in significant respects as to a peace settlement in the Middle East, then I think it would have a very unfortunate and unsettling effect.

If our policies can be coordinated, then there are several European countries, or the European Community, that could play a useful role. So, my answer to your question would depend on whether we can achieve a coordinated position.

*Mme. Antoinette Spaak-Danis, Belgian Chamber of Representatives: Mr. Secretary, I asked the same question this morning of Mr. Sonnenfeldt [Helmut Sonnenfeldt, Counselor of the Department of State]. I think it must be feminine curiosity on my part, but I would like to hear you answer this question now in the same direction as the question raised by my Danish colleague a moment ago. The integration of Europe is the subject.*

*I would like to ask you—and you said very forcefully that you thought that the Europeans should draw up this policy themselves, without the intervention of the United States, and I certainly agree with you on that. We are very zealous and jealous of our own independence, and you are quite right. But I think, under certain circumstances, the United States could show their encouragement perhaps to the more European of the Europeans, showing by verbal encouragement their appreciation of this policy, or these policies, and I am thinking especially of the Puerto Rico conference [June 27–28], where you didn't invite the European Commission as such to participate.*

*I think that this would have been very important for us as Europeans, and I would like to say, as the more European of us, it would have been important for us to have support which was other than just oral or*

*verbal. It would have been a great step forward for us.*

*Secretary Kissinger: Well, I hope that my friend and colleague Sonnenfeldt did not announce any doctrines while he was here this week. [Laughter.]*

On the question of the participation at the Puerto Rico conference, the question of membership was developed by consensus, and it was one of those cases where the United States did not believe that it could be more European than the Europeans. But it is a rather delicate issue.

*Senator Pierre Giraud, French Senate: Mr. Secretary of State, a French automobile builder said that he wanted to make them in any color provided they were black.*

*We have the impression that when the United States talks about cooperation in the area of arms and military materiel manufacture, you want any kind of equipment provided it is American equipment. And I think that this is your view of affairs, is it not?*

*Secretary Kissinger: Well, you will have a representative of the Defense Department here who can give you the technical explanations for our undoubtedly correct views. [Laughter.]*

As I understand it though, we have made efforts to find means of standardizing on tanks and other equipment, but I would prefer to let experts answer this question.

### **Cooperation on Energy**

*Patrick Wall, British House of Commons: The Arab oil boycott struck a considerable blow against many of the nations represented in this room. The threat is dormant, but it is still there. Could the Secretary of State say something about the future of energy supplies to the West?*

*Secretary Kissinger: We have always believed that the West should use this period—or the industrial democracies should use*



this period—to put themselves into the strongest possible position to resist the sort of pressures that we faced in 1973.

In some categories, considerable progress has been made. The formation of the International Energy Agency led to a stockpiling program in which I think all of the participating countries now have reserves of between three and six months. There is a program for emergency sharing in case of another embargo. And those are useful and important steps.

However, the fundamental step—that is, the conservation of energy and the development of alternative sources of energy—has not been pursued with equal intensity, and I have to say that our country is as much to blame in this as anybody.

I think the measures to deal with a possible embargo should be looked at from the point of view of emergency measures. The fundamental program has to be in the field of conservation and of the development of alternative sources of energy. And I hope that in the near future this will be a program that all the industrial democracies will jointly pursue.

*Dimmede Psilos, Greek Parliament: Mr. Secretary, I would like to ask you a question, very short, very straightforward, concerning your past, recent past. Since the United Nations General Assembly consists of representatives of governments, why did your delegation vote in favor of reconsidering the existing ruling according to which the representative of the Turkish Cypriot community should address a committee only?*

*Secretary Kissinger:* This vote concerned a procedural position that the United States has consistently taken in which various liberation movements of several countries have addressed either the committees or the Security Council. It implied no recognition. In fact, we have always taken the position that interested parties, even if they were not governments, could address committees and the Security Council. And we

have simply applied in that case votes we took in connection with many so-called liberation movements that have addressed various committees of the General Assembly. It was in no sense a new decision by the United States.

*Alan Lee Williams, British House of Commons: Mr. Secretary of State, I understand that this weekend you are going to Plains, Georgia. I am not quite sure where that is, but I am just wondering whether you could say something about the discussions that you might be having with Mr. Carter. [Laughter.]*

*Secretary Kissinger:* Would you repeat the last part of the question? I was so overwhelmed by the first part of it. [Laughter.]

Well, I have spent so much of my time finding Plains on the map [laughter] that I have not yet had time to address what I might discuss, but the discussion depends primarily on the President-elect, and I am going there to answer fully his questions and to cooperate to the fullest extent in bringing about a smooth transition and to enable the President-elect to take over under the best possible circumstances.

### **Communist Parties in NATO Governments**

*Aristide Gunella, Italian Chamber of Deputies: Mr. Kissinger, as Secretary of State, as a historian, in your view what would be the implications of the participation of the Communist Party in a government of a great NATO country in Europe, the effect of this on Europe and on NATO? Here I am talking about Italy or even France.*

*Secretary Kissinger:* I hope that the record shows that I was provoked [laughter]—that I did not, in the closing days of my incumbency, volunteer comments on so controversial a topic.

I have stated our view repeatedly that the participation of Communist parties in the government of a NATO ally would raise serious questions about the kind of

military cooperation that would be possible, the kind of policies that such a government could pursue, the degree of consultation within the alliance that might be feasible, and indeed the ultimate impact even on the European Community.

So, we have held the view, and we continue to hold the view, that participation would have serious consequences for the alliance—and this independent of whether this party takes its orders from Moscow or is a relatively autonomous party, which you cannot judge in any event from their declarations. I would be more convinced about the autonomy if the votes by which it is established in the central committees were not so totally unanimous.

### **Control of Strategic and Nonstrategic Weapons**

*Kurt Mattick, Federal German Bundestag: Mr. Secretary of State, since 1968, when we had in Europe student demonstrations and popular movements against the war in Vietnam, and demonstrations have also taken place against armaments—since then there have not been any serious objections against this development in the public opinion of Europe, even I would say a dreamlike acceptance of everything.*

*I would ask you now: How do you estimate the possibilities of disarmament? How do you see the role of the Soviet Union? And, if I may ask, does the U.S. Administration have certain reservations as far as SALT Two is concerned?*

*The third question, if there are opportunities for success in disarmament, would there not be time for all European governments to talk with the population of the countries concerned, why there has not been any progress, and should we not also underline that this is perhaps the fault of the Soviet Union and Eastern European governments? Otherwise, we might expect demonstrations against future armament.*

*Secretary Kissinger:* We have believed that the control of arms is an imperative of our period.

With respect to strategic nuclear weap-

ons, we do not believe that either side can gain a decisive advantage unless the other totally fails to meet its obligations over an extended period of time. And since one can expect that both sides will make the necessary efforts, it only insures a continuously rising level of expenditures and of arms that in the final analysis will not be relevant to most of the crises that occur.

Secondly, I believe that our governments have an obligation to their peoples not to accept a constant accumulation of nuclear weapons without having made a serious effort to limit them.

We will of course accept no unequal agreement. Of course an agreement must be balanced and reciprocal. We believe that such an agreement is achievable at levels somewhat lower than those that now exist and could lead from there to more substantial reductions.

That is the field of strategic weapons. In the field of nonstrategic weapons, the issue is more complicated because there the West is not in a position of parity as we are in the field of strategic weapons; in certain areas, our opponents have a numerical superiority.

So therefore negotiations such as those in Vienna [on mutual and balanced force reductions] are more complex, because in order to establish parity the Eastern bloc would have to make disproportionately larger cuts than NATO.

But I believe that if parity is the proper course in strategic weapons, it must also be the proper course in nonstrategic weapons.

I agree with your comment that our governments must demonstrate to their public that they are making every effort to control arms. But the art of leadership now is to demonstrate this in such a way as not to undermine the readiness to maintain adequate defenses in the absence of an agreement.

So, we have to do both things: to maintain adequate defenses and to maintain our readiness to negotiate seriously about limitation of arms.



## Sino-Soviet Relationship

*U.S. Senator Robert Morgan, of North Carolina: Mr. Secretary, would you comment on what you think the effect might be on NATO in the event of a possible Sino-Soviet rapprochement?*

*Secretary Kissinger:* I do not believe that it is in the interest of the West to give the impression that we are panicked about a possible rapprochement between the Soviet Union and the People's Republic of China.

The Soviet Union and the People's Republic of China quarrel for their own reasons, and they are going to make their rapprochement for their own reasons. They will certainly not be prevented from any rapprochement by any concern that might be expressed by either Europeans or Americans.

Whatever concerns the People's Republic of China has, however justified they might be, about its neighbor—those concerns will continue to exist. And therefore I would judge that there is a limit beyond which rapprochement is unlikely to go.

But I think our best course in the relationship between the Soviet Union and the People's Republic of China is to let those two Communist powers handle their own relationship and not give the impression that we can manipulate it for our own ends.

## Impact of Increase in Oil Prices

*Lothar Krall, Federal German Bundestag: Mr. Secretary of State, in your speech to us, you pointed out the need for economic co-operation in the alliance, and rightly so; and the energy policy, I think, is part of it. You have already commented on this.*

*During these days, the representatives of the OPEC countries [Organization of Petroleum Exporting Countries] meet in Vienna in order to discuss the increase in oil prices. Now, do you know whether the industrialized states or partners in our alliance intend consulting with each other in order to develop a joint attitude in that case where such an increase were agreed?*

*And a second question, what will be the implications for the North-South dialogue of such increases?*

*Secretary Kissinger:* Well, the United States has made its view very clear. We believe that an increase in prices will slow down economic recovery in the industrial states, will compound inflationary pressures, and will in fact not solve the problems of the OPEC nations that led to the demand for a price increase to begin with.

We have called our views to the attention of the OPEC nations. We are discussing this problem also with industrial democracies. We are also approaching some of the less developed countries, whose deficits will rise if the prices increase and whose deficits ultimately will then come back to us. So, we are paying for the increase not only out of our gross national product but eventually in some form in the less developed countries.

So, what the impact of all these consultations will be it is too early to foretell, but it is certainly a matter we take very seriously and in which the actions of the countries concerned cannot be ignored or taken lightly by the United States.

## Helsinki Conference on European Security

*Victor Goodhew, British House of Commons: Mr. Secretary of State, since the U.S. Government and other Western governments recognize the right to self-determination of the peoples of the continent of Africa, why did they all go to Helsinki to decide upon the permanent denial of that same right of self-determination to the peoples of Eastern Europe?*

*Secretary Kissinger:* First of all, there are a number of myths that have developed about Helsinki. It is clear that the United States was not exactly pushing its European allies on the issue of the European Security Conference. In fact, as I look back over the last eight years, the opposite might be said.

But leaving aside the question of who took the major role, what is it in the docu-

ment on European security that denies people in Eastern Europe the right to self-determination? The document says that frontiers should not be changed by force but that they could be changed by peaceful means, according to international law.

I do not know any NATO country that has had the principle that frontiers in Europe should be changed by force. There is nothing in the document that legitimizes Soviet domination of any outside country. And it is precisely those countries that are most concerned in Eastern Europe about getting greater freedom of maneuver that were the most active proponents of the European Security Conference.

So, I have failed to understand why it is that it is in the West that the most extreme and the most pro-Soviet interpretation of the Helsinki document should be taking hold and why we in the West should be making arguments on behalf of the Soviet Union that they don't make for themselves.

*Mme. Annemarie Griesinger, Federal German Bundestag: Mr. Secretary of State, in Western Europe—not only in Western Europe, in fact, but also in South America and Africa—we find again and again that the strategy of Communists is directed toward ideological struggle.*

*This takes two sides. First of all, the feeling of dissatisfaction of the population vis-à-vis environmental pollution, et cetera, is encouraged. We have some examples in the south of Germany recently. A number of nuclear power stations were to be built, and we had to make use of the full power of the police to make sure that these nuclear power stations could be built. And we know fully well that agitators here are not only German Communists but that there are other strategies at play.*

*Secondly, we see that Communists are active where people are dissatisfied with military governments and with racial governments in southern Africa and in South America.*

*I have had a very interesting discussion with the Secretary General of the Economical Assembly (sic), and there we saw it very clearly that everyone only bases his own judgment on his own experience.*

*And I am very worried about this in the United Nations. We can see that those who have lived under military governments are not able to judge that Communist governments in fact offer less freedom and liberty.*

*This is an important problem. This is why I would like to go into the details of this. I would like to have an answer from the Secretary of State what America can do here, what more America can do. Because what is tragic is that even the Christian churches at the moment are very much of the opinion that suppression comes from the West only and exclusively and not from the East.*

*The Secretary of State gave us such a marvelous speech, but recently—where was this, New York it was—during the 50th anniversary of the Council of Synagogues of America, and there he speaks about these problems and these values, et cetera. And this is why I would ask for a very short answer to this very long question.*

*I am fully convinced that the Secretary of State will be able to do this, brilliantly he will be able to do this. But I did not want to miss the occasion in order to ask this question.*

*Secretary Kissinger: Among my many abilities, giving a short answer isn't one of them. In fact, my country of origin puts me into the position that it usually takes me 10 minutes before I can place a verb. But I think you have called attention to an important problem. [Laughter and applause.]*

*John Arentoft, Danish Folketing: Mr. Secretary, I fully agree if you do not answer my question [laughter], but I am sure that if you do, your answer will interest very many.*

*What are your plans to serve your country and the world after the 20th of January, 1977?*



*Secretary Kissinger:* I do not have any plans. But I wish the new Administration well. And as I pointed out, I consider foreign policy a nonpartisan effort, and I will continue to support the principles for which I have stood outside the government on a nonpartisan basis. And if that helps us to have a more effective foreign policy, I would be delighted.

## Letters of Credence

### *Bahrain*

The newly appointed Ambassador of the State of Bahrain, Abdulaziz Abdulrahman Buali, presented his credentials to President Ford on November 18.<sup>1</sup>

### *Fiji*

The newly appointed Ambassador of Fiji, Berenado Vunibobo, presented his credentials to President Ford on November 18.<sup>1</sup>

### *Niger*

The newly appointed Ambassador of the Republic of Niger, Andre J. Wright, presented his credentials to President Ford on November 18.<sup>1</sup>

### *Rwanda*

The newly appointed Ambassador of the Republic of Rwanda, Bonaventure Ubali-joro, presented his credentials to President Ford on November 18.<sup>1</sup>

### *Sudan*

The newly appointed Ambassador of the Democratic Republic of the Sudan, Omer Salih Eisa, presented his credentials to President Ford on November 18.<sup>1</sup>

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<sup>1</sup> For texts of the Ambassador's remarks and the President's reply, see Department of State press release dated November 18.

## Meeting of U.S.-Egypt Working Group on Education and Culture

Press release 562 dated November 18

A series of new cooperative programs to be carried out between the two countries was announced by the Egyptian-American Joint Working Group on Education and Culture upon conclusion of a three-day meeting at the Belmont Conference Center at Elkridge, Maryland, November 16. These range from proposals of assistance to the Egyptian primary and secondary school systems to upgrade teacher skills to the recording and preservation of Egyptian folk-life and the strengthening of various Egyptian Information Agency activities.

The Joint Working Group was established 2½ years ago to stimulate and facilitate the development of mutually beneficial educational and cultural relations between Egypt and the United States. Dr. Hassan Ismail, president emeritus of Cairo University, headed the Egyptian delegation, and William K. Hitchcock, Deputy Assistant Secretary for Educational and Cultural Affairs of the U.S. Department of State, headed the American delegation. The recently appointed Egyptian Minister of Health, Dr. Ibrahim Badran, who represented Egypt at the opening of the Treasures of Tutankhamun exhibition at the National Gallery on November 15, was in the 10-member Egyptian delegation.

At this meeting, the group reviewed progress achieved since its last meeting in January. This included arrangements to assure the availability of American textbooks and periodicals in Egypt, efforts to resolve the issue of U.S. and Egyptian academic degree equivalencies, university-to-university exchanges between the two countries, the establishment of a Center for the Training of Teachers of English in Cairo, and broader exchange-of-persons programs.

The group will hold its next annual meeting in Egypt.

## The United Nations: Can It Serve the Common Interest?

*Address by Samuel W. Lewis*

*Assistant Secretary for International Organization Affairs*<sup>1</sup>

I am grateful for this opportunity to explore with you a basic question of American foreign policy: Can the United Nations serve the interests of both the United States and the Third World?

I can give you a clear response—and my answer is yes. The United Nations can serve the interests of both the United States and the Third World. It clearly has the potential to do so. The tougher question is: Will it? Or that more difficult question can be stated this way: In the decades ahead, is the United Nations likely to be more successful than not in fulfilling its basic purposes? The answer, of course, depends upon all the imponderables of future events, the play of forces in world affairs, and the behavior of governments and individuals. And these are things about which no one can speak with certainty.

But both of these questions—about the U.N.'s capacity and about its future—deserve serious analysis. And the answers to both depend, in turn, upon other related questions. For example:

—Can the work of the United Nations and its family of institutions be a force for harmonizing the efforts of diverse governments, or will the U.N. system function in ways which promote deepening conflict and harden lines of division?

—Will it be possible increasingly to identify mutual benefits from common ac-

tion, or will the existing political divisions persist so tenaciously that the work of the United Nations will be perceived only as a scoreboard for posting victories and defeats?

The relevance of these questions is surely clear to Americans. As achievers, as “can-do” people, we know that enterprises move forward and are successful only if all the participants feel they achieve some benefit.

Beyond this pragmatic approach, it may be helpful to look at much more fundamental issues. I would like to try to think through with you today the underlying purposes of the United Nations in the light of our present experience. If we analyze those purposes, and some basic challenges to them, I believe we will acquire a much sounder basis for seeing how the organization can serve the interests of all nations.

### The Challenge of the United Nations

The United Nations presents us, and all other nations, with a fundamental challenge. It is not merely a test of our technical capacity to manage an international institution efficiently. Nor is it related solely to what happens within the U.N.'s walls. It is, rather, a challenge of enormous breadth—concerning the basic nature, the purpose, and the quality of relationships among sovereign states in a world where national sovereignty remains paramount.

This challenge was first posed after the

<sup>1</sup> Made before the American Association of University Women's United Nations Seminar at New York, N.Y. on Nov. 18.



First World War with the creation of the League of Nations. Although its motivating force was the idealism of an American President, the United States was not then ready to take up the challenge. And a few decades later it became clear that the entire world had been equally unready.

Now the challenge of the United Nations still remains before us. It has two dimensions:

—First, to help reconcile individual national interests with the broader interests of the community of nations; and

—Second, to facilitate changes in the international system which reflect the ever-changing power and prosperity of individual nations—and to do so peacefully, without destructive violence.

Whether the United Nations meets these two challenges will determine whether it serves the interests of both the United States and the Third World, indeed the entire community of nations.

#### *Reconciling National and International Interests*

The problem of reconciling national and international interests underlies nearly all foreign policy disputes. But in a global international organization like the United Nations it is central.

In dealing with the great global issues—the environment, the oceans, energy, food—the interests of all nations are now more clearly entangled. Many governments are beginning to perceive that their own interests are best served by resisting pressures for immediate gains and by joining in a broader consensus in support of long-range goals. If every nation were to pursue courses of action aimed at bringing the largest and most immediate benefits, there could be no consequence other than perpetual chaos and conflict in every international organization.

If the United Nations is to work, nations must forgo pressing for some advantages now to gain lasting benefits in the future.

#### *Achieving Change Through Peaceful Processes*

The problem of achieving change through peaceful processes will be with us for as long as there are nations. Since Heraclitus, the world has known that “Nothing endures so much as change.” And a world of independent and competing sovereignties will continue to generate tensions created by desire for, or resistance to, change.

We must never be content with a world in which satisfaction with the status quo stultifies change and progress. But neither can we permit untrammelled forces of change to destroy progress already made. And we should never accept the idea that change must be brought about by one society’s imposing its system upon others. These efforts have come in many guises—colonialism, imperialism, hegemony, ideological militancy. They are all inconsistent with the U.N. Charter. They must all be left behind.

Throughout most of history, important international changes all too often have come by force. The League of Nations, and then the United Nations, were rooted, however, in a new concept: that mankind has the rational capacity to find the means of managing change through peaceful processes of negotiation. The realities of power will remain an inherent ingredient of all international relations. International organizations cannot abolish power—but they can assist in constraining and channeling its use to positive ends; they can be of vital assistance in the unending task of substituting reason and compromise for force and domination.

#### *Difficulties Confronting the United Nations*

It would be difficult enough under any circumstances to realize these two broad purposes of the United Nations: reconciling national and international interests and achieving change through peaceful processes. But there are special circumstances

in contemporary history which add new dimensions to the task: the virtual explosion in the number of independent nations comprising the international community and the emergence of pervasive political and ideological conflict. Indeed, it is the magnitude of precisely these developments which leads us to ask ourselves whether a world body can serve the interests of both the old and the new nations.

### *The New Nations and the United Nations*

I said earlier that if international institutions are to achieve their purposes, all of the participants—new nations and old—must be prepared to give up something to achieve something else.

Since the Second World War, our country has been among the strongest supporters of international institutions and the rule of law. This undoubtedly results partly from our idealistic traditions. I hope it will not be taken amiss, however, if I add that our ability to pursue such a course has been enhanced by our enormous wealth. More than most other countries, we can afford to give something up in the present to gain something in the future.

But most nations are not so fortunate. Many are extremely poor. It is understandably more difficult for them to exhibit patience in the pursuit of long-range goals when their immediate needs are so desperately pressing.

Moreover, national independence is a relatively new experience for many countries. Our country had been independent for about 140 years when it rejected the concept of the League of Nations. Many U.N. members are barely 15 years old. Yet already they confront the need to submerge some attributes of national sovereignty in the interests of global community. And many are reluctant to do so.

We can sympathize with the dilemma posed for the new nations. But today there are fundamental truths that no nation can escape. In our interdependent world, it will be impossible for most nations to progress

toward their goals of development, of providing opportunity and dignity for their citizens, unless there is broad international cooperation founded upon a mutual effort to realize common gains.

### *Political Conflict and the United Nations*

Ironically, while it is the very purpose of the United Nations to channel political conflict toward accommodation, to facilitate peaceful change, it is also true that international organizations can readily be misused as theaters for waging political warfare.

And unfortunately, the public diplomatic stage at the United Nations can provide great temptations to indulge in posturing instead of sober recognition of hard truths, to search for scapegoats instead of solutions, and to substitute voting majorities for genuine consensus.

It is a commonplace that our century has witnessed global ideological struggle perhaps unprecedented in history. That struggle, between East and West following the Second World War, dominated the United Nations for many years.

Now we have seen the possibility emerge of a new ideological struggle between North and South, the rich and the poor, with the United Nations again serving as a battlefield. And certain regional conflicts, like the Arab-Israeli dispute, seem at times to hold the potential of tearing the United Nations apart.

Clearly we must bend every effort to avoid these results. For, should they occur, there would in the long run be no winners—only losers.

### *Where We Stand*

The difficulties facing us may seem enormous. However, if we look back toward the past, not just over the last year or two, but over decades and longer, the picture is less bleak. From such a vantage point we can see some fundamental grounds for encouragement. I would like to describe briefly three areas in which the process of



change has involved a broad advance for all nations: the strengthening of law, world economic cooperation, and human rights. In all of these areas, I believe it should be possible for the international community to continue to build upon underlying common interests.

### *The Role of Law*

Despite some fearsome assaults, in our century the role of law in international affairs has gathered some strength. In prior centuries, there was little question that every state arrogated unto itself the right to use force to accomplish almost any goal which its leaders thought worth the cost—even to invade and conquer for the mere sake of glory. But today the principle embodied in the Charter of the United Nations that law and justice, not force, should guide relations among states is applicable universally.

This does not, of course, mean that there are no longer serious tensions which can lead to war or that countries will not disagree on who is at fault when violence erupts or that it is no longer essential to maintain a strong defense to deter aggression. Obviously, all these things are true, and they will remain true so long as nations accept no ultimate direction save that of their own leaders.

But, still, there has been a change. There is today an abhorrence of aggression—beyond rhetoric—that extends across the globe. That is something surely which can be built upon, provided we and others remain steadfast in maintaining our strength.

Today it is more important than ever to marshal all possible efforts for extending the role of law. And this is an interest which indisputably is shared by all nations, new and old, weak and strong.

The point warrants some elaboration because it is sometimes argued that international law is a creation of the older Western countries designed to serve them and to keep the new nations in their place.

But nothing could be further from the truth. In a world without law, every nation

would play by its own rules. And in such a world, without question the weak would suffer the most. Yet there would be scant consolation for the strong. In a world without respect for law, a world of the jungle, the strong would find no peace. And overhanging all conflict would be the ever-widening threat that someday, in some dispute, uncontrollable forces would unleash the ultimate nightmare: nuclear holocaust.

Yet the role of law cannot be extended save by negotiation—negotiation in which the interests of all states are reflected ultimately in consensus.

We are right now engaged in some critical diplomatic enterprises to extend the role of law among nations in just this fashion.

The most striking example is the Law of the Sea Conference, an ambitious effort to devise comprehensive rules to govern the entire domain of the oceans. No international negotiation in this generation has been more vital for the long-term stability and prosperity of our globe. Unless competitive practices and claims are soon harmonized, the world faces the prospect of mounting conflict. But if we succeed, the sense of community which has been so elusive on land could be realized for some 70 percent of the world's surface. And the United Nations will have met this test—to reconcile the interests of individual nation-states with those of the world community.

### *Economic Cooperation*

It was not so long ago that problems of economic cooperation between rich and poor nations simply did not exist on any diplomatic agenda. That may have been a less complex world. But it was not a better world for most of its inhabitants. For centuries the vast majority of the Earth's population lived in mute suffering.

We face today a new and more promising situation, a challenge to frame a more equitable and productive world economic system. In historical terms, we have really only just begun to take up this challenge. Whatever the difficulties, there can be great opportunities ahead.

Today we know that our interdependence inescapably imposes on all nations a need for new forms of cooperation. For this reason, the United States has increasingly taken the lead in drawing world attention to new diplomatic imperatives in this age of interdependence and in proposing concrete solutions to its challenges. Our preoccupation with interdependence has not been a matter of mere rhetoric. It is a matter of grappling with the fundamental elements of our survival, of preserving the capability of independent sovereign nations to advance the welfare of their peoples, including our own.

Some assert that our proposals are really intended to make others more dependent on us. That is utterly false.

There exist today varying degrees of dependence, or vulnerability, in all relationships among states. These differences are politically exploitable by more powerful nations. The very notion of cooperative solutions based on the facts of interdependence is this: New economic arrangements, freely negotiated and satisfactory to all the parties, can insure that differing degrees of vulnerability can less easily be exploited.

Thus, only if the realities of interdependence are honestly faced will nations have the freedom to pursue their independent courses free from the specter of abrupt disruptions in their national development plans. This is the essential meaning of the U.S. proposal to establish a system of global food reserves, a system that could enhance the basic security of many societies—if we can bring it to fruition.

But a global economic system based on equity can evolve only from negotiation, not confrontation. And its creation requires all nations to accept mutual responsibilities. The process of cooperative change cannot be sustained if there are destructive assaults on those successful economies whose dynamism is crucial to any effort to create a more just and productive global economy. Boycotts, arbitrary price hikes, confisca-

tions, and other forms of economic intimidation would only tear apart the fabric of cooperation. Indeed, we have seen recently that when the economies of the industrial nations suffer the poorer nations suffer even more.

The most prosperous nations, the United States and the other great industrial democracies, do have major responsibilities. Our experience, wealth, and technological capacity are indispensable for any lasting solutions to the problems of interdependence. I hope the American people are prepared to support long-range efforts to solve these problems. If we are to elicit the cooperation of the developing nations toward such long-term goals, we must help them now to surmount their current economic woes, which, for them, are of overwhelming proportions. We must be prepared to accompany our advice on development strategy with concrete deeds of assistance.

And we should keep in mind that assistance for development is not charity. Nor is it some form of debt owed to the poorer countries to make up for past exploitation, real or perceived. Instead, assistance from the developed countries is an investment in a future world of growing prosperity, expanding opportunity for everyone—ourselves included.

### *Human Rights*

Even in the field of human rights there has been progress, when viewed over a long perspective. Not many decades ago vast numbers of human beings were virtually bereft of all rights. Slavery and slave labor were not even recognized universally as intolerable. The present situation in many parts of the world is, without question, unsatisfactory; and in recent years there has been some serious retrogression. But for the first time in history there are now basic documents, the U.N. Charter and the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, which have a global reach and which set enlightened standards for advancing the dignity



of all human beings. And for the first time there is a beginning, weak as it may now be, of worldwide and regional procedures to protect against human rights abuse.

But do the Western democracies and the Third World truly share a common interest in advancing the cause of individual rights? Some have argued that we and the Third World are in fundamental opposition—that the human rights standards of the charter, established before the emergence of many newer member states, basically have little importance for many of them in relation to their overriding goals: economic development and the fullest preservation of their newly won independence.

I do not believe this is true. I believe that there is a fundamental community of interest between us and the Third World in advancing the protection of individual rights.

My convictions stem from the inherent nature of human rights issues. When we speak about the protection of personal rights, we allude to many things; but at the core, we have in mind the protection of the individual from arbitrary control by the state—which too often finds its ultimate expression in such abhorrent practices as incarceration without legal process and brutal torture, whether officially sanctioned or tacitly condoned.

The need to protect the individual from such abuses cannot be a discretionary matter dependent upon debate and intellectual argumentation. It is inherent in the human condition. There are no human beings in any society, new or old, who want to see members of their families tortured or imprisoned for daring to disagree with the current political orthodoxy.

This drive for individual human freedom is simply not extinguishable. Many of the leaders of the newer nation-states were responding to it when they fought and sacrificed to achieve their independence. Many of the new nations, drawing on Western European and American traditions, created institutions intended to pro-

tect basic human freedoms. In some cases, these institutions remain in place. In others, they have been cast aside, at least for now.

But it is important that we not confuse ups and downs in an endless struggle with long-range and fundamental considerations. If we are to be true to our own beliefs as Americans, we will know, and we must not be timid in asserting, that there are courageous men and women in every nation who yearn for freedom and fulfillment of the human personality, even when conditions of tyranny keep them silent. Governments will come and go—while the longing for humane relations between people and government is permanent and universal.

What can our government do to respond? I think a valid approach for us can include three elements:

—First, we and the other Western democracies must speak up vigorously in international forums in behalf of the ideals of the U.N. Charter—which we know to be right. The United Nations is a particularly appropriate forum for holding up before all nations the standards which are fundamental for decent human existence.

—Second, at the same time we should show more understanding for the problems faced by many of the newer nations, and we should keep our priorities straight. It has not been easy even for some older nations to preserve parliamentary democracy or the civil, political, and human rights of their citizens. The history of this century abounds in examples of tyranny imposed at least temporarily on nations already well advanced in the arts of self-government. But for many newer nations, the problems are compounded when there is no network of modern communications, no established and assertive free press, when there is a very low level of education and literacy. When some new nations fail in trying to sustain democratic political systems along Western lines, we naturally lament this as

a setback to the cause of representative government. But that is not necessarily the same thing as the imposition of a brutal tyranny. Without ever condoning any deprivation of personal freedoms, we must concentrate on the first priority: to promote observance of those standards of human rights which are accepted universally and which touch all human beings, like the elimination of officially sanctioned torture.

—Finally, it is in our interest and the interest of all countries to work as hard as we can to make the international procedures of the United Nations, now in embryo form, as fair and effective as possible. I must say that there has been serious misuse of these procedures. They have too often been platforms for concentrating on the shortcomings of a few while denying the massive transgressions of others. But for us the fight to improve international procedures remains of central importance. Obviously no nation, no matter how strongly it believes in the human rights cause, can take on the task of cajoling, or coercing, all others. We can, however, have more hope of achieving gradual improvement if the application of accepted human rights standards can be entrusted to genuinely fair and capable international bodies.

#### **Patient and Persistent Efforts Required**

At the outset, I said that the United Nations does have the potential to serve the interests of both the old nations and the new. In short, I believe that we and the new nations do share fundamental interests: in strengthening the role of law, in building a system of global economic cooperation, and in advancing the cause of human rights. And of course we share the overarching purpose for which the United Nations was created: the preservation of peace. I believe, despite the controversies which sometimes rage when we come to grips with specific issues, that our work within the United Nations can promote the realization of these large common interests.

But it is equally clear to me that no one can safely predict whether, over time, the U.N.'s basic purposes will actually be realized. This will require, first, that we improve our ability to reconcile individual national interests with the broader interests of the international community; and second, that we gradually master the techniques for managing change through peaceful processes. Both of these are supremely difficult tasks, requiring qualities of statesmanship not often demonstrated throughout history.

Let me stress here that it is not the United Nations, as a corporate entity, which will make the decisions that spell progress or regression. Instead, the crucial decisions will be taken by governments, and that means responsibility will rest with individual national leaders supported by, or driven by, their publics.

So, in the last analysis, whether we and other governments enable the United Nations to achieve its purposes will depend upon qualities of courage, determination, and vision that we exhibit. These will all be needed to resist ever-present temptations to seek immediate advantage and to disregard the constraints of law.

And above all, we Americans will need vision and tenacity. Creative, persistent leadership from the United States is indispensable if the United Nations is to achieve the purposes for which we helped found it. We need to keep our sights firmly fixed on our long-range goals, for there are bound to be many periods of discouragement along our way. The problems which preoccupy us at the United Nations will not be susceptible to quick solutions but at best will only gradually succumb to patient and persistent efforts of accommodation.

In closing, let me recall the words of Dag Hammarskjöld, who understood well the need for vision and who left us these words of advice: "Never look down to test the ground before taking your next step: only he who keeps his eye fixed on the far horizon will find his right road."



## United States Urges Resumption of Cyprus Talks

*Following is a statement by Senator George McGovern, U.S. Representative to the U.N. General Assembly, made in plenary on November 11.*

USUN press release 145 dated November 11

The question of Cyprus is again before the General Assembly. Despite the concern of the international community and the efforts of the Secretary General, there has been no real progress toward a lasting settlement during the past year. The goal of peace and justice for Cyprus—a goal which my government shares with the people of Cyprus and with all members of the United Nations—is yet to be achieved.

My government has repeatedly expressed its deep concern over the continuing lack of progress toward a Cyprus settlement. As Secretary of State Kissinger emphasized in his speech before this Assembly this September, the passage of time has served only to diminish possibilities for constructive conciliation. There has been ample help available, most notably through the good offices of the Secretary General, but for such assistance to be effective, an essential condition is the willingness of both sides to commit themselves to sustained negotiations. Such a commitment is not yet evident.

Since the tragic events of 1974, the United Nations has provided an important forum for encouraging progress toward a settlement. Through their resolutions the General Assembly and the Security Council have expressed the continuing concern which all members of the international community share over the situation in Cyprus. The Secretary General has worked tirelessly, under the “good offices” mandate provided for by these resolutions, to encourage negotiations between the Cyprus communities. My government again wishes to express its appreciation for the patience

and skill with which Secretary General Waldheim has pursued this mission. He and his associates have worked diligently—but thus far to little avail.

The United States has sought and will continue to seek to assist the Secretary General in every way possible. We have consulted closely with him and with other member states intimately involved with the Cyprus question. In September, Secretary Kissinger put forward several ideas aimed at serving as a point of departure for the parties’ discussion of their most serious problems.

In recent weeks we have consulted intensively with members of the European Community in an effort to refine and improve this framework. We are still engaged in this endeavor. Our hope is that shortly after the General Assembly concludes its consideration of Cyprus, the two parties will come together again under the auspices of the Secretary General and consider this set of ideas which many of Cyprus’ friends believe can provide a path through the procedural barriers which have impeded progress.

In sum, my government believes that a rapid and equitable solution is essential and that enhancing the prospects for a negotiated settlement should be the foremost consideration in the General Assembly’s current debate. We believe the cause of peace on Cyprus is less well served by continued public dispute than by serious, quiet discussion of the real issues.

This year’s session of the General Assembly, through calm and reasoned consideration of the issues, can make a meaningful contribution to the search for peace on Cyprus. What is needed is a moderate and balanced resolution which encourages both sides to embark once again on a productive negotiating course.<sup>1</sup>

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<sup>1</sup> The Assembly on Nov. 12 adopted by a vote of 94 to 1 (Turkey), with 27 abstentions (U.S.), Resolution A/RES/31/12 concerning the question of Cyprus.

## U.S. Announces 1977 Contributions to UNDP, U.N. Natural Resources Fund

*Following is a statement made in the 1976 United Nations Pledging Conference on the United Nations Development Program and the United Nations Capital Development Fund by U.S. Representative Jacob M. Myerson on November 2.*

USUN press release 137 dated November 2

On the occasion of the annual pledging conference for the United Nations Development Program, I am pleased to announce that the U.S. contribution for the coming year will be \$100 million. This represents a further tangible indication of the importance which my government—the executive branch and the Congress—attributes to the Program and to the crucial work that it performs in the cause of economic development and international cooperation. Our contribution underscores both our faith in the Program and our commitment to its future.

The past year has not been an easy one for the United Nations Development Program or for its Administrator, Mr. Bradford Morse, in whom we have great confidence. He has been confronted with administrative and financial problems of immense difficulty and complexity. We all share in the responsibility to render to UNDP the necessary assistance, cooperation, understanding, and advice required to set things aright. A good beginning has been made over the past 10 months. We look forward to further significant progress in the coming year.

The UNDP is now embarking upon its second cycle with an ambitious program designed better to meet the needs of the least well-off nations. We hope for mounting financial support from all sources, including those relatively wealthier nations which have UNDP programs. Naturally, to the extent feasible, UNDP should have freely usable, convertible currencies available. These are the most useful contributions.

My delegation believes that special

thanks are due to those countries, developed and developing, which have made extraordinary contributions to UNDP during the current year. We wish also to applaud those nations which, after reviewing their own situations, have announced their intention to forgo part or all of their indicative planning figures for the second cycle. In this spirit of mutual cooperation, the UNDP can face the future determined to carry out its vital role in meeting the problems of insufficient food, disease, unemployment, and poverty in general.

Mr. President, it is also my great pleasure on this occasion to announce the first U.S. contribution to the United Nations Revolving Fund for Natural Resources. Developing mineral resources anywhere is a far from simple matter, one involving considerable risk. Many developing countries are not in a position to finance exploration on their own even though their development objectives would be served thereby. The Fund, with its unique replenishment feature, will permit UNDP programs of countries concerned to be supplemented in an area which can provide substantial economic benefits to them. It can also expand the global base for many natural resources. In light of these considerations, the United States wishes to announce a contribution to the Fund of \$2.5 million for 1977.

## Congressional Documents Relating to Foreign Policy

### 94th Congress, 2d Session

Nuclear Reduction, Testing, and Non-Proliferation.

Hearing before the Subcommittee on Arms Control, International Organizations, and Security Agreements of the Senate Committee on Foreign Relations on S. Con. Res. 69. March 18, 1976. 57 pp.

United States-Cuba Trade Promotion. Hearing before the Subcommittee on International Trade and Commerce of the House Committee on International Relations. July 22, 1976. 63 pp.

Admission of Foreign Nationals to the Coast Guard Academy. Report of the Senate Committee on Commerce to accompany H.R. 11407. S. Rept. 94-1187. August 27, 1976. 4 pp.



## TREATY INFORMATION

### Current Actions

#### MULTILATERAL

##### Coffee

International coffee agreement 1976, with annexes. Done at London December 3, 1975. Entered into force provisionally October 1, 1976.

*Notifications of provisional application deposited:* Haiti, Netherlands, September 16, 1976; Costa Rica, September 17, 1976; Panama, September 20, 1976; Portugal, Venezuela, September 21, 1976; Ivory Coast, September 27, 1976; Bolivia, Honduras, September 30, 1976.

*Ratifications deposited:* Canada, September 17, 1976; India, September 20, 1976; Uganda, September 21, 1976; New Zealand, Switzerland, September 27, 1976; Nigeria, November 11, 1976.

##### Judicial Procedure—Documents

Convention on the service abroad of judicial and extrajudicial documents in civil or commercial matters. Done at The Hague November 15, 1965. Entered into force February 10, 1969. TIAS 6638.

*Signature:* Spain, October 21, 1976.

##### Judicial Procedure—Evidence

Convention on the taking of evidence abroad in civil or commercial matters. Done at The Hague March 18, 1970. Entered into force October 7, 1972. TIAS 7444.

*Signature:* Spain, October 21, 1976.

##### Maritime Matters

Amendments to the convention of March 6, 1948, as amended, on the Intergovernmental Maritime Consultative Organization (TIAS 4044, 6285, 6490). Adopted at London October 17, 1974.<sup>1</sup>

*Acceptance deposited:* Republic of Korea, November 8, 1976.

##### Terrorism

Convention to prevent and punish the acts of terrorism taking the form of crimes against persons and related extortion that are of international significance. Done at Washington February 2, 1971. Entered into force October 16, 1973; for the United States October 20, 1976.

*Proclaimed by the President:* November 16, 1976.

##### Trade

Declaration on the provisional accession of Tunisia to the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade. Done at Tokyo November 12, 1959. Entered into force May 21, 1960; for the United States June 15, 1960. TIAS 4498.

*Acceptance deposited:* Romania, November 4, 1976.

Tenth procès-verbal extending the declaration on the provisional accession of Tunisia to the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade. Done at Geneva November 21, 1975. Entered into force January 8, 1976; for the United States January 19, 1976. TIAS 8320.

*Acceptances deposited:* Finland, October 29, 1976; Romania, November 4, 1976.

##### Wheat

Protocol modifying and further extending the wheat trade convention (part of the international wheat agreement) 1971. Done at Washington March 17, 1976. Entered into force June 19, 1976, with respect to certain provisions, and July 1, 1976, with respect to other provisions.

*Ratifications deposited:* Egypt, November 23, 1976; Iraq, November 22, 1976.<sup>2</sup>

#### BILATERAL

##### Bangladesh

Project agreement relating to the grant of funds for feasibility studies of development projects, with annexes and related letter. Signed at Dacca September 29, 1976. Entered into force September 29, 1976.

##### Egypt

Loan agreement relating to the modernization and improvement of the Misr Spinning and Weaving Company facilities, with annex. Signed at Cairo September 4, 1976. Entered into force September 4, 1976.

Agreement amending the grant agreement of May 30, 1976, as amended, relating to technical and feasibility studies. Signed at Cairo September 30, 1976. Entered into force September 30, 1976.

##### Guatemala

Loan agreement for municipal earthquake recovery, with annex. Signed at Guatemala September 20, 1976. Entered into force September 20, 1976.

##### Peru

Loan agreement relating to a program for improved water and land use in the Sierra, with annex. Signed at Lima September 29, 1976. Entered into force September 29, 1976.

Loan agreement relating to agricultural cooperative federations development, with annex. Signed at Lima September 29, 1976. Entered into force September 29, 1976.

##### Portugal

Agreement for sales of agricultural commodities, relating to the agreement of March 18, 1976 (TIAS

<sup>1</sup> Not in force.

<sup>2</sup> With statement.

8264). Signed at Lisbon October 22, 1976. Entered into force October 22, 1976.

### United Kingdom

Extradition treaty, with schedule, protocol of signature, and exchange of notes. Signed at London June 8, 1972. Enters into force January 21, 1977.  
*Proclaimed by the President:* November 17, 1976.

### World Meteorological Organization

Agreement relating to a procedure for United States income tax reimbursement. Effected by exchange of letters at Geneva May 11 and September 24, 1976. Enters into force January 1, 1977.

### Zaire

Project agreement relating to the improvement of small farmer production and income, with annexes. Signed at Kinshasa September 30, 1976. Entered into force September 30, 1976.

## PUBLICATIONS

### GPO Sales Publications

*Publications may be ordered by catalog or stock number from the Superintendent of Documents, U.S. Government Printing Office, Washington, D.C. 20402. A 25-percent discount is made on orders for 100 or more copies of any one publication mailed to the same address. Remittances, payable to the Superintendent of Documents, must accompany orders. Prices shown below, which include domestic postage, are subject to change.*

**Background Notes:** Short, factual summaries which describe the people, history, government, economy, and foreign relations of each country. Each contains a map, a list of principal government officials and U.S. diplomatic and consular officers, and a reading list. (A complete set of all Background Notes currently in stock—at least 140—\$21.80; 1-year subscription service for approximately 77 updated or new Notes—\$23.10; plastic binder—\$1.50.) Single copies of those listed below are available at 35¢ each.

Cape Verde . . . . .	Cat. No. S1.123:C17v	
	Pub. 8874	4 pp.
Czechoslovakia . . . . .	Cat. No. S1.123:C99	
	Pub. 7758	7 pp.

**The Twelfth Report, U.S. Advisory Commission on International Educational and Cultural Affairs.** This annual report summarizes the principal activities of the Commission during the past year and makes specific recommendations on funding of the U.S. Government's international educational and cultural exchange activities, U.S. implementation of the

"Final Act" of the Helsinki Conference (CSCE), utilization of exchange to improve understanding between the United States and Latin America and Canada, and the U.S. role in UNESCO and the U.N. University. 82 pp. \$1.50. (Stock No. 044-000-01622-2).

**Narcotic Drugs—Additional Cooperative Arrangements to Curb Illegal Traffic.** Agreement with Mexico. TIAS 8297. 6 pp. 35¢. (Cat. No. S9.10:8297).

**Narcotic Drugs—Drug Enforcement Administration Representative.** Understandings with Indonesia. TIAS 8299. 5 pp. 35¢. (Cat. No. S9.10:8299).

**Criminal Investigations.** Agreement with Greece. TIAS 8300. 6 pp. 35¢. (Cat. No. S9.10:8300).

**Air Charter Services.** Understanding with the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland. TIAS 8303. 9 pp. 35¢. (Cat. No. S9.10:8303).

**Air Transport Services.** Agreement with Lebanon extending the agreement of September 1, 1972. TIAS 8304. 3 pp. 35¢. (Cat. No. S9.10:8304).

**Scheduled and Nonscheduled Air Service.** Agreement with the Socialist Federal Republic of Yugoslavia amending the agreement of September 27, 1973. TIAS 8305. 13 pp. 35¢. (Cat. No. S9.10:8305).

**Air Charter Services.** Agreement with Ireland. TIAS 8306. 7 pp. 35¢. (Cat. No. S9.10:8306).

**Statutes of the World Tourism Organization (WTO).** Agreement with other governments. TIAS 8307. 68 pp. 85¢. (Cat. No. S9.10:8307).

**Agricultural Commodities.** Agreement with Indonesia. TIAS 8308. 22 pp. 35¢. (Cat. No. S9.10:8308).

**Agricultural Commodities.** Agreement with Morocco. TIAS 8309. 13 pp. 35¢. (Cat. No. S9.10:8309).

**Agricultural Commodities.** Agreement with Tanzania. TIAS 8310. 15 pp. 35¢. (Cat. No. S9.10:8310).

**Agricultural Commodities.** Agreement with Sri Lanka amending the agreement of April 9, 1976. TIAS 8311. 2 pp. 35¢. (Cat. No. S9.10:8311).

**Agricultural Commodities.** Agreement with India. TIAS 8312. 22 pp. 40¢. (Cat. No. S9.10:8312).

**Agricultural Commodities.** Agreement with Honduras. TIAS 8313. 9 pp. 35¢. (Cat. No. S9.10:8313).

**Agricultural Commodities.** Agreement with Jordan amending the agreement of October 14, 1975, as amended. TIAS 8314. 4 pp. 35¢. (Cat. No. S9.10:8314).

**Tracking Station.** Agreement with Canada extending the agreement of December 20, 1971 and February 23, 1972, as supplemented. TIAS 8316. 3 pp. 35¢. (Cat. No. S9.10:8316).

**Food and Agriculture Organization—Amendments to the Constitution.** Adopted by the eighteenth session of the FAO Conference, Rome, November 8–27, 1975. TIAS 8318. 5 pp. 35¢. (Cat. No. S9.10:8318).



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Press releases may be obtained from the Office of Press Relations, Department of State, Washington, D.C. 20520.		
No.	Date	Subject
*565	11/22	U.S. and Spain terminate textile agreement, Sept. 23.
†566	11/22	U.S.-Egypt Joint Working Group on Technology, Research, and Development, Nov. 18-19.
*567	11/23	Jack B. Olson sworn in as Ambassador to the Bahamas (biographic data).
†568	11/23	U.S. and Romania sign long-term agreement on economic, industrial and technical cooperation, Nov. 21.
*569	11/24	Donald R. Norland sworn in as Ambassador to Botswana, Lesotho, and Swaziland (biographic data).
†570	11/26	U.S. and Mexico sign treaty on execution of penal sentences, Nov. 25.
*571	11/26	Fine Arts Committee, Dec. 14.
†572	11/26	U.S. and U.S.S.R. sign fisheries agreement.
†573	11/26	U.S. and Mexico sign fisheries agreement.
* Not printed.		
† Held for a later issue of the BULLETIN.		

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# THE DEPARTMENT OF STATE BULLETIN

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*The Department of State BULLETIN, a weekly publication issued by the Office of Media Services, Bureau of Public Affairs, provides the public and interested agencies of the government with information on developments in the field of U.S. foreign relations and on the work of the Department and the Foreign Service.*

*The BULLETIN includes selected press releases on foreign policy, issued by the White House and the Department, and statements, addresses, and news conferences of the President and the Secretary of State and other officers of the Department, as well as special articles on various phases of international affairs and the functions of the Department. Information is included concerning treaties and international agreements to which the United States is or may become a party and on treaties of general international interest.*

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## National Meeting on Science, Technology, and Development

*Representatives of industry, universities, foundations, research institutes, private voluntary organizations, and labor unions attended a National Meeting on Science, Technology, and Development held by the Department on November 17. The meeting initiated a series of activities leading to a National Conference on Science, Technology, and Development in 1977. Results of that conference will further the development of U.S. policy in this area and support U.S. participation in the U.N. Conference on Science and Technology for Development scheduled for 1979.*

*Following are informal remarks made before the meeting by Secretary Kissinger, together with addresses by H. Guyford Stever, who is Director of the Office of Science and Technology Policy and Science and Technology Adviser to President Ford, and by Daniel Parker, Administrator, Agency for International Development (AID).*

### REMARKS BY SECRETARY KISSINGER

Press release 561 dated November 17

First of all, I would like to express my appreciation and that of my colleagues to all of you for coming here and giving us your time on a subject that has proved rather obdurate for us to deal with. Of course, when we called this conference we were expecting to do some more long-range planning [laughter] than now turns out to be the case.

The issue that we are here to consider is not one that is bounded by any Administration and deals with problems that will have to concern us for the indefinite future.

I thought I would make just a few informal remarks to put before you some of the thinking that led to this conference, some of the questions to which we would appreciate your answers or your views, and then to turn it over to the regular proceedings.

Any Administration, any President or Secretary of State, must have as one of his principal concerns the problem of international

order. We are always overwhelmed on a day-to-day basis with the cables and problems that present themselves. And I have the impression sometimes that the qualities of our high officials—that our high officials need—are becoming more and more those of an athlete responding rapidly to stimuli with no opportunity to reflect about the long-term trends. The problems that present themselves, however, are not always the most significant. And in any event, they are those that are frequently the most unmanageable.

The fundamental problem is how to create an international system, or to participate in creating an international system, in which the principal participants have a sense of belonging. That doesn't mean that everybody has to be satisfied, but it does mean that everybody, or at least all those countries or groups that can upset it, feel either that their basic concerns have been met or that a mechanism exists by which their concerns can be met.

If this does not exist, then those who feel

themselves disadvantaged, unjustly treated, dispossessed, will band together, and they will join any other group that is willing to undermine the existing order. And then international problems will be settled by endless confrontations, by contests of strength; and we will be living in an environment of political, economic, and, occasionally, military conflict.

Now, the United States is the strongest nation in the world. The United States could survive better than most, in fact probably better than any other country, in such an environment. But it is an environment that would tax even our resources. It would be in the long term incompatible with the sort of economy with which we are familiar and under which we have flourished. And above all, it would be inconsistent with the fundamental American values.

We have to live in a world, not where everybody agrees with us, but where our values have some relevance. We do not wish to live in a siege mentality or in a world in which only might makes right. And therefore, while I know that many of you here are hardheaded businessmen, and while I have been told by all of my advisers never to stray from the emphasis on self-interest, I would like to point out that our self-interest is not incompatible with the world interest and that only to the extent that we can make our self-interest relevant to the world interest can we really prosper as a country and survive with our basic institutions intact.

This is the general problem, as I see it, of the relationship of the tasks that all Administrations since the war have faced in one way or another. It has become particularly acute in recent years because of the beginning cartelization of some of the world's economy; because of the organization of some of the developing countries into political units operating more and more as a bloc; because the United States, while still the most powerful country in the world, is no longer the predominant country it was in the fifties and early sixties—nor can it be.

Therefore our foreign policy problem has become, as it has been for most other nations throughout their history, how to contribute

to a world that can be both secure and make progress, how to do this with resources that are finite in relation to all of the objectives we could be pursuing at any one time, and how to build a consensus of like-minded states.

Now, the trends that I have described have resulted in some tendencies which we find very unfortunate. Too many of the developing countries are following a radical rhetoric that is incompatible with their own progress and indeed with the achievement of the goals they profess. Too many of them seek to achieve by confrontation and extortion what can only result, and what can only be significant, through the voluntary cooperation of all nations.

While it is crucial for the United States to take an enlightened and farsighted view about the process of development, while it is foolish and shortsighted for us to be niggardly and petty in our approach, it is also true that what we offer cannot appear to be, and indeed cannot be, the result of conditions imposed on us by those who will be the primary beneficiaries of the process of development.

So, we have to steer a course in which we show that we are concerned about the problems of the greater part of humanity, but where we also have a right to ask of those countries that they remember that 90 percent of the transfer of all capital from private and public sources comes from the industrial democracies, that there are no realistic alternative sources, and that the process must be a reciprocal one.

The United States, in my view, has an obligation to respond to some of the fundamental concerns of our times. The developing countries must have an enhanced capability of access to worldwide capital markets, especially private capital markets. The markets for the primary commodities sold by developing countries should be stable and efficient. Special measures will be needed to help developing countries find new markets for the goods and services which they will be increasingly able to produce. And the international community should help the developing countries to develop, transfer, adapt, and



manage technology appropriate to their needs.

On the other hand, we have a right—indeed an obligation—that the process of development is not something that is handed by one group of nations to another group of nations. In all societies it was a process that extended over decades. And indeed in all other societies it was a process that extended over generations. It needs domestic disciplines. It requires a process of education. In many societies it requires an adaptation of our basic values. There is no substitute for hard effort by the developing countries in their own process of development, and no one should create the illusion that there can be.

Developing countries must find a way to encourage savings, reward initiatives and ability, spread education and training, and expand opportunities for all their people.

It is also clear that a constructive world order must have provisions in which foreign investors can operate in a stable and peaceful environment as long as they may give serious contributions to the social and economic progress of the host country. But they must be free of harassment and unreasonable restraints. And it is indeed one of the curious phenomena of this period that, for some reason, transfer of governmental capital is considered in many countries more acceptable than private capital, even though the capacity of governments to attach restrictive conditions is infinitely greater than the capacity of private capital to attach restrictive conditions.

So, in the process of development we need a sense of obligation on the part of the developed countries and a sense of participation and reciprocity on the part of the developing countries.

Now, let me turn to the subject matter of this conference. When you see me shuffle papers here, I have been deluged with words of warning, advice, and some formulations that extend over many pages of dependent clauses. [Laughter.] As far as I can see, every bureau in this building has been given a chance, not just to add its views, but to make an input to each sentence. [Laughter.] I just want you to know that—let it never be

said that we have not institutionalized foreign policy.

Let me turn to the issues of this conference. However we view the process of development, in one way or another it must involve a transfer of technology. Whether we do it directly as an act of policy, or whether we do it indirectly by raising the general level of economic activity of the developing countries, progress in development depends on whether the developing countries learn to harness technology to the purposes of their societies.

Now, among the many warnings I have received is that there is a group—I can't see them with these lights—but I am told there is a group of cold-eyed managers sitting here that is determined not to be impressed by do-gooders who want to spread our technology around the world and to create new competitors. And I am told by my hardheaded business friend over here [Deputy Secretary of State Charles W. Robinson] that I have got to explain to them that they will make more money by spreading technology [laughter]—by spreading technology than by holding onto it. But if you are hardheaded businessmen and if you believe a Harvard professor who tells you how to make money [laughter], then you are in worse shape than I think you are [laughter].

So my friend Chuck Robinson, who specializes in building ports in landlocked countries [laughter], no doubt by telling them that it is highly profitable [laughter], will be able to explain to his colleagues from the business community exactly how this works.

I will talk about the subject that I know something about, which is that if we are going to have an international environment in which our economy can prosper at all—not any one business, but our economy in its present form—then we must be dealing with societies that consider us relevant to their concerns. We cannot abolish the concern for development, nor do we want to abolish it. It is an expression of our entire history. For the United States not to take a leading role in this would be to abdicate from one of the principal currents of our time. It would be to make us irrelevant to the concerns of the



major part of humanity. I know that it would undermine the effective conduct of our foreign policy. I must believe that over a period of time it would undermine the effective operation of our economic institutions around the world.

So, in the broad self-interest of the United States, which in this sense is identical with the world interest, development must be one of the increasing concerns of our country.

Now, I have believed for a considerable time that this country, representing the most advanced technology in the world, must be able to make a contribution to what is, after all, the principal way in which development will take place; namely, the development of technology around the world.

We have found ourselves restricted by traditional concepts in which the government would focus primarily on certain types of exchange programs and in which private industry was supposed to do its thing entirely on commercial considerations. And we have lacked a coherent strategy by which the benefits of technology that we possess can be made available in a disciplined and farsighted and cooperative manner.

During the last year we have made a number of proposals in international forums. Our initiatives have generally fallen into two categories.

One, national. We have proposed national and international institutes and programs to provide information, research, and training assistance to developing countries in science and technology.

And secondly, we have attempted to take steps to create an international environment in which the private sector, which is the repository of most of our technology, can make its maximum contribution.

The first category includes information supporting the creation of an international center for the exchange of technological information; proposing the establishment of a technology exchange service for Latin America; proposing an inventory of U.S. national information sources and improved access to U.S. facilities; supporting the concept of regional advisory services under UNCTAD [U.N. Conference on Trade and De-

velopment] auspices; and supporting an offer to host the U.N. Conference on Science and Technology for Development in 1979.

The second category is in the area of research and training. We have increased our support for international agricultural research centers; proposed the establishment of an International Energy Institute; urged the establishment of an International Industrialization Institute; supported the creation of an inter-American technology center; and extended existing support for applied research in nutrition, health, and education.

We have encouraged training by the encouragement of formation of a technology corps and by proposing incentives and measures to curb emigration of highly trained manpower from developing countries.

With respect to encouraging the private sector, we have supported a voluntary code of conduct for the transfer of technology in UNCTAD.

We have supported a voluntary code of conduct for transnational enterprises in the United Nations.

We have proposed the establishment of an International Resources Bank. And if I had not mentioned this I would have been shot in the back by the Deputy Secretary. [Laughter.]

We have supported the examination of restrictive business practices and recommended that other OECD [Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development] nations urgently study the possibility of the greater contribution of all industrial nations to the problems of technology transfer.

Now, all of these were useful steps, extorted from a recalcitrant bureaucracy with great pain. [Laughter.]

What we need, however, at this moment, is some integrated concept—something in which all sectors of American life address such questions as:

What technology is it in our interest and in the global interest to transfer?

How is that transfer accomplished in a way that the developing countries can benefit from it and the world economy as a whole advance?



What should be the relationship between our educational institutions, our industrial enterprises, and the host countries so that they can build the most creative partnership, not simply in relationship to any one firm but in relationship to the total environment?

Is the establishment, for example, of regional research centers in developing countries, which has led to major breakthroughs in agricultural research, a useful tool in such fields as industrial technology?

How can multinational corporations relate themselves to universities and the host countries in a deliberate strategy which improves the environment in which they operate and at the same time is of benefit to the host countries?

These and many other questions are the purposes behind our calling this conference. Indeed, we have, as you know, distributed a whole list of questions to this group. You should not feel confined by those questions. You should feel free to tell us that some of these questions are nonsense. My colleagues are experts at being lacerated and ignoring in a graceful way whatever they do not really agree with. [Laughter.]

But we genuinely would like to know what this distinguished group thinks about the problem I have put before you. Have we defined the problem correctly? What approach should be taken? Obviously, we cannot have a strategy emerge out of one conference, but I hope that a work program can emerge out of this conference that can be carried forward in the years ahead.

I do note, to return to my starting point, that the problem of world order is the dominant problem of our time. We have talked a great deal about its military component, and we have an understanding of its political component. But in the decades ahead it is very probable that the social and economic aspects of international order will dominate our concerns, and our ability to solve it will determine whether we live in a world that has a consciousness of cooperation and of progress or in a world of constant strife.

I have no doubt what the U.S. commitment must be. And I can think of no area in which

our host of private institutions, private enterprises, and private initiatives can make a greater contribution to the freedom, prosperity, and peace of man than in the subject matter of this conference.

#### ADDRESS BY DR. STEVER

Last May in Nairobi, Secretary Kissinger announced that the United States would convene a national conference "to bring together our best talent from universities, foundations, and private enterprise . . . to consider the broad range of technological issues of concern to the developing world."<sup>1</sup> I am pleased that so many of you are here today to help us prepare for that conference. What we accomplish here in preparation for our national conference will ultimately have a significant impact on our U.S. contribution to the 1979 U.N. Conference on Science and Technology for Development.

Nothing that has happened since last May has in any way reduced the need for and importance of the 1979 U.N. conference. If anything, the pressures are greater than ever. And they are pressures that may ultimately have greater influence on world order than the relations—including military—of the industrialized nations.

Those pressures, due to population growth, the need for more food and better nutrition, increased energy costs, resource demand, and social and political expectations, will not slacken. They involve the needs, hopes, and dreams of a major part of humanity—and, we must remember, a part of humanity that will grow vastly in proportion to the rest of us who are more fortunate. This growth will take place over the next few decades regardless of a decline in the birth rates in those poorer areas of the world.

Though pressures grow and the clamor for development assistance grows with them—often reaching a strong and strident pitch—there are some signs that a new and healthier climate is emerging in which to pursue industrial-Third World relations:

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<sup>1</sup> For an address by Secretary Kissinger made before the fourth ministerial meeting of UNCTAD at Nairobi on May 6, see BULLETIN of May 31, 1976, p. 657.



—It is one in which more people are recognizing that what is needed is less threats and recriminations and more understanding of the mutuality of benefits to be gained by successful development.

—It is one in which the advanced countries are taking a fresh look at the possibilities of new markets and sources of commodities and labor and looking beyond that to the long-term benefits of a peaceful, stable world community.

—It is one in which there is also a growing recognition that development is a continuous and dynamic matter.

—It is one recognizing that in relation to development, science and technology are not forms of magic, but costly resources difficult to acquire and apply wisely.

### **New Ways of Thinking About Development**

This new realism includes the recognition that while technology is at the heart of the development process, a new and more mature attitude toward the application of technology has emerged. This attitude emphasizes that the application of a technology should be more broadly considered in terms of the long-term environmental and social impact as well as its more immediate economic results.

The fact that we are thinking in terms of development as an ongoing process and not the reaching of a specific goal at a specific time is also an important sign of maturity. As we move into the years ahead, the very nature and aims of development may change. So we must remain flexible and creative (and perhaps humble) in our thinking about it.

To me all these are encouraging signs that we may finally be getting on the right track, or at least realizing what the right track is. They are even more encouraging if one compares today's thinking on development with that of the past. We are not dealing with a new subject here. The relations of science and technology to development have been noted and used for decades, perhaps centuries, with both notable successes and failures. There have been programs and projects that were bilateral, multilateral, interna-

tional, regional, privately supported, government-supported, and university-to-university programs, sister lab arrangements, and so forth—all with varying results. Hundreds of such arrangements still exist, and a good number of them are highly productive.

On an international organization scale, we seem to be the least successful. Plans for a U.N. Conference on Science and Technology for Development have been germinating since 1963 when the United Nations held a Conference on the Application of Science and Technology for the Benefit of the Less Developed Areas. Most who were associated with that conference recall that it failed to live up to expectations. There has been much discussion since concerning that failure. That discussion has led to the decision to hold the 1979 conference for which we are preparing now.

This preparatory meeting and the U.S. national conference in 1977 will be very important. They will help to formulate our contribution to the U.N. conference in 1979. And while we should think of that meeting not as any final activity but just the beginning of a major effort that will take place for decades, time and conditions demand that we do some constructive thinking and planning during the next few years.

There are a number of lines along which we must think, plan, and act to achieve success in using science and technology for development. And it is on some of these that I want to focus for the balance of my remarks.

First we must realize that a unified, interdisciplinary outlook is now essential to development thinking. Past U.N. conferences have emphasized to some extent our singular approaches. Such conferences have focused individually on population, food, energy, environment, habitation, economics, and so forth. One cannot be faulted for wanting to concentrate on these topics, as individually they represent enormous challenges. However, development is a matter that relates to all of them and must consider all these areas in a rather integrated approach.

We must recognize also that development is a process, one which must be pursued in an



orderly way and rest on a firm foundation. The process involves, first, assurance of subsistence: sufficient food to avoid hunger and malnutrition; shelter and clothing; protection from disease and natural disaster. Outside aid can initially provide some of this, but a people's future must depend on a fundamental ability to provide these necessities for themselves lest it collapse like a house of cards when that outside support is withdrawn.

With subsistence achieved, the next step is capitalization. When resources—materials, energy, and skills—beyond those necessary to achieve subsistence can be saved, they become capital, which in turn can be applied to increase production and productivity. At this point, the development process really begins. Science in the form of useful knowledge, and technology in the form of tools, machinery, processes, and systems, are essential to such development. We have seen this throughout history. It is the story of the industrialized world—which is really a misleading term because it is also the “agriculturalized” world, the “energized” world, and the “knowledgeized” world. Food, fuel, and information are among its major underpinnings; and we must never forget this.

When we apply this thinking to the needs of the less developed countries (LDC's), we come up against a fundamental argument where our ideas have been changing. The prevailing belief (or hope) for many years was that development, such as that achieved by the industrialized nations, could be transplanted to LDC's. We realize now that such a direct transplantation is usually rejected, much as a biological host rejects a transplant from a foreign body or organism. Most societies are complex structures. Their environment, institutions, economy, and culture cannot in most cases accept the radical change that takes place when development is imposed on a region and a people in such total fashion.

So the thought that one could force-feed development, could start the process simply by bringing in all the tools, techniques, and funds that made development go in other areas, is no longer looked on favorably.

## Production of Necessities of Life

What are some of the current ideas as to possible alternative approaches? Let me touch on several.

As mentioned before, a foremost aim of development today appears to be that of providing a means for a subsistence base. This emphasizes the need for LDC's to work toward greater agricultural self-sufficiency. A strong underlying motivation for this, both on the part of the developed and the developing nations, is the realization that the agriculturally well-endowed countries, principally the United States, Canada, and Australia, cannot remain indefinitely the world's food hedge through their sources of surplus grain. All countries, no matter where they are located and whatever their previous agriculture and food history, must seek every means to maximize their indigenous food production.

This and the importance of other subsistence items emphasize the need for a strong effort to increase research and provide the appropriate technology transfer in agriculture plus other means to stimulate the production of the necessities of life in the LDC's. Development cannot take place in a condition of abject poverty and hunger. And direct aid for preventing this condition is limited and will become relatively more so in the light of future population pressures.

In spite of the economic advantages to us in selling agricultural surplus (and most of it does not go to the LDC's), the United States recognizes the future limitations of food sales and aid and the need for foreign agricultural development; hence the recent passage of title XII of the Foreign Assistance Act and the beginning of its implementation through AID with the help of a new Board for International Food and Agricultural Development. Title XII authorizes land-grant colleges and universities to pursue research applicable to foreign agriculture and food needs. It encourages and gives some increased mechanisms for support to areas of research which heretofore have been secondary in U.S. agricultural research, which have not had the prestige and attention needed to at-



tract and hold sufficient research talent. It is important to note that the title XII Board includes in addition to its university members others associated with the agriculture and food industries. U.S. industry's long interest and involvement in overseas agricultural production and distribution have been recognized, and its future role is being emphasized.

### **Adapting Technologies to Specific Needs**

In speaking out strongly about a subsistence base for the LDC's and taking this first-things-first-for-survival approach, we are not denying the next steps in development. This has been a point of some misunderstanding and may continue to be, as some of the LDC's hold to the belief that the advanced countries want all of them to remain primarily rural, agricultural societies.

While it might be best for many LDC's to become successful in their countrysides and prevent an influx of unemployed and unemployable people to their cities, no one pattern of agriculture-industry development is suggested for all LDC's. Each represents a different set of conditions with different resources and different potentials.

This, I believe, is an important point and one of which we should take special note in these sessions and in the conferences ahead. We tend to lump all LDC's together under a single classification—and they do have some common problems. But these countries cannot and should not be so easily categorized. Not only does their per capita income vary greatly, but there is a wide range of differences in all the things that matter in development. Their land, water, and weather; their natural resources; their educational conditions; their demographic distribution; their social and political stability; their culture and institutions—all these and more make an enormous difference in how they can and should develop. There can be no single plan or path for these diverse countries, even though many share some common conditions and problems.

It is important that all this is being recognized today. As a result, we realize that the

LDC's represent a great range of technology-transfer interests and needs, many of which have to be carefully tailored to their special situations. The preliminary planning for the 1979 U.N. conference will consider this to some extent in their regional meetings. It should be a frame of reference for the work in our thinking and planning for the U.S. conference next year and for 1979.

We must consider the large range of technologies available and how they can be adapted to specific needs. Those technologies run the gamut from improved simple farm tools, to small-scale advanced technologies such as a solar-electric pump for a tube well, to the high technologies of Landsat applications for agriculture and geology and nuclear power for electricity.

Our future success, and that of the LDC's, may hinge on studying specific conditions and tailoring technologies and systems very closely to what research reveals is most applicable in each step of development. Working toward, and failing to meet, unrealistic expectations can be disastrous. Each successful step builds not only a firm technical step for the next but an entire environment of success that includes self-esteem, pride of accomplishment, and economic reward that are essential to the process. Too often in the past "grand schemes" have been brought in, have failed, and have left a devastated morale that discourages future attempts for progress. This has also alienated the people of the area from those who tried to help them.

Along these lines of working by building on specific, successful steps, I am reminded of the words of William Blake:

He who would do good to another must do it in  
minute particulars:  
General good is the plea of the scoundrel,  
hypocrite and flatterer,  
For art and science cannot exist but in minutely  
organized particulars.

The particulars of development are many and varied.

Those of you here who have had experience in technology transfer abroad know that it involves far more than making the hardware available. It calls for the availability of trained personnel and managers, a suitable



social as well as physical environment, and a population willing and able to accept the technology and be trained to use it and maintain it. In addition, no transplanted technology of any size or consequence, no matter how carefully introduced, can endure without the necessary infrastructure of education, transportation, communication, health services, and so forth to back it up.

In considering these and other broad aspects of development, the United States must enter the 1979 U.N. conference with some firm policy outlook. We must decide what it is we want to accomplish and what we want to avoid. We must be cautious about promising what we cannot deliver. We should seek means to work as directly as possible with those countries and regions that need and request our assistance and offer cooperation. In the past, direct approaches such as bilateral arrangements and industrial agreements have worked well, and these probably represent our best tactic for the future. Many agreements are in effect today and could be expanded. We are not starting from a zero base.

### **Importance of Basic Research**

A most important point that should be stated and restated for our own benefit as well as for the ultimate success of what the U.N. conference hopes to accomplish is: To help others we must be strong ourselves. The United States must maintain its leadership in science and technology through a reinvigorated program of domestic R. & D. [research and development].

Basic research is of particular importance. A deep reservoir of basic knowledge is essential to generate effective technology transfer. A major virtue of such knowledge is that it provides for a flexibility in understanding and adapting to new environments, for innovating, and for meeting new contingencies. In addition, the domestic economic health achieved through R. & D. places us in a better position to aid others and to act as markets for them.

I think it is an encouraging sign that Federal support for R. & D. is once again rising

and particularly that there has been a substantial increase in the support allocated to basic research in this year's Federal budget. This has come about through a recognition that the advancement of such research is essential to the nation's future strength and well-being.

### **Role of Industry and Universities**

I turn now to your role in all this—and I view it as most important. Among our greatest assets to generate the technology and means of technology transfer that are essential to development are our universities and industries. In this country, it is well known that our land-grant colleges and state universities played a major role in our own development. Currently many of them and our other universities are conducting outstanding work with foreign countries in agriculture, engineering, and biomedical programs. These may be expanded through title XII, which I mentioned before, and perhaps through similar arrangements in other fields. We have a Peace Corps, to which the universities contribute a flow of talent; and Secretary Kissinger at Nairobi proposed formation of a technology corps, “a private, nonprofit organization to which corporations and universities will contribute highly skilled personnel experienced in the management of scientific and technical operations.”

U.S. industry, of course, has been instrumental in technology transfer on a global scale. This has been primarily in the more advanced countries but has also had an impact on some LDC's. We know that a few of these countries have achieved remarkable economic progress through industrial technology transfer. There is going to be a growing market for such transfer in the future.

A great difficulty ahead may be in exercising restraint in transferring technologies that may be desired by but harmful to LDC's or detrimental on a regional or international scale. There will be pressures from the standpoint of short-term gains, prestige, political and military strength, and a variety of other reasons that will be difficult to deal



with. The issue of paternalism will be raised. From our standpoint, short-term profits will be a temptation in transferring technologies that might have a detrimental long-term effect on the LDC or its neighbors. There is a whole ecology of technology transfer that must be considered in such a matter. One does not simply transfer a technology but with it a host of potential natural, social, economic, and political changes.

This last point is one that emphasizes the need to bring our universities, industry, and government together in this effort to advance the LDC's through science and technology. Some of the complexities of development and development assistance that I have brought out, and many I have not mentioned, indicate how important it is that the process be studied and pursued from a number of viewpoints. These should not be considered in isolation but by bringing together people from the various segments of our society to discuss them and exchange views. These interactions will provide important new insights and approaches that may save many costly mistakes.

In discussing development realistically, we must emphasize the importance of incentives for the assisting nations. Too much talk about development is cast purely in moral and idealistic terms. We should not expect idealism alone to be a driving force for development abroad when we know that the profit motive is essential to economic growth.

To bring about new technologies and innovation for development and to see that they are applied properly, incentives for industry have to be provided. Therefore we need to take a good look at such things as our system of patent protection, taxes, and industry regulations to see what steps relating to these can be taken to encourage innovation and the best technology transfer.

Of course there are the broader incentives of establishing a peaceful and stable world community in which growing economies can flourish and thus provide new business opportunities. But this condition can best be brought about by the motivation of a great many private forces. Therefore I believe that

in the future we are going to see, both on the part of the advanced nations and the LDC's, a more favorable attitude toward industry participation in development. It is part of the new realism that must take hold if substantial progress is to be made in improving conditions in the Third World.

### **Differing Views on Technology Transfer**

One of the most difficult issues we may face in considering development will center on not the question of should there be development in an area, but the nature of that development and who should determine it. This issue comes up particularly when the case is made for introducing what has come to be known as intermediate technology or appropriate technology. Advocates of these technologies argue that it would be best if LDC's could first develop a strong rural-agricultural base to employ a large part of their population, rather than encourage a rapid influx of undereducated, untrained people into the cities. They believe that industry in these countries should be smaller scaled, less capital intensive, and more labor intensive than in the West.

Among the most prominent groups to promote such ideas has been the Intermediate Technology Development Group in the United Kingdom. Similar organizations, interested in small-scale development and helping to provide assistance along these lines, have been formed in other countries, including the United States.

However, as humanitarian and environmentally sound as the intermediate-technology approach might seem, there are those who take issue with it—and partially on ethical grounds. Their argument is that by fostering small-scale, rural-based, labor-intensive development in the Third World the advocates of such ideas are seeking to maintain the economic status quo, preventing the developing nations from reaching living standards comparable with the advanced nations. Is this not a new form of paternalism? they ask. By what right do people in the advanced nations, with their energy- and capital-intensive industries, enjoying high



standards of living—and much of it based on cheap commodities from the LDC's—suggest that the Third World remain rural and labor intensive?

These are among the many questions involving ethical as well as economic and environmental considerations that must be faced and resolved by the entire community of nations if we are going to have peace and a more equitable world in the coming century. They will be issues that will surface in some form or other in the 1979 conference and in general in the years ahead.

I have covered a great deal of ground concerning the challenges of development as we will face them in the difficult role of contributors, innovators, and mentors for development but also as members of a world community who in our own lifetime and through our children will have to live with the consequences of what we do. It is time for us to exercise the courage, the foresight, the compassion, and the united will to marshal our array of intellectual resources to meet these challenges. It is time for a rethinking of the relationship of science and technology with the global society they have created. Nothing less than human survival may be at stake in the challenges set forth by this relationship.

We are calling on all of you to devote yourselves to the problems that will be raised at this conference and carried into future deliberations on development. We know that you will make valuable contributions, and we look forward to applying those contributions toward the building of a better world.

#### **ADDRESS BY AID ADMINISTRATOR PARKER**

There has been a remarkable and tangible change in the public perception of our foreign assistance program during the last few years. Humanitarian concerns which earlier appeared altruistic are now seen as enlightened self-interest. Burgeoning population growth is not only a cause of hopeless poverty and destitution abroad; it threatens our own vital interests and well-being in many ways, tangible and intangible.

This new reality that we perceive as Americans, the philosophical foundation of our foreign aid program, is interdependence. In the search for a new international economic order, we must take into full account the developing countries, whose needs have increased dramatically. The underlying need in the Third World and the basic objective of our development program is to concentrate on increasing productivity by a large and growing poor majority of the population. But having said this, dimension of scale is lost, since it is a stark fact of reality that one-third to two-thirds of the world's people—that part of the population on which we in AID concentrate—are essentially a nonentity in economic terms. Thus, they cannot consume. Our task is to bring them to a point where they are producing more than they need for basic survival and thus become active participants in the market system.

If countries can create conditions which both stimulate and permit individuals to increase their productivity, the end result will be a collective rise in international productivity. Poor countries must do much for themselves, but until their productivity can become self-regenerating they will need massive technical and managerial resources from the industrial world. Foreign assistance must be oriented to increase the productivity of the key sectors: rural development, agriculture, and national market systems that make it possible for all people to have enough to eat.

As our assistance has shifted to these “new directions” that shape our foreign policy with the developing world, we have sought increasingly to enlist the resources, initiative, and technology of the private sector in these efforts. We have been invited to gather today to consider what you in the private sector and we in government should do in active partnership to make the vast technological resources of the United States available to the poor countries so as to enhance the achievement of their development goals.

These nations are the source of scarce raw materials and can be an expanding market for our products, provided that the purchasing power of the people is increased



through efforts that bring them remunerative returns. And it follows that as countries direct their attention toward constructive efforts and develop positive linkages to one another through commerce and investment, they will be less likely to concentrate their energies and resources on destructive confrontational activities. Thus we serve the moral purpose of building world order and justice when we help countries establish the conditions which allow all people to satisfy their basic needs by working within economic systems that provide rewarding opportunities for individual initiative.

The Secretary of State has announced that the U.S. national conference next year will deal with a number of issues related to technology and the Third World. I need not tell most of you that the U.S. foreign assistance program has for many years supported less developed nations in building the infrastructure essential to the generation or adaptation of technologies critical to economic growth. I would like to share with you some of our recent experience in this regard, cite lessons we have learned in the process, and mention some ideas to improve what we are doing now or are capable of doing in the future.

### **Sharing Advanced Technologies**

Immediately following World War II, when foreign aid was directed to the rehabilitation of Europe, the overwhelming need was for capital. Today Third World countries likewise require capital, but there is the clear perception that the capital-intensive technology which powered the economic growth of the West and the recovery of Europe will not necessarily be the source for generating the wealth which the less developed nations now require. And it is important to emphasize that the developing nations of the world are indeed abundantly endowed with the most critical of basic development assets: humankind, with the innate desire to be productive.

The fact that the requirements of Third World nations are different from our own need not preclude them from taking advan-

tage of some of our technologies. Through the diligent and imaginative application of existing advanced technology and management practices which were not necessarily created for developing-country needs, poor countries can make quantum jumps to leapfrog the conventional evolutionary steps that the industrialized countries made in their own development. A vast amount of the off-the-shelf technology is now available to developing nations. There is evidence that just as the rate of scientific discovery has greatly accelerated, so has our capability to share these advances with the Third World grown rapidly.

Advanced technologies offer a wider choice of approaches to development. They promise major advances in crucial fields such as energy, food production, health, and fertility control. In general, there is a vast unrealized potential of advanced technologies to improve the material well-being of the world's poor.

One can cite dramatic examples of these new "state-of-the-art" or "cutting-edge" technologies. Many are already in use by AID. Female sterilization has been simplified through an innovative technique called minilaparotomy, performed on an outpatient basis. We are discovering fast-growing trees to ease the shortage of firewood and for the rehabilitation of land in the developing world. Nitrogen-fixing legumes have been found which significantly reduce fertilizer demand. A recently introduced technique called thematic mapping has greatly enlarged the information available from satellite remote sensing. Systems analysis speeds effective decisionmaking by LDC planners, and computer-enhanced modeling enriches the economic and social benefits of agricultural programs and transportation systems.

A most compelling illustration of how space-age technology can be applied in developing countries in the battle against poverty, disease, and disaster lies in the cluster of technologies associated with earth satellites. One of the most perplexing problems facing decisionmakers in developing countries is how to make a scientifically accurate national assessment of the natural resource



base available for development in meeting the basic needs of their populations. Our Agency has just completed an unprecedented worldwide demonstration in 27 of the world's poorer and more remote countries of the virtually untapped potential of satellite remote sensing and communications technologies to directly improve the well-being of their people.

Nowhere was the potential of this advanced technology described more eloquently than by Prime Minister Zulfikar Ali Bhutto of Pakistan, who said:

This vivid demonstration of the relevance of space technology to our most critical and compelling problems is an occasion to reflect on the great deprivation of the Third World—its lack of technology. We cannot precisely map our water resources, observe the depth and extent of snow coverage, survey our crops and soil, detect the conditions of cultivated lands, locate the incidence of pest attacks without earth resources satellites. . . . Let the hope be reciprocal that the satellite program heralds an age in which disparities will be narrowed and justice insured in sharing the fruit of man's scientific enterprise.

As we shared information from our earliest earth resources satellites, so are we prepared now to offer this technology through more comprehensive follow-on programs. Regional training and utilization centers for satellite application will be set up in Africa, Asia, and Latin America. We are now encouraging and acting upon requests from LDC's for assistance in exploiting this sophisticated technology.

### Assimilation of Technology

In the transfer of technology, simply making products and processes known or available is not enough. Our experience indicates that a country's growth depends on the degree to which local industry can assimilate and commercialize technology. We need to know how technology can more effectively be integrated with capital and management to accelerate the process of industrialization in developing countries.

It is precisely with this objective in mind that AID has assumed leadership in establishing an International Industrialization Institute following a proposal made by the Sec-

retary of State at the U.N. General Assembly seventh special session and UNCTAD IV meetings.

In the West, the process of industrialization has been evolutionary, has been founded on private enterprise, has grown from small to large, and has been guided by criteria not relevant to the needs of and environment in the developing world. These process phenomena were not studied *a priori* but, rather, researched *ex post facto*. Thus, there is neither lore nor research into Western industrialization which would reveal the processes by which it evolved, and if such research did exist, it would not suggest a process most appropriate to the environment in the developing world. What we need to discover through the International Industrialization Institute is how to assist countries whose environments are not naturally attractive to the processes by which we achieved industrialization.

Technological assistance, which has become an appreciably larger component of our bilateral aid, can function as a power lever on a country's industrialization, and this may be a much more effective way than transfer of capital to generate foreign exchange for development purposes. In developing countries overall, three-quarters of all foreign exchange is derived from trade, 13 percent from donor aid, and 12 percent from private investment.

Through our technical assistance, projects are conceived and implemented not only with greater cost-effectiveness, but they result in production having enhanced marketability even to the extent of achieving export potential. Thus, technical assistance can lead to a profound increase in the rate of capital flows to an economy. It can also improve managerial skills and technical competence and develop the necessary institutional capacity to process more effectively capital transfer and private investment. In fact, it is fair to say that each of our projects has a technical component, an inherently innovative and learning component for both the United States and the developing country.

Making the most appropriate technologies available to developing countries through our



technical assistance program is not a new activity for AID. The Agency has a diversified portfolio of current projects directed toward the use of low-cost labor-intensive technology. However, this year Congress has provided new impetus for this activity. It instructed AID to set aside \$20 million to underwrite an expanded and coordinated private effort, an appropriate-technology fund, to develop and disseminate technologies appropriate for developing countries. This new private nonprofit organization, which is to be in operation early next year, will give priority focus to technologies suited to small market towns, rural areas, and villages in the developing world. Among other activities, it will concentrate on helping small businesses in LDC's and finding ways to involve U.S. business in appropriate-technology programs for these countries.

Considering technology and development from a broader perspective, one can compare the development process in a country to a ship convoy in wartime. The convoy moves only as fast as its slowest vessel; an observer at a distance is unable to discern which ship is the laggard. When the development process is slow or inefficient, and fails to meet the aspirations of a people, it is not easy to pinpoint the weak component or faulty linkage. To identify the systemic deficiency requires close and comprehensive *systematic* assessment. Take the multinational Volta River development project and the mainstream dams projected for the Senegal and Niger Rivers. The vast potential offered by these dams for irrigation, flood control, and power generation will be nullified in terms of human benefit if we cannot generate and infuse the technology to control or eradicate the dread tropical scourges of schistosomiasis, river blindness, and malaria.

### Industry-Government Dialogue

The Secretary of State has suggested that the most effective way to mobilize these technological resources for international development is through a new partnership between our private and public sectors. Therefore let me describe briefly some of the

programs AID is supporting not only to facilitate access to our technological resources but to assist the private sector to respond more positively to developing-country needs.

With our support, the National Technical Information Service of the Department of Commerce has made agreements with technical centers in at least 15 developing countries which improve access to government-owned or public research and development. Links between U.S. industrial research institutes and local industries and research institutes in 25 developing countries have been established by the Denver Research Institute. The National Bureau of Standards is upgrading standards with counterpart laboratories in LDC's to simplify the transfer of technology.

I am personally convinced that the potential role of the private sector—whether U.S., developing country, or transnational—has only barely been scratched. Many colleagues in business share this view, as do many leading officials of developing countries. Why, then, has foreign and domestic private sector involvement in the developing countries generally not been more significant?

Many reasons are given, but simplistically they boil down to lack of incentive on the part of the private sector on the one hand and the distrust and unfamiliarity with modern business practices on the part of many developing countries on the other. And as I mentioned earlier, the basic cause of these failures stems from attempting to introduce industrialization into what is essentially an unnatural environment for its prosperity and growth. To overcome these problems, both government and private industry will have to increase their knowledge of the complementary and yet unique roles of the public and private sectors and conscientiously identify opportunities for productive undertakings by both with genuine results for the consumer and the producer. This understanding cannot materialize without an effective dialogue involving the governments and the private sector of developing countries on the one hand and U.S. and other foreign companies on the other. Governments can and should establish the incentives and climate for meaningful involvement of private enter-



prise and can reorient policies and programs, particularly from the standpoint of political and economic considerations, to overcome constraints to individual and private initiative. The private sector can consult and advise in the process.

In such a dialogue between industry and government, many questions should be addressed, such as:

What basic goods and services does the society want produced and distributed to the people at large?

Which should be supplied by the public and private sectors, and which by some combination of the two?

At what point should industry advise governments on policies and plans?

What are the bottlenecks to effective private enterprise involvement, domestic and foreign, and how can they be overcome?

What specific policy and procedural changes are needed?

Developing countries and development agencies such as AID need private sector guidance on these questions. For our part, we are prepared to react with candor as to what we can or cannot do—and why. Government may not be able to respond favorably to all recommendations from industry; but unless we try, we cannot move forward.

In summary, the challenge before us is to:

—Bring about genuine rather than contrived productivity in the developing world, in major proportions and in very genuine economic terms;

—Take advantage of, and preserve, the symbiotic relationships between public and private sector technology, with the public sector technology being addressed in good part toward enabling developing-country people to have basic opportunities to become productive and the private sector being able to function in a naturally compatible environment where there is both the incentive and the capacity to utilize technology which may have to be adapted to needs; and

—Provide the necessary dimension to permit the developing countries to expand their own national economic level, by insur-

ing that what is produced is greater than, and different from, that which they need for their own survival.

Official development assistance alone is not a sufficient condition for achieving these goals. But, by acting in concert, the public and private sectors can bring about far more resounding results than will reliance primarily on the public sector alone. It is in this endeavor for mankind that we in the foreign assistance program earnestly seek your cooperation.

## Letters of Credence

### *Burundi*

The newly appointed Ambassador of the Republic of Burundi, Laurent Nzeyimana, presented his credentials to President Ford on November 24.<sup>1</sup>

### *Cameroon*

The newly appointed Ambassador of the United Republic of Cameroon, Benoit Bindzi, presented his credentials to President Ford on November 24.<sup>1</sup>

### *Gabon*

The newly appointed Ambassador of the Gabonese Republic, Rene Kombila, presented his credentials to President Ford on November 24.<sup>1</sup>

### *Lesotho*

The newly appointed Ambassador of the Kingdom of Lesotho, Thabo R. Makeka, presented his credentials to President Ford on November 24.<sup>1</sup>

### *Mali*

The newly appointed Ambassador of the Republic of Mali, Ibrahima Sima, presented his credentials to President Ford on November 24.<sup>1</sup>

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<sup>1</sup> For texts of the Ambassador's remarks and the President's reply, see Department of State press release dated November 24.

## U.S. Vetoes Application of Vietnam for U.N. Membership

*Following is a statement made in the U.N. Security Council by U.S. Representative William W. Scranton on November 15, together with his statement in the U.N. General Assembly on November 26.*

### STATEMENT BY AMBASSADOR SCRANTON, SECURITY COUNCIL, NOVEMBER 15

USUN press release 151 dated November 15

The United States voted against the application for membership in the United Nations by the Socialist Republic of Vietnam, not because we doubt that the Socialist Republic of Vietnam is able to carry out the obligations of the U.N. Charter; rather, the United States has serious doubts about the willingness of Vietnam to do so. It is this lack of demonstrated will which leads the United States to conclude that the Socialist Republic of Vietnam does not meet the standards established by article 4 of the U.N. Charter.<sup>1</sup>

Let me be specific. The Socialist Republic of Vietnam has failed so far to manifest satisfactory humanitarian or practical concern regarding American servicemen missing in action (MIA's). It has failed, despite the information available to it, to account satisfactorily for Americans missing in action and to return the remains of those killed in the recent conflict in Indochina, despite repeated efforts by the United States to persuade them to do so. We cannot help but conclude from the Vietnamese refusal to provide a fuller accounting that the Socialist Republic of Vietnam persists in its attempt to play upon the deep anguish and the uncertainty of the families of these men in order to obtain economic and political advantage.

Through its record and policies, the Socialist Republic of Vietnam has convinced

my government that it is not willing to carry out obligations of the charter. As we all know, these obligations embrace not only the maintenance of international peace and security but observance of human rights.

Should the Socialist Republic of Vietnam, by its actions, demonstrate its willingness to carry out fully the charter's obligations, the United States, for its part, would reconsider its position in regard to a renewed application for entry into the United Nations.

Now I would like to take the opportunity of just a moment more to comment on some of the views that have been expressed by a number of representatives during the course of this debate. Some have spoken with great seriousness and evident preoccupation. Some have reacted angrily. And still others have exuded virtuous indignation in very strong terms.

My delegation acknowledges the genuine concern of some among us over the very present situation. What we cannot accept is the cynical posturing represented in many of the statements we have heard in this Council's debate on the issue.

For instance, it comes with singular ill grace for that power which has cast 110 vetoes in this Council to lecture us on proper behavior in self-righteous tones. Fifty-one of these 110 vetoes—51 of them—were applied to membership applications.

As I look around the table, I see among the present membership of the Council one whose application was vetoed six times before that country was finally accepted. Another now at this table suffered four such vetoes.

An Asian permanent member did not hesitate not so long ago to veto the application of an emerging Asian state because it did not like the way it had come to independence. Later it relented and allowed the application to be accepted.

Numerous members of the nonaligned on the Council and among the general membership of our organization have spoken with fervor on the rights of the current applicant. However, as recently as a year ago the mem-

<sup>1</sup> The Council on Nov. 15 voted on the draft resolution (S/12226) to recommend the admission of the Socialist Republic of Vietnam to the United Nations; the vote was 14 in favor and 1 (U.S.) against.



bers of the nonaligned group on the Council could not bring themselves even to consider the application of a well-qualified Asian state—a state whose population is greater than that of 124 members of the United Nations and whose gross national product exceeds that of 107 of the current membership. And yet the nonaligned talked of an unfailing commitment to the principle of universality.

Mr. President, I do not seek here to be contentious. I merely wish to recall some facts in this Council's record. Those who make accusations, whether pious or ill tempered, might well be advised to examine the reflecting mirror for examples of their actions in times past and recent.

I speak directly to the point. I appeal to the current applicant to give attention to the human rights provisions of the charter, to abandon trading on the sorrow of families to attain its ends. Normalization of relations could then flow swiftly.

#### **STATEMENT BY AMBASSADOR SCRANTON, GENERAL ASSEMBLY, NOVEMBER 26**

USUN press release 165 dated November 26

Today as we discuss again the question of the Socialist Republic of Vietnam's application for membership in the United Nations, it is timely to restate our position and what we mean by an accounting of the MIA's.

The United States believes that Vietnam, by its refusal to account for our men missing in action during the recent conflict in Southeast Asia, has shown itself unwilling to fulfill basic humanitarian obligations consistent with U.N. membership. Vietnam apparently persists in its efforts to play upon the anguish of the families of these men for political and economic advantage. Let me remind this body that in 1974 the General Assembly itself recognized the importance of providing information on the missing and returning the remains of the dead when it passed by an overwhelming majority a resolution calling upon all parties to armed conflicts to do so after hostilities had ceased.<sup>2</sup>

What we mean by an accounting has some-

times been of concern to others. The allegation has been repeated often in harsh terms that we are asking for the impossible. This is not so. Clearly, we want to know what has happened to all of our men. But we understand that many were lost in circumstances which make it unlikely that any direct information about them will be discovered. But what we do expect from the authorities in Hanoi is that they will provide all the information in their possession on our MIA's, that they will return to us all recoverable remains of our dead, in accordance with that resolution I just cited, and that they will carry out serious search efforts to ascertain the fate of others.

Mr. President, I can add that on October 2 Secretary of State Kissinger expressed the following views during a panel discussion at the National Conference of Editorial Writers.

Secretary Kissinger said that basically we have no conflict with Vietnam now. After our experience in Vietnam we are the one great power that can be guaranteed not to have any national objectives there. So, the Secretary continued, the normalization of relations between the United States and Vietnam eventually will come.

On the other hand, the Secretary said we believe that the behavior of the Vietnamese in not turning over to us lists which we are confident they must have is a cruel and heartless act and one for which we are not prepared to pay any price.

The Secretary concluded that if this were accomplished there would be no significant obstacles to normalization.

Mr. President, these remarks should make clear that the United States is not asking the impossible but, rather, a reasonable manifestation of willingness to meet a most fundamental humanitarian obligation, as indicated in the resolution I cited.

The United States will vote against the resolution contained in document A/31/L.21, not because we object in any way in principle

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<sup>2</sup> For text of A/RES/3220 (XXIX), see BULLETIN of Dec. 2, 1974, p. 774.

to the issue of Vietnam's membership being discussed in the General Assembly.<sup>3</sup> We do object, however, to the resolution's directly citing for criticism the vote by the United States in the Security Council in opposition to Vietnam's membership. The Security Council has recently considered Vietnam's membership application. The reasons my government opposed that application are a matter of record and are very clear.

I might add that the United States still has no information that would lead us to change our view that Vietnam is unwilling to meet the humanitarian obligations of the United Nations Charter that would qualify it for membership. While we have no objection to the Security Council's meeting again on Vietnam's membership application, should the members of the Security Council wish to have such a meeting, it is important for all to appreciate the standards against which my government will continue to assess any membership application by Vietnam.

## **U.S. Abstains on Application of Angola for U.N. Membership**

*Following is a statement made in the U.N. Security Council by U.S. Representative William W. Scranton on November 22.*

USUN press release 157 (corr. 2) dated November 22

The United States will abstain on Angola's application for membership in the United Nations. Our decision to abstain, rather than to oppose this application, was made out of respect for the sentiments expressed by our African friends.

We still have serious doubts about the true independence of the current Angolan Government. It is hard to reconcile the presence of a massive contingent of Cuban troops with the claim that Angola enjoys truly independent status. The Angolan Government exercises only tenuous control over much of An-

gola that still resists domination by the regime in Luanda. The fact that it depends heavily on Cuban forces for the maintenance of its security casts doubt on the degree of popular support which it can command within the country.

It is clear that the Cuban Army, a foreign, non-African force, is waging a bloody and difficult guerrilla war in three separate areas of Angola. We have heard disturbing reports that these Cuban occupation forces have been carrying out military assaults upon undefended villages and towns in Angola. These reported attacks include the killing of refugees, the burning of villages, and the slaughter of the people's main source of food and livelihood, their cattle. Reportedly several thousand Angolans have fled from this recent onslaught across the border into Namibia.

We continue to believe that there is absolutely no justification for such a large foreign armed presence in an African state.

The real victims of this policy, of course, are the people of Angola, who have borne the weight of 14 years of colonial war and now almost two years of civil war, with no end in sight. Even now there are an estimated 700,000 Angolan refugees and displaced persons.

Nevertheless, the United States has followed a consistent policy of support for African solutions to African problems and respect for the role of the Organization of African Unity. The Organization of African Unity has formally recommended U.N. membership for Angola, and OAU members have asked us to facilitate Angola's entry. For the reasons I have enumerated earlier we cannot, in good conscience, vote in favor of the Angolan application for membership in this organization. In this case, out of deference to African views, we will not oppose the application.<sup>1</sup>

<sup>1</sup> The Council on Nov. 22 adopted by a vote of 13 to 0, with 1 abstention (U.S.), a resolution (S/RES/397 (1976)) recommending to the General Assembly "that the People's Republic of Angola be admitted to membership in the United Nations"; the People's Republic of China did not participate in the vote. The Assembly on Dec. 1 adopted by a recorded vote of 116 to 0, with 1 abstention (U.S.), a resolution (A/RES/31/44) admitting Angola to membership.

<sup>3</sup> The Assembly on Nov. 26 adopted by a rollcall vote of 124 to 1 (U.S.), with 3 abstentions, a resolution (A/RES/31/21) recommending that the Security Council reconsider Vietnam's application for membership.



# United States and U.S.S.R. Sign New Fisheries Agreement

## Joint Statement

Press release 572 dated November 26

Representatives of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics and the United States of America on November 26, 1976, signed [at Washington] a new agreement relating to fishing activities of the Soviet Union off the coasts of the United States. The agreement sets out the arrangements between the countries which will govern fishing by the Soviet Union within the fishery conservation zone of the United States beginning March 1, 1977. The agreement will come into force after the completion of internal procedures by both governments.

Vladimir M. Kamentsev, First Deputy Minister of Fisheries, U.S.S.R., signed for the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics. Ambassador Thomas A. Clingan, Jr., Chairman of the U.S. Delegation, signed for the United States.

Both delegations expressed their satisfaction with the new accord and the hope that it will contribute to mutual understanding and cooperation between the two governments.

## Current Treaty Actions

### MULTILATERAL

#### Coffee

International coffee agreement 1976, with annexes. Done at London December 3, 1975. Entered into force provisionally October 1, 1976.  
*Ratification deposited:* Rwanda, November 23, 1976.

#### Conservation

Agreement on the conservation of polar bears. Done at Oslo November 15, 1973. Entered into force May 26, 1976; for the United States November 1, 1976.  
*Proclaimed by the President:* November 26, 1976.

#### Cultural Relations

Constitution of the United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization. Done at London November 16, 1945. Entered into force November 4, 1946. TIAS 1580.

*Signatures:* Surinam, July 16, 1976; Papua New Guinea, September 21, 1976; Mozambique, October 11, 1976; Seychelles, October 18, 1976.  
*Acceptances deposited:* Surinam, April 8, 1976; Papua New Guinea, October 4, 1976; Mozambique, August 16, 1976; Seychelles, October 18, 1976.

#### Diplomatic Relations

Vienna convention on diplomatic relations. Done at Vienna April 18, 1961. Entered into force April 24, 1964; for the United States December 13, 1972. TIAS 7502.

*Accession deposited:* Yemen, November 24, 1976.

#### Health

Amendments to articles 34 and 55 of the constitution of the World Health Organization of July 22, 1946, as amended (TIAS 1808, 4643, 8086). Adopted at Geneva May 22, 1973.<sup>1</sup>

*Acceptances deposited:* Republic of Korea, November 16, 1976; Rwanda, November 19, 1976.

#### Maritime Matters

Amendment of article VII of the convention on facilitation of international maritime traffic, 1965 (TIAS 6251). Adopted at London November 19, 1973.<sup>1</sup>

*Acceptance deposited:* Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, October 22, 1976.

Amendments to the convention of March 6, 1948, as amended, on the Intergovernmental Maritime Consultative Organization (TIAS 4044, 6285, 6490). Adopted at London October 17, 1974.<sup>1</sup>

*Acceptances deposited:* Czechoslovakia, Indonesia, November 23, 1976; Egypt, November 16, 1976; Oman, Peru, November 18, 1976.

#### Meteorology

Convention of the World Meteorological Organization. Done at Washington October 11, 1947. Entered into force March 23, 1950. TIAS 2052.

*Accession deposited:* Sao Tome and Principe, November 23, 1976.

#### Oil Pollution

Amendments to the international convention for the prevention of pollution of the sea by oil, 1954, as amended (TIAS 4900, 6109). Adopted at London October 12, 1971.<sup>1</sup>

*Acceptance deposited:* Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, October 22, 1976.

Amendments to the international convention for the prevention of pollution of the sea by oil, 1954, as amended (TIAS 4900, 6109). Adopted at London October 15, 1971.<sup>1</sup>

*Acceptance deposited:* Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, October 22, 1976.

#### Phonograms

Convention for the protection of producers of phonograms against unauthorized duplication of their phonograms. Done at Geneva October 29, 1971. Entered into force April 18, 1973; for the United States March 10, 1974. TIAS 7808.

*Notification from World Intellectual Property Organization that accession deposited:* Guatemala, November 1, 1976.

<sup>1</sup> Not in force.

## Postal

Second additional protocol to the constitution of the Universal Postal Union of July 10, 1964 (TIAS 5881, 7150), general regulations with final protocol and annex, and the universal postal convention with final protocol and detailed regulations. Done at Lausanne July 5, 1974. Entered into force January 1, 1976. TIAS 8231.

*Ratifications deposited:* Algeria, July 29, 1976; Hungary, September 17, 1976; Israel, November 8, 1976; Lesotho, September 1, 1976; Niger, September 1, 1976.

Money orders and postal travellers' checks agreement, with detailed regulations. Done at Lausanne July 5, 1974. Entered into force January 1, 1976. TIAS 8232.

*Ratifications deposited:* Algeria, July 29, 1976; Hungary, September 17, 1976; Niger, July 19, 1976.

## Space—Liability

Convention on international liability for damage caused by space objects. Done at Washington, London, and Moscow March 29, 1972. Entered into force September 1, 1972; for the United States October 9, 1973. TIAS 7762.

*Accession deposited:* Chile, December 1, 1976.

## Trade

Protocol of terms of accession of Japan to the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade, with annexes. Done at Geneva June 7, 1955. Entered into force September 10, 1955. TIAS 3438.

*Acceptance deposited:* Austria, October 27, 1976.

## War

Geneva convention for amelioration of condition of wounded and sick in armed forces in the field;

Geneva convention for amelioration of the condition of wounded, sick and shipwrecked members of armed forces at sea;

Geneva convention relative to the treatment of prisoners of war;

Geneva convention relative to protection of civilian persons in time of war.

Done at Geneva August 12, 1949. Entered into force October 21, 1950; for the United States February 2, 1956. TIAS 3362, 3363, 3364, and 3365, respectively.

*Notification of succession:* Surinam, October 13, 1976.

## Wheat

Protocol modifying and further extending the wheat trade convention (part of the international wheat agreement) 1971. Done at Washington March 17, 1976. Entered into force June 19, 1976, with respect to certain provisions, July 1, 1976, with respect to other provisions.

*Ratifications deposited:* Brazil, November 26, 1976; El Salvador, November 30, 1976.

## Women—Political Rights

Convention on the political rights of women. Done at New York March 31, 1953. Entered into force July 7, 1954; for the United States July 7, 1976. TIAS 8289.  
*Accession deposited:* Morocco, November 22, 1976.

## BILATERAL

### Egypt

Loan agreement to increase Egypt's industrial and agricultural production. Signed at Cairo September 30, 1976. Entered into force September 30, 1976.

Loan agreement for construction of a National Energy Control Center in Egypt, with annex. Signed at Cairo September 30, 1976. Entered into force September 30, 1976.

### Ghana

Project agreement relating to small farmer development, with annexes. Signed at Accra September 29, 1976. Entered into force September 29, 1976.

### International Telecommunications Satellite Organization

Headquarters agreement. Signed at Washington November 22 and 24, 1976. Enters into force upon exchange of notes by the two parties.

### Japan

Agreement amending the agreement of June 11, 1976, as amended, relating to the limitations of imports of specialty steel from Japan, with attachments. Effected by exchange of letters at Washington October 29, 1976. Entered into force October 29, 1976; effective November 21, 1976.

### Korea

Agreement relating to scientific and technical cooperation. Signed at Seoul November 22, 1976. Entered into force November 22, 1976.

### Romania

Long-term agreement on economic, industrial, and technical cooperation, with annexes. Signed at Bucharest November 21, 1976. Enters into force on the date on which both parties have received written notice of its approval by the other party.

### Union of Soviet Socialist Republics

Agreement concerning fisheries off the coasts of the United States, with agreed minutes, and related letter. Signed at Washington November 26, 1976. Enters into force on a date to be mutually agreed by exchange of notes.



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No.	Date	Subject
*574	11/29	Kissinger: arrival, Mexico City.
*575	12/1	U.N. Environment Program meeting on stratospheric ozone layer, Washington, Mar. 1-9, 1977.
†576	12/1	Kissinger: remarks to U.S. delegation to inauguration of Mexican President, Nov. 30.
*577	12/2	Kissinger: remarks to the press, Mexico City, Nov. 30.
*578	12/3	Program for official visit of Italian Prime Minister Giulio Andreotti, Dec. 5-8.
*579	12/3	Kissinger, Rosalynn Carter, Jack Ford: departure, Mexico City, Dec. 2.
*580	12/3	U.S. and Canada consult on St. Lawrence Seaway, Dec. 2.
†581	12/3	U.S. and Romania sign fisheries agreement.
*582	12/3	Meat import negotiations, Dec. 6.
†583	12/3	Kissinger: statement on announcement of Cyrus Vance to be the next Secretary of State.

\* Not printed.  
† Held for a later issue of the BULLETIN.

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# THE DEPARTMENT OF STATE BULLETIN

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# THE DEPARTMENT OF STATE **BULLETIN**

VOL. LXXV, No. 1957  
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*The Department of State BULLETIN, a weekly publication issued by the Office of Media Services, Bureau of Public Affairs, provides the public and interested agencies of the government with information on developments in the field of U.S. foreign relations and on the work of the Department and the Foreign Service.*

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## Human Rights: Let's Mean What We Say

*Statement by William W. Scranton*

*U.S. Representative to the U.N. General Assembly*<sup>1</sup>

Human rights is as vital and generic an interest of the United Nations as is peacekeeping itself. In fact, the two were the impetus for the founding of the United Nations after World War II—a war fought against tyranny for the preservation of humanity and human values. While U.N. efforts in peacekeeping have not always been effective, this organization has served well in this field, as it is doing today in several parts of the world. But, to me at least, that second and equally vital concern of our institution has brought deep disappointment. The rhetoric on human rights has been superb. The record of accomplishment has been sadly deficient.

This committee has the privilege of dealing with human rights, a subject with but few exceptions absent from the body of international law before the United Nations was established. Until the United Nations Charter and the Universal Declaration of Human Rights set forth standards for relations between states and individuals, only global indignation could cause a state to desist from barbarous practices. The Universal Declaration and the cornucopia of papers that has flowed from the United Nations since, proclaiming principles and goals about the dignity of all humans, were to have made things different.

Have they? Rarely does a state dare con-

tradict the declaration publicly; yet far too few pursue its goals conscientiously, and fewer still embrace its principles to the point of allowing domestic practice to be inspected. In short, the world has not come far.

Today, the only universality that one can honestly associate with the Universal Declaration of Human Rights is universal lipservice.

Why is the United Nations so long on declarations and so short on implementation? Why does it spend so much energy recognizing rights and so little providing remedies for the wronged? Why did the year 1968—the 20th anniversary of the adoption of the declaration, designated as the International Year for Human Rights—follow the 19th-century pattern of treating human rights as little more than a political issue? Why did the Tehran Conference [Apr. 22–May 13, 1968] all but restrict its focus to anti-Israeli grievances and the black-white problems of southern Africa and consciously ignore other obvious and egregious instances of oppression on every continent?

The reason is simply this: Human rights are still treated almost exclusively in a political context, even though positions are cloaked in high moral principles. As a result, compliance with human rights standards is measured not by the standards themselves, but by vote-gathering ability.

Those imprisoned for political dissent, those tortured because they refuse to abandon what they know to be true, cannot await the day their case might happen to come

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<sup>1</sup> Made in Committee III (Social, Humanitarian and Cultural) of the General Assembly on Nov. 24 (text from USUN press release 162).

under the international political spotlight. For the literally hundreds of thousands suffering and denied their dignity as humans, the damage is irreparable. In short, in the field of human rights, justice delayed, as it is by slow and easily obstructed U.N. procedures, becomes mass murder condoned.

### **Liberty and Economic Development**

My belief and the basic concept upon which the free society of the United States is founded is this: The idea of human rights is not unique to certain groups at isolated points in history; the idea is a unifying thread through all of the history of man, even in darkest times.

Before becoming a place, or even a people, the United States was an idea: that men and women can live together in a society without surrendering their rights; that human beings are individuals, not just members of political communities or parts of social institutions; that there exists a limit on the state's right to interfere with the rights and freedoms of a citizen. This awareness of human rights and the natural dignity of human individuals lay at the very heart of our revolutionary birth 200 years ago. The idea of liberty is the single most important animating principle of our Constitution and of our people today.

The focus of that liberty has been the individual, his energies and creative abilities and how best to free those energies. Perhaps more than anything else, this has been the chief theme of our whole history, both at home and in our dealings with other nations. We have gone to war for it, and we have made peace with it foremost in our minds. To this day it remains the most powerful argument for our system.

For the protection of that liberty we limit the power of the government over the rights of the governed. During our nation's infancy it took a four-year struggle over the negotiation and ratification of the U.S. Constitution, a struggle resulting in 10 amendments—our Bill of Rights—to circumscribe government authority. Yet our nation's founders knew that without a Bill of Rights,

freedom gained from colonial domination could one day be lost to an authoritarian regime.

There are men and women in this room who share these views, who believe deeply in human rights, but whose governments confront what are said to be special and extraordinary social needs requiring priority attention. Their leaders are preoccupied with the immense problems of raising their people from poverty, of holding together diverse racial, tribal, and religious elements, of eradicating illiteracy, and of acquiring an elementary technology. In many cases their problems become a basis to rationalize a dominant role for the state, one so dominant that liberty and human rights disappear in the name of development.

History shows this to be an unfounded and destructive fiction, one the United States challenges first and foremost out of respect for the inherent dignity of man and woman, but one we also challenge for the sake of economic development itself. We offer the central lesson of modern history: that liberty is the spur to economic development, not its enemy. Countries grow economically when the inventiveness, creativity, and freedom of their citizens are unfettered, not when energies of their people are locked and chained.

So to those who tell us they are too poor to afford our notions of human rights, we reply that freedom from want can best be achieved when civil and political rights are respected, that promoting and cherishing freedom is both a moral necessity and a precondition to better living.

When some leaders who do not heed that lesson are later called to account for their failures, they blame the devastation of their societies on the effects of a bygone colonialism or, more currently, on the economic strength of the industrialized democracies and the myth of neocolonialism. Then they take for the state an even more dominant role to cope with increased discontent and opposition. Repression follows inevitably and leads to violence.

Yet for many leaders in the Third World this subordination of fundamental freedoms



to government authority was not and is not desired. Far from fundamentally opposing individual human rights, these leaders hope for the day when their people can enjoy both freedom and prosperity.

### **Human Rights Versus Marxist Dogma**

The Communist states, however, especially the Soviet Union, evidence no such aspirations. In the Soviet system any genuine respect for human rights encounters the harsh opposition of basic Marxist dogma: that individual rights stand in the way of a planned and directed society. Then there is their cynical approach to human rights discussion itself. For example, by putting forward in the Human Rights Commission what they call "the right to life" they attempt to justify in the name of national security the limitation of every other human right—the right to speak freely, to write, to worship, to be free of arbitrary action by the state.

The Soviet Union's efforts to manipulate the developing world are very destructive. Using the guise of neocolonialism to discredit the ideas and forms of freedom, they hope to strengthen the ideas and forms of totalitarianism.

But there are ways for the Soviet Union to play a constructive role for human rights, to demonstrate concrete followup on promises made. The forthcoming change in Administration in the United States will not change one fundamental fact: The United States will insist that the Soviet Union fulfill its commitments under the Final Act of the Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe, including the "basket" 3 provisions.<sup>2</sup> In considering further normalization of relations with the Soviet sphere, we shall measure their performance under the standards agreed to at Helsinki.

Mr. Chairman, some countries make fear an instrument of national policy. The creative instincts of people are continually kept

in check; arrest, torture, and imprisonment without trial, often under so-called emergency powers, become an institutionalized pattern. In this connection, I wish to reiterate my government's unequivocal condemnation of the doctrine and practice of apartheid. This pernicious philosophy has led to wave after wave of mass detention and wholesale violation of even the most elementary human rights. It degrades not only its victims but those who promulgate and defend it.

While the United States will not impose its system on others, it will and must make its views known. Concern about respect for human dignity is more than a simple reflection of American tradition; it is a critical current priority for the American people. Note the focus on human rights in U.S. foreign policy during the year's Presidential campaign and the specific pronouncements by the President-elect during the campaign itself and again last week at a press conference in Plains, Georgia.

Note, too, the legislation enacted this year by the U.S. Congress to encourage the worldwide observance of human rights. Consistent patterns of gross violations against internationally recognized human rights already affect decisions on U.S. security assistance abroad and votes in multilateral lending agencies. Future legislation may well extend the range of our concern.

### **U.N. Procedures To Deal With Violations**

Next year this Third Committee is scheduled to review human rights machinery in the United Nations. Will it then consider that, notwithstanding the body of U.N. resolutions, conventions, and declarations, violations of human rights appear as widespread today as in any recent time?

U.N. policies require secrecy of proceedings and restrict the committee from discussing the literally tens of thousands of petitions to the United Nations that cite violations of human rights in so many nations. Yet we all know what they are about: denial of basic freedoms and particularly religious expression in the Baltic states—Lithuania,

<sup>2</sup> For text of the final act, signed at Helsinki on Aug. 1, 1975, see BULLETIN of Sept. 1, 1975, p. 323; for "basket" 3, Co-operation in Humanitarian and Other Fields, see p. 339.

Latvia, and Estonia; coercive political indoctrination in the so-called "work camps" of Indochina; massive detentions and torture of political prisoners in some countries of Latin America; mass slaughter in some countries of Africa; denial of freedom of thought, religious freedom, and emigration in the Soviet Union. The full rollcall is long and depressing; it goes on and on.

We are all familiar with the procedures which were authorized by the Economic and Social Council in 1970 in Resolution 1503. These procedures marked what we then hoped would be a major step forward in improving the capability of the United Nations to deal with situations of serious human rights violations. They authorized action on human rights petitions which "reveal a consistent pattern of gross and reliably attested violations...."

But the record of Human Rights Commission actions under these procedures has been one of nonperformance. One basic reason for the dismal record is the procedures themselves. They virtually assure that complaints of violations will die in a bureaucratic maze. For example, after the receipt of the complaint, long delays occur before there is any possibility of action by the Commission.

Eighteen months must pass before a complaint is first reviewed—a complaint that evidences "a consistent pattern of gross violations." By the time a complaint is considered, it needs updating, and an update must go through the same delay-plagued process. Last March, when a motion to allow supplementary material to bypass delaying procedures was proposed, in typical fashion it too was postponed. Obviously these procedures should be made more effective, sped up to bring action. My government will do its utmost to support improvement in Resolution 1503.

This committee should establish mechanisms to stem the massive violations of human rights in the world—not merely in the handful of countries to which this body has attracted world attention. It must act against the abuse of human rights wherever it takes place. Effective investigatory power, effective procedures, effective action taken

before a particular abuse becomes a global political issue—all these are needed.

If, at the close of the third decade since the adoption of that Universal Declaration, no better U.N. machinery exists than does now, then we will have bared our true intent: to avoid fulfilling the purposes of that declaration. That anniversary will then not be a celebration, but an occasion for dismay at how little was done and how much was concealed. If we will not act to give life to the principles we profess, maybe the honest course would be for us to file out of this hall one by one, each admitting we have no intent to keep faith with our promises. But none of us can afford to abandon this sacred responsibility, whatever the difficulties.

Yearn as I may for utopia, right now I would settle for comparatively small changes and additions to our system. Total restructuring and fundamental change is not essential. But we must build upon the existing machinery, remove its weaknesses, and make it work.

There is no shortage of suggestions that merit consideration: a United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights, an International Human Rights Court, a permanent body to meet and review complaints regularly throughout the year. Each could provide timely, continuous, and public attention to serious human rights violations. In addition, this organization should make a more deliberate effort to coordinate with the important human rights work being done by regional groups. Further, more regional human rights organizations should be established. All these suggestions could improve the current situation immensely.

The responsibility to safeguard human rights is simply too sacred for all of us—and might indeed someday be needed to preserve life and freedom for any one of us—to be left hostage to political manipulation.

Every country represented here subscribes to the principles of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights. A number honor them. Many more would if they thought they could. It is time for this body to make those principles a reality, to act now to turn on some light.



Human rights are destroyed in little moves that flourish in darkness and quiet—destructive steps, each so minor that one seems able to justify not putting up a defense, not just yet. Only exposure—precise, unrelenting, and complete exposure—will prevail against that destructive process.

The conscience of mankind can ignore injustice in the dark. When the lights are on, few men of conscience can remain quiet. This body must choose between darkness and decency, between protecting the violators of human dignity and protecting human dignity itself with the light of world opinion, the clear light of truth.

## **Secretary Kissinger's Statement on Designation of Mr. Vance**

*Following is a statement by Secretary Kissinger made on his behalf on December 3 by Robert L. Funseth, Special Assistant to the Secretary for Press Relations.*

Press release 583 dated December 3

President-elect Carter has made an outstanding choice in choosing Cyrus Vance as his Secretary of State. I have known Mr. Vance for many years and have had the privilege of working with him. He is exceptionally well qualified for his new responsibilities. I wish him well; his success will be the success of all Americans.

My colleagues in the Department of State and I will do everything we can to assist the Secretary-designate during the transition period. I have ordered that all cables and other information available to me as Secretary of State be made available immediately to Mr. Vance. I look forward to meeting soon with the Secretary-designate to work out this and other details of the transition.

Mr. Vance deserves the support and prayers of all Americans; for the peace, progress, and prosperity of the United States—which will so much depend upon him—are crucial to the realization of a better world for all mankind.

## **Secretary Reaffirms Continuity of U.S.-Mexican Relations**

*Secretary Kissinger, as Special Representative of the President and Chief of Delegation to the inauguration of Mexican President José Lopez Portillo, visited Mexico City November 29–December 2. Following are remarks made by Secretary Kissinger at a reception for the U.S. delegation on November 30.<sup>1</sup>*

Press release 576 dated December 1

I would like to welcome you all and to express our appreciation for your coming here to see us. My wife and I are always happy to visit Mexico, where we had our honeymoon and where we have spent so many happy occasions. And our country has such profound ties to the people and the Government of Mexico which are symbolized by the presence here of the son of our current President, Mr. Jack Ford, and the wife of the President-elect, Mrs. [Rosalynn] Carter. Nothing could express more profoundly the importance that the United States attaches to its relationships in the Western Hemisphere and to its very special relationship to its growing, complicated, difficult, occasionally cantankerous but always close friends in Mexico.

We live in a period in which we have to find peace in the midst of ideological conflicts and we have to strive for progress when the disparities between people and within countries are enormous. And we must give expression to the interdependence of nations at a time when the pride of nations has never been more pronounced.

In this respect, our relations with our neighbors in Mexico are of central importance. We have to deal with each other on the basis of mutual respect. We have to recognize that we will not always see things identically—and how is that possible, anyway, in a nation of some 70 million anarchistic individualists? But we must also recognize that our destinies are linked and that we can

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<sup>1</sup> Other press releases relating to Secretary Kissinger's visit to Mexico City are Nos. 574 of Nov. 29, 577 of Dec. 2, and 579 of Dec. 3.

set an example to the rest of the world how proud nations can cooperate.

For the first time in nearly three decades, periods of transition in Mexico and in the United States coincide. And just as the transfer of authority is taking place in Mexico with dignity and with continuity and with the assurance that the basic principles of the relationship between our two countries will be maintained, so I am confident that the basic principles of peace, of progress, of interdependence and mutual respect reflect the views of all Americans. They do not reflect the view of a single party—and, after all, the first time that I met our President-elect, when only he knew he was going to run for President, I heard him give an address in Spanish to a group of diplomats from the Western Hemisphere signifying his own commitment to the closer relationship within the Western Hemisphere.

So, in thanking once again Mr. Ford and Mrs. Carter for joining us, I would like to propose a toast to the friendship between the Mexican and American people, to the health and long life of President Echeverría, and to the health and success of President-elect Lopez Portillo.

## **United States and Mexico Sign Treaty on Execution of Penal Sentences**

Press release 570 dated November 26

The following is the text of a press release issued November 25 in Mexico City after the signing of a treaty between Mexico and the United States on the execution of penal sentences:

"Today, at 5 p.m., Secretary of Foreign Relations Alfonso García Robles and the U.S. Ambassador to Mexico, Joseph John Jova, signed the treaty between the United States and Mexico on the execution of penal sentences.

"The agreement is the first of its kind for both Mexico and the United States.

"This treaty, which has been under negotiation since last September, has the objective of facilitating the social rehabilitation of prisoners by allowing them to serve their prison terms in their own social environment.

"That is, Mexican nationals who may be sentenced in the United States could serve their sentences in Mexico, and U.S. nationals sentenced in Mexico could serve their sentences in their own country. In determining whether a transfer should be requested, the treaty provides several factors which may be taken into account. Among these are: the type and seriousness of the crime for which the prisoner was sentenced; his previous criminal record, if any; the strength of his connections by residence, family relations, and otherwise to the social life of the country where he is imprisoned or with his native country.

"The transfer of a prisoner requires the initiation of the request by the state in which the sentence has been imposed, and the approval of the request by the other state. No transfer shall take place without the consent of the offender."

After the signing, the Secretary of Foreign Relations made the following official statement: "As is the case with all treaties, the present one is subject to Senate approval in accordance with section X of article 89 and with section I of article 76 of the Political Constitution of Mexico."

In the present case, the ratification of the treaty by Mexico is also subject to—and this has been made perfectly clear in the discussions with the U.S. Government officials—the approval by the majority of the state legislatures of an amendment to article 18 of the Constitution proposed by the Federal Executive Authority on September 4 and favorably approved by the Congress of the Union. In the United States, the treaty and enabling legislation will be sent to the Congress for appropriate action.



## Latin America and Today's World Economy

*Address by William D. Rogers  
Under Secretary for Economic Affairs*<sup>1</sup>

I should like to say a word or two about the world economic circumstance and try to draw a few lines of relevance to Latin America and for our relations with Latin America.

First, however, a brief reference to Mexico. I have just returned from Mexico City. I had the privilege of participating in our delegation, led by the Secretary of State, to the inauguration of President Lopez Portillo. He and his new Cabinet, as this group well knows, face substantial challenges in the coming months in the economic field. But I am confident that they are putting together a program of public policy with vision, determination, and courage which will permit Mexico indeed to achieve its immense potential in the years ahead.

Mexico, of course, is not alone in its present economic difficulties. Yellow lights are flashing around the world.

A few months ago the OECD [Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development] estimated that aggregate 1977 growth rates for the industrial democracies—on whom the economic vigor of the world turns—would be something like 5 percent. Although the precise revised estimate of the OECD Secretariat has not been officially released, I think it fair to say that it was recognized at last month's meeting of the OECD Economic Policy Committee, which I attended with Chairman [of the Council of Economic Advis-

ers Alan] Greenspan, that the level for 1977 has slipped and that aggregate growth rates will be measurably lower than OECD had first thought.

High rates of inflation persist among the OECD countries. The average is between 8 and 9 percent for the group. Japan, Germany, and the United States are better off. The United Kingdom and Italy are well into double digits.

Investment rates are slowing, particularly in Western Europe, and some company balance sheets are in bad shape.

The OECD countries' balance of payments on current account has deteriorated steadily. It was balanced in the first half of 1975. The deficit is now \$25–\$30 billion. If there is an increase in the price of oil, an issue to which I will come in a minute, this deficit will grow.

Faced with a need to finance growing balance-of-payments deficits, more and more OECD countries are facing a severe credit crunch. The United Kingdom and Italy are now both in the process of arranging additional IMF [International Monetary Fund] drawings, with all that implies by way of painful internal adjustments.

The divergence in economic performance among the industrial democracies is growing, and this is making more difficult the management of a sustained general expansion.

Finally, there is the ominous possibility that the OPEC [Organization of Petroleum Exporting Countries] members will increase the price of their oil exports. A few stark

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<sup>1</sup>Made before the Council of the Americas at New York, N.Y., on Dec. 6.

facts about the effects of an oil price increase:

The world's import bill for OPEC oil this year is \$125 billion. OPEC's balance-of-payments surplus—the mirror image of the balance-of-payments deficit of the rest of the world—will be about \$45 billion in 1976. A 10 percent price increase would add more than \$12 billion annually to the global energy import bill.

The effects would be to transfer additional resources to OPEC, reduce the import capacity of oil-importing countries, add to the cost of the energy component of all we consume, and thus increase worldwide inflationary pressures.

These effects would not be evenly felt. Weaker economies the world over would be the most seriously affected. And the hardest hit would be those who can least afford it: the poorest among the developing countries, the weaker of the industrial democracies.

Let us not deceive ourselves. An oil price increase of any magnitude would constitute a significant setback to the world economy and to our prospects for inflation-free recovery for all countries, rich and poor.

The restoration of the global economic system must begin with the industrial democracies. The rest of the world depends on them.

First, this means structural change in the economies of the West. Over the past decade and a half the share of national income going to wages and compensation in OECD countries as a whole has increased dramatically. Two examples illustrate the point, as well as the consequences: Between 1960 and 1964 on the one hand, and mid-1974–75, the share of consumption in relation to total domestic product has risen in Italy from 47 percent to 60 percent. In the United Kingdom it has risen from 64 percent to 71 percent. Similar changes have occurred in other countries.

There can be no permanent sustained growth for the industrial democracies without a shift in the strong as well as the weak—away from consumption expenditures to real investment. A beginning is essential, if we are to make up for low investment in

the seventies and overcome the resulting sectoral pressures on capacity, technical obsolescence, and low rate of growth.

While this may mean some restraint on demand for those economies of the West more urgently requiring structural reform, it must be matched by harmonizing policies in those countries which have relatively strong economies.

As I said a minute ago, the OPEC surplus of about \$45 billion each year has as its mirror image a deficit of the same magnitude in the current account of the rest of the world. In its internal growth policy and in its international trade posture, the United States must reflect an acceptance of its share of this deficit, in its external accounts, as must the other strong industrial economies, particularly Germany and Japan. It is up to these nations to lead the expansion and provide the impulse to renewed health that the world economy needs.

### **Fundamental Strengths of Latin America**

Renewed growth is not only significant to our own future, it is vital to the developing world and to the corner of the developing world in which those assembled here have a special interest: Latin America.

The Americas are special and will play a special role in the world's economic future.

Here is a region with:

*Considerable natural resources.*

*Food production:* For the area as a whole, output is nearly keeping up with population. And the potential is there for much larger production.

*A declining population growth rate.*

*Human resources:* Literacy rates are considerably higher than those of other developing areas. And the picture continues to improve.

*Basic infrastructure:* During the past decade most Latin American countries have made excellent progress in expanding infrastructure to spur sustained growth. Brazil now produces as much cement as the United Kingdom. Mexico already produces as much natural gas as Iran, and its capacity is expanding rapidly.



*Existing industrial capacities:* Manufacturing now accounts for more than 25 percent of Latin America's gross domestic product. At the current rate of expansion, Brazil, for example, expects to be self-sufficient in steel, petrochemicals, fertilizers, and paper products shortly.

*Export potential:* Latin America's export earnings have tripled since 1970.

It was these fundamental strengths that made things look so bright at the beginning of the decade.

It seemed six years ago that Latin America was about to ride the crest of a world boom. A simultaneous upswing in the business cycle among the industrialized countries served to boost prices for Latin America's 15 basic export commodities 300 percent between 1970 and 1974. Even excluding petroleum—the region's largest single export—prices of the other 14 commodities rose by 200 percent. The improved terms of trade, of course, spurred economic growth:

—Manufacturing output grew at an 8.5 percent annual growth rate.

—Exports of manufactures did even better; from \$2.2 billion in 1970, they reached \$7.4 billion in 1974. Even accounting for inflation, this was a tremendous improvement.

### **Current Economic Situation**

Governments, as would be expected, responded to these conditions. Development programs were infused with new vigor.

Then came trouble; first, in the form of higher oil import prices; then from the ensuing worldwide recession.

Latin American export prices crashed. Their import prices, however, stayed high. The index of the region's terms of trade for 1974 was, as a consequence, no better than the not very good period of 1961–65.

The region's rate of economic growth sank to a mere 2.6 percent for 1975—less than the 2.8 percent growth in population. Yet the countries of the region were reluctant to slow the momentum of their respective development programs launched during better days.

Country by country the specifics varied. But almost every country in Latin America now finds itself faced with a fundamental contradiction. Growth and social objectives are, at least for the moment, at odds with balance-of-payments realities.

The difficulties are reflected in the trade figures:

—Brazil is facing almost a \$6.5 billion current account deficit this year.

—Peru will probably have a \$1.3 billion imbalance.

—Jamaica and the Dominican Republic will be hard hit, as prices for their principal exports, sugar and bauxite, remain depressed.

It is not unusual for developing nations to run current account deficits. But today's deficits will require some hard choices. The need now is for:

—Austerity without repression;

—Growth without inflation; and

—Social justice without damage to more slowly expanding economic systems.

### **New Phase in U.S.-Latin American Relations**

Those are internal necessities. Externally, the crucial ingredients, as I have pointed out, are for oil price restraint by OPEC and sustained, solid recovery by the OECD countries. And we must all keep our markets open.

These, in my view, are the elements in the present global economic equation and its bearing on Latin America. I am hopeful, almost confident, that Latin America will emerge from this period of economic difficulty as an even stronger and more vital region of the world and one with which our relations will enter a new phase.

The change that has taken place in our relations in the past couple of years is astonishing. We were on a confrontation course with Latin America a short while back. Today we are on a far more constructive path. Secretary Kissinger is the author of much that has been accomplished.

—We have dealt with the Cuban trade and recognition problems and removed Cuba as

an item of conflict from the inter-America agenda.

—We are dealing with the Panama Canal issue.

—We are talking seriously with other governments of the region, both in the OAS and bilaterally, about the expansion of trade and accelerated development of technology appropriate to the region's needs.

—And we are leading no crusade. We are not taking over the region's problems for ourselves. Specifically, we do not consider that we can resolve Latin America's present balance-of-payments problems with massive unilateral official resource transfers. But we are proposing to increase our development assistance. And we are, however, demonstrating our concern and our willingness to consider how we can play a part in the search for practical solutions to these and other problems.

But how? Our effort must not be something the United States does *to* Latin America or something *by* the United States *for* the Latin Americans. We and the nations of Latin America can and must cooperate. Our success in the cooperative effort to speed growth and spread the sense of equity and justice in the hemisphere will be measured by the extent to which we can work effectively together.

## **Congressional Documents Relating to Foreign Policy**

### **94th Congress, 2d Session**

Human Rights in Iran. Hearings before the Subcommittee on International Organizations of the House Committee on International Relations. August 3–September 8, 1976. 87 pp.

East German Claims Program. Report of the Senate Committee on Foreign Relations to accompany S. 3621. S. Rept. 94-1188. August 30, 1976. 21 pp.

Military Sales to Turkey. Communication from the President of the United States transmitting his determination that the sale of certain defense articles and services to Turkey are necessary to enable her to fulfill her obligations as a member of NATO. H. Doc. 94-590. August 30, 1976. 5 pp.

## **U.S.-Egypt Joint Working Group on Technology Meets at Washington**

### *Joint Statement*

Press release 566 dated November 22

The fifth meeting of the U.S.-Egypt Joint Working Group on Technology, Research and Development was held in Washington, D.C., November 18–19, 1976. The Joint Working Group was established in June 1974 to encourage a broad program of scientific and technological cooperation for peaceful purposes and mutual benefit, advance the state of science and raise the level of technology in both countries, and strengthen the bonds of friendship between the American and Egyptian people. The last meeting was held in Cairo in February 1976.

Ambassador Frederick Irving, Assistant Secretary of State for Oceans and International Environmental and Scientific Affairs, served as U.S. cochairman; Dr. Hassan M. Ismail, President Emeritus of Cairo University, served as Egyptian cochairman.

The Joint Working Group noted with satisfaction encouraging progress in ongoing cooperative programs in the fields of instrumentation technology, science and technology information systems, science policy and research management, building materials and technology, water management and treatment, and Lake Nasser-Nile River environmental studies.

The Joint Working Group provided for broadening and expanding future scientific and technological cooperation between the two countries by encouraging exchanges and joint research in the fields of science and technology; agriculture; environment, ecology, and energy; and standards and applied technology.

The Joint Working Group considered promising new activities within this framework, including multidisciplinary research of the Red Sea marine environment, baseline environmental investigations and econometric modeling of the Suez Canal, studies of endangered wildlife species in Egypt related to



endangered U.S. species, Cairo traffic studies, telecommunications research, and educational programs in applied technology.

The Joint Working Group agreed to hold its sixth regular meeting in Cairo in November 1977. It expressed its appreciation for the strong technical participation in the meeting by officials and scientists of both countries who are planning ahead together to achieve increasing benefits from scientific and technological cooperation.

## INTERNATIONAL ORGANIZATIONS AND CONFERENCES

### United States Calls for Support for UNRWA

*Following is a statement on agenda item 53, "United Nations Relief and Works Agency for Palestine Refugees in the Near East" (UNRWA), made in the Special Political Committee of the U.N. General Assembly by U.S. Representative Pearl Bailey on November 2.*

USUN press release 138 dated November 2

Twenty-seven years ago the General Assembly created the United Nations Relief and Works Agency and tasked it with one of the most complicated and difficult humanitarian missions undertaken in modern times. Despite the fact that it is a temporary organization, created to fulfill what was expected to be a temporary mission, UNRWA has had to cope with problems and needs which have persisted and indeed grown year by year. Recently we have witnessed a renewal of fighting and bloodshed in the Middle East, this time in Lebanon, in which many innocent Palestinian noncombatants have shared the immense human tragedy and physical disruption suffered by the Lebanese people. As long as the underlying political problem related to the Palestinian refugees

persists, the United Nations must continue to assure that UNRWA remains strong and responsive to their needs.

The United States is proud that it played an important role in the creation of UNRWA. We have over the years expressed our support for its mission and confidence in its operation through contributions which have totaled some \$675 million.

Our overriding objective in the Middle East, however, is to help bring about the political conditions which will permit the eventual disappearance of UNRWA within the context of a just and lasting peace in the area and permit all Palestinians to lead meaningful and fruitful lives. We are committed to determined efforts to assure that this goal does not elude us or recede indefinitely into the future. In the meantime, there is no practical alternative, in either political or humanitarian terms, to maintaining the essential services which UNRWA has so effectively delivered to Palestinian refugees over the years.

We would like to pay tribute here to the tireless and dedicated service of UNRWA's distinguished Commissioner General, Sir John Rennie. There are few assignments in the area of international civil service more demanding of managerial skill and patient diplomacy. The uncertainties and frustrations attendant on UNRWA's dependence on voluntary contributions has magnified the already onerous burdens we have placed on him and on his most capable staff. Sir John deserves both our profound gratitude and our pledges of continued and increased support for the organization he serves.

The Commissioner General has stated in graphic terms the precarious financial position which UNRWA faces in the year ahead. Contributions to UNRWA this past year have not kept pace with the rapid rise in the cost of UNRWA's operations. This has been due principally to a combination of global inflation and special conditions in UNRWA's service area, including the hostilities in Lebanon. During the past year UNRWA services have been reduced in a desperate effort to cope with the serious shortfall in con-

tributions in relation to program expenditures. We believe further reductions cannot be made without cutting dangerously into UNRWA's basic services. We would be particularly loath to see this organization compelled to reduce those educational and health programs on which rest the hope of future generations.

Mr. Chairman, I must in all candor observe that the record of international support for UNRWA has been quite uneven. Many governments have made consistently generous contributions, while others clearly do not provide support commensurate to their means or in some cases do not contribute at all. I am pleased to observe that there have, however, recently been some notable and generous contributions from governments which have not previously contributed in substantial amounts. We commend these contributors, appeal to others to follow their example, and pledge that the United States, for its part, will not be tempted by the generosity of others to slacken its traditional support of this vital humanitarian enterprise.<sup>1</sup>

In closing, Mr. Chairman, the U.S. delegation introduces draft resolution A/SPC/31/L.2 in recognition of the critical financial situation described by Commissioner General Sir John Rennie. We urge support of this resolution, but far more important, we urge all member states of the United Nations to support the indispensable activities of UNRWA through increased financial contributions.<sup>2</sup>

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<sup>1</sup> On Oct. 20, in a meeting of the Working Group on the Financing of UNRWA, Miss Bailey announced an additional U.S. pledge of \$6 million, making a total U.S. contribution of \$38.7 million for 1976. For her statement in the working group, see USUN press release 120 dated Oct. 20. On Nov. 24, in a meeting of the Ad Hoc Committee of the General Assembly for the Announcement of Voluntary Contributions to UNRWA, U.S. Representative Albert W. Sherer, Jr., announced the U.S. pledge of \$26.7 million for 1977. For his statement in the ad hoc committee, see USUN press release 163 dated Nov. 24.

<sup>2</sup> The U.S. draft resolution calling upon all governments "to make the most generous efforts possible to meet the anticipated needs" of UNRWA was adopted by the committee on Nov. 5 by a vote of 96 to 0, with 1 abstention, and by the Assembly on Nov. 23 by a vote of 115 to 0, with 2 abstentions (A/RES/31/15A).

## United States Reaffirms Support of UNHCR Programs

*Following is a statement made in Committee III (Social, Humanitarian and Cultural) of the U.N. General Assembly by U.S. Representative Jean Picker on November 15.*

USUN press release 149 dated November 15

It is a pleasure to comment on the High Commissioner's program and to review the accomplishments of his office over the past year as outlined in the excellent and comprehensive report we are now reviewing.<sup>1</sup> We congratulate the High Commissioner on his most worthy efforts and commend him for this useful report. We have read it with great care and with the attention it deserves.

On the other hand we must observe with a high degree of sadness that the work of the High Commissioner is not diminishing. Rather, the scope and complexity of his activities have increased. There are, unfortunately, new refugee situations and increased demands upon this office, and the prospects for the future offer little solace. As we approach the end of this busy year for the High Commissioner and his staff, we must acknowledge that there are still many unresolved refugee problems to be faced in the year ahead. We will want to comment in a moment on some of them. More than ever there is a clear need for continued support of the High Commissioner's program. We join others in urging that there be full financing of the High Commissioner's program through increased contributions from the traditional donors and fuller participation by others. There is a need to widen significantly the base of support for the High Commissioner's activities.

We were indeed fortunate to have had a visit to Washington by the High Commissioner a few weeks ago. The work of the High Commissioner was featured on United Nations Day on October 24. During the course of the High Commissioner's visit we had an opportunity to review his program in

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<sup>1</sup> U.N. doc. A/31/12, report of the U.N. High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR).



some detail and to gain a better understanding of his future needs.

We are encouraged that the High Commissioner continues to devote priority attention to the question of international legal protection for refugees. Critical areas where such protection is so badly needed have come to light in recent months, and we are assured that the High Commissioner is making a special effort in each case. It is equally satisfying to note that the Executive Committee of the U.N. High Commissioner's program has seen the wisdom of establishing, in the formal sense, a subcommittee concerned exclusively with matters involving legal protection. The United States looks forward to participating in the work of the subcommittee when it meets in Geneva next year. We welcome this development as a means of focusing further attention on this important subject.

We are pleased to note also that two additional governments have decided to accede to the Convention on Refugees and that three governments have joined the ranks of those who have agreed to accede to the protocol. This represents further progress, but there are still substantial areas of the world where such accessions are sadly lacking.

Progress has also been made on the draft convention on territorial asylum, and the plenipotentiaries will meet in January. This represents another step forward. The United States has always supported the concept of a realistic convention on territorial asylum, one to which all governments could accede. We will continue to work toward this end in the spirit that has always governed our attitude toward refugee problems.

The attachment of the United States to the principle of asylum and no forced repatriation is well known. Our views on this subject have been enunciated over and over again. It is therefore particularly distressing to learn from the High Commissioner's report that there are still instances where these principles were either violated or ignored. It is unthinkable that acts of terrorism were undertaken against refugees in certain areas. We condemn terrorist activities against anyone in any form. Refugees are particularly vulnerable. At the same time we must agree

with the High Commissioner that refugees who engage in such activities against governments which have granted them sanctuary, by virtue of such acts automatically disqualify themselves for assistance under the High Commissioner's programs.

In considering the question of legal protection for refugees there is one area that deserves our special attention, and we commend the High Commissioner for bringing it into sharp focus. The High Commissioner has made a special appeal that every humanitarian consideration be given to those refugees afloat in small boats in the South China Sea. In many cases their lives are in great peril. Many are in need of rescue at sea. Unfortunately there have been instances where such rescue was not performed. There is also the critical need for places or points of safe haven and first asylum. These, too, have in some cases been denied. And finally, there is a need for governments to come forward and to offer permanent resettlement opportunities. In this connection the United States has informed the High Commissioner that it is willing to accept, for permanent resettlement, up to 100 of these boat cases per month, with the understanding that other governments will accept their fair share. The High Commissioner has agreed to provide the leadership for this international effort, and we are pleased to be able to do our share. We have already received over 145,000 Indochinese refugees in the United States, of whom 1,240 were boat cases accepted in 1976.

Tribute must be paid to the High Commissioner for the effective way in which he has carried out his regular worldwide Material Assistance Program. This program should continue to enjoy a very high priority. We note that this activity has increased over the level of previous years, with the greatest emphasis placed on refugee needs in Africa and Latin America. We share the view of the High Commissioner that these are the areas where the need is now the greatest. That is not to suggest in any way that the High Commissioner has not paid due attention to refugee needs elsewhere. The problems of refugees in Europe, Asia, and the Middle

East are still with us, and the High Commissioner continues to focus his attention on them with efficiency and in a realistic way. An important aspect of these activities is the concern that the High Commissioner has shown for the problem of family reunification. We very much support this objective of giving the tragedy of separated families in the refugee community priority attention.

The demands on the High Commissioner to exercise his good-offices function have, regrettably, also increased over the past year. Large groups of dislocated persons in Cyprus and refugees in Africa and Indochina have created new challenges. We are most appreciative and commend the High Commissioner for his leadership in these difficult areas. There will be a continued need to support these programs for next year. The High Commissioner has identified the targets. He needs all of our help in meeting them. I can assure you that he has the full support of the United States.

#### **TREATY INFORMATION**

### **U.S. and Romania Sign Agreement on Economic Cooperation**

Press release 568 dated November 24

U.S. Secretary of Commerce Elliot L. Richardson and Romanian Deputy Prime Minister Ion Patan, Cochairmen of the U.S.-Romanian Joint Economic Commission, signed a 10-year agreement on economic, industrial, and technical cooperation on November 21, 1976. The agreement was signed at the third session of the Commission in Bucharest. It reaffirms U.S. and Romanian support for the expansion of their economic relations.

The agreement sets forth general guidelines for long-term arrangements between firms and enterprises of the two countries. It protects investors against expropri-

ation or impairment of their contractual rights by government action and contains measures for improving business facilities and the provision of commercial information. It includes an annex designed to facilitate the establishment of U.S.-Romanian joint ventures and other forms of business cooperation on terms familiar to the U.S. business community.

The long-term cooperation agreement is intended to supplement, and not to replace, the U.S.-Romanian Trade Agreement, concluded with congressional approval in August 1975. Romania acquired most-favored-nation treatment under the trade agreement, which remains subject to periodic review by Congress according to the requirements of the Trade Act.

### **U.S., Mexico Sign Fishery Agreement; Set Provisional Maritime Boundaries**

Press release 573 dated November 26

The Government of the United States of America and the Government of Mexico on November 26 signed an agreement on fisheries. The agreement was signed by Ambassador Joseph John Jova for the United States and Foreign Secretary Alfonso García Robles for Mexico.

The agreement establishes the principles and procedures under which fishing for certain living resources within 200 miles of Mexico may be conducted by vessels of the United States. Mexico and the United States have both recently passed legislation establishing jurisdiction over fisheries within 200 miles from their respective coasts.

The agreement signed on November 26 is intended to promote cooperation in the effective conservation, optimum utilization, and management by Mexico of coastal fisheries resources within 200 miles of Mexico's coast. At the same time, the agreement provides reasonable terms of access for U.S. fishermen to these resources which U.S. fishermen have habitually fished.

At the same time as the signing of the fisheries agreement between the United



States and Mexico, the two countries exchanged notes on provisional maritime boundaries. These provisional maritime boundaries will be utilized until certain technical work can be completed and pending the coming into force of a maritime boundary treaty in accordance with the constitutional processes of both countries.

The provisional boundary lines established are in the Pacific Ocean, in the western Gulf of Mexico, and in the eastern Gulf of Mexico.

The U.S. Government considers the signature of this agreement to be a positive step forward in the future fisheries relationship between the United States and Mexico and to reflect the spirit of friendship and cooperation which characterizes the relations between the two countries.

## Current Actions

### MULTILATERAL

#### Coffee

International coffee agreement 1976, with annexes. Done at London December 3, 1975. Entered into force provisionally October 1, 1976.

*Ratifications deposited:* Bolivia, November 30, 1976; Ethiopia, November 29, 1976; Sierra Leone, October 6, 1976.

#### Containers

International convention for safe containers (CSC), with annexes. Done at Geneva December 2, 1972. Enters into force September 6, 1977.<sup>1</sup>

*Ratification deposited:* Bulgaria (with declarations), November 17, 1976.

#### Maritime Matters

Convention on facilitation of international maritime traffic, with annex. Done at London April 9, 1965. Entered into force March 5, 1967; for the United States May 16, 1967. TIAS 6251.

*Accession deposited:* Iraq, November 15, 1976.

Amendments to the convention of March 6, 1948, as amended, on the Intergovernmental Maritime Consultative Organization (TIAS 4044, 6285, 6490). Adopted at London October 17, 1974.<sup>2</sup>

*Acceptance deposited:* Surinam, November 26, 1976.

#### Safety at Sea

International convention for the safety of life at sea. Done at London June 17, 1960. Entered into force May 26, 1965. TIAS 5780, 6284.

*Acceptance deposited:* German Democratic Republic (with a declaration), November 11, 1976.

Convention on the international regulations for preventing collisions at sea, 1972. Done at London October 20, 1972. Enters into force July 15, 1977.

*Ratification deposited:* United States, November 23, 1976.

### Telecommunications

Partial revision of the radio regulations, Geneva, 1959, as amended (TIAS 4893, 5603, 6332, 6590, 7435), to establish a new frequency allotment plan for high-frequency radiotelephone coast stations, with annex and final protocol. Done at Geneva June 8, 1974. Entered into force January 1, 1976; for the United States April 21, 1976.

*Notification of approval:* Ireland, October 5, 1976.

### Terrorism

Convention on the prevention and punishment of crimes against internationally protected persons, including diplomatic agents. Done at New York December 14, 1973.<sup>2</sup>

*Ratification deposited:* German Democratic Republic, November 30, 1976.

*Accession deposited:* Philippines, November 26, 1976.

## BILATERAL

### Australia

Memorandum of understanding regarding the exchange training program of units from both forces. Signed at Washington November 4, 1976. Entered into force November 4, 1976.

### Austria

Agreement regarding mutual assistance between the United States and the Austrian Customs Services. Signed at Vienna September 15, 1976. Enters into force on the 90th day following the date on which parties inform each other in an exchange of diplomatic notes that all national legal requirements for entry into force have been fulfilled.

### Canada

Agreement relating to the continued use of facilities at Goose Bay airport by the United States, with annex. Effected by exchange of notes at Ottawa November 10 and 24, 1976. Entered into force November 24, 1976, effective October 1, 1976.

### Indonesia

Agreement amending the agreement for sales of agricultural commodities of April 19, 1976 (TIAS 8308). Effected by exchange of notes at Jakarta November 15 and 17, 1976. Entered into force November 17, 1976.

### Mexico

Excess property transfer agreement, with list. Dated April 8 and August 19, 1975. Entered into force August 19, 1975.

Agreement extending the excess property transfer

<sup>1</sup> Not for the United States.

<sup>2</sup> Not in force.

agreement of April 8 and August 19, 1975. Effected by exchange of notes at Mexico September 2 and 30 and October 25, 1976. Entered into force October 25, 1976.

Agreement concerning certain maritime boundaries. Effected by exchange of notes at Mexico November 24, 1976. Entered into force November 24, 1976.

Fisheries agreement, with exchange of notes. Signed at Mexico November 24, 1976. Entered into force November 24, 1976.

#### **Peru**

Agreement relating to compensation for the expropriated assets of the Marcona Mining Company. Signed at Lima September 22, 1976.

*Entered into force:* October 21, 1976.

#### **Romania**

Agreement concerning fisheries off the coasts of the United States, with agreed minutes and exchange of letters. Signed at Bucharest November 23, 1976. Enters into force on a date to be mutually agreed by exchange of notes.

Agreement relating to the reciprocal acceptance of airworthiness certifications. Effected by exchange of notes at Washington December 7, 1976. Entered into force December 7, 1976.

#### **Syria**

Loan agreement to provide assistance to Syria in its economic development programs. Signed at Damascus September 30, 1976. Entered into force September 30, 1976.

#### **Union of Soviet Socialist Republics**

Convention concerning the conservation of migratory birds and their environment. Signed at Moscow November 19, 1976. Enters into force on the day that instruments of ratification or confirmation are exchanged in agreement with international procedures.

## **PUBLICATIONS**

### **GPO Sales Publications**

*Publications may be ordered by catalog or stock number from the Superintendent of Documents, U.S. Government Printing Office, Washington, D.C. 20402. A 25-percent discount is made on orders for 100 or more copies of any one publication mailed to the same address. Remittances, payable to the Superintendent of Documents, must accompany orders. Prices shown below, which include domestic postage, are subject to change.*

**Double Taxation—Taxes on Income.** Convention with the Socialist Republic of Romania. TIAS 8228. 65 pp. 80¢. (Cat. No. S9.10:8228).

**International Trade in Endangered Species of Wild Fauna and Flora.** Convention with other governments. TIAS 8249. 275 pp. \$3.15. (Cat. No. S9.10:8249).

**Narcotic Drugs—Provision of Helicopters to Curb Illegal Production and Traffic.** Agreement with Mexico. TIAS 8298. 5 pp. 35¢. (Cat. No. S9.10:8298).

**Mutual Assistance in Criminal Matters.** Treaty with Switzerland. TIAS 8302. 160 pp. \$2.20. (Cat. No. S9.10:8302).

**Defense—Use of Facilities at Goose Bay Airport, Newfoundland.** Agreement with Canada amending and extending the agreement of June 29, 1973. TIAS 8315. 6 pp. 35¢. (Cat. No. S9.10:8315).



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No.	Date	Subject
*584	12/6	Shipping Coordinating Committee (SCC), Subcommittee on Safety of Life at Sea (SOLAS), working group on bulk chemicals, Jan. 13.
*585	12/6	SCC, SOLAS, working group on carriage of dangerous goods, Jan. 4.
*586	12/6	Kissinger, Vance: remarks to press prior to meeting.
*587	12/7	Vance: remarks to press following meeting, Dec. 6.
*588	12/8	Malcolm Toon sworn in as Ambassador to the U.S.S.R. (biographic data).
+589	12/8	Kissinger: arrival, Brussels, Dec. 7.
*590	12/8	Kissinger, Commissioner of the European Community Soames: remarks to press.
*591	12/8	Kissinger, Crown Prince Hassan of Jordan: remarks to press.

No.	Date	Subject
*592	12/9	Kissinger, Norwegian Foreign Minister Frydenlund: remarks to press, Dec. 8.
*593	12/9	Kissinger, Dutch Foreign Minister van der Stoep: remarks to press, Dec. 8.
*594	12/9	Ocean Affairs Advisory Committee, San Diego, Calif., Jan. 11-12.
+595	12/10	Text of message from President-elect Carter to NATO Foreign Ministers delivered on his behalf by Secretary Kissinger, Dec. 9.
*596	12/10	Kissinger, Turkish Foreign Minister Caglayanil: remarks to press, Dec. 9.
*597	12/10	Kissinger, French Foreign Minister de Guiringaud: remarks to press.
*598	12/10	Kissinger, Federal German Foreign Minister Genscher: remarks to press, Dec. 8.
*599	12/10	U.S. and Republic of Korea initial new fisheries agreement.
+600	12/11	Kissinger: news conference, Brussels, Dec. 10.

\* Not printed.  
+ Held for a later issue of the BULLETIN.

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
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