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# THE DEPARTMENT OF STATE BULLETIN

Volume LXXVI • No. 1971 • April 4, 1977

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# THE DEPARTMENT OF STATE BULLETIN

VOL. LXXVI, No. 1971

April 4, 1977

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*The Department of State BULLETIN, a weekly publication issued by the Office of Media Services, Bureau of Public Affairs, provides the public and interested agencies of the government with information on developments in the field of U.S. foreign relations and on the work of the Department and the Foreign Service.*

*The BULLETIN includes selected press releases on foreign policy, issued by the White House and the Department, and statements, addresses, and news conferences of the President and the Secretary of State and other officers of the Department, as well as special articles on various phases of international affairs and the functions of the Department. Information is included concerning treaties and international agreements to which the United States is or may become a party and on treaties of general international interest.*

*Publications of the Department of State, United Nations documents, and legislative material in the field of international relations are also listed.*

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## President Carter's News Conference of March 9

*Following are excerpts relating to foreign policy from the opening statement and the questions and answers of a news conference held by President Carter on March 9.*<sup>1</sup>

I have long been concerned about our own nation's stance in prohibiting American citizens to travel to foreign countries. We also are quite eagerly assessing our own nation's policies that violate human rights as defined by the Helsinki agreement.<sup>2</sup>

Later on this year we'll go to Belgrade to assess the component parts of the Helsinki agreement. And I want to be sure that we don't violate those rights. So I've instructed the Secretary of State to remove any travel restrictions on American citizens who want to go to Vietnam, to North Korea, to Cuba, and to Cambodia. And these restrictions will be lifted as of the 18th day of March.

I would like to point out that we still don't have diplomatic relationships with these countries. That's a doubtful prospect at this time. So there will be some necessary precautions that ought to be taken by citizens who go there, since we don't have our own diplomats in those countries to protect them if they should have difficulty.

I'd be glad to answer any questions that you might have.

Miss Thomas [Helen Thomas, UPI]?

*Q. Mr. President, an American delegate to the U.N. Human Rights Commission has said*

*that he believes and he hopes that his allegations concerning terror, suffering in Chile today, coincide with your human rights policy. Do they?*

*The President:* Well, I don't know which delegate this is or what his concerns are. But we are still concerned about deprivation of human rights in many of the countries of the world. I think Chile would be one of those where concern has been expressed. And I want to be sure that the American people understand that this is a very sensitive issue.

We've tried to be broad based in our expression of concern and also responsible. At first, our policy was interpreted, I think improperly, to deal exclusively with the Soviet Union. I've just pointed out how our own country has been at fault in some instances. Torture has been reported to us from some of the nations of the world. We are presenting these items to the Congress as required by law. But throughout the entire world, in Latin America, in our own country, in the Communist nations in Eastern Europe, and in the Soviet Union, we are very much aware of the concern about human rights.

I think it's entirely appropriate for our own country to take the leadership role and let the world say that the focal point for the preservation and protection of human rights is in the United States of America. I'm proud of this. And I intend to adhere to it with the deepest possible personal commitment, and I believe I speak accurately for the American people on this subject.

*Q. Well, then, does that mean, Mr. President, that you don't object to the remarks that were made by our delegate?*

*The President:* I think that the remarks made by the delegate concerning our past in-

<sup>1</sup> For the complete transcript, see Weekly Compilation of Presidential Documents dated Mar. 14, 1977, p. 328.

<sup>2</sup> For text of the Final Act of the Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe, signed at Helsinki on Aug. 1, 1975, see BULLETIN of Sept. 1, 1975, p. 323.

volvement in Chilean political affairs was inappropriate. I didn't know about it ahead of time. It was a personal expression of opinion by that delegate.

I think that the Church committee in the Senate has not found any evidence that the United States was involved in the overthrow of the Allende government in Chile. There were some allegations made, I think perhaps accurate, that we did have financial aid and other—I think financial aid to be restrictive—to political elements in Chile that may have contributed to the change in government. But I don't think there has been any proof of illegalities there. And the statements made by our delegate were his own personal statements, not representing our government's.

*Q. Mr. President, there has been a lot of talk about defensible borders lately and what that means in regard to the Middle East. Could I ask you, sir, do you feel that it would be appropriate in a Middle East peace settlement for the Israelis to keep some of the occupied land they took during the 1967 war in order to have secure borders?*

*The President:* The "defensible border" phrase, the "secure borders" phrase, obviously are just semantics. I think it's a relatively significant development in the description of possible settlement in the Middle East to talk about these things as a distinction.

The recognized borders have to be mutual. The Arab nations, the Israeli nation, have to agree on permanent and recognized borders, where sovereignty is legal as mutually agreed. Defense lines may or may not conform in the foreseeable future to those legal borders. There may be extensions of Israeli defense capability beyond the permanent and recognized borders.

I think this distinction is one that is now recognized by Israeli leaders. The definition of borders on a geographical basis is one that remains to be determined. But I think that it is important for the world to begin to see, and for the interested parties to begin to see, that there can be a distinction between the two:

the ability of Israel to defend herself by international agreement or by the sometime placement of Israeli forces themselves or by monitoring stations, as has been the case in the Sinai, beyond the actual sovereignty borders as mutually agreed by Israel and her neighbors.

*Q. Well, does that mean international zones between the countries?*

*The President:* International zones could very well be part of an agreement. And I think that I can see in a growing way, a step-by-step process where there might be a mutual agreement that the ultimate settlement, even including the border delineations, would be at a certain described point. In an interim state, maybe two years, four years, eight years or more, there would be a mutual demonstration of friendship and an end to the declaration or state of war.

I think that what Israel would like to have is what we would like to have: a termination of belligerence toward Israel by her neighbors, a recognition of Israel's right to exist, the right to exist in peace, the opening up of borders with free trade, tourist travel, cultural exchange between Israel and her neighbors; in other words, a stabilization of the situation in the Middle East without a constant threat to Israel's existence by her neighbors.

This would involve substantial withdrawal of Israel's present control over territories. Now, where that withdrawal might end, I don't know. I would guess it would be some minor adjustments in the 1967 borders. But that still remains to be negotiated.

But I think this is going to be a long, tedious process. We're going to mount a major effort in our own government in 1977 to bring the parties to Geneva. Obviously any agreement has to be between the parties concerned. We will act as an intermediary when our good offices will serve well.

But I'm not trying to predispose our own nation's attitudes toward what might be the ultimate details of the agreement that can mean so much to world peace.

*Q. At the risk of oversimplification, sir, I*

believe I understand during the campaign you proposed a gradual withdrawal of American troops from Korea.

*The President:* Yes.

*Q.* Yet, after your revised budget went to Congress, the Army has gone to Congress and asked in fiscal 1978, for a doubling of military construction funds for Korea and in the three ensuing years, for more than \$110 million for similar construction. How does that square with your withdrawal plans?

*The President:* My commitment to withdraw American ground troops from Korea has not changed. I'll be meeting this afternoon with the Foreign Minister of South Korea. This will be one of the matters that I will discuss.

I've also talked to General Vessey [John W. Vessey, Jr.], who is in charge of our armed forces in South Korea. I think that the time period as I described in the campaign months, a four- or five-year time period, is appropriate. The schedule for withdrawal of American ground troops would have to be worked out very carefully with the South Korean Government. It would also have to be done with the full understanding and, perhaps, participation of Japan.

I would want to leave in place in South Korea adequate ground forces owned by and controlled by the South Korean Government to protect themselves against any intrusion from North Korea. I would envision a continuation of American air cover for South Korea over a long period of time.

But these are the basic elements, and I'm very determined that over a period of time, as described just then, that our ground troops would be withdrawn.

*Q.* Mr. President, I'd like to try to clarify the Israeli situation, if I might. A moment ago in answering the question, you spoke of the possibility of substantial withdrawal of Israeli control over territory and then, just a few seconds later, spoke of the possibility of minor territorial concessions by the Israelis. What is it exactly that you have in mind here? Are you really talking about some big with-

drawals, or are you talking only about minor withdrawals?

*The President:* I don't think I would use the word minor withdrawals. I think there might be minor adjustments to the 1967—pre-1967 borders. But that's a matter for Israel and her neighbors to decide between themselves.

I believe that we will know by, I'd say, the middle of May, much more clearly the positions of the interested parties. I've not yet met nor talked to the leaders in Lebanon, Syria, Jordan, Egypt—Saudi Arabia, to a lesser direct-participation degree.

I will meet with all these leaders between now and the middle of May. And I don't want to try to define in any specific terms the exact delineation of borders, but I think this is obviously one of the most serious problems.

There are three basic elements: One is an ultimate commitment to complete peace in the Middle East; second, border determinations which are highly controversial and have not yet been defined by either side; and third, dealing with the Palestinian question.

And I'm not trying to act as the one to lay down an ultimate settlement. I don't know what an ultimate settlement will be. But these matters will be freely and openly debated within our own country and within the countries involved. And I think I've described as best I can my own position.

*Q.* Mr. President, last week in an interview you expressed concern about the disclosure of confidential and classified information. Admiral [Stansfield] Turner, your choice to head the CIA, has said, I believe in testimony, that he would favor criminal penalties for disclosure by government officials of that type of information, but Vice President Mondale said he's opposed to it. I wonder, sir, if you'd tell us where you stand on that issue and what, other than restricting access to classified information, you intend to do about this problem?

*The President:* Well, my own interest would be to minimize the use of any criminal penalties for disclosure of information. There are

other penalties that can be used without criminal charges, and I think that Vice President Mondale drew that distinction.

I don't know yet what procedure we will follow. My own hope would be that we could prevent the disclosure of intelligence information that might be damaging to our national security, rather than trying to control that problem by the imposition of legal criminal penalties.

*Q. Could you elaborate on how you might prevent that, Mr. President?*

*The President:* Well, I think, first of all, is a tighter control over the number of people who have access to material that's highly sensitive, that might damage the relationship between our own country and our friends and allies. We've already initiated steps to that degree and we'll be pursuing it.

As you know, Admiral Turner has only recently been confirmed. He's just now getting his presence felt in the defense communities. I'll be going out to the CIA headquarters this afternoon to see the oath of office administered to him.

But we'll make sure that the public knows what new policies we impose. But the one that's easiest to describe, and also very difficult to do, is to make sure that we don't have too many people knowing about matters that they don't need to know and, also, that we can protect the legitimate confidentiality of agreements between ourselves and our allies.

Now, I would never permit anything that was either illegal or improper. And we've got a very good arrangement that was primarily set up by President Ford to prevent abuses. The Intelligence Oversight Board is made up of three distinguished men appointed by President Ford, who have complete access to any operation conducted by the intelligence forces.

Senator Inouye's committee in the Senate and, I think, six committees in the House also have access to this information. Of course, I'm monitoring it myself. And I think Admiral Turner's integrity is also a guarantee that there will be no future abuses.

But that doesn't mean that everything that we do in gathering intelligence on which our

security might very well depend has to be revealed to the public. And drawing of that distinction is one that's my responsibility, and I think I can handle that.

*Q. What effect in your mind, if any, is the extent of debate in the Senate over Mr. [Paul C.] Warnke's qualifications to be the chief SALT [Strategic Arms Limitation Talks] negotiator going to have eventually on our negotiating position?*

*The President:* I don't believe that the exact vote in the Senate on Mr. Warnke's confirmation will have a major effect on future negotiations with the Soviet Union on SALT.

The obvious impression that concerns me is a demonstration of lack of confidence of the Senate in my own ability and attitudes as a chief negotiator. Obviously, as President, any decisions made with the Russians on reduction of atomic weapons would have to be approved by me.

I have promised the Joint Chiefs of Staff, who in the past perhaps have been bypassed in the process, that they will always know ahead of time what our position will be at the negotiating table. I've not promised the Joint Chiefs of Staff that they would have the right to approve or disapprove every individual item in negotiations.

But I hope that the Senate will give Mr. Warnke a strong vote. I think many of the people that oppose Mr. Warnke just do not want to see any substantial reductions in atomic weapons, even though they are agreed to mutually by us and the Soviet Union or even if they are designed to reduce the threat of nuclear destruction of the world. I feel very deeply that we ought to pursue with every possible means, an agreement with the Soviet Union for substantial reductions in atomic weapons. I think Mr. Warnke agrees; most of the Senators agree.

So, there are a wide range of reasons for not voting for Mr. Warnke. I have complete confidence in him. And I might say there is one more very significant guard against any error that I and Mr. Warnke and the Secretary of State and others might make. The Senate has to approve, by a two-thirds vote after complete open debate, any agreements



signed with the Soviet Union. So, I think that the attacks on Mr. Warnke are primarily by those who don't want to see substantial reductions in nuclear weapons in the world.

*Q. Mr. President, I'd like to go just a little bit further in your discussion of the defensible borders issue. If I understood you correctly, you're talking about the possibility of something like an Israeli defense line along the Jordan River and perhaps at some point on the Sinai Desert and perhaps at some point on the Golan Heights that would be defense forces but not legal borders. Have I understood that correctly, that your feeling is that the Israelis are going to have to have some kind of defense forces along the Jordan River and in those other places?*

*The President:* Well, you added a great deal to what I said. In the first place, I didn't mention any particular parts of the geography around Israel. And I didn't confine the defense capability to Israeli forces. These might very well be international forces. It might very well be a line that's fairly broad, say 20 kilometers or more, where demilitarization is guaranteed on both sides. It might very well consist of outposts, electronics or, perhaps, personnel outposts as were established in the Sinai region as a result of the Egypt and Israeli agreement.

I'm not going to try to get more specific in saying what will or will not be the case. But that is a possibility that might lead to the alleviation of tension there, and it's one about which I will be discussing this matter with the representatives from the Arab countries when they come.

*Q. On several occasions, Mr. President, you have spoken in terms of the United States being ready to move to a quick SALT agreement, omitting cruise missiles, "Backfire" bombers, if necessary. I'm wondering, sir, have you had any indication yet of Russian intentions on this subject?*

*The President:* The Soviet Union, so far as I know, still would like to include the cruise

missile question in the present negotiations. They don't want to discuss Backfire bomber at all. And my hope has been and is that by the exclusion of both those controversial items, which will require long and tedious negotiations, that we might move to a rapid agreement at SALT Two and immediately begin to discuss, for instance, the Backfire bombers, the cruise missiles, in subsequent negotiations.

But I do not have any indication yet that the Soviets have changed their position on that issue.

*Q. Mr. President, what about nuclear reductions?*

*The President:* Again, I think you have two approaches to the question.

I have proposed both directly and indirectly to the Soviet Union, publicly and privately, that we try to identify those items on which there is relatively close agreement—not completely yet, because details are very difficult on occasion. But I have, for instance, suggested that we forgo the opportunity to arm satellite bodies and also to forgo the opportunity to destroy observation satellites.

We've also proposed that the Indian Ocean be completely demilitarized, that a comprehensive test ban be put into effect, that prior notification of test missile launchings be exchanged. And I would like to see any of these items on which the Soviets will agree quickly be concluded and then get down to the much more difficult negotiations on much more drastic, overall commitments to atomic weapons, leading ultimately to the complete elimination of atomic weapons from the face of the earth.

This is going to be a long, slow, tedious process. But I think if we and the Soviets could agree on the easier items—and none of them are very easy—quickly, it would show good faith. I think it would let the world know that we are serious in stopping once and for all what has been a continuous and rapid escalation in atomic weapon capabilities since they were first evolved.

*The press:* Thank you, Mr. President.

*The President:* Thank you very much.

## Prime Minister Rabin of Israel Visits Washington

*Prime Minister Yitzhak Rabin of the State of Israel made an official visit to Washington March 6-9, during which he met with President Carter and other government officials. Following is an exchange of remarks between President Carter and Prime Minister Rabin at a welcoming ceremony on the South Lawn of the White House on March 7.<sup>1</sup>*

Weekly Compilation of Presidential Documents dated March 14

### PRESIDENT CARTER

I'd like to say first of all that I am very deeply grateful to welcome back to our country an old friend of mine and a longtime friend of the United States, Prime Minister Rabin from Israel.

We've had two foreign visitors already. This is a different kind of visit. This is going to be a series of working sessions. Because of the crucial nature of problems that face the Middle East and the close historic ties between Israel and the United States, we've decided to minimize the amount of time spent in ceremony. We will have a meeting tonight at a banquet, but it will be a working banquet.

And I believe that this is the kind of inter-relationship that will demonstrate to the world the seriousness with which we address our problems in the Middle East, our commitment to Israel, our longstanding friendship, our sharing of democratic principles and human liberty, and our constant search for peace.

As many of you may know, in the six-day war in Israel a number of years ago, the strategist and the tactician and the commander was Prime Minister Rabin. Later he was Ambassador to our country.

And while I was Governor of Georgia, he and his wife visited me in Atlanta. He had political aspirations then, I imagine, in the

back of his mind. His success in politics was much more rapid than I have achieved. When I went to Israel not too long ago, he came back from Africa to meet with me and to explain to me in a two- or three-hour session in my hotel room some of the inner workings and hidden mechanism of the Israeli political structure. I didn't realize then how well he understood them, because shortly afterward he became the Prime Minister of that great country. Later, I've now become President of our country.

But I think this longstanding relationship with him and a personal knowledge of him and his deep commitment to peace in a courageous way will stand us in good stead as we explore the future of our two countries.

Recently, Secretary of State Vance took a trip to the Middle East, began his trip with a long conversation with Prime Minister Rabin and his Cabinet, members of the Knesset, other leaders of Israel, and then subsequently went to meet with the leaders of other countries in the Middle East to try to explore some common ground for future permanent peace there, so that Israel might have defensible borders so that the peace commitments would never be violated, and that could be a sense of security about this young country in the future.

I can't think of any two nations on Earth that more narrowly focus deep commitments on a common way for the principles of government based on mutual background, the present considerations on a common basis, and in the future a mutual commitment.

This is a time of great joy for me to have Prime Minister Rabin and his wife, Leah, come to visit us. And I believe that the next two days of discussions between myself and him, his leaders and ours, the Cabinet-level officers and the leaders of Congress and the private community, will be very fruitful.

Nineteen seventy-seven is a year that might very well bring a major step forward toward ultimate and permanent peace. And to a great degree, the success of this year's negotiations and hopes rest on the shoulders of a man who in the past has demonstrated his capability of dealing with complicated problems in a frank and courageous fashion and

<sup>1</sup> For an exchange of toasts between President Carter and Prime Minister Rabin at a dinner at the White House on Mar. 7, see Weekly Compilation of Presidential Documents dated Mar. 14, 1977, p. 323.

who has a vision that is very closely compatible with the visions of the people of the United States.

So on behalf of our people, I welcome you back to our country, Mr. Rabin, and would like very much to express our complete commitment to an even greater interrelationship on a common basis with the courageous citizens whom you represent in the great nation of Israel.

Thank you for coming. You are welcome here.

#### **PRIME MINISTER RABIN**

Mr. President, Mrs. Carter: My wife and I deeply appreciate your personal welcome and your kind, warm words.

May I say it is always a pleasure to me to be back in Washington and to see around me so many friends. I wish particularly to thank you, Mr. President, for the kind invitation that brings me here today.

Your hospitality enables me to convey in a most personal manner the best wishes, the friendship, and the esteem of the people and the Government of Israel, to you, Mr. President, and to the great people you represent.

Democratic Israel stands with you in your endeavor to foster peace and human rights within the family of nations. From this platform, let me say to you, Mr. President, that Israel shall continue to work tirelessly for the peace and welfare of our region, strengthened and encouraged by the special relationship that has long marked the ties between our two peoples.

Let me emphasize to you, Mr. President, that I have come from Jerusalem, the City of Peace, with a sense of dedication to build a structure of peace between Israel and our neighbors. Peace is our highest aspiration. It is toward this end that Israel commits all its energies; for peace is the essence of the heritage we share and the goal of policy we pursue. It is a heritage as old, as eternal, and as living as the Bible.

Everything our people stand for, everything we believe in derives from the Biblical definition of what is right and good. In the

words of Solomon in the Book of Proverbs: "Righteousness exalts a nation."

It has been the moral standing of America that induces help among millions longing for a better, a more decent, and a more peaceful world. It is the understanding and support which America has throughout displayed for the security and welfare of my own nation that moves me now to express to you and through you to the American people our deepest gratitude.

Mr. President, I come knowing that our aspirations and goals are one. It is in this spirit that I look forward to our forthcoming talks, and it is in this very same spirit that I bring to you from Jerusalem our sincere greetings of *Shalom*.

## **British Prime Minister Callaghan Visits Washington**

*Prime Minister James Callaghan of the United Kingdom made an official visit to Washington March 9-12, during which he met with President Carter and other government officials. Following is an exchange of remarks between President Carter and Prime Minister Callaghan at a welcoming ceremony on the South Lawn of the White House on March 10.<sup>1</sup>*

Weekly Compilation of Presidential Documents dated March 14

#### **PRESIDENT CARTER**

It is with a great deal of pleasure personally, and on behalf of the American people, that we welcome to our country and to our national capital our good friends from the United Kingdom, Prime Minister Callaghan and his wife, Audrey.

I think it is not an exaggeration to say, nor is it any reflection on our other friends and

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<sup>1</sup> For an exchange of toasts between President Carter and Prime Minister Callaghan at a dinner at the White House on Mar. 10, see Weekly Compilation of Presidential Documents dated Mar. 14, 1977, p. 342.

allies to say, that we enjoy a special relationship with Great Britain, with the other countries of the United Kingdom. They are our closest allies and friends. We share security agreements with them, trade agreements with them, that are not shared with any other country. There has been an intimate relationship for decades and generations with the people of Great Britain that has carved out between us an unshakable friendship and mutual commitment.

We are honored today to have the Prime Minister with us because of his superb leadership capability, demonstrated in having held the three highest positions in the Government of Great Britain, even before he became Prime Minister.

He also comes here with a special honor paid to him by the other nations of the European Community. He is the President of the European Community, and in my own discussions with him today and tomorrow and tonight, we will be talking about matters that are bilateral in nature, that involve our security based on the NATO interrelationships; and also he will represent the European Community itself—nine nations—there.

We have just celebrated last year our 200th birthday, and the people of the entire United Kingdom participated in an extraordinary degree in helping us reconfirm our commitments to the essence of the American spirit.

This is a silver jubilee for Great Britain, for the United Kingdom, and we will be honoring the Queen, who has served so well over the last 25 years.

There has not been a visit by an American President to Great Britain since, I believe, 1970. But because of our own interest in strengthening ties and because of the leadership capabilities of Prime Minister Callaghan, I and the leaders of several other nations will assemble in London in May to talk about matters of great mutual interest.

I look forward to going back to my own mother country. Although we have people in our nation from many, many nations, I think that all of us recognize that, historically and politically, Great Britain is still America's mother country.

So I look forward to going to London in

May. I am very grateful to have Prime Minister Callaghan come here. I look forward tonight to a banquet. I am going to ask the Prime Minister and the Vice President to sing a duet for us as they did when the Vice President visited London not too long ago.

And I think that this combination of very serious security matters, very important economic matters, a spirit of historical friendship and also personal friendship, will exemplify this visit of our most distinguished visitor.

Thank you very much.

#### **PRIME MINISTER CALLAGHAN**

Mr. President and Mrs. Carter: Thank you very much indeed for your very warm welcome this morning and for your very kindly words and for the weather, if I may say so, too.

I am very grateful to you for what you said. I am not sure it is all true about me, but it is certainly true that I have held all the major offices. But I feel a little like the French aristocrat after the Revolution who was asked what he did. And he said, "I survived." And I have got a feeling that in politics, to survive is probably the most you can hope for. You can influence events a little, but that is about it.

At any rate, I always arrive here, Mr. President, as you well know, with a very keen sense of anticipation for the discussions that we have, and on this occasion it is especially invigorating to be here at the beginning of your new Administration.

Now, you know, sir, as I know, that the friendship between our two countries embraces all parties and all administrations on both sides of the Atlantic, whatever they may be. But nevertheless, in renewing the bonds of friendship—and I hope, sir, that you and I will be able to strike up a personal friendship—let me say that I do so with a particular sense of excitement, an excitement of sharing your new hopes, your new aspirations, your intentions, your new policies, being here at the beginning of a new Administration.

And Vice President Mondale, whose words I found very valuable when he came to London—I am not sure that his singing was

quite up to that standard—but certainly he communicated to us some of the excitement of being in at the start of this new Administration in the United States.

You bear much of the burdens of the free world—military burdens, economic burdens, aid burdens. But what is more, Mr. President, what you can do and what you have already begun to do is to influence the political tone of the world in a very marked degree. And I would like to thank you, sir, and indeed the whole American people, that in the leadership that you give to the world today, that you carry your responsibilities with spirit and with a marked constructive thinking, and imaginative thinking, too.

You referred, sir, to the fact that for the time being I am President of the European Community. Let me hasten to disabuse our friends who gather here—that has nothing to do with my capacity; it is as we say in the United Kingdom, “It just happened to be Buggins’ turn,” and I am Buggins.

But what I can say on behalf of them all is that every member of the Community is desirous that there should be a close partnership and a strengthening of relations between the United States and Europe.

You and I, Mr. President, will be holding our discussions in a world which has now experienced four years of recession, the deepest since the 1930's. Of course, the free world can and will emerge from this recession, but we need concerted intergovernmental action if we are to do so as speedily as possible.

No one group of nations and no one nation can survive permanently as an island of prosperity if the remainder of the world is in recession. And our task, sir, if I may be bold enough to say so, is to see how we can help poverty and unemployment among the world's people in an era of rapid change that has been caused by the unprecedented speed of technological development.

This is going to cause us many problems. And I was heartened yesterday, sir, to see you calling for a new program to help the young people of the United States who need training and who are unemployed and who you wish to see trained and get back into employment.

Sir, we shall also need to discuss the eternal problem, the never-ending problem of how best to maintain and enhance the liberty for our own citizens and for people in all parts of the world.

We shall have to consider how to strengthen our work for peace and enhance our own security, how we can live with the different systems, political systems, from our own, those that are not based on parliamentary democracy, as ours is; for if we don't learn how to live with them, then with the rapid advance of nuclear technology we shall certainly die with them.

And so we have much to talk about, and I look forward to our conversations on these and many other matters.

We shall be able to carry the results of our discussions with us into the international gatherings to which we both belong and especially, sir, to the Downing Street summit in London on May 7 and 8 to which you have kindly accepted my invitation. I hope that we shall be able to have prior discussions that will lead to positive results from that particular conference.

You, sir, have referred to the relationship between our countries. When I was young I used to say what I would like to do is have six months in the United Kingdom and six months in the United States. Getting a bit old now, but even so, it is a wonderful place to be.

You have got an invigorating country here. You have problems, but your attitude is always how can we lick them? That is what I like to see. That is why it is such a pleasure to be back here with you, sir, at the beginning of your Administration, to wish you every success in the tasks that you are going to have to carry through and which you will have our great support in all that you endeavor to do, because we know that as leaders of the free world you will get plenty of criticism. But you also need support and encouragement, too.

So I can assure you, Mr. President, in conclusion, you will receive a very warm welcome when you come to London. We are very honored that you should do so on May 7 and 8. And I thank you again for your most kindly welcome, you and Mrs. Carter, here this morning.

## President Carter's Call-in Radio Program of March 5

*Following are excerpts from the transcript of President Carter's telephone call-in radio program, "Ask the President," of March 5. Walter Cronkite, of CBS News, was moderator.<sup>1</sup>*

*Joseph Willman, of Sterling Heights, Mich.: First of all, I'd like to say good afternoon to President Carter and Mr. Cronkite. My question right now is, according to the UPI story in today's Detroit News, Idi Amin has sent squads that have killed 7,000 Christians. With this and other happenings there, how can we with good conscience trust a man with such an ego [inaudible], and if the time arises will we use force to get them out, even though confrontation with this country is expected by Amin?*

*The President:* Well, it's hard to know how to answer that question about future events. As you know, we had what was on the border of a crisis last weekend. The attitude that we took was constantly to monitor what is going on in Uganda to deal directly with Amin in a very forceful way, to let him know that we were expecting American lives to be protected.

We also got the help of several national leaders who are quite close to Amin. Primarily those are of the Moslem faith, and they contacted him directly.

We also got the Federal Republic of Germany—West Germany—who has diplomatic leaders in Uganda, in Entebbe, Uganda, to contact Amin.

And he was constantly giving me assurance through cables that the Americans would not

be hurt. As you know, the outcome of that weekend's tension was that he eventually said that the meeting with the Americans was called off and that anyone who wanted to leave or come into Uganda from our country would be permitted to do so.

I think that it's obvious that we'll do whatever we can to protect American lives throughout the world. We have in the past, before I became President, informed the American people in Uganda—and I might say in several other countries around the world—that there was a potentially dangerous circumstance for them and that if they were primarily concerned with a peaceful life, they ought to change countries.

We do know that most of the persons who are Americans in Uganda are missionaries, deeply committed to their own religious faith. They've got an option to leave, and they've decided to stay. So, I think at this time I feel that the American lives there will be protected.

We did act, I think, forcefully and effectively with Amin; we had a lot of help from other nations. And I can't say what I will do in the future except to try to handle the situation similarly to what I did last weekend.

*Mark Fendrick, of Brooklyn, N.Y.: Good afternoon, Mr. President. What I'd like to ask is in relationship to the attempts for returning to a normal relationship with Cuba. Now, in the paper the last couple of days here in New York there's been talk about the Yankees baseball team going to Cuba.*

*Do you think that this is a possibility in the near future, and do you think that normal relations to Cuba are possible again within the near future?*

*The President:* Well, there are varying de-

<sup>1</sup> For the complete transcript, see Weekly Compilation of Presidential Documents dated Mar. 14, 1977, p. 289.

grees of relationships with Cuba. As you know, we have had some discussions with them in the past; for instance, on the anti-hijacking agreement which expires this spring. And we now have no visitation rights by American citizens to go to Vietnam, to North Korea, to Cuba, and one or two other nations.

We do have a procedure already in effect whereby a limited number of Americans can go into Cuba without using a passport because of a prior agreement with the Cuban Government.

I would like to do what I can to ease tensions with Cuba. It's only 90 miles, as you know, from the Florida coast. And I don't know yet what we will do. Before any full normalization of relationships can take place, though, Cuba would have to make some fairly substantial changes in their attitude. I would like to insist, for instance, that they not interfere in the internal affairs of countries in this hemisphere and that they decrease their military involvement in Africa and that they reinforce a commitment to human rights by releasing political prisoners that have been in jail now in Cuba for 17 or 18 years, things of that kind.

But I think before we can reach that point we'll have to have discussions with them. And I do intend to see discussions initiated with Cuba quite early on reestablishing the anti-hijacking agreement, arriving at a fishing agreement between us and Cuba, since our 200-mile limits do overlap between Florida and Cuba. And I would not be averse in the future to seeing our visitation rights permitted as well.

*Mr. Fendrick. In relationship, though, to the Yankees playing an exhibition game there, I've noticed that Secretary Vance has backed this idea. Do you think that that's a possibility this season?*

*The President:* It's a possibility, yes.

*Mr. Cronkite: Mr. President, may I ask, it seemed that Secretary Vance indicated just the last day or so that there would be no preconditions in discussions with Cuba. Are you now saying that there will be?*

*The President:* No. The preconditions that I describe would be prior to full normalization of relationships, the establishment of embassies in both our countries, the complete freedom of trade between the two countries.

But you couldn't possibly arrive at a solution to some of those questions without discussions. So, we will begin discussions with Cuba, if they approve the idea, fairly shortly on the items that I have described—increased visitation of Americans to and from Cuba, the fishing-rights question that has to be resolved for the protection of our own fishermen, and also the anti-hijacking agreement which has been in effect in the past but is about to expire.

*John Melfi, of Johnson City, N.Y.: I know we have a foreign aid policy to help countries in need, but why do we spend so much on this when we have so much poverty, unemployment, et cetera, in our own country?*

*The President:* Well, John, I am going to take a position that's not very popular, politically speaking. We only spend about three-tenths of 1 percent of our gross national product on foreign aid, which is about half the proportion that is allotted to this purpose by other countries like France, Germany and so forth.

I don't particularly want to increase this greatly, but I would like for it to be predictable. Also, in the past, we've not had foreign aid used in an effective way. As one of my friends has said quite often, I'm not in favor of taxing the poor people in our rich country and sending the money to the rich people in poor countries; and quite often that has been done in the past.

We have also a need, in my opinion, to support the lending institutions, the International Monetary Fund, the World Bank. They give aid to other countries in the form of loans, sometimes low-interest loans. But instead of just handing gifts out that are kind of bad, as a basic philosophy—and also that are abused—I would favor contributing to the capital stock of these international or regional

lending agencies. I believe we will get a lot better return on our money.

And I might say that my own experience in this first six weeks has been that the International Monetary Fund, for instance, and the World Bank are quite strict on a nation that makes a loan. They make them work hard toward balancing their budget. Quite often they require them to clean up corruption. They make them assess very carefully their trade policies.

So, I believe that the lending procedure in foreign aid is much better than the gift procedure, and when direct grants are made, we ought to do more than we have in the past to get the grants to people who actually need it.

Within those changes, I think that our present level of foreign aid is about right, John.

*Mr. Strickland: I am John Strickland from Fayetteville, North Carolina, and I want to thank you for this opportunity to talk with you. And I would like to know what your sentiments are on the Panama Canal 1904 treaty, and changing it.*

*The President:* Okay. It is good to hear from you, Mr. Strickland. My sister lives in Fayetteville, as you may know. I am glad to answer your question.

We are now negotiating with Panama as effectively as we can. As you may or may not know, the treaty signed when Theodore Roosevelt was President gave Panama sovereignty over the Panama Canal Zone itself. It gave us control over the Panama Canal Zone as though we had sovereignty. So we've always had a legal sharing of responsibility over the Panama Canal Zone.

As far as sovereignty is concerned, I don't have any hangup about that. I would hope that after that—and expect that after the year 2000 that we would have an assured capacity or capability of our country with Panama guaranteeing that the Panama Canal would be open and of use to our own nation and to other countries.

So, the subject of the negotiation now—it has been going on quite a while—is to phase out our military operations in the Panama

Canal Zone, but to guarantee that even after the year 2000 that we would still be able to keep the Panama Canal open to the use of American and other ships.

## President Carter Interviewed by Media Representatives

*President Carter met with a group of 22 publishers, editors, and broadcasters from 20 states on March 4. Following is an excerpt from the transcript of the interview.<sup>1</sup>*

*Q. You spoke of the arms procurement as part of one of these bullet-biting operations. There has been a good deal of controversy about American arms sales abroad to other nations. The argument has been made repeatedly by supporters of that, that it is necessary to maintain the balance of payments and maintain our defense industry. What kind of look are you taking at that \$12 billion-a-year annual rate of sales?*

*The President:* A hard look. Here again, I think that if there is one person in the government that ultimately has the responsibility to take a position and to make a decision and then explain the consequences of that decision to the American people, it's the President; not just because it's me—somebody has got to do it, and it has to be the President.

When Cy Vance visited all the Middle Eastern countries early this month, there was one unanimous statement made by every head of state, and that was that we are spending too much of our money on weapons.

Now, it's hard for one of those countries, for instance—I'm singling out that part of the world—unilaterally to stop buying weapons. But every one of them unilaterally said they would like to stop. And I think that this puts a responsibility back on our country, the major arms supplier of the world, to try to induce

<sup>1</sup> For the complete transcript, see Weekly Compilation of Presidential Documents dated Mar. 14, 1977, p. 311.



Iran and Egypt and Saudi Arabia and Syria and Israel and Jordan to cut down on the quantity of arms they buy.

Now, I've also been in touch with the Soviet leaders, with the French leaders, with the German leaders, and with the British, to join with us in an effort to cut down on the quantity of arms sold throughout the world. And they've responded favorably so far. We've not reached any tangible agreement, and I can't—I don't want to claim that we have. But there is a general concern around the world that the arms sales are excessive, and I think that our country can take some unilateral action. We can take a considerable amount of action bilaterally, when we get the buyer or the purchaser of arms to agree to cut down the quantity of their orders, and on a multilateral basis, it's going to be slower to come. But I think we can get our own allies and our potential adversaries to minimize or to reduce their previous arms sales rates.

So I feel very strongly about this. And I believe that in the long run, our own economy and the world peace will be enhanced by shifting production and expenditure of funds to other services or goods.

I'll just add one other thing: When you look at it on a job-cost ratio basis, how many jobs do you get for a million dollars spent? One of the most inefficient industries is the defense weapons industry. And I think that we need not continue with a supposition that in the long run the expenditure of the limited amount of financial resources of the whole world and of our own country is going to be increased or decreased. When you spend money for defense, you don't spend it on education or health or other services or goods. And I think the shift away from weapons toward peaceful goods and services in the long run is favorable for world peace, and also you get more jobs per dollar spent.

*Q. Mr. President, I am from the Rio Grande Valley in Texas. And there is a problem there that affects the people that live in that area, but it also affects everybody else in the country. And that's the drug problem. A day doesn't pass when there are not arrests made for the drug smuggling, usually across the border of Mexico. Last week, nine tons of*

*marijuana was confiscated. In your recent discussions with Mexican President Lopez Portillo, did you discuss this problem?*

*The President:* Yes. Yes, we did discuss it at length. I would guess that 70 percent of our heroin comes to our country now from Mexico. And the only way we can reduce that particular influx of drugs to our country is to cooperate with the nations where it is grown. We can, by infrared photography, either we or the Mexican Government, for instance, identify the fields where the heroin poppies are grown. And by going to the farms, the Mexican soldiers go into the farms, they can destroy those poppyfields before the harvest is complete. At the same time, many of those farmers are small, poverty stricken, live in remote areas of the mountains. I think you have to be above 3,000 feet to grow heroin poppies, and alternative crops need to be provided for them.

So we discussed this at length, President Lopez Portillo and I did, and we agreed that with subcabinet-level representatives that we would explore this question further. A part of it, obviously, is trying to stop drugs as they cross the border. But that's a very, very inefficient operation. The cost is enormous. And as you know, a tiny volume of a very large quantity of heroin makes concealment very, very easy. And so, to stop the drugs where they are being produced is by far the better approach. Lopez Portillo is also deeply concerned about this. He feels the same way I do.

I've appointed as my own representative, here in the White House, Dr. Peter Bourne, who is probably the world's foremost expert on heroin, cocaine, and marijuana—even alcohol—all the drugs that are bad. He's traveled throughout the world at the invitation of other countries. He goes into countries that we can't even get into because we don't have diplomatic relationships with them. But because of his knowledge about the subject, they bring him in to help them with their problems. And he is heading up our drug effort in this country. And I think that with him and the equivalent leaders in the other nations, particularly Mexico, we can help a great deal in the future.

## Southern Africa in the Global Context

*Statement by Philip C. Habib  
Under Secretary for Political Affairs*<sup>1</sup>

I am pleased to be here today, Mr. Chairman, to speak to this committee on a critical question: the importance for the world at large of achieving just solutions to the problems of southern Africa and the role which the United States can play in contributing to those solutions. I believe that our time together can be most productively spent in an exchange of ideas and will therefore keep my prepared remarks to a minimum.

I particularly welcome the opportunity to appear before you at a time when the whole question of U.S. policy toward southern Africa is under urgent and comprehensive review within the Department of State and other concerned executive agencies. The views and concerns expressed by your committee here today can help us to clarify the issues and to formulate policies to deal with those issues forthrightly and positively.

I can tell you that the general thrust of our policy review has been to find ways of strengthening the commitment of the United States to social justice and racial equality in southern Africa and of demonstrating that commitment in tangible and meaningful ways. It is, regrettably, the case that our actions in the past have sometimes led others, both here in the United States and abroad, to question the depth and sincerity of that commitment. It is the Administration's earnest hope that

when the historical record is finally written, there will be no shadow of a doubt as to where the United States stood on one of the great moral and political issues of our time.

Perhaps the most concrete demonstration to date of that renewed sense of commitment is the Administration's unequivocal support for efforts to repeal the so-called Byrd amendment, under which the United States has since 1971 imported raw materials from Southern Rhodesia in open violation of its international obligations as spelled out in the U.N. Charter. Secretary of State Vance, testifying before the Senate Subcommittee on African Affairs on February 10, stressed the importance which President Carter personally attaches to the repeal of this measure.

I would like for a moment to focus on the broader context within which our policies toward southern Africa must be viewed. In constructing a policy to deal with the problems of that region, we must have a sure understanding of our own national interests and act accordingly.

What are those interests, and how do we serve them best in relation to southern Africa?

First, I believe that our foreign policy must be true to our own ideals as a nation. President Carter has, on many occasions, stated clearly and forcefully his own personal commitment to human rights. That commitment requires our firm and clear opposition to racial and social injustice wherever it exists. A policy toward southern Africa that is not firmly grounded on this principle would be inconsistent with our national character and

<sup>1</sup> Made before the Subcommittee on Africa of the House Committee on International Relations on Mar. 3. The complete transcript of the hearings will be published by the committee and will be available from the Superintendent of Documents, U.S. Government Printing Office, Washington, D.C. 20402.

therefore would not command the support of the American people. Moreover, it would cast doubt on our commitment to social justice both here at home and elsewhere in the world.

Secondly, we believe firmly that the people of Africa hold the key to the solution of African problems. The United States will remain fully committed to using its political and economic influence and its diplomatic offices to support racial and social progress on the African Continent. But it is not for us, or for any other external power, to attempt to impose its own ideas and solutions. It is for this reason that during his recent visit to Africa our Ambassador to the United Nations, Andrew Young, stressed that U.S. policy toward southern Africa, and Africa as a whole, would be developed in the closest possible consultations with African leaders.

The other important reason for our preference for African solutions to African problems is to avoid situations which make Africa an arena for great-power rivalry, as happened in Angola. Prolonged violence in southern Africa, born out of racial discrimination and social and political injustice, could create opportunities for foreign intervention and confrontation. We believe that our best defense against this possibility is to support policies that will limit the areas where potential conflict may arise.

The United States recognizes that other nations, most notably the developed countries of Europe and Asia, also have important interests in the southern African region. In many instances, their interests and influence greatly exceed our own. We are convinced that our traditional friends are equally concerned and anxious to find solutions to the difficult problems of the region. To the extent that we can combine and coordinate our efforts, the prospects for encouraging meaningful social and political change will be greatly enhanced. During his visit to Europe and Japan, Vice President Mondale stressed that the United States intends to consult even more closely in the future on ways to bring our collective influence to bear in seeking solutions to the problems of southern Africa.

From the standpoint of our own economic and strategic interests, we maintain firmly

that the United States has no reason to fear the necessary and inevitable achievement of racial equality and social justice in southern Africa. To hold any other view would be to refute the history of the past three decades and to deny the obvious fact that the United States has been able to establish cooperative and constructive relations with newly emergent nations in Africa and elsewhere in the world. Indeed, it is only where progress toward social, racial, and political justice is delayed or frustrated that the United States has any cause for concern that conditions may arise that are inhospitable to our basic national interests. It is for this reason as well that we must remain fully committed to helping those who seek rapid, peaceful, and orderly change in southern Africa.

Finally, the United States has a stake in what happens in southern Africa because of our belief that political harmony can and must be achieved in diverse societies like our own. The world is afflicted with nations in which men of good will have not yet convinced their countrymen that ethnic, racial, and religious differences do not constitute a cause for discrimination and violence. Success in achieving orderly transitions to democratic rule in southern Africa, with protection of human rights for all, regardless of race, will help those everywhere who seek peaceful resolutions to conflict arising from ethnic, racial, or religious differences.

Having outlined the considerations upon which we believe U.S. policy toward southern Africa should rest, I would like to review briefly the status of the Administration's efforts to date to develop a policy consistent with these general principles and goals.

#### **U.S. Position on Rhodesia and Namibia**

In early 1976 the United States, in consultation with the frontline Presidents, began its active involvement in the search for settlements to the unresolved problems of Namibia and Rhodesia. As the committee is aware, the previous Administration achieved a major breakthrough when, after months of intensive diplomatic effort, it persuaded Ian Smith to announce publicly last September 24 his ac-

ceptance in principle of majority rule in Rhodesia within two years.

That announcement led to the convening of a conference of the Rhodesian parties under British chairmanship in Geneva last October. Regrettably, that conference adjourned in December without measurable progress being achieved on the central issue of the establishment of an interim government that would guide the territory to majority rule and independence.

A mission to southern Africa led by Ambassador Ivor Richard, the British Chairman of the Geneva conference, was unsuccessful in bridging the gap between the Rhodesian authorities and the nationalists. On January 24 Ian Smith publicly rejected proposals that envisioned a British presence in Rhodesia during the transitional period. That presence was designed to serve as a balancing force between whites and blacks, assuring the former of a tranquil transition and the latter of an irreversible process toward majority rule within a short, fixed time frame.

This Administration's response to Smith's rejection was categoric. We stated our firm support for the British and our belief that the proposals put forward by them offered a sound basis for continued negotiations. We warned Smith that his intention to seek an internal solution from which leading nationalists would be excluded would clearly be unworkable and unacceptable. It remains our firm conviction that an internal settlement that excludes important nationalist leaders will not bring an end to the war and, on the contrary, could well fuel the fires of civil strife.

On February 10 Secretary Vance repeated before the Senate Subcommittee on African Affairs our clear statement to Smith that under no circumstances can the Rhodesian regime count on any form of American assistance in its effort to prevent majority rule. In the same statement, the Secretary reaffirmed the Administration's unequivocal support for repeal of the Byrd amendment. He underscored the importance that repeal would have in strengthening our own leverage in promoting a negotiated settlement in Rhodesia and in disabusing Ian Smith and the present Rhode-

sian authorities of any hope they might still have that the United States will assist them in their efforts to prevent majority rule.

The Administration will not be content to end its efforts here, however. We are continuing to seek other ways to bring our positive influence to bear in encouraging rapid, peaceful, and orderly change in southern Africa.

Despite Smith's rejection, neither the British nor we have abandoned the search for a negotiated settlement. During February we have twice consulted with British officials here in Washington, most recently last week, to consider what new initiatives might be necessary to get negotiations going again. On those occasions we have reaffirmed our support for the leading role that Britain, as the recognized constitutional authority in Rhodesia, must continue to play.

We are urgently consulting with the African parties most interested and concerned on possible next steps. Ambassador Young's recent visit to Africa afforded the Administration an early opportunity to establish contact at a high level on this and other issues of importance to Africans and to stress our intention to develop our policies in close consultation with them.

So long as there is no significant progress through peaceful means toward the achievement of Africa's legitimate aspirations for racial equality and social justice, Africa's commitment to armed struggle to achieve these ends will remain a real one. Nevertheless we believe that the leaders of Africa would all prefer a solution that prevents further bloodshed and destruction. It is the task of diplomacy, and particularly of British and American diplomacy in this instance, to help the parties involved find ways to make a negotiated solution possible.

With respect to Namibia, the United States has supported and will continue to support U.N. resolutions calling for South Africa to end its illegal occupation of the territory and for free elections there under U.N. supervision. We believe that all of Namibia's authentic political voices, including specifically SWAPO [South West Africa People's Organization], must be given the opportunity to

express themselves on the country's political future. Any attempted solution that excludes important Namibian political groups or that fails to win the acceptance of the international community is no solution at all and will not receive the endorsement of the United States.

During his visit to Africa, Ambassador Young found widespread support for the continuation of American efforts to develop a negotiating framework within which the principal parties can establish the steps leading to independence and majority rule in Namibia. We have assured all of the interested parties that our diplomatic good offices will remain available and that our efforts to promote a settlement acceptable to the United Nations and the international community will continue.

### **South African Role**

A key factor in the success of American diplomatic efforts to date has been our ability to speak directly and frankly with all of the involved parties. By virtue of its proximity and ties with Rhodesia and its occupation of Namibia, South Africa's role in the resolution of both problems cannot be ignored. With respect to Rhodesia, we have recently received indications that the South African Government is still interested in a negotiated settlement. With respect to Namibia, we are attempting to ascertain whether South Africa is genuinely interested in moving toward an internationally acceptable solution.

So long as we are assured of the South African willingness to be helpful, the United States will be prepared to continue its consultations with South Africa's leaders on these issues. It should be made clear to all, however, that the United States has no interest in any proposed solutions that would compromise the legitimate interests of the people involved and their desires for majority rule with full sovereignty and independence.

Moreover, our willingness to consult with South Africa on these issues should in no way be construed as an acceptance of that country's domestic policies. The violence in Soweto and elsewhere bears grim testimony to a society that must change, and change radi-

cally, or face the sure calamity of racial violence and chaos.

We will not hesitate to speak out publicly, as appropriate, on events in South Africa, and we will continue to make known to the South African authorities our views, urging peaceful and fundamental change. In addition, we will seek ways of persuading South Africa that such change is in the best interest of all its citizens, black and white alike.

We are looking at the extent to which the United States and other nations can use their influence to both encourage and facilitate change. At the same time, however, we must remain sensitive to the danger that the attitudes and reactions of the outside world to events in South Africa could have the unfortunate effect of engendering greater isolation and resistance to change. We must take care that our own actions nurture, rather than inhibit, the changes that we believe can and must be made.

The challenge that confronts our diplomacy, and that of other nations committed to the cause of social justice and racial equality in southern Africa, is to find ways of transcending the barriers of fear and suspicion and to point the way to solutions that will allow all of the people of the region to live in dignity and peace. There can be no question but that the path ahead will be fraught with extreme difficulties. But neither can there be any question of our dedication to continuing the search.

## **Congressional Documents Relating to Foreign Policy**

- Markup of S. 1439: Export Reorganization Act of 1976. Meeting before the Joint Committee on Atomic Energy. August 26-September 14, 1976. 274 pp.
- United States Contributions to International Organizations. Report to the Congress for fiscal year 1975. H. Doc. 95-11. January 1977. 126 pp.
- Messages from the President of the United States transmitting governing international fishery agreements. Agreement with the Republic of Korea; H. Doc. 95-78; February 21, 1977; 10 pp. Agreement with Japan; H. Doc. 95-79; February 21, 1977; 13 pp. Agreement with the European Economic Community; H. Doc. 95-80; February 21, 1977; 9 pp. Agreement with Spain; H. Doc. 95-81; February 21, 1977; 12 pp.

## U.S. Economic and Security Assistance Programs in East Asia

*Following is a statement made before the Subcommittee on Asian and Pacific Affairs of the House Committee on International Relations on March 10 by Richard C. Holbrooke, then Assistant Secretary-designate for East Asian and Pacific Affairs, whose nomination was confirmed by the Senate on March 23.*<sup>1</sup>

I am pleased to have this opportunity to testify today on our economic and security assistance programs in East Asia and the Pacific. I greatly look forward to establishing a constructive, compatible relationship with this subcommittee and to working closely with its members.

Mr. Chairman, I believe that the end of U.S. involvement in Indochina signals a new era in East Asia. While tensions persist, they are confined in scope and there is no major conflict in progress. It appears that all of the major powers, at least for the present, favor a continuation of this situation. For many East Asian countries, economic prospects are better than ever before.

There are, nevertheless, major uncertainties in the area. For example: Relationships among the three states of Indochina and between Indochina and neighboring Southeast Asian countries are still ambivalent and could turn for the worse as easily as go for the better. The situation on the Korean Peninsula is presently quiet, compared to the upsurge of violence last year, but it, too, is unstable. Many countries are trying to cope, internally, with the unaccustomed absence of wartime pressures and the distortions these pressures tend to cause in both economic and political

life. In brief, East Asia is undergoing its own transition from an unfortunate past to an uncertain future, albeit with high hopes for what the future will hold.

The changing circumstances in East Asia and our attitude toward this region obviously require us to take a fresh look at our present policies. As you know, we are considering new approaches to a number of issues, such as the reduction of our ground forces in Korea, the normalization of diplomatic relations with the People's Republic of China, the renegotiation of our use of military facilities in the Philippines, and more effective ways to improve observance of human rights. While we will need additional time to formulate fully detailed positions on these questions, several broad policy guidelines are already clear:

—The United States shall remain an Asian-Pacific power.

—We shall preserve a balanced and flexible military posture in the western Pacific.

—We shall maintain close ties to Japan.

—We shall make efforts to normalize diplomatic relations with the People's Republic of China, with due regard for the security of the people of Taiwan.

—We have already moved forward on the normalization of diplomatic relations with Vietnam, with the forthcoming departure of a Presidential Commission to Hanoi.

—Our security and economic ties with our allies in New Zealand and Australia remain strong.

—We intend to phase out our ground forces in Korea, while insuring that the security of Korea is in no way threatened. Our troop withdrawal will be carried out in close consultation with the Republic of Korea and with Japan.

<sup>1</sup> The complete transcript of the hearings will be published by the committee and will be available from the Superintendent of Documents, U.S. Government Printing Office, Washington, D.C. 20402.

—The United States continues to have an interest in Southeast Asia and will play an appropriate role there. We look forward, for example, to successful negotiations with the Philippines on the use of bases there.

—The United States is dedicated to improving the world economic structure and to this end will work with both developed and developing countries in East Asia. At the same time, we will promote mutually beneficial bilateral trade and investment.

—We expect continued cooperation with the individual countries of East Asia and eagerly await the opening of economic consultations with the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN), comprising Singapore, Malaysia, Thailand, Indonesia, and the Philippines.

### **Purposes of Assistance Programs**

I will now address the more specific question of U.S. economic and security assistance in East Asia. With regard to AID [Agency for International Development], we have only development programs in this region.

On March 2 Secretary Vance testified before the Subcommittee on Foreign Operations of the House Appropriations Committee on our foreign assistance programs. I would like to reiterate several of the comments the Secretary made that are especially relevant to East Asia.

First, he emphasized that the United States' foreign economic assistance reflects our nation's concern for the world's poor.

Second, he noted that our own economic prosperity is intertwined with the fortunes of other nations and that we must move swiftly, in concert with developing countries, toward expanding global supplies of food, energy, and raw materials, toward coping with population growth, and toward fostering economic development.

Third, he pointed out that our selective military assistance supports the security of our friends and allies, thus providing them with greater opportunities for social and economic progress.

Finally, the Secretary set forth the De-

partment's views on human rights, giving strong support to the observance of human rights throughout the world and favoring expression of this principle in our foreign economic assistance programs; however, no simple formula can be applied with regard to human rights violations, since economic and security goals must be taken into consideration along with our great concern for each individual's case.

In recent years, there has been greater economic growth in the East Asian region—an important market as well as significant source of such raw materials as petroleum, tin, rubber, and coconut—than in any other part of the world. Yet despite impressive progress in certain economic sectors, the nations of Southeast Asia still have far to go in their development efforts, particularly in meeting the needs of the rural and urban poor.

We feel our bilateral economic assistance efforts are truly helping the most needy elements of the Asian population as well as furthering our own policy objectives.

In our own economic assistance programs, we have tried to enhance regional cohesion. Cooperative organizations for which we provided the financial impetus several years ago are now functioning on their own with the full support of the Asians themselves. With this in mind, we are looking forward optimistically to economic consultations later this year with the Association of Southeast Asian Nations. While we hope that these talks will emphasize the desirability of fostering close and mutually beneficial trade and investment relations, we wish to hear views on other ways the United States can help ASEAN's regional cooperation.

Of course, in addition to these bilateral programs we contribute substantially to multilateral financial institutions, such as the International Bank for Reconstruction and Development (IBRD) and the Asian Development Bank (ADB). These institutions are particularly important, and I urge the subcommittee to support the Administration's request for their full funding. As you know, our support encourages other donors, thus multiplying the effect of our contribution.

We propose six recipients for security assistance in fiscal year 1978: the Republic of China, Korea, Indonesia, Malaysia, the Philippines, and Thailand.

With regard to the Republic of China, we are in the process of phasing out our security assistance program and thus are proposing this year only \$25 million in credits and a small sum for grant training. Korea and the Philippines will be discussed separately. In recent times Indonesia and Malaysia have emphasized economic development and have kept military spending to a minimum. However, since the Communist victories in Indochina, the Indonesians have become more concerned about their security and are making modest efforts to upgrade their own defenses. We feel our security assistance is an appropriate contribution to the preservation of the independence of these countries and to regional stability in the still-uncertain post-Vietnam period.

Thailand is a country with obvious security concerns—stemming from both hostile neighbors and an active, externally supported insurgency—and one with which we have had a longstanding security relationship. Again, we believe assistance to Thailand is an important contribution under present circumstances to regional security and an expression of continued U.S. interest in Southeast Asia.

Turning to our economic assistance programs, you will find them focused primarily on the rural poor, on those people who have not shared adequately in the relative prosperity of much of the region. Our first long-term objective is to attain a 3.5 percent growth rate in annual production of food grains by 1985. Our second goal is to slow down the population increases which often cancel out increases in food production. Moreover, we have important health and education programs which similarly are aimed at improving the quality of rural life and furthering agricultural development. I feel that this emphasis in our program reflects the needs of the recipient countries, as well as the concern for the poor expressed by Congress in assistance legislation.

## Assistance to Republic of Korea

I understand you are especially interested in our assistance programs for Korea and the Philippines.

With regard to Korea, our policy decisions should be made in the light of our primary objective: to maintain a deterrent that will insure peace on the peninsula. Although North Korea refuses to renew the dialogue with the South which was initiated in 1972, remains intransigent on all the political issues which divide Korea, and continues to pursue its goal of reunification of the peninsula, we have determined that a phased withdrawal of American ground forces can be undertaken while still meeting our security goal. This withdrawal will be carried out on a timetable yet to be determined. In order to maintain the military balance on the peninsula and deter renewed North Korean aggression, we will maintain our air capability in Korea and will continue to assist in the strengthening of the armed forces of the Republic of Korea through a program of foreign military sales assistance. This assistance is designed to concentrate on areas where Korean capabilities need improvement.

The impressive economic development achieved by the Republic of Korea has allowed us to phase out our economic assistance, except for a proposed title I Public Law 480 program in fiscal year 1978 of \$109.3 million. Similarly, Korean economic progress led to the termination of grant military assistance in fiscal year 1976, except for a small sum for the costs of delivery of previously funded materiel. The Republic of Korea has formulated its own force improvement plan, which seems to be both militarily and economically feasible. This plan calls for expenditure of approximately \$5 billion for the period 1976–81, of which roughly \$3.5 billion will be in foreign exchange. Most of this foreign exchange will be expended in the United States. We believe the sum proposed for credit sales—\$275 million in fiscal year 1978—is appropriate in view of our mutual security interests and our desire to strengthen Korean forces as we phase out our ground troops.

As President Carter has made clear, we are



deeply concerned about human rights violations in Korea. We are particularly concerned with restrictions on political activity which have led to the arrest of many Korean citizens voicing peaceful opposition to the present government. We will continue to express our concern in authoritative ways and to encourage a human rights situation consistent with normally accepted international standards.

At the same time, we believe it would be a serious mistake to cut back our longstanding assistance to the South Korean armed forces which helps these forces better cope with the formidable task of protecting their country against the threat from the north. Moreover, most South Koreans, including domestic critics of the government, strongly favor continuation of U.S.-Korean security ties and assistance. In brief, we will work for an improvement in South Korea's defensive capability while pressing vigorously for an improvement in the human rights situation.

Our Public Law 480 program in Korea is tied to an understanding we have with the Koreans on textiles. The United States has benefited from this arrangement. Cuts in this program would mostly affect agricultural development and would not, I feel, be an appropriate or effective response to the human rights issue.

### **Programs for the Philippines**

Turning to the Philippines, it may be useful to recall that the United States has strong and unique historical ties with the Philippines as well as an important military interest in that country because of its strategic location. Our security relationship is defined in three major agreements: the 1947 Military Base Agreement, the 1951 Mutual Defense Treaty, and a Military Assistance Agreement, revised in 1953. The base agreement is currently under renegotiation. As you know, the Administration is currently studying the status of these negotiations with the Philippines. Pending the outcome of this review, it is difficult to comment concerning these negotiations; but it is clear that if agreement is

reached it will include an element of compensation beyond the programs I am presenting to you today.

Our security ties with the Philippines and our military facilities there serve important U.S. national interests today, just as they did during World War II and during the war in Vietnam. They contribute significantly to the maintenance of stability in Southeast Asia and to our ability to keep vital sealanes open in the event of hostilities. Finally, our bases contribute to our ability to meet our obligations under the bilateral mutual defense pact with the Philippine Government concluded in 1951.

The Philippines views our security assistance program as evidence of continued U.S. interest in and commitment to the defense of that country and as an important factor in our contribution to the bilateral security relationship. As its contribution to a mutual security relationship, the Philippine Government grants us the use of a number of military facilities, the most important of which are Subic Bay Naval Base and Clark Air Base. Moreover, the Philippine Government is attempting to increase, with our help, its ability to meet its own defense needs.

The security assistance proposed for fiscal year 1978—\$19.6 million in grant materiel, \$800,000 for training, and \$20 million in credit sales—represents a continuation of existing programs. These programs are aimed at improving the ability of the Philippine armed forces to defend their own country.

The United States also has important economic ties with the Philippines: over \$1 billion in investment, a flourishing trade relationship, and a large resident American business community. We are currently discussing with the Philippine Government a new agreement regarding economic and commercial relations that will replace the expired Laurel-Langley Agreement.

It is clear from our political, military, and economic relationship with the Philippines that we have a continuing interest in assisting that country's economic development. In the past, U.S. aid has not only contributed to

Philippine economic development but has also provided important encouragement for other foreign donors to continue and enlarge their contributions. At present, U.S. bilateral aid constitutes approximately 12 percent of the \$500 million total of external assistance to the Philippines. The Japanese contribution is approximately the same, while multilateral donors such as the ADB and IBRD supply almost all of the balance. Our total proposals for fiscal year 1978 include loans of \$51,190,000, grants of \$11,781,000, and Public Law 480 programs totaling \$34,803,000, making a grand total of \$97,774,000.

We are obviously troubled by human rights abuses in the Philippines. Since the institution of martial law in 1972, there have been wide-ranging arrests and detentions without trial, in some cases for as long as four years. Recent government actions have included deportation of several foreign missionaries and newsmen, the closing down of several church radio stations and publications, and arrests of church social workers accused of improper political activity. Our concern has been communicated to the Philippine Government, along with our strong view that there should be a marked improvement in the situation.

However, we don't believe that security or economic assistance should be reduced because of the human rights problem. As I have noted, the Philippines has strategic importance, not only for our own country but also for nations friendly to the United States in the region, and thus we should continue our support.

Our economic assistance programs are clearly directed toward aiding the rural poor. Termination of these programs would not lead to an improvement in the human rights situation in the Philippines. Rather, it would most probably increase financial pressures on the government, raise doubts about our security and political relationships, and put pressures on the Philippine Government to take even more forceful domestic security measures. Given the importance of our bilateral political, security, and economic relations, we believe we will have more influence with the Philippine Government with regard to the human

rights situation if we continue our assistance rather than if we reduce or terminate our programs.

We have gone through a traumatic experience in Asia in the last decade from which we have finally emerged. While this part of the world is, fortunately, less volatile and preoccupying than during the Vietnam war, we still have important interests there. The significance of Japan, a key ally, is obvious. Improved relations with the People's Republic of China are crucial in both a global and bilateral context. We are still interested in the independence and development of our friends in Southeast Asia.

I believe the Administration's economic and security assistance proposals for fiscal year 1978 represent an appropriate contribution on the part of our government to peace, stability, and development in East Asia. Moreover, it is essential that we maintain our own credibility and sustain our old friends in the area as both we and they develop new policies to fit a new set of circumstances.

## TREATY INFORMATION

### **United States and Brazil Conclude Shrimp Fishing Agreement**

Press release 95 dated March 3

Brazil and the United States have successfully concluded negotiations on a new agreement relating to shrimp fishing activities of U.S.-flag vessels off the coast of Brazil. The agreement, which sets forth the terms and conditions under which U.S. vessels may conduct this fishery, was initialed by the chairmen of the U.S. and Brazilian delegations at Brasilia on March 1. It will come into force upon the completion of internal procedures and an exchange of notes between the two governments.

Under the agreement, U.S. vessels may

continue to conduct shrimp fishing operations during 1977 in a specified area off the coast of Brazil north of the mouth of the Amazon River. In addition to restricting the area which may be fished, the agreement reduces the number of U.S. vessels which may engage in the fishery. It also establishes fees which must be paid by U.S. vessels applying for fishing authorizations. The agreement will remain in force until December 31, 1977, during which time discussions will be held regarding new arrangements that could help Brazilian fishing enterprises achieve full utilization of the shrimp resources of the area.

Ambassador Thomas A. Clingan, Jr., was the chairman of the U.S. delegation, and Counselor Paulo Dirceu Pinheiro was the chairman of the Brazilian delegation.

## Current Actions

### MULTILATERAL

#### Agriculture

Agreement establishing the International Fund for Agricultural Development (IFAD). Done at Rome June 13, 1976.<sup>1</sup>

*Signatures:* Korea, March 2, 1977; Panama, March 8, 1977.

#### Aviation

Convention on international civil aviation. Done at Chicago December 7, 1944. Entered into force April 4, 1974. TIAS 1591.

*Adherence deposited:* Angola, March 11, 1977.

#### Copyright

Universal copyright convention, as revised. Done at Paris July 24, 1971. Entered into force July 10, 1974. TIAS 7868.

Protocol 1 annexed to the universal copyright convention, as revised, concerning the application of that convention to works of stateless persons and refugees. Done at Paris July 24, 1971. Entered into force July 10, 1974. TIAS 7868.

Protocol 2 annexed to the universal copyright convention, as revised, concerning the application of that convention to the works of certain international organizations. Done at Paris July 24, 1971. Entered into force July 10, 1974. TIAS 7868.

*Accession deposited:* Poland, December 9, 1976.

#### Expositions

Protocol revising the convention of November 22, 1928, relating to international expositions, with appendix

and annex. Done at Paris November 30, 1972.<sup>1</sup>

*Ratification deposited:* Finland, February 17, 1977.

### Narcotic Drugs

Single convention on narcotic drugs, 1961. Done at New York March 30, 1961. Entered into force December 13, 1964; for the United States June 24, 1967. TIAS 6298.

*Accession deposited:* Bolivia, September 23, 1976.

Protocol amending the single convention on narcotic drugs. Done at Geneva March 25, 1972. Entered into force August 8, 1975. TIAS 8118.

*Accession deposited:* Bolivia, September 23, 1976.

### World Meteorological Organization

Convention of the World Meteorological Organization. Done at Washington October 11, 1947. Entered into force March 23, 1950. TIAS 2052.

*Accession deposited:* Angola, March 16, 1977.

## BILATERAL

### Brazil

Agreement modifying and extending the agreement of March 14, 1975, as extended, concerning shrimp (TIAS 8253). Effected by exchange of notes at Brasilia March 1, 1977. Entered into force March 1, 1977.

### Bulgaria

Agreement concerning fisheries off the coasts of the United States, with agreed minutes and related letter. Signed at Washington December 17, 1976.

*Entered into force:* February 28, 1977.

### Canada

Procedures for mutual assistance in the administration of justice in connection with the Boeing Company matter. Signed at Washington March 15, 1977. Entered into force March 15, 1977.

Agreement relating to cooperation in reconstruction of Canadian portions of the Alaska Highway. Effected by exchange of notes at Ottawa January 11 and February 11, 1977. Entered into force February 11, 1977.

### Republic of China

Agreement concerning fisheries off the coasts of the United States, with annexes and agreed minutes. Signed at Washington September 15, 1976.

*Entered into force:* February 28, 1977.

### Guatemala

Memorandum of understanding relating to cooperative efforts to protect crops from pest damage and diseases. Signed at Guatemala February 21, 1977. Entered into force February 21, 1977.

### Jordan

Grant agreement to support and promote the economic stability of Jordan. Signed at Amman February 8, 1977. Entered into force February 8, 1977.

### Korea

Agreement terminating the agreement of November 24,

<sup>1</sup> Not in force.

1972, concerning cooperation in fisheries (TIAS 7517). Effected by exchange of notes at Washington February 24 and March 3, 1977. Entered into force March 3, 1977; effective March 1, 1977.

Agreement concerning fisheries off the coasts of the United States, with agreed minutes. Signed at Washington January 4, 1977.

*Entered into force:* March 3, 1977.

**Mexico**

Agreement relating to the limitation of meat imports from Mexico during calendar year 1977. Effected by exchange of notes at Mexico and Tlatelolco January 10 and February 10, 1977. Entered into force February 10, 1977.

**Poland**

Agreement concerning fisheries off the coasts of the United States, with annexes, agreed minutes, and related letter. Signed at Washington August 2, 1976.

*Entered into force:* February 28, 1977.

**Portugal**

Agreement relating to the continuation of international broadcast activities carried out in Portugal by RARET. Effected by exchange of notes at Lisbon February 15, 1977. Entered into force February 15, 1977.

**Spain**

Agreement concerning fisheries off the coasts of the United States. Signed at Washington February 16, 1977.

*Entered into force:* March 10, 1977.

**Sudan**

Agreement for sales of agricultural commodities. Signed at Khartoum February 21, 1977. Enters into force upon receipt by the U.S. Embassy of notification of the completion of the constitutional procedures for ratification required by Sudanese law.

**Syria**

Agreement for sales of agricultural commodities, relating to the agreement of November 20, 1974 (TIAS 8119). Signed at Damascus March 3, 1977. Entered into force March 3, 1977.

**Union of Soviet Socialist Republics**

Agreement concerning the translation and publication in English of Soviet journals and articles, with annexes. Signed at Washington February 14, 1977. Entered into force February 14, 1977.

Agreement concerning fisheries off the coasts of the United States, with agreed minutes and related letter. Signed at Washington November 26, 1976.

*Entered into force:* February 28, 1977.

**Zaire**

Project loan agreement relating to North Shaba rural development. Signed at Kinshasa January 27, 1977. Entered into force January 27, 1977.

**GPO Sales Publications**

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**Inter-American Convention on the Granting of Political Rights to Women.** Convention with other governments. TIAS 8365. 9 pp. 35¢. (Cat. No. S9.10:8365).

**Agricultural Commodities.** Agreement with Israel. TIAS 8382. 4 pp. 35¢. (Cat. No. S9.10:8382).

**Correction**

The editor of the BULLETIN wishes to call attention to the following errors which appear in the March 14 issue:

*p. 210, col. 2:* The second line of the eighth paragraph should read, "me to pass any judgment about the American".

*p. 240, col. 2, line 28:* "it" should read "its".

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**Checklist of Department of State  
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Press releases may be obtained from the Office of Press Relations, Department of State, Washington, D.C. 20520.

No.	Date	Subject
*109	3/16	Vance: House Committee on International Relations.
†110	3/16	U.S.-Yugoslav consultations on CSCE, Mar. 15-16.
†111	3/17	Vance, Irish Foreign Minister FitzGerald: joint statement.
*112	3/18	Program for official visit of Prime Minister Fukuda of Japan.
*113	3/18	Richard N. Gardner sworn in as Ambassador to Italy (biographic data).
†114	3/18	Expiration of area passport restrictions.
*115	3/18	U.S. and Malaysia amend bilateral textile agreement, Feb. 9-25.
*116	3/18	Douglas J. Bennet, Jr., sworn in as Assistant Secretary for Congressional Relations (biographic data).
*117	3/18	Richard M. Moose sworn in as Deputy Under Secretary for Management (biographic data).
*118	3/18	Australian Foreign Minister Peacock to visit Washington, Mar. 23-26.
*119	3/18	Study group 5 of the U.S. National Committee for the International Telegraph and Telephone Consultative Committee (CCITT), Apr. 13.
*120	3/18	Asian and Pacific student leaders to study citizen organizations in U.S.
*121	3/18	U.S. and Thailand amend bilateral textile agreement, Nov. 24.
*122	3/18	Study group 1 of the U.S. National Committee for CCITT, Apr. 14.

\* Not printed.

† Held for a later issue of the BULLETIN.

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*The Department of State BULLETIN, a weekly publication issued by the Office of Media Services, Bureau of Public Affairs, provides the public and interested agencies of the government with information on developments in the field of U.S. foreign relations and on the work of the Department and the Foreign Service.*

*The BULLETIN includes selected press releases on foreign policy, issued by the White House and the Department, and statements, addresses, and news conferences of the President and the Secretary of State and other officers of the Department, as well as special articles on various phases of international affairs and the functions of the Department. Information is included concerning treaties and international agreements to which the United States is or may become a party and on treaties of general international interest.*

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## Peace, Arms Control, World Economic Progress, Human Rights: Basic Priorities of U.S. Foreign Policy

*Address by President Carter*<sup>1</sup>

Last night I was in Clinton, Massachusetts, at a town hall meeting where people of that small town decide their political and economic future.

Tonight I speak to a similar meeting where people representing nations all over the world come here to decide their political and economic future.

I am proud to be with you tonight in this house where the shared hopes of the world can find a voice.

I have come here to express my own support, and the continuing support of my country, for the ideals of the United Nations.

We are proud that for the 32 years since its creation, the United Nations has met on American soil. And we share with you the commitments of freedom, self-government, human dignity, mutual toleration, and the peaceful resolution of disputes—which the founding principles of the United Nations and also Secretary General Kurt Waldheim so well represent.

No one nation by itself can build a world which reflects all these fine values. But the United States, my own country, has a reservoir of strength; economic strength, which we are willing to share; military strength, which we hope never to use again; and the strength of ideals, which are determined fully to maintain the backbone of our own foreign policy.

It is now eight weeks since I became President. I have brought to office a firm commitment to a more open foreign policy. And I be-

lieve that the American people expect me to speak frankly about the policies that we intend to pursue, and it is in that spirit that I speak to you tonight about our own hopes for the future.

I see a hopeful world, a world dominated by increasing demands for basic freedoms, for fundamental rights, for higher standards of human existence. We are eager to take part in the shaping of that world.

But in seeking such a better world, we are not blind to the reality of disagreement nor to the persisting dangers that confront us all. Every headline reminds us of bitter divisions, of national hostilities, of territorial conflicts, of ideological competition. In the Middle East, peace is a quarter of a century overdue. A gathering racial conflict threatens southern Africa; new tensions are rising in the Horn of Africa. Disputes in the eastern Mediterranean remain to be resolved.

Perhaps even more ominous is the staggering arms race. The Soviet Union and the United States have accumulated thousands of nuclear weapons. Our two nations now have five times more missile warheads today than we had just eight years ago. But we are not five times more secure. On the contrary, the arms race has only increased the risk of conflict.

We can only improve this world if we are realistic about its complexities. The disagreements that we face are deeply rooted, and they often raise difficult philosophical as well as territorial issues. They will not be solved easily. They will not be solved quickly. The arms race is now embedded in the very fabric of international affairs and can only be

<sup>1</sup> Made to representatives to the United Nations in the U.N. General Assembly Hall on Mar. 17 (text from Weekly Compilation of Presidential Documents dated Mar. 21).

contained with the greatest difficulty. Poverty and inequality are of such monumental scope that it will take decades of deliberate and determined effort even to improve the situation substantially.

I stress these dangers and these difficulties because I want all of us to dedicate ourselves to a prolonged and persistent effort designed:

—First, to maintain peace and to reduce the arms race;

—Second, to build a better and a more cooperative international economic system; and

—Third, to work with potential adversaries as well as our close friends to advance the cause of human rights.

### **Working To Advance the Cause of Peace**

In seeking these goals, I realize that the United States cannot solve the problems of the world. We can sometimes help others resolve their differences, but we cannot do so by imposing our own particular solutions.

In the coming months, there is important work for all of us in advancing international cooperation and economic progress in the cause of peace:

—Later this spring, the leaders of several industrial nations of Europe, North America, and Japan will confer at a summit meeting in London on a broad range of issues. We must promote the health of the industrial economies. We must seek to restrain inflation and bring ways of managing our own domestic economies for the benefit of the global economy.

—We must move forward with multilateral trade negotiations in Geneva.

—The United States will support the efforts of our friends to strengthen the democratic institutions in Europe, and particularly in Portugal and Spain.

—We will work closely with our European friends on the forthcoming Review Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe. We want to make certain that the provisions of the Helsinki agreement<sup>2</sup> are fully implemented and that progress is made to further East-West cooperation.

—In the Middle East we are doing our best to clarify areas of disagreement, to surface

underlying consensus, and to help to develop mutually acceptable principles that can form a flexible framework for a just and a permanent settlement.

—In southern Africa, we will work to help attain majority rule through peaceful means. We believe that such fundamental transformation can be achieved, to the advantage of both the blacks and whites who live in that region of the world. Anything less than that may bring a protracted racial war, with devastating consequences to all. This week the Government of the United States took action to bring our country into full compliance with U.N. sanctions against the illegal regime in Rhodesia. And I will sign that bill Friday in Washington.

—We will put our relations with Latin America on a more constructive footing, recognizing the global character of the region's problems. We are also working to resolve in amicable negotiations the future of the Panama Canal.

—We will continue our efforts to develop further our relationships with the People's Republic of China. We recognize our parallel strategic interests in maintaining stability in Asia, and we will act in the spirit of the Shanghai communique.<sup>3</sup>

—In Southeast Asia and in the Pacific, we will strengthen our association with our traditional friends, and we will seek to improve relations with our former adversaries. We have a mission now in Vietnam seeking peaceful resolution of the differences that have separated us for so long.

—Throughout the world, we are ready to normalize our relationships and to seek reconciliation with all states which are ready to work with us in promoting global progress and global peace.

### **Containing the Global Arms Race**

Above all, the search for peace requires a much more deliberate effort to contain the global arms race. Let me speak in this context first of the U.S.-Soviet Union relationship and then of the wider need to contain the pro-

<sup>2</sup> For text, see BULLETIN of Sept. 1, 1975, p. 323.

<sup>3</sup> For text, see BULLETIN of Mar. 20, 1972, p. 435.

liferation of arms throughout the global community.

I intend to pursue the Strategic Arms Limitation Talks (SALT) between the United States and the Soviet Union with determination and with energy.

Our Secretary of State will visit Moscow in just a few days.

SALT is extraordinarily complicated. But the basic fact is that while the negotiations remain deadlocked the arms race goes on; the security of both countries and the entire world is threatened.

My preference would be for strict controls or even a freeze on new types and new generations of weaponry and with a deep reduction in the strategic arms of both sides. Such a major step toward not only arms limitation but arms reduction would be welcomed by mankind as a giant step toward peace.

Alternatively, and perhaps much more easily, we could conclude a limited agreement based on those elements of the Vladivostok accord<sup>4</sup> on which we can find complete consensus and set aside for prompt consideration and subsequent negotiations the more contentious issues and also the deeper reductions in nuclear weapons which I favor.

We will also explore the possibility of a total cessation of nuclear testing. While our ultimate goal is for all nuclear powers to end testing, we do not regard this as a prerequisite for the suspension of tests by the two principal nuclear powers, the Soviet Union and the United States. We should, however, also pursue a broad permanent multilateral agreement on this issue.

We will also seek to establish Soviet willingness to reach agreement with us on mutual military restraint in the Indian Ocean, as well as on such matters as arms exports to the troubled areas of the world.

In proposing such accommodations I remain fully aware that American-Soviet relations will continue to be highly competitive—but I believe that our competition must be balanced by cooperation in preserving peace and thus our mutual survival. I will seek such cooperation with the Soviet Union earnestly, constantly, and sincerely.

However, the effort to contain the arms race is not a matter just for the United States and Soviet Union alone. There must be a wider effort to reduce the flow of weapons to all the troubled spots of this globe. Accordingly, we will try to reach broader agreements among producer and consumer nations to limit the export of conventional arms, and we ourselves will take the initiative on our own because the United States has become one of the major arms suppliers of the world.

We are deeply committed to halting the proliferation of nuclear weapons. And we will undertake a new effort to reach multilateral agreements designed to provide legitimate supplies of nuclear fuels for the production of energy while controlling the poisonous and dangerous atomic wastes.

Working with other nations represented here, we hope to advance the cause of peace. We will make a strong and a positive contribution at the upcoming special session on disarmament, which I understand will commence next year.

### **Molding Global Economic Prosperity**

But the search for peace also means the search for justice. One of the greatest challenges before us as a nation, and therefore one of our greatest opportunities, is to participate in molding a global economic system which will bring greater prosperity to all the people of all countries.

I come from a part of the United States which is largely agrarian and which for many years did not have the advantages of adequate transportation or capital or management skills or education—which were available in the industrial states of our country. So I can sympathize with the leaders of the developing nations, and I want them to know that we will do our part.

To this end, the United States will be advancing proposals aimed at meeting the basic human needs of the developing world and helping them to increase their productive capacity. I have asked Congress to provide \$7½ billion of foreign assistance in the coming year, and I will work to insure sustained American assistance as the process of global economic development continues. I am also

<sup>4</sup> For text, see BULLETIN of Dec. 23, 1974, p. 879.

urging the Congress of our country to increase our contributions to the United Nations Development Program and meet in full our pledges to multilateral lending institutions, especially the International Development Association of the World Bank.

We remain committed to an open international trading system, one which does not ignore domestic concerns in the United States. We have extended duty-free treatment to many products from the developing countries. In the multilateral trade agreements [negotiations] in Geneva we have offered substantial trade concessions on the goods of primary interest to developing countries. And in accordance with the Tokyo Declaration,<sup>5</sup> we are also examining ways to provide additional consideration for the special needs of developing countries.

The United States is willing to consider with a positive and open attitude the negotiation on agreements to stabilize commodity prices, including the establishment of a common funding arrangement for financing buffer stocks where they are a part of individual negotiated agreements.

I also believe that the developing countries must acquire fuller participation in the global economic decisionmaking process. Some progress has been already made in this regard by expanding participation of developing countries in the International Monetary Fund.

We must use our collective natural resources wisely and constructively. We have not always done so. Today our oceans are being plundered and defiled. With a renewed spirit of cooperation and hope we join in the conference of the law of the sea in order to correct past mistakes of generations gone by and to insure that all nations can share the bounties of the eternal oceans in the future.

We must also recognize that the world is facing serious shortages of energy. This is truly a global problem. For our part, we are determined to reduce waste and to work with others toward a fair and proper sharing of the benefits and costs of energy resources.

## Respect for Basic Human Rights

The search for peace and justice also means respect for human dignity. All the signatories of the United Nations Charter have pledged themselves to observe and to respect basic human rights. Thus, no member of the United Nations can claim that mistreatment of its citizens is solely its own business. Equally, no member can avoid its responsibilities to review and to speak when torture or unwarranted deprivation occurs in any part of the world.

The basic thrust of human affairs points toward a more universal demand for fundamental human rights. The United States has a historical birthright to be associated with this process.

We in the United States accept this responsibility in the fullest and the most constructive sense. Ours is a commitment, and not just a political posture. I know perhaps as well as anyone that our own ideals in the area of human rights have not always been attained in the United States. But the American people have an abiding commitment to the full realization of these ideals. And we are determined, therefore, to deal with our deficiencies quickly and openly. We have nothing to conceal.

To demonstrate this commitment, I will seek congressional approval and sign the U.N. covenants on economic, social, and cultural rights and the covenants on civil and political rights. And I will work closely with our own Congress in seeking to support the ratification not only of these two instruments but the United Nations Genocide Convention and the Treaty for the Elimination of All Forms of Racial Discrimination as well. I have just removed all restrictions on American travel abroad, and we are moving now to liberalize almost completely travel opportunities to America.

The United Nations is a global forum dedicated to the peace and well-being of every individual—no matter how weak, no matter how poor. But we have allowed its human rights machinery to be ignored and sometimes politicized. There is much that can be done to strengthen it.

<sup>5</sup> For text, see BULLETIN of Oct. 8, 1973, p. 450.

The Human Rights Commission should be prepared to meet more often. And all nations should be prepared to offer its fullest cooperation to the Human Rights Commission, to welcome its investigations, to work with its officials, and to act on its reports.

I would like to see the entire United Nations Human Rights Division moved back here to the central headquarters, where its activities will be in the forefront of our attention and where the attention of the press corps can stimulate us to deal honestly with this sensitive issue. The proposal made 12 years ago by the Government of Costa Rica—to establish a U.N. High Commission[er] for Human Rights—also deserves our renewed attention and our support.

Strengthened international machinery will help us to close the gap between promise and performance in protecting human rights. When gross or widespread violation takes place—contrary to international commitments—it is of concern to all. The solemn commitments of the United Nations Charter, of the United Nations Universal Declaration for Human Rights, of the Helsinki accords, and of many other international instruments must be taken just as seriously as commercial or security agreements.

This issue is important in itself. It should not block progress on other important matters affecting the security and well-being of our people and of world peace. It is obvious that the reduction of tension, the control of nuclear arms, the achievement of harmony in the troubled areas of the world, and the provision of food, good health, and education will independently contribute to advancing the human condition.

In our relationships with other countries, these mutual concerns will be reflected in our political, our cultural, and our economic attitudes.

These, then, are our basic priorities as we work with other members to strengthen and to improve the United Nations:

—First, we will strive for peace in the troubled areas of the world;

—Second, we will aggressively seek to control the weaponry of war;

—Third, we will promote a new system of international economic progress and cooperation; and

—Fourth, we will be steadfast in our dedication to the dignity and well-being of people throughout the world.

I believe that this is a foreign policy that is consistent with my own nation's historic values and commitments. And I believe that it is a foreign policy that is consonant with the ideals of the United Nations.

## **President Signs Bill Restoring Embargo on Rhodesian Chrome**

*Following is a statement by President Carter issued on March 18.<sup>1</sup>*

Weekly Compilation of Presidential Documents dated March 21

I have today signed H.R. 1746 [Public Law 95-12], which restores executive authority to enforce sanctions against Rhodesian chrome.

This measure is a central element in our African policy. Members of my Administration have supported it with one voice. With it, we are bringing the United States back in line with the decisions of the Security Council and with our obligations under the United Nations Charter.

H.R. 1746 effectively reinstates an embargo against the importation of Rhodesian chrome and other minerals, as well as any steelmill product containing Rhodesian chromium. As a matter of equity, however, I am issuing an Executive order [No. 11978] which authorizes the Secretary of the Treasury to exempt shipments now in transit to the United States.

Our country is committed to the concept of rapid transition to majority rule in Rhodesia under nonviolent conditions. I view this measure today as an appropriate and positive step toward that goal. We have consistently stated our belief that a peaceful solution in

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<sup>1</sup> For President Carter's remarks at the signing ceremony, see Weekly Compilation of Presidential Documents dated Mar. 21, 1977, p. 402.

Rhodesia depends upon negotiations that involve a full spectrum of opinion among its leaders, both black and white. With the enactment of this measure, there can be no mistake about our support for that principle.

I hope that the present Rhodesian authorities, as well as the black African nationalist leaders, will accurately assess the vote of the Congress and this Administration's stand on Rhodesia. The solution rests in their hands, not ours. Further delay in negotiations will invite more violence and increase the prospect of outside intervention—an outcome which every person of good will wishes to avoid.

With the cooperation of the Congress, we have taken a step of great importance in our southern African policy. I want to thank the leadership of both Houses for their initiative in bringing about this encouraging development.

## **President Carter's Remarks at Clinton, Mass., Town Meeting**

*Following are excerpts from President Carter's opening remarks and a question-and-answer session at the Clinton, Mass., Town Hall on March 16.<sup>1</sup>*

In the field of foreign affairs—and this is the last thing I want to talk about—I've done a lot of studying. I trust the American people. I've been criticized by some in the news media in the last eight weeks about telling the American people too much.

I've removed the restrictions on American travel overseas. I believe that an American citizen ought to be able to go wherever that person wants to go without the government telling him.

We're going to try to open up our borders for a change so visitors can come to our country. They may not be popular people, but I

<sup>1</sup> For the complete transcript, see Weekly Compilation of Presidential Documents dated Mar. 21, 1977, p. 358.

think our system of government is strong enough to have someone come into our nation and make a speech at Yale, or Harvard or here in your own town, with whom you may not agree.

I want to see our country set a standard of morality. I feel very deeply that when people are put in prison without trials, and tortured and deprived of basic human rights, that the President of the United States ought to have a right to express displeasure and to do something about it. I want our country to be the focal point for deep concern about human beings all over the world.

I am trying to search with the Soviet Union for a way to reduce the horrible arms race, where we've spent billions and billions and billions of dollars on atomic weapons. We are no more secure now than we were 8 years ago or 12 years ago or 16 years ago. We're much more deeply threatened by more and more advanced weapons. So, we are dealing with the Soviet Union, quietly and diplomatically, and I hope effectively, to search out a way to reduce dependence on weapons without damaging at all our nation's own security.

We have problem areas around the world, as you know, in the Middle East, in southern Africa, in the Horn of Africa, in the eastern Mediterranean around Cyprus. We're not trying to impose our will on other people. But when we can add our good offices and the strength of our country to bring potential warring nations together, we'll do this.

And I think the American people have enough intelligence and enough judgment to be told what's going on. In the past we've had too much of top government officials going off in a closed, locked room and evolving a foreign policy for our country and negotiating in secret and then letting the American people know about it when it's all over. I want you to know about it ahead of time, and you can depend on that when I tell you.

*Q. My name is Reverend Richard Harding, and, President Carter, it's a pleasure to welcome you to the number-one everytown, USA—Clinton, Massachusetts.*

*I would like to ask you, Mr. President—it*

seems that world peace hinges greatly on the Middle East.

*The President:* Yes.

*Q. What do you personally feel must be done to establish a meaningful and a lasting peace in that area of the world? Thank you.*

*The President:* I think all of you know that there has been either war or potential war in the Middle East for the last 29 years, ever since Israel became a nation. I think one of the finest acts of the world nations that's ever occurred was to establish the State of Israel.

So the first prerequisite of a lasting peace is the recognition of Israel by her neighbors, Israel's right to exist, Israel's right to exist permanently, Israel's right to exist in peace. That means that over a period of months or years that the borders between Israel and Syria, Israel and Lebanon, Israel and Jordan, Israel and Egypt must be opened up to travel, to tourism, to cultural exchange, to trade, so that no matter who the leaders might be in those countries, the people themselves will have formed a mutual understanding and comprehension and a sense of a common purpose to avoid the repetitious wars and death that have afflicted that region so long. That's the first prerequisite of peace.

The second one is very important and very, very difficult; and that is the establishment of permanent borders for Israel. The Arab countries say that Israel must withdraw to the pre-1967 borderlines. Israel says that they must adjust those lines to some degree to insure their own security. That is a matter to be negotiated between the Arab countries on the one side and Israel on the other. But borders are still a matter of great trouble and a matter of great difficulty, and there are strong differences of opinion now.

And the third ultimate requirement for peace is to deal with the Palestinian problem. The Palestinians claim up till this moment that Israel has no right to be there, that the land belongs to the Palestinians, and they've never yet given up their publicly professed commitment to destroy Israel. That has to be overcome.

There has to be a homeland provided for the

Palestinian refugees who have suffered for many, many years. And the exact way to solve the Palestinian problem is one that first of all addresses itself right now to the Arab countries and then, secondly, to the Arab countries negotiating with Israel.

Those three major elements have got to be solved before a Middle Eastern solution can be prescribed.

I want to emphasize one more time, we offer our good offices. I think it's accurate to say that of all the nations in the world, we are the one that's most trusted, not completely, but most trusted by the Arab countries and also Israel. I guess both sides have some doubt about us. But we'll have to act kind of as a catalyst to bring about their ability to negotiate successfully with one another.

We hope that later on this year, in the latter part of this year, that we might get all of these parties to agree to come together at Geneva, to start talking to one another. They haven't done that yet. And I believe if we can get them to sit down and start talking and negotiating that we have an excellent chance to achieve peace. I can't guarantee that. It's a hope.

I hope that we will all pray that that will come to pass, because what happens in the Middle East in the future might very well cause a major war there which would quickly spread to all the other nations of the world; very possibly it could do that.

Many countries depend completely on oil from the Middle East for their life. We don't. If all oil was cut off to us from the Middle East, we could survive; but Japan imports more than 98 percent of all its energy, and other countries, like in Europe—Germany, Italy, France—are also heavily dependent on oil from the Middle East.

So, this is such a crucial area of the world that I will be devoting a major part of my own time on foreign policy between now and next fall trying to provide for a forum within which they can discuss their problems and, hopefully, let them seek out among themselves some permanent solution.

Just maybe as briefly as I could, that's the best answer I can give you to that question.

## Secretary Vance Emphasizes Importance of Foreign Assistance Programs

*Statement by Secretary Vance<sup>1</sup>*

This is the fourth time in the short period since this Administration took office that I have come before committees of the Congress to describe and support our foreign assistance requests. That is a measure of the importance we give to these programs in the larger scheme of our foreign policy.

In their diversity, our foreign assistance efforts meet a variety of American foreign policy objectives. But a unity and common purpose binds them together. The components of the program amount to a humanitarian investment in the social, economic, and technological development of poor countries. The result will be an expanding world economy with benefits for people of all countries, our own included.

It should be clear to us all that the way American workers and consumers live, our standards of living, depends in large part on supplies of food, energy, and raw materials from the developing world—from countries we are helping to move ahead on their own courses of economic development. Furthermore, the expansion of our own economy is linked to the growth of demand abroad. Foreign buyers take some 40 percent of our grains; they take an eighth of everything we produce. The developing countries are in-

creasingly vital markets for our industries and firms. Over a third of our trade is with these countries; that amounts to more than our trade with the European Community. Our raw materials come more and more from foreign sources, especially from those developing countries we are now encouraging.

We are investing in the cause of peace, as well, when our aid becomes part of an effort to resolve old, and potential, regional disputes. Our selective military and related security assistance programs can enable our friends and allies to expend less of their national energies on insuring their own security and to concentrate instead on their own economic and social development.

We are investing through all aspects of our programs—bilateral assistance, multilateral assistance, security assistance—in a world that offers hope of decent lives and worthy goals to people whose common lot is privation and hunger. The danger of failing to address the legitimate aspirations of the developing world would be frustration in the poorer countries that could take violent forms. Terrorism and confrontational economic demands are symptoms of such malaise.

Support for economic development has become particularly necessary in the face of escalating energy costs and the effects of world recession. In 1974 the effect of quadrupled energy prices more than offset all assistance the developing countries received; and in 1975 their exports fell by almost \$5 billion, the biggest drop in the postwar period.

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<sup>1</sup> Made before the Subcommittee on Foreign Assistance of the Senate Committee on Foreign Relations on Mar. 23 (text from press release 127). The complete transcript of the hearings will be published by the committee and will be available from the Superintendent of Documents, U.S. Government Printing Office, Washington, D.C. 20402.



At the same time, what is called the North-South dialogue offers unprecedented opportunities for cooperation between the rich and poor regions of the world. Dedication of our joint efforts now to an effective economic development strategy is essential to its progress. We must keep in mind the importance of the political as well as economic stakes in achieving this progress. This is obvious in terms of our bilateral relations. Additionally, the developing nations are more likely to cooperate with us in addressing such longer term, global issues as halting the spread of nuclear weapons or protecting the environment if they are confident of our cooperation in addressing their economic difficulties.

This may be a pivotal year. Particularly great opportunities bring with them greater demands on both our resources and the wisdom of our diplomacy.

The International Development Association now faces its fifth capital replenishment—a call to both the industrialized countries and the newly rich oil producers to address jointly the problems faced by the poorest countries. This is also the initial year of a multilateral long-term program to help develop the Sahelian region of Africa, which has been devastated by drought but which now shows promise of recovery.

Private banks have helped the developing countries bridge their financial gaps during recent economic hard times, but at higher cost than most of these countries can sustain. A substantial increase in governmental and multilateral financing is necessary to sustain their development efforts and their access to private credit.

As this committee was early to see, the best way to judge our assistance efforts is by their effectiveness in meeting basic human needs. You were instrumental in charting “new directions” in bilateral foreign assistance. The Carter Administration concurs with them wholeheartedly. “New directions” call for greater emphasis on delivering aid directly to the poor people of the world. Similarly, we are called upon to concern ourselves with the status of human rights in the countries we aid.

We seek to meet both of these goals, fully mindful of the problems of implementation. How, for instance, are we to proceed in a case where our commitment to development and economic human rights may come into conflict with our commitment to principles of individual justice? No pat formula can resolve such a dilemma. We believe we can best deal with these questions on a case-by-case, country-by-country basis, always applying the same set of general criteria.

We hope that our example may influence other donors to multilateral aid organizations to adopt the pragmatic principles of “new directions.” Meanwhile, we can and will strive for the most effective day-to-day administration of our assistance programs. We will judge our programs by their results, and not just in terms of this year’s or next year’s funding levels.

To do our part in responding to the needs of the world’s poor and to meet new opportunities for development, we propose for fiscal year 1978 a total foreign assistance package of \$7,271,000,000, an increase of \$1,670,000,000 over 1977.

The bulk of that increase—a billion dollars, in fact—results from a procedural change. At the request of the Congress, we are in fiscal year 1978 seeking appropriations for the callable capital of the international financial institutions, which in the immediate past was authorized but not appropriated. But as you know, none of the callable capital has ever been called, and the appropriations will probably never be spent. The remaining \$670 million represents:

—First, restoration of reductions made by the previous Administration in its request for security supporting assistance for the Middle East;

—Second, substantial increases in our contributions to multilateral institutions; and

—Third, moderate increases in our bilateral development assistance program.

I submit a table for the record which outlines our budget request.<sup>2</sup> We will be happy to provide more detail later if you wish. Now

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<sup>2</sup>For table, see BULLETIN of Mar. 14, 1977, p. 238.

let me explain how the pieces of our aid proposals fit together and why we believe each of them is important.

### *Bilateral Development Assistance*

While proposed increases in our bilateral development assistance programs are not so large as those for multilateral institutions, we believe that our bilateral programs are no less important an element in our general aid strategy.

These bilateral programs are designed to address the basic human problems of food and agriculture, population and health, and education and human resources development in the world's poor countries. These programs are the most direct way to put American skills and resources to work improving the human condition around the world and spurring economic development. In concert with the recipient countries, we are seeking to promote growth with equity, and sound development policies. This is the core of the "new directions" approach. This effort is complemented by our bilateral food aid programs, which also are aimed primarily at poor countries.

### *Multilateral Assistance*

Our multilateral assistance programs through the international financial institutions complement the bilateral programs and serve the same broad purpose: to promote economic and social progress in the developing world.

These institutions are mechanisms for sharing the aid burden. Donors contribute according to their ability to provide aid; the share of the United States has actually declined over the years. For instance, our share of the initial subscription in the International Development Association was almost 42 percent. In the proposed fifth replenishment, it will be less than 32 percent. Thus, other nations are providing a steadily increasing share of the capital requirements of these banks.

These institutions also reinforce the concept of mutual responsibilities on the part of both developed and developing countries. When developing countries borrow from the international financial institutions, they are expected to adopt sound economic policies, to provide significant amounts of their own resources

toward the common goal, and to accept the discipline imposed by obligations to repay their loans.

The financial structure of these institutions serves the purpose of development well. They borrow funds in capital markets to finance their "hard" lending operations at commercial rates. This capital is an important source of growth for middle-income developing countries that can service debt on commercial terms. These countries receive little U.S. capital assistance. The capital funds borrowed far exceed the capital contributed by donor members and are secured by pledges of callable capital. This year, as stated, we are for the first time seeking appropriations for this callable capital; these appropriations are unlikely to result in any budget outlays. For their soft-loan operations to the poorest countries unable to borrow at commercial rates, these institutions rely on donor contributions.

Our leadership and influence in these institutions come as a result of our sizable contributions and the system of weighted voting linked to those contributions. Although our measure of control over the policies of the international financial institutions is less than over our own bilateral programs, this diminution of control is more than offset by the burden-sharing advantages that come with the participation of other major donors in these multilateral programs.

We will remain vigilant in encouraging these institutions to maintain their own financial soundness and to invest their resources well.

We also want to expand our support of the United Nations Development Program and of the assistance given by the U.N. specialized agencies.

### *Security Supporting Assistance*

Our security supporting assistance is a vitally important part of our diplomatic efforts to achieve a just and lasting peace in the Middle East and to provide the means to support a peaceful settlement in southern Africa.

Our security supporting assistance request for Africa of \$135 million includes these elements:

—\$100 million for a U.S. contribution to *an*

*international Zimbabwe Development Fund* to promote Zimbabwe's peaceful transition to majority rule. The Fund's purposes would be rapid restructuring of the economy and of government services to provide more training, education, and economic opportunities for blacks and the maintenance of confidence among skilled whites to encourage them not to abandon their jobs and homes. Our goal is to prevent a collapse of the Zimbabwe economy.

As part of our planning, we have consulted extensively with the British. We have solicited the views and support of 18 other potential donors. Initial responses have been encouraging.

Congressional support for this multilateral effort to promote economic development benefiting all segments of the Zimbabwe population could be a crucial factor in encouraging a negotiated political settlement. Its presence in this budget would be helpful in persuading other donors to contribute. We would of course consult closely with you as the outlines of the programs to be supported by this fund take shape, prior to any commitment of specific amounts.

—We also seek \$35 million for *current development programs in Botswana, Lesotho, Swaziland, and Zaire*. These countries figure significantly in the political evolution underway in southern Africa. For this reason, these programs have been included under security supporting assistance.

The United States has played a major role in efforts to achieve a peaceful transition to majority rule in southern Africa. It is critically important that this effort be reinforced by economic actions to promote political and economic stability and to demonstrate that the United States can be counted upon to cooperate in a constructive manner. This aid program therefore is directly linked to our broader foreign policy objectives.

### *Military Assistance*

Our military security assistance programs enable friendly and allied countries to meet their basic security requirements, and thus add to our own security as well. We consider the funds we are requesting essential to reassure our friends and allies of our re-

liability and consistency in their support.

In his address to the United Nations on March 17, President Carter spoke of the need for "a wider effort to reduce the flow of weapons to all the troubled spots of the globe." He promised American initiatives to limit the exports of conventional arms. The Administration has in fact embarked upon a thorough reexamination of our arms transfer policies.

We have already begun to make important changes in both our security assistance programs and our sales activities:

—In support of the President's initiative, we have indicated to other supplier nations our intention to exercise restraint in exports and our hope that they will do so as well. We have also made clear to prospective buyers our hope that they will exercise their own restraint in turn.

—We are taking steps to require arms manufacturers to seek State Department approval before they approach foreign governments about prospective sales. It is not our intention to restrict legitimate business activity. But we do have a responsibility to insure that the sales promotion activities of private American firms in the sensitive area of arms and instruments of war do not conflict with our national security interests and foreign policy objectives.

—Finally, we will provide the Congress with a statement justifying every foreign military sales proposal. These justifications will provide you with the basis for the Administration's decision to approve the sale. We are now completing our review of pending sales cases.

It may well be that the review of arms transfer policies which we are conducting and our consultations with you will reveal the need for changes in existing legislation. In the meantime, I believe it would be imprudent to try to change parts of our evolving military assistance effort and thus to threaten disruptive changes which could put heavy and unexpected burdens on our friends and allies.

I have welcomed this opportunity to present our foreign assistance programs. We believe they are coherent in concept and represent a justifiable level of effort.

## President Carter Outlines Goals of Foreign Assistance Program

*Message to the Congress*<sup>1</sup>

*To the Congress of the United States:*

In the years since World War II, the United States has encouraged economic development throughout the world through a variety of economic assistance programs.

Most of our efforts have succeeded. Some have failed. Now we have the opportunity, as with many of our domestic programs, to learn from our experience, and to improve our policies in the future.

Members of my Administration are now testifying in support of our approach to foreign assistance. I am sending you this message to explain some of the principles behind our program—especially to outline the lessons we have learned about foreign assistance and the goals we now hope to achieve.

The future of the United States will be affected by the ability of developing nations to overcome poverty, achieve healthy growth and provide more secure lives for their people. We wish to join with other nations in combining our efforts, knowledge, and resources to help poorer countries overcome the problems of hunger, disease, and illiteracy. We are seeking important improvements in our program, some of which reflect changes in emphasis and approach:

—We will ensure that lending agencies attach adequate self-help conditions to their loans so that borrowing nations will make effective use of the funds they receive.

—We will make certain that the Congress is able to exercise its legitimate responsibility to monitor the effectiveness of our aid programs.

—We will encourage other wealthy nations to contribute a greater share to the multilateral aid effort, and we will reduce our own share where it has been too high.

—In close cooperation with the Congress

we have made sure that our concessional aid goes to those who need it most; we will continue this approach.

—We are now reforming the policies which have, on occasion, awarded liberal grants and loans to repressive regimes which violate human rights.

—We will root out mismanagement and inefficiency where they exist in our foreign assistance programs in order to guarantee that benefits will always be delivered to those for whom the programs were designed.

—We recognize that salaries and living styles of some employees have been too lavish, and we will insist that the international programs we support do more to control their administrative overhead.

—I will work closely with the Congress to see that our aid efforts are more closely correlated to international economic and political circumstances and talk frankly to American citizens about the economic, political, and security benefits we receive from our foreign assistance programs.

Close cooperation and support from the Congress is essential to the effectiveness of our efforts. In a few areas the program I have submitted requires a significant increase in funding—but I have asked for this only where I am sure that the increase will be worthwhile.

To achieve our goals of helping the people of the world toward economic self-sufficiency, relieving the victims of disasters, investing in a healthy world economy, and supporting the security of friendly nations, I ask your favorable consideration for the following:

—*Multilateral Development Assistance.* International financial institutions such as the World Bank group—in particular the International Development Association—and the Inter-American and Asian Development Banks are major sources of assistance loans to the world's poor nations. These institutions have been highly professional in their work. They help remove political considerations from development efforts, and they encourage developing countries to pursue sound domestic policies. They enable many

<sup>1</sup>Transmitted on Mar. 17 (text from White House press release dated Mar. 18).

donors to pool their efforts—including some of the oil-exporting nations. An initial, modest U.S. contribution to the African Development Bank will provide our encouragement to this promising regional effort.

We are asking \$540 million in supplemental appropriations for fiscal year 1977 to fulfill past pledges to the international financial institutions, and \$2.7 billion in new appropriations for fiscal year 1978. This is an increase (of approximately one-third) for an effort which has proved to be very effective. The largest single expenditure is for U.S. participation in the 5th replenishment of the International Development Association, which makes loans on favorable terms to the world's poorest nations.

The United Nations Development Program, which provides important technical assistance to the developing world, has also proven its effectiveness and worth. We are seeking an appropriation of \$130 million for fiscal year 1978, a 30% increase over last year.

—*Bilateral Development Assistance.* Congress has played a major role in developing our bilateral programs, which provide direct American support for development programs in the poorer countries. Through these programs we have shared our expertise and our resources with other countries. Our bilateral programs are directed at the poorest people in these countries' populations; they emphasize food and nutrition, population and health, education and human resource development, and science and technology, including energy development.

We have certain expectations of the countries which we help. We have no intention of running their governments or their economies, but we expect them to mobilize their own resources in the effort to develop, to ensure that the poor share in the benefits, and to respect basic human rights.

I am asking the Congress to provide \$1.3 billion for the bilateral development assistance program for fiscal year 1978. This is a 20% increase over the amount provided for fiscal year 1977, which I believe is clearly worthwhile.

Last year, the Congress, on its own initia-

tive, appropriated \$5 million to help develop a comprehensive long-term recovery plan for the Sahel region, which had undergone a disastrous drought. As the first major U.S. contribution to this program, I am requesting \$50 million for fiscal year 1978. We will cooperate with other interested nations in making further contributions to the Sahel development effort in the future.

—*The PL-480 Program.* The enormous vitality of U.S. agricultural production permits us to share a portion of our bounty in the form of food aid. Our PL-480 programs should not only help the poorer countries improve the quantity and quality of their nutrition, but also encourage self-help programs that will improve their capacity to feed their people in the future. And these programs let us offer relief from famine and privation in the wake of natural and man-made disasters. In fiscal year 1978, our food aid programs will distribute \$1.4 billion in agricultural commodities.

—*Security Assistance Program.* Only where peace and security are assured can free nations devote their full energies to development. Our security assistance programs are keyed to these goals, and to advancing the security interests of the United States in cooperation with our friends and allies. Nearly two-thirds of the funds requested for security assistance will be for economic supporting programs. I have increased the amounts proposed by the previous Administration for the Middle East; this will strengthen the economic underpinnings so essential to achievement of our goal of peace and stability in this vital region.

For FY-1978 the major elements of my program on security assistance are:

- Grant military aid—\$284.6 million to eight countries, in most of which we also have U.S. military facilities essential to our global interests. This includes \$224 million in programs plus \$60.6 million in general and administrative costs, most of which will be reimbursed from other sources.

- Grant military education—\$35.7 million to train future military leaders.

- Financing for foreign military

sales—\$708 million, which will finance \$2.2 billion in loans to help foreign governments eventually to meet their essential security needs by themselves, instead of depending on U.S. handouts.

• Security supporting assistance—\$1.9 billion to finance programs for countries whose economic condition is a factor in our efforts to assure international security. The two areas where most of these funds will be used—Middle East, and depending on events, Southern Africa—testify to the significance of these programs.

These proposals are fully consistent with my wish to limit budget increases to essentials. My assistance program is part of an effort to combine support of our country's economic interests and security with compassion for the impoverished millions of fellow human beings who share the world with us.

I hope that the economic assistance program now before you will receive your careful, prompt, and sympathetic attention. It represents a vital step toward partnership in a peaceful and equitable world order.

JIMMY CARTER.

THE WHITE HOUSE, *March 17, 1977.*

## **U.S. Assistance Programs in Southeast Asia**

*Following is a statement by Robert B. Oakley, Deputy Assistant Secretary for East Asian and Pacific Affairs, before the Subcommittee on Asian and Pacific Affairs of the House Committee on International Relations on March 17.<sup>1</sup>*

I am pleased to have this opportunity to testify on the Administration's economic and security assistance programs in East Asia for fiscal year 1978. Since Mr. Holbrooke discussed last week our general position on assistance to East Asia, I would like today to pay special attention to Southeast Asia—the

area to which most of our assistance is directed.<sup>2</sup>

While the non-Communist nations of Southeast Asia have in recent years become increasingly prosperous and independent, these countries face continuing problems of development and major uncertainties concerning their relationships with the Communist governments in Indochina. Still fearful of the regional intentions of Vietnam, Laos, and Cambodia, they see a continuation of U.S. developmental, humanitarian, and military assistance as essential if they are to adapt to the new situation in Southeast Asia—to the demands of greater self-reliance.

Our bilateral economic assistance goes to three nations in Southeast Asia: Indonesia, the Philippines, and Thailand, while our security assistance covers these three as well as Malaysia. Since Mr. Holbrooke discussed the Philippines in his prepared statement, I will comment only on Indonesia and Thailand.

For Indonesia in fiscal year 1978, we are proposing \$57.2 million in economic assistance and \$90.7 million in Public Law 480 programs, in addition to security assistance of \$15 million in grant materiel, \$3.1 million in training, and \$40 million in FMS [foreign military sales] financing.

Indonesia's position as an important oil exporter should not obscure the fact that she remains one of the very poorest countries in the world. Her needs in critical fields such as developmental capital, technical assistance, and manpower training are vast and, according to the World Bank, can be met only with substantial external aid.

The present government, which took power in 1966 following an attempted seizure of power by Communists, is led by the military but includes many civilians, particularly American-trained economists. Prior to the Communist victories in Indochina, it held

<sup>1</sup> The complete transcript of the hearings will be published by the committee and will be available from the Superintendent of Documents, U.S. Government Printing Office, Washington, D.C. 20402.

<sup>2</sup> For a statement before the subcommittee on Mar. 10 by Richard C. Holbrooke, then Assistant Secretary-designate for East Asian and Pacific Affairs, see BULLETIN of Apr. 4, 1977, p. 322.

military spending to a minimum in order to devote its maximum resources to economic development. But recently it has felt a need to pay somewhat more attention to improving its own security, particularly its mobility and surveillance capabilities. This need is reflected in our proposed increase in FMS financing from \$23.1 million in fiscal year 1977 to \$40 million in fiscal year 1978 and the exceptional request to continue grant assistance for this next year.

We feel it is in the U.S. interest to continue assistance to Indonesia, not only because it is a strategically located country which has maintained close and friendly ties with the United States during the last decade, but also because our economic assistance programs there directly benefit some of the poorest people in the world. The requested Indonesian assistance program is, in our view, appropriate.

For Thailand, we are proposing an economic assistance program for fiscal year 1978 of \$4,405,000 and military assistance of \$8 million in grant materiel, \$1 million in training, and \$29.5 million in credit sales.

Thailand is obviously the nation most directly concerned by developments in Indochina, and its stability and independence are important to the maintenance and strengthening of peace in the region. The Thai face real security problems along the borders with their Communist neighbors as well as an active, externally supported insurgency. However, in view of the increasing ability of Thailand to provide for its security and its economic progress, we have been steadily reducing economic assistance and phasing out grant security aid. The fiscal year 1978 requests are well below those of the fiscal year 1977 program and are in line with this trend. We feel the requested fiscal year 1978 levels are an appropriate U.S. contribution to regional stability, as well as to the Thai Government's own effort in specific key fields.

In Southeast Asia, the human rights situation varies from country to country. Mr. Holbrooke's prepared statement last week described our concerns in the Philippines.

In Indonesia, the human rights problem is a

legacy of the attempt by Communists to seize power in 1965. At present, about 30,000 individuals are still detained. The Government of Indonesia fears that mass release of these people will rekindle subversion and public disorders. In this connection, it is worth recalling that in 1965 the Indonesian Communist Party (PKI) was the world's largest Communist party outside of the U.S.S.R. and China and that it has made three attempts to seize power by violence. This background contributes to Indonesian Government worries about the possible future intentions of the PKI's cadres.

While the U.S. Government understands the background, this does not diminish our strong concern over the abuse of human rights and individual liberties. Our views have been made known to the Indonesian Government. In December 1976 the Government of Indonesia released 2,500 prisoners and announced a three-year phased release of the remainder. We believe our efforts have been helpful and intend to continue them. We also believe that continued U.S. security and economic assistance at the requested levels enhances stability and furthers economic progress, thereby creating a more favorable climate for the observance of human rights.

Concerning recent press reports on civilian casualties in East Timor, our information on the situation is limited, but we believe the casualty figures cited by the press are greatly exaggerated. These figures apparently relate to the casualties which occurred in late 1975 and early 1976 and are not substantiated by any reliable observers of whom we have knowledge.

In Thailand we understand that all but 143 of the several thousand persons who were arrested following the violence that immediately preceded the October 6 coup d'etat have been or will be soon released. Under the provisions of martial law some 2,000 other people remain in detention. The vast majority fall into categories of common criminals. No members of the previous democratically elected government have been arrested or detained.

Although this hearing primarily concerns our economic and security programs in coun-

tries that have been and continue to be close friends of the United States, we are at the same time attempting to normalize relations with our former adversaries in Vietnam. The Presidential Commission is in Hanoi at this moment, trying to achieve a satisfactory accounting of our MIA's in Southeast Asia so that we can move toward the normalization of relations. The Commission will also visit Laos to discuss the MIA issue. We hope for an eventual easing of tension and promotion of stability for the entire region, making it possible for all nations to devote more of their own resources and of the assistance they receive from abroad to the economic well-being of their peoples and to relax the restraints which today are in varying degree imposed upon individual liberties throughout the region.

## Department Discusses South Asia and U.S. Assistance Programs

*Following is a statement by Adolph Dubs, Deputy Assistant Secretary for Near Eastern and South Asian Affairs, before the Subcommittee on Asian and Pacific Affairs of the House Committee on International Relations on March 22.*<sup>1</sup>

I am pleased to testify today in support of AID's [Agency for International Development] proposed fiscal year 1978 development assistance programs in Bangladesh, Nepal, Pakistan, and Sri Lanka and the Public Law 480 commodity sales to those four countries and India. Since Mr. Adler [Michael H. B. Adler, Acting Assistant Administrator for Asia, AID] is concentrating on the details and specifics of our economic assistance proposals, I would like to present a brief overview of recent political and economic developments in the region and how these

developments relate to U.S. policies, goals, and concerns.

Mr. Chairman, the programs we are considering today will affect countries with a combined population of over 800 million people, more than one-fifth of the inhabitants of the world. Most of the people in these countries are, by any standard, among the poorest individuals we are attempting to assist anywhere.

South Asia is marked by its diversity. The vast majority of its inhabitants belong to three great religions: Hinduism, Buddhism, and Islam. The political systems are not uniform in structure. The area's economies range from subsistence farming to high-technology industries. Despite this diversity, the nations of South Asia share many things. In particular, they share common acute and pressing problems: They all confront the problems associated with rising populations, declining land-man ratios, low industrialization, rapid urbanization, and severe problems in the fields of education and health.

Two successive good crop years, and the absence of manmade or natural disasters, have reduced temporarily the acuteness of the basic challenges facing South Asia. Nevertheless, the overall system remains exceedingly fragile. The economies of all the states are heavily influenced by the vagaries of weather, and the region repeatedly has been confronted by cyclical food shortages which have threatened the lives of millions.

Our goal is providing development assistance and food aid to help South Asia address these challenges. We recognize the limits of our ability to influence developments, particularly in view of the massive difficulties faced, but we feel that we have an obligation to assist these countries in their developmental efforts. Certainly, despite its many problems the area has the potential to develop, to become self-sufficient in food production, and to satisfy the basic needs of its peoples.

During the past year, South Asian states generally have improved their bilateral relations. Efforts to do so have required political courage and foresight and have demonstrated a degree of flexibility on the part of the re-

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<sup>1</sup> The complete transcript of the hearings will be published by the committee and will be available from the Superintendent of Documents, U.S. Government Printing Office, Washington, D.C. 20402.



gion's leaders. We welcome these efforts. South Asian nations, for the first time since 1962, all enjoy full and normal diplomatic relations. And outside the immediate region, India has made progress toward normalizing its relations with the People's Republic of China, while Pakistan has done the same with Afghanistan. If the regional tensions which have characterized relations among South Asian countries continue to decrease, we hope that these countries will shift increasing resources to developmental purposes.

India and Pakistan have made important strides in implementing the process of normalization under the Simla agreement, while India and Bangladesh have met on several occasions to discuss their dispute over the division of the Ganges' waters. Political problems continue to exist, but these are being addressed by the nations of the region directly, without outside intervention. This in itself is a most welcome development.

The United States, Mr. Chairman, has only a limited ability to influence this process of regional accommodation, but we encourage it and have supported it where possible. Direct U.S. security interests in South Asia are limited. We have no military bases on the subcontinent, and we seek no bases. We have been following a policy of restraint on the sale of military equipment. We believe that this policy has served our interests well. Aside from modest military training programs, we offer no grant military aid in South Asia.

This is not to say that our political interests in the region are insignificant, but compared with other areas of the world, our direct involvement is modest and our interests can best be served by encouraging the evolution of a stable regional system, free of outside domination, in which the individual countries are able to devote increasing resources to their own development.

Additionally, our political interest is enhanced by the fact that South Asia has become increasingly important in international forums, where many of the more basic economic issues confronting the world are being addressed. The regional states participate actively in the Group of 77, the

Nonaligned Conference, the Conference on International Economic Cooperation, the North-South dialogue, and in many other international forums. Within these groupings, South Asia counts for a great deal: India has long been an important spokesman for the Third World; Pakistan has been in the forefront on international economic issues; and Sri Lanka currently chairs the nonaligned group of nations. On the whole, South Asia has adopted a constructive and noncontroversial approach, seeking to promote a genuine dialogue with the developed world.

Our goals in South Asia continue to be:

—Improving regional stability and enhancing the ability of the regional states to resolve their bilateral problems without outside interference;

—Strengthening the independence of South Asian nations and supporting their determination to avoid domination by any external power;

—Providing economic assistance and humanitarian aid, when this is required, assisting the nations of the area in their efforts to attack poverty;

—Encouraging these nations to adopt constructive policies on major world economic and political issues;

—Limiting regional conventional arms acquisitions and preventing nuclear proliferation in South Asia;

—Fostering, so far as we are able, the promotion of human rights and the democratic process; and

—Controlling the production of narcotics and their supply to the world's illicit market.

Fortunately, trends in recent years within South Asia have shown substantial progress toward these goals, although the problems ahead remain formidable. Nuclear proliferation, Mr. Chairman, is one such issue.

As you are aware, India exploded a nuclear device in 1974, and Pakistan has contracted to purchase a nuclear reprocessing plant from France. It is in our basic interest that both countries behave responsibly in this field. We have repeatedly stressed our opposition to the transfer of sensitive nuclear

technology. We are discussing this problem with the Pakistan Government in diplomatic channels. Prime Minister Bhutto recently stated that he would be prepared to discuss this matter with us, and we hope that it will be possible to reach a mutually satisfactory conclusion.

Narcotics, as you are well aware, Mr. Chairman, is another significant issue confronting U.S. policy in South Asia. Two of the regional states, India and Pakistan, are large producers of opium. So far as we are aware, no South Asian opium or opium products have yet reached the United States, but as the suppression programs in Mexico and Burma bear fruit, international traffickers may turn their attention to South Asia.

Mr. Chairman, recent internal political developments in South Asia have received a considerable amount of press attention, and I would like to address myself to these developments briefly. India and Pakistan have just completed general elections; Sri Lanka is scheduled to do so before the end of the year; and Bangladesh has had nationwide local elections. In the first two instances, there were broad-ranging, extremely free debates on the domestic issues confronting these countries, as well as on their basic political structures and leadership. With regard to Sri Lanka, the campaign in that country promises to afford the voters an opportunity to openly examine the nation's priorities, goals, and direction, as has been the case in previous elections.

Mr. Chairman, our proposed AID program is supportive of our political interests in South Asia. It is aimed at the most critical problems of the area: increasing food production and reducing population growth. A solution to these problems is crucial to improving the lives of the poor in this region. The challenge also has worldwide

significance in our interdependent world. I know you will have specific questions on these proposals, as well as on the general situation in the region, which I will be happy to answer as fully and frankly as possible.

## **Expiration of Area Restrictions on Use of Passports**

Press release 114 dated March 18

On March 18 the restrictions against the use of the U.S. passport for travel to, in or through Cuba, North Korea, Vietnam, and Cambodia expire. Therefore there will no longer be any bar to the use of the passport in those countries.

It is important for would-be travelers to bear in mind, however, that the ability of the U.S. Government to extend the traditional protection to its citizens is very limited in those countries with which the United States maintains no diplomatic or consular relations. That is the case with the four aforementioned countries. Although it is possible for American travelers to seek very limited assistance from the Swiss Embassy in Havana, which protects U.S. interests in Cuba, there is no protecting power in any of the other countries mentioned above. This and other inherent risks for Americans in traveling to these countries are described in greater detail in travel advisory notices which will be made available by the Passport Office and Foreign Service posts abroad to would-be travelers to those countries.

Revisions of the Department of the Treasury licensing procedures affecting the expenditure of funds in the aforementioned countries are in preparation. Information may be secured from the Office of Foreign Assets Control, Department of the Treasury.

## Inter-American Relations in an Era of Change

*Statement by William H. Luers*

*Deputy Assistant Secretary for Inter-American Affairs*<sup>1</sup>

On behalf of the Bureau of Inter-American Affairs, I welcome this series of hearings. I hope they can contribute to an illumination and to a better appreciation of the profound changes that have taken place in our hemispheric relations over the past generation.

In this opening statement, I plan to describe briefly:

—How our perceptions of the hemisphere have lagged behind reality;

—How differently we and the other nations of this hemisphere perceive our mutual interests;

—How strikingly different our perceptions are from the Latin Americans' on the proper emphasis on rights; and

—How we are setting out in this environment to improve hemispheric cooperation.

America's appreciation of and attitudes toward Latin America and the Caribbean have not kept pace with the dramatic changes that have taken place in this hemisphere since the early days of the Alliance for Progress. Symptomatic of this lag is the fact that a major U.S. newspaper carried an editorial on Brazil only last month and referred to its capital as Rio.

Today the nations of Latin America and the Caribbean are more diverse, confident, inde-

pendent, and self-aware than any regional grouping in the Third World. But they also have a crushing burden of foreign debt, an alarming population growth, and a dizzy rate of urbanization. As change has transformed these societies, inequities have become exaggerated—stark poverty exists alongside prosperity.

Most of the nations of the hemisphere have given up one-man rule for more institutionalized forms of government. But the dominant institution is the military. Democracy, never strongly rooted in Latin America, is less prevalent today than at any time since World War II. Yet, while there are repressive governments, many democratic freedoms coexist—paradoxically—with serious abuses of human rights.

Latin America and the Caribbean present most dramatically the importance of the North-South issues to the people of this country. From no other part of the world does foreign poverty impinge so intimately on our society or create such an implicit obligation to help:

—As our living standards outstrip theirs, we become the illegal but logical haven for workers escaping the despair of poverty.

—Regional proximity sharpens our humanitarian perceptions that poverty is a global rather than a national problem.

—As our market for illicit drugs expands, our corruption and crime extends itself into the poor agricultural areas where the products of the poppy and the coca plant become valued commodities.

—As our interchanges of finance, trade, and

<sup>1</sup> Made before the Subcommittee on Inter-American Affairs of the House International Relations Committee on Mar. 24 at a hearing on fiscal year 1978 foreign economic assistance for Latin America. The complete transcript of the hearings will be published by the committee and will be available from the Superintendent of Documents, U.S. Government Printing Office, Washington, D.C. 20402.

tourism grow, they impact deeply on citizens of this country.

—And as citizens from our neighborhood enter the United States, our society is enriched and our labor force expanded.

The peoples of this hemisphere are no longer in awe of us. They respect our vitality, success, technology, and prosperity. But they charge that we have an insatiable thirst for the world's resources, that we are unwilling to share our expanding wealth, and that we have used our enormous power arbitrarily in the past.

If Latin Americans are still described in clichés by us, so we, likewise, are little understood by them.

### **Differing Perceptions of Interests**

Let me turn now to discuss briefly how our interests in the nations of Latin America and the Caribbean contrast with their interests in us.

The United States:

—Hopes that this hemisphere remains free from military conflict, from arms races, and from the proliferation of nuclear weapons;

—Depends on the expansion of two-way trade with a rapidly growing and industrializing market;

—Looks to the leaders of this hemisphere to play a mature and moderating role in the international councils now exploring the reordering of the world's economic institutions and procedures;

—Desires to see the end to torture, persecution, arbitrary arrest, and violence from the left and the right; and

—Hopes that economic development will be accompanied by the development of democratic institutions which provide the most certain guarantee of human rights.

What the nations of Latin America and the Caribbean seek from us is quite different. From each nation of the hemisphere comes a different set of requests, reflecting the diversity of the region. You will be examining this diversity with my colleagues. There are common threads, however:

—Trade and resource flows are at the cen-

ter of their concerns. They want expanded and preferred access to our markets and guarantees of stabilized earnings from their exports. They want financial backing for their heavy debt burdens.

—They insist that we not intervene in their internal affairs. Their obsession with U.S. interventionism has a long history. By interventionism they often mean not only military intervention and subversion but also the ubiquitous U.S. products and television programs.

—They also want our respect and our appreciation of their dignity, independence, and sovereignty. They want our understanding and our attention.

Interdependence requires that we respond to these hemispheric interests. Otherwise we cannot expect responsiveness to ours.

### **Differing Perspectives on Human Rights**

I would like here, Mr. Chairman, to make a comment on the differing perspectives that we and many Latin American nations have on human rights.

Some governments see our urging respect for human rights as a new type of U.S. interventionism. They are annoyed because they believe that our comments and program restrictions reflect a failure to understand their particular domestic problems and security threats. We do not pretend to measure or judge the domestic threat. It is the type and severity of the response that concerns the American people. As President Carter said [at the United Nations on March 17], no signatory of the U.N. Charter "can avoid its responsibilities to review and to speak when torture or unwarranted deprivation occurs in any part of the world."

And let it be said that other hemispheric governments and many people in this hemisphere welcome and are heartened by our renewed attention to values that still form a unique part of this New World. In our increased interest in human rights, we are not imposing our political preferences on any nation. But we are summoning governments to respect the principles to which they have subscribed in numerous U.N. and OAS documents.

There is a second aspect of the rights question, the perception of which separates us from many governments, leaders, intellectuals, and ordinary citizens in this hemisphere. We stress as fundamental the rights of liberty and freedoms from physical and mental persecution. Yet many in this hemisphere see the rights to food, shelter, work, and survival as fundamental. If the right to be free from torture and persecution is vital to man's dignity, so are the economic and social rights. We must be alert to the charge that we justify our decision not to share our wealth on the grounds that others violate human rights. Our conscience thus eased, some charge, we continue to devour a third of the world's resources.

I should like to quote here again from President Carter's address to the United Nations. The human rights issue, he said:

... is important in itself. It should not block progress on other important matters affecting the security and well-being of our people and of world peace. It is obvious that the reduction of tension, the control of nuclear arms, the achievement of harmony in the troubled areas of the world, and the provision of food, good health, and education will independently contribute to advancing the human condition.

In our relationships with other countries, these mutual concerns will be reflected in our political, our cultural, and our economic attitudes.

Mr. Chairman, if we are prepared to match our morality with our generosity, if compassion for the poor is equal to our passion for freedom, and if we pay as much attention to egalitarian as we do to libertarian issues, our message will be heard and understood.

### **Toward Improved Hemispheric Cooperation**

Mr. Chairman, I am optimistic about our capacity to shape a more cooperative relationship with the other nations of this hemisphere.

*First*, we have with our neighbors a long experience in shaping economic change and growth. The global North-South debate, in a real sense, began in this hemisphere. The leaders of Latin America are advanced in their ideas on how the United States might become a better partner in their economic development. We must address simultaneously

global, regional, subregional, and bilateral issues. Our approach to many economic issues will depend on solutions developed in a global framework. Other issues we can best work out through a strengthened inter-American system with the Organization of American States at its center. Still others we can best approach cooperatively through existing subregional organizations. Finally, there will be a number of questions we can resolve most effectively only on a bilateral basis.

*Second*, this is a hemisphere whose nations are at peace with each other. Although there are repressive governments, there is no serious threat of war. The nations of Latin America and the Caribbean spend less on armaments than any region in the world. And while violence is too often turned inward in the Americas, the governments have the interest and capacity to improve the lot of their people. Most people throughout the Americas respond instinctively to fundamental humanitarian values. Even authoritarian governments accept these ideals and explain departures from them in terms of priorities rather than preference. Without war, governments and societies can devote their energies to people.

*Third*, we must make clear that the long era of U.S. interventionism has passed. Governments will remain skeptical of our assurances. We must be open in our relations and abstain from our historic compulsion to design the future of our neighbors. We can convince them now only by our performance, not rhetoric.

*Fourth*, there is a new sense of cooperation between the U.S. private sector and the governments of this hemisphere. Governments have better defined the terms under which foreign capital is wanted. U.S. companies, for their part, are demonstrating a new sensitivity to the national pride and sovereign rights of their hosts. Improved cooperation with the private sector is critical to capital and technology transfers.

*Fifth*, the increasing role of Hispanic Americans and people from the Caribbean in our society is beginning to raise the American consciousness about our neighborhood. We must develop together with the Congress and the media new ways and new programs for

expanding our understanding of this hemisphere and its peoples. It is likewise essential that the nations of this hemisphere make greater efforts to understand us.

*Finally*, President Carter has shown an unprecedented interest in Latin America:

—His first Presidential visitor was, by no coincidence, from Mexico. We have already set an energetic and cooperative course with the Government of Mexico to manage the complex problems we share.

—A first priority of this Administration after the inauguration was to give urgent attention to negotiating a new treaty with Panama for the canal. This is an issue of importance not just between us and Panama but for our relations with the entire hemisphere.

—Several foreign ministers have visited Washington as a first step to rebuilding our relations with traditional friends.

—We have indicated a readiness to talk to the Cuban Government without preconditions on a range of issues that divide us.

—We are committed to continued strong support for international and regional financial institutions and to sustaining significant bilateral assistance programs which are critical to the development needs of the region. In this endeavor we shall need the support of the Congress.

—And although we know it will be difficult to move rapidly on the many economic issues critical to this hemisphere, this Administration is committed to engage the issues seriously.

Mr. Chairman, we have an opportunity and obligation to cooperate constructively with this new hemisphere. We must do so without sentimentality but with a sense of strong tradition, without paternalism but with respect for the sovereignty, independence, and dignity of each nation to find its own future.

## Pan American Day and Pan American Week, 1977

### A PROCLAMATION<sup>1</sup>

The people of the Western Hemisphere share a common past and a common future. As friends and neighbors we have an obligation to help one another, in order to promote our common good and to solve the problems of each nation, and advance our mutual interest in global solutions to problems that confront all of humankind. The Organization of American States, the world's oldest regional organization, is one symbol of these shared aspirations.

Since Pan American Day was first proclaimed in 1889, the nations of this hemisphere have undergone dramatic changes internally and in relationship to each other. The challenge for all of us in the coming year is to find ways to adapt our relationships to take into account these changes. At the same time, we should rededicate ourselves to the ideals of peace, cooperation, and social justice which continue to unite and inspire our peoples.

It is appropriate that we set aside a special period to honor the heritage that unites us, to reaffirm our mutual desire for peace and international harmony, and to dedicate ourselves to shaping a relationship which looks to the future for inspiration.

NOW, THEREFORE, I, JIMMY CARTER, President of the United States of America, do hereby proclaim Thursday, April 14, 1977, as Pan American Day, and the week beginning April 10, 1977, as Pan American Week. I call upon the Governors of the States and the Commonwealth of Puerto Rico, the Mayor of the District of Columbia, and appropriate officials of all other areas subject to the jurisdiction of the United States to issue similar proclamations.

I urge the communications media, educators, individuals, and organizations to join together during this week to celebrate our friendship and to recognize the need for a continuing commitment to peaceful and productive relationships with our neighbors in this Hemisphere as a special part of our effort to forge equitable global frameworks for relations among nations.

IN WITNESS WHEREOF, I have hereunto set my hand this twenty-first day of March, in the year of our Lord nineteen hundred seventy-seven, and of the Independence of the United States of America the two hundred and first.

JIMMY CARTER.

<sup>1</sup> No. 4491; 42 Fed. Reg. 15677.

## Treasury Secretary Blumenthal Testifies on Legislation on Illicit Payments Abroad

*Following is a statement by Secretary of the Treasury W. Michael Blumenthal made before the Senate Committee on Banking, Housing and Urban Affairs on March 16.<sup>1</sup>*

Department of the Treasury press release dated March 16

I would like to say at the outset that the Administration supports the aims of S. 305. The Carter Administration believes that it is damaging both to our country and to a healthy world economic system for American corporations to bribe foreign officials. The United States should impose specific criminal penalties for such acts. The effective enforcement of U.S. criminal penalties for corrupt payments abroad is a difficult matter and will require close international cooperation. I will discuss these enforcement aspects later in my testimony.

The problem of corrupt payments is one that is a cause of great concern to this Administration. Paying bribes—apart from being morally repugnant and illegal in most countries—is simply not necessary for the successful conduct of business here or overseas. I believe that the responsible elements of the business community agree, and it had been my hope that the business community itself would formulate and implement a code of business ethics that would set high standards. Unfortunately, there has been little movement to date in the private sector. The Carter Administration has decided that strong government action in the form of further legislation is needed.

In its assessment of legislative alternatives, the Carter Administration is reviewing care-

fully the record of recent regulatory action. We are finding this record a very useful guide against which new initiatives can be examined. I believe therefore that it would be worthwhile to review with you the considerable regulatory action that has taken place during the past few years.

1. The Securities and Exchange Commission has been impressively successful in obtaining disclosure from issuers of registered securities who have engaged in these improper practices. It is already clear that these disclosures have compelled many firms to impose strict internal controls against these practices. I need not describe further the SEC's action, as I am sure that Chairman [Roderick M.] Hills will give you a thorough description in his testimony today.

2. In June 1976 the Internal Revenue Service issued 11 questions to which corporate officers and outside auditors are required to respond in affidavit form. These questions are designed to discover whether corporations have been illegally deducting bribes. As of December 31, 1976, the 11 questions had been asked in approximately 800 large case examinations. Indications of slush funds or illegal activity have been found in over 270 such cases. Most of these cases are still under active consideration, and over 50 criminal investigations have been started.

Also in the tax area, the Tax Reform Act of 1976 eliminated the tax benefits (deferrals and deductions) associated with illegal payments made by majority-owned subsidiaries and domestic international sales corporations. This new prohibition parallels longstanding prohibitions against deductions of illegal payments made in the United States.

I believe that this increased audit activity and new legislation will have an increasingly salutary effect.

<sup>1</sup> The complete transcript of the hearings will be published by the committee and will be available from the Superintendent of Documents, U.S. Government Printing Office, Washington, D.C. 20402.

3. The Arms Export Control Act of 1976 now requires reports of payments (including political contributions and agents' fees) that are made or offered to secure the sale of defense items abroad. The data reported by U.S. firms is made available to Congress and to Federal agencies responsible for enforcing laws on this subject. The Department of State has issued detailed regulations to implement this requirement.

Furthermore, 1976 amendments to the Foreign Military Sales Act require disclosure to purchasing governments and to the Department of Defense of any agents' fees included in contracts covered by the act. Fees determined to be questionable by the Defense Department or unacceptable by foreign governments will not be allowed costs under such contracts.

4. Last year, the International Chamber of Commerce organized an international panel to formulate a code of ethics for businessmen. The panel is scheduled to present a code of ethics to the ICC Executive Board on March 23. Subject to approval by the national chambers of commerce, the code could be adopted by the ICC council at its June 1977 meeting.

5. The United States is actively pursuing in the United Nations a treaty on corrupt payments in international transactions. The United States has formally proposed that the treaty be based on three concepts: (1) enforcement of host-country criminal laws; (2) international cooperation on exchange of information and judicial assistance in enforcement; and (3) uniform provisions for disclosure of payments to foreign officials and agents made to influence official acts.

The U.N. working group for this initiative has met twice and will meet again to begin drafting March 28–April 8. It has been directed to report by this summer on a possible treaty on illicit payments for consideration by the United Nations Economic and Social Council and possible action by the General Assembly.

A number of other governments have expressed interest in international action, but there is much work still to be done. This treaty may be an essential complement to effective enforcement of domestic legislation,

such as S. 305. President Carter is giving this effort his fullest support.

6. The Department of Justice, in cooperation with the Securities and Exchange Commission and the Bureau of Customs, has reviewed the foreign activities of approximately 50 domestic corporations. This review has resulted in the opening of active criminal investigations on eight multinational corporations. Several of these investigations are now in the grand jury stage.

The United States is also continuing to cooperate through bilateral agreements in the law enforcement efforts of other governments. Thirteen agreements on specific corporate groups have been signed, and discussions are underway with other countries.

### **Enforcement Problems**

The initiatives described above are collectively impressive. They add up to a significant deterrent to corrupt payments by American firms, both in the United States and abroad.

Of equal importance, Mr. Chairman, is the change in the climate of public opinion in the United States. I am certain that any U.S. corporate executive faced with a choice of whether to make a corrupt payment in 1977 will be much more reluctant than he would have been three years ago.

However, the Administration believes that the recent initiatives must be complemented by new legislation. The Administration supports the criminalization of corrupt payments made to foreign officials.

But before turning to the criminalization aspects of S. 305, I would like to assure the committee that the Administration agrees with section 102 of title I concerning accounting records and dealings with accountants. We note that the SEC has recently offered for comment proposed regulations which closely parallel section 102. We suggest that the committee consider comments received by the SEC concerning the proposed regulations when it marks up this section.

Now turning to the central aspect of S. 305—the criminalization of corrupt payments made to foreign officials—as I said, we support it. At the same time, the Administration



recognizes that great care must be taken with an approach which makes certain types of extraterritorial conduct subject to our country's criminal laws. Moreover, a law which provides criminal penalties must describe the persons and acts covered with a high degree of specificity in order to be enforceable, to provide fair warning to American businessmen. Mr. Chairman, I am seriously concerned about the enforcement problems arising from the broad and sometimes vague reach of S. 305 as it is presently drafted. The Administration believes that the bill can and must be improved in a number of respects to insure that it will be fairly and effectively enforced and, in its implementation, will not give undue offense to foreign countries whose officials would be implicated in cases brought under the U.S. criminal law.

Aspects of the bill which we believe require improvement include the following elements:

—The definition of a "domestic concern" should specify the degree of control which will bring a foreign corporation controlled by *individuals* who are citizens or nationals of the United States within the purview of the law.

—The definition of the term "domestic concern" should also make it clear when a foreign corporation which is owned directly or indirectly by a U.S. *corporation* is covered.

—Foreign issuers of registered securities should not be subject to the criminalization penalties.

—Requiring the SEC to take primary responsibility for enforcing a criminalization program would be a dubious diversion from its primary mission of securing adequate disclosure to protect investors of registered securities.

—The term "interstate commerce" should be more precisely defined to provide more specifically the certainty and the extent of contacts with the United States constitutionally required in a criminal statute.

I want to emphasize that our reservations do not represent an intent to weaken the thrust of the bill or to delay its passage. Rather, we want to work with your committee to insure that legislation in this area is workable and fair. We have established an

interagency group to recommend language which will satisfy our concerns. We will get that language to you as soon as possible.

Further, the Administration believes that prompt disclosure of corrupt foreign payments also may provide a highly effective deterrent. We do not foreclose the possibility that disclosure provisions will be considered in our further review of the enforcement aspects of this subject.

Moreover, once the bill is enacted into law, the Administration plans to continue to seek a multilateral treaty and additional bilateral agreements on illicit payments. Such agreements will increase the enforceability of domestic legislation and will help to minimize any adverse effects of this law on our foreign relations. Our intent is to propose that a multilateral treaty include an undertaking by each country to adopt the approach of S. 305—in other words, to apply a criminal prohibition against foreign corporate bribery.

#### **Disclosure of Shareholder Identity**

Let me turn now to a brief discussion of title II. First, I support its concept—increased disclosure where it will help investors and serve public policy. In general, I believe that the benefits of increased disclosure outweigh its burdens. The trend in recent years toward both increased corporate disclosure and increased disclosure of shareholders themselves has benefited investors, and I have favored it.

Concerning title II, however, it seems to us that the present reporting requirement, coupled with recent SEC actions, may be already achieving its intended goal. Specifically, we think that these regulations already disclose shareholders in positions of potential control. We particularly think that recent SEC administrative actions have helped improve disclosure of the identity of large shareholders.

Let me provide some specifics concerning our reservations over title II. First, the apparent intention of this legislation is to disclose the ownership interests of persons with potential influence over corporate management. Presumably, the sponsors believe that

shareholders and the general public could be affected by these people and thus have a right to know their identity. I agree—disclosure of those who truly could exercise such control makes sense.

The issue, however, is one of whether the present disclosure requirements already accomplish this. It seems to me that the present requirement—that beneficial owners of 5 percent or more disclose their identities—already is effective.

My own experience and observations in business have been that owners of less than 5 percent rarely have potential control of managements. An ownership position of that size rarely threatens a management with being overruled or overthrown. I realize that the 5 percent requirement doesn't reveal a large absolute number of owners in any given corporation, but nevertheless it seems to reveal those with potential control.

Indeed, the area of greater abuse has been that of managements abusing shareholder rights—pursuing policies which aren't disclosed to them and which may be contrary to shareholders' best interests. In contrast, there have been almost no examples of less-than-5-percent shareholders harmfully dominating managements.

Second, I have some concerns over the effects of this lowered reporting level on foreign portfolio investment in the United States. Our equity market benefits considerably from foreign transactions in U.S. securities. Any actions which might reduce the inflow of foreign capital or divert transactions offshore should be studied carefully. In particular, the amount of new equity capital available to American business in the past three years has been too small, and if this bill would reduce it further, I would be concerned. One reason for this concern is that the 1976 Treasury report to the Congress entitled "Foreign Portfolio Investment in the United States" concluded that disclosure requirements deterred foreign investors from our equity market.

I also question the possible effects of title II on this Administration's objective of an open environment for international investment and removing existing obstacles to it. Freer in-

ternational investment would benefit all nations, and especially the United States with our strengthening economy. Imposing a lower reporting requirement, however, is inconsistent with this goal of facilitating such investment. Our report on foreign portfolio investment noted that many foreign investors often fear filing ownership reports with the U.S. Government, since it might lead to reporting their ownership interests to their home governments. Disclosure of this information to home governments could have, and in some instances has had, serious consequences for foreign investors, including forced repatriation and confiscation of assets.

As you know, portfolio investment ebbs and flows rapidly, and this tightened disclosure requirement might impede these flows. It seems to me that this impact of this legislation on overall portfolio investment should be evaluated more carefully.

My third reservation, Mr. Chairman, reflects this Administration's concern with costly reporting requirements imposed on American business by government. We believe that before new regulations requiring more documentation are imposed, the need should be proven and the costs of compliance understood. I already have indicated uncertainty over the need; moreover, I don't believe that any estimate has been made of the increased costs which title II would require. Ultimately, these costs probably will be borne by investors, since the financial intermediaries which must report will pass them through. Indeed, they may be borne particularly by individual investors, since securities firms recently have had difficulty in passing through costs to institutional investors.

In summary, we don't think that there is sufficient evidence that the objectives of this legislation aren't already being met. We particularly think that recent SEC initiatives may be making the 5 percent requirement more effective.

Concerning the SEC, its recent broadening of the definition of beneficial ownership will produce more disclosure, and we should assess its effects. Furthermore, recent legislation directed the SEC to require financial in-

stitutions to report their equity holdings. This may accomplish much of the purpose of title II. We will consult with the SEC on these developments to assess their effect on overall disclosure. Afterwards, we would be willing to report back to the committee in writing concerning our findings.

## Alan Boyd Named To Negotiate U.S.-U.K. Air Services Agreement

Press release 88 dated February 28

Alan Boyd has been designated by President Carter as special U.S. representative to negotiate a new U.S.-U.K. air services agreement. Mr. Boyd will have the personal rank of Ambassador.

The United Kingdom announced on June 22, 1976, its intention to terminate effective June 22, 1977, the current U.S.-U.K. air services agreement (the "Bermuda agreement"). Although the United States expressed its continuing satisfaction with the Bermuda agreement, it accepted a British invitation to enter into negotiations. In the first phase of the negotiations, which took place during the fall of 1976, aviation officials of both governments exchanged data and views. The United States strongly defended the principles of competition embodied in the Bermuda agreement and succeeded in laying the groundwork for what we are confident will be a productive second phase of negotiations, which began in London February 28.

The United Kingdom has informed us that beginning with the second phase of the negotiations it also intends to be represented by an official of greater seniority and status.

Ambassador Boyd is a former Secretary of Transportation and Chairman of the Civil Aeronautics Board (CAB). Until December 31, 1976, he was vice chairman of Illinois Central Railroad. In his new capacity he will be supported by the Office of Aviation of the Department of State and will work closely with the Departments of Transportation and Commerce and the CAB.

## TREATY INFORMATION

### Current Actions

#### MULTILATERAL

##### Agriculture

Agreement establishing the International Fund for Agricultural Development (IFAD). Done at Rome June 13, 1976.<sup>1</sup>

*Signature:* Philippines, January 5, 1977.

##### Customs

Customs convention regarding E.C.S. (Echantillons Commerciaux-Commercial Samples) carnets for commercial samples, with annex and protocol of signature. Done at Brussels March 1, 1956. Entered into force October 3, 1957; for the United States March 3, 1969. TIAS 6632.

*Notification of denunciation:* Norway, January 31, 1977; effective April 30, 1977.

##### Maritime Matters

Amendments to the convention of March 6, 1948, as amended, on the Intergovernmental Maritime Consultative Organization (TIAS 4044, 6285, 6490). Adopted at London October 17, 1974.<sup>1</sup>

*Acceptance deposited:* Austria, March 1, 1977.

##### Meteorology

Convention of the World Meteorological Organization, with related protocol. Done at Washington October 11, 1947. Entered into force March 23, 1950. TIAS 2052.

*Ceases to be separate member:* St. Pierre and Miquelon, effective September 28, 1977.<sup>2</sup>

##### Oil Pollution

Amendments to the international convention for the prevention of pollution of the sea by oil, 1954, as amended (TIAS 4900, 6109). Adopted at London October 21, 1969. Enters into force January 20, 1978. TIAS 8505.

*Acceptance deposited:* Surinam, March 1, 1977.

##### Postal

Constitution of the Universal Postal Union, with final protocol, general regulations with final protocol, and convention with final protocol and regulations of

<sup>1</sup> Not in force.

<sup>2</sup> Meteorological service being incorporated in that of France as of September 28, 1977.

execution. Done at Vienna January 10, 1964. Entered into force January 1, 1966. TIAS 5881.

*Accession deposited:* Angola, February 23, 1977, effective March 3, 1977.

Second additional protocol to the constitution of the Universal Postal Union of July 10, 1964, general regulations with final protocol and annex, and the universal postal convention with final protocol and detailed regulations. Done at Lausanne July 5, 1974. Entered into force January 1, 1976.

*Ratification deposited:* Iraq, November 29, 1976.

*Accession deposited:* Angola, February 23, 1977, effective March 3, 1977.

### Safety at Sea

International regulations for preventing collisions at sea. Approved by the International Conference on Safety of Life at Sea held at London from May 17 to June 17, 1960. Entered into force September 1, 1965. TIAS 5813.

*Acceptance deposited:* Libya, February 16, 1977.

Convention on the international regulations for preventing collisions at sea, 1972. Done at London October 20, 1972. Enters into force July 15, 1977.

*Ratification deposited:* Finland, February 16, 1977.

*Accession deposited:* Zaire, February 10, 1977.

### Telecommunications

Telephone regulations, with appendices and final protocol. Done at Geneva April 11, 1973. Entered into force September 1, 1974; for the United States April 21, 1976.

*Proclaimed by the President:* March 16, 1977.<sup>3</sup>

Telegraph regulations, with appendices, annexes, and final protocol. Done at Geneva April 11, 1973. Entered into force September 1, 1974; for the United States April 21, 1976.

*Proclaimed by the President:* March 16, 1977.<sup>3</sup>

Partial revision of the radio regulations, Geneva, 1959, as amended (TIAS 4893, 5603, 6332, 6590, 7435), to establish a new frequency allotment plan for high-frequency radiotelephone coast stations, with annexes and final protocol. Done at Geneva June 8, 1974. Entered into force January 1, 1976; for the United States April 21, 1976.

*Proclaimed by the President:* March 18, 1977.<sup>4</sup>

### Terrorism—Protection of Diplomats

Convention on the prevention and punishment of crimes against internationally protected persons, including diplomatic agents. Done at New York December 14, 1973. Entered into force February 20, 1977.

*Accession deposited:* Malawi, March 14, 1977.

*Proclaimed by the President:* March 18, 1977.

### German Democratic Republic

Agreement concerning fisheries off the coasts of the United States, with annexes, agreed minutes, and related letter. Signed at Washington October 5, 1976.

*Entered into force:* March 4, 1977.

### Indonesia

Loan agreement relating to a family planning oral contraceptive project. Signed at Jakarta January 24, 1977. Entered into force January 24, 1977.

Loan agreement relating to the Surakarta potable water project. Signed at Jakarta January 24, 1977. Entered into force January 24, 1977.

### Japan

Agreement concerning fisheries off the coasts of the United States, with agreed minutes. Signed at Washington March 18, 1977. Enters into force on a date to be mutually agreed.

### Mexico

Agreement relating to additional cooperative arrangements to curb the illegal traffic in narcotics. Effected by exchange of letters at Mexico March 8, 1977. Entered into force March 8, 1977.

### Philippines

Agreement amending the loan agreement of August 6, 1976, relating to improvement of local waterworks systems. Signed at Manila February 7, 1977. Entered into force February 7, 1977.

### Singapore

Agreement relating to the establishment of a U.S. Air Force management training assistance team in Singapore, with appendices. Effected by exchange of letters at Singapore February 23 and 24, 1977. Entered into force February 24, 1977.

### Thailand

Agreement relating to the deposit by Korea of 10 percent of the value of grant military assistance and excess defense articles furnished by the United States. Effected by exchange of notes at Seoul May 12, 1972. Entered into force May 12, 1972, effective February 7, 1972. TIAS 7351.

*Terminated:* February 19, 1977.

<sup>3</sup> With declarations.

<sup>4</sup> With reservation.

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*124	3/21	Shipping Coordinating Committee (SCC). Subcommittee on Safety of Life at Sea (SOLAS), working group on radiocommunications, Apr. 26 (rescheduled).
*125	3/21	SCC, SOLAS, working group on ship design and equipment, Apr. 14.
*126	3/21	Government Advisory Committee on International Book and Library Programs, Apr. 21.
127	3/23	Vance: Subcommittee on Foreign Assistance, Senate Committee on Foreign Relations.

\*Not printed.

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*The Department of State BULLETIN, a weekly publication issued by the Office of Media Services, Bureau of Public Affairs, provides the public and interested agencies of the government with information on developments in the field of U.S. foreign relations and on the work of the Department and the Foreign Service.*

*The BULLETIN includes selected press releases on foreign policy, issued by the White House and the Department, and statements, addresses, and news conferences of the President and the Secretary of State and other officers of the Department, as well as special articles on various phases of international affairs and the functions of the Department. Information is included concerning treaties and international agreements to which the United States is or may become a party and on treaties of general international interest.*

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## President Carter's News Conference of March 24

*Following are excerpts relating to foreign policy from the transcript of a news conference held by President Carter on March 24.*<sup>1</sup>

I have a brief opening statement to make about the function of the Presidency and about the Secretary of State's upcoming visit to the Soviet Union.

I think one of the most impressive observations that I have understood so far about the Presidency and what it stands for is the need to derive its strength directly from the people. There have been some expressions of concern about my bringing on these news conferences and in other ways issues that affect foreign policy directly to the people of our country.

I think it is very important that the strength of the Presidency itself be recognized as deriving from the people of this nation, and I think it is good for us, even in very complex matters when the outcome of negotiations might still be in doubt, to let the Members of Congress and the people of this country know what is going on and some of the options to be pursued, some of the consequences of success, some of the consequences of failure.

I think in many areas of the world now we are trying to invest a great deal of time and attention and the good offices of our country to bring about a resolution of differences and to prevent potential conflict.

Tomorrow, the Secretary of State will depart for the Soviet Union. We have spent weeks in detailed study about the agenda that has been prepared. This agenda is one

that's been derived by the Soviet Union and by our own country. I would say the central focal point will be arms limitations and actual reductions for a change.

I have had long discussions with the Joint Chiefs of Staff and with other members of my own Cabinet to derive our potential proposals, which Cy Vance will put forward to Mr. Brezhnev and the Russian leaders.

We will be talking about the limitation on arms sales. We are now the number-one exporter or salesman of arms of all kinds. We have been working with our own allies to cut down this traffic, and we hope to get the Soviet Union to agree with us on constraint.

We'll be dealing with mutual and balanced force reductions in the NATO area, and on this trip Cy Vance will make a report on the attitude of the Soviet Union leaders concerning the European theater.

We'll be trying to control the testing of nuclear devices, both weapons and peaceful nuclear devices, and we would like to eliminate these tests altogether if the Soviets will agree.

We are going to try to move toward demilitarizing the Indian Ocean, and here again we'll be consulting closely with our allies and friends. And we are going to express our concern about the future of Africa and ask the Soviet Union to join with us in removing from that troubled continent outside interference which might contribute to warfare in the countries involved. And we will start laying the groundwork for cooperation with the Soviet Union at the Geneva conference, which we hope will take place, concerning the Middle East.

These matters are extremely complex. We don't know whether or not we will be suc-

<sup>1</sup> For the complete transcript, see Weekly Compilation of Presidential Documents dated Mar. 28, 1977, p. 439.

cessful at all, but we go in good faith with high hopes. The Soviets have been very cooperative up to this point, and we are pleased with their attitude. And I know that the prayers of the American people will go with Cy Vance, our Secretary of State, to the Soviet Union, in hopes that this trip might result in the alleviation of tension and the further guaranteeing of peace for our world in the future.

*Q. Mr. President, in terms of bringing the American people in on the dialogue, you spoke of arms reduction. Does that mean that Vance will take a new set of proposals on SALT?*

*And two, you spoke of the cooperative attitude of the Soviets. Does that mean that you don't think that any of Brezhnev's statements in the past week will have any bearing, in terms of your human rights stand, on the SALT negotiations?*

*The President:* Well, I think the first question is easily answered. Yes, we will take new proposals to the Soviet Union. We are not abandoning the agreements made in the Vladivostok agreement. As you know, all previous SALT agreements have been, in effect, limitations that were so high that they were, in effect, just ground rules for intensified competition and a continued massive arms growth in nuclear weapons.

We hope to bring not only limitations for—to continue in the past—but also actual substantial reduction that the Soviets will agree. That will be our first proposal. I spelled this out briefly in my U.N. speech.

And the second fallback position will be, in effect, to ratify Vladivostok and to wait until later to solve some of the most difficult and contentious issues. We hope that the Soviets will agree to the substantial reduction.

The other part of your question was what, Helen [Helen Thomas, UPI]?

*Q. It was in the question of this new—this cooperative attitude.*

*The President:* About Brezhnev's attitude?

*Q. Right.*

*The President:* Well, I study Mr. Brezhnev's speeches in their entirety. And I think the speech made this past week to their general trade union conference and one made previously at Tula—I consider them to be very constructive.

There was a delineation in his speech between human rights, which he equates with intrusion into their own internal affairs—and I don't agree with that assessment—that has been divided in his speeches from the subject of peace and arms limitation, including nuclear arms. So I have nothing that I have heard directly or indirectly from Mr. Brezhnev that would indicate that he is not very eager to see substantial progress made in arms limitations.

*Q. Mr. President, in your opening statement you said you thought it was a good thing for you to speak out on negotiation details, but you didn't say why. As I understand the criticism, sir, it is that it impedes negotiations when you put out on the table, just in a range of thought, things that the parties haven't privately been able to work out. Why do you think it does not impede negotiations?*

*The President:* Well, I think if anyone would analyze the details of the statements that I have made so far, they are not so narrowly defined or specific that they would prevent both parties to a dispute from negotiating in good faith with a fairly clean slate ahead of them. The Middle East is one example.

I think, in many instances, the propositions that I have promulgated publicly are generally conceded to be very important and legitimate, but the public expression of those matters has not been made to the American people over a period of years.

The exact means of defining borders in the Middle East, the exact resolution of the Palestinian problem, the definition of permanent peace—all these things obviously

have to be decided between the Arab countries and Israel. But to point out that they are matters in dispute and that we hope they will be solved this year I think is constructive.

We have not intruded ourselves against the wishes of the interested nations in the eastern Mediterranean. Both Turkey and Greece welcomed our emissary, and I think we can be a good mediator to the extent that both parties trust us to act in good faith.

The same thing applies in southern Africa and the same thing applies to the MIA mission to Vietnam and Laos.

And I believe that it is very important for the American people to know the framework within which discussions might take place and to give me, through their own approval, strength, as a party to some of the resolutions of disputes and also to make sure that when I do speak I don't speak with a hollow voice but that the rest of the world knows that on my stand, for instance, on human rights that I am not just speaking as a lonely voice but that I am strongly supported by the Congress and the people of the country.

This week the Congress passed almost unanimously—I think with only two dissenting votes in both Houses—a strong confirmation that my own stand expressed on human rights is indeed the stand of the American people. It's an unswerving commitment. It's one that will not be changing in the future. And I think for the rest of the world to know this and for the American people to participate in that expression of concern about human rights is a very constructive thing.

*Q. Mr. President, you said that when you received the report from the Woodcock Commission that every hope you had for their mission had been realized.*

*The President:* Yes, that is true.

*Q. That report suggested that the best way to get an actual accounting of those still missing in Southeast Asia is for the normalization of relations; yet your position in*

*the past has been that there must be an accounting first before relations can be normalized. Have you changed your position, and what hope does that give for the families?*

*The President:* No, I haven't changed my position. I have always taken the position that when I am convinced that the Vietnamese have done their best to account for the service personnel who are missing in action, at that point I would favor normalization, the admission of Vietnam into the United Nations, and the resumption of trade and other relationships with the Vietnamese.

I believe that the response of the Vietnamese leaders to the Woodcock Commission was very favorable. They not only gave us the bodies of 11 American servicemen, but they also promised to set up a Vietnamese bureaucracy to receive the information that we have had about the date and the place that we think service people were lost and to pursue those investigations.

I think this is about all they can do. I don't have any way to prove that they have accounted for all those about whom they have information. But I think, so far as I can discern, they have acted in good faith.

They have also suggested, and we have agreed, that we go to Paris to negotiate further without any preconditions. In the past, the Vietnamese have said that they would not negotiate with us nor give us additional information about the MIA's until we had agreed to pay reparations. They did not bring this up, which I thought was an act of reticence on their part.

They had claimed previously that President Nixon had agreed to pay large sums of money to Vietnam because of damage done to their country. Our position had been, whether or not that agreement had been made, that the Vietnamese had violated that agreement by intruding beyond the demilitarized zone during the war.

But they told Mr. Woodcock and sent word to me: We are not going to pursue past agreements and past disagreements. We are eager to look to the future.

And I am also eager to look to the future.

If we are convinced, as a result of the Paris negotiations and other actions on the part of the Vietnamese, that they are acting in good faith, that they are trying to help us account for our MIA's, then I would aggressively move to admit Vietnam to the United Nations and also to normalize relationships with them.

*Q. As to the second part of my question, what about the families of the 2,500 people who have still not been accounted for, or remains have not been returned?*

*The President:* I have nothing but sympathy for the families involved, and I can assure them through this news conference presentation that we will never cease attempting to account for those 2,500 American servicemen who were lost.

I might point out that at the conclusion of the Korean war and the Second World War, of those that were lost in action, we only accounted for—I think we still did not account for 22 percent. At the conclusion of the Vietnam war, my understanding is that we had accounted for all except about 4 percent.

I can't certify that we have all the information available, and we are never going to rest until we pursue information about those who are missing in action to the final conclusion. But I will do the best I can. But I don't want to mislead anybody by giving hope about discovery of some additional information when I don't believe that the hope is justified.

*Q. Mr. President, on the subject of Vietnam, if you feel the United States is not obligated to uphold the terms of the Paris peace accords because of the North Vietnamese offensive that overthrew the South Vietnamese Government, do you feel, on the other hand, any moral obligation to help rebuild that country?*

*The President:* I can't say what my position would be now on future economic relationships with Vietnam. I think that could only be concluded after we continue

with negotiations to see what their attitude might be toward us.

My own natural inclination is to have normal diplomatic relationships with all countries in the world. Sometimes there are obstacles. I believe there are now 14 nations with whom we do not have diplomatic relationships.

I don't know what the motivations of the Vietnamese might be. I think part of the motivation might be to be treated along with other nations in economic assistance from our country and in trade and development of their fairly substantial natural resources, including oil.

Other considerations might be political in nature. They might very well want to balance their friendship with us with their friendship with the Soviet Union and not be completely dependent upon the Soviet Union. That is just a guess on my part. But I am willing to negotiate in good faith. But as far as describing what our economic relationship might be with Vietnam in the future after the relationships are established, I just couldn't do that now.

*Q. Mr. President, with that understanding and your hesitancy to disclose a position before negotiations are started—*

*The President:* I don't have a position.

*Q. Beyond that, do you still feel that if that information on those American servicemen who are missing in action is forthcoming from the Vietnamese, that then this country has a moral obligation to help rebuild that country, if that information is forthcoming?*

*The President:* Well, the destruction was mutual. You know, we went to Vietnam without any desire to capture territory or to impose American will on other people. We went there to defend the freedom of the South Vietnamese. And I don't feel that we ought to apologize or to castigate ourselves or to assume the status of culpability.

Now, I am willing to face the future without reference to the past. And that is what the Vietnamese leaders have proposed. And if, in normalization of relationships,

there evolves trade, normal aid processes, then I would respond well. But I don't feel that we owe a debt nor that we should be forced to pay reparations at all.

*Q. Mr. President, yesterday several Congressmen accused your economic policies as being dictated by New York banks. Now, your plans for bailing out New York through using the IMF [International Monetary Fund] with a hyperinflationary process indeed does sound like a recent speech that David Rockefeller made in which he called for hyperinflating the advanced sector and imposing so-called demand economies on the Third World, which means massive austerity.*

*Now, at the same time, over recent weeks a number of our NATO allies—*

*The President:* What is your question?

*Q. My question is, over recent weeks a number of our NATO allies have indicated that they would rather see the problem of Third World debt resolved through a debt moratorium. And I am just wondering if there is any chance that you'd go along with our allies in that direction, or if you would insist on this kind of hyperinflationary bailing out.*

*The President:* Well, I have had no entreaties from David Rockefeller concerning the New York problem, nor have I had any of our allies that have called on me to join them in a debt moratorium. I am not in favor of a debt moratorium.

*Q. Mr. President, would you mind telling us what our commitments are in Zaire and what the ramifications of those commitments might be to us?*

*The President:* We have no outstanding commitments in Zaire. Over a period of years, President Mobutu has been a friend of ours. We've enjoyed good relationships with Zaire. We have substantial commercial investments in that country.

After the recent, very disruptive conflict within Zaire when the country was finally formed—a number of years ago—it has been fairly stable since then. Zaire was involved,

I think at least indirectly, in the Angolan conflict, and there are some remaining hard feelings between Angola and Zaire on that part. Some of the Katangans who lived in the southern part of Zaire are now involved in trying to go back into the area where they formerly lived.

We have no hard evidence, or any evidence as far as that goes, that the Cubans or Angolan troops have crossed the border into Zaire. We look on them as a friendly nation, and we have no obligations to them as far as military aid goes. But we have been cooperating in exchanging information with the Belgian Government, the French Government, and others, just to try to stabilize the situation and to lessen the chance of expanding the conflict.

*Q. Mr. President, I don't ask this question in a churlish way or an argumentative way—*

*The President:* I'm sure you don't. [Laughter.]

*Q. But taking—recalling the unwillingness of the United States to interene at the time of the Hungarian uprising or at the time of Dubeek's ouster in Czechoslovakia, what do you really think that you can accomplish for political dissidents in the Soviet Union, not in other parts of the world, but in the Soviet Union? And I have a followup I would like to ask.*

*The President:* Why don't you ask your followup now and I will try to answer.

*Q. My followup is this: You are saying that all of the evidence that you have from Mr. Brezhnev is that he is willing to go forward or he is receptive to SALT Two negotiations.*

*Mr. Brezhnev said before the labor congress that normal relations would be impossible—unthinkable was his word—if your human rights campaign continued. You have referred to private communications with Mr. Brezhnev, and I would like to know, in the followup question, whether he has given you any assurances in those private communications that he is indeed willing to go forward on SALT Two.*

*The President:* Well, it is not just a matter of private conversations. We are not trying to overthrow the Soviet Government nor to intrude ourselves into their affairs in a military way.

I think it has been a well-recognized international political principle that interference in a government is not a verbal thing. There is an ideological struggle that has been in progress for decades between the Communist nations on the one hand and the democratic nations on the other.

Mr. Brezhnev and his predecessors have never refrained from expressing their view when they disagreed with some aspect of social or political life in the free world. And I think we have a right to speak out openly when we have a concern about human rights wherever those abuses occur.

I think that Mr. Brezhnev has not said that he is concerned about my campaign on human rights. What he said is that he objects to any intrusion into the internal affairs of the Soviet Union.

Now, I have tried to be reticent about it. I have tried to let my own position be clear in the speech at the United Nations and in my other actions. I have tried to make sure that the world knows that we are not singling out the Soviet Union for abuse or criticism.

We are trying to move in our own country to open travel opportunities and to correct civil rights abuses and other abuses in our country. So I don't think this is a matter that is connected with the search for peace through the SALT negotiations, for instance.

The very fact that Mr. Brezhnev and his associates have welcomed Secretary Vance to the Soviet Union and have helped us prepare a very comprehensive agenda is adequate proof that he has not broken off relationships in any way and that he has hopes that the talks will be productive. My belief is that he is acting in good faith. We are not going to negotiate in such a way that we leave ourselves vulnerable. But if the Soviet

Union is willing to meet us halfway in searching for peace and disarmament, we will meet them halfway.

I think that this is a good indication that they are acting in good faith. If we are disappointed, which is a possibility, then we'll try to modify our stance.

## Letters of Credence

### *Austria*

The newly appointed Ambassador of the Republic of Austria, Karl Herbert Schober, presented his credentials to President Carter on March 23.<sup>1</sup>

### *Chile*

The newly appointed Ambassador of the Republic of Chile, Jorge Cauas, presented his credentials to President Carter on March 23.<sup>1</sup>

### *Guinea*

The newly appointed Ambassador of the Republic of Guinea, Daouda Kourouma, presented his credentials to President Carter on March 23.<sup>1</sup>

### *Kenya*

The newly appointed Ambassador of the Republic of Kenya, John Peter Mbogua, presented his credentials to President Carter on March 23.<sup>1</sup>

### *Swaziland*

The newly appointed Ambassador of the Kingdom of Swaziland, Musa Simon Kunene, presented his credentials to President Carter on March 23.<sup>1</sup>

<sup>1</sup> For texts of the Ambassador's remarks and the President's reply, see Department of State press release dated Mar. 23.

## Presidential Commission Visits Vietnam and Laos To Seek Information on Missing Americans

*The five-member Presidential Commission on Americans Missing and Unaccounted For in Southeast Asia visited Vietnam and Laos March 16-20. Following are remarks to the press by President Carter and the transcript of a news conference by Leonard Woodcock and former Senator Mike Mansfield after the Commission's meeting with President Carter on March 23, together with the text of the Commission's report, which was released by the White House that day.*

### REMARKS AND NEWS CONFERENCE

White House press release dated March 23

#### President Carter

I would like to make a brief report on what I consider to be a superb mission to Vietnam and Laos on the part of Leonard Woodcock and Senator Mike Mansfield, Marian Edelman, Ambassador Yost, and Congressman Montgomery to inquire about the accounting for American service people who were missing in action and also to lay the groundwork for future normalization of diplomatic relationships with those two countries.

Every hope that we had for the mission has been realized. The Commission members and the staff were received with great friendship. The Vietnamese delivered to the Commission 12 bodies. Eleven of them have been identified as American servicemen. One body is not an American serviceman and will be returned. We have notified the Vietnamese Government about the error, and it was an honest mistake.

Positive identification procedures are continuing in Hawaii. We feel that without delay—this is a very careful and meticulous process—that we can notify the families when positive identification is assured.

The other 11 bodies are American service people, and we think we know who they are, but before the families are notified we want to be absolutely certain. The one body that was in error, the family is being notified about that error.

The Vietnamese have not tied together economic allocations of American funds with the MIA question. We believe that they have acted in good faith. They have promised to set up a permanent study mechanism by which the U.S. Government can provide information that we have about the potential whereabouts or identity of servicemen who were lost, and the Vietnamese have promised to cooperate in pursuing the evidence that we might present to them in the future.

They have also suggested that we reinitiate diplomatic discussions in Paris without delay to resolve other issues that might be an obstacle to peace between our two countries and friendship between our two countries and normalization of relationships between our two countries.

I will respond immediately to Premier Pham Van Dong that we accept their invitation and that these discussions will commence. There are no preconditions requested and there will certainly be no preconditions on our part for these talks in Paris.

I would like to express on behalf of the American people my sincere thanks to Chairman Leonard Woodcock and to the

Commission members. They met with almost every conceivable interested group before they departed from the United States, including representatives of the families of servicemen who are missing in action, congressional leaders, and others. And they formed a team which worked in remarkable concert and performed their assignment in an absolutely superlative way.

At this time I would like to introduce to the group Chairman Leonard Woodcock, who will be available to answer your questions about the trip. Later on this afternoon, a complete written report by the Commission to me will be made public.

Thank you very much.

### **Mr. Woodcock and Senator Mansfield**

*Q. Can you tell us what body it was that was returned? Was that a Vietnamese?*

*Mr. Woodcock:* The indication is it is a person who is approximately 50 years old and a Vietnamese. I might emphasize, as far as all the members of the Commission are concerned, we are absolutely convinced that this was a human error and simply underscores the enormity of the task of recovering those missing in action.

I think it is in the public domain that those lost in World War II and in the Korean war—22 percent were finally not accounted for. In this war, the number is less than 4½ percent.

Of course, you have substantial land areas. In the case of Laos, it is a huge land area with a very small population, no more than 3½ million; and the difficulties are considerable. We hope we have—I think we have placed on track the solution to this question.

*Q. Have you submitted the 12th name on our list to tell the Vietnamese that that particular individual has not been returned? You have 11 that are accounted for from the list of those missing in action.*

*Mr. Woodcock:* That is correct.

*Q. Have you told them that the 12th name—*

*Mr. Woodcock:* When we were acquainted with this by the Central Identification Laboratory in Honolulu, a message was immediately sent from the Commission through our normal procedures through Paris to the Vietnamese, yes.

*Q. Are you and the Commission satisfied, convinced, that the Government of Vietnam has done its best, or reasonably done its best, to account for all of the MIA's?*

*Mr. Woodcock:* At this point?

*Q. Yes.*

*Mr. Woodcock:* We are satisfied that what has been done to date, particularly within the last few days, plus their assurance that there will be renewed efforts, which is still in the future—we are satisfied with the agreement to set up the process.

We have recommended, among other things, that they be invited, for example, to send representatives to our Central Identification Laboratory in Honolulu because they do really quite extraordinary things with regard to identification on evidence that at first blush would seem to me to be very little.

*Q. Let me try from the other way. Do you believe that they are holding back either information on American men?*

*Mr. Woodcock:* It is quite obvious, with regard, for example, to the 24th body, that they have known about that for some time. And on the last evening, late in the last evening, when they informed us that Mr. Gougemann died in the South last June and they also said they would turn over that set of remains—it is quite obvious that had been held back.

We believe from this point, particularly if we can have an ongoing relationship, that that will be ended.

*Q. Mr. Woodcock, did you bring back any information on any GI's who might have chosen to stay there?*

*Mr. Woodcock:* They were queried about the possibility of deserters who had joined the Vietnamese community. They said they



were not aware of any. They did say that all Americans who had registered with them had been allowed to leave.

*Q. Do you come away then with the view to the central question that the MIA's really are all dead?*

*Mr. Woodcock:* That is the general conclusion of the Commission.

*Q. Mr. Woodcock, yesterday you refused to characterize your mission as a success. Today the President calls it a great success. Have you changed your mind, by any chance?*

*Mr. Woodcock:* I think it is a success in the terms of what we established for ourselves. I said on behalf of the Commission when we left we were seeking a key to the solution of the MIA problem and through that hoping to build a bridgehead toward normalization.

We think that has been done. But obviously what will happen from now on will depend upon future events—not unilateral future events, but bilateral future events.

*Q. The question is, what was uppermost in the minds of this government in sending you to get an accounting of the MIA's or to get started on the road toward normalization?*

*Mr. Woodcock:* I don't think you can separate the one from the other. Obviously, there has to be a solution to the one to make the other possible. It is my own personal conclusion it is in the national interest of this country to have a stable Southeast Asia. You cannot have a stable Southeast Asia without having stability with regard to our relationship with the Socialist Republic of Vietnam.

*Q. When you said you believed the general conclusion is the MIA's are all dead, how many does that include besides the 11 that were brought back?*

*Mr. Woodcock:* The total number that were unaccounted for, including civilians, at the point when we went there was 2,546.

*Q. You believe that all of these are dead?*

*Mr. Woodcock:* We do not think that there are any Americans left alive in either Vietnam or Laos who are being held against their will.

*Q. Why can't their graves be found?*

*Mr. Woodcock:* That process we have underway.

When you consider the thick foliage of jungle over so much of the land area, when that total number includes those lost at sea, we start with a number of which based upon ordinary evidence there could be no hope of finding.

*Q. When did the question of sending negotiators back to Paris come up, and in what context was it—what kind of problem? Would that be sort of a start of diplomatic relations? What are the major questions? The aid question?*

*Mr. Woodcock:* With regard to the discussions in Paris, that has never been stopped. There was a discussion last November which was not continued. Then there were preparatory discussions leading to the visit of this Commission. So that continuing negotiations or discussions in Paris is not new. That is something that has been done sporadically now over several years.

*Q. When you said you established a bridgehead toward normalization of relations, does that apply to Laos as well as Vietnam?*

*Mr. Woodcock:* With regard to Laos, we had a relatively brief formal discussion in which they laid down the position they had been holding. Our informal relationships and discussions were very frank. They indicated to us that they would set up an agency for the purpose of seeing what could be done relative to the recovery of those missing in action. Then they confirmed that in an official broadcast on the day after we had left.

We came away with some hope, which we think has been confirmed, but all of that lies in the future.

*Q. I would like to ask Senator Mansfield*

*something. Senator, did you find any extraordinary amount of bitterness on the part of government officials with whom you talked, or do you think if we established normal relations we can have a very friendly relationship with Vietnam?*

*Senator Mansfield:* Less bitterness than I thought would be noticeable. And the answer to the second part of your question: Yes.

*Q. Senator Mansfield, what do you think personally of the United States giving financial or economic aid to Vietnam?*

*Senator Mansfield:* It depends what channels you want to use. I think the present channel through international agencies is the correct one. What will come out later will be determined by what will happen in the meantime.

*The press: Thank you.*

## TEXT OF THE COMMISSION'S REPORT<sup>1</sup>

### PRESIDENTIAL COMMISSION ON AMERICANS MISSING AND UNACCOUNTED FOR IN SOUTHEAST ASIA

*Report on Trip to Vietnam and Laos March 16-20, 1977*

#### I. Mandate of the Commission

On February 25, 1977, the State Department announced that the President was sending a Presidential Commission of distinguished Americans to Southeast Asia to help him obtain an accounting about missing Americans in that region. Mr. Leonard Woodcock, President of the United Auto Workers, was chosen by the President to head the five-member Commission. Other members were: Former Senator Mike Mansfield, former Ambassador Charles W. Yost, Congressman G. V. Montgomery, and Ms. Marian Wright Edelman, Director of the Children's Defense Fund.

The Commission was charged with traveling to Vietnam and Laos to meet with representatives of the Socialist Republic of Vietnam and the Lao People's Democratic Republic to seek information on our missing personnel, including the return of recoverable remains. The Commission was also instructed to receive from these governments their views on matters affecting our mutual relations. The Commission was requested by the President to report its findings directly to him on their return.

The Commission was not a diplomatic mission in the

usual sense, in that it was not empowered to negotiate on behalf of the U.S. Government on matters involving relations between the U.S. and the two countries which it was to visit. However, the Commission was given authority to reach agreement with the Vietnamese and Lao authorities on matters pertaining to the question of our missing personnel in order to obtain information and recoverable remains.

Both White House and State Department announcements made clear that the U.S. Government remained concerned about all Americans lost in Southeast Asia, those still listed as missing as well as the larger number who have been presumed dead with no accounting being provided. The fact that a man has been declared dead for legal purposes did not affect the U.S. Government's determination to seek information about him and to arrange for the return of his remains if they could be recovered.

The announcements also stated that the naming of the Commission and its trip to Indochina was a further, measured step which the U.S. Government was taking to put the recent conflict behind us and to establish more normal relations between ourselves and the countries of that area.

#### II. Preparations for the Trip

After receiving the Presidential mandate for its mission, the Commission immediately initiated a series of actions designed to insure careful preparation for its trip.

The Departments of State and Defense provided briefing material on the background and history of the MIA issue, including details on missing individuals and on past efforts to obtain information on them, as well as a review of U.S. relations with the countries of Indochina.

On Monday, March 7th, the Commission held its first formal meeting and briefing session at the Department of State. This briefing included discussions of previous dealings with the Vietnamese and Lao, in particular the Vietnamese position of linking their action on MIA's under Article 8b of the Paris Agreement to what they claim was the remaining U.S. obligation to help heal the wounds of war to Vietnam by providing aid as stipulated by Article 21 of the same accord.<sup>2</sup> The Commission concluded that it would be better to approach the Vietnamese in a humanitarian spirit of mutual cooperation, looking to the future, rather than to engage in sterile, legalistic debate of the past which focused on the war. Dr. Henry Kenny, former staff member of the House Select Committee on Missing Persons in Southeast Asia, described that Committee's 1975 trip to Hanoi and Vientiane to obtain the return of three American pilots and to discuss the MIA problem with leaders of both countries.

In cooperation with the Commission, the Depart-

<sup>1</sup> Released on Mar. 23 (text from White House press release).

<sup>2</sup> For text of the agreement, see BULLETIN of Feb. 12, 1973, p. 169.

ment of State arranged for U.S. representatives to meet with Vietnamese representatives in Paris to prepare further for the Commission's visit to Hanoi. Mr. James D. Rosenthal, Director of Vietnam, Laos and Cambodia Affairs, and chief of the Commission's staff for its visit to Southeast Asia, attended this meeting and reported back to the Commission in Washington prior to its departure.

The Commission also met with non-governmental organizations and individuals who were concerned with the MIA problem and other matters pertinent to its mission. On March 7th, the Commission met with representatives of the National League of Families of American Prisoners and Missing in Southeast Asia. The League said that they recognized an accounting for all the missing was impossible but that some men still missing were known to be alive at one time and the American people are entitled to know what happened to them. They urged the Commission to seek all possible information on these men. Chairman Woodcock and the Commission members assured the League representatives that this was the primary purpose of the trip and the Commission would do the best it could.

A meeting was also held on March 11th with representatives of the American Friends Service Committee, who briefed the Commission on their recent visit to Vietnam and urged it to consider humanitarian aid to that country. Mr. Richard Dudman of the *St. Louis Post Dispatch*, who had been captured and released during the war in Cambodia, urged the Commission to approach Cambodia on the MIA issue, particularly in regard to the 25 international journalists missing in that country, four of whom are Americans. The Commission agreed to contact the Cambodians to try to arrange a meeting with Cambodian representatives during its trip.

Commission members also met or talked individually with persons and groups with a specific interest in their mission, such as MIA family members.

The Commission was fortunate to have the recently published final report of the House Select Committee on Missing Persons in Southeast Asia, which documented in detail past military and diplomatic efforts to obtain a resolution of the MIA problem and which included recommendations for future action. All Commission members read this report thoroughly and were told later in Vietnam by SRV Deputy Foreign Minister Phan Hien that he had also read it.

On Saturday, March 12th, the Commission met with President Carter and Secretary of State Cyrus Vance. The President expressed his deep concern about obtaining a satisfactory MIA accounting and his hope for eventual normalization of relations with Vietnam and Laos. The Commission was directed not to apologize for past relations, but to emphasize the President's desire for a new beginning with these governments on the basis of equality and mutual respect. It was instructed to seek all MIA information and to obtain all recoverable remains from the Vietnamese and Lao and to listen carefully to the concerns of these governments on other matters of mutual interest. The Presi-

dent asked Mr. Woodcock to deliver personal letters from him to Vietnamese Prime Minister Pham Van Dong and to Lao President Souphanouvong.

On March 13th the Commission departed Washington for Hawaii, where it received briefings by the Department of Defense, the Joint Casualty Resolution Center (JCRC) and the Central Identification Laboratory (CIL). The DOD briefer indicated there were 2,546 Americans who did not return from the war in Indochina, of whom 758 are still listed as MIA or POW. "We have no evidence," he said, "to indicate that any American servicemen are being held as prisoners in Southeast Asia, but whether a man is alive or dead does not relieve us of the responsibility to seek an accounting for him." The briefings described the many efforts made to obtain information and recover remains, since the end of U.S. involvement in the Indochina War and the Paris Agreement of January 1973. The Commission was impressed by data showing that the number unaccounted for in Indochina is about 4% of those killed in that conflict. As indicated in the House Select Committee Report, this contrasts with the 22% unresolved cases in World War II and Korea. This impressed upon the Commission the need to be realistic in its expectations for a further Indochina accounting. The Commission also visited the CIL where it reviewed procedures for identifying recovered remains. The Commission was impressed by the CIL's capability of identifying even partial remains and noted that CIL expertise is one reason why there is not yet an unknown soldier from the Vietnam War.

The Commission departed Hawaii on March 13th for the Philippines, where it remained overnight to rest and prepare further for its visit to Hanoi and Vientiane. U.S. Ambassador to the Philippines William H. Sullivan met with the Commission and provided it with the benefit of his many years of experience in negotiating with the Vietnamese.

### III. Visit to Vietnam

#### PROGRAM IN HANOI

The Commission arrived in Hanoi at 2:45 p.m., March 16, 1977 aboard a U.S. Air Force C-141 from Clark Air Base and departed at approximately 10:00 a.m. March 19, 1977 aboard the same aircraft for Vientiane.

Deputy Foreign Minister Phan Hien greeted the Commission at Gia Lam Airport upon arrival. The Commission and staff were housed in the official Government Guest House as guests of the Socialist Republic of Vietnam.

The Commission was received by SRV Deputy Prime Minister and Foreign Minister Nguyen Duy Trinh two hours after arrival. There were formal meetings on March 17 and 18 between the Commission and the Vietnamese delegation led by Deputy Foreign Minister Phan Hien, a meeting with Prime Minister Pham Van Dong in the afternoon of March 17, and a separate meeting between technical experts concerned with the

development of MIA information and recovery of remains. Representative Montgomery was the only Commission member who attended the latter meeting.

In addition, Minister Trinh hosted a formal dinner and cultural performance for the Commission on March 17 and attended a dinner given in turn by the Commission on the next night. Other Commission activities included: a visit to the Hanoi City cemetery, located in Ha Dong Province roughly 20 kilometers from Hanoi, to see the remains of the 12 pilots which the Vietnamese agreed to turn over to the Commission; and a dignified ceremony upon reception of the remains at Gia Lam Airport on March 19 just prior to departure.

Members of the Commission also undertook individual activities. The Chairman had two private meetings with Deputy Foreign Minister Phan Hien, and Ms. Edelman visited a kindergarten and had a meeting with Mme. Nguyen Thi Binh, Minister of Education.

#### ATMOSPHERE IN HANOI

A significant aspect of the Commission's visit to Vietnam was the cordial atmosphere which prevailed throughout its stay. The Vietnamese Government appeared to have made a major effort to ensure that the Commission's stay was both pleasant and productive and that the Commission was treated with respect and dignity. This point is of importance because in Asia the form of a visit and the level of attention given to a delegation often conveys an essential political message. Using this standard, the Commission concludes that the Vietnamese leadership was indicating by this treatment the importance it attached to the Commission's visit, and its genuine desire for a new and improved relationship with the United States. This did not, of course, mean that the Vietnamese were ready to concede on substantive issues, but it was—and is—an encouraging beginning to serious discussions on them.

The spirit of cordiality carried over into meetings as well. Phan Hien spoke in a spirit of conciliation during both of the formal meetings. There was a conspicuous absence of polemics or harsh rhetoric on either side.

Prime Minister Pham Van Dong also received the Commission for a special meeting at which the President's personal letter was delivered to him. The talks with him were candid; he expressed his government's policy firmly but without rancor or harshness despite the recent bitter past. He expressed particular appreciation for the President's message and later asked the Commission to convey back to the President a letter from him in reply.

There were sporadic attempts to restrict individual movement around Hanoi, but in general Commission members and staff were permitted to go where they wished. This was usually—but not always—under escort. Protocol officers explained that this was for security reasons, citing possible hostile acts by the populace which still remembers the "destruction caused by U.S. bombing." These restrictions eased as the visit progressed. This point is important because it

reminded the Commission that, despite all the good will and cordiality which marked the visit, there will for quite a while be an element of reserve toward us because of the long period when we and the Vietnamese were adversaries.

#### SUBSTANCE OF TALKS IN HANOI

##### *Missing in Action*

The highlight of the Commission's talks in Hanoi was the SRV's formal undertaking to give the U.S. all available information on our missing men as it is found and to return remains as they are recovered and exhumed. This new commitment was contained in statements by top SRV officials and was further refined in the Technical Sub-Commission meeting with officials of the Vietnamese agency responsible for seeking information on the missing and recovering remains.

The key elements in the Vietnamese statements were as follows:

a) The remains of the 12 U.S. airmen announced last September as killed in action would be returned to the U.S. and could be taken back by the Commission if desired.

b) All living U.S. military POW's have been returned.

c) All U.S. civilians remaining in South Vietnam after April 30, 1975 who registered with the Vietnamese authorities have left the country.

d) The SRV has established a specialized office to seek information on missing Americans and to recover remains. Although terrain and the tropical conditions of Vietnam have hindered search efforts, this office is actively seeking information and the remains of missing Americans.

e) The SRV will give the U.S. "as soon as possible" all available information and remains as they are discovered.

f) The Vietnamese would welcome U.S. assistance for this work in the form of information and documents, as well as material means helpful to the search efforts.

Although the MIA undertaking was stated in unqualified terms, the Vietnamese made clear that they still considered this subject and other aspects of U.S.-SRV relations to be "interrelated." They stated that their actions on MIA's were in conformance with Article 8b of the Paris Accord, for example, and cited the need for comparable U.S. fulfillment of its alleged obligation under Article 21 to "heal the wounds of war" and provide reconstruction aid. They also raised the issue of normalization of relations in this context. They were careful to say that none of these three points (i.e., MIA's, normalization, and aid) should be considered as preconditions to the other two and it was not the SRV's intention to raise the question this way. But they did note that they were closely related to each other and that both sides should take them in an overall context and apply their position in a flexible way. This appeared to go farther than previous SRV

statements in reducing the specific linkage between Vietnamese action on MIA's and U.S. agreement to provide aid. But it still suggests that actual Vietnamese performance on MIA's will probably be subject to our willingness to move concretely to implement the spirit of good will displayed by the Commission's visit.

The Technical Sub-Commission meeting was requested by the U.S. side and agreed on by the Vietnamese for the morning of March 18, prior to the second formal session with Phan Hien. Representative Montgomery attended for the Commission with staff support by Mr. [Frank A.] Sieverts, Dr. [Roger] Shields, Dr. Kenny, and the JCRC representatives. Leading for the Vietnamese was Vu Hoang, Director of the Consular Department of the Vietnamese Ministry of Foreign Affairs, and Director of the office responsible for seeking information on the missing and the recovery of remains. He was supported by two specialists.

The Vietnamese described their MIA office as organized from central to provincial levels and said it relies on local citizen groups for much of its information. They noted that the forested and mountainous terrain of Vietnam hindered searches, and that even where a plane had been seen coming down it was often hard to find it. Pilots who bailed out might come down many miles from the downed aircraft and were often lost, unless they landed in populated areas. Other impediments to successful searches noted by Mr. Hoang were the lack of specialized tools and transportation, the "attitude of the people" reluctant to help with U.S. MIA's when so many of their own relatives had been lost, and the fact that in the South the search had only recently been organized.

The Vietnamese noted that they had substantially increased their budget for this work and confirmed that they would be pleased to receive materials to aid the search process, including case folders, anthropological books, tools, medical supplies and antiseptics, and transportation equipment. They also said they would look into the possibility of providing items such as dog tags, aircraft numbers, and personal effects, as well as remains of Americans lost in the South.

Mr. Hoang proposed that information and other materials be exchanged directly with him at his address in the Foreign Ministry. He asked with whom he could correspond and was given Mr. Sieverts' name at the State Department as a point of contact.

The Sub-Commission also worked out procedures for the return of the 12 remains. The full Commission later visited the cemetery where the remains were being kept following their exhumation.

In a brief meeting following the final dinner, the Commission was told that American citizen Tucker Goglemann had died in Saigon in June 1976, and that his remains would be returned as soon as they could be hygienically exhumed. The Commission had asked in its initial meeting about Mr. Goglemann, the last known American remaining in Vietnam following the communist takeover who wished to leave. The Commission was also told at this final meeting that the

Vietnamese believed another American may be buried in the Hanoi cemetery and promised to return his remains as well. Although they almost certainly have at least some additional MIA information available, they did not provide it to the Commission during its visit.

### *Normalization of Relations*

Vietnamese officials expressed a strong desire to move toward normal relations with the U.S. and stated that the Socialist Republic of Vietnam is prepared to establish diplomatic relations with us. At the same time they noted that obstacles still exist on the road to normalizing relations, although expressing hope that with good will they could all be removed. They said Vietnam is prepared to normalize on the basis of sovereignty, mutual respect, noninterference in each other's affairs and peaceful coexistence. Regarding diplomatic relations, they indicated Vietnam is prepared to establish them, but then added that this will depend on the attitude of the United States and "whether it will give up its erroneous policy of the past." They stated that the Vietnamese view is that actions such as the U.S. economic blockade and the veto of Vietnam's entry into the UN stem from this erroneous policy. Finally, they said that there are three key areas of discussion between us: the MIA's, normalization, and aid. They stated we should not consider any one as a precondition to the other two, but noted that they clearly are interrelated.

The Vietnamese proposed negotiations between diplomatic representatives of the U.S. and SRV to discuss the elements and process of normalization. They suggested talks in Paris. The Commission said it would convey this proposal to the President for his consideration.

Vietnamese leaders expressed clearly to the Commission their government's foreign policy, in particular regarding their neighbors in Southeast Asia. They presented to the Commission Foreign Minister Trinh's "Four Points" as the basis for their policy:

"1. Respect for each other's independence, sovereignty and territorial integrity, non-aggression, non-interference in each other's internal affairs, equality, mutual benefit and peaceful co-existence.

2. Not to allow any foreign country to use one's territory as a base for direct or indirect aggression and intervention against the other country and other countries in the region.

3. Establishment of friendly and good-neighborly relations, economic cooperation and cultural exchanges on the basis of equality and mutual benefit. Settlement of disputes among the countries in the region through negotiations in a spirit of equality, mutual understanding and respect.

4. Development of cooperation among the countries in the region for the building of prosperity in keeping with each country's specific conditions, and for the sake of genuine independence, peace and neutrality in Southeast Asia, thereby contributing to peace in the world."

The Vietnamese complained about the negative attitude of the new Thai authorities toward Vietnam and advised the U.S., as friends of Thailand, to urge the Thais to better their relations with the SRV by living up to the Thai-Vietnamese joint communique of last August 6. The Commission expressed the new U.S. Administration's desire for a stable, peaceful, and prosperous Southeast Asia.

#### *Economic and Humanitarian Assistance*

In the Commission's meetings with them, the Vietnamese emphasized their strong interest in receiving aid from the United States. This was expressed as an American "responsibility" and "obligation," and aid was generally categorized as something the United States "should" do.

In their presentations, they cited three ways of looking at the U.S. "responsibility" to contribute to postwar reconstruction: legal, humanitarian, and on the basis of reciprocity. They said they were ready to be flexible in discussing the modalities of how we might provide aid to them, though they continued to cite Article 21 of the Paris Accord.

Aside from the legal basis for our providing assistance, the Vietnamese discussed a humanitarian basis for aid. Suggesting they were performing a humanitarian act in working to alleviate the suffering of the MIA families, they stated that in fairness we should be willing to act humanely to repair some of the destruction caused during the war. They indicated that Vietnam has a pressing immediate need for food aid, fertilizer, farm machinery, building materials for schools and hospitals, raw materials for its factories, and medicines.

In the third aspect—reciprocity—the Vietnamese made the point that actions cannot come from just one side. Obliquely referring to their accounting for the MIA's and providing aid, they indicated that each side must take steps which address the concerns of the other. As noted earlier, they did not specifically link the two issues, although they noted that aid, in MIA accounting, and normalization are "interrelated."

At other times, the Vietnamese referred to our providing aid to them as a matter of conscience or as a moral obligation. They said aid is an "obligation you should fulfill—an obligation to be fulfilled with all your conscience and all your sense of responsibility." They added that, "In brief, we have obligations which are related to each other. So we should start from this position."

The Vietnamese also indicated their government's willingness to be flexible regarding the form aid might take. While not specifically stating which they might prefer, they referred to discussions with previous U.S. administrations in which various forms of aid were mentioned, including concessional, bilateral, and multilateral.

#### *Refugees and Family Reunification*

The Vietnamese said they would be "generous" with regard to their citizens wishing to join relatives in the

U.S., and to those wanting to return to Vietnam from abroad, providing they follow proper procedures. The Commission welcomed this statement and suggested continued efforts to resolve this problem through the Red Cross and UNHCR [United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees].

#### *Social Problems*

In response to her request the Vietnamese arranged for Ms. Edelman to visit a kindergarten-child care center, and to meet with the Minister of Education, Mme. Nguyen Thi Binh (formerly Foreign Minister of the PRG [Provisional Revolutionary Government]). In discussions with Ms. Edelman the Vietnamese described their efforts to care for orphans (who they said numbered 500,000 including those with one parent) and to rehabilitate "street children" in South Vietnam. The Vietnamese said nutrition was their main child care problem, reflecting their overall concern about their current food shortages.

With Ms. Edelman and in discussions with the Commission, the Vietnamese referred to their continuing efforts to rehabilitate up to 400,000 former prostitutes, 100,000 drug addicts, and to treat venereal disease. They also noted that over 4 million of their population remained unemployed, mainly in South Vietnam.

#### **IV. Visit to Laos**

Some 550 Americans are listed as missing or dead in Laos. The President therefore asked the Commission to visit that country as well to seek the cooperation of the Lao authorities in resolving these cases. Secretary of State Vance addressed a letter to Phoune Sipaseuth, Deputy Prime Minister and Foreign Minister of the Lao People's Democratic Republic (LPDR), on February 24, 1977 asking that the Commission be received in Laos. Minister Phoune replied on March 12 accepting the Secretary's proposal.

#### **PROGRAM IN VIENTIANE**

The Commission went from Hanoi to Vientiane, capital of Laos, early March 19 by U.S. military aircraft and remained until late afternoon March 20. The Commission met for two hours in formal talks with the LPDR delegation headed by Noupnan Sidphasay, Secretary of State (Deputy Foreign Minister) on March 19. The next day the Commission was received in separate meetings by Foreign Minister Phoune and by LPDR President Souphanouvong, to whom Chairman Woodcock delivered a personal letter from President Carter. The Commission was honored at a dinner given by the Lao Government March 19 and returned the hospitality with a luncheon March 20 attended by Minister Phoune and other high-level Lao officials.

#### **ATMOSPHERE IN VIENTIANE**

Although the U.S. maintains a small Embassy in Vientiane ably led by Charge d'Affaires Thomas J.

Corcoran. Lao-American relations have been cool since events in the spring of 1975 and the subsequent establishment of the LPDR in December of that year. However, working in cooperation with our Embassy, the Lao arranged a warm reception for the Commission and made it evident throughout the visit that the Commission was welcome. The Commission was greeted at the airport by Deputy Foreign Minister Noupnan and escorted to accommodations provided by the Lao Government in Vientiane's largest hotel. In the Commission's meetings with President Souphanouvong and Foreign Minister Phoune, both expressed the view that the Commission's visit was evidence of a new American attitude toward their country, and a demonstration of the President's desire to improve relations with Laos.

As in Vietnam, the tone and atmosphere of the Commission's visit to Laos was important. Chairman Woodcock made the point that the Commission had come not to replace the work of our Embassy but to underscore the President's desire to improve relations with Laos on the basis of mutual respect and benefit. He relayed the President's desire to help remove the obstacles to improved relations, such as the MIA question. This new spirit was apparently understood and accepted by the Lao, whose leaders responded in a similar vein.

#### SUBSTANCE OF TALKS IN VIENTIANE

The Commission made clear to the Lao authorities the great importance the President and the American people attach to obtaining the best accounting possible for the Americans listed as missing or dead in Laos. The Chairman stated that the Commission would welcome any definite information or remains the Lao may have on these men, and indicated U.S. willingness to cooperate fully with the Lao in casualty resolution. He expressed the hope that the two parties could agree, during the Commission's visit, on an orderly procedure to resolve the issue. He noted to all the Lao leaders that progress on this issue would be a significant step toward improvement of U.S.-Lao relations.

The Lao expressed to the Commission their sympathy with the MIA families and their wish to relieve the latter's suffering. They noted the great difficulty of finding MIA information and remains in the rugged terrain of Laos, particularly given the country's small population and lack of material means. The Lao did assure the Commission that there are no Americans who have been captured and are alive in Laos, and that all Americans captured during the war had been returned to the U.S. They stated that the Lao Government had ordered before, and will now order again, the people of Laos to seek information and remains. But they regretted that they had no such information or remains now to provide the Commission.

In both formal and informal meetings, responsible Lao officials agreed to receive further MIA case files, as well as other material that we could provide to as-

sist their search. Commission members stressed that we understood the difficulties involved in Laos and were realistic in our expectations of what information could be developed. The Commission nevertheless emphasized the importance of all information, such as aircraft tail numbers, ID cards, dog tags, and even partial remains, as being helpful to the United States.

The Lao made clear to the Commission that they connected the MIA problem with that of U.S. assistance to "heal the wounds of war" and rebuild their country. They expressed the belief that the two problems should be resolved together, since both resulted from the war. They noted that if one speaks of humanitarian concern for the MIA's, one must also think of the damage Laos suffered at U.S. hands during the war. They said the Lao people could be expected to search for MIA information only when they see that the U.S. Government is interested in healing this damage and helping reconstruct the country. In more general terms, they indicated that the MIA problem can be resolved when there is a new relationship between the two countries and when U.S. policy has changed from hostility to friendship.

The Commission was informed during its visit of the problem of unexploded ordnance in Laos. One observer in Vientiane, who recently visited the Plain of Jars, reported that 15 persons had been killed during the past year in one village of 3400 people by such unexploded war material. The Commission believes the U.S. could provide advice and technical assistance on how to defuse such ordnance, and that the American people would understand and support such an effort.

In this regard the Lao, in the formal talks, laid great emphasis on difficulties caused by what they termed "reactionaries" engaged in hostile activities against their government. They expressed particular concern at what they claimed was Thai hostility toward them and Thai support for anti-LPDR elements both within Laos and in Thailand. They noted that the previous U.S. administration had been hostile toward Laos, and charged that it had supported some of these elements. They said that in any case, the U.S. Government has provided aid to the Thai, thus enabling the latter to support such elements. They expressed the belief that the U.S. should resolve this problem in order to provide a new atmosphere for relations between Laos and the U.S.

The Commission assured the Lao that the U.S. has no hostile intentions toward them and does not support elements hostile to the LPDR either within Laos or outside the country. Senator Mansfield made a particularly forceful rebuttal of the Lao charges, based on his experience and previous visits to Laos. The Lao took careful note of these assurances, and they later welcomed them as an indication of a new attitude on the part of the U.S. Government toward their country.

The Commission concludes from its visit to Laos that the Lao probably have considerably less information on MIA's than the Vietnamese, and are less able to develop additional information or locate remains. They probably could produce some, however, and could

gather more if they so desired. For example, there are a very few MIA's who were known to be in Lao hands in the 1960's and there are recent reports of scattered aircraft parts in the countryside which may resolve a few more cases.

The Commission feels that this will most likely happen in the context of a general improvement of relations with Laos. The Commission's visit helped considerably in this regard, not only as a demonstration of the new Administration's interest, but also as a means of assuring the Lao that we have no hostile intent toward them. The Commission took note of the formal LPR statement that no Americans are alive and prisoner in Laos, which though tragic seems true in light of all the evidence available. The Commission finds encouraging the Lao expression of willingness to accept further case files and other materials from us, and to cooperate more closely with us through our Embassy on the MIA problem.

Thus, while disappointed that it was not able to obtain further information and remains from the Lao during its visit, the Commission feels the trip was worthwhile in that it set a new tone for U.S.-Lao relations, emphasized to the Lao the importance we continue to attach to the MIA issue, and helped establish procedures for obtaining further information. One press report after the Commissioner's departure indicated that the Lao were setting up a committee to search for information, though this could not be confirmed at time of writing.

## V. Cambodia

Due to the current lack of communication between the U.S. and the Cambodian Government and the apparent unsettled situation in Phnom Penh, the Commission decided it was best not to try to go to the Cambodian capital. Instead, it was decided to attempt to arrange a contact with an Ambassador of Democratic Cambodia at a location in Southeast Asia. It was hoped that should such a meeting be possible, it would be a significant first step toward opening a dialogue with this new government, thus possibly improving our chances of obtaining information on those missing or killed in Cambodia, including the 25 journalists of various nationalities (four of whom are Americans). A representative of our Liaison Office in Peking delivered a formal request for such a meeting to the Democratic Cambodia Embassy in Peking.

On March 19 Radio Phnom Penh carried the text of a press communique issued by the Cambodian Foreign Ministry refusing our request and hurling harsh invective at the U.S. (the text is attached).<sup>3</sup> The Commission therefore was unable to meet with any representatives of the Cambodian government and was unable to provide any information about our people missing or killed there.

<sup>3</sup> Not printed here.

## VI. Press

American media viewed the Commission's trip as a major news event. The MIA issue was still generating widespread interest, the prospects for normalization reflected a significant foreign affairs initiative, and a visit to Hanoi, the first by American newsmen in five years, offered obvious human interest angles.

At the Commission's request, the State Department called Vietnamese attention to our media's strong interest in the visit and sought approval for their entry. Despite our effort to increase the number, the Vietnamese approved only five, who were selected by the State Department Correspondents' Association. NBC's John Hart served as pool reporter for American television and radio networks; CBS's Willis Brown was the pool TV cameraman. *Time Magazine's* Strobe Talbott represented the American news-magazines. AP's Peter Arnett and UPI's Richard Growald served their own companies.

Because the Vietnamese insisted that our press accompany the Commission, the trip proved unusual. Aboard the plane throughout the 24,000-mile journey, the press, the Commission, and the staff mixed freely. Both in Hanoi and Vientiane, the press was considered part of the delegation, was housed and ate with the Commission and staff, and attended all events except the talks themselves. The accessibility and frankness of the Commission with the press comported with the American public's great interest in the mission, and reflected the openness which characterizes the Administration's approach to public affairs.

American media coverage for the Commission was extensive, both in print and broadcasts. The Commission believes the public has received a fair and full account of its activities which should aid in developing the public support necessary for future Administration actions. A continuation of this openness is recommended as we move ahead.

The Vietnamese developed a fine appreciation of the importance of the American media during the war and afforded our accompanying press unusual cooperation. Special interviews were provided to them by the Vietnamese Prime Minister and the Deputy Foreign Minister for Press and Information.

In their meeting with the latter, the newsmen requested approval to remain in Vietnam to cover developments in greater detail. They were told that adequate facilities were not available at this time, but the Deputy Foreign Minister also pointed out that while over the years there had been about a dozen American newsmen in Hanoi, no Vietnamese journalists had ever been to the United States. The American newsmen offered to initiate an invitation. Should the Vietnamese seek visas as a result of this invitation, it will present the Administration with an opportunity to make a meaningful positive gesture by permitting them entry into the U.S. Although the Vietnamese media obviously reflect the constraints of a communist society, reciprocal visits would be in the interests of the normalization process generally.



While in Hanoi the American newsmen were usually free to walk around the immediate downtown area. At first, this had to be done in the company of English-speaking guides, but this gradually eased and enterprising newsmen found themselves able to explore their own interests on their own, when they chose to do so—within the obvious limits of language and lack of familiarity with the local scene.

## VII. Military Support for the Commission

Military support for the Commission was excellent. In addition to arranging briefings in Washington and Honolulu, the Defense Department and military services provided excellent transportation and billeting arrangements. Both the VC-135 which carried the Commission to the Philippines and the C-141 for the trip to Indochina were well equipped for the extensive work which was done on board. Arrangements at CINCPAC and Clark Air Base were also fully satisfactory.

## VIII. Commission's Conclusions

### MISSING IN ACTION

Although the Commission was able to obtain only the 12 remains as well as information on Tucker Gougelmann and a promise to deliver another set of remains during its brief stay, the Commission's visit did appear to create a new and favorable climate for improved relations with both Vietnam and Laos. In the Commission's view, the best hope for obtaining a proper accounting for our MIA's lies in the context of such improved relations. The Commission believes that the creation of this new spirit is the most significant contribution to the accomplishment of the mission assigned it by the President.

The Commission also believes it impressed upon the Vietnamese and Lao our realistic attitude on the MIA issue and our intention to resolve it on a reasonable basis in order to remove it as an obstacle to normalization. The Commission believes this approach is more likely to elicit further information and remains than continuing past policies of confronting the Vietnamese and Lao on the issue.

On the basis of its talks with Vietnamese and Laos officials at the highest level, and on other information available to it, the Commission specifically concludes:

1. There is no evidence to indicate that any American POW's from the Indochina conflict remain alive.

2. Americans who stayed in Vietnam after April 30, 1975, who registered with the Foreign Ministry and wished to leave have probably all been allowed to depart the country.

3. Although there continue to be occasional rumors of deserters or defectors still living in Indochina, the Commission found no evidence to support this conjecture.

4. The Vietnamese have not given us all the information they probably have, in part because of their concentration on the return of remains. The Commission believes it succeeded in making clear to the Vietnamese the importance we attach to receiving all kinds of information, however slight or fragmentary it may be.

5. The Vietnamese gave a clear formal assurance that they would look for MIA information and remains and that they would provide such information and remains to the U.S. They did not make this specifically contingent on our provision of aid, but they do see action on MIA's as related to resolution of other issues of concern to them.

6. For reasons of terrain, climate, circumstances of loss, and passage of time, it is probable that no accounting will ever be possible for most of the Americans lost in Indochina. Even where information may once have been available, it may no longer be recoverable due to the ravages of time and physical changes.

7. A new procedure has been established for the continuing exchange of MIA information between the U.S. and the SRV. The U.S. will use this mechanism to furnish additional information and materials to assist MIA searches.

8. The Lao authorities called attention to the difficulty of MIA search efforts in view of the difficult terrain in their country, but undertook to provide information and remains as they were found.

9. The Commission was unable to meet with representatives of the Cambodian Government. That government has repeatedly denied that it holds any foreign prisoners, and the Commission considers it unlikely that additional MIA information will be forthcoming from that country.

### NORMALIZATION OF RELATIONS

1. Both the Vietnamese and Lao leaders are clearly interested in establishing a new and friendlier relationship with the United States.

2. They indicate that they are willing to look to the future rather than the past in such a relationship, although they consider that the U.S. has remaining obligation to repair the damage caused by the war in their countries. This is likely to continue to be an important factor in working out new or improved relations with these two countries.

3. Both Vietnam and Laos have a clear interest in such a new relationship. Vietnam in particular apparently looks forward to benefits in such matters as trade and other long-term economic arrangements.

4. The Vietnamese are willing to enter into immediate high-level diplomatic discussions with the U.S. on normalization. They made clear their interest in establishing formal diplomatic relations as quickly as possible. They indicated their desire to see past "erroneous" U.S. policies on such matters as UN membership and the trade embargo changed.

5. Both the Vietnamese and Lao leaders appear to

view the present U.S. intentions toward them as more positive than in the past. They have a positive attitude themselves toward the new U.S. administration. They were pleased to understand that the U.S. is prepared to deal with them on the basis of equality and mutual respect, and that the U.S. has an interest in the stability and prosperity of Southeast Asia.

6. The Lao appreciated the Commission's assurances that the U.S. Government has no hostile intentions toward their regime and is not supporting elements trying to overthrow it, but they are likely to remain sensitive and suspicious as long as indigenous insurgent activity continues to give them significant problems.

#### ECONOMIC AND HUMANITARIAN ASSISTANCE

1. The Vietnamese clearly expect a significant U.S. contribution to their postwar economic reconstruction.

2. At the same time they indicated flexibility about the form this aid might take and the basis on which it could be given. They listed concessional aid, bilateral aid, multilateral aid and long-term loans as forms of aid which have been discussed in the past, although they did not specify which of these they preferred or whether any one form alone would be acceptable.

3. The Vietnamese seem prepared to deemphasize references to this aid as coming from U.S. obligations under the Paris Agreement. This remains clearly their own position, but they appear willing to discuss aid instead in humanitarian and moral terms. They indicated that they understand our domestic political constraints on this issue.

4. While not specifically linking provisions of U.S. aid to either an MIA accounting or normalization, the Vietnamese stated that these three issues are "interrelated" and indicated that they would expect both sides to take actions regarding the other's concerns. They did state that none of these three issues was a precondition to the other two. Nonetheless, it remains to be seen how forthcoming the Vietnamese may be in accounting for the MIA's if the U.S. does not take some steps on aid.

#### IX. Recommendations

1. The Commission believes that resumption of talks in Paris between representatives of the U.S. and Vietnamese Governments would be a most useful way of continuing the dialogue begun during its mission to Hanoi.

2. The Commission believes that normalization of relations affords the best prospect for obtaining a fuller accounting for our missing personnel and recommends that the normalization process be pursued vigorously for this as well as other reasons.

3. The Commission believes it most important to continue the technical exchanges with the Vietnamese agency on accounting for MIA's which were initiated in Hanoi.

4. In addition to talks in Paris, consideration should

be given to proposing that a U.S. representative personally bring such information to Hanoi, and to inviting Vietnamese representatives to visit the U.S. Central Identification Laboratory in Honolulu.

5. In view of the Vietnamese statements that they would be glad to receive material assistance to aid their search for U.S. remains, the Commission recommends that this subject be considered promptly within the U.S. Government with a view to quickly providing whatever assistance is appropriate.

6. Consideration should also be given to offering technical advice and assistance on defusing unexploded ordnance, which the Commission understands continues to be a serious problem in some areas. An international agency such as UNHCR could be helpful in arrangements for providing such information.

7. Another possible action would be to encourage private American groups to increase humanitarian aid programs for Indochina, in such areas as food and medical supplies, including prosthetic equipment.

## United States and Yugoslavia Hold Consultations on CSCE

Press release 110 dated March 16

U.S. and Yugoslav representatives met March 15-16 in Washington for consultations and discussions on the Belgrade followup meeting to the Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe (CSCE) in Helsinki in 1975. The preparatory session for the Belgrade meeting will begin June 15, and the date for the main, substantive meeting, also to be held in Belgrade, will be set at that time.

Ambassador Milorad Pesic, who is responsible in the Yugoslav Federal Secretariat for Foreign Affairs for the preparations for the Belgrade conference, led the Yugoslav delegation. Ambassador to the United States Dimce Belovski also participated on the Yugoslav side. Assistant Secretary for European Affairs Arthur A. Hartman led the U.S. delegation.

Deputy Secretary of State Warren Christopher received Ambassadors Pesic and Belovski on March 15.

In addition to discussions in the Department of State, Ambassador Pesic met with members of the CSCE Commission, including Chairman Dante Fascell.

The discussions and consultations were useful and timely and took place in a constructive and cordial atmosphere.

## Prime Minister Fukuda of Japan Visits Washington

*Prime Minister Takeo Fukuda of Japan made an official visit to Washington March 20-23, during which he met with President Carter and other government officials. Following is the text of a joint communique issued March 22.*<sup>1</sup>

White House press release dated March 22

President Carter and Prime Minister Fukuda met in Washington March 21 and 22 for a comprehensive and fruitful exchange of views on matters of mutual interest.

They expressed satisfaction that through the meetings, a relationship of free and candid dialogue and mutual trust was established between the new leaders of the governments of the United States and Japan. They agreed that the two Governments would maintain close contact and consultation on all matters of common concern.

The President and the Prime Minister expressed their determination that the two countries, recognizing their respective responsibilities as industrialized democracies, endeavor to bring about a more peaceful and prosperous international community. To this end, they agreed that it is essential for the industrialized democracies to develop harmonized positions toward major economic issues through close consultation. They agreed further that it is important to sustain and develop dialogue and cooperation with countries whose political systems differ and which are in varying stages of economic development.

The President and the Prime Minister noted with satisfaction that the friendly and cooperative relations between the United States and Japan have continued to expand throughout diverse areas in the lives of the two peoples—not only in economic and political interchange, but in such varied fields as science

and technology, medicine, education and culture. They looked forward to further collaboration on both private and governmental levels in all these areas. The President and the Prime Minister confirmed their common determination to further strengthen the partnership between their two countries, based on shared democratic values and a deep respect for individual freedom and fundamental human rights.

The President and the Prime Minister confirmed their common recognition that the interdependence of nations requires that the industrial countries manage their economies with due consideration for global economic needs, including those of the developing nations. They agreed that economic recovery of the industrialized democracies is indispensable to the stable growth of the international economy, and that nations with large-scale economies, including the United States and Japan, while seeking to avoid recrudescing inflation, should contribute to the stimulation of the world economy in a manner commensurate with their respective situations. They agreed that both Governments would continue to consult closely to this end.

They agreed that a liberal world trading system is essential for the sound development of the world economy, and in this connection expressed their determination to seek significant early progress in the Tokyo Round of the Multilateral Trade Negotiations and to bring those negotiations to a successful conclusion as soon as possible.

They reconfirmed the need for the nations concerned, including the United States and Japan, to address constructively the issues posed in the North-South relationship. They noted the continuing seriousness of the global energy problem and reconfirmed the importance of taking further steps to conserve energy and to develop new and alternative energy sources. They agreed on the necessity of intensified consumer country cooperation in the International Energy Agency and of continued promotion of cooperation between the oil-importing and oil-producing countries. They agreed that both Governments would continue their efforts to identify and promote positive solutions to these issues, and would

<sup>1</sup> For an exchange of remarks between President Carter and Prime Minister Fukuda at a welcoming ceremony at the White House on Mar. 21 and their exchange of toasts at a dinner at the White House that evening, see Weekly Compilation of Presidential Documents dated Mar. 28, 1977, pp. 415 and 420.

endeavor to bring the Ministerial Meeting of the Conference on International Economic Cooperation to a successful conclusion.

The President and the Prime Minister welcomed the convening in London in May of the summit conference of the major industrial countries. They expressed their expectation that the conference, in a spirit of cooperation and solidarity, would serve as a forum for a constructive and creative exchange of views on problems confronting the world economy.

The President and the Prime Minister reviewed the current international situation, and reaffirmed their recognition that the maintenance of a durable peace in the Asian-Pacific region is necessary for world peace and security.

They agreed that the close cooperative relationship between the United States and Japan, joined by bonds of friendship and trust, is indispensable to a stable international political structure in the Asian-Pacific region. They noted that the Treaty of Mutual Cooperation and Security between the United States and Japan has greatly contributed to the maintenance of peace and security in the Far East, and expressed their conviction that the firm maintenance of the Treaty serves the long-term interests of both countries.

The President reaffirmed that the United States as a Pacific nation, maintains a strong interest in the Asian-Pacific region, and will continue to play an active and constructive role there. He added that the United States will honor its security commitments and intends to retain a balanced and flexible military presence in the Western Pacific. The Prime Minister welcomed this affirmation by the United States and expressed his intention that Japan would further contribute to the stability and development of that region in various fields, including economic development.

Noting the activities of the Association of Southeast Asian Nations, the President and the Prime Minister valued highly the efforts of its member countries to strengthen their self-reliance and the resilience of the region. They also reaffirmed that the two countries are prepared to continue cooperation and assistance in support of the efforts of the

ASEAN countries toward regional cohesion and development.

Taking note of the situation in Indochina, they expressed the view that the peaceful and stable development of this area would be desirable for the future of Southeast Asia as a whole.

The President and the Prime Minister noted the continuing importance of the maintenance of peace and stability on the Korean Peninsula for the security of Japan and East Asia as a whole. They agreed on the desirability of continued efforts to reduce tension on the Korean Peninsula and strongly hoped for an early resumption of the dialogue between the South and the North. In connection with the intended withdrawal of United States ground forces in the Republic of Korea, the President stated that the United States, after consultation with the Republic of Korea and also with Japan, would proceed in ways which would not endanger the peace on the Peninsula. He affirmed that the United States remains committed to the defense of the Republic of Korea.

The President and the Prime Minister emphasized that, as a first step toward the most urgent task of nuclear disarmament, nuclear testing in all environments should be banned promptly. With respect to the international transfer of conventional weapons, they emphasized that measures to restrain such transfers should be considered by the international community as a matter of priority. In connection with the prevention of nuclear proliferation, the President welcomed the ratification by Japan last year of the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons.

The President and the Prime Minister, recognizing the important role the United Nations is playing in the contemporary world, agreed that Japan and the United States should cooperate for the strengthening of that organization. In this connection, the President expressed his belief that Japan is fully qualified to become a permanent member of the Security Council of the United Nations, and stated American support for that objective. The Prime Minister expressed his appreciation for the President's statement.

The President and the Prime Minister reaffirmed that the use of nuclear energy for peaceful purposes should not lead to nuclear proliferation. In this connection, the President expressed his determination to develop United States policies which would support a more effective non-proliferation regime. The Prime Minister stated that for Japan, a party to the Non-Proliferation Treaty and a highly industrialized state heavily dependent on imported energy resources, it is essential to progress toward implementation of its program for the development and utilization of nuclear energy. The President agreed to give full consideration to Japan's position regarding its energy needs in connection with the formulation of a new nuclear policy by the United States. The President and the Prime Minister agreed on the necessity for close cooperation between the United States and Japan in developing a workable policy which will meet Japan's concerns and contribute to a more effective non-proliferation regime.

The President and the Prime Minister discussed matters concerning bilateral trade, fisheries and civil aviation. They agreed on the importance of continued close consultation and cooperation between the two Governments to attain mutually acceptable and equitable solutions to problems pending between the United States and Japan.

The Prime Minister conveyed an invitation from the Government of Japan to President and Mrs. Carter to visit Japan. The President accepted this invitation with deep appreciation and stated that he looked forward to visiting Japan at a mutually convenient time.

## Secretary Vance Meets With Irish Foreign Minister

*Following is a joint statement issued on March 17 following a meeting between Secretary Vance and Irish Foreign Minister Garret FitzGerald.*

Press release 111 dated March 17

1. The Secretary of State and the Irish Minister for Foreign Affairs discussed the situation in Northern Ireland and expressed concern about the continued violence there.

2. The Minister for Foreign Affairs expressed appreciation to the Secretary of State for the continued efforts of the U.S. Administration to limit support for violence in Northern Ireland by persons mistakenly motivated in the United States, and for its wish to insure that legitimate concern for human rights is not misused by those who support violence as a means to political ends in Ireland.

3. The Secretary of State reaffirmed the longstanding U.S. Government policy of noninvolvement in the issue of Northern Ireland.

4. Both the Secretary of State and the Minister for Foreign Affairs expressed their commitment to the statement of President Carter made on October 28, 1976, which opposed violence as part of a solution to the Irish question and expressed support for negotiations and peaceful means for finding a just solution involving the two communities of Northern Ireland and which would protect human rights.

## The International Economic Situation

*Following is a statement made before the Subcommittee on Foreign Economic Policy of the Senate Committee on Foreign Relations on March 18 by Richard N. Cooper, then Under Secretary-designate for Economic Affairs, whose nomination was confirmed by the Senate on April 6.<sup>1</sup>*

It is my pleasure to be here today to present an overview of the international economic situation. As the first Administration witness to testify in this series of hearings, let me reiterate President Carter's conviction that a coherent and effective foreign economic policy, supported by the American people, requires sustained cooperation between the Administration and Congress. It is in this spirit that I view the opportunity to appear before this key subcommittee today.

In this opening statement I would like to cover several areas:

- Events leading to our present situation;
- The current state of the international economy;
- Foreign policy considerations; and
- Our overall foreign economic strategy.

I shall keep my oral presentation brief and look forward to your questions for an opportunity to more fully explain our policies.

A quick review of the recent past is helpful in understanding the current environment. Two developments are of particular significance.

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<sup>1</sup> The complete transcript of the hearings will be published by the committee and will be available from the Superintendent of Documents, U.S. Government Printing Office, Washington, D.C. 20402.

In the early 1970's the Western industrial economies began to experience a relatively synchronized economic expansion, the culmination of exceptionally rapid world growth during the previous decade. In 1972-73 the growth rate of the OECD [Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development] area exceeded 6 percent, approaching the limits of productive capacity in that area and outstripping the ability of many producers to expand supplies. By 1973, in reaction to rising inflation, several countries were already pursuing contractionary policies to cool their overheated economies, accepting the prospect of a slowdown in growth.

Then came the oil embargo and quadrupling of the price of oil in the winter of 1973-74. This was the largest single global economic shock in modern history. Because of the suddenness and magnitude of the impact, the increased price for oil acted as a major drain on purchasing power in the oil-consuming world. Coming on top of the mild slowdown already in progress, the oil price rise plunged the industrial economies into full recession.

Individual countries reacted differently. The United States, Germany, and Japan accepted the recession and permitted aggregate demand to contract. Others, particularly the weaker European economies and several semi-industrialized developing nations, delayed domestic adjustment. They financed their balance-of-payments deficits with borrowings, gambling that the recession would be short and that resumed economic growth would enable them to bring payments back into balance. The bet was understandable, even rational, but it turned out to be wrong; the recession was longer

and deeper than originally expected, large oil deficits added to the problem, and those attempting to ride it out by financing these deficits saw their indebtedness continue to mount.

### **The Current Situation**

Today the world is slowly emerging from the worst recession of the last 40 years. Recovery, which had begun in the latter half of 1975, picked up steam in the first half of last year but then began to slow in many countries. This pause, combined with pressures in foreign exchange markets associated with external payments strains in a number of countries, created renewed uncertainty. The fear that simultaneous recovery in the OECD area would overheat the world economy was replaced in the second half of the year with the concern that a flattening of the recovery might lead to insufficient growth.

As 1977 began, however, the outlook appeared more positive. The recovery began to pick up in many of the OECD countries. However, because of the different underlying conditions in various countries before the recession and the different ways they reacted to the recession, individual countries are now emerging in widely different positions of strength.

Several factors characterize the present state of recovery:

#### *Moderate But Sustained Growth*

First, we can expect moderate but sustained growth throughout the rest of this year:

—Real growth rates in the industrial countries are projected to average about 4 percent in 1977, somewhat lower than the 5 percent attained in 1976. The stronger economies—the United States, Germany, and Japan—are well into the cyclical upswing. This year we may see a growth rate somewhat below last year's average for the group, which was above 6 percent. In several other major economies, such as the United Kingdom, France, and Italy, stabili-

zation measures will lead to slower growth than the 1976 average growth rate of about 4 percent.

—Real growth in the oil-importing developing countries is likely to be somewhat below the estimated 5.4 percent of 1976. Brazil, India, and Korea were among the major countries helping to pull the LDC [less developed country] average up in 1976. This year, adjustment and slower growth in several larger countries will slightly reduce the overall average.

—Aggregate inflation rates in the OECD area will remain disturbingly high, although less than the 8 percent rate of 1976. At the upper end of the OECD spectrum, consumer prices are likely to rise about 20 percent this year in some countries. At the opposite extreme, price increases in the order of 2–4 percent might be expected.

—Unemployment will remain a major problem as approximately 15 million men and women are out of work in the OECD area, half in the United States.

#### *Problem Areas*

Second, there are areas of the recovery that need to be strengthened:

—Sluggish investment in the OECD area is perhaps the most important weakness in the recovery. The severity of the recession led to reduced real investment and a consequent lower growth in productive capacity. New capacity requirements in several key industries, the need to replace a portion of existing capital stock made obsolete by high-cost energy, and special future requirements in energy and pollution-control facilities require substantial new investment.

—Additional oil price increases, coming on top of the already high price levels, could also upset the current growth pattern. U.S. Government analysis in advance of the last OPEC [Organization of Petroleum Exporting Countries] price decision in December indicated that each 5 percent increase in the cost of crude oil would cost oil-consuming countries approximately \$6 billion in higher oil import bills, with the United States

paying about \$1.7 billion of that total. Absent compensating domestic policy actions, each 5 percent increase costs the seven largest industrial countries an average of 0.3 percent of GNP [gross national product] growth and adds roughly 0.3 percent to consumer prices.

### *Payments Imbalances and External Debts*

Third, OPEC members can be expected to amass annual current account surpluses in excess of \$30 billion for at least the next few years, and the accumulation of financial assets by several Arab oil exporters together could easily surpass \$300 billion by the end of 1980. The total oil import bill, which was \$35 billion in 1973, will be on the order of \$140 billion in 1977. The large chronic OPEC surplus is matched by aggregate deficits in both developed and developing oil-importing countries, which can be reduced but not eliminated in the medium term. Only the distribution of the deficit among importers can change.

Borrowings to finance balance-of-payments deficits each year have meant an increase in the external indebtedness of many nations in the OECD, the developing world, and the Eastern European nonmarket countries.

The debt issue is complex. As an illustration of the situation, we can look at the developing countries. Those with access to private capital markets borrowed heavily to finance deficits, in preference to making difficult domestic adjustments, which, if undertaken, would have aggravated the world recession.

While in many cases the rate of inflation has reduced the burden of past debts, debt-service payments of the non-oil-producing LDC's are now in excess of \$21 billion in 1976, or an increase of about 75 percent over the 1973 level. Over 80 percent relates to payments on private and official commercial debt. In 1976 these payments consumed about 20 percent of their income from merchandise exports as compared to 17 percent in 1973. These large debt-service payments will cause several countries to continue the search for new financing at the

same time that they make necessary internal adjustments. Collectively, debts must be accumulated beyond present levels because of the OPEC surpluses. Absent sufficient financing, several countries would be forced to take the 1974-75 recession in 1977 and 1978.

This could threaten the process of recovery itself, particularly in Europe, where dependence on external markets is considerably larger than is that of the United States. But the American economy would also be affected adversely by a major slump in export markets brought about by deflation and import restrictions.

### *Danger of Protectionism*

Fourth, the danger of protectionism is growing and remains a constant threat to the recovery. The OPEC surpluses will lead to unaccustomed deficits. At the same time unemployment will exert pressure for expansion, which, unless coordinated, will worsen deficits. Import restrictions would seem to be the way out, especially since imports are a natural scapegoat for what is basically deficient total demand. Import restrictions, however, will never work collectively—unemployment will only be exported.

Thus far, governments have generally followed prudent trade policies, but the possibility of protectionism is real. Trade restrictions would spread in the current environment, and it could easily take another decade to get back to where we are today.

### *The Less Developed Countries*

Fifth, recession and weak export markets, inflation and higher cost imports, and high energy prices, have adversely affected many LDC's. Our own economic welfare is increasingly intertwined with trade with and investment in the developing world. Many of these critical issues are under discussion in the North-South dialogue, where a failure to maintain a constructive atmosphere could undermine global economic cooperation.

This, then, is where we are in the recovery: modest growth ahead, which must be



reinforced by reduced inflation, increased employment, expanded investment, strengthened energy policies, adequate financing for payments imbalances and adjustment, turning back protectionism, and the improvement of global economic cooperation among all countries.

### **Foreign Policy Considerations**

The current economic situation has major foreign policy implications. Two general considerations are paramount:

—The growing interaction of national economies means that problems in some countries can easily become contagious and that they can be effectively addressed only by nations working closely together. Among the market economies the United States is relatively less dependent on the world economy, but our economic welfare and security cannot be divorced from the economic health of other nations and are becoming increasingly intertwined with it.

—Economic concerns preoccupy governments everywhere. They require economic stability and progress to maintain the confidence of their electorates. Economic problems can generate political and social instability and undermine the network of international cooperative arrangements which have been painstakingly erected in the last 30 years.

In the last few years the fabric of international cooperation has held together extraordinarily well despite severe economic strains. Indeed, we have made some major advances, including the first comprehensive reform of the international monetary system since Bretton Woods; an agreement by the industrial democracies to avoid unilateral trade restrictions despite the pressures of the recession; the conclusion of the OECD investment declaration, strengthening the framework for private investment among the Western democracies; and the provision of additional sources of finance to developing countries from the IMF [International Monetary Fund] Trust Fund and a greatly expanded IMF compensatory financing facility.

The general foreign policy challenge before us is not only to preserve this cooperative framework but to strengthen and extend it to insure global economic growth. I turn now to the specific issues we face and our strategy for dealing with them.

### **Foreign Economic Strategy**

Let me discuss our overall strategy in the context of our broad macroeconomic objective: a strong recovery characterized by steady, sustained, noninflationary growth and expanding job opportunities in the OECD area and the developing world. The key elements of our approach are the coordinated stimulation of the stronger economies, adequate international financing conditioned on timely adjustment, reduced dependence on foreign energy sources, continued trade liberalization, and progress in the North-South dialogue.

#### *Coordinated Stimulation*

First, coordinated stimulation: We should look first at President Carter's recovery program, which is designed to strengthen the domestic economic performance and create jobs without triggering inflation. The program should not be seen only in domestic terms but as part of an overall plan in which those countries in a strong financial position expand as rapidly as they can consistent with sustained growth and the control of inflation, thereby absorbing a greater portion of the aggregate deficit of the oil-importing countries and stimulating growth in the weaker economies.

The Administration has formulated its program with both domestic and international considerations in mind. It contains tax features to provide quick injections of purchasing power into the economy as well as encouragement for increased private investment, and it includes programs to increase employment directly. The program will extend over two years and is adjustable as conditions warrant.

We have been encouraging other strong economies to follow our lead in stimulating their economies. Thus far the degree of

stimulation varies widely among these countries, and we will be paying close attention to the evolution of their policies.

### *Financing and Adjustment*

Second, financing and adjustment: In some individual cases, countries which chose to rely heavily on external finance to cover their deficits over the past few years must take domestic adjustment measures to strengthen their payments position and avoid the risk of impairing their creditworthiness. As noted before, however, we must accept the need to sustain considerable increases in aggregate debt for the near future.

Individual requirements vary considerably, but for many countries the economic adjustment process will take years and require difficult economic decisions. For some, there is an immediate requirement to channel new funds away from financing consumption to expenditures which increase future production through investment. Over the last few years, ad hoc responses to the major international shocks resulted in large amounts of private borrowing being used to finance imports for consumption without adequate sums being directed to increase productive capacity. In addition, in some countries budget deficits must be severely reduced as government expenditures have exploded without comparable tax collections.

Unless there is international growth, countries cannot make necessary adjustments without painful and severe dislocations. Adjustment and recovery thus go hand in hand. It is also imperative that those initiating adjustments are able to find external financial support for responsible stabilization programs.

The necessary financing will have to be rechanneled one way or another from OPEC countries in surplus. In the past, private commercial institutions have been the principal mechanism for this intermediation. We will continue to rely primarily on the private sector to perform this function. But we are also examining new ways to insure adequate amounts of financing from international institutions and the proper mix of

official and private financing in individual cases. The International Monetary Fund in particular is skilled at facilitating necessary domestic stabilization as a condition for financial support, which is the type of lending that will be most appropriate for many countries.

### *Energy*

Third, energy: The events of the past four years have clearly demonstrated the vulnerability of the United States and its major allies to OPEC decisions to raise prices and to the threatened or actual use of an oil embargo by some oil-exporting countries as an instrument of national policy. As already noted, uncertainty over the course of future OPEC price policy hangs over the recovery and prospects for global economic growth and stability. And for the longer term, there is more to the energy question than OPEC's actions. A profound shift in global supply-and-demand patterns has taken place. Oil is a depletable asset. We must not only reduce our short-term vulnerability, but we must begin preparing for the post-oil age.

The key element of U.S. energy strategy is the development of a comprehensive domestic energy policy. The full plan is evolving in close cooperation with Congress and our partners in the International Energy Agency and will be detailed by April 20. Clearly one major thrust will be to reduce dependence on imported oil.

Internationally, we will be supporting several important efforts. The United States has made the International Energy Agency the principal vehicle for energy cooperation with the other industrialized countries; and we will continue our policies there to develop coordinated national programs for conservation, development, and reduced dependence. We shall continue our efforts to integrate key OPEC countries into the world economic structure so that decisions affecting international economic welfare and stability can be made cooperatively. And we shall focus attention and resources on assisting the non-oil LDC's to improve their energy positions.

Fourth, trade policy: I have already described the impact that renewed protectionism would have on the recovery. In addition, we would undoubtedly pay the price of any resurgence of protectionism in other areas of international cooperation.

In the next several weeks the Administration will face difficult decisions concerning trade policy toward such sensitive imports as shoes and color TV sets. Our own actions will have a major influence on the trade policy of other countries. We are also examining our trade strategy in the multilateral trade negotiations in Geneva, where we expect to make significant progress before the authority of the Trade Act of 1974 expires.

*North-South Dialogue*

Fifth, we plan to redouble our efforts in the North-South dialogue in order to strengthen global cooperation generally.

Economic developments of the past four years have caused the developing nations to accelerate their search for international policies which increase resource transfers to them and enhance their role in international decisionmaking. They have called for increased levels of foreign assistance, permanent trade preferences, technology transfer on more favorable terms, commodity-price stabilization, and debt forgiveness.

The Carter Administration is still reviewing its overall North-South policies, but several elements of our general approach are already clear:

—The interests of all countries are best served in an open and buoyant world economy.

—We have many mutual interests with the developing world and will emphasize those issues where all countries can derive benefit, as opposed to those where some countries' gain is others' loss.

—The dialogue must be a two-way street. All countries must accept obligations to the world system. We shall approach problems of the developing world with a desire to as-

sist in any reasonable way possible. But we shall also expect that within their capabilities they maximize their own resources for development, adhere to standards of basic human rights, and respect our interests.

This coming year commodities and official debt will be particularly important to the overall discussions.

Over the next several months we will be engaged in a series of meetings on ways to strengthen individual commodity markets and on the possibility of common funding for individual commodity stockpiles.

A number of serious problems in the commodities area must be addressed cooperatively by producers and consumers. For a large number of developing countries, earnings from commodities are critical to economic development. At the same time, all countries have a major interest in assuring that our goal of a stable, expanding world economy is not threatened either by excessive fluctuations of commodity prices and export earnings or by an inadequacy of resources.

Within this framework of mutual interest we are prepared to act on commodities issues. The problems faced in the commodities area require an integrated approach, addressing price stabilization, trade, the improvement of market structures, the stabilization of export earnings, resource development, and investment. The new Administration is currently formulating policies toward all these issues. We are prepared to deal with them constructively in the coming months in a number of meetings including the work now underway in UNCTAD [United Nations Conference on Trade and Development] and elsewhere on a number of individual commodities.

We believe the existing international institutions can play a very helpful role here. The IMF compensatory financing facility, which lends for shortfalls in LDC export proceeds, has been a particularly key element; and we will be open to possible future improvements. In addition, the World Bank might usefully facilitate resource development.

A second major issue will be the demands for general debt relief for official debt of the low-income countries. The issue should not be confused with the indebtedness issue discussed before, which involves mainly commercial borrowings of the higher income LDC's, none of whom have advocated any type of general debt relief.

The developing countries have made forgiveness of official debt a principal demand in the Conference on International Economic Cooperation in Paris, which is due to wind up late this spring. The United States and other industrialized democracies have remained firm that this would be a mistaken policy.

In general, official debt burdens can be serviced and are not major impediments to development. In addition, generalized debt relief would provide indiscriminate benefits to those countries which had not pursued effective domestic policies and would be unrelated to currently appropriate burden sharing among the aid-giving countries. Finally, since individual country situations differ so widely, debt relief can be meaningfully considered only on a case-by-case basis.

As one examines demands for debt relief, however, it is clear that the developing countries' objective is to increase resource transfers. Looked at this way, the United States, in conjunction with other donor countries, can make a major contribution to development via higher levels of foreign assistance, both multilateral and bilateral.

The Administration is convinced that larger resource transfers to the Third World are required in order to meet legitimate development requirements. Furthermore, we believe that foreign assistance is the most direct and effective way to do this, and that an improved economic assistance performance by the United States not only advances global economic development but is a sensible alternative to LDC proposals for general debt relief, as well as other resource transfer schemes which we believe to be poorly conceived. However, we will want to insure that our foreign assistance resource

transfers are efficiently used and actually reach the people who need them.

In recent weeks Secretary Vance and other Administration officials have testified in support of a larger bilateral U.S. foreign assistance program and prompt U.S. participation in the capital replenishment of international development banks, particularly the International Development Association, the soft-loan window of the World Bank. The 1978 budget calls for budget authority of \$1.35 billion for bilateral development assistance, \$2.6 billion for the World Bank Group (of which \$1 billion is callable capital), \$130 million for the United Nations Development Program, and \$1.9 billion for security supporting assistance. The support of this subcommittee and your colleagues in Congress will be essential to fulfillment of the President's objective in this area.

#### **Reinforcing Structure of Cooperation**

Mr. Chairman, the economic situation will present a major challenge to our foreign economic policy in the coming years. We will have to deal with the complex interrelationships among the pace of economic expansion, the distribution of large trade deficits, the system of international financing, energy policy, the degree of protectionism, and the strengthening of cooperative relationships among all countries. If the deep strains in the international economy force each country to go its own way, everyone will be the loser.

To date the structure of international cooperation has worked well, thus justifying the continuing effort we and other countries have devoted to building it over the last quarter century. In the face of difficulty we must now preserve and reinforce this structure. This will require the willingness of the United States and others to adapt to new circumstances. As in the past others will be looking to us to lead the way in fashioning effective policies. The Administration looks forward to working closely with the Congress in meeting this challenge.

## Department Discusses Approach to Environmental Issues

*Following is a statement by Patsy T. Mink, Assistant Secretary for Oceans and International Environmental and Scientific Affairs, made before the Subcommittee on Arms Control, Oceans, and International Environment of the Senate Committee on Foreign Relations on March 31.*<sup>1</sup>

Thank you for the opportunity to testify on S. Res. 49, which urges the United States to seek agreement of other governments to a treaty requiring preparation of an international environmental impact statement for any major project, action, or continuing activity which could reasonably be expected to have an adverse effect on the environment of another nation or a global commons area.

The Department is in full agreement with the basic purpose of S. Res. 49, which I see as seeking responsible assessment by nations of the environmental effects of their actions upon other nations.

We are embarked on a number of activities internationally to gain the support of other countries for implementation of this concept. Our efforts are meeting with some success; we also have encountered some basic resistance.

For example, the United States has played a leading role in the development of the principles concerning transfrontier pollution which have been adopted by the Council of the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD). These principles, which are intended as guides to member states, call for provision of information to, and consultation with, other countries before activities are undertaken which may have transfrontier pollution implications; provision is also made

for monitoring, research, and dispute settlement.

I think our country can be justifiably proud of the arrangements we have developed over the years with Canada and Mexico to identify and resolve transfrontier pollution issues. With Canada, we have the International Joint Commission, created in 1909. With Mexico, we have the International Boundary and Water Commission. Each of these is unique in its particular structure, but both of them have been invaluable in addressing environmental problems with our two close neighbors. I think one point to be learned from those experiences is that we should not be rigid as to the kinds of tools we develop. The important thing is to address the problem.

We have also encouraged the European Communities (Common Market) in their efforts to develop Community-wide environmental assessment procedures.

Another case in point is the United Nations Law of the Sea Conference. The United States has proposed and achieved consensus on a treaty article calling upon states to prepare environmental assessments of their activities which might adversely affect the marine environment. Such reports are to be published or provided to the competent international organizations to be made available to all states.

And with respect to the possible development of Antarctic resources, we are actively engaged in cooperative environmental studies with our Antarctic Treaty partners. This includes expanded studies that could form the basis for effective environmental measures related to marine living resources, as well as studies on the environmental implications of any mineral resource activities that may occur in Antarctica.

The United States has been working within the United Nations Environment Program (UNEP) on draft principles of conduct for guidance of states in the conservation and harmonious exploitation of shared natural resources. Included are provisions on notification, consultation, and environ-

<sup>1</sup> The complete transcript of the hearings will be published by the committee and will be available from the Superintendent of Documents, U.S. Government Printing Office, Washington, D.C. 20402.

mental assessment. These guidelines, specifically at U.S. initiative, would provide that:

States should make environmental assessments before engaging in any activity with respect to a shared natural resource which may create a risk of significantly affecting the environment of another State or States sharing that resource.

In addition, within the United Nations Economic Commission for Europe we are supporting a project to develop common international methodologies for analyzing environmental implications of economic activities. A concrete example we hope to use is the problem of long-range atmospheric transport of pollutants and the resultant phenomenon of "acid rain." If we can develop a workable and internationally accepted means of designing and assessing the specific environmental impact of related factors such as power generation, the next step would be consultations between countries leading to introduction of remedial measures to diminish these environmental impacts.

Such consultations are already called for under the OECD transfrontier pollution principles, but the problem is how to convert abstract principle into practice. We believe that our step-by-step approach is producing a strengthened international consensus on the importance of systematic environmental assessment; it is also increasing agreement among nations on how to go about this process.

I have described a rather gradualistic approach. It serves the purpose of developing an international consensus which we hope will encourage nations to be willing to adopt binding international obligations of the kind set forth in S. Res. 49. The reluctance of states to accept real or perceived restraints on their sovereignty is reflected in the Stockholm Declaration on the Human Environment, which sets forth the sovereign right of nations to conduct their own environmental policies.

The issue goes right to the heart of national economic survival. In Europe, the most dramatic current case of transfrontier pollution probably is that of acid rain. Acid rain in turn results from the production of

energy from conventional fossil fuels. The states of Europe would be understandably reluctant to adopt any broad obligations which could affect their right to continue the production of energy.

The proposed treaty could be read to require that if any activity of a state or its nationals or persons subject to its jurisdiction were to be challenged by another state or by UNEP as potentially having significant adverse effect upon the other state's physical environment or environmental interests or upon the global commons, such a challenge could halt the activity in question pending the outcome of a mandatory consultation, the preparation of an environmental impact statement for external review by the affected state and by UNEP, and submission of any related dispute to compulsory international settlement. I do not believe that other states would accept a binding obligation of this nature; moreover, we believe it would be difficult even for the United States to accept an obligation which might allow another state to halt, perhaps indefinitely, a domestic activity undertaken in accordance with U.S. laws.

The issue that I am addressing is one of degree only. Unfortunately, we do not have the shared international perception of the importance of this issue to enable us to move yet toward such binding commitments.

If you will accept the reservations I have expressed as to the specific details of the treaty text described in S. Res. 49, I am pleased to say that the concept has the support of the Department of State.

We do believe that this is the direction in which we should be moving. I understand the injunction in the resolution to "seek the agreement of other governments to a treaty" to express a conceptual goal rather than a specific charter.

I hope that the emphasis upon international environmental impact statements does not rule out the flexibility to pursue other means of achieving the purpose, such as the use of joint commissions like those we now have with Canada and Mexico. Moreover, I expect that the elaboration of cooperative procedures for assessing environmental impacts will be more palatable to foreign na-

tions than a proposal that countries do unilateral environmental impact statements on the effects of their actions in other countries. For one thing, a nation is likely to want to do its own analysis of the impact within its jurisdiction. For another, it may believe that an analysis by the nation which is responsible for the potential damage would be less balanced than a cooperative analysis.

I hope that you will accept the likelihood that we may be able to develop international machinery for exchange of information and consultation long before nations will be willing to accept compulsory dispute settlement.

Finally, I am sure that you recognize that the development of any international convention on so important a subject will be a sustained process of give-and-take and that the final product will reflect other countries' views as well as the draft which we initially put forward.

With these clarifications, may I again reiterate that the Department agrees with the goal of the resolution and wishes to compliment Senator Pell for having reminded us all of the importance of the goal.

## Current Treaty Actions

### MULTILATERAL

#### Agriculture

Agreement establishing the International Fund for Agricultural Development (IFAD). Done at Rome June 13, 1976.<sup>1</sup>

*Signatures:* Belgium, March 16, 1977; Bangladesh, March 17, 1977; El Salvador, Sudan, March 21, 1977; Romania, March 22, 1977.

*Ratification deposited:* Sri Lanka, March 23, 1977.

#### Atomic Energy

Statute of the International Atomic Energy Agency, as amended. Done at New York October 26, 1956. Entered into force July 29, 1957. TIAS 3873, 5284, 7668.

*Acceptance deposited:* Nicaragua, March 25, 1977.

#### Consular Relations

Vienna convention on consular relations. Done at Vienna April 24, 1963. Entered into force March 19,

1967; for the United States December 24, 1969. TIAS 6820.

*Notification of succession:* Bahamas, March 17, 1977.

Optional protocol, to the Vienna convention on consular relations, concerning the compulsory settlement of disputes. Done at Vienna April 24, 1963. Entered into force March 19, 1967; for the United States December 24, 1969. TIAS 6820.

*Accession deposited:* Bahamas, March 17, 1977.

#### Diplomatic Relations

Vienna convention on diplomatic relations. Done at Vienna April 18, 1961. Entered into force April 24, 1964; for the United States December 13, 1972. TIAS 7502.

*Notification of succession:* Bahamas, March 17, 1977.

#### Finance

Articles of agreement of the International Bank for Reconstruction and Development formulated at the Bretton Woods Conference July 1-22, 1944. Done at Washington December 27, 1945. Entered into force December 27, 1945. TIAS 1502.

*Signature and acceptance:* Guinea-Bissau, March 24, 1977.

Articles of agreement of the International Monetary Fund, formulated at the Bretton Woods Conference July 1-22, 1944. Done at Washington December 27, 1945. Entered into force December 27, 1945. TIAS 1501.

*Signature and acceptance:* Guinea-Bissau, March 24, 1977.

#### Maritime Matters

Amendments to the convention of March 6, 1948, as amended, on the Intergovernmental Maritime Consultative Organization (TIAS 4044, 6285, 6490). Adopted at London October 17, 1974.<sup>1</sup>

*Acceptance deposited:* Bahamas, January 31, 1977.

#### Organization of American States—Charter

Charter of the Organization of American States. Signed at Bogota April 30, 1948. Entered into force December 13, 1951. TIAS 2361.

*Signature:* Surinam, February 22, 1977.

#### United Nations—Privileges and Immunities

Convention on the privileges and immunities of the United Nations. Done at New York February 13, 1946. Entered into force September 17, 1946; for the United States April 29, 1970. TIAS 6900.

*Notification of succession:* Bahamas, March 17, 1977.

*Accession deposited:* Sudan, March 21, 1977.

### BILATERAL

#### Federal Republic of Germany

Agreement relating to the security of information on the JT-10D aircraft engine. Effected by exchange of

<sup>1</sup> Not in force.

notes at Washington February 24 and March 18, 1977. Entered into force March 18, 1977.

## Guatemala

Agreement relating to the deposit by Guatemala of 10 percent of the value of grant military assistance and excess defense articles furnished by the United States. Effected by exchange of notes at Guatemala May 16 and July 19, 1972. Entered into force April 26, 1973. TIAS 7625.  
*Terminated.* March 2, 1977.

## Jordan

Agreement amending the nonscheduled air service agreement of September 21, 1974 (TIAS 7954), and relating to scheduled air service. Effected by exchange of notes at Washington March 14 and 16, 1977. Entered into force March 16, 1977.

## Spain

Agreement concerning fisheries off the coasts of the United States. Signed at Washington February 16, 1977.

*Entered into force:* March 10, 1977.

## Syria

Agreement amending and implementing the air transport agreement of April 28, 1947, as amended (TIAS 3285, 3818). Effected by exchange of notes at Washington March 14 and 16, 1977. Entered into force March 16, 1977.

## Union of Soviet Socialist Republics

Program of exchanges for 1977-79 and conditions governing exchanges. Effected by exchange of notes at Washington October 22, 1976. Entered into force October 22, 1976.

### Checklist of Department of State

#### Press Releases: March 28—April 3

Press releases may be obtained from the Office of Press Relations, Department of State, Washington, D.C. 20520.

No.	Date	Subject
128	3/28	Vance: arrival, Brussels, Mar. 26.
129	3/28	Vance: remarks following special session of North Atlantic Council, Mar. 26.
130	3/28	Vance: press briefing on board aircraft, Mar. 26.
*131	3/28	Vance: arrival, Moscow, Mar. 26.
†132	3/28	Vance: news conference, Moscow, Mar. 27.
*133	3/28	Shipping Coordinating Committee (SCC), Subcommittee on Safety of Life at Sea (SOLAS), working group on life-saving appliances, Apr. 27.
*134	3/28	SCC, SOLAS, working group on international multimodal transport and containers, Apr. 27.
*135	3/28	U.S. Advisory Commission on International Educational and Cultural Affairs, Apr. 25.
†136	3/29	Vance: news conference, Moscow, Mar. 28.
*137	3/29	Patsy T. Mink sworn in as Assistant Secretary for Oceans and International Environmental and Scientific Affairs, Mar. 28 (biographic data).
†139	3/30	Vance: news conference, Moscow, Mar. 29.
†140	3/30	U.S.-Cuba joint communique, Mar. 29.
†141	3/30	Vance, Foreign Minister Gromyko: toasts, Moscow.
†142	3/30	Vance: news conference, Moscow.
*143	3/30	Gale W. McGee sworn in as U.S. Permanent Representative to the OAS (biographic data).
†144	3/30	U.S.-U.S.S.R. joint communique.

No.	Date	Subject
*145	3/31	Richard C. Holbrooke sworn in as Assistant Secretary for East Asian and Pacific Affairs (biographic data).
*146	3/31	Vance: departure, Moscow.
*147	3/31	Foreign Minister Genscher, Vance: arrival, Bonn.
*148	3/31	SCC, SOLAS, working group on fire protection, Apr. 26.
*149	3/31	Advisory Committee on the Law of the Sea, rescheduled, Apr. 25-26.
*150	3/31	SCC, SOLAS, working group on subdivision and stability's panel on bulk cargoes, New York, Apr. 28.
*151	3/31	Study groups 10 and 11 of the U.S. National Committee for the International Radio Consultative Committee (CCIR), Apr. 28.
*152	3/31	Hodding Carter III sworn in as Assistant Secretary for Public Affairs and Department spokesman, Mar. 25 (biographic data).
153	3/31	Chancellor Schmidt, Vance: news conference, Bonn.
154	3/31	Vance: arrival, London.
155	4/1	Vance: remarks, London.
156	4/1	Lucy Wilson Benson sworn in as Under Secretary for Security Assistance, Science and Technology, Mar. 28 (biographic data).
*157	4/1	Program for visit of President Sadat of Egypt, Apr. 3-6.
*158	4/1	Phase 2 of Caribbean-American workshop seminar begins Mar. 26.
*159	4/1	Terence A. Todman sworn in as Assistant Secretary for Inter-American Affairs (biographic data).
*160	4/1	Vance: arrival, Paris.
†161	4/2	Vance: news conference on London-Paris flight, Apr. 1.
†162	4/2	Vance, Carter: arrival, Andrews AFB.

\*Not printed.

†Held for a later issue of the BULLETIN.



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# THE DEPARTMENT OF STATE BULLETIN

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April 25, 1977

*The Department of State BULLETIN, a weekly publication issued by the Office of Media Services, Bureau of Public Affairs, provides the public and interested agencies of the government with information on developments in the field of U.S. foreign relations and on the work of the Department and the Foreign Service.*

*The BULLETIN includes selected press releases on foreign policy, issued by the White House and the Department, and statements, addresses, and news conferences of the President and the Secretary of State and other officers of the Department, as well as special articles on various phases of international affairs and the functions of the Department. Information is included concerning treaties and international agreements to which the United States is or may become a party and on treaties of general international interest.*

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## Secretary Vance Visits Moscow and Western Europe

*Secretary Vance visited Moscow March 26-31. En route to Moscow, he met with the North Atlantic Council at Brussels on March 26. Following his visit to Moscow, he met with Federal German, British, and French officials at Bonn, London, and Paris March 31-April 2.*

*Following are transcripts of news conferences held by Secretary Vance at Moscow March 27-30, the text of a joint communique of the Government of the United States and the Government of the Soviet Union issued on March 30, a news conference held by Secretary Vance on April 1 aboard the aircraft en route from London to Paris, and remarks by Secretary Vance and President Carter upon the Secretary's arrival at Andrews Air Force Base on April 2.<sup>1</sup>*

### NEWS CONFERENCE, MOSCOW, MARCH 27

Press release 132 dated March 28

*Secretary Vance:* We have been working today on fine-tuning our preparations for our discussions which start tomorrow. Really that is about all new that has happened since we arrived here last night.

*Q. Mr. Secretary, Pravda has an editorial today in which it says that the finalization of Vladivostok is not our fault—not ours, the Russians' fault—and that the United States has let this drag on for an unparadoxically long time. Would you comment on that, sir?*

*Secretary Vance:* Well, whatever may

<sup>1</sup> Other press releases relating to Secretary Vance's trip are Nos. 128-131 dated Mar. 28; 141 dated Mar. 30; 146, 147, 153, and 154 dated Mar. 31; 155 and 160 dated Apr. 1; and 163 and 164 dated Apr. 4.

have been the circumstances in the past that led to the fact that we do not yet have a SALT Two agreement, I consider that something of the past, and I am looking forward to the future and I hope that we can begin to make it move again and get a SALT Two agreement and get it promptly.

*Q. Could I follow up, sir? The editorial as well indicts the Carter Administration as well as the Ford Administration, saying there had been no deeds by the Democratic Administration to demonstrate its readiness to move forward.*

*Secretary Vance:* I think that we have been working diligently to get ourselves prepared for these talks. It has taken us not an unreasonable amount of time to get ready for the talks. We have only been in office some two months, and we are now here and prepared for serious discussion.

*Q. Would you—there has been a good deal of discussion, of confusion, over your statement made on the plane that the essentials of your comprehensive package about [inaudible].<sup>2</sup> Could you clarify what you meant by that? I think you said that minor details are negotiable, but not the essentials.*

*Secretary Vance:* Of course in any negotiations obviously you listen to whatever the other side has to say. We think that the proposals which we are making are sound proposals; and I hope and believe that they will be the basis for an agreement, that they should serve as the framework for the negotiations which will have to take place to lead to the final agreement.

<sup>2</sup> For Secretary Vance's news conference held aboard the aircraft on Mar. 26, see press release 130 dated Mar. 28.

*Q. Mr. Secretary, do you expect the question of human rights to come up either from the other side or would you bring it up yourself?*

*Secretary Vance:* I think that it may come up; if it does come up, of course we will be prepared to discuss it.

*Q. Mr. Secretary, you and the Carter Administration have frequently talked about deep cuts in the comprehensive package. I would like to ask you how deep is deep?*

*Secretary Vance:* I said yesterday I am not going to get into numbers. That is a thing which should be taken care of in the face-to-face discussions with the Soviets, and therefore I am going to stay away from numbers.

*Q. Is 2,000 in the ballpark? [Laughter.]*

*Q. Mr. Secretary, yesterday you talked about what you might expect in the way of atmospherics. Now that you have arrived and you spent a little bit of time last night with Foreign Minister Gromyko, could you expand a little bit and tell us a little bit about, perhaps characterize, your reception and give us a little idea about what the Foreign Minister had to say?*

*Secretary Vance:* Sure. Let me repeat what I said yesterday—that I hope that the atmosphere would be cordial and businesslike.

The reception which we received last night was very cordial. We had a very good discussion, cordial discussion, with the Foreign Minister coming in and I am terribly happy with the reception which we received.

*Q. What is the schedule, Mr. Secretary? Are you going to see Mr. Brezhnev in the morning? Will you see him at every session, or will you be meeting with Mr. Gromyko?*

*Secretary Vance:* We will be meeting tomorrow morning in the Kremlin. As to who the participants will be, I think we will leave that until tomorrow.

*Q. Mr. Secretary, are you going to bring up the question of microwaves and radiation, the problem in the Embassy?*

*Secretary Vance:* That may come up as one of the topics.

*Q. Mr. Secretary, could you amplify a bit, sir, at this stage before the talks begin tomorrow as to why the United States believes it is necessary at this particular stage to make what amounts to a quantum jump in moving forward very rapidly into substantial reductions in the nuclear armed forces level?*

*Secretary Vance:* We look at the objective that both sides are trying to achieve. That objective is to make real progress in the field of arms control. It seems to us that the time has come to see if we cannot make some real progress. Obviously, progress has been made in SALT One and in the Vladivostok agreement, but we hope that we could see more rapid progress; because it is, as I said to you yesterday, not only in the interest of both ourselves and the Soviet Union but the world in general that we move these discussions more rapidly toward really true arms control and only by getting into deeper cuts are we making that kind of progress.

*Q. Mr. Secretary, do you expect your first meeting tomorrow to put forward the American SALT proposals and to thereby permit the Soviets a couple of days before giving you a reply, or do you expect some kind of a reply from the Soviets if these proposals have already been privately proposed?*

*Secretary Vance:* In our discussions tomorrow, I will put forward our proposals on SALT; and I would be prepared to go into detailed discussions, I and my colleagues, should the Soviets choose to do so, should they desire to defer till the next day, Tuesday, or even till Wednesday, to continue the detailed discussions or take up detailed discussion—that is all right with me. We are prepared to take whatever time that is required to carry out these discussions, because as I said, I do not know of anything we are doing which is more important.

*Q. Mr. Secretary, do you have any general sort of outline on what you are proposing to do in the first session?*

*Secretary Vance:* I think from reading the newspapers you would have a pretty good idea of the general outlines of the proposal.

*Q. Mr. Secretary, do you think you can expect to achieve a comprehensive agreement, the kind you would really like, by the October deadline, or does that involve potentially extending SALT One until you complete the comprehensive SALT Two?*

*Secretary Vance:* I think it is possible to have a comprehensive one by October. It would mean that everybody would have to work very hard and that we would have to bend efforts on both sides to accomplish it. But I think it is possible.

*Q. Mr. Secretary, what good do you think it does to speak out on behalf of human rights in the Soviet Union? What specific good does it do?*

*Secretary Vance:* Let me say on behalf of the question of human rights on the whole, that we have spoken out on the issue of human rights across the board, not solely with respect to the Soviet Union. We have indicated, as the President did in his speech at the United Nations, that this was something that transcended individual countries or even regions. We have no intent to single out any country, and whenever we have spoken out it should not be interpreted as such.

*Q. Mr. Secretary, what do you expect it to do? What good do you expect it to accomplish?*

*Secretary Vance:* We hope that it will over a period of time sensitize the international community to the problems of human rights and as a result of that we will see actual tangible progress being made.

*Q. Mr. Secretary, can I ask you this? In a reply to an earlier question on human rights, you said that you think it may come up, if it does you will be prepared to discuss it. My question to you, sir, is whether you plan on your own behalf to raise the issue of human rights.*

*Secretary Vance:* I do not plan in my opening statement to touch on it.

*Q. Mr. Secretary, will you be talking about southern Africa at all in the course of your discussions?*

*Secretary Vance:* Yes, I am sure the question of southern Africa will come up during the course of our discussions. I would assume it would come up later on during the week and not in any depth this first day, because the central focus, I believe from the standpoint of both sides, is going to be on the strategic arms question.

*Q. Mr. Secretary, what members of the delegation will actually sit in on the SALT talks? In connection with that will you do the vast bulk of the talking on the American side, or will some of the others—*

*Secretary Vance:* The answer is, yes, I will do the bulk of the talking on our side. We will have really a small group, probably four or five at most, including a notetaker. I do not think more than four or five.

*Q. Could you tell who they will be, sir?*

*Secretary Vance:* I will leave that until tomorrow.

*Q. Mr. Secretary, I do not believe you have had an opportunity to meet with General Secretary Brezhnev before.*

*Secretary Vance:* No, I have not.

*Q. Do you know whether you will be having private talks with him, sir?*

*Secretary Vance:* No, I do not know at this point whether I will or not.

*Q. Will you be seeing any human rights activists while you are here?*

*Secretary Vance:* No, I will not.

*Q. Mr. Carter laid out the agenda at his March 24 press conference. Do you feel that success of progress on the non-SALT parts of the agenda depends on having progress in the SALT talks? In other words, with no progress in SALT, can there be progress on any other part of that agenda?*

*Secretary Vance:* Yes, I think so.

*Q. Mr. Secretary, you said you were not going to raise the human rights issue. Can you tell me if you are going to raise the issue*

*of family reunification like the Ray McClellan case?*

*Secretary Vance:* I believe that the question of family reunification could be one of the subjects for discussion.

*Q. Mr. Secretary, on that issue, in followup, there are reports that you got a list of 700 names.*

*Secretary Vance:* I am not going to comment on details or anything like that.

*Q. What are the subjects you will raise in the opening statement? You mentioned SALT.*

*Secretary Vance:* I will touch briefly on each of the items in the agenda which we agreed upon with the Soviets; and as you know, that includes a number of items—the strategic arms items, the items dealing with other arms limitations, matters of trade, and a number of international issues, and in addition to that, some bilateral questions.

*Q. On the subject of trade, do you see any movement or desire within the Congress to rescind the Jackson-Vanik amendment in favor of more trade with the Soviet Union and better relations?*

*Secretary Vance:* I think there are mixed views in Congress on this at this point in time. And we will just have to wait and see what happens.

*Q. On the whole, wouldn't you agree that there is not much desire in the Congress to do anything about that?*

*Secretary Vance:* I think that at this point it would be difficult to get it reversed in Congress.

*Q. Mr. Secretary, on subjects aside from SALT, would you bring forth any specific proposals, say on the Middle East, southern Africa, and the subject of arms trade?*

*Secretary Vance:* I think on the Middle East I would expect we would just merely have a general review of the situation that exists in the Middle East and a discussion of what has been said by the various leaders on both sides up to this point in time. I am of course prepared to discuss any matters relating to it that may come up, but I would ex-

pect it to be sort of a general overview as far as that is concerned.

On southern Africa, I think we might very well discuss specific items having to do particularly with the questions of Rhodesia and Namibia.

*Q. Mr. Secretary, are there any possibilities of a summit Carter-Brezhnev meeting before formal agreement on a new SALT agreement, or is such a summit specifically tied to an agreement and would come after agreement?*

*Secretary Vance:* I do not think it is necessarily tied to that, but there has been no discussion yet between the parties with respect to any specific date when such a meeting would be held.

*Q. Mr. Secretary, what have you thought of the Izvestia article of several weeks ago which accused several Jewish activists of being spies for CIA men working under Embassy cover?*

*Secretary Vance:* I did not read the article itself. I am familiar with the article. I am not familiar with the specific facts relating to the particular cases where the allegations were made.

*Q. Mr. Secretary, were you and the Administration encouraged by Secretary Brezhnev's comments on the Soviet plan for a Middle East peace settlement?*

*Secretary Vance:* I would like to explore that in further depth before giving you an answer on that. There are certain parts of it that appear on further reading to have something new in it, and I would like to specifically ask whether there was indeed something new intended.

*Q. What parts struck you as new? You said there were some parts that appeared to be new. Which were those?*

*Secretary Vance:* The parts dealing with the question of boundaries appear to be new.

*Q. I am sorry, sir. May I go back to this? The Izvestia article accused Melvyn Levitsky, who is in the State Department right now, of specifically being a spy, one of your State Department officials, and implied—*



*Secretary Vance:* As far as that is concerned, that is certainly not true.

*Q. Certainly not true?*

*Secretary Vance:* Yes, certainly not true.

*Q. Mr. Secretary, a specific technical point. The cruise missile—is it now the American feeling, is it your feeling, the testing and development of the cruise missile is verifiable?*

*Secretary Vance:* The verification is extremely difficult in the whole cruise missile field. That's one of the real problems of the cruise missile. At this point there are no methods of verification which provide the kind of verification I think both of us, both sides, would like to have. That has been one of the problems of the cruise missile all along. You can have some verification, but it is extremely difficult.

*Q. Are those remarks subject to deployment or development, or both?*

*Secretary Vance:* Both.

*Q. Mr. Secretary, the Soviets have said that they think the human rights question will complicate these negotiations. Do you think the human rights question will complicate them?*

*Secretary Vance:* I hope they would not complicate them. The subject of SALT is so important that I think that it can and should stand on its own two feet, and I hope very much that will be the case.

*Q. Mr. Secretary, in your ride yesterday back from the airport to town with Mr. Gromyko, was it mostly small talk, or did you discuss [laughter] anything of a more substantive nature?*

*Secretary Vance:* Mostly small talk except we discussed how we were going to proceed in terms of an agenda, et cetera, for the coming week and that we were going to go to the ballet tonight.

*Q. And you felt that Mr. Gromyko radiated a certain warmth? [Laughter.]*

*Secretary Vance:* He did.

*Q. Mr. Secretary, have any Soviet dissidents or Jewish activists asked for a meeting with you?*

*Secretary Vance:* I believe some did, and my reply was that I was going to devote all of my time during the period that I was here to working on the matters which I came to discuss. That will keep me fully busy.

*Q. Mr. Secretary, have you talked with President Carter since you have been here?*

*Secretary Vance:* No.

*Q. Mr. Secretary, the Soviets are very disturbed about the gross imbalance in trade with the United States. Have you got any comfort that you can offer them while you are here to redress their [inaudible]?*

*Secretary Vance:* No immediate comfort, but the subject of trade will be a subject which will be on the agenda.

*Q. Mr. Secretary, if the subject of human rights does come up, will you or have you already expressed to the Soviets that the Administration may run into some difficulties with Congress in ratifying the SALT agreement should the Soviets' crackdown on dissidents continue?*

*Secretary Vance:* I have not yet expressed that view to the Soviet Union in answer to your specific question. When and if the question comes up tomorrow, I will respond at that time.

*Q. Is there an Administration fear that that may happen?*

*Secretary Vance:* I would prefer not to comment on that at this point.

*Q. Mr. Secretary, there has been a lot of speculation in American magazines and newspapers on the ambassadorship to this country. Have you been able to tell Mr. [Malcolm] Toon, or in front of us—*

*Secretary Vance:* I have not discussed publicly the question of ambassadorships with anybody. I am not going to do that. When and until we, as a government, make the statements with respect to that issue, I am going to adhere to that. That properly comes from the President rather than from me, and when that time comes, we will let the public know.

*Q. Mr. Secretary, do you expect the Soviets will make specific proposals on*

*SALT, or will they simply respond to yours?*

*Secretary Vance:* No, I think they will undoubtedly want to know what we have to suggest, and I would not rule out—indeed, I would expect—that they would probably have some proposals to make.

*Q. I would like to revert to the review piece in Pravda again, in which they said more than two months later concrete steps were still not visible on the part of the Administration on arms reduction. Do you think this overlooks some of the statements and proposals that the President put forward, and if so, why do you think that Pravda might have taken this position?*

*Secretary Vance:* I do not know why any particular words were chosen by Pravda. I think that President Carter has made in general terms some concrete and very helpful proposals, and I think that when we flesh those out they will be seen to be very constructive proposals, and I hope that the Soviets will feel so.

*Q. Mr. Secretary, if you were asked why the Carter Administration decided to double the funds for Radio Free Europe, what will you be answering?*

*Secretary Vance:* Well, even after we have doubled the funds, we will be spending less in this area than many other countries, I believe including the Soviet Union, for that purpose.

A couple of more questions and then we will—

*Q. But they are spending more to broadcast to America than we are spending to broadcast to them?*

*Secretary Vance:* No, I was talking in the general field of—

*Q. Of radio propaganda?*

*Secretary Vance:* Yes, that is right. Information, I would call it. [Laughter.]

One more question.

*Q. Have you talked to Mr. Gromyko on the trip in, did you mention the possibility of extending your talks for an additional day, and if so, what was his reply?*

*Secretary Vance:* I said I would be happy to stay here as long as was necessary in order to make progress and if we were making progress that I would be delighted to stay on for another day or two, three, whatever is required.

*Q. And his response?*

*Secretary Vance:* As to the exact words, I think he ought to make it. I was encouraged by his response.

Thanks very much.

[Following the news conference, the Secretary answered additional questions in the Embassy courtyard.]

*Q. [Inaudible.]*

*Secretary Vance:* I want to put the past behind and talk about the future. I hope very much that we will be able to start some real progress now that we are here. I know that the editorial referred to the fact that the Carter Administration itself had allegedly been slovenly. I cannot believe we have. This is quite a serious subject. It has taken us a period of time within the government to review our position. We have done so. I think we are coming up with some very constructive and concrete proposals, and I really do not believe that we have been unduly long in getting ready for these talks.

*Q. Mr. Secretary, the two proposals that you will make—one a comprehensive settlement and the other one a deferral—seem both to have been rejected, in one form or another at least, by the Soviets. What reason do you have to believe that they will find them constructive at this time?*

*Secretary Vance:* Well, I hope that when we have a chance to sit down and discuss in detail the concrete proposals with respect to the comprehensive package, they will see that it really is a very constructive proposal which deals with substance, and that as we have a chance to discuss it in its full detail, they may see the merit of it.

*Q. What kind of an atmosphere are you anticipating now? You had a chance to talk briefly with Mr. Gromyko.*

*Secretary Vance:* I have been very

pleased with the cordial atmosphere which we have seen during our brief time here and the very cordial welcome when we came yesterday evening, and Gromyko was very kind and cordial on our ride in from the airport. We are going to go to the ballet together this evening, and I hope and expect that we will continue to be cordial and businesslike.

## NEWS CONFERENCE, MOSCOW, MARCH 28

Press release 136 dated March 29

*Secretary Vance:* We've had two meetings today. The first meeting was about two and a half hours in length, I believe. That was a meeting attended by General Secretary Brezhnev and the Foreign Minister. This afternoon the General Secretary did not attend; it was attended by the Foreign Secretary, the Deputy Minister.

This morning we discussed the assessment of both sides with respect to U.S.-Soviet relations in the future. This was an exchange of views and then a dialogue back and forth with respect to various items which have been raised in what amounted to sort of the opening statements on the part of the General Secretary and myself. This afternoon we devoted the whole afternoon to SALT. During the course of our discussions I put forward the two proposals which you are all familiar with. The Soviets, on their side, made certain suggestions. We discussed the various matters at considerable length.

I don't think it's appropriate to go into the details of our discussion. There will come a time later on when we will be able to talk to you more about the details of the plans and the discussion; but I just don't think it is appropriate at this juncture to get into any of that kind of detail, because we are going to be resuming again tomorrow morning at 11:00 to continue our discussions.

*Q. Can you characterize in general at all the Soviet response to the comprehensive proposal?*

*Secretary Vance:* I think it would be inappropriate to do so. Let me just say that

the general atmosphere was businesslike. It was not rejected out of hand.

*Q. Without going into details, sir, could you tell us whether the Soviets offered a proposal?*

*Secretary Vance:* Well, they did offer a proposal. It is a proposal that we are familiar with. In essence they have suggested this proposal before. There were some variations on it, but I don't want to go into details.

*Q. Mr. Secretary, did Mr. Brezhnev raise the question of human rights this morning?*

*Secretary Vance:* He did.

*Q. In what way?*

*Secretary Vance:* He made a statement with respect to the question of human rights. I responded to that, and again I really don't think it's appropriate to go into detail as to what was said.

*Q. Was his statement what you expected, or was it stronger than you expected? Did it take you off guard?*

*Secretary Vance:* It did not take me off guard.

*Q. If we could turn to the public record for the moment: We were told that Foreign Minister Gromyko in his toast [at a luncheon on Mar. 28], in the part about Palestinian representation at Geneva, said, "Can't we decide on participation at the conference itself?" which would seem to imply that the Soviets were ready to attend Geneva without having as a prerequisite Palestinian representation. Is that your understanding of what he said? If so, do you feel that breaks with—*

*Secretary Vance:* He said something along those lines. What he meant by that I am not sure. We will be discussing the Middle East question later on during our talks, and during that portion of the talks I do intend to find out exactly what he did mean to say.

*Q. You don't want to talk about your response on the human rights issue; yet the Soviet press agency made public in some detail allegedly what Brezhnev said to you. I think it's only fair for our readers that we have some idea of your response to him.*

*Secretary Vance:* I haven't seen what they said. I'll read what they said, and then I'll comment tomorrow.

*Q.* Would you like us to read you what they said right now? The Soviets come on quite strong, Mr. Secretary.

*Secretary Vance:* What did they say?

*Q.* I've got it right here, if you'll wait just a moment. The key part went like this: TASS began by saying that Brezhnev made his statement, and then it went on to say: "At the same time an appropriate appraisal was given of those moments in U.S. policy which do not square with the principle of equality, non-interference in the internal affairs of each other, and mutual benefit, without the observance of which the constructive development of relations between the two countries is impossible."

*Secretary Vance:* Let me simply say this: that I made reference to the fact that our human rights position springs out of fundamental values which we hold; that we are different societies, we have different values; that we do not intend to single out the Soviet Union in what we say about human rights; that our concerns are universal in nature; and that we will continue to do what we believe is appropriate in the overall question of human rights. That, in essence, is what I said.

*Q.* Do you feel that you cleared the air or that you are going to have more discussion about human rights?

*Secretary Vance:* No, I think the air is pretty clear now.

*Q.* Mr. Vance, is it your impression that as a result of this exchange that the subject is over with or is it going to play a part?

*Secretary Vance:* No, I would expect it is over with for these discussions.

*Q.* Mr. Vance, on SALT, when you said the Soviets made a position we're all familiar with—

*Secretary Vance:* What I said was we all are familiar with.

*Q.* So that there's no misunderstanding on our part, my assumption is that they pro-

posed keeping the 2,400 limit and including the cruise missile in it. Is that a fair assumption?

*Secretary Vance:* Yes, it is, including the cruise missile.

*Q.* Do you regard it significant, sir, that Brezhnev did not show up this afternoon?

*Secretary Vance:* No, not at all.

*Q.* Mr. Secretary, could you explain at all—you said you laid out both proposals. Does that mean that you mentioned first the comprehensive proposal and then you went immediately to raise the second proposal as well? Could you tell us a little bit about this?

*Secretary Vance:* They were both raised side by side.

*Q.* Simultaneously?

*Secretary Vance:* Yes.

*Q.* Did they ask you—without you telling us the answer—but did they ask you what type of, how far the deep reduction could go approximately?

*Secretary Vance:* I gave it to them in approximation.

*Q.* Do you hope or have any reason to believe that you might get a Soviet response before you leave Moscow?

*Secretary Vance:* Yes. They indicated they would give us a response.

*Q.* Will you discuss that tomorrow morning? Will this go on with SALT or move to other issues?

*Secretary Vance:* I believe we'll start with SALT tomorrow.

*Q.* Then your general appraisal is that it is an optimistic—

*Secretary Vance:* I am not going to characterize it as optimistic or pessimistic. I will say that we had a businesslike discussion which will continue tomorrow.

*Q.* Are they making progress on SALT dependent upon any action by us on human rights?

*Secretary Vance:* No.

*Q.* Sir, Mr. Secretary, do you see any

progress as a result of one day's talk toward this framework which you've been talking about?

*Secretary Vance:* Well, I think the fact that we're talking about it and serious questions are being asked back and forth on it is some progress. But I don't want to blow it up as any great thing.

*Q. Do you think, sir, that you'll be leaving Thursday morning on schedule?*

*Secretary Vance:* As I've said all along, if we're making progress and there's a purpose in continuing on through Thursday, I'm prepared to stay through Thursday, Friday, or however long it takes.

*Q. Mr. Secretary, on the Middle East and Gromyko's comments on that—did you feel that the Soviet position has become more flexible?*

*Secretary Vance:* I couldn't really tell; there wasn't that much of it in the toast to draw any conclusions. We are going to have to have a full discussion to really get an idea of what's involved.

*Q. Mr. Secretary, on SALT, will the primary issue be trying to unravel with the inhibitions that are on you—I assume from what you said we can safely assume that the Soviet position will be what must be very much as what it was at the end of January of 1976 and February 1976.*

*Secretary Vance:* That's a fair assumption.

*Q. Mr. Secretary, in Mr. Gromyko's toast he repeated their standard support of the Vladivostok agreement. Then he said, as we got it, "A constructive approach from the U.S. side will always be met with understanding from the U.S.S.R." Did you regard that as an encouraging sign that they would be ready to consider something more than just a simple ratification of the Vladivostok agreement?*

*Secretary Vance:* I listened to that part with great interest. But I really don't know how to characterize it.

*Q. Well, was there anything in the talks that will give you the information to help you characterize it?*

*Secretary Vance:* No. It is too early in the talks to draw any conclusions.

*Q. Mr. Secretary, can you tell us whether the Soviet representatives raised the basic question which we have heard—that they object to a new administration coming in with a fundamentally different approach?*

*Secretary Vance:* Yes, that question was raised as one of the items. We discussed at some length as to whether or not the—well, I'm getting into too much detail.

*Q. Did Mr. Gromyko do most of the talking on the Soviet side in the afternoon?*

*Secretary Vance:* Yes, he did.

## NEWS CONFERENCE, MOSCOW, MARCH 29

Press release 139 dated March 30

*Secretary Vance:* Let me give you a brief fill-in on what we covered today. We had two meetings; one in the morning, and we met again this afternoon starting at 4:30 and just finished a few moments ago. In the morning we covered two areas—mutual balanced force reductions discussions, which have been going on in Vienna, and the Middle East. In the afternoon session, we covered a number of items—the comprehensive test ban, demilitarization of the Indian Ocean, nonproliferation, conventional arms transfers, the proposal of the Soviets with respect to weapons of mass destruction—and touched just very, very briefly at the end on southern Africa.

As you can see, it was a full day with many subjects before us for discussion. We agreed in a number of these areas to set up follow-on working groups to continue the discussions that we started today. I won't try and give you a list of the various issues today, but before the end of the mission I will indicate which are the areas in which we are going to have the follow-on working groups.

*Q. Mr. Secretary, were you disappointed by the fact that SALT did not become the centerpiece of today's discussion?*

*Secretary Vance:* No, I was not. Indeed, I was glad that it didn't come up today, because it indicates to me that serious con-

sideration is being given to the question of SALT and to the proposals which have been tabled. I am not trying to be optimistic about that, but I do think it indicates that serious consideration is being given to it.

*Q. Is there an indication that the Politburo perhaps is meeting on the SALT proposal?*

*Secretary Vance:* I don't know.

*Q. On the Middle East, Mr. Secretary, did you get the feeling, in general, that the Soviets were being helpful or constructive in any way, and particularly did you get any enlightenment on Mr. Gromyko's remark in his toast yesterday?*

*Secretary Vance:* I had the feeling that they were being constructive, that they wished to play a constructive and active role as Cochairman [of the Middle East Peace Conference at Geneva]. We welcome that fact. We think we both have a responsibility in this area to try and see that progress is made toward a Middle East settlement, and therefore I welcome that.

*Q. Mr. Secretary, does the statement yesterday mean what it seems to mean?*

*Secretary Vance:* Which one are you talking about?

*Q. On the Middle East—specifically, that the Soviet position currently is that the question of PLO [Palestine Liberation Organization] participation can await discussion inside the conference.*

*Secretary Vance:* You had better let them speak to that. I do not want to—we both agreed that we will not comment on what the other side said and let them speak for themselves.

*Q. Let me just ask you generally on that point—are you somewhat more interested in the proposal than without examining it further?*

*Secretary Vance:* Well, all I want to say on the Middle East today is that I found the discussion useful. We reviewed all of the issues, both procedural and substantive. I think I have a fuller and more complete understanding now of the Soviet position, and I will let it go at that today.

*Q. Mr. Secretary, how close do you think you are to a comprehensive test ban?*

*Secretary Vance:* We had a good discussion on that today. There are some obvious issues in that area that have to be further explored, but I thought that the talks in that area were useful and constructive, as I did particularly in the area of nonproliferation.

*Q. Did anyone in the Soviet delegation indicate to you that they are now giving serious study to the proposal on SALT?*

*Secretary Vance:* I did not ask about it.

*Q. There are no other problems here?*

*Secretary Vance:* No other problems here.

*Q. Was there any allusion at all today to human rights?*

*Secretary Vance:* No allusion to human rights today.

*Q. Mr. Secretary, in the past the Russians have not ever seriously considered or responded to us when we have suggested a conventional arms reduction to areas such as the Middle East. Was that a subject of discussion today? Did you get the feeling that they would consider such an approach?*

*Secretary Vance:* Yes, it was a subject of discussion again today. As I indicated to you earlier, we have in the past discussed the question of conventional arms transfers in the Middle East. And as I have indicated previously, the problem there remains the unresolved political issue and my judgment is that it is going to be difficult to achieve any substantial reduction in arms transfers there until the political differences among the parties are resolved.

*Q. On the issue of southern Africa, did you discuss President Podgorny's recent statements in southern Africa at all?*

*Secretary Vance:* No, we just touched very, very briefly on it, and we really did not spend much time on it.

*Q. [Inaudible] conventional arms transfers, did you discuss it in reference to Africa as well?*

*Secretary Vance:* Yes.

*Q. Could you expand on that at all?*

*Secretary Vance:* I really do not want to expand on it at this point other than to say that we touched both Middle East, Africa and the general problems of Africa.

*Q. On the Vienna talks, Mr. Secretary, is there any hope that you see now that the ice will be thawed?*

*Secretary Vance:* Well, I think we both agreed that we felt it was important to try to get that out of the doldrums. It is something that, in my judgment, should be done. It would be very much in the interests of all of us to make that kind of movement. I do not want to make any predictions, however, on the basis of our discussions today that something is about to happen.

*Q. Mr. Secretary, we are getting down now to the last two sessions. Could you give us some idea of your sense of when you expect the Soviets to respond, particularly to the American priority of a comprehensive package?*

*Secretary Vance:* I cannot give you a precise answer on that, Mr. Kalb [Bernard Kalb, CBS News]. I wish I could. My best guess is that the subject will come up tomorrow.

*Q. Mr. Vance, the United Press was informed today by the Foreign Ministry that the Foreign Ministry will not grant a visa to one of our prospective Moscow correspondents. Two questions: Do you see any political significance in that, and secondly, do you recall the Helsinki agreement clearly enough to be able to help me find out whether they are obliged under that agreement to give an answer for this rejection? They gave no explanation.*

*Secretary Vance:* The answer is I do not recall those provisions of the Helsinki agreement sufficiently to give you an answer, and secondly, I am not familiar with the incident to which you refer.

*Q. How would you describe the atmosphere, Mr. Secretary?*

*Secretary Vance:* Again, it was businesslike.

*Q. Mr. Secretary, do you have any clear ideas at this point as to whether you might stay over another day or two?*

*Secretary Vance:* Let me say I am still prepared to stay over if this will be useful, and I would think I would probably know by the end of the meeting tomorrow morning.

*Q. Mr. Secretary, how does it feel for a full day to go by without you getting any indication from the Russians on the central question to which you have come to Moscow?*

*Secretary Vance:* As I indicated, I think that that is not only expectable but in a way I am pleased by that, because it leads me to guess, at least, that serious consideration is being given to the proposals which we have put forward. As I say, I do not want to be optimistic about it, but at least I think that one can draw the kind of conclusions that I did from that.

*Q. There were no followup questions by the Russians on the proposal today?*

*Secretary Vance:* No. I think the proposal is really quite clear. Maybe there will be some questions tomorrow.

*Q. Can you tell us the numbers tonight, Mr. Secretary?*

*Secretary Vance:* [Laughs.] Not tonight. [Laughter.]

*Q. Do you expect to meet with Mr. Brezhnev tomorrow? Do you expect that he will be there? Have you been given an indication?*

*Secretary Vance:* I have not been given an indication.

*Q. Sir, do you expect to see him again before you leave—Mr. Brezhnev?*

*Secretary Vance:* I do not know for sure, but I think probably I will.

*Q. In assessing these two days, Mr. Secretary, would you say you are making more progress than you expected, less, or about what you expected?*

*Secretary Vance:* I would answer by saying I found the discussions today to be useful and helpful.

*Q. Mr. Secretary, are these working groups you talk about—are these working groups that would be set up for the future or just tomorrow?*

*Secretary Vance:* For the future.

*Q. Where would they meet? Here or Washington or—*

*Secretary Vance:* Either place. Could meet in Geneva. That depends on what subject they deal with.

*Q. Is this our idea, the working groups?*

*Secretary Vance:* We both agreed to it.

*Q. Mr. Secretary, couldn't you be more precise on what areas they are going to work on and how many they are, because it makes it very difficult to write about?*

*Secretary Vance:* I realize that. Let me just say at this point there will be several. I do not want to announce, unilaterally announce, these. We will do it bilaterally when we do it.

## **NEWS CONFERENCE, MOSCOW, MARCH 30**

Press release 142 dated March 30

*Secretary Vance:* Good evening. Let me fill you in on our meeting of this afternoon.

We met this afternoon with General Secretary Brezhnev and Foreign Minister Gromyko and other officials. At that meeting the Soviets told us that they had examined our two proposals and did not find either acceptable. They proposed nothing new on their side.

Let me give you a brief outline, as I promised I would when we reached this point, on the nature of the two proposals which we put forward.

The first proposed what we had called our deferral proposal. Under this proposal we suggested the deferral of consideration of the cruise missile and the "Backfire" bomber issues and that we resolve all other remaining issues under the Vladivostok accord and sign a new treaty. The proposal is only consistent with the agreement reached at Vladivostok, as you know, and there was no agreement reached at Vladivostok with respect to either cruise missiles or the Backfire bomber and therefore they have been and are open issues. So, in essence, our proposal was: Let's sign up what has been agreed at Vladivostok and put aside

the cruise missile and get on with SALT Three.

As an alternative, and what we have referred to as the comprehensive proposal, the one that we preferred and urged that they give serious consideration to, was a proposal which would have really made substantive progress toward true arms control. It had in it four elements—or has in it four elements. Let me run through them briefly with you.

The first deals with aggregates. We proposed that there be a substantial reduction in the overall aggregate of strategic delivery vehicles.

Second, we proposed that there be a reduction in the number of what are called modern large ballistic missile launchers.

Third, we proposed that there be a reduction in the MIRV launcher aggregate.

And fourth, we proposed that there be a limit on the launchers of ICBM's equipped with MIRV's. In other words, we proposed a sublimit in that area.

Going on to ICBM restrictions, we proposed that there continue to be a ban on construction of new ICBM launchers. We proposed in addition a ban on modification of existing ICBM's. In addition to that, we proposed a limit on the number of flight tests for existing ICBM's. We proposed in addition a ban on the development, the testing, and deployment of new ICBM's. In addition to that, we proposed a ban on the development, testing, and deployment of mobile ICBM launchers.

With respect to the cruise missiles, we proposed a ban on the development, testing, and deployment of all cruise missiles, whether nuclear armed or conventionally armed, of intercontinental range. In other words, we set a limit. I'm not going to give you that precise number, but there was a specific number over which they would be banned, and that limit was the limit between intercontinental and nonintercontinental.

Finally, with respect to the Backfire bomber, we indicated that we want them to provide us with a list of measures to assure that the Backfire bomber would not be used as a strategic bomber.

That, in essence, is the comprehensive package which we put forward.



We agreed to continue discussions in the future. Foreign Minister Gromyko and I will be meeting in May to discuss the Middle East and other items, including strategic arms limitation.

In addition to that, we have agreed to set up a number of working groups in various areas to follow up on the discussions which we have had here in Moscow.

Let me give you a list of the areas in which we will have these follow-on working groups. They include the area of comprehensive test bans; the area of chemical weapons; the area of prior notification of missile test-firing; the area of antisatellite weapons; the area of civil defense; the area of possible military limitations in the Indian Ocean; the area of radiological weapons; the area of conventional weapons; and we agreed to set up a regular schedule of meetings to deal with the whole question of proliferation.

That is the summary of where we are at this point.

*Q. Mr. Secretary, what effect do you think the outcome of these negotiations will have on U.S.-Soviet relations?*

*Secretary Vance:* I think we made progress in these negotiations and they were useful. I think that U.S.-Soviet relations will continue to be good. I hope in the future we can strengthen those relations.

Needless to say, I am disappointed that we have failed to make progress in what I consider to be the most essential of all these areas, namely, the area of strategic nuclear arms. But I think that our relationships will continue. We will certainly do everything we can to continue to try and strengthen relations.

*Q. It must be very evident, sir, that without the specifics of the proposal that the United States presented, it will be impossible for any rational person to draw a conclusion as to whether the U.S. proposal was plausible or not as a proposal made between adversary nations. Is there nothing that you can do, sir, to give us the specifics which would tell the American public whether the proposal made by the United States was a plausible proposal?*

*Secretary Vance:* I cannot give you, at this point, any specific numbers. I think that you have enough in terms of the outline of the proposal to answer the question which we put, Mr. Marder [Murrey Marder, Washington Post].

*Q. I would defer with due respect, sir.*

*Q. Mr. Secretary, did the Soviet side give you any reason to hope that there may be some further negotiation on your proposal and on their proposal so that you might find a bridge between the two?*

*Secretary Vance:* Yes. We agreed that we would continue discussions. That is all.

*Q. To what extent do you think the issue of human rights might have played a role in the failure of these discussions?*

*Secretary Vance:* Well, human rights did not come up after the first day. We never discussed it again.

*Q. You don't think it in any way affected their thinking on your proposals?*

*Secretary Vance:* I do not believe it did. No, I think it stood on its own feet, but you will have to ask them.

*Q. I'm not clear what happens next. Is one side supposed to come up with a new proposal, or where do we go from here? Specifically?*

*Secretary Vance:* Where we go from here is that I am hoping that they would consider the proposals which we have made. We think that they provide a reasonable basis for further discussions.

We will be meeting again. I hope by that time there will be something to put on the table which will permit us to make progress.

*Q. Did they give you some indication that they think this is a basis, that your proposals are a basis, for further negotiations?*

*Secretary Vance:* All they gave us today was that they said they did not find it acceptable.

*Q. Did they expand on that, sir, at all, or just say they did not find it acceptable?*

*Secretary Vance:* They said they did not find it acceptable because that did not coin-

cide with their view of what they thought was an equitable deal.

*Q. Is it still possible, sir, to think to replace SALT One by October, when it expires?*

*Secretary Vance:* Yes, I think it is still possible. I would come back to the point that the deferral proposal is a proposal which is based upon what was agreed to at Vladivostok and simply puts aside the very difficult issues of Backfire and the cruise missile and one could sign that and move immediately on to the more complex problems which are contained in the comprehensive proposal in SALT Two.

*Q. Mr. Secretary, did they then give you an indication that the deferral proposal might be a better basis for further talks than the comprehensive proposal? Did they make a distinction between the two rejected proposals?*

*Secretary Vance:* They did not make a distinction between the two.

*Q. Mr. Secretary, will you be issuing a communique on other areas, such as the Middle East, southern Africa—*

*Secretary Vance:* We probably will be issuing a communique, yes.

*Q. Are your meetings continuing tonight to start the communique?*

*Secretary Vance:* Yes.

*Q. Where will the meetings be between you and Mr. Gromyko?*

*Secretary Vance:* We have not finally agreed. It will be somewhere in Europe.

*Q. Could you amplify, sir, on the meetings that are continuing tonight?*

*Secretary Vance:* The only meeting is on the draft of the communique.

*Q. Mr. Secretary, will you leave Moscow without having achieved that general framework?*

*Secretary Vance:* That is correct. We will leave without having achieved that general framework. I am very disappointed that we were unable to do so.

*Q. Mr. Secretary, you told us two days ago that the Soviets had put on the table a slightly modified version of the January 1976 proposal. Is that still on the table—*

*Secretary Vance:* Yes.

*Q. We have two American proposals and a Soviet proposal?*

*Secretary Vance:* That is right.

*Q. Mr. Secretary, do you believe that agreement on some strategic arms proposals now still remains a prerequisite, or a condition, for a summit meeting between President Carter and Leonid Brezhnev?*

*Secretary Vance:* I do not want to express an opinion on that now. I think that I should leave that for the future.

*Q. Mr. Secretary, do you think that today's failure will result in the acceleration of the arms race on the part of both countries?*

*Secretary Vance:* I would certainly hope not. I think that it would be a tragedy if there would be an acceleration of the arms race. This would be in the interest of neither side, nor in the interest of peace.

*Q. Mr. Secretary, did we express an opinion as to their proposal on the table, and if not, what is the state of play? Is it for us to come up with a new proposal, or for them to amend their proposal, or—*

*Secretary Vance:* Yes, we have discussed the proposal.

*Q. That was discussed today?*

*Secretary Vance:* Not today, but we have had a discussion.

*Q. Mr. Vance, you were saying that our relations were nevertheless good, despite your inability to reach an agreement on SALT. I must say it seems to strain credibility, that statement. It would seem to, I think, most of us that the main topic here was a collapse in the SALT negotiations. There seems to be no possible compromise on this, and I would think that relations were worse than any time in recent years. Where is the relationship good, given the*

fact on the central question that there is absolutely no agreement?

*Secretary Vance:* Well, I think, Mr. Gwertzman [Bernard Gwertzman, New York Times], that we have made, as I indicated earlier, progress in a number of other areas that I outlined to you. The nature of the talks was at no time acrimonious or unbusinesslike. I think that the task remains before us to try and find a way to reach agreement in the strategic area, and we both should bend our efforts to that end.

*Q. What progress do you mean? Are you referring to the working groups or the subject area of the Middle East—*

*Secretary Vance:* Yes, to these various other matters which we discussed.

*Q. Can you give me specifics on that? Did you find out what Gromyko meant the other day?*

*Secretary Vance:* Yes, I did. He did not mean what has been written in the papers.

*Q. Mr. Secretary, what did he mean?*

*Secretary Vance:* He did mean that he felt that the PLO [Palestine Liberation Organization] should be included in any talks.

*Q. He did or did not?*

*Secretary Vance:* He did mean that they should be.

*Q. Mr. Secretary, did you make any progress on reunification of divided families? And what was the answer?*

*Secretary Vance:* They are taking it under consideration.

*Q. Mr. Secretary, have you reported to the President already tonight on the results of the talks?*

*Secretary Vance:* I have sent a message to him indicating that the proposals we put forward have been unacceptable.

*Q. Mr. Secretary, could you help, sir, on some physical things?*

*Secretary Vance:* Yes, sure.

*Q. How long did the meeting last?*

*Secretary Vance:* You mean this afternoon? I think about an hour.

*Q. Did Mr. Brezhnev—was he present all the time?*

*Secretary Vance:* Yes, he was.

*Q. Did he participate much in the discussions?*

*Secretary Vance:* Yes, he did. He did all the talking.

*Q. Could you tell us anything more, physically, about—*

*Secretary Vance:* Well, it was similar to the other meetings which we have had. On the Soviet side Mr. Brezhnev did the talking, and on our side I did the talking for our group.

*Q. Was there any noticeable difference in mood between Monday's discussion by Mr. Brezhnev and today's discussion by him?*

*Secretary Vance:* No, I don't think there was any major difference.

*Q. Mr. Secretary, what was the central reason—perhaps you answered it somewhere in this discussion—that the Soviets gave you for their rejection for both proposals that the United States put forth?*

*Secretary Vance:* It was their view that the deferral proposal did not accord with Vladivostok. It is our very clear view that it does accord with Vladivostok because Backfire and cruise missiles were not included in the Vladivostok accord and they remained unsettled issues—so that there is a difference of view between the Soviets and ourselves on that matter.

*Q. Was there a central dispute, sir, on the difference between the two aide memoires out of Vladivostok, the one on ballistic missiles, and the American version mentioning ballistic missiles and the Soviet version mentioning just missiles?*

*Secretary Vance:* There was discussion of the aide memoire, yes.

*Q. Could you tell us, sir, what their reason was for rejecting the comprehensive package, sir?*

*Secretary Vance:* They really should speak on this themselves, but I will tell you that

their indication is that they do not feel that, as they put it, that it is an equitable package. We believe that it is equitable and it does attack the central questions which are involved in seeking a real arms control agreement.

*Q. Is that proposal still on the table and negotiable?*

*Secretary Vance:* It is. All proposals are still on the table.

*Q. It is in your view negotiable? Or did they reject it in the basic form as presented?*

*Secretary Vance:* I would hope as they reflect on it that they will find merit in it and we will find a way to get back together again and start talking pretty soon.

*Q. Sir, with respect, is that [inaudible] the reason you feel we can still get an agreement by October? Is there anything more specific as to why you feel the October deadline is still manageable?*

*Secretary Vance:* No, I think the reason that I feel it is still manageable is that if the parties get together and really put the political will behind it, an agreement can be achieved by October.

*Q. Mr. Secretary, can you get the statistics that we've been asking you for for the past three days? How deep is deep?*

*Secretary Vance:* I really don't think I can give this to you. I will try and give it to you at some point later if I can, but I just can't do it.

*Q. Mr. Secretary, did you formally tell the Soviets that we also found their proposal unacceptable? And could you tell us why we do find their proposal unacceptable?*

*Secretary Vance:* The reason that we have found their proposal unacceptable is that it does not deal properly with the cruise missile issue.

*Q. Did you discuss the possibility of extending the SALT One agreement beyond the end of October?*

*Secretary Vance:* We did not discuss that, no.

*Q. Any indication that they would settle for a reduction that was less deep than the one you proposed? A smaller reduction?*

*Secretary Vance:* As I say, no counter-proposals were made by them today.

*Q. Mr. Secretary, was it suggested at all that at any time between now and the next several months that you would return to Moscow to continue negotiating on the subject?*

*Secretary Vance:* No, but as I indicated, Mr. Gromyko and I are going to meet in May, and one of the subjects which will come up at that time will be the subject of deep arms limitations.

## **JOINT U.S.-U.S.S.R. COMMUNIQUE, MARCH 30**

Press release 144 dated March 30

On March 28-30, 1977, General Secretary of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union, L.I. Brezhnev and member of the Politburo of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union, Minister of Foreign Affairs of the U.S.S.R., A.A. Gromyko, held talks with the Secretary of State of the United States of America, Cyrus R. Vance, who was in Moscow on an official visit.

In the course of the talks there was a general discussion of American-Soviet relations, as well as certain international problems of mutual interest for the U.S. and the U.S.S.R.

Consideration of questions relevant to the completion of the new agreement on the limitation of strategic offensive arms occupied the central place in the talks. The sides have agreed to continue the consideration of these issues.

An exchange of views also took place on a number of other questions concerning the limitation of armaments and disarmament. It was agreed that bilateral contacts, including meetings of experts, would be held to discuss these matters.

The discussion of international issues included the Belgrade preparatory conference, and the situation in Cyprus and southern Africa. They reaffirmed the importance of the Quadripartite Agreement of September 1971. Special attention was given to the situation in the Middle East. The sides have agreed that cooperation between the U.S. and the U.S.S.R. as co-chairmen of the Geneva conference is essential in bringing about a just and lasting peace in the area. An understanding was reached to hold, in the first half of May, 1977 in Geneva, a meeting between the Secretary of State of the U.S. and the Minister of Foreign Af-

fairs of the U.S.S.R. for a thorough exchange of views on the Middle East problem, including the question of resuming the work of the Geneva conference. Some of the other issues discussed in the talks in Moscow will be reviewed at that time.

The consideration of practical questions of bilateral relations produced several specific understandings.

## NEWS CONFERENCE ABOARD AIRCRAFT EN ROUTE LONDON-PARIS, APRIL 1

Press release 161 dated April 2

*Q. Do you mind if I start out by asking you the same question we started off with yesterday? Now that Mr. Gromyko has told us why he thinks the package is inequitable; namely, that it preserves the American lead in some areas and requires the Russians to cut down the area where they might expand—how do you answer that?*

*Secretary Vance:* I would answer it by saying that I think that you can take a look at the overall package; it is balanced and fair.

Let us start off in the ICBM field. In the ICBM field it requires both of us to reduce, and to reduce to the same number. Secondly, it is true that it requires the Soviets to reduce in the area of large ballistic missiles. That, however, is important because it increases the stability that would result as a result of consummation of the package. If you take a look at the totals that would result from the package you would see the Soviet Union ending up with a substantial advantage in throw-weight still—but a reduced advantage in throw-weight—and it would show the United States ending up with a slight advantage in the warhead area. But both would have reduced the numbers of weapons they have and accordingly have produced a more stable situation.

Insofar as freezes are concerned, the freezes would for the first time begin to get a handle on the qualitative improvement problem, which none of the previous agreements have touched. And I think this is a terribly important step forward.

Insofar as the cruise missile is concerned, the United States in its proposal agreed to limitation on the cruise missile; insofar as

“Backfire” is concerned, it made a movement or concession toward the Soviet position.

And thus I think when you take a look at the whole package you can say it is a fair and evenly balanced package.

*Q. On the way over you said that on this particular package—you were prepared to discuss some minor aspects of it, and the essentials were fundamental and basically nonnegotiable. Is that still the case, or will there be some kind of modified proposal to make in Geneva?*

*Secretary Vance:* No. I would hope that the Soviets would study our proposals and come back with—and if they see specific aspects of it, then that they would come back with specific counterproposals, which we of course would take under consideration. But as I said, it seems to me to be fair and equitable, and if there are specifics about it which they think are not, let them put them on the table and we will consider them.

*Q. Mr. Secretary, do you think that looking back on it now, looking especially at the trade union speech and some of the comments by the Soviets leading up to your meeting with Mr. Brezhnev, that perhaps the American side may have misinterpreted the seriousness with which the Soviets held their contention that the United States was interfering in its internal affairs and that there was linkage between atmosphere and SALT?*

*Secretary Vance:* I indicated to you, I believe, on the way over, that they would make their fundamental determination on the basis of the proposal itself, not upon the question of their views with respect to the human rights issues. I think Mr. Gromyko confirmed that.

I indicated previously that I thought that their view with respect to human rights could affect the general atmosphere but would not affect their ultimate decision on the military questions involved in the package. I still think that is correct.

*Q. Mr. Vance, do you think it's possible or likely that the Russians may have been put on the defensive by the publicity given*

*our approach before the United States ever got to Moscow? Is it possible that in an effort to be sort of more open to the American people the President might have, in effect, given the wrong signal to the Russians and they may have interpreted that as a political gimmick or something?*

*Secretary Vance:* No, I do not really think so.

*Q. Mr. Secretary, to what extent do you think the Soviets rejected the package on Wednesday for military reasons, and to what extent did they reject it to test the Carter Administration's resolve?*

*Secretary Vance:* I would make just a guess. At this point I have no idea.

*Q. You have no conception—*

*Secretary Vance:* No. It would be a total guess. No, as I indicated to you, he said that insofar as the comprehensive package was concerned that they considered it inequitable and one-sided and therefore rejected it. Insofar as the other package was concerned they said that that was unacceptable because they did not believe it comported with Vladivostok.

I told you on Wednesday night that I did not—we did not agree to either of those statements by the General Secretary; that we felt that the package was equitable and fair and we felt the second package comported fully with Vladivostok.

*Q. What do you think, in general, of the Gromyko news conference [inaudible]?*

*Secretary Vance:* Obviously he felt it necessary to hold a press conference to state their views. We felt that we owed it to the people to explain what it is that had been rejected, and therefore I outlined in general terms what our proposal was. And in light of that I think he felt it necessary to come out and express what the Soviet views were. I do not see any harm coming from it, no.

I think the people are entitled to know. This is a very important issue for the American people and for the Soviet people and for the people of the world, and I think they are entitled to know what kind of package it was we put on the table.

*Q. Did he violate any agreement?*

*Secretary Vance:* No, he did not.

*Q. Mr. Secretary, you indicated Wednesday night that our approach to the cruise missiles was to put restrictions based on the range of the missiles. How would this work, in view of the fact that the air-launched and sea-launched missiles, for example, could be carried much closer to the Soviet borders by ship or by plane [inaudible]?*

*Secretary Vance:* Well, I am not sure I understand your question.

*Q. You put a restriction simply on the United States deploying a missile for a range of say 1,500 or 1,600 miles, for example. What would be the significance of that when an air-launched missile can be put on an airplane and carried by B-1, or by 747 even, to within 300 miles of the Soviet border? Or a sea-launched can be put on a ship and taken into the Baltic and fired?*

*Secretary Vance:* Well, then you have to get into the whole question of what targets can be hit at what ranges, and it gets into a very complicated kind of equation.

*Q. It is the delivery system that matters more—the range of that—than the range of the missile itself, in terms of restriction.*

*Secretary Vance:* No, no more than the fact that an IRBM [intermediate-range ballistic missile], which is not included, or an MRBM [medium-range ballistic missile], which the Soviets have, are not considered as intercontinental weapons. It is the same kind of a thing.

*Q. Mr. Secretary, after the first day of talks you said that you thought the air was cleared on the human rights issue. To get at that point of stability were the Soviets given some kind of assurance that there would not in the future be a direct approach in defense of one or another Soviet dissident by the President of the United States?*

*Secretary Vance:* No, no such assurance was given.

*Q. Well, why were they satisfied?*

*Secretary Vance:* I didn't say that they

were satisfied. They just didn't bring the subject up again.

*Q. But you said that you felt that after the first day that they would not bring it up again.*

*Secretary Vance:* I said that I felt that the air was clear because they had made their statement. I didn't say they were satisfied.

*Q. But you said that they merely were going to be satisfied by making a strong statement—*

*Secretary Vance:* You're using the word "satisfied." I never used the word "satisfied." Next question.

*Q. Mr. Secretary, Mr. Gromyko's statement in Moscow seemed to be insisting that a new SALT agreement lead to the liquidation of some of our bases in Europe—Britain, NATO bases. Was the question raised with you, and are they going to start setting some new conditions before they start negotiating?*

*Secretary Vance:* If they should pursue that idea, then it would change the whole basis of SALT. In the past, as you know, the question of forward-based systems and the Soviet equivalent—namely, the IRBM's and the MRBM's—have not been included. And therefore, if this was to be interjected into the SALT talks, it would be a total change from the past.

*Q. Did he bring it up with you?*

*Secretary Vance:* As I said, yes he did, he brought it up on the last day. He made his statement, and I indicated to him exactly what I have told you.

*Q. Let's do the numbers now today. Gromyko said "1,800 to 2,000" and 1,100 on MIRV's. Since it's out, perhaps we can talk about it. The American people are entitled to know—*

*Secretary Vance:* What about it?

*Q. Are the numbers right?*

*Secretary Vance:* I'm not going to give you specific numbers. They are in the ballpark.

*Q. Well, what does the 1,800-to-2,000 range mean?*

*Secretary Vance:* It isn't a range. The 1,800 to 2,000 as he describes it was the area of reduction—to a number in that area.

*Q. Is that a negotiable range?*

*Secretary Vance:* Yes.

*Q. What about the MIRV numbers?*

*Secretary Vance:* Same thing.

*Q. [Inaudible].*

*Secretary Vance:* I said I wasn't going to give you any specifics. It's still in the ballpark.

*Q. The President said 550. Can you explain that to us? The President said 550 on ICBM's.*

*Secretary Vance:* The answer is, Yes, there is such a number in the package.

*Q. Is that MIRV's ICBM—MIRV ICBM launchers?*

*Secretary Vance:* That's all I'm going to say about numbers.

*Q. Mr. Secretary, am I right in believing that the Soviets gave you no reason to be hopeful on the reunification of divided families?*

*Secretary Vance:* I told you, on reunification of divided families, that I discussed the subject with them and they said they would take it under consideration.

*Q. That's basically like saying we are not going to do anything about it?*

*Secretary Vance:* No, it's not. I wouldn't draw that conclusion. I think that really that's all that one can say on that subject in the interests of the divided families.

*Q. Are you reticent that in speaking out you could queer a deal?*

*Secretary Vance:* I have said really all I want to say on that.

*Q. Is it possible that there was some kind of blunder in the American psychological approach to these negotiations—that is, you presented a firm proposal hoping that the Russians might negotiate; instead, they found it so outrageous that they rejected it out of hand and have really sort of taken your breath away?*

*Secretary Vance:* They haven't taken my breath away.

*Q. You know what I mean, was there a blunder—*

*Secretary Vance:* I don't think so.

*Q. Do you see any problem at all to the Administration's credibility the way that the situation stands at present? The Administration is saying from all departments, so are congressional leaders, that the Administration was not surprised that the proposals were rejected by the Russians. Frankly, in logic, that means that your mission went with real probability that it was going to be rejected. It sets up a whole syndrome that the United States at least—it sets up a premise that this mission was doomed to failure from the start. Could you comment on that?*

*Secretary Vance:* I indicated that I was disappointed that we didn't make progress and establish a framework. That directly reflects my views.

*Q. I recognize you said you were disappointed, sir. But others are saying—the rest of the Administration is saying something considerably different. They are saying that they were not surprised. If that holds true that means in logic that they expected this mission to fail.*

*Secretary Vance:* I don't think it necessarily means that. What it probably means is that anything is possible in the negotiations and the fact that we were not successful didn't surprise them. And that's simply what—

*Q. Will we have an opportunity with some of the other officials—frankly, there are basic inconsistencies in the rationalization as it now appears for many of the American proposals; they appear to be inconsistent. I'm sure there must be an explanation for them. Well, I want to give you a small example. The United States calls for a ban on all new nuclear weapons. The cruise missile is a new nuclear weapon.*

*Secretary Vance:* It was dealt with specifically. What the proposal called for

was with respect to ICBM's, not all new systems.

*Q. But you see, we have not seen the language of the proposal as the President has stated—*

*Secretary Vance:* That answers your question.

*Q. No, it doesn't, sir. The President said on Wednesday, or Tuesday, that his proposal calls for a ban on all new nuclear weapons systems.*

*Secretary Vance:* The accurate thing is that it called for a ban on the deployment of any new ICBM's. O.K.?

## **ARRIVAL, ANDREWS AFB, APRIL 2**

Press release 162 dated April 2

### **Secretary Vance**

Good evening, ladies and gentlemen. It's very good to be home, and I want to express my deep appreciation to the President and Mrs. Carter for coming out to meet us.

I might just say a word about our recent trip. Arms control is an ongoing process. It has been going on for a long time; it will continue for a long time in the future. It is not for the short-winded. We did make some progress in a number of other arms control areas if not in the strategic area. We will have a number of working groups which will begin to work shortly in areas running from comprehensive test bans, to looking at the Indian Ocean and demilitarization, to a host of other areas. Our next meeting with the Soviets will be in May when I will meet with Mr. Gromyko to resume further discussions in the area of strategic arms.

As I say, it is good to be home. Thank you for being here, Mr. President.

### **President Carter**

Well, I am very glad to have the Secretary of State and Paul Warnke back home. We have put forward for the first time a comprehensive proposal to limit and then drastically reduce the atomic weaponry of the world. We look on this as a necessary first step. We are absolutely determined



without ceasing to work harmoniously with the Soviet leaders to reduce dependence upon atomic weapons. We will do everything we can to strengthen the ties of friendship and mutual trust with the Soviet leaders.

I want to express my thanks for the good trip and the good negotiating position and the success of the trip that the Secretary of State has taken. And I want to express my thanks to Mr. Brezhnev and Mr. Gromyko and others in the Soviet Union for the very productive negotiations on many items that we raised.

As the Secretary of State has said, negotiation for drastic elimination of atomic

weapons after all these years—a quarter of a century—is a very difficult undertaking but it is one that we will pursue with determination, with persistence, and with hope for success. Our whole Administration will be devoting a great effort to preparing for the continuation of the talks that will proceed in Geneva the first part of May. And I believe that the Soviets will ultimately agree with us that it is to the advantage of the Soviet people, the American people, and the rest of the world to reduce our dependence upon this destructive weapon.

Thank you very much.

## President Carter Discusses Strategic Arms Limitation Proposals

*Following is the transcript of remarks by President Carter and questions and answers with news correspondents in the briefing room at the White House on March 30.*

Weekly Compilation of Presidential Documents dated April 4

*The President:* Good afternoon.

This has been an afternoon devoted to receiving dispatches from Moscow, and I'd like to make a report to the American people about what has occurred.

We have proposed to the Soviet leaders in the last two days a comprehensive package of agreements which, if concluded, will lay a permanent groundwork for a more peaceful world, an alleviation of the great threat of atomic weapons, that will retain the political and strategic weapon capability and balance between the United States and the Soviet Union.

One of our proposals on this nuclear weapons talks was very brief, and it was our second option. It was, in effect, to ratify the Vladivostok agreement that had already been reached.

The difference between us and the Soviet Union on this point is that the Soviets claim that Secretary Kissinger and my predecessors in the White House—Presidents Ford and, earlier, Nixon—did agree to forgo the

deployment of cruise missiles. Our position is that we have never agreed to any such thing. But we asked the Soviet Union to accept an agreement on all other matters and postpone the cruise missile and the Russians' new bomber, the "Backfire" bomber, until continuing later discussions. They rejected that proposal.

The other one was much more far-reaching and has profound consequences that are beneficial, I think, to our own nation and to the rest of the world. It was to have substantial reductions in the level of deployment of missile launchers and the MIRV'ed missiles below the 2,400 level and the 1,320 level that were established under the Vladivostok agreements—substantial reductions; secondly, to stop the development and deployment of any new weapons systems. A third point was to freeze at the present level about 550 intercontinental ballistic missiles, our Minuteman and their missiles known as the SS-17, 18, and 19.

Another was to ban the deployment of all mobile missiles, their SS-16 and others, or ours—that is under the development stage, the MX.

Another one is to have a strict limit on the deployment of the Backfire bomber and a

strict limit on the range that would be permitted on cruise missiles.

Another element of the proposal was to limit the number of test-firings of missiles to six firings per year of the intercontinental-range and also of the medium-range missiles and to ask the Soviet Union to give us some assured mechanism by which we could distinguish between their intercontinental mobile missile, the SS-16, and their limited-range mobile missile, the SS-20.

The sum total of all this proposal was a fair, balanced, substantial reduction in the arms race which would have guaranteed, I believe, a permanent lessening of tension and a mutual benefit to both our countries. The Soviets, at least at this point, have not accepted this proposal either.

Both parties—which will be promulgated in a joint communique tomorrow—have agreed to continue the discussions the first half of May in Geneva.

You might be interested in knowing that a few other points that we proposed were to have adequate verification, an end of concealment, and the establishment of a so-called data base by which we would tell the Soviet Union the level of our own armaments at this point and they would tell us their level of armaments at this point so that we would have an assured mutually agreed level of weapon capability.

I might cover just a few more things. In addition to discussing the SALT agreements in Geneva early in May, we have agreed to discuss other matters—south Africa, the upcoming possible Middle Eastern talks.

And we've agreed to set up eight study groups; one to develop an agreement where we might forgo the development of a capability of destroying satellite observation vehicles so that we can have an assured way to watch the Soviets, they can have an assured way of watching us from satellites.

The second is to discuss the terms of a possible comprehensive test ban so that we don't test in the future any more nuclear weapons. And we've also asked the Soviets to join with us in a prohibition against the testing of peaceful nuclear devices.

Another study group that has been mutually agreed to be established is to dis-

cuss the terms by which we might demilitarize or reduce the military effort in the Indian Ocean.

Another group will be set up of experts to discuss the terms by which we can agree on advanced notice on all missile test-firings so that, perhaps 24 hours ahead of time, we would notify the Soviets when we were going to test-fire one of our missiles, they would do the same for us.

Another group will be studying a way to initiate comprehensive arms control in conventional weapons and also the sale of weapons to third countries, particularly the developing nations of the world.

Another is to discuss how we might contribute mutually toward nonproliferation of nuclear weapon capability. Nations do need a way to produce atomic power for electricity, but we hope that the Soviets will join with us and our allies and friends in cutting down the capability of nations to use spent nuclear fuels to develop explosives.

Another item that we agreed to discuss, at the Soviets' request, was the termination in the capability of waging radiological or chemical warfare.

And the eighth study group that we agreed to establish is to study the means by which we could mutually agree on forgoing major efforts in civil defense. We feel that the Soviets have done a great deal on civil defense capability. We've done a less amount, but we would like for both of us to agree not to expend large sums of money on this effort.

So the sum total of the discussions has been to lay out a firm proposal which the Soviets have not yet responded to on drastic reductions in nuclear capability in the future—these discussions will continue early in May—and to set up study groups to continue with the analysis of the other eight items that I described to you.

I'd be glad to answer just a few questions.

*Q. Mr. President, pardon me if I don't stand, but I will block the camera there.*

*Do you still believe that the Soviets in no way linked your human rights crusade with arms control negotiations?*

*The President:* I can't certify to you that

there is no linkage in the Soviets' minds between the human rights effort and the SALT limitations. We have no evidence that this was the case.

Secretary Vance thought it was quite significant, for instance, that when General Secretary Brezhnev presented a prepared statement on the human rights issue that it was done in a different meeting entirely from the meeting in which the SALT negotiations occurred.

So our assessment is that there was no linkage, but I can't certify that there is no linkage in the Soviets' minds.

*Q. Mr. President, you've said that the Soviets contend that Secretary Kissinger and your predecessors had promised that we would not deploy, I believe, the cruise missile.*

*The President: Yes.*

*Q. Just where and how do they contend that this promise was given, and have you checked with them to see if in fact it was?*

*The President: Yes. Both President Ford and Secretary Kissinger have maintained publicly and to me privately that there was never any agreement on the part of the United States to contain or to prohibit the deployment or development of cruise missiles.*

The language that was used in the early Vladivostok agreement, which, as you know, has not yet been ratified, was a prohibition against air-launched missiles.

Secretary Kissinger's position has been—and he is much better able to speak than I am to speak for him—that that meant ballistic missiles, which was a subject of the Vladivostok talks.

Two and a half years ago or so, when these talks took place, the cruise missile capability was not well understood and there was no detailed discussion at all of the cruise missile. The Soviets claim that when they did discuss air-launched missiles that they were talking about cruise missiles.

Secretary Kissinger said that he was not talking about cruise missiles.

*Q. Sir, the point, just to follow, they are*

*not contending that there was any secret understanding or discussion or anything?*

*The President: No.*

*Q. They're talking about the language that was in the Vladivostok agreement?*

*The President: Exactly.*

*Q. Did the Russians have a counterproposal on SALT that they offered us, or were they content simply to listen to our proposals?*

*The President: They listened to our two proposals. Of course, their proposal has been to ratify their understanding of the Vladivostok agreement, which includes their capability of developing the Backfire bomber and our incapability of developing cruise missiles. That's an agreement that we never understood to be part of the Vladivostok agreement.*

*Q. Mr. Carter, if necessary to achieve any progress, are you willing to modify your human rights statements—*

*The President: No.*

*Q.—or will you continue to speak out?*

*The President: No. I will not modify my human rights statements. My human rights statements are compatible with the consciousness of this country. I think that there has been repeated recognition in international law that verbal statements or any sort of public expression of a nation's beliefs is not an intrusion in other nations' affairs.*

The Soviets have in effect ratified the rights of human beings when they adopted the United Nations Charter. The Helsinki agreement, which will be assessed at Belgrade later on this year, also includes references to human rights themselves.

So I don't intend to modify my position. It is a position that I think accurately represents the attitude of this country.

I don't think that it's accurate to link the human rights concept with the SALT negotiations. I think that's an incorrect linkage. The SALT negotiations, I hope, will be successful as we pursue in laborious detail those discussions the rest of this year. They will be successful only if the Soviets are convinced that it's to their advantage to

forgo a continued commitment, and a very expensive commitment and a very threatening commitment, to the arms race—and only if our own people believe that we derive the same advantage. That's what we hope for.

*Q. Mr. President, how would you characterize what happened today? How serious a setback is this? Did we expect that the Soviets might be more receptive to our positions?*

*The President:* We had no indications either in direct or indirect communications with Brezhnev that they were ready to accept our positions. We carefully prepared over a period of five or six weeks what we thought was a balanced and what we still think is a balanced proposal with drastic reductions.

I might say that there is a unanimous agreement among the key Members of Congress, the State Department, my own staff, the Secretary of Defense, the Joint Chiefs, that this is a good and fair proposal. I have hopes that the substance of our proposal will be accepted by the Soviet Union in the future, because it's to their advantage and ours to do so.

But I'm not discouraged at all. Cy Vance sent back the word that he was disappointed that we didn't reach immediate agreement but that he was not discouraged. And I think the fact that a joint communique has been prepared and will be released tomorrow morning spelling out the fact that our nations will continue without interruption these discussions is very encouraging.

*Q. Mr. President, would it be fair to say that the talks broke down because the United States is now not prepared to accept restrictions on cruise missiles?*

*The President:* No.

*Q. Isn't that the heart of it?*

*The President:* That is not the heart of it at all. We are prepared to accept restrictions on the cruise missile if it's part of an overall and balanced package. We are not prepared to accept a unilateral prohibition against the development or deployment of the cruise missile absent some equivalent response from the Soviet Union including

the Backfire bomber. But we put together a package which was fair and balanced. But we are not prepared unilaterally to forgo an opportunity unless it's equivalent to a Soviet response.

*Q. Yes, sir, I didn't mean unilaterally, but on the January 1976 trip by Secretary Kissinger to the Soviet Union there was active negotiation regarding a balanced reduction involving some limitations on cruise missiles.*

*So when you say, sir, that the Soviets say we agreed to restrict cruise missiles, aren't they referring to 1976 and not to Vladivostok, when indeed the cruise missile was on the drawing board and not a real thing?*

*The President:* I don't believe that—I don't want to get myself into the position of speaking for Secretary Kissinger—I don't think there has ever been any insinuation of an American agreement that the Soviets could build and deploy the Backfire bomber without limitation while we limited cruise missiles. And that's the position that the Soviets adopted as the Vladivostok agreement.

*Q. Mr. President, have the Russians explained why they were turning down the comprehensive proposal? Was it because they did not want such drastic reductions as you proposed, or was it because they felt the limitations on cruise were not adequate? Did they give any reasons?*

*The President:* I do not know yet. I've not received a definitive analysis from Secretary Vance. He a few minutes ago was in the American Embassy in Moscow preparing for me a detailed report on what has occurred. So far as I know at this point, there were not any specific reasons given for the Soviets turning down of our proposal.

My guess is that this proposal is so substantive and such a radical departure in putting strict limits and reductions on existing missiles and a prohibition against the development or deployment of new missiles in the future that the Soviets simply need more time to consider it. Whether they'll accept it or not, at the May meetings in Geneva or subsequently, I don't have any way to know yet.

*Q. To follow that up—the May meetings, are they to be between Mr. Gromyko and Mr. Vance?*

*The President:* That's correct.

*Q. Mr. President, Senator Baker, just outside a few moments ago, said that during your briefing of the congressional leadership you said you intended to "hang tough." Did you say that, and what did you mean by that?*

*The President:* Yes. I do. I think that it's important for us to take advantage of an opportunity this year to negotiate not just a superficial ratification of rules by which we can continue the arms race, but to have a freeze on deployment and development of new missiles and an actual reduction in launchers and MIRV'ed missiles below what was agreed to previously. And on those items I intend to remain very strong in my position.

I don't think it's to our nation's advantage to put forward in piecemeal fashion additional proposals. Our experience in the past has been that the Soviet Union extracts from those comprehensive proposals those items that are favorable to them and want to continue to negotiate the other parts of the proposals that might not be so favorable to them.

So I do intend to continue strong negotiations to let the leaders of our country know what we are proposing. And I'm not in any hurry; it's important enough to proceed methodically and carefully. But I hope that the Soviets will agree with us to drastic reductions and strict limitations in the future which have never been part of previous agreements.

*Q. Mr. President, could I follow that?*

*The President:* Please.

*Q. When you say you intend to continue negotiations, is there a chance that you might go to Geneva in May since you will already be in Europe in the early part of May anyway?*

*The President:* As a matter of fact, I'm already scheduled to go to Europe not just to meet with the allies in London but to meet with President Asad of Syria. And where

that meeting will be taking place I don't know. But I have no intentions at this time to meet with any Soviet leaders on that trip.

*Q. Mr. President, how will this data base work? Will that include all conventional armaments as well?*

*The President:* That would be a separate matter of discussion. The data base has been for a long period of time a matter of dispute in the mutual and balanced force reductions talks taking place in Vienna, where we've asked the Soviets to give us an inventory of their arsenal among the Warsaw Pact nations. These are conventional weapons primarily.

But the data base to which I was referring this afternoon is an inventory of nuclear weapons that have been included in the SALT talks—the strategic nuclear weapons. So far we have a fairly good way on both sides of inventorying weapons that are actually deployed. But we would like to have a free and accurate exchange with the Soviet Union about how many weapons they have and how many we have, so that we can monitor much more closely any deviations from those figures in the future.

*Q. If I could follow, would that include any kind of verification?*

*The President:* Yes. We would like to have the subject of verification opened up dramatically. For instance, in a comprehensive test ban we would like to have onsite inspection. The Soviets have never agreed to this principle, but they have mentioned it a couple of times in the discussions. Foreign Minister Gromyko last year filed a statement at the United Nations that mentioned the possibility of onsite inspections. But we feel that verification is a very crucial element in a comprehensive arms limitation agreement. Verification obviously includes an absence of concealment, and verification, to a lesser degree, also includes the data base to which I just referred.

One more question.

*Q. May I ask, please? Has the breakdown of these talks in any way influenced your thinking on development of future U.S. weaponry; that is, will you be now more*

*inclined to go for full production of the B-1 or any other advanced weapon systems?*

*The President:* Obviously, if we feel at the conclusion of next month's discussions that the Soviets are not acting in good faith with us and that an agreement is unlikely, then I would be forced to consider a much more deep commitment to the development and deployment of additional weapons. But I would like to forgo that decision until I am convinced the Soviets are not acting in good faith. I hope they will.

Let me answer one question from Wes. [Wes Pippert, United Press International].

*Q. I was going to offer the "thank you."*

*The President:* Okay; fine.

*Q. Mr. President, one question about the deep cuts. Because the Soviets seem to have more delivery systems today than we do, is*

*there objection that they would have to destroy more weapons than we would have to if you did get those deep cuts?*

*The President:* Deep cuts would affect both of us about the same. Shallow cuts, say, from 2,400 down to 2,200, on launchers would affect the Soviets much more adversely than it would us. Part of our package involved the very heavy missiles, the SS-9, and SS-18, which now stand at a 308 level. We included in our package a substantial reduction below that figure.

I think that the details of our proposal would probably best be revealed later. I am a little constrained about the details because Secretary Vance and Mr. Gromyko still have agreements among themselves about revelations of the negotiations with which I am not yet familiar. But I think later on those exact figures can be made available.

## Presidential Assistant Brzezinski's News Conference of April 1

*Following is the transcript of a news conference held on April 1 by Zbigniew Brzezinski, Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs.*

White House press release dated April 1

*Dr. Brzezinski:* What I would like to do is essentially give you as much information as I legitimately can on the proposal that we made in Moscow. In so doing, I don't propose to engage in any recrimination but would merely like to lay out for you the kind of proposal we made and the thinking that went into that proposal, for I believe that the thinking that the proposal reflected is almost as important as the proposal itself.

What we were trying to accomplish and what we intend to accomplish is to move forward to genuine disarmament; that is to say, to obtain a significant reduction in the level of the strategic confrontation.

We believe that SALT agreements should not only set the framework for continued

competition but that they should indeed limit that competition, reduce its scope, introduce greater stability into our relationship.

Our proposals were thus designed to accomplish two basic purposes: to give both sides the political and the strategic parity to which each of them is entitled, and this means that there should be no self-evident advantage in the agreement which would be either of a strategic character or which would be susceptible to political perceptions as an advantage; and secondly, it was our basic purpose to seek an agreement which would provide to both sides again political and strategic stability. Parity in the first instance; stability in the second instance.

By this, I mean a proposal which would take into account the fact that if you only have certain kinds of limits but do not anticipate technological dynamics, what may seem stable in 1977 or 1978 could become very unstable in 1980 or 1985. It was there-

fore felt that genuine strategic arms limitations—indeed, a genuine strategic arms reductions agreement—ought to take both of these elements into account.

The proposal that we made was therefore very finely crafted. We attempted very deliberately to forgo those elements in our strategic posture which threaten the Soviets the most, and we made proposals to them that they forgo those elements in their strategic posture which threaten us the most. We felt particularly by concentrating on the land-based ICBM's that are MIRV'ed we would take into account the greatest sources of insecurity on both sides.

I truly believe that this proposal, if accepted, or when accepted, could serve as a driving wedge, as a historical driving wedge, for a more stable and eventually more cooperative American and Soviet relationship. It is thus a proposal which is not only strategic but political in its character; and Secretary Vance, in his remarks in Moscow, placed a great deal of emphasis on the political significance of this proposal.

It was a proposal which had strategic as well as political intentions very much in mind. Because of that, it was also a proposal which was accompanied by a series of other proposals designed to place the American-Soviet relationship not only on a more stable basis but to make the cooperative elements in that relationship more comprehensive.

This is why we have deliberately matched or accompanied the SALT proposals with initiatives in regard to such matters as the Indian Ocean and the desirability of achieving mutual restraint in regard to our respective military presence in that part of the world. This is why we proposed that we hold further discussions on conventional arms transfers to third parties. This is why we suggested that it would be in our mutual interest as a stability-producing initiative to talk and discuss our respective civil defense programs. This is why we suggested that we talk about a comprehensive test ban. This is why we suggested that there be controls on antisatellite capabilities and on prior notification of missile test-flights.

All of that cumulatively was designed to produce greater mutual stability, to widen

areas of cooperation, to indeed offset the competitive elements in our relationship by a widening pattern of cooperation. And we are encouraged by the fact that eight working groups were set up on the basis of these proposals, as well as some that the Soviets made, in order to move forward on these issues.

I should have added, incidentally, and I failed to do so, that we also proposed meetings on nonproliferation. That was part of our proposal.

It is in this context that we proposed a comprehensive package with negotiating flexibility inherent in it in order to structure a rather different and more stable and more equitable U.S.-Soviet strategic relationship.

That package has two key elements in it. First of all, it called for reductions which were of a greater scope than just symbolic. And the second, equally important, part of the package involved a proposal for a freeze, for a halt on the modernization of ICBM's; and I will talk about that in more detail.

You can well see how these two key fundamental elements are interrelated. We proposed the reduction so as to lower the level of the competition, and we proposed a freeze in order to halt it qualitatively and quantitatively. Thus, it is in many respects the first truly, genuinely disarmament-oriented proposal introduced into the Strategic Arms Limitation Talks.

We proposed more specifically that the present strategic aggregates, which were set at the high level of 2,400 for each side, be reduced to a range between 1,800 and 2,000; and here again is a demonstration of the inherent flexibility of the package, because this is something which we were prepared to discuss.

We proposed, moreover, that within that framework the present level of MIRV's, which is set at 1,320, be reduced to something between 1,100 and 1,200. And we also suggested that in that context it would be desirable that the total number of the so-called Soviet modern large ballistic missiles, particularly the SS-9 and SS-18, be reduced; because within the framework of lowered aggregates these large missiles with their potential for numerous

MIRV'ing—indeed the SS-18 can be MIRV'ed up to 8 to 10 warheads—becomes increasingly significant and introduces an asymmetrical aspect into the relationship.

On that basis we proposed that both sides freeze the deployment of all of their ICBM's and ban modifications on existing ICBM's and indeed limit the number of annual flight tests for ICBM's, thereby reducing the likelihood of significant modifications, and also ban the development, testing, and deployment of new types of ICBM's and particularly ban the deployment, testing, and development of mobile ICBM's—a factor, again, which if not checked, could introduce very major uncertainty into the U.S.-Soviet strategic relationship.

This more specifically meant that on the U.S. side we were prepared to freeze our Minuteman III deployment—that is to say, the MIRV'ed ICBM—at 550, which is where it is currently. And we would forgo further improvements in all U.S. ICBM's, and we would abandon the MX program, both for silo and mobile basing. And we would forgo any plans for any other ICBM's.

On the Soviet side we proposed that the Soviets freeze the number of their strategic ICBM's, the SS-17's, 18's, and 19's at a number not in excess of 550, which actually means that they could still go up because they are below that number, and these would be the Soviet MIRV'ed missiles.

Given the size of some of them, this is an important point to bear in mind, for it raises the issue of equity; given the size of some of them, their total number of warheads eventually could be greater than our land-based ICBM's would provide. And we would expect that the MLBM, or the modern large ballistic missile, component within the context of the 550 would not be greater than 150. This is important because this would provide for a reduction.

*Q. Could you repeat that?*

*Dr. Brzezinski:* We also proposed that the total number of the modern large ballistic missiles, which we would expect would be the SS-18's because they are the most modern Soviet ballistic missiles that are large, would not be greater than 150. And that

would be a reduction from the present total, but that will be an important element of stability because that large number of the modern large ballistic missiles introduces the destabilizing potential inherent in large throw-weight and many, many warheads.

*Q. Do they currently have 320?*

*Dr. Brzezinski:* Three hundred and eight. We would also expect the Soviets to abandon the development and deployment of the SS-16, which is their mobile ICBM, just as we would abandon the MX.

*Q. How about the SS-20; would that also be abandoned?*

*Dr. Brzezinski:* The SS-20 in its precise configuration is not a strategic weapon; and we would want, in the course of the agreement, to develop arrangements which would permit us to have the needed assurance that the SS-20 is not being upgraded into the equivalent of the SS-16 because, as some of you clearly know, the SS-20, with a third stage, could be in effect the equivalent of the SS-16. We would therefore want to have some arrangements whereby we could clearly differentiate between the two.

Finally, we would propose to make an arrangement with regard to the Backfire which would give us some assurances that it would not be used as a strategic weapon by the Soviet Union, and this is something that would be negotiated more fully within this framework; and we would propose to ban all strategic cruise missiles, and that, again, is something which would be negotiated. In that context, though, it is to be noted that the Soviet side has insisted that the Backfire is not a strategic weapon, though it has a radius of over 2,000 miles. We would presumably define the cruise missile as being strategic at a level lower than that in the context of our negotiations.

I would say that if one analyzes this proposal in detail I think one is justified within the limits of human reason, within the confines of one's own background, tradition, and concerns which necessarily confine our ability to be absolutely certain about our judgments, that this was a genuine effort at an equitable arrangement.



We would constrain those aspects of our strategic programs which are threatening to the Soviets. We would want the Soviets to adjust similarly in those regards which are most threatening to us.

We would cap the arms race; we would impose a limit on the numbers through a reduction, significant reduction; and we would impose restraints of a qualitative type on offensive systems. Thus, we would both take a giant step forward. I see a certain analogy between the situation in which we find ourselves today and the late 1960's. At that time, some of you might recall, we proposed to the Soviets that ABM's be banned because ABM's introduce an inherent element of instability into the relationship.

The first Soviet reaction to that proposal by Prime Minister Kosygin was very negative, given their backgrounds, their traditions, their ways of looking at the strategic relationship. Yet, over time, through a continuing discourse, the Soviet side came to recognize the fact that indeed in the age of highly advanced strategic systems the introduction of the ABM element into the equation was truly destabilizing. And the most important accomplishment of SALT One was precisely that which the Soviets earlier had so indignantly rejected; namely, a ban on the ABM systems. We are thus in the first phase of an ambitious and far-reaching search for a significant American-Soviet accommodation.

We believe in some respects we are in the earlier, educational part of the process in which both sides have to think through the implications both of an unchecked arms race and of the benefits of reductions and a freeze.

We are going to continue these talks with the Soviets. You know that they will be continued on a top-level basis in May by Secretary Vance and Foreign Minister Gromyko, and we expect to have contacts and exchanges prior to that date. We are hopeful that the search for something truly significant will bear fruit.

I don't think anyone in this house or in this city engaged in this process expected the Soviet Union simply to accept these proposals instantly.

We went to them in order to present to them our views regarding what might constitute a truly creative and historically novel framework for our strategic relations. We will persist in that effort, and we are hopeful, on the basis of prior experience and given the overriding interest that both sides have in stability and accommodation, with patience and with persistence, and with good will on both sides, there will be significant progress made toward what could be a very significant turn in the American-Soviet relationship.

*Q. Would you please clarify two points? Your definition of—the American definition of the strategic cruise and would you go over again, please, I guess I just didn't hear it well, the MIRV idea? Were you talking simply about MIRV equivalency, or was this—*

*Dr. Brzezinski:* In regard to the cruise missile, our position is that a cruise missile which is not capable of employment either in a transcontinental operation, or which doesn't have a range in excess of weapons systems that are typically considered to be strategic, is nonstrategic. And since there has been an ongoing discussion with the Soviets as to what is and is not a strategic weapon, we would want to reach a more precise definition of that in the course of the negotiations, banning those cruise missiles which have as themselves a strategic range, and retain for both sides flexibility for those that are not.

Specifically talking about the MIRV's, our proposal is to freeze the land-based ICBM's that can be MIRV'ed at 550 and to reduce particularly the number of those very large Soviet ICBM's which can be MIRV'ed into very numerous warheads, given their throw-weight, because that in the long run could introduce an element of instability for both sides.

We would, at the same time, in that context, forgo those systems which are particularly threatening to the Soviet land-based ICBM force. It is to be remembered in this context that, at least for the time being, the Soviet strategic forces are heavily dependent on their land-based ICBM's.

Those American systems which could threaten these land-based ICBM's are naturally and understandably particularly threatening to the Soviets.

So we try to take that concern of theirs into account while registering with them what we consider to be a legitimate concern of ours, namely, that we don't want them to acquire a capability to very significantly threaten our land-based systems.

*Q. Doctor, you didn't talk about the so-called data base, and I have a question about it. The President, at his press conference here in this room, spoke of some form of verification of the data-base material, once it was submitted by either side to the other side, I guess. Can you elaborate on what verification we are talking about?*

*Dr. Brzezinski:* I don't want to go into too many specifics, because I would really like to confine myself to the broad package, to the broad framework within which we would negotiate. But specifically, with regard to the data base, let me limit myself to this observation.

We would hope and we would expect that in the context of this increasingly more stable and more accommodating relationship that we feel ought to develop between us and them in the strategic realm, the Soviet Union would become increasingly more forthcoming with regard to data base.

Many of you know about this SALT relationship as much and I am sure, in quite a few cases, much more than I do; and therefore you will remember that throughout much of SALT One the data base on which these negotiations was based was largely American-provided and the pattern of the negotiations typically involved a situation in which we would provide information about our systems, numbers, dimensions, characteristics, and then we would say to the Soviets, "And with regard to your systems, which we estimate at being at so many and to possess the following dimensions and to have the following characteristics, we would propose the following."

And the Soviets would respond and say, "With regard to the strategic information which you have provided us about yourself,

our position is as follows. And with regard to the information that you have given us—the alleged information you have given us—about our systems, our position is as follows." And they would comment on it, but without a truly equitable data base.

I would hope and we would expect that in a symmetrical strategic relationship, which it has now become, the Soviet Union would provide us with all of the necessary data, just as we provided them with the necessary data, and we would each have and retain the needed means for verifying the accuracy of that data.

*Q. How?*

*Dr. Brzezinski:* For one thing, through satellites, which are very important sources of information. But beyond that, with regard to the cruise missile, we would have to perhaps explore some additional ways of verification; and I don't want to be too specific, because that is something which again would have to be negotiated, but let me merely note the difficulty with which, again, many of you are familiar.

It is very difficult to differentiate between the cruise missiles which are strategic and nonstrategic; their sizes, dimensions are the same. It is very difficult to differentiate between a cruise missile which has a nuclear warhead and those which do not. So we would have to have some additional, more comprehensive arrangements to give both sides the assurance that they need to have on this issue.

*Q. I am really not asking for details, but is this an onsite-inspection proposal, basically?*

*Dr. Brzezinski:* I don't think we have yet reached the stage in which direct onsite examination of all weapons systems is feasible; but certainly, if the Soviet side were prepared to accept some onsite verification, it would be a giant step toward mutual confidence, and we would certainly welcome onsite Soviet inspection of some of our weapons systems—so that this in itself would be something which would be a great contribution to mutual stability. And I would hope that as Soviet confidence grows, as Soviet

preoccupation with secrecy declines, that they will find this idea less and less abhorrent.

*Q. You talked about the Soviet concern for their land-based weapons, and there has always been a lack of symmetry between their perception of their defense needs and the U.S., which is why they came up with a freedom of choice within their weapons systems.*

*Your proposal, the American proposal—according to what you say—would appear to take away a lot of their freedom of choice; and at the same time, it doesn't say anything about sea-based missiles, which also are a threat—or the Soviets perceive as a threat—to their land-based systems.*

*Therefore, can you explain why, in your perception, this is equivalent, a third thing that they have to cut back from 308 to 150 in their superlaunch missiles and we don't have to cut back any land-based?*

*Dr. Brzezinski:* First of all, as far as the freedom to mix is concerned, that would still be retained by both sides, though there would be upper limits set on what you can do, particularly in regard to land-based ICBM's. That limit indeed would be set at 550. But each side, or one of the sides, could decide that it prefers to have fewer of these and more sea-based. So, in that sense, there is some freedom to mix, no doubt about it.

As far as the Soviet throw-weight or large ballistic missiles are concerned, their reduction is a necessary concomitant of mutual stability, because if they are not reduced in numbers, then by MIRV'ing them the Soviet Union would gain, particularly within these lower aggregates, a very significant advantage.

I think one has to recognize the fact that if you have fewer total numbers then any asymmetry becomes increasingly significant, and the Soviets do have that asymmetry to their advantage in the possession of the large ballistic missiles which can be MIRV'ed up to 8 or 10 warheads.

In addition to that, there is this other problem, which I don't want to exaggerate, but which has to be taken into account when we think of equity at the lower aggregates:

namely, the Backfire. We were prepared to consider special arrangements for the Backfire; but again, the Backfire, however one defines it, whether it is a strategic or nonstrategic weapon, becomes more significant if you have lowered aggregates than if you have higher aggregates.

If these aggregates are high, then you can say, well, it is more marginal; but if you go down to 1,800, then the introduction of the Backfire, at some number which is in excess of 100, becomes a factor. And yet we are prepared to accommodate on that, too.

I am not going to argue that—it would be silly—that this was an infallible package which has to be taken in toto. All I am going to say is that we made the damndest effort to produce a package which, within the limits of our own intelligence—and by intelligence, I not only mean information, I also mean what is in our heads—we could say was reasonably equitable for both sides. We did our best to define it that way and will be glad to discuss it, and we intend to discuss it. We would like to find out what aspects of this are particularly troubling to the Soviets, because that is what negotiations are about, and conceivably if the case is persuasive, this or that adjustment could be made in return for this or that adjustment.

*Q. What was the Soviet reaction to the package in the general sense? Did they reject it out of hand or say that certain things were difficult?*

*Dr. Brzezinski:* To say that the Soviets rejected it out of hand gives it a dramatic and categorical quality which I really do not think the circumstances justify.

The sequence was essentially as follows: Prior to the Vance mission, we did indicate to the Soviets that we would be making proposals for significant reductions. We did that deliberately because we wanted the Politburo to think about these issues.

As you know, the Soviets do not have an arms control agency. The Soviets do not have influential groups in their society that are concerned with arms control. Arms control proposals are assessed in the Soviet Defense Ministry, which has certain in-

teresting implications; and we felt it would not be particularly constructive to send in a detailed proposal which then is staffed out in the Soviet Defense Ministry and goes up to the Soviet Politburo with a categorical critique. We wanted the top Soviet leaders to focus on this issue.

Therefore we drew their attention to the fact that we will be making proposals that call for reductions, that we think would have a significant impact on the broader nature of our relationship; and then Secretary Vance presented that and, as I said earlier, not only in its strategic setting but also in its political context when he made his opening statement to the Soviets.

The Soviet leadership then expressed a preference for the discussion of other issues, during which time it presumably was undertaking at least its preliminary assessment of this proposal; and then in the final or the pre-final session, I forget which, General Secretary Brezhnev then informed Secretary Vance that this proposal was not acceptable to the Soviet Union, but he coupled it, at the same time, with a clear-cut indication that it is the Soviet expectation, which is matched by us, that these talks, including the SALT aspects, will continue and that, indeed, the Gromyko-Vance meeting will be resumed directly in Geneva in May.

So, it is in this context that I think one ought to assess where we are—and again, I would like to draw your attention to the analogy that I made before; namely, to the initial reaction by Prime Minister Kosygin when, for the first time, he was confronted at the top level and not through bureaucratic channels with the arguments why an ABM is mutually destabilizing. This was a new argument for him. It was not a convincing argument initially, even though it was made very persuasively when he met in Glassboro with President Johnson and Secretary [of Defense Robert S.] McNamara and then subsequently it became clear that such an arrangement was indeed in the mutual interest.

*Q. Dr. Brzezinski, in Mr. Vance's news conference in Moscow, he alluded to a Soviet*

*counterproposal based on the 1976 discussions with Dr. Kissinger. I am interested in why that counterproposal was not negotiable. What were its constituents, and why was it not negotiable?*

*Dr. Brzezinski:* I don't want to engage here in a critique of the Soviet position, because as I said at the beginning of my remarks, I am really not going to engage in recriminations or a kind of side dialogue on their proposals versus our proposals, but really to try to explain the rationale and the content of ours.

Let me limit myself, therefore, to one comment. It is our broad feeling that 27 years after the beginning of the nuclear race the time is right in our relations for doing something more than just creating frameworks for continued competition. It is our feeling that the framework defined by Vladivostok is so high in its numbers, so open-ended in its consequences, so susceptible to quantitative as well as qualitative improvements that in some respects it comes close to a misstatement to call any such arrangement arms limitations. All it is, really, is an arrangement for continued arms competition, and we have gone to the Soviets with a proposal which we crafted as best we could in order to convince them that maybe the time is right to take a significant step toward reductions.

We gave them ranges so they could pick either the more ambitious or the less ambitious part of it, depending on their estimate of the strategic consequences of cuts. They have very good analysts. They should be able, and I am sure they are able, to assess whether 2,000 is better for them or 1,800, whether 1,200 MIRV's is better for them or 1,100, and so forth. So we weren't very categorical about it.

*Q. Dr. Brzezinski, you placed heavy stress at the beginning on the political aspect of this, as well as this strategic aspect of the proposal. You said that no one expected them to accept it out of hand, but neither was there widespread expectation of the kind of fierce reaction from the Russians, including the press conference yesterday by Mr. Gromyko.*

*Politically speaking, do you feel that the reception of the proposal and what has happened has set back Soviet-American relations, or were you surprised at what happened, and if you weren't, was this a miscalculation?*

*Dr. Brzezinski:* If I wasn't, then it couldn't be a miscalculation. It would be a miscalculation if I was. We did not expect the Soviets to accept this total framework on the basis of three days' talks. We expected them to consider it. Our judgment—and I have talked by telephone with Secretary Vance when he was still in Moscow, I talked to some of the other members of the delegation since—was that the discussions were generally conducted in businesslike fashion, that the Soviet side, through little gestures, went out of its way to indicate that this is an ongoing relationship. They did not hide the fact that they took a negative view of this proposal, and they were quite explicit on it; but there were no nasty polemics in the meeting.

You are absolutely right in saying that some of the statements, maybe even some of the gestures, that were made in the press conference by the Soviet Minister were of a more assertive type. But I would describe that perhaps as a reaction to the political perception that indeed the United States has come up with a proposal which, if accepted, would have a significant contribution to disarmament.

The Soviets over the years have prided themselves on being in the forefront of the disarmament proposals and perhaps there was just a tiny touch of defensiveness, therefore, in some of these gestures and some of these comments. I don't think that these gestures and these comments are really that important. What is important is that the relationship involves continued negotiations, that agreements were made in Moscow to develop working groups on a large number of highly sensitive issues—and I read you the list, and indeed, there was a further element in it, namely, radiological weapons, which is what the Soviets proposed—and that therefore the negotiating process continues. And in the negotiat-

ing process you expect to be turned down, to be pressed, to be asked to make accommodations and concessions, but that is part of the game.

*Q. Doctor, what did we offer to forgo that they would have found most threatening to their land-based missiles? I am not clear on that.*

*Dr. Brzezinski:* Particularly the MX, which in its consequences, given its accuracy and so forth, by the early eighties, could be extremely, extremely threatening to them. And in that sense, I think that in itself would be a source of considerable assurance to them.

Beyond that, if we were to limit the cruise missiles merely to tactical cruise missiles, this, too, in the longer run, would be a significant assurance to them.

Beyond that, we would have to make some accommodations, given the total numbers in Minutemen I and II, and in the Poseidons.

Basically, what it would give them is the sense of security that the United States is forgoing, as a basic strategic option, the acquisition of first-strike capability against their land-based systems.

## **United States and Cuba Open Talks on Fisheries, Maritime Boundaries**

### *Joint Communiqué*<sup>1</sup>

Negotiations between representatives of the Government of Cuba and the Government of the United States of America were held from the 24th to the 29th of March on matters concerning fisheries and maritime boundaries which arise from the laws passed by both parties on these subjects. In concluding today the first stage of these negotiations, it was agreed to continue them in the near future. The delegations of both Governments hope as a result of the progress of the negotiations to reach a satisfactory resolution of these issues.

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<sup>1</sup> Issued at New York, N.Y., on Mar. 29 (text from press release 140 dated Mar. 30).

## President Announces Measures To Control Marine Oil Pollution

*Message to the Congress*<sup>1</sup>

*To the Congress of the United States:*

The recent series of oil tanker accidents in and near American waters is a grave reminder of the risks associated with marine transportation of oil. Though we can never entirely eliminate these risks, we can reduce them. Today I am announcing a diverse but interrelated group of measures designed to do so.

These measures are both international and domestic. Pollution of the oceans by oil is a global problem requiring global solutions. I intend to communicate directly with the leaders of a number of major maritime nations to solicit their support for international action. Oil pollution is also a serious domestic problem requiring prompt and effective action by the federal government to reduce the danger to American lives, the American economy, and American beaches and shorelines, and the steps I am taking will do this.

The following measures are designed to achieve three objectives: First, to reduce oil pollution caused by tanker accidents and by routine operational discharges from all vessels; Second, to improve our ability to deal swiftly and effectively with oil spills when they do occur; and Third, to provide full and dependable compensation to victims of oil pollution damage.

These are the measures I recommend:

- **RATIFICATION** of the International Convention for the Prevention of Pollution from Ships. I am transmitting this far-reaching and comprehensive treaty to the Senate for its advice and consent. This Con-

vention, by imposing segregated ballast requirements for new large oil tankers and placing stringent controls on all oil discharges from ships, represents an important multilateral step toward reducing the risk of marine oil pollution. In the near future, I will submit implementing legislation to the Congress.

- **REFORM** of ship construction and equipment standards. I am instructing the Secretary of Transportation to develop new rules for oil tanker standards within 60 days. These regulations will apply to all oil tankers over 20,000 deadweight tons, U.S. and foreign, which call at American ports. These regulations will include:

- Double bottoms on all new tankers;
- Segregated ballast on all tankers;
- Inert gas systems on all tankers;
- Backup radar systems, including collision avoidance equipment, on all tankers; and
- Improved emergency steering standards for all tankers.

These requirements will be fully effective within five years. Where technological improvements and alternatives can be shown to achieve the same degree of protection against pollution, the rules will allow their use.

Experience has shown that ship construction and equipment standards are effective only if backed by a strong enforcement program. Because the quality of inspections by some nations falls short of U.S. practice, I have instructed the Department of State and the Coast Guard to begin diplomatic efforts to improve the present international system of inspection and certification. In addition, I recommend the immediate scheduling of a special international conference for late 1977 to consider these construction and inspection measures.

- **IMPROVEMENT** of crew standards and training. I am instructing the Secretary of Transportation to take immediate steps to raise the licensing and qualification standards for American crews.

The international requirements for crew qualifications, which are far from strict, will

<sup>1</sup> Transmitted on Mar. 17 (text from White House press release dated Mar. 18).

be dealt with by a major international conference we will participate in next year. I am instructing the Secretary of Transportation to identify additional requirements which should be discussed, and if not included, may be imposed by the United States after 1978 on the crews of all ships calling at American ports.

• **DEVELOPMENT** of Tanker Boarding Program and U.S. Marine Safety Information System. Starting immediately, the Coast Guard will board and examine each foreign flag tanker calling at American ports at least once a year and more often if necessary. This examination will insure that the ship meets all safety and environmental protection regulations. Those ships which fail to do so may be denied access to U.S. ports or, in some cases, denied the right to leave until the deficiencies have been corrected. The information gathered by this boarding program will permit the Coast Guard to identify individual tankers having histories of poor maintenance, accidents, and pollution violations. We will also require that the names of tanker owners, major stockholders, and changes in vessel names be disclosed and included in this Marine Safety Information System.

• **APPROVAL** of Comprehensive Oil Pollution Liability and Compensation Legislation. I am transmitting appropriate legislation to establish a single, national standard of strict liability for oil spills. This legislation is designed to replace the present fragmented, overlapping systems of federal and state liability laws and compensation funds. It will also create a \$200 million fund to clean up oil spills and compensate victims for oil pollution damages.

• **IMPROVEMENT** of federal ability to respond to oil pollution emergencies. I have directed the appropriate federal agencies, particularly the Coast Guard and the Environmental Protection Agency, in cooperation with state and local governments to improve our ability to contain and minimize the damaging effects of oil spills. The goal is an ability to respond within six hours to a spill of 100,000 tons.

Oil pollution of the oceans is a serious problem that calls for concentrated, energetic, and prompt attention. I believe these

measures constitute an effective program to control it. My Administration pledges its best efforts, in cooperation with the international community, the Congress, and the public, to preserve the earth's oceans and their resources.

JIMMY CARTER.

THE WHITE HOUSE, *March 17, 1977.*

## **International Broadcasting Report Transmitted to the Congress**

*Message From President Carter*<sup>1</sup>

*To the Congress of the United States:*

In my letters to the Speaker and to the President of the Senate of January 31, I stated that my advisers were reviewing a report on international broadcasting in compliance with Section 403 of the Foreign Relations Authorization Act, Fiscal Year 1977. That review is now finished.

This Administration firmly supports U.S. international broadcasting as part of our commitment to the freer flow of information and ideas. Among the most valuable instruments we have for this purpose are our international radios—the Voice of America (VOA) and Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty (RFE/RL)—which for many years have been a vital part of the lives of the peoples of Eastern Europe and the Soviet Union. My review of the U.S. international broadcasting effort has led me to the following conclusions, which are reflected in the attached report:

(1) Present U.S. international broadcast transmission facilities are inadequate; 16 additional 250 Kilowatt transmitters for broadcasts to the Soviet Union and Eastern Europe are needed by VOA and RFE/RL and can be installed in a period of three to five years;

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<sup>1</sup> Transmitted on Mar. 22 (text from White House press release, which includes the text of the report); also printed as H. Doc. 95-107.

(2) There is no significant unused transmitter capacity available for sharing among U.S. broadcasters or between U.S. and other Western broadcasters;

(3) A comprehensive outline of U.S. worldwide broadcasting needs indicates a requirement for 12 additional VOA transmitters for broadcast to Asia and Africa, beyond those required for European broadcasts;

(4) Extending Board for International Broadcasting-type transmissions to other nations where access to information is restricted would be highly impractical for a variety of reasons.

This report is transmitted pursuant to the requirements of P.L. 94-350, and I believe that implementation of its recommendations can assure the United States of effective broadcasting programs in the years ahead.

JIMMY CARTER.

THE WHITE HOUSE, *March 22, 1977.*

## **Congressional Documents Relating to Foreign Policy**

Abuses of Corporate Power. Hearings before the Subcommittee on Priorities and Economy in Government of the Joint Economic Committee. January 14-March 5, 1976. 199 pp.

South Africa. Hearings before the Subcommittee on African Affairs of the Senate Committee on Foreign Relations on South Africa—U.S. Policy and the Role of U.S. Corporations. September 8-30, 1976. 792 pp.

U.S. Arms Sales Policy. Hearings before the Senate Committee on Foreign Relations and its Subcommittee on Foreign Assistance on proposed sales of arms to Iran and Saudi Arabia. September 16-24, 1976. 155 pp.

International Finance. Annual Report of the National Advisory Council on International Monetary and Financial Policies, July 1, 1975-June 30, 1976. H. Doc. 95-67. January 31, 1977. 309 pp.

Rhodesian Sanctions. Hearings before the Subcommittee on African Affairs of the Senate Committee on Foreign Relations on S. 174, a bill to amend the United Nations Participation Act of 1945 to halt the importation of Rhodesian chrome; February 9-10, 1977; 81 pp. Hearing before the Subcommittees on Africa and International Organizations of the House Committee on International Relations on H.R. 1746; February 24, 1977; 68 pp. Report to accompany S. 174; S. Rept. 95-37; March 3, 1977; 14 pp. Report, together with additional, supplemental, minority, and dissent-

ing views, to accompany H.R. 1746; H. Rept. 95-59; March 7, 1977; 19 pp.

Annual Report of the Subcommittee To Investigate the Administration of the Internal Security Act and Other Internal Security Laws to the Senate Committee on the Judiciary. S. Rept. 95-20. February 17, 1977. 55 pp.

Legislative Activities Report of the Senate Committee on Foreign Relations, January 14, 1975-October 1, 1976. S. Rept. 95-21. February 21, 1977. 147 pp.

Disapproval of the Presidential Determination To Deny Import Relief to the U.S. Honey Industry. Adverse report of the House Committee on Ways and Means to accompany H. Con. Res. 80. H. Rept. 95-25. February 22, 1977. 4 pp.

Subcommittee on Refugees. Senate Committee on the Judiciary. Report on the subcommittee. S. Rept. 95-27. February 22, 1977. 9 pp.

The United States Response to the New International Economic Order: The Economic Implications for Latin America and the United States. A study prepared for the use of the Subcommittee on Inter-American Economic Relationships of the Joint Economic Committee. February 23, 1977. 32 pp.

Human Rights Reports Prepared by the Department of State in Accordance With Section 502(B) of the Foreign Assistance Act, as Amended. Submitted to the Subcommittee on Foreign Assistance of the Senate Committee on Foreign Relations. March 1977. 143 pp.

U.S. Foreign Economic Policy Issues: The United Kingdom, France, and West Germany. A staff report prepared for the use of the Subcommittee on Foreign Economic Policy of the Senate Committee on Foreign Relations. March 1977. 32 pp.

U.S. Information and Cultural Programs: Focus on Latin America, 1976. Report of a staff survey team to the House Committee on International Relations. March 1977. 46 pp.

Fishery Conservation Zone Transition Act Amendments. Report of the House Committee on Merchant Marine and Fisheries to accompany H.R. 3753. H. Rept. 95-31. March 1, 1977. 9 pp.

Summary of Testimony and Findings and Conclusions Resulting From Oversight Hearings on Narcotic Abuse and Control. Interim report of the House Select Committee on Narcotics Abuse and Control, together with additional views. H. Rept. 95-32. March 1, 1977. 87 pp.

Reciprocal Fisheries Agreement With Canada. Message from the President transmitting a proposed agreement. H. Doc. 95-90. March 1, 1977. 7 pp.

Expulsion of George A. Krinsky From the Soviet Union. Report to accompany S. Res. 81. S. Rept. 95-35. March 3, 1977. 2 pp.

Supplemental Military Assistance to Portugal. Report of the Senate Committee on Foreign Relations to accompany S. 489. S. Rept. 95-43. March 9, 1977. 6 pp.

Denial of Import Relief for Mushrooms. Message from the President transmitting his determination that import relief for the U.S. canned mushroom industry is not in the national economic interest, pursuant to section 203 (b) (2) of the Trade Act of 1974. H. Doc. 95-96. March 10, 1977. 2 pp.

Arms Control and Disarmament Agency Authorization. Communication from the President of the United States transmitting a draft of proposed legislation. H. Doc. 95-98. March 14, 1977. 4 pp.



## U.S.-Canada Transit Pipeline Treaty Transmitted to the Senate

*Message From President Carter*<sup>1</sup>

*To the Senate of the United States:*

I transmit herewith, for Senate advice and consent to ratification, the Agreement between the Government of the United States of America and the Government of Canada Concerning Transit Pipelines signed at Washington on January 28, 1977. I also transmit, for the information of the Senate, the report of the Department of State with respect to the Agreement, including copies of letters exchanged at the time the draft text of the Treaty was initialed.

The Agreement was negotiated in response to a request made by the Congress in the Trans-Alaska Pipeline Authorization Act (P.L. 93-153) that the President determine the willingness of the Government of Canada to permit the construction of pipelines across Canada to carry oil and gas from Alaska's North Slope to markets in the lower 48 states, the terms and conditions which might apply to the operation of such pipelines and the need for inter-governmental agreements for this purpose. The Agreement negotiated in response to this request provides reciprocal protection against interruption in the flow of hydrocarbons in transit, and against discriminatory taxation. The Agreement is applicable both to existing and future pipelines transiting the United States and to future pipelines transiting Canada.

It became clear early in the negotiations that the Government of Canada was not prepared to conclude an arrangement which

<sup>1</sup> Transmitted on Mar. 30 (text from White House press release); also printed as S. Ex. F, 95th Cong., 1st Sess., which includes the texts of the agreement, an exchange of letters, and the report of the Department of State.

granted advance approval to a specific pipeline project. Consequently, the Agreement was drafted without reference to the specific proposals which have been made for the construction of pipelines to transport gas from Alaska's North Slope to the lower 48 states. Its provisions would be applicable to both existing and future transit pipelines.

The Agreement does not constitute Canadian approval of construction of a transit pipeline across its territory. Upon completion of studies currently in progress, the Government of Canada will announce whether or not it is willing to permit construction of a transit pipeline for Alaskan gas.

The Transit Pipeline Agreement provides a formal basis for United States-Canadian cooperation on hydrocarbon transportation systems, should both governments decide cooperation is advantageous. I urge the Senate to act favorably on this Agreement at an early date by giving its advice and consent to ratification.

JIMMY CARTER.

THE WHITE HOUSE, *March 30, 1977.*

## United States and Canada Amend Fraser River Salmon Convention

Press release 82 dated February 25

Representatives of the Governments of the United States and Canada signed on February 25 in Washington a protocol amending the U.S.-Canada Fraser River Salmon Convention of 1930. Russell McKinney, Minister in the Canadian Embassy in Washington, signed for Canada, and Ambassador Frederick Irving signed for the United States.

The Convention, which established a Commission to regulate the salmon fishery of the Fraser River system, also provided for an Advisory Committee to the Commission consisting of representatives from the various branches of the salmon industry. The protocol increases the number of members from each country on that committee from six to seven.

## U.S. and U.K. Reach Agreement on Air Charter Arrangements

Following is a joint U.S.-U.K. press release issued at Washington and London on April 7.

Press release 168 dated April 7

The United Kingdom and the United States have reached agreement on charter arrangements for the next months.

The agreement covers all types of charters currently approved in both countries and includes for the first time the U.S.-originating Advance Booking Charters which were approved by the Civil Aeronautics Board in September 1976. It brings closer together the charter types on both sides of the Atlantic.

The two governments hope that this agreement will lead to an increase in charter traffic between their two countries without diverting traffic from the scheduled services.

Some of the provisions of this agreement are regarded as experimental. The results will therefore be reviewed this autumn with a view to determining whether any changes would be desirable next year.

## United States and Hungary Sign Exchanges Agreement

Press release 167 dated April 6

The United States and the Hungarian People's Republic signed on April 6 at Budapest an intergovernmental Agreement on Cooperation in Culture, Education, Science and Technology. This is the first intergovernmental exchanges agreement which the United States has signed with Hungary. The agreement provides the formal framework for increased contacts and exchanges between individuals and institutions of the two countries in the areas of culture, education, technology, and science and provides a vehicle for the further im-

plementation of many provisions of the Final Act of the Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe. Assistant Secretary of State for European Affairs Arthur A. Hartman signed for the U.S. side; Rudolf Ronai, President of the Institute of Cultural Relations, signed for the Hungarian side.

The purposes of this agreement include the promotion of cooperation between institutions of higher learning of the two countries, the exchange of scholars and artists, and the translation, publication, and presentation of artistic works of each country in the other. It will also facilitate visits by scientists and researchers and the joint development and implementation of scientific programs and projects.

## Current Actions

### MULTILATERAL

#### Agriculture

Agreement establishing the International Fund for Agricultural Development (IFAD). Done at Rome June 13, 1976.<sup>1</sup>

*Signatures:* Jamaica, March 24, 1977; Federal Republic of Germany, March 29, 1977; Australia, Kenya, March 30, 1977; Austria, Ecuador, April 1, 1977.

*Ratification deposited:* India, March 28, 1977.

#### Atomic Energy

Protocol prolonging the agreement of December 9, 1970 (TIAS 7010), for the application of safeguards by the International Atomic Energy Agency to the bilateral agreement between the United States and Colombia of April 9, 1962, as amended (TIAS 5330, 6493), for cooperation concerning civil uses of atomic energy. Done at Vienna March 28, 1977. Entered into force March 28, 1977.

*Signatures:* Colombia, International Atomic Energy Agency, United States.

#### Coffee

International coffee agreement 1976, with annexes. Done at London December 3, 1975. Entered into force provisionally October 1, 1976.

*Ratifications deposited:* Austria, March 31, 1977; Cyprus, March 28, 1977; Israel, March 29, 1977.

#### Conservation

Convention on international trade in endangered

<sup>1</sup>Not in force.

species of wild fauna and flora, with appendices. Done at Washington March 3, 1973. Entered into force July 1, 1975. TIAS 8249.

*Ratification deposited:* Paraguay, November 15, 1976.

*Accession deposited:* Seychelles, February 8, 1977.

## Customs

Customs convention on the A.T.A. carnet for the temporary admission of goods, with annex. Done at Brussels December 6, 1961. Entered into force July 30, 1963; for the United States March 3, 1969. TIAS 6631.

*Accession deposited:* Cyprus, October 25, 1977.

## Health

Amendments to articles 24 and 25 of the Constitution of the World Health Organization of July 22, 1946, as amended (TIAS 1808, 4643, 8086). Adopted at Geneva May 17, 1976.<sup>1</sup>

*Acceptance deposited:* Australia, March 30, 1977.

## Maritime Matters

Amendments to the convention of March 6, 1948, as amended, on the Intergovernmental Maritime Consultative Organization (TIAS 4044, 6285, 6490). Adopted at London October 17, 1974.<sup>1</sup>

*Acceptances deposited:* Saudi Arabia, March 23, 1977; Syria, March 25, 1977.

## Ocean Dumping

Convention on the prevention of marine pollution by dumping of wastes and other matter, with annexes. Done at London, Mexico City, Moscow, and Washington December 29, 1972. Entered into force August 30, 1975. TIAS 8165.

*Accession deposited:* Libya, November 22, 1976.

## Space

Convention on international liability for damage caused by space objects. Done at Washington, London, and Moscow March 29, 1972. Entered into force September 1, 1972; for the United States October 9, 1973. TIAS 7762.

*Ratification deposited:* Denmark, April 1, 1977.<sup>2</sup>

Convention on registration of objects launched into outer space. Done at New York January 14, 1975. Entered into force September 15, 1976. TIAS 8480.

*Ratification deposited:* Denmark, April 1, 1977.

## Telecommunications

International telecommunication convention with annexes and protocols. Done at Malaga-Torremolinos October 25, 1973. Entered into force January 1, 1975; for the United States April 7, 1976.

*Ratifications deposited:* Greece,<sup>3</sup> Poland,<sup>3</sup> January 13, 1977; Cuba, January 14, 1977;<sup>3</sup> Argentina,<sup>3</sup> Ghana, January 19, 1977; Senegal, January 21, 1977; Burundi, January 25, 1977; Morocco, January 28, 1977; Chile, January 31, 1977;<sup>3</sup> Afghanistan, Iran, February 3, 1977; Mauritania, February 4, 1977; Kuwait, February 7, 1977;<sup>3</sup> Romania, February 8, 1977.<sup>3</sup>

Partial revision of the radio regulations, Geneva, 1959, as amended (TIAS 4893, 5603, 6332, 6590, 7435), to establish a new frequency allotment plan for high-

frequency radiotelephone coast stations, with annexes and final protocol. Done at Geneva June 8, 1974. Entered into force January 1, 1976; for the United States April 21, 1976.

*Notification of approval:* Sweden, January 26, 1977.<sup>3</sup>

## Tin

Fifth international tin agreement, with annexes. Done at Geneva June 21, 1975. Entered into force provisionally July 1, 1976.

*Ratification deposited:* Zaire, April 1, 1977.

## BILATERAL

### Brazil

Military assistance agreement. Signed at Rio de Janeiro March 15, 1952. Entered into force May 19, 1953. TIAS 2776.

*Notification of termination:* March 11, 1977, by Brazil, effective March 11, 1978, except that the provisions of article I, pars. 2 and 4, and agreements made pursuant to the provisions of article I, pars. 3, 5, and 6, and of article III shall remain in force unless otherwise agreed by the two governments.

### Japan

Agreement concerning fisheries off the coast of the United States. Effected by exchange of notes at Washington February 10, 1977.

*Entered into force:* March 3, 1977.

### Jordan

Agreement relating to the furnishing of defense articles and services to Jordan. Effected by exchange of notes at Amman October 20, 1976, and February 23, 1977. Entered into force February 23, 1977.

### Kenya

Agreement concerning U.S. participation on a limited voluntary basis in the National Social Security Fund of Kenya. Effected by exchange of notes at Nairobi January 31 and March 21, 1977. Entered into force March 25, 1977.

### Malaysia

Agreement relating to eligibility for U.S. military assistance and training pursuant to the International Security Assistance and Arms Export Control Act of 1976. Effected by exchange of notes at Kuala Lumpur February 11 and March 14, 1977. Entered into force March 14, 1977.

### Saudi Arabia

Agreement relating to a U.S. military training mission to Saudi Arabia. Effected by exchange of notes at Jidda February 8 and 27, 1977. Entered into force February 27, 1977.

Agreement providing for a military assistance advisory group. Effected by exchange of notes at Jidda June

<sup>1</sup> Not in force.

<sup>2</sup> With declaration.

<sup>3</sup> Confirmed statements contained in final protocol.

27, 1953. Entered into force June 27, 1953. TIAS 2812.

*Terminated.* February 27, 1977, with the exception of par. 7, which shall remain in force and shall continue to apply in respect to activities under agreement of February 8 and 27, 1977, until such time as modified or replaced.

### Thailand

Memorandum of agreement relating to the storage of ammunition in Thailand. Signed at Bangkok March 22, 1977. Entered into force March 22, 1977.

## PUBLICATIONS

## GPO Sales Publications

*Publications may be ordered by catalog or stock number from the Superintendent of Documents, U.S. Government Printing Office, Washington, D.C. 20402. A 25-percent discount is made on orders for 100 or more copies of any one publication mailed to the same address. Remittance, payable to the Superintendent of Documents, must accompany orders. Prices shown below, which include postage, are subject to change.*

**Background Notes:** Short, factual summaries which describe the people, history, government, economy, and foreign relations of each country. Each contains a map, a list of principal government officials and U.S. diplomatic and consular officers, and a reading list. (A complete set of all Background Notes currently in stock—at least 140—\$21.80; 1-year subscription service for approximately 77 updated or new Notes—\$23.10; plastic binder—\$1.50.) Single copies of those listed below are available at 35¢ each.

Cyprus .....	Cat. No. S1.123:C99/2	
	Pub. 7932	7pp.
Malta .....	Cat. No. S1.123:M29/6	
	Pub. 8220	4 pp.
Mauritania .....	Cat. No. S1.123:M44/2	
	Pub. 8169	6 pp.
Nepal .....	Cat. No. S1.123:N35	
	Pub. 7904	6pp.
Paraguay .....	Cat. No. S1.123:P21	
	Pub. 8098	4 pp.
Philippines .....	Cat. No. S1.123:P53	
	Pub. 7750	8 pp.
Qatar .....	Cat. No. S1.123:Q1	
	Pub. 7906	4 pp.
Tanzania .....	Cat. No. S1.123:T15	
	Pub. 8097	7 pp.
Western Samoa .....	Cat. No. S1.123:W52S	
	Pub. 8345	4 pp.
Yemen, People's Democratic Republic of	Cat. No. S1.123:508Y/ Pub. 8368	4 pp.

**Inter-American Beginnings of U.S. Cultural Diplomacy.** This book deals with the beginnings of the U.S. Government's effort to foster and strengthen cooperative relations with the Latin American countries through long-term, two-way, person-to-person communication. The volume highlights the first years of the program of educational and cultural exchange, the pioneering period from 1936 to 1948. Pub. 8854. International Information and Cultural Series 110. 381 pp. \$6.20. (Cat. No. S1.67:8854).

**Certificates of Airworthiness for Imported Aircraft Products and Components.** Agreement with Brazil. TIAS 8384. 9 pp. 35¢. (Cat. No. S9.10:8384).

**Agricultural Commodities.** Agreement with Afghanistan. TIAS 8390. 13 pp. 35¢. (Cat. No. S9.10:8390).

**Remote Sensing for Earth Resources.** Agreements with Brazil extending the agreement of April 6, 1973. TIAS 8391. 5 pp. 35¢. (Cat. No. S9.10:8391).

**Trade—Meat Imports.** Agreement with Mexico. TIAS 8392. 10 pp. 35¢. (Cat. No. S9.10:8392).

**Remote Sensing for Earth Resources.** Agreement with Brazil. TIAS 8393. 8 pp. 35¢. (Cat. No. S9.10:8393).

**Trade—Meat Imports.** Agreement with Costa Rica. TIAS 8394. 9 pp. 35¢. (Cat. No. S9.10:8394).

**Trade in Cotton, Wool and Man-Made Fiber Textiles and Textile Products.** Agreement with Haiti amending the agreement of March 22 and 23, 1976. TIAS 8395. 3 pp. 35¢. (Cat. No. S9.10:8395).

**Weather Stations.** Agreement with Mexico extending the agreement of July 31, 1970, as amended and extended. TIAS 8397. 3 pp. 35¢. (Cat. No. S9.10:8397).

**Aviation—Joint Financing of Certain Air Navigation Services in Greenland and the Faroe Islands and in Iceland.** Agreement with other governments amending the agreements done at Geneva September 25, 1956, as amended. TIAS 8398. 2 pp. 35¢. (Cat. No. S9.10:8398).

**Whaling—International Observer Scheme.** Agreement with Japan extending the agreement of May 2, 1975. TIAS 8399. 4 pp. 35¢. (Cat. No. S9.10:8399).

**Space Cooperation—Remote Manipulator System.** Agreement with Canada. TIAS 8400. 19 pp. 35¢. (Cat. No. S9.10:8400).

**Agricultural Commodities.** Agreements with Pakistan amending the agreement of August 7, 1975, as amended. TIAS 8401. 11 pp. 35¢. (Cat. No. S9.10:8401).

**Transportation—Cooperation on Development of High Speed Ground Systems.** Memorandum of understanding with the Federal Republic of Germany. TIAS 8402. 10 pp. 35¢. (Cat. No. S9.10:8402).

**Agricultural Commodities.** Agreement with Zaire. TIAS 8403. 25 pp. 45¢. (Cat. No. S9.10:8403).

**Agricultural Commodities.** Agreements with Indonesia amending the agreement of April 19, 1976, as amended. TIAS 8404. 5 pp. 35¢. (Cat. No. S9.10:8404).

**Agricultural Commodities.** Agreement with Chile. TIAS 8405. 6 pp. 35¢. (Cat. No. S9.10:8405).

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164	4/4	Vance, Giringaud; remarks following meeting, Apr. 2.
165	4/4	U.S.-Canada discussions on St. Lawrence Seaway tolls, Apr. 1.
166	4/5	"Foreign Relations," 1949, vol. VII, part 2, "The Far East and Australasia," released.
167	4/6	U.S. and Hungary sign exchanges agreement.
168	4/7	U.S.-U.K. air charter agreement.
169	4/8	Government Advisory Committee on International Book and Library Programs; cancellation of Apr. 21 meeting.
170	4/8	U.S. Advisory Commission on International Educational and Cultural Affairs; revision of agenda for Apr. 25 meeting.
171	4/8	Matthew Nimetz sworn in as Counselor of the Department (biographic data).
172	4/8	Herbert J. Hansell sworn in as Legal Adviser (biographic data).
173	4/8	Joseph D. Duffey sworn in as Assistant Secretary for Educational and Cultural Affairs (biographic data).

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# THE DEPARTMENT OF STATE BULLETIN

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# THE DEPARTMENT OF STATE BULLETIN

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*The Department of State BULLETIN, a weekly publication issued by the Office of Media Services, Bureau of Public Affairs, provides the public and interested agencies of the government with information on developments in the field of U. S. foreign relations and on the work of the Department and the Foreign Service.*

*The BULLETIN includes selected press releases on foreign policy, issued by the White House and the Department, and statements, addresses, and news conferences of the President and the Secretary of State and other officers of the Department, as well as special articles on various phases of international affairs and the functions of the Department. Information is included concerning treaties and international agreements to which the United States is or may become a party and on treaties of general international interest.*

*Publications of the Department of State, United Nations documents, and legislative material in the field of international relations are also listed.*



## President Carter Announces Decisions on Nuclear Power Policy

*Following is a statement by President Carter issued on April 7, together with excerpts from the transcript of his remarks and questions and answers with news correspondents at the White House that day.*

### STATEMENT BY PRESIDENT CARTER

White House press release dated April 7

There is no dilemma today more difficult to resolve than that connected with the use of nuclear power. Many countries see nuclear power as the only real opportunity, at least in this century, to reduce the dependence of their economic well-being on foreign oil—an energy source of uncertain availability, growing price, and ultimate exhaustion. The United States, by contrast, has a major domestic energy source—coal—but its use is not without penalties, and our plans also call for the use of nuclear power as a share in our energy production.

The benefits of nuclear power are thus very real and practical. But a serious risk accompanies worldwide use of nuclear power—the risk that components of the nuclear power process will be turned to providing atomic weapons.

We took an important step in reducing the risk of expanding possession of atomic weapons through the Nonproliferation Treaty, whereby more than 100 nations have agreed not to develop such explosives. But we must go further. The United States is deeply concerned about the consequences for all nations of a further spread of nuclear weapons or explosive capabilities. We believe that these risks would be vastly increased by the further spread of sensitive technologies which entail direct access to plutonium, highly enriched uranium, or

other weapons-usable material. The question I have had under review from my first day in office is how can that be accomplished without forgoing the tangible benefits of nuclear power.

We are now completing an extremely thorough review of all the issues that bear on the use of nuclear power. We have concluded that the serious consequences of proliferation and direct implications for peace and security, as well as strong scientific and economic evidence, require:

—A major change in U.S. domestic nuclear energy policies and programs; and

—A concerted effort among all nations to find better answers to the problems and risks accompanying the increased use of nuclear power.

I am announcing today some of my decisions resulting from that review:

First, we will defer indefinitely the commercial reprocessing and recycling of the plutonium produced in the U.S. nuclear power programs. From our own experience we have concluded that a viable and economic nuclear power program can be sustained without such reprocessing and recycling. The plant at Barnwell, South Carolina, will receive neither Federal encouragement nor funding for its completion as a reprocessing facility.

Second, we will restructure the U.S. breeder reactor program to give greater priority to alternative designs of the breeder and to defer the date when breeder reactors would be put into commercial use.

Third, we will redirect funding of U.S. nuclear research and development programs to accelerate our research into alternative nuclear fuel cycles which do not involve

direct access to materials usable in nuclear weapons.

Fourth, we will increase U.S. production capacity for enriched uranium to provide adequate and timely supply of nuclear fuels for domestic and foreign needs.

Fifth, we will propose the necessary legislative steps to permit the United States to offer nuclear fuel supply contracts and guarantee delivery of such nuclear fuel to other countries.

Sixth, we will continue to embargo the export of equipment or technology that would permit uranium enrichment and chemical reprocessing.

Seventh, we will continue discussions with supplying and recipient countries alike of a wide range of international approaches and frameworks that will permit all nations to achieve their energy objectives while reducing the spread of nuclear explosive capability. Among other things, we will explore the establishment of an international nuclear fuel cycle evaluation program aimed at developing alternative fuel cycles and a variety of international and U.S. measures to assure access to nuclear fuel supplies and spent fuel storage for nations sharing common nonproliferation objectives.

We will continue to consult very closely with a number of governments regarding the most desirable multilateral and bilateral arrangements for assuring that nuclear energy is creatively harnessed for peaceful economic purposes. Our intent is to develop wider international cooperation in regard to this vital issue through systematic and thorough international consultations.

#### **EXCERPTS FROM PRESIDENT CARTER'S REMARKS AND QUESTIONS AND ANSWERS <sup>1</sup>**

The second point I'd like to make before I answer questions is concerning our nation's efforts to control the spread of nuclear explosive capability.

<sup>1</sup> For the complete transcript, see Weekly Compilation of Presidential Documents dated Apr. 11, 1977, p. 502.

As far back as 30 years ago, our government made a proposal to the United Nations that there be tight international controls over nuclear fuels and particularly those that might be made into explosives.

Last year during the Presidential campaign, both I and President Ford called for strict controls over fuels to prevent the proliferation—further proliferation of nuclear explosive capability.

There is no dilemma today more difficult to address than that connected with the use of atomic power. Many countries see atomic power as their only real opportunity to deal with the dwindling supplies of oil, the increasing price of oil, and the ultimate exhaustion of both oil and natural gas. Our country is in a little better position. We have oil supplies of our own, and we have very large reserves of coal. But even coal has its limitations. So we will ourselves continue to use atomic power as a share of our total energy production.

The benefits of nuclear power, particularly to some foreign countries that don't have oil and coal of their own, are very practical and critical. But a serious risk is involved in the handling of nuclear fuels—the risk that component parts of this power process will be turned to providing explosives or atomic weapons.

We took an important step in reducing this risk a number of years ago by the implementation of the Nonproliferation Treaty, which has now been signed by approximately a hundred nations. But we must go further.

We have seen recently India evolve an explosive device derived from a peaceful nuclear power plant, and we now feel that several other nations are on the verge of becoming nuclear explosive powers.

The United States is deeply concerned about the consequences of the uncontrolled spread of this nuclear weapon capability. We can't arrest it immediately and unilaterally. We have no authority over other countries. But we believe that these risks would be vastly increased by the further spread of reprocessing capabilities of the spent nuclear fuel from which explosives can be derived. Plutonium is especially poisonous,

and of course, enriched uranium, thorium, and other chemicals or metals can be used as well.

We are now completing an extremely thorough review of our own nuclear power program. We have concluded that serious consequences can be derived from our own laxity in the handling of these materials and the spread of their use by other countries. And we believe that there is strong scientific and economic evidence that a time for a change has come.

Therefore we will make a major change in the U.S. domestic nuclear energy policies and programs, which I am announcing today. We will make a concerted effort among all other countries to find better answers to the problems and risks of nuclear proliferation. And I would like to outline a few things now that we will do specifically:

First of all, we will defer indefinitely the commercial reprocessing and recycling of the plutonium produced in U.S. nuclear power programs. From my own experience, we have concluded that a viable and adequate economic nuclear program can be maintained without such reprocessing and recycling of plutonium. The plant at Barnwell, South Carolina, for instance, will receive neither Federal encouragement nor funding from us for its completion as a reprocessing facility.

Second, we will restructure our own U.S. breeder program to give greater priority to alternative designs of the breeder other than plutonium and to defer the date when breeder reactors would be put into commercial use. We will continue research and development, try to shift away from plutonium, defer dependence on the breeder reactor for commercial use.

Third, we will direct funding of U.S. nuclear research and development programs to accelerate our research into alternative nuclear fuel cycles which do not involve direct access to materials that can be used for nuclear weapons.

Fourth, we will increase the U.S. capacity to produce nuclear fuels, enriched uranium in particular, to provide adequate and timely supplies of nuclear fuels to countries that need them so that they will not be required

or encouraged to reprocess their own materials.

Fifth, we will propose to the Congress the necessary legislative steps to permit us to sign these supply contracts and remove the pressure for the reprocessing of nuclear fuels by other countries that do not now have this capability.

Sixth, we will continue to embargo the export of either equipment or technology that could permit uranium enrichment and chemical reprocessing.

And seventh, we will continue discussions with supplying countries and recipient countries, as well, of a wide range of international approaches and frameworks that will permit all countries to achieve their own energy needs while at the same time reducing the spread of the capability for nuclear explosive development. Among other things—and we have discussed this with 15 or 20 national leaders already—we will explore the establishment of an international nuclear fuel cycle evaluation program so that we can share with countries that have to reprocess nuclear fuel the responsibility for curtailing the ability for the development of explosives.

One other point that ought to be made in the international negotiation field is that we have to help provide some means for the storage of spent nuclear fuel materials which are highly explosive, highly radioactive in nature.

I have been working very closely with and personally with some of the foreign leaders who are quite deeply involved in the decisions that we make. We are not trying to impose our will on those nations like Japan and France and Britain and Germany which already have reprocessing plants in operation. They have a special need that we don't have in that their supplies of petroleum products are not available. But we hope that they will join with us—and I believe that they will—in trying to have some worldwide understanding of the extreme threat of the further proliferation of nuclear explosive capability.

*Q. Mr. President, in the last Administration there was some proposal to have re-*

*gional reprocessing centers, which seem to some people to put the emphasis on the wrong thing. Does this mean that you are going to not favor regional reprocessing centers? And secondly, would you be prepared to cut off supplies of any kind of nuclear material to countries that go nuclear?*

*The President:* Well, I can't answer either one of those questions yet. I have had detailed discussions with Prime Minister Fukuda, with Chancellor Schmidt, and also with Prime Minister Callaghan, for instance, just in recent days about a joint approach to these kinds of problems.

Obviously, the smaller nations, the ones that now have established atomic power plants, have to have someplace either to store their spent fuel or to have it reprocessed. And I think that we would very likely see a continuation of reprocessing capabilities within those nations that I have named and perhaps others.

We in our own country don't have this requirement. It's an option that we might have to explore many, many years in the future.

But I hope that by this unilateral action we can set a standard and that those countries that don't now have reprocessing capability will not acquire that capability in the future. Regional plants under tight international control obviously is one option that we would explore. No decision has been made about that.

If we felt that the provision of atomic fuel was being delivered to a nation that did not share with us our commitment to nonproliferation, we would not supply that fuel.

*Q. Mr. President, this carries an assurance, which you had said earlier, for an assured and adequate supply of enriched uranium to replace the need for plutonium. Do you foresee any kind of price guarantees also for underdeveloped and poorer countries so that the supply would not only be assured but at a reasonable price in case lack of reprocessing drove prices up?*

*The President:* I don't know what the future prices of uranium might be. At the present time, of the enriched uranium that

we produce, about roughly a third of it is exported, roughly a third of it is used for our domestic needs, and about a third of it is put in storage.

There has been an attenuation in recent years of the projected atomic power plant construction in our own country. Other nations, though, are moving more and more toward atomic power plants. But I can't tell you at this point that we will guarantee a price for uranium fuel that's less than our own cost of production; and that would be a matter of negotiation, perhaps even on an individual national basis.

I think that a standard price would probably be preferable, but then we might very well give a particular nation that was destitute or a very close friend of ours or who cooperated with us in this matter some sort of financial aid to help them with the purchase.

*Q. You also said last year a couple of times that you hoped to call a world energy conference to discuss this as well as a lot of other things. Do you foresee that happening any time in the near future?*

*The President:* The item of nuclear power plants and the handling of spent nuclear fuels and the curtailment of the possibility of new nations joining us in their capability for explosives will be on the agenda in the discussions in London early in May. And this will be a continuing process for us.

I might add that Secretary Vance also discussed this question with the Soviet authorities on his recent visit to Moscow and asked them to join in with us in enhancing the nonproliferation concept. Their response was favorable. But it will entail a great deal of negotiation, and I can't anticipate what the results of those negotiations might be. We obviously hope for it to apply to all the nations in the world.

*Q. Mr. President, does your change in the domestic program mean that you will not authorize building the Clinch River breeder reactor in Tennessee?*

*The President:* The Clinch River breeder reactor will not be terminated as such. In

my own budget recommendations to the Congress, we cut back—I can't remember the exact figure—about \$250 million out of the plutonium breeder reactor, the liquid metal fast breeder reactor program.

I think that we would continue with the breeder reactor program on an experimental basis, research and development, but not move nearly so rapidly toward any sort of commercial use.

We also, obviously, are concerned about the adverse economic impact of these changes. And in the areas that would lose employment that was presently extant, as we increase our capacity for producing nuclear fuels, even using new techniques, other than gaseous diffusion, like centrifuge and laser beam use, then we would try to locate those facilities over a period of time—it's a very slow-moving process—in areas like Clinch River where they might be adversely affected.

*Q. Mr. President, does this mean that Canada selling nuclear power equipment to France and others, and France selling to others—does this mean that we will supply those other countries so that they won't make more power?*

*The President:* Well, I might say that the two countries that most nearly share our commitment and even moved ahead of us in this field have been Canada—perhaps because of their unfortunate experience with India—and Australia. Both those countries, along with us, have substantial supplies of nuclear fuel themselves.

I would hope that we could develop an interrelationship with other countries to remove the competitive aspect of reprocessing itself. There is obviously going to be continued competition among our own nation, Canada, France, Germany, England, in the selling of atomic power plants themselves. It ought to be a clearly drawn distinction between the legitimate and necessary use of uranium and other enriched fuels to produce electricity, on the one hand, and a prohibition against the use of those fuels for explosives.

It would be impossible, counterproduc-

tive, and ill advised for us to try to prevent other countries that need it from having the capability to produce electricity from atomic power. But I would hope that we and the other countries could form an alliance that might be fairly uniform in this respect. I know that all the other countries share with us this hope.

The one difference that has been very sensitive, as it relates to, say, Germany, Japan, and others, is that they fear that our unilateral action in renouncing the reprocessing of spent fuels to produce plutonium might imply that we prohibit them or criticize them severely because of their own need for reprocessing. This is not the case. They have a perfect right to go ahead and continue with their own reprocessing efforts. But we hope they'll join with us in eliminating in the future additional countries that might have had this capability evolve.

*Q. Mr. President, is it your assessment, sir, that some of the smaller nations that are now seeking reprocessing technology are doing so in order to attain nuclear weapon capability as well as or in addition to meeting their legitimate energy needs?*

*The President:* Well, without going into specifics—I wouldn't want to start naming names—I think it's obvious that some of the countries about whom we are concerned have used their domestic nuclear power plants to develop explosive capability. There is no doubt about it.

India, which is basically a peaceful nation, at least as far as worldwide connotations are concerned, did evolve an explosive capability from supplies that were given to them by the Canadians and by us. And we feel that there are other nations that have potential capacity already for the evolution of explosives.

But we are trying to make sure that from this point on that the increasing number of nations that might have joined the nuclear nations is attenuated drastically. We can't undo immediately the mistakes that have been made in the past. But I believe that this is a step in the right direction.

## President Sadat of Egypt Visits Washington

*President Anwar al-Sadat of the Arab Republic of Egypt made an official visit to Washington April 3-6, during which he met with President Carter and other government officials. Following is an exchange of remarks between President Carter and President Sadat at a welcoming ceremony in the East Room of the White House on April 4.*<sup>1</sup>

Weekly Compilation of Presidential Documents dated April 11

### PRESIDENT CARTER

First of all, let me say that the weather is not at all indicative of the warmth that we feel in our own hearts and minds for the visit of President and Mrs. Sadat. He said that he's very glad to see the rain, that in Egypt they don't get quite as much as we have here. And this is kind of a treat for him. I am looking forward to an opportunity to go to his great country.

One of the most exciting experiences that I have had was to visit recently the tremendous exhibit of just a few of the precious items from the tomb of King Tutankhamen, or King Tut as most of us refer to it. My wife and I and our family went to the National Gallery. And we were overwhelmed at its beauty and the ancient heritage that belongs to Egypt. I believe that the sending of this exhibit to our country—and it is now moving from one great city to another—has been a good omen for the relationship that is going to continue to improve between the people of Egypt and the people of the United States.

President Sadat, people stood in line all night long, waiting to go in to see the exhibit. And I think I can truthfully say that of the almost one million Americans who visited this exhibit in Washington, none of them were disappointed and they thought

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<sup>1</sup> For an exchange of toasts between President Carter and President Sadat at a dinner at the White House on Apr. 4, see Weekly Compilation of Presidential Documents dated Apr. 11, 1977, p. 490.

that the wait in line was well worth it when they saw these treasures.

I am very grateful that I have been lucky enough to be President during this year, a year when President Sadat and other leaders in the Middle East have established a very special goal of major achievements in bringing peace to that troubled region of the world.

There are no easy answers. There have now been about 29 years of search for accommodation among the nations who inhabit that precious area of ground. And I think it's fair to say that with President Sadat's close relationship with his own people, their trust in him as a leader, his superb demonstration of courage to make statements of hope and determination that 1977 will be a fruitful year for negotiations, that he has been an inspiration to us all. He understands the complexities of the issues there. But he also sees very clearly, as I am beginning to learn, the tremendous benefits that can be derived if leaders like him and others can meet with a common purpose to establish peace on a permanent basis in the eastern part of the Mediterranean and among those nations who share a common heritage, a common history, common ancestors, the opportunities for improved trade, economic benefits for citizens there, an end to the military arms race, and an opportunity to live in harmony, one with another.

I'd also like to say that I have been looking forward to a chance to establish a close and personal friendship with President Sadat. I have never talked to an American leader in this Administration or the past Administrations in the executive branch of government or in the Congress who had met him who didn't come away impressed with his sensitivity, his intelligence, his vision, and his courage. I hope to learn a lot from him and to share with him, as best we can, the prospects for the interested parties this year to search out a common basis for a peaceful and permanent solution to that troubled region of the world.

Our own country will offer its good offices, when called upon to do so, to share

with nations located there to find this peaceful resolution. We understand the common ground on which that peace might be brought. And I personally am willing to devote a great deal of my own time and the time of the American Government to cooperation in this worthwhile pursuit toward a great goal which might bring stability to the entire world.

So, I would like to say in closing that President Sadat is received here in our own country with a warm welcome, appreciation for his great achievements in the past, and a hope that with his leadership and that of others in the Mideast region, that the achievements might be even greater this year.

Thank you for coming to see us. I look forward to detailed discussions about many items that are on our agenda. And Mrs. Sadat, we are very grateful that you could come and be with us also. President Sadat, welcome.

#### **PRESIDENT SADAT**

Mr. President: It is with great pleasure that I revisit your country and meet with such a statesman who is the personification of the new spirit that is emerging in America today.

For so long we have been told that politics is amoral and that international relations are not the domain of idealism or spirituality, but one of expediency and the pursuit of selfish interests. But the unfortunate turn of events in the past decades and the suffering that has been inflicted upon many of our fellow men have shaken the foundations of these premises and confronted us with a new challenge.

We had to reexamine the postulates which we have taken for granted or acquiesced to for centuries. A process of soul-searching became inevitable for the salvation of mankind. Only leaders with vision and exceptional wisdom were able to grasp the magnitude of the problem and recognize the pressing need for a bold change without delay.

It is quite evident, Mr. President, that

you were among those farsighted and perceptive leaders. On the first day you assumed the awesome responsibility of your office, you took pride in the fact that your society was the first one to define itself in terms of both spirituality and human liberty. You pledged to spare no effort to help shape a just and peaceful world that is truly humane.

It is in this spirit that I come to your great country with an open mind and an open heart in order to work with you for strengthening the structure of peace and promoting the revival of idealism in international relations.

I am certain that you know, Mr. President, that Egypt ever since its emergence as a state more than 7,000 years ago has been a land of ideals and principles. From time immemorial, the Egyptian has remained faithful to higher values and ideals which render human life more rewarding and fulfilling. His belief in the divine truth, the afterlife, and the day of judgment—all this has instilled in him an extraordinary sense of justice and a genuine conviction of the universal brotherhood of man.

It is not a mere coincidence, therefore, that we share with you the belief that the only way to improve the quality of our life is to reinstall the long-neglected idealism and spirituality which enrich our existence individually and collectively.

Mr. President, a few weeks ago, you pledged to devote a major part of your time this year to efforts toward a lasting peace in the Middle East. Undoubtedly, this genuine determination stemmed out of thoughtful realization on your part of the possibility as well as the necessity to establish peace in the area after 29 years of devastating wars and stifling tension.

This also demonstrates your enlightened awareness that your country has a certain mission to fulfill and a major responsibility to contribute positively to the process of peace in the Middle East. More important, you registered your willingness and even enthusiasm to fully assume this responsibility.

In your speech at the United Nations on

March 17, you reiterated that your country has the strength of ideals and that you are determined to maintain these ideals as the backbone of your policy. I endorse this statement and hope to see it implemented in practice. Such ideals certainly coincide with the norms of legitimacy and legality in international behavior.

Thus, you cannot support foreign occupation of one's land or tolerate territorial expansionism. We know that attachment to one's land is a value which is deeply rooted in the fabric of the American society. It is the central force that made the realization of the American dream possible.

Mr. President, I am sure that you concur with me that it would be a grave mistake to waste this golden opportunity to put an end to a state of affairs that has plagued our area for decades.

There is every indication that you are aware of the centrality of the Palestinian cause to the entire dispute. It is the core and crux of the issue. No progress whatsoever can be achieved so long as this problem remains unsolved.

In your public pronouncements in recent weeks, you came very close to the proper remedy. What is needed is the establishment of a political entity where the Palestinians can, at long last, be a community of citizens, not a group of refugees. The humanitarian dimension of their plight is merely one of the aspects of the problem. Their yearning to exercise their normal rights remains the heart of the issue.

Mr. President, the Arab nation, with its

long history of tolerance and cooperation with other nations, is eager to contribute further to the welfare and prosperity of mankind. It harbors no ill-feeling toward any people, nor has it ever experienced prejudice or hatred against any creed or peoples. We remain committed to peace in our area and in the world at large.

Mr. President, over the past few years, I worked with your predecessors to develop ties of cooperation and mutual understanding between our two peoples. I am glad to say that we are satisfied with the development of our bilateral relations and are looking forward for an era of an ever-increasing exchange and interaction during your Presidency. In this respect, I must express my people's gratitude and mine, Mr. President, for the gallant action from your side, helping us in our economic problems lately. Really, it has shown the valiant American spirit after you have helped us in many ways in the last few years, especially in preparing the Suez Canal for the navigation and for the prosperity of the whole world.

Mr. President, I am carrying to every American a message of friendship and amity from 40 million Egyptians. We wish you all the success and gratification of fulfillment you are aspiring to. Let us pray to God Almighty so that the days ahead may witness a happy American family under every roof and a state of peace and solidarity in every community. Let us also pray that God grants us the strength to establish a better world for the generations to come.



## U.S. Urges Global View of Water Resource Problems

*The United Nations Water Conference met at Mar del Plata, Argentina, March 14-25. Following is the principal U.S. statement on world water problems, made in plenary session of the conference on March 15 by Charles Hugh Warren, Chairman of the Council on Environmental Quality, who headed the U.S. delegation.*

President Carter has asked our delegation to extend his greetings and express his personal interest in the results of this conference. He hopes, as do we, that our deliberations here will lead not only to the customary report but to an actual improvement in the lives of all people. Our subject here, of course, is water—its quality, its availability, and its use. Now, as in historical times, it shapes the very framework of our lives.

During the rule of Caesar Augustus, the population density of Italy was only 24 persons per square kilometer; and that of Greece, only 11 persons. By contrast, Egypt was able to support 280 persons per square kilometer. Later, in medieval times, Córdoba, the capital of Moorish Spain, is estimated to have had a million inhabitants, while north of the Alps the most populous city was London—which had only 35,000.

The greatest single factor in these regional population differences appears not to have been migration, the effects of war, or culture as we commonly define it; that factor was water. The northern regions practiced what is known as "rainfall farming"; the inhabitants watered their crops with what the skies offered. The southern regions, on the other hand, practiced "hydraulic agriculture"; they erected dams, dug canals, and built irrigation ditches to convey water into fields for intensive, continuous cultivation.

Today the techniques of hydraulic agriculture—and indeed, of hydraulic life—have spread to virtually every nation. In this respect, the nations of the north have benefited from a technology pioneered by the nations of the south. We all know how to impound water; how to collect it in lakes and reservoirs; how to move it from one place to another through canals and pumps and irrigation channels; how to probe deeper into the earth for it; how to drain it from places where it is plentiful and divert it to drylands for food or livestock.

Yet the apparent success of our technology has seduced many of us into thinking that we have entirely tamed water and that its abundance is limited only by human ingenuity and technology.

Events of the last few years, however, have made it clear that this is not so. A prolonged drought in the Sahel took a terrible toll of human lives and rendered vast areas of land incapable of sustaining plant and animal life. In the western regions of the United States lack of rainfall and snow has prolonged drought conditions and reduced already short water supplies. Also in the United States, as in other parts of the world, shortsighted forest practices and overgrazing by livestock are destroying the capacity of land to absorb water, filter it, and recharge ground supplies.

The basic lessons to be derived from these and other of man's misadventures with water are these:

—First, despite our ingenuity in converting natural resources to our own use and convenience, we still experience major fluctuations in the supply of water;

—Second, though water seems inexhaustible, it is, in fact, limited; and

—Third, water is not entirely a passive resource to be extracted and developed as we see fit. The hydrologic cycle that supplies us with water has an integrity of its own, pursuing its way from the skies, across the land, and back to the sea in courses that were ancient before man emerged on the globe. Human activities can benefit from this cycle, but we should recognize that when we allow our activities to disrupt the cycle itself we do so at our peril.

Today we more fully appreciate that the earth's processes of supply cannot indefinitely accommodate man's accelerating demand for water nor can they cleanse the pollutants and poisons which human activities cause to be discharged into surface and underground water bodies.

In my country, a series of water shortages, water problems, and indeed, water disasters is forcing us to reconsider policies heretofore considered farsighted and advanced. We are beginning to reduce our emphasis on water development and to give more thought to water management. We are beginning to distinguish human needs for water from human desires for water. In short, we are beginning to employ an environmental perspective in evaluating water projects and water use, recognizing that the supply and quality of water are affected by a host of factors that have nothing to do with hydraulic engineering.

Foremost among such other factors is population. We all know global population will double in the next 35 years. Our demand for water, however, will double in far less time, due to the increased need for water to support intensive agriculture and industrial expansion.

The location of people is another factor. Instead of settling in places where safe water is abundant, people have been encouraged to settle where they must rely upon complex systems to bring water to them. Sometimes such systems violate natural laws which set certain limits for the carrying capacity of the land and the water potential of underground aquifers.

In addition, other human activities threaten the quality of our water. As rain

falls, it picks up pollution in the air. After falling on the land it picks up fertilizer, pesticides, and silt from farms; it picks up acid from mine wastes and oil from highways and streets; it picks up a great diversity of chemicals from industrial and municipal establishments—especially human wastes. These pollutants and poisons find their way through the earth's water cycle.

In pointing out that we have begun to move from water development to water management, I do not mean to suggest that the dimensions of the transition are the same for all countries. However, despite differences in population, geographic advantage, and state of development, I do believe most nations share, in varying degrees, water problems and experiences similar to our own.

At issue, then, is how the earth's fixed supply of water can be managed to meet future demands imposed by the worldwide growth of population, agriculture, and industry. Specifically, we need to identify our most likely water needs and problems and consider how best to avert a global water crisis. The United States takes this issue and this conference most seriously. We expect to learn more of and from your local and regional experience and assessments. The information we gather here, coupled with the formal findings of the conference, will be given by me directly to President Carter.

We know that many topics will be discussed in our report to him. However, at this time I want to discuss but three vital issues of interest to us all: community water and health; water for food and fiber; and disaster assistance.

*First, community water and health.* In many regions, population growth and shifts in population distribution resulting from intensive urbanization have led to abuses in consumption patterns and water shortages.

We would hope, therefore, that countries with less than abundant water supplies or with high population growth in areas of marginal water availability would emphasize policies to reduce rates of population growth, encourage resource-oriented

settlements, stimulate reclamation and conservation, and finally, adopt development technologies appropriate to specific water needs.

In addition to supply, water must be of such quality as to enhance health. The United States has supported community water supply and sanitation programs. Our support program for water and sanitation purposes to date totals \$860 million. The United States intends to increase its emphasis on and commitment to such programs, which have as their purpose the fulfillment of basic human needs.

Benefits from non-health-oriented water development programs are, however, frequently diminished by the increased transmission of water-related diseases. As we all know, schistosomiasis, which is encouraged by construction of dams and irrigation ditches, now infects between 100 and 200 million people around the globe. Only by recognizing the relationships between water and disease, and by supporting preventive management strategies, can we increase the well-being of people.

It is essential that we explicitly consider the health impacts of each water resource project as part of our environmental review and that such review be as carefully considered and measured as our cost-benefit analyses. As an example, the United States is currently funding the environmental analysis of the Senegal River Basin and in sub-Saharan Africa is supporting projects designed to assess the public health impacts of water resource development. Moreover, we will assist countries in training project managers to assess the environmental health consequences of their own development proposals.

*Second, water for food and fiber.* Our analysis of crop yields, farming conditions, and water utilization around the world indicates that the overriding focus should not be on the amount of new land and water that might be developed for agriculture but, rather, on improving the effectiveness with which water and other production aids are applied and managed on land already under cultivation. Of course some countries will have to irrigate additional land in order to

meet their food and fiber needs. However, because of the high cost of development and the danger of long-term environmental degradation, new irrigation projects should be planned carefully and thoroughly.

In the United States we are emphasizing better water management of both irrigated and rain-fed lands. We are beginning to realize the need to protect our remaining prime agricultural lands from urban encroachment. We do so in recognition of the need to increase the production of food and fiber. For the same purpose, the United States believes that the highest priority should be given to improving the utilization of water in existing irrigation projects and in projects under development. Efficiency of water use on these projects is generally remarkably low. Improvement will require that countries and regional and international organizations give increased attention to better irrigation practices on the farm, distribution systems to fields, and provision of drainage.

*Third, disaster assistance.* Despite our best efforts toward comprehensive planning and management of water resources, we continue to suffer from droughts and floods. Solutions to these and other natural disasters will not readily be found—but we should continue to seek ways to expand our cooperative efforts around the globe to predict and then to mitigate such disasters. When disasters occur, the United States pledges to continue its commitment to aid and assist stricken peoples everywhere, should that assistance be desired.

If the world community is to avert water crises of local, national, or global dimensions, we must have accurate, pertinent, and timely water data and information at each of those levels. We should improve and share methods for collecting, storing, and exchanging data on ground and surface water quantity and quality and on current and projected water uses. We should use this information to inform our decisionmakers and their constituencies about the necessity for long-term management of limited water resources.

The United States is prepared to provide

technical aid and assistance to other nations interested in designing information systems to upgrade their own assessments of water resource needs.

But water resource data and technology will be of little use without trained people. Because water resource management requires familiarity with the specific region and its resources, the training should be done in and by the countries concerned. Such training programs can, however, draw on the collective knowledge and expertise of many other countries whenever it is not readily available locally. The United States has had a strong commitment to such training efforts in the past and we are prepared to continue and expand this commitment in the future.

These comments also apply to the related question of technology transfer. Technical knowledge exists which can help solve many of the problems of concern to us all. Its use, however, must be appropriate to the human need.

President Carter has asked me to express his conviction that, if this conference is to succeed in its aims, we must follow up our deliberations with action. Consequently, the U.S. delegation fully endorses Secretary General Mageed's [Yahia Abdel Mageed, of Sudan, Secretary General of the conference] desire to fix responsibility for acting on the specific recommendations of this conference.

Our delegation will report back to President Carter on the results of our efforts during the next several days. In addition, our government is planning a major national conference on water this May. We will make sure that the recommendations of the United Nations Water Conference are brought to the attention of our national conference.

Mr. President, it is in this spirit of commitment to the broad purposes of this conference, within the framework outlined, that we approach the work of the next several days.

We hope and trust that our collective effort will result in new perceptions for all of us, in a new global view of the water resource field, and in a consensus on the urgent problems ahead, which we—mankind—must face and solve together.

## World Trade Week, 1977

### A P R O C L A M A T I O N <sup>1</sup>

We live in a world where all of us must depend on each other—a world divided by nationality and philosophy, but drawn together by common problems and common hopes. We share with all people a concern about unemployment, inequality, poverty, inflation, and the danger of war. And we share with all people the hope of a life free of hunger, disease, and repression, and a determination to overcome international differences with mutual trust, respect and cooperation.

Our desire for justice, stability, and peace finds practical expression in world trade. Trade generates forces of friendship and understanding, which in turn bring us closer to the kind of world we want.

The United States is the unsurpassed leader in international commerce. Because our total trade is greater than that of any other nation, we can, by increasing our trade activities, make an enormous contribution to the health of the international economy, to the job market at home and abroad, to progressive relationships between rich and poor nations and, finally, to the cause of peace on our globe.

NOW, THEREFORE, I, JIMMY CARTER, President of the United States of America, do hereby proclaim the week beginning May 22, 1977, as World Trade Week. I urge business, labor, agricultural, educational, professional and civic groups, the communications media, and all concerned Americans, to observe World Trade Week with meetings, discussions, exhibits, ceremonies, and other appropriate activities that promote continuing awareness of the importance of world trade to our Nation and to our relations with other nations.

IN WITNESS WHEREOF, I have hereunto set my hand this eighth day of April, in the year of our Lord nineteen hundred seventy-seven, and of the Independence of the United States of America the two hundred and first.

JIMMY CARTER.

<sup>1</sup> No. 4496; 42 *Fed. Reg.* 18855.

## Department Discusses Debt Situations of Developing Countries and the Role of Private Banks

*Statement by Paul H. Boeker*

*Deputy Assistant Secretary for Economic and Business Affairs*<sup>1</sup>

I would like to speak briefly about the nature of the current international financing problem and then provide my assessment of developing-country debt situations and the role being played in that situation by international lending on the part of private banks.

Since the winter of 1973-74, the oil-importing countries have been forced to share a collective deficit on current account which corresponds to the surplus of the oil-exporting countries.<sup>2</sup> This pattern has clearly made the international economy a more sensitive system and one requiring greater attention to its management by all countries and by the international financial institutions. The magnitude of the collective deficit and the suddenness with which it developed meant that while international payments adjustment was certainly in order, adequate adjustment could be achieved only at a gradual pace and over a number of years. The size of the disequilibrium also meant that the financing requirements of deficit countries during the adjustment period would be exceptionally large.

Ultimate adjustment will depend upon the world reducing its energy dependence on the oil-exporting nations. Conservation and development of alternate energy resources by the major nations, particularly the United States, will be critical.

Individual country problems will persist, especially where there are social and political constraints that curb the speed of balance-of-payments adjustment. Some of the industrial democracies, for example, have faced difficult adjustment needs. Such countries in particular will need the assurance that sufficient external financing will be available on reasonable terms to allow them to move with the speed which their social and political conditions permit.

The buildup of foreign debt has been the inevitable counterpart of the current account surpluses generated by the oil-producing nations. Countries have wanted to maintain reasonable rates of economic growth during this period, thus avoiding overly harsh deflation and resulting pressures for protectionist trade policies that would spread deflation internationally.

We have averted a crisis situation because countries' external financing needs have been met on adequate terms. Future crises can be avoided, we feel, so long as adequate financing continues and the system encourages adjustment by oil-importing nations. It is important in this regard that official financing should be accompanied by appropriate conditionality on the borrowers' own economic policies.

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<sup>1</sup> Made on Apr. 5 before the Subcommittee on Financial Institutions Supervision, Regulation and Insurance of the House Committee on Banking, Finance and Urban Affairs. The complete transcript of the hearings will be published by the committee and will be available from the Superintendent of Documents, U.S. Government Printing Office, Washington, D.C. 20402.

<sup>2</sup> The current account balance is defined as the total of sales and purchases by a country of currently produced goods and services, plus unilateral transfers, gifts, and donations, both public and private.

On the whole, the international financial system has held up well under the sudden strains that were imposed upon it. The share of the oil-importing developing countries in the global account deficit has so far not been excessive, in my view. Some countries have, in fact, experienced considerable progress in their adjustment process. At the same time there have been numerous instances where balance-of-payments positions have weakened.

### **Diversity of Debt Situations**

Since 1973, balance-of-payments management for most non-oil-exporting developing countries has become very difficult. In order to preserve development momentum, while in most cases attempting internal adjustment to the new situation, these countries have been financing their deficits by external borrowings on an unprecedented scale. It is estimated that the medium- and long-term foreign indebtedness of the non-oil-exporting developing countries rose from about \$90 billion in 1974 to about \$145 billion in 1976. Debt-service payments in 1976 were about \$21 billion, an increase of about 75 percent since 1973.

While the level of indebtedness has risen rapidly, this does not by itself pose a threat of acute debt-servicing difficulties. The nominal increases are, in fact, far less dramatic when one allows for, in this case, the favorable effect on debt service of inflation and for the growth of output and trade over the period.

Nongovernment credits have played a significant role in the buildup of debt. In 1975 and 1976, private markets are estimated to have supplied roughly one-half of the credit flows to the non-oil developing countries. As a result, an estimated 40 percent of the outstanding debt of these nations is now attributable to commercial banks.

Aggregate debt statistics can be misleading, however, in that they fail to reflect the wide diversity which exists in the situations of developing countries. A more meaningful picture of the debt situation is obtained by distinguishing three broad groups of

developing-country debtors: the higher income, semi-industrial countries; second, the low-income developing countries; and third, a middle category of transitional countries.

The first category includes perhaps a dozen rapidly growing countries, with relatively high per capita income for developing countries, which depend largely on private markets for external capital. This dozen or so countries, of which Brazil and Mexico are the most important, have productive and diversified economies which have been capable of generating adequate export earnings to service debt. However, these countries will face a substantial increase in debt-service obligations over the next few years, and their ability to attract new capital will be contingent upon domestic measures to keep their economies efficient and competitive. Since exports bear the brunt of financing debt service, access to and demand from industrial-country markets will also play a critical factor in their ability to meet their financial obligations over the coming years.

At the other extreme of the developing-country spectrum is a second category, low-income countries. This is a group that has been particularly hard hit by recent economic events and confronts serious resource problems. They are looking primarily to the developed world for concessional transfers of resources and increased foreign assistance to help them improve the investment situation within their own economies. However, since they continue to benefit from such lending and have had little opportunity to attract significant amounts of commercial debt, very few, if any, of these countries have a significant debt problem as such.

In the middle is a third category which includes a number of developing countries with moderate per capita income which are in transition in that they have begun blending traditional aid-type financing with commercial borrowing. Many of these countries are still largely dependent upon the export of a few commodities with highly cyclical prices and have, therefore, external payment situations which can be quite vari-

able. Some of these countries have so far failed to take adequate domestic adjustment measures and to pursue fully efficient management of their external debt. Total commercial bank exposure to this category of borrowers, however, is relatively small, and only one of these countries has thus far asked for a rescheduling of its official and private debt.

### **Lending by Private Banks**

The shocks which confronted the world's economy in 1973 and 1974 gave many of the oil-importing developing countries two broad options. They could abruptly curb their development objectives by deflating their economies and imposing tight import restrictions, a course of action which would entail significant political risk and have profound adverse consequences on the world economy as a whole. Alternatively, they could seek an increased level of external finance which would allow a more orderly adjustment process over a longer period of years. The latter course was clearly the option preferred by most developing countries.

Despite increased availabilities of official financing, the extent of developing-country financing requirements turned many of them toward the private market. This remarkable, although not entirely unexpected, expansion of private lending has generated concern regarding the position of banks and the prospects for loan repayment. These concerns are reinforced by an assumption that developing countries may face some kind of a general debt crisis.

Careful reading of the situation, I feel, shows that despite some problems, the lending standards of international banks have been quite high and that general debt difficulties for developing countries are not likely. The selectivity of private lenders is clearly evidenced by the concentration of their lending to those developing countries whose diversified economies and strong export performance provide the most promising growth prospects.

As a result of generally prudent lending policies, losses on bank loans to developing

countries have been small, with servicing problems confined to relatively few countries. One of the characteristics of developing countries active in private markets has, in fact, been their awareness that the creditworthiness which they are so anxious to sustain is inextricably conditioned by their own governments' economic policies.

I believe that, on the whole, banks have acted prudently. I also believe that private lending, employing adequate lending standards, should continue to have a significant role in assuring adequate capital flows to developing countries. We should not, however, expect private creditors to maintain indefinitely the current or an increased level of lending to developing countries. In this context, I believe that a better mix between official and private lending is desirable, given the longer term maturity of official lending and its greater ability to facilitate economic policy changes within the borrowing countries.

### **Outlook and Implications**

Although the 1977 payments deficit of the non-oil-exporting developing countries will approximate that of 1976, external borrowing requirements should be somewhat less—especially if, as expected, the exceptionally high rate of increase in reserves that occurred in the past year is slowed. Given the expected impact of industrial-country growth on loan demand, it would appear that private financing for developing countries will still be available at a level commensurate with the aggregate financing requirements they will have for this type of borrowing. Private lenders have, however, become increasingly cautious about their exposure in some individual developing countries. The linkage of new lending to borrowing countries' action to manage efficiently their payments deficit should receive even more emphasis than in the past.

The increasingly selective nature of private lending means that individual countries encountering unexpected difficulties or delays in their adjustment process could find

their accustomed access to private markets weakened. Such financing problems could become acute, especially in the event of any slackening in the export performance of developing countries, which means in turn slackening in the rate of growth in the industrial countries and the world economy generally. Import restrictions by the major industrial-country markets on which developing countries depend could be particularly significant in aggravating any financial difficulties of this group of countries.

There are certainly grounds for caution, since the large surpluses accruing to oil-exporting countries will continue for several more years. The problem of economic adjustment to that deficit will be a continuing one, and developing countries should for several more years continue to have a balance-of-payments deficit roughly of the current magnitude.

In this situation, several major conclusions emerge:

1. Economic growth in the poorer developing countries will require a substantial rise in concessional lending. Their external financial situation does not depend on private markets.

2. In order to maintain creditworthiness in private capital markets, the middle and higher income developing countries must be prepared to improve their debt management and to make the adjustments necessary in their own economies, even in some cases at the cost of reducing recent growth.

3. The growth of the exports of these countries and their access to industrial-country markets will be critical to their long-term process of adjustment.

4. The linkage of new lending to performance criteria is increasingly important for all lenders.

5. Close attention must be given to insure that the international financial mechanisms, such as the International Monetary Fund, have adequate resources to respond efficiently to the financing needs of developing and other countries facing temporary financing difficulties.

Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

## U.S. Security Assistance Policy for Latin America

*Following is a statement by Terence A. Todman, Assistant Secretary for Inter-American Affairs, before the Subcommittee on Inter-American Affairs of the House Committee on International Relations on April 5.<sup>1</sup>*

I am pleased to appear before this subcommittee to discuss our security assistance programs for Latin America.

The United States for many years has maintained close working ties with the Latin American military, both in purely military-to-military terms and in dealing with individual military leaders in their capacity as presidents and ministers of the various governments in the region.

This long association has developed an arms relationship with the Latin American countries that has helped us maintain access to their military establishments, a matter of some importance since 15 Latin American and Caribbean nations today are governed by or under the aegis of the armed forces. Security assistance to these governments thus is a political tool that provides us an opportunity to exert some influence on their attitudes and actions. It is, in short, a means for protecting or advancing our interests, which are many and varied.

Among those interests in sharpest relief today is our commitment to the defense of human rights. President Carter has made that commitment a priority consideration that will help shape our foreign relations in the years ahead. His Administration is adjusting the attitudes of the executive branch to conform to the demands of the country, which are reflected in this Congress, for a foreign policy that is based on values the United States prizes most highly.

Another is his interest in limiting the role of the United States as arms supplier to the

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<sup>1</sup> The complete transcript of the hearings will be published by the committee and will be available from the Superintendent of Documents, U.S. Government Printing Office, Washington, D.C. 20402.



world and changing the thrust of our policies to the promotion of disarmament.

In the region for which I have responsibility for U.S. foreign relations, this means the United States will strongly support local initiatives seeking to lessen the burden of armaments. We would hope that flowing from such initiatives will come a reduction of tensions and the strengthening of stability which has allowed the countries of Latin America to pursue their affairs at peace with one another. A specific case is our support for the Declaration of Ayacucho, signed in December 1974 by the Andean states plus Argentina and Panama. The intent of the signatories is to arrive at arrangements that restrict the acquisition of offensive weapons.

We have more traditional interests in the region that engage our diplomatic energies. None could be classed as strategic concerns that are vital to the safety and well-being of the United States. Yet there are latent security interests which must be attended with some care, among them the Panama Canal and its approaches, our lines of communication in the Caribbean, and the maintenance of important sealanes in the region.

There is, finally, the range of economic interests we have in maintaining access to Latin American and Caribbean raw materials, our position in the foreign trade of the region, and the promotion and protection of extensive investments of the American private sector.

In this brief review of our political-military relations in the hemisphere, I would like to take this opportunity to put our security assistance programs into some perspective.

Ten or fifteen years ago, the United States was the principal source of armaments for the countries of the region. From the middle to the late 1960's, however, that relationship began to change radically, so that today we rank fourth or even fifth as the area's arms supplier. In fiscal year 1975, for example, new orders under our FMS [foreign military sales] program for Latin

America totaled \$174.9 million. In fiscal year 1976, a five-quarter year, they were under \$100 million. We do not have figures for the current fiscal year, of course. The Carter Administration's request for new FMS credit financing for fiscal year 1978 is \$140.5 million for the region as a whole. I would expect actual new orders to fall far short of this in fiscal year 1978.

The U.S. share of the total Latin American market for the past two years has been under 15 percent. Of what we did sell in that period, only about 25 percent went for major items such as aircraft, ships, weapons, ammunition, and the like. The balance is for spare parts, supporting noncombat equipment, and supporting services including training.

A number of factors have contributed to this tailing-off in our arms transfers to the region in recent years. One that is important, but which is frequently overlooked, is our restrictive transfer policy of limiting the sophistication and quantities of armaments that we will permit to be sold in Latin America, particularly to the smaller and poorer countries.

However, even for the larger and richer countries, we refuse to sell aircraft more advanced than the F-5 and A-4 level of sophistication. We also deny the sale of certain advanced-technology weapons—smart bombs, laser-guided missiles—unconventional munitions like napalm and flame-throwers, and major combatant naval vessels. Other munitions not prohibited by regional policy are still denied in some cases; these include certain short-range tactical missiles.

Imposing limits of this kind often is widely seen in Latin America as arbitrary and patronizing, particularly with the larger countries which today have significant arms-manufacturing capabilities of their own. In any case, most governments in the area have developed important arms relationships with Western Europe, Israel, and the Soviet Union. In a real sense, our restrictive policies have been an incentive for the Latin American military to turn to these suppliers, even though in many cases

## **Fifth-Year Review of Great Lakes Water Quality Agreement Begins**

### *Joint U.S.-Canadian Statement*

Press release 177 dated April 14

we know they would have preferred to deal with American suppliers.

Recent actions by five governments rejecting fiscal year 1978 security assistance underscore the independence of Latin America in this and other fields. Their sharp reaction to our surveys of human rights practices in their countries, stipulated by section 502B of the Foreign Assistance Act, reflected their deep attachment to the principles of sovereignty and noninterference in internal affairs.

Quite apart from the requirements of the law for future security assistance programs, President Carter, as I said at the outset, has made it clear he believes that human rights considerations are a matter of proper international concern. The governments of Latin America know this.

As we look at the wide scope of our interests and concerns in the region, we face an important question: How do we, working together with these governments, find ways of achieving improvements in the way the people of this hemisphere are treated? It is not a black-or-white proposition but, rather, a complex question which must be approached with great sensitivity.

We submit that wholesale elimination or even substantial reduction of our security assistance programs in Latin America would be inadvisable. Such an abrupt approach now, after maintaining political-military relationships with these governments dating back to and beyond the Second World War, would produce widespread resentment and alienation. We cannot predict the results of such an approach—whether it might produce improvements in the human rights situation in these countries or, paradoxically, bring about even worse conditions.

We hope therefore that the executive branch will be allowed leeway to work with the military in Latin America, using the traditional tools of a relatively modest security assistance program to take advantage of whatever opportunities we might have to advance the cause of human rights and our other real interests in the hemisphere. That remains the central issue.

Senior Canadian and United States officials met in Washington on April 13 to begin the joint review of progress made since 1972 under the terms of the Great Lakes Water Quality Agreement. The Agreement was designed to enable the two countries to undertake a coordinated effort to clean up and preserve the Great Lakes. Article IX of the Agreement stipulates that the two countries jointly review the effectiveness of programs carried out under terms of the accord during the first five years of its operation. The Canadian delegation consisted of representatives of the Federal Government and the Provinces of Ontario and Quebec.

Since 1972 substantial progress has been made under the Agreement. Many of the remedial programs are working well, but much remains to be done. The review will entail an indepth assessment of all of the measures undertaken by the two countries to restore the lakes and keep them healthy. It is anticipated that the review will be completed before the end of the year.

Over the next several months, meetings with the public in Great Lakes communities will be held on both sides of the border. Those meetings, the results of the comprehensive review by the Governments and the work already undertaken by the International Joint Commission, will enable the two countries to determine how they may reaffirm their continuing commitment to the objectives of the Agreement and respond to various proposals to strengthen the Agreement to meet new water quality issues.

President Carter and Prime Minister Trudeau, in their meeting last February, emphasized the importance they attach to the Great Lakes Water Quality Agreement.

## Strengthening the Public Law 480 Food Aid Program

*Following is a statement by John A. Ferch, Director of the Office of Food Policy and Programs, submitted to the Subcommittee on Foreign Agricultural Policy of the Senate Committee on Agriculture, Nutrition, and Forestry on April 5.<sup>1</sup>*

I would like to speak about the future of the Public Law 480 program. I believe we can be proud of the past. The food aid activities of the United States since World War II, I believe, have been a major contribution to the welfare of all mankind. We must now, however, look to the future. Will there be a need for P.L. 480 over the next 10 years, and if so, how should we structure its provisions? I believe there will be such a need. Our ultimate objective, to be sure, is a world in which U.S. food assistance is no longer necessary. However, we are still far from that situation. The food deficits of many developing countries are large and growing worse. P.L. 480 is more vital to them than ever.

I therefore believe that the P.L. 480 program should be continued and strengthened. The latter objective can be furthered in several ways:

—First, by gradually increasing the portion of food aid which we give for humanitarian purposes under title II.

—Second, by improving the development focus of our P.L. 480 programs.

—Third, by continuing the market development and foreign policy uses of P.L. 480 which have served our country so well in the past.

I leave it to representatives from the Department of Agriculture to speak to the role of P.L. 480 in furthering domestic agricultural and market development purposes. I will address myself to its international aspects, which can be divided into humanitarian, developmental, and foreign policy considerations. I also will offer a few remarks about P.L. 480 legislation and attempt to relate P.L. 480 to our emerging North-South policy.

The title II humanitarian food aid program reflects the desire of the American people to see hunger, malnutrition, and suffering alleviated throughout the world. The program, which should be continued and strengthened in the years ahead, serves several important purposes. Title II food aid, through our management control system, can be targeted to the highest priority and neediest groups in recipient countries. Title II is the major U.S. emergency food aid response for victims of natural and manmade disasters. It also is our principal source of supply for world food projects operated by the World Food Program, UNICEF [United Nations Children's Fund], and other U.N. bodies. We look to the United Nations to continue to guide this aspect of multilateral assistance, and we ourselves will maintain a generous contribution.

As title II programs evolve in the years ahead, I believe we should emphasize projects with a maximum development linkage. While helping to feed hungry and needy individuals, U.S. food programs also should help them to grow food and better provide for themselves.

This brings me to the broader issue of food aid and its contribution to development. American food assistance over the past 20

<sup>1</sup> The complete transcript of the hearings will be published by the committee and will be available from the Superintendent of Documents, U.S. Government Printing Office, Washington, D.C. 20402.

years has contributed significantly to the well-being and development of many Third World countries by combating hunger and maintaining minimum health levels. Productivity and income levels have been raised. In addition, provision of P.L. 480 products has eased balance-of-payments constraints. Their sale in the local market has supplemented limited budgets and thereby permitted many governments to direct a greater portion of their scarce resources toward development activities.

Notwithstanding such achievements, donor governments have been under attack in recent years for failing to establish a more direct relationship between their food aid and recipient countries' economic and social needs. It has been alleged that food aid has, on occasion, actually hindered development by depressing local food prices and thereby serving as a disincentive to local food production. Also, some argue that it has permitted recipient governments to postpone policy reform necessary to stimulate agricultural development.

Although I believe that the evidence of actual situations in which P.L. 480 has had an adverse development impact is quite slim, I recognize the theoretical basis of the argument. Accordingly, the Administration supports without reservation efforts to make the P.L. 480 program contribute more directly to the economic development of recipient countries. Food aid is a particularly versatile means of supporting development programs since either it can be made available in kind to those sectors of the population engaged in the programs, or through sale in the commercial markets of the country, it can provide the financing necessary to sustain more sophisticated aspects of the development plan.

### **Importance of Multi-Year Commitments**

If we are to more strongly support long-term development objectives with our P.L. 480 programs, we need to be able to negotiate long-term multi-year food aid commitments. Several proposals have been made along these lines, which we wish to

review carefully. Long-term commitments can help us assure that P.L. 480 programs foster and contribute to agricultural production and do not act as a disincentive. Stable and assured U.S. food aid supplies over a period of several years would facilitate development planning and would enable countries to undertake more far-reaching agricultural reform programs. P.L. 480 commodities provided in support of a development plan also can be more readily directed toward the poorest sectors of society.

In the past, P.L. 480 often has been treated as a variable by the United States. That is, commodities are made available for the program only when the Secretary of Agriculture determines that domestic requirements, carryover, and commercial export needs have been met. These are valid concerns, but the Secretary should be given some flexibility to assure that P.L. 480 commodities can be continued for multi-year commitments or for emergency situations. Inclusion of new authority along these lines in new P.L. 480 legislation, as proposed by Secretary of Agriculture [Bob S.] Bergland, would help to insure that the sharp cutbacks in volume which occurred in our P.L. 480 programs in 1973 and 1974 during years of tight supply would not be repeated.

In this connection, I believe it would be useful to examine the desirability of a small P.L. 480 reserve which could provide further assurance that multi-year commitments could be met and would help to stabilize P.L. 480 programing levels during years of short domestic supply.

The question of how much P.L. 480 should be directed to multi-year developmental programs at this time is difficult to assess. Unfortunately, few Third World governments today are undertaking the comprehensive agricultural development programs of the type I describe above. We estimate that the amount currently made available for "grant back" will more than adequately accommodate our needs for multi-year development programing in the years immediately ahead.

Turning now to my third point, I recognize that the foreign policy aspect of P.L. 480 often is spoken of as a misuse of the food aid program. I do not agree. I believe the authors of Public Law 480 were wise when they wrote into its preamble that among other things the program should be used "to promote in other ways the foreign policy of the United States." Most often people criticize using P.L. 480 assistance for foreign policy purposes when they disagree with the particular foreign policy goal being pursued. It is certainly valid to discuss the desirability of our various policies or even the efficacy of using P.L. 480 to help to achieve them, but it is not very realistic to suggest that P.L. 480 is somehow tainted by such use. If by use of the P.L. 480 program we can make some contribution to the prospect for peace in the Middle East, help to resolve the situation in southern Africa, assist Portugal's evolution into a prosperous European democratic nation, or make some other contribution to our overall foreign policy, we should do so.

In a sense, of course, division of the international aspects of P.L. 480 into separate categories is misleading. Almost every program has aspects of all three—humanitarian, developmental, and political—intertwined in it. Which is the major motivation or result in any particular program could be, and often is, argued. In any case, though we should be sure that any program is justified on economic and humanitarian grounds, we should not regard those inspired mainly by foreign policy considerations as in any way undesirable. In terms of priority, I believe we should continue to give first emphasis to those programs predicated mainly on humanitarian and developmental considerations. This is fundamental to the philosophy which inspires our food aid programs.

In discussing the foreign policy aspects of P.L. 480, I believe it would be appropriate to refer briefly to the question of human rights. It is not necessary for me to emphasize to you the Administration's con-

cern for human rights throughout the world. President Carter and Secretary Vance, by their actions and words, have done so already. The Administration already has made plain that human rights considerations will be taken into account in all aspects of our foreign affairs. I can assure you that they also will be considered fully in the administration of the P.L. 480 program.

Both Congress and the executive have made a distinction in the application of human rights criteria to various forms of international assistance between those forms of aid which are of direct benefit to the people and those which mainly assist the government apparatus and only indirectly affect the people. P.L. 480, both title I and title II, is in almost every instance of direct benefit to the people of a country. Either they receive food free, or the supply of food which they can purchase is expanded. I think this is an important consideration.

### Extension and Amendment of the Legislation

Let me turn now to P.L. 480 legislation and make a few comments which I believe are important.

Secretary Bergland indicated in his testimony that the Administration supports a four-year extension of the law and I want to explain the rationale for that request. A four-year extension is necessary if we are going to begin to negotiate the type of multi-year development-oriented food aid programs I have discussed above. It would help to integrate food aid into our emerging North-South strategy and would signal both recipient developing countries and other food aid donors that the United States intends to work seriously toward the food aid goals agreed to at the World Food Conference of 1974. I believe a four-year extension would be consistent with Congress' own desire to make our food aid both more supportive of long-term development efforts in food-deficit countries and responsive to their immediate and growing food needs. Finally, it would permit the United States to participate in renegotiation of the Food Aid Convention, which expires in June 1978.

Our failure to participate would lead to the collapse of the convention, thereby undermining progress made at, and since, the World Food Conference to (1) make food aid a more universal responsibility and (2) rationalize the allocation of food aid.

I also strongly support the Administration's proposed amendment of section 111 of the law, which provides that at least 75 percent of title I programs be directed to countries with per capita GNP [gross national product] under \$300. We propose to use the IDA [International Development Association] poverty criterion—currently \$520 per capita—to replace the \$300 per capita GNP figure because the latter has caused programing difficulties this year which will become worse in 1978.

Let me explain in more detail what I mean.

In fiscal year 1977, the food aid requirements of a number of countries in the Indian Subcontinent will be less than anticipated in the initial allocations table which the Administration sent to Congress in September 1976. Our first priority has been to use this shortfall to increase programs for other countries in the 75 percent category. We have had some success in doing this, but there are limits to the number of countries in the under-\$300 category which might be suitable candidates for title I food assistance.

Meanwhile, we have received a number of food aid requests from countries in the 25 percent category. Our general policy has been to keep these requests under review until we can more accurately assess the future food aid requirements this year of countries in the 75 percent category. If we cannot effectively reprogram food aid to countries in the 75 percent category, we will then begin to act on new and expanded programs for countries in the 25 percent category. The Administration is likely to make a judgment on this in the spring. Congress will be informed.

Next year our programing situation will become even more complicated under the 75/25 provision. One of largest food aid recipients, Egypt, is expected to cross the \$300 per capita line, and other food aid re-

cipients, or potential food aid recipients, may do so also. To maintain a large program for Egypt and still meet the 75/25 requirements in these circumstances would require substantial reprograming to other countries in the 75 percent category and a very sharp cutback in the already limited food resources available for the 25 percent countries. In fact, the cutback to the 25 percent countries would be so sharp that we would have little or no food aid left for programing to other countries. Clearly this situation would be highly undesirable.

### **Relations With the Developing Countries**

Before concluding, I would like to underscore the importance of P.L. 480 in the broader context of our relations with the developing countries. As you are all aware, the developing countries as a group criticize the structure of their relations with the developed countries and demand change. Food aid has not been exempt from such criticism. While much of it has been emotional and ill founded, on certain points we must accept the merits of the argument. This is especially true with regard to our previous inability to commit food aid to multi-year programs.

The food problems of many developing countries in the years immediately ahead are projected to reach very significant magnitudes for many reasons. P.L. 480 alone cannot meet those projected food needs. For this reason, our policy has been patterned on the conclusions of the World Food Conference of 1974. That is, food production in Third World food-deficit countries must be increased and world food trade liberalized in order to maximize world production, and world food security should be enhanced through an international system of nationally held grain reserves. We address the first point through the AID [Agency for International Development] program, the second through our stance in the trade negotiations in Geneva, and the third through our proposals at the International Wheat Council.

At this time I would like to stress the complementarity of food aid and international grain reserves. Under normal

circumstances even food-deficit countries can afford to meet a portion of their food needs through commercial imports. However, in 1973 and 1974 many Third World purchasers were forced to devote a significant portion of their earnings to food imports when grain prices increased sharply. An international system of grain reserves would moderate the price increases and would make available additional grain for commercial sales during low production years. Such a system thus would hold the need for food aid to a minimum. It also would have positive budgetary implications for both developed and developing countries.

For an international system of reserves to function smoothly, however, it must treat the world market for grains as a whole and not attempt to deal directly with the food needs of the Third World market. Only in this way can reserves dampen the price cycle. With your support, the Administration intends to continue both to press for the adoption of an international system of grain reserves and to increase the funding of its food aid programs.

In summary, I strongly support the extension of the P.L. 480 Act. P.L. 480 has been one of the real successes among the programs begun by this nation in the wake of the Second World War. It can be improved, however, and I am confident that an even better law will emerge from Congress this year.

## TREATY INFORMATION

### Current Actions

#### MULTILATERAL

##### Agriculture

Agreement establishing the International Fund for Agricultural Development (IFAD). Done at Rome June 13, 1976.<sup>1</sup>

*Signatures:* United Kingdom, January 7, 1977; Uruguay, April 5, 1977.

*Ratification deposited:* Philippines, April 4, 1977.

##### Antarctica

Recommendations relating to the furtherance of the principles and objectives of the Antarctic treaty of December 1, 1959 (TIAS 4780). Adopted at Oslo June 20, 1975.<sup>1</sup>

*Notification of approval:* United States, April 8, 1977, for recommendations VIII-3, VIII-4, and VIII-6 through VIII-14; VIII-1, VIII-2, and VIII-5 accepted as interim guidelines.

##### Atomic Energy

Protocol prolonging the agreement of April 4, 1975 (TIAS 8051), for the application of safeguards by the International Atomic Energy Agency to the bilateral agreement between the United States and Israel of July 12, 1955, as amended (TIAS 3311, 4407, 4507, 5079, 5723, 5909, 6091, 8019), for cooperation concerning civil uses of atomic energy. Signed at Vienna April 7, 1977. Entered into force April 7, 1977.

*Signatures:* International Atomic Energy Agency, Israel, United States.

##### Coffee

International coffee agreement 1976, with annexes. Done at London December 3, 1975. Entered into force October 1, 1976, provisionally.

*Ratification deposited:* Tanzania, April 4, 1977.

##### Gas

Protocol for the prohibition of the use in war of asphyxiating, poisonous or other gases, and of bacteriological methods of warfare. Done at Geneva June 17, 1925. Entered into force February 8, 1928; for the United States April 10, 1975. TIAS 8061.

*Accession deposited:* Jordan, January 20, 1977.<sup>2</sup>

##### Maritime Matters

Amendments to the convention of March 6, 1948, as amended, on the Intergovernmental Maritime Consultative Organization (TIAS 4044, 6285, 6490). Adopted at London October 17, 1974.<sup>1</sup>

*Acceptance deposited:* Guinea, April 1, 1977.

##### Phonograms

Convention for the protection of producers of phonograms against unauthorized duplication of their phonograms. Done at Geneva October 29, 1971. Entered into force April 18, 1973; for the United States March 10, 1974. TIAS 7808.

*Ratification deposited:* Holy See, April 4, 1977.

#### BILATERAL

##### Canada

Agreement relating to the establishment of an experimental Loran-C power chain in the vicinity of the St. Marys River, Michigan-Ontario, with annex. Effected by exchange of notes at Washington March 29, 1977. Entered into force March 29, 1977, effective August 1, 1975.

##### Colombia

Agreement continuing in effect safeguards and guarantee provisions of the agreement of April 9, 1962, as

<sup>1</sup> Not in force.

<sup>2</sup> With reservation.

amended (TIAS 5330, 6943), for civil uses of atomic energy. Effected by exchange of notes at Bogota March 28, 1977. Entered into force March 28, 1977.

### Israel

Agreement continuing in effect safeguards and guarantee provisions of the agreement of July 12, 1955, as amended, including associated understandings (TIAS 3311, 4407, 4507, 5079, 5723, 5909, 6091, 8019), for civil uses of atomic energy. Effected by exchange of notes at Washington April 7 and 8, 1977. Entered into force April 8, 1977.

### Portugal

Loan agreement relating to housing for low-income families, with annex. Signed at Lisbon March 4, 1977. Entered into force March 4, 1977.

## PUBLICATIONS

### GPO Sales Publications

*Publications may be ordered by catalog or stock number from the Superintendent of Documents, U.S. Government Printing Office, Washington, D.C. 20402. A 25-percent discount is made on orders for 100 or more copies of any one publication mailed to the same address. Remittances, payable to the Superintendent of Documents, must accompany orders. Prices shown below, which include domestic postage, are subject to change.*

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Jamaica .....	Cat. No. S1.123:J22	Pub. 8080	4 pp.
Mauritius .....	Cat. No. S1.123:M44	Pub. 8023	4 pp.
Senegal .....	Cat. No. S1.123:SE5	Pub. 7820	4 pp.
Syria .....	Cat. No. S1.123:SY8	Pub. 7761	8 pp.

**Hurricane Rural Reconstruction and Recovery.** Agreement with Honduras. TIAS 8366. 50 pp. 70¢. (Cat. No. S9.10:8366).

**Agricultural Commodities.** Agreement with Korea amending the agreement of February 18, 1976, as amended. TIAS 8380. 4 pp. 35¢. (Cat. No. S9.10:8380).

**Inter-American Development Bank.** Amendments to the agreement of April 8, 1959, as amended. Washington, June 1, 1976. TIAS 8383. 155 pp. \$2.20. (Cat. No. S9.10:8383).

**Oil Pollution.** Agreement with Bermuda. TIAS 8396. 4 pp. 35¢. (Cat. No. S9.10:8396).

**Agricultural Commodities.** Agreement with Egypt. TIAS 8406. 5 pp. 35¢. (Cat. No. S9.10:8406).

**Certificates of Airworthiness for Imported Aircraft Products.** Agreement with the Polish People's Republic. TIAS 8407. 10 pp. 35¢. (Cat. No. S9.10:8407).

**Collecting and Conserving Water Supplies From Surface Runoff.** Agreement with Abu Dhabi. TIAS 8408. 26 pp. 45¢. (Cat. No. S9.10:8408).

**Conservation of Polar Bears.** Agreement with other governments. TIAS 8409. 15 pp. 35¢. (Cat. No. S9.10:8409).

**Trade in Cotton Textiles.** Agreement with El Salvador terminating the agreement of April 19, 1972, as amended. TIAS 8410. 4 pp. 35¢. (Cat. No. S9.10:8410).

**Narcotic Drugs—Additional Equipment, Material and Technical Support to Curb Illegal Traffic.** Agreement with Mexico. TIAS 8411. 7 pp. 35¢. (Cat. No. S9.10:8411).

**Frequency Modulation Broadcasting.** Agreement with Mexico amending the agreement of November 9, 1972, as amended. TIAS 8412. 5 pp. 35¢. (Cat. No. S9.10:8412).

**Organization of American States Convention on Terrorism.** Convention with other governments. TIAS 8413. 34 pp. 45¢. (Cat. No. S9.10:8413).

**Telecommunications—Facilities of Radio Ceylon.** Agreement with Sri Lanka extending the agreement of May 12 and 14, 1951, as amended and extended. TIAS 8414. 3 pp. 35¢. (Cat. No. S9.10:8414).

**Alien Amateur Radio Operators.** Agreement with the Philippines. TIAS 8415. 3 pp. 35¢. (Cat. No. S9.10:8415).

**Earthquake Assistance.** Agreement with Italy. TIAS 8416. 5 pp. 35¢. (Cat. No. S9.10:8416).

**Claims—Marcona Mining Company.** Agreement with Peru. TIAS 8417. 6 pp. 35¢. (Cat. No. S9.10:8417).

**Military Assistance—Eligibility Requirements Pursuant to the Foreign Assistance Act of 1973 and the International Security Assistance and Arms Export Control Act of 1976.** Agreement with Greece. TIAS 8418. 7 pp. 35¢. (Cat. No. S9.10:8418).

**Military Assistance—Eligibility Requirements Pursuant to the International Security Assistance and Arms Export Control Act of 1976.** Agreement with Indonesia. TIAS 8419. 3 pp. 35¢. (Cat. No. S9.10:8419).

**Military Assistance—Eligibility Requirements Pursuant to the International Security Assistance and Arms Export Control Act of 1976.** Agreement with Ecuador. TIAS 8420. 4 pp. 35¢. (Cat. No. S9.10:8420).



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No.	Date	Subject
174	4/11	Shipping Coordinating Committee (SCC), Subcommittee on Safety of Life at Sea (SOLAS), working group on bulk chemicals, May 18.
175	4-13	SCC, SOLAS, working group on ship design and equipment, May 10.
176	4-13	Barbara M. Watson sworn in as Administrator of the Bureau of Security and Consular Affairs (biographic data).
177	4/14	Fifth-year review of Great Lakes Water Quality Agreement begins.
178	4/14	Charles William Maynes sworn in as Assistant Secretary for International Organization Affairs (biographic data).
179	4-14	James F. Leonard sworn in as Deputy Representative to the United Nations (biographic data).
180	4-14	Donald F. McHenry sworn in as Deputy Representative in the U.N. Security Council (biographic data).
181	4-15	International social workers program begins Apr. 25.

Not printed.

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# THE DEPARTMENT OF STATE BULLETIN

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*The BULLETIN includes selected press releases on foreign policy, issued by the White House and the Department, and statements, addresses, and news conferences of the President and the Secretary of State and other officers of the Department, as well as special articles on various phases of international affairs and the functions of the Department. Information is included concerning treaties and international agreements to which the United States is or may become a party and on treaties of general international interest.*

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## President Carter's Pan American Day Address <sup>1</sup>

Hace tres años, tuve el honor y placer de hablar ante la Asamblea General de la OEA celebrada en mi estado de Georgia. Igual que en Atlanta, hoy seguiré el consejo de mis compañeros, que opinan—para el beneficio de buenas relaciones—sería mejor que no hablara en español hoy.

[Three years ago I had the honor and pleasure of speaking before the General Assembly of the OAS held in my State of Georgia. As I did then in Atlanta, I will today follow the advice of my friends, who have the opinion that—in the interest of good relations—it would be better for me not to speak in Spanish today.]

Since I can also speak English, I will shift to that language.

That day in Atlanta three years ago, I shared with you some of the thoughts that my wife and I had brought back from our visits to several of the American states. I spoke particularly for the need for constant cooperation, consultation, and harmony among the nations of this hemisphere. I believe that just as strongly today as President of the United States as I did three years ago as Governor of Georgia.

I am delighted to be with you in this beautiful House of the Americas. For nearly three decades the OAS has stood for mutual respect among sovereign nations for peace and the rule of law in this hemisphere. The OAS Charter pledges us to individual liberty and social justice. I come here now to restate our own commitment to these goals.

The challenge before us today, however, is not just to reaffirm those principles but to

find ways to make them a reality. To do this, we must take account of the changes in our relationships that have taken place over the last 10 years, and we must candidly acknowledge the differences that exist among us. We must adapt our current policies and institutions to those changes so that we can pursue our goals more effectively.

As nations of the New World, we once believed that we would prosper in isolation from the Old World. But since the Second World War in particular, all of us have taken such vital roles in the world community that isolation would now be harmful to our own best interests and to other countries. Our joining in the International Monetary Fund, the World Bank, and the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade are all signs that we understand this. So is the United Nations Conference on Trade and Development, which Raúl Prebisch of Argentina made into an important forum of the developing world. Venezuela is now cochairing the Paris Conference on International Economic Cooperation. The United Nations Economic Commission for Latin America is a source of many creative ideas on development throughout the world. The leaders of many Latin American nations have been the driving force behind improving North-South negotiations.

In all these ways, the nations of Latin America were among the first in our changing world to see the importance of adapting global institutions to the new realities of our day.

The problems and the promises of our region have become as diverse as the world itself. The economies of most Latin American nations have been developing rapidly, although of course at different rates. Some

<sup>1</sup> Made before the Permanent Council of the Organization of American States at the Pan American Union at Washington, D.C., on Apr. 14 (text from Weekly Compilation of Presidential Documents dated Apr. 18).

have an impressive rate of growth. Some, a few, are among the poorest in the developing world. Some have abundant energy resources; others are desperately short of energy. Some of our countries export primary products only. Some have become major exporters of advanced manufactured goods, while others export little at all. Your problems of market access, technology transfer, and debt management sometimes defy regional solutions.

In addition to economic diversity, we have all developed widely varied forms and philosophies of government. This diversity has brought national pride and national strength. And as you've played more independent and important roles in world politics, we have all begun to construct more normal and more balanced and more equal relationships.

### **Basic Elements of New Approach**

In the light of these changes, a single U.S. policy toward Latin America and the Caribbean makes little sense. What we need is a wider and a more flexible approach, worked out in close consultation with you. Together, we will develop policies more suited to each nation's variety and potential. In this process, I will be particularly concerned that we not seek to divide the nations of Latin America one from another or to set Latin America apart from the rest of the world. Our own goal is to address problems in a way which will lead to productive solutions—globally, regionally, and bilaterally.

Our new approach will be based on three basic elements:

First of all is a high regard for the individuality and the sovereignty of each Latin American and Caribbean nation. We will not act abroad in ways that we would not tolerate at home in our own country.

Second is our respect for human rights, a respect which is also so much a part of your own tradition. Our values and yours require us to combat abuses of individual freedom, including those caused by political, social, and economic injustice. Our own concern for

these values will naturally influence our relations with the countries of this hemisphere and throughout the world. You will find this country, the United States of America, eager to stand beside those nations which respect human rights and which promote democratic ideals.

Third is our desire to press forward on the great issues which affect the relations between the developed and the developing nations. Your economic problems are also global in character and cannot be dealt with solely on regional terms.

However, some of our own global policies are of particular interest to other American states. When major decisions are made in these areas, we will consult with you.

—The United States will take a positive and an open attitude toward the negotiation of agreements to stabilize commodity prices, including the establishment of a common funding arrangement for financing buffer stocks where they are a part of individual and negotiated agreements.

—We will actively pursue the multilateral trade negotiations with your governments in Geneva, Switzerland. We are committed to minimize trade restrictions and to take into account the specific trade problems of developing countries and to provide special and more favorable treatment where feasible and appropriate. We believe that this is in our mutual interest and that it will create important new opportunities for Latin American trade.

—Our own science and technology can be useful to many of your countries. For instance, we are ready to train your technicians to use more information gathered by our own satellites, so that you can make better judgments on management of your resources and your environment. Space communications technology can also be a creative tool in helping your national television systems to promote your educational and cultural objectives.

—I have asked Congress to meet in full our pledges to the Inter-American Development Bank and the other multilateral lending institutions which loan a high

proportion of their capital to the relatively advanced developing countries of Latin America.

—And finally, we are directing more and more of our bilateral economic assistance to the poorer countries. We are also prepared to explore with other nations new ways of being helpful on a wide range of institutional, human development, and technological approaches which might enable them to deal more effectively with the problems of the needy. All of us have a special responsibility to help the poorest countries in the world as well as the poorest people in each of our countries.

I would like to add a word about private investment. Your governments are understandably interested in setting rules that will encourage private investors to play an important role in your development. We support your efforts and recognize that a new flexibility and adaptability are required today for foreign investment to be most useful in combining technology, capital management, and market experience to meet your development needs. We will do our part in this field to avoid differences and misunderstandings between your governments and ours.

### **Global and Regional Challenges**

One of the most significant political trends of our time is the relationship between the developing nations of the world and the industrialized countries. We benefit from your advice and counsel, and we count on you to contribute your constructive leadership and help guide us in this North-South dialogue.

We also hope to work with all nations to halt the spread of nuclear explosive capabilities. The states of Latin America took the initiative 10 years ago when you set up the first nuclear-free zone in any populated area of the world. The Treaty of Tlatelolco is a model worthy of our own admiration. For our part the United States will sign, and I will ask the Senate to ratify, protocol I of the treaty prohibiting the placement of nuclear weapons in Latin America.

However, banning the spread of nuclear explosives does not require giving up the benefits of peaceful nuclear technology. We mean to work closely with all of you on new technologies to use the atom for peaceful purposes.

To slow the costly buildup of conventional arms, we are seeking global policies of restraint. We are showing restraint in our own policies around the world, and we will be talking to supplier nations and to prospective buyers about ways to work out a common approach. We also believe that regional agreements among producers and purchasers of arms can further such a global effort.

I spent most of this morning working on a new U.S. policy to reduce the sale of conventional arms around the world. Again, you in Latin America have taken the lead. The pledge of eight South American nations to limit the acquisition of offensive arms in their region is a striking example. If the eight nations can implement their pledge, their own people will not be the only ones to benefit. They will have set a standard for others throughout the world to follow.

These are challenges that face us in the future. There are also problems that plague us from the past. And we must work together to solve them.

One that addresses itself to us is the Panama Canal. In the first days of my own Administration, just a few weeks ago, I directed a new approach to our negotiations with Panama on a new canal treaty. In the light of the changes which I discussed before, the treaty of 1903, which combines [defines] our relationship with Panama on the canal, is no longer appropriate or effective.

I am firmly committed to negotiating in as timely a fashion as possible a new treaty which will take into account Panama's legitimate needs as a sovereign nation and our own interests and yours in the efficient operation of a neutral canal open on a non-discriminatory basis to all users.

Another problem which we must in a way address together is that of Cuba. We believe that normal conduct of international affairs

and particularly the negotiation of differences require communication with all countries in the world. To these ends, we are seeking to determine whether relations with Cuba can be improved on a measured and a reciprocal basis.

I am dedicated to freedom of movement between nations. I have removed restrictions on U.S. citizens who want to travel abroad. Today there are no restrictions imposed by our country. Today I have also removed similar travel restrictions on resident aliens in the United States.

We seek to encourage international travel, and we must take greater account of problems that transcend national borders. Drugs and international crime, including terrorism, challenge traditional concepts of diplomacy. For the well-being of our peoples, we must cooperate on these issues. With each passing year they will occupy a more and more central place in our deliberations.

#### **Constructive Role of the OAS**

I have a longstanding interest in the OAS, and I very much want to see it play an increasingly constructive role.

The General Assembly of the OAS has been an important forum for the direct exchange of views among our governments. Such ministerial consultations are extremely useful. They allow us to apply our own collective strength to political and economic problems.

The Inter-American Commission on Human Rights has performed valuable services. It deserves increased support from all our governments. We believe deeply in the preservation and the enhancement of human rights, and the United States will work toward coordinated and multilateral action in this field. The United States will sign, and I will seek Senate approval of, the American Convention on Human Rights negotiated several years ago in Costa Rica. And we will support, in cooperation with international agencies, broadened programs for aiding political refugees. I urge this organization

and all its member states to take a more active role in the care, protection, and the resettlement of political refugees.

The peacekeeping function is firmly embedded in the OAS Charter. I want to encourage the Secretary General of the OAS to continue his active and effective involvement in the search for peaceable solutions to several longstanding disputes in this hemisphere. The United States will support his efforts and initiatives.

The OAS, of course, is not the only instrument of cooperation among the nations of the Americas. The Inter-American Development Bank is among the most important multilateral mechanisms for promoting development of the world today. By bringing in nations outside the Western Hemisphere, the IDB bears testimony to Latin America's growing involvement with the rest of the world.

Within this hemisphere, many of you are working toward regional and subregional integration efforts, including those in the Caribbean, in the Central American Common Market, and the Andean Pact; and we favor such efforts. They are the first steps toward Bolívar's vision of a hemisphere united.

Let me conclude by bringing up a matter that is particularly close to me because of my long interest in inter-American affairs. My wife and I have traveled and made many friends in Mexico and Brazil, the two largest and most rapidly changing countries in Latin America. And we have traveled elsewhere and made many friends in Central and South America. My wife is presently studying Spanish, along with the wife of the Secretary of State, and I have tried to keep up with my own Spanish that I learned at school. I have seen clearly how greatly our country has been blessed and enriched by the people and cultures of the Caribbean and Latin America. And we are bound together—and I see it very clearly—in culture, history, and by common purposes and ideals.

The United States actually has the fourth largest Spanish-speaking population in the



## President Carter's News Conference of April 15

*Following are excerpts relating to foreign policy from the transcript of a news conference held by President Carter on April 15.<sup>1</sup>*

world. I tried to meet many of them during my campaign the last two years. And they gave me their support and their encouragement and their advice. The novels we read, the music we hear, the sports that we play—all reflect a growing consciousness of each other.

These intellectual, social, cultural, and educational exchanges will continue, either with or without government help. But there are steps that governments can take to speed up and enhance this process. In the months ahead, therefore, we plan to explore with your governments—individually and here in the OAS—new people-to-people programs, an increase in professional and scientific exchanges, and other ways of strengthening the ties that already link us.

The challenge we face is to awake our institutions to a changing world. We must focus our attention on the problems which face our countries and tailor each solution to its problem.

As you know, I am a new President. I've got a lot to learn. My heart and my interest to a major degree is in Latin America. I welcome every opportunity to strengthen the ties of friendship and a sense of common purpose and close consultation with the nations and the peoples of the Caribbean and Latin America.

Many of you are leaders representing your own governments. I ask for your advice and your counsel and your support as we face problems together in the future. This means a lot to our country, and it means a lot to us also to have intimate bilateral and direct relationships with you.

We look on the OAS, headquartered thankfully here in Washington, as a channel through which we might learn more and receive advice and make plans for the future.

Simón Bolívar believed that we would reach our goals only with our peoples free and our governments working in harmony. I hope that the steps that I have outlined today and the commitments that I have made will move us toward those goals of peace and freedom.

*Q. Mr. President, in view of the Soviet reaction and your own reassessment so far, do you see any reason to change your SALT proposals? Also, do you see any validity in meeting with Secretary Brezhnev from time to time, starting this year?*

*The President:* I think that the Soviet response has been predictable. I've been somewhat concerned lately that they've decided to go public as much as they have. But I have to say that there is a very important distinction that ought to be drawn between private and determined and continuing negotiations, which are being pursued on the one hand, and the education of the public, the presentation of issues to people in our own country, which has always been the case since I've been in office. And it's very encouraging to know that now Mr. Brezhnev and his other leaders, through Pravda, are explaining the Soviet position to the people of Russia.

So I see nothing wrong with the Soviet leadership giving their arguments and their excuses for not agreeing immediately to our drastic cut proposals to the Soviet people, but I do feel encouraged about it.

As far as the—the other part of your question?

*Q. I asked, did you see any reason to change your proposals and also, do you plan a summit meeting with Brezhnev, and will you be having them from time to time?*

*The President:* I see no reason to change our proposals. We had two, as you remember. One is to ratify the basic agreements of the Vladivostok discussions,

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<sup>1</sup> For the complete transcript, see Weekly Compilation of Presidential Documents dated Apr. 18, 1977, p. 540.

and the other one is a much more drastic reduction in overall weapon capability. I see no reason to change those proposals.

I would welcome a chance to meet with General Secretary Brezhnev on a continuing basis, annually at least, and I hope that later on this year that he and I might meet in our own country. I think it's good, though, not to predicate each meeting with the belief that some dramatic conclusion might be reached or some dramatic agreement might be reached.

I hesitate and am reluctant to work under the pressure of having to come up with an agreement each time. I think it makes too much of an inclination for us to agree to things that might be counterproductive for our own nation's benefit, just in order to have some publicity derived from the agreement itself.

*Q. Mr. President, another question on strategic arms limitations. At least on the public record, which is growing daily, there seems to be a total impasse between the United States and the Soviet Union on the solution to the problem.*

*Now, do you believe that a meeting between you and Mr. Brezhnev could help overcome that impasse? And, more generally, you've been meeting with a lot of leaders. Do you feel that in meeting with foreign leaders you can help change their perception of what is actually in their national interests?*

*The President:* I wouldn't ever expect to change a foreign leader's opinion if he thought it was contrary to his own national interests, no. I have found, though, in my meetings with a number of foreign leaders already to be very helpful to me in understanding their particular perspective in trying to find some common ground on which agreements can be reached.

The Middle East is one of the more notable examples of this. And by the end of May, I intend to have met with all the foreign leaders who will be involved in the Middle Eastern settlement, which we hope to see make progress this year.

I don't consider the SALT talks at this point to have reached an impasse. There are continual discussions going on through normal diplomatic channels. I think that when we reconvene the Secretary-of-State-level discussions in Geneva in just a few weeks, we will have made some basic progress. The 8 or 10 discussion groups that were agreed to jointly by Mr. Brezhnev and Mr. Vance will be put into effect within the next two or three weeks, and a wide range of discussion of strategic arms limitations, the comprehensive test ban, commitment not to destroy one another's satellite observation posts, demilitarization of the Indian Ocean, and so forth, are going to proceed, I hope, with a moderate degree of hope for success. No one can guarantee success, but I'll be doing the best I can, and I'm sure Mr. Brezhnev will also, to find that common ground that will leave our national interest and the Soviet's national interest intact.

*Q. Mr. President, the House, as you know, just recently passed the Harkin amendment to the International Lending Institutions Act of 1977—*

*The President:* Yes, I know.

*Q. —which stipulates that the U.S. representative must vote "no" to countries who violate—loans to countries who violate human rights. Did the Administration actively support—or why didn't the Administration actively support this amendment?*

*The President:* I think the Harkin amendment is a mistake. The Reuss amendment and the Senator Humphrey amendment, which are the same, provide me with an adequate authority to deal with the question of human rights as it relates to international and regional lending institutions.

To have a frozen mandatory prohibition against our nation voting for any loan simply removes my ability to bargain with a foreign leader whom we think might be willing to ease off on the deprivation of human rights. But when the requirement is frozen into law, there is simply no reason for a foreign leader to try to comply.

I think we need to have the flexibility that we proposed. My heart is with the Harkin amendment because I want to do everything I can to assure a maximum amount of human rights commitment around the world. But I think that to give us the authority within the lending institutions to use our best judgment and to negotiate for an easing off of human rights restraints before a loan is made is the best approach to it.

## **Interview With President Carter by Media Representatives April 15**

*Following is an excerpt from the transcript of an interview with President Carter on April 15 by 27 editors, publishers, and broadcasters from 21 states.<sup>1</sup>*

*Q. Mr. President, I am Vince Sanders from the National Black Network, and I would like to know if your Administration has got to the point where it has developed a policy toward Africa that gives you a course of action rather than reaction to trouble spots like Zaire and Rhodesia. Do you have a definitive policy toward Africa as of yet?*

*The President:* We are evolving one. I have spent an awful lot of time on the African question. I don't think I have announced this previously is the reason I am hesitating, but I have asked the Vice President particularly to concentrate on the African question. He has been doing a lot of detailed analysis of each country, its history, background, leadership, and how it relates to its neighbors and so forth. I meet with him frequently. We had a meeting just before lunch on Africa.

I think that we do have a good policy evolving. We have deliberately decided as

part of that policy, though, to let the British Government retain the leadership role for the time being.

On David Owen's present trip, the Foreign Minister of Britain, we authorized him to say that we backed his proposals and that we were prepared to participate for the first time in a Geneva conference, if one could be called.

There are three interrelated items, as you know. One is what to do with Rhodesia. We think the Smith government should step down very shortly and permit majority rule in Rhodesia. My own preference is that the people of that country have a right to vote on who their leader should be.

Obviously, the only country outside Rhodesia which has a major influence on the Smith government is South Africa. And we are maintaining communications with the South African leadership.

The second question, that's related, is what to do about Namibia, or South West Africa. Here we again favor majority rule in Namibia. The United Nations has a major role to play here as do the British in Rhodesia. We have encouraged the South African Government to move expeditiously in releasing that country to its own leadership.

Of course, in South Africa, which has a legally constituted government, what we need there of course is to pursue our own commitment of the ending of apartheid and move eventually toward majority rule.

The difficult question is, you know, how much to push the South African Government and drive them into a corner and to alienate them from us, because to a major degree the South African Government is a stabilizing influence in the southern part of that continent and they have a major role to play in the peaceful resolution of Rhodesia and Namibia.

So I think we do have an evolving policy toward south Africa. David Owen will be back from his tour, having met with many of the African leaders, both black and white. On the 18th of this month, which I think is Monday, he will make his report to the British Cabinet and then make his report to

<sup>1</sup> For the complete transcript, see Weekly Compilation of Presidential Documents dated Apr. 25, 1977, p. 551.

us as well. We get daily communiques from Foreign Minister Owen on this trip.

*Q. The Kissinger plan, it makes provisions for the whites who are there in Rhodesia. And my feeling is that Ian Smith, with the kind of control that he is retaining now, he could more or less implement a peaceful transition that will also provide some reparations for the blacks who are going to be displaced.*

*I think my question is, Will the Kissinger plan be figured in a new conference that the United States will sponsor?*

*The President:* Certain component parts of it. As you know, one of the major questions is who is going to control the army or the military force that exists in Rhodesia. I think that in the past when a so-called reserve fund was set up to compensate white families and others who decided to leave, the reserve funds have not been used—in Kenya and some other countries. These kinds of reserves have been voluntarily contributed by nations. They have never been used, because in the history of those countries—it may be completely different in Rhodesia, of course—the land was simply transferred through routine, open market means.

So the fact that Kissinger did agree, I think with substantial congressional approval, to contribute to a fund to compensate white landowners and others, doesn't mean that we are putting that much money out for good. It just means we agreed back then to contribute our part to a fund that may or may not be used. It is obviously extremely complicated, and we could talk for hours about it.

*Q. On the same subject of Africa, do you agree with Andy Young that the Cuban expeditionary force is a stabilizing influence?*

*The President:* I have called publicly for the Cuban expeditionary force to be withdrawn from Africa. I read the whole text, of course, of Andy's statement, and what he said, I do agree with it. It obviously stabilized the situation. And I think the present Angolan Government under Neto is

likely to stay in power. The Cubans ought to withdraw their forces from Africa.

*Q. Would this be a precondition in the present talks of normalizing relations with Cuba?*

*The President:* I wouldn't say that it would be a precondition to the talks. We are talking to Cuba now for the first time in a number of years.

*Q. Precondition of normalizing relations?*

*The President:* I would rather not say that before we ever had normal relations with Cuba they would have to withdraw every Cuban from other nations on earth. We don't do it. I think we have got probably 1,200 different places around the world where we have some American troops. But the withdrawal of Cuban troops is a dominant factor in Angola and other places around Africa. They have troops in a lot of other countries besides—people, rather, I don't know about troops—in a lot of other countries.

I just rather would not be pinned down so specifically on it. But the attitude of Cuba to withdraw its unwarranted intrusion into the affairs of Africa and other nations would be a prerequisite for normalization, yes.

*Q. Do you maintain contact with the Chinese on SALT or the Korean withdrawal?*

*The President:* Yes, we do. I have met with the Chinese special representative here, who, as you know, is an Ambassador, for an extended conversation once. Cy Vance talks to him on a routine basis, including one substantial conversation since Vance came back from Moscow. We try to keep the Chinese informed about our own attitudes, and although we don't have diplomatic relations with them directly, with exchange of Ambassadors, we do have a friendly relationship with them.

There have been numerous congressional delegations going to China. There is one over there now. I thought it would be good to let a member of my family go. So I asked my middle son, Chip, to accompany the congressional leaders when they went over.

We exchange ideas with the Chinese on SALT. We try not to violate confidences. If the Soviets tell us something in a negotiating session which we consider to be of a confidential nature, we certainly don't tell the Chinese about it. But we tell them our basic position. I think we have as good a relationship as one could have with China short of full diplomatic relations.

## **President Carter's Remarks at Dobbins Air Force Base, Ga.**

*Following are excerpts from President Carter's questions and answers with news correspondents upon his arrival at Dobbins Air Force Base, Ga., on April 8.*<sup>1</sup>

*Q. Mr. President, do you think that the resignation of Prime Minister Rabin may throw off your timetable for the Geneva talks and a settlement in the Middle East?*

*The President:* No, I don't. Obviously, the Israeli Labor Party will now be searching for a replacement candidate for Prime Minister Rabin in May. And I believe that the outcome of the election might very well be affected; nobody can anticipate how.

But there is a great realization among the Israeli leaders that 1977 is an important year. There is almost a unanimous commitment, I think, among all the Mideastern countries that if we don't succeed this year in some major step toward peace that it will be a long time before we can mount such a mammoth multinational effort again.

So it may be affected—the chances for peace—but no one can predict how. And I believe the Israelis will push forward with their own strong desire to have a permanent and lasting peace with the Arab neighbors, to have borders that they can defend, and

that the Palestinian question be resolved. I don't think the identity of one particular political figure, even the Prime Minister, will affect that adversely.

*Q. Mr. President, when you were meeting with President Sadat and you were talking about this Palestinian question, did you get any impression that there is a way to get the Palestinians to Geneva as part of some delegation? And if so, can you give us some of your thinking on that?*

*The President:* Well, as you know, President Sadat earlier had been the Arab leader that was courageous enough to espouse the idea that the Palestinians might be part of the Jordanian delegation. Whether or not that will evolve, I don't have any way to anticipate.

But I have good hope that we can resolve the question of Palestinian participation in some fashion or another. At this point, which is quite early in the year's efforts, I believe that it's primarily a responsibility of the Arab countries and the Palestinians. And for me to spell out what I think is a most likely prospect, I think would be counterproductive at this point.

*Q. Mr. President, do you think they should be represented?*

*The President:* Well, obviously, one of the three crucial decisions to be made in the Middle East concerns the Palestinian people. And there will have to be a spokesman for their viewpoint during the conference itself. Whether that would be done by a surrogate or by them directly is something that hasn't been evolved.

The other two questions, obviously, are the definition of permanent peace and the assurance of it, and the border delineations.

But I certainly think that in some fashion that the Palestinian people must be represented.

*Q. Mr. President, President Sadat used the word "entity" when he came to Washington, instead of Palestinian nation or Palestinian state.*

*The President:* Yes.

<sup>1</sup> For the complete transcript, see Weekly Compilation of Presidential Documents dated Apr. 18, 1977, p. 515.

*Q. Did you get any impression from him that he is moving toward, or more willing now to accept a Jordanian-Palestinian union; that is, a homeland that would be under the control of Jordan?*

*The President:* That's a question I wouldn't want to answer for President Sadat. I'll let him make his own statements publicly, and I don't intend to repeat what he tells me privately.

But I think that it's obvious that that's one avenue of success. It's one that I have espoused even during the campaign months—that perhaps some confederation or some relationship between the Palestinians and Jordan might be advisable.

As you know, there are approximately a million Palestinians who are part of the Jordanian society now, in very high positions in the government, and I think this is a natural possibility. Whether or not it will be the ultimate decision, I can't say.

*Mr. President, what significance should be placed on Ambassador Dobrynin's visit to the State Department [inaudible] SALT talks? Does this indicate any softening in your mind on the part of the Russians?*

*The President:* It confirms my own unwavering opinion that the Soviets want a successful resolution of nuclear arms control, the same as we do.

It's always inevitable that in a political campaign or a SALT negotiation or a debate between myself and Congress, that the degree of combat and dispute and differences is the part that is emphasized. It's the most newsworthy part, and it's the part that's easier to understand.

There was a great deal of progress made in the recent Moscow talks. As you know, study committees were set up to explore new ideas that had never been put on the SALT negotiating table.

I believe that Mr. Dobrynin's conversation with Mr. Vance—and of course I've had a complete report on it—was encouraging. There is about a month between now and when the SALT negotiations will proceed in

Geneva between Mr. Gromyko and Secretary Vance.

And during that period of time, we'll be reassessing some of the objections that the Soviets have raised to see if there is some alternative that would be equally fair to both sides, and we are now making projections of our own level of nuclear armaments in the number of missiles, the number of warheads, the throw-weight and the diversity of nuclear capability that would be in existence in 1985 if our proposal was accepted.

If during this reanalysis we show that there is any inequity there, we would be very eager to change it. My own opinion so far—and I've done a good bit of work on it, even since the Moscow talks—is that our proposal was fair and was equitable. And if the Soviets can give us some explanation about which we were not aware concerning their own capabilities or plans, I would certainly take that into consideration.

But I believe that Dobrynin's visit to Vance is encouraging. I think if one reads Gromyko's entire text in his press conference, it was encouraging. And the private messages that I have had from Mr. Brezhnev have also been encouraging.

I am not discouraged. And I'm determined that we'll succeed in having not only a ratification of the Vladivostok agreements but substantive commitments on both sides to actually reduce nuclear weapons below what they have been in the past.

*Q. Have you heard from Brezhnev lately, Mr. President?*

*The President:* No. I think that I've already said that was the last question. Let me say in closing that I'm very grateful to be home. Thank you for coming out here.

There is a continual means by which I can communicate with Mr. Brezhnev, either through normal diplomatic sources or otherwise. It's a routine sort of exchange, nothing dramatic or startling, no new concepts that have been proposed, but just an assurance that the Soviet leadership is as determined as I am to continue with the efforts.

## President Announces Measures To Assist U.S. Shoe Industry

*Statement by President Carter*<sup>1</sup>

I am very reluctant to restrict international trade in any way. For 40 years the United States has worked for the reduction of trade barriers around the world, and we are continuing to pursue this goal because this is the surest long-range way to create jobs here and abroad. Only problems as extreme as those faced by the American shoe industry could force me to seek even modest mandatory limits on imports. I have seen those special problems firsthand during visits to many shoe plants throughout the country.

The number of firms in the shoe industry dropped from 600 in 1968 to 380 today—a 40 percent decline. Employment in that same period fell by 30 percent, which represents a loss of 70,000 jobs. Imports from our two major overseas suppliers have increased by more than 100 percent in the last two years and seem to be increasing even more rapidly in recent months.

I have decided to reject the restrictive tariff rate quota recommended by the International Trade Commission, because that

recommendation did not fairly balance our concerns for domestic jobs and production, inflationary pressures, and expanded world trade.

But I have also decided to grant import relief to our domestic shoe industry and have therefore instructed Special Trade Representative Robert Strauss to negotiate orderly marketing agreements with the appropriate foreign suppliers of shoes.

Over the long haul, the solution to difficulties in the shoe industry lies not in the restriction of imports, but elsewhere—in innovation and modernization of our own production facilities and the financing to make these possible.

The American shoe industry needs an expanded and more effective program of assistance to help it meet foreign competition. I have directed the Secretary of Commerce to work directly with the Secretary of Labor and Ambassador Strauss in developing such a program. Toward this end, these officials will see that existing assistance programs work better.

In addition, I will recommend to Congress within 90 days any legislation which may be needed to provide:

—Technological aid to increase production efficiency and develop new production methods.

—Data and market research to pinpoint new marketing opportunities.

—Assistance for affected communities and workers.

—Help with promotion and marketing services.

—Financial assistance to support these initiatives.

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<sup>1</sup>Issued on Apr. 1 (text from White House press release). For the President's memorandums of Apr. 1 for the Special Representative for Trade Negotiations and for heads of certain departments and agencies, see Weekly Compilation of Presidential Documents dated Apr. 4, 1977, p. 479; for his message to the Congress of Apr. 1 transmitting a report on the actions, see H. Doc. 95-117, Apr. 4, 1977.

## United States Relations in Southern Africa

*Statement by William E. Schauffele, Jr.  
Assistant Secretary for African Affairs*<sup>1</sup>

A few years ago I would not have chosen this subject to provoke discussion among a distinguished group of academic scholars. The African Continent in general, and the southern part of it in particular, excited sustained attention and debate only among a small band of specialists in academia, business circles, and the government, except in time of crisis. This has all changed radically, and there are times when I look back with some nostalgia to a more tranquil life before I became so intimately acquainted with African airline schedules and charters last year.

Probably never in the history of American diplomacy has the governmental and public interest, even absorption, in one relatively small and remote area of the world increased at such a rapid pace, from quasi-academic to substantial.

Our concern about southern Africa is quite unlike the basis for our interest in other parts of the world important to the United States, such as Europe, the Far East, and the Middle East. Our interest is not strategic. We have consistently made clear that the United States does not wish to play a military role anywhere in Africa. It is also not based on economic interests, although we do want to see that Western Europe as well as the United States retains access to the mineral wealth of southern Africa. Under the proper political circumstances I can visualize a very substantial growth in two-way trade with that part of the conti-

nent. Our recent actions with respect to the Byrd amendment should make clear that we are fully capable of subordinating our economic interests to other, more vital concerns.

U.S. policies in southern Africa are essentially founded on political interests. A significant ingredient of that interest is our concern for human rights and human dignity. Our policy toward southern Africa is guided by our ideals of liberty and equality and by our commitment to oppose racial and social injustice. We believe that the minority governments of Rhodesia, South Africa, and Namibia violate fundamental human rights as spelled out in the U.N. Declaration of Human Rights. We have spoken out on this subject forcefully and repeatedly so that there can be no mistaking our position. In conformity with our own fundamental principles as a nation, we have based our policies on the belief that the peaceful transfer of power to the black majority is not only necessary and desirable but also possible.

The foreign policy of the United States, if it is to be successful, must be firmly grounded in our own fundamental beliefs. Lacking this vital element, it would not obtain the requisite backing from our people. It is self-evident, therefore, that the United States must be engaged in southern Africa if we want to remain true to ourselves. Given the dangers involved, we cannot remain an idle spectator while the decolonization process takes place in Rhodesia and Namibia.

Similarly, I believe that our history dic-

<sup>1</sup> Made before the American Academy of Political and Social Science at Philadelphia, Pa., on Apr. 16.



tates that we have a role to play with respect to the system of apartheid in South Africa. It has been a long and frequently painful process for the black and white elements of our population to work out their relationship based on the ideals of the Founding Fathers. Very substantial progress has been made in recent years in this respect, and more needs still to be done. But at least there is now hope where there once was only despair, and we are on the right road. Having come through this experience, we can, I believe, without resort to the zealotry of the converted, also contribute to the resolution of the apartheid issue. Our history as a people of many races, able to live together more or less in harmony, can be, within limits, a guide and inspiration to others.

Apartheid, of course, simply means "apartness." It enshrines the concept of separateness, without even the leavening thought of equality. The system of apartheid currently being practiced in South Africa is therefore still a considerable distance from the slightly more progressive concept finally struck down by our Supreme Court a quarter century ago. It is a measure of the distance South Africa must travel to overcome the burden of its racial heritage.

The rapid changes in Portugal brought about the decolonization of the Portuguese empire in Africa. This development of the last few years has, in turn, hastened the demise of the remaining two vestiges of the era of empire, Rhodesia and Namibia.

The policy of this Administration, and that of its predecessor, has been to try to insure that the changes which we consider inevitable for both Rhodesia and Namibia take place in a peaceful manner. There are those who believe that the transition to majority rule can come about only by force of arms. These advocates of violence believe that Ian Smith's record of procrastination in Rhodesia and South Africa's continuing important role in Namibia preclude a peaceful settlement. I strongly disagree with that view. Progress has already been made, perhaps more than we had reason to hope for only a year ago. Ian Smith has agreed to the principle of turning over power to the black majority within two years. Although

negotiations broke down in Geneva over the complex questions surrounding the modalities of the transition to majority rule, I hope that talks can again be started. I am convinced there is a reasonable chance for success.

### **The Question of Rhodesia**

We believe that the United Kingdom should continue to take the lead on the Rhodesian question since it is the sovereign power in Rhodesia. We have worked closely and well with them in the past; during February we had several intensive meetings with them in Washington to concert our policies. And Foreign Secretary [David] Owen is currently in southern Africa to assess further the situation, on a trip planned in agreement with the United States.

It is also not an insignificant accomplishment that, in the course of working toward a peaceful settlement of southern African issues, we have strengthened our ties with the frontline states of Zambia, Tanzania, Botswana, and Mozambique. Ambassador [Andrew] Young, on his trip to Africa during the early days of the Carter Administration, received valuable new insights into the thinking of the African leaders on those issues of mutual concern. I want to emphasize that the frontline states continue to support the view that a peaceful solution is desirable in Rhodesia and Namibia even as armed struggle goes on. We are working closely with them to that end.

The advantages of a peaceful transition to majority rule should be manifest to all of us. The transfer of power is going to be difficult under any circumstances, and some disruption of the economic processes may be inevitable. But both Rhodesia and Namibia are potentially prosperous countries with existing structures upon which further sustained economic growth can be built. How much more desirable it would be for the black majority to inherit a country with a running economy than one so severely damaged or destroyed by prolonged strife that the immediate fruits of independence may be meager indeed.

Given the strength, on the one hand, of the Zimbabwe liberation forces, many of which are now in training camps in Mozambique and Tanzania, and the strength of the Rhodesian security forces on the other, we believe that a "solution" by combat of arms would inevitably be protracted. There would not be a quick knockout by either side. Therefore such a "solution" would be bloody and involve untold human suffering and misery, which we want to avoid if at all possible.

Prolonged violence would create a climate, moreover, conducive to intervention by forces from outside the African Continent. The frontline states have thus far successfully resisted the counsel of those contending that only armed struggle can produce success in Zimbabwe and Namibia. We cannot be sure, however, that they will always see the situation this way.

We firmly believe that African problems should be solved by the Africans themselves. Our policy has been guided by the principle that the big powers or their surrogates should not play a military role on the continent. We have seen how long it takes an outside power, once engaged in an African conflict, to withdraw its forces, and we have seen the many undesirable consequences such involvement brings in its train in terms of African stability and unity.

Following rejection of the latest British proposals in January, Ian Smith has apparently decided to attempt what he euphemistically calls an "internal solution." This involves negotiations with certain black groups and individuals, some of whom were already members of the Smith regime, to bring about majority rule. We do not believe this will lead to a solution. It ignores not only the desires of the Zimbabwe guerrilla forces and important nationalist elements but also those of the frontline states. In our view this "internal solution" cannot last; to attempt it would inevitably lead to increased bloodshed and violence.

Finally, we believe that a peaceful solution in Rhodesia and Namibia would provide a useful stimulus to orderly change in South Africa itself. Conversely, the escalation of

violence in the adjoining territories could well polarize opinion in South Africa and make more difficult the achievement of any progress in the direction of racial justice in that country.

We recognize, of course, that our dedication to a peaceful, rapid, and orderly transition to majority rule needs to be backed up with concrete measures. We worked hard for the repeal of the Byrd amendment by the Congress, accomplished by a decisive margin in both Houses, placing the United States in observance with pertinent U.N. resolutions. Repeal should convince Prime Minister Smith, if he still had doubts, that he cannot count on the United States to bail him out when his policies fail. We hope now that he will give real negotiations another chance.

We intend to insure that the sanctions against Rhodesia are strictly enforced. We will be consulting with other nations to see what can be done about tightening compliance with sanctions. We are looking into additional measures that our government might undertake to place additional pressure on Rhodesia and to convince it of the gravity of the situation.

We have provided economic assistance to the Governments of Zambia and Mozambique, in recognition of the economic losses suffered by these two countries owing to the closure of their borders with Rhodesia and the interruption of the hitherto profitable transit traffic in Rhodesian goods.

I would like to make it clear that we have no solution that we wish to impose on the various elements of the Zimbabwean political scene. We have no favorites whom we support. We will not take sides, since we believe that the Africans want to work out African solutions to African problems. We will continue to counsel maximum flexibility and readiness to compromise, maximum unity among all of the nationalist liberation forces, and a maximum effort to create the kind of atmosphere that will allow the negotiations to succeed. Both sides should come to the conclusion that their objectives can be achieved more surely and effectively by negotiation rather than by resort to arms.

While the contentious issue of Rhodesia tends to dominate the headlines, we have not been unmindful of the need for rapid progress on the Namibian issue as well. Our policy with respect to that territory has been consistent and clear. In 1966 we voted to terminate South Africa's mandate. We have supported the finding of the International Court of Justice that South Africa's occupation was illegal. We remain committed to U.N. Security Council Resolution 385 calling for free elections under U.N. auspices, South African withdrawal of its illegal administration, and the release of all Namibian political prisoners.

As in the case of Zimbabwe, we have cause for at least some optimism that the Namibian problem can be peacefully resolved. Some progress has been achieved. A target date of December 1978 has been set for independence, and the South Africans have fully endorsed the concept that Namibia should become independent on that date.

A major difficulty, as we see it, has been that the present efforts to establish an interim government for Namibia have excluded the South West Africa People's Organization (SWAPO), which is recognized by the OAU [Organization of African Unity] and the United Nations as the sole Namibian nationalist movement. These efforts have centered on a meeting of Namibian groups in Windhoek seeking to establish an interim government to lead the country to independence. For its part, SWAPO has not wished to participate and has insisted that independence could come about only as a result of direct negotiations between itself and the South African Government. On this issue, also, we urge a spirit of compromise on both sides in the belief that what may be achievable in a peaceful manner would almost certainly be preferable to anything that can be won through the force of arms alone.

In the case of Namibia, too, it seems to us that while the positions of some of the principal contenders are far apart, good will on both sides can produce agreement. We be-

lieve that all political groups in Namibia, specifically including SWAPO, have a role to play in the process leading to independence. We consider that the United Nations should have a role to play in giving birth to an independent nation from a territory which the community of nations accepts as being under U.N. authority, at least in theory. We have proposed that an international conference on a Namibian settlement take place under U.N. aegis at a neutral site with all the concerned parties.

In support of our policy, the United States has since 1970 officially discouraged American investment in Namibia. The facilities of the Export-Import Bank are no longer available for trade with the territory. No future U.S. investments there, made on the basis of rights acquired from the South African Government following termination of the mandate, would receive U.S. Government protection against the claims of a future legitimate government in Namibia. We have urged American firms doing business in Namibia to assure that their employment practices are in conformity with the principles of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights.

### Policy Toward South Africa

Our policy toward South Africa is necessarily different from our policy toward Rhodesia and Namibia.

We have had diplomatic relations with South Africa since that country became independent. In addition to our Embassy in Pretoria, we have three consulates general which keep us informed about what is going on in that country.

South Africa is not a colonial remnant. Even the leaders of black Africa do not challenge the right of the white minority to live in South Africa. The white settlers began to cultivate the lands of South Africa 300 years ago. They are also Africans, and they have no other place to go. The problems of South Africa should therefore be solved in South Africa—not by outside powers.

Our maintenance of diplomatic relations with South Africa is by no means an indication that we accept that country's in-

stitution of apartheid. We have not minced our words in stating our unalterable opposition to apartheid and shall not do so in the future. This system is a clear violation of fundamental human rights. Last summer the United States joined a consensus in the U.N. Security Council resolution "strongly condemning" the South African Government for its role in the Soweto violence. On that occasion, the acting U.S. representative called on South Africa to "take these events as a warning" and "to abandon a system which is clearly not acceptable under any standard of human rights."<sup>2</sup>

As elsewhere in southern Africa we are dedicated to the proposition that peaceful change must succeed, if only because the alternative is so unacceptable. We have watched with dismay the escalation of violence in South Africa, beginning with the Soweto riots last year. We are deeply concerned that unless the spiral of violence can be arrested and reversed, there will be such a polarization of forces within South Africa that peaceful change will become immeasurably more difficult than it is already. We shall employ all reasonable channels to get this message across to the South Africans and to facilitate this change to the maximum possible extent.

It is appropriate, however, to insert here a cautionary word. Of all people, we Americans should probably be chary about providing excessive and unsolicited advice to others about how they should solve their racial problems. True, we have made impressive progress within our own country in removing the stain of injustice and discrimination based solely on race. But we must also admit that we have a considerable way to go before our achievements approach the ideals set forth in our Declaration of Independence and our Constitution.

But perhaps more important, our recent history provides testimony to the fact that change in the racial sphere came about—gradually, unevenly, perhaps even

grudgingly—not because outsiders or foreigners told us what was right, but because the realization finally dawned on our people that the status quo was wrong and had to be changed for our own good. This self-realization must be given an opportunity to do its creative work in South Africa also, although I will readily agree that the time for results is limited.

It is in no one's interest if the South Africans move into an isolationist shell, closed against outside influences, there to defend themselves from all enemies foreign and domestic. Such a development would have an effect opposite from the one we wish to achieve.

Our diplomacy toward South Africa must therefore be carried out with a good deal of finesse and skill. We shall have to weigh carefully the relative merits of speaking out and of restraint.

In the circumstances I have described, the United States is necessarily pursuing a nuanced policy vis-a-vis South Africa, without compromising our principles. As I have already indicated, we have repeatedly made clear our opposition to a system under which an 18 percent minority limits the black majority economically, discriminates socially, and deprives the blacks of political rights.

As a corollary to this policy, the United States has opposed the South African Government's policy of creating a series of "bantustans," or "homelands." The Transkei was the first of these homelands to become "independent," but others are expected to be given that status by South Africa. The United States has not recognized the Transkei, and aside from South Africa, neither have other members of the United Nations. We have no intention of recognizing any of the other homelands that will be declared "independent."

In fact, the creation of these so-called states is an extension of the apartheid policy. Stripped of all euphemisms and rationalizations the concept of the homelands is unfair to the black majority. The effect of their creation is to deprive substantial elements of the black urban

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<sup>2</sup> For U.S. statements and text of Security Council Resolution 392, adopted by consensus on June 19, 1976, see BULLETIN of July 12, 1976, p. 59.

work force of their civil rights in South Africa and to force many urban blacks to take on citizenship of a "homeland" they have never known. The homelands were established without consulting the blacks. They are generally conglomerations of the remnants of tribal lands without contiguous borders, without the basis for economic viability, and without any basis for true political independence from South Africa.

It is worth noting that there have been some encouraging signs on the South African scene. Events of the past year have not been without their effect on the white community of South Africa. Many signs point to considerable soul-searching, even on the part of the Afrikaner community, which forms the primary political base of the ruling party. A number of leading Afrikaner intellectuals have urged that the government reconsider important elements of its policy, such as present plans for the homelands, the denial of all political rights to Africans outside the homelands, and various forms of economic discrimination.

South African businessmen, too, have begun to urge steps to improve the daily life of Africans in such areas as housing and training. In certain areas of activity which are not directly under government sponsorship, such as athletic and religious organizations, we detect some breakdown in previously rigid racial barriers. We have been encouraged by the actions of the Catholic Church to permit some integration of its schools and by the tolerance of this decision displayed by the South African Government. In terms of the daily life of an African in South Africa, these are small steps. But we believe they reflect that the faith of many South African whites in the possibility of maintaining indefinitely racial separation and white supremacy is being fundamentally reexamined.

The United States has adopted certain policies to demonstrate our opposition to the apartheid policy of South Africa. Since 1962 we have maintained a voluntary embargo on the sale of military equipment to South Africa. U.S. naval vessels do not call at South African ports (except for emergen-

cies), although they regularly make courtesy calls in some black African ports.

We have redoubled our efforts to intensify our contacts with blacks in the South African population. President Carter recently invited Gathsha Buthelezi, a prominent black moderate, to the White House, underlining the Administration's interest in establishing better ties with black leadership in South Africa.

Along these same lines, we have intensified the informational activities of the U.S. Information Service in South Africa, especially among the black population. We have also expanded our exchange program, under which a cross section of the South African population, mostly blacks, visits the United States for monthlong visits. Our diplomatic and consular officers, including black Foreign Service officers, cultivate a wide range of contacts in South Africa.

#### **Steps by U.S. Business Community**

The United States has also encouraged American firms doing business in South Africa to improve working conditions for their black employees. We believe this could be a significant American contribution to the principle of social justice and provide a vehicle for promoting economic and social progress. We have been encouraged by the progress that many American firms have demonstrated in working toward the principle of equal pay for equal work, adequate pensions, improved medical and insurance benefits, and expanded opportunities for advancement based entirely on merit, rather than on the basis of race. Although there is clearly room for improvement in the performance of their labor practices, South African-based American companies have shown considerable sensitivity in dealing with their black employees. By their example they have already set in motion some of the kinds of changes that are so desperately needed.

A recent step in the right direction was the March 1, 1977, announcement by 12 major U.S. corporations with business interests in South Africa expressing support

for a set of principles designed to promote equal employment rights for blacks and nonwhite minority groups. These principles call for the nonsegregation of races in all dining facilities and places of work and the concept of equal pay for all employees doing equal and comparable work. We hope that these constructive steps will be emulated and expanded by other U.S. firms engaged in business in South Africa and perhaps even be adopted by the South African business community itself.

We fully recognize that American corporations genuinely desirous of wishing to institute social changes in their labor practices may fear contravening South African laws and traditional practices which discourage evolutionary changes. Moreover, many of the white unions are resistant to change. They will not countenance having a black supervisor over a white worker, and they restrict the movement of black workers into the ranks of the skilled workers despite the fact that South African industry desperately needs more skilled workers.

There is no reason why American firms cannot enter into collective bargaining agreements with black unions. Unlike the white unions, these are not officially registered. However, they are not illegal, and companies can deal with them. Several weeks ago the second largest supermarket chain in South Africa announced that it would recognize and negotiate with a black trade union. We hope this will encourage American corporations to follow suit where the existence of a black union makes this feasible.

There are those, of course, who argue that American corporations in effect have no business being in South Africa in the first place, that they are either an impediment to social change or have no real effect on change, and that their net result is to buttress the status quo elements that want apartheid to go on.

Others have come forth with opposing arguments. They claim that U.S. investment assists the economic development of South Africa, which sets in motion certain powerful currents of change that will be too pow-

erful to withstand. Increased investment, the argument goes, helps create more jobs for blacks, inevitably some upgrading of their job skills, and this process has already resulted in new and different perceptions and attitudes that have made themselves felt on the South African political scene.

The South African blacks seem to be divided in their views on this issue. Some favor foreign, including U.S., investment while others have opposed it. There is certainly no clear consensus on the question.

As a government we have stayed neutral on this issue so far. We have neither encouraged nor discouraged American investment in South Africa. This is one of many facets of our policy toward southern Africa that is currently under review.

Potential American investors have been free to decide the issue on their own, although if asked we provide them with all the information we have available. We make certain they are aware of the controversy about such investment, explain our official neutrality, note the moral and social as well as economic and political problems of working in an apartheid society, and urge that if they do invest they give priority attention to the matter of fair employment practices.

We have, however, placed some restrictions on our bilateral economic relationship. For example, we restrict the Export-Import Bank facilities in South Africa. Export-Import Bank direct loans to South African importers of U.S. products are prohibited. However, the Bank does guarantee privately financed loans as a service to U.S. exporters.

As I indicated at the outset of my remarks, there are a number of positive elements on the southern African scene. Perhaps the most promising aspect is the fact that unlike a number of African countries, Zimbabwe, Namibia, and South Africa itself have strong economic assets. Southern Africa is richly endowed with a generally favorable climate and with natural resources that the world needs. We have already announced that we stand ready to assist Zimbabwe and Namibia with training pro-

grams to promote further economic development when majority rule comes.

The rest of the African Continent has, in a relatively short time, made tremendous progress from the colonial period to independence to collectively playing a major role on the world scene. The record has inevitably been an uneven one, but there are a number of African countries where Africans and Europeans cooperate in harmony for the betterment of all. I would not suggest that the situation in southern Africa is analo-

gous. But I do suggest that there are examples on the African Continent which give hope that political leaders can creatively build a future in which blacks and whites can coexist and prosper in peace rather than have the future imposed on them.

For the sake of Africa, and for our sake, I hope that the leadership in southern Africa will choose wisely. For our part we wish them well, and we will remain committed to doing everything in our power to insure that the outcome will be a happy one.

## THE CONGRESS

### Administration Supports Increased U.S. Contributions to the African Development Fund

*Following are statements by Andrew Young, U.S. Representative to the United Nations, and David B. Bolen, Deputy Assistant Secretary for African Affairs, before the Subcommittee on Africa of the Senate Committee on Foreign Relations on April 18.<sup>1</sup>*

#### STATEMENT BY AMBASSADOR YOUNG

I very much appreciate this opportunity to appear before your subcommittee today. I must also commend this subcommittee for its past lead on examining issues that affect U.S. policy in Africa and for the forum it provides today to discuss future U.S. participation in the African Development Fund.

Africa's problems are not new. Twenty-two of the 33 U.N.-designated

"most seriously affected countries," 13 of the world's 18 landlocked developing countries, and more than half of the 29 least developed countries in the world are in Africa. These problems have been severely aggravated by the current energy and inflation problems. Millions of acres of arable African land remain unused because of physical inaccessibility or lack of adequate roads, technical knowledge deficiencies, and irrigation inadequacies.

Current foreign policy dictates a clear need for addressing these problems by contributing to the economic, social, and technological advancement of these countries through international organizations. To this end, the African Development Fund has allocated 33 percent of its credits to the agriculture sector during the last year, 27 percent to public utilities, 14 percent to health, and 19 percent to transportation.

In examining the African nations, the United States should recognize the significant roles these nations play in the

<sup>1</sup> The complete transcript of the hearings will be published by the committee and will be available from the Superintendent of Documents, U.S. Government Printing Office, Washington, D.C. 20402.

United Nations and in other world contexts rather than limiting itself to bilateral policies. Our exports to Africa in 1976, showing a clear trend toward greatly increased interests in the area by American business, reflect growing U.S. concern. This concern should be furthered by sharing U.S. technological advancements in transportation, communication, and agriculture to assist the less developed countries in utilizing their increasingly valuable natural resources. The African nations are working toward a new economic order and are looking for assistance in this area from the developed countries, particularly the United States, whose role in the past has not been commensurate with its ability to assist these countries on various levels.

The African Development Fund was begun in 1973 as the concessional facility associated with the African Development Bank. The Fund directs its loan resources toward economic and social development. It is able to loan to the neediest of the countries because it has a 0.75 percent service charge with a 50-year repayment clause. At this time, the African Development Fund is unique in addressing the needs of the African countries; certainly this invaluable institution deserves our cooperation and support.

In conjunction with this Administration's policy, we must demonstrate through increased participation in the Fund our concern for the development and prosperity of these countries. Repeal of the Byrd amendment recently indicates the Administration's good will and commitment to accept a more positive role toward African growth, prosperity, and independence.

To date, the United States has contributed only \$15 million to the African Development Fund although we have pledged a total of \$25 million, thereby giving us less than 3 percent of the voting power in the Fund. If the United States is ever to obtain a significant voice in the Fund, it is essential that we contribute an amount that truly represents our commitment. I urge this subcommittee therefore to closely

examine this matter and vote to authorize funding which will augment our role in the Fund and will enable our delegation to Mauritius [the 1977 meeting of the Boards of Governors of the African Development Bank and Fund, May 2-7] to speak from a position of strength and visible commitment. It is also my hope that appropriations would be forthcoming in fiscal year 1979 which would further demonstrate our commitment.

I would also urge this subcommittee to overwhelmingly oppose the Wylie language adopted during the House debate on this bill which directs the Secretary of the Treasury to seek, in his discussions with other nations, a voting structure weighted to reflect the contributions made by donor countries. As a country which has the potential to contribute so much and yet contributes so little, we are hardly in a position to attempt to amend the current structure in a way which would greatly offend the members of the African Development Bank.

Again, thank you for allowing me this opportunity to share my thoughts on this very important matter with you.

#### **STATEMENT BY MR. BOLEN**

I welcome this opportunity to testify before this committee on U.S. contributions to the African Development Fund, the concessional loan affiliate of the African Development Bank.

U.S. contributions to the African Development Fund are of major importance to the Administration's Africa policy. They respond directly to the fundamental foreign policy objectives of the economic assistance efforts of the Carter Administration. Secretary of State Vance enunciated the following objectives for our foreign assistance before the Senate Appropriations Committee:

—To demonstrate America's compassion for the poor and dispossessed around the world—those who, through no fault of their own, are exposed to daily suffering and humiliation and are struggling to survive;

—To make our fair contribution to the



enormous task of the social, economic, and technological development of poor countries, an investment which in this interdependent world can pay us handsome dividends;

—To foster a climate of constructive cooperation, dialogue, and reciprocal benefit in our North-South diplomacy.

As you know, 18 of the world's 29 least developed countries are in Africa. Also, many African countries have experienced a deterioration in economic conditions over the past 15 years. I know members of this committee will agree that a world of poverty, illiteracy, and disease cannot be safe for this or future generations.

If we wish to demonstrate America's compassion for the world's poor, clearly we must be prepared to act in Africa. If we wish to make a fair contribution to the enormous task of development of poor countries, clearly we must be prepared to provide our fair share in Africa.

Nowhere in the world is the task so enormous, and nowhere is it more essential. Compared to other parts of the developing world, Africa is the least well endowed with the basic economic and social infrastructure essential to development generally. Only concessional finance can deal effectively with this situation. This was the underlying reason for the creation of the African Development Fund in the first place. This is why Fund loans have been directed to the poorest African countries by common consent of its African members.

I have no doubt that U.S. investment in our growing economic interdependence with Africa can pay us handsome dividends. For four years, our imports from Africa have been growing at a considerably faster pace than global U.S. imports—largely because of crude oil imports, particularly from Nigeria. Africa now accounts for over 38 percent of our crude oil imports. We are already dependent on Africa for other essential minerals—antimony, bauxite, chrome, cobalt, copper, manganese, and platinum. This dependence is likely to increase in years to come, as the continent possesses a

substantial portion of the world's known reserves of the 53 most important minerals used in the industrial process today.

During 1974 and 1975 our exports to Africa increased faster than the average rate of increase of global U.S. exports. Now that prices for many commodities exported by Africa have strengthened, we expect this favorable trend in our exports to Africa to resume, thus creating more jobs and economic opportunities for Americans.

U.S. direct investment in Africa has also grown rapidly, expanding from an estimated \$600 million in 1960 to \$3.4 billion in 1975.

Additional contributions to the African Development Fund are consistent with the national interest in building cooperative economic relations with African countries. They are consistent with our efforts to fashion a more constructive and cooperative North-South dialogue. We need concrete actions to demonstrate to these countries that we are concerned with assisting them in achieving a better life and a greater role in an international economic order based on market forces.

If we wish as a matter of humanitarian compassion and economic self-interest to make a fair contribution to the enormous task of African development, we must seek an appropriate role for the United States in the African Development Fund. The African Development Bank and Fund are the preferred development finance institutions of the Africans. They are the only pan-African development finance institutions and have proven themselves to have a unique and effective role in the economic development of the continent. The Africans view the degree of donor support for the African Development Fund to be an important measure of donor commitment to African development generally.

However, present U.S. contributions to the African Development Fund total only \$15 million, about 4.4 percent of total contributions to date. We are now eighth in donor rank—after Canada, Japan, West Germany, Sweden, Norway, Netherlands, and Denmark. If the Administration's

\$10 million fiscal year 1978 appropriation request for the Fund is approved by the Congress, our subscription would rise to \$25 million, or about 5 percent of total pledged and projected Fund contributions through July 1, 1978. We would then be about sixth in donor rank.

We know that both the Africans and other donors consider this situation to constitute an inadequate role for the United States in the African Development Fund. The United States plays a leading role in all the international financial institutions except the African Development Fund. We hold executive-directorships in all these institutions except the African Development Fund. The political benefits we have already gained from membership in the Fund will be undercut if we are unable to obtain an appropriate role within a reasonable length of time. We would also have no assurance of election to an executive-directorship in the Fund without increasing our relative voting power.

We therefore request the committee to incorporate in the legislation pending before you language already passed by the House which would authorize additional contributions to the African Development Fund. Negotiations for the Fund's second replenishment exercise are expected to begin at the end of this calendar year. We will seek to expedite those negotiations. If they are not completed prior to submission of the fiscal year 1979 budget, we would propose to seek an appropriation in fiscal year 1979. This would permit us to move toward an appropriate role in the Fund and significantly increase the prospects for U.S. election to an executive-directorship.

Conversely, the Administration strongly opposes the amendment to the House version of the authorization bill which directs the Secretary of the Treasury to seek other donor support for the purpose of changing the voting structure within the Fund to reflect actual contributions by Fund members.

Relative donor-country voting power in the Fund already reflects actual donor-country contributions. Any U.S. attempt to modify the Fund's articles of agreement to reduce the African Development Bank's share of the voting power would be politi-

cally unacceptable to the Africans and as such almost certainly would be rejected by the other donors.

Since the United States helped negotiate the Fund's articles of agreement in the first place and just ratified them last November, we believe it to be inappropriate to be forced by legislation to seek their modification. The Fund's articles require approval of all transactions by 75 percent of the total votes and fully protect donor interests. We hope the committee will seek elimination of this amendment.

## Funding for Earthquake Relief to Romania Urged

*Following is a statement made before the House Committee on International Relations on April 4 by Matthew Nimetz, then Counselor-designate of the Department, who was sworn in on April 8.<sup>1</sup>*

I am grateful for this opportunity to express the views of the Administration on the question of humanitarian and relief assistance to Romania and on H.R. 5717, which would provide funds for such assistance. Let me also express my appreciation for the cooperation which members of this committee have demonstrated in working with the Administration as we attempt to formulate a specific program of assistance which reflects traditional American responsiveness to international disasters and at the same time fits harmoniously into the overall reconstruction effort underway in Romania.

I am sure that the committee is aware of the magnitude of the damage suffered by the Romanian people in the March 4 earthquake: over 1,500 dead, 11,000 injured, 32,000 buildings destroyed, and 34,000 families homeless. In Bucharest alone, where the quake caused the greatest loss of life and property, nine hospitals were severely damaged. The Romanian Government

<sup>1</sup>The complete transcript of the hearings will be published by the committee and will be available from the Superintendent of Documents, U.S. Government Printing Office, Washington, D.C. 20402.

has estimated that losses to the economy exceed \$1 billion.

In the immediate aftermath of this disaster, the U.S. Government reacted promptly and generously—as it has in the past in countries such as Yugoslavia, Italy, Guatemala, and Turkey—by providing emergency assistance in the form of medical supplies, 300 tons of dry milk, and the dispatch of a team of seismic experts to assist in on-the-spot evaluation of structural damage. This initial package of disaster relief assistance, which was funded out of the Foreign Assistance Act and Public Law 480 title II, came to approximately \$625,000. (In addition, private American voluntary agencies have contributed over \$400,000 to assist in post-earthquake relief efforts.) Other governments have also responded generously in providing assistance to Romania for both emergency relief and for longer term reconstruction.

The Administration believes that the additional assistance envisioned by H.R. 5717 would provide an extremely important and timely followup to the emergency relief which this government has already supplied. The Romanians face a monumental task in restoring housing, medical facilities, and communal services to normal levels. The present bill would give the Administration the vehicle for putting together a package of rehabilitation and reconstruction assistance which we would plan to administer according to the following set of priorities:

(1) Hospital, medical and similar equipment, and commodities with a humanitarian purpose;

(2) Equipment, commodities, and technical services required for clearing damaged buildings and the rehabilitation and reconstruction of damaged housing, schools, and hospitals; and

(3) Equipment and commodities required for rehabilitation, reconstruction, and replacement in other sectors.

It goes without saying that we would expect to work closely with this committee and with the Senate Foreign Relations Committee in working out a suitable program that corresponds both to the intent of

the Congress and to the needs of the Romanian people.

I must add in all candor, however, that we are concerned with the action taken by the Senate on April 1 in cutting by one-half the supplementary appropriation for S. 1124 for Romanian earthquake relief and rehabilitation. The Administration, in coordination with our Ambassador in Bucharest, has carefully considered the possible levels of funding needed to implement a meaningful program of assistance, within the very clear budgetary constraints, and we have determined that \$20 million should be allocated for this purpose. I wish to stress that this determination was made in consultation with the Office of Management and Budget and has the support of the highest levels within the Administration—including the President. I also might add that the figure of \$20 million in grant aid is consistent with U.S. assistance provided to other countries which have suffered devastating earthquakes. We would therefore hope that the House and Senate can promptly work out the necessary authorizing and appropriating legislation which would permit the Administration to move forward with a \$20 million package of aid.

Although the committee's present concern is the proposal for relief and rehabilitation assistance within the framework of H.R. 5717, the Administration is also looking at the possibility of providing other forms of assistance to Romania to help in the recovery from the enormous losses sustained. We are reviewing, for example, the appropriateness of low-interest credits to help finance Romanian purchases of U.S. equipment to repair or replace items damaged in the earthquake. We will consult with this committee after the Administration has had an opportunity to study this matter further.

I think a word about Romania's relations with the United States would be appropriate here. Although Romania is a member of both the Warsaw Pact and the Communist economic group, the Council of Mutual Economic Assistance, Romania has forcefully pursued a policy of seeking friendly and constructive relations with the countries of the West, a policy which has distanced it

from the Soviet Union and the other members of the Warsaw Pact. Romania continues to pursue an independent line on a number of international issues of major concern to us and has consistently emphasized to this government its interest in establishing even closer economic and political ties with the United States. This improvement in relations has been underscored by the exchanges of visits by heads of state that have taken place in 1969, 1973, and 1975. The proposed grant of assistance to Romania in the wake of the March 4 earthquake would be an extremely significant gesture of support for the efforts which Romania has been making to map out its future independently of outside direction.

In this regard, I believe it is also important to point out that the considerable economic toll which Romania suffered as a result of the earthquake may create pressures on the Romanian Government to modify this relatively independent stance. Substantive evidence of our readiness to assist would help the Romanians to maintain their present course.

I am also aware of this committee's strong and commendable concerns with the progress of human rights in countries to which the United States supplies assistance. I think that all of the members of this committee are equally aware of the commitment of this Administration to keep this concern in the forefront in our dealings with other countries. The Administration is convinced that the proposal to provide relief and rehabilitation assistance to Romania is in no way inconsistent with our concerns over human rights. On the contrary, I can think of no better way to underscore our humanitarian concern with the conditions of human existence in other countries.

In closing, I wish to express the Administration's gratitude to the sponsors of H.R. 5717 for their initiative in proposing this package of assistance and to the committee for promptly taking up this urgent measure. I respectfully urge you to move just as quickly in translating it into law.

## Current Actions

### MULTILATERAL

#### Agriculture

Agreement establishing the International Fund for Agricultural Development (IFAD). Done at Rome June 13, 1976.<sup>1</sup>

*Ratification deposited:* Jamaica, April 13, 1977.

*Signatures:* Argentina, April 14, 1977; Denmark, January 12, 1977; Sweden, January 11, 1977.

#### Astronauts

Agreement on the rescue of astronauts, the return of astronauts, and the return of objects launched into outer space. Done at Washington, London, and Moscow April 22, 1968. Entered into force December 3, 1968. TIAS 6599.

*Ratification deposited:* Belgium, April 15, 1977.

### BILATERAL

#### Czechoslovakia

Agreement providing for consultations should textile or apparel exports from Czechoslovakia cause market disruptions in the United States. Effected by exchange of notes at Prague March 22 and 28, 1977. Entered into force March 28, 1977.

#### Egypt

Loan agreement relating to a commodity import program. Signed at Cairo March 6, 1977. Entered into force March 6, 1977.

Project grant agreement for applied science and technology research, with annexes. Signed at Cairo March 29, 1977. Entered into force March 29, 1977.

#### Nigeria

Memorandum of understanding relating to technical cooperation in geological, water resources, land-use, and related studies for the Capital Territory of Nigeria. Dated February 4, 1977. Entered into force February 4, 1977.

#### United Kingdom

Second protocol amending the convention of December 31, 1975, as amended, for the avoidance of double taxation and the prevention of fiscal evasion with respect to taxes on income and capital gains. Signed at London March 31, 1977. Enters into force 30 days after the date on which instruments of ratification are exchanged.

<sup>1</sup> Not in force.

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# THE DEPARTMENT OF STATE BULLETIN

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# THE DEPARTMENT OF STATE BULLETIN

Vol. LXXVI, No. 1977

May 16, 1977

*The Department of State BULLETIN, a weekly publication issued by the Office of Media Services, Bureau of Public Affairs, provides the public and interested agencies of the government with information on developments in the field of U.S. foreign relations and on the work of the Department and the Foreign Service.*

*The BULLETIN includes selected press releases on foreign policy, issued by the White House and the Department, and statements, addresses, and news conferences of the President and the Secretary of State and other officers of the Department, as well as special articles on various phases of international affairs and the functions of the Department. Information is included concerning treaties and international agreements to which the United States is or may become a party and on treaties of general international interest.*

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# Nuclear Nonproliferation Policy Act of 1977

## Transmitted to the Congress

*Following is the text of a message from President Carter to the Congress dated April 27, together with a fact sheet issued by the White House that day.*

### MESSAGE FROM PRESIDENT CARTER

White House press release dated April 27

*To the Congress of the United States:*

The need to halt nuclear proliferation is one of mankind's most pressing challenges. Members of my Administration are now engaged in international discussions to find ways of controlling the spread of nuclear explosive capability without depriving any nation of the means to satisfy its energy needs. The domestic nuclear policies which I have already put forward will place our nation in a leadership position, setting a positive example for other nuclear suppliers as well as demonstrating the strength of our concern here at home for the hazards of a plutonium economy. Today I am submitting to the Congress a bill which would establish for the United States a strong and effective non-proliferation policy.

This bill relies heavily upon work which the Congress has already done, and I commend the Congress for these valuable initiatives. I look forward to working with the Congress to establish a strong, responsible legislative framework from which we can continue strengthened efforts to halt the spread of nuclear weapons.

Among our shared goals are: an increase in the effectiveness of international safeguards and controls on peaceful nuclear activities to prevent further proliferation of nuclear explosive devices, the establishment of common international sanctions to

prevent such proliferation, an effort to encourage nations which have not ratified the Non-Proliferation Treaty to do so at the earliest possible date, and adoption of programs to enhance the reliability of the United States as a supplier of nuclear fuel.

This bill differs from pending proposals, however, in several respects:

1. It defines the immediate nuclear export conditions which we can reasonably ask other nations to meet while we negotiate stricter arrangements. The proposals currently before Congress would impose criteria that could force an immediate moratorium on our nuclear exports, adversely affecting certain allies whose cooperation is needed if we are to achieve our ultimate objective of non-proliferation.

2. It defines additional nuclear export conditions which will be required in new agreements for civil nuclear cooperation. In particular, we will require as a continuing condition of U.S. supply that recipients have all their nuclear activities under IAEA [International Atomic Energy Agency] safeguards. I view this as an interim measure and shall make it clear to all potential recipients and to other nuclear suppliers that our first preference, and continuing objective, is universal adherence to the Non-Proliferation Treaty.

3. For the near future, it attempts to tighten the conditions for U.S. nuclear cooperation through renegotiation of existing agreements to meet the same standards as those we will require in new agreements. I believe that this approach will better meet our non-proliferation objectives than will the unilateral imposition of new export licensing conditions.

White House press release dated April 27

4. It increases the flexibility we need to deal with an extremely complex subject. For example, instead of requiring countries that want our nuclear exports to forswear fuel enrichment and reprocessing for all time, it allows us to draft new agreements using incentives to encourage countries not to acquire such facilities. It also permits me to grant exceptions when doing so would further our basic aim of non-proliferation. All new cooperation agreements would, of course, be subject to Congressional review.

This bill is intended to reassure other nations that the United States will be a reliable supplier of nuclear fuel and equipment for those who genuinely share our desire for non-proliferation. It will insure that when all statutory standards have been met, export licenses will be issued—or, if the judgment of the Executive Branch and the independent Nuclear Regulatory Commission should differ, that a workable mechanism exists for resolving the dispute.

Since I intend personally to oversee Executive Branch actions affecting non-proliferation, I do not think a substantial reorganization of the responsibility for nuclear exports within the Executive Branch is necessary. This conclusion is shared by the Nuclear Regulatory Commission.

The need for prompt action is great. Until domestic legislation is enacted, other countries will be reluctant to renegotiate their agreements with us, because they will fear that new legislation might suddenly change the terms of cooperation. If the incentives we offer them to renegotiate with us are not attractive enough, the United States could lose important existing safeguards and controls. And if our policy is too weak, we could find ourselves powerless to restrain a deadly world-wide expansion of nuclear explosive capability. I believe the legislation now submitted to you strikes the necessary balance.

JIMMY CARTER.

THE WHITE HOUSE, April 27, 1977.

The Nuclear Non-Proliferation Policy Act of 1977, the domestic nuclear policies announced by the President on April 7, and the additional policy decisions included in this fact sheet are key components of the Administration's nuclear nonproliferation policy. The President's policy decisions include:

—New conditions we will require for the granting of nuclear export licenses.

—Additional new conditions we will require in new U.S. agreements for cooperation. These agreements are the formal bilateral undertakings which form the basis for civil nuclear interactions with other nations.

—Policies the executive branch will follow in making recommendations to the Nuclear Regulatory Commission on the export of sensitive items such as plutonium and highly enriched uranium (the weapons-usable form of uranium, known as HEU).

—Policies the executive branch will follow in deciding whether to approve a request by another nation to retransfer U.S.-supplied fuel to a third nation for reprocessing.

—Policies to improve U.S. reliability as a nuclear fuel supplier by introducing greater clarity and predictability into the export licensing process.

Together, all these policies will place the United States in a leadership position among nuclear suppliers, and will establish a strong and effective nonproliferation policy. These policies have been developed, and must be evaluated, as a complete package. They are intended as a delicately balanced blend of:

—*Denials*: for those items, such as reprocessing plants, which we believe create such a large risk that their export should be avoided whenever possible;

—*Controls*: over those items and technologies, required by ongoing programs, where improved safeguards and conditions for physical security will substantially reduce

the risk. These controls will be backed up by stiff sanctions which would be imposed on violators.

—*Incentives:* The United States fully recognizes that there is no such thing as an effective unilateral nonproliferation policy. We must gain the support of other nations—both suppliers and recipients—if we are to reach our common goal of limiting the spread of nuclear weapons. Hence the Administration's program includes substantial elements of incentives, particularly in the areas of: uranium resource assessment; guaranteed access to nonsensitive, low enriched uranium (LEU) nuclear fuel; and spent fuel storage.

The following are key features of the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Policy Act of 1977 and related Administration policies:

1. The bill establishes for the first time a statutory requirement forbidding the independent Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) from granting a license to export nuclear materials or facilities until it has been notified by the executive branch of its judgment that the issuance of a license "will not be inimicable to the common defense and security." This judgment will be reached by the Departments of State, Defense, Commerce, the Arms Control and Disarmament Agency, and the Energy Research and Development Administration.

In arriving at these judgments, the executive branch will adhere to the following policies not detailed in the act:

—Continue to embargo the export of enrichment and reprocessing plants.

—Avoid new commitments to export significant amounts of separated plutonium except for gram quantities for research and analytical uses.

—Avoid new commitments to export significant quantities of highly enriched uranium except when the project is of exceptional merit and the use of low enriched fuel or some other less weapons-usable material is clearly shown to be technically infeasible.

—Require direct Presidential approval for any supply of HEU greater than 15 kilograms (the approximate amount needed for a bomb).

—Undertake efforts to identify projects and facilities which might be converted to the use of LEU instead of HEU.

—Take steps to minimize inventories of weapons-usable uranium abroad.

2. The bill defines the immediate nuclear export conditions which we can reasonably expect other nations to meet while we negotiate stricter agreements for cooperation. These conditions include:

—A requirement for International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) safeguards on all exported items and on any other plutonium or enriched uranium that might be used in the exported facility or produced through its use.

—A requirement that no U.S. export be used for research or production of any nuclear explosive device.

—A requirement that no U.S. export be retransferred by a recipient nation to any other nation without the prior approval of the United States.

—A requirement that no fuel exported from the United States be reprocessed without the prior approval of the United States.

These criteria differ from proposals currently before Congress which include criteria that could force an immediate moratorium on U.S. nuclear exports. Such a moratorium would seriously damage U.S. relations with certain allies whose cooperation is essential if we are to achieve our nonproliferation objectives.

3. The bill defines additional nuclear export conditions which will be required in new agreements for cooperation. These include:

—A requirement, in the case of non-nuclear-weapons states, that IAEA safeguards cover all nuclear materials and equipment regardless of whether these have been supplied by the United States. Fulfillment of this requirement will be a

condition of continuing U.S. nuclear supply.

The President has also directed that this requirement be viewed only as an interim measure and that the United States' first preference, and continuing objective, is universal adherence to the Non-Proliferation Treaty.

—The stipulation that U.S. cooperation under the agreement shall cease if the recipient detonates a nuclear device or materially violates IAEA safeguards or any guarantee it has given under the agreement.

—A requirement for IAEA safeguards on all U.S.-supplied material and equipment for indefinite duration, whether or not the agreement for cooperation remains in force.

—The U.S. right of approval on retransfers extended to all special nuclear material produced through the use of U.S. equipment.

—The U.S. right of approval on reprocessing extended to all special nuclear material produced through use of U.S. equipment.

4. For the near future, the bill proposes to tighten the conditions for U.S. nuclear cooperation through the renegotiation of existing agreements to meet the same standards as those we will require for new agreements (as specified in 3 above). This approach will better meet U.S. nonproliferation objectives than would an attempt to impose unilaterally new export-licensing conditions.

5. The bill provides the flexibility needed to deal with the many different situations and nations involved. For example, it makes the necessary exceptions for licenses under existing multilateral agreements. It also establishes an efficient mechanism for the President and Congress to review cases where the executive branch and the independent NRC differ on the granting of a proposed export license. And it permits the President to grant exceptions from the stiff new conditions required for new agreements for cooperation, if he considers that this is in our overall nonproliferation interest.

6. The bill creates sanctions against the violation of nuclear agreements by providing that no nuclear export shall be granted to

any non-nuclear-weapons state that, after enactment of this legislation:

—Detonates a nuclear explosive device.

—Terminates or abrogates IAEA safeguards.

—Is found by the President to have materially violated an IAEA agreement or any other guarantee it has given under an agreement for cooperation with the United States;

unless the President determines that such a cutoff would hinder the achievement of U.S. non-proliferation objectives or would jeopardize the common defense and security.

7. The legislation proposes the establishment of an international Nuclear Fuel Cycle Evaluation Program, aimed at furthering the development of alternative nuclear fuel cycles which do not provide access to weapons-usable material, as announced by the President in his April 7 statement.

8. As an essential element of the international evaluation program, the legislation proposes a number of policies to assure that adequate nuclear fuel supply will be available to all nations as a non-proliferation incentive. These include:

—A policy to assure adequate U.S. uranium enrichment capacity.

—A policy assuring that nuclear exports will be licensed on a timely basis once statutory requirements are met.

—U.S. initiatives to promote international consultations to develop multilateral means for meeting worldwide nuclear fuel needs.

The bill further requires the President to report to the Congress on the progress of these discussions and to propose any legislation he may consider necessary to promote these objectives.

9. The bill commits the United States to work with other nations to strengthen the International Atomic Energy Agency through: contribution of technical resources, support, and funding; improving the IAEA safeguards system; and by assuring that that IAEA receives the data needed for it to administer an effective comprehensive international safeguards program.

## President Carter's News Conference of April 22

*Following are excerpts relating to foreign policy from the transcript of a news conference held by President Carter on April 22.*<sup>1</sup>

*Q. Mr. President, are we going to transfer American battle tanks to Zaire? And if so, why?*

*The President:* No. No decision has been made about that. The news stories that have come out recently about the possible sale of tanks to Zaire are a result of a study that was done a year or so ago before I became President.

This question has never come to my attention since I have been in office until this morning. I have made no decision about sending tanks to Zaire. And I think it's highly unlikely that I would advocate such a sale.

*Q. But to take up another foreign policy question, your son Chip was on a trip to China, has come back. I think you sent a message with him and may have gotten a message back. I wonder if you could tell us about that communication, and specifically, are you planning a trip to China or are they planning, any of their leaders, to come here in the near future?*

*The President:* The nature of the message is one just of friendship and good will and a mutual agreement that it's in the best interests of the world and our own countries to increase communication, trade, and ultimately, through compliance with the Shanghai agreement, to normalize relationships with China.

I don't anticipate any trips outside the country this year except my trip early next month to London. And I'll go to Geneva to meet with President Asad of Syria.

The Chinese Government have always

taken the position that their leaders coming to our country would not be appropriate so long as there is an Ambassador here which represents the Republic of China on Taiwan. So, I think even from the first visits there of President Nixon and Kissinger, this has been the Chinese position. I would certainly welcome the Chinese leaders to come to Washington to meet with me, as I would other leaders of nations, but I think I have described the situation now as best I can.

*Q. Mr. President, you have had your attention taken away from one of the alternatives that you have been working on, the Middle East peace, recently. But I wonder if there has been any progress, movement, or additional flow going on privately during this time, if you could tell us about it.*

*The President:* Well, yes. I've continued my own study of the Middle Eastern question. As you know, I have met now with the Prime Minister of Israel and also with President Sadat of Egypt. Today I'll be meeting with Deputy Prime Minister and Foreign Minister Khaddam of Syria. And early next month I'll meet with President Asad from Syria on a brief trip to Geneva. King Hussein [of Jordan] will be here Sunday and Monday to meet with me.

And I'm trying to learn as best I can the attitudes of the different nations that are involved in the Middle Eastern dispute and to try to at least observe and analyze some common ground on which a permanent settlement might be reached.

I think it's best until I meet with all these leaders to minimize my own statements on this subject. I have outlined as best I could some of the options concerning borders; Palestine, the Palestinian people; the definition of permanent peace—those are the three major issues. But now that the foreign leaders know my own suggestions, I am trying to get responses from them before I make further comments about it.

*Q. Mr. President, you described—Senator Clark has described Zaire as a military dictatorship. How can you regard this as a defender of human rights?*

<sup>1</sup> For the complete transcript, see Weekly Compilation of Presidential Documents dated Apr. 25, 1977, p. 588.

*The President:* I have never defined Zaire as a defender of human rights. I know that there are some problems in Zaire with human rights, as there are here and in many other countries. But our friendship and aid historically for Zaire has not been predicated on their perfection in dealing with human rights. I think, as you know, our military aid for Zaire has been very modest.

We have observed some stabilizing of the situation in the southern part of Zaire lately, and I think our policy even in spite of the invasion from Angola by the Katangans has been compatible with our past policies.

*Q. Are you sure there are no Cubans in that group, Mr. President?*

*The President:* I am sorry?

*Q. Cubans. We hear reports from King Hassan [of Morocco] and General Mobutu [President Mobutu Sese Seko of Zaire] that there are Cubans there.*

*The President:* Let me—I can't certify to this, because we don't have observers all over the Shaba region. Our best information is that the Katangans have been trained within Angola by the Cubans. We have no direct evidence at all that there are Cubans within Zaire.

*Q. What will you seek to accomplish, Mr. President, when you go to London, in the energy field, and to what extent is cooperation among the major industrial countries in the West an important factor in the success of your own energy plan?*

*The President:* I think it's accurate to say that we've now taken the leadership in moving toward a comprehensive energy policy for our nation. I would hope that the other nations around the world would do a similar thing.

There are other aspects of the energy question, though, that must be addressed. One is atomic energy, reprocessing of spent nuclear fuels, a move toward non-proliferation of atomic explosive capability. So there will be a very complicated interrelationship involving trade.

I think to the extent that we do conserve

in our own country it would make it easier for our European allies and for Japan to meet their own energy needs. We now sap so much extra oil from the international supplies that it makes it more difficult for them.

I think this will, over a period of time, reduce the intense competition that's inevitable for dwindling supplies of oil in the face of increasing demand.

## **Western Summation of 11th Round of MBFR Talks**

*The 11th round of negotiations on mutual and balanced force reductions in Central Europe was held at Vienna February 3-April 15. Following is a statement made on behalf of the Western allies by Baron W. J. de Vos van Steenwijk, Netherlands Representative, at a news conference at Vienna on April 15.*

Arms Control and Disarmament Agency press release 77-4

During the past round, we have dealt with a number of general topics and with the problems of the discrepancy between Eastern and Western figures on Warsaw Pact military manpower.

One of the general topics Western participants have concentrated on during the round is the need for the East to move away from its basic conceptual approach to these negotiations; namely, that all 11 direct participants in these negotiations must submit to an identical reduction formula as though they were identical in all relevant respects, that is, identical in military importance, identical in their geographic situation, and identically affected by the consequences of reductions and limitations of their forces.

Obviously, this approach is not a logical or realistic one if one looks at the important differences which actually exist among the different participants. Because of these differences, the East's insistence that all direct participants should be treated identically

would result in gross inequities and diminish Western security.

What are these differences? They are, first of all, the enormous differences in the military strength of participants. The participants in these talks include the world's largest military powers, the United States and U.S.S.R., as well as countries with much less military potential. Both the United States and U.S.S.R. possess a large and varied strategic nuclear capability. None of the other participants possesses anything remotely comparable. Clearly, it is not realistic to expect participants to overlook this basic fact of these negotiations.

Second, there are important differences between the different participants as to geographical situation. The Soviet Union, which is the largest power on the Eastern side, is situated in direct proximity to the area of reductions. The United States, on the other hand, which is the comparable Western power, is located at a distance of 5,000 kilometers on the other side of the Atlantic Ocean.

Another important difference is that some of the participants have substantially all their forces in the area; substantially all of their forces will therefore be affected under any limitation. But other participants have only a portion of their forces in the area, and it is only this portion of their forces that would in any way be limited under an agreement. The Soviet Union and the United States both fall in this second category, of course. But in the case of the Soviet Union, we are talking about the presence, on territory directly adjacent to the reduction area, of extremely large forces with an imposing array of the most modern equipment.

Finally, there is the important difference between East and West with regard to the overall numerical levels of their forces in the area. The East possesses sizable numerical advantages in ground forces manpower and in overall military manpower in the area. It also has superiority in numbers of most types of major armaments.

These are important realities which define

the negotiating situation we are addressing in these talks. However, the East continues to press an approach which deliberately disregards these realities. In defiance of the facts, it has insisted that the reduction formula should be identical for all participants.

The East continues to envisage equal-percentage across-the-board reductions of all types of military personnel and armaments which would establish in treaty form a right for the East to maintain its considerable advantages in military manpower and armaments.

This outcome would be inequitable and would seriously diminish Western security. Moreover, the East's contractualized numerical advantages inside the reduction area would be enhanced by the East's geographic advantages; inside the area the East would have more manpower and more armaments than the West, and adjoining the area of reductions is the Soviet Union, one of the most powerful countries in the world. Soviet forces in the U.S.S.R. are far larger than Western forces in the reduction area and would be subject to no numerical limitations under an agreement.

Western participants would in addition have to accept national ceilings. This would seriously hamper the operation of NATO's integrated defense structure and could prejudice the future organization of Western European defense. National ceilings could limit the Western ability to maintain the overall number of their military manpower at an agreed level. It is evident that this Eastern approach would diminish Western security.

We are determined to do everything we can to bring about an agreement. However, the East will have to realize that any agreement must be based on the realities of the situation and not on an artificial approach which insists on treating all 11 direct participants as though they were identical.

In its proposals of December 1975, the West made significant additions to the reductions and limitations it has previously proposed. These proposals offered a reason-

able and equitable basis for agreement based on approximate parity in ground forces, including a collective common ceiling on both ground forces manpower and overall military manpower. We still consider that they deserve a positive and serious Eastern response.

However, so far the East has given us no such response. In its February 1976 proposal, which is not such a response, the East continued to insist on the same equal-percentage approach, with no change in the outcome which would result from its implementation. The only change was a change in the sequence of reductions.

A major topic of our discussions during this round has been the data issue.

Last June, 2½ years after the West tabled data in November 1973, the East put down figures on its forces in the area. There was a considerable discrepancy between Eastern and Western figures on Eastern forces in the area. Our discussions during this round have sought to clarify the underlying reasons for this discrepancy. These discussions have been carried on in a businesslike way. However, the sources of the discrepancy have not yet been identified. These discussions will have to be continued in view of the need for understanding on force levels, for solution of the size of the reductions to be taken by each side, and for resulting limitations.

To sum up, we are disappointed that there has not been more progress in the past round. However, we continue to believe that

a basis for progress exists if the East moves to a more realistic approach which does take account of the real and important differences among the direct participants in these negotiations. The Western approach does this.

## **U.S. and Cuba Reach Agreement on Fisheries, Maritime Boundary**

*Following is a joint U.S.-Cuba statement issued at Havana on April 27 and at Washington on April 28.*

As a result of the negotiations held in New York City [March 24-28] and subsequently in the City of Havana [April 25-27], between representatives of the Governments of the United States of America and the Republic of Cuba, a governing international fisheries agreement on Cuba's participation in fisheries within the 200-mile zone of the United States and another agreement on a preliminary boundary between the 200-mile zones arising from the laws passed by both parties were concluded.

The delegations of the Governments of the United States of America and the Republic of Cuba were headed by Assistant Secretary of State Terence Todman and Vice Minister of Foreign Affairs Pelegrin Torras.

The text of both agreements will be published at a later date.

CITY OF HAVANA, April 27, 1977.



## Department Discusses Security Assistance Programs

*Statement by Lucy Wilson Benson  
Under Secretary for Security Assistance Science and Technology<sup>1</sup>*

I had the pleasure of appearing before this Committee in February with Secretary Vance and Governor Gilligan [John J. Gilligan, Administrator, Agency for International Development] as you began your consideration of the Administration's requests for foreign assistance program authorizations.

Since that time President Carter has sent forward our specific legislative proposals for security assistance. He emphasized in his message that these programs are essential to the attainment of important foreign policy goals throughout the world and will reassure our friends and allies of the constancy of our support. He noted that adjustment had been made to reflect the importance which we attach to human rights considerations, and he committed this Administration to taking human rights considerations fully into account in determining the scope and nature of our security assistance programs. In view of the ongoing arms transfer policy review, the President also noted that he was requesting only minimal changes in the governing legislation.

I now would like to provide this committee on behalf of the Administration a fuller justification of our requests. First I want to

acknowledge the debt which we owe to this committee for the leadership which you exercised last year leading the way toward a policy of genuine restraint on arms transfers and toward the enunciation of a clear and forthright U.S. policy on human rights, discrimination, and other matters of principle. The Administration is deeply committed to the goals articulated in the International Security Assistance and Arms Export Control Act of 1976. We intend to proceed toward those goals purposefully and steadily, with the careful planning which changes in such important policies both demand and deserve.

In this context, our present proposals represent a transitional program. As the President stated, in the time available we were able to make only minimal changes in the budget prepared by the previous Administration, where it was necessary to bring the request into line with the basic principles of the new Administration and to indicate as fully as possible the new directions in which we intend to move. We need the programs and the funds requested to provide us the means to proceed toward our international goals, deliberately and in full consultation with the responsible committees of the Congress.

Mr. Nimetz, Counselor of the Department of State, is with me today to answer any questions you may have about the Administration's proposals for Greece and Turkey. Secretary Vance has just transmitted these proposals to the committee as a supplement

<sup>1</sup> Submitted to the Subcommittee on Foreign Assistance of the Senate Committee on Foreign Relations on Apr. 21. The complete transcript of the hearings will be published by the committee and will be available from the Superintendent of Documents, U.S. Government Printing Office, Washington, D.C. 20402.

to the Administration bill sent to you last month by the President.

General Fish [Lt. Gen. Howard Fish, Director, Defense Security Assistance Agency, and Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense for Security Assistance] also has accompanied me today to discuss the military security assistance programs, for which the Department of Defense has administrative responsibility. I regret that I shall not be able to be with you tomorrow when Governor Gilligan appears to answer your detailed questions about the administration by the Agency for International Development of the security supporting assistance programs.

As you know, my subject today is military assistance, which we provide under the auspices of three programs: foreign military sales (FMS), the military assistance program (MAP), and the international military education and training (IMET) program. These programs comprise \$2,537,800,000 in program terms and \$972,750,000 in new obligational authority. This represents, respectively, 57 percent and 34 percent of the total security assistance request.

### **Military Assistance Program**

The law requires that grant military assistance programs must be terminated at the end of this fiscal year except as authorized by Congress to specified countries in specified amounts. We are asking such authorization for eight countries in fiscal 1978 for a total MAP program of \$284.6 million including general costs. Five of these (Spain, Turkey, Greece, Philippines, and Portugal) are countries where we have access to important base facilities and with which we have reached or are anticipating new agreements spelling out the terms for our continued access. We will submit each such defense cooperation agreement to the Congress for formal approval.

In addition, we are proposing grant assistance for Jordan, a key moderating influence among the Arab confrontation states. Our grant aid request for Jordan continues the effort of the U.S. Government to use se-

curity assistance as an effective means of advancing the cause of peace in the Middle East.

The other two proposed MAP recipients, Indonesia and Thailand, are strategically placed friends in Southeast Asia. These countries are acutely aware of the increased threats to their security following the U.S. withdrawal from Indochina. We expect the transition from grant aid to credit and cash sales for these two friendly nations will be completed by the end of fiscal year 1978.

As we terminate MAP programs, there remains a backlog of grant materiel in the pipeline awaiting delivery. The Congress recognized this in the current law, which anticipates the need to provide for the payment of such shipping costs. For 1978 we have estimated specific supply operations costs totaling \$5,450,000 for eight countries where we have ended grant MAP.

The largest single portion of the MAP request is for general costs, totaling \$60,550,000. Fifty-two million dollars of this amount is for administrative expenses, including \$38,295,000 for overseas management of the program. The committee will recall that, effective July 1, 1976, all costs of overseas programs management are to be authorized under the MAP account, including costs which had been borne previously by the military departments under the Department of Defense budget. We are anticipating continuing this arrangement, and the general-cost figure is therefore higher than it has been in past years, although the number of overseas personnel has been reduced. However, I hasten to point out that we expect almost 80 percent of these costs to be reimbursed, leaving a net charge to the U.S. taxpayer of \$7,877,000 for the 966 U.S. military and 177 U.S. civilian personnel for which we are asking authority in fiscal 1978.

### **Overseas Program Management**

Last year the Congress determined that Military Assistance Advisory Groups (MAAG's) and similar groups could continue to operate abroad after fiscal year 1977 only as specifically authorized by the Congress.

We are requesting such specific authority for the assignment of military personnel to 25 foreign countries. These are countries where we continue to have sizable military security assistance or military supply relationships or, in a few cases, where the importance of our overall security relations argues for the maintenance of this form of military representation. However, these personnel will not be conducting MAAG business as usual under the proposed new title of Defense Field Office. As General Fish will explain at greater length, the emphasis will be on management, to insure that our performance and that of the civilian contractors supporting the program fulfills the requirements of law and the contractual commitments of the U.S. Government.

We are also asking for two other significant amendments to last year's provisions regarding overseas program management.

First, we are requesting authority to assign up to six military personnel, instead of three, to carry out security assistance functions under the Ambassador, in cases where the job cannot be done adequately with three military persons.

Second, we are proposing that the Congress allow the President to exercise his discretion in determining where Defense Attachés may perform security assistance functions. In some cases, it has been most efficient for the security assistance functions to be handled by the Defense Attaché's office. Barring them from performing such functions could require the assignment of additional military personnel to the mission. Our proposed amendment would require that the President's determinations be reported to the chairman of this committee, with details regarding the number of personnel involved and the reasons for the decision.

I believe that these proposals are consistent with the intent of the legislation. We are reducing the number and size of military units assigned to security assistance program management overseas. But it is in our interest to insure that these programs are managed efficiently, in accordance with U.S. law, and in support of our foreign policy objectives.

### **Military Education and Training Program**

The international military education and training program is nine months old. This is the first budget year in which it stands alone. I am persuaded that this program has advanced our interests by contributing to greater communication and understanding between the United States and those countries with which we have security relationships.

Presently, the program is in transition toward greater emphasis on the professional education and training of present and future foreign military leaders. In the past the program was heavily weighted toward technical training in the operation and maintenance of U.S. military equipment provided under grant programs. For fiscal year 1978 we are asking for a program of \$35.7 million. This will provide training opportunities for an estimated 5,267 students from 46 foreign countries.

### **Foreign Military Sales Program**

The foreign military sales financing program totals \$2,217,500,000 for fiscal year 1978. One billion dollars, or 45 percent of the program, is intended for Israel. As you know, current law provides that Israel will be relieved of its obligation to repay one-half of the amount provided under the FMS financing program.

We are proposing FMS programs for 32 countries. These programs range in size from \$500,000, with which we plan to provide the Government of Liberia the means to purchase a patrol boat, to \$275 million in loans for the Republic of Korea, to enhance the capability of that country to deter aggression from its Communist neighbor to the north and to facilitate the reduction of U.S. ground troops.

In recent years, military credits provided under this program have supplanted grant assistance as the cornerstone of our worldwide security assistance effort.

Over \$10 billion in FMS credits have been provided to foreign governments under the FMS financing program over the years. There has never been an instance in which a foreign government has failed to repay or to

make acceptable arrangements to repay both principal and interest in U.S. dollars. Incidents of arrearages have also been remarkably few and have been satisfactorily resolved.

### **Security Supporting Assistance**

Security supporting assistance is the final major element of the security assistance programs for which I have responsibility within the Department of State. You will have the opportunity to examine this program at greater length tomorrow with Governor Gilligan. I will only note that this economic aid program—which represents over 42 percent of our entire security assistance request—is money spent not for arms or military support but for specific programs of assistance to friendly governments to promote economic or political stability.

Again this year the largest portion of these moneys is intended for Israel and selected states in the Middle East, where security supporting assistance is designed to provide a foundation for the search for regional peace and stability. In addition the Administration is seeking authority for the provision of security supporting assistance to southern Africa, an area of potential conflict between black majorities and white minorities, and for Jamaica, a friendly neighbor facing extraordinary economic dislocation which threatens its stability.

### **Programs for Greece and Turkey**

Turning now from general comments on our overall security assistance proposals, I would like to call your particular attention to our important programs for Greece and Turkey.

In early March, Clark Clifford reported to the full committee on his mission to the eastern Mediterranean. He gave you his recommendations for achieving progress toward a Cyprus settlement and for rebuilding our relations with Greece and Turkey. U.S. security assistance is an important element in this process.

It is our view that given the history of

U.S. defense relations with Greece and Turkey, defense cooperation agreements are the best way to structure our future security relationship with both countries. The agreement with Turkey, concluded in March 1976, and the one currently under negotiation with Greece do not mark major departures from U.S. security policy. Rather, these agreements build on the past and embody our commitment to mutual security cooperation in the NATO context. The agreements will improve and strengthen our ties with both Greece and Turkey and will help foster stability in the area.

The Administration is therefore prepared to endorse in principle the U.S.-Turkish Defense Cooperation Agreement. The Administration will also support and work to conclude a similar agreement with Greece. Though the Administration will defer for the present seeking congressional approval of either agreement, it is our considered opinion that interim measures are needed for both Greece and Turkey.

For Greece, the Administration is requesting security assistance totaling \$175 million, of which \$35 million is grant assistance and the remainder FMS credits and guarantees.

For Turkey the Administration is requesting that Congress authorize \$175 million in foreign military sales financing for fiscal year 1978 by FMS-guaranteed loans. We also ask that the ceiling on cash foreign military sales to Turkey be adjusted so that we can maintain on a government-to-government basis an ongoing Turkish procurement of 40 NATO-committed aircraft. These aircraft are already in production, and Congress previously has been notified of the FMS contracts involved. We are not requesting any additional U.S. funding for this sale. We have also in our legislative proposal retained all of the conditions regarding sales to Turkey imposed under section 620(x) of the Foreign Assistance Act.

We think this is a balanced, moderate program—one designed to begin the process of restoring stability in the eastern Mediterranean, moving toward a Cyprus solution,

and resolving the many problems which currently exist between Greece and Turkey. The Counselor of the Department, Mr. Nimetz, is prepared to go into further details with respect to our program recommendations in this area.

### **Proposed Changes in Legislation**

Finally, I would like to draw your attention to several changes we are proposing in security assistance legislation.

We are requesting an increase in the ceiling on war reserve stockpiles for allied countries outside NATO from \$125 million for the current year to \$270 million for fiscal year 1978. The stockpiles for which the authorization is sought support Korean forces. This effort relates to the President's announced intention to withdraw American ground forces from the Korean Peninsula over the next five years. No funds are being sought under this ceiling for the procurement of defense articles and services. I understand that in large part the ceiling will be used to accommodate the book transfer of ammunition stockpiles situated in Korea and previously maintained for U.S. troops, which will henceforth be earmarked as war reserves for the Republic of Korea troops which have taken over the batteries as U.S. troops are withdrawn.

We are asking for relaxation of the third-country transfer provisions to exempt transfers of maintenance and repair services and spare parts and NATO cross-servicing arrangements. It is frequently advantageous to pool repair and maintenance facilities; regional cooperation along these lines promotes closer security cooperation. Requiring 30 days' advance notice to the Congress before we authorize the furnishing of services or the use of spare parts would tend to frustrate such cooperation or give rise to unintentional violations.

As for NATO cross-servicing, we have informed the committee of the problems which arose under the NATO Sea Sparrow project, and the committee has accepted our advance notification of future transfers of Sea Sparrow parts and service among all NATO partners. Although this precedent provides a means for handling this sort of problem within NATO, we

would prefer that the law clarify this exception so that our allies will be reassured that such cross-servicing arrangements for U.S. weapons are feasible.

We are also seeking to expand the exception from the limitation of \$25 million on commercial sales of major defense equipment by including not only NATO countries as presently but also Australia, Japan, and New Zealand. We have security and military supply relations with Australia, Japan, and New Zealand similar in character to our relations with members of NATO. These three countries are all democratic and industrialized states which have demonstrated their commitment to world peace and regional stability. They have also in the past procured their defense requirements in part through substantial commercial purchases without U.S. Government participation, and they could well feel unjustly discriminated against by the present provisions of law excepting only the NATO allies from the limitation on licenses for commercial export.

We are requesting as well an exception to the \$25 million limitation for exports under coproduction agreements duly approved and reported in advance to this committee and to the Speaker of the House. The issuance of export licenses for the shipment of components and related equipment or services provides adequate U.S. oversight over the progress of the coproduction arrangements between the American manufacturer and the foreign producer. This procedure also avoids the kind of direct participation of U.S. agencies in procurement and delivery which would result from maintaining a requirement that purchases over \$25 million of major defense equipment be handled under the foreign military sales system. We believe that an early amendment of this provision is consistent with the intent of the act and the responsibility of the executive branch for the regulation of exports of military items.

In summary, gentlemen, the programs before you have the wholehearted support of this Administration. We have made every effort to insure that they provide all that is required, but no more, to meet our foreign policy and national security goals. I urge you to approve them in full.

## Foreign Aid Authorizing Bills Transmitted to the Congress

*Following are texts of identical letters dated March 28 from President Carter to Thomas P. O'Neill, Jr., Speaker of the House, and Walter F. Mondale, President of the Senate, transmitting legislation to authorize foreign assistance programs for fiscal years 1978 and 1979.*<sup>1</sup>

### LETTER ON DEVELOPMENT ASSISTANCE PROGRAMS

White House press release dated March 28

DEAR MR. SPEAKER: (DEAR MR. PRESIDENT:) I am transmitting today a bill to authorize foreign development assistance programs for the fiscal years 1978 and 1979.

Enactment of this legislation will enable the United States to carry out an efficient and effective bilateral development assistance program which our international position and objectives require. This bill also authorizes appropriation of voluntary contributions to International Organizations whose programs are focused on the developing world.

The bill provides that development assistance shall be made available to the poorest countries on a grant basis to the maximum extent that is consistent with the attainment of our development objectives. This proposal is consistent with the United States position at the UNCTAD IV Conference [United Nations Conference on Trade and Development], which urged aid donor nations to provide the relatively least developed countries on the UNCTAD list with assistance on a grant rather than a loan basis. The bill creates separate authorizations for population planning and health programs, and a requirement that all development assistance programs be reviewed to assure that proper attention is paid to the relationship of these programs to worldwide population growth. The bill also contains an authorization of \$200 million for a long-term multidonor development plan for the Sahel. U.S. contribu-

tions to this program will be based on equitable burden-sharing with other donor countries.

Enactment of this legislation will be an important step in demonstrating our concern for the economic problems of the developing world. I urge its early passage.

Sincerely,

JIMMY CARTER.

### LETTER ON SECURITY ASSISTANCE PROGRAMS

White House press release dated March 28

DEAR MR. SPEAKER: (DEAR MR. PRESIDENT:) I am transmitting today a bill to authorize security assistance programs for the fiscal years 1978 and 1979. I consider these programs essential to the attainment of important United States foreign policy goals throughout the world, and to reassure our friends and allies of the constancy of our support.

The programs authorized by this legislation include both military and economic forms of security assistance, with approximately two-thirds of the funds requested intended for nonmilitary programs. In addition, the bill provides for the continuation of our important international narcotics control efforts.

The authorizations I am proposing reflect downward adjustments this Administration has made in several programs in light of the human rights situations in the countries concerned. We are committed to a continuing effort to ensure that human rights considerations are taken fully into account in determining whether our security assistance programs serve our national security and foreign policy objectives.

I am not at this time proposing major changes in the authorities and statutory procedures which now govern security assistance and arms export controls. I have made clear on several occasions my deep

<sup>1</sup> For texts of the bills transmitted, see H. Docs. 112 and 113, 95th Cong., 1st sess.

concern over the burgeoning international traffic in arms. I am firmly resolved to bring greater coherence, restraint and control to our arms transfer policies and practices. To this end, I have ordered a comprehensive review of our policies and practices regarding both governmental and commercial arms exports.

We have already begun to discuss our preliminary ideas with members of the Congress, and will increase our consultations as we proceed with our policy review. When concluded, our review will provide the basis for the reports to the Congress mandated by sections 202 and 218 of the International Security Assistance and Arms Export Control Act of 1976.

Our goal is to develop, in close consultation with the Congress, policies which respect our commitments to the security and independence of friends and allies, which reflect fully our common concern for the promotion of basic human rights, and which give substance to our commitment to restrain the world arms trade.

The completion of this process within the next few months will give both the Executive Branch and the Legislative Branch a sound foundation on which they can base a thoughtful reexamination of existing law and fashion needed legislative revisions which will complement our common policy objectives, ensure appropriate participation and oversight by the Congress, and provide clear authority for the efficient conduct of approved programs.

In the meantime, I urge the Congress to avoid legislative initiatives which could disrupt important programs or would hinder a future cooperative effort based on a thorough evaluation of the facts and policy considerations. In this spirit, I have requested only minimal changes in statutory authority and have amended my predecessor's budget only where necessary to bring the request into line with basic principles of this Administration. I urge the early passage of the enclosed legislation and look forward to joining in a productive effort

with the Congress later this year to achieve constructive reform of the security assistance and arms export control laws.

Sincerely,

JIMMY CARTER.

## **President Carter's Second Report on Cyprus Submitted to Congress**

### *Message to the Congress*<sup>1</sup>

#### *To the Congress of the United States:*

As required by Public Law 94-104, this report describes progress which has been achieved during the last sixty days toward settlement of the Cyprus problem and the efforts the Administration has made to contribute to its resolution.

In my first report, dated February 11, I emphasized the high priority we place on this effort and reaffirmed our intention to work closely with the Congress in deciding on our future course. I promised that my Special Representative, Mr. Clark Clifford, would consult with you both before and after his trip to the area. He has done so. Before his departure, Mr. Clifford discussed the Cyprus question, and other pertinent matters, with a number of interested Senators and Congressmen. Leaving Washington February 15, he spent some two weeks visiting the eastern Mediterranean area to confer with leaders in Ankara, Athens and Nicosia. He also met with United Nations Secretary General Kurt Waldheim, under whose leadership the Cyprus intercommunal negotiations were subsequently reconvened. Returning from this series of intensive conversations, Mr. Clifford stopped in London to share his impressions with leaders of the British Government which, as current incumbent of the European Community Presidency as well as former administrator of

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<sup>1</sup> Transmitted on Apr. 15 (text from White House press release).

Cyprus, maintains a special interest in finding a just and speedy Cyprus solution.

Upon his return, Mr. Clifford reported to me that the leaders of Greece, Turkey and Cyprus correctly saw his mission as a signal of the deep interest this Administration takes in the problems of the eastern Mediterranean. He came away convinced of their clear understanding that the United States is firmly committed to the search for a fair and lasting Cyprus settlement as well as to the improvement of relations with our two important and valued NATO allies, Greece and Turkey, and to the creation of a more stable atmosphere in the eastern Mediterranean.

The tasks I gave Mr. Clifford were to make a first-hand assessment of current problems and attitudes in the three countries so that we might better judge what contribution the United States might make toward encouraging progress in the long-festering Cyprus dispute; to identify ways in which the United States could improve its bilateral relationships with Greece and Turkey; and to gain a better insight into the sources of the tensions that exist between these two NATO allies.

In his visits to Ankara and Athens, Mr. Clifford held detailed discussions on a range of bilateral issues, as well as the subject of Cyprus. These talks were useful in creating a better understanding of the problems which have complicated our relations with Greece and Turkey. I was pleased to hear from Mr. Clifford that the leaders in Ankara and Athens support a serious attempt to negotiate a fair settlement of the Cyprus problem in 1977.

On Cyprus, Mr. Clifford had lengthy meetings with Archbishop Makarios and with the Turkish Cypriot leader, Mr. Rauf Denktash. These talks were frank and forthright. Both leaders recognized that what would be needed to move the Vienna talks forward were specific discussions of the two central issues of the Cyprus problem: future territorial arrangements and the division of responsibility between the central and regional governments. Mr. Clifford found a new willingness to face the difficult deci-

sions which both sides must now make if a settlement is to be reached.

One indication of that willingness is the negotiations between the Turkish and Greek Cypriot representatives which took place in Vienna from March 31 through April 7. These meetings—the first such intercommunal negotiations in more than a year—were chaired for the first several days by U.N. Secretary General Waldheim and following his scheduled departure on April 4, the concluding sessions were held under the chairmanship of the Secretary General's Special Representative for Cyprus, Ambassador [Javier] Perez de Cuellar.

We had not expected any dramatic breakthroughs at these meetings; and none occurred. The two sides are still far apart in their views. But the meetings did move forward the process of probing and clarification of each side's position by the other. Most important, in my view, is the fact that for the first time since 1974 concrete, detailed proposals were put forward by each side covering the two central issues. And finally the momentum achieved in these meetings has been preserved by the agreement of both sides to meet again in Nicosia about the middle of May to prepare for another round in Vienna and thus continue the process toward a peaceful Cyprus solution.

In my first report I promised that the United States will do all that it can to help achieve a negotiated settlement for Cyprus. I believe that the United States should continue to take a part in supporting the negotiating process revitalized by Secretary General Waldheim last month in Vienna. I believe that it is essential that we continue to work with the parties to encourage and insure a sustained and serious negotiating process and equally important that we work with our Greek and Turkish allies to strengthen the ties of friendship and cooperation between our countries. Working in close liaison with the Congress, we will devote whatever efforts may be required to bring about a truly just and lasting peace in the eastern Mediterranean.

JIMMY CARTER.

THE WHITE HOUSE, *April 15, 1977.*



# U.S.-Canada Treaty on Execution of Penal Sentences Sent to Senate

*Message From President Carter*<sup>1</sup>

*To the Senate of the United States:*

With a view to receiving the advice and consent of the Senate to ratification, I transmit herewith the Treaty between the United States of America and Canada on the Execution of Penal Sentences which was signed at Washington on March 2, 1977.

I transmit also, for the information of the Senate, the report of the Department of State with respect to the Treaty.

The Treaty would permit citizens of either nation who had been convicted in the courts of the other country to serve their sentences in their home country; in each case the consent of the offender as well as the approval of the authorities of the two Governments would be required.

This Treaty is significant because it represents an attempt to resolve a situation which has inflicted substantial hardships on a number of citizens of each country and has caused concern to both Governments. I rec-

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<sup>1</sup> Transmitted on Apr. 18 (text from White House press release); also printed as S. Ex. H, 95th Cong., 1st sess., which includes the texts of the treaty and the report of the Department of State.

ommend that the Senate give favorable consideration to this Treaty together with the similar treaty with the United Mexican States which I have already transmitted.

JIMMY CARTER.

THE WHITE HOUSE, April 18, 1977.

## Congressional Documents Relating to Foreign Policy

Duty-Free Treatment for Aircraft Engines Imported as Temporary Replacements for Certain Aircraft Engines Undergoing Overhaul. Report of the House Committee on Ways and Means to accompany H.R. 422. H. Rept. 95-77. March 15, 1977. 3 pp.

Continuation of Temporary Duty Suspension on Importation of Certain Horses. Report of the House Committee on Ways and Means to accompany H.R. 3259. H. Rept. 95-79. March 15, 1977. 4 pp.

Duty-Free Entry of Carillon Bells for Smith College, Northampton, Mass. Report of the House Committee on Ways and Means to accompany H.R. 1404. H. Rept. 95-80. March 15, 1977. 2 pp.

Supplemental Military Assistance for Portugal for Fiscal Year 1977. Report of the House Committee on International Relations to accompany H.R. 3976. H. Rept. 95-81. March 15, 1977. 6 pp.

Authorizing Additional Appropriations for the Department of State for Fiscal Year 1977. Report of the House Committee on International Relations to accompany H.R. 5040. H. Rept. 95-84. March 16, 1977. 13 pp.

Amending the Strategic and Critical Materials Stock Piling Act, and for Other Purposes. Report of the House Committee on Armed Services to accompany H.R. 4895. H. Rept. 95-104. March 22, 1977. 12 pp.

## The Challenge to the Economic and Social Council: Advancing the Quality of Life in All Its Aspects

*Statement by Andrew Young  
U.S. Representative to the United Nations*<sup>1</sup>

The fundamental importance of the Economic and Social Council is obvious. The most critical task we confront, both as individual nations and collectively, is the advancement of the quality of life of humankind in all its aspects. That is the business of this Council, and the peoples of the world are rightly looking to us for initiative and leadership in their quest for social justice.

The question is whether we can, and will, respond to this challenge. I need not remind anyone in this room of the magnitude of the task; a brief glance at the program of work of ECOSOC for this year is sufficient evidence of the number, complexity, and inter-relatedness of the issues we confront. If we are to be successful, it will require a genuine, sustained effort by all of us:

—To establish a common agenda based upon conscious priorities. Such an agenda and priorities should be directed against the basic human misery which is well within our capacity to eliminate.

—To focus on the common enemies of humankind rather than on denunciation and polemics against each other.

—To focus on problem solving rather than ideological arguments.

—To work toward building an effective consensus founded on those basic commitments we have already undertaken in the

Charter of the United Nations, the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, and other major international instruments.

It is because my government and people are so concerned with these problems, as are all governments and peoples of the United Nations, that I feel compelled to warn against what I sense is an impatience on the part of my people with international development programs, or what we call foreign aid programs.

It is not that the American people, or the people of any nation, are basically opposed to helping other people or even making sacrifices to aid other nations in their struggle against oppression and poverty. It is that too often the American people, and the peoples of other nations, have been disappointed that their efforts have *not* resulted in any appreciable help for the poor of the world nor the liberation of the oppressed. No one can doubt the idealism and generosity of the American people; for example, in the 10 years 1969–78 the United States will deliver more than 10 billion dollars' worth of food under our Public Law 480. But it is often asked why the poor of a rich nation should be taxed in order to aid the rich of a poor nation. A significant part of the dissatisfaction of the people of the United States with the programs of international development is that so much of this nation's efforts have been directed to giving military rather than economic and social aid and to bolstering repressive regimes.

<sup>1</sup> Made before the United Nations Economic and Social Council (ECOSOC) at New York on Apr. 19 (text from USUN press release 23).

If we are to maintain the commitment of our people, and if you are to maintain the commitment of your peoples, to the economic and social programs of development and to the human rights programs, we must be able to demonstrate that these programs really work, that they really affect in a real and positive way the lives of the hungry, the poor, the oppressed, the tortured, and the homeless.

It is exactly against these timeless and basic enemies of all people that we, representatives of our various peoples, can meet and find an exciting and action-producing consensus. It is in the spirit of searching for this consensus that I would like to make some general comments as well as some specific suggestions for the work of this session.

### **The Inseparable Nature of Human Freedoms**

Some truths can never be repeated too often. They must always be before us. The most fundamental truth of all is this: Man is born to be free, and all that we do must be devoted to the well-being of human beings—every type of human being, of whatever race or religion, of whatever sex, and in all societies, new and old, rich and poor. This truth, this great objective, belongs equally to everyone—every nation represented in this chamber, every country in the United Nations, and those not in the United Nations. We are talking about an idea which is inherent in the human condition. It is humankind's nature to strive for dignity, to struggle for justice, to hunger for freedom, and to seek to live in community.

There is yet another truth flowing from this reality which is equally compelling. It is the duty of public officials, and especially the governing elite, of every nation, to do their utmost to realize these common goals of humankind. All of us in official service must be constantly reminded, and must do our best constantly to remember, that the responsiveness of the governing elites to the popular will for justice, for peace, for dignity, and for freedom is the test by which we should be measured.

This point has very recently been made by a man who has worked for justice and human dignity all his life. I refer to the new Prime Minister of India, Prime Minister Desai. Speaking on April 7 before a meeting of nonaligned nations in New Delhi, he said that:

We have learned from Gandhi that there is no nobler quest than to work for justice and a better life for one's fellow brethren. He taught us, too, that dedication to the service of one's people must not be a concealed lust for power. What the people need today is a happy contented life fully utilizing the aids which science has placed and will continually place at the disposal of mankind. Life cannot be merely mechanized if the end is to be happiness and contentment. There has to be a moral and spiritual base for development along with its materialistic content. Freedom from want and freedom from fear have to be secured to make that base. We have dedicated ourselves to the task of achieving these freedoms along with the right to liberty.

It is hard to match the eloquence of this great Indian statesman. But let me try to say in a few simple words of my own what this means—and what it doesn't mean. It obviously doesn't mean that we and all our societies have to be perfect. Obviously we can't. No matter how hard we try, there is going to be a lot of room for improvement elsewhere. No system within societies, no amount of wealth, will create perfect justice.

At the same time, there are some things which simply must never be accepted—the governing elites not doing their best to meet basic human needs, to avoid starvation and malnutrition—or utilizing the power of government to coerce and destroy people, or tolerating barbaric cruelties inflicted by lower level officials.

The Western democracies have often been accused of giving the highest priority to political rights—as we see them—and paying insufficient attention to fundamental economic and social rights. I propose to you that this is not so. I would recall the very important document in the history of my country, President Roosevelt's 1941 message to Congress in which he described the world founded upon four essential freedoms. These included freedom of speech and expression, freedom of worship, and freedom from fear.

But there was one additional freedom: freedom from want for all inhabitants of every nation of the world. The present Administration confirms our country's commitment to all four, a commitment manifested over the past 30 years by our cooperation in a series of economic development programs.

The inseparable nature of these human freedoms will always be borne in mind by policymakers in the United States. The very name of this Council clearly implies that the same should be done here.

We have long since come to realize that development cannot be measured in terms of gross national product. The shine of steel from a new mill is quickly dulled if its workers or their brothers and sisters still in the countryside must live in fear, be it fear of political repression or fear of not being able to feed themselves and their children.

I would like to speak to three basic fears today—the fear of hunger, the fear of torture, and the fear of racism—and suggest that these three are basic problems that we could attack with near-unanimity and high expectations of significant success if we agreed to focus on them as our priorities.

### **Combating World Hunger and Famine**

Hunger and famine are perhaps the problems that affect directly and most drastically the greatest number of human beings. Today as many as 400 million people—15 percent of the world's population—are starving. Hundreds of millions more receive only minimal food requirements. Perhaps 100 million children suffer chronic malnutrition. There are virtually no countries in the world where all the people have a healthy diet all the time.

These problems are not simply the legacy of international manipulations and maneuverings, as some would have it. Instead, they often reflect mistaken perceptions of growth. We have all been guilty of ignoring our rural populations in pursuit of machines and methods to propel us along the path of industrialization.

In our country we turned our back on the sturdy small farmer and skilled craftsman

whom our President Thomas Jefferson acclaimed as the strength of our nation. Today millions of Americans have left the farms of rural America to seek their fortunes in our cities. There, crowded together, depersonalized and hungry, too many have failed to find what they had sought.

If developing countries can learn some things from our mistakes, they will be able to adjust productive systems to meet their own special conditions of climate, geography, and human resources.

The international community can and should do much to help. Food-surplus countries can provide food aid. We in the United States hope to rework our own legislation so that our food assistance can help foster long-term development. Through the International Fund for Agricultural Development, we and other countries with the financial means are supporting efforts, and helping farmers, particularly small farmers in the poorer countries, to increase production.

All food-producing countries can help by working to fulfill the goal we set at the seventh special session [of the U.N. General Assembly] to reduce by half the food now wasted because of poor storage and handling—food enough to feed the 400 million people who are starving.

In the field of food grains we also need to establish a system of nationally held reserves to provide basic food security. The United States is urgently reviewing this question to see how we might be able to help get negotiations moving.

We need also to work harder to find technologies and systems which take account of the relationships among food production, available resources, and environmental stresses on the land. We need new ideas and new systems which do not rely too heavily on products which have become very expensive. We must be better able to deal with natural disasters, which can strike with devastating and heartrending consequences. In this context, the creative initiative of France in establishing a Club des Amis du Sahel provides a good example.

Without the freedom from want that these

efforts are aimed at securing, our words on economic development or on human rights will have little meaning to the great majority of the world's people. But the reverse is also true: We cannot attack the problems of hunger and famine without remembering justice as the goal of human society. Efforts at increasing food production will not be successful unless all nations face up to the problems of poor distribution of land ownership and income and inequity between traditional groups. For without justice, there can be no true stability, and there cannot be true social stability until everyone has enough to eat. As long as there is hunger anywhere it will affect people everywhere. Hunger and famine are realities that threaten the work of men and women everywhere who seek for a better world.

Hunger and famine are not ancient pestilences, but very modern plagues, stark possibilities that can arise almost any year and sweep away tens of thousands of innocent men, women, and children. The evident growing gap between the affluent minority in every nation and the sometimes great majority of poor in most nations only highlights the problem: While poverty spreads and famine is a real possibility, small groups in almost every nation live lives of luxury and waste.

We dare to say these things here because the silent poor majority of the world is not also deaf and blind; though they do not, out of fear and a sense of hopelessness, remonstrate against the gross inequity in the distribution of the goods of the world, they see and they hear and they understand. They will not, and should not, be forever ignored, Mr. Chairman.

Every country, including mine, has, at least sometimes, some hungry people; and every nation has some problem with waste of vital resources that could be used to feed the hungry. We are all on Spaceship Earth together, Mr. Chairman, and we are all neighbors in a Global Village. Surely our common humanity calls upon us in the Council meeting to find some new and effective means to combat world hunger and famine.

So again I turn to the fact that economic

and social development cannot be separated. We have two largely separate sections of ECOSOC dealing with these matters, two separate committees of the General Assembly, and in most countries two professional groups dealing with these problems. These are separations merely of natural convenience, and I do not propose to change them. But we must think of every possible way to increase the interface between the two approaches—in our national planning, in our bilateral cooperation for development, and in our work of the United Nations, most particularly in this Council.

At this session we have before us a resolution of the Commission for Social Development which recommends that we invite the Secretary General to set up a small working group to recommend how we can better integrate social development efforts into the work of the U.N. system. I would like to reiterate my government's strong support for this resolution. We cannot seek a more just international economic order, a better system of economic progress and cooperation, without reference to man's basic needs and what we have come to call social considerations.

### **The Problem of Torture**

I would like next to turn to the problem of torture. There's an obvious connection with the problem of fighting hunger. In each case the central focus is the same—the dignity and the worth of the human personality. If we are to mean what we say about promoting human rights, we should be concerned whenever a human being suffers, whenever his physical or spiritual existence is threatened, either through lack of food or through abuse of his body.

To put it bluntly, it's nothing less than deplorable that in our supposedly enlightened time some of the gravest offenses to the human person known throughout human history are still being committed. We know that torture exists in many parts of the world today. Not only is it practiced in its most debased and horrible forms; but science and technology have been perverted by

sick minds to invent unbelievably cruel, if highly sophisticated, modern methods. For example, advances in new kinds of drugs have brought with them advances in new kinds of mental torture.

The struggle to eliminate torture is, in my opinion, of basic importance, Mr. Chairman, even though relatively few people are actually tortured in comparison to those who suffer and sometimes die from hunger. Torture is not used today primarily as a means of extracting information from a few hardcore-opposition militants, but, rather, is increasingly used as a means of intimidating masses of poor and oppressed people. Torture is used as the leading edge of the whole system of intimidation, and such a system exists in almost every society in some form.

And while we can dream of someday in the future being able to dismantle this whole system of terror—subtle and otherwise—that keeps people from being free to express their legitimate aspirations and complaints, at this moment in history we must attack the ugliest head of this hydra-headed monster: We must attack torture. In so doing we will make it possible, perhaps, for the poor and oppressed to find more spokesmen so they can be more fully represented at the tables of deliberation of the world.

I want to make it clear that we in the United States understand that our own society still has subtle but very strong systems of intimidation at work that inhibit the possibilities of our poor, our discriminated against, and our dissidents from speaking fully to redress themselves. The bright but poor young man from our ghettos is much more likely to go to jail and find himself abused there; for those few from affluent families who get in trouble with the law, lawyers are readily available, while for the majority of the poor, minimal legal assistance is very difficult indeed.

One thing else needs to be mentioned, Mr. Chairman. The outcry against torture that has arisen in the last few years has, unfortunately, produced new and subtler ways of intimidating the spokesmen of the poor and

the oppressed and of driving the dispossessed into even greater despair and passivity. In particular, it is now increasingly common to just murder a dissident or to illegally kidnap the dissident and quickly murder him. In such cases, the security forces of a nation often disclaim any knowledge of the act, and there is no tortured person left to later tell the sad story of suffering inflicted by other human beings. So when we speak about torture, we mean three things: physical torture, the general problem of "missing persons," and the problem of political assassinations.

"Torture" is a word that is repugnant to all our ears, Mr. Chairman. There are some things we don't like to talk about in supposedly polite society. But do we not deny our own humanity, Mr. Chairman and my fellow delegates, as well as abandon others to lives of degradation and suffering, when we refuse to name that which is important and significant and has a name? Perhaps our "politeness" is something of a mask for cowardice or for our basic unwillingness to do our duty as human beings as well as representatives of our peoples and governments. Can we allow "politeness" and protocol to stand in the way of a search for answers and solutions to this problem of torture? Its essence is barbarism—today increasingly associated with modern technology, unfortunately.

In order to focus our attention firmly on the nature of the problem, a problem that I firmly believe we can help solve if we but have the will, let me mention some of the kinds of torture of which I have recently heard, from various parts of the world.

In some cases, the prisoner is hung by his or her knees, with the mouth taped tightly shut. Then a piece of cotton is stuffed in the nostrils—then the head hanging down perhaps held tightly in place by the hair. And then water is dripped from an eyedropper on the cotton, until the prisoner nearly drowns with only a few drops of water applied. The terror—not to mention the great potential for permanent physical damage—is hardly imaginable to us.

We have all heard the stories of how electric shocks are used to torment prisoners—a sad application of modern technology! Of how leather or canvas hoods are placed on the prisoners' heads. Of the sexual violations of especially young female prisoners, that even has gone so far as the raping of people of religious orders before groups of security personnel.

And then there are the more "subtle" kinds of torture, using drugs or enforced dehydration. I know of one case where a peasant leader was hung for over two days in a refrigerated room with a group of corpses, also suspended, but by meat hooks, and constantly bombarded by a loudspeaker denouncing him and telling him that if he didn't denounce his fellow peasant leaders he would be allowed to stay there until he, also, died. I know of a case today where Protestant pastors are imprisoned in a darkened cell, with one meal per day and no human contact allowed, apparently in the expectation that they will finally go mad.

Such stories—there are many of them—I only mention them here to remind us that we are dealing with flesh-and-blood problems—problems we can help solve, problems of the greatest urgency and poignancy.

### **Strengthening the Effort To End Torture**

For the past several years, the General Assembly has taken a number of unanimous decisions reiterating its total rejection of torture and endorsing measures to combat it. We now have a Declaration on the Protection of All Persons From Being Subjected to Torture, unanimously adopted by the 30th Assembly. But in spite of these ringing pronouncements taken with unanimous support, we have reports that torture still continues.

There is something gone wrong, I am convinced, in those societies in which torture has taken hold, to whatever degree. No government which claims respect from the world community can endorse torture. I am sure that in most cases the practices that do

occur are the result of the actions of disturbed or misguided individuals perverting governmental authority. Admittedly, in a few extreme instances the prevalence and persistence of torture suggests that it has been practiced as a deliberate weapon of governments' intimidation.

But whatever the reasons for torture, our concern must be to do everything we can to see that this practice is brought to an end. We must find a way to make better use of the institutions that we have, because up to now what we have done has obviously not been enough. We have before us a challenge to find more effective ways to attack this problem and to bring help to many people who still suffer from torture.

In saying this I do not for the moment denigrate what has already been done. It was all to the good for us to proclaim the declaration against torture. It has been useful to strengthen the Standard Minimum Rules for the Treatment of Prisoners. We support as well the effort to draft a body of principles for the protection of all persons under any form of detention or imprisonment which is now before the Subcommittee on Discrimination and Minorities.

Every modest step taken to strengthen the fabric of law as it applies to persons under any form of detention is to be encouraged. Support for these legal advances by all governments can be significant in strengthening the national barriers against mistreatment of persons, in making less likely the abuse of prisoners by lower level officials.

We have not yet fully exploited what is universally acknowledged to be the ultimate remedy at our disposal: publicity and public condemnation. Isn't this problem of torture of such gravity that we should seriously consider taking additional steps? I have in mind steps that would help us to expose where torture has been a part of a consistent pattern of gross violation of human rights and to learn from the experience of some governments which have institutionalized legal norms for the protection of dissidents.

This second element occurs to me because I think it gets us to the heart of the problem. In some countries, governments have felt themselves threatened by subversive or terrorist forces, and that situation has led these governments to be less stringent than they might otherwise have been in controlling the spread of torture. Several things need to be said about this aspect of the problem:

—First, no conditions which may threaten the existence of a government, however weak or insecure it may feel, are such as to justify resort to torture. This proposition is recognized by the United Nations Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, which absolutely forbids derogation from the prohibition against torture, even in times of public emergency threatening the life of a nation.

—Second, as a practical matter, infliction of torture as a means to maintain order is ultimately self-defeating. This reaction of revulsion and the renewed determination to bring down regimes which grind down their populations almost always creates even greater problems of public order.

—And third, looking at historical experience, it has been true that many new and weak governments have taken hold and have survived without resort to such methods.

These are some of the reasons we feel it would be worthwhile to consider how we might establish a group which would investigate under U.N. mandate the problem of torture on a worldwide basis—to tell us where it exists and persists, to identify the most flagrant instances, and to inform us about cases in which governments have successfully resisted or curbed resort to torture. It might be appropriate for the United Nations to establish a panel of distinguished nonpartisan experts. Such a special ad hoc body would be best able to carry out the sort of mandate I have in mind. An authoritative, comprehensive report from such a group would motivate us all, I am sure, in the direction of a new and more effective effort to eliminate this evil.

I want to mention another important area of work. I referred earlier to the perversions of science and technology which have led to new forms of assaults on the physical and intellectual integrity of human beings. The Subcommittee of the Human Rights Commission has recently been asked to formulate guidelines for the protection of those detained on the grounds of mental ill health. This timely and humane initiative of the United Kingdom deserves our full support.

### **U.N. Human Rights Machinery**

The problem of torture and the measures we take in the United Nations to combat it are part of a bigger problem; namely, the U.N.'s role in promoting human rights and the development of machinery to carry out that role. We attach great importance to strengthening the U.N.'s human rights machinery. My colleagues will recall the remarks of President Carter on this subject in his address on March 17.

It has been more than 30 years now since this machinery first began to function through meetings of the Human Rights Commission. In this relatively short time, much valuable groundwork has been laid in an area which 30 years ago was unexplored. We are at a stage when we must persist in exploiting the advances which have been made and in strengthening the somewhat fragile structure of the newer procedural devices, like those provided for in ECOSOC Resolution 1503.<sup>2</sup>

Each member of the United Nations is now under a mandate from the Assembly to develop and propose new ideas for improving the effective enjoyment of human rights through the United Nations. We take this assignment very seriously and will be proposing initiatives in the future. As the President indicated, we think there is much to be said for the idea of establishing a United Nations High Commissioner for

<sup>2</sup> ECOSOC Resolution 1503 (XLVIII), entitled "Procedure for dealing with communications relating to violations of human rights and fundamental freedoms," was adopted by the Council on May 27, 1970.



Human Rights. In addition, we want to find ways to make the Commission on Human Rights a more effective body. We think the key lies in more complete cooperation with the Commission on the part of all nations. That will go a long way to make the United Nations much more effective in protecting the basic rights of all peoples.

### **Racism and Racial Discrimination**

One of the most serious problems confronting humankind today is the problem of racism and racial discrimination. In this area the people of the United States have a peculiar responsibility: as a nation long afflicted with the problems of racism and racial discrimination, we feel a responsibility to contribute to the world struggle to eliminate all forms of racism and racial discrimination, and our President recently called upon the American people to move toward ratification of the convention of this name. Furthermore, we have been engaged in the United States for more than a century in a serious nationwide struggle, in many respects a successful struggle, against racism. Our ongoing struggle, which is not completed by a long shot and which continues, has been conducted in general in an open and problem-solving way which minimized violence to persons.

The experience of the United States offers, we believe, many examples from which the rest of the world might selectively profit. We are still struggling to appreciate the richness of diversity and to purge ourselves of the curse of believing in conformity and uniformity in this country; nevertheless, perhaps no nation has made as much progress in its struggle against racism as the United States.

That this transformation took place over a relatively short time in the face of a problem many thought was insoluble is not only a source of pride for Americans but grounds for faith that fundamental changes can take place when people of good will, everywhere in the world, show determination to work for them.

Without this faith, I would not have come here today. I believe that the United Nations provides all of us a very special opportunity—to help each other. It won't always be easy. There will sometimes be contentions and embarrassment.

But all of us must know, as government officials and as individuals, that we will not be true to ourselves as human beings unless we make the most persistent, creative, and concerted attack possible on the problem of advancing the human dignity of the individual and social justice for all. As delegates, we have the responsibility to see that our world organization plays a central role in the process. I have suggested some priorities which I hope can unite us in a new consensus—a consensus that will enable us to move forward in the long struggle to realize the dream of a world of justice and freedom for all. It is a consensus that unites us in a struggle against evils which afflict us all—not a potential and polemic struggle against each other.

The Economic and Social Council is one of the principal places where this consensus can be formulated, strengthened, and put into practice. Indeed, this is our mandate under the charter, and the people of the world—especially the hungry, the persecuted, and the tortured—expect no less from us. And it is, Mr. Chairman, exactly in these areas that real progress can be made. These are not areas in which the age-old, and sometimes new, political rivalries and conflicts make consensus impossible. These are not areas in which nationalism and racist ideologies can forever repel the great desire of the peoples of the world for justice.

Political confrontation may be a fact of the life of the world, and the correct balancing of powers perhaps is a necessary prerequisite to the struggle for world justice and peace. But the struggle for justice and peace is also a necessary prerequisite to the building of any real world order: Where there is no justice, order is tyranny. So political confrontation in ECOSOC is unnecessary and unhelpful. We must be able to unite against the common enemies of humankind

in the Economic and Social Council of the United Nations.

Perhaps in the past we have been too timid, perhaps we have asked too little of ourselves, of our nation, of the United Nations. Before the massive problems of racism, torture, and famine, we dare not be timid. We must try to measure ourselves against the challenge of the problems which confront us.

## United States Joins Consensus on U.N. Resolution on Benin

*Following is a statement made in the U.N. Security Council by U.S. Representative Albert W. Sherer, Jr., on April 14, together with the text of a resolution adopted by the Council that day.*

### STATEMENT BY AMBASSADOR SHERER

USUN press release 21 dated April 14

The United States was able to join in the resolution before the Council because of its concern at the armed attack on Benin and the loss of life and damage of property suffered by the people and Government of Benin. We want to extend our sympathy to the people of Benin through their distinguished Ambassador to the United Nations, Thomas Boya.

The United States also wishes to express its concern at the apparent violation of the territorial integrity of Benin. As members of this Council know very well, threats to the territorial integrity of African states have become a serious problem, whether by mercenaries or any other type of armed intervention. More than mere lipservice—and selective concern—must be paid to the principle of territorial integrity if international peace and security are to be maintained.

I would also like to express briefly the views of my government on the question of mercenaries and comment on operative paragraphs 4 and 5 of the draft resolution.

Under U.S. law it is a criminal offense for

any person to recruit an American citizen in the United States for service as a soldier in foreign armed forces or for any American citizen to enlist in the United States for such service. In the event that there is evidence of such activity taking place in the United States, my government will move vigorously to investigate and, where sufficient evidence is available, to prosecute. We are opposed to the use of mercenaries to intervene in the internal affairs of other countries and are committed to the enforcement of our laws concerning the recruitment of American citizens as mercenaries.

While a literal reading of paragraphs 4 and 5 of the resolution would inevitably pose problems for any government in terms of effectively controlling activities of its citizens outside its territorial jurisdiction, the United States will make every effort to insure that its laws on the subject are complied with strictly so as to discourage American citizens from becoming involved in any type of unlawful mercenary activity.

### TEXT OF RESOLUTION <sup>1</sup>

*The Security Council,*

*Having considered* the report of the Security Council Special Mission to the People's Republic of Benin established under resolution 404 (1977) (S/12294 and Add.1),

*Gravely concerned* at the violation of the territorial integrity, independence and sovereignty of the State of Benin,

*Deeply grieved* at the loss of life and substantial damage to property caused by the invading force during its attack on Cotonou on 16 January 1977,

1. *Takes note* of the report of the Special Mission and expresses its appreciation for the work accomplished;

2. *Strongly condemns* the act of armed aggression perpetrated against the People's Republic of Benin on 16 January 1977;

3. *Reaffirms* its resolution 239 (1967) which, *inter alia*, condemns any State which persists in permitting or tolerating the recruitment of mercenaries and the provision of facilities to them, with the objective of overthrowing the Governments of States Members of the United Nations;

4. *Calls upon* all States to exercise the utmost vigilance against the danger posed by international mercenaries and to ensure that their territory and

<sup>1</sup> U.N. doc. S/RES/405 (1977); adopted by the Council by consensus on Apr. 14.

other territories under their control, as well as their nationals, are not used for the planning of subversion and recruitment, training and transit of mercenaries designed to overthrow the Government of any Member State of the United Nations;

5. *Further calls upon* all States to consider taking necessary measures to prohibit, under their respective domestic laws, the recruitment, training and transit of mercenaries on their territory and other territories under their control;

6. *Condemns* all forms of external interference in the internal affairs of Member States, including the use of international mercenaries to destabilize States and/or to violate the territorial integrity, sovereignty and independence of States;

7. *Requests* the Secretary-General to provide appropriate technical assistance to help the Government of Benin in assessing and evaluating the damage resulting from the act of armed aggression committed in Cotonou on 16 January 1977;

8. *Appeals* to all States to provide material assistance to the People's Republic of Benin in order to enable it to repair the damage and losses inflicted during the attack;

9. *Notes* that the Government of Benin has reserved its right with respect to any eventual claims for compensation which it may wish to assert;

10. *Calls upon* all States to provide the Security Council with any information they might have in connexion with the events in Cotonou on 16 January 1977 likely to throw further light on those events;

11. *Requests* the Secretary-General to follow closely the implementation of the present resolution;

12. *Decides* to remain seized of this question.

## TREATY INFORMATION

### Current Actions

#### MULTILATERAL

##### Agriculture

Agreement establishing the International Fund for Agricultural Development (IFAD). Done at Rome June 13, 1976.<sup>1</sup>

*Signatures:* Brazil, April 13, 1977; Thailand, April 19, 1977.

*Ratification deposited:* Panama, April 13, 1977.

*Accession deposited:* Libya, April 15, 1977.

##### Aviation

Convention for the unification of certain rules relating to international transportation by air. Done at Warsaw October 12, 1929. Entered into force February 13, 1933; for the United States October 29, 1934. 49 Stat. 3000.

*Accession deposited:* Oman, August 6, 1976.

Additional protocol no. 3 to amend the convention for the unification of certain rules relating to international carriage by air signed at Warsaw on October 12, 1929 (49 Stat. 3000), as amended by the protocols done at The Hague on September 28, 1955, and at Guatemala City on March 8, 1971. Done at Montreal September 25, 1975.<sup>1</sup>

*Signature:* Denmark, December 1, 1976.

Montreal protocol no. 4 to amend the convention for the unification of certain rules relating to international carriage by air signed at Warsaw on October 12, 1929 (49 Stat. 3000), as amended by the protocol done at The Hague on September 28, 1955. Done at Montreal September 25, 1975.<sup>1</sup>

*Signatures:* Denmark, December 1, 1976; Senegal, August 18, 1976.

##### Narcotic Drugs

Protocol amending the single convention on narcotic drugs, 1961. Done at Geneva March 25, 1972. Entered into force August 8, 1975. TIAS 8118.

*Accession deposited:* Bahamas, November 23, 1976.

##### Oil Pollution

Amendments to the international convention for the prevention of pollution of the sea by oil, 1954, as amended (TIAS 4900, 6109). Adopted at London October 15, 1971.<sup>1</sup>

*Acceptance deposited:* Bahamas, March 28, 1977.

##### Safety at Sea

Convention on the international regulations for preventing collisions at sea, 1972. Done at London October 20, 1972. Enters into force July 15, 1977.

*Extended by United States to:* Puerto Rico, Guam, Canal Zone, the Virgin Islands, American Samoa, Trust Territory of the Pacific Islands, Midway, Wake, Johnston Islands, Palmyra Island, Kingman Reef, Howland Island, Baker Island, Jarvis Island, and Navassa Island, April 1, 1977.

International convention for the safety of life at sea, 1974, with annex. Done at London November 1, 1974.<sup>1</sup>

*Acceptance deposited:* Mexico, March 28, 1977.

##### Space

Convention on international liability for damage caused by space objects. Done at Washington, London, and Moscow March 29, 1972. Entered into force September 1, 1972; for the United States October 9, 1973. TIAS 7762.

*Ratification deposited:* Greece, April 27, 1977.

##### Telecommunications

International telecommunication convention, with annexes and protocols. Done at Malaga-Torremolinos October 25, 1973. Entered into force January 1, 1975; for the United States April 7, 1976.

*Ratifications deposited:* Somalia, February 11, 1977; Libya, February 22, 1977; Oman, February 24, 1977.<sup>2</sup>

*Accession deposited:* San Marino, March 25, 1977.

Partial revision of the radio regulations, Geneva, 1959, as amended (TIAS 4893, 5603, 6332, 6590, 7435), to establish a new frequency allotment plan for high-

<sup>1</sup> Not in force.

<sup>2</sup> Confirmed statements contained in final protocol.

frequency radiotelephone coastal stations, with annexes and final protocol. Done at Geneva June 8, 1974. Entered into force January 1, 1976; for the United States April 21, 1976.  
*Notification of approval:* Hungary, February 16, 1977.

## BILATERAL

**Bangladesh**

Agreement for sales of agricultural commodities. Signed at Dacca April 1, 1977. Entered into force April 1, 1977.

**Cuba**

Convention for the conservation of shrimp. Signed at Havana August 15, 1958. Entered into force September 4, 1959. TIAS 4321.

*Notice of termination:* April 27, 1977; effective April 27, 1978.

Agreement on the hijacking of aircraft and vessels and other offenses. Effected by exchange of notes at Washington and Havana February 15, 1973. Entered into force February 15, 1973.

*Terminated:* April 15, 1977.

Agreement concerning fisheries off the coasts of the United States, with agreed minutes. Signed at Havana April 27, 1977. Enters into force on a date to be mutually agreed by an exchange of notes.

Modus vivendi concerning a maritime boundary. Effected by exchange of letters at Havana April 27, 1977. Entered into force April 27, 1977.

**Guatemala**

Agreement relating to a cooperative program for the prevention of foot and mouth disease, rinderpest, and other exotic diseases in Guatemala. Signed at Guatemala March 3, 1977. Entered into force March 3, 1977.

**Haiti**

Agreement amending the agreement for sales of agricultural commodities of November 30, 1976. Effected by exchange of notes at Port-au-Prince April 13, 1977. Entered into force April 13, 1977.

**Mexico**

Agreement extending the air transport agreement of August 15, 1960, as amended and extended (TIAS 4675, 7167). Effected by exchange of notes at Mexico and Tlatelolco March 11 and 18, 1977. Entered into force March 18, 1977.

**Tanzania**

Agreement for sales of agricultural commodities, relating to the agreement of June 15, 1976 (TIAS 8310). Signed at Dar es Salaam March 19, 1977. Entered into force March 19, 1977.

**United Kingdom**

Agreement renewing and amending the memorandum of understanding of April 28, 1976 (TIAS 8303), relating to passenger charter air services, with related letter. Effected by exchange of notes at Washington April 11, 1977. Entered into force April 11, 1977; effective April 1, 1977.

## GPO Sales Publications

*Publications may be ordered by catalog or stock number from the Superintendent of Documents, U.S. Government Printing Office, Washington, D.C. 20402. A 25-percent discount is made on orders for 100 or more copies of any one publication mailed to the same address. Remittances, payable to the Superintendent of Documents, must accompany orders. Prices shown below, which include domestic postage, are subject to change.*

**American Women Today & Tomorrow.** This report is an analysis of a survey conducted by Market Opinion Research for the National Commission on the Observance of International Women's Year. The survey assessed women's attitudes and opinions, recorded their current activities, looked at the patterns of their lives, and asked about their views of the future. 79 pp. \$1.25. Stock No. 052-003-00249-3.

**Aviation—Joint Financing of Certain Air Navigation Services in Iceland and in Greenland and the Faroe Islands.** Agreement with other governments amending the agreements done at Geneva September 25, 1956, as amended. TIAS 8421. 2 pp. 35¢. (Cat. No. S9.10:8421).

**Whaling—Amendments to the Schedule to the International Whaling Convention of 1946.** Adopted at the twenty-eighth meeting of the International Whaling Commission. TIAS 8422. 5 pp. 35¢. (Cat. No. S9.10:8422).

**Debt Consolidation and Rescheduling.** Agreement with Bangladesh. TIAS 8423. 11 pp. 35¢. (Cat. No. S9.10:8423).

**Use of Veterans Memorial Hospital—Grants-in-Aid for Medical Care and Treatment of Veterans and Rehabilitation of the Hospital Plant.** Agreement with the Philippines amending the agreement of April 4, 1974. TIAS 8424. 3 pp. 35¢. (Cat. No. S9.10:8424).

**United States Naval Medical Research Unit.** Agreement with the Philippines. TIAS 8425. 4 pp. 35¢. (Cat. No. S9.10:8425).

**Nutrition Development.** Agreement with Chile. TIAS 8426. 42 pp. 55¢. (Cat. No. S9.10:8426).

**Industrial and Agricultural Production.** Agreement with Egypt. TIAS 8427. 14 pp. 35¢. (Cat. No. S9.10:8427).

**Agricultural Commodities.** Agreement with Indonesia amending the agreement of April 19, 1976, as amended. TIAS 8428. 2 pp. 35¢. (Cat. No. S9.10:8428).

**Mutual Defense Assistance.** Agreement with Belgium amending Annex B to the agreement of January 27, 1950. TIAS 8430. 3 pp. 35¢. (Cat. No. S9.10:8430).

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186	4/26	Fine Arts Committee, May 26.
187	4/27	Meeting to report on Apr. 1 talks with representatives of Committee on Harmonization, Conference of European Posts and Telecommuni- cation Administrations, May 13.
189	4/28	Program for working visit to Wash- ington of Prime Minister Suarez of Spain, Apr. 28-29.
190	4/28	Shipping Coordinating Committee, U.S. National Committee for the Prevention of Marine Pollution, working group on segregated ball- ast in existing tankers, May 26.
191	4/28	German-U.S. cultural talks, Apr. 26-27; communique.
192	4/29	U.S. and Czechoslovakia terminate textile agreement, Mar. 22-28.
193	4/29	W. Tapley Bennett, Jr., sworn in as U.S. Ambassador to NATO (bio- graphic data).
194	4/30	Vance: University of Georgia, Athens, Ga.

<sup>1</sup>Not printed.

<sup>2</sup>Held for a later issue of the BULLETIN.

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# THE DEPARTMENT OF STATE **BULLETIN**

VOL. LXXVI, No. 1978

May 23, 1977

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*The Department of State BULLETIN, a weekly publication issued by the Office of Media Services, Bureau of Public Affairs, provides the public and interested agencies of the government with information on developments in the field of U.S. foreign relations and on the work of the Department and the Foreign Service.*

*The BULLETIN includes selected press releases on foreign policy, issued by the White House and the Department, and statements, addresses, and news conferences of the President and the Secretary of State and other officers of the Department, as well as special articles on various phases of international affairs and the functions of the Department. Information is included concerning treaties and international agreements to which the United States is or may become a party and on treaties of general international interest.*

*Publications of the Department of State, United Nations documents, and legislative material in the field of international relations are also listed.*

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## Human Rights and Foreign Policy

*Address by Secretary Vance<sup>1</sup>*

I speak today about the resolve of this Administration to make the advancement of human rights a central part of our foreign policy.

Many here today have long been advocates of human rights within our own society. And throughout our nation that struggle for civil rights continues.

In the early years of our civil rights movement, many Americans treated the issue as a "Southern" problem. They were wrong. It was and is a problem for all of us.

Now, as a nation, we must not make a comparable mistake. Protection of human rights is a challenge for *all* countries, not just for a few.

Our human rights policy must be understood in order to be effective. So today I want to set forth the substance of that policy and the results we hope to achieve.

Our concern for human rights is built upon ancient values. It looks with hope to a world in which liberty is not just a great cause, but the common condition. In the past, it may have seemed sufficient to put our name to international documents that spoke loftily of human rights. That is not enough. We will go to work, alongside other people and governments, to protect and enhance the dignity of the individual.

Let me define what we mean by "human rights."

First, there is the right to be free from governmental violation of the integrity of

the person. Such violations include torture; cruel, inhuman, or degrading treatment or punishment; and arbitrary arrest or imprisonment. And they include denial of fair public trial and invasion of the home.

Second, there is the right to the fulfillment of such vital needs as food, shelter, health care, and education. We recognize that the fulfillment of this right will depend, in part, upon the stage of a nation's economic development. But we also know that this right can be violated by a government's action or inaction—for example, through corrupt official processes which divert resources to an elite at the expense of the needy or through indifference to the plight of the poor.

Third, there is the right to enjoy civil and political liberties: freedom of thought, of religion, of assembly; freedom of speech; freedom of the press; freedom of movement both within and outside one's own country; freedom to take part in government.

Our policy is to promote all these rights. They are all recognized in the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, a basic document which the United States helped fashion and which the United Nations approved in 1948. There may be disagreement on the priorities these rights deserve. But I believe that, with work, all of these rights can become complementary and mutually reinforcing.

The philosophy of our human rights policy is revolutionary in the intellectual sense, reflecting our nation's origin and progressive values. As Archibald MacLeish wrote during our Bicentennial a year ago: ". . . the cause

<sup>1</sup> Made at Law Day ceremonies at the University of Georgia School of Law at Athens, Ga., on Apr. 30 (text from press release 1974).

of human liberty is now the one great revolutionary cause. . . . ”

President Carter put it this way in his speech before the United Nations:

All the signatories of the United Nations Charter have pledged themselves to observe and to respect basic human rights. Thus, no member of the United Nations can claim that mistreatment of its citizens is solely its own business. Equally, no member can avoid its responsibilities to review and to speak when torture or unwarranted deprivation occurs in any part of the world.

Since 1945, international practice has confirmed that a nation's obligation to respect human rights is a matter of concern in international law.

Our obligation under the United Nations Charter is written into our own legislation. For example, our Foreign Assistance Act now reads: “. . . a principal goal of the foreign policy of the United States is to promote the increased observance of internationally recognized human rights by all countries.”

In these ways, our policy is in keeping with our tradition, our international obligations, and our laws.

In pursuing a human rights policy, we must always keep in mind the limits of our power and of our wisdom. A sure formula for defeat of our goals would be a rigid, hubristic attempt to impose our values on others. A doctrinaire plan of action would be as damaging as indifference.

We must be realistic. Our country can only achieve our objectives if we shape what we do to the case at hand. In each instance, we will consider these questions as we determine whether and how to act:

1. First, we will ask ourselves, what is the nature of the case that confronts us? For example:

What kinds of violations or deprivations are there? What is their extent?

Is there a pattern to the violations? If so, is the trend toward concern for human rights or away from it?

What is the degree of control and responsibility of the government involved?

And finally, is the government willing to permit independent outside investigation?

2. A second set of questions concerns the prospects for effective action:

Will our action be useful in promoting the overall cause of human rights?

Will it actually improve the specific conditions at hand? Or will it be likely to make things worse instead?

Is the country involved receptive to our interest and efforts?

Will others work with us, including official and private international organizations dedicated to furthering human rights?

Finally, does our sense of values and decency demand that we speak out or take action anyway, even though there is only a remote chance of making our influence felt?

3. We will ask a third set of questions in order to maintain a sense of perspective:

Have we steered away from the self-righteous and strident, remembering that our own record is not unblemished?

Have we been sensitive to genuine security interests, realizing that outbreak of armed conflict or terrorism could in itself pose a serious threat to human rights?

Have we considered *all* the rights at stake? If, for instance, we reduce aid to a government which violates the political rights of its citizens, do we not risk penalizing the hungry and poor, who bear no responsibility for the abuses of their government?

If we are determined to act, the means available range from quiet diplomacy in its many forms, through public pronouncements, to withholding of assistance. Whenever possible, we will use positive steps of encouragement and inducement. Our strong support will go to countries that are working to improve the human condition. We will always try to act in concert with other countries, through international bodies.

In the end, a decision whether and how to act in the cause of human rights is a matter for informed and careful judgment. No mechanistic formula produces an automatic answer.

It is not our purpose to intervene in the internal affairs of other countries, but as the President has emphasized, no member of the

United Nations can claim that violation of internationally protected human rights is solely its own affair. It is our purpose to shape our policies in accord with our beliefs and to state them without stridency or apology when we think it is desirable to do so.

Our policy is to be applied within our own society as well as abroad. We welcome constructive criticism at the same time as we offer it.

No one should suppose that we are working in a vacuum. We place great weight on joining with others in the cause of human rights.

The U.N. system is central to this cooperative endeavor. That is why the President stressed the pursuit of human rights in his speech before the General Assembly last month. That is why he is calling for U.S. ratification of four important human rights covenants and conventions and why we are trying to strengthen the human rights machinery within the United Nations.

And that is an important reason why we have moved to comply with U.N. sanctions against Rhodesia. In one of our first acts, this Administration sought and achieved repeal of the Byrd amendment, which had placed us in violation of these sanctions and thus in violation of international law. We are supporting other diplomatic efforts within the United Nations to promote basic civil and political rights in Namibia and throughout southern Africa.

Regional organizations also play a central role in promoting human rights. The President has announced that the United States will sign and seek Senate approval of the American Convention on Human Rights. We will continue to work to strengthen the machinery of the Inter-American Commission on Human Rights. This will include efforts to schedule regular visits to all members of the Organization of American States, annual debates on human rights conditions, and the expansion of the inter-American educational program on human rights.

The United States is seeking increased consultation with other nations for joint programs on economic assistance and more general efforts to promote human rights. We

are working to assure that our efforts reach out to all, with particular sensitivity to the problems of women.

We will meet in Belgrade later this year to review implementation of the Final Act of the Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe—the so-called Helsinki conference. We will take this occasion to work for progress there on important human issues: family reunification, binational marriages, travel for personal and professional reasons, and freer access to information.

The United States looks to use of economic assistance—whether bilateral or through international financial institutions—as a means to foster basic human rights.

—We have proposed a 20 percent increase in U.S. foreign economic assistance for fiscal year 1978.

—We are expanding the program of the Agency for International Development for “New Initiatives in Human Rights” as a complement to present efforts to get the benefits of our aid to those most in need abroad.

—The programs of the United States Information Agency and the State Department’s Bureau of Educational and Cultural Affairs stress support for law in society, a free press, freedom of communication, an open educational system, and respect for ethnic diversity.

This Administration’s human rights policy has been framed in collaboration and consultation with Congress and private organizations. We have taken steps to assure firsthand contact, consultation, and observation when Members of Congress travel abroad to review human rights conditions.

We are implementing current laws that bring human rights considerations directly into our decisions in several international financial institutions. At the same time, we are working with the Congress to find the most effective way to fulfill our parallel commitment to international cooperation in economic development.

In accordance with human rights provisions of legislation governing our secu-

rity assistance programs, we recently announced cuts in military aid to several countries.

Outside the government, there is much that can be done. We welcome the efforts of individual American citizens and private organizations—such as religious, humanitarian, and professional groups—to work for human rights with commitments of time, money, and compassion.

All these initiatives to further human rights abroad would have a hollow ring if we were not prepared to improve our own performance at home. So we have removed all restrictions on our citizens' travel abroad and are proceeding with plans to liberalize our visa policies.

We support legislation and administrative action to expand our refugee and asylum policies and to permit more victims of repressive regimes to enter the United States. During this last year, the United States spent some \$475 million on assistance to refugees around the world, and we accepted 31,000 refugees for permanent resettlement in this country.

What results can we expect from all these efforts?

We may justifiably seek a rapid end to such gross violations as those cited in our law: "torture or cruel, inhuman, or degrading treatment or punishment, (or) prolonged detention without charges. . . ." Just last week our Ambassador at the United Nations, Andrew Young, suggested a series of new ways to confront the practice of torture around the world.

The promotion of other human rights is a broader challenge. The results may be slower in coming but are no less worth pursuing. And we intend to let other countries know where we stand.

We recognize that many nations of the world are organized on authoritarian rather than democratic principles—some large and powerful, others struggling to raise the lives of their people above bare subsistence levels. We can nourish no illusions that a call to the banner of human rights will bring sudden transformations in authoritarian societies.

We are embarked on a long journey. But our faith in the dignity of the individual encourages us to believe that people in every society, according to their own traditions, will in time give their own expression to this fundamental aspiration.

Our belief is strengthened by the way the Helsinki principles and the U.N. Declaration of Human Rights have found resonance in the hearts of people of many countries. Our task is to sustain this faith by our example and our encouragement.

In his inaugural address three months ago, President Carter said, "Because we are free we can never be indifferent to the fate of freedom elsewhere." Again, at a meeting of the Organization of American States two weeks ago, he said, "You will find this country . . . eager to stand beside those nations which respect human rights and which promote democratic ideals."

We seek these goals because they are right—and because we, too, will benefit. Our own well-being, and even our security, are enhanced in a world that shares common freedoms and in which prosperity and economic justice create the conditions for peace. And let us remember that we always risk paying a serious price when we become identified with repression.

Nations, like individuals, limit their potential when they limit their goals. The American people understand this. I am confident they will support foreign policies that reflect our traditional values. To offer less is to define America in ways we should not accept.

America fought for freedom in 1776 and in two World Wars. We have offered haven to the oppressed. Millions have come to our shores in times of trouble. In time of devastation abroad, we have shared our resources.

Our encouragement and inspiration to other nations and other peoples have never been limited to the power of our military or the bounty of our economy. They have been lifted up by the message of our Revolution, the message of individual human freedom. That message has been our great national asset in times past. So it should be again.

## Questions and Answers Following Secretary Vance's Address at the University of Georgia School of Law

Press release 194A dated May 4

*Q. Secretary Vance, if I may digress from your speech a little bit, you were quoted in the New Yorker magazine last August as saying that if our efforts to encourage pro bono work by lawyers voluntarily were unsuccessful, it might be necessary to impose a mandatory system on all private lawyers to do a certain amount of pro bono work. Would you comment on that, please, sir?*

*Secretary Vance:* Yes. I would be delighted to comment on that.

I think that lawyers have a special responsibility to the communities in which they live and to the peoples of those communities. In New York, where I practiced law, I came to the reluctant conclusion that the lawyers were not discharging their responsibilities in terms of public service and meeting the needs of the poor and those who could not afford proper legal services. And I therefore urged that the lawyers in our community increase their efforts both in terms of time committed to pro bono activities and in terms of contributions to help support those activities. And I went on to say that if this voluntary response—which is what I pray would be the answer to this—does not succeed, then I think it may be necessary for the bar, the organized bar, to set down prescriptions with respect to contributions of time or other efforts to make possible the rendering of these services to those in the community who are not getting them. I do not think we can, in this great democracy, have a situation where the courts and the processes of the law are not freely available to all.

*Q. Secretary Vance, I'd like to ask you a somewhat more general question and ask*

*you to speculate, just a bit, if you will.*

*First of all, do you think that in the course of this Administration there is a real possibility for significant and meaningful arms limitation, particularly in light of your recent conversations with the Soviets?*

*And then in a more long-range vein, I'd like to ask you simply: Do you think that any of us will live to see a day when nuclear arms will in fact no longer exist?*

*Secretary Vance:* On the first question, I think it is possible during President Carter's Administration to see significant arms control; but, I would caution, arms control is a process which takes time and a great deal of patience. It's not something for the short-winded or the faint of heart.

These are extremely difficult problems that have to be dealt with, that in terms of the nations involved affect their very national security. And therefore it is inevitable that they become a very time-consuming process. All we have to do is look back over the history of the past to see the facts that underlie that statement.

But having said that, arms control—particularly nuclear arms control—is one of the major objectives of President Carter's Administration. It is, along with a few other items, at the very top of the list; and we will continue to put our full efforts behind seeking a fair and just settlement. And I think in time that settlement can be achieved.

Now, your second question dealt with—I believe the question: Can, in your lifetime, we see the total elimination of nuclear weapons?

I pray that that can happen. I'm not sure it can. But I think that all of us have got to bend our efforts in my generation and your generation, and the generation that will be

following on after that, to inexorably move us along the path to that time when we will be able to achieve that goal.

*Q. Secretary Vance, 200 years ago the U.S. military came into being to protect the citizens of the United States of America. Two weeks before Abraham Lincoln was shot in 1865, he said that the worst aspect of the Civil War was that it enabled a handful of corporations to take over the economy of the United States and that if this trend wasn't stopped, the Republic would be destroyed.*

*Now, 112 years later, after Lincoln said that, a handful of American corporations—mainly multinational oil corporations—around the world are protected by U.S. military forces which outnumber any forces in the days of the Roman Empire.*

*What is going to be done about our foreign policy of maintenance of empire? How are we going to return this country once again to being the democratic republic which it was founded as?*

*Thomas Jefferson said that a standing army in peacetime is the greatest threat to the civil liberties of the people.*

*We are officially in peacetime, and yet we have a big standing army which is going to equip divisions in Russian uniforms with captured Russian weapons. What use is a policy of human rights if we are going to press our policy of empire until we have a third world war with the Russians and everyone is obliterated in nuclear atoms?*

*What I'm asking you is: Isn't it time to stop the multinational corporations from dictating governmental policy? Isn't it time to set up a public solar energy corporation of the people, by the people, and for the people, to break the power of the multinational oil monopolies which have risen to power since Lincoln's assassination and have turned our nation from a democratic republic into a military worldwide empire?*

*Secretary Vance:* Well, you've made a number of assumptions and asked a goodly number of questions. Let me say that I do not agree with a number of the assumptions which you have made, but you have asked

some serious questions and I will try to answer them.

I do not believe that it is fair or accurate to state that the multinational corporations control the policy of the United States. They do not.

With respect to the development of foreign policy, this is developed within the government, without interference by corporate action from without. That policy is being developed on the basis of the fundamental values which have undergirded the founding of this country and its development through the years since then.

Insofar as military forces are concerned, the military forces at this juncture are less than they have been in many years. They stand ready as a defensive organization to protect our country and our allies should the need arise. But there is no aggressive purpose on the part of the United States to use those forces, and that should be crystal clear.

We are bending our efforts in the military area to find ways to reduce the likelihood of conflict through arms negotiations. In the area of the spread of nuclear weapons, the United States has taken the leadership in moving to try and get a control on the spread of weapons through the policies which have been announced with respect to plutonium, the transfer of sensitive technology relating to reprocessing and enrichment, and the seeking of international mechanisms to control this.

Let me just speak once more. And finally, with respect to the problems of the developing world, I think that you will see in this Administration, in the years ahead, an increasingly important attention directed to trying to work with the developing countries to try and find ways to solve the common problems which we have and the needs and concerns which they have.

*Q. Secretary Vance, as Professor [Dean] Rusk has often explained to us, one of your hardest jobs is often to justify—and sometimes even defend—our foreign policy to the people here at home.*

*One of the areas that is always touchiest is foreign aid; and that's something that the*

*press and the public are always ready to criticize the Administration for, in light of the problems we have in this country, as far as sending money out of the country. When the Administration announces a 20 percent increase next year in our foreign aid bill, what answer will the Administration, as I'm sure it's thought, have to the press and to the American public for justifying that more?*

*Secretary Vance:* I believe that it is of fundamental importance that we increase our assistance through foreign aid. The problems which face the developing world are immense in terms of the social and economic turmoil that have been caused over the last several years.

Insofar as the developing world was concerned, these problems were intensified by the action taken by the OPEC countries [Organization of Petroleum Exporting Countries] a couple of years ago, which came on top of a recession and which exacerbated the situation insofar as their economies were concerned.

Also, as the world grows more tightly knit, the economic problems of countries—wherever they may be located—tend to affect those in other countries. One of the ways that we have of dealing with this is by increasing, in a sensible and measured way, the resources available to these developing countries.

In my own judgment, the best way of doing this is through the international financial institutions—which is the area in which the greatest increase has been suggested in our budget. The international financial institutions are, in my judgment, better able to impose the kind of fiscal controls and constraints to make sure that the money is properly spent than can be done on a bilateral basis. Also, for every dollar that we put in, we get matching money from others, so that increases the funds available to meet these problems.

There are always situations where we can help on a bilateral basis—help the poor and the needy in other parts of the world. And there I think that we can and should do this on a bilateral basis.

In the long run I think this does two things:

First, I think it fills a world need for which we have a responsibility along with other nations.

And secondly, we are so interrelated these days that in the end it helps us. We depend in great measure on these nations for commodities. If we're going to deal with the global problems—we're dealing with them now in international fora—we can't do this alone. We have to be working with other nations. And to the extent that we begin to know them and work with them, I think we strengthen our chances of dealing with them satisfactorily.

*Q. With Mr. Carter in the White House and Andy Young in the United Nations there will be a lot of changes in American policy toward Africa, but there have been charges by some African political analysts that the only people who can solve African problems are the African people, who refuse to get identified as Communist or capitalist—white or black.*

*Within the last few months there have been some changes in some of the African nations—that African nations traded Communist friends for capitalist friends. Another nation may, next to that, trade, you know, capitalist friends for Communist friends. In light of some of the developments since independence of some African nations, you see people here who will be represented by a bunch of other people that are not elected by African people and there have been changes that have been brought about either by their Communist friends or capitalist friends from outside of Africa, with the result that people keep killing each—one side keeps killing the other side, then somebody else comes to power and changes policy to the other side.*

*Do you really think that if Africa will develop and grow in a peaceful environment that this Communist-capitalist influence can really help the nations in Africa? And, if you don't, do you see a time when the people of the capitalist and Communist world can walk together with other people instead of trying to tear each other apart*

*solely on the basis of ideological differences?*

*Secretary Vance:* I believe that the future of Africa must be determined by the African nations.

Self-determination on their part is the answer, in my judgment, to their future. That does not mean that we should be indifferent. If we can help to move the process of self-determination in a constructive and peaceful way, then I think it's appropriate that we do so—as we are trying to do in the situation that afflicts Rhodesia and Namibia at this time. They themselves—the African nations—are asking that assistance be given in terms of trying to move the political process to a solution of the differences without having to resort to violence as a way of achieving that. And I think it's appropriate that the United States and the other nations of the world should assist in trying to bring about such a peaceful transition.

*Q. Mr. Secretary, in light of the Administration's recent mission to Hanoi and in light of the innovative negotiations which have been occurring with Hanoi, what do you foresee or predict to be the future of U.S.-Vietnamese relations with regard to rebuilding in that country or whatever?*

*Secretary Vance:* We have said to the North Vietnamese—both President Carter and I have said on many occasions—that we believe a return toward normalization of the relationships between Vietnam and the United States is in the interests of both our countries.

The first step was taken in the mission to Hanoi which was led by Mr. [Leonard] Woodcock and out of which came real progress in the field of dealing with the

missing-in-action problem, which had been a major separating influence.

We are meeting again, as you know, next week with the Vietnamese in Paris to discuss the question of possible recognition of each other. I think that this would be a good second step along the way.

There are other problems that separate our two countries. They will have to be discussed over a period of time. And through those discussions I hope we will be able to find solutions which are commonly satisfactory to our two nations.

Specifically with respect to the question of aid, as you know, we are prohibited from giving aid, other than a small amount of humanitarian aid, by virtue of the laws of the United States.

## **Strategic Arms Limitation Talks To Resume at Geneva**

*Joint U.S.-U.S.S.R. Statement*<sup>1</sup>

The United States and the U.S.S.R. have agreed that their delegations will resume negotiations on strategic arms limitations in Geneva beginning May 11, 1977. The discussions will consider questions related to the text of a SALT agreement which were considered but not settled in previous Geneva negotiations.

In addition to the Geneva negotiations, the two sides have agreed to continue to exchange views at other levels in an effort to conclude a SALT agreement.

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<sup>1</sup> Read to news correspondents on Apr. 26 by Department spokesman Hodding Carter III; also released that day at Moscow.



## Secretary Vance's News Conference of May 4

Press release 202 dated May 4

*Q. Good morning, Mr. Secretary. How do we stand on our negotiations with the Soviets in SALT? Has the United States modified the packages that were presented at Moscow in the subsequent talks through Mr. Dobrynin [Anatoliy F. Dobrynin, Soviet Ambassador to the U.S.]? And will there be, can there be, a summit meeting with Mr. Brezhnev [Leonid I. Brezhnev, General Secretary of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union] sometime this year without an agreement on SALT?*

*Secretary Vance:* First, let me give you a rundown on where we stand since we had our meetings in Moscow.

I have had several conversations with the Soviets here in Washington since we returned from Moscow. In those conversations, we have discussed two matters.

The first has been to set up the procedures and dates for the working groups which, you know, we agreed to establish as a result of the Moscow meetings. We have set up dates for almost all of the working groups now. The meetings will be held in three different places. One meeting will be held in Washington, one meeting will be held in Moscow, and several meetings will be held in Geneva, for the various working groups. I believe there are three working groups for which we still have not been able to set up a date because we have to exchange further papers in preparation for those meetings.

Secondly, we have reviewed the two proposals which we put on the table in Moscow and the longstanding Soviet proposal with respect to SALT which existed before we went to Moscow. We have put no new proposals on the table, nor have they.

We have merely reviewed the existing proposals.

We will be discussing SALT with the Soviets when I go to Moscow to meet with the Foreign Minister. I do not want to predict at this time what may come out of those discussions. We will just have to wait and see what happens at the time.

*Q. You said when you would go to Moscow, you meant Geneva?*

*Secretary Vance:* Excuse me, yes.

*Q. And the second part of my original question, can there be or will there be a summit with Mr. Brezhnev in case there is no SALT agreement this year?*

*Secretary Vance:* I simply don't know the answer to that. That is up to the Soviets, and that has not been specifically discussed with them.

*Q. Five years have passed since the Shanghai communique was signed. Is there any reason to believe that a solution to the Taiwan problem will be any less troublesome over the next five years than it has been since '72?*

*Secretary Vance:* First, let me say that since this Administration came into office, we have made clear that we are going to conduct our bilateral relations with the People's Republic of China in accordance with the principles of the Shanghai communique.

We have had a few discussions with the liaison officer for the People's Republic of China here in Washington.

I hope that later in this year we will be able to set up a date for a trip when I will go to Peking to have discussions where we could explore in depth some of the issues

which need to be discussed between our two countries.

It is indeed a difficult problem to move toward normalization. As you all know, normalization as an ultimate goal is a principle stated in the Shanghai communique, and a principle behind which we place our acceptance. How one proceeds in terms of time and the modalities is a very difficult question and one which we will have to take time to discuss with them; and this can only be done through face-to-face discussions.

*Q. If I might follow up on the question about the SALT negotiations, do you believe that limits on the cruise missile could or should be included within the Vladivostok framework?*

*Secretary Vance:* That is a question of the details of negotiations that I really don't want to get into now. As I said, we have discussed all three proposals which have been put forward. What you are asking is: Is there some combination of the various proposals that might be put together? I don't want to speculate on that at this time.

*Q. If I may make it more general, do you have any more hope today that you are closer to establishing a framework for resuming the negotiations?*

*Secretary Vance:* I guess when you put things in terms of hope, one tends to sometimes create expectations and get oneself into problems.

Let me say that this will be a subject of discussion, and I don't want to characterize it in terms of hope or lack of hope.

*Q. Mr. Secretary, when do you plan to return to the Mideast, and do you expect the new Israeli Prime Minister to come here for talks?*

*Secretary Vance:* I expect to go back to the Middle East after the Israelis have put together a new government. As to exactly when that will be, it is a matter of speculation. The numbers that I have heard are that it could take anywhere from three weeks to a couple of months for that to happen. It would not make sense for me to go back to the Middle East until after there is a new Israeli government in place.

On your second question, I think it would be useful, once there is a new Israeli Prime Minister, for us to meet with the new Prime Minister before I go back to the Middle East, because by that time the new Prime Minister will be in a position where he will be able to speak with authority with respect to the Israeli position and what it may be and what flexibility there may be in that position. To go back prior to that time, it seems to me, would not make sense.

*Q. You seem to imply that the United States does not plan to change its negotiating position on SALT before the return to Geneva. Is that a correct assumption? And if so, why go, given the rapid communications and the intimate communications with the Soviet Union? Do you have any reason to believe you are going to be able to achieve anything concrete?*

*Secretary Vance:* We are going to be doing several things while I am in Geneva. We will be signing the Environmental Modification Treaty. In addition to that, we will be discussing the Middle East.

I think it will be useful and constructive for the Foreign Minister [Andrei A. Gromyko] and me, at that level, to pick up the discussions with respect to SALT, as was indicated when I left Moscow. And I think that any time the parties sit down and start talking to each other, there is always a possibility that something constructive can come out of it, and therefore I am very much in favor of it.

#### **Range of Missiles Carried by Aircraft**

*Q. Can you explain what modifications, if any, were made in the American proposal while the delegation was in Moscow, specifically referring to this question of nonheavy bombers carrying cruise missiles?*

*Secretary Vance:* I would be glad to talk to that.

This relates to the question of whether or not there should be a limitation on the range of missiles that could be carried by tactical aircraft.

One of the elements of the proposal which we made to the Soviets in Moscow was that

any missile, air-launched cruise missile, with a range over 600—in other words, between 600 kilometers and 2,500 kilometers—could only be carried on heavy bombers.

The reason for that was to meet the problem created by the "Backfire" bomber, which the Soviets maintain is an intermediate bomber. But if one were to be able to hang long-range missiles on it, it could, as you can obviously see, change the characteristics of that bomber.

Now, coming to the specifics of how that provision came into being, the provision with respect to tactical aircraft not being able to carry air-launched cruise missiles with ranges over 600 kilometers was first developed in 1975.

When this Administration came into office, we reviewed those studies. In the discussions in the NSC [National Security Council] subsequently, one of the options which was considered was that option. The reason for its consideration is as I have indicated. It is a very important aspect of limiting or constraining the Backfire so that it cannot become an intercontinental bomber. And it was determined in the NSC and approved by the President that this would be a provision.

That provision was not contained specifically in the very brief general instructions which I took with me to Moscow. But when we got to Moscow and put down on paper the specific proposal in all its detail, it was clear that that had to be spelled out so that there would be no ambiguity in dealing with the Soviet Union, and it was therefore included in the specific proposal which was put before the Soviets.

#### **Discussions With Vietnam and Cuba**

*Q. Mr. Secretary, how close is the United States to normalizing relations with Vietnam and Cuba, and what purpose does it serve? What is in it for the American people?*

*Secretary Vance:* Let me bring you up to date on the Vietnamese situation.

We have just completed two days of talks with the Vietnamese in Paris. The meetings have been adjourned. The parties will meet

again in two weeks in Paris. The meetings were useful. There were differences between us.

We made clear to the Vietnamese that we will not pay any reparations. We indicated to the Vietnamese that we are prepared not to oppose their admission to the United Nations. In turn, we are pleased with the progress which is being made in the missing-in-action area.

The ultimate goal of the parties is to see whether or not we can find a basis for normalization of relations between our two countries.

I have previously stated, as has the President, that we believe that is in the interests of our two countries, and we will continue to see whether or not we can achieve that objective.

*Q. Excuse me, I tucked Cuba into that, too, trying to get two questions for the price of one. How close are we on Cuba?*

*Secretary Vance:* On Cuba, we have had several meetings, but those meetings have really dealt with the fisheries question.

As you know, on the recent meeting that Assistant Secretary [for Inter-American Affairs Terence] Todman had in Havana with the Cubans, we reached agreement with respect to a fisheries treaty.

There were other subjects which were touched upon at the end of the meeting on fisheries.

Since that time, there have been follow-on technical meetings, and indeed I think one is going on today in New York, on technical fisheries questions.

There remain a number of issues between our two countries, and I would expect that these issues will become the subject of discussion at subsequent meetings.

*Q. Mr. Secretary, this is another question on the Middle East. Does the Administration consider as an option at the end of the round of talks of presenting an American peace plan to the parties, a comprehensive American peace plan, without the element of compulsion or enforcement, just for discussion?*

*Secretary Vance:* As the President has

indicated, we are going to go ahead and complete the round of discussions which we are having with the leaders of the various countries concerned.

We will complete these discussions by the end of May with respect to all countries except the new leaders in Israel. And as I have said, we cannot consider that until we have seen who the new leaders will be and when we could meet with them.

Following that, however, we will then complete our work, and we will be prepared to make suggestions to the parties with respect to what we believe would be a fair and equitable manner of dealing with the Middle East problems. We will then go and discuss these suggestions with the parties in an effort to see how much common ground we can find among the parties.

The ultimate decision, however, on a Middle East settlement, as we have said many times, must be made by the parties themselves.

*Q. Mr. Secretary, going back to your last question about Vietnam, you spoke of differences between the United States and Vietnam and also said that the United States will not pay reparations to Vietnam. Are the Vietnamese insisting on economic aid of some kind as a precondition to normalization at this time?*

*Secretary Vance:* They have talked about their view that there is a need for assistance to, quote, "heal the wounds of war." That is, in the terms of the language which was used before, essentially a repetition of a request for reparations. And so there is a difference of opinion between us on that, because we have said we will not pay reparations.

*Q. As a precondition to normalization are they insisting on this aid? Does that mean it would have to be committed before?*

*Secretary Vance:* As a precondition to normalization, I think the answer is yes. If your question is, as a precondition to a diplomatic recognition on either side, I don't know the answer to that.

*Q. Mr. Secretary, following up on the Middle East: One, did you mean to say that the suggestions you are talking about will in*

*effect be a comprehensive American plan and then you will see how much agreement there is among the parties? And two, you and the President seemed earlier this year determined that the Geneva peace conference be reconvened by the end of this year, during the second half of the year. That determination seemed to lessen somewhat after King Hussein's visit, if I read the President's remarks correctly. Where do you stand on that?*

*Secretary Vance:* Let me take the latter question first.

We have said right from the outset that it is terribly important that the proper base be laid before going to a Geneva conference so that one doesn't come to Geneva and then just start thrashing around because nobody has thought out how you are going to proceed and how the issues will be dealt with and what the degree of commonality is with respect to the views on the core issues.

Insofar as the timing is concerned, we still believe that it is very important to have a meeting before the end of 1977, indeed, in the fall of 1977.

So our views remain unchanged on that. But I stress the fact that we feel that it is essential that adequate preparation be made and that we have some idea of what will come out of Geneva rather than just going to Geneva to be in Geneva.

Now, I think you asked a second question?

*Q. When you answered the previous question you talked about American suggestions. Is that in the framework of a comprehensive American plan?*

*Secretary Vance:* I would think we would have suggestions on the core issues. Whether you want to call it a comprehensive plan or not is a question that gets into semantics. But I think we will have suggestions on all the core issues.

*Q. What kind of persuasive power does the United States have when it runs into resistance on these suggestions? In other words, are we going to see another reassessment on Israel, will the United States review the question of aid to Egypt and so forth, to accelerate compliance or voluntary*

*compliance on the part of the parties to the core suggestions?*

*Secretary Vance:* I would think that the first thing which one would have to do in moving between the parties is to try and put before the various parties the logic behind the position, why it appears to be fair, and have a dialogue with each of the individual countries with respect to whatever suggestions we may make in terms of why we believe them to be fair and equitable. But again I stress that ultimately the decision for settlement has to be made by the parties. It can't be made by the United States.

### **Prospects for New Initiative on Rhodesia**

*Q. Mr. Secretary, what is your assessment so far of the prospects for a joint Anglo-American initiative on Rhodesia, and can you say will you be seeing African leaders in London while you are there and, if so, which ones?*

*Secretary Vance:* We are working very closely, as we have all through the last several months, with the British on the southern Africa questions and specifically with regard to Rhodesia. We have been in close touch with David Owen [British Foreign Secretary] and the members of his staff in developing ideas for a new initiative in Rhodesia.

We have had a group from the State Department which has been over there recently for several days working with Mr. Owen and the members of his staff. I have reviewed the results of that along with the Vice President.

I will be going back to London, as you know, on Thursday, and on Friday I will be meeting with the Foreign Secretary and his staff to discuss the decisions which remain before us on how we are next going to proceed in this area. I think we will reach those decisions in the near future. By the near future I would say about the middle of May, perhaps even a little earlier than that.

Was there another part to your question?

*Q. Will you be seeing African leaders in London and, if so, which ones?*

*Secretary Vance:* I will be seeing Mr. Nkomo [Joshua Nkomo, President of the Zimbabwe African People's Union and President of the African National Council-Zimbabwe] on Friday afternoon. Let me indicate I have already seen Bishop Muzorewa [Abel Muzorewa, Chairman of the United African National Council] when he was here in the United States.

*Q. Mr. Secretary, your comments about SALT suggest there is a deadlock; is that correct?*

*Secretary Vance:* Nobody has moved from their position at this point, but the parties are talking to each other. So you can draw your own conclusions, use whatever words you want. We are talking to each other, and I hope out of this process we will be able to make some progress.

*Q. Well, do you find at this point as a result of these talks that there has been any "give" in the positions of either side to suggest a compromise?*

*Secretary Vance:* I don't want to get into the details of our conversations at this point, and I am just going to leave it there.

### **Expanding the Definition of Human Rights**

*Q. Mr. Secretary, in your speech at the University of Georgia on Saturday you suggested a number of questions that the United States should be asking itself about human rights.*

*Is it the implication of those questions that in the future we will be hearing fewer Presidential statements and Department of State statements on human rights, or is that a false conclusion to draw from this?*

*Secretary Vance:* It doesn't necessarily follow.

What I tried to do in the speech which I gave at the University of Georgia was to define what we meant by human rights; and as you will notice, in the speech that I gave I expanded the definition of human rights in terms of the various subcomponents that are included within human rights.

I secondly tried to set out the considerations that we would have to take into ac-

count in deciding how we were going to proceed in given cases on a country-by-country basis, which I have said all along is the way I believe that you are going to have to deal with the problem except when you are dealing in the international fora.

I stressed also the importance of using the international and regional fora to have discussions on these human rights questions.

There is no lessening at all in terms of our conviction that this is absolutely essential to our foreign policy and that it must be carried forward. I did believe it was useful to define with greater precision than we have in the past both what we meant by human rights and how we intended to apply ourselves to dealing with those questions.

### **U.S. Policy Toward South Africa**

*Q. Since the Vice President will be meeting with the Prime Minister of South Africa, could you define for us what this government's policy now is toward South Africa and particularly toward how rapidly we believe there should be moves toward majority government including all people in South Africa?*

*Secretary Vance:* Our policy with respect to South Africa is and remains that we are inalterably opposed to apartheid.

We feel it would be constructive, however, to meet with the Prime Minister, Mr. Vorster, to talk with him about the questions of Rhodesia, Namibia, and South Africa and how they plan to move within South Africa in making progress in moving away from apartheid and in dealing with the problems of minorities within their country. That is a subject which will be discussed by the Vice President with Mr. Vorster when he meets with him shortly.

*Q. Sir, when you say there is no deadline on SALT, did you have in your mind that the interim agreement lapses in October? Isn't that a deadline of sorts?*

*Secretary Vance:* It is a fact that the interim agreement expires in October, but if we reach October and we have not had an agreement, we have two choices. We can

either extend the agreement if the Soviets are willing to do so, or we can continue to proceed without an agreement but on the assumption that we will continue as if there were a continuing agreement. And I am not saying that we won't reach agreement or that we will reach agreement by October. But I don't feel we are fighting any deadline that is going to cause us to take actions that are not wise and prudent.

*Q. I am interested in the Policy Review Memorandum that the Administration is currently preparing on arms limitations.*

*I understand that when you appeared before the Senate Foreign Relations Committee last week you suggested that the United States should severely cut back its coproduction agreements with other countries and you specifically limited future coproduction agreements to NATO, Japan, Australia, New Zealand.*

*Now, my specific question is, why won't you want to consider Israel as a partner in future coproduction agreements, and related to that, what is the specific status of Israel's request for coproduction for the F-16?*

*Secretary Vance:* Let me set aside the latter question and talk about the discussions which I had with the Congress.

I met last week in two sessions, one with the leadership on the House side and a second meeting with the leadership on the Senate side, to talk about a proposed directive which would be issued by the President to govern our actions in the future in the area of arms transfers. That document is still in a draft stage. We are taking into account the suggestions which have been made by the Members of the Congress.

Incidentally, they were very helpful suggestions, and I think out of the process of meeting with them and discussing this paper we have improved substantially the end product which will be coming out of it.

The President has not yet had a chance because of preparations for the summit to reach his final decisions with respect to that memorandum, and I don't want to go into detail until he has made his decisions.

I will comment, however, that one of the items does deal with coproduction and that

this was a matter which was discussed at some length with members of both the Senate and of the House. And we have their views and they have been taken into account and will be discussed with the President as he makes up his mind concerning the ultimate form of that memorandum.

### **Developments in Zaire**

*Q. Can you tell us what are your views now on the present developments in Zaire and with the past and present involvement of France, Egypt, Morocco, and others in this conflict?*

*Secretary Vance:* The situation in Zaire has changed somewhat since we last met. There has been an active mediation effort led by the Nigerians, which we have been very strongly supporting since the outset. I discussed this a number of weeks ago with [Nigerian] Foreign Minister Garba when he came to the United States before it was decided to launch that effort.

I believe that the solution will have to ultimately be found by the Africans in a political solution, and therefore I very strongly support and welcome this effort which is being carried forward.

On the military side, as all of you know as well as I do, the situation has somewhat changed in the last several weeks. As a result of additional support which has been given to the Government of the Republic of Zaire, the military situation has appeared to change on the ground, and it has resulted in a movement back from the area nearest to the copperbelt closer down toward the border where the fighting appears to be going on now.

A number of nations, both African and non-African, have made contributions to the Republic of Zaire in terms of both nonlethal, nonmilitary equipment and assistance; and some of the other nations have made contributions of both soldiers and lethal equipment.

We will continue to follow the situation with great care and work with the parties in trying to bring about an ultimate resolution, which again I say I believe must be worked out by the Africans themselves.

*Q. Mr. Secretary, will you make any effort, when you meet Mr. Gromyko in Geneva, to revitalize the MBFR [mutual and balanced force reduction] talks; and does that have a very high priority or not in the Administration's foreign policy?*

*Secretary Vance:* Yes, it does have a high priority. You know, I discussed the MBFR situation with the Soviets when we were in Moscow. And I subsequently have discussed it with a number of the heads of state whom I visited on my trip back from Moscow.

In addition, there are discussions going on with respect to MBFR in the NATO context, which is the negotiating context, insofar as the West is concerned, for MBFR. Any decisions that have to be taken there must be alliance decisions taken among the NATO alliance members. There are subjects under discussion at this point, and we would continue in the United States to press to see that progress is made in this area, because we believe this whole question of the central balance—or the balance in the central part of Europe—is of great importance and one where we have to make progress.

### **Situation in Horn of Africa**

*Q. What is your assessment of U.S. relations in eastern Africa, and are you concerned about the Communist influence there, particularly in the Horn?*

*Secretary Vance:* We have been following the situation in the Horn with great care. We have done a study and have completed our study within the government on the problems of the Horn of Africa. Recently, the situation has become more tense as a result of a number of activities.

As you all know, the Ethiopians have asked us to withdraw a number of our people and from a number of facilities, which we have done. We had previously indicated to the Ethiopians that we had already decided that we were going to close down our communications facility in Asmara and, at the same time, to reduce our military assistance mission in Ethiopia.

We have kept in close touch with others in the area, including the other countries in the Horn of Africa, and with others who are in-

terested in the situation which is developing in the Horn of Africa.

Everybody, of course, will be watching to see what happens in the elections which will be taking place in the Territory of Afars and Issas, which is coming up very soon—that's Djibouti—and we are prepared to send a consul general there immediately after the elections are held, should the decision be that it's going to become independent at that time.

*Q. Mr. Secretary, could we talk a little bit about the European summit? We haven't mentioned it yet. This is the first summit, after all, of this Administration. What are the expectations generally? And specifically, do you feel that you will be able to smooth over some of the differences that have developed, particularly with West Germany?*

*Secretary Vance:* I think one of the main benefits that we hope will come out of the summit will be the opportunity for the heads of state to establish a close working relationship, a close personal working relationship, between each other; and this will be possible not only in the full discussions but in bilateral discussions that the heads of state will be able to have between them.

Insofar as the substantive items are concerned, as you know, the objective is to see whether or not we can develop a common perspective on the global economic situation so that the individual countries can better develop their domestic economic plans and policies within the framework of a generally agreed analysis, an evaluation, of the overall global economic situation as we see it during the next year or two.

Secondly, we would hope that there would come out of it support for an augmentation of the resources of the IMF [International Monetary Fund].

Thirdly, we would hope that we would get agreement with respect to a joint intent among the parties to resist protectionist pressures and to expand trade.

We would hope also that there would be a general agreement with respect to the steps which should be taken by all of us to improve the global balance between energy

supply and demand, and we hope also that we can reach agreement with respect to setting up a follow-on study to evaluate the fuel cycle. And this would permit one then to see what the alternatives for the long run may be in terms of the fuel cycle and how one might proceed to try out these alternatives, while at the same time assuring a supply of fuel through international means to all of the countries concerned.

And finally, we hope to reach agreement on a common approach to the upcoming discussions which will take place in Paris at the end of May—the North-South dialogue—and as a result of that to more effectively help the developing countries.

## **King Hussein of Jordan Visits Washington**

*His Majesty King Hussein I of the Hashemite Kingdom of Jordan made an official visit to Washington April 24-27, during which he met with President Carter and other government officials. Following is an exchange of toasts between President Carter and King Hussein at a dinner at the White House on April 25, together with President Carter's remarks to reporters following his meeting with King Hussein at the White House on April 26.*<sup>1</sup>

Weekly Compilation of Presidential Documents dated May 2

### **EXCHANGE OF TOASTS, APRIL 25**

#### **President Carter**

The first thing I want to do tonight is to welcome all of you to the White House to join with me in expressing our appreciation to a courageous man who's come to visit our country again.

This is his silver jubilee year. He's been in office now 25 years. And as I said this

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<sup>1</sup> For an exchange of remarks between President Carter and King Hussein at a welcoming ceremony at the White House on Apr. 25, see Weekly Compilation of Presidential Documents dated May 2, 1977, p. 598.



morning when we had the welcoming ceremony, he has been here to visit frequently; the first time, I believe, 18 years ago.

On this trip he is going to be traveling around the country. He is going down to one of the better parts of our nation, Atlanta, and then further south, a little too far south, perhaps, to Orlando. He's going to bring his young children over to join him and enjoy our beautiful country.

For a number of years we've enjoyed his friendship, and the close interrelationship that has existed between Jordan and the United States has been a great stabilizing force in the Middle East. In spite of the disharmonies that have existed there now for 29 years, there never has been a threat to the close cooperation and communication and friendship between Jordan and our country. And we are very delighted to have tonight the leader of that country come to see us.

We had a very fruitful discussion today about past history—which I have just described briefly—and the future. We recognize the difficulty of resolving the historical animosities that have existed in the Middle Eastern region. But I think there is almost a unanimous belief among the leaders with whom I've discussed this subject that 1977 can be a propitious year for major strides toward permanent peace.

We are blessed with a deep awareness of the devastation of previous wars. There is a widespread sense of waste and frustration in spending so much of a country's resources on weapons when economic progress and better health care and education needs cry out to be met. And when Secretary Vance visited all the leaders in the Middle Eastern region, a unanimous statement was: "We wish that we could stop spending so much on the weapons of war."

I think there is also a sense of hope in the character of the leaders this year. We are blessed with a sense of moderation and an inclination toward peace.

And I think the last thing I'd like to mention is that all of us feel that because of these circumstances that an extraordinary effort is worthwhile during 1977. And unless we make some substantive progress toward

resolving the historical differences, it may be a long time in the future before we can mount such an effort again.

By the end of May, I will have met with all the leaders of the countries involved and will have listened to their thoughts, their hopes, and their dreams and their plans for peace.

I think there is a general sense that the countries there trust our nation, at least more than any other nation is trusted. And it puts a tremendous responsibility on me and the Vice President, the Secretary of State, and others not to betray that trust, to be fair and open and honest in our own discussions with the leaders who have honored us by coming to our nation to visit.

I don't know whether or not we will be successful this year. That's a very difficult thing to predict. But I believe that one of the great potential benefits that we can observe and use is the courage and sound judgment and experience and the seniority and a sensitivity and, I think I can say accurately, the unselfishness of King Hussein of Jordan.

He's a natural leader. He's quiet-spoken but firm. He's honest and courageous. He's our friend, and he's a good adviser and instructor for me, a new President, as I join with many of you around this table in searching for some opportunities to resolve differences that have divided peace-loving people too long.

So I'd like to propose a toast now to a courageous King, to the people of Jordan, to King Hussein. Welcome to our country, sir.

### **King Hussein**

Mr. President, my dear friends: It's a privilege and an honor for me to be here, to have this wonderful opportunity to meet with you, sir, and to meet with friends once again, to bring you the sincerest wishes of the people of Jordan for every success not only in leading the people of this great nation, but in fulfilling the aspirations and hopes of so many throughout the world.

I thank you, Mr. President, for the opportunity you gave me today to speak to you frankly and to hear your views on many of

the problems that beset the part of the world from which I come.

I can only say that despite the feeling that I have had which has caused me to be cautious in regard to the possibilities of real, genuine progress toward a solution to the Middle East problems, I have, as a result of meeting you, sir, and our friends today, felt more encouraged and more hopeful than I have for a very long time.

To me, sir, humility is one of the most important qualities in this world and in life and one of the greatest signs of greatness. Your humility, your genuine interests in problems of others, your courage and your vision, your desire to know the truth, are all most encouraging to me and to those who have come with me from Jordan.

I am sure this feeling is shared by others who have had the privilege of meeting you, and I am sure that many others will share with us these feelings.

Twenty-five years have been short and long at the same time. Whatever remains, God willing, I will dedicate to one and one objective only: to do all I can that the future generations enjoy a better life than that which they would have had to live.

My greatest hope and dream is to feel that in some way I may, in what remains of life, contribute toward a just, a lasting peace, one which would enable all the people in our area to divert their energies and resources to build and attain a brighter future with stability that is their right. I pledge to you, sir, that I will do all that I can to work very closely with you toward that end.

Our faith in you is great, our pride and our friendship, and the pride in the fact that the same ideals are upheld by us, the same objectives are dear to us, and we share the same hopes for a better future.

I wish you every success. I will pray for you, and you can rest assured of our genuine desire to do all we can for us to arrive at our common objectives.

I thank you for your courtesy and your kindness and the warmth of your feelings. I treasure our friendship.

Gentlemen, I'd like you to join me in drinking a toast to the President of the United States.

## REMARKS BY PRESIDENT CARTER, APRIL 26

*Q. How did it go, Mr. President?*

*The President:* Just fine. It was one of the most productive and enjoyable visits we have had.

*Q. Mr. President, could you clarify a point? On the participation of the Palestinians and the possible participation in a Jordanian delegation, do you mean PLO [Palestine Liberation Organization] representatives or Palestinians who are not part of the PLO?*

*The President:* Well, it's too early to start spelling out specifics about that. The one thing I might add, on which all the leaders seem to agree, is that the more agreement that we can reach before going to Geneva, the less argument there is going to be about the form of the Palestinian representation.

And I think unless we see some strong possibility for substantial achievements before a Geneva conference can be convened, unless we see that prospect, then I think it would be better not to have the Geneva conference at all.

So far, though, I have been encouraged. I think it would be a mistake to expect too much. The differences are very wide and longstanding and deep. But I found a strong desire among all the leaders with whom I met so far to marshal extraordinary efforts during this year because of the moderate leadership that exists in the Middle East and because of the experiences that have been so devastating in the past. So we are all determined to do the best we can in '77.

I think that the exact composition of the delegations, involving the Palestinians, of course, and the interrelationships that exist among the Arab nations—whether part of the discussions would be done as a group and part of them on a bilateral basis, those kinds of things have to be worked out.

After I've finished meeting all the leaders in May, a strong likelihood is that we would consolidate our own analysis of the remaining problems and possible answers to questions, and then Secretary Vance would go back to the Middle East for another com-

plete round of talks with the leaders involved.

Those are our present plans, and so far the leaders in the Middle East have agreed with that.

*Q. May I follow that up, Mr. President?*

*The President:* I think that is probably about all I need to say.

*Q. But you do seem more pessimistic than before Hussein came.*

*The President:* No, I am not more pessimistic. I think it would just be a mistake for us to be overly optimistic. To raise expectations too high would be—I think would be potentially very damaging. I think after May, though, we'll have a much clearer concept of what can be done.

*Q. Did you learn anything new from Hussein?*

*The President:* Yes, I did. He is a very good instructor, and I am a very eager student.

## **U.S., France Hold Annual Meeting of Cooperative Science Program**

### *Joint Statement*

Press release 203 dated May 5

The Annual Review Meeting of the U.S.-France Cooperative Science Program was held in Washington, D.C., May 2, 1977. The purpose of the meeting was to underline the accomplishments of the ongoing bilateral programs in science and technology as well as to explore possibilities for expansion of the program in areas of mutual interest to both countries.

Dr. Edward E. David, former Presidential Science Adviser, and U.S. Coordinator of the U.S.-France Cooperative Science Program, headed the U.S. delegation. The

French Coordinators, Professor Bernard Gregory, Director of the General Delegation for Scientific and Technological Research (DGRST), and Xavier de Nazelle, Director for Scientific Affairs, Ministry of Foreign Affairs, led the French delegation. They were accompanied by Charles Maisonnier, Counselor for Foreign Affairs, Science Bureau, Ministry of Foreign Affairs; and Philippe Peltier, Director, Division of Foreign Relations, DGRST.

As a part of the review, reports on the status of cooperative activities were given by representatives from the Department of Agriculture, the National Bureau of Standards, National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration, Energy Research and Development Administration, Health, Education and Welfare, National Aeronautics and Space Administration, National Science Foundation, and the Department of Transportation.

In addition, meetings were held with Dr. Frank Press, Presidential Science Adviser, and Mrs. Patsy Mink, Assistant Secretary of State for Oceans and International Environmental and Scientific Affairs. Visits were also made to the National Science Foundation, National Bureau of Standards, Energy Research and Development Administration, and the House of Representatives.

The delegations agreed to work toward furthering cooperation between the two countries in the fields of alternative energy sources, energy conservation, toxicology, and agricultural research and food production.

The U.S.-France Program was established in 1969 by agreement between the French Minister for Industrial and Scientific Development and the President's Science Adviser. Collaborative programs in such fields as agriculture, oceanography, space, environment, transportation, basic and applied sciences, and health involve over 15 agencies of the United States Government.

## Administration Gives Views on Proposed Legislation on Deep Seabed Mining

*Following is a statement by Ambassador at Large Elliot L. Richardson, Special Representative of the President for the Law of the Sea Conference, made before the Subcommittee on Oceanography of the House Committee on Merchant Marine and Fisheries on April 27.*<sup>1</sup>

Mr. Chairman [Representative John B. Breaux]: I am very pleased to have this opportunity once again to address this committee. I welcome your interest and concern regarding the Law of the Sea Conference, the purpose of which is to insure the orderly use and development of the oceans, which contribute so much to our security and economic, scientific, and environmental well-being. An internationally agreed framework which would accommodate the many different national interests in the oceans would, as this committee has many times acknowledged, be of great benefit. It is the purpose of the Law of the Sea Conference, to which I head the U.S. delegation, to achieve such an agreement.

At the same time, I recognize your concern over the slow pace with which the negotiations in the Law of the Sea Conference have progressed with regard to providing a framework for mining of the deep seabed which lies beyond the limits of national jurisdiction. In particular, I can understand your concern, as evidenced in H.R. 3350, that U.S. nationals who have pioneered development of deep seabed technology may be held up in moving forward to

prove the technology and then, hopefully, to provide the world with additional sources of the minerals concerned. Our job, the Congress and the Administration together, is to find a way in which this can best be done.

Since the question of legislation, and therefore H.R. 3350, about which I will comment in a moment, is intimately tied to progress at the Law of the Sea Conference, I would like first to outline briefly where I think we are. I will not, before this knowledgeable subcommittee, go into a lengthy history of the negotiations but will comment only on developments since the summer of 1976 session.

As you know, that session did not go well, with the seabed proving to be the major sticking point. Since the Carter Administration took office and I was privileged to be named as the President's Special Representative for Law of the Sea, we have undertaken an intensive review of our positions and the problems facing the conference. We have also conducted an extensive series of bilateral and multilateral consultations. These include the intersessional consultations under Minister Evensen [Jens Evensen, of Norway, a Vice Chairman of the Law of the Sea Conference] which you, Mr. Chairman, attended and with respect to which I briefed the full committee March 17.

In addition, I have made an extensive trip to the Far East, talking to leaders in Japan, Malaysia, Singapore, Indonesia, and Australia. I have also visited Mexico and Canada and will this evening depart for a series of discussions in France, Saudi Arabia, India, the U.S.S.R., Norway, and the United Kingdom. Richard Darman and J. T. Smith,

<sup>1</sup> The complete transcript of the hearings will be published by the committee and will be available from the Superintendent of Documents, U.S. Government Printing Office, Washington, D.C. 20402.

my deputies, have also traveled widely, going first to Africa, where they visited Senegal, Ghana, Cameroon, Nigeria, Kenya, and Egypt, and Latin America, where they visited Venezuela, Colombia, Peru, and Brazil.

I will not tell you that as a result we "see light at the end of the tunnel." But I can say that we believe we can see the outline of a solution which could accommodate the diverse interests of conference participants. Whether or not we can strike a bargain along these or other lines is impossible now to predict and will depend in large measure on factors over which we have no control and limited influence. Paramount among these will be group dynamics within the Group of 77, which, as you know, is the developing-country caucus at the conference.

But I am encouraged, Mr. Chairman, by what I have seen to date, and I hope to be able to return to this subcommittee and other congressional bodies and announce substantial progress toward a comprehensive treaty covering the whole range of outstanding oceans issues. Such a treaty—establishing an ordered, agreed regime for 70 percent of the surface of the globe—would be a truly historic accomplishment. It would prove by its very existence that the nations of the world could in fact come together and in a spirit of mutual accommodation overcome their differences for the benefit of mankind.

Mr. Chairman, the United States seeks a number of important objectives at the Law of the Sea Conference. We seek to:

—Provide a framework of law within which competing oceans uses can be accommodated;

—Preserve high seas freedoms, including navigation and similar uses, in the 200-mile economic zone;

—Insure unimpeded passage through and over straits;

—Maintain maximum freedom of scientific research;

—Provide a framework for protecting the marine environment;

—Establish a comprehensive dispute-settlement mechanism; and

—Establish a regime for mining the deep seabed.

Mr. Chairman, it is because of the importance of all of these objectives, particularly our security and international objectives, that we reaffirm our intention to seek agreement on a comprehensive treaty which protects our interests. As I have indicated, I believe this is a realistic objective. We do not, therefore, support legislation now. Passage of legislation now, or indeed even Administration support for legislation, could disrupt the May-July conference session and jeopardize the prospect for progress at that session. We will be reviewing the overall question of our position on the enactment of legislation once again after that session.

On the other hand, we must recognize that international agreement may not be obtained in the near future, in which event the United States must consider legislation. It is in that spirit that I offer the Administration's preliminary views on the substantive provisions of H.R. 3350.

H.R. 3350 or any other legislation must be judged with respect to its probable effect on the conference as well as its intrinsic merits as a vehicle to permit U.S. companies and U.S.-led consortia to mine the seabed. I believe Secretary [of Commerce Juanita M.] Kreps and others will be testifying in detail on the substance of seabed legislation, so I shall confine myself to a brief summary at this point.

We believe there are certain basic elements which should be provided for in any legislation. Many of these elements are present in H.R. 3350:

—It is interim; that is, it would be superseded by a comprehensive treaty;

—Implicitly, it reaffirms our legal position that mining the deep seabed beyond the limits of national jurisdiction is a high seas freedom;

—It provides that U.S. operators must pay reasonable regard to other marine activities;

—It provides for environmental and safety protection;

—It provides for duty-free entry of hard minerals recovered from the deep seabed; and

—It provides for harmonizing these requirements with those of other nations enacting similar legislation.

The Administration also agrees with the concept embodied in H.R. 3350 that legislation, when enacted, should cover both prototype and commercial mining operations. It appears that in the next year or two the mining consortia will be committing major sums to pilot programs in anticipation of commercial operations. In order to make these commitments, the companies must know, at least generally, what legal framework will govern their future operations.

We believe, however, that authorizing the administering agency to issue at the outset the necessary rules and regulations to permit the companies to proceed with exploitation, as opposed to exploration, is premature. Industry will not need to move forward with actual exploitation until the early eighties. This approach will provide regulations for exploration and a degree of certainty to permit companies to move forward toward exploitation without forcing the administering agency to promulgate exploitation regulations without an adequate data base. We thus believe it would be preferable to defer issuance of exploitation regulations.

H.R. 3350 provides that any license shall be exclusive as against any person subject to the jurisdiction of the United States or of any reciprocating state within a specified block. We believe there is an alternative approach which would better serve our foreign policy, economic, and national security interests and still give the sort of assurance required by the miners and their banks. Permits to mine could be issued without regard to any specific mining site or block. But the legislation could provide that in regulating deep seabed mining the administering agency would set out specific criteria under which authorization to mine would be

issued in accordance with sound resource-management and environmental principles.

Under such an approach, prior to receiving a permit to mine—which would not be tied to a particular area—the applicant would be required to submit a plan of work which would include a description of the area to be mined. The permit, when issued, would limit the applicant's activities to the plan of work. Thus the legislation would not grant exclusive rights; yet it would at the same time be likely that the administering agency would, in applying sound resource-management and environmental principles, avoid conflicting mining operations, should the problem arise. Thus we believe that this system would reasonably accommodate the needs of the miners and their creditors and avoid the appearance of carving up the common heritage of mankind.

On another issue, Mr. Chairman, the Administration shares with you and the other drafters of H.R. 3350 the desire to protect companies which begin mining operations prior to the entry into force of a comprehensive law of the sea treaty against any adverse effects of such a treaty. We would approach the problem somewhat differently, however.

H.R. 3350 provides for compensation by the U.S. Government for any loss suffered in commercial operations as a result of the entry into force of a treaty. We believe this provision is unnecessary, potentially expensive (up to \$2 billion in 1975 dollars), and potentially harmful to the negotiations. I believe, in the interest of obtaining a treaty that protects our varied interests, our negotiators must have the flexibility to choose among a wide number of approaches that would, in different ways, protect our interests. Legislation providing for a U.S. Government obligation to compensate for any losses caused by a treaty could force our negotiators to assure that the treaty would conform to U.S. legislation.

The alternative favored by the Administration would be to reaffirm that U.S. miners now have the right to mine the deep seabed under high seas principles and

therefore reaffirm our intention to seek provisions in the treaty which will insure that the integrity of prior investments in commercial mining operations will be protected. Specifically, we will seek special grandfather protection for investments already made. While difficult, I believe this is reasonable and can be done if we stress that it is investment and preparation for mining an area—rather than a specific claim—for which protection is sought.

Mr. Chairman, the Administration also shares your concern that the benefits of deep seabed mining accrue to the United States to the maximum extent possible. However, H.R. 3350 approaches this problem by providing that licenses will only be issued if the minerals recovered, to the extent of the proportionate interest therein of all U.S. entities, are processed in the United States. The Administration considers this provision unnecessary since, initially at least, it is likely that our share, and probably more, of the processing will take place in the United States anyway. More importantly, however, we consider such a provision to be potentially harmful since it will certainly irritate foreign countries whose nationals are participating in U.S.-led mining consortia. We believe, therefore, that the provision should simply be dropped. We are still studying the question of whether a requirement should be provided regarding use of U.S.-flag and/or U.S.-built vessels.

Finally, Mr. Chairman, I would like to indicate the Administration's interest in having U.S. legislation provide for benefits for the international community. Such provisions would emphasize by our action, not only our words, that we are fully committed to the concept of the common heritage of mankind. It would also anticipate any future treaty, which will surely provide for certain international benefits. Such provisions could help mitigate any adverse international consequences by providing some inducement to developing countries to agree to a treaty.

Benefits to the international community could take a variety of forms. An escrow ar-

angement could be established for collecting moneys for the benefit of developing countries. Mine sites, or portions of sites, could be reserved for the future use of the world community, or there could be provisions for the training of nationals of developing countries. It is not necessary to decide now just what form such benefits should take. As the time for enactment of legislation draws nearer, there will be time to work out specific proposals. But I believe it would be useful to agree to the principle from the outset.

Mr. Chairman, I would like to conclude by emphasizing the importance I attach to the closest cooperation between our negotiators and the Congress. Since I became the President's Special Representative two months ago I have appeared five times before congressional committees and have had innumerable private contacts. Members of my staff are in virtually daily contact with the staffs of various Members of Congress. Some of you and members of your staff participated in the deliberations of the Advisory Committee earlier today and yesterday. You, Mr. Chairman, took the time to come to our meeting in Geneva and will, I trust, with others of your colleagues, be with us in New York.

I consider this ongoing exchange absolutely essential to the success of my mandate—to negotiate a comprehensive treaty on the law of the sea which will protect and further not only our own interests but the interests of all mankind. For, while there are some interests in conflict at the conference, all participants share a common interest in providing a rational regime for all uses of the oceans.

A phrase President Kennedy was fond of using is particularly apt here: "A rising tide lifts all the boats." Our task, that of the Administration and the Congress, working together and with the leadership of the rest of the world, is to provide a framework to insure that the oceans will be managed to provide an ever-rising tide—hopefully, undisturbed by conflicts—of benefits for all our people.

## Department Discusses Proposal for Zimbabwe Development Fund

*Statement by William E. Schaufele, Jr.  
Assistant Secretary for African Affairs*<sup>1</sup>

I am delighted to testify today before the Senate Subcommittees on African Affairs and on Foreign Assistance in support of the President's request for funds to support the search for a peaceful resolution to the Rhodesian problem.

This is a momentous occasion, one which is underlined by the gravity of the situation in Rhodesia. Today the balance is delicately poised between the forces of violence and those seeking to demonstrate that mankind has the capacity to bind up its wounds and to live together in peace and harmony. Only too rarely do we have the opportunity to move the forces of history into paths that demonstrate that men of all races and political persuasions can share common goals of human growth and friendly association. This occasion and this opportunity exists today.

Gentlemen, I do not wish to minimize the complexities of the Rhodesian problem. Nor do I intend to minimize the many forces and difficult obstacles that must be overcome if we are to produce the type of multiracial solution that will bring peace to southern Africa. As one who has been intimately involved in the search for peace for the past year or more, I can testify amply to that. However, I also must point out the consequences that will follow if the United States proves unwilling to make its resources available to the processes of peaceful change and economic growth in Rhodesia.

This Administration has made clear that it strongly supports the protection and

enhancement of basic human rights throughout the world. We are convinced that this principle must find expression in our foreign policy, including our foreign assistance, as current legislation indeed requires. We have already announced reductions, related to human rights, in assistance to three countries. It behooves us, I firmly believe, to provide economic assistance where such assistance can tilt the balance in favor of human rights. Such is the case in Rhodesia, and much of Africa is watching to see if we have the capacity and the will to promote peaceful change in what could become one of the most turbulent regions of the world.

With your indulgence, Mr. Chairman, I will review the current status of the Rhodesian crisis. As the Senators know, violence has been spreading in that territory since its white minority declared, illegally, its independence from British rule in 1965. This action earned the Smith government the condemnation of the international community, and the United Nations, for its part, called for sanctions against this illegal regime. Three successive Administrations have endorsed actions taken by the international community to end the illegal status of the breakaway regime. In April 1976, with bipartisan support from the Congress, we visited southern Africa and launched a campaign to bring the principals involved in the Rhodesian dispute to the conference table.

Despite the setback at Geneva, we remain committed to the search for a peaceful settlement. We will redouble our efforts toward that goal. We are prepared to bring to bear the influence and prestige of the United States in an attempt to foster a successful outcome of a second Rhodesia conference which the British Government has suggested convening. We are, if called upon to do so by the principal participants, willing to cosponsor the conference and act as an honest broker during its deliberations.

We are aware that the price of failure to negotiate a settlement will continue to be paid by the people of Rhodesia and its neighboring states in the currency of human

<sup>1</sup> Made before the Subcommittees on African Affairs and Foreign Assistance of the Senate Committee on Foreign Relations on Apr. 28. The complete transcript of the hearings will be published by the committee and will be available from the Superintendent of Documents, U.S. Government Printing Office, Washington, D.C. 20402.



suffering. Further, continued violence will spread instability and promote the possibility of foreign intervention in the region. Such a denouement would throw into doubt prospects for accommodation between peoples of different races in Africa and could compromise efforts to establish confidence in relations between our government and that of the Soviet Union.

We are consulting closely with British Foreign Secretary David Owen, who has recently returned from his mission to southern Africa. The Foreign Secretary reports that he was encouraged in his efforts to reconcile competing and conflicting forces in Rhodesia. His starting point has been the acceptance by Prime Minister Smith, in September 1976, of the goal of majority rule for Africans within two years. Mr. Owen's principal objectives at this point are to establish agreement that majority rule will come in 1978 and, through the proposed conference, to prepare a constitution which protects basic human rights and defines a democratic process for the transition to independence. We hope that an independent Zimbabwe will be multiracial, will reflect a commitment to political and economic growth, and will demonstrate that moderation offers greater hope for the future than the forces of division and violence.

In order to insure that the journey of Rhodesia to political stability and independence has a reasonable prospect of success, the United States, in concert with the United Kingdom, has agreed to establish a special economic consortium—the Zimbabwe Development Fund. I cannot stress too strongly the essential element of trust which is embodied in the Fund. It represents an unprecedented international economic commitment in support of a Rhodesian settlement.

I wish to assure you at this juncture that the Fund is not a buy-out for whites who wish to leave Rhodesia. The central focus on the Fund is on economic and social development. Congressional support for the Fund would demonstrate to Africans and potential donors that the United States can be

counted on to cooperate in a constructive manner in working for peaceful change in southern Africa. The Fund would encourage blacks and whites to work together for the future development of Zimbabwe and thus demonstrate that multiracialism is a viable option in southern Africa. I have no doubt that the Fund may well be an important factor in the negotiating process and will contribute to promoting peace and progress in southern Africa.

As to the nature of the Fund itself, our expectation is that we would be in a position to utilize it to insure a constructive transition during the initial period of majority rule. The Fund would respond to requests from the Zimbabwe Government to support specific development projects and programs. We envisage, for example, substantial assistance requirements in agricultural and land reform, education and training, social and economic infrastructure. In brief, the Fund would represent an investment in Zimbabwe's human resources and a contribution to its future development.

I recognize that you would like to have full particulars on the nature and scope of specific projects to be financed by the Fund. At present, we can only provide the broad outlines of the kind of projects which may be proposed by the new government. We know that the rural sector will require greatly expanded agricultural extension services for Africans, road construction, land reform, and resettlement for large numbers of Africans. Large investments will also have to be made in training Africans to assume positions as managers, educators, planners, and directors of the many activities which independence bestows upon a hard-pressed people. In the fields of trade, finance, and development, large-scale support also will be required. Beyond these generalized guidelines, we will have to learn as we proceed. However, I can assure you that we plan to keep the Congress fully apprised of the projects and programs supported by the Fund.

The anatomy and financial underpinnings of the Fund are not as difficult to define.

Last December, the U.S. Government and the United Kingdom approached 18 nations to support a Zimbabwe economic program. Support is to be provided along the following lines:

—Initial contributions of a minimum on the order of \$1 billion and, at a maximum, approximately \$1½ billion.

—The United States would contribute 40 percent, or up to a maximum of \$520 million.

—It is envisaged that contributions to the Fund would be over a five-year period.

—Flows of bilateral concessional aid could be counted as part of each nation's contribution, but for the five-year period we assume that the majority of each contributor's assistance would be a direct contribution to the Fund.

Thus far, initial responses to our appeal for support have been encouraging. If adequate progress is made in the political sphere, we would plan to organize a donors' conference. The purposes of such a conference would be to formalize pledges and to draft articles of agreement for the Fund.

I wish to point out, gentlemen, that our own position has been put forth subject to the approval of Congress. Accordingly, favorable action by the Senate and the House of Representatives will make it possible to proceed with our plans for the Fund.

Clearly, failure on the part of Congress to extend its support would be a serious setback to the Administration's efforts to work for a peaceful settlement of the Rhodesian problem. I firmly believe that we are at a critical turning point in our effort to restart the negotiating process and that a strong signal from the Congress is essential now. Without rapid progress toward settlement, we confront the prospect of chaos in southern Africa. Soviet President Podgorny's recent visit to the region and his pledges of arms aid are ample testimony to his government's commitment to a violent outcome. We now require a constructive

alternative—one which the Congress of the United States can make credible in the testing weeks and months ahead.

Gentlemen, we urge and welcome your support as we pursue the path of peace in southern Africa. With it we can accomplish much; without it, constructive action would be difficult, if not impossible.

## **Congressional Documents Relating to Foreign Policy**

Multinational Oil Companies and OPEC: Implications for U.S. Policy. Hearings before the Subcommittee on Energy of the Joint Economic Committee. June 2-8, 1976. 337 pp.

International Convention for the Prevention of Pollution From Ships, With Annexes and Protocols. Message from the President of the United States transmitting the convention. S. Ex. E. March 22, 1977. 108 pp.

United States Military Installations and Objectives in the Mediterranean. Report prepared for the Subcommittee on Europe and the Middle East of the House Committee on International Relations by the Foreign Affairs and National Defense Division, Congressional Research Service, Library of Congress. March 27, 1977. 95 pp.

Urging the Canadian Government To Reassess Its Policy of Permitting the Killing of Newborn Baby Harp Seals. Report of the Senate Committee on Foreign Relations to accompany H. Con. Res. 142. S. Rept. 95-71. March 29, 1977. 10 pp.

NATO Standardization: Political, Economic, and Military Issues for Congress. Report to the House Committee on International Relations by the Foreign Affairs and National Defense Division, Congressional Research Service, Library of Congress. March 29, 1977. 58 pp.

Protocol With Canada To Amend the Convention for the Protection, Preservation, and Extension of the Sockeye Salmon Fisheries in the Fraser River System, as Amended. Message from the President of the United States transmitting the protocol, signed at Washington on February 24, 1977. S. Ex. G. March 31, 1977. 4 pp.

International Financial Institutions. Report of the House Committee on Banking, Finance and Urban Affairs, together with minority, supplemental, additional, and separate views, to accompany H.R. 5262. H. Rept. 95-154. March 31, 1977. 67 pp.

Report on the Activities of the Senate Committee on Armed Services, 94th Congress, First and Second Sessions. S. Rept. 95-85. April 5, 1977. 77 pp.

Export Administration Amendments of 1977. Report of the House Committee on International Relations, together with additional views, to accompany H.R. 5840. H. Rept. 95-190. April 6, 1977. 58 pp.

United States-Canadian Reciprocal Fisheries Agreement. Report of the House Committee on Merchant Marine and Fisheries, together with dissenting views, to accompany H.R. 5638. H. Rept. 95-193. April 7, 1977. 26 pp.

Supplemental State Department Authorization for Fiscal Year 1977. Report of the Senate Committee on Foreign Relations to accompany H.R. 5040. S. Rept. 95-99. April 21, 1977. 13 pp.

Arms Control and Disarmament Act Amendments of 1977. Report of the House Committee on International Relations to accompany H.R. 6179. H. Rept. 95-219. April 25, 1977. 17 pp.

## TREATY INFORMATION

### Current Actions

#### MULTILATERAL

##### Agriculture

Agreement establishing the International Fund for Agricultural Development (IFAD). Done at Rome June 13, 1976.<sup>1</sup>

*Signatures:* Iran, April 27, 1977; Ireland, Israel, April 28, 1977.

##### Arbitration

Convention on the recognition and enforcement of foreign arbitral awards. Done at New York June 10, 1958. Entered into force June 7, 1959; for the United States December 29, 1970. TIAS 6997.

*Extended by the United Kingdom to:* Hong Kong, effective April 21, 1977.

##### Aviation

Convention on international civil aviation. Done at Chicago December 7, 1944. Entered into force April 4, 1947. TIAS 1591.

*Adherence deposited:* Seychelles, April 25, 1977.

Protocol on the authentic trilingual text of the convention on international civil aviation, Chicago, 1944 (TIAS 1591), with annex. Done at Buenos Aires September 24, 1968. Entered into force October 24, 1968. TIAS 6605.

*Acceptance deposited:* Venezuela, May 3, 1977.

##### Coffee

International coffee agreement 1976, with annexes. Done at London December 3, 1975. Entered into force provisionally October 1, 1976.

*Extended by the United Kingdom to:* Bailiwick of Guernsey and the Bailiwick of Jersey, January 21, 1977.

#### Consular Relations

Vienna convention on consular relations. Done at Vienna April 24, 1963. Entered into force March 19, 1967; for the United States December 24, 1969. TIAS 6820.

*Accession deposited:* Tanzania, April 18, 1977.

#### Maritime Matters

Amendments to the convention of March 6, 1948, as amended, on the Intergovernmental Maritime Consultative Organization (TIAS 4044, 6285, 6490). Adopted at London October 17, 1974.

*Enters into force:* April 1, 1978.

#### Narcotic Drugs

Protocol amending the single convention on narcotic drugs, 1961. Done at Geneva March 25, 1972. Entered into force August 8, 1975. TIAS 8118.

*Accession deposited:* Mexico, April 27, 1977.

#### War

Geneva convention for the amelioration of the condition of the wounded and sick in armed forces in the field;

Geneva convention for the amelioration of the condition of the wounded, sick and shipwrecked members of armed forces at sea;

Geneva convention relative to the treatment of prisoners of war;

Geneva convention relative to protection of civilian persons in time of war.

Done at Geneva August 12, 1949. Entered into force October 21, 1950; for the United States February 2, 1956. TIAS 3362, 3363, 3364, and 3365, respectively. *Ratification deposited:* Bolivia, December 10, 1976.

#### Wheat

Protocol modifying and further extending the wheat trade convention (part of the international wheat agreement) 1971. Done at Washington March 17, 1976. Entered into force June 19, 1976, with respect to certain provisions, and July 1, 1976, with respect to other provisions.

*Ratification deposited:* Venezuela, May 3, 1977.

#### BILATERAL

##### Cuba

Convention for the prevention of smuggling intoxicating liquors into the United States, and exchange of notes. Signed at Havana March 4, 1926. Entered into force June 18, 1926. 44 Stat. 2395.

On April 27, 1977, the parties agreed that the convention had lapsed.

##### Japan

Agreement extending the agreement of May 2, 1975, as extended (TIAS 8088, 8399), concerning an international observer scheme for whaling operations from land stations in the North Pacific Ocean. Effected by exchange of notes at Tokyo April 27, 1977. Entered into force April 27, 1977.

<sup>1</sup> Not in force.

## PUBLICATIONS

### GPO Sales Publications

*Publications may be ordered by catalog or stock number from the Superintendent of Documents, U.S. Government Printing Office, Washington, D.C. 20540. A 25-percent discount is made on orders for 100 or more copies of any one publication mailed to the same address. Remittance, payable to the Superintendent of Documents, must accompany orders. Prices shown below, which include domestic postage, are subject to change.*

**Long Range Aid to Navigation (Loran) Station at Keflavik, Iceland.** Arrangement with Iceland. TIAS 8429. 4 pp. 35¢. (Cat. No. S9.10:8429).

**Mutual Defense Assistance—Cash Contribution by Japan.** Agreement with Japan relating to the agreement of March 8, 1954. TIAS 8431. 5 pp. 35¢. (Cat. No. S9.10:8431).

**Reimbursement of Income Taxes.** Agreement with the World Meteorological Organization. TIAS 8437. 3 pp. 35¢. (Cat. No. S9.10:8437).

**Air Transport Services.** Agreement with Venezuela amending the agreement of August 14, 1953, as amended. TIAS 8433. 9 pp. 35¢. (Cat. No. S9.10:8433).

**Aviation—Joint Financing of Certain Air Navigation Services in Greenland and the Faroe Islands.** Agreement with Other Governments amending the agreement done at Geneva September 25, 1956, as amended. TIAS 8434. 1 p. 35¢. (Cat. No. S9.10:8434).

**Trade, Investment and Financial Matters.** Joint communique with Brazil. TIAS 8435. 4 pp. 35¢. (Cat. No. S9.10:8435).

**Reimbursement of Income Taxes.** Agreement with the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development. TIAS 8436. 5 pp. 35¢. (Cat. No. S9.10:8436).

**Reimbursement of Income Taxes.** Agreement with the Universal Postal Union. TIAS 8438. 2 pp. 35¢. (Cat. No. S9.10:8438).

**Reimbursement of Income Taxes.** Agreement with the World Intellectual Property Organization. TIAS 8439. 3 pp. 35¢. (Cat. No. S9.10:8439).

**Certificates of Airworthiness for Imported Civil Glider Aircraft.** Agreement with the Socialist Republic of Romania. TIAS 8440. 4 pp. 35¢. (Cat. No. S9.10:8440).

**Air Transport Services.** Agreement with the Socialist Republic of Romania extending the agreement of December 4, 1973. TIAS 8441. 3 pp. 35¢. (Cat. No. S9.10:8441).

**Trade—Specialty Steel Imports.** Agreement with Japan. TIAS 8442. 28 pp. 45¢. (Cat. No. S9.10:8442).

**Agricultural Commodities.** Agreement with Israel amending the agreement of September 30, 1976, as amended. TIAS 8443. 4 pp. 35¢. (Cat. No. S9.10:8443).

**Claims of United States Nationals.** Agreement with Egypt. TIAS 8446. 17 pp. 35¢. (Cat. No. S9.10:8446).

**Visas for Correspondents.** Agreement with the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics. TIAS 8448. 3 pp. 35¢. (Cat. No. S9.10:8448).

**Narcotic Drugs—Provision of Aircraft to Curb Illegal Production and Traffic.** Agreement with Mexico. TIAS 8449. 5 pp. 35¢. (Cat. No. S9.10:8449).

**Narcotic Drugs—Additional Cooperative Arrangements to Curb Illegal Traffic.** Agreement with Mexico amending the agreements of August 9, 1976 and February 4, 1976, as amended. TIAS 8451. 6 pp. 35¢. (Cat. No. S9.10:8451).

**Social Security.** Agreement with Japan. TIAS 8452. 5 pp. 35¢. (Cat. No. S9.10:8452).

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194A	5/3	Vance: questions and answers following address at University of Georgia, Apr. 30.
195	5/2	Overseas Schools Advisory Council, New York, June 1.
196	5/2	Advisory Committee on International Intellectual Property, June 1.
197	5/2	Samuel W. Lewis sworn in as Ambassador to Israel (biographic data).
198	5/3	Robert F. Goheen sworn in as Ambassador to India (biographic data).
199	5/4	Shipping Coordinating Committee, U.S. National Committee for the Prevention of Marine Pollution, June 14.
200	5/4	Six foreign officials begin 30-day study of local government and community leadership in U.S.
*201	5/4	Vance: House Ad Hoc Committee on Energy.
202	5/4	Vance: news conference.
203	5/5	Meeting of U.S.-France Cooperative Science Program, May 2.

\*Not printed.

†Held for a later issue of the BULLETIN.

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# THE DEPARTMENT OF STATE BULLETIN

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# THE DEPARTMENT OF STATE **BULLETIN**

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*The Department of State BULLETIN, a weekly publication issued by the Office of Media Services, Bureau of Public Affairs, provides the public and interested agencies of the government with information on developments in the field of U.S. foreign relations and on the work of the Department and the Foreign Service.*

*The BULLETIN includes selected press releases on foreign policy, issued by the White House and the Department, and statements, addresses, and news conferences of the President and the Secretary of State and other officers of the Department, as well as special articles on various phases of international affairs and the functions of the Department. Information is included concerning treaties and international agreements to which the United States is or may become a party and on treaties of general international interest.*

*Publications of the Department of State, United Nations documents, and legislative material in the field of international relations are also listed.*



## President Carter Interviewed by European Newspaper Journalists

*Following is the transcript of an interview with President Carter by Fred Emery of the Times, London, Henri Pierre of Le Monde, Paris, Horst-Alexander Siebert of Die Welt, Bonn, and Vittorio Zucconi of La Stampa, Turin, held in the White House on April 25.*

Weekly Compilation of Presidential Documents dated May 9

*Mr. Emery: We tried to have a European unity parley here to get organized with questions and order of sitting. It has proved impossible. We are not going to unite. [Laughter.]*

*The President: We will make it informal. I am glad to have you here. I am looking forward to meeting with the leaders of your own countries when we go to Europe. I will defer to your questions.*

*Mr. Emery: As I say, we have tried to prepare some things. Mr. President, you know that quite a few people in Europe are puzzled and some are refreshed by the way you are going about governing. How do you describe your first hundred days in office?*

*The President: I have been pleased so far at the response of the American people to our Administration. I think we have attempted to address some very difficult questions which in the past have been either ignored or delayed.*

Last week I spent presenting our energy proposals to the American people. We have evolved and laid before the Soviet Government a comprehensive reduction proposal in nuclear armaments. We have begun to reduce the effort to sell conventional arms around the world. We have spelled out a strong position, which has not been unanimously accepted well, on nonproliferation of nuclear explosive capability.

I have, I think, accurately mirrored the

American people's beliefs on public espousal of human rights. We have begun to reorganize our own nation's government and to commence proposals which will ultimately transform our welfare system and our income tax structure. I have made some—sometimes controversial—decisions to prevent the raising of trade barriers and have had an almost unprecedented stream of distinguished visitors here from other countries. This past week, four foreign leaders came to see me.

So in all of these areas I think we have been fairly successful, either in beginning efforts or in some few accomplishments at this early time. The relationship between myself and the American people is very good now.

*Mr. Emery: May I interrupt to say—*

*The President: Please.*

*Mr. Emery: How about your relations with Congress—*

*The President: That was the other clause in my sentence.*

*Mr. Emery: —the business community and the unions?*

*The President: I think the relationship with Congress has been steadily improving as we have gotten to know one another. The first time I was ever in the House of Representatives was Wednesday night when I made my speech. I had never visited there before. But I believe that within the Democratic leadership now, there is a growing sense of mutual understanding and trust and consultation that has gotten to be a habit—and a good one.*

I think the business community has begun to recognize that my own background as a businessman will help to color the decisions

that I make about economics, and I think that I have a fairly good relationship with labor, as well.

So in general, as a completely unbiased observer, I have been pleased. [Laughter.]

We have got a long way to go. I have a lot to learn. And we are studying how to restore normal relationships with governments where those relations have been strained in the past. We are exploring some possibilities for the resolution of the historic conflict in the Middle East. We are trying to work closely with Great Britain's leaders in describing a proper role for us in southern Africa. And I think we have got a possibility at the meetings in London to more strongly establish my personal friendship and understanding with the European leaders as well. So I feel good about the Administration so far.

*Mr. Pierre: Can I ask you a general question about Europe? Since you took office, we have the feeling in Europe that the relationship between the United States and Europe are now getting the same priority as the American-Soviet relationship. What is your general approach regarding Europe and, more precisely, regarding the European Community? Some of your predecessors, we feel, seemed to fear that a united Europe, if it comes to be, might be a competitor, might be going against the political and economic American interests. Do you share those fears?*

*The President:* No. I think within 100 hours of my becoming President, the Vice President had begun consultations with the leaders of many nations in Europe. I have already met with Prime Minister Callaghan [James Callaghan, of the United Kingdom], with the leaders of Portugal, with the European Community, NATO. I will meet with the other leaders within the next two weeks. And this will likely be the only trip I shall take outside our country this year. I have no other plans at this time.

I think all these items describe my deep concern about good relationships with Europe. I see no way that we can have a successful resolution of East-West problems

without the full comprehension, understanding, participation with our allies and friends in Europe.

We have, in addition to that, demonstrated, I think, in my own budget proposals to the Congress, an increasing emphasis on military capability within NATO. And I intend to stay over after the conference with the heads of state, to meet with the NATO leaders as well.

The people of our country, regardless of who happens to be President, have a natural sense that our historical ties and our future are intimately related with the European countries.

The other part of your question is that I strongly favor, perhaps more than my predecessors, a close interrelationship among the nations of Europe, the European Community, in particular.

We have a legitimate reticence about trying to interfere, but I will do everything I can within the bounds of propriety to strengthen those natural ties—economically, politically, militarily—that do exist now among the countries of Europe and to strengthen them in the future. And when the nations involved consider it appropriate, I would certainly welcome the absorption within the European Community of Portugal and Spain.

So I think that already I have both come to realize and also have begun to act on the premise of a strong Europe as essential to our own good future and have recognized the importance of the bilateral relationships with the nations involved.

*Mr. Zueconi: Mr. President, about NATO, do you think that NATO is still a viable alliance as it is now after 30 years of existence, and do you foresee or wish any change? Do you think the Europeans should do more in their own defense? You might share your thoughts on NATO with us.*

*The President:* Yes. I think the NATO military alliance is a cornerstone of our own national security. I think the degree of cooperation that has evolved from NATO since its inception has helped to tie our nations together in political and economic

and social ways. So the military alliance has been a core around which our good progress has been enhanced.

I have been concerned about the need for a more fair sharing of military supplies and weapons among the countries involved. It ought to be a two-way street, and to the extent that we can have common understandings about standardizing weapons systems, I believe that we will increase the portion that does come from the European suppliers.

I would hope that within the next 12 months, that the other leaders and I could acquire a renewed commitment to NATO principles and improvements on a multilateral basis. I am quite reluctant to move unilaterally in this field because I am so new. I have a lot to learn from the leaders of France and Germany and Great Britain and other countries where they have been involved so long.

The last point is that the differences that we have had among us, I think, can only be resolved among the heads of state. And with the Leopard tank and the AWACS system [airborne warning and control system]—these matters are of tactical importance, but they don't endanger the total commitment of our countries to share in our future security. And although France is not a complete partner in the process as far as mutual defense is concerned, that is not a matter of great concern to us.

We have among the American people an almost unanimous belief that NATO is a very beneficial commitment to us. So I see no danger of a deterioration in the NATO alliance.

*Mr. Zucconi: That leads inevitably to the question of the political situation, certainly, in the European countries, among which Italy and France—how do you react to the growth of the Marxist left, so-called Euro-Communists in those countries? How would you react to the possibility of coalition governments in a member's country, with a role for the Communists in it?*

*The President:* I think the first premise on which we function is that the European citi-

zens are perfectly capable of making their own decisions about political matters through the free election process.

Within my own memory, this is the first time that all the NATO countries have been democracies. And I think this is a very good evolution that we have already witnessed.

Secondly, we prefer that the governments involved continue to be democratic and that no totalitarian elements become either influential or dominant. And I would hope that the democratic parties would prevail during the coming years in the struggle for political authority.

I believe that the best way we can prevent the enhancement of Communist political strength in Europe is to show that democratically controlled governments can function effectively and openly and with humaneness and a genuine and continuing comprehension of what people need and expect from government.

To the extent that we fail as democracies, as democratic leaders, to live up to the ideals that exemplify our own commitments, to that extent we open the opportunity for Communist parties to be more successful.

So to summarize, I think each country has to make its own decisions in the electoral process. I am pleased at the enhanced degree of commitment to the democratic governments. We certainly prefer that the democratic parties prevail in the future. And we can encourage that process not by interfering in electoral procedures within countries themselves, but making the system work ourselves.

*Mr. Siebert: Mr. President, the economic summit is only a couple of days away. The meeting of the heads of state shows clearly how interdependent the economies are and that this interdependence is rapidly growing. How much sovereignty is the United States willing to give up in the decisionmaking process?*

*The President:* None. [Laughter.]

*Mr. Siebert:* None?

*The President:* Not to give up sovereignty. I think within the bounds of

sovereignty to be maintained by all the nations, though, cooperation is very important.

As I search for a proper way to exemplify the sovereignty and independence of our own nation, I want to make the right decisions that are best for our own people. I don't think there is any doubt that our own people are best served when we do cooperate with our allies, when we have open and free trade, when we have a proper concern about the less developed nations, when we do have military security, when we have international lending institutions like the World Bank that can function effectively, when we have a proper and multilateral approach to solving the chronic and rapidly deteriorating energy circumstances—all those things that are multilateral in nature and require cooperation and unselfishness can enhance, I believe, the legitimate sovereignty of nations and the protection by leaders of the sovereignty.

So with the exception of your use of the word "sovereignty," I think that we need to be sure that our actions are unselfish and predicated on proper consultation and a sharing of both opportunity and the resolution of problems.

*Mr. Siebert: The American economic growth has accelerated and you, Mr. President, recommended a sharply reduced stimulus, fiscal stimulus, for 1977.*

*The President: Yes.*

*Mr. Siebert: Has the focus of the summit altered? Will you still press for higher internal deficits and lower external surpluses by Germany and Japan?*

*The President: We have left intact an economic stimulus package for the 1977-1978 years, the 18-month period, of a little more than \$20 billion, which we consider to be adequate.*

It still is a substantial amount of stimulus effort, and I would hope that the countries that are relatively affluent and economically strong might provide some stimulus for the rest of the free world economy.

There is an element of trade which is of concern. The OPEC [Organization of Petro-

leum Exporting Countries] nations have a positive trade balance of about \$40 billion. All the other nations in the world who are their trading partners have to have a deficit of about \$40 billion. To the extent that the strong nations like ourselves, Japan, Germany, and others, can absorb part of that deficit, it takes that requirement away from the much weaker nations who have to share it with us.

So to that extent, I am willing for our country to experience some controllable international trade deficits for a while. And we have cut our own national budget deficit down from about \$65 billion to \$47 billion or \$48 billion this year. Next year it is going to go up some.

But I think that it is a matter of each nation deciding on its own what is best for its citizens but, at the same time, recognizing that when we are selfish and try to have large trade surpluses and a very tight restraint on the international economy, that we make the weaker nations suffer too much.

*Mr. Siebert: Mr. President, are you carrying major proposals to London, and what kind?*

*The President: I think those specific agenda items would best be reserved until we get there. You are perfectly at liberty to talk to the people in the offices of the Secretary of State and the Secretary of the Treasury. But as far as my own comments as President, I think I would rather wait until later to talk about that.*

*Mr. Emery: Can I bring you back to energy? We are very struck by the fact that at the same time as you can mention an item like "unselfishness" on American commitments to help allies with their petroleum deficiencies in times of crisis, through this conference in Paris, at the same time energy always seems to be the biggest source of discontent and discord between us. Look at the results of the Middle East war and the energy crisis that followed.*

*Now, your own nuclear energy policy, which, while many leaders give lipservice to, they seem to be in some concern over,*

namely, your ban on plutonium and what you intend to do in terms of international policy.

*So my question really is, how can we stay united and be so disunited assuming, if I am correct, that Germany and France go ahead with their nuclear deals?*

*The President:* I think you would have to go back, to save time, and read the minutes of my press conference when I described our own reprocessing policy. I made it clear that I was not trying to tell Germany and France, Great Britain, Japan, what to do within their own countries. We have actually built and attempted to operate two reprocessing plants unsuccessfully.

We are blessed with moderate quantities of uranium ore and large quantities of coal and reasonable quantities of natural gas and oil. I don't believe that within the next 20 years we will need to move to commercial use of the breeder reactor, which is the initiation of the plutonium society. I cannot speak for other countries.

I am very much aware that the waste products from our own light water reactors, using enriched uranium, are being held intact. They are not being destroyed or wasted. If we should need in the future, they will be there.

The third point is that I am deeply concerned if nations who presently do not have the capability of building nuclear explosives should have them. And we are going to do what we can in the trade of nuclear fuels and nuclear power plants to reduce that number of nations who have the ability to build nuclear explosives.

And the process has to start somewhere, and in our own nation's history, it happened to have started with me. It was a campaign commitment of mine, shared, by the way, with my opponent, President Ford, and I have no reticence about imposing it.

This is a matter of contention. We would prefer that reprocessing plants not be sold to other nations of the world, particularly those who have not signed the Nonproliferation Treaty. But some of the trades or contracts had already been initiated or consummated.

We have let our views be known, but we recognize the autonomy of nations to deal as they see fit.

So I think that the present competition and some degree of disharmony among nations on energy might very well be exacerbated badly unless we all try to conserve energy as much as possible.

And I am not criticizing other nations when I say that I am very glad that we have finally moved, after being wasteful to the extreme degree for so long, toward a new policy that will be built around conservation of all kinds of energy supplies. And I would guess that our own action, as a very powerful, influential nation, might induce other countries to join with us in a mutual commitment to both inventory energy supplies, assure a more fair distribution in the future, and reduce the waste of them.

*Mr. Siebert:* *Mr. President, you spoke already about foreign trade, about the protectionist pressure in the United States growing. Do you think you can resist the demands of the unions and some industries? What is your philosophy on international trade, and what are your objectives?*

*The President:* Yes. I can't guarantee it, but I believe and I hope that I can resist pressures of this kind. Among all the nations who will be participating in the economic summit, I would guess that our unemployment rate is the highest. It is running in excess of 7 percent. And with the high unemployment rate comes extraordinary pressure to get one's own workers reemployed.

My position on trade restraints was spelled out very clearly during the long campaign that I conducted. And it is based around the hope that whenever American jobs are excessively in danger, that we can best resolve this question by bilateral and voluntary agreements on the importation of overly competitive goods.

I think this is the case in shoes from Taiwan and South Korea. I think it will be the case with color television sets from Japan. And I would hope that this would be an adequate pattern.

The Congress of the United States has the authority under the law to override my decisions if they are not considered to be adequate. But I believe that I can prevail.

*Mr. Siebert: The industrialized world must find answers to the demands of the developing nations, or the North-South conflict will become more serious. What is your position on commodity arrangements, common funds, and the debt situation? Let's put it this way: What can we offer them?*

*The President:* Again, I think that specific question can best be answered at a later time. I have my own ideas about it, but they will be much more firmly developed when I get to the London conference.

And as we approach the CIEC [Conference on International Economic Cooperation] meeting which will follow immediately thereafter, I would hope that the advanced industrial nations could provide a more uniform, comprehensive, and compatible approach to the very serious question. I just don't feel that I am qualified at this point—

*Mr. Siebert: At this point, perhaps, you can take this. How do you look at the future role of the international organizations like the World Bank and the International Monetary Fund? Do you think those roles should be broad and they should get—*

*The President:* I think they should be broadened and strengthened. I believe that this is very important.

*Mr. Siebert: Thank you.*

*The President:* In the multinational trade agreements and GATT [General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade] and OECD [Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development] and the International Energy Agency and the World Bank, regional banks—I believe that is a proper place for continuing multilateral interrelationships. And I think in many instances, it is better to approach the problems of the nations of the Southern Hemisphere through those mechanisms than through bilateral actions. There are a few exceptions. But I will do all I can to strengthen those entities that are discussed.

*Mr. Zucconi: Mr. President, let's move again from North-South to East-West.*

*A few people might have been concerned about the situation and the relationship between the United States and the Soviet Union. Let me put it bluntly as the man in the street would. Are we in for another cold war?*

*The President:* No. I think not. We proposed to the Soviet Union two options. One was a fairly quick ratification of the basic agreements that had been derived from the Vladivostok conference. The other option is our preference, and that is a much more drastic and deep reduction in the level of nuclear armaments, with a prohibition against the evolution of new weapons systems, and a much more open capability of confirming that the agreements are being honored.

The worst that can happen, in my opinion, is a standoff at the present pace of development, which would be very unfortunate. I don't believe that either the Soviet Union or we want to continue this armaments race, which is very costly and also increasingly dangerous.

The second level of achievement would be a ratification of the basic Vladivostok terms. And I would never give up both the hope and the effort to move toward ultimate elimination of atomic weapons altogether. Over a long period of time that should be our goal. And I would hope that when I go out of office, that we will have reduced the level of nuclear armaments substantially throughout the world.

*Mr. Zucconi: So you are still optimistic even in the short term?*

*The President:* I am. Yes.

*Mr. Pierre: About the human rights policy, do you feel satisfied how it is going? And I will ask you a nasty question.*

*The President:* Please go ahead.

*Mr. Pierre: We read in the press recently that the three leaders of the Russian trade union couldn't get visas. So how can it be reconciled with your declared intention of*

*making easier the entry of this country? Belgrade will come soon—*

*The President:* Compared to what we have done in the past, we have lowered the barriers altogether, almost. This was an exception, and I was not involved in the decision. But I certainly support it.

There are no prohibitions now against American citizens traveling anywhere in the world, initiated by us. For the first time, Americans can go to North Korea, to Vietnam, to Cambodia, to Cuba. They couldn't a couple of months ago. We have removed the constraints in our own nation on travel as well as from aliens.

There will be a need to change the basic American law that was written during the cold war. I would be in favor of removing all restrictions on travel, except those that have to be; that would be minimal.

As far as the human rights effort is concerned, this is a position that is compatible with the character of the American people. It is one that is almost overwhelmingly supported by the American people. It is one that will be permanent. And it is one that has to be pursued in a very sensitive way.

We can't change the structure of governments in foreign countries. We can't demand complete compatibility in a system of government or even basic philosophies with our own, but we reserve the right to speak out freely and aggressively when we are concerned.

So I think that although there has been some temporary adverse reaction to our position on human rights, perhaps in the Soviet Union, in Brazil, and maybe a few other countries, I don't intend to back down on it.

*Mr. Emery:* *This is a very brief question. We are struck by the fact that you are willing to coordinate your policies with Britain in seeking to avert a race war in southern Africa. And yet, in the case where there has*

*been an invasion, apparently, across the frontier into Zaire from neighboring Angola, you appear to wish to stay out of any involvement and—how shall I say it—leave it to the French? Is that a fair characterization, and can you tell us what your policy is?*

*The President:* We have an aversion to military involvement in foreign countries. We are suffering, or benefiting, from the experience that we had in Vietnam. It would not be possible for the American people to support an invasion force with the United States into the Shaba region of Zaire.

We have continued to send Zaire aid and supplies, C-130's, ammunition, fuel, medical supplies, parachutes, and so forth.<sup>1</sup>

We obviously did not interfere in the decisions made by the Egyptians, Moroccans, the French Government, to give Zaire more direct aid. We certainly don't disapprove it.

I think when the European countries or the African nations, because of close political and historical ties with Mobutu and his government, are inclined to be more active in their help for him, we, you know, would certainly approve of that, of their prerogative.

So we would like to see the boundaries of the African nations honored. We are friendly with Mobutu and the Government of Zaire. We do not intend to get militarily involved, unless our own security is directly threatened, in the affairs of other countries. We honor and respect and appreciate the action that the French and the Moroccan and Egyptian nations have taken.

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<sup>1</sup> On May 5, the White House Press Office released the following clarification of the President's statement:

The President was referring to the fact that previous Administrations have supplied ammunition to Zaire. This Administration has not sent any ammunition to Zaire and is not sending any during the present crisis.

Zaire has a total of five C-130's provided by previous administrations and will shortly be receiving an additional C-130. We have continued to supply spare parts for C-130's.

## President Carter Interviewed by European Broadcast Journalists

*Following is the transcript of an interview with President Carter by David Dimbleby of the British Broadcasting System, Carl Weiss of ZDF German Television, and Emmanuel de la Taille of TFI French Television held in the White House on May 2.*

Weekly Compilation of Presidential Documents dated May 9

*Mr. Dimbleby: Mr. President, when you came into office, people in the West were looking to you on the basis of the campaign you had run for quite a big boost to the economies of the world, and I wonder whether you think that they may understandably feel a little bit let down at the caution and conservatism you have shown and you've cut back even on what you've done, and perhaps feel that America hasn't yet begun really to pull her weight to get everybody back to work in the rest of the world.*

*The President:* Well, we will wind up with an economic stimulus package for this year or next year in excess of \$20 billion, which we consider to be adequate. In addition to that, we have had very encouraging news about our own rate of economic growth in the first three months. The unemployment rate has dropped and the gross national product has increased well above what we had anticipated, almost doubling what it was the fourth quarter of 1976.

At the same time, we've addressed some long-range questions that would help our economy in the future to channel our resources where it's needed most. A comprehensive energy policy with an emphasis on conservation will help us to cut down our very serious payments deficit, which this year is likely to be \$12 billion.

As you know, some of the other Western governments have a payments surplus. We

think we are doing our share to absorb the built-in deficit that's caused by the OPEC [Organization of Petroleum Exporting Countries] oil sales.

*Mr. Dimbleby: But will you be under pressure in London, do you think, from other governments to do more than you have done, or do you think they are quite happy to accept what you have now decided on?*

*The President:* Well, I can't anticipate what other governments will think, but my judgment is that they will agree that our effort is adequate.

*Mr. Weiss: It has been suggested frequently, Mr. President, that your Administration expects somewhat higher gross rates, higher stimulating efforts, particularly from countries like Germany and Japan. Now since you have cut yourself back a bit in your stimulating measures, do you still think that the Federal Republic isn't doing enough?*

*The President:* Well, that's a judgment for each country to make, of course. Japan and we have tried to stimulate the economy, about 1 percent of our gross national product, which I think is a reasonable level. We have a much higher unemployment rate than does either Japan or Germany. Our inflation rate is already higher than it is in Germany. Our basic inflation rate is about 6 percent. I think that of the Federal Republic is about 4 percent.

These questions are answered best by showing the great difference that exists among nations. Each nation is an individual, but we share common problems on overconsumption of energy, a lack of attention to the future, a lack of concern in dealing with one another and close consultation before we



make basic decisions, a lack of attention that has been given in the past to the developing or undeveloped nations of the world.

So, I think the purpose of the summit is not to make every nation exactly the same as others or to criticize one another, but to search out common ground to get to know one another, to set long-range goals on the control of energy consumption, the proliferation of atomic weapon capability, cutting down on the sale of military weapons, and increasing economic growth in the less developed countries. These kinds of things are what we hope to address.

*Mr. de la Taille: Mr. President, we are very conscious that we are speaking with you from many countries in Europe. I would like to go to the political impact of the crisis. Because of the economic situation, most of the governments in Europe are in a very weak position. They are almost everywhere looking for confidence and sometimes for money. Don't you think there is a danger to see the economic crisis leading to political crisis in Europe, and what could be really done during the London summit in order to restore some confidence in the governments?*

*The President:* I think one of the things that we need to keep in mind is not to expect dramatic solutions to all of the economic problems of the world. Another thing that we need to keep in mind is that the crisis atmosphere that existed a couple of years ago has been alleviated to some degree. I think that most of the nations now are much better off than they were two years ago.

A reassuring thought, in addition to that, is that among all our people, particularly those in this country, there's a sense of assurance and confidence that's derived from the fact that I will be cooperating with the leaders of France and the Federal Republic of Germany and Italy and Great Britain and Japan and Canada and others in making plans for the future.

So, I don't think the crisis is something that needs to be a matter of intense concentration or the search for magic answers. The

problems that we have had in the past among our own nations are much better resolved than those that exist among nations who are destitute, who have no economic base, who don't have a high standard of living, and who don't have any energy reserves of their own.

We are much better off than most countries, and I think that the strength that we can show among the developed free industrial nations in harmonizing our efforts together and dealing with the more unfortunate nations is a great step forward in itself.

*Mr. Weiss: Speaking of North-South, Mr. President, how far do your views differ from the views of the European Community as far as establishing a common commodity fund is concerned?*

*The President:* It's hard for me to answer that question without knowing what all the other nations feel. We think that on an individual commodity basis, after negotiations have been completed, that a common fund is the best approach.

I think that in my own exchange of letters in several instances with Chancellor Schmidt [Helmut Schmidt of the Federal Republic of Germany] we've arrived at a fairly compatible approach to this basic question.

We strongly favor, my own Administration does, strengthening of the European Community itself. And I think that as we deal with individual commodities that are either in short supply or those which have a history of wildly fluctuating prices, then I think we can more fairly treat our own consumers and also more fairly treat the producers of those raw materials where quite often a very poor country is heavily dependent upon stable prices for a particular commodity.

So, we favor the stabilization of prices with a commodity fund, but we prefer to deal with it on an individual commodity basis.

*Mr. Dimbleby: Can we turn to your energy policies, which you say you are going to discuss at London? You talked about the energy program being the moral equivalent of war, but to some people it has given the impression of being rather strong*

on rhetoric and preaching and rather light when it actually comes to the measures.

I mean I saw an American humorist actually took the four letters m-e-o-w and said the policy amounted to "meow," that in other words it's all talk and there isn't very much there compared with what happens in Europe on controlling energy.

*The President:* The goals that we have set for our own energy consumption between now and 1985 are very stringent, and the legislative proposals that I have submitted to the Congress are adequate to meet those goals.

*Mr. Dimbleby:* If you get them through Congress?

*The President:* If we get them through Congress.

*Mr. Dimbleby:* Do you think you will get them through Congress?

*The President:* I think so. One of the goals, for instance, is to reduce substantially the amount of oil that we anticipate importing in 1985. Our present projections, with no actions, show that we will import about 16 million barrels of oil per day. With the program implemented, we'll cut that 16 million down to less than 6 million barrels per day.

We actually anticipate lowering our gasoline consumption in this country 10 percent below the present level of consumption and to build up this benefit primarily by conservation induced by tax incentives and also without very serious damage to our own economy.

For instance, we feel that the inflation rate will be affected less than one-half of 1 percent over the period between now and 1985, and in addition, we feel that there is practically a nondetectable adverse impact on the rate of economic growth.

We have a much better opportunity to do this than most of the countries with whom we'll be meeting in London because we waste so much more.

*Mr. Dimbleby:* But isn't there a sense in which it's fair to say that some of these things don't appear to have been thought

right through? I mean two things we have talked about now, both the economy, where you drop back a third of the growth you were going to give, and then the energy policy, where already the five cents which seems quite a small figure, that you are trying to raise, we heard yesterday—they are saying it's not going to get through Congress. Do you think you yourself, as President, are moving too fast on too many fronts and haven't actually worked out the mechanics of how you are going to get the things done?

*The President:* Well, it's difficult to move too fast on too many fronts and also to have a program that's not adequate because it's so timid. Those to me seem to be inherently incompatible.

*Mr. Dimbleby:* Well, too fast in language, I meant, and not clear enough in policy.

*The President:* Our goal, for instance, in automobile economy—we now have an average gasoline consumption in our country, in all our automobiles put together, of only 14 miles per gallon, because the American economy has been built around very large, very heavy automobiles. By 1982 we project that the average gasoline economy of new automobiles will be 27½ miles per gallon, almost twice the present fleet level.

This is a dramatic change in purchasing habits of the American people concerning automobiles. So, the changes are quite profound. We consider them to be adequate, and we consider them to be capable of phasing in so that they don't disrupt our economy as we make these basic changes. And those factors are very difficult to accommodate, but I think that we have put together a package that will do that.

*Mr. Weiss:* Can we turn to nuclear matters and proliferation, nonproliferation, Mr. President?

*Mr. de la Taille:* Yes, Mr. President, I would like to ask you some questions about that. Your new nuclear program can be seen in Europe as an American pressure in order to prevent the European people from getting more independence in terms of energy, in

*terms of nuclear fuel or exports. What's your answer to this reaction that you have in Europe, especially in France and in Germany?*

*The President:* The sharp distinction that needs to be drawn, which hasn't been adequately understood yet, is that we favor the supply of adequate nuclear fuel to nations for power production and we will rapidly increase our own capability in this country to manufacture and to distribute enriched uranium. That is compatible, I think, among all nations.

We also are heavily committed to the prevention of the capability of nonnuclear nations from developing explosives, atomic weapons. We think the key to that is whether or not these nonnuclear countries sign the Nonproliferation Treaty on the one hand and forgo the opportunity to reprocess spent nuclear fuel or used nuclear fuel into explosives, as was done by India just a few years ago.

This creates a disharmony among us, but I think the basic principle is compatible between us and the Federal Republic of Germany, between us and France.

*Mr. Dimbleby:* You have been condemned today by the 59-nation energy conference in Salzburg by the chairman, who is saying that at a time when atomic energy is needed, what you have done is made it harder than ever to get it.

*The President:* I think that is an incorrect statement on his part, because as I pointed out, we will substantially increase our production of nuclear fuels. We are very eager to sell our own nuclear power plants. We are very eager to see other nations do the same.

What we don't want to do is to give these nonnuclear countries the capability of making weapons. And I don't think these two thrusts of our policy are incompatible.

*Mr. Weiss:* Could you perhaps, Mr. President, explain in some more detail the conditions and criteria under which the United States will, in the future, reliably supply nuclear fuel? Could nuclear fuel

elements originally supplied by the United States be reprocessed in third countries?

*The President:* Yes. They are now. And they would be permitted to be reprocessed in the future.

*Mr. Weiss:* Now, the German Federal Government has said it is in no position to retreat from the nuclear exports. Do you consider this still as a deal concluded with Brazil—

*Mr. de la Taille:* Or France with Pakistan.

*The President:* I understand.

*Mr. Weiss:* —as a major impediment to your desire to curb proliferation?

*The President:* We have expressed ourselves publicly in this Administration—and my predecessor, President Ford, and Secretary Kissinger did the same—in exploring the sale of the reprocessing plants both to Pakistan and to Brazil. This is a decision, though, for France, the Federal Republic of Germany, Brazil, and Pakistan to make themselves. We hope that our objection to this sale, which has been openly expressed, will curb or prevent future sales of this kind being consummated regardless of the action of the nations on these two particular sales.

I don't know what's going to happen in Brazil or Pakistan about these purchases. My understanding is that the Brazilians are quite determined to go through with their reprocessing capability. But we did object to it. We do object to it. We are not going to try to impose our will on other countries. And we believe that our opposition will prevent similar sales in the future.

*Mr. de la Taille:* Mr. President, before we go farther, I feel obliged to ask you a question about Concorde. You know that it has been largely misinterpreted in Europe, and the problem of Concorde is spreading anti-American feelings in Europe, especially in France, as you know. What's your position on the "political noise" of Concorde and the way it could be solved?

*The President:* My position is very clear. I

support the decision made by President Ford and his Administration in authorizing a 16-month trial period for the Concorde, both at Dulles Airport, which the Federal Government controls, and also at the John F. Kennedy Airport, which is controlled by local authorities in New York.

As you know, where the Federal Government has had that authority, the test flights are now being conducted by Concorde at Dulles, near Washington. I have no authority at all over the New York port officials—

*Mr. de la Taille: People in Europe don't know that—are not familiar with that.*

*The President:* I know. That is the crux of the misunderstanding, because in our own nation, the executive leaders—even the President has absolutely no authority over the judicial system or the courts, and to try to exert that authority would be a very serious breach of our constitutional processes.

We also have a similar constitutional division of authority between local governments, that is, the state and the city on the one hand compared to the President. I have no authority at all to tell the Governor of New York State or the mayor of New York City nor the New York Port Authority what to do about the Concorde. We have made our Federal position clear, that we prefer to see John F. Kennedy Airport open to the Concorde for the 16-month period.

*Mr. Dimbleby: Mr. President, can we turn to one area of foreign relations which perhaps made the greatest impact in the last three months, which is your stand on human rights and its effect on American foreign policy. I think people may be a bit puzzled now about quite where this is leading and wonder also why you've concentrated so very much on Russia and human rights there, where you are not actually able to do very much, and haven't apparently done anything, for instance, in Iran, a country which you have very close links with and where you could presumably very much influence what in fact went on.*

*The President:* My stand on human rights is compatible with the strong and proven

position taken by almost all Americans. We feel that the right of a human being to be treated fairly in the courts, to be removed from the threat of prison, imprisonment without a trial, to have a life to live that's free is very precious. In the past this deep commitment of the free democracies has quite often not been widely known or accepted or demonstrated.

Our policy is very clear. It doesn't relate just to the Soviet Union. I've always made it clear that it doesn't. It relates to our own country as well. It relates to all those with whom we trade or with whom we communicate.

It's an undeviating commitment that I intend to maintain until the last day I'm in office. And through various means, either public statements or through private negotiations, through sales policies, we are trying to implement a renewed awareness of the need for human rights in our dealing with all countries.

*Mr. Dimbleby: But has anything been done, for instance, about human rights in Iran since you came into office?*

*The President:* We feel that it has. But that's something for the Iranian Government to announce and to decide.

*Mr. Dimbleby: But privately you are putting pressure on them?*

*The President:* Both privately and publicly. I think there are very few leaders in the world now who don't realize that their attitude toward the basic question of human rights is a crucial element in our future relationships with them. This applies not only in the Communist countries; it also applies in totalitarian governments in South America and otherwise. It also applies among our closest friends.

*Mr. Dimbleby: But just lastly on that one point, if, for instance, with Russia you say that your stand on human rights shouldn't affect the SALT talks [Strategic Arms Limitation Talks]—*

*The President:* That's correct.

*Mr. Dimbleby: —may not other countries in the world say, well, when it actually*

comes down to practical matters of negotiation, of foreign policy, of aid, America doesn't mean it, it's simply what the President wishes America to be saying all the time rather than doing?

*The President:* I think that's not accurate. As you may or may not have noticed, I have a very hard time preventing the American Congress from inserting into the laws of our nation a direct prohibition against loans or foreign aid programs to countries that violate human rights.

My own best approach has been to treat these countries' violations in a negotiating way so that I can talk to a president of a country or to the leader of a country and say: this is a very serious problem between us, we don't want to put public pressure on you which would make it embarrassing for you to release political prisoners, for instance.

*Mr. Dimbleby:* But you did with Russia, very public.

*The President:* I have never predicated our stand on SALT or our trade policies with Russia on the basis of the attitude toward human rights. But I think that in many countries around the world there has been initiated a new awareness of the importance of human rights, at least in dealing with our own country.

*Mr. Weiss:* Quite generally, Mr. President, what basic rules for the future state of détente would you like to see established between East and West?

*The President:* Well, of course, I would like to see the Soviet Union join with us in a demonstrable commitment to put a limit on new atomic weapons, to reduce the number of weapons we presently have authorized and also in place, and eventually eliminate nuclear weapons altogether. I would like to see a comprehensive test ban where no testing of nuclear weapons, either peaceful or for military purposes, is carried out.

I would like to see a prior notice of all test firings to alleviate tensions that exist between our two countries. Also I would like to see us both withdraw any unwarranted influence in the private or internal affairs of

African countries where on occasion disputes have been nourished by outside influence.

I would like to see the Indian Ocean demilitarized, and I would like to have the Soviets agree with us to do this, working very closely with India, Australia, and others. I would like to see increased trade between our countries. I would like to see the Soviet Union and us, when we get to the Belgrade conference to assess the progress made under the Helsinki agreement, demonstrate along with us that we have moved very strongly toward correcting human rights violations within our own countries—and we have been guilty on occasion. These are the kinds of things that would be very helpful.

*Mr. Weiss:* But you are not—obviously not going to draw—to engage the Soviet Union into a much stronger ideological, global dispute?

*The President:* You know, I have no objection to that. We have our own democratic form of government which we think is best. In everything that I do concerning domestic or foreign policy, I like to try to make other people realize that our system works, that freedom of elections, freedom from persecution, that basic human rights being preserved, that a move toward peace, reduction in weapons, prohibition against suffering from inadequate health care and so forth, are part of our national consciousness and that we can demonstrate that it works in this country and serve as an example to others.

I am sure the Soviet Union has always maintained that an ideological struggle was legitimate and they have never refrained from doing so. I don't feel any inclination to refrain from doing it either.

*Mr. de la Taille:* Mr. President, I would like to ask you a question which is not related directly to the East-West relations, but maybe could be. What's going to be your attitude if there are someday Communist leaders participating in governments as Cabinet members, I mean, in Italy or in France in the case of a victory of the leftist coalition? And how do you see the impact of

*this question of Communists participating in governments in Europe—in Western Europe, I mean?*

*The President:* That's a question that is hard for me to answer, and I have got a lot to learn from other leaders of the nations with whom I'll be meeting in London. President Giscard [Valéry Giscard d'Estaing, of France] can help me a lot to understand that question. So can Mr. Andreotti [Giulio Andreotti, Prime Minister of Italy].

We have taken the basic position that it's not up to us to tell other people how to vote or how to choose their leaders or who those leaders should be.

Secondly, we strongly favor the election of leaders who are committed to freedom and democracy and who are free from Communist philosophy, which quite often has been dominated from the Soviet Union or other nations.

Third, we believe that the best way to prevent a shift toward communism in Italy or France or other countries is to make sure that the democratic government that's presently in existence works, that it's open to change when necessary, that it's sensitive to the needs of people, that its economic structure is sound, and that the administration of government is both competent and honest.

It's important for us to do this in our own nation. It's important for other free societies to do that in their countries. And to the extent that there is a demonstrable incapability of governing either because of incompetence or lack of sensitivity or honesty, that opens the door for increased Communist intrusion into the governmental process.

I think that's the best way to approach it, not for us to tell other nations what to do.

*Mr. Weiss: Sir, do you foresee any changes in the U.S. attitudes or policies or priorities concerning Berlin?*

*The President:* No. We will be consulting with the other nations involved, as you know—the Federal Republic, Great Britain, and France—to reemphasize our commitment to the quadripartite agreement with the Soviet Union on East and West Berlin.

I don't anticipate any change in our policy. What I do anticipate is that we reconfirm our commitment to the policy that has been in effect for the last 25 or more years.

*Mr. Dimbleby: When you came to office, Mr. President, you talked a great deal—and during the campaign—about the new openness that you were going to bring to diplomacy. And I wonder now, three months in, and after the Moscow talks which collapsed, if you feel that you were too open, that you pitched your bid too publicly and also too high, and that you have in fact set back the cause of disarmament by three months?*

*The President:* No. In the first place, the Moscow talks did not collapse. They are continuing. The Secretary of State, Mr. Vance, and the Foreign Minister, Mr. Gromyko, will continue their talks in Geneva in the middle of this month.

Also, we've established 8 or 10 subcommittees to work on some of the matters that I discussed earlier. I need not repeat those.

My Administration, including myself, have been criticized because we have brought into the open some basic foreign policy discussions that in the past took place in secret. I feel that I'll make a better judgment on foreign matters if the Congress and the American people know what my options are, debate these options freely and openly, and that my conclusions are drawn after those debates are completed.

In addition to that, when I do make a decision as President, I think other nations will pay much more attention to my decision if other nations' leaders know that the Congress and the American people support me.

In the Mideast, for instance, we hope to make some progress this fall. And a description of some of the options that we have available to us, a description as best I can without violating confidence of the different opinions expressed by the Arab countries and Israel, I think, is a very healthy development. We have been 29 years now with no agreement among those nations, and I think it's time to bring out some of the disputes into the open.

*Mr. Dimpleby: But can you yet point to any benefit that's been gained by your openness?*

*The President:* Well, I think so. I believe we have a much better chance now of reaching an actual reduction in commitments to atomic weapons than we did before, working with the Soviet Union. I think we have a much better chance this year than we have had in a long number of years to have some substantive move toward peace in the Middle East. I think that we have a much clearer concept around the world of the importance of human rights than we did a few years ago, a few months ago.

I think we have raised the question in a vivid fashion of the dangers to be derived from a continued proliferation of atomic weapon capability, and other points that we have tried to express is a need for conservation in the consumption of energy and for the sale of conventional weapons to the developing nations of the world.

I am not trying to say that our country has taken the only initiative in this. I think other leaders with whom I'll meet in London have done these things long before I did.

*Mr. Dimpleby: Do you believe—you were talking about the Middle East—do you believe that American influence is sufficient just holding the ring and getting things together, or do you think actually in the end a Middle East solution will only be possible when America decides to use every kind of pressure both on Israel and on the Arab countries to come to a conference?*

*The President:* It is hard to anticipate what is going to happen in the Middle East. What we are trying to do is to consult extensively and privately with the leaders of the nations involved directly. By the end of May, I will have had long and extended conversations with every one of those nations' leaders.

This has been preceded by visits to those countries by our own Secretary of State. After these meetings are concluded, we will decide, based on the conversations we have had, what are the possible common grounds for agreement and what are the remaining disharmonies among the nations concerned.

Then we'll go back to those countries, Secretary of State Vance will make that trip, and we'll put together what we think is a consensus among the nations involved. And I think we'll either go public with it or that we'll try to put together that as a basic agenda for a meeting in Geneva, if it takes place.

I would not hesitate if I saw clearly a fair and equitable solution to use the full strength of our own country and its persuasive powers to bring those nations to agreement. I recognize, though, that we cannot impose our will on others, and unless the countries involved agree, there is no way for us to make progress.

The last point I would like to make is this: Not because of any special quality of our own has this occurred, but I believe it is accurate to say that at this point we have a group of moderate leaders in the Middle East, all of whom have an inclination to trust our government to be fair. And if I should ever do anything as President to cause the Arab leaders to think that I was unfair to them and their interests, then the hope for peace would be reduced substantially. And the same thing applies to Israel.

So, we are in effect in the position of a communicator between the parties involved or among them, and also we are in the position of one who can influence countries to modify their positions slightly to accommodate other nations' interests. I think it's a very important position in which I find myself. I take the responsibility very, very heavily.

*Mr. Weiss: Mr. President, I would like to ask you quite generally, how do you assess the mood of the American nation to intervene abroad, if necessary? I think there is little doubt that the American people would not hesitate to support military action if one of its major allies would be in danger. The public reaction was very cool when the Ford Administration considered, for a moment, action in Angola. How do you assess the mood?*

*The President:* We have deep commitments to Japan, to the NATO countries as

an equal partner for mutual defense. These commitments are supported overwhelmingly by the American people. There is no doubt that those commitments would be honored.

The intrusion of American military forces into the internal affairs of other nations is highly unlikely and would not be supported by the American people or by me. The only exception would be if I felt that our own nation's security was directly threatened.

We could not have supported an American military offensive in Angola. The people of the country nor the Congress would have supported it even if President Ford had decided to go ahead with it.

I think that the unfortunate experience that we had in Vietnam has impressed on the American people deeply, and I hope permanently, the danger of our country resorting to military means in a distant place on Earth when our own security is not being threatened, except under those conditions as it relates to approved treaties that have in effect been ratified by the American people, as is the case with, say, Japan and NATO.

*Mr. Dimbleby: Mr. President, our time is coming toward a close. Can I just ask you lastly, you came into this office in January very confident about how you would handle it, not particularly impressed by people who had done it before you, thinking you would be able to do it perfectly well with your own achievements.*

*Are you chastened in any way by the difference between what you found since you came into office and what you expected when you first walked into the White House?*

*The President:* Well, I have been almost permanently chastened in my own political career. I have had victories and defeats. I have had high expectations, and some of those haven't been realized. But on the whole I have been very pleased, and I see the future of my own administration of the nation which I serve and of the world community in which we play a part as being one that provides me with a great deal of hope and expectation for improvement.

I do feel chastened, to use your word, to

the extent that I know I have got a lot to learn. I see that there is no way for us to make progress without the closest possible harmony, consultation with our allies and our friends, who share with us the blessings of strong and viable economy and free people. That's why the summit is so important to me and to the people of the United States. I hope that I can contribute something as we meet with other leaders, but I am going to learn as well.

I am not an expert on finance. I know that the Chancellor of Germany, the Prime Minister of Great Britain, the Prime Minister of Japan have all been finance ministers. I expect to learn a lot from them.

*Mr. de la Taille: The French President.*

*The President:* And the French President, too.

I think to the extent that we can understand each other and see our common problems and derive strength from one another, I think to that extent we can approach the future with confidence and hope and the expectation of progress. I feel very good about the future.

## **President Carter Interviewed by Newspaper Editors Convention**

*President Carter spoke with members of the American Society of Newspaper Editors in a telephone call to their convention at Honolulu, Hawaii, on May 3. Following is an excerpt from the transcript of the questions and answers.<sup>1</sup>*

*Q. Mr. President, as a Japanese, I wish to take this opportunity to thank you for your wise decision to appoint Senator Mansfield to Japan as the new American Ambassador. The Japanese are all very happy not only be-*

<sup>1</sup> For the complete transcript, see Weekly Compilation of Presidential Documents dated May 9, 1977, p. 650.



cause we know he is a man of character and duty but also because we've found that you value Japan as a very important key country in capacity and [inaudible]. At the same time, however, we feel a little disappointed that at the end of your 100 days you will soon be in Europe, while you have no plans—no definite plans—to pay a visit to Asia, including Japan or China.

*In view of the importance of U.S.-China relations as well as U.S.-Japan relations, we strongly feel that you had better visit Japan and China as soon as possible. How do you feel about that?*

*The President:* Well, that's very gracious of you to say that. As a matter of fact, the last foreign country that I visited was Japan. And I only intend to make one trip outside our country this year, and that will be to the London conference. And while there, I'll go to Geneva to meet with President Asad from Syria.

As you know, Prime Minister Fukuda has had a very good meeting with me here. So have, I think, 11 other leaders of foreign countries. And he will be with us in London.

I look upon our relationships with Japan as being crucial to peace on a continuing basis in the western part of the Pacific. And my own hope is that with careful prior consultation before we make a decision that affects the world economy, in which Japan plays such a large role, or any matter that relates to political or diplomatic or military affairs in the Western Pacific, that this can strengthen our ties with Japan.

I would like to see Japan play a much more aggressive role in both economics and politics. And one of the things that we think can be accomplished in the London meeting is to have a growing closeness between Japan and the European Community—which we presently have, both with Japan and the European Community nations.

So if we can help to bridge that gap on a permanent basis and a very friendly basis, I'm sure it will be productive for us all. But I certainly would not neglect, ever, the growing importance of Japan. And as you well know, within three or four days of the time I was inaugurated, the Vice President, Vice President Mondale, left here and went on a tour of just a few nations, one of which of course was Japan.

So I thank you for your interest in my visiting your great country. I hope I can get back there maybe within the next year or two.

*Q. Mr. President, this is Dave Broder from the Washington Post. The front page news here this morning was the report that the Soviet Union had made a breakthrough that could lead to development of a high-energy weapon against U.S. ballistic missiles. Is there any such development, and does it threaten the U.S. strategic deterrence?*

*The President:* We have no evidence, David, that the Soviets have achieved any major breakthrough in the kind of weapon described in the news today. We have conducted experiments along with the Soviets and others—they've been published in scientific journals—concerning laser beams, the use of charged particles, and so forth. But as far as their evolution into a major weapon capability, we believe that the Soviets are many years away from that possibility.

And I think that this is, first of all, a report that's based on some inaccuracies. Secondly, the assessment of the report in the aviation magazine has been exaggerated. So the answer, to summarize, is that we do not see any likelihood at all, based on our constant monitoring of the Soviet Union as best we can, that they have any prospective breakthrough in a new weapons system that would endanger the security of our country.

## United States Policy on Nuclear Technology: Combining Energy and Security

*Address by Joseph S. Nye, Jr.<sup>1</sup>*

The future of nuclear energy is today at a crucial point. For the past 30 years, we have viewed it as the ultimate solution for the world's energy needs. The energy crisis of 1973 and the subsequent large increase in oil prices accentuated this belief. However, in the past few years, hard questions have been asked about the effects of nuclear power on the environment, on human health and safety, and on national security. Public opinion is concerned about the issue of nuclear wastes, the potential sabotage of nuclear facilities, terrorist theft of nuclear materials, and the risks of nuclear weapons proliferation. Our governments must answer these questions.

For our part, the United States has just completed a comprehensive review of our energy policy, including nuclear policy. I would like to review the principal features of this policy, in particular our policy with regard to nuclear proliferation.

President Carter has made it clear that the United States remains committed to the use of nuclear energy at home and to peaceful nuclear cooperation abroad. The President's energy program envisages a substantial increase in our nuclear power-generating capacity. Moreover, he has explicitly recognized the considerations that have led other nations to consider nuclear energy to be important in their own energy plans.

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<sup>1</sup>Made at Salzburg, Austria, on May 2 at a luncheon for heads of delegations to an International Conference on Nuclear Power and Its Fuel Cycle held under the auspices of the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA). Mr. Nye is Deputy to the Under Secretary for Security Assistance, Science, and Technology.

To those countries who rely on our nuclear cooperation to meet their energy needs, the President has pledged that the United States will remain a reliable supplier of nuclear equipment and resources. To that end, we have taken steps to enhance our own enrichment capacity in order to be able to meet our own needs and the needs of other nations. With those countries, particularly those adhering to the Nonproliferation Treaty (NPT), with whom we have not previously engaged in nuclear cooperation and who share our nonproliferation objectives, we remain prepared to undertake negotiation of bilateral agreements for cooperation under which the United States can assist in their use of nuclear power. Finally, the United States for a number of years has contributed funds, technology, equipment, materials, and expertise through the IAEA to assist nations, particularly developing nations, in the peaceful uses of nuclear energy. We pledge to continue this assistance. In short, we remain firmly committed to assist other nations in the peaceful uses of nuclear energy. The current generation of commercial nuclear reactors does not pose a major proliferation hazard.

However, we are left with the key question of how we can reconcile the next stage of nuclear power development with the increased threat of nuclear weapons proliferation. This is a question for the entire international community, and one of the most important challenges facing us all. Clearly the solution to this problem cannot be achieved by one country or even a number of countries working alone. We need an interna-

tional solution. For its part, the United States stands prepared to work with other countries in searching for such a common solution. Indeed, I believe that unless governments are able to show their citizens that the governments have been able to work together to maintain the distinction between the peaceful and nonpeaceful uses of the atom, we will find increasing public reluctance to accept this energy source.

Nuclear proliferation is a matter of real public concern. The spread of nuclear explosives capabilities to an increasing number of countries would present a serious danger to the world community from which no single nation would be immune. A multi-proliferated world would not be a stable world. It would increase the prospect that nuclear weapons might once again be used in war. It would adversely affect the ability of our governments to control international events and expose all of us to new risks. It would have a dissolvent effect on international relationships and increase the prospect of terrorist nuclear attacks.

Given these threats to security, a failure to contain proliferation would inevitably result in serious curtailment of the continued application of peaceful nuclear power. Hence, I believe that nonproliferation is an objective upon which all of us who are interested in the peaceful use of nuclear energy agree. Indeed, this is the fundamental premise of the NPT and of the important Agency that is our host at this conference.

There are two crucial elements of the proliferation problem: (1) the motivation to acquire nuclear explosive devices, and (2) the technical capability to do so. Neither dimension can be ignored.

First, we must diminish the political and security motivations that lead states to acquire an explosives capability. This means reducing the role of nuclear weapons in world politics. In his inaugural address, President Carter stated a longrun goal of eliminating nuclear weapons, and he has taken steps to reduce nuclear weapons force levels and to move toward halting nuclear tests. The Non-proliferation Treaty provides another important way to diminish the role of nuclear

weapons in world politics. It creates an essential framework for reassurances that one's neighbors are confining their nuclear activities to peaceful purposes and that, in the event of diversion to explosives purposes, the safeguards system provided for by the treaty would give timely warning for diplomacy to work. For these reasons, it is essential that we continue to seek the widest possible adherence to the NPT and to support measures which strengthen the international safeguards system of the IAEA.

The second element of the proliferation problem—technical capability—presents us with a different set of challenges. For if a sudden sense of insecurity should happen to coincide with a capability to produce nuclear explosive devices, further proliferation is all but inevitable. To avoid such situations, we must pay attention to capabilities as well as motivations.

We all agree on the need for safeguards and controls on peaceful nuclear activity. The IAEA safeguards system has been successful in the case of the current generation of reactors in that it provides an alarm that would ring early enough for diplomacy to work in the event of deliberate diversion. But for certain facilities such as reprocessing, a safeguards system, even if technically perfect, does not prevent the spread of direct weapons-usable material that results from normal operation. Therefore, technical perfection of safeguards does not solve the central problem of providing timely warning for diplomacy to work. In other words, our present dilemma is how to cope with developments in commercial nuclear energy which threaten to empty safeguards of their central political meaning.

It was in response to this dilemma that the United States decided to defer domestically, and not to export, commercial reprocessing facilities. I would emphasize categorically that this decision does not mean that the United States has failed to support article IV of the NPT. On the contrary, we recognize that, as a nuclear-weapons state, the United States has a special responsibility to share with others the benefits of nuclear energy.

Our policies are aimed at fulfilling this responsibility, while directed against those activities proscribed in articles I and II of the treaty. But in doing so, we must not imperil the objectives of articles I and II. When, for such reasons, we decide to deny ourselves commercialization of reprocessing, it hardly seems required to export it. If anything, as I will describe shortly, our proposal of a fuel cycle evaluation program is designed to enhance the type of peaceful nuclear cooperation which is really envisioned in article IV.

The United States position on reprocessing facilities has sometimes been misunderstood. President Carter's April 7 statement did not prejudge the question of whether some form of reprocessing would be necessary if we enter a breeder economy. Rather he said that we have a responsibility to search for alternatives that will meet our energy needs while reducing security risks. In short, he opposed the premature entry into a plutonium economy. Studies done for our Nuclear Regulatory Commission indicate that reprocessing in relation to recycle is premature. They predict a total discounted benefit of \$3.2 billion (in 1975 dollars, discounted at 10 percent) over the period 1976-2000 from uranium and plutonium recycle when this option is compared with that of disposing of spent reactor fuel without recovery of uranium and plutonium. This corresponds to a reduction of about 8 percent in the average nuclear fuel cycle cost. This is much smaller than the uncertainties in the cost estimates on which the analysis is based. Moreover, since fuel costs are only about 15 percent of bus bar electricity cost,<sup>2</sup> and less than 10 percent of consumer electricity price, the possible reduction in electricity price would be less than 1 percent.

At the same time, we fully recognize the concern of other countries for security of fuel supply. To accommodate this need, we will be embarking on a wide-ranging program to provide assured supply of nonsensitive nu-

clear fuels on a timely, adequate, reliable, and economic basis. Specifically, we will expand U.S. enrichment capacity and reopen our order books. In addition, we will go beyond a strictly bilateral approach. We invite others to join us in exploring:

—Multilateral arrangements designed to substantiate guarantees; and

—International arrangements such as stockpiles which might serve as a contingency reserve.

I should emphasize that these concepts are still in their formative stages and need further investigation. The important point, however, is that the fuel assurances we envisage should be designed to provide real multilateral incentives for countries to forgo the costly and dangerous acquisition of sensitive facilities. To be credible, such international incentives must be nondiscriminatory and they must not increase the dependency of recipient nations on any one supplier.

The problems related to the back end of the fuel cycle, notably the need to insure adequate spent fuel and nuclear waste storage, are equally urgent. We are presently studying a wide range of solutions which would, as is the case with fuel assurances, alleviate the pressure for acquisition of reprocessing capabilities. These include an expansion of domestic U.S. storage capacity for spent fuel; the possibility of making storage capacity available for the interim storage of foreign spent fuel; and international spent fuel storage arrangements, including regional centers.

As we pursue these programs designed to meet the world's nuclear energy needs while at the same time advancing the cause of non-proliferation, the logical question that arises is whether there is still time to affect the next generation of nuclear technology. Our conclusion is that we do have time to examine future fuel cycle alternatives that present fewer proliferation and health risks. This was the basis for the President's April 7 decision to restructure the U.S. breeder reactor program. I should emphasize that our intent is not to turn the clock back or to deprive any other nation of required energy

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<sup>2</sup>The bus bar electricity cost includes all costs up to the point the electric power is transmitted from the generating plant, but not transmission and distribution costs.

sources, but to explore whether we are able to shape the future of nuclear technology to serve our broader social purposes while at the same time deriving the benefits of its energy potential.

Particular technologies always reflect certain social assumptions prevalent at the time of their origin. For example, the objective of embarking on the Purex process some 30 years ago was to derive plutonium in as pure a state as possible. As time passes, social assumptions change. Today, our societies are more concerned about nonproliferation, and we must look again at alternative technologies that may have been rejected as suboptimal in the past but which may today be preferable because of changed social assumptions.

Options and alternatives to reprocessing and recycle that have long been overlooked or forgotten because they were out of line with past policies should be closely examined to assure that failure to develop them was based on technical judgments that are not altered by changes in the parameters which society set for such judgments. These include the tandem fuel cycle, various coprocessing schemes, homogeneous reactors, the spectral shift reactor, and the thorium-uranium cycle. All of these possibilities have the potential to extract additional energy from a nuclear fuel cycle while making it more proliferation-resistant. There is no guarantee, of course, that any of them will prove technically and economically viable, but the dangers of nuclear proliferation demand that they be explored while we still have time.

It is in this spirit that the United States has embarked on a major program to examine fuel cycle alternatives. In fact, we will be spending some three-quarters of a billion dollars on that objective in fiscal 1978 alone. We invite other countries to join us in this endeavor. This is the point of the President's call for an international nuclear fuel cycle evaluation program open to all interested countries. We envision that this evaluation program would study urgent problems associated with the current operation of the fuel cycle, such as reliable fuel supply and means of storing spent fuel, as well as study-

ing alternative future fuel cycles, including future generation reactors and institutional arrangements for reducing proliferation risks.

Among the specific technical studies envisaged in this proposed multinational effort are: (1) uranium and thorium supply; (2) enrichment availability, (3) institutional arrangements related to fuel assurances; (4) spent fuel storage including study of the technology for long-term retrievable and permanent disposal in international/multinational repositories as well as near-term capacity options; (5) methods to increase once-through uranium utilization in light water reactors; and (6) advanced reactors and breeder options. This includes studies of alternative forms of and institutional means of managing reprocessing to reduce proliferation risks in a possible breeder economy.

We will be consulting with many nations—both nuclear suppliers and consumers—on our proposed evaluation program in the weeks and months ahead. We invite all nations to join us in this effort to the extent they are interested.

The precise form of organization will be decided upon following discussions with interested countries. The basic concept would be to establish a number of coordinated research and study programs for existing reactor fuel cycles and future fuel cycle alternatives. The efforts in some of these areas are related to ongoing programs and could start immediately. In any event, efforts in each major area would start as soon as possible with as many countries as are interested in that area. International institutions, as appropriate, could also be major participants. Each aspect would be coordinated as appropriate by interested countries; in other words, a lead-country approach might be utilized. Countries interested in participating in research and evaluation in that particular area would work together on both a bilateral and multilateral basis. Lead countries and institutions would meet as a steering group to coordinate the overall program. There would be no single agreed product of the program. The purpose would be mutual education and

voluntary harmonization of policies. In this spirit, the results of studies would be made broadly available, for example, through IAEA symposia and other means. While no specific duration is envisaged, periodic collective assessments would be carried out as appropriate.

In conclusion, let me reiterate that we are not trying to stem the progress of science and technology. Quite the contrary, we are inviting others who will be working with nuclear energy to join us in shaping the most advanced work in nuclear technology in a way that reflects our shared social purposes of combining energy and security. In short, we must work together to maintain the vital distinction between the peaceful and non-peaceful uses of the atom for the next generation—of reactors and of people.

## **National and Multilateral Action on Corrupt Practices**

*Address by Mark B. Feldman  
Deputy Legal Adviser<sup>1</sup>*

Over the past two years, SEC [Securities and Exchange Commission] investigations and congressional hearings have revealed a pattern of corruption in international trade and investment involving millions of dollars of questionable payments, 300 companies or more, and public officials in many countries. The cases involve bribery, extortion, questionable political contributions, excessive agents' fees, and a gray area of payments routinely made to expedite administrative action. Disclosure of these payments has had serious political consequences in a number of friendly countries and has hurt U.S. foreign relations. But the disclosures have forced to public consciousness a problem that cannot be ignored and needs to be corrected.

The U.S. Government has taken a strong stand against illicit payments because they corrupt governments, distort international trade and investment, and undermine public confidence in economic and political institu-

tions. Government agencies, particularly the SEC and the Internal Revenue Service, have developed programs to control these practices. Congress has enacted new tax legislation and new reporting requirements in respect of foreign military sales to deter illicit payments abroad. The Department of Justice has concluded agreements with authorities in a dozen foreign countries to exchange information to facilitate criminal investigations.

As a result of these disclosures and actions, we believe there has been a significant improvement in the practices of U.S. enterprise abroad, but further measures are necessary to restore public confidence in American business and to improve the operation of the international economic system.

The Carter Administration has decided to support congressional proposals to make it a crime for U.S. enterprises to take steps in the United States to bribe foreign officials to gain their assistance in obtaining business or in influencing legislation. President Carter believes that American foreign policy should reflect the values of our society, and a criminal statute is a clear statement to the world that the United States will not condone bribery at home or abroad. The Administration recognizes that criminal legislation with extraterritorial implications presents a number of problems of definition and enforcement, and the executive branch has proposed amendments to the pending bills to deal with these issues.

The government also recognizes that the measures taken by the United States will not be fully effective unless they are complemented by similar action by other nations. U.S. enterprises are in the news because the United States insists on reform, but the problem is not confined to one country or economic system; it is rooted in local conditions in many countries and affects large sectors of international trade.

The international community has recognized the international character of this problem and its importance in a series of resolutions by international organizations:

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<sup>1</sup> Made before the 71st annual meeting of the American Society of International Law at San Francisco, Calif., on Apr. 21.

— In July 1975, the OAS [Organization of American States] Permanent Council condemned “in the most emphatic terms any act of bribery . . . by any transnational enterprise” and “any demand for or acceptance of improper payments” by any public or private person.

— In December 1975, the U.N. General Assembly adopted Resolution 3514 condemning corrupt practices, including bribery, and calling upon governments to take measures to prevent them. The resolution further calls upon home governments to cooperate with host countries and to prosecute, within their national jurisdictions, those who engage in such acts.

— In June 1976, the member governments of the OECD [Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development], as part of their Declaration on International Investment and Multinational Enterprises, jointly recommended that: “Enterprises should not render—and they should not be solicited or expected to render—any bribe or other improper benefit, direct or indirect, to any public servant or holder of public office. . . .”<sup>2</sup>

These resolutions and declarations are helpful, but as the Senate recognized in S. Res. 265 of November 12, 1975, an international agreement is necessary to control illicit payments that distort international trade.

The U.S. Government first proposed the negotiation of an international agreement to control illicit payments in international trade and investment in March 1976. In response to this initiative, the Economic and Social Council of the United Nations last August established an Ad Hoc Intergovernmental Working Group to examine the problem of corrupt practices and to elaborate, in detail, the scope and contents of an international agreement to prevent and eliminate illicit payments in connection with international commercial transactions. The Working Group is to report to the Economic and Social Council this summer.

<sup>2</sup> For the text of the declaration, with annex, and decisions of the Council adopted on June 21, 1976, see BULLETIN of July 19, 1976, p. 83.

The Working Group has met three times in New York, and it will hold a fourth session in Geneva in the last week of June. Progress has been slow, but it is encouraging that governments, for the first time, are engaged in serious discussion of measures that can be taken to control corruption affecting international commerce. At its last session [March 28–April 18, 1977], the Working Group began consideration of specific texts that might be included in an international agreement. These texts were prepared by the U.N. Center for Transnational Corporations at the request of the Working Group, and a revised text will be annexed to the draft report being prepared for consideration of the Working Group. The examination of texts is proceeding at this stage without prejudice to the position of any government concerning an international agreement, and several delegations have emphasized measures other than an international agreement.

The United States has made proposals which envision an international agreement based on four fundamental elements:

1. Enforcement of existing criminal laws prohibiting bribery of and extortion by public officials;

2. New criminal laws prohibiting bribery of foreign officials under defined circumstances;

3. Uniform provisions for public disclosure of agents' fees paid to obtain government business to be enforced by both home and host countries with record-keeping requirements and penal sanctions for false reporting; and

4. International cooperation in the enforcement of these national laws by arrangements for the exchange of information and judicial assistance.

The United States would also favor commitments not to provide tax deductions for foreign bribes. Other ideas put before the Working Group by other delegations include disclosure of political contributions, extradition, financial disclosure by public officials, reports to the United Nations on convictions of bribery, and some political issues, par-

ticularly other alleged corrupt practices including payments of taxes and royalties in contravention of U.N. resolutions.

Some of these issues are not germane to an international agreement on illicit payments, but the biggest challenge is to obtain the basic decision that the United Nations should adopt an international agreement on illicit payments that will require meaningful action by states.

Experience has demonstrated that international bribery cannot be controlled solely by traditional criminal laws. Practically every country of the world has legislation punishing bribery of its officials, and those laws generally prohibit the demand for bribes as well as their offer. However, enforcement is difficult, and until recently there have been few prosecutions. It is apparent that new measures are necessary to deter bribery and to strengthen law enforcement.

Accordingly, the United States is asking other nations to join with us in adopting penal sanctions for bribery of foreign officials and internationally agreed requirements for disclosure of agents' fees in connection with international commercial transactions. To be effective these measures must be embodied in national legislation. However, an international agreement is necessary to give every country confidence that it can take strong action against bribery without injury to its foreign trade or foreign policy and to insure cooperation and minimize friction in particular cases. An agreement would define the responsibilities of home and host countries and specify the measures that each would take under its own national legislation and in cooperation with foreign law enforcement authorities.

The task for U.S. diplomacy is to persuade other countries that such an agreement is in their interest. While a number of countries recently have taken steps to control bribery of their own officials, few have done anything to inhibit bribery of foreign officials by their nationals. All countries give lipservice to effective international action to control bribery, but many are reluctant to expand their legislation because they fear political or commercial consequences.

The United States believes that these fears can be overcome in the context of a well-focused and broad-based international agreement, but success will require persistence, patience, and persuasion.

The United States will continue to press for an effective international agreement because we believe there is a general interest in reducing the level of bribery and extortion affecting international commerce. Exporting countries should all desire to protect their enterprises from unfair competition and from extortion which is a kind of tax on trade. Purchasing countries should have a keen interest in protecting the integrity of their decisionmaking procedures and in reducing payments that raise the cost of goods and services and absorb scarce foreign exchange. All countries would benefit from strengthened public confidence in established institutions.

We recognize that established patterns of corruption cannot be changed overnight, but we believe significant changes can be made in the procedures of international trade that are worth the effort to negotiate. This result can be achieved if an agreement is narrowly focused on the most serious problems, and if it provides for specific measures with real teeth. The U.S. Government is working very hard to develop such proposals and the necessary international support. Success is not assured, but we will not fail for lack of effort.

## **Fifth U.S.-German Cultural Talks Held at Washington**

*Following is the text of a communique issued on April 27 at the conclusion of the fifth annual German-American Cultural Talks.*

Press release 191 dated April 28

The Fifth Annual German-American Cultural Talks took place in Washington April 26-27, 1977. The delegation from the Federal Republic of Germany, led by Ambassador Guenther Schoedel, was welcomed by Assistant Secretary of State for



Educational and Cultural Affairs Joseph D. Duffey, who headed the U.S. delegation.

The talks reflected the close partnership which exists between the two countries and which permitted a wide-ranging exploration of various matters of mutual interest in the cultural and educational fields. The two delegations reviewed portions of the implementation of the Helsinki Agreement on the Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe and the preparations being made by their Governments for the Belgrade Conference which will begin later this year. They discussed this subject at length and confirmed that the two Governments are in full agreement on their evaluation of these aspects of this Conference and on their general approach to it.

In addition, the German and American representatives agreed on various ways to improve and extend cultural and educational relations between their countries. Among other points, they agreed to encourage a wide variety of exchanges, and in particular of young leaders. The two sides noted the success of the November 1976 Munich Conference on "Culture in the Urban Environment," and agreed to explore the possibility of another Conference in 1977. The role of German cultural centers in the United States was reviewed and found valuable in maintaining the quality of German-American relations. The two sides recognized the valuable contribution made by private foundations to German-American understanding, and explored the possibility

of increasing exchanges of students and professors between their countries. The Sixth German-American Cultural Talks will be held in the Federal Republic of Germany in 1978.

## Letters of Credence

### *Chad*

The newly appointed Ambassador of the Republic of Chad, Pierre Toura Gaba, presented his credentials to President Carter on May 13.<sup>1</sup>

### *Korea*

The newly appointed Ambassador of the Republic of Korea, Yong Shik Kim, presented his credentials to President Carter on May 13.<sup>1</sup>

### *Thailand*

The newly appointed Ambassador of the Kingdom of Thailand, Arun Phanupong, presented his credentials to President Carter on May 13.<sup>1</sup>

### *United Arab Emirates*

The newly appointed Ambassador of the United Arab Emirates, Hamad Abdel Rahman al-Madfa, presented his credentials to President Carter on May 13.<sup>1</sup>

<sup>1</sup>For texts of the Ambassador's remarks and the President's reply, see Department of State press release dated May 13.

## Department Testifies on Nonproliferation and Nuclear Export Policies

*Following is a statement by Joseph S. Nye, Jr., Deputy to the Under Secretary for Security Assistance, Science, and Technology, made before the Subcommittee on Energy, Nuclear Proliferation and Federal Services of the Senate Committee on Governmental Affairs on May 6.<sup>1</sup>*

I am pleased to have this opportunity to testify on our nonproliferation and nuclear export policies on behalf of the Department of State.

Let me say at the outset, speaking for the President and Secretary Vance, that we very much appreciate the patience of this subcommittee in awaiting the results of the Presidentially directed nuclear policy review. I know you had hoped to receive substantive testimony from Deputy Secretary Christopher when he appeared before you earlier [April 1], but as he emphasized at the time, Presidential decisions on key elements of our new policies were still pending. Since then, we have seen the President's statements of April 7 and 27 and the Administration's proposed nonproliferation bill submitted to the Congress on April 27.<sup>2</sup> I should note at this juncture that we have much work still ahead of us in fleshing out the details of our strategy and that some Presidential decisions are still needed on selected issues.

<sup>1</sup> The complete transcript of the hearings will be published by the committee and will be available from the Superintendent of Documents, U.S. Government Printing Office, Washington, D.C. 20402.

<sup>2</sup> For President Carter's statement and remarks to the press on Apr. 7, see BULLETIN of May 2, 1977, p. 429; for his message to the Congress and a White House fact sheet issued on Apr. 27, see BULLETIN of May 16, 1977, p. 477; for text of the bill, see H. Doc. 95-131, 95th Cong., 1st sess.

Today, I would like to share with you the progress we have made thus far. Specifically, I will:

- Outline for you the conceptual basis of the approach we took to the Presidentially directed nuclear policy review;
- Elaborate on some of the key decisions made to date by the President; and
- Provide you with general comments on executive branch legislative recommendations.

As the President has made clear, the problem of nuclear proliferation is one of the most crucial and complex issues we face, and he directed the Interagency Group that I chair to conduct a very comprehensive review of our nonproliferation and nuclear export policies.

As we approached this review, we recognized two basic objectives; namely, that nuclear power should be available to meet legitimate energy needs, but that this must be done in a way that avoids the proliferation of nuclear explosives capabilities. Proliferation of such capabilities to an increasing number of countries carries with it an inordinate cost in terms of our overall foreign policy and national security objectives. It would increase the prospect that nuclear weapons would once again be used in war. It would reduce our ability to control international crises, expose our nation to new risks, and have a seriously detrimental effect on our alliances.

In considering an optimum nonproliferation strategy, one must identify two crucial elements of the problem: a given nation's motivation to seek to acquire or not to acquire nuclear explosive devices, and its

technical capability to do so. Both elements are critically important, and we must be careful not to adopt policies to deal with one element of the problem that might have serious adverse effects on the other element.

With regard to motivation, our policies should reduce incentives to acquire nuclear weapons capabilities.

For example, the security assurances provided by the United States in the context of the NATO Treaty and our bilateral security agreement with Japan reduce the incentives of these states to seek nuclear weapons even though they have the technical capability to acquire them. In fact, lest we overlook the obvious, I would say that the security guarantees implicit in our alliance relationships are some of the most important instruments of our nonproliferation policy.

Similarly, the Nonproliferation Treaty (NPT) provides an essential framework for affecting motivation. In general terms, the NPT represents an international regime in which states agree that their security interests would be better served by avoiding the further spread of nuclear weapons capabilities. In specific terms, the treaty provides reassurances that potential adversaries are confining their nuclear activities to peaceful purposes and that in the event of diversion to military purposes the safeguards system provided for by the treaty would give timely warning. This also diminishes the motivation of NPT parties to seek the nuclear explosives option. For this reason and because it is an indispensable framework for effective nonproliferation efforts, we continue to seek the widest possible adherence to the NPT.

The NPT is a delicate international arrangement in which states have accepted an explicitly discriminatory status in the military area. But it is imperative that our nuclear policies not discriminate among NPT adherents with regard to civil nuclear cooperation. The essence of the treaty is a compromise in which discrimination is accepted in the military sphere—between nuclear-weapons and non-nuclear-weapons states—in

return for the energy benefits of the atom in the civil sphere. For nuclear-weapons states to adopt discriminatory policies on the civil side would destroy the very fabric of the NPT and, with it, one of the key nonproliferation institutions.

In sum, therefore, we must be acutely sensitive to the political and security motivations that lead states to acquire nuclear explosive devices. This will necessitate insuring the credibility of existing security guarantees; making progress in achieving meaningful and verifiable arms control agreements that reduce nuclear weapons force levels and limit or prohibit nuclear testing; strengthening our alliances; and devaluing the prestige identified with a nuclear weapons capability.

The other element of the proliferation problem—technical capability—presents us with a very different set of challenges of a more immediate nature. For if motivations coincide with a capability to produce nuclear explosive devices, further proliferation is all but inevitable. As nuclear capabilities spread, particularly the sensitive facilities of enrichment and reprocessing that can produce weapons-usable material, the number of states near the nuclear weapons threshold increases. In a sense, we have innocent progress toward a bomb. Then, if a state suddenly changes its motivation—for example, because of a change of government or sudden action of a neighbor—it can quickly go nuclear. We must therefore seek to avert the further spread under national control of facilities and materials capable of quick or easy conversion to weapons purposes, while meeting our obligations under the NPT. We need to strengthen the NPT and IAEA [International Atomic Energy Agency] safeguards to insure that we have as much time as possible for diplomacy to work in the event of deliberate diversion and to help to deter such diversion.

In the past, particularly before 1974, we focused our nonproliferation efforts on reinforcing the international system of controls to insure that civil nuclear supply was used only for peaceful purposes. This included

upgrading the IAEA safeguards system and improving physical security measures to deter unauthorized use of nuclear materials and facilities.

Since 1974, we have realized that safeguards, however important, are not always sufficient. Thus, we adopted a policy of encouraging supplier countries to exercise self-restraint in the transfer of sensitive facilities and technologies, particularly enrichment and reprocessing, so as to delay the spread of weapons-usable materials and the facilities that produce them. We believe that this second approach of self-restraint is necessary while the international community develops ways to shape the future of nuclear energy so as to reduce proliferation risks.

Both approaches—safeguards and restraint—are still crucial to our efforts, but each has inherent limitations.

For example, a policy based on safeguards alone could prove inadequate in the case of reprocessing facilities. The central concept of safeguards is adequate warning of diversion that would provide sufficient time for diplomatic efforts to cope with the problem. But the very nature of Purex reprocessing technology means that the timely-warning function of safeguards would all but vanish. Even with the most effective of safeguards administered by angels, there would be a stockpile of pure plutonium at the end of the process. The dangers are clear when one considers the possibility of a nation with sensitive facilities suddenly abrogating a safeguards agreement. It can build an explosive device within a matter of weeks—too little time for diplomacy to work.

On the other hand, it is important to realize the limitations of a policy of denials. A program that consists primarily of denials not only would engender severe political resentments but also would not necessarily prevent a nation intent on acquiring a nuclear explosives capability from doing so through indigenous means.

Thus, we believe that a third key element is required for a successful long-term non-proliferation policy—one based on the principle of incentives set forth in bilateral and multilateral arrangements. These incentives

would include our being able to provide assured supply of nonsensitive nuclear fuels on a timely, adequate, reliable, and economic basis at the front end of the fuel cycle, and to insure there is sufficient spent fuel and nuclear waste storage capacity at the back end of the fuel cycle.

On the question of assured fuel supply, we believe a successful program must assure access to adequate supplies of natural uranium and enrichment services at reasonable prices. In this connection, as the President announced on April 7, we will increase U.S. production capacity for enriched uranium. Another essential feature of such a program is that there should be parallel policies among suppliers so as to avoid placing any reactor exporter at a commercial disadvantage. And finally, we must be able to assure the prompt and predictable issuance of export licenses to those nations willing to abide by our export conditions.

In analyzing the elements of an attractive fuel assurance program, we have concluded that a strictly bilateral approach would not be sufficient. We therefore believe we should explore a three-tiered approach based on the following components:

— Bilateral fuel supply commitments, which must serve as the bulwark of international cooperation. However, major fuel exporters should follow parallel policies to avoid commercial competition that might be damaging to their common nonproliferation interests.

— Multilateral arrangements designed to substantiate guarantees to consumers by fuel suppliers backing up of each other's fuel contracts as well as to assure access to fuel supply by reactor exporters having no indigenous fuel capabilities and resources.

— International arrangements, such as an "international fuel bank" along the lines of the International Nuclear Fuel Authority you, Mr. Chairman [Senator John Glenn], proposed in Senate Concurrent Resolution 17, which might serve as a contingency reserve for the other supply arrangements.

We are moving on all of these approaches. We will be investigating them further and

consulting with other nations. The important point, however, is that an effective and credible international fuel assurance system must have three characteristics: It must seek to remove what incentives exist for the acquisition of full fuel cycles; it must be nondiscriminatory to consumers that are in fulfillment of their nonproliferation obligations; and it must not increase the dependency of recipient nations upon possibly capricious supplier nations.

The problems related to the back end of the fuel cycle, notably the need to insure adequate spent fuel and nuclear waste storage, are equally urgent. We are presently studying a wide range of solutions which would, as is the case with fuel assurances, alleviate the pressure for acquisition of reprocessing capabilities. Among others, these concepts under study include the possibility of making storage capacity available for the interim storage of foreign spent fuel and international spent fuel storage arrangements, including regional centers.

Thus far, I have been discussing our policy in relation to the current generation of nuclear technology. When we look further to the future and the next generation of nuclear technology, our policy is necessarily more tentative. But we have begun by reexamining some basic assumptions that have been widely held in the nuclear industry in this country and others for the past quarter century. We have heretofore proceeded on the assumption that reprocessing would begin when there were sufficient light water reactors to justify the large-scale facilities needed for economic operation and that plutonium would be recycled in light water reactors until the fast breeder reactors are introduced. Foreign nations without our fossil fuel and natural uranium resources are even more strongly wedded to the belief that reprocessing would be needed to reduce long-term risks from nuclear wastes and that plutonium stockpiles would be needed at an early date to achieve energy independence through the use of breeder reactors.

We have come to realize that a second look is required at these assumptions of the past. Legitimate questions are now being

raised about the proliferation implications of separated plutonium and the possibility that terrorists might steal plutonium for weapons purposes. Additional concerns are also being raised about the health hazards of plutonium. There are substantial grounds for challenging the previous assumption that recycling plutonium in light water reactors is economically advantageous; and at most any such advantage would be minor. Such recycle does not provide independence, and there are other potential ways of stretching uranium resources. There is also evidence that waste disposal problems could be exacerbated, rather than alleviated, by reprocessing.

The question is whether we have come too far down the plutonium road or is there still time for a second look. Our conclusion is that we do have time to examine fuel cycle alternatives that minimize proliferation and physical protection risks. This was the basis for the President's April 7 decisions to defer indefinitely the commercialization of reprocessing and to restructure the U.S. breeder reactor program. I should emphasize that our intent is not to turn the clock back or to deprive any nation of required energy sources, but to explore whether we are able to shape the future of nuclear technology to serve our broader social purposes while at the same time deriving the benefits of its energy potential.

There are a number of things that the United States can do immediately to reexamine the assumptions to which I referred, and these are already reflected in the ERDA [Energy Research and Development Administration] budget. Over the longer term, however, for a second look at a plutonium economy to be meaningful, we must engage other nations in the venture. This is the objective of the President's call for an international nuclear fuel cycle evaluation program. We envision that this evaluation program would study current generation reactors, including ways of assuring a reliable supply of nuclear fuel and means of solving the spent fuel storage problem, as well as studying future generation reactors and fuel cycles with emphasis on cycles that

utilize nonsensitive fuels and on institutional arrangements for reducing proliferation risks.

Specific technical elements of this proposed multinational effort would include work on uranium and enrichment availability; institutional arrangements related to fuel assurances; spent fuel storage including study of the technology for long-term retrievable and permanent disposal and international/multinational repositories as well as near-term capacity options; methods to increase once-through uranium utilization in light water reactors; and advanced reactors and breeder options, including nonplutonium breeders.

Another aspect of our nonproliferation policy for the longer term future has to do with nonnuclear technologies. We recognize that cooperation and assistance in the development of nonnuclear energy resources, including appropriate technology, forms an important element in any nonproliferation strategy. We are therefore exploring how such cooperation might best be carried out, keeping in mind the need to integrate our nonproliferation goals with the overall economic and development objectives of the countries whom we might assist.

The potential role of nonnuclear energy technology in delaying, changing the scope of, or substituting for nuclear is also under review. We are especially interested in those technologies which draw on essentially renewable resources.

The eventual impact of alternative technologies depends on individual country situations; however, there is little doubt that acceleration in the development and utilization of nonnuclear energy technologies could influence the future energy mix and therefore the proliferation risk in countries not now firmly committed to major nuclear programs.

I have reviewed for you thus far the conceptual underpinning and key elements of our new nonproliferation policy. I would like to turn now to the issue of legislation in the nonproliferation field, as well as related policy decisions made by the President.

As you realize, the President sent to the

Congress on April 27 the Administration's nuclear nonproliferation policy bill. Two days earlier, Paul Warnke, the Director of ACDA, testified before this committee and presented the Administration's position regarding S. 897 and gave a preview of the Administration's bill. This bill was accompanied by a section-by-section analysis, and a White House fact sheet released on the same day contained additional Presidential decisions. Earlier this week the executive branch also delivered to this committee a detailed section-by-section commentary on S. 897. These comments clarified the differences between the Administration bill and S. 897. I shall be happy to discuss points contained in that analysis at the end of my testimony. However, I would first like to make a number of points with regard to the Administration's proposal.

First, I would like to emphasize that we favor prompt passage of nonproliferation legislation. We submitted a separate Administration bill because certain major substantive differences in approach could not in any workable fashion be incorporated by amendment in S. 897. These differences are highlighted in the President's message to the Congress transmitting the Administration bill, and they are set forth in detail in the section-by-section analysis of S. 897 that we have also provided for you. However, I would like to emphasize another part of the President's message. He recognized that the bill he was submitting "relies heavily upon work which the Congress has already done." He commended Congress for these valuable initiatives and said, "I look forward to working with the Congress to establish a strong, responsible legislative framework from which we can continue to strengthen efforts to halt the spread of nuclear weapons." Thus, our purpose is to work together toward a common objective.

Second, let me stress an additional point. Certain additional policy decisions made by the President were set forth in the fact sheet released by the White House on April 27. The bill must be considered in the context of these policies. Taken together, the Administration's legislation and the policy

decisions form a tough, new, workable policy which fulfills the campaign pledges the President made.

I would like to take a moment to review the new policy decisions set forth in the fact sheet. Like S. 897, the Administration bill would require that, prior to the issuance of the license for the export of nuclear material or facilities, the Nuclear Regulatory Commission must have been notified by the executive branch of its judgment that the issuance of the license will not be inimical to the common defense and security of the United States. In making this judgment, the executive branch will adhere to the following policies:

— We will continue to embargo the export of enrichment and reprocessing plants from the United States.

— We will avoid new commitments to export significant amounts of plutonium except for gram quantities for research and analytical uses.

— We will avoid new commitments to export significant quantities of highly enriched uranium except when the project is of exceptional merit and the use of low enriched fuel or some other less weapons-usable material is clearly shown to be technically infeasible.

— We will not approve any supply of highly enriched uranium greater than 15 kilograms unless the President has himself approved the export.

— We will undertake efforts to identify projects and facilities which might be converted to the use of low enriched uranium from highly enriched uranium.

— We will take steps to minimize inventories of weapons-usable uranium abroad.

These policies represent a significant tightening of U.S. nuclear export policy. Presidential and congressional non-proliferation policies should be mutually reinforcing. The new Presidential policies, taken together with the provisions of the Administration's bill, will enable the United States to assume a leadership position in the world in preventing the proliferation of nuclear explosive devices.

Finally, I would like to focus on the four particular points of difference in the Administration bill which were pointed out in the President's message on April 28:

— We are concerned that S. 897 would impose immediate export criteria that could force a moratorium on our nuclear exports, adversely affecting certain allies whose cooperation is needed if we are to achieve our ultimate nonproliferation objectives. The Administration bill has therefore redefined the immediately applicable nuclear export conditions so that they reflect commitments we can reasonably ask other nations to meet while we negotiate stricter arrangements.

— S. 897 does not focus on strengthening the requirements for new agreements for cooperation, which the Administration bill would incorporate in section 123 of the Atomic Energy Act. The Administration bill defines additional nuclear export conditions which will be required in new agreements for civil nuclear cooperation. A cornerstone among these is our proposal to require, as a continuing condition of U.S. supply, that recipients have all their nuclear activities under IAEA safeguards. Moreover, the President has announced that he shall "make it clear to potential recipients and to other nuclear suppliers that our first preference, and continuing objective, is universal adherence to the Nonproliferation Treaty."

— S. 897 employs the technique of trying unilaterally to impose new export-licensing conditions after 18 months. We are concerned that the negative international reaction to this would be severely counterproductive to our nonproliferation objectives. Enactment of such a measure could drive recipient nations to other suppliers or toward the development of indigenous facilities to meet their nuclear fuel needs. Therefore, the Administration bill focuses on tightening the conditions for U.S. nuclear cooperation through the renegotiation of existing agreements to meet the same standards as we will require in new agreements.

— The Administration bill is designed to

give the President the ability to deal with the extremely complex problem of proliferation in a manner which will best suit the circumstances of particular cases. For example, instead of requiring countries that want our nuclear exports to foreswear fuel enrichment and reprocessing for all time, it allows us to draft new agreements using incentives to discourage countries from acquiring such facilities. It also permits the President to make exceptions when doing so would further our basic aim of nonproliferation. Of course, we expect Presidential actions to be the subject of congressional scrutiny.

Finally, I would stress that we do not live in a world where the United States alone can dictate the policies of other nations. We simply do not have the leverage to exact compliance with sweeping new provisions, insistence on which could be seen by many of our nuclear partners as a breach of our supply commitments. They could decide to take the route of developing their own indigenous facilities. As the nuclear proliferation and safeguards report of the [congressional] Office of Technology Assessment, prepared under the auspices of this committee, perceptively noted, "Solutions to the proliferation problem will have to be found primarily, though not exclusively, through multilateral actions . . . the extent of U.S. influence will vary from country to country." Or as Paul Warnke ably expressed the same point before you, the most effective nonproliferation policy is not necessarily the one that appears to impose the most stringent restrictions.

In closing, I would like to compliment the committee for the work it has done in addressing, over the past two years, the crucial issue of proliferation. During your lengthy and complicated hearings, you and your witnesses addressed many of the substantive issues we still face today. The auxiliary materials produced from the hearings are now part of the necessary reading materials for any policymaker on nonproliferation. I believe it fair to say that, in large measure, you are responsible for raising the

level of public consciousness to the dangers with which we are jointly coping. Be assured that in this most important endeavor, our two branches of government are of one mind. We must succeed, for failure could be catastrophic to all mankind.

## Secretary Vance Testifies on Energy Program

*Statement by Secretary Vance*<sup>1</sup>

I am pleased to testify on the international and security considerations which make it essential to adopt the comprehensive energy policy proposed by the President.

The facts of the energy crisis are stark and the implications profound. The year 1970 was a watershed year. In 1970, the United States became a net oil importer. Our growing demand for oil, combined with that of Europe and Japan, caused a rapid and fundamental shift in the global supply-demand balance for energy. The OPEC countries [Organization of Petroleum Exporting Countries] moved to exercise more and more control over the production and disposition of 85 percent of the oil moving in world trade.

Our vulnerability was amply demonstrated by the embargo and sudden fivefold increase in the price of oil in 1973-74. Yet, since the end of the embargo more than three years ago, our demand for imported oil and hence our vulnerability to another supply interruption have increased further. In the winter months of this year, oil imports for the first time reached 50 percent of our national oil consumption. Moreover, the OPEC producers have continued to increase the price of oil. We have little influence on their

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<sup>1</sup> Made before the House Ad Hoc Committee on Energy on May 4 (text from press release 201). The complete transcript of the hearings will be published by the committee and will be available from the Superintendent of Documents, U.S. Government Printing Office, Washington, D.C. 20402.



policies so long as our requirement for their oil continues to grow.

The CIA's recent analysis and independent studies undertaken in the OECD [Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development] and the International Energy Agency all indicate that by 1985 a gap will develop between world demand for oil and installed capacity to produce oil. Should we allow this to happen, we will face rapid price escalations, severe economic dislocation, and heightened global tensions.

The experience of the past few years and the forecasts for the years not far ahead require us to regard security of energy supply as a major national imperative. We cannot be in a position where we must accept a continuing vulnerability to arbitrary supply disruptions and price changes. We must resolve to regain control of our energy destiny.

To do this, we must meet the following objectives set by the President:

—In the short term, to reduce dependence on foreign oil and to limit supply disruptions.

—In the medium term, to prepare for the eventual decline in the availability of world oil supplies caused by capacity limitations.

—In the long term, to develop new, reliable, and, hopefully, inexhaustible sources of energy for sustained economic growth.

Over the short and medium term, we can best protect ourselves from uncertain supplies by reducing our demand for foreign oil and making the most of more abundant resources, notably coal and uranium for carefully safeguarded nuclear reactors. We are also developing a strategic petroleum reserve. The cornerstone of the President's plan is to conserve the fuels that are scarcest and use those that are most plentiful. It is a principle of the plan that prices should generally reflect the replacement cost of energy. With respect to oil, I wish to make clear that this does not mean that we consider the price imposed by OPEC producers as right or proper or that further OPEC price increases are justified. We are

only recognizing the hard reality that the replacement cost to our country of each barrel of oil added to our consumption since 1970 has been at the OPEC price.

At the same time, we should not consider the energy problem solely in national terms. It is a global problem affecting all nations.

We cannot afford to lose sight of the energy problems of other nations including our allies which are even more dependent on imported oil than we are. We share a vulnerability with them. In fact, energy has become a central element in the web of our political, economic, and security ties with our key trading partners. We must cooperate for our mutual benefit. Otherwise, as in the frantic days following the 1973 embargo, energy will become a divisive issue that weakens our overall relationship.

We are joined with 18 other industrialized countries in the International Energy Agency to facilitate close cooperation in energy. The IEA has in operational readiness an emergency program to mitigate the impact of a sudden supply interruption through use of stocks, demand restraint, and allocation of available oil under agreed guidelines.

The IEA is also undertaking a program of long-term energy cooperation to reduce our collective dependence on imports through joint efforts in conservation, accelerated development of alternative energy sources, and research and development.

While progress has been significant, other member countries have looked to the United States to take the lead in adopting a strong and comprehensive national energy program. Frankly, unless we do, it is unrealistic to expect other consuming nations, for whom reduced import dependence is even more difficult and expensive, to do so.

The President's proposed program will permit the United States to play a leading role in joining with other consuming nations in coping with the global energy problem. It corresponds closely to findings and recommendations arising from the recent work of the IEA. Elements of the program will require detailed international consultations

and negotiations—for example, nuclear fuel cycle issues and auto rebates. However, the reaction of the other major consuming countries represented in the IEA is very positive to the President's program as a whole.

The oil-producing countries have acquired a special role as a result of the energy problem. They have acquired wealth, power, and influence in a brief period. They are becoming integrated step-by-step into the world economic and financial systems. But they, too, are concerned about the finite limits of their oil reserves. Their representatives have urged us to conserve oil and to moderate demand for their oil. In turn, we have strongly urged them to pursue responsible price and production policies. Adoption of the President's energy program can provide an improved basis for our dialogue as well as a more balanced relationship of interests.

In reality, the oil-producing countries share common long-term interests with the oil-consuming countries. They, too, need a growing, stable global economy and a liberal trading system that will insure the availability of future markets for their products, both energy- and non-energy-related goods. Otherwise their efforts to develop and diversify their economies cannot succeed.

To insure global growth and prosperity, the oil-producing countries should recognize a responsibility for supplying adequate quantities of oil at reasonable prices. Special attention must be given to assisting the developing countries overcome their energy burdens. These low-income nations cannot significantly reduce their energy consumption. They are not profligate energy users. Furthermore, there is a high correlation between energy use and economic growth. But as increasing amounts of scarce foreign exchange are expended for energy imports, their other development needs suffer.

The OPEC countries should recognize the need to provide generous assistance to help developing nations overcome the direct and indirect costs of the post-1973 oil prices. We

also have a responsibility to devise means to share our technology and other forms of assistance even as we are dealing with our own pressing energy concerns.

Finally, the oil-producing nations as well as the oil-importing nations are joint participants in a new energy transition period. The world has entered a period in which its energy use will gradually shift from primary reliance on oil and gas for energy to increased use of other fossil fuels and synthetics and ultimately to expanded use of non-depletable energies, such as solar. All nations, including the oil producers, will some day have to meet their energy needs largely with supplies other than oil and gas.

There have been other energy transition periods, but this one will be the shortest in history. Because of the rapid depletion of oil and gas supplies, we do not have decades to complete the process. It is in the interests of all nations to manage this transition period so that it is not economically disruptive and politically destabilizing. To achieve this goal, oil-consuming countries must conserve their energy use, accelerate development of conventional and new energy supplies, and speed up the pace of energy research and development. Adoption of the President's program will demonstrate that the United States has accepted its responsibility in this process and is ready to contribute.

The implications of the energy crisis for all nations and the global economy are profound. The President's program is a call to leadership. The United States and other industrial nations must eliminate their vulnerability to energy supply disruptions and arbitrary oil price decisions. Together with the OPEC countries, we must focus on our common long-term interests and insure cooperation for global growth, international financial stability, and a smooth energy transition period. We must help the oil-importing developing countries overcome their energy burdens and accelerate their economic development.

## A New Unity and a New Hope in the Western Hemisphere: Economic Growth With Social Justice

*Statement by Andrew Young  
U.S. Representative to the United Nations*<sup>1</sup>

The Economic Commission for Latin America has achieved a very special stature in the modern world. ECLA, as the oldest of the regional commissions, has acted as a trailblazer for the others. It represents the most economically dynamic of the developing regions of the modern world and probably has the greatest variety of economic levels in it. It has long been recognized as the pacesetter in the still-emerging vision of what a new international economic order would look like.

It was from the reflection and research of ECLA thinkers, headed by the distinguished Dr. Raúl Prebisch, that the UNCTAD [United Nations Conference on Trade and Development] conferences came. ECLA has been particularly important for its fearlessness in promoting the interests of the developing countries and its insistence at looking at the financial and commercial structures of the international system. It has done pioneering work on the inequalities of a world composed of states at very different levels of development.

Indeed, ECLA is a symbol of our need for each other and for institutions that seek to integrate our separate visions and transcend our parochialisms in a new synthesis and vision of the total common good. We come together in meetings like this one and here discover in our labors and conversations with

one another that no nation is an island, no government completely autonomous, and that we all are part of an interlocking global community. ECLA represents that thin but brave line of dedicated persons who represent the bridge from the contemporary near world anarchy to the hoped-for future world community. ECLA is the hope, in the words of Dr. Martin Luther King, Jr., that we can choose the community of shared goals and interests over the chaos that means destruction.

No reference to ECLA today would be complete without paying tribute to our Executive Secretary, Enrique Iglesias. His imagination and integrity, his tact and courage, have combined to make him a person on whom we all have come to rely. Under his leadership, I believe that ECLA will continue to build upon its already solid history of accomplishments and will generate research, programs, ideas, and visions that will inspire and challenge all of us and provide us much of what we need to be able to serve the people of our hemisphere better. For my part, I would appreciate it, Mr. Iglesias, if you would accept this spoken token of my admiration and respect for you and your coworkers and ask if you would pass along these sentiments to your associates.

I have come in recent months to believe that we are living at the early dawning of a new period of hope in human history—after a period of confusion, struggle, and some despair. This new period of hope is one in which it is again realistic to believe that de-

<sup>1</sup> Made before the 17th session of the United Nations Economic Commission for Latin America (ECLA) at Guatemala on May 3 (text from USUN press release 25).

mocracy is viable, that human rights can be protected, and that the rule of law through international institutions can become more significant.

It is a period in which, in spite of all the obvious problems and pitfalls, we can once again dare to hope that we can continue to roll back colonialism, roll back racism, contain the arms race, and attack the major enemy of humankind—poverty—with some confidence that we can have some effect. Within the past five years we have seen four significant nations return to open, democratic government without bloody revolutions: Greece, Portugal, Spain, and India. We have seen the deepening of the world's consciousness of racism, in spite of the efforts by some to politicize for national advantage this historical task of all of the world community. We have seen the near elimination of colonialism in Africa, with but a few remaining vestiges soon to fall. We have, at least and at last, come to realize the peril to us all of the armaments race that afflicts in varying scales so many nations today, robbing societies of vital energies and resources that could and should be used to feed the hungry and nurse the sick and to build society and freedom rather than prepare for doomsday.

But this new hope in our time is not an automatic thing that is happening over our heads, somewhere out there, Mr. Chairman. It is something that we are creating, that we must create and make live if it is to be sustained and become a powerful driving force in our time. We all understand that hope is a powerful motivating force, that it can awaken the slumbering millions from their despair and passivity, and that once they believe that change is possible, they can become a mighty force for social change and justice. There have been other periods of such hope in the past, Mr. Chairman, periods in which there was real change and in which humankind became—at least to some degree—master of its own destiny and chose justice and peace and freedom.

We all long to be seized by a realistic hope and to be part of such a mighty movement that would change the lives of millions for the better. Of course, we all also reject the

illusion of choosing hope only to flee from reality and despair—hope must have a basis or it is not hope, but an illusion.

What, in the history of our hemisphere, have been the conditions that made hope instead of despair or passivity a living possibility? As I review the history of inter-American cooperation, I find that only when the nations of the hemisphere have agreed upon basic goals and programs has there been that powerful surge of hope, among both leaders and masses alike, that not only makes meaningful social change possible but without which positive social change is really impossible. Who will make sacrifices, or from where will come the new ideas, and what will bond great numbers of people together in far-reaching tasks, unless there is the belief that change for the better is possible? If we want social change, we must believe it is possible. This is as true for the economist and the ambassador as it is for the poorest peasant.

At other times in the history of the hemisphere, when there was lacking this belief that unity and hope were possible, the international relations of this hemisphere have been characterized by slogans and conferences that were sterile in real results. For all their good intentions, too many past attempts at hemispheric cooperation to build justice and encourage development did not achieve the wide acceptance and credibility, and the momentum among our peoples, that are absolutely necessary if we are to avoid the impending catastrophes that will accompany continued unplanned population growth, spiraling inflation, mass hunger and malnutrition, mass unemployment and underemployment, the continued growth of repression and terror in the political realm, the continued growth of the gap between the rich and the poor in every nation, and mass illiteracy. Indeed, there is no possibility of stopping where we are and just avoiding catastrophe. We must either move forward, boldly and hopefully, or continue to slide toward ever-widening circles of misery and catastrophe. The repetition of traditional slogans and the reliance on tested but inadequate ideas and institutions will continue

to occupy us, without, however, opening up the new vistas without which we cannot achieve more justice, freedom, and peace for the hemisphere.

How can we dynamize our institutions and our peoples? How can we conserve what is good but begin to move irresistibly forward in the pursuit of full justice for everyone? In the civil rights campaigns of my country of the past few decades, we were often faced with tremendous obstacles, criticism, and opposition. In such moments, before such odds, it would have been easy to abandon the particular campaign, to retreat, to compromise, to be intimidated. In such moments, often before we would go out to march before a hostile populace and police, we would gather together to rediscover and reaffirm our unity of purpose and our mutual commitment and support. In those moments we found new hope and new strength; and that which at the beginning of our meeting seemed impossible, by the time we filed out of the meeting to begin to march, seemed inevitable. What fed us and kept us marching, through many a long and hot day under southern skies, was hope. And that hope began in a resolute unity of purpose.

If we of this hemisphere can agree on a common vision, on a set of goals that transcend our old differences and our diversity, we shall discover in our new unity of purpose a new ingredient that will multiply the effect of our efforts—the ingredient of a common and contagious hope. And while hope is not a substitute for hard, concrete programs, for sacrifice and work, it can be and often is the mother of such new programs and sustains sacrifice and hard work. For hope can give birth to imagination and new ideas that can break seemingly impossible impasses.

I believe that too often in the past we have been afraid to try new initiatives and to experiment with new ideas for fear of failure. Certainly we have now reached that point in human history where the consequences of failing to try to do something are at least as serious and far-reaching as probably will be the consequences of trying to do something and failing. We need more ideas, more initiatives, and more courage to try, even if we will

sometimes fail. And for one of the leading roles in this effort to develop new ideas and programs, to lead the hemisphere in this effort, I propose ECLA. Too often, it seems to me, the United States has tried to take or preempt leadership in the hemisphere without sufficient multilateral consultation. Here in ECLA we can gather together not only as representatives of our respective governments and peoples but as experts of many kinds, all concerned with the welfare and progress of the whole hemisphere.

Probably more initiatives should come from such groups as this, from the professional staff of groups like ECLA, hopefully relying on the intelligent and prompt response of all the member governments to perfect and implement such initiatives. But if ECLA is to bring us the new, concrete programs that we all want and that our hemisphere so desperately needs, it will not be the result of just more negotiations, more research, and more conferences. All of those are necessary, but one thing more is necessary: a vision, a dream, and a hope that all of our efforts can make a difference.

This is a call for a new unity of purpose to mold together the concepts of social justice and economic development, a new unity which, if achieved, I am convinced will give us a new vision and a new hope for our hemisphere. But I want it clearly understood that such a unity, which I believe is not only necessary but possible, is a unity that recognizes and even fosters the great and beautiful cultural diversity of our hemisphere. Unity does not mean uniformity; a common purpose does not mean we must become a homogenized hemisphere. Indeed, in our diversity we can all contribute in different ways to a unity of purpose that will enrich the common and strengthen what is good in each of our cultural traditions.

It may just be the preacher in me, but I honestly believe we stand on the threshold of a new period of hope, a period in which humankind will be able to take some steps forward in our never-ending struggle for justice, peace, and freedom. We have both the need and the opportunity, both the challenge and the possibility, of discovering and ar-

tulating a new hemispheric unity, a new vision based on our own recent experience, that will give birth to new hope and thus to powerful creative dynamics that will enable us to do what seems impossible to dream of at this moment.

The potential for this new definition of unity is inherent in our shared goals and aspirations as stated in the basic documents of the United Nations that are waiting to be rediscovered, and in the dreams and aspirations of our peoples, waiting for spokespersons to make them come alive. There is at this moment, waiting to be born, a new synthesis of two powerful ideas, a synthesis that all of us have felt in one way or another, many times, in our own lives. And here, at ECLA, we can continue the process of creating this new synthesis.

The achievement of this dynamic new hope and new unity will be no easy task; many things must be done to nurture and give flesh and blood to the still dimly seen dawn of hope I am trying to describe. The task in this total effort that most directly affects us here is the integration of the concepts of social justice and economic development into a single vision of historical process. Such an integrated vision would profoundly affect our attitudes, our styles of life, and the programs we plan, research, and administer. Such an integrated vision would be the basis for a working consensus between governments and peoples, between rich and poor, between North and South, between the United States and Latin America.

We must unite the concept of development (which usually means economic growth) with the concept of liberation (which usually means freedom from oppression, poverty, dependence, and degradation). This must be done by defining development in terms of the process by which full human rights and dignity are achieved, by which full social justice for all peoples and all persons is realized, rather than just as an economic process. In this new definition we can find new goals and a new unity that will unite the North and the South, the East and the West, rich and poor, on some critical programs for development and liberation. Such a new definition and a

new unity will appeal to the interest and conscience of all our nations and peoples.

In April, speaking before the Economic and Social Council in New York, I argued that "economic and social development cannot be separated." I said that:

. . . we must think of every possible way to increase the interface between the two approaches—in our national planning, in our bilateral cooperation for development, and in our work of the United Nations. . . .

You can reasonably expect that this is a theme to which not only I will continue to return but which the new Administration in the United States as a whole will continue to develop and to insist upon, not only in our international initiatives but in our domestic programs as well. For we have learned, not only by observing the sometimes bitter lessons of world history of recent decades but repeatedly in our own domestic experience, that separating the economic considerations from the social, political, and cultural goals is not only an illusion but it produces unintended and harmful effects for both the social and economic process.

For instance, one thing we have learned is that impressive national growth rates alone do not mean that poverty or economic imbalance will automatically be overcome. Per capita food production in most countries has not increased over the past decade. Population projections for the future are staggering—Latin America and the Caribbean will add 300 million people, doubling its population in the next three decades. We must all be greatly concerned over the continued high rates of unemployment and underemployment.

There has been significant economic growth in many parts of the region during the last three decades; and yet, as the Secretariat's report underscores, the fact is that the benefits of this growth have not been distributed anywhere near equally to those who are in the greatest need. The problem of the "little man" is camouflaged by looking only at national growth rates and per capita income figures as measures of "development." By any standard, the majority of the region's inhabitants do not have levels of living that can be considered acceptable. In spite of eco-

economic growth, half the region's population suffers a substandard daily caloric intake, and a quarter of all the adults are still illiterate. Economic growth, divorced from social considerations and the goals of justice and freedom for all, has often appeared to have exacerbated rather than diminished the human misery and degradation in which far too many of our people, in every nation, still live.

We are all in the process of learning that society cannot be neatly dissected into a "political and civil" segment on one side and an "economic, social, and cultural" segment on the other. Any attempt to focus exclusively on one aspect of society's problems, such as the need for economic growth, ignoring the other, will almost certainly produce unexpected and undesired effects on all of society. Neither can it be assumed that if we promote one aspect of society, such as civil rights, political rights will just naturally evolve.

When the basic documents of the United Nations talk about "human rights and fundamental freedoms," they spell out the full panoply of rights and freedoms—civil, political, economic, social, and cultural. No society is healthy that is not consciously striving to realize more fully all of these rights, all of the time. Too often in the past have we imagined that by just increasing the size of the cake, its better distribution for all would be automatically realized. "Trickle-down" as a social theory is increasingly a cruel joke, as modern technologies impact on all of our societies in such a way as to tend to reconcentrate power rather than to diffuse it.

The "no-growth" movement may be seen partly as a reaction to the insensitivity of those who thought that growth would automatically bring everything else with it. The "no-growth" movement ignored one of the basic mandates of society: create and grow, or die. Healthy social change certainly includes some form of growth and progress.

Such a new integration of traditional concepts as I am here calling for may help us break the sterile impasse between "capitalism" and "Socialism" that has for several generations served as an anesthetic

to imagination as we were all caught up in one rigidity or another.

The truth is, freedom and human rights seem to be victimized by governments and economic institutions in any society that does not have adequate institutions of social accountability built into its system. And the truth is that any institution that has become socially accountable can serve the common good. Even the much-maligned transnational corporations, some of which have undoubtedly contributed to social problems, can—and have on occasion—become instruments of helpful diffusion of technology, the allocation of development resources, and the promotion of social justice. It may not be so much the name of the system as whether or not it is effectively accountable to the public that determines its social usefulness.

Social justice certainly cannot be achieved in any nation without economic growth and development. On the other hand, economic development by itself, we have learned, does not automatically produce social justice. I am a professional "change agent," working for social justice in my country for many years, but I don't know nearly enough about economics. Most of you are professional economists or planners, but I daresay we all need to apply the lessons of the nature of social justice. We need each other to create this new vision, this new hope, this new unity. It will be a struggle to learn from each other and to unlearn some of our pet prejudices as we develop this new, integrated vision of society. But out of that struggle many exciting things will be born.

This integration of the two visions of human rights and fundamental freedoms is so important, let me summarize by attempting to give two aphorisms:

—Where there is poverty (lack of economic development), there cannot be full political participation and freedom.

—Where there is political oppression, there will also be economic exploitation.

Therefore both economic development and political liberty are essential, each for the good and health of the other, as well as a good thing in itself. Let us then unite the

two so long divided—social justice and economic development—and in so doing help give new hope to millions of people who await our efforts in helplessness.

The political and economic situation in my own country for the past decade has represented a search for unity between development and social justice. Many of the “development” issues we have confronted stem from our search for a system that permits liberation and development for each individual. We have sought and continue to seek development, and liberation, in many ways:

—Economically, through social legislation and the war on poverty;

—Socially, through civil and women’s rights movements; and

—Politically, through increased attention by the Congress and the courts to the rights of individuals and groups of individuals normally outside the “power elites” but whose interests are affected by legislation and political decisions.

Real hope, as an engine of social change, is never an abstraction, but always is directed to a real problem and offers a real solution. To avoid spinning a dreamworld of pretty words, we must always maintain the tension between our hope and the problems that confront us. The problems of Latin America—the real, human problems—are not Latin American problems; they are worldwide problems. The real dimensions of these problems are obscured when we use only the macroeconomic indicators and measure the performance of some system in only economic terms. But the mere enumeration of the massive problems confronting all of our nations shows once again that only a unified approach, seeking both the goals of liberation and development, can hope to address these questions meaningfully.

The objective problems are clear, and many of them are addressed in the ECLA Secretariat’s report for this meeting:

—Poverty and malnutrition are the visible symbols of underlying problems. The Secretariat has reported to us that 43 percent of Latin America’s population, or 110

million individuals, live in a state of poverty. A substantial percentage of the population, perhaps as much as 35 percent, lacks sufficient income to purchase a minimum balanced diet.

—Population growth contributes to the difficulties of addressing the problem of poverty. Latin America’s growth led the world through the sixties and early seventies. Its population doubled between 1950 and 1970; it will double again before the year 2000. The second doubling will occur even though the growth rate has peaked and will decline throughout the rest of the century.

—Existing problems of unemployment and underemployment have exacerbated migration of the rural poor to urban areas. Because of differences in methodologies, it is almost impossible to assign a figure to regional underutilization of manpower; but there is little likelihood that the 28 percent estimate of the Secretariat is too high.

—A growing unevenness in the distribution of income poses the specter of increased concentration of economic power, and of the benefits that derive from it, such as education and jobs. Seventy percent of the increased income of the region between 1960 and 1970 went to the richest 30 percent of the Latin American region. Less than 1 percent went to the poorest 20 percent.

—Illiteracy and lack of educational opportunity remain serious problems. An estimated 25 percent of the adult population cannot read and write; and perhaps more important, the studies that do exist indicate that educational opportunity is not equally available. It remains true that the poorer the student the less likely he is to obtain even a minimal education. Provision of educational opportunity therefore is a major challenge.

There is also reason to be concerned about the alarming loss of momentum in progress toward rule by constitutional law, and protection and promotion of basic human rights and fundamental freedoms. The reasons for this trend are many, and there is no clear single cause or remedy. Nonetheless, the great number of allegations of torture of political prisoners, “*desaparecidos*,” political assassination, cannot but be a disconcerting



factor in any search for unity of purpose, especially since the whole U.N. structure is built upon the premise that societies should be governed by law, through orderly processes, and not arbitrarily.

The truth is, Mr. Chairman, that torture and other forms of political repression are not only in violation of our own national commitments to the United Nations but are also major obstacles to economic and social change. Repression prevents the full popular participation which is essential to every development process, regardless of the economic system which guides it. We cannot, as nations or as a body of nations, be truly effective agents of economic development until we can enlist the talents and capacities of all the people we represent here, whether the black sharecropper of Georgia, the Indian of the Andean Altiplano, or the professional man who has left his native land because of political repression—the saddest form of “brain drain” of all. There can be no real economic development without a free exchange of ideas and a real accountability of the elites who manage society, no matter how well intentioned they may be.

Though we may not be able to agree all the time on what should be done, nor even on the causes of the problems that we face, surely we can agree that these are our major problems—furthermore, that these problems are the concern of the economist as well as the politician and that only a global vision of society will enable us to attack any of these problems with any hope of success. Underdevelopment and political repression are surely part of the same total problem.

These problems—of growing unevenness in the distribution of income, of illiteracy, of poverty, of malnutrition, of unemployment and underemployment, of unplanned population growth, and of political repression—exist of course in all nations to some degree. They are not just problems of the developing nations or of the Latin American nations. But it is fair to say that the countries of the ECLA region have recognized many of these problems and are actively searching for solutions.

What is needed now is an integrated

approach to all of these problems that will give coherence to all our programs. And as has often happened in the recent past, the struggles and successes of the ECLA region will be watched and learned from with great eagerness by other regions of the world. In many ways, the New World is the laboratory of the whole world.

U.S. relations with Latin America have sometimes been, or seemed to be, an obstacle to the realization of full development and social justice for the hemisphere. But I want to contend here that there is, in our diversity of experience, resources, and even values, great potential for a new unity that respects our many diverse national heritages. For, we all now certainly recognize, the hemisphere is far too complex to be simply divided into two categories—the United States and all others. Jamaica is as different from Argentina, and again from the United States, as is Venezuela from Chile and Mexico. Canada and Panama and Ecuador are different, and yet all have much to contribute to the common quest. And each of our nations is itself a sea of complexity with its own diversities and richness. And so we celebrate, and do not hide, our diversity. Still, because we are the richest and most powerful nation in the hemisphere—though maybe not as powerful and rich as some believe—it might be useful to say a word about U.S.-Latin American relations.

It is necessary first to affirm that all of us are part of a global community, from which we cannot secede even if we wanted to do so. As part of this community, we must act the part of world citizens and not just protect or promote the interests of the hemisphere. There certainly is a role for creative regionalism, within the context of the whole U.N. framework. But we are part of one world—all the nations of this hemisphere.

Secondly, there is an ever greater need for more and more open consultation on all matters of common concern, from trade agreements to pollution of the seas, from human rights to arms control, from exchange of scientific information to control of narcotics traffic. Let us actively promote and develop all these consultations, aware that sometimes

there will be conflict but that in the long run we will all gain more if we talk openly and honestly.

And lastly, the United States has no monopoly on ideas and should have no monopoly on initiatives. It would be a foolish continuation of dependence to await upon the U.S. Government to propose all the initiatives. Let many initiatives bloom, and let the United States be one of many sovereign nations—making its contribution but not dominating in any sense the international dialogue.

There have been times in the past when we in the United States felt that our strength and determination made all things possible and that what worked for us would surely work for any other nation. We have learned, however, that we cannot solve the world's problems, or the hemisphere's, and that "Made in the U.S.A." does not necessarily mean that it will work in Latin America.

Progress must depend on a degree of consensus among nations, and this consensus can only be built with the participation of all nations and domination by none. The problems we face are common problems; they are not caused by any one factor, nor are they limited to any one nation or group of nations. The United States is indeed part of the problem; but it is not the whole cause of the problem, any more than it can offer the whole solution to the problem.

We are a nation that has had to struggle to achieve whatever measure of justice, equality, and freedom we have, and we are still struggling to improve what we have. We welcome honest criticisms and suggestions, for we realize that we need the help of the community of nations if we are to achieve more of our full potential as a nation.

Any meaningful plan must have a starting point. Now, near the end of this address, I reach the starting points I want to suggest. Up until now I have tried to set the stage and suggest the attitude and values that we must have if we are to become truly effective agents for justice and develop-

ment. Now, I want to suggest what we can do.

First we must work out the full implications of unifying the concepts of social justice and economic development. All of us will have to change some of our pet theories and prejudices as we delve into this matter. In part because society keeps changing, technology keeps developing, and new problems keep arising, many of our institutions and programs will have to be reexamined and some of them redone. But to fail to do so would be to be unfaithful to the mandate of any government official to care for the welfare of our peoples.

I have already proposed, and now repeat here, that ECLA is a community that can and should, in my opinion, take the lead in the melding of the concepts of social justice and economic development. I hope that ECLA will consider a series of conferences, perhaps on a national or regional basis, to discuss these issues, which will be open to all sectors of society. To find the answers that we all need, we will need to broaden the dialogue—a dialogue that ECLA has been involved in now for many years.

Secondly, we must set priorities for ourselves. We cannot attack frontally all of the problems that have been mentioned, at least not without dooming ourselves to inevitable failure and frustration. While having a unified picture of the problems, and a unified vision of justice and freedom, we must choose the problems that will have, if solved, the greatest impact on the lives of our people, and that will open up the next step in our long quest for liberation and development. This process of setting priorities is an ongoing one, and one in which ECLA has an important role. For ECLA is one of our principal "think tanks" and, as such, should be protected and encouraged. The debate on priorities, both inside and outside ECLA, will often be strenuous, but it is necessary. And out of our disagreements will often arise a new consensus.

In my recent speech at ECOSOC I proposed that that body might well want to set for itself some priorities so as to focus its ef-

forts. Specifically, I proposed the problems of hunger and famine, torture and other severe forms of political repression, and racism. It may well be that ECLA will decide that these, or some of these, should not be the priorities for this region. Let us not predict what will be the outcome of a process that I hope will gather momentum, building on the excellent work already begun. Only, in the setting of priorities, let us remember that it is imperative that both the social justice and the economic development goals be fully represented.

Thirdly, we must choose programs that give relief to the poorest and most misery-burdened of our people. As President Carter indicated in his speech before the OAS on April 14:

All of us have a special responsibility to help the poorest countries in the world as well as the poorest people in each of our countries.

As we have already indicated, dedication to some model of development that does not help real people in a significant way is a denial of our very reason to exist as governments. In the United States, we increasingly have to answer the question, "Why should the poor of the United States be taxed to help the rich of the poor nations?" I am convinced that the taxpayer of the United States will continue to support foreign aid programs as long as they are convinced that these programs are really helping the poor to help themselves.

Fourthly, we must struggle to become more accountable as governments by bringing the people more and more into our deliberations. We must carry on more of our discussions with and before the public. We must become both educators for our nations and students of our people. Recently President Carter has made several efforts to travel to the American people, to talk directly to average citizens. This is no public relations gimmick, but a serious attempt to find still another way—along with elections, a free press, free political parties, defense of the rights of dissidents, et cetera—to involve the American people in the political process. It is

not just for the good of the people that we do this; it is for the good of the governing elites. It is a good experience to be asked a question you can't answer by a workingman and to have to defend your programs to a secretary or a dentist. We believe any healthy society will always be working to become more open and more democratic, and we believe that is as true of the international society, and of ECLA, as it is of our society. So we hope for more debate, not less. We are not afraid of disagreements—if they are honest and carried on with respect by both sides. And, I hope, we are not afraid to be convinced that we are wrong and to change our position—when convinced.

It is still true today, as it was at the founding of the United States, that governments derive their just powers from the consent of the governed. Ultimately, legitimate authority must be derived from the people speaking freely on their own behalf. Power and authority in society are established finally by reason and respect for dissent, and not upon force and intimidation. In the struggle for democracy, as in the struggle for social justice, it is necessary to seek constantly to be more democratic or run the risk of losing what freedom we have. Democracy must be dynamic; it cannot live in stagnation.

Fifthly, and the basic priority as I see it, is to bring the people into the economic process, as well as the political process. This means, quite simply, expansion of the domestic markets and concentration on basic human needs even if it might mean some curtailment of luxury goods. I believe in that old saying that the real revolution occurs when everyone has been co-opted into the system. That is, give everyone a stake in society and you will have a healthy society, because all will feel responsible for it. On that day when every person is paid a reasonable wage for a socially useful job, the need for revolution will begin to disappear.

Some people have told me that I am too optimistic because the political movement out of which I came—the civil rights movement headed by the late Dr. Martin Luther King, Jr.—just happened to be lucky and, besides,

our experience is not translatable into international terms.

I know that much of what we did and experienced is not relevant, but a lot of it may be, too. At least we are a successful movement—we freed a lot of people—and since there aren't too many such movements around, it won't hurt to study for ideas any of these movements that had some success.

One of the things we learned was that civil rights weren't enough. We had to struggle to get our people some economic power, too. If they just had the right to vote but were still poor, they were still at the mercy of powerful and sometimes hidden economic elites. This is true, I believe, in every society, no matter what kind of political or economic system it has. But once you had a fair wage and a just tax system, then the poor were protected and were able to participate in society; and their participation made for a healthier and more dynamic society. That was our experience, and I believe in it.

I come to this conference bearing neither a new slogan nor a basket full of gifts. But I do

not come emptyhanded. I come with the promise of the Government and people of the United States to work with you—and to work hard—to find ways of uniting our common love for freedom and justice with our great need for economic development. I believe that you want it this way. There have been plenty of promises in the past, sometimes with a poor performance record. Now is the time to take the full measure of our problems and our resources, material and human, and then to attack our problems together in a systematic and rational way.

Neither will I leave this conference of ECLA emptyhanded. I have discovered here the same willingness to admit the difficult problems we face that I have urged upon us. I have discovered, to my immense satisfaction, that your hunger and thirst for justice as well as growth is real and great. It will be my pleasure, Mr. Chairman, to report to President Carter that we are ready to work together to find that new unity and that new hope that will be born by bringing together social justice with economic development.

## **U.S. Emphasizes Role of International Lending Institutions in African Development**

*Statement by David B. Bolen*

*Deputy Assistant Secretary for African Affairs*<sup>1</sup>

I am honored to represent the United States at the first annual meeting of the African Development Fund in which we are participating as a full-fledged member of the Fund. I wish to express appreciation for the warm words of welcome by the distinguished governors to the U.S. accession to the Fund. I am pleased to bring warm greet-

ings from President Carter and from the U.S. Governor of the African Development Fund, Secretary of the Treasury Blumenthal.

I want to thank the Government of Mauritius for hosting this meeting, for making these fine facilities available, and for its extraordinary hospitality.

We meet at a time when the world economy is recovering from the world recession of 1974-75. We expect 1977 will be the second consecutive year of solid, sustainable

<sup>1</sup> Made on May 3 before the fourth annual meeting of the Board of Governors of the African Development Fund at Port Louis, Mauritius. Mr. Bolen was temporary U.S. Alternate Governor of the Fund.

real growth, although growth in the industrialized countries is expected to be somewhat slower than in 1976.

The United States accepts the principle that the strongest countries have an international responsibility to provide a stimulus to world economy. We have been urging industrialized countries with strong economies to adopt policies aimed at accelerating their growth rates as fast as is compatible with controlling inflation. We have argued that accelerated growth rates in the major industrialized countries must be spurred by increased domestic demand rather than by reliance on export-led growth. If this occurs, these countries should provide growing export markets for other countries, particularly for producers of raw materials and other basic commodities. World trade in 1977 is expected to grow at about 7-8 percent—roughly the average rate of the 1960's. Such growth, coming on top of an increase of 11-12 percent in 1976, will help expand the growth of exports of non-oil-producing developing countries—perhaps as high as 15-16 percent in value terms.

In spite of these good signs, inflation continues to pose substantial problems for the world economy. Inflation rates in some industrialized countries in 1977 are expected to range up to 20 percent, with rates in many developing countries even higher. We must all work toward reducing inflationary pressures in order to obtain maximum solid, sustainable growth.

Another major challenge before us is to build a better and more cooperative international economic system. The United States is committed to fostering a climate of constructive cooperation and dialogue that brings hope, equal opportunity, and full prospects for self-betterment to all the peoples of Africa. To this end, we have already undertaken specific measures designed to address the basic needs and aspirations of the developing countries. We are also looking at additional ways to create an enduring international structure of cooperation so that the quality of life on this planet can be improved for all.

The aspirations of the developing countries for a change in basic economic relation-

ships with the United States and other industrialized countries are understandable. The health of the world economy today must be measured in terms of economic cooperation between developed and developing countries, for our fortunes and future are linked as never before. Both of our interests dictate compromise—a compromise, I suggest, that could include elements such as commodity agreements to dampen excess price fluctuations for producers of raw materials and arrangements that promote direct transfers of resources from the industrialized countries to the poorer developing countries.

Believing that trade and investment are the engines of development for Third World countries, the United States has taken the initiative to propose improvements in the international economic system in these areas. Many of these proposals have been brought to fruition through the joint efforts of the developed and the developing nations.

The United States remains committed to an open international trading system. In the current multilateral trade negotiations (MTN) in Geneva, we have offered substantial trade concessions on goods of primary interest to the developing countries. The United States will continue to press for significant progress in the MTN in 1977. In accordance with the Tokyo Declaration,<sup>2</sup> we are also examining ways to provide additional consideration to the special needs of developing countries.

The United States is willing to consider with a positive and open attitude the negotiation of agreements to stabilize commodity prices, including the establishment of a common funding arrangement for financing buffer stocks where they are a part of individual, negotiated agreements.

Foreign assistance is the other key aspect in U.S. relations with the developing countries. We recognize that the future of the international community will be affected by the ability of developing nations to overcome poverty, achieve healthy growth, and provide more secure lives for their people.

<sup>2</sup> For text of the declaration, see BULLETIN of Oct. 8, 1973, p. 450.

The United States believes that the international development banks are an especially useful vehicle for combining the efforts, knowledge, and resources of many countries to help poorer countries overcome the problems of hunger, disease, and illiteracy and to develop the vast potential of the African Continent. We are convinced that channeling aid flows through the international development banks is a wise investment. The international development lending institutions have highly professional staffs that know how to get the job of development done. They have demonstrated their effectiveness in over a hundred countries. One reason for this effectiveness is that these institutions can—and do—insist on sound projects and programs in the recipient countries. Finally, they enable many donors to pool their efforts, thereby increasing the amount of loanable funds available for development.

Let me add that my government also believes that the goals and purposes of the international banks encompass a broad range of fundamental concerns, including advancement of basic human rights, as well as freedom from economic privation and want. On behalf of my government, I would express the hope that other members of the African Development Fund would join hands with the United States in exploring ways to give effect to that view.

Let me turn now to a review of recent U.S. activities regarding the international development banks that have, or will, affect Africa greatly in the near future.

Less than two months ago, the United States and other donor countries agreed to a major replenishment of the International Development Association, or IDA, which will provide \$7.6 billion to IDA's developing-country members during the period July 1977 through June 1980. The U.S. share of this replenishment is \$2.4 billion. Africa has been receiving over a third of IDA funds in recent years. There is a good chance that this percentage could increase somewhat in the IDA V [fifth replenishment] period. Thus the poorest countries in Africa can expect to receive some-

where between \$2½ and \$3 billion in new lending from IDA during this period.

The World Bank, which also lends to Africa, has also had a replenishment recently. Under the terms of the capital increase negotiated in May 1976, the Bank's resources will be increased by a further \$8.3 billion. The U.S. share of this capital increase is \$1.6 billion, or 19 percent of the total; these funds will be made available to the Bank over the three-year period 1978–80. In recent years the World Bank has lent almost 25 percent of its funds to Africa. Thus the capital increase to the Bank should provide an additional \$2 billion or so for African development during the next few years.

Let me now turn to the U.S. role in the African Development Fund. The United States joined the African Development Fund on November 18, 1976, with a \$15 million contribution. Since that date, the United States has noted with admiration the dedicated work of President Fordwor [Kwami Donkor Fordwor, of Ghana, President of the Fund] and his staff in support of the activities of the African Development Fund. Furthermore, we share much of President Fordwor's eloquent vision for Africa.

But faith and respect for an institution and its leadership are not enough. The Carter Administration believes a tangible expression of solidarity is required. The Carter Administration has therefore requested the appropriation of \$10 million for the Fund in our current budget. We expect to be able to take this second step in our growing relationship with the Fund before the end of 1977.

Finally, although the United States was late in joining the African Development Fund, we hope to use the forthcoming second replenishment of Fund resources to catch up and assume an appropriate U.S. role in the funding of the institution. Before Fund management proceeds with negotiations for a second replenishment of Fund resources it has very wisely chosen to carry out a review of the Fund's activities to date. I understand that members of a review committee have already been nominated by Fund management and that the committee

expects to begin its deliberations in July. Without sacrificing thoroughness, I hope that the committee can carry out its deliberations expeditiously so that formal negotiations for a replenishment of the Fund's resources can be commenced and final agreement reached well before the beginning of the replenishment period in January 1979. As far as the United States is concerned, the Carter Administration hopes to be able to submit a budget request for our fiscal year 1979 for an additional U.S. contribution to the African Development Fund.

The House of Representatives of the U.S. Congress recently took a major initiative to seek passage of legislation which would authorize additional U.S. contributions to the African Development Fund in FY 1979. We expect the Senate to take similar action.

Mr. Chairman, distinguished delegates, the Administration supports this action of the Congress to seek an increased U.S. contribution to the Fund—a key institution in African development. It reflects the determination of the American people to support African aspirations for a better material life and a fair share in the international economic system. We are proud to be associated with the African Development Fund. We look forward to many years of fruitful cooperation with the Fund for the sake of African economic and social development.

## TREATY INFORMATION

### Current Actions

#### MULTILATERAL

##### Agriculture

Agreement establishing the International Fund for Agricultural Development (IFAD). Done at Rome June 13, 1976.<sup>1</sup>

*Signatures:* Guinea, May 3, 1977; Nigeria, May 6, 1977; Thailand, April 19, 1977.

*Accession deposited:* Libya, April 15, 1977.

##### Customs

International convention to facilitate the importation of commercial samples and advertising material. Done at Geneva November 7, 1952. Entered into force November 20, 1955; for the United States October 17, 1957. TIAS 3920.

*Accession deposited:* Iceland, April 28, 1977.

Customs convention regarding E.C.S. (Echantillons Commerciaux-Commercial Samples) carnets for commercial samples, with annex and protocol of signature. Done at Brussels March 1, 1956. Entered into force October 3, 1957; for the United States March 3, 1969. TIAS 6632.

*Notification of termination:* Italy, March 12, 1977; effective June 12, 1977.

##### Narcotic Drugs

Convention on psychotropic substances. Done at Vienna February 21, 1971. Entered into force August 16, 1976.<sup>2</sup>

*Ratification deposited:* Guyana, May 4, 1977.

##### Postal

Second additional protocol to the constitution of the Universal Postal Union of July 10, 1964, general regulations with final protocol and annex, and the universal postal convention with final protocol and detailed regulations. Done at Lausanne July 5, 1974. Entered into force January 1, 1976. TIAS 8231.

*Ratifications deposited:* Australia, January 25, 1977;<sup>3</sup> Bolivia, December 10, 1976; Egypt, March 7, 1977; Kuwait, December 1, 1976; Sweden, July 9, 1976.<sup>4</sup>

Money orders and postal travellers' checks agreement, with detailed regulations. Done at Lausanne July 5, 1974. Entered into force January 1, 1976. TIAS 8232.

*Ratification deposited:* Egypt, March 7, 1977.

*Approval deposited:* Sweden, December 27, 1976.

##### Safety at Sea

International convention for the safety of life at sea, 1974, with annex. Done at London November 1, 1974.<sup>1</sup>

*Accession deposited:* Tonga, April 12, 1977.

##### Treaties

Vienna convention on the law of treaties, with annex. Done at Vienna May 23, 1969.<sup>1</sup>

*Ratification deposited:* Korea, April 27, 1977.

#### BILATERAL

##### Egypt

Agreement amending the agreement for sales of agricultural commodities of October 26, 1976 (TIAS 8406). Effected by exchange of notes at Cairo April 18, 1977. Entered into force April 18, 1977.

<sup>1</sup> Not in force.

<sup>2</sup> Not in force for the United States.

<sup>3</sup> Applicable to all of the external territories of Australia.

<sup>4</sup> Approval of General Regulations of the Universal Postal Union, and Universal Postal Convention deposited December 27, 1976.

## Hungary

Agreement on cooperation in culture, education, science and technology. Signed at Budapest April 6, 1977. Enters into force on the date of written notification from the Government of the Hungarian People's Republic that the agreement has been approved.

## Lebanon

Agreement for sales of agricultural commodities. Signed at Beirut April 25, 1977. Enters into force upon the date of receipt by the U.S. Government of the communication of the approval of the agreement by the competent authorities of the Government of Lebanon.

## PUBLICATIONS

### GPO Sales Publications

*Publications may be ordered by catalog or stock number from the Superintendent of Documents, U.S. Government Printing Office, Washington, D.C. 20402. A 25-percent discount is made on orders for 100 or more copies of any one publication mailed to the same address. Remittances, payable to the Superintendent of Documents, must accompany orders. Prices shown below, which include domestic postage, are subject to change.*

**Safeguarding of Classified Information.** Arrangement with Kuwait. TIAS 8444. 10 pp. 35¢. (Cat. No. S9.10:8444).

**Air Transport Services.** Interim agreement with Brazil. TIAS 8445. 27 pp. \$1.20. (Cat. No. S9.10:8445).

**Debt Consolidation and Rescheduling.** Agreement with Pakistan. TIAS 8447. 27 pp. 45¢. (Cat. No. S9.10:8447).

**Rural Primary Education.** Agreement with Guatemala. TIAS 8450. 39 pp. 55¢. (Cat. No. S9.10:8450).

**Sale of Aircraft.** Agreement with Colombia. TIAS 8453. 5pp. 35¢. (Cat. No. S9.10:8453).

**Defense—Use of Facilities at Goose Bay Airport, Newfoundland.** Agreement with Canada. TIAS 8454. 7 pp. 35¢. (Cat. No. S9.10:8454).

**Economic Cooperation.** Agreed minutes with Iran. TIAS 8455. 21 pp. 35¢. (Cat. No. S9.10:8455).

**Scientific and Technical Cooperation.** Agreement with the Republic of Korea. TIAS 8456. 8 pp. 35¢. (Cat. No. S9.10:8456).

**Cooperation in Biomedical Research and Technology.** Agreement with the Federal Republic of Germany. TIAS 8457. 9 pp. 35¢. (Cat. No. S9.10:8457).

**Smallpox Eradication.** Agreement with the World Health Organization. TIAS 8458. 18 pp. 35¢. (Cat. No. S9.10:8458).

### Checklist of Department of State

#### Press Releases: May 9-15

Press releases may be obtained from the Office of Press Relations, Department of State, Washington, D.C. 20520.

No.	Date	Subject
*204	5/11	Shipping Coordinating Committee, Subcommittee on Safety of Life at Sea, working group on ship design and equipment, June 9.
+205	5/11	Vance, Allon: remarks, London, May 11.
+206	5/12	Vance: arrival, Madrid, May 11.
*207	5/12	Study group 1, U.S. National Committee for the International Radio Consultative Committee, June 16.
*208	5/12	Los Angeles World Affairs Council-Department of State "Town Meeting," May 20.
*209	5/12	Vance: news conference on London-Madrid flight, May 11.
+210	5/13	Vance, Oreja: departure, Madrid, May 12.
*211	5/13	Vance: arrival, Tehran, May 12.
+212	5/13	North Atlantic Council meeting May 10-11: communique.
+213	5/14	Vance: news conference, Tehran, May 13.
*214	5/14	Stephen Low, Ambassador to Zambia, designated U.S. representative to special consultative group on Rhodesia.
+215	5/14	Vance: CENTO Council of Ministers.
216	5/15	Vance: departure, Tehran.

\* Not printed.

† Held for a later issue of the BULLETIN.



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# THE DEPARTMENT OF STATE BULLETIN

Volume LXXVI • No. 1980 • June 6, 1977

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# THE DEPARTMENT OF STATE BULLETIN

Vol. LXXVI, No. 1980

June 6, 1977

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*The Department of State BULLETIN, a weekly publication issued by the Office of Media Services, Bureau of Public Affairs, provides the public and interested agencies of the government with information on developments in the field of U.S. foreign relations and on the work of the Department and the Foreign Service.*

*The BULLETIN includes selected press releases on foreign policy, issued by the White House and the Department, and statements, addresses, and news conferences of the President and the Secretary of State and other officers of the Department, as well as special articles on various phases of international affairs and the functions of the Department. Information is included concerning treaties and international agreements to which the United States is or may become a party and on treaties of general international interest.*

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## President Carter Attends Economic, Berlin, and NATO Meetings at London; Meets With President Asad of Syria at Geneva

*President Carter left Washington May 5 for a trip to Newcastle, London, and Geneva. He participated in a seven-nation economic summit meeting at London May 7-8, a four-nation meeting on Berlin May 9, and the North Atlantic Council meeting May 10. On May 9 he met with President Hafiz al-Asad of Syria at Geneva. While in London he held bilateral meetings with leaders of NATO countries.*

*Following are remarks by President Carter at Washington and London, his exchanges of remarks and toasts with President Asad at Geneva, a news conference held at London by Secretary Vance and Secretary of the Treasury W. Michael Blumenthal, and texts of the joint declaration of the international economic summit meeting and its appendix, the declaration on Berlin, and the communique issued at the conclusion of the North Atlantic Council meeting.<sup>1</sup>*

### DEPARTURE, THE WHITE HOUSE, MAY 5<sup>2</sup>

This is an important trip. It's the only trip that I have planned this entire year outside of our country. We have a great undertaking to bind ourselves closer together with our friends and allies in Japan and Canada and in Europe as we face common tasks and common challenges.

The economic discussions will be designed to put the people of the world back to work, to discourage a rampant robbing of people by inflation, to share the proper and fair use of raw materials and other supplies that come from the less developed countries, and to share with those less fortunate nations the bounties that God has given the world.

<sup>1</sup> Remarks by President Carter on other occasions during the trip, including his May 6 visit to Newcastle, are printed in the Weekly Compilation of Presidential Documents dated May 16, 1977.

<sup>2</sup> Introductory paragraph omitted (text from Weekly Compilation of Presidential Documents dated May 16).

We will have long discussions about close political interrelationships, consultations, with our closest allies and friends. We'll be dealing with problems that concern NATO, the defense of Europe, the relationships between the East and the West, among close friends and potential adversaries whom we hope to be our close friends in the future.

I'll be having bilateral private consultations with more than a dozen leaders of foreign countries. I feel well briefed and well prepared. And my own hope is that I can well and truly represent what the American people would like to see their President do in discussing world problems with other world leaders.

We will be pursuing our long-range goals for world peace, for nuclear disarmament, for holding down the sale of conventional weapons, for preventing the spread of the capability for nuclear explosives among nations that don't share it, for a discussion about the proper uses of energy and the sharing of world trade with others, for loans and direct

aid to the less developed countries, and the establishment of basic mechanisms by which these discussions can continue, not just at the summit level on special occasions but on a continual day-by-day interrelationship.

All these things are our hopes for this meeting at the summit with six other nations, on discussions of Berlin with three other nations, our discussions with our NATO allies, and a special meeting that I shall have with President Asad from Syria in Geneva.

I feel good about the prospects for success, and I believe that I will come back after this five-day trip with a major step having been made forward in dealing with the world's problems with the other leaders of our closest friends.

I want to thank the ones who have come out this afternoon, this morning, to see me off. I will try to do a good job for you. And I think when I come back we will have had a successful trip.

#### **REMARKS AT CONCLUSION OF ECONOMIC SUMMIT CONFERENCE, LONDON, MAY 8 <sup>3</sup>**

I think the great attention that's being paid to our deliberations and decisions by the world is accurately expressed by the attendance of the news media here. I think, however, it's good for all of us to remember that sometimes heads of state tend to overemphasize or overestimate our own influence.

Historical occurrences can remind us of this. There was a King of England who considered himself to be more influential than the actual fact. Three hundred and twenty-eight years ago he had a struggle with the Parliament. He came to this building. And when he left, on orders of the Parliament he was beheaded in the street.

And I think this may not happen to us, but we have to remember [laughter]—we have to remember that making decisions, even difficult ones, in unanimity is not a guarantee that our decisions will be consummated.

I have been very fortunate on my first trip to meet with experienced leaders. Five of

them have been Finance Ministers before becoming Presidents or Prime Ministers. I've learned a lot. I think it's accurate to say that we've made some far-reaching decisions, facing a world whose economic structure has changed.

We now face the constant prospect that the OPEC [Organization of Petroleum Exporting Countries] nations export about 45 billion dollars' worth of goods more than they import, which means that the consuming nations, including our own country, have to have a deficit of about \$45 billion a year. Most of us can accommodate these deficits for the time being. But the poor and deprived nations of the world, who don't have the industrial capacity, can't do so.

The prime discussion that we had that created the most problems was trade and how to seek and use new sources of energy.

I think it's accurate to report that the leaders who were debating these points decided that there is no way to insure future world prosperity unless we have a maximum degree of free trade among our countries. It's a great temptation in a time of high unemployment to erect protectionist barriers at our nations' borders. But after a great deal of discussion, we all decided that this was something that we want to avoid.

We also are now embarked upon a time when the use of nuclear energy is crucial to some nations who are not blessed with other kinds of fuel supplies. We are one of the supplier nations, along with Canada and others, of nuclear fuel. We want to be sure that when we export these nuclear fuels, that they are not subsequently converted into explosives. And how to deal with this difficult question without encroaching upon the autonomy of nations who consume this energy is a very difficult and sensitive question indeed.

We've agreed, as Prime Minister Callaghan has pointed out, to study this problem for two months—to define the terms of reference and to assess the entire nuclear fuel cycle from the exploration for uranium and other supplies, the extraction of those supplies, the enrichment of the fuel, the transportation of it, the consumption of it to produce electricity, the handling of the waste products with care, and the ultimate disposal of waste is a very, very

<sup>3</sup> Made following the reading of the summit conference declaration (text from Weekly Compilation of Presidential Documents dated May 16).

difficult assignment, which I believe for the first time has been addressed in a very frank fashion.

Another point that was discussed, which was not so far reported, is that we believe that a time has come for international control and prohibition against illegalities, bribery, extortion, and other actions that sometimes have been condoned in the field of trade, commerce, and banking. I was very pleasantly impressed with the strong support of all the leaders of government in attempting, through the United Nations and through our own actions, to stamp out this embarrassment that has been brought upon the industrial world.

The last point I would like to make is this: We see very clearly a need for expanding the function of such institutions as the International Monetary Fund, the World Bank, the regional banks, and of reaching out beyond our own group to our natural allies and friends with whom we have been associated in years gone by, and to welcome the very good attitude of the oil-supplying nations like Saudi Arabia and others who are now seeking not only to supply aid for developing countries but who want to participate with us in making decisions commensurate with their own economic influence.

And I think we've taken a good step forward in addition to that, as has been pointed out, in inviting in a congenial way the Communist countries and the Socialist countries, like the Soviet Union, to join with us in trying to provide studies of very difficult questions that concern us all and also providing aid to those nations which are much less fortunate.

We have resolved to continue the function of the highly skilled persons who prepared for this conference. They will follow up to be sure that our conference has not been an idle discussion and not just consummated when we issue a very unanimous report. And I believe that this will be an innovation which will remind us all in the months and weeks ahead, as we go back home, that we have obligations to fulfill, and in many ways our own reputations are at stake, to carry out the promises that we are now making this afternoon to the world, who looks to us for the solution of these difficult problems.

I want to express my own thanks to Prime

Minister Callaghan and to all those who helped to make this conference so successful. I am very deeply grateful to them and to my colleagues on this platform, who helped me learn at first hand the wealth of their knowledge and background and experience. They have been very gracious to me.

## TEXTS OF SUMMIT CONFERENCE DECLARATION AND APPENDIX, MAY 8<sup>4</sup>

### DOWNING STREET SUMMIT CONFERENCE: DECLARATION

In two days of intensive discussion at Downing Street we have agreed on how we can best help to promote the well-being both of our own countries and of others.

The world economy has to be seen as a whole; it involves not only co-operation among national Governments but also strengthening appropriate international organizations. We were reinforced in our awareness of the interrelationship of all the issues before us, as well as our own interdependence. We are determined to respond collectively to the challenges of the future.

—Our most urgent task is to create more jobs while continuing to reduce inflation. Inflation does not reduce unemployment. On the contrary it is one of its major causes. We are particularly concerned about the problem of unemployment among young people. We have agreed that there will be an exchange of experience and ideas on providing the young with job opportunities.

—We commit our governments to stated economic growth targets or to stabilization policies which, taken as a whole, should provide a basis for sustained non-inflationary growth, in our own countries and worldwide and for reduction of imbalances in international payments.

—Improved financing facilities are needed. The International Monetary Fund must play a prominent role. We commit ourselves to seek additional resources for the IMF and support the linkage of its lending practices to the adoption of appropriate stabilization policies.

—We will provide strong political leadership to expand opportunities for trade to strengthen the open international trading system, which will increase job opportunities. We reject protectionism: it would foster unemployment, increase inflation and undermine the welfare of our peoples. We will give a new impetus to the Tokyo Round of Multilateral Trade Negotiations. Our objective is to make substantive progress in key

<sup>4</sup> Issued at London (text from Weekly Compilation of Presidential Documents dated May 16). Participating in the meeting were President Carter, Prime Minister Pierre Elliott Trudeau of Canada, President Valéry Giscard d'Estaing of France, Chancellor Helmut Schmidt of the Federal Republic of Germany, Prime Minister Giulio Andreotti of Italy, Prime Minister Takeo Fukuda of Japan, and Prime Minister James Callaghan of the United Kingdom.

areas in 1977. In this field structural changes in the world economy must be taken into consideration.

—We will further conserve energy and increase and diversify energy production, so that we reduce our dependence on oil. We agree on the need to increase nuclear energy to help meet the world's energy requirements. We commit ourselves to do this while reducing the risks of nuclear proliferation. We are launching an urgent study to determine how best to fulfil these purposes.

—The world economy can only grow on a sustained and equitable basis if developing countries share in that growth. We are agreed to do all in our power to achieve a successful conclusion of the CIEC [Conference on International Economic Cooperation] and we commit ourselves to a continued constructive dialogue with developing countries. We aim to increase the flow of aid and other real resources to those countries. We invite the COMECON [Council of Mutual Economic Assistance] countries to do the same. We support multilateral institutions such as the World Bank, whose general resources should be increased sufficiently to permit its lending to rise in real terms. We stress the importance of secure private investments to foster world economic progress.

To carry out these tasks we need the assistance and cooperation of others. We will seek that cooperation in appropriate international institutions, such as the United Nations, the World Bank, the IMF, the GATT [General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade] and OECD [Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development]. Those among us whose countries are members of the European Economic Community intend to make their efforts within its framework.

In our discussions we have reached substantial agreement. Our firm purpose is now to put that agreement into action. We shall review progress on all the measures we have discussed here at Downing Street in order to maintain the momentum of recovery.

The message of the Downing Street Summit is thus one of confidence:

—in the continuing strength of our societies and the proven democratic principles that give them vitality;

—that we are undertaking the measures needed to overcome problems and achieve a more prosperous future.

#### APPENDIX

#### TO DOWNING STREET SUMMIT DECLARATION

##### *World Economic Prospects*

Since 1975 the world economic situation has been improving gradually. Serious problems, however, still persist in all of our countries. Our most urgent task is to create jobs while continuing to reduce inflation. Inflation is not a remedy to unemployment but one of its major causes. Progress in the fight against inflation has been uneven. The needs for adjustment between surplus and deficit countries remain large. The world has not yet fully adjusted to the depressive effects of the 1974 oil price rise.

We commit our Governments to targets for growth and stabilization which vary from country to country but which, taken as a whole, should provide a basis for sustained non-inflationary growth worldwide.

Some of our countries have adopted reasonably expansionist growth targets for 1977. The governments of these countries will keep their policies under review, and commit themselves to adopt further policies, if needed to achieve their stated target rates and to contribute to the adjustment of payments imbalances. Others are pursuing stabilization policies designed to provide a basis for sustained growth without increasing inflationary expectations. The governments of these countries will continue to pursue those goals.

These two sets of policies are interrelated. Those of the first group of countries should help to create an environment conducive to expansion in the others without adding to inflation. Only if growth rates can be maintained in the first group and increased in the second, and inflation tackled successfully in both, can unemployment be reduced.

We are particularly concerned about the problem of unemployment among young people. Therefore we shall promote the training of young people in order to build a skilled and flexible labor force so that they can be ready to take advantage of the upturn in economic activity as it develops. All of our governments, individually or collectively, are taking appropriate measures to this end. We must learn as much as possible from each other and agree to exchange experiences and ideas.

Success in managing our domestic economies will not only strengthen world economic growth but also contribute to success in four other main economic fields to which we now turn—balance of payments financing, trade, energy and North/South relations. Progress in these fields will in turn contribute to world economic recovery.

##### *Balance of Payments Financing*

For some years to come oil-importing nations, as a group, will be facing substantial payments deficits and importing capital from OPEC [Organization of Petroleum Exporting Countries] nations to finance them. The deficit for the current year could run as high as \$45 billion. Only through a reduction in our dependence on imported oil and a rise in the capacity of oil-producing nations to import can that deficit be reduced.

This deficit needs to be distributed among the oil-consuming nations in a pattern compatible with their ability to attract capital on a continuing basis. The need for adjustment to this pattern remains large, and it will take much international co-operation, and determined action by surplus as well as deficit countries, if continuing progress is to be made. Strategies of adjustment in the deficit countries must include emphasis on elimination of domestic sources of inflation and improvement in international cost-price relationships. It is important that industrial countries in relatively strong payments positions should ensure continued adequate expansion of domestic demand, within prudent limits. Moreover these countries, as well as other countries in strong



payments positions, should promote increased flows of long-term capital exports.

The International Monetary Fund must play a prominent role in balance of payments financing and adjustment. We therefore strongly endorse the recent agreement of the Interim Committee of the IMF to seek additional resources for that organization and to link IMF lending to the adoption of appropriate stabilization policies. These added resources will strengthen the ability of the IMF to encourage and assist member countries in adopting policies which will limit payments deficits and warrant their financing through the private markets. These resources should be used with the conditionality and flexibility required to encourage an appropriate pace of adjustment.

This IMF proposal should facilitate the maintenance of reasonable levels of economic activity and reduce the danger of resort to trade and payments restrictions. It demonstrates co-operation between oil-exporting nations, industrial nations in stronger financial positions, and the IMF. It will contribute materially to the health and progress of the world economy. In pursuit of this objective, we also reaffirm our intention to strive to increase monetary stability.

We agreed that the international monetary and financial system, in its new and agreed legal framework, should be strengthened by the early implementation of the increase in quotas. We will work towards an early agreement within the IMF on another increase in the quotas of that organization.

#### *Trade*

We are committed to providing strong political leadership for the global effort to expand opportunities for trade and to strengthen the open international trading system. Achievement of these goals is central to world economic prosperity and the effective resolution of economic problems faced by both developed and developing countries throughout the world.

Policies on protectionism foster unemployment, increase inflation and undermine the welfare of our peoples. We are therefore agreed on the need to maintain our political commitment to an open and non-discriminatory world trading system. We will seek both nationally and through the appropriate international institutions to promote solutions that create new jobs and consumer benefits through expanded trade and to avoid approaches which restrict trade.

The Tokyo Round of multilateral trade negotiations must be pursued vigorously. The continuing economic difficulties make it even more essential to achieve the objective of the Tokyo Declaration and to negotiate a comprehensive set of agreements to the maximum benefit of all.<sup>5</sup> Toward this end, we will seek this year to achieve substantive progress in such key areas as:

(i) a tariff reduction plan of broadest possible application designed to achieve a substantial cut and harmonization and in certain cases the elimination of tariffs;

(ii) codes, agreements and other measures that will facilitate a significant reduction of non-tariff barriers to trade and the avoidance of new barriers in the future

and that will take into account the structural changes which have taken place in the world economy;

(iii) a mutually acceptable approach to agriculture that will achieve increased expansion and stabilization of trade, and greater assurance of world food supplies.

Such progress should not remove the right of individual countries under existing international agreements to avoid significant market disruption.

While seeking to conclude comprehensive and balanced agreements on the basis of reciprocity among all industrial countries we are determined, in accordance with the aims of the Tokyo Declaration, to ensure that the agreements provide special benefits to developing countries.

We welcome the action taken by Governments to reduce counterproductive competition in officially supported export credits and propose that substantial further efforts be made this year to improve and extend the present consensus in this area.

We consider that irregular practices and improper conduct should be eliminated from international trade, banking and commerce, and we welcome the work being done toward international agreements prohibiting illicit payments.

#### *Energy*

We welcome the measures taken by a number of Governments to increase energy conservation. The increase in demand for energy and oil imports continues at a rate which places excessive pressure on the world's depleting hydrocarbon resources. We agree therefore on the need to do everything possible to strengthen our efforts still further.

We are committed to national and joint efforts to limit energy demand and to increase and diversify supplies. There will need to be greater exchanges of technology and joint research and development aimed at more efficient energy use, improved recovery and use of coal and other conventional resources, and the development of new energy sources.

Increasing reliance will have to be placed on nuclear energy to satisfy growing energy requirements and to help diversify sources of energy. This should be done with the utmost precaution with respect to the generation and dissemination of material that can be used for nuclear weapons. Our objective is to meet the world's energy needs and to make peaceful use of nuclear energy widely available, while avoiding the danger of the spread of nuclear weapons. We are also agreed that, in order to be effective, non-proliferation policies should as far as possible be acceptable to both industrialized and developing countries alike. To this end, we are undertaking a preliminary analysis to be completed within two months of the best means of advancing these objectives, including the study of terms of reference for international fuel cycle evaluation.

<sup>5</sup> For text of the declaration, approved at Tokyo on Sept. 14, 1973, by a ministerial meeting of the Contracting Parties to the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade, see BULLETIN of Oct. 8, 1973, p. 450.

The oil-importing developing countries have special problems both in securing and in paying for the energy supplies needed to sustain their economic development programs. They require additional help in expanding their domestic energy production and to this end we hope the World Bank, as its resources grow, will give special emphasis to projects that serve this purpose.

We intend to do our utmost to ensure, during this transitional period, that the energy market functions harmoniously, in particular through strict conservation measures and the development of all our energy resources. We hope very much that the oil-producing countries will take these efforts into account and will make their contribution as well.

We believe that these activities are essential to enable all countries to have continuing energy supplies now and for the future at reasonable prices consistent with sustained non-inflationary economic growth, and we intend through all useful channels to concert our policies in continued consultation and cooperation with each other and with other countries.

#### *North/South Relations*

The world economy can only grow on a sustained and equitable basis if developing countries share in that growth. Progress has been made. The industrial countries have maintained an open market system despite a deep recession. They have increased aid flows, especially to poorer nations. Some \$8 billion will be available from the IDA [International Development Association] for these nations over the next three years, as we join others in fulfilling pledges to its Fifth Replenishment. The IMF has made available to developing countries, under its compensatory financing facility nearly an additional \$2 billion last year. An International Fund for Agricultural Development has been created, based on common efforts by the developed OPEC, and other developing nations.

The progress and the spirit of cooperation that have emerged can serve as an excellent base for further steps. The next step will be the successful conclusion of the Conference on International Economic Cooperation and we agreed to do all in our power to achieve this.

We shall work:

(i) to increase the flow of aid and other real resources from the industrial to developing countries, particularly to the 800 million people who now live in absolute poverty; and to improve the effectiveness of aid;

(ii) to facilitate developing countries' access to sources of international finance;

(iii) to support such multilateral lending institutions as the World Bank, whose lending capacity we believe will have to be increased in the years ahead to permit its lending to increase in real terms and widen in scope;

(iv) to promote the secure investment needed to foster world economic development;

(v) to secure productive results from negotiations about the stabilization of commodity prices and the creation of a Common Fund for individual buffer stock agreements and to consider problems of the stabilization of export earnings of developing countries; and

(vi) to continue to improve access in a non-disruptive

way to the markets of industrial countries for the products of developing nations.

It is desirable that these actions by developed and developing countries be assessed and concerted in relation to each other and to the larger goals that our countries share. We hope that the World Bank, together with the IMF, will consult with other developed and developing countries in exploring how this could best be done.

The well-being of the developed and developing nations are bound up together. The developing countries' growing prosperity benefit industrial countries, as the latter's growth benefits developing nations. Both developed and developing nations have a mutual interest in maintaining a climate conducive to stable growth worldwide.

### **NEWS CONFERENCE OF SECRETARY VANCE AND SECRETARY BLUMENTHAL, MAY 8**

Weekly Compilation of Presidential Documents dated May 16

*Secretary Vance:* I thought I might say just a few words first in the way of general background, and then both Mike and I'll be glad to answer any questions which you may have on the details of the document which was issued and the appendix to it.

There are about three points, I think, that are important to make at the outset.

First of all, I think the summit was very important because it dealt with substantive matters in a way which was unique. I talked to one person after the summit who had been to all three of the summits, and he said that there was more substance dealt with in this summit than any of the others which had been held. This came about as a result of a process of frank exchanges between the participants. The atmosphere was friendly; yet people were willing to put their differences out on the table. They listened to each other and, as a result of this, were able to develop common ground even though they may have started with differences.

Unlike the past, there will be a follow-on for this summit, and each of the countries will establish one or more individuals who will have the responsibility to follow up and make sure that the pledges which were made and the recommendations which had flowed from these meetings will be carried forward. I think this is a very important step.

Thirdly, I think it is important because it

gave for the first time a number of the participants a chance to meet with each other and to establish a close personal working relationship. It was interesting to observe this and to see the closeness develop as the days went on. I think in this respect it was a great success, and overall I would evaluate it as a very useful and constructive set of meetings.

The Prime Minister covered a number of the questions which you've had with respect to the various pledges made and the individual items. But I'm sure you have a number more, and Mike and I will divide up answering the questions. Mike will take primarily those dealing with the economic issues and trade. I will cover those dealing with the nuclear matters and with the North-South dialogue. So, who has the first question?

*Q. Who will follow up for the United States?*

*Q. Mr. Secretary, I would like to know about the positions, precise positions, about the deal between Germany and Brazil about the nuclear question. Could you elaborate this problem?*

*Secretary Vance:* That subject was just mentioned in passing. It did not come up as a subject for any real discussion. The subject matter was much broader than that in dealing with the nuclear issues.

*Q. Who will follow up with the United States?*

*Secretary Vance:* Henry Owen, who is sitting right there and who is responsible for the preparation work insofar as the United States is concerned, will be the one who will do that. I might say, incidentally, that another reason for the success of this summit, I think, is the excellence of the preparation work that was done by Henry and the others representing their various countries.

*Q. How will that work exactly?*

*Secretary Vance:* The details have not yet been worked out.

*Q. But there are counterparts for Mr. Owen?*

*Secretary Vance:* There are. Yes, indeed.

*Q. When the communique speaks of addi-*

*tional resources for the IMF [International Monetary Fund], is that beyond what the Interim Committee has already agreed on, the \$10 billion to \$15 billion? Is there something more in mind?*

*Secretary Blumenthal:* The question is whether or not the reference in the communique to the additional resources of the IMF refers to what the Interim Committee has already agreed on.

This refers first to the Witteveen facility and to the support of the countries there to making that a reality. Secondly, it refers to the support for increase, a further increase, a seventh increase in the quotas, which has to be decided by February of next year.

*Q. In Washington when we got a briefing about the summit, we were told that the issue of bribery, extortion, illicit payments, would not be ready for discussion at this summit. How come we end up with it in the appendix?*

*Secretary Blumenthal:* This was a suggestion that was made by the United States, and the other countries agreed to it. Indeed, the actual language includes not only reference to trade but also to commerce and to banking, and it really reflects the view of all of the leaders there that that was an important issue and that we should collaborate together to stamp it out.

*Q. At what point did you decide to bring it up? Before we left, according to the people who prepared the summit, it wasn't going to be brought up.*

*Secretary Blumenthal:* It was in the drafts that I saw.

*Q. Mr. Secretary, to follow that, just what does the language of the appendix mean? What will follow here in relation to international trade, banking, and commerce? What are the practices you are talking about?*

*Secretary Blumenthal:* There are discussions going on to negotiate agreements in the United Nations. We have before us in the Congress a legislative proposal to make bribery for Americans illegal. That would require collaboration with other governments, and certainly this language ought to make it pos-

sible to and somewhat easier to really put some teeth into that legislation.

*Q. Mr. Secretary, at which level the primary analysis of the nuclear question is going to be conducted?*

*Secretary Vance:* Let me tell you what was agreed upon. It was agreed that there would be a study to be completed within two months with reports back to the members of the summit. That would encompass an analysis of what could be done in general terms to meet the problems raised in the nuclear field arising out of the danger of proliferation coming from the export of nuclear materials for purposes of energy.

And it was further agreed that there would be the development of the terms of reference for a much longer study which would be involved with an evaluation of the international fuel cycle. And that study would take, I would say, probably a year or more to do, once the terms of reference are developed.

*Q. Mr. Secretary, could you tell us whether the language of the communique is meant to imply that all of the members now approve of a common fund for commodities stabilization?*

*Secretary Vance:* There was agreement that there should be a common fund. It is not *the* common fund, but *a* common fund.

*Q. Is that the IRF idea?*

*Secretary Vance:* The idea is that there should be a common fund which would be related to commodity agreements which have been negotiated.

*Q. A common fund of how much, Mr. Secretary?*

*Secretary Blumenthal:* None of the details have been worked out and are stated in the communique. The important decision that was taken here is represented by the agreement of all the heads of government there. On the notion that there shall be a common fund for stabilization of commodities, with buffer stocks, that the type of fund, how and where and what amounts, how it will function, that's something to be discussed and negotiated in the future. But there is an acceptance of the notion of a common fund idea.

*Q. Mr. Blumenthal, I think it's lovely that you have agreed that you would promote economic growth and yet curb inflation simultaneously, but what specifically have you decided to do that would help you achieve that rather magnificent goal?*

*Secretary Blumenthal:* I think the significant thing about that statement is that the heads of government have agreed that having stated certain growth targets in some cases and certain stabilization targets in other cases, that they undertake a pledge, as Prime Minister Callaghan said, to do whatever is necessary to meet those targets. And they have also agreed that the meeting of those targets cannot, should not, be at the expense of inflation; that therefore, as each of them takes the necessary steps to meet the growth targets, it is understood by all of the others that they will not do so at the expense of inflation and that they will fight against inflation; that these two things are closely related together and must be watched together. It's clearly left to each individual country to develop its own internal policies and specifics.

*Q. But how is that any different from any previous goals, either common or individually? Does it mean higher inflation and less growth?*

*Secretary Blumenthal:* I think as far as summit meetings are concerned, there is a difference in the sense that previously there were some general goals. But here there are not only targets, but there is a commitment to do what is necessary to meet these targets.

*Q. Mr. Secretary, President Carter said he is bringing new initiatives to the summit conference. Could you be more specific as to what those initiatives were and the final results of them?*

*Secretary Vance:* Yes. There were a number of new initiatives.

One of them is the study that I referred to a moment ago which concerns an evaluation of the international fuel cycle.

Secondly, were proposals relating to the special action fund. We reached general agreement that there should be a special action fund to take care of some of the developing countries in the greatest need and that

each would contribute his adequate share to that particular fund.

The whole issue of irregular practices which Mike referred to a moment ago is another one of the new initiatives that was brought forward.

Those are some examples.

*Q. Just to follow up on that, Mr. Secretary, this special action fund to which you refer, is that mentioned in the appendix, and what exactly is it?*

*Secretary Vance:* It is not, in those terms, mentioned. It is something which will come up at the meetings which will be held in Paris at the end of this month, the North-South meetings which are called the CIEC [Conference on International Economic Cooperation] meetings. And what it is, is a fund which will be available to meet the needs of some of the poorest countries which are having balance-of-payments problems and specific needs of that kind. That, in general, is what the nature is.

*Q. Outside the IMF?*

*Secretary Vance:* Yes, outside.

*Q. Outside of the common fund as well?*

*Secretary Blumenthal:* Yes. That is unrelated to the common fund. May I just add one or two others in the area of special initiatives—of new initiatives.

I would think that one ought to add the decision in the trade area, that there has to be a new—of the heads of government—to pledge themselves to a new impetus in the trade negotiations, against the background of a rejection of protectionism and with the commitment to make substantial progress by the end of this year.

*Q. Mr. Secretary, you mentioned the two-month nuclear study and the one-year study to set terms of reference. Was there any agreement here that during that period, either the two-month or the one-year, that there would not be the sales of nuclear-grade materials?*

*Secretary Vance:* No. No such agreement was reached at this time. Each country will take care of that decision, which it will have to make according to its own views of the

matter. The discussions of these issues will continue in the London suppliers group as they have in the past.

Now, I just want to correct one thing which you said. The two-month study will be a study which will include recommendations with respect to the terms of reference. So, after that two-month study, one should have the terms of reference. And then a decision as to how to proceed on the actual study itself, which could last a year or more.

*Q. Mr. Secretary, how would the nuclear suppliers be brought into the study, if at all?*

*Secretary Vance:* In the initial study, the two-month study, the nuclear suppliers group as such will not be involved in it. As one moves on to international fuel cycle evaluation, then the London suppliers group and the individuals involved in it would undoubtedly become a part of that broader study.

*Q. Mr. Secretary, would the special action fund be within the framework of any existing organization such as OECD [Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development], G-10 [Group of Ten], or something entirely new?*

*Secretary Vance:* That decision has not yet been made, as to where it would be placed.

*Q. Mr. Vance, how does your special action fund differ from the decisions made at the Washington Energy Conference in 1974?*

*Secretary Vance:* I can't answer that.

*Q. Can Mr. Blumenthal?*

*Secretary Blumenthal:* No, I really can't. I do not know what happened with that conference with regard to the special fund.

*Q. Mr. Blumenthal, most of the countries involved here have not been able to fight inflation and reduce unemployment in the recent past. Now, apart from saying that they're going to do it now, what is it that they have done here that's going to enable them to do it then?*

*Secretary Blumenthal:* Well, I can only repeat again that what I think is significant is that the countries have agreed that they will do what is necessary to meet their growth targets. Meeting their growth targets and at

the same time meeting the stabilization targets for those countries who have been deficit countries in the past will improve the international economic environment. It will create additional volumes of trade. Certainly, the stabilization programs will reduce inflation. And through this improved international environment, and through the commitment to meet those targets, the overall situation is likely to be improved.

There was no effort on the part of the heads of government to find a solution, to find the formula for dealing with inflation and for dealing with unemployment in their individual countries. There was an effort to see how they could work together in order to make that situation for each of them better.

*Q. Mr. Secretary, with respect to your rejection of protectionism, you still reserve the right to avoid significant market disruption. If any country can characterize its problem as significant market disruptions, wouldn't protectionism still grow under that flag?*

*Secretary Blumenthal:* I don't really think so. We interpret that as a reference, and it's generally interpreted as a reference, to the existing arrangements that now exist and the rights that exist under the GATT [General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade] for countries who face particular problems of disruption to get some relief, sometimes for temporary periods of time. The GATT has specific provisions for that. And this particular paragraph merely calls attention to the fact that as further liberalization takes place, these rights, of course, are not affected by them.

*Q. Mr. Secretary, what is the difference between the part of the communique emphasizing the readiness of the heads of government to meet the targets they have set themselves in sovereignty between that old practice in the OECD to have representatives talk in various groups about targets and establishing when the governments are to meet those targets? I don't see a difference. How do you see the difference?*

*Secretary Blumenthal:* In the past, countries have indicated what it is that they hope to do. In this particular instance, the heads of government have not only indicated what it is

that they hope to do but they have given a pledge that they will, if they fail, fall short of it, take the necessary measures to make sure that they achieve their targets.

*Q. Mr. Secretary, given what you have said here today, and Secretary Vance as well, just how disappointed is the American delegation that something substantial is not accomplished? [Laughter.] Seriously, how disappointed are you?*

*Secretary Blumenthal:* We are not at all disappointed. We are quite pleased, because we believe that very substantial results have been accomplished.

There have been a number of specific things that have been done in the area of setting targets and the commitment that they will be met, in the commitment of all of us to strengthen international institutions, both the IMF and the World Bank, in the decision to give a real impetus to the trade negotiations which have been stalled for some time, in finding a solution to the nuclear problem to which Secretary Vance has referred, in the decision to collaborate and take some specific steps in the North-South dialogue and to resolve to make the CIEC ministerial meetings and these discussions a success, in the matter of illicit payments, and a variety of other ways.

We think that kind of complete agreement, the way in which the leaders got to know each other, that they worked out these problems, represents a considerable success. But perhaps Secretary Vance would like to add to that further.

*Secretary Vance:* No.

*Q. Is that good intentions only, then?*

*Secretary Vance:* No, I don't think it's good intentions only, at all. These declarations were reached, and as I indicated earlier, these are not simply pious words; they are going to be followed up on.

Plans are to be developed and will be carried out. We'll be seeing the results of the actions with respect to the North-South issues to which both Mike and I have referred in the CIEC meeting which will come up at the end of this month.

Insofar as the illicit payments are concerned, the fact that this declaration is made,

I think, is going to have a very important effect on the action that has been going forward in the United Nations to try and complete the study in that particular area. It will give impetus and strength to it.

And I could go on through many of the other issues.

*Q. There was a great deal of discussion of the communique from the various leaders about how they had influenced each other, and the President said that he had learned a great deal. Does that mean that any of his views that he had before coming into this session on these various matters were modified or changed?*

*Secretary Vance:* Yes. I think that that was not only true of the President, but of all of the participants. They really did listen to each other and learned from the listening process.

*Q. Can you give us some examples of how the President's view may have been changed, for instance, on the nuclear issue, if it were modified at all there?*

*Secretary Vance:* On the nuclear issue, I think that this was primarily one in which we were trying to explain what our suggestion was about. And in the process of doing that, there was a full exchange which, I think, sharpened the view of all of us with respect to the problems of the other nations who are not quite as fortunate as we are in terms of the resources which we have. And in that sense, I think it was useful for us. I think they also learned from the process, and therefore we were very much encouraged when they were willing to agree to go forward with these studies to which I have referred.

*Q. Does this year or more of study of the nuclear problem, Mr. Secretary, represent a retreat from President Carter's position on the nuclear proliferation?*

*Secretary Vance:* Not at all, no. This is wholly consistent with it. This is what he has proposed before.

*Q. What's the policy going to be on export of enriched uranium during that year or year and a half?*

*Secretary Vance:* You say you've got copies in the room?

*Mr. Powell [Jody Powell, White House Press Secretary]:* The statements of the President's policy that were delivered two weeks ago are available in the back of the room for anyone who wants them.

*Secretary Vance:* Did you get the answer to that?

*Q. I was asking you what the policy is going to be.*

*Secretary Vance:* It's laid out in some detail. It's rather long and complicated. There are two or three sheets in the back of the room on it.

*Q. The common fund will be invited to join in aid for the underdeveloped countries. Which form will this invitation have?*

*Secretary Vance:* I think the public announcement of this is the form which it will take.

*Q. Mr. Secretary, there's a notable lack of reference to Japan's involvement in trilateral issues. Could you please explain how Japan was involved in the discussions and also whether or not it was talked about—Japan's trade surplus with the European countries?*

*Secretary Vance:* Japan was intimately involved in all of the discussions. There was a free-flowing discussion between the heads of state which flowed back and forth. The Japanese participated very actively and in a very constructive way during these discussions. The question which you specifically referred to did come up as one of the items in the discussion.

*Q. How was it resolved?*

*Q. Mr. Secretary?*

*Secretary Vance:* Yes.

*Q. The other day Secretary Blumenthal was talking to us about the human rights issue, said that the leaders universally praised President Carter's position. And Mr. Callaghan tonight indicated the same thing. The German sources are saying that during the conversations, while praising President Carter's position, Chancellor Schmidt pointed out that continuation of a too-vocal human rights policy might deter the ability of the Germans to get Germans out of Eastern countries. Did*

*Chancellor Schmidt make such a statement during the meeting?*

*Secretary Vance:* He did make such a statement during the meeting. I don't want to go into details on what individuals said, but that was one of the issues which was raised in general terms, that some countries had different problems with respect to how they would handle it—but not with the basic principle. There was no difference at all with respect to the basic principle.

*Q. Do you agree with the idea of organizing free trade, and to which extent do you think it can be organized?*

*Q. Free trade, as the French have suggested.*

*Secretary Vance:* Did you get that, Mike?

*Secretary Blumenthal:* I think I got the question. I hope I understand the significance of it. [Laughter.]

Yes, we do agree that indeed we are happy with the conclusion that comes out of this meeting, which rejects protectionism and therefore, by implication and also very explicitly, comes down in favor of negotiating and having a new impetus, so that this year there will be a lot of progress toward a rapid conclusion of a negotiation which will represent freer trade.

We certainly believe that it can be done. There was reference to the fact that there are structural changes in the world economy that have to be taken into account.

We welcome that because it will allow all of us in the context of the trade negotiations to take into account not only tariff problems but also non-tariff-barrier problems and agricultural problems, internal taxation, subsidies, the many matters that exist in the world of trade that have to be dealt with if freer trade, which we desire and which we all want to achieve, is to be brought about.

*Q. Mr. Secretary, how do you see tomorrow's meeting with President Asad of Syria and your coming meeting with Mr. Allon?*

*Secretary Vance:* The question was: How do I see the forthcoming meeting with President Asad, which we will have tomorrow, and also my meeting with Foreign Minister Allon?

The President and I are looking forward very much to our meeting with President Asad. He is one of the key figures, of course, in the Middle East and in the solving of the Middle East question. We have had the opportunity to meet with most of the other Arab leaders, but this will be our first meeting with him, at least the President's first meeting with him.

His views are going to be extremely important in the development of our final views with respect to the proposals which we may choose to make in connection with the settlement of the Middle East question.

I met with Foreign Minister Allon on my last Middle East trip. A good deal has happened since that time, and we have had these meetings with the other Arab leaders during that period. Therefore, I thought it was time for us to meet again, where I could review with him what had come out of the conversations with the other Arab leaders and get the latest thinking of the Israelis on the Middle East question.

*Q. Excuse me; one followup. You did mention the trade surplus of Japan to the European Economic Community, but was it resolved? Did Japan make any overtures at reducing trade surplus and helping these economic deficits in Europe?*

*Secretary Blumenthal:* Japan, along with the other countries, committed itself to meet its growth targets and to meet its targets that had previously stated. And it did accept the notion that the strong countries must make a particular effort so that the surpluses in the world can be taken care of. So, in that sense, the Japanese took full cognizance of their position and promised to act accordingly.

*Q. Is the United States willing to modify its nuclear policy if the result of the two-month study should request, and especially in terms of the condition, or requirement, of the approval for doing the reprocessing in foreign countries—or do you know if the United States expects to store the nuclear waste inside the United States in the future?*

*Secretary Vance:* The two-month study will be a preliminary analysis, as I indicated, which will develop the terms of reference for



the longer study which will go into the kinds of question which you are talking about. Of course, what comes out of that will be very important, not only to the United States in determining what its policy should be in the future but to all the other participants who will be involved in it.

#### **TEXT OF DECLARATION ON BERLIN, MAY 9 <sup>6</sup>**

The four heads of state and of government of France, the United States, the United Kingdom and the FRG have reviewed questions relating to the situation in Germany and particularly Berlin.

The four governments expressed their satisfaction at the positive effect which the Quadripartite Agreement of 3 September 1971 has had on the situation in and around Berlin. They agreed that the strict observance and full implementation of the Agreement, which are indispensable to the continued improvement of the situation, are essential to the strengthening of detente, the maintenance of security and the development of cooperation throughout Europe. The governments of France, the United States and the United Kingdom noted that detente would be seriously threatened if any one of the four signatory powers to the Quadripartite Agreement were not to respect fully the undertakings confirmed by the signatory powers in the Agreement and in the Quadripartite Declaration of November 1972.

The three Powers recalled that the Quadripartite Agreement was based explicitly on the fact that quadripartite rights and responsibilities and the corresponding wartime and post-war four Power agreements and decisions were not affected. They reaffirmed that this status of the special area of Berlin could not be modified unilaterally. The three Powers will continue to reject all attempts to put in question the rights and responsibilities which France, the United States, the United Kingdom and the Soviet Union retain relating to Germany as a whole and to all four sectors of Berlin.

The four governments recalled that one of the essential elements in the Quadripartite Agreement is the affirmation that the ties between the Western Sectors of Berlin and the FRG should be maintained and developed in accordance with the relevant provisions of the Agreement. This conforms with the interests and wishes of the people directly concerned. In this regard, the three Powers took special note of efforts by the Federal Republic of Germany, taking into account the provisions of the Quadripartite Agreement relevant to its responsibilities for representing the interests of the Western Sectors of Berlin abroad, to enable the Western Sectors of Berlin to profit from the practical benefits of East-West relations.

<sup>6</sup> Issued following a meeting of President Carter, President Giscard d'Estaing, Chancellor Schmidt, and Prime Minister Callaghan (text from Weekly Compilation of Presidential Documents dated May 16).

The four governments pledged their cooperation in maintaining a political situation conducive to the vitality and prosperity of the Western Sectors of Berlin. The three Powers expressed their appreciation of the efforts of the Federal Republic of Germany and the Senat of Berlin to ensure that the Western Sectors remain an attractive place in which to invest and to work. They reaffirmed their commitment to the city's security, which is an indispensable prerequisite for its economic and social development.

#### **EXCHANGE OF REMARKS WITH PRESIDENT ASAD OF SYRIA, GENEVA, MAY 9 <sup>7</sup>**

##### **President Carter**

It's with a great deal of pleasure and hope that I come to Geneva to meet with the great President of Syria, President Asad. As a leader of one of the great countries in the Middle East, I look to him for guidance and advice and for support as all of us search for progress in achieving peace in that important and troubled part of the world.

President Asad has a great role to play because of his experience, the greatness of his country, his interest in and sensitivity about world affairs outside his region, and because of his ability to bring together different peoples who in the past have been unfriendly toward one another and at odds.

This is a year when we are blessed with strong and moderate leaders in the Middle Eastern region. I believe that it is a year of hope for substantial progress, but it can only be achieved with close consultation, open minds, and a determination to succeed in spite of very difficult obstacles. I have already met with the leaders of Israel and Egypt and Jordan, and this meeting with President Asad will help me to understand the common agreements that exist and the potentials for the resolution of differences that still remain.

The good will of President Asad has already been demonstrated. For many years he has been a strong supporter in the search for peace, working closely with my predecessors in the White House and with Secretary Kissinger and others, as efforts have been made.

<sup>7</sup> Made prior to their meeting (text from Weekly Compilation of Presidential Documents dated May 16, which includes additional remarks by President Carter on this occasion). President Asad spoke in Arabic.

We have no regional role to play in this year's deliberations, but we hope to act as an intermediary who can have influence only to the extent that the other nations trust us to be fair, to be objective, to be truthful, to be determined.

Following my own meetings with these great leaders, we will ask our own Secretary of State, Cyrus Vance, to visit the Middle Eastern region again to consult more closely with the nations involved in future deliberations. And I believe that if I can learn from President Asad today, that that will be another major step toward the progress that we all hope to see.

There must be fairness; there must be some flexibility; there must be a forgetting about past differences and misunderstandings; there must be determination; there must be a resolution of the Palestine problem and a homeland for the Palestinians; there must be some resolution of border disputes; and there also must be an assurance of permanent and real peace with guarantees for the future security of these countries which all can trust. We will add our good offices as requested, but I am very much aware that the agreement can only be permanent and can only be initiated if the parties who live there reach an understanding with one another.

I want to express my deep thanks to President Asad for being willing to come to Geneva to meet with me, and I will try to capitalize on the close friendship which he and I have already established. And I believe that the discussions will be fruitful because of his good will, his experience, his knowledge, his sensitivity, and his graciousness in meeting me here.

So, thank you again, President Asad. I hope that this day's deliberations will be a contribution to peace in the Middle East which can help to guarantee peace and prosperity throughout the whole world.

#### **President Asad**

Before I read the prepared short statement, I would like to express my thanks and appreciation to President Carter for his warm expressions which he has kindly offered and also to thank him for his untiring, persistent

efforts which he manifested toward reaching, achieving peace in the area which he has manifested since he took office.

In spite of the difficulties which we have encountered in the past and which will obviously exist to some extent in our search for peace and for a solution of the problems in the Middle East, I must say, in spite of all this, that taken in their totality, the expressions of President Carter on the subject have created an atmosphere of faith and an encouraging atmosphere of optimism.

And as I said at the airport in Geneva yesterday on arrival, I believe that the target which President Carter has in mind, the target which we have in mind—namely, the resolution of the problem and the achievement of peace in the area—is a noble target, is of such a nobility as a target that it should be the goal of everybody in the world who loves peace. And as long as we hold tenaciously to some moral values, as long as we do that, we are bound to strive very hard for the achievement of justice and the solution of causes all around the world, causes that are worthy, and of course we mentioned foremost among these the cause that we are engaged in, trying to seek a solution for in our area.

And as long as leaders of principle meet together to discuss these pernicious, difficult, complicated problems—foremost among which is that of the Middle East—as long as these leaders, with that moral courage, can meet together, so much more would we be armed with the possibilities of finding a just and lasting solution.

Although it is not always wise or useful to prejudge things and be ahead of events, I would like to express myself right now—although the meeting between President Carter and myself is still at its first flush, so to speak, the first few minutes—I would like to say nevertheless, and take the risk in saying it, that we are greatly optimistic.

This does not mean the solution of the problem has become axiomatic, nor do we mean that there is, or there suddenly has appeared, a magic wand to solve the problem. But what it does prove is that obviously there is the will to look for a solution, a solution which is just and lasting.

The recent statement of the President you know that as a result of contacts that have taken place between the Syrian Arab Republic and the United States of America, it has been agreed that President Carter and myself would meet today. This is the first time we meet. After a few minutes, we shall begin our talks at the hotel, and shortly we shall discuss the main subject, which is of interest to all; namely, how to move toward a just peace in the Middle East. Again, I would thank President Carter for his coming to Geneva for this meeting.

Regarding the achievement of a just peace in the Middle East, our opinion, which we have always declared, is that a grave situation threatening international peace and security exists in our region.

This situation arises from the continued occupation of the Arab territories which Israel seized by force in 1967, as well as from Israel's denial of the legitimate recognition of various of the Arab people of Palestine. The fact that this occupation and the homelessness of an entire people continue inevitably means the prolongation of a grave situation that threatens to renew the wars and tragedies from which our region has suffered for 30 years.

We in Syria have repeatedly stressed our determination to continue to work with full facility in order to make our region enjoy the peace which it needs. This peace would serve not only the interests of our region but those of the world at large. We welcome any sincere effort that may help establish a just peace in our region and believe that the sincere efforts which the United States of America can exert in this field are basic and important.

As you know, President Carter has started a series of talks with a number of Arab leaders aimed to know at first hand the facts of the situation in order to promulgate an American stand and, as a number of American officials have declared, in order to use the great influence of the United States to help find a solution based on justice for the existing conflict in the Middle East.

My meeting with President Carter today is within this context. I sincerely hope that our talks will enhance opportunities of peace, will

throw light on the justice of our cause, and will pave the way with clear ideas for the holding of the Geneva conference, which, as is generally agreed, provides a suitable framework for the implementation of the resolutions on the Middle East of the United Nations Security Council and the United Nations General Assembly.

We shall spend three days in Switzerland, during which I shall visit Bern at the invitation of President Furgler, who has kindly come to Geneva and to whom I have paid a courtesy call this morning. We are happy to be in Switzerland.

Finally, I wish to thank again President Carter and hope that we will meet success in our effort.

#### **EXCHANGE OF TOASTS WITH PRESIDENT ASAD OF SYRIA, GENEVA, MAY 9<sup>8</sup>**

##### **President Carter**

Many of the American leaders who have been to Syria to meet with President Asad, and who have also met with many other leaders around the world, have almost always come back to report that he is one of their favorite leaders of all the world; that he's brilliant, also a very enjoyable companion, very frank, and very helpful in the discussions. Although I don't agree with everything that my predecessors have reported, this is one occasion when I agree completely.

Although he's quite modest, I've discovered that he speaks English very well and also reads the finest American literature. He's about halfway through reading "Why Not The Best?" [Laughter.]

He and I have compared our backgrounds. He comes from the same type farm community where I grew up, and we've just discovered that we were whipped quite often by the same stern but fair fathers. We also agreed that the whippings didn't hurt us much since we both became Presidents of our country.

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<sup>8</sup> Given at a dinner hosted by President Carter (text from Weekly Compilation of Presidential Documents dated May 16). President Asad spoke in Arabic.

I believe that this visit in Geneva, which President Asad was kind enough to help arrange, can possibly be a milestone in the world's search for peace. Because of President Asad's personal strength and his intimate knowledge of the Middle Eastern region and its history and background, he has helped me a great deal to understand. And the unique role that Syria can play in this year's search for agreement is valued by all those who have studied this very difficult question. His willingness to reach out to other people has been demonstrated by the trust which the Palestinians have placed in him, by his sacrificial effort to bring peace to Lebanon, and by his effort to bring about a closer relationship with his neighbors, particularly in Jordan.

We realize that this year's deliberations will not be easy ones, but we will not be deflected from our effort to reach agreements by slogans which no longer apply and by ancient wounds which all of us are trying to help be cured and forgotten.

The prospect for peace and harmony, prosperity and trade, mutual understanding and increased world leadership, is an inspiration to all parties involved to search equally for a resolution of differences.

I'm especially grateful that our own nation's relationships with Syria are being strengthened with every passing week. We have just completed a treaty on cultural exchange and, shortly in the future, our airline service will begin between Syria and the United States with Syria's only passenger airline.

I have great confidence in the constructive attitude and the contribution which President Asad can bring to the difficult negotiations this year. And on behalf of the people of the United States, Mr. President, I would like to propose a toast to the greatness of Syria and to their own great leader, President Asad. My new friend.

No broken glasses? [Laughter.] That's good luck, a good omen.

#### **President Asad**

Once more I have to say that the cordial atmosphere in which we have lived since the

first minute we have met makes us be hopeful in the future. There is no doubt that I have, myself, as well as the members of the Syrian delegation, realized that President Carter is seeking what is good, what is just, and wants the United States to play a constructive role in the solution of the Middle East problem.

After the meeting now, I talked with members of the Syrian delegation in this sense, and we agreed on the same conclusions.

It is a cause of confidence if there were in the world, many leaders who are seeking the good of humanity. And it is our task to work for the good of humanity, once we are convinced that the road on which we go serves justice, serves the good of humanity.

Mr. President, in my name and in the name of members of the Syrian Arab delegation, I thank you for the invitation to dinner and for the kind remarks we have just heard. I am happy we are having this meeting, which has provided the first occasion for personal contact between us and has provided me with the opportunity to know you personally, firsthand, after having become acquainted with you as well as possible through your stance and statements.

We have come to Geneva prompted by the sincere desire to make of this meeting, through our common efforts, a landmark in the history of relations between the Syrian Arab Republic and the United States of America and to realize the main objective of this meeting—that of working assiduously in order to establish a just peace in the Middle East. This objective both you and we have, on several occasions, expressed the wish to see achieved.

You are aware of the extent to which bilateral relations between our two countries have been influenced by the Middle East conflict, passing through low-ebb phases, due to our feeling that the American attitude toward our cause was incompatible with the American responsibilities as we see them. And this, unfortunately, has had an influence on the interests of the Arab and the American missions.

We consider our talks today a joint effort

aimed to remedy the situation that has caused a misstatement from which relations between our two countries have suffered. We hope that this effort will produce results promoting the good of our peoples and serving the cause of the establishment of a just peace in the Middle East.

I believe that you agree with me that the outcome of the phase which we have started today depends on continuing efforts to be exerted after reaching the conviction that peace in the Middle East can be established only on the basis of justice and that the continued occupation of the Arab territories and the denial of the rights of the Palestinian people are completely opposed to justice.

There are those who believe that time, aided by considerations of violence and various forms of coercion, can solve problems of the conflict in accordance with their viewpoints and aspirations, though these may be illegitimate. I have no doubt that they are mistaken and that they act in accordance with a wrong, destructive urge.

I have an unshakable belief that the rights of peoples cannot and should not be obliterated by the passage of time. It is vain that man should build his happiness at the expense of the happiness of others and that he should believe that such happiness could continue while he persists in the destruction of the happiness and existence of others. Of course, events will not happen isolated from the will and efforts of man, but I presume that the will of man is one of good, one of justice and fruitfulness, and that the efforts of man are exerted in order to fulfill his will.

What we, the Arabs, seek with consistency, is to arrive at a just peace on the basis of the resolutions of the United Nations. We believe that the United States, as a big power, as a permanent member of the Security Council and a cochairman of the Geneva conference, can play a major and effective role toward contributing to the achievement of this goal to which all those who sincerely believe in the cause of a just peace aspire.

The U.S. efforts can help fundamentally in making the march to peace obtain its desired objective. What makes us hopeful that the

United States will play its full role in this field is that you, Mr. President, have repeatedly stressed the importance you attach to ethical principles. What is based on these principles and ideals would surely lead to justice and would constitute a sound basis for lasting peace.

Permit me to quote here what I told my people and the world on October 6, 1973—not to record the word, not to remind of the war, but merely to repeat the meaning of what I said that day and to assert that we lived the meaning of these words while we were fighting the war:

We are not lovers of killing and destruction, but we defend ourselves against killing and destruction. We are not aggressors, and have never been. But we have defended and are still defending ourselves against aggression. We do not want anyone to die, but we defend our people against this. We love freedom and want it for ourselves, as well as for others. And we are on the defense so that our people may enjoy freedom.

We are advocates of peace. We endeavor to secure peace to our people and to all peoples of the world. We defend ourselves in order to live in peace.

Mr. President, peace is a noble aim and the precious objective worthy to be served by sincere exertions. Let us exert joint efforts to achieve this objective.

Again, I thank President Carter and I propose a toast to the health of President Carter and to the prosperity of the American people. I want to propose a toast to our first meeting.

*President Carter:* Many more in the future, I hope.

#### **REMARKS TO THE NORTH ATLANTIC COUNCIL, LONDON, MAY 10<sup>9</sup>**

We meet at an important time in the development of the international institutions on which our countries rely.

Here in London last week the leaders of seven nations and of the Commission of the European Communities pledged to join others in strengthening these institutions in the economic field.

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<sup>9</sup> As prepared for delivery (text from Weekly Compilation of Presidential Documents dated May 16).

Today and tomorrow this Council will discuss how to adapt the alliance to meet the military and political challenges of the 1980's.

Taken together, these meetings should give new impetus to relations among our industrial democracies.

At the center of this effort must be strong ties between Europe and North America. In maintaining and strengthening these ties, my Administration will be guided by certain principles. Simply stated:

— We will continue to make the alliance the heart of our foreign policy.

— We will remain a reliable and faithful ally.

— We will join with you to strengthen the alliance—politically, economically, and militarily.

— We will ask for and listen to the advice of our allies. And we will give our views in return, candidly and as friends.

This effort rests on a strong foundation. The state of the alliance is good. Its strategy and doctrine are solid. We derive added strength and new pride from the fact that all 15 of our member countries are now democracies. Our alliance is a pact for peace—and a pact for freedom.

The alliance is even stronger because of solid progress toward Western European unification and the expanding role of the European Community in world affairs. The United States welcomes this development and will work closely with the Community.

### Political

In the aftermath of World War II, the political imperatives were clear: to build the strength of the West and to deter Soviet aggression. Since then East-West relations have become far more complex. Managing them requires patience and skill.

Our approach to East-West relations must be guided both by a humane vision and by a sense of history. Our humane vision leads us to seek broad cooperation with Communist states for the good of mankind. Our sense of history teaches us that we and the Soviet

Union will continue to compete. Yet if we manage this dual relationship properly, we can hope that cooperation will eventually overshadow competition, leading to an increasingly stable relationship between our countries and the Soviet Union.

The United States is now discussing with the Soviet Union ways to control strategic arms. By involving the Soviet Union in a continuing effort to reduce and eventually to eliminate nuclear weapons we hope not only to minimize the risks and costs of continuing arms competition but also to promote broader cooperation between our countries.

The Soviet Union has not yet accepted our proposals. But it has made clear that it wants an agreement. We will persevere in seeking an early and a genuine end to the arms race, through both a freeze on modernization of strategic weapons and substantial reductions in their number. And as we pursue this goal, we will continue to consult with you fully—not only to keep you informed but also to seek your views.

I hope that our countries can also reach agreement with the Soviet Union in limiting and reducing conventional forces. The United States strongly supports the efforts of the alliance to gain an accord on mutual and balanced reduction of forces in Central Europe. That agreement should be based on parity in force levels through overall ceilings for the forces of NATO and the Warsaw Pact. The Soviet Union, by contrast, seeks to preserve the present conventional imbalance and to impose national force ceilings. I hope that these obstacles can be overcome. MBFR [mutual and balanced force reductions] must be a means for achieving mutual security, not for gaining one-sided military advantage.

As we pursue arms control with the Soviet Union and the Warsaw Pact, we should also try to draw the nations of Eastern Europe into cooperative undertakings. Our aim is not to turn this region against the Soviet Union, but to enlarge the opportunities for all European countries to work together in meeting the challenges of modern society.

Next month delegates of 35 countries will

confer in Belgrade to plan for a meeting to review progress since the Helsinki Final Act. The United States shares with you a desire to make this a useful and constructive meeting. We support a careful review of progress by *all* countries in implementing *all* parts of the Final Act. We approach these meetings in a spirit of cooperation, not of confrontation.

America's concern for human rights does not reflect a desire to impose our particular political or social arrangements on any other country. It is, rather, an expression of the most deeply felt values of the American people. We want the world to know where we stand. (We entertain no illusion that the concerns we express and the actions we take will bring rapid changes in the policies of other governments. But neither do we believe that world opinion is without effect.) We will continue to express our beliefs—not only because we must remain true to ourselves but *also* because we are convinced that the building of a better world rests on each nation's clear expression of the values that have given meaning to its national life.

In all these tasks and others facing the alliance, it is vital for us to work together—particularly through close consultation and cooperation with the North Atlantic Council. We do not need new institutions, only to make better use of one that has served us so well. To this end I pledge that the United States will share with the Council our views and intentions about the full range of issues affecting the alliance.

The Council should also examine long-range problems, so as to make this consultation more effective. A special alliance review of East-West relations, undertaken by the Council and drawing in national experts, could serve this end. Such a review might assess future trends in the Soviet Union, in Eastern Europe, and in East-West relations, and analyze the implications of these trends for the alliance. The United States is prepared to make a major contribution to this study, whose conclusions could be considered at the May 1978 NATO meeting.

## Defense

Achieving our political goals depends on a credible defense and deterrent. The United States supports the existing strategy of flexible response and forward defense. We will continue to provide our share of the powerful forces adequate to fulfill this strategy. We will maintain an effective strategic deterrent, we will keep diverse and modern theater nuclear forces in Europe, and we will maintain and improve conventional forces based here.

The threat facing the alliance has grown steadily in recent years. The Soviet Union has achieved essential strategic nuclear equivalence. Its theater nuclear forces have been strengthened. The Warsaw Pact's conventional forces in Europe emphasize an offensive posture. These forces are much stronger than needed for any defense purpose. Since 1965, new ground and air weapons have been introduced in most major categories: self-propelled artillery, mobile tactical missiles, mobile air defense guns, armored personnel carriers, tactical aircraft, and tanks. The pace of the Pact's buildup continues undiminished.

Let me make it clear that our first preference is for early agreement with the Soviet Union on mutual and balanced force reductions. Failing to reach this agreement, our military strength must be maintained.

The collective deterrent strength of our alliance is effective. But it will only remain so if we work to improve it. The United States is prepared to make a major effort to this end—as Vice President Mondale told you in January—in the expectation that our allies will do the same.

There have been real increases in allied defense spending. But difficult economic conditions set practical limits. We need to use limited resources wisely, particularly in strengthening conventional forces. To this end:

— We must combine, coordinate, and concert our national programs more effectively.

— We must find better ways to bring new technology into our armed forces.

— We must give higher priority to increasing the readiness of these forces.

To fulfill these goals, I hope our Defense Ministers, when they meet next week, will begin developing a long-term defense program to strengthen the alliance's deterrence and defense in the 1980's. That program should help us make choices and set priorities. It should emphasize greater alliance cooperation to insure that our combined resources are used most effectively. It should take full advantage of work already done within the alliance.

But plans are not enough. We must insure that our alliance has an adequate means for setting overall goals in defense, for measuring national performance against these goals, and for devising and carrying out joint programs. I propose that our Defense Ministers, working closely with the Secretary General, consider how best to strengthen the alliance's ability actually to fulfill agreed programs.

After an interim report to the December 1977 meeting, I hope the Defense Ministers will submit their program to the spring meeting, which might be held at the summit to review their recommendations. I also hope the defense administrators will agree next week to make high-priority improvements in the capabilities of our forces over the next year.

As we strengthen our forces, we should also improve cooperation in development, production, and procurement of alliance defense equipment. The alliance should not be weakened *militarily* by waste and overlapping. Nor should it be weakened *politically* by disputes over where to buy defense equipment.

In each of our countries, economic and political factors pose serious obstacles. None of our countries, the United States included, has been free from fault. We must make a major effort—to eliminate waste and duplication between national programs; to provide each of our countries an opportunity to develop, produce, and sell competitive defense equipment; and to maintain technological excellence in all allied combat forces.

To reach these goals our countries will need to do three things:

*First*, the United States must be willing to promote a genuinely two-way transatlantic trade in defense equipment. My Administration's decisions about the development, production, and procurement of defense equipment will be taken with careful attention to the interests of all members of the alliance. I have instructed the Secretary of Defense to seek increased opportunities to buy European defense equipment where this would mean more efficient use of allied resources. I will work with the Congress of the United States to this end.

*Second*, I hope the European allies will continue to increase cooperation among themselves in defense production. I welcome the initiative taken by several of your countries in the European Program Group. A common European defense production effort would help to achieve economies of scale beyond the reach of national programs. A strengthened defense production base in Europe would enlarge the opportunities for two-way transatlantic traffic in defense equipment while adding to the overall capabilities of the alliance.

*Third*, I hope that European and the North American members of the alliance will join in exploring ways to improve cooperation in the development, production, and procurement of defense equipment. This joint examination could involve the European Program Group as it gathers strength and cohesion. Some issues could be discussed in the North Atlantic Council. Whatever the forum, the United States is ready to participate in the way and at the pace that our allies wish. We are eager to join with you in trying to identify opportunities for joint development of new equipment and for increasing licensing or direct purchase of equipment that has already been developed. Together, we should look for ways to standardize our equipment and make sure it can be used by all allied forces. We should see if ways can be found to introduce into our discussions a voice that would speak for the common interests of the



alliance in offering advice about cooperation in defense equipment.

## Conclusion

To conclude: It is not enough for us to share common purposes; we must also strengthen the institutions that fulfill those purposes. We are met today to renew our dedication to one of the most important of those institutions and to plan for actions that will help it to meet new challenges. Some of these actions can be taken in the near future. Others can be developed for review at our meeting next year at this time. I would be glad to offer Washington as the site of that meeting.

The French writer and aviator, Saint-Exupéry, wrote that "the noblest task of mankind is to unite mankind." In that spirit, I am confident that we will succeed.

## TEXT OF NATO COMMUNIQUE, MAY 11<sup>10</sup>

The North Atlantic Council met in London on 10th and 11th May, 1977 with the participation of heads of State and Government.

The essential purpose of the Alliance is to safeguard the independence and security of its members, enabling them to promote the values of democracy and respect for human rights, individual freedom, justice and social progress, and to make possible the creation of a lasting state of peace. The Allies are firmly resolved to maintain and enhance the effectiveness of the Alliance and the ties which unit them.

Although there have been some improvements in East-West relations in recent years, elements of instability and uncertainty persist. Of particular concern is the continuing growth in the strength of offensive capabilities of the Armed Forces of the Warsaw Pact countries. In these circumstances, the Allies emphasize the need for the Alliance to maintain at an adequate level the forces required for the common defense and for deterrence. They are resolved to strengthen their mutual support efforts and cooperation.

The Allies are determined to cooperate closely in all aspects of defense production. Their aims are to achieve the most effective use of available resources and to preserve and promote the strong industrial and technological capability which is essential for the defense of the Alliance and to develop a more balanced

relationship between European and North American members of the Alliance in the procurement of defense equipment. The means of deepening this cooperation should be reviewed in appropriate fora.

Leaders of states taking part in the integrated defense structure of the Alliance requested their Defense Ministers to initiate and develop a long-term program to enable NATO forces to meet the changing defense needs of the 1980s and to review the manner in which the Alliance implements its defense programs to ensure more effective follow-through.

At the same time, the Allies reaffirm their conviction that security in Europe and in the world, without which detente could not produce its beneficial effects, cannot be achieved by statements of intent, but requires concrete efforts to reduce the level of armaments through realistic measures of disarmament and arms control. They will continue to move towards this goal in a manner consistent with Allied security, while recognizing that progress also depends on a constructive attitude on the part of the Soviet Union and East European states.

The Allies warmly welcome the efforts of the United States to negotiate with the Soviet Union an agreement to limit and reduce strategic arms which takes into account Allied interests.

With respect to MBFR (mutual and balanced force reductions), the participating Allies emphasize the importance they attach to these negotiations, the goal of which is to contribute to a more stable relationship and to the strengthening of peace and security in Europe. They call for a positive response to the additional offer they made to the Warsaw Pact countries in December 1975, and reaffirm their overall objective of establishing approximate parity in ground forces in the form of a common collective ceiling for ground force manpower and the reduction of the disparity in tanks, which would ensure undiminished security at a lower level of forces.

The collective security ensured by the Alliance, in addition to enhancing global stability, provides the strength and confidence that enable the member countries to persevere in their efforts to lessen the tensions between East and West and to increase progressively the areas of cooperation. In this connection the Allied leaders requested the Council in permanent session to make a fresh study of long-term trends in East-West relations and to assess their implications for the Alliance. Improvement in East-West relations will depend on the extent to which all concerned show moderation and self-restraint both in Europe and in other parts of the world. With regard to Berlin and Germany as a whole, the other allies fully associated themselves with the views expressed by the heads of States and the Governments of the United States, the United Kingdom, France and the Federal Republic of Germany in their statement of 9th May, 1977, and noted in particular that the strict observance and full implementation of the Quadripartite Agreement of 3rd September, 1971 are essential to the

<sup>10</sup> Issued at London at the conclusion of the meeting (text from press release 212 dated May 13).

strengthening the detente, the maintenance of security and the development of cooperation throughout Europe.

The Allies stress the great importance they attach to the implementation by the CSCE [Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe] signatory states of all the provisions of the Helsinki Final Act. There has been limited progress in certain fields. While welcoming this, the Allies emphasize that much still remains to be done if the potential of the Final Act is to be realized both in terms of inter-state relations and in the lives of the inhabitants of all the countries concerned. The forthcoming Belgrade meeting will provide a useful opportunity for a thorough review of the implementation of the Final Act, and for an exchange of views on ways of developing the process of detente in the future. At that meeting the Allies will work for a constructive outcome which will promote better relations between the participating States and be beneficial to all their peoples.

The Allies recognize as wholly legitimate the aspirations of people throughout the world to human rights and fundamental freedoms. They are convinced that respect for these rights and freedoms, in accordance with the commitments accepted by governments in the Charter of the United Nations and in other international documents including the Helsinki Final Act, is essential for peace, friendship and cooperation among nations.

The Allied leaders reaffirm their support for an equitable world system in which all countries, developing as well as developed, will see their best interests served and which can sustain the economic progress of all. They intend to mobilize their efforts towards the attainment of that objective, in the appropriate fora. They invite the Warsaw Pact countries to do the same.

Recognizing the vitality and vigor shown by the Alliance over the years, the Allied leaders reaffirm their determination to maintain and strengthen their close association and cohesion within the framework of the North Atlantic Treaty. On that firm foundation they will persevere in the task of building a more just and peaceful world.

## REMARKS TO NEWS CORRESPONDENTS, LONDON, MAY 10

Weekly Compilation of Presidential Documents dated May 16

*Q. Mr. President, could you sum up the results of this visit here?*

*The President:* The whole visit?

Well, it's been very productive for me. I had a chance to meet with more than a dozen heads of state, many of whom I had not known before, and I learned from each conversation about their own particular

country's needs and opportunities. So I was a good student.

I think I've been extremely impressed with the genuine outpouring of friendship and affection by the British people toward our own country.

And this has been very stimulating to me. I've had a renewed confidence in the strength of the Western democratic societies, and I believe that this confidence is increased among other leaders who have attended these meetings.

We have some countries that are temporarily inconvenienced economically, but there's an innate strength in the people who live in freedom that I think will tide us through very well. We have enormous natural resources in our country—and many others—that give us a base on which to correct the problems and to deal with challenges.

I think as far as the NATO meeting was concerned, most of the nations were relieved to know that the reluctance on the part of the United States three or four years ago to participate fully in NATO is now past, that we are a full partner, that our financial commitment to conventional forces in NATO are stronger than they were before. And I think that if they will carry out the suggestions that I made this morning—and they were adopted unanimously—to do an analysis of NATO for the 1980's, to do a complete analysis of the relationship between the Western democratic societies and the Eastern Communist societies, and also to share the benefits of NATO as far as the purchase of equipment and so forth is concerned—these, of course, will be made back in Washington next year for the next NATO summit meeting.

So I think in every way my meetings here in England have been productive.

This was supplemented by a brief trip to Geneva, where I met with President Asad from Syria. I believe we—I feel better about the prospect for some progress in the Middle East than I ever have before. King Hussein and President Sadat and President Asad have all been very constructive in their conversations with me, and I look for-

ward to meeting the new leader of Israel after the elections are held in a few days. I'll be meeting with Prince Fahd in Washington later on this month.

So it's been a good trip, but I am ready to go home.

*Q. Mr. President, what kind of experience was this for you personally?*

*The President:* It was one of learning. I've got a new appreciation for the strength and influence of the United States as observed from the viewpoint of other nations. And this is a sobering thing but also a very gratifying thing. I think there's a much greater depth of friendship toward our nation than I had anticipated. And I think that my own presence here, and the fact that the United States has now come through the ordeal of Watergate and Vietnam, adds a renewed confidence to the people in Western Europe.

So it's been a gratifying thing for me, and I believe the personal friendships that I've formed with the leaders of more than a dozen nations will stand our country in good stead in the months ahead, as we have slight differences between us.

I think it'll be easy to have a quick communication to resolve those differences rather than to have it deteriorate into a serious circumstance.

So I think it has been a good trip for me personally.

*Q. Do you expect further moderation on the part of the Arab countries, based upon your conversations with President Asad yesterday?*

*The President:* I have been very encouraged by the moderate attitude of the Arab leaders.

*Q. Mr. President, how do you assess your own performance? When you came over here, you had some reservations about your ability to compete with these former Finance Ministers.*

*The President:* Well, I didn't find the competition to be there. There was a ready acceptance of me. And I have a good ability to listen when I'm in a learning situation.

I think there was an eagerness on their part to teach. I don't think there was any feeling of superiority or inferiority. There was no inclination to dominate. I think everyone who participated would agree with that.

So I feel good about the encounters that we had, because they were all constructive. There was not a negative result that I can remember in the long series of interrelationships among the nations' leaders.

*Q. Did the NATO meeting this morning produce any greater agreement to work together that will help in the SALT talks [Strategic Arms Limitation Talks] for instance? Will there be a thaw-out in the Soviet Union?*

*The President:* I think these meetings will be constructive, even toward the SALT talks—not particularly the NATO meeting, but that would be included.

For instance, General Secretary Brezhnev will be visiting France next month, and I think for President Giscard d'Estaing to know my position and know the good will that we have toward the Soviets, and to express that as a third party, will be constructive. And I think this next year, as we analyze in some depth with specialists the basic compatibilities between the East and the West and the basic reasons for differences between the East and West, this will provide, I think, some foundation on which to correct those differences.

All of us want to have peace, and all of us want to have a substantial progress in reducing dependence upon the nuclear weapons. All of us want to have progress made on the mutual and balanced force reductions with conventional arms. All of us want to open up a sharing of aid to the developing countries and include the Soviets and other Eastern countries in it.

So I think there was a very constructive development here toward the East-West relationships in all the forms.

*Q. In the beginning there was some talk that there was friction or at least a certain amount of uneasiness that existed between*

*you and Chancellor Schmidt. Did you find that to be the case, sir?*

*The President:* No. We have had differences of opinion about several important issues. They were just coincidental. There was nothing there personal. But I think that after our own private conversations and in the general discussions, we've reached, so far as I know, a resolution of all those differences.

I have a very good personal friendship with Chancellor Schmidt. He represents a nation that's vigorous and strong economically, and I think that the only remaining difference that I can think of is the sale of the nuclear reprocessing plant by the Federal Republic of Germany to Brazil. And

we've initiated a study which may or may not resolve that problem. But even if it doesn't, I'm determined to see very tight and stringent international safeguards concerning nuclear wastes, and if I am successful along with others in that endeavor, then I think any reprocessing plant anywhere in the world could handle nuclear wastes without danger of it developing into explosives.

So I think there is nothing that's important that divides me and Helmut Schmidt.

*Q. Are you going to France?*

*The President:* I have not accepted. He invited me, and I told him I'd try to come. But I have not accepted for sure.

*Q. They say you're coming.*

## President Carter's News Conference of May 12

*Following are excerpts relating to foreign policy from the transcript of a news conference held by President Carter on May 12.<sup>1</sup>*

I have a very brief statement to make—to begin with, just an overview of what I consider to be the results of our trip to Europe, and then I will be glad to answer whatever questions you might have.

This was the first trip I've taken outside of our country since I became President. It was a very full few days. I tried to be well prepared. And I think that I can report substantial success, not particularly because of my own participation, but because there was, I believe, a renewed spirit of hope and confidence engendered among all of us who participated as we look to the future in our ideological competition with the Eastern Communist and Socialist countries, compared to our own in the Western democracies, now including Japan.

I think there is a sense, a quiet sense that we have justified reasons for that confidence, although we sometimes suffer a temporary discomfiture in unemployment, inflation, and a sense that the Soviets perhaps are increasing their military strength.

I think there is now a much clearer picture that we are able to compete and that that competition must be conducted under peaceful circumstances.

There is a difference. We have strong systems of government. For the first time since NATO was begun many years ago, all the participating countries are democracies.

We are very proud of the new emergence of Spain and Portugal with the democratic system of government. And I think there is a sense to conclude that in a test of will, of confidence, of cooperation, that when men and women in our societies are free, when we can make our own decisions, choose our own governments, that gives us an inherent advantage.

There was a closeness among us when we

<sup>1</sup>For the complete transcript, see Weekly Compilation of Presidential Documents dated May 16, 1977, p. 705.

adjourned that I thought was very encouraging, a better understanding.

I personally had private conversations with the leaders of 16 or 17 different countries. I tried to study, ahead of time, what their special problems were and what their opportunities were for increased friendship with us. And I think we were successful.

We recommitted our commitment to NATO. We called on a reanalysis of what NATO will be during the 1980's, a new study of East-West relationships, and a better way to save money and to make a NATO commitment more effective with standardization of weapons.

While there, I took a quick trip to Geneva to meet President Asad of Syria—a continuing process in my own life as President—to study the special attitudes toward a possible alleviation of the Middle Eastern dispute this year. And hopefully, after the Israeli elections this month, we can have the new leader of the Israeli Government come back to meet with me, as Prime Minister Rabin did earlier this year.

So, these are the things that we attempted. I think our successes were well publicized, but it was a joint success and I believe that we understand each other better. There's a renewed strength and commitment in the democratic societies who are our friends and allies.

Ms. Thomas [Helen Thomas, UPI].

*Q. Mr. President, do you think that Israel should accept the Palestinian homeland if the Palestinians or PLO [Palestine Liberation Organization] accept the fact of Israel? And also, as a result of your talks today, are you persuaded that we should share arms technology and coproduction with Israel?*

*The President:* The answer to both those questions is yes. I don't think that there can be any reasonable hope for a settlement of the Middle Eastern question, which has been extant now on a continuing basis now for more than 29 years, without a homeland for the Palestinians. The exact definition of what that homeland might be, the degree of independence of the Palestinian entity, its relationship with Jordan, or perhaps Syria

and others, the geographical boundaries of it, all have to be worked out by the parties involved. But for the Palestinians to have a homeland and for the refugee question to be resolved, is obviously of crucial importance.

We have a special relationship with Israel. It's absolutely crucial that no one in our country or around the world ever doubt that our number one commitment in the Middle East is to protect the right of Israel to exist, to exist permanently, and to exist in peace. It's a special relationship.

Although I've met with the leaders of Egypt, Syria, Jordan, and had long hours of discussion, I never found any of those Arab leaders who objected to that special commitment of ours to the protection of the integrity of Israel.

And obviously, part of that is to make sure that Israel has adequate means to protect themselves without military involvement of the United States. I have no objection about this arrangement. I'm proud of it. And it will be permanent as long as I'm in office.

*Q. May I get back briefly to Helen's question? It seemed to us, traveling with you, that you and the people in your party were a bit more upbeat on the question of the Middle East this week than perhaps a couple weeks ago after the Hussein visit. I just wonder, do you have indications now that the Palestinians are ready to recognize the right of Israel to exist? And also, do you have—in reference to the question Helen brought up—do you have some indication that Israel is ready to recognize the need for a Palestinian homeland?*

*The President:* We have had no contact with the Palestinians, with the PLO. But I have concluded meetings with the Prime Minister of Israel, the President of Egypt, the President of Syria, and the King of Jordan. At the conclusion of this series of meetings, I feel better than I did before. At the end of the Hussein meeting, my own hopes were improved.

I don't want to mislead anyone. The chances for Middle Eastern peace are still very much in doubt. We have a long way to

go. But I do believe that there's a chance that the Palestinians might make moves to recognize the right of Israel to exist. And if so, this would remove one of the major obstacles toward further progress.

Our government, before I became President, promised the Israeli Government that we would not recognize the PLO by direct conversations or negotiations, as long as the PLO continued to espouse the commitment that Israel had to be destroyed.

I would like to see this resolved. There's a chance that it will be done. We are trying to add our efforts to bring this about. But I have no assurance that it will be accomplished.

*Q. Mr. President, one of your predecessors is going on television tonight to discuss his foreign policy, Mr. Nixon, and I suspect he'll talk a great deal about China.*

*Inasmuch as it's been five years since the Shanghai communique was signed, I was wondering if you have a target date within your Administration for full diplomatic recognition of the People's Republic of China? Do you have a target date? Will it come within your first Administration, and if you don't have a target date, what's the problem?*

*The President:* Well, it's very difficult for me to set a target date, because this is a two-way negotiation. We have commenced discussions with the Chinese Government to resolve the first obstacle, and that is the claims settlement.

Long years ago, we had roughly \$190 million worth of American property and other goods confiscated by the Mao Tse-tung government. We in our country confiscated in return about \$80 million, I believe, primarily in Chinese bank deposits. We've never been able to work out those differing claims. That would be the first step.

We have espoused and I have renewed my commitment to the Shanghai communique, which says that there's just one China. We didn't say which one, and I think that we have moved [laughter]—and neither did anyone else—we have moved, I think, to

strengthen our ties with the People's Republic of China.

I have met personally with Ambassador Huang [Huang Chen, Chief of the P.R.C. Liaison Office in Washington]. Cy Vance has met several times with him. We've sent a delegation of Congress Members over there, along with my own son, as a demonstration or gesture of friendship. They were well received. We have chosen one of the good friends of mine and a great leader, Leonard Woodcock, who we expect to be the next Ambassador to the People's Republic of China, and I would like to see progress made toward normalization of relationships.

The one obstacle, major obstacle, obviously, is the relationship we've always had with Taiwan. We don't want to see the Taiwanese people punished or attacked. And if we can resolve the major difficulty, I would move expeditiously to normalizing relationships with China. But I can't put a time limit on it.

*Q. Mr. President, your trip to Europe was judged to be a great success. We know that you've been invited to Paris in the fall by President d'Estaing. When will you be going back to Europe, or to any other foreign country?*

*The President:* I've not decided definitely to go to France. President Valéry Giscard d'Estaing did invite me to come, and if the Congress is able to get through with its work as presently scheduled, sometime in October, then that would make it possible for me perhaps to take another trip at the end of this year. But I have not decided to do that yet.

I don't know what the prospects of the trip would be. I don't know what the itinerary would be, and it's still very much in doubt.

*Q. Mr. President, about a month ago you got recommendations on your desk for a new weapons sales policy for overseas, and Secretary Vance has explained that to some members of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee. Did you explain that policy to the other leaders in London that you met*

*with, and will Israel get any kind of special treatment? Will there be a class of countries that get special treatment?*

*The President:* I did explain it to the other leaders in London—to some of the other leaders, not all of them, because I met with so many. And the second answer is that Israel will get special treatment. We have a certain small group of nations who, because of longstanding historical commitments of Presidents, Congress, and the American people, do have a special relationship with our government.

In coproduction—that's when we share responsibilities for the production of a certain weapons system or the sale of the advanced weapons systems—Israel is one of those countries.

[After the news conference President Carter answered questions from members of the press on an informal basis. Following is an excerpt from the transcript.]

*Q. Mr. President, would you please comment about your meeting with Prime Minister Demirel? Did you find any solutions in achieving some proposal to the strained Turkish-American relations in the last few years?*

*The President:* I don't have time to get into that subject deeply. But I can say this: Both Demirel and Caramanlis, with whom I met the same morning, expressed their complete commitment to seek and to find a peaceful solution of the differences between them and the Aegean Sea.

When I left those meetings at the American Embassy residence and arrived for the NATO conference, I found Prime Minister Demirel and Prime Minister Caramanlis talking to each other with their hand on one another's shoulder, as though they were trying to resolve their differences. So, although Turkey has been very disappointed at our inability to have passed in the Congress the mutual defense agreement, I do believe that they appreciated the increase in the authorization for military sales by \$50 million. And I think I let Mr. Demirel and also Caraman-

lis understand that to the American public, a resolution of the Cyprus question is of supreme importance to us and interest to us.

They feel that the Aegean Sea is the more important of the two questions, because of the actual threat to peace, the fact that war might begin. But I was pleased.

*Q. Mr. President, is there any chance to have the PLO office in Washington?*

*The President:* I don't know.

## **Secretary Vance Meets at London With Israeli Foreign Minister**

*Following are remarks with the press by Secretary Vance and Israeli Foreign Minister Yigal Allon following a luncheon meeting at London on May 11.*

Press release 205 dated May 12

*Secretary Vance:* I have just finished a discussion with my old friend Foreign Minister Allon, who is one of the distinguished leaders not only of his own country but in the Middle East. This is part of our continuing conversations relating to our search for a just and lasting peace in the Middle East. We reviewed our discussions with other parties which we have had since the Foreign Minister and I met last time, and I shall be going back in the future to the area after we have completed all of our discussions with the Arab foreign leaders.

I would like to note that I have seen some speculation in some of the papers to the effect that the United States might impose a settlement on the parties. We have made it very clear from the outset that no such thing is intended in any way. We have said, both the President and I, on many occasions that if there is to be a just and lasting peace in the Middle East, then it must be determined by the parties in negotiations among themselves. We will help to facilitate that process and will work with the parties to that end.

I have also noticed some speculation in the newspapers to the effect that the possibility exists that in our arms transfer policy, which

we have been working on and which will be announced in the future, that this may in some way harm Israel. That is not the case. We have made it very clear that we have a special relationship with Israel. We are committed to the security of Israel; and as we have in the past, we will in the future make sure that Israel has the defense articles necessary to preserve that security, including the advanced technology which will be required. I want to make this very, very clear.

*Q. Mr. Secretary, the reports have not spoken of any attempt by the United States to impose a solution but, rather, to set the process of negotiation going in such a way that some concessions will be likely made by Israel or the other parties before the actual face-to-face negotiations begin. Is there any actual process of give-and-take going forward? For example, is there a proposal for Israel to recognize—for the PLO [Palestine Liberation Organization] to recognize the State of Israel in exchange for Israel recognizing a Palestinian state?*

*Secretary Vance:* There have been no specific proposals made by either side at this time. As I have indicated earlier, we are in the process of getting the general views of the parties. I would hope that at a later date there will be specific proposals from all of the parties which we will then discuss initially among them and at that time we may have some suggestions of our own.

*Q. What did you mean by that term "homeland for Palestinians"—or the President when defining that term?*

*Secretary Vance:* The President indicated at that time that it meant just what it said and that the actual definition of that would have to be made by the parties in their negotiations.

*Q. Mr. Secretary, what do you mean by "special relationship"?*

*Secretary Vance:* We were at the very outset of Israel's birth one of those that helped to bring it into being. We have been very close to Israel. We share the same values, we share the same hopes and aspirations, and we have been the closest of friends

through all of these years and will in the future as well.

*Q. Could we ask Mr. Allon—do you feel there is any danger of Israel becoming diplomatically isolated by this process that is now going forward?*

*Foreign Minister Allon:* Well, I see no reason for being isolated, because for the time being Israel is the only party to the Middle Eastern conflict which made it public that she is ready to offer territorial compromises in return for a lasting peace agreement. Our position is being explained to our friends all over the world, and as far as we are concerned, the Geneva peace conference could have been reconvened long ago. So we are in a good position vis-a-vis our friends.

*Q. Mr. Allon, do you feel that the new American Administration has a new attitude toward the Middle East, and if so, how do you like it compared to the Ford-Kissinger attitude?*

*Foreign Minister Allon:* If you listen carefully to what Secretary Cyrus Vance has said just now about a "special relationship," about the role that America is playing the [inaudible] of peacemaking in the Middle East, I think it is a very positive definition of America's role and we are very [inaudible].

*Q. Mr. Allon, what is your view about the American plan as Secretary Vance has enunciated? Do you think it is a good idea?*

*Foreign Minister Allon:* Well, I have been given to understand that the United States is not intending to come out with a plan of its own, that the agreement should be reached by the parties concerned and the United States will facilitate with its good offices the parties to the conflict in such a way that the hope for peace will be implemented and realized.

*Q. Does that mean that the Administration is not going to put out any ideas, at least publicly, how the situation [inaudible]?*

*Secretary Vance:* As I have indicated previously, we have suggestions to make. We will make the suggestions to the parties.

*Q. Would you agree with the definition of*



*Mr. Carter, President Carter, that moderate leaders are ruling now, are in power now, over the Arab countries?*

*Foreign Minister Allon:* Well, there is only one way to express moderation—that is by proposing moderate policies and solutions—and I do hope that Arab leaders in the Middle East become more realistic as a result of the developments in the Middle East of the last years. Since President Carter had the chance to meet with each and every one of the Arab leaders and I didn't yet, he is in a better position to judge. Nevertheless, I am very anxious to give them a chance to demonstrate their moderation around the conference table as soon as possible.

*Q. Mr. Vance, could I ask you to clarify your earlier statement about the arms sales question?*

*Secretary Vance:* I thought it was clear.

*Q. Are you meaning to say, then, that Israel will be given the same priority in our arms transfers as the NATO countries are now?*

*Foreign Minister Allon:* Do you think it is enough? [Laughter.]

*Secretary Vance:* I think I made it very clear that they will receive and have from us whatever is required for their security, I said, including advanced technology.

*Q. Could you repeat that?*

*Secretary Vance:* I said that I thought I had made it very clear that we will make available to Israel whatever is needed for their security, including advanced technology.

## **U.S. To Join United Kingdom in Consultative Group on Rhodesia**

*U.S.-U.K. Joint Statement*<sup>1</sup>

The U.S. Secretary of State, Mr. Cyrus Vance, and the British Foreign and Commonwealth Secretary, Dr. David Owen, have considered the problem of Rhodesia in the light of the latter's trip to Africa. Both governments wish to reiterate their common determination to work for the independence of Rhodesia under majority rule in 1978. They have been encouraged by their contacts so far to believe that detailed consultations about an independence constitution and the necessary transitional arrangements could be a satisfactory way to achieve this. They have, therefore, agreed that Britain and the United States should now enter into a phase of intensive consultations with the parties. For this purpose, the British Government has decided to establish a consultative group to make contact with the parties which will visit the area as necessary, including Salisbury. It will be headed by Mr. J. A. N. Graham, Deputy Under Secretary at the Foreign and Commonwealth Office. Mr. Vance has agreed to appoint a senior United States official to work with the head of the British consultative group.<sup>2</sup>

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<sup>1</sup> Issued by the Department of State on May 11; also issued at London that day.

<sup>2</sup> The Department announced on May 14 (press release 214) that Secretary Vance has named Stephen Low, Ambassador to Zambia, as the U.S. official assigned to the special consultative group on Rhodesia.

## Secretary Vance Attends Spanish-U.S. Council Meeting at Madrid and CENTO Council of Ministers Meeting at Tehran

*Secretary Vance visited Madrid (May 11-12), where he met with King Juan Carlos, Prime Minister Adolfo Suárez González, and Foreign Minister Marcelino Oreja Aguirre and attended the first regular session of the Spanish-U.S. Council. He then went to Tehran (May 12-15), where he met with His Imperial Majesty Mohammad Reza Shah Pahlavi and headed the U.S. observer delegation to the meeting of the Council of Ministers of the Central Treaty Organization (CENTO).*

*Following are transcripts of remarks and statements made during the trip, together with the texts of the Spanish-U.S. Council communique and the CENTO communique.<sup>1</sup>*

### ARRIVAL, MADRID, MAY 11

Press release 206 dated May 12

Mr. Minister, let me say how pleased I am to be here in Madrid and to have the opportunity to meet with you again and to carry on the conversations which we started in Washington, along with the Prime Minister, a short while ago.

We are very, very pleased to have the opportunity to meet in this meeting of the U.S.-Spanish Council. We consider this to be of very high importance to us and to the relationships between our two countries. I look forward to discussing tomorrow at the meeting matters relating to defense, economics, cultural affairs, science and technology, and other matters which will strengthen our mutual interests.

Let me also say that we have the greatest admiration for the actions which have been taken under the leadership of the King to

<sup>1</sup> Other press releases related to Secretary Vance's trip are Nos. 211 dated May 13 and 216 dated May 15.

strengthen the institutions of democracy. And it will be a privilege and a great pleasure for me to meet tomorrow with the King and the Prime Minister and the Foreign Minister, and I look forward to enjoying the gracious hospitality of this lovely city and of your great country.

### DEPARTURE, MADRID, MAY 12

Press release 210 dated May 13

*Secretary Vance:* First, let me say how much I appreciate the very gracious hospitality which I and my colleagues have received in our far too short visit to Madrid. I want especially to thank the Foreign Minister for his many, many kindnesses to us and for the very instructive and useful discussions which we have had.

I am very honored to have had the opportunity to meet with His Majesty the King and with the Prime Minister this morning in discussion which covered both bilateral and international matters.

I also appreciated the opportunity to participate in the first meeting of the Spanish-U.S. Council. We had a good first meeting, and I look forward to the work of the Council in the future and to the strengthening of the ties between our two nations.

I see I have a first question here, and the first question is: What is my opinion of the meetings that I participated in? The meetings were excellent. I found them very instructive, as I have indicated. They were friendly, warm, and I learned a lot in the process.

*Q. Mr. Secretary, did you agree on any steps to improve military cooperation between the United States and Spain, and did you discuss—or General [George] Brown—discuss*

*the question of the American tanker fleets and the possibility of expanding it from the number limited by the treaty?*

*Secretary Vance:* Let me say first, I do not know whether General Brown discussed that question during his visit here. In the military field these were preliminary discussions and primarily on setting up a framework for consultation in the future between our two countries.

*Q. What sort of framework did you set up, sir?*

*Secretary Vance:* Well, we have a subcommittee of the Council which will be devoting itself specifically to that end.

*Q. Can you tell us when the joint staff will be set up between the United States?*

*Secretary Vance:* Mr. Foreign Minister, do you want to comment on that?

*Foreign Minister Oreja (in translation):* Concerning the setting up and launching of a combined U.S.-Spanish military staff, we were awaiting the establishment of headquarters. I may now state that an agreement has been reached upon the location of the Council's headquarters, and within a period of no longer than 40 days, this combined U.S.-Spanish military staff will hold its first meeting.

The remaining committees have already met. They have debated and have reached agreements, and the results of their meetings have been reviewed this morning in the U.S.-Spanish Council—the first further to its inauguration last October 1.

*Q. Where are the headquarters?*

*Foreign Minister Oreja:* Well, the headquarters have been agreed upon, but it would appear that the question of the rent has yet to be settled formally, and for this reason I hesitate to name the street and the number exactly, although I can tell you that the Secretary of State and I have passed by the future headquarters. And to both of us it was a source of great satisfaction, since we consider that it adequately fulfills all the conditions.

*Q. Mr. Secretary, the talk with Prime Minister Suárez lasted somewhat longer than*

*expected. Any particular reason for that?*

*Secretary Vance:* No, we had a very interesting conversation which covered a lot of different matters. I spoke with the Prime Minister about the recent meetings which I have been attending in London, both the summit of the seven and the NATO meeting, and our discussion on that took quite a deal of time. We then discussed a number of other international issues and our bilateral issues as well, and the net of it was that it took a long while.

## SPANISH-U.S. COUNCIL COMMUNIQUE

JOINT COMMUNIQUE OF THE SPANISH-U.S. COUNCIL  
MAY 12, 1977

The Spanish-United States Council, which was established by the Treaty of Friendship and Cooperation and inaugurated formally on October 1, 1976, held its first regular session at Ministerial level at the Viana Palace in Madrid on May 12, 1977.

The meeting was held under the joint chairmanship of Foreign Minister Marcelino Oreja Aguirre and Secretary of State Cyrus R. Vance. Also participating were the Permanent Military Representatives on the Council, Admiral Carlos Buhigas Garcia, Acting President of the Junta of Chiefs of Staff of Spain, and General George Brown, Chairman of the United States Joint Chiefs of Staff, as well as the Deputy Co-Chairman, Undersecretary of Foreign Affairs Miguel Solano, and United States Ambassador to Spain, Wells Stabler. Also in attendance were the Ambassador of Spain in Washington, the Director General for North American Affairs, the Spanish Co-Chairmen of the Joint Committees of the Council and the Co-Directors of the Combined Military Coordination and Planning Staff, as well as appropriate United States representatives on the committees.

The council reviewed during this first semiannual meeting the accomplishments of the first 7 months of the life of the Treaty of Friendship and Cooperation, in particular the progress made in each of its five joint committees.

The Council considered the preparations for establishment in Madrid of the Combined Military Coordination and Planning Staff and requested the Joint Military Committee to fix a date to place this staff in operation, with a view to submitting to the Council for its approval at its next meeting a program for carrying out the responsibilities of this important body.

In this same vein, the Council received a preliminary report from its Ad Hoc Committee on Coordination with NATO.

The Council also reiterated the objective of the two countries to contribute through their cooperation to closer ties in the European and Atlantic area.

In their review of the world situation, the Co-Chairmen exchanged views on recent developments in various parts of the world, principally in Europe. The Secretary of State reported on the recent meetings in London of Heads of Government and of the North Atlantic Council.

Prior to the meeting of the Council, there was also a meeting of the Joint Military Committee.

The next semiannual meeting of the Council at Ministerial level will be determined by agreement of the Co-Chairmen.

## NEWS CONFERENCE, TEHRAN, MAY 13

Press release 213 dated May 14

*Secretary Vance:* First let me apologize for being late. Our meeting lasted considerably longer than I had anticipated.

We had a very broad-ranging discussion which was extremely useful. We covered many subjects including such subjects as the economic situation, the steps which were being planned as a result of the seven-nation summit to stimulate the world's economy, the economic problems arising out of the energy concerns and issues. We discussed the situation in the region and the problems of the region. We discussed Africa and a number of bilateral matters between our two countries.

So I will now take any questions you may have.

*Q. Did you invite the Shah to come to the United States, or did you carry an invitation for him to come to the United States?*

*Secretary Vance:* Yes, I did.

*Q. When will that be?*

*Secretary Vance:* I'll leave that up to him and the President to announce.

*Q. But this year?*

*Secretary Vance:* This year.

*Q. The second part of the year?*

*Secretary Vance:* I'll leave that up to them.

*Q. When it comes to Pakistan, are the allegations that Mr. Bhutto makes about American payments to opposition members there true? Is this an accurate statement?*

*Secretary Vance:* They are false.

*Q. And are you meeting with Mr. Bhutto to discuss this?*

*Secretary Vance:* No. I am not meeting with Mr. Bhutto to discuss this. I am not able to go to Pakistan because of my schedule. He is unable to leave his country at this time. I had hoped that the Foreign Minister of Pakistan would be attending the CENTO meeting tomorrow at which time we might be able to discuss these matters. Unfortunately, he will not be coming to that meeting.

*Q. Do you think this is a direct snub to the United States?*

*Secretary Vance:* I'm not going to characterize it.

*Q. Mr. Secretary, I have a question with regard to CENTO. The relations of Iran with other allies have been very good. But with respect to relations between Great Britain and Turkey, and between Pakistan and the United States, what would be your comments at this time about the CENTO situation? Would CENTO continue to exist as a real treaty at this point?*

*Secretary Vance:* Yes, in my judgment it will. The organization has over the years performed a very valuable function. The relationships between the CENTO members are of great importance. They are important not only to each other, but bilaterally among the CENTO members. And I see no reason why CENTO should not continue, because I think it performs a useful function.

*Q. What sort of progress has Mr. Warnke [Paul C. Warnke, Director, Arms Control and Disarmament Agency] been making in Geneva to enable you to further your SALT [Strategic Arms Limitation Talks] negotiations there, when you arrive on the 18th?*

*Secretary Vance:* I have not yet received a report from Mr. Warnke. I hoped maybe there would be one in the cables tonight. I do plan to meet with Mr. Warnke when I go back through Geneva on Sunday. He will be meeting me at the airport, and I will have an hour with him between the change of planes—I will be taking a plane back from Geneva to the United States. And we will have a chance to discuss with each other what has been happening in his discussions with the Soviets. And I will be able to communicate to him fur-

ther guidance in connection with his activities and with the upcoming discussions which will be taking place between myself and Mr. Gromyko and Mr. Warnke, which will start Wednesday and Thursday of next week.

*Q. Mr. Secretary, Mr. Warnke indicated that the next stage of negotiations seemed to be pointing toward a synthesis—that's what he described it as—of the two American proposals and the Russian proposal. Is that indeed the objective?*

*Secretary Vance:* I think it is possible that out of the discussions one might find a bridging of the differences between them and a form of synthesis. Whether in fact this will occur, I, of course, can't predict at this time. It will depend upon discussions which we will have with the Soviets when we sit down at the table in Geneva. But that is a possibility.

*Q. You're talking about a bridging between the Soviets and the Americans?*

*Secretary Vance:* Of the three proposals.

*Q. All three?*

*Secretary Vance:* Yes.

*Q. Mr. Secretary, in which way did you outline the U.S. foreign policy with particular reference to Iran?*

*Secretary Vance:* I stressed the fact that our long and close relationships to Iran, with Iran, had been a policy which I believed was very beneficial to both our countries and to the stability of the region. We reached agreement on this. We feel that we must continue to strengthen that relationship in the future and reached agreement on that proposition. And we will be continuing to work together very closely on common matters during the years ahead.

*Q. Was the Shah concerned at all that the Administration's policy of reducing arms transfers and sales abroad might have a harmful effect on the U.S.-Iranian relations? And if so, what did you tell him?*

*Secretary Vance:* I don't want to go into the details of our discussion except to say that we did discuss the question of arms sales. He did not express concern that our arms transfer policy was causing, or would cause, concern to

him. As to the details of our discussion, that will have to wait until a future—

*Q. Sir, did you discuss the question of nuclear reactors to Iran?*

*Secretary Vance:* Yes, we did. We discussed the question of nuclear reactors and found a great deal of commonality between our views. We are going to pursue those matters in joint discussions which we will be having with the Iranians in the weeks and months ahead.

*Q. Mr. Secretary, did you discuss oil pricing?*

*Secretary Vance:* Not as such.

*Q. Did you discuss the Iranian threat perception as well as arms policy?*

*Secretary Vance:* Yes, we did.

*Q. How are you impressed by it?*

*Secretary Vance:* I found it was a very interesting and lucid analysis.

*Q. Mr. Secretary, did you promise any specific arms to Iran?*

*Secretary Vance:* We discussed some outstanding orders and agreed to discuss them further. There were suggestions about additional items which we will discuss further in the future.

*Q. Mr. Secretary, did you go into the question of the human rights in Iran with the Shah?*

*Secretary Vance:* Yes, I did.

*Q. Could you elaborate?*

*Secretary Vance:* Not any more than to say that we did discuss the matter. I explained the views of the United States with respect to the human rights issues. The Shah explained his views with respect to those issues and to our policy. And I think that is all I should say at this point.

*Q. Mr. Secretary, what is, in your opinion, the military importance of the CENTO pact?*

*Secretary Vance:* I think that CENTO over the years has had a stabilizing influence in the area. I think it continues to have importance, and this is one of the questions which we will be discussing in some detail tomorrow to see

whether we have a consensus of views as to the degree of importance that it has.

*Q. Mr. Secretary, the United States has supplied India with nuclear fuel in the past 15 years?*

*Secretary Vance:* Yes.

*Q. Are you going to do it in future years?*

*Secretary Vance:* There will be a decision taken on this in the near future, and at that time there will be an announcement.

*Q. Mr. Secretary, did you have any disagreements with the Shah on any areas, and if so, could you tell us what they are, or were you in full agreement on this broad exchange of views?*

*Secretary Vance:* Broadly speaking, we found a great deal of commonality in our view of the world situation. There are differences of views on some matters but not on broad strategic matters.

*Q. What are those matters, sir?*

*Secretary Vance:* That is all I want to say on that.

*Q. When does the United States intend to join the international covenant on human rights?*

*Secretary Vance:* We have indicated publicly that we intend to take that step as soon as we can get the necessary action by our Congress. When that will happen, I don't know.

*Q. Mr. Secretary, is Iran going to buy the AWACS system [airborne warning and control system]?*

*Secretary Vance:* Yes, that was announced previously that they are confirmed.

*Q. If I may ask a Middle East question, I wonder if you could shed any light on the dispute that has been going on in Washington, in which Mrs. Benson [Lucy Wilson Benson, Under Secretary for Security Assistance, Science, and Technology] went before the Senate committee and argued against a series of amendments to seek a guarantee of a supply of arms to Israel. This seems somewhat peculiar in view of your assurance to Foreign Minister Allon the same day that Israel could*

*buy anything she needed from the United States. I wonder if you could explain the reason behind this decision.*

*Secretary Vance:* I believe there is a very simple reason. Mrs. Benson felt that it was unnecessary under the draft arms transfer proposal to include specific language because it was clearly recognized that because of the special relationship that exists between the United States and Israel that we would provide the necessary equipment and defense materials to assure that security, including advanced technology. Therefore she felt there was no reason to spell it out and in any different words than were used in the draft proposal.

*Q. Would it have hurt to spell it out?*

*Secretary Vance:* Well, that's opinion—you have differences of view on something like that. I think that her position was a very logical position.

*Q. Mr. Secretary, on Iran, do you see the possibility of there ever being any linkage between the Administration's being willing to give the Shah the weapons he wants and the Shah's willingness to make progress on human rights?*

*Secretary Vance:* No such linkage has been discussed.

*Q. Mr. Secretary, the U.S. Government has reportedly begun a secret dialogue with Moscow on the Indian Ocean. Don't you think that the littoral states should be taken into confidence and given a role in shaping the area's zone of peace?*

*Secretary Vance:* I think it is inaccurate to characterize these as "secret discussions." We raised with the Soviets when I was last in Moscow the question of whether or not they wished to discuss with us the question of a possible demilitarization of the Indian Ocean. They indicated that they were prepared to enter into such a discussion, and as a result of that, a meeting—a preliminary meeting—has been scheduled for, I believe it is June. And I believe the location is Moscow.

We have discussed this proposal before and in advance with our allies. We intend to keep them fully informed. If any of them wish to

join the discussions they are welcome to do so.

And so, therefore, I think that to characterize these as "secret" is inaccurate. And whether anything will come out of those remains to be seen, but they are straightforward discussions of the problem which has been of concern to the littoral states and others for quite a while.

*Q. How does the Carter Administration view the human rights situation in Iran, and why hasn't Iran been mentioned in any of the various statements made on this issue?*

*Secretary Vance:* I believe that it was mentioned along with a number of other nations in the report which was filed with the Senate at an earlier date. That is my understanding anyway.

*Q. Could you tell me if you draw a line of difference between terrorism and dissent?*

*Secretary Vance:* Well, that gets into a difficult problem of definition as to what is and is not the violation of human rights. I think people have recognized that each country has a responsibility to itself and to its integrity to deal with terrorist problems. On the other hand, the question of dissent doesn't necessarily involve terrorism, and therefore it depends upon the individual factual situation—the context within which the problem arises as to whether or not you have a question of human rights or not.

*Q. Mr. Secretary, does the question of human rights complicate the relationship between Iran and the United States in any way?*

*Secretary Vance:* I wouldn't say that it has complicated the situation. It is one of the factors that has to be taken account of in our bilateral relations, as it does with other countries, but I wouldn't use those words.

*Q. The Carter Administration has allowed Andrew Young to be pretty outspoken. Are you using him as a trial balloon for possible new U.S. foreign policy, especially regarding South Africa?*

*Secretary Vance:* No.

*Q. Has the Shah accepted your invitation to come to the United States?*

*Secretary Vance:* Did he accept it, did you say? Yes, he did. A couple more questions, then I've got to go because I've got a meeting.

*Q. Sir, how do you see the African developments affecting the security in the region here?*

*Secretary Vance:* The African situation does not have an immediate direct effect, but in the long run it might have an effect with respect to the question of the oil routes which spring from and flow out of the Middle East.

*Q. Mr. Secretary, after the London meeting and the NATO meeting, when President Carter met with Hafiz Asad, what would you say will be the situation of the U.S. arms sales to Iran?*

*Secretary Vance:* Well, we are going to have to take that up on a case-by-case basis, in terms of individual requests as they come up, and we will deal with them one-by-one as they arise.

*Q. Would the arms sales situation be getting tighter with Carter or would it continue the same way that it was before, like in the Ford Administration?*

*Secretary Vance:* No, the criteria with which we review it will be spelled out in the arms transfer policy. It will apply to all nations, and I think you'll have a clearer view then as to what the policy is going to be, not only with respect to Iran, but with respect to other countries.

*Q. As I understand, you were discussing in the Senate session—at several meetings—the arms sales to Iran—*

*Secretary Vance:* Yes, it was. The draft paper which we are working on was discussed with both the Senate side and the House side and some of the congressional leaders who are not on either of the armed services, I mean the foreign relations, committees of both sides. Last question.

*Q. There seems to be an impression that Saudi Arabia is going to increase its price of oil by 3 percent in the coming months, in order to have a one-price system in OPEC [Organization of Petroleum Exporting Countries]. What are your readings of this situa-*

*tion, and what would be Washington's reaction if they actually increase their prices?*

*Secretary Vance:* Let me say that I have asked that question and I have not yet gotten an answer as to whether or not the assumption which you make is correct. I have heard rumors to the effect that that may be the case, but I can't tell you firsthand that that will be the case.

Well, we believe that the current price is a fair and adequate price, and we would hope that the price would not be raised. We think that this would have adverse effects not only on the developing countries, but particularly on the poorest countries. Those are the ones that are going to suffer most from an oil price rise.

#### **STATEMENT BEFORE THE CENTO COUNCIL OF MINISTERS, MAY 14**

*Press release 215 dated May 14*

Distinguished delegates, ladies and gentlemen: It is a special pleasure for me to bring to you greetings and warm wishes from President Carter. I want in particular to express the President's deep appreciation, as well as mine and that of the members of the American delegation, to His Imperial Majesty and his government for the gracious hospitality extended to us during our visit to Tehran.

The U.S. association with the member states of CENTO is important to our nation and to President Carter's Administration, as it was to our predecessors. Personally, I look forward with anticipation to our discussions today. Our relations with each of the CENTO governments are of great importance to us. We value highly your views and your counsel. Our traditional ties of cooperation have benefited all our countries and, we believe, have positively contributed to the stability and to the security of the CENTO region.

Both now and later in our deliberations today I shall share our perception from Washington on the state of the world and the pursuit of peace.

There are some world and regional issues I would particularly like to speak about in these opening remarks.

The search for a just and lasting peace in the Middle East is one of the highest priority items on the foreign policy agenda of our country. We believe it is critically important that a meaningful beginning be made this year toward a permanent settlement of the Middle East conflict. To that end, we are working with the governments concerned to reconvene the Geneva peace conference on the Middle East in the latter part of 1977. We are also convinced, however, that the Geneva conference has to be well prepared, since failure at Geneva would bring with it serious risks of future hostilities.

Our intensive consultations with the key Middle East leaders have given us some hope for progress. In these consultations, we are seeking to clarify the positions of the parties and to identify the areas of possible agreement with respect to the basic issues that must be resolved in the final settlement; namely, the nature of peaceful relations among the parties; the question of withdrawal from occupied territories, security arrangements that will help make recognized borders secure borders; and a settlement of the problem of a homeland for the Palestinian people.

These are complex and difficult issues. Given the legacy of almost three decades of hostility, suspicion, and frustration, we do not underestimate the obstacles which must be overcome. We believe, however, that there is today in the Middle East a will for peace and a growing awareness of the grim alternatives. If all concerned keep the image of these alternatives before them, we believe that reason may prevail and that necessary compromises on all sides can be found. It should not be beyond the imagination of statesmen to devise solutions that will meet the concerns of all states and peoples in the Middle East for their security and territorial integrity, for peace and justice, and for the future prosperity and well-being of their people.

With respect to another regional area, that of Cyprus, our distinguished Foreign Minister of Turkey has already commented upon that issue, and I would merely note that we continue to follow the matters in that area with great interest and are keeping in close touch with all of the parties concerned.



Another area of great interest to all of us, as David Owen has underscored, is Africa. Recent events there have raised questions in the minds of all those who favor political, economic, and social progress for all people of that great continent. My government supports certain principles regarding the future development of Africa.

In cooperation with the countries of the region and our allies, we have worked for the early resolution of those problems preventing independence with majority rule in Rhodesia and in Namibia. We have recently announced, as David Owen has pointed out, a joint effort with the United Kingdom to expedite the process of constitutional government and peaceful transition in Rhodesia. We have also participated in a special delegation of five nations who are members of the Security Council in an effort to create an atmosphere and a process by which Namibian independence can be achieved in the near future.

In these areas and in other trouble spots, such as Zaire and the Horn of Africa, my government has operated on the principle that African problems should be resolved peacefully in an African context and in a manner acceptable to the African nations themselves. We are opposed to the use of force by external powers to bring about change in Africa.

In a large context, the United States will make positive contributions to the sense of community that is developing among nations. But we know that peaceful progress must be protected through adequate defense. We are attempting to work with the Soviet Union for a substantial reduction in strategic weapons. But we shall not in the process neglect our existing alliances and bilateral relations.

The United States will work for the peaceful resolution of disputes and for the goals of freedom, self-government, human dignity, and mutual toleration. We are determined that our foreign policy shall reflect our traditional commitments to political, social, and economic human rights; and in partnership with others, we are directing our political and economic efforts to those ends.

We are willing to share the benefits of our economic strength with others, as President Carter made plain in his address to the United

Nations. We are committed to the continued improvement of the world economic system.

We are dedicated to the resolution of global problems in the areas of food, energy, environment, and trade. Whether at the United Nations, the Conference on International Economic Cooperation, or elsewhere, our hope is to work with other nations in practical ways for real solutions unencumbered by differing ideological views.

We expect our bilateral foreign assistance to exceed \$7 billion this year. In addition, we have asked our Congress to authorize increases to contributions to the United Nations Development Program and to contribute very substantial funds to the various international and lending institutions, including the International Development Association.

The United States now provides for tariff-free entry into the American market of many products from developing countries. In the search for additional ways to help meet the needs of developing countries, we have decided upon other proposals such as a common fund to finance buffer stocks as part of individual commodity agreements, to participate in the special action fund, and to increase our development assistance programs.

The goal of physical well-being for people in all countries is only one aspect of justice in the broader sense. Equally important is the observance of the political and economic rights recognized in the Universal Declaration of Human Rights and in other international covenants. Encouraging these rights is central to our policy, and there is a very practical aspect to it. Each country's growth, prosperity, and stability sooner or later depend upon its ability to meet the aspirations of its people for human rights. The success of nations of the world in mastering the economic and social problems of resource limits, population growth, and environment will inevitably lead and be linked to our success in promoting individual dignity.

We have all learned there can be little security against internal dangers without strength at home founded upon economic and political justice. We have also learned that armaments can place crushing financial burdens upon us—burdens that can lessen or prevent the

application of resources to social and economic development. I am confident that we can agree that our common aim is to lighten this burden through the reduction of tension and conflict throughout the world. But we shall not relax our guard unless conditions permit us to do so.

We will work with our friends and allies, those of you present today, toward our common security, as well as for the respect and understanding among our peoples which are so basic to our mutual cooperation.

## FINAL COMMUNIQUE OF CENTO COUNCIL OF MINISTERS

TEHRAN, *May 15, 1977*—The Council of Ministers of the Central Treaty Organization (CENTO), which was inaugurated by the message of His Imperial Majesty the Shahanshah Aryamehr, read by His Excellency Mr. Amir Abbas Hoveyda, Prime Minister of Iran, held their 24th Session in Tehran on May 14-15, 1977.

The delegations were led by:

*Iran*—H.E. Dr. Abbas Ali Khalatbary, Minister of Foreign Affairs

*Pakistan*—H.E. Mr. S. Ghias Uddin Ahmad, Ambassador of Pakistan to Iran

*Turkey*—H.E. Mr. Ihsan Sabri Caglayangil, Minister of Foreign Affairs

*United Kingdom*—The Rt. Hon. David Owen, Secretary of State for Foreign and Commonwealth Affairs

*United States*—The Hon. Cyrus Vance, Secretary of State

Following an address by the Prime Minister of Iran, opening statements were made by leaders of the delegations and by the Secretary General of CENTO expressing their appreciation for the Shahanshah's gracious message and for the warm hospitality of the Host Government. H.E. Mr. Unit Haluk Bayulken, the Secretary General of the Central Treaty Organization, presided at the opening meeting of the Session. His Excellency Dr. A.A. Khalatbary, Minister of Foreign Affairs of Iran, presided at subsequent Council meetings.

The Council of Ministers conducted a wide-ranging and constructive review of the present international situation paying particular attention to matters of interest in the CENTO area, and noted with satisfaction the economic and social progress in the region. The Ministers pledged continued support for the Central Treaty Organization and reaffirmed the vital importance they attach to the preservation of the independence and territorial integrity of each of the Member States in the region.

During their warm and friendly discussions the Ministers explained their positions and their views regarding the problems which are of special interest and importance for their respective countries. The impor-

ance of peaceful and just settlement of disputes and the need to maintain vigilance in the region were reaffirmed.

The Ministers also reviewed progress towards further promoting cooperation within the Alliance in the economic and cultural fields. In reviewing the report of the Economic Committee, they directed the Committee to consider ways of expanding its work in the form of development projects with a view to strengthening and promoting economic cooperation within the Alliance. They also noted with approval the expanded cultural exchange and mass media programmes undertaken within the framework of CENTO.

The Ministers reviewed developments in the Middle East since their last meeting. They noted with satisfaction the improvement of the situation in Lebanon and paid tribute to all those who are contributing towards the solution of this problem. They agreed that the failure to achieve peace in the Middle East continues to constitute a grave threat to world peace. They reaffirmed the importance they attached to the continuation of efforts designed to achieve a settlement resulting in a just, honourable and durable peace in the Middle Eastern area as a whole.

The Council of Ministers exchanged views on developments in Europe and expressed their sincerest hopes that the Review Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe to be held in Belgrade later this year, would lead to a further relaxation of international tension. In this context, the Ministers once again stressed that security in the CENTO region constitutes an important related element.

The Ministers noted the report of the Military Committee, and expressed satisfaction at the progress made during the past year in the improvement of cooperation among the partners in the military field.

The Ministers expressed their belief that all bilateral questions between the member countries should be discussed between the parties concerned in an atmosphere of friendships and solidarity with a view to further improving their cooperation.

The Ministers noted the progress made in countering the threat of subversion in the region and reaffirmed their resolve to continue to take the necessary measures to eliminate this threat.

In reviewing events within the CENTO region during the past year, the Ministers expressed their appreciation for the cooperation, solidarity, and friendship, demonstrated by the CENTO member countries by being among the first to come to the aid of the victims of the earthquake disaster in East Anatolia.

In concluding their review the Ministers noted with appreciation the annual report of the Secretary General, which contains many valuable recommendations. They reiterated their determination to ensure that the Alliance continues to contribute to the peace, security and stability of the region so as to promote further the social and economic welfare of its people.

The Ministers accepted the invitation of the Government of the United States to hold the next Session of the Council in Washington during April, 1978.

# Current Treaty Actions

## MULTILATERAL

### Agriculture

Agreement establishing the International Fund for Agricultural Development (IFAD). Done at Rome June 13, 1976.<sup>1</sup>  
*Ratification deposited:* Bangladesh, May 9, 1977.  
*Signature:* Rwanda, May 10, 1977.

### Arbitration

Convention on the recognition and enforcement of foreign arbitral awards. Done at New York June 10, 1958. Entered into force June 7, 1959; for the United States December 29, 1970. TIAS 6997.  
*Accession deposited:* Spain, May 12, 1977.

### Aviation

Convention on international civil aviation. Done at Chicago December 7, 1944. Entered into force April 4, 1947. TIAS 1591.

*Adherence deposited:* The Gambia, May 13, 1977.

Protocol relating to certain amendments to the convention on international civil aviation (TIAS 1591). Done at Montreal June 14, 1954. Entered into force December 12, 1956. TIAS 3756.

*Ratifications deposited:* Angola, April 10, 1977; Uganda, September 16, 1976.

Protocol relating to amendment of article 50(a) of the convention on international civil aviation (TIAS 1591). Done at Montreal June 21, 1961. Entered into force July 17, 1962. TIAS 5170.

*Ratifications deposited:* Angola, April 10, 1977; Uganda, September 16, 1976.

Protocol relating to an amendment to the convention on international civil aviation (TIAS 1591). Done at Rome September 15, 1962. Entered into force September 11, 1975. TIAS 8162.

*Ratifications deposited:* Angola, April 10, 1977; Guinea, August 19, 1976; Iraq, April 26, 1977; Uganda, September 16, 1976.

Convention on offenses and certain other acts committed on board aircraft. Done at Tokyo September 14, 1963. Entered into force December 4, 1969. TIAS 6768.

*Ratification deposited:* Indonesia (with reservation), September 7, 1976.

*Accessions deposited:* Afghanistan, April 15, 1977; Iran, June 28, 1976; Oman (with reservation), February 9, 1977; Uruguay, January 26, 1977.

Protocol relating to an amendment to the convention on international civil aviation (TIAS 1591). Done at New York March 12, 1971. Entered into force January 16, 1973. TIAS 7616.

*Ratifications deposited:* Angola, April 10, 1977; Guinea, August 19, 1976; Iraq, February 10, 1976; Mauritania, January 28, 1977.

Protocol relating to an amendment to the convention on international civil aviation. Done at Vienna July 7, 1971. Entered into force December 19, 1974. TIAS 8092.

*Ratifications deposited:* Algeria, February 2, 1977; Angola, April 10, 1977; Guinea, August 19, 1976; Mauritania, December 20, 1976; Poland, May 17, 1976.

Amendment of annexes of the 1956 agreements on joint financing of certain air navigation services in Greenland and the Faroe Islands and in Iceland (TIAS 4048, 4049). Approved at Montreal April 6, 1977. Entered into force April 6, 1977.

### Bills of Lading

International convention for the unification of certain rules relating to bills of lading and protocol of signature. Done at Brussels August 25, 1924. Entered into force June 2, 1931; for the United States December 29, 1937. 51 Stat. 233.

*Adherence deposited:* Ecuador, March 23, 1977.

Protocol to amend the international convention for the unification of certain rules of law relating to bills of lading signed at Brussels August 25, 1924 (51 Stat. 233). Done at Brussels February 23, 1968.

*Accession deposited:* Ecuador, March 23, 1977.

*Enters into force:* June 23, 1977.<sup>2</sup>

### Load Lines

International convention on load lines, 1966. Done at London April 5, 1966. Entered into force July 21, 1968. TIAS 6331, 6629, 6720.

*Accessions deposited:* Tonga, April 12, 1977; Uruguay, April 18, 1977.

### Postal

Additional protocol to the constitution of the Universal Postal Union with final protocol signed at Vienna July 10, 1964, general regulations with final protocol and annex, and the universal postal convention with final protocol and detailed regulations. Signed at Tokyo November 14, 1969. Entered into force July 1, 1971, except for article V, which entered into force January 1, 1971. TIAS 7150.

*Accession deposited:* Ecuador, January 26, 1977.

*Ratification deposited:* Mauritania, January 31, 1977.

Second additional protocol to the constitution of the Universal Postal Union of July 10, 1964, general regulations with final protocol and annex, and the universal postal convention with final protocol and detailed regulations. Done at Lausanne July 5, 1974. Entered into force January 1, 1976. TIAS 8231.

*Ratifications deposited:* Cyprus, January 10, 1977; Ecuador, January 26, 1977; Mauritania, January 31, 1977.

Money orders and postal travellers' checks agreement, with detailed regulations. Done at Lausanne July 5, 1974. Entered into force January 1, 1976. TIAS 8232.

*Ratifications deposited:* Cyprus, January 10, 1977; Ecuador, January 26, 1977; Mauritania, January 31, 1977.

### Safety at Sea

International convention for the safety of life at sea. Done at London June 17, 1960. Entered into force May 26, 1965. TIAS 5780, 6284.

*Acceptance deposited:* Tonga, April 12, 1977.

International regulations for preventing collisions at sea. Approved by the International Conference on Safety of Life at Sea held at London from May 17 to

<sup>1</sup>Not in force.

<sup>2</sup>Not for the United States.

June 17, 1960. Entered into force September 1, 1965. TIAS 5813.

*Acceptance deposited:* Tonga, April 12, 1977.

Convention on the international regulations for preventing collisions at sea, 1972. Done at London October 20, 1972. Enters into force July 15, 1977.

*Accessions deposited:* Czechoslovakia (with declarations), April 7, 1977; Tonga, April 12, 1977.

### Space

Convention on registration of objects launched into outer space. Done at New York January 14, 1975. Entered into force September 15, 1976. TIAS 8480.

*Ratification deposited:* German Democratic Republic, May 12, 1977.

### Tonnage Measurement

International convention on tonnage measurement of ships, 1969, with annexes. Done at London June 23, 1969.<sup>1</sup>

*Accession deposited:* Tonga, April 12, 1977.

## BILATERAL

### Honduras

Memorandum of understanding relating to cooperative efforts to protect crops from plant pest damage and plant diseases. Signed at Washington and Tegucigalpa March 4 and April 18, 1977. Entered into force April 18, 1977.

### Israel

Agreement establishing the Israel-United States Binational Industrial Research and Development Foundation, with annexes. Signed at Jerusalem March 3, 1976.

*Entered into force:* May 18, 1977.

### Portugal

Agreement amending the agreement for sales of agricultural commodities of October 22, 1976 (TIAS 8535). Effected by exchange of notes at Lisbon April 15 and 26, 1977. Entered into force April 26, 1977.

### Romania

Long-term agreement on economic, industrial and technical cooperation, with annexes. Signed at Bucharest November 21, 1976.

*Entered into force:* May 5, 1977.

### Rwanda

Agreement relating to the transfer of food grain to

Rwanda. Signed at Washington April 26 and 29, 1977. Entered into force April 29, 1977.

### Tonga

Agreement continuing in force between the United States and Tonga the extradition treaty of December 22, 1931 (47 Stat. 2122), between the United States and the United Kingdom. Effected by exchange of notes at Nukualofa and Wellington March 14 and April 13, 1977. Entered into force April 13, 1977.

## 1949 "Foreign Relations" Volume on the Far East Released

Press release 166 dated April 5 (for release April 16)

The Department of State on April 16 released "Foreign Relations of the United States," 1949, volume VII, part 2, "The Far East and Australasia." The "Foreign Relations" series has been published continuously since 1861 as the official record of American foreign policy.

Part 2 presents 620 pages of previously unpublished documentation (much of it newly declassified) on Japan, Korea, and multilateral relations in the area. There is extensive coverage of the occupation and control of Japan, the withdrawal of U.S. forces from Korea, military and economic assistance to the Republic of Korea, and consideration of proposals for the formation of regional associations or pacts. Part 1 of this volume, released in 1975 as Department of State publication 8797, contained documentation on Australia and New Zealand, Indochina, Indonesia, and the Philippines.

"Foreign Relations," 1949, volume VII, part 2, was prepared in the Office of the Historian, Bureau of Public Affairs, Department of State. Six volumes for 1949 have now been released, and three more are in preparation. Three volumes for 1950 have also been released, including volume VI, "East Asia and the Pacific," and volume VII, "Korea."

Copies of volume VII, part 2 (Department of State publication 8857; GPO Cat. No. S1.1:949/v. VII), may be obtained for \$9.30 (domestic postpaid). Checks or money orders should be made out to the Superintendent of Documents and should be sent to the U.S. Government Book Store, Department of State, Washington, D.C. 20520.

<sup>1</sup> Not in force.

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Press releases may be obtained from the Office of Press Relations, Department of State, Washington, D.C. 20520.

No.	Date	Subject
†217	5/17	Vance; signing of Environmental Modification Convention, Geneva (for release May 18).
†218	5/18	Shipping Coordinating Committee, Subcommittee on Safety of Life at Sea, working group on the carriage of dangerous goods, June 16.
†219	5/18	Study group I of the U.S. National Committee of the International Telegraph and Telephone Consultative Committee (CCITT), June 9.
†220	5/18	Advisory Committee on Transnational Enterprises, June 10.
†221	5/18	Vance; arrival, Geneva.
†222	5/20	Program for official visit to Washington of Prince Fahd of Saudi Arabia, May 23-27.
†223	5/20	Meeting of the U.S.-Spanish Joint Committee for Scientific and Technological Cooperation, May 16.
†224	5/21	Joint U.S.-U.S.S.R. communique, Geneva.
†225	5/21	Lucy Wilson Benson and Patsy T. Mink to participate in World Environment Day celebration.
†226	5/21	Vance; news conference, Geneva.

\* Not printed.  
 † Held for a later issue of the BULLETIN.

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# THE DEPARTMENT OF STATE BULLETIN

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# THE DEPARTMENT OF STATE BULLETIN

VOL. LXXVI, No. 1981  
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*The Department of State BULLETIN, a weekly publication issued by the Office of Media Services, Bureau of Public Affairs, provides the public and interested agencies of the government with information on developments in the field of U.S. foreign relations and on the work of the Department and the Foreign Service.*

*The BULLETIN includes selected press releases on foreign policy, issued by the White House and the Department, and statements, addresses, and news conferences of the President and the Secretary of State and other officers of the Department, as well as special articles on various phases of international affairs and the functions of the Department. Information is included concerning treaties and international agreements to which the United States is or may become a party and on treaties of general international interest.*

*Publications of the Department of State, United Nations documents, and legislative material in the field of international relations are also listed.*

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## A Foreign Policy Based on America's Essential Character

*Address by President Carter*<sup>1</sup>

In his 25 years as president of Notre Dame, Father Hesburgh has spoken more consistently and more effectively in the support of the rights of human beings than any other person I know. His interest in the Notre Dame Center for Civil Rights has never wavered, and he played an important role in broadening the scope of the Center's work—and I have visited there last fall to see this work—to include now all people in the world, as shown by last month's conference here on human rights and American foreign policy.

And that concern has been demonstrated again today in a vivid fashion by the selection of Bishop Donal Lamont, Paul Cardinal Arns, and Stephen Cardinal Kim to receive honorary degrees. In their fight for human freedoms in Rhodesia, Brazil, and South Korea, these three religious leaders typify all that is best in their countries and in their church. I am honored to join you in recognizing their dedication and their personal sacrifice and their supreme courage.

Quite often, brave men like these are castigated and sometimes punished, sometimes even put to death, because they enter the realm where human rights is a struggle, and sometimes they are blamed for the very circumstance which they helped to dramatize. But it has been there for a long time, and the flames which they seek to extinguish concern us all and are increasingly visible around the world.

Last week, I spoke in California about the

domestic agenda for our nation to provide more efficiently for the needs of our people, to demonstrate, against the dark faith of our times, that our government can be both competent and more humane.

But I want to speak to you today about the strands that connect our actions overseas with our essential character as a nation. I believe we can have a foreign policy that is democratic, that is based on fundamental values, and that uses power and influence which we have for humane purposes. We can also have a foreign policy that the American people both support and, for a change, know about and understand.

I have a quiet confidence in our own political system. Because we know that democracy works, we can reject the arguments of those rulers who deny human rights to their people.

We are confident that democracy's example will be compelling, and so we seek to bring that example closer to those from whom in the past few years we have been separated and who are not yet convinced about the advantages of our kind of life.

We are confident that democratic methods are the most effective, and so we are not tempted to employ improper tactics here at home or abroad.

We are confident of our own strength, so we can seek substantial mutual reductions in the nuclear arms race.

And we are confident of the good sense of American people, and so we let them share in the process of making foreign policy decisions. We can thus speak with the voices of 215 million, and not just of an isolated handful.

Democracy's great recent successes—in In-

<sup>1</sup> Made at the commencement exercises of Notre Dame University at South Bend, Ind., on May 22 (text from Weekly Compilation of Presidential Documents dated May 30; introductory paragraphs omitted).

dia, Portugal, Spain, Greece—show that our confidence in this system is not misplaced. Being confident of our own future, we are now free of that inordinate fear of communism which once led us to embrace any dictator who joined us in that fear. I am glad that that is being changed.

For too many years, we have been willing to adopt the flawed and erroneous principles and tactics of our adversaries, sometimes abandoning our own values for theirs. We have fought fire with fire, never thinking that fire is better quenched with water. This approach failed, with Vietnam the best example of its intellectual and moral poverty. But through failure, we have now found our way back to our own principles and values, and we have regained our lost confidence.

By the measure of history, our nation's 200 years are very brief, and our rise to world eminence is briefer still. It dates from 1945 when Europe and the old international order lay in ruins. Before then America was largely on the periphery of world affairs, but since then we have inescapably been at the center of world affairs.

Our policy during this period was guided by two principles—a belief that Soviet expansion was almost inevitable, but it must be contained, and the corresponding belief in the importance of an almost exclusive alliance among non-Communist nations on both sides of the Atlantic. That system could not last forever unchanged. Historical trends have weakened its foundation. The unifying threat of conflict with the Soviet Union has become less intensive, even though the competition has become more extensive.

The Vietnamese war produced a profound moral crisis, sapping worldwide faith in our own policy and our system of life, a crisis of confidence made even more grave by the covert pessimism of some of our own leaders.

In less than a generation we have seen the world change dramatically. The daily lives and aspirations of most human beings have been transformed. Colonialism is nearly gone. A new sense of national identity now exists in almost 100 new countries that have been formed in the last generation. Knowledge has

become more widespread; aspirations are higher.

As more people have been freed from traditional constraints, more have been determined to achieve, for the first time in their lives, social justice.

The world is still divided by ideological disputes, dominated by regional conflicts, and threatened by the danger that we will not resolve the differences of race and wealth without violence or without drawing into combat the major military powers. We can no longer separate the traditional issues of war and peace from the new global questions of justice, equity, and human rights.

It is a new world, but America should not fear it. It is a new world, and we should help to shape it. It is a new world that calls for a new American foreign policy—a policy based on constant decency in its values and on optimism in our historical vision.

We can no longer have a policy solely for the industrial nations as the foundation of global stability, but we must respond to the new reality of a politically awakening world.

We can no longer expect that the other 150 nations will follow the dictates of the powerful, but we must continue—confidently—our efforts to inspire, to persuade, and to lead.

Our policy must reflect our belief that the world can hope for more than simple survival and our belief that dignity and freedom are fundamental spiritual requirements. Our policy must shape an international system that will last longer than secret deals.

We cannot make this kind of policy by manipulation. Our policy must be open; it must be candid; it must be one of constructive global involvement, resting on five cardinal principles.

I have tried to make these premises clear to the American people since last January. Let me review what we have been doing and discuss what we intend to do.

### *Human Rights*

First, we have reaffirmed America's commitment to human rights as a fundamental tenet of our foreign policy. In ancestry, religion, color, place of origin, and cultural back-

ground, we Americans are as diverse a nation as the world has ever seen. No common mystique of blood or soil unites us. What draws us together, perhaps more than anything else, is a belief in human freedom. We want the world to know that our nation stands for more than financial prosperity.

This does not mean that we can conduct our foreign policy by rigid moral maxims. We live in a world that is imperfect, and which will always be imperfect; a world that is complex and confused, and which will always be complex and confused.

I understand fully the limits of moral suasion. We have no illusion that changes will come easily or soon. But I also believe that it is a mistake to undervalue the power of words and of the ideas that words embody. In our own history, that power has ranged from Thomas Paine's "Common Sense" to Martin Luther King, Jr.'s, "I Have a Dream."

In the life of the human spirit, words are action, much more so than many of us may realize who live in countries where freedom of expression is taken for granted. The leaders of totalitarian nations understand this very well. The proof is that words are precisely the action for which dissidents in those countries are being persecuted.

Nonetheless, we can already see dramatic worldwide advances in the protection of the individual from the arbitrary power of the state. For us to ignore this trend would be to lose influence and moral authority in the world. To lead it will be to regain the moral stature that we once had.

The great democracies are not free because we are strong and prosperous. I believe we are strong and influential and prosperous because we are free.

Throughout the world today, in free nations and in totalitarian countries as well, there is a preoccupation with the subject of human freedom, human rights, and I believe it is incumbent on us in this country to keep that discussion, that debate, that contention alive. No other country is as well-qualified as we to set an example. We have our own shortcomings and faults, and we should strive constantly

and with courage to make sure that we are legitimately proud of what we have.

### *Industrial Democracies*

Second, we have moved deliberately to reinforce the bonds among our democracies. In our recent meetings in London, we agreed to widen our economic cooperation, to promote free trade, to strengthen the world's monetary system, to seek ways of avoiding nuclear proliferation. We prepared constructive proposals for the forthcoming meetings on North-South problems of poverty, development, and global well-being, and we agreed on joint efforts to reinforce and to modernize our common defense.

You may be interested in knowing that at this NATO meeting for the first time in more than 25 years all members are democracies.

Even more important, all of us reaffirmed our basic optimism in the future of the democratic system. Our spirit of confidence is spreading. Together, our democracies can help to shape the wider architecture of global cooperation.

### *U.S.-U.S.S.R. Relationship*

Third, we have moved to engage the Soviet Union in a joint effort to halt the strategic arms race. This race is not only dangerous, it is morally deplorable. We must put an end to it.

I know it will not be easy to reach agreements. Our goal is to be fair to both sides, to produce reciprocal stability, parity, and security. We desire a freeze on further modernization and production of weapons and a continuing substantial reduction of strategic nuclear weapons as well. We want a comprehensive ban on all nuclear testing, a prohibition against all chemical warfare, no attack capability against space satellites, and arms limitations in the Indian Ocean.

We hope that we can take joint steps with all nations toward a final agreement eliminating nuclear weapons completely from our arsenals of death. We will persist in this effort.

Now, I believe in détente with the Soviet Union. To me, it means progress toward peace. But the effects of détente should not be

limited to our own two countries alone. We hope to persuade the Soviet Union that one country cannot impose its system of society upon another, either through direct military intervention or through the use of a client state's military force, as was the case with Cuban intervention in Angola.

Cooperation also implies obligation. We hope that the Soviet Union will join with us and other nations in playing a larger role in aiding the developing world, for common aid efforts will help us build a bridge of mutual confidence in one another.

### *Middle East*

Fourth, we are taking deliberate steps to improve the chances of lasting peace in the Middle East. Through wide-ranging consultation with leaders of the countries involved—Israel, Syria, Jordan, and Egypt—we have found some areas of agreement and some movement toward consensus. The negotiations must continue.

Through my own public comments, I have also tried to suggest a more flexible framework for the discussion of three key issues which have so far been so intractable:

The nature of a comprehensive peace—what is peace; what does it mean to the Israelis; what does it mean to their Arab neighbors?

Secondly, the relationship between security and borders—how can the dispute over border delineations be established and settled with a feeling of security on both sides?

And the issue of the Palestinian homeland.

The historic friendship that the United States has with Israel is not dependent on domestic politics in either nation; it is derived from our common respect for human freedom and from a common search for permanent peace. We will continue to promote a settlement which all of us need.

Our own policy will not be affected by changes in leadership in any of the countries in the Middle East. Therefore, we expect Israel and her neighbors to continue to be bound by U.N. Resolutions 242 and 338, which they have previously accepted.

This may be the most propitious time for a genuine settlement since the beginning of the Arab-Israeli conflict almost 30 years ago. To

let this opportunity pass could mean disaster, not only for the Middle East, but perhaps for the international political and economic order as well.

### *Weapons Proliferation*

Fifth, we are attempting, even at the risk of some friction with our friends, to reduce the danger of nuclear proliferation and the worldwide spread of conventional weapons.

At the recent summit we set in motion an international effort to determine the best ways of harnessing nuclear energy for peaceful use, while reducing the risks that its products will be diverted to the making of explosives.

We have already completed a comprehensive review of our own policy on arms transfers. Competition in arms sales is inimical to peace and destructive of the economic development of the poorer countries.

We will, as a matter of national policy now in our country, seek to reduce the annual dollar volume of arms sales, to restrict the transfer of advanced weapons, and to reduce the extent of our coproduction arrangements about weapons with foreign states.

And just as important, we are trying to get other nations, both free and otherwise, to join us in this effort.

But all of this that I have described is just the beginning. It is a beginning aimed toward a clear goal, to create a wider framework of international cooperation suited to the new and rapidly changing historical circumstances.

We will cooperate more closely with the newly influential countries in Latin America, Africa, and Asia. We need their friendship and cooperation in a common effort as the structure of world power changes.

More than 100 years ago Abraham Lincoln said that our nation could not exist half slave and half free. We know a peaceful world cannot long exist one-third rich and two-thirds hungry.

Most nations share our faith that in the long run, expanded and equitable trade will best help the developing countries to help themselves. But the immediate problems of hunger, disease, illiteracy, and repression are here now.

## President Carter Announces Policy on Transfers of Conventional Arms

*Statement by President Carter*<sup>1</sup>

The Western democracies, the OPEC [Organization of Petroleum Exporting Countries] nations, and the developed Communist countries can cooperate through existing international institutions in providing more effective aid. This is an excellent alternative to war.

We have a special need for cooperation and consultation with other nations in this hemisphere, to the north and to the south. We do not need another slogan; although these are our close friends and neighbors, our links with them are the same links of equality that we forge for the rest of the world. We will be dealing with them as part of a new worldwide mosaic of global, regional, and bilateral relations.

It is important that we make progress toward normalizing relations with the People's Republic of China. We see the American-Chinese relationship as a central element of our global policy, and China as a key force for global peace. We wish to cooperate closely with the creative Chinese people on the problems that confront all mankind, and we hope to find a formula which can bridge some of the difficulties that still separate us.

Finally, let me say that we are committed to a peaceful resolution of the crisis in southern Africa. The time has come for the principle of majority rule to be the basis for political order, recognizing that in a democratic system the rights of the minority must also be protected.

To be peaceful, change must come promptly. The United States is determined to work together with our European allies and with the concerned African states to shape a congenial international framework for the rapid and progressive transformation of southern African society and to help protect it from unwarranted outside interference.

Let me conclude by summarizing: Our policy is based on a historical vision of America's role. Our policy is derived from a larger view of global change. Our policy is rooted in our moral values, which never change. Our policy is reinforced by our material wealth and by our military power. Our policy is designed to serve mankind. And it is a policy that I hope will make you proud to be Americans.

The virtually unrestrained spread of conventional weaponry threatens stability in every region of the world. Total arms sales in recent years have risen to over \$20 billion, and the United States accounts for more than one-half of this amount. Each year, the weapons transferred are not only more numerous but also more sophisticated and deadly. Because of the threat to world peace embodied in this spiraling arms traffic and because of the special responsibilities we bear as the largest arms seller, I believe that the United States must take steps to restrain its arms transfers.

Therefore, shortly after my inauguration I directed a comprehensive review of U.S. conventional arms transfer policy, including all military, political, and economic factors. After reviewing the results of this study and discussing those results with Members of Congress and foreign leaders, I have concluded that the United States will henceforth view arms transfers as an exceptional foreign policy implement, to be used only in instances where it can be clearly demonstrated that the transfer contributes to our national security interests. We will continue to utilize arms transfers to promote our security and the security of our close friends. But in the future the burden of persuasion will be on those who favor a particular arms sale rather than those who oppose it.

To implement a policy of arms restraint, I am establishing the following set of controls, applicable to all transfers except those to countries with which we have major defense treaties (NATO, Japan, Australia, and New Zealand). We will remain faithful to our treaty obligations and will honor our historic responsibilities to assure the security of the State of Israel. These controls will be binding *unless* extraordinary circumstances necessitate a Presidential exception or where I determine that countries friendly to the United

<sup>1</sup> Issued on May 19 (text from White House press release).

States must depend on advanced weaponry to offset quantitative and other disadvantages in order to maintain a regional balance.

1. The dollar volume (in constant fiscal year 1976 dollars) of new commitments under the foreign military sales and military assistance programs for weapons and weapons-related items in fiscal year 1978 will be reduced from the fiscal year 1977 total. Transfers which can clearly be classified as services are not covered, nor are commercial sales, which the U.S. Government monitors through the issuance of export licenses. Commercial sales are already significantly restrained by existing legislation and executive branch policy.

2. The United States will not be the first supplier to introduce into a region newly developed advanced weapons systems which would create a new or significantly higher combat capability. Also, any commitment for sale or coproduction of such weapons is prohibited until they are operationally deployed with U.S. forces, thus removing the incentive to promote foreign sales in an effort to lower unit costs for Defense Department procurement.

3. Development or significant modification of *advanced* weapons systems *solely for export* will not be permitted.

4. Coproduction agreements for significant weapons, equipment, and major components (beyond assembly of subcomponents and the fabrication of high-turnover spare parts) are prohibited. A limited class of items will be considered for coproduction arrangements, but with restrictions on third-country exports, since these arrangements are intended primarily for the coproducer's requirements.

5. In addition to existing requirements of the law, the United States, as a condition of sale for certain weapons, equipment, or major components, may stipulate that we will not entertain *any* requests for retransfers. By establishing at the outset that the United States will not entertain such requests, we can avoid unnecessary bilateral friction caused by later denials.

6. An amendment to the international traffic in arms regulations will be issued, requiring policy-level authorization by the Department of State for actions by agents of the

United States or private manufacturers which might promote the sale of arms abroad. In addition, embassies and military representatives abroad will not promote the sale of arms and the Secretary of Defense will continue his review of government procedures, particularly procurement regulations which may provide incentives for foreign sales.

In formulating security assistance programs consistent with these controls, we will continue our efforts to promote and advance respect for human rights in recipient countries. Also, we will assess the economic impact of arms transfers to those less developed countries receiving U.S. economic assistance.

I am initiating this policy of restraint in the full understanding that actual reductions in the worldwide traffic in arms will require multilateral cooperation. Because we dominate the world market to such a degree, I believe that the United States can and should take the first step. However, in the immediate future the United States will meet with other arms suppliers, including the Soviet Union, to begin discussion of possible measures for multilateral action. In addition, we will do whatever we can to encourage regional agreements among purchasers to limit arms imports.

## President Discusses U.S. Policy Toward South Africa

*Following is an excerpt from the transcript of President Carter's television question-and-answer session at Los Angeles on May 17 with residents of the area.<sup>1</sup>*

*Q. My name is Doug Patton. I am an industrial designer at Cal State, Long Beach. My question is: In view of your outlook and stance on human rights, and in view of the fact that in the past the United States has often supported South Africa in the United Nations, can you tell me if we will continue to*

<sup>1</sup> For the complete transcript, see Weekly Compilation of Presidential Documents dated May 23, 1977, p. 733.

*support our interests in South Africa by offering support in the United Nations or not?*

*The President:* We're trying as best we can to make changes in South Africa. We have just formed, under the leadership of Andrew Young, who's our Ambassador to the United Nations, a five-nation proposal to Prime Minister Vorster from South Africa, to try to get them to withdraw the white domination of Namibia, which was formerly a German colony of southwest Africa.

Vice President Mondale has just finished a visit to Portugal and Spain. He's going to Yugoslavia, and then he is going to come back to Vienna. Prime Minister Vorster from South Africa is coming to Vienna to meet him to talk about the shift in South Africa away from the racially discriminatory practices known as apartheid. We're doing the best we can to bring about these changes.

There have been 25 or 30 nations in the last couple of months that have let it be known to us that they've taken good steps toward preserving human rights. I believe it's accurate to say that there's hardly a government in the world right now that's not trying to do a better job on human rights, partially because we've made such an issue of it.

As you know, all the signatories of the Helsinki agreement—I think there are about 35 of us—will go to Belgrade later on this spring to assess how well our countries have done in the field of human rights. We're not perfect ourselves. Since I have been in office, for instance, I've changed the regulations so that American citizens for the first time can visit any foreign country. In the past, we had very tight constraints on visitors visiting back and forth.

But we're not supporting South Africa. We are very eager to see, and willing to use, all the leverage that we can to bring about an end to racial discrimination in South Africa and an end to the apartheid system where the black people have to carry passes and have special constraints on them and the white people don't. But we don't have the author-

ity, short of war, which we wouldn't consider, to go in and just change the structure of their government.

But we're not only trying to move ourselves, but we're trying to get other nations to join in with us. You might be interested in knowing that the other four nations that have joined with us with the help of Andrew Young were the Federal Republic of Germany, France, Great Britain, and Canada.

We've gone to Vorster now and given him a request—a little bit stronger than a request—saying that if you don't do something about Namibia, then we're going to take strong action against you in the United Nations.

## Letters of Credence

### *Barbados*

The newly appointed Ambassador of Barbados, Oliver Hamlet Jackman, presented his credentials to President Carter on May 16.<sup>1</sup>

### *Panama*

The newly appointed Ambassador of the Republic of Panama, Gabriel Lewis, presented his credentials to President Carter on May 16.

### *Paraguay*

The newly appointed Ambassador of the Republic of Paraguay, Mario López Escobar, presented his credentials to President Carter on May 16.<sup>1</sup>

### *South Africa*

The newly appointed Ambassador of the Republic of South Africa, Donald Bell Sole, presented his credentials to President Carter on May 16.<sup>1</sup>

<sup>1</sup> For texts of the Ambassador's remarks and the President's reply, see Department of State press release dated May 16.

## Secretary Vance and Soviet Foreign Minister Gromyko Hold Talks at Geneva

*Secretary Vance and Soviet Foreign Minister Andrei A. Gromyko met at Geneva May 18-20. Following is the transcript of a news conference held by Secretary Vance at Geneva on May 21, together with the text of a joint U.S.-U.S.S.R. communique issued that day.<sup>1</sup>*

### NEWS CONFERENCE

Press release 226 dated May 21

*Secretary Vance:* Good morning, ladies and gentlemen. We completed our talks yesterday, as you know, with the Soviet Union, and I believe you probably all now have a copy of the joint communique which we have issued today. Let me say a few words about SALT and then a few words about the Middle East, and then we will open it up for questions.

On the SALT issue, in our judgment the talks have been both necessary and useful and also constructive. Progress has been made.

We have reached general agreement on a common framework for the SALT II agreement. This consists of three elements: First, a treaty; second, a protocol to the treaty; and third, a statement of general principles which would govern the conduct of SALT III. All of these parts are interdependent, and I want to make that point very strongly. This is an interdependent whole made up of these different parts. The treaty would run until 1985, the protocol would be for a period of three years, and the statement of general principles would be, as I said, a statement of general

principles which would govern the conduct of SALT III. This framework provides a method of blending the three proposals which have been on the table since our discussions in Moscow.

Differences remain, substantial differences between the sides on a number of issues. They break down into several categories. One category is whether certain items should be included in the treaty or in the protocol. Another set of items raises questions as to whether they should be included at all in either the protocol or the treaty. And the third set is the precise nature of all of the items which would be included in a statement of general principles.

A word on the Middle East: In regard to the Middle East, we had an exchange of views. We both have been meeting with parties to the Geneva conference and others. We exchanged our views with respect to these visits which we have had. We agreed that it is important to direct our efforts jointly toward reconvening a Geneva conference in the fall of this year, and we will work to that end. To help us in this process, we have agreed to set up monthly meetings at the ambassadorial level where we can keep each other informed as we continue our discussions with the parties.

Now we will open it up for questions.

*Q. Mr. Secretary, you said that we reached general agreement on a common framework for a SALT treaty. The communique does not state that. The language of the communique falls short of stating that you have reached general agreement. Why is that?*

*Secretary Vance:* When I say general agreement, what I mean is that we have on

<sup>1</sup> For remarks by Secretary Vance upon his arrival in Geneva on May 18, see press release 221; for his remarks upon arrival at Andrews Air Force Base on May 21, see press release 229 dated May 23.



the form of it—namely, treaty, protocol, and a statement of general principles—we have agreement. We do not have agreement that comes within the various elements as I have indicated to you. We have differences of opinion on that.

*Q. Mr. Secretary, what happens now? Who will do the negotiating and when? Do you think you will have these three component parts by October?*

*Secretary Vance:* We are going to talk at three different levels. Some of the discussions will be had between the two delegations here in Geneva. Some of the discussions will probably be had at ambassadorial levels within the two capitals between the local ambassador and the foreign minister, and Mr. Gromyko and I will be meeting again at a time to be set in the future. We both have to check our calendars to find out what is going to be the most convenient time for us to meet again, and we have agreed to get in touch with each other as soon as we have done that once we've gotten home.

*Q. And the second part of that question: Do you think you will have it by October?*

*Secretary Vance:* I really don't know. This is a long process, as I've said many, many times. It's one which requires patience. We are going to devote ourselves to carrying through on a continuing basis on this, but I don't want to make any predictions as to when we'll reach agreement.

*Q. Mr. Secretary, would you elaborate on how the protocol would operate, as distinct from the treaty itself?*

*Secretary Vance:* Yes, the protocol would be limited to three years whereas the treaty would run until 1985.

*Q. Excuse me, three years starting when?*

*Secretary Vance:* Starting with the signing of the treaty and the protocol. It would run for three years and therefore would expire—assuming that one could be reached in the near future—well in advance of 1985.

*Q. Why was this course taken? Can you—*

*Secretary Vance:* Because it helps provide a blending of the various elements.

*Q. Mr. Secretary, on the blending, is it fair to say—since you are using the word blending—that the Soviets accept President Carter's deep-cuts proposal as one of the principles of the SALT agreement?*

*Secretary Vance:* Certainly one of the—let me say that SALT II and SALT III in our judgment are a continuum, and it is extremely important to set up the process so that this continuum can take place. Therefore, one of the portions of this framework is to provide the long-term goals which would be taken care of in SALT III and which, insofar as we are concerned, involve the comprehensive proposals. We have made clear to the Soviets our views with respect to what should be included in the statement of general principles. They will want to reflect on that and, I'm sure, give some views of their own as to what items should be included in such a statement of general principles, and that will be part of the ongoing talks.

*Q. Mr. Secretary, is there an agreement on what you will do if you do not have a new treaty by the time the current treaty expires?*

*Secretary Vance:* No, we did not discuss that.

*Q. Mr. Secretary, on some detail questions, first of all, is there an agreement that the treaty would be at 2,400 or is there a different number being talked about?*

*Secretary Vance:* I am not going to get into the details of the various pieces that would fit within these three elements. I have said before that these are an interdependent whole. Whether or not a particular piece goes in depends, in a number of cases, on whether another piece fits in. I think it would be not useful—indeed, I think it would be counterproductive—at this time to try and deal with individual pieces because we are involved in this ongoing process of discussions with them.

*Q. What is the purpose of the protocol? Does it begin around the cruise missile question? It is still not clear why you would have a three-year protocol.*

*Secretary Vance:* There are some items

which in the judgment of the parties do not fit in an agreement which lasts as long as 1985, and therefore there should be a shorter period of time to take care of those items.

*Q. What kind of items are you talking about?*

*Secretary Vance:* I have indicated that because of the interdependence of these, I am not going to spell out what items go in what particular parts of the package.

*Q. Is it all agreed which items you are going to—*

*Secretary Vance:* We have agreed on some; we have not agreed on others.

*Q. Is there a definite list of the unresolved questions?*

*Secretary Vance:* We are not going to make available a list of that.

*Q. Does it exist?*

*Secretary Vance:* Yes, we each understand what the unresolved issues are.

*Q. Mr. Secretary, have you discussed a possible meeting between the President and Mr. Brezhnev?*

*Secretary Vance:* We did not discuss it this time. No.

*Q. Mr. Secretary, has any of what one could call "the promise of the Beecher interview" been evident during your talks?<sup>2</sup>*

*Secretary Vance:* Some of the matters that were suggested in the Beecher interview were subjects of discussion in our talks.

*Q. Mr. Secretary, is the United States prepared to accept restrictions on the cruise missile now in any other framework than the comprehensive plan that was presented by the Soviets in Moscow last March?*

*Secretary Vance:* Again, I don't want to go into the detail of where individual pieces are going to fit in the proposed framework, and for the reasons that I have given you, because of this interdependence, and therefore I think it's—I'm not going to answer that question.

*Q. Mr. Secretary, if there is no treaty, is there also no protocol?*

*Secretary Vance:* That's correct. All the parts are interdependent: treaty, protocol, statement of general principles.

*Q. How would you compare this framework in significance with the Vladivostok understanding of November 1974?*

*Secretary Vance:* As the communique indicates, the Vladivostok accords are part of this general framework. I would point out to you that insofar as the U.S. position is concerned, we have always believed that the Vladivostok accords were an appropriate part of the discussions. Our deferral proposal related specifically to the Vladivostok accords, and the principles of it were certainly included also in our comprehensive proposal as well. So that is nothing new.

*Q. So when you talk about the Vladivostok accords, are you talking solely about 1974 or are you including Secretary Kissinger's discussion in 1976?*

*Secretary Vance:* The '76 discussions would be included within the overall framework we are talking about. When I use the word Vladivostok accords, I use it with a more restricted meaning than I think you are suggesting.

*Q. Mr. Secretary, there was a great deal of talk before these discussions took place here of cooling, of freezing, and deadlock of U.S.-Soviet relations. Do you feel that what has transpired here has set these two nations on a new course at all?*

*Secretary Vance:* Well, I said yesterday that I thought these had been very constructive talks, and I believe the Soviets would share that view, and I think the atmosphere is better as a result of these talks.

*Q. Mr. Secretary, do you give the continuation of these talks a good prospect of success in this year?*

*Secretary Vance:* On dates, I really don't want to speculate, because I think it is rather fruitless to speculate. There are serious issues that remain between us, and it's going to take a lot of discussion and negotiation before one

<sup>2</sup>In a copyrighted article in the Boston Globe of May 6, William Beecher reported on his interview with officials of the U.S.S.R.'s Institute of the USA and Canada.

can see whether or not these issues can be resolved.

*Q. In face of what you negotiated so far, Mr. Secretary, do you exclude a view that envisions a summit conference this year?*

*Secretary Vance:* I don't exclude it.

*Q. Is it safe to assume, Mr. Secretary, that cruise missile is one of the unresolved issues?*

*Secretary Vance:* [Laughter] I'm not going to answer on specific issues.

*Q. Mr. Secretary, did you hang tough in these negotiations? [Inaudible] assumed we would?*

*Secretary Vance:* [Laughter] I don't want to characterize how either Mr. Gromyko or I acted during the talks. I want to say that they were businesslike and constructive, and I think that describes it satisfactorily.

*Q. Was this three-tier framework fundamentally an American idea or a Soviet idea or [inaudible]?*

*Secretary Vance:* As I have indicated to you earlier, we have always believed that this was a continuum—namely, a continuum between SALT II and SALT III—and as a result of the discussions with the Soviets it developed out of that process and with that background.

*Q. Mr. Secretary, at his press conference in Moscow, Mr. Gromyko said that the Soviet Union would raise the question of forward-basing of missiles in certain circumstances. Is that issue still on the table?*

*Secretary Vance:* It was one of the ones that was raised during our talks here, yes.

*Q. Has it been resolved?*

*Secretary Vance:* Again I am not going to comment on specific items as to whether they have or have not been resolved.

*Q. Mr. Secretary, when you arrived here was this framework what you had in mind? Are you leaving here with what you wanted to leave with?*

*Secretary Vance:* Let me say that such a framework was in mind when we arrived here.

*Q. And you expected nothing more than that?*

*Secretary Vance:* I am pleased that this framework was basically agreed upon.

*Q. Mr. Secretary, one question on the Middle East. In view of the fact there has been such a contentious area between the Soviet Union and the United States, over the past, what is the convergence of views now between the two powers on the [inaudible]?*

*Secretary Vance:* Since the Carter Administration came into office, we have felt that both we and the Soviet Union, as cochairmen of the Geneva conference, have responsibilities to try and find a just and durable peace in the Middle East. We have kept each other generally informed throughout the period we have been in office as to the nature of our discussions with the various parties to whom we have talked, and to that end have cooperated in trying to move forward the peace process. This was but another step in that continuing process. We agreed that it was important now to try and see if we couldn't move forward to a meeting in the fall and therefore felt it would be useful to intensify our discussions with each other to see whether we could bring about such a process.

*Q. Mr. Secretary, a question of forward-basing—[inaudible] completely new dimension was being added to these talks by the Russians?*

*Secretary Vance:* No, they raised that question in Moscow as well.

*Q. Mr. Secretary, I don't want to sound overly negative or anything—without the details, we're thinking you're saying the general agreement on the framework—is there real progress toward resolving the real dispute or is it just another jiggling around of the same disagreement? In other words, have you actually removed some of the basic disagreements from the table or are you just working out another framework but the same basic problems still exist?*

*Secretary Vance:* I would say two things. I think there has been some progress toward resolving some of the issues. But I would say, secondly, that serious differences remain be-

tween us which are going to have to be worked out and which will be difficult to work out.

*Q. Mr. Secretary, from what you have said, it would appear that you do not have a clear commitment at this time from the Soviets to talk about deep cuts. Is that correct?*

*Secretary Vance:* I would put it this way, that if we achieve the total package which I have talked about—in other words, the total framework—then there would be such a commitment in the overall result.

*Q. But is there such a commitment [inaudible]?*

*Secretary Vance:* That is still a subject of discussion.

*Q. Did you find that Mr. Gromyko shares the U.S. assessment of the impact of the Israeli election on the Middle East?*

*Secretary Vance:* Well, I think both of us are waiting to see what happens. It is still unclear as to what the results are going to be. It remains to be seen when a government is formed, what the nature of that government will be. It will depend upon the statements of that government when it is formed. And we will not know that until we visit with the new Prime Minister, whenever the government is formed.

*Q. Mr. Secretary, you said just now if we achieve a total package in Geneva—the agreement for a three-tier thing you speak of—in that case the framework is still quite tentative, is that not so?*

*Secretary Vance:* The framework is clear as to the various elements in it. There is still disputed a number of them, as I indicated right at the outset.

*Q. Is that why the three pieces of the framework are not mentioned in the communique?*

*Secretary Vance:* No, I don't think that was the reason for it. We just described in it a shorthand way. We are agreed on the nature of the framework—three pieces, and the three pieces are as I described them.

*Q. But the impression, to me at least, is without putting it into the communique it is*

*more tentative than perhaps you are conveying to us.*

*Secretary Vance:* I think not. All I am saying is that there is substantial difference as to what pieces fit under what part and exactly what items will be included under each of these categories.

*Q. Mr. Secretary [inaudible] to the Soviet demand for limitation of spread of cruise technology to the NATO allies?*

*Secretary Vance:* Our position with respect to forward-based systems is well known. We believe that those are not an appropriate subject for discussion in this bilateral forum, that that is a question for discussion in the multilateral forum. Our position on that is well known and has been for a long time.

*Q. Mr. Secretary, did you discuss onsite inspection?*

*Secretary Vance:* Not as such. We decided to discuss the question of verification.

*Q. Without going into the details, I wonder if you could give us a little more help on the concept of the protocol and what it is meant to do. One would speculate very rapidly that you can put constraints on the deployment of cruise and Backfire in the protocol for three years and then bargain in the meantime. Is that the general idea, or—*

*Secretary Vance:* Those kinds of items could be included in the protocol.

*Q. Will the SALT II agreement be based on the figures of Vladivostok and the reductions only envisioned in the next stage [inaudible]? Will it be at this 2,400 ceiling and only in SALT III you will come to reductions?*

*Secretary Vance:* The answer to that is there may be reductions prior to SALT III. And that's as far as I want to go on that.

*Q. Mr. Secretary, could you tell us anything about progress made on the so-called secondary issues [inaudible]?*

*Secretary Vance:* Yes, the discussions are going on here in Geneva between Mr. Warnke's [Paul C. Warnke, Director, U.S. Arms Control and Disarmament Agency, and chairman of the U.S. delegation to the

Strategic Arms Limitation Talks} delegation and the Soviet delegation on those. The discussions have just started a short while ago. I can't say that any major progress has been made yet, but the discussions are underway. And perhaps as a result of the progress which has been made in our discussions here the last few days that may act as a stimulus to further activity on the secondary issues.

## JOINT COMMUNIQUE

Press release 224 dated May 21

In the course of the discussions between Cyrus R. Vance, Secretary of State of the USA, and L. I. Brezhnev, General Secretary of the Central Committee of the CPSU, and A. A. Gromyko, Member of the Politburo of the CPSU, Minister of Foreign Affairs of the USSR, held in Moscow at the end of March, 1977, Cyrus R. Vance and A. A. Gromyko met in Geneva on May 18-20.

They examined in detail the situation regarding the preparation of a new agreement on the limitation of strategic offensive arms based on the Vladivostok Accord and taking into account the results of subsequent discussions. Both sides agreed that the discussions in Geneva were necessary and useful and that progress had been made in developing a common framework for further negotiations. As a result of the exchange of views, the differences between the two sides on several of the previously unresolved questions have been narrowed. It is agreed that the discussions of all unresolved questions will be continued with the aim of an early conclusion of a new agreement that will replace the interim agreement on certain measures with respect to the limitation of strategic offensive armaments.

Cyrus R. Vance and A. A. Gromyko also had a thorough exchange of views on the problem of the settlement in the Middle East.

Both sides proceed on the premise that elimination of the continuing source of tension in the Middle East constitutes one of the primary tasks in ensuring peace and international security. They are convinced that in achieving this goal an important role belongs to the Geneva Peace Conference on the Middle East, an international forum specifically set up to negotiate a settlement of the Middle East problem in the interests of all the parties concerned.

Having confirmed that mutual efforts of the US and the USSR, who are co-chairmen of the Geneva Conference, are of substantial importance for achieving a just, durable and stable peace in the Middle East, the sides agreed to direct their joint efforts toward resuming the work of the Conference during the fall of 1977, while recognizing the importance of careful preparation before the Conference meets. For these purposes, the US and the USSR will be conducting monthly consultations at the level of ambassadors in Washington or Moscow.

They agreed, too, that they will be working in this direction also in their contacts with the parties immediately involved in the Middle East conflict.

## United States Signs Convention Banning Environmental Warfare

*Statement by Secretary Vance*<sup>1</sup>

On behalf of the United States of America, I am pleased to sign the Convention on the Prohibition of Military or Any Other Hostile Use of Environmental Modification Techniques. It is especially significant that this ceremony is taking place here in Geneva where, for a decade and a half, dedicated officials have labored to bring the goal of disarmament closer to reality. This convention was negotiated in this city by the Conference of the Committee on Disarmament and is an achievement to be added to other significant arms control agreements, such as the non-proliferation treaty, seabed arms control treaty, and the biological weapons convention.

While the intentional modification of the environment at present can be done only on a local and small scale at best, we scarcely need remind ourselves that in our era technology can advance to make possible actions which would cause hitherto inconceivable environmental consequences. So we believe it wise to outlaw what is commonly called "environmental warfare" before it has a real chance to be developed significantly for military purposes, with potentially disastrous consequences.

The convention does not prohibit research on and development of, or the use of, environmental modification techniques for peaceful purposes. The United States earnestly desires that all research and development, as well as use of environmental modification techniques, be dedicated solely to peaceful ends. To this end, as we have made clear in the past, we have no secrets in this area: All of our activities in the area of environmental

<sup>1</sup> Made at a ceremony on May 18 at Geneva at which 33 other signatories, including the Soviet Union, signed the convention (text from press release 217 dated May 17). For text of the convention, see BULLETIN of Jan. 10, 1977, p. 27.

modification are carried out on an open basis and the information is shared with others.

In the view of the United States, the effect of the convention should be to eliminate the danger of environmental warfare because it prohibits all significant hostile use of environmental modification techniques. According to the present terms, the convention limits the prohibition to those uses having "widespread, long-lasting or severe effects." The United States will be prepared to reexamine this limitation on the scope of the convention at the review conference or possibly before.

I wish to express the gratitude of the United States, as well as my own personal satisfaction, for the presence of the Secretary General of the United Nations on this occasion. For the first time in the history of our arms control endeavors, the Secretary General has been designated the depositary for an international convention; moreover, he has an important role to play if a question arises for which the factfinding committee of experts must be convened. The United States welcomes this new evidence of confidence and trust which nations have demonstrated in the Secretary General and in the United Nations.

In signing this convention, I hope that all other states do likewise.

## **U.S.-U.S.S.R. Working Groups Meet on Arms Limitation Questions**

*Joint U.S.-U.S.S.R. Communiqué*<sup>1</sup>

Pursuant to agreement reached in the course of the talks during the visit of United States Secretary of State Cyrus Vance to Moscow in March 1977, bilateral consultations

on some questions of arms limitation and disarmament were held in Geneva from 9 to 13 May between delegations of the USA and the USSR.

In the course of the consultations, questions of the prohibition of the development and production of new types and new systems of weapons of mass destruction were considered. In particular, the question of the prohibition of radiological weapons was examined. The sides discussed certain aspects and identified areas of agreement on questions under discussion.

The sides continued the consideration of questions related to a possible joint initiative in the CCD with respect to the conclusion of an international convention dealing with the most dangerous, lethal means of chemical warfare as a first step toward complete and effective prohibition of chemical weapons. The negotiations on this issue were held on the basis of the summit agreement between the USA and the USSR of July 3, 1974, and were a continuation of the US-Soviet consultations on lethal and other highly toxic means of chemical warfare conducted in Geneva in August 1976 and in April 1977. The discussion of these matters provided a useful basis for the continuation of the work with a view to preparing the text of an appropriate document which would be a practical implementation of the joint initiative.

The two sides agreed to meet in the near future to continue consideration of all the matters which had been under discussion.

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<sup>1</sup> Issued at Washington, Geneva, and Moscow on May 17 following meetings of the working groups on the prohibition of chemical weapons and on weapons of mass destruction (text from U.S. Arms Control and Disarmament Agency press release 77-6 dated May 17).

## U.S. Policy Toward Our NATO Partners: Traditional Commitments and New Directions

*Statement by Arthur A. Hartman  
Assistant Secretary for European Affairs*<sup>1</sup>

U.S. policy toward Europe and Canada is a compound of continuity and change: Continued commitment to our traditional responsibilities and enhanced impetus to new directions necessary to meet the common challenges of the next decade.

Our increased emphasis on human rights, on curbing nuclear proliferation, and on reducing arms transfers to volatile areas is set in a context of commitment to the Atlantic alliance; of ongoing support for European integration and the European Community; of a close relationship with our northern neighbor, Canada; of the assurance of military security vis-a-vis the Soviet Union, combined with realistic measures to reduce East-West tension; and of a determination to treat the countries of Eastern Europe as independent and sovereign entities.

The three summit meetings in London this month dramatically underscored both our traditional commitments and our new directions. The unity and strength of NATO remain critical. President Carter, during the summit meetings in London two weeks ago, pledged our commitment to preserving that unity and enhancing that strength. He did so by asserting that:

—We will continue to make the alliance the heart of our foreign policy.

—We will remain a reliable and faithful ally.

—We will join with (our allies) to strengthen the alliance—politically, economically, and militarily.

—We will ask for and listen to the advice of our allies. And we will give our views in return, candidly and as friends.

The President's attendance at a NATO session on his first foreign trip demonstrates our commitment to alliance unity. Vice President Mondale's trip to Brussels to address the NATO Council only 39 hours after the inauguration underlined the same commitment.

Our commitment to join in strengthening the alliance has already been proven by the increased defense contribution to NATO in the President's first budget—over one-half billion dollars. The President has also reaffirmed our commitment to a strategy of flexible response and forward defense. To achieve the necessary strength to apply this strategy, however, all the allies must develop and modernize their forces, as well as promote efficiency by eliminating waste and duplication.

To do this, the President has proposed that NATO develop a long-term defense program for the 1980's. This program should combine, coordinate, and concert national programs; introduce new technology; and give higher priority to increasing force readiness. The NATO summit meeting enthusiastically endorsed this approach, and NATO defense ministers have already initiated followup work.

<sup>1</sup> Made before the Subcommittee on Europe and the Middle East of the House Committee on International Relations on May 23. The complete transcript of the hearings will be published by the committee and will be available from the Superintendent of Documents, U.S. Government Printing Office, Washington, D.C. 20402.

Finally, the President has proposed, and NATO has agreed to, a major review of East-West relations and an analysis of what these trends mean for the alliance. This study and our continuing consultations with our allies on a broad range of issues should help us forge that unity of purpose and political will that strengthens our NATO ties.

In his speech at the NATO summit, the President also expressed strong U.S. support for progress toward Western European unification and the expanding role of the European Community in world affairs and added that we will work closely with the Community. This does not mean, of course, that there will not be problems between us. In particular, it will be important to preserve the fluid transatlantic trading relationship which has been of overall benefit both to the U.S. and to the European economies. Nor does the President's statement mean that the United States should seek to determine the character and the pace of the unification process. That is for the Europeans themselves to determine. But we are glad to give our wholehearted support to the unification process, as every U.S. Administration has done since the end of World War II.

President Carter remarked in London that for the first time all the members of the alliance are democracies. We are particularly gratified at the democratic progress in Spain and Portugal. Our continued support—and that of other friends and allies—for this progress will be necessary. The United States has taken the lead in a multilateral lending program to provide balance-of-payments assistance to the greatly strained Portuguese economy. In three weeks Spain will have its first democratic election in over four decades. Both Vice President Mondale and Secretary Vance, in their recent visits, have emphasized U.S. support for the process of democratization and for all the genuinely democratic forces in Spain.

#### **Problems in the Eastern Mediterranean**

Elsewhere in Western Europe there are serious problems affecting U.S. interests. Instability in the eastern Mediterranean is re-

flected in a triple problem: a Cyprus problem, an Aegean problem, and a NATO problem.

The Administration is committed to doing everything it possibly can to advance the cause of a just solution to the Cyprus problem at the earliest possible date. We recognize that the gap in positions between the two Cyprus communities remains wide after the talks in Vienna last month. We think, however, that with time, good will, and hard work a settlement can be achieved. We think it important that the negotiations continue and concentrate on the two key issues of the future governmental structure for Cyprus and the territorial aspect of the problem.

The Aegean Sea involves complex questions of international law of the sea, but also strong mutual fears and suspicions on the part of Greece and Turkey. We have urged both sides on many occasions to avoid provocative actions, pursue a path of moderation, and attempt to negotiate their differences. Talks are going on, and we hope that progress can be made on such questions as the Continental Shelf and control of the airspace in the Aegean area.

We are also anxious to strengthen our bilateral and NATO relations with both Greece and Turkey. We think this can best be done through defense cooperation agreements with both countries. In the interim, until such agreements can enter into effect, we think the security assistance program presented by the Administration for 1978 is reasonable and is in the long-term interest of both countries, the United States, and NATO.

In much of Western Europe the slowness of the economic recovery has caused major economic difficulties and exacerbated political troubles. In a large sense, only the countries themselves can deal with the root causes of these difficulties. The United States and other major industrial countries can contribute to these efforts. And the pace of our own economic recovery will have an effect on recovery in Western Europe. The seven leaders at the London economic summit recognized that in each of our countries the most urgent task is to create more jobs while continuing to reduce inflation. The United States en-



thusiastically subscribes to the other objectives of the economic summit: To strengthen the open international trading system and give new impetus to the Tokyo round of multilateral trade negotiations; to conserve energy and reduce our dependence on oil; and to increase the flow of aid and other real resources to developing countries.

For the last 18 months representatives of the industrialized and developing countries have been meeting at the Conference on International Economic Cooperation (CIEC) in intensive discussion of the relations between rich and poor nations. The conference will conclude with a ministerial-level meeting, beginning May 30 in Paris, where we expect the two sides will agree on a set of realistic recommendations which will foster improved relations between the industrialized and developing countries.

### **Priority of East-West Relations**

East-West relations remain a signal priority in our European policy. The mutually reinforcing dimensions of U.S. policy toward the East remain: (1) to prevent the Soviet Union from transforming its military power into political expansion or advantage and (2) to seek to resolve conflicts and disputes through negotiation while enhancing incentives for Soviet moderation.

In SALT [Strategic Arms Limitation Talks], the United States has a unique challenge. We know that competition with the Soviets will continue, but we must seek ways to control and especially to reduce that competition. Given the strength of our own strategic programs, and Western technological superiority, we believe that Soviet interest in accommodation with us will continue to be strong. But nothing will produce Soviet concessions which in their view would damage their security interests. Thus we must find ways to limit competition equitably.

In addition, both we and certain of our European allies are engaged in MBFR [mutual and balanced force reduction] talks in Vienna, where we wish to apply the same principles of parity and where we wish to achieve a collective ceiling that does not in-

hibit our ability to plan our force structure within that ceiling. In Secretary Vance's discussions in Moscow we underscored the need for serious examination of force data. We indicated that this is necessary if we are to achieve the understandings necessary to promote mutual security and to avoid one-sided military advantage. The President has pledged his support for these efforts.

The major objective of NATO's deterrent is of course to convince the Soviets that any aggression would be counterproductive. But we will need to show our concern for Soviet behavior beyond the shores and borders of the European Continent. We cannot be oblivious to Soviet activities in southern Africa, the Horn, and elsewhere in the Third World. As the President said at Notre Dame yesterday, "We cannot have accommodation in one part of the world and the aggravation of conflicts in another."

It is worth pointing out that, despite the new opportunities in southern Africa which Moscow has sought to exploit, in most areas the Soviet record is not particularly inspiring. The new government in India appears anxious to return to a more balanced policy of nonalignment; and Sino-Soviet relations seem to be souring anew in the wake of Soviet efforts to improve relations with the post-Mao leadership in China.

We cannot realistically seek to exclude the Soviets from a role in areas where tensions exist, such as the Middle East. It is in our interest to encourage a responsible Soviet role in helping revive the negotiation process among the parties concerned, looking toward a peace settlement in the Middle East. We should also make every effort to insulate Third World situations from East-West competition and to seek a reduction of tensions of benefit to all.

The Administration believes that Western economic engagement in the Soviet Union and Eastern Europe should be an important aspect of our policy toward the East. We see both economic and political advantages to expanding our trade ties—economic because of the export surpluses we are able to create, political because in the long run a significant

East-West economic relationship should contribute to a broader lessening of tensions. In view of the growth in East-West trade and, perhaps even more important, of the large debt which the Soviets and their allies have run up with Western creditors, it would seem logical for us to take a more coordinated look at the long-term implications of our economic relations with the East. President Carter's proposal for a NATO study of East-West relations, approved in London earlier this month, should be helpful in such a process.

### **Continuation of CSCE Process**

Let me say a word about the U.S. approach to another major multilateral negotiation now underway in the East-West context in addition to the SALT talks and MBFR—the review of implementation of the CSCE [Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe] understandings reached at Helsinki.

We strongly believe that the Helsinki Final Act has initiated a process which can prove very useful for Western objectives. This is a perception which was not widely accepted at the time. The U.S. Government begins from the premise that Western unity is all-important if we are to keep CSCE consistent with our own interests. And we strongly favor the Western approach approved at the NATO summit that emphasizes the importance of implementation of all the obligations undertaken two years ago at Helsinki. We need to remember that the CSCE process will be a useful one only insofar as it concentrates on the importance of specific obligations. If such a concentration requires some fairly frank talk with the Soviets and their allies, we will not shrink from that. We don't want to be confrontational, but we do want to be firm.

We are fully aware of the opportunities for growing contacts with Eastern Europe, as well as the Soviet Union, that CSCE provides. We think it is only natural that the countries of Eastern Europe, so many of which have strong traditional ties with Western Europe and with the United States, should revive and expand those ties. There is some concern that increased Western contacts with the countries of Eastern Europe would

be destabilizing and should therefore be kept to a minimum. I believe this concern is exaggerated. To the degree that Eastern Europe is unstable, it is unstable because of the relationship between the Eastern European countries and the Soviet Union; the West had nothing to do with defining that relationship. Our attitude will continue to be based on a determination to treat the countries of Eastern Europe as independent and sovereign and to recognize no claim to spheres of influence or to hegemony. Naturally, the process of expanding ties can only proceed at a pace which the governments of Eastern Europe are willing and able to sustain. We envisage a gradual evolutionary process, but a commitment to that process is a fundamental one for the United States.

### **Conditions for Progress in Human Rights**

I said at the outset that the new Administration brings new directions to our policies, and this is particularly true in the human rights area. An increased priority for human rights issues can contribute to the evolution of societies in a more moderate direction without endangering Western security objectives. At the NATO summit, the allies stressed the importance of promoting respect for human rights. In our view, our human rights policy is consistent with détente and not antithetical to it; indeed, it can contribute to the détente objectives we and our allies all seek.

President Carter and Secretary Vance have made clear that we recognize the limits which are imposed upon us. As the President said yesterday, we will not conduct our foreign policy by rigid moral maxims. In many cases we are dealing with societies which have a tradition of authoritarianism that goes back many decades, even centuries. We cannot hope for changes overnight, nor should we deflect our primary objective from the essential need to moderate the international, rather than the internal, behavior of states. We do not intend to meddle in matters which can properly be considered the internal affairs of states. But at the same time, no state which has signed the U.N. Declaration on Human Rights and the Helsinki Final Act can claim

that the way they treat their own citizens is entirely their internal affair.

That being said, let me emphasize our conviction that in the long run progress in human rights in Europe is best achieved in conditions of détente. We are well aware that an approach which ignores this fact would not only imperil some of our major objectives of détente but also fail to improve the condition of the very people we are trying to help.

Mr. Chairman, let me make a final point about the East-West relationship. In the end, the military balance, our ability to reduce East-West political tension, and the ultimate success of our détente policies will depend on the degree to which the West can maintain its military strength, its economic health, and its democratic values. The ultimate challenge that is posed for us is not so much the challenge of a foreign threat; it is a challenge within ourselves and our societies.

There is some pessimism in Europe about our ability to get our economies moving and to preserve the viability of our democratic systems. The summits which have just taken place in London were above all an effort to show to ourselves and to our publics and legislatures that no matter how intricate the problems that crowd about us, we have the political will and the ability to deal with them. If we can master this type of challenge, then I have every confidence that we can manage the separate but related challenge that confronts us from the Eastern half of the continent.

The final words of the seven-nation summit communique were as follows:

The message of the Downing Street Summit is thus one of confidence:

—in the continuing strength of our societies and the proven democratic principles that give them vitality;

—that we are undertaking the measures needed to overcome problems and achieve a more prosperous future.

President Carter voiced that same confidence in South Bend yesterday. Let me end by recalling his words:

It is a new world, but America should not fear it. It is a new world, and we should help to shape it. It is a new world that calls for a new American foreign policy—a policy based on constant decency in its values and on optimism in our historical vision.

## Third Sinai Support Mission Report Transmitted to the Congress

*Message From President Carter*<sup>1</sup>

*To the Congress of the United States:*

I am pleased to transmit herewith the Third Report of the United States Sinai Support Mission. This report describes the manner in which the Mission is continuing to carry out its peacekeeping responsibilities by operating an early warning system in the Sinai, as called for in the basic agreement between Egypt and Israel signed on September 4, 1975. This report is provided to the Congress in conformity with Section 4 of Public Law 94-110 of October 13, 1975.

The report emphasizes the successful completion on February 22, 1977, of one full year of operations. With the completion of initial construction activity, the Sinai Field Mission has had an opportunity to analyze in detail various elements of the Mission's activity. In particular, attention has been directed to improving operating procedures, to upgrading equipment and to reducing personnel through the introduction of advanced technology.

The parties to the agreement continue to affirm their satisfaction with the role of the United States in the Sinai and the fair way in which the Sinai Support Mission has discharged its responsibilities for the early warning system.

As our initiatives to help the parties to the Arab-Israeli dispute move toward a resumption of negotiations, it is important that the United States continue to fulfill its commitments. As long as the Sinai Support Mission is able to make a positive contribution to these efforts, I will urge that the Congress continue its support for this important mission.

JIMMY CARTER.

THE WHITE HOUSE, *April 27, 1977.*

<sup>1</sup> Transmitted on Apr. 27 (text from Weekly Compilation of Presidential Documents dated May 2); also printed as H. Doc. 95-130, which includes the text of the report.

## Department Discusses International Economic Importance of Enactment of the President's Energy Program

*Statement by Julius L. Katz*

*Assistant Secretary for Economic and Business Affairs*<sup>1</sup>

I am pleased to have this opportunity to testify on behalf of the President's comprehensive energy program. I propose in this statement to speak to the international economic importance of enactment of the President's energy program. Other Administration witnesses are addressing the detailed operation and impact of the specific tax proposals in the package before you.

The proposals before you for taxes, rebates, and credits are, of course, critical elements of the total energy program. They are the ways by which conservation will be made effective as the cornerstone of our national energy policy. They are the means by which required burdens will be shared fairly among all sectors of the population. These measures will result in a change for the better in the way we regard, value, and use energy.

While questions will be raised about whether the country needs to undertake the program proposed or whether it can afford it, the more appropriate question is: Can we really afford to do less than what the President proposed, considering the energy prospects we face and the limited time we have to make adjustments?

There has been a fundamental shift in global supply and demand for energy in the 1970's. The United States imported little more than 3 million barrels a day in 1969. However,

domestic oil production peaked in 1970 and the import level rapidly increased to over 6 million barrels a day in 1973. By that time, the United States had become the world's largest oil importer. U.S. demand, plus the exponential growth in European and Japanese demand over the previous two decades, created a situation which was exploited by the oil producers in 1973-74. The average cost of our oil imports rose from \$3.22 to \$12.52 a barrel between 1972 and 1974.

Nevertheless, the full impact of these massive price increases on the United States was blunted because imports accounted for little more than one-third of total U.S. oil consumption. However, our dependence on oil imports has continued to grow. Imports made up 42 percent of oil consumption in 1976 and reached 50 percent for the first time in the depth of the past winter. If we do not put policies in place now to correct this trend, our vulnerability will be far greater in the 1980's than it was in 1973-74.

The President has made available the CIA forecast of a gap in the 1980's between the production and demand for oil. Independent analyses by the OECD [Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development] and the International Energy Agency have reached the same conclusion. This is a prudent forecast which should rest at the foundation of U.S. energy policy.

Unfortunately, this forecast has been misunderstood. No one in government, not the President nor the CIA, has suggested that there is an immediate danger of exhausting

<sup>1</sup> Made before the House Committee on Ways and Means on May 17. The complete transcript of the hearings will be published by the committee and will be available from the Superintendent of Documents, U.S. Government Printing Office, Washington, D.C. 20402.

worldwide or even domestic oil reserves. Rather, the CIA estimate dealt with producible capacity in relation to projected growth in global demand for oil. Because of the long leadtimes, the ability to increase capacity by the mid-eighties is constrained. Thus, unless the rate of growth of demand is slowed substantially, the world would face severe supply shortages or sharp increases in oil prices by 1985, and perhaps earlier in the decade. Other, nongovernmental studies we have seen of the long-term prospects for producing conventional and synthetic oil and gas do not contradict this forecast. All serious studies acknowledge that there are major economic, technological, environmental, and other constraints on full exploitation of potential world oil reserves in the medium term.

The energy challenge is a global challenge. Its solution requires global cooperation. The United States cannot solve the global imbalance by its own efforts alone. At the same time, the ability of the world to correct the global imbalance requires our strong contribution to the effort to reduce dependence on imported oil and to accelerate the transition to other sources of energy.

The United States and its industrialized allies share a collective vulnerability. As a result, energy has become a central element in our close political, economic, and security relations with them. We must cooperate in energy for our mutual benefit, or energy will become a divisive issue that undermines and weakens our overall strength.

The focus of cooperation among industrialized countries is the International Energy Agency, made up of 19 major oil-importing nations. The IEA now has in operational readiness an international emergency program to mitigate the impact of sudden supply interruptions through the use of stocks and reserves, demand-restraint measures, and the allocation of available oil.

The IEA has also agreed to develop a program of long-term energy cooperation through joint efforts in conservation, accelerated development of alternative energy sources, and research and development (R. & D.). For example, in conservation, major studies have been undertaken in dis-

trict heating, conservation in industry, and cogeneration of electricity and steam heat. Implementing agreements have been signed for projects in energy conservation in buildings, energy cascading to utilize waste heat, and the applications of heat pumps.

The IEA has underway sectoral studies on the supply and demand for natural gas and coal in the IEA area and the identification of cooperative measures that will optimize coal consumption in the medium term. Implementing agreements have been signed for R. & D. projects in such areas as hydrogen production, solar heating and cooling, construction of an intense neutron source, the exchange of information on nuclear safety, and others. In addition, the IEA has completed design work for a \$5 million fluidized-bed combustion facility to burn coal cleanly.

The IEA is now engaged in a process which will result in its adopting a collective objective for reducing the oil import dependence of this group of countries by 1985. To support this goal and insure that it will be achieved, IEA governments would adopt an overall framework within which national energy policies would be formulated and reviewed. In this process, each IEA member government would make an appropriate contribution to the common objective.

The United States accounts for one-half the energy consumed by IEA member countries and is the largest single importer of oil. The U.S. contribution will obviously be the most important single element in the ability of the group to achieve reduced dependence. The President's program to reduce U.S. oil imports to 6 million barrels a day by 1985 would represent a substantial contribution by the United States to the common goal. Enactment of the program will clearly demonstrate U.S. leadership and will give a strong impetus to other industrialized countries to set and meet their own national goals.

The President's energy program will also be a key element in eliciting cooperation from the producers in supplying adequate quantities of oil at manageable prices in the years ahead. Sharp oil price increases in the 1980's will be avoided only if the United States and other major consuming countries show demonstra-

ble progress toward reduced dependence through conservation-based energy policies and if key oil-producing countries accept that their self-interest in global economic stability and growth requires restraint in oil price increases.

In this connection, the President's proposals to move domestic oil prices to world levels through phased tax and price increases do not constitute an endorsement of OPEC [Organization of Petroleum Exporting Countries] prices or a justification for further OPEC price increases. The President's oil-pricing proposal has two main features:

1. The price of domestic oil to consumers should reflect its replacement cost, which is the price of imported oil.
2. Returns to domestic producers should reflect increases in their costs. Consequently, an adjustment in returns to producers will be made to compensate for domestic inflation.

The situation in the OPEC countries is far different. They are today receiving several times the cost of producing their oil. Even if prices were to remain fixed in nominal terms for a number of years, there would remain substantial incentive for them to continue to produce and in fact to increase production.

As we have seen, massive OPEC price increases have a severe impact on global economic growth and price stability. Oil-importing countries have paid \$367 billion in oil import bills since 1973. This income transfer is equivalent to a huge excise tax. The impact reduced the annual growth rate in OECD countries by 1.2 percent and accelerated the average rate of inflation in these countries by 3 percent.

Oil-importing developing countries were hurt even more by the massive oil price increases of the recent past. While their oil import costs soared, their own exports suffered because of the oil-price-induced recession in industrialized countries. The prices of their imports of manufactured goods rose as energy costs rose and their debt burden mounted. From 1973 to 1975, the direct and indirect foreign exchange loss to these countries from higher oil prices was \$30 billion, pushing their total foreign debt to precarious heights. Energy burdens have become a criti-

cal constraint to their development prospects. Moreover, if oil shortages and sharp price increases are allowed to develop in the 1980's, they will again be the least able to compete and to cope. Thus, their interests, too, are at stake in the willingness and ability of all nations to pursue policies which will insure a smooth energy transition period and adequate, sustainable economic growth.

The lesson which the oil producers must draw from recent global economic history is that their new-found power must be exercised with restraint and responsibility. Even short-term gains from further additions to their annual \$125 billion in oil earnings through price increases are undermined by the effects on global inflation and domestic inflation in the OPEC countries themselves. More importantly, the long-term interests of the producers in maintaining the value of their financial assets and investments and in achieving their aspirations for economic and industrial development as future exporters of non-oil goods depend upon a stable and growing world economy.

The Department of State will be making the strongest possible effort in bilateral and multilateral dealings with the producers to enlist their positive cooperation and responsible contribution during the global energy transition, in which the interests of all nations are at stake. Nothing is as crucial to the credibility and effectiveness of this diplomatic effort as enactment of the President's program to demonstrate U.S. leadership and acceptance of our share of responsibility in meeting the global energy challenge.

## **Congressional Documents Relating to Foreign Policy**

- Foreign Relations Authorization for Fiscal Year 1978. Hearings before the Subcommittee on International Operations of the House Committee on International Relations. Part I. March 22-24, 1977. 253 pp.
- International Cooperation To Curb Nuclear Proliferation. Report of the Senate Committee on Foreign Relations to accompany S. Res. 94. S. Rept. 95-103. April 26, 1977. 4 pp.
- Control of Nuclear Proliferation. Message from the President of the United States dated April 27, 1977, transmitting draft legislation. H. Doc. 95-131. April 28, 1977. 25 pp.

Foreign Relations Authorization Act, Fiscal Year 1978. Report of the House Committee on International Relations to accompany H.R. 6689. H. Rept. 95-231. April 29, 1977. 58 pp.

Foreign Corrupt Practices and Domestic and Foreign Investment Improved Disclosure Acts of 1977. Report of the Senate Committee on Banking, Housing, and Urban Affairs, together with additional views, to accompany S. 305. S. Rept. 95-114. May 2, 1977. 23 pp.

Extending and Amending the Export-Import Bank Act of 1945. Report of the House Committee on Banking, Finance and Urban Affairs, together with dissenting views, to accompany H.R. 6415. H. Rept. 95-235. May 2, 1977. 22 pp.

International Development and Food Assistance Act of 1977. Report of the House Committee on International Relations, together with supplemental views, to accompany H.R. 6714. H. Rept. 95-240. May 3, 1977. 87 pp.

## TREATY INFORMATION

### U.S.-Finland Extradition Treaty Transmitted to the Senate

*Message From President Carter*<sup>1</sup>

*To the Senate of the United States:*

With a view to receiving the advice and consent of the Senate to ratification, I transmit herewith the Treaty on Extradition between the United States of America and Finland, signed at Helsinki on June 11, 1976.

I transmit also, for the information of the Senate, the report of the Department of State with respect to the Treaty.

The Treaty is one of a modern series of extradition treaties being negotiated by the United States. It adds to the list of extraditable offenses the offenses of aircraft hijacking, narcotics, and conspiracy to commit listed offenses and, upon entry into force, will terminate and supersede the

<sup>1</sup> Transmitted on Apr. 18 (text from White House press release); also printed as S. Ex. I, 95th Cong., 1st sess., which includes the texts of the treaty and the report of the Department of State.

existing extradition treaty relationship between the United States and Finland.

This Treaty will make a significant contribution to the international effort to control narcotics traffic. I recommend that the Senate give early and favorable consideration to the Treaty and give its advice and consent to ratification.

JIMMY CARTER.

THE WHITE HOUSE, April 18, 1977.

## Current Actions

### MULTILATERAL

#### Environmental Modification

Convention on the prohibition of military or any other hostile use of environmental modification techniques, with annex. Done at Geneva May 18, 1977. Enters into force upon the deposit of instruments of ratification by 20 governments.

*Signatures:* Belgium, Bolivia, Bulgaria, Byelorussian Soviet Socialist Republic, Canada, Czechoslovakia, Denmark, Ethiopia, Finland, German Democratic Republic, Federal Republic of Germany, Hungary, Iceland, Iran, Ireland, Italy, Lebanon, Liberia, Luxembourg, Mongolia, Morocco, Netherlands, Norway, Poland, Portugal, Romania, Spain, Turkey, Uganda, Ukrainian Soviet Socialist Republic, Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, United Kingdom, United States, Yemen, May 18, 1977.

#### Nuclear Free Zone—Latin America

Additional protocol I to the treaty of February 14, 1967, for the prohibition of nuclear weapons in Latin America. Done at Mexico February 14, 1967.<sup>1</sup>

*Signature:* United States, May 26, 1977.

#### Ocean Dumping

Convention on the prevention of marine pollution by dumping of wastes and other matter, with annexes. Done at London, Mexico City, Moscow, and Washington December 29, 1972. Entered into force August 30, 1975. TIAS 8165.

*Accession deposited:* Cape Verde, May 26, 1977.

#### Safety at Sea

Convention on the international regulations for preventing collisions at sea, 1972. Done at London October 20, 1972. Enters into force July 15, 1977.

*Accessions deposited:* Cape Verde, April 28, 1977; Morocco, April 27, 1977; Singapore, April 29, 1977.

Amendments to chapters II, III, IV and V of the international convention for the safety of life at sea, 1960 (TIAS 5780). Adopted at London November 20, 1973.<sup>2</sup>

*Acceptance deposited:* Tunisia, May 3, 1977.

<sup>1</sup> Not in force for the United States.

<sup>2</sup> Not in force.

Amendment to chapter VI of the international convention for the safety of life at sea, 1960 (TIAS 5780). Adopted at London November 20, 1973.<sup>2</sup>  
*Acceptance deposited:* Tunisia, May 3, 1977.  
 International convention for the safety of life at sea, 1974, with annex. Done at London November 1, 1974.<sup>2</sup>  
*Accession deposited:* Cape Verde, April 28, 1977.

## BILATERAL

### Guatemala

Excess property transfer agreement, with annexes. Signed at Guatemala April 21, 1977. Entered into force April 21, 1977.

### Japan

Agreement modifying and extending the agreement of March 27, 1974 (TIAS 7843), relating to the location and operation of a temporary Japanese downrange station on Kwajalein Island. Effected by exchange of notes at Washington May 20, 1977. Entered into force May 20, 1977.

### Mexico

Act approving Minute No. 257 of the International Boundary and Water Commission confirming relocation of the channel of the Rio Grande. Signed at

Washington May 26, 1977. Entered into force May 26, 1977.

### Pakistan

Loan Agreement for the Fauji-Agrico fertilizer project, with annex. Signed at Islamabad April 1, 1977. Entered into force April 1, 1977.

### Union of Soviet Socialist Republics

Agreement concerning dates for use of land for, and construction of, embassy complexes in Moscow and Washington. Effected by exchange of notes at Moscow March 30, 1977. Entered into force March 30, 1977.

Agreement concerning cooperation in the exploration and use of outer space for peaceful purposes. Signed at Geneva May 18, 1977. Entered into force May 24, 1977.

### United Nations Children's Fund

Agreement relating to the transfer of blended foods to the United Nations Children's Fund. Signed at Washington and New York April 29 and May 11, 1977. Entered into force May 11, 1977.

Agreement relating to the transfer of instant corn-soy-milk to the United Nations Children's Fund. Signed at Washington and New York May 4 and 11, 1977. Entered into force May 11, 1977.

<sup>2</sup> Not in force.

### Checklist of Department of State

#### Press Releases: May 23-29

Press releases may be obtained from the Office of Press Relations, Department of State, Washington, D.C. 20520.

No.	Date	Subject	No.	Date	Subject
*227	5/23	U.S. Advisory Commission on International Educational and Cultural Affairs, Jun. 13.	*234	5/27	Rozanne L. Ridgway sworn in as Ambassador to Finland (biographic data).
*228	5/23	Wilbert John Le Melle sworn in as Ambassador to Kenya and the Seychelles (biographic data).	*235	5/27	Mabel Murphy Smythe sworn in as Ambassador to Cameroon (biographic data).
*229	5/23	Vance: arrival, Washington, May 21.	*236	5/27	Philip H. Alston, Jr., sworn in as Ambassador to Australia (biographic data).
*230	5/24	Anne Cox Chambers sworn in as Ambassador to Belgium (biographic data).	*237	5/27	Shipping Coordinating Committee, Subcommittee on Safety of Life at Sea, working group on radiocommunications, Jun. 22.
*231	5/25	Michael J. Mansfield sworn in as Ambassador to Japan (biographic data).	*238	5/27	Advisory Committee on Private International Law, study group on maritime bills of lading, Jun. 24.
†232	5/26	U.S.-Mexico complete transfer of territory.	*239	5/27	Advisory Committee on Private International Law, study group on maritime bills of lading, Jun. 23.
†233	5/26	Texts of agreements and related documents on fishery matters and maritime boundaries signed at Havana, Apr. 27.	*240	5/27	Advisory Panel on Folk Music and Jazz, Jun. 17.
			*241	5/27	U.S. National Committee for the International Radio Consultative Committee (CCIR), study group 6, Jun. 20-21.
			*242	5/29	Kingman Brewster sworn in as Ambassador to the U.K. (biographic data).
			*243	5/29	Vance: arrival, Paris, May 21.

\* Not printed.

† Held for a later issue of the BULLETIN.



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Volume LXXVI • No. 1982 • June 20, 1977

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# THE DEPARTMENT OF STATE BULLETIN

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*The Department of State BULLETIN, a weekly publication issued by the Office of Media Services, Bureau of Public Affairs, provides the public and interested agencies of the government with information on developments in the field of U.S. foreign relations and on the work of the Department and the Foreign Service.*

*The BULLETIN includes selected press releases on foreign policy, issued by the White House and the Department, and statements, addresses, and news conferences of the President and the Secretary of State and other officers of the Department, as well as special articles on various phases of international affairs and the functions of the Department. Information is included concerning treaties and international agreements to which the United States is or may become a party and on treaties of general international interest.*

*Publications of the Department of State, United Nations documents, and legislative material in the field of international relations are also listed.*

## Secretary Vance Attends Ministerial Meeting of the Conference on International Economic Cooperation

*Secretary Vance headed the U.S. delegation to the final meeting of the Conference on International Economic Cooperation (CIEC), which was held at Paris, May 30-June 2. Following is Secretary Vance's address made before the conference on May 30, the transcript of a news conference held at Paris by Under Secretary for Economic Affairs Richard N. Cooper on June 3, and the text of the final communique issued at Paris on June 3.<sup>1</sup>*

### ADDRESS BY SECRETARY VANCE, MAY 30

Press release 244 dated May 30

The message I bring from my President and from the United States is this:

We believe in the purposes and objectives of this conference.

We are committed to finding solutions to problems which face no single country, but all of us.

We are under no illusion that the actions we take this week will resolve problems that have been centuries in the making.

But we know that failure is not acceptable—not acceptable to any person or any nation at this conference.

I want you to know where my country stands. In recent years I know that some have come to question the motives of my country and to believe that we, as a rich and powerful nation, can only be addressed as though we were an adversary. At this meeting, and at this moment, I want the policy of the United States to be understood.

There should be a new international economic system. In that system there must be

equity; there must be growth; but above all, there must be justice. We are prepared to help build that new system.

But at the same time, we are prepared to admit that it will not be built here this week, nor will it be built without many painful adjustments, accommodations, and sacrifices by all of us present here today.

The United States will not be passive in this effort. We will not merely react. We will join with you in sharing the responsibility to lead.

As a first step, and before the business of this conference has been completed, I wish to make clear that we believe the North-South dialogue should continue. We are openminded about the appropriate forum.

The larger vision underlying CIEC is far more important than the smaller and temporary interests which sometimes divide us. It is this larger vision—the vision of a world in which common humanity and common values can override regional or national selfishness—which we must continually keep foremost in our minds.

Now let me speak about the tangible ways we can begin—here this week.

### Transfer of Resources

First, the transfer of resources.

Development requires capital, technology, and managerial skills on an enormous scale. They must come from many nations, in many ways. Official development assistance will remain a significant source of support and must be increased worldwide. But private capital is also vital and will continue to offer even greater resources over a wider range of activities than official aid.

In the last two years the United States, through both private and official sources, has

<sup>1</sup> Other press releases related to Secretary Vance's trip include Nos. 243 of May 29, 245 of May 30, 247 of May 31, and 250 of June 2.

provided capital transfers to the developing world averaging 1 percent of our gross national product. But we know that even these transfers are no more than a beginning and that they have not always been most usefully directed.

We are joining with others in channeling billions of dollars in new resources to existing multilateral institutions—the International Development Association, the World Bank and regional banks, and the International Finance Corporation. And the poorest countries can look forward to a new source of finance to help produce food for their people—the billion-dollar International Fund for Agricultural Development.

Let me be candid. Too many of our transfers, too much of our aid, has not been intelligently directed to the purposes and priorities which will really make a difference in people's lives.

We are still learning what works in international development and what does not; what creates lasting change and what does not—and when I say we, I mean the rich and poor nations alike.

For our part, President Carter will seek from the Congress a substantial increase in the volume of our bilateral and multilateral aid programs over the coming five years. But we will also demand that this aid be more effectively planned, delivered, and administered.

The American people will support an effective aid program that is devised clearly and specifically to meet human needs. They also will insist that other rich nations, many of which have already taken the lead, also make significant contributions. And they also will expect that recipients of assistance display a proper concern for the economic, social, political, and human rights of their citizens.

We believe the industrialized Communist countries also should increase their development assistance. We are prepared to join with them in such assistance, when and where they are willing to do it.

We should agree here to support a substantial increase in the general capital of the International Bank for Reconstruction and Development. Such an increase would not only

permit the World Bank to expand its normal lending in real terms, it also would enable the bank to undertake new programs in areas of growing importance—energy, resource development, and commodity diversification.

The development of local oil, coal, gas, and other energy resources in developing countries poor in energy will help ease the rising financial burden of high-priced oil imports. The United States is prepared to share in any such program of energy development.

We are ready, too, at this conference to join with other countries in a special action program of \$1 billion to help meet the most acute needs of the world's poorest nations. For our part, the Carter Administration, subject to congressional approval, is prepared to devote an extra \$375 million over present levels in bilateral aid for the poorest countries.

We can be counted upon to help in ways the American Congress and American people will support. That means insistence upon sound developmental criteria in use of money we contribute.

Since this conference is about poor people as much as poor countries, my government will be willing to participate in a plan to develop specific programs to alleviate the problem of absolute poverty on a global basis. Such a plan must deal with needs that directly affect the way people live their lives:

- Essential health services, particularly in rural areas;
- Increased food production and adequate nutrition;
- Basic education, also in rural areas; and
- A chance for a worthwhile job, to help people provide a better life for themselves and for their children.

The United States plans to ask the members of the OECD [Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development] to consider ways to achieve these objectives in the OECD's general work program. Participation of the developing countries in this process will be essential.

#### **Private Investment**

After resource transfers, there is private investment—investment that builds in a

partnership that works for developing countries and investors alike. The growth plans of the world's developing economies require a level of foreign investment well beyond the capacity of official sources alone.

Private capital from abroad can contribute as substantially to the growth of the developing countries as it has to the industrialization of the United States.

But private investment can be effective only if it is truly acceptable to the host country. Each nation must decide for itself the role that private investment should play in development. Private firms, in turn, will invest where they are confident of positive and predictable treatment.

### **Monetary System**

The nature and functioning of the monetary system are fundamental to smooth operation of the world economy. We all have a high stake in it. The issues are both technical and complex, but we are prepared to—indeed we must—discuss them together.

Many countries, including developing countries, need balance-of-payments assistance. In the last two years, we have seen major increases in balance-of-payments help for countries that need it most.

The International Monetary Fund has expanded its compensatory finance facility, provided increased credit, and established a new Trust Fund, built with profits from the sale of gold and devoted to the needs of the world's poor majority.

We in the United States will support more resources for the International Monetary Fund for balance-of-payments assistance. We strongly support both the new facility currently under discussion and an IMF quota increase adequate to meet the heavy demands on the Fund from countries in deficit.

We look forward to the agreed-upon study of the evolving role of the special drawing rights as the principal reserve asset in the international monetary system, fully recognizing the importance of this question to both developed and developing countries.

We are particularly aware of the growing volume of international indebtedness and the

need for establishing orderly procedures for addressing particular cases before they reach a critical stage.

### **Commodities**

In addition to resource transfers and capital, trade in commodities is critical, as well as our shared interests in stability of price and supply.

When commodity markets fluctuate wildly, development planning in low-income countries is disrupted or made impossible. When commodity prices rise sharply, inflation intensifies and lasts long after these prices have turned downward—hitting rich and poor countries alike. Through this conference, we have agreed on the need for common action to moderate fluctuations in commodity prices, supply, and earnings. We must work together:

—To establish agreements between producers and consumers to stabilize the prices of individual commodities, wherever the nature of the commodity and the market permit;

—To create a common fund—that is efficient and that works—to back up commodity agreements;

—To assure the adequacy of compensatory finance to help offset fluctuation in the export earnings of developing countries;

—To provide enough investment to develop new supplies of primary products adequate to meet the needs of an expanding world economy; and

—To support product improvement and diversification where specific commodities face stagnant or declining demand.

The United States will take part in all these efforts.

We belong to the coffee and tin agreements, and we strongly support an effective international sugar agreement. We are ready to join in financing reserve stocks of sugar to assure stable prices, and the Carter Administration will ask Congress for a U.S. contribution to the tin buffer stock.

We hope that agreement will soon be reached on an international system of nationally held grain reserves to enhance food security. Five years ago, world grain stocks

shrunk and prices soared. Today, harvests are more plentiful. But we cannot rely on this in the future. For countries and peoples living on the margin of existence, there must be reliable and growing supplies of food.

The United States is committed to work toward additional stabilization agreements. Where it is agreed that direct governmental contributions are appropriate to finance buffer stocks, we will join producers and consumers in financing them.

### Trade

Next, there is the critical effort to expand and liberalize trade.

We can all be proud that we have maintained an open trading system throughout a period of extraordinary economic stress. For the developing world, this has provided continued access to the world's major markets and provided export earnings to pay for imports of capital goods, food, and raw materials. For the United States, liberal trade has offered expanded opportunities for jobs and sales from exports. Liberal trade has given us lower prices and wider choice for consumers.

This conference is not the place for detailed trade negotiations. But we in the United States pledge that, at Geneva, we shall seek areas of more favorable treatment for developing-country products.

This Administration is committed to giving new impetus to the Tokyo Round of multilateral trade negotiations. We are committed to making real progress in key areas in 1977.

### Energy

The next item on our agenda is energy. All of us share an urgent need for a reliable energy supply, strict energy conservation, and a shift to new energy resources. President Carter has proposed a comprehensive domestic energy policy to reduce our country's profligate use of energy, to limit American dependence on imported oil, and to speed the development of new energy technologies.

In addition, the prosperity of the world economy depends on stable energy prices and reliable supply. And equity in the world economy demands this as well. In the energy

commission, the acute problems faced by developing countries which rely on imported oil have been made painfully clear.

Over the longer term, both rich and poor countries must make increased use of their own local energy resources. This conference should help find ways to transfer appropriate energy technology to the developing countries.

This conference is a beginning, and only that. Its real significance will be in what together we do now. For its part, the United States will carry out the pledges I have made today. We shall take seriously the results of this conference.

But to build on these efforts—on the commitments we have made and shall make to one another—we are charged with seeing that what is discussed here is translated into positive action that benefits nations and individual people. In the last three decades, the nations of the industrialized world have gained a far deeper awareness of the concerns, the hopes, the needs of the people in the developing world—the majority of mankind.

Our work will continue. Our success will be measured in many ways: in our agreements, in our surmounting of inevitable disagreements, and in our future dedication to a new international economic system based on equity, growth, and justice.

We commit ourselves here and now to consult and collaborate and to join in the most significant effort of our time: To bring the benefits of mankind's progress to all mankind.

### NEWS CONFERENCE BY MR. COOPER, JUNE 3

The American delegation came to this conference representing a new Administration with a new spirit and a genuine sense of commitment to help meet the needs of the developing countries, to pursue a constructive cooperation between North and South, and to build a new international economic system based on equity, growth, and justice.

In the last several days Secretary Vance and I and other members of the U.S. delegation have had the opportunity to work closely with colleagues from the developed and developing nations. We have been able to make significant progress in a number of areas. We



believe this will be of genuine benefit to the peoples of the world and to an improved global economic structure in our common interest.

Important agreements have been reached in the field of food and agriculture, African infrastructure, technology, foreign assistance, investment, access to capital markets, and a common fund among others. If we take a longer view, there have been substantial improvements in the international economic system since the beginning of CIEC 18 months ago.

In other areas differences remain. Some of these involve major differences in principle which we could not expect to resolve here at this conference. As the Foreign Minister of Brazil so wisely stated Wednesday afternoon: "It is only reasonable to recognize the practical impossibility for CIEC to reach immediate results in all its areas of negotiation and that the most sensitive and controversial issues would eventually have to be subject to further examination."

We recognize, too, that the results of this conference fall short of the expectations of some governments. We, for example, would have preferred an ongoing dialogue on energy. But the important thing is that we have taken a step forward toward a better world which will enhance the well-being of people in all countries. We consider that the results constitute a firm political commitment by the United States to constructive action. Equally important, we have furthered our understanding of a need to continue a global effort to surmount the compelling issues of poverty, hunger, and disease and to launch a truly international effort to promote international development and to deal with the global issues of common concern.

The United States remains committed to work vigorously toward these objectives. In cooperation with other nations here, and with those not represented at CIEC as well, we will continue to pursue the larger vision which Secretary Vance referred to in his opening statement at the conference—the vision of a world in which common humanity and common values can override regional or national self-centeredness—and to build a new international

economic system based on equity, growth, and justice.

I would just like to sum up by saying that while, as the statement from the conference says, there are many issues of agreement, there are also many issues of disagreement. That is entirely to be expected given the extraordinarily broad range and depth of the issues which have been considered here, and on the whole we are quite satisfied with the outcome of the conference. I'd welcome any questions.

*Q. Do you take any satisfaction from the statement by Mr. Perez-Guerrero, Chairman of the Group of 19 [developing-country members of CIEC], that he does want some kind of a continuing energy dialogue in other forums?*

*Under Secretary Cooper:* Well I think the position of the Group of 19 in the conference itself, and indeed the position of Mr. Perez-Guerrero when he answered your question on the same topic not so long ago, is slightly different from the way you formulated it. What they have said is they are prepared to discuss the whole range of issues, including energy, involving the world economy in existing international forums. That's fine, but we felt that it didn't go quite far enough.

It is the case that energy is distinctive among the various areas of the world economy which among existing forums today has no natural place of discussion. Therefore we felt that it was worthwhile singling out energy. Not that energy is more important than financial issues or more important than trade issues, but that unlike those other areas there is today no obvious existing place in which to discuss energy, and we felt that it would have been useful if this conference could have acknowledged that more explicitly than it has.

*Q. Sir, your statement is full of fine rhetoric but I would like to put it to you that on the key issues of debt and the common fund no real advance was made. Would you like to comment on that?*

*Under Secretary Cooper:* Yes. On the issue of the common fund, we don't know whether an advance will be made until we sit down to negotiate it. This was not a negotiating con-

ference on the common fund. The Group of 19 did not come here with any negotiating mandate and indeed will tell you that they could not negotiate on the common fund. And under those circumstances we felt that we, too, could not negotiate on the common fund.

What we did do was accept the principle of the common fund which we think would be a desirable new element in the world economy. We will have to negotiate the specific purposes and other elements of the common fund at Geneva, which is where the actual negotiations are going on. In the common fund we did reach agreed language.

As to debt we did not reach agreed language, and I think that's too bad because I think that the problem of external debt in today's world is a serious one, not only, I would add, for the less developed world or the developing countries, but for many developed countries as well. It's a global problem; it's not peculiarly a problem of developing countries. And I think we do need to improve our mechanisms for dealing with external debt, and indeed, in other forums we are working for such improvements.

The specific proposal put forward by the Group of 19 in this conference, which you will find in that pink book [annex—not printed here—to the final communique] when it comes out, we felt did not deal adequately with the debt problem as we perceived the debt problem. Although it was addressed to debt, it did not in fact deal with the debt problem.

On the other hand, while it would transfer some resources, canceling debt is a peculiarly arbitrary way of transferring resources to developing countries. It depends on what their historical pattern of external borrowing happens to have been. That surely is not one of the best criteria in which to transfer resources to developing countries.

The Group of 8, or more specifically, the United States and the European Community, did table a procedural proposal for dealing with the debt problem, which we think is serious, and it does, I believe, mark a substantial advance over past practice and institutionalizes some of past practice. And we are sorry the Group of 19 did not take it up.

*Q. What happened to Secretary Vance's*

*suggestion that the North-South dialogue be kept alive?*

*Under Secretary Cooper:* I think that there is general agreement that that should be done. We waffled a little on how it should be done.

*Q. The commercial banks of the United States who lend money to the Third World are showing considerable concern about their investment problems, and they would like to be able to establish more active cooperation with the International Monetary Fund. Do you agree with this?*

*Under Secretary Cooper:* Well, I think this is a matter that ought to be explored. I would not at this stage either want to agree or disagree. The IMF receives under its charter from its members highly proprietary information, and it seems to me that one would not want the IMF to cooperate without the willingness of the countries in question. To do so without that willingness would jeopardize the relationship between the IMF and its members. But it seems to me that this is an area that ought to be explored involving all the parties that have an interest in it.

*Q. Is the special action program still completely firm? At the end of this conference is this still a total commitment?*

*Under Secretary Cooper:* It is a firm proposal. In fact it was formally tabled at the conference today.

### TEXT OF FINAL COMMUNIQUE, JUNE 3

Press release 257 dated June 3

The Conference on International Economic Cooperation held its final meeting in Paris, at the Ministerial level, from May 30 to June 2, 1977. Representatives of the following 27 members of the Conference took part: Algeria, Argentina, Australia, Brazil, Cameroon, Canada, Arab Republic of Egypt, European Economic Community, India, Indonesia, Iran, Iraq, Jamaica, Japan, Mexico, Nigeria, Pakistan, Peru, Saudi Arabia, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland, United States, Venezuela, Yugoslavia, Zaire and Zambia. The participants welcomed the presence of the Secretary General of the United Nations. The following observers also attended the Conference: OPEC, IEA, UNCTAD, OECD, FAO, GATT, UNDP, UNIDO, IMF, IBRD and SELA.<sup>2</sup>

<sup>2</sup> Organization of Petroleum Exporting Countries; International Energy Agency; United Nations Conference

The Honorable Allan J. MacEachen, PC, MP, President of the Privy Council of Canada, and His Excellency Dr. Manuel Perez-Guerrero, Minister of State for International Economic Affairs of Venezuela, Co-Chairmen of the Conference, presided over the Ministerial meeting. Mr. Bernard Guittou [of France] served in his capacity of Executive Secretary of the Conference.

The Ministerial representatives at the meeting recognized that during the course of its work, and within the framework established at the Ministerial meeting with which the Conference was initiated in December 1975, the Conference had examined a wide variety of economic issues in the areas of energy, raw materials, development and finance. There was recognition that the issues in each of these areas are closely interrelated and that particular attention should be given to the problems of the developing countries, especially the most seriously affected among them.

The Co-Chairmen of the Commissions on Energy, Mr. Stephen Bosworth and H.E. Abdul-Haidi Taher; on Raw Materials, Their Excellencies Alfonso Arias Schreiber and Hiromichi Miyazaki; on Development, H.E. Messaoud Ait-Chaalal and Mr. Edmund Wellenstein; and on Financial Affairs, Mr. Stanley Payton and H.E. Mohammed Yeganeh presented on May 14 the final reports of the work of the four commissions, which were considered at a meeting of senior officials of the Conference on May 26-28, and subsequently submitted to the Ministerial meeting.

The participants recalled their agreement that the Conference should lead to concrete proposals for an equitable and comprehensive programme for international economic cooperation including agreements, decisions, commitments and recommendations. They also recalled their agreement that action by the Conference should constitute a significant advance in international economic cooperation and make a substantial contribution to the economic development of the developing countries.

The participants were able to agree on a number of issues and measures relating to:

#### *Energy:*

1. Conclusion and recommendation on availability and supply in a commercial sense, except for purchasing power constraint.<sup>3</sup>

2. Recognition of the depletable nature of oil and gas. The transition from oil-based energy mix to more permanent and renewable sources of energy.

on Trade and Development; Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development; Food and Agriculture Organization; General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade; United Nations Development Program; United Nations Industrial Development Organization; International Monetary Fund; International Bank for Reconstruction and Development; Latin America Economic System.

<sup>3</sup> The Group of 19 considers that this item should be viewed in the context of the report of the Co-Chairmen of the Energy Commission to the Ministerial meeting and the proposal presented to the Energy Commission by the delegates of Egypt, Iran, Iraq and Venezuela. [Footnote in original.]

3. Conservation and increased efficiency of energy utilization.

4. Need to develop all forms of energy.

5. General conclusions and recommendations for national action and international cooperation in the energy field.

#### *Raw Materials and Trade:*

1. Establishment of a common fund with purposes, objectives and other constituent elements to be further negotiated in UNCTAD.

2. Research and development and some other measures for natural products competing with synthetics.

3. Measures for international cooperation in the field of marketing and distribution of raw materials.

4. Measures to assist importing developing countries to develop and diversify their indigenous natural resources.

5. Agreement for improving generalized system of preferences [GSP] schemes; identification of areas for special and more favorable treatment for developing countries in the multilateral trade negotiations [MTN], and certain other trade questions.

#### *Development:*

1. Volume and quality of official development assistance.

2. Provision by developed countries of \$1 billion in a special action program for individual low-income countries facing general problems of transfer of resources.

3. Food and agriculture.

4. Assistance to infrastructure development in developing countries with particular reference to Africa.

5. Several aspects of the industrialization of developing countries.

6. Industrial property, implementation of relevant UNCTAD resolutions on transfer of technology and on U.N. Conference on Science and Technology.

#### *Finance:*

1. Private foreign direct investment, except criteria for compensation, transferability of income and capital and jurisdiction and standards for settlement of disputes.

2. Developing country access to capital markets.

3. Other financial flows (monetary issues).

4. Cooperation among developing countries.

The texts agreed appear in the attached Annex which is an integral part of this document.<sup>4</sup>

The participants were not able to agree on other issues and measures relating to:

#### *Energy:*

1. Price of energy and purchasing power of energy export earnings.

2. Accumulated revenues from oil exports.

3. Financial assistance to bridge external payments problems of oil importing countries or oil importing developing countries.

<sup>4</sup> Not printed here.

4. Recommendations on resources within the Law of the Sea Conference.

5. Continuing consultations on energy.

#### *Raw Materials and Trade:*

1. Purchasing power of developing countries.

2. Measures related to compensatory financing.

3. Aspects of local processing and diversification.

4. Measures relating to interests of developing countries in: world shipping tonnage and trade; representation on commodity exchanges; a code of conduct for liner conferences, and other matters.

5. Production control and other measures concerning synthetics.

6. Investment in the field of raw materials.

7. Means for protecting the interests of developing countries which might be adversely affected by the implementation of the integrated program.

8. Relationship of the integrated program to the new international economic order.

9. Measures related to trade policies, to the institutional framework of trade, to aspects of the GSP, to the MTN, and to conditions of supply.

#### *Development:*

1. Indebtedness of developing countries.

2. Adjustment assistance measures.

3. Access to markets for manufactured and semi-manufactured products.

4. Transnational corporations.

#### *Finance:*

1. Criteria for compensation, transferability of income and capital and jurisdiction and standards for settlement of disputes.

2. Measures against inflation.

3. Financial assets of oil exporting developing countries.

The proposals made by participants or groups of participants on these matters also appear in the same Annex.

The participants from developing countries in CIEC, while recognizing that progress has been made in CIEC

to meet certain proposals of developing countries, noted with regret that most of the proposals for structural changes in the international economic system and certain of the proposals for urgent actions on pressing problems have not been agreed upon.

Therefore, the Group of 19 feels that the conclusions of CIEC fall short of the objectives envisaged for a comprehensive and equitable program of action designed to establish the new international economic order.

The participants from developed countries in CIEC welcomed the spirit of cooperation in which on the whole the Conference took place and expressed their determination to maintain that spirit as the dialogue between developing and developed countries continues in other places. They regretted that it had not proved possible to reach agreement on some important areas of the dialogue such as certain aspects of energy co-operation.

The participants in the Conference think that it has contributed to a broader understanding of the international economic situation and that its intensive discussions have been useful to all participants. They agreed that CIEC was only one phase in the ongoing dialogue between developed and developing countries which should continue to be pursued actively in the U.N. system and other existing, appropriate bodies.

The members of the Conference agreed to transmit the results of the Conference to the United Nations General Assembly at its resumed 31st Session and to all other relevant international bodies for their consideration and appropriate action. They further agreed to recommend that intensive consideration of outstanding problems be continued within the United Nations system and other existing, appropriate bodies.

The participants in the Conference pledged themselves to carry out in a timely and effective manner the measures for international cooperation agreed to herein. They invite the countries which did not participate in the Conference to join in this cooperative effort.

Finally, the Ministerial representatives at the Conference reiterated their appreciation to the President of the French Republic and to the Government of France for their hospitality and for their cooperation in facilitating the work of the Conference on International Economic Cooperation.

## President Carter's News Conference of May 26

*Following are excerpts relating to foreign policy from the transcript of a news conference held by President Carter on May 26.<sup>1</sup>*

*Q. Mr. President, can you tell us where you would like to go from here on SALT [Strategic Arms Limitation Talks] with particular reference to cruise and Backfire, and how do you assess the upbeat words we got from Secretary Vance in Geneva and the downbeat words we got from Foreign Minister Gromyko on the same?*

*The President:* Compared to the Moscow meeting, the Geneva meeting was very upbeat. There was a great deal of harmony there. There was a sincere effort on the part of the Soviets and ourselves to explore conflicting positions and to seek for some framework on which we could agree.

There are three basic elements, I think, of a SALT II agreement. One is an agreement that would last through 1985, ratifying in effect those elements from Vladivostok on which agreement was reached without dispute and hopefully encompassing significant reductions below the Vladivostok levels.

Second would be a protocol, in addition to the basic agreement, that would last for a briefer period of time, two or three years, in which temporary solutions to the controversial issues might be included, giving us more bargaining time. This would include the very heavy missiles of the Soviets which caused us great concern. It would include some constraints on the cruise missiles. And the overall agreement would also include some constraints on the Backfire bomber.

And the third element of the agreement, which we hope to achieve, would be a mutual commitment in writing to pursue the drastic substantial reductions which we advocated as an alternative in Moscow, leading toward a much more comprehensive, much more effective, much more needed SALT III agreement.

So, I think there are substantial remaining differences between ourselves and the Soviet Union. No firm proposals were put forward on either side. It was an exploratory meeting. But the tenor of the meeting, the obvious attitude of the Soviets toward being willing to assess our positions and to modify their own, I think was reciprocated by us. And in that way it was an upbeat meeting, as described by Secretary Vance.

When you emphasize the differences that still remain, however, there is cause for some concern.

*Q. Why did you fire General Singlaub [Maj. Gen. John Singlaub, Chief of Staff, U.S. Forces in Korea]? He claims that the officers there have never been given a rationale on withdrawal. And have you had any soundings from North Korea as to the possibility of improving relations?*

*The President:* Well in the first place, General Singlaub was not fired. General Singlaub was informed that he was not being fired; he was not being chastised or punished. He was being transferred to a new position at an equivalent degree of responsibility and stature.

We have, however, considered very carefully the question of our troops to be withdrawn from South Korea, the Republic of Korea, ground troops. This is a matter that has been considered by our government for years. We have been in South Korea now more than 25 years. There has never been a

<sup>1</sup> For the complete transcript, see Weekly Compilation of Presidential Documents dated May 30, 1977, p. 815.

policy of our government evolved for permanent placement of ground troops in South Korea. In 1970 and 1971 a full division of troops was withdrawn.

Many leaders in our country and in the Republic of Korea have advocated complete removal of ground troops from Korea. Melvin Laird, the former Republican Secretary of Defense, is one of those. President Park himself, the President of the Republic of Korea, has called for the removal completely of American troops.

The essence of the question is, is our country committed on a permanent basis to keep troops in South Korea even if they are not needed to maintain the stability of that peninsula? I think it is accurate to say that the time has come for a very careful, very orderly withdrawal over a period of four or five years of ground troops, leaving intact an adequate degree of strength in the Republic of Korea to withstand any foreseeable attack and making it clear to the North Koreans, the Chinese, the Soviets, that our commitment to South Korea is undeviating and is staunch.

We will leave there adequate intelligence forces, observation forces, air forces, naval forces, and a firm, open commitment to our defense treaty, so there need not be any doubt about potential adversaries concerning our support of South Korea.

I think it is accurate to point out that overall strategic considerations have changed since the 1940's and early 1950's, when the Korean question came into most prominence in the international scene. The relationship between the Soviet Union and us, the People's Republic of China and us, and the relationship between the People's Republic and the Soviet Union have all changed, among other things.

South Korea, because of their own incentive and deep dedication to progress, now has one of the most strong economies in the world. Their growth rate last year in real terms was 15 percent. They have massive, very healthy industry—in steel, shipbuilding, electronics, chemical industries—to make it possible for them to grow into a position of defending themselves.

We have also a complete confidence in the deep purpose of the South Koreans to defend

their own country. Compared to the North Koreans, they have a two-to-one advantage in total population, and they have much greater access to the Western industrialized democracies for advanced equipment and for technology.

So, for all of these reasons, I think it is appropriate now for us to withdraw those troops. A decision has been made. President Park has been informed. And we will work very closely with the South Koreans for an orderly transition, leaving the ground troops of the Republic of Korea strong enough to defend themselves and leaving our own commitment to them sure.

I might say that this has been brought about by two things—our complete confidence in the Republic of Korea and its ability and a complete awareness on the part of the rest of the world that our own commitment is firm.

*Q. Mr. President, on March 9, you talked about the idea of Israel withdrawing to her '67 borders, with only minor adjustments. Is that still your position, and is there any way that Israel could retain the West Bank of the Jordan and make that fit in the definition of "minor adjustments"?*

*The President:* That is still my position, although I might add again that the United States, including myself as President—we do not have a Middle Eastern settlement plan, but the basic premises have been spelled out very clearly.

In the U.N. resolutions that have been passed, coming from the Security Council, voted on and supported by our government—and these have been binding policies of the government—they do include the right of the Palestinians to have a homeland, to be compensated for losses that they have suffered. They do include the withdrawal of Israel from occupied territories from the 1967 war, and they do include an end of belligerency and a reestablishment of permanent and secure borders.

All these things have been spelled out in writing in those U.N. positions which we have endorsed—every Administration since they were passed.

I would certainly assume that withdrawal from West Bank territories, either partially or in their entirety, would be a part of an ultimate settlement, but that is something that has to be worked out still between the Israelis and their neighbors.

We do not intend to put forward a description of what the exact borders should be. It is not our role to play. We will explore possibilities for common agreement and reserve the right to make our opinions known. But we have no control over anyone in the Middle East and do not want any control over anyone in the Middle East. But those three basic principles—permanent peace, secure borders, and resolution of the Palestinian question—all have been and still are integral parts of any peace settlement.

*Q. Mr. President, to follow up on the Middle East, Mr. President, could you give us more of your thinking on the disposition of places like the Golan Heights, which you talked about during the campaign, the question of Jerusalem, and other areas like that? And can you say how your proposal for minor alterations differs from the 1969 American plan calling for substantial alterations?*

*The President:* No, I can't respond to those specific things. I think it would be inappropriate for me to try to draw a line on a map in the Golan Heights, the West Bank of Jerusalem, or the Sinai Peninsula. That is something that would have to be negotiated between the parties involved.

But I think also that it was obvious that the United States didn't advance the cause of the settlement when the so-called Rogers plan was put forward without adequate prior consultation with the different nations who were concerned with the Middle Eastern question.

I think it is better just to talk in terms of what our country has had as its long-time policy. But as far as an exact definition of the borders, I don't have the capability nor the inclination to go into that.

*Q. Mr. President, I'd like to go back to General Singlaub and your transfer of him. How do you square that with the claims of your Administration that it's an open Administra-*

*tion where dissent is encouraged? Isn't there a double standard between your treatment of him and your treatment of Andrew Young, the U.N. Ambassador, who has dissented several times from American policy and yet has not been transferred from his job?*

*The President:* Well, I know of no instance when Andy Young has violated a policy you described. In the case of General Singlaub, as I said earlier, he was not punished. We evolved the policy for South Korea over a long number of years. And I finally made a decision after consultation with the intelligence community, the military leaders, a formal meeting of the National Security Council, that we would withdraw our ground troops over a period of four or five years.

A member of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, Bernie Rogers, went to South Korea to meet with our own military leaders and some of the South Korean military leaders, as well. Our policy was explained. General Singlaub was one of those.

An announcement was made publicly that a representative of the State Department, [Under Secretary for Political Affairs] Phil Habib, and the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, General Brown, would go to Korea to explain this policy to the Korean officials and also, of course, to the American military officials.

After that announcement was made is when General Singlaub made a comment publicly that if this policy was carried out, it would result in war. In my opinion, that was a very serious breach of the propriety that ought to exist among military officers after a policy has been made, and I think to some degree it was an invitation to the North Koreans to believe that South Korea was not able to take care of themselves, which we think they are. I think it was an invitation to the world to expect an inevitable war. And I certainly don't agree that there is any cause for a war to be expected.

In addition to that, I think it is important to remember that we are now in the process of carrying out this policy. And I don't believe that General Singlaub, being our negotiator with the North Koreans, by the way, and also

being the third person in command in South Korea, could have effectively carried out this policy when he had publicly been identified as being opposed to it.

The other point is I think his presence in South Korea on a continuing basis would have been a disturbing factor. He would have been the focus of admiration and attention from those who do not want to carry out our policy. And I think it would have made it very difficult for his superiors to carry out the policy in harmony and cooperation with the South Korean Government.

*Q. Mr. President, your SALT II proposals calling for deeper cuts in the Vladivostok agreement were rejected by the Soviet Union after you had enunciated them publicly.*

*The President:* Yes.

*Q. And your public statements with respect to a Palestinian homeland are being credited as being a factor in the election of a conservative, hardline political group in Israel.*

*Do you think that you are going to be able to continue your policy of open discussions of foreign policy issues and, at the same time, achieve agreements? In other words, do you think you are going to be able to have your cake and eat it, too?*

*The President:* I don't agree with the premise of your question. I don't believe that my open espousal of a desire on the part of the American people to reduce the number of missile launchers or atomic weapons prior to the time we negotiated in Moscow was a reason for a breakdown in that discussion.

It has led to continuing discussions, and I believe it's a viable policy that I will pursue, and I see no reason why the American people should not know it, and I believe that overwhelmingly the American people support it. I think it's good for the American people to know what our positions are at the time that the Soviets know what our positions are, and vice versa.

This is a matter that must be addressed openly. It involves not only the Soviet and American people but it also involves our allies and friends who depend upon us around the

world. In the campaign itself and in my Inaugural Address, I expressed a hope which I still have that ultimately myself or my successor, Mr. Brezhnev or his successor, can arrive at a point where nuclear weapons are eliminated completely from the Soviet and the American arsenals.

The other point of your question was concerning the results of the election in Israel. I think that the international questions in Israel were very slightly discussed or debated during their campaign. My opinion is that the result of the elections were not affected appreciably if at all by any statements that I made concerning an ultimate Middle Eastern settlement.

Our positions are compatible with the positions taken by my own predecessors and, in fact, historically the United States has espoused these basic principles. And I think that this is something that must be addressed frankly by the prospective government in Israel, by the people of Israel, their Arab neighbors, and by the people in the United States.

So, I don't intend to refrain from expressing very clearly my position on foreign issues to the public. On occasion when negotiations are going on or when we have an agreement with our negotiating partners to refrain from public statements, of course I will do so. But that will be an individual judgment to be made.

*Q. Realizing that the Israeli Government is not in place yet, but assuming that Mr. [Menachem] Begin will have a dominant role in it, and based on his initial remarks about withdrawal of the sector, do you see him as a potential obstacle to the peace process?*

*The President:* No, I don't. I don't yet have any way to know who will put the government together. Obviously Mr. Begin leads the Likud government which came in first. And we are waiting now for the Israeli election results to be confirmed and for the President of Israel to designate the leader of that party to put the government together. Following that time and before the government is completely evolved, I intend to congratulate Mr. Begin, if



it is he, and to invite him or whoever is designated to come over here for discussions with me.

There obviously are difficulties caused by a change in the Israeli Government. But in the long run, as is the case in our own country and in a democracy like Israel, the government leaders fairly accurately reflect the hopes and desires and fears and purposes of the people whom they are chosen to lead.

Mr. Begin will have to put together a government. He'll have to deal with conflicting interests as he forms his cabinet and brings in other groups to make sure that he has a majority in the Knesset.

So, I don't look at this as an insuperable obstacle. It does create a question. I think a large part of that question can be resolved when I meet with him personally and when he meets with the congressional leaders and with the Jewish Americans who are very deeply interested in this and sees the purpose of our own country.

I think this may have an effect on him. I have already seen some moderation in his views as he's dealt with Mr. Yadin and others, and I hope that this moderation will continue.

Obviously, the Arab leaders also have to be moderate. Some of the adamant stands that they have taken in the historical past will have to be abandoned. If they didn't, there would be no hope for peace.

So, both sides of this—or rather all sides of this discussion have to yield to some degree to accomplish the purposes of their own people.

## **Decisions on Sugar Imports and Income Supports Announced**

*White House Announcement*<sup>1</sup>

President Carter announced on May 4 a series of actions aimed at maintaining a viable domestic sugar industry. The President believes that in the long run implementation of a workable International Sugar Agreement (ISA) provides the best means for achieving this end. In the interim, the President has instructed the Secretary of Agriculture to institute an income support pro-

gram for producers offering supplemental payments whenever the market price falls beneath 13.5 cents a pound.

At the same time, the President determined that import relief, in the form of import quotas recently recommended on March 17 by the U.S. International Trade Commission (USITC), would not be in the overall national economic interest, including that of both consumers and producers.

These actions were announced on May 4 by Ambassador Robert S. Strauss, the President's Special Representative for Trade Negotiations.

In the past year sugar prices have fallen sharply to a point less than the costs of production for many U.S. growers. Therefore the President has instructed the Secretary of Agriculture to institute an income support program which would provide supplemental compensation to growers of up to 2 cents a pound for sales at market prices below 13.5 cents per pound. 13.5 cents is the estimated average breakeven price for domestic sugar growers. This would be an interim measure, pending the negotiation and implementation of a new ISA, and would not raise costs to consumers.

The President noted that the United States is actively participating in negotiations now underway in Geneva for an ISA, which if successful would provide long-term assurance of greater stability in world prices and supplies. Successful implementation of an ISA would make further consideration of unilateral measures by the United States unnecessary.

The President's decision is based on an interagency review of a report by the USITC which found that imports were a substantial cause of a threat of serious injury to the domestic industry and recommended a five-year import quota of 4.275

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<sup>1</sup> Issued on May 4 (text from White House press release). For the President's memorandum of May 4 for the Special Representative for Trade Negotiations, his letter of May 4 to the Secretary of Agriculture, and his letter of May 4 to the Speaker of the House and the President of the Senate transmitting a report on his decisions, see *Weekly Compilation of Presidential Documents* dated May 9, 1977, pp. 657 and 658.

million short tons, raw value, for sugar imports, to be allocated among supplying countries.

The interagency review considered the USITC report on the basis of overall national economic interest criteria spelled out in the Trade Act of 1974.

The President determined that a remedy involving import restraints, achieved either through import quotas or tariff increases, would not be a desirable course of action. It would raise prices to consumers without the promise of offsetting price stabilization benefits. Import relief would also adversely affect the export earnings of a number of developing countries which depend on sugar exports for their economic growth and prosperity. The United States strongly believes that the economic development of these countries is in the mutual interest of themselves and the United States.

The President also directed the Special Trade Representative to continue to follow the sugar import situation closely and to advise him in consultation with the Secretary of Agriculture of any need for consideration of further actions.

In connection with this decision on the USITC report, the President also concurred with the determination of the interagency Trade Policy Staff Committee (TPSC) that sugar will continue to receive duty-free treatment from eligible developing countries under the generalized system of preferences (GSP). A petition submitted to the Special Trade Representative by the American Farm Bureau Federation requesting that sugar be withdrawn from the list of GSP-eligible products was therefore denied.

The TPSC found that imports of sugar under GSP account for a relatively small percentage (17 percent) of total sugar imports and, more importantly, do not significantly affect the U.S. price level. Removal of sugar from GSP would also be contrary to the U.S. policy of encouraging mutually beneficial development of the economies of less

developed nations. Major developing-country suppliers of sugar exports to the United States have not been, and will not be, eligible for GSP under the provisions of the program which limit its benefits.

## **President Names New Members to Intelligence Oversight Board**

*Statement by President Carter*<sup>1</sup>

I am announcing the appointment of Mr. Thomas L. Farmer of Washington, D.C., and Governor William Scranton and Senator Albert Gore as the new members of the important Intelligence Oversight Board. Mr. Farmer will serve as chairman.

This Board reports directly and exclusively to me. It is empowered to receive information directly from individual members of the intelligence community and receives periodic required reports from the Inspectors General and General Counsels of the community.

In announcing this appointment, I want to take this occasion to thank Ambassador Robert Murphy, Mr. Leo Cherne, and Mr. Steve Ailes for distinguished service as members of the first Intelligence Oversight Board. They have rendered very important service to the nation.

At the same time I am abolishing the President's Foreign Intelligence Advisory Board, which had previously been monitoring the quality of intelligence. The National Security Council system and the intelligence community themselves, as structured in this Administration, plus the creation of the new Senate Committee on Intelligence, as well as the contemplated House committee, can now effectively review and assess foreign intelligence activities.

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<sup>1</sup> Issued on May 5 (text from White House press release, which includes biographic data on the new appointees).

## Vice President Mondale Visits Europe and Meets With South African Prime Minister Vorster

*On behalf of President Carter, Vice President Mondale departed Washington on May 14 to meet with leaders of Portugal, Spain, Austria, Yugoslavia, and the United Kingdom, as well as South African Prime Minister John Vorster in Vienna. His itinerary was Lisbon (May 14-17), Madrid (May 17-18), Vienna (May 18-20), Belgrade (May 20-22), and London (May 22-23).*

*Following is a statement by President Carter announcing the trip and statements and the transcript of a news conference by the Vice President during his trip.*

### STATEMENT BY PRESIDENT CARTER, MAY 3<sup>1</sup>

I am very pleased to announce today that I am asking Vice President Mondale to undertake an important overseas mission in my behalf later this month.

The Vice President will be traveling to Portugal, Spain, Austria, Yugoslavia, and the United Kingdom on a mission that will enable this Administration to pursue as effectively as possible additional foreign policy objectives that are also central to the goals of my Administration. In Lisbon and Madrid, the Vice President will continue the important consultations we have begun with the Portuguese and Spanish Governments. I believe I speak for the American people when I say how very deeply encouraged we are by the return to democracy in Portugal and by the steps Spain is taking to build a true and just democracy. We value the closest possible consultations with these governments at this important time in their histories—consultations which will enable us to build on our cooperation in all fields of mutual interest.

<sup>1</sup> Opening paragraph omitted (text from White House press release).

The Vice President's visit to Vienna, Austria, will have two prime objectives. We view Austria as a good friend of the United States. I have the highest respect for the Austrian Chancellor, Bruno Kreisky, whom I regard as an important international statesman, and I have asked the Vice President to meet with the Chancellor and other leaders of the Austrian Government not only for bilateral consultations but also so that we may have the benefit of their views on a number of important international issues.

A few weeks ago I mentioned that I had asked the Vice President to play a key role—in close coordination with Secretary Vance and Ambassador Young—in the development of the Administration's policy toward Africa. In keeping with that role the Vice President will meet with Prime Minister Vorster of the Republic of South Africa while he is in Vienna. Prime Minister Vorster, like ourselves, has an interest in meeting to discuss developments in southern Africa. We have been working closely with the British Government on Foreign Secretary Owen's efforts to make progress on Rhodesia. Separately we have been working closely with the British and other governments on the issue of Namibia. The talks in Vienna will enable the Vice President, in my behalf, to discuss these complex issues with the South African Prime Minister and to state our views on the crucial role which can be played by the South African Government in bringing the needed changes in southern Africa.

In this regard we are very grateful to Prime Minister Kreisky for the hospitality being given by the Austrian Government.

The Vice President's visit to Yugoslavia for talks with President Tito and members of the Yugoslav leadership will mark the first high-level U.S.-Yugoslav consultations under my

Administration. The United States places importance on Yugoslavia's independence, political unity, and territorial integrity, and we recognize Yugoslavia's and President Tito's vital role in providing leadership to the nonaligned world. I believe these early consultations with President Tito will be of great value.

Finally, I have asked the Vice President to include a stop in the United Kingdom to continue the close consultations we are conducting with the British Government on developments related to southern Africa.

#### **STATEMENT, LISBON, MAY 16**

Well, I had a very, very useful meeting with the President, Mr. Eanes, in which we ranged over a host of subjects of concern to our two nations, including and emphasizing matters of economic development and prosperity, the arrangements that are being made now for bilateral loans to assist the Portuguese economy in increasing economic activity, employment, trade opportunities, and the rest. We also discussed the matter of help to assist the Portuguese defense forces to be modernized to have an air mobile brigade that would work with NATO forces, and we also discussed the issue of human rights.

This nation stands as a symbol—perhaps one of the most outstanding in the world today—of leadership that is moving dramatically toward the principle of democracy and toward the closest possible observance of human rights. The President himself has issued a document, which is being distributed widely to the people of Portugal, in which he spells out his complete commitment to democratic procedures, to the popular will in the formulation of public policies. And they are completely committed to that objective and to working with other nations similarly committed at the upcoming Belgrade conference.

Today's meeting further strengthens an already solid, friendly relationship between the United States and Portugal which began first with the meeting by the Prime Minister, Mr. Soares, in Washington and then last week between President Carter and President Eanes in London. It was an excellent meeting, and

there are no contentious bilateral issues that affect our relationship. We are in complete agreement. I feel very, very good about today's meeting, and I look forward to meeting now with the Prime Minister.

#### **ARRIVAL, MADRID, MAY 17**

I am delighted to be in Spain. On behalf of the President of the United States and representing the people of my country, I look forward very much to my meetings with His Majesty King Juan Carlos and to continuing the very important discussions begun by your Prime Minister, Mr. Suarez, in Washington just a few weeks ago.

My country and Spain enjoy a common bond that goes back to the earliest beginnings of the United States. We are linked by history, we are linked through a shared culture, and no people have contributed more to the strength and the vitality and the spirit and the culture of my country than those of Spanish origin. And today that relationship is even closer because both of our countries now share a common love and support of democracy and human liberty.

I wish to say on behalf of my President, on behalf of the people of my country, that we are thrilled and excited by the developments toward a democratic society here in your country. There is a new confidence in democracy around the world. It is found in the leadership of our own government, but especially your nation and its leadership have demonstrated to the world that the forces of democracy are not on the decline but are on the offensive, and we wish to honor the process underway here in your great country. The relationship between your nation and mine has never been sounder—economically, in terms of our military relations, and in terms of our common commitment to democracy and liberty.

We have just completed a few weeks ago the first visit of a political head of state of Spain to the United States, Prime Minister Suarez. In the talks with the President of the United States and with the other leaders of our government, I can report that the relations between Spain and the United States

are on a very strong, firm, friendly, and cooperative basis. The U.S.-Spanish Council is making great progress, and great understanding is being developed. We look forward to these talks today. We look forward to working with the leaders of Spain in this great effort toward democracy and liberty.

#### **STATEMENT, VIENNA, MAY 18**

Thank you, Chancellor, for this opportunity to meet with you and to report briefly to the media on the results of our talks.

It was our privilege recently to receive the Chancellor in Washington and in the White House, and in talks with the President and myself and later with other officials we discussed the broad range of issues, many of which have been mentioned by the Chancellor. He is not only a great leader of this country, his experience, his knowledge, and his personal acquaintances with leaders throughout the world make him an important international resource to people interested in a secure and a stable world.

Today we drew on his knowledge and his experience to better understand many of the issues that my nation confronts and which our nations confront together. As the Chancellor observed, happily there are no bilateral problems existing between the United States and Austria. Indeed, the two nations have the friendliest possible relations. The President and the Chancellor are good friends. It was my privilege to bring to the Chancellor today a letter of greetings and good wishes from the President to the Chancellor.

We spent our time discussing—as the Chancellor has mentioned—issues that face us together: the upcoming Belgrade talks dealing with the Helsinki accords and their implementation; the Chancellor gave me a thorough briefing on recent talks he has had with Middle East leaders; I reported on my visits to Lisbon and Madrid; we had a discussion with his finance officials about the upcoming loan which several countries wish to make to Portugal in unison to assist that nation in its economic development; we talked briefly about Africa and then about some matters in European politics. As was true in our first talks, I

learned a great deal from the Chancellor, and we are most grateful to him for his hospitality today and also for his hospitality in providing the city of Vienna as a forum in which Prime Minister Vorster and I can have our talks tomorrow and possibly again on Saturday morning.

#### **NEWS CONFERENCE, VIENNA, MAY 20**

With me today are the members of our negotiating team—Tony Lake, Director of the Policy Planning Staff of the State Department; Ambassador Don McHenry [Deputy U.S. Representative to the U.N. Security Council]; David Aaron, Deputy Director of the National Security Council; and Bill Bowdler, our Ambassador to the Government of South Africa.

I have been meeting with South African Prime Minister Vorster and his government at the request of President Carter to convey the new policies of our Administration regarding southern Africa—specifically Rhodesia, Namibia, and South Africa itself. We had a day and a half of very frank and candid discussions. Both sides were aware before the meetings began of possible fundamental differences, and yet we pursued these discussions in a constructive spirit in order to improve the possibility of mutual understanding and progress. Put most simply, the policy which the President wished me to convey was that there was need for progress on all three issues: majority rule for Rhodesia and Namibia and a progressive transformation of South African society to the same end. We believed it was particularly important to convey the depth of our convictions.

There has been a transformation in American society of which we are very proud. It affects not only our domestic life but our foreign policy as well. We cannot accept, let alone defend, the governments that reject the basic principle of full human rights, economic opportunity, and political participation for all of its people regardless of race. This basic mission was accomplished during these talks. I believe our policy is clear, and I believe the South African Government now appreciates that it is deeply rooted in American experi-

ence and values. I do not know how or whether this will affect the decisions that confront South Africa, particularly in regard to its own system, but I made it clear that without evident progress that provides full political participation and an end to discrimination, the press of international events would require us to take actions based on our policy to the detriment of the constructive relations we would prefer with South Africa.

As for Rhodesia and Namibia, I believe we registered some useful progress but the significance of this progress will depend on future developments. Prime Minister Vorster agreed to support British-American efforts to get the directly interested parties to agree to an independence constitution and the necessary transitional arrangements, including the holding of elections in which all can take part equally, so that Zimbabwe can achieve independence during 1978 and peace.

Likewise every effort will be made to bring about a deescalation of violence, and it is believed that the negotiating process will be the best way to achieve this end. We believe this is an encouraging step in a positive direction. Hopefully we will work together to bring the interested parties to find a peaceful solution to the conflict in Rhodesia. The extent to which this pays off will, of course, remain to be seen as we pursue the British initiative. In this connection I made clear our support for these efforts and the closest collaboration with them.

I explained that our concept of the Zimbabwe Development Fund is different from that of the previous American Administration. Instead of being a fund aimed at buying out the white settlers in Rhodesia, we want to reorient that fund to a development fund—one that will help build a strong economy and one that will encourage the continued participation of the white population in an independent Zimbabwe. I emphasized that the United States would support a constitution for Zimbabwe that would contain guarantees of individual rights such as freedom of speech, religion, assemblage, due process of law, and an independent judiciary and that we believe these are essential to a democratic system of government.

On Namibia I made clear that we supported

the efforts of the so-called contact group—which consists of the United States, West Germany, Britain, France, and Canada—in their efforts to implement Security Council Resolution 385.<sup>2</sup> In some respects the position of the South African Government, as reflected in the earlier talks, was encouraging. In those talks they agreed to free elections to be held on a nationwide basis for a constituent assembly which would develop a national constitution for an independent Namibia. They agreed that all Namibians inside and outside the country could participate, including SWAPO [South West Africa People's Organization]. They agreed that the United Nations could be involved in the electoral process to assure that it was fair and internationally acceptable.

However, potentially important differences over the structure and character of the interim administrative authority that would run Namibia while this process takes place became much clearer in the process of our talks. South Africa wants an administrative arrangement that draws upon the structure developed at the Turnhalle conference [South African-sponsored constitutional conference held in Windhoek, Namibia, beginning September 1975]. This structure, in the conference that proposed it, is based on ethnic and tribal lines, and as it stands it is unacceptable to us. We emphasized that any interim administrative arrangement must be impartial as to the ultimate structure of the Namibian government. Moreover, it must be broadly representative in order to be acceptable to all Namibians and to the international community.

For his part Mr. Vorster felt quite strongly that any such structure should be based on the work of the Turnhalle conference. We agreed to propose that the five-nation contact group meet with the South African Government before the end of the month in Capetown, at a time to be determined if the other members of that group agree to hear South Africa's views and the details of the proposed interim administrative authority, to see if an impartial broadly based and internationally acceptable structure can be found. We hope that it can be.

<sup>2</sup> For text of the resolution, adopted on Jan. 30, 1976, see BULLETIN of Feb. 23, 1976, p. 246.

It is my view that the South African position on Namibia is involved in a positive direction in certain important respects. But unless this last issue can be satisfactorily resolved by the South African Government, fair free elections will be difficult if not impossible. I hope that the most serious effort will be made to find a solution that provides an impartial broadly representative and internationally acceptable interim authority in Namibia.

I also raised the question of political prisoners with regard to Namibia. I said that the United States believes that all political prisoners should be released. Mr. Vorster said he believes that what he called political detainees, some of which are held in other African countries, should be released. He said he would favorably consider our suggestion that all Namibian political prisoners be turned over to Namibia and that, in the event of a difference in view of whether a particular prisoner was political or criminal, a body of international jurors review the case and make a determination. This suggestion will be pursued as well when the contact group meets in Capetown.

South African prospects are much less bright for progress toward the change of course which we believe is essential to provide justice, stability, and peace in that country. We hope that South Africa will carefully review the implications of our policy and the changed circumstances which it creates. We hope that South Africans will not rely on any illusions that the United States will, in the end, intervene to save South Africa from the policies it is pursuing, for we will not do so.

I think the message is now clear to the South African Government. They know that we believe that perpetuating an unjust system is the surest incentive to increase Soviet influence and even racial war but quite apart from that is unjustified on its own grounds. They know that we will not defend such a system and in all honesty, however, I do not know what conclusions the South African Government will draw. It is my hope that it will lead to a reassessment, to a change of course which enables us to be helpful and supportive in the difficult times that change inevitably entails. But I cannot rule out the

possibility that the South African Government will not change, that our paths will diverge and our policies come into conflict should the South African Government so decide. In that event we would take steps true to our beliefs and values. We hope to be able to see progress in Rhodesia, Namibia, and South Africa. But the alternative is real, much as we dislike it. For a failure to make progress will lead to a tragedy of human history.

*Q. Mr. Vice President, I wonder if you would tell us if these talks, which appear indeed to have been extremely tough, what the atmosphere was, whether it was acrimonious, or whether you could tell us that it really wasn't as tough as it seemed to be?*

*Vice President Mondale:* We were very anxious, as I indicated earlier, to conduct these talks in a constructive environment, in a nonconfrontational environment. We were anxious at the same time that this meeting be one in which we could very clearly define American policy and further make clear the depth and the permanence of our commitment to human rights as a central element in our relations with the Government of South Africa and as a policy guiding our affairs in southern Africa. The talks were candid and they were frank and I think they were nonconfrontational.

We think there may be some progress in Rhodesia. We think the statement today indicates hope. We are hopeful that the talks surrounding the details on Namibia which I mentioned will produce results that are effective and will permit the independence of Namibia within the outline and framework of U.N. Resolution 385 and that the upcoming talks in Capetown will bring about that result.

On the issue of South African policies, it is our position that separateness and apartheid are inherently discriminatory and that that policy of apartheid cannot be acceptable to us. We also are of the opinion strongly held that full political participation by all the citizens of South Africa—equal participation in the election of its national government and its political affairs—is essential to a healthy, stable, and secure South Africa.

South Africans take the view that their

apartheid policies are not discriminatory. There is a basic and fundamental disagreement. They take the position that they have different nations within South Africa and that the full participation that we discussed is irrelevant. There is a fundamental and a profound disagreement. What we had hoped to do in these talks was to make it clear to the South African leadership the profound commitment that my nation has to human rights, to the elimination of discrimination, and to full political participation. We explained to them how our nation went through essentially the same dispute, and the elimination of discrimination and the achievement of full political participation has contributed enormously to the health, vitality, stability, economic growth, and social and spiritual health of our country. We are convinced that those same policies will have the same effect in other societies. That was the nature of the discussion; it was very frank, it was very candid.

*Q. Mr. Vice President, were you afraid at any time that the talks might break down?*

*Vice President Mondale:* No, at no time. As a matter of fact, the talks went on longer than scheduled. We added an hour to the discussion this morning, we added some extra time yesterday. There were points when it was quite difficult, but there was no point when there was a breakdown. As a matter of fact, the basic civility of the meeting was there at all times.

*Q. What steps would you take in South Africa if it doesn't go along with our policy?*

*Vice President Mondale:* The purpose of this meeting was not to provide a list of remedies that this nation—that is the United States—might take by itself, or in cooperation with the others through the United Nations or in other ways, to pursue its values, as I have described them, of human rights. We did, however, make it very clear.

First of all, we hoped that there would be progress in these areas that would permit an improved relationship. In other words, our basic objective is not to have a confrontation but to have an understanding that will lead to progress and, we hope, for improved relations.

We also said that these values that we hold, and these objectives for an independent Rhodesia with an independent constitution and a freely elected government, and a Namibian government established under the general outlines of U.N. Resolution 385 with a freely elected government, and the social transformation of the South African Government as we described it were important objectives—crucial objectives—affecting the relationship of our two countries.

Any progress will be helpful, but we need progress in all three categories and the failure to achieve it will lead to several elements—increasing instability, increasing violence and bitterness, increasing opportunity for international caprice, and a worsening of U.S. relations with the Government of South Africa and of relations between that government and the international communities. We did not go into what those steps would be because it is our hope that we can have progress and that that will not be necessary. There will be other occasions at which that policy, in the case of deteriorating relations, will be described.

*Q. In regard to the transformation or progress that you speak of with South Africa itself, how is that to be measured and, specifically, did you suggest or outline any possible things that you would like to see done there on a step-by-step basis or are you leaving this to the South Africans to ponder?*

*And the second part of the question is, did they give any sign during these talks that they would possibly modify such elements that would permit the joint participation and unify South Africa politically?*

*Vice President Mondale:* Let me answer the last part of your question first. The answer was that they did not intend to do so. What I said was that we see two fundamental principles as essential—the elimination of discrimination, and we think apartheid is discriminatory, and full political participation by all of its citizens on an equal basis. These are essential to the transformation that would be the prerequisite to a stable South Africa and to the best possible relations with this country.

We also talked about steps, but not in de-



tail, because we did not want to get into the position of prescribing what particular steps they should be taking. We said any progress would be helpful. For example, I said if the pass laws were repealed so that the citizens of South Africa could travel in and around South Africa as they chose, that would be helpful. We mentioned the retaining of political dissidents—Mrs. Winnie Mandela—and the intimidation of political dissidents as an example. I did not get into a specific list of particular laws and schools, the set-aside of certain jobs—I forget the exact name—that can only be held by certain people of a certain race. There is a long list that we could get into, but I did not want to do that because I wanted to get the emphasis on the principles, the long-term objectives that we see crucial to fundamental reform in South Africa.

*Q. You pointed out that apartheid and full participation were two separate matters. Now you said that the Prime Minister offered you no hope on full participation politically. You said he did not want to get into detail on questions of apartheid. But did he tell you that he plans any progress at all on certain race discrimination?*

*Vice President Mondale:* He will be here shortly to describe his position. He went into some detail about the number of black Africans within South Africa now going to school, the income of South African minorities compared to the income elsewhere in Africa, the meetings that they have had with certain black leaders. One of the proposals I made in response—I should have made this point to the earlier question—was that they should meet early with a broad range of the legitimate nonwhite leaders of South Africa to hear from them as to the process and the approach and the steps to be taken. His answer to that was that they had already had such meetings. But it is our opinion that many of the legitimate leaders of the nonwhite community have not engaged in such a conference and that such a conference would be very helpful. That was the nature of his discussion, but I would have to be very candid, that on the issue of apartheid and on the issue of full political participation in the sense we are talking, namely,

voting for the national government, they were very, very direct in its rejection.

*Q. He offered you nothing new in the area of positive participation?*

*Vice President Mondale:* He talked generally along the lines that I discussed.

*Q. If there is no progress on full participation, would that produce the deterioration in our relations that you had spoken of? Even if there had been some progress on apartheid or on Namibia and Rhodesia?*

*Vice President Mondale:* We see all three issues of basic importance. We don't think progress on one issue excuses no progress on another. But any progress of significance will be appreciated, will be valuable, and will have to be recognized as such. If we are able to create a healthy, independent Rhodesia based on majority rule, that's something that is very important. If we are able to achieve the objectives of an independent Namibia based on the principles of U.N. Resolution 385, that's a very important objective. If the South African Government helps achieve those objectives, they should be commended for it. If there is progress within South Africa to remove laws such as the pass laws, discrimination laws, these job set-aside laws, laws to permit active political expression without intimidation, those things should be encouraged and appreciated. But I thought it was important, and I believe it to be fundamental, that the basis of the problems in South Africa stems from two fundamental principles—discrimination and the absence of full political participation rights available to all their citizens.

*Q. Did you come to agreement on a timetable on the independence of Namibia and Rhodesia and did you come to an agreement on a specific next step on Rhodesia as you did on Namibia?*

*Vice President Mondale:* On Rhodesia—and I think I'll read this again if I might because it spells out the terms of our agreement—Prime Minister Vorster agreed to support British-American efforts to get the directly interested parties to agree to an independence constitution and the necessary transitional ar-

rangements, including the holding of elections in which all can take part equally, so that Zimbabwe can achieve independence during 1978 and peace. And then it goes on—in other words, the objective in support of the Owen mission is for the establishment of a constitution which will provide for elections and independence in 1978.

*Q. And in Namibia?*

*Vice President Mondale:* In Namibia the only specific timeframe agreed on there was the prospective meeting with the contact group in South Africa—hopefully by the end of this month—to see if we can resolve most problems to which I made reference. If those problems are solved, then the other elements of a free election—national election—in which all can participate, to establish a constituent assembly to develop a constitution with a U.N. presence, will be in place, and I think the prospects of peaceful transformation of U.N. Resolution 385 are very hopeful, and the progress could come quite quickly. So there is an element of hope here that it all depends upon the success in resolving what could be major differences of the kind that I discussed in my earlier remarks.

*Q. Have you specifically discussed the possibility of withdrawing South African troops from Namibia before the coming of elections in that part?*

*Vice President Mondale:* One of the matters that would be discussed at Capetown is the phased withdrawal of the South African Government instrumentalities within Namibia. There is not a schedule for that yet. It would be hoped that the terms and the phasing out of that process could be more particularly discussed at that meeting.

*Q. Is there any possibility of a further meeting between yourself and Mr. Vorster or between President Carter and Mr. Vorster?*

*Vice President Mondale:* We have no plans for such a meeting.

*Q. Mr. Vice President, could you possibly go into slightly more detail on your concept of full participation as opposed to one-man one-vote? Do you see some kind of a compromise?*

*Vice President Mondale:* No, no. It's the same thing. Every citizen should have the right to vote and every vote should be equally weighted.

#### STATEMENT, BELGRADE, MAY 21

We have just completed a very fine, useful, thorough, and friendly discussion about U.S.-Yugoslav relations; about our attitude and support for the independence, the integrity, the unity, and the permanent state of Yugoslavia; our recognition and admiration for the leadership of the President in the nonaligned nations' movement. Then we discussed a range of issues that we face together, such as the relations between developed nations and the poorer nations of the world and the upcoming, so-called CIEC [Conference on International Economic Cooperation] talks in Paris. We discussed the matter of the upcoming preparatory conference on the Helsinki accords, to be held here in Belgrade.

I reported to the President on the results of my discussions in Vienna on matters of southern African politics and in particular Rhodesia, Namibia, and the politics of South Africa.

I was able to report to President Tito that we had successfully cleared the necessary licenses through our nuclear regulatory agency late last night which will mean that the reactors and other facilities needed to complete the Krsko plant will go forward immediately. And among other things, I delivered a letter personally from President Carter to President Tito—a letter bearing his best wishes and hopes for the closest possible cooperation.

I invited Mr. Kardelj [Edvard Kardelj, Presidency Member] to visit our country this fall, which he will do. He will be visiting the President and other leaders of our government.

It's my impression from these talks that the relations between the United States and Yugoslavia, between its leaders, are on the finest possible basis—one of cooperation, of friendship, of respect for each others' independence and independence of foreign policies, and that the future of our relations is in good, sound, and secure condition.

## TREATY INFORMATION

### Current Actions

#### MULTILATERAL

##### Customs

Customs convention regarding E.C.S. carnets for commercial samples, with annex and protocol of signature. Done at Brussels March 1, 1956. Entered into force October 3, 1957; for the United States March 3, 1969. TIAS 6632.

*Notification of denunciation:* United States, May 11, 1977; effective August 11, 1977.

##### Gas

Protocol for the prohibition of the use in war of asphyxiating, poisonous or other gases, and of bacteriological methods of warfare. Done at Geneva June 17, 1925. Entered into force February 8, 1928, for the United States April 10, 1975. TIAS 8061.

*Ratification deposited:* Uruguay, April 12, 1977.

##### Human Rights

American convention on human rights. Done at San José November 22, 1969.<sup>1</sup>

*Signature:* United States, June 1, 1977.

##### Load Lines

International convention on load lines, 1966. Done at London April 5, 1966. Entered into force July 21, 1968. TIAS 6331, 6629, 6720.

*Accession deposited:* Cape Verde, April 28, 1977.

Amendments to the international convention on load lines, 1966 (TIAS 6331, 6629, 6720). Adopted at London October 12, 1971.<sup>1</sup>

*Acceptance deposited:* Sweden, May 16, 1977.

##### Maritime Matters

Convention on the Intergovernmental Maritime Consultative Organization. Done at Geneva March 6, 1948. Entered into force March 17, 1958. TIAS 4044.

*Acceptance deposited:* Qatar, May 19, 1977.

Amendments to the convention of March 6, 1948, as amended, on the Intergovernmental Maritime Consultative Organization (TIAS 4044, 6285, 6490). Adopted at London October 17, 1974. Enters into force April 1, 1978.

*Proclaimed by the President:* June 2, 1977.

Convention on facilitation of international maritime traffic, with annex. Done at London April 9, 1965. Entered into force March 5, 1967; for the United States May 16, 1967. TIAS 6251.

*Accession deposited:* Cape Verde, April 28, 1977.

##### Patents—Microorganisms

Budapest treaty on the international recognition of the deposit of microorganisms for the purposes of patent procedure, with regulations. Done at Budapest April 28, 1977. Enters into force three months after the

date on which the fifth instrument of ratification or accession has been deposited.

*Signatures:* Bulgaria, Denmark, Finland, France, Federal Republic of Germany, Hungary, Italy, Netherlands, Norway, Spain, Switzerland, United Kingdom, United States, April 28, 1977.

##### Property—Industrial

Nice agreement concerning the international classification of goods and services for the purposes of the registration of marks of June 15, 1957, as revised (TIAS 7418, 7419). Done at Geneva May 13, 1977. Enters into force three months after six or more countries have deposited instruments of ratification or accession, provided that at least three of these countries were, on May 13, 1977, countries of the Special Union.

*Signatures:* Finland, France, Federal Republic of Germany, Hungary, Italy, Monaco, Netherlands, Portugal, Spain, Switzerland, Tunisia, Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, United Kingdom, United States, May 13, 1977.

##### Safety at Sea

Convention on the international regulations for preventing collisions at sea, 1972. Done at London October 20, 1972. Enters into force July 15, 1977.

*Accession deposited:* Argentina, May 11, 1977.

#### BILATERAL

##### Brazil

Agreement concerning shrimp, with agreed minute. Effected by exchange of notes at Brasilia May 1, 1977. Entered into force May 1, 1977.

##### Cuba

Agreement relating to the establishment of Interests Sections of the United States and Cuba in the Embassy of Switzerland in Havana and the Embassy of Czechoslovakia in Washington, respectively. Effected by exchange of notes at New York May 30, 1977. Entered into force May 30, 1977.

##### Finland

Agreement relating to the deposit by Finland of 10 percent of the value of training services furnished by the United States. Effected by exchange of notes at Helsinki August 17, 1972. Entered into force August 17, 1972. TIAS 7421.

*Terminated:* April 27, 1977.

##### Pakistan

Agreement amending the agreement of May 6, 1975 (TIAS 8071), relating to trade in cotton textiles. Effected by exchange of notes at Islamabad April 1 and May 4, 1977. Entered into force May 4, 1977.

##### Philippines

Agreement for sales of agricultural commodities. Signed at Manila May 12, 1977. Entered into force May 12, 1977.

##### Sudan

Agreement for Sudan quelea bird research project. Signed at Khartoum May 12, 1977. Entered into force May 12, 1977.

##### Syria

Cultural agreement. Signed at Damascus May 12, 1977. Entered into force May 12, 1977.

<sup>1</sup> Not in force.

## Union of Soviet Socialist Republics

Agreement extending the agreement of May 24, 1972 (TIAS 7346), on cooperation in the fields of science and technology. Effected by exchange of notes at Washington May 24, 1977. Entered into force May 24, 1977.

### PUBLICATIONS

## GPO Sales Publications

*Publications may be ordered by catalog or stock number from the Superintendent of Documents, U.S. Government Printing Office, Washington, D.C. 20402. A 25-percent discount is made on orders for 100 or more copies of any one publication mailed to the same address. Remittances, payable to the Superintendent of Documents, must accompany orders. Prices shown below, which include domestic postage, are subject to change.*

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**Ecuador** ..... Cat. No. S1.123:EC9  
Pub. 7771 8 pp.  
**The Gambia** ..... Cat. No. S1.123:G14  
Pub. 8014 4 pp.  
**Pakistan** ..... Cat. No. S1.123:P17  
Pub. 7748 8 pp.

**Agricultural Cooperative Development.** Agreement with Uruguay. TIAS 8460. 12 pp. 35¢. (Cat. No. S9.10:8460).

**Drought Recovery and Rehabilitation.** Agreement with Mali. TIAS 8461. 23 pp. 45¢. (Cat. No. S9.10:8461).

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244	5/30	Vance: Conference on International Economic Cooperation, Paris.
*245	5/30	Vance, Perez-Guerrero: remarks, Paris.
*246	5/31	National Foreign Policy Conference for Editors and Broadcasters, June 28-29.
*247	5/31	Vance, de Guiringaud: remarks, Quai d'Orsay, May 30.
*248	5/31	U.S. and Pakistan amend textile agreement.
*249	6/1	U.S.-Romanian consultations on Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe, May 31-June 1.
*250	6/2	Vance: arrival, Andrews Air Force Base.
†251	6/2	Christopher: Marshall Plan Commemoration Conference, Paris.
*252	6/3	Shipping Coordinating Committee (SCC), subcommittee on safety of life at sea (SOLAS), working group on subdivision and stability, June 28.
*253	6/3	SCC, SOLAS, working group on international multimodal transport and containers, June 29-30.
*254	6/3	SCC, SOLAS, working group on subdivision and stability's panel on bulk cargoes, June 30.
*255	6/3	International parliamentarians here to study U.S. legislative process.
†256	6/3	U.S. and Cuba to open interests sections.
257	6/3	Final communique, Conference on International Economic Cooperation, Paris.
*259	5/26	Ulric Haynes, Jr., sworn in as Ambassador to Algeria (biographic data).
*260	5/27	William H. Sullivan sworn in as Ambassador to Iran (biographic data).

\* Not printed.

† Held for a later issue of the BULLETIN.

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# THE DEPARTMENT OF STATE BULLETIN

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# THE DEPARTMENT OF STATE **BULLETIN**

Vol. LXXVI, No. 1983

June 27, 1977

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*The Department of State BULLETIN, a weekly publication issued by the Office of Media Services, Bureau of Public Affairs, provides the public and interested agencies of the government with information on developments in the field of U.S. foreign relations and on the work of the Department and the Foreign Service.*

*The BULLETIN includes selected press releases on foreign policy, issued by the White House and the Department, and statements, addresses, and news conferences of the President and the Secretary of State and other officers of the Department, as well as special articles on various phases of international affairs and the functions of the Department. Information is included concerning treaties and international agreements to which the United States is or may become a party and on treaties of general international interest.*

*Publications of the Department of State, United Nations documents, and legislative material in the field of international relations are also listed.*



## Secretary Discusses Administration's Objectives for Belgrade Review Conference on CSCE

*Statement by Secretary Vance*<sup>1</sup>

Mr. Chairman [Congressman Dante B. Fascell, of Florida], Members of the Commission on Security and Cooperation in Europe: You have all received the Administration's report on the implementation of the Final Act of the Helsinki Conference.<sup>2</sup>

Today I want to underline, as did the report, the continuing importance of the effort which began at Helsinki.

You are fully aware of this Administration's interest in promoting more stable and mutually beneficial relations between the peoples of East and West. The Helsinki Final Act provides one framework for such cooperation.

You are also aware of our commitment to honor and promote the rights of individuals, the human rights of all peoples, no matter what their political or social origins and affiliations. The Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe has provided a multilateral mechanism through which to pursue these aims.

Before discussing our plans for the forth-

coming meeting in Belgrade, I want to convey my thanks for the close working collaboration achieved between the executive and legislative branches of our government on the many political, economic, and humanitarian issues involved in the Helsinki accords.

I wrote you three months ago, Mr. Chairman, to say that "I am most anxious to bring about a relationship of full cooperation between the State Department and the Commission." I think that this relationship has been achieved. You and your colleagues in the Congress have played a helpful and constructive role. We are looking forward to your personal contribution in the work of the Belgrade review conference.

The spirit of collaboration has also marked our relations with our allies, at the Geneva and Helsinki phases of CSCE, as well as in our preparatory work for the forthcoming review process.

Let me now state the objectives which we seek at our Belgrade meeting:

—We seek full implementation of all the commitments contained in the Helsinki Final Act. None can be called more binding, more vital, than others. All three of the so-called baskets are important.

—We seek incremental improvements in relations between East and West on all the fronts surveyed at Helsinki: political, economic, scientific, cultural, security, and humanitarian.

—We seek to move forward on all these fronts simultaneously: the freer flow of people and ideas is as important to long-term security and cooperation as, for exam-

<sup>1</sup> Made before the Commission on Security and Cooperation in Europe on June 6 (text from press release 258). The complete transcript of the hearings will be published by the Commission and will be available from the Superintendent of Documents, U.S. Government Printing Office, Washington, D.C. 20402.

<sup>2</sup> Second Semiannual Report by the President to the Commission on Security and Cooperation in Europe. Single copies are available from the Public Correspondence Division, Bureau of Public Affairs, Room 5819-A, Department of State, Washington, D.C. 20520.

For text of the Final Act of the Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe (CSCE), signed at Helsinki on Aug. 1, 1975, see BULLETIN of Sept. 1, 1975, p. 323.

ple, advance notice of major military maneuvers; the humanitarian pledges at Helsinki are as important as, say, the promises of greater commercial cooperation.

—There will be consideration of new proposals. But we must not be diverted from assessment of how fully the specific undertakings of Helsinki have been carried out by all the signatories.

This is an ambitious agenda. There may well be differences in understanding and priority; these can be discussed in good faith, in hopes of narrowing such differences.

But such discussions cannot serve as a diversion or a cloak for inaction. The CSCE Final Act was approved by 35 heads of state and government after three years of intense negotiations. Undertakings of such gravity cannot subsequently be relaxed or overlooked.

At Belgrade we will assess on the spot how best to be effective and persuasive in pursuing our objectives. Between public diplomacy and quiet diplomacy, we will strive for maximum practical impact. We will avoid grandiose new proposals that have little chance of being acceptable. Propaganda ploys, debating points have no place in our strategy. We will state our goals and our assessments clearly, without polemics. It would serve no one's interests if such serious and far-reaching questions were dealt with in anything other than a serious and straightforward manner.

The report I have transmitted to the Commission on behalf of the President gives you a detailed assessment of what has been done and what has not been done.

Let me say from the start that no nation's record is perfect, and we will accept constructive criticism of our own record, just as we ask others to do.

When I outlined the Administration's human rights policy at the University of Georgia last April,<sup>3</sup> I said that:

... a decision whether and how to act in the cause of human rights is a matter for informed and careful judgment. No mechanistic formula produces an automatic answer.

<sup>3</sup> For text, see BULLETIN of May 23, 1977, p. 505.

So it will be in our decisions about working for implementation of the commitments contained in the Helsinki Final Act, those dealing with our political, economic, and military relations, as well as those affecting human rights.

Respect for the undertakings solemnly accepted at CSCE is an effort to which our government is firmly committed, in the full knowledge that the pursuit of security and cooperation in Europe poses a test of our perseverance as much as of our ideals. I am confident that we will, together, persevere.

## **Crown Prince Fahd of Saudi Arabia Visits Washington**

*His Royal Highness Prince Fahd bin Abd al-Aziz Al-Sa'ud of the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia made an official visit to Washington May 23-27. Following is an exchange of toasts between President Carter and Crown Prince Fahd at a dinner at the White House on May 24, together with President Carter's remarks to reporters following his meeting with Crown Prince Fahd at the White House on May 25.<sup>1</sup>*

Weekly Compilation of Presidential Documents dated May 30

### **EXCHANGE OF TOASTS**

#### **President Carter**

I've said several times since I've been President of our country that I don't believe there is any other nation with whom we've had better friendship and a deeper sense of cooperation than we've found in Saudi Arabia.

There have been many times unpublished when we saw a particular need or a particular problem, either in our own country or around the world, and as soon as this need became known by the leaders of that great country,

<sup>1</sup> For an exchange of remarks between President Carter and Crown Prince Fahd at a welcoming ceremony at the White House on May 24, see Weekly Compilation of Presidential Documents dated May 30, 1977, p. 798.

the need has been met in a quiet but very effective and friendly way.

We've shared a friendship for many years. In 1945, for instance, Franklin Roosevelt met with the father of Crown Prince Fahd near the Suez Canal and began a longstanding conversation and mutual commitment toward peace that has stood our nations in good stead since that time.

Three years ago, Crown Prince Fahd came to our country to resubmit his own interest in us and to begin a new approach to peace, particularly in the Middle East.

We have had today some very productive discussions with Crown Prince Fahd and the other great leaders of Saudi Arabia, about the Middle East. We told them that our deep commitment was to the security and peaceful existence of Israel, and they understand this very well. And we emphasized the importance of a fair and permanent peace in the Middle East.

In both these commitments, the Saudi Arabians share our purpose. As we look at this extremely valuable and important crossroads of the whole world in this modern day, there is an increasing realization that peace in that region means to a great degree a possibility of peace throughout the world.

We have seen in clear terms in months gone by the importance of forming a joint economic commission between the United States and Saudi Arabia. The late King Faisal and now King Khalid have strengthened this cooperation between our country and theirs.

Tomorrow Prince Sa'ud will go to Fairfax County in Virginia, for instance, to dedicate a solar heating project which has been sponsored by Saudi Arabia. From the memorial fund dedicated to King Faisal, they have also been gracious enough to give two very fine gifts to my alma mater, Georgia Tech.

These projects also involve solar energy, and many of the distinguished leaders from Saudi Arabia tonight wished us well in establishing for our country a comprehensive energy policy based on conservation, which we proposed to the Congress. When Senator Humphrey and Senator Percy and others formed the Alliance for Conservation of Energy in our nation to save the consumption

of oil, the Saudi Arabians came forward and offered to help with a major part of the financing of this effort. Although their generosity was not accepted in this instance, it shows their deep commitment to reducing the waste of oil around the world.

Saudi Arabia is a nation which has grown in many ways in the last few years in world importance. Their supplies of energy are crucial to the well-being of people in many nations. They produce their own oil for world consumption beyond the level which perhaps would be best for them.

The wealth that has flowed to Saudi Arabia from these sales has been invested around the world in a very responsible and productive and constructive way. This responsible and unselfish action has saved the entire economic structure of the world from disruption and has alleviated the fears that did exist when the price of oil was raised in 1973.

Saudi Arabia has about \$60 billion invested in our own country, and they are one of our largest customers since we sell them about \$3½ billion worth of U.S.-produced goods each year. This trade relationship is very important, and it helps to tie us together in dealing with political problems which we face in a mutual way.

I think it is accurate to say that the future of Saudi Arabia and the future of the United States are tied together very closely in an irrevocable way. It is very valuable to us to understand and to preserve and to strengthen this important friendship.

The visit of Crown Prince Fahd to us is another demonstration of the mutual interest that we share. We are proud to have him here. And on behalf of the American people, I would like to propose a toast to King Khalid, to the Royal Family, and to the great people of Saudi Arabia, our friends.

#### **Crown Prince Fahd <sup>2</sup>**

Mr. President, your excellencies, and friends: It gives me a great pleasure and pride to meet with you this evening. I am also delighted and honored to convey to you, Mr. President, and to the friendly American

---

<sup>2</sup> Crown Prince Fahd spoke in Arabic.

people, through you, the warm greetings of His Majesty King Khalid bin Abd al-Aziz Al-Sa'ud and the esteem of the Saudi Arabian people.

By conveying these genuine feelings, I can clearly see the historical facts and the propitious events reinforcing the strong links between our two friendly nations. Both the United States of America and the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia follow a free economic system that seeks the well-being of man, not only in their respective countries but also in the world at large.

Both nations believe in individual freedom, necessary for the well-being of man and for justice. Both countries believe in working toward securing a better life for man in every part of the world.

Mr. President, you expressed your belief that international relations should be based on the solid ground of morality, high ideals, and genuine respect for human rights. Sharing your belief, Mr. President, that any policy defying these values and standards is doomed to failure, we hope that this humane conviction on your part will contribute to bringing about a new era in international relations where supremacy will be for right and not for might, for justice and not for oppression.

Your sympathetic attitude toward the Third World's search for a future without hunger, poverty, or backwardness means that we can look forward toward a future full of understanding and cooperation between the industrial nations and the developing nations, between the energy-producing nations and the energy-consuming nations, in order to build an international community free of discrimination, injustice, or exploitation.

Mr. President, what concerns us most in the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia and the Arab world in general is to achieve our goals in the areas of development, well-being, and stability. We are concerned with using our own resources and investing them in programs that will enable us to catch up with progress and technology, to shake off the burdens of backwardness and their inherent ills, which infest man's best values and turn him against everything that is good and noble.

The greatest hindrance to achieving this creative, enriching goal is the problem of instability in the Middle East area, whose core is the Palestine issue with all its ramifications—this issue, which for more than a quarter of a century has been pleading, has been crying out for free human consciousness hoping to find one with a just and clear vision, to say a word of justice that will restore the situation and return a displaced people to its homeland.

I hope that our discussions here with you, Mr. President, will enhance the peace prospects and clarify the justice of Arab demands. Looking at the developments in the Palestinian issue during the last few months, I find it a pleasant task to express my appreciation to the friendly people of the United States of America and my thanks to you, Mr. President, for the realistic view and the increasing understanding of the Palestinian issue.

I believe that this view will give the issue the needed thrust to achieve just peace and permanent stability in the Middle East, where the energy of its peoples might then be devoted to their development and betterment.

We in the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia look with optimism to what can be attained through the increased relations between our two nations for our mutual benefit, to what can be coveted through your support and that of the friendly American people for a just solution to the Palestinian issue and its people who suffered displacement, destitution, and expulsion from their homeland, Mr. President.

Mr. President, Excellencies, and friends, please permit me to express my true appreciation and gratitude for your kind reception and genuine warm feelings and to convey the same to the friendly American people from the people of the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia.

I thank you very much, Mr. President, and if you will permit me, I would like to propose a toast in the name of King Khalid and ourselves to the President of the United States of America.

President Carter.

*The President:* We have enjoyed having you. Thank you again. Good luck to you. You have been very helpful to us.

*Q. Mr. President, can you tell us anything about this visit?*

*The President:* Well, it was a very fruitful discussion. At the Crown Prince's suggestion, we divided up into groups this morning for a very deep discussion of some of the major issues that bind us together. The Crown Prince and I were alone, and then Secretary Vance had a chance to meet with Prince Sa'ud, who is a Foreign Minister. And I think this was a much more productive arrangement than we've had in the past.

*Q. [Inaudible.]*

*The President:* But we discussed a wide range of issues, including future oil-pricing prospects and the interrelationships between the OPEC [Organization of Petroleum Exporting Countries] nations and the countries in Africa. We discussed the Horn of Africa and how to keep the Red Sea region peaceful. We discussed the hopes or possibilities for a Middle Eastern peace settlement this year. We had a long discussion about our own involvement in this process.<sup>3</sup>

I think that we understand each other very well. And so far as I know, between ourselves and Saudi Arabia there are no disturbing differences at all. So, I think that I have benefited greatly from those meetings.

The Crown Prince will now meet with the Senate Committees on Energy and Foreign Relations and also with the House Committees. And I think that his total visit here has been one that's very productive.

*Q. What did you agree on on oil prices?*

*Q. What did he say about the oil prices?*

*The President:* I would have to let him make comments on that.

*Q. [Inaudible.]*

*The President:* Just pleasure at the progress that has been made there within the last 12 months.

*Q. Was there ever any mention of the threatened embargo which we heard about last weekend?*

*The President:* No, there's no threatened embargo at all. He said that was a completely false report.

*Q. What did he ask you to say to Israel?*

*The President:* Just to continue a search for peace and keep the process alive to make sure that no one closes the door for a settlement that would provide a just and lasting peace. He also expressed his strong hope that Israel would be reassured about the inclinations of his country toward the protection of their security. These were the comments that he made concerning—about his view—

*Q. Do you feel he expects you to pressure Israel in any way?*

*The President:* I think not. I think it's obvious that we have some influence in Israel and also the Arab countries. But we also obviously have no control over—

*Q. Do you think that [Menachem] Begin would close the door?*

<sup>3</sup> A notice to the press dated May 25 summarized the meetings between President Carter and Crown Prince Fahd. In part, it says:

"... the two sides today discussed a number of matters of mutual interest pertaining both to our bilateral relations and to the challenges facing the international community. In this regard, the comprehensive energy conservation policy the President has proposed to the Congress was reviewed. The President asked Crown Prince Fahd to convey to King Khalid his congratulations on the policy which Saudi Arabia, the world's largest oil exporter, has pursued in petroleum production and pricing to sustain the economic health of both developed and developing countries. The President expressed his confidence that the United States will do its share to conserve energy supplies and hold down excessive growth in global demand for oil, a central aim of his energy program.

"The President reaffirmed longstanding American interest in the security of Saudi Arabia, which is important to stability in the Arabian Peninsula area. The President and Crown Prince Fahd discussed the continuing U.S. role in helping Saudi Arabia to meet its legitimate defense needs. The President emphasized his desire, in consultation with the Congress, to maintain the cooperation between the United States and Saudi Arabia in pursuing common goals related to peace and security in the world."

## Former President Nixon's Message to Prime Minister Pham Van Dong

### Department Announcement

*The President:* I think he shares my views that it's too early to comment on the future policies of the new government. No one knows the composition of it yet. And I think it would be premature to comment.

*Q. In your public statements so far you haven't mentioned the 1977 Geneva conference possibilities or a Palestinian homeland.*

*Q. He mentioned it yesterday at the hand-out.<sup>4</sup>*

*Q. Not publicly.*

*Q. That's a public hand-out. It was placed right in your hand.*

*Q. Are you going to visit us in the Middle East, Mr. President, this year?*

*The President:* Well, some day, I hope. I'm not much on foreign travel. I don't know.

*Q. After each one of these meetings you usually think you are more optimistic or less. What is your impression now?*

*The President:* Well, it's hard to tell. I think a lot of the uncertainty there is involved in the recent election results in Israel. There's no way to predict what the formation of the government might be yet or what their policies might be after they are ultimately evolved.

So, that is not encouraging or discouraging. But it's much more difficult to predict at this point.

*Q. Could you tell us how your views have evolved on the Palestinian homeland as a entire state or as part of the Jordanian state?*

*The President:* No, my views are not firmed on what the composition of the Palestinian homeland might be. But all of the U.N. resolutions have contemplated a homeland for the Palestinians. And this is obviously something that will have to be accommodated.

<sup>4</sup> A notice to the press dated May 24 summarized the meeting that day between President Carter and Crown Prince Fahd. In part, it says:

"The President went over in detail the core issues: territorial and security problems, the nature of peace in the Middle East, and the Palestinian question, both the immediate problem of Palestinian representation in the negotiations and the question of a Palestinian homeland in the final settlement. They agreed that the major effort should continue toward trying to reconvene the Geneva conference in the second half of 1977. They also agreed that this conference should be well prepared so as to offer the best possible prospects for success."

The Department released on May 19, 1977, the text of a message dated February 1, 1973, from former President Nixon to the Prime Minister of the former Democratic Republic of Vietnam, Mr. Pham Van Dong. The existence and substance of this document have already been made public, including public references by the recipient. Its author has indicated no objection to its release. In light of all present circumstances, we have determined that the message is no longer deemed sensitive, and it has been declassified.

### TEXT OF MESSAGE FROM THE PRESIDENT OF THE UNITED STATES TO THE PRIME MINISTER OF THE DEMOCRATIC REPUBLIC OF VIETNAM

FEBRUARY 1, 1973.

The President wishes to inform the Democratic Republic of Vietnam of the principles which will govern United States participation in the postwar reconstruction of North Vietnam. As indicated in Article 21 of The Agreement on Ending the War and Restoring Peace in Vietnam signed in Paris on January 27, 1973, the United States undertakes this participation in accordance with its traditional policies. These principles are as follows:

1) The Government of the United States of America will contribute to postwar reconstruction in North Vietnam without any political conditions.

2) Preliminary United States studies indicate that the appropriate programs for the United States contribution to postwar reconstruction will fall in the range of \$3.25 billion of grant aid over five years. Other forms of aid will be agreed upon between the two parties. This estimate is subject to revision and to detailed discussion between the Government of the United States and the Government of the Democratic Republic of Vietnam.

3) The United States will propose to the Democratic Republic of Vietnam the establishment of a United States-North Vietnamese Joint Economic Commission within 30 days from the date of this message.

4) The function of this Commission will be to develop programs for the United States contribution to reconstruction of North Vietnam. This United States contribution will be based upon such factors as:

(a) The needs of North Vietnam arising from the dislocation of war;

(b) The requirements for postwar reconstruction in the agricultural and industrial sectors of North Vietnam's economy.

5) The Joint Economic Commission will have an equal number of representatives from each side. It will agree upon a mechanism to administer the program which will constitute the United States contribution to the reconstruction of North Vietnam. The Commission will attempt to complete this agreement within 60 days after its establishment.

6) The two members of the Commission will function on the principle of respect for each other's sovereignty, non-interference in each other's internal affairs, equality and mutual benefit. The offices of the Commission will be located at a place to be agreed upon by the United States and the Democratic Republic of Vietnam.

7) The United States considers that the implementation of the foregoing principles will promote economic, trade and other relations between the United States of America and the Democratic Republic of Vietnam and will contribute to insuring a stable and lasting peace in Indochina. These principles accord with the spirit of Chapter VIII of The Agreement on Ending the War and Restoring Peace in Vietnam which was signed in Paris on January 27, 1973.

#### UNDERSTANDING REGARDING ECONOMIC RECONSTRUCTION PROGRAM

It is understood that the recommendations of the Joint Economic Commission mentioned in the President's note to the Prime Minister

will be implemented by each member in accordance with its own constitutional provisions.

#### NOTE REGARDING OTHER FORMS OF AID

In regard to other forms of aid, United States studies indicate that the appropriate programs could fall in the range of 1 to 1.5 billion dollars depending on food and other commodity needs of the Democratic Republic of Vietnam.

### U.S.-Vietnamese Officials Meet for Second Round of Talks

#### *U.S. Delegation Statement*<sup>1</sup>

The delegations, led by American Assistant Secretary of State for East Asian and Pacific Affairs Richard Holbrooke and Vietnamese Vice Minister of Foreign Affairs Phan Hien, met on June 2 and 3 for a total of about seven hours at the American Embassy in Paris. Each side presented its views in an atmosphere which was cordial and friendly. The delegations agreed to meet again in the near future to continue their talks aimed at normalizing relations. The exact time and place for the next meeting will be decided upon by mutual agreement.

The Vietnamese delegation provided new information about 20 Americans missing in action who died in Vietnam. There will be no public announcement of these names until the identifications have been confirmed by the U.S. Central Identification Laboratory in Hawaii after the return of the remains. The families of the men whose names are on the list are being informed by their respective military services. Arrangements for the return of the remains will be worked out through the technical channels established for the exchange of information on the subject. The U.S. delegation expressed its appreciation for this positive action on the part of the Socialist Republic of Vietnam.

<sup>1</sup> Issued at Paris on June 3, 1977.

## Administration Recommends Senate Approval of Genocide Convention

*Following is the text of the President's message to the Senate of May 23, together with statements by Warren Christopher, Deputy Secretary, and Herbert J. Hansell, Legal Adviser, before the Senate Committee on Foreign Relations on May 24.*<sup>1</sup>

### MESSAGE FROM PRESIDENT CARTER<sup>2</sup>

*To the Senate of the United States:*

I am honored to have the privilege of recommending to the Senate that it approve the Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide. This Convention was initially drafted in the wake of the wanton acts committed by some of our enemies during the Second World War. With the strong support of the United States, the Convention was unanimously adopted by the United Nations General Assembly on December 9, 1948.<sup>3</sup>

The Convention, which now has 83 parties, provides that genocide consists of acts intended to destroy a national, ethnic, racial or religious group as such. The parties to the Convention undertake to establish genocide as a criminal behavior under their own legal systems.

The Convention thus protects the most fundamental of all human rights—the right

to live—and it creates an essential limit on the actions governments may appropriately take with respect to the people they govern.

The right to life was initially proclaimed for this nation in the Declaration of Independence. The promise of the Declaration was to protect that right by instituting a new and democratic government in America. Today it is important that this nation assist the world community to protect the right to life internationally.

The Genocide Convention has been recommended by a succession of Presidents, with specific endorsement by the Departments of State, Defense and Justice. It also has the support of many of our distinguished citizens and organizations, including the American Bar Association.

I urge the Senate to give its advice and consent to the ratification of the Convention. Ratification would be a significant enhancement of the human rights commitments of this nation, demonstrating again to the world in concrete fashion our determination to advance and protect human rights.

JIMMY CARTER.

THE WHITE HOUSE, *May 23, 1977.*

### STATEMENT BY MR. CHRISTOPHER

I am very grateful for the opportunity to testify before the committee in support of the Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide.

The genocide convention, as it is popularly known, is an important part of the human

<sup>1</sup> The complete transcript of the hearings will be published by the committee and will be available from the Superintendent of Documents, U.S. Government Printing Office, Washington, D.C. 20402.

<sup>2</sup> Text from White House press release dated May 24, 1977.

<sup>3</sup> For the text of the convention, see BULLETIN of Dec. 19, 1948, p. 756.



rights policy of this Administration. As President Carter said in his message to the Senate, "The Convention . . . protects the most fundamental of all human rights—the right to live—and it creates an essential limit on the actions governments may appropriately take with respect to the people they govern."

The convention was unanimously adopted by the U.N. General Assembly on December 9, 1948. The United States strongly supported its passage. Two days later our government signed the convention, and President Truman submitted it to the Senate on June 16, 1949.<sup>4</sup> Eighty-three governments—including almost every other major nation of the world—are now parties. The convention came into force in 1951. Yet as far as the United States is concerned, this international compact stands exactly where it has been for 28 years—pending before the Senate.

It is not necessary now to review all the reasons for our government's delay. What matters is that the failure of the United States to become a party to the treaty remains a matter of great puzzlement and concern to other nations, including our closest friends and allies. It is also a matter of concern to this Administration.

I think you join me in believing that the time is long overdue to correct this anomaly. We are encouraged by the decision of the committee to hold hearings on the genocide convention so early in the new session of Congress. The Administration is also encouraged by the support repeatedly demonstrated by this committee, which has favorably reported the convention to the Senate on no less than four occasions, the most recent of which was little more than a year ago—in April 1976.<sup>5</sup>

Last year a significant new endorsement for the genocide convention was added to the positive recommendation of a succession of Presidents before President Carter and to the specific endorsements of the Departments of State, Defense, and Justice. In February 1976

the House of Delegates of the American Bar Association, meeting in Philadelphia, approved the convention by a voice vote and recommended the same understandings and declarations that this committee had previously attached to its proposed resolution of ratification. To me this ABA action has cardinal importance; it is the considered judgment of the leading professional association of attorneys in the United States. I believe that this ABA action should have particular impact in the Senate deliberations on the treaty.

As the members of the committee well know, the genocide convention provides that genocide consists of acts intended to destroy a national, ethnic, racial, or religious group as such. The parties to the convention undertake to establish genocide as criminal behavior and to punish perpetrators of that crime through their own legal systems.

U.S. adherence to this convention has special meaning to our nation and to the world community. The right to life was initially proclaimed for this nation in the Declaration of Independence and is obviously the *sine qua non* of all other human rights. To impose on our government the explicit duty to respect that right and to punish those who violate it is a clear statement of faith in our own national principles.

At the same time adherence to the convention is a statement to the world community that the United States stands ready to develop the international law of human rights and to make such rights a matter of international concern. I believe it is in the national interest of the United States to make such a statement. It is important for all to know that this nation stands ready to commit itself legally, in treaty form, to the assertion that genocide is a crime and that we will punish those who commit it. I believe it is in our interest to remove an ambiguity in our foreign policy, a source of perplexity and concern about our adherence to a rule of law. I believe that it is in our interest to assist the world community in constructing a legal system that protects human rights. It most certainly is *not* in our interest to stand aloof while the democratic principles we have long championed are

<sup>4</sup> For the text of President Truman's letter transmitting the convention to the Senate, see BULLETIN of July 4, 1949, p. 844.

<sup>5</sup> For the text of the committee's report, see S. Ex. Rept. 94-23 dated Apr. 29, 1976.

internationally proclaimed and applied by others. The United States should be in the forefront of this movement, as indeed we were when the United Nations drafted and approved this convention.

In his message to the Senate urging approval of the convention, President Carter referred to the "wanton acts committed by some of our enemies during the Second World War." More than 30 years have elapsed since that time and still we stand apart from the worthy document which was written in reaction to that unparalleled outrage. There is no valid moral, political, or legal argument against U.S. adherence to the genocide convention. There are strong moral, political, and legal reasons why we should become a party. I am hopeful that the Senate now can agree that U.S. adherence to the convention will serve the best interests of this country, of the international community, and of the rule of law everywhere.

#### STATEMENT BY MR. HANSELL

I am very grateful for this opportunity to testify in support of the Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide, or the genocide convention, as it is generally known. In coordination with the testimony by Deputy Secretary Christopher, I should like to focus on some questions that have been raised about the convention and various legal criticisms that have been directed against it.

Perhaps most fundamentally, it has been argued that genocide is not a proper subject for treaty-making and is essentially a subject within the domestic jurisdiction of states. But I believe it is generally accepted that genocide is a proper subject for the treaty power. As this committee pointed out in its most recent report on the convention, some 83 nations are now parties to this convention, and clearly these nations believe genocide is properly a subject of international concern. In addition, the United States is a party to other human rights treaties, including those on slavery and refugees. Most recently the Sen-

ate approved by 88-0 two treaties on the political rights of women. The day is past when it could be seriously contended that human rights are not appropriately the subject of international agreements. As President Carter said in his speech to the United Nations two months ago:

All the signatories of the United Nations Charter have pledged themselves to observe and to respect basic human rights. Thus, no member of the United Nations can claim that mistreatment of its citizens is solely its own business.<sup>6</sup>

It has also been charged that certain of the key terms of the convention are vague. But the understandings which are attached by the committee to the resolution of ratification that this committee has previously proposed, and also the draft implementing legislation, are both designed to define more precisely the meaning of such terms as "mental harm" and the phrase "intent to destroy, in whole or in part, a national, ethnical, racial or religious group as such."

It has been said that the proscription in article III of the convention against direct and public incitement to commit genocide is a restriction on free speech. But direct and public incitement to crime is not protected by the constitutional guarantee of free speech. As this committee heard in 1970 from William Rehnquist, now Associate Justice of the Supreme Court and at that time an Assistant Attorney General, the constitutional guarantee of free speech would not be and could not be adversely affected in any way by the terms of the convention. In 1969, in the case of *Brandenburg v. Ohio*, 395 U.S. 444, the Supreme Court reaffirmed that even advocacy of force is protected unless it is directed to inciting lawless action and is likely to produce it.

It has also been asked whether state law will be overridden by the terms of the convention. However, nothing in the convention overrides state law. The proposed implementing legislation, if enacted, would expressly clarify that Congress does not intend to oc-

<sup>6</sup> For the complete text of President Carter's address to the United Nations on March 17, see BULLETIN of April 11, 1977, p. 329.

copy the field and would confirm that state laws not inconsistent with the legislation are not invalidated.

Question has been raised as to whether the convention will enlarge the powers of the Congress. Once again neither the convention nor the implementing legislation contain any provisions which could have such an effect. Certainly the Congress can legislate the crime of genocide even without the convention. Under article I, section 8, clause 10 of the Constitution, the Congress is empowered "to define and punish . . . offenses against the law of nations." Approval of the convention will require the Congress to exercise powers it already possesses but does not enlarge those powers.

It has been suggested that if the United States adheres to the convention, we will be confronted with spurious charges of genocide arising out of racial and religious discrimination. It also has been asked whether wartime combat might result in charges of genocide made by our opponents. Loose charges of genocide are not valid under the terms of the convention, which requires the intent to destroy an entire group. This is a critical and essential element. The requirement of intent to destroy a group as such distinguishes killing or wounding in combat from genocide.

There has also been some discussion about possible use of international tribunals to punish defendants. It has been said that the International Court of Justice, referred to in article IX of the convention, would become a forum for trial. But of course neither the International Court nor any other international tribunal has criminal jurisdiction and no such trial is possible.

As for the international penal tribunal referred to in article VI of the convention, the United States has no obligation to become a party to the statute of any such tribunal should it ever be established. For the United States to accept the jurisdiction of an international penal tribunal, an exercise of the treaty power would be required, and the advice and consent of the Senate by a two-thirds vote would be necessary.

I want to address the question of extradi-

tion, in view of some complexities involved and in order to allay any misunderstandings. Article VII of the convention provides that the parties pledge to grant extradition of persons charged with genocide "in accordance with their laws and treaties in force" and provides that there is no defense to extradition on the ground that genocide may be a "political" crime.

Concern has been expressed that American citizens could be extradited for trial in foreign countries where the legal system does not provide for the kinds of guarantees to criminal defendants available in the United States. There are several points to be made in response.

First, U.S. law provides for extradition only where there is an extradition treaty in force which covers the crime in question, but the genocide convention is not an extradition treaty. The convention simply contemplates that the crime of genocide will be added to the list of crimes for which Americans will be extraditable under any new extradition treaties we might conclude, or in any existing extradition treaties we may revise. At the present time, genocide is not listed as an extraditable offense in any of our extradition treaties.

Second, the United States does not negotiate extradition treaties with nations which do not permit defendants a fair trial. The possibility of a fair trial, even though the standards cannot be expected to match ours in every detail, is always a factor taken into account in deciding whether to negotiate an extradition treaty.

In addition, since these treaties may remain in force for many years, during which time the judicial system of the foreign country may change, certain procedural safeguards are built into our extradition treaties. Such treaties require that the state requesting extradition must produce evidence of the crime sufficient to persuade a U.S. court and the executive branch that the person whose extradition is requested would also be held for trial in the United States had the alleged crime been committed in this country.

Further, our extradition treaties provide that extradition will not be granted if the per-

son sought has already had a trial or is undergoing a trial in the United States for the same act.

Article VI of the convention provides that persons charged with genocide are to be tried by a competent tribunal of the state in the territory in which the act was committed. But the negotiating history of the convention makes it abundantly clear that trial may also occur in the country of which the defendant is a national. The third understanding attached by the committee to the proposed resolution of ratification makes this point as well, and it is further spelled out in the implementing legislation.

Moreover, section 3 of the draft implementing legislation sets forth the sense of the Congress that the Secretary of State, in negotiating extradition treaties, is to reserve for the United States the right to refuse extradition of a U.S. national to a foreign country to stand trial on a charge of genocide if the United States intends to exercise jurisdiction in the case or the defendant has been or is being prosecuted for the offense in the United States. In brief, the United States may always elect to try a U.S. national and thus refuse extradition, no matter where the alleged crime had been committed.

There is one very positive legal aspect of this matter that I believe has not received the attention it deserves and that is the place of the genocide convention in the development of an emerging concept of international crimes, a concept that serves the interests of the United States and the world community. As you know, we are a party to a number of criminal law treaties, including the laws of war conventions, the treaties on aircraft hijacking and sabotage, the convention on the protection of diplomats, and treaties on narcotics trade, oil pollution, and others. Piracy has long been prohibited by international criminal law. We have also introduced at the United Nations a treaty on terrorism. And, of course, these criminal law treaties to which we are a party, like the genocide convention and piracy charges, rely on our own court system for their enforcement.

In brief, we are a party to and we are in the process of developing a body of international criminal law that is important to the United

States and to a peaceful world order. The genocide convention is one of the missing pieces in U.S. adherence to such a pattern of international criminal standards, and it is my hope that this situation will be corrected. As this committee stated in its 1976 report on the genocide convention, what is really at issue is an attempt of a civilized society to curb the excesses of mankind and to set a higher standard of international morality.

## **Congressional Documents Relating to Foreign Policy**

- Canadian Oil Policies and Northern Tier Energy Alternatives. Hearing before the Joint Economic Committee. September 13, 1976. 217 pp.
- Trading With the Enemy. Legislative and executive documents concerning regulation of international transactions in time of declared national emergency. Prepared by the Subcommittee on International Trade and Commerce of the House Committee on International Relations. November 1976. 684 pp.
- United States/Soviet Strategic Options. Hearings before the Subcommittee on Arms Control, Oceans, and International Environment of the Senate Committee on Foreign Relations on the national security and arms control implications of current U.S. strategic options; Soviet capabilities and intentions. Jan. 14-Mar. 16, 1977. 187 pp.
- U.S. Foreign Economic Policy Issues: The United Kingdom, France, and West Germany. A staff report prepared for the use of the Subcommittee on Foreign Economic Policy of the Senate Committee on Foreign Relations. March 1977. 32 pp.
- To Authorize Supplemental Military Assistance to Portugal for Fiscal Year 1977. Hearing and markup before the Subcommittee on Europe and the Middle East of the House Committee on International Relations on H.R. 3976. March 1, 1977. 45 pp.
- Atlantic Tunas Convention Act of 1975 Authorization. Report of the House Committee on Merchant Marine and Fisheries to accompany H.R. 6205. H. Rept. 95-265. May 6, 1977. 8 pp.
- The Soviet Union and the Third World: A Watershed in Great Power Policy? Report to the House Committee on International Relations by the Senior Specialists Division, Congressional Research Service, Library of Congress. May 8, 1977. 186 pp.
- International Security Assistance Act of 1977. Report of the House Committee on International Relations, together with supplemental and additional views, to accompany H.R. 6884. H. Rept. 95-274. May 9, 1977. 52 pp.
- The Tanker and Vessel Safety Act of 1977. Report of the Senate Committee on Commerce, Science, and Transportation on S. 682 to amend the Ports and Waterways Safety Act of 1972, to increase the use of vessels of the United States to carry imported oil, and for other purposes. S. Rept. 95-176. May 16, 1977. 76 pp.

## Partners in a Common Enterprise: Building for the Future

*Address by Deputy Secretary Warren Christopher<sup>1</sup>*

It is a pleasure to participate this evening in a ceremony that honors both the memory of a great man, Gen. George Marshall, and the monument he built, the first successful attempt at broad-based European economic cooperation.

As I begin, however, I would like to bring you a personal message from President Carter. It reads as follows:

Thirty years ago one of our greatest statesmen, George Catlett Marshall, spoke to an audience of graduating students at Harvard University of the condition of Europe in the wake of war. World War II had brought devastation upon Europe, he said, yet the "visible destruction was probably less serious than the dislocation of the entire fabric of European economy." In bold, generous and practical terms he proposed a cooperative European effort, in which the United States would participate, to rebuild the European economy laid waste by the war. "Our policy," he said, "is directed not against any country or doctrine but against hunger, poverty, desperation, and chaos. Its purpose should be the revival of a working economy in the world so as to permit the emergence of political and social conditions in which free institutions can exist."<sup>2</sup>

Like George Marshall and his co-workers, this conference is appropriately focused on building for the future. Rather than merely commemorating the Marshall Plan, great as it was, you are discussing future relations among the industrialized democracies of the OECD [Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development] and their future relations with both the developing nations and the Eastern countries. I am sure that your deliberations will provide valuable insights for all of us who are concerned about our future relations with the rest of the world.

I send my personal greetings to each of you participating in the conference and my warmest thanks to all those who helped organize it.

JIMMY CARTER.

World War II shattered the European economy and shook European societies to

their very foundations. Then came the cold and cruel winter of 1946-47. The bleak outlook for economic recovery in Europe worsened: Resources, finances, and confidence were exhausted; fear abounded—fear of the Soviet Union, of revolution from within, of collapse.

This was the context in which Secretary Marshall made his proposal. It sounded modest; at the core were just six sentences in the entire speech—only one of those sentences addressed itself to American action. The initiative, he emphasized, had to come from Europe. Despite its simplicity, the Marshall plan became the basis for a leap into the future—a radical transformation of Western institutions, Western ways of thought, and Western cooperation.

### Development of Cooperative Efforts

Marshall's idea was effective because it brought about the recognition of common solutions to what everyone agreed were common problems. The piecemeal efforts of individual states became the great cooperative enterprise of a Western community of nations.

—Together we built the North Atlantic alliance. In time of tension, it has protected us from foreign aggression. The Carter Administration has already given evidence of our commitment to strengthen the alliance. President Carter's first budget contained an in-

<sup>1</sup> Made before the Marshall Plan Commemoration Conference at Paris on June 2, 1977 (text from press release 251).

<sup>2</sup> For the text of Secretary Marshall's remarks at Harvard University's commencement exercises on June 5, 1947, see BULLETIN of June 15, 1947, p. 1159.

creased defense contribution to NATO of over one-half billion dollars. The President has also reconfirmed our commitment to a strategy of flexible response and forward defense.

—The European Community grew out of Europe's economic recovery—first as an economic union, now also as a political force in world affairs. In his speech at the NATO summit, the President expressed strong U.S. support for progress toward Western European unification and the expanding role of the European Community.<sup>3</sup>

—The OECD—the host organization for this conference—is a direct outgrowth of the Marshall plan. With the membership of the original organization expanded to include the United States and Canada plus the Pacific nations of Japan, Australia, and New Zealand, the OECD has become the locus of our ongoing cooperation on the full range of economic policy issues.

But the institutions are only part of the story. Historic and positive changes have taken place around the world in the wake of the Marshall plan.

—The industrial democracies have created a liberal trading and financial system. It is now under stress, but it has worked remarkably well for 30 years, and it was built to last. Today the industrial democracies are responsible for 65 percent of the world's production and 70 percent of its trade.

—The internecine rivalries of Western Europe, which led to two World Wars in this century, have vanished. In their place is a deep and durable abhorrence of force as a solution to problems.

—Western Europe has developed genuinely free societies. Today, for the first time in history, all the countries of Western Europe are democracies.

—We in North America share with the nations of Europe a deep commitment to human rights. We stand for freedom in the world, and the cause of human rights in other countries is our shared concern.

—Our technology, our products, and our in-

vestment capital have been a major factor in the development of poorer nations. And we have maintained the political will to assist development, even when our own economies have been under strain. Since 1960 OECD countries have contributed more than \$125 billion in assistance to developing countries.

Today we are strong in common ways and, because of interdependence, vulnerable in common ways. Our situation now is not so much that of strong nations coming to the aid of those in need as that of partners in a common enterprise. We can face our problems and weaknesses with the same resilience, optimism, and practicality that informed the vision of the builders of postwar Europe.

The world has changed since 1947, but the Marshall plan holds a lesson for us today. Thirty years ago, in adversity, the family of nations that constitutes the West reached out to one another. Those that could offer aid helped those in need.

### **A Shared Responsibility Toward People**

Since then the family of nations, in close relation with one another, has multiplied in numbers and grown diverse. So have the problems that entangle us.

Within that growing family of nations, there is much that we now ask of each other. The most direct questions, of course, are how the world can be made to prosper, how the wealth of nations should be shared, and how our resources should be managed for the common good.

As we work out the answers, our first responsibility is to think in terms of people, not categories of nations.

It is poor people—everywhere—not just poor nations whose aspirations and needs cut straight across conventional national borders and conventional wisdom. And those needs are both compelling and immediate.

Echoing one of Franklin Roosevelt's four freedoms—freedom from want—Secretary Vance spoke at the University of Georgia of a category of human rights which is central to U.S. policy. He spoke of the right to food, shelter, health care, and education. "We recognize," he said, "that the fulfillment of this

<sup>3</sup> For text of the President's remarks to the North Atlantic Council on May 10, see BULLETIN of June 6, 1977, p. 597.

right will depend, in part, upon the stage of a nation's economic development." <sup>4</sup>

Again, at the Conference on International Economic Cooperation here in Paris this week, our government pledged to work for the betterment of the human condition in basic economic terms. We pledged cooperation and aid but stressed that, as Secretary Vance put it: "We will join with you in sharing the responsibility to lead." <sup>5</sup>

Understanding the shared responsibility to lead was the balance wheel of the Marshall plan. As General Marshall put it in his speech in 1947, it would be neither fitting nor efficacious for us to draw up a program to put Europe on its feet. That, he said, is the "business of the Europeans."

In 1947 the European countries organized not as supplicants but as managers of their own fortunes, with the aid and cooperation of others. That productive and meaningful relationship can now be a model for a comparably practical and compassionate relationship in the growing family of nations.

Today it is the business of the developing countries to come to practical terms not only with the industrialized world but with themselves, separately and together. Only they can insure the effectiveness of any economic endeavor in which we in the West participate. The countries of the developing world must move, as European nations did 30 years ago, to put their own economic houses in order. Equally urgent is that they perceive that the problem is not "us" against "them," "poor" against "rich." Rather, the problem is poverty, and policy, as Marshall said, must be directed "not against any country or doctrine but against hunger, poverty, desperation, and chaos."

In 1947 we in the West still hoped that the wartime alliance with the Soviet Union was not altogether shattered. In good faith we extended the invitation to participate in the Marshall plan to the nations of Eastern Europe. For a moment it seemed possible that some would accept, but East-West tensions

were on the rise, and the opportunity for an all-embracing effort to achieve European recovery was lost.

Today, when we are pursuing improved East-West relations in the spirit of détente, the need for the industrialized Communist countries to join us in our support for development in the Third World—to abandon the role of spectator or spoiler and join the North-South dialogue—is clear. We would welcome these nations in joining with us to demonstrate that they share our concern about absolute poverty and care about the needs of people.

### Cooperation for a Secure World

The Marshall plan was conceived to meet human needs in order to build a more secure world. We joined together to define security in the broadest sense—not just in terms of armaments but in terms of economic strength and justice and in a spirit of confidence in the future. We understand that no amount of armaments by themselves could prevent fatal cracks in an empty shell. We made the distinction between real security and false security.

These lessons of the Marshall plan apply today. While maintaining our military strength, we are working together to strengthen our fundamental economic relationships. It should be at the root of our common concern that the developing nations come to see their security in the broadest sense and that they not unreasonably divert scarce resources to armaments.

The danger the proliferation of arms poses for global stability is increasingly well understood. It is perhaps less well understood how great a drain arms purchases are on the budgets of developing countries—and thus, on people in deepest poverty. Over the past 10 years developing countries have steadily increased their military expenditures. In 1975 they were 6.1 percent of annual gross national product, proportionately more than developed countries spend.

In the 1970's arms transfers to sub-Saharan Africa have been, on an annual basis, six times what they were in the 1960's. For the

<sup>4</sup> For text of the Secretary's address on Apr. 30, see BULLETIN of May 23, 1977, p. 505.

<sup>5</sup> For text of the Secretary's address on May 30, see BULLETIN of June 20, 1977, p. 645.

Middle East and North Africa the increase was eightfold. Over and over again poor people, living on the edge of starvation, are forced to bear the cost of weapon systems their leaders buy because of false pride or foolish competition or in the mistaken notion that arms alone make us strong.

Today we know that even military security—in the narrowest sense—is dependent on international arms control as well as on the strength of our arms. And so we in the United States and you in Western Europe have been reaching out to the Soviet Union in efforts to build security through the reduction of arms.

In close consultation with our allies, we in the U.S. Government are conducting a range of arms control negotiations with the Soviet Union to reduce strategic nuclear armaments, to stop nuclear explosions, and to prevent the arms buildup in the Indian Ocean.

President Carter has acted to meet the U.S. obligation to bring conventional arms transfers under control. While recognizing that some conventional arms transfers are necessary for stability, the President has concluded that we will now view arms transfers as an exceptional foreign policy instrument. As he put it, "the burden of persuasion will be on those who favor a particular arms sale rather than those who oppose it."<sup>6</sup> The United States will:

—Reduce in the next fiscal year the dollar volume of new commitments for arms sales and assistance;

—Refrain from being the first supplier to introduce into a region newly developed advanced weapons systems;

—Refrain from developing or modifying advanced weapons systems;

—Refrain from developing or modifying advanced weapons systems solely for export; and

—Tighten restrictions against transfer of weapons to third parties.

These steps we will take unilaterally. But the cooperation of our industrialized allies will be needed to achieve reductions in the

<sup>6</sup> For the full text of the President's statement issued on May 19, see BULLETIN of June 13, 1977, p. 625.

worldwide arms buildup. And, as we did at the time of the Marshall plan, we call upon the Soviet Union and other Eastern European countries to join with the West in this resolve. We dare to hope that their response will be different now than it was then. The United States accepts the responsibility of going first. It would be not only ironic but tragic if other nations were to react to the discipline we are imposing on ourselves by filling the orders we decline. As we did in 1947 we look toward Western Europe for the cooperation needed to achieve real security for us all.

Further, and finally, we who have been made strong by the Marshall plan must now apply the lessons of 30 years ago by nurturing a relationship of true common purpose with the developing world. To do so would be the most fitting commemoration of an idea—and a man—that can truly be said to have shaped the future of postwar Europe.

## **Agreement on Importation of TV Sets From Japan**

*White House Announcement*<sup>1</sup>

President Carter has approved an Orderly Marketing Agreement (OMA) signed May 20 with the Government of Japan, which will limit the number of Japanese color television receivers shipped to the U.S. market for three years—from July 1, 1977, to June 30, 1980.

The President chose this agreement, under the Trade Act of 1974, as the appropriate import relief in the national economic interest to remedy serious injury to the domestic industry and its workers, which the U.S. International Trade Commission (USITC) found last March to have been substantially caused by increased imports, over 80 percent of which come from Japan. A USITC recommendation for tariff increases was rejected by the Presi-

<sup>1</sup> Issued on May 20 (text from the Weekly Compilation of White House Documents dated May 23, which includes contrasting definitions of "complete" and "incomplete" television sets). For the President's letter of May 19 (released May 20) to the Speaker of the House and the President of the Senate, see source cited above, p. 762.



dent as not being in the national economic interest.

At the same time, the President determined that imports of monochrome (black-and-white) sets have not substantially caused or threatened serious domestic injury.

These actions were announced on May 20 by Ambassador Robert S. Strauss, the President's Special Representative for Trade Negotiations, who negotiated the OMA with Japan.

Ambassador Strauss characterized the U.S.-Japan accord as a fair and equitable arrangement—one which does not unnecessarily limit trade or raise consumer costs, but which also gives American firms and workers time to adjust to international competition without market disruption caused by sudden surges in import penetration.

U.S. imports of color TV's from Japan almost tripled last year over 1975 levels—to 2.7 million sets from 1 million. An additional several hundred thousand Japanese units entered the U.S. market in varying stages of completion and assembly, including so-called kits, and other substantially assembled but not complete sets. Together these shipments comprise more than 80 percent of all current U.S. color TV imports.

The OMA with Japan defines categories of complete and incomplete receivers, both assembled and unassembled, more broadly than under definitions used by the USITC in its remedy recommendation for higher tariffs. Thus the OMA definitions cover more "complete" and "incomplete" sets than the USITC remedy, particularly sets which require relatively little or no U.S. labor content.

Under the U.S.-Japan OMA, limits of 1.56 million units per year are placed on "complete," but not necessarily fully assembled, receivers and of 190,000 units per year on "incomplete" receivers.

These two categories together total 1.75 million units per year over the next three years, beginning July 1, 1977. This figure is comparable to the 1976 Japanese exports of "complete" and "incomplete" color receivers.

Thus the OMA provides Japan continued access to the U.S. color TV market for the next three years at a level consonant with its

recent representative historic share, but approximately 40 percent below the abnormally high 1976 rate of penetration, which has been continuing into 1977. It also contains an "equity clause" which provides for extension of import controls by the United States to any other supplier which attempts to take unfair advantage of the Japanese restraints.

Further, in order to assure the effectiveness of the agreement, separate assurances have been made that the Japanese Government will encourage investment by Japanese TV makers in productive U.S. facilities to provide for substantial levels of U.S. labor content in the completion and assembly of semifinished imports.

The President chose the OMA remedy over a recommendation by the USITC for a quintupling of duties on imports of color TV sets from 5 percent ad valorem to 25 percent. The President found that this remedy was not in the overall national economic interest on several counts.


*First*, it would have resulted in an undue and unjustifiable cost to consumers in higher prices reflecting the higher duties. Because of current heavy inventories of Japanese color sets as a result of last year's record imports, the OMA limit on numbers of sets is not expected to result in any immediate significant price increases. In future years the OMA may result in increased investment and capacity in the United States, thereby reducing pressures for increased prices.

*Second*, the high tariffs would have applied to all imported color TV's, whereas increased imports from Japan were the principal cause of concern.

*Third*, nothing in the USITC remedy would have prevented circumvention of relief by minor design changes in imported receivers.

*Finally*, the higher duties would have exposed the United States to significant potential claims of trade damage by supplying countries, exposing the United States to compensatory duty reductions in other import levies or foreign retaliation against other American exports.

To monitor the adjustment of the domestic industry and conditions in the domestic mar-



**U.S.-CUBA  
INTERIM FISHERY  
ENFORCEMENT LINE**

0 100 200  
Nautical miles at 30° N.  
Miller Cylindrical Projection

200 Nautical miles

ket, the President will request the USITC to report regularly on domestic production, sales, inventories, employment, and prices of color television sets.

The USITC in its March report found by majority vote that color receiver imports were causing injury, but split 3-3 on the questions of injury due to imports of color subassemblies and monochrome receivers. The President found with the three Commissioners who found injury to the domestic color subassembly industry, and with the three Commissioners who found no injury to the monochrome industry.

The Congress has 90 working days in which to consider resolutions of disapproval of his action in implementing the U.S.-Japan OMA as the appropriate remedy for domestic color TV market disruption.

## **U.S., Cuba Agree on Maritime Boundaries and Fishery Matters**

*Following is the explanation of the agreements and related documents on fishery matters and maritime boundaries signed at Havana on April 27.*<sup>1</sup>

The Governing International Fishery Agreement (GIFA) between the United States and Cuba has been concluded in accordance with the requirements of the new U.S. law establishing a 200-mile fishing zone off the coasts of the United States (the "Fishery Conservation and Management Act of 1976").

The agreement establishes the principles and procedures under which Cuban fishing would take place in the U.S. fishing zone. The agreement does not guarantee to vessels of Cuba an automatic right to fish; it provides the means by which Cuba may apply for permits which would allow fishing up to a level specified by U.S. authorities for certain kinds of fish which have been identified by U.S. authorities as surplus fish above the harvesting capacity of U.S. vessels.

The agreement takes effect after it is transmitted by the President and remains be-

fore the Congress for 60 days of continuous session, unless the Congress takes earlier action. The GIFA was transmitted to the Congress on May 17<sup>2</sup> with a request that it be given earlier effect, in view of the passage of the 1977 fishing season. No permits for fishing vessels of Cuba will be issued, and no fishing permitted, until the agreement takes effect.

The *modus vivendi* establishing a preliminary maritime boundary creates a simplified boundary, basically half way between the United States and Cuba, which begins in the east at the trijunction point equidistant from the nearest coastal points of the United States, Cuba, and the Bahamas and proceeds southwesterly separating the Cuban and U.S. zones until it touches latitude 23° 50' N at longitude 81° 50' W. It then follows this latitude to longitude 83° 12' 10" W, where it becomes the line published by the United States in the Federal Register of March 7, 1977, in which we delimited our fishing zone pending agreement to establish maritime boundaries.

The *modus vivendi* establishes the coordinates that both countries will use as the maritime boundary for 1977 until certain technical work is done for a more definitive delimitation on a provisional or final basis. A final boundary determination would be accomplished by treaty.

Notes were exchanged relating to termination of the 1958 Convention for the Conservation of Shrimp and relating to the lapse of the 1926 Convention for the Prevention of Smuggling of Intoxicating Liquors into the United States. In view of legislation by both governments which created the need for establishing a maritime boundary, it was recognized that both of these treaties were outdated and could have no further applicability. The exchange of notes on the 1958 convention, which has not been operational, terminated it with effect one year from the date of signature, in accordance with the termination provision of the convention (Article VIII, paragraph 2). The exchange of notes on the 1926 convention recognized that the convention, by its own terms (Article VI), had automatically lapsed.

<sup>1</sup> Text from press release 233 dated May 26, 1977, which includes the agreements and related documents.

<sup>2</sup> Printed as H. Doc. 95-157 of May 17, 1977, 13 pp.

# U.S.-Spain Committee on Science and Technology Meets at Madrid

## Joint Statement <sup>1</sup>

The U.S.-Spanish Joint Committee for Scientific and Technological Cooperation, established by the Treaty of Friendship and Cooperation between both countries and by its Supplementary Agreement No. 3, held its first formal meeting on Monday, May 16, 1977, at the Spanish Ministry of Foreign Affairs.

The meeting was presided over by the two Co-Chairpersons of the Committee, Patsy Mink (Assistant Secretary of State for Oceans and International Environmental and Scientific Affairs) and Manuel Barroso Feltner (Director General for International Technical Cooperation). Representatives of various ministries and agencies of the two governments attended the meeting.

The Joint Committee examined the activities carried out by both sides in order to put into effect the provisions of the Treaty and of its Supplementary Agreement in the field of scientific and technological cooperation, and concluded that important progress had been made toward launching a program of cooperation in these areas.

## Current Treaty Actions

### MULTILATERAL

#### Cultural Relations

Constitution of the United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization. Done at London November 16, 1945. Entered into force November 4, 1946. TIAS 1580.

*Signatures:* Angola, March 11, 1977; The Comoros, March 22, 1977.

*Acceptances deposited:* Angola, November 9, 1976; The Comoros, March 22, 1977.

#### Satellite Communications System

Agreement relating to the International Telecommunications Satellite Organization (INTELSAT), with annexes. Done at Washington August 20, 1971. Entered into force on February 12, 1973. TIAS 7532.

*Accession deposited:* Chad, June 9, 1977.

Operating agreement relating to the International Telecommunications Satellite Organization (INTELSAT), with annex. Done at Washington August 20, 1971. Entered into force February 12, 1973. TIAS 7532.

*Signature:* Societe des Telecommunications Internationales du Tchad (T.I.T.) of Chad, June 9, 1977.

#### Trade

Proces-verbal extending the declaration on the provisional accession of Colombia. Done at Geneva November 12, 1976.

*Entered into force:* December 17, 1976; for the United States March 28, 1977.

*Acceptances deposited:* Colombia, December 9, 1976; Japan, December 17, 1976; Romania, January 27, 1977; South Africa, February 9, 1977; United States, March 28, 1977.

### BILATERAL

#### Iran

Arrangement for the exchange of technical information and cooperation in nuclear safety matters, with appendices. Signed at Shiraz April 11, 1977. Entered into force April 11, 1977.

#### Venezuela

Agreement on procedures for mutual assistance in connection with the Boeing Company matter. Signed at Washington May 31, 1977. Entered into force May 31, 1977.

#### Zaire

Agreement for sales of agricultural commodities, relating to the agreement of March 25, 1976 (TIAS 8403), with memorandum of understanding. Signed at Kinshasa May 24, 1977. Entered into force May 24, 1977.

<sup>1</sup> Issued at Madrid on May 16 (text from press release 223 dated May 20).

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Press releases may be obtained from the Office of Press Relations, Department of State, Washington, D.C. 20520.

No.	Date	Subject
258	6/6	Vance: statement before the Commission on Security and Cooperation in Europe.
261	6/6	L. Douglas Heck sworn in as Ambassador to Nepal (biographic data).
262	6/7	Second round of Japanese-U.S. energy talks concludes.
263	6/8	Robert H. Miller sworn in as Ambassador to Malaysia (biographic data).
264	6/8	U.S.-Poland consultations on fisheries.
265	6/9	James G. Lowenstein sworn in as Ambassador to Luxembourg (biographic data).
266	6/9	Caribbean Trade and Development Conference, Tampa, Fla., June 23-24.
267	6/9	Vance: message to the Opportunities Industrialization Center Convention, Detroit, Mich., June 8.
268	6/10	Lawrence S. Eagleburger sworn in as Ambassador to Yugoslavia (biographic data).
269	6/10	Christopher: remarks at Occidental College, Los Angeles, Calif., June 11.
270	6/10	U.S. delegation to attend ECLA Conference on the Integration of Women in Economic and Social Development at Havana, June 13-18.

† Not printed.

‡ Held for a later issue of the BULLETIN.

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76/1958-1983

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### Corrections for Volume LXXVI

The editor of the BULLETIN wishes to call attention to the following errors in volume LXXVI:

*March 14*, p. 210, col. 2: The second line of the eighth paragraph should read, "me to pass any judgment about the American."

*March 14*, p. 240, col. 2, line 28: "it" should read "its."

*June 27*, p. 684, col. 2, footnote 1, line 2: "White House" should read "Presidential."

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
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
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
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
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
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
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